Wilhelm Röpke’s Political Economy
Wilhelm Röpke’s Political Economy Samuel Gregg Acton Institute, Michigan, USA
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Wilhelm Röpke’s Political Economy
Wilhelm Röpke’s Political Economy Samuel Gregg Acton Institute, Michigan, USA
Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA
© Samuel Gregg 2010 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2009937917
ISBN 978 1 84844 222 1 Printed and bound by MPG Books Group, UK
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Contents Acknowledgments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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Introduction Ruin and reform: the crisis of German economic liberalism Economics and the economist Toward a new economic liberalism Booms, recessions and business cycles After Keynes: full employment, inflation and the welfare state A liberal international economy Between humanism and social science
References Index
1 17 45 71 94 117 142 165 183 207
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Acknowledgments The name and thought of Wilhelm Röpke awakens in me memories of the most tragic phase of German history, of a time when not a single star seemed to light over Germany, and the indispensible ultimate values of every human society and practice – truth, justice, and morality – were trodden under foot. In these inconsolable straits and in the most disturbing possible environment, I illegally obtained Röpke’s books . . . which I absorbed as the desert drinks life-giving water. Ludwig Erhard (1967, p. 22)
These words, spoken by the principal architect of West Germany’s economic resurrection after the abyss of World War II at a memorial service in 1967, exemplify the regard in which the person and writings of the German economist, Wilhelm Röpke, was held by many of his contemporaries. Though readers will soon discover that I am critical – sometimes quite critical – of aspects of Röpke’s thought, even Röpke’s critics find it difficult not to admire the scope and depth of his political economy. This went beyond superficial familiarity with subjects outside the realm of economic science, so much so that Röpke often unpretentiously assumed that others were as familiar with history, philosophy and ancient languages as himself and was shocked when he discovered that this was not the case among some of his students (Röpke, 1949f). If ever the much-overused expression ‘Renaissance man’ was applicable to any individual, Röpke merited it. He was one of the last great polymaths. Nor is it possible to underplay Röpke’s courage as a man and a scholar. Against National Socialist and Communist totalitarianism Röpke spoke out fearlessly and at considerable personal risk at a time when many intellectuals proved all too willing to acquiesce with authoritarian regimes. Though Röpke and another prominent twentieth-century economic liberal, Friedrich von Hayek, had a falling out in the early 1960s, Hayek did not hesitate to write the following about his erstwhile friend and colleague: ‘let me emphasize a special gift for which we, his colleagues, admire him particularly – perhaps because it is so rare among scholars: his courage, his moral courage’ (Hayek [1959] 1992, p. 197). Similar sentiments were expressed by another well-known liberal economist, Ludwig von Mises, with whom Röpke had substantial intellectual disagreements: ‘[T]he future historians of our age will have to say that he was not only a great scholar, a successful teacher and a faithful friend, but first of all a vi
Acknowledgments
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fearless man who was never afraid to profess what he considered to be true and right’ (Mises, 1966b, p. 200). To political leaders, Röpke did not hesitate to present hard truths about their economic policies. This was especially evident during the post-war period when neo-Keynesian ideas dominated economics and to question this consensus was to put oneself at odds with most policymakers in the Western world. To the economics profession, Röpke insisted that economic science did not and could not encapsulate the whole truth about man and society. He also maintained that any claim to value-neutrality on the part of economics was itself unscientific, and stressed that economics should not be reduced to being a poor cousin of applied mathematics. Not all political leaders and economists react well to such arguments. But being ‘politically correct’ was never Röpke’s forte. He set a standard for integrity which, his biographers concur, cost him a great deal. Today Röpke continues to be a subject of considerable controversy, with numerous groups in Europe and the Americas laying claim to his legacy. This may owe something to Röpke’s conception of political economy, which harkens back to an older, perhaps richer way of understanding and doing economics. The number of institutions willing to entertain political economy in the fuller, more classical sense of this expression is almost as limited as those which promote the history of economic thought. The Acton Institute is such a place, and, if one may say so, it is perhaps one of the few institutions today where Röpke himself might have found a congenial environment in which to pursue political economy as he understood it. Therefore, I would like to express my gratitude to the Acton Institute for its support of this book. There are many individuals whose contributions to this project must also be acknowledged. As well as the original proposal’s anonymous referees whose comments substantially improved the text, my thanks for intellectual input (witting and unwitting) are due to Dennis Bark, Philip Booth, Alejandro Chafuen, John Finnis, J. Daniel Hammond, Carlos Hoevel, Kęstutis Kėvalas, Annette Kirk, Kishore Jayabalan, Kris Mauren, Michael Miller, Michael Novak, Marcelo Resico, Andrea Schneider, Amity Shlaes, Robert A. Sirico and Jeffrey Tucker. Particular thanks are extended to William Campbell, Leonard Liggio and Christian Watrin for their assistance with obtaining difficult-to-find materials relevant to this book. Then there are the numerous graduate and undergraduate students in Europe, the United States and Latin America with whom themes of this book have been tested through the cut-and-thrust of vigorous discussion. I hope that they benefit from – and vigorously critique – the result. Röpke,
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I have discovered, is one of those rare free-market economists to whom students quickly warm. On a personal and intellectual level, my most significant debt is, as always, to my wife, Ingrid A. Gregg. As a historian of the Scottish Enlightenment, she was always available for me to ask questions or test untried notions. As my life’s companion, her moral and personal support is inestimable. Finally, a note about sources: this book is for English-speaking audiences. It therefore utilizes as far as possible the extensive body of Englishlanguage translations of Röpke’s writings as the primary sources before turning to texts published in other languages, most notably German and French. It is also the case that many of Röpke’s works were published in several editions. In some instances, Röpke added and modified considerable sections of text in successive editions. In the cases where this occurs and provides fresh insights into Röpke’s thought, this is noted. Grand Rapids, Michigan 1 June 2009
1.
Introduction
The current world crisis could never have grown to such proportions, nor proved as stubborn, if it had not been for the many forces at work to undermine the intellectual and moral foundations of our social system and thereby eventually to cause the collapse of the economic system indissolubly connected with the social system as a whole. Not withstanding all the harshness and imperfections of our economic system, which cry out for reform, it is a miracle of technology and organization; but it is condemned to waste away if its three cardinal conditions – reason, peace, and freedom – are no longer thought desirable by the masses ruthlessly reaching for power. Wilhelm Röpke, ‘End of an Era’ ([1933d] 1969, p. 80)
When Wilhelm Röpke spoke these words in a public address at Frankfurt am Main on 8 February 1933, he knew that he was sealing his professional fate. None of his listeners would have doubted who Röpke had in mind by ‘the masses reaching for power’. Only nine days before, Weimar Germany’s second and last President, Field-Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, appointed the leader of the National Socialist German Workers Party, Adolf Hitler, as Reich Chancellor of Germany. From Röpke’s perspective, the Nazis’ accession to government office was a disaster. As a decorated World War I veteran, a young distinguished academic and, importantly, not Jewish, Röpke could have easily conformed to the new regime’s demands and perhaps risen to high office in the Third Reich. But Röpke had no illusions about where he believed Hitler would lead Germany. He also had the fortitude to speak his mind. During Germany’s 1930 national elections, Röpke distributed a leaflet to voters that he had written himself. As his wife Eva recorded, it read: No one who votes for the National Socialists on September 14 should be able to say he did not know what might come of it. He should know that he is voting for chaos in place of order, destruction in the place of reconstruction. He should know that he is voting for war at home and senseless destruction abroad. Vote, but vote in a way such that you will not feel any complicity in the catastrophe which may yet erupt upon us. (Röpke, 1977, p. 420)
It followed that on 7 April 1933, no-one was surprised that Röpke was among the first German professors to lose his position as the National Socialists purged Germany’s universities of scholars who were outspoken 1
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anti-Nazis, Jewish, or both. He also had an angry confrontation with two SS officers who visited his home to persuade him to alter his opinions (Kaufmann, 1966; Boarman, 2000, p. 37). Accepting that there was no place in the Third Reich for someone with his decidedly liberal economic and political views, Röpke departed into exile in November 1933, initially taking refuge in Amsterdam. At the invitation of Turkey’s modernizing president Kemal Atatürk, Röpke joined the large diaspora of German intellectual refugees from National Socialism in Turkey (Reisman, 2006) and was appointed to a teaching position at the University of Istanbul. In 1937, Röpke accepted a post at Geneva’s Graduate Institute of International Studies, where he taught until his death on 12 February 1966. Röpke never returned to live in Germany. Exile did not diminish Röpke’s energetic engagement in the world of ideas. Even his more technical works avoid dry formalism. They betray the passion that he brought to his work. This may help account for the fact that, unlike most of his fellow liberal German economists, Röpke enjoyed an intellectual reputation that extended beyond the frontiers of the German-speaking world. Over the course of his life, Röpke wrote prolifically, including several books, dozens of academic pieces and untold numbers of newspaper articles, penning over 900 publications by the end of his life.1 He also served as an editor of the journals Kyklos and Studium Generale, and was a founding editorial board member of the economic journal Ordo. While economics remained central to his intellectual concerns, Röpke did not hesitate to engage other subjects. When Röpke first came to the attention of another modern economist and social philosopher, Friedrich von Hayek (1899–1992), it was on the basis that Röpke was ‘one of the few young German economists seriously interested in theoretical questions . . . [especially] abstract questions of monetary theory’ (Hayek, 1992, p. 196). But as Hayek wrote in a tribute to mark Röpke’s sixtieth birthday, ‘Röpke realized at an early stage, perhaps earlier than most of his contemporaries, that an economist who is nothing but an economist cannot be a good economist’ (Hayek [1959] 1992, p. 195). Röpke himself praised those economists with whom he often disagreed, such as Joseph Schumpeter, for being willing to engage in multidisciplinary analysis (Röpke, 1948m). Like most scholars, Röpke’s thought developed and changed over time. The general orientation of Röpke’s economic thought is itself a matter of much disagreement. The Chicago school economist Milton Friedman once described Röpke as ‘something of an agrarian’ (Shlaes, 1996, p. 2). By contrast, the Oxford historian Anthony Nichols regards Röpke’s later writings as becoming ‘less and less easy to distinguish from . . . “paeloliberals” ’ such as the economist Ludwig von Mises (1881–1973) (Nichols,
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1994, p. 323). These observations are difficult to reconcile, given that ‘paelo-liberals’ and ‘agrarians’ generally have very different views about political economy. More commonly, Röpke’s economic thought is often located in what is usually denoted as the ‘neoliberal’ tradition associated with twentieth-century figures such as Franz Böhm (1895–1977), Walter Eucken (1891–1950), Alfred Müller-Armack (1901–78) and Alexander Rüstow (1885–1963). Yet even here there are difficulties of classification. Though these economists shared an interest in modifying capitalism in ways compatible with free competition, there were significant differences between them. While Eucken and Böhm increasingly focused upon the relationship between legal institutions and the economy, Müller-Armack and Rüstow’s economic reflections were more akin to the type of historical sociology associated with Max Weber. Despite his prodigious literary output, Röpke’s work is less known in the English-speaking world than other prominent twentieth-century free-market economists such as Friedman, Hayek and Mises. Though Röpke often wrote in English or was quickly translated for the benefit of English-speaking audiences, there are very few extended English-language scholarly treatments of Röpke’s thought. Apart from John Zmirak’s introductory book to Röpke’s life and thought (2001), there is no booklength English-language study of Röpke’s contributions to political– economic discourse that matches German-language studies of Röpke’s writings such as S.H. Skwiercz’s lengthy analysis (1988), Helge Peukert’s two-volume study (1992) and Hans Jörg Hennecke’s biography (2005), or the Spanish-language analyses authored by Jerónimo Molina Cano (2001) and Marcelo Resico (2008). As a consequence Röpke often appears in the eyes of some English-language audiences as a European anti-Fascist, antiCommunist economist who made significant contributions to the midtwentieth-century American effort to integrate classical liberalism and traditional conservatism into a cohesive political movement commonly known as ‘fusionism’ (Nash, 1996, pp. 166–8). Others present Röpke as one of the small group of market-inclined economists who paved the intellectual path for Ludwig Erhard’s liberalization of West Germany’s economy in 1948 (Van Hook, 2004, p. 160). As Mises later wrote, ‘For most of what is reasonable and beneficial in present-day Germany’s monetary and commercial policy, credit is to be attributed to Röpke’s influence. He – and the late Walter Eucken – are rightly thought of as the intellectual authors of Germany’s economic resurrection’ (1966, p. 200). These pictures reflect something of Röpke’s life and work. But they do not do justice to the breadth, depth, and above all complexity of Röpke’s work in the area of political economy. Situated as it was in the stream of nineteenth- and twentieth-century German and European history and the
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numerous political, economic and methodological debates that preceded and developed in these decades, Röpke’s thought is not easily condensed into contemporary ideological categories. In many respects, Röpke’s work has more in common with the intellectual agendas pursued by Adam Smith (1723–90) and Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–59).
A MAN OF HIS TIMES Röpke’s relatively early death may account for the fact that his writings did not receive the attention which began to be accorded to free marketorientated economists in the 1970s when Keynesian theories began losing credibility among important sections of elite opinion in Western Europe and North America. Much of Röpke’s economic writing involved reflection upon events that directly affected him and his contemporaries. While historical context cannot explicate everything about any scholar’s work, Hennecke speculates that Röpke’s happy youth growing up in the village of Schwarmstedt may help explain his preference for smaller forms of human association (Hennecke, 2005; Boarman, 2000, pp. 47–8). Like many other young men of his generation, Röpke’s experience of military service in World War I cannot be underestimated when attempting to comprehend the post-war direction of his thought. Reading Röpke’s reflections on life in the Kaiser’s army in the trenches of northern France, it is striking to see how much feeling it still aroused in Röpke over forty years later. At the most basic level, it fostered in him ‘a violent hatred of war’ (Röpke, 1959f, p. 228). War was, to Röpke’s mind, ‘the expression of a brutal and stupid national pride that fostered the craving for domination and set its approval on collective immorality’ (ibid.). Though a genuine war hero, Röpke clearly despised military life. ‘Life in the army’, he recorded, ‘had shown what it meant for an individual to exist as part of an apparatus whose every function assumed lack of freedom and unconditional obedience’ (ibid., p. 230). It resulted in the physical and spiritual debasement of the individual’s dignity in the name of the mass – mass existence, mass armies, even mass feeding (ibid.). Initially Röpke’s anti-nationalism and anti-war positions translated into ‘a protest against the prevailing economic and political system, which was a feudal and capitalist one. The protest and its attendant denial made, the affirmation followed of itself: socialism’ (ibid., p. 229). But to his surprise, Röpke’s university studies lead him to conclude that his protest against war and nationalism mandated ‘a commitment to liberalism in the sphere of international economic relations; in other words, to free trade’ (ibid.). The same reaction also aroused in Röpke ‘a great wariness about
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the powers of the modern state and, along with this, about the powers of the various pressure groups within the nation’. ‘The more I looked into it’, Röpke stated, ‘the more clearly I saw that my indignation over the war was a protest against the unlimited power of the state’ (ibid., p. 230). Röpke did not arrive at this realization easily. He was acutely conscious that the trend of intellectual opinion was heading in a different direction. But, as Röpke recalled, ‘Not all the pacifist, antimilitarist and freedomdemanding statements of even the most honest socialists could obscure the fact that socialism, if it was to mean anything at all, meant accepting the state as Leviathan not only for the emergency of war but also for a long time to come’ (ibid., p. 231). Having made his choice, Röpke never recoiled from its consequences. His intellectual abilities and early success as an economist soon brought him to the attention of those German politicians seeking to stabilize Weimar Germany as its foundations were subject to relentless attrition from the Communist left and the radical nationalistright. Röpke subsequently found himself asked for advice on the direction of government economic policy, especially when Germany was engulfed by the Great Depression. His views on the policy implications of sound political economy, Röpke wrote, ‘meant speaking against most of the groups and policies that prevailed in the field of economics between the wars’ (ibid., p. 231). But taking such stands was, Röpke believed, the intellectual’s non-negotiable moral responsibility. ‘Society’, he wrote, ‘is in supreme danger if the “Clerks” remain dumb, if they are not allowed to express themselves freely, or from fear or confusion commit the treachery of silence, or what is the worst of all, when they speak against their inward and better conviction’ ([1944b] 1948, p. 72). Few people can spend long periods of time as one of a small group of intellectuals opposing the dominant trends in politics and economic policy without coming to certain conclusions about themselves and their work. For Röpke, one such realization was that economics had to be attentive to ‘the nature of man and the sort of existence that was fitting to that nature’. It was the best way of ensuring that economic science ‘always had something concrete and real to refer to and was protected from the tendency of the over-abstract to result in monstrosities when it is brought into the human realm’ (Röpke, 1959f, pp. 231–2). It took Röpke several years to integrate this focus into his economic thinking. But his peers’ recognition that this attention to human nature had become central to Röpke’s economics was one reason, Röpke wrote, why his way of thinking had ‘come with good reason to be called “economic humanism” ’ (ibid., p. 232). Like many other economists of his generation, much of Röpke’s career was consumed by the effort to understand the Depression’s causes and
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how to overcome it. While the Nazi seizure of power was deeply unsettling for someone of his liberal inclinations, Röpke also saw the rise of Hitler as part of a wider chain of events, including certain inadequacies in economic liberalism. Thus, it is hardly surprising that Röpke’s thought was especially influenced by attempts to save capitalism from its apparent immolation. This ranged from John Maynard Keynes’s effort to radically revise the entire science of economics, to Hayek’s struggle to reinvigorate classical liberalism by emphasizing the need to resist the general movement toward economic planning that gathered apace in North America and Western Europe after 1945. On several occasions, Hayek (1994, pp. 132–3) acknowledged Röpke’s critical role in helping to realize Hayek’s objective of establishing an international group of intellectuals – later called the Mont Pèlerin Society – concerned about the trend to planning following World War II.2 Röpke is also notable for the fact that he believed that the events which he was living through were not isolated phenomena. His books reflect his long-standing interest in Western intellectual history and his conviction that the seeds of the problems he was attempting to overcome were buried deep in Europe’s past. One is struck by the number of detailed references to classical, medieval and post-Enlightenment writers on subjects ranging from international law to political theory. Occasionally Röpke even drew analogies between the intensity of divisions within economics as a branch of learning and those prevailing in theology ([1952b] 1969, p. 167). It explains why, for example, Röpke traced a straight line between France’s Jacobin revolutionaries of the 1790s and the expansive welfare states that began to characterize Western European democracies from the 1950s onwards. It may also account for Röpke’s barely repressed frustration with members of his own profession who, he held, sought to reduce economics to a mathematical science of aggregates. Röpke certainly believed that there were economic laws that societies defied at their own peril. Nonetheless he also thought that careful reflection on the past provided guidance for the present and future, especially if an economist was committed to the preservation and extension of particular moral values (Röpke, 1960i, pp. 20–22, 1961f). This in turn contributed to Röpke’s insistence upon the limits of economics as a science. Economics, from Röpke’s standpoint, was not an ideology, philosophy, or religion. Instead it was a social science capable of providing society with powerful insights into reality, but also incapable of encapsulating reality in its entirety. Röpke opposed collectivist policies not simply because economic science told him they were bound to inflict misery on millions. He also regarded collectivism as incompatible with authentic human freedom. Summarizing his view on economics’ relationship to moral concerns, Röpke wrote:
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[W]e need a combination of supreme moral sensitivity and economic knowledge. Economically ignorant moralism is as objectionable as morally callous economism. Ethics and economics are two equally difficult subjects, and while the former needs discerning and expert reason, the latter cannot do without humane values. ([1958f] 1998, p. 104)
Twenty-five years later, a theologian who would later assume the highest office in the Roman Catholic Church articulated almost identical thoughts on the same subject: A morality that believes itself able to dispense with the technical knowledge of economic laws is not morality but moralism. As such it is the antithesis of morality. A scientific approach that believes itself capable of managing without an ethos misunderstands the reality of man. Therefore it is not scientific. Today we need a maximum of specialized economic understanding, but also a maximum of ethos so that specialized economic understanding may enter the service of the right goals. Only in this way will its knowledge be both politically practicable and socially tolerable. (Ratzinger, 1986, p. 204)
ECONOMICS AND ECONOMIC POLICY While widely versed in a range of scholarly disciplines, economics remained Röpke’s intellectual focus throughout his academic career. Coming from a family that had produced lawyers, doctors, civil servants and Protestant clergy, Röpke studied law and then economics at the universities of Tübingen and Göttingen. He earned his doctorate under the supervision of Walter Troeltsch (1866–1933), a specialist in the economics of unemployment, at the University of Marburg in 1921. While Röpke’s doctoral thesis concerned the very technical subject of German potash mines (Röpke, 1922a), this happened to be one of the most heavily cartelized industries in Germany (Eucken, 1951, p. 31). It marked the beginning of his lifelong interest in curbing cartels and monopolies, a subject about which Röpke was still writing 33 years later (Röpke, 1955e). By contrast, Röpke’s habilitation dissertation addressed the economics of business cycles (Röpke, 1922b), a topic to which he would consistently return in the context of analyzing international trade issues and business-cycle theory. Following a year working in the Foreign Office advising the still-fragile Weimar government on how to pay Germany’s war reparations – an issue on which he continued to write throughout the 1920s and 1930s (1924d, 1928d, 1929e, 1930e, 1931e) – Röpke was appointed professor at the University of Jena at the age of 24, thereby becoming Germany’s youngest professor in 1924. Part of his tenure at Jena was spent in the United States,
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where, thanks to funding from the Rockefeller Foundation, he studied the economic problems of American agriculture (Röpke, 1927a, 1927b). After spending time at the University of Graz in 1928, Röpke returned to the University of Marburg the following year to assume a full professorship. His subsequent appointments in Istanbul and Geneva were to professorships in economics. At different times throughout his career, Röpke provided formal and informal advice on economic policy to various German governments. This included service on a government commission studying unemployment in 1930–31, as well as Ludwig Erhard’s currency-reform council which, between 1947 and 1948, forcefully advocated the German economy’s liberalization. In 1950, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer commissioned Röpke to write a defense of his government’s economic policies – a defense which, besides praising Erhard’s liberalizing measures, also criticized emerging trends of government intervention (Röpke [1950e] 1982). Often unwilling to wait for policy-makers to ask for his opinion, Röpke was unafraid to enter the public square to advocate or contest different ideas and proposals. The publication of his book, The German Question ([1945b] 1946, cf. 1946l), has been described as having similar effects upon post-war German public opinion as Hayek’s Road to Serfdom (1944) had upon Anglo-American audiences (Schwarz, 1980, pp. 393–401). Likewise, many of Röpke’s newspaper articles had a profound impact upon informed opinion. One of his more famous pieces was an article in the Catholic weekly Rheinische Merkur (Röpke, 1947b). Its critique of Günther Keiser, the foremost economist opposing Erhard’s plan to abolish wartime economic regulations as quickly as possible, is regarded as one of the most important pieces that helped prepare German public opinion for Erhard’s reestablishment of the market economy in West Germany in 1948.3 Röpke’s periodic involvement in developing government economic policies and his regular commentaries on contemporary economic developments reflected his conviction that, as one who survived World War I, he had a responsibility to work for a better future. His efforts to do so were framed against a background of the crisis of capitalism, especially German capitalism, in the first half of the twentieth century. The breakdown of free trade, relatively open borders, and rising living standards that prevailed throughout much of the world between the 1850s and 1914 – ‘that magnificent century’, as Keynes called it – was a shocking experience for his generation of intellectuals. Many of them spent much of the rest of their lives attempting to comprehend this course of events. Writing somewhat autobiographically, Röpke stated that upon returning home from the Western Front in 1918, he had wanted to ‘understand the reasons for the crisis, to learn what had brought it to the stage of war’. For this
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reason, Röpke commented, ‘I determined to become an economist and sociologist’ (1959f, p. 228). Röpke’s description of himself as one who was not just an economist is revealing. On one level, it reflects the fact that economics in continental Europe in the 1920s was considered a sub-branch of law and sociology. Yet it is also reasonable to interpret this description as indicative of an early conviction on Röpke’s part which became increasingly pronounced over time: that the nature and purpose of economic science was somewhat broader than the positivistic character assumed by much mainstream economics, especially after World War II (Röpke, 1964e, pp. 78–87). Röpke’s willingness to pursue economic science beyond the parameters imposed by positivistic assumptions was, some of his peers believed, one reason why broader audiences listened to him. Hayek claimed that Röpke had achieved an influence that reached beyond circles of professional economists, partly because an economist can be ‘in closer touch with reality in the social sciences when one does not limit oneself to those facts that are measurable and quantifiable’. In Hayek’s opinion, Röpke’s ‘special gifts’ lay in the ‘intermediate realm between “pure” theory and questions of practical politics where systematic treatment is at least as useful as in pure theory’. This intermediate realm, Hayek continued, constituted the essence of ‘political economy’ (1992, p. 197). The purpose of this book is to provide a descriptive and critical introduction to Röpke’s understanding of political economy. It is an exercise in historical recovery insofar as it seeks to recapture Röpke’s philosophy of the market economy and how it was shaped by the challenges of his time. It first outlines the historical and intellectual background to Röpke’s political economy, before describing and critiquing his particular vision of a reformed economic liberalism. This involves examining the crisis in which German economic liberalism found itself in the closing years of the late-nineteenth century and the twentieth century’s first three decades. We then explore Röpke’s understanding of the nature and purpose of economic science, and his general schema for reforming economic liberalism. Though it did not achieve mature expression until the early 1940s, essential elements of Röpke’s neoliberalism were in place by the mid-1930s as he grappled with the problem of how to salvage the market economy and the values that he associated with it, as collectivist planning became increasingly the norm. Having considered Röpke’s political economy in theoretical terms, we then explore how it manifested itself in his treatment of three particular subjects to which he applied sustained attention at different periods of his life: the challenge of business cycles; the welfare state, employment and inflation; and international economic relations.4
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REDISCOVERING POLITICAL ECONOMY Since apparently first coined in 1615 by Antoyne de Montchrétien (Schumpeter [1954] 1994, p. 167) to describe how monarchs could manage their kingdoms as landowners organized their estates, the term œconomie politique has been defined in many ways. Some treat political economy as the study of economic theories in order to discover their underlying political and social underpinnings (Maier, 1987, pp. 3–6). Others regard political economy as the effort to critically analyze economic policy. Then there is political economy understood as an interdisciplinary study which integrates economics with other social sciences in order to explore how political and legal institutions shape the economy and vice versa. Prominent examples are institutional economics and public choice theory. It was, however, Adam Smith who established the meaning of political economy in the commonly accepted positive sense of the term by defining ‘what is properly called Political Oeconomy’ as the scientific study of ‘the nature and causes of the wealth of nations’ (Smith [1776] 1981, IV.ix.38). As A.M.C. Waterman notes, Smith’s vision of political economy involves the establishment of scientific (in the positivist sense of the word) theories to explain economic phenomena. In a broader sense, however, Waterman observes that Smith’s political economy also embraces the study of the interrelationship between economic theory and the political ideas and movements of a given time. This, Waterman argues, is found in Smith’s attention to the manner in which political ideas and events influence economic practices and systems as well as the ways that economic theory simultaneously shapes the rulers’ decisions (Waterman, 2002, pp. 13–40). Lastly, there is the sense in which Smith understood political economy in terms of what is known today as economic policy insofar as Smith regarded political economy as ‘a branch of the science of the statesman or legislator’ whose objective was ‘to provide a plentiful revenue or subsistence for the people, or more properly to enable them to provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves; and secondly, to supply the state or commonwealth with a revenue sufficient to the public services’ (Smith [1776] 1981, IV, Introduction). On one level, Smith’s Wealth of Nations was certainly an exercise in abstract analysis of economic life. Smith carefully dissected the claims of prevailing economic thought, presented a fresh approach to understanding how wealth is created, and then elaborated on what should be done on the policy level if wealth-creation and society’s overall material enrichment are deemed desirable. But in doing so, Smith also attempted to develop a powerful normative argument for an economy based around private property, free competition and limited government over and
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against the mercantilist systems that dominated the West at the time. For Smith, the move from mercantilist to market economies was not simply a matter of following the promptings of scientific economic reasoning focused on wealth-creation. It was also a question of civilizational growth. Certain elements of commercial order disturbed Smith, most notably what he considered the dehumanizing effects of the division of labor’s infinite extension. Nevertheless Smith also regarded market-orientated economies as superior to previous economic arrangements, on grounds of the greater efficiency and liberty they accorded to ever-widening numbers of people. As Emma Rothschild reminds us, Smith saw economic liberty as something to be approved and pursued because of its capacity to free people from many forms of oppression (Rothschild, 2001, p. 27). This outlook was not foreign to a number of twentieth-century economists. Both Hayek and the Chicago economist Frank Knight separately insisted that the study of political economy differs from technical economic analysis precisely because the former is rooted in a concern with the impact of values upon economic life and is orientated toward promoting certain values (Knight, 1960, pp. 131–40; Hayek, 1960, p. vii). With some notable exceptions, however, this Smithian conception of economics and political economy did not persist after Smith’s death in 1790. The economic historian Terence Hutchison underlines the differences between Smith’s sociological economics and post-Ricardian pure economics (Hutchison, 1979a, p. 433). In Hutchison’s view, economic science became progressively less interested in the question of what facilitated the social cohesion upon which economic life itself depended. Instead it increasingly focused upon examining the behavior of homo economicus, a creature whose nature is far removed from that of the more complex, not-always rational human being found in Smith’s corpus. The speed of this transformation was relatively quick. By the first half of the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill was stating: What is now commonly understood by the term ‘Political Economy’ . . . makes entire abstraction of every other human passion or motive except those which may be regarded as perpetually antagonizing principles to the desire of wealth, namely, aversion to labour, and desire of the present enjoyment of costly indulgences . . . Political economy considers mankind as occupied solely in acquiring and consuming wealth; and aims at showing what is the course of action into which mankind, living in a state of society, would be impelled, if that motive, except in the degree in which it is checked by the two perpetual counter-motives averted to, were the absolute rule of their actions. (Mill, 1844, v.38)
Almost immediately Mill qualified these remarks, claiming that no investigator of economic science believed that this description captured
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the essence of human nature and society. Political economy, understood in the sense described by Mill, was simply a method for understanding an important aspect of human existence. It reflected, however, a narrowing of the parameters of political economy outlined and envisaged by Smith.
POLITICAL ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND VALUES A crucial argument of this book is that Röpke’s understanding of political economy has a strong ‘Smithian’ or ‘Scottish’ dimension. Like Adam Smith, Lord Kames, Adam Ferguson, David Hume, Francis Hutcheson and other Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, Röpke developed a broad social science agenda. Though Röpke had a clear sense of the boundaries of economic science per se, Röpke’s political economy was deeply attuned to complex social realities. He believed strongly in what Eucken called ‘the interdependence of orders’ (Eucken, 1952, p. 332).5 From this standpoint, economic life was understood to be thoroughly integrated into interconnected and mutually reinforcing social, political and cultural orders. Hence there were limits to which economics could abstract from this context. Röpke was also as convinced as the Scots that it was impossible to separate empirical analysis from normative judgment. His writings, like those of the Scots, involve sophisticated analysis of human nature and the institutional settings that promote – or diminish – human flourishing, alongside careful study of the empirical realities in which humans live. As Ryan Hanley observes of the Scots, ‘In their social science, the distinction of the descriptive from the normative is unintelligible; empirical study of experience, synthesis of empirical data into axioms, and analysis of how activities guided by such axioms affect human life are equally crucial elements of a single endeavor to promote individual and collective well-being’ (2009, p. 30). In short, both Röpke and the Scots were as much concerned with promoting freedom and human thriving as they were with maximizing utility. While modern liberalism in its Rawlsian guise prioritizes the ‘right’ over the ‘good’, the ‘liberalism’ of Röpke and the Scots places questions of human happiness at the center of their respective inquiries. Röpke’s consistent effort throughout his life to engage the subject of political economy in this manner may well have contributed to the attention which his work received from economists and policy-makers during his lifetime. From the very beginning, Röpke integrated his positive economic analysis with reflection on past and contemporary historical and intellectual developments, both with an eye to understanding what was happening, but also with the intention of influencing decision-makers about future choices. He was both attentive to the economic impact of
Introduction
13
different social movements and ideas, but also conscious that economic insights can, if presented in persuasive ways, reshape political and intellectual trends. These are quintessentially Smithian methods and priorities. Another reason for the attention that Röpke garnered outside professional economic circles was his conviction that economics could not eschew questions of value. Röpke was an unabashed économiste-philosophe. This was characteristic not only of a good number of his fellow German neoliberals, but also other prominent twentieth-century economic liberals such as Hayek and the less well-known French economist Jacques Rueff (1896– 1978). Many were beneficiaries of the education received by members of continental Europe’s upper-middle class that stressed a broad, integrated, deep and classical approach to learning, which included immersion in subjects as diverse as poetry and canon law, not to mention classical and modern languages. This allowed them to write with credibility about many subjects outside their immediate field of expertise. In Röpke’s case, this manifested itself in the ease, confidence, and evident authority with which he ranged far and wide outside the boundaries of economics in his wartime trilogy – The Social Crisis of Our Time ([1942g] 1992), Civitas Humanas ([1944b] 1948) and International Economic Disintegration (1942h). His first post-war book, The German Question ([1945b] 1946), barely considers strict economics as Röpke draws upon history, literature and philosophy to explain Germany’s mid-twentieth century catastrophe to German and non-German audiences. Like Smith’s Wealth of Nations, Röpke’s approach to political economy was partly an effort to explore economic development in positive-scientific terms and partly a response to the particular challenges of his age. Yet it also involved the exposition and development of normative propositions that, in Röpke’s view, preceded and would outlast contemporary circumstances. These principles, he believed, would enable capitalism to overcome some of the philosophical burdens under which it had labored since the eighteenth century, limit the state to a small number of clearly defined economic roles, and prevent interest groups from using state power to escape the strictures of competition. Röpke’s pursuit of economic knowledge thus formed part of his own effort to articulate a particular normative vision of the market economy and the type of society in which he desired to see this economy embedded. The positive dimension of economic science, Röpke insisted, was subordinate to these normative ends. Nonetheless, we shall see that Röpke did not regard normative commitments as necessarily compromising economics’ credentials as a positive science. Much ‘Röpkean’ political economy thus represents an attempt to forge a creative synthesis between economic science, and the broader normative enterprise of influencing economic and social policy toward
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the realization and maintenance of particular moral, social and political goals. In his last book, Röpke identified the nineteenth-century French economist Jean Charles Léonard Simonde de Sismondi (1773–1842) as an early precursor of his own approach. In his youth, Sismondi was a strong advocate of Smithian economics. He was also one of the first to articulate the concept of business cycles. Röpke stressed, however, that Sismondi also reminded nineteenth-century audiences in his Nouveaux Principes d’économique politique (1819) that political economy was not simply about wealth-accumulation, but rather how to create and use this wealth for the happiness of all ([1958f] 1998, p. 275). This is not to claim that Röpke’s project represented an attempt to ‘return’ modern economics to the Aristotelian realm of ethics from which economics originally emerged. Rather Röpke regarded positive economic science as having its own worth, but also its limits when it comes to many questions about the appropriate course of action to follow in given circumstances. It is not just that Röpke believed that economics ultimately should serve certain values – most notably liberty and order – but also his sense that the economy, like all facets of human existence, is not self-sufficient. Its immersion in other spheres of life required economists to look beyond positive and even normative economics, and consider how the pursuit of particular values, such as equality, affect the incentives and structures shaping economic activity and policy over the long and short term. As he wrote in his last major book, A Humane Economy: The market economy, and with it social and political freedom, can thrive only as a part and under the protection of a bourgeois system. This implies the existence of a society in which certain fundamentals are respected and color the whole network of social relationships: individual effort and responsibility, absolute norms and values, independence based on ownership, prudence and daring, calculating and saving, responsibility for planning one’s own life, proper coherence with the community, family feeling, a sense of tradition and the succession of generations combined with an open-minded view of the present and the future, proper tension between individual and community, firm moral discipline, respect for the value of money, the courage to grapple on one’s own with life and its uncertainties, a sense of the natural order of things, and a firm scale of values. ([1958f] 1998, p. 98)
Röpke’s political economy thus embodied a positive-descriptive analysis but also a normative-prescriptive approach which, while distinct, were mutually reinforcing. He consequently concerned himself with evaluating different possible economic arrangements and outlining what combination of economic, legal, political and social structures was most likely to protect and enhance particular values. It was not just the fact that markets were more efficient from the standpoint of utility that inclined Röpke to
Introduction
15
economic liberalism rather than socialism. It was also that the market economy allowed people to exercise their natural liberty in ways that brought a certain type of order to human affairs, while simultaneously solving the economic problem of scarcity. In part, Röpke’s conclusions are derived from empirical observation concerning the operations of markets and planned economies and their respective consequences for political and social order. Yet it also owes something to his long observation of human nature and certain conclusions that Röpke reached about the character of human beings. Humans, he claimed, were driven to a large extent by the type of enlightened self-interest portrayed by Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America. But Röpke’s understanding of man – his philosophical anthropology – is also rooted in what might be called the tradition of ‘Christian realism’ often associated with St. Augustine. Röpke recognized that his concern for certain values and, more particularly, his sense that these were embedded in particular ways of life left him open to accusations of romanticism. For a German of his generation, acutely aware of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century romanticism’s contribution to National Socialism’s rise, this was a serious charge. The point, however, is that Röpke – like Smith, Hume and Edmund Burke – did not believe that liberty could be rooted just anywhere. There is a ‘conservative’ dimension to the Scottish Enlightenment tradition insofar as it acknowledged that there were a whole range of un-designed customs, institutions and moral codes that underpinned the market economy (Sally, 1998, p. 33). Without these, Röpke believed that there was considerable risk that the void would be filled by artificial constructs that could inhibit and suffocate liberty. It was not that Röpke thought that everything about the pre-Enlightenment, pre-modern world was good. He had seen, however, what happened when particular habits and institutions decayed or were swept away by revolutions seeking to create a new man or new society, be it the Third Reich or utopian Marxist visions of social change. Phrases like ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ are wonderfully pliant terms. They are regularly used to label a range of political, philosophical, economic, and even religious positions, many of which have little in common with each other. They are also terminologically inexact descriptions and have arguably proved insufficiently stable to convey particular meanings over long periods of time. Yet for all these problems, the normative vision underlying Röpke’s political economy might perhaps be accurately called one of ‘conservative liberalism’ insofar as it sought to combine the ‘conservative’ value of order with the ‘liberal’ underscoring of human liberty. An inevitable subsequent question is whether there is a tension between Röpke’s ‘liberal’ focus upon freedom and his ‘conservative’ interest in order. This may simply be an irresolvable tension in the ‘grand liberal
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tradition’ to which Röpke regarded himself as belonging. Perhaps it is unavoidable precisely because while they often grate at each other, order and liberty are both necessary for social life and individual flourishing. As we shall see, it is not clear that Röpke was always able to reconcile these values and their associated set of priorities, expectations and institutional expressions. What is not in doubt, however, is the manner in which the effort at synthesis underlying Röpke’s political economy challenges not only the direction of much post-1945 economic science, but also those who question the market economy’s moral and economic benefits.
NOTES 1. This figure includes the translation of some of Röpke’s writings into multiple languages. Röpke also re-published many articles as chapters or sections in books. Many of the chapters in Röpke’s Mass und Mitt, for instance, were previously published as standalone articles. 2. Hayek and Röpke corresponded on a regular basis before and during World War II. After the war, Röpke attempted to establish an international journal for liberal thought while Hayek wanted to create an international academy. Röpke, however, was unable to raise sufficient funds for such a journal, but, with the cooperation of Albert Hunold, persuaded the Swiss businessmen who had provided some resources for the journal to allow the money to be spent on the first meeting of Hayek’s academy in 1947 (Hartwell, 1995, pp. 22–31). 3. For other vital contributions by Röpke to the case for post-war Germany economic liberalization in this period, see Röpke (1946b, 1947a, 1947c, 1947e, 1947g, 1947h, 1947i, 1948f). 4. These are only a select number of the economic subjects addressed by Röpke throughout his career. But, as this book is not intended to provide a comprehensive study of every aspect of Röpke’s economics, the subjects considered here have been chosen on the basis that they allow a thorough exploration of Röpke’s political economy. 5. To this extent, this book substantially agrees with Hutchison’s argument that the German neoliberals who began rising to prominence in the early 1930s had more in common with the Scottish Enlightenment than with more contemporary movements such as the Chicago school insofar as the Germans were willing to extend their inquiries beyond positive economic analysis to encompass the cultural, historical and political context in which economies operated over long periods of time (Hutchison, 1979b, pp. 167–8).
2.
Ruin and reform: the crisis of German economic liberalism
In the beerhall brawls and street fights of the Weimar Republic, National Socialists gradually gained the upper hand over Communists. But it was an intimate struggle with many conversions to and fro and evident family resemblances: National Socialism adopted the negative, brutal, and cynically subversive tendencies of Communism and also its technocratic-totalitarian enthusiasm for a centrally planned economy. This last similarity lent some justification to the claim that the Nazis were a National ‘Socialist’ movement. But to the street brawler, this bit of Marxian economic doctrine meant little, and he readily replaced Marxian internationalism with nationalism. Alexander Rüstow (1980, p. 644)
For understandable reasons, analysis of National Socialism’s economic dimension often takes second place to study of the regime’s foreign, military and racial policies. In part, this reflects the immensity of its crimes. It may, however, also proceed from the fact that many Nazi economic policies met with approval from large segments of European and North American opinion, even from individuals who otherwise detested Hitler’s creed. The regime’s success in reducing unemployment, its willingness to adopt expansionist fiscal policies, its extensive welfare programs, its protectionist agricultural policies, and its goal of an autarkic economy were praised by many politicians and economists throughout the 1930s. But for some German economists in the 1930s, the Nazis’ economic policies reflected their totalitarian inclinations as much as their nullification of basic civil liberties via the 1933 Enabling Act. In Wilhelm Röpke’s view, the Nazis’ increasingly interventionist economic policies, culminating in the extensive regulation and price controls associated with Germany’s war economy, were not incidental effects of the Nazis’ desire to wage war. The regime’s gradual collectivization of the economy, while never as thorough as that of the USSR, represented the logical conclusion of Germany distancing itself from liberal economic and political priorities. The reasons for Germany’s slide from the 1834 customs union (Zollverein), which removed internal customs barriers between 38 states of the German Confederation, towards Nazi Germany’s autarkic policies puzzled many German economists. Röpke focused on this in his two books addressing German issues: German Commercial Policy (1934a) and 17
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The German Question ([1945b] 1946). Röpke and other German economic liberals were deeply conscious that the shift had occurred against the backdrop of intense argument within the emerging economics profession of late-nineteenth-century Germany and Austria-Hungary about the nature of economic science. On one level this dispute (known as the Methodenstreit) concerned epistemological and methodological issues. Yet it also reflected intense differences concerning political economy, specifically between the ‘Austrian school’ who generally favored market policies and the ‘historical school’ who encouraged interventionist positions (Mises [1969] 1984; Caldwell, 2004, pp. 64–130). Thus while the Methodenstreit had profound implications for the teaching of economics in the early twentieth century, it also intersected with debates about German political economy from 1879 onwards (Hamerow, 1972; Rüstow, 1980). What follows is a sketch of the intellectual and historical developments which precipitated and contextualized Röpke’s efforts to articulate a new liberal vision of political economy in the wake of capitalism’s travails in the twentieth century’s first decades. First, we consider the formation assumed by German capitalism in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries before outlining key intellectual developments during the same period that were especially consequential for German economic liberalism. We then examine the different approaches to reforming economic liberalism associated with figures such as Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, Alexander Rüstow and Alfred Müller-Armack that began emerging in the 1920s and 1930s. Often described as ‘neoliberals’,1 this term does reflect their common effort to produce a revised version of liberal political economy. The term, however, also masks important differences. It is possible, for instance, to distinguish between a Cologne-based school associated with Müller-Armack and another school linked with the University of Freiburg (Vanberg, 1988), especially Eucken and Böhm. Röpke himself did not like the expression ‘neoliberalism’ (neoliberalismus), though he sometimes used it to describe his approach (1953d, 1962d). He also believed that the term ‘liberal’ had become associated with so many, often contradictory positions that its usefulness as a stand-alone description was questionable. Hence, he preferred expressions such as neuen Liberalismus and neuen Liberalen because they underlined the break that Röpke and others sought with what he often called nineteenth-century historical liberalism (historischen Liberalismus des 19 Jahrhundert) (Röpke, 1947d). Röpke also thought that these terms captured the fact that the attention of figures such as Eucken to the role of law (Recht) in economic life marked a genuinely new development in liberal thought rather than an evolution from preexisting liberal positions (Röpke, 1950f, pp. 141–4).
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FREE MARKETS IN CRISIS On 31 December 1833, the internal customs barriers between most German states were removed. Trade began flowing freely across borders and smugglers found themselves without employment. In what now seems ironic in light of subsequent developments, the initial impetus for economic liberalization came from Prussia when government officials, much influenced by reading Smith’s Wealth of Nations, established what amounted to free trade between Prussia’s provinces. This marked a prominent break from the mercantilist, cameralist and interventionist policies hitherto pursued by Prussia’s Hohenzollern rulers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. After the 1834 Zollverein, the next liberalizing step was a tariff-reducing commercial treaty between Prussia and France in 1862. There was, it seems, widespread support for these policies, including from the export-orientated Prussian agricultural sector. Ten years later, the newly united Germany adopted a different approach. Indeed the trajectory of German capitalism in the last half of the nineteenth century differed significantly from the Anglo-American world. During this period, Germany experienced a rapid transition from a post-feudal, hierarchical society to one in which commercial bonds were increasingly dominant. This produced significant tensions, which were complicated by the concurrent emergence of German nationalism during the same period, the 1848 liberal revolution’s failure to reshape the German political landscape in favor of parliamentary democracy, and the rise of the world’s largest Social Democrat party. In these circumstances, Germans of a liberal political and economic disposition increasingly found themselves in an invidious position. Their primary political expression, the National Liberal Party, applauded the liberalization of trade and industry regulations throughout the North German Confederation in 1869. But they also viewed the emergence of the Social Democratic party and its associated trade union movement with alarm, especially given that many German Social Democrats were strongly influenced by Marxism. By 1912, the Social Democrats had emerged as the largest party in the German Reichstag. The National Liberals also allowed their domestic agenda of political and economic liberalization to be subordinated to Otto von Bismarck’s successful effort to establish German unity under the Prussian monarchy – a unity forged through Bismarck’s ruthless realpolitik and the victories of the Prussian army and its decidedly antiliberal officer-corps over Austria-Hungary in 1866 and France in 1871. The emergence of a German unity animated by nationalist sentiment and underpinned by a relatively weak national legislature and a strong monarchically focused executive contributed to German capitalism’s
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increasingly state-orientated nature. This economic trend was exacerbated by the new German Empire’s financial and commercial crash in 1873. This was followed by a severe industrial recession and a downturn in German agriculture’s profitability in the wake of competition from American farmers. Many economists, politicians and business leaders subsequently became skeptical of the benefits of competition and free trade. Thus when Bismarck introduced customs duties on iron and grain imports in 1879, he was taking advantage of growing dissatisfaction throughout Germany with economic liberalization (Hamerow, 1972). Though the level of duties – one mark per hundred kilos of wheat or rye – was small by twentieth-century standards, it had tripled by 1890, a figure which itself had doubled by 1906 (Nicholls, 1994, p. 17). This protectionist shift was accompanied by attempts to establish a council of corporatist organizations designed to represent the interests of a range of business and occupational interests to the government (Abelshauser, 1984). Bismarck’s intention was to facilitate a greater centralization of power and to marginalize the Reichstag as a rival source of authority. Though Bismarck’s initiative failed, it embodied for many economic liberals the connection between the reduction of economic liberty and the weakening of political liberty. Though a brief period of economic liberalization followed Germany’s accession to a series of Central European commercial treaties in the 1890s, the economic downturn of the early 1900s gave further impetus to interventionist policies. Increasing doubts about free trade and other policies popularly associated with laissez-faire economics also contributed to the gradual cartelization of much of the German economy. As C.E. Fischer observes, this was partly a reaction of German manufacturers to the economic decline of the 1870s, as they sought to protect themselves against the subsequent price deflation. These arrangements consisted of businesses in the same industry privately agreeing to divide the market for their goods and services among themselves and committing themselves to sell their products at a non-market-determined price (Fischer, 1954, p. 441). As Eucken later observed, ‘it meant that the right of freedom of contract could be used to eliminate competition and to restrict the freedom of others by means of sanctions, boycotts, etc. The principle of freedom of contract had thus come into open conflict with the competitive principle’ (Eucken, 1951, p. 31). Upon receiving the legal seal of approval from the German Supreme Court on 4 February 1897, cartelization quickly spread throughout the German economy. According to Eucken, the increase in tariffs in this period exacerbated the problem insofar as it helped German industry to isolate the German market from foreign competition and then monopolize it (ibid., p. 50).
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These moves towards dirigiste policies were largely accepted across Germany’s much-fractured political spectrum. Extension of the electoral franchise had meant that millions of industrial workers gained the right to vote. Few were inclined to appreciate the often-counterintuitive arguments concerning the positive benefits of free trade and competition. Many voted for the market-hostile Social Democrats. After the Social Democrats, the Catholic Center party was the second largest group in the Reichstag. Though firmly anti-Marxist and anti-socialist, many German Catholics had mixed views of business and free markets, not least because of the solidarist and corporatist thinking that many late-nineteenth-century German Catholic intellectuals applied to economic questions (Koslowski, 2000). Given that many industrial cartels were based in the heavily Catholic regions of the Rhineland and Silesia, the Center party had no strong incentives to agitate for more market-inclined policies. Nor did the German conservative–nationalist parties have any desire to challenge the status quo. They relied heavily upon the votes of the heavily protected, subsidized and often Junker–associated East Elbian farmers. Moreover, like the National Liberals, German conservative–nationalists generally approved of the social welfare programs instituted by Bismarck’s government, beginning with a state-supported universal social insurance scheme, which were expanded by successive Imperial and Weimar governments. Many German politicians regarded such measures as a means of pacifying industrial workers tempted to embrace left-wing political movements (Fay, 1950). The National Liberal party itself slowly evolved into two distinct groupings. One sought an opening to the left, while the other aligned itself closely with the Imperial government, including its protectionist policies. Neither faction was especially interested in reinvigorating economic liberalism, not least because much of their financial support came from the highly cartelized iron and steel industry.
WORLD WAR, WAR ECONOMY AND ITS AFTERMATH By 1914, Germany’s economy had become characterized by a high degree of regulation and cartelization and also deeply integrated into Germany’s prevailing political order. Writing almost thirty years later, Röpke observed: Berlin became the magnetic pole of German economic life; here the threads that bound together industry and politics were concentrated . . . here the great associations had their syndics and their central offices, and no less the trade
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Wilhelm Röpke’s political economy union organizations . . . here, too, the whole German credit system was soon centralized . . . ([1945b] 1946, p. 169)
Not surprisingly, Röpke commented (1938c, 1938e), these trends accelerated upon Germany’s entry into World War I. Just as the Imperial Government’s foreign policy slowly became subordinated to the German General Staff’s military objectives, so too much of the economy was militarized. Germany’s war economy was directed by Walter Rathenau, a German-Jewish industrialist who founded one of Germany’s biggest electricity companies, the Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaf, in the pre-war period. Rathenau was opposed to socialist and nationalization schemes. He did, however, favor close cooperation between the German civil service, industrialists and union leaders in managing the economy. To this extent, Rathenau represented what Eucken called ‘a new type of economic politician . . . the experimentor’ (Eucken, 1951, p. 30). Germany’s November 1918 revolution did little to change the situation. Though the political order experienced democratization, there was no corresponding economic liberalization. Dirigisme remained the primary framework for economic policy. This was reinforced by the creation of a Reich Ministry of Economics. Though it had some success in transitioning Germany away from its war-economy arrangements, neither the economics ministry nor Germany’s central bank, the Reichsbank, was able to contain the inflation that resulted from the decision to expand Germany’s money supply to reduce unemployment. Monetary stabilization only occurred in 1924. The anti-liberal trend in economic policy was exacerbated by articles 264–75 of the Treaty of Versailles. These imposed a free-trade regime upon Germany when it came to economic relations with the victorious Allied powers. Free trade thus became indelibly associated with what most Germans regarded as an unjust treaty. This made it unlikely that many German economists, politicians, or business leaders could be persuaded to advocate free-trade solutions to Germany’s economic problems once these provisions of Versailles expired in 1925.2 Apart from the unpatriotic overtones involuntarily acquired by free trade, the economic consequences of defeat in 1918 also resulted in many German businesses actively lobbying for subsidies and, after 1925, outright protectionism. Despite growing complaints about the level of government subsidies for industry, virtually all segments of interwar German industry sought some type of government assistance in the 1920s, even in periods of relative prosperity (James, 1990). When Germany regained control of its economic policy in 1925, a renewed spate of cartelization almost immediately ensued. Given the seemingly irresistible tide of illiberal economic policies,
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economic liberalism experienced great difficulty in finding a political base in Germany through which to present and argue its case. The two main liberal parties that emerged from the ashes of the National Liberals – the German People’s Party (DVP) led by Gustav Stresemann and the German Democratic Party (DDP) associated with Rathenau – were opposed to socialism, but ambiguous about competition and free trade. Like other political parties, it was hard for them to resist the rising tide of economic nationalism. Given the intensity of lobbying from business interests and cartels, their own internal divisions, and their subsequent inability to forge a cohesive economic program beyond opposition to outright socialism, neither liberal party could present a clear market-based alternative to the dirigisme of the socialist left and nationalist right (Maier, 1975, pp. 444–57). Cartels and protectionism became accepted as simply immovable parts of Germany’s post-war economic landscape (Sheehan, 1978, pp. 256–7). The onset of severe recession in 1929 did not lead to any public questioning by politicians of dirigiste economic policies. The situation was exacerbated by the passage of the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in the United States which locked many German industries out of foreign markets. Even the deleterious effects of this protectionist measure on the German economy did not persuade Germany’s political class to revisit the fundamental settings of economic policy. If anything, it confirmed them in their dirigiste ways.
AUSTRIAN THEORISTS VERSUS GERMAN HISTORICISTS The consolidation of anti-economic liberal trends in Germany from the last quarter of the nineteenth century onwards did not deter a good number of German economists from taking a dim view of these developments. During much of the same period, however, economists in Germany and Austria-Hungary were embroiled in a serious methodological dispute. Far from being confined to the realm of abstract economic theory, this debate affected the direction of German economic policy before World War II and influenced the efforts of some German economists to produce revised theories of economic liberalism. Economic liberalism had always enjoyed support within the Germanspeaking lands. Prussia’s trade liberalization of 1818 occurred almost three decades before Britain’s formal embrace of free trade in 1846. Writing over one hundred years later, Röpke observed that the Prussian officials implementing the program of 1818 were ‘eager followers of Adam Smith’ and noted that Prussia’s experiment in economic liberalism was studied by
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many wishing to see their own nations follow a similar path ([1945b] 1946, p. 159). Economic liberalism’s true intellectual epicenter in nineteenthcentury Central Europe was not, however, to be found in Prussia. In 1871, the Vienna-based scholar Carl Menger (1840–1921) published his Principles of Economics. The effect was to re-invigorate the study of political economy as a theoretical science capable of revealing economic laws prevailing in all times and places. Central to Menger’s approach was the identification of empirically verifiable dimensions of economic life, including the time, needs and knowledge of individual persons. Menger demonstrated how these manifest themselves in the multifarious but observable facts of economic life, such as prices. Among other things, this empirical method led to Menger pioneering the marginalist revolution in economics against the production and labor theory of value associated with Smith and David Ricardo. The latter held that the relative prices of two or more goods mirrored the different proportions of labor invested in the goods. Menger took a different view: There is no necessary and direct connection between the value of a good and whether, or in what quantities, labor and other goods of higher order were applied to its production . . . In general, no one in practical life asks for the history of the origin of a good in estimating its value, but considers solely the services that the good will render him and which he would have to forgo if he did not have it at his command . . . The quantities of labor or of other means of production applied to its production cannot, therefore, be the determining factor in the value of a good. ([1871] 2007, p. 145)
Menger’s subjectivist theory of value thus grounds the price of anything – services, loans, labor, objects – in people’s subjective estimation of its ability to meet a particular need relative to all the other goods available to them to meet other needs. Menger’s search for empirical laws that governed the economy’s workings spawned the ‘Austrian school’ of economics. Its leading lights included Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk (1851–1914), Friedrich von Wieser (1851–1926), as well as Mises and Hayek. While this school was not free of internal disagreements, their method of inquiry led them to conclusions that placed them very much in the free-market camp when it came to economic policy. Another pronounced commonality was their resistance to the claims of ‘historicism’ – the view that any apparent regularity in economic trends should be treated as historical laws that reflected the peculiarities of a given historical period. This brought them directly into conflict with the ‘historical school’ of economics. As the name implies, the historical school owed much to the effort in nineteenth-century German historical circles to resist Enlightenment and
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pre-Enlightenment natural law claims that there were certain characteristics common to all societies which can be revealed by reason. Under the influence of figures such as Georg Hegel, many German historians argued that all societies reflected a different developmental history and even possessed their own distinct characters (Caldwell, 2004, p. 43). Forerunners of the German historical school such as Friedrich List (1789–1846) and Wilhelm Roscher (1817–94) held that Smithian free-trade arguments largely reflected particular British circumstances which could not be uniformly applied to other nations. Economists, in Roscher’s view, should focus upon uncovering laws of general historical development. This meant that the proper study of political economy involved placing the workings of economic phenomena such as prices in the context of everything else changing in Germany over a period of time. This would allow economists to determine what stage of economic development had been reached by different nations. On this basis, Roscher concluded, governments would be able to adopt economic policies suited to a given country’s economic development stage. It was, however, Gustav von Schmoller (1838–1917) who sharpened the emerging tensions between the ‘Austrian’ and ‘historical’ schools, not least by penning a critical review of Menger’s Principles. Praising Roscher for his willingness to distance economics from excessively abstract theorizing, Schmoller insisted on a deductive approach to economic phenomena and stressed the historical–cultural conditioning of economic reflection. Though he agreed with Menger that the labor theory of value was erroneous and accepted that the workings of self-interest should be studied in seeking to understand economic life, Schmoller believed that classical and Austrian economics had succumbed to the temptation of excessive theorizing. Both had consequently erected what Schmoller regarded as their own historically conditioned insights and precepts into universal dogmas. As Joseph Schumpeter described the views of Schmoller and his followers, ‘It looked as if theory had been no more than an interlude in the history of ideas, an attempted foundation for the economic policies of a particular fleeting period’ (1965, p. 82). Schmoller consequently encouraged economists to immerse themselves in the empirical collection and study of historical data and statistics, believing that the assembled facts would speak for themselves. From a sociological and normative standpoint, Schmoller welcomed the manner in which the market economy linked people while simultaneously keeping them freer by virtue of its reduction of compulsion (Schmoller, 1900/1904, vol. 2, p. 100). But he also held that free markets had potentially disintegrative effects upon social bonds. Unless a society possessed a common sense of morality, laws and customs, Schmoller did not believe
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that a cohesive economy could survive (ibid., vol. 1, p. 5). A student of Prussia’s rise from Northern European obscurity to world power status, Schmoller was convinced that the Prussian state’s intervention in economic life, most notably under Frederick William I (1688–40) and Frederick the Great (1712–86), had brought about faster economic development than could possibly have occurred with laissez-faire economic policies. This, Schmoller argued, was the pattern established in Prussian – and now – German society for economic growth. It constituted, in Schmoller’s view, strong grounds for similar policies to be pursued in the present. The economic liberalization that characterized Prussia between 1818 and 1873, Schmoller argued, should be regarded as an aberration from the more general historical pattern. The most glaring methodological weakness in the historical school’s approach is that while empirical studies can provide some historically contingent information about aspects of the outcomes produced by reallife social processes, empirical studies cannot provide information about the structures of those processes. Theoretical knowledge cannot therefore be derived from empirical studies and statistics (Huerta de Soto, 2008, p. 15). The historical school’s strength, however, was its consciousness of the importance of historical differences. In this regard, Schmoller’s approach marks less of a departure from previous approaches to economics than is often supposed inasmuch as Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments and his Wealth of Nations involve far more sociological reflection than, for instance, the more abstract economics associated with Ricardo and John Stuart Mill. Schmoller’s insistence on placing economics into a broader social science agenda thus had more in common with Smith’s approach than that of Smith’s nineteenth-century English successors. Schmoller’s views and those of the historical school were castigated as culturally relativist by a number of Austrian school scholars. A common historical school response to such critiques was to insist that their approach to economics was not just historical but also an ethical approach insofar as the historical school claimed to take the ‘social question’ seriously. By ‘the social question’, the historical school meant the social upheavals associated with the Industrial Revolution, especially what Röpke was to describe as the ‘proletarization’ of much of society in the form of a large urban working class. This situation, according to Schmoller and other members of the historical school – most notably Gustav Wagner (1835–1917) – was the result of economically liberal policies. Classical Smithian economics, they argued, had reduced the ethical to the pursuit of self-interest narrowly construed. It was therefore unable to respond adequately to what the historical school regarded as the gross inequalities and injustices released by laissez-faire. In 1873, key members
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of the historical school created an association of economists, the Verein für Socialpolitik – the very year that the German economy lurched into recession – which stressed that necessity and morality demanded that the state play a central role in shaping social and economic life. By this, they did not mean a ‘night-watchman’ state, but rather the government’s benevolent and regular intervention into economic life to reduce social tensions and tame untrammelled economic individualism. This helps to explain, as Schumpeter observes, why many members of the historical school were interested in the development of institutions and how they shaped economic activity ([1954] 1994, pp. 811–13). Historians continue to debate whether the historical school’s emergence encouraged Bismarck’s government to implement a number of social welfare programs or whether Bismarck regarded them as providing useful intellectual cover for policies he had already decided to pursue. There is, however, little question that the historical school’s rise was providential for Bismarck’s gradual shift of German economic policy away from economic liberalism. Not only did the historical school oppose socialism and social democracy, but their unswerving loyalty to what they regarded as the House of Hohenzollern’s nation-building project made them convenient academic allies for the government. In 1874, for instance, Schmoller presented a paper in which he attacked economic liberalism and lamented the failure of Germany’s liberal middle class to address the social problems unleashed by capitalism, while simultaneously underscoring how previous Hohenzollern monarchs had not hesitated to use state power to preempt or correct potentially disastrous social developments (Small, 1924, pp. 249–53). The differences between the historical and Austrian schools over the nature of economic science – or, as Mises claims, ‘whether there could even be such a thing as a science, other than history, dealing with aspects of human action’ (1969, p. 12) – was bound to produce intellectual conflict. Over time, the Methodenstreit became increasingly bitter. With each school attacking the other’s methodology, they became locked into antagonistic positions. Yet the differences between the schools should not be exaggerated. Schmoller acknowledged and approved of the market’s ability to facilitate connections between millions of previously disassociated people, and noted how this left individuals freer by diminishing many constraints that were unjustifiable on moral or economic grounds (Schmoller [1900/1904] 1919, vol. 2, p. 100). Likewise prominent Austrians such as Mises and Hayek moved beyond strict economics in their later years, having become convinced that some of the reasons for the drift toward collectivism lay in the extra-economic realm. Moreover, there were, as Caldwell observes (2004, pp. 77–8), some similarities between the
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two schools. This included their mutual antagonism toward positivism and Marxism and a wariness about mass movements, especially as democratization spread throughout Western, Central and Northern Europe. The most disappointing aspect of the historical–theoretical dispute, Caldwell notes, is that it obscured the fact that both the study of history and the exposition of theory had a role in comprehending social developments (ibid., p. 404). From this standpoint, the Methodenstreit might be regarded as a polemic between theory (the Austrians) and empiricism (the historical school). Whatever the Austrian and historical schools’ respective merits, there is no question that Schmoller and the historical school won the battle for supremacy when it came to securing chairs of political economy throughout Imperial Germany. Writing several decades later, Mises claimed that Schmoller enjoyed a close friendship with Friedrich Althoff, who controlled academic appointments on behalf of the Prussian education ministry, and that Althoff relied heavily upon Schmoller for advice on suitable appointments (Mises, 1969). This facilitated the spread of what its detractors called Kathedersozialisten (socialism of the chair) throughout German universities, whose adherents invariably agitated for more Bismarckian social programs.
EUCKEN, BÖHM AND FREIBURG ORDOLIBERALISM Eventually the historical school declined in relevance and importance throughout Germany. This resulted partly from inner dissension, especially after Max Weber’s critique of historicist methodology. Even more damaging was Imperial Germany’s defeat in 1918, which discredited those intellectual schools associated with the Hohenzollern–Bismarckian state. It remains, however, that the combination of the historical school’s long intellectual ascendency, Bismarckian dirigiste policies, and the economic arrangements imposed on defeated Germany between 1919 and 1925, continued to incline many German economists toward economic nationalist policies and against economic liberalism. Moreover, after World War I, the German confidence in progress – especially as expressed in liberal thought – was severely undermined and replaced by a pessimism which regarded the nineteenth-century faith in progress through liberty and free exchange as naive, even dangerous. Hence by the 1920s, German economics was at the crossroads. Though economic liberalism seemed widely discredited, the historical school was also in decline. Many German economists responded by effectively embracing economic nationalism or
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Marxist theories. How did those who still considered themselves economic liberals respond to this situation? While economic liberalism managed to survive in Weimar Germany, it differed from the program articulated in post-war Austria by Mises, by far the most penetrating exponent of Austrian economics following World War I. A self-described ‘paleo-liberal’, Mises articulated powerful critiques of the socialist, dirigiste and corporatist economic policies pursued by successive Austrian governments. Mises’ economic thought is invariably denoted as laissez-faire (a label accepted by Mises), though Mises himself always stressed that his conclusions were derived from the strictly scientific approach to economics pioneered by Menger. Mises’ Socialism ([1922] 1932) held that socialist economies would ultimately fail because no amount of government planning could possibly substitute for the free price mechanism’s unique ability to transmit information about the supply and demands of goods. This economic calculation argument formed a crucial part of Mises’ ongoing advocacy for strong anti-inflationary policies and the radical liberalization of economic life throughout the 1920s and 1930s. According to Mises, the tendency of governments to accord legal privileges to trade unions, to provide unemployment benefits, to legislate minimum wage laws, to generate artificially low-interest rates through manipulation of the money supply, and to denigrate the importance of a sound currency backed by an irrevocable commitment to the gold standard had all contributed to Germany and Austria’s post-war economic problems. Though challenged by many, Mises’ critique of socialism proved influential in convincing some economists that socialism was bound to flounder on the reefs of sound economic science. Reading Mises’ early works, Röpke later stated, rendered him forever ‘immune’ from ‘the virus of socialism’ (1961c, p. 6). Still, economic liberalism’s path in Germany was different from that advocated by Mises, and ultimately to be more influential on Röpke’s economic thought. Crucial figures in this regard were Eucken, Rüstow, Böhm and Müller-Armack.3 For all their reservations about the historical school, these thinkers showed relatively early in their careers that their agenda went beyond economics as a positive science. The son of the philosopher Rudolf Eucken (1846–1926), winner of the 1908 Nobel Prize for Literature for his work on Kantian ethical theory, Walter Eucken’s thought and writings appear to have reflected something of his father’s anti-positivism, anti-utilitarianism, anti-socialism (Eucken, 1921a, p. 126, 1921b, p.186), as well as the influence of the phenomenological philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) who taught at the University of Freiburg. Like his father, Eucken was a believing Protestant Christian. However, he pursued a different academic career. Eucken began
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his doctorate in economics at the University of Bonn first under the supervision of Heinrich Dietzel, one of the few German economists with a university position who did not belong to the historical school (Bilger, 1964, pp. 40–44). Eucken then worked as an assistant to Hermann Schumacher, a noted adherent of the historical school (Wendt, 1956), completing his doctorate in 1914. Although exposed to both theoretical and historical approaches to economics, Eucken was critical of what he viewed as many German economists’ tendency to adopt a position of historical relativism and to view economics as the study of specific economic questions in a given set of historically contingent conditions. Eucken observed, for example, that the historical school had justified the German economy’s cartelization in terms of a necessary process of historical evolution (1951, p. 84). He also argued that economic science had been deformed by ‘the relativist conception of truth brought about by the historical school, pragmatism, positivism, and other intellectual movements of the previous century’ (Eucken [1940] 1992, p. 305). Adam Smith, he noted, had indeed worked out his economic principles in the context of an economy shifting from mercantilist conditions towards freer economic arrangements. This, however, did not invalidate Smith’s theoretical insights. For Eucken, the theoretical truths remained valid, regardless of historical circumstances, just as the truths discerned through the natural sciences were of a permanent significance, no matter what the historical period in which they had been discerned. Rejecting historicism was, Eucken held, essential if economists were to pursue their central task, which was to discover the truths of economic science and then defend them, especially against those anxious to exempt themselves from market disciplines (1938, pp. 63–86). He thus sought to break free of the historical school’s anti-theoretical empiricism and to return German economics to the realm of theory from which it had been cut off during the historical school’s long period of dominance. Eucken’s conviction that economic science was capable of discerning universally valid positive truths did not mean that he was disinterested in normative questions. Indeed, his concern for free markets was not primarily based on utilitarian arguments but rather upon the notion that humans were ends in themselves. The overall purpose of intellectual activity across the centuries was, Eucken held, to be found in the concept of ordo, in the sense of ‘the meaningful bringing together of diversity to a whole’, an idea which first found exemplary expression in medieval scholastic thought (1952, p. 372). In his Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie, Eucken focused upon the study of economic systems in concrete historical situations, but underscored that he thought there was an order of things that transcended immediate historical circumstances. He even went so far as to contend
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that the essence of capitalism’s crisis lay in the moral and spiritual realm. This required a return to a ‘comprehensive spiritual order of life’ (Eucken, 1926, pp. 15–16), because human life could ‘only be given a comprehensive meaning again by religion, by the belief in God’ (Eucken, 1932a, p. 87). Liberalism, Eucken claimed in a letter to Rüstow, decayed ‘as soon as it lost its religious and metaphysical content’ (cited in Lenel, 1991, p. 13). Eucken was especially concerned with the issue of how to preserve freedom in complex social orders based primarily upon voluntary cooperation. He worried about the accumulation of power and was less convinced than laissez-faire thinkers that the spontaneous interaction of people usually sufficed to produce a stable and flourishing social order. The pursuit of self-interest, Eucken thought, was not always beneficial, especially when private parties enlisted state power to conspire against others to nullify the freedom of market transactions. This collusion of private and public power undermined essential market mechanisms such as free prices and paved the way for extensive economic intervention and, eventually, centrally planned economies. Again and again, Eucken emphasized that economic reality cannot be understood without considering the fact of economic power. From Eucken’s standpoint, the essential problem of economics was therefore how to overcome scarcity without destroying liberty (1952, p. 300). Eucken’s vision of political economy was thus shaped by his commitment to the rather Kantian normative goal of a social, political and legal order in which each individual’s liberty from all other individuals and the state was preserved (ibid., pp. 181–99). Pursuing an intellectual project of such magnitude required, in Eucken’s view, ‘a very dispassionate analysis’ (ibid., p. 300) and a division of labor among intellectuals. Hence Eucken was not initially inclined to accept the historical school’s attempt to embed the pursuit of economic truth in the study of history and sociology. This may explain why Eucken did not address these more normative concerns in great detail in his primary economic works. It also suggests that Eucken generally adhered to his original decision to limit his theoretical work to a defined set of parameters. He seems to have resigned himself to accepting that no individual could produce a comprehensive explanation of all spheres of social existence as Smith himself had tried but failed to complete. Yet despite his efforts to focus on a specific field, Eucken’s approach to economics grew increasingly synthetic over time. Eucken’s first forays into public policy debates underlined his skepticism about the efficacy of state economic intervention. Eucken’s work on monetary theory, for instance, challenged the notion that inflation was caused by currency speculation,4 a negative balance of payments and excessive imports. Inflation in post-war Germany, he insisted, was caused
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by government deficit-spending and the Reichsbank’s loose interest-rate policy (Eucken, 1923). Like Mises, Eucken argued that inflation was a monetary phenomenon that proceeded from loose monetary and credit policy (ibid., p. 80). Indeed at a 1924 Verein conference, Eucken supported Mises when the latter critiqued balance-of-payments explanations for inflation (Nicholls, 1994, p. 34). Throughout the rest of the 1920s and early 1930s, Eucken broadened his critique of economic nationalism. He argued, for example, for Germany’s return to the gold standard (1925, pp. 79–81), maintaining that this would limit the state’s ability to pursue monetary policy according to the desires of powerful interest groups. Eucken also stressed the economic advantages of German businessmen borrowing capital from abroad at cheaper interest rates (1928, pp. 120–23), an argument that reflected his commitment to free international capital markets at a time when autarkic policies were becoming popular in Germany. After his appointment as professor of economics at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau in 1927, Eucken’s work began to integrate insights from history and law that shaped his approach to political economy in a decisive way. In 1932, Eucken outlined a type of historical–institutional stage-theory explanation of the development of the relationship between the economy, the state and society. Mercantilism, Eucken maintained, involved sovereigns building up economic enterprises and structures that boosted the state’s power. The age of liberal capitalism reflected the dismantling of such structures and the state’s withdrawal from much of the economy. But, Eucken held, the period following Bismarck marked a reversion to the state’s extensive intervention in economic life. This form of interventionism, however, differed from mercantilism inasmuch as the state itself was no longer in charge (Eucken, 1932b, p. 304). For Eucken, a state that constantly expanded its functions became, paradoxically enough, weak and unable to perform its limited but essential roles (ibid., p. 307, 1952, pp. 300–301). While entrepreneurial activity continued in the sense of technical innovation, government economic policy became virtually indistinguishable from the particular interests of established businesses and politically connected entrepreneurs (Eucken, 1932b, p. 304). The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the state was no longer subject to an absolutist monarch or small powerful executive. Instead it was highly susceptible to the dynamics created by the emergence of mass movements who exerted increasing power as a consequence of the steady democratization of political life. In these circumstances, state power had ‘no unifying thought or will’ (ibid., p. 307). It was subsequently unable to resist the pressures of interest groups and the masses. Economic liberty was consequently diminished. When competition was restricted, the question of power became unavoidable (Eucken [1940] 1992, p. 202). The
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solution, in Eucken’s view, was to work toward a separation of the political and economic realms that was as unambiguous as possible (1932b, p. 302). Eucken’s work in the 1920s and early 1930s thus focused upon theoretical argumentation supplemented with some historical analysis in order to shed light on Germany’s particular economic and political problems. Gradually, however, Eucken became persuaded that neither Menger’s theoretical approach nor Schmoller’s historical–empiricism were adequate for his purposes. Neither Menger’s insistence on separating theory and history nor Schmoller’s ‘pure empiricism’ did ‘justice to economic reality’. Consequently, Eucken concluded, ‘a new start is necessary’ ([1940] 1992, p. 324). ‘Economic science’, he claimed, ‘is compelled to do justice to the historical diversity of economic forms and yet, at the same time, to treat problems in a theoretical and general way’ (1951, p. 87). A major reason for this development in Eucken’s thought was the influence of the legal theorist, Franz Böhm, whom Eucken encountered after taking up his chair at Freiburg. Böhm was especially interested in the role of law in shaping economic conditions. Having served in Germany’s economics ministry in the 1920s, Böhm witnessed at first hand how farmers and industrialists worked closely with politicians to ensure that the German economy remained on a dirigiste path. ‘The experience of the last decades has shown’, Böhm contended, ‘that business associations and interest groups have mastered the art of turning every politically influential ideology to their own purpose in a most effective manner’ (1933, p. xi). Among the many restraints on competition created though business collusion with politicians, Böhm was especially attentive to cartelization. This was a prime example of law, he noted, being shaped to justify preexisting anti-competitive economic practices. From Böhm’s standpoint, the critical problem was not simply that it undermined competition. It also eroded crucial distinctions between the public and private spheres when it came to the subject of power. As Knut Wollgang Nörr observes, ‘Public power over public matters, i.e., government, was accepted, as was private power in the private sphere . . . but not private power transcending the private sphere and spreading out into the public’ (2000, p. 155). This was to become a central concern of the emerging Freiburg school of ordoliberalism. As Böhm commented retrospectively: The question which preoccupied us all was . . . the question of private power in a free society. This leads by necessity to the further question of what an order of a free economy is made of. From there one arrives at the question, what kinds and possibilities of economic power are at all feasible, what role is played by power in each, in fact the power of government as well as the power of private persons and groups, and what obstructions of order arise if a distribution of
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In 1933, Böhm produced his magnum opus Wettbewerb und Monopolkampf (Competition and the Struggle against Monopolism). Apart from representing the most powerful critique of cartelization and protectionist policies of the early 1930s, this text was an early exercise in what later came to be called ‘economic constitutionalism’. As summarized in the famous Ordo Manifesto composed by Böhm, Eucken and the lesser-known Hans Grossman-Doerth, this project consisted ‘of viewing individual economic questions as constituent parts of a greater whole. The treatment of all practical political–legal and political–economic questions must be keyed to the idea of the economic constitution . . . The economic constitution must be understood as a general political decision as to how the economic life of the nation is to be structured’ (Eucken, Böhm and Grossman-Doerth [1936] 1989, pp. 23–4). Normatively speaking, economic constitutionality was concerned with an equality of rights, personal liberty and protecting the liberty of action of the individual and the state against established economic power (Möschel, 2001, p. 157). Other economic liberals working outside the emerging Freiburg school arrived at similar conclusions in the same time period. In 1935, Hayek claimed that ‘The question as to which is the most appropriate permanent framework which will secure the smoothest and most efficient working of competition is of the greatest importance and one which must be admitted has been sadly neglected by economics’ ([1935] 1948, p. 135). Part of Böhm’s reason for writing his 1932 book was to demonstrate that, from a legal perspective, the free market was by no means ‘unfettered’. Market economies, he argued, embodied a distinct order based on the idea of competition. Competition, Böhm held, possessed the characteristics of an institution because it was predicated upon certain political and legal decisions that allowed it to emerge. Once competition existed, the legal system was responsible for protecting its foundations from rent-seeking interest groups. This was consistent with law’s purposes, Böhm maintained, precisely because the role of law was to serve the common good rather than the sectional interests of any one group – including civil servants. The moment that law begins serving vested interests, reverence for law is bound to decline and competition as the organizing principle of economic life gradually disappears (Böhm, 1933, p. 323). Instead the effort of private businesses shifts from entrepreneurship and wealth-creation to political manipulation and bureaucratic lobbying. In this scenario, consumers lose out to the organized efforts of well-organized businesses, industries and
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unions who essentially manipulate markets for their own benefit. Part of the moral value of the ordoliberal vision of the economy lay precisely in the fact that it sought to make the market as free of privileges as possible. Though Böhm did explore how different historical ideas, such as Rousseau’s theory of the General Will, had contributed to the state succumbing to powerful interests (Böhm [1966] 1989), his approach to economics was primarily theoretical. In Wettbewerb und Monopolkampf, Böhm specified that he was seeking to translate the language of classical political economy into the parlance of legal discourse. In doing so, he facilitated something of a mini-revolution in much German economically liberal opinion by underscoring the importance of institutions – something highlighted by the historical school – but without embracing the historicist error. Böhm’s conclusion was that free exchange required the formal definition of property rights and the specification of a set of rules which allowed people of equal legal status to freely associate with each other through private contracts. Cartels, to Böhm’s mind, exemplified how private contracts, often with the support of the legal system and government, were used to shelter sections of the economy from competition. Hence it was necessary for the law to ensure that markets remained open to competition, not least because competition helped limit consolidation of political and economic power. In this sense, legal guarantees of competition indirectly protected the economic and political liberty of individuals. As Streit and Wohlgemuth observe, this is one of Freiburg ordoliberalism’s most important insights (2000, p. 231). They were not prepared to allow people to freely decide among themselves to restrain the economic freedom of others, especially consumers, which, as Viktor Vanberg stresses, is a central emphasis of Smithian political economy (2004, p. 12). Under Böhm’s influence, Eucken’s attention began shifting toward developing a policy of order to realize and maintain a free-market economy. In 1961, Röpke recalled that at the second Mont Pèlerin meeting in 1949, Eucken and Mises had engaged in a major dispute about how to address monopolies which in turn led to a wider argument about the organizing concept of the market economy. For Mises, it was the unhampered market. Eucken by contrast believed that it was a competitive and constitutional order (Röpke, 1961a, p. 10; Vanberg, 2004, p. 16). One of Eucken’s criticisms of nineteenth-century liberalism was that it left the rules governing economic life up to uncontrolled development and seemed to deny that law – especially rule of law – had a role in improving social conditions in the sense of promoting justice, especially in the sense of contractual equity. Instead of simply waiting for economic problems to resolve themselves, Eucken claimed that there had to be a ‘general political decision’ to create and protect an economy characterized by freedom and
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complete competition, by which, as Hans Willgerodt observes, Eucken did not mean ‘perfect competition’ but rather the minimization of arbitrary coercive power (Willgerodt, 1975). Once this basic framework was in place, the state was responsible for maintaining the legal and institutional framework of a free economy, but should not meddle in the process of market competition, especially the price mechanism (Eucken, 1951, p. 96). Undergirding Eucken’s ordo framework were one ‘fundamental’, seven ‘constitutive’ and four ‘regulative’ principles. The fundamental principle required for free competition, Eucken specified, was an efficient and free price system. This ruled out policies such as exchange controls and monopolies. The constitutive principles were a commitment to a stable anti-inflationary monetary system; open markets and free trade; protection of private property; freedom to contract (without allowing people to contract in ways that diminish others’ freedom to contract); liabilities for people’s formal commitments and choices (thereby tying risk to responsibility); constancy of economic policy (in the sense of avoiding decisions that create uncertainty); and, lastly, acknowledging the interdependence of all the aforementioned constitutive principles (Eucken, 1952, p. 254ff). When it came to government interventions in the economy, Eucken sought to limit these to what he called ‘regulative principles’ consistent with maintaining a free market, such as prohibiting the establishment of monopolies (ibid., pp. 291–4). An economy controlled by monopolies and cartels effectively destroyed the liberty of other market participants, thus rendering meaningless the rule of law (ibid., pp. 41–55). The second principle was ‘incomes policy’, by which he meant redistributive measures (such as progressive taxation) when market outcomes were socially unacceptable. Third, under the heading of ‘economic calculation’, Eucken identified the internalization of external costs of the technological development associated with economic progress, such as environmental protection. Eucken’s fourth regulative principle concerned the labor market. Here he was willing to countenance the setting of a minimum wage as well as trade unions, provided that they respected the limits established by market competition. According to Eucken, these principles required the existence of a state strong enough to resist interest-group pressures, but whose own authority was strictly limited by the same principles. This necessitated a political constitution that protected the economic constitution while itself being rendered immune from the machinations of power-seekers. For Eucken and Böhm, the political order thus had a twofold task. First, it had to articulate a highly developed system of checks and balances that inhibited the potential for arbitrary uses of state power. Its second task was to
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secure the independence of those with the legitimate authority to make laws from pressures exerted by interest groups (Streit and Wohlgemuth, 2000, p. 231).
ECONOMICS AND HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY: RÜSTOW AND MÜLLER-ARMACK While Eucken and Böhm focused on developing a type of economic–legal constitutionalism, their fellow economic liberals, Alexander Rüstow and Alfred Müller-Armack, sought to integrate the study of economics with insights derived from historical sociology. Unlike Eucken and Böhm, Rüstow returned from World War I a convinced socialist. Like Böhm, Rüstow worked in the economics ministry in the immediate post-war period, and was responsible for plans to nationalize Germany’s Ruhr coal industry. The ongoing instability of Weimar governments in the 1920s made implementation of such plans increasingly improbable, so much so that Rüstow resigned from the ministry in 1924 to become research director for the German tool and dye industry association (VDMA). This industry was negatively affected by the coal and steel cartels’ price-fixing practices and the protection extended by the state to East Elbian agricultural interests in the form of import duties on grain and direct financial assistance. These experiences facilitated Rüstow’s disillusionment with socialism (Rüstow, 1980, pp. xiii–xxix) and turned him into a prominent and vocal anti-dirigisite. Rüstow’s substantial intellectual contribution to German neoliberalism began in 1932, when, during a presentation at the Verein, he insisted that liberating the state and law from the influence of rent-seeking pressure groups, cartels and legally sanctioned monopolies had to be central to any new program of economic liberalism ([1932] 1982, pp. 185–6). Rüstow also argued that the state’s economic role should primarily be one of protecting competition from any interest group seeking legal privileges (ibid., p. 186). This meant that while the state’s power should be limited, it should also be strong enough to defend the market economy from private actors. Rüstow’s subsequent call for a strong state in the interests of a liberal economic policy was to be immensely influential on those Germans rethinking economic liberalism in the post-Depression era. Rüstow’s concerns about the social question led him to advocate particular redistributionist policies, such as inheritance taxes (Rüstow, 1950, p. 98), to reduce economic inequities in society. More significantly, Rüstow held – like Schmoller – that markets tended to undermine social cohesion: ‘competition as such’, he wrote, ‘appealing as it does solely to selfishness
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as a motivating force, can neither improve the morals of individuals nor assist social integration; it is for this reason all the more dependent upon other ethical and sociological forces of coherence’ (Rüstow in Röpke, 1942, p. 272). Rüstow chose to invest much of his energy in explaining why this was the case. Throughout the 1930s, most of which he spent as an exile in Turkey, Rüstow began connecting his economic liberalism with his growing interest in the history of ideas. In a series of reviews and essays which gradually turned into books, Rüstow sought to explain why economic liberalism, which dominated much of nineteenth-century Western Europe, had become discredited by 1919. He eventually concluded that the problem was ultimately one of the intellectual and religious culture associated with laissez-faire, an argument he articulated at great length at the end of World War II (Rüstow, 1945) but later expanded upon in his own opus, Freedom and Domination. Rüstow’s argument was that classical Smithian economics was born at a period in which the late-Enlightenment Deistic confidence in natural harmonies dominated much eighteenth-century intellectual life. According to Rüstow, ‘Eighteenth-century deism . . . was permeated with the religious belief that the laws of the market are effluences of divine world reason’ (1980, p. 455). This led to economic liberalism absorbing a type of ‘sociologic blindness’ (ibid.) to the political, social and legal preconditions that allow markets to work in the first place. The mistake of laissez-faire advocates, Rüstow maintained, was their failure to realize that only ‘so long as the unrelenting market police of a strong and independent state excludes every private formation of monopoly and every obstacle to competition [will] the market economy produce an automatic harmonization of self-interest and public weal’ (ibid.). The absence of such an authority ‘above’ the market allowed established businesses to diminish competition through cartels and state-sponsored policies of tariffs, subsidies and regulation. In this light, Rüstow suggested, one could hardly blame Western Europe’s working classes for adopting similar strategies. The most obvious such maneuver was the efforts of trade unions to establish labor monopolies and request state assistance in doing so (ibid., p. 456). On these grounds, Rüstow sought to distinguish between ‘the freemarket economy of perfect competition, which constitutes the normal object of liberal economic theory’ and its impure historical expression, ‘the subsidy-ridden, monopolistic, protectionist, pluralist economy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that resulted in a quasi-theological perversion of laissez-faire’ (ibid., p. 459). The latter, Rüstow added, was properly designated as ‘capitalism’ (ibid.). Rüstow conceded that this distinction meant that he agreed with Marx’s proposition that ‘this “capitalist” economy, carried further, must perforce lead to communism and
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collectivism’ (ibid., p. 458). But Rüstow insisted that what he considered to be the true market economy did not necessarily lead to ‘capitalism’. Nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century ‘capitalism’ was a phenomenon of the market economy’s corruption from its gradual association with non-economic elements ‘inimical’ to the market economy. A crucial part of Rüstow’s Schmoller-like attention to history was his growing conviction that the market economy’s degeneration into ‘capitalism’ formed part of a historical stream going back to Antiquity in which societies had struggled, usually unsuccessfully, to preserve freedom against the forces of domination. Rüstow celebrated the High Middle Ages as a period in which, for all its faults, freedom had achieved an eminence that had since proved difficult to replicate. However, he viewed the Enlightenment more ambivalently and the French Revolution as a positively regressive step. Similar sentiments are found in the writings of another German economic liberal – Alfred Müller-Armack. Müller-Armack’s path toward economic liberalism was more complicated than that of Eucken, Böhm and Rüstow. A committed Christian and intensely interested in Catholic social teaching, Müller-Armack obtained his doctorate at the University of Cologne in 1932, and became an established professor on the Cologne faculty in 1939 (Watrin, 2000, p. 193). Müller-Armack spent much of the 1920s working on business-cycle theory. While he opposed price controls as a way to dampen business-cycle fluctuations, Müller-Armack also held that allowing wage levels to fluctuate in an unhampered manner was ineffective. Far better, he argued, were restrictive credit policies, preferably implemented by banks, which should be used early in the upswing of the business cycle rather than in the boom’s later stages as its momentum began declining (Müller-Armack, 1929). Business-cycle theory was an important component of Müller-Armack’s overall economic vision, not least because it reflected the reality of the market system as a dynamic and open economic phenomenon whose future could not be predicted (Müller-Armack, 1932). This contradicted the Marxist position that capitalism’s very nature would lead it in the very predictable direction of socialism and eventually communism (Watrin, 2000, pp. 196–7). Müller-Armack, however, perceived a greater threat to the market’s open nature as emanating from the sphere of politics. Politics was, in his view, inevitable because there was no ‘end of history’ in which, for example, peaceful trade universally prevailed. The persistence of historical contingencies and human error meant that politics understood as ‘the artificial regulation of human relations’ could not be avoided. The political order always had the ability to expand beyond the boundaries set by laissez-faire policies, and was always susceptible to being captured by pressure groups. Both of these potentialities, Müller-Armack held, had
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been realized in Germany through the growth of cartels, successful lobbying by industry for economically illiberal policies, and the breakdown of the constitutional distinction between state and society, exemplified by government economic interventionism. Like Eucken, Rüstow and Böhm, much of Müller-Armack’s subsequent theoretical research was not concerned with trying to restore laissez-faire arrangements. It was, he believed, a ‘disastrous mistake to expect that the mechanism of the market itself will create the ultimately worthwhile social order’ (1947, p. 85). Given the inevitability of the market being subject to political pressures, Müller-Armack suggested that the most optimal approach was to design socially and economically interventionist policies that did not damage the competitive order’s fundamental institutions, but which also met modern industrial mass society’s peculiar social needs (1971, p. 51). He was looking for a way to allow interventions which did not undermine a price system capable of adapting to changing consumer preferences, the coordination of economic life through competition, and a system of rules that encouraged entrepreneurship. Interventions that did not violate these vital prerequisites for markets, Müller-Armack believed, allowed economic freedom to be integrated with measures that provided some degree of social security. Security, he argued, did not require nullifying the rules underlying the market. That, Müller-Armack argued, was the mistake of measures such as price controls (1947, p. 107). Yet Müller-Armack had no objection in principle to ‘open direct subsidies’ because he regarded these as preferable to barring access to markets or hidden subsidies. Direct subsidies were subject to scrutiny and therefore, he maintained, more likely to go to those truly in need (ibid., p. 109). Müller-Armack’s willingness to permit government interventions in the economy went far beyond what Eucken and Böhm thought permissible, and even exceeded Rüstow’s parameters. Müller-Armack was thus closer to Schmoller than others commonly identified with ordoliberalism and sociological neoliberalism – something that Müller-Armack acknowledged later in life ([1973] 1974, p. 83). On several occasions, he noted that his economic philosophy was grounded ‘in dynamic theory and in philosophical anthropology, both of which were developed in the twenties, in a different view of the state and the further development of the idea of style, which is usually rejected by neoliberalism’ ([1962] 1974, pp. 148–9). By ‘style’, Müller-Armack meant a ‘stylistic coordination between the spheres of life of the market, the state and societal groups’ (ibid., p. 149). To this extent, he agreed with the historical school that the economy’s formal direction towards realization of specific political and social ends was achievable and desirable (Müller-Armack [1973] 1974, p. 248).
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Müller-Armack also shared Schmoller and Rüstow’s interest in theories of historical development (Müller-Armack [1948b] 1974, p. 108). This may explain why, as Christian Watrin notes, Müller-Armack’s ‘publications on political economy were permeated with social-philosophical reflections’ (2000, p. 214). These thoughts also reflected a central conclusion of Müller-Armack’s research: that economic, social, and political institutions are powerfully shaped by different religious convictions (Müller-Armack, 1944, p. 110). Müller-Armack was not inclined to determinist positions, but, following the line of inquiry outlined in Weber’s Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, looked carefully at the intellectual and spiritual roots of different economic arrangements and concluded that different religious convictions explained many variations between Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox Europe. The close links, Müller-Armack argued, between Eastern Orthodoxy and the state had meant that it was harder for any significant non-familial, non-state forms of association, such as market economies, to emerge in Orthodox countries. By contrast, Catholicism had helped facilitate Western Europe’s feudal culture in the Middle Ages. This made it difficult for national boundaries to take root, thereby encouraging relatively free trade throughout Western Europe. Looking at Protestant-influenced areas, Müller-Armack noted that Calvinist regions had quickly developed the basics of a liberal economic system, while Lutheranism’s bolstering of royal power in the post-Reformation period helped foster absolutism, strong state bureaucracies, and less-liberal economic arrangements. In later works, Müller-Armack argued that the Enlightenment had given rise to a particular understanding of reason that facilitated economic progress, but which also helped spawn totalitarian-inclined movements, ranging from French Jacobinism to Marxism–Leninism (1948a). The point of these historical excursions was Müller-Armack’s desire to reconcile apparently opposing forces, ranging from Catholic social teaching and Protestant social ethics, to classical liberalism and corporatism. Following World War II, he focused on balancing the need for social protections with the requirements of a market economy. Here Müller-Armack differed from Eucken, Böhm and even Rüstow who generally regarded the market economy’s ‘social’ aspect as ensuring that the market embraced as many people as possible, rather than attempting to balance the outcomes of market transactions, or synthesize corporatist-like arrangements with the market. Müller-Armack was thus prepared to contemplate codetermination arrangements in businesses that exceeded a certain number of employees, government subsidies for small business, and even policies aimed at eliminating business cycles in the name of full employment (Müller-Armack [1960] 1982, pp. 53–61). Without the active promotion
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of social cohesion, Müller-Armack believed, it was questionable how long the market economy could sustain itself.
RÖPKE AND THE NEW ECONOMIC LIBERALISM After World War II, Eucken, Böhm, Rüstow and Müller-Armack exerted considerable influence upon West German economic policy. Böhm was a prominent member of the Bundestag, while MüllerArmack served as State Secretary in the Ministry of Economics, and was thus close to Ludwig Erhard. This does not mean, however, that they promoted identical policies. As Razeen Sally observes, ‘there are some differences in emphasis, and some differences in content, between the Freiburg School and the “sociological neoliberalism” of the others’ (1998, p. 106). Though not inattentive to history, Eucken and Böhm focused upon the intersection between the legal and economic realms whereas Rüstow and Müller-Armack incorporated stronger sociological, historical and religious emphases into their writings. Rüstow and Müller-Armack were also more willing to permit state intervention in the economy than Eucken and Böhm, and more explicit about their ambition to develop a ‘third way’ which retained laissez-faire’s benefits and avoided socialism. Nevertheless the similarities should not be downplayed. Like Keynes, the German new liberals were prepared to consider significant changes to capitalism in order to ‘save’ the best of the market economy. Apart from their common conviction that a return to laissez-faire was neither possible nor desirable, both the ordoliberals and sociological neoliberals sought, in their own ways, to overcome the theory–history division. Whereas the historical school took the view that history was theory, Eucken, Böhm, Rüstow and Müller-Armack’s writings reflect a keen interest in theoretical questions on their own terms. But none, however, was prepared to consider these matters as ahistorical phenomena. Ordoliberals and sociological neoliberals also had a common interest in maintaining a social order that upheld liberty over the long term. They did not regard economic efficiency or free markets as ends in themselves. It was about realizing certain normative goals. Likewise these economists’ diagnoses of Germany’s economic and political problems had much in common. All placed a premium on preventing the state’s capture by interest groups and wanted to elevate the state to a position whereby its powers were clear, limited and immune to being co-opted to serve sectional ends. Finally, all were driven by a sense that Germany’s economic problems were not simply the result of mistaken
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economic theories, but also moral and political errors. From a Hayekian perspective, some of their ideas may seem somewhat constructivist. But in the context of a society as traumatized as Germany after 1918 and 1945, such policies are understandable. For a brief period after World War I, Röpke adopted mildly socialist views. It was, he commented retrospectively, the natural position of ‘those who wished to make a radical protest against the Prussian system’ (1959f, p. 229). But Röpke soon concluded that a great deal of the ‘Prussian mentality lay hidden in this same socialism’ (ibid.). Röpke’s conversion to economic liberalism was not instantaneous. While his 1922 doctoral thesis sharply criticized nationalization schemes, it also suggested that high wages would incentivize more productivity by wage-earners, while low wages decreased productivity. In the same text, Röpke advocated some degree of worker participation in the management of companies, arguing that it would ease industrial tensions (1922a, pp. 69–70). Röpke later became deeply skeptical of codetermination arrangements, arguing that they were often used by unions to extend their power and invariably placed people in positions of responsibility for which they were simply unqualified ([1958f] 1998, pp. 299–300). By the mid-1920s, Röpke had become familiar with Eucken and Rüstow, most notably through regular attendance at conferences of the Verein, meetings of the Friedrich-List-Gesellschaft, and gatherings of the German League for Free Economic Policy (Nicholls, 1994, pp. 49–57). They regularly corresponded with each other as individuals with whom they need not dissemble. This was especially true in the case of Rüstow and Röpke, particularly after they went into exile in 1933. Many elements of Röpke’s understanding of political economy were already in place by the time he left Germany. While it is an exaggeration to claim that his thought changed radically during his time in Turkey and Switzerland, it did undergo significant development. In reviewing Eucken’s Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie, Röpke argued that Eucken’s focus on a narrow data-set contributed to the book’s ‘excessively narrow’ examination of its subject matter ([1940] 1959, p. 339). The same criticism could not have been made of Röpke, even in his earlier days when his own economic focus was relatively narrow in comparison to his later works. Like Müller-Armack, Röpke was deeply interested in philosophical anthropology and the influence of religion. He shared Rüstow’s passion for history. At the same time, Röpke believed, like the Austrians, that certain economic truths transcend culture and can be recognized through theoretical exposition. This much is apparent from Röpke’s own understanding of the nature of economics, to which we now turn.
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NOTES 1. More recently, the terms ‘neoliberal’ and ‘neoliberalism’ have lost a core common meaning in the way that, for example, the expression ‘Keynesianism’ has not. This partly flows from contemporary tendencies to use ‘neoliberal’ or ‘neoliberalism’ to label polemically many positions with little in common. ‘Ordoliberal’ and ‘ordoliberalism’ have a more settled meaning. But even here one should be cautious. Streit and Wohlgemuth note that ordoliberalism was not a monolithic intellectual phenomenon (2000, p. 225). 2. Despite his criticisms of Versailles’ implications for Germany’s political and economic future, Keynes argued for imposing free trade upon Germany for twice as long as required by Versailles (Keynes [1919] 2007, p. 152). 3. The broad German ‘neoliberal’ tradition includes figures such as Leonhard Miksch and Constantine von Dietze. We focus, however, on a select number who most represent certain trends in this movement. 4. Röpke (1926c) was also dismissive of the alleged connection between currency speculation and inflation.
3.
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The master-economist must possess a rare combination of gifts. He must reach a high standard in several different directions and must combine talents not often found together. He must be mathematician, historian, statesman, philosopher – in some degree. He must understand symbols and speak in words. He must comprehend the particular in terms of the general, and touch abstract and concrete in the same flight of thought. He must study the present in light of the past for the purposes of the future. No part of man’s nature or his institutions must lie entirely outside his regard. He must be purposeful and disinterested in a simultaneous mood; as aloof and incorruptible as an artist, yet sometimes as near the earth as a politician. John Maynard Keynes (1924, pp. 173–4)
When Keynes penned these words in his obituary of Alfred Marshall (1842–1924), regarded by many as the doyen of the economics profession of his time, Keynes may have been outlining the type of economist he himself aspired to be. Some were left wondering if anyone was capable of attaining such distinction. More importantly, Keynes’s description provides some insight into what he understood economics to be: a discipline with scientific characteristics, but which depended for its efficacy on the cultivation of particular intellectual and moral habits and certain practical skills. For one whose thought was to reshape radically the direction of economics, Keynes wrote relatively little on the nature and method of economics. Most of Keynes’s views on this subject have to be inferred from his writings (Dostaler, 2007, p. 70). This is not uncommon among economists. Relatively few economists in the past or present devote significant energy trying to delineate more precisely the character of their science. Such questions involve their own sets of controversies. Hence many economists prefer to apply established theories and concepts to more immediate practical problems. Nevertheless, as the Methodenstreit demonstrated, an economist’s particular understanding of the nature of economics is important in shaping the forms and ends of his particular inquiries. Attempts to recast economics can thus re-orientate the teaching and practice of political economy for considerable expanses of time. The debates fueled by the publication of Keynes’s General Theory were intense not only because Keynes’s thought played a significant role in reconfiguring most Western economics. Many of Keynes’s critics were concerned with what they regarded as his effort to change the essence of economics itself. 45
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Efforts to reshape economics are not new. Marshall’s Principles of Economics (1890) sought to rescue economics from what he regarded as the chaos into which it had descended in the nineteenth century’s last quarter. There were, Marshall believed, three reasons for this. The first was attacks from those who regarded Smithian classical political economy as lacking substantial moral foundations. Second, there were the methodological questions raised by the German historical school. Lastly, Marshall was attentive to the critique of classical value theory (that a good’s price depends on its production cost) by figures such as W.S. Jevons and Carl Menger, both of whom argued that value is entirely dependent upon utility. Much of Marshall’s work subsequently involved attempting to reconcile these critiques with the older economic doctrines. But Marshall also sought to refurnish economics with claims to ethical substance by showing how a range of economic phenomena such as incentives required and generated moral habits such as thrift and honesty. This chapter analyzes Röpke’s view of the nature of economics and the role of the economist. It traces his understanding of how modern economic science emerged and his conception of economics’ positive and normative dimensions. We then consider Röpke’s diagnosis of trends in modern economic thinking. Over time, Röpke became increasingly concerned about what he thought was happening to economic science and its implications for human freedom. On one level, Röpke consistently warned against rationalism’s influence upon economics. But Röpke was also perturbed about Keynesianism’s impact upon economic science and economic policy. Sound political economy was, Röpke insisted, impossible if a false vision of economics prevailed, if economists did not recognize their own science’s advantages and limitations, or if they sacrificed the integrity of economic science to the zeitgeist’s demands.
HISTORY AND ECONOMIC SCIENCE No-one familiar with Röpke’s writings could accuse him of limiting his attention to positive economics. Even his more technical writings contain philosophical and historical analysis. Business-cycle theory was an early area of interest for Röpke. Yet his most substantive analysis of the subject, Crises and Cycles, contains an entire chapter tracing the history of economic booms and busts in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries (Röpke, 1936a, pp. 38–60). Admitting that such a historical account is difficult because of ‘scrappy and inaccurate data’ (ibid., p. 38), Röpke nonetheless enters into considerable detail about the specifics of different business cycles. He directs attention to matters ranging from the impact
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of particular events, such as the Californian gold discoveries (ibid., p. 42), to changes in industrial output and bankruptcy levels (ibid., p. 44). Large portions of Röpke’s post-1940 works contain as much historical sociology as strict economics. Then there are Röpke’s excursions into economic history, such as his L’Economie mondiale aux XIXe et XXe siècles (1959c). Röpke’s attention to these matters did not mean that he had embraced the historical school’s methodological claims. None of his writings contains the type of exhaustive statistical compilation and analysis typical of Schmoller and his followers. Nor does Röpke attempt to ‘uncover’ laws of general historical development, as proposed by early historical school figures such as Roscher. In another sense, however, some of Röpke’s writings suggest that he agreed with the historical school’s emphasis upon each nation’s history reflecting differing paths of economic development. In German Commercial Policy and The German Question, Röpke stresses how certain political and intellectual trends helped shape the German economy between 1871 and 1945. Nowhere, however, does Röpke suggest that this history necessitates a highly economically interventionist state in Germany. Röpke’s German Question argued that the political and economic policies pursued by Germany since Bismarck and praised by the historical school were now so discredited that Germany could make a decisive break with its dirigiste past ([1945b] 1946, pp. 182–214). Defeated Germany, Röpke wrote, ‘offers particularly favorable conditions for carrying out an anti-collectivist programme, for the very reason that she has pursued the collectivist path to the very end’ (ibid., p. 192). For Röpke, the insights of economic science transcended historical considerations, even if attention to the latter was important for economists seeking to understand the particular opportunities and obstacles facing different countries. Even when Röpke enters into highly detailed discussions of the relationship between ideas and economic developments, he maintains a demarcation between economic science and extra-economic subjects. While Röpke was interested in reconnecting normative and positive economic science with historical narrative, he was not seeking to pursue the type of research agenda advocated by the historical school. Instead Röpke’s attention to historical concerns owes something to his wariness of excessive abstraction, a concern that pervades his reflections upon the nature of economics.
THE ORIGIN OF ECONOMICS An accurate understanding of the character of economics began, for Röpke, with reflection upon its origins. At the most basic level, Röpke
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maintains that humanity’s perennial search for truth was as central to the emergence of economics as it was to natural sciences such as physics. This quest for truth arose from man’s innate desire to explain why certain things occur in the natural and human world. Even apparently banal daily occurrences such as buying and selling goods demand explanation. Once people sense that there is more going on behind the daily humdrum of the exchange of goods and services than hitherto realized, they have began to engage in economic inquiry (Röpke [1937a] 1963, p. 1). They start, for example, to construct theories about the relationship of prices to competition so as to discern the order that underlies these happenings. As Röpke later put it, ‘the operation of economics has again and again shown itself to be a question of order. Order is something continuous; in its true sense, it is a harmony of parts, not a regularity imposed from without’ (1959f, p. 232). Röpke acknowledged that economic theories may not capture the entirety of a given economic reality. Nevertheless, he also regarded theoretical explanations as indispensible if people were to make any reasoned judgment concerning why a given set of economic circumstances differed from the abstract economic conditions associated with the theory of free prices (1956i, pp. 115–16, 1964e, pp. 78–85). Röpke’s claim that the theory of the free price mechanism should be a working assumption of economics may seem odd inasmuch as it appears to deny a priori the possibility of any economic policy seeking to replace free prices. But Röpke’s point is not that it is impossible to devise socialist economic theories. Rather it is that a socialist economy’s workings cannot be explained without comparing them to the theoretical pattern of free prices. Another reason for Röpke’s linkage between modern economics as a distinct post-Aristotelian social science and something as central to the market economy as free prices is his conviction that modern economics owed much to the growth of modern economic arrangements. Writing in a festschrift for Ludwig von Mises in 1956, Röpke argued that ‘economics is, in the main, a science which is rooted in our market economy’. This makes economics ‘a matter of catallactics’ (1956i, p. 115). Modern economics emerged in part because people wanted to understand how such an extraordinarily complex system as the market economy functioned without any conscious central control. ‘Honesty’, Röpke wrote, ‘compels the admission that the existence of ordered anarchy is cause for astonishment, that it is something which urgently requires explanation’ ([1937a] 1963, p. 4). Another cause for wonder was the objective fact of the superiority of what Röpke called this ‘spontaneous order’ over the commanded order. By superiority, Röpke meant the manner in which market economies created wealth, harmoniously coordinated the supply and demand of
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services and goods, and provided millions with basic necessities and luxuries without generating chaos (ibid., pp. 1–3, 1953f). Röpke thought that modern economics owed something to people’s desire to understand these and other features of market economies. Studying ‘parts’ such as interest, money and prices became as interesting as the study of the ‘whole’. It was not, however, simply the existence of market economies that, to Röpke’s mind, facilitated the development of modern economics. Contemporary economics owed much to the concurrent emergence of markets in free societies ([1937a] 1963, p. 4). The market, he held, was inseparable from political and legal arrangements that promoted liberty. Neither these liberties nor free economic arrangements had appeared ex nihilo in the eighteenth century. The economies of the Middle Ages, Röpke argued, were far from being ‘natural economies’ in the sense of being money-less. Instead they prefigured the type of ‘world economy’ which ended with the outbreak of war in 1914 (ibid., p. 15). Medieval economies were based heavily on business enterprise, generally characterized by free trade, and emphasized the production of consumer goods. These features crumbled under the weight of mercantilism and the rise of nation-states (ibid., pp. 15–16). At the same time, Röpke maintained that the development of critical reason and what he called ‘liberal rationalism’ in the 1700s ([1933d] 1969, pp. 89–91) was crucial in establishing economics as a distinct form of intellectual inquiry. Under the impact of eighteenth-century Enlightenment reasoning, the economy became viewed as a work of human intelligence and action and thus subject to rational investigation. Critical reason probed the causes of everything and became the ‘incorruptible arbiter’ (ibid., p. 90). When the mercantilist practices of the time were subject to critical reason, they were found wanting. Thus ‘economics as a science’, Röpke argued, ‘has its origin in rational criticism of the naively unscientific government practices of mercantilism’ (ibid., p. 91). This critique, especially when accompanied by the Enlightenment’s stress on freedom, developed into liberal rationalism which itself evolved into a program of economic liberalism. Reason, freedom and economic inquiry became intertwined, the result being that ‘economic liberalism in effect [coincided] with economics’ (ibid., p. 90). Röpke’s view of the Enlightenment’s impact upon the way people conceptualized the economy was not uncritical. He believed that the same liberal rationalism which broke mercantilism’s sway over men’s minds also laid socialism’s foundations (ibid.). Nonetheless, Röpke argued, a true science of collectivist economics was impossible inasmuch as collectivism involved subordinating free prices to the achievement of particular political objectives (1956i, p. 115). For better or worse, Röpke held, true
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economics was a science of market economics. Even the honest study of collectivist economies underlined the validity of basic imperatives derived from analysis of market economies, such as the necessity of choice among given alternatives, the drive for optimal utilization of scarce resources, and the signaling functioning of prices (ibid., pp. 114–15).
ECONOMICS AS POSITIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE To Röpke’s mind, the market economy’s emergence was a decisive factor in making economics more than a descriptive activity. Yet he insisted that economics was a social rather than a natural science insofar as its most fundamental unit of analysis was the human being, and more particularly human acts and relationships in light of the fact of scarcity. But within this categorization, two distinct yet interrelated dimensions to Röpke’s vision of economics can be identified. The first is best described as positive-analytical, the other as normative. If, Röpke suggested, prices reflected relationships that could be identified and sometimes even quantified, then economic science was capable of assuming the analytical characteristics of a positive science ([1937a] 1963, p. 115). According to Röpke, economics had three central concerns as a positive science. One was economics’ peculiar attention to what he called ‘the logic of relationships’ (ibid., p. 118). This focus on interdependencies was perhaps the most difficult thing for non-economists to grasp. It was ‘second nature’ for the economist to think in terms of relationships; to know, for instance, that wages and employment are intimately and reciprocally related. But the logic of relationships was not only one of dualities. Economics recognized that the interdependencies radiated beyond these phenomena and affected, for instance, the price, supply and demand of given goods. Consistent study over time of these relationships and the achievement of a high degree of predictability about how these interdependencies affected each other was, Röpke stated, unique to positive economic analysis. A common error of economists, Röpke argued, was a failure to think through all the implications of different economic relationships. An inevitable degree of intuition was involved in this. By ‘intuition’, Röpke did not mean something like spontaneous judgments without the intervening force of reason. Instead he had in mind ‘that intuitive power which enables us to keep our eyes on all the complicated threads at once, and to emulate the juggler who never loses sight of a single one of the balls he is keeping aloft’ (1956i, p. 117). It was a state of mind developed by the economist who is not simply well trained but who maintains a ‘supreme attentiveness’ (ibid.,
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p. 118) to all possible implications of particular economic relationships. This may explain Röpke’s skepticism of economics’ capacity to make the type of predictions characteristic of the natural sciences. He regarded positive economics as involving qualitative judgments that sought not to predict precise future events, but rather reduce uncertainty through accumulating greater theoretical and experiential knowledge about how people act. The second concern of positive economic science for Röpke was the study of the workings of marginal utility – something he defined as the foundational concept for sound economic analysis. Much of human existence consisted of decisions that attempt to balance people’s unlimited wants and their limited means to satisfy them – that is, the fact of scarcity (Röpke [1937a] 1963, p. 8). By ‘limited’, Röpke did not mean an objective scarcity of things. There were many scarce things (such as bubonic plague) that humans had no need for and indeed were anxious to minimize. Conversely, there were things of which there is no shortage (such as water and air), but which can grow in value. The position of any good or thing in the scale of economic value was determined ultimately by the degree of subjective value attached to it by human beings (ibid., p. 8). A good’s subjective value was in turn determined by its marginal or final utility – not, for example, by the value we attach to the glass of water that saves our life, but rather the utility of the last dose of water we use to bathe ourselves. On this basis, Röpke concluded that marginal utility diminishes with the increasing possibility of satisfying a want; that marginal utility determines the utility of all other units of the supply; and that increasing the quantity of a good produces its corresponding fall in our scale of values, provided that our preferences remain stable (ibid., p. 9). Röpke’s reflections on marginal utility are not remarkable. They reflect commonly accepted elements of marginal theory as developed by Menger and Jevons. But Röpke considered it necessary to elaborate on these points for three reasons. First, Röpke believed the crucial significance of marginal utility was being ignored by some economists and actively denigrated by others, despite the fact that their own work implicitly accepted the importance of marginal utility (ibid., p. 16). Second, Röpke wanted to downplay the tendency to view marginal theory as marking a radical break with the classical theory articulated by Smith and Ricardo. Modern marginalist theory provided a clearer and more useful concept of utility (ibid., p. 16). Yet its explanatory power, Röpke insisted, could only be understood against the background of classical theory’s own attention to the importance of utility. Much marginalist theory involved the supplanting of classical theory’s objective-technical explanation of value with a subjective-economic explanation (ibid., pp. 17–18). This rendered
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redundant the classical school’s labor theory of value. And herein lay the third reason for Röpke’s attention to marginal utility. If the labor theory of value lacked scientific validity, then so too did Marxist economics inasmuch as it was based on the labor theory of value. Socialism could not be scientifically established on a key foundation that Marxists regarded as central to their methods of economic analysis (ibid., p. 18). This is an example of Röpke employing positive economic theory to challenge the basic validity of particular economic schools of thought. When marginal utility, scarcity and subjective value are put together, Röpke argued, we realize that study of the fact of limitation and the necessity of making choices are essential to economics. Faced with the unending necessity of balancing our unlimited wants with our limited means, people must choose which wants to satisfy and how much they wish to do so (ibid., p. 13). ‘It is certain’, Röpke holds, ‘that we shall arrange our purchases in such a fashion that the satisfaction procured by the last increment of one commodity will be approximately equal to that afforded by the last increment of any other commodity’ (ibid.). In other words, we constantly make decisions that seek to balance our means with our wants. These factors – choice, limitation, equalization of marginal utilities – determine how people use their resources and organize the production of goods and services. This is as true of an economy characterized by autarkic structures as an economy thoroughly integrated into the global market. To make a choice from possible alternatives is to economize. To this extent, Röpke maintained, economics is simply the science of alternatives (ibid., p. 14). The third concern of Röpke’s vision of positive economics is how people deal with scarcity. This was ‘the commonest point of departure’ for economics and had contributed significantly to the formation of classic data points for economics such as optimal utilization of resources and choice among alternatives (Röpke, 1956i, p. 114). Not only, Röpke suggested, do humans have to decide what needs they will satisfy and in which order in light of limited resources; they also need to make decisions about what methods to use as individuals and a society to wage the unending war against scarcity. In one sense, this involves a choice of method. But even prior to that decision, Röpke held, people must choose which of three moral stances they want to dominate their economy. At this point, Röpke’s understanding of positive economics begins to draw on normative terminology to achieve analytical clarity. The first moral position was described by Röpke as ‘the ethically negative’ method: that is, solving the scarcity problem by employing force to take others’ resources. The second was the ‘ethically positive’ method of altruism. This occurs when people are given things by others, albeit at the expense of those giving. The third was ‘the business principle’ – an ethically neutral method
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through which people increase their own well-being by increasing the wellbeing of others (Röpke [1937a] 1963, pp. 20–21). Reciprocal exchange and a division of labor are crucial elements of the business method. With this tripartite schema in place, Röpke demonstrated that all three organizing methods existed in any given economy, albeit to varying degrees. Altruism and the business principle were present even in command economies, albeit clandestinely. The use of force to satisfy wants certainly occurred in market economies – be it through theft or exorbitant taxation. Nor did the prevalence of the business principle inhibit people from being altruistic. Röpke also stressed that these ethical distinctions can be used to avoid errors when economists attempted scientific descriptions of different features of an economy. Many people made ‘the common mistake of attributing to the third method (business) acts which properly should be put to the account of the first (fraud, exploitation, etc)’ (ibid., p. 23). The same criteria also allowed people to avoid misleading language when engaging in positive economic analysis. One example was the tendency to describe the business method in terms appropriate for the method of coercion, epitomized by expressions such as ‘the conquest of markets’ (ibid., p. 24). Finally, Röpke’s invocation of normative criteria to clarify his positive descriptions of different ways of organizing an economy also allowed him to deepen understanding of the business method’s non-economic prerequisites. From a positive-scientific standpoint, Röpke noted that it was difficult to deny that the business method’s efficacy depended heavily upon people’s acceptance of norms of conduct, adherence to the basic rules governing market exchange, and avoidance of corruption, lying and manipulation of state power for personal ends (ibid., p. 25).
ECONOMICS AS NORMATIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE Just as Röpke’s view of economics’ positive-analytical dimensions invoked normative criteria at crucial points, Röpke’s treatment of economics’ normative dimension draws upon his understanding of positive economic analysis. For Röpke, true economists did not simply pursue research and leave it for others to decide the appropriate policy to be adopted. The point of positive economic analysis was not only the discernment of scientifically verifiable truth. The particular truths discovered through positive economics were unique contributions that economists could bring to discussions of what should be done in the policy realm. Here Röpke stressed that positive economic analysis allowed economists to remind people of the full costs of alternative uses of the same resources. He defined ‘costs’ as the renunciation of alternative utilities:
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that is, opportunity costs (ibid., p. 38).1 Using the example of building a bridge, Röpke observed that the engineer has the responsibility of constructing it. His ‘end’ is given. Conversely the economist shares in the wider responsibility of determining whether the bridge should be built at all. Economists compare, for instance, the cost of building the bridge with the costs of alternative means of routing traffic, with the cost of raising the taxes needed to pay for the bridge, with the cost of requiring taxpayers to renounce part of their personal utility. The economist then offers a view of whether the bridge ought to be built from the standpoint of whether it represents the best possible use of the available means in a given economy’s context (ibid., p. 27). The ‘positive’ aspect of economics was thus a major foundation of the economist’s normative recommendation qua economist. Röpke did not believe that the conclusions of positive economics should necessarily be the decisive element in determining policy-makers’ choice (1953b, p. 376). He was merely insisting upon a ‘trivial truth’: that economics can furnish public opinion and governments with specific guidance concerning the formation of public policy (1956i, pp. 124–5). The first and perhaps most important of these was the difficult but essential task of disabusing people of ‘home-grown economics’. Economic policy, Röpke lamented, was one subject where virtually all non-economists considered themselves competent to offer an informed opinion, despite often being ignorant of basic economic truths. This was complicated by the fact that even after some people were informed of the economic effects of particular courses of action, they often willfully ignored this advice (ibid., p. 125). The true economist’s ongoing struggle against home-grown economic falsities was, Röpke contended, perhaps the most important way in which economists could contribute to the maintenance of ‘culture’, defined as the essential structures and laws that allowed societies to function. With reference to Eucken’s study of the principles of economic policy (Eucken, 1952, p. 194), Röpke maintained that a culture in which most people have ceased to understand its inner laws – including economic truths – will not survive (1956i, p. 126). But the onus was on the economist to resist the temptation to ‘esoteric seclusion’ and to invest time and energy in explaining the methods of economics to elite and public opinion in a clear and intelligible manner (ibid., pp. 126–7). If anything, Röpke thought that this responsibility was even more incumbent on economists in the democratic age if populist economic policies (which he described as expressions of ‘mass superstition’) were to be resisted ([1933f] 1969, p. 47). Economists had to be willing to highlight all the inconvenient economic truths that self-interested politicians and utopian-inclined intellectuals did not want to hear (Röpke, 1956i, p. 127). This brings us to the question of the specific habits Röpke believed
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economists should cultivate if they were to render a meaningful service to society. Apart from the obvious moral courage needed to deflate populist ideas, Röpke believed that economists needed to be flexible without betraying the principles of their science. They needed to recognize the accuracy of a claim of the German mathematician and Enlightenment philosopher G.W. Leibnitz (1646–1716): there is no truth which does not have something erroneous comingled with it (Röpke, 1956i, p. 119). This, Röpke added, should not be interpreted as implying a commitment to relativism on the part of economists. The fact, for example, that it is ‘difficult to say that a small increase of the amount of money in circulation is inflationary and yet more difficult to decide whether anything ought to be done about it’ does not imply that the economist is denying that printing too much money produces inflation (Röpke [1944b] 1948, p. 76). Röpke’s point was that economists needed to distinguish between the fundamental principles and truths of economics, and ‘that which is a modification of the fundamental thesis’ (1956i, p. 119). Being a good economist does not mean insisting that all policies must conform to every single demand of economic science at all times (Röpke, 1953b, p. 378). Nonetheless, as if to remind economists of the limits of this caution, Röpke specified that economists must simultaneously bear in mind that ‘the particular circumstances decide in each case how much practical significance attaches to the qualifying modification’ (Röpke, 1956i, p. 119). Economists cannot simply rationalize ‘any abuse that assumes the name of economic policy’ (ibid.). Here Röpke seems to oscillate between presenting economists as those who must fight for fundamental economic principles to be observed in public policy, and, on the other hand, suggesting that economists must be prepared to modify such axioms to fit prevailing circumstances. There is, however, only conflict between these counsels if we believe that economists cannot be committed to discerning and explicating sound economic theory, and simultaneously involved in the formation of public policy which inevitably involves compromises. For our purposes, the importance of Röpke’s distinctions lies in the fact that they provide important clues to his own approach to political economy, especially those instances when he recommended particular forms of state intervention. The adoption of a particular policy might, to his mind, be consistent with being a good economist, even if it represented a departure from fundamental principles that ought to prevail in a market economy. Yet it might also be wrong for economists to recommend a similar policy in a mild recession, precisely because the conditions did not justify, to use Röpke’s phraseology, modification of the fundamental thesis. Fully recognizing the challenging nature of such a role, Röpke specified that it required economists to acquire special virtues, most notably
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‘judgment, sound common sense, a feeling of proportion and perspective’. These qualities, Röpke stated provocatively, were the exact opposite of those he labeled ‘modern intellectuals’ (ibid., p. 119). He also recommended that economists subordinate their emotions to their reason, but allow their reasoning to be guided by experience (ibid.). Above all, economists had to learn that they could not avoid responsibility by hiding behind a façade of academic or moral neutrality: We, beyond all others, are representatives of the social sciences and under the duty to make up our minds at the great crossroads of our civilization. It is not enough for us merely to decipher the roadmarkers; we must know whether we are sending society along the road to freedom, to humane living, to unalterable truth, or in the opposite direction and toward slavery, the prostitution of man, and crassest falsehood. To avoid that decision would just as assuredly be a ‘trahison des clercs’ as if we were to betray the sanctity that lies in the truth of science to the political passions and the social emotionalism of our era. (ibid., p. 127)
SCARCITY, ORDER AND LIBERTY Röpke’s understanding of economics is thus one in which positive analysis and normative concerns are seamlessly woven together; the true economist was one who combines objective-empirical analysis with advocacy of normative positions. Few pieces better express Röpke’s pursuit of this ideal than a series of lectures he delivered to the Bank of Egypt in Cairo in 1951. At the core of these lectures was a simple question: what is the purpose of economics? Röpke’s answer was that economics was concerned with providing an answer to the problem of economic order. Given the sheer number of commodities and services and the varying levels of demands for these products, how were these to be made available in the right proportions at the right place and the right time (Röpke [1951h] 1987, p. 14)? This problem of order, however, is inseparable from the question of incentives. The production of the right goods and services, in the right proportions, at the right time, and in the best quality and the maximum quantity requires ‘the proper incentives corresponding to human nature as it is – neither angel nor beasts, as Pascal has said’ (ibid., pp. 14–15). Expecting people constantly to behave in economic life like saints should be dismissed, Röpke wrote, ‘as utterly unworkable’ (ibid., p. 15). The economy should be arranged so that everyone has the incentives to work well and consciously. This has immediate practical implications. Economics tells us, for example, that high taxes will change the incentives shaping the economic process, not least because entrepreneurs and would-
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be entrepreneurs will simply act differently if they cannot be assured of the fruits of their labor (Röpke, 1945f, p. 110, 1949g, [1951h] 1987, p. 8). Correct answers to these questions of order and incentives are, Röpke says, essential if we are to avoid bottlenecks, understood as disproportionalities and disharmonies that manifest themselves in shortages that make the economy grind to a halt ([1951h] 1987, p. 16). Here, Röpke insisted, lies the positive significance of free prices. Collectivism produces bottlenecks because it lacks the regulating agent that tells those involved in production and consumption where an increase or decrease of certain commodities is desired (ibid., p. 17). By contrast, free prices seamlessly transmit these orders to producers and consumers to expand and restrict. In collectivized economies, prices are replaced by political directives. But, Röpke states, political commands are a poor substitute for prices because they are inevitably wrong and slow in their ability to transmit economic information. Moreover, producers and consumers will react quickly to price changes, but ‘not to the orders of the central authority’ (ibid., p. 18, cf. 1953f, 1954c). At this point, Röpke’s analysis of economics’ central concerns begins to embrace normative value-laden features. He argues that there are only two ways of approaching the economic problem: coordination and liberty, or subordination and command. Citing Eucken, Röpke states that once competition is accepted as the means of creating efficiency, then you cannot have centralized planning ([1951h] 1987, p. 15). Coordination and liberty is an economic order associated with the market, competition and the free price. By contrast, subordination and command result in planned and command economies (ibid., p. 18). Each system’s external focus is also radically different: coordination and liberty are concerned with the customer; subordination and command concentrate on fulfilling the bureaucracy’s commands which license, order, seize, allocate, distribute and forbid – all with the threat of coercion in the background (ibid., p. 20). Significantly, Röpke relies on positive economics to answer the normative objection that a system based on coordination and liberty produces anarchic disorder and thus a breakdown in harmonious social arrangements. In response, Röpke points to the price mechanism. The free price is ‘the true measure of the scarcities in question relative to the other economic data of the whole economic process at a particular moment. They speak out an objective truth, and as long as there is competition there is no scope for arbitrariness’ (ibid.). The ‘office economy’, by contrast, ‘is quite at sea in all its decisions’ (ibid., p. 21). The central authority simply cannot know the right value of any particular good at any particular moment, let alone what commodities to import or export. Thus it either guesses or makes snap arbitrary decisions ‘colored by some subjective idea of the
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planners’ (ibid.). Office economies are therefore inevitably political. While market economies ‘separate the two spheres of economic action and political sovereignty (of dominium and imperium), it is the salient point of the office economy that it merges the two spheres’ (ibid.). This, Röpke comments, illustrates that the choice between the market and office economies is ultimately political. An economist can marshal all the ‘neutral’ positive facts in favor of free markets, but at some point the positive scientist must enter the normative realm of argument (ibid., p. 24). There are three normative reasons why Röpke believes that economists – and everyone else – should opt for the market: a desire to preserve liberty; the need to control power; and the fact that markets rather than central planning can efficiently resolve the scarcity issue (ibid., p. 24, 1954e). Efficiency appears here not simply in terms of the market’s superior capacity to address scarcity, but also something to be valued for its own sake. Invoking the indictment against collectivism articulated in Hayek’s Road to Serfdom, Röpke argues that socialism as an economic technique – whether directed by a totalitarian or democratic government – demands the economy’s total subjection to the state. This requires extending state power to the point whereby liberty is more or less repressed and ‘replaced by the allocation of productive resources planned and enforced by the government’ (Röpke [1951h] 1987, p. 26). Responding to objections that mixed economies need not lead in this direction, Röpke stresses Tocqueville’s warnings about how the state’s slow expansion of power gradually reduces the people to a state of servitude with only superficial appearances of freedom remaining (ibid., p. 28). Loss of liberty, Röpke insists, is intimately associated with the question of the control of power (ibid.). Socialism proposes to address this by eliminating capitalism’s alleged concentration of power. But there is, Röpke comments, ‘no getting away from the fact that collectivism involves the maximum centralization of the economic process in the hands of the government’ (ibid., p. 29). While monopolies occur under capitalism, they are scattered, limited and constantly subject to the pressure of potential competition (ibid., p. 20). This in turn is related to the value of economic efficiency. Collectivism, Röpke argues, cannot provide a system of order and incentives which is as economically efficient as the market. Nor can it provide substitutes for the incentives associated with market economies (ibid., pp. 30–31). ‘By frankly appealing to private initiative’, Röpke writes, the market ‘makes individual success dependent on a corresponding productive performance, provided that markets are competitive’ (ibid., p. 31). By contrast, office economies seek to fight self-interest and ‘replace the natural incentives of the market economy by fear, artificial emulation, hysteria, and propaganda’ (ibid.).
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ECONOMICS, VALUES AND VALUE JUDGMENTS Röpke’s insistence that economists cannot confine themselves to positive economic analysis and must be willing to promote particular moral values involved him in two important debates for economists. The first, hardly limited to economists, is whether there are discernible values beyond utility. The second controversy was whether such values should be allowed to play a role in economics. The most common objection would be that a commitment to certain moral goods necessarily compromises the integrity of any positive science. The underlying assumption is that values are ultimately a subjective matter. Hence, an a priori commitment to particular values could distort the integrity of the knowledge yielded by the application of positive scientific methods to given problems. Röpke squarely addressed these matters in the 1940s, most notably in Civitas Humana and an article published in an otherwise obscure Turkishbased journal. For Röpke, the question was whether the authority of science can be used not simply ‘for demonstrations of “facts” but pass on into positive recommendations or rejection, in short, for so-called valuejudgments in contradistinction to statements of facts’ ([1944b] 1948, p. 73). Facts were invariably portrayed as the area of inquiry for ‘the so-called exact sciences’ (ibid.). But, Röpke commented, many natural and social scientists disputed the idea of objectivity ‘where it is a matter of deciding between good and bad, the beautiful and the ugly, between healthy and unhealthy, between the normal and the degenerate’ (ibid.). It was curious, Röpke wrote, that those who insisted upon the subjectivity of such values invariably did so with ‘the emphatic . . . authority of someone who knows’ (ibid.). In short, arguments that all values are relative are themselves based upon a truth-claim. This is, Röpke stated, ‘the old catch of the Cretan, who declared that all Cretans are liars’ (ibid., p. 75). Marxism exemplified this internal contradiction. By supposing ‘all philosophy to be but “an ideological superstructure” above the material relationships of society and therefore of only relative value, Marxist philosophy therefore cannot be exempted from this law’ (ibid.). Attributing many natural and social scientists’ attachment to value-relativism partly to positivist philosophy’s influence upon the sciences (ibid., p. 73), Röpke contended that such arguments embodied a contradiction common to all commitments to valuerelativism. To condemn, he wrote, ‘value judgments in Science, is itself a value judgment’ which the relativist ‘intolerably forbid[s] . . . to others’ (ibid., p. 75). Röpke did not view all the concerns of those economists skeptical about the place of values in their discipline as completely unfounded. Ideologies per se were an obstacle to sound economic reflection (Röpke, 1936e), and
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he acknowledged that there are many occasions when science and ‘topical political ideas’ were merged and used as a basis for ‘making demands for which the authority of Science could not be claimed in the least’ ([1944b] 1948, p. 73). Nonetheless, Röpke regarded the claim of some economists that economics should aspire to value-neutrality as absurd. On the most basic level, Röpke emphasized that the entire enterprise of science was premised on the assumption that it was good to know truth (1942a, pp. 1–6). To this extent, science was inseparable from value-judgments, ‘especially the moral sciences, to which the social sciences inclusive of jurisprudence belong’ (Röpke [1944b] 1948, p. 75). The real question for economists was ‘what type of value-judgments were legitimately scientific and for what reasons’ (ibid.). Conceding the challenges involved in answering this question, Röpke attempted to delineate the sphere of value-judgments properly understood. There, he argues, are three types of judgment. The first are the strictly logical: A cannot be at the same time not A. The second are empirical judgments, the truth of which can be established by experiment. The third are judgments of value. Each of these has a different logical structure. Nevertheless it was possible in this third group to distinguish between ‘all political whimsicalities, arguments and ideologies’ which ought to be excluded from science, and ‘ultimate and highest values’ (ibid., p. 74). It is the last that cause people to ‘go in for Science at all, that the social sciences have been developed as a branch worthy of study, that we select specific problems, that we economists and sociologists devote ourselves to our Science, that we view Truth as an indispensible scientific principle: all these imply value judgments’ (ibid., p. 75). At the root of the endeavor of ancient and modern medicine, for instance, is ‘the moral assumption that living is preferable to dying and health better than disease’ (ibid.). Putting the point another way, Röpke asks the relativist ‘whether he is seriously prepared to devote his life to the task of discovering the method for the quickest possible ruination of a country, for constructing the most horrible concentration camp possible’ (ibid.). To this extent, positive science only finds its higher purpose when these inquiries serve the values that make human society truly human. Röpke seems to be indicating that human reason itself suggests that there are certain values that are self-evidently good for man. Who, for example, would reasonably prefer ignorance to truth? Having established that not all value-judgments are subjective, Röpke argued that social scientists could create distinctions between valuejudgments on the basis of how much subjectivity and arbitrariness they may embody (ibid., p. 77). This was not, he thought, as difficult as it might initially appear. There were value-judgments so universally accepted (such
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as truth being intrinsically better than error) that they assumed a virtually objective character. Others derived their high degree of objectivity from simple moral-anthropological facts about human beings (Röpke, 1942a, p. 5). An example was Pascal’s description of human beings as being neither angels nor beasts, but rather ‘Medium Creatures’ (Röpke [1944b] 1948, p. 77). This fact involved an implicit moral characterization of human nature: humans could not live as if they were angels, but nor were they as self-absorbed and intrinsically brutish as animals. To deny the truth of these value-judgments in the name of scientific integrity would amount to ‘[narrowing] the sphere of Science in a scientifically non-tenable way, and is at the same time adopting a standpoint which can only be disastrous for society as a whole’ (ibid., p. 73). The validity of these value-judgments, Röpke argued, was so evident that they ought to ‘guide us in our judgments upon the desirability of this or that form of society and economic system’ (ibid., p. 77). Though we cannot determine a society’s ‘health’ as a doctor determines a patient’s health by taking his temperature, this does not change the fact that there ‘are healthy and sick forms of society even if here the zone of doubt and indeterminativeness is much larger than in medicine’ (ibid., p. 76). Röpke also underlines the importance of value-judgments for economics by examining the controversial issue of interpersonal comparisons of utilities. ‘After at first heedlessly making use of the concept of “marginal utility” in order to demonstrate “scientifically” the advantage of a more equal division of income or of progressive taxes’, Röpke notes that economists soon concluded that this stance was ‘illusionary without taking value judgments into account’ (ibid., p. 81). Most economists therefore concluded that ‘interpersonal comparisons of utility were scientifically inadmissible’ (ibid., p. 79). This determination, Röpke suggested, was ‘altogether too precipitate’. Different individuals’ value-judgments might be ‘subjective’ in the sense that they derive from individuals’ subjective decisions, but they are also objectively real inasmuch as these valuejudgments unquestionably existed. This meant that the tendency to view all value-judgments as subjective and therefore excludable from science was itself unscientific because it involved willfully ignoring reality. These reflections about value-judgments, Röpke stressed, find support in the development of an anti-relativist line of thought ‘which meets us in such varied thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas, Montesquieu or Tocqueville’ (ibid., p. 78). There is surely something deliberate about Röpke’s effort to include pre-modern and modern thinkers as proponents of such a position. He is seeking to dissolve any false divisions between a pre-modern world that stressed the knowability of objective values, and a modernity that limited objectivity to empirical issues. The broader
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relevance of attention to value-judgments for Röpke’s work as an economist was threefold. First, his own enterprise of addressing the problem of economic order was premised at crucial points upon affirmation of the values of order and liberty. Second, he regarded the tendency of many economists to disengage from value-questions as contributing to adverse developments in economic science. Third, Röpke believed that these changes contributed to economic policies that violated certain values and sought to defy certain economic truths. Here Röpke singled out the effects of mistaken understandings of human nature and the growth of what he called the ‘scientistic’ mentality.
ECONOMICS, HUMAN NATURE AND SCIENTISM Writing in the 1950s, Röpke marveled at the enormously augmented scope for economic research. It was a remarkable contrast to the situation of the economics profession in pre-war Germany in which economics was often a lowly appendage to faculties of philosophy and law (Röpke, 1956i, p. 112). Economic science now enjoyed a prestige that had hitherto eluded it, partly, Röpke thought, because a range of problems that had emerged since the 1930s had caused many to turn to economics for answers (ibid., p. 114). These new realities were more grounds, Röpke held, for deep concern to be expressed about economics’ development in the post-war period. ‘The economist’, Röpke once wrote, ‘has his occupational disease: restricted vision’ (1959f, p. 234). Stressing that he spoke from personal experience, Röpke commented that some economists found it difficult to look beyond their own area of competence or to concede that economics and the economy were part of a larger order, about which other disciplines had relevant things to say (ibid.). This was compounded by the error of ‘economism’: the tendency to judge ‘everything in relation to the economy and in terms of material productivity, making material and economic interest the center of things by deducing everything from them and subordinating everything to them as mere means to an end’ (Röpke [1942] 1992, p. 53). Paraphrasing the eighteenth-century physicist Georg Christoph Lichtenburg, Röpke wrote, ‘Whoever understands economics only, understands not even them’ (1959f, p. 234). By this, Röpke meant that the pursuit of economic science would not be fruitful if economists ignored the highly complex world in which economic laws operate (ibid.). Economism invariably led economists into the trap of what Röpke called ‘social rationalism’ – the habit of viewing market mechanisms as valueneutral techniques applicable to any social order. One example was the
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attempt of socialist economists to reconcile the price mechanism with collectivist economies. How, Röpke asked, could this mechanism which assumes human freedom operate in societies premised on the radical subordination of liberty ([1958f] 1998, p. 93)? Being wary of basing anything on simplified assumptions, Röpke strove to avoid separating economics from the reality of human nature. Though not inattentive to utility, Röpke rejected the neoclassical working assumption of humans as rational utility maximizers: ‘The ordinary man is not such a homo oeconomicus . . . The motives that drive people toward economic success are as varied as the human soul itself’ (ibid., p. 121). Nor did Röpke consider it reasonable to premise economic theory on the vision of human beings as selfless creatures. ‘An economic system’, he wrote, ‘that presupposes saints and heroes cannot endure’ (1959f, pp. 233–4). Instead, Röpke invoked more Smithian assumptions about human beings and society to explain his moral preference for the market economy over the alternatives: There is a deep moral reason for the fact that an economy of free enterprise brings about social health and a plenitude of goods, while a socialist economy ends in social disorder and poverty. The ‘liberal’ economic system delivers to useful ends the extraordinary force inherent in individual self-assertion, whereas the socialist economy suppresses this force and wears itself out in the struggle against it. Is the system unethical that permits the individual to strive to advance himself and his neighbor through his own productive achievement? Is the ethical system the one that is organized to suppress this striving? . . . It makes virtue appear irrational and places an extravagant demand upon human nature when men in serving virtue in a collectivist economy must act against their own proper interests in ways that, as even the simplest of them can see, do nothing to increase the total wealth. (ibid., p. 233)
Alongside faulty moral-anthropologies, Röpke was impatient with those forms of political economy that reduced the study of individual human choice and action to relative insignificance (Röpke, 1942i). This was an inevitable result of scientism’s impact upon economics. Röpke defined ‘scientism’ as the tendency to ‘understand by science [what] is merely fundamentally the narrow territory of the “positivist” and “exact” natural sciences and their technical application’ ([1944b] 1948, p. 61). It was the child of Cartesian rationalism and embodied the notion that there were no limits to the cognitive abilities of positivist methodology and technical analysis. Invariably, this was accompanied by ‘an optimistic belief in progress by means of a mechanical leadership of society’ (ibid., p. 69). To say that Röpke was skeptical of these developments would be an understatement. He regarded scientism as epitomizing the struggle between ‘a humanistic and tolerant “Enlightenment” and the intolerant
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and unbridled positivist–mechanistic Rationalism of the Encyclopaedists’ (ibid., p. 62). It resulted in ‘the scientific elimination of the Human element in political and economic practice’ (ibid.). To this end, Röpke would often cite the French philosopher Rabelais: ‘science sans conscience n’est que ruine de l’âme’ ([1942g] 1992, p. 8, 1963a, p. 199). Röpke also regarded scientism as destructive of humanity’s centuriesold striving towards a unity of knowledge, epitomized by the scholastic tradition. Though he accepted ‘the endless multitude of possible problems’ ([1944b] 1948, p. 75) as necessitating much specialization, Röpke was convinced of ‘the utter futility of a science which progressively heaps up matter, which is always measuring, analyzing, and documenting but which gets further and further away from a synthesis’ (ibid., p. 70). It produced people ‘whose head . . . is filled exclusively with “useful” knowledge and who cannot grasp that abstract natural science and physics possess quite a different educational value from the moral sciences . . . that the science of mathematics is an admirable, nay an indispensible training for the intellect but that when it has done its work it can be put aside’ (ibid., p. 66). Scientism, Röpke claimed, ‘implies simultaneously disdain for synthesis. It means ever more specialization, the breeding of a learned type’ (ibid., p. 68). In the economics profession, Röpke lamented, scientism had significantly contributed to ‘the disinclination of so many economists to make contact with sociology, ethics or politics’ (ibid., p. 79). This added up to a cult ‘of endless documentation, of Empircism and Historicism, of the quantitatively measurable, of research more geometrico to the detriment of the humane sciences (the moral sciences), and their orientation towards the natural sciences as the one ideal to be pursued in everything’ (ibid., p. 68).2 Much of Röpke’s critique of scientism’s impact upon economics parallels and draws upon writings of Hayek (ibid., p. 59). In Hayek’s view, scientism distorted economics insofar as it involved the illegitimate application of the methods of the natural sciences to the social sciences. While mathematics lent itself to describing the functional relationships and constants of sciences such as chemistry, Hayek thought that there were limits to its applicability to a social science like economics (Hayek, 1952) because he did not see economics as embodying the same type of functional relationships. Any such relationships were undermined by the fact of entrepreneurial creativity, which disturbs the constancy of information required by mathematics and the methods of the natural sciences (Huerta de Soto, 2008, p. 14). Röpke also shared Hayek’s concern that scientism in economics encouraged collectivist economic thinking. The post-Enlightenment ‘faith in the mission of rationalism for the reconstruction of society, faith in the task of organizer scientifiquement l’humanité’
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(Röpke [1944b] 1948, p. 64) had led some social scientists to believe that economic life could simply be redesigned along more ‘rational’ lines than the market economy. It produced a viewpoint which Röpke described as ‘eternal Saint-Simonism’ (ibid., p. 63). Named after the nineteenthcentury French philosopher of scientific socialism Henri de Saint-Simon (1760–1825), Röpke presented this attitude as ‘the outcome of a mixture of the hubris of the natural scientist and engineer mentality of those . . . who would construct and organize economics, the State and society according to supposedly scientific laws and blueprints, whilst mentally reserving for themselves the principal portefeuilles’ (ibid.). Röpke described Walter Rathenau as personifying Saint-Simonist tendencies (1922c) insofar as he, with his engineer friends, invented the term ‘planned economy’ while managing Imperial Germany’s war economy ([1944b] 1948, p. 79). Nothing, to Röpke’s mind, could be further from the vision of economic science found in Smith’s works. In his Economics of the Free Society, Röpke presents Smith as ‘a deistic moralist’ and ‘a representative of the humanist spirit of the eighteenth century’, whose Wealth of Nations formed part of a larger intended opus on ‘the cultural history of mankind’ in which ‘economics was viewed as an organic part of the larger whole of the intellectual, moral and historical life of society’ ([1937a] 1963, p. 224). In other writings, Röpke presented Smith as one who, as the author of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), understood that his Wealth of Nations (1776) did not and could not capture the entirety of human existence ([1958f] 1998, p. 92). For Smith, Röpke maintained, the economy and society resulted from an invisible hand and ‘a living order with an immanent logic of its own which the human mind could comprehend and even destroy but not duplicate’ ([1937a] 1963, p. 224). In the same writings, Röpke presents Keynes as the antithesis of Smith. Keynes, he wrote, was ‘a representative of the geometric spirit of the 20th century’ and ‘an exponent of positivistic scientism’, for whom ‘economics was part of a mathematical–mechanical universe’ (ibid.). When added to the modern penchant for statistics, this outlook actually limited economists’ ability to understand phenomenon such as the Great Depression (Röpke, 1938b). Thus, for Röpke, while Smith marks a promising beginning, Keynes embodied a rationalistic regression in economics’ explanatory power ([1937a] 1963, p. 224).
KEYNES AND KEYNESIAN FALLACIES Though Röpke did not regard all Keynesian positions as wrongheaded, he did consider ‘Keynesianism’ to be an unreliable way of economic thinking.
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While Röpke assigned more blame to Keynes’s disciples (ibid., p. 225,3 [1951h] 1987, p. 3, [1958f] 1998, p. 193), he insisted that Keynes’s approach to economics had created an ‘old economics’ and a ‘new economics’ in which the sense of one was nonsense in the other (Röpke [1952b] 1969, p. 170). Economics had effectively split into ‘two realms of logic’ (Röpke [1951h] 1987, p. 5) to the extent ‘that there is today a rabies economica which is just as bad if not worse than the old rabies theologica’ (ibid., p. 4). Whereas the economics pioneered by Smith in the Wealth of Nations was viewed as part of society’s larger social and intellectual life, Röpke insisted that Keynesian economics reflected Keynes’s ‘mathematical–mechanical’ outlook on life, as evidenced by Keynes’s prior work on probability theory in his Treatise on Probability (1921). Hence no-one should therefore be surprised, Röpke concludes, that Keynes viewed the economy as ‘the result of mechanical quanta subject to precise measurement and direction by an omnicompetent technical human intelligence’ (Röpke [1937a] 1963, p. 224). Röpke’s claim that Keynes had a mathematical view of life that dominated his approach to economics is almost certainly unfair. Keynes’s vision of morality and society was profoundly shaped by his reading of G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica (1903). Even later in life, Keynes said that he accepted Moore’s ‘fundamental intuitions’, especially Moore’s critique of Benthamite utilitarianism – a system of moral reasoning that relied heavily upon the (highly problematic) claim that numerical value could be assigned to each expected and unforeseen effect of all actions or rules. Keynes claimed that Moore’s book had protected him from the Benthamite tradition’s ‘overvaluation of the economic criterion’ (Keynes [1933] 1972, pp. 445–6), so much so that even Röpke acknowledged that Keynes had rejected utilitarianism as a philosophy ([1958f] 1998, p. 276). Moreover, when we examine Keynes’s Treatise on Probability ([1921] 1989) we see, as Robert Skidelsky writes, that one of its key implications is that ‘we can and do have probabilities without numbers’, in the sense that we can say something is ‘greener’ in color than something else without assigning ‘greenness’ a numerical significance (2003, p. 285). On the other hand, probability theory is a subject that teeters on a hazy borderline between philosophy and mathematics, calculus and logic. Strictly speaking, it is considered a branch of mathematics. It is also one of the mathematical bases for statistical analysis and indispensible to the quantitative study of significant sets of empirical data. In his characterization of Keynes’s outlook on life, Röpke may simply have been indicating that he thought Keynes’s long-term interest in such questions colored the post-Keynesian understanding of economics. This thesis begins to acquire validity when we consider the substance of Röpke’s methodological
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complaint against Keynesianism. According to Röpke, Keynesians were inclined to reduce economics to mathematical and statistical formulae and analysis. The whole science of economics thus became a quantitative exercise that ‘teems with equations in ever-increasing profusion’ and the development of models and patterns of aggregate behavior by whole populations with little resemblance to reality and real human beings. Opening a post-Keynes economic textbook, Röpke suggested, made readers wonder if they had stumbled upon a chemistry curriculum (1956i, p. 121, cf. 1953a). Röpke’s wariness about the Keynesian macroeconomic focus did not entail that he was entirely dismissive of macroeconomics. The new economics, he stated, had enhanced the use of macroeconomic concepts. Even non-Keynesians used expressions like ‘a country is living beyond its means’ as a shorthand way of describing how the aggregate expenditure for consumption and investment in a given geographical area created more purchasing power than could be provided at present prices for the economy’s output in that area (Röpke [1958f] 1998, p. 226). Röpke’s complaint was that Keynes had effectively ‘declared the method of thinking in aggregates to be the only one, both now and in the long run’ thereby defying what theory and common sense ‘have so far considered right and proven’ ([1952b] 1969, p. 172). This trend – aggressively propagated by Keynesian economists – was obliterating the great achievement of 150 years of economic science: the doctrine of the movement of individual prices (Röpke, 1956i, p. 121, cf. 1953a) and thus economics’ real content. With the emergence of a generation of economists exclusively trained to operate with economic aggregates, Röpke argued that the economist’s skills were increasingly reduced to the ability to express ‘hypothetical statements about functional relationships in mathematical formulas or curves’ through methods illegitimately transferred from the natural to the social sciences ([1958f] 1998, p. 193). Röpke may have been thinking of Paul Samuelson’s effort to reconfigure economics on the basis of mathematical language (Samuelson, 1947). For Röpke, such efforts conflated the object of economics with a medium of economic analysis. Mathematics is a form of language based upon symbols. Its origins lie in facilitating the study of the natural sciences. But mathematics and empirical studies are less adequate when it comes to the study of things such as traditions, institutions and values. In Röpke’s view, mathematical formalism addressed these realities by generally ignoring them. It thus lost sight of economics’ essence which is not macroaggregates but the choices of individuals and institutions. On this basis, Röpke believed that the ‘new economics’ was destroying economics as ‘a “moral science” in the sense that it deals with man as an intellectual and
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moral being’ (1956i, p. 122). Economic science partly involved analysis of the economic order based upon a truthful understanding of human nature, whereas neo-Keynesian economics was about economic modeling based on certain assumptions, mathematical formulae and quantitative methodology (ibid.). In the new economics, the economist became a type of bureaucratic technocrat charged with acting preemptively against a range of real and imagined economic problems through the use of constantly developing quantitative and mathematical tools. Thus, Röpke states, the post-Keynes economist was typically . . . obsessed by only one thing, i.e., ‘economic demand’, which he thinks must be kept up at whatever cost, while he forgets the working of the mechanism of prices, wages, interest, and exchange rates. Whereas formerly a good economist was a man who knew how to assess the relation of the actual economic forces and whereas formerly judgment, experience, and a sense of proportion were rated higher than the formal skill in handling certain research techniques introduced illegitimately from the natural sciences into economics – today glory goes to him who knows how to express more or less hypothetic statements in mathematical symbols and curves. ([1951h] 1987, pp. 4-5, cf. [1958f] 1998, p. 193)
Worries about these developments, Röpke stressed, were not confined to non-Keynesians. He quotes one of Keynes’s followers (and first biographer), Roy Harrod, to the effect that the substitution of attention to basic economic principles with an immersion in mathematics and aggregates had led him to conclude that ‘ “we should be better off with the old political economy” ’ (Harrod cited in Röpke [1951h] 1987, p. 3). Drawing upon Mises, Röpke maintained that sound economics allows mathematics to be used to explicate certain relationships that have quantitative characteristics. This was one element that made economics ‘truly a border science’ with all its attractions and dangers. Nevertheless the more economics drifted in a mathematical–statistical direction, the more it lost sight of that which is un-mathematical and which does not always behave predictably – human beings (Röpke, 1956i, p. 122). Though Röpke believed that mathematics can be useful in describing relatively stable and uncomplicated economic relationships, he was unconvinced that it could handle the full complexity and instability of economic life. For all the apparent knowledge conferred by neo-Keynesian methods, be it in the form of enhanced data and greater ability to predict economic developments, economic trends rarely seemed to conform to either the short- or the long-term forecasts of Keynesian economists. The eventual result was not only the fact that ‘with all our cleverness, we have become decidedly less wise, while knowing more and more about less and less’ (Röpke [1951h] 1987, p. 3), but also the ‘dehumanization of economic science’
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(Röpke, 1956i, p. 123). ‘Keeping economics human’, Röpke held, did not require rejecting mathematics or always refraining from using aggregate concepts. But he did ask economists to remember that, ‘behind factors such as supply and demand, amounts of savings, volumes of investment, rates of inflation, and levels of wages were individual human beings with their feelings, their deliberations, their appraisals of value, their collective suggestions and decisions’ (ibid.). At another level, Röpke’s strictures against the dominance of mathematics and the use and language of aggregates – ‘ “coefficients of elasticity”, “multipliers”, “accelerators” and other ingenious devices’ – reflected his concern that economics would be rendered increasingly unintelligible to non-economists and thereby of decreased utility to policy-makers (ibid., p. 124). But in an example of his refusal to separate value-judgments from economic science, Röpke argued that the new economics’ marginalization of individual human beings, choices and actions reflected general social trends ‘toward impersonalization, toward collectivization, toward mechanization, toward dehumanization’ (ibid.). Just as true economic science received tremendous impetus from the desire to understand the workings of market economies, Röpke also thought that mid-twentieth-century economics was being negatively influenced by the context of political and economic collectivization in which it was practiced. Röpke even compared Keynes with Pablo Picasso, inasmuch as Picasso’s purported banishment of real human beings from art paralleled Keynes’s expulsion of humans from economic science (ibid.). It was no wonder, Röpke wrote somewhat cuttingly, that Keynesian economics was so popular in those countries where a preference for planning and a suspicion of liberty tended to prevail ([1937a] 1963, pp. 227–8).
FROM ECONOMIC SCIENCE TO ECONOMIC POLICY Though expressed in rather passionate terms, the preceding observation illustrates how closely much of Röpke’s views of economic science and the economist’s role were shaped by his normative concerns. Certainly Röpke’s reflections on economics’ origins and nature contain many standard distinctions between its positive and normative dimensions that few modern economists would dispute. The normative/positive distinction in Röpke’s view of economics may be viewed as a continuum that involves statements of a highly positive nature at one end of the spectrum, and highly normative claims at the other. Yet the two are interwoven so tightly in Röpke’s thought that separating them becomes difficult. Free prices are a centerpiece of his understanding of positive economic analysis, but
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he stresses that their functioning presupposes and facilitates a normative concern for liberty. Likewise, Röpke’s criticism of Keynes’s approach to economics as a science is closely associated with his criticisms of Keynesian policies. The direction of economic policy, in Röpke’s view, be it at the national or international level, had become unhinged in the twentieth century, not least because economics had lost sight of the primordial fact that economic life concerned human choices and action. This observation was central to Röpke’s particular effort to articulate a reformed theory of economic liberalism.
NOTES 1. Röpke observed that this understanding of costs rendered redundant the notion of costs as the expression of and compensation for the pain and sacrifice involved in production – an idea that found its purest expression in Marx’s labor theory of value. Modern marginal theory thereby refuted another staple of Marxist economics ([1937a] 1963, p. 38). 2. In later life, Röpke’s anti-positivism was increasingly derived from his religious convictions: ‘For more than a century, we have made the hopeless effort, more and more baldly proclaimed, to get along without God and vaingloriously to put man, his science, his art, his political contrivances, in God’s place’ (Röpke, 1959f, p. 236). 3. The sections on Keynes and Keynesianism in Economics of the Free Society were added to this text for the 1963 American edition (Boarman in Röpke ([1937a] 1963, p. ix).
4.
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The whole edifice of the Reich will collapse, and much more completely than in 1918, since the whole framework of the national economy, of the monetary and financial system, of communications and administration, which in 1918 had largely remained intact, will now fall into hopeless ruin. Again in contrast with 1918, there will this time no longer be any organized political life, no parties and programmes, no group ready and able to take over the bankrupt estate of the Third Reich, but only prostration and immense longing for peace . . . Wilhelm Röpke, 1945 Memorandum to Allied Diplomats (cited in Röpke [1945b] 1946, p. 186)
On 7 May 1945, Colonel-General Alfred Jodl, Chief of the Wehrmacht’s Operations Staff, signed the instruments for Germany’s unconditional surrender. Once dominant over continental Europe, National Socialism was extinguished. Marxism–Leninism, however, was poised to achieve a stranglehold over much of Europe. While many Western Europeans were prepared to resist the political collectivism imposed on most Soviet-occupied nations, opposition to extensive economic planning was weaker. Despite the considerable anti-socialist sentiment in Europe and North America revealed by the publication of Hayek’s Road to Serfdom in 1944, nothing better symbolized the low regard in which capitalism was held than the Labour party’s sweeping victory in Britain’s 1945 general election. With its explicit commitment to nationalizing the British economy’s ‘commanding heights’ and creating a cradle-to-grave welfare state, the Labour government’s efforts to implement key provisions of the 1942 Beveridge report suggested that comprehensive economic planning was the future. At the time, exploring the deeper reasons for these developments was not a priority for some economic liberals. Their post-war focus was upon protecting economic liberty against further extensions of planning. This much is apparent from the proceedings of the first gathering of the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947. The conference considered questions ranging from monetary reform to Germany’s future. The only papers addressing why the world was embracing collectivism were delivered by William Rappard (a close friend of Röpke and cofounder of the Graduate Institute of International Studies), Aaron Director (a progenitor of the law and economics movement), and Hayek. Rappard argued that the turn to planning had resulted from two 71
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factors. One was many societies’ militarization during two world wars. The second was that Europeans, empowered by democracy but exhausted by the 1914–45 ‘thirty years war’, were ‘clamoring for social security and equality’ (Danielson [1947] 1997, p. 14). Director agreed that there had been a drift away from the values associated with individual freedom in favor of an emphasis upon security. He added, however, that increasing state intervention proceeded from ‘the incomplete character of the theory of liberalism as developed in the nineteenth century’ (ibid., p. 76). Nineteenth-century liberal philosophy had proved unable to provide adequate answers to the social conflicts generated by capitalism (ibid.). Hayek’s explanation was somewhat different from that of Director and Rappard. Aspects of continental liberalism, he suggested, had ‘led many of its adherents directly into the folds of socialism or nationalism’. Other elements (most notably aggressive rationalism, positivism, Hegelianism and extreme utilitarianism) had simultaneously alienated many people, especially Christians, from a liberal movement to which they may have otherwise been sympathetic (Hayek, 1992, p. 244). Hayek’s critique of this ‘false rationalism’ – which Hayek described as an instance of ‘intellectual hubris’ and ‘which presumed that science was competent to tell us not only what is but also what ought to be’ (ibid.) – foreshadowed his later arguments concerning the constructivist understanding of reason and the collectivist impulse (Hayek, 1952). At the 1947 meeting, Röpke refrained from offering detailed reflections upon economic liberalism’s decline. Commenting, however, upon lectures presented by Vivian Wedgwood and Carlo Antoni upon historiography’s influence upon the contemporary political context, Röpke suggested that there was a problem in the relationship ‘between economic liberalism and general liberalism’ (Danielson [1947] 1997, p. 105). The subjects discussed under the heading of ‘economic liberalism’, he argued, concerned means rather than ends. This, Röpke insisted, made it all the more urgent for liberals to ‘find out the truth, including the truth about ourselves’ (ibid.). Two days after the conference, the leading Swiss newspaper, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, published an article by Röpke outlining his arguments for ‘a new market economy combined with a broad program of economic and social reform’ (1947n). It demonstrated that Röpke had been probing the truth about the development of liberalism and its economic implications for many years. The same article illustrated that Röpke had definite views about what needed to be done to resist the drift to planning, both in terms of economic policy and at the level of political order. These amounted to a program for a reformed economic liberalism – a neoliberalism – that, alongside preserving and promoting the values, institutions and benefits of the market, addressed what Röpke regarded as nineteenth-
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century liberalism’s shortcomings so as to defuse the historical and social forces facilitating the spread of planning.
TREASON OF THE INTELLECTUALS Röpke first began to explore the challenges faced by liberalism in a systematic manner in the 1930s. He wrote German Commercial Policy in order to explain how the world had gone from embracing ‘a new era of economic liberty’, symbolized by the 1834 Zollverein, to the starkly different scenario of 1934: a world in which interventionist policies were dominating Europe and where ‘the mentality of 1834, even in its noblest parts, is decried as a strange abomination’ (Röpke, 1934a, p. 2). Röpke subsequently unfolds a story of struggle between economic liberalizers and protectionists, in which economic liberalism’s gains were wound back, partly because of Germany’s ‘three great economic crises’ of 1873, 1902 and 1929. These encouraged particular industries, especially the iron and steel industries and the agricultural sector, to establish cartels and seek subsidies. Gradually a situation emerged whereby lobbying for government protection became more important for many businesses than marketing, costcutting and entrepreneurship. Bismarck’s economic policies are underlined by Röpke contributing to these developments (Röpke, 1955e). German Commercial Policy, however, presents only part of Röpke’s explanation of Germany’s turn away from economic liberalism. This is evident from a number of essays penned by Röpke before he left Germany in late 1933. Characterized by its polemical tone, Röpke’s 1931 article, ‘The intellectuals and “capitalism”’, accused the intellectual classes – regardless of ‘whether they join the social democrats, the communists, or the national socialists’ – in Germany, Britain and America ([1931l] 1969, p. 31) of weakening an economic system that had generated widespread economic prosperity for millions. While noting his personal distaste for certain features of contemporary capitalism, such as the commercialization of culture (ibid., p. 27), these concerns did not justify the intelligentsia’s active fostering of anti-capitalist sentiment – a criticism he later extended to most German economists ([1933f] 1969, p. 46). Conceding that many intellectuals were genuinely concerned about the difficult interwar economic conditions (Röpke [1931l] 1969, p. 32), Röpke maintained that the same intellectuals had uncritically embraced a number of erroneous ideas about markets. First, they failed to distinguish between the market economy’s sound institutions and capitalism’s particular historical manifestations, such as the capitalism of the 1920s, distorted by excessive regulation, interventionist policies and the Great War (ibid.,
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p. 30). In doing so, they had displayed a lack of nuance, detachment and capacity to make distinctions – the very qualities supposedly valued by intellectuals. Second, the same intellectuals were woefully ignorant of basic economic insights. This was reflected in their refusal to acknowledge the consequences of socialism’s suppression of free prices, as exemplified by the Soviet experiment (ibid., pp. 28, 39, 43); failure to understand how free competition forced businesses to perform efficiently (ibid., p. 38); and advocacy of ‘geographical romanticism’ (ibid., p. 36) in the form of autarkic policies that emphasized countries acquiring more ‘space’, but which could not account for the economic prosperity enjoyed by small countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands. Third, Röpke accused many intellectuals of favoring a planned economy because, with its demand for engineers and lawyers, they thought that it would improve their career prospects. Lastly, Röpke insisted that many intellectuals, especially Marxists and nationalist anti-capitalists, had become so intoxicated with forebodings of catastrophe, doom and destruction (ibid., pp. 33–4, 1933b) that they were actually inclined to resist constructive reforms to address the crisis. Writing fifteen years later, Röpke commented that no other class had failed Germany so badly in its time of need than its intellectuals ([1945b] 1946, p. 64, 1946j). In 1933, Röpke repeated many of these arguments, but underscored how the intellectuals’ moral and philosophical errors had become widespread among the masses. The explosion of nationalist sentiment, he noted, threatened to accelerate the trend toward autarkic policies (Röpke [1933f] 1969, pp. 76–7). This was accentuated by growing acceptance of the economic fallacy that capitalism had encountered insurmountable limits in geographical space (Röpke, 1932b), despite the observation of economic liberals that a market’s size was not determined by geographical space but rather by the volume of production and purchasing power in an economy (Röpke, 1934c). Above all, Röpke expressed growing skepticism about the masses’ ability to grasp even the simplest explanation of how market economies work (Röpke [1933f] 1969, p. 74). Part of the problem, Röpke maintained, was that Germany’s economic crisis had been sparked largely by the international economy’s disintegration under the weight of international capital movements. This facilitated an international liquidity crisis, much of which was associated in many Germans’ minds with the burden of war reparations (ibid., pp. 58, 69–70). More worryingly, Röpke contended, German capitalism was faltering in the face of what he called (using the title of Ortega y Gasset’s famous book) ‘the revolt of the masses’ against the principles of reason, tolerance and peace. These were, he claimed, quintessentially liberal values, but ‘never had much appeal for the masses’, who were, even in prosperous times, susceptible to emotionally
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satisfying but economically irrational sloganeering. Explaining free trade’s benefits was difficult in such an atmosphere, because understanding free trade required ‘serious thought and control of the emotions by reason and independent judgment’ (ibid., p. 75).
LIBERALISM AND ITS FOES Röpke’s theme of economic liberalism being suffocated under a wave of populism is reiterated in his other writings from the period (1930–31), but also in works penned by Eucken (1932a, 1932b) and Rüstow in the same time-frame (1932–33). Looking beyond immediate circumstances, however, Röpke argued that a deeper intellectual problem undermining market economies was widespread questioning of liberalism’s key moral commitments. Liberalism and the market economy, Röpke contended, were inextricably linked fruits of two thousand years of Western civilization ([1933d] 1969, p. 84). Liberalism was not therefore to be reduced to its nineteenth-century manifestations (ibid., p. 83). A richer liberal tradition needed to be rediscovered, especially when it came to the idea of liberty itself. Röpke was not content to confine this to the idea of negative liberty in the sense of being ‘free from something’ (ibid., p. 84). Indeed liberalism valued the freeing of people from redundant authorities so that they could contribute to the development of civilization. ‘True creative power’, Röpke wrote, ‘can prosper only in liberty’ (ibid., p. 85). Part of liberalism’s genius was its protection of such individuality from arbitrary power (ibid., p. 85). This led to liberalism’s emphasis on civil liberties, the rule of law (ibid., p. 86), and political liberty in the sense of political selfdetermination. This usually facilitated democratic arrangements, though Röpke thought that there were real prospects for conflict between liberty and democracy (ibid., p. 87). This emphasis may have owed something to Röpke’s experience of watching mass movements such as National Socialism and Marxism (Röpke, 1936c, 1937d, 1939a) dismantle safeguards of civil, political and economic liberty throughout Europe. But it is also a theme constantly underlined by particular nineteenth-century liberals, including Lord Acton, Alexis de Tocqueville and Benjamin Constant, whose writings were regularly referenced by Röpke. Röpke noted, however, that no-one should assume that economic liberty necessarily flowed from liberalism’s emphasis on freedom. Economic liberty, he observed, had existed in less-than-free countries. Certainly there was a point when growing impositions on economic liberty would deliver a society into bondage (Röpke [1933d] 1969, p. 87). But Röpke maintained that economic liberty was more directly a product of a
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second liberal value – reason (1924a). Warning against tendencies to associate reason with progressivist and utilitarian outlooks, Röpke defined reason as the pursuit of truth and rejection of bias and obscurantism ([1933d] 1969, p. 88). Historically speaking, Röpke claimed that this vision of reason was effectively rediscovered with the advent of modernity associated with the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. The application of reason to economic life, Röpke suggested, had produced economic liberalism. For once mercantilism and protectionism were subjected to rational scrutiny, it was hard to deny that they resulted in losses of productivity and national wealth (ibid., pp. 90–91). An attachment to liberty and reason, according to Röpke, was central to another liberal concern: the idea of humanity. Röpke did not understand this as ‘secular humanism’, but rather ‘the unquestioned and absolute respect for every individual’s human dignity’ – an idea rooted in Antiquity which Christian, natural law and Enlightenment thought had developed (ibid., pp. 91–2). This meant that violence was rejected in favor of reasoned discussion and only employed as a last resort. It also implied the development of the polite civilized society which allowed people to live together peacefully (Röpke, 1938a). Once liberalism’s essential values were understood, Röpke stated, it was easy to see why it was in decline. Each of its key ideas was under attack from their opposites. Liberty was being replaced by an acceptance of servility inasmuch as people were allowing the modern state to relieve them of the burden of self-responsibility in return for permitting the government increased control over many spheres of life. This servility was closely connected to nationalism, which exalted the nation above the individual and permitted the state to isolate entire nations from all external influences. Röpke regarded this as contrary to the development of an international Western civilization rooted in the worlds of Athens, Rome and Jerusalem (Röpke [1933d] 1969, pp. 93–5). Likewise, reason was being replaced by a cult of the irrational, as exemplified by Nazi appeals to ‘myth’, ‘voice of the people’ and ‘blood’ when asked to provide reasons for their policies (ibid., p. 95). Finally, liberal humanism was being undermined by an unashamed appeal to a Nietzschean ‘brutalism’ that justified ‘every immoral and brutal act’ ‘by the sanctity of the political end’ (ibid.). The pernicious effects of these developments were amplified, Röpke stated, by the advent of Ortega y Gasset’s ‘mass man’, who ‘likes others to do his thinking for him’. When the masses’ rebellion against liberty, reason and humanism found able leaders, liberals had to insist that their advocacy of democracy assumed that democracy is limited by safeguards which protected liberal principles. Liberal democracy, Röpke commented, was very different from illiberal democracy (ibid., pp. 96–7).
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And yet for all the energy and historical analysis that Röpke invested in his early defense of liberalism, it has an air of being incomplete. Though he noted that liberal rationalism eventually gave birth to socialism (ibid., p. 60), Röpke did not explain how this occurred. The same articles raise questions concerning the coherence of Röpke’s view of the Enlightenment. He conflates, for example, figures such as Pascal, Smith, Kant, Voltaire and Descartes, despite the fact these individuals belonged to often dissimilar streams of Enlightenment thought. Röpke’s attempt, however, to distinguish liberalism from its nineteenth-century manifestations did hint at some dissatisfaction on his part with aspects of liberalism. This became more evident after he went into exile in 1933.
RATIONALISM AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE Life was difficult for German intellectual exiles in Atatürk’s Turkey (Röpke, 1977, p. 421). Often unable to speak Turkish, viewed with suspicion by their hosts, and wary of friendships with other Germans for fear of Nazi agent-provocateurs, they were cautious about whom they associated with. Matters were further complicated for Röpke and his fellow economist-exile Alexander Rüstow by the fact that, unlike most other German exiles, they were not Jewish and thus could have made their peace with the Nazi regime and returned to Germany. This sometimes created awkwardness between them and the German-Jewish exiles. Thus it is hardly surprising Rüstow and Röpke spent much time in each others’ company, even living together in the village of Kadiköy on the Asian side of Istanbul (Röpke, 1963a; Reisman, 2006, p. 106). They continued to collaborate after Röpke’s departure for Switzerland in 1937.1 A number of scholars have noted that Röpke’s thinking about economic liberalism developed significantly under Rüstow’s influence (Johnson, 1989, p. 56; Zmirack, 2001, pp. 101–13). Röpke himself acknowledged this influence on several occasions (1963a). This became especially evident with the publication of Röpke’s International Economic Disintegration in 1942. It contains an appendix by Rüstow and begins with an introduction based on a memorandum coauthored by Röpke and Rüstow in 1938. This introduction contains the essential points of Röpke’s critique of nineteenthcentury liberalism and begins to articulate a distinct reform agenda. Capitalism, Röpke suggested, had fallen into disrepute because competition had been corrupted by the monopoly and interventionism which proceeded from the exploitation of state power by sectional interests (1942h, p. 5). The situation was further complicated by the fact that free competition itself had socially corrosive effects. It ‘reduces the
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moral stamina and therefore requires moral reserves outside the market economy’ (Röpke [1942g] 1992, p. 52). The sources of these reserves were primarily the family and intermediate associations, the importance of which Röpke thought had been ignored by those economists focused on the egoistical atomistic homo œconomicus (ibid.). Social cohesion, Röpke added, cannot be based simply on the principle of competition (1942h, p. 6). Unfortunately, Röpke argued, the ‘traditional liberalism’ which formed the primary philosophical foundation for pre-1914 capitalism was permeated with the idea that competition was an ordre naturel and selfsustaining once impediments to its functioning were removed. Echoing Rüstow, Röpke maintained that Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ was no different from the ‘logos’ of the Greek philosopher Heraclitus (who held that everything is ultimately unified in a system of balanced exchanges) or the rationalistic ‘divine reason’ of deistic philosophy (ibid., p. 67; cf. Rüstow, 1980, pp. 169–70, 215–16). From this standpoint, the market economy was a self-regulating, sociologically autonomous system that required neither a special morality nor extra-economic supports, and produced forms of social morality, peace and security in its wake (Röpke, 1942h, p. 68). How far Röpke and Rüstow accurately interpret eighteenth-century liberal thought is questionable. They seem to conflate, for instance, the positions of the Physiocrats with those of Smith. While praising Smith for his warnings concerning the tendency for merchants to seek favors and subsidies (Rüstow, 1980, p. 458), Rüstow argued that the invisible hand ‘is the perfection of the Physiocratic conception of the ordre naturel’ (Rüstow in Röpke, 1942h, p. 270). Careful reading of the Wealth of Nations certainly indicates that Physiocrat ideas are present in Smith’s work. Yet Smith also criticized certain Physiocrat ideas such as their insistence that agriculture was the ‘sole source of the revenue and wealth of every country’ (Smith [1776] 1981, IV.ix, 2) and their view of merchants as ‘altogether barren and unproductive’ (ibid., IX.ix, 9). Nor does characterizing Smith as laissez-faire – an expression that appears nowhere in Smith’s work – explain Smith’s advocacy of particular policies uncharacteristic of a committed free marketer, such as his approval of particular export subsidies (ibid., V.ii.k, 12), official limits on interest rates (ibid., II.iv, 13–16), and certain monopolies (ibid., V.i.e, 30). Moreover, Smith’s political economy is not premised on a Physiocrat– rationalist vision of man but rather one of complex human beings with a variety of interests and limited knowledge. For Smith, economic liberty operated within a context of customs and specific institutions, and was enveloped in a legal framework in which government had clear albeit limited roles. Self-interest is certainly operative, but it is shaped, molded and occasionally constrained by law. Though Röpke’s writings do not suggest it, he may have been influenced by the focus of many nineteenth-
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century German intellectuals associated with the historical school on what they called Das Adam Smith Problem, which asserted a contradiction between the self-interested activities underlined in the Wealth of Nations, and the Theory of Moral Sentiments’ emphasis on benevolence and sympathy (Montes, 2008, pp. 159–62). Twentieth-century scholars, however, have demonstrated that though there may be tensions (Otteson, 2000), there are also profound links between the two works (Montes, 2008, p. 166), many of which involve Smith applying different and partial models of human choice to dissimilar areas of human activity, most notably the more impersonal market where self-interest tends to dominate and the spheres of family and church where sympathy prevails (Coase, 1994, pp. 81–2; Viner, 1991, pp. 252–4). Perhaps a better target for Röpke’s reservations about metaphysical harmonies may have been the French economistjournalist Frédéric Bastiat, whose insights Röpke greatly appreciated, but who came closer to articulating the arguments for invisible harmonies of which Röpke and Rüstow were critical. As if aware of potential criticisms that their analysis oversimplified the position of some eighteenth-century economic writers, Röpke conceded that such thinking had never been stated as crudely as he and Rüstow put it (Röpke, 1942h, p. 67). Far from being an ordre naturel, Röpke claimed that free economies depend upon an extra-economic framework of moral, legal, political and institutional conditions. More specifically, it was ‘a highly sensitive artifact’ of Western civilization and Christian and pre-Christian morality. Even the eighteenth-century economists, Röpke acknowledged, simply assumed the moral influence of church and tradition (ibid., pp. 68–9, 1960f). The underlying problem was that these truths were lost sight of in the nineteenth century by particular liberal philosophers such as Herbert Spencer who thought that the market economy, with its division of labor and exchange, could be relied upon to educate and domesticate humanity. These, Röpke claimed, were ‘fatal errors’ ([1957d] 1988, p. 515). Röpke affirmed that market economies played a role in molding people toward more civilized behavior, but they were only one factor. Röpke’s criticisms of economic liberalism’s associations with rationalism were extended in The Social Crisis of our Time and Civitas Humana. By ‘rationalism’, Röpke meant a ‘hubris of the intellect’ that regarded human reason as a ‘never-failing guide’, that did not accept the possibility of making mistakes, and which refused to accept that reason can know unquantifiable certainties ([1944b] 1948, p. 46). Rationalism also reflected the tendency to base political economy upon ‘the always rationally acting homo œconomicus’ (Röpke [1942g] 1992, p. 48), the application of the a priori reasoning employed in mathematics to social life (ibid.), and an associated contempt for that which is spontaneous, bequeathed to us, or
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smacks of tradition (Röpke [1944b] 1948, p. 46). All three characteristics were shared by the libertarian fanatic who . . . forgets that freedom without constraints will end in the worst kind of bondage . . . the apostle of equality who airily dismisses the brutal truth that the essence of life is inequality and variety; [and] the socialist who builds his ideal state without taking man’s unalterable nature and the anthropologically vital character of property into account; it is likewise true of the liberal, who [desires] to turn competitive economy into a precision machine based entirely on men’s rational behavior. (ibid., p. 49)
Röpke did not view this rationalism as a reaction against seventeenthand eighteenth-century absolutism (ibid., p. 50). Illustrating how far he had moved from his previous tendency to broadly associate the Enlightenment with liberty, Röpke noted that the progress of absolutism and the centralization of power in France were associated with the rise of rationalist thought during the French Enlightenment which fostered greater concentration of power in the state (ibid., p. 50, 1945c). This process continued during the revolutionary period under the inspiration of Rousseau’s desire to equalize society (Röpke [1944b] 1948, p. 52). In the realm of eighteenth-century economic science, Röpke maintained that rationalism manifested itself in economic doctrines which were grounded on a ‘theological–metaphysical’ foundation of absolute optimism regarding human progress in the sense that it assumed that the invisible hand would guide all egoism freed from external limitations towards the greatest happiness of the greater number (ibid., pp. 51–3). It was not, Röpke believed, the case that nineteenth-century liberals were blind to the social disturbances associated with the spread of capitalist industrialization and what Röpke called the ‘proletarianization’ of large segments of society (Röpke, 1949j).2 In line with their economic philosophy, however, economic liberals had believed that the market would gradually resolve these problems (Röpke, 1936f, [1942g] 1992, p. 53). When this failed to occur, many liberals began supporting social programs often indistinguishable from socialist measures (Röpke [1942g] 1992, p. 55). None of these criticisms, Röpke stressed, implied that either economic liberalism or the market economy was irredeemable (1940a). While economic liberty was insufficient for freedom, it was indispensible: ‘Freedom, immunity of the economic life from political infection . . . these are the non-materialistic achievements of the pure market economy’ (Röpke [1942g] 1992, p. 108). To this extent, Röpke viewed market economies as indispensible for civilized societies seeking to integrate concerns for liberty and order with an attention to economic efficiency. From the standpoint of liberty, the market economy ultimately consisted of ‘innumerable voluntary economic actions of individuals’ (ibid., p. 89). In terms
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of efficiency, the competitive mechanism allowed production to be guided by consumer choices, and quickly punished those businesses which ceased to be attentive to consumer demand (ibid., pp. 90, 105). Hence in a free economy, economic performance was the decisive factor in a business’s survival rather than proximity to state bureaucrats (ibid., pp. 90, 106). The market was also successful in coupling together responsibility and risk insofar as individuals and businesses taking risks enjoyed the profits of success and bore the loss of failure. Profit was thus an irreplaceable yardstick for determining whether an enterprise was going to be successful (ibid., pp. 90, 105, 1964c). Socialist systems had failed to find a replacement for this function of profit (Röpke [1942g] 1992, pp. 90, 106). Nor had socialism proved able to produce a substitute for the free price structure – ‘the sole apparatus in a highly differentiated society for making economic calculations’ (Röpke [1944b] 1948, pp. 13–14). Instead, socialism had produced state-planning bureaucracies that bumbled their way through the maze of constantly changing economic data without the compass of free prices (Röpke, 1926b). Socialism thus meant replacing this democracy of market choice with an autocratic ruler of the economy in the form of the state and the subsequent politicization of economic life (Röpke [1942g] 1992, p. 103, 1960g, p. 223). Equally inadequate, in Röpke’s view, were proposals to entrust the economy’s direction to professional and business associations that incorporated managers, workers and union officials among their membership ([1944b] 1948, p. 38). For Röpke, ‘corporativism’ – epitomized by what he called ‘the veritable farce of the guild state in Austria’ ([1942g] 1992, p. 93) (the attempt by Engelbert Dollfuss to construct a corporatist state in Austria before the 1938 Anschluss) as well as some fascist countries’ economic policies (1935a) – implied that the state either retained ultimate direction of the professional groups and therefore the economy, or it effectively abdicated large parts of its sovereignty to professional groups who would in all likelihood protect their own bureaucratic interests at consumers’ expense ([1942g] 1992, pp. 93–5). In totalitarian states, Röpke observed that the government invariably uses corporative policies ‘to push its tentacles far into the economic sphere and [increase] its power’ ([1944b] 1948, p. 38). As Eucken later commented, ‘a corporative economy prepares the ground for central control’ (1951, p. 59).
REVIVING THE LIBERAL CIVILIZATION Not content with simply criticizing historical liberalism’s deficiencies, Röpke embarked upon the difficult task of articulating a tradition of
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liberal political economy that avoided these errors. This endeavor had two distinct but associated components. One involved outlining a particular vision of the market order. This, however, was premised on Röpke’s conscious attempt, beginning in the mid-1930s, to revive a philosophical tradition of liberalism that avoided the intellectual tendencies of which he was so critical. As Chapter 2 illustrates, Röpke was not the only self-identified liberal interested in reconfiguring liberalism in this period. In 1935, for example, Hayek argued it was not true that the only rational form of capitalism was laissez-faire, recognizing that private property did ‘not by any means necessarily imply that the particular delimitation of the contents of this right as determined by the existing laws is the most appropriate’ (Hayek [1935] 1948, p. 135). By the late 1930s, many European liberals’ growing conviction that liberalism itself needed to be systematically rethought eventually resulted in this subject being discussed in detail at the last major gathering of liberal intellectuals before World War II. The purpose of the conference – the Colloque Walter Lippmann – was to discuss Lippmann’s book, The Good Society (1937), which had made a considerable impression upon many European liberal thinkers. Among the prominent attendees in Paris in 1938 were Mises, Rüstow, Hayek, Jacques Rueff, Walter Lippmann, Raymond Aron and Röpke himself. Seeking to focus the conference on liberalism’s contemporary inadequacies, the opening speech of the French philosopher Louis Rougier (1889–1992) argued that Lippmann’s book had illustrated: the liberal regime is not solely the result of a spontaneous natural order as several authors of the eighteenth century with their Codes of Nature declared. It is also the result of a juridical order that presupposes the legal intervention of the state. Economic life occurs within a legal order, one that fixes the regime of property, of contracts, of patents, of fault, the status of professional associations and commercial enterprises, currency and banks – all things that are not given in, or by nature, as are the laws of economic equilibrium, but are the contingent creations of the legislator. (Travaux, 1938, p. 9)
Also likely to gain Röpke’s approval was Rougier’s point that Lippmann had highlighted the need to integrate economic problems in their political, social and psychological context. Rougier argued that Lippmann was not opposed to economists reasoning on the basis of theoretical models, which implies simplified and simplifying models. Rather, theoretical analysis should be done with a view to synthesizing multiple and complicating hypotheses. Homo economicus was one place to begin, but he must be integrated with ‘the man of flesh, passion, and limited understanding who is subject to collective moods, adheres to mystical
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beliefs and never really knows how to calculate the exact or full consequences of his acts’ (ibid., p. 10). Lippmann himself followed upon Rougier’s critique of traditional liberalism by bluntly contending that nineteenth-century liberalism’s inadequacies were evident from the fact that it had collapsed (ibid., p. 13). It was therefore vain to believe that reaffirming liberalism simply meant ‘repeating formulas from the nineteenth century’ (ibid., p. 14). Liberalism itself required a total revision. This was not a matter of resurrecting an old theory; rather ‘mankind must once again evaluate science and its relationship with philosophy and morality, it must revise the notion of the state, of property, of individual rights . . . in order to reconstruct liberalism’ (ibid., p. 15). Lippmann’s envisaged liberalism was ‘one which reconciles such obvious antitheses as individual liberty and popular sovereignty, order and liberty, national sovereignty and international security, the power of majorities and the continuity of the state, between stability and change, between private property and the common good, between liberty and social organization’ (ibid., p. 18). Variations upon these themes were articulated by other Colloque participants. In a debate with Mises and Hayek, Rüstow insisted that ‘traditional liberalism’ had paid insufficient regard for the need for noneconomic forms of integration, the absence of which National Socialism, Fascism and Communism had capitalized on (ibid., pp. 65–6). Rüstow even argued that the world had simply ceased listening to representatives of traditional liberalism. ‘If they have not listened’, Rüstow stated, ‘to . . . the prophets – Adam Smith and David Ricardo – how will they believe Mr. von Mises?’ (ibid., p. 66). Supporting Rüstow’s position, Röpke commented that one needed to ‘be prepared for the new type of liberalism to be attacked by the old liberals’ (ibid., p. 75). By ‘old liberals’, Röpke was probably thinking of Mises. Jörg Guido Hülsmann’s biography of Mises underlines the degree of disagreement between Mises on the one hand, and Röpke and other German neoliberals on the other (Hülsmann, 2007, pp. 866, 869–72, 878–80, 1005–11). In later years, Röpke stressed that, notwithstanding his admiration for Mises’ economic insights, he had significant differences with Mises’ ‘whole social philosophy’ ([1954g] 1969, p. 182).3 It is not, however, apparent from the papers delivered at the 1938 conference what advocates of a reformed liberalism had in mind as alternatives to ‘old liberalism’. Rougier vaguely suggested that ‘the return of a revised liberalism . . . would simply be the return of the state of civilization’ (Travaux, 1938, p. 12). Much of Röpke’s subsequent work was devoted to explaining that liberalism and market orders were a product of preChristian, Christian and certain Enlightenment strains that, together,
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constituted Western civilization. Liberalism in this civilizational sense was distinct from the liberalism which Röpke denoted as ‘the narrower and more specific sense of an intellectual, economic, and political ideology, born in the nineteenth century under the influence of certain factors proper to that period’ ([1957d] 1988, p. 514). Instead, the liberalism that Röpke imagined was the valuable work of centuries . . . even of millenniums, a heritage which goes back to the origins of our civilization, to the Ionian Greeks, to the men of the Stoa, to Aristotle and Cicero. . . . those thinkers of antiquity who were among the first to speak of human dignity and the absolute nature of the individual soul in terms that could be understood by all rational men – who discovered the kingdom of ideas, who opposed human caprice, who proclaimed the inviolability of an order beyond the State – ideals which became the guiding stars of Western thought. What the animae naturaliter Christianae launched was completed in a grand way by Christianity and transmitted to us as Christian natural law. Christianity was necessary to wrest man, as a child of God, from the grasp of the State and to undertake . . . the destruction of the ‘Pharaonic spirit’ of the State of antiquity. (ibid.)
Antiquity, in Röpke’s view, was an insufficient basis for a civilization of freedom. The Greek view of the state and its ‘notion of the collective freedom of the “sovereign people” did not exclude the total subjection of the individual’. A modern equivalent was Rousseau’s notion of the General Will with all its implications for democratic despotism (ibid., pp. 514–15). Western civilization’s view of liberty embodied protections for the rights of the person, of the family, of political opposition, and of religious practice, not least by limiting state power (ibid., p. 515). All these elements, Röpke stated, were intrinsically linked to Christianity’s insistence upon rendering to Caesar what belongs to Caesar, but to God what belongs to God (1955a, [1957d] 1988, p. 515). In summary, Röpke contended, it would be possible to write a description of his vision of reformed liberalism ‘using only the orations of Cicero, the Corpus Juris, and the Summa of Aquinas’ ([1957d] 1988, p. 515, cf. 1950f, p. 17). Röpke’s neoliberalism was thus underpinned by a commitment to Christian humanism. Making the point explicit in the last decade of his life, Röpke wrote: my picture of man is fashioned by the spiritual heritage of classical and Christian tradition. I see in man the likeness of God; I am profoundly convinced that it is an appalling sin to reduce man to a means (even in the name of high-sounding phrases) and that each man’s soul is something unique, irreplaceable, priceless, in comparison with which all other things are as naught. I am attached to a humanism which is rooted in these convictions and which regards man as the child and image of God ([1958f] 1998, p. 5)
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The Christian humanism that increasingly shaped Röpke’s political economy emphasized the folly of pretending that humans were perfectible.4 But did embracing such ideas mean that Röpke gradually transitioned from liberalism to conservatism? Certainly Röpke grew critical of policies largely justified by appeals to ‘progress’ in the sense that change constituted its own justification (Röpke, 1951g). He was also sympathetic to domestic American efforts to forge alliances between conservatives and liberals against socialism and communism (Röpke, 1955f, 1956a). In later life, Röpke acknowledged that his liberalism had absorbed some conservative insights of a Burkean variety ([1958f] 1998, pp. 227–8): these ‘conservative ingredients are plainly recognizable in our predilection for natural law, tradition, Corps intermédiaires, federalism and other defenses against the flood of modern mass democracy’. Such principles also counteracted particular currents within contemporary liberalism that Röpke regarded as ‘elements of moral and spiritual disintegration’, most notably progressivism and rationalism (1959f, p. 235). Nevertheless, Röpke continued to consider himself a liberal, partly because he considered conservatism to be a discredited term ([1958f] 1998, p. 228). The forefathers of the liberalism advocated by Röpke were exemplified by Catholic liberals such as Tocqueville and Acton (Röpke 1950f, p. 20, [1957d] 1988, p. 515) and, at a greater distance, the late-scholastic moral theologian Luis de Molina (Röpke, 1950f, p. 33).5 As a contemporary example of the liberalism he supported, Röpke identified Eucken as one who was both an economic liberal and a Christian, and who believed, partly because of the experience of living under the anti-liberal and antiChristian Nazi regime, that Christians had to join secular-minded liberals in pursuing ‘a common goal: the development of a political and economic order which would be the opposite of a totalist society and economy and express both Christian and liberal ideals’ (Röpke [1957d] 1988, p. 514, cf. 1955a).6 The Christian humanist liberalism increasingly espoused by Röpke enabled him to reinforce his particular normative case for liberalism and the market economy. Röpke favored ‘liberalism’ and opposed socialism partly on ‘technical grounds’. ‘The economic “orthodoxy” ’, with which Röpke associated liberalism adequately demonstrated that ‘economic activities are not the proper sphere of any planning, enforcing, and penalizing authority; these activities are better left to the spontaneous cooperation of all individuals through a free market, unregulated prices, and open competition’ (1959f, p. 232). But more importantly, socialism simply gave ‘too little to man, his freedom, and his personality; and too much to society’. In economic terms, socialism was ‘committed to means that simply are not compatible with human freedom’ (ibid., pp. 232–3). By
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contrast, Röpke insisted that ‘only a free economy is in accordance with man’s freedom and with the political and social structure and the rule of law that safeguard it’ (ibid., p. 233). For these reasons, Röpke stated, he would favor the market economy even if it were the case that economic liberty implied material hardship for all and planned or collectivized economies ‘gave the certain prospect of material increase’ (ibid.).
A NEOLIBERAL REFORM PROGRAM The desire of many participants at the Colloque Walter Lippmann to reform economic liberalism found expression in more than rethinking the foundations of liberalism. It also took on a practical dimension when it came to reexamining the state’s economic role. Rougier, for example, asked conference participants to consider ‘what forms of intervention are compatible with the price-mechanism, [and] what forms are incompatible with the laws of the market?’ (Travaux, 1938, p. 9). Reflecting upon Western capitalism’s disarray, Rüstow asked ‘how these situations have occurred, [and] whether it wasn’t the state itself that encouraged them, or even created them’. ‘And’, he added, ‘one must ask how the state ought to intervene once a similar situation is created . . . it is not competition that kills competition. It is rather the intellectual and moral weakness of the state which . . . lets competition decline’ (ibid., p. 28). During this discussion, Röpke limited himself to suggesting that one had to ‘discover the criterion by which one can determine the sector in which competition can be done without’ (ibid., p. 75). Röpke had, however, already been thinking about how to reconfigure the state’s economic role in a manner consistent with a commitment to the market economy. Though suspicious of interventionism, he had commented in German Commercial Policy: I believe it to be a great mistake to say that we are sinning against the spirit of liberalism by admitting that there are kinds of state intervention which are rational and useful, and I believe further that that is just the mistake which has discredited economic liberalism so much in these days. (1934a, p. 50)
Three years later, in an echo of Freiburg ordoliberalism, Röpke wrote in the preface to the first German edition of Lippmann’s The Good Society: ‘the question is not: For or against laissez-faire? Rather it is: Which judicial order fits an economic constitution that is just, free, of the highest productivity, and based on a sophisticated division of labor?’ (1937c, p. 32). Röpke did not embark on this project expecting that it would produce immediate results. He was thinking of the future. The rationalism of
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eighteenth-century deistic philosophers and political economists, Röpke argued, had sown the seeds for nineteenth-century capitalism. This was an instance of what he called ‘historical interference’, whereby ‘internal, mental incubation’ in one period led to a new ‘phase of external, physical realization’ in the future ([1942g] 1992, p. 54), just as Marx’s ideas had helped prepare the way for socialist policies in the twentieth century (Röpke, 1951, p. 267). By 1940, Röpke had decided that the time had come for another instance of historical interference – one which he was determined to shape by articulating his ‘third way’ vision of economic liberalism. Röpke did not have in mind a ‘middle road’ between socialism and capitalism. In his Bank of Egypt lectures, Röpke was extremely critical of third way propositions, such as ‘market socialism’ and ‘cooperativism’, because of their destructive effects upon the free price mechanism (Röpke [1951h] 1987, pp. 20–21, 23). All third ways tried to avoid both the workings of free prices and the problem of bureaucracy, but essentially amounted to a type of ‘ersatz-socialism’ (ibid., p. 22) because any system attempting to diminish the price system inevitably heads in a collectivist direction. He also considered ‘syndicalism’ – understood as a type of industry self-government or industrial democracy based upon co-ownership by employers and employees (with trade unions effectively exercising employees’ ownership rights) under the state’s broad supervision – as highly problematic, not least because it could facilitate a trade-union capture of the economy and the state (ibid., pp. 24–5). Röpke also observed that many purported third-way programs were central to the economic policies advocated by fascist regimes. But, Röpke noted, the collectivist politics of fascist movements invariably necessitated collectivist economic policies on their part. In this sense, Röpke wrote, ‘Fascist Economics has nothing new to offer, whether in practice or in theory’ (1935a, p. 100). Röpke’s ‘third way’ closely paralleled the efforts of Eucken, Böhm and Rüstow in the 1930s to devise an economic constitution which would, first, prevent the state being co-opted to serve particular interests; and, second, reposition the state as an institution capable of protecting market institutions from monopoly, cartelization and interest-group manipulation. Of his fellow neoliberals, Rüstow was perhaps the most influential in shaping Röpke’s thinking on this subject. In his 1932 essay ‘Liberal intervention’, Rüstow called for rejection of the haphazard interventions that seemed to drive government economic policy, much of which was done at the behest of particular interest groups and invariably required other interventions to assist those economic sectors damaged by the original intervention. But rather than calling for a return to laissez-faire, Rüstow argued for:
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When, for example, an agricultural industry began to lose its competitive edge due to changes in the world economy, Rüstow suggested that governments should neither do nothing nor immediately inject subsidies and erect tariffs. Instead, those affected should be immediately encouraged with educational and financial aid to move to a less fragile sector of the economy. This was far less costly than subsidies and tariffs, which would in any case fail to achieve their purpose (ibid., p. 185). Rüstow thus presents a new logic for government intervention: it is to accelerate the reestablishment of equilibrium, while confining such interventions to cases of extreme social distress, keeping them free of interest-group manipulation, and not undermining the workings of prices and competition. In this short paper, Rüstow made no attempt to spell out the full implications of his liberal interventionism, save to say that it ‘presupposed the creation of a completely different type of state to the one that has hitherto been customary’ (ibid., p. 185). Röpke first gave serious attention to this matter in his work in the 1920s and 1930s on business-cycle theory, isolated articles dealing with particular aspects of state intervention (Röpke, 1929f, 1929g), and his participation in the 1931 Brauns Commission advising the Weimar government on how to respond to the Depression. Röpke’s more mature reflections on economic liberalism reflected his growing conviction that, like democracy, market economic orders presuppose a number of concrete decisions which must be continuously adhered to, or the market order will weaken or even collapse. In Röpke’s schema, the first and most central step to a sustainable market economy is a basic decision for the market and against collectivism. This fundamental option for the market economy implied a choice for free exchange, private initiative, genuine competition, free prices, flexible costs and consumer sovereignty. It also meant a choice against monopoly and attempts by pressure groups to use state power to enrich themselves (Röpke [1944b] 1948, pp. 26–7, 32, 1952g). Once this choice is made, Röpke maintained that the second step was to implement positive economic policy. Positive economic economy was divided into what Röpke called framework policy and market policy. Drawing explicitly upon the work of Böhm and Eucken (Röpke, 1942e, 1943b, [1944b] 1948, pp. 38–9), Röpke’s framework policy concerned the
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rules for competition; that is, the rules of the market and an impartial apparatus to ensure that these rules are followed. This necessitated the recognition of clear legal and moral rules, and a limited, impartial and strong government that sought to ensure that effective competition was not being displaced (Röpke [1944b] 1948, p. 28). By market policy, Röpke had in mind a version of Rüstow’s liberal interventionism (ibid., p. 39). The key to ensuring that the state intervenes in the way envisaged by Rüstow ‘without continually intervening to the point where the highly developed nervous system of the market economy refuses to function’ was to distinguish between ‘ “compatible” and “incompatible” interventions: i.e., those that are in harmony with an economic structure based on the market and those which are not’ (Röpke [1942g] 1992, p. 160, [1944b] 1948, pp. 28–9). An intervention that did not interfere, for example, with the price mechanism was market compatible; one that undermined the price mechanism was incompatible (Röpke, 1941b). On this basis, Röpke thought that modest customs duties could be viewed as a market-conformable policy inasmuch as they resembled internal freight costs insofar as they simply widen the cost margin between geographically different locations without significantly deforming the workings of free prices (1955b, pp. 252–3). By contrast, other devices such as exchange controls and quotas were market non-conforming precisely because they interfere with free prices (ibid., pp. 252–3; cf. Sally, 1998, p. 148). The third element of Röpke’s reform of economic liberalism – ‘economic and social policy’ ([1944b] 1948, p. 40) – concerned the pursuit of specific social–economic objectives. As if aware that pursuing some of these goals could considerably compromise economic freedom, Röpke claimed that these social goals flowed directly from the prior commitment against monopoly and concentration and the willingness to allow conformable interventions aimed at making life easier for those negatively impacted by market competition. This implied a choice in favor of: small and medium-sized business in every branch of economic life, in favor of moderation, of what can be overseen and of what is suited to human dimensions, in favor of the middle classes, of the re-establishment of property for the widest circles, in favor of that policy which can be described in the catchphrases ‘deproletariatization’ and economic decentralization. (ibid., p. 30)7
Economic and social policy also implied using the state to break up monopolies. Such actions, Röpke claimed, constituted a compatible intervention. Monopolies, Röpke observed, were far more common in socialist economies, not least because such systems were based on principles of anti-competition and centralization (Röpke [1951h] 1987, p. 21). But he also held that monopolies could exist in free markets; hence, antitrust laws
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might be necessary ([1942g] 1992, p. 179). In later works, Röpke become more skeptical of such measures. If, he contended, monopolies and other impediments to the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises were essentially products of government intervention, then ‘it is of no avail to look to government for new compulsion and new legislation which would only accelerate centrism elsewhere’ ([1958f] 1998, p. 241). The fourth and last component of Röpke’s neoliberal economic theory was ‘social policy’. This concerned the protection and promotion of nonmarket associations (Röpke, 1951f, p. 49). It meant recognizing that the market was reliant upon a broader set of social institutions if it was to work. The person who competes in the market was also someone with a family, often a member of civil associations, and usually a citizen. According to Röpke, these sociological facts needed to be taken into account when it came to the functioning of various market mechanisms.8 This placed him, Röpke thought, at odds with both ‘unregenerate Liberals of the old school’ and contemporary ‘unregenerate illiberals’ (Röpke [1944b] 1948, pp. 32–3). To illustrate his point, Röpke used the example of wage policy. Wage elasticity was indispensible in a market economy. Without it, flexibility in costs is undermined and there is no possibility of competition. Inflexible wages also undermined an economy’s ability to absorb external movements in the global economy. But, Röpke also argued, wage elasticity could only be maintained if wage-earners enjoyed a minimum of stability in their material lives. Hence they needed practical skills that permitted them to earn a living during the short-term periods of unemployment that are often part-and-parcel of a dynamic market economy (ibid., p. 33). To provide content to the third and fourth elements of his reformed liberal program, Röpke detailed a large number of specific policies. These included the decentralization of political power (1942d, [1944b] 1948, pp. 99–114); the decongestion and decentralization of industry in the name of deproletariatization (1943d, [1944b] 1948, pp. 152–81); reducing population growth ([1958f] 1998, pp. 39–52); the revitalization and growth of peasant agriculture, artisans and smaller trading industries ([1942g] 1992, pp. 201–17, 1945g, 1948d, 1948e); the integration of factory workers into the countryside; and the promotion of tax and credit policies that favored small and medium-sized businesses and the acquisition of land property ([1942g] 1992, pp. 218–22, 1948h). For a short time, Röpke even argued that there existed a strong presumption for utilities (such as radio, postal communications, water, gas and electricity) to belong to the state, and wondered whether the state should not have some monopolies of raw material production ([1942g] 1992, p. 190). Even pursuing only a small number of these policies in a systematic
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manner would require the state to assume a major role in the economy. This may explain why Röpke attached heavy caveats to some of these goals. He stated, for example, that neither agricultural subsidies nor artificial rigidities in agricultural prices were compatible with a thriving agricultural sector (1942h, pp. 111–90, [1944b] 1948, pp. 184–93). Röpke also acknowledged that his neoliberalism raised genuine questions about whether it burdened the state with too many task