White House Studies Compendium

WHITE HOUSE STUDIES COMPENDIUM, VOLUME 5

WHITE HOUSE STUDIES COMPENDIUM, VOLUME 5

ROBERT W. WATSON EDITOR

Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

Copyright © 2008 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

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ISBN-13: 978-1-60692-761-8

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

New York

CONTENTS Preface

ix

Health Care Initiatives and the Modern Presidency Bryan Hilliard and Richard M. Yon

1

Presidents and the Development of Medicare in the United States Max J. Skidmore

23

President Bush and Stem Cell Policy: the Politics of Policy Making Kant Patel and Mark Rushefsky

35

The ‘Blame Game’: What Went Wrong with Health Care Reform Gary D. Wekkin

51

The Influence of First Ladies on Mental Health Policy Jerome L. Short, Colleen J. Shogan and Nicole M. Owings

63

The George W. Bush Presidential Transition: The Disconnect between Politics and Policy Anthony J. Eksterowicz and Glenn P. Hastedt

75

The White House Budget – What It Isn’t, What It Is: And A Five-Year Comparison Bradley H. Patterson

91

Are all Presidential Legislative Successes Really Victories? Examining the Substance of Legislation Andrew W. Barrett

101

Revisiting El Dorado Canyon: Terrorism, the Reagan Administration, and the 1986 Bombing of Libya David B. Cohen and Chris J. Dolan

121

Could You Spare a Dime? Better Make it $10,000: Contributions to the Clinton Legal Expense Trust Israel Waismel-Manor and Shelley Conroy

143

vi

Contents

Learning the Art of Policy Management Bruce E. Altschuler

163

Inflation Rhetoric: Gerald Ford’s First Six Months in Office David Gore

183

Jefferson Davis, Religion, and the Politics of Recognition D. Jason Berggren

199

George Washington’s Leadership Style and Conflict at the Federal City John C. Pinheiro

211

The Presidency of Ulysses S. Grant: A Reconsideration Max J. Skidmore

221

Lessons From the First Great American Presidents: An Introduction William D. Pederson and Frank J. Williams

237

Abraham Lincoln’s George Washington Ronald D. Rietveld

241

Abraham Lincoln’s Thomas Jefferson Ronald D. Rietveld

279

Washington’s Farewell Address and Lincoln’s Lyceum Address Joseph R. Fornieri

317

Jefferson, Lincoln and Religious Freedom Rodney A. Grunes

335

Invoking the Framers: The Lincoln-Douglas Debates Danny M. Adkison

353

Lincoln, Seward and the United Kingdom Scott Crichlow

363

Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties: The Balance of Liberty and Security Frank J. Williams Ex Parte Milligan: Lincoln’s Use of Military Commissions Joseph R. Thysell, Jr. The Rectitude of Their Intentions: Proclaiming Independence in Philadelphia and Tel Aviv Norman Provizer and Claire Wright Beyond Maternalism: Women and the Spaces of Political Leadership Marsha Marotta A Role Model for Twenty-First Century Presidential Politics: Condoleezza Rice Ronald D. Petitte

375 395

409 425

437

Contents Embracing the Next Generation: How Young Women Can Help Elect Our First Woman President Marni Schultz

vii

449

Media Coverage of Women Candidates Jessica Aubin, Michelle Haak and Andrew Mangini

471

Experiences of Female Presidential Candidates Alicia Jencik

487

Countdown to Iowa Mosemarie Boyd

505

Monetizing the Audience: Campaign Allocation Strategies David M. Keithly

511

Book Reviews

519

The Law and Order Presidency. By Willard M. Oliver Reviewed by: Roy E. Brownell II

519

On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit. By George C. Edwards III Reviewed by: Richard S. Conley

521

Presidential Campaign Quality: Incentives and Reform. By Bruce Buchanan. Reviewed by: David A. Dulio Franklin D. Roosevelt and Abraham Lincoln: Competing Perspectives on Two Great Presidencies. Edited by William D. Pederson and Frank J. Williams. Reviewed by: Jack Lechelt The Tormented President: Calvin Coolidge, Death, and Clinical Depression. By Robert E. Gilbert Reviewed by: Glen Sussman The Challenge of the American Presidency. By Phillip Abbott. Reviewed by: Robert J. DeCastro

523

526

529 531

Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America, 2nd Edition. By William E. Odom, Reviewed by John Davis

533

Against all Enemies:Inside America’s War on Terror. By Richard A. Clarke Reviewed by Anthony J. Eksterowicz

535

Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Transformation of the Supreme Court. By Stephen K. Shaw, William D. Pederson and Frank J. Williams, Reviewed by Bryan Hilliard

537

viii

Contents

Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Formation of the Modern World. By Thomas C. Howard, William D. Pederson, Editors. Reviewed by Sondra Pena

539

The Nerve Center: Lessons in Governing from the White House Chiefs of Staff. By Terry Sullivan, Reviewed by Michael Frabotta

542

Reagan’s Revolution: The Untold Story of the Campaign That Started it All. By Craig Shirley. Reviewed by Peter Hannaford

543

The War for Righteousness: Progressive Christianity, the Great War, and the Rise of The Messianic Nation. By Richard M. Gamble Reviewed by Michael W. Popejoy

545

Power and Prudence: The Presidency of George H.W. Bush. by Ryan J. Barilleaux and Mark J. Rozell. Reviewed by: Jeremy B. Johnson

549

About the Contributors

553

Index

561

PREFACE The American presidency has become one of the most powerful offices in the world with the ascendency of American power in the 20th century. “White House Studies Compendium” brings together piercing analyses of the American presidency - dealing with both currect issues and historical events. The compendia consist of the combined and rearranged issues of “White House Studies” with the addition of a comprehensive subject index.

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 1-21

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

HEALTH CARE INITIATIVES AND THE MODERN PRESIDENCY

Bryan Hilliard and Richard M. Yon ABSTRACT We catalogue significant activities and specific Executive Orders relating to health care and healthcare policy from Franklin D. Roosevelt through the first three years of George W. Bush’s term in office. As the federal government’s role in health care has expanded, presidents have had, and continue to have, significant impact on policies and regulations that in turn affect individual and public health care in the United States. No doubt, other factors such as the influence of powerful special interest groups, legislative intent, and judicial oversight may alter presidential initiatives. Yet presidents, especially those of the modern era, have immense prestige and power to influence policies related to American health. Any assessment — ethical, political, and social — of a particular chief executive’s effectiveness in influencing health policy begins with knowledge of specific policies and initiatives (those that have succeeded as well as those that have failed) undertaken by the White House. This list is by no means exhaustive, and some may quarrel with particular items, but it should provide a foundation for understanding presidential priorities regarding individual public health measures. Also, it is hoped that this catalogue provides an historical perspective for continued discussions on the ethical obligations presidents have in shaping health care policy.

INTRODUCTION In 1798 President John Adams signed the Act for Sick and Disabled Seamen. This legislation passed by the 5th Congress provided for the care of seamen in existing facilities, and the building of hospitals where there were none, with financing to come from deductions from seamen’s wages. Debate over the bill was intense. Supporters noted that the states would have to assume the burden of care if the federal government did not act. Opponents argued that seamen were no different from other sick and disabled individuals who could not take care of themselves, and thus should rely on charity care, not the government. President

2

Bryan Hilliard and Richard M. Yon

Adams’ signature on the legislation represented the first action in what would become a long history of federal involvement in, and presidential initiatives concerning, the nation’s health.1 The next 206 years saw a dramatic increase in federal involvement in policies directed at the personal and public health needs of the nation. This federal role involved many players, including Congress, the judiciary, various administrative and regulatory agencies, several offices and councils inside the White House, and the presidency itself. The years following the presidency of John Adams also witnessed a great deal of debate centered on the degree to which the federal government should participate in matters related to the nation’s health. While no one today seriously maintains that government has no role, considerable disagreement exists over the proper scope of such involvement. Lack of consensus regarding regulatory, financial, and legal control in matters related to health has resulted in many of the efforts of the federal government becoming incremental. Since the beginning of the modern presidency, debate over federal control of programs and policies designed to protect and promote the health of Americans has intensified. Problems related to financing, access, distributive justice, and what constitutes proper government intervention have occupied, to one degree or another, all presidents from FDR to George W. Bush. Regardless of whether a particular piece of legislation or initiative can be characterized as incremental or comprehensive, modern presidents have had a direct impact on health care policy. In some cases, presidential involvement was voluntary, influenced by a set of ideals, and motivated by a sense of justice. In other cases, presidents found themselves forced to act, either from political expediency, or as a result of overwhelming events. As the current crisis in America’s system of healthcare financing and delivery deepens, the next occupant of the White House will continue to face many of the same challenges encountered by previous occupants as well as new challenges stemming from advances in technology and threats of bioterrorism.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (1933-1945) Selected Significant Activities In 1935 the Social Security Act was passed, thus creating the modern Social Security system. The Act included a federal/state unemployment compensation system, grants to develop public health programs, and benefits to the elderly and to poor families with dependent children. In 1935 the Works Project Administration designated funds to build hospitals and improve existing ones. In 1943 the Emergency Maternity and Infant Care Program authorized the provision of health care to wives and children of men in the military. The program was terminated in 1949.

1

Jo Ivey Boufford and Philip R. Lee, “Health Policy Making: The Role of the Federal Government,” in Ethical Dimensions of Health Policy, edited by Marion Danis, Carolyn Clancy, and Larry Churchill (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 161-162.

Health Care Initiatives and the Modern Presidency

3

Selected Executive Orders EO 7709-A Abolishing the National Emergency Council ƒ Signed: September 16, 1937 ƒ Amended by: EO 7776, December 27, 1937; EO 7906, June 6, 1938 EO 7710 Authorizing the Appointment of Dr. Winfred Overholse as Superintendent of St. Elizabeth’s Hospital without Regard to Civil Service Rules ƒ Signed: September 17, 1937 EO 7846 Prescribing Regulations Relating to Sick Leave of Government Employees ƒ Signed: March 21, 1938 ƒ Revoked by: EO 8385, March 29, 1940 EO 8807 Establishing the Office of Scientific Research and Development in the Executive Office of the President and Defining Its Functions and Duties ƒ Signed: June 28, 1941 ƒ Amended by: EO 9389, October 18, 1943 ƒ Superseded by: EO 9913, December 26, 1947 EO 8890 Establishing the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services in the Executive Office of the President and Defining Its Functions and Duties ƒ Signed: September 3, 1941 ƒ See: EO 9310, March 6, 1943 EO 9039 Authorizing Sick and Rest Leave for Alien Employees of the Panama Canal and the Panama Railroad Company ƒ Signed: January 24, 1942 ƒ Revoked by: EO 9740, June 20, 1946 EO 9079 Making Certain Public Health Service Hospitals Available for the Care and Treatment of Insane Persons ƒ Signed: February 26, 1942 EO 9219 Extension of Provisions of EO 9001 of December 27, 1942, to the Office of Scientific Research and Development in the Office for Emergency Management ƒ Signed: August 11, 1942 ƒ Amended by: EO 9296, January 20, 1943 ƒ Note: The authority of this Executive Order was repealed by Pub. L. 89-554 (80 Stat. 651). EO 9280 Delegating Authority with Respect to the Nation's Food Program ƒ Signed: December 5, 1942 ƒ Amends: EO 8734, April 11, 1941; EO 8942, November 19, 1941; EO 9023, January 14, 1942; EO 9040, January 24, 1942; EO 9125, April 7, 1942; EO 9138, April 17, 1942 ƒ Amended by: EO 9334, April 19, 1943; EO 9392, October 28, 1943; EO 9915, December 30, 1947 ƒ Note: The Administrations established in this Executive Order were terminated by EO 9577, June 29, 1945. EO 9310 Transferring the Nutrition Functions of the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services to the Department of Agriculture ƒ Signed: March 6, 1943

4

Bryan Hilliard and Richard M. Yon EO 9322 Centralizing and Delegating Authority with Respect to the Production and Distribution of Food ƒ Signed: March 26, 1943 EO 9411 Prescribing Rates for Hospitalization and Medical Care of Dependents of Naval Personnel and Others ƒ Signed: December 23, 1943 ƒ Revoked by: EO 11116, August 5, 1963 EO 9414 Regulations Relating to Annual and Sick Leave of Government Employees ƒ Signed: January 13, 1944 ƒ Note: The authority of this Executive Order was repealed by the Annual and Sick Leave Act of 1951. EO 9454 Temporary Appointments as Officers in the Army of the United States of Members of the Army Nurse Corps and Female Dietetic and Physical-Therapy Personnel of the Medical Department of the Army ƒ Signed: July 10, 1944 EO 9498 Amending Executive Order 9079 of February 26, 1942, Making Certain Public Health Service Hospitals Available for the Care and Treatment of Insane Persons ƒ Signed: November 11, 1944

HARRY S. TRUMAN (1945-1953) Selected Significant Activities In 1946 Congress passed the Hospital Survey and Construction Act (Hill-Burton Act). The legislation was designed to assist states in building hospitals. In 1954 the Act was amended to provide funding for the construction of long-term care facilities, rehabilitation centers, and outpatient departments.2 On January 6, 1947, in his State of the Union address, Truman called for a national health insurance program that would include support for mental health, childcare, and hospital construction.3

Selected Executive Orders EO 9568 Providing for the Release of Scientific Information ƒ Signed: June 8, 1945 ƒ Amended by: EO 9604, August 25, 1945; EO 9809, December 12, 1946 EO 9575 Declaring the Commissioned Corps of the Public Health Service to Be a Military Service and Prescribing Regulations Therefore ƒ Signed: June 21, 1945 ƒ Superseded by: EO 13049, April 26, 1952

2 3

See http://indylaw.edu/healthlw David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), pp. 473-474.

Health Care Initiatives and the Modern Presidency

5

EO 9655 Regulations Relating to Commissioned Officers and Employees of the Public Health Service ƒ Signed: November 14, 1945 ƒ Amended by: EO 9897, October 10, 1947 ƒ Revoked by: EO 9993, August 31, 1948 EO 9680 Abolishing the United States of America Typhus Commission ƒ Signed: January 17, 1946 EO 9703 Regulations Relating to the Medical Care of Certain Personnel of the Coast Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Public Health Service, and Former Lighthouse Service ƒ Signed: March 12, 1946 ƒ Amended by: EO10122, April 15, 1950; EO 10400, September 27, 1952; EO 11160, July 6, 1964 EO 9708 Specifying Communicable Diseases for the Purpose of Regulations Providing for the Apprehension, Detention, or Conditional Release of Individuals to Prevent the Introduction, Transmission, or Spread of Communicable Diseases ƒ Signed: March 26, 1946 ƒ Amended by: EO10532, May 28, 1954; EO 11070, December 12, 1962 ƒ Revoked by: EO 12452, December 22, 1983 EO 9791 Providing for a Study of Scientific Research and Development Activities and Establishing the President's Scientific Research Board ƒ Signed: October 17, 1946 ƒ Amended by: EO 9809, December 12, 1946 ƒ Note: EO 9841 terminated the office, April 23, 1947. EO 9993 Regulations Relating to Commissioned Officers and Employees of the Public Health Service ƒ Signed: August 31, 1948 ƒ Revokes: EO 9655, November 14, 1945; EO 9879, October 10, 1947; EO 9955, May 6, 1948 ƒ Amended by: EO 10031, January 26, 1949; EO 10280, August 16, 1951; EO 10354, May 26, 1952; EO 10497, October 27, 1953; EO 10506, December 10, 1953 ƒ Revoked by: EO 11140, January 30, 1964 EO 10014 Directing Federal Agencies to Cooperate with State and Local Authorities in Preventing Pollution of Surface and Underground Waters ƒ Signed: November 3, 1948 ƒ Superseded by: EO 11258, November 7, 1965 EO 10122 Regulations Governing Payment of Disability Retirement Pay, Hospitalization, and Re-Examination of Members and Former Members of the Uniformed Services ƒ Signed: April 14, 1950 ƒ Amended by: EO 10400, September 27, 1952; EO 11733, July 30, 1973

6

Bryan Hilliard and Richard M. Yon EO 10166 Establishing the National Advisory Committee on the Selection of Doctors, Dentists, and Allied Specialists ƒ Signed: October 4, 1950 ƒ Amended by: EO 10185, December 1, 1950 ƒ Revoked by: EO 11415, June 24, 1968 EO 10194 Establishing the Federal Safety Council ƒ Signed: December 19, 1950 ƒ Revokes: EO 8071, March 21, 1939 ƒ Superseded by: EO 10990, February 2, 1962 EO 10262 Suspension of Professional Examinations for Promotion of Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Officers in the Regular Army and Air Force ƒ Signed: June 28, 1951 ƒ Note: See Pub. L. 94-412 (90 Stat. 1255), which terminated, effective September 4, 1978, all powers and authorities, except those expressly cited, possessed by the President and/or other Federal officials as a result of any declaration of a national emergency in effect on September 14, 1976. EO 10302 Interdepartmental Committee on Narcotics ƒ Signed: November 2, 1951 ƒ Revoked by: EO 11529, April 24, 1970 EO 10317 Establishing the President's Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation ƒ Signed: December 29, 1951 EO 10356 Continuing the Commissioned Corps of the Public Health Service as a Military Service ƒ Signed: May 29, 1952 EO 10399 Designating the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service to Perform Certain Duties under the International Sanitary Regulations ƒ Signed: September 27, 1952 EO 10400 Amending EO 10122 of April 14, 1950, entitled "Regulations Governing Payment of Disability Retirement Pay, Hospitalization, and Re-Examination of Members and Former Members of the Uniformed Services" ƒ Signed: September 27, 1952

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (1953-1961) Selected Significant Activities In 1954 Eisenhower proposed a comprehensive health and welfare plan that included a proposal to re-insure private health insurance companies against losses. Congress rejected the plan.4 Also, in 1954, the Internal Revenue Code was amended to exempt employer purchased health benefits from taxable income. In 1956 Eisenhower oversaw the expansion of Social Security benefits to include the disabled.5 And, in 1956 the federal government established 4 5

See http://indylaw.edu./healthlw Ibid.

Health Care Initiatives and the Modern Presidency

7

the Civilian Health & Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS). This program extended benefits to military dependents in civilian medical facilities.

Selective Executive Orders EO 10506 Delegating Certain Functions of the President under the Public Health Service Act ƒ Signed: December 10, 1953 ƒ Superseded by: EO 11140, January 30, 1964 EO 10510 Establishing a Seal for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ƒ Signed: December 17, 1953 EO 10532 Amendment of the List of Communicable Diseases Contained in EO 9708 of March 26, 1946 ƒ Signed: May 28, 1954 ƒ Revoked by: EO 12452, December 22, 1983 ƒ See: EO 11070, December 12, 1962 EO 10555 Establishing a Seal for the President's Committee on Employment of the Physically Handicapped ƒ Signed: August 23, 1954 EO 10640 The President's Committee on Employment of the Physically Handicapped ƒ Signed: October 10, 1955 ƒ Superseded by: EO 10994, February 14, 1962 EO 10673 Fitness of American Youth ƒ Signed: July 16, 1956 ƒ Amended by: EO 10704, March 25, 1957; EO 10740, November 21, 1957; EO 10772, June 30, 1958; EO 10785, October 17, 1958; EO 10931, March 29, 1961 ƒ Revoked by: EO 11074, January 8, 1963 EO 10779 Directing Federal Agencies to Cooperate with State and Local Authorities in Preventing Pollution of the Atmosphere ƒ Signed: August 20, 1958 ƒ Superseded by: EO 11282, May 26, 1966 EO 10807 Federal Council for Science and Technology ƒ Signed: March 13, 1959 ƒ Revokes: EO 9912, December 24, 1947 ƒ Amended by: EO 11381, November 8, 1967 ƒ See: Pub. L. 94-282 (90 Stat. 472) (Council abolished) ƒ Note: The Council was physically located at the National Science Foundation. NSF assumed the functions of the old Office of Science and Technology under Reorganization Plan 1 of 1973. EO 10858 The President's Committee for Traffic Safety ƒ Signed: January 13, 1960 ƒ Revoked by: EO 11382, November 28, 1967

8

Bryan Hilliard and Richard M. Yon

JOHN F. KENNEDY (1961-1963) Selective Significant Activities In 1962 the Migrant Health Act was enacted, providing federal funding to migrants for health services. On January 11, 1963, in his State of the Union address, Kennedy called for the creation of the National Institutes of Health. Also, in early 1963, he spoke out forcefully for health reform legislation and health insurance for seniors.6 In 1963 the Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act was enacted. See Pub. L. 88-164.

Selected Executive Orders EO 10914 Providing for an Expanded Program of Food Distribution to Needy Families ƒ Signed: January 21, 1961 EO 10994 The President's Committee on Employment of the Handicapped ƒ Signed: February 14, 1962 ƒ Supersedes: EO 10640, October 10, 1955 ƒ Superseded by: EO 11480, September 9, 1969 EO 11001 Assigning Emergency Preparedness Functions to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare ƒ Signed: February 16, 1962 ƒ Revoked by: EO 11490, October 28, 1969 EO 11022 Establishing the President's Council on Aging ƒ Signed: May 14, 1962 ƒ Amended by: EO 11376, October 17, 1967; EO 12106, December 28, 1978 ƒ Revoked by: EO 12379, August 17, 1982 EO 11060 Prescribing Certain Regulations and Delegating to the Attorney General Certain Authority of the President to Prescribe Other Regulations Relating to the Recovery from Tortuously Liable Third Persons of the Cost of Hospital and Medical Care and Treatment Furnished by the United States ƒ Signed: November 7, 1962 ƒ Amended by: EO 12608, September 9, 1987 EO 11070 Amendment of the List of Communicable Diseases Contained in EO 9708 of March 26, 1946, as Amended by EO 10532 of May 28, 1954 ƒ Signed: December 12, 1962 ƒ Revoked by: EO 12452, December 22, 1983 EO 11074 Establishing the President's Council on Physical Fitness ƒ Signed: January 8, 1963 ƒ Amends: EO 10830, July 24, 1959 ƒ Revoked by: EO 11398, March 4, 1968

Health Care Initiatives and the Modern Presidency

9

EO 11076 Establishing the President's Advisory Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse ƒ Signed: January 15, 1963 EO 11116 Prescribing Rates of Charges for Certain Hospitalization and Dispensary Services and Delegating Authority to Prescribe Such Rates ƒ Signed: August 5, 1963 ƒ Revokes: EO 9411, December 23, 1943 ƒ Amends: EO 10530, May 10, 1954 ƒ Superseded in part by: EO 11230, June 28, 1965 ƒ Revoked by: EO 12553, February 25, 1986

LYNDON B. JOHNSON (1963-1969) Selected Significant Activities In 1964 the Surgeon General released the first report on smoking and health. On July 30, 1965, President Johnson signed the Medicare Act into law.

Selected Executive Orders EO 11140 Delegating Certain Functions of the President Relating to the Public Health Service ƒ Signed: January 30, 1964 ƒ Supersedes: EO 10506, December 10, 1953 ƒ Amended by: EO 12608, September 9, 1987 EO 11258 Prevention, Control, and Abatement of Water Pollution by Federal Activities ƒ Signed: November 17, 1965 ƒ Supersedes: EO 10014, November 3, 1948 ƒ Superseded by: EO 11288, July 2, 1966 EO 11279 Establishing the President's Committee on Health Manpower and the National Advisory Commission on Health Manpower ƒ Signed: May 7, 1966 EO 11280 Establishing the President's Committee on Mental Retardation ƒ Signed: May 11, 1966 ƒ Superseded by: EO 11776, March 28, 1974 EO 11282 Prevention, control, and abatement of air pollution by Federal Activities ƒ Signed: May 26, 1966 ƒ Supersedes: EO 10779, August 20, 1958 ƒ Superseded by: EO 11507, February 4, 1970

6

Robert Dallek, An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy 1917-1963 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2003), pp.

10

Bryan Hilliard and Richard M. Yon EO 11357 Administration of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act through the National Highway Safety Bureau and its Director ƒ Signed: June 6, 1967 ƒ See Pub. L. 91-605 (84 Stat. 1739), functions vested in National Highway Traffic Safety Administration EO 11415 Reconstituting the National Advisory Committee on the Selection of Physicians, Dentists, and Allied Specialists and the Health Resources Advisory Committee ƒ Signed: June 24, 1968 ƒ Revokes: EO 10166, October 4, 1950; EO 10185, December 1, 1950 ƒ Committee continued by EO 11827, January 4, 1975; EO 11948, December 20, 1976 ƒ Revoked by EO 12148, July 20, 1979

RICHARD M. NIXON (1969-1974) Selected Significant Activities In 1971 the National Cancer Act was signed into law. In 1972 Medicare eligibility was expanded to include people under 65 who were receiving disability benefits and people with end-stage renal disease. In 1973 the Health Maintenance Organization Act was signed into law. The Nixon administration viewed the establishment of HMOs as a major health care initiative; the Act authorized federal financial support for HMOs and promoted their adoption by Employer-sponsored health plans. See Pub. L. 93-222, (87 Stat. 914).7 In 1974 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) was signed into law. See Pub. L. 93-406, (88 Stat. 832). ERISA is the legislation that has made the proliferation and success of managed care organizations possible. In 1974 the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research was established and was active until 1978.

Selected Executive Orders EO 11472 Establishing the Environmental Quality Council and the Citizens' Advisory Committee on Environmental Quality ƒ Signed: May 29, 1969 ƒ Revokes: EO 11278, May 4, 1966; EO 11359A, June 29, 1967; EO 11402, March 29, 1968 ƒ Committee continued by: EO 11827, January 4, 1975 ; EO 11948, December 20, 1976 ƒ Committee terminated by: EO 12007, August 22, 1977

7

490-496. Eleanor Kinney, Protecting American Health Care Consumers (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), p. 132.

Health Care Initiatives and the Modern Presidency

11

ƒ See Pub. L. 91-190 (83 Stat 852) and Pub. L. 91-224 (84 Stat. 114) EO 11480 The President's Committee on Employment of the Handicapped ƒ Signed: September 9, 1969 ƒ Supersedes: EO 10994, February 14, 1962; EO 11018, April 27, 1962 ƒ Amended by: EO 12106, December 28, 1978; EO 12608, September 9, 1987 ƒ Superseded by: EO 12640, May 10, 1988 EO 11523 Establishing the National Industrial Pollution Control Council ƒ Signed: April 9, 1970 ƒ Council terminated, January 5, 1975, by Pub. L. 92-463 (86 Stat. 770) EO 11562 Developing and Coordinating a National Program for Physical Fitness and Sports ƒ Signed: September 25, 1970 ƒ Amended by: EO 11945, October 25, 1976; EO 12098, November 14, 1978 ƒ Revokes: EO 11398, March 4, 1968; EO 11492, October 30, 1969 ƒ Revoked by: EO 12345, February 2, 1982 EO 11599 Establishing a Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention ƒ Signed: June 17, 1971 ƒ Nullified by: Pub. L. 92-255 (86 Stat. 65), which establishes the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention superseding this Executive order EO 11612 Occupational Safety and Health Programs for Federal Employees ƒ Signed: July 26, 1971 ƒ Superseded by: EO 11807, September 28, 1974 EO 11628 Establishing a Seal for the Environmental Protection Agency ƒ Signed: October 18, 1971 EO 11735 Assignment of Functions under Section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as Amended ƒ Signed: August 3, 1973 ƒ Amended by: EO 12418, May 5, 1983 ƒ Revoked by: EO 12777, October 18, 1991 EO 11738 Providing for Administration of the Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act with Respect to Federal Contracts, Grants or Loans ƒ Signed: September 10, 1973 ƒ Supersedes: EO 11602, June 29, 1971 EO 11752 Prevention, Control, and Abatement of Environmental Pollution at Federal Facilities ƒ Signed: December 17, 1973 ƒ Amended by: EO 12038, February 3, 1978 ƒ Revoked by: EO 12088, October 13, 1978 EO 11776 Continuing the President's Committee on Mental Retardation and Broadening Its Membership and Responsibilities ƒ Signed: March 28, 1974 ƒ Amended by: EO 12608, September 9, 1987 ƒ Supersedes: EO 11280, May 11, 1966 ƒ Committee continued by: EO 11827, January 4, 1975; EO 11948, December 20, 1976; EO 12110, December 28, 1978; EO 12258, December 31, 1980; EO 12399, December 31, 1982; EO 12489, September 28, 1984; EO 12534,

12

Bryan Hilliard and Richard M. Yon

ƒ

September 30, 1985; EO 12610, September 30, 1987; EO 12692, September 29, 1989; EO 12774, September 27, 1991; EO 12869, September 30, 1993; EO 12974, September 29, 1995 Superseded by: EO 12994, March 21, 1996

GERALD R. FORD (1974-1977) Selected Significant Activities As Vice-President, Gerald Ford directed the Nixon administration’s efforts regarding right to privacy legislation. As President, Ford signed into law the Privacy Act, which granted rights to individuals to control their personal information and gave citizens the right to view information the government had gathered about them. In his State of the Union address on January 19, 1976; President Ford stated, “We cannot realistically afford federally dictated national health insurance providing full coverage for all 215 million Americans. The experience of other countries raises questions about the quality as well as the cost of such plans.” In the same address, Ford called for budgetary consolidation of 16 health programs, including lead paint poisoning prevention, maternal and child health, and family planning, that did not require states to match the federal funds provided.8

Selected Executive Orders EO 11807 Occupational Safety and Health Programs for Federal Employees ƒ Signed: September 28, 1974 ƒ Supersedes: EO 11612, July 26, 1971 ƒ Federal Advisory Council on Occupational Safety and Health continued by: EO 11827, January 4, 1975; EO 11948, December 20, 1976; EO 12110, December 28, 1978 ƒ Revoked by: EO 12196, February 26, 1980 EO 11914 Nondiscrimination with Respect to the Handicapped in Federally Assisted Programs ƒ Signed: April 28, 1976 ƒ Revoked by: EO 12250, November 2, 1980

8

Stephen J. Williams and Paul R. Torrens, Introduction to Health Services, 4th edition (Albany, NY: Delmar, 1993), p. 100.

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JIMMY E. CARTER (1977-1981) Selected Significant Acitivites In 1977 the administration introduced a proposal to contain health care costs in hospitals. No legislation was adopted, but some hospitals tried for a year to contain costs. In 1978 President Carter issued 10 Principles for a “National Health Plan” designed to insure comprehensive health coverage for all Americans. No legislative action was ever taken. In 1978 the Ethics Advisory Board was established, and continued until 1980. On October 17, 1979, Carter signed the Department of Education Organization Act, which established the Department of Health and Human Services. Pub. L. 96-88. HHS was activated on May 4, 1980. In 1980 the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research was established,and it continued until 1983.

Selected Executive Orders EO 11973 President’s Commission on Mental Health ƒ Signed: February 17, 1977 ƒ Revoked by: EO 12110, December 28, 1978 EO 11991 Relating to Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Quality ƒ Signed: May 24, 1977 ƒ Amends: EO 11514, March 5, 1970 EO 12109 Federal Physicians Comparability Allowance ƒ Signed: December 28, 1978 EO 12133 Drug Policy Functions ƒ Signed: May 9, 1979 ƒ Revoked by: EO 12368, June 24, 1982 EO 12184 Relating to the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research ƒ Signed: December 17, 1979 ƒ Revoked by: EO 12553, February 25, 1986 EO 12196 Occupational Safety and Health Programs for Federal Employees ƒ Signed: February 26, 1980 ƒ Revokes: EO 11807, September 28, 1974 ƒ Amended by: EO 12223, June 30, 1980; EO 12258, December 31, 1980; EO 12399, December 12, 1982; EO 12489, September 28, 1984; EO 12534, September 30, 1985; EO 12610, September 30, 1987; EO 12692, September 29, 1989; EO 12774, September 27, 1991; EO 12869, September 30, 1993; EO 12974, September 29, 1995; EO 13062, September 29, 1997; EO 12608, September 9, 1987; EO 13138, September 30, 1999; EO 13225, September 28, 2001 EO 12270 President's Council on Spinal Cord Injury ƒ Signed: January 15, 1981 ƒ Revoked by: EO 12553, February 25, 1986

14

Bryan Hilliard and Richard M. Yon EO 12286 Responses to Environmental Damage ƒ Signed: January 19, 1981 ƒ Revoked by: EO 12316, August 14, 1981

RONALD W. REAGAN (1981-1989) Selected Significant Activities In 1983 major revisions in the financing of Social Security were recommended, and adopted. These revisions included the Medicare prospective payment scheme on a diagnosticrelated group basis. In 1986 dramatic changes in Medicare and Medicaid occurred through the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act. In addition to expanding Medicaid coverage for children and pregnant women, the Act prescribed federal penalties for hospitals that denied care to poor people in emergencies. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act was also part of COBRA. In 1987 President Reagan signed into law the McKinney Act, which provided, among other things, health care to homeless persons. See Pub. L. 100-77. In 1988 the Biomedical Ethics Advisory Committee was established, and it continued until 1989.

Selected Executive Orders EO 12316 Responses to Environmental Damage ƒ Signed: August 14, 1981 ƒ Revokes: EO 12286, January 19, 1981 ƒ Amended by: EO 12418, May 5, 1983 ƒ Revoked by: EO 12580, January 23, 1987 EO 12345 Physical Fitness and Sports ƒ Signed: February 2, 1982 ƒ Amends: EO 12258, December 31, 1980 ƒ Revokes: EO 11562, September 25, 1970; EO 11945, October 25, 1976; EO 12098, November 14, 1978 ƒ Amended by: EO 12399, December 31, 1982; EO 12489, September 28, 1984; EO 12534, September 30, 1985; EO 12539, December 3, 1985; EO 12610, September 30, 1987; EO 12692, September 29, 1989; EO 12634, October 11, 1989; EO 12709, April 4, 1990; EO 12774, September 27, 1991; EO 12869, September 30, 1993; EO 12974, September 29, 1995; EO 13062, September 29, 1997; EO 13138, September 30, 1999; EO 13225, September 28, 2001 ƒ Revoked by: EO 13265, June 6, 2002 EO 12358 Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving ƒ Signed: April 14, 1982 ƒ Amended by: EO 12376, August 5, 1982; EO 12415, April 5, 1983 ƒ Revoked by: EO 12553, February 25, 1986

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EO 12368 Drug Abuse Policy Functions ƒ Signed: June 24, 1982 ƒ Revokes: EO 12133, May 9, 1979 ƒ Amended by: EO 12590, March 26, 1987 EO 12450 Interagency Committee on Handicapped Employees ƒ Signed: December 9, 1983 ƒ Amends: EO 11830, January 9, 1975 EO 12452 Revised List of Quarantinable Communicable Diseases ƒ Signed: December 22, 1983 ƒ Revoked by: EO 13295, April 4, 2003 EO 12511 President's Child Safety Partnership ƒ Signed: April 29, 1985 EO 12564 Drug-Free Federal Workplace ƒ Signed: September 15, 1986 EO 12566 Safety Belt Use Requirements for Federal Employees ƒ Signed: September 26, 1986 ƒ Revoked by: EO 13043, April 16, 1997 EO 12590 National Drug Policy Board ƒ Signed: March 26, 1987 ƒ Amended by: EO 13284, January 23, 2003 EO 12591 Facilitating Access to Science and Technology ƒ Signed: April 10, 1987 ƒ Amended by: EO 12618, December 22, 1987 EO 12595 White House Conference for a Drug Free America ƒ Signed: May 5, 1987 EO 12601 Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic ƒ Signed: June 24, 1987 ƒ Amended by: EO 12603, July 16, 1987 ƒ Revoked by: EO 12692, September 29, 1989

GEORGE H.W. BUSH (1989-1993) Selected Significant Activities In 1990 Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act, perhaps the most extensive civil rights legislation since 1964. In the spring of 1992 President Bush proposed a “Comprehensive Health Reform Program” that included tax incentives and vouchers to meet the problem of the rising number of Americans without health coverage.

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Bryan Hilliard and Richard M. Yon

Selected Executive Orders EO 12696 President's Drug Advisory Council ƒ Signed: November 13, 1989 ƒ Amended by: EO 12756, March 18, 1991 EO 12700 President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology ƒ Signed: January 19, 1990 ƒ Amended by: EO 12768, June 28, 1991; EO 12869, September 30, 1993 ƒ Revoked by: EO 12882, November 23, 1993 EO 12737 President's Commission on Environmental Quality ƒ Signed: December 12, 1990 ƒ Revoked by: EO 12852, June 29, 1993 ƒ EO 12777 Implementation of Section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of October 18, 1972, as Amended, and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ƒ Signed: October 18, 1991 ƒ Amends: EO 12580, January 23, 1987 ƒ Amended by: EO 13286, February 28, 2003 ƒ Revokes: EO 11735, August 3, 1973; EO 12123, February 26, 1979; EO 12418, May 5, 1983 EO 12806 Establishment of a Fetal Tissue Bank ƒ Signed: May 19, 1992 ƒ Revoked by: Pub.L. 103-43 (107 Stat. 133)

WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON (1993-2001) Selected Significant Activities On September 22, 1993, Clinton gave a speech before a joint session of Congress in which he outlined his plan for national health care reform.9 The Clintons tried, but failed, to develop and implement sweeping policy changes in the American health care system. In November of 1993 Clinton signed the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act. See Pub. L. 103-159, 107 Stat. 536. The Act provided, in part, that background checks be conducted on persons buying handguns. In 1997 the U.S. Supreme Court found certain provisions of the Act unconstitutional. In 1993 the Family Medical Leave Act was passed, requiring employers to provide 12 weeks of unpaid leave to employees for birth or to take care of a sick child or spouse. And, in September 1994, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell declared the Clinton healthcare reform proposals (Health Security Act) dead.10 In 1996 concern over what was commonly referred to as “drive-through” deliveries led to passage of the Newborns’ and Mothers’ Protection Act. The legislation prohibited managed care plans from restricting inpatient hospital benefits to less than 48 hours. In 1996 Congress passed the Health 9

Marc Landy and Sidney M. Milkis, American Government: Balancing Democracy and Rights (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), p. 285. 10 Ibid.

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Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). Among the Act’s provisions is the requirement for private insurers to stop using pre-existing conditions as a reason to deny coverage.

Selected Executive Orders EO 12856 Federal Compliance with Right-to-Know Laws and Pollution Prevention Requirements ƒ Signed: August 3, 1993 ƒ Revoked by: EO 13148, April 21, 2000 EO 12859 Domestic Policy Council ƒ Signed: August 16, 1993 ƒ Note: The Domestic Policy Council and the National Economic Council compose the Office of Policy Development. These offices aid in the formulation, coordination, and implementation of domestic social and economic policies, including public health policies. The president may assign one or more members of the Domestic Policy Council to observe and act upon certain health issues.11 EO 12880 National Drug Control Program ƒ Signed: November 16, 1993 ƒ Amended by: EO 13008, June 3, 1996 EO 12881 Establishment of the National Science and Technology Council ƒ Signed: November 23, 1993 ƒ Amended by: EO 13284, January 23, 2003 EO 12882 President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology ƒ Signed: November 23, 1993 ƒ Revokes: EO 12700, January 19, 1990; EO 12768, June 28, 1991 ƒ Amended by: EO 12907, April 14, 1994; EO 12974, September 29, 1995; EO 13062, September 29, 1997; EO 13138, September 30, 1999 ƒ Revoked by: EO 13226, September 30, 2001 EO 12891 Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments ƒ Signed: January 15, 1994 ƒ Revoked by: EO 13062, September 29, 1997 EO 12911 Seal for the Office of National Drug Control Policy ƒ Signed: April 25, 1994 EO 12961 Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses ƒ Signed: May 26, 1995 ƒ Continued by: EO 13034, January 30, 1997 EO 12963 Presidential Advisory Council on HIV/AIDS ƒ Signed: June 14, 1995 ƒ Amended by: EO 13009, June 14, 1996

11

Boufford, and Lee, p. 171.

18

Bryan Hilliard and Richard M. Yon EO 12975 Protection of Human Research Subjects and Creation of National Bioethics Advisory Commission. ƒ Signed: October 3, 1995 ƒ Amended by: EO 13018, September 16, 1996; EO 13046, May 16, 1997; EO 13137, September 15, 1999 ƒ On October 3, 2001, the NBAC ceased to exist. EO 12994 Continuing the President's Committee on Mental Retardation and Broadening Its Membership and Responsibilities ƒ Signed: March 21, 1996 ƒ Supersedes: EO 11776, March 28, 1974 ƒ Amended by: EO 13062, September 29, 1997; EO 13138, September 30, 1999; EO 13225, September 28, 2001 EO 13017 Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry. ƒ Signed: September 5, 1996 ƒ Amended by: EO 13040, March 25, 1997; EO 13056, July 21, 1997 ƒ Note: The Commission produced two reports, Consumer Bill of Rights and Responsibilities: Report to the President of the United States and Quality First: Better Health Care for All Americans. The procedural recommendations of the Commission served as the foundation for most of the patient protection legislation introduced by the Democrats in the 105th and 106th Congresses.12 EO 13023 Amendments to EO 12992, Expanding and Changing the Name of the President's Council on Counter-Narcotics ƒ Signed: November 6, 1996 EO 13040 Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry ƒ Signed: March 25, 1997 ƒ Amends: EO 13017, September 5, 1996 ƒ Note: EO 13040 is nullified by virtue of the Commission being abolished by EO 13138, September 30, 1999. EO 13045 Protection of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks ƒ Signed: April 21, 1997 ƒ Revokes: EO 12606, September 2, 1987 ƒ Amended by: EO 13229, October 9, 2001; EO 13296, April 18, 2003 EO 13046 Extension of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission ƒ Signed: May 16, 1997 ƒ Amends: EO 12975, October 3, 1995 EO 13058 Protecting Federal Employees and the Public from Exposure to Tobacco Smoke in the Federal Workplace ƒ Signed: August 9, 1997 EO 13100 President's Council on Food Safety ƒ Signed: August 25, 1998 ƒ Amended by: EO 13286, February 28, 2003

12

Eleanor Kinney, p. 194.

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EO 13124 Amending the Civil Service Rules Relating to Federal Employees with Psychiatric Disabilities ƒ Signed: June 4, 1999 EO 13137 Amendment to EO 12975, as Amended, National Bioethics Advisory Commission ƒ Signed: September 15, 1999 EO 13139 Improving Health Protection of Military Personnel Participating in Particular Military Operations ƒ Signed: September 30, 1999 ƒ See: Food and Drug Administration rule of May 25, 1999 (64 FR 54180) EO 13145 To Prohibit Discrimination in Federal Employment Based on Genetic Information ƒ Signed: February 8, 2000 EO 13147 White House Commission on Complementary and Alternative Medicine Policy ƒ Signed: March 7, 2000 ƒ Amended by: EO 13167, September 15, 2000 EO 13155 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals and Medical Technologies ƒ Signed: May 10, 2000 EO 13164 Requiring Federal Agencies to Establish Procedures to Facilitate the Provision of Reasonable Accommodation ƒ Signed: July 26, 2000 EO 13165 Creation of the White House Task Force on Drug Use in Sports and Authorization for the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy to Serve as the United States Government's Representative on the Board of the World Anti-Doping Agency ƒ Signed: August 9, 2000 ƒ Amended by: EO 13286, February 28, 2003 EO 13168 President's Commission on Improving Economic Opportunity in Communities Dependent on Tobacco Production while Protecting Public Health ƒ Signed: September 22, 2000 ƒ Revoked by: EO 13225, September 28, 2001 EO 13172 Amendment of EO 13078 (March 13, 1998), to Expand the Role of the National Task Force on Adults with Disabilities to Include a Focus on Youth ƒ Signed: October 25, 2000 EO 13181 To Protect the Privacy of Protected Health Information in Oversight Investigations ƒ Signed: December 20, 2000 EO 13193 Federal Leadership on Global Tobacco Control and Prevention ƒ Signed: January 18, 2001

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GEORGE W. BUSH (2001-PRESENT) Selected Significant Activities As early as 2000, Bush claimed that he opposed any type of national health care plan, saying he did not want the federal government making decisions for consumers or providers. On August 9, 2001, Bush gave a nationally televised speech in which he outlined the administration’s policy on federal funding of embryonic stem cell research. While on November 6, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a memo to Asa Hutchinson, Chief Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, asserting that physician assistance in a suicide is not a legitimate medical purpose under the Controlled Substances Act. Ashcroft’s directive was aimed at Oregon physicians who prescribe medication to assist their terminally ill patients in committing suicide. The DEA was instructed to review prescribing records of physicians, and to take administrative action against those physicians deemed to have violated the Controlled Substances Act. In 2002 a federal district court granted summary judgment for the state of Oregon, and issued a permanent injunction prohibiting Ashcroft, and the Bush Justice Department from implementing the directive.13 On September 27, 2002, the Bush administration announced that it would begin considering developing fetuses as “unborn children” for purposes of meeting requirements of the government funded health initiative known as the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). On December 13, 2002, President Bush put forth a plan making it mandatory for all military personnel in risky areas to have the smallpox vaccination and recommending that all health care workers take the vaccine. One week later the President was vaccinated against smallpox. On November 5, 2003, Bush signed legislation banning a certain type of abortion commonly referred to as “partial-birth” abortion. The legislation shares so much in common with a Nebraska law that the U.S. Supreme Court found unconstitutional in 2000. And, on November 22, 2003, the House, by a vote of 220-215, approved a $400 billion restructuring of Medicare. Three days later the controversial measure passed in the Senate by a 54-44 margin. The changes include more federal money for rural doctors and hospitals, allowing the creation of tax-sheltered saving accounts for medical expenses, and federal payment for outpatient prescription drugs. The proposed legislation represents the largest single change to Medicare since its inception in 1965.

Selected Executive Orders EO 13198 Agency Responsibilities with Respect to Faith-Based and Community Initiatives ƒ Signed: January 29, 2001 EO 13199 Establishment of White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives

ƒ 13

Signed: January 29, 2001

Ben A Rich, “Oregon v. Ashcroft: The Battle Over the Soul of Medicine,” Cambridge Quarterly of Health Care Ethics, 12, 3, (2003), 310-321.

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EO 13214 President's Task Force to Improve Health Care Delivery for Our Nation's Veterans ƒ Signed: May 28, 2001 EO 13217 Community-Based Alternatives for Individuals with Disabilities ƒ Signed: June 18, 2001 EO 13226 President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology ƒ Signed: September 30, 2001 ƒ Amended by: EO 13305, May 28, 2003 EO 13229 Amendment to EO 13045, Extending the Task Force on Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks to Children ƒ Signed: October 9, 2001 EO 13237 Creation of the President's Council on Bioethics ƒ Signed: November 28, 2001 EO 13263 President's New Freedom Commission on Mental Health ƒ Signed: April 29, 2002 EO 13265 President's Council on Physical Fitness and Sports ƒ Signed: June 6, 2002 ƒ Revokes: EO 12345, February 2, 1982 EO 13295 Revised List of Quarantinable Communicable Diseases ƒ Signed: April 4, 2003 EO 13296 Amendments to EO 13045, Protection of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks ƒ Signed: April 18, 2003

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 23-33

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

PRESIDENTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICARE IN THE UNITED STATES

Max J. Skidmore ABSTRACT When Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Medicare Act into law, it was the culmination of actions by numerous presidents, including the two Roosevelts, Truman, and Kennedy. Even Dwight Eisenhower’s approval of the addition of Disability Benefits to Social Security could be considered as part of the pattern, as could the actions of some subsequent presidents, including certain of Richard Nixon’s proposals. Ronald Reagan clearly had a strong influence also, but for the first time it was a negative presidential influence. Since LBJ, however, only Bill Clinton had the political courage to attempt to deal comprehensively with the manifold troubles in America’s health-care system that Theodore Roosevelt saw developing nearly a century ago—and he failed. On the whole, Medicare, with the notable exceptions of no prescription-drug coverage for outpatients and no provision for long-term care, operates well. The solution to projected cost increases is not “reform” of Medicare; rather it is reform of America’s entire, highly inefficient, health-care delivery system.

INTRODUCTION President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Medicare Act into law at the Harry S. Truman Library and Museum in Independence, Missouri, on 30 July 1965. Former President Harry Truman was the honored guest. The following January, Harry and Bess Truman received the first Medicare registration cards issued, numbers one and two respectively.1 This was fitting. No president except perhaps for Johnson himself had exceeded Truman in his commitment to ensuring that health care was available to the population of the United States. In the 1940s, he had been the first president to propose providing health coverage through Social Security. Several other presidents before and since, however, in varying ways have also played key roles in Medicare’s development. 1

“Chronology, Harry S. Truman’s Life and Presidency: Postpresidential⎯1953-1972,” Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/truman-3.htm, p. 2.

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The roots of America’s Medicare system go far back in time, but there were several presidents who figured most prominently in the developments that led to the act that LBJ signed into law that day, or who contributed to the programs flowing from that act. They were Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, John F. Kennedy, Johnson, Bill Clinton, and—in a negative sense—Ronald Reagan. In TR’s case, his influence came predominantly after his presidency. In Reagan’s case, it began long before he became president, and has had continuing repercussions. By the time of TR’s presidency⎯he was the first president to serve entirely in the twentieth century⎯some two decades had passed since the first modern comprehensive social insurance programs. These were in Germany, the best-known of which came under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, whose pioneering efforts in 1883 included health coverage. Even Bismarck’s programs were based upon earlier Prussian legislation. The German model soon inspired similar programs throughout Europe, including the United Kingdom. In the United States, the idea for some sort of social insurance had been around for almost a century. In the winter of 1795-1796, Thomas Paine wrote a brief pamphlet, Agrarian Justice, published initially in a French edition in Paris; the first English edition was in 1797.2 Paine proposed a 10 percent tax on inheritances to create a national fund that would provide every person a cash payment upon becoming twenty-one, and also would provide every person an annual pension beginning at age fifty. It is noteworthy that he included both women and men. The United States did not adopt Social Security until 1935, and Medicare was not developed until three decades later. Although Paine’s program would not have included health care, even today—more than two centuries later—his proposal sounds radical. Paine’s concern was for the economic well-being of both women and men, both young and old. Even now, America is almost unique among industrial countries in having no general program to provide health care to the whole population, and it has little prospect for having one in the near future. Prevalent cultural attitudes, along with opposition from vested interests, have always made enacting any progressive program in the United States difficult. Regardless of party control of Congress, conservatives almost always dominate. True progressive reforms have been possible only during a few periods in American history, and generally these periods have been brief. One such period has gone largely unrecognized because it occurred during the Civil War, which, of course, overshadowed all other events and concerns. During the Lincoln administration Southern obstructionists withdrew from Congress, making progressive measures possible. In the first six months of 1862, Lincoln signed into law the Homestead Act, an act to establish a national currency, and an act to regulate banks; perhaps most radical of all, he signed “the first federal income tax in United States History.” Although Congress repealed the tax after the war, “it established what until then was considered a revolutionary principle: the idea of taxing rich people at a higher rate compared to the rate for people less well off.”3

2

The complete text of Paine’s Agrarian Justice is available on the website of the Social Security Administration: http://www.ssa.gov/history/tpaine3.html. 3 Steven R. Weisman, The Great Tax Wars, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002, p. 33.

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The Progressive Period, the New Deal, and the Great Society essentially exhaust the list of periods of true progressive reforms. Such unusual periods present opportunity for progressive measures. There are two prerequisites for such periods to exist. First, there must be extraordinary conditions⎯a war, the emergence of corporate industrialism, a Great Depression, or some other unusual circumstance (9/11 could have been a prime example) that encourages national unity. Second the president must be a strong, resourceful, and visionary leader. The presidency is clearly the source of progressive reform. Medicare was no exception; it came about as an extension of the New Deal reform impulse, and required the brilliant legislative leadership of Lyndon Johnson. Medicare could not have come about during a period of normal politics, nor could it have come without an extraordinary president. Although the program is highly popular, it continues to face strong⎯if often covert⎯opposition. A comparison of the extent of health coverage in the United States with that in nearly all other industrial democracies indicates how slow the progress has been here. Despite the difficulties, the United States has made progress. Under the circumstances, that progress has been substantial. Certainly, many figures, private citizens as well as officials, have been involved. Presidents have not acted alone⎯others may deserve at least as much credit⎯but the commitment of a few presidents at a few key moments has been essential. Progress could not have occurred without them. Giving too much emphasis to these points is impossible.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT Theodore Roosevelt (TR) was a great progressive president, holding office at a time of a huge wave of reform. He was the first president who recognized the necessity for government regulation of huge concentrations of private economic power not only to regulate the economy, but also to preserve individual liberty. After his presidency, he developed an awareness of the need for governmental action to insure individual economic well being. On 31 August 1910, speaking in Osawatomie, Kansas nearly a year and a half after he left office, TR outlined the bold themes of his “New Nationalism.” Kathleen Dalton calls it “the most important speech of his political career.”4 Speaking before thirty thousand people, he sounded his “familiar themes,” but gave them “a more radical tone.” He thundered that the special interests must be driven out of politics, company directors must be held personally liable for the actions of their corporations, a graduated income tax and an inheritance tax must be levied in order to put “swollen fortunes” to public use, and the like. In 1912, failing to gain the Republican nomination again, TR embarked upon his famous “Bull Moose” bid for the presidency under the banner of the Progressive Party. On 6 August, he addressed the ecstatic delegates of the Progressive Convention, after accepting their nomination with his “Confession of Faith.” He spoke of the many reforms that he had previously sought, but this time “he went further and called for the creation of a full welfare

4

Kathleen Dalton, Theodore Roosevelt: A Strenuous Life, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002, pp. 365-366.

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state by advocating social security insurance to cope with the ‘hazards of sickness accident, invalidism, involuntary unemployment, and old age. . . .’”5 Roosevelt, of course, failed to win his third, comeback, term. He did, however, run far ahead of the Republican incumbent, William Howard Taft, in both popular and electoral vote. His race paved the way for the victory of a Democrat, Woodrow Wilson, in a heavily Republican era. Reformers at first were dismayed at TR’s defeat, but soon discovered that in Wilson they had another champion of reform. Social Security and Medicare were some distance away, but for a time there was a flurry of activity.6 The American Association for Labor Legislation in 1912 formed a Committee on Social Insurance, which included considerations of health care. This resulted, in 1913 during the Wilson administration, in a national conference on social security that produced model social insurance legislation to be presented to state legislatures. In 1915, even the American Medical Association expressed some interest in a government-supported health program. Several states did consider the proposed legislation, but all rejected it. By 1918, serious opposition had arisen within the AMA. Quickly, the AMA transformed itself into the most implacable foe of government health insurance of any special-interest group in the country. Insurance companies and pharmaceutical houses were nearly as strong in their opposition. As the prominent scholar of health politics, Odin W. Anderson, put it, the AALL leaders naively assumed “that a reform which they thought should be deemed good by everyone would triumph on its own merits.”7 They were mistaken. TR remained active in advocating reform, but he was out of office, and his support could no longer be decisive. Wilson’s more cautious proposals did not attempt to mobilize support for health care. When TR died in January of 1919, the country lost its most articulate spokesman from the public sector⎯of course he was a private citizen, but, as a former president he retained some of the influence, if not the power, of a public official. Until Dalton’s excellent study, writers on the period⎯with a few notable exceptions⎯tended to overlook Roosevelt’s continuing advocacy of progressive reform, treating his postpresidential years as though they involved little more than bitter attacks upon his antagonist, Woodrow Wilson. Dalton has helped bring perspective to studies of TR, and therefore, to the development of social insurance and government programs for health care in the United States. There were a number of studies advocating social insurance during the next decade or so, but they tended to deal largely with income maintenance. The sweeping Republican victory in 1920 set the tone. The triumphant winner for the first time in American history received 60 percent of the popular vote. This was no Theodore Roosevelt; no Progressive Republican. This was Warren G. Harding, who called for a return to “normalcy.” Harding, a conservative with a whiggish view of the presidency, vowed to leave policy formulation to Congress. He died in office in 1923 to be succeeded by Vice President Calvin Coolidge, who as one recent study observed, “raised inactivity to an art.”8 5

John Allen Gable, The Bull Moose Years: Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Era, Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1978, pp. 81-83. 6 Odin W. Anderson, “Compulsory Medical Care Insurance, 1910-1950,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 273 (1951), pp. 106-111. 7 Ibid., p. 110. 8 Sidney M. Milkis and Michael Nelson, The American Presidency, 4th ed., Washington: CQ Press, 2003, p. 258.

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Coolidge was passive, but popular. In 1924 he won his own term handily, becoming the second vice president who succeeded a fallen president to win nomination and election in his own right. Ironically, the first one to do so could hardly have presented a greater contrast to the indolent Coolidge⎯it was Theodore Roosevelt. Coolidge declined to run in 1928, and again a conservative Republican won easily. The new president, Herbert Hoover, was far from passive. Nevertheless, he adhered to a rigid ideology that prevented him from being effective as president. He believed in government activity, but in general only to exhort private effort. Any assistance directly to individual citizens, even unemployment benefits, would be “socialism” and lead to government despotism; according to Hoover. Many later politicians have adopted his theme in spite of the fact that it is historical nonsense. No dictatorship has ever resulted because of social welfare measures, but that has not prevented continuing assertions that it does. As for Hoover, he proved completely unable to deal with the Great Depression that hit the country shortly after he took office.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT Conditions had become so difficult under Hoover that Franklin D. Roosevelt won overwhelmingly in 1932. Hoover had not caused the Depression, but he received the blame. Not only was he in office, and the buck stopped there, but he gave no evidence of being able to cope with the crisis. His cold demeanor mistakenly gave the impression that he had no concern for the plight of the people. Groups of tarpaper shacks and piano-crate boxes served as makeshift shelters thrown together throughout the country by the homeless. They became known as “Hoovervilles.” Under such circumstances it would be possible once again to consider progressive measures if the right kind of leadership emerged. With FDR, it did. Among the many programs that Roosevelt achieved, the most outstanding⎯and without doubt the greatest break with the anti-governmental past⎯was the Social Security System. The 1935 Act provided most notably for unemployment, and old-age benefits. Amendments in 1939 expanded the system to include benefits for spouses, and for survivors of deceased wageearners. The missing benefit, of course, was health care. The President’s Committee on Economic Security studied health care, but included only a brief mention of the subject in its report, in spite of its original charge to consider health measures as an overall part of economic security. The Committee’s executive director, Edwin Witte, noted that medical leaders were fearful that the administration was attempting to include governmental health insurance. FDR did not push the issue. He was interested above all in obtaining passage of Social Security. Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins said that the AMA’s opposition was so strong that any inclusion of health benefits “could have prevented passage of the entire Social Security Bill.”9 In fact, as soon as it became known that FDR was appointing a Committee on Economic Security, the White

9

Max J. Skidmore, Medicare and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation, Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, pp. 6667.

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House had been deluged with telegrams, letters, and telephone calls demanding appointment of a physician known to be an outspoken critic of any government plan. FDR, therefore, backed off from any effort to include health care. Objectively considered, it is difficult to see that inclusion of health benefits would have been any more radical than the inclusion of unemployment and old-age benefits. The difference was the nature of the special interests. They were much more organized to resist health benefits than any other program. Although FDR did not call for health benefits, he did secure the first true comprehensive social insurance program in the United States, therefore paving the way for the ultimate addition of health care as a benefit.

HARRY S. TRUMAN Although the idea was not unique to Truman, he was the first president to propose formally that the Social Security system be expanded to include health care. On May 19, 1947, he requested from Congress an extensive program of public-health services with special attention to mothers and children; additional federal support for medical education and research; funds for additional hospitals and physicians; and “an insurance program that would allow people to pay their medical costs, and to make up for their loss of earnings during times of illness. The reaction from certain quarters was ferocious. Insurance and pharmaceutical companies joined with the American Medical Association in conducting an intensive and expensive campaign against Truman’s ‘socialized medicine’ program.”10 He pushed on, regardless. Congressional resistance to a presidential legislative initiative was nothing unusual. “What was novel was a President who, when repeatedly rebuffed, refused to change his tactics.” The radical nature of his proposal also was novel. He proposed compulsory national health insurance to be paid for through payroll deductions. “All citizens would receive medical and hospital service irrespective of their ability to pay.”11 This was far more comprehensive than anything even proposed, not to mention adopted, until the Clinton presidency. The United States remains one of the few industrial countries having nothing resembling Truman’s proposals of more than a half-century ago. In a message to Congress the following year, on January 7, 1948, Truman again called for a sweeping program of various progressive measures, including national health insurance. “The Republicans, as anticipated, did not like it at all, any more than did the southern Democrats.”12 In fact, later that year he had to veto a Republican measure that would have taken Social Security benefits away from some three-quarters of a million people. On June 14th he blasted their attempt in a hard-hitting speech to the Greater Los Angeles Press Club. He said he refused “to let them get away with tearing up Social Security,” and pointed out that this had been a response to his request for expansion of Social Security’s base.13 Throughout the 1940s a series of “Wagner-Murray-Dingell” bills (Senators Wagner and Murray, and Representative Dingell were the sponsors) called for health care reform. Truman 10

Donald R. McCoy, The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984, p. 105. David McCullough, Truman, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992, pp. 473-474. 12 Ibid., p. 586. 13 Max J. Skidmore, Social Security and its Enemies, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999, pp. 116-117. 11

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supported the 1945 proposal, the first under his presidency. His 1947 proposal was another. His last comprehensive proposal came in 1949, and was similar to the Wagner-MurrayDingell Bill of 1947. This proposal was based on a massive report that Truman had commissioned, The Nation’s Health: A Ten Year Program, by Oscar Ewing (head of the Federal Security Agency). Truman earlier had established a Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation, which produced the Ewing Report. In his 1949 State-of-the-Union address, Truman pointed to the health needs of Americans, and said, “we need⎯and we must have without further delay⎯a system of prepaid medical insurance which will enable every American to afford good medical care.”14 The AMA flooded the country with propaganda opposing any government insurance plan.15 Working through a National Physicians Committee for the Extension of Medical Service, it inundated patients with pamphlets in physicians’ waiting rooms, included leaflets with their bills, and launched a massive advertising campaign. Threaded throughout was the theme that government support for health-care bills was “socialism,” or even worse, “communism.” Often the material referred specifically to the Soviet Union. Partly because of such tactics, and partly because the country simply was tired of reform and war; Truman was generally much less successful with his domestic agenda, the “Fair Deal,” than he was with his strong foreign policy. Through the 1950s, the propaganda battle subsided. The Eisenhower administration was not inclined be innovative with regard to progressive legislation, and Eisenhower himself was careful to avoid any hint of “socialism.” Nevertheless, he fully accepted the major outlines of the New Deal, and made no attempt to reverse its progress. In fact, during the Eisenhower administration the Social Security system not only expanded, and Ike pointed with pride to that expansion, but President Eisenhower signed into law one of the greatest additions to that system in its history: disability benefits. However, Eisenhower took no steps to develop a Medicare-type program. Representative Aime Forand did introduce a series of bills relating to health-care benefits, but they received no administration support, and died in Congress. Although Progressives could not have recognized it at the time, there was a cloud on the horizon. A former film actor had become a spokesman for the General Electric Corp., and his political talks around the country at company gatherings were attracting the attention of antigovernmental activists. Slowly, beneath the general awareness of the public, they began to coalesce around his leadership. His name was Ronald Reagan; he gave his talk thousands of times. He called it simply, “The Speech.”16 Staples of “The Speech” were, among other things, the evils of communism, and of Big Government assertions, more than four decades ago, that Social Security was a failure, and was “bankrupt,” and fierce attacks on government health insurance.

14

Ibid., p. 52; pp. 117-118. See ibid., pp. 53-55; See also Skidmore, Medicare, passim. 16 See Kurt Ritter, “Ronald Reagan and ‘The Speech,’: The Rhetoric of Public Relations Politics,” Western Speech, 32:1 (Winter 1968); reprinted in Max J. Skidmore, Word Politics: Essays on Language and Politics, Palo Alto: Freel and Associates, 1972, pp. 110-118. 15

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JOHN F. KENNEDY Although the Forand Bills stood no chance of becoming law during the Eisenhower administration, the AMA attacked them fiercely. They were a foot-in-the-door strategy, said the Association’s press releases that would lead to socialized medicine. The chances for such legislation increased greatly when John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency. So did the AMA attacks. Kennedy’s greatest strength as president was symbolic. He projected an image of youth, vigor, and good will, not only to Americans, but around the world. He pledged to get the country moving again, and firm support for health care was a key part of his domestic agenda. Legislative leadership was not Kennedy’s greatest talent, but he was genuinely committed to health care for the aged through Social Security. In contrast to some other parts of his “New Frontier,” such as civil rights, his efforts on behalf of what came to be called Medicare were there from the beginning. He put the full weight of the presidency behind the new AndersonKing Bill that Senator Clinton Anderson and Representative Cecil King were sponsoring. Kennedy appeared on national television, speaking from Madison Square Garden on May 20, 1962 at a rally to urge support for Medicare. The administration scheduled 42 such rallies around the country. Physicians’ groups in numerous locations threatened boycotts. The AMA bombarded the airwaves with anti-Medicare advertisements, it enlisted Reagan’s covert assistance to encourage anti-Medicare mail to Congress⎯the AMA’s so-called “Operation Coffeecup” featuring a recording, “Ronald Reagan Speaks Out Against Socialized Medicine”; it placed an anti-Medicare article in the then very popular Reader’s Digest; and it urged physicians who had members of Congress as patients to lobby them to oppose Medicare.17 Both sides blanketed the country with advertisements in every conceivable medium. It was one of the most intensive public-relations campaigns in history, and Medicare failed.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON After Kennedy’s tragic assassination on November 22, 1963, Vice President Johnson stepped into the presidency. President Johnson, a legislative genius, clearly one of the most skilled politicians in American history. This was a rare opportunity for progressive legislation in the United States to once again emerge briefly. Johnson moved quickly to conduct a “War on Poverty” as part of his “Great Society.” LBJ ran for his own term in 1964, and won the greatest popular-vote majority in American history. He is the only president ever to achieve 61 percent of the popular vote, and only the fourth to win his own term after stepping from the vice presidency into a presidential vacancy. The Great Society brought new programs one after another. They included, among others; Head Start, the Work-Study Program, Federal Aid to Education, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, environmental protections, assistance to the arts and humanities, and, most relevant here, Medicare. His legislative accomplishments rivaled those of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt. 17

See Skidmore, Medicare, chapters IV-VI.

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Irony abounded in his presidency. Physicians discovered quickly that Medicare worked significantly to their advantage, as they began to receive payment for many services to indigent patients that would previously have been written off. The AMA in 1939 had said in its official journal JAMA (The Journal of the American Medical Association), that “indeed, all forms of security, compulsory security, even against old age and unemployment, represent a beginning invasion by the state into the personal life of the individual, represent a taking away of individual responsibility, a weakening of national caliber, a definite step toward either communism or totalitarianism.” The author was JAMA’s editor and prominent AMA spokesman, Morris Fishbein, M.D. Immediately after Medicare’s passage, the AMA leadership had even considered making it mandatory for its members to refuse to treat Medicare patients.”18 Soon, however, attitudes changed. Dr. Fishbein, who for three decades had been identified as the AMA’s most outspoken opponent of Medicare, railing against “medical soviets” and “peasant medicine,” conceded that the AMA should have cooperated with the government to help shape the program, rather than opposing it rigidly. On October 29, 1965, he even said publicly that “as conditions change, we must adapt to the changes.” He expressed support for federal programs, including Medicare. “When conditions become so severe they can no longer be handled by private initiative,” he said, “the government must step in.”19 It was a statement that could have come from TR, FDR, Truman, Kennedy, or LBJ.

RONALD REAGAN A long chain of presidents from both parties; FDR, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, LBJ, Nixon, Ford, and Carter, had accepted the basic outlines of the New Deal, and had recognized the need for social insurance in the complex modern world. Reagan, who took office on January 20, 1981 was the first to reject the modern approach to politics and to attempt to turn his back on what had become traditional American government. He had a long record of opposition to Medicare, and even to Social Security. He came to office announcing that government was not the solution to the problem, government was the problem. By the time he became president, Reagan had been Governor of California for two terms. Prior to that, he had attracted national attention by giving on national television a stirring rendition of “The Speech” on behalf of Senator Barry Goldwater’s doomed presidential candidacy in 1964. Even before that, in 1961, he had been the nucleus of the AMA’s clandestine campaign, “Operation Coffeecup,” to encourage individually handwritten letters to members of the House and Senate to opposed Medicare. The public-relations campaign was brilliant. The AMA sent copies of “Ronald Reagan Speaks Out Against Socialized Medicine” to the president of every women’s auxiliary to the county medical society in the country, members of which were all physicians’ wives. They were instructed to “put on the coffeepot,” play Reagan’s record to their friends, and then urge each one to write on provided stationery. The text was Reagan’s familiar, “Speech.” He no doubt terrified many of his listeners with his conclusion, telling them that if they did not 18 19

Quotation Ibid., p. 131; see also p. 186, n9. Quoted ibid., pp. 145-146.

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prevent the passage of Medicare, “one of these days you and I are going to spend our sunset years telling our children and our children’s children what it once was like in America when men were free.”20 When Reagan debated President Carter during the 1980 campaign, Carter said that Reagan had begun his career attacking the idea of Medicare. Reagan responded with his famous line, “there you go again,” and denied that he opposed the principle, merely that he had favored another program that Congress was then considering.21 Carter had been absolutely right; Congress was considering no such program, and Reagan opposed any governmental assistance except to the very poor, and then under the control of states. The audience laughter, though, threw Carter off his stride, and Reagan’s untruthful statement stood. There were many factors that contributed to his election, and most people credit the debate as a significant one. Once in office, Reagan moved to cut Social Security. The firestorm of protest caused him to back away, but in a major way he succeeded. He left a legacy that has made it possible, if done discreetly (or deviously), to oppose Social Security and Medicare, and still survive politically. One can call for vouchers to replace Medicare, for example. Beneficiaries then would use the vouchers to purchase private coverage. Apart from being a massive subsidy to the woefully inefficient private insurance mechanisms that have brought this country such maldistribution of health coverage, vouchers would provide no specific benefit, no guarantee of coverage, and no guarantee that the beneficiary would not face burdensome additional charges. It would, though, eliminate a government program. This is ideology, not economics.

WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON Although Richard Nixon had proposed expansion of health coverage by encouraging employers to provide insurance, Bill Clinton was the first president since LBJ to turn his attention to the need for comprehensive health care. He was new in office, and inexperienced, and that handicapped his efforts. In view of the other accomplishments that he did manage to achieve under highly adverse conditions; a budget with a tax increase for which no Republican would vote but which was a major factor in eliminating the deficit, for example, he may have had the legislative skills necessary to secure passage. What he did not have was the right combination of circumstances. Ideologues worked with the special interests to make hysterical and inaccurate charges. Clinton, they said, was attempting a “government take-over of health care.” Even more nonsensically they said that he was attempting to “socialize one-seventh of the U. S. economy.” Undoubtedly, the Clinton plan was overly complex. No serious and well-informed observer, though could honestly have seen it or continue to portray it as “socialism.” At its simplest, the Clinton proposal required employers to provide health insurance through private companies to their employees.

20 21

For the full text, see Skidmore, Social Security, Appendix. See Max J. Skidmore, “Ronald Reagan and ‘Operation Coffeecup:’ A Hidden Episode in American Political History,” Journal of American Culture, 12:3 (Fall 1989).

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CONCLUSION After TR’s whirlwind, but failed, Bull Moose campaign, more than two decades passed before his distant cousin, Franklin D. Roosevelt, came to power, and brought his New Deal. Only then was it possible to secure any of the programs that TR had suggested, and not until more than half a century after TR, with Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, was Medicare possible to achieve. Even then, Medicare benefits were limited to the elderly. Now that another three decades have passed, these programs that have become fundamental to the American way of life again are under fierce attack from opponents; opponents who draw their policy proposals from the nineteenth century. One such opponent today occupies the presidency. His calls for privatization or vouchers, coming as they do from the President of the United States, can only undermine public confidence, regardless of the fundamental soundness of the programs involved. The lack in Washington today of such courage as TR displayed over 90 years ago should give pause to anyone who might still believe that progress is inevitable. FDR, Truman, Kennedy, and LBJ helped achieve much of TR’s dream, as did Dwight Eisenhower, and even Richard Nixon. Since LBJ, however, no president except Bill Clinton has sought to provide a comprehensive solution to the problems with health-care delivery that TR saw developing nearly a century ago⎯and Clinton, of course, failed. To be fair, Nixon did seek to expand health coverage but not in a comprehensive manner. Troubles exist in the Medicare system, but on the whole this system operates well. The solution that will prevent burdensome costs to the public in years to come, if projections of health cost increases are accurate,is not to reform Medicare. Rather, the solution is to reform the health-care delivery system in the United States. This can only occur when proper conditions exist, and when there is vigorous presidential leadership that also is sound and thoughtful. Currently, America’s health-care delivery costs far more than that in any other country, and simultaneously it fails to provide the universal coverage⎯generally high-quality coverage, one might add⎯found in other industrial nations. No great degree of perception is needed to recognize that the current health-care delivery system is flawed; nor is great discernment required to recognize that privatization is not the answer to America’s current health-care crisis. Perhaps we should remember that private health-care delivery systems led to the unsatisfactory situation that exists today.

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 35-50

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

PRESIDENT BUSH AND STEM CELL POLICY: THE POLITICS OF POLICY MAKING

Kant Patel and Mark Rushefsky ABSTRACT This article examines the politics and ethics surrounding President Bush’s stem cell policy announced to the nation in August 2001. The article discusses arguments for and against federal funding for stem cell research, the policy alternatives available, and the policy option he selected. Ethical, scientific, and political implications of Bush’s decision are examined, and we argue that his decision is ethically inconsistent, will harm scientific progress on whatever potential benefits stem cell research holds, and will prove politically unsatisfactory. The article concludes that President Bush’s stem cell policy decision was founded more on political considerations than sound ethical principles.

INTRODUCTION Embryonic stem cell research has generated a significant amount of controversy, and debate among its supporters, and opponents. This controversy becomes intense over the question of whether the federal government should fund such research. At the center of this debate is a complex set of ethical, political, and legal issues. Supporters of embryonic stem cell research argue that such research may help cure diseases such as Parkinson’s and diabetes, and it offers scientists an opportunity to advance their understanding of genetic disorders. In addition, the research will lead to interventions whereby damaged tissues are replaced, and transplanted organs are created from a patient’s own cells, solving the problem of tissue and organ rejection.1 The opposition to this research is based on the argument that deriving embryonic stem cells leads to the destruction of a human embryo, which is equivalent to murder. Opponents further maintain that the human embryo deserves the same respect and rights as a fully developed human being, thus creating and then destroying human embryos for the purpose of

1

Bert Vogelstein, Bruce Alberts, and Kenneth Shine, “Please do not call it Cloning,” Science 295 (February 15, 2002): 1237. Also see Steve Mitchell, “Congress Grapples over Cloning Issue,” United Press International (June 30, 2003).

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benefiting another is unethical.2 Finally, critics note that research on adult stem cells hold the same scientific promise without the attendant ethical problems. The debate over embryonic stem cell research is invariably connected to the question of whether scientists should be allowed to clone human embryos for research purposes (therapeutic cloning), and for reproductive purposes (reproductive cloning). Although a strong consensus among policy makers, and the general public, against reproductive cloning exists, a great deal of disagreement prevails over the issue of therapeutic cloning.3 As a result, despite many efforts, Congress during the late 1990s failed to formulate a well-crafted cloning policy.4 However, several presidents have tried to formulate a policy with respect to whether federal funds can be used for embryonic stem cell research. President George W. Bush in August 2001 declared that federal funding for embryonic stem cell research would be limited to stem cell lines already in existence prior to August 9, 2001. The purpose here is to examine the politics of policy making regarding stem cell research and how politics shaped President Bush’s policy making on this issue. In the process, the political, ethical and legal arguments surrounding embryonic stem cell research is presented as well as the ethical, scientific, and political consequences of President Bush’s policy. As background, a brief history of policy development in this area during the late 1980s and 1990s is presented.

POLICY DEVELOPMENTS The use of embryonic tissue for research became controversial after the 1973 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade legalizing abortion. Since the 1980s, the federal government has restricted the use of federal funds for research in which fetuses and embryos could be harmed or destroyed. In March 988, Assistant Secretary of Health Dr. Robert E. Windom declared a moratorium on federal support for fetal tissue transplantation research. He asked the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to establish an advisory panel to examine the issue.5 The NIH Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research Panel voted 19-2 in favor of government funding. After the transition from the Reagan administration to George H. W. Bush, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Louis Sullivan, in 1989, extended the moratorium on federal funding based on the view that lifting the moratorium would lead to an increase in abortions, a view held by a minority of the panel members. In 1990, Congress voted to override the moratorium; however, President Bush vetoed the legislation.

2

Peter Berkowitz, “The Pathos of the Kass Report,” Policy Review (October-November 2002): 71-78. Steve Mitchell, “Analysis: Research Results Support Cloning,” United Press International (March 4, 2003); Arlene J. Klotzko, “Take Therapeutic Cloning Forward,” Scientist 16 (July 22, 2002): 11-12; Peter Berkowitz, The Pathos of the Kass Report,” Policy Review (October-November 2002): 71-78; Richard T. Hull, and Tom Flynn, “Defending Cloning and Stem Cell Research against Faith-Based Curbs,” Free Inquiry 23 (Winter 2002): 27. 4 Andrea Bonnicksen, Crafting a Cloning Policy: From Dolly to Stem Cells (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002); William Kristol, and Eric Cohen, eds., The Future is Now: America Confronts the New Genetics (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002). 5 Alexander M. Capron, “Stem Cells: Ethics, Law, and Politics,” Biotechnology Law Report 20 (October 2001): 678-699. 3

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In November 1992, Bill Clinton was elected president, and in January 1993, he directed the incoming Secretary of DHHS to lift the moratorium. In March 1993, the NIH published new guidelines based on the 1988 advisory panel’s recommended safeguards for permissible research. Congress enacted these guidelines into law in the NIH Revitalization Act of 1993. Safeguards provided under the law include full disclosure of information, and voluntary, informed consent of donors. Furthermore, the law prohibits researchers from paying for fetal tissue, thus removing any financial incentives to women for conceiving a fetus and aborting it for financial gain.6 The 1994 NIH Human Embryo Research Panel recommended allowing the use of embryos remaining from in vitro fertilization (IVF) for research on the condition that the embryos were donated for research with the informed consent of the donors. The panel also recommended, with dissent that under some circumstances researchers should be allowed to create human embryos using IVF with the intent to use them solely for research.7 However, President Clinton, facing considerable opposition, issued a directive that no federal funds were to be used to create human embryos for research. In 1996, Congress enacted the Dickey Amendment to DHHS’s FY 1996 appropriation prohibiting federal funding for research in which human embryos are created through any means (including IVF and cloning), or are destroyed or discarded for research purposes. Thus, beginning in 1996, federal law banned federal funding of human embryo research. In November 1998, a genetics company, Geron, announced that it had extracted, for the first time, stem cells from human embryos. In response, President Clinton asked the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) to review issues related to human stem cell research. In September 1999, the NBAC issued its report titled Ethical Issues in Stem Cell Research.8 The report recommended federal funding for embryonic stem cell research with discarded embryos. The report also advocated implementation of safeguards against abuses of embryonic stem cell research. Major safeguards recommended included requiring informed and voluntary consent by the donor, prohibiting designated or restricted donations, forbidding the selling of embryos, using the minimum number of IVF embryos to derive embryonic stem cells, and notifying researchers and recipients of the sources of embryonic stem cells.9 In 1999, DHHS concluded that the 1996 congressional ban on funding research involving human embryos did not extend to stem cell research because stem cells are not embryos and do not have the potential to develop into a fetus or a person. Pursuant to this, the NIH issued guidelines for federally funded stem cell research following guidelines recommended by the NBAC in its report. Under the guidelines, federal funds could not be used to derive stem cells from embryos, and federal funds could be used only for research involving stem cells produced through privately funded initiatives. 10 Furthermore, the stem cells could only have been derived from spare or left over human embryos that were created for fertility treatment. NIH guidelines also required informed consent of the donors, and stipulated that donors could not derive any financial benefits from their decision to donate. 6

NIH Revitalization Act of 1993. Public Law No. 103-43. Ronald M. Green, “Stopping Embryo Research,” Health Matrix 9 (1999): 235, 238. 8 National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell Research: Report and Recommendations. Volume 1 (Rockville, MD: National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 1999). 9 Ibid. 10 Jeffrey P. Kahn, “Stem Cells and a New Brain Drain,” (July 1, 2001): On-line at [http://www.cnn.com/health]. 7

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Federal funding of embryonic stem cell research became a major issue in the 2000 presidential campaign. During the campaign, Republican candidate George W. Bush indicated that he would review, and likely reverse the Clinton administration’s policy on stem cell research. In fact, his spokesperson indicated that candidate Bush opposed federal funding for research that requires embryos to be discarded or destroyed.11 Political and religious conservatives, including the Catholic Church, supported a ban on federal funding, and Bush was trying hard to win the Catholic vote. Upon assuming the presidency, President Bush was confronted with the task of formulating policy on the question of federal funding of embryonic stem cell research. A coalition of medical and scientific organizations along with notable Nobel laureates wrote a letter to President Bush urging him to retain the existing NIH guidelines, arguing against regulations that would prohibit federal funding for embryonic stem cell research.12

POLICY ENVIRONMENT As with most disputes and concerns in the policy arena, special interest groups adopted various positions on the issue. The split among Republicans is especially noteworthy. We begin by identifying supporters of the policy, and the arguments they employ. Next, we identify opponents of federal funding for stem cell research, and their arguments. Finally, we take note of the division within the Republican Party itself. Sometimes groups form large associations.13 For example, labor unions have a large association group, the AFL-CIO. In the stem cell case, the Coalition for the Advancement of Medical Research (CAMR) is just such an organization. The coalition’s purpose, according to its web site (www.camradvocacy.org/fastaction), is to foster research in regenerative medicine, which includes stem cell research, or, as they call it, somatic nuclear cell transfer. CAMR is composed of universities, scientific societies, patient organizations, and individuals with disorders that might be helped by stem cell research. This coalition is comprised of some seventy-five separate organizations. One set of groups within the coalition is scientifically based groups, such as professional societies and academic organizations. Members in this category include the American Medical Association (AMA) and the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology (FASEB). Corporations, such as Geron Corporation (a major research company working in this area), may also support stem cell research. The Biotechnology Industry Organization is an association of companies with an interest in stem cell research. Patient groups include the Christopher Reeve Paralysis Foundation and the Michael J. Fox Foundation for Parkinson’s Research. Pro-choice groups, such as NARAL, also support such research. These groups oppose any restrictions on reproductive technology.

11

Arthur Allen, “Will Thompson, Bush Clash over Human Embryo Research?” (December 29, 2000): On-line at [http://www.salon.com]; Also see Jessica Reaves, “Stem Cells: When Politics and Science Collide,” (August 24, 2000): On-line at [http://www. cnn.com/health]. 12 Kathi Hanna, “Stem Cell Politics: Difficult Choices for White House and Congress,” Hasting Center Report 31 (July 2001): 9. 13 The classic statement of this can be found in David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York, Knopf, 1951).

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The arguments in favor of funding stem cell research are fairly straightforward. Such research may lead to treatment of diseases such as diabetes, Parkinson’s, spinal cord damage, and Alzheimer’s disease, through slowing its progression. Stem cell research, including therapeutic cloning (producing a new embryo from a clone, and then extracting stem cells), could alleviate the nationwide shortage of donor organs, and successfully address the problem of donor organ rejection. One commentator, Arlene Judith Klotzko, argues that this research will allow us to become “masters of our fate.”14 That is, humans as a group would no longer be subject to, or limited by the vagaries of natural reproduction. Supporters of stem cell research also argue that their view is ethical. In this perspective, the proper ethical position is to try to reduce human suffering, thus limiting such research condemns those with a debilitating or life threatening disease to a lifetime of suffering. The status of the embryo is also relevant in this debate. Supporters argue that as a result of in vitro fertilization, thousands of frozen embryos are being kept but will never be used. At some point the embryos will be destroyed anyway. Therefore, supporters maintain, these embryos should be made available for stem cell research. A related point is that supporters of this research do not view embryos as human, though they admit that embryos are potentially human. To these supporters, depending on their view, an embryo is not human unless implanted in a female. To others, the embryo must be at least fourteen days old, and have demonstrated some specialization of cells to be considered human. Opponents of stem cell research are vocal as well. A major opponent is an organization called Do No Harm: The Coalition of Americans for Research Ethics whose website can be found at www.stemcellresearch.org. The coalition’s founding statement, issued July 1, 1999, opposed embryonic stem cell research on the following grounds: 1) that it violates state, national and international law; 2) that it is unethical; and 3) that it is unnecessary. We will consider these arguments below. The eight founding members are all academics, one of whom, Frank Young, is a former commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration. Another major opponent is the Catholic Church. The Church’s insistence that humans have a moral obligation to follow the dictates of natural law is well known. In the United States, the most important Catholic organization is the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. In a July 18, 2001, statement before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee, Richard M. Doerflinger, the Associate Director for Policy Development at the Conference’s Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities, testified against funding stem cell research, or, as he put it, “forcing U.S. taxpayers to subsidize research that relies on deliberate destruction of human embryos for their stem cells.”15 This view is shared by the Do No Harm coalition. Other major opponents to federal funding include The National Right to Life Committee, Focus on the Family, and the American Family Association. As noted, three basic reasons that these groups oppose stem cell research, and funding for such research are given. The first claim is that such research is illegal. The Do No Harm

14 15

Arlene Judith Klotzko, “Take Therapeutic Cloning Forward,” Science 16 (July 22, 2002): 11. Testimony of Richard M. Doerflinger, Associate Director for Policy Development at the Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, before the Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee (July 18, 2001). Found at http://www.nccbuscc.org/prolife/issues/bioethic/stemcelltest71801.htm.

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Coalition asserts that an important aspect of law in the United States is its protection of human life. This is based on “an affirmation of the essential dignity of every human being.”16 Because opponents view embryos as humans, their destruction for any purpose, constitutes homicide, which is illegal nationwide. The coalition notes that laws in several states protect embryos outside of the mother’s body, and points to federal laws banning such research, as well as to international documents such as the Nuremburg Code, and the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. The coalition notes further that medical experimentation requires human consent, and that embryos have not given their consent. The second argument revolves the claim that research on embryos is inherently unethical. Here the argument is based, again, on the premise that embryos are fully human, and fully deserving of full human rights. The coalition points to the horrendous “scientific” experiments carried out in the Nazi death camps during World War II and the Tuskegee syphilis experiments conducted on African-Americans for over forty years as examples of what can happen if humans are treated solely as objects of research. The coalition emphasizes that one lesson of the Nazi and Tuskegee experiments is the importance of obtaining subjects’ consent, and embryos cannot consent. Along the same lines, the coalition and others object to embryonic stem cell research, and therapeutic cloning because they result in the destruction of embryos. Further, opponents object to the notion that embryos have an instrumental value, that is, the stem cells produced from them will help those suffering from diseases. Although these groups are sympathetic to the plight of those suffering from disease and injury, they do not believe that taking a human life to prevent suffering of another human being is justified. The last argument given by opponents is scientific in nature and involves two basic claims. First, research with embryonic stem cells has been discouraging. Second, and more importantly, opponents argue that it is unnecessary. Critics disagree with supporters who argue that the versatility of embryonic stem cells is their major advantage in that they can be stimulated to create virtually any type of human cell; they are totipotent.17 Opponents respond that encouraging new research demonstrates that other kinds of stem cells, such as adult stem cells, can be stimulated to create other kinds of cells. Cells can be derived from bone marrow, blood from the umbilical cord and the placenta, and fetal bone marrow.18 Opponents, specifically those from the Do No Harm Coalition claim that developments in gene therapy lessen the need for embryonic stem cell research. President Bush’s policy decision regarding stem cell research was made more complicated by the deep division over the issue among conservative Republicans. Bush tried to craft a policy designed to strike a political balance between competing political and ethical viewpoints. On the pro stem cell research side were people such as Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson; Republican senators Orrin Hatch (Utah), Allen Specter (Pennsylvania), Gordon Smith (Oregon), Bill Fritz (Tennessee), the only physician in the Senate, Strom Thurmond (South Carolina); former senator Connie Mack (Florida); and former First Lady Nancy Reagan. In some cases, the reason for their support was personal. 16

Do No Harm: The Coalition of Americans for Research Ethics, “On Embryos and Stem Cell Research,” (July 1, 1999): 2. Found at http://www.stemcellresearch.org/statement/statement.htm. 17 Alexander Morgan Capron, “Stem Cells, Ethics, Law and Politics,” Biotechnology Law Report 20 (October 2001): 678. 18 Do No Harm, p. 6.

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For Nancy Reagan, her support was based on her husband’s, former president Ronald Reagan, Alzheimer’s disease. For Senator Mack, his personal battle with cancer inspired his support. Hatch made several claims in a letter to Secretary Thompson expressing his support for stem cell research.19 First, he pointed out that he has always been pro-life, and that he opposes abortion. Interestingly, Hatch wrote that some exceptions to his opposition to abortion exist, such as protecting the life of the mother; thus Hatch’s opposition to abortion was not absolute. Hatch also noted that he was one of the leaders in the Senate opposed to fetal tissue research. His position on stem cell research was that it “raises questions and considerations fundamentally different from issues attendant to abortion.”20 Hatch asserted that in vitro fertilization benefits society, and is ethical. Indeed, the Senator considered IVF as basically pro-family, even though more embryos than needed are produced by the procedure. The issue for Hatch was what to do with the remaining embryos. His view was that the frozen embryos are “more kin to a frozen unfertilized egg or frozen sperm than to a fetus naturally developing in the body of a mother.”21 He further observed that the U.S. Supreme Court has never stated that fetuses or embryos are protected by the Constitution. In contrast to Senator Hatch’s views were the testimony and actions of Senator Sam Brownback (R-Kansas.)22 Senator Brownback opposes stem cell research, and has sponsored bills in the Senate that would ban both reproductive and therapeutic cloning.23 Brownback asserts that stem cells are derived from embryos, and that embryos are human. He repeats the points made above that stem cell research is “deeply immoral, illegal and unnecessary.”24 He uses the phrase “slippery slope,”25 arguing that embryonic stem cell research will inevitably lead to cloning since both are based on the idea that the embryo is nothing more than property. He also maintains that embryonic stem cells deserve the same rights and dignity as human beings. Other Republican opponents included Dick Armey (Texas), Senate majority leader Tom Delay (Texas), House majority whip and head of the House Republican Conference J. C. Watts (Oklahoma), and Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert (Illinois). The first three sent a letter to President Bush calling for the complete prohibition of federal funding for embryonic stem cell research.26 Another opponent of embryonic stem cell research is Representative Christopher Smith (R-New Jersey). In the summer of 2003, Smith announced that he was

19

Orrin G. Hatch, “Letter to HHS Secretary Tommy G. Thompson,” in William Kristol and Eric Cohen (eds.), The Future is Now: America Confronts the New Genetics (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD., 2002), pp. 250-253. 20 Ibid., p. 251. 21 Ibid., 252. 22 Sam Brownback, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, in William Kristol and Eric Cohen (eds.), The Future is Now: America Confronts the New Genetics (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD., 2002), pp. 276-278. 23 See Rich Weiss, “Debate About Cloning Returns to Congress; Senate Considers Ban Affecting Human Embryos,” Washington Post (January 30, 2003). Found through LexisNexis. 24 Brownback, p. 276. 25 For a discussion of the use of the concept of “slippery slope” as a strategic tool in policy debates, see Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making, revised edition (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), pp. 151-152. 26 Richard Lacayo, “How Bush Got There,” Time 158, no. 7 (August 20, 2001). Retrieved from www. time.com.

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proposing legislation that would create a series of blood banks for storing umbilical cord blood, a source of stem cells.27

PRESIDENT BUSH AND STEM CELL POLICY ALTERNATIVES This then is the situation in which President George W. Bush found himself. He had promised during the 2000 presidential campaign to reverse the Clinton administration position by ending federal funding for embryonic research. Powerful groups to which Bush wanted to appeal, such as Catholics, opposed stem cell research.28 The president certainly wanted their support for his 2004 re-election campaign, and Pope John Paul II specifically asked Bush to ban stem cell research funding.29 However, his course of action was not at all clear since important members of his party supported the research. Substantially more support for stem cell research existed in the Senate than in the House of Representatives.30 Two reports referred to the period before the president’s speech of August 9, 2001, as a “battle” for his soul.31 In many ways this was the most important, and the most public decision of his early presidency. The president had four options.32 Each option had advantages and disadvantages from both a scientific and technological perspective. The first option was to forbid federal funding for such research, a position based primarily on ethical foundations. Under this position, embryos are considered human, the sanctity of human life is an important value, and embryos should not be experimented on without their consent. A problem with this option is that stem cell research would be left to the private sector.33 Profit motives would guide research plans if research were located totally in the private sector. This option would also require research laboratories receiving federal funds to demonstrate that they had separated stem cell research from federally funded research, a difficult contortion.34 Another problem with private sector control is that it would likely lead to a decline in the review of how stem cells were derived.35 Politically, decline in the review of how stem cells are derived would be favored by prochoice groups; however, as noted above, embryonic stem cell research enjoyed support from the Republican Party, and conservatives.

27

See “Representative Christopher Smith Introduces Bill that would Establish National Umbilical Cord Blood Stem Cell Bank,” Kaisernetwork.org (July 28, 2003). Retrieved from http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/rep_repro.cfm#19034. 28 Capron. 29 See Victor L. Simpson, “Pope urges Bush Against Stem Cell Research,” Associated Press (July 19, 2001). 30 See Lizette Alvarez, “61 Senators Call for Stem Cell Research,” The New York Times (July 21) and Evan Thomas and Eleanor Clift, “Battle for Bush’s Soul,” Newsweek 138 (July 9, 2001): 28-30. 31 Thomas and Clift. 32 Capron, pp. 689-698. 33 Unless the president prohibited all embryonic stem cell research which, apparently, was not an option considered. 34 One can see the problems in the analogous issue of federal funding for both domestic and international family planning organizations. Pro-life groups have insisted, as have Congress and the two President Bushes, that no organization receiving federal funds could counsel clients about abortion, let alone perform abortions. The result of these federal policies is that family planning clinics have lost funding, even if they separated activities and funding sources. One can imagine research laboratories having to go through the same contortions. 35 Capron, p. 690.

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A second possible option would be to limit support to research using adult stem cells, an approach that has the major advantage of not requiring the destruction of embryos. Capron notes difficulties with this position.36 Much of the research establishment, such as research centers at universities, and at the National Institutes of Health, would not be able to conduct such research. Further, because the science is still at a very early stage of development (the president’s decision coming only three years after embryonic stem cells were first extracted), some problems in the use of adult stems may still occur since adult stem cells may not be sufficiently flexible for prospective needs. The third option, and the one ultimately chosen by President Bush, would allow for federal funding of stem cell research on stem cell lines that had already been developed, but forbid funding for development of new lines which would require the destruction of embryos. The fourth option facing the president was to allow support for both using stem cells and deriving them. This was the position the Clinton administration was considering.37 As noted above, the Clinton-appointed NBAC had recommended allowing the use of embryos left over from IVF procedures as long as appropriate safeguards and procedures were in place. This was the most liberal option, allowing the most freedom for scientific development. For several reasons, President Bush did not really consider this option. First, again as noted, Bush had campaigned against federal funding for research allowing the destruction of embryos. Second, his strong pro-life views and his supporters argued against it. Finally, the president did not want to adopt policies of an administration from the opposing party, particularly one that was headed by a president beset by scandals.38 Politically, little support from Republican and conservative groups for this position existed.

PRESIDENT BUSH’S STEM CELL POLICY Bush agonized over the decision, and consulted with experts in a variety of fields, especially bioethicists.39 The President had six formal meetings in July 2001, and a variety of informal meetings as well.40 Interestingly, the President never sought the opinions of scientists on this issue.41 Two reporters described the President as “Hamlet-like.”42 The reason for his indecisiveness was attributed to the division of opinion in the country, and 36

Capron, p. 691. Capron, pp. 697-698. 38 This can be seen in the foreign policy area. For example, the Bush administration was very reluctant until the spring of 2003 to get involved in trying to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. Administration officials felt that President Clinton’s personal participation in the peace talks in 2000 and the failure of those peace talks led to an increase in the violence (the second intifada). Further, the administration was opposed to nation building. Both of these views were changed after the September 11, 2001, attacks and the second Persian Gulf War. 39 See Edward Chen and Aaron Zitner, “Policy: Known for Quick Decisions, the President is Agonizing over the Funding of Embryo Research,” Los Angeles Times (July 13, 2001) and Rick Weiss, “For President, No Easy Solution to Stem Cell Debate,” Washington Post (July 13, 2001). 40 Katharine Q. Seelye and Frank Bruni, “The President’s Decision: The President: A Long Process that Led Bush to his Decision,” The New York Times (August 10, 2001). 41 For a discussion of the lack of input of scientists into science policy decisions on this and other issues during the Bush administration, see Nicholas Thompson, “Science Friction.” The Washington Monthly, 35, nos. 7 and 8 (July/August): 11-15. 37

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among his supporters, and to his search for an appropriate compromise. Washington Post reporter Howard Kurtz observed that the process of decision making, and the decision itself, “has all the elements: politics, science, religion, morality, and, for the moment, an indecisive president.”43 On August 9, 2001, President Bush gave his first nationally televised address to the nation. In a didactic manner, the president presented a summary of stem cell research, its potential benefits, and the sources of stem cells. He noted that federal funds were important for the advancement of biomedical research. Bush said that there were two underlying issues: First, are the embryos human life, and therefore, something precious to be protected? And second, if they are to be destroyed anyway, shouldn’t they be used for a greater good, for 44 research that has the potential to save and improve other lives?

The President claimed that scientific developments could lead to serious ethical problems, referring specifically to Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World where people were born in hatcheries. He also noted a recent, troubling scientific development: a research scientist had announced the creation of an embryo specifically for the purpose of obtaining new stem cells.45 Bush stated that he, like most of the country, opposed cloning. He also said that he had “deeply held beliefs” that had an impact on his decision. One such belief was the importance of the scientific research and medical technology in alleviating human disease. He noted that he had spoken with Nancy Reagan about the former president’s Alzheimer’s disease, and that a member of his family had childhood leukemia. On the other hand, he also believed that “human life is a sacred gift from our Creator,” and he opposed a culture where human life was devalued. The President also noted that scientists had promised great discoveries from fetal tissue research, yet eight years later little benefit had been realized. All these considerations suggested to him that he should “proceed with great care.” Based on these considerations, he concluded the following: As a result of private research, more than 60 genetically diverse stem cell lines already exist. They were created from embryos that have already been destroyed, and they have the ability to regenerate themselves indefinitely, creating ongoing opportunities for research. I have concluded that we should allow federal funds to be used for research on these existing stem 46 cell lines, where the life-and-death decision has already been made.

The President also announced the creation of a President’s Council on Bioethics, to be headed by Leon Kass, a politically conservative bioethicist.47 The purpose of the council was 42

Chen and Zitner, “Policy.” Howard Kurtz, “Politics, Science Collide,” Washington Post (July 16, 2001). 44 George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President on Stem Cell Research,” (August 9, 2001). Retrieved from the White House web site: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010809-2.html. 45 Rick Weiss, “Changing Conceptions,” The Washington Post (July 15, 2001). 46 George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President on Stem Cell Research.” 47 Bush’s choice of Kass as president was enlightening. Kass opposes in vitro fertilization and cloning. Kass apparently had a major impact on the option that the president chose. See Amy Goldstein and Mike Allen, “Bush Backs Partial Stem Cell Funding,” The Washington Post (August 10, 2001); and Judy Keen, “Reading, Reflection Brought Bush to Decision,” USA Today (August 10). 43

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to advise the President on bioethical issues, to monitor research in the area, and to recommend policy changes. President Bush’s decision was a political one, designed to arrive at a compromise among competing political interests and ethical values; it was not necessarily based on sound political, ethical or scientific principles. His decision focused only on federal funding for stem cell research, and limited such research to about sixty stem cell lines that the National Institutes of Health stated met President Bush’s conditions. The conditions included 1) the purpose of the creation of the embryos was for reproduction only (i.e., for in vitro fertilization), 2) the embryos were no longer needed, 3) the donors had given their informed consent for the use of the embryos in research, and 4) the donor had not received any financial reward. His decision also asserted that no additional stem cell lines would be created.48

IMPLICATIONS OF BUSH’S STEM CELL DECISION Ethical Implications President Bush portrayed his decision as highly ethical. The sixty or so stem cell lines to which he referred were already in existence; the embryos from which the stem cells were derived had already been used (destroyed), and federal funds would not be used to generate additional lines. However, the decision is ethically inconsistent. If the President adopted the view that preservation of life is important, and all life is sacred, then he should have also called for an end to abortion. If destroying a human embryo is ethically wrong, as the President believes, then destroying a much more developed fetus is ethically wrong. Similarly, as Scott Rosenberg49 notes, thousands of embryos will be destroyed though IVF procedures. Rosenberg then argues that if destroying embryos is destroying human life, then Bush should be against IVF (a position, as noted above, that Leon Kass takes). If President Bush is against the destruction of embryos, he should have called for the closing of fertility clinics. For Rosenberg, the “courageous” stance would be to distinguish “between embryos created with intent to produce life, and those created solely to be destroyed for their stem cells.” A second ethical problem with the decision is there does not seem to be any justifiable rationale for limiting research on stem cell lines already in existence on August 9. As Kahn50 correctly points out, the August 9 cutoff date for stem cell lines is arbitrary. He notes that perhaps as many as 200,000 frozen embryos will eventually be discarded; embryos that could have been used for stem research. This observation leads to two other ethical problems. The President claims that since the decision about the life of the embryo has already been made on the sixty stem cell lines, using these lines is permissible. But if destroying an embryo to 48

National Institutes of Health, “National Institutes of Health (NIH) Update on Existing Human Embryonic Stem Cells,” (August 27, 2001). Retrieved from the NIH web site: www.nih.gov/news/stemcell/082701/list.htm. 49 Scott Rosenberg, “Bush’s Stem-Cell Fumble,” Salon.com (August 20, 2001). Retrieved from dir.salon.com/politics/features/2001/08/10/stem_cell/index.html. 50 Jeffrey P. Kahn, “Missing the Mark on Stem Cells,” CNN.com/health (August 20, 2001). Retrieved from www.cnn.com/2001/HEALTH08/20/ethics.matters.

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create stem cells is ethically wrong, as the President believes, or else he would have permitted federal funding on all stem cell lines regardless of date, then benefiting from such a decision is ethically wrong. An analogous situation is the “scientific” experiments carried out by the Nazis on death camp inmates. One example is the hypothermia experiments. Prisoners were exposed to wintry conditions, and scientists recorded data from the prisoners’ responses. Obviously scientific interest exists regarding the issue under question; i.e., designing appropriate treatment for victims of cold weather. Apart from the Nazi experiments, little other data about this topic is available. If the experiments were morally wrong, as they were on a number of counts, then ethically the tainted data should not be used.51 Furthermore, if destroying an embryo to create stem cells is morally wrong, then it should not matter whether the stem cell lines were created before or after an arbitrarily set date. As Kenneth L. Connor, of the Family Research Council, argues, whether the embryos (or “embryonic children”52 as he calls them) were destroyed before or after the speech is irrelevant. Finally, the President’s major argument against federal funding was based on the principle of nonmaleficence. This ethical principle guides the professional activities of scientists and health providers. Simply stated, the principle means “do no harm.”53 In other words, medical professionals and researchers must not purposely injure patients and research subjects. Applying nonmaleficence to stem cell research, the harm in question is to the embryo, which, some believe, is human, or at the least has human potential. But the President’s decision ignored a second ethical principle, beneficence. This principle states that researchers and health care providers have an obligation to benefit research subjects and patients.54 In the context of the stem cell decision, the beneficence principle would be balanced against the nonmaleficence principle: the concern for preventing harm should be balanced by the promise of healing. Stem cell research does hold the promise of reducing human suffering, and possibly curing disease. Interestingly, an historical parallel can be drawn here. As Eric Cohen points out, President Bush’s decision is analogous to the Missouri Compromise.55 The stem cell decision, like the 1820 legislation that permitted Missouri to enter the Union as a slave state, and Maine as a free state, sought to find a balance of viewpoints, and therefore postpone resolution of the larger issues.

51

For a discussion of the use of such tainted “data,” particularly from a Jewish standpoint, see Baruch C. Cohen, “The Ethics of Using Medical Data from Nazi Experiments.” Retrieved from the Jewish law website: http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/NaziMedEx.html. 52 Kenneth L. Connor, “Bush’s Broken Promise,” in William Kristol and Eric Kohen, (eds.), The Future is Now: America Confronts the New Genetics (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham: MD: 2002), pp. 3314-3315. The column originally appeared in the Washington Post (August 11, 2001). 53 For a discussion of this principle in the field of psychiatry, see Cynthia M. A. Geppert, “Do No Harm,” Psychiatric Times, vol. 20, issue 7 (July 2003), pp. 91-92. See also the code of ethics of the American Dental Association at http://www.ada.org/prof/prac/law/code/opin02.html. 54 American Dental Association code of ethics at http://www.ada.org/prof/prac/law/code/opin03.html. 55 Eric Cohen, “Bush’s Stem-Cell Ruling: A Missouri Compromise,” in William Kristol and Eric Cohen (eds.), The Future is Now: American Confronts the New Genetics (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD., 2002), pp. 316318. The column originally appeared in the Los Angeles Times August 12, 2001.

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Scientific Implications One of the important arguments made by the President is that some sixty plus stem cell lines meeting his criteria would be eligible for federal research funding, but scientists examining the National Institutes of Health registry of stem cell lines found far fewer than sixty. In May 2003, the director of the NIH, Elias Zerhouni, announced that only eleven lines were usable for research.56 As of July 21, 2003, almost two years after President Bush’s speech announcing his decision, the NIH listed twelve cell lines that were eligible, though it suggested that there were as many as seventy-eight derivations.57 Having so few lines is very likely to hamper research, and put the United States at a disadvantage as compared to other countries that do not place such limits. An example of the overestimation by President Bush and the National Institutes of Health came when NIH announced shortly after the speech that nineteen of the cell lines had been established in a hospital in Sweden. By the President’s criteria, all were available. The reality, however, was much different. Only three of the nineteen were actually established and usable; four were being studied; and the other twelve were possible stem cells lines. The head researcher at the Swedish hospital was quoted as saying about the twelve possible lines, “If we get 3 good lines out of them we'll be satisfied.”58 Other commentators have noted that research with mouse stem cell lines over several decades has shown that such lines lose some of their viability over time. They “can lose their differentiation potential, become contaminated, accumulate mutations, and tend toward spontaneous or uncontrolled differentiation.”59 Another question raised with existing stem cell lines is whether there is sufficient genetic diversity to represent a human population of over 5 billion people within those lines.60 Apart from these problems, the available stem cell lines are themselves inadequate for supporting embryonic stem cell research. A number of the stem cell lines are privatelyowned. These proprietary companies could charge fees for the use of the stem cells. Kahn points out that the private companies, some associated with universities such as the University of Wisconsin, would stake a claim not only to the stem cells but the research emanating from studies using those cell lines.61 A related point concerns whether the stem cell lines listed in the NIH registry were all viable. The American Society for Cell Biology offered its own criteria for assessing the viability of stem cell lines: 56

Randolph Schmid, “NIH Says Only 11 Stem-Cell Lines Are Available for Research,” The Philadelphia Inquirer (May 9, 2003). 57 See registry at http://stemcells.nih.gov/registry/index.asp. 58 Don G. McNeil, Jr., “In a Tiny Room in Sweden, A Large Trove of Stem Cells,” The New York Times (August 29). 59 Testimony of Douglas Melton, Ph.D., before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (September 5, 2001). Dr. Melton was representing the American Society for Cell Biology. Retrieved from http://www.ascb.org/newsroom/melton9.5.01.html. 60 “Scientists: It’s Not Enough,” ABCNews.com (August 10, 2001), retrieved from abcnews.go.com/sections/scitech/DailyNews/stemcell-researchers010810. See also The American Society for Cell Biology, “Position Paper on Bush Decision on Federal Funding of Stem Cell Research, 2001. Retrieved from http://www.ascb.org/newsroom/positionpaper.html. 61 Jeffrey P. Kahn, “Missing the Mark on Stem Cells,” CNN.com (August 20, 2001). Retrieved from www.cnn.com/2001/HEALTH/08/20/ethics.matters.

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(1) They must truly be available to both public-funded research scientists located at the NIH and at universities, academic health centers and research institutes throughout the Nation. (2) They must be free of restrictions that would impede publicly funded investigators from seeking important disease treatments. (3) They must be capable of robust growth. (4) Sufficient information must be available about each line's derivation so that it can be grown and handled under reasonable conditions. (5) Each of the approved lines must retain the important capacity to generate the three early 62 embryonic cell types: ectoderm, mesoderm and endoderm.

The scientific society expressed some skepticism as to whether the sixty lines, if there really were sixty lines, could meet those criteria. Further, the society noted that over the next several years, new and enhanced lines might become available, but federal funding of research using those lines would be prohibited.63 Thus, the society implied, biomedical progress in this promising area would be stymied. Furthermore, the federal government has continued to fund, and increase funding for adult stem cell research. For example, in January 2003, NIH announced that it was providing $1.4 million for five studies using adult stem cells. Robert Lanza, the vice president at one of the major private companies conducting stem cell research, Advanced Cell Technology, argued that the decision was essentially a political one. The decision follows from the limits placed by President Bush’s decision, and by Congressional Republicans who are against embryonic stem cell research. The NIH, according to Lanza, is responsive to congressional views on this issue. Lanza pointed out that similar funding for embryonic stem cell research would have led to clinical trials.64 Some observers considered this to be indicative of the real intent of the President’s decision to hinder embryonic stem cell research, and foster adult stem cell research.65 Finally, the restrictions imposed by the federal government (and by states banning therapeutic cloning) led to a concern about “brain drain.” A number of prominent scientists began to leave the United States, and had moved to countries that were less restrictive. Singapore was one place that was attractive to scientists seeking to continue research in this area.66 England was another possible destination.67 Both England and New Zealand were in the process of making it easier for scientists to engage in embryonic stem cell research.68 One example of a scientist emigrating to another country is Dr. Roger Pedersen of the University of California at San Francisco, who left his tenured position to go to England to continue his

62

The American Society for Cell Biology, “Position Paper on Bush Decision on Federal Funding of Stem Cell Research, 2001. Retrieved from http://www.ascb.org/newsroom/positionpaper.html. 63 Ibid. 64 Steve Mitchell, “Experts: Bush Stem Cell Policy Limits NIH,” United Press International (January 3, 2003). 65 See Steve Mitchell, “Experts: Bush Stem Cell Policy Limits NIH,” United Press International (January 3, 2003). 66 “Send in the Clones; Biotechnology in Singapore,” The Economist (August 24, 2002). Retrieved from infotrac service. 67 Jeffrey P. Kahn, “Stem Cells and a New Brain Drain,” (July 9, 2001). Retrieved from www.cnn.com/2001/HEALTH/07/23/ethics.matters. 68 See, for example, “Britain Authorizes New Stem Cells Line for Geron,” Associated Press (June 11, 2003) and “Researchers Can Begin Process for Stem Cell Permission,” AAP (May 16, 2003). Retrieved from Lexis/Nexis. See also, “American and British Governmental Views of Human Stem Cell Research,” Morning Edition, National Public Radio (December 31, 2002).

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research.69 And, Edison Liu, who worked at the National Institute of Cancer, left for Singapore.70 Gerald D. Fischbach, writing in Newsweek, argued that apart from the possible alleviation of human suffering through stem cell research, the President’s decision will damage “the fabric of America’s extraordinary culture of inquiry and technical development in biomedical sciences.” 71 He anticipates that scientists will either move to other countries or leave the field entirely. An example of the latter is Jose Cibelli, a researcher at Advanced Cell Technology, who had spent five years working in this area. He quit his job to become a faculty member at Michigan State University, and went on to conduct research in another area.72

Political Implications As is typical in politics, public policy decisions rarely settle an issue. Bush’s compromise was unsatisfactory to both liberals and conservatives. Congressional legislation introduced as early as September 2001 was aimed at allowing more liberal funding of embryonic stem cell research, although some legislators sought to cut such funding completely. Some of the legislation focused on cloning, with most of the proposed bills banning both reproductive and therapeutic cloning.73 For example, H.R. 534, the Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2003, passed the U. S. House of Representatives in February 2003, banning any kind of cloning. Senator Sam Brownback (R-Kansas) introduced legislation banning both kinds of cloning, and Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pennsylvania) proposed legislation that would ban reproductive cloning but allow therapeutic cloning under certain conditions. Universities, foundations, corporations, and state governments also have responded. States as diverse as New York and Tennessee were considering legislation to allow such research outside of the President’s guidelines. Some states, particularly California, sought to promote embryonic stem cell research74 while others sought to ban both types of cloning.75 Foundations in disease specific areas (such as diabetes) began to fund stem cell research. Corporations engaged in research using their own funds or donated money. Opponents of such research started pressing for stricter federal regulations.76 This demonstrates the plurality of views on the matter. 69

“Two Scientists' Embryonic Research Leads Them in Opposite Directions,” Morning Edition, National Public Radio (January 1, 2003). 70 “Send in the Clones: Biotechnology in Singapore,” The Economist (August 24, 2002). 71 Gerald D. Fischback, “The Dangers of Delay: Restrictions on Stem-Cell Research in the United States Will Exact Costs on American Doctors as well as Potential Patients,” Newsweek (January 13, 2003). 72 Paul Elias, “Politics Stalls Stem-Cell Work,” The Seattle Times (November 18, 2002). 73 See National Institutes of Health, “Pending Stem Cell Research and Cloning Legislation,” retrieved from www.stemcells.nih.gov/fedPolicy/pending?Legis.asp. 74 Aaron Zitner, “States Challenge Bush on Embryonic Stem-Cell Research,” The Los Angeles Times (November 29, 2002) and Richard Perez-Pena, “Broad Movement is Backing Embryo Stem Cell Research,” The New York Times (March 16, 2003). 75 See, for example, the stories in “Michigan House Committee Approves Bill that would Ban Importation of Embryonic Stem Cells for Research,” (March 13, 2003) at www.kaisernetwork.org. 76 Richard Perez-Pena, “Broad Movement is Backing Embryonic Stem Cell Research,” The New York Times (March 16, 2003).

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CONCLUSION The controversy arising from, and the effects of President Bush’s August 9, 2001, stem cell decision remain. Since policy decisions are often results of political compromises rather than clear principles—typical in the American political system—policy decisions are rarely final. Battles over the same policy issues are continually re-fought, and such is the case with President Bush’s embryonic stem cell research policy. President Bush’s decision was limited to federal support for stem cell research. His decision did not address the larger issue of whether such research should be banned in the first place, as was the case with the issue of cloning (both reproductive and therapeutic). As we have seen, President Bush’s policy on federal funding of embryonic stem cell research is flawed, and these flaws occur in three areas: scientific, political, and ethical. It is quite likely that no policy decision will have more long lasting importance for American society than how the federal government should approach the issue of research on embryos. In implementing his policy on stem cell research, President Bush appears to have ignored or abrogated his responsibility to carefully consider the scientific expertise, the ethical merit, and the political leadership required to craft a national stem cell policy.

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 51-62

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

THE ‘BLAME GAME’: WHAT WENT WRONG WITH HEALTH CARE REFORM

Gary D. Wekkin ABSTRACT Competing causal stories explaining the Clinton administration’s failure to win enactment of health care coverage reform are compared here against each other, and against the documentary records of the White House Health Care Interdepartmental Working Groups, which have been opened to the public by the Clinton Presidential Materials Project. The documents, which are not yet complete, reinforce the critiques provided by participant-observers such as Sidney Blumenthal, David Gergen, and George Stephanopoulos, and by veteran White House watchers such as Elizabeth Drew, Joe Klein, Haynes Johnson, David Broder, and Bob Woodward, rather than the explanation tendered by the Clintons. The process by which the White House health care reform proposal was produced was so flawed that it may have been by itself sufficient cause for the defeat of the proposal.

INTRODUCTION Competing explanations for the failure of the Clinton health care reform proposal to pass in 1993-94 abound. Economic determinists look no further than the fact that the $1 trillion-ayear health care industry accounted for one-seventh of the gross domestic product of the United States1 spends over $100 million annually just on lobbying the federal government,2 and pumped $30 million into the ‘Harry and Louise’ advertising campaign (versus a $150,000 Democratic National Committee campaign in reply) against the Clinton health care reform proposal.3 Skocpol’s analysis, in particular, concludes not only that interest group-dominated “money-driven elections”4 deprived the Clinton health care proposal of the unified backing of 1

Theda, Skocpol, Boomerang (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), 48. www.opensecrets.org/lobbyists/index.asp 3 Sidney Blumenthal, The Clinton Wars (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux), 118. 4 The concept of “money-driven elections” is Thomas Ferguson’s. See his Golden Rule (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). 2

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Democratic constituency groups, and of the Democratic majorities in Congress, but that the sheer size of the annual budget deficit, and overall national debt inherited by the Clinton administration ($300 billion and $3 trillion, respectively) effectively “imprisoned [it] within a fiscal environment that makes it difficult for government to do anything.”5 In brief, the staggering federal debt and deficit deprived the Clinton White House of public trust, and confidence in government solutions, and of recourse, to tax increases to finance health care coverage, therefore forcing it to propose a plan in which health care remained privatized, but subject to very heavy regulation in order to keep costs down while making health care coverage universal.6 However, Washington insider accounts by those who served in the Clinton White House. or covered the White House on a daily basis, point out a myriad of problems in how the Clinton health care proposal was produced, and put forward. Many present the plan itself as flawed from the start; a highly detailed “regulated market competition” approach, and at 1,342 pages, was so cumbersome that it lent itself to charges of “big government” as readily as if it were a government-operated “single-payer” plan. Some ascribe this to the inexperience of those in charge of producing the plan, First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton and Ira Magaziner; even Mrs. Clinton now writes that “Bill had assigned Ira the task of setting up the process for health care reform, which turned out to be an unfair burden for someone who was not a Washington insider;”7 and to their unwillingness to listen to those who were insiders with such experience.8 The plan had been formulated in-house; thus the First Lady’s (and therefore the President’s) fingerprints were all over it, through a tightly controlled process, with too little input from the private sector (the Task Force even selected its own critics, referred to as “Contrarians”).9 All of these liabilities could have been avoided had the assignment been given instead to an administration official with appropriate line authority and resources, such as Health & Human Services Secretary Donna Shalala.10 Other participants and observers fault the start-and-stop manner in which the plan was rolled out, explained, and marketed to the public;11 and the mixed signals that the Clinton White House sent to Congress by sidetracking health care reform in favor of so many other 5

Skocpol, 1996, 83-87, 176. Skocpol, 1996, 173-83. 7 Hillary Rodham Clinton, 2003. Living History (New York: Simon & Schuster, , 153. Mrs. Clinton does not say so directly, but it is left between the lines here that she, too, was not then a Washington insider prepared for such a burden. 8 See the section on Candor in Short Supply below. 9 “Health Professionals to Review Clinton Proposal as it Develops,” Draft Press Release, 13 April 1993 (White House Health Care Interdepartmental Working Group, Papers of Ira Magaziner, Box 367, Folder 4, Clinton Presidential Materials Project, Little Rock AR), announces the names of 46 practicing health care professionals selected by Mike Lux, Special Assistant to the President for Public Affairs, to serve as “an outside ‘reality check’ to advise the Task Force.” 10 David Gergen, veteran adviser to Clinton and four other presidents, writes that “Primary responsibility for design of the program should have been assigned to the lead cabinet officer in health affairs, Donna Shalala….Ms. Shalala has been a successful president of two universities and a shrewd policy-maker. With marching orders from the president on his goals, she could have drawn upon the expertise of her department, worked with Congress, the cabinet, academics, and outside groups, and kept the White House in the loop” (2000, 307). Haynes Johnson and David Broder’s The System (Boston: Little, Brown, 1996), 112 concurs that the proposal should have been assigned to HHS. 11 Skocpol, 1996, 107-32; see also Jeffrey Birnbaum, Madhouse (New York: Times Books, 1996), 59-103. 6

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issues of the moment, such as deficit reduction, economic stimulus, welfare reform, and NAFTA, and by wasting its leverage on ill-advised nominations.12 Some of course argue that the Clinton White House should have asked the Congress itself to formulate the health care reform legislation: in the words of journalist/Clinton aide Sidney Blumenthal, “The very idea of having the bill originate from an administration council rather than from within the Congress had given no one on Capitol Hill ownership of health care reform.”13 President Clinton himself now seems to have joined this school of thought, having acknowledged that the First Lady’s task force should only have produced a general statement of principles, and then said, “‘Okay, here’s all of our work…you guys draft the bill.’ Or, I should have insisted that we have a joint bill.”14

HEALTH CARE DEFEAT: THE CLINTONS’ EXPLANATION Interestingly enough, as the remarks attributed to President and First Lady Clinton in the two preceding paragraphs suggest, both of the Clintons seem to emphasize tactical, rather than structural, explanations of their failure to pass health care reform. To be sure, both mention in passing that insurance and medical interests had more money to spend on advertising and lobbying against health care reform than the Democrats, and their allies had to spend in favor of it; Mrs. Clinton specifies that the opponents of reform spent an estimated $300 million compared to only $15 million spent by its supporters.15 The President said that he chose regulated managed care because the deficit he inherited made it impossible to raise taxes, and simply expand Medicaid and Medicare.16 For the most part, however, the explanations released by both Clintons during the summer of 2003 dwelt mainly upon various tactical political considerations. In a nationallytelevised lecture recapping his presidency for University of Arkansas-Little Rock students on May 23, 2003, President Clinton again sounded the themes that the White House’s Health Care Reform Task Force should have just identified its destination, and let Congress do the driving, or worked together with Congress to produce a compromise bill. “I offered to send a general bill to Congress, as Hillary wanted to do, with a report of our findings, and Dan Rostenkowski said, ‘no, you can’t do that, we want a bill (Clinton’s emphasis); the whole nine yards.’”17 (This statement was one of four Clinton made that night exculpating Mrs. Clinton from responsibility for the failure of health care reform.)18 He also faulted Senator Bob Dole’s presidential ambitions, and the fear of rightwing strategists, such as Bill Kristol, that successful health care reform legislation would make voters believe in government (and the Democrats) again, for Republican refusals to accept the President’s offer to work on a 12

Birnbaum, 1996, 15-57; H. Clinton, 2003, 182-83. Blumenthal, 2003, 122. 14 President Clinton, quoted in Joe Klein, The Natural (New York: Broadway Books, 2002), 126. 15 H. Clinton, 2003, 233. 16 www.ualr.edu/~presidents/ClintonImp/TOC.html 17 www.ualr.edu/~presidents/ClintonImp/TOC.html 18 The President was emphatic that any mistakes were his, not the First Lady’s—e.g., “Hillary got a bum rap on that thing…I am a hundred percent responsible for this”—leaving little doubt as to whose political viability has not expired. 13

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compromise bill.19 Bracketing those two obstacles, however, the President’s first and last statements about what went wrong convey his sense that the health care initiative’s greatest problem was its timing, given the pace of a crowded first-year agenda: I think I made a mistake in not passing welfare reform before health care reform….[During 1993] I had this big economic plan, we had NAFTA on the way, we had to bail out Russia once financially, we had the Brady bill, we got the Family Medical Leave bill through…all in just one year….I should have done welfare reform first, and waited another year to do health 20 care.

First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton’s Living History (2003), published less than a month later, echoed these very same themes; the President called the shots on health care strategy (pgs. 143-44, 150, 182-83), the Clintons’ preference for presenting Congress a general outline of principles (p, 191), Rostenkowski’s preference for a fully-specified bill (p. 191), Clinton’s willingness to compromise with Republicans, Dole’s feet of clay and Republican strategists’ “scorched earth” mentality (pgs. 190, 230-31, 247), and the timing of health care reform and welfare reform, respectively (pgs. 151-52, 182-83), plus the considerable lack of unanimity among Congressional Democrats about whether to back a “single-payer” system, or incremental extension of Medicaid and Medicare benefits to most (but not all) uninsured Americans, or the President’s ‘middle-way’ regulated managed care approach (pgs. 149-53). Clearly then, the Clintons’ forensic analysis of the “cause of death” of health care reform tilts away from the structural or economic determinist view that the effort was doomed at birth by “the system,” in favor of ad hoc, “inside baseball” reconstructions of who did what, and when, to kill the victim. If we accept the basic premise of the latter school of thought, which is the perception (shared by the Clintons, and many participants and observers) that health care reform legislation could have been saved had it been done differently, then we are left a ‘whodunit’ to solve. Are the President and/or the First Lady to blame for events that undermined the process; i.e., the very restricted, in-house drafting process, the comprehensive nature of the approach taken by the White House bill, the unwillingness of the Republicans to support any kind of health care bill at all (even a compromise), the fissures within the Democratic majorities; or were these matters over which the Clinton White House had little or no control, that must be credited to the opponents of reform?

WHAT THE AVAILABLE HEALTH CARE REFORM DOCUMENTS SHOW Because President Clinton chose to make the records of the White House Health Care Inter-Departmental Working Group open to the public in early 2003, there is now documentation available against which the claims of the participants themselves (e.g., both Clintons, Stephanopoulos, and Gergen), and their watchers (e.g., Blumenthal, Klein, Drew, 19

Such partisan competitive considerations are given great weight in the thinking of Skocpol (1996) and of Johnson and Broder (1996), respectively, whose books on the defeat of health care reform each argue that the American political system has become unworkable because of such partisanship. 20 www.ualr.edu/~presidents/ClintonImp/TOC.html

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Birnbaum, and Johnson & Broder), can be measured. The White House’s own files on health care reform remain closed, however, which means that the files not only of First Lady Clinton but of some of the most important staff players in the health care policy process (e.g., Chris Jennings) are not yet available. Thus, what follows is an incomplete analysis that sheds additional, but not perfect, light on the claims made by the participants and the media observers. Indeed, because the files that have been opened are not those of the White House, nor even those of the White House Health Care Task Force, but rather those of the staff-level Inter-Departmental Working Groups created by Ira Magaziner, there are some questions regarding which there is not yet any telling documentary evidence available. Foremost among the latter questions is the nature of the Clinton health care proposal that was developed, including how and why such a comprehensive plan was developed when the preference of both Clintons was to present Congress a more general statement of health care principles, to be fleshed out by the legislative process.

A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN The Clintons’ respective statements in 2003 about preferring to send Congress a general statement of health care principles, rather than a comprehensive plan consisting of specifics, are at odds with the actions taken a decade earlier, as well as with retrospective statements that were made soon after the 1994 demise of the Clinton health care plan. In the first place, a mere general outline of health care reform philosophy and principles should not have required the services of Ira Magaziner, a professional consultant known for complex organizational plans such as a 400-page study of the health care system of tiny Rhode Island, an 1100-page economic development plan for Rhode Island known as “The Greenhouse Compact” (which was defeated in a statewide referendum), an ambitious national apprenticeship and jobtraining program that “would have reorganized America’s high school curriculum”and imposed a mandatory training fee on companies lacking their own training programs (Mrs. Clinton was involved with this proposal as a board member); and a 400-page revision of Brown University’s undergraduate curriculum that he had prepared during the summer of his sophomore year there, which Brown enacted in 1969.21 Clearly, if the Clintons intended only a general roadmap for health care reform that left the actual driving to Congress, they had picked the wrong man for the job; and they picked him in early January 1993. In the second place, the President himself told Haynes Johnson and David Broder in an interview during the Summer of 1995 that his mandate to the White House health care task force he had created (to avoid Cabinet infighting, according to Mrs. Clinton) had been to produce a comprehensive health care plan. In Mr. Clinton’s own words, “It seemed to me that all aspects of this problem were sufficiently interrelated that we ought to try to have a comprehensive solution.”22 Indeed, there are many indications that Mr. Clinton had arrived at his middle-way, “regulated managed care” approach to health care reform by the time of his now-famous 21 22

Johnson & Broder, 1996, 104-07, 113-14. Johnson & Broder, 1996, 98.

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campaign speech on health care reform at Merck Pharmaceutical Company in Rahway, New Jersey, on 24 September 1992. Johnson and Broder identify the speech, and the approach it contained, and the health care briefing that prepped it, as having “determined the basic substantive approach he would take to health care as President; and, equally important, established the political strategy he would pursue in office to achieve his reforms.”23 This is a view that is confirmed by Skocpol, who was given considerable research access to Mrs. Clinton, Mr. Magaziner, and their documents in early 1995.24 Given these antecedents (and the President’s threat during the 1994 State of the Union address to veto any health care bill that did not include universal coverage)25 it is difficult to accept the 2003 claim that the Clintons’ preference would have been to draft a general bill stating reform principles, but that congressional leaders insisted they create an opus instead.

INCLUSIVE GOALS: INCLUSIVE PROCESS? Mrs. Clinton’s book depicts a process that was more open than has been depicted by many critics: (1) “Bill had assigned Ira the task of setting up the process for health care reform…;” (2) “In addition to the President’s Task Force, which consisted of me, the Cabinet secretaries, and other White House officials, Ira organized a giant working group of experts…;” (3) “This group [the White House Health Care Inter-Departmental Working Group], comprising as many as six hundred people from different government agencies, Congress, and health care groups, including physicians, nurses, hospital administrators, economists, and others, met regularly with Ira to debate and review specific parts of the plan…;” (4) but “the attempt to include as many people and viewpoints as possible—a good idea in principle—ended up weakening rather than strengthening our position” because some participants frustrated by the large, unwieldy nature of the process stopped participating; (5) yet, despite the fact that “There was certainly nothing secret about hundreds of people participating in this process,” health care interest groups who were not included in the task force process sued in order “to foster an impression with the public and the news media that we were conducting ‘secret’ meetings.”26 While Mrs. Clinton is certainly correct that the interest groups that sued did so to embarrass, and even impede the health care reform task force and working groups; the process set up and overseen by Mr. Magaziner was such that its opponents did not have to work very hard.

Task Force Membership Limited On 25 November 1992, three Republican U. S. Senators; Nancy Landon Kassebaum (KS), John Danforth (MO), and Conrad Burns (MT); and three Democratic House members; Dan Glickman (KS), Dave McCurdy (OK), and Pat Roberts (KS), wrote to President-elect 23

Johnson & Broder, 1996, 89-90. Skocpol, 1996, passim. See also Gergen (2000, 300). 25 Blumenthal, 2003, 122; Gergen, 2000, 309; H. Clinton, 2003, 219. 26 H. Clinton, 2003, 153-54. 24

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Bill Clinton at his transition team office in Little Rock, offering their assistance in passing his health care reform package. In doing so they touted their own proposal (BasiCare, which would provide comprehensive access to the uninsured, and hold down health care costs by instituting government-set price ceilings) as a compromise between single-payer and managed competition models.27 As such, their proposal was less reliant upon market forces than a managed-competition model embraced by President Clinton in September 1992 (at Merck), and preferred by many conservative Democrats, such as Rep. Jim Cooper (D-TN). Surely, then, there were at least three, perhaps four Republican votes in the U.S. Senate that could have been courted, and won along with those of the Democratic majority. Yet, when President Clinton announced the composition of the formal White House Health Care Reform Task Force after his inauguration, none of the six signers of the November 25, 1992 missive was included in the Health Care Reform Task Force, even though the standard operating procedure of congressional party leaders for a decade had been to practice the “in at the beginning, in at the end” strategy of building roll-call voting coalitions by creating large “task forces” to study, and prepare legislation from the ground up.28 Instead of practicing such inclusiveness in order to assemble a legislative coalition with a better chance of winning, it appears that, consistent with William Riker’s theory of minimum winning coalitions (the smaller the margin of victory, the larger the share of rewards for the victors),29 the Clinton White House elected to take its chances on passing health care reform with the support of Democrats only. As one account notes: Mrs. Clinton preferred to proceed with a “fifty-one vote” strategy: get enough votes from Democrats (with one Republican ally, Senator James Jeffords of Vermont) to pass something as close to the administration’s bill as possible.30 Accordingly, joining Mrs. Clinton and Mr. Magaziner on the Task Force were four Cabinet members whose jurisdictions in some way include provision of governmental health care benefits; Les Aspin (Defense), Robert Reich (Labor), Donna Shalala (Health & Human Services), and Jesse Brown (Veterans Administration). Two more Cabinet members, who would have to reckon with the fiscal requirements of the proposal; Lloyd Bentsen (Treasury) and Leon Panetta (Office of Management & Budget) were added. And, others included three senior White House staff, Robert Rubin (Assistant to the President for Economic Policy), Carol Rasco (Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy), and Laura D’Andrea Tyson (Chair, Council of Economic Advisors); the majority leaders and minority leaders of the congressional chambers through which the proposal must pass; Sen. George Mitchell (D27

Nancy Landon Kassebaum, Conrad Burns, John C. Danforth, Dan Glickman, Dave McCurdy, and Pat Roberts, Letter to President-Elect Bill Clinton, 25 November 1992 (White House Health Care Inter-Departmental Working Group, Papers of Atul Gawande, Box 206, Folder 10, Clinton Presidential Materials Project, Little Rock, Arkansas). 28 See Barbara Deckard Sinclair, “The Speaker’s Task Force in the Post-Reform House of Representatives,” American Political Science Review 75 (1981), 397-410; Barbara Deckard Sinclair, “Leadership Strategies in the Modern Congress,” in Christopher J. Deering, ed., Congressional Politics (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press); and James C. Garand, “The Socialization to Partisan Legislative Behavior: An Extension of Sinclair’s Task Force Socialization Thesis,” Western Political Quarterly 41 (1988), 391-400. 29 William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (Westport CT: Greenwood, 1984). 30 Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 435. Further testimony that this was the strategy is provided in “Clinton’s Legislative Strategy Falters,” Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1994 (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1995), 29; Gergen, 2000, 302; and Klein, 2002, 124.

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ME), Rep. Dick Gephardt (D-MO), Sen. Bob Dole (R-KS), and Rep. Bob Michel (R-IL); and two governors from each party because the states currently provide Medicaid, and could play a role in the extension of health services to the uninsured; Govs. Roy Romer (D-CO) and Howard Dean (D-VT), and Govs. Carroll Campbell (R-SC) and George Mickelson (R-SD).31 What did not fit into the logic of the above appointments was the Task Force membership of seven members of the Congressional Women’s Caucus—Reps. Rosa DeLauro (CT), Maria Cantwell (WA), Eva Clayton (NC), Eddie Bernice Johnson (TX), Barbara Kennelly (CT), and Sens. Barbara Mikulski (MD) and Barbara Boxer (CA), Democrats all32—as opposed to those members of the House and Senate who had been interested enough in health care reform to have earned an identity with the issue, such as Senators Ted Kennedy (D-MA) and John Chafee (R-RI) and Rep. Jim Cooper (D-TN), for example, or the three Democratic House members, and three Republican senators who had volunteered back in November to work with the incoming administration on health care reform. Two of those interested but not included would later team to successfully enact their own health care reform act, the Kennedy-Kassebaum bill that insured the portability of health care coverage from job to job. Neither Republican cooperation nor even intense interest from Democratic congressional entrepreneurs seemed to be wanted; legislation along the lines of the White House model was the goal. Not surprisingly, this resulted in congressional demands for more input in the process: during a closed meeting with Mrs. Clinton on March 17, 1993; tensions arose between Mrs. Clinton and congress members when her response to their demand for more input was that 100 congressional aides were involved in Magaziner’s inter-departmental working groups, to which the members countered that aides do not make the decisions on Capitol Hill.33

Behind Closed Doors The similar demands of health care interest groups for more input into the formulation of the proposal also came as little surprise, given public statements by Ira Magaziner that “We are not going to give the special interests a special seat at the table.”34 True to his word, Magaziner appears to have attempted to “stack” public feedback to the plan by “leading the parade”: forty-six doctors, nurses, and other health care professionals were selected to review the health care proposal as it developed, providing “an outside ‘reality check’” for the Task

31

Medical Group Management Association, 1993 Legislative and Regulatory Briefing, pp. 10-11 (White House Health Care Inter-Departmental Working Group, Papers of Linda Grabel, Box 220, Folder 4, Clinton Presidential Materials Project, Little Rock, Arkansas). 32 Ibid. 33 Dana Priest, “Health Benefits Tax Still Possible, Hillary Clinton Says,” Washington Post, 18 March 1993, A14. 34 National Journal Congress Daily, 22 March 1993, pg. 4 of 5 (White House Health Care Inter-Departmental Working Group, Papers of Roger Berry, box 74, folder 4, Clinton Presidential Materials Project, Little Rock, Arkansas). Magaziner’s arrogance was a problem noted by many (see, e.g., Johnson & Broder 1996, 14, 81).

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Force;35 a strategy that appears to have been recommended by fellow management consultant David Raab.36 Although a draft copy of the April 13, 1993 press release announcing the selection of these health care professionals indicates that Mike Lux, Special Assistant to the President for Public Affairs, “helped assemble the group,”37 staff memoranda indicate that the names of possible “contrarians” who might be selected to serve in the group were submitted by staff to Magaziner,38 and the draft press release itself was submitted to First Lady Clinton’s chief of staff, Maggie Williams, with carbon copies to Magaziner and Williams’ deputy chief of staff Melanne Verveer, five days in advance of the suggested date of release.39 The 511 members of the Inter-Departmental Working Groups were instructed to observe strict silence about their work for fear that leaks would prompt unwanted interest group, media, and congressional attention,40 and to refer all interest group, media, and congressional requests for information to Michael Lux, Bob Boorstin, and Chris Jennings, respectively.41 Indeed, the Clinton White House did not release to the public for a very long time the composition of the White House Health Care Task Force’s various Inter-Departmental Working Groups, ostensibly “to stop reporters and lobbyists from badgering the staff,”42 which prompted one physicians’ group to file a lawsuit (Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton) to force the Working Groups to hold open public meetings that representatives of the group could attend.43 Thereafter, the Task Force and working group procedures set up by Magaziner continued as before, but now following guidelines that assured nominal (as opposed to substantive) compliance with the court order, and opinion of the district court by changing the nomenclature of working procedures.

35

“Health Professionals to Review Clinton Proposal as it Develops,” Draft Press Release, 13 April 1993 (White House Health Care Interdepartmental Working Group, Papers of Ira Magaziner, Box 367, Folder 4, Clinton Presidential Materials Project, Little Rock AR). 36 David Raab, “A Contrarian Perspective on Managed Competition,” 4 January 1993 (White House Health Care Interdepartmental Working Group, Papers of Ira Magaziner, Box 358, Folder 2, Clinton Presidential Materials Project, Little Rock AR). 37 “Health Professionals to Review Clinton Proposal…,” Draft Press Release, 13 April 1993. 38 Jennifer Klein, Memo to Ira Magaziner, no date (White House Health Care Interdepartmental Working Group, Papers of Ira Magaziner, Box 367, Folder 4, Clinton Presidential Materials Project, Little Rock AR). 39 Bob Boorstin, Memo to Maggie Williams re “Announcement of Health Professionals Review Group,” 8 April 1993 (White House Health Care Interdepartmental Working Group, Papers of Ira Magaziner, Box 367, Folder 4, Clinton Presidential Materials Project, Little Rock AR). 40 “Task Force’s Regimen of Deadlines, Debates,” Washington Post 16 April 1993, A12 (in White House Health Care Inter-Departmental Working Group, Papers of Roger Berry, Box 74, Folder 4, Clinton Presidential Materials Project, Little Rock, Arkansas). See also Dana Priest and Michael York, “First Lady is a Government ‘Outsider,’ Judge Rules,” Washington Post, no date, found in same folder and box; and Klein, 2002, 120. 41 “Health Care Reform Working Group Guidelines,” no date (White House Health Care Inter-Departmental Working Group, Papers of Alline Norman, Box 423, Folder 8, Clinton Presidential Materials Project, Little Rock, Arkansas). 42 “Task Force’s Regimen of Deadlines, Debates,” Washington Post 16 April 1993, A12 (in White House Health Care Inter-Departmental Working Group, Papers of Roger Berry, Box 74, Folder 4, Clinton Presidential Materials Project, Little Rock, Arkansas). See also Dana Priest and Michael York, “First Lady is a Government ‘Outsider,’ Judge Rules,” Washington Post, no date, found in same folder and box. 43 This lawsuit and its outcome and implications are covered by Barbara C. Burrell, “The Governmental Status of the First Lady in Law and Public Perception,” in Lois Duke Whitaker, ed., Women in Politics: Outsiders or Insiders? 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999), 233-47.

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For example, Task Force and working group members received a “privileged and confidential attorney-client/work product” providing guidelines for meetings with the President to discuss health care issues: each meeting is convened by the President; persons attending do so in their individual capacities as government officials or members of a working group or the Task Force, but do not represent the working group or Task Force, and have no authority to speak for either; nor have such individuals been designated a subgroup or subcommittee by either; the President seeks only information or advice from the individuals attending, not advice from the group as a whole, at these meetings; no business of the Task Force or working group is conducted at these meetings; no documents normally will be presented to the President during these meetings, and any that are will not be documents provided by the working group for purpose of advising the president; and if such meetings are listed in the President’s schedule, they shall be described as “meetings with individuals to discuss health care reform.”44 Working Group participants were admonished anew to “be discreet.”45 Federal employees cannot disclose what hasn’t been made public by the White House, should communicate with other government staff only on a “need to know” basis, should not “gossip regarding confidential information,”46 and should check first with Bob Boorstin “on all publications, testimony, communications.”47

Candor in Short Supply A final flaw in the health care reform formulation process appears to have been that second-guessers inside the Clinton administration were little more welcome than those from outside. At the Inter-Departmental Working Group level, and at the Task Force level alike, few messengers were spared when they raised doubts about the plan or the process, until they learned to keep their silence. Stephanopoulos recalls that Mrs. Clinton’s “position stifled healthy criticism about our strategy, and Hillary became the object of some quiet resentment because no one was ever quite sure what the rules were in internal debates.48 Some of those who attended the task force meetings found the First Lady “intimidating, hard to argue with, and uninterested in the points they made.” As one of them said, “There was a little feeling on her part of ‘You’re not in my caste, and I’m not going to debate you’ even when she said, ‘Great, let’s debate this.’ You can’t debate across caste lines.”49 White 44

“Guidelines for Meetings with the President to Discuss Health Care Reform Issues” (White House Health Care Inter-Departmental Working Group, Papers of Peter Kemper, Box 277, Folder 6, Clinton Presidential Materials Project, Little Rock, Arkansas). 45 Ira Magaziner, during 29 April 1993 meeting, in personal notes taken by Kathy Lohr (White House Health Care Inter-Departmental Working Group, Papers of Kathy Lohr, Box 341, Folder 1, Clinton Presidential Materials Project, Little Rock, Arkansas). 46 Richard Worksman (Office of Legal Counsel) during 29 April 1993 meeting, in personal notes taken by Peter Kemper (White House Health Care Inter-Departmental Working Group, Papers of Peter Kemper, Box 277, Folder 4, Clinton Presidential Materials Project, Little Rock, Arkansas). 47 Bob Boorstin during 29 April 1993 meeting, in personal notes taken by Peter Kemper (White House Health Care Inter-Departmental Working Group, Papers of Peter Kemper, Box 277, Folder 4, Clinton Presidential Materials Project, Little Rock, Arkansas). 48 George Stephanopoulos, All Too Human (Boston: Little, Brown, 1999), 302. 49 Drew, 1994, 194.

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House staff members had similar reactions: “because it was Hillary’s project, everyone was nervous about criticizing it.”50 Even chief of staff Leon Panetta would not offer the benefit of his counsel on health care because “The First Lady did what she always did; she acted as if anyone who disagreed with her didn’t know what they were talking about, and I said to myself, “Okay, I’m recusing myself from this issue.”51 Cabinet members fared little better: an unidentified Cabinet member told Haynes Johnson and David Broder, “You make your point once to the President’s wife, and if it is not accepted, you don’t press it.”52 Even HHS Secretary Donna Shalala, who had enjoyed a prior peer relationship with Mrs. Clinton, found this to be true: a colleague of Shalala’s said, “Donna learned that there were certain subjects you didn’t raise.”53 Many of the senior White House staff and Cabinet members on President Clinton’s “economic team” also had serious doubts about the heavily bureaucratic, costly health care plan Mrs. Clinton’s task force was assembling,54 but when they raised any questions, “the First Lady would, with cold fury, tell the questioner to stuff it; their plan was the plan.” The President “sat quietly as the First Lady bludgeoned respected members of the Administration, like Lloyd Bentsen, Bob Rubin, and Leon Panetta—into silence.”55 In sum, the First Lady’s direct, executive involvement had a telling effect upon the whole health care policy process: as Gergen relates, “At health care meetings that summer, the economics group started to muffle their voices…In one meeting in the cabinet room, only Laura Tyson, head of the Council of Economic Advisers, challenged the First Lady on cost projections. The rest of us shuffled our feet, and held Laura’s coat. No need to say who prevailed.”56 In the words of another insider, “The person who’s in charge shouldn’t sleep with the President, because if you sleep with the President, nobody is going to tell you the truth.”57

CONCLUSION The documentary evidence found in the files of the White House Health Care InterDepartmental Working Groups, though far from complete because related files have yet to be made public, is less supportive of the interpretation put forth during 2003 by the Clintons than it is of the more critical depiction found in the accounts of participants such as Gergen, Stephanopoulus, and Blumenthal; and of observers such as Drew, Klein, and Johnson and Broder. Although Skocpol has defended the Clintons’ health care policy formulation process as not so different from that which produced the New Deal’s Social Security legislation in

50

Ibid., 195. Quoted in Klein, 2002, 121. 52 Johnson & Broder, 1996, 176. 53 Drew, 1994, 193; see also Gergen, 2000, 300-01. 54 Drew, 1994, 194-95; Klein, 2002, 121; Gergen, 2000, 301-03. 55 Klein, 2002, 121. 56 Gergen, 2000, 301. 57 Johnson & Broder, 1996, 101. 51

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1934-35; in both cases, administration officials, and selected policy experts made decisions about major policy options without public hearings.58 It is self-evident that the policy-making process employed in 1993 was not nearly as inclusive as the benefits it intended to create and distribute. Although such a democratic irony might pass unchallenged in an age when fourteen million were out of work, and the media kept the president’s physical condition and private life from public view; it was certain to draw fire during our own hyper-mediated and hyper-pluralistic age, as surely the Clintons should have known after what they had endured to reach the White House.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author would like to thank Skip Rutherford of the Clinton Presidential Foundation and Emily Robison, Supervisory Archivist, and the staff of the Clinton Presidential Materials Project for facilitating this early research.

58

Skocpol, 1996, 14.

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 63-74

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

THE INFLUENCE OF FIRST LADIES ON MENTAL HEALTH POLICY

Jerome L. Short, Colleen J. Shogan, and Nicole M. Owings ABSTRACT Due to their personal and family experiences with mental illness, religious beliefs, formal education, socialization as caregivers, earlier success in changing state policies, and political ideology; several first ladies have chosen to influence federal mental health policy. The political advocacy of first ladies, and their preferred policies reflect presidential preferences, but over time they have become more autonomous, and systematic in their work as their accepted political roles multiply. This article traces the development of federal mental health policy, and the contribution of six first ladies from Eleanor Roosevelt to Laura Bush.

INTRODUCTION First ladies have engaged in many different social roles during the history of the United States. They have served as supportive spouses, hosted social events in the White House, overseen renovations of the White House, campaigned for their husbands, edited presidential speeches, advised on cabinet appointments, championed important social causes, represented 1 the president in foreign affairs, and developed and influenced social policy. First ladies have performed all of these roles without being elected, appointed, paid, or even mentioned in the Constitution. The role of the first lady reflects the status and concerns of women in the United States. For the past century, first ladies have attempted to improve the quality of life for children and families through their efforts to increase the availability and quality of mental health services. The Surgeon General’s report on mental health estimates that 21 percent of all Americans 2 have experienced a mental disorder during the past year. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th edition-text revision; DSM-IV-TR) describes more than 200 1

Watson, R. P. (2000). The presidents' wives: Reassessing the office of the first lady. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 2 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (1999). Mental health: A report of the Surgeon General. Bethesda, MD: U.S. Public Health Service.

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specific diagnostic categories for mental disorders that are separate from any diagnoses of physical disorder.3 In this article, mental health will refer to the successful treatment of psychiatric disorders, the reduction of psychological symptoms, and the enhancement of self-esteem, life satisfaction, and quality of life. Since approximately 60 million Americans experience mental disorders, and many friends and family members serve as caregivers, it is incumbent that the executive branch promotes policies designed to address mental disorders. Next, we examine the efforts over the past century of six first ladies from three Democratic, and three Republican administrations to influence federal mental health policy, and how this policy has changed over recent years.

ELEANOR ROOSEVELT: COMPASSIONATE LIBERALISM Eleanor Roosevelt took on a variety of issues as they arose, most of them growing out of her pre-White House career as a social and political activist, and many coinciding with New Deal programs. Her interest in mental health services started with her own experience of growing up in a family with an alcoholic father, and visiting an uncle who suffered from mental illness. In 1913, Franklin Roosevelt was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and he and Eleanor moved to Washington, DC. During World War I, Eleanor was a Red Cross volunteer, and worked in a canteen for soldiers, organized knitting projects to provide clothing, and regularly visited soldiers in military hospitals. In her autobiography, Mrs. Roosevelt described that once a week she visited the Federal Naval Hospital and took flowers, cigarettes, and other items that might cheer the men who had returned from the war overseas.4 The naval hospital filled rapidly, and one building was taken over at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, DC for the so-called “shell-shocked” patients. Some of them recovered, but others remained permanently hospitalized. Many of these veterans were kept in padded cells or in some kind of confinement. At this time, St. Elizabeth's was the only federal hospital for the “insane” in the country. The hospital was understaffed, attendants were poorly paid, and Eleanor observed that many distressed patients gazed at her from behind bars, and were restricted to walking up and down on enclosed porches. Distressed by these sights, Mrs. Roosevelt persuaded the Secretary of the Interior, Franklin Lane, to investigate the living conditions at the hospital. Lane appointed a committee that later appeared before Congress, and asked for, and received, increased congressional funding for St. Elizabeth's Hospital; and for a time, it became a model for treatment of persons with psychological disorders. During the 1920s in New York, Eleanor began to focus more on improving the day-today quality of life for average Americans. She joined a variety of women's associations, and spent a great deal of time examining legislation and committee reports from Congress. She outlined strategies to lobby for legislation that would expand the rights of women and children. Mrs. Roosevelt testified before the New York Senate committees on behalf of protective labor legislation and criticized her husband's plan for unemployment insurance. 3

American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (4th ed., text rev.). Washington, DC. 4 Roosevelt, E. (1961). The autobiography of Eleanor Roosevelt. New York: Harper & Brothers.

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After Franklin Roosevelt became president in 1933, Eleanor accepted an offer for a monthly column from Women's Home Companion, and donated her monthly $1,000 fee to charity. She asked her readers to share problems with her that puzzled or saddened them. By January 1934, 300,000 Americans had responded to her request. Eleanor learned about the squalid living conditions of coal miners in West Virginia, and met with the Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, to argue that the National Industrial Recovery Act could help address the community's problems. She supported other programs to reduce poverty and advocated the hiring of women, African Americans, and liberals within federal agencies. Eleanor wanted programs to focus more on dealing with the distress of poverty, and not just on material needs. For example, she pressured Harry Hopkins, head of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, to develop a youth program that would provide vocational guidance and education rather than military training.5 She argued that the specific problems facing youths needed to be addressed, but only in a way that fostered a sense of self-worth. By providing job skills and education, she hoped that the new National Youth Administration (NYA) would foster a sense of civic awareness that, in turn, would promote a commitment to social justice. In the White House, Eleanor revolutionized the role of First Lady. She was the first (and only) first lady to hold regular press conferences, write a daily newspaper column, publish books and articles, travel the nation on speaking tours, chair national conferences in the White House, address national conventions of social reform organizations, give a keynote address at her party's presidential convention, represent her nation abroad, travel across battlefields, and direct a governmental agency.6 After Franklin died, Eleanor was urged to run for governor or senator from New York, but declined. President Truman appointed her to the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, and she oversaw the drafting and unanimous passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. She also served on the national board of directors for the NAACP, CORE, and other major civil rights organizations. One of her final efforts was to pressure John Kennedy to make concessions to civil rights in his platform before she would campaign for him. One could argue that Mrs. Roosevelt's compassion for less fortunate Americans had motivated a variety of efforts during her lifetime to establish governmental and societal institutions that helped support people, and reduce their psychological distress. The next several first ladies until Betty Ford would limit their activities primarily to the roles of wife, mother, sometime campaigner, social hostess, and caretaker of the White House.

MENTAL HEALTH POLICY REFORMS FROM THE 1940S TO 1970S After World War II, the Veteran's Administration was created to care for the unprecedented number of veterans with medical and psychological disorders. Also, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) was established to coordinate funding for mental 5

Black, A. M. (1996). (Anna) Eleanor Roosevelt. In L. L. Gould (ed.), American first ladies: Their lives and their legacy (pp. 422-448). New York: Garland. 6 Ibid.

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health research and training. In 1955, Congress created the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Mental Health that developed a comprehensive mental health plan. The committee reported its plan in 1961 after President Kennedy took office, and recommended that instead of constructing large mental hospitals, the government should provide a flexible array of services for the mentally ill in the patients' communities. Part of the social problem of mental illness was that treatment disrupted patients' lives by taking them from their communities where family members and neighbors might help them to resume normal lives. As a response to the Joint Commission report, the NIMH proposed a series of community mental health centers. With the support of President Kennedy, who was personally interested in mental health because of his sister Rosemary Kennedy's mental retardation, and through timely advocacy by members of Congress, the NIMH, and the National Mental Health Association, Congress passed the Community Mental Health Centers (CMHC) Act in 1963. The mandate given CMHCs was different than that of traditional psychiatric hospitals, and it included care for persons with mental disorders in the community, crisis intervention, prevention, and consultation with other community agencies.7 The community mental health movement in the United States evolved into a political as well as a therapeutic endeavor that attempted to reach many underserved and underprivileged groups. Those active in the movement conceptualized psychological disorders in the context of poverty, and other environmental stressors; and some influential psychologists advocated 8 the view that mental illness was not due to individual weakness or immorality. This was essentially a view that those with mental illness were often as much victims as blameworthy individuals. The policymakers who supported community mental health legislation were generally liberal Democrats and, together with mental health professionals and patients’ rights activists, made the movement more social change oriented. With its emphasis on benevolent, rather than punitive, measures for social control, community mental health legislation and programs became an incarnation of the Progressive Era.9 Although spending money and passing laws are ways for political leaders to make claims about solving social problems, they can also use rhetoric and imagery connected to these problems to unite political coalitions. In the 1960s, the federal government supported community mental health not only by providing funds but also by legitimating the movement's approach and concerns.10 Presidents Kennedy and Johnson were vocal in their support for community mental health as part of their vision of a New Frontier and a Great Society. Their rhetoric and policies were centered on the creation of a better society, in which more people, such as those with problems in living, would be included. They avoided claiming that individual character defects were to blame for social ills.

7

Levine, M. (1981). The history and politics of community mental health. New York: Oxford University Press. Humphreys, K. and Rappaport, J. (1995). From the community mental health movement to the war on drugs: A study in the definition of social problems. American Psychologist, 48(8), 892-901. 9 Rothman, D. J. (1981). Conscience and convenience: The asylum and its alternatives in progressive America. Boston: Little, Brown. 10 Humphreys and Rapport. 8

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BETTY FORD: THE PERSONAL IS POLITICAL Following several Democratic presidents' efforts to establish mental health treatment and research institutions; a Republican first lady, Betty Ford, influenced the use of mental health services in a more personal way. While Gerald Ford was President, Betty spent many hours in the Washington Hospital for Sick Children, and comforted disabled and emotionally disturbed children. She also supported efforts to eliminate the abuse of older people, and improve nursing homes for the poor and ailing elderly. Mrs. Ford campaigned, and sought support for these causes among people involved in the arts and humanities.11 One event became a turning point in Betty Ford's life, and changed her perceived capacity to influence others. In September 1974, a month after entering the White House, she was diagnosed with breast cancer. Despite the very private nature of her condition, Mrs. Ford made an important decision that would have a tremendous social impact: she decided to make her condition known to the public. She discussed the uncomfortable issue of her breast cancer diagnosis and mastectomy with the media. According to an article in Ms. magazine, Betty Ford said that "there had been so much cover-up during Watergate that we wanted to be sure there would be no cover-up in the Ford Administration."12 By disclosing her breast cancer and mastectomy, Betty Ford was personally responsible for increased public awareness of cancer related issues, and for the reduction of stigma surrounding cancer. After Mrs. Ford went public to alert as many women as possible to the benefits of early detection, millions of women scheduled appointments at breast cancer clinics across the country. Among the lives saved was Happy Rockefeller, the vice president's wife, who underwent a mastectomy shortly after Betty did. The First Lady received over 55,000 cards and letters from women who had mastectomies or who were encouraged by her experience to get check-ups. For the first time, Mrs. Ford truly understood the extraordinary power she held.13 Following Gerald Ford's defeat in 1976, and the Fords return to California, Betty became dependent on pain-killing pills for her osteoarthritis, and on tranquilizers and alcohol for her anxiety. Her family became increasingly concerned about her erratic behavior, and her deteriorating physical and psychological health. In early 1978, family members persuaded her to check into the Alcohol and Drug Rehabilitation Service of the Long Beach Naval Hospital. Doctors encouraged her to tell the public about her substance abuse, which she refused to do at first, fearing much embarrassment would befall her husband and family.14 Eventually, she realized that disclosing her alcoholism could help others to seek diagnosis and treatment, as had occurred after her disclosure of her cancer and mastectomy four years previously. After her successful treatment, she became an advocate for support of similar programs. With the cooperation of her family, friends, and medical professionals; she helped found the 11

Davis, K. L. and Refkind, L. J. (2002). The role of first ladies in healthcare reform. White House Studies, 2(3), 287-298. 12 “Betty Ford: Today Still Speaking Out," Ms. (April 1984), p. 41 13 Ashley, J. S. (2001). The social and political influence of Betty Ford: Betty Bloomer blossoms. White House Studies, 1(1), 101-109. 14 Davis and Refkind

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Betty Ford Center for Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation, which opened in 1982 in Rancho Mirage, California. For more than 20 years, the program has treated celebrities and ordinary citizens with drug and alcohol problems. The larger impact of her efforts was to help break down the stigma associated with psychological disorders by speaking out about her anxiety and substance abuse, obtaining professional help, and making treatment more widely available to others. Mrs. Ford's advocacy for substance abuse treatment was consistent with a Republican philosophy of viewing problems as occurring within individuals, and expecting individuals to help themselves, and mobilize their local communities to generate funding for mental health treatment.

ROSALYNN CARTER: POLITICAL LEADER OF SYSTEMIC CHANGE Rosalynn Carter, as part of a Democratic administration, chose to take a more systemic approach to mental health policy. Mrs. Carter has been a visible, active leader in the mental health field for more than 30 years, and she has also been an enthusiastic supporter of the Special Olympics. As First Lady of Georgia, and of the United States; and in the years since, Mrs. Carter has pushed for reform on a number of mental health issues such as reducing stigma, parity for treatment options, payment by insurance providers, increased brain related research, better access to improved mental health services, and early intervention for children. In her book, Helping Someone with Mental Illness; Rosalynn reported that, during her childhood, she knew one of Jimmy’s cousins who was in and out of the state mental hospital in Georgia, and that her visits to the hospital had a deep impression on her.15 Also, her early social life focused on church activities with her Lutheran grandmother, Baptist grandfather, and Methodist parents that encouraged service to less fortunate others. Mrs. Carter's public service commitment to mental health issues began when her husband was Governor of Georgia from 1971 until 1974. While she was campaigning, Rosalynn learned about the serious deficiencies in state mental health services. When she became the First Lady of Georgia, she served as a volunteer at a mental health facility. Also, her husband appointed her to serve as a member of the governor's commission to improve services for the mentally and emotionally handicapped. The commission compiled a report that was sharply critical of mental health services, and outlined a comprehensive care plan to shift the treatment from large institutions to community mental health centers. Over the next three years, the number of community mental health centers grew from 23 to 134, and the mental health programs became models for other states.16 Mrs. Carter focused on mental health as her central policy concern while First Lady of Georgia, and she expanded her involvement as First Lady of the nation. During the 1976 presidential campaign, she stated, "It has been fifteen years since anyone has even done a report on mental health care, and the programs have become so splintered that it's time we look at all of them, and give some direction to national health care for the mentally ill."17 15

Carter, R., and Golant, S. K. (1998). Helping someone with mental illness. New York: Times Books. Smith, K. B. (1996). (Eleanor) Rosalynn (Smith) Carter. In L. L. Gould (ed.), American first ladies: Their lives and their legacy (pp. 556-582). New York: Garland. 17 Carter, R. (1984). First lady from Plains. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, p. 140. 16

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As President, Jimmy Carter appointed Rosalynn the honorary chairperson of the President's Commission on Mental Health. President Carter gave the commission one year to conduct a study of the nation’s mental health system, and prepare a report. In 1979, only a small percentage of Medicare and Medicaid funds were available for mental health, and only one-half to one percent of the federal budget was dedicated to research in mental health. The report included a list of 117 recommendations for improving mental health care, ranging from mental health insurance to community mental health centers, and addressed rural mental health needs. Once the report was completed, the task of the administration became the implementation of the commission's recommendations. For the recommendations that did not require congressional action, President Carter asked government agencies affected by the proposed changes to develop timetables and plans to implement the recommendations. The remaining proposals were written into legislation in the form of the Mental Health Systems Act, and President Carter submitted it to Congress in May 1979. As the legislation made its way through Congress, Rosalynn worked to gain support for the bill from interest groups and healthcare organizations.18 In February, 1979, Mrs. Carter also testified on behalf of the bill before the Senate subcommittee on Human Resources that was responsible for the legislation. She followed Eleanor Roosevelt as the second first lady to testify before Congress. In September 1980, the Mental Health Systems Act was enacted and funded by Congress. It was the first major reform of national mental health programs since 1963. However, most of the funding for the act was withdrawn within a month of President Reagan's inauguration in January 1981. The changes in mental health policy that did not require congressional action were not easily reversed, and remained in effect. After returning to Georgia, President and Mrs.Carter formed The Carter Center. Mrs. Carter's advocacy goals provided the framework for the Center's Mental Health Program, formed in 1991. She led the annual Rosalynn Carter Symposium on Mental Health Policy, a meeting of national mental health leaders, and led the development of the Carter Center Mental Health Task Force. In December 2000, the Program, as co-sponsor, convened its first conference on the international level, the Inaugural World Conference on the Promotion of Mental Health and Prevention of Mental and Behavioral Disorders. In addition, Mrs. Carter has chaired the World Federation for Mental Health's (WFMH) International Committee of Women Leaders for Mental Health since its establishment in 1992. In 1992, to focus attention on the plight of those suffering from mental illnesses, WFMH designated October 10th as World Mental Health Day. To increase awareness of this special day, WFMH created an International Committee of First Ladies for Mental Health, and Rosalynn was the chairperson. To expand the scope of committee involvement to include not only first ladies, but also female members of royal families, and heads of state; the name was recently amended to International Women Leaders for Mental Health: A Committee of the World Federation for Mental Health Consisting of Royalty, Heads of State, and First Ladies. Working together with mental health leaders of various countries provides an important opportunity to produce positive change for citizens with mental disorders.

18

Chanley, V. A. (2001). The first lady as presidential advisor, policy advocate, and surrogate: Rosalynn Carter and the political role of the first lady. White House Studies, 1(4), 549-561.

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NANCY REAGAN: INDIVIDUAL CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS In 1982, First Lady Nancy Reagan became involved in substance abuse prevention with the famous three-word command that was emblematic of a more conservative view of the nature of substance abuse problems, “Just say no.” She traveled around the country visiting substance abuse treatment centers and schools, and spoke about the seriousness of the drug problem in the United States. She delivered numerous speeches on the issues of drugs and drug addiction, attended countless anti-drug conferences, appeared on television specials regarding drug abuse, and appeared in a televised documentary, "The Chemical People" shown on PBS. Mrs. Reagan also guest starred on the television show "Different Strokes" in a cameo role for one episode discouraging drug use among young people. She hosted 18 foreign first ladies at the First Ladies Conference on Drug Abuse at the United Nations. By May 1987, Nancy had traveled to 60 cities in 30 states and seven foreign countries for antidrug awareness.19 Mrs. Reagan's public statements reflected a view of substance abuse resulting from an internal defect in the abuser. By advancing such a view of substance abuse, the Reagan administration took advantage of the claims made about substance abuse throughout American history. Historically, moral and cultural conservatives have defined the social problem of substance abuse. In politically conservative times explanations for problems are often intra-individual; this approach deflects criticism of and attributions of responsibility to government officials. The treatments that follow from such a model are programs that focus on spiritual enlightenment, punishment by moral condemnation or imprisonment, psychotherapy, and biological treatment. Administrations can adopt superficially progressive programs to help those with internal defects, but, in essence, such policies are conservative in that they accept the claim that the government has minimal responsibility in relieving the problems of individuals.20 Many social programs, including community mental health, were curtailed in the ReaganBush era, but the public substance abuse treatment network increased in size. Policymakers in the Reagan administration replaced a problem that had historically been defined by progressives with one that had historically been defined by social conservatives. The federal government reduced its financial support of community mental health centers, and related programs that emphasized the social and environmental causes of their clients' problems. A new group of political activists in public substance abuse agencies, often located in the poorer areas of large cities, emphasized the need for individuals to overcome moral, spiritual, and physical defects to stop substance abuse. Although the community mental health movement was broader than any one government policy, federally funded community mental health centers became the visible, institutional embodiment of the government’s values and goals. After two decades of strong support, in 1981 the government began scaling back funding to community mental health centers beyond what had originally been planned. Under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (PL 19 20

Davis and Refkind. Davis and Refkind.

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97-35), the Reagan administration reduced the federal role in community mental health, repealed Carter's Mental Health Systems Act, and replaced direct federal funding for community mental health with smaller block grants to the states.21 At this time, only 750 of the envisioned 2,000 community mental health centers were in place.22 The financial strain left these centers fighting for survival.23 Although the Reagan administration curtailed funds for community mental health centers, it pumped increasing amounts of money into substance abuse treatment and prevention programs. From 1981-1991, funding for federal drug programs increased by 679 percent. In contrast, total federal outlays only grew 95 percent over the same period. The Reagan administration also created the Office of Substance Abuse Prevention, the Office of Treatment Improvement, and the post of drug czar. From 1989 to 1993, the Bush administration continued many of the same drug fighting policies of the Reagan administration. In 1991, President Bush proposed to appropriate $1.674 billion for substance abuse treatment, and $1.396 billion for substance abuse prevention, which included hundreds of millions of dollars for substance abuse research grants.24 However, within three weeks of taking office in 1993, President Clinton eliminated the majority of jobs at the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

HILLARY CLINTON: SUPPORT FROM THE VILLAGE AND THE GOVERNMENT Hillary Clinton's advocacy for mental health care programs has its roots in her childhood, and her formal education. In her 2003 autobiography, Living History, she described her devout Methodist upbringing that advocated serving others in need.25 Her church activities led to meetings with black and Hispanic teenagers in downtown Chicago, and an awareness of the effects of poverty and prejudice on the self-esteem of less-privileged peers. During her law school years at Yale University, she helped draft guidelines for the treatment of abused children at Yale-New Haven Hospital, and observed distressed children being treated at the Yale Child Study Center. As First Lady of Arkansas, Hillary focused on improving parenting instruction with the introduction of the Home Instruction Program for Preschool Youngsters (HIPPY). Also, she founded the Arkansas Advocates for Children and Families, and served as chair of the Arkansas Education Standards Committee. Shortly after Bill Clinton's inauguration in 1993, Hillary was named to head the President's Task Force on National Health Care Reform. She was following in the path of earlier Democratic first ladies: Eleanor Roosevelt had served as Assistant Director of Civilian Defense, and Rosalynn Carter had been named Honorary Chair of the President's Commission on Mental Health. However, neither Mrs. Roosevelt nor Mrs. Carter had the staff, funds, 21

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Public Law 97-35. Mosher, L. R., & Burti, L. (1989). Community mental health: Principles and practice. New York: Norton. 23 Goplerud, E. N., Walfish, S., & Apsey, M. O. (1983). Surviving cutbacks in community mental health: Seventyseven action strategies. Community Mental Health Journal, 19, 62–76. 24 Humphreys and Rappaport. 22

25

Clinton, H. R. (2003). Living History. New York: Simon & Schuster.

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formal training, or political clout of Mrs. Clinton. Unfortunately for Mrs. Clinton, her husband’s political opponents quickly challenged her health care reforms. To achieve her goals, Hillary had closed meetings to the media and the public, causing frustration and anger. The Association of American Physicians and Surgeons brought suit in federal court to open the meetings. A federal judge ruled that the task force was guilty of misconduct in withholding documents; later, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that Mrs. Clinton was a "de facto officer or employee" of the government, and that the Task Force was not obligated to open its hearings.26 When the Task Force unveiled its sweeping, controversial reform plan, a variety of physician’s groups, drug companies, and insurance companies lobbied Congress to stop it. Several senators offered compromises that might have won the support of both the Democrats and Republicans, but the First Lady remained unyielding, particularly on the provision of universal coverage. After Democratic Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan began to criticize the health care cost estimates as “fantasy” numbers, the health care plan was soundly defeated in September 1994.27 However, some of the elements of the program, such as parity between medical and mental health treatment, were later incorporated in the insurance coverage of federal workers. For a time, Mrs. Clinton adopted a more traditional First Lady role, addressing women’s groups and conferences, and touring Asia with her daughter Chelsea. She started a weekly syndicated newspaper column, Talking It Over, like Eleanor Roosevelt had done 60 years earlier. In 1995, she attended the United Nations Fourth World Conference of women in Beijing, China. Hillary criticized the governments of China, India, Bosnia, Iran, and others, for their poor human rights records, especially the lack of women's rights. In 1996, she published It Takes a Village, a book that described her parenting experiences, and reviewed a variety of psychological research on raising children, and improving community programs to prevent mental health problems.28 Following her years in the White House, Mrs. Clinton has earned another opportunity to affect mental health policy with her election to the Senate from New York in 2000. Aspects of the Clinton health care plan are part of the campaign platforms for several Democratic presidential candidates for the 2004 election. The Second Lady, Tipper Gore, also served as a mental health advisor in the Clinton Administration. Mrs. Gore joined the Task Force on Mental Health Benefits in 1994, and pressed for parity between mental and physical health benefits, and supported projects that helped decrease the stigma of mental illness. Her knowledge of mental health policy stemmed from her academic work in earning a master's degree in psychology from George Peabody College at Vanderbilt University. In addition, Tipper revealed her own treatment for depression, and helped publicize the experiences of others who were treated for mental illness during the first ever White House Conference on Mental Health that she chaired in 1999.

26

Gutin, M. (2001). Hillary Clinton. In R. P. Watson (ed.), Laura Bush: the report to the first lady (pp. 165-169). Huntington, N.Y.: Nova History Publications. 27 Clinton. 28 Clinton, H. R. (1996). It takes a village: and other lessons children teach us. New York: Simon & Schuster.

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LAURA BUSH: COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATISM The current First Lady, Laura Bush, has occasionally focused on the mental health of children, starting with her efforts in the 1990s as First Lady of Texas. She promoted a program for abused and neglected children called Greater Texas Community Partners run by the state Department of Child Protective services. The agency set up volunteer-run "Rainbow Rooms" where child-abuse caseworkers could get free clothes, diapers, formula, and other supplies for children. The statewide program spread to more than seventy cities.29 Laura also advocated for an Adopt-A-Caseworker program in which child abuse caseworkers were supported by a business, church, or school with material supplies, and appreciation for their work. Mrs. Bush's policy efforts from the White House have included helping to organize a summit on early childhood cognitive development in July 2001. However, the emphasis of the summit was preparing children for school rather than dealing with developmental disorders. Mrs. Bush has also influenced children’s mental health by her efforts to provide support and reassurance to children after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. She wrote two letters, one for elementary school students, and one for middle and high school students that were sent to every state school superintendent. The letters explained that family, teachers, and school counselors were available to listen and talk about the recent national tragedy. A week after the attacks, Mrs. Bush appeared on the Oprah Show speaking on ways to help children cope with the stressful events, and their consequent anxiety and sadness. President George W. Bush has initiated another consideration of federal mental health policy. President Bush established the New Freedom Commission on Mental Health in April 2002 as part of his initiative to eliminate inequality for Americans with disabilities; charging it with the first comprehensive study of the nation's public and private mental health service delivery system since President Carter's 1978 Mental Health Commission, 25 years ago. The Commission's Report, released in 2003, declared the existing system a fragmented, inefficient maze of private, federal, state, and local government programs with scattered responsibility for services that frustrates both people with mental disorders and providers of mental health care, and called for dramatic reform at all levels of the mental health system.30 However, no new funding is currently dedicated to this reform plan. The Commission’s Report recommends parity of insurance coverage between the costs of mental and physical health services. However, differences may exist in how Republicans and Democrats define parity, and in how they allocate financial resources needed for parity. Although conservatives tend to focus on the individual and biological causes of social problems, liberals often accept enviromental and social group explanations. Thus Republican legislators may be more likely to limit insurance coverage to the most severe mental disorders that are generally treated with medication in an effort to minimize governmental expenditures. One recent estimate is that approximately 5 million people suffer from severe mental illness.31 29

Felix, A. (2002). Laura, America's first lady, first mother. Avon, MA: Adams Media Corporation. President’s New Freedom Commission on Mental Health. (2003). Achieving the promise: Transforming mental health care in America. 31 Health care reform for Americans with severe mental illnesses: Report of the National Advisory Mental Health Council. (1993). American Journal of Psychiatry, 150(10), 1447-1465. 30

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In contrast, Democratic legislators may be more likely to extend mental health insurance coverage in the form of comprehensive services including medication, psychotherapy, and community support services to many more of the approximately 60 million who suffer from any of the more than 200 diagnostic categories in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.

CONCLUSION First ladies have contributed substantially to federal mental health policy, and the availability and use of mental health services. Many of the recent first ladies of the White House were formerly first ladies at the state level. Their activity at the state level served as a reliable predictor of their involvement with federal mental health policy. Personal and family experiences with mental illness elicited aspects of the caregiving role for most of the first ladies described here. Also, the Christian ethic of serving the less fortunate has provided motivation for government and volunteer efforts to improve access to mental health. The recent efforts of Hillary Clinton and Tipper Gore, both of whom have graduate degrees, show the importance of more specialized education in understanding and developing federal mental health policy. In general, Democratic first ladies have played a more active role in mental health policy than Republican first ladies. This partisan divergence can be explained partially by their distinct ideological philosophies about both personal responsibility, and whether the federal government should attempt to provide funding for comprehensive mental health services. At this point, our preliminary observations about partisan divergence must remain speculative because there are not enough activist first ladies in American history to facilitate a robust comparative study. However, the influence of first ladies in mental health policy has accelerated, and become more systematic over the past century. Since the public policy component of the first lady’s job will likely continue to grow, future scholars will be able to draw concrete conclusions concerning partisan differences between Republican and Democratic first ladies. The role of first ladies in the policymaking process is part of a research agenda that seeks to study the Office of the First Lady as a political institution. This essay argued that first ladies have been instrumental in effecting change in mental health policy. In addition to giving due credit to first ladies, who have often worked without significant accolades, or any monetary compensation, research on their role as policymakers also contributes to presidential scholarship. First ladies are now firmly part of their husband’s electoral coalition. Polls regularly measure the popularity of first ladies, and both national party organizations measure the public’s approval of “would-be” first ladies during a presidential campaign. Therefore, the policy issues that first ladies pursue can have a measurable effect on the popularity of a president’s administration. The time has come for scholars to monitor which policy issues first ladies choose, how they enact their proposals, and whether divergent approaches to the office influence executive governance.

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 75-89

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

THE GEORGE W. BUSH PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION: THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN POLITICS AND POLICY

Anthony J. Eksterowicz and Glenn P. Hastedt ABSTRACT The first months of a new presidency are a unique time in American politics. It is a period of great presidential activism, with appointments and policy initiatives announced on almost a daily basis. It is a “honeymoon” period, when the president’s relationships with Congress and the media are at least cordial if not deferential. It is a period when campaign promises come due and domestic politics are on everyone’s mind. It can also be a period of frustration as newly elected presidents struggle with recalcitrant staffs and large unfamiliar bureaucracies. This paper examines the transition of the Forty-third president, George W. Bush, noting problems experienced and offering lessons.

INTRODUCTION Newly elected presidents almost always feel frustrated and inadequate in their dealings with the Congress. Washington is unfamiliar territory for presidents, especially if their only experience was at the gubernatorial level of government. The key to a successful first year in the White House is advanced planning and learning during the transition period from one administration to another. This period lasts eleven weeks just seventy-seven days. It is a frightfully short period of time to adjust to the Washington culture. Yet failure to do so will inevitably result in policy failures for the president. What if the elected president had to survive a strong primary challenge and then engage his opponent in a razor thin election? Suppose further that the election was not over on Election Day and continued during the transition phase. Suppose a newly elected president lost more than half of the transition to this contested election. This was the plight of George W. Bush after December 13, 2000. The 2000 presidential election represented a unique challenge for transition efforts. Due to the uncertainty of the electoral vote open transition efforts were highly criticized. For example, President Bush sought to create an image of leadership by openly discussing his

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possible cabinet choices in the days immediately following the undecided election – discussions criticized by the media as premature.1 This article will examine the effects of the short transition upon George W. Bush’s policy agenda. It is the position here that certain dysfunctions can be traced to the transition period which resulted in a confusion of politics from policy. We will first present a framework for analyzing intra-party presidential transitions. Second, we briefly describe the complexity of the 2000 election and its impact upon transition efforts. Third, we assess a few impacts upon various Bush Administration policies. Fourth, we present a case study of the effects of this transition upon Iraq policy. Finally we offer some suggestions for remediating these problems traceable to a shortened or normal transition period.

PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS One way of judging presidential transition is by assessing the quality and quantity of presidential appointees in place early in a presidential administration. While appointments are important (and we shall assess the Bush II Administration’s progress in this area) they do not tell the entire story of a successful transition. We need a framework that can connect appointments to policy. Other factors can influence and even overwhelm presidential administrations. The late Richard Neustadt has warned of the perils facing incoming presidential administrations in their transition phase.2 Most first-term presidents are new to the presidential policy process; thus they are prone to be caught by surprise by the events in the domestic or foreign policy realm. The Chinese forced landing of an American spy plane is such an example early in the Bush II Administration. This is especially the case with successful presidential candidates who have campaigned as Washington outsiders. Second, most presidents will face pressures to act, perhaps in haste, to developing problems. New administrations face the pressure of time to achieve policy accomplishments with limited political capital. In fact, as Paul Light has warned, presidents must push their domestic policy agenda through the Congress before losing precious political capital during their first year in office.3 Third, most presidents will face the problem of hubris, or the feeling that they or their administration know best how to organize and respond to policy problems.4 This feeling of hubris can lead to a fourth problem of naiveté concerning the Washington policy and political process. New presidential administrations invariably are affected by their campaign victory. These administrations were victorious and thus tend to think that their answers to policy problems are correct ones. However, new presidents who have campaigned as Washington outsiders do not fully comprehend how the Washington establishment operates and this complicates their tasks. These administrations need to learn the Washington policy process; however, naiveté and hubris act as barriers to the learning process. 1

For example, William Schneider on CNN’s Inside Politics, November 8, 2000; and Brian McGrory, “Both Rivals Failing Test,” The Boston Globe, November 14, 2000. 2 Richard E. Neustadt, “Presidential Transitions: Are the Risks Rising,” Miller Center Journal, 1 (1994:2. 3 Paul C. Light, The President’s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choices from Kennedy to Carter (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press), pp. 1-62. 4 Neustadt, “Presidential Transitions: Are the Risks Rising?” p. 4.

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All of these problems can be found in each modern presidential administration. Furthermore, W. David Clinton has listed the following as factors in the presidential transition process: the outgoing president, the incoming president, the career services, the Congress, and foreign states.5 Each of these factors can complicate the transition process, especially if the new president is unfamiliar with the Washington policy or political process. Newness, haste, hubris, and naiveté all combine to complicate a new president’s transition process. These factors have an impact on a president’s understanding of the Washington political and policy process. Ignorance concerning key elements of the political or policy process can cripple key items in a president’s domestic or foreign policy agenda. It can lead to proposing flawed or contradictory policies. It can damage political relationships so necessary for presidential success. Examples abound from various presidential administrations. From President Carter’s insistence upon congressional authority for a government reorganization plan before Congress had elected its leaders,6 to President Clinton’s failed British thermal unit tax proposal.7 While an understanding of the political and policy process is crucial for presidential success, learning about the policy and political process must occur early to increase presidential first year success. Suppose a president’s opportunities for learning during a transition phase are cut by more than half. In addition this particular president elect is largely considered a political novice due to his first successful election and re-election to the Texas governorship. The President in question, George W. Bush, also campaigned as a Washington outsider. The potential for disastrous domestic and foreign policy recipes were ever present. We now turn to a brief description of the 2000 presidential and the Bush transition efforts.

THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND BUSH TRANSITION EFFORTS The Bush 2000 presidential campaign faced hotly contested races and pressures from John McCain and Albert Gore during the primaries, general election and post election phase of the election. Candidate Bush had to first remove McCain as an impediment standing in his way but while Bush was successful, McCain essentially forced Bush to spend tremendous sums of campaign money to ensure victory. This made the general election between Gore and Bush more financially competitive. While Political Scientists predicted a Gore victory of three to five percentage points based upon their economic election modeling8 the daily tracking polls continued to indicate a close race.9 Both candidates pursued strategies of shoring up their base then moving to the political center. Perhaps they both succeeded given the close nature of the race with Gore 5

W. David Clinton and Daniel G. Lang, eds., Papers on Presidential Transition and Foreign Policy Volume IX: What Makes a Successful Transition? University of Virginia White Burkett Miller Center (Lanham Md: University Press of America, 1993), pp. 3-24. 6 William F. Mullen, “Perceptions of Carter’s Legislative Successes and Failures: Views from the Hill and the Liaison Staff,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 12, no. 4 (1982): 527. 7 George Hager and Eric Pianin, Mirage (New York: Random House, 1997), pp. 212-13. 8 Robert G. Kaiser, “Academics Say It’s Elementary: Gore Wins,” August 31, 2000, p. A12. 9 R. S. Erickson, “The 2000 Presidential Election In Perspective,” Political Science Quarterly, 116: 38.

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winning the popular vote and Bush eventually triumphant in the Electoral College. Electoral battleground targeting may have been responsible for such a close race.10 The election results reflected the fact that the candidates essentially divided the nation. Most of the urban industrial county and city areas cast their votes for Gore but most of the rural counties cast their votes for Bush. Two Americas appeared with two competing visions on the role of government, values, morality and the importance of character and leadership. All of this, in part caused by two candidates who pledged to the American people that they would govern by bringing people together for compromise and conciliation. Nothing would be settled on Election Day. Much has been written about the post Election Day phase of the 2000 presidential election from hanging chads to county wide recounts. We know of the animosity generated between the two campaign camps as illustrated in their legal challenges. We also know about the Supreme Court case Bush v. Gore which ended Bush versus Gore. The bitter 5-4 ruling reflected the divisions within the nation. What is less well known is the continuing impact of this election upon public policy. When the dust had settled on December 13, 2000, Candidate Bush had become President George W. Bush. His congressional coattails were non-existent. His party lost three seats in the U.S. House of Representatives and four seats in the U. S. Senate. The Senate was now evenly split 50 to 50 and both parties had to agree to a power sharing arrangement.11 Within a mere one hundred and thirty –six days from the inauguration the United States Senate made history. Vermont Republican Senator James Jeffords announced that he was switching parties to become an independent. He would vote with the Democrats to effectively give them give control of the Senate. President Bush became the first president in U.S. history to lose party control of one house of Congress between national elections. By all accounts this was a weak presidency with no congressional coattails, a problematic and perhaps non existent mandate and more than half of the transition period lost to a contested presidential election. Presidential public opinion and job approval polls would hover, on average, around 55% until September 11th. It would be hard to cite another president facing such monumental problems of political capital so early in an administration. What type of transition could possibly be salvaged from such circumstances? On the surface it appeared that the transition was disciplined, organized and effective. There is evidence that the Bush II transition was underway in the spring of 1999 under the direction of a Bush II friend and former Yale classmate, Clay Johnson. Plans were undertaken to provide for a successful transition.12 Yet despite the early planning no one could predict the loss of time due to the contested election. On November 26 2000 Bush announced that Vice President designate Dick Cheney would run the transition operation. Cheney immediately attempted to secure a federal facility for transition purposes and to acquire federal funding for the operation. The General Services Administration gave the Bush team a setback when it refused to allow transition funding until there was a clear winner in the presidential contest. This implied that more time would be lost. It was not until November 29 that Cheney secured a private facility from which transition operations could be 10

Ibid. p. 43. Gary C. Jacobson, “A House and Senate Divided: The Clinton Legacy and the Congressional Elections of 2000,” Political Science Quarterly, 116: 5-28. 12 John P. Burke, “The Bush Transition,” in Gary L. Gregg II and Mark J. Rozell, Considering the Bush Presidency (New York: Oxford University Press), 2004 pp.22-25. 11

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conducted. 13 There was another problem. The transition organization employed advisory teams of up to 474 members. These people were to fan out and advise the various bureaucracies on transition appointments. Most of these people were heavy Bush II campaign contributors or people who worked on the transitions of Bush I or President Reagan. Many of these people were also lobbyists or corporate executives. A more select group of 85 transition advisers referred to as a “coordinating “group dealt directly with bureaucratic agencies. This group was comprised of GOP congressional staffers. At this time, Paul Light noted that the lateness of this transition could cause problems due to a nominee’s possible relationship with issues lobbied for by the transition people.14 Generally, President Bush was given a lot of credit for having his cabinet appointees in place early despite the problems surrounding the election. However, the administration was not so effective in filling the top federal posts. In fact the Brookings Institution concluded that, “On average, Bush appointees were confirmed 8.5 months after the inauguration compared to 2.3 months during J.F.K.’s administration.”15 Furthermore, there were many key federal vacancies left unfilled in the administration for up to twenty two months.16 This was well after September 11th. In this environment many Clinton appointees were asked to serve on including Richard A. Clarke at the National Security Council.17 This touched off a mini firestorm of controversy between the new Bush II administration and the conservative interest group community. The infighting at the sub cabinet level was intense and involved controversy over an appointees’ ideology.18 Those especially targeted were Clinton appointees and this controversy well exceeded the month of March in the new administration.19 In fact the phrase “complete and total disarray” was used to describe the first month in Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s office.20 Of course it did not appeal to conservatives that the early Bush Administration was reaching out and discussing cabinet posts with prominent democrats such as Senator John Breaux from Louisiana.21 There were various other things that affected the transition process. For example, there were reports of dirty tricks between the outgoing Clinton Administration and the incoming Bush Administration. There were reports of vandalism attributed to outgoing Clinton aides such as popping all the “W” keys off computer keyboards, the cutting of wires and the appropriating of official signs. All of this had occurred in past administrations and probably was a reflection of the bitter presidential contest but an administration facing a shortened transition did not find any humor in these situations.22 Another subtle indication that things were progressing slowly was a White House web site that was not up to speed as late as April 13

Ibid, p. 26. John Mintz, “Transition Advisers Have Much To Gain,” The Washington Post, January 17, 2001, p. A15. 15 Kathryn Dunn Tenpas and Stephen Hess, “Organizing the Bush Presidency,” in Gary l. Gregg II and Mark J. Rozell, eds. Considering the Bush Presidency (New York: Oxford University Press) 2004, P. 15. 16 Ibid. 17 Al Kamen, “In The Loop,” The Washington Post, January 19, 2001. 18 Steven Mufson, “Republicans At Odds Over Who Is Hired,” The Washington Post, January 31, 2001. 19 Ellen Nakashima, “Clinton Holdovers Targeted: Conservatives Fault Bush Transition Pace,” The Washington Post, March 23, 2001. 20 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon and Schuster), 2004, P. 14. 21 Mike Allen and Dana Milbank, “Bush Reaches Out To Democrats,” The Washington Post, December 15, 2000, p. A1. 22 Mike Allen, “New Administration Cataloguing Pranks,” The Washington Post January 26, 2001, P. A1, 10. 14

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of 2001.23 Finally, there were reports that the White House was having difficulty attracting staffers because they were paying significantly less than Congress.24 All of these problems had effects upon policy but many of these problems did not surface until well after September 11th and the congressional mid term elections. We will consider some of the general problems that can be attributed to newness, haste, hubris and naiveté before we concentrate upon the Iraq policy problem.

GENDERAL PROBLEMS STEMMING FROM THE TRANSITION One of the problems that all incoming presidents face after an inter party changing election is the relationship with the outgoing president. The 2000 presidential election caused bitter feelings between outgoing and incoming administration personnel as illustrated by the “dirty tricks” claim. There was a sense that the Bush II Administration was going to do thing differently than the Clinton Administration. Any Clinton policy advice was suspect. Thus newness and hubris helped to cancel out any benefit of advice derived from the Clinton people. This, would in turn impact policy and affect the tragedy of September 11th.25 Former president Clinton recalls giving incoming President Bush advice concerning terrorism and security issues with Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda at the top of the list. President Bush changed to subject from policy to the nature of the president’s job.26 Again newness, hubris and perhaps a little naiveté were at work here. One way of combating these traits is to think about formal, mandated and structured ties to both incoming and outgoing administrations. The Bush Administration also faced enormous political problems. The 2000 presidential election did not convey a mandate for the policies that the president campaigned for. There was public ambivalence toward the president’s tax cut policies. The president was also declining in the national polls as early summer and fall approached.27 The Administration decided to combat this built in insecurity stemming from the election by pursuing a policy of confrontation with Congress and expending political capital to pass a huge tax cut bill. This strategy, developed in the transition period, would hopefully demonstrate leadership.28 While it was successful in obtaining passage for the tax cut bill the price was the loss of control in the Senate with the Jeffords defection. This endangered the rest of the president’s agenda until September 11th intervened and it cast doubt on the White House staff’s ability to manage political problems. Again newness, hubris, haste and perhaps a little bit of arrogance were at work here. There were also other problems such as the Linda Chavez nomination for the Labor Secretary post which the administration had to rescind. It was blamed on an improper vetting 23

Ben White, “White House Web Site Blasted for too Much White Space,” The Washington Post, April 30 2001. Dana Milbank, “Bush White House So Far: Pinching Pennies and Lips,” The Washington Post, February 9, 2001 P. A27. 25 See Richard A. Clarke’s discussion of this in, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (New York: Free Press), 2004. pp. 225-26. 26 Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf), 2004, P. 935. 27 George C. Edwards III, “Riding High in the Polls,” in Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman, eds., The George Bush Presidency: Appraisals and Prospects (Washington D.C.: CQ Press), 2004, p. 21-23. 28 Colin Campbell, “Managing the Presidency or the President?” in Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman, eds., The George W. Bush Presidency: Appraisals and Prospects (Washington D.C.: CQ Press), 2004, pp. 5-6. 24

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process. There was also the problem concerning the Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill’s financial dealings which received negative press.29 Again, perhaps a vetting problem. Eventually the Enron scandal would catch the Administration by surprise and then there was the matter of the President’s Faith Based Initiatives which went the way of Clinton’s proposed Gays in the Military initiative. 30 All of these problems in some part exhibit traits of newness, haste, hubris and naiveté. Before the tragedy of September 11th the Bush II Administration was facing perceptions of disorganization, contradictory policies and perhaps general incompetence. The shortened transition period was causing difficulties. Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill observed these problems first hand. In describing the early internal battles within the Administration over Iraq he observed: ….George W. Bush was just learning the issues. Surround a president like that with one of the most experience-heavy teams of any recent administration, and you have senior officials both formulating and, in some cases, conducting U.S. policy. It was a broken process, O’Neill thought, or rather no process at all; there seemed to be no 31 apparatus to assess policy and deliberate effectively, to create coherent governance.

This observation occurred in the first month of the new administration. With the shortened transition there were pressures to at least get the senior cabinet level posts appointed. Haste was at work here. Most observers agreed that the cabinet secretaries were accomplished conservatives and quite a diverse group.32 However, it seemed that very little attention was paid to exactly how they fit together and how they would interact together. In fact, both the President and Vice President may have placed a premium on early nominations of respected people above all else. For example, main stream economic conservatives like Paul O’Neill were mixed in with hard line supply siders like Larry Lindsay and Glenn Hubbard. Amazingly O’Neill tried to warn both Vice President Cheney and President Bush about this when he read them a list of reasons why he should not be considered for the Treasury post. He told them of his work on global climate change, of his independent mind, of his call for a 50 cent per gallon increase in the cost of gasoline, of his avocation for the development of alternative energy sources, of his frankness. He was essentially telling them that he may not be ideologically compatible with them or their administration. They did not care. They wanted him anyway.33 They needed him and his public portfolio, his integrity, his reputation especially now after such an election, such a transition. How he would fit when making policy would come later. The same could be said of Secretary of State Colin Powell who was known as a cautious man especially when it came to war. The result was economic policy in large part based upon tax cuts that were not well thought out. In fact, O’Neill and Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan entered into a pact to promote the congressional passage of economic triggers if the tax cut bill led to deficits. They lost by only one vote in the Senate 5- to 49. This was an extraordinary undertaking. The 29

For a discussion of this see Ron Suskind, The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House and the education of Paul O’Neill (New York: Simon and Schuster), 2004, pp. 157-59. 30 For a discussion of the Faith Based Initiatives see, Ibid. p. 170. 31 Ibid. p. 97. 32 Dana Milbank, “3 Nominees Round Out Diverse Cabinet,” The Washington Post, January 3, 2001, p. A1. 33 Suskind, The Price of Loyalty, pp. 26-27.

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President’s own Treasury Secretary and the Federal Reserve Chair altering the President’s economic policy for the good of the nation. This was an extremely deep division early in the administration directly traceable to a high level appointment.34 The drama does not end there. O’Neill describes deep division in environmental policies. For example former New Jersey Governor Christie Todd Whitman as Environmental Protection Agency chief argued against withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol and for stronger measures to combat global warming. 35 There were also divisions in health care policy especially concerning the now famous stem cell divisions.36 Perhaps to combat these divisions O’Neill describes the stacking of task forces and commissions such as Vice President’s Cheney’s Energy Task Force and the Social Security Commission with right wing conservatives.37 Thus while divisions persisted throughout these various policy areas the eventual adopted policies were foreordained. In addition to these problems the president, according to O’Neill, seemed disengaged from the details of policy. There was a lack of attention to detail or in acquisitiveness. It seemed as though the president was starting from scratch on most issues. Therefore he ceded authority to others. 38 Was it possible that the short transition and controversial election lead to a small circle of ideological advisers? Were appointments like Powell, O’Neill, Whitman, Minetta (at Transportation) a cover for ideological policy making in the economic, environmental, health care and foreign policy areas? Or was it more basic than that. Did newness, haste, hubris and naiveté contribute to such divisions and lengthen the president’s learning curve? Did it inhibit him from making competent decision making? In short was it ideology or incompetence or was it both? We will see some of the same divisions and problems in the foreign policy area especially concerning the Bush II Administration’s Iraqi policy.

THE BUSH TRANSITION AND FOREIGN POLICY In foreign policy the George W. Bush administration addressed two crises where the dynamics of the transition process influenced the decisions made: the emergency landing of an American surveillance aircraft in China after a mid air collision with a Chinese fighter and the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. They present an interesting juxtaposition of cases. In the first crisis the president emerged as a “deal-maker” and not a “confrontation-seeker.”39 In the second crisis the imagery is reversed as his administration almost from the outset looked to expand the War on Terrorism to Iraq on questionable intelligence.40 34

Ibid. p. 40. Ibid. pp. 121-123. 36 For a discussion of this see, Anthony J. Eksterowicz and Nancy B. Eksterowicz, “ Pain Care and Stem Cells: The Effect of Political Ideology on the Patient Centered Paradigm of Health Care,” Paper delivered at the Annual Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, January 7-10,2004. 37 Suskind, The Price of Loyalty, pp. 152-56. 38 Ibid .p. 126. 39 William Schneider, “Bush Wins ‘Lets Make A Deal,” The National Journal April 21, 2001, p. 1194. 40 Glenn Hastedt, “Public Intelligence,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, forthcoming. 35

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The first foreign policy crisis for the new administration began on March 31, 2001 and has now become all but forgotten after the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Not even 100 days into his presidency George W. Bush was forced to respond to an international incident in Asia. A U.S. naval surveillance plane collided with a Chinese fighter in international waters over the South China Sea. The U.S. plane and its crew of twenty-four landed safely in China. China blamed the incident on the United States and demanded a formal apology for the collision and the death of a Chinese pilot. The Bush administration refused to apologize (instead it expressed regret over the incident). It blamed the collision on China and demanded the release of the American crew and the damaged plane. The president warned that China’s refusal to act could harm U.S.-Chinese relations. The “failure of the Chinese government to react promptly to our request…is inconsistent with the expressed desire of both our countries for better relations.”41 Bush took no questions in demanding a “prompt” return of the plane and crew. The president was determined to keep a low profile public stance mindful of how the Carter presidency had become engulfed and tarred by the steady stream of attention focused on the White House by the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979. This, his first public statement on the issue, came on April 2. He also continued his schedule of public appearances. The administration further sought to reduce the scope of the crisis a few days later. On April 4 Secretary of State Colin Powell spoke of U.S. regret and sorrow over the death of the Chinese fighter pilot. On April 5, White House press secretary Ari Fleischer stated the 24 Americans held in China are not hostages. They were not even “detainees.” “The president refers to them as servicemen and women.” A navy spokesperson said the plane was not a spy plane but a surveillance aircraft.42 Relations stiffened on April 9 when the United States failed to send representatives to the Chinese Embassy when it hosted a reception for the new Chinese ambassador to the United States. The next day President Bush warned that “diplomacy takes time” but also warned that at some point “our relations with China become damaged.” At the same time the Pentagon moved to document that fault lay with the Chinese pilot for the collision.43 The situation soon improved, however, as compromise wording was found that would bring about the release of the American crew. On April 12, after Bush approved a communiqué to China in which the U.S. stated it was “very sorry” over the loss of the Chinese pilot’s life, China released the 24 American service people. It would be July 5 before the fuselage and other parts of the American plane would return to the United States. The decision-making dynamics of the crisis supports evidence of many of the traits that would come to be associated with the Bush Administration’s handling of foreign policy. First, Bush appears to have set the broad parameters of the policy (that it was a diplomatic problem) and then delegated to others the responsibility for follow through with the State Department taking the organization lead in the crisis. His personal involvement appears to have been highly selective determining that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld should not speak out on the issue for fear of inflaming the situation by inquiring if the pilots had bibles, were getting enough exercise and were staying in the equivalent of officer’s quarters. Second, Bush 41

David E. Sanger, “Bush is Demanding A Prompt Return of Plane and Crew,” The New York Times, April 3, 2001, p. 1. 42 Dana Milbank, “No Spies, No Incident, No Apology,” The Washington Post, April 5, 2001, C1. 43 Mike Allen and Steven Mufson, “Bush Backs Diplomacy,” The Washington Post, April 10, 2001, A1.

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demanded loyalty from those involved in the decision stressing “we don’t need to be pointing fingers.” Third, Bush created a crisis management group to coordinate U.S. policy. It was composed of Powell, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, “Scooter” Libby, Vice President Cheney’s chief of staff, national security advisors Condloeezza Rice, her deputy Stephen Hadley, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Finally, Bush demonstrated his penchant for conceptualizing complex foreign policy problems in stark black and white language that appealed to his conservative political base in the U.S. but played out poorly abroad. In late April the United States announced an offer to sell a major arms package to Taiwan. This action had been contemplated during the crisis as a means of showing U.S. displeasure with Chinese intransigence in returning the 24 Americans. China was known to oppose the sale. The day after it was announced, Bush proclaimed the United States would do “whatever it took” to defend Taiwan. Questions immediately arose both in China and the United States as to whether the president was signaling a fundamental shift in U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan which has been deliberately ambiguous about how it would respond to such a clash. The administration quickly put out the word that no change in policy was contained in the president’s comments. Not unexpectedly George W. Bush’s initial inclination was to pursue a foreign policy that was “anything but Clinton”44 And, Bush had heavily criticized Clinton for his failure to pursue a more aggressive policy toward China. This impulse should have directed Bush to take a more unbending stance toward China in this crisis. This did not happen because this impulse was offset by the halting and incomplete nature of the foreign policy transition process, most notably the failure to put his “team” in place and translate this impulse into policy. Secretary of State Powell’s isolation in the administration is frequently noted. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay note that he was on the defensive from the outset of the administration and that his pragmatic approach to foreign policy had no support in the national security bureaucracy that was staffed by allies of Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.45 At this point, however, it is important to recognize that this isolation, especially within the State Department, was incomplete. It was not until May 11 that John Bolton was sworn in as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. Bolton was forced upon Powell. Prior to coming into the administration he was an outspoken defender of Taiwan who wanted to see the United States recognize it as an independent state and opposed the one China policy. As a member of the Bush administration he would take a hard line stance against North Korea. Similarly, it was not until April 30 that Bush introduced Clark Randt as his choice for ambassador to China. It was Clinton’s ambassador, Joseph Prueher, who served as the Bush administration’s eyes and ears in China during the crisis. Prueher was cited as having played an important role in urging the Bush administration to ease tensions and seek a diplomatic solution.46 Also contributing to the nonconfrontational manner in which the crisis was resolved was the desire of hawkish members of the Bush administration to separate themselves from previous Republican administrations much as Clinton appointees sought to distance 44

Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, America Unbound (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2003), p. 37. Ibid., pp. 58-59. 46 Steven Mufson and Dana Milbank, “Diplomats Resurgent in Bush’s 1st Test,” The Washington Post, April 13, A1. 45

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themselves from Carter foreign policy experts. In this case it led them to endorse Powell’s efforts at a diplomatic solution in order to “prevent Bush from calling on people from his father’s and other GOP administrations whom the hard liners regard as too eager to accommodate China.”47 This failure to pursue a more aggressive policy toward China in the crisis did not go unnoticed. Frank Gaffney, a Pentagon official under Reagan, predicted during the crisis that Bush’s failure to take a tougher line with China would be the “end of the Bush honeymoon with conservatives who believed that China was a real threat. He observed “there is a growing restiveness among conservatives, who feel he is giving these guys a pass.”48 Viewed in combination with the timing of the above appointments, Bush’s unqualified pro-Taiwan statement that occurred at the end of the crisis and almost set of another crisis is consistent with proclivity of presidents to view foreign policy decisions largely in the context of domestic politics. It was an attempt to reconnect with his conservative political base. Generally speaking Bush received high marks for his nonconfrontational handling of the crisis. Yet to the surprise of many the China problem was not an accurate barometer of how he and his administration would handle the next foreign policy crisis to confront it. No one was surprised by the swift military response against al Qaeda and its Taliban benefactors in Afghanistan for the September 11 terrorist attacks. What was surprising was the quick embrace of Iraq as an enemy. The transition dynamics we have identified provide us with insight into why this was the case. The second major foreign policy decision of the Bush administration that clearly was affected by the transition was the War on Terrorism.49 Linkages between the two are evident in three areas. The first involves the nature of the collaboration between the outgoing Clinton administration and the incoming Bush administration. While the 9/11 Commission did not single out either the outgoing Clinton administration or the incoming George W. Bush administration for responsibility in failing to avert the tragedy of September 11 we can find signs of impending problems in the transition period. Most strikingly, the two sides have different memories about the urgency of the terrorist problem facing the country in 2000. During the presidential campaign and the transition George W. Bush and his key advisors all received intelligence briefings. One hour of an early September briefing was devoted to terrorism. After the election the CIA set up an office in Crawford, Texas to brief the president-elect. At one briefing in Washington Bush asked if the CIA could kill bin Laden. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet replied this would not end the threat. Rice and Vice-President elect Dick Cheney were also at this two and one half hour meeting. They were told bin Laden was a “tremendous” and “immediate threat” and that his group was coming at the United States again. Along with weapons of mass destruction and China, bin Laden was presented as one of the three top challenges facing the U.S. Also in December Bush met with Clinton for a two hour one-on-one discussion of foreign policy. Recollections of the meeting differ. Clinton recalls saying one of his great regrets was not getting bin Laden. Bush is sure Clinton said something about terrorism but does not remember much being said about al Qaeda. In early January Dick Clarke who spearheaded 47

Ibid. Allen and Mufson, “Bush Backs Diplomacy.” 49 Material in this section is drawn from The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: Norton, 2004) and The 9/11 Investigations (New York: Public Affairs Reports, 2004). 48

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Clinton’s anti-terrorism effort and would be asked to stay on in the Bush administration briefed Rice, Cheney and his top aide, along with Secretary of State designate Colin Powell on terrorism. Clinton’s national security advisor Sandy Berger recalls stopping by at the meeting to stress the importance of the issue and telling Rice she would spend more time on terrorism in general and al Qaeda in particular than on any other issue. Rice remembers there being less of an emphasis on these issues in the discussion. A second area of linkage between the transition process and the War on Terrorism is found in the pace of decision making on terrorism in the new administration. It was not as high a priority for the incoming George W. Bush administration as was China, missile defense, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East peace process. While the new administration retained Clinton’s key antiterrorism advisor, Richard Clarke, and his staff it altered its place in the national security decision making process downward. He reported to the Deputies Committee chaired by national Security advisor Condoleezza Rice’s top aide Stephen Hadley rather than directly to the Principles Committee made up of the key national security secretaries and chaired by Rice. Clarke objected to the move. Rice justified it as necessary to place the administration’s counterterrorism efforts in broader context. One of Rice’s first acts was to request her NSC staff to identify major policy reviews or initiatives. Clarke submitted a memo January 25, 2001 offering plans drawn up but not approved in December 2000 and 1998. Clarke also asked on several occasions for an early Principles Meeting where he could present information on al Qaeda. In one early request he stated such a meeting as “urgently’ needed. No Principles Meeting was held on the subject until September 4, 2001. Formal and informal meetings were held to discuss terrorism below this level. In March Hadley met with a group to discuss action against al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the drafting of a new presidential directive on terrorism. One point of dispute in the deliberations of the Deputies Committee chaired by Hadley which had jurisdiction on Afghanistan centered on the administration’s desire to have a policy in place on Afghanistan and Pakistan before dealing with al Qaeda and Clarke’s desire to move forward separately on these matters. He felt linking them had slowed down the decision making process too much. On April 30 the CIA briefed the Deputies Committee and described al Qaeda as “the most dangerous group we are facing.” One of the slides warned “there will be more attacks.” In May Rice reported that Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet briefed the president on the terrorist threat. Bush expressed impatience with “swatting flies” and wished to go on the offensive. This led Clarke and the NSC staff to put forward a broad policy initiative to eliminate al Qaeda. Hadley circulated it for comment as “an admittedly ambitious program.” Also in May Bush announced that Vice President Dick Cheney would lead a review of preparations for managing a possible weapons of mass destruction attack. The next few months were spent organizing the inquiry. In early August the CIA prepared an analysis of how terrorists might attack the U.S. for inclusion in the President’s Daily Brief of August 6. This was done in response to periodic questions by the president if any of this information pointed to an attack on the United States. Rice and Hadley also reviewed a draft presidential directive on al Qaeda. Rice felt it was “very good” and scheduled it to be discussed at the Principles Group meeting of September 4 before going forward to George W. Bush. Before that meeting took place Clarke wrote to Rice about his frustrations with the pace of decision making and urged policy makers to “imagine a day after a terrorist attack, with hundreds of Americans dead at home and abroad.”

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Rice chaired the September 4 meeting and according to the 9/11 Commission the draft presidential directive that called for expanded covert operations against al Qaeda was apparently approved. On September 10 Hadley’s committee met to finalize their recommendations for a three phase, multi year plan to bring down the Taliban leadership. Three factors appear to have influenced the slow pace of decision making. The first two are linked. Richard Posner asserts that by the time the Bush administration took office “bin Laden fatigue” had set in.50 He sees the Clinton administration has having tired of attempting to capture or kill Osama bin Laden in spite of the warnings it passed on to the Bush administration. Second, rather than taking up the challenge as Clarke sought the new administration was determined to pursue an “anything but Clinton” foreign policy. Since neither of these traits, the exhaustion of an outgoing administration nor the desire of the incoming administration to distance itself from its predecessor are unique to Clinton and Bush, the situation points to the need for an improved method for linking the outgoing and incoming foreign policy teams. Third, the slow pace of decision making is consistent with the overconfidence and self-centeredness of a new administration. Absent in all accounts of pre 9/11 Bush administration deliberations on terrorism is a sense of urgency. The unstated assumption was that the world would wait for the United States to select its strategy and then respond. No consideration was given to the possibility that the new administration might have to adopt a policy on the timetable of others. While it is not unique to the Bush administration this conviction is startling and shows the difficulty that new administrations have in learning given that it had already experienced one foreign policy crisis that caught it off guard. The third area of linkage between the War on Terrorism and the transition is the expansion of that war to include Iraq. Paul O’Neill is not alone in commenting on how quickly, and for many how unexpectedly, Iraq emerged as a prime target in the War on Terrorism after the 9/11 attacks.51 Transition dynamics shed light on how this was possible. New administrations tend to be drawn to campaign rhetoric and position papers in formulating their positions on issues rather than relying upon policy analysis carried out by their newly inherited foreign policy establishment. In the 2000 presidential election references to terrorism, much less Iraq, were few in number. Yet, one does not have to look too far in the past to find a clearly articulated strategy for linking Iraq and terrorism. Five years earlier, Richard Pearle, Douglas Feith, and David Wurmser produced a think piece for Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. One of its recommendations was the removal of Saddam Hussein from power as a necessary step in making the Middle East less hostile to Israel.52 In waging war against Saddam Hussein, they recommended that Israel invoke a policy of preemption, striking first in self defense. The planning document even contained recommended text for a media campaign, language that appeared in the Bush administration’s public statements after 9/11. In the Bush administration Pearle was head of the Defense Policy Review Board, Feith was Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, and Wursmer was Cheney’s top Middle East expert. Somewhat earlier Paul Wolfowitz presented two arguments that bear on this decision. James Mann labels them the Strength Hypothesis and the Follower Hypothesis. Wolfowitz, a 50

Richard Posner, “The 9/11 Report: A Dissent,” The York Times Book Review, August 29, 2004, p. 9. Ron Suskind, The Price of Loyalty (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), p. 188. 52 The study is entitled “Clean Break” and is discussed in James Bamford, A Pretext for War (New York: Doubleday, 2004). 51

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vocal opponent of Clinton’s foreign policy, argued in 1997 that the reason America’s allies were reluctant to follow Clinton’s policy against Iraq was because they perceived that the administration was weak. He continued that if the United States led with strength others would follow. “A willingness to act unilaterally can be the most effective way of securing collective action.”53 Here again is evidence of the pull of partisan pre-presidency thinking about foreign policy that becomes the basis for a new administration’s foreign policy due to the failure to make a transition from the politics of campaigning to the politics of governing.

CONCLUSION The two foreign policy crises illustrate lessons that can be applied to presidential transitions. During the China crisis the Bush Administration’s foreign policy team was not fully in place. Therefore there was significant collaboration and learning with and from the remnants of the Clinton foreign policy team. This helped to mitigate the problems of newness, haste, hubris and perhaps arrogance displayed by all new incoming presidential administrations. By the time the decision to invade Iraq came around the new Bush foreign policy team was fully in place and previous administration voices like Richard Clarke had been marginalized. Valuable information was not heard or ignored. Put another way, newness, haste and hubris had been institutionalized. How do we combat these trends and lay the foundation for smoother transitions? After all in our modern ear American national security is at stake. First, all incoming presidential administrations should understand that outgoing administrations have valuable information especially in the foreign policy realm. These administrations should be used as valuable resources. Second, having stated the obvious, the real problem is obtaining the cooperation of administrations that may be of different political parties. We can call for greater cooperation through such suggestions as incoming and outgoing staff to staff contact concerning domestic, international and national security issues, a reduction of political rhetoric between administrations and respect for a common mission for the nation but it is our judgment that these pleas will most likely fall on deaf ears. The ideological divide between the parties is probably too great to bridge without some formal help. That help comes in the form of legislation. The 9/11 Commission reviewed problems of transition. They noted the different styles between the Clinton and Bush Administrations.54 However, in their recommendations concerning presidential transitions they essentially focused on methods for improving the appointment process by speeding up the process. 55 One wonders how a quicker appointment process would have affected the China crisis? We believe that greater collaboration, education, and information exchanges are part of the answer between incoming and outgoing administrations especially those of differing political parties. How do we get them to work together? The Congress has a role here. It is our contention that diverse administrations will not naturally want to work together therefore they should be mandated by legislation to do so. 53 54

James Mann, “Bush Wanted His Doctrine And the Allies, Too,” The Washington Post, March 16, 2003, B1. The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 198-203

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The Congress has done this in the past by funding presidential transitions. It can do so again. What specifically would be required? First, Congress should establish and mandate a process for greater staff to staff level contact between outgoing and incoming administrations in the vital international, domestic and national security areas. These contacts should be a matter of public record (with the usual precautions for national security matters) and the Congress should provide funding for these contacts. Some of this funding is already in place under the Presidential Transition Act. Second, the Congress should establish and fund a bipartisan presidential transition commission .This commission would conduct research into presidential transition problems, fund seminars for potential presidential transition advisers and generally serve as a resource base or library of information on the perils of presidential transitions. The commission would be active before, during and after presidential transitions. Such a commission could form educational alliances with existing university organizations and think tanks currently researching these issues. Previous participants in presidential transitions could also serve as valuable resources for such a commission. Presidential transitions can be difficult periods for our nation. We must begin the process of systematically examining these periods with the aim of strengthening them. Wishing and hoping that they will get better by merely providing suggestions is entirely inadequate. Any suggestion must be backed with the full force of funding and mandated legislation. Nothing less than our national security is at stake.

55

Ibid., 422-423.

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 91-99

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

THE WHITE HOUSE BUDGET – WHAT IT ISN’T, WHAT IT IS: AND A FIVE-YEAR COMPARISON

Bradley H. Patterson ABSTRACT Presidents have an aversion to revealing the actual size and expense of the modern White House staff, and political scientists have not paid much attention to the question of how much it costs to operate that institution, including where the operating funds come from. This article sets forth the parts of the White House budget which are public, lays out the figures showing the changes in the past five years, and discusses the much larger portion of the White House finances which are partly or fully concealed. It further describes reform proposals President Bush is trying to make in his own backyard and illustrates congressional relationships related to White House appropriations.

INTRODUCTION What is, and how much is, the White House budget? At the outset, three clarifications are in order: (A) as used here, the term “White House” refers not to the building (the official name of which is “the Executive Residence”) but refers to the presidential staff; (B) the “White House,” the personal staff for the president is part of, but different from the institutional staff of the president which is called the Executive Office of the President; and, (C) even the body of people called “White House” has two meanings:

“White House” Defined Definition one: the White House staff community is a group of at least 133 separately identifiable units in which some six thousand men and women directly serve the presidency. Besides the well-known elements; such as the Chief of Staff, National Security Adviser, Senior Political Adviser, this staff community also includes the Office of the Vice President, the very large White House Military Office, the presidential and vice-presidential protective units of the U.S. Secret Service, teams from the National Park Service, from the General Services Administration, and from the U. S. Post Service, dozens of detailees from other

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federal agencies, plus the White House interns, White House Fellows and the many White House volunteers.1 Definition two: the elements publicly labeled as “White House” in the president’s annual budget presentation made to the Congress include a narrower portion of the 133, i.e. only: ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ

Compensation of the President The White House Office The Executive Residence (Operating outlays plus funds for Repair and Restoration The Office of Policy Development (which includes the Domestic and Economic Councils and the National AIDS Policy Coordinator) The National Security Council (i.e. the staff of the NSC) The Office of Homeland Security (i.e. the staff of the new Homeland Security Council) Unanticipated Needs of the President The Office of Administration (in its entirety) The Council of Economic Advisers

In the author’s judgment, the Council of Economic Advisers, an institution established by statute in 1946, is not part of the White House, and more properly should be categorized as an element of the Executive Office of the President. Likewise, only about one-half of the personnel in the Office of Administration directly serve the president; the other half should be considered as part of the Executive Office. The author also maintains that, today, the Office of the Vice President is so closely joined into the White House community that its outlays, for staff costs and for residence expenses, should be counted in the White House total. The other major elements which make up the Executive Office of the President, i.e., the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), the Office Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), and the Council on Environmental Policy (CEQ), are institutional rather than personal presidential staff, and are not included in either of the two definitions of “White House.”

THE WHITE HOUSE BUDGET THAT ISN’T The expenses of the White House in definition one are quite complex, and are largely concealed from the public. The White House Military Office is financed by the Department of Defense; the costs of its eleven sub-elements (e.g. the White House Communications Agency, Air Force One, Camp David) are embedded in a plethora of Department of Defense accounts, some of them classified. The outlays for the presidential/vice presidential protective operations of the U.S. Secret Service (itself now part of the Department of Homeland Security) are kept confidential for 1

Each of these White House elements is described in the author’s book The White House Staff: Inside the West Wing and Beyond (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, paperback edition, 2001.

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security reasons. The contributions of the National Park Service, General Services Administration, Postal Service, and of several other departments such as State, and the National Archives, are found only within the accounts of those respective agencies. The salaries of the many detailees serving at the White House are buried in the budgets of the multitude of agencies from which those detailees originate. An example of this multi-compartmented puzzle is the cost of presidential travel. President Clinton, for instance, made trips to Africa, Chile and China in 1998. Three senators asked the General Accounting Office to add up the expenses. For the African trip alone, the GAO reported, fourteen federal agencies supplied support for the president, thirteen of them contributing services costing $42,805,992;. the fourteenth agency, the Secret Service, citing national security concerns, refused, even to the General Accounting Office, to reveal its support costs – which were undoubtedly quite large.2 In his 2001 book, The White House Staff: Inside the West Wing and Beyond, the author assayed an estimate of all of these concealed or semi-concealed outlays for the whole White House staff community. His addition, for FY 2001, totaled $730,500,000. It is almost certainly much more today. Readers may share the author’s surprise to discover that no office in Washington even attempts to identify and assemble all of these White House expenditures to put together, analyze and evaluate a budget for the whole White House, broadly defined. This is not done in the White House itself, not in the Office of Administration, not in the Office of Management and Budget, and not anywhere in the Congress or by its General Accounting Office.

THE WHITE HOUSE BUDGET THAT IS This article focuses on the budget for the White House elements in definition two; that. within the White House, the budget process for its internal units is initially managed by the Assistant to the President for Management and Administration ; an office which had its beginnings under President Carter. This officer balances the always insistent requests from senior White House colleagues that expansion of their staffs is indispensable, with the equally insistent hope by every president that his staff will appear to be modest in size and parsimonious in expenditures. As a campaigner, Mr. Clinton, unwisely, promised to cut his staff by 25 percent. The Chief of Staff, and the President, finally weigh in; the resulting figures for the White House are put into the budget format by the staff of the Office of Administration. The requests for appropriations are then published in the comprehensive appendix to the president’s annual budget, and are also described in detail in a separate document entitled Congressional Budget Submission (for FY 2005 it is 269 pages) which covers not only the White House units, but also all the institutions in the Executive Office of the President.

2

U.S. General Accounting Office: Costs and Accounting For the President’s 1998 Trips to Africa, Chile and China, Report Number GAO/NSIAD-99-164, September, 1999.

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Bradley H. Patterson Table. The Budget Of The White House (As appropriated; for FY 2005, as requested)

President White House Office Executive Residence Vice President Office of Policy Development National Security Council ½ of the Office of Administration Unanticipated Needs Subtotal White House Office of Homeland Security Total (Patterson definition of “White House”) Council of Economic Advisers Other ½ of the Office of Administration Vice President Alternate Total (“White House” as defined in the Budget Presentation

FY 2001

FY2002

FY 2003

FY 2004

FY 2005

390,000 53,288,000 10,900,000 986,000 3,673,000 354,000 4,032,000

450,000 54,611,000 11,686,000 8,618,000 3,922,000 318,000 3,514,000

450,000 50,385,000 12,149,000 1,192,000 4,040,000 322,000 3,230,000

450,000 69,168,000 12,501,000 4,225,000 4,461,000 331,000 4,109,000

450,000 63,698,0003 12,760,000 1,900,000 4,571,000 333,000 3,592,000

7,165,000

7,488,000

7,770,000

10,551,000

8,932,000

21,868,500

46,955,9004

45,455,000

41,413,0005

42,838,000

1,000,000

1,000,000

1,000,000

1,000,000

1,000,000

103,638,500 0

138,562,000 26,955,1006

125,993,000 19,398,000

148,209,000 (7,231,000)

140,074,000 (7,300,000)7

103,638,500

165,518,000

145,391,000

148,209,000

140,074,000

+ 4,110,000

+ 4,208,000

+ 3,739,000

+ 4,502,000

+ 4,904,000

+ 21,868,000

+ 46,955,900

+ 45,455,000

+ 41,413,000

+ 42,838,000

- 4,027,000 125,589,000

- 4,243,000 212,438,900

- 4,390,000 190,195,000

- 4,792,000 189,332,0008

- 4,904,000 182,048,0009

The table above identifies the nine elements which, in the author’s judgment, constitute, in reality, the contemporary White House staff. These do include the Office of the Vice President but only half of the Office of Administration. In a complementary section, the table 3

This figure represents an increase, from FY 2004, for the White House Office, of $1,394,000 in personnel Costs and $1,744,000 in other expenses, but these increases are offset by some $8,411,000 in rental costs (for those White House Office units which are located in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building) and by other related charges which have been moved out of the White House Office budget into the Office of Administration accounts. 4 Of which $23,044,900 came in an FY 2002 Homeland Security supplemental. 5 Some $8,209,000 of OA’s total FY 2004 budget has subsequently been transferred out to the Office of Management and Budget accounts. The FY 2005 OA request includes $11,337,000 in incoming transfers, including the $8,411,000 referred to in endnote “a.” 6 Estimated; included in the OA budget as part of the FY 2002 Homeland Security supplemental. 7 The FY 2005 figure is an estimate by the author; the White House no longer publishes it. Both the FY 2004 and 2005 White House Homeland Security outlays are included in the respective White House Office accounts. 8 This total differs from the official figure of $179,615,000 due in part to the $11.3 million in transfers mentioned in endnote “c.” 9 The apparent reduction from the FY 2004 total is achieved by the $8,209,000 transfer to OMB .

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goes on to add in the Council of Economic Advisers, and the other half of the Office of Administration, and subtracts the vice presidential amount, yielding as a result the total which is used in the administration’s official budget presentation under the label “The White House.” The table displays the funds actually appropriated for the final budget of the Clinton White House (FY 2001), and for the first three years of President George W. Bush’s administration (FYs 2002-3-4). The last column represents President Bush’s FY 2005 request.

ANALYSIS AND OBSERVATIONS Even after transferring $8.2 million out of the White House accounts to the OMB appropriation, the publicly presented White House budget has increased by 44.9 percent over the last five years. A major increase occurred between FY 2000 and FY 2001 reflecting the emergency supplemental appropriation for homeland security; an enterprise which at that time took the form of a new, large element in the White House Office, created by Executive Order 13228 of October 8, 2001, and headed by former Governor Tom Ridge. By FY 2004, $16.8 million, and much of the personnel of that office had been switched to the new Department of Homeland Security, but a 66-person unit, including the staff of the Homeland Security Council, still stays within the White House. Reviewing the president’s FY 2004 request for that staff group, the House Appropriations Subcommittee opined that it was not clear what work remains that cannot be effectively performed by the Department of Homeland Security. Although the Committee understands the President’s need for policy support and advice, it is not clear why that would require 66 staff, given the existence and 10 support of the Department of Homeland Security.

The Committee recommended reducing the White House Homeland Security Office budget to $4,120,000, but in the final FY appropriations bill (HR 2673) this allocation was restored to $7,231,000. At it’s April 1, 2004 hearing on the FY 2005 request, the House Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman again raised the question of whether the White House itself needed such a large Office of Homeland Security in view of the creation of the amalgamation known as the Department of Homeland Security, and also in view of the coordinating responsibilities vested in the National Security Council. In response, the administration’s principal witness explained that there are agencies outside the national security community, e.g. Agriculture, Interior, which perform functions vital for homeland security. Effective interagency coordination must reach out to include them as well. Comparing the final year of the Clinton administration (FY 2001) with the upcoming year under President George W. Bush (FY 2005), we see that the “White House Office” budget rises by 19.5 percent, the vice president’s office by 21.8 percent, the National Security Council by 10.7 percent, and the White House-related half of the Office of Administration by 96 percent. 10

U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session, Committee on Appropriations, Report Number 108-243 re the Departments of Transportation and Treasury and Independent Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2004, July 30, 2003, 163

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In the author’s judgment, these increases are neither surprising nor unjustified. They reflect the increasingly centralized responsibilities and activities of the contemporary president and vice president, especially in a time of serious and unique national security threat.

THE PRESIDENT’S PROPOSED BUDGET REFORMS Beginning with his FY 2003 budget published in January, 2002, President Bush requested Congress give him more flexibility in managing the budgets both of his personal (White House) and of his institutional (Executive Office) units.11 First, he asked for authority to consolidate common functions within his own White House elements. Procurement and management of information technology, rent, printing and reproduction, supplies, materials and equipment had heretofore been separately conducted by each element; standardization suffered; costs were unnecessarily high. It was thought that consolidation would permit economies of scale. The appropriations subcommittees agreed, and earmarked some $13 million (plus another $8 million from OMB) for a pilot program of consolidation, to be run by the Office of Administration. This initiative was endorsed by the House Appropriations Subcommittee in its report on the FY 2004 appropriations legislation. As the FY 2005 request was being compiled, it turned out that the greatest economies in costs, and in administrative effectiveness were to be found in consolidating the handling of rents and of telecommunications expenses. In FY 2005, what is now called the “Core Enterprise Pilot Program” will focus on these two areas, and funds will be transferred from White House and Executive Office accounts to the Office of Administration to effect the consolidation. Second, President Bush asked Congress in his FY 2003 budget for a loosening of the strictures which deprive him of financial flexibility in his own budgetary backyard. He wanted to be able to “respond rapidly to fluid situations” and to “address emerging priorities and shifting demands.”12 At present, he cannot reprogram outlays within any one of those White House accounts by more than ten percent without giving 15 days advance notice to, and getting the imprimatur of, the House and Senate appropriations subcommittees; and he cannot transfer monies among those accounts without asking Congress to pass separate legislation in each instance. President Bush requested that he be given a blanket ten percent transfer authority among seven of the Executive Office appropriations: the White House Office, OMB, USTR, ONDCP, CEQ, OSTP and the Vice President’s Office too (with the approval of the vice president.) The appropriations committees would simply be given advance notice. Third, the president recommended that several of the White House accounts “that directly support the president’s executive role” actually be merged. His request was to lump together the planned outlays for the Compensation of the President, the White House Office (including the Homeland Security monies), the Executive Residence (including its Repair and Restoration funds), the Office of Policy Development, the Council of Economic Advisers, the 11 12

U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget Appendix, The Budget for Fiscal Year 2003, 882 Executive Office of the President, Fiscal Year 2005 Congressional Budget Submission, March 2004, 3.

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National Security Council and the Office of Administration into a single appropriation which would be labeled “The White House.” The President said in his FY 2004 budget: “This initiative provides enhanced flexibility in allocating resources and staff in support of the President and Vice President, and permits more rapid response to changing needs and priorities.”13

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON THE WHITE HOUSE BUDGET The initial and principal responsibility in the Congress for analyzing the budget submissions of the White House lies in the appropriations subcommittees; in the House the Subcommittee on Transportation, Treasury and Independent Agencies (chaired by Congressman Istook of Oklahoma with Congressman John Olver of Massachusetts as the ranking minority member), and in the Senate the Subcommittee on Transportation, Treasury and General Government (chaired by Senator Shelby of Alabama with Senator Murray of Washington the ranking minority member). Since the House of Representatives originates appropriations legislation, the House subcommittee acts first. A hearing is held, usually in the early spring, and it is the Director of the Office of Administration who is the principal witness. Members of the subcommittees have been known to fuss about the absence, at the witness table, of any of those very White House officers whose expenditures are being reviewed, but President Bush hews to the traditional rule that White House staffers do not (except in the rare instances of alleged criminality or scandal or, as in the recent case of Condoleeza Rice, of overwhelming political pressure, formally testify before congressional committees. On one occasion in 1997, the House Subcommittee was criticizing the division of the entertainment expenses of the White House between “official” and “political.” Finally the Assistant to the President for Management and Administration brought the White House Chief Usher (who manages the Residence) up to the Hill, and had him explain informally to subcommittee members that “the eggs in this soufflé were billed to the State Department because it was for an international dinner, but the eggs in this souffle…” There is a certain comity which is generally observed between the Congress and the president about the budgets of their respective institutions. OMB does not review, and the president does not comment on the budget of the legislative branch. For their part, the congressional appropriations subcommittees’ hearings on the White House budget submission are businesslike; the amounts requested are often approved without change. A few questions are directed at the OA witnesses, and follow-up answers are prepared; the hearings transcripts are later published. The House Subcommittee held its hearing for the FY 2005 White House budget request on April 1, 2004. Only three of the 15 subcommittee members attended, however, and the audience in the hearing room totaled 5. In some years (including the spring of 2004), the Senate subcommittee does not even hold hearings on the Executive Office request. The subject of the White House budget is not of intense congressional, or public interest.

13

U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget Appendix, The Budget for Fiscal Year 2004, 928.

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There are occasions when Congress does exercise its authority to give direction to, and set limits on White House financial operations. Two examples can be cited: the White House Communications Agency (WHCA, the largest element in the Defense-funded White House Military Office) handles the president’s encrypted telecommunications requirements. In 1996, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense reported to the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight that the White House Office had been calling upon WHCA to provide support beyond WHCA’s official communications duties; i.e., making audio-visual recordings for the National Archives of all presidential events, providing stenographic services plus lecterns, flags, seals and teleprompters for all White House functions, camera equipment for the White House photographers, and providing newswire services to White House staffers. This was considered as inappropriately burdening WHCA’s resources.14 The following year, the House Appropriations Subcommittee saw to it that the FY 1998 appropriations legislation contained a requirement that White House Office funds be earmarked to reimburse WHCA for these “non-telecommunications” services. This statutory obligation has been repeated in the subsequent years. The FY 2004 appropriations act set the earmark at $8,650,000. The FY 2005 request increases that level of reimbursement to WHCA by $2,393,000 but also designates $543,000 of the total to be paid to the Department of State for providing “audiovisual support associated with Presidential Diplomatic Missions.” And, in 1998, the appropriations committees became annoyed at the lateness of payments of reimbursements due the White House from political or other recognized groups which are invited to sponsor events in the Executive Residence. A requirement was written into the appropriations act, and remains there today, that each such group shall pay for the estimated cost of its event in advance, and must within 60 days, be notified about any costs beyond the estimate, must pay these charges within 30 days of the notification, and must be charged interest and penalties if the reimbursement has not been made within that deadline. The president’s political party, furthermore, must maintain a separate deposit of $25,000 to cover costs of events it sponsors in the Residence.15 On occasion there is sheer harassment. In February of 1992, the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee; led by Congressman Paul Kanjorski, undertook an election-year vendetta against the Bush White House. Question after question was flung at the weary testifiers; (here is a sample:“How many floral arrangements, invitations, banners, streamers, balloons and other decorative items were used for each event at the White House or at the residence of the Vice President during 1991?”) Thousands of pages were generated in response.16

14

U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, Second Session, Oversight of the White House Communications Agency (Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice of the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight), May 16 and June 13, 1996, 82. 15 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget Appendix, The Budget for Fiscal Year 2003, 928. 16 As quoted in Patterson, The White House Staff: Inside the West Wing and Beyond, The Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2001, p. 464, footnote 34.

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CONCLUSION The White House budget is an elusive concoction; partly well-displayed, and partly hidden, and exciting neither broad congressional nor public attention. The well-displayed segments are labeled “White House,” and are discussed in this article. As for those kept confidential, the author would contest the assertion that revealing the gross sum of the Secret Service’s protective costs would damage national security. If this figure were available; and if then, all of the expenses of the White House were assembled and added together, including those borne by the Department of Defense, it is the author’s belief that the current annual total would be over $1 billion. Presidents have their political reasons for being nervous about disclosing the whole White House budget picture, and about admitting that the modern White House staff community is in fact a large, complicated, and expensive institution. Less justifiable is the rarity with which presidential scholars themselves give attention to the total staff, and to its costs. Throwing more light on this picture would, the author believes, reveal not unconscionableness, but a reasonable, and bearable attentiveness to meeting the leadership needs of the nation.

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 101-119

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

ARE ALL PRESIDENTIAL LEGISLATIVE SUCCESSES REALLY VICTORIES? EXAMINING THE SUBSTANCE OF LEGISLATION Andrew W. Barrett ABSTRACT Despite numerous studies focused on presidential success in the legislative arena, political scientists have largely ignored the president’s ability to shape the substance of legislation. This article examines 233 significant bills to measure presidential success in terms of legislative content over a twenty-year period and demonstrates that the president usually receives most of what he wants in terms of the substance of legislation when he signs a bill into law, but he usually accepts significant legislative concessions, including regarding his own initiatives and especially under divided government. These findings support Richard Neustadt’s argument that presidents must bargain to influence the lawmaking process. The results presented also suggest that congressional leaders must accommodate presidential wishes to secure passage of their own proposals.

INTRODUCTION Two major pieces of legislation proposed by President Jimmy Carter became law in October 1978; a civil service reform bill and a comprehensive energy package. Although Congress passed both of these presidential initiatives, Carter received much more of what he wanted in terms of legislative content regarding the former compared to the latter bill. The bill enacted to reform the civil service system “contained all but one of the basic changes the president had proposed” even though it was “reworked extensively by both the House and the Senate.”1 On the other hand, the final version of the energy package “contained only remnants of the tough plan originally presented by Carter.”2 Under most measures of presidential success in Congress previously used by political scientists (such as presidential box scores or success rates), Carter would have been credited with two equal legislative successes regarding these proposals since in each case a bill he initiated became law. Yet, as these two cases demonstrate, the passage of every presidential 1

“Congress Approves Civil Service Reform,” Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1978 34 (1979), p. 818. “Energy Bill: The End of an Odyssey,” Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1978 34 (1979), p. 639.

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proposal is not necessarily an equivalent legislative victory. In fact, if Congress dramatically alters or waters down a presidential proposal before it can be signed into law, has the president even won the legislative battle? A seemingly endless parade of political scientists have attempted to measure presidential success in the legislative arena over the past few decades. Regrettably, most of these scholars have ignored the most important aspect of the legislative battles that transpire between the president and Congress, the specific legislation in question. The focus has been on tallying presidential wins and losses, not on the final product produced by the lawmaking process. This past focus has created a gap in the literature on presidential legislative success since the president may win a legislative battle by prevailing on a single roll call vote or by signing a bill into law, but lose the legislative war if the proposal he signs has been gutted by Congress. This article begins to fill this gap by examining the content of 233 significant pieces of legislation over a twenty-year period to determine whether all presidential legislative successes are really victories. Based on the analyses conducted, the president usually receives most of what he wants in terms of the substance of legislation when he signs a bill into law, but he usually accepts significant legislative concessions, including his own proposals, and especially under divided government. It is also found that congressional leaders accommodate presidential wishes to secure passage of their own initiatives.

LITERATURE REVIEW Presidential scholars have studied presidential success in the legislative arena for many years. The methods most often adopted by these researchers include presidential box scores (in particular, those produced by Congressional Quarterly), success rates on roll call votes3 and/or support scores4 regarding a particular subset of votes and/or bills. Each of these measures -- although useful -- suffers from a number of different problems that limit their value, however.5 One shortcoming common to all of these measures is that they each ignore the content of the legislation being considered by Congress. These measures emphasize how often the president wins on a series of bills or how many votes he receives on a particular vote, yet they neglect whether the substance of the legislation that the lawmaking process produces is what the president wanted.

3

Dennis W. Gleiber and Steven A. Shull, “Presidential Influence in the Policymaking Process,” Western Political Quarterly 45 (1992), pp. 441-467; Brad Lockerbie, Stephen Borrelli, and Scott Hedger, “An Integrative Approach to Modeling Presidential Success in Congress,” Political Research Quarterly 51 (1998), pp. 155-172. 4 George C. Edwards III, At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989); Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, The President in the Legislative Arena (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, “The President in a More Partisan Legislative Arena,” Political Research Quarterly 49 (1996), pp. 729-748. 5 Cary R. Covington, “Congressional Support for the President: The View from the Kennedy/Johnson White House,” Journal of Politics 48 (1986), pp. 717-728; James M. Lindsay and Wayne P. Steger, “The ‘Two Presidencies’ in Future Research: Moving Beyond Roll-Call Analysis,” Congress & the Presidency 20 (1993), pp. 103-117; Charles O. Jones, The Presidency in a Separated System (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994); Jon R. Bond, Richard Fleisher, and Glen S. Krutz, “An Overview of the Empirical Findings on Presidential-Congressional Relations,” in James A. Thurber, ed., Rivals for Power: Presidential-Congressional Relations (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1996).

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In all likelihood, the primary reason scholars have ignored the content of legislation is the difficulty of measuring it quantitatively. Most pieces of legislation produced by Congress today are incredibly long, detailed and complicated. As a consequence, it is a problematic and time-consuming task to measure what the president wanted in regards to a legislative proposal and what Congress placed on his desk to sign (especially when one is examining hundreds of pieces of legislation). Despite the complexity of this task, an analysis of the substance of legislation is necessary if scholars want to more accurately measure presidential success in the legislative arena. The substance of legislation has not been completely ignored by political scientists. In his examining 299 presidential legislative initiatives from 1953-1984, Mark Peterson distinguishes between initiatives regarding which the president dominated the legislative process, and proposals on which the president needed to compromise.6 Likewise, Charles Jones touches on the president’s ability to shape the content of legislation, yet his main interest is “in identifying presidential and congressional participation at different points in the lawmaking process.”7 Scholars who are interested in the president's use of his veto power, and veto threats also have addressed the question of whether the president can alter the content of legislation.8 Finally, a few political scientists have briefly discussed the importance of examining the substance of legislation, yet taken no action. For example, in his study of divided government, David Mayhew talks about the quality and coherence of laws produced by Congress, but he does not analyze the substance of the bills he discusses.9 Despite these various studies, presidential success in Congress in terms of the substance of legislation has not been a popular research topic.

HYPOTHESES The formal powers of the president under the U.S. Constitution, as many scholars have asserted, are relatively weak, particularly in the legislative arena. Therefore, the president, according to Richard Neustadt, needs to use informal powers to persuade or bargain with other political actors to influence the policymaking process.10 Depending on persuasion may appear to be a precarious base of power; yet, the White House “controls the most encompassing array of vantage points in the American political system,” including the president’s status and authority, his professional reputation, and his public prestige.11 These vantage points enhance the president’s ability to persuade. 6

Mark Peterson, Legislating Together: The White House and Capitol Hill from Eisenhower to Reagan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). 7 Jones, The Presidency in a Separated System, p. 208. 8 See, for example, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, “Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions,” American Journal of Political Science 32 (1988), pp. 713-736; Charles M. Cameron, Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 9 David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations,1946-1990 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991). 10 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: The Free Press, 1990). 11 Ibid., p. 31.

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One aspect of presidential persuasion that scholars have largely ignored in their quantitative examinations of presidential legislative success involves bargaining in terms of the substance of legislation. To build a winning congressional coalition, presidents can offer to reshape their proposals more to the liking of important actors in the legislative process, such as a committee chairman or party leader. In other words, the president can create legislative support by making legislative compromises. Since the lawmaking process is long with many different obstacles to be overcome, it is likely the president will need to accept some level of legislative compromise to ensure the passage of his proposals. Thus, I hypothesize that presidents will accept a significant number of legislative concessions before they sign most bills into law. As a number of political scientists have demonstrated, the president’s ability to influence the lawmaking process is largely determined by the legislative environment that surrounds him.12 It is then reasonable to assume that presidents will have to bargain less in terms of legislative content when faced by a favorable legislative environment as opposed to a hostile one. The most important aspect of the legislative environment surrounding a president is whether his party controls one or both chambers of Congress.13 This leads to my second hypothesis that the president will be more successful in terms of the substance of legislation under unified compared to divided government. Another factor that may influence the president’s ability to shape the content of legislation is whether the proposal being considered in Congress is a presidential or congressional initiative. As Neustadt points out, the formal powers of the president and Congress “are so intertwined that neither will accomplish very much, for very long, without the acquiescence of the other. By the same token, though, what one demands the other can resist. The stage is set for that great game, much like collective bargaining, in which each seeks to profit from the other’s needs and fears.”14 When a bill is proposed by the White House, the president will likely need to accommodate congressional leaders by accepting legislative concessions to ensure its passage. Conversely, when a congressional initiative is being considered, the president’s bargaining advantage should be enhanced since he has the ability to kill a proposal with his veto pen that congressional leaders want to become law. Therefore, I also hypothesize that the initiator of a bill -- either the president or Congress -will need to accommodate the wishes of the other legislative actor in terms of the content of legislation to ensure that proposal becomes law.

12

Edwards, At the Margins; Bond and Fleisher, The President in the Legislative Arena; Peterson, Legislating Together; Jones, The Presidency in a Separated System. 13 See George C. Edwards III, Andrew Barrett, and Jeffrey Peake, “The Legislative Impact of Divided Government,” American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997), pp. 545-563. Some political scientists have argued that divided government does not hinder the legislative process, including Mayhew, Divided We Govern; Jones, The Presidency in a Separated System; and Charles O. Jones, Separate But Equal Branches: Congress and the Presidency (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1995). However, numerous scholars have shown that divided government does have important policymaking consequences, such as Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, “Divided Control of Fiscal Policy,” in Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell, eds., The Politics of Divided Government (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); Samuel Kernell, “Facing an Opposition Congress: The President’s Strategic Circumstance,” in Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell, eds., The Politics of Divided Government (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); James L. Sundquist, Constitutional Reform and Effective Government, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992); Sean Q. Kelly, “Divided We Govern? A Reassessment,” Polity 25 (1993), pp. 475-484; and Edwards, Barrett, and Peake, “The Legislative Impact of Divided Government.” 14 Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents, p. 32.

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DATA AND METHODS To measure presidential success in terms of the substance of legislation, I developed a sample of bills by combining David Mayhew's list of important legislation that passed,15 and a list of potentially significant legislation that failed produced by George Edwards, Andrew Barrett, and Jeff Peake.16 The standard used both by Mayhew as well as Edwards and his colleagues to determine whether a bill was important or potentially significant was whether it was "both innovative and consequential.”17 Creating a sample of legislation from these two lists provides a number of advantages. First, these lists include both presidential and congressional initiatives, a necessity since one of the emphases of this study is the initiator of legislation. Second, as Jean Reith Schroedel demonstrates in her examination of banking legislation, presidents are more attentive to important policy initiatives, meaning that presidential involvement in the lawmaking process is more likely regarding significant pieces of legislation.18 Finally, the intensity of legislative battles should increase when significant legislation is debated because so much is at stake both politically and in terms of policymaking regarding these bills, providing for a good test of presidential success regarding the substance of legislation. To make this project manageable, it was limited to a twenty-year time period (19771996) encompassing four separate presidential administrations (Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton).19 When combined for this period, the two aforementioned lists created a sample of 357 significant bills to analyze.20 However, I placed some limitations on this sample of bills. First, since the purpose of this study is to measure the president’s success at altering the content of legislation, I eliminated all bills from the Mayhew and Edwards, et al. lists whose substance the president had no interest in shaping, i.e., bills the president wanted killed or never took a public position on. In particular, I removed all bills that the president was inexorably opposed to, and simply wanted defeated, (and would not sign in any form), as well

15

Mayhew, Divided We Govern. Edwards, Barrett, and Peake, “The Legislative Impact of Divided Government.” 17 Mayhew, Divided We Govern, p. 37. 18 Jean Reith Schroedel, Congress, the President, and Policymaking: A Historical Analysis (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994). 19 I limited my analysis to the years 1977-1996 for two primary reasons. First, I begin with the year 1977 to avoid any problems associated with the Watergate era. As many scholars have found, the years 1973-1976 pose a problem for studies regarding the president and Congress because of the impeachment process surrounding Richard Nixon, his subsequent resignation and the ascendency of Gerald Ford to the Oval Office. Second, the lists of legislation used to develop a sample of bills for this study do not include any data beyond 1996. As originally compiled, Mayhew’s list of important legislation stops with the 101st Congress (1989-1990). Edwards, Barrett, and Peake extended this list through 1992, the same year their list of failed legislation ends. Both of these lists were later extended through the 104th Congress (1995-1996) by George C. Edwards III and Andrew Barrett, “Presidential Agenda Setting in Congress,” in Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, eds., Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2000). No one has extended either of these two lists any further, however. 20 I eliminated a number of bills from Edwards, Barrett and Peake’s list of significant legislation that failed. The total number of bills excluded for the time period examined is 44. These bills were eliminated for a variety of reasons on a case-by-case basis. Some of these bills were mistakenly included in the original data set while others no longer seemed to merit inclusion in a list of potentially significant legislation after further analysis of how each of these proposals would have altered American policy. Plus, I added 4 other bills that were overlooked by Edwards, Barrett, and Peake. 16

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as bills which the president showed complete indifference, (and never publicly stated a preference).21 It is important to note that if the president opposed the current version of a given bill as it moved through the lawmaking process (and, perhaps, even threatened to veto that bill); but, he supported some alternative version of that legislation, these bills were included in my analysis. Thus, bills the president opposed in their current form that he wanted to alter are included in this study but bills the president simply wanted killed are not.22 In addition, I eliminated both treaties and treaty implementation legislation considered under fast track authority from both lists since these types of proposals do not follow the regular legislative process.23 Having eliminated some bills, I was left with 233 significant pieces of legislation to examine.24 For each bill from my sample, I coded its content in terms of what the president wanted in both chambers of Congress following three stages of the lawmaking process; in particular, the committee stage (including both subcommittee and full committee action), the floor vote stage (including congressional action during full chamber sessions), and the final passage stage (including conference committee action, the passage of the conference report by both houses, and any congressional action following a presidential veto).25 I coded the substance of legislation following these three stages; instead of merely the content of each bill in its final form, to develop a better picture of how the substance of legislation is used as a bargaining tool during the lawmaking process. To measure the content 21

The president’s position regarding each proposal examined (i.e., supported, wanted killed, or took no public position) was determined by using the legislative histories of each bill from Congressional Quarterly Almanac as well as any relevant remarks from the Public Papers of the Presidents. 22 For the time period examined, there were 84 bills that the president simply wanted killed and 32 bills regarding which the president took no public position. Of the former, 81 bills (or 96.4 percent) were eventually killed, indicating that when the president wanted a bill to fail, he usually received his legislative wish (whether he was responsible for defeating these bills or not). Some might argue that these 84 bills opposed by the president should be included in this study because the president’s ability to kill legislation is a form of presidential influence in the lawmaking process. I concede this point, yet the purpose of this article is not to examine all aspects of presidential influence in the legislative arena, only the president’s success in terms of the substance of legislation. Preventing bills he opposes from becoming law is outside the scope of this analysis. 23 There were 8 treaties or treaty implementation bills considered under fast track authority that were removed from the sample. 24 By examining the substance of legislation, it is possible to test the concept of the two presidencies (i.e., that presidents have more power in the defense and foreign policy arena than in domestic policy) as developed by Aaron Wildavsky, “The Two Presidencies,” Trans-Action 4 (1966), pp. 7-14. Even using the broadest definition of defense and/or foreign policy issues possible however, less than 10 percent of the bills from my sample can be fairly classified as defense and/or foreign policy issues. Thus, there were not enough of these proposals to make any valid comparisons with domestic policy proposals. To increase the number of defense and/or foreign policy proposals in my sample, I considered using a list of major foreign policy legislation created by Barbara Hinckley, Less Than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994). I chose not to use this data for several reasons. First, Hinckley only includes legislation that was brought to a vote on the floor of at least one chamber of Congress. This is a more stringent standard than Edwards, Barrett and Peake used to identify failed legislation. Second, Hinckley includes many proposals that may be considered important foreign policy initiatives, but that do not rise to the level of significance of the bills included in Mayhew’s and Edwards et al.’s lists. For example, she includes annual intelligence and State Department authorization bills. Third, there is a great deal of overlap between Hinckley’s list and the two lists used in this study. Consequently, adding Hinckley’s list of foreign policy legislation would only marginally increase the number of foreign policy bills examined. Finally, Hinckley’s list ends in 1991, meaning that this list of foreign policy initiatives does not include bills from 5 of the 20 years I examine. 25 Regarding twelve bills whose legislative histories were extremely complicated, I only examined the substance of legislation following the final passage stage.

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of legislation, I used the descriptions of the legislative history of each bill from Congressional Quarterly Almanac as well as any relevant presidential remarks included in the Public Papers of the Presidents. The descriptions from CQ Almanac were particularly helpful as they gave detailed information regarding the content of each piece of legislation as it moved through the legislative process as well as frequent references to the president’s position regarding the substance of each bill. Based on these legislative histories, I assigned a score indicating how much of what the president wanted was included in a given piece of legislation as it cleared each of the three lawmaking stages examined. In assigning a score, the substance of each bill as it was originally proposed was used as a baseline. The coding scheme adopted for the substance of legislation, and whether it was what the president wanted is as follows: 5 = the president received virtually everything he wanted (with the possible exception of only a few minor provisions opposed or not wanted by the president included) 4 = the president received most of what he wanted, yet he accepted a number of significant provisions he either opposed or did not want included 3 = the substance of a bill was a relatively equal compromise between the president and congressional leaders 2 = the bill contained a few significant provisions that the president wanted, yet the majority of the bill was not what he wanted 1 = the president supported passage of legislation to deal with a legislative issue, but the bill passed by Congress was nothing like what he wanted For the remainder of this article, this coding scheme is referred to as the presidential substance scale or as presidential substance scores. To help explain how coding decisions were made, here are a few specific examples of these decisions regarding four pieces of legislation included in this study: 1) During the 104th Congress (1995-1996), President Bill Clinton supported most of the substance of a House-passed bill to deal with illegal immigration, yet he opposed a few significant provisions including one that would have denied illegal immigrants access to public schools. Thus, the presidential substance score following the House floor vote stage for this bill was coded as "4". However, during the ensuing conference committee; congressional leaders, who wanted to pass a bill dealing with illegal immigration prior to the 1996 elections, altered the substance of the bill significantly in the direction of the president, including the removal from the bill’s final version of the provision regarding access to schools Clinton opposed. Consequently, although Clinton did not quite receive everything he wanted, the presidential substance score for this bill following the final passage stage was coded as a "5" since the president was the dominant winner in the battle over the content of this legislation. 2) Earlier in the same session of Congress, although Clinton supported portions of a Republican tax package (such as a smaller version of the child tax credits that was included); he opposed most of the proposal’s provisions. Since he was never able to significantly alter the content of this legislation (which he would eventually veto as

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Andrew W. Barrett part of a budget reconciliation bill), the presidential substance score following each stage of the legislative process in each chamber, except for the final passage stage since no tax legislation ever cleared this stage during this congressional session, was coded as a "2". 3) During the 102nd Congress (1991-1992), President George H.W. Bush strongly opposed the version of a civil rights bill approved by two House committees. However, since Bush was in support of an alternative civil rights bill, the presidential substance score following the House committee stage was coded as "1". In reaction to his objections, House leaders changed the substance of this legislation in the president's direction during the floor vote stage, yet Bush still opposed the House-passed version of this bill so the presidential substance score following the House floor vote stage was coded as "2". In October 1991, the president reached a compromise on the issue of civil rights with Senate leaders, a compromise that was passed by the entire chamber, and was largely adopted as the final version of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Thus, the presidential substance score following both the Senate floor vote, and final passage stages was coded as "3". 4) During the 99th Congress (1985-1986), President Ronald Reagan opposed most of the provisions of a Democratic-controlled House version of an omnibus water projects bill which he threatened to veto while he supported most of the provisions passed by the Republican-controlled Senate in its version. Therefore, the presidential substance scores following the House and Senate floor vote stages were coded as "2" and "4", respectively. The final version of the water projects bill was a compromise between the House and Senate versions; and, as a result, the presidential substance score following the final passage stage was coded as "3,” representing a compromise between the president and congressional leaders.

These four examples demonstrate roughly how coding decisions were made; but, in most cases, CQ Almanac and the Public Papers of the Presidents provided more detailed information about the content of legislation than is presented here. For a handful of bills from each congressional session examined (approximately 2 or 3 per session), the description of the president's position in the sources used was quite vague. To deal with this issue, the following coding rule was adopted: if CQ Almanac (or the Public Papers of the Presidents) indicated that the president supported a bill in general, yet made no other reference to an administration's position regarding the various provisions of that bill, it was assumed that the administration was pleased with the basic makeup of that bill as it cleared each stage of the legislative process. The presidential substance score for such bills was coded as "5" after each legislative stage.26 26

Clinton’s first two years in office were particularly problematic. Specifically, for the 103rd Congress (1993-94), CQ Almanac frequently mentioned that Clinton supported a bill yet gave no other indication regarding the administration’s support for or opposition to specific provisions. In fact, CQ Almanac provided limited information regarding the president’s position for approximately 55 percent of the bills from the 103rd Congress included in this study. As a result, by adopting the coding rule that I would code as “5" the presidential substance score for any bill supported by the president regarding which I found no provisions objected to by the White House, the results for the 103rd Congress may be skewed if -- for whatever reason -- CQ Almanac was not very thorough in discussing Clinton’s objections. Based on the experience of coding the substance of over 200 pieces of legislation and the circumstances that existed during the 103rd Congress, it is my impression that for most of these bills that CQ Almanac did not discuss in

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The descriptions of the legislative histories of bills in CQ Almanac were usually very thorough in regards to the president’s position; and, thus, if an administration had a significant problem with a proposal at any point during the legislative process, CQ Almanac would probably have made a reference to it. If there was no mention of dissatisfaction with a bill from CQ Almanac (or the Public Papers of the Presidents); it may not always be a sign of absolute support. Consequently, some of the results that follow may be skewed toward the high end of the presidential substance scale.27 Nevertheless, for the vast majority of bills included in this article, I was able to find ample information regarding the substance of legislation and what the president wanted following each lawmaking stage. Despite any coding problems that existed, the findings presented in this article should represent a fairly accurate assessment of presidential success in terms of the content of legislation. Finally, a few words about the nature of the coding scheme are necessary. To code the substance of 233 diverse and complex pieces of legislation that dramatically varied in scope and subject matter following various stages of the legislative process, many subjective judgments needed to be made using a rather broad and somewhat imprecise coding scheme. Without a doubt, someone trying to replicate these decisions would make some different judgments. Regrettably, a second coder for these decisions was not possible due to the size of the project and limited resources. However, I have re-coded a number of these bills at different points in time to help verify the coding decisions made. More important, I relied very heavily on how CQ Almanac, an objective source, characterized the changes made to the substance of legislation throughout the lawmaking process. It also should be stated that I had no preferred outcome for the results at the beginning of this project since the findings from this study, no matter what they were, would be valuable since scholars have mostly neglected this research topic. Lastly, although this analysis is based on somewhat subjective coding decisions, subjective judgments under a defined coding scheme, even one as broad and imprecise as the one adopted here, need to be made if presidential scholars want to move beyond the realm of success rates and support scores to form a better understanding of presidential legislative success.

detail any presidential objections, Clinton probably had few. Why? The 103rd Congress was the first time in 12 years the Democrats controlled the White House and both chambers of Congress and, therefore, Clinton and congressional leaders were probably more concerned with passing legislation that had been bottled up by Republican presidents for over a decade, such as the ‘Motor Voter’ and ‘Brady’ bills, than fighting amongst themselves over minor provisions. In addition, it is likely that Clinton agreed with congressional leaders regarding the substance of most pieces of legislation as he and congressional leaders shared the same basic policy preferences. Finally, Clinton spent most of his first two years in office worrying about his first budget as well as his health care reform package and, thus, he might easily have deferred to congressional leaders on other bills. 27 It is obviously preferable if the results presented in this article were not skewed in any direction, yet it is better that the results are skewed toward the high end of the scale -- if they are skewed at all -- for the purposes of this study. Specifically, the main hypothesis examined is that presidents -- who operate with few formal powers in the legislative arena -- will be forced to bargain in terms of legislative content to secure passage of bills they support (particularly under divided government and regarding their own legislative initiatives). The lower the presidential substance scores, the more the presidents examined were forced to compromise. Thus, any skewing of the results toward the high end of the presidential substance scale that may exist is working in the opposite direction from the expected relationship, meaning that one can be confident that if the expected results are found that this is evidence of presidents needing to bargain and not the result of a skewed measure.

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EXAMINING THE SUBSTANCE OF LEGISLATION Are all presidential legislative successes really victories? The average presidential substance scores following each of the lawmaking stages examined are presented in Table 1. Table 1. The Substance of Legislation Following Three Stages of the Legislative Process

House Committee Stage

Senate Committee Stage

House Floor Vote Stage

Senate Floor Vote Stage

Final Passage Stage

Score Number of Bills 1 17 2 37 3 10 4 35 5 60 Average Score Following House Committee Stage 3.53 1 15 2 26 3 8 4 47 5 78 Average Score Following Senate Committee Stage 3.84 1 14 2 31 3 11 4 35 5 43 Average Score Following House Floor Vote Stage 3.46 1 10 2 22 3 11 4 43 5 47 Average Score Following Senate Floor Vote Stage 3.71 1 3 2 3 3 25 4 41 5 29 Average Score Following Final Passage Stage 3.89

Percent 10.7 23.3 6.3 22.0 37.7 8.6 14.9 4.6 27.0 44.8 10.4 23.1 8.2 26.1 32.1 7.5 16.5 8.3 32.3 35.3 3.0 3.0 24.8 40.6 28.7

The average presidential substance score following the final passage stage was 3.89. This number indicates that the president, as hypothesized, generally accepted a significant level of compromise to ensure that a bill he supported became law. The president received everything he wanted in terms of the substance of legislation regarding 28.7 percent of the bills examined. These findings support Neustadt’s notion that the president must bargain to influence the actions of other political actors. Nonetheless, even though the president bargained in terms of the substance of legislation, he still received most of what he wanted or more regarding approximately 69 percent of the bills that became law. Therefore, a solid

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majority of the presidential successes examined can be fairly characterized as legislative victories.28 Although the president was fairly successful regarding the substance of the 101 pieces of legislation examined that became law, 56.7 percent of the bills studied, each supported by the president, were eventually defeated. As a consequence, the president’s general success in terms of the substance of legislation should not be used as evidence that he was able to dominate the lawmaking process. On the other hand, only rarely was the president forced to accept a bill whose substance did not constitute at least a fair compromise from his perspective. Specifically, only six bills became law during the twenty years examined whose substance was not to the president’s liking (i.e., bills whose substance was coded as “2” or “1"). Regarding three of these bills, Reagan’s veto was overridden during his final two years in the White House.29 Reagan signed another of these bills, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, although he was opposed to its legislative content because it was supported by a veto-proof majority in both congressional chambers. Finally, Reagan was able to secure passage of only a portion of his Caribbean Basin Initiative package as part of a supplemental appropriations bill in 1982, and Clinton’s $16.3 billion economic stimulus package was gutted before a portion of it became law in April 1993. Compared to the final passage stage, the president was not quite as successful in terms of the substance of legislation following the earlier legislative stages. As presented in Table 1, presidential substance scores following both the committee (3.53) and floor vote (3.46) stages in the House and the committee (3.84) and floor vote (3.71) stages in the Senate were lower than the substance score following the final passage stage (3.89). In addition, both chambers were far more likely to approve or pass legislation that the president disagreed with following the earlier lawmaking stages. In particular, while only 6 percent of the bills that became law were scored a "2" or lower on the presidential substance scale, more than 30 percent of bills cleared by House committees or passed on the House floor were coded as "2" or lower while more than 20 percent of the bills approved by Senate committees or passed on the Senate floor were coded as such. What do these differences between presidential substance scores following the final passage stage compared to the earlier stages of the legislative process demonstrate? There are 28

Although they supported all 233 bills included in this study, it is unlikely that the presidents examined put forth the same lobbying effort regarding each of these proposals. It is possible that the intensity of White House lobbying -- both publicly and privately -- has on impact on presidential success in shaping the substance of legislation. To measure the intensity of presidential lobbying efforts on behalf of the bills included in my sample, I used the average number of public remarks per month the president made in support of each of these proposals. This data was available from an earlier study I conducted on the legislative impact of presidential rhetoric. Andrew W. Barrett, “Gone Public: The Impact of Going Public on Presidential Legislative Success,” American Politics Research 32 (2004), pp. 338-370. Unfortunately, I only measured presidential rhetoric through the end of the first Bush administration in this study. Data was thus unavailable for the bills I examine here during the Clinton years. Nonetheless, the average number of presidential public remarks in support of the 70 bills in my sample that became law from Carter to Bush was 1.39 remarks per month. To determine whether the intensity of the president’s lobbying efforts had an impact on the substance of legislation, I compared the presidential substance scores following the final passage stage for the 24 bills that became law that the president publicly supported more than 1.39 times per month with the substance scores regarding the 46 bills that became law that the president publicly supported less than 1.39 times per month. Surprisingly, the substance scores for both sets of bills were quite similar, 3.63 for the bills the president publicly supported more than 1.39 times per month compared to 3.70 for the bills the president publicly supported less than 1.39 times per month. 29 These bills include the Water Quality Act of 1987, the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, and the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987.

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a few possibilities. First, these statistics might suggest that during the final passage stage, where the threat of a presidential veto is most imminent, and the end of the lawmaking process is near, the president has more leverage with members of Congress than during the earlier stages of the lawmaking process. Simply, the president’s ability to shape the substance of legislation may be strongest during the final passage stage. Second, these numbers could simply indicate that the president does not normally become intimately involved in the lawmaking process during its early stages. With so many pieces of legislation being introduced each congressional session, the president may only choose to become engaged in legislative debates when a bill is close to reaching his desk. This explanation is consistent with Jean Reith Schroedel’s finding that presidential involvement during the early stages of policy formation is minimal.30 Another possible explanation for the higher average presidential substance score following the final passage stage may merely be that presidents are preventing legislation from becoming law whose substance they do not like during this stage. In other words, the higher presidential substance score following the final passage stage may be an indication that presidents do not alter the substance of legislation as much as prevent bills they do not like from becoming law. Based on the data, there is some truth to this assessment. When bills that did not become law are excluded from the analysis, the difference between the presidential substance score following the final passage stage, and the floor vote stages in both chambers is smaller. In particular, the average presidential substance score for bills that passed the House and the Senate but did not become law was 3.31 and 3.62, respectively. On the other hand, the average presidential substance score for the bills that became law was 3.53 following House passage and 3.76 following Senate passage. Nonetheless, even when bills that did not become law are excluded, the presidential substance score following the final passage stage (3.89) is higher than the scores following the floor vote stage in both chambers, indicating that the president is not simply preventing legislation he does not like from becoming law during the final passage stage, but that he also is successfully shaping the substance of legislation.

DIVIDED GOVERNMENT A comparison of presidential substance scores under unified and divided government is presented in Table 2. As hypothesized, the president receives more of what he wants in terms of legislative content when the government is unified and his party is in control of Congress than during divided government. Presidential substance scores under unified government range from 4.14 to 4.46 across the various stages of the legislative process whereas these scores range from only 2.76 to 3.70 under divided government. Based on these numbers, the presidents examined were undoubtedly more satisfied with the substance of legislation when Congress was controlled by their own party.

30

Schroedel, Congress, the President, and Policymaking.

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Table 2. The Substance of Legislation During Unified and Divided Government Following Three Stages of the Legislative Process Unified Government Divided Government Score No. of Bills Percent No. of Bills Percent 1 0 0 17 19.5 House 2 3 4.2 34 39.1 Committee 3 4 5.6 6 6.9 Stage 4 22 30.6 13 14.9 5 43 59.7 17 19.5 Average Score Following House Committee Stage: Unified 4.46 / Divided 2.76 t = 8.976** 1 1 0.9 14 24.6 Senate 2 12 10.3 14 24.6 Committee 3 4 3.4 4 7.0 Stage 4 39 33.3 8 14.0 5 61 52.1 17 29.8 Average Score Following Senate Committee Stage: Unified 4.26 / Divided 3.00 t = 4.350** 1 1 1.8 13 16.5 House 2 2 3.6 29 36.7 Floor Vote 3 3 5.5 8 10.1 Stage 4 20 36.4 15 19.0 5 29 52.7 14 17.7 Average Score Following House Floor Vote Stage: Unified 4.35 / Divided 2.85 t = 7.058** 1 1 1.2 9 17.3 Senate 2 8 9.9 14 26.9 Floor Vote 3 5 6.2 6 11.5 Stage 4 32 39.5 11 21.2 5 35 43.2 12 23.1 Average Score Following Senate Floor Vote Stage: Unified 4.14 / Divided 3.06 t = 3.224** 1 0 0 3 4.7 Final 2 1 2.7 2 3.1 Passage 3 4 10.8 21 32.8 Stage 4 18 48.6 23 35.9 5 14 37.8 15 23.4 Average Score Following Final Passage Stage: Unified 4.22 / Divided 3.70 t = 2.671** *

T-test for equality of means between presidential and congressional initiatives is significant at the .1 level ** T-test for equality of means between unified and divided government is significant at the .05 level

The president rarely signed legislation whose content he did not mostly support under unified government. In particular, 86.4 percent of the bills that became law were coded as "4" or "5" under unified government compared to only 59.3 percent under divided government. In addition, the legislative content of 32.8 percent of the bills that became law under divided government were coded as “3" indicating a relatively equal compromise between the president and congressional leaders, as opposed to only 10.8 percent under unified government. Clearly, the four presidents examined here accepted more legislative concessions when their party did not control both chambers of Congress. Five of the six bills that became

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law with a presidential substance score of “2" or lower also were from congressional sessions where the government was divided, again indicating the president’s weakened bargaining position under these circumstances.31 However, the president received everything he wanted in terms of legislative content regarding only 37.8 percent of the bills under unified government, suggesting that the president had to bargain with congressional leaders even when his party controlled both congressional chambers. As demonstrated by Table 2, the president was able to sign legislation into law under divided government that was largely to his liking. Even though the substance of legislation was generally not what the president wanted during the earlier stages of the lawmaking process under divided government (with presidential substance scores ranging from 2.76 to 3.06), the presidential substance score was significantly higher (3.70) following the final passage stage. When bills that did not become law are excluded, the presidential substance score following the final passage stage under divided government (3.70) is still higher than the substance scores for the House-passed (3.02) and Senate-passed (3.28) versions of these bills; providing evidence that the president played a role in shaping the substance of legislation at the final passage stage, even when his party did not control Congress. Nonetheless, across each of the various stages of the legislative process, the president was generally less satisfied with the substance of legislation under divided compared to unified government.32 The results presented in Table 2 also demonstrate an interesting difference in the nature of the two chambers of Congress which influences how large a role the president can play in the shaping of legislation. Following both the committee and floor vote stages, the differences between substance scores under unified and divided government are significantly higher in the House than in the Senate. In particular, the difference between substance scores under unified and divided government in the House is 1.70 following the committee stage and 1.50 following the floor vote stage. Comparatively, the difference between presidential substance scores under unified and divided government in the Senate is only 1.26 following the committee stage, and 1.08 following the floor vote stage. What do these numbers indicate? This data is probably reflective of the difference in rules between the two chambers. The structured nature of House rules allows the majority party leadership to have more control over its members than in the Senate where individual senators are not as limited in their legislative actions.33 This stricter House discipline seems to accentuate the difference between unified and divided government whereas the individual nature of the Senate weakens the ability of party leaders to run that chamber as a purely partisan institution. Certainly, partisanship plays a role in the Senate, yet, in terms of the substance of legislation, the legislative product produced in the Senate appears less partisan than the legislation produced by the House under divided government. 31

The only bill examined that became law under unified government with a presidential substance score of “2" or lower was Clinton’s economic stimulus package from the 103rd Congress (1993-1994). In this case, a Republican filibuster in the Senate was successful in preventing virtually all of the president’s proposals included in his package from becoming law, with the exception of a $4 billion emergency supplemental appropriation for extended unemployment benefits. “Fiscal 1993 Stimulus Bill Killed,” Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1993 49 (1994), pp. 706-709. 32 This finding supports the claim that divided government matters, backing up the findings of Edwards, Barrett, and Peake, “The Legislative Impact of Divided Government” and others. 33 Ross K. Baker, House and Senate, 3d ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001).

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This assessment is supported by an examination of President Bush’s four years in office with a divided government. In particular, although Bush had a difficult time shaping the substance of legislation in the Democratic-controlled Senate, he had even less influence in the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives. In the Senate, the presidential substance scores during the Bush administration were 3.23 and 3.00 after the committee and floor vote stages, respectively. These low scores were significantly lower still in the House with presidential substance scores of 2.59 and 2.48 following the House committee and floor votes stages. Although he struggled to shape the content of legislation in the Senate, the House appeared to be the more partisan institution during Bush’s four years in office.

PRESIDENTIAL VERSUS CONGRESSIONAL INITIATIVES To determine the impact of who initiated a bill on legislative content, I divided my sample of legislation into presidential and congressional initiatives.34 Fifty-eight of the 233 bills examined were initiated by the White House while 146 of these bills were originally proposed by a member of Congress. The initiator of 29 bills in my sample was unclear, however. Bills that fell into this category include those regarding which the president and a congressman proposed similar legislation simultaneously; the president and a member of Congress proposed different bills that the relevant congressional committee/s combined into a larger piece of legislation; or the president and a congressman collaborated on a particular bill. Since an initiator for these 29 bills could not be identified, they were eliminated from this part of the analysis. The presidential substance scores for presidential and congressional initiatives following the five stages of the lawmaking process examined are presented in Table 3. As this table demonstrates, there is only a small and statistically insignificant difference between presidential substance scores when comparing presidential and congressional initiatives following the final passage stage. Specifically, the average presidential substance score for presidential initiatives is 3.80 following this stage compared to 3.96 for congressional initiatives. Granted, there are statistically significant differences between presidential and congressional initiatives following the earlier stages of the legislative process, yet it is the content of legislation as signed into law that matters most. Based on the numbers presented in Table 3, the presidents examined essentially were no more or less successful in terms of the substance of legislation depending on who initiated each bill.

34

The initiator of the bills in my sample was largely determined by Edwards and Barrett, “Presidential Agenda Setting in Congress.” These authors coded bills as presidential initiatives if the president introduced the original draft bill or a detailed set of proposals that formed the basis for congressional action. Bills introduced by members of Congress without a request from the president and without the assistance of the White House in the drafting process were coded as congressional initiatives. For a small number of the bills examined, the initiator was re-coded as additional information was used to correct any possible mistakes from the previous study.

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Presidential Initiatives

House Committee Stage

Score 1 2 3 4 5

No. of Bills 0 5 3 17 13

% 0 13.2 7.9 44.7 34.2

Congressional Initiatives No. of Bills 15 26 5 14 40

% 15.0 26.0 5.0 14.0 40.0

Average Score Following House Committee Stage: Pres. 4.00 / Cong.3.38 t = 2.261** Senate Committee Stage

1 2 3 4 5

0 3 2 18 17

0 7.5 5.0 45.0 42.5

13 21 4 21 54

11.5 18.6 3.5 18.6 47.8

Average Score Following Senate Committee Stage: Pres. 4.22 / Cong. 3.73 t = 1.995 House Floor Vote Stage

1 2 3 4 5

1 3 3 15 9

3.2 9.7 9.7 48.4 29.0

12 23 6 13 31

14.1 27.1 7.1 15.3 36.5

Average Score Following House Roll Call Stage: Pres. 3.90 / Cong. 3.33 t = 1.919 Senate Floor Vote Stage

1 2 3 4 5

0 3 2 17 9

0 9.7 6.5 54.8 29.0

10 15 6 19 34

11.9 17.9 7.1 22.6 40.5

Average Score Following Senate Roll Call Stage: Pres. 4.03 / Cong. 3.62 t = 1.475 Final Passage Stage

1 2 3 4 5

0 2 4 16 3

0 8.0 16.0 64.0 12.0

3 1 15 14 24

5.3 1.8 26.3 24.6 42.1

Average Score Following Final Passage Stage: Pres. 3.80 / Cong. 3.96 t = -.671 *

T-test for equality of means between presidential and congressional initiatives is significant at the .1 level ** T-test for equality of means between presidential and congressional initiatives is significant at the .05 level

Taking a closer look at presidential initiatives, Table 3 demonstrates that only 12 percent of these proposals that became law were coded as “5”, indicating that the president received practically everything he wanted in terms of legislative content. This statistic shows that the presidents examined almost always accepted some significant level of compromise to ensure that their proposals became law. This finding supports the hypothesis stated earlier that the initiator of a proposal will need to compromise to ensure passage of their legislation as well as Neustadt’s contention that presidents must bargain to influence other political actors,

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including members of Congress. Nonetheless, the presidents analyzed received most of what they wanted, as indicated by the presidential substance score of “4” regarding 64 percent of their proposals that became law, evidence that most presidential legislative successes are victories in terms of the substance of legislation. Regarding congressional initiatives, we find that congressional leaders accommodated presidential wishes to ensure that their proposals became law. In particular, the presidential substance scores for congressional initiatives increase from 3.38 and 3.33 following the committee and floor vote stages in the House; respectively, and from 3.73 following the committee stage and 3.62 following the floor vote stage in the Senate to 3.96 following the final passage stage. These figures suggest that congressional leaders were forced to compromise with the president during the final passage stage to secure his signature on their proposals. Even when bills that did not become law are eliminated, the presidential substance scores following the House (3.39) and Senate (3.74) floor vote stages are still lower than the substance score following the final passage stage (3.96). These results again support the hypothesis that the initiator of a bill will need to compromise in terms of legislative content (in this case, congressional leaders accommodated presidential wishes).

CONCLUSION What has been learned by examining the substance of legislation? First, the president generally accepted significant legislative concessions when he signed most of the bills examined (as indicated by the 3.89 presidential substance score following the final passage stage). This finding supports Neustadt’s contention that presidents must bargain to influence other political actors. Nonetheless, the president still received most of what he wanted in terms of the substance of legislation regarding 69.3 percent of the bills enacted into law. Therefore, most presidential legislative successes, at least those examined here, can be fairly characterized as presidential victories in terms of the content of legislation. In addition, only rarely was the president forced to sign a bill he strongly opposed or was a bill whose substance the president did not like become law over his veto. Presidential success in terms of legislative content was significantly reduced under divided government, however (although the president still frequently received much of what he wanted). Finally, although the president needed to make significant concessions regarding his proposals to secure their passage, congressional leaders often accommodated presidential wishes regarding their own initiatives. There are two important caveats to the results presented above. First, none of the findings presented demonstrate presidential influence in the lawmaking process, merely that the president was more successful in terms of the substance of legislation under certain circumstances. This lack of direct evidence regarding presidential influence in the legislative arena is common among studies seeking to measure presidential success in Congress, and this study does not correct for this shortcoming. Unless the preferences of members of Congress can be measured prior to presidential efforts to influence the substance of legislation, it is not possible to make any definitive statements about whether the president was able to shape the legislative content of the bills examined.

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Consequently, although this study fills a large gap in the current literature regarding presidential success in terms of the substance of legislation, and certain inferences can be made from the data presented, while no conclusive evidence is provided to demonstrate presidential influence in shaping the content of legislation. Second, are the measures of presidential preferences regarding legislative content used in this study reflective of the president’s true policy preferences or do they reflect strategic decisions made by the chief executive? Put another way, did the presidents examined reveal what they really wanted in proposing or supporting legislation or did they make calculated and/or anticipatory decisions to improve their chances of securing what they were looking for in terms of the content of legislation? Regrettably, the data presented above cannot answer this question either (as extensive archival research would be needed to determine the president’s true policy preferences regarding each of the 233 bills examined). However, previous studies indicate that presidents are generally sincere in the policy preferences they reveal to the public and members of Congress.35 In particular, based on more than 100 interviews with executive and legislative officials, Mark Peterson finds that presidents, who may have a firm position on an issue, who want to pursue good public policy and/or who may lack necessary information about congressional reactions to policy proposals, “have incentives to be quite sincere in the public announcement of their initiatives and to prefer to wage a campaign for their programs after initiation rather than temper them beforehand.”36 Nonetheless, before any definitive statements about the president’s success at shaping the content of legislation can be made, more research needs to be conducted regarding the nature of stated presidential policy preferences. Keeping these two caveats in mind, what are the implications from the findings presented here for the examination of presidential-congressional relations? As the data presented above indicate, there are clearly different types of presidential success in terms of the substance of legislation. Regarding some proposals, the president dominates the lawmaking process while he receives most, but not all, of what he wants concerning other bills. On other occasions, the president is either forced to accept an equal compromise with congressional leaders or sign a bill he largely disagrees with. Because of this variety, political scientists should incorporate the substance of legislation into their studies of presidential-congressional relations to obtain a more accurate measure of presidential legislative success. The legislative process is a very complicated one and presidential scholars should treat it as such. Simple success rates or support scores, while useful, are not sufficient measures of presidential success in Congress. Furthermore, presidents usually accept some level of compromise when they sign legislation into law while members of Congress usually alter their proposals to account for the wishes of the president. This finding raises several questions about the legislative process. How do changes in legislative content resulting from political compromises impact the quality and coherence of legislation enacted? In securing passage of legislation, are the president and congressional leaders sacrificing important provisions whose exclusion will 35

Kiewiet and McCubbins, “Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions”; Peterson, Legislating Together; Patrick J. Fett, “Truth in Advertising: The Revelation of Presidential Legislative Priorities,” Western Political Quarterly 45 (1992), pp. 895-920. 36 Peterson, Legislating Together, p. 43. Peterson also states that “there will be times when the president’s program is diluted as a result of consultation and executive estimates of congressional action” (p. 66). Thus, although the studies cited in the text indicate that presidents generally will be sincere in stating their policy preferences, even these studies leave room for the possibility of strategic and/or anticipatory decisions in terms of the announcement of presidential preferences.

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adversely impact the chances that a bill will fix the problem it was intended to solve? Or, do the compromises made throughout the lawmaking process improve the quality of the legislative product? If all legislation produced by the battles between the president and members of Congress is watered down for no other reason than political expediency, how effective is the American lawmaking process?

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 121-142

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

REVISITING EL DORADO CANYON: TERRORISM, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, AND THE 1986 BOMBING OF LIBYA David B. Cohen and Chris J. Dolan ABSTRACT America’s current war on terrorism has led presidency scholars to revisit past U.S. antiterrorism measures. This study employs a case study approach to examine President Ronald Reagan’s decision to attack Libya in April 1986 as a national security response to terrorism. More specifically, it assesses the opportunities and constraints on presidential power with respect to terrorism, and stresses how political advisory group dynamics influence decision-making. It then analyzes several political dimensions that contributed to the eventual use of force, namely rising military tensions between the United States and Libya, as well as Libyan sponsorship of terrorist attacks. It also highlights the importance of key political factors within Reagan’s foreign policymaking process that shaped several options for the president including economic sanctions, non-lethal military pressure, and Operation El Dorado Canyon. The bombing of Libya also had far-reaching goals that went beyond responding to terrorism as Reagan also sought to influence the U.S.-USSR balance of power, and deter Iran and Syria from sponsoring future terrorist attacks. However, Reagan’s use of force should be interpreted as a limited military response since it did not halt Libyan terrorist attacks against the United States, and came at the same time as the Iran-Contra scandal, which greatly constrained, for the time being, executive power over American foreign policy.

INTRODUCTION At 7 o’clock this evening eastern time, air and naval forces of the United States launched a series of strikes against the headquarters, terrorist facilities, and military assets that support Mu’ammar Qadhafi’s subversive activities….Despite our repeated warnings, Qadhafi continued his relentless pursuit of terror. He counted on America to be passive. He counted

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wrong….I said that we would act...if necessary to ensure that terrorists have no sanctuary anywhere. Tonight, we have.1 With this speech, President Ronald Reagan announced to the world that the United States was prepared to use military means as a deterrent to future terrorist acts. The April 15, 1986 bombing of Libya was highly popular as 70 percent of Americans approved of the military strike.2 The Reagan administration had been threatening to use military force as a weapon against terrorism ever since Reagan was sworn into office. In fact, only a week after his inauguration, Reagan promised “swift and effective retribution” for terrorists. 3 Five years later, Reagan fulfilled his promise. However, the Reagan administration’s plans for a more consistent and powerful strategy against terrorism ceased not long after the bombing—the Iran-Contra scandal, which became public in November, 1986, paralyzed Reagan’s terrorism policy for the remainder of his second term. The September 11, 2001 attacks, and the recent U.S. military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, have renewed academic and policymaker interest in understanding presidential efforts to combat terrorism. The purpose of this study is to strengthen an understanding of the political components of a president’s decision to use military force in response to terrorism. Recently, President George W. Bush emphasized that his long-term security objective is the destruction of terrorism, a goal to be achieved by the death or apprehension of terrorists, the destruction of their infrastructure, and support base, and retaliation against states that aid terrorists.4 Perhaps due to the magnitude and devastation of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the G.W. Bush administration, unlike the Reagan administration, does not plan to initiate limited strikes in response to individual attacks. President Bush has in fact promised to eradicate terrorism from where it currently exists and to attack any and all states that protect and finance terrorist networks. Therefore, the differences between Reagan and Libya, and Bush and global terrorism are great. Assessing the options and objectives within Reagan’s foreign policy process that structured his decision to use force against Libyan terrorism is the central theme of this case study.

TERRORISM AND PRESIDENTIAL POWERS The U.S. Constitution grants Congress authority to declare war and other powers with respect to the armed forces. The president has explicit authority to serve as commander-inchief. Most presidential scholars agree the president can use military force in the absence of 1

“Address to the Nation on the United States Air Strike Against Libya: April 14, 1986,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1986, Book I, (Washington, DC, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration), pp.468-469. 2 George J. Church, “Hitting the Source,” Time, 28 April 1986, p.26. 3 “Freed American Hostages,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 17 (2 February 1981): 50. 4 Perhaps the most well-known of all of Bush’s speeches on this topic is the 2002 State of the Union speech in which Bush discussed the “axis of evil”: “We will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction. We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect America and our allies from sudden attack. And all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security. We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.” “President Delivers State of the Union Address: January 29, 2002.” Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html. Retrieved October 8, 2003.

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congressional approval in order to “repel sudden attacks” against the citizens and property of the United States5 In other circumstances, presidents must seek formal legislative consent before using military force.6 For much of American history, presidents have respected Congress’s war powers.7 However, during the Cold War, the president was preeminent in the political system, and his position as commander-in-chief increasingly overwhelmed Congress leading many scholars to speak of an imperial presidency.8 Since the end of World War II, presidents have broadly interpreted their powers to make war and use military force. As Congress consented to presidential supremacy in U.S. foreign policy at the height of the Cold War, it established a precedent for deferring to the executive branch.9 This was standard practice until the passage of the War Powers Resolution in 1973, designed to limit the power of presidents to use military force. and to resurrect Congress’s role in the deployment of combat troops abroad. The legislation stipulates that presidents “should consult with Congress in every possible circumstance,” both before and after the use of military force.10 Specifically, the president must notify Congress in writing within 48 hours after he uses force, and must seek Congress’s formal approval within 60 days of the operation. If Congress disapproves, the president is forced to withdraw U.S. forces. The employment of U.S. armed forces abroad has been a catalyst in the growth of presidential power and has, at times, strained relations between the executive and legislative branches. While the War Powers Resolution was clearly a response to expanded presidential war powers in the wake of Korea and Vietnam, all presidents since its passage have claimed it violates the president’s power as commander-in-chief.11 Moreover, Congress is hard pressed to enforce it, as it would appear unpatriotic to refuse support for military action once initiated by the president. However, the War Powers Resolution represents a major symbolic effort at congressional reassertion, and does complicate the president’s ability to use force abroad unilaterally.12 In response to terrorism, and to specific terrorist threats, presidents have used military force, and justified such actions as fully within their constitutional powers.

5

For an assessment of the presidential literature concerned with executive’s war-making powers, see David Gray Adler, “The Constitution and Presidential War-making,” Political Science Quarterly 103 (1988): 1-36. See also Charles A. Lofgren, “War-making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding,” Yale Law Journal 81 (1972) 6 See: Barry Blechman and W. Philip Ellis, The Politics of National Security: Congress and US Defense Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1995); Rebecca KC Hersman, Friends and Foes: How Congress and the President Really Make Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2000); James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Policy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Robert J. Spitzer, President and Congress: Executive Harmony at the Crossroads of American Government (Philadelphia. PA: Temple University Press, 1992), Chapter 4. 7 Francis D. Wormuth and Edwin B. Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989). 8 E.g., see Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973). Interestingly, many commentators are recalling the imperial presidency in light of the G.W. Bush administration’s response to the 9/11 attacks. See, e.g., Bruce Shapiro, “Restoring the Imperial Presidency,” Salon.com, June 27, 2002 [available at http://www.salon.com/politics/feature/2002/06/17/bush_watergate/] and Linda Greenhouse, “The Imperial Presidency and the Constraints of the Law,” New York Times, April 18, 2004. 9 Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995). 10 Public Law 93-148. 11 Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1996). 12 The impact of the 1973 War Powers Resolution appears to be mixed. As Richard Grimmett of the CRS held, “Some observers contend that the War Powers Resolution has not significantly increased congressional participation, while others emphasize that it has promoted consultation and served as leverage.” See Richard F.

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In 1980, following the 1979 seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran by Islamic followers of Ayatollah Khomeini, President Jimmy Carter, in the absence of congressional consultation, ordered a military rescue operation that ultimately failed in the Iranian desert.13 Years later, during his first term in office, President Bill Clinton ordered a military strike against Iraq after uncovering evidence linking Iraqi intelligence agents to a plot to assassinate former President George H.W. Bush in Kuwait.14 Clinton again used force in 1998; this time against targets in Afghanistan and Sudan, in response to terrorist attacks coordinated by the Al-Qaeda terrorist network against U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.15 While Congress supported these retaliatory strikes, it balked at the White House failure to adhere to the War Powers Resolution.16 President Reagan’s level of consultation with Congress prior to the Libya bombing was somewhat unique. In January 1986, Reagan submitted Executive Order 12543, which decreed that a state of emergency existed between the United States and Libya. After that, the president did not petition Congress for an authorization to use force, justifying his actions as commander-in-chief, which he claimed were unquestioned.17 However, the issue of war powers was first raised on March 24, when Libyan forces fired missiles at U.S. aircraft operating in the Gulf of Sidra. In response, the U.S. fired missiles at Libyan vessels in defense of the U.S. naval presence in the gulf. Subsequently, on April 5, a terrorist bombing of a discotheque in West Berlin occurred, and an American soldier was killed. On April 14, President Reagan announced there was irrefutable evidence that Libya had been responsible, and U.S. Air Force planes commenced bombing strikes on headquarters, terrorist facilities, and military installations in Libya in response. The President reported both terror attacks cases to Congress although the report on the bombing did not cite section 4(a) (1) of the War Powers Resolution and the Gulf of Sidra report did not mention the War Powers Resolution. Since the actions were short lived, there was no issue of force withdrawal, but senators introduced bills to amend the War Powers Resolution. S.J. Res. 340 called for improving consultation by establishing a special consultative group in Congress, and an anti-terrorism bill demanded specific cooperation between the president and Congress on authorizing force in response to terror attacks was introduced.18

Grimmett, “War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance.” Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for Congress, March 24, 2003. Available at: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/19134.pdf. 13 In fact, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance resigned in protest of Carter’s failure to notify Congress in advance of the military operation as well as National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski’s dominance of Carter’s foreign policy agenda. For more, see Robert A. Strong, Working in the World. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000). 14 George Stephanopoulos, All Too Human (A Political Education). (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1999). 15 For an excellent study of global terrorism and its impact of US interests, see Walter Landers and Todd Sandler, “Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era.” International Studies Quarterly 43 (1999). 16 For an excellent analysis of how the Republican Congress criticized Clinton’s foreign policy in general and his decision to use force against Al-Qaeda in the absence of congressional support, see: Reihan Salam, “Guide to the Iraq Debate,” The New Republic, October 13, 2003. 17 Steven V. Roberts, “Attack on Libya: The View From Capital Hill,” New York Times, April 15, 1986, 17. 18 S.J.Res. 340 was introduced on May 8, 1986. It was not acted upon although the proposal was later incorporated in other proposed amendments. The Anti Terrorism bill, formalized as S. 2335 and H.R. 4611 and introduced on April 17, 1986, was never acted upon.

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PRESIDENTIAL DECISION-MAKING Empirical research on presidential foreign policy advisory systems assists our examination of President Reagan’s decision to attack Libya. Richard E. Neustadt advances the concepts of backward mapping and forward planning to aid us in the understanding of presidential foreign policy advisory systems. Backward mapping involves the president and his advisers’ level of confidence that his decision will produce a desired political result. Put simply, how will the president’s decision facilitate the attainment of his political objectives? A president formulates effective decisions when he believes the opportunity to act has arrived, and his advisers will determine the steps needed to maximize the results.19 Therefore, it is important to consider Neustadt’s backward mapping concept since it allows both scholars and policymakers to discern how President Reagan estimated the effects of a U.S. military strike on disrupting terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens and property. Forward planning involves the president’s management of the foreign policy process, and how it promotes the attainment of his established objectives. The president and his advisers must be constantly aware of the domestic and international political consequences of a decision to use force; and to consider any available information and advice that may alter the decision’s goals. However, forward planning is highly problematic, given the array of domestic political pressures on presidents to act.20 For example, why did Reagan attack Libya while trading arms for hostages with Iran at the same time? Similarly, Alexander L. George contends that case studies of particular events, such as presidential decision-making and foreign policy advisory systems, must be contextual. He advances four principles, in order to develop a discriminatory assessment of individual cases. First, George delineates that presidential decision-making involves trade-offs between policy quality, the need for support from others, and the need for timely action. A president is often faced with deciding how much of their political capital and resources should be spent in order to obtain a higher quality decision. Second, a thorough examination of the problems, information, and available options immediately prior to identifying choices is not always necessary to make a sound decision. A president must establish limits, and define the parameters within which the development of choices takes place. Third, effective decisions can be made in the absence of unity within the president’s inner circle. A president can have a poorly constructed or flawed foreign policymaking process, and rely on personal or organizational resources between his advisory groups to strengthen his decisions. Finally, presidents do not always consult with their advisers in order to receive information and advice; he must have an incentive to consult, which is of course circumstantial.21 A president’s personality and management style directly affects the structure of his advisory groups, and the array of options available to him.22 19

Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership. (New York: John Wiley, 1960). Ibid. Alexander L. George, “From Groupthink to Contextual Analysis of Policymaking Groups.” In Paul 't Hart, Eric K. Stern, Bengt Sundelius, Eds. Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policymaking. (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 44 – 50. 22 Alexander L. George, Presidential Decision-making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1980); Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader. (New York: Basic Books, 1982); Richard Tanner Johnson, Managing the White House: An Intimate Study of the Presidency. (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). 20 21

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Of course, research has demonstrated that presidential management style can also affect the parameters of president-adviser relations, influence small group characteristics, and shape the political roles played by advisers in establishing options for the president.23 Jean A. Garrison argues that a more open and undisciplined advisory system provides key foreign policy advisers, especially the secretary of state and the national security adviser, with equally consequential status with respect to the president, enabling them to compete with one another and effectively promote their favor policy alternatives in decision-making. In her study of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in the Carter administration, Garrison observes that the open and undisciplined system contributed to significant policy differences over specific issues, which produced what she describes as “an all-out framing war” that weakened the ability of the president to direct his own foreign policy program. Her findings are particularly significant to the study of the Reagan administration’s use of force against Libya, since the organization of the president’s foreign policy advisory system has a direct influence on policy outcomes.24 Moreover, presidential preferences for policy choices will determine how the president processes advice from subordinates, and how his advisory structures and institutions coordinate issues in the greater policymaking process.25 As noted by Stephen Hess, President Reagan preferred to convey, “general goals…letting his subordinates work out the details.”26 Reagan White House Counsel Peter Wallison described the president’s management style as one focused on broad ideological goals, in which specific policy decisions were delegated to his staff. Wallison argues that these very same qualities permitted the devastation wrought by the Iran-Contra affair.27 Reagan himself described his advisory system in the following way: “You surround yourself with the best people you can find, delegate authority, and do not interfere as long as the overall policy that you have decided upon is being carried out.”28 Reagan’s worldview also influenced the ability of his advisers to identify policy options. As demonstrated by Betty Glad, Reagan frequently used simple-minded analogies, stereotypes, and enemy-images to ongoing events in both foreign and domestic affairs.29 While this limited Reagan’s options, it enabled him to act decisively, although at times hastily, on such foreign policy issues as global terrorism and the Soviet Union. Overall, presidential decisions are sharply defined by pressures that complicate the attainment of the president’s goals. Most of the time, presidents decide quickly how to 23

Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Jean A. Garrison, Games Advisers Play (College Station, TX: Texas A & M Press, 1999); Margaret G. Hermann and Thomas Preston, “Presidents, Advisers, and Foreign Policy; The Effect of Leadership Style on Executive Arrangements,” Political Psychology 15 (1): 75 – 96; Thomas Preston, The President and His Inner Circle (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Thomas Preston, “Following the Leaders?: The Impact of U.S. Presidential Style Upon Advisory Group Dynamics, Structure, and Decision.” In Paul t’Hart, Eric Stern Bengt Sundelius, Eds. In Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policymaking (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 191-248; Jerel A. Rosati, The Carter Administration’s Quest for the Global Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on Behavior (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1982). 24 Jean A. Garrison, “Framing Foreign Policy Alternatives in the Inner Circle: President Carter, His Advisors, and the Struggle for the Arms Control Agenda,” Political Psychology 22, 4 (2001): 775-807. 25 Stephen Hess, Organizing the Presidency. (Washington DC: Brookings, 1988); Johnson, Managing the White House. 26 Hess, Organizing the Presidency, 143. 27 Peter Wallison, Ronald Reagan: The Power of Conviction and the Success of his Presidency (New York: Westview Press, 2002). 28 Reagan’s description of his management style and organizational preference can be found in Ann Reilly Dowd, “What Managers can Learn from Manager Reagan,” Fortune. September 15, 1986, 36. 29 Betty Glad, “Black and White Thinking: Reagan’s Approach to Foreign Policy,” Political Psychology. 4: 33 – 76.

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respond to threats, surprises, and unexpected terrorist actions.30 Presidents must also be aware of their foreign policy objectives, management style, worldview, national security strategy, and relations with U.S. allies and coalitions. Furthermore, presidents have to be mindful of the domestic political context that structures whether or not a decision will be made. The exercise of what is perceived to be strong presidential leadership ultimately influences the degree of success in persuading others to fall in line.

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION FOREIGN POLICY APPARATUS In order to investigate how the decision to bomb Libya was made, it is necessary to examine the components of Reagan’s foreign policy process. Ronald Reagan came into office committed to cabinet style government. Witnessing the paralyzing problems of his predecessor, Reagan downgraded the role and prestige of the national security adviser position while upgrading the role of his cabinet officials. From the start, however, it appeared that Reagan’s national security process would fare no better than Carter’s. His first assistant for national security affairs, Richard Allen, was ineffective and not perceived as a team player. After allegations of financial wrongdoing, Allen was fired and replaced by Reagan’s friend William Clark in 1982. Although Clark had little experience in national security matters, he succeeded in bolstering the prestige of the national security adviser position. Clark then left his post for another cabinet position in 1983, and was succeeded by Robert McFarlane. Although technically much more competent than Clark, McFarlane never enjoyed the same access to the President that Clark had.31 McFarlane resigned in December 1985, and was succeeded by Vice Admiral John Poindexter, his deputy on the NSC staff. Reagan’s first Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, was surprisingly vocal and critical of Reagan’s foreign policy process. He frequently clashed with Richard Allen and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger over who was the primary foreign policy adviser to the president.32 After Haig was dismissed in 1982, he was succeeded by George Shultz who held the position for the remainder of the Reagan presidency. As time wore on, Reagan relied upon Shultz increasingly as a foreign policy adviser. Their counterpart was Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, an old Reagan friend. Although Weinberger lacked much of the technical expertise required for such a position, he enjoyed great access to the President. In 1986, the NSC/Principals Committee consisted of the statutory members: VicePresident George H.W. Bush, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, and Secretary of State Shultz. Other critical members of Reagan’s foreign policy team included Assistant for National Security Affairs Poindexter, Chief of Staff Donald Regan, and Director of Central Intelligence William Casey. The foreign policy apparatus at that time was characterized by the strict control of Chief of Staff Donald Regan. Regan acted as a filter through which access to the President was

30

George, Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy, chapter 8; Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960); Preston, The President and His Inner Circle. 31 E.g., see John P. Burke, The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton, 2nd Edition (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2000) and Hess, Organizing the Presidency. 32 Godfrey Sperling, “Reagan’s Problems with the Press,” Christian Science Monitor, November 16, 1981.

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tightly managed and involved few people.33 However, even with this tight command by Regan, the process tended to be disordered and tumultuous. In part, the reason for this is due to Reagan’s management style as he delegated authority to a fault. Instead of being in the center of foreign policy decisions and evaluating information on the subject at hand, Reagan preferred to remain at the periphery and to let his policy advisers analyze information and derive policy options.34 The NSC was not a dynamic body in which policy options were analyzed and decisions were hammered out. Instead, it was an institution decaying from lack of innovation. In a September, 1986 interview Reagan commented about his Cabinet meetings: “I use a system in which I want to hear what everybody wants to say honestly...I encourage all the input that I can get...and when I’ve heard all that I need to make a decision, I don’t take a vote. I make the decision.”35 This rather idealized view by Reagan has been discounted by many who served under him and who study him. Especially after Donald Regan became chief of staff; and streamlined the chain of command, open and substantive debate involving the President was not a regular part of the agenda.36 A Time article highlighted this situation at the White House in 1986: “In two years as chief of staff, Donald Regan has kept most of such controversy [open debate and disagreement] away from the President. Regan generally mediates the battles and presents the President with sanitized position papers that give little hint of the cacophony outside.”37 Regan had his share of troubles with other members of the White House staff. His relationship with Reagan’s national security advisers was shaky at best. Some posit that McFarlane’s departure in December 1985 was in part due to Regan. A U.S. News & World Report article asserted as much: The exit of McFarlane did not surprise insiders. Friends say he was physically exhausted and becoming frustrated by the president’s disinterest in the analytical briefings that were his specialty. Despite denials by both McFarlane and the President, sources also made clear that he resented what he saw as the chief of staff’s meddling in his area and attempts to choke off 38 access to the Oval Office.

The informality of the Reagan national security apparatus in turn resulted in pockets of independent and unscrupulous action. Vice-Admiral Poindexter, and his predecessor Robert McFarlane, transformed the NSC staff into a clandestine policy-making and policyimplementing body. The Iran-Contra scandal actively promoted and executed by the NSC

33

Ann Reilley Dowd, “Learning From Reagan’s Debacle,” Fortune, 27 April 1987, p.170. E.g., Donald T. Regan. For The Record: From Wall Street to Washington (New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988); see also Burke, The Institutional Presidency and Hess, Organizing the Presidency. 35 Ann Reilley Dowd, “What Managers Can Learn From Manager Reagan,” Fortune, 15 September 1986, p.36. 36 E.g., see David B. Cohen, “From the Fabulous Baker Boys to the Master of Disaster: The White House Chief of Staff in the Reagan and G.H.W. Bush Administrations,” Presidential Studies Quarterly Vol.32, #3 (2002) September, pp.463-83 and David B. Cohen, Chris J. Dolan, and Jerel A. Rosati, “A Place at the Table: The Emerging Foreign Policy Roles of the White House Chief of Staff” Congress & the Presidency Vol.29, #2 (2002). 37 George J. Church, “Is He More Out of Touch Than Ever,” Time, 26 January 1987, p.17. 38 William L. Chaze et al., “White House Shake-Up,” U.S. News & World Report, 16 December 1985, p.20. 34

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staff, was by far the biggest embarrassment of the Reagan administration and in effect incapacitated Reagan’s foreign policy for the remainder of his term.39 The problems stemmed in large part from the way Reagan designed his foreign-policy machinery. Determined to avoid the conflicts that raged between the State Department and the National Security Council under Jimmy Carter, Reagan downgraded the NSC from a policymaking and control group to little more than a funnel for policies generated by the strong-minded secretaries. Reagan also favored conservative ideology over ability or experience in filling foreign-policy slots, particularly at the NSC.40 For all the control Regan tried to assert on the other members of Reagan’s team, the administration was besieged by internal squabbles from the first term. Shultz and Weinberger rarely agreed on any subject. A key issue on which both advisers continued to strongly disagree was over the deployment of military force in Lebanon in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the U.S. Marine barracks in October 1983. Schultz argued vehemently that the Marines should have remained in place, and that any retreat from Lebanon would be a sign of weakness. Weinberger opposed the contined military presence, arguing in favor of an immediate withdrawal and against the use of retaliatory force. Although Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff convinced President Reagan to order the withdrawal, any hope for cooperation between Schultz and Weinberger had deteriorated. Another issue on which each adviser sparred was U.S.-Israeli relations. Weinberger was resistant to closer relations between the two nations; whereas Schultz, National Security Adviser William Clark, and President Reagan himself were among Israel’s stronger supporters.41 The tension between Shultz and Weinberger was further aggravated by the rivalry between the departments of State and Defense. Brian Davis asserted that it was Reagan’s weakness that allowed the bickering of Cabinet officials to continue unabated, and thus Reagan’s foreign policy became prostrate. He commented that: Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger disagreed on most serious policy issues, compounding their long-standing personal antipathy.…The most fundamental problem was the passivity of a president whose interest in foreign affairs was known to be weak, [and] his failure to referee among factions and impose decisions upon 42 them.

Even President Reagan stated that there were problems between his Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense: “Cap Weinberger and George Shultz never got along especially well together. There was always a little chill—a tension—between them.”43

39

E.g., see Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime. (New York: Public Affairs, 2000). Lawrence E. Walsh and Patrick C. Walsh, Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover up. (New York: WW Norton and Company, 1997). 40 David Alperin, “Who Makes US Foreign Policy?” Newsweek, November 9, 1981, 32. 41 For more on the conflicting relationship between Schultz and Weinberger on these and other issues, see: Bernard Gwertzman, “Schultz’s Address Touches Off Stir in Administration.” New York Times 26, October 1983, p.1. See also Jeffery Record, “Weinberger-Powell Doctrine Doesn’t Cut It” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126, no. 10, October 2000, p.35. 42 Brian L. Davis, Qadhafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya (New York: Praeger, 1990), p.62. 43 Reagan, p.511.

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On one subject Shultz and Weinberger agreed: Iran-Contra. From the start both men opposed the secret arms sales to Iran, and both felt that the NSC staff and Regan were not protecting the President. Reagan asserted as much in his memoirs: “while George and Cap disagreed on many topics, they were united on one thing: Almost from the day Bud McFarlane brought us the proposal for arms sales to Iran, they were against it.”44 Caspar Weinberger’s criticism of the NSC staff on the subject of Iran-Contra is especially poignant: The President was misled and badly served by Robert McFarlane and some of his staff who should never have been appointed to the White House staff, and who were completely unwilling to recognize their own severe limitations of intellect, or moral principles, or any real understanding of history….I always expressed the most vigorous opposition, as did Secretary 45 Shultz, to the whole plan.

So what exactly are the images of Reagan’s foreign policy apparatus in 1986? The system, which in theory is to be run by the President, appears to be one of informality to the point of disarray. Reagan was passive and detached, delegating much of his authority to subordinates. Chief of Staff Regan attempted to assert complete control over the national security network, thus positioning himself as a buffer between Reagan and other policy advisers. Although the role of the national security adviser was downgraded from the start, both McFarlane and Poindexter operated independently in making policy decisions. What appeared to be a weakened role for the national security adviser and his staff, is in essence quite the opposite—a national security adviser and a NSC staff frequently out of control.46 We are thus left with a picture of disorganization and chaos pervading the Reagan White House. For all of Reagan’s criticisms of the Carter presidency, the Reagan administration’s national security apparatus fared little better.

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, QADHAFI, AND TERRORISM: 1981-1985 From day one, the Reagan administration was forced to confront the growing problem of terrorism. The lessons of the Carter administration’s losing battle against terrorism were well known. The hostage crisis, which began on November 4, 1979, crippled the last year of Jimmy Carter’s presidency as he was unable to resolve the crisis and bring home the hostages. The failed April 1980 hostage rescue attempt marked the nadir of the Carter presidency. The apparent helplessness and frustration of the Carter administration’s attempts to secure the release of the Embassy hostages did not go unnoticed by Reagan. In early speeches, he vehemently denounced terrorism and promised a more aggressive and effective counterterrorism policy. The Reagan administration started on an emotional high as all 52 U.S. hostages were released by Iran minutes after Reagan was sworn into office. This would be the pinnacle of 44

Reagan, p.512. Weinberger, pp.353-373. 46 Although it has not been discussed here, Director of Central Intelligence William Casey was a major figure in Reagan’s national security network as well. E.g., see Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 19811987 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987). 45

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the Reagan administration’s campaign against terrorism. Over the next eight years, U.S. citizens from Beirut to Berlin, El Salvador to Zimbabwe found themselves victims of heinous terrorist acts. Table 1 provides a brief chronology of major terrorist incidents involving Americans that occurred during the Reagan administration’s first term.47 Table 1: Major Terrorist Incidents Involving Americans, 1981-1986 April 18, 1983 October 23, 1983

December 12, 1983 September 20,1984 November 20, 1984

December 3, 1984

June 14, 1985 June 19, 1985 August 8, 1985 October 7, 1985 November 23, 1985

December 27, 1985

U.S. Embassy in Beirut is blown up by a van packed with explosives; 63 people killed, 17 Americans dead The headquarters of the U.S. Marine Battalion Landing Team in Beirut is blown up by a truck packed with explosives; 241 Americans killed. Suicide squads attack U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait; five people are killed A van carrying explosives detonates outside of the U.S. Embassy annex in Christian East Beirut; two U.S. servicemen are killed A truck bomb exploded outside the Aukar, Lebanon annex of the U.S. embassy in Beirut. Twenty-four people are killed including 2 U.S. military personnel Kuwait Airways Flight 221 from Kuwait to Pakistan was hijacked and diverted to Tehran. Two passengers who were U.S. government employees were murdered TWA Flight 847 is hijacked en route to Rome; one U.S. Navy diver is murdered Six Americans (four U.S. Marines and two American businessman) are murdered outside a café in San Salvador, El Salvador A car bomb explodes outside the U.S. Rhein-Main Air Base near Frankfurt, Germany killing two Americans Italian cruise liner, the Achille Lauro, is hijacked off the coast of Egypt; one American passenger is murdered Egypt Air Flight 648 enroute from Athens to Cairo is hijacked to Malta. During the rescue operation, 60 passengers are killed including one American Terrorists simultaneously attack Rome and Vienna airport ticket counters; 20 people murdered, 5 Americans

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND QADHAFI: A ROUGH BEGINNING From inauguration day, it was obvious that Reagan and Libyan leader, Mu’ammar Qadhafi, would have difficulties. With the new administration, there came a new outlook on 47

The information for this chronology was extracted from David C. Martin and John Walcott, Best Laid Plans, (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), pp.xv-xx.

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Libya. Jimmy Carter’s policy toward Libya embodied increasing displeasure with Qadhafi and a decline in relations; Reagan’s policy was immediately hostile and condemnatory. Seven months after taking office, Reagan faced the first of many challenges by Qadhafi. In August 1981, the U.S. Navy’s Sixth Fleet was taking part in maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra. For years Qadhafi had claimed that the Gulf, which is nestled between two northern Libyan promontories, was his “lake” and was not to be considered international waters. Officially, these maneuvers were routine naval exercises in international waters. Unofficially, the positioning of the Sixth Fleet was a ploy by the Reagan administration to provoke Qadhafi. On August 19, two Libyan SU-22s fired on two American Navy F-14s 30 miles off the coast of Libya. The Libyans missed their targets and were subsequently shot down by the Navy fighters.48 Following this episode, Qadhafi was so enraged he vowed to assassinate Reagan and other U.S. diplomats. This further confirmed what the administration already suspected: that Qadhafi was insane. Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, said of Qadhafi: Qadhafi is a theatrically posturing, fake mystic, with a considerable dollop of madness thrown in. Rumors have long circulated in intelligence circles that he suffers from an incurable venereal disease, and that the disease accounts for occasional bouts of madness exhibiting 49 hysteria, braggadocio and extreme theatricalism.

President Reagan, in response to a reporter’s question at a news conference, said of Qadhafi, “how can you not take seriously a man that has proven that he is as irrational as he is on things of this kind [terrorism]. I find he’s not only a barbarian, but he’s flaky.”50

1985: 3 Terrorist Incidents Push Reagan into Action Terrorism was heating up in 1985. As the publicity and attention for acts of terrorism increased, so did the pressure on the Reagan administration to respond. Three events were particularly important in eliciting a tougher response from the administration. The hijacking of TWA Flight 847 on June 14 was the first of these critical events. In a highly publicized affair, a Lebanese Shiite group, Hezbollah, hijacked Flight 847 en route to Rome from Athens. One American Navy diver was murdered; and his body was thrown out on to the tarmac for millions of television viewers to see. The affair lasted over two weeks, and the ostensible helplessness of the Reagan administration to deal with the situation invoked images of Jimmy Carter. The crisis eventually ended without any further loss of life. Surprisingly, this was accomplished with the help and intervention of Syrian leader Hafez Assad. Following the crisis, Reagan instructed Vice-President Bush to head a task force to investigate terrorism and possible counter-terrorist responses.51

48

Davis, p.47. Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting For Peace (New York: Warner Books, 1990), p.175. 50 “The President’s News Conference: January 7, 1986,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1986, Book I, (Washington, DC, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration), p.21. 51 Martin and Wolcott, pp.161-202. 49

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The hijacking of the Italian cruise ship, the Achille Lauro, was another troubling episode for the Reagan administration. Shortly after setting sail from Alexandria, Egypt on October 7, 1985, the cruise-liner was commandeered by four armed gunmen affiliated with the Palestinian Liberation Front, and headed by Abu Abbas, a known terrorist kingpin. The crisis lasted three days and resulted in the murder of an elderly American, Leon Klinghoffer, who was shot in the head and chest by one of the terrorists. The crisis was defused after the terrorists were given a get-away plane and the rest of the passengers were set free. Again, the Reagan administration seemed powerless; however, a secret plan to intercept the hijacker’s plane in the air was devised by Vice-Admiral John Poindexter, a member of the NSC staff, and approved by Reagan.52 The hijacker’s plane was intercepted successfully by U.S. Navy fighters, and forced to land at Sigonella, Sicily. After a three way standoff between Italian, American, and Egyptian forces, the terrorists were handed over to the Italian government.53 The interception was highly popular in the United States, and gave the country hope that the administration could effectively combat terrorism. President Reagan was particularly upbeat: Events of the past 24 hours reinforce the determination of all of those who share the privileges of freedom and liberty to join together in countering the scourge of international terrorism...[America has] sent a message to terrorists everywhere. The message: you can run 54 but you can’t hide.

The excitement for the administration was short lived, however. On December 27, in one of the most grisly incidents in recent times, 20 innocent people were gunned down at airport ticket counters in Rome, Italy, and Vienna, Austria, in simultaneous attacks.55 Five of the dead were Americans, including an 11 year-old girl who was shot in the head at point-blank range. As networks broadcast the gruesome scenes on television, the event sent a shock wave through the American public. The Abu Nidal terrorist organization was implicated in the massacres and a Libyan link was suspected. Not only was it well known that Qadhafi was one of Nidal’s biggest sponsors, Libya praised the airport massacres as “heroic operations.”56 Also, Tunisian passports that were confiscated or stolen by Libyan authorities from Tunisian workers in Libya were found on the terrorists after the airport attacks.57

52

Poindexter would later become national security adviser under President Reagan and it is thought that the plan helped Poindexter to secure the job when Robert McFarlane stepped down. 53 Martin and Wolcott, pp.235-257. 54 “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters: October 11, 1985,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1985, Book II, (Washington, DC, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration), pp.1231-1232. 55 There was disagreement in the Administration concerning what U.S. reaction to the airport massacres should have been. Many in the Administration, such as Shultz and the NSC staff, favored an immediate retaliatory strike on Libya. Others, including Reagan, Weinberger, and the JCS, felt that the evidence was not solid enough to unequivocally prove a Libyan connection. Absent a smoking gun, Reagan opted to try economic sanctions and wait for a better opportunity to use the big stick. See Davis, p.82., Martin and Wolcott, p.274., & Hersh p.19. Another event that occurred in response to the airport massacres was the almost immediate response of the Administration in drawing up contingency plans. Although there is dispute as to which agency or policy-making body was responsible for this, contingency plans were nevertheless started in early January, 1986. See Davis, p.82., Weinberger, p.188., & Hersh, p.48. 56 Davis, pp.78-79. 57 Martin and Wolcott, p.268.

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OPTIONS AND OBJECTIVES Economic Sanctions Shortly following the brutal incidents in Rome and Vienna, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J. Crowe initiated contingency plans for a military strike against Libya in the event that the President ordered a military response.58 Reagan himself recalls that, following the airport massacres, the United States “couldn’t ignore the mad clown of Tripoli any longer. By now, we had a shelf full of contingency plans designed to express in a concrete way our displeasure with his terrorism.”59 Vice-President Bush’s task force on terrorism endorsed the use of military force as a way of combating terrorism. The report, which was made public in February, 1986, stated: When perpetrators of terrorism can be identified and located, our policy is to act against terrorism.…We are prepared to act in concert with other nations, or unilaterally when necessary, to prevent or respond to terrorist acts. A successful deterrent strategy may require 60 judicious employment of military force to resolve an incident.

Libya would indeed be the main target of the administration’s war on terrorism. Because of the evidence the United States had obtained that Qadhafi was implicated in the airport massacres, Libya became the primary target of U.S. counter-terrorism efforts. It was, however, necessary to take a preliminary step, short of military action, in order to initiate this counter-terrorism policy. On January 7, 1986, President Reagan signed Executive Order 12543 which called into effect a national emergency with respect to Libya, and instituted stiff economic sanctions. Among other things, E.O. 12543 prohibited trade with Libya (with certain exceptions for humanitarian goods or publications), and ordered all U.S. citizens and companies to leave there as soon as possible.61 In discussing the reasons for the economic sanctions, Reagan pointed toward Qadhafi’s connection to the Rome and Vienna massacres, and his tacit support of Abu Nidal and other terrorist organizations: The Rome and Vienna murders are only the latest in a series of brutal terrorist acts committed with Qadhafi’s backing. Qadhafi and other Libyan officials have publicly admitted that the Libyan Government has abetted and supported the notorious Abu Nidal terrorist group, which was directly responsible for the Rome and Vienna attacks. Qadhafi called them heroic actions, 62 and I call them criminal outrages by an outlaw regime.

58

Davis, p.81. Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), p.511. 60 “Public Report of the Vice President’s Task Force On Combating Terrorism,” (Washington, DC: USGPO), February 1986, p.9. Available at: http://www.population-security.org/bush_and_terror.pdf. 61 “Executive Order 12543-Prohibiting Trade and Certain Transactions Involving Libya: January 7, 1986,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1986, Book I, (Washington, DC, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration), pp.14-15. 62 “The President’s News Conference: January 7, 1986,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1986, Book I, (Washington, DC, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration), p.17. 59

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Officially, the administration had the view that economic sanctions would deter Libya from any further support of terrorism. Unofficially, sanctions appeared to be a formality opening the door for a military response. Martin and Wolcott asserted that “the sanctions were only a first step. Having got them out of the way, [Deputy National Security Adviser] Donald Fortier said, people will step up to more forceful actions.”63 Implicit in Reagan’s comments on the sanctions was that the United States would consider the military option if Qadhafi did not curb his sponsorship of terrorism. Reagan hinted that he would take military action when he threatened that “if these steps do not end Qadhafi’s terrorism, I promise you that further steps will be taken.”64 Another reason for instituting economic sanctions was to buy time in order to get U.S. nationals out of Libya. It was thought at the time that there were upwards of 1000 Americans in Libya at the beginning of 1986. If any military action were taken against Libya before those citizens had left, Qadhafi would have ample opportunity to kidnap and use them for political purposes. Reagan acknowledged that this was a factor in his imposing economic sanctions and subsequently ordering all Americans to leave Libya: “whatever we did [in terms of a response to the airport massacres], we had to take into account the presence of nearly one thousand American oil workers in Libya. Qadhafi wouldn’t think twice about taking his vengeance on them.”65 Other reasons why Reagan initially opposed a military strike on Libya, and instead opted for economic sanctions included the possibility of killing Libyan and other civilians; killing Soviet advisers; American fighters being shot down, and/or the possibility that an American fighter pilot would be captured; responses of other Arab governments and peoples; retaliation by terrorists; and, world opinion.66 Ultimately, economic sanctions failed to alter Qadhafi’s behavior and the fact that Europe did not institute sanctions did not help matters. Since terrorism was as much a European problem as it was an American problem, the administration had hoped that Western European nations would help isolate Libya. Instead, because of economic self-interest and fears of terrorist reprisals, countries such as Great Britain and France refused to break economic ties with Qadhafi. The vacuum that was left in Libya when U.S. companies departed was quickly filled by nations clamoring for an easy profit. Only one month after U.S. sanctions were instituted, France struck a secret deal with the Libyans to sell them Exocet anti-ship missiles, aware that those missiles may be used against U.S. naval forces.67 This action by Europe was in defiance of Reagan who commented during his announcement of economic sanctions that: Qadhafi deserves to be treated as a pariah in the world community. We call on our friends in Western Europe and elsewhere to join with us in isolating him. Americans will not understand 68 other nations moving into Libya to take commercial advantage of our departure.

63

Martin and Wolcott, p.276. “The President’s News Conference: January 7, 1986,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1986, Book I, (Washington, DC, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration), p.18. 65 Reagan, p.511. 66 Davis, p.82. 67 Davis, p.102. 68 “The President’s News Conference: January 7, 1986,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1986, Book I, (Washington, DC, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration), pp.17-18. 64

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Operations in the Vicinity of Libya Following the initiation of economic sanctions, the Reagan administration decided to send the Sixth Fleet back to the Gulf of Sidra.69 This move was officially intended to reassert America’s right of passage in international waters. Unofficially, the Operations in the Vicinity of Libya (OVL), as it was known, was intended to taunt Qadhafi and to show U.S. resolve in the face of Libyan threats.70 The military operations began in late January, 1986, and consisted of three phases with each phase designed to up the ante of confrontation. The first phase began near the end of the month and resulted in 14 encounters between United States and Libyan aircraft. The second phase took place between February 12 and 15 and resulted in over 160 encounters between United States and Libyan fighters.71 In the third phase of OVL, labeled Operation Prairie Fire, U.S. naval forces erased Qadhafi’s so-called “line of death” (parallel 32o30’ north latitude).72 Pushing ever closer toward Libya, the administration finally got Qadhafi to react. At 3:00 p.m., on March 23, Libyan forces fired 2 SA-5 missiles at U.S. planes. With Qadhafi initiating hostilities, the United States was able to respond in kind under the aegis of self-defense. The U.S. Navy proceeded to knock out Libyan radar stations and several attack boats. The United States suffered no casualties, while Libya lost dozens of military personnel.73 Had any American serviceman been killed, the United States was prepared to respond with overwhelming force against military and possibly economic targets on the Libyan mainland.74 Polls showed the American public supported the Navy’s actions in the Gulf with a whopping 75 percent approval rating.75 Following the incidents, President Reagan telephoned Vice Admiral Frank Kelso, the Commander of the Sixth Fleet, and congratulated him for sending “a message to the whole world that the United States has the will and...the ability to defend the free world’s interests.”76 The confrontation in the Gulf of Sidra, however, did not deter Qadhafi from further acts of terrorism. Less than two weeks later, on April 5, a bomb exploded in the West Berlin discotheque, the La Belle, a known hangout for American military personnel. Three people

69

Following the Rome and Vienna airport massacres, Ronald Reagan approved the Navy show of force, the Operations in the Vicinity of Libya (OVL). See Davis, p.82. 70 E.g., see Tim Zimmerman, “The American Bombing of Libya,” Survival, vol.29 (May/June 1987), p.204. 71 Martin and Wolcott, pp.278-279. 72 Reagan approved Operation Prairie Fire, the third stage of OVL, sometime in mid-March. Both Davis and Weinberger assert that Reagan’s decision to approve Prairie Fire occurred at a NSPG meeting March 14, 1986; see Davis, p.103, and Weinberger, p.182. There is evidence that in discussing the rules of engagement for the upcoming Prairie Fire operation, there was a serious disagreement concerning level of force. Some in the Administration, including Shultz and the NSC staff, wanted a disproportionate response on Libyan mainland targets if Qadhafi attacked the Sixth Fleet. Others including Weinberger and Crowe called for a proportional response in which the United States would respond tit-for-tat against Libyan military targets. A compromise was worked out in which the United States would only respond in kind unless any U.S. personnel were killed, in which case a U.S. strike on Libyan military, political, and economic targets would ensue. See Seymour M. Hersh, “Target Qadhafi,” New York Times Magazine, 2 February 1987, p.71., & Davis, p.103. for more details. 73 Richard Stengel, “Sailing in Harm’s Way,” Time, 7 April 1986, pp.16-24. 74 Davis, p.103. 75 Robert Oakley, “International Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, (America and the World 1986), p.616. 76 “Remarks by Telephone to Vice Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, Commander of the United States 6th Fleet: March 27, 1986,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1986, Book I, (Washington, DC, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration), p.407.

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were killed including two U.S. servicemen, and over 250 people were injured.77 British intelligence services had intercepted and decoded messages before and after the incident from Libya linking it to the bombing. The evidence was damning and the Reagan administration had its “smoking gun.”78 This incident, coupled with the explosion three days earlier on board TWA Flight 840 in which four Americans were killed, greatly increased the pressure on the administration to act in a forceful way against Libya.79

Operation El Dorado Canyon Ronald Reagan recalled that shortly following the La Belle disco bombing, he immediately decided on a more lethal military response.80 He asserted: I felt we had no alternative but a military response: As a matter of self-defense, any nation victimized by terrorism has an inherent right to respond with force to deter new acts of terror. I felt we must show Qadhafi that there was a price he would have to pay for that kind of 81 behavior, that we wouldn’t let him get away with it.

Caspar Weinberger similarly recalled the decision to strike Libya being made shortly after the La Belle bombing. He stated that after messages were intercepted linking Libya to the bombing, “we had our proof. And so we [the Reagan administration] decided to give the focused response to terrorism that we had always planned to deliver when our proof was clear.”82 Operation El Dorado Canyon began on April 14, as 29 USAF F-111’s and 28 USAF refueling tankers took off from bases in Great Britain. It took a great deal of arm-twisting to convince British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to allow the F-111’s based in the U.K. to be used.83 After weeks of publicly stating that a U.S. retaliatory strike against Libya would be in violation of international law, Thatcher finally agreed to permit the use of those fighters stationed in Britain. Ultimately, Reagan convinced Thatcher that a retaliatory strike against Libya, specifically aimed at terrorist support facilities while avoiding civilian areas, would indeed be self-defense. Thatcher was quoted as saying such a military attack would be “fully

77

Oakley, p.617. Davis, pp.115-116. 79 There was, however, little evidence that Libya was responsible. Martin and Wolcott, pp.285-286. 80 The decision to bomb Libya was made following the La Belle discotheque bombing. The evidence, it was felt by Reagan, was irrefutable, and thus he decided quickly to commence with Operation El Dorado Canyon. In fact, Weinberger stated that following the La Belle bombing, Reagan was “anxious to do the attack as soon as all was ready.” Weinberger p.190. Although it is unclear at exactly what point Reagan decided to go ahead with the operation, it appears that he decided on April 5 or 6, shortly following the presentation of evidence from the La Belle attack. See Reagan, pp.518-519., Weinberger, p.190., Hersh, p.74., & Davis, p.119. Davis contends that Reagan tentatively agreed on April 6 and signed a National Security Decision Directive on April 9. 81 Reagan, p.518. 82 Weinberger, p.188. Following the La Belle bombing, Reagan received widespread approval from his advisers to strike at Libya. If there was dissent, it was not expressed. This is significant as this was the first time Reagan had unanimous support to initiate a military strike on Libya, and thus the pressure to act must have been enormous. It is evident that in the absence of Cabinet support, Reagan would have pressed ahead with El Dorado Canyon. See Davis, p.119., & Weinberger, p.188. 83 William R. Doerner, “In the Dead of the Night,” Time, 28 April 1986, p.28. 78

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consistent with the right of the United States to defend itself under the inherent right of selfdefense recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.”84 Early in the morning of April 15, the F-111’s rendezvoused off the coast of Tunisia with a U.S. Navy armada consisting of 18 A-6 and A-7 strike and strike-support planes, six F/A-18 fighters, and 14 EA-6B electronic jamming aircraft as well as numerous other naval support planes. The F-111’s were forced to fly an extra 2400 miles round-trip because France and Spain refused to grant over-flight rights over their respective territories.85 French President Francois Mitterrand added insult to injury when he reportedly advised the American military attaché in Paris, who submitted the over-flight request, that the United States should go all out and “not do a pinprick.”86 Shortly before 2:00 a.m. Libyan time (7:00 p.m. EDT), the U.S. fighters approached their targets. Thirteen of the Air Force F-111’s proceeded to bomb targets in Libya’s capital city Tripoli, while twelve Navy A-6 attack bombers struck simultaneously at targets near the coastal city of Benghazi which lies across the Gulf of Sidra opposite Tripoli. The attack lasted just over eleven minutes, and resulted in substantial damage, some of it collateral. Of the targets in Tripoli, Sidi Bilal, a naval commando school, the military side of Tripoli International Airport, and the Bab al Azziziyah Barracks, Qadhafi’s home, and command and control center, were heavily damaged. Qadhafi’s eighteen month-old adopted daughter was reportedly killed, and several other members of his family were injured. Qadhafi himself was apparently shaken but relatively unharmed. U.S. officials denied that the targeting of the Azziziyah Barracks was an attempt to assassinate Qadhafi; however, it is unclear whether this was indeed the case. Benghazi targets also suffered great damage as a military barracks, and several Soviet-made Libyan jet-fighters were destroyed. The United States suffered two casualties in the strike as one of the F-111’s crashed off the coast of Tripoli killing both crew members. Tripoli also suffered much civilian damage and many civilian casualties as at least one of the 2000 pound bombs used in the raid went astray from its target, crashing into a populated area.87 It has been reported that upwards of 100 Libyans, most of them military personnel, were killed during the strike.88 Two days after the action, three previously kidnapped westerners (two Britons and one American) were found slain in Lebanon in apparent retaliation for the U.S. bombing.89 From the start, the Reagan administration called the action a resounding success. The implicit message of the bombing was that the United States would not back down from repeating such an action if it had evidence that Libya or other states were sponsoring terrorism. The day after the raid Reagan said: Yesterday the US won but a single engagement in the long battle against terrorism. We will not end that struggle until the free and decent people of this planet unite to eradicate the scourge of terror from the modern world...We would prefer not to have to repeat the events of

84

Martin and Wolcott, p.290. Doerner, pp.28-29. 86 Martin and Wolcott, p.293. 87 Doerner, pp.28-31. 88 Edward Schumacher, “The United States and Libya,” Foreign Affairs, (Winter 1986/1987), p.335. See also Frederick Zilian, Jr., “The U.S. Raid On Libya-and NATO,” Orbis, (Fall 1986), pp.509-510. 89 “Chronology 1986,” Foreign Affairs, (America and the World 1986) p.674. 85

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last night. What is required is for Libya to end its pursuit of terror for political goals. The 90 choice is theirs.

Why not Iran or Syria? The problems the Reagan administration experienced with Libya with respect to terrorism lead one to question why Iran or Syria were not seriously considered as primary targets for the administration’s military retaliation option. At the time, Iran and Syria were viewed as the two biggest supporters of Middle East terrorism. Why then did the United States not seriously consider punishing these two international pariahs as well as or instead of Libya? There are several possible explanations for this. First, both Syria and Iran had more military power than Libya, and were not only better equipped, but also better trained. The United States experienced this fact first hand after a botched air raid on Syrian anti-aircraft positions in Lebanon on December 4, 1983. The operation cost the Navy two planes, and the life of one pilot.91 Iran’s military, after years of fighting a brutal war with Iraq, would have been more experienced than Libya’s.92 Also, Iran and Syria were much more populous than Libya. Their combined populations amounted to over 45 million people compared to 3.5 million people for Libya. If the United States were to have been dragged into a prolonged conflict, this fact would have been very important. Both countries were also strategically more important to the Soviet Union. Especially in the case of Iran, military action so close to its border risked Soviet intervention, and possible escalation. More important, concurrent with the United States bombing of Libya, the Reagan Administration was pushing ahead with its Iran initiative. The initiative was an attempt by the administration to forge new links with moderates in the Iranian parliament and cabinet. It was an attempt to head off Soviet meddling in Iran’s internal affairs pending the eventual, and, what was thought at the time, imminent death of the Iranian spiritual and political leader Ayatollah Khomeini.93 It was also part of an effort to influence Iran to help secure the release of U.S. hostages being held in Lebanon in exchange for American weapons and military equipment. As Reagan’s troubles with terrorism were heating up in the 1984-1986 period, his Iran initiative was gaining momentum. Engaging in military reprisals against Iran at the same time the United States was selling arms to the Iranians would have been counterproductive. The Reagan Administration was also hoping for better relations with Syria. Hafez Assad’s intervention on behalf of the hostages in the TWA 847 episode was a positive first step. A military strike on Syria would have eliminated any Syrian thoughts of opening up to the West following the TWA 847 episode. In addition to these reasons, the fact that Qadhafi had been a thorn in Reagan’s side ever since he took office made Libya the most attractive candidate for the United States to 90

“Remarks at a White House Meeting With Members of the American Business Conference: April 15, 1986,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1986, Book I, (Washington, DC, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration), p.472. 91 Martin and Wolcott, pp.141-144. 92 Although Libya had been waging war on and off with Chad for years, its forces were not as experienced as Iran’s.

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experiment with its new hard line counter-terrorism policy. Not only was Qadhafi viewed as a madman, Libya was particularly vulnerable to political, economic, and military pressures. Politically, Qadhafi was increasingly isolated from his Arab allies and the Soviet Union. Economically, Libya was completely dependent on oil exports. The drop in oil prices in the 1980’s coupled with U.S. economic sanctions and potential sanctions from Europe put Libya’s economy at the mercy of the Western powers.94 Finally, as was mentioned before, Libya’s armed forces were amateurish; its pilots were not trained to fly at night, and its navy consisted of a few patrol boats.

Shifting the American-Soviet Balance of Power In striking at Libya, Reagan believed he succeeded in bringing about a more favorable Soviet-American balance of power thereby enabling his administration to act with greater freedom and decisiveness around the world, according to Secretary of State Shultz. For Shultz, the new balance and assertiveness were also reflected in unfolding events on the Honduran-Nicaraguan border where Reagan airdropped U.S. troops in March 1986. However, Reagan was sure to add that the two events were not tied together by any new grand strategy.95 According to Reagan, the operation against Libya was planned in advance to make a point about Libyan involvement with terrorism and freedom of navigation on the high seas. The emergency arms aid to Honduras was the product of opportunity presented by the surprise Nicaraguan operation across the Honduran border, although it allowed the president to highlight his Administration’s desire to aid anti-Communist insurgencies throughout the world, and especially in Latin America. Senior officials at the NSC maintained that the administration was in a position to make these points because there was little the Soviet Union could do or was willing to do about it. Thus, to Reagan, the administration could afford to be more assertive.96 Taken together, the military strike against Libya, and covert pressure on Nicaragua, plus such efforts as stepped-up covert aid to Afghan rebels, framed a new American stance in the world that emerged as a consistent feature of the Reagan presidency. It is an assertiveness that grew directly from Reagan’s critique of Jimmy Carter. However, as administration officials acknowledge, Reagan’s actions evolved more from an attitude of confidence and optimism about having the Soviets on the run. A senior administrative official said: “It is not a national strategy, in part, because Congress does not agree with it.”97 Even to a number of officials who applauded them, the Libya and Honduras actions represented raw demonstrations of power rather than invitations to diplomacy and negotiations. In both cases, Reagan’s advisers made clear their conviction that there was not much to negotiate with Libya and the Sandinista leadership. While most administration officials were careful not to make bold statements that the strikes were likely to curtail Libyan 93

John Tower, Edmund Muskie, and Brent Scowcroft, The Tower Commission Report (New York: Bantam Books & Times Books, 1987), p.20. 94 Zimmerman, p.198. 95 See: George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: Diplomacy, Power, and the Victory of the American Ideal. (New York: Macmillan publishing, 1993). 96 David Shipler, “Trying to Use the Military as a Diplomatic Strategy,” New York Times, March 30, 1986, 1. 97 Quote can be found in Leslie Gelb, “Policy Struggles By US and Soviet Union on Verge of a Shift,” New York Times, April 5, 1986, 1.

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terrorist activities, Secretary of State Shultz insisted that the attacks sent a bold message that “terrorism is going to pay a cost” and dismissed critics who suggested that the United States may have unleashed anti-American sentiment in the Arab world and strengthened Qadhafi’s hold on power.98 If there was any consensus in the administration, most felt Qadhafi would be more likely to increase these activities. Similarly, few believed that the Sandinista Government would be cowed into concessions as a result of American posturing in Honduras. They, too, might increase their operations if they can.99 In both instances, however, officials contended that Reagan wanted to send a longer-term message, namely, that both Libya and Nicaragua should worry more about what the United States might do next, and should understand that Moscow cannot be counted upon for support. From the outset of his administration, Reagan was prepared to dispatch American forces to trouble spots around the globe and provide covert aid to rebels fighting Soviet troops or Soviet-backed regimes.100 However, while Reagan’s rhetoric was strong, his actions were generally cautious since the Soviet Union was a militarily superpower. In time, however, senior officials came to feel that their arms buildup was forcing the USSR into real problems of economic stagnation at home and overextension of commitments abroad.101 President Reagan was of the belief that military action against Libya, and American involvement in Honduras, had Moscow on the defensive. As a result, the United States could be somewhat more venturesome in challenging Soviet interests with less risk of a serious Soviet response. Thus, there were the open and strong military challenges to Soviet client states. This was done directly with American military power in Libya, and on the assumption officials said, that Moscow would do little in response, save to protest and portray Washington as an aggressor.102 Despite the billions of dollars in arms sales from Moscow to Tripoli, U.S. intelligence agencies never expected that the Soviet Union would take serious risks to defend Qadhafi.

FINAL THOUGHTS Although there was a significant internal debate concerning United States policy toward Libya from the very beginning of Reagan’s presidency, following the events of 1985 and early 1986, a consensus evolved within the administration approving of the use of military force to teach Qadhafi a lesson. This is not to purport that all of the administration’s officials were on friendly terms with each other. Rather, it is to suggest, that at least on this particular issue, a consensus was arrived at within Reagan’s national security apparatus and eventually acted upon. Furthermore, although the temporary goals of retaliation, retribution, and the temporary disturbance of Libyan-sponsored terrorism were attained, the bombing of Libya certainly did 98

Robert A. Manning, “The Raid: Was it Worth It?” US News and World Report, May 5, 1986, 18. Frederick Kemp and Robert S. Greenberger, “Policy Test: Events in Libya and Nicaragua Aid Reagan at Least Temporarily,” Wall Street Journal, March 26, 1986, 1. 100 See Gerald M. Boyd, “Reagan Accuses Soviets of Aiding Latin American Terrorists in Nicaragua,” New York Times, February 2, 1986, A1; David Shipler, “US and Soviet Union are Talking Sotto Voice,” New York Times, March 9, 1986, 3. 101 Leslie Gelb, “Reagan’s Maneuvers,” New York Times, April 27, 1986, 1. 102 Robert Toth, “Soviets are Quieter on the Third World Front,” Los Angeles Times, July 29, 1986, A4. 99

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not result in a long-term cessation of Libyan terrorism. Perhaps no incident illustrates this more than the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 on December 21, 1988 over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 259 passengers and crew and 11 on the ground.103 Then, on September 19, 1989, a French DC-10 exploded over Chad in the Sahara Desert killing 170 people. Libya has been linked to both cases and has agreed to pay the families of the victims in both tragedies.104 We can therefore conclude that Operation El Dorado Canyon did not permanently disrupt Libyan sponsored terrorist activities. In the end, the American people saw the bombing of Libya in 1986 as a prudent and forceful move in America’s war on terrorism that certainly did not halt future terrorist attacks by Libya against the United States. Whether the bombing achieved the objective Reagan sought is open to debate. The United States bombing of Libya provides scholars with an opportunity to reexamine Reagan’s foreign policy process as well as U.S. terrorism policy in general—an especially relevant and important task in a post-9/11 world.

103

In 1999, the two suspects were turned over by Qadhafi to an international tribunal in the Hague, as a sign of cooperation in exchange for economic aid from the European Community. In August of 2003, Libya agreed to pay families of the victims of Pan Am 103 $2.7 billion. At the end of 2003, Libya agreed to end its nuclear program in hopes of normalizing relations with the West. See Edward Alden and Roula Khalaf, “Dealing with Gadaffi,” Financial Times (London), October 28, 2003 and Stephen Fidler, Mark Huband, and Roula Khalaf, “Return to the Fold,” Financial Times (London), January 27, 2004. 104 In January of 2004, Libya agreed to pay the victims of French UTA DC-10 bombing $170 million. Originally, Libya agreed in 1999 to pay the victims $35 million but the victims’ families demanded more money in the wake of the settlement between Libya and families of the victims of Pan Am 103. See John Lichfield, “Libya to Pay $170 million Over 1989 Attack On French Jet,” The Independent (London), January 10, 2004.

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 143-161

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

COULD YOU SPARE A DIME? BETTER MAKE IT $10,000: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CLINTON LEGAL EXPENSE TRUST Israel Waismel-Manor and Shelley Conroy ABSTRACT For all of the concern over the role of money in American politics, President Clinton’s Legal Expense Trust, created to ease the burden of the President’s legal expenses, has not only gone unregulated (its contribution limits and disclosure rules were self imposed) but also uninvestigated. Using original survey data this article seeks to answer three questions. Who are the donors to Clinton's Trust? Why did they make a contribution? And what determines the amount they contributed to the Trust? The final section of the article explores the possible consequences of this loophole and suggests some possible remedies.

INTRODUCTION Long before the public learned about Kenneth Starr and Monica Lewinsky, scholars have warned us of the rise of “politics by other means.”411 In a balkanized political arena, where parties are weak, and the electorate is somewhat indifferent, political actors resort to all means at their disposal, especially the media, the bureaucracy, and the courts to triumph over their opponents. Ever since Watergate, the use of the criminal justice system as a political weapon against one’s opponent has been on the rise. In 1982, there were 158 indictments and 147 convictions of federal officials. By 2001, that number had climbed to 502 and 414 respectively.412 Most Americans have come to accept the fact that federal investigations and civil lawsuits are a part of the political scene.

411

Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shefter. Politics By Other Means: Politicians, Prosecutors, and the Press from Watergate to Whitewater, 2nd Ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999). 412 U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Public Integrity Section. “Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2001.” Table II. <www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin/Annual_ Report_2001.pdf> accessed May 21, 2003.

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To ease the burden of these legal expenses many politicians under investigation have recently created defense funds, and asked their supporters to open their hearts and wallets.413 Politicians from Senators Orrin Hatch and Robert Torricelli to House majority Whip Tom DeLay started one, yet no fund has gotten more exposure or money than the Clinton Legal Expense Trust. While there is an extensive literature addressing campaign contributions, little research has been done about these unique donations. For all of the concern over the role of money in American politics, this avenue of potential influence over the president is not only unregulated but also uninvestigated. This paper addresses the latter. In doing so, it analyzes an increasingly important form of political contribution. We start with a descriptive account of Clinton's legal odyssey, from his early days as Arkansas’ Attorney General, to his impeachment trial. In the second section we tell the story of the President’s two Trusts. Using an original survey of contributors to Clinton’s Legal Expense Trust, we attempt to answer, in the third section, who are these donors? Why did they give money to the President? And, what determined the amount they contributed to the Trust? In Politics by Other Means, Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shefter lament the price American democracy pays for its recent modus operandi. We, however, lament the price the president and other politicians have to pay, literally, to fight these legal battles. Our concern is not with their finances but with the things desperate politicians may do to battle those bills, and especially with public sentiment towards these contributions. The final section of the paper explores the consequences of this loophole and suggests some possible remedies.

PRESIDENT CLINTON’S LEGAL BATTLES414 President Bill Clinton's legal odyssey goes back to his time as Arkansas’ Attorney General. In 1978, together with his wife Hillary, and business partners James and Susan McDougal, Clinton borrowed $200,000 from Madison Guaranty, a small savings and loan bank, to create the Whitewater Development Corp, a real estate investment. Soon after the Bank collapsed in 1989, following a series of fraudulent loans, accusations of impropriety emerged, naming the Clintons as potential beneficiaries of the illegal activities at Madison. When Vincent Foster, former law partner of Mrs. Clinton and now deputy White House counsel committed suicide in 1993, just a month after he filed delinquent Whitewater corporate tax returns, many observers suspected foul play. In January of 1994 former U.S. attorney Robert B. Fiske Jr. was appointed special counsel to investigate the Clintons' activities in the Whitewater investment. In August, when it was time to renew Fiske's powers, Republicans charged him as being too soft; he was replaced by former U.S. solicitor, Kenneth Starr. Starr’s investigation expanded to other events such as the firing of White House travel office clerks (Travelgate), and the collection 413

Holly Bailey. “The Best Defense: Members of Congress and Personal Legal Funds.” opensecrets.org. July 12, 2001. <www.opensecrets.org/alerts/v6/alertv6_21.asp> accessed May 23, 2003. and Ann Devroy. “Clinton Aides Setting Up Defense Funds to Pay Lawyers’ Bills.” The Washington Post February 29, 1996. A21. 414 The following information chronicles the developments of the Clinton’s legal struggles, and is taken from The Washington Post Online – “Clinton Accused - Special Report". It can be accessed online at <www.washingtonpostonline.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/clinton.htm>

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of hundreds of confidential FBI files on prominent Republicans by a minor White House operative in 1993 and 1994 (Filegate). While Arkansas Gov. Jim Guy Tucker (D) and the McDougals were convicted on charges of conspiracy and fraud415, the President and the First Lady emerged from the investigations relatively unscathed. President Clinton’s legal problems were not limited to the Whitewater scandal. In 1994 Paula Jones filed a civil suit against the President on charges of sexual harassment and assault, three years earlier. Clinton tried to have to have the case dismissed on grounds of presidential immunity416, but the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the President's claims that a trial would distract him from performing his work.417 The case went to trial, but a Federal District Judge dismissed it on the grounds that, regardless of the truth of Jones’ accusations, she was not seriously harmed to warrant a claim.418 During the final months of 1997 there had been rumors about a relationship between a young White House intern and the President. These allegations received credibility when Linda Tripp, a friend of the intern Monica Lewinsky, gave Starr tapes of conversations, in which Lewinsky discussed her affair with the President. Starr began to investigate whether Clinton encouraged Lewinsky to lie in the Jones case about the affair. In January 1998, Clinton testified in the Jones case, and denied having sexual a relation with Lewinsky. Even after the story broke on January 21, Clinton continued to deny a “sexual relationship” with the intern, and said that he never asked her to lie. It was not until his August 17 grand jury testimony that Clinton admitted to his intimate contact with Lewinsky, and later said on television that he had an “inappropriate relationship with Miss Lewinsky.”419 A few months later Jones dropped her lawsuit after the President agreed to pay her $850,000, offering no apology or admission. Following Starr's September report to Congress, the Judiciary Committee recommended that the House of Representatives impeach the President for perjury before the grand jury, obstruction of justice, abuse of power, and perjury in the Jones case.420 The House impeached Clinton for perjury before the grand jury and obstruction of justice, but he was later acquitted by the Senate.421 In a Rose Garden statement Clinton told the nation that he was “profoundly sorry” for his actions, and for the “great burden they have imposed on the Congress, and on the American people.”422 The “great burden” his actions imposed on Congress and the American people was one thing. The burden on the President's bank account was another. There is no doubt that Clinton was “profoundly sorry” for that as well.

415

Governor Tucker resigned after the verdict. As for the McDougals, they were both convicted and sentenced to prison. Susan McDougal was sentenced to two years in prison, but began her sentence in May 1998, after spending a year and a half in jail for refusing to testify before Starr’s grand jury and for her obstruction of the investigation. In March of 1998 James McDougal died in prison, a few months before his expected release. 416 For further discussion on presidential immunity and other aspects of Clinton’s legal affairs see Fischer, Louis. “The Law: Legal Disputes in the Clinton Years.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 29 (September 1999) 697-707. 417 Clinton v. Jones 520 U.S. 681 (1997). 418 Jones v. Clinton LR-C-94-290 U.S. District Court Eastern District of Arkansas Western Division (1998). 419 Televised Clinton statement, August 17, 1998. 420 U.S. House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee. House Report 105-830. “Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.” December 5, 1998. 421 U.S. House of Representatives. 144 Congressional Record H 11975. 105th Congress, 2nd Session. December 19, 1998.

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A REMEDY FOR LEGAL EXPENSES By mid 1994 the real price of the First Family's legal battles caught up with them. In order to deal with his mounting legal bills, Clinton created an expense fund.

The Presidential Legal Expense Trust With no legal regulation to guide them, Clinton's advisers pitched the idea of creating a fund to pay the cost of Clinton’s legal battles. The concept itself was not new; after Nixon's resignation a fund was established to pay his legal bills, but Clinton's fund was the first set up for a president while in office. The Presidential Legal Expense Trust was established in June 1994 with the following guidelines: contributions must be from U.S. citizens other than federal employees or registered lobbyists; contributions from corporations, labor unions, partnerships, and PACs, or anonymous givers were not accepted; and individuals were limited to $1,000 per contribution in a calendar year.423 At first, the outlook for the President's new fund was positive. Through self-imposed contribution caps, and the selection of prominent citizens for its board of trustees (like Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach and retired university presidents), the Trust earned the credibility it needed. From a financial perspective, things were also running well. Contributions were coming in at a satisfying pace; the fund received $608,080 in its first six months of operation. Additionally, the President's liability insurance policies helped to pay for the expenses of Jones' sexual harassment case. During 1995, however, the figures began falling short. Contributions to the fund started dropping quite drastically; the first half of 1995 brought in just $258,449, and it diminished to merely $62,000 by the second half of 1996. By 1997, the fund was not only $2.25 million short, but also losing money; its operational bills and fundraising costs exceeded donations. Additionally, the fund triggered a controversy of its own. Judicial Watch, a public watchdog group that deals with ethics and legal issues, brought suit against the Trust, claiming it violated the Federal Advisory Committee Act which mandates public access to groups that advise the president.424 In February of 1996, a District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Trust did not provide policy advice and, as such, was not in violation of the Act. The Court’s decision also confirmed a prior ruling of the Office of Government Ethics, which had previously given the President a green light to create the Trust.425 Additionally, the Justice Department launched an investigation into the possibility that hundreds of contributions were given in the hopes of buying access to the White House. A Senate investigation that followed was unable to answer whether or not such contributions were linked in any way to the favors received by donors.426 But the investigation and its 422

Peter Baker and Helen Dewar. "The Senate Acquits President Clinton," The Washington Post. February 13, 1999. 423 Presidential Legal Expense Trust. Bi-annual Report of the Trust. February 22, 1996. (Ex. 2). 424 Locy, Toni. “Group Sues for Access to Clinton Legal Fund,” The Washington Post. August 5, 1994. A18. 425 Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Clinton. 76 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 426 U.S. Senate. Report 105-167, Part 2. “Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with the 1996 Federal Election Campaigns.” Committee on Governmental Affairs, 1998.

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negative public exposure had an immediate impact on the cash flow: potential donors were increasingly reluctant to contribute. The Trust’s failure was also embedded in its own guidelines. The self-imposed $1,000 limit was too low. Many of the President's supporters were willing to give more money. Also, because the Clintons themselves were the Trust’s grantors, or founders, it was not free to solicit contributions or take advantage of all possible ways of contacting potential donors. By February 1997, the President was said to be "painfully aware" of the Trust’s poor performance and of his mounting legal bills.427

The Clinton Legal Expense Trust Within a year, Clinton and his advisers decided to terminate the original trust and create a new one. On February 17, 1998, the Clinton Legal Expense Trust was established by former US Senator David H. Pryor of Arkansas. Its official purpose was “to enable Americans to help defray the burdensome legal expenses that are being incurred by the President and the First Lady.”428 By this time, these bills amounted to approximately $3 million, far more than the President could afford to pay. Headed by Terry McAuliffe, successful Democratic fundraiser and key player in the Clinton-Gore 1996 presidential campaign, the new Trust kept most of the guidelines that directed contributions to the earlier Trust, including its commitment to biannual disclosure. Two major changes, however, were made. Because Pryor was the Trust’s grantor, it was now allowed to seek out donations on the Clinton’s behalf through direct fundraising, as long as the request was not directly from Clinton. Also, with no regulatory agency like the FEC to cap contributions, the self-imposed limit was raised to $10,000 per year. This new limit was by no means arbitrary since the IRS imposes a federal gift tax on any gift beyond $10,000.429 The change was remarkable. In its first six months the Trust received almost three times the money that the previous fund had earned in over three years, totaling $2.2 million. On the one hand, the increase had to do with the inner changes in its rules and charter. On the other, the political turmoil that had many people questioning the integrity and motives of the special council's investigation also led to an increase in donations. Though it had a devastating outcome for the President, the breaking of the scandal actually helped the Trust in several ways. First, the President's legal battles, once thought to be private, were now seen by Democrats as an orchestrated Republican witch-hunt; this mobilized supporters to come to his defense. Many Democrats and non-Democrats sympathetic to the President, or to the institution of the presidency, became convinced that the investigation was out of line because it extended into the realm of private behavior. Second, others, though indifferent to the investigation itself, worried that economic prosperity would end with Clinton’s impeachment. Lastly, the scandal gave substantial visibility to the President’s legal problems and expenses. 427

John F. Harris. “Clinton Defense Fund Returns More Than it Raises,” The Washington Post. February 28, 1997, A6. 428 Clinton Legal Expense Trust. “The Clinton Legal Expense Trust.” Clinton Legal Expense Trust 1998 brochure to potential contributors. <www.clintontrust.com/brochure.html> accessed 1/4/00. 429 Since 1999, this limit has been indexed for inflation and is currently $11,000 (Department of the Treasury. Internal Revenue Service. Publication 950, “Introduction to Estate and Gift Taxes).

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The fundraising accomplishments of the Trust itself earned positive publicity which generated even more support. Coverage was also generated by Hollywood’s relationship to the President and the Trust. Support from famous directors, producers and performers like Tom Hanks and Ron Howard became a news story of its own. Together with a direct-mail solicitation campaign sent to about 170,000 potential supporters drawn from the 1996 Clinton-Gore, and other Democratic fundraising list, this publicity gave the Trust all that it needed to succeed. To summarize, from Feb 17, 1998 through December 31, 2000; 113,775 donors contributed $8,503,169. In reality the number of donors is much smaller. First, many names repeat themselves, meaning donors gave more than once. The 204 donations of $10,000 came from 147 individuals who actually come from 127 households; there were many cases in which a spouse was an additional contribution channel. Though the Trust portrayed the donors as ordinary individuals, pointing out that 95 percent of the contributions have come in amounts less than $100, it is important to remember that the 204 $10,000 contributions amounted to almost one - quarter of the total contributions!

THE SURVEY During July 1999, 200 individuals from the 38,560 donors who had contributed to the Trust between February 17, 1998 (the day the Trust was created) and December 31, 1998 (the Trust’s second public report release) were randomly selected and surveyed. While the sample size is rather small (N=200), they represent the most interesting, and probably the most important contributors to the Trust. The reason lies in the fact that these individuals made their contributions during the scandal, and prior to the President’s acquittal, and yet were surveyed shortly after. Unlike those who may have joined the bandwagon and made a donation after the impeachment trial was over430, our survey captures Clinton’s most loyal group, and does so at a time when they still recall their motivations for giving. The following sections will explore three important questions: Who are these donors? What are the reasons they gave to the Legal Expense Trust? And finally, what determines the level of the contributions?

Who are the Donors? In order to explain who the donors are, we look at two types of characteristics: demographic and political. We see in Table 1 that African Americans and Hispanics are underrepresented in the survey. Only 6.6 percent of the contributors are African Americans,

430

Donations continued to flow to the Fund after the survey was conducted, with many contributing after Clinton’s acquittal; these donors are not represented in our survey. While this group is close to half of the entire population of contributors, these donors may have different reasons for making a donation, and they may also share other important characteristics not found in the data presented here. Thus, our sample should not be seen as representative of the entire donor population.

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while their percentage in the general population at the time was 13 percent.431 Hispanics also contribute less than their percentage in the population: 7.1 percent and 11.7 respectively.432 When it comes to religion, there is also under and overrepresentation. Protestants contribute less than their relative size in the population, about ten percent less than the 55 percent they hold in the general population. The Catholics’ share, on the other hand, is somewhat higher: 40.9 percent in contrast to their 28 percent in the population. And, while Jews are over represented in the donor pool, making up 12.2 of the donors, close to six times their size in the population, Muslims are almost nonexistent; only one Muslim contributed to the Trust.433 Contributors in general are highly educated. Thirty five percent had a Masters degree or higher, 38 percent are college graduates, 16 percent had attended college for a few years, and only 13 percent were not educated beyond high school (N=191). Additionally, the donors’ occupations are mainly high training and prestige positions.434 Ninety three of the respondents are retired, and an additional 16 donors were either homemakers or housewives (N=198). Why are so many contributors retired? It might be, as Brown, et al. suggests, that older people respond better to printed material than the more technologically sophisticated younger generations, or that “older people enjoy getting and reading mail, have more time to absorb the message, and have more disposable income to give to candidates.”435 To some extent, this could be also the case for housewives/homemakers. Finally, donor family income is also high. This should come as no surprise. We find a high level of correlation between education and job level training (r=0.30, p=0.000) and education and income (r=0.35, p=0.000). While the national income average at that time was $39,657 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000), the data here shows that for Clinton's contributors the number is much higher with 64.5 percent earning over $49,999. It is important to note that our respondents are probably less affluent than all Trust donors are as a whole, as we find in our comparison of the two mean contributions: $49.45 for the survey and $96.25 for the entire Trust donor population. Our data here coincides with Frank Sorauf's (1992) findings that political donors have higher levels of education, occupational prestige, and income than other Americans.436 Besides contributing to the President's Trust, many donors have also participated in other political activities. The most common one was voting; 192 out of 194 individuals voted in the last four years. This was followed by 76 who contacted an official or a representative, and 44 that volunteered for a campaign. Twenty five respondents protested, marched or demonstrated during the same time period.

431

Jesse McKinnon and Karen Humes. “The Black Population in the United States.” Washington D.C: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000. 432 Roberto R. Ramirez. “The Hispanic Population in the United States.” Washington D.C: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000. 433 U.S. Census Bureau. “Population.” Statistical Abstracts of the United States. issued February 2001. At Table 75. 434 The categories are an adaptation to the ones used in Voice and Equality, 293 (their first and second categories were merged here into one). Examples of these levels include : very low training - dishwasher, cashier, mail carrier, machine operator. Low training - electrician, constructor inspector. High training - insurance agent, teacher, engineer. Very high training - physician, attorney. 435 Clifford W. Brown, Jr., Lynda Powell, and Clyde Wilcox. Serious Money: Fundraising and Contributing in Presidential Nomination Campaigns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 55. 436 Frank J. Sorauf. Inside Campaign Finance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 35.

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We would expect that those individuals contributing to the Trust would be Democratic Party supporters. Approximately 58 percent of our sample voted for Dukakis in the 1988 presidential election, 79.2 percent voted for Clinton in 1992, and 97.4 percent supported him in 1996. The 1996 data clearly confirms that most respondents supported Clinton prior to the scandal. Do these numbers reflect an affinity to the President or an affinity to the Democratic Party? The answer may be both. The data indicates that a majority of our sample are relatively strong Democrats. Almost 77 percent of our sample group identify themselves as strong or not very strong Democrats, with an additional nine percent leaned Democratic. Only three people in the entire sample were Republican or leaned Republican.

Why Did They Make a Contribution? Political participation can be defined as an “activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action, either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy, or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies.”437 These activities may take many forms, such as voting, working as a volunteer, protesting, marching, writing letters to congressmen, and contributing money. Over the last decades, political contributions have become the third largest form of political participation (behind voting and contacting officials), rising from 13 percent in 1967 to 23 percent in 1987. Why are people so willing to donate money to political causes? Herbert Alexander describes an array of reasons: 1) solicitation; 2) out of a sense of civic duty or attachment to a cause; 3) personal identification with a candidate, group, or party; 4) concern for government policy; 5) access to government officials; and 6) ego or self-esteem.438 Usually it will be a mixture of goals that motivates a person to contribute.

437

Sidney Verba, Key Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 38. 438 Herbert E. Alexander. Financing Politics: Money, Elections and Political Reform (Washington D.C: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1976), 49-50; see also Brown et al, 51.

Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of Contributors Variable Race Religion Education Occupation Income

Total White 156 (85.2%) Protestant 82 (45.3%) High School 24 (12.6%) Homemaker 16 (8.1%) $25,000-49,999 66 (34.7%)

Black 12 (6.6%) Catholic 74 (40.9%) Some College 31 (16.2%) Very Low Training 6 (3.0%) $50,000-99,999 111 (58.4%)

Hispanic 13 (7.1%) Jewish Muslim 22 (12.2%) 1 (0.6%) College Grad Masters or Above 72 (37.7%) 64 (33.5%) Low Training High Training 25 (12.6%) 27 (13.6%) $100,000-249,999 12 (6.3%)

Asian 2 (1.1%) None 2 (1.1%)

183 181 191

Very High Training Retired 31 (15.7%) 93 (47.0%) $250,000 and over 1 (0.5%)

198 190

Table 2. Political Characteristics of Contributors Variable Voted* Contacted Official or Representative* Volunteered for a Campaign* Protested, Marched, or Demonstrated* Voted for Democratic Candidate Partisan * In the last four years

Total Yes 192 (99%) Yes 76 (39.2%) Yes 44 (22.7%) Yes 25 (12.9%) 1988 111 (57.8%) Strong Democrat Democrat 95 (49.2%) 53 (27.5%)

No 2 (1%) No 118 (60.8%) No 150 (77.3%) No 169 (87.1%)

Leaner Democrat 18 (9.3%)

1992 152 (79.2%) Independent 24 (12.4%)

Leaner Republican 2 (1%)

1996 186 (97.4%) Republican Strong Republican 1 (0.5%) -

194 194 194 194 192

193

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It is important to understand the difference between contributions and other political resources. First, requests to contribute are the most common type of political solicitation and are more likely to come from strangers, especially through the mail. Second, unlike other forms of activism, contributors do not tend to think that their activity made much difference.439 Third, contributors also have a lower sense of gratification from taking part in this activity than those who volunteer, demonstrate or vote.440 The use of money as a political resource carries with it important consequences for political participation. Money separates the haves from the have-nots, and gives an advantage to those who have money to spend.441 While other types of participation, like voting, give all the same amount of influence, contributions do not. Also, fewer people participate by donating money. Why is this the case? Sorauf writes that while some contributors respond to inner motivations and political cognitions, like strong political convictions, “they respond more immediately to a specific stimulus,” i.e., a solicitation.442 So, why are not all people solicited? The reason lies in the practical aspects of fund raising. Predictably, the wealthier a person is likelier than a poor individual to donate money. Moreover, since the most likely person to make a contribution is one who contributed before, fund raisers rely heavily on previous donor mailing lists.443 While there is always some attempt to attract contributions from new prospects, fund raisers rely heavily on these lists.444 Using the 1996 Clinton-Gore contributors’ list, the Trust sent approximately 170,000 letters during its first six months of activity, generating about a ten percent response rate.445 In our sample, 121 said they were solicited, 51 said they acted on their own initiative, and 20 responded that a friend asked them to contribute (N=192). What explains this behavior? For contributors who were not solicited, and even those who were, there may be other reasons for making a contribution to the Trust. One reason may be that these individuals like to contribute money to political causes. Nearly 56 percent had in fact made a previous donation. Additionally, these individuals may have a tendency for political participation in general. Their contribution to the Trust may be just one aspect of their broader political activity. To evaluate the connection between the level of activism and donations, the number of the different activities our contributors took part in during the last four years were recoded to create a variable called “activism.”446 Only two contributors did not take part in any one of the activities below (vote, contact, protest, volunteer, and contribute). 439

Verba et al, 517. All these may help to explain why contributions have risen significantly in the last two decades. Although much of the literature focuses on the high costs of campaigns as the major reason for higher volume and number of contributions, there is hardly any discussion on the higher donation sums contributors need to give these days in order to feel that their donation made a difference. 441 For most types of contributions, there is an upper limit to the amount a donor can give. This equalizes the rich donors with the very rich ones, but, for most people, this cap is already beyond their financial means. 442 Sorauf, 35. 443 When dealing with computer generated mailing lists errors are bound to happen. Bernard Lewinsky, Monica's father received a letter from President Clinton's Legal Expense Fund asking him for a donation. "Lewinsky, a Los Angeles physician, marked the letter "return to sender" and added a note: "You must be morons to send me this letter". See Steve Harley. "Mr. President, Are You Totally Crazy?" Los Angeles Times, September 1, 1999. 444 Brown et al, 33. 445 Clinton Legal Expense Trust press release. “Over $2.2 Million Raised by Clinton Legal Expense Trust in Six Months.” The Clinton Legal Expense Trust press release, August 21, 1998. 446 The variable “activism” is measured on a scale of 0-5. It measures the number of the following activities in which an individual has participated: voting; protesting, marching, or demonstrating; contacting a government 440

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Table 3. Prior political activism Variable

Total 0

1

2

3

4

5

2 (1%)

66 (34.2%)

55 (28.5%)

35 (18.1%)

12 (6.2%)

23 (11.9%)

193 Activism

Since our sample consists of individuals who have made a contribution to Clinton’s Trust, we would expect that they are more actively involved in politics than the average citizen. The data confirms that they are a politically active group, especially when compared to the general public. Sidney Verba, et al’s findings show that, in an election year, 71 percent of the people in their survey voted, 34 percent contacted an official, eight percent worked for a campaign, six percent protested, and 24 percent made a political contribution.447 Our analysis, as described above, finds that 99 percent, 39.2 percent, 22.7 percent, 12.9 percent, and 55.9 percent participated in these activities, respectively.448 The survey included an open-ended question that asked donors for their reasons for contributing. The responses were grouped into the following categories, included in Table 4.449 Many of the responses fell into the category that Clinton was a good man (20.7 percent). The second highest response dealt with Clinton’s performance as president, and his policy and political success (19.2 percent). The third highest reason for contribution was that Clinton was unjustly attacked (18.7 percent). The motivations expressed here correspond with the results of many public opinion polls taken during the same summer our survey was conducted. In a late July poll taken for NBC News and the Wall Street Journal, 73 percent of those surveyed approved of the way President Clinton was handling the economy.450 Around the same time, Clinton had a 64 percent overall approval rating.451 Corresponding with the above responses, in early August, 65 percent of those polled considered the scandal involving Lewinsky a “private, personal matter.”452 Even the hostility towards Republicans corresponds with public sentiments; a quarter of those polled thought the exposure of the Clinton-Lewinsky affair was the result of a right-wing conspiracy.453

official or representative; volunteering for a campaign; (all four in the last four years); or contributing money to politicians (ever). 447 Verba et al, 51. 448 The 55.9 percent denotes the portion of the sample that made a political contribution prior to their donation to the Clinton Legal Expense Fund. It is important to note that Verba’s survey asked respondents if they had participated in these activities in the past year, while ours asks about the past four years. Nevertheless, Verba’s survey took place in an election year, when all forms of political participation are higher, so we do not expect a drastic difference between our two measurements. 449 Because some respondents provided more than one answer, we took the first one to be the most important and coded it as that person’s motivation. 450 NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll. (July 24-26, 1999). Roper Center at University of Connecticut, Public Opinion Online. 451 Fox News/Opinion Dynamics Poll. (July 28-29, 1999). Roper Center at University of Connecticut, Public Opinion Online. 452 CBS News Poll. (August 1-3, 1999). Roper Center at University of Connecticut, Public Opinion Online. 453 Zogby Real American Poll. (October 11-14, 1998). Roper Center at University of Connecticut, Public Opinion Online.

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Israel Waismel – Manor and Shelley Conroy Table 4. Self - reported reasons for contribution

Reason Clinton is a good man Clinton does a good job Clinton was unjustly attacked I want to help support Clinton Personal life should be private I am against the Republicans I want to be involved Other Total

Frequency 41 (20.7%) 38 (19.2%) 37 (18.7%) 31 (15.7%) 20 (10.1%) 14 (7.1%) 10 (5.1%) 7 (3.5%) 198 (100%)

What Explains the Contribution Level? Thus far we have presented data on the contributors that explains both who they are and why they gave money to Clinton’s Trust. Within our sample, however, and within the entire donor population, there is substantial variation in the levels of contributions. Using multivariate regression analysis, six potentially influential variables are tested to explore the determinants of contribution size. First, we present the theoretical arguments and expectations for these six variables. We then present the regression results and analyze the explanatory power of these variables. To begin, we expect that those individuals who were solicited for a contribution will give more money than those who were not. At first, this claim may seem counterintuitive; one might expect that those who will contribute the most money are those who will make a donation without being asked to do so. However, the individuals who were contacted by the Clinton Legal Expense Trust were compiled from a list of donors who had made a political contribution in the past. Thus, we would expect that these individuals who had contributed before, and demonstrated a willingness to make financial donations, would give higher amounts of money. Secondly, we would expect self-identified Democrats to donate more than Independents or Republicans. In our analysis, we measure partisanship on a scale of one to seven; a lower score indicates strong Democrat. Since we expect Democrats to give more money, the coefficient should be negative. Our second variable measures the voting history of each donor. This variable can take on a value of zero, one, or two, and represents the number of times an individual voted for Clinton in the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections. One can assume that the higher this number is, the stronger the respondent’s support for Clinton. Education and income are two variables that are often strongly related to each other. Consequently, we have very similar expectations for their influence in our analysis. As a respondent’s income increases, we expect that their donation will be larger as well. Since high levels of education typically correlate with higher income, education and level of donation should also be positively related.

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Table 5. Expectations of Variable Influence Independent Variables Solicit Partisanship Voting History Education Income Activism

Expectation + + + + +/-

One might also expect that occupation would be closely related to the level of contribution. In our sample, there is a statistically significant correlation between occupation and income (r=0.43, p=0.000). To include both in the regression model would create problems of multicollinearity, since occupation is really a proxy for income. Thus, we chose not to incorporate occupation into our final analysis. Some may argue that the inclusion of both education and income would present similar problems. While this may be true, we have theoretical reasons for keeping education in the model. Past studies have demonstrated that high levels of education are also associated with a liberal ideology.454 Because this trait may influence contribution levels, we felt it was necessary to keep education in the model despite its correlation with income. Finally, what are our expectations for activism? Should we expect that individuals who have high levels of political participation will also donate more money? At first glance, one would expect a positive relationship. High levels of political participation, including prior contributions, would indicate a higher level of money when a contribution is made. However, previous research indicates that this may not be the case. According to Verba et al, “time and money function differently as inputs for political activity…the affluent are more likely than the poor to become active. Once active, however, the poor are as generous with their time as those who are better off financially…No such leveling occurs when it comes to money.”455 This leads us to believe that those who are more active in giving their time (for voting, protesting, volunteering) may not have extra money to give away. Thus, we have no clear expectations for the relationship between donation and activism levels. Table 6 provides the results of a regression analysis that seeks to explain the level of donations for the individuals in the sample. Two variables in the model demonstrate statistical significance: income (p = 0.000) and voting history (p = 0.025). As an individual moves up one income bracket, their contribution increases by about $40. The measurement of this particular variable is less than ideal, and will be addressed later in the paper. But the conclusion makes sense: those who have more money are likely to give more money. The coefficient for voting history is very surprising: it is negative. The more times an individual has voted for Clinton, the lower their contribution is, by about $25. None of the other independent variables are statistically significant.

454

Mary R. Jackman and Michael J. Muha. “Education and Intergroup Attitudes: Moral Enlightenment, Superficial Democratic Commitment, or Ideological Refinement?” American Sociological Review. 49:6 (December 1984) 751-769. 455 Verba et al, 192.

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Israel Waismel – Manor and Shelley Conroy Table 6. OLS Regression Results on Level of Donation to Legal Expense Trust456

Variable Solicit Partisanship Voting History Education Income Occupation Activism Constant Adjusted R2

Regression Coefficient (Standard Error) 8.51 (8.06) -6.81 (4.43) -24.75** (11.20) -1.51 (3.13) 30.54*** (6.91) -1.76 (2.54) -2.83 (2.90) 14.62 (32.67) 0.168

N=193 *p<0.05, ***p<0.00

There are two points worth mentioning regarding this regression. Unfortunately, the measurement for income is a rough one. The survey asked individuals to circle which range their income fell into: under $25,000; $25,000 to $49,999; $50,000 to $99,999; $100,000 to $249,999; or $250,000 and over. As a result, our measurement captures ranges of income, but nothing more. Had we had the exact income for each individual, so that we had a continuous measurement, our conclusions regarding that variable’s influence on contribution would have been much more precise. The fact that it still remains the most significant variable, however, is still telling. Of all the results described above, the most surprising is the negative impact that voting history has on contributions. As the number of times an individual voted for Clinton in a presidential election increased, their contribution is expected to decrease, significantly and somewhat sharply. The reasons for this are unclear. Our first explanation deals with the characteristics of those individuals who typically have a strong history of voting for the Democratic Party. Since the New Deal, the Democratic Party has typically been the party of the working - class and minorities. As we noted earlier in the paper, our data indicates that levels of education, job training (occupation), and income are all strongly related to each other. If these are also related to vote history, as this argument about the nature of the Democratic Party suggests, this may explain our odd results. Thus, those individuals who are likely to be loyal

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The regression presented here use imputed data to deal with the problem of missing observations. We conducted two sets of analysis, one with the imputed data and one without, and there were no significant differences in the results. We chose to use the imputed data so as to maximize the number of observations in our study.

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Democratic voters may also be those who have lower income levels. While this is certainly a compelling argument, we found no support for these possibilities in our own data analysis.457 A second explanation is the candidacy of Ross Perot. In both the 1992 and 1996 presidential campaigns, Perot ran as a third-party candidate. Perhaps his participation in the elections somehow skewed the voting patterns of the electorate. Regardless of this possible explanation, however, it is still very puzzling that an individual with a history of voting for a Republican or third-party candidate would actually contribute more than a proven Clinton supporter.

DISCUSSION What are the consequences of these donations? Much of the literature on campaign contributions raises the question whether there is a quid pro quo relationship between financial donations and legislative or political favors. What exactly does a contribution buy: time, access, or favors?458 The same can be asked regarding donations to legal expense funds. If donors make a substantial contribution to an official’s fund, do they receive anything in return? Much of the journalistic literature on contributions is heavy on anecdotes and light on systematic evidence.459 Yet, though these studies may not exactly prove a quid pro quo relationship between politicians and donors, the stories still resonate with the public. Thus, we argue that the actual existence of a quid pro quo relationship matters less for democracy than the public’s perception of such a relationship. Over the years, many Americans “have come to view legislative politics as a money game, in which campaign contributions are the dominant influence on policymaking.”460 And when additional information on contributions makes it to the news, like the $20,000 contributions Hollywood heavyweights Steven Spielberg, David Geffen and Jeffrey Katzenberg gave to Clinton's Trust, it only increases the public’s skepticism. The existence of these stories alone, regardless of their accuracy, is enough to create negative attitudes among the public. Recent polls indicate that many Americans do, in fact, believe that financial contributions result in political favors for donors. Ninety-three percent of the respondents in a recent poll said that “politicians do special favors for people and groups who give them campaign 457

In order to test these possible relationships, we ran a number of statistical tests. These consisted mainly of looking for correlation among many variables and running regressions to predict vote history and partisanship. None of the results confirmed this alternative explanation. These surprising findings may be a function of the small sample size of our survey. We also ran regressions that broke the vote history variable into dummy variables for each of the elections. Again, the result were unexpectedly negative, but statistically insignificant. 458 see David Austen-Smith. “Campaigns Contributions and Access,” The American Political Science Review 89:3 (September 1995), 566-581; Richard L. Hall and Frank W. Wayman. “Buying Time: Moneyed Interest and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees,” The American Political Science Review 84:3 (September 1990), 797-820; James Snyder. “Campaign Contributions as Investment: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980-86,” Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990), 1195-1227; James Herndon. “Access, Record, and Competition as Influences on Interest Group Contributions to Congressional Campaigns,” Journal of Politics 44 (1982), 996-1019. 459 see, for example, Philip M. Stern. The Best Congress Money Can Buy (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1992).

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contributions.”461 Of this 93 percent, 80 percent believe that it happens often. When the same poll asked people if respondents thought this was a problem, 88 percent answered in the affirmative. When asked if President Clinton in particular had “promised government favors in return for campaign contributions,” 69 percent agreed. These poll results bode poorly for democracy and the profound importance it places on public trust in the system of governance. While the true power of contributions has yet to be systematically confirmed, campaign donations are one reason behind the cynicism and distrust American citizens have towards public officials. We can expect that similar attitudes are also true for donations to legal defense funds; in fact, citizens may be more skeptical about donations to an official under investigation. What is the best way to alleviate the problem? The general consensus on regulating campaign contributions is to limit expenditures, cap contributions, and publicly disclose information about donations and donors.462 In our case, limiting expenditures is impractical. No limits can be set on legal fees, and every citizen has a right to the best legal advice and lawyers available. As for the other two options, the House and Senate have each found a remedy along these lines. Each chamber has established rules for the maximum contribution to legal defense funds per individual per year, as well as reporting requirements.463 The question is whether these self - imposed congressional guidelines will hold. One option is to cap contributions. Placing a lower cap on contributions will weaken the appearance of a quid pro quo relationship. With the increased size of the donor pool, and the decreased size of donations, the influence of any single contribution is greatly diminished. Another possible method of regulation is public disclosure. Keeping the process open enables Congress, the media, and the public to see who the donors are and what, if anything, they are getting in return for their gift. Together, these last two measures seem promising methods of regulation, but they must be written into law. If this new type of political contribution is left unregulated, we may find ourselves faced with even higher self imposed limits, if any, and less public disclosure. Although it is unlikely that most elected officials will have to face the financial burdens of defending themselves, the Clinton presidency has made politicians aware of the possibility that they may find themselves in a court room.464 Thus, it is crucial to pass the regulatory laws needed now, before these legal funds become even more commonplace.

460

Anthony Corrado, et al, eds. Campaign Finance Reform: A Sourcebook (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 107. 461 ABC News/Washington Post Poll. (March 22-25, 2001). Roper Center at University of Connecticut, Public Opinion Online. 462 Alexander, 4. 463 Bailey. <www.opensecrets.org/alerts/v6/alertv6_21.asp> 464 Already some commentators have suggested that President George W. Bush should establish a legal defense fund to protect himself from any potential investigations. Some political supporters have already gone as far as buying a web address should the need for contributions arise (see Noah, Timothy. “The Case for a Bush Legal Defense Fund. Slate Magazine’s Chatterbox. January, 15 2001. May 23, 2003.)!

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CONCLUSIONS While Clinton’s strong performance on the economy helped him maintain his high job approval ratings, it was the money flow to the Trust that helped him maintain his job. The Trust served the President well; the security of being able to afford the best legal defense enabled him to continue doing his job, instead of worrying about his growing legal expenses.465 The survey reported here enabled us to better understand who the Trust’s contributors were, as well as their motives for participation. We were also able to explain the variation within the sample population regarding levels of contribution. We have elaborated on the problems of unregulated contributions to elected officials, and the subsequent effects on the American political system, especially the increase of public cynicism. The example of campaign finance regulation provides a useful model for the regulatory steps that should be taken to reign in this new type of financial donation. In order to curb the negative consequences of these donations, Congress should establish clear guidelines for both donors and all elected officials, including the president. In recent decades, Congress has made progress in regulating financial donations to politicians’ election campaigns. Amending the current campaign finance law to include donations that cover legal expenses would stem the growth of public cynicism, at least about the role of money in politics. Additionally, scholars of the presidency should explore these legal donations further. Research on the topic can take two approaches. First, it should focus on possible policy alternatives that can provide solutions to this problem. For example, can donations to legal funds be eliminated altogether through the creation of a governmental mechanism, such as a loan to be repaid following public service that will prevent politicians from needing expense trusts in the first place? A second research trajectory should explore if these donations have any influence on politicians’ decisions; it should also measure public attitudes towards these contributions. A greater understanding of the nature of these donations, their influence in the political system, and their effects on the electorate may incline Congress to act. Allowing trusts to operate without regulation is an unhealthy situation for democracy. It raises doubts about presidential loyalty and accountability to the people. When money and politicians are involved, the public wants the dollars to be in the open. Allowing these contributions to take place without regulation generates the feeling, whether based on facts or mere impressions that something unethical is going on out of the public eye. These negative feelings lower citizens' willingness to participate and increase cynicism. The office of the presidency, following Watergate, Iran - Contra, and the Clinton scandals, has already suffered substantially from a lack of public confidence. Any other action that further undermines the public’s trust in the institution of the presidency is something the American people, even its wealthiest, cannot afford.

465

The distractions caused by Clinton’s legal problems may have hindered his ability to concentrate on his job as President, but one can assume that any financial worries were eased by the Trust’s existence.

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APPENDIX: THE QUESTIONNAIRE Two hundred contributors were surveyed in July 1999. They were chosen randomly from a list of all 38,560 donors who made a contribution to the Trust from February 17, 1998 (the day the Trust was created) to December 31, 1998 (the Trust's second period limit day). After a donor was picked, a "white pages" search was done to find that person's phone number. If that person’s phone number was not listed, the next name on the list was searched. Also, when there was a doubt that the person found was not the person who gave the money (usually when two persons or more bearing the same name were found in the same city or town), the guideline was to continue to the next randomly selected donor. In order to assure the donors were at home, the phone calls were made during the evenings and Saturdays. All respondents were given complete confidentiality for their cooperation. The overall response rate was about 30 percent. Transcripts of the conversation exist on the questionnaire sheets.

THE QUESTIONNAIRE Name: Tel.: Address: Donation: Hello. We are doing a research on contributions to The Clinton’s Legal Defense Trust, and we came to know from a public listing that you made a contribution to it. The purpose to this research is strictly for academic use and anything you tell us is strictly confidential. Your name will not be mentioned in any way. Would you be willing to answer a few questions? It shouldn’t take more than 7 minutes. 1.

In the last four years, have you done any of the following? Please say yes to all relevant activities: − Did you vote? − Did you protest, march or demonstrate? − Did you contact an official or a representative? − Did you work as a volunteer for a campaign? 2. Have you ever before contributed money to politics or politicians? If so, why? 3. Why did you contributed to the Clinton’s Legal Defense Trust? 4. Were you solicited by a letter or someone, asking you to contribute, or was it your initiative to do it?

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5. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a: − strong Democrat, − not very strong Democrat, − Independent – closer to Democrat, − Independent, − Independent – closer to Republican, − not very strong Republican, or − strong Republican? 6. Whom did you vote for in the 1988 presidential elections? Bush/Dukakis/neither 7. Whom did you vote for in the 1992 presidential elections? Bush/Clinton/Perot 8. Whom did you vote for in the 1996 presidential elections? Clinton/Dole/Perot 9. How many years of education did you complete? − Some high school − High school − Some college − College graduate − Some graduate school − Master’s, M.D., Ph.D., LL.B., and so forth. 10. If you don’t mind answering, what is your race and religion? 11. Could you define in your own words your occupation (if retired also previous occupation)? 12. What is your total family income before taxes? − Under 25,000 − 25,000 to 49,999 − 50,000 to 99,999 − 1 00,000 to 249,999 − 250,000 and over

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 163-182

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

LEARNING THE ART OF POLICY MANAGEMENT

Bruce E. Altschuler ABSTRACT The textbook model of the presidency encourages presidents to enter office with the goal of achieving good public policy, using the techniques of “going public” to promote their programs. Based on case studies of presidents from Ford to Clinton, this article argues that during the first two years of their terms, each learned the inadequacy of this model and the necessity of using a strategy of policy management which designs a program aimed more at building and mobilizing a winning electoral coalition than congressional passage of legislation. Presidents Reagan and Clinton successfully adopted this strategy which they continued to use despite the impossibility of reelection. Although President Ford utilized it to reduce his challenger’s lead in the polls, he lost the 1976 contest. Carter and the first President Bush reduced their chances of winning a second term by ignoring the advice of aides to employ policy management.

INTRODUCTION A common textbook view of the presidency; modeled largely upon Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first hundred days; is that after winning election, a new president should transform his campaign promises into a program aimed at solving the nation’s main problems. Enacting this program would then become the new administration’s major task. As Hedrick Smith writes, “Franklin D. Roosevelt, with his famous New Deal legislative blitz in 1933, generated the modern presidency and created the model for focusing national initiative in the White House.”1 “As soon as an election concludes,” we are told by a popular textbook, “a president inevitably must try to win Congressional support for his policies.”2 James Pfiffner advises that as quickly after taking office as possible, “the president must articulate the policy direction of the administration and build public and Congressional support for his policies.”3 1

.Hedrick Smith, The Power Game: How Washington Works (New York: Random House, 1988), 335. .James MacGregorBurns; J.W. Peltason; Thomas E. Cronin; David B. Magleby and David M. O’Brien, Government by the People, National Version, 2001-2002 Edition (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall 2002), 297. 3 .James P. Pfiffner,. The Strategic Presidency: Hitting the Ground Running (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1988), 158. 2

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In their recent book on the presidency, Jeffrey Cohen and David Nice supply a number of reasons for this: First, the public expects presidential leadership of the policy-making process. Second, presidents believe that legislative accomplishments provide a record that they can run on for reelection. Third, presidents build a historical legacy primarily by establishing a record of legislative accomplishment. Finally, a president may come into office with definite ideas 4 about how he wants to shape and direct the nation.

Accounts of the beginning of George W. Bush’s administration demonstrate that this view remains the basis for judging incoming presidents. Once the results of the election had become clear, two reporters observed that “President-elect Bush met with Washington’s top power brokers yesterday, promising to work with both parties but also vowing to push forward his full campaign agenda – including a sweeping cut in tax rates.”5 Two political scientists suggested that “Bush’s chances for success also will turn on his ability to resist pressure from conservative Republican constituencies, and occupy the moderate position that offers his only hope of working effectively with the 107th Congress.”6 The textbook model has added “going public” as the major tactic used by presidents to enhance their popularity and promote passage of their programs. Burns, et.al. write that, “Presidents use state of the union addresses, news conferences, and travel around the country in an effort to win political support for their programs.”7 The more popular the president is, the greater his leverage in Congress. Examining presidents from Gerald Ford to Bill Clinton, this article will argue that most have come to office holding the traditional view, generally adding on the techniques that proved successful in their campaigns as the means to “go public,” and sell their programs. However, they soon learned that this strategy jeopardized their reelection. As Paul Brace and Barbara Hinckley write, “If presidents know what they are doing, then their activities should have an impact on the polls” (emphasis in original). Instead, they find that presidents’ increased use of international and domestic travel has either no or even a negative effect on their popularity.8 This failure occurs due to the incompatibility between campaigning and governing. After the election, there is no longer an opponent to whom one can be favorably compared. A campaign organization totally dedicated to the candidate’s election will be replaced by a far larger executive branch, much of which lacks comparable loyalty to this particular president. No longer merely political statements, the president’s words and deeds suddenly have greater consequences. Candidates merely need to state their positions to mobilize supporters while the enactment of legislation requires deliberation, and give and take. Legislation is passed by compromise rather than the total victory or defeat of an election.

4

.Jeffrey Cohen and David Nice, The Presidency (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2003), 283. .Carolyn Lochhead and Zachary Coile, “Bush Pledges to Press on with Tax Cut,” San Francisco Chronicle, December 19, 2000: A1. 6 .Paul J. Quirk and Sean Matheson, “The Presidency: The Election and the Prospects for Leadership,” in Michael Nelson (ed.), The Elections of 2000 (Washington DC: CQ Press 2001), 180. 7 .Burns et. al. 312. 8 .Paul Brace and Barbara Hinckley. Follow the Leader: Opinion Polls and the Modern Presidents (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 55. 5

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Rather than focusing on making good policy, Paul Light recommends that “regardless of the normative implications, reelection must be the President’s top priority in the first term.”9 The thesis of this article is that newly elected presidents have not fully grasped this point until popularity declines forced each into a strategic reconsideration. This change of strategy causes presidents to look at issues in a new way. Rather than appealing to the public to gain support for their programs, successful presidents design policies that will help build and mobilize a winning coalition; a process of policy management. Although this reverses the traditional view of means and ends, it does not mean that presidents lack convictions. Instead, they use these convictions selectively, emphasizing those which can be used to mobilize or expand the presidential coalition while downplaying or scrapping those which will not. As Hugh Heclo has written, “the permanent campaign engages people to tell them what they want to hear.”10 Rather than informing audiences, campaigns try to frame issues in ways that will increase their likelihood of victory. Implementing policy management requires the president to transform the White House into a permanent campaign organization. The methods for doing so include: 1. Utilizing polls to identify the constituencies to be courted and the major themes used to do so. Instead of simply taking the popular side of every controversial issue, surveys must be carefully analyzed to understand the themes, and arguments best able to build the various parts of a presidential coalition. Voters and potential voters count more than general popularity ratings. Within the overall group of voters, particular groups, primarily those who have supported the president or are potential switchers will be the focus of attention. The president must then stay “on message” as much as possible. Of course, every president is faced with a range of foreign and domestic issues that cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, diversions from the theme must be minimized to the extent possible and media attention concentrated on the administration’s main themes. 2. Endless campaigning by the president and his aides -- traveling outside Washington, raising funds (constant campaigning is costly), using advertising etc. The need to raise funds makes energizing sympathetic groups more important than gaining generalized support. 3. Success does not require the actual enactment of legislation. Just as negative campaigns have become a feature of the political landscape, policy management works best when the president can create what is in effect an opposing candidate -Congress or unpopular opposition leaders (Newt Gingrich is an obvious example), interest groups, or even special prosecutors -- who can then be attacked as blocking popular presidential proposals. Thus, the development of the policy management during an era of divided government is no mere coincidence. The ability to blame the opposition party in one

9

.Paul C. Light C. The President’s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Reagan, Revised edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 222. 10 .Hugh Heclo, “Campaigning and Governing: A Conspectus,” in Norman J. Ornstein and Thomas E. Mann. The Permanent Campaign and Its Future. (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2000), 32.

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The Ford administration began the Office of Public Liaison (OPL) to work with interest groups to develop support for the president. As liaison to the party, and other important political figures, the Office of Political Affairs (OPA) eventually evolved into the reelection staff. Although political consultants and pollsters have not yet become an official part of the White House staff, all the presidents discussed in this article made use of their parties’ national committees to pay for their services. For better or worse, the degree to which each president learns to move away from the traditional view and accept the new model affects his electoral success. Our examination of the administrations of the past 25 years will show the learning curve of each.

GERALD FORD As the first president to come to office without any sort of national electoral constituency, Gerald Ford was forced to begin building one from scratch. The Nixon coalition he inherited had been shattered by the Watergate scandal. High inflation and growing unemployment made the country’s economic situation perilous; nor did Ford have the luxury of a transition period. Following the standard theory, he quickly developed a program to meet the country’s problems; then went public to pressure an unfriendly Congress to pass it. Instead of thinking primarily of reelection, he used his instincts, and congressional experience, to set policy based on the traditional Republican philosophy of reducing inflation even at the cost of greater unemployment.12 The result was a policy that stressed the sacrifices of spending cuts, and a tax surcharge, for the promise of a relatively undefined long term gain. Sacrifice was also the foundation of Ford’s energy program based on increasing the cost of fuel. Such proposals were hardly geared toward maximizing the president’s chances of nomination and election in 1976. Pardoning former President Nixon, even before any charges had been filed, reduced Ford’s election prospects and popularity ratings still further. Going public did not help much since Ford’s first address to Congress had declared inflation “domestic enemy number one,” even if controlling it ran the risk of a recession. He laid out his program in more detail in an October 8 speech to Congress: an investment tax credit, a five percent tax surcharge, and 4.4 billion dollars in spending cuts. The media heaped 11

.Stephen P. Nicholson, Gary M. Segura, and Nathan D. Woods, “Presidential Approval and the Mixed Blessing of Divided Government,” Journal of Politics 64 (Aug. 2002), 701-20 argues that periods of divided government are characterized by higher presidential approval ratings than those where one party controls president and Congress. 12 .Gerald R. Ford, A Time to Heal (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 152.

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scorn upon these proposals which Newsweek termed “a placebo to ease the pain of stagflation.”13 Even the more optimistic analysis by Ford’s own pollster concluded that approval of the program was “more of a hope than a promise.”14 Ford’s Gallup approval ratings dropped from 71 percent in August to 52 percent after his Congressional speech. Leaving Washington proved no more effective. Ford averaged 4.41 days of domestic travel, twice as much as his post-Truman predecessors.15 Yet, after an early 1975 series of trips to Texas, Kansas, Florida, Indiana and California, his Gallup ratings had sunk to around 40 percent. If “the president wanted to improve his public and press standing by traveling often and looking ‘presidential,’ the strategy did not work,” writes Mark Rozell.16 Although Ford had told a group of business leaders in late December 1974 that he did not intend to make any “180 degree turns” in his economic program, declining approval ratings coupled with severe losses in the 1974 mid-term elections had caused a reassessment that was soon to result in a shift so dramatic that his press secretary would joke that “it could be 179 degrees.”17 The political dilemma faced by the president was that moving too far in the direction of the Democrats’ anti-recession program would endanger his chances of nomination by the Republican Party. What was needed was less a program designed for passage than one demonstrating to the public his concern about unemployment while showing Republicans that he remained determined to hold down government spending. Light describes the situation well: “Though Ford wanted a measure of legislative success, he also wanted to run for election in 1976; Ford had to be nominated by Republicans, not Democrats.”18 As a result, Ford adopted policy management. A mid-January televised address followed two days later by the State of the Union message set out the new program: $16 billion in tax cuts (significantly less than proposed by Congressional Democrats, but a reversal of his previously proposed surcharge), an energy import fee, a freeze on new programs except for energy and defense, caps on pay and pension increases for federal employees as well as COLAs for Social Security, and incentives for domestic energy production. The addition of incentives; as well as a later proposal for rebates to farmers to offset higher fuel costs, shows Ford adjusting his program to appeal to core elements of his coalition. Although Richard Wirthlin’s polls showed at best limited support for this program, he argued that the public faulted Congress more. Its approval ratings were below the president’s with many blaming it for the failure of the administration’s proposals to pass. If, as seemed likely, Ford’s program was not enacted into law, the public could be convinced that Congress was at fault. “President Ford,” Wirthlin concluded, “can continue to ‘take on’ the Congressional leadership for his own political advantage.”19 In a separate analysis of these polls, Robert Hartmann, one of Ford’s closest aides, noted that “people rate you positively (48 13

.Mark J. Rozell, Mark, The Press and the Ford Presidency (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), 6566. 14 .Richard Wirthlin, “President Ford’s Anti-Inflation Program: The Public Reaction,” October 9-11, 1974. Files of Robert Hartmann, Box 33, Ford Library. 15 .Brace and Hinckley, 52. 16 .Rozell 1992, 107. 17 .Barbara Kellerman, The Political Presidency: The Practice of Leadership (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 165. 18 .Light 1991, 114.

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to 42 percent) on the overall job you are doing as President and rate the Congress almost the reverse.”20 Divided government had provided an opponent for the president to campaign against. Ford replaced his program’s tax surcharge with a decrease, even if less than proposed by congressional Democrats, he went on the offensive. The strategy was clear to contemporary observers; with John Osborne writing that Ford’s attacks on Congress were “all calculated” as they decreased the chances that its members would want to compromise with the very person making such public criticisms.21 The administration began to pay more attention to institutionalizing campaign management within the White House. It had originally incorporated the Office of Communications into the Press Office. However, after the first year, according to Chief of Staff Richard Cheney, there was a switch into “campaign mode.” “You’ve got to control what you put out,” he explained, “you don’t let the press set the agenda.” Each day, administration officials met to develop a theme. After Ford lost several primaries to Ronald Reagan, Communications regained its status as a separate office, playing important campaign roles in scripting the Republican convention, coordinating election appearances by administration officials with the President Ford Committee, and even preparing Ford for the debates with Carter.22 The Ford administration began OPL which organized numerous meetings with interest group leaders, establishing connections which proved particularly helpful during the formal election campaign.23 His successors would continue expanding these and other White House offices, thereby turning ad hoc efforts into a fully staffed continuous campaign. When the formal campaign began, Ford’s strategy was first to solidify his base to gain the party’s nomination, then expanded it after the convention. Once Ford had won the nomination, according to Gerald Pomper, he had gained “the full majesty of the presidential office, the legitimacy of the party’s chosen leader, and the independence conferred by its designation.”24 As a result, Ford significantly narrowed Jimmy Carter’s lead. His ultimate plan, beginning with his modified economic program in 1975, was the only possible road to electoral success. Winning the election rather than legislative success became the president’s primary goal.

JIMMY CARTER Unlike Ford, Jimmy Carter was able to build a winning coalition in an election campaign. Nevertheless, the coalition he assembled was far from the majority developed by Franklin D. Roosevelt. Pomper argues that “a purely `traditional’ vote could not have brought the Democrats victory,” as many of its components were a shrinking proportion of voters.25 19

.Richard Wirthlin, “The Public Perceptions of Economic Issues,” February 1975. Files of Robert Hartmann, Box 30 and “National Issues Survey,” March 1975. Box 32, Ford Library. .Robert Hartmann, “Memo to President Ford,” 1975. Files of Robert Hartmann, Box 34, Ford Library. 21 .John Osborne. White House Watch: The Ford Years (Washington DC: New Republic Books, 1977), 93. 22 .John A. Maltese, Spin Control: The White House Office of Communications and the Management of Presidential News (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 119, 140-48. 23 .James W. Davis, The President as Party Leader (New York: Praeger, 1992), 131-32. 24 .Gerald Pomper, The Election of 1976: Reports and Interpretations (New York: David McKay, 1977), 66. 25 .Pomper 1977, 64. 20

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Carter had to add new constituents, particularly in the suburbs, without alienating more traditional liberal Democratic voters. His 51-49 percent margin, despite the Republican Watergate legacy, illustrates how tenuous this strategy was. Whether it would be possible to hold together a coalition based on such a contradictory foundation would be the key to Carter’s reelection chances. To understand the dynamics of public opinion, Carter met with pollster Patrick Caddell at least eight times between the election and the end of January.26 In a 57 page report, Caddell wrote “that governing with public approval requires a continuing political campaign though one conducted in a different framework.”27 A later memo suggested an “inflation offensive” to broaden the coalition by targeting professionals and white collar workers whose concerns about taxes, spending and inflation made them more likely than liberal Democrats to support administration programs.28 Despite these suggestions, Carter decided that his first post-inaugural speech would be a fireside chat “to emphasize the importance of the energy problem.”29 In fact, all three of his 1977 nationally televised speeches were about energy, a choice of subjects that hardly seems politically inspired. The energy issue had not been a major one during the campaign nor did it rank as a public priority in any polls. At the time, Carter estimated that these energy proposals would reduce his poll ratings by at least ten percent.30 The rest of the administration’s legislative program was equally unappealing. In his memoirs, Carter concedes that “there was little in the list to attract constituents.”31 Proposing the elimination of nineteen water projects upset their Democratic supporters in Congress. Even though Carter eventually cut his losses with a compromise retaining some of the projects, he concedes that it “was accurately interpreted as a sign of weakness on my part.”32 Failure to consider the political effects of his decisions complicated an already difficult situation. Like Ford, he had built a program then tried to sell it rather than designing one geared toward coalition building, and reelection. Despite televised speeches, and extensive travel, Carter’s approval ratings dropped steadily. After an April 1978 memo from top aide Hamilton Jordan told Carter of problems with the Cabinet, primarily on political matters, a high level strategy meeting was convened at Camp David.33 The meeting was a first step in the direction of policy management. However, Carter himself never fully gave priority to electoral considerations, preferring instead to stress balancing the budget at the expense of more politically appealing programs, even programs he had promised during the 1976 campaign. The next step was a reorganization of the White House staff. Tim Kraft was named Assistant to the President for Political Affairs and Personnel, a precursor to what would become the Office of Political Affairs in the Reagan administration.

26

.Charles Mohr,“Carter’s and Pollster’s View of Public May Slow Administration’s Tempo,” New York Times, Jan. 29, 1977, 9. 27 .Patrick Caddell, “Initial Working Paper on Political Strategy,” Dec. 10, 1976. Files of Jody Powell, Box 4, Carter Library. 28 .Patrick Caddell, “Additions to December 10 Working Paper,” Dec. 21, 1976. Files of Jody Powell, Box 4, Carter Library. 29 .Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 93. 30 .Richard Rovere, “Letter From Washington,” The New Yorker 53 (May 9, 1977), 136-142. 31 .Carter 1982, 88. 32 .Carter 1982, 79. 33 .Hamilton Jordan, “Thoughts on Cabinet/Staff Meeting,” Apr. 1978. Files of Jordan, Box 33, Carter Library.

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Another important change was the replacement of Assistant to the President for Public Liaison Margaret Costanza with Anne Wexler who formalized and transformed OPL into an agency whose goal was to develop interest group support for the administration. Using techniques of policy management, she invited group leaders to White House meetings before legislation was submitted to Congress. Once legislative proposals were written, group leaders were briefed after which they contacted local media. At least a part of the Carter administration had moved toward policy management. However, this movement was incomplete as most of the goals were not designed to aid in reelection. Instead, Carter took his own program, and tried to use the new apparatus to build support. While successful in passing parts of the program, this approach proved inadequate to maintain the majority coalition that elected him or build one for the 1980 election. Media attention focused on the appointment of Gerald Rafshoon as communications director. Like Ford, Carter had returned the Communications Office to the supervision of the Press Office. But as John Maltese writes, “As in any campaign, the president must set the agenda, maintain discipline among his spokespeople, and orchestrate media coverage of that agenda through long term public relations planning. Yet the striking thing about the early part of the Carter administration is the lack of such planning.”34 Describing his methods, Rafshoon made a revealing comparison, “In any kind of marketing situation, you always take two or three messages and repeat them enough so that the wording gets through.”35 Unfortunately for Rafshoon; his boss, and other staffers; were often unreceptive to such public relations approaches. When Rafshoon saw an opportunity to show the courage behind Carter’s energy program by speaking “in Houston at a fat-cat DNC fund raiser,” Domestic Policy Staff Director Stuart Eizenstat cautioned against direct attacks on oil companies since “we will need their help to pass the last part of our energy program.”36 Because the program had been developed so far in advance of the strategy to sell it, such contradictions were bound to plague any public relations effort. Upon receiving the first draft, Carter resisted the idea of focusing on a single theme. Energy should be reduced “to no more than 1/4 of speech” to make room for a list of the administration’s accomplishments followed by an even longer list of goals.37 In response, speechwriter James Fallows pressed the argument for concentrating on one subject as the only way to attract national attention. Even if lists of goals and achievements would be informative to the audience of 1300, they “will not advance our themes with the other 200 million.”38 Unconvinced, Carter did not begin speaking about energy until the second half of his speech, following tax cuts, welfare reform, balancing the budget, reducing government regulation, urban revitalization, and agriculture.39 National coverage was limited; generally focusing on issues other than those Rafshoon had sought.40 Carter’s speechwriters later told Mark Rozell “that the president placed little emphasis on mass audience persuasion, did not work closely

34

.Maltese 1992, 150. .Maltese 1992, 164. 36 .Gerald Rafshoon, “Speeches,” June 2, 1978, Files of Stuart Eizenstat, Box 254, Carter Library. 37 .Jimmy Carter, “Houston Speech,” June 20, 1978, Files of Gerald Rafshoon, Box 62, Carter Library. 38 .James Fallows, “Houston Speech,” June 20, 1978, Speechwriters’ Chronological File, Box 28, Carter Library. 39 .Jimmy Carter, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter 1978, Book I. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1979, 1165-72. 40 .Terence Smith, “Critics of Brzezinski Rebutted by Carter,” New York Times, June 25, 1978: 1, 20. 35

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with the speechwriting staff, and did not heed how his frequent negative messages undermined public support.”41 Neither televised speeches nor a cabinet shakeup were able to reverse the decline in popularity ratings to 30 percent by the summer of 1979. Carter’s failure to hold his own constituency together was evidenced by his having to fend off a primary challenge from Senator Edward Kennedy. Of course, the Iranian hostages, and the state of the economy contributed significantly to these difficulties; but, Carter worsened matters by continuing to resist proposals that would have helped him politically even if they conflicted with his views of good policy. Despite an upsurge in unemployment, he rejected advice to counter Ronald Reagan’s tax cut pledge with a proposal for a smaller one coupled with modest spending increases to stimulate the economy; because he believed so strongly in balancing the budget.42 In the general election, he was swamped by Reagan.

RONALD REAGAN Reagan had the clearest campaign agenda of any of the presidents examined in this article. Economic discontent had been the overriding issue among voters. Reagan’s campaign prescription was to cut taxes, and reduce government spending, except for the defense budget which would increase. Barbara Kellerman points out the effectiveness of emphasizing concern about the economy without pointing to specific budget cuts; which she terms, “the device of stressing the ends and avoiding the means.”43 Particularly important in Reagan’s electoral coalition were Catholics and Southerners, two groups whose Democratic inclinations had been declining since 1968. Because their support was based more on dissatisfaction with Carter’s performance than agreement with Reagan’s positions on major issues, the newly elected president would have to show quickly that he was doing something to improve the economy to get reelected.44 As Office of Management and Budget (OMB) head David Stockman saw it, “the `window’ for successfully launching sweeping change in the national political economy would be exceedingly brief.” 45 The Reagan administration used policy management to develop its program more than any of its predecessors. Surveys taken by Wirthlin showed that only economic issues would hold together the traditional elements of Republican coalitions, and those added in 1980. When asked in a February 1981 poll about the most important problem facing the country, 38 percent cited inflation, and 33 percent cited the economy compared to 5 percent cited foreign policy, and 3 percent cited moral decline. For Wirthlin such social issues as abortion, school

41

.Mark J. Rozell, “President Carter and the Press: Perspectives from White House Communications Advisers,” Political Science Quarterly 105 (Fall 1990), 426. .Burton I. Kaufman, The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr. ( Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1993), 178-181. 43 .Kellerman 1984, 221. 44 .Andrew Kohut and Norman Ornstein, “Constructing a Winning Coalition,” Public Opinion 10 (Nov./Dec. 1987): 41-44. 45 .Stephen Skowronek,. The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 419. 42

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prayer and school busing were “no-win issues politically.”46 Although no president could entirely avoid them or distracting foreign policy problems, it was crucial to do everything possible to keep the focus on the most popular elements of the economic program. The economic program contained three major elements: a large tax cut, increased defense spending, and reductions in social programs. According to one analysis, “with Reagan, the president in power was much closer to the candidate as campaigner than was the case for any chief executive in modern memory.” While Reagan worked to mobilize public support, his political advisers made the final decisions, hiding the trade-offs necessary to accommodate conflicts between monetarist, neoclassical, and supply-side economic experts. The result was more a plan to advance Reagan’s political principles than a blueprint for managing the economy.47 The campaign’s avoidance of specific details about budget cuts indicated awareness that these would be the least popular part of what would be termed “Reaganomics”. In order to minimize opposition, the White House stated that “social safety net” programs such as Social Security, Head Start, Medicare, and veterans’ benefits would be exempted. Staff leadership was divided among the “troika” of James Baker, Edwin Meese, and Michael Deaver. For Baker, the key to success would be “to pick your issues carefully...and, also not to have the focus too diffuse.” Early White House coordination was so effective that “almost no news item, no speech, no trip, no photo-op whatsoever was put on the President’s schedule during 1981 unless it contributed to the President’s economic program.”48 The Communications Office managed many of the details. When David Gergen became director, he began the practice of line of the day meetings. Media access to Reagan was limited to induce reporters to cover the line as each presidential appearance was designed to present the best television images. No attempt was made to hide this strategy as shown by Reagan’s response to one reporter’s question on another subject, “If I answer that question, none of you will say anything about what we’re here for. I’m not going to give you a different lead…”49 Selling the economic program began February 5, 1981 with a nationally televised speech, in which the president contrasted promises of prosperity if his program was adopted; to a likely disaster if not, rather than laying out specific budget cuts. Two weeks later, the State of the Union address maintained focus on the economic program. Eventually those specifics would have to be proposed, resulting in the administration’s first serious miscalculation. In February, Senators Domenici and Hollings had negotiated a bipartisan agreement to freeze both Social Security and federal pension cost of living adjustments. However, Reagan rejected it in favor of one by Stockman which made far larger cuts in Social Security disability and early retirement benefits. Public and congressional opposition was so strenuous that the plan was quickly killed. Administration economic adviser William Niskanen later termed this “the major domestic policy mistake of the Reagan

46

.Summaries of Wirthlin’s polls can be found in “D/M/I Flash Results,” March 20-22, 1986 PR 015, Box 9 and March 5-7, 1987, Box 11 (reactions to speeches) and “RNC Flash Results,” Nov. 12-17, 1988, Box 25, Reagan Library (most other polls). Unless otherwise cited, references to Reagan surveys come from these memos. 47 .M. Stephen Weatherford, and Lorraine M. McDonnell, “Ideology and Economic Policy,” in Larry Berman (ed), Looking Back on the Reagan Presidency, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 127. 48 .Mark J. Rozell, “Presidential Image-Makers on the Limits of Spin Control,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 25 (Winter 1995), 84-5. 49 .Maltese 1992, 198.

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administration,” one the Democrats would make a major theme during the 1982 Congressional elections.50 Even after Reagan was shot on March 30, the drive to pass his economic program barely slowed down. A combination of speeches and lobbying of individual members resulted in the passage of the budget. The House rejected Democratic amendments requiring the budget resolution to include explicit program cuts. When cuts were finally specified, they most affected the least politically influential such as the poor.51 In the long run, these proved inadequate to prevent large deficits for every budget year of Reagan’s two terms in office. Reagan’s first year seems the perfect combination of traditional strategy, and going public. Samuel Kernell concludes that “going public rewarded the president handsomely in his dealings with Congress while he remained popular.” Yet, paradoxically, “no president managed to exhaust his popular support so thoroughly by his first midterm election.”52 As with Ford and Carter, sharply declining job ratings would lead to a reassessment of the administration’s approach, increasing its emphasis on reelection at the expense of policy. That decline began during the last third of 1981. By the following spring, those disapproving began outnumbering those supporting his performance. After the 1982 elections, only 35 percent approved. One approach taken by the administration was to hope that economic recovery would come to the rescue. Reagan had argued that such an extensive overhaul of economic policy would require time to show results. Wirthlin’s polls regularly asked how much time respondents expected before the program would work. Even during the 1982 recession, with Reagan having been in office for a year and a half, 35 percent were willing to give him another two years, 27 percent 12-23 months, and only 35 percent less than another year.53 Despite considerable dissatisfaction with the president’s performance, there was enough goodwill to postpone a definitive decision. Reagan regularly predicted that prosperity was coming although he had to change the dates each time. His 1982 State of the Union Address put the country “on the road to prosperity and stability by the latter half of this year.” By year’s end he was “convinced this coming year, 1983, is going to see a definite upturn.”54 The 1982 State of the Union shows the administration searching for a strategy. Reagan began the speech with statistics about the seriousness of the economic situation he had inherited, followed by predictions of eventual success because of his program. He promised no tax increases for the year even though the deficit “exceeded our earlier expectation.” The main initiative was the New Federalism, a federal takeover of Medicaid in exchange for putting the states in charge of welfare and food stamps. The only specific budget cuts proposed were elimination of the cabinet Departments of Energy and Education. Seeking to improve his support among women, Reagan proposed a 50 States Project to review state laws in order to eliminate provisions that discriminated on the basis of sex. This proposal was primarily a rhetorical device to try to show that despite the

50

.Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 244-52. .Kellerman 1984, 245. 52 .Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, 3d edition. (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1997), 168, 171 53 .Richard Wirthlin, Memo to Craig Fuller, Summer 1982, PR 015, Box 1, Reagan Library. 54 .James W. Ceaser, “The Reagan Presidency and American Public Opinion,” in Charles O. Jones, The Reagan Legacy: Promise and Performance, (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1988), 187. 51

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1980 party platform’s opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment, the administration was interested in eliminating legal sex discrimination.55 The New Federalism initiative demonstrates that policy management requires more than simply following poll results that agree with the administration’s policy inclinations. Although Wirthlin found solid majorities in favor, none of his earlier polls had ranked the issue high on the public agenda nor had these proposals been discussed much during the campaign or before the State of the Union. When governors of both parties, not having been consulted in the design of the proposal, expressed their opposition, the plan slowly faded away.56 In a memo to the troika, Wirthlin expressed concern about an eight percent decline in approval ratings during the two weeks following the State of the Union. Putting his faith in economic recovery, he argued that “while a lot of Americans are hurting economically, they expect improvement over the next year.”57 In addition to measuring overall opinion, surveys regularly tracked the reaction of important constituencies to specific policies. Catholic voters provide a good example. After polls found 66 percent of Catholics in favor of tuition tax credits for private school,58 Reagan traveled to Chicago, the city with the largest parochial school system in the country, to announce just such a proposal. Newsweek’s evaluation that “Congress, however, is almost certain to turn a deaf ear” shows that the media was still trapped in the old model, believing that the goal of presidential proposals was enactment into law rather than assisting reelection.59 From these events, we can see the development of a new strategy: use symbolic appeals to solidify or expand the main parts of the 1980 coalition while waiting for the economy to improve before the 1984 vote. Getting a legislative program passed no longer seemed particularly important. Indicative of the focus on reelection over legislation was the transfer of the entire OPA from the White House to the 1984 campaign staff, from which it returned after the election.60 By the end of the 1983 Congressional budget process Kernell notes that Reagan “had assumed a defensive posture, threatening vetoes and promising public appeals” on the most popular issues.61 Defusing the Social Security issue was an important part of reelection strategy, with poll results so sensitive that one aide’s memo included a recommendation to “not have anything on paper.”62

55

.Evidence of how low a priority the 50 state project was can be found in the following introduction to a “progress report” (probably written by Elizabeth Dole 3 months after the project began): “You should be aware that upon Judy Peachee’s departure this was reassigned to Jean Traweek. Apparently Jean has also left, and the project is now assigned to Judy Van Rest. When I approached her for a status yesterday, she admitted that she was reading the files for the first time.” “Gender Gap -- Back Up Data,” Files of E. Dole, OA 5455, Reagan Library. 56 .John W. Mashek, “Governors Balk: We Want a Better Deal,” US News and World Report 92 (March 8, 1982), 49. 57 .Richard Wirthlin, “The President’s Job Rating and Perceptions About our Economic Future,” Feb. 20, 1982, WHORM PR 015, Box 1, Reagan Library. 58 .Richard Wirthlin, “Tuition Tax Credits,” Feb. 16, 1982, WHORM PR 015, Reagan Library 59 .Norman M. Bradburn and Seymour Sudman. Polls and Surveys: Understanding What They Tell Us. (San Francisco: Josey-Bass, 1988), 47-48. 60 .Kathryn Dunn Tenpas and Matthew J. Dickinson, “Governing, Campaigning and Organizing the Presidency,” Political Science Quarterly 112 (Spring 1997), 61. 61 .Kernell 1997, 167. 62 .Ken Clarkson, “Reactions to Poll Data on Social Security,” Nov. 17, 1982, PR 015 Box 2.

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Agreeing with the Democrats to appoint a bipartisan commission, whose recommendations were enacted into a law signed by Reagan at a White House ceremony in April 1983, made Social Security far less of an electoral threat. Even more important, economic recovery kicked in, vindicating Reagan’s strategy and helping him win reelection overwhelmingly. Even though the president’s popularity peaked during the first half of his second term, he continued the defensive strategy of tracking key groups while maintaining their allegiance with symbolic appeals and the contrast between economic performance under his, and Carter’s administrations. Light notes that “Reagan’s entire second term consisted of proposals from the first,” the one exception being the 1986 tax reform.63 Loss of control of the Senate in 1986 followed by the Iran-Contra revelations effectively ended any chance of additional major legislative achievements for the duration of the Reagan administration yet proposals continued to come forth. A good example is the 1987 State of the Union. Prior to the speech, a Wirthlin survey asked, “if you were President of the United States, and could make just one change or improvement to help our country what would it be?” This “wish list” was then broken down by constituency groups.64 However, including most of their wishes into his speech failed to divert attention from an explanation of the Iran-Contra affair that the media and public found unconvincing.65 Thus, we can see that up to the end, Reagan was using policy proposals less to enact a program than to hold together his electoral coalition for himself and his designated successor George Bush who ran with the promise of maintaining the Reagan legacy. According to Gerald Pomper; “cooperating exceptionally, President Reagan’s administration used the powers of office to aid his heir.”66 Pomper specifically cites popular legislation that Reagan opposed but allowed to become law, the deferral of unpopular actions such as farm mortgage foreclosures, and an anti-abortion appeal to the Supreme Court until after Election Day, and speaking for Bush.

GEORGE BUSH Although George Bush retained enough of the Reagan coalition to defeat Michael Dukakis by a margin of 53-46 percent, his party lost seats in both houses of Congress. By running on a platform of continuity with no major initiatives, Bush began without a legislative agenda of his own. After trailing in the polls during the summer, he had relentlessly attacked his opponent, making only one memorable promise: “Read my lips, no new taxes.” While willing to embrace modern techniques during the campaign, Bush was uncomfortable using them as a tool for governing. David Mervin writes that “Bush was never able to conceal his distaste for image-making, for packaging, for the public relations aspects of the president’s role ... [but] he showed no such reluctance when campaigning for office.”67 63

.Light 1991, 243. .Richard Wirthlin, “DMI Pre-State of the Union Analysis,” Jan. 15, 1987, PR 015, Box 11, Reagan Library. 65 .George J. Church, “The State of Reagan,” Time 129 (Feb. 9, 1987): 24-5. 66 .Gerald Pomper, The Election of 1988: Reports and Interpretations. (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1989), 138. 67 .David Mervin, George Bush and the Guardianship Presidency (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 52-3. 64

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This distaste resulted in a de-emphasis of the permanent campaign offices in the White House. Instead of Reagan’s line of the day, Communications Director David Demarest preferred to “place the onus on the press to decide what it was going to cover.”68 Bush reduced OPL’s staff from 60 to 16, causing director Bobbie Kilberg, to complain that “we were much too small... we had no support staff whatsoever and we had to rely on interns.”69 Rather than using policy management to propose a legislative program that would solidify and expand his coalition, Bush seemed uninterested in presenting much of a domestic program of any kind. Late in 1990, Chief of Staff John Sununu went so far as to tell a conservative group that “there’s not a single piece of legislation that needs to be passed in the next two years for this president.”70 Bush’s most significant domestic legislative success, the 1990 Budget Reconciliation Act, was his most conspicuous political failure. Objectively, one could argue that he won significant concessions from Congressional Democrats. James Davis points out that “some Capitol Hill observers marveled at just how much power had been shifted from one end of Pennsylvania Avenue to the other on pinpointing deficit targets and spending cuts.”71 However, breaking Bush’s one ironclad campaign promise, not to raise taxes, more than negated these gains. Furthermore, it alienated conservatives who had made up a crucial part of the Reagan constituency, but had always been suspicious of Bush’s commitment to their cause. So important were they that Bush soon apologized for his “mistake” in raising taxes, promising not to repeat the error. The administration might have mitigated the damage had it chosen to use the institutional tools of policy management. According to Kilberg, however, during the budget negotiations, OPL “didn’t have the foggiest idea what was going on, and neither did any of the interest groups.” Instead, after the agreement was announced, Sununu turned, and directed her to “sell it.” Communications was equally in the dark as Demarest was not even told that Bush’s televised speech would ask the public to contact their legislators to urge support. The legislative affairs office learned of the agreement only after it was faxed a copy of Press Secretary Fitzwater’s public statement.72 The result was a humiliating Congressional defeat in which majorities of both parties voted against the president. Only after three weeks of renegotiation was a second version narrowly approved; just a week before Election Day. The damage was so severe that RNC Co-chair Ed Rollins advised Republican candidates to register their differences with Bush publicly.73 Even worse, Bush would face a conservative challenge for the Republican nomination from Pat Buchanan Foreign affairs interested the president more than a domestic program. John Kessel articulates a common view: “In foreign policy, George Bush was surefooted, and decisive, but in economics, he was uncertain, and frequently delayed taking action.”74 The collapse of the Soviet Union along with military successes in Panama and the Gulf War seemed to vindicate Bush’s priorities. By February 1991, his approval ratings had risen to record setting levels 68

.Mark J. Rozell, The Press and the Bush Presidency. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 151. .Mervin, 81-82. 70 .Mervin, 78. 71 .Davis, 77. 72 .Mervin, 77, 133-34, and 144-45. 73 .Rozell 1996, 76. 74 .John H. Kessel, Presidents, the Presidency and the Political Environment (CQ Press, 2001), 227. 69

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around 90 percent. However, as the economy faltered, those ratings plummeted, dropping by 57 percent during the year and a half prior to the Republican convention.75 As with his predecessors, Bush would have to reevaluate his strategy By late 1991, both White House advisers, and Congressional Republicans were alarmed enough by polls showing growing public concern about the economy to urge Bush to take action.76. Instead, the 1992 State of the Union address merely proposed what one scholar derides as “a little of this and a little of that” such as a $500 increase in the personal exemption which was abandoned a week later.77 “In the end,” writes Richard Waterman, “the president had no viable economic plan in hand.”78 Like Reagan, Bush put his faith in economic recovery. But whereas the public had been willing to give Reagan more time, seeing him as having acted vigorously to correct problems he had inherited, there was no such patience for Bush who had promised to continue Reagan-era prosperity, but now seemed unconcerned, and unwilling to act. The “going public” tactic of traveling abroad only worsened Bush’s image problems. Facing criticism over trips to Australia, and the Far East, he countered by declaring they were about “jobs, jobs, jobs” but, publicity about the expense of bringing along business leaders as well as pictures of Bush vomiting at a state dinner resulted in a barrage of media criticism.79 Even as he shifted into campaign mode, Bush continued to separate his reelection, and White House organizations leading to confusion, and numerous changes of message. First, he tried arguing that the economy was not technically in recession, and was beginning to improve. He tried changing the subject with attacks on his opponent’s character and record. In September he belatedly offered an economic plan, but failed to follow up. None of these worked as Bill Clinton won by a margin of 43.3-37.7 percent.

BILL CLINTON A famous sign at Clinton’s campaign headquarters succinctly stated his agenda, “Change vs. more of the same; the economy, stupid. Don’t forget health care.” He promised an immediate congressional introduction of a specific economic plan which would be followed in 100 days by one for health care. If elected, he would be a New Democrat with an activist agenda on the economy, but, a more moderate posture on social issues. However, his 43 percent plurality along with the Democratic Party’s loss of ten House seats made expanding his coalition a necessity. Clinton’s first target was the 19 percent of the electorate who voted for Ross Perot. His inaugural speech gave more attention to the deficit, Perot’s signature issue, than to his own main campaign themes. However, stressing deficit reduction would make it difficult to find the funds for education, health care, and job training that appealed to most of those who had voted for Clinton.

75

.Richard Morin, “Come November, Will Bush Defy History,” Washington Post, Aug. 17, 1992: A11. .Richard W. Waterman, “Storm Clouds on the Political Horizon: George Bush at the Dawn of the 1992 Presidential Election,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 26 (Spring 1996): 340-41. 77 .Kessel, 228. 78 .Waterman, 341. 79 .Rozell 1996, 117-18. 76

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According to incoming Communications Director George Stephanopolous, “We want to repeat what worked in the campaign... We have to make sure we coordinate activities so the administration is speaking with one voice, and building support for the president’s policies.”80 Unfortunately, campaign techniques could not be so directly translated into governing. When the administration tried to duplicate its campaign “war room” to orchestrate fights on major issues it found that the war metaphor made compromise with congressional Republicans more difficult. Lacking the relatively short time frame of an election, and its focus on the single goal of victory rather than a multiplicity of issues, the war room approach cannot be termed a success. The complexity, and contradictions, inherent in its economic and health care plans together with considerable White House disorganization caused the administration to miss its deadlines. With no immediate economic program, and health care not arriving until late October, less favorable issues filled the media vacuum, most notably eliminating the military’s ban on gays which Clinton had made the centerpiece of his campaign appeals to gay voters. The administration tried in vain to change or deemphasize the topic. His one television, and two radio speeches, between February and April completely ignored the issue. In April, the first White House meeting ever with gay leaders was closed to television cameras. Rather than accept an invitation to a gay march a week later, the president gave a radio speech about the economy, including no mention of gay issues.81 The issue persisted until Clinton’s July 19 announcement of the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy which he called “an honorable compromise.” However, his handling of the issue added to Clinton’s reputation for retreating from campaign pledges. Hoping to regain a centrist position, Clinton’s economic program included a five year $700 billion deficit reduction plan, half from spending cuts, and half from tax increases primarily affecting those with the highest incomes. The public relations offensive was modeled after Reagan’s first year with a televised speech on February 15 followed two days later by Clinton’s first major speech to Congress. However, a program based primarily on sacrifice lacked the potential public, and specific constituency appeal of Reagan’s tax cuts and defense buildup. Clinton lacked Reagan’s ability to focus entirely on his main theme. According to OMB Director Leon Panetta, after the two February speeches “the message became confused. The President began to push health care, and enterprise zones, community development banks, and immunization.”82 Nevertheless, after major changes in the proposed tax increases, the main elements of the administration budget were approved albeit narrowly, and without a single Republican vote. In early August, Clinton spoke from the Oval Office to counter polls showing widespread belief that his tax increases would fall largely on the middle class. Because his polls also indicated strong support for welfare reform he included it as a goal but had yet to propose an actual plan.83 With a health care bill not ready either, the administration decided to take up NAFTA next despite opposition by organized labor, and much of the Congressional party leadership. 80

.Bradley H. Patterson, Jr. The White House Staff: Inside the West Wing and Beyond (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 146. 81 .Robert E. Denton, Jr. and Rachel L. Holloway (eds.), The Clinton Presidency: Images, Issues and Communications Strategies (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 203-205. 82 .Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Touchstone 1994), 83. 83 .Drew 265-66.

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Even if Clinton thought this was good public policy it was neither effective policy management, nor coalition building. As one Democratic representative put it, “politically, NAFTA is not a winner for the president. On the left, the labor folks, and environmentalists are all upset, and they are core constituencies for the Democratic Party.”84 Republicans and business leaders who supported NAFTA would likely return to the opposition on other issues. Although techniques of going public, most notably a televised debate between Al Gore and Ross Perot, and a corporate sponsored ad campaign featuring Lee Iacocca, helped to achieve passage; as Mark Peterson has written (Campbell and Rockman:162), this victory “did not mitigate, and probably aggravated, his coalition building challenges.”85 Health care was another example of the old model. During his first year in office Clinton met at least once weekly with Stanley Greenberg, who conducted monthly surveys. But, according to a memo from two White House aides, these polls primarily provided information about “how best to sell a health care reform plan that is constructed by the policy people.”86 As with Carter’s energy plan, the health care initiative was drafted in secret; in this case, with a task force eventually proposing a 1300 page bill whose complexity made it difficult to explain, but easy for affected interest groups to attack. These attacks, most notably in the “Harry and Louise” ads sponsored by insurance companies, showed that “going public” could work for the president’s opponents too. Evaluating the devastating administration health care defeat, Greenberg concluded that “our problem is not being political enough, and focusing on doing the right thing in public policy.”87 As the economy improved in late 1993, Clinton’s approval ratings rose to nearly 60 percent but the health care fiasco, and charges about Whitewater, and Clinton’s past sex life soon sparked a decline. By mid-1994, approval had dropped to the low forties. Facing potential disaster in the midterm elections, Clinton began a secret consultation with Dick Morris whose poll results provided a severe jolt. Many voters wrongly believed that unemployment, and the deficit, were on the rise; others with a more accurate view gave Clinton little credit for progress. Only smaller achievements such as family leave, and the Brady Bill were attributed to him.88 The loss of 52 seats in the House, and eight in the Senate confirmed Morris’ findings. It was time for a strategic reassessment. In early 1995, the administration seemed to mark time as Morris took a detailed survey to test the popularity of the Republicans’ proposals. It showed that cuts in Medicare were universally disliked, creating a potent weapon to use against the new congressional majority. From this was born the strategy of triangulation, described by Morris as “a fusion alternative embodying the best elements of the traditional Republican and Democratic positions, but rejecting the extremes of either party.”89 Clinton would protect the country from the excesses not only of Newt Gingrich, and other conservative Republicans, but also from big spending liberal Democrats. He would support the most popular parts of the Republican program such as balancing the budget, cutting taxes, and welfare reform while opposing them on the Democrats’ best issues. As 84

.Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman (eds.). The Clinton Legacy (New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2000), 162. .Campbell and Rockman, 162. 86 .Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro. Politicians Don’t Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 95, 103. 87 .Jacobs and Shapiro, 97. 88 .Dick Morris, Behind the Oval Office: Getting Reelected Against All Odds (Los Angeles: Renaissance Books, 1999), 9-12. 89 Morris, 93, 389. 85

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Jacobs and Shapiro write, the desire for reelection caused the president to “discount policy goals favored by his allies and, at one time, himself.”90 Clinton also had to stand for something of his own. Because the 30 percent of the public giving priority to economic problems was dwarfed by the nearly two-thirds more interested in a “values agenda,” Morris advised stressing issues such as crime, decreasing underage smoking, television violence, and school discipline, poll testing each to ensure that only the most popular would be offered. The administration would replace large scale proposals with what Morris terms “bite size” initiatives91 which worked because of their volume. Issuing new ones day after day ensured a steady stream of media coverage whereas fewer, more ambitious programs would only have generated a brief flurry of attention before being overwhelmed by negative stories about allegations against the president. In order to bypass critical press coverage, beginning in July 1995, the DNC spent $85 million on pro-Clinton ads in 20 key states, excluding the media centers New York City, Washington D.C., and Los Angeles. Although, Morris boasts, “we created the first fully advertised presidency in U.S. history;” a major downside was the need for large sums of money. Clinton complained to Morris, “I can’t think, I can’t act. I can’t do anything but go to fund raisers.” This pressure likely contributed to the fund raising scandals that dogged Clinton during, and after the 1996 campaign.92 Not only were administration proposals poll tested before, and after their introduction, media coverage of them was thoroughly tracked. As Stephanopolous describes the process, Morris’ “cardinal rule was to end up on the right side of a `60 percent’ issue.”93 When Congress approved a Medicare premium increase during the first government shutdown, Clinton’s ads were reedited to add footage of Gingrich and Bob Dole’s attacks on Medicare. Clinton’s 1996 State of the Union address included the memorable phrase, “the era of big government is over,” which tested at 80 percent94. Issues were included in that speech based on whether polls showed they helped Clinton’s reelection. Seeing 80 percent in favor of the Republican proposal to balance the budget in seven years; Clinton switched to supporting it.95 The most controversial reversal was signing a welfare bill little different from the two he had vetoed. Despite campaign promises to put an “end to welfare as we know it,” no legislation was introduced until June 1994, too late for Congressional action before the Republican electoral sweep. Although his program included time limits, and benefit reductions, it also sought to encourage recipients to gain employment through education, training, and child care. After Clinton had twice vetoed bills he criticized as being too punitive, Morris (1999: 593) told him that a third veto “would be a disaster” that would “cost us eight points,” and possibly the election.96 In a televised July 1996 speech, Clinton said he would sign the bill despite “serious flaws.” Several administration officials resigned in protest. Even with reelection no longer possible after his 1996 victory, Clinton’s strategy remained constant as he sought to maintain his public standing in the face of scandal, and 90

Jacobs and Shapiro, 281. The agendas of administration strategy meetings are included in Morris. 92 Morris, 145, 151. 93 George Stephanopoulos, All Too Human: A Political Education (Boston: Little Brown, 1999), 403. 94 Stephanopoulos, 411. 95 Jacobs and Shapiro, 281. 96 Morris, 593. 91

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eventual impeachment. His 1998 State of the Union sought to overcome a drop in approval ratings in the week after the revelations about his affair with Monica Lewinsky. With 60 million people watching, the president delivered what even Trent Lott called a “boffo speech” filled with Morris’ “bite size initiatives” such as tax credits to help parents pay for college tuition.97 The 1999 State of the Union stressed what polls showed to be the most popular proposals -- fixing Social Security, government supported retirement accounts, 50,000 more police, and 70,000 more teachers. Fund raising not only continued but even accelerated. During the first quarter of 1999 Clinton attended events collecting over $9 million compared to $4 million, and $2 million during similar periods in 1998, and 1997.98 As Norman Ornstein and Thomas Mann (2000:219) wrote, “in his eighth and final year in the White House, Clinton remains in full campaign mode.”99

CONCLUSIONS In each of the five administrations examined, a similar pattern emerges. The president takes office with a goal of making good policy in accord with his preferences, using the tools of going public and/or strategies from the election campaign to achieve that goal. Despite varying degrees of legislative success, around the second year each faces a dramatic decline in support. One or more advisers suggest making reelection the paramount goal, embracing policy management to change priorities, and sometimes even reversing course on major issues. Legislative goals would be primarily an election tool. Clinton and Reagan successfully took this advice. Ford tried, but was only able to slightly narrow the gap against Carter, still losing the 1976 election. Neither Carter nor Bush was comfortable with policy management, and both lost their reelection bids. This article is not arguing that economic or other problems were irrelevant; only that the best chance of success in the face of such difficulties was to adopt a position of policy management. Both two term presidents continued policy management throughout their second terms despite the impossibility of being elected to a third. This may have been due to the need to defend against scandals investigated by special prosecutors. Reagan successfully fought off Iran-Contra. Clinton maintained high popularity ratings despite a lengthy investigation by an independent counsel, and impeachment by the House of Representatives. More likely, the desire for public approval, and to help elect a successor administration suggest that a president, once having learned what works, would have no reason to change strategy. Although George W. Bush declared during his presidential campaign that “a responsible leader is someone who makes decisions based on principle, not based upon polls or focus groups,” his administration hired Matthew Dowd to take surveys every two to three weeks. His presidency began by following the textbook model, achieving Congressional passage of 97

Jackie Koszczuk, “Clinton Succeeds in Slowing Scandal’s Momentum,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 56 (Jan. 31, 1998): 215-218. 98 Katherine Q. Seelye, “One Consolation for Clinton: Democratic Donations Surge,” New York Times, March 20, 1999: A1, 11. 99 Norman J. Ornstein and Thomas E. Mann (eds). The Permanent Campaign and Its Future (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2000), 219.

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his main initiatives, a tax cut, and educational reform. According to one account, “despite the lack of clear support for the president’s $1.6 trillion plan, Bush never wavered in his determination to fight for the whole package.” Approximately one million dollars was spent on polls whose primary use was to determine how best to promote the president’s program. Declines in Bush’s popularity ratings suggested that he was likely to follow one model, but the events of September 11, 2001 reversed the decline as his Gallup approval which went from 51 percent on September 10 to 90 percent less than two weeks later. After approval was reduced to 62 percent, the war in Iraq brought it back to 77 percent in early April 2003. Theodore Lowi has argued that such international crises were the exception to what he saw as an inevitable decline in presidential popularity during any administration, but that “the effects of the rallying event tend to be brief.” The length of the Bush rallies would suggest a possible exception to this article, and Lowi’s arguments. Nevertheless, there are signs that these rallies have merely postponed the inevitable adjustment. Support for Bush’s handling of the economy has been significantly lower than his overall approval ratings. As Bush pressed his program in April 2003, one senior aide suggested that the president would benefit simply by showing that, unlike his father, he has a “busy agenda,” whether or not Congress enacts it. Such a strategy indicates that Bush may be amenable to the policy management process described in this article.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would like to thank the Gerald R. Ford Foundation and SUNY Oswego for providing grants to support the research in this article. The archivists at the Ford, Carter, and Reagan presidential libraries supplied invaluable assistance in finding the documents I was looking for (and some I had not thought to look for) as did Emily Johnson, my research assistant for materials at the Reagan Library. Without their help, this article would never have been written

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 183-198

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

INFLATION RHETORIC: GERALD FORD’S FIRST SIX MONTHS IN OFFICE David Gore ABSTRACT Gerald Ford’s first six months in office were plagued by intensely high inflation rates coupled with the failure of the now infamous Whip Inflation Now Campaign. That campaign’s failure left the Ford presidency with seriously limited rhetorical space in which to argue for further economic change. This paper examines how Ford’s administration was able to expand their conception of economic realities with three very focused messages in January 1975, including that year’s State of the Union address and accompanying fact sheet. This paper argues that Ford in fact understood well the complexities of economic problems, but was unable to communicate those complexities to the public, concluding that sound macroeconomics must appreciate rhetorical elements of governing.

INTRODUCTION It is generally believed that Ford’s choice of Nelson Rockefeller as his vice presidential nominee, and his other actions during his first month in office were an “almost total triumph for the new president.”1 They were such mostly because Ford was able to wage a successful public relations campaign to rally the nation, and restore self-respect to the office of the presidency, and because much of the nation wanted desperately to share the sentiment. All of that changed drastically on Ford’s thirtieth day in office when he delivered a full presidential pardon to Richard Nixon. One author described this as Ford’s fall from grace because prior to this pardon Ford was seen as a potentially strong and capable president.2 Whatever the reasons for pardoning Nixon, that act took on a tremendous symbolic meaning for the nation, and widespread and disappointing speculation about a possible deal between Nixon and Ford regarding a pardon surfaced in the press, and the minds of the American people. Within hours of the pardon, the Gallup poll reflected a sixteen-point decline from 65 to 50 percent in the president’s public approval. Ford’s press secretary, Jerald

1

R.T. Hartman, Palace Politics: An Inside Account of the Ford Years (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1980), p. 239. 2 M.J. Rozzell, The Press and the Ford Presidency (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1992), p. 51.

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F. terHorst, resigned in protest; a most damaging consequence for the president given terHorst’s popularity with the White House press corps.3 For the rest of Ford’s 865 days in office he had to carry the burden of both the Watergate crisis, and what was becoming a very heated economic crisis. According to Amos Kiewe, crisis rhetoric is distinguished from non-crisis rhetoric because it is more dynamic. Kiewe writes,

The perceptions of immediacy and urgency, and the public’s expectation of strong leadership qualities during crises, require discourse that can seemingly resolve critical situations. Such discourse is expected to offer quick solutions, preserve the strength and integrity of the nation and its leadership, justify necessary action, garner support for action, correct misperceptions and recover from setbacks. 4 The public mind has an urgent need for solutions, and while a distinction must be made between rhetoric that reacts to crisis, and rhetoric that aims to respond in specific ways to crisis, presidents are often faced with both kinds simultaneously.5 This was surely the case with President Ford, and the economic crisis, namely high inflation and high unemployment that lasted throughout his term, and defined much of his policy rhetoric. On October 8, 1974, within a month to the day of pardoning Nixon, Ford launched the “Whip Inflation Now” public relations campaign to curb what Ford defined as “public enemy number one.”6 Amidst proposals for Americans to drive less, heat less, and plant gardens, Ford also said, in that address to Congress, that inflation will …unless whipped, destroy our country, our homes, our liberties, our property, and finally our national pride, as surely as any well-armed wartime enemy. I concede there will be no sudden Pearl Harbor to shock us into unity and into sacrifice, but I think we have had enough early warnings. The time to intercept is right now. The time to intercept is almost gone. My friends and former colleagues, will you enlist now? My friends and fellow Americans, will you enlist now?

By linking the problem of inflation to Pearl Harbor, and a war metaphor, and by further layering this metaphor in requesting Congress and the American people to “enlist” in the fight on inflation, Ford laid the groundwork for the ultimate demise of the “WIN” campaign. But even this explanation is somewhat over-simplified unless placed in the context of Ford’s larger response to the campaign itself, and to the economic crises that plagued the nation during most of his presidency. Hermann G. Stelzner argues that Ford’s war metaphor failed to “cross-over” in large part because of post-Vietnam war fatigue.7 The WIN campaign, however, was doubly doomed from the start because Ford too narrowly focused on improving inflation without paying 3Ibid., p. 52. 4Amos Kiewe, The Modern Presidency and Crisis Rhetoric (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994), p. xviii. 5See B.J. Dow, “The Function of Epideictic and Deliberative Strategies in Presidential Crisis Rhetoric,” Western Journal of Speech Communication 53 (1989), 294-310. 6Gerald R. Ford, “Address to the Congress – The “WIN” Campaign, October 8, 1974,” Gerald R. Ford Presidential Papers. 7 H.G. Stelzner, “Ford’s War on Inflation: A Metaphor That Did Not Cross,” Communication Monographs 44 (1977), 284-297.

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sufficient attention to other economic realities that related to inflation. In short, the rhetoric of the WIN campaign limited Ford’s rhetorical space as evidenced by the Ford administration’s drastic attempt in January of 1975 to re-craft their economic rhetoric. Erwin C. Hargrove, in a recent book, argues that presidential success is measured by whether presidents are successful at “teaching reality.”8 The narrow focus of Ford’s WIN campaign rendered him unable to construct inflation as a part of the economic problems of the nation. Indeed, the WIN campaign’s definition of inflation as the sole economic problem, instead of a part of a more complex economic reality, had two consequences. First, it suggested that inflation could somehow be curbed in a vacuum. Second, it reduced Ford’s ability to maneuver policy on economic questions because his rhetoric was too closely tied to a single objective. By January of 1975, the Ford administration, I argue, realized it had to position inflation in a complex relationship between economic issues, like unemployment, recession, and energy policy, and tone down the urgency of its crisis rhetoric. The 1975 State of the Union message was an attempt to make the issue of inflation more complex, and thereby draw attention away from the administration’s inability to lower it. Recognizing that economic problems are best addressed rhetorically by paying attention to both their complexity, and their effect on the rest of civic life is a key lesson learned from Ford’s failed WIN campaign. Thus, the 1975 State of the Union address can be seen as Ford’s way of expanding the meaning of the economic crisis to include the host of other economic problems that the country faced at the time, and that expansion of rhetorical space to include more than inflation in his economic rhetoric enabled Ford to craft changes in his economic policy. Such space was required, not only in the event that inflation would not decrease during his term, but also in light of the dismal failure of the rhetorical lens employed during the WIN campaign.9

PRESIDENTIAL INFLATION POLICY While some uncertainty about the relative influences of different economic variables still exists, it is clear that economic conditions are associated with how favorably the public comes to view a sitting president.10 Richard Nixon was as aware as anyone of the link between macroeconomic activity and electoral behavior. He believed that during the mid-term elections of 1954 and 1958 the Republican Party had suffered serious losses due to sagging economic performance. Nixon wrote, The power of the pocket-book issue was shown more clearly perhaps in 1958 than in any offyear election in history. On the international front, the administration had had one of its best

8

Erwin C. Hargrove, The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels of our Nature (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1998). 9 See Martin J. Medhurst, “Rhetorical Portraiture: John F. Kennedy’s March 2, 1962 Speech on the Resumption of Atmospheric Tests,” in _Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology, Ed. Martin J. Medhurst, Robert L. Ivie, Phillip Wander, and R.L. Scott (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press), pp. 51-68 for an example of a study that employs similar arguments about the concept of rhetorical space. 10M.B. MacKuen, “Political Drama, Economic Conditions, and the Dynamics of Presidential Popularity,” American Journal of Political Science 27 (1983), p. 166.

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David Gore years…yet; the economic dip in October was obviously uppermost in people’s minds when 11 they went to the polls.

Nixon goes on to observe that the economy dipped during his 1960 run for the presidency and while it began to climb in October, “it was too late to affect election returns…All the speeches, television broadcasts, and precinct work in the world could not counteract that one hard fact.”12 Nixon never forgave the Eisenhower administration for failing to pump up the economy on his behalf. Thus in 1968 when Nixon did ascend to the White House he was acutely aware of the problem of accelerating inflation and very tight labor markets on his potential for re-election in four years. As a Republican president, Nixon predictably implemented a contraction macroeconomic policy in order to control inflation.13 The impact of Nixon’s contraction when coupled with a simultaneous decrease in the real money supply, President Johnson’s attempt to hide the costs of the Vietnam War, and the changing structure of the world’s energy market brought on the 1970-1971 recession, which lowered the real rate of inflation by more than two percent.14 This recession had the unfortunate effect of driving unemployment to more than six percent. President Nixon needed to increase the output of the economy while maintaining low inflation. Michael J. Mumper and Eric M. Uslaner write, The politically optimal solution was to stimulate the economy while simultaneously putting the lid on inflation through mandatory income policies. So as Douglas Hibbs observes, ‘The policy of restraint was jettisoned in a successful attempt to stimulate an election year boom.’ This stimulation, coupled with dramatic leaps in food and oil prices, produced an unprecedented double digit inflation in less than two years after instituting wage and price 15 controls.

Nixon shamelessly used the levers of economic policy to ensure that there would be no repeat of 1960 in 1972.16 This false “election year boom,” and its attending “unprecedented double digit inflation” is what Ford inherited upon his accession to the presidency. The round of inflation inherited by Ford can be attributed, in part, to Nixon’s tinkering with the economy in an effort to get re-elected but its complexity extends much deeper into the rapid changing American and world economy. Don Paarlberg argues that it was the Great Depression that ushered in what he calls an “age of inflation;” in other words inflation was, since the policies of F.D.R., a consistent part of the American economy. Paarlberg argues that government has a stake in inflation, and that “government officials publicly deplore inflation

11Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962), p. 309. 12Ibid., p. 310-311. 13D.A. Hibbs, Jr., “The Mass Public and Macroeconomic Performance: The Dynamics of Public Opinion Toward Unemployment and Inflation,” American Journal of Political Science 23 (1979): p. 707. 14D.A. Hibbs, Jr., “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy,” American Political Science Review 71 (1977): p. 1487. 15M. Mumper and E.M. Uslaner, “The Bucks Stop Here: The Politics of Inflation in the United States,” in The Politics of Inflation, Ed. Richard Medley (NY: Pergammon Press, 1981), p. 111. 16See Edward Tufte, Political Control of the Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978) for an extensive analysis of the electoral business cycle.

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but by their actions promote it.”17 They do this, Paarlberg argues, for several reasons: Inflation reduces the real burden of public debt, inflation allows progressive income taxes to “bracket creep” thus providing a “natural” alternative to a tax increase, and, of course, moderate inflation may even improve prospects for reelection especially when not accompanied by high unemployment.18 Still, many scholars dismiss exhortation as a mode for dealing with inflation. Ford, on the other hand, dismissed “restrictive practices” like price and wage controls, opting rather for arguments. At the announcement of the WIN campaign, Ford declared, Now, I know many Americans see Federal controls as the answer, but I believe from past experience controls show us that they never really stop inflation, not the last time, not even during and immediately after World War II, when, as I recall, prices rose despite severe and enforceable rationing. Now, peacetime controls actually, we know from recent experience, create shortages, hamper production, stifle growth, and limit jobs. I do not ask for such powers, however politically tempting, as such a program could cause the fixer, and the black marketer to flourish, while decent citizens face empty shelves and stand in long waiting lines.

Nixon’s earlier tinkering with price controls in an effort to get reelected in 1972 had negative long-term results, and Ford’s recollection of that “recent experience” is meant to dissuade the public from that approach. Furthermore, Ford adds that he is not looking for an expansion of the presidential powers to assist him in his struggle against inflation. Ford committed his presidency to fight inflation without using the traditional Republican tactic of price and wage controls. This commitment must be viewed as twofold. First, Ford is obviously trying to distance himself from Nixon by refusing to implement Nixon’s preferred method of choice to regulate the economy. Second, Ford is not willing to ask for an increase of presidential power in order to handle the current crisis, undoubtedly because of Nixon’s poor handling of power.

WHIP INFLATION NOW AND ITS DISCONTENTS According to the Gallup poll, in every year between 1972 and 1979, more than 70 percent of the mass public identified an economic issue, principally inflation or unemployment, as “the most important problem facing this country today.”19 Douglas Hibbs has argued that macroeconomic policy toward unemployment and inflation generate intense controversy and conflict among key political actors and interests groups, and therefore cannot be explained adequately from a purely technical economic perspective.20 The general consensus among economists and politicians is that full employment and price stability pose conflicting goals, and it is difficult to make substantial progress on one problem without running the high risk of exacerbating the other.21 From the moment he became president, Ford was faced with high 17

Donald Paarlberg, An Analysis of History and Inflation (Westport, CT: Praegar Publishers, 1993), p. 134. See also B. Barry, “Does Democracy Cause Inflation?,” in The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation, ed. L.N. Lindberg and C.S. Maier (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 280-317. 18 Ibid., p. 141. 19 Hibbs, 1979, pp. 705-706. 20 Hibbs, 1977, pp. 1470, 1487. 21 Hibbs, 1979, p. 708.

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unemployment and high inflation coupled with a low confidence in government to handle problems judiciously. The intense focus of the WIN campaign severely limited his options for the duration of the campaign’s life.

Intense Inflation Focus Soon after pardoning Nixon, Ford launched a massive public relations campaign called “Whip Inflation Now.” It came complete with “WIN” buttons, signs, and participating “inflation fighter” membership forms printed in the nation’s newspapers that could be cut out and mailed in to the White House. The campaign was a complete failure, primarily because inflation continued to rise throughout its run, but also because Ford’s rhetoric did not match the mood of the country through its use of war metaphors, gimmicky participation schemes, and a lack of legislative vision that focused too narrowly on inflation in isolation from other issues. Both the Nixon and Ford administrations consistently followed a pattern of attempting to shave points off the inflation rate by inducing high levels of unemployment. It was not until 1976 before a cheering Wall Street audience that Ford acknowledged that, “After all, unemployment affects only 8 percent of the people while inflation affects 100 percent.”22 At the announcement of the “WIN” campaign Ford made a curiously metacommunicative statement when he declared, “And this is a very important part of the overall speech. The Conference on Inflation made everybody even more aware of who is suffering most from inflation. Foremost are those who are jobless through no fault of their own.” So, while he pursued a policy to decrease inflation while raising unemployment, Ford tried rhetorically to mitigate that policy with “a very important part of the overall speech.” Hibbs argues that the financial community, corporate spokesmen, and the Republican leadership generally endorsed the deflationary policies of the Ford administration, whereas the trade unions, and most elements of the Democratic leadership attacked them, arguing that unemployment rather than inflation was our most critical domestic issue.23 The conflict was one of priorities, and Ford from the very start argued that inflation was “public enemy number one.” It is quite likely, according to Hibbs, that many people blamed rising prices for the shrinkage of their real income, even though the immediate post-OPEC inflationary burst was merely the mechanism of a change in relative prices. “Had the real loss absorbed by the oil consuming nations taken place about a stable price level, the pain would not have been any less unpleasant, but inflation could not have been held responsible. However, if people were confused it is understandable.”24 As James Tobin has pointed out, neither President Ford, nor his economic advisors, nor the Federal Reserve authorities, and very few independent economists, told the public that anti-inflationary policies could not restore the former terms of trade or the real income loss.25

22

Ibid. Ibid. 24 Ibid., p. 713. 25 See J. Tobin, “Inflation Control as Social Priority,” paper delivered at the Conference on the Political Economy of Inflation and Unemployment in Open Economies, Athens, Greece, 1976 and Hibbs, 1979. 23

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All President Ford told the public is that they needed to wage an all-out war on inflation. On September 6, 1974, Ford spoke in Philadelphia at a dinner honoring the 1774 convening of the Continental Congress. After linking the present situation to the Founding Fathers, who were also “inflation fighters,” Ford said, I have decided that the first priority for us as a Nation, domestically, is an all-out war against inflation. Like the patriots who met here 200 years ago, we may seem to be moving cautiously and too deliberately. But, I hope no one will underestimate the generalship, or fighting ability of all Americans today the same way they did in 1774….We are going after, one and all, Democrats and Republicans, we are going after what I term public enemy number one, inflation, in 1974, and we will lick it by July 4, 1976.

Hermann G. Stelzner, in his insightful analysis of the WIN campaign, argues that Ford’s use of war imagery did not cross with the American people for several reasons. First, appearing as it did at the end of Vietnam conflict, it asked a public tired of, and strained by war language, to once again “enlist” against an uninspiring foe, inflation. Second, the popular press actually undercut Ford’s war imagery by presenting their analysis of the crisis in nonwar imagery. Third, though inflation was clearly designated the enemy, Ford could not portray the crisis in terms sufficiently severe for a metaphor of war to motivate action from citizens.26 Overburdened with war rhetoric the American people were, according to Stelzner, not ready to enlist in a war on inflation. Stelzner writes, If the situation was as serious as Ford proclaimed, why was not more risked? If the situation was not as serious as Ford’s metaphor proclaimed, then the metaphor, the instrument of definition, was inaccurate and inappropriate to the economic reality, causing one to wonder 27 what reality it did describe.

If the American people were really under attack from an enemy as real as any foreign foe, Stelzner asks, then why were they asked to drive five percent less? Why were they urged to eat less, and heat less, and plant gardens? Somehow, Stelzner argues, these recommendations did not sufficiently balance with the idea of an all out state of war. Mary Stuckey argues that while Ford declared at the start of the WIN campaign that it does no good to blame the public for spending too much when the government is spending too much, his rhetoric through most of the campaign forgot his own warning.28 The fact is that in the campaign Ford blames the American people as the culprit for inflation, including, but not limited to, the federal government spending. Ford said, on October 15, 1974 in a speech delivered to the Future Farmers of America, a speech he urged the networks to broadcast, With your help, each new day will bring more good news than bad news for our economy. Yes, there will be some setbacks. We will not be out of the economic trenches by Christmas, but I remind you, if I might, of just one fact: Every battle in history has been won by the side

26

Stelzner, “Ford’s War,” p. 285. Ibid., p. 296. 28 Mary E. Stuckey, Strategic Failures in the Modern Presidency (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, Inc., 1997), p. 110. 27

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David Gore that held on for just five minutes longer. Our enemy in this battle has been called inflation. But perhaps Pogo was wiser when he said, ‘I have met the enemy and he is us.’

It is clear that during the WIN campaign Ford was committed to using, and re-using, the war metaphor. In addition, he argued that the enemy was the American people. Setting the terms of the discussion in this way likely contributed to the campaign’s failure to resonate with the electorate. Furthermore, it did not acknowledge the effects of OPEC price controls, unemployment, and increasing energy consumption on inflation. This failure to accurately depict reality was a major shortcoming of the WIN campaign and resulted from its narrow focus. The crisis of high inflation and high unemployment that Ford faced at the beginning of his tenure in office was one that did not respond well to the WIN campaign. The biggest reason for the WIN campaign’s failure is obviously the fact that during its run from September to December of 1974 inflation continued to rise. The failure to effect any change in the inflation rate contributed to a view that Ford was somehow out of touch with America’s needs. Perhaps inflation is something, as some economists believe, that does not respond at all to rhetoric. Or, it is also possible that Ford’s chosen rhetoric was simply not the kind that could lower inflation. What is certain is that the WIN campaign failed in its efforts to persuade the American people to whip inflation through changing their economic habits on gasoline consumption, food consumption, and heating. Furthermore, its failure contributed to the idea that President Ford was out of touch with what was going on in the country. Whether or not Ford lacked perspective, the WIN campaign was a failure right up to the end. In a speech delivered in early December, Ford was still arguing against price controls, and other mechanisms to stimulate the economy. As Ford left Washington, D.C. to spend the holidays in Vail, Colorado, his speechwriters and policy advisors were already busy on a draft of his 1975 State of the Union address that would permanently do away with the WIN campaign, and craft a new approach to the economic crisis.

JANUARY 1975: A NEW DIRECTION Milton Friedman, not the economist, but deputy editor and senior speech writer for Ford, said that the State of the Union that year was meant to be “action oriented rather than rhetorical…a little straight talk among friends.”29 It was meant to be a return to Ford’s style during his highly successful first month in office. This address, in keeping with his August 9, 1974 inaugural statement, must be conversational in tone, long on explanation, and short on oratorical flourishes. Paul Theis, executive editor and administrator of the White House Editorial Office, points out that, The State of the Union message was conceived as one of three presidential proclamations which, taken as a whole, were intended to serve as a declaration of intent, encompassing the Administration’s proposals, principles and philosophy. The other two presidential statements in the White House communications campaign were Ford’s nationally televised “fireside” talk

29

Dom Bonafede, “Speech Writers Shun Flourishes in Molding Ford’s Image,” National Journal Reports 7 (1975), p. 123.

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Jan. 13, in which he unveiled the essence of his economic and energy policies, and a lengthy “fact sheet” put together as background material for the State of the Union message. Each 30 document was meant to complement the other.

Thus the new-year brought with it the demise of the “WIN” campaign and the start of a new communications campaign that was intended to address economic issues through three separate pieces of official discourse meant to be read as one. This trinity of economic and energy rhetoric was to convey the Ford administration’s new philosophy for handling the economic crisis, and that philosophy was to drop the intense focus on inflation alone, and instead depict inflation as part of a larger, more complex problem with many variables. Friedman, as part of his responsibilities as senior speechwriter, attended all of the meetings where policy issues were discussed. Friedman said, I participated in all meetings between the President and his advisers, the idea being that one person in the speech writing department should know the reasons for the decisions made and actions taken. The chief difficulty for a writer was to take complex economic and fiscal issues and put them into words that were understandable to millions of people. We were less concerned with style, and the imprint of history. We did not attempt a grandiose speech. We wanted to produce a practical response to very real problems, to communicate extremely sophisticated ideas in a way that would achieve the support of the Congress, and the cooperation of the people. The three statements were meant to dovetail, one flowing into the 31 other.

The speechwriting team wanted the January 13, 1975 speech, the January 15, 1975 State of the Union, and the 48 page “fact sheet,” to dovetail with one another, and represent the coherent philosophy and approach of the administration. Ford recalled later how important these two speeches were for the success of his tenure in office when he said, I knew much depended on the way I delivered these two speeches. If I came across as a Chief Executive fully in command of the situation, I could win the support I needed to push my programs through the Congress. If, on the other hand, the public viewed me as weak and indecisive, I would decline in their esteem to a point from which I could not hope to recover, 32 and the legislation that the country needed wouldn’t stand a chance of passage.

It should be clear how much was riding on these speeches. In fact, both Seidman and Friedman had worked until 3 a.m. on the night of December 20, 1974 on the first draft of the State of the Union message. The next day they flew to visit Ford in Colorado. Once there, Ford and his inner advisers went over the raw draft of the speech. During the next several weeks at least seven drafts were written. Friedman recalls “endless changes and revisions and constant editing and updating.”33 As was his custom, Ford made changes, but rarely substantive changes, to the text almost up to the moment he delivered it.

30

Ibid. Ibid. 32 Rozell, p. 89. 33 Bonafede, p. 124. 31

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The administration’s three-prong message began on January 13, 1975 when Ford delivered an address to the nation on energy and economic programs from the Lincoln library at the White House. Almost immediately, Ford began by redefining inflation as a long-term problem instead of a “first priority” of “all-out war,” and as something largely out of the control of American citizens. Ford said, Since becoming your President 5 months ago, economic problems have been my foremost concern. Two elements of our problem are long-range – inflation and energy. Both are affected not only by our actions but also by international forces beyond our direct control. The new and disturbing element in the economic picture is our worsening recession and the unemployment that goes with it. We have made some progress in slowing the upward spiral of inflation and getting interest rates started down, but we have suffered sudden and serious setbacks in sales and unemployment. Therefore, we must shift our emphasis from inflation to recession, but in doing so, we must not lose sight of the very real and deadly dangers of rising prices and declining domestic energy supplies.

Ford links inflation to energy, defines them as long-term goals, argues that they are largely controlled by international forces, and simultaneously substitutes inflation with recession rhetoric. After connecting inflation and energy, Ford addresses the urgent need for energy conservation and a new energy policy to guide our country. He can then address the “long-term” effects of energy policy on the United States without ever having to speak directly of inflation as either long-term, or, for what it no longer was, “public enemy number one.” By expanding the economic problems to include energy and international considerations Ford was being more honest about the complexities of inflation and the economy. He was also deflecting sole responsibility for inflation from the people. Ford does assure the audience that he is aware, implicitly, that his rhetoric has changed drastically by dropping the all out focus on inflation. Ford said, This economic program is different in emphasis from the proposals I put forward last October. The reason is that the situation has changed. You know it, and I know it. What we most urgently need today is more spending money in your pockets rather than in the Treasury in Washington. Let’s face it, a tax cut to bolster the economy will mean a bigger Federal deficit temporarily, and I have fought against deficits all my public life. But unless our economy revives rapidly, Federal tax revenues will shrink so much that future deficits will be even larger. But I have not abandoned my lifelong belief in fiscal restraint. In the long run, there is no other real remedy for our economic troubles.

Ford sounds eerily like two of his later successors. Remember Reagan’s “another time, another era”? His rhetoric sounds even more like George W. Bush’s recent tax-cut stimulus package meant to bolster the economy. However, Ford directly admits the adverse effect his tax cut will have on the nation’s deficits. Nevertheless, his admission that current proposals have a different emphasis more now than during the WIN campaign is significant. His purpose is to show that he is a man in control in an out-of-control, and unpredictable world. The change in emphasis allows Ford to imply that he was always in control, even when he was narrowly focusing on inflation. The new emphasis is only necessary because the times have changed. His proposal that Congress pass a tax cut for citizens to boost the economy

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makes the question of inflation, energy policy, and the recession a national affair with international consequences, instead of a one-man whipping. Finally, Ford concludes by linking the current situation with the great depression. Ford argues, “We are in trouble, but we are not on the brink of another Great Depression. Our political and economic system is many times stronger than it was in the 1930’s. We have income safeguards and unemployment cushions built into our economy.” Ford assures the nation that the current crisis is unlike the Great Depression because of a stronger political and economic system that has safeguards for unemployment. This assurance underscores the fact that the Great Depression is to economic rhetoric what the Vietnam War now is to war-time rhetoric: both, Americans are promised, will not happen again. Ford, in 1975, not wanting the current crisis to escalate assures listeners that unemployment is a significant aspect of his new economic proposals, and that his new focus will reduce the possibilities of a larger crisis. Two days later, during the State of the Union address, Ford opens by speaking about Harry Truman. Earlier Ford had replaced portraits of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson with portraits of Abraham Lincoln and Harry Truman in the Cabinet room.34 His connection to Truman was two-fold; Ford, like Truman, had succeeded to the presidency without winning a presidential election, and, second; Ford likely saw himself as a common man; and Truman as a symbol of the common man. By connecting himself to Truman in the speech, Ford is able to transcend the war metaphor of the WIN campaign by conjuring the image of victory in World War II. In fact, much of the 1975 State of the Union address can be read as an attempt to link the current recession crisis with both FDR’s handling of the Great Depression, and Truman’s subsequent victory in WWII. Ford no longer makes his fighting explicit, but he no longer needs to as long as he can link his current policy proposals with victory. Ford proposes numerous policy changes, like tax credits for energy efficient homes, decontrolling domestic crude oil prices, reducing the corporate tax rate by six percent, and placing excise and import taxes on all crude oil imports. Ford claimed that these proposals, along with cutting energy consumption through personal sacrifice, would result in tremendous changes, the likes of which had not been seen since the end of the Great Depression. Ford said, I have a very deep belief in America’s capabilities. Within the next ten years, my program envisions: 200 major nuclear power plants; 250 major new coal mines; 150 major coal-fired power plants; 30 major new [oil] refineries; 20 major new synthetic fuel plants; the drilling of many thousands of new oil wells; the insulation of 18 million homes; and the manufacturing and the sale of millions of new automobiles, trucks, and buses that use much less fuel. I happen to believe that we can do it. In another crisis – the one in 1942 – President Franklin D. Roosevelt said this country would build 60,000 military aircraft. By 1943, production in that program had reached 125,000 aircraft annually. They did it then. We can do it now.

By recounting the huge number of new things that his policy will make, Ford creates a sense of urgency in the listener. In linking his policy approach to Roosevelt’s he is able to continue the idea of victory through war by talking about military aircraft. This linkage served to bolster the impression that Ford was doing all that could be done to achieve victory. 34

Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton (NY: The Free Press, 2000), p. 116.

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It gives the impression that Ford is doing the job Roosevelt did – not merely by holding the office – but by doing precisely what Roosevelt did. Ford goes back to his comparison with Truman by connecting the recession fight to foreign policy and implying that the world could be faced with a situation much like the instability of WWII if America is not successful in stemming the economic crisis. Ford declares, We are a great Nation – spiritually, politically, militarily, diplomatically, and economically. America’s commitment to international security has sustained the safety of allies and friends in many areas – in the Middle East, in Europe, and in Asia. Our turning away would unleash new instabilities, new dangers around the globe, which, in turn, would threaten our own security. At the end of World War II, we turned a similar challenge into a historic opportunity and, I might add, an historic achievement. An old order was in disarray; political and economic institutions were shattered. In that period, this Nation and its partners built new institutions, new mechanisms of mutual support and cooperation. Today, as then, we face an historic opportunity. If we act imaginatively and boldly, as we acted then, this period will in retrospect be seen as one of the great creative moments in our Nation’s history.

A resurgent American economy, according to Ford, would do the whole world good. Furthermore, it would be like the historic achievement that ended WWII because it would show America’s commitment to “international security” and the “safety of allies.” In short, the metaphor of war has been dropped entirely from Ford’s rhetoric, but the idea of war has not. Ford is deliberately creating the feeling of war without using the term. By connecting his personal battle against inflation to both Roosevelt’s handling of the Great Depression, and Truman’s victory in World War II, Ford is able to avoid talking about war and depression by talking about victory over both through drawing historical analogies to past presidents. This kind of argument is significant as a genre of presidential war rhetoric because, as Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson argue, justification for intervention is embodied in a dramatic narrative from which an argument is extracted.35 Ford’s dramatic narrative is one that places him in the position of both Roosevelt and Truman, two presidents credited with defeating economic and military crises, to extract the argument that Ford is doing what they did by fighting against the current crisis. Furthermore, by appealing to war implicitly in this speech Ford is able to overcome the failure of the WIN campaign’s “war on inflation” because it allows him to continue talking about the war as if it is ongoing while simultaneously redefining the enemy as consisting of more than just inflation. Ford’s forty-eight-page press release was the major thrust of his redefinition of policy that placed inflation as one of many variables negatively affecting the economy. The two lines of attack, energy and economic policy, work rhetorically because the administration is able to define one problem against the other so that they are not forced with having to deal with a single problem in isolation. The policy was laid out in three parts that focused on making the nation independent of foreign oil by 1985, immediate choices, long-term goals, and strategy to achieve those goals. During a White House press conference, William L. Seidman, assistant to the president for economic affairs, and Frank Zarb of the Federal Energy Administration, handed out the 35

Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Deeds Done in Words: Presidential Rhetoric and the Genres of Governance (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990), p. 107.

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press release accompanied by a question and answer period. William E. Simon, secretary of the treasury, was unable to attend the press conference because he was engaged in meetings with the ten finance ministers of the International Monetary Fund that was having its annual meeting in Washington, D.C. at the time. Alan Greenspan, who chaired Ford’s Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), was also absent from the press briefing because he overslept, and was busy showering and shaving. Seidman, in the press briefing, states that there are two aspects of the president’s plan that deal mainly with taxes. The first is that the administration is proposing an immediate tax cut meant to stimulate the economy. Second, the administration is asking for energy taxes to raise the price of energy to cut down on the nation’s use of petroleum. The tax-cut was meant to address the issue of bracket creep, which is also why the administration favored a corporate tax cut because inflation was causing people and corporations to overstate their earning amounts because their earnings were actually shrinking in real terms. Seidman was asked by a member of the press corps why the president was criticizing government for not being able to make tough decisions and stick with them, while at the same time he is drastically overhauling his economic plan from the 31-point plan he announced in October as part of the WIN campaign. Seidman’s answer is instructive: First, I think there has been a change in emphasis. A great part of the October 8 speech is still part of the plan, and there are a great many things in there that need to be done that will be helpful to our economy. I think it is obvious that the economy has gone downhill faster, as far as I can remember, than anybody predicted when we were at the summit conference. I think the most vital thing in settling economic policy is to be in touch with what is really going on, 36 and design your program to meet the actual facts as they are.

Seidman’s use of the word emphasis is significant. The Ford administration is changing its emphasis in a very important rhetorical way. By expanding the conception of economic policy to address the question of inflation through addressing the problem of energy Ford is able to complicate the problem of inflation, and blame its occurrence on energy prices. Energy prices, and the OPEC nations, were the likely cause of the economic crisis, and by coupling the two problems Ford is able to imply that his war on inflation was never misguided. That implication protects him from having to address the severe rhetorical inadequacies of the WIN campaign, while simultaneously allowing him to proceed with legislative proposals that give the impression that he is addressing the nation’s problems. Seidman does not admit that Ford was misguided in October. Instead he argues that the facts have changed and that the implications of what is being said, the emphasis, is changing to meet those facts. The fact sheet addresses the now threefold problem of recession, inflation, and energy policy. The fact sheet argues in favor of a multi-pronged approach to policy to remedy what has now become a problem with many causes. The approach the administration takes with the document is one that contributes to the idea of our economic problems as being multiple and complicated; but, reassuring the American people that we are not in danger of another Great Depression. The fact sheet reads,

36

See Transcript, The White House Press Conference of William L. Seidman and Frank Zarb, January 15, 1975; Folder, 1-15-75 (2); Box 5B; Gerald R. Ford Library.

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David Gore The economy is now in a full-fledged recession and unemployment will rise further. Inflation continues at a rapid pace and the need to take immediate steps to conserve energy will further complicate the problem initially. There are no instant cures. A careful and balanced policy approach is required. It will take time to yield full results. There is, however, no prospect of a 37 long and deep economic downturn on the scale of the 1930’s.

Where the WIN campaign defined the problem as immediate and the solution as urgent, this document suggests that the problem may be long lasting but requires a balanced approach to address a myriad of problems that are simultaneously affecting one another. The energy proposals in the document are designed to expand the price control of energy products by requesting amendments to the clean air act to make burning coal easier and encourage the use of natural gas. The energy proposals were also aimed at freeing up the Elk Hills national reserve in California to increase domestic oil production. These proposals all had to overcome arguments by both environmentalists and economists because there was no sure indication that these actions would not destroy the environment or improve the economy. The administration’s request was that the nation should balance its environmental and energy goals – an argument that very likely resonated well with conservatives at the time. The fact sheet also states that the Secretary of Transportation had obtained written agreements with the major domestic automobile manufacturers to yield a 40 percent improvement in fuel efficiency, if the administration would relax the Clean Air Act auto emission standards. Such approaches obviously raise both economic and environmental questions. The connection between economic and environmental rhetoric in the press release illustrates the administration’s willingness to complicate the problem of inflation by admitting its interdependence and interconnectedness with other problems. The fact sheet also contributes to the notion that the problems with the economy are international and that the United States must play the role of leader in overcoming them. The document requests the other oil consuming nations to cooperate to reduce consumption and accelerate the development of new sources of energy. Furthermore, it blames the OPEC nations for the economic problems, including inflation. It reads, “Even after paying for their own increased imports, OPEC nations will report a surplus of over $60 billion in 1974, which must be invested. Oil price increases have created serious problems for the world economy. Inflation problems have been intensified. Domestic economies have been disrupted.”38 The solution for this international problem is America’s leadership. The fact sheet states, “The United States believes that the increased price of oil is the major international economic problem and has proposed a comprehensive program for reducing the current exorbitant price….international stability must be protected by financing facilities to assure oil importing nations that financing will be available on reasonable terms to pay for their oil imports. The United States is active in developing these financing programs.”39 The United States takes the role of leader in the international crisis of inflation and energy supply by financing programs in other nations to offset the increased prices of oil. By so doing, the administration contributes to the notion that America will help solve the world’s economic problems if the world will cooperate with America’s terms. The broad expansion of 37

See Fact Sheet: The President’s State of the Union Message; January 15, 1975; Folder, 1-15-75 (2); Box 5B, Gerald R. Ford Library. 38 Ibid., p. 46. 39 Ibid.

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economic rhetoric to include aspects of energy policy, environmental policy, and recession, instead of a narrow focus on inflation was the goal of January 1975. Such an expansion was critical for Ford rhetorically because it ensured that the American people would not focus solely on inflation as a measure of his success, thus providing space for Ford should inflation continue to rise.

CONCLUDING REMARKS Upon first consideration of the WIN campaign, many conclude that Gerald Ford did not know what he was doing economically and that he did not have a firm grasp of the issues. Alan Greenspan has said, While I felt fairly close to his general point of view on economic policy problems, my initial impression was that he was not really capable of abstractly articulating a philosophy. Because of that, I sensed that he wasn’t fully in control of the general framework of the policy decisions he was making on a day-by-day basis. But if you began to look at the concrete decision making process, what came through was a very sophisticated and consistent framework. Within perhaps a year, maybe even less, I was able to forecast how he would come out on individual issues with virtually zero error. I then began to conclude that this was not an accident. So, while he was not consciously or verbally in control of a general 40 philosophy toward economic policy, he nonetheless had a fairly sophisticated view.

Alan Greenspan also remarked that his first impression of Ford was that he lacked the capacity for abstract reasoning; however, the consistency of Ford’s concrete economic decisions persuaded him otherwise. Ford’s problem, Greenspan notes, was that he was particularly poor at “abstractly articulating,” and that he was “not consciously or verbally in control of a general philosophy.” Indeed, Ford’s problem was not one of understanding economics, but of understanding economic rhetoric. Ford’s problem was not that he did not understand the complexities of economic issues, but that he could not express them in a clear and consistent manner to the public during much of his early months in office. Greenspan thought that Ford found it enjoyable to discuss economics, even when there was no pending decision to be made. Additionally, Greenspan’s CEA colleague Burton Malkiel said that although it often took Ford some time to grasp difficult economic concepts, “He always ended up with a very firm grasp of the issues and a complete mastery of the complexities that might be involved. He loved to hear things argued out in front of him and would often ask the most insightful questions of the participants of the debate.”41 The misguided assumption that Ford did not understand economic problems is too simple an explanation. Herein are suggested a number of different possibilities that affected Ford’s inflation rhetoric during his first six months in office, including the distinct possibility that he did not understand rhetoric’s relationship to economics. The WIN campaign ultimately failed 40

E.C. Hargrove and S.A. Morley, “The Chairman of Economic Advisers Under Alan Greenspan, 1974-1977,” in _The President and the Council of Economic Advisers: Interviews with CEA Chairmen, Ed. E.C. Hargrove and S.A. Morley (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 416-417. 41 Greenstein, p. 124.

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because inflation continued to rise. It is probably not altogether true that inflation does not respond at all to exhortation, as Paarlberg concludes. What is more likely is that inflation should not be addressed in isolation of other problems. Inflation, in order to be handled rhetorically, must be part of a larger scheme of factors all of which interact to varying degrees. While the war metaphor, and the lack of strategy on the part of the administration, contributed to the WIN campaign’s failure – increasing inflation was the reason it failed rhetorically. Because it did not decrease, but rather increased, the administration had no rhetorical way of arguing on its own behalf because they had so narrowly defined the problem. By expanding the crisis to include energy policy and economic recession, the State of the Union, and its accompanying fact sheet, and speech created the possibility that the administration could still succeed and win the war for the economy without necessarily changing the inflation rate. Economic rhetoric works best when it is aware of its effects on other aspects of life, a point brought home by recent books on economic rhetoric.42 Ford’s redefinition of inflation as merely a part of his economic policy rather than the whole focus of it enabled him to escape absolute failure if the inflation rate remained unchanged. In fact, Ford was able to get the tax-cut stimulus passed, but inflation did not significantly change until just days before he lost the election to Carter. Ford’s rhetoric of January 1975 provided him the rhetorical space to appear as if he was addressing the nation’s problems regardless of whether or not the rate of inflation changed. That fact, regardless of the WIN campaign’s failures, means presidents should handle economic problems by conveying their complexity to the people. Presidents should teach the reality that individual economic problems, like inflation or tax-cuts, are only part of the complexity of economic and civic life.

42

See James Arnt Aune, Selling the Free Market: The Rhetoric of Economic Correctness (NY: The Guilford Press, 2001) and Davis W. Houck, Rhetoric as Currency: Hoover, Roosevelt and the Great Depression (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2001).

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 199-209

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

JEFFERSON DAVIS, RELIGION, AND THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION D. Jason Berggren ABSTRACT At a time when Catholics and Jews were often held in contempt and discriminated against, one president did more than any other American president before the twentieth century to symbolically recognize them. That president was Jefferson Davis. Through his appointment power, the Confederate President created the first administration in American history that included Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. Unlike his contemporary Abraham Lincoln who only appointed Protestants to high office, Davis practiced the politics of recognition by appointing individuals identified with persecuted religious minorities. In this regard, contrary to conventional wisdom, Jefferson Davis was a remarkable president, a president ahead of his time. This paper not only compares the Davis and Lincoln records, it suggests two reasons why Davis was the more inclusive: his personal character and his ties to the Democratic Party.

ANOTHER TRAIL OF INQUIRY V.O. Key once wrote that in studying and understanding Southern politics “sooner or later the trail of inquiry leads to the Negro.”1 Those who follow Key’s line of inquiry, which most scholars of the South do, conclude that the South has not only been “illiberal”, but more importantly the South has been “non-democratic”.2 But what if the trail of inquiry is drawn away from issues of race? Might we see a different South? Might a redrawn trail lead us to see aspects of the South largely unacknowledged or unappreciated? Might there be a redeemable, laudatory Southern past? Might there be Southern precedents beneficial to what Arend Lijphart called the quality of democracy?3 In a very small way, the broader purpose of this paper is to commit a heretical act.

1

V.O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation. Reprint. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, [1949] 1984), 5. 2 John H. Aldrich, “Southern Parties in State and Nation,” Journal of Politics 62.3 (August 2000), 643-670. 3 See Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).

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A DIFFERENT COMPARISON OF LINCOLN AND DAVIS In the typical comparison between Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis, Lincoln is judged to be far and away the better president of the two. After all, Lincoln was the winning war president who saved the Union and Davis the loser who tried to divide it. But more than that, Lincoln is judged to be the president that fully embodied the American spirit of equality, inclusion, and civic nationalism, and Davis the contrary spirit of hierarchy, exclusion, and ethnic nationalism. It is commonly recognized that Lincoln, more than any president before and more than most after him, reached out and expanded the circle of inclusion to include African Americans. He is the one who issued the Emancipation Proclamation and made the abolition of slavery a chief war aim. In contrast, Davis is viewed as a defender of slavery and traitor to the Union. This article shows a different side of Jefferson Davis, the Confederacy, and the South -- a side under-appreciated if even known by most Americans. With the exception of Davis scholars and non-mainstream Southern scholars, most may not know that President Davis broadened the circle of inclusion for minority communities, that the Confederacy was vigorously supported by minority communities, including Catholics, Jews, and Native Americans, and that religious minorities succeeded politically more so in the antebellum South than in the North. When Davis put together the inaugural cabinet of the Confederacy, he not only included men from various Southern states, he included men from various religious communities. In choosing Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, Davis forged the first tri-faith administration in American history, something that would not happen again until the twentieth century. Considering the history of religious conflict in the West, this was no small achievement. Furthermore, when comparing the Confederate Administration of Jefferson Davis and the Union Administration of Abraham Lincoln, Davis’ was consistently more diverse, more religiously inclusive than Lincoln’s. It may be said that Davis was ahead of his time. On the issue of diversity, Davis pushed the acceptable bounds of nineteenth-century American politics as no chief executive had done before him or any in the decades immediately after him. Through executive appointment, President Davis recognized the three great religious peoples that have shaped the course of American history--Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. This purpose of this article is not only to describe the extent to which Jefferson Davis employed the politics of recognition, it also offers two clues as to why he used it: his personal character and the party culture of the Democratic Party of which Davis was a life-long member.

THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION Scholars have often noted that the American electoral system of “winner-take-all”, single-member districts tend to underrepresent minority groups and historically disadvantaged groups, thus diminishing the quality of democracy. However, American presidents have often compensated for this by at least symbolically appointing individuals who belong to or could

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identified with minority groups. In efforts to reach out to or reward support from minority communities, American presidents have filled cabinet posts, federal judgeships, and ambassadorships with minorities. Nominating or electoral bodies, such as the Electoral College, the congressional caucus, and national party conventions, have also typically “balanced” presidential tickets, such as nominating a presidential candidate from one region and a vice-presidential candidate from another. Today, even though presidential nominees appoint their own vice-presidential running mates, they still often consider a variety of potential running mates that possess different personal qualities or symbolically represent different constituencies, communities, or interests. Though some may dismiss such presidential moves as mere tokenism or window dressing,4 presidents and parties often take symbolic or descriptive appointments seriously and the media and many voters look for such cues. Beginning with President James Madison, presidents began to appoint cabinet members not so much because of their abilities, political experience, or personal loyalty to president, but because of their politics, state residence, and constituent affiliation.5 To use the language of Bill Clinton, presidents sometimes construct cabinets that “look like America.” The politics of recognition is a customary means by which presidents appoint individuals from particular constituencies and communities to political office to symbolically express a desire to unify the country and to demonstrate to the wider polity that they recognize and welcome the country’s diversity and everyone should too. Such appointments may signal to individuals from minority constituencies or communities that they will be treated fairly as individuals. It is a type of patronage that tells key constituencies, communities, and interests that they are appreciated for their past electoral support, that they are wanted for future support, and that they are of equal worth and shall have equal opportunity. The politics of recognition is a means of bestowing legitimacy upon and acceptance of a collectivity through the symbolic promotion of one of its own.

THE INAUGURAL UNION CABINET President Lincoln appointed men to his inaugural cabinet largely on the basis of 6 geography. Lincoln was from Illinois and Vice President Hannibal Hamlin from Maine. Secretary of State William Seward was from New York. Salmon Chase, the Secretary of Treasury, was from Ohio. Edward Bates, the Attorney General, was from Missouri. Simon Cameron, the Secretary of War, was from Pennsylvania. Gideon Welles, the Secretary of the Navy, was from Connecticut. Montgomery Blair, the Postmaster General, was from Maryland, and Caleb Smith, the Secretary of the Interior, was from Indiana. Lincoln additionally named men who had challenged him for the 1860 nomination, such as Seward

4

See Arend Lijphart and Ronald Rogowski, “Separation of Powers and the Management of Political Cleavages,” in Political Institutions and Their Consequences, ed. Kent Weaver and Bert Rockman (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1991); Clarence Lusane, “Diversity was window dressing,” The Miami Herald (September 5, 2004), 5L. 5 Cabinets and Counselors: The President and the Executive Branch (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1997), 75, 86. 6 Phillip Shaw Paludan, The Presidency of Abraham Lincoln (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1994), 41.

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and Bates. However, the cabinet posts through the Lincoln years were reserved for Protestants. Lincoln was a man of strong man of faith, but for most of his life he never formally joined a particular church. Ultimately, he did join his wife’s Presbyterian faith; as president, he privately began attending services at Washington’s New York Avenue Presbyterian Church.7 As such, Lincoln will be classified here as a Presbyterian. The religious affiliations of the other top Union officials are as follows: Vice Presidents Hamlin was Unitarian, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Treasury, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Postmaster General (Seward, Chase, Welles, and Blair) were Episcopalians, Secretary of War Cameron was Presbyterian, and Attorney General Bates was a Quaker.8 (Interior Secretary Caleb Smith’ faith was not obtained.) In all, four religious affiliations were represented in Lincoln’s first Cabinet formation. To be sure, Lincoln’s Cabinet was religiously diverse, however that diversity was confined within Protestantism.

THE INAUGURAL CONFEDERATE CABINET After being unanimously elected and sworn in as President of the new Confederate States of America in February 1861, Jefferson Davis’ first official priority was to form his cabinet.9 President Davis had six posts to fill: State, Treasury, War, Navy, Attorney General, and Postmaster General.10 In filling the posts, Davis, like Lincoln, was guided by considerations of geography and politics. He intended for each of the seven seceding states to be represented in the new government and he sought men of moderation, not ideological fire-eaters. Davis, hailing from Mississippi, ensured that state’s representation and Vice President Alexander Stephens was from Georgia. Therefore, Davis made it a priority to find capable and moderate men from the remaining states. Davis appointed Robert Toombs of Georgia for State, Christopher Memminger of South Carolina for Treasury, Leroy Walker of Alabama for War, Judah Benjamin of Louisiana for Attorney General, Stephen Mallory of Florida for Navy, and John Reagan of Texas for Postmaster General. Though geography and political moderation were priorities for Davis, religion appears to have been one as well. Davis’ inaugural cabinet was remarkably diverse, and compared with the Confederate Congress and Lincoln’s cabinet, Davis’ was much more religiously balanced.11 In total, six different religious affiliations were represented: Davis was a nominal Baptist at the time, 7

Brian R. Dirck, Lincoln and Davis: Imagining America, 1809-1865, (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2001), 191. 8 Victor J. Howard, Religion and the Radical Republican Movement, 1860-1870 (Lexington, KY: The University of Kentucky Press, 1990). 9 Information for Davis’ cabinet formation came from Clement Eaton, A History of the Southern Confederacy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954), 50-51; William J. Cooper, Jr., Jefferson Davis, American (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 331; William C. Davis, Look Away! A History of the Confederate States of America (New York: The Free Press, 2002), 77-84; Emory M. Thomas, The Confederate Nation: 1861-1865 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1979), 72-80; Burton J. Hendrick, Statesmen of the Lost Cause: Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet (New York: The Literary Guild of America, Inc., 1939). 10 Lincoln actually had seven posts to fill. The Provisional Confederate Congress did not see the need to create a Department of the Interior. 11 According to Richard E. Beringer, “the leading denominations” in the Confederate Congress “were Methodist, Episcopal, Presbyterian, and Baptist.” See “A Profile of the Members of the Confederate Congress,” The Journal of Southern History 33.4 (1967), 538.

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Stephens and Walker were Presbyterians, Toombs and Reagan were Methodists, Memminger was Episcopalian, Mallory was Roman Catholic, and Benjamin was Jewish.12 With the inclusion of Mallory and Benjamin, Davis’ cabinet made history. It was the first in American history that simultaneously included a Catholic and a Jew and the first that included a Jewish American at all. Of further interest, Memminger, Mallory, and Benjamin were foreign-born.

DAVIS AND THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION Though no direct evidence was found to confirm that Davis specifically intended to balance his cabinet religiously, the evidence is highly suggestive. Davis’ first-order preferences for the Navy post were Catholics, Mallory and John Perkins of Louisiana. His foreign missions typically included Catholics and Protestants, and he actively sought out Catholics to perform important administrative, diplomatic, and foreign service tasks on behalf of the Confederate States.13 Davis also pursued a “Catholic” foreign policy throughout the war. This policy had two objectives: 1) to establish diplomatic ties with the great Catholic powers, including the Papal States, Catholic France and Spain, and Mexico’s pro-clerical Conservative Party, and 2) to convince the Catholic world that Catholic natives and foreigners are welcome in the Southern Confederacy, unlike the Union, which was home to nativist, Know-Nothing sentiment and discrimination.14 (A fact which turned out to be true when in 1867 the United States 15 terminated its mission to the Vatican, in part, because of “growing nativism” in Congress. ) While Confederate foreign policy failed to gain international recognition of its independence, it is interesting that the only major international leader to formally address Jefferson Davis as “the Illustrious and Honorable…President of the Confederate States of America” and keep in touch with him after the war was Pope Pius IX.16 If Davis wanted Southern Jewry represented in his administration, he could not have made a better choice than Benjamin. Not only did Davis serve with him in the U.S. Senate,

12

Jon L. Wakelyn, “Appendix III: Religious Affiliation,” in Biographical Dictionary of the Confederacy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977), 529-533; The Political Graveyard, http://politicalgraveyard.com; The Catholic Encyclopedia, http://www.newadvent.org; Dirck, Lincoln and Davis, 196; Eli N. Evans, Judah P. Benjamin: The Jewish Confederate (New York: The Free Press, 1988), 55. Basil Manly, an Alabama Baptist minister, was also the chaplain at President Davis’ inauguration. Richard J. Carwardine, Evangelicals and Politics in Antebellum America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 314. 13 Examples include the Irish-born Father John Bannon of Missouri (Envoy to Ireland and the Vatican, 1863-1864), the Swiss-born Henry Hotze of Alabama (Confederate propaganda agent in Britain and France, 1861-1865), Duncan Kenner of Louisiana (Envoy to the Vatican, 1864-1865), Emile LeSére of Louisiana (Envoy to Mexico, 1864-1865), Bishop Patrick Lynch of South Carolina (Envoy to Ireland, Britain, France, and the Vatican, 1864), Lucius B. Northrop (War Department Commissary General), Robert Ould (Assistant Secretary of War, 1861), William Preston of Kentucky (Commissioner to Mexico, 1864-1865), Cuban-born Juan Quintero of Texas (Envoy to Mexican states of Nuevo León and Coahuila, 1861-1865), A.B. Roman of Louisiana (Commissioner to the U.S., 1861), and the French-born Pierre Rost of Louisiana (Commissioner to Britain, France, and Spain, 1861-1865) . 14 Frank Lawrence Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1959), 496. 15 Jo Renee Formicola, “U.S.-Vatican Relations: Toward a Post-Cold War Convergence?” Journal of Church and State 38.4 (Autumn 1996), 800. 16 Eaton, A History of the Southern Confederacy, 79; Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, 505; Philip Thomas Tucker, The Confederacy’s Fighting Chaplain: Father John B. Bannon (University of Alabama Press, 1992), 171-172.

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Benjamin also came from the state that had the largest number of Jews in the South.17 Whatever his motive, Davis’ selection of Benjamin had the impact one would expect if he purposely employed the politics of recognition: increased pride and enthusiasm among Southern Jews for the Confederacy. Southern Jews were proud of the fact that one of their own had risen to such heights and believed that Benjamin’s success “validated their legitimacy as Southerners.”18 Finally, and most importantly, at a time when Know-Nothing nativism was a powerful political force, it could not have escaped Davis that Mallory and Benjamin’s religious backgrounds and foreign birth made them potentially risky and controversial choices.19 If religion was not on the mind of Davis, his critics at home and his enemies in the North soon made the religion of Mallory and Benjamin an issue. In fact, for many Northerners, especially abolitionists (e.g., William Lloyd Garrison, Massachusetts Senator Henry Wilson, and Unitarian cleric William Ellery Channing),20 the inclusion of a Catholic and a Jew in the highest levels of the Confederate government only confirmed to them that Catholics and Jews were “secessionists, copperheads, and rebels” and that the Confederacy was a CatholicJewish conspiracy.21 Benjamin, in particular, was seen as a “chief enemy,” a “Mephistopheles,” and “the evil genius of the Slave Power” because he was a Jew and because of his closeness to President Davis.22 One could reasonably conclude then that Davis knew exactly what he was doing when he chose Mallory and Benjamin – he was practicing the politics of recognition.

A QUESTION OF CHARACTER In his examination of the Jewish experience in America, Max Dimont wrote that while “the North gave the Jews their first American anti-Semitic cause célèbre, ‘l’affaire Grant’,” a reference to Union General Ulysses Grant’s infamous 1862 order (Order No. 11) to expel all Jews from Tennessee, the Confederacy, under the leadership of President Davis, “gave the Jews their first American statesman of note, Judah Philip Benjamin.”23 If, as Benjamin biographer Eli Evans wrote, “Benjamin…must stand as a symbol of American democracy and

17

Robert N. Rosen, The Jewish Confederates (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2000), 25. Evans, Judah P. Benjamin, xxi. Other Jews appointed by Davis were South Carolinians Edwin DeLeon (Envoy to France, 1862-1864), David DeLeon (Surgeon General, 1861), Abraham C. Myers (War Department Quartermaster General, 1861-1863), and Goodman L. Mordecai (Commerical agent in the Bahamas). Davis also offered Alfred Mordecai of North Carolina to head the War Department’s Ordinance Bureau. Mordecai, however, declined. See Rosen, The Jewish Confederates; Bertram W. Korn, American Jewry and the Civil War (Cleveland, OH: Meridian Books and Philadelphia, PA: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1961); Theodore and Dale Rosengarten, ed., A Portion of the People: Three Hundred Years of Southern Jewish Life (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2002). 19 Michael F. Holt, The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 855857; David H. Bennett, The Party of Fear: The American Far Right from Nativism to the Militia Movement (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 141-152. 20 Rosen, The Jewish Confederates, 38. 21 Korn, American Jewry and the Civil War, 159. 22 Charles Curran, “The Three Lives of Judah P. Benjamin,” History Today (September 1967), 588. 23 Max I. Dimont, The Jews in America: The Roots, History, and Destiny of American Jews (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 130. 18

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its openness to religious minorities,”24 what does it say about the Confederacy? What does it say about President Jefferson Davis? According to Evans, President Davis ought to be given “his due on one level—he was the first chief executive in America to appoint a Jew to his Cabinet, and he confirmed that decision twice more in the face of the storm of controversy surrounding Judah P. Benjamin.”25 Bertram W. Korn provided this assessment. “It is to be counted to the everlasting credit of President Davis that he steadfastly refused to sacrifice Benjamin’s administrative talent as a sop to prejudice, and that he retained his Jewish friend and confidant as a trusted lieutenant all through his service as the Confederate chief of government.”26 Davis’ historic appointments, according to Evans, reveal a character quality in President Davis unusual for the time -- he possessed an uncommon admiration for Southern Jews and Catholics.27 Though Lincoln and Davis had Jewish friends and acquaintances and neither man was anti-Semitic, the crucial difference in presidencies, in presidential character, and the use of presidential power is found in that Davis used the positive power of the presidency to appoint, promote, and thereby give legitimacy, to Southern Jewry and Southern Catholicism. He boldly made choices that Lincoln did not make, that no previous American president had made, and he stood by his appointments in the face of criticism. Lincoln, to his credit, did use the negative power of the presidency to rescind Grant’s order and personally lobbied the United State Congress to revise the Christian-only chaplain qualifications in the military. But what is interesting is that the individual who first raised objections to the exclusionary chaplain law and speak “in defense of Jewish rights” was Ohio Congressman Clement L. Vallandigham, a Copperhead who was later arrested and exiled to the Confederacy. Moreover, the Confederacy never erected legal barriers to non-Christian chaplains. On the question of chaplain qualifications, Korn wrote, “the Confederate Congress was more liberal and tolerant than its Washington counterpart” by not imposing Christianonly criteria.28 Though Lincoln resisted the prejudices of his party, he did not use the positive powers of the presidency to challenge those prejudices and acknowledge Northern Jewry and Catholicism to the extent Davis had in the South. Lincoln’s non-Protestant appointees, particularly Jewish ones, were few and far between, safe, obscure, and mostly inconsequential. Davis’ Catholic and Jewish appointees, however, were among his closest friends and advisors, worked in the courts of Europe, and were integral parts of the civil administration of the Confederate war effort. Further, Davis risked some political capital on them. He risked his own professional reputation and public prestige by appointing Catholic and Jewish Americans to prestigious civil posts and to accomplish crucial state objectives at a time when it was uncommon and controversial. Lincoln risked no comparable amount of political capital on Catholics and Jews.

24

Evans, Judah P. Benjamin, xx. Evans, Judah P. Benjamin, xiii. 26 Korn, American Jewry and the Civil War, 177. It should also be noted that Benjamin was well-liked by First Lady Varina Davis. According to Hendrick, “With Mrs. Davis, Benjamin was a favorite. No man was more welcome to her tea table.” Hendrick, Statesmen of the Lost Cause, 172. 27 Evans, Judah P. Benjamin, 85. 28 Korn, American Jewry and the Civil War, 57. 25

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CONTRASTING PARTY CULTURES The fact that the Lincoln Administration was a Protestant preserve and the Davis Administration was not should not really surprise us. In addition to personal character, one may find the answer as to why Lincoln and Davis’ appointments were different in party culture.29 Though the Confederacy did not have formal political parties, Davis was a career Democrat, and historically, the Democratic Party of Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson, was a hodgepodge party of religious minorities who held in common a fear of theocracy, church establishment, and religious homogeneity.30 Because of their mutual fear, it was a party open to peoples of all faiths, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, who shared a mutual “disdain for Republicans and their self-righteous evangelical desire to impose their version of Christian morality on the nation.”31 Therefore, because of this common bond and the party’s need to maintain unity, it should not be surprising that Democratic politicians, like Davis, would be more inclusive in seeking votes from, working with, and distributing patronage to various religious minorities. In fact, that is what Democratic presidents had done. Prior to the War Between the States, four Catholics had served in a president’s cabinet – all of them Democratic, beginning with Madison. It would not be until 1897 that a Catholic would serve in a Republican administration (Table 1). Table 1. Catholics in 19th Century U.S. and C.S. Presidential Cabinets Catholic Nominee John Armstrong, Jr Roger B. Taney Roger B. Taney

Years of Service 1813-1814 1831-1833 1833-1834

Cabinet Position War Atty General Treasury

Appointing President Madison Jackson Jackson

James Campbell John B. Floyd Stephen Mallory Joseph McKenna

1853-1857 1857-1861 1861-1865 1897-1898

Postmaster War Navy Atty General

Pierce Buchanan Davis McKinley

President’s Party Dem.-Rep. Dem. Dem. Dem. Dem. Dem.* Rep.

*Davis was a life-long Democrat, however, the Confederacy did not have formal political parties. Sources: Political Graveyard, http://www.politicalgraveyard.com; The Catholic Encyclopedia, http://www.newadvent.org

The same has been true for Jewish appointments. Table 2 shows that 18 Jews have served in presidential cabinets, 14 of which were appointed by Democratic presidents. What may be of further interest and warrant extended consideration is that Southern Democratic presidents, from Davis to Clinton, were far more likely to appoint Jews to cabinet positions than either 29

Jo Freeman, “The Political Culture of the Democratic and Republican Parties,” Political Science Quarterly 101.3 (1986), 327-356. 30 A. James Reichley, The Life of the Parties: A History of American Political Parties (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1992); Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1963), 94-95. 31 George Marsden, “The Religious Right: A Historical Overview,” in No Longer Exiles: The Religious New Right in American Politics, ed. Michael Cromartie (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1993), 6.

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Republican or non-Southern Democratic presidents. Southern Democratic presidents have made 13 Jewish appointments, non-Southern Democratic presidents three, and Republican presidents four. One may want to explore what is it about Southern Democratic presidents that has made them more likely than non-Southern Democratic and Republican presidents to use their appointment power on behalf of minorities. In contrast to the Democratic Party, the Federalist, Whig, and later the Republican parties were the parties of religious establishment and Puritan moralism. From its inception in the 1850s, the Republican Party has been the closest thing to “the [Protestant] Christian Party in [American] politics.”32 And it was widely viewed as the “anti-Romanist party.” For instance, William Seward may have lost his bid for the 1860 presidential nomination to Lincoln because of “his persisting closeness to the Catholic hierarchy” in New York, thereby making him unelectable.33 For many, the “Grand Ole’ Party” was more like the “Grand Ole’ Protestants”. To secure a Lincoln victory over Stephen Douglas in the North, part of the Republicans 1860 strategy was to portray the Democrats as the party of “Romanism,” much in the same way the party would in 1884 and 1928. “The Republicans’ propaganda machine studiously kept the Catholic issue before…voters, not least because of the persisting conviction that the Roman church was in cahoots with the slave power” of the South.34 Not surprisingly, analyses of the 1860 election show that “Catholics and immigrant voters strongly favored Stephen Douglas while native-born Protestants in the North went heavily for Lincoln.”35 Many Republicans were also suspicious of Jews. In contrast, Jewish Americans fared better in the Democratic, Confederate South than in the North. Robert N. Rosen argues that not “since the Golden Age of Jewry in medieval Spain” had Jews been as accepted and included in public life as they were in the antebellum South. Given their level of inclusion in the South, when secession and war came, Southern Jews rallied to the cause of independence to maintain the “right to breathe ‘the free air of Dixie’.”36 Noticing Jewish enthusiasm for Southern independence, Unionists often described the Confederate cause in anti-Semitic terms. No doubt, the principal association of the Confederacy with Jewry was the fact that the South had the only Jewish senators, Benjamin and David Levy Yulee, and that President Davis had included a number of Southern Jews working in the Confederate War and State departments. In fact, Union General Benjamin F. Butler even exaggerated the extent of Jewry in the Davis Administration. He believed that, in addition to Benjamin, Mallory and Memminger were also Jewish.37

32

Carwardine, Evangelicals and Politics in Antebellum America, 307; Robert P. Swierenga, “Ethnoreligious Political Behavior in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: Voting, Values, Cultures,” in Religion and American Politics: From the Colonial Period to the 1980s, ed. Mark A. Noll (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 146-171. 33 Carwardine, Evangelicals and Politics in Antebellum America, 300; Bennett, The Party of Fear, 153-154. 34 Carwardine, Evangelicals and Politics in Antebellum America, 300. 35 Swierenga, 159-160; Albert J. Menendez, Evangelicals at the Ballot Box (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1996), 95. 36 Rosen, The Jewish Confederates, 35. 37 Korn, American Jewry and the Civil War, 164-165.

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D. Jason Berggren Table 2. Jews in U.S. and C.S. Presidential Cabinets

Jewish Years of Cabinet Appointing President’s Nominee Service Position President Party Judah P. Benjamin 1861 Attorney General Davis Dem.* Judah P. Benjamin 1861-1862 War Davis Dem.* Judah P. Benjamin 1862-1865 State Davis Dem.* Oscar Straus 1906-1909 Commerce/Labor T. Roosevelt Rep. Henry Morganthau, Jr. 1934-1945 Treasury F. Roosevelt Dem. Lewis L. Strauss^ 1958-1959 Commerce Eisenhower Rep. Arthur J. Goldberg 1961-1962 Labor Kennedy Dem. Abraham Ribicoff 1962-1965 Health, Edu, Welfare Kennedy Dem. Wilbur Cohen 1968-1969 Health, Edu, Welfare Johnson Dem. Henry Kissinger 1973-1977 State Nixon Rep. Edward Levi 1975-1977 Attorney General Ford Rep. Michael Blumenthal 1977-1979 Treasury Carter Dem. Harold Brown 1977-1981 Defense Carter Dem. Neil Goldschmidt 1979-1981 Transportation Carter Dem. Phillip Klutznick 1979-1981 Commerce Carter Dem. Robert Reich 1993-1997 Labor Clinton Dem. Robert Rubin 1995-1999 Treasury Clinton Dem. Daniel Glickman 1995-2001 Agriculture Clinton Dem. Mickey Kantor 1996-1997 Commerce Clinton Dem. Lawrence Summers 1999-2001 Treasury Clinton Dem. * Davis was a life-long Democrat, however, the Confederacy did not have formal political parties. ^Unconfirmed by Senate. Source: “Roster A: Jewish Cabinet Officers,” in Jews in American Politics, eds. L. Sandy Maisel and Ira N. Forman (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001), 445

CONCLUSION All too frequently in comparisons between Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis, Lincoln’s “outstanding qualities” and Davis “deficiencies” are highlighted. The reality, however, is the usual assessments of President Davis have underestimated and underappreciated his presidential leadership. Ludwell Johnson was onto something when he wrote that “even a brief systematic comparison” between Davis and Lincoln would reveal that Davis in many ways “was clearly superior to Lincoln.”38 From the angle examined here, the politics of recognition, this is true. At a time when being religiously inclusive was not easy, President Davis demonstrated a greater appreciation and inclusiveness of Catholics and Jews in his presidential appointments than President Lincoln. Even though on the whole the Union was much more religiously diverse than the Confederacy, Davis’ cabinet was religiously diverse throughout his tenure, Lincoln’s was not. The Confederate administration was the first in American history to reflect the tri-faith reality, and Davis showed admirable resolve and courage, even by twenty-first century 38

Ludwell H. Johnson, “Jefferson Davis and Abraham Lincoln As War Presidents: Nothing Succeeds Like Success,” Civil War History 27.1 (1981): 50-51.

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standards, in defending it from many critics who were motivated by prejudice. As historian Clement Eaton wrote, “one admirable trait in his character was his loyalty to cabinet members when they were attacked in Congress and the press.”39 Davis defended them and promoted them whether they were Protestant, Catholic, or Jew. History is amiss in forgetting Davis in this regard. Consequently, the evidence presented here may present a serious challenge to, or at least warrant a serious revision of, assessments that have tried to identify the Union with inclusive civic nationalism and the Confederacy with exclusive ethnic nationalism.40 Frank Vandiver is right that “Davis deserves a better fate” than that which history has consigned him. “He deserves to be judged not by victory or defeat, but by his own deeds.”41 If Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. is right that risk-taking, challenging the status quo, is a hallmark of great presidents then Davis, at least in this respect, his use and defense of the politics of equal recognition for Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, possessed a streak of greatness.42

39

Eaton, A History of the Southern Confederacy, 52-53. See James M. McPherson, Is Blood Thicker Than Water? Crises of Nationalism in the Modern World (New York: Vintage Books, 1999). 41 Frank E. Vandiver, The Making of a President: Jefferson Davis, 1861 (Biloxi, MS: The Beauvoir Press, 1989), 8. 42 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. “Rating the Presidents: Washington to Clinton,” in The Presidency: Classic and Contemporary Readings, ed. Jeffrey Cohen and David Nice (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003), 97. 40

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 211-220

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

GEORGE WASHINGTON’S LEADERSHIP STYLE AND CONFLICT AT THE FEDERAL CITY John C. Pinheiro ABSTRACT In the 1790s, the establishment of the Federal City in the District of Columbia was far from assured. Frequent disputes between the three D.C. Commissioners, and their employees threatened to delay work on the city, and undermine public support for the project. One particularly contentious fight erupted at a critical time in early 1793 between chief surveyor Andrew Ellicott, and the D.C. Commissioners. President George Washington, acting to prevent further delays in the city’s planning, and construction, successfully mediated the conflict using a combination of tactics. In so doing he demonstrated many of the best elements of his leadership style. First, he was highly effective at personal diplomacy because he possessed a keen awareness of human behavior, and knew how to use his prestige advantageously. Second, Washington recognized the important yet limited value of surrogates, but did not shy away from personal intervention when his surrogates failed. Finally, even while orchestrating important events he succeeded at preserving his reputation as an Olympian leader who rarely came down from the Mountain to sully his hands in factional or interpersonal disputes like those at the Federal City.

INTRODUCTION That George Washington spent a great deal of time and effort tending to the establishment of the city that now bears his name is well known. What is less known is that his labors on behalf of the Federal City encompassed more than verbally championing it, and approving the city plans or designs of the Capitol, and the president’s house. Washington often found himself refereeing squabbles involving the three commissioners of the District of Columbia, their employees, and the local proprietors of the lands on which the city would be built. The challenge for the president, and one which he met with great success, was to work diligently in private while maintaining his public persona as one who had delegated authority, and therefore was uninvolved in the minutiae of city affairs. In the summer of 1790, President Washington signed the “Act for establishing the temporary and permanent seat of the Government of the United States,” commonly known as the Residence Act. This act established the District of Columbia on territory ceded by

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Virginia and Maryland, and it moved the seat of the federal government from New York City to Philadelphia, where it was supposed to remain until 1800. During the intervening period, the city on the Potomac River was to be made ready for occupation by the three branches of government when it came time to move them. Philadelphians, for their part, cheered every setback at the Federal City, hoping that the City of Brotherly Love might become the permanent capital by default. The Residence Act also authorized Washington, without the need for Senate confirmation, to appoint “as long as may be necessary, three commissioners, who . . . shall, under the direction of the President,” be responsible for surveying the district, purchasing all necessary land from proprietors, and supervising the construction of federal buildings.1

BUILDING THE PRESIDENT’S HOUSE The next two years proved to be critical in the development of the Federal City. On January 22, 1791, Washington appointed Daniel Carroll, Thomas Johnson, and David Stuart to be the first three commissioners of the District of Columbia.2 In March 1792, the D.C. commissioners advertised a contest for the design of the presidential residence. They selected James Hoban's architectural plan in July 1792, and hired him to supervise its construction. However, the house as designed by Hoban did not fill the space allotted by Pierre Charles L'Enfant in his plan of the Federal City. The commissioners turned to Washington for advice. On August 2, 1792, he visited the site of the proposed house with Stuart and Carroll, concluding “that the North front of the Building, should be brought up to the post fixed by Majr L'Enfant for the center of the North front -- Among other reasons, it will be most in View to the Diagonals…tho not so much so, from the Capitol as might be wished." At Washington’s urging, the commissioners agreed to enlarge the building by one - fifth. With Masonic fanfare and ceremony, the cornerstone of what was called the President's House was laid on October 13, 1792. The home of future American presidents seemed well on its way to being built.3 As it turned out, however, these proposed changes proved to be expensive. Hoban informed the commissioners of this, who then gave Washington the unwelcome news. He hardly could restrain his surprise: When it was suggested to increase the dimensions of the President's House, one fifth, I had no idea that it would carry the expence of that building to any thing like the sum of £77,900 Sterling, which is estimated by mister Hoben. And if that should be the case, I am decidedly of opinion that it would be best to take the plan on it's original scale as you mention…But I 1

Richard Peters, ed., The Public Statutes at Large of the United States of America, vol. 1 (Boston: Little and Brown, 1845), 130. 2 Commission, Jan. 22, 1791, in Jack D. Warren, Jr., editor, The Papers of George Washington: Presidential Series, vol. 7 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1998), 258-60. For a good study of how and why Washington chose these three men, and his relationships with each, see William C. di Giacomantonio, “All the President’s Men: George Washington’s Federal City Commissioners,” Washington History 3 (1991): 52-75. 3 D.C. Commissioners, “Washington, in the Territory of Columbia, A Premium,” in National Gazette (Philadelphia), Mar. 22, 1792, 3; Daniel Carroll and David Stuart to Thomas Johnson, Aug. 3, 1792, Records of the Commissioners for the District of Columbia, Letters Sent, 1791-1867, Record Group 42, National Archives;

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confess, that I cannot see how so great an increase of expence would arise from the small encrease of dimensions proposed; & am much mistaken indeed, if it does not far exceed any ideas he let out at the time his plan was adopted.

As was his normal pattern; Washington, after offering his opinion almost in the form of a command, closed with a flourish of diplomacy: “However, as I do not profess to be an accurate Judge of these matters, I cannot undertake to say that the additional expence is inconsistent.” Soon after learning of Washington’s opinion, the commissioners told Hoban that "we believe it will be best to begin the Presidents House on the large plan with a present Intention of Dropping a Story in the Execution: It will bring it on the whole, to much about the same Expence as in the smaller Length and Bredth, with the 4 addition of the Story."

BUILDING THE U.S. CAPITOL On the same day the commissioners inaugurated the contest for the President’s House, they did so for the U.S. Capitol as well, offering $500 and a lot in the Federal City to the person who by July 15, 1792, could provide the best plan. They also offered $250 for the second best plan. Not completely satisfied with any entry, however, the commissioners began to work with French architect Stephen Hallet in an effort to make his more suitable. After months of work, Hallet submitted a revised plan on January 28, 1793. The next day, Dr. William Thornton submitted a partially finished design to Washington, who was so taken with it that he immediately asked the commissioners to put Hallet’s plan on hold. He told the commissioners that the design as a whole “will, I doubt not, give it a preference, in your eyes, as it has done in mine, and those of several others whom I have consulted, and who are deemed men of skill and taste in Architecture. I have therefore thought it better to give the Doctor time to finish his plan, and for this purpose to delay 'till your next meeting a final decision.” The president acknowledged that this might inflame Hallet, “who, you know, was in some degree led into his plan by ideas we all expressed to him.” Still, “this ought not to induce us to prefer it to a better.” Washington, trying to prepare the commissioners for his inevitable choice of Thornton, asked them to ensure that Hallet’s feelings “be saved and soothed as much as possible. I leave it to yourselves how best to prepare him for the possibility that the Doctor's plan may be preferred to his.” After leaving the choice of action up to the commissioners, Washington nevertheless made his own suggestion -- that they hire Hallet to work on the Capitol in some fashion.5

4

5

Minutes for Oct. 13, 1792, Records of the Commissioners for the District of Columbia, Proceedings, 1791-1802, Record Group 42, National Archives. D.C. Commissioners to Washington, Jan. 5, 1793, Records of the Commissioners for the District of Columbia, Letters Received, 1791-1802, Record Group 42, National Archives; Washington to D.C. Commissioners, Mar. 3, 1793, George Washington Papers, Library of Congress; D.C. Commissioners to James Hoban, Mar. 14, 1793, Records of the Commissioners, Letters Sent, RG 42, NA. D.C. Commissioners, “Washington, in the Territory of Columbia. A Premium,” in National Gazette (Philadelphia), Mar. 22, 1792, 3; Dorothy Twohig, editor, The Papers of George Washington: Journal of the Proceedings of the President (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1981), 37-38; Washington to D.C. Commissioners, Jan. 31, 1793, Washington Papers, LC.

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In a private letter to his longtime friend Stuart, Washington was free with his thoughts: “Doctr Thornton's Plan for the Capitol, is so much superior to any I have seen, that I have no hesitation in giving it a decided preference.”6 Thornton attended a meeting of the commissioners in March, and on April 2 Washington officially approved his plan. On April 10, the commissioners ordered Hallet “to study the plan of the Capitol & make calculations of the expence and materials &c.” Although disagreements ensued in the coming months between Hallet, Thornton, and the commissioners; for the time being Hallet was left to supervise the construction of the Capitol according to the design of his tardy, victorious competitor.7 In the episodes involving Washington’s intervention concerning the President’s House, and the Capitol, the president demonstrated an ability to give orders in the form of suggestions or opinions, and to work quietly behind the scenes. Moreover, he showed that though he had delegated authority to the commissioners of the District of Columbia, he still was greatly concerned that all go according to plan in the building of the city. Yet, the problems of unforeseen expenses, or allegedly unfair competitions, were not beyond the norm for large - scale building projects. There were other, more pressing disputes that really did endanger the future existence of the Federal City. Indeed, soon after their appointments, the three commissioners had become the focal point of all manner of disagreements. Oftentimes, proprietors tried to dispute the price offered for their land, or protested the planned locations of certain buildings in relation to their real estate. For varying lengths of time, many fought to have the city plan altered or just flat out refused to cooperate. Most conflicts, however, centered upon the slow, crawling pace of work on the Federal City.

THE ELLICOTT AFFAIR On January 20, 1793, Washington addressed one particular conflict, what he termed “a serious difference,” in a letter to proprietor Uriah Forrest. Responding to Forrest’s offer to help mediate a burgeoning, but still private dispute between the commissioners, and their chief surveyor, Andrew Ellicott, Washington encouraged Forrest to “use his influence to heal differen[c]es & promote harmony among those engaged in the execution of the work.”8 Ellicott had tendered his resignation in early January amid accusations of slowness and inaccuracy, and it was to take effect on May 1. He blamed his departure not only on the accusations, but also on his treatment at the hands of the commissioners, which had given him a “disgust” for all things relating to the Federal City.9 Forrest decided that the best course of action for the time being would be to avoid approaching the commissioners, and to concentrate instead on convincing Ellicott not to publicize his grievances. The fight between Ellicott and his bosses soon went public, but not by Ellicott’s choice. On January 29, an anonymous writer in a Baltimore newspaper charged Ellicott with malice 6

Washington to Stuart, Feb. 1, 1793, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Gratz Collection. Minutes for Apr. 2, 10, Records of the Commissioners, Proceedings, RG 42, NA. 8 Washington to Uriah Forrest, Jan. 20, 1793, Washington Papers, LC. 7

9

Andrew Ellicott to the D.C. Commissioners, Jan. 8, 1793, Records of the Commissioners, Letters Received, RG 42, NA; Ellicott to Sally Ellicott, Jan. 15, 1793, in Catharine Van Cortlandt Mathews, Andrew Ellicott: His Life and Letters (New York: The Grafton Press, 1908), 98-99.

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and enormous errors in his surveys, and sarcastically lauded the surveyor’s impending resignation. Ellicott, exhibiting his quick temper, and characteristic flair for dramatic rhetoric, published his reply under his own name. Notably, he refrained from criticizing the commissioners or elaborating on his problems with them: If the arrangement of the different departments in the City of Washington did not render it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain an adequate investigation of the conduct of the several Officers, I should not think it necessary to reply to, or bestow a moment’s attention on, the inconsistent calumnies of an anonymous Writer, who, like you, attempts to impose, on an enlightened Public; puerile smartness for wit, invective and abuse for satire, and pusillanimous insinuations for facts.

Ellicott declared that the only persons fit to judge his work were “those acquainted with such business.” Admitting only to one of the alleged inaccuracies, Ellicott called it a “trifling error made by the engravers,” and argued that “if your intention has been to embarrass the affairs of the City, by increasing any disagreement among those concerned in the different departments, you will be disappointed.”10 Despite his public stance, Ellicott already had written to the commissioners on the day the anonymous editorial appeared, demanding a fair and “speedy investigation of my conduct.”11 Ellicott believed that Stuart, and assistant surveyor James R. Dermott, were working together to undermine his credibility. Dermott, a native of Ireland, was well known locally in Alexandria as a heavy drinker, and frequent rabble rouser. But, he was also respected for his experience in cartography and surveying. Ellicott believed that Dermott wanted his job as chief surveyor.12 Two of Ellicott’s assistants loyally rushed to the aid of their boss. Of course, one was his brother, Benjamin, a surveyor in his own right though not one of equal caliber with his older sibling. The other was Isaac Briggs, who had helped to draw up the boundary of the federal district. Both men contacted the commissioners to defend the competence, and work ethic of their boss.13 There was some truth to Ellicott’s accusations against Dermott. Although Stuart claimed that Dermott had been hired at Ellicott’s urging in the spring of 1792, in fact Ellicott had given a short list of possible assistants to the commissioners that did not include Dermott. It seems that the commissioners hired Dermott, and Ellicott mistrusted him from the beginning. In the summer months of 1792, Ellicott attempted to dismiss Dermott from his team for bad behavior. When Stuart resisted this, Ellicott retained Dermott a while longer before finally dismissing him without the commissioners’ permission. When papers soon turned up missing from the surveyor’s office, Ellicott suspected Dermott. Then, in late 1792 or early 1793, Stuart met with Dermott while traveling through Virginia on his way to Georgetown. At this meeting, Dermott apparently criticized Ellicott, and alleged that the chief surveyor had committed major errors in his measurements of the 10

A Citizen of Columbia, “To the Geographer-General of the United States,” in Maryland Journal and Baltimore Advertiser, Jan. 29, 1793, 3; Ellicott, “For the Maryland Journal, &c.,” in Maryland Journal and Baltimore Advertiser, Feb. 8, 1793, 3. 11 Ellicott to the D.C. Commissioners, Jan. 29, 1793, Records of the Commissioners, Letters Received, RG 42, NA. 12 Ellicott to the D.C. Commissioners, Jan. 18, 1793, ibid. 13 Statement of Briggs, Jan. 12, 1793, in Mathews, Andrew Ellicott, 97-98.

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federal district. Stuart asked Dermott to submit a written complaint to the commissioners, to which he readily agreed. Soon after this conversation, Dermott requested $550 from the commissioners for “my expenditures and other Contracts for the last year.” 14 From Ellicott’s point of view, the commissioners, led by Stuart, were paying Dermott to thwart his surveys. In early February, Ellicott publicized his accusations against Stuart and Dermott. He, or more likely his brother Benjamin, writing under the pseudonym “Balaam,” in the Georgetown Weekly Ledger, criticized the commissioners for believing the lies of a drunkard, whom he called Judas, but readers would have recognized as Dermott. “Balaam” singled out Stuart as Judas’s fellow conspirator in a plot to promote Judas to Ellicott’s position by impugning the latter. In the February 16 edition of the Ledger, a person writing as “Decius” attacked “Balaam” as a “perverter of truth,” and denied that Judas sought Ellicott’s position as chief surveyor. In his defense of Dermott, “Decius” also made other accusations against Ellicott: Judas never told the lye to Thomas [Johnson] about the proof - sheer plan; nor did he except by direction, deceive Daniel [Carroll], in keeping up a shew in laying off the [Potomac] Canal, neither did he tell David [Stuart] and the rest, that there was more done by the middle of summer, with the few hands employed then; than was done the whole preceeding year with nearly double the number.

Most important to Stuart was “Decius’s” assertion that the “insinuation of David and Judas’ conspiracy and accusation is false, David never had a conversation with Judas about the inheritance but once, the sum and substance of which…will be made public if thought necessary.” The “inheritance,” of course, was the chief surveyorship.15 Ellicott accused Dermott not only of being “Decius,” but also of intentionally recording errors in their surveys, and stealing the very papers that might exonerate his boss. The commissioners, growing weary of what they called “Mr. Ellicott’s ill humor,” informed Washington that: We have done every thing in our power to pr[e]serve a good agreement for the time he is with us but in vain -- He refuses to give us any Account of the business of his department till he has finished in May[.] If he should persist in this opinion after reflection, it will be impossible for us to continue him even to that time.

Although he had always supported Ellicott, and believed him to be a man of remarkable intellect, for Washington the city always came first. Thus, he responded that if the firing took place, he wished “no time…lost in obtaining a suitable & well qualified” replacement.16 14

Stuart to Washington, Feb. 18, 1793, Washington Papers, LC; Andrew Ellicott to the D.C. Commissioners, Mar. 7, 1792, Records of the Commissioners, Letters Received, RG 42, NA; D.C. Commissioners to Washington, Mar. 23, 1794, Andrew Ellicott, Benjamin Ellicott, and Isaac Briggs to Washington, June 29, 1793, Washington Papers, LC; Bob Arnebeck, Through a Fiery Trial: Building Washington, 1790-1800 (Lantham, New York, and London: Madison Books, 1991), 107; James R. Dermott to the D.C. Commissioners, Jan. 8, 1793, Records of the Commissioners, Letters Received, RG 42, NA. 15 Decius, “For the George-Town Weekly Ledger,” in Georgetown Weekly Ledger, Feb. 16, 1793, 1. 16 D.C. Commissioners to Washington, Mar. 13, 1793, Ellicott’s “Report of Squares not sold,” Apr. 4, 1793, and Ellicott to the D.C. Commissioners, June 17, 1793, Records of the Commissioners, Letters Received, RG 42, NA; Ellicott, et al. to Washington, June 29, 1793 [not sent until Feb. 1794], Washington Papers, LC; D.C. Commissioners to Washington, Mar. 23, 1794, Records of the Commissioners, Letters Sent, RG 42, NA; Washington to the D.C. Commissioners, Mar. 3, 1793, Records of the Commissioners, Letters Received, RG 42, NA.

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Meanwhile, Stuart accused Thomas Jefferson of inciting Ellicott, which Jefferson denied. But, Stuart did not back down, assuring Washington that his suspicion of Jefferson was “well grounded.” Jefferson, to prove his innocence, showed Washington “the only letter (he says) he has written to him for many Months.” One day after meeting Washington, Jefferson still; “apprehensive that there has been some misconception of his correspondence with mister Ellicott,” sent the president “full copies of the only letters…written to mister Ellicott in the course of the years 1792. & 1793…written with no other view than to prevent public altercation between mister Ellicott and the Commissioners." Washington, now deeply embroiled in the tedious, but widening conflict, believed Jefferson’s claims of innocence, and forwarded the letters to Stuart.17 The contents of Jefferson’s letters to Ellicott bear out the confidence that Washington placed in his fellow Virginian, and no other extant letters or private notes written by Jefferson suggest that he colluded with Ellicott. In one of the letters, Jefferson did not even mention the Federal City. In the other, dating from January 1793, Jefferson actually tried to convince the surveyor that, for the good of the Federal City, he should not engage in a public dispute with the commissioners. Uriah Forrest had given similar advice to Ellicott in early January. But, Ellicott, as demonstrated by his newspaper editorials, chose to ignore their advice.18 By order of the D.C. commissioners, George Fenwick, another assistant of Ellicott’s, examined several of the questionable squares, and handed in his results on March 8. As it turned out, there were a number of mistakes in Ellicott’s measurements. Therefore, the commissioners decided to have Ellicott explain the discrepancies.19 It was in the quest to find a suitable way for Ellicott to defend his work that the commissioners and their chief surveyor proved they needed little prodding from Jefferson or any other person to aggravate their relationship. On March 12 and 13, they quarreled over whether the surveyor should provide his defense orally or in writing. The commissioners demanded the latter, but Ellicott insisted on the former. “Writing,” according to Ellicott, “will be a work of time: which at present, is of too much importance, to be wasted in an enquiry that, will eventually be found too trifling.” Exasperated, the commissioners fired Ellicott and demanded “all papers concerning the Business.” When he turned in every document that he believed “appeared of the least importance to the public,” the commissioners countered that “your Judgement is not to decide, our Demand is for all.” Ellicott then repeated his accusation that Dermott had stolen, hidden, or destroyed important papers, but promised to comb his office, and send “every scrap…which bears the mark of a pen.” He returned the commissioners’ last letter of March 13 unread: “From a strong presumption that the enclosed letter is from you, I have declined opening it.”20

17

Jefferson to Washington Feb. 14, 1793, Miscellaneous Letters, Record Group 59, National Archives; Stuart to Washington, Feb. 18, 1793, Washington Papers, LC; Washington to Stuart, Mar. 3, 1793, Princeton University, Special Collections, André de Coppet Collection; Jefferson to Washington, Mar. 4, 1793, Thomas Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress; Washington to Stuart, Mar. 3, 1793, Princeton, de Coppet Collection, and to Stuart, Mar. 4, 1793, Miscellaneous Letters, RG 59, NA. 18 John Catanzariti, editor, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 24: 151 and 25: 54-55; Forrest to Washington, Jan. 10, 1793, Ellicott to Forrest, undated, Miscellaneous Letters, RG 59, NA. 19 Minutes for Mar. 8-9, 1793, Records of the Commissioners, Proceedings, RG 42, NA; Ehrenberg, “Mapping the Nation's Capital,” 94, 290. 20 Ellicott to the D.C. Commissioners, Mar. 12, 13, 13, 14, 1793, D.C. Commissioners to Ellicott, Mar. 12, 13, 13, 13, 1793, Records of the Commissioners, Letters Received and Sent, RG 42, NA.

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Uriah Forrest chose this delicate moment to follow Washington’s advice, and attempted to remedy the situation. After three unsuccessful attempts to see the commissioners in person at their offices, Forrest wrote to them on March 14. Far from trying to “promote harmony” and efficiency at the Federal City, as Washington had suggested, he instead accused the commissioners of insulating themselves from Ellicott’s numerous supporters while listening to a few peevish, tendentious critics. Forrest cautioned that dismissing Ellicott would appear irrational, and undermine public support for the Federal City at a time when it already faced criticism for being behind schedule. According to Forrest, other than “a few solitary stones” the only substantial accomplishments at the city thus far had been Ellicott’s maps and surveys.21 The commissioners strongly rebuked Forrest for his intervention. What really angered them was that Forrest apparently had read their presumably private letters to Ellicott of March 12 and 13. Forrest denied this, but the fact that he demonstrated an intimate knowledge of the letters, and even quoted from one in his letter to the commissioners makes his denial unbelievable. Always protective of their own offices from the encroachment of others, the commissioners also told Forrest that “a proprietor has now [sic] Right than any other private person to interfere, with the Conduct of the Commissioners.” Not satisfied with merely reprimanding Forrest, the commissioners then complained to Washington about his interference, but received no immediate reply.22 Meanwhile, on March 16, Ellicott also called on Washington, and asked him to undertake “an examination” of the whole affair. “Otherwise,” Ellicott complained, “I shall consider myself a sacrifice at the schrine of ignorance.” Washington replied indirectly through Jefferson, who told the surveyor “that it would be out of the line of his [Washington’s] interference to originate orders relative to those employed under the Commissioners.” Privately, Ellicott expressed his disappointment at Washington’s seeming unwillingness to aid him.23 Yet, on April 2, the president did intervene, when he encountered Ellicott by apparent happenstance in Georgetown. The two men spoke as they walked through the town, and down to “the landing” on the Potomac River. Writing to the commissioners, Washington described his “conversation with Major Ellicott -- who says . . . he is persuaded he can expln to your entire satisfaction if you will afford him a candid & patient hearing. . . . This I assured him you would do.” Nevertheless, Washington reassured the commissioners that he had reminded Ellicott “in stronger terms than ever that I would not interfere between the Commissioners & the characters Subortinate to them.”24 As for the complaints about proprietary intervention in the official affairs of the District of Columbia, and the Federal City, Washington said “it . . . [is] . . . painful to me, to see such interference of the Proprietors.” Yet, only months before he had enjoined Forrest to do just that! Of course, Washington had not counted on his surrogate’s brash, and less than tactful 21

Forrest to the D.C. Commissioners, Mar. 14, 1793 (first letter), Records of the Commissioners, Letters Received, RG 42, NA. D.C. Commissioners to Forrest, Mar. 14, 1793, Forrest to the D.C. Commissioners, Mar. 14, 1793 (second letter), Records of the Commissioners, Letters Received and Sent, RG 42, NA. 23 Ellicott to Washington, Mar. 16, 1793, in Sally Kennedy Alexander, “A Sketch of the Life of Major Andrew Ellicott,” Records of the Columbia Historical Society 2 (1899): 189-90; Twohig, ed., Journal of the Proceedings of the President, 95, 99; Jefferson to Ellicott, Mar. 22, 1793, Ellicott to Jefferson, Mar. 26, 1793, in Catanzariti, ed., Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 25: 425-26, 449. 24 Washington to the D.C. Commissioners, Apr. 3, 1793, Washington Papers, LC. 22

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approach. Still, had Forrest succeeded in mending the rift between Ellicott and the commissioners; Washington no doubt would have praised rather than censured his “interference.” Now the president told the commissioners that proprietors “had no more to do with the conduct of” the commissioners than did any other American citizen. Washington even accused the meddlesome proprietors of “acting the parts of suicides to their own interests, as far as their conduct could effect it.”25 After his conversation with Washington, Ellicott bragged to the commissioners that he had “demanded of the President an investigation. His reply was; that you were ready and willing to afford me that justice. I have therefore to request, that you will at any hour convenient this afternoon give me a hearing.” Along with Dermott, the commissioners met with Ellicott on April 4. Although no minutes exist detailing what happened at this meeting, the atmosphere could not have been a comfortable one for either party. The results seemed to vindicate Ellicott’s claim that nearly every surveying error had resulted from Dermott’s “false copying” and not the “work on the ground,” for on April 9, the commissioners reinstated him. They even allowed him to pick his own team of assistant surveyors.26

CONCLUSION The D.C. commissioners, not wanting “to tire” Washington “with particulars” of the settlement, offered him no details of the meeting. They merely informed him of Ellicott’s reinstatement. On April 10, Ellicott wrote his wife to tell her that his “victory was complete . . . the defeat of the commissioners has given great pleasure to the inhabitants of this place."27 In July, claiming that he had “that business in such a situation that my personal attendance will be unnecessary for some time to come,” Ellicott left the federal district, and did not return until December. At that time, the commissioners refused to accept his services. Benjamin Ellicott and Isaac Briggs resigned that same December as a result of the commissioners’ unwillingness to reinstate the former surveyor following his long absence. James Dermott continued to work at the Federal City until 1798, when the board of commissioners (which by now contained none of the original three) fired him for stealing documents, poor record keeping, and “misconduct.”28 And, thus ended one of the most telling episodes in the founding of the Federal City. But, the rancorous quarrels surrounding Andrew Ellicott’s tenure as chief surveyor provide more than just a glimpse at the infighting that took place in the city of Washington before there even was a city of Washington. More than George Washington’s exertions toward the construction of the President’s House and the Capitol, the Ellicott affair illuminates an important facet of the complex man who did so much to establish the nation’s capital near his 25

Ibid. Ellicott to the D.C. Commissioners, Apr. 3, Records of the Commissioners, Letters Received, RG 42, NA; D.C. Commissioners to Dermott, Apr. 3, to Ellicott, Apr. 3, 6, 9, 1793, Records of the Commissioners, Letters Sent, RG 42, NA; Ellicott, Ellicott, and Briggs to Washington, June 29, 1793, Washington Papers, LC; Minutes for Apr. 9, 1793, Records of the Commissioners, Proceedings, RG 42, NA. 27 D.C. Commissioners to Washington, Apr. 9, 1793, Records of the Commissioners, Letters Sent, RG 42, NA; Ellicott to Sally Ellicott, Apr. 10, 1793, in Mathews, Andrew Ellicott, 99-100. 28 Ellicott to the D.C. Commissioners, July 19, 1793, Records of the Commissioners, Letters Received, RG 42, NA; D.C. Commissioners to Washington, Dec. 23, 1793, Washington Papers, LC; Arnebeck, Through a Fiery Trial, 474. 26

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home on the Potomac River. Concerned primarily with keeping the city on schedule, Washington decried interference, even while interfering or prodding others to do the same. Washington’s role in solving the dispute between Ellicott and the District of Columbia’s commissioners proved that he would define on his own terms the Residence Act’s call for the commissioners to be “under the direction of the President.” At the same time, he endeavored to balance the legitimate use of his substantial influence with his desire to appear as, and actually be, a delegant who resided above the oftentimes juvenile fray. While he may have maintained that appearance in public, Washington’s actions and private letters indicate that his concern for the Federal City led him to use methods he claimed to abhor. His clever orchestration of events should serve as a warning to historians and students of history not to underestimate Washington’s political ability and knowledge of human behavior.

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 221-236

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

THE PRESIDENCY OF ULYSSES S. GRANT: A RECONSIDERATION Max J. Skidmore ABSTRACT Until recently, the consensus has been that Grant, so brilliant in warfare, was a failure as president. "Hopelessly naïve," "passive," "subservient to Congress," are frequent descriptions. Recent scholarship shows instead that Grant was a good president; certainly a strong one. The misconception nevertheless continues. It has resulted primarily from a naïve acceptance of comments from hostile "reformers" of Grant's day, and from deliberate misrepresentations by Southern vindicators seeking to diminish the Union cause, and ignore the role of slavery. It is time to replace the caricature with an accurate representation.

INTRODUCTION A number of recent studies by Grant scholars have demonstrated that the common view of the 18th president is incorrect. In fact, by reflecting gross misunderstanding of the Grant presidency, a misunderstanding deliberately fostered by long-ago misrepresentations, the conventional wisdom is worse than merely incorrect. Nevertheless, despite the reconsideration underway, other historians, along with political scientists, still tend to view him as politically naïve, and to portray President Grant as passive, and as a tool of Congress. The facts of his administration clearly demonstrate otherwise. One does not have to portray him as among the greatest of presidents to recognize that the reconsideration of Grant's presidency was shamefully long in coming. Ratings of presidents nearly always place Grant near, or even at, the bottom. Studies of the presidency frequently dismiss him out of hand by repeating what "everyone knows," often without even a supporting reference. For example, a recent ranking of presidents placed Grant "in last place by a large margin."1 The authors, Charles and Richard Faber, provided a more extensive discussion of each administration than do the authors of most such rankings, but although they were sweeping in their assertions regarding Grant as president, they offered not a single citation to support any of their judgments. A few of the many examples of this were 1

Charles F. and Richard B. Faber, The American Presidents Ranked by Performance, Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2000, p. 136; see also pp. 131-136.

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that Grant's successes in foreign affairs were "mainly due" to his secretary of state (apparently the buck did not get so far as the president), and his "failures were usually caused by Grant's acting alone;" "many of his appointees were unqualified and unsuited for their positions;" the president "became so disrespected by public opinion that it was difficult for him to govern;" he was "incredibly naïve;" and "people were ashamed of him."2 Such pronouncements would seem certainly to require more than ex cathedra proclamations. The popular Ridings and McIver study treated Grant in a manner similar to that of the Fabers, but placed him fourth from the bottom. Their conclusions resulted from an extensive survey of academicians, a few of whom were even scholars of substance, but their summary comments, like those of the Fabers, cited no sources.3 Their disdain for Grant apparently was so massive that Ridings and McIver seemed to have forgotten him completely by the time their narrative reached McKinley; at least they had forgotten the eighteenth president's reelection victory, and his eight years in the White House. McKinley, they wrote, had pleased the voters "enough to make him the first president since Abraham Lincoln to be elected to two consecutive terms."4 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. is too competent a historian to make such a glaring error. His 1996 study placed Grant marginally better than most, sixth from the bottom, although still in the group of "failures."5 Schlesinger at least was reporting a poll of historians, not pontificating. Moreover, he conceded that Grant was not "villainous," and mused whether the low rankings that he customarily received were truly warranted.6 A good reflection of the conventional wisdom may be found in Michael Genovese's study of the presidents. He presented Grant as "politically inept and managerially lax," and said that he "saw the presidency as a purely administrative office." In sum, Genovese wrote, "Grant is considered a failure as president. His limited view of the office, limited experience, and limited abilities all contributed to this failure, as did the rise of congressional assertiveness. He is most remembered for the scandals that took place during his tenure."7 To be sure, the Grant administration today is indeed remembered primarily for scandal. It is important for the scholar, however, not merely to accept prevailing opinion, but rather to question whether the conventional wisdom is accurate. If common assumptions are inaccurate, it becomes the scholar's obligation to explain how misunderstanding came to permeate the dominant view. Until recently, few scholars have bothered to do more than transmit the judgment of others. Of those re-opening the record regarding the Grant administration, the most uncompromising defender of the eighteenth president is Frank Scaturro.8 Others, although not going so far as Scaturro, have decried what for so long has been the accepted view of the Grant presidency. Brooks Simpson, for example, has discussed the enormous difficulties that Grant faced, not the least of which was obstruction from the courts. Simpson noted pointedly 2

Ibid., pp. 131-136. William J. Ridings, Jr., and Stuart B. McIver, Rating the Presidents, rev. ed., New York: Citadel Press, 2000, pp. 121-127. 4 Ibid., p. 155. 5 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Rating the Presidents: Washington to Clinton," Political Science Quarterly, 112:2 (Summer 1997), p. 189. 6 Ibid., p. 185. 7 Michael Genovese, The Power of the American Presidency, 1789-2000, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. pp. 94-96. 8 Frank J. Scaturro, President Grant Reconsidered, Lanham, Maryland: Madison Books, 1999. 3

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that none of those who have been so quick to condemn have been able to suggest how Grant, or anyone else for that matter, could have achieved what at the time appears simply to have been impossible: "sectional reconciliation" on the one hand, and "justice for black Americans" on the other.9 As recent political developments demonstrate, these goals continue to present difficulties even in our more racially-enlightened age.

CORRUPTION Perhaps it would be well to deal first with the corruption issue. Was there corruption in the Grant administration? There was. Was it uniquely serious? It was certainly not. The most lurid of the scandals that many later observers have associated with Grant was the Crédit Mobilier episode. This association disregards two salient facts. First, the wrongdoing related not to the executive branch, but rather to bribery of members of Congress; it involved the financing of the Union Pacific Railroad. Second, it pertained to nothing that occurred while Grant was president, and in fact took place during the Johnson administration; before Grant even took office. It only became known during the Grant presidency. Scaturro noted pointedly that "nowhere else in the American historical tradition is a president held accountable for a major scandal that took place before he assumed office." He quoted Thomas Bailey approvingly that "we could as fairly blame President Benjamin Harrison for the Johnstown flood…"10 The "Whiskey Ring" was more relevant to the Grant administration. Lower level officials were shown to have diverted money to distillers that should have been collected in taxes. The practice had begun years earlier, but continued into Grant's presidency. Grant has been derided for having said, "let no guilty man escape," and then testifying on behalf of Orville Babcock, his own secretary whom the scandal touched. Grant may have been impolitic to have defended his subordinate in so public a manner, but he was convinced of Babcock's innocence, and suspected that the charges against him were politically motivated. Grant's confidence is understandable. There was in fact little evidence against his secretary, who almost assuredly would have been acquitted even without Grant's testimony.11 Moreover, since there actually were more than one hundred convictions, there clearly was no whitewash. The scandal that reached closest to Grant himself still did not implicate him personally. Secretary of War William Belknap had been charged with receiving illegal payments from private concessions on military posts. Belknap sought to avoid impeachment by submitting his resignation. Before Grant was aware of the charges he accepted Belknap's resignation. The House proceeded to impeach him anyway, but the Senate voted acquittal on the grounds that the Constitution did not provide for impeaching one who held no office.12 Grant ordered his attorney general to prosecute if he could find sufficient evidence against Belknap, but the attorney general concluded that he could not make an adequate case. 9

Brooks D. Simpson, The Reconstruction Presidents, p. 196; see also his Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph Over Adversity, 1822-1865, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 2000; unless otherwise indicated, subsequent references to Simpson will refer to The Reconstruction Presidents. 10 Scaturro, p. 29. 11 See ibid., pp. 36-40; see also Jean Edward Smith, Grant, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001, pp 583-584, and pp. 590-593. 12 See Smith, pp. 593-595.

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These scandals were serious, but they hardly came up to the level of corruption found in some other administrations. One explanation for their prominence was the confusion between political patronage and corruption. At the time a faction of the Republican Party was dedicated to reform, primarily of the civil service. Patronage had long been the normal way of conducting government, but the reformers saw it as "corrupt." Grant, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, was actually "the first president to recommend a professional civil service." He "pressed the initial legislation through Congress, and appointed the first Civil Service Commission. Yet unlike many reformers, he did not confuse patronage with corruption." He was a "pragmatist. His military success reflected his willingness to make do with what he had. So, too, he acted in politics. Patronage was a fixture on the Washington scene. Rather than reject it, Grant sought to minimize its pernicious effects."13 Congress, however, thwarted him, and refused to empower, or ultimately even to fund, the Commission. Grant bowed to reality, and dissolved it.14 Citing the conclusions of other scholars for support, Grant biographer Jean Edward Smith drew his own, and one must say quite sound, conclusion. "Accusations of corruption that attach to the Grant administration are in some measure a result of careless semantics," he wrote. "Much of what the reformist school of historiography has called corruption was merely the dominant mode of choosing government officials through the patronage system." Smith approvingly quoted Michael Les Benedict as saying that "scholars have tended to accept the judgment of the anti-Grant reformers that this system was inherently corrupt, but this is a very questionable conclusion, and reformers had ulterior political motives for making the charge." He agreed with one of the leading scholars of civil service reform, Ari Hoogenboom, who wrote that "the typical historian has been too loose in applying the term 'corruption.' Specifically," Hoogenboom said, that historian "labels a partisan civil service corrupt" when the label should be "inefficient."15 Scaturro carefully analyzed the allegations of corruption in the Grant administration. He found that there were four categories:16 1. Cases of actual corruption for which Grant bore no responsibility, either directly or indirectly; 2. Events that took place while Grant was president that historians construe to be "scandals," but which refer merely to disturbing developments for which Grant was clearly not accountable; 3. Irresponsible charges of corruptions against Grant's subordinates; and 4. Well-founded charges of corruption on high levels of the Grant administration. Only one, the Belknap case, actually fell into category 4.17 This is hardly the picture of an administration that set records for corruption.

13

Ibid., pp. 587-588; during the administration of the unlamented Franklin Pierce, there were some primitive beginnings of a merit system, but it was so rudimentary that even if implemented permanently, it would not have affected the patronage system. See Larry Gara, The Presidency of Franklin Pierce, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991, pp. 54-55. 14 Smith, p. 589. 15 Ibid., p. 701, n46. 16 Scaturro, p. 29. 17 See his discussion of all these cases, ibid., pp. 29-42.

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POLITICAL NAÏVETÉ Grant unintentionally encouraged misinterpretation of his position regarding executive leadership when he "reassured Americans" that the "president was 'a purely administrative officer' who 'should always be left free to execute the will of the people.' This statement deceived listeners at the time, and historians ever since."18 Such historians have tended to concentrate upon the phrase "purely administrative officer," that sounds Whiggish in the extreme, and ignore the follow-up that a president should "execute the will of the people," a phrase that Andrew Jackson or even Theodore Roosevelt would have felt comfortable uttering. The perception of Grant as a political innocent reflects influence from biased commentaries rather than knowledge of the record. The Education of Henry Adams was a major commentary that encouraged such a notion, but was highly misleading. "Adams's portrait," Smith observed acutely, "often quoted, reflected the bitterness of a self-indulgent and overly genteel young man who had gone to Washington confident of securing a position with the Grant administration and not found one."19 That portrait, Smith continued, was quite at variance with the one that Adams's older, more mature, less quoted, and in this case more perceptive brother, Charles Francis Adams, Jr., reported. Grant, in fact, brought a considerable political background to the presidency. "During the Civil War and the early years of Reconstruction he had displayed an awareness of the larger political issues connected with the war and its resolution; he had usually played politics skillfully in his relationships with his civil superiors and fellow officers."20 He had served as a skillful mediator between Andrew Johnson who was determined to preserve white supremacy, and Radical Republicans, who sought to punish the South. Smith pointed out that, following Lincoln's assassination, Grant had "carried the burden of reconstruction. He had demobilized the world's largest army, maintained order in the West, assisted in the overthrow of the Archduke Maximilian in Mexico, and ushered the freedmen of the South into a new era. This he did, Smith said, steering "adroitly" between the obstructionist president, and congressional determination. Grant thoroughly routed the president "when Johnson chose to do battle," he said. Smith conceded that Grant "was not an instinctive politician, but his familiarity with the ways of Washington had been finely honed by three years of vicious infighting."21 The "honed familiarity" had developed a keen political awareness. During the election of 1872, for example, George William Childs, Republican editor of the Philadelphia Public Ledger, found Grant's political instincts to be awe inspiring. Childs had feared that Grant was paying too little attention to the campaign, and therefore went to Washington to encourage him to devote more attention to his re-election. He reported that Grant said little, but simply proceeded to spread out a map. With a pencil, Grant pointed to one state after another, indicating which ones the Republicans would carry. Childs said that "When the election came, the result was that Grant carried every state that he had said he would."22

18

Simpson, p. 135. Smith, p. 476. 20 Simpson, p. 134. 21 Smith, p. 464 22 Ibid., p. 549. 19

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Nevertheless, even one of the best texts on the presidency, by Sidney Milkis and Michael Nelson, fails to rise much above the superficial, and in fact warped, traditional view of Grant's administration.23 Its own presentation on the subject is confused, and at times contradictory. Milkis and Nelson write, for example, that Grant began his presidency with a show of weakness that "set the tone for his entire two terms as president." He had sought repeal of the Tenure of Office Act, originally directed at Johnson; that required Senate approval for the removal of presidential appointees. They say that Grant accepted a "compromise" (quotation marks theirs) without "realizing the implications of his decision," which was a capitulation to the Senate. They say that he should have insisted on full repeal, because he was so popular at the time that he "probably" (quotation marks mine) could have prevailed. Instead, he agreed to an arrangement that "essentially preserved" the Senate's "role in the removal of executive officials." What really happened? Grant did seek repeal of the act, and was successful in the House. The Senate, however, was the bastion of patronage and refused to pass the measure. Grant's response was forceful. He said that he would obey the law, but that would appoint no more officials (other than to fill vacancies) while it remained in force. That is, he would leave Johnson's appointments in office. "By halting patronage appointments the president was using the one weapon the senators understood."24 The most ardent spoilsmen hastened to compromise. The new measure provided Grant with complete control over removals from the cabinet, which was his major goal. He could remove other appointees, either with Senate approval or by appointing a successor acceptable to the Senate. Insisting on full repeal would have brought him a fierce battle⎯one that would have been unnecessary because he already had achieved his prime objective. Grant, after all, was on the scene. It would seem reasonable to assume that anyone who would presume to second guess him on the issue more than a century and a quarter later should feel impelled to offer a convincing case. To conclude merely that he "probably" could have prevailed makes no such case, and certainly is not sufficient to support the judgment that Grant was politically naïve. Smith's judgment appears far more solid. Grant, he said, "was scarcely the political babe in the woods sometimes depicted."25 Milkis and Nelson do, however, begin to provide a measure of balance when they examine the Grant administration in more detail, and this is in complete contradiction to what they have written in the preceding two pages. Even though the period was one of congressional dominance, they wrote, "Grant did not abdicate presidential responsibilities entirely in the face of this legislative onslaught. Indeed, he restored the most important power of the nineteenth-century executive: the veto." They note that Johnson had "wielded the veto aggressively, but most of his vetoes were overturned. Grant used the veto ninety-three times, more than all his predecessors combined, and only four of his vetoes were overturned."26 The actual figures for Johnson were twenty-nine vetoes, and fifteen overrides, and Johnson himself had vetoed more bills than any previous president. One of Grant's vetoes killed the 1874 inflation bill that most authorities believe would have brought chaos. Milkis and Nelson praise this, and even quote Scaturro approvingly that Grant, more than any other president 23

Sidney M. Milkis and Michael Nelson, The American Presidency, 4th ed., Washington: CQ Press, 2003, pp. 174179 (all quotations taken from these pages). 24 Smith, pp. 479-480. 25 Ibid., p. 479. 26 Milkis and Nelson, p. 176.

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should receive credit "for putting the country on the gold standard." They then admit, astonishingly, in view of their earlier comments, that "Grant was thus a stronger president than most scholars have recognized."27 This is precisely the point, yet Milkis and Nelson are not yet done. On the very next page they again make an about face, and refer to Grant as a "hopelessly naïve president!" How can one explain this puzzling, and most unsatisfying, section regarding Grant? He was passive, inexperienced, and a tool of Congress; yet he also was forceful and vigorous, and a stronger leader than has been recognized; yet again also was hopelessly naïve! Milkis and Nelson are respected presidential scholars. Was Grant's record so convoluted that they could not present it except to shift back and forth, or are Milkis and Nelson at fault here? If so, how could they contradict themselves so many times in such a brief passage? One can solve the puzzle by looking at the previous edition of The American Presidency.28 In that 1999 edition, Milkis and Nelson were completely consistent in their treatment of Grant, and consistently mistaken. The Grant that the 1999 edition presents is the traditional one, passive and naïve. By the time of the 4th edition in 2003, however, Milkis and Nelson had taken some note of more recent scholarship. Unfortunately, they did little more than simply insert the more favorable passage in the middle of what they had before without sufficiently re-thinking what they were doing; certainly they did not sufficiently rewrite the passage. Unfortunately, the little more that they did adds some questionable material from a recent, but unreliable, Grant biography by Geoffrey Perret.29 In any case, though, the answer to the puzzling question appears to be that the confusion resulted from a hastily, and poorly done revision.

DOMESTIC POLICY Congress proposed the Fifteenth Amendment in February 1869, after Grant's election but before he took office. The Amendment provided that race could not be used as a qualification for voting. Grant worked hard for ratification, which came on March 30, 1870; just over a year after he became president. Grant considered the Amendment necessary "to enable blacks to shape their own future at the ballot box." He had exerted enormous effort to secure ratification. For example, "he urged Nebraska's governor to call a special session to secure ratification there." To obtain Nevada's approval he "twisted arms," and he even considered rushing through the readmission of Georgia and Texas, complete with their ratification of the amendment, in time to enfranchise blacks for spring elections in Connecticut." He issued a proclamation when the Amendment achieved ratification, declaring that it was a total repudiation of Dred Scott. This, as Simpson put it, was a most "unusual step."30 The many writers who have been so critical of Grant have almost never acknowledged his role in securing passage and approval of the Fifteenth Amendment. Their disdain for Grant, in fact, tends to reflect disdain for the Amendment itself. From the standpoint of presidential performance, however, even a neo-Confederate who opposed granting the vote to 27

Ibid., pp. 176-177. Milkis and Nelson, The American Presidency, 3rd. ed., Washington: CQ Press, 1999; see pp. 170-173. 29 Geoffrey Perret, Ulysses S. Grant: Soldier and President, New York: Random House, 1997. 30 Simpson, pp. 143-144. 28

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African-Americans should credit Grant with an enormous political victory. Note that nearly every area of the country primarily favored white supremacy. The nation was hardly devoted to racial equality, then note further that the constitutional amendment would apply to every state, north and south; and remember that ratification required the approval of three-fourths of all the states. It was a radical measure that would likely not have been possible for generations had it not been for Grant's determination, and for his political skill as president. During his presidency, the predominant view of Grant certainly was not that he was passive. In fact, he was so active that his critics considered him a dictator, especially with regard to his efforts to ensure political rights in the South for its black citizens. Despite his reputation at the time, a more recent biographer, the hostile William McFeely, could criticize him for doing too little to protect the Freedmen's rights.31 It is always easy to criticize, but no one has suggested a feasible way in which Grant; or any other president in his position at that time, and under those circumstances, could have done much more than he did in that regard. Note that Johnson had already destroyed much of reconstruction, Democrats fought Grant at every turn, Republicans did not have overwhelming majorities, and in any case were split with the "liberal" faction of reformers turning its collective back on efforts to protect the Freedmen's rights in favor of measures supported by the "better elements" of the South. In fact, in 1872, the "reformers" broke away from the main party and threw their support to the Democratic candidate, the erratic Horace Greeley. Added to these difficulties were an essentially hostile Supreme Court, and a lack of enthusiasm throughout the country for black rights. Despite the reformers' defection, Grant overwhelmingly won re-election in both the popular vote, and the Electoral College. From the time the recording of the popular vote began in 1824 until Theodore Roosevelt's landslide victory in 1904, only Andrew Jackson's 56 percent in 1828 exceeded Grant's 1872 total of 55.6 percent.32 Grant ran for re-election on a solid record. In his first term, he succeeded in securing legislation to establish the Department of Justice, certainly a major step forward in strengthening the executive. Previously, the attorney general had been merely the president's legal adviser. To staff the new department, he appointed a "powerful team" to deal with the Ku Klux Klan, a terrorist guerilla force organized to use violence to intimidate not only former slaves, but white Republicans, and former Union soldiers as well. This team of U.S. attorneys operated under three Enforcement Acts that Congress at Grant's urging had passed in 1870. Before long, in northern Mississippi alone, they indicted almost one thousand persons, and managed to obtain convictions in fully 55 percent of the cases. During the early Twentieth Century, Southern vindicators dominated histories of reconstruction, and they greatly minimized Grant's actions against the Klan, and the convictions that his administration achieved. 33 Grant faced great obstacles in securing authority to deal with the Klan. His success in overcoming these obstacles required not only considerable political skill, but also persistence. He called for action in 1871. Democrats, of course, opposed him. Some Republicans joined them, accepting the Southern argument that the Constitution granted the federal government no authority to intervene in state matters, not even to suppress violence or to protect 31

See William McFeely, Grant: A Biography, New York: W.W Norton, 1982. See Yanek Mieczkowski, The Routledge Historical Atlas of Presidential Elections, New York: Routledge, 2001, pp. 29-82. 33 Smith, pp. 542-545; 696 n11. 32

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constitutional rights. The politically astute Grant recognized that his Ku Klux Klan bill had no chance for passage as things stood, so he took action that violated Nineteenth Century traditions, and should have shattered any after-the-fact assessment that he was a "passive president," or that he was a "tool of Congress." In person, Grant "made a rare visit to Capitol Hill to rally his forces." His supporters in Congress told him that Reconstruction no longer had any appeal to the electorate, but he nonetheless persuaded them. Congress passed his proposed Ku Klux Klan Act into law, and he signed it on April 20. The Act authorized him to use force, something he had hoped to avoid, but ultimately he had to send in troops. The new Department of Justice under Attorney General Amos Akerman acted vigorously. "By 1872 Grant's willingness to bring the full legal and military authority of the government to bear had broken the Klan's back, and produced a dramatic decline in violence throughout the South. Akerman gave full credit to the president." As a result of Grant's actions, blacks voted freely, and without intimidation in the 1872 election. Significantly, that election has been called "the fairest and most democratic in the South until 1968."34 Grant was unable, however, to establish permanent democratic conditions for all the South's citizens, or to develop a viable two-party system in the region. Voters outside the South had too little commitment to democratic government and equal rights in the defeated Confederate states to support continued armed protection of their citizens who were most in danger. Moreover, existing conditions limited Grant's effectiveness, as they would have limited any other president's. Neither the Justice Department nor the courts had adequate resources, and "even avid supporters of enforcement came to admit that public support for prolonged intervention was frail."35 An indication of the public mood may be seen in the reaction when his successor, Rutherford B. Hayes, sent troops to suppress the great railroad strike in July, 1877. As Grant himself later lamented, the "whole Democratic press, and the morbidly honest and 'reformatory' portion of the Republican press, thought it horrible to keep U. S. troops stationed in the Southern States," or to use them to protect the rights, or even the lives, of black citizens. To suppress workers in asserting their rights, however, "there is no hesitation about exhausting the whole power of the government to suppress a strike on the slightest intimation that danger threatens."36 Nor was Congress in any mood to grant the president's request for assistance to public schools, which he hoped would aid the former slaves. Senators and representatives, in fact, were disposed even to eliminate the Bureau of Education. However, they "backed down when Grant pointed out, 'With millions of ex-slaves to be educated, now is not the time to suppress an office for facilitating education'."37 With regard to the economy, not only did Grant veto the Inflation Bill mentioned above, he intervened directly to prevent turmoil when "Robber Barons" Jim Fiske and Jay Gould attempted to corner the gold market. After he and Secretary of the Treasury George Boutwell found out about the plot, including the fact that Grant's own brother-in-law was involved, the president moved rapidly. He and the secretary decided to sell 4 million dollars worth of government gold. At the time it was a huge amount (originally the secretary had suggested $3 34

Ibid., pp. 546-547. Simpson, p. 156. 36 Cited in Scaturro, p. 100. 37 Simpson, p. 144. 35

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million, and Grant said that it should be $5 million, but they ultimately agreed that $4 million would be sufficient for the purpose). "The news hit the Gold Room like an avalanche. Gold, which had been hovering between $160 and $162 per ounce, plummeted to $133 per ounce within minutes. The Gold Ring had been broken. Grant's role had been decisive."38 It was the first time that an American president ever "had intervened massively to bring order to the marketplace. It was a watershed in the history of the American economy."39 Gould and Fisk, thwarted by the president, vindictively attempted to implicate him in their plot. Secretary Boutwell, they alleged, had received orders from Grant to withhold gold sales. Boutwell explicitly denied this, and the record clearly supports the denial. Despite the secretary's direct denial of the charge and despite the complete lack of contrary evidence, so great has been the animosity toward Grant that some historians and biographers have accepted the charges, rather than the historical record, as being accurate.40 In any case, it is simply impossible to argue plausibly that Grant did not move successfully and actively to save the economy.

FOREIGN POLICY Grant's diplomatic record stands out for its strength. The Treaty of Washington brought an end to years of tension with Great Britain by settling the Alabama claims resulting from British aid to the Confederacy. It was such a "landmark of international conciliation"41 that many of Grant's critics, however grudgingly, have recognized it as a diplomatic triumph. It established two enormously important principles in international relations by incorporating requirements for binding arbitration, and by laying the groundwork for international law with regard to maritime neutrality.42 These were truly precedent-setting provisions. Grant's diplomatic accomplishments included avoiding war with Spain. In 1870, Cuban rebels were resisting the Spanish colonial government. Congress that June considered passing a resolution recognizing a Cuban state of belligerency. Disregarding constitutional questions, the resolution would have undermined administration policy and could have brought war. Literally minutes before debate on the issue began, Grant sent a message to Congress. In it, he expressed sympathy with the rebels but pointed out that they had no real government. That is, they held no cities or towns, had no courts, and lacked any mechanism for collecting revenues. "Grant's intervention proved decisive."43 His message, which diplomatic historians have praised, led to defeat for the offending resolution. Also that year, Grant had a notable foreign policy failure, one that resulted from his concern for the civil rights of the South's black citizens. In response to a request from the government of Santo Domingo that the United States annex that country (now the Dominican Republic), he attempted without success to annex the island nation. He saw it as an opportunity for the South's black labor force to bargain with Southern leaders for their rights. Grant was aware that black labor was essential to the South, and he hoped that the white 38

Smith, p. 489. Ibid., p. 490. 40 Ibid., p. 687, n113. 41 Ibid., p. 512. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid., p. 498. 39

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South would also become aware of its value if the black labor force threatened to emigrate; that the white South would offer inducements to its black citizens to stay.44 His proposal was therefore not an effort to colonize blacks elsewhere, nor was it an imperial thrust for new territory. In hindsight, which supposedly is always 20/20, this effort does seem to have been naïve on Grant's part. Put in perspective, however, it looks quite different. Before he recommended annexation, Grant appointed a commission to go to Santo Domingo to study the issue and bring back a recommendation. Its members were largely public supporters of black rights, and they included the prominent orator, writer, editor, future diplomat and former slave, Frederick Douglass. Douglass, of course, had long opposed colonization. His support for annexation demonstrates that reasonable people at the time could have found the proposal attractive. With regard to diplomatic achievements, Smith pointed to Grant's prevention of a likely Spanish war, his settling of the Alabama claims and the securing of a lasting peace with Great Britain, and his introduction of arbitration as a principle in international disputes. These denote quite a strong diplomatic record. Smith praised Grant as a leader. "Under his leadership," he said, "the United States crept onto the world stage almost unnoticed.45

INDIAN POLICY The policy of Grant's administration toward America's native peoples would not pass muster today, but for its time it was uniquely enlightened. Despite his support for church-state separation, Grant sought to end the long-standing corruption among Indian agents by appointing church groups, Quakers and some others, to administer education and health policies on reservations. This would be consistent with a later administration's "faith-based" initiatives. Although his policies reflected little awareness of the value of preserving Indian cultures, they were based upon humanitarian treatment and assimilation, making them vast improvements upon previous approaches. It is significant that he appointed the first commissioner of Indian affairs who was himself an Indian, Eli S. Parker, a Seneca. Under Grant's administration, for the first time there were steps toward incorporating Indians into the United States as full citizens; he was the first president to deal with Indians as individuals, not solely as tribes.

GRANT AS PRESIDENT As more than a century of racial strife will attest, Grant was certainly unsuccessful in some of what he tried to accomplish. Typical accounts of his presidency, however, have exaggerated his shortcomings and ignored his accomplishments, and his strong leadership. One does not have to look hard to find statements that Grant sought a third term, but that the Republicans denied him the nomination. Even William McFeely, who had studied his 44 45

Ibid., pp. 499-506. Ibid., p. 515.

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administration enough to write a Grant biography (albeit an unfriendly one), could speak of such a denial.46 The typical treatment speaks of Grant as having left office in disgrace, or, as in the case of Milkis and Nelson, that he left "the office he had occupied for eight years at one of its lowest ebbs."47 In fact, there was a strong third-term movement. Some state party conventions had already endorsed him when, in May of 1875, long before the Republican National Convention, Grant sent a letter to the New York Times declaring that he would not be a candidate. The Times published his letter on page one.48 His widow, Julia Dent Grant, in her memoirs (published posthumously) described Grant's determination to retire.49 The election of 1876 became, along with that of 2000, one of the two most controversial presidential elections in American history. The Democrat, Samuel Tilden won the popular vote, but the electoral vote was in dispute. Democrats controlled the House; Republicans the Senate. Ultimately, the decision rested on a straight party-line vote in the commission Congress appointed to determine which electoral votes to count. Hayes, the Republican, won. Apparently Hayes had agreed to withdraw the remaining occupation troops from the South (the "Compromise of 1877," the decision did not come until immediately prior to the inauguration), if the Democrats would accept his election. Upon becoming president, he did so. In retrospect, it seems clear that the decision was a partisan one that went contrary to the will of the voters. On the other hand, there was considerable suppression of the black vote in the South, so one could argue that a fair election would indeed have chosen the Republican. In any case, Grant's firm and fair policy reassured the country and prevented turmoil. He announced that he would not influence the decision, but that he would not permit outside groups to do so either. Rumors abounded that Southern "rifle clubs," Klan-like organizations, had threatened to march on Washington, and install Tilden by force. Any such threat evaporated in the face of Grant's determination to use troops if necessary to protect the political system. It also is significant that whatever Hayes's intentions, his policies brought an abrupt end to the U. S. government's efforts to protect black rights in the South. Scaturro has noted how odd it is that there came to be a "notion of President Grant as a man of no policy whose leadership was ultimately superficial," when "no presidential transition in American history has equaled Grant's in 1877, which truly marked the end of Reconstruction, as a decisive national shift on a major issue of American democracy." He quoted Foner, quite aptly, that 1877 "marked a definitive turning point in American history." It was, wrote Foner, "a decisive retreat from the idea, born during the Civil War, of a powerful national state protecting the fundamental rights of American citizens."50 It is ironic that, along with Southern Democrats, those most pleased to see the national state turn away from protection for individual rights were the "reformers," who had been so upset about corruption, and were concerned to implement clean government, at least as they defined it.

46

See his later piece, "Ulysses S. Grant," in Alan Brinkley and Davis Dyer, eds., The Reader's Companion to the American Presidency, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000, p. 227. 47 Milkis and Nelson, 3rd. ed., p. 173; 4th ed., p. 179. 48 Smith, pp. 585-586. 49 Julia Dent Grant, The Personal Memoirs of Julia Dent Grant, John Y. Simon, ed., New York: Putnam's, 1975, pp. 185-186; cited ibid. 50 Scaturro, p. 101.

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It is equally ironic that later historians could accuse Grant of being a passive president, subservient to Congress, when the predominant criticism among his contemporaries was that he was a despot, that he was too vigorous as an executive. He understood politics, and practiced the art skillfully. Not only was he unusually successful in his use of the veto, but congressional enemies found that he was a formidable opponent. The powerful chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Charles Sumner, "the nation's most prestigious senator,"51 was an example. It was Sumner who brought Grant defeat on the annexation treaty, and he was a threat even to the vitally important settlement of the Alabama claims. "Angered by what he perceived as Sumner's dishonesty and insubordination, determined to enforce party discipline, and hoping for success in the negotiations with Great Britain, Grant, behaving like anything but a deferential executive, demanded that legislators unseat him as chairman. Sumner was deposed accordingly, and Simon Cameron, a strong supporter of the president, was installed as the new Foreign Relations Committee chairman in time for Grant to have an uncompromised success with the Treaty of Washington in the Senate." Grant in 1873 became the first president to seek the line-item veto, initiating the first discussion between a president and Congress on the issue in American history. In 1876, he signed a rivers and harbors bill, but thought that several of the bill's appropriations were wasteful, and thus refused to expend the fund. "Grant thus started the presidential practice of impoundment." Based upon these, and many other factors, Scaturro argues that "traditional notions of Grant's weakness as a chief executive are simply inaccurate." He quotes Michael Les Benedict that "Grant dominated his era," and David Donald that Grant was a "skillful and successful politician."52 He says himself that Grant's "willingness to break with custom," in fact "helped make him an unusually strong president."53

MANUFACTURING THE MYTH: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST PRESIDENT GRANT How is it that historians for so long ignored the record, and portrayed Grant's presidency as one of drift, indecision, and incompetence? Why did they ignore his accomplishments? Why did they accept exaggerated notions of corruption, and in fact present them as the predominant feature of his administration? Part of the answer, of course, is that they misinterpreted Grant's own words regarding the president as a "purely administrative officer." More important is the treatment of the Grant administration by many of his contemporaries, intellectuals who confused patronage with corruption. Most important, however, and considerably more sinister, was a deliberate, and for a long time highly successful, campaign to undermine Grant's reputation in an effort to glorify the South's "Lost Cause;" also, to minimize the role of slavery in American history in general, and in the events leading to the Civil War in particular. Robert E. Lee's death in 1870 "brought an outpouring of grief from Southerners." In addition, it "crystallized the efforts of individuals who would fashion the 'Lost Cause' 51

Ibid., p. 59. Ibid., pp. 60-61. 53 Ibid., p. 59. 52

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interpretation. Jubal Early, William Nelson Pendleton, and Rev. John William Jones led the refashioning of history, and along with others, mostly fellow Virginians, would dominate the forthcoming histories of the war."54 Early (a former Confederate general), and his followers used the Southern Historical Society, which they controlled, to broadcast their views. Those views set the tone for more than a generation of American historians. "William A. Dunning effectively formulated the traditional verdict on Grant and Reconstruction in the early 1900s."55 Dunning, while a professor at Columbia University; trained a generation of historians, many of them Southerners, in the tradition of the Southern vindicators. That tradition triumphed when he assumed the presidency of the American Historical Association in 1913, and it remained triumphant for decades. Fortunately, more realistic assessments now are coming forth. Historian Joan Waugh recently received national publicity when she pointed out that "with the rise of Robert E. Lee and the 'Lost Cause' came the diminution of the Union cause."56 The South lost the war, but for a time conquered in the interpretation of that war. Their writers "put the best possible spin" on the conflict, and "characterized the South's shattering defeat as an honorable effort against impossible odds," historian Gary Gallagher has remarked. "And to distance the Confederacy from the taint of slavery, those so-called Lost Cause writers suggested that the war itself was not about slavery but about constitutional issues."57 They created the myth of the "South as a land and a culture apart," a land that in the words of one of the Confederate romantics had developed a way of life that had been "the most glorious in the history of the world."58 To develop their image of Lee, the pro-Confederate school considered it necessary to prove that Grant could not have been his superior in any way.59 "For the better part of the last century the images of two of the greatest icons of the Civil War remained fixed in the American imagination: Robert E. Lee as the noble and tragic leader of the Confederate forces, the brilliant tactician fighting against overwhelming odds, and Ulysses S. Grant as the heavydrinking butcher who used the North's superior resources to grind down the South, then became one of the worst presidents in the nation's history."60 Thus, as Grant biographer Smith has noted, "Lee as the exemplar of slave-owning aristocracy was romanticized by three generations of Southern historians," while Grant's reputation suffered under "this same school of historiography which really dominated American thought through World War II."61 Ironically, Lee himself would have been among the first to condemn this interpretation of Grant. He remarked that having searched military records of both ancient and modern history, he could find no superior to Grant as a general.62

54

Jeffry D. Wert, "James Longstreet and the Lost Cause," in Carl Gallagher and Alan T. Nolan, eds., The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000, pp. 129-130. 55 Scaturro, p. 65. 56 Quoted in Janny Scott, "History's Judgment of the 2 Civil War Generals is Changing," New York Times on the Web (30 September 2000). 57 Quoted ibid. 58 See Lloyd A. Hunter, "The Immortal Confederacy: Another Look at Lost Cause Religion," in Gallagher and Nolan, pp. 205-206. 59 Brooks D. Simpson, "Continuous Hammering and Mere Attrition: Lost Cause Critics and the Military Reputation of Ulysses S. Grant," in Gallagher and Nolan, p. 151. 60 Scott, "History's Judgment." 61 Smith, quoted ibid. 62 See Ulysses S. Grant, III, Ulysses S. Grant: Warrior and Statesman, New York: Morrow, 1968, pp. 269-270.

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Table: President Ulysses S. Grant: Accomplishments Versus “Conventional Wisdom” Was Grant as President Politically Naïve? • Grant’s efforts were a major factor in securing ratification, against great odds, of the Fifteenth Amendment⎯a major achievement long ignored. • Grant perceptively identified those states he would carry in 1872. • In contrast to his predecessor and his successor, Grant understood political realities in the South, and recognized that its white leaders would not protect black rights. • Grant broke the “Robber Barons’” attempt to corner the gold market. • Even Grant’s critics recognize the strength of his foreign policy, which included establishing the principle of binding arbitration, and providing a framework for international law regarding maritime neutrality. • Grant’s purpose in his failed attempt to annex Santo Domingo (at that country’s request) may appear naïve in retrospect, but no less an opponent of colonization than Frederick Douglass supported it as a way of pressuring the South to assure civil rights. • Much more than most late nineteenth-century presidents, Grant understood the need for reform of the country’s Indian policies. • Grant secured creation of the Department of Justice. • Grant broke the Klan, which was no longer a force in the nineteenth century. • Grant skillfully, and firmly, prevented violence in connection with the tumultuous election of 1876. Was the Grant Administration Uniquely Corrupt? • The scandal often associated with Grant’s administration, the Crédit Mobilier episode, related to bribery of members of Congress, not the executive; in any case it occurred before Grant took office. • The “Whiskey Ring” scandal began before Grant took office, but continued into his administration. He strongly supported prosecution of those involved. The highest official to be tainted was his secretary, for whom Grant testified, but there was no substantial evidence implicating him. • Grant’s Secretary of War was implicated in a serious scandal, but resigned before it came to light, or before Grant knew of it. • Grant’s accusers inaccurately and inappropriately equated political patronage with corruption; in any case he actually was sympathetic to merit-based civil service, • Instances of corruption in Grant’s administration were less serious than those of some 20th-century administrations; even most critics concede his integrity. Was Grant a Passive President, Subservient to Congress? • Grant secured revision of the Tenure of Office Act, strongly pressuring the Senate to grant him control over removal of Cabinet officers. • Grant energetically exercised the veto, casting more than all his seventeen predecessors combined; Congress overrode only four of his total of ninety-three. • Grant personally lobbied Congress in a successful attempt to gain approval of the Ku Klux Klan Bill. • No other President until LBJ was as vigorous in support of constitutional rights for all citizens. • Grant successfully pressured the Senate to remove the distinguished Senator Charles Sumner as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee⎯a feat that no modern president, not even FDR or LBJ, would likely have been able to accomplish.

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Contemporary critics charged Grant, not with passivity, but with excessive usage of power. How Did the Contemporary Public React to Grant’s Presidency? • Grant dominated an era more than any other President between Lincoln and TR. • Grant’s re-election majority was the greatest between Jackson’s in 1828, and TR’s in 1904, and was greater than that of his initial election. • Grant remained popular at the end of his administration, but declined⎯despite popular support⎯to run for a third term. That pro-Confederate views were successful for so long is odd in an age that upholds civil rights and condemns racism. The same is true for any interpretation of the Civil War that minimizes slavery. Antebellum Southern leaders made no secret of their goal: the preservation of their "way of life," which had as its foundation their "peculiar institution."

THE STRENGTH OF THE GRANT PRESIDENCY As I discuss at length elsewhere,63 any attempt to produce a precise ranking of presidents is inherently superficial. Thus, there will be no such effort here. It would be reasonably simple, though, to select a dozen Presidents who stand out because of superior performance. I have no hesitation in asserting that Grant is among them. The accompanying list of selected accomplishments should make it clear at a glance why this is so. I concur with Historian Richard N. Current, who has pointed out that Grant's "low repute among historians has been largely a product of the Dunning school. His fame continues to suffer," Current said, "even though the Dunning interpretation as a whole has been discredited." Current argued, in fact, that Grant's future reputation will no doubt be much higher than it has been in the past. In a certain respect, he said, Grant is one of the greatest of presidents. "In this respect," he said, "only Lyndon B. Johnson can even be compared with him. None of the others carried on such a determined struggle, against such hopeless odds, to give reality to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and to protect all citizens of this country in the exercise of their constitutional rights."64 It was precisely this "determined struggle" that brought Grant such enmity from those who came (unfortunately) to dominate America's interpretation of its past. It now is time for all presidential scholars, political scientists and historians alike, to recognize the strength of Grant's presidency, and to set the record straight at last.

63 64

Max J. Skidmore, Presidential Performance: A Comprehensive Review, Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2004. Richard N Current, "President Grant and the Continuing Civil War," in David L., Wilson and John Y. Simon, eds., Ulysses S. Grant: Essays and Documents, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981; quoted in Scaturro, p. 114.

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 237-239

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

LESSONS FROM THE FIRST GREAT AMERICAN PRESIDENTS: AN INTRODUCTION William D. Pederson and Frank J. Williams More than a century after his assassination, Abraham Lincoln continues to fascinate the public as well as scholars. He has been the subject of more books than any other democratic leader in world history.1 He is one of only three presidents to have academic journals devoted exclusively to them. The others are the Theodore Roosevelt Association Journal, a quarterly established in 1975; and the Hayes Historical Journal: A Journal of the Gilded Age, a quarterly about Rutherford B. Hayes established in 1981. By comparison, three journals are devoted exclusively to Lincoln; who was Theodore Roosevelt’s political hero. The Lincoln journals are the Lincoln Herald, a quarterly established in 1898; the Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association, established in 1979, and published semiannually; and the annual International Abraham Lincoln Journal, established in 2000. Intellectual appetites for Lincoln are also fed by a number of city, state, national and international organizations that publish newsletters about America’s sixteenth president, and hold regular meetings that focus on the diverse aspects of Lincoln, and his legacy. That scholars consider Abraham Lincoln to be America’s greatest president is well established.2 From the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C.; to the Lincoln Shrine in Redlands, California; to Mount Rushmore in South Dakota; to the Lincoln Museum in Fort Wayne, Indiana; tributes to the sixteenth president remind Americans of the homespun “Honest Abe” who transcended the Oval Office to become democracy’s icon. This is the leader who so eloquently defined democracy at Gettysburg, and is now synonymous with it. While his approval rating among the general public may fluctuate, his presence in American culture remains ubiquitous from shiny pennies stamped with his profile to shiny luxury cars that bear his name. As the nation nears the bicentennial of his birth in 2009, Lincoln once again tops the list of greatest presidents in polls of the public.3 The indelible image of Lincoln on the American consciousness is but one measure of his impact. Among political leaders abroad, Lincoln continues to be the most emulated democratic leader. His legacy is apparent in societies around the world in tangible ways. Lincoln is the only American president to have a city (in Argentina), and an island (off the coast of Vietnam), named for him. Worldwide, countless stamps, streets and statues of 1

Peter Dickson, “Experts’ Picks,” Book World (September 12, 1999). William D. Pederson and Ann McLaurin (eds.), The Rating Game in American Politics (New York: Irvington, 1987), pp. 3-12. 3 (Shreveport, LA) Times, February 19, 2002, p. 4A. 2

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Lincoln can be found in both democratic and non-democratic nations. An example of the latter is that pre-Castro governments as well as the Castro government in Cuba chose to honor Lincoln. Cuban schools are named for him, and Fidel Castro keeps a Lincoln bust in his office.4 This special issue of White House Studies, which is an exploration not only of the lessons that America’s sixteenth president drew from the founders of the United States, especially George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, but also how others abroad have interpreted and incorporated his legacy. Because Lincoln occupied the presidency during democracy’s first great civil war, he set a precedent for other leaders at home and abroad. “Liberal” leaders tend to identify with his roles as the Great Emancipator and magnanimous Great Reconciler, who eschewed “ethnic cleansing” in favor of restoring the Union as soon as possible after secession. On the other hand, some “conservatives” see his persistence in preserving the Union as his greatest legacy and use it to justify autocratic rule. The latter tend to forget that Lincoln also upheld the principle of conducting elections even during a great civil war, despite his certainty that he would lose that 1864 election. Lincoln’s leadership did not occur in a political vacuum. The first four essays in this special issue demonstrate the extent to which Abraham Lincoln was influenced by George Washington and Thomas Jefferson during his lifetime as well as the residual impact of their influence on his legacy. Lincoln first admired George Washington, then Thomas Jefferson. Ronald Rietveld shows how the young autodidact read about “The Father of His Country,” who inspired Lincoln to “rise in society” despite his frontier upbringing. Using a Washingtonian model, Lincoln tried a career in the militia, which was short-lived but important because from it he gained confidence when his peers elected him as their captain. It was his first elected position and he took lasting pride in it. Historian Rietveld then demonstrates that Jefferson, too, played a decisive role in Lincoln’s political ascendancy. Rietveld states that Lincoln came to believe that Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence contained the “highest political truths of all humankind.” As early as Lincoln’s single Congressional term he read Jefferson’s papers, and quoted him regularly. Rietveld clearly establishes that Lincoln had decided to reconcile the notion of equality and slavery nearly a decade prior to the Gettysburg Address. If Lincoln needed a further reminder of Jefferson, Rietveld notes that a seven-foot, six-inch bronze statue of Jefferson unveiled in 1847 was in clear view on the president’s lawn. Joseph R. Fornieri explores linkages between George Washington’s “Farewell Address” and Lincoln’s first public speech on-record, the “Lyceum Address.” America’s sixteenth president insisted that the American colonists revolted not just against British rule but also for a new society anchored in political equality. A major portion of Lincoln’s public career was etching out a society based on this secular imperative. Matt Glassman performs a time-series analysis of congressional references to Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln for the period 1989 to 2003. He concludes that all three presidents continue to enjoy popularity among members of Congress, but that for the time frame analyzed conservatives are more likely than liberals to cite the trio, and that Southerners are least likely to cite Lincoln. 4

William D. Pederson, “Lincoln’s Legacy Goes Beyond U.S. Borders,” Washington Times (October 5, 2002), p. 83

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Rodney A. Grunes contrasts Thomas Jefferson’s “wall of separation between church and state” with Abraham Lincoln’s tendency to blur the distinction. Though the author favors Jefferson’s “absolutist” approach today, he recognizes that Lincoln was willing to employ any available tool to build support for the Union while fighting democracy’s first major civil war. Yet Lincoln’s characterization of Americans as “the almost chosen people” serves perhaps as a wry reminder that periodic introspection is valuable. Danny M. Adkison revisits the Lincoln-Douglas debates in terms of which orator “got it right” with the Framers based on philosophies in the Federalist Papers. The author clearly shows that Lincoln’s view of slavery most closely corresponded to that of the Framers. It was a diseased institution that the Framers felt would eventually die off in the Old South and not be allowed to spread to the territories. Scott Crichlow compares the foreign policy stances of Lincoln and William Seward, the sixteenth president’s more experienced Secretary of State, with particular focus on the United Kingdom. Seward initially had aspired to be Lincoln’s “prime minister” but quickly came to appreciate his political rival’s prudence; and by 1864 Seward supported Lincoln’s re-election. The author does a content analysis of Lincoln’s words in foreign policy which also serves to echo Lincoln’s approach in domestic affairs. In foreign as well as domestic affairs, Lincoln was neither cynic nor idealist.5 He operated from a considered middle ground between those two extremes. Frank J. Williams and Joseph R. Thysell, Jr., deal with the still controversial issue of Lincoln’s suspension of civil liberties during democracy’s first major civil war. Williams tends to give Lincoln the benefit of the doubt while Thysell is more aligned with Chief Justice Roger B. Taney’s position. However, when this issue is placed into the perspective of the period, it has been shown that Jefferson Davis, and the South took actions that were similar to, if not worse than, Lincoln’s.6 Because of the “war on terrorism” this issue remains especially relevant today for those who seek lessons from the acts of democracy’s greatest political leader. The final essay brings the issue of Lincoln’s legacy full circle. Norman Provizer and Claire Wright discuss the founding of Israel in 1948. David Ben-Gurion, who admired Lincoln, faced extremists as fanatical as the Abolitionists, and the slaveocracy supporters who confronted Lincoln. The authors show how Ben-Gurion navigated between his extremist opponents by using the notion of an underlying “covenant.” They compare his experience to the two efforts that it took for the Framers to “get it right”—the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union followed by the United States Constitution. Furthermore, it took a major civil war and genius of Lincoln’s touchstone democratic leadership to finally reconcile the Declaration of Independence with the Constitution, even though the Union was based on the notion of subjective political equality. The first great presidential triumvirate finally had reconciled America’s ideals with its practices to provide “the last best hope of earth.”

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 241-277

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN’S GEORGE WASHINGTON

Ronald D. Rietveld Had it not been for Abraham Lincoln, and his determination to save the Union, the sun would have forever set on the work of George Washington, and humanity's "last best hope of earth" would have perished. Washington was born in Virginia, and became one of the richest men in the colonies, by birth and by marriage. Abraham Lincoln was born in a log cabin, and was an average American boy in an average pioneer family. Both came into the world, not as finished products, but possessing great possibilities. Both men acquired the virtue of self-control to a marked degree. Both were ambitious. Both were endowed with strong, comprehensive intellects. Both were physically strong. Both were equally devoted to the nation they served."...Both thought only of the public good, simply, purely, constantly, so that singlehearted devotion to country will always find a synonym in their names," declared Senator Charles Sumner in June, 1865.1 Both had to create an army and learn from the trials and campaigns of battle. Each was a national chief during a time of successful war, one for eight years, and the other for four. In his last will and testament, Washington manumitted all his slaves. And, Lincoln, by issuing the Emancipation Proclamation, made possible the ultimate liberation of all slaves in the United States. Washington became the "Father of his Country;" and Lincoln the "Savior" of the United States. The work left undone by Washington was continued by Lincoln. As Sumner declared: Washington fought for National Independence and triumphed,--making his country an example to mankind. Lincoln drew his reluctant sword to save those great ideas, essential to the life and character of the Republic, which unhappily the sword of Washington had failed to 2 put beyond the reach of assault.

However, from his youth through his presidential years, Lincoln himself admired the "Great Washington," and was inspired by his devotion to the American people. Lincoln had once said: "Let us believe, as in the days of our youth, that Washington was spotless. It makes human nature better to believe that one human being was perfect--that human perfection is 1

Frank Brooks Cowgill, “Washington and Lincoln: A Comparison and a Contrast, Lincoln Fellowship of Southern California (1942), 10-17; Isaac Rusling Pennypacker, “Washington and Lincoln” (New York, 1934), pp. 3437. 2 A Memorial of Abraham Lincoln, Late President of the United States (Boston: Printed by Order of the City Council, 1865), pp. 92-93

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possible."3 Abraham Lincoln's George Washington left his imprimatur on the 16th President of the United States and, thus, the nation itself.

LINCOLN’S YOUTH AND WASHINGTON, 1809-1836 When Abraham Lincoln was born on February 12, 1809, George Washington had been dead less than nine years; and John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and many other patriots of the revolutionary generation were still alive and active. Both of Lincoln's parents were born in Washington's Virginia of decent, average American stock.4 Thomas Lincoln, son of Abraham and Bathsheba Lincoln, was born in Rockingham County, Virginia, January 6, 1778; during the years when Washington was commanding the Continental Army in the war for American Independence. Lincoln's grandfather Abraham moved his family from Virginia to Kentucky in 1782 before the war was over, when Lincoln's father was four years old. In the spring of 1786; Grandfather Lincoln was killed by an Indian, leaving a widow, three sons and two daughters. Having purchased incredibly cheap land in Kentucky with depreciated Virginia currency, Captain Abraham Lincoln left at least 2,334 acres. Both Washington and Jefferson Counties claim the site of Captain Lincoln's death. Lincoln's father, Thomas lived in both Washington and Hardin counties, and appears on the tax lists of Washington County in 1795; as a minor above sixteen years of age, and again on May 16, 1796, during the time Washington was still President of the nation. In 1799, the year Washington died in December, Thomas Lincoln's name appears on a tax list as 21 years old. Lincoln's father was associated with the Washington name in another way. There was fear of an Indian uprising in 1795 in Kentucky, and Thomas Lincoln, then a boy of seventeen, served some thirty days from June 8 to July 7 as a private in Captain George Ewing's Company of Washington County militia, under command of Brigadier General John Caldwell.5 Abraham Lincoln's mother, Nancy Hanks, was also born in Washington's Virginia in 1784. She was born on Mike's Run, a small tributary of Patterson's Creek, in what is now Mineral County, West Virginia. Her family left Washington's Virginia for Kentucky in the very year she was born.6 Lincoln's fascination for George Washington began when he became a reader at a very early age. His stepmother, Sarah Bush Lincoln, remembered that young Lincoln had "devoured everything in the book line within his reach." Sometimes he read a book over and over, and thus his literary tastes were formed during this early period of his life. Lincoln enjoyed biographies of eminent men early on. His stepmother managed to buy a life of Henry Clay for him which dates the beginning of his undying admiration for Henry Clay of Kentucky.7 And, he found a life of Benjamin Franklin which gave him a good background for 3

Dorothy Meserve Kunhardt, and Philip B. Kunhardt, Jr., Twenty Days (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1965), p. 302. 4 Albert J. Beveridge, Abraham Lincoln: 1809-1865 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928), 1:2. 5 William E. Barton, The Life of Abraham Lincoln (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company Publishers, 1925), 1:30, pp. 9-10. 6 Ibid., pp. 63-64. 7 Noah Brooks, Abraham Lincoln and the Downfall of Slavery (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1894), pp. 223224.

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understanding the importance of the American Revolution, and the concepts of liberty and justice. However, Lincoln "lingered with rapt delight" over both the Franklin biography, and another biography which he had found. In his campaign biography, John Locke Scripps wrote: He followed Washington and brave Ben. Franklin through their early trials and struggles as well as through their later triumphs; and even then, in the midst of his cramped surroundings, and in the face of the discouragements which beset him on every hand, his soul was lifted upwards, and noble aspirations which never afterwards forsook him, grew up within him, and great thoughts stirred his bosom--thoughts of emancipated nations, of the glorious principles which lie at the foundation of human freedom, and of honorable fame acquired by heroic 8 endeavors to enforce and maintain them.

It is not exactly known just who presented young Lincoln with a copy of the Reverend Mason Locke Weems's The Life of Washington which he probably read shortly thereafter. Lincoln had been attending classes under his schoolteacher, Andrew Crawford, and it seems to be associated with his teacher. However, Weems's book influenced him more than any other book except the Bible. He probably read the 1809 edition which contains an addition of "curious anecdotes" such as the famous cherry tree story.9 Throughout the book Washington is portrayed as the perfect example for young people to emulate. Washington's policy was "the divine policy of doing good for evil. It melted down his iron enemies into golden friends." Weems dramatically developed the tragedies and triumphs of the American Revolution, for example, his account of the Battle of Trenton. This account made Lincoln aware "that there must have been something more than common that these men struggled for...that something even more than National independence; that something that held out a great promise to all the people of the world to all time to come...." Weems personified that something as the "Genius of Liberty" and under Washington's leadership the struggle for liberty ended victoriously. Thus, Weems helped young Lincoln to find George Washington as both a great inspiration and personal challenge. Washington personified those who founded the United States, a nation which had been conceived in liberty and dedicated to justice for all. But it also gave him a Washington who was a model of private virtue and self-control to help him overcome the frontier conditions of his young life.10 Some time later, young Lincoln borrowed David Ramsay's Life of Washington from Josiah Crawford, an Indiana neighbor. The volume was exposed by some accident to a rain shower and was water-soaked. The young man had no money but he offered to work out the full value of the book. Crawford owned a field of corn which had been stripped of the blades as high as the ear, and expressed his willingness to let Lincoln cut the tops for winter fodder for his cattle. And, after three days of hard work, Lincoln was the proud owner of the watersoaked biography of George Washington. As his friend from New Salem days, "Charlie" Maltby, said: "His manliness and honesty won the respect and esteem of Mr. Crawford, and 8

Josiah G. Holland, The Life of Abraham Lincoln (Springfield, MA: Gurdon Bill, 1866), p. 31; John Locke Scripps, Life of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P. Basler and Lloyd A. Dunlap (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1961), pp. 35-36 9 Louis A. Warren, Lincoln’s Youth, Seven to Twenty-One, 1816-1830 (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1959), pp. 90-91. 10 Ibid., pp. 93-95.

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all his neighbors, who were soon informed of the incident." Ramsay's dedicatory statement in his Life of George Washington reads: To the Youth of the United States, in the hope that from the Example of their common father, they will learn to do and suffer whatever Their Country's Good may require at their hands, the following life of George Washington, is most affectionately inscribed by the author.

Ramsay's Life of George Washington gave young Lincoln a much more detailed account of the Revolution than could be found in Weems's biography of Washington. In addition, Ramsay developed more information about the beginning of the United States federal government and added an appendix with an address and petition to Congress from the Officers of the Army of the United States, Washington's Farewell Address and Washington's personal will. As he labored in the fields, he thought of Washington and Jefferson. Thus it was that Washington became his hero.11 The Lincolns moved to Illinois in 1830. The twenty-two year old Lincoln left his father's home and settled in New Salem, Illinois on the Sangamon River. He longed to better himself and to improve both his education and his status. What had Lincoln read before he came to New Salem? Caleb Carman, who knew Lincoln before and during his residence in New Salem was later asked the question by Lincoln's law partner, William H. Herndon. Carman replied: I Reed your letter of the 5th Decb whishing to know if Lincoln quotied Shakespear in Sangamon Town it was in Sangamon Town and Newsalem the words I Can not Recollect often in Conversation he would Refer to that Great man Shakespear allso Lord Byron as being a great man and Burns and of Burns Poems and Lord Nellson as being a Great Admarall and Naval Commander and Adams and Henry Clay Jackson George Washington was the Greatest of all of them and was his Great Favorite in Conversation he would Refer to those Great men 12 and would say thay was Great men....

Another New Salem friend, Jason Duncan later marveled that his friend Lincoln would eventually be placed in the same category as those he had so admired as a young man trying to advance himself. "So Singular is it," he noted, "and sometimes to my mind so marvelous, that a man at the age of twenty one with so few advantages for preferment, should at last reach the goal and posterity lace his name high up with those of Washington Adams Webster and Clay upon the same page of history."13 However, Lincoln's admiration for Washington took an interesting twist in a story he repeated to his friends. Shortly after the Black Hawk war, Captain Abraham Lincoln returned to New Salem, and Abner Y. Ellis met him, but did not know him well until the summer and fall of 1833 when the two young men boarded at the same log Tavern kept by Henry Onstott. Ellis heard Lincoln tell an anecdote about Colonel Ethan Allen of Revolutionary war fame. According to Lincoln's telling, shortly after the United States made peace with England, 11

Ibid., pp. 162-164; Charles Maltby, The Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln (Stockton, CA, 1884), p. 18. 12 Caleb Carman to William H. Herndon, December 8, 1866, in Douglas I. Wilson and Rodney O. Davis, eds., Herndon’s Informants: Letters, Interviews and Statements about Abraham Lincoln (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1998), p. 504 13 Jason Duncan to William H. Herndon, late 1866-early 1867, in Herndon’s Informants, p. 540

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Ethan Allen visited England, and while there "the English took Great pleasure in teasing him, and trying to “make fun of the Americans and General Washington in particular...." So one day they got a picture of General Washington and hung it up in the "Back House" where Ethan Allen could see it. They asked Allen if he had seen the picture of his friend in the privy. Allen said "no," as Lincoln told the story, "but said he thought that it was a very appropriate [place] for an Englishman to Keep it." "Why," they asked. Ethan Allen answered: "there is nothing that Will Make an Englishman Shit so quick as the Sight of Genl Washington." And after that, they let "Mr. Allens Washington alone." Some years later, Lincoln repeated the story on the day of his nomination to the presidency by the Republicans at the Wigwam in Chicago. Christopher C. Brown, his old friend, reported that he was nervous and "intensely excited Lincoln told stories," one of which was about Washington's picture in an English privy. 14

LINCOLN’S LEGISLATIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL YEARS AND WASHINGTON 1836-1854 Young Lincoln's interest in politics began in his Indiana years. The Federalist party of Washington and Hamilton had died years before young Lincoln settled in New Salem. The only national political organization in the 1820s was the Jeffersonian Republican party. By 1832, party lines had divided and voters identified themselves as Jackson, Calhoun, or Clay men. When Lincoln returned from the Black Hawk campaign in 1832, encouraged by his great popularity among his New Salem neighbors, he ran for the Illinois State Legislature. He received 277 votes from his own precinct, with only 7 votes in opposition. But, he lost the election, "the only time Lincoln was ever beaten in a direct vote of the people."15 After his defeat, he continued to deliver political speeches; and as a good politician, he began to use his hero in them. In 1834, he was elected to the state legislature by the highest vote cast for any candidate. Lincoln began to study law and read American history in earnest. He concentrated on American history and especially the Revolution, the Federalist era and Hamilton's fiscal policies. Lincoln was reelected to the state legislature in 1836, 1838, and 1840. He revered Washington and the "Immortal Washington" could now serve as an ally in Lincoln's political ambition.16 Lincoln received his license to practice law in 1836. The following year on April 15, 1837; he moved to Springfield, the new state capital, and began to practice law with his old friend John Todd Stuart. There he came in contact with one of the leading forces of Springfield's cultural activity, the Young Men's Lyceum. On January 27, 1838, Lincoln was invited to deliver a lecture before the Lyceum on "the Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions," and George Washington was on his mind. He concluded his address on the note that the "pillars of the temple of liberty" like Washington and the founders had "crumbled away" and that the "temple" would fall unless their descendants "supplied their places," supporting and defending the "temple of Liberty" with 14

Abner Y. Ellis to William H. Herndon, January 1866, in Herndon’s Informants, p. 174; Christopher C. Brown (William H. Herndon interview), [1865-66]; Ibid., p. 438 15 D.W. Bartlett, The Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln (New York: A.B. Burdick, 1860), p. 21 16 Ibid., p. 24.

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"reason, cold, calculating, unimpassioned reason" and continued to improve and remain free "to the last." So "...that we revered his name to the last; [tha]t, during his long sleep, we permitted no hostile foot to pass over or desecrate [his] resting place; shall be that which to le[arn the last] trump shall awaken our WASH[INGTON]. Thus, Lincoln ended his speech by inviting citizens to partake of Washington's immortality by upholding his advice and following his example. That following winter, an editorial appeared in the Sangamo Journal on November 3, 1838; almost certainly written by Lincoln, which declared that both the names of Henry Clay and Daniel Webster would be remembered as long as the name of "our immortal Washington."17 Lincoln became a spokesman for the Whig party and took part in a debate between Democrats and Whigs in the Hall of Representatives at Springfield during the week of Christmas 1839. Using Washington as part of his ammunition that the Bank of the United States was constitutional, he concluded the Whig argument on the Sub-Treasury. The first National Bank was established "chiefly by the same men who formed the constitution, at a time when that instrument was but two years old, receiving the sanction, as President, of the immortal Washington; that the second [bank] received the sanction, as President, of Mr. Madison, to whom common consent has rewarded the proud title of 'Father of the Constitution.'" Lincoln endeavored to show that the United States Bank bill was constitutional because both Washington and Madison had signed it. Lincoln posited that the "last ten years under General Jackson and Mr. Van Buren, cost more money than the first twenty-seven did (including the heavy expenses of the late British war), under Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and Madison." Then Lincoln used Washington to demonstrate the figures of the matter: Gen. Washington administered the Government eight years for sixteen million, Mr. Van Buren administered it one year (1838) forty million, so that Mr. Van Buren expended twice and a half as much in one year, as Gen. Washington did in eight, and being in the proportion of twenty to one--or, in other words, had Gen. Washington administered the Government twenty years, at the same average expense that he did for eight, he would have carried us through the whole twenty, for no more money than Mr. Van Buren has extended in getting us 18 through the single one of 1838.

Not long after this time, Lincoln became "a great temperance man;" during the time of the Washingtonians, the national temperance organization which was then very popular in the nation. He joined the movement. Lincoln became a Washingtonian sp[eaker and "...he would go on foot 5 or ten miles to talk," according to his New Salem friend Mentor Graham. Known as an excellent speaker, Lincoln was invited to give the principal address on George Washington's birthday, for whom the organization was named. As he had used Washington for political purposes, so now he used Washington in a persuasive speech to support "moral reformation" in the lives of the reformed drunkards who made up the core membership of the Washingtonians. "This is the one hundred and tenth anniversary of the 17

“Address before the Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois, January 27, 1838,” in The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P. Basler, 9 vols. (New Brunswick, J.J.: Rutgers University Press in association with the Abraham Lincoln Association, 1953-1955), 1:115; Sangomo Journal, November 3, 1838; Beveridge, Abraham Lincoln, 1:270

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birth-day of Washington," he said. "We are met to celebrate this day." He dramatically concluded: Washington is the mightiest name of earth--long since mightiest in the cause of civil liberty; still mightiest in moral reformation. On that name, an eulogy is expected. It cannot be. To add brightness to the sun, or glory to the name of Washington, is alike impossible. Let none attempt it. In solemn awe pronounce the name, and in its naked deathless splendor, leave it shining on.

Although not well received among "professing Christians" because of his criticism of those who ostracized drunkards on religious grounds, it was published in the Sangamo Journal on March 25, 1842. Lincoln was present the following year in the chamber of the Illinois House of Representatives on Washington's birthday, when Masons, the Legislative Temperance Society of 60 members, and the Springfield Cadets celebrated the occasion.19 In a campaign circular from the Whig Committee, prepared by Lincoln, an address was made to the "people of Illinois" on March 4, 1844. Again, as in 1839, Lincoln declares that the issue of the National Bank is based on solid constitutional grounds. Because it was established chiefly by the same men who formed the constitution, "at a time when that instrument was but two years old, receiving the sanction, as President, of the immortal Washington...." On Washington's birthday in 1844, Lincoln delivered various speeches in Virginia, Illinois on the Bank question in which he proved that "it was no new fenagled scheme." The Bank had been "advocated and carried out by the fathers of the Republican school." As in 1839, and in 1843, Lincoln began by showing that because Washington and Madison signed the U. S. Bank bill, it was therefore constitutional. "He labored hard to prove that Washington never done a wrong thing in his life," it was reported.20 Lincoln received the nomination for Congress from the Sangamon district in 1846; and, after the manner of Western nominees, "stumped" his district. Political issues were well defined, and Lincoln was a Whig on principal points. Popular in his own district, he was elected by more strength than that of his own party. His majority was unprecedented in his district. As the only Whig member from Illinois, he took his seat in the 30th Congress on December 6, 1847; as Stephen A. Douglas took his seat in the U. S. Senate during the same session. Barely adapted to his freshman role in the House, Lincoln made an unsuccessful effort to bring Polk to a statement of the facts upon which the Congress, and the country could verify the president's role in the war. Lincoln introduced a series of resolutions on December 22, 1847; if adopted, would give President Polk the opportunity to furnish the grounds upon which the nation went to war with Mexico. On January 12, 1848; Lincoln delivered a speech to the House, in committee of the whole. "...let the President answer the interrogatories, I proposed, as before mentioned, or some other similar ones," Lincoln challenged. "Let him

18

“Speech on the Sub-Treasury, December [26], 1839,” in CWAL, 1:172-173 Mentor Graham (William H. Herndon interview), [1865-1866], in Herndon’s Informants, 452; pp. 260-261; “Temperance Address, February 22, 1842,” in CWAL, 1:279; Earl Schenck Miers, ed., Lincoln Day by Day (Washington: Lincoln Sesquicentennial Commission, 1960), 1:202 20 “Campaign Circular from Whig Committee, March 4, 1843,” in CWAL, 1:3-9, 312; “Speech in Virginia, Illinois, February 23, 1844,” Ibid., 1:333-334 19

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answer with facts, and not with arguments." And, then he challenged President Polk with President Washington. He said: Let him remember he sits where Washington sat, and so remembering, let him answer, as Washington would answer. As a nation should not, and the Almighty will not, be evaded, so let him attempt no evasion--no equivocation.

However, the resolutions were never adopted and Polk did not reply to Lincoln's challenge.21 Before Lincoln made his next speech on the House floor for the 1848 Whig campaign, he participated in an important ceremony in the nation's capital on July 4. Never before had Washington honored President Washington in such a grand manner. The city had never witnessed such an event before. "Great multitudes rushed" into the streets and open spaces were filled with carriages, horsemen, and thousands of people on foot. Guns and pistols fired, firecrackers exploded, and the sounds of children's laughter mingled together. When the parade was ready, it stretched a mile and a half, much like the later inaugural parades. At the head of the parade was the official carriage of President Polk and his Secretary of State James Buchanan, followed by the carriages of cabinet members. The Grand Marshal and his handsome staff followed. A hero of the Mexican war, Major General John Anthony Quitman of the United States army led the military--infantry, artillery, cavalry, marines and various companies from Baltimore, Richmond and Boston in their dashing uniforms. The Members of Congress followed in a solid body, and noticeable for his height as they proceeded, was Congressman Abraham Lincoln of Illinois. They met just south of the White House, and laid the cornerstone of the monument to George Washington with Masonic ceremonies. Two very old ladies sat on the Speaker's stand, Mrs. Alexander Hamilton and Mrs. James Madison, wives of Washington's close friends of an earlier day. Speaker of the House, Robert C. Winthrop, delivered the oration of the day. Lincoln heard him declare: "This wide-spread Republic is the true monument to Washington. Maintain its Independence. Uphold its Constitution. Preserve its Union. Defend its Liberty." The very things that Lincoln himself would later declare in various addresses and proclamations as President of the United States.22 Two months after General Zachary Taylor obtained the Whig nomination for the presidency in 1848, Lincoln delivered a "stump" speech on the floor of the House of Representatives. While discussing the policy of Taylor in 1848, Lincoln unconsciously revealed some of the various positions he himself would hold as a candidate for the presidential office in 1860 and 1864. As before in 1839, and 1844, he called upon the Great Washington to support his position, the Whig position, on the issue of chartering the first bank of the United States and its constitutionality. Lincoln noted that Congressman James Madison had opposed the bill chartering the bank of the United States on the basis of its lack of constitutional sanction. Madison was not alone in his opposition. "Gen: Washington, as President, was called on to approve or reject it," Lincoln noted. And so Washington sought and obtained on the constitutional question the separate written opinions of Jefferson, Secretary of State; Hamilton, Secretary of the 21

Holland, The Life of Abraham Lincoln, p. 100; “Speech in United States House of Representatives: The War with Mexico,” January 12, 1848, in CWAL. 22 Beveridge, Abraham Lincoln, 1:454-455; National Intelligencer, July 6, 1848

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Treasury; and Edmund Randolph, Attorney General. But, President Washington, following Hamilton's position, approved the Bank. Again, for Lincoln, Washington's position was enough on the bank issue, but also the first president was an embodiment of the early republican spirit of opposition to the institution of slavery. Lincoln remembered well the appendix in Ramsay's Life of Washington which included Washington's personal will which manumitted the Mount Vernon slaves upon Martha's death.23 Upon returning home from Congress, Lincoln devoted his full attention to the practice of law. Although less concerned with political diversions than in previous years, he still continued his interest in the political world around him. Like the many other Union-loving moderates, Lincoln was relieved to see the tensions subside after the Compromise of 1850, as a final settlement of all the outstanding issues of the slavery controversy. Meanwhile, he spent time reading, devoting his time to his family, his profession, and the Springfield social whirl. Upon the death of Henry Clay, June 29, 1852; the citizens of Springfield held two memorial meetings, one conducted in the Episcopal Church by the Reverend Charles Dresser [who married the Lincolns and whose home they later purchased]; and the following service in the Hall of Representatives where Lincoln delivered the eulogy. Once again, Washington came to mind. Referring to a "lost" speech which Clay delivered during the British aggressions against American seamen in 1812, Lincoln noted that it "invoked the genius of the revolution, that it apostrophized the names of Otis, of Henry, and of Washington, that it appealed to the interest, the pride the honor, and the glory of the nation...."24

LINCOLN, SLAVERY, AND WASHINGTON 1854-1860 Suddenly Lincoln's whole life and political aspirations underwent a drastic change on May 22, 1854. While he was attending court in Urbana, Illinois, Lincoln heard about the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill. The news aroused him, he said, "as it had never been before." Suddenly, Lincoln had a new purpose. He had always been opposed in principle to the institution of slavery, but had never enlisted actively in the antislavery crusade. Lincoln believed that the constitutional recognition of slavery in the South did not mean that Washington, and the other founders, approved the institution which excluded a whole race from the benefits of the principles of the Declaration of Independence. Men like Washington may have been tied to slavery economically but were politically, and morally opposed to it. During a discussion one night, Lincoln, along with some friends, discussed possible flaws in America's greatest hero Washington. He reportedly declared: Let us believe, as in the days of our youth, that Washington was spotless; it makes human nature better to believe that one human being was perfect: that human perfection is possible.

23 24

“Speech in U.S. House of Representatives on the Presidential Question, July 27, 1848,” in CWAL, 1:502 Benjamin P. Thomas, Abraham Lincoln (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), p. 132; “Eulogy on Henry Clay, July 6, 1852,” in CWAL, 2:127

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He became convinced that slavery and free society were incompatible in the nation.25 After Douglas introduced the Kansas-Nebraska Bill in the Senate, Lincoln pondered the slavery issue deeply, studied congressional debates, pored over various books in the Illinois State Library, and jotted down notes for future use. He inductively assembled his case, using Washington, and the founding fathers, as authority to oppose the extension of slavery. And, George Washington became his ally in both his deep moral conviction that slavery was wrong and in his practical political aspirations. This became evident when Lincoln answered Senator Stephen A. Douglas at Peoria, Illinois on October 16, 1854. He accused Douglas of setting history of the United States on its head. The Compromises of 1850 were dependent on each other; Illinois did come into the Union as a free state. "If we do not know these things, we do not know that we ever had a revolutionary war, or such a chief as Washington," he declared. "To deny these things is to deny our national axioms, or dogmas, at least and it puts an end to all argument." For the next six years, Lincoln poured his energies into the battle against the extension of slavery into the national territories, gleaning his knowledge from his earlier studies of American history, principally the era of the American Revolution and the Federalists. Lincoln's conviction that slavery was a morally wrong, and the fact that Washington, and other founding fathers agreed with him, together with this political opportunity, helped lead him to the presidency.26 As soon as the Kansas-Nebraska bill passed the Congress, already frayed party ties began to collapse. Antislavery castoffs from the Northern Democrats, and the Whigs, and the KnowNothings came together. As early as February 22, 1854 (Washington's Birthday), a group of northern Democrats, Whigs, and Free-Soilers met at Ripon, Wisconsin, to organize a new party, an anti-Nebraska party, to resist the extension of slavery if the Kansas-Nebraska bill became law. Later on July 6, a great fusion meeting met at Jackson, Michigan, and adopted the name "Republican;" emulating earlier Jefferson's Democratic-Republican party. The anti-Nebraska coalition of 1854 was kept alive by the subsequent disorder and violence in Kansas which verged at times on civil war. This kept the coalition together and transformed it into a permanent organization which became the Republican Party. Republicans held their preliminary national convention in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on Washington's Birthday 1856. This move stimulated action in Illinois. On that same day, Washington's Birthday 1856, a group of antislavery editors met at Decatur, Illinois, and planed "a state convention of the Anti-Nebraska party of Illinois" at Bloomington on May 29, 1856. Lincoln was committed to organize an Illinois Republican party and his early support in 1856 for the Bloomington convention impacted those who wavered. Lincoln himself drew up a "Call for Republican Convention" on May 10, 1856. It was addressed to the "citizens of Sangamon County" who were opposed to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise of 1820, to the Democratic Pierce Administration, and "who are in favor of restoring the administration of the General Government to the Policy of Washington and Jefferson...." Lincoln delivered his so-called "Lost Speech," a climactic address, declaring that "it must be 'Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable.'" From all accounts, it was "one of the most eloquent and effective performances of his life." and Illinois had a functioning Republican 25

Henry C. Whitney, Life on the Circuit with Lincoln (Boston: Eses and Lauriat, 1892), pp. 45-46; Don E. Fehrenbacher and Virginia Fehrenbacher, Recollected Works of Abraham Lincoln (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1996), p. 490 26 “Speech at Peoria, Illinois, October 16, 1854,” in CWAL, 1:502.

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party which was equal to any others in unity discipline and zeal called to establish the policy of Washington.27 That following September 23, 1856, a Fremont meeting was held in the old State House, and Lincoln arrived after the meeting had opened and he was the second speaker. "He demonstrated that the Republicans are walking in the 'old path's,'" according to the Chicago Democratic Press. Then he read the recorded sentiments of Washington, Jefferson and others, "canonized leaders of both great parties." This was a more conservative approach to demonstrate that the new political party was moderate. Lincoln was somewhat slow in calling himself a "Republican," with its more radical connotation, but it was much easier to align himself with the policy of Washington. During this same year 1856, seven thousand people waited inside New York City's Academy of Music to listen to Edward Everett of Massachusetts speak on "The Character of Washington." Washington's image was more than that of mere celebrity, but sacred. And, Lincoln continued to use the "Immortal Washington" to give the Republican cause purpose and respectability.28 By the summer of 1858, ninety-five Republican county conventions named Lincoln as their first choice for the U. S. Senate. The state convention met on June 16 in Springfield and unanimously adopted a challenge to the pro-Douglas faction of the party in the East. The resolution declared that "Abraham Lincoln is the first and only choice of the Republicans of Illinois for the United States Senate as the successor of Stephen A. Douglas." Lincoln was ready with a speech which is one of his most historic speeches. "The result is not doubtful." He declared: "We shall not fail--if we stand firm, we shall not fail."29 On the advice of his managers, Lincoln challenged Douglas to a series of debates and Senator Douglas reluctantly consented to meet him once in each Congressional district except in Chicago and Springfield, where they had already met. Douglas selected Ottawa, Freeport, Jonesboro, Charleston, Galesburg, Quincy, and Alton. Lincoln agreed. The election would be decided in the central counties of Illinois. In the first debate at Ottawa, Douglas asked why could the nation not remain divided into free and slave States. "Washington, Jefferson, Franklin, Madison, Hamilton, Jay and the great men of that day, made this Government divided into free States and slave States, and left each State perfectly free to do as it pleased on the subject of slavery," he said. Douglas repeated this same argument at Jonesboro and Charleston. The problem Lincoln answered, was that Douglas and his friends had placed slavery on a "new basis." "Our fathers [including Washington]" originally restricted slavery from the new Territories and legislated to cut off its source from the slave trade and thus put the seal of legislation "against its spread." Once again, Lincoln enlisted Washington. He declared: Now I believe if we could arrest the spread, and place it where Washington, and Jefferson, and Madison placed it, it would be in the course of ultimate extinction, and the public mind would, as for eighty years past, believe that it was in the course of ultimate extinction.

27

Don E. Fehrenbacher, Prelude to Greatness: Lincoln in the 1850s (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 40-46; “Call for Republican Convention, May 10, 1856,” in CWAL, 2:340. 28 “Speech at Vandalia, September 23, 2856,” in CWAL, 2:378; Fehrenbacher, Prelude to Greatness, 4; Barry Schwartz, George Washington, The Making of An American Symbol (New York: The Free Press, 187), p. 195 29 “‘A House Divided:’ Speech at Springfield, Illinois, June 16, 1858,” in CWAL, 2:468

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Lincoln hoped that southerners would once again regard bondage as an evil, just as Washington, Jefferson, and the other founders had regarded it. And just as the "founders" had limited slavery expansion as a first step toward ending the evil, Lincoln said, "I have no doubt that it would become extinct, for all time to come, if we but re-adopted the policy of the fathers."30 Douglas charged that Negroes were not included in the Declaration of Independence and that it was a "slander" upon Washington, and the other founders who framed the Declaration. But, Lincoln replied that the "entire records of the world, from the date of the Declaration of Independence up to within three years ago, may be searched in vain for one single affirmation, from one single man, that the Negro was not included in the Declaration of Independence." Lincoln defied Douglas to show that Jefferson ever said so, "that Washington ever said so, that any President ever said so, that any member of Congress ever said so, until the necessities of the present policy of the Democratic party, in regard to slavery, had to invent that affirmation."31 Lincoln "won" the debates, so far as the judgment of historians is concerned. But, he lost the election. Eight of the thirteen holdover senators were not up for reelection, and the Democrats had a majority in the next legislature and in January, 1859 selected Douglas for another six-year term as Senator from Illinois. As Princeton Historian James M. McPherson puts it, "For Lincoln the election was a victory in defeat." "I am glad I made the late race," Lincoln wrote his personal friend Dr. A. G. Henry. "It gave me a hearing on the great and durable question of the age, which I could have had in no other way; and though I now sink out of view, and shall be forgotten, I believe I have made some marks which will tell for the cause of civil liberty long after I am gone." Lincoln had clarified the issues between Republicans and northern Democrats more clearly than ever before, with the help of Washington and the other "fathers." Lincoln emerged as a spokesman for the Republican cause in the nation.32 Lincoln's influence in party affairs extended beyond the borders of Illinois after his defeat for the Senate seat and he overlooked no opportunity to influence Republican Party policies. He made a business trip to Iowa and spoke at Council Bluffs. He consulted Republican leaders in Iowa and St. Joseph, Missouri. He received invitations to speak in far distant New Hampshire, New York, Minnesota and Pennsylvania during the summer months, but turned down most invitations. With a new confidence gained from the contest with Douglas, he began to assume the role of a national leader, even intervening discreetly in the politics of other states.33 It was announced that Douglas would speak in Ohio, which took the Republican organization there by surprise. The very day the announcement was made, Lincoln was invited to make several speeches in Ohio "to head off the little gentleman." Although Lincoln was not well known in Ohio, his debates with Douglas had proven his ability as a 30

“First Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Ottawa, Illinois, August 21, 1858,” in CWAL, 3:8; “First Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Ottawa, Illinois, August 21, 1858,” Ibid., 3:18; “Third Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Jonesboro, Illinois, September 15, 1858,” Ibid., 3:111; “Fourth Debate with Stephan A. Douglas at Charleston, Illinois, September 18, 1858,” Ibid., 3:162, 178, 181. 31 “Fifth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Galesburg, Illinois, October 7, 1858,” in CWAL, 3:220. 32 James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 187-188; Lincoln to Anson G. Henry, November 19, 1858,” in CWAL, 3:339. (Note: to the date–five years later–Lincoln delivered his Gettysburg Address.] 33 Collected Works, 3:378-379, 384, 389, 394-395, 4:34.

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campaigner. However, Lincoln had kept in close contact with political developments in Ohio. The foremost issue in the state election campaign involved the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, because of the federal indictment of thirty-seven Ohioans who had rescued an escaped slave. Lincoln was enthusiastically received in Cincinnati, Ohio on September 17, 1859, even though he delivered a partisan speech. Although Douglas had spoken earlier and branded Lincoln as a radical, he portrayed himself as a Republican and declared his unequivocal opposition to slavery. Lincoln aimed his remarks at Kentuckians across the Ohio River, as though they were in his audience. "I think Slavery is wrong, morally and politically," he declared. He wanted to block its spread and would not object to its gradual termination from the nation. He noted that Kentuckians radically differed with him on the issue. But the Republicans were going to stand by their guns and beat the Douglas Democrats in a fair election. Lincoln boldly declared: We mean to treat you as near as we possibly can, like Washington, Jefferson and Madison treated you [Cheers] We mean to leave you alone, and in no way to interfere with your institution; to abide by all and every compromise of the constitution, and, in a word, coming back to the original proposition, to treat you, so far as degenerated men (if we have degenerated) may, according to the examples of those noble fathers--Washington, Jefferson and Madison. [Applause]

Lincoln used Washington and the other "noble fathers" to present the Republican Party as a peaceful political body and to appeal to other liberty-loving nationalists both in Ohio and across the River in Kentucky.34 On the way home to Springfield, he delivered an address in Indianapolis. Eight days later he set off for Milwaukee and gave an annual address at the Wisconsin State Fair and a political speech at the Newhall House in Milwaukee. Then he spoke at Beloit, Wisconsin. Lincoln declared that the real position of the Republican Party was its underlying principle of hatred to the institution of Slavery; hatred to it in all its aspects, moral, social, and political. "This," said Lincoln; "is the foundation of the Republican Party, and its active, life-living principle." Then he "went on to prove the identity of the Republican principles with those of the Fathers of the Republic," noted the reporter of the Beloit Journal. "This he did most satisfactorily." Lincoln said that if he could find twelve "good sound democrats" in the county of Rock, he would put them under oath as a jury. Then "he would bring his evidence in form of depositions in a court, and wring from them the verdict that the Republicans hold to the same principles which Washington, Jefferson, Adams, Madison and their compeers held."35 On the eve of the territorial election, Lincoln was in Kansas on December 1, 1859 at the request of friends. Kansas had already adopted a constitution, elected a legislature and was about to elect territorial officers and a congressional delegate. He spoke twice at Leavenworth on December 3. He charged that the early action of the government dealt with the institution of slavery as a wrong. Lincoln took up the idea that the Kansas-Nebraska act was based on the idea that slavery was not wrong. Kansas was the first place that the "new" policy had been applied. "Compare, or rather contrast, the actual working of this new policy with that of the

34

Harry V. Jaffa and Robert W. Johnannsen, In the Name of the People (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1959), 3-6; 20-23; “Speech at Cincinnati, Ohio, September 17, 1859,” in CWAL, 3:453 35 “Speech at Beloit, Wisconsin, October 1, 1859,” in CWAL, 3:484

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old, and say whether, after all, the old way--the way adopted by Washington and his compeers--was not the better way," he said. The new policy had proven false to all its promises. "The Fathers did not seek to interfere with slavery where it existed but to prevent its extension," he said. Lincoln had been warmly received, and began to give serious consideration about entering the presidential race.36 During the previous October, 1859, Lincoln received an invitation to lecture at the Plymouth Congregational Church in Brooklyn, Henry Ward Beecher's church. Lincoln asked if he could speak on political issues, and the committee on arrangements consented. Lincoln began in earnest to research his topic. He and Douglas had sharply differed on the views of the Founding Fathers about slavery extension. Lincoln now began to research his evidence to clinch his case against the "Little Giant." He put in hours doing historical research in Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution, Annals of Congress and the Congressional Globe. When Lincoln arrived in New York after a long two-day trip, he found hat the Young Men's Central Republican Union of New York City had decided to sponsor the lecture and moved the location to the Cooper Union. On the evening of February 27, 1860, Lincoln nervously rose to his feet before an august audience and delivered his research effort. Lincoln proved that twenty-one of the original thirty-nine signers of the Constitution understood that nothing could forbade the Federal Government from controlling slavery in the federal territories. Probably the rest of the signers favored the same opinion. "Again," said Lincoln, George Washington, another of the "thirty-nine," was then President of the United States, and, as such, approved and signed the bill; thus completing its validity as a law, and thus showing that, in his understanding, no line dividing local from federal authority, nor anything in the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government, to control as to slavery in federal territory. Democrats "delight to flaunt in our faces the warning against sectional parties given by Washington in his Farewell Address." However, "less than eight years before Washington gave that warning, he had, as President of the United States, approved and signed an act of Congress, enforcing the prohibition of slavery in the Northwestern Territory," which was the embodiment of the government's policy on that subject up to the very moment he wrote that warning. In fact, Lincoln carefully noted, Washington wrote LaFayette that he considered this prohibition a wise measure and expressed "his hope that we should at some time have a confederacy of free States." Indeed, Washington had written that "I have long considered it [Negro slavery] a most serious evil, both socially and politically..."37 Then he concluded his address with a stirring challenge to the Republicans in Washington's name: Let us be diverted by none of those sophistical contrivances wherewith we are so industriously plied and belabored--contrivances such as groping for some middle ground between the right and the wrong, vain as the search for a man who should be neither a living man nor a dead man--such a policy of "don't care" on a question about which all true men do care--such as Union appeals beseeching true Union men to yield to Disunionists, reversing the divine rule,

36

Fehrenbacher, Prelude to Greatness, 145; “Speech at Leavenworth, Kansas, December 3, 1859,” in CWAL, 3:497-498; “Second Speech at Leavenworth, Kansas, December 5, 1859,” in CWAL, 3:502 37 “Address at Cooper Institute, New York City, February 27, 1860,” in CWAL, 3:537, pp. 536-537

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and calling, not the sinners, but the righteous to repentance--such as invocations to Washington, imploring men to unsay what Washington said, and undo what Washington did.

One of those present said that in "the close parts of his argument, you could hear the gentle sizzling of the gas-burners" and when Lincoln reached the climax of the address "the thunders of applause was terrific." Indeed, "it was a great speech." Lincoln had successfully turned George Washington into both an antislavery champion and the spiritual ancestor of Republicans. Washington had helped Lincoln conquer "one of the most critical and cultivated audiences to be gathered in the Republic." But Lincoln himself had not expected to create such a marked impression on this eastern audience.38 Lincoln's purpose was to visit Phillips Exeter Academy in New Hampshire to visit his son Robert who was preparing to try a sixteenth time to pass the entrance examination into Harvard. Delegations along Lincoln's route invited him to speak. At Providence, the Governor of Rhode Island sat on the platform. At Concord, Dover and Exeter, large grounds turned out to hear him. When Lincoln was introduced in Manchester, he was introduced as the next President of the United States. At Harvard, Lincoln told his audience that the framers of the Constitution understood that slavery would be abolished at the end of the slave trade in 1808 because they considered slavery a wrong. Lincoln reminded them that the "old fathers" said that it was an "irrepressible conflict," "Jefferson said it; Washington said it." He argued that it was then regarded as an evil. "The Republicans go back to first principles and deal with it as a wrong," he declared. Even southern senators like James M. Mason of Virginia "said openly that the framers of our government were anti-slavery." Senator James H. Hammond of South Carolina said "Washington set this evil example." Even Preston S. Brooks, who had beaten Senator Charles Sumner so badly on the Senate floor in May, 1856, had admitted: "At the time the Constitution was formed, no one supposed slavery would last till now." Lincoln declared: "We stick to the policy of our fathers."39 At New Haven, Lincoln delivered a speech which he repeated substantially at Meriden, Connecticut, Woonsocket, Rhode Island, Norwich and Bridgeport, Connecticut. He drew heavily upon Washington to point out that there was an "irrepressible conflict" and "that almost every good man since the formation of our government has uttered that same sentiment, from Gen. Washington, who 'trusted that we should yet have a confederacy of Free States,' with Jefferson, Jay, Monroe, down to the latest days...." Lincoln repeated his charge from his Cooper Institute address that Democrats had flaunted "in our faces the warning against sectional parties given by Washington in his Farewell address." But, less than eight years before Washington gave that warning, he had, as President, approved and signed an act of Congress which enforced prohibition of slavery in the Northwestern Territory. A year later, President Washington wrote LaFayette in France that he believed this prohibition was wise and that he hoped that a time would come when the nation would be a confederacy of Free States. Then Lincoln queried: "Could Washington himself speak, would he cast the blame of that sectionalism upon us, who sustain his policy, or upon you who repudiate it." He answered: "We respect that warning of Washington, and we commend it to 38

Ibid., 3:550; Noah Brooks, Abraham Lincoln (Washington, D.C.: National Tribune, 1888), p. 187; Lord Charnwood, Abraham Lincoln (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1917), pp. 156-157.

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you, together with his example pointing to the right application of it."[Applause.] He called for the Republicans to stand by their duty and not be diverted by the "Disunionists" who invoke Washington, "imploring men to unsay what Washington did."40

LINCOLN’S ELECTION, SECESSION CRISIS AND WASHINGTON 1860-1861 When Lincoln returned to Springfield after his Eastern trip, Milton Hay addressed the local Republican Club and said: Our history is prolific in examples of what may be achieved by ability, perseverance [sic] and integrity...but in the long list of those who have thus from humblest beginnings won their way worthily to proud distinction there is not one can take precedence of the name of Abraham Lincoln....

Before the Illinois Republican convention met at Decatur on May 9 and 10, 1860, there existed a well planned strategy for the Republican presidential nomination by Lincoln's selfappointed managers. A former Democrat, John M. Palmer, offered a resolution which was accepted "That Abraham Lincoln is the choice of the Republican party of Illinois for the Presidency, and the delegates from this state are instructed to use all honorable means to secure his nomination by the Chicago Convention, and to vote as a unit for him."41 The Republican National Convention met in Chicago on May 16, 1860. When the convention assembled everybody was anxious to get to the serious business of the nominations for the presidential and vice presidential office. It was felt that the third ballot would be the decisive one and, before the final result was announced, hundreds of pencils tallied the ballots. It was whispered that Lincoln had received two hundred and thirty-one and a half votes, lacking only one vote and a half for the nomination. The Ohio delegate, Cartter, announced the change of four Ohio votes for Lincoln which finished the work. "After a moment's pause, like the sudden and breathless stillness that precedes the hurricane, the storm of wild, uncontrollable and almost insane enthusiasm descended," wrote one Lincoln biographer. As the cheering inside died away, the roar began outside in the streets of Chicago. But "the scene surpassed description." Lincoln was "the favorite of Chicago and of Illinois--he was the people's idol." Soon after his nomination, Lincoln's first "appearance" with Washington was in an expensive lithograph by a Chicago artist, Edward Mendel. It showed a plain and somber Westerner looking at the viewer. George Washington's bust was at his elbow. Lincoln received a copy of the print and the next day thanked Mendel for the "truthful" image [underlining truthful]. "Lincoln may have liked the print in part because he liked to see Washington at his elbow," notes three Lincoln historians.42 39

Thomas, Abraham Lincoln, pp. 204-205; “Speech at Hartford, Connecticut, March 5, 1850,” in CWAL, 4:6, pp. 11-12. 40 “Speech at New Haven, Connecticut, March 6, 1860,” in CWAL, 4:23, 26-27, 29-30 41 Thomas, Abraham Lincoln, pp. 206-207. 42 Holland, Abraham Lincoln, pp. 224-226; Harold Holzer, Gabor S. Boritt, Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Lincoln Image: Abraham Lincoln and the Popular Print (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1984), p. 188

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Lincoln was a candidate for the office of the presidency which was virtually tailored to fit the heroic figure of the "immortal" George Washington. Indeed, there probably was never a more important election, necessary election, as Washington's in 1789. However, it was a foregone conclusion. Washington received all the electoral votes cast in both 1789 and 1792. There were four aspiring candidates for the presidential office in 1860. On the night of November 6, 1860, Lincoln sat alone with the operator in the telegraph box at Springfield, and received the results of the elections of presidential electors in the various states as they came in. It became evident that for the first time in American history, the united North [except New Jersey] had used its superior numbers to outvote the Southern states. Even if all the opposition votes had been united behind one single candidate, Lincoln would still have won. However, modest changes in just a few strategic places undoubtedly would have produced a different result. Lincoln was legally and constitutionally elected President of the United States. Like Washington, Lincoln had become the most important man in the nation. He received an invitation to visit Bryan Hall in Chicago to view the "Gallery of the Presidential Portraits from Washington to Lincoln inclusive." But Lincoln endorsed the back of the invitation that he could not "find leisure to avail myself of this Mr. Bryan's kindness."43 And, now the one who had dreamed of the accomplishments of George Washington, the hero of his youth in Indiana, and modeled Washington's modesty and humility, legally occupied Washington's presidential chair. But Lincoln saw a gathering storm and realized that upon him it would break its wildest fury. And indeed it broke on December 20, 1860 when South Carolina voted to secede from the United States, followed in January by Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, and in February by Louisiana and Texas. President-elect Lincoln wrote his close Whig friend of the 1840s, Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia, that if the South really feared that his Republican administration would, "directly or indirectly, interfere with their slaves, or with them, about their slave," there was no cause for fear. He assured Stephens: The South would be in no more danger in this respect, than it was in the days of Washington. I suppose, however, this does not meet the case. You think slavery is right and ought to be extended; while we think it is wrong and ought to be restricted [just like Washington]. That I 44 suppose is the rub. It certainly is the only substantial difference between us.

Meanwhile, Washington City was full of treason. It was the talk in hotels and government offices. Many of the forts and arsenals of the United States in the South were in the hands of those in rebellion, the northern arsenals had been stripped, and every available ship with the exception of two was beyond call. The Confederate government had been organized, the U. S. Treasury was bankrupt, and business was depressed. Threats of assassination had been made on his life. And, fear stalked the nation. However, President-elect Lincoln delayed his arrival in the nation's capital to around Washington's Birthday. This would enable him to accept official invitations to stay at four great towns and five State capitals which he could pass on

43

Don E. Fehrenbacher, Lincoln in Text and Context: Collected Essays (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), p. 67; Thomas, Abraham Lincoln, p. 225; Holland, Abraham Lincoln, p. 243; “Endorsement: Thomas B. Bryan to Lincoln [November 22, 1860],” in CWAL, 4:144. 44 “To Alexander H. Stephens, December 22, 1860,” in CWAL, 4:160

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his way east, and bring assurance to the people of the nation. The day for departure finally arrived in the second week of February. On that drizzly early morning of February 11, 1861, a bewildered president-elect stood sadly before his old friends and neighbors at the back of the last rail car which would take him to Washington. He had not planned to speak, but the crowd called for a speech. Sadly, he told them that no one who had never been in his situation could possibly understand the feeling of sadness at this parting. He owed everything to "this place" and "the kindness of these people." But the cares of his presidential responsibility weighed heavy on him. And, Washington was very much on his mind. According to the Illinois State Journal reporter, Lincoln said: To-day I leave you; I go to assume a task more difficult than that which devolved upon General Washington. Unless the great God who assisted him, shall be with and aid me, I must fail. But if the same omniscient mind, and Almighty arm that directed and protected him, shall guide and support me, I shall not fail, I shall succeed. Let us all pray that the God of our fathers may not forsake us now. To him I commend you all--permit me to ask that with equal security and faith, you all will invoke His wisdom and guidance for me. With these few words I must leave you--for how long I know not. Friends, one and all, I must now bid you an affectionate farewell.

Lincoln never again made so many speeches in so few days as he journeyed on to Washington for his inauguration.45 Lincoln celebrated his fifty-second birthday traveling through southern Indiana, near the grave of his mother Nancy Hanks Lincoln. An immense crowd greeted him in the largest city in Ohio, Cincinnati. He remembered his words to his southern friends across the Ohio River in Kentucky, the land of his birth, during his campaign visit back in 1859. And to reassure them, he repeated his words once again: We mean to treat you, as near as we possibly can, as Washington, Jefferson, and Madison treated you. We mean to leave you alone, and in no way to interfere with your institution; to abide by all and every compromise of the constitution, and, in a word, coming back to the original proposition, to treat you, so far as degenerated men (if we have degenerated) may, according to the examples of those noble fathers--Washington, Jefferson and Madison.

The next day, he spoke to the Ohio Legislature and shared with them the Washington theme of his Farewell Address to his friends in Springfield the day he left: I am deeply sensible of that weighty responsibility. I cannot but know what you all know, that, without a name, perhaps without a reason why I should have a name, there has fallen upon me a task such as did not rest even upon the Father of his country, and so feeling I cannot but turn and look for the support without which it will be impossible for me to perform that great task. I turn, then, and look to the American people and to that God who has never forsaken them.

Lincoln was fully aware that not even the "immortal Washington" faced a task of such magnitude as Lincoln faced in the presidential office--the task of saving the Union.46

45

“Farewell Address at Springfield, Illinois, February 11, 1861 [C. Version],” in CWAL, 4:190-191.

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Lincoln appealed for the preservation of the Union all along his journey. The day before Washington's Birthday, he addressed the New Jersey Senate at Trenton. He remembered the impact of Weems's Life of Washington on him and its description of the battle of Trenton. He reminisced: May I be pardoned if, upon this occasion, I mention that away back in my childhood, the earliest days of my being able to read, I got hold of a small book, such a one as few of the younger members have ever seen, "Weem's Life of Washington." I remember all the accounts there given of the battle fields and struggles for the liberties of the country, and none fixed themselves upon my imagination so deeply as the struggle here at Trenton, New-Jersey.

He vividly remembered the Washington's crossing of the Delaware River, the contest with the Hessians, the great hardships of Washington and his men endured at that time. These "all fixed themselves on my memory more than any single revolutionary event; and you all know, for you have all been boys, how these early impressions last longer than any others." Lincoln's deep admiration for Washington, and these early Revolutionary War heroes had begun so early. "I recollect thinking then, boy even though I was, that there must have been something more than common that those men struggled for," he said.47 When the President-elect spoke to the New Jersey General Assembly that same day, cheers rang out in the hall when he warned that if it became necessary "to put the foot down firmly;" the people must support him. They cried out: "Yes," "Yes" "We will...."48 As the Lincoln Inaugural Special traveled toward the nation's capital city, warnings of a possible assassination attempt on Lincoln in Baltimore seemed more certain. Although Lincoln had already been aware of the possible danger to his life before he left Springfield. The presidential party traveled from Trenton to Philadelphia. Lincoln had agreed to address the people outside the old state house where the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution were signed. He had also agreed to raise an American flag over the historic building on the morning of Washington's Birthday and attend a reception by the Pennsylvania legislature in the afternoon. "Both of these engagements I will keep," Lincoln said, "if it costs me my life." He kept all of his scheduled appointments on Washington's birthday 1861, but said that he regretted that he did not have more time "to express something of my own feelings excited by the occasion--somewhat to harmonize and give shape to the feelings that had been really the feelings of my whole life." Washington's presence at that place moved Lincoln deeply.49 The Lincoln presidential party then left for Harrisburg, where he made two public speeches in the Pennsylvania state capital, one of which was before the General Assembly, again, on Washington's birthday. Lincoln had been impressed with his experience that day at Independence Hall. He told the Assembly: Allusion has been made to the fact--the interesting fact perhaps we should say--that I for the first time appear at the Capitol of the great Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, upon the birthday of the Father of his Country. In connection with that beloved anniversary connected with the 46

“Speech at Cincinnati, Ohio, February 12, 1861,” in CWAL, 4:199; “Address to the Ohio Legislature, Columbus, Ohio, February 13, 1861,” Ibid., 204. 47 “Address to the New Jersey Senate at Trenton, New Jersey, February 21, 1861,” in CWAL, 4:235-236. 48 “Address to the New Jersey General Assembly at Trenton, New Jersey, February 21, 1861,” in CWAL, 4:236-237. 49 Holland, Abraham Lincoln, pp. 269-270; Brooks, Abraham Lincoln, pp. 230-231

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Lincoln was forced by his advisors to change his route and go by night through Baltimore to the nation's capital. Lincoln was in some danger and he was only officially protected by four army officers who were detailed to accompany him.50

LINCOLN’S PRESIDENTIAL YEARS: SAVING THE UNION AND WASHINGTON 1861-1863 When Lincoln's carriage left Willard's Hotel, in company with President Buchanan on March 4, 1861; he made his way down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol East front where President Washington had laid the original cornerstone for the nation's Senate chamber. Lincoln delivered his inaugural address, and then took the same oath as President which Washington had taken on April 30, 1789 in New York City, including Washington's added words: "So help me God." Lincoln wrestled with just how he should conclude the address, and William H. Seward of New York, Lincoln's new Secretary of State, thought that Lincoln might need some suggestions. Frederick Seward, his son and secretary, wrote out a concluding paragraph: I aspire to come in the spirit, however far below the ability and the wisdom, of Washington, of Madison, of Jackson and of Clay. In that spirit I here declare that in my administration I shall know no rule but the Constitution, no guide but the laws, and no sentiment but that of equal devotion to my whole country, east, west, north and south.

Instead, Lincoln drew from another suggestion from Seward and put it in his own words. He concluded: “The mystic cords of memory, stretching from every battle-field and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone, all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.” When the address was delivered, and the oath finally administered, Lincoln was escorted to the President's Mansion, the site for which Washington had selected and laid the cornerstone. And, now Abraham Lincoln took the august responsibilities as President of the United States, the sixteenth following the first.51 Washington's presence at the White House could mainly be found in the Washington Parlor or the Red Room, which was the First Lady's sitting room, and the room to which the President and his guests retreated after dining. There hung Gilbert Stuart's portrait of Washington which Dolly Madison saved from the British during the War of 1812. Through his office windows on the second floor the President could see, not far to the south, the unfinished monument to Washington sometimes blurred by snow-filled air. Lincoln

50 51

“Address to the Pennsylvania General Assembly at Harrisburg, February 22, 1861,” in CWAL, 4:244. “First Inaugural Address–First Edition and Revisions, March 4, 1861,” in CWAL, 4:261; “First Inaugural Address–First Text, March 4, 1861,” Ibid., 271

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remembered when he was present at the cornerstone ceremony in 1848 as a lone Whig congressman from Illinois. Soon after the Lincolns took up residence in the White House, Lincoln related an anecdote with relish about Senator Thomas Corwin of Ohio. Corwin had been told by an old Virginian who knew Washington that George Washington often swore. Corwin's father, as was true of that generation, held the Father of his Country to be a faultless person and told young Thomas to follow in Washington's footsteps. "Well," said Senator Corwin, "when I heard that George Washington was addicted to the vices and infirmities of man, I felt so relieved that I just shouted for joy." Lincoln laughed heartily. Later, when President Lincoln was told of Washington's reputation as a great wrestler, it was said that Lincoln brought up his own experience as a wrestler on the frontier. "If George was loafing around here now, I should be glad to have a tussle with him, and I rather believe that one of the plain people of Illinois would be able to manage the aristocrat of Old Virginia." If the presidential office appears to dazzle at times, it is not of record that Washington enjoyed the position, which brought him grief and kept him from his beloved Mount Vernon.52 Meanwhile, the provisional government of the Confederate States of America had been organized on February 4, 1861; exactly one month before Lincoln's own inauguration as the 16th President of the United States. Jefferson Davis and Alexander H. Stephens had been selected as provisional president and vice president of the "new nation." In 1861, Washington remained the hero for the Southern cause which was still passively conserving the antebellum status quo before it changed to the active assertion of independence by 1863. Colonel Robert E. Lee went with Virginia into the Confederacy in April 1861, a great boon to the Southern cause, and a great loss for the Union. The colonel was married to Mary, daughter of George Washington's adopted son. Lee had a deep reverence for the first President and strove to emulate him.53 Lincoln wished to visit Mount Vernon, Washington's home on the Potomac, to pay his respects at the gravesite of the Father of his Country, his boyhood hero, and now his predecessor as President of the Republic. However, a little over three weeks after his inauguration on March 27, 1861, Mrs. Lincoln; and her friends visited the home, probably without the President along. Mrs. Lincoln's maternal great grandmother Porter delivering provisions to her husband, Captain Andrew Porter, at Valley Forge in the winter of 1777, met an officer who took her to her husband. The officer was General Washington. Proud of her forbear, Mrs. Lincoln wrote her friend Hannah Shearer: "One day this week, we went down to Mount Vernon. A visit we can again pay, when you are with us." The President was in the midst of preparing 50 nominations for the U. S. Senate's consideration. Even more importantly, it was not easy for Lincoln to get away because the crisis at Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor had reached crisis proportions. In fact, the very next day, the Lincolns held their first state dinner for the cabinet and special guests. That same evening, Lincoln told cabinet members that General Winfield Scott had shockingly recommended evacuation of Fort Sumter, South Carolina and Fort Pickens, Florida.54

52

Alexander K. McClure, “Abe” Lincoln’s Yarns and Stories (Philadelphia: Winston, 1901), p. 235; James G. Randall, Lincoln the President: Midstream (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1953), p. 2 53 Emory M. Thomas, The Confederate Nation, 1861-1865 (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1979), p. 224. 54 Baltimore Sun, March 29, 1861; Jean H. Baker, Mary Todd Lincoln: A Biography (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1987), p. 16; James G. Randall, Lincoln the President: Springfield to Gettysburg (New York: Dodd, Mead

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The Civil War began in the morning of April 12, 1861, when a signal mortar sounded; and a fiery ball ascended; and burst over the fort in Charleston Harbor. Major Robert Anderson surrendered his small garrison and marched out of the Fort on Sunday, April 14. For two hours Lincoln conferred with his old friend and rival, Senator Douglas of Illinois, who approved Lincoln's proclamation to call on the states for 75,000 men for the militia for three months service. This far reaching act, the Federal militia act, was passed under President Washington in 1795. It provided for summoning the militia of the states into Federal service whenever the nation's laws should be resisted by "combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings." Lincoln had his finger on this statute and followed the precedent of Washington used in 1795 during the time of the Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania when he called out the 75,000 militia "to suppress said combinations, and to cause the laws to be duly executed." The President summoned Congress to meet in special session on July 4, 1861. He issued the proclamation on April 15 and the response from the free states was overwhelming. A Harvard professor born during Washington's presidency wrote: "I never knew what a popular excitement can be....The whole population, men, women, and children, seem to be in the streets with Union favors and flags."55 As the rebels attacked a Federal garrison in Charleston Harbor, so Baltimore citizens attacked Federal troops passing through their city to defend the nation's government and protect lives and property in the capital city. Lincoln replied to a committee of fifty representing the Young Men's Christian Associations of Baltimore on Monday, April 22. He told the delegation that he would not break his presidential oath "and surrender the government without a blow." "There is no Washington in that, no [Andrew] Jackson in that, no manhood nor honor in that," he said sternly. "I have no desire to invade the South; but I must have troops to defend this Capital."56 President Lincoln sent his message to Congress in special session on July 4, 1861, the nation's birthday. "Our adversaries have adopted some Declarations of Independence; in which, unlike the good old one, penned by Jefferson, they omit the words "all men are created equal," Lincoln told the Congress; "Why?" "They have adopted a temporary national constitution, in the preamble of which, unlike our good old one, signed by Washington, they omit 'We, the People,' and substitute 'We, the deputies of the sovereign and independent States,'" he observed. Lincoln then queried why the deliberate elimination of the rights of men and the authority of the people? "This is essentially a People's contest," Lincoln answered. It was "the patriotic instinct of the plain people." "They understood, without an argument; that destroyed the government, which was made by Washington, means no good to them."57 During the Civil War years, Mount Vernon was declared neutral territory. Both sides, North and South, claimed George Washington as a symbol of their cause. For Northerners, Washington symbolized the Union and in the South, whose President would be sworn in on Washington's Birthday, and under his statue, in Richmond, Virginia, Washington symbolized resistance to tyranny.

and Co., 1946), 1:332; Mary Lincoln to Hannah Shearer, March [28], 1861, in Justin G. Turner and Linda Levitt Turner, Mary Todd Lincoln: Her Life and Letters (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), p. 82 55 Randall, Lincoln the President, 1:354; McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 274. 56 “Reply to Baltimore Committee, April 22, 1861,” in CWAL, 4:438-439 57 “Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861,” in CWAL, 4:438-439.

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There had been a long struggle to save Washington's decaying home for the nation. Annoyed by thousands of visitors every year, and the destruction of his private property, the young owner was unable to keep the estate in proper order and he expressed a willingness to sell. Congress was asked to purchase it for the nation and failed. With the help of Edward Everett who delivered an oration upon Washington's character from city to city, the Mount Vernon Ladies' Association purchased the property from John Augustine Washington in 1859. Mount Vernon was located only 16 miles from the Lincoln White House, and about a hundred from Virginia's capital of Richmond. Already reluctantly loyal to the Federal government, Maryland possessed the broad Potomac River. Thus, the legal border between the Federal Union and the Confederacy did not run half a mile away through middle of the Potomac, but ran literally at the foot of Mount Vernon's sloping lawn down to the river front. Mount Vernon was the only island of neutrality during the war years. If President Lincoln had ordered any of his commanding generals to march the Army of the Potomac in a straight line from the District of Columbia to Richmond, the Confederate capital, his troops would have had to march directly across Washington's Mount Vernon plantation. The Federal army did everything but that between April 1861 and April 1865. Although the residence at Mount Vernon had little knowledge of what was happening close at hand, they could at times hear the sound of artillery drifting across the fields for the first time since 1814.58 About the middle of August, 1861, there was a skirmish at Pohick Church, six miles from Mount Vernon. Northern pickets had been placed just north of Mount Vernon. Miss Sarah C. Tracy, who was Secretary of the Mount Vernon Ladies' Association, spent the war years on the plantation. On October 2, 1861, Lincoln's General in Chief of the United States Army, Winfield Scott, issued Miss Tracy a pass which would enable her to go in and out safely through Union lines on her travels between Mount Vernon, Alexandria, and Washington. But the pass was disputed by the pickets and the Federal pickets had moved down to within three miles of Mount Vernon and barricaded the road. Lacking candles, oil and food, Miss Tracy "took to the woods" and went directly to Washington to find help. Some advised her to see Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, others advised her to see Mrs. Lincoln, "but with a woman's instinct and faith in those who have proved kind, I went to Headquarters." General Scott was ill, but her friend, Colonel E. D. Townshend listened to her story, and told her to write it all down and send it to him. She did so, and General Scott answered that she should see Lincoln himself if Scott's pass was disputed, "there was no power but the president who could help me"! So, Miss Tracy went to President Lincoln. She wrote: "He received me very kindly and wrote a note to Mr. McClellan requesting him to see me and arrange the matter in the best way possible." She carried Lincoln's note to General George McClellan who said "it was a grand mistake; he had never given an order revoking one of General Scott's passes." He knew his position well and would not dare do such a thing. It was all because of the zeal of some Volunteer officers. In fact, McClellan offered to do anything he possibly could for her and offered to send a steam tug with provisions to Mount Vernon from time to time, as she might desire. Miss

58

Dorothy Troth Muir, Mount Vernon: The Civil War Years (Mount Vernon, VA: The Mount Vernon Ladies’ Association, 1993), pp. 28-31

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Tracy received a new pass much more positive than the first. She had climbed "the hill of Difficulty" at Mount Vernon, she said, but "everybody was so kind."59 On February 17, 1862; Congressman Edward Haight of New York wrote Lincoln to suggest that the "Commander in Chief order that the Farewell Address of Washington be read on his birthday, as the head of Armies and Navies, and that the Loyal people of the United States in all their states, cities and hamlets, their churches, houses and hearts be requested to devote that day to Exaltation for victory and gratitude to the Almighty protector of the Republic." Lincoln issued his "Proclamation for Celebration of Washington's Birthday" on February 19, 1862: It is recommended to the People of the United States that they assemble in their customary places of meeting for public solemnities on the twenty-second day of February instant, and celebrate the anniversary of the birth of the Father of His Country by causing to be read to 60 them his immortal Farewell address.

There was an elaborate celebration in the nation's capital on that day. A scheduled ceremony at the capitol included a presentation of capture Confederate flags to the Congress, which was to be followed by the reading of Washington's Farewell Address. However, Congressman John J. Crittenden of Kentucky introduced a resolution which opposed accepting the captured flags on the ground that they were nothing more than flags of pirates and rebels and represented no recognized legal government. After a very heated debate, Crittenden's resolution was adopted in the House seventy to sixty-one, to the great disappointment of the large crowd in the gallery. The pursuant ceremony was disrupted by a commotion in the audience. The captain of the Capitol Police, Nathan Darling, arrested two people in the lobby of the House of Representatives. Darling was indicted by a grand jury on the complaint of one he arrested. The case was continued in Criminal Court and Darling pled guilty and was fined heavily. Lincoln signed Darling's pardon on February 18, 1863; nearly a year later.61 Lincoln did not attend the Washington Birthday celebration at the Capitol. The day after he issued his official Proclamation for Washington's Birthday celebration, his son Willie Lincoln died, and his youngest son, Tad, remained seriously ill in his second floor White House bedroom. Lincoln's cabinet met and requested Congress to cancel illumination of public buildings on Washington's Birthday out of respect for the President's family. By Joint Resolution of Congress, all public buildings were not illuminated that evening. A year later, Lincoln acknowledged the receipt of "a beautifully engrossed and bound copy of the resolutions and proceedings of a meeting of Merchants of New York assembled in obedience to my proclamation to observe in an especial manner the Birthday of Washington in the year of our Lord, 1862...." Lincoln thanked them for their "patriotism and loyalty."62 During the last week in March 1862; Mrs. Lincoln, accompanied by Mr. and Mrs. Kellogg of Illinois, and a select party of friends, visited Mount Vernon by steamer. Captain Baker of the steamer Thomas Collyer escorted them over the grounds. Upton H. Herbert, 59

Ibid., pp. 87-91 “Proclamation for Celebration of Washington’s Birthday, February 19, 1862,” in CWAL, 5:136-137. 61 Lincoln to Edwin Bates, February 16, 1863, in CWAL, 6:106-107 62 Washington Star, February 21, 22, 1862; Lincoln to Joseph Gillett and William J. Beebe, April 24, 1864, in CWAL, Supplement, 1832-1865, p. 186 60

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Superintendent and a direct descendant of a great grandmother whose sister married into the Washington family, took them into the Banqueting Room and General Washington's bedroom where he died in 1799. Then he escorted them through Washington's gardens. Miss Tracy wrote: "I have not seen Mrs. Lincoln, but unprejudiced persons say she is rather stout, dresses in admirable taste, and receives like a lady." Her friend saw her "more than once, and said there was nothing coarse or unlady-like in her manner or conversation, all the slang and bad manners attributed to her is false."63 Wishing to see Washington's home and gravesite, and probably encouraged by his wife, Lincoln suggested that Mrs. Lincoln's visiting sister, Elizabeth Edwards, make up a party of Springfield relatives and friends for a visit to Mount Vernon. So on the morning of April 2, 1862; the President and Mrs. Lincoln, and their party, together with Commodore Dahlgren, went down the Potomac by steamer, passed the arsenal and Fort Washington and spent a delightful hour and a half visit at Washington's mansion, gardens and tomb. Although some accounts say that the President remained aboard the boat, his biographer, Benjamin P. Thomas, suggested that he went ashore. It must have been a moving experience for Lincoln to visit the home and gravesite of his boyhood hero. Lincoln had much on his mind that day. General McClellan arrived at Yorktown and started his Peninsula Campaign.64 The matter of colonizing freed blacks outside the United States came to ahead in July and August 1862. An interview was arranged with President Lincoln and a committee of blacks headed by Edward Thomas on August 14, 1862. Speaking to the committee, Lincoln referred to Washington's childless condition while he urged free blacks to migrate to Africa. He told the black delegation: In the American Revolutionary war sacrifices were made by men engaged in it; but they were cheered by the future. Gen. Washington himself endured greater physical hardships than if he had remained a British subject. Yet he was a happy man, because he was engaged in benefitting his race--something for the children of his neighbors, having none of his own.

Such a sacrifice in leaving the United States for Liberia would be like Washington's sacrifice during the Revolutionary War. Blacks were openly hostile to Lincoln's colonization proposal--with or without Washington's example.65 Various gentlemen associated with religious bodies in New York called on the President to urge upon him the need for enforcing better Sabbath observance in the army. The interview with Lincoln was agreeable and "satisfactory." On November 15, 1862; the President issued his "Order for Sabbath Observance" to reduce Sunday labor in the Army and Navy "to the measure of strict necessity." "The discipline and character of the national force should not suffer, nor the cause they defend be imperiled, by the profanation of the day or name of the Most High," he declared. Lincoln quoted Washington's words in 1776: "At this time of public distress men may find enough to do in the service of God and their country without abandoning themselves to vice and immorality." "The General hopes and trusts that every officer and man will endeavor to live and act as becomes a Christian soldier defending the dearest rights and liberties of his country," Lincoln concluded with Washington's words. This

63

Muir, Mount Vernon, p. 46 New York Herald, April 2, 1862; Muir, Mount Vernon, pp. 36-37; Thomas, Abraham Lincoln, pp. 477-478 65 “Address on Colonization to a Deputation of Negroes, August 14, 1862,” in CWAL, 5:373 64

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was the first General Order issued on July 9, 1776 by the Father of his Country after the Declaration of Independence.66

LINCOLN’S PRESIDENTIAL YEARS: ABOLITION, VICTORY AND WASHINGTON 1863-1865 On January 1, 1863 Abraham Lincoln issued one of the most important state papers ever issued by a President of the United States; the Emancipation Proclamation. Lincoln had read a copy of George Livermore's little book entitled An Historical Research: Opinions of the Founders of the Republic on Negroes as Slaves, as Citizens, and as Soldiers, which argued that free black men had also served in the Revolutionary armies, and that General Washington had valued their services. Whether due to this argument or just the nature of the war by 1863, Lincoln was ready to authorize the service of freedmen in the United States military forces. This statement was the most important change Lincoln made from his Preliminary Proclamation of Emancipation issued on September 22, 1862. As Historian Mark Neely, Jr. declares: "This momentous decision guaranteed a multiracial future for the United States."67 Public meetings were organized by the United States Christian Commission in Philadelphia, New York, Boston and Washington "to check distrust and disloyalty and to restore confidence and support to the government." To give the Washington meeting greater prestige, the House of Representatives was selected as the site for the meeting, Washington's Birthday was chosen for the date, and President Lincoln was selected to serve as chairman of the occasion. Lincoln declined to preside but he fully supported the purpose of the meeting: "To strengthen our reliance on the Supreme Being, for the final triumph for the right, can not but be well for us all." Then he added: "The birth-day of Washington, and the Christian Sabbath, coinciding this year [1863], and suggesting together is most propitious for the meeting proposed."68 As President, Lincoln did not limit himself to legally official acts, as may be found in his establishment of Thanksgiving as an official national holiday along with Washington's Birthday and the Fourth of July. Through Lincoln the day became the matter of a regular annual proclamation by the President of the United States. The religious observance of thanksgiving was an old American custom traced back to the days of the "Plimoth" Colony. Before Lincoln, there were no regular annual presidential proclamations for the day. Presidents Washington, Adams, and Madison had called for special days of public thanks or prayer; but, they were never annual or associated with the harvest festival familiar in Europe and early America. Washington had issued such a proclamation when the whiskey insurrection was suppressed in 1795. On October 3, 1863; following Washington's precedent, Lincoln issued a proclamation "to set apart...the last Thursday of November next, as a day of Thanksgiving and Praise." Again, Lincoln issued another Thanksgiving Proclamation on October 20, 1864,

66

“Order for Sabbath Observance, November 15, 1862,” in CWAL, 5:497-498 Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Last Best Hope of Earth: Abraham Lincoln and the Promise of America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 114 68 Lincoln to Alexander Reed, February 22, 1863,” in CWAL, 5:114-115 67

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setting aside the last Thursday in November. Thus, Lincoln is credited with beginning the regular national observance of Thanksgiving.69 On Washington's Birthday, 1864 there was a meeting in the nation's capital of the Vice Regents of the Mount Vernon Ladies' Association. The war continued to cut off Mount Vernon's sources of revenue. Strict Federal control of giving passes meant that few land visitors came to Mount Vernon any more. And, by January, 1864; they had ceased entirely. A boat had been permitted to run regularly between Mount Vernon and Washington; but, after the second battle of Bull Run [Manassas] in August, 1862, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton forbade passengers to land on the Virginia side of the Potomac. A few days after the meeting, the Vice Regent of the Association, Harriet V. Fitch, wrote to the President, requesting that the steamboat Thomas Collyer [which both the President and Mrs. Lincoln had taken before] be permitted once again to run between Washington and Mount Vernon. "We have through much labor bought, and paid for, the home and grave of Washington, and but for the national troubles, would long since have collected a sum, equal to its restoration, and future keeping," she wrote. "Now," she said: we have no means to keep it--no revenue but such as this boat will bring us. With that we will be enabled to go on another year, at least, and at the end of that time, let us hope for brighter days, when we can add to our fund; by further collections in the States.

Lincoln sent the letter to the Secretary of War, and endorsed the letter: "I send this over as a reminder in relation to allowing the 'Thomas Colyer' to run between here and MountVernon." But, Stanton's endorsement follows the President's: "The Secretary of War does not deem it expedient to allow a Steamboat to run to Mt Vernon at present." The boat would not be allowed to run until June 1, 1865.70 In the spring of 1864, Union arms were progressing, and Congress decided to revive the rank of lieutenant general which was last held by George Washington. The Senate approved a bill on February 26, 1864; which authorized the President, with the consent of the Senate, to appoint a lieutenant general from those officers "most distinguished for courage, skill and ability" to command the armies of the United States. In the process of passing both houses, Grant's name had been attached to the bill by Congressman Washburne of Illinois and then had been dropped. But it was fully understood for whom the position was intended. Convinced Grant had no presidential ambitions to interfere with his responsibilities, Lincoln appointed him and the Senate confirmed the nomination on March 6. The next day Stanton ordered Grant to report to Washington. Now General Washington had a successor as Lieutenant General of the United States.71 There was a vast woods about 35 miles south of Mount Vernon known as the Wilderness. During the days of May and June, 1864, the woods were filled with both Federal and Confederate soldiers, fighting one of the bloodiest battles of the entire war. The new Lieutenant General had begun his drive toward Richmond, the capital of the Confederacy. In the Battle of the Wilderness alone, May 5-7, 1864; the effective strength of the Army of the

69

“Proclamation of Thanksgiving, October 3, 1863,” in CWAL, 6:496-497; “Proclamation of Thanksgiving, October 20, 1864,” in CWAL, 8:55-56. 70 Lincoln to Edwin M. Stanton, March 4, 1864,” in CWAL, 7:225; Muir, Mount Vernon, pp. 108-112. 71 Speech to Ulysses S. Grant [March 9, 1864],” in CWAL, 7:234-235

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Potomac was 115,000; it suffered 17,500 casualties (15 percent). The effective strength of the Army of Northern Virginia was 60,000; its casualties were estimated at 7,500 (12 percent). But, from June 1 to June 3, Grant was involved in the most disastrous event of his military career, a hopeless attack on a strong entrenched position. Lee's men mowed down the Federal troops as they came in waves. Grant lost ten thousand men, the pride of his army.72 While the battle was raging at Cold Harbor, delegates en route to Baltimore to the National Union (Republican) Convention stopped to see the President to learn of his views. "They were all welcomed with genial and cordial courtesy, but received not the slightest intimation of what would be agreeable to him," observed his secretaries. The Convention met on June 7, 1864 with great unanimity behind Lincoln's re-nomination. The following day, with the exception of Missouri, each state cast its vote for Lincoln. The decision was then made unanimous by the delegates and Andrew Johnson of Tennessee was nominated for Vice President.73 Songs were a common feature of special events, campaigns, elections and presidential inaugurations since the days of the early Republic. For the 1864, Lincoln presidential campaign, Henry C. Work composed both words and music for Washington and Lincoln, and published them in Cleveland Ohio. Thus Lincoln was already conjoined with "the Great Washington" in song and verse. The national history in the future would contain the story of these two great American patriots which would never be excelled. Work penned: Come, happy people! Oh come let us tell The story of Washington and Lincoln! History's pages can never excel The story of Washingtron and Lincoln. Down through the ages an anthem shall go, Bearing the honors we gladly bestow-Till every nation and language shall know The story of Washington and Lincoln:

The composer believed that both whites and blacks shared in passing their glorious "tale" on to future generations. Parents to children shall tell with delight, The story of Washington and Lincoln: Free born and freed men together recite The story of Washington and Lincoln Earth's weary bond men shall listen with cheer-Tyrants shall tremble, and trators shall fear-When, in it's fullness of glory, they hear The story of Washington and Lincoln:

In his concluding verse Work makes references to their role in two great American wars, the Revolutionary War and the Civil War, but notes that only "Peace" could reveal their full "story." 72

Patricia L. Faust, ed., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1986), p. 827 73 Howard K. Beale, ed., Diary of Gideon Welles, 3 vols. (New York, 1960), June 3, 1864, 22:44-45.

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Though on the war cloud recorded with steel, The story of Washington and Lincoln; Peace only Peace, can completely reveal The story of Washington and Lincoln. Thanks to the Lord for the days we behold! Thanks for the unsullied flag we unfold! Thanks that to us, and in our time, was told The story of Washington and Lincoln:

Then the Lincoln songster repeats his chorus: Who gave us independence, On continent and sea Who saved the glorious Union! And set a people free! This is the story--Oh happy are we-The story of Washington and Lincoln.

A few days after his re-nomination, accompanied by a committee of escort, President Lincoln and his party left Washington on a special train for Philadelphia to attend the Great Central Fair in aid of the U. S. Sanitary Commission. Lincoln responded to a toast at a banquet held in the main assembly hall of the fair. He said: War, at the best, is terrible, and this war of ours, in its magnitude and in its duration, is one of the most terrible....It has destroyed property, and ruined homes;...We accepted this war for an object, a worthy object, and the war will end when the object is attained....I have never been in the habit of making predictions in regard to the war, but I am almost tempted to make one.--If I were to hazard it, it is this: That Grant is this evening, with General Meade and General Hancock, of Pennsylvania, and the brave officers and soldiers with him, in a position from whence he will never be dislodged until Richmond is taken.

Following Lincoln's address, James Pollock, former governor of Pennsylvania, presented Lincoln with a silver medal on behalf of the ladies of the Fair. He responded to the gift of the medal: I have only to say that I accept this present of the ladies as an additional token of your confidence, but I do not need any further evidence of the loyalty and devotion of the women of America to the cause of the Union and the cause of Christian humility. I accept it 74 thankfully, as another manifestation of the esteem of the ladies.

In addition to the silver medal, the Ladies of the fair also gave Lincoln other presents as well, including a memento of General Washington. "The loyal ladies of Trenton," many of them were descendants of those 'Matrons and Maidens' who had scattered flowers in Washington's path when he passed through the triumph arch built in 1789. "By the blessing of Providence," the arch marked the spot where General C. C. Cornwallis had been repulsed, an occasion that "reversed the gloomy fortunes of war for our National Independence." It was a token of their "love confidence and respect." 74

“Speech at Great Central Sanitary Fair, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, June 16, 1864,” in CWAL, 7:394-396; “Speech Accepting Medal Presented by Ladies of the Fair, June 16, 1864,” in CWAL, 7:396-397

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Ronald D. Rietveld The presentation read: Approaching as you do so near the character and experiencing the trials and responsibilities of the venerated Father of our Country, most especially in unswerving fidelity to free principles and the discharge of all the duties with which you have been invested by a confiding people, we trust that you may find in the staff now presented you, as an 'heir loom' of the old Arch, where the 'gratulating song' was sung by the patriotic young ladies of Trenton, similar gratification as that which was felt by Washington.

Because of pressing responsibilities, Lincoln was not able to thank the "Loyal Ladies of Trenton, New Jersey" until July 25, 1864. Then he recalled that he had been presented "a very pretty Cane," on their behalf by a gentleman whose name he could not remember; so much for a former governor of Pennsylvania. It does not appear that Lincoln was awed by the historic nature of the gift, however.75 Lincoln received a letter from Charleston, South Carolina, written by Mrs. M. Davis Parks on August 22, 1864. She told Lincoln that her older son had since died while he was removed from Point Lookout to Elmira Prison and requested that her younger son, Bushrod Washington Parks should be released. "Not only in my own name, but in that of Washington I make my request, as the Grand-son of Harriet Washington the much loved niece and adopted daughter of the great Patriot," she wrote. "I feel he should have the consideration of the representative of the people of this union...." But these young men had chosen to take up arms against the Union and the "representative of the people." Nevertheless on June 24, 1864 Lincoln responded: "Allow this lady, Mrs. Parks, with her friend, Mr. Tallmadge, to see her two sons, prisoners of war at Point Lookout."76 A Confederate agent, Clement C. Clay, in Canada prepared a Platform, and an Address, which was to be adopted by the Democrats at their Chicago Convention slated to meet on August 29, 1864. But, Clay himself was for peace and disunion. Before the Democrats assembled in Chicago, Lincoln wrote out in his own handwriting Clay's words: The stupid tyrant who now disgraces the Chair of Washington and Jackson could, any day, have peace and restoration of the Union; and would have them, only that he persists in the war merely to free the slaves.

Even before the Democrats had met, Lincoln's chances for reelection seemed hopeless.77 Defection struck among the Republicans. A movement spread among the party ranks to remove Abraham Lincoln from the Union Party ticket. Public dissatisfaction was due both to the military failures and the Lincolns Administration's unwillingness to consider any terms of peace to end the war until slavery had been abolished. This was the time when Lincoln had no "adversary," a Democratic nominee, and "seemed to have no friends." Lincoln himself began to feel that his Administration could not be reelected. The war was now in its fourth year. Weary and thin and with little appetite, sitting at his desk, he remarked whimsically, "I wish

75

“To the Loyal Ladies of Trenton, New Jersey, July 25, 1864,” in CWAL, 7:458 “Pass for Mrs. M. Davis Parks, June 24, 1864,” in CWAL, 7:406 77 “Memorandum on Clement C. Clay [c. July 25, 1864],” in CWAL, 7:459-460 76

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George Washington or some of those old patriots were here in my place so that I could have a little rest."78 Lincoln came to the conclusion that his reelection might be very close in the Electoral College. The President was clearly counting on the soldier vote. But, as election day drew near, Lincoln became more confident of victory. Washington was very quiet on election day, November 8, 1864. Still somewhat uneasy, he was not sure just how the people would vote. Lincoln's friend from California, Noah Brooks found Lincoln alone at the White House. "The house has been still and almost deserted today," John Hay, his assistant secretary wrote in his diary, "Everybody in Washington, not at home voting, seems ashamed of it and stays away from the President." It seems ironic that Lincoln was left alone in a rather deserted White House on that rainy day of election--a rather depressing portrait. However, there were those around the President who had clearly grasped Lincoln's capabilities. Secretary of State Seward saw what others did not see. After Seward cast his ballot for president on the Union ticket, he responded to a large crowd gathering in front of his residence on Lafayette Square, across from the White House: Henceforth all men will come to see him as you and I have seen him: a true loyal patient patriotic, and benevolent man....Abraham Lincoln will take his place alongside Washington, Franklin, Adams, Jefferson and Jackson, among the benefactors of the country and of the human race.

Despite Lincoln's fears, he received an overwhelming majority of votes. Except for three states, every state that voted in the 1864 election gave majorities to the Republican or Union candidates, Lincoln and Johnson; two states were former slaves states, Kentucky and Delaware. Lincoln's election clearly demonstrated that "a people's government can sustain a national election in the midst of a great civil war." His election was another major turning point in destroying the hope of southern independence.79 The day after the election, F. W. Emmons of Sturbridge, Massachusetts wrote Lincoln a letter. An old man of 105 years lived in Sturbridge and was a Democrat of the Jeffersonian School. Deacon John Phillips had voted for Washington as young man, and on election day 1864, he rode from his home, two miles, to the Town Hall with his son, Colonel Edward Phillips, who was 79 years old, to cast his vote for president. He was offered two votes, George B. McClellan or Abraham Lincoln, to take his choice. The old man answered: "I vote for Abraham Lincoln." The Centenarian John Phillips had voted for both Washington and Lincoln. The President was impressed. Some days later, on November 21, 1864, Lincoln picked up his pen and wrote old man Phillips: "I have heard of the incident at the polls in your town, in which you bore so honored a part, and I take the liberty of writing to you to express my personal gratitude for the compliment paid me by the suffrage of a citizen so venerable." Then he added: "The example of such devotion to civic duties is one whose days have already extended an average life time beyond the Psalmist's limit, cannot but be valuable and fruitful." Lincoln was grateful. "It is not for myself only, but for the country which you have in your sphere served so long and so well, that I thank you." 78

John Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History. 10 vols (New York: The Century Co., 1890), 9:250251; Ruth Painter Randall, Lincoln’s Sons (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1955), p. 184 79 Victor Searcher, The Farewell to Lincoln (New York: Arlington Press, 1965), p. 183

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It took some time but Deacon Phillips replied to the President's letter of appreciation on January 16, 1865: I feel that I have no desire to live but to see the conclusion of this wicked rebellion, and the power of God displayed in the conversion of the nation. I believe by the help of God you will accomplish the first--and also be the means of establishing universal freedom and restoring 80 peace to the Union.

After Lincoln's reelection, in the fall and winter of 1864-65, Washington offices and salons were filled with rumors that soon after Lincoln's re-inauguration in March the president's cabinet would "all bust up". Lincoln still had friends who were willing to defend him. Edward Everett of Massachusetts [the keynote speaker at Gettysburg] delivered a speech in Boston and eloquently replied to the charge that Lincoln's administration lacked "unity of counsel" by pointing out that George Washington's cabinet had included "the heads of two radically opposite parties," Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. Everett protested: "It rarely happens that any other course is practicable in difficult times." But the gossips continued to characterize Lincoln's cabinet as a "solemn failure," and that even the President had come to realize it.81 On Washington's Birthday 1865, the Washington Literary and Dramatic Association planned to give a Soiree at Odd Fellows Hall in honor of the First President. President Lincoln was invited to attend, but did not do so. The President was not well.82 As the war appeared to be drawing to a close, the New York Times, edited by Lincoln's 1864 Campaign Manager, Henry J. Raymond, drew on Washington for inspiration: Every since WASHINGTON'S day, secession has a been trying to show its head, but has always been put down in his name. WASHINGTON is completing his second cycle. He was with JACKSON in 1832, when he suppressed treason, and he also sailed with WINFIELD SCOTT into the harbor of Charleston; stood by Anderson in 1861, and was with GILMORE, last Saturday, when he put that good old flag on Fort Sumter once more. He has been with ABRAHAM LINCOLN, and has gone with us through the war, teaching us to bear reverses patiently. He was with GRANT as the taking of Vicksburgh, and will go with him to Richmond. He went with PORTER to Wilmington; with SHERMAN to Atlanta and Charleston, and will go with him to Richmond. His spirit leads us in this second war of the Constitution, and if the rebellion should cease, he would still guide us in peaceful 83 enterprises.

Abraham Lincoln took office for the second time as President of the United States on March 4, 1865. As Washington before, he again took the same presidential oath to serve as the nation's Chief Executive for a second term. A new feature in the simple ceremony was the presence of a battalion of black troops in the president's escort. He called for binding up the nation's wounds, “with malice toward none and charity for all.” Although drawing from the 80

“Lincoln to John Phillips, November 21, 1864,” in CWAL, 8:18. Washington Daily Chronicle, November 18, 1864; James G. Randall and Richard N. Current, Lincoln the President: Last Full Measure (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1991), pp. 275-276 82 “A Washington’s Birthday Celebration, [February 16, 1865],” in Harold Holzer, Dear Mr. Lincoln: Letters to the President (New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1993), p. 300 83 New York Times, February 23, 1865. 81

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New Testament lesson of forgiveness, he reminded the nation that "The Almighty has His own purposes." As he told a friend later: "There is a God governing the world." "Lincoln plumbed depths of spirituality never touched by Washington," Historian Merrill Peterson observed. Lincoln who took the presidential office with some reluctance had indeed become a revolutionary leader like Washington himself. "Lincoln fits the pattern of a revolutionary leader," writes Historian James M. McPherson. "He was a reluctant one at first, to be sure, but in the end he was more radical than Washington or Jefferson or any of the leaders of the first revolution." Lincoln had supported the abolition of slavery which made the Civil War a revolution.84 Richmond fell on April 3, 1865, a day which was long remembered by the people of the nation, in both sections of the country. The North was turned into a frenzy of joyous excitement. On the Palm Sunday morning, April 9, 1865; General Robert E. Lee surrendered less than one sixth of the Confederates in arms at Appomattox Court House, Virginia. The southern cause had fallen to pieces. The remaining armies of the Confederacy, though perhaps inconsiderable when compared with the large Federal force, were still infinitely larger than any General Washington had ever commanded, and still remained capable of great resistance and much trouble. But the next morning, booming cannon awakened Washington City to the news of the surrender. Those at Mount Vernon did know the reason for all the noise until later when they heard that General Lee had surrendered.85

LINCOLN’S DEATH, FUNERAL AND WASHINGTON 1865 Good Friday, April 14, 1865 was a very busy day for the President. Sometime after 5 p.m., President and Mrs. Lincoln took a carriage drive alone into the countryside and talked about their future together after his second term was completed. During the drive, Mrs. Lincoln told her husband: "Dear husband, you almost startle me, by your great cheerfulness." He responded: "I consider this day, the war has come to a close...." That evening the Lincolns prepared for theater to attend a benefit performance of "Our American Cousin."86 The Lincolns arrived late to Ford's Theatre and, with their guests. The orchestra struck up "Hail to the Chief," Lincoln acknowledged the applause, placed his hand over his heart and bowed twice. They were seated, just over the stage, in the box, festooned with American flags, and the Treasury Guard's blue regimental flag at the center post. To add patriotic color for the historic occasion, John T. Ford, proprietor, brought a gilt-framed engraving of George Washington from the reception room and placed it on the center pillar. During the third act, holding Mrs. Lincoln's hand in his, he turned to view someone in the orchestra below. Unobserved, John Wilkes Booth, the actor, stepped close behind the 84

Merrill D. Peterson, Lincoln in American Memory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 218; James M. McPherson, Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 36-37 85 John G. Nicolay, A Short Life of Abraham Lincoln (New York: The Century Co., 1904), p. 524; Muir, Mount Vernon, p. 41. 86 W. Emerson Reck, A. Lincoln: His Last 24 Hours (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland and Co., Inc., Publishers, 1987), pp. 31-40; Ruth Painter Randall, Mary Lincoln: Biography of a Marriage (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1953), pp. 380-381

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President's head and fired the trigger of his .44 caliber weapon. Her agonizing screams told the audience what had happened in a theater box festooned with Washington's portrait. Booth had left a gash from his spur in the side of the gilded frame.87 The mortally wounded and insensible President was taken across the street to a rooming house owned by William Petersen. And, the President stopped breathing at 7:21 and 55 seconds on the morning of April 15, and his pulse ceased beating at 7:22 and 10 seconds. President Lincoln now joined the illustrious dead of the nation, along with George Washington. For the first time in the history of "this democratic republican government, the tragic scenes of the Roman Empire and the French Revolution were enacted in America almost within sight of the last resting place of the Father of the country," noted the New York Herald. But, the assassination also evoked the memory of a previous plot to assassinate George Washington in 1776, when one of his privates in his bodyguard was hanged.88 It was to be the longest state funeral in the history of the United States. Although bedridden in her second floor White House bedroom, Mrs. Lincoln had to make serious decisions. On at least three occasions, she said "no." Mrs. Lincoln said "no" to enshrining her husband's remains in New York City. She said "no" to her husband's interment in Washington (the Congressional Cemetery was also recommended). The widow also said "no" to depositing his remains in the vault under the Senate Chamber in the Capitol building. It was originally designed for George Washington, whose wife, Martha, also said "no," preferring to keep him interred at Mount Vernon.89 Mrs. Lincoln did agree to a funeral procession after the White House obsequies. And, she also yielded to his remains lying in state at the Capitol rotunda, en route home to Springfield, Illinois, following almost the same route he had taken east as President-elect four years before. The business of saying farewell took almost a full week in the nation's capital. The capitol rotunda was heavily draped and all the paintings and statues were shrouded. Only Houdon's white plaster statue of George Washington appeared differently. It was simply hung with a black sash in the military fashion. After the lying in state, the first lieutenant general since Washington, Ulysses S. Grant, walked behind the hearse as the President's remains were taken to the train for the nearly 1,700- mile journey. The dead President's remains finally came to rest in Oakridge Cemetery, Springfield, Illinois in the temporary receiving vault. As his funeral train slowly wound its way back to Illinois, the Lincoln legend was born, placing him alongside George Washington. And, Lincoln's old friends intended to place the remains of the resurrected hero of Springfield in the middle of the city in a proper memorial.90 When Lincoln's son, Robert, returned to Washington, he informed his mother that his father's old friends had already purchased the Mather property with its beautiful grove of native trees. The Lincoln Monument Association was advised of her objections through her son and family members. The land was unconsecrated ground and did not allow a place for his wife and children to be buried. On June 5, 1865, she wrote Governor Richard J. Oglesby that in all candor and fairness she wished to notify the Monument association that unless she was officially assured in the next ten days that "the Monument will be erected over the Tomb in Oak Ride Cemetery, in accordance with my oft expressed wishes," she would yield consent 87

Reck, A. Lincoln, pp. 73, 84, 102 Ibid., p. 157; Searcher, The Farewell to Lincoln, p. 35; Albany, Atlas and Argus, April 26, 1865 89 Searcher, The Farewell to Lincoln, p. 57 90 Ibid., pp. 85-86; Gabor S. Boritt, The Historian’s Lincoln (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), p. 367 88

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to the request of the National Monument association in Washington and other Eastern friends to "have the sacred remains deposited, in the vault, prepared for Washington, under the Dome of the National Capitol, at as early a period as practicable." This was, of course, only a threat because if there was no place beside her husband, she would not have been interested.91 Evidently, she had not received the assurance immediately, and read in the paper that the Governor and Ozias M. Hatch, another member of the Monument Association, were on the way to see her in Chicago. Nevertheless, she followed with another letter to the Governor on June 10, 1865. "My determination is unalterable," she wrote. If she did not receive a formal and written agreement that the Monument would be placed over her "Beloved" husband's body in Oak Ridge Cemetery, and that only the bodies of the President, his wife, his sons, and his sons' families would be buried there, she would "rigidly comply with my resolution." She had not anticipated that her wishes would not be carried out or she would have "readily yielded to the request of the many and had his precious remains, in the first instance placed in the vault of the National Capitol, a tomb prepared for Washington the Father of his Country and a fit resting place for the immortal Savior and Martyr for Freedom." However, a majority of the members of the Monument association felt compelled to reject Mrs. Lincoln's proposition. Again, the next day, she wrote: "My wish to have the Monument, placed over my Husband's remains, will meet the approval of the whole civilized world...." In time, she won.92 During this very time when Mrs. Lincoln struggled to honor her husband in her own way as his wife and widow, their mutual friend, Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts delivered a eulogy entitled "Promises of the Declaration of Independence and Abraham Lincoln" before a Boston audience in the Music Hall on June 1, 1865 at 4:00 p.m. During the later White House years, Sumner had visited with the Lincolns almost constantly. He attended their receptions, he went to the opera with both of them; he even accompanied them on a trip down to visit Grant's Army in the field. It was a close relationship. Sumner had been at the bedside when the President died on April 15, and Lincoln's son, Robert, had leaned on him through that long night and morning. Sumner pointed out that this was only the second time the American people had been summoned by a President [Andrew Johnson, this time] to unite on an appointed day to commemorate the death of a great leader, the first had been George Washington. "Thus are WASHINGTON and LINCOLN associated in the grandeur of their obsequies," he noted. Sumner explained: It is from the nature of things, and because the part which Lincoln was called to perform resembled in character the part which was performed by Washington. The work left undone by Washington was continued by Lincoln. Kindred in service, kindred in patriotism, each was naturally surrounded at death by kindred homage. One sleeps in the East, and the other sleeps in the West; and thus, in death, as in life, one is the complement of the other.

Then Sumner, the great orator of the United States Senate, compared Washington and Lincoln in that which they were much alike: 91

Baker, Mary Todd Lincoln, pp. 250-251; Mary Lincoln to Richard J. Oglesby, June 5, 1865, in Turner and Turner, Mary Todd Lincoln, pp. 241-242 92 Mary Lincoln to Richard J. Oglesby, Near Chicago, June 10, 1865 in Turner and Turner, Mary Todd Lincoln, pp. 243-244; Mary Lincoln to Richard J. Oglesby, Near Chicago, June 11, 1865; Ibid., pp. 244-245

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Ronald D. Rietveld Each was at the head of the Republic during a period of surpassing trial; and each thought only of the public good, simply, purely, constantly, so that single-hearted devotion to country will always find a synonyme[sic] in their names. Each was the national chief during a time of successful war. Each was the representative of his country at a great epoch of history. But here, perhaps, the resemblance ends and the contrast begins.

But there were also differences between these two great American presidents: Unlike in origin, conversation, and character, they were unlike also in the ideas which they served, except as each was the servant of his country. The war conducted by Washington was unlike the war conducted by Lincoln--as the peace which crowned the arms of the one was unlike the peace which began to smile upon the other. The two wars did not differ in the scale of operations, and in the tramp of mustered hosts, more than in the idea involved. The first was national independence; the second was to make the Republic one and indivisible, on the indestructible foundations of Liberty and Equality. The first only cut the connection with the mother country, and opened the way to the duties and advantages of Popular Government. The second will have failed unless it performs all the original promises of that Declaration which our fathers took upon their lips when they became a Nation.

Charles Sumner, Lincoln friend, seemed to have a clearer view of the contributions which both Washington and Lincoln had made to the Union--contributions which built one upon the other.93 Lincoln's name was now constantly coupled with Washington's. It certainly had begun in the last year of the President's life, as when Seward mentioned them together on the day of Lincoln's second presidential election; but, now funeral banners proclaimed; "Washington the Father, Lincoln the Savior." There were some people who urged that Lincoln be entombed beside Washington at Mount Vernon. But, of course, Mrs. Lincoln would not have consented. After Lincoln's assassination, picture publishers across the nation began transforming the Washington, Lincoln relationship in prints and photographic composites. From May 15, to July 15, Lincoln items were published in bulk, many of them with Washington somewhere on the item.94 During the weeks after the President's death, while the Lincoln Funeral Train made its slow winding journey back to Illinois, Northern preachers and politicians alike drew comparisons between the first president and the sixteenth. Lincoln was even called "the second Father of his Country." They struck the common note that there had been no purer statesman, or wiser, nobler Christian man at the head of the government since the days of Washington. Some preachers called Washington the first Savior of his Country, and Lincoln was the second one; thus, Washington's equal. From this time forward, Washington began to share his glory with Abraham Lincoln. On April 16, 1865, Easter Sunday, and the day after Lincoln's death, Pastor J. G. Butler of St. Paul's Lutheran Church in Washington, D. C. declared: "In all future this name [Lincoln] will stand beside that of Washington. If he was the father of his country, under God,

93

Randall, Mary Lincoln, pp. 355-356; A Memorial of Abraham Lincoln Late President of the United States (Boston: Printed by Order of the City Council, 1865), pp. 92-95 94 Peterson, Lincoln in American Memory, pp. 27-29; Holzer, et al, The Lincoln Image, pp. 164, 187, 192-207

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Abraham Lincoln was its savior." Others pronounced Lincoln even greater than Washington because Lincoln had saved the nation which Washington had founded.95 Young Lincoln had repeatedly spoken in the Indiana and Illinois years of the "Immortal Washington." In death, Abraham Lincoln too had become "immortal." Again the following morning after Lincoln's death, on Easter Sunday morning, another eulogist proclaimed: His hearse is plumed with a nation's grief; his resurrection is hailed with the songs of revolutionary patriots, of soldiers that have died for their country. He, the commander-in-chief 96 has gone to his army of the dead! The patriot President has gone to our Washington!

95

96

.G. Butler, The Martyr President (Washington, D.C.: McGill and Witheron, Printers and Stereotypers, 1865), p. 9. Our Martyr President Abraham Lincoln: Lincoln Memorial Address (New York: The Abingdon Press, nd.), pg. 39

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 279-316

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN’S THOMAS JEFFERSON

Ronald D. Rietveld Abraham Lincoln came into the world, much the same world, that Thomas Jefferson had known, the old slow moving world of sails and horses. Just nine years after George Washington’s life was over, Abraham Lincoln’s life began on a Sunday morning, the twelfth day of the month of February in the year 1809.1 By then, nine years of a new century had passed into history, and a new age had begun. Many of the Revolutionary War generation still survived. In fact, Thomas Jefferson was in his final days as President of the United States, and James Madison was serving as his Secretary of State. Madison soon succeeded Jefferson as the fourth President of the young nation, and James Monroe would then serve as his Secretary of State, the last of the generation of those who were active during the days of the Revolution and the early days of the Republic.

JEFFERSON AS THE HEROIC FIGURE TO THE YOUNG LINCOLN Abraham Lincoln came to idolize Thomas Jefferson as a heroic figure, whose principles became “the definitions and axioms of free society.” Lincoln admired, for a lifetime, the man who had “the coolness, forecast, and capacity to introduce into a merely revolutionary document, an abstract truth, applicable to all men and all times....”2 During those last days of Jefferson’s second term, the president did not feel very heroic. He longed to leave the President’s Mansion and return to his beloved Monticello in the mountains of western Virginia. “Within a few days I retire to my family, my books and farms; and having gained the harbor myself, I shall look on my friends still buffeting the storm, with anxiety indeed, but not with envy,” he wrote a good French friend. “Never did a prisoner, released from his chains, feel such relief as I shall on shaking off the shackles of power.” The nation had avoided war with Europe.33 The long shadow of Napoleon stretched over the eight years of Jefferson’s presidency, and trouble had shaken the nation, and changed its future both for good and ill during his years as president. When he needed money to expand the 1

Genevieve Foster, Abraham Lincoln’s World (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1948), pp. ix-x. “To Henry L. Pierce and Others,” April 6, 1859,” in The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P. Basler, 9 vols (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press in association with the Abraham Lincoln Association, 1953-1955), 3:375-376, hereafter cited as CWAL 3 “Thomas Jefferson to P.S. DuPont de Nemours, March 2, 1809,” in Thomas Jefferson: Writings (New York: The Library of America, 1984), p. 1203 2

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French navy, Napoleon had been willing to sell the great tract of land known as the Louisiana Purchase in 1803; and, President Jefferson’s purchase had thus doubled the size of the territory of the United States, west of the Mississippi River. Controversial as the purchase had been, those who were satisfied soon felt mortification over the damage to American shipping by both France and England on the high seas. In February, 1809, the problem remained unsolved when Abraham Lincoln was born, and Thomas Jefferson was forced by a rebellious Congress to repeal the Embargo which had restricted American ships to American shores. The year of the Louisiana Purchase, 1803, Thomas Lincoln also purchased some land. He bought a 238-acre tract of land near Elizabethtown, the county seat of Hardin County in Kentucky, for one hundred and eighteen pounds [about $200] “in hand paid.”4 During those years, there had been anti-slavery agitation going on within hearing in the area. A number of Baptist ministers in Kentucky started a crusade in 1804 against the institution, which resulted in a warm contest in the denomination and the organization of the “Baptist Licking-Locust Association Friends of Humanity.” On June 12, 1806, two young Baptists, Thomas Lincoln and Nancy Hanks “were joined together in the Holy Estate of Matrimony agreeable to the rules of the Methodist Episcopal Church.” The officiating minister was a Methodist, the Reverend Jesse Head, a friend, who also “talked freely and boldly against slavery.” One of Thomas and Nancy Lincoln’s old friends, Christopher Columbus Graham, who had been present at their wedding, declared: “Tom and Nancy Lincoln and Sally Bush were just steeped full of Jesse Head’s notions about the wrong of slavery and the rights of man as explained by Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine.”5 When young Lincoln was only seven years old, the family moved across the great Ohio River to the new state of Indiana in 1816 where the United States government had surveyed the land and guaranteed titles to the new settlers. Here too, Thomas Jefferson’s Northwest Ordinance of 1787 forbade the institution of slavery. The Ohio River acted as a continuation of the Mason and Dixon Line which divided the free states of the North from the slave states of the South. Just the same, “a system of thinly disguised slavery had existed, but the new state had come in free, despite the fact that, four years after admission, the State still contained one hundred and ninety slaves, most of who lived in the southwest corner of the state where the Lincolns would settle. Thomas and Nancy Lincoln had chosen to leave Kentucky “partly on account of slavery, but chiefly on account of the difficulty in land titles in Ky.”6 Both Thomas and Nancy Lincoln found that both causes were connected in their thinking. They had religious grounds for disliking slavery from the early days of their marriage in Washington County, Kentucky. They joined the Separate Baptist Church where members accepted traditional Calvinist doctrines, but did not espouse any particular creed. Most of the Separate Baptists were also opposed to human slavery and adhered to strict morality. As his parents, Abraham Lincoln was “naturally anti-slavery” and later declared as president in 1864 that “I cannot remember when I did not so think, and feel.”7 Just after the Lincolns moved to Indiana, James Monroe was elected President of the United States in 1817. Less than two years later, in 1819, a question arose which shook the 4

Stefan Lorant, Lincoln: A Picture Story of His Life (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), p. 9 Ida M. Tarbell, The Life of Abraham Lincoln (New York: Lincoln Memorial Association, 1900), 1:34-35 6 Ibid., CWAL, 4:61-62 7 CWAL, 7:281 5

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entire nation. It occurred the same year that Thomas Lincoln married Sarah Bush after the death of his wife Nancy in October, 1818. The Missouri Territory had acquired the required 65,000 settlers to become a new state in the Federal Union. Should Missouri be only where free people could live or should slavery be allowed? Most of the settlers were from Kentucky and Tennessee and desired a slave state. But of the twenty-two states in the Union, eleven were free states and eleven were slave states. The admission of Missouri was blocked when two senators from each state deadlocked on the admission of the new state. “It sounded “like a fire bell in the night” to Thomas Jefferson at Monticello, it “awakened and filled me with terror.” “I considered it at once as the death knell of the Union,” he wrote a friend. “It is hushed, indeed, for the moment.” He warned; “But this is a reprieve only, not a final sentence.”8 The nation had never known such excitement over slavery, and as petitions poured into the Congress, the debate raged on for nearly two years. It was Henry Clay of Kentucky, Lincoln’s future beau ideal of a statesman, who helped drive the Missouri Compromise through the Congress in 1820. Missouri was to be let into the Union as a slave state, but from that point on slavery was to be barred from all territory north of its southern boundary line all the way through Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase. The Missouri Compromise postponed the evil day for the nation. But Jefferson warned that it was only a hush for the moment, but the day of reckoning would still come. And, when it did Abraham Lincoln was there–a moment which changed Lincoln’s life and that of nation Jefferson loved so well. During these years, young Lincoln was growing up in Indiana as a “good boy,” according to his stepmother Sarah Bush Lincoln. Family members and friends all attested to his hunger for knowledge. “He didn’t like physical labor,” she said, but he was “diligent for Knowledge.” Lincoln “wished to Know and if pains and Labor would get it he was sure to get it.” He was the “best boy” she ever knew, and he read all the books he could lay his hands on. He read the Bible some, though not as much as was being said later. But, it was probably the first book Lincoln ever read. “He sought more congenial books–suitable for his age,” she reported. To a friend, he was “always reading, studying, and thinking.” “What Lincoln read he read and re-read–read and Studied thoroughly,” noted his boyhood friend. In fact, “he was generally at the head of all his classes whilst at school, in fact was nearly always so.” “I think newspapers were had in Indiana as Early as 1824 and up to 1830 when we moved to Ills,” noted his stepmother. “Abe was a Constant reader of them.” Mrs. Lincoln was “sure of this for the years of 1827-28-29-30.” In fact, the Louisville Journal, which began publication in November, 1830, was one of them she distinctly remembered. And, he never forgot what he read.9 During the time of young Lincoln’s beginning interest in reading newspapers, the nation celebrated its fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of Bunker Hill on June 15, 1825. The President, James Monroe, and the Congress had felt that it would be most fitting to have present, the gracious and beloved Frenchman who had given so largely in money and service to the American Revolution, and had been a personal aide to General George Washington. General Lafayette arrived on August 15, 1824, and was feasted and feted in a round of

8

Douglas L. Wilson and Rodney O. Davis, eds., Herndon’s Informants: Letters, Interviews, and Statements of Abraham Lincoln (Urbana and Chicago: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1998), p. 106 9 Wilson and Davis, eds., Herndon’s Informants, pp. 106-107; Douglas L. Wilson, Lincoln Before Washington: New Perspectives on the Illinois Years (Urbana and Chicago: Univ. Of Illinois Press, 1997), p. 5

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dinners, receptions, balls, and speeches as he traveled in all the twenty-four states of the Union before departing on September 3, 1825. Thousands wanted to shake his hand. Jefferson had warned his “old affectionate friend” of a real danger that the American people might kill him with kindness, which they nearly did. This was to be a triumphal tour which lasted more than a year and is without parallel in American history. In the course of his journey, Lafayette visited Mount Vernon, the home of his friend Washington. He was accompanied by his son George Washington. Jefferson hoped that the Marquis would make “headquarters with us at Monticello.” He made two memorable visits to Monticello, and was the first official guest of the University of Virginia. Lafayette found Jefferson “much aged” after their last visit thirty-five years before, but “marvelously well” for an eight-one year old man who was “in full possession of all the vigor of his mind and heart.”10 Steamboat transportation was of great importance to the West, because these vessels could ascend as well as descend a river. From 1811 through 1826, there were 160 ships built and launched in the West, and fatalities were heavy. In the spring before young Lincoln began working on the Ohio River, he had no doubt heard the story many times over. In May, 1825, one of the most famous river disasters had occurred above Troy, and involved the Marquis de Lafayette on his triumphal tour through the United States. The Lafayette party had left Nashville, Tennessee on board the steamboat Mechanic, and came up the Mississippi, and entered the Ohio, bound for Louisville. The boat hit a snag and sank, but no lives were lost. Lafayette, his son George Washington, and his party spent the night on the Kentucky shore. The next morning they were picked up by the steamboat Paragon and taken to Louisville. The story is told that the Marquis sought refuge in a cabin on the Indiana shore which belonged to a Mr. Cavender, and held a kind of reception for the neighbors the following morning. Young Lincoln may have also read about Lafayette’s tour in the local papers, as well as hearing the story told about the tragic wreck of the vessel which carried him on the Ohio River.11 “He read diligently,” Sarah Lincoln said. Young Lincoln studied in the daytime, but did not study much at night. He went to bed early, got up early, and then read. She recalled that “Abe read all the books he could lay his hands on; and, when he came across a passage that struck him he would write it down on boards if he had no paper and keep it there till he did get paper.” Then he would re-write it, looked at it, and repeat it. Like Thomas Jefferson, he kept a notebook of his early readings, but it has not survived. Lincoln read histories, papers, and other books. In fact, he once told a friend that he “read through every book he had ever heard of in the country, for a circuit of fifty miles.” He discovered his lifetime heroes, George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and those other patriots of the Revolutionary War generation.

10

Thomas Jefferson to Lafayette, September 3, 1824 in Gilbert Chinard, ed., The Letters of Lafayette and Jefferson (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1919), p. 421; “Thomas Jefferson to Lafayette, October 9, 1824,” in Thomas Jefferson: Writings (New York: The Library of America, 1984), p. 1498; Gilbert Chinard, ed., The Letters of Lafayette and Jefferson (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1919), pp. 358-359. 11 Charles N. Thompson, “General LaFayette in Indiana,” in Indiana Magazine of History, XXIV (1928), pp. 67-69; Louis A. Warren, Lincoln’s Youth: Indiana Years. Seven to Twenty-one, 1816-1830 (New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts, Inc., 1959), p. 149

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Years later, he testified as president-elect to the impact “all the accounts...given of the battlefields, and struggles for the liberties of the country” had on him during those Indiana years while working in the fields and doing the physical labor he did not enjoy. He told a New Jersey audience in 1861: “You all know, for you have all been boys, how these early impressions last longer than others.” “I recollect thinking then, boy even though I was, that there must have been something more than common that those men struggled for.” He continued: I am exceedingly anxious that that thing which they struggled for; that something that held out a great promise to all the people of the world to all time to come; I am exceedingly anxious that this Union, the Constitution, and the liberties of the people shall be perpetuated in accordance with the original idea for which that struggle was made, and I shall be most happy indeed if I shall be a humble instrument in the hands of the Almighty, and of this, his almost chosen people, for perpetuating the object of that great struggle.

INFLUENCE ON A FUTURE PRESIDENT There in the pristine woods of Indiana Lincoln began to idolize Washington and Jefferson. The founding fathers, and the documents of American liberty became an integral part of Lincoln’s entire life, political career, and even his own death and funeral at the end of the “final sentence” which Thomas Jefferson had feared during the Missouri crisis back in 1819.12 It may have been while young Lincoln was in Troy, near the Anderson River where Lincoln helped operate a ferry, and not far from where the Lafayette party had suffered the great Ohio River disaster in 1825, that Lincoln was introduced to a new field of reading; newspapers. The town was an official post office, and newspapers were delivered there by the post rider and were certainly available to anyone who might be interested to read them. Located only a mile and a half from the Lincoln family cabin; Gentry’s Store became a post office on June 15, 1825. There were sixteen papers published in Indiana in the mid 1820s. Certainly occasional copies of Indiana papers would reach Gentry’s Store, but also papers from Louisville, Cincinnati, Lexington, and other eastern cities. It could be days, weeks, or even months before they might arrive, but news was still news to the people of Little Pigeon Creek, Indiana. A friend of the Lincolns, John Romine, later related that he had loaned young Lincoln a paper which contained an editorial on Thomas Jefferson. When the boy returned it, Romine declared, “it seemed he could repeat every word in that editorial and not only that but could recount all the news items as well as all about the advertisements.” This particular issue may have been published in July, 1826, when newspapers were filled with editorials and articles commemorating the fiftieth anniversary celebration of the signing of the Declaration of Independence, and the sudden deaths, a double apotheosis, of the penman and the congressional advocate, Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, on the very day July 4, 1826. 12

Douglas L. Wilson and Rodney O. Davis, eds., Herndon’s Informants (Urbana and Chicago: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1998), p. 107; Noah Brooks, Abraham Lincoln and the Downfall of American Slavery (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1894), pp. 23-24; “Address to the New Jersey Senate at Trenton, New Jersey, February 21, 1861,” in CWAL, 4:236.

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This unusual occasion of both men dying on the fiftieth anniversary of American’s Charter of Liberty made a lasting impression on Abraham Lincoln. He recalled that event thirty-seven years later after a July 4 celebration in the middle of civil war, and a significant northern military victory at a place called Vicksburg, Mississippi.13 While in Indiana “a playmate, schoolfellow, associate and firm friend,” David Turnham of Gentryville, loaned Lincoln The Revised Laws of Indiana[1824]...to which Are Prefixed the Declaration of Independence, The Constitution of the U. S., the Constitution of the State of Indiana and Sundry other Documents, connected with the Political History of the Territory and State of Indiana. It was through this volume, the first law book he ever read, that Lincoln became acquainted with the Declaration of Independence which became “his political chart and inspiration,” according to John Nicolay, his White House secretary. Such reading led Lincoln to try his own hand at such writing. William Wood, a Lincoln neighbor, remembered that “A. Wrote a piece on national politics, saying that the American government was the best form of government in the world for an intelligent people; that it ought to be kept sacred and preserved forever....that the Constitution should be sacred, the Union perpetuated, and the laws revered, and enforced....This was in 1827 or ‘28.” Neighbor Wood showed Lincoln’s article to a lawyer, John Pitcher, practicing in Posey County at that time. “I told him one of my neighbors’ boy wrote it,” said Wood. “He couldn’t believe it till I told him Abe did write it...said to me this: ‘The world can’t beat it.’ He begged for it. I gave it to him and it was published, can’t say what paper it got into.” The seeds of Lincoln’s future reverence for the Union and the determination to keep it sacred and to preserve it forever” may be found in this writing of a young Hoosier boy. This was probably Abraham Lincoln’s first published piece.14 On March 1, 1830, the Lincoln-Hanks-Johnston party of 13 left their Little Pigeon Creek neighbors, and took the Troy-Vincennes trace, an old ridge road running about four miles north of their Pigeon Creek homes. They headed for Macon County, Illinois. Illinois was admitted to the Union as a free state in 1818. In fact, Edward Coles of Albemarle County, a neighbor, with whom Jefferson had often talked about the past, left Virginia and moved to the new state in 1819. As an anti-slavery candidate, Coles was elected to a four-year term as governor in 1822. He had blocked a serious attempt to open Illinois to slavery in 1824, but suffered defeat as a congressional candidate in 1831, not long after the Lincolns had arrived in the state. Since 1826 every general election in Illinois had resulted decisively in favor of Jackson’s friends. When young Lincoln arrived in Illinois, General Andrew Jackson was in the midst of his first Presidential term.15 Lincoln was at home in Illinois, and that summer of 1830, he gave his first political speech in front of Renshaw”s store in Decatur when one of two politicians, candidates for the state legislature, made a bad speech, and failed to follow the custom and offer the crowd drinks. “I turned down a box or Keg and Abe made his Speech,” John Hanks, Lincoln’s cousin, remembered. “Abe beat him to death.” And, when Lincoln was finished speaking, the 13

14

15

John Romine to William H. Herndon, September 14, 1865, in Herndon-Weik MSS, Library of Congress; Louis A. Warren, Lincoln’s Youth: Indiana Years, Seven to Twenty-One, 1816-1830 (New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts, Inc., 1959), pp. 168-169; CWAL, 6:319-20 Warren, Lincoln’s Youth: Indiana Years, pp. 201-202; 169; 265; Wilson and Davis, eds., Herndon’s Informants, pp. 120-123. Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time: The Sage of Monticello (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1981), 6:32526; Joseph H. Barret, Life of Abraham Lincoln (New York: Moore, Wilstach and Baldwin, 1865), p. 49.

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Candidate “took Abe aside and asked him where he had learned So much and what he did so well.” “Abe Explained,” said Hanks,”Stating his manner and method of reading and what he had read: the man Encouraged Lincoln to persevere.” Drawing from his reading of anti-Jackson National Republican newspapers, Lincoln had declared his enthusiasm for Henry Clay’s “American System,” which called for internal improvements, a protective tariff and a national bank. He pled for improving the Sangamon River for transportation. He surprised his hearers when he ended “with “an eloquent picture of the future of Illinois.” “I can say that Abe was never a Democrat,” John Hanks later declared. “He was always a Whig; so was his father before him.” Dennis Hanks disagreed. He believed Lincoln was a Democrat, “after the order of Jackson,” as was his father, but he had become a Whig about 1827-28 or 1828-29. Nathaniel Grigsby later declared: “Lincoln in Early years, say from 1820 to 1825 was tending towards Democracy, He afterwards changed; parties at this time ran Jackson, Adams and others.” “What changed Lincoln,” he said. “I don’t remember, we were all Jackson boys and men at this time in Indiana.” Lincoln’s Indiana neighbor believed that when the Lincolns left Indiana, “they were Jackson men.” In fact, he declared “Abe Lincoln was a Jackson man when he left here, turned whig in illionoi.” It was “Jackson’s opposition to the U.S. Bank and the Crisis that followed Caused them to turn.”161 In 1831, when he was just twenty-two, Lincoln arrived in New Salem which was to be his home for the next six years. It was the largest community Lincoln ever lived in, with about one hundred residents. He longed to better himself and he hungered for education and status. He soon established himself with the men of that commercial village and earned a reputation as a hardworking and a very agreeable young man. “He improved every opportunity to cultivate his intellect....” D. W. Bartlett wrote in his 1860 campaign biography: “He was early distinguished for a disputational turn of mind, and many are the intellectual triumphs of his in the country or village lyceum selected by old settlers who remember him as he then appeared.” In fact, Bartlett noted: “His strong, natural, direct, and irresistible logic marked him there as it has ever since, as an intellectual king.” Here Lincoln became a politician. In fact, one of the first things he did was to vote in an election.17 Lincoln arrived back in New Salem just ten days before the 1832 state election. He immediately applied to for permission to place his name among the candidates for the legislature. The application was a great surprise to him. He was then just twenty-three years old, and had been but a short time a resident of Sangamon County. But his political convictions as a Whig and a supporter of Henry Clay placed him among those who were in almost a hopeless minority. The friends of Henry Clay had little power in Democratic Illinois. But in this his first election, he was voted in his own precinct by political friend and foe alike. His official vote of the New Salem precinct was 277, or one more than the aggregate for both congressional candidates. The vote was the result of his personal popularity acquired by Lincoln during his brief military campaign in the Black Hawk war and the all the soldiers 16

Jane Martin Johns, Personal Recollections of Early Decatur, Abraham Lincoln, Richard J. Oglesby and the Civil War, ed. Howard C. Schaub (Decatur, IL: Decatur Chapter Daughters of the American Revolution, 1912), pp. 60-61; David Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), pp. 36-37; Wilson and Davis, eds., Herndon’s Informant’s, p. 456, CWAL, 3:512; John Hanks to Herndon, n.d., in Herndon-Weik MSS; Warren, Lincoln’s Youth: Indiana Years, 189; Wilson and Davis, eds., Herndon’s Informant’s, pp. 103, 105, 114, 376, 356. 17 D.W. Bartlett, The Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln (New York: A.B. Burdick, 1860), p. 22

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who worked for him and voted for him. However, he was defeated in the general vote. About this time, Lincoln was appointed postmaster by President Jackson, an office which was considered politically insignificant. He was pleased with the appointment, however, because it gave him a chance to read every newspaper taken in the vicinity. “He had never been able to get half the newspapers he wanted before, and the office gave him the prospect of a constant feast,” J. G. Holland noted in his Lincoln biography in 1866.18 In 1834, Lincoln became a candidate for the legislature, and was elected by the highest vote cast for any candidate. At the close of the canvass, he walked to Springfield and borrowed “a load” of books from Major John T. Stuart, an acquaintance from the Black Hawk war, and who advised him to study law, Stuart himself having a lucrative legal practice in Springfield. He began the study of law in good earnest. When it was time for the Illinois Legislature to meet in Vandalia, Lincoln “dropped his law books, shouldered his pack, and, on foot, trudged to Vandalia, then the capital of the state, about a hundred miles, to make his entrance into public life,” according to J. G. Holland in 1865.19 During that first session as an Illinois legislator, he remained a quiet observer of the proceedings, but he was exceptionally faithful in attendance, as the next to the youngest legislator. The legislature began meeting on December 1, 1834, and remained in session until February 13, 1835. Four days after the session began, young Lincoln attended the Illinois General Education Convention which also met at Vandalia. The delegates selected Cyrus Edwards of Madison County President and Stephen Arnold Douglass of Morgan County Secretary pro-tem. Along with four others, Lincoln represented Sangamon County at the Convention. Although he did not play a major role in the battle for universal, free elementary education, he joined the far-sighted politicians of Illinois who advocated such a Jeffersonian program for Illinois. It was Thomas Jefferson who had advanced a well-devised plan for a comprehensive system of public education for the Commonwealth of Virginia in 1779 which was directly linked to the struggle to establish free public elementary schools in Illinois. It was Governor Edward Coles, Jefferson’s friend, who viewed universal education as the natural corollary of a free society. The Convention drafted a memorial to pressure the Legislature, as well as inform the public. Lincoln, who had been at the Convention, was present when the matter was brought to the floor of the Legislature. Although the Legislature did not enact the essential recommendations, Lincoln fully supported Jefferson’s philosophy of education. Back in the 1832 campaign he declared: Upon the subject of education, not presuming to dictate any plan or system respecting it, I can only say that I view it as the most important subject which we as a people can be engaged in.....For my part, I desire to see the time when education, and by its means, morality, sobriety, enterprise and industry, shall become much more general than at present, and should be gratified to have it in my power to contribute something to the advancement of any measure which might have a tendency to accelerate the happy period.

Lincoln’s thoughts about education are Jeffersonian in tone. He accepted Jefferson’s announcement that; if the people are enlightened, tyranny and the oppression of body and mind will vanish. The Monticello sage also believed that an educated population would thus 18 19

J.G. Holland, The Life of Abraham Lincoln (Springfield, MA: Gurdon Bill, 1866), pp. 53, 56. Ibid., p. 65.

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preserve constitutional principles and enact progressive legislative measures. Lincoln knew the Jeffersonian credo.20 During this time Lincoln was much concerned with his own education, he also began to read American history in earnest, and paid special attention to the revolution, the Federalist era, and Hamilton’s fiscal programs. He liked Henry Clay’s nationalism, his economic program, his goal of sectional interdependence, and his stand on colonization. Clay applauded the national programs of Alexander Hamilton, and Lincoln applauded both. Lincoln accepted the doctrines of the founding fathers and thus he adhered to Hamilton’s ideas of utilizing banks as fiscal agencies of government. Thus, Lincoln built a reputation as a leading and effective Whig “internal improvements” man and won reelection to the state legislature and received his license to practice law in the same year of 1836. The following year, 1837, he left New Salem and moved to Springfield and was elected for a third term to the state legislature the following year.21 The Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield was a leading cultural force in the fast growing community. Lincoln delivered a lecture on “The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions” before the Lyceum on January 27, 1838. His interest in the founding fathers of the Republic had been on his mind since those young years in Indiana. Now he had the opportunity to express his deep concern for the perpetuation of their memory and their sacred principles in a nation which was endangered by the growth of social disorder. The slavery controversy had further increased sectionalism and destroyed any national consensus during Jackson’s presidential years. Using the thoughts of Jefferson, he pled: As the patriots of seventy-six did to the support of the Declaration of Independence, so to the support of the Constitution; and Laws, let every American pledge his life, his property, and his sacred honor....Let reverence for the laws, be breathed by every American mother, to the lisping babe, that prattles on her lap–let it be taught in schools, in seminaries, and in colleges;–let it be written in Primmers [sic.], spelling books, and in Almanacs;–let it be preached from the pulpit, proclaimed in legislative halls, and enforced in courts of justice. And, in short, let it become the political religion of the nation; and let the old and the young, the rich and the poor, the grave and the gay, of all sexes and tongues, and colors and conditions, sacrifice unceasingly upon its altars.

The situation in the country was crucial, however. As the revolutionary generation was passing from the scene, they must not be forgotten. Although “like every thing else, they must fade upon the memory of the world, and grow more and more dim by the lapse of time,” he averred. “They were the pillars of the temple of liberty; and now, that they have crumbled away, that temple must fall, unless we, their descendants, supply their places with other pillars, hewn from the solid quarry of sober reason.” The nation must rely on “reason, cold, calculating, unimpassioned reason.” This is the Jeffersonian spirit of education for civic

20

21

David Donald, Lincoln, p. 53; Edward W. Ellsworth, “Lincoln and the Education Convention; Education in Illinois–A Jeffersonian Heritage” in Lincoln Herald, Vol. 80, No. 2 (1978), pp. 69-71, 75-76; CWAL, 1:8; R.O. Honeywell, The Educational Work of Thomas Jefferson (Cambridge, 1931). Ibid., p. 65; Stephen B. Oats, With Malice Toward None: The Life of Abraham Lincoln (New York: Mentor Books, 1978), pp. 20-21; Benjamin P. Thomas, Abraham Lincoln: A Biography (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), p. 80.

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responsibility which was fused with Lincoln’s thinking for progressive citizenship on the American frontier.22 As one of the more experienced members, Lincoln served on no fewer than fourteen committees, which included the important finance committee. Although most of his work was done behind the scenes, organizing and managing the Whig minority, Lincoln participated in a major debate on the floor between Democrats and Whigs in the Hall of the House of Representatives at Springfield during the week of Christmas, 1839. He concluded the Whig argument on the Sub-Treasury, trying to show that Washington and Madison signed the United States Bank bill which made it constitutional. However, he declared that “the last ten years under General Jackson and Mr. Van Buren, cost more money than the first twenty-seven did (including the heavy expenses of the late British war), under Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and Madison.23 In a campaign circular from the Whig Committee in March 1843, over Lincoln’s signature, are the thoughts of the third President. “The question of protection is entirely too broad to be crowded into a few pages only, together with several other subjects,” it reads. Because of that, Lincoln and his friends gave extracts from the writings of Jefferson, Jackson and Calhoun. He quoted Jefferson’s letter to Benjamin Austin (April 6, 1816) in supporting a federal tariff for the promotion of domestic manufacture. Jefferson wrote: To be independent for the comforts of life, we must fabricate them ourselves. We must now place the manufacturer by the side of the agriculturalist. The grand inquiry now is, shall we make our own comforts, or go without them at the will of a foreign nation? He, therefore who is now against domestic manufactures must be for reducing us either to dependence on that foreign nation, or to be clothed in skins and to live like wild beasts in dens and caverns. I am not one of those; experience has taught me that manufactures are now as necessary to our independence as to our comfort.

This was one of the first instances of Lincoln invoking Jefferson’s name for substantial support on an issue. As a loyal Whig, he began to invoke Jeffersonian principles. More and more, Lincoln came to believe that the Declaration of Independence contained the highest political truths in the history of all humankind; all men are created equal, and are entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Since the days as a boy in Indiana, he had acquired a very deep reverence for that document. Jefferson offered more support for Lincoln’s various positions, and he now began to quote the author of the Declaration of Independence, his platform, his confession of faith, more frequently.24 Lincoln was elected to Congress in 1846, but he had over a year to prepare because the Thirtieth Congress did not assemble until December 1847. The Lincolns arrived in the nation’s capital city on December 2, 1847. However, after a while; Mrs. Lincoln and the boys, Robert and Eddie, returned to her home in Lexington, Kentucky, leaving the congressman by himself at the boarding house. Little is known of Lincoln’s activities in the city from his arrival until his departure in March 1849. But, there seems no question that he frequented the congressional library which was across the street from the boardinghouse of Mrs. Ann G. Sprigg where he lived [the site 22

“Address Before the Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois, January 27, 1838,” in CWAL, 1:112, 115. David Donald, Lincoln, p. 75; Speech on the Sub-Treasury, December [26], 1839, in CWAL, 1:172-173 24 “Campaign Circular from Whig Committee,” March 4, 1843, in CWAL, 1:310 23

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which the Library of Congress occupies today]. The Library was housed in an impressive suite of rooms and served as a popular meeting place for any sociable young congressman, as well as an excellent place to research his congressional speeches. The Library contained a large number of books which had belonged to Jefferson, one of his earliest heroes. The acquisition of Jefferson’s 6,700 volumes was the beginning of the new Congressional Library after the British had burned the original in 1814. The books were still arranged according to Jefferson’s classification system. Lincoln could easily identify the books which had once belonged to Jefferson because they were plainly marked on the first page: “The Works to which the letter J. is prefixed, were in the Library of the late President Jefferson, when it was purchased by Congress in 1815.” Lincoln had an opportunity to vote for the purchase of Jefferson’s papers in his first year in Congress. Thus, while researching his speeches, Congressman Lincoln carried back to the boardinghouse, books which belonged to Thomas Jefferson.25 Lincoln was the only Whig representative from Illinois, and he was fully aware that he would have little influence with the Polk Administration. He was no novice in politics or legislation, and he certainly understood every phase of the great questions which agitated Congress and divided the people. Although he saw the opportunity to help the Whig party with fresh leadership, he was fully aware that many of the traditional Whig issues; were now dated. Although one of them may have been federal support of internal improvements, he saw an opportunity to at least address the issue. The subject of internal improvements had long been one in which Lincoln had taken special interest. In the Illinois Legislature he had favored the policy to develop the States’ resources by fostering aid of the local government as far as he could, under the constraints of the Democratic majority. He had been capable of delivering an eloquent and impressive speech on that subject before the River and Harbor Improvement Convention in Chicago. It had been “an electrifying address.” On June 20, 1848, Lincoln delivered his carefully researched speech before the House of Representatives. Lincoln favored improvements. “There are few things wholly evil, or wholly good,” he admitted. “Almost everything, especially of governmental policy, is an inseparable compound of the two: so that our best judgment of the preponderance between them is continually demanded.” Lincoln had found a flaw in President Polk’s veto message on an improvement bill. Although others had addressed the constitutional argument, he would “attempt but little more than a brief notice of what some of them have said.” Lincoln then corrected Polk’s use of Thomas Jefferson. “In relation to Mr. Jefferson’s views, I read from Mr. Polk’s veto message– President Jefferson, in his message to Congress in 1806, recommended an amendment of the constitution, with a view to apply an anticipated surplus in the Treasury “to the great purposes of the public education, roads, rivers, canals, and such other objects of public improvements as it may be thought proper to add to the constitutional enumeration of the federal powers;” and he adds: “I suppose an amendment to the constitution, by consent of the States, necessary, because the objects now recommended are not among those enumerated in the constitution,

25

Douglas L. Wilson, “What Jefferson and Lincoln Read: An Essay on Literacy and Achievement,” in The Atlantic (January 1991), pp. 51-62

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Ronald D. Rietveld and to which it permits the public moneys to be applied.” In 1825, he repeated, in his published letters, the opinion that no such power has been conferred upon Congress.

Lincoln noted that he was introducing this quote, “not to controvert, just now the constitutional opinion, but to show that on the question of expedience, Mr. Jefferson’s opinion was against the present president–that this opinion of Mr. Jefferson, in one branch at least, is, in the hands of Mr. Polk, like McFingal’s gun; “Bears wide, and kicks the owner over.” Although humor was a part of his attack, Lincoln quoted one Democrat president against another, proving that he read Jefferson better than the President himself.26 Lincoln revised a speech delivered on the floor of the House of Representatives on July 27, 1848 as a campaign document in which he used Thomas Jefferson’s words. Democrats criticized the Whig candidate for president, General Zachary Taylor, for his position on the veto power. Lincoln wanted to show that Taylor agreed with the earlier statesmen on this question. Lincoln said: “He sought and obtained on the constitutional question the separate written opinions of Jefferson, Hamilton, and Edmund Randolph; they then being respectively Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, and Attorney General” in Washington’s cabinet. Hamilton’s opinion was for the veto power, said Lincoln; while Randolph and Jefferson were both against it. “Mr. Jefferson, after giving his opinion decidedly against the constitutionality of that bill, closes his letter with the paragraph which I now read,” he told the House: It must be admitted, however, that, unless the President’s mind, on a view of every thing, which is urged for and against this bill, is tollerably [sic] clear that it is unauthorized by the constitution; if the pro and the con hang so even as to ballance [sic] his judgment, a just respect for the wisdom of the legislature, would naturally decide the ballance [sic] in favor of their opinion: it is chiefly for cases, where they are clearly misled by error, ambition, or interest, that the constitution has placed a check in the negative of the President. February 15–1791 Thomas Jefferson--

According to Lincoln, “it is here seen that, in Mr. Jefferson’s opinion, if on the constitutionality of any given bill, the President doubts, he is not to veto it...but is to defer to congress, and approve it.” Lincoln said that if the opinions of Jefferson and Taylor were compared, “we shall find them more exactly alike, than we can often find any two expressions, having any litteral [sic.] difference. Using Biblical criticism, Lincoln then went on to originally say: “They are more alike than the accounts of the crucifixion, as given by an two of the evangelists, more alike, or at least as much alike, as any two accounts of the inscription, written and erected by Pilate at that time.” Then he substituted the sentence with another: “None but interested fault-finders, I think, can discover any substantial variation.”27 Lincoln continued to draw upon his research on Jefferson for various issues, political and otherwise. And when Lincoln delivered eulogy for President Zachary Taylor at Chicago on July 25, 1850; he noted that “near the commencement of our last war with Great Britain, he was appointed by President Jefferson, a lieutenant in the 7th regiment of Infantry.” And, that 26

J.G. Holland, Life of Abraham Lincoln, pp. 89-90; Speech in United States House of Representatives on Internal Improvements, June 20, 1848, in CWAL, 1:485. The Polk-Jefferson quotation is a newspaper clipping which Lincoln had pasted on to his manuscript

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on his return from war with the Indians, where he completely repulsed them, he returned to find a letter from President Madison, “who had succeeded Mr. Jefferson,” which conferred on him a major’s brevet for “his gallant defence of Fort Harrison.”28 When Henry Clay died in June, 1852, Lincoln delivered a eulogy in the House of Representatives on July 6. And, he began with the opening line: “On the fourth day of July, 1776; the people of a few feeble and oppressed colonies of Great Britain, inhabiting a portion of the Atlantic coast of North America, publicly declared their national independence, and made their appeal to the justice of their cause, and to the God of battles, for the maintainance [sic] of that declaration.” “The infant nation, and the infant child, began the race of life together,” he noted. While eulogizing Clay, Lincoln again employed the felicitous phrase, and Jefferson’s keen insight. He noted that when Missouri “knocked at the door of the Union for admission” in 1819, that “a fearful and angry struggle instantly followed.” Jefferson saw the danger while in retirement, Lincoln noted. Jefferson was awakened, and filled with terror, he said, by this “fire bell in the night.” It was “at once as the knell of the Union,” but not yet “a final sentence.” Then he quoted Jefferson: A geographical line, co-inciding [sic] with a marked principle, moral and political, once conceived, and held up to the angry passions of men, will never be obliterated; and every irritation will mark it deeper and deeper. I can say, with conscious truth, that there is not a man on earth who would sacrifice more than I would to relieve us from this heavy reproach, in any practicable way. The cession of that kind of property, for so it is misnamed, is a bagatelle which would not cost me a second thought, if, in that way, a general emancipation, and expatriation could be effected; and, gradually, with due sacrifices I think it might be. But as it is, we have the wolf by the ears and we can neither hold him, nor safely let him go. Justice is in one scale, and self-preservation in the other.

Clay was “on principle and in feeling, opposed to slavery,” and yet he owned slaves, Lincoln averred. Clay opposed those abolitionists “who would shiver into fragments the Union of these States; tear to tatters its now venerated constitution; and even burn the last copy of the Bible, rather than slavery should continue a single hour....” But, he also opposed those Southern hotheads who, in their idolatry of slavery, denied the assertion of Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence that “all men are created equal.”29 Political maneuvering which ended with the repeal of the Missouri Compromise began during the Congressional session of 1852-3, when a bill to organize the Nebraska Territory passed the House of Representatives. It did not mention the repeal of the Missouri Compromise and thus was strongly opposed by Southern congressmen. Southerners demanded that the Compromise be explicitly repealed. When the Kansas-Nebraska bill came out of the Senatorial Committee on Territories with the explicit repeal which would permit slavery above 36 30, it raised “a hell of a storm,” as Stephen A. Douglas, the Chairman, predicted. Across the nation, as well as on the Senate floor, rage and bitter debate broke out after the bill came before the Senate on January 23, 1854. Traveling the Eighth Judicial Circuit in Illinois, Lincoln grew more and more pensive, as his companions noticed. While attending 27

Speech in U.S. House of Representatives on the Presidential Question, July 27, 1848, in CWAL, 1:502-503 “Eulogy on Zachary Taylor, July 25, 1850,” in CWAL, 2:83-84 29 “Eulogy on Henry Clay, July 6, 1852,” in CWAL, 2:128:129 28

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court in Urbana, word arrived of the bill’s passage. Lincoln declared that the news had roused him “as he had never been before. As Jefferson before him in 1819, Abraham Lincoln too heard the, ”fire bell in the night.” And, if it did not fill Lincoln with “terror,” as it did Jefferson, it appeared to be another “knell of the Union,” as it stirred the depths of his soul.30

JEFFERSON, LINCOLN, AND THE REPUBLICAN PARTY When the Kansas-Nebraska Act passed the Congress and was signed into law by President Franklin Pierce, thousands of Northern Democrats withdrew from their party in furor. The Whig Party, already divided along northern and southern lines, ceased to be an effective national party; although, it lingered some time longer in the northern states. Former Liberty Party members, and Free Soil Party adherents, now joined the anti-slavery Democrats in Ripon, Wisconsin to organize a new party to resist the extension of slavery in the KansasNebraska territories. In Washington, several members of Congress advocated the same course at a Boarding House. That summer, a great fusion mass meeting met at Jackson, Michigan on July 6; and adopted the name Republican in emulation of Thomas Jefferson’s Democratic-Republican Party. The Republican Party claimed Jefferson as its political saint, and Republicanism was presented as true Jeffersonianism. This new party was born by “natural combustion,” as evidenced by seven states which claimed to be the birthplace of the new Republican Party. Initially, in Illinois, the Republican Party was composed mostly of former Free-Soilers, and abolitionists.31 Lincoln was so deeply moved. “Suddenly he had a new purpose and a new chance;” Professor Don E. Fehrenbacher wrote in Prelude to Greatness: Lincoln in the 1850s. “For the next six years he poured his energies without stint into the battle against the extension of slavery and in the process raised himself to the presidency.” Lincoln had always been opposed to the institution of slavery as a moral wrong, although he had not enlisted actively in the crusade against it before. Professor Fehrenbacher wrote that “his primary concern; and this cannot be stated too emphatically, as with the moral status of slavery in a nation originally dedicated to the inalienable rights of man,” as declared in the Nation’s birth certificate. More and more, Lincoln had let his mind dwell on Jefferson and his principles. In the summer of 1854, he began to reveal a great familiarity with Jefferson’s history, his views, and his writings. He wrote a fragment on Government, which was very Jeffersonian, in which he declared: The legitimate object of government, is to do for a community of people, whatever they need to have done, but can not do, at all, or can not, so well do, for themselves–in their separate, and individual capacities. In all that the people can individually do as well for themselves, government ought not to interfere.

30 31

Benjamin P. Thomas, Abraham Lincoln, pp. 139-143 Ibid., pp. 144-145; W.G. Bean, “Anti-Jeffersonianism in the Ante-Bellum South,” in Caroli The North Carolina Historical Review, Vol. XII, No. 3, April, 1935, p. 104

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Slavery and free society were absolutely incompatible. Now he began to publicly speak out against the moral wrong of slavery after many months of study and reflection32. There is no exact moment when Lincoln ceased to be a Whig and became a Republican. Certainly, he espoused Jeffersonian principles as a Whig, and this did not change when he became a Republican. In fact, if anything, his use of Jefferson began to increase when Southerners were becoming more, and more less, certain that Jefferson spoke for their cause. His candidacy for the Illinois State Legislature was announced on September 4, 1854. After that time, he averaged about one speech a week. In his speeches, he went over much of the same arguments. He spoke at Bloomington, Illinois on September 12, 1854, and declared there was a vast difference between tolerating slavery where it existed, protecting the slaveholders’ rights granted them by the Constitution, “and extending slavery over a territory already free, and uncontaminated with the institution.” Virginia owned almost all of what became the State of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Then he drew upon Jefferson: Thomas Jefferson, being a Virginian, proposed the cession of this territory to the general government, and in carrying out the measure, had the clause especially inserted, that slavery should never be introduced into it. Kentucky belonged also to Virginia, but was settled as a part of the State of Virginia, so that slavery was carried there by the first settlers from Virginia, and was admitted into the Union with the institution existing there.

He declared: Jefferson saw the necessity of our government possessing the whole valley of the Mississippi; and though he acknowledged that our Constitution made no provision for the purchasing of territory, yet he thought that the exigency of the case would justify the measure, and the purchase was made.

Lincoln acknowledged that Louisiana possessed the institution of slavery long before Jefferson bought the territory from Napoleon, and thus, without opposition, Louisiana had been admitted as a slave state. There had been no opposition because the right to hold slaves belonged to her citizens.33 Two weeks later, Lincoln was invited back to speak in Bloomington. He intended to meet Senator Douglas’ main position. He began with explaining just what was the Missouri Compromise? “Under the auspices of Jefferson an Ordinance was enacted in 1787 prohibiting slavery forever in that [Northwest] territory.” “Mr. Jefferson purchased for $15,000,000 the territory of Louisiana, which was afterwards divided and two territories formed there from, New Orleans, and St. Louis.” The Missouri Compromise was a contract made between the North and the South, by which the former got all the Louisiana purchase north, and the latter all south, of the line of 36.30 within that territory. Lincoln pointed out: “There was no show of sense in endeavoring to make this bargain apply to any future territory acquired by the United States.”34 At Springfield, on October 4, 1854; Lincoln spoke, and Douglas responded, taking on the tone of a real debate. He drew upon the Founding Fathers, including Jefferson, when he took 32

Don E. Fehrenbacher, Prelude to Greatness: Lincoln in the 1850s (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 23-25; “Fragment on Government [July 1, 1854?],” in CWAL, 2:220. 33 “Speech at Bloomington, Illinois, September 12, 1854,” in CWAL, 2:231

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up the anti-slavery ordinance of 1787; that had been applied to all the Northwest Territory. Lincoln presented that the act of the fathers of our republic, the vindicators of our liberty, and the framers of our governments, as the best exposition of their views of slavery as an institution. Their Northwest Ordinance of 1787 declared that slavery should never exist in the territory north and west of the Ohio River. He then took up the Missouri Compromise, and showed it to be a real compromise between both North and South. And, then he recited the history of the Wilmot Proviso. Thus, he gave the history of slavery prohibition down to the current time when it was “descending from the high republican faith of our ancestors.” “We no longer have a choice between freedom and slavery,” In fact, we are proclaiming ourselves “political hypocrites before the world, by thus fostering Human Slavery and proclaiming ourselves, at the same time, the solid friends of Human Freedom,” Lincoln said, shadowing Jefferson’s famous clause. “Their theory of our government is Universal Freedom,” he noted. “‘All men are created free and equal,” says the Declaration of Independence.”35 By the time Lincoln spoke in Peoria, Illinois on October 16, 1854; his message was well polished and fully recorded. Thus, of all his speeches in 1854, the “Peoria Speech” became the most famous. Senator Douglas spoke first to a large crowd. After three hours, when Douglas closed, there was a loud call for Lincoln who was expected to answer Douglas. This was by agreement and had already been announced by Douglas himself. Lincoln said that he would speak in about an hour and a half. Lincoln encouraged the audience to get their supper and return. Lincoln was well prepared. Early in his speech, he introduced Jefferson to his audience: Mr. Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of Independence, and otherwise a chief actor in the revolution; then a delegate in Congress; afterwards twice President; who was, is, and perhaps will continue to be, the most distinguished politician of our history; a Virginian by birth and continued residence, and withal, a slave-holder, conceived the idea of taking that occasion, to prevent slavery ever going into the north-western territory. He prevailed on the Virginia Legislature to adopt his views, and to cede the territory, making the prohibition of slavery therein, a condition of the deed. Congress accepted the cession, with the 36 condition...that slavery should never be permitted therein.

Thus, Lincoln pointed out, it was with Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of Independence, that the policy of prohibiting slavery in new territory originated. He then developed the history of the purchase of the Louisiana Territory in 1803 and the Missouri Compromise of 1820. But, the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854, and the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, changed all of that. There is a right of self-government, of course. But, Douglas misapplied it. He uses it to protect the White population only. He boldly declared: When the white man governs himself that is self-government; but when he governs himself, and also governs another man, that is more than self-government–that is despotism. If the 34

“Speech at Bloomington, Illinois, September 26, 1854,” in CWAL, 2:235, 238. “Speech at Springfield, Illinois, October 4, 1854,” in CWAL, 2:240, 242, 245 36 “Speech at Peoria, Illinois, October 16, 1854,” in CWAL, 2:249 35

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negro is a man, why then my ancient faith teaches me that “all men are created equal;” and that there can be no moral right in connection with one man’s making a slave of another...No man is good enough to govern another man, without that other’s consent.

This is the leading principle, Lincoln declared. It is “the sheet anchor of American Republicanism.” Lincoln cited this “sheet anchor:” Our Declaration of Independence says: “We hold these truths to be self evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, DRIVING THEIR JUST POWERS FROM THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED.”

Lincoln explained that he had quoted the Declaration at length “to show that according to our ancient faith, the just powers of governments are derived from the consent of the governed.” And, the relation of masters and slaves was, PRO TANTO, a total violation of that principle. Lincoln thus objected to the “NEW position” which the avowed principle of the Nebraska law gave to slavery. “I object to it because it assumes that there CAN be MORAL RIGHT in the enslaving of one man by another.” Lincoln aligned the principle of the Jefferson’s Declaration with the moral issue of slavery.37 Eighty years before, Lincoln noted, “we began by declaring that all men are created equal; but now from that beginning we have run down to the other declaration, that for SOME men to enslave OTHERS is a “sacred right of self-government.” “These principles can not stand together,” he declared. “They are as opposite as God and mammon; and whoever holds to the one, must despise the other. One member of Congress called the Declaration of Independence “a self-evident lie:” If this had been said in old Independence Hall, seventyeight years before, “the very door-keeper would have throttled the man, and thrust him into the street.” In making profit of the Negro, Lincoln warned his fellow countrymen to beware “lest we ‘cancel and tear to pieces’ even the white man’s charter of freedom’–the Declaration of Independence.” And, then, not yet a member of the new Republican Party, Lincoln gave voice to the heart of its platform: Our republican robe is soiled, and trailed in the dust. Let us re-purify it. Let us turn and wash it white, in the spirit, if not the blood, of the Revolution. Let us turn slavery from its claims of “moral right,” back upon its existing legal rights, and its arguments of “necessity.” Let us return it to the position our fathers gave it; and there let it rest in peace. Let us re-adopt the Declaration of Independence, and with it the practices, and policy, which harmonize with it. Let north and south–let all Americans–let all lovers of liberty everywhere–join in the great and good work. If we do this, we shall not only have saved the Union; but we shall have so saved it, as to make, and to keep it, forever worthy of the saving. We shall have so saved it, that the succeeding millions of free happy people, the world over, shall rise up, and call us 38 blessed, to the latest generations.

During 1855, Lincoln’s law practice absorbed most of his time. However, he continued to follow events closely, and became more concerned with the growing consolidation of 37 38

Ibid., 2:266 Ibid., 2:274-276

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Southern opinion regarding the institution of slavery. Southern statesmen like Thomas Jefferson had favored the gradual extinction of the peculiar institution, but a new radical breed of “fire-eaters” emerged in the South who favored, not only its perpetuation, but its extension. These Southern anti-Jeffersonians were the aggressive slave element that would precipitate secession in 1860-1861. Lincoln and William H. Herndon, his law partner, subscribed to both the Richmond Enquirer and the Charleston Mercury, which were rabidly pro-slavery. And, Lincoln observed the growing rejection of the democratic ideals of Jefferson by the leaders across the ante-bellum South. Herndon had purchased a copy of the extreme Virginian George Fitzhugh’s Sociology for the South in which he characterized Jefferson as the “architect of ruin, the inaugurator of anarchy.”39 The more Lincoln thought about these issues in the summer of 1855, the more pessimistic he became. By the end of 1855, Lincoln was ready to join the Republican ranks. Republicans held their first national convention in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania on Washington’s Birthday. On that same day, a group of anti-slavery editors made plans for a ”state convention of AntiNebraska party of Illinois” to meet at Bloomington on May 29, 1856. Lincoln as a prominent leader; delivered a major address, the so-called “Lost Speech.” He was “ready to fuse with anyone who would unite with him to oppose slave power.” “It was to be remembered that the Union must be preserved in the purity of its principles as well as in the integrity of its territorial parts,” he declared. It must be “Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable,” he said. 40 Lincoln campaigned earnestly for John C. Fremont, the first Republican presidential candidate across Illinois. Although few of Lincoln’s 1856 campaign speeches have survived, we have the text of his speech at Vandalia, Illinois on September 25. He objected to the Southern Democrats trying to stigmatize the Republican Party as “fanatical and disunion” sectional party. Some of the southern hotheads had even threatened to secede from the Union if Fremont was elected. He attempted to clearly demonstrate that the Republicans were walking in the “old paths” of the Founding Fathers, and quoted Washington, Jefferson, and others to support his case. After the election was over, Lincoln returned to his law practice.41 When the Supreme Court issued the Dred Scott Decision in March, 1857, Lincoln was troubled by the assertion that neither the Declaration of Independence nor the Constitution ever intended to include blacks. After Senator Douglas returned to Illinois, and declared that the Negro was not included in the Declaration of Independence, and appealed to the negrophobic in Illinois. Two weeks later, Lincoln answered Chief Justice Taney and Senator Douglas. Taney questioned whether blacks were included in the Declaration of Independence at the time it was written during the Revolutionary generation. “In those days,” said Lincoln, “our Declaration of Independence was held sacred by all, and thought to include all.” But now, in Lincoln’s own day, while trying to make the Negro’s bondage universal and eternal, the Declaration “is assailed, and sneered at, and construed, and hawked at, and torn, till, if its framers could rise from their graves, they could not at all recognize it.”

39

George Fitzhugh, Sociology for the South (Richmond, Virginia, 1854); David Donald, Lincoln, p. 187 “Speech at Bloomington, Illinois, May 29, 1856,” in CWAL, 2:341 41 “Speech at Vandalia, Illinois, September 23, 2856,” in CWAL, 2:377-378 40

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As Republicans insist that the Declaration of Independence includes ALL men, black as well as white; Douglas boldly denied that it includes Negroes at all. Even in his opinion in the Dred Scott case, Chief Justice Taney admitted that the Declaration’s language was broad enough to include the whole human family; but both he and Douglas argued that “the authors of that instrument did not intend to include Negroes.” In the phrase “all men are created equal,” Lincoln said the Declaration “set up a standard maxim for free society, which should be familiar to all, and revered by all; constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly spread and deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people of all colors everywhere.”42 Lincoln was selected by the Illinois Republicans to run for Douglas’ senatorial seat in Springfield on June 16, 1858. A month later, Senator Douglas spoke in the House of Representatives in Springfield; and that evening Lincoln answered him. Lincoln admitted that it is tedious reading from documents in public speaking, but he did so. “I shall read from a letter written by Mr. Jefferson in 1820, and now to be found in the seventh volume of his correspondence, at page 177.” Lincoln’s research skills were clearly evident as he could quote Jefferson, chapter and verse.43 Lincoln’s conviction that the nation was based on an idea, that all men are created equal, became the subject which threaded through Lincoln and Douglas’s joint debates the summer and fall of 1858. Before his first joint debate with Douglas, Lincoln spoke at Lewistown, Illinois on August 17 where a reporter wrote his story at the scene of the speech and transcribed verbatim the peroration on the Declaration of Independence. Lincoln quoted Jefferson’s opening lines of the Declaration, and then declared it to be the majestic interpretation of the economy of the Universe by those representatives in old Independence Hall. “This was their lofty, and wise, and noble understanding of the justice of the Creator to His creatures,” he said. This was for “all His creatures, to the whole great family of man.” “In their enlightened belief, nothing stamped with the Divine image and likeness was sent into the world to be trodden on and degraded and imbruted by its fellows.” Not only did these representatives at Independence Hall include all the race of man then living, but they reached forward and seized upon the farthest posterity. They erected a beacon to guide their children and their grandchildren, and the countless myriads that should inhabit the Earth in other ages. He now hit his stride: Wise statesmen as they were, they knew the tendency of prosperity to breed tyrants, and so they established these great self-evident truths, that when in the distant future some man, some faction, some interest, should set up the doctrine that none but rich men, or none but white men, were entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, their posterity might look up again to the Declaration of Independence and take courage to renew the battle which their fathers began–so that truth, and justice, and mercy, and all the humane and Christian virtues might not be extinguished from the land; so that no man would hereafter dare to limit and circumscribe the great principles on which the temple of liberty was being built.

And, then “with great earnestness, Lincoln concluded:

42 43

“Speech at Springfield, Illinois, June 26, 1857,” in CWAL, 2:403-407 “Speech at Springfield, Illinois, July 17, 1858, in CWAL, 2:516-517

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Ronald D. Rietveld Now, my countrymen, if you have been taught doctrines conflicting with the great landmarks of the Declaration of Independence; if you have listened to suggestions which would take away from its grandeur, and mutilate the fair symmetry of its proportions; if you have been inclined to believe that all men are not create equal in those inalienable rights enumerated by our chart of liberty, let me entreat you to come back. Return to the fountain whose waters spring close by the blood of the Revolution.

As an old fashioned evangelist from the frontier, he declared he was willing to lay his life on the altar of sacrifice: Think nothing of me–take no thought for the political fate of any man whomsoever–but come back to the truths that are in the Declaration of Independence. You may do anything with me you choose, if you will be heed these sacred principles. You may not only defeat me for the Senate, but you may take me and put me to death. While pretending no indifference to earthly honors, I do claim to be actuated in this contest by something higher than an anxiety for office. I charge you to drop every paltry and insignificant thought for any man’s success. It is nothing; I am nothing; Judge Douglas is nothing. But do not destroy that immortal emblem of Humanity–the Declaration of American Independence.44

At their first joint debate at Ottawa, August 21, Lincoln declared: “there is no reason in the world why the Negro is not entitled to all the natural rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” “I hold that he is as much entitled to these as the white man.” Maybe he is not equal “in many respects, certainly not in color, perhaps not in moral or intellectual endowment, “but in the right to eat the bread, without the leave of anybody else, which his own hand earns, he is my equal and the equal of Judge Douglas, and the equal of every living man.” Douglas and his friends had placed the institution of slavery on a “new basis” which only perpetuated and nationalized slavery. Lincoln posited: “Now I believe if we could arrest the spread, and place it where Washington, and Jefferson, and Madison placed it, it would be in the course of ultimate extinction, and the public mind would, as for eighty years past, believe that it was in the course of ultimate extinction.” This was the “original basis–the basis upon which our fathers placed it.” “I am fighting it upon these ‘original principles’–fighting it in the Jeffersonian, Washingtonian, and Madisonian fashion. During the third debate at Jonesboro on September 15, Lincoln quoted a resolution from 1850 in which the principles of the Ordinance of 1787 received “the sanction of Thomas Jefferson, who is acknowledged by all to be the great oracle and expounder of our faith.”45 At Galesburg, Lincoln and Douglas once again discussed Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence, and what he intended to include or exclude. Douglas insisted that Negroes were not included in that document and that “it is a slander upon the framers of that instrument, to suppose that Negroes were meant therein.” Douglas had queried if it was possible to believe that Mr. Jefferson, who penned the immortal paper, could have supposed himself applying the language of that instrument to the Negro race, and yet held a portion of that race in slavery? Lincoln answered:

44 45

“Speech at Lewistown, Illinois, August 17, 1858, in CWAL, pp. 546-547 “First Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Ottawa, Illinois, August 21, 1858,” in CWAL, 3:16-19; “Third Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Jonesboro, Illinois,” in CWAL, 3:124

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I only have to remark upon this part of the Judge’s speech (and that, too, very briefly, for I shall not detain myself or you, upon that point for any great length of time), that I believe the entire records of the world, from the date of the Declaration of Independence up to within three years ago, may be searched in vain for one single affirmation, from one single man, that the negro was not included in the Declaration of Independence.

Lincoln defied Douglas to show that Jefferson ever said so, or Washington, or any other President, or even any member of Congress said so. In fact, Lincoln said: ...I will remind Judge Douglas and this audience, that while Mr. Jefferson was the owner of slaves, as undoubtedly he was, in speaking upon this very subject, he used the strong language that “he trembled for his country when he remembered that God was just;” and I will offer the highest premium in my power to Judge Douglas if he will show that he, in all his life, ever uttered a sentiment at all akin to that of Jefferson.

Anyone, like Douglas, who teaches that “the negro has no share, humble though it may be, in the Declaration of Independence, is going back to the era of our liberty and independence, and, so far as in him lies, muzzling the cannon that thunders its annual joyous return; that he is blowing out the moral lights around us....” In fact, even Jefferson differed with Senator Douglas in regard to the political obligation of a Supreme Court decision. Lincoln quoted Jefferson against him. Jefferson said, that “Judges are as honest as other men, and not more so.” And he said, substantially, that “whenever a free people should give up in absolute submission to any department of government, retaining for themselves no appeal from it, their liberties were gone.” For Lincoln, certainly, Senator Douglas was no Jeffersonian whatsoever.46 During the final joint debate at Alton on October 15, Lincoln brought up his struggle with Douglas in regard to the Declaration of Independence. “I confess that I have had a struggle with Judge Douglas on that matter,” he said. Then he quoted extracts from Douglas’s speech and also one he delivered; “I think the authors of that notable instrument intended to include all men, but they did not mean to declare all men equal in all respects,” he quoted himself. But, it was meant to be a standard maxim for free society which should be familiar to everyone, “constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its influence and augmenting the happiness, and value of life to all people, of all colors, everywhere.” It was at Alton that Lincoln now had the nub of the issue in his debates with Senator Douglas. The real issue “is the eternal struggle between these two principles, right and wrong, throughout the world.” “They are the two principles that have stood face to face from the beginning of time; and will ever continue to struggle,” he said. As Lincoln biographer David Donald wrote in his biography Lincoln, “it was a choice between two fundamentally opposed views of the meaning of the American experience.” Professor Don E. Fehrenbacher concluded: “Thus, for Lincoln the restriction of slavery

46

“Fifth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas, at Galesburg, Illinois, October 7, 1858,” in CWAL, 3:220, 232, 234

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continued to be not only an immediate objective in itself, but the means of determining the moral status of slavery.”47 Election day, 1858, was a cold raw day, but voters turned out in greater numbers than they had in the presidential election of 1856. Lincoln was beaten in his contest for Douglas’s Senate seat because “the unfair apportionment of the legislative districts,” it was reported. There were fourteen Democrats to eleven Republicans in the Senate, and forty Democrats to thirty-five Republicans in the House. Even if representation had been apportioned exactly on the basis of population, Republicans would still have lost the election to Douglas on January 5, 1859. Douglas received 54 votes for another six year term in the U.S. Senate and Lincoln received 46 votes. “This reinstated Mr. Douglas, and the champion of the Republican Party was defeated after a contest fought by him with wonderful power and persistence, with unfailing fairness, good nature and magnanimity, and skill rarely if ever surpassed,” reported J. G. Holland, his biographer. When he was asked by a friend how he felt when the returns came in which signaled his defeat, he replied that he felt, he supposed, very much like the stripling who had bruised his toe, ‘too badly to laugh and too big to cry.” According to Lincoln’s 1860 campaign biographer, D. W. Bartlett: Mr. Lincoln and his fellow Republicans of Illinois, far from being discouraged by the result of the campaign, were greatly encouraged, well knowing that with such gains, such a steady increase, by the Republican party of Illinois, its day of complete triumph could not be far off.

In a moderate way, talk of Lincoln as a presidential possibility began immediately after the election was over. “Admiration of the manly bearing and gallant conduct of Mr. Lincoln, throughout this campaign, which had early assumed a national importance, led to the spontaneous suggestion of his name, in various parts of the country, as a candidate for the Presidency,” wrote Joseph Bartlett in his 1865 biography of Lincoln.48 At the end of the 1858 campaign, Lincoln had spent more than usual, and earned less for the last six months. As he put it, he was “absolutely without money now for even household purposes.” “This year I must devote to my private business,” he averred. But various invitations began to pour in from across the nation to test that new resolution. One of those invitations came from far off Boston, dated March 19, 1859. A committee of five Boston Republicans, who were in charge of a Festival to honor Thomas Jefferson on his birthday, invited Lincoln to attend in the old citadel of Federalism. This was clear evidence that New England Republicans, in contrast to Southern Democrats, now clearly honored and revered the author of the Declaration of Independence. The invitation bore the signature of Henry L. Pierce, a Boston manufacturer, who later served as state representative, 1860-1862. On April 6, Lincoln wrote that his engagements, unfortunately, prevented him from attending. Lincoln immediately noted the curious nature of their invitation. He wrote:

47

48

“Seventh and Last Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Alton, Illinois, October 15, 1858,” in Ibid., 3:300-301; 315; David Donald, Lincoln, p. 227; Don E. Fehrenbacher, Prelude to Greatness: Lincoln in the 1850s, 148. Ibid., p. 227; J.G. Holland, The Life of Abraham Lincoln, p. 194; D.W. Bartlett, The Life and Public Services of the Hon. Abraham Lincoln, pp. 102, 180

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Bearing in mind that about seventy years ago, two great political parties were first formed. In this country, that Thomas Jefferson was the head of one of them, and Boston the head-quarters of the other, it is both curious and interesting that those supposed to descend politically from the party opposed to Jefferson, should now be celebrating his birth-day in their own original seat of empire, while those claiming political descent from him have nearly ceased to breathe his name everywhere.

Lincoln noted how completely the two political parties have changed hands as to the principle upon which they were originally supposed to be divided.49 The Democratic party of Lincoln’s day, he said; “hold the liberty of one man to be absolutely nothing, when in conflict with another man’s right of property.” On the other hand, Republicans were for both the man and the dollar; but in cases of conflict, the man before the dollar.” “But soberly,” he wrote, “it is now no child’s play to save the principles of Jefferson from total overthrow in this nation.” Jefferson’s principles are the definitions and axioms of free society. However, they were being denied and evaded, “with no small show of success.” These anti-Jeffersonians call them “glittering generalities” or “self evident lies.” But, there are those who insidiously argue that Jefferson’s principles apply only to “superior races.” These expressions replace the principles of free government. “This is a world of compensations,” Lincoln declared. “And, he who would be no slave; must consent to have no slave.” “Those who deny freedom to others; deserve it not for themselves; and, under a just God, can not long retain it,” he wrote. And, then he concluded with his great ode to Jefferson, widely circulated in the Republican press: All honor to Jefferson–to the man who, in the concrete pressure of a struggle for national independence by a single people, had the coolness, forecast, and capacity to introduce into a merely revolutionary document, an abstract truth, applicable to all men and all times, and so to embalm it there, that to-day, and in all coming days, it shall be a rebuke and a stumbling-block 50 to the very harbingers of re-appearing tyrany [sic] and oppression.

Lincoln had gained new confidence from his contest with Douglas in the senatorial campaign of 1858. Invitations continued for Lincoln to speak. From August to December 1859, Lincoln delivered political speeches in Illinois, Iowa, Ohio, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Kansas. By the fall of 1859, he already appeared to be a presidential candidate. In Shawnee, Kansas, he was welcomed by a large throng. The Leavenworth Register declared: Never did man received such honors at the hands of our people, and never did our people pay honors to a better man, or one who has been a truer friend to Kansas. The name of ‘Abe Lincoln’ is a household word in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, Let it be so in Kansas, for we owe 51 much to him for his early efforts in behalf of freedom in Kansas.

Lincoln genuinely believed that Douglas was a “dangerous enemy of liberty.” So, upon receiving an invitation from Ohio Republicans, he readily accepted the opportunity to “to 49

Don E. Fehrenbacher, Prelude to Greatness: Lincoln in the 1850s, pp. 143-144; “To Henry L. Pierce and Others,” April 6, 1859, in CWAL, 3:374-375 50 Ibid., 3:375-376 51 D.W. Bartlett, Life and Public Services of Hon. Abraham Lincoln, p. 103

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head of the little gentleman.” Lincoln now had the opportunity to more fully develop his Jeffersonian arguments, and apply them against Senator Douglas and his cohorts. At Columbus, Ohio, on September 16, he told the crowd that Douglas “ought to remember that there was once in this country a man by the name of Thomas Jefferson, supposed to be a Democrat; a man whose principles and policy are not very prevalent amongst Democrats today...” Lincoln reminded them that Jefferson had declared: “I tremble for my country when I remember that God is just!” As it was in Jefferson’s day, the slavery issue was a “danger to this country, a danger of the avenging justice of God in that little unimportant popular sovereignty question of Judge Douglas.” Lincoln believed that “there was a question of God’s eternal justice wrapped up in the enslaving of any race of men, or any man, and that those who did so braved the arm of Jehovah that when a nation thus dared the Almighty every friend of that nation had cause to dread His wrath.” Then Lincoln boldly charged: “Choose ye between Jefferson and Douglas as to what is the true view of this element among us.”52 Lincoln then delivered a history lesson which he would share across the state of Ohio. It involved Jefferson’s Ordinance of 1784. He noted: “In 1784, Mr. Jefferson drew up an ordinance for the government of the country upon which we now stand; or rather a frame or draft of an ordinance for the government of this country, here in Ohio; our neighbors in Indiana; us who live in Illinois; our neighbors in Wisconsin and Michigan.” In his ordinance, Jefferson expressly provided for the prohibition of slavery in the territories north of the Ohio River, as well as south of it. That provision was lost from the ordinance even before it failed to pass. But, three years later, “the Congress of the Confederation” adopted a new ordinance for the government of the Northwest Territory, not including that across the river, and applied the prohibition of slavery only to the territory north of the river. And, this provision which excluded slavery “was inserted and passed unanimously, or at any rate it passed and became a part of the law of the land.” And, Lincoln said he could use history to prove it. He used the same history lesson in Dayton the next day “to show that the framers of the government found slavery existing when the constitution was formed, and got along with it as well as they could in accomplishing the Union of the States, contemplating and expecting the advent of the period when slavery in the United States should no longer exist.”53 Lincoln left Dayton for Cincinnati, and spoke there the same day. However, Lincoln aimed his remarks for Kentuckians across the Ohio River, some of whom were in the audience. “I think Slavery is wrong, morally, and politically,” he said. Five years before, “no living man had expressed the opinion that the Negro had no share in the Declaration of Independence. He repeated the phrase to make his point very clear. Douglas said that no Negro had any share in the Declaration of Independence. Lincoln made it clear that he greatly disagreed. But, just the same, he assured them that Republicans meant them no harm. He promised: We mean to treat you as near as we possibly can, like Washington, Jefferson, and Madison treated you. We mean to leave you alone, and in no way to interfere with your institution; to

52 53

“Speech at Columbus, Ohio, September 16, 1859,” in CWAL, 3:410 Ibid., 3:414, 422; “Speech at Dayton, Ohio, September 17, 1859,” in CWAL, 3:436-437

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abide by all and every compromise of the constitution, and, in a word, coming back to the original proposition, to treat you, so far as degenerated men (if we have degenerated) may, according to the examples of those noble fathers–Washington, Jefferson and Madison. We mean to remember that you are as good as we; that there is no difference between us other 54 than the difference of circumstances. .

On the way back to Springfield, Illinois, Lincoln stop in Indianapolis, Indiana and spoke to the largest Indiana crowd he had ever spoken to. He believed there was a feature in Senator Douglas’s doctrine of Popular Sovereignty which was more dangerous than anything, and few could see it. Douglas “did not care whether slavery was voted up or voted down.” That is to say, Douglas did not believe slavery was wrong. This was certainly not the opinion of “the good men of the Revolution.” “It was not the expressed opinion of Mr. Jefferson,” he posited. Douglas says that the Declaration of Independence never was meant for Negroes, and every follower joins him, and says that the Declaration did not apply to Negroes. Lincoln boldly asked if any Democrat present would declare that the Declaration did not include Negroes as well as whites. Then Lincoln turned and looked sternly at Governor Willard sitting in front of him. No one had ever said so, and he had asked thousands. “No President had ever said so, no head of any department, nor a member of Congress,” he noted. Douglas had changed all that about five years before.55 Lincoln journeyed to Wisconsin, and spoke before the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society in Milwaukee at the Newhall House on the evening of September 30. The next day, at two o’clock, he spoke at Beloit. Lincoln stated the real position of the Republican Party to be “hatred to the institution of Slavery; hatred to it in all its aspects, moral, social, and political.” “This is the foundation of the Republican party–its active, life-giving principle,” Lincoln declared. He repeated his position that slavery was forbidden in the northwestern territory by the Ordinance of 1787, in the Free states formed out of the Louisiana Purchase by the Missouri Compromise, and in California, by the Missouri Compromise, and by Mexican laws. Meanwhile, Douglas doctrines were demoralizing the country because “Mr. Douglas takes it for granted that slavery is not a moral wrong.” And, then Lincoln went on “to prove the identity of the Republican principles with those of the Fathers of the Republic.” The reporter wrote: “This he did most satisfactorily.” Lincoln said that he could bring his evidence in form of depositions in a court; and, “wring from them the verdict that the Republicans hold to the same principles which Washington, Jefferson, Adams, Madison, and their compeers held.” Lincoln made the same arguments that same day at Janesville.56 Two weeks later, a rally was called in Clinton, Illinois to celebrate the Republican victories in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Iowa, and Minnesota. Lincoln was loudly called for, and he promptly mounted the stand, and responded. He spoke of the purpose for the meeting, and reiterated the evils and disasters which attended the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. He then traced the beginning of the Republican Party in 1854 “to its present altitude of power and greatness, in an able and masterly manner reviewed the momentous questions which now agitate the minds of our people.” 54

Ibid., 3:444 “Speech at Indianapolis, Indiana, September 19, 1859, in CWAL, 3:469-470 56 “Speech at Beloit, Wisconsin, October 1, 1859,” in CWAL, 3:482-484; “Speech at Janesville, Wisconsin, October 1, 1859, in CWAL, 3:485-486 55

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He and Douglas both agreed, Lincoln said; that the fathers of this Government understood its powers over the institution of slavery better than we do now.” He then proceeded to show how the Democratic Party had departed from the old landmarks, and had set up a new theory, and a different policy, and would speedily make slavery a national institution in which states would exercise no control. Republicans must resist because their position was identical, as far as the slavery question was concerned, with that of the founders of the Government. Lincoln believed that the recent Republican victories in the nation were an indication that “the good old doctrines of the fathers of the Republic would yet again prevail, and become the rule of action of the Government.” Lincoln finished with an affirmation. He said: Our position is right–our principles are good and just, but I would desire to impress on every Republican present to have patience and steadiness under all circumstances–whether defeated or successful. But I do hope that as there is a just and righteous God in Heaven, our principles will and shall prevail sooner or later.

It appeared that the God of Heaven had joined the Republican party of Jeffersonian principles. The next day in Springfield, Lincoln spoke to a crowd of Republicans who marched to the Lincoln home in a victory parade. Lincoln again, as at Clinton, assured them that Republicans occupied the identical position occupied by the founders of the Government on the slavery question.57 While traveling across the Midwest campaigning for Republicans in 1859, Lincoln received an invitation to speak at the Reverend Henry Ward Beecher’s Plymouth Congregational Church in Brooklyn. The fee was $200, and they permitted him to discuss political issues. He accepted. It would also give him a chance to see his son Robert who was failing his entrance exams to Harvard College. As Lincoln told the historian George Bancroft later, “that he was on his way to Massachusetts where he had a son in college, who, if report were true, already knew much more than his father.” Knowing that he would speak before a sophisticated eastern audience, Lincoln began to prepare his speech in earnest to find the proof to substantiate some of the circumstantial evidence had relied on previously in his speeches. He researched Elliot’s six-volume Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, and works Douglas had used for his Harper’s article in 1859. Lincoln used his own copies, as well as the Congressional Globe, the Annals of Congress, and some old newspaper files and clippings. “The historical study which it involved–study that led into unexplored fields, and fields very difficult of exploration, must have been very great,” biographer J. G. Holland noted, “but it was intimate and complete.” Those who prepared the speech for circulation as a 1860 campaign document later “were much surprised by the amount of research that it required to be able to make the speech, and were very much wearied with the work of verifying its historical statements in detail.” In fact, “they were weeks in finding the works consulted by him.” He prepared his speech with some references to Beecher’s church, which he later removed when the site was changed to Cooper Institute in New York City. It was more carefully prepared than any other speech of his life.58 57

“Speech at Clinton, Illinois, October 14, 1859, in CWAL, 3:487-489; Speech at Springfield, Illinois, October 15, 1859, in CWAL, 3:489 58 J.G. Holland, The Life of Abraham Lincoln, pp. 204-207; David Donald, Lincoln, p. 237

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When Lincoln arrived in New York City on February 25, he learned that the Young Republicans had moved the lecture from the Church to Cooper Institute, and Lincoln spent the following day revising his address to make it suitable for a general political audience rather than a religious one. He was unaware of the custom of giving portions of an address ahead of time, he expressed the doubt that any of the papers would care to publish the speech in its entirety. Having accepted an invitation to tour the city, someone asked him how it was with him. “Oh, very well,” he relied; “I have the cottage at Springfield, and about eight thousand dollars in money If they make me vice-president with Seward, as some say they will, I hope I shall be able to increase it to twenty thousand; and that is as much as any man ought to want.” There was a great curiosity to see and hear Lincoln, so that when he entered the great hall the platform was filled with Republican leaders from New York City, and from Brooklyn; and many ladies as well. William Cullen Bryant editor of the New York Evening Post; presided and introduced the speaker, and said: “It is a grateful office that I perform, in introducing to you an eminent citizen of the West, hither to known to you only by reputation.” Lincoln stood to his feet and began “in a low, monotonous tone, but gaining confidence in the respectful stillness, his tones, that had long been keyed to out-of-doors efforts, rose in strength and gained in clearness, until every ear heard every word.” He now had his audience. Biographer Holland noted: “His style of speech was so fresh, his mode of statement was so simple; his illustrations were so quaint and peculiar; that the audience eagerly drank in every sentence.” “The backwoods orator had found one of the most appreciative audiences he had ever addressed, and the audience gave abundant testimony that they were listening to the utterances of a master,” noted Holland.59 As Lincoln drew from the history of the Congress, he reported the public careers of these thirty-nine men on the question of slavery. He briefly stated these men’s actions, and that of the thirty-nine fathers, twenty-one; a clear majority, acted as if the government possessed the power to control slavery in the territories. The same Congress which forbade slavery in the Northwest Territory had formulated the first ten amendments to the Constitution. “As those fathers marked it [slavery], so let it be again marked, as an evil not to be extended, but to be tolerated and protected only because of and so far as its actual presence among us makes that...a necessity.” The Republican Party was simply clinging to “the old and tried policy” of the founding fathers toward slavery. Then Lincoln raised the issue of emancipation, in the light of growing violence among the slave population in the South. “In the language of Mr. Jefferson, uttered many years ago, ‘It is still in our power to direct the process of emancipation, and deportation, peaceably, and in such slow degrees, as that the evil will wear off insensibly; and their places be, pari passu, filled up by free white laborers. If, on the contrary, it is left to force itself on, human nature must shudder at the prospect held up.’” “Mr. Jefferson did not mean to say, nor do I;” said Lincoln, “that the power of emancipation is in the Federal government.” Jefferson was speaking about Virginia. But, Lincoln spoke of the slaveholding States alone. However, the federal government, as Republicans insist, does have the power to restrain the extension of the slavery institution; “the power to insure that a slave insurrection shall never occur on any American soil which is now free from slavery.” The historical record was entirely unanswerable. “Wrong as we think 59

J.G. Holland, The Life of Abraham Lincoln, pp. 205-206

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slavery is, we can yet afford to let it alone where it is...,” he said. But, “we can forbid it spreading to the National Territories, and keep it from over running the free states. He ended on a crescendo: Neither let us be slandered from our duty by false accusations against us, nor frightened from it by menaces of destruction to the Government nor of dungeons to ourselves. LET US HAVE FAITH THAT RIGHT MAKES MIGHT, AND IN THAT FAITH, LET US, TO THE END, 60 DARE TO DO OUR DUTY AS WE UNDERSTAND IT.

The crowd stood to their feet and cheered. The speech was a great success. “Its argument and its illustrations were masterly,” a biographer wrote in 1865; and, “the logic unanswerable.” The curious went away thoughtful. Many who entered the hall in doubt, left with a certainty. And, most of all, the New York politicians who had doubted this western Lincoln left convinced that if William H. Seward of New York, their choice, should be set aside as a candidate for the presidency, “Mr. Lincoln, the favorite of the West, would be abundantly worthy of their support.” This was to be the last of Lincoln’s great speeches prior to the election of 1860, although he did speak in New England in a “swing around the circle” before heading back to Springfield.61 While in New York, invitations came in from many places in New England to speak on political issues. On March 5, he spoke at the city hall at Hartford, Connecticut; where he was escorted to the hall by the first company of “Wide-Awakes” ever organized in the nation. Later the “Wide-Awakes” became universal throughout the free states during the 1860 campaign. Before an immense audience at the City Hall, he declared that “the slave question is the prevailing question before the nation.” It was not a new problem, but had been “rife before the Revolution.” “I think the Democracy are pretty generally getting into a system of bushwhackery in this controversy,” he said. They accused Seward over and over again about his statement that this was an “irrepressible conflict.” But, it was “bushwackery because they have been reminded time after time, but could never be made to admit, that the old fathers said the same thing.” They cannot deny it because the proof is there. “Jefferson said it,” Lincoln declared. “Washington said it.” He drew from his Cooper Union address: “If slavery is right, it ought to be extended; if not, it ought to be restricted–there is no middle ground.” “Let us not be slandered or intimidated to turn from our duty.” Lincoln stated. Then he closed: “Eternal right makes might–as we understand our duty, let us do it!”62 The next day, Lincoln spoke at New Haven where he declared that “there is ‘THE IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT.’” The proof is that almost every good man since the formation of our government has uttered that same sentiment, from Washington, who ‘trusted that we should yet have a confederacy of Free States,’ with Jefferson, Jay, Monroe, down to the latest days....” There immense crowds at Meriden; on March 7, at Woonsocket, Rhode Island; on March 8, at Norwich, Connecticut on March 9; and, at Bridgeport on May 10 where he carried the Republican message of Jefferson, and the other founding fathers.

60

“Address at Cooper Institute, New York City, February 27, 1860,” in CWAL, 3:525, 533, 541 Joseph H. Barrett, The Life of Abraham Lincoln, p. 188; J.G. Holland, The Life of Abraham Lincoln, p. 212 62 “Speech at Hartford, Connecticut, March 6, 1860,” in CWAL, 4:6, 13 61

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After Lincoln returned from New York and New England, he no longer made light of his interest in the Republican Party presidential nomination. He had been accepted as an “honest, fresh, original and powerful man.” Lincoln went home gratified.63

IN THE PRESIDENCY Abraham Lincoln was nominated for the Republican candidate for President of the United States on the third ballot at the Chicago Wigwam convention on May 18, 1860. All through his political career, even back to the days when he was a young man in Indiana, Lincoln was never interested in redefining the nature of the United States, but he was always concerned with reaffirming the original definition which the founding fathers, especially Thomas Jefferson, had given the nation. As believed proper for presidential aspirants in that day, Lincoln remained at home in Springfield during the summer and fall campaign of 1860. He remained in close contact with his managers and supporters, however. He took the time to correct an error in speech which was sent to him which a friend had delivered in Lockport, New York on July 19. “And, now allow me to name one error,” Lincoln wrote back: “John Adams was not elected over Jefferson by the H.R.; but Jefferson was over Burr.”“Such is my recollection,” he wrote. The correspondent wrote back to Lincoln that the “mistake in my Lockport speech as to John Adams, was a great blunder,” and, after he had received Lincoln’s letter he had corrected in the newly published pamphlet edition. “You must not lay much stress on the blunder about Mr. Adams,” Lincoln wrote again, “He had said that he had, “made a more mischievous one, in the first printed speech of mine, on the Slavery question.” He had declared that the prohibition of slavery in the Northwest Territory was made a condition in the Virginia deed of cession, which was not true.64 During the summer campaign, a very serious charge was brought against Lincoln which involved Thomas Jefferson himself. It appeared in the Chicago Times and Herald, a loyal Douglas newspaper, taken from the Macomb Eagle. The clipping had been sent to Lincoln. Supposedly Lincoln had made a speech in 1844 in which he had said: The character of Jefferson was repulsive. Continually pulling about liberty, equality, and the degrading curse of slavery, he brought his own children to the hammer, and made money of his debaucheries. Even at his death he did not manumit his numerous offspring, but left them soul and body to degradation and the cart whip. A daughter of this vaunted champion of Democracy was sold some years ago at public auction in New Orleans, and purchased by a society of gentlemen, who wished to testify by her liberation their admiration of the statesman, who “Dreamt of freedom in a slave’s embrace.”

Lincoln was angry, and called it “a base forgery, so far as its authorship is imputed to me.” “I never said anything like it, at any time or place. I do not recognize it as anything I have ever seen before, emanating from any source,” he said. Then, he requested that his name 63

64

“Speech at New Haven, Connecticut, March 6, 1860,” in CWAL, 4:23; J.G. Holland, The Life of Abraham Lincoln, pp. 213, 215 “‘To James O. Putnam, July 29, 1860,’” in CWAL, 4:11-12; “To James H. Reed, October 1, 1860,” in CWAL, 4:124-125

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not be used, “but my friends will be entirely safe in denouncing the thing as a forgery, so far as it is ascribed to me.” The next day, September 6, 1860, the Illinois State Journal, Lincoln’s hometown paper, published a refutation, which Lincoln himself may have written. It said: This is a bold and deliberate forgery, whether originating with the Chicago Times and Herald or the Macomb Eagle. Mr. Lincoln never used any such language in any speech at any time. Throughout the whole of his political life, Mr. Lincoln has ever spoken of Mr. Jefferson in the most kindly and respectful manner, holding him up as one of the ablest statesmen of his own or any other age, and constantly referring to him as one of the greatest apostles of freedom and free labor. This is so well known that any attempt, by means of fraud or forgery to create the contrary impression, can only react upon the desperate politicians who are parties to such disreputable tactics.

That same month, Lincoln received a letter from a publisher in Aledo, Illinois, asking if Lincoln had ever said anything derogatory about Thomas Jefferson in McDonough county. Lincoln was delayed in answering the letter, but finally wrote on October 1 that he had never been in that county until the 1858 campaign. “I never said anything derogatory of Mr. Jefferson, in McDonough country, or elsewhere.” About three weeks before, first time in his life, he had ever seen, or heard, the language which was attributed to him, as having been used against Jefferson. And, then it was sent to him. Lincoln wished to make it perfectly clear. “I never used any such language at any time.” “You may rely on the truth of this,” he wrote.65 Although Lincoln received less than 40 percent of the votes in the 1860 presidential election in the November election; he won a clear and constitutional majority in the Electoral College, and was elected the 16th President of the United States. Sometime prior to and, perhaps even during, Lincoln’s preparation of his Inaugural Address, he wrote a fragment which has survived. The subject was the Constitution and the Union. There was something back of these, “entwining itself more closely about the human heart.” “That something,” he wrote, “is the principle of “Liberty to all’–the principle that clears the path for all, gives hope to all; and, by consequence, enterprize [sic], and industry to all.” Then he referred to Jefferson’s Declaration: The expression of that principle, in our Declaration of Independence, was most happy, and fortunate. Without this, as well as with it, we could have declared our independence of Great Britain; but without it, we could not, I think, have secured our free government, and consequent prosperity.\

Lincoln believed that the Union was perpetual, confirmed by the history of the Union itself. The Union was much older than the Constitution because it had been formed earlier under the Articles of Association in 1774. However “it was matured and continued by the Declaration of Independence in 1776.” It was declared to be perpetual by the Articles of

65

“‘To Anson G. Chester, September 5, 1860,’” in CWAL, 4:11-12; “‘To James H. Reed, October 1, 1860,’” in CWAL, 4:124-125

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Confederation in 1778. And thus one of the declared objects in 1787 was to establish a Constitution to “form a more perfect union.”66 The day before his fifty-second birthday, Lincoln boarded the train to leave for Washington, D. C. for his inauguration on March 4. With a heavy heart, he bade his fellow townsmen goodbye, and invoked Washington’s memory “with a task before me greater than that which rested upon Washington. Without the assistance of that Divine Being, who ever attended him, I cannot succeed. With that assistance I cannot fail.” Lincoln made more speeches, some quite short, than he had ever made before as he traveled across the country to the nation’s capital. Jefferson seemed farther away now except for his Declaration. Washington seemed more of a comfort.67 The train arrived in Cincinnati, Ohio on his birthday, and Lincoln received a magnificent reception. Once again, as his last visit to Cincinnati during the 1859 campaign, Lincoln tried to reassure Kentuckians across the Ohio River that they had nothing to fear from the new Republicans in office. He quoted the same paragraph from his speech at that time which declared: “We mean to treat you, as near as we possibly can, as Washington, Jefferson, and Madison treated you.” While at Trenton, New Jersey, Lincoln remembered reading “Weem’s Life of Washington,” and he shared his impressions with the state senators of the impact it had on him as a young boy. “I recollect thinking then, boy that I was, that there must have been something more than common that those men struggled for,” he said. When Lincoln arrived in Philadelphia his thoughts now turned to Thomas Jefferson, and his Declaration of Independence, as he responded to the Mayor of Philadelphia after a grand reception. The Mayor expressed the wish that, if it were convenient for Lincoln, he should consult the merchants and manufacturers of the city, as at it were; “to listen to those breathings rising within the consecrated walls where the Constitution of the United States.” Lincoln said: “I will add, the Declaration of American Independence as originally framed.” He would like to do so.68 The next day, Washington’s Birthday, Lincoln delivered two more addresses in Philadelphia. His second Philadelphia appearance was to the hallowed halls of the old Pennsylvania State House, now called Independence Hall. “I am filled with deep emotion at finding myself standing here in the place where were collected together the wisdom, the patriotism, the devotion to principle, from which sprang the institutions under which we live,” he said. It had been suggested that in his hands rested “the task of restoring peace to our distracted country,” as seven southern states had already seceded from the Union. Lincoln declared: “I can say in return, sir, that all the political sentiments I entertain have been drawn, so far as I have been able to draw them from the sentiments which originated, and were given to the world from this hall in which we stand.” And, then he boldly stated the impact of Jefferson’s Declaration on his entire life, when he was young, and now when he was much older.” I have never had a feeling politically that did not spring from the sentiments embodied in the Declaration of Independence,” which was followed by great cheering.

66

Don E. Fehrenbacher, Prelude to Greatness: Lincoln in the 1850s, pp. 159-160; “Fragment on the Constitution and the Union, [c. January ? 1861],” in CWAL, 4:168-169; “First Inaugural Address—Final Text, March 4, 1861,” in CWAL, 4:265. 67 “Farewell Address at Springfield, Illinois, February 11, 1861,” in CWAL, 4:190. 68 “Address to the New Jersey Senate at Trenton, New Jersey, February 21, 1861,” in CWAL, 4:235-237; “Reply to Mayor Alexander Henry at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, February 21, 1861,” in CWAL, 4:238-239

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Lincoln told them that he had often pondered what great principle or idea kept “this Confederacy” so long together. “It was not the mere matter of the separation of the colonies from the mother land,” he said; “but something in the Declaration giving liberty, not alone to the people of this country, but hope to the world for all future time.” “It was that which gave promise that in due time the weights should be lifted from the shoulders of all men, and that all should have an equal chance,” he said to cheers from his audience. “This is the sentiment embodied in that Declaration of Independence.” Could the nation be “saved upon that basis,” he asked. He would be one of the happiest men in the world if he could help to save it. It would be “truly awful” if the nation could not be saved on any other principle. But, if the country could not be saved without giving up that principle; “I was about to say I would rather be assassinated on this spot than to surrender it.” Rumors of plots against the presidentelect’s life were circulating at that time, and Lincoln was fully aware of them.69 Immediately after his speech in Independence Hall, he made his third Philadelphia address as Lincoln was led to a platform for a flag-raising ceremony in front of Independence Hall. It was to celebrate the addition of a new star for the new free state of Kansas. The flag contained thirty-four stars now. He invoked “the spirit that animated our fathers, who gave renown and celebrity to this Hall,” they should promise themselves, not only the new star, but additional stars would be added the flag.70 That same day, Washington’s Birthday, Lincoln delivered another address before the Pennsylvania General Assembly at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, the state capital. The glow of the morning ceremony at Independence Hall still lingered. “Under the kind conduct of gentlemen there, I was for the first time allowed the privilege of standing in old Independence Hall,” he said, to enthusiastic cheering. A few words were first addressed to him, and then he had the opportunity to express, “with much regret that I had not more time to express something of my own feelings excited by the occasion, somewhat to harmonize, and give shape to the feelings that had been really the feelings of my whole life.” How deeply Lincoln had been moved by just being there, and how much he wanted to put in words the depths of his feelings coursing through his heart, and mind. There is so much he wanted to say, but there was no time to do so. But, he had kept all of his appointments on Washington’s Birthday .71 The evening before Lincoln spoke in Independence Hall and raised the flag outside the old building, Lincoln had received a warning that his life was in danger. Both Allan Pinkerton, head of a private detective agency, and Secretary of State-elect Seward and General Winfield Scott agreed separately that a plot existed to kill Lincoln while passing through Baltimore. Lincoln was convinced that Seward’s information came from independent sources from those of Pinkerton, and thus agreed that the plot was more than rumor. After his speech before the General Assembly in Harrisburg, Lincoln left by train that evening, passed through Philadelphia, and then quietly changed engines in the middle of the night in Baltimore. The next morning, Saturday, February 23, Lincoln arrived safely in the nation’s capital at six a.m. Nine days later, March 4, 1861; Abraham Lincoln became the

69

“Speech in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, February 22, 1861, in CWAL, 4:240-241 “Speech at the Flag-raising before Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, February 22, 1861,” in CWAL, 4:241-242 71 “Address to the Pennsylvania General Assembly at Harrisburg, February 22, 1861,” in CWAL, 4:244 70

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sixteenth president of the United States and assumed the same office Thomas Jefferson occupied exactly sixty years before.72 While preparing his inaugural address, Lincoln allowed Secretary of State-elect Seward to read it, and make suggestions to correct and improve it. The day after Lincoln’s arrival, Seward sent Lincoln a letter in which he told the president-elect that his case was “quite like Jefferson.” Seward elaborated: He brought the first Republican Party into power against and over a party ready to resist and dismember the Government. Partisan as he was, he sank the partisan in the patriot in his inaugural address, and propitiated his adversaries by declaring: “We are all Federalists, all Republicans.” I could wish that you would think it wise to follows this example in this crisis. Be sure that while all your administrative conduct will be in harmony with Republican principles and policy, you cannot lose the Republican party by practicing in your advent to office the magnanimity of a victor.

Seward did not like Lincoln’s closing statement. It ended much too abruptly. Lincoln had closed: “With you, and not with me, is the solemn question of ‘Shall it be peace, or a sword?’” Under the heading of “Suggestions for a closing paragraph,” Frederick Seward, his father’s secretary, wrote a wordy paragraph which his father suggested. It read: “I aspire to come in the spirit, however far below the ability and the wisdom, of Washington, of Madison, of Jackson and of Clay.” It did not include Jefferson. Lincoln did not use Seward’s suggested sentence. During his presidential years that followed, he would at times refer to Washington, but Jefferson’s legacy, except for the Declaration of Independence, no longer served easily as a symbol for the Union. But that does not mean that Lincoln forgot Jefferson. The Library of Congress still has the record that four volumes of Jefferson’s writings were charged to the president in 1861.73 In fact, when the Lincoln family moved into the White House, Thomas Jefferson was there to greet them. On the front law, stood a 7'6" bronze statue of Jefferson, a gift from Lieutenant Uriah P. Levy, United States Navy, in 1833 to the American people, represented by the Congress. Jefferson is holding a quill pen in his right hand, and the Declaration of Independence in his left hand. Levy had borrowed a Thomas Sully portrait of Jefferson from the Marquis de Lafayette, and made it available to sculptor Pierre-Jean David D’Anger to use as a model. The gift was objected to for several different reasons. The Lieutenant’s humble rank made the gift presumptuous, others objected that no statue of Washington was in the capitol, and he deserved greater honor than Jefferson. It was placed in the Capitol Rotunda when House members voted 69 to 55 to accept the gift. However, President James Knox Polk, who called himself a Jeffersonian, admired the bronze statue and had it moved to the front lawn of the White House in 1847, where Lincoln would have seen it during his days in Congress as a the only Whig congressman from Illinois. Jefferson’s likeness stood there through four years of fratricidal war. But it was also joined by another Democratic president, Andrew Jackson, whose statue stood in the President’s square 72 73

Benjamin P. Thomas, Abraham Lincoln, pp. 242-244 John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History (New York: The Century Co., 1890), 3:319-320; “First Inaugural Address-First Edition and Revisions, March 1861,” in CWAL, 4:262; Lauriston Balland, “Lincoln as a Jeffersonian,” More Books 23 (1948), p. 289

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in front of the White House as well. Lincoln’s White House front lawn was occupied by two previous Democratic occupants of the Executive Mansion. Lincoln saw Jefferson every hour of the day and night for four years. War began on April 12, 1861, when Confederate forces fired on Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina. The attack on Sumter aroused the North, and Lincoln’s call for troops mobilized the South to action. In calling for troops, both upper and lower South regarded Lincoln as the aggressor; they had believed they had a natural right to secede. Lincoln had forsaken persuasion, and had turned to force instead. Lincoln exercised emergency powers as commander in chief of American military forces. However, he called for a special session of the Congress to meet on the nation’s birthday, July 4, 1861; the day Jefferson’s Declaration had been issued to the world. In his message, read before the Congress by a clerk, as since Jefferson’s time, Lincoln declared: “Our adversaries have adopted some Declarations of Independence; in which, unlike the good old one, penned by Jefferson, they omit the words “all men are created equal.” “Why,” he asked. And, then he drew from the meaning of Jefferson’s Declaration, which he had done so many times before on the campaign trail This is essentially a People’s contest. On the side of the Union, it is a struggle for maintaining in the world, that form, and substance of government, whose leading object is, to elevate the condition of men–to lift artificial weights from all shoulders–to clear the paths of laudable pursuit for all–to afford all, an unfettered start, and a fair chance, in the race of life.

Lincoln believed that “the plain people understand, and appreciate this.”74 Jefferson, once again, came to mind when Lincoln weighed the issues of colonizing former slaves outside the continental United States. In his first annual message to Congress, December 3, 1861; President Lincoln spoke of the possibility of devising a plan to colonize former slaves which would probably require the necessity of further purchasing territory, and the need for appropriation for such a project. The constitutional question of power to acquire territory had been settled sixty years before. Jefferson questioned the power first. When he purchased Louisiana, however, he yielded his scruples “on the plea of great expediency.” “Mr. Jefferson, however, placed the importance of procuring Louisiana more on political and commercial grounds than on providing room for population,” he noted.75 The Union victories at Gettysburg on July 3, and at Vicksburg on July 4, 1863, closely associated with the annual celebration of the nation’s birthday, electrified the nation. On the seventh, Lincoln received the dispatch about Vicksburg, and wrote to Frederick F. Low, the collector of the Port of San Francisco, and the Republican nominee for governor of California, that “we also have despatches rendering it entirely certain that Vicksburg surrendered to Gen. Grant on the glorious old 4th.” Word reached the White House that a large crowd might gather to celebrate the two northern victories that evening. Lincoln was asked “to remain at the Presidential mansion that evening and receive the serenade.”76 When the band arrived, Lincoln was brought to the central window under the north portico where he usually addressed jubilant crowds, looking 74

Thomas, Abraham Lincoln, p. 260; “Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861,” in CWAL, 4:438 “Annual Message to Congress, December 3, 1861,” in CWAL, 5:48 76 Louis A. Warren, Lincoln’s Gettysburg Declaration: ‘A New Birth of Freedom’ (Fort Wayne, IN: The Lincoln National Life Foundation, 1964), pp. 22-23 75

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down on the Jefferson statue. The President remembered the great impression he had received as an Indianan when he read about the great apotheosis of 1826, and now he related it to the great throng of people, stretching down Pennsylvania Avenue. He said: ”Fellow-citizens: I am very glad indeed to see you tonight, and yet I will not say I thank you for this call, but I do most sincerely thank Almighty God for the occasion which you have called.” Cheers rang out. “How long ago is it? Eighty odd years since on the Fourth of July for the first time in the history of the world a nation by its representatives, assembled and declared as a self-evident truth that “all men are created equal. That was birthday of the United States of America.” Then he was reminded that July 4 also had other significant events associated with that historic date. “The two most distinguished men in the framing and support of the Declaration were Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, the one having penned it, and the other sustained it the most forcibly in debate–the only two of the fifty-five who sustained [signed?] it being elected President of the United States.” Then, he said: “Precisely fifty years after they put their hands to the paper it pleased Almighty God to take both from the stage of action. This was indeed an extraordinary and remarkable event in our history.” Another President, James Monroe, five years after, “was called from this stage of existence on the same day and month of the year; and now, on this last Fourth of July just passed, when we have a gigantic Rebellion, at the bottom of which is an effort to overthrow the principle that all men were [are?] created equal, we have the surrender of a most powerful position and army on that very day....” He was interrupted by cheers. “He continued: “and not only so, but in a succession of battles in Pennsylvania, near to us, through three days, so rapidly fought that they might be called one great battle on the 1st, 2d and 3d of the month of July; and on the 4th the cohorts of those who opposed the declaration that all men are created equal, ‘turned tail’ and run.” The crowd then broke out into a long and continuous cheer.77 And, now Lincoln wanted to put an end to his response to the serenade, and said: “Gentlemen, this is a glorious theme, and the occasion for a speech, but I am not prepared to make one worthy of the occasion. He turned their attention to those who gave and were giving their last all for the nation’s survival. “I would like to speak in terms of praise due to the many brave officers and soldiers who have fought in the cause of the Union and liberties of the country from the beginning of the war.” The President said that there were “trying occasions, not only in success, but for the want of success.” He did not like to mention any name of one single officer unless he might do wrong to those he might forget to mention. The recent victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg certainly brought forth “glorious names, and particularly prominent ones” which he did not choose to mention. He closed: “Having said this much, I will now take the music.” It was music by the “powerful and almost matchless band” of the Thirty-Fourth Massachusetts Regiment. The band struck up “Hail, Columbia” and the serenaders went on to honor Secretary of War Stanton and Secretary of State Seward. Lincoln had just expressed the same basic ideas he would refine and use in an address he was asked to deliver the following November at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.78 On November 19, 1863; Lincoln delivered “a few appropriate remarks” which he was asked to give as the President at the dedication of the first national cemetery. He began with 77 78

“Response to a Serenade, July 7, 1863,” in CWAL, 6:320. Ibid; Kenneth A. Bernard, Lincoln and the Music of the Civil War (Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1966), p. 146

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“Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.” The ninetieth Psalm with its “three score years and ten; and if by reason of strength there be four score years” was familiar to the President who readily quoted Scripture. As early as 1840, Lincoln had referred to the struggle for freedom as “more than three score years ago.” It was a clear reference to the date of Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence and the birth of the nation. Jefferson and the other founding fathers had demonstrated practically that of a proposition that “all men are created equal” and were capable of governing themselves. “Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation so conceived, and so dedicated can long endure.” And, that those who were there must “highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain–that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom–and that government of the people, by the people for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”79 The problems of the war had taken its toll on the President’s health by 1864. Sitting at his desk in his second floor White House office, Lincoln said wearily, “I wish George Washington or some of those old patriots [like Jefferson?] were here in my place so that I could have a little rest.” By August Lincoln was convinced that he probably could not be reelected, although Republicans, and other Union supporters, had nominated him for a second term as president on the Union ticket. Early in his administration, “Governor Seward,” as Lincoln called his Secretary of State, was aware of Lincoln’s strengths. In fact, Seward had written his wife that “he is the best of us.” When a large crowd gathered in front of his residence on the east side of Lafayette Square, Seward appeared and said: Henceforth all men will come to see him as you and I have seen him: a true, loyal, patient, patriotic, and benevolent man....Abraham Lincoln will take his place alongside Washington, Franklin, Adams, Jefferson, and Jackson, among the benefactors of the country and of the human race.

The man Lincoln had defeated for the presidential nomination at the Republican national convention in Chicago in 1860; now voted for Abraham Lincoln on the Union ticket in 1864.80 Lincoln sought a second term, as he said out of “personal vanity, or ambition.” He said he wanted to be reelected in order “to finish this job of putting down the rebellion, and restoring peace and prosperity to the country;” not especially for the labor or the responsibility for the next four years. He believed he was better qualified than any other man to do it. And, he wanted the endorsement of the people for his labor and service over the last four years, most years of war. The election resulted in an overwhelming majority of votes for President Lincoln. Every state that voted, except for three, gave the Union [Republican] party a majority, and two of the three were old slave states, Kentucky and Delaware. The Republican Party was no longer a sectional party by obtaining Southern state support. In addition, West Virginia, Tennessee, Arkansas and Louisiana gave Lincoln support.81

79

Warren, Lincoln’s Gettysburg Declaration, p. 104 Ruth P. Randall, Lincoln’s Sons (Boston: Little, Brown, 1955), p. 184; Victor Searcher, The Farewell to Lincoln (New York: Arlington Press, 1965), p. 183 81 CWAL, 7:506; David Donald, Lincoln, p. 540; J.G. Holland, The Life of Abraham Lincoln, pp. 488-489 80

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In fact, Lincoln’s election in the midst of civil war proved clearly that “a people’s government can sustain a national election in the midst of a great civil war.” Lincoln declared: “I give thanks to the Almighty for this evidence of the people’s resolution to stand by free government, and the rights of humanity.” Abraham Lincoln’s reelection was one of the greatest blows to the rebellion. It destroyed the last hope of the Confederate States of America. It was said at the time that masses of Democratic Party members “were more than satisfied with the results.” Many were thankful that last Thursday in November, the day Lincoln had appointed Thanksgiving Day, for the result of the presidential election.82 Lincoln praised “the inscrutable intentions of God in his Second Inaugural Address.” Through his deep pondering concerning the war’s existence, he had discerned that God’s purposes might also bring judgment. He had often repeated Jefferson’s warning that he trembled when he remembered that God was just. Borrowing from a passage in Scripture, Lincoln told the nation: “Woe unto the world because of offences; for it must, needs be that offences come; but woe to that man by whom the offence cometh [Matthew 18:7, KJV].” Drawing from Christ’s lesson about being a “stumbling block” to others, Lincoln believed that “slavery made a lie of democratic principles.” He believed that slavery was once of those “offences” to God which made the American people guilty before Him. Beginning in 1854, Lincoln had appealed to Jefferson’s words in the Declaration, “All men are created equal,” for supporting political rights for blacks. Now on March 4, 1865, appealed to the words of Jesus Christ in Scripture that the time to end slavery in the nation had come and gone.83 President Lincoln was assassinated at Ford’s Theatre on the evening of April 14, 1865, and died the next day. It was to be the longest presidential funeral in American history, a 1,700 mile journey back to Springfield, Illinois; which followed the general route of his inaugural journey in 186l. For miles before the Philadelphia station, there was a solid line of people. The Lincoln Funeral Train had arrived four hours earlier than scheduled. Eight black horses hauled Lincoln’s coffin to Independence Square. Of all the funeral events along the entire route, Philadelphians believed their funeral display to be the largest, and the most impressive of all the processions held. A transparency was uncovered of Lincoln, with the words HE STILL LIVES. Lincoln’s remains were placed in the East Wing of Independence Hall, in the very room where the Declaration of Independence had been signed, and just a few yards from the Liberty Bell. This was the very room where Lincoln had spoken on Washington’s Birthday, February 22, 1861. This was the very place where he had been deeply moved to stand. There was so much he wanted to say then. This too was the very place where he had said that all his political feelings had sprung from the Declaration of Independence and that Jefferson’s promise of equality for all men was the binding principle behind “the Confederacy” [the true Confederacy, not the new one recently organized in the South]. But he had also added that “...if this country cannot be saved without giving up that principle...I would rather be

82 83

Ibid., pp. 490-491 Ronald C. White, Jr., Lincoln’s Greatest Speech: The Second Inaugural (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), pp. 144-145

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assassinated on the spot than surrender it.” He had not surrendered Jefferson’s binding principle, but he had given his life in his effort to keep and protect it.84 As president, Abraham Lincoln helped preserve the Union, formed by Thomas Jefferson and the other Revolutionary leaders of his day. But, he also reestablished the nation, in theory and practice, once again on the binding principle of the nation’s birthright contained in the Declaration of Independence. As Secretary of State William H. Seward declared to a crowd at Lafayette Square in 1864, Lincoln had taken his place, not only alongside Washington, but also Jefferson, “among the benefactors of the country and of the human race.”

84

Dorothy Meserve and Philip B. Kunhardt, Twenty Days (New York: Harper and Row, Publisher, 1965), pp. 147149; Searcher, The Farewell to Lincoln, p. 183

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 317-334

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

WASHINGTON’S FAREWELL ADDRESS AND LINCOLN’S LYCEUM ADDRESS Joseph R. Fornieri A nation often takes on the characteristics of its leaders. Consider the influence of Frederick the Great upon the German national ethos or Peter the Great upon Russia. Unlike other founders who bequeathed a political legacy of militarism, despotism, and repression to their country; George Washington passed on a legacy of virtue, liberty, and magnanimity. Undoubtedly, he inspired Abraham Lincoln as a model of statesmanship in speech as well as deed. It is therefore fortuitous that these two leaders were born during the same month of February making possible a national holiday, President’s Day, commemorating both of them. Indeed, the memory of Washington and Lincoln ought to be linked in our public consciousness if we are to appreciate more fully our political heritage. George Washington correctly stands in American memory as the nation’s Founder, its pater patriae; who oversaw the establishment of a fledgling republic at a critical moment in history when the flickering ember of liberty might have been snuffed out. And, Abraham Lincoln justifiably represents the nation’s Savior who sacrificed the “last full measure” to preserve the Union while cleansing it of the blight of slavery and securing a new birth of freedom. The symbolic roles of Washington as the nation’s Founder, and Lincoln as its Savior are appropriate insofar as they stress continuity between the two leaders as key representatives of American order. Their mutual devotion to a common political creed provides an important link between them. While historical circumstances account for some differences in the thinking of each, both shared a common political faith in the principles of American republicanism; both affirmed an enduring vision of American destiny; and both manifested the moral qualities of magnanimous statesmanship. The similarities between Washington and Lincoln’s statesmanship are revealed through a comparison of two respective speeches: The Farewell Address and Lyceum Address. The following will trace the continuity in political thought and leadership between Washington and Lincoln by comparing the republican parallels in the Farewell Address and Lyceum Address. A close textual analysis of these works shows that they are related. As will be seen, the latter was consciously modeled after the former. Lincoln’s Lyceum Address applies the broad republican themes of Washington’s Farewell Address to the circumstances of antebellum America. Particular emphasis will be placed on the extent to which Washington’s prescient warning of a sectional conflict in the Farewell Address, and his corresponding plea for a strong national Union influenced Lincoln’s statesmanship.

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Unfortunately, the manifest parallels between these texts have been obscured by a number of scholars from different ideological camps who insist that the Lyceum Address contains an esoteric or hidden teaching that unlocks the underlying psychological or philosophical motives of Lincoln’s leadership.1 These scholars interpret the Lyceum Address in a vacuum, apart from its historical context and, most egregiously, apart from Washington’s influence. In so doing, they have 1

Controversy rages over the meaning of Lincoln’s Lyceum Address. For many scholars, Lincoln’s entire political thought hinges upon an interpretation of this seminal text. Allegedly, it provides the philosophical or psychological key that unlocks his deeper motives and intentions. In short, the Lyceum Address has been misinterpreted by three groups of scholars: 1) the Straussians; 2) the Southern Conservatives; 3) the Pychohistorians. While there are vast ideological differences between each group, they all focus upon a peculiar interpretation of Lincoln’s reference to a “political religion” in the Lyceum Address. Moreover, they all fail to recognize the republican intention of the Lyceum Address and its thematic continuity with Washington’s Farewell Address. Within the field of political philosophy, the Straussians have provided a significant account of the relationship between reason and revelation in Lincoln’s political thought. In sum, the Straussians maintain that Lincoln subscribed to a formal doctrine of civil religion comparable to Spinoza and that the Lyceum Address contains a covert theological critique of revealed religion. While Harry V. Jaffa is perhaps the most renowned amongst these scholars, others include Glen E. Thurow, Michael Zuckert, Leo Paul S. De Alvarez and Laurence Berns. The nuances between these scholars should not obscure their more fundamental agreement. In sum, they all claim that Lincoln was a skeptical rationalist who exploited religion for salutary political ends. They reduce wholesale his myriad religious invocations to functional political rhetoric. Most importantly, they distinguish in the Lyceum Address an exoteric and esoteric teachings. The former is adapted to the masses, while the latter is conveyed between the lines to the wise. See the following: Michael P. Zuckert, “Lincoln and the Problem of Civil Religion,” in Law and Philosophy: The Practice of Theory: Essays in Honor of George Anastaplo, ed. John Murley, Robert L. Stone and William T. Braithwaite (Athens, OH: Ohio Univ. Press, 1992), vol. 2, pp. 720-743; Glen E. Thurow, Abraham Lincoln and American Political Religion (Albany: State University Press of New York, 1976); Leo Paul S. De Alvarez, “Reflections on Lincoln’s Political Religion,” in Abraham Lincoln: The Gettysburg Address and American Constitutionalism, ed. Leo Paul S. De Alvarez (Irving, TX: Univ. Of Dallas Press, 1976); Laurence Berns, “Lincoln’s Perpetuation Address,” in Abraham Lincoln: The Gettysburg Address and American Constitutionalism, ed. Leo Paul S. De Alvarez (Irving, TX: Univ. of Dallas Press, 1976); Harry V. Jaffa, Crisis of the House Divided (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1982). Southern conservative scholars like Wilmoore Kendall, George Carey and M.E. Bradford maintain that Lincoln viewed the Civil War as a millenarian crusade between “the children of light” and “the children of darkness.” They portray the Sixteenth President as a secular messiah who, much like the Jacobins of the French Revolution, sought to transfigure society in accordance with the abstract rights of liberty, fraternity and equality. Motivated by the will to power, he attempted to anoint himself as the nation’s savior. He used the coercive instruments of the state to achieve secular salvation. The southern conservatives view Lincoln’s reference to “political religion” as compelling evidence that he confounded the secular and sacred realms. As a gnostic millenarian who combined secular and spiritual authority, he sought secular salvation through political means. In sum, these scholars argue that Lincoln’s political thought holds apocalyptic and millenarian expectations for politics. They repudiate his exploitation of religious sentiment and portray him as a cunning tyrant who usurped spiritual authority for personal glorification. See the following: M.E. Bradford, A Better Guide Than Reason: Studies in the American Revolution (La Salle, IL: Sherwood Sugden, 1979); Wilmoore Kendall and George Carey, The Basic Symbols of the American Political Tradition (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995). The psychohistorians maintain that Lincoln’s Lyceum Address holds the psychological key that unlocks the subconscious motivations of his leadership. Garry Wills correctly observes that the psychohistorians and psychobiographers “make the Lyceum speech a key not only to Lincoln’s personal life but to his political ideals and significance.” Charles B. Strozier, Lincoln’s Quest for Union: Public and Private Meanings (New York: Basic Books, 1982); Edmund Wilson, Patriotic Gore: Studies in the Literature of the American Civil War (New York Oxford Univ. Press, 1962); Dwight G. Anderson, Abraham Lincoln: The Quest for Immortality (New York: Knopf, 1982); Dwight G. Anderson, “Quest for Immortality: A Theory of Abraham Lincoln’s Political Psychology,” in The Historian’s Lincoln: Pseudohistory, Psychohistory, and History, ed. Gabor S. Boritt and Norman O. Forness (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois, 1988); George B. Forgie, Patricide in the House Divided (New York: Norton, 1979); George B. Forgie, “Lincoln’s Tyrants in The Historian’s Lincoln: Pseudohistory, Psychohistory, and History, ed. Gabor S. Boritt and Norman I. Forness (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1998).

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imposed their own ideological dogmas on Lincoln’s thought, distorted his obvious intention, and neglected the broader continuity between the Farewell Address and Lyceum Address as companion texts of American republicanism. A comparison between the Farewell Address and Lyceum Address reveals a core of political principles shared by the nation’s Founder and Savior. In paying tribute to the deeds of Washington and Lincoln, we must not lose sight of the enduring principles that they stood for. Taken together, these two texts provide a lucid account of American republicanism as envisioned by two of its greatest exemplars.

WASHINGTON’S FAREWELL ADDRESS: A MODEL OF AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM The Farewell Address represents Washington’s vision of American republicanism. Its intention is to ensure the viability of the newly conceived republic by (a) affirming the fundamental principles of popular government; and (b) diagnosing specific threats to the nation’s liberty. As an affirmation of the nation’s political creed, and a plea for unity based upon this creed, the Farewell Address provides an enduring normative standard, a model, of how republican government “ought to be.” It provides an account of the particular historical circumstances that confronted Washington and the new republic. While some of these circumstances no longer apply to the nation today, the speech nevertheless offers an authoritative account of public order from the pater patriae that has formed the political culture of succeeding generations of Americans. Throughout the Farewell Address, Washington uses the term “republican” to describe the American regime. He speaks not of democracy, but of “Republican Liberty” and “Republican Government.”2 As presumed by the speech, the term “republican” refers not to a political party; but, to a broader political tradition of self-government as envisioned by Washington and the founders. It will be helpful to adumbrate briefly the core principles of American republicanism before examining their concrete expression in the Farewell and Lyceum Addresses. In sum, the republican creed of Washington and the founders includes the following elements: 1) the commitment to the correlative principles of self-government, equality, and consent of the governed; 2) the dedication to an ordered liberty that reconciles both authority and freedom; 3) the adherence to constitutionalism and the rule of law; 4) the maintenance of a limited government through a system of checks and balances, and the separation of powers; 5) the affirmation of a unique American destiny, and mission to preserve self-government in the world; 6) the defense of individual rights, especially the sacredness of property; 7) the recurrence to first political principles, national origins, as a means to renew political order; 8) the invocation of civil theology; 9) the recognition of the important role of civic virtue to government; 10) the belief in the inseparability of liberty and Union. The term “republican” is used precisely in the Federalist to describe a specific type of self-government in contradistinction to “democracy.” While a republic and a democracy are both types of popular-government, the latter is a diseased species, the former healthy. In 2

The Farewell Address in The Writings of George Washington, 1796.

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examining the foundations of self-government, the authors of the Federalist point out that many have erred by the “confounding of a republic with a democracy…. Under the confusion of names, it has been an easy task to transfer to a republic, observations applicable to a democracy only.”3 The Federalist repudiates “the turbulent democracies of ancient Greece and modern Italy” for their historical tendency to degenerate into the extremes of tyranny and anarchy.”4 In view of the founders’ distinction between different species of popular government, it is therefore significant that Article Four Section Four of the constitution guarantees “to every state in this Union” not a democracy, but a “Republican form of Government….” The founders’ important distinction between democracy as a degenerative form of popular government, and republicanism as a healthy form is predicated on their notion of an ordered liberty that reconciles both freedom and authority. This norm of ordered liberty underlies both Washington’s intention in the Farewell Address and Lincoln’s in the Lyceum Address. While authority and freedom are both essential ingredients of republican government, their reconciliation is elusive. Throughout history, their corruption has led to the degeneration of government into the extremes of either tyranny or anarchy. On the one hand, the perversion of authority by those in power has generated numerous tyrannies; on the other, the abuse of freedom by corrupt citizens, so common in democracies, has resulted in license and anarchy. The republican goal of ordered liberty therefore should be understood as a mean between the despotic extremes of tyranny and anarchy. The founders’ aspiration to balance liberty and authority as necessary constituents of republican government was shaped not only through their study of history, especially the Italian city states, and the ancient democracies of Rome and Greece, but through their own concrete experience with self-government in the new world. Their experience with the tyranny of the mother country, its usurpation of property rights and denial of colonial selfgovernment, convinced them of the need to establish a republic dedicated to political, civil and religious liberty. On the other hand, the weakness of the Articles of Confederation, Shay’s Rebellion, and the excesses of democracy during “the Critical Period,” convinced them of the need for a strong central government with energy, vigor, and authority. Indeed, the practical concern to secure both liberty and authority presented a dilemma to Washington, and the founders: how to provide for vigor and energy in government without encroaching upon freedom? Their solution was to establish a republican form of government that relied upon both institutional and sociological checks. American republicanism attempts to maintain popular government through both institutional and sociological checks. Institutional checks or “auxiliary precautions” as Publius calls them in the Federalist5 are built into the very structure of government as safeguards in order to prevent public officials from abusing the broad powers granted to the central government. Such institutional checks are well known to students of American government and history, to name a few; the separation of powers, the enumeration of powers, checks and balances; federalism, and a bill of rights. These “auxiliary precautions” were built into the system of government to canalize the more dangerous passions of human nature: self3

Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: Menor, Penguin, 1961), Federalist #24, p. 100 4 Federalist, pp. 70-71, 100

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interest, lust for power and ambition. Conveying the necessity of these internal, selfregulating mechanisms to republican government, Madison states in a celebrated passage from Federalist 51: Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature. If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would by necessary.

In his Farewell Address, Washington concurs with Madison that institutional checks like the separation of powers and checks and balances are necessary to the viability of republican government: “The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of political power; by dividing and distributing it into different depositories, and constituting each the Guardian of the Public Weal against the invasions by the others, has been evinced by experiments ancient and modern; some of them in our country under our own eyes.”6 Indeed, he credits the American experiment for its novel reliance upon institutional checks and balances to maintain republican liberty. In addition, Washington emphasizes that “sociological checks” are also important to the integrity of republican government. In Federalist 55, Madison himself reminds us that while institutional checks are essential, they cannot be relied upon exclusively: As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form. Were the pictures which have been drawn by political jealousy of some among us, faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference would be that there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring 7 one another. [Underlining added]

To a greater extent than Madison, however, Washington and Lincoln were more explicit in pointing out the insufficiency of institutional checks per se in maintaining a republican form of government. Both recognized that institutional frameworks alone could not prevent a popular government from degenerating into tyranny or anarchy if its citizens were morally corrupt. As a result, both emphasized that sociological checks are needed in addition to institutional checks. These checks are termed “sociological” because they rely upon societal norms, morals and manners to maintain republican government. Such norms are derived ultimately from religion. As will be seen, both Washington and Lincoln envisioned a public role for religion affirming and defending an authoritative account of political order. This public role of religion is tantamount to a civil theology. John Adams implicitly recognized the role of a civil theology to popular government when he noted that “religion and virtue are the only 5

Federalist, p. 322 Farewell Address, pp. 228-229 7 Federalist, p. 346 6

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foundations, not only of republicanism and of all free government, but of social felicity under all government, and in all combinations of human society.”8 According to Adams, the Constitution of the United States presumes a moral and religious citizenry: “We have no government armed with power capable of contending with human passions unbridled by morality and religion. Our constitution was made only for a moral and a religious people. It is wholly inadequate for the government of any other.”9 In sum, religion, morality, manners and civic education are all examples of sociological that serve republican government by forming the moral character of the citizenry. Each of these promotes civic virtue, that is, those moral qualities that dispose citizens to the common good and public happiness. It is instructive to clarify the historical context of the Farewell Address in order to clarify further its author’s intention.10. Preparing to retire from public life, after guiding the fledgling self-government through nativity, and early development, Washington raises the question of the republic’s long-term viability. The gravity of the occasion demanded that he depart from his usual reticence by addressing the public directly on those issues most crucial to the survival of the nation. His grave concerns about the destiny of the American republic were precipitated by a number of serious challenges during his presidency: the ideological split in his administration between Hamilton and Jefferson; the unanticipated development of political parties; the acrimonious debate over the Jay Treaty; the polarization in public opinion over the French Revolution; the effort to maintain American neutrality throughout this conflict; the tendency toward mob rule and plebiscitary democracy; the attendant breakdown of public order and the rule of law (the Whiskey Rebellion); and, the omnipresent threat of disunion and sectionalism. In view of these historical circumstances, the Farewell Address defends the rule of law and the integrity of the national Union against threats to ordered liberty from mob rule, factionalism and sectionalism. The preservation of constitutionalism and the rule of law against the impulsive will of the mob is a major theme in the Farewell Address. In defending the rule of law, Washington manifests a traditional republican concern for ordered liberty. He attempts to prevent popular government from degenerating into the extreme of anarchy. If republican government is to endure, it cannot tolerate the substitution of the will of a minority or a mob for the will of the duly constituted authorities and legal process. To permit this would be to invite anarchy. Washington’s speech in defense of the rule of law in the Farewell Address is matched by an important deed: his quelling of the Whisky Rebellion. The suppression of the Whisky Rebellion vindicated the rule, and established an important precedent for Lincoln in his struggle against secession. Washington’s warnings against party factionalism and sectionalism as a threat to national unity are another major theme of the Farewell Address. Washington had not anticipated the emergence of political parties. He feared that partisan self-interest would supersede the common good of the nation.

8

Quoted from Jurgen Gebhardt, Americanism: Revolutionary Order and Societal Self-Interpretation in the American Republic, trans. Ruth Hein (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1990), p. 13 9 Quoted from Richard Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1991), p. 95. 10 The fact that Alexander Hamilton helped Washington write the Farewell Address does not discredit the fact that the intention of the speech was Washington’s or was accepted by Washington.

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In the Farewell Address, he warns of the “danger of Parties in the State” and “against the baneful effects of the spirit of Party, generally.” In reference to the split between Hamilton and Jefferson, and the acrimonious partisan strife between the newly formed Federalist and Republican Parties, Washington explains: This spirit [of faction], unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passion of the human Mind. It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less, stifled, controuled, or repressed; but, in those of the popular form it is seen in its greatest rankness and is truly their worst enemy. The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge natural to party dissension, which in different ages 11 and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism.

Washington agrees with the authors of the Federalist that factional strife is rooted in human nature. He agrees further with them that faction thrives upon the freedom implicit to a “popular form” of government. Republics are therefore prone to this evil. In particular, Washington warned against the establishment of political parties on a sectional basis: “In contemplating the causes which may disturb our Union, it occurs as matter of serious concern, that any ground should have been furnished by characterizing parties by Geographical discriminations: Northern and Southern; Atlantic and Western; whence designing men may endeavor to excite a belief that there is a real difference of local interests and views.”12 He is almost prophetic in anticipating the polarization that occurred after the Kansas Nebraska Act, and the consequent division of parties along sectional lines that finally escalated into a bloody Civil War. Indeed, Washington’s admonition in the Farewell Address against “designing men” who would exploit sectional differences for personal fame and glory would be reiterated by Lincoln in the Lyceum Address. However, while Washington agrees with much of the description of faction in the Federalist, he does not accept its prescription. Although he was a stern defender of an extended republic that would spread American political institutions throughout the continent, Washington did not share Madison’s faith in pluralism as a means to diffuse faction and serve liberty. According to Washington, the affects of faction must be counteracted not through their multiplication as a means to weaken them, as Madison argued in Federalist 10, but through an appeal to national unity and the adherence to an underlying moral consensus. Contrary to Madison’s vision in Federalist 10, Washington viewed the unrestrained pluralism of the extended republic as a potential threat to Union and liberty. If not counterbalanced by some overarching national vision of the public good, a civil theology, excessive pluralism would undermine liberty and fragment the Union. Seeking to avoid the disease of factionalism that plagued the democracies of antiquity, Washington hoped that Americans would be members of a single, national party, united by a common devotion to the principles of self-government.13 In his last public address, he attempts to transcend partisan interests by speaking to the common good of the nation. One of the enduring contributions of the Farewell Address is its recognition that the pluralism of the United States must be informed by some underlying 11

Farewell Address, pp. 226-227 Farewell Address, p. 223 13 Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 17801840 (Berkely: Univ. of California Press, 1969), pp. 96-103. 12

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moral consensus if the Union is to flourish. Washington’s admonition to unity would influence the young Lincoln as he wrestled with the issue of sectionalism in the Lyceum Address.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND INTENTION OF THE LYCEUM ADDRESS Although the Lyceum Address prefigures republican themes in the mature Lincoln's political thought, it provides neither a formal esoteric doctrine nor the definitive statement of his political thinking. Rather, its historical context, political intention and literary form suggest that it is primarily the rhetorical utterance of a young Whig who upholds the rule of law against "the mobocratic spirit" of romantic democracy. Robert V. Bruce describes it "as the high flown rhetoric of an aspiring young politician."14 Its design and argument suggests that it was modeled after George Washington's Farewell Address. The Lyceum Address should therefore be read in this context as a rhetorical attempt by the young Lincoln to apply the republican themes found in Washington’s Lyceum Address to the circumstances of antebellum America. Garry Wills correctly recognizes the rhetorical context of the Lyceum Address as a Whig response to the excesses of Jacksonian democracy: “The importance of the Lyceum speech in Lincoln's life has more to do with his literary development than with his psyche. As calmer scholars have pointed out, the political point of the speech was conventional, a Whig denunciation of Jacksonian usurpations, of "King Andrew," and his high-handed ways.”15 Indeed, the Lyceum Address was delivered in a rhetorical atmosphere and context. The speech was composed during the Silver Age of Oratory in American history when aspiring young leaders practiced a cult of filial piety toward the founders, especially George Washington who was revered as pater patriae. In a nation without a hereditary aristocracy, the founders of the republic replaced family ancestors as an inspiration to aspiring leaders. The antebellum period was characterized by a cult of filial piety in which Washington was the center. The Lyceums of the antebellum period provided a forum for aspiring young statesman to practice their oratorical skills.16 They served as institutions of civic discourse and debate. Indeed, the distinctive rhetorical style of the speech has been noted by Lincoln scholars. For example, in his most recent biography on Lincoln, David Donald points out the stylistic difference between Lincoln's Lyceum and Temperance lectures and his other early speeches and writings: "In most of his public speeches and legal papers, he kept to simple, pithy statements, notably devoid of ornamentation or rhetorical flourish. But on occasion, as in the lyceum address, he adopted the florid style so common in nineteenth century oratory."17 As a Whig response to "romantic democracy", the Lyceum Address manifests a traditional republican concern for ordered liberty and the rule of law against mob violence: Such are the effects of mob law; and such are the scenes, becoming more and more frequent in this land so lately 14

Bruce, p. 276 Garry Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg: the Words that Remade America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), pp. 45-49 16 Thomas F. Schwartz, “The Springfield Lyceums and Lincoln’s 1838 Speech,” Illinois Historical Journal, 83 (Spring 1990), pp. 45-49 15

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famed for love of law and order; and the stories of which, have even now grown too familiar, to attract any thing more than an idle remark....By such examples [of lawlessness], by instances of the perpetrators of such acts going unpunished, the lawless in spirit, are encouraged to become lawless in practice; and having been used to no restraint, but dread of punishment, they thus become, absolutely unrestrained. Having regarded Government as their deadliest bane, they make a jubilee of the suspensions of its operations; and, pray for nothing so much as its total annihilation. While, on the other hand, good men, men who love tranquility, who desire to abide by the laws, and enjoy their benefits, who would gladly spill their blood in the defense of their country; seeing their property destroyed; their families insulted, and their lives endangered; their persons injured; and seeing nothing in prospect that forebodes a change for the better; become tired of, and disgusted with, a Government that offers them no protection; and are not much averse to a change in which they imagine they have nothing to lose. Thus, then, by the operation of this mobocratic spirit, which all must admit, is now abroad in the land, the strongest bulwark of any Government, and particularly of those constituted like ours may effectually be broken and destroyed--I mean the attachment of the People....18 Indeed, Lincoln's early speeches clearly reveal his republican commitment to ordered liberty. A year before the Lyceum Address he delivered another speech that repudiated the "lawless mobocratic spirit."19 His denunciation of mobocracy seems to be a continuous theme throughout his early days as a Whig.20

A COMPARISON OF WASHINGTON’S FAREWELL ADDRESS AND LINCOLN’S LYCEUM ADDRESS. The argument and design of Lincoln’s Lyceum Address suggests that it was modeled after Washington's Farewell Address. One is immediately struck by the parallel themes of the Addresses. Both speeches begin by surveying the benefits and blessings of the Union. The theme of both is dominated by the perpetuation of the Union and the nation's republican institutions. Indeed, both speeches defend the rule of law against "the spirit of innovation." Washington states: "Toward the preservation of your government and the permanency of your present happy state, it is requisite, not only that you speedily discountenance irregular opposition to its acknowledged authority, but also that you resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its principles, however specious the pretexts." 21 Lincoln’s title for the Lyceum Address clearly conveys its theme and intention: The Perpetuation of our Political Institutions. The parallels are not coincidental. Lincoln was inspired by Washington in both speech and deed throughout his life. The nineteenth century cult of filial piety upheld Washington as a role model for American youth. Indeed, as a young man, Lincoln had read the Washington 17

David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), p. 83. CW, I, pp. 110-111 19 George M. Fredrickson, “The Search for Order and Community” in The Public and Private Lincoln: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Cullom Davis, et. al., (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1979), p. 91; CW, I, pp. 65-69. 20 Fredrickson, p. 90 21 Copeland Lewis and Lawrence W. Lamm, The World’s Great Speeches, 3rd. Ed (New York: Dover), p. 253 18

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biographies of Parson Weems and David Ramsay. Years later, in his Address to the New Jersey Senate at Trenton, he described the influence of Weems’ biography.22 These famous biographies provide an important textual link between the Farewell and the Lyceum Addresses. Significantly, David Ramsay’s Life of Washington published the Farewell Address in its entirety. Although the psychohistorian Dwight Anderson draws the wrong conclusion about the influence of Washington on Lincoln, he is correct in noting the influence of Weems on Washington, and the parallels between the Farewell and Lyceum Addresses: The characterological influence of Weems's influence on Lincoln can only be assumed, but the intellectual influence can be demonstrated. In his book Weems presented Washington as the founder of a new political family, regenerated through violence of a civil war and the blessings of God. Washington's paternal authority, which depended upon his renunciation of a crown at the war's conclusion, is embodied in his Farewell Address—an excellent summary of Federalist political thought—which Weems reprinted in full. Much of the remainder of the book was devoted to the embellishment of Washington's advice, in which Weems emphasized the need for obedience to the law and preservation of the Union; constant vigilance to the dangers posed by ambitious, unprincipled men; and the establishment of "true religion." All these themes found their way into Lincoln's 1838 address to the Young Men's Lyceum, a 23 speech that can be read as a rebuttal to Washington's Farewell Address.

Contrary to Anderson, it will be shown that contrary to Anderson’s belief, the Lyceum Address was not intended as a rebuttal to Washington, but as a continuation of the republican themes expressed in the Farewell Address. The republican invocation of a civil theology; that is, the public role of religion in affirming, and defending an authoritative account of political order, is a parallel theme in both the Farewell Address and Lyceum Address. Prior to Abraham Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address, perhaps the single most celebrated invocation of religion in American public life occurs in Washington’s Farewell Address: Of all the dispositions and habits, which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism, who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the destinies of men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man ought to respect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connections with private and public felicity. Let it simply be asked, where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths, which are the instruments of investigation in courts of justice? And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect, that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principles. It is substantially true, that virtue or morality is a 24 necessary spring of popular government.

Washington’s civil theological intention in the Farewell Address can be understood more fully by appreciating the historical context of the above passage as response to the atheism of 22

CW, IV, p. 235 Anderson, pp. 258-259 24 Farewell Address, p. 229 23

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the French Revolution and its American admirers. He wanted to inoculate American republicanism against the corrupting influence of French Jacobinism and its ideological trinity of atheism, plebiscitarianism and secularism. It is noteworthy that Washington refers to religion not only as “an indispensable support” to republican government, but also “a great pillar of human happiness.” This suggests more than a mere utilitarian view of religion. Likewise, in the Lyceum Address, Lincoln calls for a “political religion” that will instill reverence for the laws. In the Lost Soul of American Politics, John Diggins recognizes the parallel theme of civil theology in these two republican texts: "Lincoln reminds Americans that Washington's 'Farewell Address' held up religion as vital to the political character of the Republic....The touchstone of Lincoln's political philosophy was the American Revolution and its hero George Washington....Lincoln saw himself as Washington's spiritual son."25 Indeed, Lincoln has been celebrated by many as the preeminent exemplar of American civil theology, the individual who has provided the most authoritative account of public order.26 While he certainly recognized that the Civil War could be attributed to a number of causes, Lincoln’s thought is of enduring value because he situated the politics of his time in a wider theological and philosophical context. He discerned that ostensible conflicts over social, economic and political claims are derived from a more comprehensive vision of God, history, man and society. Both Washington and Lincoln emphasize that republican liberty relies upon the virtue and character of its citizens. By invoking a civil theology, both addresses reveal the inherent limitations of selfinterest and institutional checks as a means to perpetuate the nation’s republican form of government. Both affirm the necessity of sociological checks as well as institutional checks. While recognizing “the necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of political power; by dividing and distributing it into different depositories, and constituting each the Guardian of the Public Weal against invasions by the other”, Washington also stresses the need for sound religion, manners and morals to maintain republican government. Likewise, in his diagnosis of the "mobocratic spirit", Lincoln also reveals the limitations of base motives as an ordering principle of public life. He states: "And thus, from the force of circumstances, the basest principles of our nature, were either made to lie dormant, or to become active agents in the advancement of the noblest causes, that of establishing civil and religious liberty." The motives for public sacrifice must be greater than the hatred of a common enemy. Lincoln explains that once the common threat of British despotism has been removed, the base motives will turn against themselves. In order for the republic to endure, its source of 25 26

Diggins, pp. 327, 303, 304 Robert N. Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” in American Civil Religion, ed. Russell E. Richey and Donald G. Jones (New York: Harper and Row, 1974); Ellis Sandoz, “The Civil Theology of Liberal Democracy: Locke and His Predecessors,” chap. in A Government of Laws: Political Theory, Religion, and the American Founding (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1990); Sidney Mead, “The Nation with the Soul of a Church,” in American Civil Religion, ed. Russell E. Richey and Donald Jones (New York: Harper and Row, 1974); Melvin B. Endy, Jr., “Abraham Lincoln and American Civil Religion: A Reinterpretation,” Church History, 44 (1975); David Hein, “Lincoln’s Theology and Political Ethics,” in Essays on Lincoln’s Faith and Politics, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (Lanham, MD: Univ. Press of America, 1983); Joseph R. Fornieri, “Biblical Republicanism: Abraham Lincoln’s Civil Theology,” Ph.D. diss., Catholic University, 1996; William J. Wolf, The Religion of Abraham Lincoln (New York: Seabury, 1963); Jurgen Gebhardt, Americanism: Revolutionary Order and Societal Self-Interpretation in the American Republic, trans. By Ruth Hein (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1993); John Patrick Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1986).

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national unity must be found in something positive, a shared moral consensus upon its destiny and principles, rather than an ephemeral and servile hatred of Great Britain. The perpetuation of American government depends upon the higher qualities that Madison himself acknowledges in Federalist 55. In other words, as Washington emphasized, the maintenance of the nation’s political institutions requires that citizens are morally virtuous. Genuine civic virtue springs not from a negative hatred of a common enemy, but from a shared consensus on moral principles that disposes a positive reverence for law and order. This reverence for the law is instilled through social norms, sociological checks. It depends upon the cogency of an ultimate moral justification that sanctions public life, a political religion or civil theology. Although Lincoln’s use of the term “political religion” in the Lyceum Address is part of a rhetorical flourish, and should not be interpreted as an esoteric doctrine of civil religion comparable to Spinoza’s religio catholica, it nevertheless correctly stresses the need for civic and moral virtue for the perpetuation of republican government. Indeed, one of the enduring contributions of Lincoln’s statesmanship is his recognition that public opinion and laws must rest on some ultimate moral grounding. This ultimate moral grounding is tantamount to a civil theology: “Public opinion settles every question here; any policy to be permanent must have public opinion at bottom, something in accordance with the philosophy of the human mind as it is.”27 Lincoln speaks of a permanent “philosophical basis” that must guide public opinion thereby promoting reverence for the laws. The “political religion” mentioned in the Lyceum Address represents the proper moral disposition of republican citizens toward the rule of law. This disposition or opinion is formed by some deeper philosophical basis, viz, a civil theology that provides an authoritative account of public order grounded upon an ultimate moral justification. In a momentous speech at New Haven, Lincoln expounds the relationship between “philosophical public opinion” and public life: “Whenever this question shall be settled, it must be settled on some philosophical basis. No policy that does not rest upon some philosophical public opinion can be permanently maintained.”28 In sum, Lincoln and Washington are more explicit than the Federalist in emphasizing the need for civic virtue and the role of morals, manners, and religion in perpetuating the republic. Civic virtue requires arduous moral habituation and public sacrifice. It requires that the "public mind" be disposed to the public good through a civil theology and a shared moral consensus. The speeches are further parallel not only in surveying the advantages and strengths of the Union, but also in diagnosing potential threats to republican liberty. Washington states: But as it is easy to forsee, that from different causes and from different quarters, much pains will be taken, many artifices employed, to weaken in your minds the conviction of this truth; as this is the point in your political fortress against which the batteries of internal and external enemies will be most constantly and actively (though often covertly and insidiously) directed, it is of infinite moment that you should properly estimate the immense value of your national 29 union, to your collective and individual happiness....

27

CW, IV, pp. 9-10. CW, IV, p. 17 29 Copeland and Lamm, p. 250 28

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In particular, both speeches emphasize the threat of mob rule to republican liberty. Lincoln's repudiation of the "mobocratic spirit" in the Lyceum Address corresponds to Washington's warnings against mob rule in the Farewell Address. Washington explains: The very idea of the power and the right of the people to establish a government presupposes the duty of every individual to obey the established government. All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all combinations and associations, under whatever plausible character, with the real design to direct, control, counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and action of the constituted authorities, are destructive of this fundamental principle, and of fatal 30 tendency.

The above passage should be understood in the context of Washington’s struggle against the Whisky Rebellion and his effort to vindicate the rule of law in the early Republic. In the beginning of the Lyceum Speech, Lincoln reiterates Washington’s warnings against mobocracy: "I hope I am overly wary; but if I am not, there is, even now, something of illomen amongst us. I mean the increasing disregard for law which prevails the country; the growing disposition to substitute the wild and furious passions, in lieu of the sober judgment of Courts; and the worse than savage mobs, for the executive ministers of justice (underlining is mine)."31 The then recent lynching of Reverend Lovejoy, the radical abolitionist, is strongly implied in Lincoln’s speech. In accordance with the rhetorical context of the entire speech, Lincoln uses hyperbola in juxtaposing "the wild and furious passions" of "savage mobs" to "the sober judgment of Courts." He states: Let reverence for the laws, be breathed by every American mother, to the lisping babe, that prattles on her lap--let it be taught in schools, in seminaries, and in colleges;--let it be written in Primmers, spelling books, and in Almanacs;--let it be preached from the pulpit, proclaimed in legislative halls, and enforced in courts of justice. And, in short, let it become the political religion of the nation; and let the old and the young, the rich and the poor, the grave and the gay, of all sexes and tongues, and colors and conditions, sacrifice unceasingly upon its 32 altars.

Indeed, this language is manifestly rhetorical in its use of repetition and religious imagery. Lincoln's evocation of "blood" is intended to remind his audience of the price of liberty. The perpetuation of republican government requires constant civic sacrifice. The citizenry must be willing to abide by the rule of law. They must sacrifice their momentary desires to the deliberations of the democratic process. In using the metaphor of “attachment” to describe the nation’s commitment to its republican institutions, the very language of the two speeches corresponds as well. Washington speaks of the people's "attachment" to their political institutions.33 Likewise, Lincoln states: "Thus, then, by the operation of this mobocratic spirit, which all must admit is now abroad in the land, the strongest bulwark of any Government, and particularly of those constituted like ours, may effectually be broken down and destroyed; I mean the attachment

30

Copeland and Lamm, p. 252 CW, I, p. 109 32 CW, I, p. 112 33 Copeland and Lamm, pp. 249, 251 31

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of the people." Adherence to the rule of law and legal process is a sine qua non of republican government’s attempt to maintain an ordered liberty that reconciles freedom and authority. The Lyceum Address is characteristically republican in its call for a return to the founding and national origins. Lincoln explains that the disorders of mobocracy can be remedied through a rededication to the principles of the Revolution. He attempts to renew political order through a dynamic recurrence to the nation's origins: Let every American, every lover of liberty, every well wisher to his posterity, swear by the blood of the Revolution, never to violate in the least particular, the laws of the country; and never to tolerate their violation by others. As the patriots of seventy-six did to support of the Constitution and Laws, let every American pledge his life, his property, and his sacred honor;-let every man remember that to violate the law, is to trample on the blood of his father, and to 34 tear the character [charter?] of his own, and his children's liberty.

In their warnings against mob rule, both speeches warn against the designs of a cunning domestic tyrant who will exploit sectional animosities. In a controversial passage from the Lyceum Address, Lincoln states: The field of glory is harvested, and the crop is already appropriated. But new reapers will arise, and they, too will seek, a field. It is to deny, what the history of the world tells us is true, to suppose that men of ambition and talents will not continue to spring up against us. And, when they do, they will as naturally seek the gratification of their ruling passion, as others have so done before them. The question, then, is: can that gratification be found in supporting and maintaining an edifice that has been erected by others? Most certainly it cannot. Many great and good men, sufficiently qualified for any task they should undertake, may ever be found, whose ambition would aspire to nothing beyond a seat in Congress, a gubernatorial or a presidential chair; but such belong not to the family of the lion, of the tribe of the eagle. What! think you these places would satisfy an Alexander, a Caesar, or a Napoleon? Never! Towering genius disdains a beaten path. It seeks regions hitherto unexplored. It sees no distinction in adding story to story, upon the monuments of fame, erected to the memory of others. It denies that it is glory enough to serve under any chief. It scorns to tread in the footsteps of any predecessor, however illustrious. It thirsts and burns for distinction; and, if possible, it will have it, whether at the expense of emancipating the slaves, or enslaving freedom. It is unreasonable then to expect, that some man possessed of the loftiest genius, coupled with ambition sufficient to push it to its utmost stretch, will at some time, spring up among us.

Psycho-historians interpret the above passage as self-referential. Edmund Wilson is credited with launching the psychological speculations about the Lyceum Address: “It is evident that Lincoln has projected himself into the role against which he is warning.” Following this psycho-speculative train of thought, Dwight G. Anderson explains: “Lincoln seemed to project himself into the very role which he warned his audience: a towering genius who would destroy inherited institutions rather than suffer the death of political obscurity.” And, George Forgie suggests that “Lincoln had himself in mind when he composed the entire speech.”

34

CW, I, p. 112.

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Charles B. Strozier conveys Lincoln’s ambivalence and envy toward the Founders in psychoanalytic terms: The Oedipal implications of the (Lyceum Address) should not be ignored. The danger of the towering genius poses is the destruction of the idealized fathers’ glorious work, their “temple of liberty” which they have left for us to protect and maintain. By his identification with the towering genius, Lincoln makes himself the one to carry out such a destruction, to become the jealous son displacing the ambivalently loved father and wage a mythic battle against the collective, historical fathers….The imagery here suggests emasculation and castration a the hands of the aspiring son.

The psycho-historians believe that the Lyceum Address reveals Lincoln’s subconscious envy toward the Founders. Envy implies both hatred and admiration. Initially, Lincoln admired and emulated the Founders, especially Washington; however, after he became frustrated with his own political impotence, his admiration became mixed with hatred and envy. His reverence for the founders grotesquely transmuted into illusions of grandeur. Like the founders, Lincoln seeks to gratify his own ruling passion of ambition. Unfortunately, he arrives upon the political stage too late. The field of glory has been harvested. The political edifice has already been established. The glorious act of founding had been consummated. With this done; what glory is left for the individual of towering genius? In view of this dilemma, George Forgie maintains that the Lyceum Address reveals the “problem of ambition in a post heroic age.” Unable to build up, Lincoln must tear down. According to the psycho-historians, Lincoln strives to transcend the monumental heights reached by the founders. In doing so, however, he disdains the beaten path. He contemns the banality of “seat in Congress, a gubernatorial or a presidential chair.” These subservient positions would never satisfy “an Alexander, a Caesar, or a Napoleon.” The man of towering genius “denies that it is glory enough to serve under any chief.” The act of founding consummated, the beaten path disdained, Lincoln’s towering ambition must be gratified in a way that surpasses the Founders. Thus he will crown himself the nation’s savior; for only he act of saving a nation can rival the act of founding one. In order to save the Union, however, Lincoln must first destroy it. With Machiavellian gusto, he sows a crisis in order to reap the glory of its final resolution. Paradoxically, the acts of creation and destruction are morally indistinguishable to individuals of “towering genius.” The will to power destroys to create; and it creates only to destroy again. The psychohistorians suggest further that Lincoln provoked the Civil War, either consciously or subconsciously, as an opportunity to become the nation’s savior. All of his political actions and principles anticipate this final role as secular messiah. If Lincoln’s discussion of the towering genius in the Lyceum Address is indeed self-referential in this sense, then it would follow that his views on slavery were wholly unprincipled. He would deserve to be held in contempt in American history as a nefarious tyrant and a cunning opportunist, not as a national hero whose nobility is comparable to Washington’s. However, Lincoln’s warning against the tyrant in the Lyceum Address is not selfreferential as the psycho-historians claim; on the contrary, it parallels yet another theme raised by Washington in his Farewell Address. The psycho-historian interpretation has been

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critiqued in great detail elsewhere.35 In view of the scope of this analysis it is enough to point out that in warning against a potential tyrant who will seek fame whether “at the expense of emancipating the slaves or enslaving freemen”, Lincoln was developing a theme raised by Washington. The latter cautioned against the motives of ambitious men who would exploit sectional differences for personal gain: With such powerful and obvious motives to union affecting all parts of our country, while experience shall not have demonstrated its impracticability, there will always be reason to distrust the patriotism of those who, in any quarter, may endeavor to weaken its bands....In contemplating the causes which may disturb our union, it occurs, as a matter of serious concern, that any ground should have been furnished for characterizing parties by geographical discriminations--Northern and Southern, Atlantic and Western--whence designing men may endeavor to excite a belief that there is a real difference of local interests 36 and views.

The very description of this tyrant is similar in both cases. Both tyrants will destroy the very political institutions which have nurtured them. Washington states: However combination or association of the above description may now and then answer popular ends, that are likely, in the course of time and things, to become potent engines, by which cunning, ambitious and unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the power of the people, and usurp for themselves the reins of government; destroying afterward the very 37 engines that have lifted them to unjust dominion.

Although Anderson draws the wrong conclusion, namely that Lincoln’s reference to the towering genius is a self-fulfilling prophecy, he nevertheless recognizes that Lincoln was pursuing a parallel theme raised in the Farewell Address: “In taking up Washington’s admonition against he dangers of “cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men,” Lincoln seemed to project himself in the very role against which he warned his audience: a towering genius who would destroy inherited institutions rather than suffer political obscurity.” Both Washington and Lincoln warn that the tyrant will emerge at a time when the bonds of Union are strained, weakened and vulnerable. Consequently, both leaders attempt to strengthen the bonds of Union against this danger. National unity is another theme that dominates both speeches. Speaking to the new nation, Washington emphasizes “the immense value of your national Union to your collective and individual happiness; that you should cherish a cordial, habitual and immovable attachment to it….” He stresses the “efficacy and permanency of [the] Union, a Government for the whole is indispensable.” He therefore warns against “the danger of Parties in the State, with particular reference to the founding of them on Geographic discriminations.” 35

Robert V. Bruce, “Commentary on `Quest for Immortality,’” in The Historian’s Lincoln: Pseudohistory, Psychohistory, and History, ed. Gabor S. Boritt and Norman O. Forness (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1988); Marcus Cunliffe, “Commentary on Quest for Immortality,” in The Historian’s Lincoln: Pseudohistory, Psychohistory and History, ed. Gabor S. Boritt and Norman O. Forness (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1988); Don E. Fehrenbacher, Lincoln in Text and Context (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1987), p. 282; Joseph R. Fornieri, “Biblical Republicanism: Lincoln’s Civil Theology,” Ph.D. diss., Catholic University, 1996, po. 184-224. 36 Copeland and Lamm, pp. 251-252 37 Copeland and Lamm, pp. 252-253.

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Indeed, Washington exhorts the preservation of the Union at least nine times throughout his address. Thus, Lincoln’s nationalist devotion to the Union was not unprecedented as some scholars who defend a states’ rights interpretation of the Constitution have suggested. On the contrary, the republican theme of the Union’s priority over the states can be clearly traced to Washington’s Farewell Address. The republicanism of Washington and Lincoln affirms the inseparability of Union and liberty. The blessings of civil and religious liberty can only be secure under the auspices of a strong, national Union. Furthermore, both speeches affirm an American mission to preserve the form of selfgovernment in the world. This mission can only be fulfilled under the auspices of a strong national union. Both speeches are concerned with maintaining the honor and reputation of the United State in the eyes of the world.38 Washington hopes that nation will acquire “the glory of recommending it to the applause, the affection, and adoption of every nation which is yet a stranger to it.” Likewise, Lincoln speaks of the “[the Founders’] ambition…to display before an admiring world a practical demonstration of the truth of proposition, which had hitherto been considered, at best, no better than problematical; namely, the capability of a people to govern themselves. If they succeeded their names were to be transferred to countries and cities, and rivers and mountains; and to be revered and sung, and toasted throughout all time. If they failed, they were to be called knaves fools and fanatics for a fleeting hour; then to sink and be forgotten.” Both Washington and Lincoln American subscribe to a common understanding of America’s special destiny and mission to be an exemplar of self-government in a world dominated by Old World despotisms. The fate of self-government throughout the entire world depends upon the success or failure of the American experiment. Despite many parallels, there are some areas of divergence between the two speeches. First, Lincoln takes for granted the existence of political parties as an accepted fact of American public life. There is also an important difference in emphasis between domestic and foreign affairs in the two speeches. Washington warns against both external and internal threats to liberty while Lincoln emphasizes the internal threat. The latter rhetorically asks: "At what point then is the approach of danger to be expected? I answer, if it ever reach us, it must spring up amongst us. It cannot come from abroad. If destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a nation of freemen, we must live through all time, or die by suicide."39 This difference in emphasis corresponds primarily to the difference in historical circumstances. Washington's task was that of founding a nation; Lincoln's that of preserving it Lincoln wrote at a time when the United States had achieved both independence and relative isolation from European affairs. The external threat was no longer grave and manifest. Thus, the difference in emphasis can be attributed to the exigencies that confronted the nation at the time of its birth and at the time of its youth respectively. In view of the increasing sectional strife during the antebellum period, it was reasonable to anticipate that the greatest threat to the nation’s liberty would come from an internal convulsion.

38 39

Paul Johnson, History of the American People, p. 225 CW, I, p. 109.

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CONCLUSION In sum, the parallels between the two addresses are undeniable. Both are paradigmatic expressions of American republicanism in their mutual commitment to ordered liberty, their defense of the rule of law, their repudiation of mobocracy, their warning against a domestic tyrant who exploits internal strife, their invocation of civil theology, and in their plea for national unity. The parallels between Washington and Lincoln can finally be inferred from an important dramatic detail in the Lyceum Address: Lincoln concludes his speech by invoking its inspirational source, George Washington.40 As parallel texts of republicanism, the Farewell Address and Lyceum Address should be consulted by succeeding generations as a means to foster a deeper national self-understanding. The extent to which Washington was a positive role model for Lincoln raises important questions about civic education in a deconstructionist and politically correct era that revels in tearing down traditions and deconstructing national heroes. The emergence of an Abraham Lincoln might have been impossible without the contribution and example of a George Washington. One wonders if the pervasive mediocrity and corruption in American public life today is at least in part a consequence of a cynical age that has irreverently trivialized, deconstructed, forgotten or mocked its national heroes. Furthermore, Washington and Lincoln’s republican emphasis on civic virtue and a Union that is informed by a deeper moral consensus is highly relevant to the enduring challenge of the United States in coping with the fragmentary pressures of pluralism. The threat of a political opportunist who will attempt to undermine the bonds of the Union by exploiting sectional, racial, gender, ethnic or religious differences remains today. Ever vigilant of this threat, let us remember the central message echoed throughout these parallel texts of republicanism: “United we stand, divided we fall.”

40

CW, I, p. 115. Also see: Anderson, p. 260

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 335-351

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

JEFFERSON, LINCOLN AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Rodney A. Grunes Both Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln made lasting contributions to the development of religious freedom in their presidencies. Their differing views are reflected in the modern separationist-accommodationist debate over the framers intended meaning of the religion clauses in the First Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the establishment clause, and more generally, in the relationship of religion and politics in the American polity. When taken together, Jefferson’s metaphor of a wall separating church and state, and Lincoln’s embrace of “civil religion” provide a pragmatic solution, especially from public policy and jurisprudential perspectives, to the contemporary problem of trying to remain faithful to the founders’ separationist principles when accommodationist values are dominant in the executive branch, and are gaining strength on the nation’s highest court.1 The constitutional foundation of the relationship of religion and politics is found in the religion clauses, establishment and free exercise, of the First Amendment. The words are deceptively simple: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” While there is general agreement, including by Jefferson and Lincoln, that the free exercise clause is intended to protect the right of individuals to believe or not believe according to their own conscience,2 there continues to be substantial disagreement by scholars and public officials as to the purpose of the establishment clause.3 While there is consensus that this clause made it impossible for the national government to establish a church, as many states had done prior to the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, a number of early leaders, especially President Thomas Jefferson, maintained that the establishment clause prohibited much more than this. Later presidents, including Abraham Lincoln, by words and actions, would challenge the Jeffersonian view, calling for far greater accommodation of religion by the national government in large part by recognizing and endorsing what scholars have called “civil religion.”4

1

See, generally, the arguments of political scientists Marcy C. Segers and Ted G. Jelen in Wall of Separation?— Debating the Public Role of Religion, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998). 2 Derek H. Davis, “Editorial: Civil Religion as Judicial Doctrine,” Journal of Church and State, 40 (Winter 1998), 7 3 The debate may be seen in the competing views of Robert L. Cord, Separation of Church and State: Historical Fact and Current Fiction, (New York: Lambeth Press, 1982), and Leonard W. Levy, The Establishment Clause and the First Amendment, revised 2nd edition, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994). 4 For a comprehensive examination of “civil religion,” see Robert N. Bellah and Phillip E. Hammond, Varieties of Civil Religion, (New York: Harper and Row, 1980).

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JEFFERSON ON RELIGION AND POLITICS Although never an orthodox Christian, Thomas Jefferson was not an atheist or hostile to religion as opponents charged during the presidential campaign of 1800.5 The primary author of the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson had maintained in 1776 that the colonies needed to separate themselves from Great Britain so that the American people could exercise those powers “to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them….” And, in the phrase often so often quoted by Abraham Lincoln and later presidents, “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights….”6 While these views are frequently described as being “deistic,” Jefferson did not believe that God was a mere “clockmaker” who retired from the world after its creation. Rather, as Edwin S. Gaustad has noted, Jefferson “believed that God continued to create and sustain the world moment by moment.”7 As Leonard W. Levy has noted, Jefferson “displayed a principled consistency” on the issue of religious liberty.8 In Virginia, for example, the legislature in 1776 adopted his proposals to repeal laws punishing religious opinions, modes of worship, and requirements that dissenters support the Church of England. Three years later, countering a proposal by Patrick Henry to create a plural or multiple establishment of religion in the state in which all Christian denominations would be supported on a nonpreferential basis, Jefferson introduced a Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom which proposed a complete separation of religion and government. Beginning with the declaration that “Almighty God hath created the mind free, and manifested his supreme will that free it shall remain by making it altogether insusceptible of restraint,” Jefferson developed his notion that religion was a private matter of the individual conscience that was beyond the power of government to either support or restrain.9 Finally adopted on January 16, 1786 after Jefferson had sailed to France, the law declared “that no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever … nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions and beliefs.” This said Jefferson, was part of the “natural rights of mankind.”10 As Thomas E. Buckley suggests, the essence of Jefferson’s legislation represented a “sweeping attack on religious establishments,”11 designed to promote free inquiry, and facilitate growth and learning. Civil governments lacked all authority to legislate in the area of personal beliefs and religious conscience.

See Frank Lambert, “God—and a Religious President … Or Jefferson and No God”: Campaigning for a VoterImposed Religious Test in 1800,” Journal of Church and State, 39 (Autumn 1997), 769-789, and Daniel L. Dreisbach, “Mr. Jefferson, a Mammoth Cheese and the ‘Wall of Separation Between Church and State’: A Bicentennial Commemoration,” Journal of Church and State, 43 (Autumn 2001), 733-737 6 According to Richard V. Pierard and Robert D. Linder, Civil Religion and the Presidency, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Academic Books, 1988), p. 97, Lincoln embraced the Declaration as “both a formal theory of rights and as an instrument of democracy.” 7 Edwin S. Gaustad, Sworn on the Altar of God: A Religious Biography of Thomas Jefferson, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1996) 8 Leonard W. Levy, Jefferson and Civil Liberties: The Darker Side 9 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), 3. 10 Ibid., p. 4. 11 Gaustad, Sworn on the Altar of God, p. 68. 5

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Given these views and the attacks on his lack of traditional Christian or Protestant religiosity during the 1800 presidential campaign, it is not surprising that early in his first term he would welcome an opportunity to explain more fully his views on church-state relations. That opportunity was provided by the Baptist Association of Danbury which had written to the new president, who had a reputation for sharing similar views on religious freedom, seeking support for its campaign to have the Congregational Church disestablished in Connecticut. It was in his January 1, 1802 reply that President Jefferson made his most complete statement regarding the proper interpretation of the religion clauses of the First Amendment and invoked the well-known metaphor of a wall of separation between church and state: believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should “make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” thus building a wall of separation between Church and State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore man all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural rights in opposition to his social duties.12 The historical record indicates that Jefferson’s reply to the Danbury Baptists was made with care and deliberation. So much so that he asked Attorney General Levi Lincoln and Postmaster General Gideon Granger to review and offer suggestions before sending it. In the attached note to the Attorney General that accompanied this request, Jefferson explained: Averse to receive addresses, yet unable to prevent them, I have generally endeavored to turn them to some account, by making them the occasion, by way of answer, of sowing useful truths and principles among the people, which might germinate and become rooted among their political tenets. The Baptist address, now enclosed, admits of a condemnation of the alliance between Church and State under the authority of the Constitution. It furnishes an occasion, too, which I have long wished to find, of saying why I do not proclaim fastings and 13 thanksgivings, as my predecessors did.

Accepting the advice of Levi Lincoln that the president might lose support from New England republicans, the final version of the President’s response to the Danbury Baptists omitted any mention of his opposition to the executive branch proclaiming national days of fasting, and thanksgiving. Although the “wall of separation” metaphor had been coined by Roger Williams in colonial Rhode Island more than a century and a half before the letter to the Danbury Baptists;14 it was Jefferson’s use of the term, especially after it was accepted as authoritative by the U.S. Supreme Court, that would spark debate and controversy. Those seeking to dismiss Jefferson’s strict separationist ideas have referred to the letter as a “little address of

12

Thomas E. Buckley, S.J., Church and State in Revolutionary Virginia, 1776-1787, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977), 32. 13 Segers and Jelen, Wall of Separation?, pp. 74-75. 14 Levy, Jefferson and Civil Liberties, p. 8. For an analysis of the Postmaster General’s response, see Daniel L. Dreisbach, “‘Sowing Useful Truths and Principles’: The Danbury Baptists, Thomas Jefferson, and the ‘Wall of Separation’,” Journal of Church and State, 29 (Summer 1997), 467-468

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courtesy” containing merely a “figure of speech,”15 a reflection of “an impish desire to heave a brick at the Congregationalist-Federalist hierarchy of Connecticut,”16 an “absurd” idea that was foreign to the Founding Fathers,17 an “angry note” that mentioned the Establishment Clause in passing,18 and, more recently, a deliberate “reconceptualization” of the meaning of the Establishment Clause which was intended to prohibit a national church and the federal government’s favoring one religion over another while allowing religion to influence the government.19 The debate over the meaning of Jefferson’s words took on a new dimension when James Hutson, the curator of a 1998 exhibition at the Library of Congress on “Religion and the Founding of the American Republic” wrote that his analysis of an FBI restored draft, had convinced him that it was politics, not the meaning of the First Amendment, that was at the heart of the President’s response to the Danbury Baptists. His central thesis is this: “the Danbury letter must be understood in the political context in which Jefferson wrote it, and it was designed by the third president to respond to a malignant and persistent campaign of political defamation.”20 No serious scholar would disagree that it is appropriate to consider “the political context” in evaluating presidential statements and policies. Moreover, there should be nothing surprising in finding that presidents utilize political motives in their pronouncements and decision-making. This is the expected norm for any politician, including Thomas Jefferson, the anti-Federalist republican. But, Hutson doesn’t stop here. Rather, he uses the political context, the consultation with political advisors and the editing out of key phrases having to do with “eternal separation” and days of fasting and thanksgiving, to cast doubt on Jefferson’s sincerity in articulating a view of religious freedom in which the “wall of separation” is central. To be sure, other than being published in a Massachusetts newspaper a month after Jefferson’s response to the Danbury Baptists, it disappeared from public view until an edition of Jefferson’s writings were published in 1853.21 And, certainly Philip Hamburger makes a valid point by noting that the Jeffersonian view did not become a dominant part of the American culture until later in the century when anti-Catholicism produced a new and unusually wide consensus in favor of separation.22 There is also some merit, moreover, in Daniel Dreisbach’s observation that the “wall” only applied to the relationship of the national government and religion and did not apply to the states.23 15

Segers and Jelen, Wall of Separation?, p. 71. James M. O’Neil, Religion and Education Under the Constitution, (NewYork: Harper and Bros., 1949), 81-82, 83. 17 Edwin S. Corwin, “The Supreme Court as National School Board,” Law and Contemporary Problems, 14 (Winter 1949), 14. 18 David Barton, The Myth of Separation, 3d. edition (Aledo, Texas: Wall Builder Press, 1992 19 Pat Robertson, 1988 presidential candidate and founder of the Christian Coalition quoted in Derek H. Davis, “Editorial: Thomas Jefferson and the ‘Wall of Separation’ Metaphor,” Journal of Church and State, 45 (Winter 2003), 6-7. 20 Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of Separation Between Church and State, (New York: New York University Press, 2002). 21 James H. Hutson, “Thomas Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists: A Controversy Rejoined,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3d. series, LVI (October 1999), 777. This is a revision of his original background paper with “an appropriate scholarly apparatus.” 22 James Hutson, “‘A Wall of Separation’—FBI Helps Restore Jefferson’s Obliterated Draft,”LC Information Bulletin, June 1889,” http://www.loc.gov.lcib/9806/danbury.html, accessed 7/16/2003 23 See Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002) 16

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While it is certainly true that Jefferson viewed federalism as one of the checks and balances that helped protect civil liberties, Dreisbach is only stating the obvious here for the doctrine of incorporation simply did not exist. Indeed, the idea of applying provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states did not become a political or constitutional controversy until much later when the Supreme Court maintained that certain liberties were so “fundamental” that, through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, they limited the actions of all levels of civil government.24 Too much of this criticism, however, is aimed at minimizing the importance of Jefferson’s statements on the need to separate church and state. No casual or “polite” reply, Jefferson’s three paragraph 259 word response to the Danbury Baptists is clearly a policy statement; one that is consistent with his earlier support of separation as author of Virginia’s Statute for Religious Freedom. Moreover, Jefferson’s actions demonstrate his strict separationist principles. Unlike George Washington and James Madison, for example; Jefferson was unwilling to use the executive office to issue proclamations for prayer, thanksgiving, or fasting.252Finally, it begs logic and common sense to suggest that a president cannot have both constitutional and political objectives when formulating official statements and policies. Of course, what irks many of Jefferson’s critics, is that in its first authoritative interpretation of the Establishment Clause in the 1947 case of Everson v. Board of Education, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously adopted the wall of separation metaphor as the basis of its jurisprudence. Writing for the Court, Justice Hugo Black explained: The “establishment of religion” clause … means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion to another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs…. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called or whatever form they adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of Separation between church and State.”26 Although the idea of “separation” had been twice mentioned in passing in earlier cases,27 Everson marked the first time that it formed the rationale of a Supreme Court decision, and equally important, acknowledged that the prohibitions of the establishment clause were so “fundamental” that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied them to the states. Clearly, the “culture of Americanism” now included separation as an American freedom.28

24

Dreisbach, Journal of Church and State, (Autumn 2001), p. 740, note 50 See Henry J. Abraham and Barbara A. Perry, Freedom and the Court: Civil Rights and Liberties in the United States, 7th edition, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), chapter 3 26 Davis, Journal of Church and State, (Winter 2003), p. 12 27 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). 28 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), and Justice Felix Frankfurter’s dissent in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 655 (1943). 25

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Despite the strict separationist language and Justice Black’s declaration that the “wall” should be “kept high and impregnable,” four justices dissented from the Court’s decision to uphold a Ewing Township, New Jersey program which authorized reimbursement to parents for the transportation costs they incurred in sending their children to public and private schools, including nonprofit religious schools affiliated with the Roman Catholic church. As Justice Jackson wrote: “[M]uch of its reasoning confirms my conclusions that there are no good grounds upon which to support the present legislation. In fact, the undertones of the opinion, advocating complete and uncompromising separation of Church from State, seem utterly discordant with its 29 conclusion yielding support to their commingling in educational matters."

Justice Jackson’s approach to implementation of the “wall of separation” seems consistent with the Jeffersonian view that civil government should not assist religious institutions, directly or indirectly. As Edwin S. Gaustad has noted, Jefferson believed that Americans needed a system of universal and secular education to liberate the mind and promote individual growth. Sectarian instruction and control worked against this, substituting dogmatism for rationality and free inquiry.30 In his 1778 Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, Jefferson went even farther, proposing the elimination of religious instruction in the state’s elementary and secondary schools. As he explained in his Notes on the State of Virginia, “Instead therefore of putting the Bible and Testament into the hands of the children, at an age when their judgments are not sufficiently matured for religious enquiries, their memories may here be stored with the most useful facts from Grecian, Roman, European and American 31 history.”

These views did not change, for in 1817, after Jefferson had left the presidency, he authored a Bill for Establishing a System of Public Education which listed only secular subjects, prohibited ministers from serving as “visitors” or supervisors, and specifically prohibited religious reading, instruction, or exercises. “Clearly,” notes Leonard W. Levy, “Jefferson opposed the use of public funds for the teaching of religion in public schools.”32 However, Jefferson saw a link between religion and morality. In his view, there were moral precepts (e.g. the need to be true, just, charitable, humane, etc.) that were “innate in man” and understood by reason and common sense. Schoolchildren, therefore, should be taught these “essentials” of “natural religion,” and should understand that the “Supreme Ruler of the Universe” created these universal principles of morality.33 Jefferson also sought to promote separation principles, though somewhat inconsistently, with respect to higher education. In 1779, he introduced a bill to abolish the school of theology, and its two professorships of religion, at the College of William and Mary. Never happy with the educational program there, he sought to transform Albemarle Academy, a small privately established and endowed school, into an institution that served students from 29

Hamburger, Separation of Church and State, p. 446. Everson v. Board of Education, at 19. Gaustad, Sworn on the Altar of God, pp. 157-162 32 Quoted in Levy, Jefferson and Civil Liberties, p. 9 30 31

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the primary grades to post-college graduate training using some public funds. Though the proposal failed, and Jefferson never renewed it, the original idea did include a professional school devoted to “Theology and Ecclesiastical History,” and, thus, it represents a departure from separationist principles. Somewhat more consistent with separationist principles was Jefferson’s proposal, in 1818, for a new state institution, the University of Virginia. Initially, he called for establishing ten professorships who would teach thirty-four subjects, but none relating to religion. Fearing that the absence of a professor of divinity might renew criticism that he was seeking to establish a “godless” institution; Jefferson, as chair of the commissioners for the University, noted that the state Constitution protected the liberty of each sect to offer its own instruction on its own grounds, and that sometime in the future, a room might be set aside in a building for “religious worship.”34 Unfortunately for Jefferson, the promise of a “supposed probable” room did not satisfy religious critics who charged that the new university was “atheistic” and hostile to religion. As a result, additional concessions were agreed to by Jefferson, now rector of the University, and by the Board of Visitors, which included James Madison as one of its members. Though couched again in conditional language and involving no public funds, the two stalwarts of strict separation agreed to allow the state’s sects to establish religious schools for instruction in their own tenets on university grounds; and, perhaps in the interim, to set aside rooms for worship on campus. The only limitation on what Jefferson called allowing students to worship at the “establishment” of their choice; was that it was to occur early in the morning prior to regular university classes. However, Jefferson was able to make the best of the situation given his separationist principles. No room or university facility was used for worship during his lifetime. Unlike most other colleges and universities, there was no compulsory chapel and no chaplain. And, the establishment of religious schools did not take place for several decades. 35 At least one scholar has called Thomas Jefferson the “most self consciously theological of all America’s presidents.”36 Described as a deist, Unitarian, rationalist, and monotheist, Jefferson followed his predecessors in using his presidency to advance what Benjamin Franklin called “Publick Religion.” Trying to bring the nation together after a divisive presidential election; for example, Jefferson closed his first inaugural with the words: “And may that Infinite Power which rules the destinies of the universe, leads our councils as to what is best, and give them a favorable issue for your peace and prosperity.”37 In his Second Inaugural Address in 1805, moreover, Jefferson more directly used “civil religion” to link the president, God, and Americans as chosen people when he stated: I shall need, too, the favor of that Being in whose hands we are, who led our fathers, as Israel of old, from their native land and planted them in a country flowing with all the necessaries and comforts of life; who has covered our infancy with His providence and our riper years with His wisdom and power, and to whose goodness I ask you to join in supplications with me that He will so enlighten the minds of your servants, guide their councils, and prosper their

33

Ibid., p. 9 Gaustad, Sworn on the Altar of God, pp. 162-165 35 Levy, Jefferson and Civil Liberties, pp. 11-12 36 Ibid., p. 14 37 Gaustad, Sworn on the Altar of God, p. xiii. 34

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Rodney A. Grunes measures that whatsoever they do shall result in your good, and shall secure to you the peace, 38 friendship, and approbation of all nations.

On the other hand, Jefferson refused to follow his predecessors when it came to fulfilling what scholars have called the “priestly” role of presidents39. As mentioned above, he refused to use the presidential office to proclaim national days of thanksgiving, fasting, prayer, or feasting. In Jefferson’s mind, these were private and voluntary religious activities between individuals and their God and public officials had no authority to intervene in such matters. Thomas Jefferson, then, had a very narrow view of acceptable civil religion. While certain practices were impermissible under the standards of reason, common sense, and the religion clauses of the First Amendment, a limited amount of “public religion” was permissible because as Derek H. Davis has observed, “the same rationality that directs the civil order to regulate life in keeping with peace, order, and civic unity also provides for affirming nature’s God as the promoter and protector of peace, order, and civic unity.”40 Most important, Jefferson’s view of the religion clauses and liberty did not require citizens to adhere to the deistic or Unitarian ideas that made up his civil religion. While he expected them to eventually prevail, this would depend more on the thinking of citizens than the pronouncements by presidents or other American leaders. Finally, there is one area where Jefferson’s views created an even higher wall of separation than endorsed by James Madison and other supporters of the metaphor. Believing that the Establishment Clause imposed limitations on both church and state, Jefferson was especially unsympathetic to clergy participating in politics. In his view, clergy were specialists in religion and theology and not politics. They had no business instructing their congregants on other matters; they should stick to their specialization. To allow more than this, said Jefferson, would threaten freedom by allowing those with power to impose a “mental tyranny.”41 Or, as another scholar has observed, “Jefferson had no problem with institutional religion until it sought or accepted any alliance with political power.”42

LINCOLN ON RELIGION AND POLITICS Although once a skeptic; 43 and never a member of a church, 44 Abraham Lincoln accommodated religion and politics to a much greater extent than Thomas Jefferson. This should come as no surprise for a president who has been described as our nation’s “only civil theologian,”45 a leader with a “sense of providence,”46 an “Instrument of God,”47 the

38

Ibid., p. 97 Pierard and Linder, Civil Religion and the Presidency, p. 51 40 Ibid., p. 24 41 Davis, Journal of Church and State, (Winter 1998), p. 12 42 Hamburger, Separation of Church and State, p. 148 43 Gaustad, Sworn on the Altar of God, p. 72. 44 William Lee Miller, Lincoln’s Virtues: An Ethical Biography, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2002), pp. 84-85 45 Edgar DeWitt Jones, Lincoln and the Preachers, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), 141. See also Wayne C. Temple, Abraham Lincoln: From Skeptic to Prophet, Mahomet, Ill.:, Mayhaven Publishing, 1995) 46 Bellah and Hammond, Varieties of Civil Religion, p. 15. 47 Reinhold Niebuhr, “The Religion of Abraham Lincoln, in Allan Nevins (ed.), Lincoln and the Gettysburg Address, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), 73 39

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theologian of “American Anguish,”48 a promoter of “biblical republicanism,”49 and the theologian of “The American Democratic Faith.”50. In addition to contributing to the development of what has been described as the “political religion of the nation,”51 he used civil religion as a major support mechanism for presidential leadership. No document about the nature of civil authority had more of an impact on the political philosophy of Abraham Lincoln than Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence. In addition to being “both a formal theory of rights and instrument of democracy,”52 the Declaration places the sovereignty of “nature’s God” over secular society, and states that government is constituted to protect God-given inalienable rights, including equality. On at least one occasion, Lincoln stated that he “did not have a feeling politically that did not spring from the sentiments embodied in the Declaration of Independence.”53 It is not surprising, therefore, that at Gettysburg on November 19, 1863; President Lincoln would refer to the Declaration when he noted that “Four score and seven years ago, our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.”54 One of those “political feelings” found in the Declaration, of course, was the consent of the governed. In Lincoln’s view, the realization of this principle, and the self-evident truths in the Declaration, required adherence to the rule of law. Lincoln would call this his “political religion.” The first public expression of this occurred in a speech before the Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois on January 27, 1838 when he stated: Let reverence for the laws, be breathed by every American mother, to the lisping babe, that prattles on her lap—let it be taught in schools, in seminaries, and in colleges—let it be written in Primers, spelling books, and in Almanacs—let it be preached from the pulpit, proclaimed in legislative halls, and enforced in courts of justice. And, in short, let it become the political religion of the nation and let the old and the young, the rich and the poor, the grave and the gay, of all sexes and tongues, and colors and conditions, sacrifice unceasingly upon its 55 altars.

This idea that the laws should be “religiously observed” was continued by Lincoln as president. In his view, this was the best way to preserve our founding principles. He believed so strongly in the rule of law; moreover, that he was highly critical of the abolitionists, though he was always convinced that slavery was contrary to the sovereignty of God.56 Yet, as Glen E. Thurow has noted, “political religion” was a malleable idea for Lincoln, taking on a different character when, as during the Civil War, it proved insufficient to maintain selfgovernment. As he explains:

48

William J. Wolf, The Religion of Abraham Lincoln, (New York: Seabury Press, 1964), p. 194. Elton T. Trueblood, Abraham Lincoln: Theologian of American Anguish, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1973). 50 Joseph R. Fornieri, Abraham Lincoln’s Political Faith, (DeKalb, Ill.: No. Illinois Press, 2003), p. 165 51 Pierard and Linder, Civil Religion and the Presidency, pp. 97-98 52 Roy P. Basler (ed.), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 9 vols. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1955), 1:112 53 Pierard and Linder, Civil Religion and the Presidency, p. 97 54 Fornieri, Abraham Lincoln’s Political Faith, p. 142 55 Pierard and Linder, Civil Religion and the Presidency, p. 103 56 Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 1, p. 112 49

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Rodney A. Grunes In ordinary times, political religion preserves the superior spirit of the founding; in the fortunate circumstances of an extraordinary man in power, it becomes an instrument of his reforms. Political religion is a perfect valve, opening and closing as necessary, under the 57 direction of a man such as Lincoln.

Therefore, during emergency conditions of the Civil War, political religion no longer meant adherence to the laws and respect for the Constitution. How could it when there was so little social order because a substantial portion of the Republic was no longer adhering to the rule of law? As a result, Lincoln transformed his idea of “political religion” as expressed in the Lyceum Address into what Robert N. Bellah has called “the national religious selfunderstanding.”58 Or, as Lucas E. Morel has observed, combining the Biblical tradition, and the principles of the Founders, “[t]he reason or prudence of Lincoln molds the Christian sentiment of the American people into a civil religion that aims to reunite the fractured populace.”59 Virtually all scholars agree that Lincoln’s use of civil religion, what Bellah describes as “that religious dimension, found … in the life of every people, through which it interprets its historical experience in the light of transcendent reality,”60 was an essential ingredient to his success as a presidential leader. Like Jefferson, Lincoln combined both the “priestly” and the “prophetic” varieties of civil religion, but as Stephen K. Shaw has observed, his major contribution “stands squarely within the prophetic version of American civil religion.”61 Although Jefferson contributed deism, and Unitarianism, Abraham Lincoln brought to the presidential office a theistic approach to the American experiment in constitutional democracy. Public addresses included constant references to his dependence on the Almighty and Biblical passages, and introduced the idea of sacrifice into prophetic civil religion. He was, as one scholar has noted, both “a biblical prophet” and a “biblical Christian.”62 Examples of Lincoln’s mixing of religion and politics include the Gettysburg Address, where he argued that faith in God was necessary to hold the nation together;63 the Emancipation Proclamation, where he suggested that God would use a people who freed its slaves to advance liberty throughout the world;64 and his Second Inaugural Address, acknowledged by almost every scholar as the best example of his prophetic civil religion, where he confronts the dilemmas of faith, republicanism, and the demands of the presidential office during the Civil War. 57

Lucas E. Morel, Lincoln’s Sacred Effort: Defining Religion’s Role in American Self-Government, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2000), 126-162 58 Glen R. Thurow, Abraham Lincoln and American Political Religion, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1976), 35 59 Robert N. Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” Daedalus, 96 (Winter 1967), 8 60 Morel, Lincoln’s Sacred Effort, p. 16 61 Robert N. Bellah, The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), p. 3. 62 Stephen K. Shaw, “Abraham Lincoln and Civil Religion: The President and the Prophetic Stance,” in Frank J. Williams and William D. Pederson (eds.), Abraham Lincoln: Contemporary, (Campbell, CA: Savas Woodbury Publishers, 1996), p. 182. For an extended discussion, see Pierard and Linder, Civil Religion and the Presidency. They note that [i]n a functional sense, the prophet stands before the people and speaks to them the necessary (and sometimes unpleasant) words from God, but the priests stands before God and speaks on behalf of the people. The prophet focuses on judgment and repentence while the priest pronounces the words of comfort, praise, and celebration.” p. 24 63 Wolf, The Religion of Abraham Lincoln, pp. 193-194 64 Pierard and Linder, Civil Religion and the Presidency, p. 103

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Both read the same Bible, and pray to the same God; and each invokes His aid against the other. It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God’s assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men’s faces; but let us judge not that we be not judged. The prayers of both could not be answered, that of neither has been answered fully. The Almighty has His own purposes: “Woe unto the world because of offenses; for it must needs be that offenses come, but woe to that man by whom the offense cometh.” If we shall suppose that American slavery is one of those offenses which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through its appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He give to both North and South this terrible war as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a living God always ascribe to Him? Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away… Yet, if God wills it continue … so still it must be said “the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether. With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in, to bind up the nation’s wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the battle and for his widow and his orphan, to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations.65 Without a doubt, President Lincoln’s contributions to the development of the prophetic voice of American civil religion were extraordinary. As Pierard and Linder have noted, “No one ever articulated the beliefs of American public religion clearly as this master of English prose. He utilized the power of the spoken word, duly recorded and reported in the press, to formulate a civil theology which encompassed American mission, emphasized the necessity of the bonds of religious faith for nationhood, and affirmed a transcendental reference point external to the nation. He sought meaning in the Civil War and concluded that the conflict was a divine judgment upon both North and South for the sin of tolerating slavery.”66 None of this, however, not the references to prayer, the Bible, providence, the need for divine guidance, the importance of divine judgment, or Lincoln’s linking of republican principles to the Bible as the best way to maintain social order, raise questions under the religion clauses of the First Amendment. Rather, it is in the “priestly” activities of President Lincoln that issues arise concerning the proper relationship of religion and politics. Lincoln did not share the Jeffersonian view on the need to maintain a “wall of separation” between church and state. Rather, as Lucas E. Morel has observed, President Lincoln “saw to it that government … accommodated religion as the citizenry saw to its higher end.”67 To a significant extent, Lincoln’s willingness to depart from Jefferson occurred during his prosecution of the Civil War. On November 5, 1862; for example, the president issued an order to the military, as commander-in-chief, to observe the Sabbath. Although there is some debate whether Lincoln or Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton composed the Sabbath Observance order, it was issued under his name. Explaining that the authority for the order was both constitutional and personal, Lincoln began his directive with the following: “The President, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and 65

Ibid., p. 108. Ibid., p. 106 67 Ibid., p. 98 66

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Navy, desires and enjoins the orderly observance of the sabbath by officers and men in the military and naval service.”68 However, it is in the reasons for the order that it becomes evident that Lincoln favored particular religions, i.e. Christian, over other religions. This is ironic since the president draws on Hebrew Scripture to provide the following four justifications for his order: The importance for man and beast of the prescribed weekly rest, the sacred rights of Christian soldiers and sailors, a becoming deference to the best sentiment of a Christian people, and a due regard for the Divine Will, demand that Sunday labor in the Army be reduced to the 69 measure of strict necessity.

Though Jefferson might have agreed with Lincoln that religious freedom involves “sacred” natural rights, and that soldiers should be free to worship God without government interference, his view of the establishment clause would not sanction a directive that declares Sunday rest as a “truth” or which singles out “Christian” soldiers and sailors. Nor would Jefferson likely agree with Lincoln’s additional explanations that the “discipline and character” of the military would be undermined if the Sabbath went unobserved or if God’s name were disregarded. President Lincoln also preferred the Christian religion over others in his Annual Message to Congress in 1863. Believing that revealed religion was necessary for the education and moral training of American Indian tribes, Lincoln proposed a policy of reconciliation and friendship that would raise their “material well-being,” promote their “progress in the arts of civilization,” and, most importantly, “under the blessing of Divine Providence, … confer upon them the elevated and sanctifying influences, the hopes and consolation of the Christian faith.”70 The president’s sanctifying and endorsement of the Christian religion seems to place his Indian policy outside the realm of civil religion. As Lucas E. Morel points out, there was no national consensus that following Christianity is necessary to achieve eternal life in the hereafter, a premise that Lincoln seems to promote when he links “the hopes and consolation” with the Christian faith.71 Also, outside the realm of civil religion, but within the sphere of his own personal religious beliefs, was Lincoln’s response to a delegation of “the Loyal Colored People of Baltimore” after receiving a Bible in appreciation for issuing the Emancipation Proclamation. Although the press reported the president’s response the following day, Lincoln’s implicit endorsement of Christianity took place in the following private reply: “All the good the Saviour gave to the world was communicated through this book. But for it we could not know right from wrong. All things desirable for man’s welfare, here and hereafter, are to be found … in … the very elegant copy of the great Book of God which you present.”72

68

Morel, Lincoln’s Sacred Effort, p. 85 Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 5, p. 497 70 Morel, Lincoln’s Sacred Effort, p. 93 71 Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 7, p. 48 72 Morel, Lincoln’s Sacred Effort, p. 97 69

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Thomas Jefferson, of course, would disagree with Lincoln that all universal moral principles come from the Bible, that Jesus is “the Savior;” and that the Christian church is God’s preferred church. President Lincoln took a similar pro-Christian stance in his foreign policy as he sought to convince the British to adopt an anti-slavery resolution. Fearing a possible recognition of the Confederacy by Great Britain, Lincoln sought approval of the following: “Resolved, That no such embryo State should ever be recognized by, or admitted into the family of Christian and civilized nations; and that all ch[r]istian and civilized men everywhere 73 should, by all lawful means, resist to the utmost, such recognition or admission.”

On the other hand, Lincoln took a nonpreferentialist stance in responding to “Christian Ministers, and other pious people” who requested appointment of hospital chaplains during the Civil War. Finding no legal basis upon which to make these appointments himself, Lincoln suggested that Protestant and Catholic clergy identify the names of volunteers who would receive “a sort of quasi appointment” until Congress was able to fulfill a presidential request to authorize chaplains for hospitals and the military. The president’s belief in the importance of providing the troops and wounded soldiers with religious support extended beyond Christian denominations as he asked Congress to change the law so that he might appoint a rabbi to serve as chaplain to a predominantly Jewish regiment from New York. As Morel has noted, “Lincoln demonstrated that the political usefulness of religion could coexist with government accommodation of church and synagogue involvement in the war effort.”74 One of the most difficult political dilemmas that Lincoln faced was determining how much religious liberty would be protected in the occupied South. Viewing religious worship as “an ordinary right of citizenship,” the president urged Union generals to limit the use of loyalty oaths as a condition for worship in secessionist churches. Moreover, Lincoln intervened to prevent them from expelling secessionist friendly ministers, appointing proUnion clergy, expelling Jews “as a class,” or interfering with churches such as the southern Episcopal Church that had included pro-Confederacy prayers in its Prayer Book. As Lincoln wrote to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, “I have never interfered, nor thought of interfering as to who shall or shall not preach in any church; nor have I knowingly, or believingly, tolerated any one else to so interfere by my authority.”75 The one area where the Jeffersonian and Lincolnian views differ most, is in the use of presidential power to encourage religious observances. Unlike Jefferson who saw a clear-cut violation of the Establishment Clause, Lincoln consistently issued executive proclamations declaring days of fasting, prayer, and thanksgiving. Blurring the line between civil and revealed religion, President Lincoln, upon a recommendation by Congress, issued his first National Fast Day proclamation for “humiliation, prayer and fasting” four months after the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter. Declaring that “it is fit and becoming in all people, at all times, to acknowledge and revere the Supreme Government of God,” Lincoln urged the nation to “recognize” the Civil War as a chastisement by God, seek God’s mercy, and to pray for military success. The final paragraph of this first proclamation, asks the nation to observe this day “according to their 73

Ibid., p. 98 Ibid., p. 99. 75 Ibid., p. 103. 74

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several creeds and modes of worship,” so that, as the Bible directs, “the united prayer of the nation may ascend to the Throne of Grace and bring down plentiful blessings” upon the country.76 Three months later, on November 28, 1861; Lincoln announced that government offices in Washington and Georgetown would be closed for a day of Thanksgiving. The following spring, this time without any congressional urging, Lincoln issued a national proclamation for thanksgiving, asking Americans to “render thanks to our Heavenly Father for these inestimable blessings.”77 Once again, the president adopted a non-preferential approach, using the nation’s separate religions to support the objectives of the government during the Civil War period. A far more religious proclamation was issued one year later when, following a request by the Senate, Lincoln declared that it was the duty “of nations as well as of men” to “recognize the sublime truth, announced in the Holy Scriptures and proven by all history that those nations only are blessed whose God is the Lord.”78 While a biblical reference to Psalms 33:12 may be the language familiar to Americans in 1863, Lincoln’s proclamation for “prayer and humiliation” endorses a particular religious tradition for both Americans, and the rest of the world. Lincoln issued six more proclamations, including one, closer to the tradition of civil religion; that made Thanksgiving into an annual national holiday. In addition, the president formulated the phrase “In God We Trust” which was added to our currency; and, at Gettysburg, the phrase “under God” which was later added as an official part of our Salute to the Flag.79 Although far less of a strict separationist than Jefferson, Lincoln’s civil religion and nonpreferential approach has received some support by an increasingly accommodationist U.S. Supreme Court. While still adhering to the “wall of separation” metaphor first announced in Everson; for example, the Court has adopted a historical or ceremonial exception to its Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In Marsh v. Chambers,80 for example, the Court held that the First Amendment was not violated by Nebraska’s practice of opening state legislative sessions with a prayer offered by a Presbyterian minister who was paid with public funds. The Jeffersonian position was taken by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. who, in a dissenting opinion, argued that the Establishment Clause was clearly violated since the invocation of divine guidance on a government body by a paid “chaplain” had no secular purpose, a primary effect of advancing religion, and produced the kind of “political divisiveness” that this clause was intended to prevent.81 Support for national religious holidays was first upheld in Lynch v. Donnelly.82 Here, the Court, relying on a long history of government acknowledgement of religion, and public funding of holidays with religious significance, upheld state support of a nativity scene in Pawtucket, Rhode Island’s annual Christmas display. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice

76

Ibid., p. 107 Ibid., p. 110. 78 Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 5, p. 186 79 Morel, Lincoln’s Sacred Effort, p. 111 80 Trueblood, Abraham Lincoln: Theologian of American Anguish, pp. 6-7 81 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 82 Ibid., pp. 799-801 (Justice Brennan, dissenting). 77

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Warren Burger argued that the Establishment Clause did not require the complete separation of church and state; rather, it mandated benevolent neutrality and accommodation. Nevertheless, applying the separationist formula announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman,83 the Chief Justice found that the celebration of a national holiday was a valid secular purpose, that the primary effect advanced religion no more than the hundreds of religious paintings hanging in government supported museums, and that any benefit to a particular religion was “remote” and “incidental.”84 However, in Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,85 another Christmas display case, the Court held that a nativity scene displayed in the county courthouse and bearing a banner declaring “Glory to God in the Highest!,” constituted an endorsement of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. Yet, the Court upheld a display of a Chanukah menorah next to a Christmas tree just outside a public building that included a mayoral statement saluting the holiday lights of freedom.

JEFFERSON AND LINCOLN: A SYNTHESIS? In addition to providing the “wall of separation” metaphor that continues to underlie Establishment Clause jurisprudence, Thomas Jefferson also contributed a view of civil religion, one grounded in ceremonial deism, that has allowed the U.S. Supreme Court to acknowledge, as Justice William O. Douglas declared in 1952, “[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”86 However, Abraham Lincoln moved considerably beyond the Jeffersonian view of civil religion. As president, he soon moved away from what he called his “political religion” and adopted a more accommodationist view of religion. Specifically, Lincoln departed from the separationist ideas of Jefferson by using biblical passages in his public announcements; his search for redemption as commander-in-chief during the Civil War; in his appointment of chaplains for military hospitals; and his official proclamations for days of humiliation, prayer, and thanksgiving. Many of the differences that exist between the Jeffersonian and Lincolnian views stem from a difference in how both viewed the relationship of religion and politics. Ironically, both Jefferson and Lincoln viewed the freedom of religion as a “natural” right, one given by a Supreme Being and known to humankind by the use of the gift of reason. However, as a separationist, Jefferson viewed religion as largely a private and individual matter, one that should be free of governmental restraint. Lincoln, on the other hand, viewed religion more instrumentally than Jefferson, finding that endorsing and promoting the communal exercise of religious freedom, often limited to the “Judeo-Christian” tradition, might help produce the unity and understanding necessary for a successful conclusion to the Civil War. The constitutional dilemma, of course, is reconciling civil religion with the religion clauses of the First Amendment. As Pierard and Linder, have noted, 83

Lynch v. Donnelly 465 U.S. 668 (1984) Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) 85 Lynch v. Donnelly, at 683 86 Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) 84

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“The First Amendment … guarantees religious freedom and forbids the establishment of any church or religion…. The result is a strict separation of the institutions of church and state but not of religion and politics as such. Americans have always been a fundamentally religious people and this extends to every level of life, including politics.”87 Thomas Jefferson’s use of civil religion causes few Establishment Clause problems. The gift of God to humankind was rooted in right reason and common sense, and Jefferson assumed that religion and politics would use these qualities to achieve “peace and good order.” Unlike his immediate predecessors, he refused to declare days of prayer or thanksgiving. Most important, he refused to use the office of president to give legitimacy, endorse, or promote any sectarian religious tradition. However, it wasn’t until the presidency of Abraham Lincoln that American civil religion became a cultural reality. It was Lincoln who embraced the symbols and gave expression to ideas such as the existence of a transcendent God that was linked to America as His chosen country and Americans as His chosen people in modern history.88 He also connected the ideas of divine providence, suffering, and redemption as understood within the Judeo-Christian tradition. While Lincoln’s God-centered rhetoric and use of religious symbolism does not raise any Establishment Clause problems, such cannot be said by making Thanksgiving into a national religious holiday, appointing military chaplains, proclaiming National Days of Prayer, and, perhaps placing the motto “In God We Trust” on our coins. As Derek Davis has noted, “[a]ll of these practices are violations of a strict notion of the separation of church and state.” 89 Some scholars, however, complain that this Jeffersonian view fails to understand the importance of religion in American history, and leads to “absurd conclusions” such as preventing chaplains from opening legislative sessions with prayer.90 Others argue that civil religion has become so much a part of American culture that it should be given a special exception from traditional Establishment Clause jurisprudence.91 Unfortunately, there is considerable disagreement today as to what should be included and offered special protection under the civil religion exception. As Derek Davis points out, liberal and conservative proponents differ as to whether ideas such as America as a chosen nation, the Judeo-Christian tradition, or justice, and peace should be included in our civil religion.92 Moreover, few would doubt that our nation has become more diverse and pluralistic since the presidencies of Jefferson and Lincoln. Under these circumstances, there is much to commend in the Supreme Court’s approach to the problem of civil religion. While continuing to adhere to the “wall of separation” approach advanced by Thomas Jefferson, it has added a narrow, though not very well defined, accommodationist exception to allow constitutional protection for longstanding historical practices of ceremonial deism. Thus, opening legislative sessions with prayers said by a publicly paid clergyman and permitting religious holiday displays have been found to be constitutionally permissible under the Establishment Clause.

87

Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.s. 306, 313 (1952). Pierard and Linder, Civil Religion and the Presidency, p. 19 89 Ibid., p. 25 90 Davis, Journal of Church and State, (Winter 1998), p. 21 91 Bellah and Hammond, Varieties of Civil Religion, p. 7 92 Yehudah Mirsky, “Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause,” Yale Law Journal 1237 (1986). 88

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More recently, the Court has refused to extend this exception to nondenominational prayers at public school graduations. In the 1992 case of Lee v. Weisman,93 for example, Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the high court, said that students were exposed to “subtle and indirect” coercion by participating in a graduation ceremony where the school chose a clergyman to deliver the Invocation and Benediction in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Most important, Kennedy refused to place this case into the ceremonial deism category as had been suggested by at least one lower federal court.94 Instead he suggested that, for constitutional purposes, government endorsement of civil religion differed little from promoting revealed religion. “If common ground,” explained Kennedy, “can be defined which permits once conflicting faiths to express the shared conviction that there is an ethic and morality which transcend human invention, the sense of community and purpose sought by all decent societies might be advanced. But though the First Amendment does not allow the government to stifle prayers which aspire to these ends, neither does it permit the government to undertake that task for itself.”95 As we become more pluralistic, it becomes increasingly difficult to identify faith traditions that represent a consensus of Americans. Accommodationists, including those in the Bush Administration, disagree and would add “faith-based” initiatives to the historical exceptions of legislative prayers, and chaplains that were nurtured during the Lincoln presidency.96 They find no major problem in a government that promotes and endorses religion, as long as it does so on a non-preferential basis. However, the accommodationists underestimate the divisiveness of mixing religion and politics as well as the impact that government sponsorship of religion has on minority religions and those who profess no religion at all. Moreover, they tend to discount the impact of government intervention on the purity and authenticity of purely voluntary and private religion. Thus, despite the increase in scholarly and political criticism, it is suggested here that Thomas Jefferson’s “wall of separation” metaphor continues to provide the most satisfactory way of protecting freedom under the religion clauses of the First Amendment.

93

Davis, Journal of Church and State, (Winter 1998), p. 20 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) 95 See Stein v, Plainwell Community Schools, 822 F.2d 1406 (6th cir. 1987). 96 Lee v. Weisman, at 589. See Derek H. Davis, “Editorial: Thoughts on the Separation of Church and State under the Administration of President George W. Bush,” Journal of Church and State, 45 (Spring 2003), pp. 229-235. 94

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 353-362

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

INVOKING THE FRAMERS: THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES Danny M. Adkison INTRODUCTION It is perhaps the most recognized campaign event in the history of the United States. The Lincoln-Douglas debates were held in the late summer and early fall of 1858. Abraham Lincoln, the challenger, debated Stephan A. Douglas, the incumbent Senator from Illinois. There were seven debates, each three hours long. These twenty-one hours of debate covered a variety of subjects; however, most of the Lincoln-Douglas debate centered on the issue of slavery. The slavery issue could be addressed from several different perspectives.1 Of course, there was the political component. Each candidate hoped to use the debate to win votes. Each, therefore, used broad strokes to paint the other as an extremist. Douglas accused Lincoln of being, at heart, an abolitionist.2 Lincoln accused Douglas of being, at heart, in favor of wanting slavery throughout the nation.3 Both candidates also addressed the question of the legality of slavery. The U.S. Supreme Court had issued the Dred Scott decision about seventeen months earlier. Furthermore, Congress had been debating laws concerning how to address the slavery issue as more territories were acquired, populated, and requesting statehood. Another aspect of the debate was the question of the morality of slavery. The question of the morality of slavery existed independent of the question of the legality of slavery. Even if legal, slavery could be, and was, attacked as immoral. A final issue that was addressed by both candidates during the debates was that of history. As is still the case today, the founding fathers or framers were held in high regard. Thus, both candidates sought to demonstrate that the founders of the nation and the framers of the Constitution took a position on slavery that if not identical to their own, at least was supportive of their position. Assuming the founders and framers had a position on slavery, both candidates could not be correct in their assertions. The question then is which candidate was correct in his assertion that he was merely following the lead of the framers? The answer to that question is the subject of this paper. 1

David Zarefsky, Lincoln, Douglas, and Slavery: In the Crucible of Public Debate (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990). 2 Ibid., pp. 68-80. 3 Ibid., pp. 80-93.

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BACKGROUND In 1820, Congress passed the Missouri Compromise. The law was prompted by the question of whether Missouri, seeking statehood, should be admitted as a slave state or a free state. At the time, there were eleven free states and ten slave states, with a subsequent decision in Alabama to allow slavery, creating an equal balance of free and slave states.4 When Congress took up the issue, another territory, Maine, had already organized, and requested statehood. This presented Congress with the opportunity to preserve the balance between slave and free states. In an attempt to defuse the slavery question, Congress passed the Missouri Compromise dividing the Louisiana territory into North (above the 36 degrees 30 minutes north latitude), and South (below that latitude) with slavery prohibited north of that latitude (except for Missouri, where slavery would be allowed). The slavery issue resurfaced again following the Mexican War, and the acquisition of territory that came following the U.S. victory. There were three basic approaches to handling the slavery issue in these territories. Some wanted to ban slavery in these territories, some argued that neither Congress nor the territorial governments had authority to prohibit slavery, and a third group sought some form of compromise (such as extending the Missouri Compromise or allowing each territory to decide for itself whether to be free or slave). Ultimately, Congress passed the Compromise of 1850 allowing, among other things, for California to be admitted as a free state. Once again it appeared that the slavery issue had been diffused. Attempts on each side of the issue to win concessions, however, kept the issue alive. Southern proslavery interests seemed always to be seeking ways of expanding slavery. Meanwhile, antislavery forces were becoming particularly upset with a provision of the 1850 Compromise: strict enforcement of fugitive slave laws. Then, too, there were the additional territories in the West that would be seeking statehood. It was in this atmosphere that Senator Stephen Douglas sought to propose a solution that would be favored by both North and South. Douglas took an idea from the Compromise of 1850 and proposed it as a solution for the new territories that would be called Kansas and Nebraska. He took note of the fact that under the Compromise of 1850 the territories of New Mexico and Utah were free to decide whether, when seeking statehood, to be admitted as free or slave states. Although the Kansas and Nebraska territories were north of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes north latitude, Douglas proposed that rather than have the question of slavery determined by Congress, leave it for the residents of each territory to decide for themselves. Douglas’ idea was called “popular sovereignty.”5 Congress passed Douglas’ so-called “Kansas-Nebraska Act” in 1854. Of these two territories, Kansas was developing much more rapidly than Nebraska, so attention shifted to it. Both proslavery and antislavery advocates took actions to guarantee that Kansas would enter the Union aligned with their interests. In the end, the two sides ended in violent conflict, resulting in calling the area “bleeding Kansas.” The final major event preceding the confrontation between Lincoln and Douglas was a decision of the Supreme Court. In 1857 the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in the Dred 4

John D. Hicks, George E. Mowry, and Robert E. Burke, The Federal Union: A History of the United States to 1877, Fourth Edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964), p. 399. 5 Ibid., p. 602.

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Scott case. That decision raised a multitude of questions and allowed the Court, led by Chief Justice Taney, to give the judicial branch a chance to weigh-in on the issue of slavery. The case came about when a slave, owned by a Missourian, was taken into a free state and a free territory. The slave, Dred Scott, subsequently sued in federal court for his freedom.6 A big part of the problem with the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision was the Court approaching the slavery question as if it, the branch that Hamilton had described as the “least dangerous,” could settle once and for all the issue that had so severely divided the nation.77 The decision hardly settled anything, and its racist language tarnished the heretofore rather respected reputation of Chief Justice Taney. Here is how historian James MacGregor Burns described the decision: “As a political decision it upset the delicate position between North and South, exacerbated antagonism between proslavery and antislavery, and destroyed that superb device of compromise.”8 What did the Court rule? First, the Court ruled that blacks (whether slave or free) could not be citizens of the United States. Second, it ruled, for only the second time since the Constitution went into effect in 1789, that a federal law, the Missouri Compromise, was unconstitutional. Finally, the Court ruled that Congress had no authority to ban slavery in territories. All of these conclusions resulted in the Court denying Dred Scott his freedom. One of the most unforgiving aspects of Taney’s decision was the racist position it took on blacks. In fact, Taney based his first ruling (the citizenship ruling) on the assumptions of the inferiority of the black race. As such, it set the stage for the Lincoln-Douglas debates.

EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE DEBATES In 1858, Stephen Douglas was running for his third term as a Senator representing Illinois.9 His Republican challenger was Abraham Lincoln, who lacked a strong record in national government service (he had served one term in the U.S. House of Representatives during the Polk presidency); but, who “was well known throughout the state for his political sagacity, and his forceful public speaking.”10 Lincoln accepted his Party’s nomination with a speech in which he issued these famous words: “A house divided against itself cannot stand.”11 Douglas could not have been more pleased for he felt Lincoln’s words would allow him to campaign on the grounds that Lincoln advocated civil war. In the early phases of the campaign, Douglas clearly had the lead, and it appeared the Lincoln forces were following Douglas around the state in an attempt to “take advantage of the crowds” Douglas was drawing.12 Some newspapers pointed out that this was, in fact, Lincoln’s strategy. Perhaps seeking to go on the offensive, Lincoln countered by challenging Douglas to a series of debates. By challenging Douglas to debate, Lincoln could continue to 6

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857). Bernard Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Court (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 106-125. Fred W. Friendly and Martha J.H. Elliott, The Constitution: That Delicate Balance (New York: Random House, 1984), p. 18. 9 Of course, until ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, state legislatures elected U.S. Senators. The quote is from Hicks, Mowry, and Burke, p. 617. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Zarefsky, p. 48. 7 8

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share the crowds Douglas drew, and no longer could Douglas refuse to ignore Lincoln’s accusations.13 The proposal sent to Douglas would have involved fifty debates, the Illinois State Journal had called for one-hundred, and would have virtually preempted the Douglas’s calendar for the remainder of the campaign.14 Since Lincoln’s challenge came after Douglas had made his campaign schedule public, Douglas was able to refuse more than seven debates. He chose seven because that was the number of congressional districts left that he had not visited.15 Much like today, Douglas, as the incumbent, did not really want to debate. Lincoln could only gain in strength, and Douglas, as the frontrunner, could only lose support. Furthermore, Lincoln had a reputation as a skilled debater. Although he suffered from stage fright, he was generally able to overcome it as the debate progressed.16 Even as a young man Lincoln would give “stump” speeches, but “cultivated a combative style of argument [probably due to his training in law], including mimicry and stare, but in his later years he fused metaphor and analogy with logic, and he became more precise and eloquent.”17 Douglas, too, was a good speaker. His voice was much more resonant than Lincoln’s, while “his argumentation has been described as misrepresenting the opposition and twisting logic.”18 In the end, however, Douglas, having been placed on the defensive, did not want to appear fearful in going head-to-head with Lincoln in debate, and so he accepted Lincoln’s challenge. Lincoln asked Douglas to name the manner in which the debates should be held, asking only that he be guided by “perfect reciprocity.”19 Douglas proposed the seven cities, that each debate last three hours, with the candidates alternating who gave the opening and closing speeches (with Douglas going first, which gave him one more opening and closing speech than Lincoln).20 After pointing out the advantage Douglas would have in his proposal Lincoln nonetheless accepted these terms.

THE DEBATES Here is a list of cities in which Lincoln and Douglas debated and the format. First Debate: Ottawa - August 21 - Douglas Opened - Douglas Closed Second Debate: Freeport - August 27 - Lincoln Opened - Lincoln Closed Third Debate: Jonesboro - September 15 - Douglas Opened - Douglas Closed Fourth Debate: Charleston - September 18 - Lincoln Opened - Lincoln Closed Fifth Debate: Galesburg - October 7 - Douglas Opened - Douglas Closed Sixth Debate: Quincy - October 13 - Lincoln Opened - Lincoln Closed Seventh Debate: Alton - October 15 - Douglas Opened - Douglas Closed 13

Ibid., p. 49. Ibid. 15 Ibid., p. 50. 16 Ibid., p. 35. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid., p. 30. 19 Ibid., p. 51. 20 Ibid. 14

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One strategy each candidate relied on was to claim legitimacy for his position by invoking the name of the Founding Fathers or Framers (or even mentioning such well-known American politicians such as Washington, Jefferson, and Madison) as supporting his own. For example, Douglas’ comments in the first debate, commenting on Lincoln’s metaphor of the “house divided” to describe the nation, he asked, “Why can it not exist divided into free and slave States? Washington, Jefferson, Franklin, Madison, Hamilton, Jay, and the great men of that day, made this government divided into free States and slave States.”21 Lincoln and Douglas each referred to the Framers in five of the seven debates (first, third, fourth, fifth, and seventh debates), although on one occasion Lincoln made such a reference, and Douglas did not (third debate), and on one occasion Douglas made such a reference, and Lincoln did not (fourth debate). Typically, if one candidate made a reference to the Framers the other responded in kind. As indicated by the quote above, Douglas invoked the Framers as a way of questioning the assumption in Lincoln’s “house divided” comment. Douglas invoked this argument again in the third debate, replying to Lincoln’s “house divided” metaphor: “Why cannot this government endure divided into free and slave States, as our fathers made it?” Douglas also argued (in the fifth debate) that the authors of the Declaration of Independence could not have meant to include blacks in the assertion that “all men are created equal.” Finally, Douglas agreed with the Supreme Court in asserting that slaves were property “like all property,” and that this principle was recognized in the “popular sovereignty” doctrine he espoused (seventh debate). Each of these points will be addressed in turn with a view of examining what the Framers’ position on each was. The primary evidence used for answering this question will be the one public statement from those advocating ratification of the Constitution made on the question of slaves and slavery: Federalist 54. Federalist 54 is the sole essay in eighty-five Federalist Papers devoted solely to an issue related to the issue of slavery. It was written by James Madison, but he was writing under the pseudonym of Publius, and as such was speaking for the Framers in general. Thus, it is a good objective reference point for determining what they thought about the subject of slavery. In the essay, Madison seeks to explain why the Framers included the Three-fifths Compromise in the Constitution. That compromise is mentioned in Article I, Section 2 which stipulates, “Representatives … shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.”

THE “HOUSE DIVIDED” ARGUMENT The difference between Lincoln and Douglas on this point revolves around the question of whether the Framers, by refusing to prohibit slavery in the U.S. Constitution, would endorse Douglas’ notion of “popular sovereignty.” Douglas’ clearly believed that the answer to the question was “Yes” (as indicated in the quotes from his comments during the debates). The logic of the argument was that since slavery did not exist in all of the states when the 21

http://www.nps.gov/liho/debates.htm (Note: All quotations from the debates comes from this website.)

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Constitution was written, the Framers were, at a minimum, giving tacit approval of this arrangement by refusing to mandate a change. Here is another way in which Douglas made this point: “Our fathers intended that our institutions should differ. They knew that the North and the South, having different climates, productions and interests, required different institutions” (first debate). In response, Lincoln makes it clear that his “house divided” remark should in no way be taken to mean that there should in all (or even most) things be uniformity throughout the states. He argued: “The great variety of the local institutions in the States, springing from differences in the soil, differences in the face of the country, and in the climate, are bonds of Union. They … make a house united. If they produce in one section of the country what is called for by the wants of another section…. But, can this question of slavery be considered as among these varieties in the institutions of the country?” Lincoln answered this question in the negative. Concerning the failure of the Framers to prohibit slavery, Lincoln took the position that out of expediency they did not prohibit it, but that the evidence indicated it was going to die on its own. The evidence Lincoln gave for this assertion was (1) by restricting slavery in the Northwest Ordinance, and (2) by stipulating a date in which the slave trade could be made illegal. Here are Lincoln’s words: “I account for it by looking at the position in which our fathers originally placed it, restricting it from the new Territories, and where it had not gone, and legislating to cut off its source by the abrogation of the slave-trade thus putting the seal of legislation against its spread; the public rested in the belief that slavery was in the course of ultimate extinction” (first debate). Lincoln’s view is one that some scholars have accepted as substantiated by the evidence. Although they admit that some, during the writing of the Constitution, may have been engaging in wishful thinking, Collier and Collier conclude that many at the time believed that slavery was a “dying institution,” and ending slave trade would “automatically follow.”22 The Framers did not include the word “slave” or “slavery” in the Constitution. When the Thirteenth Amendment was added to the Constitution in 1865 it did not repeal any portion of the original Constitution. That is because there was no mention of slavery in the Constitution of 1787. It is also a fact that the Constitution allows Congress to ban the importation of slaves beginning in 1808 (Article I, Section 9, Clause 1). In addition, at the time the Constitution was written, ten states had already banned the importation of slaves.23 It must also be remembered that the Three-fifths Compromise did not spring from the minds of those drafting the Constitution, but was borrowed from the Articles of Confederation. Lincoln’s view would also tend to be supported by a holistic view of the debate at the Constitutional Convention. That debate, in spite of the fact that many who spoke had slaves, is almost universally critical of the institution of slavery (see list of quotes in appendix at end). Mason, a Virginian, called it a “nefarious institution.” On the whole, the institution was repeatedly criticized when the issue surfaced at the Convention. One is hard pressed, however, to find a speech defending slavery. As such, that debate tends to support the assertion that the Framers refused to prohibit slavery out of expediency, and hoped for its extinction. Furthermore, those who had examined the constitutional debates in detail have 22

Christopher Collier and James Lincoln Collier, Decision In Philadelphia: The Constitutional Convention of 1787 (New York: Ballantine Books, 1986), p.189. 23 Ibid.

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concluded that the compromise on slavery was due to political expediency, and was not a statement on the morality of slavery or the humanity of blacks.24 The arguments in Federalist 54 confirm the correctness of Lincoln’s assertion, namely that the failure of the Framers to ban slavery, and thus allowing some states to be free and others slave, was one of expediency. The entire essay is a justification for counting slaves as 3/5s of a person for purpose of apportioning representatives and taxes. By the very act of seeking to justify the compromise, Publius’ argument is not one of principle; but, of creating amity between the free and slave states. In fact, in providing the argument for how a Southern might seek to justify counting slaves for representation, Publius concedes some rather startling conclusions. For example, he argues that while slaves do have some of the traits of property (such as being sold to another master), they also have traits of personhood. Here is how Publius describes the evidence for this assertion: “In being protected … in his life and in his limbs, against the violence of all others, even the master of his labor and his liberty; and in being punishable himself for all violence committed against others, the slave is no less evidently part of the irrational creation; as a moral person, not as a mere article of property.” Two final points should be made regarding this argument. These points, however, come from different Federalist Papers, and while they do not deal directly with slavery, by relating to the slave trade they do shed light on the issue. The first comes from Federalist No. 38. In this essay Publius (again, Madison) argues that while the proposed Constitution is not flawless, it is still an improvement on the existing government, the Articles of Confederation. Thus, to those that criticize the proposed Constitution because it would allow the slave trade to continue until at least 1808, it should be pointed out that under the Articles of Confederation the slave trade could continue forever. This is an important point because it demonstrates the fact that the Framers recognized there were flaws in the Constitution, but that they had, through compromise, written the best constitution allowed given the demands each side was making. This, clearly, is an argument from necessity. The second argument comes from Federalist No. 42, also authored by Madison. Publius addresses the objection that the proposed constitution should have placed an immediate prohibition on the slave trade. Publius responds, “But it is not difficult to account either for this restriction on the general government, or for the manner in which the whole clause is expressed.” With this coded sentence Publius explains the 1808 slave trade provision in a manner that could just as easily have been applied to the institution of slavery itself. Namely, that this was a concession to the Southern States and did not express, in principle, what the Framers’ position on the institution of the slave trade or slavery itself was. In fact, Publius follows this remark with a statement that could hardly be made by someone who would view slavery in a positive light: “It ought to be considered as a great point gained in favor of humanity, that a period of twenty years may terminate for ever within these States, a traffic which has so long and so loudly upbraided the barbarism of modern policy; that within that period it will receive a considerable discouragement from the federal Government, and may be totally abolished by a concurrence of the few States which continue the unnatural traffic, in the prohibitory example which has been given by so great a majority of the Union.”

24

Ibid., pp. 197-222.

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THE DECLARATION AND EQUALITY Douglas also argued that the Founders could not have intended for slaves to be included in the Declaration of Independence’s assertion that “All men are created equal.” Here is how Douglas, in the fifth debate, described Lincoln’s (and his own position) on the subject: “I tell you that this … doctrine of Lincoln’s, declaring that the Negro and the white man are made equal by the Declaration of Independence and by Divine Providence, is a monstrous heresy.” To support this assertion Douglas goes on to point out that the author of that document, and many who signed it, owned slaves. Lincoln, in his reply to Douglas, stated, “I only have to remark upon this part of the Judge’s speech … that I believe the entire records of the world from the date of the Declaration of Independence up to within three years ago, may be searched in vain for one single affirmation, from one single man, that the Negro was not included in the Declaration of Independence; I think I may defy Judge Douglas to show that [Jefferson] ever said so, that any President every said so, that any member of Congress ever said so, or that any living man upon the whole earth ever said so, until the necessities of the present policy of the Democratic party, in regard to slavery, had to invent that affirmation.” Douglas is correct in pointing out that Lincoln was not asserting that slaves were equal (an obvious absurdity), but rather that there was a higher law that viewed them in this way (Douglas called it Divine Law). Douglas was asserting that not only did positive law in some states recognize the inequality of whites and blacks, but that so, too, did Divine Law. In this, Douglas was agreeing with Chief Justice Taney in the Dred Scott decision. Did the Framers hold a similar view? Federalist 54 would indicate that they did not. In referring to the mixed character of slaves (as exhibiting characteristics of being persons and being property), Publius explains, “It is the character bestowed on them by the laws under the proper criterion; and it will not be denied that these are the proper criterion; because it is only under the pretext that the laws have transformed the Negroes into subjects of property that a place has disputed them in the computation of numbers ….” Publius’ position is that the status of slaves is not due to divine plan, but due solely to positive law. Yet, if that were true, wouldn’t the status of slaves, as having not only characteristics of personhood but also property, change if the positive law were changed? In the final portion of that rather long sentence Publius gives a definitive answer to that question: “…; and it is admitted that if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away, the Negroes could no longer be refused an equal share of representation with the other inhabitants.” Not only does this statement support Lincoln’s position instead of Douglas’, it goes beyond that by admitting that whites are responsible for stripping blacks of their rights. God (Divine Law) did not do that. It was done by positive (man-made) laws.

SLAVES AS PROPERTY Since Douglas believed the nation’s founding document did not pertain to slaves, it should come as to surprise that he believed that blacks were unequal to whites. This, of course, was the view taken by the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott decision, and, in fact,

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Douglas invokes this case in making his point during the last debate. As has already been demonstrated, the Framers, if Publius is taken at his word, viewed the condition of slaves as a result of positive law, not Divine law. Here is how Douglas described his position in the seventh debate: “… every fair-minded man … has asserted that the people of a Territory, like those of a State, shall decide for themselves whether slavery shall or shall not exist within their limits. I answer specifically if you want a further answer, and say that while under the decision of the Supreme Court, as recorded in the opinion of Chief Justice Taney, slaves are property like all other property, and can be carried into any Territory of the United States the same as any other description of property ….” Douglas endorsed Chief Justice Taney’s opinion, which spoke of the inferiority of blacks, and special notice should be taken of Douglas emphasizing that not only were slaves property, they were “the same as all other property.” Lincoln, on the other hand, reacted to the Dred Scott decision this way: “I believe that the Supreme Court, and the advocates of that decision, may search in vain for the place in the Constitution where the right of a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed” (fifth debate). No objective examination of Publius’ comments in Federalist 54 could reasonably conclude that the Framers agreed with Douglas. As has already been demonstrated, Publius’ position is that slaves are not like “all other property.” In that essay Publius asserts, “But we must deny the fact that slaves are considered merely as property, and in no respect whatever as persons”.25 The traits and characteristics that indicate the personhood of slaves is the following: “In being protected, on the other hand, in his life and in his limbs, against the violence of all others, even the master of his labor and his liberty; and in being punishable himself for all violence committed against others, the slave is no less evidently regarded by the law as a member of society, not as a mere article of property”26 What, however, of the fact that some, like Douglas and Taney, viewed the slave as having characteristics solely of property? Doesn’t the treatment of slaves; “being compelled to labor for a master and being vendible by one master to another master, and being restrained in his liberty,” indicate that slaves are, in fact, property. Publius answers this question in the negative, explaining that “the slave may appear to be degraded from the human rank, and classified with those irrational animals which fall under the legal donomination of property” (emphasis added).27

CONCLUSION In the famous Lincoln-Douglas debates both verbal combatants sought to add legitimacy and credibility to their respective positions on slavery by invoking the name of the Founders and Framers. Douglas argued that the Framers intentionally left slavery in place so that states could, if they so desired, continue the practice. Thus, he argued, his doctrine of “popular sovereignty” for territories (like Kansas) which allowed the residents of the territories to

25

Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, Introduction by Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1961), p. 337. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid.

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decide for themselves whether to allow slavery was merely an extension of the Framers’ position. Lincoln, on the other hand, argued that the Framers declined to include a provision in the Constitution concerning slavery out of expediency, knowing that such a statement would doom the document. This refusal should not be taken as the Framers endorsing slavery or the right of any territory or state to allow slavery since they believed slavery was a dying institution. Most of the speeches made at the Constitutional Convention were not just antislavery but vehement in their condemnation of that institution. Lincoln took these facts, along with the refusal of the Framers to include the word “slave” or “slavery” as evidence that they thought the institution of slavery would, in time, expire. When it did there would be no need to amend the document removing any vestiges of it from the Constitition they drafted. During the ratification campaign for the proposed 1787 Constitution, The Federalist Papers were written to explain and justify every major provision the Framers included. One of those essays, Federalist 54, explains why the Framers included the three-fifths compromise (for counting slaves for representation and taxation purposes). A careful reading of that essay demonstrates the Framers believed slaves exhibited traits of personhood and property. Publius also made clear the belief that the status of slaves was due entirely to positive law rather than divine law. In fact, Publius makes the rather surprising admission that if the black slave appeared to be property this was due to positive laws which had “transformed the Negroes into subject of property,” and “if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away, the Negroes could no longer be refused an equal share of representation with the other inhabitants” (emphasis added).28 An overview of the Framers’ views on the slavery issue indicates that the views of Lincoln in his debates with Douglas come closer to the Framers’ views on slavery than Douglas’ views on slavery.

28

Ibid.

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 363-374

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

LINCOLN, SEWARD AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

Scott Crichlow The basic story of the Civil War is familiar to most Americans. Four years of fratricidal warfare ended with the Union preserved, though at a terrible price that included hundreds of thousands of battle deaths. But, often forgotten is that while North and South engaged in combat, the Union faced threats abroad as well. There was a very real chance, particularly early in the war, that domestic battles could spill over into an international war. However, a number of factors intervened to block such an eventuality. Among these a matter of central importance was President Lincoln taking a personal role in directing the Union’s international affairs. The United States had the opportunity to pursue a variety of foreign policies at this time, and the fact that Lincoln personally handled policy-making was highly consequential because his preferences often diverged from those of Secretary of State William Henry Seward; the second-most powerful foreign policy decision maker in the administration. What follows is an examination of the international relations setting in 1861; the conflicting foreign policy beliefs of Lincoln and Seward; and how Lincoln taking charge of foreign policy put the United States on a different course in world affairs than may have occurred if he had left the direction of foreign policy solely in Seward’s hands. This paper examines the challenges and constraints facing the United States in world affairs at this time, and the different strategies and tactics two leaders favored in their attempts to influence the European powers, particularly the United Kingdom, the most powerful state in the world, during the early stages of the Civil War.

THE SETTING The United States was in a precarious position in 1861. The South was in open revolt. However, the peril facing the new administration of Abraham Lincoln was not solely a domestic matter. The country had to face the possibility that civil war would ignite a conflict with one of the European powers. The Union’s greatest concern in this regard was the possibility of intervention by the United Kingdom, the most powerful state in the world. British intervention would have fundamentally changed the nature of the war. As matters stood in the weeks preceding President Lincoln’s inauguration, the Union faced armed insurrectionists who were bent on severing all political ties with the North. This was a dire threat. But, there were reasons why the administration believed the Confederacy

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could be defeated. However, the prospect of facing rebellion at home, and a war against the leading military and economic power of the age, was daunting. This was particularly true given that the geostrategic position of the United Kingdom and its dependencies opened up the possibility of the United States being forced to deal with an aggressive Southern army within its borders, and British forces surrounding the exterior of the country. The United Kingdom also had a fleet that was technically superior to the Union’s navy, and was generally acknowledged to have mastery of the sea.1 And, of course among the numerous economic tools that the British government could choose to employ in a war were the industrial plants of the United Kingdom. These factories could supply the rebels with key resources that the South would not otherwise possess, as well as strengthening Britain itself. The strength of the United Kingdom meant that most members of the government of the United States were wary of committing acts that could lead to war with the British. What policies would be the most likely to avert a war? There were reasons, in the eyes of some political leaders, for the United States to appear strong and take unyielding stands in its relations with the British government in order to deter actions that could harm American interests. In terms of foreign relations members of the Lincoln government placed great importance on ensuring that the United Kingdom did not formally recognize the Confederacy. As Secretary of State Seward described that possibility, such an act would “create within our own territory a hostile state by overthrowing the Republic itself”.2 The United States also had to do all it could to discourage trade between the United Kingdom and the Confederacy. In addition, the Lincoln administration would have to do what it could to discourage the European powers from taking advantage of the current turmoil and extending their possessions and ties in the Americas, something they appeared to begin doing even before armed hostilities broke out between North and South3. Maintaining a purely conciliatory tone with the British government might not have served those goals. Some believed a clear national resolve, and image of a willingness to pursue all necessary steps, including military engagement, would work better than diplomacy to achieve these ends. These individuals believed that the perception across much of Europe that the Union would not be able to crush the rebellion, much less act against European moves elsewhere on the continent, meant that aggressive actions were needed. Likewise, the British themselves had a number of reasons to foresee a possible war with the Union. Certainly the economic ties between Britain and the South were strong. While bumper crops meant that the supply of cotton was not a critical matter at the start of hostilities, the British could not be sure of how long that would be the case. In addition, with the departure of Southern members of Congress, the Union had approved the Morrill tariff in the final days of the Buchanan presidency. The British viewed this as an attack on their interests. Some in the United Kingdom felt an affinity for Southern ways that they felt were more characteristic of English culture than those of the North.4 There 1

D.P. Crook, The North, The South, and the Powers 1861-1865 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974), pp. 145146. 2 Norman B. Ferris, Desperate Diplomacy: William H. Seward’s Foreign Policy, 1861 (Knoxville, TX: University of Tennessee Press, 1976), p. 22. 3 Ibid., p. 4. 4 R.J.M. Blackett, Divided Hearts: Britain and the American Civil War (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2001), pp. 13-16.

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was a concern over statements made by Secretary of State Seward during the campaign and early in 1861.5 He had implied that launching a war against the British would be a good way to rally the South back into the Union, he had expressed a belief that Canada should be incorporated into the United States, and he was generally seen by the British government as an impetuous Anglophobe.6 And, of course as the war progressed, a string of new conflicts emerged between the British and American governments. The overall situation these states found themselves in was one marked by distrust, uncertainty and fear. Few members of either government longed for war. But, both saw the other as potentially a mortal threat to its goals and interests. And, both states appeared cognizant of the fact that a war between North and South could produce sparks which might inflame an international conflagration.7 It was up to the Lincoln administration to guide the foreign relations of the United States on a path that would promote U.S. interests, including limiting European expansion in the Americas, and European political and economic aid to the South. The Union government could have pursued a variety of tactics from aggressive military and political action to pleas for international cooperation. To understand why they chose the path they did, and why war was avoided, it is necessary to understand the foreign policy beliefs, perceptions and goals of the two Americans who bore primary responsibility for the shape of American foreign policy, William Henry Seward and Abraham Lincoln.

WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD When William Henry Seward assumed the office of Secretary of State in 1861, he had already established himself as one of the country’s most able politicians, and he was arguably the most prominent Republican in the country. A politically formidable former governor of New York, he had spent the last twelve years in the Senate, including service on the Foreign Relations committee, and he had entered the race for president in 1860 expecting to become his party’s nominee. Though he led on the early ballots, his support was not broad enough to overcome the staunch opposition of many other Republicans. Nonetheless, his reputation and influence were such that his appointment to what was generally regarded as the senior post in the cabinet was an obvious choice for Lincoln and his advisors.8 His ability and personal history made him “as well suited by experience” as anyone Lincoln would have considered for the post.9 Being named Secretary of State did not, obviously, afford him a free hand in shaping U.S. policies. He served at the pleasure of the president, and in the mid-nineteenth century, 5

Eugene H. Berwanger, The British Foreign Service and the American Civil War (Lexington: KY: The University of Kentucky Press, 1994), pp. 31-33. 6 Glyndon G. Van Deusen, William Henry Seward (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 247-248 and 292-294. 7 Dean B. Mahin, One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American Civil War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1999), p. 14. 8 David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), pp. 261-265. 9 Ferris, Desperate Diplomacy: William H. Seward’s Foreign Policy, 1861, p. 3.

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Congress tended to view itself as having more authority over international affairs than it does in the early twenty-first century. This could have been an important check on his power even if he did not already have frequently antagonistic relationships with many members of Congress including Charles Sumner, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Nonetheless, Seward began his term as Secretary of State with a sense of “overweening importance”,10 confident that he would be able to bend Lincoln to his will, and take advantage of the concentration of power within the executive branch that was likely to occur during the Civil War. He had enormous faith in his own abilities and ideas, and sought to direct Lincoln’s political decision making before he had even been inaugurated.11 This sense of power led him to attempt to exert complete mastery over a wide variety of national policies soon after his appointment.12 He expected to be given particularly wide latitude over foreign affairs since Lincoln had promised him such discretion in February of 1861.13 And, he believed his own knowledge of international politics made him vastly better prepared for such a role than the president. Seward’s flagrant attempts to assume a wide variety of duties, and make state decisions, intensified the opposition of his detractors within the cabinet.14 And, this led many at home, and abroad, to believe Seward might become the most powerful man in Washington. Indeed, it is clear from the dispatches exchanged between European governments and their representatives in the United States, that foreign governments expected Seward to be a powerful force, perhaps the most powerful force, in shaping American policy. This caused the Europeans much concern.15 Europe’s concerns were the product of both Seward’s political decision-making style, and his core foreign policy beliefs. Europe had reason to fear both. As to the former matter, Seward had shown a considerable willingness to link foreign policy to domestic politics.16 This mattered to the European powers in that he showed a willingness to make “reckless”17 comments to advance his political standing; comments that were often attacks on European interests. He had learned this lesson early, practiced it often, particularly to appeal to constituencies with clear grievances, like the Irish,18 and he had generally taken this approach further than many of his contemporaries. For example, when President Pierce sought to increase his popularity by starting a quarrel with the British over activities in Central America, Seward called for him to take this as far as an American expansion into Canada.19 Given this favored tactic it is not surprising that his early comments as Secretary of State were characterized as the “rantings of a demagogue”.20 10

Van Deusen, William Henry Seward, p. 270. Van Deusen, William Henry Seward, pp. 249-254; Mahin, One War at a Time, pp. 5-10. 12 Van Deusen, William Henry Seward, pp. 270-275; James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Ballantine, 1988), p. 260. 13 Mahin, One War at a Time, p. 8. 14 Van Deusen, William Henry Seward, pp. 270, 275. 15 Berwanger, The British Foreign Service and the American Civil War, pp. 31-33; Crook, The North, the South, and the Powers, 1861-1865, pp. 29-25, and 47-50; Ferris, Desperate Diplomacy, pp. 8-9. 16 Berwanger, The British Foreign Service and the American Civil War, pp. 32-33. 17 Ferris, Desperate Diplomacy, p. 9. 18 Berwanger, The British Foreign Service and the American Civil War, pp. 32-22. 19 Crook, The North, the South, and the Powers 1861-1865, p. 35. 20 Ferris, Desperate Diplomacy, p. 15. 11

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If promoting conflicts abroad to enhance popularity at home was one reason for worry, another was Seward’s ardent belief in American expansionism.21 “The most committed imperialist ever to serve as Secretary of State”;22 he saw territorial expansion as a necessary “facet of America’s nascent industrial-capitalism”,23 and believed that America was destined to expand over most of the continent, and one day would certainly rule Canada.24 Great Britain, the greatest empire in the world, and one with considerable interests in North America, stood to lose a great deal if the United States pressed activist policies that would build an American empire at the expense of Britain’s. The core beliefs about international relations that Seward had developed over his years in politics predicted that he would pursue aggressive foreign policies. His imperialist beliefs; and, his beliefs about the propriety, and usefulness of threats, and intimidation as levers of foreign policy were firmly established long before he became Secretary of State. They informed his vision of the fundamental and desired nature of the international arena, and were central to his opinions about what policy instruments were likely to provide him with the greatest utility. Europe feared him because of these beliefs. The policies he promoted upon assuming office showed that the fears of the United Kingdom, Spain and France were wellfounded. Seward’s early behavior as Secretary of State followed from his well-developed core beliefs about international relations and foreign policy. This matched Europe’s worst expectations. The most glaring example of how these beliefs transposed themselves onto Seward’s foreign policy at the beginning of the administration was Seward’s memorandum “Thoughts for the President’s Consideration” which was sent to Lincoln on April 1, 1861. The bellicose proposals he made in that document included declaring war on France or Spain if they did not provide satisfactory explanations for their recent actions in Santo Domingo and Haiti, and sending agents throughout Canada, Mexico and Central America to stir up a spirit of rebellion against European influence.25 Such actions were meant to quash European actions in what Seward believed to be America’s proper sphere of influence, and to abate support for secession by uniting North and South against foreign enemies. This memorandum exemplified Seward’s belief that an antagonistic, hard-line approach toward Europe was likely to best secure American interests. And, this was just the first major example of Seward’s actions supporting such an approach. He took a number of other highly aggressive actions in the spring of 1861. Others included a threat to seize the British steamer Peerless, which he believed was to be used by Confederate agents. And, Seward sent Lincoln a copy of a dispatch he planned to send to Charles Francis Adams, the new American minister to the Court of St. James, in which he stated that British recognition of the South as belligerents would mean the United States would be “as we have twice before been forced to

21

Crook, The North, the South and the Powers 1861-1865, pp. 29-31; Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 24-32; Milton Plesur, America’s Outward Thrust: Approaches to Foreign Affairs, 1865-1890 (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1971), p. 11; Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 44-45 and 57-67. 22 Warren Zimmerman, First Great Triumph (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 2002), p. 29. 23 Crook, The North, the South and the Powers 1861-1865, p. 30. 24 Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, pp. 58-59. 25 Crook, The North, the South and the Powers 1861-1865, pp. 57-63; Van Deusen, William Henry Seward, p. 282.

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be, enemies of Great Britain”.26 By these actions Seward was essentially threatening to go to war against the most powerful empire on the planet. In these cases, and others, Seward’s quick willingness to antagonize the United Kingdom, and the other European powers was blocked by Lincoln.27 Lincoln quickly and definitively intervened to block Seward’s attempt to assert unilateral control over American foreign policy. Seward had to learn “that he could not interfere with impunity in all the functions of the government, and that Lincoln rather than he was to be its head”.28 Lincoln’s actions in these instances were instrumental in shaping the particular policies at issue, but are also illustrative in that they show Lincoln asserting personal control over foreign policy just a month into his presidency. These actions point to an often underappreciated point. Though Seward was an activist Secretary of State who played a central role in directing foreign policy during one of the most critical periods of American history, and was a Secretary whose vision of America’s proper role would have a lasting effect in shaping the foreign policy beliefs of American elites for decades to come,29 ultimate executive authority rested with the president, and Lincoln had no compunction about blocking Seward’s preferences if he believed they were at odds with his own interpretation of the national interest. Therefore, though much of the world was focused on Seward as the ultimate arbiter of American foreign policy, observers could have gained better insights into and understandings of American action by focusing on the president. Lincoln’s views on international relations were different from Seward’s beliefs in key respects, and it was Lincoln’s views which would ultimately set policy.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN The view held by most historians is that Abraham Lincoln was not what most would refer to as a “foreign policy” president.30 He had little experience in foreign affairs, and he did not appear to have a great interest in the matter. He had a powerful Secretary of State who had more experience in international affairs than himself, and the war demanded so much of his time that he had a limited ability to focus on international issues that were related to the war, much less international issues that did not. However, this view of Lincoln underestimates the personal impact that he had on American foreign policy. As Dean Mahin has pointed out;31 if for no reason other than the war, Lincoln had to expend much attention on foreign affairs. The threat of European intervention was very real, as was the threat of war with Britain during the Trent affair and later, and the threat of war with France arising from the French intervention in Mexico. The escape of the future Alabama from Britain virtually eliminated 26

Donald, Lincoln, p. 321. Crook, The North, the South and the Powers 1861-1865, pp. 85-86; Mahin, One War at a Time; Van Deusen, William Henry Seward, pp. 283-284 and 297-298. 28 Van Deusen, William Henry Seward, p. 270. 29 LaFeber, The New Empire, pp. 24, 40, and 56; Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, pp. 127 and 164-165 30 Donald, Lincoln; Philip S. Paludan, The Presidency of Abraham Lincoln (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1994), pp. 88-89. 31 Mahin, One War at a Time, p. 3. 27

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international trade by ships flying the American flag. The threatened escape from Britain of two ironclad rams posed a severe threat to the Union blockade of Confederate ports and to the safety of Union ports. Lincoln was too intelligent and perceptive and too aware of his constitutional responsibilities to leave the U.S. responses to these foreign dangers entirely to a cabinet member. It is also worthwhile to remember that even presidents who are relatively isolated from the creation of foreign policy nonetheless have a significant role in shaping America’s role in the world. The president has primary authority within the executive branch. He can not wholly decline that power while serving in office. This point is central to Stephen Krasner’s32 incisive critique of the bureaucratic politics theory of decision making. Pulling and hauling may go on between a set of competing actors in the policy-making process, but the mere entry of presidents into the arena notably changes the bargaining process due to their unequaled power. While one can quite legitimately point out that mid-nineteenth-century presidents lacked the foreign policy power of their twenty-first century counterparts, they held the leading role in government then, as now. While he may not have been deeply involved in the details of foreign policy on a day-to-day basis, Lincoln unquestionably set the overall goals of his administration’s foreign policy. This was seen from the start of the administration, as witnessed by his early clashes with Seward, and he maintained this control throughout his term in office.33 In addition to being reluctant to cede this type of power to a subordinate, Lincoln took advantage of the national crisis to concentrate decision-making authority within the White House.34 This gave him considerably more influence and freedom of action than most other presidents of his time.35 His position was further strengthened by the fact that no member of the cabinet other than Seward had much knowledge or interest in international affairs.36 Given these circumstances, the fact that an unusual amount of policy-making power was concentrated in one man who had the willingness to use it, it becomes clear that it is important to consider Lincoln’s personal beliefs about the conduct of foreign policy if we are to understand why the United States acted as it did in international relations during his presidency. However, determining Lincoln’s basic beliefs about state behavior in the international system is a somewhat more complicated matter than determining Seward’s core foreign policy beliefs in 1861. Prior to becoming president, Lincoln rarely dealt with issues of foreign affairs. It was not a central issue in the 1860 campaign, and Lincoln did not have the type of long-standing personal involvement in such matters that Seward had. Therefore it is not possible to establish firm predictions about his fundamental beliefs about the international system by examining his political behavior prior to assuming office. Instead, I measure Lincoln’s foreign policy beliefs by conducting an operational code analysis using his statements about international political events as the key data that reveal his 32

Stephen Krasner, “Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland).” Foreign Policy 7 (Summer 1972), pp. 159-179. 33 Mahin, One War at a Time, pp. 257-261 34 Ibid., p. 10. 35 Peri E. Arnold, “The Institutionalized Presidency and the American Regime,” in Richard Waterman, ed., The Presidency Reconsidered (Itasca, IL: F.E. Peacock, 1993), pp. 215-245; George C. Edwards, III and Stephen J. Wayne, Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making (New York: St. Martin’s, 1995). 36 Mahin, One War at a Time, p. 10.

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core beliefs. An individual’s operational code is a measure of their fundamental beliefs about the nature of the international system and their place in it. It is composed of “philosophical” beliefs about the basic nature of international affairs and “instrumental” beliefs that deal with how individuals believe they should act in the international system to achieve their goals. Basically, the former addresses basic beliefs about the nature of other practices, while the latter addresses basic beliefs about one’s own nature and preferred behaviors. There is a long tradition of operational code analysis,37 most of it stemming from early work by Alexander George.38 The most advanced versions of this methodology currently measure these fundamental beliefs on the basis of patterns in decision makers’ statements about international affairs. It is this approach39 that I use to measure President Lincoln’s operational code. The basic theory involved is that patterns in one’s comments about international matters reflect basic beliefs on a number of key variables. For example, does a political leader tend to talk about himself acting in global affairs, or does he or she more often discuss others acting? This pattern points to how much of an influence someone thinks they can have in shaping world events. As another example, when a decision maker is discussing the acts of others, are those acts generally framed as being cooperative or aggressive? That pattern shows whether or not a decision maker thinks that the basic nature of international affairs is essentially marked by cooperation or conflict. In practice this approach involves text coding, breaking down comments into phrases and clauses that are coded according to various formulas that produce quantitative measures. Ideally, this measurement would be completed using comments made by Lincoln before he took office so as to avoid the possibility that his statements might be affected by post hoc rationalizations of policies he set after taking power. However, the paucity of comments that Lincoln made on foreign policy issues during his campaign makes this impossible. Instead, I base the operational code analysis on the foreign policy comments in his first annual message to Congress. This message was given on December 3, 1861, and involved some of the most extensive comments on international affairs and the European powers that he made while president, though it should be noted that even these comments were brief compared to those made by modern presidents. In this analysis, I am interested in five operational code measures that have been operationalized and tested by Walker et al.,40 which should provide basic knowledge of Lincoln’s core beliefs about the nature of international relations: Nature of the Political Universe, Realization of Political Values, Control Over Historical Development, Strategy, and Tactics. Nature of the Political Universe indicates whether or not an individual believes that the basic nature of behavior in the political world is conflict or cooperation. This scale runs from 37

See Stephen G. Walker, “The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis,” Political Psychology 11 (June 1990), pp. 403-418; and Michael D. Young and Mark Schafer, “Is There Method in Our Madness? Ways of Assessing Cognition in International Relations,” Mershon International Studies Review 42 (May 1998), pp. 63-90. 38 Alexander L. George, “The `Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making,” International Studies Quarterly 13 (June 1969), pp. 190-222. 39 Stephen G. Walker, Mark Schafer and Michael D. Young, “Systematic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis: Measuring and Modeling Jimmy Carter’s Operational Code,” International Studies Quarterly 42 (March 1998), pp. 175-190. 40 Ibid.

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-1 (conflict) to +1 (cooperation). Realization of Political Values connotes how optimistic an individual is about achieving their aims. This scale runs from -1 (pessimistic) to +1 (optimistic). Control Over Historical Development deals with the level of control one sees themselves as having over political events. This scale runs from 0 (other locus of control) to 1 (self locus of control). Strategy and Tactics both deal with the types of actions an individual believes they should pursue to achieve their aims. These scales run from -1 (conflict) to +1 (cooperation). Lincoln’s scores on these measures are seen below in Table 1. Table 1: President Lincoln’s Operational Code Nature of the Political Universe: Realization of Political Values: Control Over Historical Development: Strategy: Tactics:

-.11 -.19 .74 +.08 +.07

These results show some important basic tendencies in Lincoln’s beliefs about international relations that doubtless had an impact on his foreign policy behavior. First, Lincoln believed that the fundamental nature of international affairs was such that states tended to balance their actions between conflict and cooperation, with a slight tendency toward conflict. It appears clear that Lincoln did not believe international cooperation was the norm, though neither necessarily was it warfare. Matching that belief, he was somewhat pessimistic about achieving his foreign policy goals. However, he nonetheless believed he did have some power to affect events. And, while he believed that his own behavior in foreign affairs should come close to balancing cooperation and conflict, the pattern he saw as the norm in world politics, he showed a preference for using cooperative strategies and tactics himself, even if he did not expect these to be the norm among other actors. These general beliefs about foreign policy can inform us of the basic prism through which Lincoln was likely to judge international affairs, and the types of tools and policy options he was most likely to rely upon. Generally, he appears as someone who would have been reluctant to rely upon the use of force. However, it does not necessarily follow that he would have engaged in an exceedingly cooperative and felicitous foreign policy. He appears to have fundamentally had faith in strategies that balanced toughness and incentives, though he appears to have believed that the strategies that offered the greatest utility relied upon more cooperative tactics to achieve one’s aims. Given the text these measurements are drawn from, these scores may even understate Lincoln’s general belief in the utility of cooperative strategies and tactics. This address was composed during the Trent affair. While Lincoln was firmly committed to avoiding a war with the United Kingdom and had assured Senator Sumner that there would be no war “unless England was bent on having one”41 it is quite possible that at that point in time he did not wish to appear too conciliatory while that matter was still being debated. A façade of

41

Donald, Lincoln, p. 322.

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toughness and obstruction may also have been necessary given the popular support for the seizure of the Confederate envoys.42 Indeed, if one looks at the substantive comments on foreign policy contained in the annual addresses composed in the succeeding years of Lincoln’s presidency there are virtually no negative comments about American relations with the United Kingdom. Instead, Lincoln praised American-British efforts to work together on matters like the slave trade treaty and the Washington territory treaty. These core tendencies suggest that it was not simply the balance of power or the domestic imperative to avoid more than “one war at a time”43 that led Lincoln to avoid a military clash with the United Kingdom. Lincoln appears to have generally been wary of using military force to achieve political ends in the international system. While Seward sought to practice “brinksmanship” once installed in office44 Lincoln’s approach to foreign policy was “much more diplomatic”45 and the difference between the two men, and Lincoln’s moves to rein in his Secretary of State, had important policy consequences.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS Perhaps the most far-reaching policy implications were the two earliest major disputes that Lincoln had with Seward over dealing with Europe. First, Lincoln flatly and immediately rejected Seward’s moves to start a foreign war to bring the South back into the Union. Secondly, Lincoln substantially altered Seward’s dispatch to Charles Francis Adams in May 1861 that had threatened the United Kingdom.46 These were in and of themselves extremely important matters in that they settled key policy disagreements between these men on matters of great consequence. But, these actions by Lincoln were also influential in that they showed Lincoln’s willingness to quickly settle the structure of decision-making in his administration in a manner that established that it would be him, not Seward, who was to be the final authority on matters of foreign policy. This meant two things: first, Seward had to be aware of Lincoln’s preferred policies and approaches in dealing with the European powers, and he was expected to follow them. This new constraint on his behavior is believed to have been a key force in Seward moving toward a more diplomatic and conciliatory style of foreign policy.47 It was also important though in that it settled the procedures and authority structures of the administration early. Many governments have suffered due to unclear structures of decision making. There is a wealth of literature on the negative impact of poorly structured decision making,48 including statistical 42

Foster Rhea Dulles, Prelude to World Power (New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 9-11. Mahin, One War at a Time, p. 8. 44 Crook, The North, the South and the Powers 1861-1865, p. 63 45 Mahin, One War at a Time, p. 258 46 Donald, Lincoln; Mahin, One War at a Time; Van Deusen, William Henry Seward, pp. 283-284 and 297-298. 47 Berwanger, The British Foreign Service and the American Civil War, pp. 35-36. 48 See Alexander I. George, Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980); Patrick J. Haney, Organizing for Foreign Policy Crisis: Presidents, Advisers, and the Management of Decision Making (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997); Paul ‘t Hart, Eric Stern and Bengt Sundelius, Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-Making (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997); Irving Janis, Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management (New York: The Free Press, 1989); Richard T. Johnson, Managing the White House (New York: Harper and Row, 1974); Zeev Maoz, “Framing the National Interest: 43

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support for the proposition foreign policy choices made in such circumstances are more likely than others to be detrimental to the national interest.49 That the norms of this decision-making group were quickly set, and accepted likely helped the administration to avert policy drift, and clashes resulting from muddled strategies that could have been the product of prolonged disputes between competing factions. That their disputes over the substance of foreign policy were firmly settled in Lincoln’s favor continued to be a matter of consequence for the remainder of the Civil War. The clear and early direction of policy away from war-like measures undermined any attempts by others to push the United States into a military conflict with the British. This was true even in the face of highly anti-British public opinion at the time of the seizure of Mason and Slidell from the Trent, a circumstance that lends itself to stirring up anti-British sentiment for domestic political gain. However, in this case, with Lincoln firmly opposed to considering war an option, Seward worked hard to come to a diplomatic settlement. Lincoln and Seward became arguably even more conciliatory with the British over time as they became aware of growing unrest in England resulting from its diminishing stocks of cotton,50 and the possibility that Palmerston’s government could be “replaced by a Conservative government more hostile to the United States”.51 None of this should be taken to mean that Lincoln was necessarily correct in this dispute, though it is easy in retrospect to assume that Lincoln’s approach was the proper one. The notion that the United States should have been engaged in multiple wars at this time strikes many as needlessly risky, and the belief that instigating a war against a European power would have actually diminished support for secession is highly questionable. Nonetheless, Seward believed that several Union-friendly actions taken by the British in the spring and summer of 1861, including the British Foreign Secretary cutting off meetings with the Confederate emissaries to the United Kingdom, and Britain refusing to allow privateers from bringing their prizes into British ports, were attributable to his early threatening behavior.52 And, this should also not be taken to imply that Seward was an irrational figure with an unquenchable thirst for war. British opinion that he was a “war-monger”53 “hell-bent on wrapping the world in flames”54 was inaccurate. While on the Senate Foreign Relations committee he had generally been a fair and even-handed observer of European politics55 and after his first months in office he became notably less antagonistic toward the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe.56 But, whatever the relative merits of their positions, it is important to remember that this dispute occurred. The government of the United States could have opted for a variety of The Manipulation of Foreign Policy Decisions in Group Settings,” World Politics 43 (October 1990), pp. 77110; and Bruce Tuckman, “Developmental Sequence in Small Groups,” Psychological Bulletin 63 (November 1965), pp. 384-399. 49 Mark Schafer and Scott Crichlow, “The Process-Outcome Connection in Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Quantitative Study Building on Groupthink,” International Studies Quarterly 46 (March 2002), pp. 45-68. 50 Blackett, Divided Hearts, pp. 7 and 125 51 Mahin, One War at a Time, p. 185 52 Van Deusen, William Henry Seward, p. 299. 53 Crook, The North, the South and the Powers 1861-1865, p. 156. 54 Ibid., p. 60 55 Van Deusen, William Henry Seward, p. 293. 56 Berwanger, The British Foreign Service and the American Civil War, pp. 34-35; Van Deusen, William Henry Seward, pp. 299-300.

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foreign policy strategies 1861. And, it is not hard to imagine a counter-factual history in which Seward, rather than Lincoln, would have directed foreign policy. This case points to a number of key features of the foreign policy making process in the United States. These matters are perhaps obviously true today, but they also had important policy implications before the age of the imperial presidency. First, in times of crisis, the president is usually given extraordinary powers in of foreign policy. If he chooses to exercise them this gives him the opportunity to place a peculiarly personal stamp on foreign policy. Related to this point, if a president takes a personal interest in decision making he has more power to direct foreign policy than anyone else in government. Finally, while many Realist and Neorealist scholars have held that individual decision makers have little power to shape world events, this case reinforces the position held by critics of those theories. Who leads matters. Here we see that Lincoln took full advantage of his position as president, and as a war-time leader, to shape the fundamental direction of American relations with the United Kingdom, and the other European powers as he saw fit. Had he not done so; had he been a less activist decision maker; or had he entered office with different basic beliefs about the proper nature of American foreign policy, American history might have been very different.

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 375-393

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

THOMAS JEFFERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE BALANCE OF LIBERTY AND SECURITY Frank J. Williams Recent acts of terrorism have yet again raised tensions between American security and civil liberty. It is not the first time. President George W. Bush is treading the same waters as have great presidents in our nation’s past. Many times in the nation’s history, as is the case today, our leaders have been criticized for taking extra-constitutional measures. Upon closer examination of the situations facing both Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln, parallels can be drawn to the current atmosphere in this country. If Jefferson and Lincoln failed to uphold all the provisions of the Constitution, they faced possible condemnation regardless of their actions, assailed not only by those who genuinely valued civil liberty, but also by enemies and opponents whose motive was criticism itself. In the end, the verdict of history is that Jefferson’s and Lincoln’s use of power did not constitute abuse. Every survey of historians ranks Lincoln as number one among the great presidents,1 while Thomas Jefferson is consistently ranked amongst the best.2 Far harsher would have been their denunciation if the whole experiment of the democratic American Union failed, as seemed possible given the circumstances that they faced. If such a disaster occurred, what benefit would have been gained by adhering to a fallen Constitution? It was a classic example of the age-old conflict: do the ends justify the means? Jefferson realized that the ends did indeed justify the means, and that if the United States was to survive, there would be instances when he would have to operate outside the strictures imposed by the Constitution on the executive. Jefferson expressed this in a letter to John B. Colvin in 1810. He wrote: “The question you propose, whether circumstances do not sometimes occur, which make a duty in officers of high trust, to assume authorities beyond the law, is easy of solution in principle, but sometimes embarrassing in practice. A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher obligation. To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself, 1

2

See, e.g., Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., “The Ultimate Approval Ratings,” NY Times Magazine, Dec. 15, 1996, pp. 45-51. Lincoln did well, too, in a survey of “famous” people in the second millennium. He ranks 32nd behind Gutenburg (1) and Hitler (20). See Agnes Hoope Gottlieb, et. al., 1,000 Years, 10,000 People: Ranking the Men and Women Who Shaped the Millennium (Kodansha International, Ltd., 1998). See e.g., C-Span Survey of Presidential Leadership (1999), available at http://www.americanpresidents .org/survey/historians/overall.asp

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Frank J. Williams with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly 3 sacrificing the end to the means.”

Lincoln expressed similar thoughts in the draft of his report to Congress on July 4, 1861 when he stated: “The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed, were being resisted, and failing of execution, in nearly one-third of the States. Must they be allowed to finally fail of execution * * *? [A]re all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go 4 to pieces, lest that one be violated?”

There is enormous opposition to President Bush’s post-September 11 policies, and his decision to engage Iraq in war. However, is Bush merely following in the steps of Jefferson and Lincoln by doing what is necessary for the preservation of America? Will his legacy someday leave him in their company? To better predict, it is necessary to look at the problems facing Jefferson and Lincoln, and their subsequent handling of them.

THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE ROLE OF EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Perhaps there is no greater example of Jefferson’s legacy as president than his 1803 “Louisiana Purchase” from France. Today, we celebrate the bicentennial of that event as well as Lewis’s and Clark’s expedition in that territory. We take it for granted that America enjoys the protection of two great oceans on its eastern and western coastlines. This has left us relatively unscathed by conventional military invasion. Yet, at the beginning of Jefferson’s presidency that destiny was anything but secure. At the time, the French and English were renewing their traditional hostility towards each other. This animosity would soon lead to war between the two nations; a war that Jefferson believed would destroy the development of the United States, especially with a potentially hostile presence to its immediate west;5 this prospect became a distinct possibility in 1801 when Spain ceded the Louisiana Territory to Napoleon. Realizing that access to the Mississippi river through the port of New Orleans was crucial to America’s continued economic and geographic development, Jefferson was determined to secure it at all costs6. His opportunity came in March 1803 when the French made a surprise offer to sell the entire Louisiana territory to the United States.7 Despite only having the authority to purchase the port of New Orleans, Jefferson’s envoys to France, James Monroe and Robert Livingston, seized Napoleon’s offer and purchased the entire Louisiana territory.8 3

Merrill D. Peterson, ed. Jefferson, Writings (New York: Literary Classics of the United States, Inc., 1984), p. 1231 (hereinafter Writings) 4 Roy P. Basler, et. al., eds. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press 1953-55), 4:430 (hereinafter referred to as Collected Works) 5 See Hon. John C. Godbold, “`Lawyer’ A Title of Honor,” 29 Cumberland Law Review. 301, p. 317 (1998-99) 6 Ibid 7 Ibid 8 Ibid

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This amazing stroke of good fortune for the United States, however, posed quite a constitutional quandary for President Jefferson. There was no authority in the Constitution for acquiring foreign territory and incorporating it into the Union. Yet, despite this dilemma, the president made his beliefs and intentions clear in a letter to John C. Breckenridge: “The treaty must of course be laid before both Houses, because they have important functions to exercise respecting it. They, I presume, will see their duty to their country in ratifying and paying for it, so as to secure a good which would otherwise probably be never again in their power. The Constitution has made no provision for our holding foreign territory, still less for incorporating foreign nations into our Union. The Executive in seizing the fugitive occurrence which so much advances the good of their country, have done an act beyond the Constitution. But we shall not be disavowed by the nation, and their act of indemnity will confirm and not 9 weaken the Constitution, by more strongly making out its lines.”

Convinced of the national importance of approving the purchase, Jefferson ignored the constitutional limitations, and acted in what he thought was the best interests of the United States. The agreement, documented in the form of a treaty, was thereafter approved by Congress.10 Certainly, when we look back at this act today we can be grateful to Jefferson for beginning the territorial drive west that would eventually lead to an America stretching from coast to coast. Unfortunately, however, Jefferson’s precedent for acting beyond the boundaries of the Constitution could not always be objectively justified by such a clear proof of national interest. It could not be found in Jefferson’s attempt to suspend the right of habeas corpus against Samuel Startwout and Dr. Erick Bollman. In 1806, General James Wilkinson arrested Startwout and Bollman for their suspected involvement with former Vice-President Aaron Burr’s alleged plot to separate the western territories from the United States and form a new country (though Burr claimed that he was merely attempting to go to war with Mexico).11 General Wilkinson, who had declared martial law, refused to recognize the writ of habeas corpus that the Supreme Court of New Orleans issued, thereby refusing the prisoners of access to civilian courts.12 The writ of habeas corpus is a procedural method by which one who is imprisoned can file the writ in an appropriate court to have his imprisonment reviewed. If the imprisonment is found not to conform to law the individual is entitled to immediate release. With suspension of the writ, this immediate judicial review of the imprisonment becomes unavailable. Concerning Wilkinson’s actions, Jefferson wrote to Governor William Clairborne that “[o]n great occasions every good officer must be ready to risk himself in going beyond the strict line of law, when public preservation requires it.”13 Jefferson would later attempt to compromise the fundamental right of habeas corpus when he secretly lobbied Congress that it should suspend the writ of habeas corpus.14

9

Jefferson, Writings, pp. 1138-1139 Godbold, supra note 5, at p. 317 11 Alan Clarke, Habeas Corpus: The Historical Debate, 14 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. p. 375, 398 (1998). 12 Ibid 13 Jefferson, Writings, p. 1172 14 Clarke, supra note 11, at pp. 376-377 10

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Within hours, the Senate responded to Jefferson’s message by dispensing with its rules and passed a bill suspending the writ of habeas corpus for three months in all cases of persons charged with treason of high crimes against the United States.15 The House, however, voted down the measure by a vote of 113 to 19.16 Later, in the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Marshall granted the writ to Startwout and Bollman.17 What is so amazing about the incident is that Jefferson, by relenting after the House voted against the suspension, was later praised by Chief Justice Taney for his ability to show restraint in a time of apparent danger to the Union.18 Taney was under the belief that Jefferson had merely expressed his opinion to Congress and allowed it to decide whether to suspend habeas corpus, a function delegated to the legislative branch in the Constitution.19 Nevertheless, Jefferson, the expounder of the Declaration of Independence, and the ideals which are espoused by civil libertarians everywhere, established the precedent of taking extra-constitutional measures (in the case of the Louisiana Purchase) or infringing upon civil liberties (in the case of Bollman and Startwout) when the president firmly believed that danger to the nation gave him the prerogative to do so. It was a precedent that Lincoln would rely upon in far greater excess and in far graver times.

CIVIL LIBERTIES DURING CIVIL WAR In facing emergencies during the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln, much more so than Jefferson sixty years earlier, found himself in a difficult political position. In the words of historian James G. Randall: “No president has carried the power of presidential edict and executive order (independently of Congress) so far as he did . . . it would not be easy to state what Lincoln conceived to be the limit of his powers.”20 It has been noted how, in the eighty days between the April 1861 call for troops and the convening of Congress in special session on July 4, 1861, Lincoln performed a whole series of important acts by sheer assumption of presidential power. He proclaimed not “civil war” in those words, but the existence of “combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.”21 He called forth the militia to “suppress said combinations,”22 which he ordered “to disperse and retire peacefully”23 to their homes. Congress is constitutionally empowered to declare war, but suppression of rebellion has been recognized as an executive function, for which the prerogative of setting aside civil procedures has been placed in the President’s hands.24 To suppress the “rebellion,” he 15

Ibid Leonard W. Levy, Jefferson and Civil Liberties, The Darker Side (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 42 17 Clarke, supra note 11, at p. 377 18 See Lisa M. Ivey, “Comment: Ready, Aim, Fire? The President’s Executive Order Authorizing Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-citizens in the War Against Terrorism is a Powerful Weapon, but Should it be Upheld?” 33 Cumberland Law Review 107, p. 116 (2002-2003) 19 Ibid 20 J.G. Randall, Lincoln the Liberal Statesman (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1947), p. 123 21 Collected Works, 4:332 22 Ibid 23 Ibid 24 Kermit L. Hall, ed., The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 428-429 16

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proclaimed a blockade, suspended the habeas corpus rights, increased the size of the regular army, and authorized the expenditure of government money without congressional appropriation. He made far-reaching decisions and commitments while Congress was not in session, and all without public polls. By the time of his inauguration on March 4, 1861, seven Southern states had already seceded from the Union. But Lincoln played a waiting game and made no preparation for the use of force until he sent provisions to Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor a month later, which precipitated its bombardment by the rebels. Now began Lincoln’s period of executive decision. Congress would not meet until the special session of July 4, and it was basic to Whig-Republican theory of government that Congress was vested with the ultimate power, a theory which Lincoln, as both Whig and Republican, had long agreed. As a former member of Congress, four-term legislator, and for twenty-four years a lawyer, Lincoln respected the traditional separation of powers. But now, as he put it, “events have controlled me.”25

SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS The border state of Maryland was by 1861 seething with secessionist views also more violent at times than those in some Southern states that did secede. Events in Maryland ultimately provoked Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. This suspension triggered the most heated and serious constitutional disputes of the Lincoln administration. Lincoln’s defenders argued that “events” had forced his decision. On April 19, the Sixth Massachusetts militia arrived in Washington after having literally fought its way through hostile Baltimore. On April 20, Marylanders severed railroad communications with the North, almost isolating Washington D.C. from that part of the nation for which it remained the capital. Lincoln was apoplectic. He had no information about the whereabouts of the other troops promised him by Northern governors, and Lincoln told Massachusetts volunteers on April 24, “I don’t believe there is any North. The Seventh Regiment is a myth. Rhode Island is not known in our geography any longer. You are the only Northern realities.”26 On April 25, the Seventh New York militia finally reached Washington after struggling through Maryland. The right of habeas corpus was so important that the President actually considered the possible bombardment of Maryland cities as an alternative to suspension of the writ, having been authorized by General Winfield Scott, Commander of the Army, in case of “necessity,” to bombard the cities, but only “in the extremist necessity”27 was Scott to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. In Maryland, there was at this time a dissatisfied American named John Merryman. Merryman’s dissent from the course being chartered by Lincoln was expressed in both word and deed. He spoke out vigorously against the Union and in favor of the South. He recruited a company of soldiers for the Confederate Army and became their Lieutenant Drillmaster. Thus, he not only exercised his Constitutional right to disagree with what the government was 25

Collected Works, 7:282 Tyler Dennett, ed., Lincoln and the Civil War in the Diaries and Letters of John Hay (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1939), p. 11 27 Collected Works, 4:344 26

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doing, but engaged in raising an armed group to attack and attempt to destroy the government. This young man’s actions precipitated legal conflict between the President and Chief Justice of the United States, Roger B. Taney. On May 25, 1861, Merryman was arrested by the military and lodged in Fort McHenry, Baltimore, for various alleged acts of treason. Shortly after Merryman’s arrest, his counsel sought a writ of habeas corpus from Chief Justice Taney, alleging that Merryman was being illegally held at Fort McHenry. Taney, already infamous for the Dred Scott decision,28 took jurisdiction as a Circuit Judge. On Sunday, May 26, 1861, Taney issued a writ to fort commander George Cadwalader directing him to produce Merryman before the Court the next day at 11:00 a.m. Cadwalader respectfully refused on the ground that President Lincoln had authorized the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. To Taney this was constitutional blasphemy. He immediately issued an attachment for Cadwalader for contempt. The marshal could not enter the Fort to serve the attachment, so the old justice, recognizing the impossibility of enforcing his order, settled back and produced the now famous opinion, Ex Parte Merryman.29 Notwithstanding the fact that he was in his eighty-fifth year, the Chief Justice vigorously defended the power of Congress alone to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Chief took this position in part because permissible suspension was in Article I § 9 of the Constitution, the section describing Congressional duties. He ignored the fact that it was placed there by the Committee on Drafting at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 as a matter of form, not substance.30 Nowhere did he acknowledge that a rebellion was in progress, and that the fate of the nation was, in fact, at stake. By addressing Congress, Lincoln had ignored Taney. Nothing more was done about Merryman at the time. Merryman was subsequently released from custody and disappeared into oblivion. Two years later, Congress resolved the ambiguity in the Constitution and permitted the President the right to suspend the writ while the rebellion continued. 31 Imagine the reaction of our fellow American citizens today if an anti-war demonstrator was treated as Merryman was in 1861. Nevertheless, five years later (after the Union victory and with a Lincoln appointee, Salmon P. Chase, now serving as Chief Justice) the Supreme Court reached essentially the same conclusion as Taney in a case called Ex Parte Milligan; “The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace . . . The Government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence.”32 Habeas corpus could be suspended, but only by Congress; and even then, the majority said civilians could not be held by the Army for trial before a military tribunal, not even if the charge was fomenting an armed uprising in a time of civil war. The Court would later retreat from this in Ex Parte Quirin, the German saboteurs case. Lincoln never denied that he had stretched his Presidential power. “These measures,” he declared, “whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon, under what appeared to be a 28

Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How., p. 393 (1857) Ex Parte Merryman is reprinted in The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Ser. 2 Government Printing Office, 1880-1902), 1:578 30 U.S. Constitution, articles I and 9 31 Habeas Corpus, Act of March 3, 1863 32 Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. pp. 120-121 (1866) 29

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popular demand, and a public necessity; trusting, then as now, that Congress would readily ratify them.”33 Lincoln thus confronted Congress with a fait accompli. It was a case of a President deliberately exercising legislative power, and then seeking congressional ratification after the event. There remained individuals who believed that in doing so he had exceeded his authority.

THE SUPREME COURT SUSTAINS THE PRESIDENT IN THE PRIZE CASES The constitutional questions; the validity of the initial war measures, the legal nature of the conflict; Lincoln’s assumption of war power, came before the Supreme Court in one of the classic cases heard by that tribunal. The decision in the Prize cases, 34 issued in March 1863, though the specific executive acts had been performed in 1861. The particular question before the Court pertained to the seizure of vessels for violating the blockade whose legality had been challenged since it was set up by presidential proclamation in absence of a congressional declaration of war. The issue, however, had much broader implications, since the blockade was only one of the emergency measures Lincoln took by his own authority in the “eighty days.” It was argued in the Prize cases that Congress alone had the power to declare war, that the President had no right to institute a blockade until after such a declaration, that war did not lawfully exist when the seizures were made, and that judgments against the ships in lower federal courts were invalid. Had the high court in 1863 decided according to such arguments, it would have been declaring invalid the basic governmental acts by which the war was waged in its early months, as well as the whole legal procedure by which the government at Washington had met the 1861 emergency. The matter went even further, and some believed a decision adverse to the President’s excessive power would have overthrown, or cast into doubt, the legality of the whole war. Pondering such an embarrassment to the Lincoln administration, the distinguished lawyer Richard Henry Dana, Jr., wrote to Charles Francis Adams: “Contemplate, the possibility of a Supreme Court deciding that this blockade is illegal! . . . It would end the war, and how it would leave us with neutral powers, it is fearful to contemplate!”35 Given these circumstances, the Lincoln administration was enormously relieved when the Court sustained the acts of the President, including the blockade. A civil war, the Court held, does not legally originate because it is declared by Congress. It simply occurs. The “party in rebellion” breaks allegiance, “organizes armies, and commences hostilities.” In such a case it is the duty of the President to resist force by force, to meet the war as he finds it “without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name.” As to the weighty question whether the struggle was an “insurrection,” or a “war” in the full sense, (as if between independent nations), the Court decided that it was both.36 33

Collected Works, 4:429 Prize, 67 U.S. 635 (1863) 35 James G. Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1951), p. 52 36 Ibid., pp. 71-72 34

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The Court then held Lincoln’s acts valid. The blockade was upheld, and the condemnation of the ships sustained. But it was a narrow victory. The decision, handed down on March 10, 1863, was five to four, with Chief Justice Taney among the dissenters. Again, Lincoln was not Don Quixote; he could count popular votes, congressional votes, as well as judicial ones. He had stacked the Court in his favor, and his appointments cast the deciding votes. The three Lincoln appointees, Noah H. Swayne, Samuel F. Miller, and David Davis, joined Justice Robert C. Grier, who wrote the majority opinion, and the loyal Justice James M. Wayne of Georgia.

EMANCIPATION AS A MILITARY MEASURE Another illustration of Lincoln’s legal and political astuteness with constitutional issues relates to emancipation. The problem was prodigious. Nothing in the Constitution authorized the Congress or the President to confiscate property without compensation. When the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, issued on September 22, 1862, declared slaves in the states still in rebellion to be free on January 1, the legal basis for this action seemed obscure. Lincoln cited two acts of Congress for justification.37 Although reference to the two acts occupied much of the proclamation, they actually had little to do with the subject, indicating that Lincoln had not really settled in his own mind the extent of his power and on what authority to issue the Proclamation. But, by the time of the final Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863; Lincoln had concluded his act to be a war measure taken by the Commander-in Chief to weaken the enemy. “Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States by virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and navy of the United States, in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do … Order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States and parts of States are, and henceforward shall be free . . .”38 The Proclamation may have had all “the moral grandeur of a bill of lading,” as historian Richard Hofstader later charged;39 but, the basic legal argument for the validity of Lincoln’s action could be understood by everyone. African-Americans reacted with exhilaration when the proclamation was signed on January 1, 1863 and more than 200,000 went to serve in the Union Army and Navy.40 And, the time was ripe. To a critic, James Conkling, the President wrote: “You dislike the Emancipation Proclamation; and, perhaps, would have it retracted. You say it is unconstitutional - I think differently. I think the Constitution invests its commander-in-chief, with the law of war, in time of war. The most that can be said, if so much, is, that slaves are property. Is there – has there ever been – any question that by the law 37

Collected Works 5, pp. 434-435 (“An Act to Make an Additional Article of War” March 13, 1862 and “An Act to Suppress Insurrection, to Punish Treason and Rebellion, to Seize and Confiscate Property of Rebels and for other Purposes,” July 17, 1862) 38 Collected Works, 4:29-30 39 Richard Hofstader, The American Political Tradition (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 169 40 See Edna Greene Medford, “Beckoning them to the Dreamed Promise of Freedom: African-Americans and Lincoln’s Proclamations of `Emancipation’” in The Lincoln Forum: Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg and the Civil War, pp. 50-51 (John Y. Simon, Harold Holzer and William D. Pederson, eds., Savas Publishing Co., 1999).

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of war, property, both of enemies and friends, may be taken when needed? And is it not needed whenever taking it, helps us, or hurts the enemy?”41 This is the Lincoln who consistently took the shortest distance between two legal points. The proposition as a matter of law may be argued. But it is not the law being analyzed, but rather Lincoln’s political and legal approach to it. Lincoln saw the problem with the directness with which he dissected most problems: the Commander-in-Chief may, under military necessity, take property. Slaves were property. There was a military necessity. Therefore, Lincoln, as Commander-in-Chief, took the property. Not only could Lincoln count votes, he could reason clearly during a constitutional crisis.

VALLANDIGHAM AND THE CORNING LETTER Clement Laird Vallandigham, the best known anti-war Copperhead 42 of the Civil War, was perhaps President Lincoln’s sharpest critic. An Ohioan, this “wily agitator,”43 as Lincoln once obliquely described him, found many substantial supporters for his views in New York State. Active in politics throughout most of his life, he was elected to Congress from Ohio in 1856, 1858 and 1860. Before he was defeated for the 38th Congress in 1862, he returned to Ohio to seek the Democratic nomination for Governor. While in Congress he made a bitter political speech on July 10, 1861, criticizing Lincoln’s inaugural address, and the President’s message on the national loan bill. He charged Lincoln with the “wicked and hazardous experiment” of calling the people to arms without counsel and authority of Congress; with violating the Constitution in declaring a blockade of Southern ports; with “contemptuously” setting at defiance the Constitution in suspending the writ of habeas corpus; and with “cooly” coming before the Congress and pleading that he was only “preserving and protecting” the Constitution and demanding and expecting the thanks of Congress, and the country for his “usurpations of power.”44 In his last extended speech in Congress on January 14, 1863, Vallandigham reviewed his lifelong attitude on slavery and espoused the extreme Copperhead doctrine he said: Neither, sir, can you abolish slavery by argument . . . The South is resolved to maintain it at every hazard and by every sacrifice; and if “this Union cannot endure ‘part slave and part free,’ then it is already and finally dissolved . . . But I deny the doctrine. It is full of disunion and civil war. It is disunion itself. Whoever first taught it ought to be dealt with not only as hostile to the Union, but as an enemy of the human race. Sir, the fundamental idea of the Constitution is the perfect and eternal compatibility of a union of States ‘part slave and part

41

Collected Works, 6:406-410 Copperhead, a reproachful epithet, was used to denote Northerners who sided with the South in the Civil War and were therefore deemed traitors, particularly those so-named Peace Democrats who assailed the Lincoln administration. It was borrowed from the poisonous snake of the same name that lays in hiding and strikes without warning. However, “Copperheads” regarded themselves as lovers of liberty, and some of them wore a lapel pin with the head of the Goddess of Liberty cut out of the large copper penny minted by the Federal treasury. 43 Collected Works, 6:266 44 Congressional Globe, 37. Congress 1 session, pp. 23, 100, 348. See also Frank L. Klement, The Limits of Dissent: Clement L. Vallandigham and the Civil War (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998) 42

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free.’ . . . In my deliberate judgment, a confederacy made up of a slave-holding and nonslave-holding States is, in the nature of things, the strongest of all popular governments.45 Later that year, on March 25, 1863, Union General Ambrose E. Burnside took command of the Department of the Ohio with headquarters at Cincinnati. Burnside, who earlier had succeeded George G. McClellan in the command of the Army of the Potomac, had failed miserably before Lee at Fredericksburg. Smarting from his defeat, he was eager to repair his military reputation. The seat of the Copperhead movement was located within the area of his new command. Wholesale criticism of the war was rampant there, and this particularly irked Burnside. On March 21, the week after Vallandigham’s return from Washington, and four days before Burnside took command of the Department of the Ohio, Vallandigham had made one of his typical anti-Administration speeches at Hamilton, Ohio. On April 13, General Burnside, without consultation with his superiors, issued his famous General Order No. 38 in which he announced that all persons found within the Union lines committing acts for the benefit of the enemies of the country would be tried as spies or traitors, and, if convicted, would suffer death.46 The Order enumerated the various classes of persons falling within its scope, and stated that the habit of declaring sympathy for the enemy would not be allowed in the Department, and that persons committing such offenses would be at once arrested with a view to being tried or banished from the Union lines. Learning that Vallandigham was to speak at a Democratic mass meeting at Mt. Vernon, Ohio, on May 1, Burnside dispatched from his staff two captains in civilian clothes to listen to Vallandigham’s speech. One of the captains leaned against the speaker’s platform, and took notes while the other stood a few feet from the platform among the audience. As a result of their reports, Vallandigham was arrested in his home at Dayton, on Burnside’s orders, early after midnight on May 5 and escorted to Kemper Barracks, the military prison in Cincinnati. On May 6 and 7, he was tried by a military commission convened by General Burnside, found guilty of violation of General Order No. 38, and sentenced to imprisonment for the duration of the war.47 On the first day of his imprisonment, Vallandigham smuggled out a message, “To the Democracy of Ohio,” in which he protested that his arrest was illegal, and triggered by no other offense than an expression of his “political opinion.” He urged his fellow Democrats to “stand firm” and assured them: “As for myself, I adhere to every principle, and will make good through imprisonment and life itself, every pledge and declaration which I have ever made, Uttered or maintained from the beginning.”48 Vallandigham’s counsel applied to the United States Circuit court, sitting at Cincinnati, for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied. This time, unlike Merryman, the Court agreed with the suspension. An application was made later for a writ of certiorari to bring the proceedings of the military commission for review before the Supreme Court of the United States. This application was denied on the ground that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over a military tribunal.48 General Burnside approved the finding, and the sentence of the military commission, and made plans to send Vallandigham to Fort Warren, Boston Harbor, for imprisonment. Before 45

Congressional Globe, 37 Congress, 2 session, Appendix, pp. 52-60 Klement, The Limits of Dissent, p. 149 47 Ibid., pp. 152-168 48 Ibid., pp. 163-164 46

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these plans could be carried out, however, President Lincoln telegraphed an order that commuted the sentence to banishment from Union territory.49 Vallandigham was then conducted by way of Louisville, Kentucky, and Murfreesboro, Tennessee, into Confederate lines. He reached the headquarters of General Braxton Bragg on May 25. But, before the federal officers left him, Vallandigham announced defiantly: “I am a citizen of Ohio, and of the United States. I am here within your lines by force, and against my will. I therefore surrender myself to you as a prisoner of war.”50 Vallandigham subsequently found his way to the Confederate capital of Richmond, where he was received indifferently by the Confederate authorities, although he maintained the fiction that he was a Union prisoner of war. Having resolved before leaving Cincinnati to endeavor to go to Canada, Vallandigham, without interference, took passage on June 17 on the blockade runner Cornubia of Wilmington bound for Bermuda, arriving on June 20. After ten days in Bermuda he traveled by steamer to Halifax, Canada, arriving there on July 5. He then found his way to Niagara Falls, Canada, then settled at Windsor, opposite Detroit, where he remained until he returned to Ohio on June 15, 1864. The arrest, military trial, conviction, and sentence of Vallandigham aroused excitement throughout the country. The public roundly criticized Burnside for the issuance of General Order No. 38, and for its use against the Ohio Copperhead. President Lincoln also endured severe criticism for commuting instead of countermanding Vallandigham’s sentence. The general dissatisfaction with the case was not confined to radical Copperheads. The outcome also disturbed many conservative Democrats who were otherwise loyal government supporters in the prosecution of the war. Many Republican newspapers joined in questioning the action, public meetings of protest were organized in several cities. The Democrats of Albany hosted one of the most dignified and impressive protest meetings on Saturday evening, May 16, 1863, three days before Lincoln altered Burnside’s sentence of imprisonment and ordered that Vallandigham be sent beyond federal lines. Staged in the park in front of the state Capitol, it was presided over by Erastus Corning, a distinguished congressman from the city. Democratic Governor Horatio Seymour, though unable to attend, endorsed the meeting in a letter. At the rally, fiery speeches criticized Burnside for his action against Vallandigham. Orator after orator expressed outrage against the allegedly arbitrary action of the Administration in suppressing the liberty of speech, and of the press, the right of trial by jury, the law of evidence, and the right of habeas corpus, and in general, its assertion of the supremacy of military over civil law. The attendees adopted a series of resolutions by acclamation, and ordered that a copy of these resolutions be transmitted “to his Excellency the President of the United States, with the assurance of this meeting of their hearty and earnest desire to support the Government in every Constitutional and lawful measure to suppress the existing Rebellion.” Three days later, Erastus Corning addressed the resolutions to the President, and sent them along with a brief note signed by himself, as president of the assemblage, and by its vice-presidents and secretaries. Though couched in dignified and respectful language, the resolutions clearly articulated the position of those attending the meeting they regarded the

49 50

Ibid., p. 171 Ibid., pp. 177-178

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arrest and imprisonment of Vallandigham illegal and unconstitutional, and deplored the alleged usurpation of personal rights by the Administration.51 On May 28, 1863, the President acknowledged receipt of the resolutions in a note addressed to “Hon. Erastus Corning,” promising to “give the resolutions consideration” and “to find time and, make a respectful response.”52 There is no record that Lincoln was consulted by General Burnside in advance of the issuance of General Order No. 38, or over the arrest, trial and sentence of Vallandigham. Lincoln was, of course, thoroughly familiar with Vallandigham as leader of the Copperhead critics of his administration; if left to his discretion alone, Lincoln would probably have counseled that Vallandigham be allowed to talk himself to death politically. Yet on June 12, 1863, the President sent a studied reply to the Albany Democrats addressed to “Hon. Erastus Corning and others.” In a closely reasoned document of more than 3,000 words, constructed in lawyer-like fashion, Lincoln justified the action of the Administration in the arrest, trial, imprisonment, and banishment of Vallandigham and elaborated on his view that certain proceedings are constitutional “when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public Safety requires them, which would not be constitutional when, in [the] absence of rebellion or invasion, the public Safety does not require them.” The President defended the action not on free speech grounds but on the effects of such speech.53 The political instincts of the lawyer-president emerged in Lincoln’s reply when he said: In giving the resolutions that earnest consideration which you request of me, I cannot overlook the fact that the meeting speak as ‘Democrats.’ Nor can I, with full respect for their known intelligence, and the fairly presumed deliberation with which they prepared their resolutions, be permitted to suppose that this occurred by accident, or in any other way than that they preferred to designated themselves ‘democrats’ rather than ‘American citizens.’ In this time of national peril, I would have preferred to meet you upon a level one step higher 54 than any party platform.

Erastus Corning referred Lincoln’s response to the committee that reported the resolutions while they were widely printed in pro-Lincoln newspapers throughout the country. On July 3, Corning forwarded to the President the rejoinder of the committee, another document of some 3,000 words. This rejoinder dwelt at length upon what it deemed “repeated and continued” invasions of constitutional liberty and private rights by the Administration, and asked anew what the justification was “for the monstrous proceeding in the case of a citizen of Ohio.” The rejoinder, drawn mainly by an ex-justice of the State Court of Appeals, did not maintain the even-handed dignity of the original resolutions, charging Lincoln with “pretensions to more than regal authority,” and insisted that he had used “misty and cloudy forms of expression” in setting forth his pretensions. The committee was especially sensitive to Lincoln’s argument that the resolutions were presented by “Democrats” instead of by “American citizens” and sought to portray the 51

Ibid., pp. 181-183 Ibid., p. 182 53 Collected Works, 6:235 54 Ibid., pp. 260-272 52

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President as a usurper of constitutional liberties. The President was too busy with countless other issues to engage in prolonged debate. He had his say in his reply to the initial resolutions, ignored the rebuttal and turned to other matters.55 Almost simultaneously, Lincoln found himself engaged in similar encounter with Democrats in Ohio. The Ohio Democratic State Convention held at Columbus on June 11, 1863, while Vallandigham was still within the Confederate lines, nominated him for Governor by acclamation. George E. Pugh, Vallandigham’s lawyer in the habeas corpus proceedings, was nominated for Lieutenant Governor. The convention passed a series of resolutions condemning the arrest, trial, imprisonment, and banishment of Vallandigham, and appointed a committee of 19 members to communicate with the President, and to request the return of Vallandigham to Ohio. The committee, all members of Congress, addressed their communication from Washington on June 26 “To His Excellency the President of the United States.” The committee called on the President at the White House and filed with him its protest, including the detailed resolutions adopted by the Ohio Democratic State Convention. Similar in import to those adopted by the Albany Democrats, the resolutions held that “the arrest, imprisonment, pretended trial, and actual banishment of Clement L. Vallandigham” was a “palpable” violation of the Constitution. The committee when on to elaborate its view that the Constitution is no different in time of insurrection or invasion from what it is in time of peace and public security.56 Re-employing the arguments he had used in his letter to the Albany Democrats, Lincoln promptly replied to the Ohio committee. He added “a word” to his Albany response: “You claim that men may, if they choose, embarrass those whose duty it is, to combat a giant rebellion, and then be dealt with in turn, only as if there was no rebellion. The constitution itself rejects this view. The military arrests and detentions, which have been made; including those of Mr. V. which are not different in principle from the others; have been for prevention, and not for punishment, as injunctions to stay injury, as proceedings to keep the peace.”57 In concluding his reply, Lincoln introduced a new legal argument. He insisted that the attitude of the committee encouraged desertion and resistance to the draft, and promised to release Vallandigham if a majority of the committee would sign and return to him a duplicate of his letter committing themselves to the following propositions:

1) That there is now a rebellion in the United States, the object and tendency of which is to destroy the national Union; and that in your opinion, an army and navy are constitutional means for suppressing the rebellion. 2) That no one of you will do any thing which in his own judgment, will tend to hinder the increase, or favor the decrease, or lessen the efficiency of the army or navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress that rebellion; and, 3) That each of you will, in his sphere, do all he can to have the officers, soldiers, and seamen of the army and navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress the rebellion, paid, fed, clad, and otherwise well provided and supported.58 55

Ibid., p. 267 Klement, Limits of Dissent, p. 183 57 Ibid., pp. 183-185 58 Collected Works, 6:303 56

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Not surprisingly unconvinced, the Ohio committee spurned Lincoln’s concluding proposals, and demanded in its rejoinder the revocation of the order of banishment, not as a favor, but as a right, without sacrifice of dignity and self respect. Once again, Lincoln did not reply to the rejoinder of the Ohio committee. Safe in his retreat in Canada, Vallandigham accepted the nomination for Governor of Ohio by the Democratic State Convention in an impassioned letter “Address to the Democracy of Ohio.” The name of Burnside, he declared, was “infamous forever in the ears of all lovers of constitutional liberty” and the President was guilty of outrages upon liberty, and the Constitution.” Vallandigham’s “opinions and convictions as to war” and his faith “as to final results from sound policy and wise statesmanship” were not only “unchanged but confirmed and strengthened.”59 While the Democrats went on to conduct a vigorous campaign, the Republicans nominated John Brough, a former Democrat, to oppose Vallandigham. The keynote of the campaign was expressed by the Republican State Convention in a declaration that “in the present exigencies of the Republic we lay aside personal preferences and prejudices, and henceforth, till the war is ended, will draw no party line but the great line between those who sustain the government, and those who rejoice in the triumph of the enemy.”60 The tone and temper of the Democratic campaign was typified by a speech at St. Mary’s, Ohio, on August 15, 1863 by George E. Pugh, the candidate for Lieutenant Governor, which was printed in full by the Columbus Crisis the following month. Pugh paid his “compliments” to Lincoln in language which outdid Vallandigham: Beyond the limits and powers confided to him by the Constitution, he is a mere County court lawyer, and not entitled to any obedience or respect, so help me God [Cheers and cries of ‘Good’.] And, when he attempts to compel obedience beyond the limits of the Constitution by bayonets and by swords, I say that he is a base and despotic usurper, whom it is your duty to restrict by every possible means if necessary, by force of arms. [Cheers and cries ‘That’s the talk.’] If I must despot, if I must be subject to will of any one man, for God’s sake let him be a man possesses some great civil or military virtues. Give me a man eminent in council, or eminent in the field, but for God’s sake don’t give me the miserable mountebank who at 61 present exercises the office of President of United States.

This extreme language, may well have contributed to the result of the election. The total vote in Ohio was more than 476,000. Brough received a solid majority both at home, and in the armed forces, winning by 71 percent of the vote. The Republicans won 29 of the 34 seats in the state senate, and 73 of the 97 in the state assembly.62 One more formal effort was made in Vallandigham’s behalf. On February 29, 1864, Ohio Congressman George H. Pendleton (later that year to become the Democratic candidate for Vice President of the United States) offered the following resolution in the House of Representatives, and moved the previous question for adoption: Resolved . . . That the military arrest, without civil warrant, and trial by military commission, without jury, of Clement L. Vallandigham, a citizen of Ohio, not in the land or naval forces of 59

Ibid., p. 305 July 15, 1863, published in Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, July 20, 1863 61 Klement, Limits of Dissent, p. 248 62 Ibid 60

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the United States, or the militia in active service, by order of Major General Burnside, and his subsequent banishment by order of the President, executed by military force, were acts of mere arbitrary power, in palpable violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States.

The proposed resolution was killed by a vote of 37 to 35.63. In developing his arguments for sustaining the government’s actions on Vallandigham, Lincoln’s turned above all to the doctrine of necessity. In his view, the civil courts were powerless to deal with the insurrectionary activities of individuals.64 As Lincoln expressed the problem: “he who dissuades one man from volunteering, or induces one soldier to desert, weakens the Union cause as much as he who kills a Union soldier in battle. Yet this dissuasion, or inducement, may be so conducted as to be no defined crime of which any civil court would take cognizance.”65 He knew as president he had to act to counter such subtle, and not so subtle, treasons. In his most famous passage on the subject, contained in the Corning Letter, Lincoln stated eloquently: Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert? This is nonetheless injurious when effected by getting a father, or brother, or friend into a public meeting, and there working upon his feelings, till he is persuaded to write the soldier boy, that he is fighting in a bad cause, for a wicked administration of a contemptible government, too weak to arrest and punish him if he shall desert. I think that in such a case, to silence the agitator, and save the boy, is not only 66 constitutional, but, withal, a great mercy.”

CIVIL LIBERTIES AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 In the “epilogue” to his book, The Fate of Liberty, historian Mark E. Neely, Jr., closes by admitting: “If a situation were to arise again in the United States when the writ of habeas corpus were suspended, government would probably be as ill-prepared to define the legal situation as it was in 1861. The clearest lesson is that there is no clear lesson in the Civil War – no neat precedents, no ground rules, no map. War and its effect on civil liberties remain a frightening unknown.”67 Neely’s point is well taken today, since September 11, 2001, many scholars and citizens have questioned how President Bush’s reactions and actions to the problems of national security and war will have on his legacy, the Constitution, and civil liberties. Recently, there has been much dissension among Americans over the President’s motives in Iraq. Surely, President Bush has more challenges that will present themselves during these dangerous times. Even though Lincoln and Jefferson improvised on their constitutional authority during their respective presidencies, they ultimately preserved the American system itself. After the 63

Ibid., p. 252 Ibid 65 LaWanda Cox called this “Limits of the Possible.” See “Reflections on the Limits of the Possible,” in Freedom, Racism and Reconstruction: Collected Writings of LaWanda Cox, pp. 243-278 (Donald G. Nieman, ed., University of Georgia Press, 1997) 66 Collected Works, 6:264 67 Ibid., p. 266 64

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Iraqi conflict ends, Bush must create a more democratic government, and reunite not only the American people, but as many countries as he can.

WAR ON TERRORISM AND MILITARY TRIBUNALS After Osama Bin Laden, and his forces of Al Qaeda, admitted to master-minding the destruction of the twin towers and the Pentagon on September 11. Hundreds of suspected Al Qaeda associates were arrested and detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. President Bush proposed the use of military tribunals to try foreigners charged with terrorism. With over 90 million cases in our justice system each year, these commissions may be needed. Such commissions do not enforce national laws, but a body of international law that has evolved over the centuries. Known as the law of war, one of its fundamental axioms is that combatants cannot target civilians. Historically, military commissions during wartime began as traveling courts when there was a need to impose quick punishment. The use of military tribunals, rather than the normal justice system, was used not only during the Civil War but also during the Revolutionary War, Mexican War, and both world wars. Abraham Lincoln declared martial law, and authorized such forums to try guerillas or terrorists during the American Civil War because of the ability of the tribunals to act quickly; their ability to preserve and protect intelligence gathered through interrogation; limit lifesaving information from becoming public, and otherwise protect civilians who would have been jurors if tried in a United States District Court. During the Civil War, the Union Army conducted at least 4,271 trials by military commission, which reflected the disorder of the time. Lincoln answered his critics with a reasoned, constitutional argument. A national crisis existed and in the interest of self-preservation he had to act. At the same time he realized Congress had the ultimate responsibility to pass judgment on the measures he had taken. He found the right of self-preservation in Article II, section 1, of the Constitution, whereby the chief executive is required “to preserve, protect and defend” it, and in section 3, that he “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” All laws which were required to be “faithfully executed” were being resisted, and “failed of execution” in nearly one-third of the states. Like Lincoln’s critics during the Civil War, many today have expressed their concern about the modern use of military tribunals,68 fearing “people around the world will view the outcome as a foregone conclusion.”69 Yet, questions remain as to the degree that terrorists, 68

69

Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 235 Ironically, the case of Lincoln assassin John Wilkes Booth, was tried before a military tribunal. Although Booth was already dead, eight defendants were put on trial. This included Dr. Samuel Mudd, the physician who set Booth’s broken leg and sent him on his way. Dr. Mudd was accused of abetting Both’s escape. He escaped the death penalty and served four years of a life sentence. See James H. Johnston, Swift and Terrible: A Military Tribunal Rushed to Convict after Lincoln’s Murder, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A90102001Dec7?language=printer, December ll, 2001, at F01. Interestingly, Dr. Mudd’s grandson brought the case before a federal appeals court in September 2002. He sought to have the conviction overturned, arguing that his grandfather had only been doing his duty as a doctor. As Richard Willing stated in his article, “On its face, the Mudd appeal turns on a fairly dry point of law–whether the army’s decision followed the standard of review called for by the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. But underlying the dispute is a basic

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known as “unlawful combatants” in legal jargon, are entitled to legal protection. Many have questioned whether the proposed use of military tribunals would survive a court challenge; they assert that courts may not find that current circumstances justify the tribunals use. However, as discussed supra American courts have been reluctant to second-guess the chief executive as to when commissions are justified.70 “There certainly are precedents through history for military commissions, but that doesn’t mean the president has constitutional authority to use them whenever he says there’s an emergency.”71 It is clear that the 9/11 terrorists and detainees, whether apprehended in the United States or abroad, are not protected under America’s criminal justice system. Initially, President Bush proposed that the terrorists would neither be protected by the international law of war, the four Geneva Conventions.72 However, he reversed himself when many countries indicated that if detainees would not be entitled to the Geneva Convention protections, they would be hesitant to turn over any alleged terrorists in their custody.73 Furthermore, our own Department of Defense indicated that Bush would put troops in Afghanistan, and now Iraq, at risk if captured if this country refused to apply the international law protections.74 74 Afghanistan, and other unfriendly countries, would refuse to do the same. Terrorists are not members of an organized command structure with someone responsible for their actions; they do not wear a military uniform so that the other side can spare civilians without fear of counterattacks by disguised fighters; they do not carry arms openly; and there is no respect for the laws of war. Similarly, there have been reports that our soldiers are facing renegade fighters in Afghanistan and Iraq – who wear no uniform and drive non-military vehicles. To address some of the confusion, the Pentagon issued regulations to govern tribunals. Under Military Commission Order No. 1, issued in March 2002, the Secretary of Defense was vested with the power to “issue orders from time to time appointing one or more military commissions to try individuals subject to the President’s Military Order and appointing any other personnel necessary to facilitate such trials.”75 The Commissions are to be composed of military personnel or civilians who are commissioned sitting as both triers of fact and law. Any evidence may be admitted as long as, according to a reasonable person, it will have probative value. The defendant is entitled to a presumption of innocence and must be convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. However, only 2/3rds of the panel is needed to convict. The sentence may be reviewed by the Department of Defense and the President. However, criticism has remained. A New York Times editorial issued after the regulations, notes that despite the fact that the idea of military tribunals for suspected terrorists is less troubling than it was at inception, “there is still no practical or legal disagreement over how the legal system should function during wartime–during the Civil War and today.” Unfortunately for Dr. Mudd’s family, on November 8, 2002, the court dismissed the case. Judge Harry Edwards wrote that the law under which the Mudd family was seeking to have Samuel Mudd’s conspiracy conviction expunged applied only to records involving members of the military. Although Mudd was tried by a military tribunal, he was not a member of the military. 70 William Glaberson, “Closer Look at New Plan for Trying Terrorists,” NY Times, November 15, 2001 71 Ibid 72 Ibid 73 Thom Shanker and Katherine Q. Seelye, :Behind-the Scenes Clash Led Bush to Reverse Himself on Applying Geneva Conventions,” NY Times, February 22, 2002 74 Ibid 75 Ibid

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justification for having the tribunals. The United States has a criminal justice system that is a model for the rest of the world. There is no reason to scrap it in these cases.”76 However, it is clear that the present federal courts are ill-equipped to efficiently adjudicate terrorism cases; unique issues like witness and jury security and preservation of intelligence have, and will cause extraordinary delay. Others have suggested that a combination of independent federal court review and military tribunal may be the answer. Harvey Rishikoff, former FBI legal counsel, suggests that clearly, the federal court system as it now exists is ill-equipped to handle matters of domestic and international security.77 He suggests that “A specialized federal security court could accommodate the particular challenges of prosecuting terrorism cases without undermining constitutional principles.”78 The “New Court for Terrorism” could “craft procedures for secret evidence gathered by sources and methods that should not be disclosed. It would have jurisdiction over matters that involve citizens and noncitizens operating in a loose network for terrorist purposes . . .”79 The most distinct difference between this debate, and Lincoln’s civil liberty dilemma, is that most of the modern prospective defendants are non-citizens. What about those who are, in fact, citizens? In the case of Jose Padilla, also known as Abdullah al-Muhajir, he is accused of planning to explode a radioactive device, and is also a U.S. citizen.80 He has been held as an “enemy combatant” under the current regulations governing military tribunals, but the current regulations exclude U.S. citizens.81 Not surprisingly, a writ of habeas corpus was filed on his behalf. In the matter of Yasser Esam Hamdi, also an American-born suspected terrorist, a federal appeals court ruled that “enemy combatants” can be held indefinitely without access to legal counsel.82 In the Hamdi case, the “combatant” has yet to be formally charged, and has been detained since his capture in November 2001. The decisions made by President Bush are increasingly coming under attack. Our nation is engaged in another conflict that may be as difficult as it is different from the Civil War. It is a war waged against us by an almost unknown and indiscernible enemy. Some urge us to proclaim the war over with victories in Afghanistan and Iraq. Even our strongest allies, and some of our fellow citizens cannot understand why President Bush should continue the war against terrorists by going after them rather than just being reactive. Shouldn’t we be satisfied with one victory, they argue. Why must we identify other sources of danger and prepare to act against them?

CONCLUSION The dilemmas facing Lincoln and, to a lesser extent, Jefferson were as robust in their own time as in ours, and deserve careful reexamination by modern historians. That these men emerge from the perennial controversy that afflicted his administration over civil liberties 76

Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1, March 21, 2002 “Refining Military Tribunals,” Editorial, NY Times, March 22, 2002 78 Harvey Rishikoff, “A New Court for Terrorism,” NY Times, June 8, 2002 79 Ibid 80 Ibid 81 Adam Liptak, Suspect’s Custody Raises Questions of Constitutionality, Prov. J. June, 11, 2002 at A19 82 Ibid 77

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with a reputation for statesmanship may be the most powerful argument for their judicious application of executive authority during the immense difficulties of their times. Whether President Bush will emerge similarly unscathed is yet to be determined. Shortly after September 11, two-thirds of Americans supported President Bush’s creation of a Homeland Security department and his overall approval rating was 77 percent.83 But, after attention turned to Iraq, Bush spent much of his time attempting to persuade the American public that a war against Iraq is necessary to suppress future September 11-style terrorism. His approval rating consequently slipped. When the government of a democratic nation imposes harsh methods to sustain itself, sincere protest and criticism will undoubtedly follow, along with slurs on democracy itself. This criticism secures the future of constitutional liberties if the nation survives; but suppose it does not survive? Suppose it fails because of internal division, dissension or treason? In such cases, there will be greater criticism, stressing the weakness and inadequacy alleged to be a characteristic of a democratic nation in an emergency. As historian Don E. Fehrenbacher has noted: “Although Lincoln, in a general sense, proved to be right, the history of the United States in the twentieth century suggests that he brushed aside too lightly the problem of the example that he might be setting for future presidents.”84 Yet, this problem existed before Lincoln was even born when Jefferson was still shaping the borders on the infant United States. The full impact of their legacy on President Bush is yet to be fully realized. In Lincoln’s words, the United States was “the last best hope of earth,” and it still is for survival of democracy and, as Jefferson so eloquently stated, “the pursuit of life, liberty and happiness.”

83 84

“Detaining `Enemy Combatants,’” Editorial, NY Times, January 14, 2003 Terror v. Liberties, Poll: Americans Believe Stopping Terror is More Important Than Privacy, June 10, 2002, http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/terror_poll02060.html

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 395-407

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

EX PARTE MILLIGAN: LINCOLN’S USE OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS Joseph R. Thysell, Jr. President George W. Bush’s response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 has been called unprecedented in American history. Bush using the full weight of his office has initiated extraordinary wartime measures to protect what he deemed the national interest. One hundred forty years earlier in April 1861, President Abraham Lincoln initiated similar extraordinary wartime measures for the same reason. Both Bush and Lincoln, using their powers as Commander-in-chief and as Chief Executive, sought to ensure the survival of the nation while at the same time protect the Constitution and its democratic institutions. Both Presidents resorted to restrictions and even suppression of important civil liberties as guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution, and in particular Bill of Rights.1 One of the most controversial measures of the Bush Administration has been the authorization of military commissions. On November 13, 2001, Bush signed a presidential order entitled Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizen In The War Against Terrorism authorizing their use to try suspected international terrorists.2 Under Bush’s order, defendants were denied certain constitutional rights normally given in civil courts and were granted a limited right to appeal the military commission’s final decision. In past cases, similar defendants charged with terrorist-related offenses were tried in federal district court. The Bush Administration concluded that trying Al Qaeda members in civil courts could place judges and jurors at risk. Security would have to be extended not only to the courtroom but to the entire building and adjacent streets. Much of the evidence introduced would be classified, having been gathered through covert sources.3 In addition to military commissions Bush issued several different executive orders that he judged vital for safeguarding national security and aiding law enforcement. These executive orders, including military commissions, were made without prior consultation with Congress or the courts. They included: allowing the interrogation of Middle East men who had recently come to the U.S., circumventing the issuance of visas to Muslim men and eavesdropping of confidential conversations between defendants in federal custody and their lawyers. In justifying the government’s actions, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft has argued:

1

Walter Koenig, The Chief Executive (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), pp. 248-249 “Military Order of November 13, 2001–Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,” Federal Register, November 16, 2001, Vol. 16. n. 222. 3 “Justice in the Shadows,” Newsweek, November 26, 2001, p. 39 2

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Joseph R. Thysell, Jr. Foreign terrorists who commit war crimes against the United States, in my judgment, are not entitled to and do not deserve the protections of the American Constitution, particularly when there could be very serious and important reasons related to not bringing them back to the 4 United States for justice. I think it’s important to understand that we are at war now.

The Bush Administration’s adoption of military commissions came despite intense criticism from Congress, especially Democrats, who charged that his actions were contrary to a long history of bipartisanship. Vermont Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, charged that using military commissions to try “foreign nationals” on charges of suspected terrorism would send the wrong message both at home and around the world. Military commissions if conducted in secret and where execution is summary and judicial review is nonexistent, would be strongly condemned. In the months after the September 11, 2001 bombing, the Bush Administration believed that the public would overwhelmingly support their adoption, and that Congress would only hamper their anti-terrorist activities through extended debate.5 When compared to other Presidents; the Bush detainees are fewer in number, and are limited to aliens, and confined for more specific reasons. The Bush Administration was concerned that the detainees, if released, would leave the country, preventing the U.S. government from treating them as defendants or witnesses.6

LINCOLN’S ACTIONS One hundred forty years earlier Lincoln also authorized the use of military commissions. Lincoln had just assumed office in March 4, 1861, and Congress was not in session. One by one eleven Southern states would secede from the Union and eventually form the Confederate States of America. Lincoln would be forced to act on the home front hoping to avert a permanent break between the North and the South, and at the same time win Congress’ approval for his actions after the fact.7 During a ten week period beginning with the surrender of Fort Sumter, South Carolina on April 14, 1861, through the convening of a special session of Congress on July 4 1861; Lincoln adopted a series of unprecedented wartime measures. Lincoln’s measures included: combining state militias into ninety day volunteers; transferring 40,000 volunteers into three year enlistments; enlarging the regular army by 23,000, and the navy by 18,000; spending two million dollars which Congress had not yet appropriated to pay for the war; preventing the Post Office from delivering “treasonable correspondence”; enacting new restrictions upon foreign travelers, such as passports; ordering the blockage of all Southern ports; suspending the right of habeas corpus; and arresting and detaining in military custody political opponents on charges of “treasonable practices.” These and other wartime measures were done without prior congressional authorize action, which was eventually granted.8

4

“White House Push on Security Steps Bypasses Congress,” The New York Times, November 15, 2001, p. 1 Ibid., p. 1 6 War Powers: Is Bush Making History?” Time, December 3, 2001, p. 1. 7 Ibid., p. 1 8 Edwin S. Corwin, The President–Office and Powers (New York: New York University Press, 1957), p. 229 5

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Lincoln’s predecessor James Buchanan had adopted a view of the Presidency diametrically opposed to that of his own. Buchanan’s view, better known as the strict constructionist approach, held that the President had no more power than what was specifically set down in the U.S. Constitution or in federal law.9 In 1861, Buchanan believed that as President he could not constitutionally or statutorily intervene to resolve the Southern act of secession. He was “bound by solemn oath, before God and the country, ‘to take care that the laws be faithfully executed’, and from this obligation he cannot be absolved by any human power.”10 The President, Buchanan argued, had no legal authority or grant of discretion to intervene into the relationship between the national government and the states. To entrust the President with such powers would go beyond his constitutional mandate. Buchanan wrote: This would be to invest a mere executive officer with power of recognizing the dissolution of the confederacy among our thirty-three sovereign States. It bears no resemblance to the recognition of a foreign de facto government, involving no such responsibility. Any attempt to do this would, on his part, be a naked act of usurpation. It is therefore my duty to submit to 11 Congress the whole question with all its bearings.

Lincoln’s view, better known as the prerogative approach, held that a President may use his constitutional powers liberally when responding to a national crisis or emergency. Recent presidents, especially Franklin D. Roosevelt, have adopted Lincoln’s approach. Inherent within this approach is that the President may act decisively and use the full weight of his office in the performance of his duties.12 In his first major address to the nation as president on March 4, 1861, Lincoln warned the Southern states that the United States of America was a permanent entity. This permanence, or rather “perpetuity,” must be seen as “implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law of all national governments.” No government has written into its laws the means to its own destruction. No state can voluntarily secede from the Union. Legislative acts allowing for secession “are “legally void, and that acts of violence within any State or States against the authority of the United States are insurrectionary or revolutionary, according to circumstances.”13 Lincoln called the whole idea of secession “anarchy.” The rule of the majority adheres to “constitutional checks and limitations” and is shaped through “deliberate changes of popular opinion and sentiments” guaranteeing their liberties, had instead become hostage to the rule of the minority.14 Lincoln justified his wartime measures in a July 4, 1861 message to Congress. In that message, Lincoln adopted a more warlike and less conciliatory tone toward the seceding Southern states. Lincoln again brought up the issue as to whether the majority had become hostage to the minority and whether the majority can use its power to ensure its preservation against that minority. Lincoln asked the question as to whether a constitutional republic or democracy can ensure its territorial existence against enemies at home. In the impending 9

James Pfiffner and Roger H. Davison, Understanding the Presidency, 3rd. ed. (New York: Longman, 2003), pp. 23-24 10 Messages and Papers of the Presidents (New York: Bureau of National Liberature, Inc., 1897), p. 3165 11 Ibid., p. 3166 12 Pfiffner and Davison, Understanding the Presidency, pp. 25-27 13 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, p. 3208 14 Ibid., p. 3210

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crisis a nation faces a faction of discontented persons who lack the required votes to form an administration and are intent upon bringing down that government. Lincoln spoke: It must force us to ask, Is there, in all republics this inherent and fatal weakness? Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence? So viewing the issue, no choice was left but to call out the war power of the Government and so to resist force employed for its destruction by force for its 15 preservation.

Lincoln explained that his wartime “measures whether strictly legal or not,” resulted from what appeared to be “a popular demand and a public necessity,” and the belief that Congress would approve them. All his measures were constitutionally within the scope of Congress. His administration decided that with the calling up of the state militias the military authorities should have the “discretion” to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and “to arrest and detain without resort to the ordinary processes and forms of laws such individuals as he might deem dangerous to the public safety.” This power to suspend and to arrest and detain was exercised, though only “sparingly.” The “legality and propriety” of his administration’s actions had been openly challenged. One third of the states had defied or failed to carry out the nation’s laws. He asked the question as to whether a nation based upon a rule of law should be compelled to enforce a particular law protecting an individual’s liberties, even when the overall effect of enforcing that law favors the guilty over the innocent. Lincoln spoke: To state the questions more directly, Are all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the Government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated? Even in such a case, would not the official oath be broken if the Government should be overthrown when it was believed that 16 disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it?

The major constitutional issue at stake is that which provides that “the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.” A “rebellion” has taken place and the “public safety” mandates a “qualified suspension” of this right, which he authorized. The argument is made that the Congress, and not the President, has the power to suspend. On this issue, the Constitution was “silent.” Suspension was intended to take place during a “dangerous emergency.” In the event that Congress was not in session, the framers of the Constitution could not possibly have wanted a “rebellion” to go unabated, without taking action.17 In the latter part of his July 4, 1861 message, Lincoln spoke: Our popular Government has often been called an experiment. Two points in it our people have already settled—the successful establishing and the successful administering of it. One still remains—its successful maintenance against a formidable internal attempt to overthrow it. It is now for them to demonstrate to the world that those who can fairly carry an election can also suppress a rebellion; that ballots are the rightful and peaceful successors of bullets, and that when ballots have fairly and constitutionally decided there can be no successful 15

Ibid., p. 3224 Ibid., pp. 3225-3226 17 Ibid., p. 3226 16

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appeal back to bullets; that there can be no successful appeal except to ballots themselves at 18 succeeding elections.

In a letter to A. G. Hodges, Editor of the Frankfurt Kentucky Commonwealth dated April 4, 1864 Lincoln gave a more descriptive interpretation as to how he viewed his constitutional powers upon assuming the office of president with the onset of the Civil War. Lincoln abhorred the whole institution of slavery: “If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong.” He wrote that whatever his personal views on slavery were he was bound by constitutional oath to protect its legal existence. The “ordinary civil administration” prohibited him from indulging into “abstract” moral judgments on slavery. On the broader issue as to the nation’s survival in the impending crisis, Lincoln wrote that his constitutional oath to preserve the Constitution imposed on him “the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that government-that nation, of which that Constitution was the organic law.” Lincoln spoke: Was it possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution? By general law, life and limb must be protected, yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures otherwise unconstitutional might become unlawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution through the 19 preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assume this ground, and now avow it.

Throughout the Civil War, especially the early years, the Lincoln Administration’s major concern on the home front was the presence of pro-South Northerners. Though most professed loyalty, the military authorities were concerned that they could pose a threat to the Union war effort. Their wartime activities could involve spying, sabotage, supplying troops to the embattled South, passing treasonable materials, encouraging acts of secession in the North, and giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Even if they remained peaceful, they could still do political damage to the Lincoln Administration. Their activities could include hindering enlistments, encouraging desertions, handing out disloyal material, and criticizing the President and the Republican Party. Existing statutes and court rulings on treason, and conspiracy to commit treason were seen as inadequate for the impending crisis. Convictions would be very difficult in civil courts, especially before pro-Southern or indifferent juries. Also, many anti-war activities did not qualify as violations of federal law. Grand jury indictments would be very difficult in many Northern jurisdictions. Convictions would be few in number.20 The military authorities in lieu of charging for treason would arrest potential violators and suspend their writ of habeas corpus. Early in the war, arrests were based on presidential proclamations covering certain areas. The U.S. State Department whose function was to arrest relied upon various sources such as secret service, federal marshals and the military authorities. Violators were often not informed as to the reasons for the government’s actions. Arrests were made without adequate investigation or evidence. Violators without habeas corpus suspended had no legal recourse to challenge their terms of their confinement. Release came only after the emergency had ended. On occasion judges would order prisoners to be 18

Ibid., p. 3231 Pfiffner and Davison, Understanding the Presidency, p. 35 20 Alfred H. Kelly and Winifred A. Harbison, The American Constitution–Its Origin and Developments, Vol. 1 (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1948), pp. 437-438 19

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released, but the provost marshals or the military authorities would ignore their rulings. When military and civilian jurisdictions clashed, the military inevitably held the upper hand.21 The Lincoln Administration used military commissions to try civilians in both free and border states. Military security became the ultimate justification given for the government’s actions. During General Robert E. Lee’s July 1863 invasion of Pennsylvania resulting in the Battle of Gettysburg, Lincoln responded to citizens’ fears and imposed martial law. A year later in July 1864, he imposed martial law on all of Kentucky. Military commissions were set up in full recognition of the civil authorities and civil courts. Interference was kept to a minimum. Among the major wartime offenses tried were spying and sniping. In the border states; the punishment varied in severity. One of the most controversial aspects was the trying of civilians who were arrested for offenses committed considerable distances from actual Union military operations. In all Northern jurisdictions, the civil courts were open and in session. During the years 1863 and 1864, opposition was especially strong among many Northern Democrats from the states of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, who openly opposed Lincoln’s war policy. These dissident Democrats, better known as Copperheads, supported an early end to the war with the South. They became the target of the military authorities in their campaign to root out disloyalty and treason.22 On February 14, 1862, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton was given the task of enforcing the Lincoln Administration’s policy of detainment, arrest and trial of civilians, which included dissident Democrats. As the civilian head of the U.S. War Department, Stanton was seen as the most logical choice. He was seen as being the least judicious of all the Cabinet Secretaries, as well as the most aggressive and partisan on wartime policy. Two other Cabinet Secretaries were considered but dismissed as unsuitable to the task. U.S. Attorney General Edward Bates was seen as “too old, slow and erratic” as well as being a staunch opponent of military arrests. Secretary of State William Seward, though competent, was too involved in foreign policy and frequently acted in a “distressing casual, circuitous, and flippant manner.”23 Lincoln authorized Stanton in Executive Order No. 1 Relating To Political Prisoners to use his discretion (as Secretary of War) to detain “as spies any persons in the service of the insurgents, or others whose release at the present moment may be deemed incompatible with the public safety.” Stanton’s order called the Southern “insurrection” a clash of “political ideas” unknown in U.S. history. His order proclaimed: “Every department of the Government was paralyzed by treason.” Defection” was the order of the day. That included: Congress, federal judges, diplomats, the armed forces, territories and many state officials. Dissension existed even in most loyal Union states in the form in political organizations and “secret societies.” Northern groups were supplying men, money and war material to the Southern insurgents. Congress did not anticipate the Southern “insurrection” and did not plan for this emergency. Courts which were intended to support the administration were hesitant when called to act.24

21

Ibid., pp. 438-439 Ibid., pp. 443-444 23 Allan Nevins, “The Case of the Copperhead Conspirator,” Quarrels that have Shaped the Constitution, ed. John A. Garraty (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), pp. 106-107. 24 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, pp. 3303-3304 22

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Stanton’s order conceded that the recent reversals on the field of battle had disheartened loyal Union supporters and gave new optimism to its opponents. The most obvious indicator was the decrease in enlistments and the increase of desertions. The President concluded that it was “his duty to employ with energy the extraordinary powers which the Constitution confides to him in cases of insurrection.” The armed forces were used as he felt necessary, even though “existing law’ provided for no such use. Suspension of habeas corpus was also exercised. Stanton order declared that the President “caused persons who were represented to him as being or about to engage in disloyal and treasonable practices to be arrested by special civil as well as military agencies and detained in military custody when necessary to prevent them and deter others from such practices.” The detainee was examined and released when conditions held that the “public safety” was no longer at risk. Lincoln’s wartime measures were intended to clearly define the difference between loyal and disloyal conduct.25 Ten days later on September 24, 1862; Lincoln issued a proclamation aimed at those persons who interfere with the calling up of Union volunteers and draftees and those which the civil law cannot adequately persecute for military offenses. Such offenses impede the war effort and “give aid and comfort in various ways to the insurrection.” Lincoln’s wartime measures were to include “all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors, within the United States, and persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice, affording aid and comfort to Rebels against the authority of the United States….” Offenders were subject to martial law and were to be tried and punished before courts-martial or military commissions. In addition, the writ of habeas corpus was to be suspended during the “rebellion” and the imprisonment was to include “any fort, camp, arsenal, military prison, or other place of confinement by any military authority or by the sentence of any Court-Martial or Military Commission.”26 Lincoln’s September 1862 proclamation created a firestorm of criticism. Lincoln was charged as having acted as a despot totally ignoring the will of Congress. Critics charged that his actions showed no respect for the rule of law, but was rather based on military expediency. Former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Curtis believed that Lincoln had entrusted himself with powers which only Congress and the Judiciary enjoyed. Lincoln’s actions created offenses unknown in U.S. jurisprudence, such as discouraging volunteers and encouraging disloyal acts. Prisoners were unlawfully removed from the jurisdiction of the civil courts. Also, grand jury indictments were substituted for provost marshal reports and military commissions for trial by jury. As for the latter, military commissions used uncontrolled discretion, determining the punishment imposed rather than relying upon the will of Congress.27 Curtis believed that the President’s powers, even in wartime, were constitutionally limited to the conduct of his office. In time of war, a military commander, whether he be the commander-in-chief, or one of his subordinates, must possess and exercise powers both over the persons and property of citizens which do not exist in time of peace. But he possesses and exercises such powers, not in spite 25

Ibid., pp. 3304-3305 Ibid., pp. 3299-3300 27 Homer Carey Hockett, The Constitutional History of the United States 1826-1876 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1939), pp. 284-285 26

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Joseph R. Thysell, Jr. of the constitution and laws of the United States, or in derogation from their authority, but in 28 virtue thereof and in strict subordination thereof.

To ensure that Lincoln’s September 24, 1862 proclamation enjoyed the full color of law, Congress passed the Habeas Corpus Act on March 3, 1863. Through its actions, Congress sanctioned the president’s actions after the fact. The 1863 Act required that the military authorities provide a list of prisoners to the civil authorities within twenty days of their capture otherwise the prisoners must be released from custody. Upon release, the prisoners must swear allegiance to the U.S. government and give evidence of future good behavior. In the event that the list is not given to the civil authorities, the prisoners may petition the civil courts through writ of habeas corpus. The effect of the 1863 Act was to speed up the release of prisoners charged where no violations of federal law occurred. After twenty days and no grand jury indictment, the prisoners must be granted immediate release.29 One year later on September 15, 1863, Lincoln issued a second; and more detailed proclamation, suspending the writ of habeas corpus. His September 1863 proclamation reaffirmed the validity of the 1863 Act passed a year earlier. Like 1862, Lincoln authorized the suspension when in his judgment the “public safety” was at risk. The 1863 proclamation was expanded to include all persons under the command or in the custody of the military, naval or civil authorities. A wide number of potential offenders were again covered: prisoners of war, spies, aiders and abettors of the enemy; all U.S. military personnel including deserters, draft dodgers and any person who commits military-related offense. Lincoln declared that suspension was to remain for the duration of the rebellion or until this proclamation was revoked or modified. All magistrates, attorneys and civil officers, as well as all military and naval authorities, were “to take distinct notice of this suspension, and give it full effect….”30 The year 1863 saw the Lincoln Administration become even more stringent in its position against anti-war Northern opponents. The two main reasons were increased Union defeats and Confederate military operations in the vicinity of Washington., D.C. A year earlier in 1862 the nation’s first conscription law was passed resulting in widespread evasion and blatant opposition. The U.S. War Department arrested would-be violators whether leaving town or aiding a draftee. Northern public opinion, on the whole, supported conscription, labeling violators as ‘skeedaddlers’.31 The Civil War saw Lincoln and Chief Justice Roger Taney supporting opposite positions on the issues of law and war. Lincoln symbolized war and military expediency whereas Taney symbolized the letter of the law. This clash of positions came to a head in the case of Ex Parte Merryman. In that case, the military authorities acting upon Lincoln’s authority ignored Taney’s court order of release of the prisoner Merryman. Eighteen sixty four saw a new Chief Justice (Salmon P. Chase), and four new Associate Justices (Noah H. Swayne, Samuel F. Miller, David Davis and Stephen Fields) all appointed by Lincoln. The remaining four Justices were holdovers from previous Presidents. They included: James M. Wayne (Andrew Jackson - 1835), Samuel Nelson (John Tyler - 1845), Robert C. Grier (James Polk -

28

Ibid., p. 285 Ibid., pp. 286-287 30 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, pp. 3299-3300 31 Nevins, “The Case of the Copperhead Conspirator,” Quarrels that have Shaped the Constitution, pp. 110-111 29

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1846) and Nathan Clifford (James Buchanan - 1858). On the issue of military commissions, both the Lincoln appointees and the holdovers were split.

THE MILLIGAN CASE The most famous case of the Lincoln’s use of military commissions was the trial of Lambdin Milligan, a Northern Democrat, who opposed the war. On October 4, 1864; the military authorities acting under the 1862 proclamation arrested Milligan; and several others at their homes in Indiana, and imprisoned them in a military stockade. Less than a month later, Milligan was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death before a military commission held in Indianapolis, Indiana which Lincoln upheld.32 During the military trial, evidence was brought out that Milligan belonged to a secret organization known as the Sons of Liberty. Milligan and others had conspired to commit various illegal acts such as: capturing federal and state arsenals in the Northern states of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois; releasing prisoners of war at Camp Douglas (Chicago), Camp Morton (Indianapolis), Camp Chase (Columbus, Ohio) and Johnson’s Island on Lake Erie; arming freed Southern prisoners; starting a reign of terror including arson and pillage; and resisting Union forces stationed in Missouri and Kentucky.33 Though Milligan could have been tried for violations of federal law, Secretary of War Stanton and Indiana Governor Oliver P. Morton desired more drastic measures than what the civil law provided.34 His date of execution was set for May 19, 1865.35 On January 2, 1865; after the military commission had completed its findings the U.S. Circuit Court in Indianapolis authorized a grand jury to hear his case to see if any federal laws were violated. After almost a month, the grand jury failed to issue a bill of indictment or a presentment. Milligan appealed his case to the U.S. Circuit Court claiming that the military commission lacked jurisdiction to hear the charges against him or any charges in the future. Milligan also claimed that the military commission violated his right of trial by jury. The lower federal court ruled that military authorities arrested, tried and sentenced him all in violation of the 1863 Act. On May 10, 1865, nine days before his execution his petition was granted. The two judge federal panel split on the final result, forcing a question of law before the U.S. Supreme Court.36 A similar case on military commissions occurred in Ex Parte Vallandigham, where the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the military authorities. Though the facts in Vallandigham appeared similar to Milligan, the Justices saw a major factual difference. In Vallandigham, the petitioner appealed directly from a military commission to the U.S. Supreme Court which federal law did not provide for, whereas in Milligan the petitioner appealed from a federal circuit court in violation of a federal law, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863. Milligan argued

32

“The Military Commission in 1942,” Virginia Law Review, 29 (1942), p. 326. Nevins, “The Case of the Copperhead Conspirator,” Quarrels that have Shaped the Constitution, pp. 110-111 34 William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court–How it was, How it is (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc. 1987), pp. 158-159 35 Ex Parte Milligan 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2, p. 107 36 Ibid., p. 107; Nevins, “The Case of the Copperhead Conspirator,” Quarrels that have Shaped the Constitution, p. 112 33

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successfully that the military authorities should have transferred him forthwith to the civilian authorities.37 On April 3, 1866; one year after Lincoln’s death, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its unanimous decision. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the President had exceeded his constitutional powers when he established a military commission to try Milligan, a civilian, for the offenses charged. The civil courts of Indiana were open and in session. Lincoln’s actions were taken without proper authorization from Congress.38 Where the Justices in Milligan differed was the extent of the President’s power to establish military courts (commissions) in wartime. The language of the majority was sweeping in the negative on the President’s power, whereas the language of the concurring was more circumspect. Better known as Ex Parte Milligan, this case stood as a historical reminder that limits do exist on the war-making power of the President as spelled out in Article II of the Constitution. Prior to the World War II case of the eight Nazi saboteurs, Milligan had little or no significance.39 Justice Davis, a close personal friend of Lincoln and one of his four appointees to the U.S. Supreme Court wrote for the majority. He was joined by Justices Nelson, Grier, Clifford, and Fields. Davis ruled that the military commission did not have proper jurisdiction to try and to punish Milligan. Milligan was not a resident of any of the rebelling states, nor was he a prisoner of war, nor did he serve in the U.S. armed forces. Rather, he was a citizen of the state of Indiana for over twenty years at the time of his arrest. The military commission, in Milligan’s case, tried, convicted and sentenced him to die for criminal offenses. The actions of the military authorities stripped from him the protection of the law which placed him “at the mercy of wicked rulers or clamor of an excited people.”40 The framers of the U.S. Constitution understood the historical struggle against tyranny, and that the Bill of Rights was the best guarantee against the abuses of government. The framers knew that during troubled times leaders, and people seek to sever government restraints and, instead, try to accomplish their goals through “sharp and divisive measures.” Important constitutional liberties were at risk unless the rule of law prevailed. Davis wrote: “The history of the world had taught them [framers of the U.S. Constitution] that what was done in the past might be attempted in the future. The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.”41 Davis ruled that Milligan was denied his right to trial before a civil court. The military commission trying Milligan lacked proper jurisdiction, having been established without valid congressional or presidential authority. The President, in war as in peace, is empowered to execute, rather than legislate, the law. In addition, the “laws and usages of war” cannot be substituted for proper jurisdiction. U.S. citizens cannot be tried before military commissions when the civil courts are open and in session. The civil courts of Indiana were handling routine judicial business deciding criminal cases and redressing grievances. The trial judges hearing Milligan’s case must be appointed for terms of “good behavior.”42

37

Carl Brent Swisher, American Constitutional Development (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1943), pp. 287-288 71 U.S. (4 Wall), 2, pp. 121-122 39 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S., 18 (1942). 40 71 U.S. (4 Wall), pp. 118-119 41 Ibid., pp. 120-121 42 Ibid., pp. 120-121 38

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Davis was emphatic in his ruling that Milligan should have been transferred to the civil authorities. Congress had already set down into law the offenses, the punishment, and the court to hear the case. The civil courts were “peaceful,” not needing “bayonets” or “military aid to execute its judgments.” The trial would be held in a loyal Union state before judges who were “eminently distinguished for patriotism,” and juries who were “upright, intelligent,” and lawfully selected. Davis ruled: “The government had no right to conclude that Milligan, if guilty, would not receive in that court merited punishment; for its records disclose that it was constantly engaged in the trial of similar offenses, and was never interrupted in its administration of criminal justice.”43 Davis ruled that Milligan’s right of trial by jury was also denied. Milligan was a civilian and entitled to be treated as such. Trial by jury does not apply to a person who is “attached to the army, or navy, or militia in actual service.” The discipline essential for running efficient armed forces demands a “swifter” trial than what the civil courts provide. Congress has the constitutional power to decide the type of trial which the armed forces will use when trying military-related offenses. Both soldiers and sailors subject themselves to the jurisdiction of Congress which makes the rules.44 Martial law can never be used when the civil authorities and civil courts remain in power undisturbed. States, such as Indiana, having once invaded were designated as a “theatre of operations.” On this point, Davis responded that the threat of invasion was past. Any reason for martial law had ceased. Mere threat is not enough. Davis reasoned: “The necessity must be actual and present; the invasion real, such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration.” Martial law can be used only in a “real war” situation. The president can use such wartime measures in states like Virginia where lawful authority, especially the courts, was overthrown. The same cannot be said for Indiana.45 Chief Justice Chase wrote the concurring opinion. He was joined by Justices Wayne, Swayne and Miller. Chase agreed with the majority’s conclusion that the military authorities lacked jurisdiction to detain, and to try Milligan for the offense charged. The grand jury failed to indict after the close of its session, making his continued imprisonment unlawful. The government clearly violated the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 Act. Chase expressed major reservations as to the majority opinion. First, the president, like the Congress, has the power to detain and to arrest in the event that habeas corpus is suspended. Second, Congress may establish military courts to exist alongside civil courts with full powers even though habeas corpus is suspended.46 Chase believed that Congress, though not exercising such, did have the power to establish military commissions in the state of Indiana. The Constitution gives the Congress the power to raise and support the armed forces and the power to make the rules and regulations for their use. This same power extends to the state militias when called into active service. Inherent within these powers is to establish military courts to try and to punish without trial by jury. The guarantees of the Bill of Rights, especially the Fifth Amendment right of presentment or grand jury indictment, were not extended to armed forces.4747 43

Ibid., p. 122 Ibid., pp. 122-123 45 Ibid., pp. 125-126 46 Ibid., p. 137 47 Ibid., p. 137-138 44

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Chase believed that limits do exist on the war-making power of Congress. When a nation is at peace “the laws of peace must prevail.” But when a nation is at war and all or part is invaded the power rests with Congress to respond. Congress must decide those jurisdictions where “great and imminent public danger” reign which justify military courts to try offenses against the national interest. Contrary to what the majority says, the official record shows that when Milligan was arrested, Indiana was in a military district within a “theatre of operations.” Indiana was previously invaded and was subject to further invasion. Chase wrote: It appears, also that a powerful secret association, composed of citizens and others, existed within the state, under military organization, conspiring against the draft, and plotting insurrection, the liberation of prisoners at various depots, the seizure of the state and national 48 arsenals, armed cooperation with the enemy and war against the national government.

Chase believed that Congress did have the constitutional power to establish military courts to try civilians charged with conspiracy offenses. He disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that since the civil courts were open, Congress was somehow prohibited from exercising this power. The civil courts can be hearing cases and rendering decisions and, at the same time, be ill-prepared to try and to punish a conspirator, such as Milligan. Chase called the judges and the judicial officers of Indiana “loyal” to the present administration. Under different circumstances, the opposite can be true. Judges can conceivably sympathize with the conspirators and even rule in their favor.49

THE MILLIGAN LEGACY The full Milligan opinion was not made public until December 1866. When the case was handed down, Lincoln’s wartime actions were called into question. Though the opinion was split, all the Justices agreed that Lincoln had exceeded his constitutional powers. The entire Court in Milligan sided with Taney over Lincoln in Ex Parte Merryman earlier in the war that the President cannot substitute military courts for civil courts when trying civilians for military related-offenses.50 Milligan influenced the on going post-Civil War conflict between President Andrew Johnson, and the Radical Republicans in Congress on the issue of Southern Reconstruction. Johnson supported a policy of terminating military governments throughout the South. Milligan, so Johnson believed, strengthened his case for ending all trials of civilians before military commissions within the occupied South. U.S. Supreme Court Justices had stopped hearing appeals before the federal circuit courts due to the Union occupation.51 In contrast, the Radical Republicans supported a policy of continued military governments. Johnson and various federal judges had implied through their actions that the Lincoln assassination conspiracy trial was unlawful. Republican Senator Thadeus Stevens of Pennsylvania argued that Milligan “places the knife of the rebel at the throat of every…loyal 48

Ibid., p. 140 Ibid., pp. 140-141 50 Elder Witt, Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1990), p. 21 51 Ibid., p. 21 49

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Union man in the South.” Federal judges would abuse their powers over writ of habeas corpus through their release of Lincoln’s “assassins.”52 Reacting to Milligan, the Radical Republicans proposed new laws, all aimed at circumventing the U.S. Supreme Court’s powers to hear cases on appeal. They included: limiting its appellate jurisdiction, requiring unanimity whenever constitutional issues were involved, and even voiding the Milligan case itself. One proposal did pass Congress. The Radical Republicans passed a law revoking the U.S. Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction to hear cases challenging Congress’ Reconstruction legislation. When brought before the Court, the Justices ruled in a unanimous decision that Congress’ policies and motives concerning the defeated South could not be challenged. (Ex Parte McCardle).53 Occurring at the same time as Milligan was the death of the two remaining Justices from the South, William Catron and James M. Wayne, both appointed by President Andrew Jackson. In part because of Milligan, but also because of Johnson’s tenure, Congress rescinded the ninth seat and decreased the number of Justices to eight.54 Milligan was not the only famous case of military commissions during the Civil War. Eight civilians, including one woman, were tried and convicted before a nine member military commission in the Lincoln assassination conspiracy trial. As a result of the Lincoln assassination, Secretary of War Stanton began a “reign of terror” in his attempt to apprehend the conspirators. On May 1, 1865, President Johnson issued a proclamation declaring that “all persons implicated in the murder” of the president, and “the attempted assassination” of Secretary of State Seward and other government officials, as well as “their aiders and abettors (were to be) subject to the jurisdiction of and legally triable before a Military Commission.” The trial of the eight conspirators lasted from May through July 1865. Four conspirators, including the lone woman Mrs. Mary Surratt, were hanged whereas four others received long prison terms.55 Historically, cases dealing with military commissions and martial law are limited to national emergencies. Events such as Fort Sumter, Pearl Harbor and the World Trade Center bombing of September 11,2001; inevitably force government to initiate wartime measures which would be seen as both unlawful and unpopular in peacetime. In all three instances, the government resorted to using national security as justification however unpopular. Lincoln set the example that later Presidents, such as Franklin D. Roosevelt and George W. Bush, would follow. Lincoln showed that nothing would prevent him from ensuring the survival of the Union and that the government would use, if necessary, extraordinary wartime measures to protect itself, including military commissions. Lincoln’s wartime measures in many cases, if not violating the letter of the law, at least stretched the law to its outer limits.

52

Hockett, The Constitutional History of the United States 1826-1876, p. 298 Ibid., p. 298 54 Witt, Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court, p. 21 55 “The Military Commission in 1942,” Virginia Law Review 29 (1942), pp. 323-325 53

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 409-424

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

THE RECTITUDE OF THEIR INTENTIONS: PROCLAIMING INDEPENDENCE IN PHILADELPHIA AND TEL AVIV Norman Provizer and Claire Wright INTRODUCTION: FROM SINAI AND BACK In May 1948, Golda Meir traveled in Arab dress to Jordan for a secret meeting with that nation’s ruler, King Abdullah. Six months had now passed since Meir (at that time known as Golda Myerson) held her first face-to-face discussion with the King in early November 1947. At that first meeting, Abdullah told Meir, who was then the head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency; that he would not join in any attack on the Jews of Palestine. Just weeks after that meeting, the United Nations approved a partition plan for the region, carving the territory into a Jewish state and an Arab one. The stage was set for war and Abdullah’s pledge seemed in doubt. Those were the circumstances under which Meir asked for this second meeting. As the King explained why he could not now resist joining the other Arab nations in opposing, by force, the creation of a Jewish state; he offered his plan to avoid war. The Jews would drop their demand for a state. Their territory would become part of Jordan, and they would be treated well by him. According to the future prime minister of Israel, Abdullah asked; “Why are you in such a hurry to proclaim your state? What is the rush? You are you so impatient!” In response, Meir told the King, “I don’t think that a people who had waited 2,000 years should be described as being ‘in a hurry.’” 1 On May 14, 1948; the 2,000-year (or, more specifically the 1,878-year) wait ended. At the unimposing Tel Aviv Museum, 200 people gathered to hear the David Ben-Gurion proclaim the independence of the new State of Israel as the British mandate over Palestine came to an end. When Ben-Gurion, Israel’s version of “the indispensable man,” read the 979 Hebrew words contained in “the Scroll of Independence,” the die was cast. 2 Almost 172 years after Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence proclaimed freedom for the United States of America, there was a new declaration of independence, this time signed by the members of the Jewish People’s Council; resounding around the globe.

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Golda Meir, My Life (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1975), p. 218. For her general discussion of the meetings with King Abdullah, see pp. 216-221. Abdullah was assassinated at the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in 1951. 2 Ibid, pp. 226-227.

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Certainly, there were great differences in time, circumstances and history, all of which separated the two proclamations. But there were common threads that connected them as well. After all, the political founders in both Philadelphia and Tel Aviv followed the words of Leviticus (25) to “Proclaim liberty throughout the land and to all the inhabitants thereof.” 3 So, in a very real sense, the American declaration of 1776 was built on a foundation transported, in part, from ancient Sinai. And, 172 years later, that foundation returned home.

THE COVENANT TRADITION AND THE COVENANT CULTURE During the 1990s, Daniel Elazar produced an imposing series of volumes breathing new life into the old idea of covenant politics. 4 In a very real sense, Elazar’s efforts provide an important reminder that the covenant tradition connected to the Old Testament remains much more than a parochial, and a peripheral artifact without meaning in the modern world. In short, like the ancient Greeks, the ancient Hebrews provide a crucial reservoir of ideas that continue to inform politics and the social order. “Politically,” in Elazar’s words, “a covenant involves a coming together (a congregation) of basically equal humans.” Those people “consent with one other through a morally binding pact supported by a transcendent power.” That consent establishes, in voluntary, morally informed partnership, “a new framework” or it sets those involved “on a road to new task that can only be dissolved by mutual agreement of all parties to it.” 5 The covenant relationship, like that of the later social-contract concept, stumbles over any number of empirical barriers. For example, what is the exact nature of individual consent to the covenant? What about the power differentials among those “basically equal humans” who have joined together? In fact, what is the very meaning of the covenant when faced with dissent and the disenfranchised? Yet, despite the existence of such issues, the covenant tradition’s symbolic meaning and its significance in providing basic orientations for an organized, rule-directed society remain intact (though, admittedly, President William Jefferson Clinton’s 1995 call for a New Covenant for America failed to ignite anyone’s imagination). And, even when its overt religious underpinnings are removed in secular style, the covenant tradition retains its message in the form of compacts and contracts. 6 3

This is the quote, for example, found on the Liberty Bell Excerpts from Daniel Elazar’s four-volume series on The Covenant Tradition in Politics and his other writing on covenants are available from the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs which has an on-line library of his work, www.jcpa.org. In addition to that series, Elazar is the co-editor, with John Kincaid, of The Covenant Connection (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000). Elazar died in 1999 and Kincaid is the editor of a book of essays for him titled Covenants, Federal Democracy, and Political Culture (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004). The four-volume series on the covenant tradition is also from Transaction Publishers 5 Daniel Elazar, Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel, Volume I of The Covenant Tradition in Politics (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995), 1. Also see, Michael Walzer, Exodus and Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1985), p. 84. There, Walzer notes that the individuals who commit themselves to the covenant “are moral equals.” 6 Elazar, Covenant and Polity, pp. 30-32. Also see the general discussion in Peter Grosse, Israel in the Mind of America (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1983). Both Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin, for example, suggested designs for the Great Seal of the United States that contained scenes drawn from the imagery of biblical Israel. Jefferson offered a depiction of the children of Israel in the wilderness, while Franklin focused on Moses parting the Red Sea. 4

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In the American context, to borrow the words of Milton Konvitz: When the colonists revolted against England, they were like the people of Israel who had revolted against the Egyptian tyrants. The American Revolution was first and foremost a struggle of the colonists to preserve their identity as a covenanted people. 7 As Elazar notes, “Covenant thinking was the common mode of political conceptualization and expression during the American Revolution….” 8 And, why wouldn’t it be? After all, “The Puritans, and particularly the Pilgrims, placed special stress on the covenant, and one of the most interesting aspects of colonial thought was the ‘covenant theology’ developed by Richard Baxter, William Perkins, John Preston, William Ames, and other colonial theologians.” 9 To use John Winthrop’s summary of the Puritan enterprise, “We are entered into Covenant with him for this work….” 10 New England would be the New Israel. Simply stated, the covenant tradition was in the air from the Mayflower Compact (known as the Plymouth Combination until 1793) to the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. That covenant culture was also reflected in the system of voluntary associations so closely connected to the emerging idea of America, in the notion of federalism (a term that comes from the Latin foedus which means covenant), and in the very practice of popular consent in a constitutional order. Donald Lutz, for example, writes, “Colonial political institutions were generally established by a single document, a covenant or compact, which functioned as a constitution…the compact, in turn, rested upon de facto popular consent, even though no theory of popular sovereignty as yet existed.” 11 In short, the covenant culture provided a framework in which a biblical orientation could establish a coherent foundation for colonial political thinking without precluding the practical focus on experience as a guide to human action. Reflection and choice beyond the direct management of a transcendent power are, after all, essential elements in the covenant idea of consent. 12 Like many other writers who survey the landscape of American political thought, Lutz notes that while covenant theology had deeply affected the colonist’s earliest constitutions, “secularization had moved the colonists away from direct reliance on religion to justify their form of government.” 13 Yet, the important point about the covenant culture is that it could accommodate a shift from “direct reliance on religion” to reliance of a more subtle kind without abandoning its fundamental principles. In Judith Shklar’s view; there was no barrier to John Locke in New England’s political theology. “The Puritans,” she writes, “had not only taken up the covenant of Abraham with God, but had also contracted with each other to fulfill

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Milton Konvitz, Torah and Constitution (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1998), p. 16. Elazar, Covenant and Polity, p. 20 9 Konvitz, Torah and Constitution, p. 12. 10 Ibid, p. 14. 11 Donald Lutz, A Preface to American Political Theory (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 115. Also see Lutz’s “The Evolution of Covenant Form and Content as the Basis for Early American Political Culture” in Daniel Elazar (ed.) Covenant in the 19th Century: The Decline of an American Tradition (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994). 12 Elazar, using the distinctions offered by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 1, offers three models of foundings/regimes in Covenant and Polity, pp. 35-42. 13 Lutz, A Preface, p. 115 8

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together the terms of that first covenant. Their society was built on a mutual promise to bear the communal responsibility to fulfill the mission of Israel.” 14 Thus, within the walls of the covenant culture, religion and the secular would share space in nonexclusive terms as would change and continuity. As Alexis de Tocqueville recognized long ago, “Religion, which never intervenes directly in the government of American society, should therefore be considered as the first of their political institutions, for although it did not give them the taste for liberty, it singularly facilitates their use thereof.” 15 In Michael Walzer’s words, “The covenant makes for responsibility; it is therefore a reason for political action.” 16 It bridges the gap between biblical mission and the social contract. Additionally, though the covenant approach provided an idea, a tectonic map, it was not at all a lifeless, logical abstraction. Instead, the idea combined reflections on the past with choices made for the future. Thus, while certainly not the only source shaping the political thinking of the colonists, the covenant tradition (including its secular offshoots) was, arguably, the most instrumental in creating a culture that could filter and blend the various concepts found in the aquifer of ideas that nourished American political thought. 17 From the covenant tradition and the covenant theology drawn from it, a covenant culture emerged. If Americans were, in Thomas Paine’s words, “to begin the world anew,” they would be successful in that quest, in no small measure, because they kept one foot firmly planted in the past, in the tradition of the covenant. In other words, the Mayflower brit (to borrow the Hebrew word for covenant) would continue to sail through American thought long after 1620. Here were people mutually covenanting and combining themselves into a civil body politic that would frame and obey just and equal laws based on the general good and changing needs of the colony. And they did this not only in the presence of God but also in the presence of each other. The conceptual foundation of what would become America was in place. Even as the colonies, by the time of the American Revolution, moved, in terms of their political ideas, from Puritan to Whig, the covenant culture did not have to be sacrificed. The Whig tradition may have lacked a direct theological base, yet it was “a set of political doctrines derived from the covenantal tradition and first given expression in the English Glorious Revolution of 1688-89, which brought together a synthesis of the English political tradition and the revolutionary politics of Civil War Puritanism.” 18

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Judith Shklar, edited by Stanley Hoffman and Dennis Thompson, Redeeming American Political Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 131. Alexis de Tocqueville, edited by J.P. Mayer and translated by George Lawrence, Democracy in America (New York: Perennial Library, 1988), 292. Walzer, Exodus and Revolution, 90. When the merchants of Boston, in 1774, attempted to convince the other colonies to act in concert with Massachusetts, relative to stopping trade with Britain, they called for “A Solemn League and Covenant.” Theodore Draper, A Struggle for Power (New York: Vintage, 1997), p. 421. Lutz, A Preface, 115, lists examples of early constitutions in the American colonies that were deeply influenced by covenant thinking. Of course, there were also changes over time relative to covenantal thinking. See Daniel Elazar’s “What Happened to Covenant in the Nineteenth Century” in Elazar (ed.), Covenant in the 19th Century. Daniel Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism, Volume III of The Covenant Tradition in Politics (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 49. Also see Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of Democracy and the Vulnerability of Democracies (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997), p. 261, for a sample of covenant-based political expressions through history. Daniel Elazar’s Covenant and Commonwealth, Volume II of The Covenant Tradition in Politics (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996) explores this question as well.

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With the covenant culture in mind, it is not difficult to examine the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 as a prime example of a voluntary effort to plant the seeds for both a political body and a people in line with the principles of the covenant tradition. (In keeping with the spirit of this discussion, 1776 is also translated as 5536, the corresponding year in the Jewish calendar.) Prior to his death on July 4, 1826, Thomas Jefferson had decided on the three achievements to be listed at his burial site. The first of those items, of course, is “Author of the Declaration of Independence.” 19 There is no shortage of writing on Jefferson, on the Declaration (including the “remaking” of the instrument by Abraham Lincoln), and on the relationship existing among the individuals and the ideas that merged to form the document. And, it is certainly not our purpose here to reexamine all of the paths leading to and from the July 4th event that placed the Declaration on the table of history. Instead, we focus on the covenantal aspects of the words that proclaimed independence in Philadelphia. Garry Wills organizes his book on Jefferson’s Declaration around the ideas of the document as a “Revolutionary Charter,” “A Scientific Paper,” “A Moral Paper,” “A Sentimental Paper” and a “National Symbol.” 2020 To this we would add the view of the document as a covenantal expression of a covenant culture. In the “Prologue” to Inventing America, Wills cites Gilbert Chesterton’s observation that “America is the only nation in the world that is founded on a creed. That creed is set forth with dogmatic and even theological lucidity in the Declaration of Independence, perhaps the only piece of practical politics that is also theoretical politics and also great literature.” Wills then notes; “To the extent that Chesterton read the Declaration as ‘dogmatic and even theological,’ he was misreading it. Jefferson would take such terms as an insult if applied to his draft. He thought most theology as an enemy to man’s freedom, and he opposed any religious tests for holding office or citizenship.” 21 Of course, the Declaration is not Jefferson’s draft of the document any more than the Constitution is James Madison’s draft for the document as expressed in the Virginia Plan. So, while it is true that phrases such as “appealing to the Supreme Judge of the World for the Rectitude of our Intentions” and “with a firm Reliance on the Protection of divine Providence” were additions to Jefferson’s draft; they, nevertheless, are part of the document. And, when viewed through covenantal lenses, the additions are anything but foreign to the initial body of the text where even Jefferson uses phrases such as “the Laws of Nature and Nature’s God” and “endowed by their Creator.” In American Scripture, Pauline Maier writes, “I dissent from any suggestion that Jefferson was alone responsible for the Declaration of Independence, or that the document most worth studying or admiring is his draft, or that the full story of the Declaration can be told apart from that of the Independence it declared and the process that led to it. After all, the Declaration, she notes, “was, according to Jefferson, ‘to be an expression of the American mind, and give that expression the proper tone and spirit called for by the occasion.’” 22And, 19

For a brief description of the development of Thomas Jefferson’s ideas concerning his achievements in life, see Konvitz, Torah and Constitution, 18-20 20 Garry Wills, Inventing America: Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978). 21 Wills, Inventing America, pp. xxi-xxiii 22 Pauline Maier, American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), xvii. Also see her discussion of the controversial Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence, which has its own connections to the Scottish covenant tradition (pp. 172-175).

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while Maier makes no mention of the covenant tradition in her historical examination of the making of the Declaration, it is exactly that tradition that so well expresses the American mind whether overtly stated or not. “By 1776,” Daniel Elazar observes, “the word covenant had been largely, though not entirely, superseded in political affairs by the words compact and constitution. It was during this period, for example, that the Plymouth Combination became known as the Mayflower Compact.” 23 Yet, whatever the label used, the revolutionary era, in fact, required, in Elazar’s words, “a new round of covenanting as the colonies reconstituted themselves as independent civil societies. Invariably they followed the customary patterns, albeit in the new secularized forms of declarations of rights and of (or in) constitutions.” 2424 True, the new secularized forms indicated, in their own way, a shift in emphasis from communitarian and republican principles to those of the more individual/liberal kind. The resulting tensions, in part, were “reflected in the Declaration of Independence, the founding covenant of the American people, bound by a shared moral vision as well as common interests.”25 Those tensions, of course, have not abated, and today they continue to be expressed in debates concerning the republican vs. the liberal interpretation of American society, its structures, values and direction. 26 But, while that debate is ongoing, there is considerable merit in Elazar’s perspective that “the Declaration of Independence is the most thorough and concise statement of the underlying political and social philosophy of the American people.” A statement that “is more covenantal than compactual in the American context.” A statement that is not only a part of the nation’s covenant culture but also highlights how that culture provides a framework for blending together the collective and the individual. Again, in Elazar’s words; “The Declaration stands where it does within the American political tradition because it is the covenant that transformed the disparate colonies into an organized people, the American people.”27 There are, of course those who argue that the Declaration’s primary purpose was simply to severe the “bands” tying the colonies to Great Britain and nothing more. From this perspective and “contrary to what we may have learned in our institutions of higher learning, there is no pretense as of this moment that we are, legally speaking or otherwise, one people or nation.” 28 The separate political units, in this view, “are ‘united’ for the purpose of declaring their independence, and so far as we can see no other purpose is even so much as mentioned in the remainder of the document.” 29 Certainly, the Declaration proclaims the right of the colonies to be “free and independent states,” and makes no effort to dismantle them. But, to dismiss the document’s references to “one People” or “United Colonies” or “the Representatives of the United States of America, 23

Elazar, Covenanat and Constitutionalism, pp. 47 Ibid. 25 Ibid, p. 48. 26 See Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996) for one influential discussion of this recurring theme in American political thought 27 The quotes are from Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism, p. 48. Additionally, he notes that the connection between the Great Awakening (1730-1750) and the American Revolution also helps to highlight the covenant nature of the Declaration which appears “on its surface” to be “a secular document” (51). Additionally, see the discussion of the Declaration of Independence in Daniel Elazar, The American Constitutional Tradition (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), pp. 89-106 28 Willmoore Kendall, edited by George Carey, The Basic Symbols of the American Political Tradition (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), p. 75. 29 Ibid, p. 76 24

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in General Congress, Assembled” as meaningless is to blindly ignore the covenantal connection. A joint action of convenience by completely unconnected entities requires no covenant, no compact. And yet, as Elazar points out, “The Declaration substantially follows the classical covenant formula.” That historic formula includes six dimensions. There is a preamble specifying the parties to the covenant, and an ideological or historical prologue indicating the setting for the covenant. Then, there is a section stipulating what is agreed to, and its public proclamation. Finally, the covenant refers to a divine witness to the action, and makes note of the blessings that come from adherence, and the curses that flow from non-adherence.30 Without restating all of Elazar’s points, the Declaration’s comportment with the covenant formula can be summarized as follows. 313The parties to the covenant are the people of “the United States of America” acting through their representatives assembled in a “General Congress.” Those delegates, while carrying a commitment to the states, nonetheless represented something new as well, the United States. In fact, logically there was no barrier simply to refer to the representatives as representatives of the individually named states assembled if a new covenant was not under construction. Little wonder then, that James Wilson would later call on the Declaration in support of a national-centered view during debates about the Constitution. In Wilson’s words, “The United Colonies” gained independence “not individually, but Unitedly.”32 Second, the historical prologue is contained in the document’s opening statement. Faced with history (“the Course of human events”), the former colonists proclaimed their existence as a single (though not undifferentiated) and separate people If they chose to combine as such, as they did, they were entitled to do so by “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God.” The merit of their actions would be further supported by a long list of charges against the British crown, citing the historical causes producing and legitimizing the separation. Justification of both the particular and the universal kind were thus linked. Third, the stipulation of what is agreed to is found in the self-evident truths articulated that “all men are created equal” and that the given rights (such as “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness”) by “their Creator” cannot be transferred from their possession. Equal creation lends credence to the idea of consent. And consent, in turn, requires ordered freedom. “In a covenantal system, liberty is as necessary as equality,” Elazar asserts, “since only a free people can enter into covenants.”33 In related fashion, the document stipulates agreement on the goal of happiness and on the idea that the just powers of government are based on “the consent of the governed” and are aimed at securing those unalienable rights. When government fails to follow the compact, consent can be withdrawn. Fourth, in every way, the Declaration is a public document. While the rights articulated are inalienable; respect for “the Opinions of Mankind,” require a public declaration accounting for the action taken. In the case of this document, Congress, in a separate context, provided for a public reading as well. 34 30

Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism, pp. 52-53 Ibid, pp. 53-67. Much of Elazar’s discussion here is based on a paper he wrote with John Kincaid, “The Declaration of Independence: The Founding Covenant of the American People” (mimeo, December 1980). 32 Cited in Samuel Beer, To Make a Nation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 325 33 Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionlism, p. 60 34 Joseph Ellis, American Sphinx (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1997), 57, discusses a “novel” interpretation of Jefferson’s Declaration that follows the premise that he intended the document “to be read aloud or performed.” 31

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Fifth, the representatives directly appeal “to the Supreme Judge of the World” for the rectitude of their intentions, for the moral rightness of the plan of action and purpose of their undertaking. To support their Declaration, the representatives of the people stated, “we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our scared Honor.” In line with that pledge, they would also express “a firm Reliance on the Protection of divine Providence.” Sixth, the new covenant would deliver the blessings that flow from being “Free and Independent States” deciding their own combined fate in areas such as war and peace, alliances and commerce. Failure, as noted, would exact its toll in terms of life, fortune and honor. Four years after the Declaration, the Massachusetts Constitution, drafted in large measure by John Adams and still in operation, offered similar themes in a constitutional context. “The body-politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals: It is a social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen; and each citizen with the whole people, that they shall be governed by certain laws for the common good.” In adherence, there lies blessings; and in non-adherence, there lurks the curse. Each nation, Elazar notes, has “a sacred history.” In America, that sacred, symbolic history “frequently draws the analogy between the founding and settlement of the United States, and the history of ancient Israel, striking several common themes: exodus, covenant, wilderness, opposition to corrupt foreign kings, Divine favor, human failure and repentance, and the necessity to cultivate moral virtue to preserve the benefits of Divine grace, particularly those of freedom.” 35 Based on that last theme, it’s not surprising that even a Jefferson could tremble for his country when he reflected “that God is just” and “that his justice cannot sleep for ever.” 36 Certainly, the man who became America’s third president placed his faith in Enlightenment rationalism rather than in faith. “The general spread of the light of science,” to use Jefferson’s words, “has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace of God.” 373But, of course, the covenant culture itself had little place for saddles, boots and spurs. It thus provided a common ground where God and consent could join together. Resistance to King George III, and England was, in other words, not only a consensual proclamation of political liberty; it was also “a reaffirmation of God’s covenant with the New Israel.” 38 On November 29, 1947; the United Nations voted to partition what remained of the British mandate of Palestine into a Jewish state, and an Arab one. The seemingly impossible Zionist dream was now within grasp. When representatives of the Jewish state officially declared the independence of the nation to be called Israel in Tel Aviv on May 14, 1948; that dream became a reality. Thus the declaration establishing the state of Israel “can be seen as its founding covenant, much like the American Declaration of Independence.” 39

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Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism, p. 66 Ellis, American Sphinx, p. 87. 37 From his 1826 letter to Roger Weightman. 38 Konvitz, Torah and Constitution, p. 16. 39 Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism, 233. Of course, the Israeli founding document (the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel) was anything but a unilateral declaration. 36

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That founding covenant transcended, at least for the moment, the enormous divisions existing within the Jewish population of Palestine (the yishuv). As David Ben-Gurion wrote, “Never in Jewish history has the unity of [the people of] Israel been revealed in a fuller or more perfect manner than in the Declaration of Independence of our state in our times.” 4040 If the search for unity in the American context had to cross a divide reflecting geographical/state interests, the search for that unity in Israel had to bridge divisions of a more overt, ideological kind. There were, after all, Communists who saw the Zionist entity as a bourgeois, counterrevolutionary enterprise, while many of those in the ultra-Orthodox camp viewed that same search (coming, as it did before the appearance of the messiah) as an abandonment of religious faith. Additionally, there were those who were ardent believers in a bi-national state of Jews and Arabs as the only path for Zionism to follow, as well as revisionists who resisted any partition at all, claiming all of the biblical land of Zion for Zionism. Yet, despite the vast political and religious differences separating members of the community, they proclaimed their consent to a common cause in the new, founding covenant. In an essay on that founding covenant, E. Gutmann notes that the seven sections of that document stipulate six basic matters. 41 From this perspective, the Declaration asserts “the natural right of the Jewish people to be like all other peoples, exercising self-determination in a sovereign state” and therefore proclaims the establishment of the Jewish state of Israel. It also establishes provisional institutions for governing the state and says that an elected assembly will produce a constitution before long. Finally, it sets forth the fundamental principles of political rule and calls for peace and cooperation, especially with those opposing the very establishment of the state itself. In terms of the classical covenant formula discussed previously, the Tel Aviv Declaration indicates that the parties to the covenant are found in both the Jewish community in Palestine and the Zionist movement in general. That duality highlights a special dimension of the covenant itself. Just as the people of the United States acted through their representatives gathered in the General Congress, the Jewish community in Palestine acted through their representatives, gathered together as the People’s Council, to construct and proclaim the independence document. At the same time, however, the People’s Council also spoke for the Zionist movement that was not limited, geographically, to the boundaries of the state. In this sense, while the proclamation had its direct impact on the Jewish community on the ground in the land of Israel, it also contained an indirect covenant with the broader Jewish community worldwide; thus, the Tel Aviv Declaration’s call for “the Ingathering of the Exiles;” and its appeal “to the Jewish people throughout the Diaspora” to aid “in the great struggle for the realization of the age-old dream – the redemption of Israel.” Before the independence declaration articulates the parties to the covenant, it establishes the historical setting for the document. In fact, nearly half of the proclamation issued in Tel Aviv is devoted to what might be termed a review of history. This review covers the role played by the ancient land of Israel (Eretz-Israel) in shaping the spiritual, religious and political identity of the Jews. It also highlights their forced exile and their continued

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Michael Walzer et. al. (eds.), The Jewish Political Tradition, Volume One, Authority (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 491 41 E. Gutmann, “The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel” at www.mfa.gov.il, p. 1

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attachment to the land, as well as the Zionist call to rebuild the Jewish state and the activities of the immigrant/pioneers in that regard. Additionally, the historical overview notes the lessons of the Holocaust and the international recognition provided by the Balfour Declaration, the League of Nations mandate and the 1947 United Nations resolution calling for the establishment of a Jewish state (which the Tel Aviv Declaration describes as “irrevocable”). It is the combination of such factors that supports the basic stipulation as to what is agreed to in the independence covenant, the political and the natural right for “the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like other nations, in their own sovereign state.” That sovereign Jewish state, in turn, would be open to all members of the Diaspora. And beyond that, it would “foster the development of the country for the benefit of all inhabitants,” following the principles of “freedom, justice and peace as envisioned by the prophets of Israel.” Despite this call to the ancient prophets, the document’s actual delineation of rights has a decidedly more modern tinge. The new state, after all, “will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all of its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex” and “will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture.” Such universal guarantees (that refer to collective as well as individual rights) represent a 20th century extrapolation of the American Declaration’s self-evident truths. Additionally, if the Philadelphia proclamation showed its respect for “the Opinions of Mankind” by declaring, in a public way, the reasons for the action taken, the Tel Aviv document took that public notion a step further, offering not only an historical justification but a set of public promises as well. The new state, for example, pledged to “safeguard the Holy Places of all religions” and stay “faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” It also expressed its desire to promote regional advancement while appealing to the Arab inhabitants of Israel “to preserve peace and participate” in building the state “on the basis of full and equal citizenship, and due representation in all its provisional and permanent institutions.” Of course, those Arab inhabitants were non-consenting adjuncts to the covenant not parties to the document. The member’s of the People’s Council assembled in Tel Aviv, after all, represented the Jewish community and no other, just as the members of Congress in Philadelphia acted for the people of the colonies and not the Indian nations. Moving to the dimension of a divine witness to the covenant, the Tel Aviv Declaration, in many ways, fails to fit the classic covenant formula; as ironic as it sounds there is nothing in the document that parallels the references in the American Declaration to “the Supreme Judge of the World” and “the Protection of divine Providence” and a “Creator.” Even the mention of the Old Testament (“the eternal Book of Books”) in the Israeli Declaration is couched in terms of something the Jewish people gave the world. And, though the English version of the Tel Aviv document contained on the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs web site has the proclamation concluding with the words “Placing our trust in the Almighty” the document actually reads “Placing our trust in the Rock of Israel.” This statement, obviously, could be read in a secular as well as religious fashion. In either case, the blessings flowing from the covenant are clearly implied. Deprived by history of its independence and a state that could protect its interests, the Jewish people as “outsiders” had suffered greatly. The “redemption of Israel” through the establishment of a

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state would change that historic equation, while its failure would condemn the people to remain on the tortured path that had marked its past. Also, unlike the American Declaration, the proclamation in Tel Aviv makes reference to the actual institutions of governance from the role played by the People’s Council as the provisional government to the idea of an elected constituent assembly charged with the creation of a constitution. In fact, right on the heels of proclaiming independence in Tel Aviv, the new state immediately passed its first legislative act called the Manifesto. This was done, according to Gutmann, because legal authorities noted that the independence proclamation “amounted to a public proclamation and was not an authentic legislative act.” 42 The Manifesto thus filled in the gaps in order to prevent legal chaos and to establish clear lines of authority in the new state already under military attack and without an established legislative body on the order of America’s Continental Congress. As for the constitution called for in the proclamation, it remains a document still unwritten. Instead, Israel would follow the piecemeal path of passing, over time, a series of Basic Laws. And, in several of those laws dealing with human dignity and freedom, the principles contained in key sections of the independence proclamation have themselves been granted status as law. In fact, as a key symbol of the nation, the Tel Aviv Declaration from almost the very beginning of the state was viewed in constitutional, or, at least, quasiconstitutional terms by Israeli courts because it embodied “the aspirations of the people and its fundamental credo.” 43 Of course, the unity reflected in Israel’s modern covenant did not erase the significant conflicts existing among those giving their consent to the document. Just as the American Declaration papered over differences so too did Israel’s Declaration of Independence. In both cases, that which divided those who had united would continue to resonate in compelling and divisive fashion.

APPLES, ORANGES AND ABRAHAM LINCOLN As America moved through the 19th century, the Philadelphia Declaration proclaiming independence found new expression in the thought and action of Abraham Lincoln, who claimed that all of his political sentiments had their source in the document. In Andrew Delbanco’s words: Lincoln decided that the authentic Thomas Jefferson was the man who wrote that “all men are created equal.” The document that meant everything to him…was the Declaration of Independence. By the end of his life he saw himself as having been appointed to complete the 44 promise that Jefferson had left unfulfilled.

42

Ibid, p. 6 Yoram Hazony, The Jewish State (New York: Basic Books, 2000), p. 343. Also see Pnina Lahav, Judgment in Jerusalem: Chief Justice Simon Agranat and the Zionist Century (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 91-95 and 189-192; and George Gross, “The Constitutional Question in Israel” in Daniel Elazar (ed.), Constitutionalim: The Israeli and American Experiences (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1990), pp. 75-76 and 79-83 44 Andrew Delbanco, The Real American Dream (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 73 43

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In Proverbs (25:11) King Solomon says “A word to the wise fitly spoken is like an apple of gold in a silver fitting.” In words that never found their way into his public utterances, Lincoln observed that, for America, the “apple of gold” was the Declaration, while the Union and the Constitution represented the “picture of silver, subsequently framed around it. The picture was made for the apple – not the apple for the picture.” 45 In short, “the word to the wise fitly spoken,” for Lincoln, were the words of the nation’s founding covenant, the Declaration. When comparing America’s “apple of gold” to Israel’s Declaration of Independence, not surprisingly, we see both similarities and differences. It can be argued that the differences make the comparison a matter of apples and oranges. From this perspective, beyond the purpose of proclaiming liberty, the two documents travel on fundamentally different paths. And yet, the similarities allow for a different perspective as well. According to this alternate viewpoint, the covenant apples may have distinct colorings and flavors, but they are both apples nonetheless. Often, the two perspectives are blended together in marble-cake fashion. Gary Jacobson, for example, argues in his book Apple of Gold that the revolutionary experience of Israel, and the United States “produced independence proclamations that reveal both the animating ideals of their respective regimes, and the likely directions that their paths of constitutional development would take.” He then adds that “Important differences are to be found here, but there is also considerable overlap; the paths, in other words, are not destined to reach diametrically opposed constitutional destinations.” 46 Several of those differences appear rather obvious. While America’s document begins with a universalistic, statement of individual rights, Israel’s proclamation affirms something more parochial, more collective, the birth, the plight, and the Zionist redemption of a particular people. As Daniel Elazar notes, “The American Declaration addresses itself to the universal natural rights of men while the Israeli declaration, reaffirming those rights, emphasizes the particularities of Jewish history.” Continuing, he writes “the American Declaration clearly reflects the synthesis between the covenantal and the political compact traditions (‘nature and nature’s God’),” while “the Israeli Declaration clearly shows the tension and synthesis between covenant and kinship.”47 For America, the independence document declared a separation of its still undefined people from the British. For Israel, the independence proclamation reaffirmed the unity, and the communal destiny of the long established nation of the Jews. 48 Additionally, the former did so, the argument goes, in individual terms (the unalienable rights of all men) while the latter focused on the collective (“the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate”). Such legitimate distinctions, however, do not obviate the points of commonality.

45

Gary Jacobsohn, Apple of Gold (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 246. The Fragment is available on line at www.ashbrook.org and in Roy Basler (ed.), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Volume 4 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), pp. 168-169. Also see Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism, p.17 46 Jacobsohn, Apple of Gold, p. 6. 47 Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism, p. 234 48 Ibid. At the time of the Tel Aviv Declaration, the size of Jewish settlement in Palestine was approximately 600,000 people or approximately 25 per cent the size of the colonial population in America at the time of independence

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After all, the Declaration issued in Philadelphia speaks of the necessity produced by history (“the Course of human events”) for “one People to dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them to another.” And, in fact, doesn’t the Tel Aviv proclamation speak of something quite similar. To use the language of 1776, the document refers to the necessity produced by history for one people to dissolve the bands that have tied them to suffering and destruction at the hands of others. True, the 1948 declaration is couched in terms of the restoration of independence rather than its creation (with an eye toward the future) as in the American case. Yet, ultimately, both documents lay claim to the right of their respective peoples (each of whom had established their own covenant) to occupy a sovereign state, and by so doing assume “the separate and equal Station” that will allow them “to be masters of their own fate.” Additionally, both documents declare to the world the causes that impel them to the action taken. For America, the facts summoned are found in the list of charges against King George III and England. It is such particulars that create the environment, the necessity, for invoking the universal principles and truths articulated. For Israel, the charges are broader and more universal. Still, its historic (and natural law) claim to a right of “national rebirth” is made necessary by the flow of history, by the specific “Course of human Events,” as well as desire. The American colonies would claim that their “patient Sufferance” made their actions necessary after “a long Train of Abuses.” And, when it came to patient suffering and abuse, who would claim that the founders in Philadelphia had a better case to make than did the founders in Tel Aviv? The particular, and the universal, are blended together more than they are separated, with each element existing in both documents rather than being relegated to only one of them. Certainly, there is nothing in the Philadelphia plan to match the emphasis in the Tel Aviv proclamation on the ingathering of exiles, defined in kinship terms. But then, Americans were in the process of becoming, not in the process of being reconstituted. Even this fact, however, does not erase the interconnections that exist. While the American Declaration exhibits “many of the characteristics of the classical biblical covenant at Sinai,” the Israeli Declaration (which reclaims that covenant), in turn, includes many of the characteristics of the Philadelphia proclamation updated, of course, for the 20th century. 49 It thus contains the assurance of equality in social and political rights, as well as freedom of religion and conscience, and the promise of freedom, justice and peace “as envisioned by the prophets of Israel.” Though reference to the prophets strikes a strange and particularistic chord, it can also be viewed as a substitute “for the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” that guide the American Declaration. Here we should not forget that the first paragraph of Israel’s independence document notes that the “cultural values” generated through the original covenant have universal as well as national significance. And, the very covenant tradition that develops in America (and is expressed in the Declaration of Independence) stands as a witness to that universal element.

49

Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism, p. 50

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Furthermore, both documents serve to remind us that a covenant serves other purposes than the establishment of a specific form of government. It is not, after all, a constitution. 50 Ironically, the Tel Aviv proclamation, unlike its American counterpart, contains a specific provision referring to a constitution for the state that will be adopted by October 1, 1948. Well over a half century has passed and no such picture of silver has ever emerged. So, while Lincoln argued that the constitutional picture of silver “was made for the apple, not the apple for the picture,” Israel turned its apple into the picture itself, granting portions of the Declaration a kind of constitutional status in a land without a written constitution. If the judicial interpretation of laws should occur in light of a stated national vision, and the core values associated with that vision, then what better picture existed of that vision and values than the words contained in the Tel Aviv Declaration. 51 This leads us to one of the most telling differences between the paths staked out in Philadelphia and Tel Aviv, with the former leading to a system of federalism while the later followed the road toward a unitary state. Though Israel was the original home of the covenant, the development of Zionism in Europe gave the new independent nation a decidedly state-centric tinge, leaving, in Elazar’s words, little room “for the kind of individual initiative represented by the covenantal tradition.” 52 That tradition, in many ways, would fare better in its adopted American home. Finally, mention needs to be made of the direct role of religion in the twin documents. On the surface, again, the image is one of difference given the very idea of Israel proclaiming itself to be a Jewish state while America’s proclamation contains no such overt reference to any religious denomination. 53 Yet that is not really the case. Golda Meir relates how the People’s Council met on the morning prior to the signing of the independence document. It was at that meeting, on the day the British mandate over Palestine ended, that the name of the new state was finally agreed upon. In her words: The name was less of a problem than the declaration because there was a last-minute argument about the inclusion of a reference to God…The very last sentence, as finally submitted to the small subcommittee charged with producing the final version of the proclamation, began with the words “With trust in the Rock of Israel, we set our hands in witness to his Proclamation…” Ben-Gurion had hoped that the phrase “Rock of Israel” was sufficiently ambiguous to satisfy those Jews for whom it was inconceivable that the document which established the Jewish state should not contain any reference to God, as well as those who were certain to object strenuously to even the least hint of clericalism in the proclamation. 54 While Ben-Gurion’s compromise eventually won out, it did not do so without a fight. Religious parties wanted an unequivocal reference to God and those with a strong secular perspective were just as adamant in the other direction. Ben-Gurion was able to keep the ambiguous balance he sought by successfully convincing both sides they could read what they wanted into the statement. It could certainly signify God and it could equally be seen as a

50

Ibid. Gutmann, “The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel,” pp. 8-12. 52 Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism, p. 235 53 See Alan Dershowitz, America Declares Independence (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2003), pp. 9-84. 54 Meir, My Life, p. 223 51

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secular, symbolic reference to the strength of the people. 55 That was a debate that would not sound strange to those hammering out the American Declaration in Philadelphia.

CONCLUSION: ON RECTITUDE AND INTENTIONS In his brief “apple of gold” fragment, Abraham Lincoln, who stated his covenantal ideas with biblical “language and cadences,” noted that “No oppressed people will fight, and endure, as our fathers did, without the promise of something better than a mere change of masters.” 56 It is that promise which found expression in the American Declaration of Independence just as it did in the independence proclamation issued in Tel Aviv 172 years later. Both the representatives of the United States of America assembled in Congress or the members of the People’s Council representing the Jewish community in the land of Israel; and, the Zionist movement embarked on a course which seemed likely to succeed. But, embark they did with a willingness to fight and endure, armed not only with weapons but a covenantal faith that supported the rectitude of their intentions. It was for that the representatives mutually pledged their lives, their fortunes and their honor. Of course, not everyone agreed with the rightness of those intentions. In American, colonists who remained loyal to Britain and its king went north to Canada and England fought to maintain the colonies. In the Middle East, despite the independence proclamation’s conciliatory rhetoric and reliance on the legitimacy given Israel by the United Nations, the creation of the new state fueled the animosity resounding through Arab lands, and war followed to try and erase what had just been established. Beyond that, the two founding covenants contained sentiments more noble than many of the actions carried out in their name. While all men might be created equal and endowed with inalienable rights, America after the Declaration still countenanced slavery. And the promise of “full and equal citizenship” for the Arab inhabitants of Israel in the Tel Aviv proclamation remained a dream unfulfilled. Both nations, in short, would commit many “unoriginal” sins. 57 And yet, each would also have its covenantal standard against which to measure its actions and its failings. If there is nothing original about sin, there is surely something original about admitting to its existence and striving to meet its challenge in the search for a more perfect order. The covenant

55

Ibid and Walzer et. al. (eds.), The Jewish Political Tradition, pp. 491-493. Still, as previously noted, numerous references to the Tel Aviv Declaration substitute “Almighty” for “Rock,” including Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre’s O Jerusalem (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), p. 410 56 Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism, p. 127. The statement concerning “a mere change in masters” is from the Lincoln’s “Fragment on the Constitution and Union.” 57 On unoriginal sin, see Jeff Spinner-Halev, “Unoriginal Sin: Zionism and Democratic Exclusion in Comparative Perspective,” Israel Studies Forum (Fall 2002), Vol. 18, No.1.

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tradition, which involves more than a changing of masters, is an important part of that search. It is the bronze plate that holds in place the apple of gold framed in silver.

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 425-436

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

BEYOND MATERNALISM: WOMEN AND THE SPACES OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Marsha Marotta ABSTRACT The story of Zoë Baird’s failed nomination to be the first woman U.S. attorney general exposes underlying discourses that help construct the spaces of political leadership with a double standard for men and women. The discourses view women’s actual or potential motherhood as trumping other aspects of their identity, understand mothers as responsible for children, and assume that responsibility cannot be fulfilled outside a particular set of spaces. A maternalist strategy reinforces these discourses, tending to relegate mothers to a particular space in politics rather than politics writ large. Contesting these discourses to move beyond maternalism will help pave the way for the first woman president.

INTRODUCTION When part of the contents of a 500-page FBI report was leaked to The New York Times in January 1993 showing that Zoë Baird hired illegal immigrants to provide child care and other duties and did not pay Social Security taxes for them, it created a firestorm that derailed Baird’s nomination for U.S. Attorney General. Public opinion measured by polls, calls to members of Congress, and radio talk shows blasted Baird for her “criminal” behavior. There was a lot of talk at the time about class resentment – after all, Baird reportedly earned more than $500,000 a year. Critics charged that she could have found an American to do the job if she had only been willing to pay the price, that she must have considered herself above the law, that she would not have the confidence of the people to be the nation’s top law enforcement official. But clearly there was more going on than class resentment or trust, even more going on than fear of illegal immigrants. This also was very much about the changing roles of men and women – and the possibilities for mothers with daily responsibilities for children to enter the spaces of political leadership. It became clear that the price Baird and other mothers paid went far beyond dollars per hour. Why else, for example, would several men face the same problem at virtually the same time and survive, including two cabinet level appointments and two Supreme Court justices, especially without any expression of class resentment. And why else would then-President

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Bill Clinton drop Kimba Wood after announcing he would nominate her in Baird’s place – when Wood, who hired undocumented domestic workers before it was illegal to do so and had paid all taxes, had broken no written law. The unwritten law she broke was to step outside the prescribed spaces for mothers with young children. I remind you of this story of a failed nomination to highlight the underlying discourses that say mothers of young children do not belong in the highest spaces of political leadership. These discourses are revealed in Senate hearing testimony, news reports, editorials, letters to the editor, talk radio, and public opinion polls. And they continue to exist today: When President Bush included in his second-term cabinet Margaret Spellings as Secretary of Education, National Public Radio and The Washington Post were among the news outlets that listed among her primary identifications that she was the mother of four.1 I do not have to tell you that fatherhood has never been listed as an identity or credential associated with a U.S. cabinet position. Until we contest and transform the discourses of politics and the discourses of motherhood, very few mothers with minor children will be considered eligible for the highest offices – leaving a double standard for men and women candidates. I use discourses plural because several exist simultaneously. In documents surrounding the Zoë Baird nomination, for example, the discourses came from liberal Democrats, conservative Republicans, working class women, middle class women, and more. While the details vary somewhat, what they all have in common is that they reflect attitudes that mothers are nonpolitical beings and less than ideal workers.2 At the heart of this is the assumption that mothers are responsible for children and cannot carry out that responsibility outside a particular set of spaces. When they do venture outside those spaces, the assumption is that they do so incompletely, always with one foot in what I call MotherSpace.3 I use the example of Zoë Baird and her Senate Judiciary Committee hearing not only because she was the first woman nominated for U.S. Attorney General, but also because she was the first mother with daily responsibilities for a young child to be nominated to such a high-level position. Before Baird, and to a great extent since, most of the women in top leadership positions either had no children or grown children. Clinton’s third nominee for attorney general, confirmed 98-0, was Janet Reno: 6’2”, single, and at 54 not likely to have any children.4 Further, Baird represents a new generation of political leader nominated by the first Baby Boomer president. Yet the tenacious discourses still prevailed. Even though Baird 1

These are just two of many examples. In The Washington Post article by Michael Dobbs (Nov. 18, 2004, p. A37), the second paragraph is a quote from Republican political consultant Mary Matalin calling Spellings a “multitasker” who survives “grueling 12-hour days while juggling her responsibilities to two young children.” Bush called her “a tough babe” in that article, and the article notes that Spellings described herself in 2001 as “an earth-mother type of Republican.” The White House announcement of her confirmation said, “As the mother of two school-age daughters, Spellings has a special understanding of the issues facing students today” (www.whitehouse.gov/government/spellings-bio.html). 2 In her book Why So Slow? The Advancement of Women (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999), Virginia Valian reported that supervisors see high success as less compatible with women than men. This is kept in place by attributing high success not to abilities but to hard work (129). See also Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Family and Work Conflict and What to do About it (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), who reports that jobs requiring extensive overtime exclude 93 percent of women because of their family responsibilities. 3 See Marsha Marotta, “MotherSpace: Disciplining through the Material and the Discursive” in Caroline Wiedmer and Sarah Hardy eds., Motherhood and Space: Configurations of the Maternal through Politics, Home and Body (London: Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming 2005). 4 Janet Reno was widely described at the time as masculine-looking and as a tough prosecutor, made of steel, and she proclaimed publicly at the time of her nomination that she rejects the label of feminist. Reno illustrates the claim that women who enter traditionally male spaces often become masculinized – something more difficult to achieve for mothers.

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did not use her motherhood to get nominated, she and others invoked it during the hearings and it was used against her to spoil her nomination. The spaces of political leadership, constructed as masculine, could not accommodate her. The discourses of leadership could not accommodate her. And the discourses of motherhood and maternalism could not accommodate her. 5

MATERNALISM AND SPACES Any examination of women and political leadership shows that motherhood has served as a credential for leadership mainly through its link to a higher sense of morality. From Jane Addams’ speeches in the early 1900s in the Votes-for-Women Movement, to U.S. Sen. Patty Murray’s claims in 1992 to be “just a mom in tennis shoes,” to Margaret Spellings tendency in 2004 to preface comments with the phrase “As a mother,” many women have succeeded in politics by calling attention to their connection to children and often claiming this as a standing to get votes.6 It is no wonder then that Zoë Baird and her supporters apparently thought it made sense to play the maternalist card to try to save her nomination. Maternalism as a strategy fits comfortably with the assumption that mothers are primarily responsible for children. Yet mothers have not had this responsibility for most of history.7 All the same, contemporary cultural scripts that continue this association are powerful, and these discourses from several different directions work to keep mothers out of the highest spaces of political leadership. In doing so, they make acceptable a double standard for men and women candidates for those spaces. Central to my argument is that we should examine maternalism as a political strategy, and the discourses surrounding spaces, in a new way. We can do this by making these familiar concepts strange, seeing them in a new light, so that they can be examined critically.8 The goal is to open up possibilities for other ways of thinking about political strategies and spaces – what we might call making the strange familiar, placing it more firmly in our imaginations. This can be a profitable tactic for feminist political thought and action. The maternalist strategy claims a public role for women based on their private role as mothers, idealizing the power of maternal love to transform the world. It highlights tenderness, warmth, and affection. On the positive side, this strategy makes it possible for

5

This story, like all political stories out of Washington, has several layers of intrigue, each revealing more discourses. For example, liberal Democrats were assumed to have leaked the damning information to The New York Times; feminist groups reportedly had been pushing for the Washington, D.C. lawyer Brooksley Born for attorney general and were lukewarm at best toward Baird; conservative Republicans and especially the Judiciary Committee’s ranking Republican Orrin Hatch of Utah supported Baird despite the criticisms, warmed by her experience in corporate America; and Bill Clinton, who had repeatedly “gone public” during the campaign when he faced problems, refused to stand up for Baird when the controversy erupted. 6 Jane Addams, “The Larger Aspects of the Women’s Movement,” Annals of the American Academy, 1914, and “Why Women Should Vote,” in Frances M. Borkman and Annie G. Poritt, eds., Woman Suffrage: History, Arguments, and Results (New York: National Woman Suffrage Publishing, 1915). Patty Murray used the moniker “just a mom in tennis shoes” when she ran for U.S. Senate for Washington State in 1992. 7 See, for example, Philippe Aries, Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962). 8 The strategy of making the familiar strange apparently began in literary and critical theory but has been adopted in many fields including education and engineering.

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mothers to gain political clout and achieve goals that might not be possible otherwise.9 It draws media attention, and it has given many women a more powerful sense of self that has the potential to be useful elsewhere in their lives. But I argue that maternalism has tended to put mothers in a particular space in politics rather than in politics writ large. We can see that for example, in the types of cabinet positions to which women have tended to be named: labor (six), health and human services (three), and education, housing, and commerce (two each). That is, half of the 22 women who have held traditional cabinet positions have been named to the “helping” departments.10 This includes Margaret Spellings, whose appointment last year places her in a department whose business – education of children – has long been linked with mothers. The maternalist strategy has tended to reinforce notions of women’s inequality because it places women in a different political space from men. It suggests we need to listen to mothers only when they address issues having to do with children or care taking, and makes women less appealing candidates during times of war or other strife. At the same time, it tends to overlook differences among mothers. For example, maternalism is associated with upper class, Christian, white women’s activities. When privileged as a route into politics for women, it tends to exalt motherhood and exclude racial and ethnic minority women, and women who do not have children. I argue that it is time to move beyond the maternalist strategy – that is, to reconceive the spaces of motherhood and the spaces of political leadership so they can overlap, creating an equally acceptable alternative route to women entering politics. Like the “mommy track” at work, a maternalist strategy might work for some but it should not be the only “choice.” One way to approach such a change is to examine the discursive spaces of political leadership and their relationship to the discursive spaces of motherhood.11 What we will see is that these are not a comfortable fit. Great investments have been made in discourses that establish political space as masculine – calling for an image of power and strength, and favoring military experience, for example. Investments also have been made to relegate mothers to particular spaces outside of politics – home, schools, and other spaces occupied by children, reinforcing mothers’ locations there as well as expectations that mothers practice self-discipline and self-sacrifice. These discursive spaces have played a key role in creating and sustaining power relations involving mothers. I have argued elsewhere that the very spaces mothers inhabit contribute to the construction of who mothers are and what they can imagine for themselves.12 The discursive spaces of motherhood and the discursive spaces of politics are nearly mutually exclusive – making it not only more difficult for mothers to enter 9

A good example of successful campaigns can be found in “Maternalism Redefined: Gender, the State, and the Politics of Daycare, 1945-1962” in Gender and Society, Vol. 14, No. 5, 608-629 (2000). 10 Another eight women have held appointments that were treated as cabinet level at the time but are not among the 13 traditional cabinet positions. 11 Kathleen B. Jones in Compassionate Authority: Democracy and the Representation of Women (Routledge, 1993) insists that rather than try to remove obstacles to women being in authority, or integrate women into politics, what we need to do is challenge the terms of authority (11). “Contemporary scholars … have developed methodologies designed to describe and explain women’s political behavior within the framework of an epistemology that provides, at best, only a partial and distorted view of political life,” according to Jones (20). Also, see Freeman, Bourque, and Shelton, eds., Women on Power: Leadership Redefined (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2001). 12 See Marsha Marotta, “Time, Space, and Motherhoods” in Constance Mui and Julien Murphy, eds., Gender Struggles: Practical Approaches to Contemporary Feminism (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 276294.

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the spaces of political leadership, but more difficult for mothers and others even to imagine mothers there. Zoë Baird’s 60-plus-hour-a week, $500,000-a-year job excluded her from the discursive spaces of motherhood and maternalism, but her motherhood excluded her from the discursive spaces of political leadership. Space is political on a material level in that it is one way we physically organize home, work, school, sports, leisure, commerce, politics, arts, and other activities in our lives. The material or built spaces of high national political leadership – the White House, Supreme Court, halls of Congress – are bounded and visible, and serve as limits to both movements and behaviors. Space is also political on a discursive level as we learn from language and interpretation ideas about the way we can live our daily lives and the practices we can engage in as we do so. That is, discursive spaces complete the function of material or built spaces, making them inhabitable and alive. Discourses produced by institutions or “experts” communicate to the occupants of a space what should or should not be done there, what practices are acceptable there, setting normative expectations for that historical moment. But ideologies change over time and normative expectations may be defied. Therefore, renegotiation of space and its role in creating power relations is always possible. Like so many other aspects of culture, the particular ways these discursive spaces are organized and the ways our lives are implicated in them, are contestable.

THE CONTEXT OF A CABINET NOMINATION In the 228 years since the first cabinet was formed, women have held 22 cabinet appointments, beginning with Frances Perkins named as Labor Secretary in 1933 by Franklin Delano Roosevelt.13 Another eight women have held appointments to departments or agencies not traditionally part of the cabinet but considered cabinet level at the time. But if you look at first appointments only, for the moment putting aside replacement appointments, presidents have named 11 women to traditional cabinet level posts, and six women to positions raised to cabinet level at the time. The literature on cabinet appointments makes a distinction between first appointments and replacement appointments, identifying the former as the more significant acts with a stronger message about who they are as presidents.14 When Bill

13

This includes two women who headed two different departments. The next cabinet appointments to go to women were in 1953 by Eisenhower and 1977 by Carter. Reagan did not name any women among his first appointments, while George H.W. Bush named one in 1983. Clinton named three and George W. Bush named five if we count departments raised to cabinet level. Of these, only Christie Todd Whitman had young children, but as former governor of New Jersey she possessed her own political capital when she got to Washington. All of the statistics in this section are from the website of the Center for American Women and Politics at Rutgers University, which can be found at www.cawp.rutgers.edu/facts 14 Anthony J. Bennett, The American President’s Cabinet: From Kennedy to Bush (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Appointments Process: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000). Until recently, it has not been easy to determine these specifics because most treatments of cabinet appointments – even those through the Clinton Administration – have no listing for women, female, gender or related terms in the index, and virtually no gender analysis. This confirms the conclusions of, among others, Georgia Duerst-Lahti and Rita Mae Kelly who, in their edited collection Gender Power, Leadership, and Governance (University of Michigan Press, 1995) say that even though women are clearly disadvantaged in what they call the domain of leadership and governance, “most analyses of political leadership continue to ignore gender” (5). As feminist theorists have pointed out, defining the political terrain in genderless terms obscures the ways in which women are excluded (Jones, 1988:11).

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Clinton nominated Zoë Baird as attorney general, only six women before her had been named to traditional cabinet positions as a first appointment, and none as attorney general. The literature makes it clear that, even if the cabinet has declined in importance as White House staff has increased in size and importance, it still matters who is in the cabinet. Cabinet members still wield considerable power – through advising the president, setting agendas, and managing their departments. For example, at the time of Baird’s nomination the Attorney General managed the Justice Department’s 91,000 employees which included the FBI, DEA, INS, U.S. Marshal Service, Bureau of Prisons, and U.S. Attorneys. As noted in testimony during Baird’s hearing, there were no women among the 342 senior executives at the Justice Department as of September 1991. Not only does the Clinton Administration mark a generational change in the White House, but Clinton promised to name a cabinet that looked more like America and he promised to name a woman attorney general. When Clinton accepted – news reports suggest he requested – Baird’s withdrawal after two days of hearings, at least 11 senators had said publicly that they would not vote for her. Clinton also reportedly had received phone calls from Joe Biden, D-DE, chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, suggesting the nomination was in trouble. Yet Clinton did not choose to fight for Baird. He apparently made no phone calls to save her nomination. And perhaps most important for our purposes here, he did not try to influence the way people were thinking about her so-called “nanny problem.” He (and others) had an opportunity to contest the discourses, to reshape the spaces of political leadership, and did not take it. A Senate rejection of Baird’s nomination would have been enormously embarrassing for Clinton. It had only been four years since the most recent cabinet nominee had been rejected by the Senate – John Tower for Secretary of Defense in 1989. Tower’s rejection because of substantiated reports of alcohol abuse, womanizing, and personal and financially profitable relationships with defense contractors was considered a classic fight between a Republican president and a Senate controlled by Democrats, and a settling of old scores against both Tower and George H. W. Bush.15 Yet Baird’s case was very different. There was no political score to settle. This fight was on another level and, as we will see, plunged to a level rarely reached for a nominee in a confirmation hearing. The invasion of privacy was intense in Clarence Thomas’ confirmation hearings for the U.S. Supreme Court but never against Thomas, only against Anita Hill.16 In the Baird case, the division between what was considered public and what was considered private again was divided on gender lines, but the target was the nominee herself. To place the discourses surrounding the Baird nomination in context I examined the growing literature on space, presidential cabinets, and women in political leadership. For the discourses themselves I examined a number of documents including Senate Judiciary 15

16

Anthony J. Bennett, The American President’s Cabinet: From Kennedy to Bush (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 115. Dorothy Helly and Susan Reverby say in Gendered Domains (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992) that Clarence Thomas was able to draw the line of privacy beyond which the male members of the committee tacitly agreed not to go, but the same senators felt no limits on their right to question Anita Hill far beyond the bounds of privacy. “In fact, they speculated in public about her sanity, her fantasies, her ambitions, and her conduct toward others inside and outside of work,” the authors report, making it clear that what was considered public and what was considered private would be divided along gender lines (23). Their analysis of the Thomas hearings came less than two years before Baird’s hearing, and the chair and many members of the Senate Judiciary Committee were the same.

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Committee hearing transcripts for Baird as well William Barr and Janet Reno, the attorney general nominees directly before and after her. I also looked at major newspaper news and editorial coverage of these nominations; the short-lived nomination of Kimba Wood; and public opinion poll results on Baird, Wood and Reno. What becomes clear from these documents is that this is not a matter of women needing to be more vigilant, as suggested by some of the commentators at the time. Clearly, the men who had not paid taxes on domestic help at around the same time were not vigilant and were excused. The cabinet members were Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and Transportation Secretary Frederico Pena, for whom the tax payment issue was not raised until after they were safely confirmed. The Supreme Court Justices were David Souter and Stephen Breyer, both excused after they weathered light winds that surrounded the questions on their failure to pay proper taxes on domestic help. Although Charles Ruff was considered and then dropped as a potential nominee for Attorney General because he had not paid proper taxes on domestic employees, it was not until Linda Chavez was exposed as having hired and harbored an illegal immigrant that this issue led to another withdrawal. Chavez, who had been critical of Baird during her ordeal, withdrew from her nomination as Labor Secretary in George W. Bush’s first term before hearings started. Chavez, who has four children, was replaced with Elaine Chao, who had none. Instead of women not being vigilant enough, this is a matter of women being held to a different standard, a higher standard that links them with children and household help directly while it distances men from these things. It distances women from the White House while it links men directly with the highest spaces of political leadership. To claim that women need to be more vigilant is to add to the discourses that say mothers belong in MotherSpace. The discourses insist that there is no substitute for maternal care (except in certain cases having to do with class or race, including being on welfare). This was made clear when senate questioners ignored Baird’s statements that her husband, Paul Gewirtz, a law professor at Yale, often spent time during the day with their son because of the professor’s more flexible schedule. The senators persisted with questions that focused on how much time she spent with her child or at work. In fact, the Senate judiciary hearing testimony offers a clear and poignant example of the dissonance created when mothers try to enter the spaces of political leadership. For this reason, and because of limited time, I will focus here on the discourses the hearings reveal. The kinds of questions posed to Baird during her nomination hearings are more personal, in fact relentlessly personal, than the questions posed to Barr and Reno. These include questions about her “typical day” – when she left the house in the morning, and when she got back – and the values of the people in her neighborhood.17 The questions and comments use sports metaphors that help define the space as masculine, and birth metaphors that help distinguish Baird as feminine. As such, her voice is suspect. There are lots of examples, but I will highlight just a few today that set the tone for the hearings.

17

Congressional Record, Senate Judiciary Hearing, Jan.21, 1993, p. 13.

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DISSONANCE THAT ENDED IN FAILURE Biden tells Baird in his opening remarks, “this is big league baseball,” warning her about the arduous process of the hearings.18 He repeatedly interrupts her, asks the same questions over and over, and seems not to hear many of her answers. It was big league baseball and he was the umpire, making the calls with the understanding that nothing happens without his consent, no testimony is admitted without his approval.19 Later in the hearings other senators refer to “softball” and “hardball” questions and make analogies that do not fit Baird’s characterization of the matter, showing they have not listened to or do not accept her responses to their questions.20 Committee members report that they have made their own phone calls to Baird’s attorneys and might have to call them and her husband to testify – that is, conveying that her word is not enough and will have to be supplemented by the words of men.21 No such comments were made at the other hearings. As chair, Biden asks questions first, and his first question is about the hiring of the childcare providers. When Baird explains that her husband, with the advice of immigration attorneys, did the actual hiring of the Peruvian couple, applied for green cards for them and put in escrow all appropriate taxes, with the understanding that the INS did not prosecute or even pursue such violations of the law, and that it was not possible to pay social security taxes for someone who did not have a social security number, Biden says, “It is amazing, the ability of the human condition to rationalize, to justify.…”22 He asks her what she paid the couple (the going rate in her area), suggesting that she was trying to save money by hiring them. He notes at least twice that, after his wife’s death in an accident, he was a single parent and he knows how hard it is to deal with childcare issues. Through his comments about being a single parent, he establishes himself as an authority on the question of childcare and diminishes her authority.23 Baird is introduced by, among others, U.S. Rep. Rosa de Lauro, D-CT, who emphasizes that no matter how busy Baird is with her demanding career, she always makes time for family, friends, and community.24 De Lauro and others make it clear that Baird is a committed mother and wife – what we might term the “don’t worry” discourse, as in “don’t worry, we’ll still do our duties as wives and mothers.” In this case, Baird might be trying to step out of traditional MotherSpace, but she will keep one foot in there. One of the others who introduces Baird is Sen. Patty Murray, D-WA, whose well-known description of herself as “just a mom in tennis shoes” also links Baird with her motherhood.

18

Senate Judiciary hearing, Jan. 19, 1993, p. 3. There is a classic story in journalism about levels of interpretation: the first umpire says some are balls and some are strikes, and he calls them as they are (not acknowledging any interpretation); the second umpire says he calls them as he sees them (acknowledging that there is some room for interpretation); and the third umpire says they’re not anything until he calls them (acknowledging the power of his position to name and to interpret). 20 Senate Judiciary hearing, Jan. 19, 1993, p. 18. In one example from this session, Sen. Alan Simpson, R-WYO, shifts the context, comparing her violation with a man who builds a fence that violates zoning laws, taking the chance that the sheriff, the only enforcer, will not find out (p.4). 21 See especially Sen. Arlen Specter, R-PA, Senate Judiciary hearing, Jan. 19, 1993, p. 13-14. 22 Senate Judiciary hearing, Jan. 19, 1993, p. 13. By the time of her nomination, Baird had paid all back taxes as well as a $2,900 civil fine. 23 Senate Judiciary hearing, Jan. 19, 1993, p. 15. 24 Senate Judiciary hearing, Jan. 19, 1993, p. 6. 19

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Baird taps motherhood discourse, using a birth metaphor for a nonprofit corporation she started, which is to provide evidence of her community service. Also she repeatedly prefaces comments with, “As a mother…” including, “As the mother of a three year old, I can particularly appreciate the passion and the anger about the day-to-day terror of crime in America, whether urban, suburban or even rural.”25 Perhaps most to the point is the line oftrepeated at the time: “Quite honestly, I was acting at that time really more as a mother than as someone who would be sitting here designated to be Attorney General.” Here she summons the mantle of maternalism, the closest she comes to trying to excuse her actions.26 She links herself with mothers; she links mothers with children; and she separates mothers from political leadership. Later that first morning of the hearings, Sen. Howard Metzenbaum, D-OH, noting that he had received phone calls from 50 constituents, all against her, said, “So I think you carry a burden not alone upon your own shoulders but for all the women of this country….”27 He does not define what he means by burden, nor why she bears it. And clearly, when men are questioned, they do not represent all men. Further, the senators appear reluctant to accept Baird’s answers; they do not acknowledge any power or authority in her voice. They ask the same questions repeatedly. In fact, Biden – who was chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee for all three hearings – announces immediately in his opening comments only in the Baird hearing that he is not sure he can vote in favor of the candidate. It is the only one of the three hearings in which he questions the candidate about how many hours a day she spends at work and at home. Neither Biden nor other senators asked Barr or Reno personal questions. The committee members are presented to the hearing by seniority, with the chair going first. That means that although the committee includes women members for the first time – Dianne Feinstein, D-CA, and Carol Mosley-Braun, D-IL – the women make comments and ask questions last. Feinstein is particularly hard on Baird, vilifying the nominee for her actions. Feinstein has the opportunity to influence how Americans think about the spaces of political leadership as gendered, but instead repeatedly questions whether Baird is tough enough, whether she can go after crime “like a tiger.”28 She ends up sounding as skeptical as most of the male senators that a woman can do the job. In fact, an article about Feinstein in The Los Angeles Times ten days later describes her performance: “as if determined to prove a woman could be tough on a woman and a nominee of her own party, [she] provided the most pointed and indeed most unfriendly questioning of the hearings.”29 Feinstein acts, in bell hooks’ terms, like many black men and white women who enter leadership positions: following the existing patriarchal and autocratic model.30 Further, Feinstein suggests that Baird’s failing might be less about violating the law than about being a mother in distress, reiterating the discourses that separate mothers from political 25

Senate Judiciary hearing, Jan. 19, 1993, p.8. Senate Judiciary hearing, Jan. 19, 1993, p. 14. 27 Senate Judiciary hearing, Jan. 19, 1993, p. 23. 28 Senate Judiciary hearing, Jan. 21, 1993, p. 13-15. 29 Robert Scheer, “Los Angeles Times Interview: Dianne Feinstein,” The Los Angeles Times, Jan. 31, 1993. 30 “bell hooks: in Conversation with Deborah Gray White, Charlotte Bunch, and Harriet Davidson” in Mary S. Hartman, ed., Talking Leadership: Conversations with Powerful Women (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1999), p. 99-116. hooks urges a redefinition of leadership, especially as it intersects with gender and race. “The whole paradigm for leadership, black and white, is based on a patriarchal and autocratic 26

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leadership . “I think it is important… for me to understand the situation that you found yourself in as a working mother – not in legal terms, but in human terms.”31 Yet she makes no use of this information except to suggest that Baird had only one foot in the spaces of political leadership. Strom Thurmond, R-SC, who had just turned 90, and who welcomed the new male members of the committee as Senator So-and-so and the new female members as Ms. So-andso, grills Baird like a father might a little girl. This is part of one exchange: THURMOND: Now, as I understand, you admit you did wrong. Is that correct? BAIRD: Yes. THURMOND: You’re sorry you did wrong? BAIRD: Absolutely. THURMOND: You’re repentant for doing wrong? BAIRD: Yes, sir. THURMOND: You won’t do it again? BAIRD: You can be sure of that. No such questions are asked, or tone taken, in the other two attorney general nomination hearings. Thurmond later notes that he read in the newspaper that Baird played a role in opposing Robert Bork’s nomination to the Supreme Court, and asks her about that – at once suggesting she is a little girl and that she might have a dangerous power.32 Most of this, and more, took place in the first morning of the first day of the hearings. Baird had appeared calm, self-assured, and logical throughout. Yet Biden announced that afternoon, right after the two women members receive a special welcome, “I’m supposed to tell you all that showing emotion in any way is not permitted. You have to remember, this is Washington.”33 Once again, the space is defined as masculine, imbued with masculine qualities, intolerant of qualities defined as feminine. Also on the afternoon of the first day, Sen. Arlen Specter, R-PA, quoted an article in The Nation that reported that the neighborhood association to which Baird made monetary contributions had tried to block the purchase of a home by a woman with 10 “adopted foster children, all of them … with disabilities, and all African-American or Latino.”34 Specter, and then other senators, went on to ask detail after detail about Baird’s relationship to the legal action by the neighborhood group long after she said she did not know any more about it than what she had read in the newspaper. Biden, interrupting, said, “Everyone we interviewed said that you were no party to any of this;” yet he went on to ask more questions about the matter.35 Questions from senators addressed why she lived in the neighborhood, and what kind of character and values the neighborhood had. Neither Barr nor Reno was asked about their neighbors’ values and it unlikely that any other cabinet nominees have been.

model, so as black men (and white women) became leaders, they used this model,” according to hooks, who suggests it was hard for these new leaders to conceive of having universal appeal any other way (109). Senate Judiciary hearings, Jan. 21, 1993, p. 13. 32 Senate Judiciary hearings, Jan. 19, 1993, p. 22. 33 Senate Judiciary hearings, Jan. 19, 1993, p. 16. 34 Senate Judiciary hearings, Jan. 19, 1993, p. 15. 35 Senate Judiciary hearings, Jan. 19, 1993, p. 15. 31

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Senators questioned whether Baird had the management skills to oversee the Justice Department, even though the testimony showed she had more management experience and had supervised more people than almost any of her predecessors. Finally, in the last session of the hearings, Biden questions Baird’s attentiveness to business and her rise to power, especially as a mother: The fact is, you did what you did. It was wrong. But it’s a civil violation. It is a violation that took place in the context of a woman in her mid-30s taking a job that most men don’t get, if they get it, until they’re in their mid-60s, or mid-50s, and with an eight-month-old baby, and with – and I don’t mean to cast aspersions, but with a very qualified husband who’s a leading constitutional lawyer in America. And maybe we’re all absent-minded professors. That used 36 to be the – but it clearly – someone was at the minimum absent-minded on your watch.

In what may be seen as the final, culminating insult that completely boxes Baird into a corner of MotherSpace and out of the spaces of political leadership, Sen. Dennis DeConcini, D-AZ, questions whether Baird would resent all the personal questions she had been asked and whether that would interfere with her job performance as attorney general. He suggested that now that the committee had felt free to invade her privacy to learn all this personal information about her, Baird might no longer be able to present herself as a professional. He said: What I am interested in finding out is what has happened to you as a result of this, because I find that when witnesses and nominees go through these grueling hearings and what have you that it can change their attitude. There can be some deep-seated resentment that even having to address things of a personal nature, of household help, and what you pay them and what they eat and what their hours are and those kinds of things. And also the professionalism that is 37 necessary to carry on in the job. Has this really changed you, Ms. Baird?

CONCLUSION I suggest here that whether or not the hearings changed Zoë Baird, the players used discourses that reinforced the status quo separating mothers from public, political space – making it impossible for the mother/Baird to enter the spaces of political leadership. Daphne Spain argues that gendered spaces and institutionalized spatial segregation reinforce the advantages of men and the exclusions of women.38 Spatial segregation is one of the mechanisms by which a group with greater power can maintain its advantage over a group with less power, according to Spain.39 While examining space and status does not explain the origins of gender inequality, Spain suggests it does address the ways in which inequality is maintained by spatial relationships between men and women. In reinforcing the discursive boundaries that separate the spaces of mothers and the spaces of political leadership, the players in the Baird case missed an opportunity to change 36

Senate Judiciary hearings, Jan. 21, 1993, p. 12. Senate Judiciary hearings, Jan. 19, 1993. 38 Daphne Spain, Gendered Spaces (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 3. 39 Spain, Gendered Spaces, 15. 37

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the rigid definition of those spaces. They reinforced the exclusion of mothers with daily responsibilities for children from the spaces of political leadership. Activity on the front lines of politics to elect more women to high offices including the presidency is important, but there is other work to be done as well. The slow progress of mothers entering the highest spaces of political leadership reveals the power and tenacity of the discourses of both motherhood, especially as expressed through maternalism, and of political leadership. Only when these discourses are contested and changed will spaces open up so that mothers, and thus all women, may win entry into those spaces without facing a double standard.

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 437-447

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

A ROLE MODEL FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS: CONDOLEEZZA RICE Ronald D. Petitte

ABSTRACT The prospect that, in the 21st Century, we, in the United States, will witness “The First Woman President,” is made possible by those who have gone before; specifically, those visionaries who saw the need for change, such that American truly would be a land of opportunity for all its peoples, males and female, embracing its diverse racial, ethnic, and religious groupings. Shirley Chisholm ranks with William Jennings Bryan as a giant of her time – a truly great woman who had vision, courage, determination, and the patience not only to bring sweeping change to American politics, but to build a bridge such that others coming after her could realize her dream to be the first woman president. Neither the Democrat nor Republican Party – and neither liberal nor conservative philosophy – can, in themselves, make possible the first woman president. Rather, the excellence and timing of a 21st Century woman of the quality of Dr. Condoleezza Rice will carry the day.

“BACK TO THE FUTURE”1 The simple fact of our gathering together, here, at Siena College, to share ideas on the prospect that, in this 21st Century, we, in the United States, will witness “The First Woman President,” is made possible, not only by those who already have been acknowledged, but those who have gone before, specifically, those visionaries, who saw the need for change, such that America2 truly would be a land of opportunity for all its peoples, male and female, embracing its diverse racial,3 ethnic,4 and religious5 groupings. 1

As one who teaches Film (“Film: Three Perspectives,” Communication Studies/COMM 350) in addition to Political Science, I consider “Back to the Future” an exceptionally good film, one, in particular, with a marvelous title, which has multiple applications for political analysis. 2 “America” is used throughout this paper to represent the United States of America. 3 The American Heritage College Dictionary defines “racial,” as, “Of, relating to, or characteristic of race or races.” The Integrated Post Secondary Educational Data System (IPEDS) lists the following racial groupings for reporting purposes: Black, non-Hispanic; American Indian or Alaskan Native; Asian or Pacific Islander; Hispanic; White, non-Hispanic. 4 “Of or relating to sizable groups of people with a common, distinctive racial, national, religious, linguistic, or cultural heritage” (American Heritage College Dictionary).

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Bridge Builders William Jennings Bryan was a giant of presidential politics at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Centuries, who, three times was nominated by the Democratic Party6 to be their presidential candidate.7 According to Dr. Richard Cornelius, preeminent William Jennings Bryan Scholar,8 Bryan, in all probability, won the presidential election of 1896, but massive voting fraud across six states negated Bryan’s effort, and William McKinley was sworn in as President of the United States.9 10 Bryan served as Democratic Party leader for fifteen years.11 He worked hard for Woodrow Wilson’s presidential victory in 1912; then, served Wilson as Secretary of State for three years, until his opposition to war led him to resign. How does William Jennings Bryan link to “The First Woman President,” one may ask? Bryan was an extraordinary progressive, who was instrumental in the initiation, promotion, and passage of the 19th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which heralded women’s suffrage.12 It should go without saying that women’s suffrage is the watershed event, without which we would not have this discussion today. Furthermore, Bryan was instrumental in the initiation, promotion, and development of the 17th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, i.e., the direct election of U.S. Senators.13 Currently, there are fourteen women serving in the U.S. Senate and, “to date, a total of 33 women have served in the Senate,”14 at least one of whom, surely will be mentioned, in the context of this symposium. As far as a number of you are concerned, without the direct election of U.S. Senators, this discussion would not be taking place. It might be said, as a counterpoint, that if Bryan had not advanced women’s suffrage and the direct election of U.S. Senators, somebody else would have, and that would be true.15 If you will allow me to beg the question: How long 5

“Having or showing belief in and reverence for God or a deity” (American Heritage College Dictionary). Christian, Jew, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist are the predominant groupings in the USA today. 6 And seven other parties. 7 Bryan was the Democratic Party presidential candidate in 1896, 1900, and 1908. 8 The Pulitzer Prize winning author, Edward J. Larson, consulted Dr. Cornelius in researching his award winning book, Summer for the Gods: The Scopes Trial and America’s Continuing Debate over Science and Religion. 9 Interview, 9th February, 2005, Bryan College, Dayton, Tennessee/TN. 10 See “William Jennings Bryan, The Scopes Trial, and ‘Inherit the Wind’” by R.M. Cornelius, published 2004 by Bryan College, Dayton, TN 37321-7000. Dr. Cornelius is Professor Emeritus of English and Archivist at Bryan College. 11 Ibid. 12 See The Constitution of the United States. The Amendment reads: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” Ratification took place on August 18, 1920. 13 See The Constitution of the United States. The Amendment reads: “The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the Legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct. This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.” Ratification took place on April 8, 1913. 14 Rutgers University, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Center for American Women and Politics (CAWP), available from http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/Facts/Officeholders/cawpfs.html; Internet; accessed 23 February 2005. 15 Consider that, if Zipporah had not taken matters into her own hands, the Lord God would have killed Moses: “At a lodging place on the way, the LORD met Moses and was about to kill him. But Zipporah took a flint knife, cut off her son’s foreskin and touched Moses’ feet with it. ‘Surely you are a bridegroom of blood to me,’ she

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would America16 have wanted to wait for women’s suffrage and the direct election of senators? Ten years? Twenty years? Without William Jennings Bryan’s remarkable foresight, courage, and determination to stay the course and see these worthy initiatives through, we would not be here, today. And, even though a 21st Century symposium “The First Woman President” eventually would take place, it might not take place for the ten or twenty years posited above and probably not at such a venerable institution as Siena College. And, so, let us give credit where credit is due, recognizing William Jennings Bryan, as the foremost progressive political thinker of his time. Before I cite a second great political visionary, I wish to acknowledge Ms Billie LuisiPotts, Executive Director, National Women’s Hall of Fame, who presented the paper, “U.S. Women Who Have Run for President,” at the Siena Symposium. Shirley Chisholm ranks with William Jennings Bryan, as a giant17 of her time: A truly great woman, who had vision, courage, determination, and the patience, not only to bring sweeping change to American politics, but to build a bridge, such that others coming after her could realize her dream, “The First Woman President.” Susan Bruce said of Chisholm that “she was an embodiment of what every citizen of this country should be and feel.”18 Chisholm was the first black woman elected to Congress (1968) and the first woman to run for President of the United States (1972).19 Chisholm’s famous speech, announcing her candidacy for President of the United States, rang with a progressive, populist tenor that would have made Bryan proud.20 Listen to these words: I stand before you today as a candidate for the Democratic nomination for the Presidency of the United States. I am not the candidate of black America, although I am black and proud. I am not the candidate of the women’s movement of this country, although I am a woman, and I am equally proud of that. I am not the candidate of any political bosses or special interests. I 21 am the candidate of the people.

Bryan would have supported Chisholm and fought for her, as he did Woodrow Wilson. Therefore, I give you Shirley Chisholm, with William Jennings Bryan, as two who built the bridges Condoleezza Rice will walk across, as A Role Model for 21st Century Presidential Politics. My next comments are inspired by Laura A. Liswood, founder and SecretaryGeneral of the Council of World Women Leaders, who delivered the paper “Lessons from Woman Presidents Around the World” at the Siena Symposium. For those in America, who say that this (a woman president) is not going to happen, I direct your attention to Great Britain, where Margaret Thatcher served admirably for eleven

said. So the LORD let him alone.” (Exodus 4:24-26, NIV) This took place after the burning bush and other miraculous signs. Zipporah is one of the unsung heroes of the Bible. Without her, we would not know that Moses existed, let alone that he led Israel out of bondage and through the wilderness. God simply would have chosen someone else. 16 See footnote 2. 17 This was how I described Shirley Chisholm, before reading Susan Bruce’s laudatory article. I feel the description appropriate, as Ms. Bruce and I came to it independently of one another. 18 Bruce, Susan. “Shirley Chisholm-A Giant Passed This Way” People for Change. 9 January 2005. (accessed 26 January 2005). 19 See Susan Bruce’s article, referenced above, but note that these facts are public/common knowledge. 20 This is my own supposition. 21 I recently heard Ms. Chisholm’s famous speech on National Public Radio (January 7, 2004) following her death, as a part of a piece commending her magnificent career. Ms. Bruce includes this passage in her article.

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years, as Britain’s Prime Minister.22 Travel, then, with me, to the early years of Israel’s statehood, where we will meet Golda Meir;23 and then to India to meet Indira Ghandi24 and, as we come “back to the future” in Pakistan, we meet Benazir Bhutto.25 It is only a matter of time before America fully recognizes the pursuit of excellence which characterizes many of America’s finest women in this 21st Century. Dr. Douglass Lonnstrom, Director of the Siena Research Institute, said, “All Americans . . . want the nation’s highest office held by the best people, regardless of their gender.”26 I agree with Dr. Lonnstrom. Accordingly, I say that excellence and timing are what will make possible “The First Woman President.” Neither the Democrat nor Republican Party; and neither liberal nor conservative philosophy can, in themselves, make possible “The First Woman President.” Rather, the excellence and timing of a 21st Century woman of the quality of Ms. Condoleezza Rice, will carry the day. Much has been written about excellence,27 but not nearly so much has been written about timing. Timing is critical in this equation, and there is, to my mind, no more beautiful phrasing of the importance of timing, than that which is given to us in The Book of Esther, wherein Mordecai sends these words of exhortation and encouragement to Esther (Hadassah) his cousin, “whom he had brought up because she had neither father nor mother.”28 Who knows but that you have come to royal position 29 for such a time as this?

LEADERSHIP PREPARATION Just as much has been written about excellence, so too, much has been written about leadership. For the sake of brevity, consider that, in politics, there are two dominant leadership styles, executive and legislative.30 A few examples from 20th Century political history should suffice: 1. Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR), Governor of the great State of New York and the only person elected to serve as President of the United States four consecutive terms. FDR has been credited with bringing the United States out of the Great Depression, creating Social Security, and being one of the greatest War Presidents in U.S. History; and 2. Dwight David Eisenhower, World War II Supreme Commander, Allied

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For an excellent political biography of Lady Margaret Thatcher’s tenure as Prime Minister, see her book, The Downing Street Years. Her term ran from 1979-1990. 23 Golda Meir served as Prime Minister from 1969-1974. 24 Indira Ghandi served as Prime Minister from 1966-1977, and 1980-1984. 25 Benazir Bhutto served as Prime Minister from 1988-1990, 1993-1996. 26 Siena College, Siena Research Institute. “Hearst Newspapers-Siena College poll: Do You Think the United States is Ready for a Woman President in 2008?” 22 February, 2005, 2. available from (accessed 23 February 2005). 27 Two works of note are: John Gardner’s Excellence, and Tom Peter’s The Pursuit of Excellence. 28 Esther, Chapter 2, verse 1 (New International Version [NIV]). 29 Esther, ch. 4, v. 14 (NIV). 30 Tennessee State Senator, David Fowler, first shared this idea with me and it resonated. In addition to serving in the Tennessee State Senate, as Assistant Majority Leader, Dr. David Fowler is a lawyer and teacher at Bryan College. His course (which he designed) The Origin and Basis of Government, is a rigorous study of political history and political philosophy.

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Powers Europe; one of the few, five star, flag rank, officers in U.S. Military History; also President, Columbia University, New York City, New York, and two-term President of the United States. These two examples, albeit brief, are, clearly, executive leaders. In the legislative leadership style are: 1. Sam Rayburn, who served as Speaker of the House an unprecedented ten terms, and 2. Thomas P. (“Tip”) O’Neill Jr., who served as speaker from the 95th to the 99th Congress.31 Only one Speaker, James K. Polk, of Tennessee, was elected President of the United States, but he served as Governor of Tennessee, subsequent to serving as Senate Majority Leader and prior to serving as President. Not one Senate Majority Leader was elected President save Lyndon B. Johnson, who resigned his senate seat after being elected Vice President (and the rest is history). One only may conclude that the top legislative leadership positions do not provide sturdy bridges to the White House. That being said, some leaders are capable of serving in both capacities, such as Lyndon Johnson and Gerald Ford. The U.S. Army has long recognized close variants on these two forms of leadership. Executive leadership is the political equivalent of military command, and legislative leadership is more analogous to a military, staff, type of leadership.32 33

PRESIDENTIAL PATHWAYS A survey of the career pathways that our 43 presidents followed, yielded some (at least to my mind) interesting data. My purpose is to illustrate that executive leadership experience is preferable to legislative leadership experience, as preparation for the highest leadership position in America. There are three executive leadership positions that I will offer as exceptional preparation for a person aspiring to the office of the Presidency of the United States. First, and foremost, is the position of Vice President. But before I proceed any further, allow me to acknowledge the work of Dr. Sara Weir of Western Washington University, my co-panelist at the Siena Symposium, who presented the paper “Women Governors in the 21st Century.” Absent this unique opportunity (to serve as Vice President of the United States) which opportunity 14 of our presidents have had,34 I submit to you that experience as a governor of one of our 50 states, which experience 20 of our Presidents have had,35 offers an excellent opportunity to prepare to be President. The states serve, if you will, as microcosms of the 31

An example of young legislative leadership is Zach Wamp, who represents the 3rd Congressional District from the State of Tennessee. Wamp, who passed on the chance to enter the U.S. Senate race in Tennessee, when Bill Frist declared his intention to resign to run for President, could, in time, become Speaker of the House. [It is a wise man, who knows where his gifts are better utilized.] 32 Military command is more analogous to executive political leadership than is military staff leadership analogous to legislative leadership. The author trusts that the listener/reader will understand that these analogies are not perfect but, rather, are used here to draw a distinction between two political styles of leadership, the former (executive) being the preferred form. 33 David S. Broder, wrote an article for The Washington Post entitled “Why Few Senators Become President.” Broder drew on an article published in Political Science Quarterly, which was written by Barry Burden, Harvard University, Professor of Government. The Burden-Broder thesis is that Senators do not have a big enough stage, are not battle hardened (my phrase: Burden-Broder call it “battle readiness”) and do not have the organization. I agree with this thesis, but I think the Fowler-Petitte Executive versus Legislative leadership style to be the missing piece in this puzzle. 34 32.5%.

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United States as a whole, and therefore provide an exceptional laboratory in which to prepare for higher, executive level, national office. The Secretary of State experience, which experience six of our Presidents have had,36 is an executive office of unique and unparalleled opportunity for one to prepare to serve at the highest levels of the U.S. Today’s Secretary of State, Ms. Condoleezza Rice, is the President’s direct representative to 180 countries recognized by the U.S. She leads an agency with an estimated 50,000 people worldwide and oversees a budget of $9.283 billion, an amount in excess of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 96 countries of the world.37 Historically, the Office of Secretary of State provided four of our “founding fathers”38 this unique preparation: No less personages than Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and Adams (John Quincy) served as Secretary of State.39 Neither senatorial nor congressional/representative leadership offers either the breadth or the depth of leadership testing, as does the crucible of the Office of Secretary of State, or that of service as governor of a state.40 The remaining fourteen permanent, presidential, cabinet positions41 also offer unique crucibles in which national leaders can be tested for the ultimate leadership position, President of the United States of America. The Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security42 should be given serious consideration as potential presidential leaders, because of the extraordinary executive leadership positions they hold.43 Again, for the sake of brevity, I will focus on the Department of State and its uniquely qualified and remarkably talented executive leader, Condoleezza Rice. In this century, which gives us instant, world-wide, visual, communication, Rice already may be the second, most recognizable American, world-wide, second only to George W. Bush [I say this with all due respect to Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton.]. There is no United States gubernatorial, senatorial, or congressional/representative position with national, let alone world-wide visibility, as that of Secretary of State: Neither Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, or California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, command the press or attention of today’s United States Secretary of State. In fact I will go so far as to say, Condoleezza Rice, as Secretary of State, is more in the public eye, than is the United States Vice President, Dick Cheney.

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46.5%. Includes 2 territorial governors and 1 civil governor, all of whom became President. 13.5%. 37 “Rank Order - GDP.” World Factbook 2005. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Public Affairs. (accessed 25 February 2005). 38 Forgive the lack of political correctness. 39 The others were Van Buren and Buchanan. 40 Allowing for the relative size of the state, i.e., the larger, more populous states offering greater challenges of scale, e.g., New York or California, as compared to Rhode Island or North Dakota. 41 Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Justice, Labor, Transportation, Treasury, Veterans Affairs. 42 The newest cabinet level department, Homeland Security (formerly headed by the Director of Homeland Security), by dint of its mission, size, and scope, should be elevated to serious consideration in this discussion, and more so, for example, than Agriculture, or Veterans Affairs, as important as those departments are. The Governor of New York or California receives national recognition often not bestowed on a governor of a smaller, less politically powerful state. This is a simple fact of political life. 43 It has been said that Tom Ridge, former Governor of Pennsylvania and the first Secretary of Homeland Security will run for President in 2008. 36

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Indicative of Rice’s humility is that she did not seek the office of Secretary of State, the preeminent cabinet position, which would make her first among equals;44 rather, she preferred to lead the Department of Defense.45 Should anybody doubt the toughness, or sheer mettle of Rice, her preference to be Defense Secretary, rather than Secretary of State, should address that question in full. Having retired with 26 years of military service, active and reserve, and, again, with all due respect to Senator Rodham-Clinton (who sits on the Senate Armed Forces Committee) there is no woman I can think of, who could lead the Defense Department, except one, and that one is Condoleezza Rice. I also think it indicative of the remarkable pursuit of excellence that characterizes Ms. Rice that she is the most qualified person in America today (man or woman, civilian or military) to serve as Secretary of State. The first woman to serve as National Security Advisor (NSA) Condoleezza Rice is the quintessential international relations expert. Not since Henry Kissinger has such a high profile, international expert, and mentor to a President, arrived on the world scene.46 Recall, if you will, the perfect timing, in which Esther ascended to a royal position of leadership in the empire of King Xerxes, ruler of Persia,47 and, now, consider the timing in which Rice has ascended to the preeminent position in world foreign affairs. The current Secretary of Defense, Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, may not serve through this calendar year, let alone through a complete second term of the George W. Bush Administration. The Vice President, Mr. Dick Cheney, whose serious health/heart problems are a matter of public record, is a political star in decline,48 so much so, that there is political speculation49 that he might resign mid-way through his second term, to allow the President to nominate, for Vice President, a person who could win the Presidential race in 2008. The two people most often spoken of, in this scenario, are Bill Frist and Condoleezza Rice.50 Finally, consider, please, the enormity of the challenge Colin Powell faced in the first George W. Bush administration, having to “compete”51 with a Vice President, who himself

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A commonly accepted descriptor of the Department of State. No other department has such world-wide reach or impact, and the Constitution of the U.S. ends the argument by placing the Secretary of State fourth in the line of succession to the Office of President, after the Vice President, Speaker of the House, and President Protempore of the Senate (before all other cabinet secretaries). 45 According to the BBC News, in their story “Rice picked to be top US diplomat,” “There was speculation that the only reason she might turn down the post was because she coveted the defence portfolio but that has not become vacant.” British Broadcasting Corporation. “Rice picked to be top US diplomat.” BBC NewsAmericas. 16 November 2004. (accessed 27 January 2005). 46 This is not to disregard the remarkable career and world-wide impact of Colin Powell, who also served as NSA, as well as serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Desert Storm-Desert Shield operation, which, although not of the magnitude of World War II [see reference to General Eisenhower, p. 6, this paper] was remarkable in its inclusiveness and success. Powell served as Secretary of State from 2001-2005. 47 From 486-465 B.C. 48 A second term Vice President, who will not run for the Presidency, is, by dint of his choice not to run, a “lame duck.” 49 Political speculation is not worthy of a footnote. The listener/reader may retort that such speculation is not worthy of a paper of this nature; to which I would respond that political speculation is the only form of gossip I enjoy. Please, bear with me. 50 Just in case the listener/reader cannot resist such political “gossip,” go to “http://www.rice2008.com.” I take no responsibility, if the listener/reader chooses to sin in this way. On a serious note, see the Hearst NewspaperSiena College poll. 51 I use the word intentionally. A careful case study of the first George W. Bush Administration, or any preceding administration, Democrat or Republican, will show intense competition within, as without. The key is assembling an executive leadership team [Vice President and Cabinet] which will minimize such competition and maximize cooperation and communication. This is no mean task.

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had served as Defense Secretary,52 and who claimed as political mentor, the current Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld. And, consider that Donald Rumsfeld had previously served as Defense Secretary for Gerald Ford.53 And, finally, that these two executives (Messrs. Cheney and Rumsfeld) were primary architects54 of the invasion of Iraq and the deposing of Saddam Hussein. In summary, Powell faced as daunting a challenge as did William Rogers, years before him.55 Powell, as Rogers, handled the challenge with grace, dignity, and political aplomb. Although, there will be conflicts, internal and external, facing Rice, she clearly has the world stage to herself and stands on this stage, knowing she has the complete loyalty and support of a President, who clearly admires and respects her.

SO MUCH FOR MY OPINION The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported in a “Story from BBC News” dated November 16, 2004, entitled, “Rice picked to be top U.S. diplomat,” that President Bush said of her and her appointment that “The secretary of state is America’s face to the world and in Dr. Rice the world will see the strength, grace, and decency of our country.” Let me share other opinions, e.g., of those countries, whose national interests will be affected directly by a Bush-Rice foreign policy? Consider this, from the BBC News story cited above: “Much of the foreign policy focus in the second term is likely to be firmly on the Middle East but Ms. Rice’s background as a Russian expert will prove useful at a time of concern about President Putin’s handling of political and civil rights.”56 As I said before, there is no person better suited to serve as United States Secretary of State, “at such a time as this”57 than Condoleezza Rice.58 The Taipei Times59 reported as an editorial headline, on 27 November 2004, that “Rice will play an important role.”60 Consider this comment from the article: “While Powell’s views could never fully reflect Bush’s views, when Rice talks, it carries a different kind of authority.”61 Last November (22nd) the BBC reported that “Dame Billie seeks Rice meeting Barbados Foreign Minister Dame Billie Miller is hoping for an early meeting with the incoming U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.”62 Whether Rice meets with Dame Billie, consider that one of the bridge builders to “such a time as this”63 was Ms. Shirley 52

1989-1993, during the George Herbert Walker Bush administration. 1975-1977. 54 Primary in the sense that they had the executive leadership positions at the time. Ms. Rice was an “advisor,” although her input on the war was highly valued. 55 Today’s play has a different cast, i.e., Ms. Rice is a friend to General Powell which was not the case between Messrs. Kissinger and Rogers. 56 See endnote 40. 57 See endnote 29. 58 See page 10, this paper. 59 The listener/reader may be appalled that I would go beyond the BBC. Such is life. 60 Cheng-yi, Lin. “Rice will play an important role.” Taipei Times. 27 November 2004. (accessed 6 December 2004). 61 ibid 62 British Broadcasting Corporation. “Dame Billie seeks Rice meeting” BBC Caribbean.com. 22 November 2004. (accessed 31 January 2005). 63 See page 6, this paper. 53

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Chisholm, whose mother was from Barbados. Linkage to historical moments is extremely important. The distinguished journalist, Helen Thomas, America’s First Lady of the Press, posed a question, up front, in the title of a column, she authored on January 28, 2005: “Rice’s Choice: Hawk or Diplomat.”64 The question is not only a good one, but a timely one. Allow me to go “back to the future” to offer an answer to Thomas’ question. I will draw on a BBC correspondent’s story, one by Ms. Caroline Frost, (who profiled Ms. Rice on August 5, 2003, when Rice was the President’s National Security Advisor). Frost referred to Condoleezza Rice, even at that time, as “The world’s most powerful woman.”65 Frost credits Rice with being “determined to protect U.S. interests across the world, proving steadfast, some say uncompromising, on issues such as ballistic missile defense and the environment. She has, however, balanced this forcefulness with diplomacy, an effective combination one observer calls her “steely grace.”66 From this BBC assessment of August 5, 2003, fast forward to Saturday, February 26, 2005, when former President Bill Clinton was visiting Tokyo, Japan. According to The Chattanooga Times Free Press, Clinton said Bush’s second-term appointment of Condoleezza Rice as secretary of state marked a new beginning for the administration. [Specifically, Mr. Clinton said, and I quote] “I think by sending Condoleezza Rice to the State Department, (the president) was saying diplomacy will be more important in his second term,” [. . .] “The drain on our military has 67 made this administration more interested in diplomacy” [which is a very good point].

CONCLUSION I should like to offer these recommendations: That the Democratic Party give serious consideration to advancing one of its currently serving female governors, i.e., Kathleen Blanco, Christine Gregoire, Ruth Ann Minner, Janet Napolitano, or Kathleen Sebelius,68 as either a Presidential candidate, or a Vice Presidential candidate, in 2008.69 This recommendation is consistent with the Burden-Broder and Fowler-Petitte theses, as well as with the Hearst Newspapers-Siena College Poll that found that: “60% [of registered voters] expect a woman to be on the Democratic ticket for president” and “42% expect a woman to be on the Democratic ticket for vice president.”70 My second recommendation is that the Republican Party give serious consideration to advancing Condoleezza Rice, as Vice Presidential candidate in 2008, ideally paired with an executive style leader, e.g., a currently serving or former governor, or with someone who brings a unique and distinctly different skill set to the political arena, such as Senate Majority 64

Thomas, Helen. “Rice’s Choice: Hawk or Diplomat.” TheBostonChannel.com. 28 January 2005. (accessed 7 February 2005). 65 Frost, Caroline. “Condoleezza Rice: Profile.” BBC Four. 5 August 2003. (accessed 27 January 2005). 66 ibid 67 Associated Press. “Clinton Sees More Diplomacy.” Chattanooga Times Free Press, 27 February 2005, sec. A, p. 3. 68 Governors of Louisiana, Washington, Delaware, Arizona, and Kansas, respectively. 69 Governor Jennifer Granholm (MI) was born in Canada, and, therefore, is ineligible to run. 70 See footnote 26.

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Leader Bill Frist, also known as a compassionate doctor, who was at the top of his field, as a highly successful heart-lung transplant surgeon, and who now is a leader in the fight against AIDS. In this latter case, there would be a dynamic division of labor, wherein Bill Frist could be responsible for the domestic agenda71 and Condoleezza Rice foreign policy. This pairing, coupled with the fact that neither Frist nor Rice are lawyers, could give the Republican Party a unique ticket in 2008. It should be noted that Republican respondents are not as excited about a woman President, as are Democratic respondents (see the Hearst poll).72 Therefore, taking this incremental step of beginning at the Vice Presidential level, is the preferable approach, vis-à-vis Rice. In closing, does the world weigh in when a woman (or man, for that matter) is elected governor of a state, United States Senator, or U.S. Congressman/Representative, even from New York or California? Hardly, unless one is identified as worthy of a “Lexington” piece in The Economist, or as a terminator of world renown. But when women such as Madeleine Albright and Condoleezza Rice are elevated to the world’s stage by Presidential decree, and Senate acclamation, the world takes notice, because such women are real players, not mere actors playing the role of a lifetime.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS It is important, first, that I acknowledge the clarity of vision, thoughtfulness, and graciousness of those people at Siena College, whose leadership has made this thought provoking and challenging symposium, “The First Woman President,” possible. First and foremost, let me thank: 1. The Friars Minor (Order of Friars Minor) and Father Kevin Mackin, President of Siena College; 2. Dr. Douglas Lonnstrom, Director of the Siena Research Institute; 3. Dr. Linda Richardson, Vice President for Academic Affairs, Siena College; 4. Dr. Leonard Cutler, Director, Siena College Center for the Study of Government and Politics; 5. Dr. Leon Halpert, Political Science Department, Siena College and Associate Dean, Arts Division; and last, but not least: 6. Mr. Joseph Caruso, Director of Polling, Siena Research Institute, and Joseph Cirillo and the students and faculty of Siena College,all of whom made this symposium possible. Without their efforts, I for one, would not be here. Accordingly, I wish to publicly acknowledge and thank each one of these people.

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Which would necessitate Hearst Newspapers and Siena College to conduct another poll. I should think a compassionate doctor would score high vis-à-vis domestic issues.72 60% expect a woman to be on the Democratic ticket for president, but only 18% on the Republican ticket.

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REFERENCES Associated Press. “Clinton Sees More Diplomacy.” Chattanooga Times Free Press, 27 February 2005, sec. A, p. 3. British Broadcasting Corporation. “Dame Billie seeks Rice meeting” BBC Caribbean.com. 22 November 2004. (accessed 31 January 2005). British Broadcasting Corporation. “Rice picked to be top US diplomat.” BBC NewsAmericas. 16 November 2004. (accessed 27 January 2005). Broder, David S. “Why Few Senators Become President.” The Washington Post, 23 June 2004, (accessed February 25, 2005). Bruce, Susan. “Shirley Chisholm-A Giant Passed This Way” People for Change. 9 January 2005. (accessed 26 January 2005). Cheng-yi, Lin. “Rice will play an important role.” Taipei Times. 27 November 2004. (accessed 6 December 2004). Cornelius, Richard M. “William Jennings Bryan, The Scopes Trial, and ‘Inherit the Wind’” Dayton, TN: Bryan College, 2004. Frost, Caroline. “Condoleezza Rice: Profile.” BBC Four. 5 August 2003. (accessed 27 January 2005). “Rank Order - GDP.” World Factbook 2005. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Public Affairs. (accessed 25 February 2005). Rutgers University, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Center for American Women and Politics (CAWP), (accessed 23 February 2005). Siena College, Siena Research Institute. “Hearst Newspapers-Siena College poll: Do You Think the United States is Ready for a Woman President in 2008?” 22 February, 2005, available from http://www.siena.edu/sri/FirstWomanPresident/FWP_release_final_sans. pdf; Internet; accessed 23 February 2005. Thomas, Helen. “Rice’s Choice: Hawk or Diplomat.” TheBostonChannel.com. 28 January 2005. (accessed 7 February 2005).

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ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

EMBRACING THE NEXT GENERATION: HOW YOUNG WOMEN CAN HELP ELECT OUR FIRST WOMAN PRESIDENT Marni Schultz ABSTRACT In recent years, young women have brought new energy to feminism, leading efforts to organize themselves into a powerful force for societal change. To harness this activism, established feminists must make concerted efforts to recognize and support young women as leaders. If they are going to pay attention, get involved, and stay committed, young women must see that their opinions are valued and their voices are heard. This engagement, of young women as activists, voters, and candidates themselves, is critical to efforts to elect a woman president, and to produce and sustain a significant increase in elected women office-holders at all levels.

SETTING THE SCENE In 1984, feminists around the country celebrated Geraldine Ferraro’s selection as the Democratic Party’s vice presidential nominee as a watershed moment in women’s struggles towards political equality in the United States. However, Ferraro’s nomination did not create a dramatic readjustment in the number of women at the very top levels of politics – in fact, she remains the only woman ever nominated to a major party ticket. What many hoped would spur on historic gains has instead become a footnote in history. Few young women today are old enough to remember that historic race – their knowledge of Geraldine Ferraro comes as a story shared by their mothers, feminist mentors, or history teachers, not as a moment actually experienced. Young women of the third wave, defined here as women born after 1975, are more likely to have been affected by the Year of the Woman, the 1992 elections that brought dozens of new female faces to Congress. They may also remember the downswing in women’s representation at the federal level in subsequent years. Younger women may have cheered on, or worked on, the candidacy of Hillary Clinton to the US Senate. Perhaps in following this race, they first realized the tremendous challenges facing female candidates. Women born in the late 1970s and 1980s do not face the same personal and professional obstacles as women

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of the previous generation. Tremendous gains have been made in women’s educational and professional achievement and opportunities; however, as the example of Geraldine Ferraro indicates, there is much ground left to cover. Although a quick glance through the past several years of newspaper headlines and magazine covers might suggest an opposite conclusion, feminism is not dead1. The movement is simply remaking itself, with young women leading the way. This remodeling is critical to efforts to elect a woman president. Perhaps even more important, reshaping feminism is essential if we hope to produce and sustain a significant increase in the number of women holding elective office at all levels. Young women are exerting great energy in activist endeavors to reach feminist goals. This energy can and should be mobilized to advance the success of women candidates. To accomplish this, established women and feminist organizations must make a more concerted effort to embrace young women’s work and to develop them as leaders. Young women are critical to any efforts to elect a woman president – if we want them to pay attention, get involved, and stay committed, we must show young women that their opinions are valued and their voices are heard.

THE POWER OF YOUNGER WOMEN On the Front Lines – Younger Women’s Initiatives “From the suffrage movement to the third wave, corporate media spin doctors have labeled feminism unladylike, unnecessary, and – above all – unwanted. Yet while these mediamanufactured stereotypes stigmatized feminists, they failed to stem the tide of progress…Indeed, post-feminism is a fiction. Far from the media spotlight, girls and young women are undertaking exciting, creative, and uncompromising activism every day.” 2 Jennifer Pozner

In recent years, feminism has been infused with new energy as young women create and lead successful activist efforts to organize themselves into a powerful force for societal change. These initiatives include the establishment of a foundation that provides grants exclusively to young female activists; a rapidly-expanding new movement to clarify and articulate a younger women’s political and social agenda; and a new approach to campus organizing that has recruited thousands of young women to become active in feminist issues on their campuses and in the society beyond. Some are run in partnership with, or with the support of, established women’s organizations; others have developed independent of any existing group. They all have two remarkable traits in common: young women conceived them and young women run them today. As these groups attract and empower young women, they are generating an enormous source of activist energy. The young women participating in these initiatives are engaged and ready to serve as organizers for social advocacy campaigns; as volunteers and workers for women candidates, including our first woman president; and with the right support and motivation, as political candidates themselves. 1 2

“Is Feminism Dead?”, TIME Magazine, Cover Story, June 29, 1998 Pozner, Jennifer L., “The ‘Big Lie’: False Feminist Death Syndrome, Profit, and the Media,” in Catching a Wave – reclaiming feminism for the 21st century, editors Rory Dicker and Alison Piepmeier, 2003, Northeastern University Press, Boston, p. 33

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Younger Women’s Task Force The Younger Women’s Task Force (YWTF) of the National Council of Women’s Organizations (NCWO) is the most recent in series of successful efforts to organize young women into a powerful force for societal change. It is the brainchild of Alison Stein, then a NCWO program assistant, whose experiences as a feminist activist in college first demonstrated to her that some young women activists’ uneasiness about the feminist label kept them away from organizing around women’s issues. “I had progressive young women friends who were active in all other events, but would never come to women’s group events – this led me to ask, ‘Why is feminism not trendy anymore?’”3 This tension led Stein to see herself as having “two lives – my close friends mostly did not work in women’s organizations, but my work and extracurriculars were focused there. I was often in a position to explain feminism to people who weren’t involved with it.” Stein’s personal and professional experiences helped her to realize two things, which formed the rationale for creating the YWTF. First, Stein saw young women as a significantly untapped group, especially those women recently out of college. “By my estimates and conversations with others, 80-90% of the young women at the [April 2004] March for Women’s Lives were part of college organizing groups, not post-college women in their 20s and 30s.” Second, young women often realize the challenges they face because of their gender (decisions about careers, job opportunities, moving for a partner) when they are in their late 20s and 30s, making these post-college age women an ideal group for the women’s organizations to target for activists. Stein has always believed that any younger women’s organization should not start outside the feminist movement, which made her job at NCWO an ideal launching point. “NCWO is the perfect place to start this initiative, since it is a coalition of every major progressive women’s group.” YWTF is unique from other younger women’s groups because it explicitly targets this slightly older group of young women, and a large majority of its members are new to feminism (they had never attended a women’s conference before the YWTF Meet-Up). To make her idea a reality, Stein recruited a core group of 15 young women working in women’s groups in Washington, DC to form a coordinating committee. For approximately six months, these women crammed into Stein’s apartment once a week to plan for their first event, a Meet-Up that would attract young women from around the country to Washington. “These women all used their volunteer time, which speaks to the importance of the Meet-Up. We put together amazing outreach to young working women, professional societies, and other groups that are not traditionally targeted by the feminist organizations. In the end, we emailed information on the Meet-Up to over 5,000 women in 42 states.” When the Meet-Up occurred in January 2005, over 80 women from around the country attended to discuss and consider a younger women’s agenda for the women’s movement. The participants addressed the reality that issues which mattered to activists 30 years ago have a different relevance today. Stein explains that “for [older feminists], it was laws and bills. For us, it's implementation and everyday life.4“ Young women also have additional focuses that were not part of the major feminist activist work in the 60s and 70s – for example, eating disorders, media portrayal of women, and global concerns. At the Meet-Up, 3 4

Stein, Alison, Telephone Interview, February 15, 2005 Jones, Mary Lynn F., “Young Women Meet in D.C., Create Own Movement,” Women’s eNews, 2/3/05

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the participants created an issue agenda for younger women, representing both an affirmation and an expansion of the missions of many NCWO member organizations. This agenda will serve as a mobilizing tool for the nine regional chapters that were launched at the Meet-Up. It can be used in the participants’ work back home, providing defined issues around which the regional groups can take action, hold events, and recruit new members. Moving forward, the Task Force will strive to meet two main needs – to develop the next generation of leadership for the women’s movement and to develop the next generation of women activists. In leading this work, Stein and the other members of the coordinating committee want to ensure that the group’s membership is primarily from outside the Beltway. The national group, or coordinating committee, will focus on providing support for the regional groups. For example, making the Meet-Up an annual event, as well as hosting periodic meetings for regional directors, will ensure that members from around the country have the opportunity to come to Washington to share their work and concerns, and interact with national leaders. YWTF’s ultimate goal is to have younger women speaking at Congressional briefings and other important policy events. Stein also hopes to create mentoring relationships between YWTF members and mid-career women who are 10 to 15 years ahead in their careers, an aspect of mentoring that she believes is currently missing.

Third Wave Foundation The Third Wave Foundation utilizes a different approach to supporting young women’s activism. Having recognized that each year only 7% of all philanthropic dollars are directed to programs serving women and girls, Third Wave operates as a nonprofit foundation, providing direct support to young women activists and the organizations they lead. Grants and scholarships are awarded exclusively to young women aged 15 to 30 who are working for gender, racial, social, and economic justice. Third Wave provides not only financial resources, but also develops public education campaigns and opportunities for relationship building, helping create a supportive community in which young feminists can network, strategize, and ultimately take collective action around issues of common concern. Beyond its uniquely targeted grant recipient population, Third Wave further develops and supports young activists through its selection of board members – a group of “young women, men, and transgender activists who reflect America’s diversity.5“ The overwhelming majority of board members, the guiding force for the organization, are under the age of 30. Vivien Labaton was in her early 20s when she became the organization’s founding director. Third Wave views its work as essential to building a lasting foundation for young women’s activism, and since its creation in 1997 the foundation has given more than $700,000 to groups and individuals around the country. The money for this grantmaking activity has been raised through a variety of major events, as well as the establishment of an endowment. The fundraising events are also designed to raise awareness about various feminist issues – such as violence against women and threats to reproductive rights. Many also emphasize intergenerational work, which is a priority for Third Wave. Third Wave membership, which charges dues on a sliding scale according to age ($1 for each year of a

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person’s age), serves as another funding source for the organization, supporting the production and dissemination of the newsletter, See It? Tell It. Change It!

Feminist Majority Foundation Campus Program (Choices) The Feminist Majority Foundation’s campus program is based on the FMF’s philosophy that the most effective activism is informed activism. The program, Choices, encourages young women to build and sustain feminist activist groups (Feminist Majority Leadership Alliances – FMLAs) on their college campuses, providing them with substantial on-line and in-person resources to do so. These FMLAs provide progressive students with opportunities to learn about timely feminist issues, develop their leadership and organizing skills, and connect with the larger pro-choice and feminist movements. One of the more impressive aspects of this program is the story of its creation. As related by Choices director Sarah Boonin, “from the beginning, Ellie Smeal and the entire staff at FMF viewed the new campus program not as a preconceived project to be implemented by young activists, but rather as an experiment to be created and inspired by young activists from its grass roots up through its leadership.6“ As the Choices program expanded onto campuses, its organizers came across an unexpected obstacle to organizing young women: many did not consider themselves as leaders. As Boonin relates, “the assumption seemed to be that some of us are born with it and can be leaders if we choose, and the rest of us are not and can only aspire to follow along…Rather than developing effective leadership training tools, we wait for the few young self-defined leaders to step forward, or we spend our time trying to identify one or two ‘natural leaders’ on campus (who 7 are already overcommitted). “

Rather than getting held back by this challenge, FMF has tailored its approach to address young women’s hesitancy to see themselves as leaders. Choices runs Feminist Leadership Institutes around the country, providing young women the chance to learn from prominent women’s rights leaders, network with other student leaders, learn about feminist issues, and hone their organizing skills. In addition, the campus program has worked to create a nationwide network of feminist faculty and professional staff who serve as a source of collective action, knowledge, and support for feminist communities on college campuses. Through these efforts, FMLAs have become a major organizing force on college campuses, bringing younger women into the feminist movement who will likely be active leaders for many years to come.

6

Boonin, Sarah, “Please – Stop Thinking about Tomorrow: Building a Feminist Movement on College Campuses for Today,” in Catching a Wave – reclaiming feminism for the 21st century, editors Rory Dicker and Alison Piepmeier, 2003, Northeastern University Press, Boston, p. 142 7 Ibid, p. 145

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Haven Young women have also created efforts to meet specific needs. One example is Haven, which provides temporary shelter for women coming to New York for abortion procedures. It was started several years ago by then 23-year-old abortion counselor Catherine McGill. Working at several different clinics in New York City, McGill kept seeing women arriving with sleeping bags or needing last minute sleeping arrangements. She realized that most women don’t know that they often need to stay two days, especially for second trimester procedures. In addition, even after extensive borrowing from friends and family, and often cleaning out their own personal savings, many women still did not have sufficient funds for their procedure. Abortion procedures get more expensive the further into the pregnancy they are performed – a second trimester abortion can cost up to $2,000, while the first trimester procedures usually cost only $400. Thus, women were often arriving in New York and waiting even longer as abortion counselors worked to raise money through abortion access funds that help impoverished women. McGill also recognized that New York City serves as a magnet for women from other cities and states seeking abortions. This is a result of New York’s liberal state laws and the high number of providers in NYC. The combination of circumstances convinced McGill that there was an unmet need for housing for out-of-town women seeking abortions. Her position as an abortion counselor prevented McGill from putting up women herself, so she created Haven – a small informal network where McGill would call her friends and arrange for women to sleep on their couches. Through the first year, Haven had between five to fifteen hosts. In 2002, when McGill left New York City to attend medical school, she turned the reigns over to friend and fellow feminist Shauna Shames, who was working at the time for the White House Project. Shames grew Haven to forty hosts. As coordinator, she was on-call 24-hours a day to arrange day-of housing. She also conducted outreach to clinics outside the Haven network (at its inception, Haven served four clinics in the city), and established “Starbuckers”, a group of volunteers available to spend one or two hours with a woman at Starbucks while she waited for her host to pick her up. Shames left New York City in the summer of 2004 to pursue an advanced degree in government at Georgetown University. She transferred leadership of the network to an intergenerational committee of four women, where “hard work is equally recognized, regardless of age”8.

MEETING OF THE MINDS Intergenerational Outreach The organizations and projects described above represent some of the most prominent activist efforts being undertaken by young women today. Dozens of other groups exist on campuses and in communities around the country. Some of these efforts will be folded into the larger initiatives just described, others will continue to work on the local level, serving as an introduction for young women to the possibilities of collective action to produce social change. All these initiatives are creating enormous energy for advocacy and political

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campaigns by attracting new, engaged young women to feminism. To fully tap this energy, established women leaders – those currently heading efforts to promote a feminist agenda and those working to advance women’s political participation and representation (sometimes the same women) – need to ensure that younger women’s ideas and concerns inform the goals of the movement, and that younger women’s efforts are met with support and enthusiasm. Successfully carrying out this intergenerational cooperation will require trust and good faith from both sides. It will need to overcome what is at times significant tension between younger and older feminists. As Rory Dicker and Alison Piepmeier explain in the introduction to their volume Catching a Wave, cooperation will not always be easy, but it is critical to achieving the goals that we all pursue: “Although claiming the presence of the third wave has been an exuberant act for young feminists, it has been seen by many in the second wave as profoundly alienating, an act of amputation. Instead of focusing on the alleged conflict between the generations, we see many strands of continuity between the second and third waves. After all, the goals set by the second wave have not yet been accomplished and the current generation of feminists is – and should be – working on many of the same issues as the second wave, often alongside older 9 feminists. “

Beyond recognizing the commonalities of our work, we as feminists must also recognize the importance of language. Paying attention to how we discuss issues and define the roles that various groups will play in cooperative efforts increases the likelihood of productive communication. As Rebecca Walker articulates, this will not always be easy work, but it is critical to realizing the full energy that young women can bring to feminist activist and political efforts: “Linked with my desire to be a good feminist was, of course, not just a desire to change my behavior to change the world, but a deep desire to be accepted, claimed, and loved by a feminist community that included my mother, godmother, aunts, and close friends…Once I offered a face different from the one they expected, I thought the loyalty, the bond of our shared outlook and understanding would be damaged forever…My hope is that we can see how the people in the world who are facing and embracing their contradictions and complexities and creating something new and empowering from them are important voices 10 leading us away from divisiveness and dualism. “

CREATING SYNERGIES BETWEEN ESTABLISHED AND EMERGING EFFORTS YWTF is a great example of an organization working hard to bridge the generational gap. From its inception, it was envisioned as a partnership effort between the generations. Alison Stein was a paid NCWO staffer when she coordinated the details of the first Meet-Up and is 8

Shames, Shauna, Personal Interview, February 17, 2005 Catching a Wave, Dicker and Piepmeier, Introduction 10 Walker, Rebecca, editor, to be real: Telling the Truth and Changing the Face of Feminism, 1995, Anchor Books, New York, xxx 9

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now employed as the Project Director. She explains that the task force could never have existed without NCWO’s support – the organization provides overhead and technology, its leaders have provided advice and guidance, and the establishment of YWTF within NCWO “allows the group to be a continuation of what’s already been done, allows us to work from their accomplishments and learn from their mistakes. Since most younger women aren’t in positions of power sitting at the big tables yet, this arrangement also allows us to educate senior women about our work and concerns.11“ Shortly after the first Meet-Up, Martha Burk, then chair of the National Council of Women’s Organizations, explained the organization’s involvement: “NCWO decided to found and fund the YWTF because we recognized that at NCWO's meetings, other women's meetings, and meeting with Congress, there was a lack of a younger women's voice and that a new generation of activists and leaders must be nurtured. This voice is critical to the future of the women's movement and the future of any progressive political 12 climate. “

The Meet-Up itself, the group’s first principal organizing event, included programming that promoted intergenerational collaboration and knowledge exchange. There were two workshops about the second wave – one highlighting its accomplishments, another highlighting its mistakes – to help the younger women understand the important work that has already been done, and to ensure continuity in efforts and lessons learned. In addition, nine established women leaders opened up their homes, hosting groups of the Meet-Up participants for intergenerational dinners. According to coordinating committee member Sarah Brewer, who organized the dinners, “Especially for the women from outside Washington, who rarely have the opportunity to meet with national leaders, these dinners were a very empowering experience. Feedback [from all the young women who participated] indicated that the dinners allowed them to learn from the older women’s experiences and to feel that their work was being recognized as exciting and valuable to the movement. For the hosts, the chance to meet younger, active progressive 13 women energized their own activism. “

Including programmatic elements like these in the Meet-Up is an important first step towards intergenerational learning and collaboration. Stein described the value of these interactions this way, “If our conversation happened in isolation, it wouldn’t be as powerful.14“ The critical outcome of this approach is that both sides come to recognize the advantages of working together, while still acknowledging differences in their goals and preferred action paths. This collaboration will be critical as the YWTF works to implement the program they have created, including the promotion of their issue agenda by NCWO member organizations. The relationship will be most beneficial to both sides – and most powerful – if younger women have constant, evolving voice, feel they are being welcomed into the movement, and feel that their ideas are recognized as important.

11

Stein, supra at note 3 Jones, supra at note 4 13 Brewer, Sarah, Telephone Interview, February 17, 2005 14 Jones, supra at note 4 12

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Hearing New Voices In this exchange of ideas, NCWO and other organizations committed to encouraging and supporting younger activists’ voices will be challenged to accept the diversity and range of issues that are central to many younger women’s initiatives. Younger women may conceive of a feminism that, in the words of Dicker and Piepmeier, “can engage with issues as diverse as women’s sweatshop labor in global factories and violence against women expressed in popular music.15“ One successful example is the creation of the National Organization for Women (NOW)’s Young Feminist Task Force. At the 2003 national conference, a group of young NOW members expressed their feelings that the organization was not prioritizing the issues of greatest concern to them. With the help of feminist leaders and former NOW presidents Patricia Ireland and Eleanor Smeal, the young women led an effort to successfully create a permanent task force, made up of young feminists under 30, who would advise NOW’s president on matters of agenda, leadership recruitment, and issue prioritization regarding young feminists in the organization. The guidance provided by Ireland and Smeal was critical in several ways: their institutional knowledge allowed the young women to navigate the procedural process; their support gave the effort significant credibility, especially with the organization’s long-time members (who make up a majority of the membership pool); and their attention helped the young women see themselves as leaders and make speeches that convinced others about the need for such action. Creating the Young Feminist Task Force demonstrated that NOW was ready to embrace a set of issues that could differ, either slightly or significantly, from its traditional areas of emphasis. Its establishment was successful because young women’s energy was paired with older women’s support. However, the same organization can be both strong and weak in promoting intergenerational collaboration and helping young women raise their voices. While national leaders like Patricia Ireland, Eleanor Smeal, and current president Kim Gandy continue to do extraordinary work to bring young women into the organization, both as members and in leadership positions, young women are often stymied in their activism at the local chapter level. NOW is structured as a grassroots organization, meaning that much of its work is directed from the bottom up. This structure is designed to encourage creativity and new ideas driven by local concerns, and to make the chapters an easy place for people to connect with feminist activism. Unfortunately, chapter leaders often stay in power for a long time, making it difficult for new ideas to flourish. Many chapters with entrenched leaders organize little new action and consequently suffer from stagnant membership. Younger women joining local chapters, eager to take on leadership positions and reenergize the chapter’s work are often told that they’re too young to understand the way things are done. The unfortunate preponderance of such attitudes makes it doubly important that national leaders are prioritizing young women’s work and concerns, providing them with a chance to help guide the organization’s direction. The national office also takes great care to promote leadership through its internship program, another common avenue for young women interested in feminism. National NOW’s intern coordinator has put significant effort into creating a strong program that recognizes young women’s desire to be involved in a meaningful way in the organization’s work, and cultivates each individual’s potential to do 15

Dicker and Piepmeyer, supra at note 9, p. 5

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so. The program capitalizes on its location in Washington, running a range of seminars and trips meant to demystify Capital Hill, teach lobbying skills, and expose young women to the culture and challenges of national feminist organizing. NOW and other major feminist organizations must continue making significant efforts to bring young women to the decisionmaking tables and overcome any ageism that persists in the organization at any level. As Shauna Shames, former coordinator of Haven and former assistant to NOW president Kim Gandy lucidly captures, “Any chain is only as strong as its weakest link. When young women are not treated well or welcomed by older feminists, then they can’t wait to leave. This kills potential activism. Interns and young staff come to work because they’re enthusiastic about the movement. The challenge is not how to get more young women into the movement, but how to better use the young women who are already there, to ensure that those who are interested and involved do 16 not get turned away. “

If young women are turned away at the local level, they may never realize the great opportunities that exist for them to be heard within the national organization. The profusion of young women-led initiatives will only realize their full potential impact if they are supported by established feminist leaders and organizations.

DEVELOPING YOUNG WOMEN AS LEADERS “We need to change the risk/reward ratio that many view as an insurmountable barrier to entry. If we can increase the number of women in power at the highest level, we can turn the system inside out, creating the atmosphere we need to attract a new generation, and a new 17 gender, of leaders. “

Obstacles and Opportunities Embracing and encouraging young women’s potential as leaders will play an important role not only in helping to elect our first woman president, but also in ensuring that she will be followed by others. There is significant work to be done. Over three-fourths of our nation’s presidents served first as congressmen, senators, and/or governors. Given these statistics, the political pipeline for women in higher office is in a sorry state today: 86 percent of Congress and 88 percent of governors are male. Without more women in Congress and governor’s offices, our choices of female presidential candidates will be severely limited. Gender balance in political representation is no better among young women. Although half of today’s top elected leaders first ran for office before age 35, only 14 percent of today’s young leaders are women18. If we want to change this situation and effectively encourage young women to run for office, we must first acknowledge – and challenge – the existing barriers to young women’s political participation. 16

Shames, supra at note 8 Wilson, Marie C., Closing the Leadership Gap: Why Women Can and Must Help Run the World, 2004, Viking 18 Eagleton Institute, “Young Elected Leaders Project,” 2004, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey 17

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Several important research initiatives have been undertaken to better understand why women remain considerably underrepresented in politics. As Marie Wilson highlights in her recent book, Closing the Leadership Gap: Why Women Can and Must Run the World, the “core of what brings women to leadership – a tendency toward greater inclusiveness, empathy, communication up and down hierarchies, focus on broader issues – makes stronger government and richer business.19“ However, these “core feminine qualities” often create friction with women’s need to meet society’s expectation of leaders demonstrating authority, which they may not see in these more collaborative traits. Another challenge [to fulfilling women’s leadership potential] is society’s double-standard on ambitious women. Wilson elaborates, “ambition in men is an expectation and a virtue. In women, it can be a kiss of death, guaranteeing isolation, ending relationships (personal and professional), pushing entire families into therapy, and making even the most self-assured CEO wonder what she was thinking .20“ Wilson also highlights the challenges many women perceive in maintaining personal authenticity once they enter politics. She suggests that “Women often find they must lose qualities associated with being female to blend in with the boys. Once gone, it is terribly difficult to reestablish this voice…As we rewrite the rules, we begin to change perceptions. We can stop mimicking men as a pathway to authority. We can gain strength from our ambition as we offer every bit of our natural and learned abilities. We 21 can finally be valued for the original we are, rather than the man we sometimes try to be. “

Many of these barriers come from perceptions and expectations set by our culture. By identifying and addressing them head on, we have the ability to change the circumstances that give them legitimacy. One way to do this is to identify and celebrate women who have successfully pursued alternative paths. Expectations of “women’s professions” have mostly disappeared from our society as increasing numbers of women excel as doctors, lawyers, and engineers, to name a few traditionally male-dominated professions. Although cultural change is slow, it is essential for creating permanently altered societal expectations that embrace women in leadership positions. The best way to work towards this long-term goal is by recognizing the women leaders already at work, and encouraging others – through mentoring and training – to join them. While changing societal expectations have somewhat improved the situation for young women, a 2003 study by Rutgers University’s Eagleton Institute showed that young women remain more hesitant than young men to demonstrate ambition or pursue ambitious goals. Almost half of men “self-started” in politics, compared with only 28% of women; half of women politicians were encouraged to run by someone else, and 22% had to be persuaded, compared with only 14% of male officeholders. Statistics at one key starting point for politics – involvement in student government – further demonstrates this problem. In high school, equal numbers of young men and women participated in student governance activities; in college, 42% of men participated, compared with only 19 percent of women.22

19

Wilson, supra at note 17 Ibid, p. 53 21 Ibid, pp. 96-7 22 Eagleton, supra at note 18 20

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Studies conducted exclusively with young women reveal that they face similar barriers as women in general, but that these are compounded by their age. In her work on young women’s political ambition, Elizabeth Smith highlights the role that self-presentational concerns play in reducing young women’s desire to run for public office. Smith notes that many of the traditional barriers to women’s political office holding can no longer explain the low numbers of female politicians. “Fund-raising obstacles, lack of party support, and voter bias no longer seem to work to prohibit women much more than men from office-holding. More women than ever have prior social and work experiences that situate them well in the ‘eligibility pool’.23“ However, as Fox and Lawless report, women choose not to run for office in large part because they do not feel they are qualified to run for and hold public office24. This perception of inadequacy extends to young women. Although they have made significant advances in social and political life – young women, for example, are more likely than young men to pursue higher education and participate in extracurricular activities at school (including student government)25 – young women are less confident about politics than young men26. Some factor seems to lead women, even those who are very qualified for office, to perceive themselves as unqualified or incapable of running27. This reality makes it imperative to find ways to address these self-perceptions early and encourage young women to run for office. Smith’s findings echo several of the challenges identified by Wilson. Self-presentational concerns – defined in Smith’s research as the managing of the image one presents of oneself to others – provide a powerful explanation for women’s evaluations of their personal qualifications for office, and thus, their hesitancy to consider running for public office. Gendered social norms play a role, as women are often expected to be less assertive, less independent and more emotionally expressive than men, thus losing or hiding characteristics that would be useful to a political candidate. Smith also cites several studies which indicate that women are also less willing to self-promote than men. As Wilson also suggests, women who self-promote may be punished socially. Quoting Laurie Rudman, Smith highlights that “women may suffer from a backlash effect in which self-promotion may enhance perceptions of their qualifications, but at the cost of social rejection.28“ Using both quantitative and qualitative data collected by Lake, Snell, Perry and Associates for The White House Project’s study, “Pipeline to the Future: Young Women and Political Leadership,” Smith measured the prevalence of above-noted attitudes in young women. The trends she identifies in the research demonstrate that young women do face barriers to political office unique to their age and gender. Although young women are participating in activities that would situate them well to seek political office – community 23

Smith, Elizabeth S., “The Political Ambition of Young Women: The Role of Self-Presentational Concerns in Affecting the Desire to Run for Public Office,” paper prepared for presentation at Southern Political Science Association Annual Meeting, January 6-9, 2005, New Orleans, Louisiana, p. 3 24 Fox, Richard L. and Jennifer L. Lawless, “Entering the Arena? Gender and the Decision to Run for Office,” American Journal of Political Science, 2004, 48: 264-280 25 Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman and Sidney Verba, The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality and Political Participation, 2001, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 26 Hahn, Carole L., Becoming Political: Comparative Perspectives on Citizenship Education, 1998, State University of New York Press, Albany 27 Smith, supra at note 23 28 Rudman, Laurie, “Self-Promotion as a Risk Factor for Women: The Costs and Benefits of Counterstereotypical Impression Management,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1998, 74: 629-645

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activities, leadership experience, and receipt of advice from others suggesting they run for political office – concerns about public perceptions and self-presentation were very present. When asked about obstacles to running for office, young women were more likely than young men to report self-presentational concerns (such as public scrutiny, intelligence, and appearance) as the biggest obstacle, rather than logistical concerns (such as fundraising). Smith’s analysis demonstrated that the relationship between respondent’s sex and perception of obstacles was statistically significant. Surprisingly, Smith also found that individuals who cited a self-presentational concern as the biggest obstacle facing political candidates were more likely to be thinking about running for political office than were individuals who cited a logistical concern29. This result suggests that changing young women’s perceptions of themselves significantly enough to get over some threshold of doubt may lead to greater numbers of them running for public office. Other findings in The Pipeline to the Future report underscore the idea that the best way to increase young women’s participation in politics is to convince them that they can overcome the barriers that currently make it difficult for them to run for office. The report, which was undertaken in order “to move beyond an analysis of youth disengagement to identify solutions,30“ found that young adults (both men and women) are aware that women, younger people, and people of color are underrepresented in politics, and believe that it is harder for these groups to run for office than for white men. A majority of respondents also felt that the addition of women, young people, and people of color would make government and politics better by bringing in new perspectives. Young women are not avoiding politics because they do not believe that they could make a positive difference by running. They are avoiding politics because they believe that there are too many obstacles to their success. Another key finding is that young women who initially say they would not consider running but become more interested after hearing about tools – such as trainings – that would make it easier to run include many of the least represented groups in political office now: African-American women, Latina women, non-college women, and young mothers. These women typically have little leadership experience and have not received encouragement from anyone to seek elected office. They strongly desire role models, mentors, training, and more exposure to leadership opportunities and encouragement. The study also found that showing young women examples of politicians accomplishing goals and making positive impacts in their communities helped them believe that running for office could be worth the effort and perceived personal risk. Finally, young women were far more responsive and confident about political opportunities at the local and community level than at the national level. These positions could be an important starting point for young women and one that might lead to greater numbers of women running for national office in the future. If young women can be helped by these motivating factors to begin envisioning themselves in the political realm as candidates, the possibility opens up for them to dramatically shift the demographic make-up of our elected officials.

29 30

Smith, supra at note 23 Lake, Snell, Perry and Associates, “Pipeline to the Future: Young Women and Political Leadership,” Findings on mobilizing young women from a survey and focus group for The White House Project Education Fund, April 12, 2000, p. 5

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ENCOURAGING YOUNG CANDIDATES: FILLING THE POLITICAL PIPELINE “You’re bound to make mistakes along the way in running for office, better to start early. [Campaigns are like] trial by fire, get mistakes out of the way now and you will be more ready later on in life. Women often wait too long to run for office. Nobody has ownership of good ideas; just because you are a certain age, doesn’t mean you don’t have good idea. You can overcome people’s expectations of youth by delivering on your promises.” Samara Barend, Executive Director, Minds of Steel; 2004 Democratic nominee for Congress, 29th District, New York

Having identified many of the obstacles that keep young women from running for political office, the critical task becomes designing programs that can help young women overcome these hurdles. Several initiatives are successfully undertaking this work, using a variety of approaches to help young women develop confidence and political leadership skills. These initiatives are all driven by the fact that 12 of the last 19 presidents were elected to their first political office by the age of 35. To elect a woman president, we need to ensure that women get into politics early. By working to significantly increase the number of young women who seek political office, these programs are helping to bring about a dramatic shift in political representation by women at all levels, including the top office in the land. The White House Project has transformed the findings from Pipeline to the Future into Vote, Run, Lead, an initiative that works to get young women ages 18 to 35 engaged in the electoral process. Vote, Run, Lead is currently partnering with women’s funds and foundations in five states – Minnesota, Georgia, Maine, Colorado, and Washington State – to run its programs. In the initiative’s first year, 2004, programming focused on training young women in the basic skills of civic engagement and electoral participation. Three main strategies were emphasized – voter registration, voter education, and voter mobilization. These Go Vote trainings were run in partnership with national youth Get Out the Vote (GOTV) organizations such as Rock the Vote, as well as local organizations. According to Tracy Sturdivant, Vice President of the White House Project, who is directing the initiative, these local partnerships served as a terrific opportunity to involve women who did not traditionally engage in electoral politics, but who had a vested interest in what policy decisions are made. For example, many service provider organizations, such as domestic violence shelters, were local partners for Go Vote trainings. Each Go Vote training also focused on introducing young women to the idea of considering themselves as political leaders. This was accomplished through two mechanisms. First, the documentary Chisholm ’72: Unbought and Unbossed, about Shirley Chisholm’s unsuccessful presidential bid, was shown as an icebreaker at the start of each training. For many young women, this was their first opportunity to see what Chisholm had done, and it spurred lively discussion about the challenges and opportunities facing female presidential candidates of the past and present (including the 2004 candidacy of Ambassador Carol Moseley Braun). The showing of this film reflects the White House Project’s belief that changing our culture is one of the key ways to see women as leaders. Second, the centrality of cultural change was also supported by panels of local elected officials who discussed “why women matter.” Panelists, such as Atlanta mayor Shirley Franklin, talked about why women’s participation is important, and what distinct attributes women bring to politics.

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Although at times the messengers were very different, the same encouraging messages were heard by young women across the training locations. Sturdivant recalls one particularly compelling panelist in New York: “At our training in New York, one councilwoman from the Bronx shared her story, which is very different from what we see as the traditional path to political office. She was a high school dropout, went back to school for her associate’s degree, and then became a union organizer. She decided to run for office to improve the public education system. This was a great example for the young women that you don’t have to ‘fit the mold’ to be a successful 31 candidate. She really helped to demystify the process. “

In addition to the Go Vote training sessions, Vote, Run, Lead created innovative mobilization programs to help young women get to the polls. For example, in Minnesota, college students who had no access to public transportation were given limo rides to the polls, a strategy that both enabled them to vote and highlighted the importance of their act. Following the success of the Go Vote trainings, 2005 is dedicated to Go Run. This set of trainings will focus on how to enter the process, including information on how to assess the political landscape, how to conduct effective fundraising, and how to handle the media. As with the Go Vote trainings, these trainings will recruit participants through the work of field organizers on the ground, an extensive e-mail listserv, and the existing networks of partner organizations. Funding allowing, each training will serve 100 young women. White House Project organizers hope that young women who had not thought about running, as well as women who are already primed to run, will attend and benefit from these trainings. The goal is that once resources are available to young women, they will feel that running for office is possible. In fact, this is exactly what the Pipeline research suggests – young women’s hesitancy to run declines once they learn about opportunities to receive support, such as trainings and mentors. Moving forward, Sturdivant plans to continue the alternating cycle of Go Vote and Go Run trainings. She is working with other White House Project staff to create a four-year plan for the project. One main feature will be efforts through the Go Run trainings to identify a small, select group of women who are truly ready to run and provide them with additional attention and assistance. For these White House Project Fellows, Vote, Run, Lead will serve as a conduit to other organizations, such as EMILY’s List and the Yale Campaign School, to ensure that these women have knowledge about and access to all the tools they need to run successfully. In Sturdivant’s opinion, this work is critical because “if we don’t start to educate women early on issues and help them to feel comfortable and trust themselves, they won’t be prepared. Women bring different skills to the table; if we don’t get more women into the process early, we won’t be able to change the representation of power.32“ An entirely different approach to encouraging young women’s involvement in electoral politics is being used by EMILY’s List, the nation’s largest political action committee. Campaign Corps is a national grassroots program dedicated to political empowerment of young people by helping them work on political campaigns. Each summer, women and men just out of college are trained at a week-long Campaign School, where they learn the basics of political campaigning – voter targeting, field organizing, fundraising, and press strategy – 31 32

Sturdivant, Tracy, Telephone Interview, March 1, 2005 Ibid

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from top political operatives. Following the training, each Campaign Corps staffer has the opportunity to immediately put their new skills to work. EMILY’s List assists with placement onto targeted progressive campaigns for the campaign’s final three months. While on the campaign trail, participants receive a stipend, free housing, and travel expenses to and from the campaign33. After Election Day, Campaign Corps helps participants to find another job, ensuring that their campaign experience serves as a first step towards a career in progressive politics. Since its inception in 1988, Campaign Corps has brought hundreds of young activists into the political system as knowledgeable and confident operatives. Another approach to bringing young women into politics is the educational program run by the Center for American Women and Politics (CAWP) at Rutgers. Preparing the next generation of women leaders and shaping leadership that breaks the mold of ‘politics as usual’ is central to CAWP’s mission. To this end, National Education for Women’s (NEW) Leadership works to increase the representation of women in national, state, and local decision-making bodies by empowering college women to take on public leadership roles. Through NEW Leadership programs, college women learn about the importance of having women in positions of political leadership. The program is designed to help young women “focus their interests, recognize their strengths, and develop the skills and confidence necessary to join the next generation of public leaders.34“ The main activity of NEW Leadership is a week-long summer institute, where college women have the opportunity to learn about women’s leadership and political participation from scholars and practitioners. Launched in 1995 with one summer institute in New Jersey, the program has since expanded to include regional programs in the South and Midwest. Over the past few years, CAWP has been developing partnerships with colleges and universities across the country to bring NEW Leadership programs to college women in every state. At the institutes, students participate in workshops to develop leadership skills such as public speaking, conflict resolution, networking, and advocacy training. Another key aspect of the program is its emphasis on connecting the young women with political leaders. Recognizing the importance of strong role models as a source of inspiration, the institute provides numerous opportunities for students to learn from and interact with women leaders. Each institute includes speakers and staff who represent a broad range of racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic backgrounds, as well as diverse political perspectives and experiences. This helps ensure that “each student will have someone they can relate to as well as someone who may challenge their world view.” After the institute, the women are encouraged to put their ideas about leadership into action on their campuses and in their communities. Moving forward, one emphasis of NCWO’s Younger Women’s Task Force will be to help increase the number of women running for office. Through the work of its regional chapters, the Task Force hopes to empower women to engage more in local politics – in their regions, states, and localities. The leaders of this effort are considering how to create mechanisms to identify and empower young women to run for office through the encouragement of others in their communities. Such a system would look for women in less traditional settings – such as at community colleges, or young mothers volunteering for the PTA – who with encouragement, training, and support could be tapped to run for office in their state and local governments, thereby changing the tide of decision makers in their 33 34

www.campaigncorps.com www.newleadership.rutgers.edu

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communities. This effort will begin with the Washington, DC regional group, led by Sarah Brewer, Associate Director of the Women and Politics Institute at American University. “There are currently no younger women running for city council. There are a variety of positions that younger women could run for, even if they don’t win, to help them get comfortable running for office. I would also like to see more young women in leadership of the local party wards.35“ Brewer’s interest in this project comes from her own positive experiences as a young feminist and the importance of great mentors in challenging and empowering her to take on new tasks. At the Women and Politics Institute, she works directly with women students every day, trying to empower them and encourage them to take jobs in politics, to get involved and make an impact on issues they care about. Despite this work, it has taken her a long time to think of herself as a mentor. Seeing that she is indeed a role model to younger women, although she is only 30 herself, is an important self-realization that Brewer believes many other young women activists must go through as well to see themselves as leaders. As increasing numbers of young women recognize – on their own or with the encouragement of others – that they are leaders in the work that they do, hopefully some of these women will also see themselves as potential candidates and political leaders. Once young women make the decision to run for office, it is crucial that they have support and resources. The Women Under Forty PAC (WUFPAC) provides targeted support to help younger women get elected to public office. WUFPAC is driven by the reality that entering politics early dramatically increases the likelihood of rising to positions of power within elected bodies such as Congress and attaining higher office. If we want to elect women as president, we need to first ensure that women are running for statewide and federal office. As WUFPAC president Susannah Shakow explains, “The statistics show that to gain the highest prize, which is president, almost everyone realized you had to get into politics early. Young women are not getting in early. That’s something we really need to work on.36“ Recently, WUFPAC has helped elect several dynamic young women to federal office, including Representative Stephanie Herseth (D-SD, 2004, age 33), Representative Cathy McMorris (R-WA, 2004, age 33), Representative Linda Sanchez (D-CA, 2002, age 31, youngest Latina woman in federal office), Representative Debbie Wasserman Schultz (D-FL, 2004, age 37), and Senator Blanche Lincoln (D-AR, 1998, age 37, youngest-ever woman Senator). The election of these women is not only beneficial for their own futures in politics, it also ensures that young women’s voices and concerns will be heard. In a statement following Election Day 2004, Shakow expressed that “Electing younger women helps women everywhere by ensuring that young women's views are represented in Congress, and by allowing women legislators to build up their political resumes to pave the path to leadership.37“ Each new young woman elected to office is another potential role model for other young women. Sanchez has taken up this challenge and opportunity, acknowledging the power she has to influence others’ decisions, “I’m hoping to be the one to help awaken a political interest in young people, women, and people of color.” This attitude fits with all the techniques highlighted above, and forms a key piece to WUFPAC’s approach. Shakow 35

Brewer, supra at note 13 DiNardo, Kelly, “Group Recruiting Young Women to Run for Office,” Women’s eNews, 4/27/04 37 Press Release, 11/3/04, www.wufpac.org 36

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elaborates, “We’re trying to do everything we can to encourage young women to become more interested in politics, take politics more seriously and understand the impact of politics in their lives.”

CONCLUSIONS Moving Towards a Powerful Collaborative Future Young women have great potential to effect dramatic change in the social and political landscape. As they start initiatives, join established organizations, and participate in programs that encourage and prepare them to become political candidates, they are helping to change expectations about what young women can, and want to, accomplish. Many people have been discouraged by low voter turnout among youth in recent elections. However, the 2004 election saw an increase in the number of voters under 30, and over half of these new young voters are women. Whether as activists, voters, or candidates, young women are increasing their political involvement. The challenge for current feminist leaders is to ensure that young women are welcomed and supported in ways that maximize the contributions they can, and will, make to efforts to change the face of political leadership. Each of the young women highlighted here has chosen a unique path for her efforts to mobilize young women as activists and advocates for political and social change. However, they all agree about one central condition for success – without cooperation and collaboration among older and younger activists, much potential to create real change will be lost. Through her work establishing the Younger Women’s Task Force, Alison Stein has gained several important insights. First, she has recognized that some young women are fearful of and hesitant about the women’s movement and feminism, a fact that Stein believes needs to be accepted by those in the movement. However, she has also seen that when personal issues are broken down and women realize that their lives are affected by the issues about which feminists are advocating, they will become involved. Finally, Stein observed that many young women do feel as though they are an unnoticed group. She believes it is critical for the women’s movement to grow the next generation of leadership and activists, and that older women must always be conscientious of including younger women’s voices as decisions are being made. She hopes that YWTF will be able to create a “really clear, engaged, wellcommunicated voice for younger women. It’s more about creating a movement that’s less rigid, less narrow, less defined and more inclusive and making feminism or whatever we may call it something that women who care about equality just think of themselves as.38“ In reflecting on her experiences at a range of feminist organizations, large and small (Haven, the White House Project, and NOW), Shauna Shames concludes that the most important task for the women’s movement is to encourage the young women who are already trying to be active within it. To do this, leaders at all levels of the feminist movement need to embrace and acknowledge the skills, creativity, and energy possessed by the younger women trying to get more involved. “We have come to the generational gap. We cannot ignore it, we need to bridge it.39“ 38 39

Jones, supra at note 4 Shames, supra at note 8

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Sarah Brewer, who has done significant mentoring work at American University, and now with YWTF, is shifting her focus to encourage and support more young women in running for political office. In her opinion, young women’s relationship to feminism and politics today is not black and white, “it’s not either/or, young women are not apathetic, or all empowered.40“ She reflects that because of the work of the women of earlier generations, young women today have opportunities to engage in issues and politics at more levels than ever before and are doing so. There is also tremendous work yet to be done, particularly in encouraging young women to run for political office. “The torch is being carried, we are not losing young women. However, we did think we’d be further along than we are today. This is the generation that’s supposed to rise through the pipeline and take the reigns of power, and it’s not happening in large numbers. At the same time that we have activism and a sense of empowerment, women continue to be absent from traditional positions of authority and power. As a collective, we are not accessing, nor are we 41 in line to access, these positions. “

The paths to progress are being identified by young women themselves, as they create and run programs for social change. Opportunities abound to embrace young women’s initiatives and invite them to decision-making tables as plans are drawn up to elect our first woman president. However, some feminist groups still hold back from enthusiastic acceptance of younger women activists, often because they do not recognize that the variations on feminist issues that younger women have chosen to tackle are not a repudiation of past work but simply a redefinition of future work. Established leaders may also unwittingly leave young women out of their discussions and decisions through the way they frame and describe the contributions young women can make. Sarah Boonin reflects on this challenge through her experience launching the Choices program at FMF: “the fundamental assumption that students could and would make major contributions as young leaders today ultimately led to the success of the program…By welcoming our participation at some future date [as the future of the movement], the establishment shuns any 42 meaningful role we might have alongside them on the front lines of the current movement. “

This is a key insight for efforts to elect a woman president now, and not 10, 15, or 20 years into the future. Young women are ready to participate in the larger movement; they are already demonstrating tremendous activist political energy through their own initiatives. It is time to tap this energy to create more inclusive, more powerful efforts. As young women recognize themselves and are identified by others as leaders in activist efforts, they are also primed for direct political participation as candidates themselves. Programs such as Vote, Run, Lead and NEW Leadership are providing skill-building and support that will help these new young leaders realize their potential to effect change through electoral politics. Taken together, the intergenerational cooperation of the activist movements, and the encouragement of leadership training programs, hold great promise for creating a generation of engaged, empowered young women who will not only provide critical support 40

Brewer, supra at note 13 Ibid 42 Boonin, supra at note 6, p. 143 41

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for today’s women candidates, but could also become a significant group of talented female political leaders themselves.

REFERENCES Boonin, Sarah, “Please – Stop Thinking about Tomorrow: Building a Feminist Movement on College Campuses for Today,” pp. 138-156, in Catching a Wave – reclaiming feminism for the 21st century, editors Rory Dicker and Alison Piepmeier, 2003, Northeastern University Press, Boston Brewer, Sarah, Telephone Interview, February 17, 2005 Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman and Sidney Verba, The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality and Political Participation, 2001, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Dicker, Rory and Alison Piepmeier, editors, Introduction, pp. 3-28, Catching a Wave – reclaiming feminism for the 21st century, 2003, Northeastern University Press, Boston DiNardo, Kelly, “Group Recruiting Young Women to Run for Office,” Women’s eNews, April 27, 2004 Eagleton Institute, “Young Elected Leaders Project,” 2004, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey Farmer, Ann, “Women Offer Haven to Abortion Seekers,” Women’s eNews, August 4, 2003 Fox, Richard L. and Jennifer L. Lawless, “Entering the Arena? Gender and the Decision to Run for Office,” American Journal of Political Science, 2004, 48: 264-280 Greenberg, Anna, Telephone Interview, March 2, 2005 Hahn, Carole L., Becoming Political: Comparative Perspectives on Citizenship Education, 1998, State University of New York Press, Albany Jones, Mary Lynn F., “Young Women Meet in D.C., Create Own Movement,” Women’s eNews, February 3, 2005 Lake, Snell, Perry and Associates, “Pipeline to the Future: Young Women and Political Leadership,” Findings on mobilizing young women from a survey and focus group for The White House Project Education Fund, April 12, 2000 Pozner, Jennifer L., “The ‘Big Lie’: False Feminist Death Syndrome, Profit, and the Media,” pp. 31-56, in Catching a Wave – reclaiming feminism for the 21st century, editors Rory Dicker and Alison Piepmeier, 2003, Northeastern University Press, Boston Rudman, Laurie, “Self-Promotion as a Risk Factor for Women: The Costs and Benefits of Counterstereotypical Impression Management,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1998, 74: 629-645 Shames, Shauna, Personal Interview, February 17, 2005 Smith, Elizabeth S., “The Political Ambition of Young Women: The Role of SelfPresentational Concerns in Affecting the Desire to Run for Public Office,” paper prepared for presentation at Southern Political Science Association Annual Meeting, January 6-9, 2005, New Orleans, Louisiana Stein, Alison, Telephone Interview, February 15, 2005 Sturdivant, Tracy, Telephone Interview, March 1, 2005

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Walker, Rebecca, editor, to be real: Telling the Truth and Changing the Face of Feminism, 1995, Anchor Books, New York Wilson, Marie C., Closing the Leadership Gap: Why Women Can and Must Help Run the World, 2004, Viking www.campaigncorps.org www.newleadership.rutgers.edu www.thirdwavefoundation.org www.wufpac.org

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 471-485

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

MEDIA COVERAGE OF WOMEN CANDIDATES

Jessica Aubin, Michelle Haak and Andrew Mangini ABSTRACT With the onset of the 21st century, political attention has turned to the possibility of a women being elected president. One factor that affects females when it comes to being elected is gender stereotyping by media outlets in our country. The main focus of this paper is the media’s influence and bias on women candidates for office. The four areas that are concentrated on are: coverage, viability, electability, and an empirical study. The media have an objective when it comes to the perceptions of female candidates to the citizens; often it is a negative depiction given to female candidates

INTRODUCTION Both men and women feel that gender makes a difference in politics. Women still continue to win political office much less frequently than men do and they are not as influential within our government as males. This is something that is of great interest, considering that our political figures are supposed to be representative of the people. “Women constitute a little over half of the population in the U.S., yet the numbers of women who hold office in state legislatures is only about 22.5 percent. The representation in the legislative arena is still substantially lower than that of males”.1 What could possibly be some of the reasons behind such low representation in the political arena? Women rarely make the choice to run for political office. They usually lack the necessary political resources to run, and most of the ones that do, run in hopeless races. Another factor that affects females when it comes to being elected is the fact that they are victims of gender stereotyping by voters and by media outlets in our country. The main focus of this paper will be on the latter explanation: the media’s influence and bias on women candidates.2 “The electability of women candidates for local, statewide, and national offices may be significantly influenced by differential press treatment. Female candidates may be covered

1

2

Miller, Geralyn. 2001. “Newspaper Coverage and Gender: An Analysis of the 1996 Illinois State Legislative House District Races.” Women and Politics 22(3): 83. Kahn, Kim F. and Edie N. Goldenberg. 1991. “Women Candidates in the News: An Examination of Gender Differences in U.S. Senate Campaign Coverage.” The Public Opinion Quarterly 55(2): 181.

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Jessica Aubin, Michelle Haak and Andrew Mangini differently because of standard operating procedures of the press, as well as stereotyping by reporters and editors”.3

The media can have a huge impact on the portrayal of candidates for any political race. They are where the population turns to get their information on the races, the issues, the agendas, and the candidates. The media even influence what voters learn about the candidates in races. They can also set the criteria that voters may use when it comes to evaluating the candidates.4 The media have been known to represent female candidates differently. The type of coverage that they receive is almost always different from that of their male counterparts. The media have an objective when it comes to the perceptions of female candidates to the citizens, and more than often it is a negative depiction that is given female candidates. “Female candidates have consistently received less coverage than men and coverage that is more focused on their chances of winning, less devoted to issues and more likely to emphasize their possession of typical feminine traits and their strengths in typical female policy areas”.5 It is common for the media to only concentrate on the typical “female traits” of candidates, female issues, or the viability of female candidates in their coverage. Then press evaluates some male and female candidates that are identical as different, due to this different style of coverage by the media. This becomes a problem when the only characteristics that voters associate with these candidates are these topics given to them by the media.6

COVERAGE In election races, the media are one of the prominent ways voters become educated. The coverage of a candidate that the media provide is different for each candidate. However, the coverage that female candidates receive is strikingly different than the coverage male candidates receive. The news coverage that women candidates get disadvantages them over their male counterparts.7 This disadvantage is a result of the way the news media covers a female candidate. The media concentrate on: gender differences, feminine attributes, and different overall coverage for female candidates. As a result of this, voters’ decisions are swayed for or against a candidate based on the media’s coverage and not the issues presented by the candidate. In news stories, the media often concentrate on gender differences. Mainly, the media will concentrate on how women are not like men.8 These gender differences in coverage often favor male candidates and negatively affect female candidates.9 The gender differences come from long standing stereotypes. Men are seen as being tougher than women. When translated 3

Miller, Penny M. 1996. “Teaching Women in the News: Exposing the ‘Invisible Majority.’” PS: Political Science and Politics 29(3): 515. 4 Kahn and Goldenberg. 1991, 181. 5 Miller 1996, 515. 6 Kahn, Kim F. 1992. “Does Being Male Help? An Investigation of the Effects of Candidate Gender and Campaign Coverage on Evaluations of U.S. Senate Candidates.” The Journal of Politics 54(2): 511. 7 Larson, Stephanie G. 2001. “American Women and Politics in the Media: A Review Essay.” PS: Political Science and Politics 34(2): 228. 8 Larson 2001, 228 9 Kahn 1992, 510

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to the political arena, these gender differences mean that women are not mentally and emotionally strong enough to lead. The media focus on these differences, which decrease the chances that a female has at winning office. Another way that the media hinder the possibility of a female winning election is the feminine attributes on which they focus. Female candidates do not receive the same press treatment as male candidates.10 In particular, female candidates “were described in terms of their physical attire, personal feminine attributes, and family relationships”.11 Media stories about men do not detail what they are wearing, their hairstyle or their relationships. In fact “political women argue that the media treat them less seriously than they treat men, focus too seldom on issues and too often on their appearances and their family lives and relegate stories about women and politics to the style pages”.12 The news media do not concentrate on the issues a female candidate runs on. The ways these women look are more important to the press. However, by doing this, the media do not properly present the candidate to the voters and, as a result, the voters may not feel a female candidate is in touch with the needs of the constituents or strong enough to lead. Along with placing emphasis on female candidates attributes, the news media place emphasis on trait-based evaluations. While trait coverage is not different between male and female candidates, trait-based evaluations are more common for female candidates.13 These differences are those personality traits that are associated with each gender. Male traits include independent, unemotional, and tough. Female traits include being emotional, weak, and noncompetitive.14 When the media discuss female candidates they are more inclined to use traits that are associated with women than they would with men. Consequently, male candidates are able to discuss their positions on issues with much more ease than female candidates can. The media’s focus on these traits can also have an affect on the voters. By focusing on female traits the press may cause voters to believe that these personality traits are more important than a candidate’s issue stance. Therefore, when it comes to voting for a candidate, voters may concentrate more on the candidate’s personality traits, instead of the more important issue positions.15 When voters do get to the polls, they may not be able to make informed decisions as to which candidate’s positions are most like theirs. In effect, the media, by concentrating on female traits, hinders the chance that a woman has to win by not allowing women the airtime or print space to get their positions out there. “Women candidates may be less likely than male candidates to describe press coverage of their campaigns in positive terms. Many successful and unsuccessful women candidates have complained publicly about the press’ preference for style over substance”.16 The press gives preferential treatment to male candidates over female candidates, thus hurting a female’s chance of winning. Another way that the media prevent females from obtaining a political office is through the type of questions that they ask female candidates. Journalists will typically ask female politicians questions they would not ask men. These questions often have to do with their

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Kahn and Goldenberg 1991, 195 Miller 1996, 514. Norris, Pippa Ed. 1997. Women, Media and Politics. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, Inc.131 13 Kahn and Goldenberg 1991, 194. 14 Kahn and Goldenberg 1991, 195 15 Kahn and Goldenberg 1991, 195 16 Norris 1997, 173 11 12

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appearance, behavior or traditional feminine roles.17 Also, when the media refer to male candidates, it is their name with little descriptive wording attached. However, when references by the media are made to female candidates, they often include gender identification and may not mention the female candidates name at all.18 The main question still remains. Why does the press do this? A possible explanation is that the media still have a hard time seeing females outside of traditional roles. Over the years, females have broken into various fields of employment, but politics has remained a male-dominated profession. As a result of this, when a women does run, the media may regard it as unusual and newsworthy, therefore stressing their femininity and not their position on various issues. This type of coverage does not offer females the opportunity to speak and voice their concerns.19 This hurts a female’s chance at being elected and is a direct result of the press coverage. The type of coverage that females receive is much different from male coverage. When they cover female candidates, the media treat them the same way they do minor party candidates. This is especially true for females who run in presidential campaigns.20 The media judge female candidates as long shots, so they do not include them in their coverage. When the media do discuss female candidates, it is usually negative coverage.21 The media will highlight the qualities a candidate lacks, emphasize personality traits or concentrate only on “female issues.” By concentrating on certain issues and leaving out others, journalists create “misleading impressions” about the candidate.22 This impression is then given to potential voters, who may disregard the candidate. The issues highlighted by the media may not be the dominant issues for that campaign, which makes the female candidate appear out of touch with the voters. Even coverage on Sunday morning news shows, like “Meet the Press” and “Face the Nation”, favor men over women. In a study conducted by The White House Project, only nine percent of the guests on these programs were women, and when they are on the shows they only talk ten percent of the time, which leaves 90 percent of the airtime to the male guests. The media still consider men to be experts in various fields and looks to them for explanations or opinions.23 So, even when females are given the opportunity to appear on television, they do not have the chance to discuss their opinions for the general population to hear. This negative coverage of female candidates by the media has serious consequences. The media are, in effect, eliminating a female’s chance at winning an election before she begins. “Voters’ attitudes are shaped both by the kind of information delivered by the news media and by the way it is delivered”.24 This is a double blow to the candidacy of a female. Females are not only hindered because they are unable to voice their opinions on issues, but also the negative coverage makes a female candidate look unfit for governing. In fact, when it comes 17

Braden, Maria. 1996. Women Politicians and the Media. Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky Miller 1996, 515 19 Miller 1996, 515 20 Braden 1996, 195 21 Larson 2001, 228 22 Kelly, Rita M. and Kimberly Fisher. 1993. “An Assessment of Articles about Women in the ‘Top 15’ Political Science Journals.” PS: Political Science and Politics 26(3): 548. 23 Media Coverage of Women and Women’s Issues. Retrieved February 4, 2005, from http://www.mediaawareness.ca/english/issues/stereotyping/women_and_girls/women_coverage.cfm 24 Braden 1996, 3 18

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to evaluating candidates “coverage is more influential than gender”.25 Media sources are the major way that the public finds out about candidates, but the biased positions of the media steer voters toward male candidates and away from female candidates. To ensure fair, unbiased media coverage, journalists and editors need to throw away old stereotypes of women and concentrate on their issues and not their gender. When the media do discuss women, it is within certain boundaries. One way reflects the typical gender stereotypes of women. The main focus is whether or not a female is fit to govern. For the most part, the images relayed by the media focus on how a female candidate could not solve tough issues. One reason generally used is she would be too emotional. The other way that the media discuss female candidates is to focus only on the “female” issues. By doing this, it becomes increasingly difficult for the public to hear the opinions of the candidate and frustrating for the candidate because she is unable to get her position heard. One of female candidate’s hardest obstacles to overcome is the media’s skepticism about a female’s ability to hold public office and make tough decisions.26 The gender stereotypes that the media portray signify this difficulty. The media constantly infuse womanhood into the campaign of female candidates.27 The media, once again, ignore issues, as they concentrate on the femininity and frailty of a female. This image conveyed to the public, is one of female candidates who cannot fulfill the tougher roles of political life. Getting their issues out to the public is difficult enough for female candidates. However, when the media decide to play into gender stereotypes, females lose whatever benefits free media coverage gives them, just to get their issues to the public. Female vs. male issues are a major element of how the media do present the positions of female candidates. Female-centered issues are domestic ones, such as education, health care and social welfare. On the other hand, male issues are such things as defense and foreign policy. Female and male issues reinforce gender stereotypes by further representing women as docile and incapable of handling tough issues. Although the media emphasize female issues for women, in the news reports male issues are what are presented to the public and female issues are ignored.28 The media are unresponsive to females attempting to break into the domain of male issues. Female candidates are given a mold to fit into by media and any attempt to break out of that mold is ineffective. The media, no matter how hard a female candidate tries, report mainly on male issues and exclude female issues. Due to this stigma, females tend to do better on the state level than on the national level.29 At the state level, the major issues are usually female issues, domestic, while at the national level more issues are considered male, or dealing with foreign policy or defense. It is necessary for the media to erase all notions of male and female issues and present both male and female candidates equally. This will allow the voters to decide who is better equipped for governing without any media bias. When this is accomplished, female candidates will have a level playing field and an increased viability for election.

25

Kahn 1992, 508 Braden 1996, 8 27 Braden 1996, 184 28 Norris 1997, 132 29 Miller 2001, 86 26

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VIABILITY As women get more and more involved with candidacies throughout our country, they continue to be faced with difficulties in their steps toward achieving their career goals. For female candidates, the media can be the ultimate friend or foe, and more often than not they are a foe. Women have a hard time when it comes to controlling the way the media portray them and are often treated very differently than males are by the press.30 They tend to have a harder time controlling the media’s agenda than their fellow male counterparts. One huge issue that these female candidates face is the fact that they receive less issue coverage than the males. The coverage that they usually do receive tends to deal mostly with the concept of “viability”.31 Viability tends to be a more negative issue when it is related to females and it causes many female candidates and their staffs to be concerned with the media and their influence on prospective voters and the election process. Along with this idea of viability, which is the likeliness or the chances of winning, comes an issue with competitiveness, which leads to the “Horse race,” and also the topic of electability. All of these issues are very influential on public perception of candidates for any election or race in our country, and this is why the media have such strong authority when it comes to the portrayal of candidates, especially females and their viability. Can election races be held without any competitiveness? Obviously this would be a huge leap from the traditions that our country is accustomed to especially as far as media are concerned. Non-competitive races would probably not generate as much coverage as those races that are competitive because they are not seen as very exciting, so, in turn, they are not very newsworthy in our society.32 But are competitive race images always the best for the candidates? If you were to ask most female candidates, their staff members or many academics and scholars that have looked at this issue, you would find an overwhelming amount of them believe that the competitiveness of candidates is definitely not a positive factor for female candidates. “The media, deny women the chance to compete fairly with male candidates”.33 The media often portray women as noncompetitive or less competitive, whereas their competition is seen as very competitive when male. Not only does this issue of competitiveness affect candidates of races, it also affects female incumbents. They are a bit better off when it comes to some perceptions that the media normally give. They are seen as more competitive, but in comparison to male incumbents they are still lacking support. “Male incumbents are usually described as ‘sure winners’ while female incumbents are more likely to be considered ‘competitive’”.34 Incumbents almost always win their elections, and that is pretty well known to most and is portrayed through the media as being that way. That is, if you are male. Female incumbents are not seen as having that overwhelming reassurance of regaining their seat. This also affects the viability of female candidates. They are seen as less viable by the media because they are less competitive or are not seen as having the same chance of being a competitive contender 30

Kahn and Goldenberg 1991, 180 Larson 2001, 228 Kahn, Kim F. 1991. “Senate Elections in the News: Examining Campaign Coverage.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 16(3): 352 33 Gerber, Robin. (2001, January). Female Candidates Still Battle for Serious Contention. Retrieved February 4, 2005, from http://www.academy.umd.edu/AboutUs/news/articles/10-03-02.html 34 Kahn 1992, 500. 31 32

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or opponent.35 This type of negative media coverage and the fact that the media see females as less competitive may have an influence on voters. The attention that is put on competitiveness leads to the “Horse race” aspect of our government and its elections. “The greater emphasis on the horse race for females occurs for all types of candidates: competitive and noncompetitive, incumbents, challengers, and candidates in open races”.36 The horse race is very common in our system because the media need something that people will watch or pay attention to in the news. Our country is one centered on competition and the desire to win. So if the press focuses on the competitiveness of races in its stories, then the population is more likely to be interested in the issue. This is an unfortunate approach for females, considering that they are usually portrayed negatively when it comes to the horse race, because of their lower viability. This negative depiction may also lead to more pessimistic evaluations of female candidates.37 Along with the depiction of the horse race comes the fact that these candidates’ issues are not being covered because the focus is merely on the horse race. This leads to the previously mentioned subject of issue coverage for female candidates. “The media regularly call attention to women’s lack of experience and credentials. If the voters/readers are focused on the “horse race” and viability of the candidate issues will be lost in the fray”.38 When there is limited coverage of issues because a majority of the coverage is spent on the horse race, female candidates are hurt because issue coverage, especially of domestic issues, may be a little bit more positive than coverage of viability. This coverage most influences those who follow the media closely and are swayed easily by what they see or hear. They are the ones who use this coverage and these images and portrayals and take them to heart. “This lack of issue attention in the press, coupled with the emphasis on the horse race, may lead voters to discount issues and emphasize viability when evaluating female candidates”.39 Citizens use this material when they are deciding for whom to show support. This type of support could be either through voting, campaigning or even financial support. “The conventional wisdom suggests that female candidates are often disadvantaged with regard to campaign finance”.40 When people perceive negative attitudes from the media about a candidate, they are less likely to support that candidate and do not want to back a candidate who is seen in such a negative light. People would not support candidates financially if they felt that the person didn’t have a good chance of winning. Also, if they are concentrated fully on the horse race, then they may be less likely to support a female candidate because of the idea that they are not “electable”.41 Electability is a very popular term used in the government, especially throughout the last presidential year. It is loosely defined as whether or not a candidate has the “goods” needed to win the candidacy and to then be elected. The whole idea behind electability goes hand in hand with the idea that has been the focus of this section of the paper, viability. Electability is important when it comes to voters and political parties’ influence on elections. A political party will be less likely to show support for a candidate that they do not feel would be electable. The parties would rather back someone who they feel would have the best shot at 35

Kahn 1991, 352 Kahn and Goldenberg 1991, 181 37 Kahn and Goldenberg 1991, 188 38 Miller 2001, 86 39 Kahn and Goldenberg 1991, 191 40 Kahn and Goldenberg 1991, 190 36

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winning. Now whether or not that candidate is actually the right one is a whole other issue. When political parties are not as confident with a candidate, that candidate will get less backing from them, which could mean less media coverage, less help or support, and even less financial contributions. Another thing that could lead to less news exposure is when reporters and editors regard female candidates as being less viable and thus, less important. “If voters decide to take their cues from the media with regard to viability of the various candidates, then this media information may influence voters’ attitudes toward the candidates”.42 Some previous studies have shown that viability is a huge issue when it comes to why or why not candidates are elected. “[Some of these studies] suggest that viability assessments are more important than trait assessments for understanding voters’ overall evaluations of candidates”.43 This again can be seen as a potential problem for female candidates, mostly due to the fact that female candidates’ coverage consistently has produced negative viability assessments. If viability plays as large of a role at it seems, then this could be one reason why the amount of women in government positions is low. The issue of viability ultimately is a huge obstacle to overcome for female candidates of any type of governmental election, whether it is for Senate, the House of Representatives, or even local positions. What about females running for president? If the media have such a great impact on the campaigns of women running for lower seats in the government, then the impact on a female running for president would increase dramatically. This is especially due to the fact that a presidential campaign is most successful when it has momentum. The way to get this momentum is for a candidate to be perceived as having a great, if not the best, chance of winning the race. “Viability can overwhelm the issues and build momentum unrelated to other considerations [in a presidential race]”.44 If a necessity of a successful campaign for the presidency is to have momentum and good viability, where does that leave female candidates who have neither, according to media outlets, when it comes to running for the presidency?

EMPIRICAL STUDY There are many different factors that may influence the way that people view or follow campaigns. The media are the main contributor to informing the public about campaigns and about politics in general. In addition, the media can have a strong impact on how citizens view particular politicians, especially women. In 1978, the year of our first study, the public had mixed feelings about women politicians and the differences that existed between men and women. Across the board, people were unlikely to vote for women in politics and some believed that women were not suited for politics. The second study was done using 1998, and the data between the two years was compared. A drastic change was seen in the respondents, as more said that they would vote for a women and fewer felt that women were not suited for politics. Even when the variables of age and gender are added, differences are still present and the relationships are strong. Also, one must look at the media and its effect on the public.

41

Kahn 1992, 506 Kahn and Goldenberg 1991, 187 43 Kahn 1992, 511 44 Kahn 1992, 498 42

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With the rise of the Internet, media has become more powerful and influential in informing people.

Hypothesis Women will be more likely than men to vote for a woman and to feel that women are suited for politics. Also, the younger the respondent is, the more likely they are to vote for a woman and to feel that women are suited for politics.

Research Design We conducted two studies: one to determine the changes that have taken place in the media as well as the changes that have occurred in people’s views towards women politicians. Also, we will see if there is any relevance between the two to see if the media do in fact affect people’s views towards women politicians. It will be a cross-sectional study, with 1978 and 1998 looking at the views of women politicians, since the media and people’s views change immensely in 20 years. This individual study will look at people’s particular views of the questions that were asked in the surveys. This study that deals with views of women candidates uses the years 1998 and 1978. 1998 was the most current study available and 1978 was chosen as the second year to study because it would show a significant change in data and be best for comparison. For this study, there were two different dependent variables. The first deals with the question of whether or not women are suited for politics. Only “Yes” and “No” answers were counted and the rest were recoded and classified as “missing”. The next question dealt with the idea of respondent’s party nominating a woman for president and the respondent’s willingness to vote for that woman. Only “Yes” and “No” answers were counted. Both age and gender were used as independent variables. Gender was measured simply by “male” and “female.” For age, some recoding was needed. The respondents answered by giving their exact age, so the ages were then grouped together. Ages 18-24 were put in one group, since within this group lies college students. The remaining groups were 25-44, 45-64 and 65 and up. Also, for the view on women politicians survey, the data was calculated by the impact of each independent variable on the dependent variable, as well as using both independent variables, at the same time, on the dependent variables. This was done to see if relationships existed in both age and gender. Data for the study were collected using the General Social Survey. This broad study, that encompasses a wide range of variables, was done every year with the exception of a few years. Many of the same questions are asked year-to-year to facilitate comparisons. It is done through a lengthy questionnaire and a rigorous sampling technique is used to gather households. Lastly, we used Chi-Square tests of independence, obtained through the use of SPSS and a crosstabs procedure, to find the significance of the relationships among the variables. We will be using a significance level of .05 as the standard for evaluation of the relationships. In addition, we conducted an original survey that measured what types of media college students used, as well as their views on the coverage of politicians, their tolerance of a woman

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president and their willingness to vote for a woman candidate for president. Also, the gender of the respondent was taken into consideration. It was done through a survey and our sample consisted of students at Siena College who were taking classes in the field of political science. There were a total of 170 respondents, with 83 males and 87 females. Students ranked five types of media (television, internet, newspapers, magazines and radio) in order of which they used most frequently. If the Internet was one of their first two choices, they were asked to rank television channel sites, newspaper sites and “other” sites, in order of importance. The second part dealt with the views on women politicians and the media, yielding answers of “Yes” or “No”. The first question asked whether male and female politicians get equal coverage in the media. The next question measured the respondent’s tolerance of a female president. The third asked whether or not the respondent would vote for a woman for president. The data from the original survey were broken down into males and female. For the media section, the rankings were added and then an average ranking was found. The second set of questions was measured using percentages.

Analysis After analyzing the data, it became clear that there were distinct patterns that were present in both studies. For the study only on the view of women politicians, gender proved to be insignificant, as many of the views did not change. In the original survey, gender was a very strong variable, with responses varying greatly in regard to gender. Age was a very significant variable for the first study, yielding strong relationships in most circumstances. More astonishing than the independent variables were the differences that existed when comparing the studies that were 20 years apart. These differences are present in the topic of views on women candidates. The first question asked dealt with women being suited for politics. This question was computed four times, two for each year, with one of those being for each independent variable. There proved to be no significance for gender as a variable, as their views were very close. However, when age was the independent variable, there was a significant relationship for both years, yielding a value of 50.448 and a significance level less than .001 for 1998, and a value of 53.127 and a significance level of less than .001 for 1978. This means that there was a strong relationship between the two variables. For both years, as the respondents age increased, they became more likely to agree with the statement that women were not suited for politics. For example, in 1978, in the age group 17-24, 70.4 percent disagreed with the statement, decreasing to 61.3 percent, 49.9 percent and 40.3 percent as the age groups increased. Table 1. Women Not Suited for Politics by Gender (1998)

Agree Disagree N= 1747

Male 23% (169) 77% (565) Chi-Square= .018

Gender Female 23.3% (236) 76.7% (777) NS

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Table 2. Women Not Suited for Politics by Gender (1978)

Agree Disagree N= 1468

Male 41.2% (249) 58.8% (356) Chi-Square= 2.923

Gender Female 45.7% (394) 54.3% (469) NS

Table 3. Women Not Suited for Politics by Age (1998)

Agree Disagree N= 1743

17-24 25-44 21.7% (31) 19.6% (160) 78.3% (112) 80.4% (656) Chi-Square= 50.448

Age 45-64 20.3% (102) 79.7% (401) Sig. < .001

65+ 39.5% (111) 60.5% (170)

Table 4. Women Not Suited for Politics by Age (1978)

Agree Disagree N= 1461

17-24 25-44 29.6% (59) 38.7% (250) 70.4% (140) 61.3% (396) Chi-Square= 53.127

Age 45-64 50.1% (193) 49.9% (192) Sig. < .001

65+ 59.7% (138) 40.3% (93)

Results for the next question were very similar. When asked whether they would vote for a woman for president, gender had no significant impact, as both genders have similar responses. Age, again, prevailed as the dominant independent variable. For both 1998 and 1978, the youngest age group had the highest percentage that would vote for a woman candidate, while the oldest age group was the least likely to vote for a female candidate. In 1998, 98.1 percent of the 17-24 age group would vote for a woman, as opposed to 95.4 percent for the 25-44 age group, 94.4 percent for the 45-64 age group and 84.4 percent for the 65 and up age group. These results yielded a Chi-Square value of 51.081 and a significance level less than .001 for 1998 and a Chi-Square value of 115.282 and a significance level less than .001 for 1978. Table 5. Vote for a Woman for President by Gender (1998)

Yes No N= 1803

Male 94.5% (733) 5.5% (43) Chi-Square= 1.803

Gender Female 92.9% (954) 7.1% (73) NS

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Jessica Aubin, Michelle Haak and Andrew Mangini Table 6. Vote for a Woman for President by Gender (1978)

Yes No N= 1492

Gender Female 80.3% (694) 19.7% (170) NS

Male 83.3% (523) 16.7% (102) Chi-Square= 2.114

Table 7. Vote for a Woman for President by Age (1998) Age Yes No N= 1799

17-24 25-44 98.1 (151) 95.4% (796) 1.9% (3) 4.6% (38) Chi-Square= 51.081

45-64 94.4% (493) 5.6% (29) Sig. < .001

65+ 84.4% (244) 15.6% (45)

Table 8. Vote for a Woman for President by Age (1978) Age Yes No N= 1485

17-24 25-44 92.6% (189) 88.5% (578) 7.4% (15) 11.5% (75) Chi-Square= 115.282

45-64 77.8% (301) 22.2% (86) Sig. < .001

65+ 60.2% (145) 39.8% (96)

Table 9. Rank of TV by Gender

1 2 3 4 5 N= 170

Males 37.3% (31) 37.3% (31) 15.6% (13) 7.2% (6) 2.4% (2) Average= 2.0

Females 44.8% (39) 34.5% (30) 12.6% (11) 4.6% (4) 3.4% (3) Average= 1.87

It is evident that there are distinct differences in how various groups use the media and what form they use. To gauge this effect, as well as see how that tied into views on women politicians, we used our original survey and broke the groups down into males and females. All of the answers to the media questions were weighted to calculate the proper ranking order. For males, the Internet was ranked as the number one news source with an average ranking of 1.92, followed by television (2.0), newspapers (2.66), radio (4.13) and magazines (4.24). Females, however, had a different first choice. Television came out on top with a ranking of 1.87, followed by the Internet (1.94), newspapers (3.04), radio (3.92) and magazines (4.08). This shows that television and the Internet are clearly the top choices, most likely due to the fact that 24-hour news channels are commonplace and one can view news whenever they feel, and the Internet is always available, with hundreds of different sites that provide news all the

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time. For both males and females, Internet newspaper sites were the most used, followed very closely by television channel sites, with “other” sites far behind. Table 10. Rank of Internet by Gender

1 2 3 4 5 N= 170

Males 49.4% (41) 20.5% (17) 19.3% (16) 9.6% (8) 1.2% (1) Average= 1.9

Females 41.4% (36) 34.5% (30) 16.1% (14) 4.6% (4) 3.4% (3) Average= 1.94

Table 11. Rank of Newspapers by Gender

1 2 3 4 5 N= 170

Males 9.6% (8) 31.3% (26) 47% (39) 7.2% (6) 4.8% (4) Average= 2.7

Females 8% (7) 18.4% (16) 41.4% (36) 25.3% (22) 6.9% (6) Average= 3.04

Table 12. Rank of Magazines by Gender

1 2 3 4 5 N= 170

Males 0% (0) 7.2 % (6) 7.2% (6) 39.8% (33) 45.8% (38) Average= 4.24

Females 3.4% (4) 2.3% (2) 17.5% (15) 36.8% (32) 40.2% (35) Average= 4.08

Table 13. Rank of Radio by Gender

1 2 3 4 5 N= 170

Males 3.6% (3) 2.4% (2) 10.8% (9) 37.3% (31) 45.6% (37) Average= 4.13

Females 4.6% (4) 10.3% (9) 12.6% (11) 29.9% (26) 42.5% (37) Average= 3.92

For the second part of out study, we looked at views of the media and female politicians. When asked whether or not male and female politicians received equal media coverage, 61

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percent of males felt it was not equal, while 39 percent felt that there was equal coverage. The results were different for females, as 80 percent felt that there was not equal coverage and only 20 percent felt that it was equal. The next question asked if the respondent would tolerate a female president. 88 percent of males would tolerate a female president, while 99 percent of females would tolerate a woman president. The last question asked whether the respondent would vote for a woman for president. Again, there was a great difference between genders, as 66 percent of males would vote for a woman candidate for president, while 94 percent of females would vote for a woman candidate for president. Although only 66 percent of males responded that they would vote for a woman, 88 percent said that they would be tolerant of a woman president, producing a difference of 22 percent. For female respondents, the difference between those willing to vote for a woman candidate and those who would be tolerant of a woman president was much smaller, with totals of 99 percent and 94 percent for the respective questions. Table 14. Males and Females Get Equal Media Coverage by Gender

Yes No N= 169

Males 39% (32) 61% (50)

Females 20% (17) 80% (70)

Table 15. Tolerate a Woman President by Gender

Yes No N= 168

Males 88% (71) 12% (10)

Females 99% (86) 1% (1)

Table 16.Vote for a Woman Presidential Candidate by Gender

Yes No N= 166

Males 66% (52) 34% (27)

Females 94% (82) 6% (5)

CONCLUSION As the study moved from 1978 to 1998, fewer respondents felt that women were not suitable for politics and more responded that they would vote for a woman for president. Therefore, one could make the argument that several factors may be involved; including the change that has taken place in the media. The feeling of women politicians may be tied into feelings towards women’s rights and equality. However, one should not ignore the extreme change in the media and cannot help but ponder the thought that the media do influence the public.

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Also, in the original survey that was conducted, it was obvious that the Internet plays a major role in the media, as it was at the top, or close behind, for both genders. When looking at the second part of the survey, gender differences were very visible as the females were more tolerant of women politicians than the males in every case. In addition, female and male candidates do not receive equal media coverage, like what much of the literature states. Unfortunately, most of what little coverage they do get is focused on their in ability to win. This focus on the horserace, teamed with the lack of coverage, make it increasingly difficult for women to gain support and, ultimately, prevail in elections.

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 487-504

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

EXPERIENCES OF FEMALE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES Alicia Jencik ABSTRACT Although many nations have had a woman serve as president or prime minister, the United States has yet to even come close to electing its first female president. Using profiles of the women who have pursued the presidency in the United States, as well as scholarly literature on women and executive politics, this study offers a comparative analysis of the factors impacting – and impeding – their campaigns, providing lessons from these trailblazing but unsuccessful efforts that might prove to be relevant for future female candidates for the White House.

INTRODUCTION Women make up over 50 percent of the world’s population; however, with few exceptions, women are not equally represented as elected officials throughout the world. In the United States, women are underrepresented in local, state, and national government positions. In addition, at the time of this writing, the United States has had 43 presidencies (42 different presidents, as Grover Cleveland was both the 22nd and 24th president), all of whom have been males. Nevertheless, throughout the nation’s brief history, seven women have been serious candidates for the United States presidency five of them from major political parties and one woman has been the vice presidential nominee of a major political party (See Tables 1 and 2). Table 1. Women Seeking the United States Presidency Name Margaret Chase Smith Shirley Chisholm Patricia Schroeder Elizabeth Dole Carol Moseley Braun

Year 1964

Party Republican

Birth 12/14/1897

Death 5/29/1995

1972 1987 1999 2004

Democrat Democrat Republican Democrat

11/30/1924 7/30/1944 7/29/1936 8/16/1947

1/1/2005 N/A N/A N/A

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Alicia Jencik Table 2. Women Seeking The United States Vice Presidency

Name Geraldine Ferraro

Year 1984

Party Democrat

Birth 8/26/1935

Death N/A

The first woman to run a formal campaign for president was Victoria Woodhull in 1872. She ran as a member of the Equal Rights Party and, despite her lack of success, she has a place in history due to her role as the first woman to run for president. Woodhull had a difficult time campaigning, facing widespread discrimination, and was even arrested for attempting to register to vote and for campaigning. (1) In 1884, Belva Lockwood, a teacher, became the second woman to run for president. Lockwood ran on behalf of the National Equal Rights Party, which was a newer manifestation of Woodhull’s Equal Rights Party. Lockwood faced the same discrimination as Woodhull; however, both women are remembered not for their losses, but for being trail-blazers. It was not until nearly a century later that another woman ran for president. In 1964, Margaret Chase Smith from Maine campaigned for the top job. Unlike Woodhull and Lockwood, Smith had experience in elective office: she was the first woman to serve in both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. A pioneer in her time, Smith became the first woman to have her name placed in the nomination process of a major political party, the Republican Party. Despite her political experience, Smith’s campaign had little hope. She was treated as though she was running for vice president and the news media constantly referred to her as “Mrs.,” as opposed to “Senator,” which placed her marital status over her political status in the public eye, further hampering her viability. (2) In short, she was not taken seriously as a candidate in spite of her successful political career. Shirley Chisholm followed Smith almost a decade later. In 1972, Chisholm, the first African American woman to serve in Congress, became the first woman and the first African American to run for the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination. It is worth noting that Chisholm frequently stated that she faced more discrimination for being a woman then she did for being black, (3) suggesting that her sex was even more of an obstacle for her than her race. In 1984, Democrat Geraldine Ferraro, Congresswoman from New York, and an advocate for women’s rights, became the first woman to receive the vice-presidential nomination of a major political party when Walter Mondale selected her as his running mate. In 1987, Democrat Patricia Schroeder began her candidacy for the presidency. Although her presidential bid was unsuccessful, by the end of her tenure in office, Schroeder served as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives for 24 years, the longest tenure of any woman in that chamber. In 1999, Republican Elizabeth Dole ran for the nation’s highest office and was widely considered to be the first truly viable woman to pursue the presidency. Dole had prior political experience as a former cabinet member for Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, was the wife of the 1996 Republican presidential nominee, a Harvard-educated attorney, and had also served as president of the Red Cross. In 2004, Democrat Carol Moseley Braun was one of many candidates contending for the Democratic Party’s nomination, but the only woman in the race. Although most of the women competing for their party’s nomination for president had political experience, none of their campaigns were successful. Among these politicians,

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Ferraro was the most successful, winning the party’s nomination for vice president in 1984. In the year 2000, two women secured their party’s nomination for vice president, although both were “third” or minor parties: Winona La Duke, an American Indian, was Ralph Nader’s number two on the Green Party ticket; and Ezola Foster, an African American, secured the vice presidential spot on the Reform Party ticket with Patrick Buchanan. Of the other aforementioned female presidential candidates, only Chase Smith was actually nominated at a party convention, while Chisholm won delegate votes at the convention. The other candidates all dropped out before or during primary elections.

METHODOLOGY There are three research questions driving this study. First, what were the challenges and barriers faced by the women who ran for their party’s nomination for president? Second, were there any personal and political similarities and differences among female candidates for president, and if so what were they? Third, what factors might offer explanations of why female candidates have so far been unsuccessful in their campaigns in gaining a major political party’s nomination for president? (4) Political biographies of the five presidential aspirants within the last half century, beginning with Margaret Chase Smith in 1964 and concluding with Carol Moseley Braun in 2004, as well as vice-presidential nominee Geraldine Ferraro in 1984, illustrate the array of personal and social obstacles in running for the top office. Along with their personal situation, perhaps the greatest obstacle is the office itself, which is arguably the most masculine job in the country. A number of scholars have analyzed the problem of institutionalized gender in terms of women and politics. (5) These challenges are only compounded when the office in question is the presidency. (6) According to Duerst-Lahti and Kelly, “Leadership and governance, in particular, have been defined in terms of masculinism. As a result, women and feminism are particularly disadvantaged in this crucial domain.” (7) Masculine values are preferred over feminine values and men garner much more substantive attention than women in politics, making them more privileged. Masculinity – having qualities suitable to or usually associated with a man – is similar to an ideology and is pervasive in American society, therefore hampering the political aspirations of females. Also according to Duerst-Lahti and Kelly, most books on the presidency and political leadership fail to take into account the importance of gender dynamics. (8) The masculinity of the executive branch is important in understanding why seeking executive office is so much more difficult for women than it is for men. Closely related to masculinism is sexism, which undervalues the experiences of women pursuing and serving in elected office. As the literature suggests, both sexism and gender stereotypes are key to assessing the fate of women running for office. (9) Six profiles have been constructed and two of the six female candidates – Geraldine Ferraro and Patricia Schroeder – were interviewed by the authors. The following individuals were the focus of the profiles: Margaret Chase Smith (1964), Shirley Chisholm (1972), Geraldine Ferraro (1984), Patricia Schroeder (1987), Elizabeth Dole (1999), and Carol Moseley Braun (2004). According to Karen O’Connor and other scholars, these are the main female presidential contenders in the modern post-World War II era. In addition, these

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women were chosen because they are the only women who ran on the behalf of a major political party and ran in the modern era. (10) The existing literature on women and politics and women in executive office was used as a basis for the analysis. This paper borrows from and attempts to build on several existing models and theories of women and elective office. Although most studies of women and politics focus on the congressional and local levels, this paper analyzes the executive level, and the presidency in particular. Specifically, literature on the challenges and barriers women face when running for political office was explored. In addition, biographies, autobiographies, books, and scholarly articles about the individual women who are the focus of this study were utilized. As a first step in the study, we analyzed the female presidential candidates by building profiles of each, which were used to explain similarities and differences among them. The profiles constructed included an array of interesting and useful factors – demographic, social, and political – all suggested by the literature base as potentially important in understanding the political success of men and especially of women. Secondly, the analysis compared these factors among the female presidential candidates, as well as against male presidents, in general, using both personal and political characteristics. The personal characteristics included: family background and class; level of education; whether the candidate was married and had children; and age at marriage. Political characteristics included: party affiliation; previous political experience and careers; hardships in campaign financing; and other barriers faced by women in politics, in general, and by each candidate, in particular. Additionally, the length of the campaign, whether each candidate competed in a primary election, or not, and approval ratings of the candidates were be noted. The time period each candidate ran during, whether they debated members of their own party, and any other unique features of the campaign were also taken into account. So too were changes in the process of nomination taken into account, as well as whether the candidate’s viewed themselves as feminists or were perceived as feminists. It should be noted that there is a potential methodological problem of a small universe, since only a few women have run for the presidency and only one woman has been the vice presidential nominee of a major political party. However, at the time of this study, only fortytwo men have served as president; yet, the field of presidential studies successfully works within this constraint. (11)

LITERATURE REVIEW Despite the possible benefits derived from more women serving in government, women continue to face many barriers, both inside and outside elected political office. The following section breaks down the main barriers facing women into four general challenges: campaign finance; women, sex stereotypes, and the media; women candidates and voters; and recruitment and representation. The article then examines the impact of women in elective office and the unique challenges to women and executive office.

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Campaign Finance Campaign finance plays a very large role in political campaigns at all levels because money influences the publicity each candidate’s message receives. According to Burrell, money was a serious problem in the past for women candidates at the local and congressional levels. (12) More recently, women have generally raised the necessary level of campaign funds required to be competitive at the local and legislative levels. According to FarrarMyers, successful women congressional candidates have been better fundraisers than men and, on average, have spent more money than most male candidates. (13) However, as Table 3 demonstrates, fundraising differences between men and women are extremely evident, particularly in terms of PAC contributors. Male candidates receive more money from business-related PACs than females, while female candidates receive more money from labor-related PACs than males. (14) It is important to note that this study did not control for the effects of incumbency. Also, women pursuing executive office – particularly the presidency – still tend to raise far less money than their male competitors. Table 3. Average Source Of Funds In The Senate (1996-2000), By Sex Source of Funding Individuals PACs Business PACs Labor PACs Single-Issue PACs Candidate Other

Women Candidates 65.3 18.6 (71.6) (12.8) (15.7) 7.8 8.3

Men Candidates 55.8 34.6 (87.9) (4.5) (7.6) 0.0 8.8

Source: Victoria Farrar-Myers, “A War Chest Full of Susan B. Anthony Dollars: Fund-raising Issues for Female Presidential Candidates,” Anticipating Madam President (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003), 91. Note: Parentheses represent percentages of the PAC total

According to Haussman, women’s PACs, such as the Women’s Campaign Fund, the National Women’s Political Caucus, EMILY’s List, and the National Organization for Women (NOW), have also become very important players in women’s electoral success. (15) EMILY’s List, which was founded in 1986 by Ellen Malcom, is an organization that helps elect pro-choice, Democratic women. EMILY’s List made an early contribution to the campaign of Barbara Mikulski (D – MD), the first democratic woman elected to the United States Senate in her own right, which enabled Mikulski to be viewed as a viable candidate. (16) Farrar-Myers argues that as women spend longer amounts of time in the Senate, the difference in funding from PACs between women and men will likely be eliminated – a trend that is already taking place in the House of Representatives. (17) Fundraising is one of the most fundamental and important elements of a political campaign. Women presidential aspirants face even more challenges in fundraising and campaign finance due to the large amounts of funds necessary to run for executive office. Although female congressional candidates are beginning to raise campaign funds in amounts that are equivalent to male candidates, this does not extend to the executive level, which is demonstrated by the hardships that each female candidate faced while campaigning for the

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presidential nomination. Even Elizabeth Dole, who was known for her fundraising prowess, could not raise the funds necessary for a campaign at the executive level, in part because of her sex, which bodes poorly for women candidates. (18)

Women, Sex Stereotypes, and The Media Women in politics face many challenges with the news media that men do not have to face. Women must portray themselves as assertive, independent decision makers, as do men, but must especially make it a point to repeatedly demonstrate such traits. At the same time, women must seem more trustworthy and empathetic than men. (19) According to a study of the U.S. Senate from 1982 to 1986, women not only had to explain their stance on issues, but also had to demonstrate personality traits, such as competence and integrity far more than did men. Similarly, it is necessary for women to focus on competence more frequently than men since they are generally viewed as less skilled and experienced by the public who perceives leadership as a masculine trait. (20). On average, female candidates receive less media attention than male candidates, which results in the loss of the valuable asset of name recognition among voters, which affects the amount of support that women candidates receive. (21) Men receive more coverage than women and more political coverage, while a majority of media coverage involving women focuses on personal issues, such as family or attire. In addition, a lack of media attention also limits women’s potential viability as presidential candidates. A study by Kahn demonstrates that in print media, articles on male candidates average thirteen paragraphs, while articles on women candidates average ten paragraphs. Likewise, when a woman is a part of a political campaign, the press is more likely to emphasize the “horse race,” which focuses on which candidate is ahead in the polls. This negatively impacts the candidacies of women by making them appear less viable. (22) Clearly, because of the generally negative and dissimilar media coverage between the sexes, women face more difficulties in fundraising. In addition, reporters frequently discuss traits of male and female candidates in different terms. For instance, even women reporters frequently hinder women’s candidacies by discussing their campaigns in a stereotypically feminine manner. Sex stereotypes are used to differentiate between male and female candidates since it is easier to judge individuals based on predispositions about a particular group than to learn about each individual person. For example, a widely used stereotype of women running for elected office is that they are weak in foreign policy and budget issues. Although women reporters utilize sex stereotypes in their coverage of candidates, they are more likely than male reporters to cover women’s policy issues. In addition, women candidates are more likely to receive equitable coverage when the electoral climate is positive for women, such as when there is a focus on domestic issues; however, when the political climate is focused on foreign policy or national security issues women are treated less fairly by the press. (23) Kahn also notes that the media partially determines the electability and viability of female candidates through their ability to distinguish between male/female differences, which can affect voter perception of candidates. (24) In her study, Kahn cites four main ways in which the media can affect a campaign. First, the media controls the amount of information and the kind of information that people see. Second, the media can cause changes in public opinion about the candidate. Third, the media sets an agenda in which they determine what

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issues people will view as most important by focusing on specific issues, while ignoring others. Fourth, the media is involved in what Kahn refers to as ‘priming’ by influencing what people think when viewing a candidate. Although poor media coverage is detrimental to women at all levels, it is extremely damaging to women running for their party’s nomination for president. Women presidential aspirants have to overcome even more stereotypes and viability issues, which negative media coverage makes very difficult. However, according to Bystrom, coverage of women candidates may improve in the future due to media reporting becoming more equitable. (25) For example, Bystrom notes that it is important for women candidates to build a positive relationship with the media in order to achieve equality within this realm of politics. If media coverage becomes more equitable in the future, this could be beneficial to women running for executive office and provide an opportunity for their issue positions to be taken seriously by the media, and therefore the general public, on both domestic and international issues.

Women Candidates and Voters According to Cook, in a study of voter perceptions of female candidates, there are essentially three ways to test voter reaction to women running for office – taking polls, conducting experiments, and reviewing data from past elections. (26) Cook also notes that women candidates face a voter bias. For instance, a 1997 Gallup Poll demonstrated that seven percent of voters would not vote for a woman candidate under any circumstance. Cook argues that there are three main reasons for voter bias against female candidates: males and females have different ideological views; male and female candidates bring different values to politics; and there is a difference between men and women in terms of gender identity. For instance, individuals who are older and less educated, refer to themselves as conservative, and hold traditional religious beliefs, are less likely to show support for a woman candidate. Although sex is a major factor, there are other important factors involved when electing female candidates. For instance, partisanship rather than sex of the voter is a better determinant of whether an individual is likely to vote for a woman. Evidence provided by Cook demonstrates that Republican women running for the Senate receive more votes from men than Democratic women. (27) This is important to political parties in selecting a presidential candidate because they want to support an individual that they consider viable. According to the most recent poll, the 2005 Sienna College/Hearst Newspaper Poll, eighty-one percent of Americans would vote for a woman for president. Ten percent of respondents were not sure whether they would vote for a woman and nine percent stated that they would not vote for a woman for president under any circumstance. Since recent presidential elections have been decided by less than nine percentage points, this deficit could be decisive. According to Kennedy, scholarly research that has identified subtle attitudinal barriers towards a woman president and structural barriers against women, in general, are rarely taken into account in most popular analyses of the readiness of our country to elect a female president. (28) People frequently reply to questions in polls with a response that they feel is socially desirable, as opposed to how they may actually feel. In addition, Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate that the percentage of people willing to vote for a female president changes depending upon the wording of the question in the poll.

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If your party nominated a woman for president, would you vote for her if she were qualified for the job? Year 1975 1983 1984 1986 1987 1996 1999

Yes (%) 73 80 78 N/A 82 N/A 92

No (%) 23 16 17 N/A 12 N/A 7

No opinion (%) 4 4 5 N/A 6 N/A 1

Source: Carole Kennedy, “Is the United States Ready for a Woman President? Is the Pope Protestant?,” Anticipating Madam President (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 136. Note: N/A means that no data were available during that year

Table 5. Polling Results For The General Social Survey Question (1975-1999) Do you agree or disagree with this statement: Women should take care of running their homes and leave running the country up to men. Year 1975 1983 1984 1986 1987 1996 1999

Agree (%) 35 N/A N/A 23 N/A 16 N/A

Disagree (%) 62 N/A N/A 73 N/A 80 N/A

Not sure/No answer (%) 3 N/A N/A 4 N/A 4 N/A

Source: Carole Kennedy, “Is the United States Ready for a Woman President? Is the Pope Protestant?,” Anticipating Madam President (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 136. Note: N/A means that no data were available during that year

Recruitment and Representation According to many studies, including a study conducted in 1994 by the National Women’s Political Caucus (NWPC), when women run, they win as frequently as men at the state legislative and congressional levels. Therefore, the problem is not the ability of women to win, but the lack of women running for office. Between 1972 and 1993, only 20 percent of state legislators, seven percent of Congress, and six percent of gubernatorial candidates were women. (29) Many women who do not consider running for political office frequently cite the strength of incumbency, lack of time, money, training, and role models, as well as feelings of low confidence in their ability to run a successful campaign and fear of the amount of pubic scrutiny they will receive. (30) According to Genovese in his study of women leaders worldwide, political socialization, situational and structural factors, as well as active discrimination against women are three

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main factors causing the under-representation of women in public political office. (31) In American states, Norrander and Wilcox show that women’s representation is higher in states where “…politics is considered public business”; although, in the South and Mid-Atlantic regions, representation is higher in “individualistic states” where “... individual politicians advance their own careers by helping different groups achieve their political goals.” (32) In addition to region, religion also has an effect. States with a large proportion of voters with a high level of Church attendance have fewer women in government. (33) It is possible that the West could become fertile ground for women in executive politics. If current trends persist and the West continues to have the most women serving in elected office, this region may include many women with political experience wishing to obtain a position in higher office. Many state legislators move to higher office, becoming representatives and senators in the U.S. Congress, or run for governor, which are some of the positions that past presidential contenders, as well as past presidents, have occupied. The election of a woman president will likely be the result of more women being elected into positions at all levels of government. In terms of representation and recruitment at the executive level, major political parties do not seek out women as their choice for a presidential contender. None of the women who sought their party’s nomination for the presidency was recruited by their respective political parties. In addition, they did not receive support from their party once they announced their candidacy or exploratory campaign. This may be due to what Thomas refers to as “the social eligibility pool”, which deals with the expectations of citizens concerning the background of candidates. (34) Strategists for the Democratic and Republican parties know that women are viewed as less viable candidates due to their lack of electoral and military experience, as well as executive or administrative experience, which comes into play as we consider a woman in the White House. Therefore, women are less likely to be recruited by major political parties. In addition, it is important to note the history of the nomination process, as well as the changes that have taken place. In the 1800s, members of Congress nominated candidates for president and vice president; however, in the 1830s this began to change. By 1832, candidates were nominated at party conventions by delegates who were chosen by party leaders. This lasted until the early 1900s when the primary system came to existence due to the frustration of voters who began to view the nomination system as corrupt. Although delegates still chose the candidates at the party’s convention, the voters began to select the delegates, which resulted in candidates having to appeal to the national electorate instead of top party leaders. In the early 1970s, after many problems at the Democratic National Convention, Senator George McGovern initiated legislation to change the nomination system again. Since 1972, candidates have been chosen by the voters in primary elections. A number of scholars, including Kahn, Falk and Jamieson, and Duerst-Lahti and Kelly have noted several reasons that help explain why women are less likely to be recruited and are not equally represented in the political system. (35) First, the political system has a bias in favor of incumbents. Male candidates are more likely to be incumbents, and therefore, garner more political experience. Second, women rarely have mentors and role models within the political realm since women make up only a minority of politicians at the local, state, and national level, and there has never been a woman president. Third, women have a “role conflict” arising from a double burden that they face. (36) Women are more likely to run for office once their children are raised and family responsibilities are over. According to political analyst, Eleanor Clift, candidates with young children are viewed as irresponsible,

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while it is very risky for a candidate to have adolescents while in office, since it is impossible to predict what they may do. (37) Until several women become president, all women will continue to face many barriers that men do not have to face in pursuing the White House. (38) According to political analyst and activist, Marie Wilson, one of the first barriers that must be addressed is authority. (39) If journalists and the media allow their focus to be superficial, then women’s authority can easily be eroded. For instance, Sunday morning talk shows have a major effect on the upcoming week’s issues; yet, women rarely appear on these shows, which makes them appear to lack authority and expertise and also lessens the chance of a woman’s perspective on the issues to be heard, further undermining the authority of women.

THE IMPACT OF WOMEN IN ELECTIVE OFFICE If entering politics is more difficult for women than for men, and women continue to face challenges and hardships when running for elected office, then why should women undertake this enterprise? Kahn cites four reasons as to why women need to be elected into public office: Men and women have different agendas and women’s concerns are neglected by men who do not share their concerns; women bring a new perspective to government; women’s societal roles could lead to ways of governing that are different from those of men; and women need to feel that the political system is open to them. (40) The reasons that women need to be elected to political office, in general, are the same reasons that women need to be elected to the most prestigious office, the presidency. In essence, it becomes a matter of descriptive versus substantive representation. Some voters feel that substantive representation is acceptable, since in theory, women’s and minority’s interests are being represented. However, many other voters do not feel as though substantive representation is enough. Descriptive representation allows women and other minorities to be represented by someone like them who is more likely to understand and empathize with their concerns and needs as a constituent. According to several scholars, descriptive representation is necessary in order for women’s concerns and perspectives to become a part of government. (41)

CHALLENGES UNIQUE TO WOMEN AND EXECUTIVE OFFICE In order to be an effective president, an individual must master the “bully pulpit,” be a strong leader both domestically and internationally, work well with Congress, and be able to effectively appeal to the public. Han notes that it is important for people to start judging everyone as an individual, not as a member of a specific sex by concluding, “Some presidents are destined for greatness and some for obscurity, regardless of whether they are addressed as ‘mister’ or ‘madam’ president.” (42) According to Lansford, a woman president will have to deal with key domestic groups, such as Congress, foreign policy elites, and interest groups that will make it difficult for her to make important policy decisions and influence the public. The first woman president’s foreign policy plans and goals will be limited by the agenda of the president that served

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before her, which is the case for all presidents, irrespective of their sex or party affiliation. In addition, she will have the difficult task of combining isolationism and internationalism into her foreign policy initiatives. (43) The first woman president will face a major paradox in her foreign policy decisions – if she negotiates peaceful resolutions, she will be viewed as weak; if she seeks out tough resolutions, she will be viewed as if she is trying to prove something, and is thus “overcompensating.” According to a study of gender stereotypes of women candidates by Leonie and Terkildsen, “…women are more likely than not to adopt male characteristics, particularly those regarding the military and the use of force when seeking national office.” (44) According to Lansford, a female president’s foreign policy agenda will have to address three main issues – human rights, security, and economic interactions. Her policies will need to reverse the effects of the feminization of poverty and she will need the support of the public and Congress in order to achieve this lofty goal. (45) According to Davis, many people will assume that a woman cannot handle being in charge of U.S. national security. (46) Davis goes on to argue that female presidents will likely make the same mistakes as male presidents, but will be given far less leeway than their male counterparts. “As leader of the nation, the first female president will falter on occasion, as do all presidents. The ability to minimize those errors – in the face of public skepticism – will be a barometer of the success or failure of Madam President in the protection of national security interests.” (47)

ANALYSIS The profiles that were created help illuminate the personal and political similarities and differences between the presidential contenders and allowed for an attempt to determine if there are any trends among the women who have sought their party’s nomination for the presidency and whether a female presidential model can be formed.

Family and Early Years It is worth noting that three of the six candidates – Chisholm, Ferraro, and Braun – were the first born of four children, while Chase Smith was the first born of six. Dole was the second of two children, while Schroeder was an only child. Some leadership studies find that leaders are more likely to be the first born in their families, so the same, perhaps not surprisingly, holds true for women leaders. With the exception of Dole and Schroeder, the candidates were also from relatively large families. The social status of the candidate’s family’s varied. Chase Smith and Chisholm were raised in low-income families, while Schroeder and Braun were members of middle class families. It is worth noting that for Chase Smith and Chisholm, running for their party’s nomination for the presidency was quite an accomplishment since they faced an even larger barrier than the other women candidates – they were women from a lower class background. Ferraro was part of an upper-middle class family, while Dole was the only candidate with a wealthy background. Demographic characteristics also differed significantly. Three

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candidates – Chase Smith, Chisholm, and Ferraro, were all born in the Northeast, while Schroeder was born in Oregon, Dole in North Carolina, and Braun in Illinois. In terms of religious background, Ferraro and Braun are Catholic, while Dole is Presbyterian. However, the religious beliefs of the other candidates were not emphasized in their presidential bids or their political careers, suggesting that they were not very religious. This differs significantly from most male presidents and presidential candidates, where the trend in recent elections has been to emphasize religious beliefs. Similarities exist among the candidates on the topic of education. All of the candidates, with the exception of Chase Smith, hold a Bachelor of Arts degree; however, Chase Smith received over ninety honorary degrees from various institutions. In addition, Chisholm and Dole obtained a Master of Arts degree, while Ferraro, Schroeder, Dole, and Braun hold a JD. Therefore, aside from Chase Smith, all of the candidates were well educated at well-known institutions, which is not surprising since these women were members of Congress or presidential cabinets. In addition, it should be taken into account that it was extremely rare for a woman to have the opportunity to attend college during the time in which Chase Smith graduated from high school. Another similarity between the women who ran for their party’s nomination was that they were all married. Most of the candidates met their future husbands at some point during their college and post-baccalaureate school years. All of their husbands also held degrees and were employed in reputable careers. Schroeder was married the earliest at the age of twenty-one to Jim Schroeder, a lawyer. Chase Smith and Dole married politicians at ages thirty and thirtynine, respectively, while Ferraro married a real estate broker at the age of twenty-five. Chisholm wedded a private investigator at age twenty-five and Braun was married at the age of thirty. Although all of the candidates were married, Braun and Chisholm were divorced, adding yet another hurdle for these African-American female candidates. Three candidates – Chase Smith, Chisholm, and Dole – did not have children. The amount of children that the other three candidates conceived varied. For instance, Ferraro had three children, while Schroeder had two, and Braun had one. Although the amount of children differed, it is safe to state that these three candidates raised small to average-size families. The information compiled about the family life and early years of the candidates suggests that there is no single model for a female presidential candidate. However, similarities and differences can be noted between these female aspirants and male presidents, in general. For instance, many male presidents are the first born child in their family. In addition, in the modern presidential era, most presidents have been well-educated, obtaining degrees from top-notch institutions. Furthermore, all U.S. presidents in the modern era have been married. One major difference that can be noted is religion. In the modern era, all presidents, with the exception of John F. Kennedy, have been Protestant, main-line Christian denominations.

Career and Politics Studies of women world leaders show that some women presidents and prime ministers did not have any type of career prior to being elected to political office. (48). However, among the women candidates who sought their party’s nomination for the U.S. presidency, all of the candidates had other careers before serving in the U.S. Congress. For instance, Chase Smith and Chisholm were both teachers, while Schroeder was a law professor. In addition,

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Chisholm was also the chief education consultant in New York. Ferraro briefly served as New York City’s Assistant District Attorney, while Schroeder and Dole were lawyers for a short amount of time. Schroeder was also a legal counsel for Planned Parenthood. Most notably, Dole served as President of the Red Cross for eight years. Braun began her career by working at a Post Office, but upon obtaining her JD, became a prosecutor in Illinois. Like male presidential candidates, in general, these female candidates were educated in and had backgrounds in law. In addition, several of these women, most notably Chase Smith and Chisholm, were career women at a time when many women were unable to work. However, not only were they working, but they also established successful careers. Four of the six women running for their party’s nomination for the presidency – Chisholm, Ferraro, Schroeder, and Braun –were Democrats; however, the first candidate – Chase Smith – was a Republican. Perhaps it is not surprising that more Democratic women sought their party’s nomination since the Democratic Party has attracted more women supporters than the Republican Party. In terms of feminism, all of the Democratic candidates identified themselves as feminists and were perceived as feminists by the general public. As for the Republican candidates, neither Chase Smith nor Dole identified themselves as feminists, although Chase Smith was frequently perceived as feminist by the public. Like other women candidates during her time, Chase Smith came into office by succeeding her husband in the U.S. House of Representatives. Frequently termed the “widow’s mandate,” this was not an uncommon path to power for many women historically. (49) However, Chase Smith also became the first woman to win a seat in her own right. Chisholm began her political career in the state assembly, becoming the first African American woman to win a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives. Ferraro served in the U.S. House of Representatives prior to becoming the vice presidential nominee in 1984. Schroeder was an activist, founding the National Women’s Political Caucus prior to becoming a member of the U.S. House of Representatives. Dole did not serve in Congress prior to her exploratory campaign for the presidency, instead serving as a member of the Cabinet for two presidential administrations (Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush). In addition, Braun was a state representative for her home state of Illinois prior to becoming a U.S. Senator. In summary, four of the six candidates served in the U.S. House of Representatives and came to the campaign eminently qualified. Smith and Ferraro were in office for four terms each, while Chisholm served for six terms and Schroeder for 12 terms. Chase Smith and Braun were the only candidates who served in the U.S. Senate, with Chase Smith being in office for four terms and Braun for only one term. Dole became a U.S. Senator after her exploratory presidential campaign. All of the candidates, with the exception of Dole, served on several congressional committees. However, some committees are considered to be more masculine than others, and the female presidential candidates bucked tradition by serving on precisely such committees. For instance, Chase Smith served on the Navy and Defense Committees; Chisholm, on the Veterans Affairs Committees; Ferraro, the Steering and Policy, Budget and Public Works, and Transportation Committees; Schroeder, the Armed Services, Post Office, and Civil Services Committees; and Braun, the Judiciary Committee. In many instances, these women were the first of their sex to serve on these committees. In order to be a serious presidential contender from the U.S. Congress, it is imperative to serve on such powerful committees.

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Seeking the Nomination It is important to note that Ferraro did not face some of the hardships that Chase Smith, Chisholm, Schroeder, Dole, and Braun encountered because she was the vice presidential nominee. She never had to debate other members of her party and her main job was to sell the Mondale-Ferraro ticket. In addition, financing was provided for by the Mondale campaign. Ferraro felt as though she received the full support of the Democratic Party, since she was the vice presidential nominee, which differed significantly from the other candidates. (50) Although the age at which the women began campaigning for the party’s nomination differed, there were some similarities along party lines. For instance, the Republican candidates, Chase Smith and Dole, ran at ages 67 and 63, respectively. On the other hand, the Democratic candidates, Chisholm, Ferraro, Schroeder, and Braun, were younger, running at ages 48, 49, 47, and 55, respectively. In answer to the second research question – what are the personal and political similarities and differences between the female candidates – it becomes evident that in terms of personal characteristics, the female candidates were all married and were well-educated. Beyond this, however, the characteristics varied significantly. In terms of political characteristics, all of the Democratic candidates were feminists, while the Republican candidates were not. In addition, all candidates with the exception of Dole served on at least one committee that could be considered masculine. Furthermore, the average age at which the Democratic candidates ran for their party’s nomination was 49, while the Republican candidates began their campaigns at the average age of 65. As with personal characteristics, political characteristics varied significantly.

CONCLUSION It is evident that women at all levels of political office face discrimination and sexual stereotypes that undermine their potential as candidates. Executive politics is no exception and comes with its own unique set of additional hurdles and challenges. However, several of the women who ran for their party’s nomination believe that United States voters look for the same personal and political characteristics in a woman as they do in a man. In personal interviews with these same candidates, Representatives Ferraro and Schroeder argue that once the first woman is elected president, most of the stereotypes and discrimination that impede women will end. However, this is questionable. Ultimately, it will depend on the successes and failures of the first woman president. If the first woman president has a successful first term, then many stereotypes will be discredited. Nevertheless, if the first woman president is unsuccessful and has low approval ratings, it may be a long time before the United States elects another woman as president. In addition, women’s political experiences may not “measure up” to that of their male counterparts, at least in terms of women and executive office, in the eyes of many voters. For instance, several of the women who ran for their party’s nomination had many years of political experience in local politics and in congressional politics. Nevertheless, recent presidential elections have demonstrated a trend in which presidents are no longer former members of Congress, but rather were previous governors. Perhaps if more women begin to

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serve in the governor’s mansion, women will be one small step closer to being viewed as viable presidential contenders. Governors benefit from executive experience and decisionmaking, as well as management experience, which are all masculine in nature. Furthermore, it is possible that in the future gender may begin to become a less important factor than party identification, as the parties become more polarized. Therefore, it is crucial to redefine who a leader is and what they look like. As Duerst-Lahti and Kelly state, “At this moment in time, as we seek to promote gender awareness and gender balance, we need to recognize that leadership must be reconceptualized to better incorporate notions from women and feminism.” (51) Ultimately, it appears as though women have been unsuccessful in receiving their party’s nomination for the presidency for several key reasons. First, women lack the campaign funds necessary to win a presidential election. Although they may be able to raise the amount of money necessary to win a seat in the U.S. Congress, representing their state or district, it is much more difficult to raise the amount of money necessary to run a national campaign. Second, women are frequently discriminated against by the media. Reporters constantly focus on the personal rather than the political when a female candidate is campaigning for office. This is compounded when a woman is running for president and the media treats her as a novelty. Third, women presidential candidates face a wide array of sexism from the media and voters. The women who sought their party’s nomination for the presidency were frequently stereotyped and their experience in office was devalued. To make matters even more difficult, they frequently experience sexism from their own party and fellow members of Congress. The combination of these three factors make women appear as less viable candidates. Despite the shortcomings of Chase Smith, Chisholm, Ferraro, Schroeder, Dole, and Braun, future female presidential aspirants can learn two important lessons from the women who ran before them that could make their candidacies more successful. First, it is important to begin a campaign early. Nearly all of the women who ran for their party’s nomination began their campaigns far too late making it even more difficult to raise the campaign funds necessary to be taken seriously as a candidate. By starting early and raising money right away, the next woman to run for president can make her campaign appear more viable and organized. Second, it is important for women candidates to build a positive relationship with reporters and the media, in general, in order to advance their agenda. By building a rapport with reporters, the next woman candidate may have a better chance of getting her message out to the public. Despite the accomplishments that the women who ran for their party’s nomination have made, women still have much to accomplish in the realm of executive politics. Perhaps the focus on war and defense from 2001 to 2005 will eventually cause a backlash resulting in a new focus on domestic, stereotypically feminine interests, which could result in a woman running for her party’s nomination for the presidency in an era when the public is ready for and supportive of her candidacy.

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REFERENCES [1]

See Lois Beachy Underhill, The Woman Who Ran for President: The Many Lives of Victoria Woodhull. New York: Bridge Works, 1995. [2] Erika Falk and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, “Changing the Climate of Expectations,” in Anticipating Madam President, ed. Robert P. Watson and Ann Gordon. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003, pp. 43-52. [3] Max J. Skidmore, “Breaking the Final Glass Ceiling: When (Not If) a Woman Becomes President.” In Anticipating Madam President, ed. Robert P. Watson and Ann Gordon. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003, pp. 21-30. [4] Margaret Chase Smith did receive nominating votes in her quest to receive the Republican Party’s nomination in 1964, but lost to Barry Goldwater of Arizona. [5] See, for example, Wendy Brown, Manhood and Politics: A Feminist Reading in Political Thought. Lanham: Rowan and Littlefield, 2002; Dianne Bystrom, Terry Robertson, and Mary Banwart, “Framing the Fight: An Analysis of Media Coverage of Female Candidates in Primary Races for Governor and US Senate in 2000.” American Behavioral Scientist 44, 2001: 1999-2013; Georgia Duerst-Lahti and Rita Mae Kelly, eds., Gender Power, Leadership, and Governance. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000 (1995); Leonie Huddy and Nayda Terkildsen, “The Consequences of Gender Stereotypes for Women Candidates at Different Levels and Types of Office.” Political Science Quarterly 46, 1993: 503-525; Kim Fridkin Kahn, The Political Consequences of Being a Woman: How Stereotypes Influence the Conduct and Consequences of Political Campaigns. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996; Mark Leeper, “The Impact of Prejudice on Female Candidates: An Experimental Look at Voter Inference.” American Politics Quarterly 19, 1991: 248-261; Valerie R. O’Regan and Stephen J. Stambough, “Female Candidates for Executive Office: The Road to the Governor’s Mansion.” White House Studies 2, 2002: 299-313; Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox, eds., Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998; Marie C. Wilson, Closing the Leadership Gap: Why Women Can and Must Help Run the World. New York: Viking Benguin Group, 2004. [6] Robert P. Watson, “The White House as Ultimate Prize,” in Robert P. Watson and Ann Gordon, eds., Anticipating Madam President, Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003: 1-20. [7] Duerst-Lahti and Kelly, 1995. [8] Ibid. [9] Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 1995; Kahn 1996; Leeper, 1991; Wilson 2004. [10] Karen O’Connor, “Madam President: Sooner or Later?” In Anticipating Madam President, ed. Robert P. Watson and Ann Gordon. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003: 20718; see also Robert P. Watson, 2003. [11] To attempt to compensate, the thesis paper did not simply analyze and evaluate one woman and her quest for the presidency; instead, it comparatively evaluated the candidacies of six women and identified the barriers women face and how likely it is that these barriers will be overcome.

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[12] Barbara Burrell, “Campaign Finance: Women’s Experience in the Modern Era.” In Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, ed. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998: 26-37. [13] Victoria A. Farrar-Myers, “A War Chest Full of Susan B. Anthony Dollars: Fundraising Issues for Female Presidential Candidates.” In Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, ed. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003: 81-94. [14] Farrar-Myers, 2003. [15] Melissa Haussman, “Can Women Enter the ‘Big Tents’? National Party Structures and Presidential Nominations.” In Anticipating Madam President, ed. Robert P. Watson and Ann Gordon. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003: 59-80. [16] Eleanor Clift and Tom Brazaitis, Madam President: Women Blazing the Leadership Trail. New York: Routledge, 2003. [17] Farrar-Myers, 2003. [18] Caroline Heldman, Susan J. Carroll, and Stephanie Olson, “Gender Differences in Print Media Coverage of Presidential Candidates: Elizabeth Dole’s Bid for the Republican Nomination.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C., 2001. [19] Williams, 1998. [20] Kahn, 1996. [21] Kahn, 1996; Thomas, 1998. [22] Kahn, 1996. [23] Ibid. [24] Ibid. [25] Bystrom, 2003. [26] Elizabeth Adell Cook, “Voter Reaction to Women Candidates.” In Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, ed. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998: 56-72. [27] Ibid. [28] Carole Kennedy, “Is the United States Ready for a Woman President? Is the Pope Protestant?” In Anticipating Madam President, ed. Robert P. Watson and Ann Gordon. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003: 131-144. [29] Center for American Women and Politics. 2005. “Facts and Findings.”www.cawp.rutgers.edu (accessed May 22, 2005). [30] Duerst-Lahti, 1995. [31] Michael A. Genovese, “Women as National Leaders: What Do We Know?” In Women as National Leaders, ed. Michael Genovese. Newbury Park: Sage, 1993: 211-218. [32] Barbara Norrander and Clyde Wilcox, “The Geography of Gender Power: Women in State Legislatures.” In Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, ed. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998: 103-117, see page 109. [33] Ibid. [34] Sue Thomas, “Introduction: Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future.” In Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, ed. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998: 1-14, see page 6. [35] Duerst-Lahti, 1995; Kahn, 1996; Falk and Jamieson, 2003.

504 [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42]

[43]

[44]

[45] [46] [47] [48]

[49] [50] [51]

Alicia Jencik Falk and Jamieson, 2003. Clift, 2003. Skidmore, 2003 Wilson, 2004. Kahn, 1996. Kahn, 1996; Thomas, 1994. Lori Cox Han, “Presidential Leadership: Governance from a Woman’s Perspective,” In Anticipating Madam President, ed. Robert P. Watson and Ann Gordon. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003: 163-176, see page 175. Tom Lansford, “A Female Leader for the Free World: The First Woman President and U.S. Foreign Policy,” In Anticipating Madam President, ed. Robert P. Watson and Ann Gordon. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003: 177-188. Cited by Davis, page 195. See John Davis, “Confronting the Myths: The First Woman President and National Security.” In Anticipating Madam President, ed. Robert P. Watson and Ann Gordon. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003: 189-200. Lansford, 2003. Davis, 2003. Ibid., page 193. Laura Liswood, Women World Leaders: Fifteen Great Politicians Tell Their Stories. San Francisco: Harper, 1996; Robert P. Watson, Alicia Jencik, and Judith Selzer, “Women World Leaders: Comparative Analysis and Gender Experiences,” Journal of International Women’s Studies , Vol. 7, No. 1, Fall 2005: 53-76. Watson, Jencik, and Selzer, 2005; Robert P. Watson, The Presidents’ Wives: Reassessing the Office of First Lady, Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000. Geraldine Ferraro, Vice-Presidential Nominee. Interviewed by authors, 10 May 2005 (and earlier phone interviews in 2001 and 2002). Tape Recording. Duerst-Lahti and Kelly, 1995, page 263.

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 505-510

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

COUNTDOWN TO IOWA

Mosemarie Boyd ABSTRACT This presentation gives a brief, yet – to the author – exciting description of the major women who have run for the U.S. presidency since 1972, including the first woman stock broker on Wall Street, the first woman to argue a case before the U.S. Supreme Court, the first woman to serve in both the U.S. House and Senate, and so on. This report highlights New York State’s central role in electing presidents and advancing women for president. It transitions to the key factor of campaigning in the primaries, reviewing the primary statistics for women candidates so far. Then, it explains the work of American Women Presidents and Ms. President PAC to level the playing field for women candidates by giving them a head start in Iowa and New Hampshire – the critical early primaries which usually determine who is nominated to run for president.

INTRODUCTION I want to invite y’all to join me in making hotel reservations in Washington, DC for the night of January 20, 2009…because we are going to elect a woman to the presidency in 2008. And I want you to be there with me to watch her take the oath of office and to celebrate. Powerful women have commanded great nations as presidents, prime ministers and heads of state throughout history. And women will soon serve as commander-in-chief of the United States. The campaign to elect women to the U.S. presidency began over 132 years ago, in 1872 – and now it’s time to finish the job. Long before Elizabeth Dole and Carol Moseley Braun ran for president, outstanding American women campaigned for the U.S. presidency and won numerous important symbolic political battles.

THE CAMPAIGN The first woman to establish her own stock brokerage on Wall Street, New York’s Victoria Claflin Woodhull ran for president in 1872. On April 2, 1870, in The New York Herald, she pronounced herself a candidate for U.S. president in the next election.

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A wealthy newspaper owner, Woodhull received national press coverage for her campaign, won the right for women to address Congress and advanced women’s suffrage. Belva Anne Lockwood, the first woman to argue a case before the U.S. Supreme Court, ran for president in 1884 and 1888. Lockwood got on several state presidential primary ballots and won votes from the all-male electorate – before the 19th Amendment guaranteeing women’ suffrage. In 1964, U.S. Senator Margaret Chase Smith, a Maine Republican, became the first woman to seek a major party nomination for president. She was also the first woman to serve in both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. Smith campaigned in five out of the 17 Republican primaries in 1964 and won 224,970 votes or 3.8 percent of the total votes case for Republican candidates. She finished fifth out of seven candidates in the first primary in New Hampshire with 2,120 votes or 2.3 percent, skipped the second primary in Wisconsin, and finished second among eight candidates in the third primary in Illinois with 209,521 votes or 25.3 percent, where she waged her most serious campaign.

The first African-American woman in Congress, New York Representtive Shirley Chisholm, ran for the Democratic nomination for president in 1972, along with Rep. Patsy Mink (Hawaii) and Rep. Bella Abzug (New York). Chisholm shattered records for women on the presidential primary ballots — campaigning in 14 out of 21 primaries, she won the New

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Jersey primary and took delegates to the Democratic National Convention — an unprecedented victory on the 100th anniversary of Woodhull’s historic campaign. More recently, Rep. Patricia Schroeder, a Colorado Democrat, ran for president briefly in 1988. Elizabeth Dole, now a U.S. Senator, was perceived as the first serious challenger to a major party’s presidential nominee in the 2000 election. And Ambassador Carol Moseley Braun set the precedent for women running in consecutive presidential campaigns and got on a record number of ballots.

NEW YORK’S PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE How many of our presidents have come from New York? Can anyone guess? Eight! Only Ohio comes close with six. U.S. Presidents Years Served 17891797 17971801 18011809 18091817 18171825 18251829 18291837 18371841 18411841 18411845 18451849 18491850 18501853 18531857 18571861 18611865 18651869 18691877 18771881

President and Political Party*

Age at Elected Inauguration From

Qualifications/Prior Service

George Washington (F)

57

VA

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Armed Forces

John Adams (F)

61

MA

Continental Congress, VP

Thomas Jefferson (D-R)

57

VA

Continental Congress, Governor

James Madison (D-R)

57

VA

Congress, Secretary of State

James Monroe (D-R)

58

VA

Senate, Governor, Secretary of State

John Q. Adams (D-R)

57

MA

Senate, Secretary of State

Andrew Jackson (D)

61

TN

Congress, Senate, Governor

Martin Van Buren (D)

54

NY

Senate, Governor, Secretary of State, VP

W. H. Harrison (W)

68

OH

Union Army, Senate

John Tyler (W)

51

VA

Governor, Senate, VP

James Polk (D)

49

TN

Congress, Governor

Zachary Taylor (W)

64

LA

Mayor, General in U.S. Army

Millard Fillmore (W)

50

NY

Congress, NY Comptroller, VP

Franklin Pierce (D)

48

NH

Congress, Senate

James Buchanan (D)

65

PA

Congress, Senate, Secretary of State

Abraham Lincoln (R)

52

IL

Congress

Andrew Johnson (R)

56

TN

Congress, Governor, Senate, VP

Ulysses Grant (R)

46

IL

Commander-in-Chief, Union Army

Rutherford Hayes (R)

54

OH

Union Army, Congress, Governor

508

Mosemarie Boyd U.S. Presidents (Continued)

Years Served 18811881 18811885 18851889, 18931897 18891893 18971901 19011909 19091913 19131921 19211923 19231929 19291933 19331945 19451953 19531961 19611963 19361969 19691974 19741977 19771981 19811989 19891993 19932001 2001-

President and Political Party*

Age at Elected Inauguration From

Qualifications/Prior Service

James Garfield (R)

49

OH

Union Army, Congress

Chester Arthur (R)

50

NY

VP

Grover Cleveland (D)

47

NY

Mayor, Governor

Benjamin Harrison (R)

55

IN

Union Army, Senate

William McKinley (R)

54

OH

Congress, Governor

Theodore Roosevelt (R)

42

NY

Assistant Secretary of Navy, Governor, VP

William Taft (R)

51

OH

Secretary of War

Woodrow Wilson (D)

56

NJ

Governor

Warren Harding (R)

55

OH

Lt. Governor, Senate

Calvin Coolidge (R)

51

MA

Governor, VP

Herbert Hoover (R)

54

CA

U.S. Food Administration, Secretary of Commerce

Franklin Roosevelt (D)

51

NY

Governor

Harry Truman (D)

60

MO

Senate, VP

Dwight Eisenhower (R)

62

NY, PA

U.S. Army, NATO Commander

John Kennedy (D)

43

MA

Congress, Senate

Lyndon Johnson (D)

55

TX

Congress, Senate, VP

Richard Nixon (R)

56

NY, CA

Congress, Senate, VP

Gerald Ford (R)

61

MI

Congress, VP

Jimmy Carter (D)

52

GA

Governor

Ronald Reagan (R)

69

CA

Governor

George Bush (R)

64

TX

Congress, CIA Director, VP

Bill Clinton (D)

46

AR

AR Attorney General, Governor

George W. Bush (R)

54

TX

Governor

*(D) =Democrat, (D-R) =Democratic Republican, (F) =Federalist, (R) =Republican, (W) =Whig.

One-hundred years later, the first woman to run for president - Shirley Chisholm - ran from New York. And, of course, the 1984 Democratic vice presidential nominee Geraldine Ferraro came from New York. Does anyone see a pattern here? If this theory holds true, then you—the great people of the great State of New York— may hold the future of our world in your hands.

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ADVANTAGES Many women have convinced voters that they were they best candidate to serve as governors and in Congress by following their husbands into office. The first woman elected a governor in the United States, Democrat Nellie Tayloe Ross of Wyoming, followed her husband into office in 1924. The first woman elected to the U.S. Senate, Democrat Hattie Wyatt Caraway of Arkansas, followed her husband into office in 1931. While this may not be everyone’s preferred route, it is possible that it could happen in the presidency.

THE KEY TO WINNING Obviously, the key to winning the presidency is running in the primaries. The goal of American Women Presidents and Ms. President PAC is to help level the playing field for women in the presidential primaries, like so many other groups have already succeeded at doing for women running for Congress. Every four years, the presidential nomination contest begins in late January or early February with the Iowa presidential caucuses followed immediately by the New Hampshire presidential primary election. Often the regionally significant South Carolina presidential preference primary follows shortly thereafter. Success in these early contests almost always determines who wins the nomination to run for president in the general presidential election in November. At the time of the First Woman President Symposium at Siena College, only 20 months remained until Election Day 2006. Then — and this is key — only 13 months remained until the critical Iowa and New Hampshire elections are over. To be successful on this fast-paced schedule, women candidates need our help. They need our support in order to put their credibility on the line by running. In 2003, American Women Presidents and Ms. President PAC helped launch Ambassador Carol Moseley Braun’s campaign by hosting her at media events in Iowa, New Hampshire and South Carolina. What we did was give Braun a platform from which to launch her campaign. We rented conference rooms in well-known political venues in each state, invited party leaders to cohost the campaign kick-off events, and provided local and national media with an opportunity to cover her campaign. Without having to plan or pay for it, Braun accepted our invitation to a three-state presidential campaign kick off tour. And the national media covered her campaign to “take the men-only sign off the White House.” We’re already gearing up to host an event next year at Drake University in Des Moines, Iowa to kick off the 2008 campaign.

ELECTING THE BEST CANDIDATE American voters will elect women presidents and vice presidents the same way we have always elected presidents and vice presidents: we will elect the best candidates—those with charismatic appeal, strong executive leadership abilities, vision, commander-in-chief

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credibility, convincing economic credentials, proven law and order experience, sensitivity to family and social issues, outstanding fundraising prowess, a friendly media rapport, enthusiastic campaign stamina, and the most powerful nationwide network of supports. Therefore, in order to help elect women to the U.S. presidency, our goal is to build that network. We want American women to know that they can step forward to campaign for the presidency with a winning support network waiting for them to hit the campaign trail running. We want to be there campaigning in the cold winter weather in Iowa and New Hampshire during the primaries. And we want to be there standing in the cold winter weather outside the U.S. Capitol in Washington, DC when they are sworn into office as President of the United States. We hope you will join us in realizing these goals!

CONCLUSION There are many practical things that we can all do to help elect a woman to the presidency in 2008. The most important are to pray, volunteer and give generously to ensure the successful re-election of our strongest candidates in 2006. And please sign up to join American Women Presidents and Ms. President PAC — we are online. In addition, we can all learn and talk about the powerful women who have commanded great nations throughout history. We can all remind our family, friends and colleagues—and especially our favorite media outlets — how silly it now seems that in past centuries woman were not allowed to attend college, vote or enter the profession of their choice. We can all point out that now we take for granted that women will continue to make important contributions in academics, medicine, science, law, business, media, state and congressional politics, the presidential cabinet, national defense, economic development and beyond. We can explain that when the first woman is sworn in as President of the United States, standing in the cold winter weather outside the U.S. Capitol in Washington, DC, we will begin making the same assumptions about women in the presidency — just as so many other citizens have done in nations around the globe. Finally, the key to winning in 2008 is helping Americans realize that the campaign to elect women tot the U.S. presidency began more than 132 years ago, and now it’s time to finish the job.

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 511-518

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

MONETIZING THE AUDIENCE: CAMPAIGN ALLOCATION STRATEGIES David M. Keithly ABSTRACT The chief reason for the high cost of getting elected (or defeated) in U.S. political campaigns is the use of merchandising techniques. Candidates usually hire a professional campaign firm, a polling organization, an advertising agency, and sometimes specialists in filmmaking. Enough money will buy the best campaign managers, equipment, transportation, research, and consultants. As a rule, when ample campaign funds are available, so are good candidates.

INTRODUCTION If you are a challenger, you are…going to have to convince the voters to ‘fire him and hire you.’ 1 -Senator Joseph I. Lieberman

Candidates in U.S. elections use resources such as money, time, and paid volunteer labor that they must decide how to allocate efficiently and within a specified budget. Allocation strategies concern decisions such as how much time to spend campaigning in various areas of a constituency, what part of limited funds to use for billboards, bumper stickers, and radio and television advertisements, and at what point in the campaign and at what rate to spend these resources. Some allocation strategy dilemmas have intuitive solutions. For example, as a general rule presidential candidates should spend little time campaigning in states they are certain to win or lose. Allocation strategies figure prominently in primary elections and caucuses. “Momentum” waxes and wanes in importance as the candidates play out a set of dynamic games over a period of time. Here we will consider the allocation factors that can assist or injure the chances of candidates.

1

Joseph I. Lieberman, In Praise of Public Life (New York: Simon & Shuster, 2000), p. 41.

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INCUMBENT ADVANTAGES Money drives modern campaigns. Thirty-second television and radio ads, websites, pollsters, and plane tickets are all essential to the conduct of a congressional race. Ready cash allows the candidate to finance these considerable expenses. Of course, the need for campaign finances applies to incumbent and challenger alike. Why then does a sitting congressman, for example, hold a distinct advantage in this area? The principal reasons are several. First, incumbents have the length of their term to continue tapping donors who contributed during their campaign. A representative thus has two years from the time of her election to raise money for the next contest, while a senator can build his war chest over a sixyear period. Former Senator Bill Bradley of New Jersey estimated that he needed to raise $20,000 per week throughout his term in order to have sufficient funds for the following election.2 By contrast, challengers are rarely identified years in advance. Thus, the challenger must raise significant amounts of money on a much more compressed schedule as the primaries approach. A second fundraising advantage of incumbency is the primary, or lack thereof, prior to the general election. An incumbent is far less likely to face an opponent in his party’s primary than a challenger. The challenger must deplete some, or even most, of his funds just to win his party’s nomination. Therefore, the challenger must compete in, and spend money on, two elections, held just months apart. The sitting legislator, with an uncontested party nomination, is free throughout primary season to raise money and focus his expenditures on the fall general election. Third, incumbents are usually proven fundraisers. As is often the case in human affairs, nothing quite substitutes for experience. The incumbent previously learned which individuals, constituencies, and organizations are both enthusiastic about her candidacy, and also able monetarily to contribute to its success. The sitting legislator can focus her advertisements and fundraising events, and “hunt where the ducks are.” As one example, Senator John McCain received $100,000 for three consecutive campaigns from influential businessman Charles Keating.3 The challenger, by contrast, must use much more trial and error in order to find his own financial supporters. Special interest groups make fundraising even easier on the incumbent, as they often seek out the legislator. These groups donate to both candidates, in order to ensure access following the election. Nonetheless, they support incumbents by a ratio of seven to one.4 Thus, a large and often decisive financial advantage lies with the incumbent. Another area that favors incumbents is political pork. “Citizens Against Government Waste,” a watchdog group, qualifies domestic spending as “pork” when it meets some or all of the following criteria: • • • • • 2

Requested by only one chamber of Congress; Not specifically authorized; Not competitively awarded; Not requested by the President; Greatly exceeds the President's budget request or the previous year's funding;

Bill Bradley, Time Present, Time Past: A Memoir (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), p. 177. John McCain, Worth the Fighting For (New York: Random House, 2002), p. 59. 4 Charles Stewart III, Analyzing Congress (New York: W. W. Norton & Co: 2001), pp. 219. 3

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Not the subject of congressional hearings; and Serves only a local or special interest.5

As legislators serve for several consecutive terms, they rise in seniority and assume leadership positions in committees and subcommittees. These legislative groups determine where and how public dollars are spent. Self-interested chairmen reward their constituents and do much to ensure reelection by steering both essential and questionable projects towards their districts and states. The 2004 contest between former Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle of South Dakota and his Republican challenger highlighted this incumbent advantage. The pithy rhetorical question posed by political writer Joseph Bottum encapsulates the matter: “If Daschle’s positions on abortion and gun control differ from those of his constituents, if he lives a high-celebrity life in Washington while posing as a populist at home, what’s that compared with a federal-pork power that John Thune will need ten to twenty years in the Senate to match?”6 Yet, in Daschle’s 2004 reelection bid, other factors outweighed the incumbent advantage, not least that Daschle was targeted by a highly organized Republican Party. Dan Rostenkowski, as chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, delivered huge sums of pork to his constituents in the Illinois 5th District in the 1970s and 1980s. Two billion dollars for the Deep Tunnel project in Chicago and the annual $90 million tax assessed on O'Hare International Airport travelers are but two of the hundreds of projects proudly itemized in his fifteen page, “Accomplishments of Congressman Dan Rostenkowski on Behalf of the Chicago Metropolitan Area (Partial List)” brochure. The congressman's fiscal might did much to ensure his reelection for seventeen terms.7 Some incumbents find themselves facing little or no competition in the general election. Five of Georgia's thirteen sitting congressmen faced no opponent in the November 2004 contests.8 Twenty-seven of New York's twenty-nine districts had two or more candidates seeking the congressional seat. Most of these races were not truly competitive, however, as the challenger raised little or no money to battle the incumbent. Only nine of the New York congressional races pitted two candidates who have each raised $100,000 or more.9 One reason that an incumbent faces no opposition is his popularity, whether for pork delivery, personal charisma, national stature, or other reasons. Another reason, far more prevalent, is that the congressman resides in a safe district. Demographics are often reliable indicators of voting patterns; urban blacks vote overwhelming Democratic, while married whites are a reliable Republican base, as two examples. State legislatures use gerrymandering, the carving of odd-shaped federal districts in order to concentrate or disburse certain demographic groups. The state's majority party seeks to maximize its number of safe districts, while necessarily conceding some districts to the opposing party. Those who win their party's nominations in safe districts are positioned for long careers in the House of

5

David E. Williams and Kerrie N. Rezac, Citizens Against Government Waste, article available at http://publications.cagw.org/PigBook2002/introduction.htm Joseph Bottum, “Prairie Politics,” The Weekly Standard, 27 September 2004. 7 Mark Brown, “Rosty: The Clout is Gone,” Illinois Issues, 12 December 1994, available at http://www.lib.niu.edu/ipo/ii941212.html 8 Center for Responsive Politics article at http://www.opensecrets.org/states/election.asp?State=GA&year=2004 9 Center for Responsive Politics article at http://www.opensecrets.org/states/election.asp?state=NY 6

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Representatives. These incumbent advantages resulted in recent House and Senate reelection rates of greater than ninety percent.10

REVVED UP WITH SOMEWHERE TO GO The general election challenger can avail herself of certain opportunities, though. It is ironic that a lack of legislative experience may aid the challenger immensely. The challenger can claim one or both of the coveted titles of “independent” and “outsider,” hammering home the point on the campaign trail. She can use perfect hindsight to point out the poor decisions and ill-advised votes of her incumbent opponent. Since she has no voting record to pick apart, the incumbent cannot respond in kind. Lieberman wrote that many of his congressional peers believed, with good reason, that a single vote would come back to haunt them on television in the following election.11 Former Arkansas Senator Dale Bumpers recalled: The most politically volatile issue I faced in my twenty-four years in the Senate was the vote on the Panama Canal treaties. I voted for the treaties [to ultimately return control of the canal to the Panamanian government] knowing that should I have a fairly well-financed opponent in 1980, I would surely be defeated on that one vote. For three weeks prior to the vote, my office received three thousand calls and letters a day, ninety-nine percent of which were in opposition to the treaties…. My pollster said my vote cost me ten percent of the vote in my 12 race in 1980, five percent in 1986, and three percent in 1992.

Because few challengers have had to compromise in order to pass legislation, they can issue rather lofty statements and ideals as their platforms. The incumbent must spend much of the campaign defending his own, often imperfect, record. The next step is an actual strategy of ambiguity, employed far more frequently by challengers than incumbents. Inconsistency in elections can be profound. Candidates benefit by inconsistency by saying little about public policy issues. Instead, they salute the flag, sample ethnic food, and rail at their opponents’ inadequacies. The strategy of ambiguity is far more difficult for incumbents to succeed with than challengers. Without a substantial political record--”a paper trail”--the challenger has the luxury of being able to foster ambiguity. For example, as a presidential candidate, Jimmy Carter successfully issued vague and conflicting messages to the electorate in the 1976 campaign. President Ford, as the incumbent, was constantly on the defensive and could do little more than call attention to Carter’s ambiguity. By 1980, however, the shoe was on the other foot. Perhaps to conceal his administration’s shortcomings, President Carter continued to employ the strategy of ambiguity. Providing few specifics about his plans for the country, he repeatedly rebuked Candidate Ronald Reagan and mocked his political ideas. The stratagem eventually backfired, above all, because the President came across to many voters as inept and mean-spirited. Scandals sometimes provide openings for challengers. Whether political or personal, improprieties can taint a legislator who is otherwise likely to coast to reelection. The powerful Democrat Rostenkowski faced little opposition for much of his congressional career. The 10

Stewart, Analyzing Congress, pp. 132, 152. Lieberman, Public Life, p. 125. 12 Dale Bumpers, The Best Lawyer in a One-Lawyer Town (New York: Random House, 2003), p. 248. 11

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chairman entered into numerous grafts and illegal schemes during his tenure, eventually resulting in a seventeen-count federal indictment against him. While under this legal cloud, Rostenkowski lost in the 1994 general election to the relatively unknown Republican Michael P. Flanagan.13 The Savings and Loan financial scandal of the 1980s hurt or ruined the careers of many legislators. Speaker of the House Jim Wright and Democratic Whip Tony Coelho both resigned in the aftermath, thus putting two otherwise safe seats into contention again.14 Congressman Gary Condit served as a seven-term Democratic moderate from Modesto, California. His image as an honorable husband and father was shattered when his Washington D.C. mistress was reported missing in 2001. A previous affair, this one with the eighteen-year old daughter of a preacher, soon surfaced in the media. With many of his party colleagues remaining neutral in his reelection bid, Condit lost in the March 2002 primary.15 Though few challengers have it, fame can neutralize many advantages of the incumbent. Bill Bradley was a two-time All-American forward at Princeton, then led the New York Knicks to the 1970 and 1973 National Basketball Association championships. When he ran for the Senate in 1978, a poll indicated that Bradley had higher name recognition than his opponent, incumbent Clifford Case, a sitting senator of twenty-four years.16 John Glenn became a national hero in 1962 when he became the first American to orbit the Earth in outer space. This recognition, along with other attributes, vaulted him to the top echelon of the Ohio Democratic leadership a decade later. Hollywood star Fred Thompson, who won two Senate elections in Tennessee, undoubtedly benefited from his appearances in Days of Thunder, Die Hard II, and other popular movies.

EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES Other factors can influence the chances of either candidate and must be weighed in allocation strategy decisions. The President of the United States often plays a significant role in congressional races. A popular presidential candidate may increase his party's voter turnout in certain states and districts, as was the case in the 2004 South Dakota Senate race. Would-be voters who see their presidential candidate trailing badly in their state may decide not to bother with polling place lines after all. A sitting president can greatly boost the stature of a candidate simply by appearing at the latter's political fundraiser or rally. The national media may, and the local media most certainly will, cover the event, thus delivering free advertisements for the candidate. The candidate also gains additional campaign dollars from those who attended the fundraising dinner simply to see the President speak. Candidates may even publicly attach themselves to a popular president of a different party. Though he provided much opposition to the President's policies and judicial nominations, Daschle ran South Dakota television advertisements in 2004 showing him and President George W. Bush embracing on the Senate floor.17 Because it ultimately resulted in considerable political blowback, the advertisement involved a spectacular misallocation of resources. The 13

Brown, “Rosty,” at http://www.lib.niu.edu/ipo/ii941212.html McCain, Worth the Fighting For, p. 168. 15 CNN People in the News, “Levy Case Opens Door on http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/people/shows/condit/profile.html 16 Bradley, Time Present, Time Past, p. 31. 17 Bottum, “Prairie Politics.” 14

Private

Life,”

available

at

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Democratic Party faithful were appalled, and swing voters tended to view the advertisement as crassly opportunistic. Those normally voting Republican were not about to cast their ballot for someone in the GOP’s gun sights, however eager Daschle might have been to demonstrate his commitment to national security. To be sure, ties to the President can be detrimental. The congressional elections falling on the sixth year of a presidency are historically harmful to the party of the administration. In 1986, with President Ronald Reagan in his sixth year in the White House, the Senate Republicans lost seven incumbents, four open seats, as well as control of the upper chamber.18 President Richard M. Nixon's second term, engulfed by political scandal and criminal cover-ups, proved especially poisonous for Republican legislative candidates. In November 1974, just three months after Nixon’s resignation, the Republican Party lost fortyeight House and five Senate seats.19 Candidates can avoid many of the fundraising challenges by simply using their own money. In its 1976 Buckley v. Valeo decision, the Supreme Court ruled that an individual could spend unlimited amounts of his own resources on his own political campaign.20 Jon Corzine amassed hundreds of millions of dollars as the Chief Executive Officer of Goldman Sachs. He then cut into his massive fortune while obtaining a New Jersey Senate seat in 2000, spending over $35 million on the Democratic primary alone. His unmatched funds allowed him to flood the media with advertisements, and to overcome such shortcomings as sub-par oratory skills, alleged leftist liberalism, and even an ill-advised joke about a local Italian businessman belonging to the mafia.21 Nonetheless, wealth will not always ensure success. Republican Michael Huffington ran for the Senate in traditionally liberal California in 1994. Despite spending $30 million of his own resources on the campaign, he lost to incumbent Dianne Feinstein in a close race. Candidates of modest means must decide whether or not to dip into their own accounts in order to begin or sustain a campaign. Connecticut Attorney-General Lieberman, running for the Senate in 1988 and desperate for advertisement dollars, opened a $100,000 line of credit with a lien on his house.22 In his first campaign in 1970, small-town attorney Bumpers scraped together $10,000 from his own savings, along with $40,000 from his two sisters.23 Congressmen currently earn less than $160,000 annually.24 Middle-class candidates must consider whether the opportunity to serve in Congress is worth the initial cost to their own resources. An intimate knowledge of the district, and frequent contact with its constituents, usually gives a candidate a decided edge. Daschle, though a longtime Washington D.C. resident, conducted an annual driving tour across the Dakota plains to meet with the farmers, truckers, and small-town merchants of his state. McCain, when a new resident of the Arizona 1st District, recalled of his initial campaign, “I knocked on thousands of doors in the furnace heat of a desert summer, hailing audiences assembled for other purposes, imposing on new acquaintances, courting the local press, begging for money, making a nuisance of myself to 18

McCain, Worth the Fighting For, p. 116. Stewart, Analyzing Congress, pp. 132, 145. 20 Stewart, Analyzing Congress, p. 215. 21 David Plotz, “Jon Corzine: Politician as Mark,” 2 June 2000l, available at http://slate.msn.com/id/83533 22 Lieberman, Public Life, p. 88. 23 Bumpers, Best Lawyer, pp. 194-6. 24 Robert Longley, “Salaries and Benefits of U.S. Congress Members,” available http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/weekly/aa031200a.htm 19

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anyone who would give me a few minutes – all to make enough friends and admirers that they would grant me the distinction of representing them in Congress.”25 Bradley’s periodic strolls across the New Jersey beaches, self-described “walking town meetings,” familiarized the Senator with the concerns of his constituents. With his aides in tow, he could tabulate the number of times an issue was raised, and also immediately begin to address constituent service complaints, such as lost Social Security checks and missing tax refunds.26 Bumpers cited the infrequency with which his first opponent, Senator J. William Fulbright, returned to Arkansas as a major reason for the Republican’s defeat.27 Of course, religion plays an important role in politics and campaigns, but attendant issues must be carefully handled in political campaigns. Lieberman, an observant Jew, flew to Los Angeles in 1988 to solicit donations from the heavily Jewish movie and television community. The then Connecticut Attorney-General also campaigned in the Jewish districts of nearby New York. These efforts yielded much of the $2.6 million raised for his 1988 Senate campaign. Lieberman still could not count on carrying an overwhelming amount of the Jewish vote, however. “One of the most frustrating, eye-opening experiences of the 1988 campaign was approaching several largely Jewish, pro-Israel [Political Action Committees] and finding that they had a hard-and-fast rule of not giving any support to challengers facing incumbents with a pro-Israel voting record, no matter who the challenger was or what his stance on Israel. [Senator Lowell] Weicker had a pro-Israel voting record, so I was shut out.”28 Bradley too witnessed the consideration paid to religion in his 1978 campaign. New Jersey is forty-two percent Roman Catholic. Jeff Bell, his Republican opponent, made a highly publicized conversion to Roman Catholicism during the campaign. Though suspicious of Bell’s convictions, Bradley declined to make the conversion an issue in the fall campaign.29 While most Democrats can count on solid Jewish support, Republicans have made significant inroads with the more numerous Protestant electorate in recent years. South Carolina Senator Jim DeMint carried a nineteen-point advantage amongst all Protestants in his 2004 race, and an impressive sixty-five-point edge with Evangelical Christians.30 Last but not least, media coverage is a crucial factor in any campaign. Candidates have veto power over their own campaign’s advertisements, and significant influence over those of friendly interest groups. They do not control newspaper editorial boards or television news divisions, however. Fortunately for liberal candidates, the journalists in these traditional media sources are overwhelming Democratic. A 1996 survey conducted by the American Society of Newspaper Editors found that sixty-one percent of reporters described themselves as Democratic or liberal, while just fifteen percent identified themselves as Republican or conservative.31 This heavily liberal tilt often finds it way into news reports as well as editorial pages. Rightly or wrongly, a sizable majority of Americans see a “fair amount” or “great deal” of political bias in the news. By a greater than two-to-one margin, those who perceived 25

McCain, Worth the Fighting For, p. 53. Bradley, Time Present, Time Past, p. 38. 27 Bumpers, Best Lawyer, pp. 233-9. 28 Lieberman, Public Life, pp. 83-6. 29 Bradley, Time Present, Time Past, p. 148. 30 CNN.com Election 2004 Coverage available at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004//pages/results/states/ SC/S/01/epolls.0.html 31 American Society of Newspaper Editors 1997 report, “The Newspaper Journalists of the ‘90s,” available at http://www.asne.org/kiosk/reports/97reports/journalists90s/survey19.html 26

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a bias said the media slant was “liberal.”32 Conservative radio talk shows and the wide range of opinions and news sources available on the Internet increasingly berate candidates taking “liberal” positions on abortion, affirmative action, and gun control.

WHAT IT WILL TAKE Candidates must start a campaign with sufficient money on hand to run advertisements, and then raise more money to continue the multimedia message until election day. With their experience and connections, incumbents are better prepared to conduct efficient and lucrative fundraising. A wealthy challenger, willing and able to donate millions of his own fortune, can counter this traditional incumbent advantage. Sitting congressmen, especially more senior ones, prove adept at delivering federal tax dollars and contracts to their states and districts. These legislators then remind the electorate of their pork delivery prowess as the election draws near. The challenger most often competes in, and spends money on, both the primary and general elections while the incumbent focuses his funds on just the latter race. Given these financial disparities, along with the gerrymandered safe districts in which they often reside, sitting Congressmen are poised to return to Washington time and again. Challengers can counter these advantages through simple, clear themes and well-aimed attacks against the congressman's record. Should a legislator make a serious error, whether in his private life or on the Senate floor, the challenger can appear as a much-needed representative of change. Both candidates can use other assets -- religious denomination, connections with the President, and a finger on the pulse of the electorate, are but a few -- to convince voters that they can best represent the state or district in Congress. Each decision in a political campaign is in effect an allocation strategy problem in which the preferences of citizens shape the challenges candidates face.

32

Louis Harris and Associates 1996 poll conducted for the Center for Media and Public Affairs, available at http://www.gargaro.com/bias.html

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 519-551

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

BOOK REVIEWS The Law and Order Presidency. By Willard M. Oliver. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall, 2003. Reviewed by: Roy E. Brownell II, U.S. Department of State One of the seemingly irresistible tides of American history has been the federal government’s gradual extension of authority into areas traditionally reserved for states and localities. Among the more striking examples of this trend has been the centralization of law enforcement authority in the hands of the federal government. One reason for this expansion has been the political leadership exercised by presidents on criminal justice matters. Willard Oliver’s The Law & Order Presidency contributes to the literature by discussing the role of the presidency in this phenomenon, in particular, by asking and answering the question: has the presidency affected public perceptions of crime? Oliver answers this question in the affirmative. Before turning to his hypothesis, Oliver methodically discusses his underlying assumptions: that presidents have actually devoted time and attention to criminal justice issues, that presidents have legitimate reasons for involving themselves in the criminal justice field, and that presidents have the institutional means to involve themselves in this area. To address his first assumption, Oliver begins by tracing the history of presidential involvement in crime control efforts. Beginning modestly with presidents intervening to quell domestic unrest, presidential involvement in criminal justice matters has gradually swollen as the federal government has expanded its regulatory mandate, with the turning point taking place during the mid 1960s. Following the historical overview, Oliver turns his attention to his second assumption, that presidents have good reasons for putting crime on their agenda in the first place. He notes that a number of factors influence why presidents spend valuable time and political capital on this issue. He argues that they do so because: 1) crime is a matter of widespread concern and that the nation instinctively turns to the president for guidance on pressing public issues; 2) crime offers presidents an opportunity to engage actively in substantive policy matters; and 3) crime, as a political issue, permits the president to gain advantage through the use of symbolic, valence, and racial politics. Oliver next turns his attention to the final assumption: that presidents have the means to promote their criminal justice agenda. This segment focuses on the president’s formal, legal powers as well as his

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informal powers such as utilizing the “bully pulpit” to focus national attention on particular issues. Finally, Oliver turns to his major concern, which is whether presidents influence public perceptions of crime. Utilizing an Ordinary Least Squares time-series regression analysis from information collected from 1945-1996, and controlling for other issues including actual crime rates, media attention, congressional activity, and the prevailing economic climate, Oliver compares poll data on public perceptions of political issues (the dependent variable) to the amount of time and effort presidents have devoted to crime as reflected by crime-related references in the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (the key independent variable). The cornerstone of his research is the Gallup Poll’s survey of which issue ranks as the “most important problem” facing the United States. Oliver’s statistical analysis concludes that there is indeed a relationship between presidential attention to criminal justice matters and public concern over the issue. Underscoring Oliver’s statistical analysis is that in 1994 and 1995, the American public ranked “crime” as the number one problem facing the nation for the first time in history, despite statistical indicia demonstrating that crime had been decreasing in each of the previous three years. Oliver’s central question is why did this anomaly occur when it did? Oliver concludes that it was primarily President Clinton’s focus on criminal justice matters that accounted for this outcome. In the end, although resigned to the prospect of continued federalization of criminal justice matters, Oliver offers a sensible solution. He argues that local communities should take the lead on street crime and other related matters while the federal government should busy itself with major breaches of the peace, inter-state crimes (such as white collar crimes), terrorism, and instances of local police malfeasance. With the book, Oliver fills a void in the literature. In the past, commentators had either: 1) evaluated the president’s ability to influence his own standing with the public or on certain specific policy concerns; or 2) evaluated public perceptions of crime. Hitherto, no one had linked the two elements together and looked at the president’s ability to influence public perceptions of crime. Oliver brings together these two strains and in so doing shores up a lacuna in both the disciplines of presidential and criminal justice studies. Jeffrey Cohen demonstrated years back that presidents can in fact influence public perceptions of issues such as the economy, foreign policy, and civil rights. Therefore, it is not a radical leap to hypothesize that presidents might also influence public perceptions of crime. This cautious outlook is indicative of Oliver’s workmanlike approach – he takes little for granted. Oliver does not ignore counterarguments and is candid about the major problem in his thesis: the issue of causality. Is the president driving public opinion or is it driving him? In attempting to uncover the answer to this question, Oliver administers the Granger causality test, which reveals that public perceptions of crime do not appear to influence presidential action with respect to crime. Neither does Oliver oversell his conclusion. While presidents do influence public perceptions of crime, Oliver is quick to point out that presidents are not the exclusive factor influencing public opinion – actual crime trends and the media both play important roles in public perceptions of crime; thus, at least partially, explaining the high level of concern over crime and drugs in certain years despite presidential inattention during the same period. As noted by others, another of the book’s strengths is its dispassionate tone. As Oliver discusses, presidential involvement in criminal justice has long been a highly charged issue.

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Despite, or perhaps because of the political insensitivity involved, Oliver maintains throughout a balanced approach, never betraying his political leanings one way or the other. Finally, Oliver writes clearly and his thesis is convincing, helping make the book well suited not only for classroom use but also for specialists, with perhaps greater emphasis on the former. For students, Oliver provides a number of photographs as well as text boxes with presidential statements on crime. For those specializing in the study of the public perceptions of the presidency, Oliver offers a detailed discussion of his assumptions and methodology with an equally helpful outline of areas for future research. His work is also well footnoted and contains a useful bibliography. For all its attributes, the book is not without a few faults, minor though they are. First, Oliver never satisfactorily addresses the conclusions reached by William Gonzenbach, who concluded that, with respect to the drug issue in the late 1980s and early 1990s, public opinion drove media coverage which in turn drove the presidential agenda, not, as Oliver would anticipate, largely the other way around. One suspects that there may not be a clear answer to this question but, given the close relationship between crime and drugs as political issues, perhaps Oliver could have focused more attention on reconciling the inconsistency between his conclusion and Gonzenbach’s. Second, Oliver’s history of presidential involvement in law enforcement is a bit inconsistent as to what is included. Oliver discusses executive branch malfeasance such as the Teapot Dome and Watergate scandals but not the Credit Mobilizer scandal of the Grant Administration. More surprisingly, Oliver discusses major federal law enforcement campaigns but does not mention well-known efforts such as the A. Mitchell Palmer raids against American radicals in the years 1918-1921. At the end of the day, these omissions are not major but puzzling nonetheless, given the thoroughness of the rest of Oliver’s work. Third, while Oliver is critical as to the efficacy of federal crime control efforts, he overlooks one of the most pressing issues stemming from the federalization of crime control. Given finite resources, the placement of crime on the president’s agenda necessarily crowds out consideration of other problems that fall more properly within the purview of the federal government such as foreign affairs and defense. Thus, these areas of federal endeavor are likely to suffer accordingly since states cannot pick up the slack. This point is left largely unmentioned in Oliver’s work. Aside from these few minor problems, The Law & Order Presidency is, on the whole, a commendable work of scholarship and one to be recommended to students of criminal justice and the presidency alike. Note. The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of State or of the U.S. Government.

On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit. By George C. Edwards III. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. Reviewed by: Richard S. Conley, University of Florida In his valuable contribution to the study of presidential persuasion, George Edwards’ book On Deaf Ears takes up a vital—and surprisingly overlooked—question of paramount importance to scholars of the presidency, and presidents themselves: How successful can

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chief executives hope to be in utilizing the “bully pulpit” to rally Americans behind their agendas and policy stances? As Edwards notes, “It is not only the need for leverage with Congress that drives the White House to seek public support; it is also the belief that leading the public—changing opinions and mobilizing citizens into action—is the ultimate presidential resource.” The core question with which Edwards struggles is whether presidents’ “permanent campaigns” make any difference in opinion leadership. He correctly accentuates that most contemporary studies of the “public presidency” examine the timing, content, substance, and extent of presidential rhetoric and symbolic speech—in other words, what presidents say. Edwards endeavors to fill the extant void in the literature by analyzing the ultimate effect of presidents’ bids to lead public opinion. Edwards’ answer, predicated on a wealth of polling data he brings to bear, is a resounding “no.” The normative implications of his analysis are considerable, especially with respect to so much of the literature spawned by Richard Neustadt’s Presidential Power. Presidents most often fail to galvanize public sympathy for their agendas and policies in the long run, a phenomenon that calls into question seemingly unremitting White House efforts to utilize public communication and outreach as an essential means of governance in the modern presidency. Drawing on his prior scholarship, Edwards makes important distinctions between presidential opinion leadership as a strategy of directing or facilitating policy change in Congress. At best, he contends, public support gives presidents only marginal leverage or “leeway” over Congress early in their terms, but the impact is ephemeral. Edwards debunks the myth that presidents necessarily receive a “bounce” in public approval following their State of the Union or other major televised addresses, since most changes in public approval following such speeches fail to exceed the sampling margin of error. Moreover, even when presidents benefit from “rally effects” from international crises— whether Clinton’s air strikes on Iraq in 1998 or Bush’s exceptional jump in the polls following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001—increases in the presidents’ job approval do not translate into augmented support for specific policies, domestic or foreign. The central lesson of the study is that American public opinion proves to be remarkably stable, despite presidents’ best efforts to manipulate the public’s views. In Chapters 2 and 3 Edwards analyzes public responses to the opinion leadership attempted by two recent presidents who are frequently deemed to have been gifted in the art of public rhetoric, Clinton and Reagan. The Clinton White House viewed the president’s inability to marshal public opinion in favor of policies ranging from health care reform to the budget as failures of communication. Edwards’ analysis demonstrates, however, that Clinton (and his advisors) vastly overestimated his ability to convert the public. Similarly, Reagan, dubbed the “Great Communicator,” was repeatedly frustrated by the public’s disinterest in communist insurgencies in Central America. His indefatigable efforts to galvanize support for the Strategic Defense Initiative, scaling back environmental regulations, and increased defense spending similarly met not only with public inattention but also growing hostility by the end of his two terms as public opinion actually moved away from the president’s stated positions. Chapters 4 and 5 take up the question of presidential charisma and public opinion leadership. Edwards struggles to find a definition of charisma that might explain the relative successes of several presidents, including Kennedy and Reagan, in terms of “going public” and job approval. The search comes up empty. Both Kennedy and Reagan suffered much

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instability in their job approval following narrow electoral victories. In Reagan’s case, Edwards makes the point that Reagan’s use of a combination of insider negotiation and selective public appeals to ultimately win a narrow House vote on the Economic Recovery Tax Act explains that uncertain victory far better than charismatic leadership. In Chapter 5, Edwards takes readers back through history to Washington’s first term to evaluate whether the “venerated” leader of the Revolution was any more able to act as a director of change and exercise charismatic leadership than contemporary chief executives. The detour back to the early Republic, while a highly interesting topic, fits somewhat uncomfortably with the focus on modern presidents in the rest of the book. Nonetheless, Edwards strives to use the example of Washington to contend that the nation’s first president was neither charismatic nor a “director” of change, but faced the constraints analogous to those of contemporary presidents in attempting to exploit opportunities for leadership. The final chapters of the book consider how presidents have sought to frame their messages in an increasingly “congested” media environment. Edwards’ analysis confirms the conventional wisdom—that presidents “talk” much more but fewer Americans are listening. Presidents not only have little influence over media coverage but also confront a dwindling share of the public that pays attention to presidential messages. Edwards must be congratulated on an eminently readable and in-depth analysis of public opinion. The book provides an invaluable repertoire of data during recent presidencies that readers will find an extremely useful reference. The book complements Samuel Kernell’s Going Public (3rd edition, Congressional Quarterly, 1997), and the established literature on presidential rhetoric, by providing an alternative perspective on presidents’ seemingly misplaced obsession with manipulating public opinion. The analysis is certainly a “must” for courses on the presidency and presidential communication—and should be recommended to future occupants of the Oval Office. At the same time, Edwards’ failure to analyze the wealth of data through the use of more systematic, quantitative tools of social science may be a significant weakness in the study. A sharper linkage between presidential rhetorical activities and opinion change on specific policy areas is missing throughout many of the chapters. The thrust of the analysis centers on long-term trends of public views of policy questions across administrations without directly controlling for presidential addresses, speeches, and opinion change or success in Congress. That said, the presentation of data and balanced, anecdotal evidence is compelling and places into sharp relief presidents’ dilemma. At a minimum, the findings entice scholars to re-think connections between the permanent campaign as a governing strategy and the net impact on public opinion, thereby laying groundwork for the next generation of studies to consider more closely the nexus between presidential rhetoric, public opinion, congressional leadership, and policy success.

Presidential Campaign Quality: Incentives and Reform. By Bruce Buchanan. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2004. Reviewed by: David A. Dulio, Oakland University The notion that presidential campaigns in the United States are of poor quality is not new to the scholarly literature, as considerable data illustrate that, among other things, voters are

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not well informed about candidates or issues, the media tend to cover campaigns as sporting events (e.g., the “horse race”), and candidates choose to campaign on anything but issues important to the public. This is not what sets Bruce Buchanan’s work in Presidential Campaign Quality: Incentives and Reform apart from others that tackle similar topics. What does set it apart is his optimism for how the status quo can be changed and what it will take to change it. In fact, he argues that a few past campaigns have come close to attaining these ideals because the right conditions were present. More importantly, Buchanan argues that improving the quality of campaigns will result in better and more effective government. While some may quibble with whether or not the reforms he suggests can or will be instituted, Buchanan makes a convincing argument. Buchanan asserts that presidential campaigns currently do not meet the ideals of democratic elections — principled policy debates, well-informed votes, and high levels of participation on Election Day — because of the incentive structure that is in place for candidates, voters, and the media. By changing these incentive structures, says Buchanan, quality campaigns can be attained. In the end, much of the onus is put on voters (which is why some skeptics may doubt the feasibility of Buchanan’s reform ideas) to demand certain kinds of electoral behavior from candidates and the media by affecting the choices that candidates, and in turn, the media, make. One of the most interesting aspects of Buchanan’s argument is that some election cycles have actually approached the kind of incentive structure and outcomes that lead to highquality campaigns. In some elections, he argues, the mix of incentives was altered and good campaigns were produced. Buchanan identifies the elections of 1800, 1824, 1864, 1936, 1960, and 1992 as those that meet this standard. However, he identifies these campaigns because they were surrounded by some problem or crisis that led to the right conditions for a good campaign, not because the campaign actors went out of their way to create the right context. Buchanan offers the two most recent examples (1960 and 1992) as evidence of how crises and problems can lead to high-quality elections, and therefore sound policy outcomes. In 1960, the author argues, there were clear national issues that everyone cared about with one taking precedence over others — the questions of peace and war in regard to the mounting threat posed by the Soviet Union. What brought this to the fore of the campaign (on both sides) was not a conscious decision by the candidates or the media to raise the issue, but citizen demand for the candidates to address the problem that they found to be most important. Buchanan makes the connection between what happens during and after the campaign when he says: “The depth of public concern made it likely that the president-elect, whoever he was and however small his margin of victory turned out to be, would have as his first priority a strengthening of America’s competitive position in the world.” A similarly assessment of 1992 is offered — it was citizen demand that made candidates deal with the economy during the campaign. In contrast, Buchanan offers the campaigns of 1988 and 1996 as examples of the kind of campaigns Americans see if there is no voter demand for spirited policy debates. These “lackluster campaigns” were characterized by low voter turnout, no major policy focus, and scant attention by the media. Again the focus is on the voters. Buchanan argues that, “The years 1988 and 1996…show what happens when mass anxieties do not arise to energize campaigns and tie the hands of candidates. There is a reversion to a norm in which candidates may safely pursue self-serving agendas that do not clarify national priorities and do not

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inspire high rates of voter engagement.” In other words, because the electorate did not put policy pressure on the candidates, they could do just about whatever they wanted and talk about whatever they wanted during the campaign. In Buchanan’s argument, this is a key point. If candidates do not feel a credible threat from voters, they will not respond and deliver a high-quality campaign because they know that they have no price to pay at the ballot box. In other words, candidates and politicians will take the initiative and make their campaigns about important national issues and do so in a policy-centered manner, “if and only if they understand it to embody widespread, clear, and stable expectations that are backed by a credible threat of electoral consequences.” In addition, if the media sense this demand from the public, they will also respond with quality media coverage because they “must design campaign coverage with audience reaction in mind.” This, Buchanan argues, makes “it possible, in theory at least, for voters to dictate the tone and content of candidate and media presentations.” This is desirable because, as noted above, Buchanan argues that these types of elections are the ones that lead to sound policy making after inauguration day. Buchanan develops an important concept he calls a “policy signal,” which is fundamentally different than a policy mandate. Policy signals reflect the possibility that campaigns can form a consensus about certain policy problems that should be top national priorities. The way to achieve quality campaigns, according to Buchanan, is not out of the reach of those who want to change the status quo. While other reforms, from campaign finance reform to increasing voter turnout, have seen “indifferent results,” the move toward quality campaigns can be made by enacting reforms that already have public support. Buchanan argues that prior reforms have not been completely successful because they have not focused on the right incentives. The most thought provoking part of the book is the proposal of a three-step process that would “equip voters to use credible threats to evoke both real public policy debates and civil campaign practices” during campaigns. This is the point in the book that some readers may lose steam because some of the reforms that Buchanan calls for would require a fundamental change in the culture of campaigning. This, however, does not mean that he is wrong. The first step is to remove the barriers that citizens face in learning and voting, including the remoinstitutional barriers to voter registration. However, also included here are more ambitious reforms such as doing away with “repellent candidate behaviors,” such as “attack or negative advertising.” These are more difficult, of course, because candidates know that the tactics that the electorate dislikes work to help them get elected. The second step in the process is to strengthen situational incentives by increasing the number of debates between candidates, and encouraging mobilization activities that are done by partisan organizations (e.g., parties and interest groups) as well as nonpartisan organizations. Step three may be the most difficult as it requires “reinventing citizenship” by redefining what a “satisfactory presidential campaign” is and how candidates, the media, and voters must perform their roles to achieve the goal. Central to this step is the creation of a new role for voters based on the requirement that citizens be able to enforce credible threats (electoral punishment) on candidates who do not engage in quality campaign practices. This new role goes beyond participation in the campaign and extends to policing the process by enforcing the threats they can pose to candidates. Buchanan acknowledges that the hardest aspect of this reform is “getting citizens to care enough to assert themselves” and to take the required actions, but argues that the first step in this process is to rejuvenate civic duty in the citizenry

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and expand it to include a responsibility not only to vote but to punish activities that do not lead to quality campaigns. In the end, Presidential Campaign Quality is a solid piece of scholarship that connects the theory of political science to the real world of politics. Buchanan tells us why this kind of work matters and why the goal of quality campaigns matters—because good campaigns lead to effective government, they affirm democracy, and they build support for the electoral process. Buchanan also does a nice job of outlining the modern dynamic that occurs between candidates, voters, and the press. I highly recommend this book to a wide range of audiences, from introductory to upper level undergraduate courses; this broad spectrum of readers will find it both appealing and accessible. In addition to using examples from recent campaigns, the book is timely in that there are ample ways to apply the concepts discussed in the book to future campaigns. Buchanan does a nice job of setting up the discussion so that the reader can look ahead by looking back. By this I mean that the reader can look ahead to the 2004 campaign (or any future campaign) and see what candidates are dodging the important issues of the day, what policy signals might be out there in the electorate, and what kind of election is going to occur. There is also plenty of potential for instructors to create class assignments from the material covered in the book. If I had to make one critical remark about the book it would be that the author leaves the reader wanting more. The book contains interesting data and appealing arguments; after finishing, the reader wishes that there were more than four elections used as small case studies and that the author had spent more time detailing the empirical data used to make his case. My appetite was wet at the end, but I wanted more.

Franklin D. Roosevelt and Abraham Lincoln: Competing Perspectives on Two Great Presidencies. Edited by William D. Pederson and Frank J. Williams. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003, 287 pages. Reviewed by: Jack Lechelt, University of South Carolina Pederson and Williams, the editors of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Abraham Lincoln, compiled an eclectic array of essays, many of which are interesting and informative. However, based on the diverse contributions, the subtitle may have missed the mark: there hardly appears to be any competition among the authors. A more accurate subtitle might have contained adjectives such as “diverse” or “unique,” instead of “competing.” Taken together, the essays allow many of us, coming from different fields such as history, political science, and law, to look at two of the most loved past presidents in new ways. The subject of their compilation is clearly stated: “the contribution of [FDR’s and Lincoln’s] leadership style to [their] victories and how successor generations preserve and teach their legacies.” Hopefully, “by examining and comparing personalities, leadership style, and the times in which the sixteenth and thirty-second presidents held office, the ten contributors to this volume help us to better understand why scholars and the public value the enduring contributions of Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt to the American heritage.” Ronald D. Rietveld, a professor of history, offers an insightful analysis of “Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Abraham Lincoln.” Roosevelt, the master politician, worked hard to take the legacy of Lincoln away from Republicans to help garner support for the New Deal. Imagine

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that! The Grand Ol’ Party of the 1930s forced to hand over the legacy of their greatest president to Franklin Roosevelt, a politician who was the epitome of everything Republicans were then against. Even though FDR “used, manipulated, and emulated” Lincoln’s example for political gain, the Depression combined with the Second World War made FDR’s “use of Lincoln [change] from political purpose … to the challenge of saving the nation and democracy from its enemies, both within and without.” David E. Long, another historian, offers a comparative evaluation of an incredibly important period of both Lincoln’s and FDR’s presidencies: their wartime elections of 1864 and 1944, respectively. It is always impressive to note that both presidents, in the midst of serious national emergency, stood by the democratic electoral process; one can seriously question how many other leaders, American or otherwise, would have let an opportunity to seize more permanent control slip away. Long also discusses the selection of vice presidents in both elections, which in hindsight proved to be incredibly important decisions. When both presidents died shortly after their reelection and inauguration, power transferred to two most unlikely politicians. For all the greatness of Presidents Lincoln and Roosevelt, they do not receive enough criticism for their involvement, or lack thereof, in the selection process for vice president, or for not preparing either man for the job that landed in their laps. Perhaps more so with Lincoln, one can argue that presidents were not much involved in their conventions and in vice presidential selections, but Lincoln was a precedent-setter in so many regards; also, as Long points out, Lincoln’s assistants at the convention made numerous requests for the President’s input – he offered no hints or guidance. Roosevelt was more involved in selecting Truman, albeit duplicitously. Dishonesty aside, FDR clearly made the better choice in Truman. But still, the lack of attention both Johnson and Truman received from the time of the convention up until their elevation to the presidency was a gross oversight by both presidents. Although most of us can agree that Lincoln and Roosevelt were great presidents, perhaps a great research project can focus on the mistakes each made, which should also include discussions of Lincoln’s wartime imprisonment of many without trial and FDR’s forced relocation of Japanese-Americans. Often underappreciated is the influence spouses have on presidents: James Chowning Davies looks at the relationships of Abraham and Mary, and Franklin and Eleanor. Davies also posits three reasons for the “immortality” of Lincoln and Roosevelt: “they both identified with people as human beings and trusted them.” Of course, both received a “large nudge” from their spouses. Much has been written about Eleanor’s influence on Franklin: she was the liberal force that continually reminded her husband about the masses of regular Americans who were often overlooked in politics. Where their marriage lacked passion for each other (due largely to Eleanor’s realization of Franklin’s earlier infidelity), both stuck to the powerful partnership they created. Mary and Abraham Lincoln also had a strong relationship, with more passion indeed. Mary’s mental instability has been oft-noted, but Davies makes a point of acknowledging her “indispensability” to Lincoln. Finally, Davies considers all four partners and their capacities in intelligence, empathy, comprehension, and magnanimity. Although all four had different mixtures of the various ingredients, both Lincoln and FDR “acted on their values, at whose core was their real affection for and identification, not with the abstract masses but with real ordinary people,” and their wives helped make them the political forces for good that they became.

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The most interesting essay for me was C. Todd Stephenson’s “FDR and Lincoln in Stone (and Bronze).” Aside from the White House and Capital, one cannot visualize Washington, D.C. without thinking of the Lincoln Memorial. Its ancient Greek look, with the somber and contemplative Lincoln sitting therein leaves all with a sense of the difficulties that he presided over. The Memorial, however perfect it appears to us now, almost ended up as something completely different: a road from Washington, DC to Gettysburg, PA. Thankfully, Congress adopted Henry Bacon’s temple that we all look upon today. Likewise, Roosevelt’s memorial faced political battles. Arguments over whether or not to make a living memorial (such as a working children’s hospital) were discussed. Also, many wanted to see FDR depicted in a wheelchair so that the masses would see that a disability did not prevent FDR from becoming a great president; others believed that, since FDR did not want to be depicted in a wheelchair, his preferences should have been honored in his memorial. This brings to the forefront questions of who memorials are supposed to serve: the individual honored or the people? Stephenson recommends that future discussions of memorials should not occur until at least fifty years have elapsed after the passing of a leader. Within that fifty year period, modern politics are still likely to play a part - and so are the children of the leader; Stephenson pointed out that both Lincoln’s son and FDR’s children were excessively involved in their fathers’ memorial plans. Some interesting comparisons follow: Frank J. Williams, chief justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, finds that among Lincoln, Churchill, and Roosevelt, Lincoln and Roosevelt rank higher in regards to premodern Mayan leadership ideals. In particular, as “the echo,” which signifies “an individual who transcended a culturally defined role and learned to truly hear his people,” both Lincoln and FDR surpassed Churchill. Churchill’s strong stance against the Nazi menace was indeed impressive, but when the fighting stopped, Churchill’s leadership offered less. Lincoln, on the other hand, left a legacy of freeing the slaves; likewise, FDR offered a true understanding for the plight of regular Americans through Depression and war. Glen Jeansonne, another historian, has two short essays focusing on Roosevelt. The first of which is an evaluation of FDR and “his willingness to break with the past, to ignore policies that had worked in the past because he knew that the present was different.”. In the second essay, Jeansome compares FDR with another larger than life figure of the time: Huey P. Long. Although Long was brilliant, his “compulsive desires for power and recognition” allowed him to take advantage of the suffering of his fellow Louisianans. Although Long did take abuse his positions as governor and U.S. senator, at the very least he did much good for the regular folks of his state. Thankfully, however, Long had neither the temperament nor the strategy necessary to become president of the United States. In one of the more bizarre comparisons, James Chowning Davies considers the similarities among Jesus, Lincoln, and Beethoven. One can certainly claim that all three have had enormous impacts on their environments. But the connections beyond that are not satisfying. The bulk of this chapter focuses on Beethoven, and yet with the short sections on “Jesus and equality” and “Lincoln and equality,” I am not left with the sense that Beethoven belongs in this small crowd. Although his music was powerful and held deep meaning to him and his fans, Jesus and Lincoln did a fair better job conveying to the world that their work was for the betterment of all – and their work resonates still to this day as testaments (old, new, or otherwise) to equality and freedom.

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The book finishes with a look at how Franklin Roosevelt’s legacy is taught in schools today. Sherry L. Field discusses FDR and elementary school social studies textbooks, and O. L. Davis and Matthew D. Davis do the same with regards to secondary school texts. Not surprisingly, they all find that FDR does not occupy the space in our educational texts that he deserves. However, the authors should have offered a better comparative analysis: how well or poorly was he focused on compared to other American leaders and presidents? Field lists the number of times Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln and others are mentioned, but FDR appears to hold his own among the greats of American history. Textbooks are probably brief on all topics of American history. Finally, Matthew Ware Coulter writes about his efforts to better feature FDR in American history courses. Coulter offers useful suggestions on how teachers can step away from the chalk and talk lecture method and include more diverse teaching techniques. Video tapes of speeches and different writing assignments more aggressively challenge today’s students. When all is read and said, I am left wondering what audience this book was intended for. Specialists and those with a narrow focus who have already thoroughly investigated the presidencies of Lincoln and FDR probably have little need for the essays in this edited volume. However, those who want to challenge themselves with unique perspectives on two great presidents may indeed find interesting gems here. In academia and in the quest for broadening our horizons, diverse research methods and topics should always be encouraged. The book is readable, informative, and often interesting. As such, from Pederson and Williams, I hope other comparative analyses of the great and not-so-great presidents of our past will be forthcoming.

The Tormented President: Calvin Coolidge, Death, and Clinical Depression. By Robert E. Gilbert. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003. Reviewed by: Glen Sussman, Old Dominion University Robert E. Gilbert=s The Tormented President is an interesting, informative and alternative view of the presidency of Calvin Coolidge. Coolidge grew up within the rural, New England social environment where family ties were strict and hierarchical, frugality was an important value, and hard work and diligence were encouraged. Coolidge=s life was a paradox. He put public life first and family second. In his private life, he was an abusive husband and domineering and absentee father. In his public life, he was a shrewd politician who carefully and deliberatively moved up the political ladder. On the one hand, he was a shy individual characterized over the years by those who knew him as the loner, the sphinx, the mute and later as Silent Cal (despite his mastery over the media while serving in the White House). On the other hand, here was an individual who moved easily and effectively into public life - earning a law degree, winning office in the Massachusetts state legislature, becoming governor of the state, nominated as vice presidential candidate to run with Warren Harding in 1920 and winning the presidency on his own in 1924. Yet the thread that runs throughout his private and public life was death – the loss of his mother, sister, youngest son – each having a considerable impact on his psyche and ultimately his presidency. While discussing the environment in which Coolidge was socialized, Gilbert emphasizes the point that death (and its psychological impact) was a life long companion to Coolidge. He

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was exceptionally close to his mother and suffered from a stern and absentee father who was politically active. The loss of his mother was devastating to Coolidge only to be followed a few years later by the death of his only sibling, his sister Abbie. After Coolidge=s father remarried, he developed a close relationship with his stepmother. Sadly, she too suffered from ill health and was unable to attend Coolidge=s inauguration as governor in 1919 and she passed away shortly before the important 1920 Republican nomination process that brought Coolidge to national prominence and the vice-presidency. In 1923, President Harding died leading to the assumption of presidential power by Coolidge. The devastating impact of the loss of his youngest and favored son, Calvin, Jr. in 1924 culminated in the psychological breakdown of the president and its impact on his presidency over the next four years. Finally, he lost his father in 1926 two years after the successful 1924 electoral campaign. This book could have been titled the ATwo Presidencies of Calvin Coolidge.@ Prior to assuming the presidency in 1923, he was already a successful governor and an activist vice president. After moving into the White House in 1923, the Afirst@ Coolidge presidency was characterized by Gilbert as engaged, active, and energetic. For example, he guided his presidency away from the scandalous affairs of the Harding administration; he established an important personal link with the American electorate; he worked to strengthen the executive against legislative encroachment; he helped settle a coal strike in Pennsylvania among other actions. Yet several days after his party nominated him as its candidate for president in June 1924, Gilbert informs us that Coolidge=s Agreatest moment of political triumph@ would change forever when Calvin, Jr. died on July 24 due to complications from an infection. Coolidge became Aapathetic toward the presidential campaign@ and despite an electoral landslide, due to Ahis obsession with his dead son, . . . he became a different man and a different president.@ Gilbert argues that Coolidge Abecame engulfed in a major depressive episode, one from which he did not recover.@ In short, Aafter the president lost his son, the nation lost its president.@ For every positive attribute that Coolidge exhibited earlier, he now was a broken and depressed man. He was indifferent to his vice president and disengaged from his cabinet; he no longer consulted with political colleagues; he had strained relations with Congress despite the fact that his party had majorities in both chambers; he was uninformed during press conferences and exhibited dysfunctional behavior. Consequently, according to Gilbert, while the Afirst@ Coolidge presidency of 1923-mid-1924 might be considered quite successful, the Asecond@ term (mid-1924-1929) was characterized by a president grieving for his youngest son that ultimately resulted in a gradual disengagement from presidential leadership. The Tormented President is a substantive case study of the private and public life of Calvin Coolidge written against the backdrop of psychological illness. This reader would have preferred that the author had discussed the clinical depression literature earlier in the book as a basis upon which to conduct the case study of Coolidge. After all, death and clinical depression are central to the title and content of the book and the reader would have been better served to have this literature presented at the outset. Instead the reader is introduced to the psychological literature in the final chapter – a chapter that also includes presidential ratings where Coolidge is consistently ranked low by presidential scholars. Gilbert concludes that these scholars have missed an important element of the Coolidge presidency – namely, his clinical depression and its impact on his presidency. If as Sidney Milkis and Michael Nelson have argued in their book, The American Presidency (1999) that Coolidge was quite open to allowing Aunprecedented@ public scrutiny of his private life, why have presidential scholars missed the issue of clinical depression in their analyses of the Coolidge presidency?

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In his book, The Politics Presidents Make (1997) Stephen Skowronek points out that it was Acurious@ that Coolidge decided not to run again in 1928 despite the strong likelihood of victory. At the same time, however, Skowronek notes that Coolidge dropped out to protect his place in history suggesting a strategic decision rather than personal psychological problems. As Gilbert describes Coolidge=s life, one wonders how the Asecond@ Coolidge presidency might have been characterized had he not lost his favored son. The Tormented President should encourage presidential scholars to give a second look at Calvin Coolidge who over the years has been evaluated, in the words of Raymond Tatalovich and Thomas Engeman in their book The Presidency and Political Science (2003) as Aa wholly ineffectual president.@

The Challenge of the American Presidency. By Phillip Abbott. Prospect Heights Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc. 2004. Reviewed by: Robert J. DeCastro, Florida Atlantic University Phillip Abbot writes that “ perhaps no other person both celebrated and explored executive power more thoroughly” than the 16th century Italian writer and diplomat Niccolo Machiavelli. His famous works The Prince and The Discourses have contributed many famous theories to political science. Our Founding Fathers were acutely aware of the observations Machiavelli made on executive power. Machiavelli’s famous analogy of a fox and lion, illustrates how leaders must adapt to challenges facing them. A great leader knows when to act like a fox and bargain with his enemies, while simultaneously understanding when the time is right to overpower them. President George W. Bush and his administration would be wise to review Machiavelli’s teachings on abuses of executive power. In this book, the author ties Machiavelli’s definition of executive power to the American presidency. Citing specific examples throughout American history, Abbot skillfully illustrates how each president faced the challenges of the day, and how they shaped the course of history according to the available power of the executive branch at each point in time. Beginning with the Revolutionary period, Abbot illustrates how the Founding Fathers struggled with the question of executive power as they were defining the parameters of the federal government, and the subsequent rise in the level of power within the executive branch over the course of history. The Challenge of the American Presidency begins by citing specific instances in American history where outside influences forced a president to expand the powers of the executive branch. George Washington’s refusal to enter war between England and France in 1793, Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase from Napoleon, Jackson’s use of veto power, Lincoln’s refusal to accept Southern succession, and JFK’s standoff with the Soviets, all illustrate the ways in which presidents respond to domestic, foreign, and economic challenges, and most importantly how each specific response helped shape the office of the presidency. Abbot divides the book into six presidential periods, with each period embodying certain rules and behavior within the political system, the economy, and the international system that shift and vary over time. During the “Founding Presidency” (1789-1829), presidents stood above party factions and governed impartially in the public interest. The “Partisan Presidency” (18291865) is marked by a rise in partisanship; with presidents building party machines that rewarded friends and punished foes. The “Eclipsed Presidency” (1865-1897) still featured

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strong partisan ties, but at the time the office had been greatly reduced in its power. The “Modern Presidency” (1897-1945) faced the challenges of industrial growth and the rise of America into a global economic power and an international actor. The “Cold War Presidency” (1945-1993) symbolized the pinnacle of executive power, where the office of the presidency was bureaucratically enlarged and presidents assumed the role of international crisis manager. Finally, the “Post-Modern Presidency” (1993-present) is defined by no longer being able to rely on Cold War accords to create support for international commitments. Within each period, Abbot analyzes each specific administration, identifying the goals and aspirations of each president, and how he succeeded (or failed) in accomplishing those goals. Theoretically, Abbot comes to various conclusions. He concludes that the six presidential periods show certain basic features of American political development in general and of the presidency in particular. First, aspects of change are cyclical. Historically, executive power seems to rise in some periods and decline in others. Sometimes, the resurgence of executive power is the result of war and economic distress, while at other times it is due to imaginative efforts of presidents themselves. Second, Abbot observes that many changes are layered, that is a once president assumes new responsibility for the executive branch, each subsequent president accepts these new parameters. Third, changes in the presidency are uneven in regards to other American institutions. New cabinet posts and agencies are frequently created after major changes in society occur. Lastly, Abbot concludes that some changes in the executive branch are episodic, where changes in the executive branch are made as a result of the individual inclinations of particular presidents. This book has many strengths. It reads as a biography of our nation, illustrating the birth of the United States from a colonial rebellion to its ascent as the last remaining superpower on Earth. At each step of the way, Abbot skillfully illustrates the major challenges facing the United States, and most importantly, how each individual president handled these changes, at home and abroad. Detailed insight and commentary from administrators, political scientists, and historians holds the readers attention throughout the book. While the level of detail found in this book can be considered one of its strengths, that same level of detail could also be considered a weakness. While the book is a perfect fit for hard-core political junkies, average readers may find the scope and scale of the book to be somewhat daunting. I recommend this book for scholars interested in a very thorough analysis of the history and evolution of the executive branch in American politics. It is also well suited as a historical reference book. Scholastically, this book is well suited for graduate studies or senior level undergraduate students in political science. Presidential scholars and Historians may also find The Challenge of the American Presidency required reading for their students.

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Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America, 2nd Edition. By William E. Odom, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003, 206 pages Reviewed by John Davis In the wake of the devastating events of 9/11 and following the failed search for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq, a veritable cottage industry has emerged on the subject of intelligence. Scholarly activity has focused on a number of areas: the failure of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to track and apprehend sleeper cells in the United States; the absence of a strong human intelligence component within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to infiltrate Al Qaeda and affiliated organizations; the absence of Arab linguists to translate important intercepts of terrorist communications; the failure to communicate with other agencies (i.e., FBI/CIA, or the CIA/Defense Intelligence Agency); the need for a national terrorist center; and finally, the turf wars that have resulted in a succession of intelligence breakdowns. Collectively, these and other issues have been the source of discourse among intelligence analysts, the Congress, and scholars. In Fixing Intelligence author, the former head of the super-secret National Security Agency, retired general William Odom, provides a litany of examples that offer the reader a historical illustration of the bureaucratic (structural), environmental (cultural), and policy dilemmas that provide an incredible window into the counterintelligence deficiencies that have haunted America’s intelligence apparatus. After September 11, 2001, Odom explicates that members of Congress and the media incessantly debated the unremitting turf battles that precluded the FBI and CIA from effectively communicating with each other (along with the laws that prohibit such contact). The author pointedly asserts that turf wars in intelligence are by no means a new phenomenon and today’s failures are symptomatic of long-simmering feuds between a series of disparate bureaucratic entities: On the domestic front, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had that responsibility [uncovering foreign espionage in the US] but proved no match for Soviet espionage agents and the Communist Party of the United States. Many Soviet spies duped the FBI, the OSS, and every other counterintelligence effort during and after the war [WWII]. Abroad, the Army’s Counterintelligence Corps was active in Europe and Japan, where it clashed over turf with the successor to the OSS, the Central Intelligence Agency. Thus the counterintelligence field was weak and increasingly fragmented during and the war.

Odom asserts that such battles did not dissipate, even after the passage of the 1947 National Security Act, whose purpose was to provide substantial reorganization of intelligence. In fact, the author explains that such wars intensified: “the FBI (domestic) and military service chiefs (foreign)” resisted the agency’s (CIA) attempt to control elements within there respective areas. What sets this book apart from similar studies concerns the fact that it is written to inform the reader on the complex issues associated with intelligence. That is, the author describes with great precision the importance of security, collection management, analysis and production and the multiple intelligence agencies — National Reconnaissance Office, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and the National Security Agencies, to name a few

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— and their role in gathering and disseminating intelligence to government agencies and to clients (usually policy makers and it is a reference to key allies). In short, the guiding framework of this study is that “security depends on intelligence.” This is a most interesting point given the Bush administration’s penchant for preemption or preventive war, where in both cases the intelligence picture (the clarity of the threat and the intensions of the enemy is not confirmed) is not complete and thus, as was the case in Iraq, the country may initiate war on false pretenses. The results have been telling: in the absence of complete or finished intelligence, U.S. policy under such terms has resulted in an unintended and paradoxical consequence. Intelligence was supposed to lead to security, but instead, again as a result of the Iraq conflagration, we have global insecurity and distrust within the NATO Alliance and UN organization that continues to its stature. In order to fix U.S. intelligence, the author provides a number of recommendations to reform select bureaucratic entities. A few examples are instructive. In chapter two the author makes an astonishing revelation: within the military a host of executive level colleges and universities were established to enhance the knowledge of senior military officers, but similar opportunities are unavailable for the counterparts within the intelligence community. The prescription for the intelligence community, according to Odom, is to learn from the military: construct similar institutions that will provide “doctrinal” (a single set of rules and of procedures that govern the work of all intelligence organizations), teach “community-wide training in resource management”, and third, provide educational training for senior executives and for the bureaucracy as a whole. Chapter three provides discourse surrounding the requirement for reform of the authority of the Director of the Central Intelligence (DCI). Such changes should occur in two areas: increase the DCI’s control over the management of personnel (this includes with the CIA) and within areas now under other departments, such as Defense Intelligence Agency. The second concerns program management authority. The problem for the DCI in this area is that in making presentations to the Congress, the director is not always cognizant of every aspect of intelligence. That is, many operations and initiatives occur outside the purview of the CIA; yet again it is the director that must present the case to the House or Senate oversight committees without full acquaintance of the issues or dynamics that may govern a particular program, or overt/covert activity. Modification in this area according to the author requires “no statutory change” but rather codification of existing procedures. Finally, in spite of the importance of this book, the study nonetheless has two salient shortcomings: it does not deal with the Report of the 9/11 Commission or the pre-war intelligence failures in Iraq. Even with such problems, this is a significant study that will contribute to our understanding of the importance of intelligence and the need to correct the all-to-numerous problems. Thus this is a text that will enhance the knowledge of students interested in one of the more significant participants in the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy. This study is aimed at an additional target audience: the intelligence community. He routinely implies that the fixing intelligence can not commence without the assistance of those within the bureaucracy but simultaneously asserts that if such entities stand in the way transformation, the congress and the president must be willing to jettison such roadblocks for the sake of U.S. security.

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Against all Enemies:Inside America’s War on Terror. By Richard A. Clarke New York: Free Press 2004, 304 pages Reviewed by Anthony J. Eksterowicz, James Madison University Richard Clarke, the former terrorism czar for both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations has penned a monumental work on terrorism, bureaucratic politics, and national tragedy. The work is complicated, demanding, tragic, humane, and ultimately riveting. One, even careful, reading is not enough. The reader will want to return to various passages again and again. It will serve as a reference work on terrorism and America’s response to the threat. Clarke’s work exists on many levels but three stand out significantly for their time periods and substance. First, Clarke covers the recent past of the Clinton and G. W. Bush administrations. Second, he provides an in depth historical account of America’s struggle with terrorism beginning with the Ronald Reagan administration. Finally, there is the personal level involving bureaucrats warning of future disasters and suggesting measures of remediation, all to very little avail. It is this lonely struggle that will haunt readers and force them to question why. The indictment of four previous presidents, but especially the G. W. Bush administration, comes early in the preface. All of the damning stories are here. We have read about them in the newspapers and they were covered in the 9/11 Commission’s hearings during the summer of 2004. Indeed the Commission relied heavily on Clarke’s testimony. We learn here of the troubled transition from the Clinton to the Bush administrations. The new administration was suspicious of any advice from the Clinton administration including advice on al Qaeda. Clarke details President Bush’s focus upon Iraq instead of al Qaeda not only shortly after the attack on the towers but early in the administration. In fact, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz focused on the state sponsored terrorism which they believed emanated from Iraq. Clarke documents his insistence for a meeting of the principal advisors to the president on the subject of terrorism during the first six months of the new administration. This plea fell on deaf ears until one week before September 11. The author is convincing when describing the new administration’s focus upon Iraq and how those bureaucratic warnings were ignored. There is enough culpability to go around from the President’s National Security Council Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, to Vice President Dick Cheney, to the president himself, newly and contentiously elected and filled with naiveté, hubris, and a touch of arrogance. Clarke claims that anyone who was warning of the al Qaeda threat was immediately suspect in the eyes of many administration officials. He discusses Paul Wolfowitz’s attempts to remove Indonesian ambassador Bob Gelbard for pressuring the Jakarta government to do something about al Qaeda. Gelbard later retired from the Foreign Service. Clarke agreed with the decision to invade Afghanistan because the focus was on al Qaeda. However, he criticizes the Bush administration, especially Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, for not committing enough forces to destroy the Taliban. He did not condone the invasion of Iraq. He quotes Jeff Record’s opinion on the invasion as a strategic error of the first magnitude. While the bureaucratic struggles within the new administration are compelling and as a result have received the most press coverage, the history of America’s struggle with terrorism is the strongest part of Clarke’s book. We need to know how and why this all started if we are

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to successfully combat terrorism. To this end Clarke begins with the Reagan administration. He meticulously traces the early decisions and demonstrates their impact upon our present policy. He begins with the ill-fated Reagan policy toward Lebanon. The United States did not retaliate for the bombing of the marine barracks in Lebanon nor for the bombing of Pan Am 103. President Reagan withdrew from Lebanon and the terrorists and would be terrorists drew the conclusion that the American infidel could be beaten. Both president’s Reagan and Bush (H.W.) share culpability here. Clarke documents the sharing of intelligence with Iraq to use against Iran during the 1980s.He delineates four mistakes of the Reagan administration that have direct impact today. He notes the inability of our intelligence services to develop ties to Afghans due to our ties to the Pakistani intelligence services during the Reagan years. America also did not keep track of the Arab people coming to Afghanistan as a result of our encouraging Arab states in the struggle against the Russians there. We also pulled our resources too quickly out of Afghanistan after the Soviet defeat. This diminished our influence there. Finally, we did not help Pakistan adjust to the new mix of Arab peoples or Afghan refugees. All of these factors affect in some measure our current predicament in Iraq. There are other connections in how America handled the 1990 Gulf War and the crisis in Mogadishu. The effects of the 1993 World Trade Center incident and the bombing of embassies in Tanzania and Kenya are all covered by Clarke. The greater lesson here (and Clarke is surely trying to raise it) is that we have to get better at understanding recent history. History that develops in a 25- to 50-year time frame. We have to begin to make connections and project them into the future. For example, what does the invasion of Iraq portend for the future? Will it lead to greater democracy or civil war? What will the foreign fighters who have migrated to Iraq be doing ten or twenty years from now? What will the citizens of Iraq do with or to them? How have our actions contributed to these possible outcomes? Clarke’s work forces us to confront these questions. History is important because (if used wisely) it allows us to view possible connections. Past scenarios beget future possibilities. We have to get better at analyzing these scenarios and possibilities. This is why Clarke’s book should be assigned in every course that deals with terrorism or basic American foreign policy. The third level of this work is the personal. One can sense Clarke’s frustration on almost every page. He was the voice in the wilderness warning of catastrophe against complacence. What might that have felt like? Is this what compelled him to apologize to the victims and families of the 2001 tragedy before delivering his testimony to the 9/11 Commission? It certainly had an impact upon the dedication of the book to John O’Neill, the FBI agent who, like Clarke, was a voice in the wilderness, and lost his life in one of the World Center Trade towers. Clarke had allies. Good people who understood the historical connections but few who would seriously listen to them or explore these connections. Max Weber noted long ago that bureaucratic behavior is not heroic behavior. It can not be because the bureaucrat prioritizes routine behavior by sprinkling it with standard operating procedures. Those harboring an innovative mind need not apply. Charisma was the domain of a special leader. Bureaucracy comes later, after the leader has stabilized the state. But maybe this is wrong. Maybe there are bureaucratic voices trying to be heroic. From an anonymous CIA agent publishing a study critical of the Iraq war during a presidential election year to a former administrator of the Iraqi Provisional Authority who admits Bush administration mistakes in the aftermath of the war also during the same year. The actions of O’Neil and Clarke could not prevent the tragedy of 9/11 but there is something heroic about their attempt.

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Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Transformation of the Supreme Court. By Stephen K. Shaw, William D. Pederson and Frank J. Williams, Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004 271 pages Reviewed by Bryan Hilliard, New England College At 11:00am on Wednesday, November 3, the 2004 race for the White House ended with John Kerry’s phone call to President Bush conceding defeat. Kerry’s concession also ended weeks of speculation and fear that the presidency would once again be decided by the United States Supreme Court. But as George W. Bush prepared for another four years in office the Supreme Court remained the focal point of much attention. The fact that four of the justices are over seventy years of age, coupled with the news that Chief Justice Rehnquist has thyroid cancer, makes it quite likely that President Bush will have the opportunity to nominate and see confirmed as many as four justices in his next term. For good or ill, a Bush Supreme Court will dominate and define many aspects of social, economic, and public policy for decades to come. As the nation prepares to watch the coming confirmation battles that are sure to take place before the Senate Judiciary Committee and to familiarize itself with the intricacies of constitutional interpretation, judicial temperament, and the legitimate power of the judicial branch, we will once again have the opportunity to explore and witness firsthand the complex relationship between the presidency and the Supreme Court. What better time then to revisit what is perhaps one of the most interesting and important episodes in the history of both the presidency and the judicial branch — the relationship between Franklin D. Roosevelt and the United States Supreme Court. In their edited volume, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Transformation of the Supreme Court, Stephen Shaw, William Pederson, and Frank Williams bring together ten essays that explore different aspects of FDR’s dealings with and influence on the Court, both as an institution and with the individual justices. Although FDR did not have the opportunity to place even one judge on the Court during his first term — a fact that caused him a great deal of frustration — FDR, by the time of his death, had placed ten jurists on the Court and thus left a legacy that remains with us today. Roosevelt’s efforts to shape the Court and constitutional adjudication to his liking are impressive and intriguing; the essays as a whole ably demonstrate the complexities and consequences of the interactions between FDR and the Court, including an explanation of the personal lives, ambitions, and judicial philosophy of select justices. The essays in the book were papers originally presented at a conference titled “FDR After 50 Years,” held at Louisiana State University in 1995. In his introduction to the volume, Stephen Shaw notes: “In the long history of the American presidency and the High Court, few events, if any, have been of more lasting consequence than the Court battle of the mid1930s….Both the individual and the institution demand our critical attention as citizens and scholars.” The essays cover a wide range of topics, including public perceptions of the Court as an institution and of its early adherence to economic conservatism, the Court’s rejection of Roosevelt’s first term legislative and administrative initiatives, the resulting Court-packing plan, the “constitutional revolution” of 1937, Roosevelt’s personal and political relationships with several of the justices, and FDR’s understanding of constitutional law as applied politics. The essays are divided into three parts. In Part I, “The Supreme Court: Image and Reality,” three essays examine the Court as institution. Barbara Perry and Henry Abraham focus on symbols and images to illustrate how the justices portrayed themselves during the

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New Deal era and how the media communicated this portrayal to the public. Of special interest is their detailed description of the Supreme Court building, the “marble temple,” which was completed in 1935. In one of the longest essays, Roger Corley takes issue with the notion that the election of 1936 and FDR’s subsequent Court-packing proposal caused the constitutional revolution of 1937. Corley, through an intricate comparison of decisions handed down under Chief Justice Taft with those of Chief Justice Hughes, demonstrates that the Court’s turn toward a more liberal understanding of federal economic policy cannot be explained simply by reference to West Coast Hotel v. Parrish and Justice Robert’s “switch in time.” Those familiar with the Court’s commerce and contract clause jurisprudence before and after 1937 would agree with Corley; however, many essays in the collection continue to subscribe to this conventional wisdom. The last essay in this section by James Durhan examines how the Kansas press covered Roosevelt’s Court-packing proposal. Durham’s research demonstrates that many newspapers opposed Roosevelt’s New Deal economic reforms based on both economic self-interest and a specific understanding of the constitutional limitations on the role of the federal government in economic affairs. President Roosevelt’s relationship with four justices, one might say “legends,” of the High Court is the topic of Part II, “The Roosevelt Court, Law, and Politics.” Kenneth Holland’s exploration of the relationship between FDR and Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes dramatically demonstrates the consequences of agreements and disagreements between chief executive and chief justice for federal economic and social policy. Holland’s detailed analysis of agreements and disagreements between Roosevelt and Hughes over the meaning and scope of federal power is a lesson in how two powerful parties can enter into rational discourse for the good of the nation. Elaine King examines the controversy surrounding the nomination and confirmation of Hugo Black by detailing the coverage of Black by two newspapers, the Shreveport Times and its rival, the Shreveport Journal. Black’s liberal philosophy — reflected in his ardent support of FDR’s New Deal reforms — and his membership in the Ku Klux Klan captured the attention of the nation and highlighted the ideological divide between Republicans and Democrats. In the shortest essay in the collection, William Bader presents a sympathetic portrayal of Justice Felix Frankfurter and his supposed legal inconsistency. Bader is surely correct in stating that Frankfurter’s judicial restraint was based on textualism and precedent, but one wishes Bader had gone into more detail regarding Frankfurter’s position on social welfare and civil rights legislation. The conventional wisdom that Justice William Douglas had presidential ambitions is analyzed and rejected in James Moses’s fascinating account of the 1944 Democratic convention in Chicago. Much of Moses’s thesis centers around Douglas’s behavior during the 1944 presidential campaign and letters from Douglas to friends worrying that Roosevelt would tap him as his vice president. Douglas may have indeed enjoyed politics, but he enjoyed his role as Supreme Court Justice even more. The three essays that comprise Part III, “Constitutional Law as Applied to Politics: The Roosevelt Legacy,” will interest those concerned with how the decisions of the Roosevelt Court influence future rulings. In their essay “Federalism, the Roosevelt Coalition, and Civil Rights: FDR’s Political Leadership,” Donald Jackson and James Riddlesperger, Jr. remind us that presidential power to shape national policy is limited by the necessity to bargain with the other branches of government. The authors’ discussion of FDR’s position on civil rights and the importance FDR attached to civil rights reform as part of his overall agenda is insightful. Stephen Shaw’s essay examining the Roosevelt Court’s understanding and application of both

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the free exercise and establishment clauses of the First Amendment is necessary reading for anyone wishing to understanding modern Supreme Court religion jurisprudence. Beginning with Cantwell v. Connecticut, in which the Court ruled for the first time that the free exercise clause was binding on the states, Shaw provides a nuanced discussion of the Court’s view of religion and the extent to which government may influence the establishment of religion. The last essay in the collection by Harvey Hudspeth is also essential reading for anyone attempting to place into historical context the Supreme Court of the next millennium. In attempting to articulate exactly how Roosevelt impacted Constitutional law, Hudspeth expertly explains and analyzes the “ideological divisions and realignments” that plagued the Roosevelt Court by the middle and late 1940s. The drawbacks to the volume are minimal. The usual problem with a collection of essays — some are better written and better argued than others — is to be expected. Readers will notice some small editing errors, but these should prove a minor inconvenience. The fact that all the essays were written several years before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the Bush administration’s subsequent initiation of the “war on terror” means that the editors miss a golden opportunity to draw parallels between Roosevelt’s and George W. Bush’s use of war powers to circumvent procedural due process. Both presidents argued before the Supreme Court and the public that in times of national emergency administration actions designed to address imminent threats should be beyond judicial review. The Supreme Court in Ex parte Quirin upheld the establishment of military tribunals, thus allowing Roosevelt to order the execution of Nazi saboteurs. Sixty years latter, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court was much more hesitant to grant George W. Bush a “blank check” in overriding the due process rights of citizens accused of terrorism. Those interested in how presidents and politics influence the Court in times of war will be disappointed that Ex parte Quirin is not mentioned. Supreme Court decisions have always garnered significant popular and scholarly attention. The complex relationship between the Supreme Court and the executive branch, and the power of that relationship to shape national policy, is certainly one reason for our fascination with High Court rulings. This book is an impressive achievement that it provides us with a critical look inside one of the most influential relationships impacting constitutional law and politics in history. The essays deserve a wide audience.

Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Formation of the Modern World. By Thomas C. Howard, William D. Pederson, Editors. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003, 261 pages Reviewed by Sondra Pena, Florida Atlantic University Few Presidents have had such a profound impact on our nation’s history as Franklin Delano Roosevelt. In, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Formation of the Modern World, the editors Thomas C. Howard and William D. Pederson have compiled a collection of essays that offer a comprehensive examination of our 32nd President’s foreign policy initiatives that shaped the future of our country. During his more than 12 years in the office of the presidency, Roosevelt reshaped America’s stand on foreign policy drastically. When FDR assumed his duties as president, the majority of Americans were firmly embedded in

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isolationist attitudes. As world events around him began to heat up, Roosevelt slowly emerged as a committed internationalist. He cautiously set out to educate the American public on the foreign dangers he perceived would have a negative impact on our domestic prosperity as well. In this anthology, Howard and Pederson have gathered examples of Roosevelt’s diplomacy that range from critical to praising and everywhere in between. The authors that have contributed to this work cover a wide range of topics from Roosevelt’s diplomacy with Europe, the Soviet Union, and Canada during the war to his position and influence concerning the Baltic States and the Caribbean. His appointment of admirals to influential positions around the globe is examined to better glean an understanding of the types of individuals he trusted and relied on. Another essay examines the operation of the Civilian War Services during his tenure and finally his relationship with the Jewish community before and during the Holocaust is examined. In the first chapter, author Chris Van Adler examines Roosevelt’s role as educator of the American public. Van Adler addresses America’s isolationist tendencies as a hurdle FDR had to skillfully overcome as he shifted his own views more towards an interventionist stance. Van Adler describes Roosevelt favorably as having exactly the right personal qualities for this daunting task. He portrays FDR as a natural motivator who was able to manipulate public opinion from behind the scenes through his relationship with the press and sway America to his point of view on foreign affairs. Manfred Landecker’s chapter deals with FDR’s leadership style as well. He examines the events leading up to the United States’ entry into WWII. Looking closely at Roosevelt’s ability to anticipate the reaction of those affected by his policies, Landecker espouses that it was this connection with the common man that enabled him to be so successful in gaining their support for his policies. In his chapter on Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Strategic Vulnerability, David M. Esposito discusses how FDR aided the American public in dealing with the threat of invasion by hostile forces. Although there was much rumor and talk of enemy invasions across the United States, the actual threat was minimal. However, Esposito argues that this didn’t stop FDR from using this heightened state of paranoia to his political advantage. Roosevelt was convinced that the war was a danger to the United States even if we never entered it. He believed that if Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan prevailed, it would be devastating to our economy and that we would be living as prisoners in our own country. Esposito believes that FDR used the American public’s fears of an invasion, which was highly unlikely; to protect them from what was a distinct possibility, economic and social collapse. Another topic addressed in Howard and Pederson’s collection is that of the possibility of limited war. The author, Stephen Bunch, examines this issue of containment as it may have been applied to Germany and Japan. Bunch argues that a policy of containment may have worked against Hitler even after his invasion of the Soviet Union and expresses surprise over President Roosevelt’s unwillingness to entertain the notion of containing Hitler by limited means as opposed to all out war. In William Kinella’s chapter FDR’s actions specifically towards the Soviet Union are examined. After identifying Nazi Germany as the major threat to United States national interest, he was eager to help the enemy of his enemy. Kinella offers a skillful chronology of the strained relationship between our two nations at the onset of the war. Much insight is gleaned into the tenuous negotiations between Stalin and Roosevelt from this author.

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The individuals chosen to represent our nation to foreign countries are a telling study of the management style of a president. In his chapter, Calvin Hines describes the contributions and shortcomings of six admirals Roosevelt personally chose to represent our country’s interests at this time of precarious foreign relations. Hines offers a comprehensive overview of the particulars that each admiral was faced with and lays out the outcomes for the reader to analyze. Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel tackles a seldom-addressed topic. The present relationship between Canada and the U.S. was established through the personal relationship between Roosevelt and Prime Minister McKenzie. Roosevelt’s commitment to an alliance with Canada inadvertently led to a stronger bond with Winston Churchill and Great Britain. ElliotMeisel delves into the interactions between these three men and how they shaped the United States’ involvement in the war. With Europe’s prominent status as global tinderbox, it would have been easy to overlook other regions of the world. Thomas Howard’s chapter focuses on Roosevelt’s commitment to preserving the integrity of the Caribbean. Howard describes FDR’s ability to look into the future to see the importance of establishing sovereignty throughout the Caribbean nations. True to his word, Roosevelt did not ignore the state of the home front while America was fighting the war throughout Europe and Asia. Julia Seibel details Roosevelt’s desire to protect the four freedoms on the home front in her chapter devoted to the creation of the Civilian War Services of the Office of Civil Defense. His appointment of the first lady to oversee this office as the assistant director to the OCD stresses the importance he placed on strengthening and protecting America at home. Howard and Pederson designated their final chapter for a delicate topic. The question that has risen to the surface repeatedly is one of Roosevelt’s lack of involvement in aiding the Jews of Europe escape the Holocaust. Carol Silverman’s chapter offers an honest portrayal of the salient factors that prevented Roosevelt from acting out on behalf of the Jews of Europe. Silverman, although critical of Roosevelt’s inaction, offers honest and logical suppositions as to why he did not act sooner. At the conclusion of this book the reader will find what I consider to be one of its greatest assets. Howard and Pederson have assembled a comprehensive chronology of the major global events that impacted this time in history. This quick and easy reference for salient events is invaluable to understanding the times in which these events took place. In addition to this, the editors include a complete biographical index of all the major players that had an impact on the events detailed in the eleven essays. This reference helps the reader to clarify the roles each individual played in history. With so many names and events swirling around in any historical depiction, indexes such as these are a welcome clarification. Overall, Howard and Pederson have compiled an important overview of our 32nd President’s contributions in a variety of areas. Any one who is interested in this period of history or President Roosevelt himself will find this highly informative. Students and researchers alike will appreciate the brevity of each essay as well. Although at a glance the topics seem unrelated, they are actually connected quite skillfully. Upon completion of this book, the reader can expect to gain a comprehensive awareness of the multitude of events and outcomes that President Roosevelt was responsible for shaping.

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The Nerve Center: Lessons in Governing from the White House Chiefs of Staff. By Terry Sullivan, College Station: Texas A&M University, 2004, 176 pages Reviewed by Michael Frabotta, Florida Atlantic University In The Nerve Center, Terry Sullivan wants to begin a study on the chief of staff position for the President of the United States. He feels that in order to fully understand and research the office of the president, a serious scholarly study must begin on the crucial job of the chief of staff. The editor of the book divides the book into two sections. This first section is further divided into four parts. These include: Starting the White House; Refocusing the White House; Campaigning, Routine, and Closing Out; and finally, In the Governing Community. Each part deals with a certain time period the president and the White House must deal with when running the country. Section I: The first part deals with the transition from election and campaigning to governing. Terry Sullivan and the participants believe this is the most important time the new president and his staff go through, and that it is imperative for an administration to have as smooth as a transition as possible. This would in turn make governing the country that much easier. The second part is devoted to how the White House deals with any crises or scandals. They feel that it is necessary to not only deal with these successfully and in a timely manner, but to maintain focus on their agenda and running the country. The administration must stay focused, and if they lose focus then it is the chief of staff who must refocus the team back into the right agenda. The third part deals with campaigns and closing out the administration. When the White House goes through a campaign, these former chiefs of staff feel that not only is it necessary to run a successful campaign, but, at the same time it is important they do not cease running the country. They must balance both sides carefully. This section also shows how the participants deal with closing out an administration either due to defeat, or at the end of two terms. Items of concern include dealing with closing up shop, running through pardons, and helping the party win the White House again. In the final part of the first section, the interviewees discuss how to work with the larger community. The White House is not an island that makes policy in a vacuum; rather they must work with interest groups, congress, and the bureaucracy. Therefore it is important to have good communication and a healthy working relationship with others. In the second section of the book the editor uses data from different sources including the Papers of the President, public newspapers, The Congressional Record, and Lexis Nexis. He uses this data to help determine the success of the Bush administration’s transition from the campaign to the running of government. To do this he compares similar statistics from previous administrations’ transitions. In this last section of the book, the editor deals with assessing the 2000-2001 transition of the current Bush administration. To do this he focuses on six goals that the Bush team wanted to achieve. These include: 1) creating an effective personnel process; 2) having a balanced staff; 3) keeping a disciplined process; 4) having a focused agenda; 5) maintaining a capacity to handle a crisis; and 6) thinking into the future. In these six goals Terry Sullivan researches it and makes a decision as to how successful they were in each category.

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In this book, Terry Sullivan used interviews to help discover how the chief of staff position works and how it is run in the White House. To achieve this he interviewed 12 of the former 15 chiefs of staff. They answer questions that deal with the inter-workings of the White House and the chief of staff’s central role that the play in that process. Questions covered such subjects as transition, dealing with scandals or crises, campaigning, working with congress or other departments of the administration, and the closing out of administrations. The most important feature of this book is the fact that most of the information comes from interviews of former chiefs of staff. These men have been there and know the intricacies of the job. Even one of them, James Baker III has had the job twice in two separate administrations. The information, insight, and analysis they provide are the prime strengths in the book. There would be no point in doing research on a subject without getting first-hand information from someone who was there. On top of this is the fact that not only do you get one chief of staff, but a total of 12 that have contributed their insights. Therefore the reader learns about similarities and differences between different administrations, and if there are any between Democrats and Republicans. Perhaps the biggest strength of the book also lends to a small weakness in the book. These men that were interviewed are understandably still very loyal to their former bosses. Their reputations are often tied to these former presidents. Because of this a few times during the interviews the gentlemen sounded a bit partisan, which is difficult to assess in a scholarly context. The other small weakness in the book was the inclusion of the assessment of the transition of the Bush administration. It is understandable to include this because it is an important job of the chief of staff to help create a smooth transition. However, it is not the only job of the chief of staff. This book was created to help begin an understanding of the job of the chief of staff. Therefore the assessment was a bit out of place with the rest of the book. The target audience for this book includes several groups of people. The first being scholars whose specialty is the presidency and the White House. If one wants to better understand the workings of an administration, then it is important to learn about the chief of staff position in the White House. The second group this book targets is those actually working in politics. Those preparing to run for the presidency need to know what are in store for them if they in fact win the White House. This book contributes to a better understanding and learning of how the White House works. It focuses on the chief of staff and demonstrates the immense tasks of the job and the many pitfalls that one could fall into. It shows how policies can be shaped, or for that matter lost in the maze of politics just inside of the White House. Sullivan’s work is a necessary read to understanding to the inner-workings of the White House. Anyone who studies the presidency would learn a great deal reading this book. This book provides insights to the White House that an outsider would never learn.

Reagan’s Revolution: The Untold Story of the Campaign That Started it All. By Craig Shirley. Nelson Current, 417 Pages Reviewed by Peter Hannaford (co-director of issues and research, 1976 Reagan presidential campaign)

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As 1975 dawned, the Republican Party was in about the same shape the Democrats are today: reeling from election losses, demoralized, unsure of its footing, grasping at straws. Presidential calculations for 1976 had been thrown into a cocked hat. John Connally, Nixon’s favorite, had been derailed by the Watergate resignation. Ronald Reagan, who had been waiting his “turn”, found the concept suddenly irrelevant. Gerald Ford, who, upon appointment as vice president assured Nixon he would retire in 1976, now, as the 38th president, was having second thoughts. In Reagan’s Revolution, Craig Shirley sets the stage for the remarkable Ford-Reagan campaign for the 1976 presidential nomination by examining these and other antecedents going back to the Goldwater-Johnson campaign of 1964. He shows how Reagan’s latecampaign television speech for Goldwater captured the hearts of a number of conservatives; how a small cadre of them pushed hard for Reagan to permit his name to be put into nomination in 1968 (he agreed, at the last minute), then clamored for him to run in 1976. On joining Reagan’s senior staff in the Governor’s office in Sacramento in early 1974, I was advised by chief-of-staff Ed Meese, “We don’t know whether he intends to run for president in 1976, but we don’t want to do anything to close off that option.” In other words, do a bang-up job in the Governor’s final year in office. We all watched Watergate events with the avidity of tea readers that year. Those around him constantly recalculated the political calculus; however, Reagan kept his own counsel as to the future. Late that year, the early months of Ford’s presidency, the White House watched the Californian warily. They even made heavy-handed attempts to preempt him by offering him minor cabinet positions. Early in 1975, when he became a private citizen, Reagan was bombarded with friendly pleadings to found a third party or declare himself a candidate for 1976. He did neither. Instead, he plunged into his daily radio commentaries, weekly newspaper column, and frequent speaking tours. All this steadily broadened his constituency, as was little understood at the time, but which the author traces effectively. Shirley had access to several fascinating internal Ford political documents and contrasts these with memos, conversations, and actions in the Reagan camp to give the reader a vivid you-are-there sense of participation in events as they unfold. The author shows the suspense, building as the year wears on. He also describes the tension between Reagan operatives who wanted an early candidacy announcement and those who wanted one as late as possible. Reagan, himself, was in the latter camp, so “later” prevailed. He details the almost constant misreadings of Reagan by Ford operatives and the fecklessness of campaign director Bo Callaway’s planning until Stuart Spencer, one-time Reagan gubernatorial campaign wizard, came upon the scene to create an effective strategy. Spencer correctly saw that a detailed addendum which accompanied a Reagan speech in Chicago in September 1975 (the “$90 Billion Speech”) offered solid material for undermining Reagan in tax-averse New Hampshire. While Reagan’s speech called for the transfer of several programs to states and communities, along with the resources to pay for them, he did not list the programs that would result in the estimated $90 billion federal savings. The addendum spelled these out. Spencer’s researchers projected that many of these shifts would require states to increase their taxes. Shirley’s dramatic narrative shows how Spencer and Co. used this to great effect in New Hampshire. The Reagan campaign was thrown on the defensive and kept there for several weeks.

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Reagan recovered from the early losses, of course, with a dramatic come-from-behind win in North Carolina and went on to lose the nomination to Ford in Kansas City by a slim 1,187 – 1,070. This was to be the last presidential nomination of either party to be settled at a convention. The final night of that convention brought the unprecedented call by President Gerald Ford to Ronald Reagan to come down to the floor and address the delegates. Reagan’s short speech riveted the audience. Shirley captures the intensity of the moment and concludes that this speech was a turning point for the Republican Party. Thereafter, Ronald Reagan and the conservatives would be in the ascendancy. To produce this rich, comprehensive account of a complex campaign, the author conducted something on the order of 200 interviews wand reviewed dozens of books and papers. For this writer, for whom the flames of political passion have been banked for some time, the book fanned an ember which for 417 pages was reignited. Craig Shirley gores no oxen and grinds no axes here. He gives us a nearly fly-on-the-wall account of events. While he is a Reagan partisan, he is not tendentious. Thus, his book makes a useful and highly readable addition to the literature that is adding up to history’s assessment of a man who most agree was one of the most important public figures of the 20th century.

The War for Righteousness: Progressive Christianity, the Great War, and the Rise of The Messianic Nation. By Richard M. Gamble. Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2003, 306 Pages Reviewed by Michael W. Popejoy This first book by history professor Richard M. Gamble explores part of the reason, maybe a larger part of the reason than has previously been presented in the literature, that America chose to invest so many young lives in a largely European conflict then called the Great War, and what we now refer to as World War I. Furthermore, the war continued long after it was feasible to make peace. No reasonable armistice could be accepted. America and Great Britain were convinced that they were on a holy mission, and only when the enemy was totally vanquished could there be peace. In Great Britain the conviction to go to war echoed broadly. Further, Dr. John Clifford appealed to the free churchmen (in Great Britain) to join the battle—”a battle of moral ideals and ideas against the immoral; of spiritual forces against material…a fight for the human soul to freedom, independence, and self-control against an arrogant, autocratic, swaggering, and cruel military caste.” Even H.G. Wells wrote, “Never was a war so righteous as against Germany now.” The same rhetoric was inflaming the war cry and the meritorious cause of a righteous war in America. Passions were stirred. Gamble’s book extensively covers the Christian influence through the years before the war, and he clearly outlines the ideas that led up to America’s direct involvement despite the prevailing ideology of isolationism of the time. Walter Lippmann, an eminent player of the times, a close confidante of Wilson, at least in the beginning; writes of the war movement in his book The Public Philosophy (1955) that “Once again the people were drugged by the propaganda which had aroused them to fight the war and to endure its miseries. Once again they would not think or allow their leaders to think about an eventual peace with their enemies…” He goes on to state, “Usually, moreover, when

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the decision is critical and urgent, the public will not be told the truth…the public opinion of masses cannot be counted upon to apprehend regularly and promptly the reality of things.” So, Woodrow Wilson knew that a propaganda machine would be needed to spread the gospel of the righteousness of the war and the imperative that America was called by a higher authority to send her young men to suffer and die in Europe. The Progressive proselytizers had already prepared the intelligentsia for the righteousness of the war message. Wilson turned to George Creel and his Committee of Public Information (a war-time propaganda office) to spread the gospel of war to the masses. Creel consistently referred to the war as a crusade, and borrowed the rhetoric of the progressive clergy. As Gamble quotes Reverend Randolph McKim, “the Great War was a Crusade…the greatest in history—the holiest. The soldiers at the front were engaged in no ordinary mortal combat, but rather were “marching to their Calvary, ready to meet the armies of the Antichrist and rescue civilization, humanity and Christianity.” The progressive philosopher John Dewey wrote in 1899 that “a society is a number of people held together because they are working along common lines, in a common spirit, and with reference to common aims. The common needs and aims demand a growing interchange of thought and growing unity of sympathetic feeling.” Wilson knew he had to bring society together to put the country into the war while at the same time preserving the progressive ideals. Gamble’s work is a remarkable study of progressive Christians on a mission to reform the world and remake it in America’s idealistic image. A redemptive America, a perfectable society, a socialistic America embedded within capitalism and democracy. He effectively redefines at least one significant source of America’s identity—Progressive Protestant Christianity, and its influence on the Progressive polity. Indeed, Dr. Gamble ventures that the Progressive Era, or movement, if it can be classified as such, originated within the historical framework of a Christian Protestant influence, and advanced to the political arena much later in the history of the era. He strongly suggests that it was the Christian leadership that drove the political leadership toward Progressivism rather than the other way around. In this vein, it is important to note who were the key thinkers that influenced men like Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, who then became key players in world affairs? These influential thinkers were a combination of Progressive Christian ministers, university professors such as Richard T. Ely who taught political science at Johns Hopkins and was one of Woodrow Wilson’s seminar professors, and community social activists who openly professed their faith in the perfectability of society through the redemptive power of God. This Christian Progressive theology informed an American ideology of the times long before it became “politically incorrect” to do so as it seems today. This unsettling fact of Christian influence on the Progressive Era may be the most controversial conclusion in Gamble’s position. A survey of several general history texts reveals a reference to the roots of the Progressive Era in such generic terms as “moral” influence and a few references to “Social Gospel” but these same texts don’t address in specific terms the direct Protestant Christian influence on the political leaders of the time. Perhaps a strict adherence to political correctness in the current literature has created a dark void to a full understanding of the era; since looking at works written during and just after the Progressive Era is rather fearless in calling God, God; and demanding a world view that is demonstrably Christian in orientation. They believed they were doing God’s work on Earth to

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spread the gospel of Christianity, capitalism (although a capitalism heavily modified by a unique form of American socialism) and democracy throughout the world, even if it meant war, a righteous war for a righteous cause—autocracy versus democracy as opposing forces. Gamble’s book is more important than its publication with a small press like ISI Books would indicate. Why would major publishers and university presses reject this book? It is an important work common to historians, Christian theologians and certainly an important work to public administrationists; but, the book was not as widely distributed as it should have been. Why was this the case? Could it be that that no scholarly disciplines wanted to face the perceived controversy of religion’s more direct historical role in national public policy setting in a country that prides itself on a Constitutionally mandated and operationally real separation of church and state, and even more so today than ever before in history when we now argue the constitutionality of the “one nation under God” clause of the Pledge of Allegiance? Again, could this omission be part of the political correctness agenda? Was the role of the Progressive ministers of the time merely an aberration in history? Did it not happen at all— was it just a figment of Gamble’s imagination or his belief system expressing itself or is it simply a world view that is not popular (or politically unsafe) to consider today? It is also possible that modern society does not wish to fall victim again to the passions of religious demagoguery that created a mandate for war. However, if this book is not more widely read by those interested in studying the Progressive Era, Gamble’s thesis will fall into obscurity along with a book with a limited publication budget, and that reality (or viewpoint) would be a loss to our understanding of the role of religion not just in this country but on an international stage including but not limited to our understanding of why Muslim extremists continue to fight on in the Middle East and elsewhere. That connection may seem a stretch of intellectual hubris, but as one reads Gamble’s book, one cannot help but wonder if the Christian theology that was a significant contributing driving force behind America’s ideological motives for involvement in Europe during the years 1914-1918 parallels the Muslim influence on Middle Eastern conflicts across the region and throughout the world today. Religion can and does drive a public policy agenda and enlists the support of a previously apathetic mass of the population who may be sensitive and responsive to the call of the clergy to arms. Charles Kimball remarks in the opening lines of his book When Religion Becomes Evil (2002) with his main thesis; “Religion is arguably the most powerful and pervasive force on earth…while religious ideas and commitments have inspired…communities of faith to transcend self interest in pursuit of higher values and truths…noble acts of sacrifice…and at the same time, religion has been linked directly to the worst examples of human behavior;” and Karen Armstrong comments in her book The Battle for God (2000); “…the moral and spiritual imperatives of religion are important for humanity and should not be relegated unthinkingly to the scrap heap of history in the interests of unfettered rationalism.” To avoid quoting her out of context, it is fair to say that she was referring to William Jennings Bryan and Clarence Darrow’s face-off in Dayton, Ohio at the Scopes Trial in 1925. Bryan’s death just days after the trial was symbolically the dying gasp of the Progressive Era. Regardless, Bryan was taking on the rationalists in defense of religion as the prevailing ideology of America; and, he was raised in the progressive protestant Christian tradition. However, her statement regarding the immediate post-Progressive Era rings just as strong today as it did then. The power of religious belief whether used for good or for evil seems relegated to that “scrap heap of history” until we are forced to face the realities of religious

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conviction as we strive to understand the motives of extremists factions in many of the world’s major religions; they remain with us today. If I were teaching a public administration history (or foundations or scope and theory) course today that emphasized a study of the Progressive Era as a major time for the growth of the public administration discipline, I would now without reservation adopt this new book as a required second reader to the primary textbook, and I would spend considerable lecture time reflecting on Gamble’s research which is sufficiently objective to allow ample room for class room discussion without crossing the line into the dark and dangerous waters of lecturing theology in the public classroom. Certainly, one would not want to be defending against that accusation in these times. Dr. Gamble was a former colleague of mine; our faculty offices at the university were separated by a mere short hallway. We spoke often and I am very certain that he never predicted his book would be of value to public administration since he is by discipline primarily an historian. The complex functional processes of administration never interested him. However, pubic policy has been, and continues yet today to be, significantly influenced by organized religion and politically active religious leaders. Gamble’s book proves this beyond the shadow of argument. There is no doubt that the Jerry Falwells, the Pat Robertsons, the “Moral Majority,” the “Rainbow Coalition,” Catholics, and the Jewish Federation, and others in organized American religion always get their views on the national agenda and before the press. However, in keeping with the long held philosophy of separation of church and state, Americans have not sent Jerry Falwell or Pat Robertson to the White House even though they campaigned for the job. So, it would appear that Americans seem to want a religious voice heard, but not a religious leader in the White House—an interesting dichotomy of public sentiment. Voters may want a President to believe in God and go to church, but not be a clergyman. The Protestant clergy were “progressive” in their thinking on “theology, politics and foreign affairs” and their influence went far beyond their pulpits. They were literate and educated and wrote widely in both secular and religious journals, magazines and newspapers. They spoke in public forums of both religious and public groups. They organized smartly into respected political action groups and became adept at lobbying their global world view. These organizations were so influential that they took on the form of social and political movements claiming large memberships of socially and politically active people. Further, they were professors at the best universities and many future political leaders were their students. If anyone questions the influence charismatic and influential professors can have on their students, one need look no farther than the Progressive Era and the years it’s proponents influenced politics. Gamble writes, “the Progressive clergy viewed the war as a chance to achieve their social gospel objectives—expressing an expansive, interventionist spirit to save the world for Christianity and modernism.” He goes on to observe, “They seized upon the war as an opportunity to reconstruct the churches, America, and the world according to the imperatives of the social gospel…their peacetime crusade became a wartime crusade.” Does Gamble’s interpretation have implications for our understanding of today’s events in the world? By another name, but by the same definition, this Protestant conversion of the world for Christianity sounds like the Muslim’s modern-day Jihad. The Progressive clergy viewed the war as God’s plan for humanity—”to rid the world of wickedness and make a way for new, modern ideas and launch every country on a path to

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prosperity.” This same rhetoric continues to be used today to justify American intervention in world affairs to save people and introduce them to a better way of life under democracy and (socialistic) capitalism—twin ideals within which Christianity weaves itself. Gamble quotes British historian Herbert Butterfield who writes in 1914, “each nation told its people, that our enemy is worse than the rest of human nature and that his wickedness demands utter destruction.” This sentiment is echoed repeatedly to justify wars throughout the 20th century. This is almost the same wording used to justify dropping two atom bombs on an already defeated Japan in order to force an unconditional surrender just a few decades later in history. The Progressive clergy played a large, pivotal role in turning the Great War into a “War for Righteousness” worthy of American involvement and sacrifice. “Religion helped Americans define themselves, their enemies, their purpose and their future.” Gamble traces this belief from the first Puritan settlers to the New World—”bringing a Puritan sense of mission, a community of visible saints charged with a world-redemptive mission. America was sanctified to engage in a world-wide mission to reform the world and embrace the common goals of modernism, prosperity, and community spirit under the common banner of a Protestant ethic. This Christian rhetoric was soon adopted by the politicians of the time who generated public policy initiatives that put America squarely into the role of world leader and has kept it there throughout the remainder of the 20th century and seems to be solidly fixed as we move through the first decade of the 21st century. This expectation was reflected in Woodrow Wilson’s 1917 war message in which he proclaimed that America intervened for the sake of “a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. In the final analysis, the final chapter on the views of the Progressives has not been written. As Gamble concludes, “The immediate failure of the War for Righteousness of 19141918 did not quench the progressives’ zeal for their social gospel imperatives.” He further postulates, “with righteousness only postponed, the question remains whether the progressive mind ever truly abandoned its perpetual war.

Power and Prudence: The Presidency of George H.W. Bush. by Ryan J. Barilleaux and Mark J. Rozell. College Station: Texas A and M University Press, 2004, 183 Pages Reviewed by: Jeremy B. Johnson (Villanova University) The standard interpretation of a president assigned the label “great” is usually one who offers bold and decisive leadership in a moment of national crisis. Hence, presidents such as Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt usually are ranked at the top of the list. On the other side of the scale stands a man such as George H.W. Bush, who led the nation during a relatively placid era, and who was much noted for lacking the “vision thing.” Therefore, Bush generally has not been considered one of the upper-echelon presidents – a lesson noted by his own son, President George W. Bush, who has dramatically eschewed the leadership style of his father for the more flamboyant big-idea model of President Ronald Reagan. Barilleaux and Rozell attempt to contest this perceived notion of presidential leadership by providing a spirited and well-reasoned defense of the elder Bush’s leadership style.

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Throughout the book, the authors stress the “incremental” nature of Bush’s presidency as serving as the style of leadership best suited for both his political time as well as his own particular personality. Barilleaux and Rozell rely heavily on the work of Charles O. Jones, author of The Presidency in a Separated System (1994), in defending Bush’s caution by pointing out that the nation may not be ready for major changes in certain eras, and any attempt to do so will result in a debacle. The authors quite rightly point out that when Bush’s successor, Bill Clinton, tried to remake the health care system, he failed so miserably that the Democratic party suffered a humiliating midterm trouncing in 1994 that featured the historic loss of the once impregnable House Democratic majority. The new Republican congressional majorities then so overreached that they allowed a defeated Clinton to recover to easily win reelection in 1996. Faced with such electoral volatility resulting from subsequent attempts to govern boldly, it is small wonder that the authors conclude that George H.W. Bush’s governing strategy was the more “prudent” course of action. Power and Prudence was not designed to treat exhaustively the Bush presidency, but rather function as an extended essay considering the methods and effectiveness of his leadership style. The book is divided into five chapters. The first considers incrementalism in both theory and practice. The discussion of incrementalism is so pervasive throughout the entire book that one senses that the authors are trying through their thesis to compensate for one significant Bush presidency failing: the lack of a definitive and cohesive central message to relay to the public. The second chapter provides a succinct overview of the entire Bush presidency, stressing how Bush’s incremental foreign leadership, while often derided at the time, became vindicated in the long term, especially in how he handled the tumultuous events surrounding the demise of the Soviet Union. In subsequent chapters, Barilleaux and Rozell delve into particular aspects of the Bush presidency that give a sense of what the authors consider most intriguing and defining in the Bush years. The third chapter surveys the “public presidency” of Bush through the use of extensive interviews with the president’s communication operatives. Here, of course, the president is judged to have faltered, by undervaluing the importance of presidential rhetoric, control of the political agenda, and an overarching vision. Underpaid and understaffed, the communications staffers are highly critical of Bush’s attempts to distinguish himself from his predecessor, Reagan, who cultivated the most public relations-driven presidency in history. Ideological tension also comes to the fore, as conservatives such as Tony Snow, director of speechwriting, reveal that they thought Bush should have emulated Reagan as opposed to adopting a more moderate-conservative approach. The fourth chapter examines information control in the Bush presidency. The Panama invasion and Bush’s defining moment, the Persian Gulf War, were marked by overt censorship and manipulation of the press. The White House gained its greatest successes through this information control project, although the press ruefully realized that these wars for freedom were achieved in great part by limiting that hallowed ideal of freedom of the press. Despite that paradox, Bush achieved his objectives remarkably well by limiting access to potentially damaging information, such as the civilian casualties in Panama and Iraq, and also the role of American support for Saddam Hussein before the Persian Gulf conflict. The second part of the chapter details the shrewdness of the President in protecting information from disclosure to the public and Congress, usually without resorting to the doctrine of executive privilege, which after Richard Nixon had come to have unsavory connotations and tended to backfire once a president invoked it.

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The concluding chapter advocates prudence as public policy. Perhaps the authors go too far when they assert, “As is often the case, good policy was bad politics. Bush insisted on good policy…ultimately to his electoral undoing….” Liberal alternative policies are not considered in the book, nor are Bush’s vetoes of various Democratic initiatives examined in detail, as no Democrats were interviewed for the study. Yet the point of the book is to be reevaluative, if not polemical, so it cannot be expected to give a fair airing to all sides of the issues. Perhaps the most constructive and innovative theme found throughout the book is the refutation of the notion that Bush was a moribund president from a domestic perspective, while taking an activist foreign policy approach. The authors effectively debunk this interpretation, by showing that Bush was an incremental president in both the domestic and foreign arenas. Perhaps his perceived foreign policy successes can be attributed to the fact that Bush had more latitude in dealing with foreign affairs than he had in the domestic sphere because of the constraints of a Congress controlled by the opposing party. Nonetheless, one of Bush’s chiefs of staff, John Sununu, made an infamous gaffe by insinuating that Congress could leave town for the second part of Bush’s term because there were no initiatives that Congress needed to act on, suggesting Bush could be content with a lethargic domestic policy. Another interesting point by the authors is that while Bush has often been criticized for running a very harsh issueless campaign against Michael Dukakis in 1988, for someone who wanted to govern not as a visionary but as an incrementalist as Bush wished to, such a divisive campaign was necessary for Bush to win the White House. Even though the generally positive revisionist approach to Bush has great merit, it must come to terms with the fact that he failed to be reelected. While James Pfiffner is the editor of the Texas AandM series in which the book is published, and he is even quoted in it, arguments from his masterpiece on presidential transitions, The Strategic Presidency: Hitting the Ground Running (1996), are only alluded to in passing without any reference to Pfiffner. Pfiffner believes, in opposition to Jones, that a President should always show a strong policy oriented objective, even in quiet times, because otherwise he may be caught in the groundswell of events not of his own choosing. Indeed, President Bush seems to have suffered such a fate with a recession that took place on his watch. So while Jones’s approach may have merit, it needs to be tempered with a dose of Pfiffner. Otherwise, the result is likely to be what it was in Bush’s case – a decisive reelection failure. Not citing or fully developing Pfiffner’s thesis is the major theoretical weakness of the book. The book seems to have been carefully produced, although on page 37, Senator Harris Wofford’s (D PA) first name is given incorrectly. Overall, this book provides an important contribution not only to the study of the Bush presidency, but to the study of the presidency in general, and should be read by all those who are interested in assessing and evaluating recent presidents. Finally, the book is definitely accessible enough for the student and the educated general reader while containing theoretical content essential for scholars.

In: White House Studies Compendium, Volume 5 Editor: Robert W. Watson, pp. 553-559

ISBN: 1-60021-542-4 © 2008 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS Danny M. Adkison is Associate Professor of Political Science at Oklahoma State University. He is the author of The Oklahoma Constitution (2001) and many articles on the judicial process and constitutional issues. Bruce Altschuler, Ph.D. is Chair of the Department of Political Science at SUNY Oswego. His books include Keeping a Finger on the Pulse: Private Polling and Presidential Elections and LBJ and the Polls. In addition to articles on the presidency published in journals such as Public Opinion Quarterly and Presidential Studies Quarterly, his political analysis is regularly featured on public radio stations throughout the United States and Canada. Jessica Aubin is a Political Science major with a Sociology minor at Siena College (class of 2006). She is from Syracuse, NY. At Siena College, Jessica is a member of the Political Science Society and the Ambassadors Club. Andrew W. Barrett, Ph.D. is an assistant professor of political science at Marquette University in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. His research on presidential-congressional relations has appeared in American Politics Quarterly, American Journal of Political Science, and Presidential Studies Quarterly. Earlier drafts of his article in WHS were presented at the 2000 American Political Science Association annual meeting and the 2001 Midwest Political Science Association annual meeting. D. Jason Berggren is currently a Ph.D. student and adjunct professor of political science at Florida International University. He has published articles in several newspapers and journals such as the Middle East Affairs Journal, and was the editor and publisher of Religion Matters (2000-2002). His research interests include religion and politics, the American presidency, and Southern politics. He is writing his dissertation on the role of religion in the Carter presidency. Mosemarie Boyd serves as head of American Women Presidents, a national political action committee dedicated to promoting the election of women to the U.S. presidency, and Ms. President PAC, dedicated to helping Democrats win back the House, Senate and presidency. Boyd helped launch Ambassador Carol Moseley Braun's 2004 presidential campaign in Iowa, New Hampshire, and South Carolina on Presidents' Day weekend in February 2003 and led American Women Presidents’ 2000 Campaign For Women Vice Presidential Nominees. In a symbolic effort to get more women to run for governorships — the political pipeline to the presidency – Boyd ran for Governor of California in the March 5,

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About the Contributors

2002 primary election and won over 95,000 votes in her first campaign for public office. Boyd earned an MA in National Security Studies from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a BA with honors in American Civilization from Brown University, and studied at Oxford. Joe Caruso is the Director of Polling at the Siena Research Institute at Sience College. He coordinated the “First Woman President Symposium” held at Siena College in 2005. David B. Cohen, Ph.D. is currently an assistant professor of political science and honors adviser at The University of Akron. His research on executive politics and other topics has been published in American Politics Quarterly, Congress & the Presidency, Presidential Studies Quarterly, PS: Political Science & Politics, Southeastern Political Review, and White House Studies. He is coeditor of American National Security and Civil Liberties in an Era of Terrorism (Palgrave, 2004). His primary areas of interest are the American presidency, particularly White House staffing and organization, as well as the conduct and formulation of U.S. national and homeland security policy. Cohen earned his Ph.D. from the University of South Carolina. Shelley Conroy is a graduate student in the Department of Government at Cornell University. Her research interests include interest groups, Congress, campaign finance, and metholodogy. Her dissertation will focus on patters of interest group campaign contributions, with an emphasis on congressional committee policy jurisdictions. She would like to thank Jonathan Cowden, Michael Genovese, Walter Mebane, Elizabeth Sanders, Robert Spitzer, and Jonathan Wand for their thoughtful comments and suggestions, and Michael Glosny for conducting the interviews. Scott Crichlow is Assistant Professor of Political Science at West Virginia University. His recent articles have appeared in Political Psychology. Chris J. Dolan, Ph.D. is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Central Florida where he teaches courses on the American presidency, U.S. foreign policy and national security, and the mass media. He is the author of the forthcoming In War We Trust: The Political Dimensions and Ethical Consequences of the First Strike Doctrine (Ashgate Press, 2005) and co-editor of Striking First: The Preventive Doctrine and the Reshaping of US Foreign Policy (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004). His research on the American presidency, foreign policy, and the mass media appears in Policy Studies Journal, Congress and the Presidency, Politics and Policy, White House Studies and in numerous edited volumes. Dolan’s Ph.D. is from the University of South Carolina. Anthony J. Eksterowicz, Ph.D. is Professor of Political Science at James Madison University in Virginia. He has published numerous articles and chapters on such topics as the presidency, first ladies, and U.S. foreign policy. His recent books include Public Journalism and Political Knowledge (Rowman & Littlefield, 2000) and The Presidential Companion: Readings on the First Ladies (University of South Carolina, 2003).

About the Contributors

555

Joseph R. Fornieri is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Rochester Institute of Technology. He is the author of many articles. His most recent book is Abraham Lincoln’s Political Faith (2003). David Gore is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Communication at Texas A&M University. He is the author of the recent chapter, “Between Sympathy and Self-Interst: A Reframing of Adam Smith’s Economic Rhetoric” in Rhetorical Democracy: Discursive Practices of Civic Engagement (Erlbaum, 2004). The author wishes to thank Martin J. Medhurst and James Arnt Aune for their assistance on earlier drafts of this paper. Rodney A. Grunes is Professor of Political Science and Chair, Department of History and Political Science, Centenary College of Louisiana. He is the author of numerous articles dealing with the U.S. Supreme Court and constitutional issues. Michelle Haak is a History Education major with a minor in Political Science at Siena College (class of 2006). She is from Ontario, NY. At Siena College, Michelle is a member of the Political Science Society, Education Club, College Ambassadors and Honors Fellows Program. Glenn P. Hastedt, Ph.D. is Professor of Political Science at James Madison University in Virginia. He received his Ph.D. from Indiana University and is the author of American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future (5th ed.), co-author of International Politics in a Changing World, and has published numerous articles on intelligence and American foreign policy. Bryan Hilliard, Ph.D. is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at New England College and Director of the Center for International Politics and Ethics. He teaches and publishes in the areas of bioethics, clinical medical ethics, law and bioethics, business ethics, and health care policy. He has published numerous articles and book reviews, and has co-edited two books. Dr. Hilliard’s most recent book is The U.S. Supreme Court and Medical Ethics: From Contraception to Managed Health Care, (Paragon House). Alicia Jencik’s studies have focused on women and politics and specifically, women and executive office. When presenting at the First Woman President Symposium, she was a graduate student in political science at Florida Atlantic University, where she received her M.A. in June 2005. Alicia's master’s thesis was entitled Electing Madam President: Candidates, Campaigns, and Consequences. She is currently a doctoral student in political science at the University of New Orleans. Andrew Mangini is a Political Science major, also minoring in Economics and Classical Studies, at Siena College (class of 2006). He is from Saratoga Springs, NY. At Siena College, Andrew serves on the Student Senate, is President of Plassmann Hall and is a member of the Political Science Society. Marsha Marotta, PhD, is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Westfield State College in Westfield, Massachusetts, where she teaches political

556

About the Contributors

theory and courses in the Women’s Studies Program. A former reporter and city editor, she is the author of several book chapters and papers on contemporary motherhood which she is collecting in a volume tentatively titled MotherSpace: Disciplining through the Material and the Discursive. Nicole M. Owings, is a second-year doctoral student in Clinical Psychology at George Mason University. She received her undergraduate degree from Carnegie-Mellon University. Her research and clinical interests focus on children coping with family stressors such as parental divorce. Kant Patel, Ph.D. is Professor in the Department of Political Science at Southwest Missouri State University in Springfield, MO. He has published numerous articles and books in the area of health care politics and policies. He has published articles in journals such as Journal of Health and Social Policy, Evaluation, and Health Professions, among others. Dr. Patel has co-authored (with Mark Rushefsky) several books including Health Care Policy in an Age of New Technologies (M. E. Sharpe, 2002). Their other books include Health Care Politics and Policy in America, 2nd edition (M. E. Sharpe, 1999), and Politics, Power and Policy Making: The Case of Health Care Reform in the 1990s (M. E. Sharpe, 1998). They are currently working on a new book titled The Politics of Public Health in the United States. Bradley H. Patterson, a federal career executive, served for nine years in the Department of State, then helped design the White House secretariat system for President Eisenhower. He was appointed the Assistant Cabinet Secretary under Dwight Eisenhower for seven years, was the Executive Secretary of the Peace Corps at its beginning, and later a National Security Adviser in the Department of Treasury. He returned to the White House staff for five years as Executive Assistant to the Special Counsel under Richard Nixon and for two years as Assistant Director of the Presidential Personnel Office under Gerald Ford, finishing his career with twelve years at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of two books, most recently The White House Staff: Inside the West Wing and Beyond (Brookings, 2001). Patterson was presented the 1960 Arthur S. Flemming Award as one of the Ten Outstanding Young Men in Federal Service, is a graduate of the National War College, a former National President of the American Society for Public Administration, and a Senior Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration. William D. Pederson is Professor of Political Science and the American Studies Chair at Louisiana State University in Shreveport. He is the author and editor of many articles and books, including George Washington. Foundation of Presidential Leadership and Character (2001), Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Formation of the Modern World (2003), and Franklin D. Roosevelt and Abraham Lincoln. Competing Perspectives on Two Great Presidents (2003). With Frank J. Williams, he co-edits the International Abraham Lincoln Journal. Dr. Ronald D. Petitte is an associate professor of Political Science at Bryan College in Dayton, Tennessee. He serves as the Director of Honors and Political Science Programs at Bryan College. His dissertation is entitled, “One Hundred Years of Leadership in Administration: Contributions of Formative National Leaders in Public Administration from 1887 to 1997.”

About the Contributors

557

Dr. Petitte’s professional accomplishments and papers include: The Marshall University, 2004, Paul Dekker Stewart, Political Science Honors Lecturer; Subject, “Just War Arguments: The Iraqi War and Occupation;” designer of more than a dozen programs and unique course offerings, from the first Political Science and Governmental Program for Bryan Collte, a new major in Public Policy and Governmental Studies (in the drafting stage), a Classical Studies major, courses range from “Strategy & Tactics in American Politics,” “The American National Election,” and “The Presidential Cabinet,” to “The Contemporary World” and “Film: Three Perspectives.” John C. Pinheiro, Ph.D. is assistant professor of history at Aquinas College in Grand Rapids, Michigan. From 2002 to 2004 he worked as assistant editor of The Papers of George Washington at the University of Virginia, where he co-edited volume 12 of the Presidential Series. His other publications include articles in the Journal of Popular Culture, the Journal of the Early Republic, and an essay in Nineteenth-Century America, as well as a forthcoming anthology from the University of Tennessee Press. Dr. Pinheiro is currently writing a book on civil-military relations during the Mexican War. He received his doctorate from the University of Tennessee in 2001. Norman W. Provizer is Professor of Political Science and the Director of the Golda Meir Center for Political Leadership at Metropolitan State College of Denver. He is the author of many articles and books, including Leaders of the Pack. Polls and Case Studies of Great Supreme Court Justices (2003). Ronald Rietveld is Professor of History at California State University, Fullerton. He coauthored A Day with Mr. Lincoln (1994), and is the author of numerous essays and reviews. Mark E. Rushefsky, Ph.D. is Professor in the Department of Political Science at Southwest Missouri State University, in Springfield, MO. He has published numerous articles, chapters and books in the field of public policy, concentrating on health policy. The third edition of his Public Policy in the United States: At the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century) was published in 2002 (M. E. Sharpe). Dr. Rushefsky has co-authored (with Kant Patel) several books including Health Care Policy in an Age of New Technologies, Health Care Politics and Policy in America, and Politics, Power and Policy Making: The Case of Health Care Reform in the 1990s. They are currently working on a new book titled The Politics of Public Health in the United States. Marni Schultz is a graduate student at the Georgetown Public Policy Institute in Washington, DC, where she is pursuing a Master’s of Public Policy with a concentration in Public and Non-Profit Management. She also works as a graduate fellow at Georgetown’s Center for Democracy and the Third Sector. Prior to her recent studies, Ms. Schultz was the External Affairs Associate at Hunt Alternatives, coordinating policy dinner discussions and political involvement for Ambassador Swanee Hunt. Ms. Schultz graduated from Swarthmore College in 2001 with a Bachelor of Arts with Honors in Political Science. Colleen J. Shogan, Ph.D. is an Assistant Professor of Government and Politics at George Mason University, where she teaches courses on the presidency. She received her Ph.D. from

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About the Contributors

Yale University in 2002, and recently published an article in Studies in American Political Development. She is currently finishing a book concerning presidential moral leadership and rhetoric. Jerome L. Short, Ph.D. is Associate Professor in the Department of Psychology at George Mason University, where he teaches courses such as Abnormal Psychology, Community Psychology, Theories of Psychotherapy, and Group and Family Psychotherapy. He is a licensed clinical psychologist and supervises doctoral students who are providing psychological assessments and psychotherapy to their clients. His research focuses on mental health promotion and has appeared in the American Journal of Community Psychology, the Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, and the Journal of Divorce & Remarriage. He is currently working on a book on psychological fitness. Max J. Skidmore, Ph.D. is Thomas Jefferson Professor and University of Missouri Curators’ Professor of Political Science at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. He has been Distinguished Fulbright Lecturer to India and Senior Fulbright Scholar at the University of Hong Kong. Skidmore is the author of scores of articles and chapters on a wide range of topics (including in this journal, articles on Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, former presidents, and “Presidents and the Development of Medicare”). His most recent books are Presidential Performance: A Comprehensive Review (McFarland, 2004); After the White House: Former Presidents and Private Citizens (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Social Security and its Enemies (Westview, 1999); Legacy to the World: A Study of America’s Political Ideas (Peter Lang, 1998); and Hong Kong and China (Toppan, 1997). Editions of his books have appeared in Arabic, Armenian, Chinese, French, Hungarian, Russian, and Spanish. His Ph.D. is from the University of Minnesota. Joseph R. Thysell, Jr. is Associate Professor of Government at Nicholls State University. He is the author of many articles on judicial issues. Israel Waismel-Manor is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Cornell University. His dissertation title is “Making up their minds: Knowledge, learning and decision-making among campaign consultants.” His interests include political behavior, public opinion, political communication, and the presidency. He would like to thank Jonathan Cowden, Michael Genovese, Walter Mebane, Elizabeth Sanders, Robert Spitzer, and Janathan Wand for their thoughtful comments and suggestions, and Michael Glosny for conducting the interviews. Gary D. Wekkin, Ph.D. is Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Arkansas, where he teaches courses in the American Presidency, political parties, and voting behavior. He has published numerous journal articles and three books, including the V.O. Key Prize-winning Partisan Linkages in Southern Politics (with Michael A. Maggiotto), and is the founding editor of the American Review of Politics. His latest research project, titled "New Footsteps in the West Wing," is about transformations of the American presidency that have led to the empowerment of First Ladies and Vice Presidents.

About the Contributors

559

Frank J. Williams is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, the founding Chairman of the Lincoln Forum, and serves on the Abraham Lincoln Bicentennial Commission. The author and editor of many articles and books, his latest are: Judging Lincoln (2002), and Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Transformation of the Supreme Court (2004). Claire Wright is a Research Assistant at the Golda Meir Center for Political Leadership, Metropolitan State College of Denver. Richard M. Yon is a Ph.D. student at the University of Florida. His research has focused on such topics as presidential doctrines, Thomas and Martha Jefferson, presidential health care initiatives, and the American criminal justice system. Mr. Yon has presented papers at the Western Social Science Association and the International Lincoln Center’s conference on Thomas Jefferson, and has a chapter in Debating the Issues: American Government and Politics and Presidential Doctrines: National Security from Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush. He served as an assistant with the Truman Legacy Symposium held at the Harry S. Truman Little White House in Key West, and is co-authoring works on Thomas and Martha Jefferson, and Truman's executive order to desegregate the military.

INDEX

9 9/11 Commission, 85, 87, 88, 534, 535, 536

A abatement, 9 Abdullah, 392, 409 abortion, 20, 36, 41, 42, 45, 171, 175, 454, 513, 518 academics, 39, 52, 476, 510 acceptance, 201, 221, 467 access, 2, 56, 57, 68, 74, 107, 127, 128, 146, 150, 157, 172, 376, 377, 392, 454, 463, 467, 512, 544, 550 accommodation, 335, 347, 349 accountability, 159 accounting, 415 accuracy, 157 achievement, 194, 200, 235, 450, 539 activism, 75, 152, 153, 155, 449, 450, 452, 453, 456, 457, 458, 467 Adams, John, 1, 2, 171, 242, 283, 307, 313, 321, 416, 507 adaptation, 149 addiction, 70 adjustment, 182 administrators, 56, 532 adolescents, 496 adult stem cells, 36, 40, 43, 48 adults, 461 advertisements, 30, 283, 511, 512, 515, 516, 517, 518 advertising, 29, 51, 53, 165, 511, 525 advocacy, 26, 63, 66, 68, 69, 71, 450, 454, 464 affect, 1, 72, 80, 126, 186, 371, 438, 472, 473, 476, 479, 492, 536

affirmative action, 518 Afghanistan, 85, 86, 122, 124, 391, 392, 535, 536 Africa, 93, 265 African American(s), 65, 148, 200, 488, 489, 499 afternoon, 219, 259, 434 age, 24, 26, 27, 28, 31, 62, 186, 223, 236, 242, 244, 252, 279, 281, 308, 331, 334, 340, 364, 374, 375, 417, 426, 451, 452, 454, 458, 460, 462, 465, 478, 479, 480, 481, 490, 498, 500, 537 agent, 149, 203, 204, 270, 536 agriculture, 170 AIDS, 17, 19, 92, 446 air pollution, 9 Al Qaeda, 390, 395, 533 Alaskan Native, 437 alcohol, 67, 68, 430 alcohol abuse, 430 alcohol problems, 68 alcoholism, 67 alternative, 81, 106, 108, 137, 157, 179, 187, 379, 428, 459, 523, 529, 551 alternative energy, 81 alternatives, 35, 66, 126, 159 alters, 102 ambiguity, 380, 514 ambivalence, 80, 331 amendments, 124, 173, 196, 305 American Civil Liberties Union, 349 American culture, 237, 338, 350 American Indian, 346, 437, 489 American Presidency, 26, 222, 226, 227, 232, 530, 531, 532, 558 American Psychiatric Association, 64 Americans with Disabilities Act, 15 amputation, 455 anger, 72, 433 animals, 361 annihilation, 325 antagonism, 355

562

Index

anti-terrorism, 86, 121, 124 anxiety, 67, 68, 73, 279, 298 appendix, 93, 244, 249, 358 appetite, 270, 526 appointees, 76, 79, 84, 205, 222, 226, 382, 403, 404 appointment process, 88 Arab world, 141 arbitration, 230, 231, 235 Argentina, 237 argument, 35, 40, 46, 101, 156, 170, 194, 196, 228, 246, 250, 251, 255, 262, 266, 288, 289, 306, 324, 325, 356, 357, 359, 382, 383, 386, 387, 390, 393, 398, 420, 422, 427, 443, 484, 524, 525, 548 Arizona, 445, 502, 516 armed forces, 122, 123, 140, 388, 400, 401, 404, 405 arrest, 251, 298, 380, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 398, 399, 400, 404, 405 arson, 403 Arthur, Chester, 508 Asia, 72, 83, 194, 541 aspiration, 320 assassination, 30, 225, 237, 257, 259, 274, 276, 406, 407 assault, 145, 241 assertiveness, 140, 222 assessment, 1, 109, 112, 115, 123, 125, 205, 229, 445, 524, 543, 545 assets, 121, 518, 541 assignment, 52 assimilation, 231 Associate Justices, 402 association, 38, 207, 223, 246, 274, 275, 279, 332, 406, 416, 427, 434 assumptions, 222, 355, 510, 519, 521 asylum, 66 Athens, 131, 132, 188, 318 attachment, 150, 325, 329, 332, 380, 418 attacks, 26, 29, 30, 43, 73, 82, 85, 86, 87, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 129, 133, 134, 141, 142, 168, 170, 177, 179, 180, 337, 366, 395, 518, 522, 539 attention, 28, 29, 31, 32, 59, 69, 81, 82, 83, 91, 99, 132, 165, 168, 170, 175, 177, 180, 185, 215, 225, 249, 287, 313, 354, 368, 393, 427, 428, 439, 442, 449, 450, 455, 457, 463, 471, 477, 489, 492, 514, 519, 520, 521, 523, 524, 527, 532, 537, 538, 539 attitudes, 24, 31, 157, 158, 159, 426, 457, 460, 474, 477, 478, 540 Attorney General, 8, 20, 144, 146, 201, 202, 208, 223, 228, 229, 249, 290, 337, 395, 400, 425, 426, 427, 430, 431, 433, 434, 435, 508 Australia, 177 Austria, 133 authenticity, 351, 459

authority, 3, 4, 52, 60, 77, 82, 96, 98, 103, 106, 122, 126, 128, 130, 211, 214, 228, 229, 250, 254, 262, 318, 319, 320, 325, 326, 330, 336, 337, 342, 343, 345, 347, 354, 355, 366, 368, 369, 372, 376, 377, 381, 382, 383, 386, 389, 391, 393, 397, 401, 402, 404, 405, 419, 428, 432, 433, 438, 444, 459, 467, 476, 496, 519, 534, 546 automobiles, 193 availability, 63, 74 aversion, 91 avoidance, 172 awareness, 25, 29, 65, 67, 69, 70, 71, 172, 211, 225, 231, 452, 474, 501, 541

B backlash, 460, 501 bad behavior, 215 bail, 54 Baird, 425, 426, 427, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435 ballistic missile, 445 banking, 105 banks, 24, 42, 178, 287 Barbados, 444 bargaining, 104, 106, 114, 369 barriers, 76, 205, 410, 458, 459, 460, 461, 489, 490, 493, 496, 502, 525 batteries, 328 behavior, 67, 135, 137, 147, 152, 185, 211, 215, 220, 367, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 402, 404, 425, 428, 455, 474, 524, 530, 531, 536, 538, 547, 558 Beijing, 72 beliefs, 44, 63, 336, 339, 345, 346, 363, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 374, 377, 493, 498 Ben-Gurion, David, 239, 409, 417 benefits, 2, 6, 10, 16, 27, 28, 29, 33, 35, 37, 41, 44, 54, 57, 62, 67, 72, 114, 172, 249, 325, 416, 475, 490 bias, 460, 471, 475, 493, 495, 517, 518 Bible, 243, 281, 291, 340, 345, 346, 347, 348, 439 Bin Laden, Osama, 80, 87, 390 binding, 230, 235, 272, 315, 316, 410, 539 bioethics, 555 birth, 16, 20, 54, 204, 237, 241, 247, 258, 264, 266, 292, 294, 301, 314, 317, 333, 420, 431, 433, 532 black market, 187 Blacks, 265 blame, 27, 54, 66, 165, 189, 195, 223, 255 blasphemy, 380 bleeding, 354 blood, 40, 42, 295, 298, 325, 329, 330, 438 Blumenthal, Sidney, 51, 53

Index board members, 452 body, 40, 41, 91, 128, 132, 133, 248, 253, 275, 286, 307, 348, 390, 412, 413, 416, 419 bonds, 332, 334, 345, 358 bone marrow, 40 borrowing, 454 Bosnia, 72 bounds, 200, 430 boys, 259, 283, 285, 288, 459 brain, 48, 68 brain drain, 48 breaches, 520 breakdown, 322, 530 breast cancer, 67 breathing, 274, 410 Britain, 48, 135, 137, 203, 230, 231, 233, 290, 291, 308, 328, 336, 347, 364, 367, 368, 373, 412, 414, 423, 439, 541, 545 British mandate, 409, 416, 422 Broder, David, 51, 52, 55, 61 Bryan, William Jennings, 437, 438, 439, 447, 547 Buchanan, James, 248, 397, 403, 507 budget cuts, 171, 172, 173 budget deficit, 52 budget resolution, 173 buffer, 130 buildings, 212, 214, 264 bureaucracy, 84, 143, 534, 542 burn, 291 burning, 196, 439 Burr, Aaron, 377 Bush Administration, 76, 79, 80, 83, 88, 128, 351, 395, 396, 443 Bush, George Herbert Walker, 444 Bush, Laura, 63, 72, 73 Bush, George W., 1, 2, 20, 36, 38, 42, 44, 73, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 95, 122, 158, 164, 181, 192, 351, 375, 395, 407, 429, 431, 442, 443, 508, 515, 531, 535, 537, 539, 549, 559 business cycle, 186 business ethics, 555 buttons, 188

C cabinet members, 201, 209, 248, 261, 431 cabinets, 201, 206, 430, 498 calculus, 544 caliber, 31, 215, 274 California, 31, 48, 49, 67, 68, 167, 196, 237, 241, 250, 251, 271, 303, 312, 323, 354, 419, 442, 446, 515, 516, 553, 557 Camp David, 92, 169

563

campaign funds, 491, 501, 511 campaigns, 30, 152, 157, 159, 164, 165, 241, 268, 428, 450, 452, 455, 463, 473, 474, 478, 487, 488, 489, 491, 492, 500, 501, 507, 511, 512, 517, 521, 522, 524, 525, 526, 542 Canada, 270, 365, 366, 367, 385, 388, 423, 445, 540, 541, 553 canals, 289 cancer, 41, 67, 537 candidates, 72, 76, 77, 149, 176, 257, 271, 284, 285, 353, 356, 426, 427, 428, 449, 450, 458, 461, 462, 465, 466, 467, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 485, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 505, 506, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 516, 517, 518, 524, 525, 526 capitalism, 367, 546, 547, 549 Capitol Hill, 53, 58, 103, 176, 229 carbon, 59 caregivers, 63, 64 caregiving, 74 Caribbean, 111, 444, 447, 540, 541 Caribbean Basin Initiative, 111 Caribbean nations, 541 carrier, 149 Carter, Rosalynn, 68, 69, 71 case study, 76, 121, 122, 443, 530 cash flow, 147 cast, 78, 80, 245, 255, 257, 268, 271, 286, 338, 381, 382, 409, 435, 444, 516 casting, 235 castration, 331 catalyst, 123 category a, 244, 351 Catholic Church, 38, 39 Catholics, 42, 149, 171, 174, 199, 200, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 548 cattle, 243 causality, 520 CBS, 153 cell, 20, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 82 cell division, 82 cell line(s), 36, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47 censorship, 550 Census, 149 Census Bureau, 149 Central America, 366, 367, 522 certainty, 238, 306 certificate, 292 Chad, 139, 142 chain of command, 128 channels, 482

564

Index

chaos, 130, 226, 419 Cheney, Dick, 78, 84, 85, 86, 442, 443, 535 Chicago, 51, 71, 102, 106, 163, 174, 179, 194, 203, 244, 245, 251, 256, 257, 270, 272, 274, 275, 281, 283, 289, 290, 307, 308, 314, 318, 327, 353, 403, 412, 513, 538, 544 Chief Justice, 239, 296, 297, 348, 349, 355, 360, 361, 378, 380, 382, 402, 405, 419, 537, 538, 559 Chief of Staff, 91, 93, 127, 128, 130, 168, 176 child abuse, 73 childcare, 4, 432 childhood, 44, 68, 71, 73, 259 children, 2, 14, 20, 28, 32, 46, 63, 64, 67, 68, 71, 72, 73, 248, 262, 265, 268, 274, 297, 307, 318, 330, 340, 410, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 431, 433, 434, 436, 490, 495, 497, 498, 528, 556 Chile, 93 China, 72, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 93, 558 Chinese, 76, 82, 83, 84, 558 Chisholm, Shirley, 437, 439, 445, 447, 462, 487, 488, 489, 506, 508 Christianity, 346, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549 Christmas, 189, 246, 288, 348, 349 CIA, 85, 86, 130, 508, 533, 534, 536 Cincinnati, 253, 258, 259, 283, 302, 309, 384, 385, 388 circulation, 304 citizenship, 288, 347, 355, 413, 418, 423, 525 civil law, 143, 385, 401, 403 civil liberties, 239, 339, 378, 389, 392, 395 civil rights, 15, 30, 65, 108, 230, 235, 236, 444, 520, 538 civil service, 101, 224, 235 civil service reform, 101, 224 Civil War, 24, 204, 205, 207, 208, 225, 232, 233, 234, 236, 238, 239, 250, 262, 263, 268, 271, 273, 284, 285, 313, 314, 315, 318, 323, 326, 327, 331, 343, 344, 345, 347, 348, 349, 355, 363, 364, 365, 366, 372, 373, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 399, 402, 406, 407, 412, 536 classes, 243, 281, 341, 384, 404, 480 classification, 289 classroom, 521, 548 clean air, 196 Clean Air Act, 11, 196 cleaning, 454 Cleveland, Grover, 487, 508 clients, 42, 70, 534, 558 climate change, 81 clinical depression, 530 clinical trials, 48 Clinton administration, 51, 85, 87, 535 Clinton, Hillary Rodham, 52, 54, 442

Clinton, William Jefferson, 16, 32, 145, 410 clone, 36, 39 cloning, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 44, 48, 49, 50 CNN, 45, 47, 76, 515, 517 coal, 65, 193, 196, 530 Coast Guard, 5 coattails, 78 coding, 107, 108, 109, 370 coercion, 351 cognitive development, 73 coherence, 103, 118 Cold War, 123, 124, 185, 203, 532 collaboration, 85, 88, 456, 457, 466 collateral, 138 collective bargaining, 104 college campuses, 453 College Station, 126, 198, 542, 549 college students, 463, 479 colleges, 287, 329, 341, 343, 464, 534 colonization, 231, 235, 265, 287 combustion, 292 commander-in-chief, 122, 123, 124, 277, 345, 349, 382, 401, 505, 509 commerce, 416, 428, 429, 538 commitment, 23, 25, 65, 68, 147, 176, 187, 194, 229, 319, 325, 329, 334, 415, 516, 541 communication, 387, 442, 443, 455, 459, 522, 523, 542, 550, 558 communism, 29, 31 Communist Party, 533 community, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 79, 91, 92, 93, 95, 99, 135, 178, 188, 285, 287, 292, 351, 417, 418, 423, 432, 433, 452, 455, 460, 461, 464, 517, 534, 540, 542, 546, 549 community service, 433 community support, 74 compassion, 65 compatibility, 383 compensation, 2, 74, 382 competence, 215, 492 competition, 52, 57, 443, 476, 477, 513, 526 competitiveness, 476, 477 competitor, 214 compilation, 526 complement, 191, 275 complexity, 76, 103, 178, 179, 185, 186, 198 compliance, 59 complications, 530 components, 122, 127, 168 composites, 276 composition, 57, 59 comprehension, 527 computation, 360

Index concentration, 366, 557 conception, 183, 195 conceptualization, 411 conciliation, 78, 230 concrete, 74, 134, 197, 301, 319, 320 conduct, 30, 43, 49, 69, 89, 215, 219, 260, 300, 310, 311, 369, 388, 401, 430, 446, 463, 512, 518, 530, 554 confession, 288 confidence, 33, 52, 125, 140, 159, 188, 217, 223, 238, 252, 266, 269, 301, 305, 321, 425, 462, 464, 494 confidentiality, 160 confinement, 64, 399, 401 conflict, 139, 187, 188, 189, 200, 211, 214, 217, 234, 255, 301, 306, 317, 322, 345, 354, 363, 370, 371, 373, 375, 380, 381, 390, 392, 406, 455, 464, 495, 545, 550 conflict resolution, 464 confrontation, 80, 82, 136, 354 confusion, 76, 177, 224, 227, 320, 391 congress, 58, 290, 534, 542, 543 congressional races, 513, 515 Congressional Research Service, 124 Connecticut, 153, 158, 201, 227, 255, 256, 306, 307, 337, 338, 516, 517, 539 consciousness, 237, 317 consensus, 2, 36, 141, 158, 187, 221, 287, 323, 324, 328, 334, 335, 338, 346, 351, 525 consent, 37, 40, 42, 45, 123, 246, 267, 274, 289, 295, 301, 319, 343, 410, 411, 415, 416, 417, 419, 432 conservation, 192 consolidation, 12, 96, 295 conspiracy, 145, 153, 204, 216, 391, 399, 406, 407 constituent service, 517 Constitution, 41, 63, 103, 122, 123, 223, 228, 239, 246, 248, 254, 255, 259, 260, 272, 283, 284, 287, 293, 296, 304, 305, 308, 309, 322, 330, 333, 335, 337, 338, 341, 344, 353, 355, 357, 358, 359, 361, 362, 375, 377, 378, 380, 382, 383, 387, 388, 389, 390, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 411, 413, 415, 416, 420, 423, 438, 443, 553 constitutional law, 435, 537, 539 constitutional limitations, 377, 538 constraints, 121, 289, 363, 523, 551 construction, 4, 211, 212, 214, 220, 415, 428 consultants, 166, 511, 558 consumers, 20 consumption, 190, 193, 196 content analysis, 239 contingency, 133, 134 continuity, 175, 317, 318, 319, 412, 455, 456

565

control, 2, 9, 12, 24, 32, 42, 54, 66, 78, 80, 112, 113, 114, 127, 129, 130, 138, 168, 175, 186, 192, 196, 197, 226, 235, 241, 243, 254, 267, 304, 305, 321, 329, 340, 368, 369, 371, 491, 513, 514, 516, 517, 519, 521, 527, 533, 534, 545, 550 control group, 129 Controlled Substances Act, 20 conversion, 272, 517, 548 conviction, 87, 140, 207, 250, 297, 328, 351, 385, 390, 545, 548 convulsion, 333 Coolidge, Calvin, 26, 508, 529, 530, 531 coping, 334, 556 copper, 204, 383 corn, 243 corporations, 25, 49, 146, 195 correlation, 149, 155, 157 corruption, 223, 224, 231, 232, 233, 235, 320, 334 cost of living, 172 costs, 13, 28, 33, 52, 57, 73, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 98, 99, 146, 152, 167, 186, 259, 340, 376 cotton, 364, 373 counsel, 42, 61, 144, 181, 272, 380, 383, 384, 392, 499, 544 counterterrorism, 86 coupling, 195 Court of Appeals, 72, 146, 386 coverage, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 23, 24, 25, 32, 33, 51, 52, 56, 58, 72, 73, 74, 170, 180, 431, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 483, 485, 492, 493, 506, 517, 521, 523, 525, 535, 538 covering, 399 creativity, 457, 466 credentials, 477, 510 credibility, 145, 146, 215, 361, 457, 509, 510 credit, 25, 32, 74, 79, 166, 179, 205, 227, 228, 229, 439, 516 creep, 187, 195 crime, 180, 389, 433, 519, 520, 521 criminal justice system, 143, 391, 392, 559 criminality, 97 crisis management, 84 critical period, 368 criticism, 60, 70, 130, 177, 205, 218, 233, 247, 290, 339, 341, 351, 375, 384, 385, 391, 393, 396, 401, 527 crops, 364 cross-sectional study, 479 CRS, 123 crude oil, 193 Cuba, 238, 390 cues, 201, 478 cultural heritage, 437

566

Index

cultural values, 421 culture, 44, 49, 75, 200, 206, 234, 237, 319, 338, 339, 350, 364, 411, 412, 413, 414, 416, 418, 429, 458, 459, 462, 525 curing, 46 curiosity, 305 currency, 24, 242, 348 curriculum, 55 cycles, 524

D damage, 39, 49, 77, 99, 138, 176, 280, 399 danger, 195, 229, 257, 259, 260, 282, 291, 302, 310, 323, 331, 332, 333, 375, 378, 392, 406, 540 data analysis, 157 data set, 105 dating, 217 Davis, Jefferson, 199, 200, 202, 203, 205, 208, 209, 239, 261 DCI, 534 death, 40, 44, 46, 54, 83, 122, 136, 139, 233, 242, 249, 275, 276, 277, 281, 283, 284, 298, 307, 330, 384, 386, 390, 403, 404, 407, 413, 432, 439, 459, 529, 530, 537, 547 death penalty, 390 deaths, 283, 363 debt, 52, 187 decision makers, 370, 374, 464, 492 decision making, 44, 82, 86, 87, 197, 366, 369, 372, 374 decisions, 20, 43, 49, 50, 58, 62, 82, 85, 107, 108, 109, 118, 125, 126, 128, 129, 130, 159, 169, 172, 181, 191, 195, 197, 274, 366, 379, 392, 406, 451, 462, 465, 466, 467, 472, 473, 475, 496, 497, 511, 514, 515, 527, 536, 538, 539 defamation, 338 defects, 66, 70 defendants, 390, 392, 395, 396 defense, 86, 87, 106, 124, 136, 137, 144, 147, 158, 159, 167, 171, 172, 178, 205, 209, 216, 217, 319, 322, 325, 334, 430, 445, 475, 501, 510, 521, 522, 547, 549 deficit, 32, 52, 53, 173, 176, 177, 178, 179, 192, 493 definition, 66, 92, 93, 94, 106, 185, 189, 307, 436, 522, 531, 548 deflationary policies, 188 degenerate, 320 degradation, 307 Delaware, 259 delivery, 2, 23, 33, 73, 513, 518 demand, 58, 346, 381, 398, 409, 524, 525, 537, 546

democracy, 144, 157, 158, 159, 199, 200, 204, 232, 237, 238, 239, 319, 320, 322, 324, 336, 343, 344, 393, 397, 526, 527, 536, 546, 547, 549 democratic elections, 524 Democratic Party, 150, 156, 177, 179, 199, 200, 206, 207, 304, 315, 438, 445, 449, 488, 499, 500, 516 Democrat(s), 18, 26, 28, 53, 54, 57, 58, 66, 72, 73, 78, 79, 109, 147, 150, 151, 154, 161, 167, 168, 169, 173, 175, 176, 177, 179, 189, 206, 207, 208, 228, 232, 246, 250, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 270, 271, 285, 288, 290, 292, 296, 300, 302, 303, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 396, 400, 403, 426, 427, 430, 437, 440, 443, 487, 488, 499, 507, 508, 509, 514, 517, 538, 543, 544, 551, 553 denial, 218, 230, 232, 320 Department of Agriculture, 3 Department of Defense, 92, 98, 99, 391, 392, 443 Department of Health and Human Services, 13, 36, 63 Department of Homeland Security, 92, 95 Department of Justice, 143, 228, 229, 235 Department of the Interior, 202 dependent variable, 479, 520 depression, 72, 193, 194, 530 desire, 83, 84, 86, 87, 140, 180, 181, 201, 206, 220, 262, 263, 272, 286, 304, 325, 338, 385, 418, 421, 455, 457, 460, 461, 477, 541 desires, 329, 346, 528 destruction, 35, 39, 40, 43, 45, 85, 86, 122, 263, 306, 331, 333, 390, 397, 398, 421, 549 detainees, 83, 391, 396 detection, 67 development banks, 178 developmental disorder, 73 diabetes, 35, 39, 49 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 63, 74 differentiation, 47 dignity, 40, 41, 386, 388, 419, 444 disability, 10, 29, 172, 528 Disability Benefits, 23 disappointment, 218, 264 disaster, 172, 179, 180, 283, 375 discipline, 114, 170, 180, 233, 251, 265, 346, 405, 428, 548 disclosure, 37, 67, 143, 147, 158, 550 discourse, 184, 191, 324, 432, 433, 533, 534, 538 discrimination, 174, 203, 488, 494, 500 disorder, 64, 250, 287, 390 disposable income, 149 disposition, 328, 329 dissatisfaction, 109, 171, 173, 270, 385 dissenting opinion, 348

Index distress, 65, 265, 433, 532 distributive justice, 2 District of Columbia, 72, 146, 211, 212, 213, 214, 219, 220, 263 divergence, 74, 333 diversity, 47, 200, 201, 202, 452, 457 division, 38, 40, 43, 82, 97, 323, 393, 430, 446 division of labor, 446 divorce, 556 doctors, 20, 58, 450, 459 Dole, Elizabeth, 174, 487, 488, 489, 492, 503, 505, 507 domain, 429, 475, 489, 536 domestic policy, 76, 106, 172, 551 domestic violence, 462 dominance, 124, 226 Dominican Republic, 230 donations, 37, 144, 146, 147, 148, 152, 154, 155, 157, 158, 159, 517 donors, 37, 45, 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 152, 153, 154, 157, 158, 159, 160, 512 doors, 305, 516 Douglas, Stephan A., 252, 353 draft, 53, 56, 59, 71, 86, 115, 170, 190, 191, 302, 338, 376, 387, 402, 406, 413 dramatic narrative, 194, 544 dream, 33, 416, 417, 423, 437, 439 Dred Scott, 227, 296, 297, 353, 355, 360, 361, 380 Drew, Elizabeth, 51, 57, 178 drug abuse, 70 drug addict, 70 drug addiction, 70 drug use, 70 drugs, 20, 66, 70, 520, 521 DSM, 63 DSM-IV, 63 dualism, 455 due process, 339, 539 duration, 175, 188, 269, 384, 402 duties, 98, 270, 271, 276, 337, 366, 375, 380, 397, 425, 432, 539

E early retirement, 172 early warning, 184 earnings, 28, 195 ears, 71, 84, 88, 262, 263, 275, 291, 388, 498, 535 earth, 54, 239, 241, 247, 291, 314, 360, 393, 426, 547 eating, 451 eating disorders, 451 eavesdropping, 395

567

economic change, 183 economic crisis, 184, 185, 190, 191, 194, 195 economic development, 55, 510 economic institutions, 194 economic performance, 175, 185 economic policy, 81, 173, 185, 186, 194, 195, 197, 198, 538 economic problem, 180, 183, 185, 192, 195, 196, 197, 198 economic reform, 538 economic reforms, 538 economic security, 27 economics, 32, 61, 176, 197 economies of scale, 96 ectoderm, 48 Education, 7, 8, 13, 28, 30, 39, 47, 63, 65, 71, 74, 81, 88, 124, 149, 151, 154, 155, 156, 161, 173, 177, 180, 225, 229, 231, 244, 285, 286, 287, 289, 322, 326, 334, 338, 339, 340, 346, 418,426, 427, 428, 442, 452, 460, 461, 462, 463, 468, 475, 490, 498, 499, 555 egg(s), 41, 97 ego, 150 Egypt, 131, 133 Egyptian, 133, 411 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 23, 33, , 440, 508, 556 El Salvador, 131 elderly, 2, 33, 67, 133 electoral coalition, 74, 163, 171, 175 electoral process, 462, 526, 527 elementary school, 73, 286, 529 Ellicott, Andrew, 211, 214, 215, 216, 218, 219 emancipation, 291, 305, 382 Emancipation Proclamation, 200, 241, 266, 344, 346, 382 embryo, 35, 37, 39, 41, 44, 45, 46, 347 embryonic stem cells, 35, 37, 40, 41, 43 emergence, 25, 322, 334 emission, 196 emotion, 309, 434 empathy, 459, 527 employees, 16, 32, 60, 131, 146, 167, 211, 430, 431 employment, 123, 134, 180, 187, 474 empowerment, 463, 467, 558 encouragement, 440, 461, 464, 465, 467 endoderm, 48 end-stage renal disease, 10 enemy combatants, 392 energy, 81, 101, 166, 167, 169, 170, 179, 185, 186, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 198, 320, 401, 449, 450, 454, 455, 457, 466, 467 energy consumption, 190, 193 energy supply, 196

568

Index

engagement, 136, 138, 364, 449, 462, 525 England, 48, 244, 280, 300, 306, 307, 336, 337, 371, 373, 411, 416, 421, 423, 529, 531, 537, 555 Enlightenment, 155, 416 enthusiasm, 204, 207, 228, 256, 285, 455 entrepreneurs, 58 environment, 52, 79, 104, 196, 421, 445, 523, 529 environmental policy, 197 environmental protection, 30 Environmental Protection Agency, 11, 82 environmental regulations, 522 epistemology, 428 Equal Rights Amendment, 174 equality, 113, 116, 200, 228, 238, 239, 307, 315, 318, 319, 343, 415, 418, 421, 449, 466, 484, 493, 528 equipment, 96, 98, 139, 511 erratic behavior, 67 espionage, 533 Establishment Clause, 335, 338, 339, 342, 347, 348, 349, 350 etching, 238 ethics, 35, 45, 46, 47, 48, 146, 555 ethnic minority, 428 Europe, 24, 135, 140, 194, 205, 266, 279, 364, 366, 367, 372, 373, 422, 441, 533, 540, 541, 546, 547 European Community, 142 evacuation, 261 evening, 121, 254, 261, 264, 269, 273, 297, 303, 310, 312, 315, 385 everyday life, 451 evidence, 27, 55, 61, 78, 83, 88, 109, 111, 114, 117, 118, 124, 133, 134, 136, 137, 138, 157, 203, 209, 223, 230, 235, 253, 254, 269, 300, 303, 304, 315, 318, 357, 358, 359, 362, 385, 391, 392, 395, 399, 402, 403, 433, 523, 524 evil, 122, 204, 243, 252, 254, 255, 281, 289, 305, 323, 547 evolution, 532 Ex parte Quirin, 539 examinations, 104 exclusion, 118, 200, 326, 436 excuse, 433 execution, 214, 329, 376, 390, 396, 403, 539 Executive Branch, 201 executive function, 378 Executive Order, 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20, 95, 124, 134, 378, 400 exercise, 83, 98, 127, 236, 304, 321, 327, 335, 336, 337, 349, 374, 377, 401, 523, 539 expectation, 173, 184, 459, 549 expenditures, 73, 93, 97, 158, 216, 512 expertise, 50, 52, 122, 127, 496

experts, 43, 56, 62, 85, 172, 429, 474 exploitation, 318 explosives, 131 exports, 140 exposure, 144, 147, 153, 461, 478 Exposure, 18 expression, 308, 319, 337, 343, 350, 384, 386, 411, 412, 413, 419, 423, 425 extinction, 251, 296, 298, 358 extrapolation, 418 eyes, 84, 213, 321, 333, 364, 500, 535

F fabric, 49 failure, 29, 43, 51, 53, 75, 83, 84, 85, 88, 124, 129, 147, 164, 167, 171, 176, 183, 185, 188, 190, 194, 198, 221, 222, 230, 272, 333, 358, 359, 416, 419, 431, 497, 523, 533, 549, 551 fairness, 274, 300 faith, 174, 177, 200, 202, 208, 231, 258, 263, 288, 294, 295, 298, 317, 323, 337, 344, 345, 346, 351, 366, 371, 388, 416, 417, 423, 455, 546, 547 Faith Based Initiative, 81 family, 12, 41, 42, 44, 63, 64, 66, 67, 73, 74, 138, 149, 161, 179, 241, 242, 249, 264, 265, 274, 279, 280, 283, 297, 311, 324, 326, 330, 347, 391, 426, 432, 454, 473, 490, 492, 495, 497, 498, 510, 529, 556 family income, 149, 161 family life, 498 family members, 64, 66, 67, 274 family planning, 12, 42 family relationships, 473 Far East, 177 Farewell Address, 238, 244, 254, 258, 264, 309, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 329, 331, 332, 333, 334 farmers, 167, 516 farms, 279 fasting, 337, 338, 339, 342, 347 fat, 170 fatigue, 87, 184 fear, 53, 59, 83, 206, 242, 257, 268, 309, 365, 366, 391, 425, 494, 537 fears, 104, 135, 271, 367, 400, 540 Federal City, 211, 212, 213, 214, 217, 218, 219, 220 federal courts, 381, 392 federal funds, 12, 36, 37, 42, 44, 45 federal government, 1, 2, 6, 20, 35, 36, 48, 50, 51, 66, 70, 74, 189, 212, 228, 244, 305, 338, 519, 520, 521, 531, 538 federal law, 37, 40, 355, 397, 399, 402, 403, 521

Index Federal Register, 122, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 139, 395 federalism, 320, 339, 411, 422 feedback, 58 feelings, 80, 159, 213, 259, 310, 315, 343, 389, 457, 478, 484, 494 feet, 54, 61, 254, 305, 306, 384, 438 females, 471, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 480, 482, 484, 485, 489, 491, 493 femininity, 474, 475 feminism, 449, 450, 451, 453, 455, 457, 466, 467, 468, 489, 499, 501 Ferraro, Geraldine, 449, 450, 488, 489, 504, 508 fertility, 37, 45 fertilization, 37, 39, 41, 44, 45 fetal tissue, 36, 37, 41, 44 fetus, 37, 41, 45 fidelity, 270 Fifth Amendment, 405 filial piety, 324, 325 Fillmore, Millard, 507 film, 29, 437, 462 finance, 52, 122, 159, 195, 288, 477, 490, 491, 512, 525, 554 financial resources, 73, 452 financial support, 10, 70, 477, 512 financing, 1, 2, 14, 196, 223, 490, 500 First Amendment, 335, 337, 338, 342, 345, 348, 349, 350, 351, 539 first lady, 63, 65, 67, 69, 72, 73, 74, 541 fitness, 558 flexibility, 96, 97 flight, 138 flood, 223, 516 fluid, 96 focus groups, 181 focusing, 163, 165, 170, 179, 192, 368, 455, 473, 493, 528 food, 173, 186, 190, 263, 514 Food and Drug Administration, 19, 39 Ford, 12, 31, 65, 67, 68, 105, 163, 164, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 173, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 208, 273, 315, 441, 444, 508, 514, 544, 545, 556 Ford, Betty, 65, 67, 68 Ford, Gerald, 12, 67, 105, 164, 166, 183, 197, 441, 444, 508, 544, 545, 556 foreign affairs, 63, 129, 222, 333, 366, 368, 369, 371, 443, 521, 540, 548, 551 foreign nationals, 396 foreign policy, 29, 43, 76, 77, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 106, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130,

569

142, 171, 176, 194, 203, 230, 235, 239, 347, 363, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 400, 444, 446, 475, 492, 496, 497, 520, 534, 536, 539, 551, 554, 555 foreign policymaking, 121, 125 forgetting, 209 forgiveness, 273 formal education, 63, 71 Fourteenth Amendment, 339 framing, 126, 313 France, 135, 138, 203, 204, 255, 280, 336, 367, 368, 376, 531 fraud, 145, 308, 438 Frederick the Great, 317 freedom, 43, 133, 140, 243, 272, 294, 295, 301, 307, 308, 314, 317, 319, 320, 323, 330, 335, 337, 338, 339, 342, 346, 349, 350, 351, 355, 369, 409, 413, 415, 416, 418, 419, 421, 528, 545, 550 friction, 459 Friedman, Milton, 190 friends, 31, 64, 67, 135, 184, 190, 194, 205, 243, 244, 248, 249, 251, 253, 258, 261, 264, 265, 270, 272, 274, 279, 280, 281, 284, 285, 288, 294, 298, 308, 383, 432, 451, 454, 455, 510, 517, 532, 538 friendship, 342, 346 frustration, 72, 75, 130, 495, 536, 537 fuel, 166, 167, 193, 196 fuel efficiency, 196 full employment, 187 funding, 4, 8, 20, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 64, 65, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 78, 89, 348, 453, 491, 512 fundraising, 146, 147, 148, 452, 461, 463, 491, 492, 510, 512, 515, 516, 518 funds, 2, 12, 28, 36, 37, 42, 44, 45, 49, 66, 69, 71, 91, 92, 95, 96, 98, 144, 157, 158, 159, 165, 177, 340, 341, 348, 454, 462, 491, 501, 511, 512, 516, 518 fusion, 179, 250, 292 futures, 465

G Gallup Poll, 493, 494, 520 GAO, 93 Garfield, James, 508 gasoline, 81, 190 GDP, 442, 447 gender, 334, 429, 430, 433, 435, 440, 451, 452, 458, 460, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 478, 479, 480, 481, 485, 489, 493, 497, 501 gender balance, 501 gender differences, 472, 485

570

Index

gender identity, 493 gender inequality, 435 gender stereotyping, 471 gene, 40 gene therapy, 40 General Accounting Office, 93 general election, 77, 171, 284, 512, 513, 514, 515, 518 generation, 234, 242, 261, 279, 282, 287, 296, 426, 450, 452, 455, 456, 458, 464, 466, 467, 523 genetic disorders, 35 genetic diversity, 47 genetics, 37 Geneva Convention, 391 genre, 194 geography, 201, 202, 379 Georgia, 68, 69, 202, 227, 257, 382, 389, 429, 462, 502, 513 Gergen, David, 51, 52, 172 Germany, 24, 131, 540, 545 gift, 44, 147, 158, 269, 270, 311, 349, 350 gifted, 522 girls, 450, 452, 474 global climate change, 81 global terrorism, 122, 124, 126 goals, 52, 69, 70, 72, 121, 125, 126, 139, 141, 150, 170, 180, 181, 187, 192, 194, 196, 223, 364, 365, 369, 370, 371, 404, 428, 450, 455, 456, 459, 461, 476, 495, 496, 510, 532, 542, 549 God, 258, 260, 265, 272, 273, 276, 291, 295, 299, 301, 302, 304, 313, 314, 315, 326, 327, 336, 337, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 360, 388, 397, 411, 412, 413, 415, 416, 420, 421, 422, 438, 546, 547, 548 gold, 227, 229, 230, 235, 420, 423, 424 good behavior, 402, 404 Gore, Al, 179 gossip, 60, 443 governance, 74, 81, 158, 419, 429, 459, 489, 522 government intervention, 2, 351 government policy, 70, 150 grades, 341 grand jury, 145, 264, 401, 402, 403, 405 Grant, Ulysses, 204, 205, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 267, 268, 269, 274, 275, 312, 507, 521 grants, 2, 71, 122, 182, 450 grass, 453 grassroots, 457, 463 gravity, 322 Great Britain, 135, 137, 230, 231, 233, 290, 291, 308, 328, 336, 347, 367, 368, 414, 439, 541, 545

Great Depression, 25, 27, 186, 193, 194, 195, 198, 440 Greece, 188, 320 greed, 341 Greeks, 410 grief, 233, 261, 277 gross domestic product, 51 grounding, 328 group characteristics, 126 groups, 1, 30, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 52, 56, 58, 66, 69, 72, 98, 125, 146, 157, 165, 166, 171, 175, 176, 179, 181, 187, 200, 231, 232, 318, 339, 400, 427, 437, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 461, 467, 479, 480, 482, 495, 496, 509, 512, 513, 517, 525, 542, 543, 548, 554 growth, 48, 123, 159, 187, 287, 336, 340, 532, 548 Guantanamo Bay, 390 guidance, 65, 258, 345, 348, 456, 457, 519, 527 guidelines, 37, 38, 49, 59, 60, 71, 146, 147, 158, 159 guilty, 72, 223, 264, 315, 384, 388, 398, 401, 405 gun control, 513, 518 guns, 253

H habituation, 328 Haiti, 367 Hamilton, Alexander, 248, 272, 287, 320, 322, 361, 411 hands, 211, 214, 216, 244, 257, 281, 282, 283, 290, 301, 309, 313, 331, 340, 341, 363, 378, 421, 422, 438, 508, 519, 524 handwriting, 270 happiness, 288, 295, 297, 298, 299, 322, 326, 327, 328, 332, 393, 415 harassment, 98, 145, 146 Harding, Warren, 508, 529 harm, 35, 46, 83, 214, 218, 302, 311, 364 harmony, 214, 218, 311 Harrison, Benjamin, 223, 508 Harvard, 103, 150, 171, 255, 262, 266, 304, 336, 338, 378, 414, 415, 419, 441, 460, 468, 488 Hawaii, 506 Hayes, Rutherford, 507 hazards, 26 HE, 315 healing, 46 health, 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 37, 38, 45, 46, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 82, 109, 177, 178, 179, 231, 314, 428, 443, 475, 522, 530, 550, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559

Index Health and Human Services, 13, 36, 39, 40, 41, 63, 442 health care, 1, 2, 10, 13, 14, 16, 20, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 30, 32, 46, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 82, 109, 177, 178, 179, 475, 522, 550, 555, 556, 559 health care costs, 13, 57 health care professionals, 52, 58, 59 health care system, 16, 55, 550 health insurance, 4, 6, 8, 12, 26, 27, 28, 29, 32, 69, 74 health problems, 72 health services, 8, 28, 58, 63, 64, 67, 68, 73, 74 heat, 184, 189, 516, 540 heating, 132, 139, 190 height, 123, 248 helplessness, 130, 132 HHS, 13, 36, 41, 52, 61 high school, 55, 73, 149, 161, 459, 463, 498 higher education, 340, 460 higher quality, 125 hip, 50, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 433, 434, 435, 441, 462, 464, 466, 489, 519, 546 hiring, 65, 432 Hispanic, 71, 149, 151, 437 Hispanics, 148 HIV/AIDS, 17, 19 homeland security, 95, 554 homicide, 40 homogeneity, 206 Honduras, 140, 141 honesty, 243 Hong Kong, 558 Hoover, Herbert, 27, 508 hospitals, 1, 2, 4, 13, 14, 20, 28, 64, 66, 347, 349 host, 185, 454, 509, 534 hostility, 153, 376, 522 hotels, 257 households, 148, 479 housing, 428, 454, 464 human behavior, 211, 220, 547 human condition, 432 human dignity, 419 human nature, 241, 249, 305, 320, 321, 323, 549 human rights, 40, 72, 497 humanity, 241, 315, 359, 546, 547, 548 humiliation, 347, 348, 349 humility, 257, 269, 443 husband, 41, 64, 67, 68, 72, 74, 261, 273, 274, 275, 431, 432, 435, 499, 509, 515, 527, 529 hypothermia, 46 hypothesis, 104, 109, 116, 117, 519

571

I ideas, 164, 191, 213, 241, 276, 287, 313, 337, 342, 349, 350, 366, 400, 410, 412, 413, 423, 429, 437, 455, 456, 457, 462, 464, 514, 524, 545, 547, 548 identification, 150, 331, 474, 501, 527 identity, 58, 253, 303, 411, 417, 425, 426, 493, 546 ideology, 27, 32, 63, 79, 82, 129, 155, 489, 545, 546, 547 illumination, 264 illusions, 331 imagery, 66, 82, 189, 329, 331, 410 images, 126, 130, 132, 172, 234, 475, 476, 477, 537 imagination, 234, 259, 410, 547 immigrants, 107, 425 immigration, 107, 432 immortality, 246, 527 immunity, 145 immunization, 178 impeachment, 105, 144, 147, 148, 181, 223 implementation, 17, 37, 69, 106, 150, 340, 451, 534 imports, 193, 196 impotence, 331 imprisonment, 70, 377, 384, 385, 386, 387, 401, 405, 527 impulsive, 322 in vitro, 37, 39, 41, 44, 45 inattention, 520, 522 inauguration, 57, 69, 71, 78, 79, 122, 131, 203, 232, 258, 261, 272, 309, 363, 379, 525, 527, 530 incentives, 15, 37, 118, 167, 371, 524, 525 Incidents, 131, 132 inclusion, 27, 28, 86, 105, 155, 200, 203, 204, 207, 422, 543 income, 6, 24, 25, 26, 149, 154, 155, 156, 161, 186, 187, 188, 193, 497 income tax, 24, 25, 187 incompatibility, 164 incumbents, 476, 477, 495, 512, 513, 514, 516, 517, 518 indecisiveness, 43 independence, 168, 203, 207, 243, 261, 269, 271, 276, 288, 291, 299, 301, 308, 333, 409, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 479, 545 independent variable, 155, 479, 480, 481, 520 India, 72, 440, 558 Indians, 231, 291, 357 indication, 79, 108, 112, 196, 229, 304 indicators, 513 individual character, 66, 529 individual rights, 232, 319, 418, 420 indolent, 27

572

Index

industrial democracies, 25 industry, 51, 286, 308, 533 inequality, 73, 360, 428, 435 infancy, 341 infection, 530 inferences, 118 inferiority, 355, 361 infinite, 328 inflation, 147, 166, 169, 171, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 226 influence, 1, 23, 24, 26, 63, 64, 67, 74, 76, 101, 103, 104, 106, 110, 115, 116, 117, 118, 121, 126, 139, 144, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 214, 220, 225, 232, 238, 252, 289, 297, 299, 317, 318, 324, 326, 327, 338, 339, 363, 365, 367, 369, 370, 430, 433, 465, 471, 472, 476, 477, 478, 484, 496, 515, 517, 519, 520, 523, 527, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 545, 546, 547, 548 information exchange, 88 information technology, 96 informed consent, 37, 45 infrastructure, 122 inheritance, 25, 216 inheritance tax, 25 initiation, 118, 136, 438, 539 injury, 40, 138, 387 inmates, 46 innocence, 217, 223, 391 innovation, 128, 325 input, 43, 52, 58, 128, 444, 527 INS, 430, 432 insane, 64, 132, 256 insecurity, 80, 534 insight, 85, 291, 467, 532, 540, 543 inspiration, 243, 272, 284, 324, 464 instability, 194, 523, 527 instinct, 262, 263 institutions, 65, 67, 68, 93, 97, 126, 194, 309, 323, 324, 325, 328, 329, 330, 332, 339, 340, 349, 350, 358, 395, 411, 412, 414, 417, 418, 419, 429, 498, 532, 534 instruction, 71, 340, 341 instructors, 526 instruments, 318, 326, 367 insulation, 193 insurance, 4, 6, 8, 12, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 53, 64, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74, 146, 149, 179 integrity, 81, 147, 184, 235, 256, 296, 321, 322, 492, 541 intellect, 130, 216, 285 intelligence, 82, 85, 106, 124, 132, 137, 141, 386, 390, 392, 461, 527, 533, 534, 536, 555

intensity, 105, 111, 545 intent, 1, 37, 45, 48, 150, 190, 398 intentions, 232, 315, 318, 377, 416, 423 interactions, 456, 497, 537, 541 interdependence, 196, 287 interest, 1, 26, 38, 46, 51, 56, 58, 59, 64, 69, 79, 98, 103, 105, 122, 129, 165, 166, 168, 170, 176, 179, 192, 203, 206, 245, 249, 281, 287, 289, 290, 297, 307, 321, 368, 369, 373, 374, 377, 390, 395, 406, 462, 465, 471, 496, 512, 513, 517, 525, 538, 540, 542, 547, 554 interest groups, 1, 38, 56, 58, 69, 165, 166, 176, 179, 496, 512, 517, 525, 542, 554 interest rates, 192 interference, 218, 219, 220, 346, 385 internal controls, 321 Internal Revenue Service, 147 international law, 39, 137, 230, 235, 390, 391 International Monetary Fund, 195 international relations, 230, 363, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 443 international terrorism, 133 international trade, 369 internationalism, 497 internet, 480 Internet, 438, 447, 479, 480, 482, 483, 485, 518 internship, 457 interpretation, 61, 234, 236, 297, 318, 331, 333, 335, 337, 339, 368, 399, 414, 415, 422, 429, 432, 537, 548, 549, 551 intervention, 2, 66, 68, 132, 139, 194, 211, 214, 218, 219, 229, 230, 351, 363, 368, 549 interview, 55, 128, 245, 247, 265 intifada, 43 intimidation, 229, 367 introspection, 239 invasion of privacy, 430 investment, 144, 166 involuntary unemployment, 26 Iran, 72, 121, 122, 125, 126, 128, 129, 130, 139, 159, 175, 181, 536 Iran-Contra, 121, 130 Iraq, 76, 80, 81, 82, 85, 87, 88, 122, 124, 139, 182, 376, 389, 391, 392, 393, 444, 522, 533, 534, 535, 536, 550 Ireland, 203, 215, 457 iron, 243 Islamic, 124 isolation, 84, 188, 194, 198, 333, 456, 459 isolationism, 497, 545 Israel, 87, 129, 143, 239, 341, 409, 410, 411, 412, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 439, 440, 517, 558

Index Italy, 133, 320

J Jackson, Andrew, 206, 225, 228, 284, 311, 402, 407, 507 Japan, 445, 533, 540, 549 Jefferson, Thomas, 206, 217, 218, 238, 239, 242, 272, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 286, 287, 289, 290, 292, 293, 296, 298, 300, 301, 302, 307, 308, 309, 311, 313, 314, 316, 335, 336, 337, 338, 341, 342, 347, 349, 350, 351, 375, 376, 409, 410, 413, 419, 507, 558, 559 Jews, 149, 199, 200, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 347, 409, 417, 420, 422, 541 job performance, 435 job skills, 65 job training, 156, 177 jobless, 188 jobs, 71, 177, 187, 426, 465 Johnson, Andrew, 225, 268, 275, 406, 507 Johnson, Eddie Bernice, 58 Johnson, Haynes, 51, 52, 55, 61 Johnson, Lyndon B., 9, 23, 25, 30, 33, 186, 236, 407, 441, 508 Jordan, 169, 409 journalism, 432 journalists, 474, 475, 496, 517 judges, 395, 399, 400, 404, 405, 406 judgment, 20, 88, 92, 94, 96, 222, 224, 226, 252, 289, 290, 315, 329, 344, 345, 384, 387, 390, 396, 402 judicial branch, 355, 537 judiciary, 2, 431 Judiciary, 145, 396, 401, 426, 427, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 499, 537 Judiciary Committee, 145, 396, 426, 427, 430, 431, 433, 499, 537 juries, 399, 405 jurisdiction, 86, 380, 384, 392, 401, 403, 404, 405, 407 justice, 2, 65, 143, 145, 219, 223, 243, 287, 291, 297, 302, 326, 329, 343, 350, 380, 386, 390, 391, 392, 396, 405, 416, 418, 421, 452, 519, 520, 521, 528, 538, 559 justification, 194, 328, 359, 382, 386, 392, 400, 407, 418

K Kennedy, John F., 8, 9, 24, 30, 65, 185, 498, 508 Kenya, 124, 536

573

killing, 131, 135, 138, 142 Klein, Joe, 51, 53 knowledge, 1, 72, 218, 220, 225, 250, 263, 281, 366, 369, 370, 439, 449, 453, 456, 457, 463, 516, 534 Korea, 84, 123 Kuwait, 124, 131

L labeling, 402 labor, 38, 64, 146, 178, 186, 230, 265, 267, 281, 283, 308, 314, 326, 346, 359, 361, 428, 446, 457, 491, 511 labor force, 230 labor markets, 186 land, 133, 212, 214, 234, 242, 258, 260, 267, 274, 280, 297, 302, 310, 324, 325, 329, 341, 388, 410, 417, 422, 423, 437, 462 language, 84, 87, 189, 201, 268, 297, 298, 299, 305, 308, 329, 340, 341, 348, 355, 385, 388, 390, 404, 418, 421, 423, 429, 455 Latin America, 140, 141 laughter, 32, 248 law enforcement, 395, 425, 519, 521 laws, 40, 66, 103, 158, 173, 260, 262, 284, 287, 303, 325, 327, 328, 329, 330, 336, 339, 343, 344, 353, 354, 360, 362, 375, 376, 389, 390, 391, 397, 398, 402, 403, 404, 406, 407, 412, 416, 419, 422, 432, 451, 454, 533 lawyers, 158, 395, 446, 459, 499 layering, 184 lead, 12, 27, 30, 35, 36, 39, 41, 42, 44, 52, 76, 77, 82, 83, 86, 139, 163, 168, 172, 173, 199, 250, 326, 353, 355, 364, 376, 377, 443, 450, 452, 460, 461, 473, 477, 478, 496, 520, 522, 524, 525, 526, 534, 536 leadership, 25, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 50, 75, 78, 80, 87, 99, 114, 127, 140, 164, 167, 172, 178, 184, 188, 196, 204, 208, 211, 225, 231, 232, 238, 239, 243, 289, 317, 318, 343, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 433, 434, 435, 436, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 446, 452, 453, 454, 457, 459, 461, 462, 464, 465, 466, 467, 489, 492, 497, 501, 509, 513, 515, 519, 522, 523, 526, 528, 530, 540, 546, 549, 550, 558 leadership abilities, 509 leadership style, 211, 440, 441, 526, 540, 549, 550 leadership training programs, 467 League of Nations, 418 leaks, 59 learning, 75, 76, 77, 81, 82, 87, 88, 166, 213, 336, 414, 456, 525, 543, 558 learning process, 76 Lebanon, 129, 131, 138, 139, 536

574

Index

Legal Expense Trust, 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 152, 154, 156 legal issues, 35, 146 legal protection, 391 legality, 353, 381, 398 legislation, 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 20, 24, 26, 29, 30, 36, 42, 46, 49, 53, 54, 57, 58, 61, 64, 66, 69, 88, 89, 96, 97, 98, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 123, 163, 164, 165, 170, 174, 175, 176, 180, 191, 224, 228, 251, 289, 336, 340, 358, 407, 438, 495, 514, 538 legislative proposals, 170, 195 leisure, 257, 429 lens, 185 leukemia, 44 liability, 146 liability insurance, 146 liberalism, 516 liberation, 241, 307, 406 Liberia, 265 Libya, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142 life satisfaction, 64 lifetime, 39, 65, 238, 279, 282, 341, 446 likelihood, 103, 165, 455, 465, 531 limitation, 341 Lincoln, Abraham, 193, 199, 200, 201, 208, 222, 237, 238, 239, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 248, 249, 250, 251, 255, 256, 257, 259, 260, 265, 266, 270, 271, 272, 273, 275, 276, 277, 279, 280, 281, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 290, 292, 300, 301, 304, 305, 306, 307, 310, 311, 312, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 326, 327, 334, 335, 336, 342, 343, 344, 346, 348, 349, 350, 353, 355, 363, 365, 368, 375, 376, 378, 382, 390, 395, 413, 419, 420, 423, 507, 526, 527, 549, 555, 556, 558, 559 Lincoln, Mary Todd, 261, 275 linkage, 86, 87, 193, 523 links, 139, 192, 346, 431, 432, 433 listening, 218, 305, 523 literature, 102, 118, 123, 144, 152, 157, 372, 413, 429, 430, 485, 487, 489, 490, 519, 520, 522, 523, 530, 545, 546 living conditions, 64, 65 loans, 144 lobbying, 51, 53, 111, 173, 458, 548 lobbyists, 51, 59, 79, 146 local government, 73, 289, 464 location, 254, 458 locus, 371 long run, 173, 192, 522

Los Angeles, 28, 43, 46, 49, 141, 152, 179, 180, 433, 517 Lott,Trent, 181 Louisiana, 79, 124, 202, 203, 257, 280, 281, 293, 294, 303, 312, 314, 322, 327, 354, 364, 376, 378, 414, 445, 460, 468, 531, 537, 555, 556 love, 269, 325, 427 loyalty, 84, 159, 164, 201, 209, 264, 269, 347, 399, 444, 455 lung, 446 Lyceum Address, 238, 317, 318, 319, 320, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 334, 344 lying, 274

M machinery, 129 macroeconomic policy, 186, 187 macroeconomics, 183 Madison, James, 201, 242, 248, 279, 282, 320, 339, 341, 342, 357, 361, 413, 507, 535, 554, 555 magazines, 480, 482, 548 magnet, 454 males, 437, 471, 476, 480, 482, 484, 485, 487, 491, 493 malfeasance, 520, 521 management, 59, 84, 96, 125, 126, 127, 128, 163, 165, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 174, 176, 179, 181, 182, 411, 435, 501, 533, 534, 541 mandates, 146, 398 manipulation, 550 manners, 265, 321, 322, 327, 328 mantle, 433 manufacturer, 288, 300 manufacturing, 193 mapping, 125 marital status, 488 market, 52, 57, 186, 229, 235 marketing, 170 markets, 186 marriage, 241, 280, 490, 527 marrow, 40 martial law, 377, 390, 400, 401, 405, 407 Maryland, 201, 212, 215, 222, 263, 335, 379 masculinity, 489 mass, 170, 187, 292, 384, 416, 524, 547, 554 mass media, 554 Massachusetts, 97, 204, 251, 271, 272, 275, 304, 313, 338, 379, 412, 416, 529, 555 mastectomy, 67 mastery, 197, 364, 366, 529 maternal care, 431 McCain. Senator John, 77, 512

Index McKinley, William, 438, 508 meanings, 91 measurement, 155, 156, 370 measures, 1, 24, 25, 27, 28, 66, 82, 101, 102, 118, 121, 152, 154, 158, 228, 287, 342, 370, 371, 373, 375, 378, 380, 381, 390, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 401, 403, 404, 405, 407, 535 media, 55, 56, 59, 62, 67, 72, 75, 76, 87, 143, 158, 165, 166, 170, 174, 175, 177, 178, 180, 201, 428, 450, 451, 463, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 482, 483, 484, 485, 488, 490, 492, 493, 496, 501, 509, 510, 515, 516, 517, 520, 521, 523, 524, 525, 529, 533, 538, 554 Medicaid, 14, 53, 54, 58, 69, 173 medical care, 29 Medicare, 9, 10, 14, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 53, 54, 69, 172, 179, 180, 558 medication, 20, 73, 74 medicine, 28, 30, 31, 510 Meir, Golda, 409, 422, 440, 557, 559 membership, 58, 188, 246, 452, 457, 538 memory, 172, 259, 260, 274, 287, 309, 317, 330 mental disorder, 63, 64, 66, 69, 73 mental health, 4, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 558 mental health of children, 73 mental health professionals, 66 mental illness, 63, 64, 66, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74 mental retardation, 66 mentor, 443, 444, 465 mentoring, 452, 459, 467 Merck, 56, 57 Mercury, 296 mesoderm, 48 messages, 137, 170, 171, 183, 463, 514, 523 messengers, 60, 463 metaphor, 178, 184, 189, 190, 193, 194, 198, 329, 335, 337, 339, 342, 348, 349, 351, 356, 357, 433 methodology, 370, 521 Mexico, 203, 225, 247, 248, 354, 367, 368, 377 Miami, 201 microcosms, 441 mid-career, 452 middle class, 178, 426, 497 Middle East, 86, 87, 139, 194, 395, 423, 444, 547, 553 midterm elections, 179 migrants, 8 militarism, 317 military, 2, 7, 20, 64, 65, 85, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 129, 131, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 176, 178, 193, 194, 205, 223, 224, 229, 234, 248, 266, 268, 270, 274, 284, 285, 312, 345, 346,

575

347, 349, 350, 364, 365, 372, 373, 376, 380, 383, 384, 385, 387, 388, 390, 391, 392, 395, 396, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 419, 428, 441, 443, 445, 495, 497, 533, 534, 539, 545, 557, 559 military aid, 405 military government, 406 Military Order, 391, 395 military pressure, 121, 140 military tribunals, 390, 391, 392, 539 militias, 396, 398, 405 Millennium, 375 mimicry, 356 Minnesota, 252, 303, 462, 463, 558 minorities, 156, 199, 200, 201, 205, 206, 207, 496 minority, 36, 57, 97, 200, 201, 285, 288, 322, 351, 397, 428, 495, 496 minority groups, 200 missions, 203, 452 Mississippi River, 280 Missouri, 23, 46, 201, 203, 250, 252, 268, 281, 283, 291, 293, 294, 303, 354, 355, 403, 556, 557, 558 misunderstanding, 221, 222 Mitchell, George, 16, 57 mixing, 344, 351 mode, 168, 177, 181, 187, 224, 305, 411 modeling, 77 models, 57, 68, 411, 461, 464, 490, 494, 495 moderates, 139, 249 modern society, 547 modernism, 548, 549 modus operandi, 144 mold, 463, 464, 475 momentum, 139, 478 money, 20, 49, 51, 53, 66, 71, 77, 142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 157, 159, 160, 180, 186, 192, 223, 243, 246, 279, 281, 288, 300, 305, 307, 379, 400, 432, 452, 454, 491, 494, 501, 511, 512, 513, 516, 518 money supply, 186 Monroe, James, 279, 280, 281, 313, 376, 507 mood, 188, 229 moral judgment, 399 moral training, 346 morality, 44, 78, 206, 280, 286, 322, 326, 340, 351, 353, 359, 427 moratorium, 36, 37 morning, 138, 258, 259, 260, 262, 265, 273, 274, 275, 277, 279, 282, 310, 341, 422, 431, 433, 434, 474, 496 Moscow, 141 motherhood, 425, 426, 427, 428, 432, 433, 436, 556

576

Index

mothers, 28, 425, 426, 427, 428, 431, 432, 433, 435, 449, 461, 464 motivation, 74, 153, 450 motives, 42, 147, 159, 224, 318, 327, 332, 338, 389, 407, 547, 548 Mount Rushmore, 237 mountains, 279, 333 movement, 66, 70, 170, 232, 246, 270, 384, 417, 423, 439, 450, 451, 452, 453, 455, 456, 458, 466, 467, 545, 546 MSS, 284, 285 multimedia, 518 multiplication, 323 multiplicity, 178 multivariate, 154 murder, 35, 133, 407 music, 268, 313, 457, 528 Muslim, 149, 151, 395, 438, 547, 548 Muslim extremists, 547 Muslims, 149 mutations, 47

N NAFTA, 53, 54, 178 naming, 144 nation building, 43 National Basketball Association, 515 national debt, 52 national emergency, 6, 134, 527, 539 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 10 national income, 149 National Institutes of Health, 8, 36, 43, 45, 47, 49 national interests, 444 national origin, 319, 330 National Park Service, 91, 93 National Party, 503 National Public Radio, 48, 49, 426, 439 National Science Foundation, 7 national security, 84, 86, 88, 89, 93, 95, 96, 99, 121, 126, 127, 128, 130, 133, 141, 389, 395, 407, 492, 497, 516, 554 National Security Council, 79, 92, 94, 95, 97, 129, 535 nationalism, 200, 209, 287 Native Americans, 200 NATO, 138, 508, 534 natural gas, 196 Nazi Germany, 540 Nebraska, 20, 227, 249, 250, 253, 291, 292, 294, 295, 296, 323, 348, 354, 414

needs, 2, 29, 43, 65, 69, 97, 99, 103, 104, 118, 176, 190, 193, 315, 345, 412, 422, 452, 454, 466, 473, 496, 546, 551 negative attitudes, 157, 477 negative consequences, 159 neglect, 102 negotiation, 523 network, 70, 124, 130, 392, 452, 453, 454, 510 networking, 464 New England, 300, 306, 307, 337, 411, 529, 537, 555 New Jersey, 41, 56, 82, 257, 259, 270, 283, 309, 326, 340, 429, 458, 464, 468, 507, 512, 516, 517 New Mexico, 354 New Orleans, 82, 293, 307, 376, 377, 460, 468, 555 New Zealand, 48 news coverage, 472 newspapers, 188, 281, 283, 285, 286, 355, 385, 386, 480, 482, 535, 538, 542, 548, 553 next generation, 452, 464, 466, 523 Nicaragua, 140, 141 Nixon, Richard, 23, 32, 33, 105, 166, 183, 185, 508, 550, 556 noise, 273 non-citizens, 392 North America, 291, 367 North Carolina, 168, 204, 273, 292, 335, 435, 498, 545 North Korea, 84 novelty, 501 November 22, 1963, 30 nuclear power plant, 193 nuclear program, 142 nucleus, 31 Nuevo León, 203 nurses, 56, 58 nursing, 67 nursing home, 67

O obedience, 264, 326, 388 obligation, 39, 46, 98, 222, 299, 326, 375, 397 observations, 74, 156, 320, 531 obstruction, 145, 222, 372 occupational prestige, 149 OCD, 541 oceans, 376 Odyssey, 101 offenders, 402 Office of Management and Budget, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 171 oil, 135, 140, 170, 186, 188, 193, 194, 196, 263

Index oil production, 196 Oklahoma, 41, 97, 553 old age, 26, 31 older people, 67, 149 OMB, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 171, 178 omission, 547 OPEC, 188, 190, 195, 196 open spaces, 248 openness, 205 Operation El Dorado Canyon, 121, 137, 142 operator, 149, 257 opinion polls, 153, 426 oppression, 286, 301 optimism, 140, 401, 524 orbit, 515 orchestration, 220 organ, 35, 39, 381, 413 orientation, 411, 546 osteoarthritis, 67 outline, 54, 55, 521 outpatients, 23 output, 186 oversight, 1, 527, 534 overtime, 426 ownership, 53, 462

P Pacific, 223, 437 Pacific Islander, 437 packaging, 175 PACs, 146, 491 pain, 67, 167, 188, 435 pairing, 446 Pakistan, 86, 131, 440, 536 Palestine, 409, 416, 417, 420, 422 Panama, 3, 176, 514, 550 paranoia, 540 parenting, 71, 72 parents, 68, 181, 242, 280, 340 Paris, 24, 138 partition, 409, 416, 417 partnership(s), 146, 410, 450, 455, 462, 464, 527 party system, 229 passive, 27, 121, 130, 221, 227, 228, 229, 233 pathways, 441 patriotism, 264, 275, 309, 326, 332, 405 payroll, 28 peace process, 86 peer relationship, 61 peers, 71, 238, 514 penalties, 14, 98 Pentagon, 82, 83, 85, 122, 390, 391

577

perception(s), 33, 54, 81, 157, 184, 225, 365, 459, 460, 461, 471, 472, 476, 492, 493, 519, 520, 521, 537 performance, 147, 153, 159, 171, 173, 175, 185, 227, 236, 273, 397, 433, 435 performers, 148 permit, 96, 122, 137, 232, 258, 291, 322, 351, 544 perseverance, 256 Persian Gulf, 43, 86, 550 Persian Gulf War, 43, 550 personal, 2, 12, 31, 41, 43, 60, 63, 67, 74, 83, 91, 92, 96, 125, 129, 150, 153, 177, 193, 194, 199, 200, 201, 206, 211, 219, 243, 244, 249, 252, 271, 281, 285, 314, 318, 323, 332, 336, 346, 363, 365, 368, 369, 374, 386, 388, 399, 404, 430, 433, 435, 449, 451, 454, 459, 460, 461, 466, 473, 489, 490, 492, 497, 500, 501, 513, 530, 531, 535, 537, 540, 541 personal control, 368 personal history, 365 personal life, 31, 318 personal qualities, 201, 540 personal relations, 541 personal relationship, 541 personal responsibility, 74 personality, 125, 473, 474, 492, 550 personality traits, 473, 474, 492 personhood, 359, 360, 361, 362 perspective, 1, 26, 39, 42, 111, 146, 187, 190, 231, 239, 414, 417, 420, 422, 496, 523, 551 persuasion, 103, 104, 170, 312, 521 photographs, 521 physical health, 72, 73 Physicians, 10, 13, 29, 30, 31, 59, 72 Pierce, Franklin, 224, 292, 507 placebo, 167 placenta, 40 planning, 12, 42, 75, 78, 87, 125, 170, 211, 392, 544 plants, 193, 364 pleasure, 219, 245, 365 pluralism, 323, 334 plurality, 49, 177 polarization, 322, 323 police, 181, 520 policy choice, 126, 373 policy initiative, 75, 86, 105, 106, 497, 539, 549 policy instruments, 367 policy makers, 36, 86, 534 policy making, 36, 82, 374, 525 policy problems, 76, 84, 172, 197, 525 policymakers, 66, 74, 125 political action committee, 463, 553

578

Index

political leaders, 50, 66, 237, 364, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 433, 434, 435, 441, 462, 464, 465, 466, 468, 489, 519, 546, 548 political participation, 150, 152, 153, 155, 455, 458, 464, 467 political parties, 88, 206, 208, 301, 322, 323, 333, 477, 487, 493, 495, 558 political power, 321, 327, 342 Polk, James, 402, 507 Polk, James Knox, 311 polling, 511, 515, 522 pollution, 9 poor, 2, 14, 32, 67, 72, 147, 152, 155, 173, 187, 197, 219, 287, 329, 343, 493, 514, 523 poor performance, 147 popular vote, 26, 30, 78, 228, 232, 382 population, 23, 24, 47, 134, 148, 149, 154, 159, 262, 286, 294, 300, 305, 312, 417, 420, 452, 471, 472, 474, 477, 487, 547 pork, 512, 513, 518 portability, 58 portfolio, 81, 443 ports, 369, 373, 383, 396 positive relation, 155, 493, 501 positive relationship, 155, 493, 501 posture, 174, 177 Potomac River, 212, 218, 220, 263 poverty, 65, 66, 71, 497 power plants, 193 power relations, 428, 429 power sharing, 78 prayer, 172, 266, 339, 342, 345, 347, 348, 349, 350 preference, 54, 55, 56, 106, 126, 213, 214, 371, 443, 473, 509 preferential treatment, 473 pregnancy, 454 prejudice, 71, 205, 209 preparation, 308, 379, 441, 442 President Bush, 15, 20, 35, 36, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 71, 73, 75, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 91, 95, 96, 97, 115, 122, 132, 134, 163, 376, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 426, 444, 535, 537, 551 President Clinton, 37, 43, 53, 54, 57, 61, 71, 77, 93, 143, 144, 145, 146, 152, 153, 158, 520 President’s Day, 317 presidential campaigns, 157, 474, 507, 523, 524 presidential elections, 154, 161, 232, 493, 500 presidential performance, 227 presidential politics, 438 presidential travel, 93 presidential veto, 106, 112 press conferences, 65, 530

pressure, 65, 76, 97, 121, 132, 137, 140, 164, 166, 180, 286, 301, 525 prestige, 1, 103, 127, 149, 205, 211, 266 presumption of innocence, 391 prevention, 12, 66, 70, 71, 231, 387 price ceiling, 57 price stability, 187 prices, 140, 186, 187, 188, 192, 193, 195, 196 priming, 493 principle, 24, 32, 46, 56, 181, 231, 235, 238, 249, 253, 291, 295, 301, 303, 308, 309, 310, 313, 315, 316, 327, 329, 343, 357, 359, 375, 384, 387 prisoners, 46, 270, 377, 399, 402, 403, 406, 540 prisoners of war, 270, 402, 403 privacy, 12, 430, 435 private property, 263 private sector, 42, 52 privateers, 373 privatization, 33 probability, 438 pro-choice, 42, 453, 491 producers, 148 production, 167, 187, 193, 196, 453, 533 profession, 249, 474, 510 professionalism, 435 professions, 459 profit, 104, 135, 295 program, 2, 4, 7, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31, 32, 52, 55, 65, 68, 72, 73, 86, 96, 118, 126, 142, 163, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 178, 179, 180, 182, 187, 192, 193, 195, 196, 286, 287, 340, 451, 453, 456, 457, 463, 464, 467, 534 programming, 456, 462 progressive income tax, 187 proliferation, 10 promote, 2, 49, 65, 81, 126, 163, 164, 182, 187, 214, 216, 218, 336, 340, 346, 350, 365, 418, 455, 457, 460, 501, 519 promoter, 342, 343 propaganda, 29, 203, 207, 545, 546 property rights, 320 proposition, 253, 258, 275, 303, 314, 333, 343, 373, 383 prosperity, 147, 172, 173, 177, 297, 308, 314, 326, 341, 540, 549 Protestants, 149, 199, 200, 202, 203, 206, 207, 209, 517 prudence, 239, 344, 551 psychiatric disorders, 64 psychiatric hospitals, 66 psychological assessments, 558 psychological distress, 65 psychological health, 67

Index psychological problems, 531 psychologist, 558 psychology, 72 psychotherapy, 70, 74, 558 public administration, 547, 548 public awareness, 67 public debt, 187 public education, 286, 289, 452, 463 public funding, 348 public health, 1, 2, 17 public interest, 97, 531 public opinion, 78, 153, 169, 222, 322, 328, 373, 402, 426, 431, 492, 520, 521, 522, 523, 540, 546, 558 public policy, 49, 74, 78, 118, 150, 163, 179, 335, 514, 525, 537, 547, 549, 551, 557 public radio, 553 public safety, 398, 400, 401, 402 public schools, 107, 229, 340 public sector, 26 public service, 68, 159 public support, 136, 171, 172, 211, 218, 229, 231, 522, 525 publishers, 276, 547 pulse, 274, 518 punishment, 70, 325, 387, 390, 400, 401, 405, 525 Putin, 444

Q Quakers, 231 qualifications, 205, 438, 460 quality of life, 63, 64 questioning, 147, 357, 385, 433

R race, 26, 77, 161, 199, 227, 249, 252, 254, 265, 271, 291, 297, 298, 302, 312, 314, 316, 355, 365, 383, 418, 431, 433, 437, 441, 443, 449, 472, 476, 477, 478, 488, 492, 512, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 524, 537 racism, 236 radar, 136 Radiation, 17 radio, 178, 425, 426, 480, 482, 511, 512, 518, 544, 553 rain, 243 range, 112, 133, 156, 165, 192, 457, 458, 464, 466, 479, 518, 526, 537, 540, 557, 558 ratings, 159, 165, 166, 167, 169, 171, 173, 174, 176, 179, 181, 182, 490, 500, 530

579

rationality, 340, 342 reading, 149, 174, 249, 264, 281, 283, 284, 285, 297, 309, 340, 362, 415, 439, 532, 535, 539, 543 Reagan, Nancy, 40, 44, 70 Reagan, Ronald, 23, 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 41, 108, 121, 122, 126, 127, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 168, 171, 488, 499, 508, 514, 516, 535, 544, 545, 549 real estate, 144, 214, 498 real income, 188 real terms, 195 reality, 47, 52, 58, 94, 148, 185, 189, 190, 198, 208, 224, 236, 344, 350, 416, 451, 460, 465, 546, 547 reasoning, 197, 340 recall, 148, 187 recalling, 123 reception, 83, 259, 273, 282, 309 recession, 166, 167, 173, 177, 185, 186, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 551 reciprocity, 356 recognition, 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 208, 209, 249, 319, 323, 328, 347, 367, 397, 400, 418, 442, 492, 515, 528 recollection, 187, 307 reconcile, 238, 239 reconciliation, 108, 223, 320, 346 reconstruction, 225, 228 recovery, 173, 174, 175, 177 recurrence, 319, 330 Red Cross, 64, 488, 499 Red Sea, 410 reduction, 53, 64, 67, 88, 94, 177, 178 reelection, 163, 164, 165, 166, 169, 170, 173, 174, 175, 177, 180, 181, 187, 252, 270, 271, 272, 287, 315, 513, 514, 527, 550, 551 reflection, 79, 216, 222, 293, 321, 338 reforms, 24, 25, 56, 72, 344, 524, 525, 538 refugees, 536 regenerate, 44 regenerative medicine, 38 regional, 418, 452, 464 regression, 154, 155, 156, 520 regression analysis, 154, 155, 520 regulation, 25, 52, 146, 158, 159, 170 regulations, 1, 38, 49, 391, 392, 405, 522 rehabilitation, 4 rejection, 35, 39, 296, 430, 460, 537 relative prices, 188 relative size, 149, 442 relatives, 265 relevance, 451, 479 religion, 44, 149, 161, 202, 204, 287, 318, 321, 322, 326, 327, 328, 329, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340,

580

Index

341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 411, 412, 418, 421, 422, 495, 498, 517, 539, 547, 548, 553 religiosity, 337 religious beliefs, 63, 339, 346, 493, 498 religious observances, 347 remediation, 535 remembering, 248 remodeling, 450 rent, 96 repair, 384 replacement, 170, 216, 429 repression, 317 reprisals, 135, 139 reproduction, 39, 45, 96 Republican Party, 38, 42, 167, 185, 207, 224, 250, 252, 253, 292, 295, 296, 300, 303, 305, 307, 311, 314, 399, 437, 440, 445, 488, 499, 502, 513, 516, 544, 545 Republicans, 28, 38, 40, 48, 54, 72, 73, 79, 144, 153, 154, 167, 177, 178, 179, 189, 206, 207, 225, 228, 231, 232, 245, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 270, 296, 297, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 309, 311, 314, 365, 388, 406, 407, 426, 427, 516, 517, 526, 538, 543 reputation, 81, 103, 178, 205, 211, 228, 233, 234, 236, 261, 285, 287, 305, 326, 333, 337, 355, 356, 365, 384, 393 research funding, 42, 47 resentment, 60, 425, 435 reserves, 344 resistance, 28, 262, 273, 387 resolution, 46, 173, 225, 230, 251, 256, 264, 275, 298, 300, 315, 331, 347, 388, 389, 418, 464 resource management, 534 resources, 52, 73, 88, 89, 97, 98, 109, 125, 152, 229, 234, 289, 364, 452, 453, 463, 465, 471, 511, 515, 516, 521, 536, 544 responsibility, 31, 50, 52, 53, 70, 73, 83, 85, 97, 192, 224, 258, 288, 314, 365, 390, 397, 412, 425, 426, 427, 443, 526, 532, 533 restructuring, 20 retaliation, 122, 135, 138, 139, 141 retardation, 66 retirement, 172, 181, 291 retribution, 122, 141 returns, 144, 186, 300 revenue, 267 Revolutionary, 244, 259, 265, 266, 268, 279, 282, 296, 316, 322, 327, 337, 390, 413, 531 rewards, 57

rhetoric, 66, 87, 88, 111, 141, 184, 185, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197, 198, 215, 318, 324, 350, 423, 522, 523, 545, 546, 549, 550, 558 Rhode Island, 55, 255, 306, 337, 348, 379, 442, 528, 559 rice, 444, 445, 447 Rice, Condoleezza, 86, 437, 439, 440, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 535 right to life, 298 rights, 12, 35, 41, 64, 65, 66, 72, 108, 138, 205, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 235, 236, 262, 265, 280, 292, 293, 295, 298, 315, 318, 320, 321, 336, 337, 343, 346, 360, 362, 379, 386, 395, 414, 415, 418, 420, 421, 423, 452, 453, 484, 488, 538, 539 rings, 547 risk, 141, 166, 187, 209, 377, 391, 395, 401, 402, 404, 458, 461 risk-taking, 209 role conflict, 495 Roman Empire, 274 Roosevelt, Eleanor, 63, 64, 65, 69, 71, 72 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 1, 2, 24, 27, 30, 33, 64, 65, 163, 168, 193, 397, 407, 429, 440, 508, 526, 527, 529, 537, 539, 540, 549, 556, 559 Roosevelt, Theodore, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 193, 225, 228, 237, 508, 546, 558 rule of law, 319, 322, 324, 325, 328, 329, 330, 334, 343, 344, 398, 401, 404 Russia, 54, 317

S SA, 136 sabotage, 399 sacrifice, 178, 184, 193, 205, 218, 265, 287, 291, 298, 327, 328, 329, 343, 344, 383, 388, 428, 547, 549 Saddam Hussein, 87, 444, 550 sadness, 73, 258 safety, 172, 194, 369, 398, 400, 401, 402, 549 sales, 130, 141, 192, 230 sample, 98, 105, 106, 111, 115, 148, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 157, 159, 412, 480, 514 sampling, 479, 522 San Salvador, 131 sanctions, 121, 133, 134, 135, 136, 140, 328 satisfaction, 64, 218, 337 savings, 144, 454, 516, 544 scaling, 70, 522 scandal, 81, 97, 121, 122, 128, 145, 147, 148, 150, 153, 166, 180, 222, 223, 235, 515, 516, 521 scholarship, 74, 221, 227, 521, 522, 526

Index school, 53, 54, 55, 70, 71, 73, 107, 138, 149, 161, 171, 174, 180, 224, 229, 234, 236, 238, 247, 281, 286, 287, 329, 340, 341, 343, 351, 426, 428, 429, 454, 459, 460, 463, 498, 529 science, 43, 44, 416, 480, 510, 523, 526, 531, 532, 546, 553, 554, 555 scientific progress, 35 scores, 101, 102, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 117, 118, 371, 430, 558 search, 44, 160, 254, 349, 361, 417, 423, 522, 533 searching, 173 Second World, 527 secondary schools, 340 Secretary of Commerce, 508 Secretary of Defense, 79, 83, 84, 127, 129, 132, 391, 430, 443, 535 Secretary of Homeland Security, 442 Secretary of the Treasury, 229, 249, 290 secularism, 327 security, 26, 27, 31, 80, 84, 86, 88, 89, 93, 95, 96, 99, 121, 122, 126, 127, 128, 130, 133, 134, 141, 159, 194, 258, 326, 375, 387, 389, 392, 395, 400, 407, 432, 492, 497, 516, 533, 534, 554 segregation, 435 seizure, 124, 372, 373, 381, 406 seizures, 381 selecting, 493, 527 self-control, 241, 243, 545 self-discipline, 428 self-esteem, 64, 71, 150 self-interest, 135, 321, 322, 327, 538 self-perceptions, 460 self-presentation, 460, 461 self-promotion, 460 self-understanding, 334, 344 self-worth, 65 semantics, 224 senate, 388, 431, 441 Senate approval, 226 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 233, 366 sensitivity, 510 separation, 231, 239, 310, 319, 320, 321, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 345, 348, 349, 350, 351, 379, 415, 420, 547, 548 separation of powers, 319, 320, 321, 379 September 11, 43, 73, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 85, 122, 182, 376, 389, 390, 393, 395, 396, 407, 522, 533, 535, 539 series, 28, 29, 42, 66, 102, 121, 134, 144, 167, 238, 247, 251, 338, 355, 378, 385, 387, 396, 410, 419, 451, 520, 533, 551 service provider, 462

581

services, 31, 55, 63, 64, 66, 68, 73, 74, 77, 93, 98, 137, 166, 202, 219, 266, 428, 536 severity, 400 Seward, William Henry, 363, 365, 366, 367, 368, 372, 373 sex, 173, 179, 418, 438, 461, 488, 490, 492, 493, 496, 497, 499 sexism, 489, 501 sexual harassment, 145, 146 shape, 31, 101, 103, 104, 112, 115, 117, 126, 164, 227, 259, 310, 365, 374, 518, 531, 537, 538, 539, 544 shaping, 1, 105, 111, 112, 114, 115, 118, 365, 366, 368, 369, 370, 393, 412, 417, 464, 541 shares, 20 sharing, 78, 337, 536 shelter, 454 shock, 133, 184 shoot, 389 shores, 280, 520 shortage, 39, 413 shoulders, 310, 312, 433 shy, 211, 529 sibling, 215, 530 sign, 103, 104, 105, 109, 114, 117, 118, 129, 142, 169, 177, 180, 387, 509, 510 signaling, 84 signals, 52, 525, 526 significance level, 479, 480, 481 signs, 79, 85, 101, 102, 182, 188, 439 silver, 269, 420, 422, 424 Silver Age, 324 similarity, 498 Singapore, 48, 49 sites, 480, 482 skills, 32, 65, 297, 324, 435, 453, 458, 462, 463, 464, 466, 516 slavery, 200, 221, 233, 234, 236, 238, 239, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 257, 270, 273, 280, 281, 284, 287, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 298, 299, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 315, 317, 331, 343, 345, 347, 353, 354, 355, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 383, 399, 423 slaves, 228, 229, 241, 249, 257, 270, 271, 280, 291, 293, 295, 299, 312, 330, 332, 344, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 382, 528 smallpox, 20 Smith, Margaret Chase, 487, 488, 489, 502, 506 smoking, 9, 133, 137, 180 sobriety, 286 social change, 66, 454, 466, 467 social conservatives, 70 social contract, 412

582

Index

social control, 66 social environment, 529 social events, 63 social group, 73 social ills, 66 social justice, 65 social life, 68 social norms, 328, 460 social order, 344, 345, 410 social policy, 63, 538 social problems, 66, 73 social roles, 63 social security, 26, 432 Social Security, 2, 6, 14, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 61, 82, 167, 172, 174, 175, 181, 425, 440, 517, 558 social status, 497 social welfare, 27, 475, 538 socialism, 27, 29, 32, 547 socialization, 63, 494 society, 31, 41, 48, 50, 66, 238, 250, 279, 286, 293, 297, 299, 301, 307, 318, 322, 327, 343, 361, 410, 412, 414, 450, 459, 476, 489, 532, 546, 547 soil, 305, 358 sounds, 24, 192, 225, 248, 418, 548 South Carolina, 40, 126, 202, 203, 204, 255, 257, 261, 270, 312, 396, 509, 517, 526, 553, 554 South China XE "China" Sea, 83 South Dakota, 237, 513, 515 sovereignty, 302, 343, 354, 357, 361, 411, 541 Soviet Union, 29, 126, 139, 140, 141, 176, 524, 540, 550 Spain, 138, 203, 207, 230, 367, 376, 435 specialization, 39, 342 species, 319, 320 spectrum, 526 speculation, 183, 443, 537 speech, 16, 20, 25, 28, 42, 46, 47, 56, 122, 166, 169, 170, 172, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180, 181, 188, 189, 190, 191, 193, 194, 195, 198, 238, 246, 247, 248, 249, 251, 253, 255, 258, 272, 284, 289, 290, 293, 294, 296, 297, 299, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 313, 317, 318, 319, 322, 324, 325, 326, 328, 329, 330, 334, 338, 343, 355, 356, 358, 360, 383, 384, 385, 386, 388, 439, 522, 544, 545 speed, 79, 402 spelling, 287, 329, 343 sperm, 41 spin, 234, 450 spinal cord, 39 spirituality, 273 sports, 429, 431 SPSS, 479

St. Louis, 293 stability, 173, 187, 196 staffing, 554 stages, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 117, 363 stagflation, 167 standardization, 96 standards, 196, 209, 342 stars, 310 state laws, 173, 454 State of the Union address, 4, 8, 12, 56, 172, 177, 180, 183, 185, 190, 193 statehood, 353, 354, 440 states’ rights, 333 statistical analysis, 520 statistics, 112, 173, 429, 458, 465, 505, 542 statutes, 399 steel, 269, 426 stem cell, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 stem cell lines, 36, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47 stem cell research, 20, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 stem cell(s), 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 Stephanopoulos, George, 51, 60, 124, 180 stereotypes, 126, 450, 472, 475, 489, 490, 492, 493, 497, 500 stereotyping, 471, 472, 474 stigma, 67, 68, 72, 475 stigmatized, 450 stimulus, 53, 111, 114, 152, 192, 198 stock, 242, 505 strain, 71 strategies, 64, 71, 77, 181, 363, 371, 373, 374, 427, 462, 511 strength, 30, 88, 184, 230, 235, 236, 247, 267, 305, 314, 335, 356, 364, 423, 428, 444, 459, 494, 543 stress, 86, 169, 307, 317, 411, 550 stressful events, 73 stressors, 66, 556 stretching, 260, 313, 377 strictures, 96, 375 strikes, 121, 122, 124, 140, 373, 383, 421, 432, 522 stroke, 377 structural barriers, 493 students, 53, 73, 220, 320, 340, 341, 351, 426, 446, 453, 463, 464, 465, 467, 479, 480, 521, 529, 532, 534, 548, 558 subjective judgments, 109 subsidy, 32 substance abuse, 67, 68, 70, 71 substitutes, 192, 512

Index substitution, 322 success rate, 101, 102, 109, 118 Sudan, 124 suffering, 39, 40, 46, 49, 69, 188, 350, 421, 528 suicide, 20, 144, 333 summer, 41, 53, 55, 61, 80, 153, 171, 175, 211, 215, 216, 244, 251, 252, 284, 292, 296, 297, 307, 353, 373, 454, 463, 464, 516, 535 Sumner, Charles, 233, 235, 241, 255, 275, 276, 366 Sun, 261 Superfund, 111 supervision, 170 supervisors, 340, 426 supply, 81, 164, 172, 186, 196, 287, 364 support services, 74 support staff, 176 suppression, 232, 322, 378, 395 Supreme Court, 16, 20, 36, 41, 78, 145, 175, 228, 296, 299, 335, 337, 338, 339, 348, 349, 350, 353, 354, 355, 357, 360, 361, 377, 378, 380, 381, 384, 401, 403, 404, 406, 407, 425, 429, 430, 431, 434, 505, 506, 516, 528, 537, 538, 539, 555, 557, 559 Surgeons, 59, 72 surplus, 196, 289 surprise, 58, 76, 81, 85, 93, 128, 140, 149, 206, 212, 252, 285, 342, 360, 376, 540 surrogates, 211 surveillance, 82, 83 survival, 71, 313, 322, 393, 395, 399, 407 survivors, 27 suspects, 142, 521 suspense, 544 suspensions, 325 sweat, 345 Sweden, 47 switching, 78 symbols, 350, 537 symmetry, 298 sympathy, 230, 384, 522 symptoms, 64 synthesis, 412, 420 syphilis, 40 Syria, 121, 139 systems, 33, 125

T tactics, 28, 29, 211, 308, 363, 365, 371, 525 Taft, William, 508 Taft, William Howard, 26 Taiwan, 84, 85 takeover, 173 talent, 30, 205

583

Taliban, 85, 87, 535 tanks, 89 Tanzania, 124, 536 targets, 124, 132, 136, 138, 139, 176, 451, 543 tariff, 285, 288, 364 tax credit, 107, 166, 174, 181, 193 tax cuts, 81, 167, 170, 178 tax incentive, 15 tax increase, 32, 52, 173, 178, 187 tax rates, 164 tax reform, 175 taxation, 362 Taylor, Zachary, 248, 290, 291, 507 teachers, 73, 181, 449, 498, 529 teaching, 185, 272, 318, 340, 529, 548 technology, 2, 38, 44, 96, 122, 456 teenagers, 71 Tel Aviv, 409, 410, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423 telecommunications, 96, 98 telephone, 28 television, 30, 31, 70, 132, 133, 145, 172, 178, 180, 186, 474, 480, 482, 511, 512, 514, 515, 517, 544 television advertisements, 511, 515 temperament, 528, 537 temperance, 246 temporary appointment, 438 Tennessee, 40, 49, 199, 204, 268, 281, 282, 314, 364, 385, 438, 440, 441, 515, 556, 557 tension, 129, 230, 420, 451, 455, 544, 550 tenure, 190, 191, 208, 219, 222, 407, 440, 488, 515, 540 terminally ill, 20 territory, 75, 212, 231, 254, 262, 280, 281, 293, 294, 302, 303, 312, 354, 355, 362, 364, 372, 376, 377, 385, 409 terrorism, 80, 85, 86, 87, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 239, 375, 390, 392, 393, 396, 520, 535, 536, 539 terrorist acts, 122, 131, 134 terrorist attack, 73, 82, 85, 86, 121, 124, 125, 129, 142, 395, 522, 539 terrorist organization, 133, 134 Texas, 41, 73, 77, 85, 126, 167, 198, 202, 203, 227, 257, 338, 542, 549, 551, 555 textbooks, 529 The Economist, 48, 49, 446 theory, 57, 130, 166, 294, 304, 316, 336, 343, 369, 370, 379, 411, 427, 496, 508, 525, 526, 548, 550, 556 therapy, 40, 459

584

Index

thinking, 54, 88, 166, 227, 259, 280, 281, 283, 288, 309, 317, 324, 342, 358, 411, 412, 427, 430, 459, 461, 528, 542, 548 Third World, 141 threat, 56, 85, 86, 96, 112, 175, 232, 233, 275, 322, 323, 327, 329, 333, 334, 363, 365, 367, 368, 399, 405, 524, 525, 534, 535, 540 threatening behavior, 373 threats, 2, 103, 123, 127, 136, 319, 322, 328, 333, 363, 367, 452, 525, 539 threshold, 461 thyroid, 537 thyroid cancer, 537 tides, 519 time frame, 178, 238, 536 time periods, 535 timing, 54, 85, 437, 440, 443, 522 tissue, 35, 36, 37, 41, 44 tokenism, 201 Tokyo, 445 totipotent, 40 tracking, 77, 175 trade, 125, 134, 172, 188, 251, 255, 358, 359, 364, 369, 372, 412 trade union, 188 trade-off, 125, 172 trading, 125 tradition, 223, 234, 319, 344, 348, 349, 350, 351, 370, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 421, 422, 424, 499, 547 traffic, 359 training, 55, 65, 66, 72, 149, 156, 177, 180, 341, 346, 356, 453, 459, 461, 462, 463, 464, 467, 494, 534 training programs, 55, 467 traits, 80, 81, 83, 87, 359, 361, 362, 450, 459, 472, 473, 474, 492 trajectory, 159 tranquilizers, 67 transcripts, 97, 431 transformation(s), 534, 558 transition(s), 36, 57, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 166, 232, 505, 535, 542, 543, 551 transition period, 75, 76, 78, 80, 81, 85, 166 transparency, 315 transplantation, 36 transportation, 282, 285, 340, 463, 511 treaties, 106, 514 trees, 274 trend, 491, 498, 500, 519 trial, 144, 145, 148, 276, 380, 385, 386, 387, 388, 390, 400, 401, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 462, 512, 527, 547

trial and error, 512 triangulation, 179 tribes, 231, 346 triggers, 81 Truman, Bess, 23 Truman, Harry S., 4, 23, 24, 28, 559 trust, 52, 147, 158, 159, 270, 375, 418, 422, 425, 455, 463 tuition, 174, 181 turnout, 466, 515, 524, 525 Tyler, John, 402, 507

U U.S. history, 78, 180, 400 U.S. military, 122, 125, 131, 402 umbilical cord, 40, 42 umbilical cord blood, 42 uncertainty, 75, 185, 365 undergraduate, 55, 526, 532, 556 unemployment, 2, 26, 27, 28, 31, 64, 114, 166, 167, 171, 179, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 190, 192, 193, 196 unemployment insurance, 64 uniform, 391 uninsured, 54, 57, 58 unions, 38, 146, 188 United Kingdom (UK), 24, 103, 239, 363, 364, 367, 368, 371, 372, 373, 374 United Nations (UN), 40, 65, 70, 72, 138, 409, 416, 418, 423, 534 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 65 universe, 341, 490 universities, 38, 43, 47, 48, 52, 341, 464, 534, 548 updating, 191 USSR, 121, 141

V vacancies, 79, 226, 438 vaccine, 20 vacuum, 135, 178, 185, 238, 318, 542 valence, 519 validity, 254, 381, 382, 402 values, 45, 70, 78, 180, 335, 414, 421, 422, 431, 434, 489, 493, 527, 547 Van Buren, Martin, 507 vandalism, 79 variable, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, 479, 480, 481, 520 variables, 154, 155, 157, 185, 191, 194, 370, 478, 479, 480 variance, 225

Index variation, 154, 159, 290 vehicles, 391 vein, 546 venereal disease, 132 Vermont, 57, 78, 396 versatility, 40 vessels, 124, 282, 381 veterans, 64, 65, 172 vice-presidency, 530 vice-president, 91, 201, 305, 385, 488, 489 victims, 46, 66, 131, 142, 471, 536 Vietnam, 123, 184, 186, 189, 193, 237 village, 72, 285 violence, 43, 180, 228, 229, 235, 250, 305, 324, 326, 359, 361, 397, 452, 457, 462 Virginia, 65, 77, 212, 214, 216, 241, 242, 247, 250, 255, 261, 262, 263, 267, 268, 273, 279, 282, 284, 286, 293, 294, 296, 305, 307, 314, 336, 337, 339, 340, 341, 403, 405, 407, 413, 426, 554, 555, 557 visas, 395 vision, 66, 188, 317, 319, 323, 327, 367, 368, 414, 422, 437, 439, 446, 509, 549, 550 voice, 178, 295, 345, 356, 431, 433, 456, 459, 466, 474, 536, 548 voiding, 407 volatility, 550 vomiting, 177 voter turnout, 466, 515, 524, 525 voters, 53, 157, 165, 168, 171, 174, 178, 179, 201, 207, 222, 232, 245, 300, 445, 449, 466, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 490, 492, 493, 495, 496, 500, 501, 509, 511, 514, 515, 518, 523, 524, 525, 526 voting, 57, 149, 150, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, 227, 271, 438, 473, 477, 513, 514, 516, 517, 525, 558 voting record, 514, 517 Voting Rights Act, 30 vouchers, 15, 32, 33

W wages, 1 walking, 64, 251, 296, 517 Wall Street Journal, 141, 153 war crimes, 396 war on terror, 121, 134, 142, 239, 539 War on Terror, 80, 82, 85, 86, 87, 390, 535 war years, 263 Washington, George, 211, 212, 213, 220, 238, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 248, 250, 251, 254, 255, 256, 257, 261, 262, 267, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 279, 281, 282, 314, 317, 319, 324, 327, 334, 339, 507, 531, 556, 557

585

water, 108, 169, 243 watershed, 230, 438, 449 weakness, 66, 129, 169, 226, 233, 320, 393, 398, 523, 532, 543, 551 wealth, 372, 516, 522, 523 weapons, 85, 86, 122, 139, 423 weapons of mass destruction, 85, 86, 122 wear, 305, 391 web, 38, 44, 45, 79, 158, 418 websites, 512 Webster, Daniel, 246 welfare, 6, 25, 27, 53, 54, 170, 173, 178, 179, 180, 346, 431, 475, 538 welfare reform, 53, 54, 170, 178, 179 welfare state, 26 well-being, 24, 346 wells, 193 West Wing, 92, 93, 98, 178, 556, 558 Western Europe, 135 Whigs, 246, 250, 288 Whip Inflation Now Campaign, 183 wholesale, 318 wilderness, 410, 416, 439, 536 Wilson, Woodrow, 26, 30, 193, 438, 439, 508, 546, 549, 559 windows, 260 winning, 57, 78, 104, 163, 165, 168, 193, 200, 388, 438, 472, 473, 474, 476, 477, 478, 489, 509, 510, 529, 558 winter, 24, 243, 246, 261, 272, 510 wires, 79 Wisconsin, 47, 250, 253, 292, 293, 301, 302, 303, 506, 553 withdrawal, 124, 129, 430, 431 witnesses, 97, 396, 435 wives, 2, 31, 63, 248, 432, 527 WMD, 533 women, 14, 24, 31, 37, 63, 64, 65, 67, 72, 83, 91, 173, 262, 269, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 433, 434, 435, 436, 438, 439, 440, 446, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 482, 484, 485, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 505, 506, 507, 509, 510, 553, 555 women’s groups, 72, 451 women’s issues, 451 women’s organizations, 450, 451 Woodhull, Victoria, 488, 502 Woodward, Bob, 51, 79, 130 words and actions, 335 work ethic, 215

586

Index

workers, 20, 72, 133, 135, 169, 229, 426, 450 working groups, 56, 58 working women, 451 World Anti-Doping Agency, 19 World Trade Center, 82, 122, 407, 536 World War, 40, 64, 65, 123, 187, 193, 194, 234, 404, 440, 443, 489, 545 worldview, 126, 127 worry, 141, 367, 432 writing, 49, 123, 150, 168, 191, 216, 217, 271, 284, 351, 357, 358, 410, 413, 487, 529, 553, 557 wrongdoing, 127, 223

Y yield, 196, 254, 274 young adults, 461 young men, 244, 270, 459, 460, 461, 546 young women, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468

Z Zimbabwe, 131