Weapons of Mississippi
Weapons of Mississippi
KE VIN D OUGHERT Y U N I V E RS I T Y P RE S S OF M I S S I S S I PPI ...
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Weapons of Mississippi
Weapons of Mississippi
KE VIN D OUGHERT Y U N I V E RS I T Y P RE S S OF M I S S I S S I PPI / J ACKSON
www.upress.state.ms.us The University Press of Mississippi is a member of the Association of American University Presses. Frontis: Knife (detail) courtesy of the Mississippi Armed Forces Museum, Burnelle B. McMahan Collection. Photograph by Jay Van Orsdol. See page 49. Copyright © 2010 by University Press of Mississippi All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America First printing 2010 ∞ Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Dougherty, Kevin. Weapons of Mississippi / Kevin Dougherty. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 978-1-60473-451-5 (cloth : alk. paper) — isbn 978-1-60473-452-2 (ebook) 1. Weapons— Mississippi—History. 2. Mississippi—History. 3. Mississippi—History, Military. I. Title. U818.D68 2010 623.409762—dc22 2009052094 British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data available
CO NTENTS
vii
3
I N T ROD U C T I ON
1. AT L AT L S, B OW S A N D A R R OW S, A ND S TRIK ING W E APONS W E A P ON S OF T H E M I S S I S S I P PI I N D I A NS
12
2. GUNS, STEEL, AND FORTS W E A P ON S OF T H E E U ROPE A N S I N M IS S IS SIPPI
28
3. M I LI T I A S, O U T L AW S, A N D K E N T UCK Y RIFLE S W E A P ON S OF T E RRI TORI A L M I S S I S S IPPI
43
4. DU E L I N G A N D S L AVE R Y W E A P ON S OF A N T E B E L LUM M I S S I S SIPPI
59
5. M I SS I S S I P P I R I F L E S W E A P ON S OF M I S S I S S I PPI A N S I N M E X ICO
71
6. I RON C L A DS A N D TOR P E DO E S W E A P ON S ON T H E WAT E R I N C I V I L WA R MISSISSIPPI
84
7. SI EG E G U N S A N D S ABE R S W E A P O N S O N T H E L A N D I N C I V I L WA R M I S S I S S I P P I
vi 116
CON TE N TS 8. RI FL E S, B OW S, A N D G U N S W E A P ON S OF M I S S I S S I PPI H U N T E R S A ND PR IVAT E CIT IZ E NS
143
9. T RA I N I N G C A M P S AN D M I L I TAR Y MOB ILIZ AT ION W E A P ON S OF M I S S I S S I PPI D U RI N G T H E T WO WOR LD WAR S
164
10. FI RE BOM BS AN D R O P E S W E A PON S OF T E RROR I N M I S S I S S I P PI
188
11. SHIPS, AIRCRAFT, AND ARTILLERY W E A PON S OF M I S S I S S I PPI’S POS T –WOR LD WAR II MI L I TA RY - I N D U S T RI A L COM P L E X
203
12. N U C L E A R T E S T I N G W E A PON S OF T H E ATOM I C AG E I N M IS S IS SIPPI
214
AFT E RWORD
217
N OT E S
241
B I B L I OG R A P H Y
255
INDEX
INT RO DU C T ION
Weapons serve many functions for many people, but perhaps the common denominator in all cases is that, broadly defined, weapons enhance control. Hunters use weapons to control animals. Criminals use weapons to control their victims. Soldiers use weapons to control their enemies. Terrorists use weapons to control the innocent. The story of weapons in Mississippi parallels this theme of control. Native Mississippians used bows and arrows to hunt deer and bear. The outlaws of the Natchez Trace used hatchets, knives, and guns to rob isolated travelers. Jefferson Davis’s First Mississippi Regiment used rifles to defeat the Mexicans at Buena Vista. The Ku Klux Klan used firebombs to intimidate blacks. All these examples show how one group used weapons to control another. The desire to control is strong, and therefore man is willing to devote much of his creative and competitive spirit to the pursuit of weapons. Technology allows for the introduction of better and more weapons. The quality of weapons is relative, and merely possessing them is not enough. The question of control is often decided by who has access to technically superior weapons. A native Mississippian hunter with an atlatl had an advantage over a competitor armed with only a spear. The steel weapons of the conquistadores defeated the wood and bone ones of the Indians. Federal ironclads outmatched the meager Confederate naval assets. Traditionally agricultural Mississippi began to industrialize largely to produce vii
viii IN TR OD U C TI O N
the military weapons required to defeat America’s enemies in World War II. Mississippi even became a nuclear test site as the United States and the Soviet Union competed in the Cold War nuclear arms race. Technology, often fueled by competition, changes weapons, and Mississippi changed as a result. Finally, weapons can be both agents and products of centralization and organization. As Mississippi progressed from a sparsely populated wilderness to a structured modern society, control of weapons became one of the main requirements for establishing centralized control. Militiamen, slave patrols, military training camps, and hunting clubs are all examples of weapons used in an organized way as a result of or to enhance central authority. According to Max Weber’s classic definition, a state “successfully upholds a claim on the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence in the enforcement of its order.”1 Indians, outlaws, runaway slaves, secessionists, and night riders have all challenged this monopoly only to be ultimately defeated by the better-armed central authority. Returning to my original assertion, weapons enhance control. Thus in many ways, those wishing to control must first control weapons. Weapons of Mississippi explores these themes of control, technology, and centralization by examining the roles that weapons have played in twelve phases of Mississippi’s history. From its prehistoric period to the present, Mississippi has served as host to a variety of interesting, lethal, and imaginative weapons. Weapons of Mississippi is partly a technical book of these devices, but also, perhaps more importantly, a way of viewing Mississippi’s history through the context of its weapons.
Weapons of Mississippi
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1 ATL ATLS, BOWS AND AR R OWS, A ND S TRIKING W E AP ON S W EAPONS OF THE MISSISSIPPI INDIANS
The themes of control, technology, and centralization can be traced to the first appearance of weapons in what is now Mississippi. Native Mississippians spent most of their time in a desperate effort to control a hostile environment in order to survive. Therefore the weapons of the prehistoric period in Mississippi were largely for the purpose of hunting, with spears, initially equipped with fluted points, being the common weapon. As time passed, the early spear points went through a series of gradual changes that resulted in a lance-shaped projectile point with notches on the sides and corners. The craftsmen usually rubbed the bases and stem edges smooth and serrated the edges of the blade to create many small points of contact. Larger and cruder square-stemmed points followed, and later still, the points were made smaller and their bases usually rounded and narrowed toward the bottom.1 This progression shows that the native Mississippians worked energetically to perfect the weapon that was so critical to their survival. While the spear experienced these evolutionary modifications, the largest early leap in technology came with the atlatl, a device that used mechanical advantage to increase the distance and velocity of a spear 3
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thrown by hand. The atlatl showed the imagination, intelligence, and creativity of the native Mississippians. Even in these earliest times, man improved weapons using technology in revolutionary ways. Native Mississippian weapons technology produced other weapons, such as the bow and arrow and a variety of striking weapons. However, the technology involved in these weapons was no match for the outside technology introduced by the more centralized European society. The European metal pipe tomahawks, for example, proved more durable and powerful than the native wooden war clubs. The European metal technology that produced superior weapons was part of the same centralized society that could launch military expeditions to suppress the Indians. Even before the first contacts between the Europeans and the Indians, European centralization was creating a disparity in the weapons of the future adversaries. Once contact occurred, centralization would give the Europeans a decided weapons advantage.
AT L AT LS Technological advances expanded spears from exclusively being a stabbing weapon to one that could also be thrown with the help of an atlatl, or spear thrower.2 The atlatl was about eighteen inches long and was essentially a stick with a handle on one end and a hook or socket that engaged a light spear or “dart” on the other. Explanations of how the atlatl worked, as well as how effective it may have been, vary. The simplest and most common explanations argue that the atlatl in effect increases the length of the human arm, thereby increasing the amount of time during which force is imparted to the dart. By maintaining contact with the spear during a greater portion of the throw than does the unaided hand, the atlatl propels a light spear much faster and farther than it could be thrown by hand alone.3 Theories about how exactly the atlatl hurled the dart also vary, but perhaps the most likely explanation is that the procedure involved a straight trajectory in the launch path. According to this technique,
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5
The dart was inserted in the spur at the end of the atlatl, and the atlatl was then used as an extension of the thrower’s arm. The exact purpose of the weights is a matter of some debate. Illustration by Harry Smith.
the marksman took aim with the atlatl by stretching his throwing arm behind his head. His shoulders were parallel to the projected line of fire, and the thrower’s weight was on his rear leg. The thrower held both the atlatl and dart with his fingers, while the dart was secured by a spur at the end of the atlatl. Rocking forward from the rear leg, the thrower then stepped toward the target with his front leg and planted his heel. While the upper body, arms, and atlatl had now moved forward, they had not yet changed their basic position from the aiming posture. With his leading foot and leg firmly planted, the thrower then rotated his upper body and shoulders from a line parallel to the throwing path to one perpendicular to it. His body weight was now completely forward of the leading leg, his shoulders were perpendicular to the line of fire, and his throwing arm was parallel to the shoulders with a ninety-degree bend at the elbow. At this point, the thrower released his finger grip, which was holding the dart to the atlatl.
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The atlatl served as an extension of the thrower’s arm to increase the range the dart or spear could be thrown. Illustration by Harry Smith.
The forearm and then the wrist began to rotate downward and forward. The atlatl pivoted forward and, after forming a ninety-degree angle with the arm, released the dart. Modern experiments with this technique demonstrate that a dart launched in this way travels 60 percent farther than one propelled by the unaided hand.4 In some cases, small, shaped stones were attached to the atlatls. Determining the exact purpose and utility of these atlatl weights has proved frustrating to modern researchers. Much of the experimentation with the weights’ ability to increase velocity, distance, and accuracy has yielded contradictory theories,5 but atlatl weights continue to present a fascinating mystery in early weapons in Mississippi and elsewhere.
B O W S AND ARROWS The atlatl served as the predominant weapon and hunting device until around 1000 BC, when it began to be replaced by the bow and arrow. Even with this new development, the atlatl retained certain advantages. For example, because the atlatl required just one hand, it could often be used from a canoe. Another advantage was that the atlatl could project a missile
AT L AT L S, B OW S A N D A R R OW S, A N D S T R I K I N G W E A P O N S
7
that was several times heavier than an arrow.6 Still, the bow and arrow was easier to use and allowed its bearer to carry more ammunition. It soon became the weapon of choice of the native Mississippians. East of the Mississippi, Indians seem to have exclusively used the “self-bow,” a bow type made of a single piece of hard, elastic wood. Reflecting the importance of the new weapon, the Indians used the best wood available to make their bows, typically crafting them from hickory, ash, and black locust trees.7 The characteristic bow of the Indians of the Southeast was a moderately long D-bow with a length of fifty to sixty inches. These bows had a pull weight of about fifty pounds and a long pull that could propel an arrow over a substantial distance. An observer in the late sixteenth century reported Indians hitting targets at two hundred paces and one arrow penetrating as much as six inches into the base of a poplar tree.8 The typical Mississippian projectile point was a small triangular or ovoid arrow point, often made from antler tips. Bowstrings were fashioned from twisted dried deer and bear sinew and entrails. Reflecting the hostile and opportunistic environment, the Indians often slept with their bowstrings strung and arrows near at hand so as to be ready at a moment’s notice.9 Boys learned to hunt at an early age, but before graduating to the bow and arrow, they practiced the trade using blowguns. Jean-Bernard Bossu, a French naval officer who visited the Southeast between 1751 and 1762, described this weapon as being “made of a reed about seven feet long into which is placed a little arrow feathered with thistle down. When aimed right and blown into, this weapon can often kill small birds.”10 Because hooks were not introduced until the arrival of the Europeans, weapons were also used to catch fish.11 The Indians made substances from devil’s shoestring, buckeye, and crushed green walnut hulls to drug fish. These concoctions were thrown into deep holes in rivers and creeks, causing subdued catfish, drum, and bass to surface. The fish were then caught by hand, speared, or retrieved with arrows fitted with a special barb and hand line.12
8
AT L AT L S, B OW S A N D A R R OW S, A N D S T R I K I N G W E A P O N S
Replicas of two different types of tomahawks. The pipe tomahawk is on top and the more utilitarian hatchet version is on the bottom. Photograph from the author’s personal collection.
S T R IKI NG W E APONS WAR C LUBS, TOMA H AWKS, AND SC ALPING KNIVE S Southeastern Indians were at their best when fighting with offensive weapons in individual, hand-to-hand combat. Consequently the war club was an essential element of Mississippian warfare. These clubs were probably made of hickory, although other suitable woods were available, and measured from one to three feet in length. They came in many shapes, including varieties with a V-shaped edge that resembled a cutlass and others with a ball carved on the distal end, designs that facilitated the club’s ability to fracture bones and skulls. Other versions sported stone celts or sometimes spikes made of shark’s teeth, animal bone, antler, or flint to inflict further injury. The business ends of still other clubs were fashioned into spatulate or mace shapes. Archaeological evidence suggests the war club was an effective weapon, because skeletal remains found at several Mississippi sites have shown fractured skulls, cracked collar bones, and lower-arm breaks, the latter likely sustained in a defensive move to ward off a war club blow. Even off the battlefield, the war club was a significant part of Mississippian society. Learning to use the war club in hand-to-hand combat must have required extensive training, and some of the moves appear to have been practiced in ritual dances that celebrated warfare. Sometimes war clubs were created as objects of art, crafted from materials such as
AT L AT L S, B OW S A N D A R R OW S, A N D S T R I K I N G W E A P O N S
9
sheet copper, carved out of stone, or cut from sheets of mica, rendering them nonfunctional as weapons. Some of the more elaborately designed weapons are believed to have been reserved for elites as a symbol of high status, and decorations on the war clubs commemorated not only warfare but Indian deities such as Thunder. Obviously, the war club was both the primary instrument and the dominant symbol of warfare for the Mississippi Indians. The wooden ball-headed war clubs eventually came to be known as tomahawks, but with the passage of time and a variety of striking weapons to describe, the modern anthropological lexicon tends to reserve the word “tomahawk” to describe metal axes.13 Like the war club, axes served both functional and ceremonial purposes, and possession of some of these weapons connoted high social status. Some axes were made from cold-hammered copper, while the more utilitarian version was made from stone.14 As the Indians began to trade with the Europeans, the pipe tomahawk emerged as perhaps the most iconic of the Indian striking weapons. The pipe tomahawk was so prevalent that it became a part of the Great Seal of the Choctaw Nation. Styles varied greatly, but the basic design combined both peace pipe and war hatchet in a single unit. Thus the pipe tomahawk represented both peace and war. It was a highly prized and useful item.15 The Mississippi Indians relied on speed and agility to effectively wield striking weapons like the war club and tomahawk. To stay as unencumbered as possible, the Indians usually fought wearing only minimal clothing. It is possible they may have possessed some woven-cane and woodenslat body armor as well as shields, but there is little evidence that these defensive items played an important role in fighting. This lack of protection placed the Indians at a marked disadvantage against the heavily armored Spaniards upon the arrival of Hernando de Soto.16 Warfare was a critical component of power particularly among Choctaw men, and no male could become a man until he had participated in a successful war party. Taking part in warfare proved to others that a Choctaw boy could manipulate spiritual powers for the protection of society. Unless the Choctaw boy killed an enemy, either individually or as part of a war party, the youth remained a child. It was only by succeeding at this rite of passage
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that the boy earned an adult title, and boys who failed to demonstrate martial prowess were publicly deemed effeminate by the Choctaw chiefs.17 The ritual of proving oneself to be skilled at warfare required bringing home proof, such as a scalp. Scalping was generally accomplished by placing a knee between the victim’s shoulders while he was lying facedown on the ground. A long arc was then cut in the front of the scalp from the upper part of the forehead to the back of the neck, allowing the scalper to pull back on the hair with both hands and remove the trophy. The skin would then be scraped to remove blood and fibers and preserved. Scalping knives were designed with narrow blades that could be worked between the skull and scalp after the initial incision had been made. These knives were not native to the Indians but instead the result of trading with the Europeans. In spite of the exclusivity implied by the name, almost any knife could be used for scalping.18
O B S E RVATI O NS CONCE RNING WE APONS O F T HE MI SS I S S IPPI INDIANS Weapons were critical to the original Indians of the lower Mississippi Valley, because their males were first and foremost warriors and hunters.19 The Indians developed weapons that were highly advanced given the tools and natural resources available to them, and native Mississippi weapons makers were expert craftsmen. They selected the finest materials for their products and showed creativity, imagination, and resourcefulness. As a result, the hunting weapons were able to kill animals that were faster, stronger, and more agile than the hunters. The weapons of war were also critical to the native Mississippian way of life and reflected the Indians’ up-closeand-personal form of warfare. In many cases, these weapons were almost extensions of the Indians themselves. With the atlatl in particular, native Mississippian weapons showed the impact of technology in what one observer likened to a “prehistoric arms race.”20 Nonetheless the Indians found themselves at a technological disadvantage in terms of weapons when the Europeans arrived. The Indians’
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limited knowledge of metallurgy was restricted to hammering sheet copper into tools and gold and silver into ornaments. Their weapons made of wood, bone, antler, and hammered copper were no match for European iron weapons.21 Contact with European traders brought European-manufactured pipe tomahawks and scalping knives into the hands of the Indians, but the decisive weapon was the gun. By 1700, every Indian in Mississippi had heard of guns and was clamoring for one.22 For the time being, however, the Europeans would enjoy a great technological advantage as conquistadores, administrators, and settlers began exploring, exploiting, and colonizing the New World.
2 GUNS, STEEL, AND FORTS W EAPONS OF THE EUROPEANS IN MISSISSIPPI
In the fifteenth century, powerful new monarchies built on centralized authority emerged in Europe. The heads of these states were able to control financial and military resources to a degree that undermined the authority of competing nobles, and the kings built powerful armies that dominated the armored knights who were loyal to the noblemen. In the process, armies developed a broad range of bowmen, pikemen, musketeers, and artillerymen, all armed with the weapons of the new military technology. This European state building and military progress resulted in the projection of power across the seas. On October 12, 1492, Christopher Columbus made landfall at an island in the Bahamas, and the Spanish soon established a base of operations on the island of Hispaniola. By then, all complex Eurasian societies were skilled in using metal to make tools and weapons. At the same time, the weapons of native Mississippians were still principally of wood, stone, and bone, with the exception of a few largely ornamental pieces made of copper. The result was that when Columbus and other European explorers and conquistadores reached the New World, they possessed a tremendous weaponry advantage that they would use to control the new lands they had found.
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13
This print of de Soto discovering the Mississippi shows the marked contrast between the wellarmed, well-equipped Spanish conquistadores and the native Indians. Courtesy of Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division.
When the Caribbean failed to produce the huge deposits of gold that the Spanish sought, they shifted their attention to the American mainland. During the early sixteenth century, the Spanish presence in the New World was advanced by conquistadores such as Hernando de Soto, who led an expedition through what is now Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Alabama before reaching present-day Mississippi. Whenever he encountered Indians, he treated them harshly, often holding their chief captive to ensure good behavior and demanding porters to carry the Spaniards’ heavy loads.1 De Soto was able to impose his will on the Indians because of his weapons advantage. Just as de Soto was about to enter Mississippi, he fought his most deadly battle with the Indians at Mabila, a contest that pitted superior Spanish weapons technology and military hardware against Indian bravery and skill with the bow and arrow. Indeed, the battle was a harbinger for the role technology would play in weapons in Mississippi. According to one observer, “It was modern warfare—iron, steel, armor, and gunpowder— against stone arrows, clubs, and spears, and as would happen often in years
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to come, modern technology carried the day.”2 Not just outsiders but their weapons as well had come to Mississippi and changed the landscape. De Soto continued to explore Mississippi and beyond until his death in 1542. The survivors of his expedition withdrew to Vera Cruz, Mexico, the next year, and with their departure, Mississippi was left undisturbed by Europeans for nearly 150 years. Still, the trauma of the violence and previously unknown weaponry introduced by de Soto was seared into the Indian consciousness.3 After the rather inglorious Spanish exit, the next European power to begin establishing settlements in the lower Mississippi River Valley was France. Explorers like Louis Joliet, Jacques Marquette, René-Robert Cavelier (Sieur de La Salle), Henri de Tonty, and Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne (Sieur de Bienville) helped forge a French presence in the vast region they called Louisiana, but though La Salle claimed the region in 1682, he failed to solidify the act by establishing a settlement. It was not until the late 1690s that the French government took serious steps to fortify the region and begin transforming it into a functioning colony. The introduction of forts and their weapons was a critical component in the steady march of European domination in Mississippi. In 1699, Bienville’s older brother Pierre Le Moyne, Sieur d’Iberville, landed at present-day Ocean Springs, or Vieux Biloxy (Old Biloxi), and built Fort Maurepas. The French proceeded to fortify other key locations in the region, including Fort Rosalie at present-day Natchez, which Bienville completed in 1716. Unlike the somewhat desultory wanderings of de Soto, Forts Maurepas and Rosalie serve as examples of how Europeans used weapons to secure a fixed presence in Mississippi by leveraging technology, organization, and centralization completely foreign to the native inhabitants. However, with the increased European presence came increased trading with the Indians, including trade for weapons. At Fort Rosalie, the Indians would turn this European-acquired technology against its originators. An adage from the Bible holds that “those who live by the sword, die by the sword”;4 the French at Fort Rosalie felt the sting of this truism.
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15
CO N Q UIS TA DO RE S Hernando de Soto was no stranger to conquest, having helped Francisco Pizarro ruthlessly subjugate the Incas in Peru. In the process, de Soto had accumulated great wealth and might easily have returned to Spain to live comfortably resting on his laurels. Instead his adventures in Peru only impassioned him to pursue additional challenges, being “filled with a yearning to undertake other tasks of equal if not greater consequence.”5 The result of this yearning was de Soto’s appointment as adelantado (military governor) of Florida and his ensuing Florida expedition. When de Soto landed in Tampa Bay in 1539, he had with him some six hundred men who included not just a variety of soldiers and their weapons but also the armorers and smiths who would produce and repair the Spanish tools of war.6 It is hard to imagine a better-equipped expedition. Perhaps up to half of de Soto’s men were mounted, and these horsemen were armored knights equipped with long steel lances that gave them a great advantage over natives on foot. Foot soldiers, wearing mail coats and helmets, walked near the horsemen to provide them protection and wielded steel axes for close-in fighting. To engage enemies at a greater distance, the foot soldiers had guns and crossbows. Everyone carried swords and daggers. De Soto even brought with him packs of bloodhounds and Irish greyhounds to pursue Indians.7 The European society and technology that had produced “guns, germs, and steel” gave the conquistadores an advantage that far offset their enemy’s greater numbers.8
M A B IL A In late 1540, de Soto met with Tuscaloosa (alternately Tascaluza), apparently a district chief of the local Indians, at a town also called Tuscaloosa. There de Soto demanded carriers and women. Tuscaloosa provided the carriers immediately but promised to provide the women at Mabila (alternately Mobila or Mauvila), near present-day Mobile. As Tuscaloosa
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bought time preparing rafts for the journey to Mabila, he sent one of his people ahead, ostensibly to gather supplies and women for the Spaniards, but actually to summon warriors. Forcing Tuscaloosa to accompany him, de Soto reached Mabila on October 18. He had with him a vanguard of forty horsemen, as well as a guard of crossbowmen and halberdiers. The crossbow was a powerful weapon that could inflict horrific wounds. The Spanish had three types: the ballesta de gaffa, which was cocked by a lever, the ballesta de armatoste, which was cocked by a windlass, and the ballesta de cranequin, which was cocked by a rack-and-pinion device. The bow itself was made out of steel or horn with a string of hemp or flax fixed to a stock of straight-grained wood. Drawing the bow required leverage, which in the case of the common military crossbow was provided by a detachable goat’s-foot lever, so named for its distinctive shape. The claws of the lever were hooked over the center of the bowstring, and the prongs were then placed over the top of the stock with the ends resting on a traverse iron pin. The bowman would hold the crossbow in a level position with his left hand and pull the lever toward him with his right. The bowstring, now drawn taut, was held in place by the nut, and the projectile (the crossbow bolt) was placed in the groove. When the bowman applied pressure on the trigger, the nut was released. The nut revolved, releasing the bowstring and, with it, the projectile. Crossbow bolts came in a variety of designs, based on the specific use. However, in military situations, because the recovery of bolts and arrows was uncertain and because large quantities were needed, designs were kept simple. The most common European military crossbow bolt heads were made of ferrous metal capable of piercing armor, and many were winged with strips of leather, wood, skin, or horn. The bolts and shafts were relatively short and heavy; the shafts were wooden, fairly uniform, and usually tapered forward.9 Steel crossbows enhanced by mechanical advantage increased range and penetration, but the system left the bowman vulnerable to enemy fire as he prepared his weapon. Therefore bowmen were often accompanied by a companion who held a shield to offer protection while the bow was
G UNS, ST E E L, AND FORTS
17
being prepared. Another disadvantage of the crossbow was its slow rate of fire compared to the bow and arrow.10 In many respects, the crossbow was “the blunderbuss of archery,” but the fact that it did not require much skill, practice, or strength to use made it a popular weapon.11 De Soto regularly had axmen remove the vegetation surrounding his camp to the radius of a crossbow shot to give his men clear fields of fire.12 Crossbows figured so heavily in Spanish warfare that archaeologists consider the presence of numerous bolts to be a key indicator of the presence of de Soto.13 If such firepower was not reassuring enough, de Soto had further reason for confidence when his party was met by seemingly friendly messengers from Mabila who brought bread made from chestnuts. This hopeful situation, however, did not last for long. In spite of the pretense of welcome, Spanish scouts soon delivered reports that the Indians had prepared a defense of the town, gathering both warriors and weapons and strengthening the town’s palisades. With many of his men scattered to forage in the neighboring villages, de Soto entered Mabila with just forty soldiers. Tuscaloosa, arguing that he had completed his task of delivering the Spanish to Mabila, asked to be released, and when de Soto delayed in answering the request, the Indians attacked. Firing their bows, they killed five Spaniards and wounded several others, including de Soto. The Indians quickly drove the Spanish out of the town, and de Soto’s men retreated with haste. In the process, the Indians had captured some of the Spanish weapons, including swords and halberds, and turned them against their former owners. Spanish swords were individually crafted and came in a variety of styles, but they were usually long with double-edged blades.14 The halberd was a polearm, a family of weapons that includes the lance. The halberd bore an ax head balanced by a beak or flute and capped by a sharp point. The bottom of the shaft was usually finished with a cap of iron or brass known as the ground iron, butt cap, or foot. Halberds were sometimes used as a combat weapon but were more often carried as symbols of rank by noncommissioned officers.15 The lance was the trademark of the conquistadores. It was between ten and fourteen feet long and served as the horseman’s spear. A leaf-shaped
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George Gibbs’s illustration Back and Forth They Charged (1898) depicts a Spanish horseman using his lance to attack an Indian at Mabila. Courtesy of Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division.
steel head was attached to the wooden shaft either by a socket or a tang, and the shaft was constructed of either a single piece of wood or several longitudinal strips. Contrary to what was common on other polearms, the shaft of the lance usually had no iron augmentation to protect it from sword strokes, but against the Indians this vulnerability presented little danger. The shaft was usually widest just before the grip, and this point was often protected by a circular metal shield called a vamplate. The diameter of the grip itself was
G UNS, ST E E L, AND FORTS
19
This drawing of a conquistador armed with a harquebus shows the weapon’s requirement for an abundance of match cord. Courtesy of Pearson Scott Foresman.
reduced where the weapon was grasped, and then increased and quickly tapered to the butt.16 In spite of these weapons, the Indians believed the Spanish to be routed. Thus emboldened, the Indians pursued, and with this tactical error, the tide of the battle quickly turned. The Spanish wheeled and, on the signal of the firing of a harquebus, launched an assault on the town. The harquebus (sometimes arquebus) was the earliest and mechanically the crudest of the handheld firearms. It was a cumbersome weapon that was slow to load and not particularly accurate. Because the Indians fought from a crouched position, darting from position to position and dodging missiles fired at them, they presented a difficult target for the slow-firing harquebus.17 Another of the weapon’s chief vulnerabilities was that it was fired by touching a piece of lighted match cord, like a slow-burning fuse, to the powder hole. To be always ready for action, the conquistador had to maintain the match cord in a lighted condition, a requirement that not only
20
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presented problems in moist and rainy conditions but also consumed great quantities of match cord. In spite of these drawbacks, a ball or shot fired from a harquebus had much greater velocity than an arrow and gave the Spanish a firepower advantage in terms of penetrating power, as well as a considerable psychological effect.18 The penetrating power of the Spanish weapons, as well as the protection afforded by Spanish armor, gave the conquistadores a marked advantage, as several anecdotes from the battle indicate. Captain Baltasar de Gallegos, one of de Soto’s most trusted officers, “gave an Indian a slash [with his sword] that, as he wore no defensive armor nor even any clothing except the mantle, laid open his whole side, and with his entrails all protruding he immediately fell dead, without having a chance to shoot the arrow.”19 For his part, de Gallegos later was fired on by six or seven arrows but was unharmed “because the Spaniard was well protected with armor.”20 Even the marginal protection worn by de Gallegos’s brother, a Dominican friar named Fray Juan de Gallegos, proved sufficient. While trying to give his brother a horse, the friar was struck by an arrow in the back but was wounded only slightly “because he wore his two cowls and all the other robes that those of his order usually wear, which are many, and over all this he had a large felt hat that was fastened around his neck with a cord and hung down over his shoulders. The arrow wound the Indian gave him with such good will was not mortal because of all these defenses.”21 As these examples show, the Indians’ crude weapons could wound the heavily armored Spaniards but seldom kill them. While the Indians were exceedingly brave warriors and expert bowmen, they could not overcome their disadvantages in terms of weapons’ power and protection. Of even more consequence was the Spanish possession of horses, an animal that many of the Indians had never seen before. The shock and speed of a horse’s charge, its maneuverability, and the raised and protected firing platform it offered left the dismounted and unprotected Indians nearly helpless.22 The shock effect was dramatic, and the Spanish used their horses to charge and scatter the Indians. Realizing the disadvantage they had against the Spanish horsemen in an open field, the Indians withdrew behind the walls of their town. Seeing
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this development, de Soto ordered his mounted soldiers, who were better armed than the infantry, to dismount and pursue. Using their shields for protection and their axes to break down the gates, the Spaniards fought their way into the town. Some two hundred Spaniards rushed through the gates while others used their axes to knock through the mud-and-straw mortar that secured the top logs to the walls, and gained entry by that means. The ruthless Spaniards set fire to the stockade, and many Indians chose to hang themselves with their bowstrings rather than to burn to death or be captured. No one knows the exact count, but de Soto claimed to have killed 2,500 to 3,000 Indians, a figure no doubt exaggerated, compared to just 22 of his own men killed and 148 wounded with a total of 680 wounds. Even by conservative estimates, the Battle of Mabila was the bloodiest single day of combat on American soil until the Battle of Shiloh over three hundred years later.23 The high number of Spanish wounds demonstrates that the Indians’ arrows, though accurate, lacked the power to kill. Spanish horses, firearms, polearms, axes, and armor provided a superiority in weapons technology that the Indians simply could not match.24 Nonetheless, the close brush with disaster convinced de Soto to discontinue his planned march southward and undoubtedly gave him pause as he considered the tenacious fighters who inhabited the region.
FORTS Where de Soto merely traveled through the area that is now Mississippi, other Europeans used weapons to establish a more permanent presence. Among these was Pierre Le Moyne, Sieur d’Iberville, who led the colonization of Louisiana. Iberville was a good choice for the task. A native of the French colony in Montreal, Canada, he had gained a reputation as a bold warrior in colonial wars with Britain, having captured Fort Severn at the mouth of the Severn River on Hudson Bay in 1690, as well as conducting a campaign against British interests in Newfoundland from 1695 to 1697. Iberville then returned to France as a hero and was selected to
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lead an expedition to rediscover the mouth of the Mississippi River and colonize Louisiana. With this purpose in mind, Iberville’s ships arrived off the Gulf Coast in January 1699. He anchored off Ship Island on February 10 and went ashore three days later at present-day Ocean Springs. He moved quickly to win the friendship of the local Biloxi Indians by providing them food and gifts, and he also was able to impress them with the superior European weapons. Iberville arranged for the Biloxi to participate in a harquebusfiring demonstration, but when the Indians saw the powder catch fire, “they threw out their arms, dropped the guns, and shrank back from the fear they had of them.”25 The new technology was alarmingly foreign to the Biloxi, but Iberville’s decision to make a gift of the guns would foreshadow an era when the Indians would lethally use European weapons against Iberville’s successors. After failing to locate a suitable site for a fort along the Mississippi River, Iberville returned to the coast. Finding a channel of sufficient depth to accommodate seagoing ships, he ordered the construction of a fort on the eastern side of Biloxi Bay in April 1699. Fort Maurepas, named in honor of the French minister of marine and colonies, became the setting for the first European settlement in Mississippi and the first capital of the French colony of Louisiana. Fort Maurepas, like most of the European forts built in early North America, was unimpressive by later standards.26 These structures usually consisted of a common layout that included bastions, walls (sometimes called curtains), stockades, and exterior works. The bastion is the part of the fort that projects out from the wall for the purpose of providing firing positions to cover the wall.27 A palisade is a wall enclosure made of timbers placed vertically in the ground. The timbers formed a wall generally from fifteen to eighteen feet in height, and the tops of the timbers were usually sharpened. The words “palisade” and “stockade” are often used interchangeably, although there is sometimes the connotation of a stockade having its timber stakes placed more tightly together and being very thick.28 Like most French forts, Fort Maurepas was made of timber and had four bastions with loopholes, or small openings, for firing. Its two strongest
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Bastions on the four corners of Fort Maurepas allowed defenders to deliver a deadly crossfire in front of the fort’s walls. Illustration by Harry Smith.
bastions stood at diagonally opposite corners of the fort, were built of logs, and included a platform for positions on the upper level. Unlike in a typical stockade, the logs for these bastions were squared to result in a more solid construction. The other two bastions were made from vertical logs, and the curtain walls were made of a double row of logs inserted vertically. Inside, Fort Maurepas contained several structures such as barracks, a storehouse, and a chapel. It was surrounded by a ditch, and its exterior works included an additional timber stockade with redans around the fort.29 Redans were small forts, open at the rear, which provided additional firing positions to supplement the main fire from the fort. Fort Maurepas
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had twelve artillery pieces and was built to withstand the standard European weapons of the day. Throughout the remainder of 1699, the fort, garrisoned by approximately eighty men, served as a base of operations for further exploration of the area. Fort Maurepas did not last long. The hot temperatures, lack of fresh water, crop failures, and poor discipline among the soldiers conspired against the settlement, and it was only thanks to the help of the Biloxis that the fort survived as long as it did. In 1701 the French settlement moved to Mobile to be closer to France’s ally Spain in the event that a war with England broke out. By the spring of 1702, Fort Maurepas was abandoned.30 In spite of the failure of Fort Maurepas, France continued its efforts to establish a presence along the Mississippi River. The high bluffs and fertile soil of Natchez made it especially attractive, and in 1716 the French built Fort Rosalie there. Fort Rosalie was a hastily built post of rectangular shape with a bastion on each corner and only a small stake fence to offer exterior protection.31 Despite its designation as a fort, the compound appears to have served more as a strategic control point for monitoring traffic on the river and as a trading post than a defensible military outpost. In fact, Fort Rosalie remained in an unimproved condition until its destruction in 1729.32 Inhabiting the region around Fort Rosalie were the Natchez Indians, who numbered perhaps three thousand in 1700 when Iberville visited them. At first the two groups enjoyed good relations, with the Natchez offering Iberville the calumet (pipe) of peace. Iberville reciprocated by leaving two young boys with the Natchez to learn their language, and he also gave Grand Soliel, the Natchez chief, a gun, lead, powder, hatchets, and knives. When Bienville succeeded Iberville, he continued the practice of arming the Natchez, and in October 1722 he presented Grand Soliel “many munitions which is an indication that I do not distrust thee at all.”33 At the time, trade relations such as these were a critical component of the international diplomacy of the region. It was by trade that the colonial powers sought to gain and maintain the allegiance of the Indians.34 However, it is unlikely that either Iberville or Bienville imagined that these gifts foreshadowed a day when the Natchez would use European weapons to destroy Fort Rosalie.35
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Fort Rosalie had suffered from a want of supplies and priority from its very inception. Bienville complained that he was allocated only a few raw recruits and a minimum amount of supplies to complete the project. He lamented that “there is nobody here who thinks that I shall be able to succeed in even building the fort.” Nonetheless, he reassured himself that even if defenses were scarce, he had “great influence over the minds of the Indians.”36 Events would come to suggest that Bienville should have put greater stock in weapons than psychology. Instead Fort Rosalie remained a picture of unpreparedness. One observer reported that “there were not as many as 100 palisades” standing in the fort and that “it was possible to enter it on foot from all sides.”37 In spite of the fort’s relatively weak defenses, the French aggravated the local Natchez Indians by treating them harshly. There were several outbreaks of violence, including a small war in 1723, but the situation reached a crisis in 1729 when Boucher de La Perier, who had succeeded Bienville as governor in 1726, appointed the Sieur de Chepart as commander of the fort. Chepart was a tyrant who mistreated not just the Indians but his own subordinates as well. He was found guilty of abuse of power by the Superior Council in New Orleans and dismissed from office, only to be restored by Perier. Seemingly emboldened by this show of support, Chepart continued his mistreatment of the Indians. The abuse reached a climax in 1729 when the French demanded land that included the White Apple Village, a sacred ceremonial center of the Natchez. For the Indians, this affront was the last straw, and they began to develop a plan to attack the fort. What enabled the Natchez to go on the offensive was in large part the weapons they had acquired from the French. Weapons also played an important role in the ruse the Natchez developed to precede the attack. On the morning of November 28, 1729, a large party of Natchez arrived at the French settlement, asking to use French weapons for a hunting expedition. They also asked to see Chepart to present him a gift from their harvest. When Chepart came to the door of his cabin, the Natchez immediately opened fire from several well-placed locations. At the time of the attack, only three officers and twenty-five enlisted men were at the fort. The ensuing battle lasted most of the day, and in the end, 144 men, including all but one of the soldiers, thirty-five women, and
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fifty-six children were killed. Many others were taken captive and later released. As a final sign of total victory, the Natchez burned Fort Rosalie, once a symbol of French authority, to the ground.38 The French quickly sent forces to retaliate against the Natchez and within two years had virtually destroyed the tribe. Some found refuge with the Chickasaw and others with the Cherokee, but the end result was that the Natchez people were too widely scattered and too few in number to again challenge the French. Fort Rosalie was eventually repaired and regarrisoned, but the French were never able to restore the vibrant settlement at Natchez that had been their dream.39 Fort Rosalie nonetheless serves as a testimony to how the growing European presence introduced more lethal weapons to the Mississippi region and escalated violence.
O B S E RVATI O NS CONCE RNING WE APONS O F T HE E URO PE ANS IN MIS S IS S IPPI Technology gave the Europeans a tremendous weapons advantage over the native people they encountered in America. Nonetheless weapons alone were not sufficient to completely subjugate the Indians at this point. While the Europeans possessed guns, germs, and steel, they were still isolated and outnumbered. Indian bravery and war-fighting skills, the inhospitable environment, and the equalizing effects of trade on weapons technology all served to lessen the European advantage. Mabila was a victory for de Soto, but nearly a disastrous one. De Soto’s military machine was well equipped and genuinely superb, and a variety of weapons ranging from firearms to crossbows to polearms gave de Soto an advantage that offset his numerical weakness. Though not technically weapons, the horse and armor proved to be other decisive tools available to de Soto. Even with these capabilities, de Soto barely escaped defeat at Mabila, where the Indians’ local intelligence, numbers, tactical skill, and superb marksmanship with the bow and arrow nearly carried the day. Superior European weaponry created a rough parity between the betterequipped Europeans and the more numerous natives, but because of the
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wandering nature of de Soto’s expedition, there was no climactic showdown between the competitors. Still, the arrival of the Europeans was a cause for alarm for the Indians who had tasted the power of European weapons and taken measure of the severity of the new threat they posed. De Soto was followed by Europeans who sought to establish a fixed and enduring territorial presence, and to punctuate and defend their claims, the Europeans built forts. Both Fort Maurepas and Fort Rosalie showed the vulnerability of these bastions of European weaponry. Fort Maurepas benefited from peaceful, even helpful, relations from the neighboring Biloxi but still failed because of its isolation and hostile environment. It also inaugurated the practice of giving away the European weapons advantage. Fort Rosalie failed for a variety of reasons, mostly because of the incompetent French leadership and its abusive attitude toward the Indians; but for the purposes of this study of weapons, Fort Rosalie’s undoing lay in the French garrison’s loss of its monopoly on advanced weapons. By gifts and trading, the Europeans squandered their technological advantage. The massacre at Fort Rosalie showed what could happen if the Indians gained weapons superiority at the local level. Still, however, the Europeans maintained the overall weapons advantage, as demonstrated by their ability to rally and virtually destroy the Natchez. The experience at Fort Rosalie illustrates that whoever controls weapons, controls the situation. Indeed, as Mississippi entered its territorial period, the struggle for control of weapons would be a pivotal component of bringing order to a region still largely governed by local power.
3 M ILITIAS, OUTL AWS, A ND KE NTUCKY R IFL E S W EAPONS OF TERRITORIA L MISSISSIPPI
On April 7, 1798, President John Adams approved an act of Congress that established the Mississippi Territory. The northern border of the new territory ran from the junction of the Yazoo and Mississippi rivers eastward. The southern border was latitude 31° north, the U.S. border with Spanish West Florida, and the western border was the Mississippi River. In 1804 Congress added a northern tract of land still occupied by Indian tribes, and in 1810 President James Monroe added West Florida, having seized the area from Spain.1 These actions produced a fairly competitive and fluid environment, as the new territory faced hostile threats both internally and externally. To cope with the situation, the government formed a territorial militia, but the new organization faced numerous challenges with scant resources. A shortage of weapons was a major problem. In the absence of firm governmental control, even the capital city of Natchez was not a safe place. Natchez “On-the-Hill,” the city proper, was made up of stores, residences, and professional and government offices, but Natchez “Under-the-Hill,” at the river’s edge, hosted a rowdy
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crowd of hard-drinking, hard-fighting gamblers and rivermen. Conditions in Natchez Under-the-Hill were so unwholesome that it had the reputation of being “the nucleus of vice upon the Mississippi,”2 and in many ways, the rough-hewn lifestyle had much in common with the standard view of the Wild West.3 Crude but lethal weapons abounded in such an environment, but they were often in the hands of outlaws and robbers rather than those of the governmental authorities. Many of these criminals preyed on travelers who used the Natchez Trace to do business in Natchez. On the periphery, Mississippi was in a hostile neighborhood where Indians and European colonial interests also presented a threat. Growing tensions between white settlers and the native Creeks eventually erupted into the Creek War, which combined with the War of 1812 against Britain to bring additional weapons and violence to the region. In June 1813, Governor David Holmes ordered 550 of General Ferdinand Leigh Claiborne’s Mississippi Territorial Volunteers to march east from their base at Baton Rouge to assist U.S. Regulars in securing settlements around the Tombigbee and Tensaw Rivers. Claiborne’s force was raised largely from the Natchez district, and although the soldiers had been federalized to defend against a potential British invasion from the Gulf of Mexico, they suffered from the same supply difficulties that had long plagued the militia. The situation was so dire that Claiborne was forced to draw on his own credit to help equip and transport the troops.4 Brigadier General Thomas Flournoy, commander of the regular troops in the Seventh U.S. Military District, considered the British to be a greater threat than the Creeks, and Claiborne’s defense of the settlements was relegated to a secondary effort. Flournoy nevertheless supplied Claiborne with “a quantity of ammunition, swords, pistols &c.”5 Although these supplies were token at best, the enemy was even less well equipped, and technology gave the Americans a marked advantage over the Creeks in both the number and quality of weapons. Of critical importance was the Kentucky rifle, a weapon that was rapidly becoming a mainstay of the American frontier.
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TE R R I TO R IA L MI LITIA One of the first orders of business for Winthrop Sergeant, Mississippi’s first governor, and William Claiborne, his successor, was to organize a militia to protect the fledging territory. Sergeant and Claiborne were plagued by a host of challenges in establishing their militias, including distance from resources, inadequate finances, dispersed populations, political infighting, and marginal federal support.6 The result was that the militias suffered in both quantity and quality of weapons, leading Governor Claiborne to complain to Secretary of State James Madison in 1802, “I am making exertions to organize the Militia of this District;—but many obstacles present, the greatest of which are the want of arms and the means of obtaining a supply.”7 In response, the government sent 163 rifles and 100 muskets for the militia’s use, significantly increasing the number of firearms in Mississippi but still providing only enough to outfit less than 32 percent of the registered militia.8 Ten years later, David Holmes, the fourth territorial governor, continued to lament, “It has been, and still is, impracticable to procure arms suitable for active service in this part of the United States.” After the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, Claiborne became territorial governor of the Orleans Territory, where he found the same situation, reporting that his battalions were armed with “a mixture of rifles, fowling pieces, broken muskets, and sticks.”9 In 1808, Congress finally passed legislation to allocate funds annually to arm the militias, but it was not until the War of 1812 that any significant numbers of weapons were purchased or distributed. Until then, the story of weapons in the territorial militia of Mississippi was more one of absence than presence.
O UT L AW S O F TH E NATCHE Z TRACE One impetus for strengthening the territorial militia was the increasing number of robberies along the Natchez Trace. The Trace was a fairly continuous road from Nashville, Tennessee, to Natchez, and although it was an improvement over the disjointed Indian trails that preceded it, the Trace
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was still a wilderness road through dense canebrakes, thickly wooded bayous, and stretches of utter desolation. Among the Trace’s frequent users were farmers, lumbermen, and trappers who floated their products down rivers to market but often dismantled and sold their boats and returned home on foot or horseback. These travelers, carrying the proceeds of their trip to market, presented tempting and vulnerable targets to the gangs of robbers who often congregated in Natchez Under-the-Hill.10 One historian of the era writes, “The Trace was a thoroughfare of the hunted and the hunting—of men going to get what they wanted and of others fleeing from what they only too well deserved. On an unpoliced road and in a society where every man fended for himself and expected others to do the same, the opportunities for plundering were overwhelmingly enticing.”11 The robberies that occurred along the Natchez Trace, as well as the justice meted out to the captured criminals, provide interesting looks at weapons in territorial Mississippi. One of the most notorious of the Natchez Trace outlaws was Samuel Mason, a Virginian who had served with George Rogers Clark during the American Revolution. In spite of this noble beginning, Mason turned to crime when, with the help of his sons, he stabbed to death a man named Kuykendall, who had married Mason’s daughter against Mason’s objections. After the crime, Mason fled to the notorious Cave-in-Rock, a hideout for outlaws on the northern bank of the lower Ohio River. Later, however, the vulnerable travelers of the Natchez Trace, as well as the potential to exploit the disunity created by presence of both Spanish and American jurisdictions in the region, drew Mason to the Mississippi Territory. Armed with a Spanish passport, Mason could slip back and forth from one jurisdiction to another, compounding the difficulties of his would-be pursuers. Mason soon established his headquarters just outside Natchez at an area known as the Devil’s Punchbowl, an enormous cup-shaped opening about five hundred feet wide in the Mississippi River bluffs. Thick foliage in the area gave Mason the concealment and limited access he desired, and together with several cohorts, he operated out of the Punchbowl for years.
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From his new headquarters, Mason benefited from the assistance of Anthony Glass (or Gass), who purported to be an honest merchant in Natchez. In reality, Glass acted as an informer for Mason, alerting him of lucrative travelers preparing for a journey. Operating both on land and water, Mason often used guns, but his most gruesome weapon was the hatchet. An especially devious tactic of Mason’s was to use female cries for help to lure good Samaritans into his trap. Mason would then hack his victims to death and hurl their bodies from the Punchbowl into the river below. Under such circumstances, Mason operated with great success until one day in Natchez he was recognized and hauled before the court. He and his son were found guilty of having robbed Colonel Joshua Baker, a merchant and planter from Kentucky, of horses, supplies, and money back in August 1801. Now it was Mason’s turn to be on the receiving end of one of the ferocious weapons of territorial Mississippi, the whip. The Masons received thirty-nine lashes, publicly administered, to their bare backs. The number of lashes was no coincidence. Deuteronomy 25:3 had long established forty lashes as the maximum punishment a judge could assign, but traditionally, to be on the safe side, the number had been reduced by one to thirty-nine. Throughout the ordeal, Mason protested his innocence, endeavoring, according to one author, by sheer insistence to make his own lies true.12 After the whipping, the Masons were locked neck and wrist in the town pillory for twelve hours. Nonetheless they emerged from their punishment unrepentant. They shaved their heads, stripped naked, and rode through town and away in a drunken show of defiance. Mason then disappeared from the public eye, but the robberies and murders continued. As a result of the threat from Mason and other outlaws, in 1802 soldiers were ordered to protect travelers along the Natchez Trace, a duty they “carried out to some degree” until 1812.13 In addition to the militia, many private individuals eager to garner the generous reward offered by Governor Claiborne joined the hunt for Mason. In the midst of such interest, Mason was captured by Spanish authorities in New Madrid, Missouri, in January 1803, but the Spanish determined they lacked jurisdiction to
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prosecute him for violations of American law. Mason escaped while being transported to Natchez for trial by Mississippi Territory courts. Mason eluded capture for a remarkably long time until two men who had previously committed robberies with Mason found him near Rodney in Jefferson County. The pair convinced Mason that they intended to join his gang again, but then turned on him. As the story goes, Mason was in the process of counting his loot when one of his would-be partners plunged a tomahawk into Mason’s skull. The betrayers then severed Mason’s head, preserved it in a ball of blue clay, and took it to Washington, seat of the territorial government, to claim their reward. Many people recognized Mason’s head, and the grisly spectacle attracted quite a crowd. The vigilantes were in the process of having a judge prepare a certificate to be mailed to the governor to claim the reward when a traveler from Kentucky named Captain Stump entered the courtroom and demanded the would-be heroes be arrested. He had recognized the men’s horses as belonging to a gang that had robbed him two months earlier along the Trace. Soon the pair were identified as Wiley Harpe and James May. Both men were thrown in jail but proceeded to escape, only to be recaptured in the village of Greenville, halfway between Natchez and Port Gibson. There, in January 1804, they were tried and found guilty of murder and sentenced to be hanged. The weapon involved in the execution was a gallows constructed of a heavy pole placed high between two trees. Two ropes were tied to the pole, one for Harpe and one for May, and on February 8, the men were led from the jail to the gallows. The usual procedure was to transport the condemned prisoners in a wagon, with their coffin serving as their seat. With the men still in the wagon, the nooses would be fitted around their necks, and the horses commanded to “gee-up.” With the wagon and coffin pulled out from under them, the prisoners would hang to death. In the case of Harpe and Mays, the prisoners walked to their gallows with their hands tied behind their backs. There they climbed a ladder to where the ropes hung. Their feet were bound, and their heads were placed in the nooses. The ladders were then knocked away, and Harpe and May
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were each “hung up by the neck until he was dead, dead, dead.”14 After the execution, the criminals’ heads were cut off and placed on poles, one pole placed to the north of Greenville and the other to the west on the Trace to warn away other outlaws.15 Guns, hatchets, tomahawks, whips, and the hangman’s noose were all weapons used by and against the outlaws of the Natchez Trace. It was a violent, chaotic era in which the unarmed were particularly vulnerable. While the weapons were unsophisticated, they were nonetheless deadly.
THE KENT UC K Y RIFLE Elsewhere in Mississippi, weapons of greater technological advancement were making their presence known. One of these was the Kentucky rifle, a firearm that evolved from the European Jaeger (hunter) rifle. The Jaeger was built by central European gunsmiths and was probably the first firearm that could deliver reliable long-range fire. It was a flintlock with a set trigger and a walnut stock with a distinctive “trap” or patch box in the side that was covered by a sliding plate. Its heavy, octagonal rifled barrel was short, just 24 to 30 inches, and of .60 or .75 caliber. Although its sights were just an open rear V and a front blade, it was highly accurate. Good marksmen could hit targets at 200 to 300 yards. In the sixteenth century, some of these gunsmiths from central Europe migrated to Pennsylvania and brought the Jaeger design with them. There, however, economics necessitated a change. In the New World, lead was more expensive than in Europe, and a frugal frontiersman could cast many more .40 or .45 caliber balls than he could .60 or .75 caliber ones. Since the smaller bullets required less powder to propel them, gunsmiths found they could increase the length of the barrels, and the traditional Jaeger design gave way to slimmer, round barrels of 42 to 46 inches. This modification gave the rifle a muzzle-heavy feel that allowed steady offhand, or unsupported, shooting. At the same time, the extended sight radius improved aiming. Because the barrel was made of soft iron, when it became worn, the owner could take it back to the gunsmith, who would “fresh it out” by
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Kentucky rifles were a highly prized item among both hunters and soldiers in the Mississippi Territory. Courtesy of Saratoga National Historical Park.
recutting the rifling. The owner would then use bullets large enough to fit the new diameter, and his rifle was as good as new. When the Jaeger came to America, its stock was also changed from walnut to slender maple, and the sliding wood cover was replaced by a hinged one. These covers were usually made of brass and were often highly ornate. Inside the patch box was another innovation: a greased patch of cloth or buckskin. This patch would be placed on the muzzle, greasy side down, and the bullet was pushed down on top of it and rammed home with a ramrod. The greased patch served several purposes. It filled the grooves, helped the bullet slide down, and partially cleaned the barrel when it was fired out of it. All told, the greased patch enabled rifles to be loaded in a quarter of the time previously required. Although it was a product of Pennsylvania, the new rifle was so popular in the rugged Kentucky frontier that it is most commonly called the Kentucky rifle. The rifle gained instant fame at the Battle of New Orleans, where Tennessee and Kentucky militiamen under the command of Andrew Jackson hid behind cotton bales and cypress logs and used the weapon to great effect. Their performance was immortalized in song “The Hunters of Kentucky, or the Battle of New Orleans,” which boasted: But Jackson was wide awake, And wasn’t scar’d of trifles, For well he knew what aim we take, With our Kentucky rifles.16
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A replica of the war clubs commonly used by the Red Sticks. Photograph from the author’s personal collection.
The musket had certain military advantages over the new rifle, especially when traditional Napoleonic tactics were being used. The rifle’s rate of fire was only about one-third of the musket’s, thus reducing the rifle’s ability to deliver massed volley fire, but on the frontier, where men fought from behind trees, bushes, and rocks rather than in a linear formation, the rifle was the superior weapon.17 The rifle afforded the Mississippi militia a significant advantage in the Creek Wars. The hostile Creeks were often called Red Sticks because their wooden war clubs, the atassa, were invariably painted red. The eighteenthcentury form of the club was long and straight with a single notched edge. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, a new variety that featured a gunstock shape had gained popularity. Still another version contained a ball head. George Stiggins, a half-blood Creek who fought with the Americans, described the signature weapon of the Red Sticks as “shaped like a small gun about two feet long and at the curve where the lock would be is a three square piece of iron or steele with a sharp edge drove in to leave a projection of about two inches.”18 Lewis Sewell, author of an epic poem of the Red Stick War published in 1833, described it as “a kind of war club, about two feet long, thick and heavy at one end, in which was fixed a piece of sharp iron or bone; with which they struck their captives with great violence on the head and speedily put an end to their existence.”19 The war club was usually carried into battle inserted into the warrior’s belt.20
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The Mississippi Territory, which included the modern state of Alabama, was the scene of much fighting, including the Battle of Holy Ground. Map by Harry Smith.
The Red Sticks numbered perhaps 2,500 warriors, but only one in three was armed with a rifle or a musket. The rest had only their characteristic clubs, tomahawks, hatchets, and bows and arrows.21 The white American advantage in weaponry was very apparent at the Battle of Holy Ground. This battle took place around the town of Ikanatchaka (alternately Econochaca) on the east bank of the Alabama River between Pintahala and Big Swamp Creeks in Lowndes County. The Creeks considered
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Ikanatchaka to be sacred ground, and by July 1813 it had become a rallying point for the Indians. Refugees from earlier battles flocked to the town, as did families seeking protection. Warriors assembled there, eager to fight for William Weatherford, the great Red Stick leader. Perhaps most significant was the presence of Weatherford’s brotherin-law, Prophet Francis, and other key prophets. The prophets had consecrated Ikanatchaka, protecting it from intrusion by the white man by drawing wizard circles around it. Francis promised that any white man who dared to enter this sacred ground would suffer instant death. The approach to the town was further protected by a long, low pile of finely split lightwood. Lighting this consecrated fuel also would bring death to the white man. The confident prophets called the town the “Grave of White Men.” In spite of such reassurances, Weatherford took care to prepare a stiff defense. To this end, he was greatly assisted by the natural terrain. Ikanatchaka was located on a high bluff overlooking the Alabama River. There the Alabama and the Holy Ground Creek formed a horseshoeshaped peninsula, and the town was almost entirely surrounded by thick swamps and tricky ravines, including two of some two hundred yards in length each, which protected the western approaches. In addition to these natural defenses, Weatherford had fortified the town with pickets that extended across the neck of the peninsula to a point on the river just above the two ravines. The result was an enclosed area of some fifty acres in which Weatherford had accumulated an impressive stockpile of supplies, including 1,200 to 1,500 bushels of corn. A nearby spring provided an abundance of fresh water. Weatherford and his men were ready. On December 22, 1813, Weatherford was awakened from a comfortable sleep with the alarming news that the enemy was approaching. General Ferdinand Claiborne had marched his army of just over one thousand soldiers from Fort Deposit and was now camped just ten miles outside the Holy Ground. Claiborne’s army consisted of Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert Russell’s Third Regiment, a battalion of mounted cavalry commanded by Major Cassels, Major Benjamin Smoot’s militia battalion, Colonel Joseph
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Carson’s Mississippi Volunteers, and 150 Choctaws led by Pushmataha. All indications were that Claiborne planned to attack at daybreak. Prophet Francis remained confident. “This is our sacred ground,” he promised. “The prophets have cast their spells, encircling the town with magic circles. If the white man be bold enough to enter, the air shall turn to sheets of flame, and drive him back in fear.” Weatherford was more pragmatic. “The white army is strong,” he admitted. Acknowledging the weapons differential, he noted, “They have guns, where most of our warriors are armed with only bow and arrow. If we go out and attack them, many of our warriors will be cut down by their lead, even before they are close enough for their arrows to meet their mark.” Instead of attacking, Weatherford decided to take advantage of his strong position and defend his ground. “If the [soldiers] wish to do battle,” he promised, “they will have to come to us, and we will be ready.” Weatherford used the few rifles he had judiciously. He positioned a large group of warriors armed with rifles behind the bank of a stream that emptied into Holy Ground Creek. A smaller group took up positions behind a fallen tree that adjoined the bank, and other warriors concealed themselves as best they could. Then they waited for the inevitable attack. By eleven o’clock on the morning of December 23, Claiborne had advanced his army to within two miles of Ikanatchaka. There he halted and prepared to attack. Claiborne’s plan was to divide his force into three columns. The outside columns, commanded by Carson on the right and Smoot on the left, would surround the town. Assisted by Cassel’s mounted riflemen, who would take up positions on the riverbank west of the town, these forces would cut off all possible escape routes. Russell’s regiment would form the center column, attacking the enemy to cause it to scatter. This carefully designed plan soon encountered some problems. The formidable terrain disrupted Cassel’s advance and caused him to take an alternate route that left a gap in the American line. The difficult movement also generated enough noise to give the Red Sticks plenty of warning. Carson’s Mississippians also ran into trouble. Unaware of the welllaid ambush, they advanced as the enemy patiently waited for the volunteers to enter rifle range. Then the Red Sticks suddenly opened fire from
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behind their protected positions. Both sides fought bravely, but Carson’s men slowly made progress. Still, Weatherford was prepared. Behind his riflemen, he had positioned other warriors armed with bows and arrows. Now was the time for this second line of defense to unleash its fury. Unfortunately for the Red Sticks, when the order was given to fire, most of the arrows sailed high and fell harmlessly to the rear of Carson’s men. Even so, the warriors were spurred on by the periodic incantations of one of the prophets. With such encouragement, the Red Sticks held their ground for about thirty minutes. Then, unencumbered by the linear formations required by the musket, the militiamen were able to make an oblique maneuver around to the other side of the log concealing the Indians and deliver a deadly enfilading fire. The warriors were forced to retreat and did so in an organized manner, continuing to fight from behind the plentiful trees and fallen logs. Until this point, Carson’s Mississippians had been the only American unit involved in the fighting. Now, as other Americans entered the battle and forced the Red Sticks to continue to withdraw, one of Carson’s men, named Gatlin, struck one of the enemy’s chief prophets, most likely Sikaboo, with a well-placed shot that shattered the Indian’s arm and punctured his chest. Seeing their prophet fall to the ground destroyed the Red Sticks’ confidence. The very man who had promised protection from the white man’s weapons now lay lifeless. As the Red Sticks struggled to come to grips with this new development, Carson pressed the attack. Soon he was joined by Claiborne’s entire command, and against such pressure many Red Sticks threw down their bows, arrows, and war clubs and retreated. Eventually even Weatherford was forced to retreat. Mercifully for the Red Sticks, the gap left by Cassels’s interrupted advance provided an escape route for many warriors. Weatherford himself escaped on his mighty horse Arrow only after a legendary daring leap off a bluff into the Alabama River. The Battle of Holy Ground was a one-sided victory for the Americans. Claiborne lost just one man and had twenty wounded, while the Creeks suffered thirty-three dead. Because the Creeks evacuated their wounded, that number is unknown. These disproportionate casualty figures are a
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testament to the impact of the possession, or lack of, sophisticated weapons.22 H. S. Halbert and T. H. Ball, noted historians of the battle, explain that “the slight [American] loss, considering the bravery with which the enemy fought, must doubtless be ascribed to the scarcity of ammunition among the Creeks, which compelled them to have recourse to bows and arrows, the primitive weapons of their race.”23 Shortly after the battle, Carson and his Mississippi volunteers were mustered out of service, but their actions at Ikanatchaka illustrate the advantage the Americans had over the Indians in terms of weaponry in the Mississippi Territory. Red Stick spirituality, clubs, and bows and arrows were no match for the white man’s firearms. While the Red Sticks judiciously used the few firearms they had, their numerical disadvantage was simply too great. Harvey Jackson describes the battle as “the age of steel and powder against the age of stone. Steel and powder won.”24 Perhaps nowhere in territorial Mississippi is the importance of technological weapons superiority more apparent than in the Creek Wars.
O BS E RVATI O NS CONCE RNING WE APONS O F T E RR ITO RI AL MIS S IS S IPPI Territorial Mississippi was a place in which the institutions of government, order, commerce, and society were struggling to take hold. Distance exacerbated all problems, and local authority was clearly the operative authority. In such an environment, the rule of force usually triumphed, at least initially, over the rule of law. Because the rule of force is applied more easily with the assistance of weapons, not only quantity but quality became critical. At first territorial authorities struggled to affect this outcome, as evidenced by the difficulties of arming the militia. In the absence of a well-equipped central force, local entities that controlled weapons and violence were able to exert influence. This phenomenon is epitomized by the outlaws of the Natchez Trace, who, armed with crude weapons (but weapons nonetheless), were able to exert their will over unarmed and isolated travelers.
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The threat to order posed by these outlaws, as well as increasing tensions with both Indians and European colonial powers, provided a strong incentive to strengthen the territorial militia. This strengthening manifested itself in the application of weapons technology. The militia was able to arm itself with superior weapons—namely, the rifle—in superior quantities. The defeat of the Red Sticks at the Battle of Holy Ground shows the result of this early American technological competition. Thus the territorial period in Mississippi was marked by the increased introduction of lethal weapons to the region. Because the central authorities had better access to acquisition, organization, and production synergies, they were able to take advantage of weapons in a way that outstripped nonterritorial government groups such as outlaws and Indians. This capability to control and use weapons helped centralize territorial Mississippi.
4 D UE LING AND S L AVE R Y W EAPONS OF ANTEBELLUM MISSISSIPPI
In the Old South, honor was a complicated but all-pervasive phenomenon. Bertram Wyatt-Brown goes as far as to call honor “the most important aspect of antebellum ethics” and the “keystone of the slaveholding South’s morality.”1 He then proceeds to explain three elements of Southern society—dueling, the slavocracy, and policing slave society— in the context of honor. Wyatt-Brown groups these topics in a section of his book that addresses social control. Control, be it social or otherwise, as this present study has thus far been tracing, is often maintained by weapons. In personal combat such as a duel, weapons helped establish control over a rival. On the plantation, masters used weapons to maintain control over the slave labor force. In the slaveholding society, weapons maintained control over the threat to the social order posed by slave insurrection. In all these situations, Wyatt-Brown sees Southern honor at stake, and in all these cases, that honor was safeguarded by weapons. Throughout the South, dueling was a means of defending honor and identifying oneself. By dueling, a man could influence his community’s evaluation of him. Personal grudges were settled. Up-and-coming men were able to enter the leadership ranks, and followers were able to manipulate leaders. Frustration over unresolved personal problems could be channeled toward a scapegoat.2 Indeed, a number of prominent Mississippians, 43
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including governors Henry Foote, Hiram Runnels, and Alexander McNutt; congressmen William Gwin, Sergeant Prentiss, and William Lake, and supreme court judges Isaac Caldwell and Joshua Childs, all engaged in duels for various reasons.3 But as useful as dueling was to address these myriad purposes, Southerners also recognized its unseemly side.4 The Mississippi Constitution of 1832 empowered the legislature to pass laws to prevent dueling and to exclude from public office those who had engaged in duels after 1832.5 At a meeting in 1844 of the Anti-Dueling Society of Mississippi, Judge John F. Bodley denounced dueling as an “anti-moral, anti-legal and anti-ecclesiastical custom.” Other Mississippi leaders such as John Quitman and Jefferson Davis shared Bodley’s assessment.6 Quitman describes one impromptu duel in Clinton as “a dreadful encounter in the pavement before this house between Gen. Runnels and Jas. B. Marsh in which seven pistols were discharged, both are wounded,” but duels of this format were atypical.7 Mississippians had to rectify the utility of dueling as a means of defending the critical attribute of honor while at the same time curbing the activity’s threat to civilized society. The result was a strict code duello by which duels became carefully orchestrated events in which weapons were a means of defending honor rather than necessarily inflicting as much physical harm as possible. It was this code duello that distinguished the gentleman from the brawler.8 The original code duello was written in 1777 by a group of Irishmen, and it contained twenty-six specific rules covering all aspects of the duel. Specifications ranged from the time of day during which challenges could be received to the number of shots or wounds required to satisfy one’s honor. South Carolina governor John Lyde Wilson wrote an Americanized version of the code, which appeared in 1838, but before that, Americans followed the European rules.9 The Maddox-Wells duel of 1827, also known as the Sandbar Fight, was one of the most famous duels in Mississippi. It began in the classical code duello tradition but ended in an ungentlemanly melee. In the process, it showcased both the weapons of the choreographed ritual and the noholds-barred street fight.
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Weapons were also a key part of Mississippi slavocracy. Maintaining slave discipline was essential to the successful operation of the plantation, and the overseer was given primary responsibility for enforcing rules and regulations. This task was a challenging one, because in Mississippi and throughout the Lower South, the most efficient ratio of overseers to slaves was considered to be one to fifty.10 The most common weapon the overseer used to even these odds was the whip. A. De Puy Van Buren, a native of Michigan, traveled throughout Mississippi’s Yazoo Valley in 1854–55 and found the whip was “ever in [the overseer’s] hand.”11 Yet the overseer had to be judicious in his use of the weapon. To protect the plantation owner’s investment, most overseers were under strict instructions to exercise restraint in their use of force. Ideally, the whip was intended to discipline slaves, but not to administer such physical harm as to limit their productivity.12 Obviously, significant numbers of slaves resisted their status and sought freedom. Slaves could generally be controlled during the day when they were laboring under supervised conditions, but the night afforded them a better opportunity to run away. To prevent escape and other undesirable behavior, white society organized armed slave patrols, which provide another example of how superior organization, centralization, and weapons facilitate control. In some cases, the slaves sought to gain these advantages for themselves by obtaining weapons and revolting. As a result, the fear of slave insurrection permeated Mississippi, and the control of weapons, especially firearms, was the decisive factor in both the revolts and the countermeasures.
D UE L ING P ISTOL S, SWO RD C A NES, AND BOWIE KNIVES The Maddox-Wells duel was the result of a long-standing feud between two groups of men in Rapides Parish, Louisiana. On one side of the disagreement were Dr. Thomas Maddox, Colonel Robert Crane (sometimes reported as Crain or Grain), Major Norris Wright, and Alfred and Carey
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Blanchard. On the other were Samuel Wells, General Samuel Cuney (sometimes reported as Currey), and Colonel Jim Bowie. There was plenty of bad blood between the rival groups. Bowie and Crane had previously fought a fistfight, and Crane and Cuney had fought a duel in which Crane had been wounded in the arm. On September 19, 1827, Wells and Maddox met on the first large sandbar above Natchez on the Mississippi side of the river. There is no record of the exact pistols used by the combatants, but dueling pistols were typically of about .50 caliber and were engraved and housed in a velvet-lined mahogany box that contained the pistol and its accessories. Dueling pistols were prized possessions of the gentleman and were often passed down from father to son. Duels were usually fought at a distance of twelve paces, although in 1834 Alexander McClung, known as the “Black Knight of the South,” killed a man with his first shot by striking him in the mouth at a distance of over one hundred feet.13 McClung was a notorious duelist whose duels included one fought with the planter-merchant John Menefee at Vicksburg in 1838. The duel was fought with Mississippi rifles at thirty paces and left Menefee dead.14 The Maddox-Wells duel began in an organized fashion. Bowie and Crane were forbidden to come on the sandbar, and by all accounts the duel itself was conducted with the proper decorum. Maddox and Wells exchanged two shots each without damage, shook hands, and started off the field, the matter presumably settled. At this point, the exact events are subject to some debate. According to one account, both groups then joined for a festive picnic with plenty of champagne and brandy. The trouble started when Crane, perhaps thinking that since the feud was over he was no longer restricted from the sandbar, decided to join the party. When Bowie learned that Crane was on the sandbar, Bowie rowed over himself. Another version of the story has Bowie in a much more antagonistic role. According to this account, Bowie, Wells, and Cuney emerged from the woods as the dueling parties withdrew from the field, and Bowie and his partners met them with pistols and knives drawn. Seeing this
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development, Crane and other friends of Maddox rushed from the other side of the sandbar to meet them. Cuney saw the opportunity now to resolve his old score with Crane. According to one report, Cuney advanced on Crane and said, “Colonel Crane, this is a good time to settle our difficulty.” Cuney drew his pistol but was restrained by his brother before he could fire it. In the meantime, Crane and Bowie fired at each other nearly simultaneously. Bowie missed and was knocked to the ground by a bullet that struck his side. Cuney, having broken loose from his brother’s grasp, fired at Crane and grazed him in the arm. Crane, using his second pistol, killed Cuney. What had begun as a fairly proper duel was now a wide-open brawl, featuring a variety of weapons of frontier Mississippi. Bowie drew his knife and began working his way toward Crane, who threw his empty pistol at Bowie, striking him in the side of the head and opening a wide gash in Bowie’s scalp. In spite of the blood streaming into his eyes, Bowie was able to see Wright and Blanchard approaching with drawn pistols. Bowie reportedly pleaded with Wright not to shoot, but Wright fired anyway, wounding Bowie yet again. Wright and Blanchard then proceeded to attack Bowie with sword canes, long, slender blades drawn from walking canes. Somehow Bowie got hold of a pistol and fired at Wright. Although wounded, Wright continued to stab Bowie with his sword cane. The melee had now narrowed largely to the life-or-death struggle between Bowie with his knife and Wright with his sword cane. Wright stabbed Bowie in the chest, but the narrow blade struck bone and broke. The powerful Bowie was then able to grab the slender Wright by his cravat, yank him to the ground, and plunge his knife into Wright’s heart, killing him instantly. Bowie reportedly told Wright, “Now, Major, you die.” With that climactic blow, the fighting subsided, but not before, according to one account, fifteen men were wounded and at least six killed.15 As news of the Sandbar Fight spread across the nation, Bowie and his knife became legendary, so much so that it is difficult to separate the history of the knife from its lore. The knife Bowie wielded at the sandbar may have been merely a butcher knife, but according to an article in the New York Times in 1895, it was made by Bowie’s brother Rezin out of a blacksmith’s
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rasp or large file. Upon presenting the knife, Rezin supposedly told Jim that it was “strong, and of admirable temper. It is more trustworthy in the hands of a strong man than a pistol, for it will not snap.” Rezin then specifically cautioned his brother about Crane and Wright, and advised him, “Keep this knife always with you. It will be your friend, and may save your life.”16 Another account claims that John Sowell, a blacksmith, fashioned the first Bowie knife from a model cut in wood by Bowie. According to this version, Bowie had injured himself in an Indian fight when his hand slipped and he cut himself on his own knife. To protect against such an accident in the future, Bowie suggested that Sowell add a guard.17 Still another explanation credits Bowie with taking a fourteen-inch file to a cutler named Pedro in New Orleans and having him turn it into a knife.18 A comparison of the various descriptions of the original knife suggests it boasted a superbly tempered blade, ten to fifteen inches long and curved concavely along the back and convexly along the edge near the point. It was about two inches wide at its broadest part and had a wide guard and generous hilt.19 It was an ideal weapon for the rough-and-tumble combat of the Sandbar Fight. Whatever the exact origin or design of the knife Bowie wielded that day in 1827, it soon became widely copied throughout the Southwest. Bowie traveled east in 1828 and in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, had a cutler named Henry Schively fashion a high-quality knife, complete with a fancy silver sheath, patterned after the original. Bowie’s brother Rezin wore the knife, engraved with his initials, RPB, on the pommel cap, for several years, and in 1831 he gave the knife to his friend Jesse Perkins of Jackson. Rezin made it a practice of presenting Bowie knives to friends and important individuals. He gave one knife made by Daniel Seales of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, to H. W. Fowler. This knife is now on display at the Alamo.20 In an era when pistols frequently misfired, the Bowie knife was a reliable backup weapon with a variety of uses. Hunters and pioneers used it for skinning game, cutting meat, digging holes, eating, and fighting. It was strong enough to cut firewood or hack a trail through dense undergrowth. Imaginative users found its handle suitable for everything from hammering nails to grinding up a bag of coffee beans.21
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This replica of a Bowie knife models many of the various designs of the weapon that were inspired by Bowie’s original. Knife courtesy of the Mississippi Armed Forces Museum, Burnelle B. McMahan Collection. Photograph by Jay Van Orsdol.
The popularity of the Bowie knife reached its peak in the 1850s, and the knife was popular with Confederate troops during the Civil War. By the 1870s, however, the efficiency, reliability, and wide distribution of Colt revolvers displaced the pivotal role of the Bowie knife.22 Until then, the Bowie knife played an important part in Mississippi life, so much so that Harold Peterson ranks it as one of the three key weapons in the history of American arms. The other two are the Kentucky rifle, which was discussed in the previous chapter, and the Colt revolver, discussed in chapter 7.
S L AVE RY AND TH E WE APONS OF THE OVERSEER While dueling was a matter of personal control, slavery was an issue of control in Mississippi’s broader society. Slave labor on Mississippi cotton plantations was organized under the time-work or gang system. Under this system, slaves of approximately equal ability were grouped together to form work parties that labored from sunrise to sundown under the supervision of a black driver. While this system lacked the incentive to work rapidly that was afforded by the task system common to South Carolina or Georgia rice fields, it was well suited for the labor requirements of Mississippi’s staple crops. During the course of the day, the overseer would ride throughout the plantation and inspect the work of each gang.23 Many
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overseers shared the opinion of one who told Frederick Law Olmsted that the slaves would “never do any work at all if they were not afraid of being whipped.”24 The omnipresent weapon that was used to enforce slave discipline was the whip, a device carried by drivers and overseers alike.25 The driver was the lone black operative on the plantation. Normally selected for his intelligence, common sense, and physical strength, the driver assisted the overseer by supervising routine tasks.26 Olmsted made several trips throughout the South in the 1850s. At one plantation in Mississippi, he observed the driver supervising a plow gang with the help of “a whip, which he frequently cracked at them, permitting no dawdling or delay at the turning.”27 Olmsted also reported seeing a driver supervising a hoe gang of some two hundred slaves moving across the field in precise parallel lines. Order was maintained “by a tall and powerful Negro who walked to and fro in the rear of the line, frequently cracking his whip, and calling out in the surliest manner, to one and another, ‘Shove your hoe, there! Shove your hoe, here!’ But I never saw him strike anyone with the whip.”28 In fact, drivers were usually allowed to administer corporal punishment only in the presence of the overseer.29 These overseers were perhaps the most important figures in the plantation managerial hierarchy. In many ways, they determined the plantation’s success or failure.30 Although the overseer possessed little personal decision-making authority, he was empowered to execute the policies developed by the plantation owner. These responsibilities included disciplining the slaves, which William Scarborough considers to be “clearly the decisive factor in the success or failure of an overseer.”31 Overseers operated with much freer rein than the drivers in imposing discipline. Olmsted describes an instance when an overseer caught a slave girl around eighteen years of age apparently shirking work. The overseer administered “thirty or forty blows across the shoulder with his tough, flexible ‘raw-hide’ whip.” Olmsted describes the blows as “well laid on, at arm’s length, but with no appearance of angry excitement on the part of the overseer.” After the slave refused to confess to avoiding work, the overseer delivered more blows across the girl’s “naked loins and thighs, with
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as much strength as before.” Olmsted reported never having seen a man, yet alone a young girl, flogged “with a hundredth part of the severity used in this case,” but perhaps what shocked him most was “the perfectly passionless but rather grim business-like face of the overseer” throughout the ordeal.32 Another overseer told Olmsted that punishment was “my business, and I think nothing of it.”33 Indeed, whippings were a regular part of plantation life, and overseers used the weapon routinely for even minor transgressions. Within a single week during the fall of 1855, T. L. Vandiver, the overseer of a plantation in Washington County, recorded meting out the following punishments: [November 12.] Whipt Betsey and black to day for changing their places at the wagons. [November 13.] Whipt new Dave and matilda for fighting. [November 16.] Whipt morgan For Telling Lies. [November 17.] Whipt Lancaster To day for picking Trashey Cotton.34 Nonetheless, a large amount of whipping was normally considered a sign of a poorly run plantation.35 One concern was that excessive whipping often motivated slaves to run away.36 There were also social ramifications for the owner who gained a reputation as being inordinately cruel.37 The principal motivation for restraint, however, was to avoid physically damaging the valuable labor investment. Thus most plantation owners placed limits on the type and severity of punishment that could be inflicted. For example, Andrew Flynn’s Green Valley plantation rules specified that the slaves “must be flogged as seldom as possible yet always when necessary. A good manager who is with the hands as much as he Should be can encourage them on with very little punishment. Violent threats must never be used & the Overseer is strictly enjoined never to kick a negro or strike one with his hand or a stick or the butt end of his whip. These things will not be tolerated. No unusual punishments must be resorted to without the Employers approbation.”38 Likewise, the Bolivar County planter Charles Clark specifically forbade his overseers from using “the but
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[sic] of the whip or any instrument that will bruise the flesh. This will not be allowed except in case of absolute necessity.”39 In fact, most planters limited the number of lashes that could be applied at any one whipping to fifty, the traditional limitation of forty imposed by Deuteronomy 25:3 notwithstanding. Obviously, these self-imposed restraints were not legally binding on the plantation owner. Many overseers also found ways around the limitations. Kenneth Stampp argues that the overseers’ “inclination in most cases was to punish severely; if their employers prohibited severity, they ignored such instructions as often as not.”40 There is at least one recorded case in which a slave received three hundred lashes for murdering a fellow slave.41 Olmsted describes the whip itself as “a terrible instrument.”42 Whipping caused unspeakable pain, often resulted in loss of blood, and could lead to shock and infection.43 One example of the permanent results of whipping was a Mississippi slave who had “large raised scars or whelks in the small of his back and on his abdomen nearly as large as a person’s finger.”44 The amount of pain inflicted was in part a function of the type of whip used. The most common whip was the rawhide, or cowskin, whip. This particular whip was extremely brutal and required only a few strokes to make its point.45 Frederick Douglass provides a vivid account of the rawhide whip: It is made entirely of untanned, but dried, ox hide, and is about as hard as a piece of well-seasoned live oak. It is made of various sizes, but the usual length is about three feet. The part held in the hand is nearly an inch in thickness; and, from the extreme end of the butt or handle, the cowskin tapers its whole length to a point. This makes it quite elastic and springy. A blow with it, on the hardest back, will gash the flesh, and make the blood start. Cowskins are painted red, blue and green, and are the favorite slave whip. I think this whip worse than the “cat-o’nine-tails.” It condenses the whole strength of the arm to a single point, and comes with a spring that makes the air
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This illustration from an 1863 issue of Harper’s Weekly shows the scars of repeated whippings on a runaway slave named Gordon, who escaped from his owner in Mississippi and joined the Federal army in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Courtesy of Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division.
whistle. It is a terrible instrument, and is so handy, that the overseer can always have it on his person, and ready for use. The temptation to use it is ever strong; and an overseer can, if disposed, always have cause for using it. With him, it is literally a word and a blow, and, in most cases, the blow comes first.46 Because of the tremendous potential of the rawhide whip to lacerate the skin and do other damage, many plantation owners used other types of whips.47 Charles Clark advised his managers to use “a whip with a suitable lash,” rather than the more damaging rawhide, to preserve his investment.48 In fact, one visitor to Mississippi reported that the lash whip was in general use in the state. He described it as consisting of a “stout flexible
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stalk” covered with a tapering leather plait some three and a half feet long, which formed the lash. On the end of the lash was a soft, dry buckskin cracker about three-eighths of an inch wide and ten or twelve inches long. This was the only part of the whip allowed to strike when whippings were administered to the bare skin. According to the observer, the lash whip “makes a very loud report, and stings, or ‘burns’ the skin smartly, but does not bruise it.” He claimed that one hundred well-laid blows with a lash whip would not injure the skin as much as ten moderate strokes with the rawhide whip.49 Other types of whips include those resembling carriage whips or even a bundle of small, thin switches.50 The whip seemingly accomplished its intended purpose of infusing the slaves with fear. Considering the total number of slaves who worked under overseer supervision, instances of slave resistance to overseer authority were minimal.51 Nonetheless there were other weapons on the plantation more deadly than the whip. One Mississippi overseer who had twice been assaulted while administering punishment “always carried a bowie-knife, but not a pistol, unless he anticipated some unusual act of insubordination. He always kept a pair of pistols ready loaded over the mantel-piece however in case they should be needed.”52 Whether it was whips, Bowie knives, or firearms, it was critical that the white population maintain control of the weapons. The subject of slaves carrying weapons had been addressed by Louisiana’s Code Noir, which was promulgated in 1724 and remained in force until the United States took possession of Louisiana in 1803. Article XII prohibited slaves “to carry offensive weapons or heavy sticks, under the penalty of being whipped, and of having said weapons confiscated for the benefit of the person seizing the same. An exception is made in favor of those slaves who are sent a hunting or a shooting by their masters, and who carry with them a written permission to that effect, or are designated by some known mark or badge.” However, as fear of rebellion became an increasing concern, exceptions allowing slaves to possess weapons even for hunting were eliminated.53 As elsewhere in Mississippi history, the issue was control. Control of the plantation meant control of weapons, and rules were created to ensure the advantage lay with the white population.
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S L AVE I NSUR RE C TION AND S L AVE PAT ROL S Slavery thrived in Mississippi’s rich agricultural areas, and the influx of slaves created a potential threat to the security of the white population. In 1830, blacks accounted for 48.4 percent of Mississippi’s population,54 and by 1860, blacks outnumbered whites, comprising 55.3 percent of the population.55 The discrepancy was much more pronounced in certain parts of the state. For example, in the last two decades of the antebellum period, slaves made up approximately 75 percent of the population in the five leading cotton-producing counties. In the Delta counties of Issaquena and Washington, blacks outnumbered whites nine to one.56 Absentee plantation owners who resided in other parts of the state often left the overseer as the only white man on the plantation. Under these circumstances, reports of slave insurrection naturally instilled stark fear in the white minority.57 Perhaps the greatest slave insurrection scare in Mississippi occurred in 1835, when rumors spread that John Murrell, the “Great Western Land Pirate” who had plagued the Natchez Trace stealing slaves, had planned an insurrection. In 1834, Murrell was confined to the state penitentiary in Nashville, Tennessee, but his captor, Virgil Stewart, reported that Murrell had advised him of a plot to instigate a general slave uprising on Christmas Day of 1835. Murrell’s gang reportedly consisted of about a thousand operatives, and Stewart revealed the names of forty-seven of them located in Mississippi.58 In the ensuing panic, whites in Livingston in Madison County rounded up several blacks on June 30, 1835. Subjected to torturous whippings, the suspects admitted that a revolt was planned to coincide with the July 4 holiday, a day it was felt that slaves could assemble without drawing suspicion. On July 2, an angry mob summarily hung the blacks suspected of being involved and then seized two white men, Joshua Cotton and William Saunders, who had been implicated in the plot. On July 4, after an irregular judicial proceeding designed to circumvent the “glorious uncertainty of the law,” Cotton and Saunders were found guilty and sentenced to hanging.59 The pair was marched to the Livingston jail, where the executioners, “fastening a rope to the grating of a window, in the upper story of the jail,
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and leaning a couple rails against the wall, assisted the culprits upon the rails; then adjusting the other end of the rope around their necks, removed the rails.”60 Saunders maintained his innocence to the end, but Cotton warned his executioners to “beware to-night, to-morrow, and the next night.” Based on Cotton’s information, additional whites were captured. Some were hung using a more substantial gallows than the improvised one shared by Saunders and Cotton. One was tortured and later committed suicide. Those whose involvement was considered of lesser severity were punished by “slicking.” Under these proceedings, the victim was stripped naked and laid face down with his hands and feet fastened to pegs. He was then whipped by different individuals.61 The panic lasted in Madison County for a week and spread to other localities as well. On July 8, Governor Hiram Runnels even offered to provide Madison County with weapons to guard against insurrection. He also called on every able-bodied white man to arm himself and be ready for service. By mid-July, approximately twelve whites and a much larger number of blacks had been executed at the hands of vigilantes. It was not until July 13, after most of the initial hysteria had died down, that the governor issued a proclamation urging people to turn suspects over to the “proper authorities.”62 By then news of the turmoil in Mississippi had traveled throughout the South. As far away as North Carolina, a woman wrote, “I should be almost afraid to live in Mississippi now there is so much fuss with the negroes.”63 The slave patrol system, which initially grew out of an adaptation of the militia system, was an important means of controlling the threats that many whites saw in Mississippi’s large black population. Slave patrols were drawn from a manpower pool consisting of all slave owners and everyone subject to militia duty who was junior to rank of captain. Captains were tasked to manage patrols within their assigned districts and to make a detachment roster at each company muster. Each detachment consisted of a leader and three patrol members, with the patrols performing their duties once every two weeks or sometimes more often.64
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Apparently this system was unsatisfactory because in the 1830s, the patrol system was brought under the jurisdiction of local units of the civil government. The militia’s duties were relegated to rural areas in 1831 when incorporated towns assumed responsibilities for slave patrols within the town’s geographic limits. In 1833, these remaining militia responsibilities were transferred to the boards of county police. These changes focused the patrol system at the local level, where the greatest threat existed, and made the system subject to the control of local governments.65 The slave patrol’s principal task was to apprehend any slave found outside his authorized location. According to Mississippi law, a slave could not leave the property of his master without a written pass. The patrols apprehended blacks who were out after curfew, dispersed assemblies of blacks, and inflicted “rough-and-ready punishments.”66 As on the plantation, the principal weapon involved was the whip. If the slave was in an unauthorized location, but did not appear to be a runaway, the patrol meted out a punishment of fifteen lashes. Runaways were to be turned over to the justice of the peace, and the patrol would collect a six-dollar reward.67 Conclusions about the effectiveness of the slave patrols vary. William Scarborough believes that “the county patrol was one of the most effective instruments in maintaining white control over the large population of the state.”68 Conversely, Charles Sydnor writes that “the patrol seems to have been no more efficient than the medieval town watch.”69 Regardless, slave patrols were an attempt to use centralization, order, and weapons to maintain control over a group with superior numbers.
O BS E RVATI O NS CONCE RNING WE APONS O F A N TE BEL LUM MIS S IS S IPPI Antebellum Mississippi was a violent era in the state’s history. Individual social scores were often settled by duels, which were supposed to be conducted according to strict rules that limited the damage. However, as the Sandbar Fight shows, just below the surface of this decorum was a wild
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side of Mississippi society that was unencumbered by such restrictions. The Sandbar Fight catapulted the Bowie knife to fame, and it became a fixture in Mississippi and throughout the South. Dueling and brawling were ways that Mississippians used weapons to control their social environment on an individual scale. The broader social environment rested on the institution of slavery. Again, control was critical because the very nature of slavery requires force and compulsion. As in other cases examined thus far, a numerical disadvantage was offset by possession of weapons and centralization. The overseer’s whip allowed him to control large numbers of slaves on the plantation, and the organized system of slave patrols allowed outnumbered whites to control great swaths of territory. While slaves posed a constant threat of rebellion, this threat seldom materialized because of the superior control of weapons and organization among the white society. Bertram Wyatt-Brown groups dueling, slavery, and slave patrols under the heading of social control in a study that focuses on honor rather than weapons. This present study demonstrates the criticality of weapons in maintaining social control and, by extension, Wyatt-Brown’s all-important Southern honor. George Orwell is credited with having said, “People sleep comfortably in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf.” In antebellum Mississippi, behind the stately pillars of the plantation and the refined decorum of the parties and balls were a group of rough men wielding weapons to control what was dear to them.
5 M IS S IS S IPPI R IFLES W EAPONS OF MISSISSIPPIANS IN MEXICO
America of the 1840s was the America of Manifest Destiny. In 1845, Congress annexed Texas, which until 1836 had been a republic of Mexico. Since then, however, Texas had considered itself an independent republic, while Mexico still saw it as a wayward province in revolt. When Texas joined the United States, relations between Mexico and the United States rapidly deteriorated. On May 13, 1846, the United States declared war on Mexico, and President James Polk faced the problem of building an army capable of battling the formidable Mexican army of Antonio López de Santa Anna. Mississippians had long supported Texas independence and welcomed it into the Union as a Southern state critical to maintaining the delicate balance of power between slave and free states. In spite of a flood of volunteers, Secretary of War William Marcy limited the Mississippi state quota to a single regiment of infantry or riflemen for twelve months’ service. Competition was stiff, and many disappointed volunteers were refused, but finally the 936-man First Mississippi Volunteer Regiment was mustered into federal service. On the second ballot, Jefferson Davis, then serving in the U.S. Congress, was elected as the regiment’s colonel.1
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Davis’s selection profoundly impacted the weapons Mississippians would use in Mexico. The most common shoulder arm in the Mexican War was the flintlock musket, although technical developments had made it possible to replace the flintlock with the percussion cap and therefore make muskets more reliable and serviceable in rain and snow. Indeed, in 1842 the army ceased producing flintlocks, and the Model 1841 Springfield caplock actually became the standard shoulder arm. The way the system worked was that when the weapon’s hammer fell, it struck a small brass cap that fit snugly over a nipple at the breach of the weapon. The inside of the cap was painted with a small daub of mercury fulminate, which would ignite when hit by the hammer. This action sent a spark to the chamber and ignited the powder charge. The used cap could then be discarded and a new one put in place for the next firing. The percussion cap system eliminated the need to prime the weapon. The system not only made the rifle faster to load but also achieved a much lower rate of misfires than the flintlock, which was particularly vulnerable under damp conditions. However, Army General-in-Chief Winfield Scott distrusted the percussion cap as being too complicated, and because of his influence, the flintlock remained the predominant firearm when the Mexican War began. Volunteer units, however, were less traditional in embracing the new technology, and many, such as Davis’s “Mississippi Rifles,” were outfitted with rifles.2 The weapon and the Mississippi soldiers who bore it would win fame and victory at the Battle of Buena Vista.
M IS SI SS IP PI’S MILITIA TRADITION By 1846, Mississippi had reversed completely the poor militia that territorial governors Sergeant and Claiborne had struggled just to supply with weapons. Mississippi now had a well-organized, well-equipped, and welldrilled militia that personified the society’s fascination with all things martial. This martial spirit was a large part of the culture of not just Mississippi but the entire South. Southern men relished in hunting, riding horses,
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fighting, and dueling, and these preferences naturally led to an enthusiasm for participation in the militia. The result, according to one visitor to the state, was a man “almost naturally trained for war.”3 An example of this martial spirit and its impact on the Mississippi militia is John Quitman. Originally from New York, Quitman arrived in Natchez in 1821 at the age of twenty-three. By then the militia system, not just in Mississippi but in the entire nation, had reached a serious crisis. The failure to achieve federal regulation of the militia and an absence of imminent enemy attack had caused a dangerous lapse in militia standards. This was exactly the situation Quitman found in Natchez. By 1823, Quitman was the brigade inspector for the second brigade of the first division in the Mississippi militia. The position gave Quitman both experience and visibility, and by the spring of 1824 he was able to lead a group of like-minded individuals to form a volunteer company that became known as the Natchez Fencibles. With Quitman as their captain, the Fencibles were incorporated into the fourth regiment of the state militia. The Fencibles were an integral part of the Natchez community, participating in parades and public ceremonies, maintaining law and order, and guarding against the ever-present threat of slave revolt. By 1829, Quitman had gained a statewide reputation as an expert on militia reform, and state legislators called on him to provide advice on new legislation to revitalize the militia. By the end of the year, Quitman sent Governor Gerard Brandon recommendations to improve supervision, discipline, and promotion policies, to reduce the number of brigades, and to provide state funding for certain positions. The substance of Quitman’s recommendations was then enacted in a thirty-four-page piece of legislation. In 1836 Quitman was presented an opportunity to test his reformed militia. On March 6 the Alamo fell, and when Quitman learned the news, he, like many Mississippians, was filled with passion for the cause of Texas independence. In April he led approximately forty men, including many of the Fencibles, into Texas. Quitman secured Nacogdoches against a threatened Mexican-Indian attack and then rushed to join Sam Houston’s force, which was reportedly falling back against Mexican pressure. Quitman
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arrived two days late to participate in the Battle of San Jacinto, and then, seeing that Houston had things well in hand, Quitman returned to Natchez. His men, however, stayed in Texas and joined the Army of Texas as volunteers under Thomas Rusk’s command. Having missed his opportunity for battle, Quitman remained active in the militia and anxiously waited. In 1837 he was elected major general in the second division of the Mississippi militia, and when the United States declared war on Mexico in 1846, he lobbied for command. Six civilian brigadier general positions were created to lead the volunteers, and President Polk designated Quitman for one of the posts. While in Mexico, Quitman saw combat at Monterrey, Vera Cruz, and Chapultepec.4 Ironically, the Natchez Fencibles, the militia unit that Quitman had initially been associated with, were not among those selected to go to Mexico as part of the First Mississippi Regiment. The competition was steep, and twenty-two militia companies and perhaps seventeen thousand volunteers had gathered in Vicksburg to vie for the coveted ten positions that would form the regiment. When a few of the Fencibles left formation to “partake in some refreshment,” the unit was unable to muster the required ninety-three-man strength when the roll call was held. The Fencibles were rejected, and the Vicksburg Volunteers took their place. The result was that when the First Mississippi Regiment reported for federal service on June 16, 1846, many disappointed volunteers were left behind. There is some evidence, however, that the Fencibles may have been able to see limited service in Mexico as part of a Louisiana regiment.5 In spite of such fierce competition for service and the militia’s advanced state of readiness, Colonel Davis was still displeased with its firearm, the standard-issue Model 1822 flintlock. This weapon was a smoothbore musket of .69 caliber. Its overall length was 57 inches, with the barrel accounting for 42 inches. Paper cartridges, containing a single round lead ball, several lead buckshot, and a charge of powder, were loaded from the musket with a rammer. The powder was then discharged by a flintlock. Like all smoothbores, the weaknesses of the Model 1822 were in range and accuracy. To easily load the weapon, the diameter of the ball had to be slightly smaller than that of the barrel. Thus when fired, the ball would
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bounce along the smoothbore, with its final direction being largely a function of the last bounce it took. Under such conditions, the weapon was hardly reliable beyond fifty yards, but this lack of individual accuracy was offset by the tactic of firing mass volleys by troops in close formation. The standard infantry tactic of the day was to deliver a volley at close range, followed by a charge with the bayonet. Instead of the Model 1822, Davis favored the Model 1841 rifle. He had long been an advocate of establishing rifle regiments in the army, arguing that the United States was falling behind France and Britain, which had fully adopted the rifle by the early 1840s.6 Davis praised the rifle, arguing, “In accuracy of fire they are equal to the finest sporting rifles, their range I think exceeds that of the (old pattern) Musket, and they less often miss fire, or want repair than any small arms I have seen used in service.”7 Davis’s feelings on the subject were so strong that, before leaving Washington, he met with Cadmus Wilcox, a future Confederate general, but now just a plebe, or first-year cadet, at West Point, and told Wilcox that he would accept command of the regiment only if it were allowed to be equipped with the rifle. In addition to preferring the rifle’s characteristics, Davis explained to Wilcox that being equipped with the rifle would add distinction and conspicuity to the regiment.8 Events would prove Davis to be correct. The Model 1841 was a rifle of .54 caliber. Its overall length was 48 inches with a 33-inch barrel. These dimensions made the Model 1841 almost nine inches shorter than the musket, giving the rifle a considerable advantage when maneuvering in close formation, reloading, and fighting in close quarters. Its paper cartridge contained only powder, and the ball was inserted in a greased patch, which, as in the Kentucky rifle, was used to seat the ball tightly against the rifled grooves of the barrel. The ball and greased patch were inserted in the muzzle by a rammer, and the black powder charge was ignited by a percussion cap. The expanding gases forced the ball out through the riflings, spinning as it progressed. Just as a football thrown with a spiral is superior to a wobbly pass, so the ensuing aerodynamic stability increased the range and accuracy of the rifle. A good rifleman could hit a man at 300 to 400 yards with the Model 1841.
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The First Mississippi Regiment is more commonly known as the “Mississippi Rifles” after the 1841 Whitney rifles they carried in the Mexican War. Rifle courtesy of the Mississippi Armed Forces Museum, Burnelle B. McMahan Collection.
Because of this accuracy, the Mississippians relied more on aimed rather than volley fire and were able to deviate from the close-ordered formations of the day and adopt more open tactics that presented less of a target for the enemy. The standard infantry regiment of the era consisted of eight companies with muskets and two with rifles. The rifle companies were designed to serve primarily as skirmishers and sharpshooters. Davis’s desire to arm his entire regiment with the Model 1841 met with much resistance, most significantly from General-in-Chief Scott, who objected that the rifle took longer to load than the standard musket and could not be fitted with a bayonet Davis held his ground and ultimately prevailed. He recalled in 1889, “Gen. Scott . . . objected particularly to percussion arms as not having been sufficiently tested for the use of troops in the field. Knowing that the Mississippians would have no confidence in the old flint-lock muskets, I insisted on their being armed with the kind of rifle then recently made at New Haven, Conn., the Whitney rifle.”9 Eli Whitney, a man most commonly associated with Mississippi for his later invention of the cotton gin, thus became the provider of a thousand rifles issued to the First Mississippi. These weapons were the first mass-produced rifles with interchangeable parts to be adopted by the U.S. government. Before Whitney, a skilled worker had made the entire firearm, individually forming and fitting each unique piece. Whitney replaced this method with a team of unskilled workers who made only a particular part that fit every weapon of the same model. This method of standardized,
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interchangeable parts became the model of manufacture for all manner of products in the nineteenth century. To calm Scott’s anxiety about the lack of bayonets, Davis allowed his men to carry short cavalry swords, Bowie knives, pistols, and the new Colt five-shooter revolvers as auxiliary weapons for close-quarters combat.10
BUE NA VIS TA Davis was no stranger to military service. After graduating from West Point, he served seven years on the northwest frontier, resigning in 1835 as a first lieutenant to settle down to a life as a Mississippi planter. When he took charge of the Mississippi Rifles, he fell under the command of Brigadier General Zachary Taylor, the father of Davis’s first wife, Sarah Knox, who had died just three months after their wedding. In February 1847, Taylor possessed excellent defensive ground guarding the approaches to Buena Vista, but he faced a numerically superior army. Unsure of Santa Anna’s intentions, Taylor was located six miles north of Buena Vista at the more vulnerable Saltillo. He left the arrangement of the defense of Buena Vista to Brigadier General John Wool, who had identified three avenues of approach available to Santa Anna. Wool defended two but accepted risk and left the third, a relatively narrow ridge that led around his east flank straight to Buena Vista in the Americans’ rear, unprotected.11 On the morning of February 22, Taylor concluded that nothing significant would happen at Saltillo, and he departed for Buena Vista. He arrived at Wool’s position around 11:00 a.m. Taylor had been wise to relocate. By 3:00 p.m., the battle there began. Santa Anna had both attacked in the center and discovered the unprotected avenue on the American’s east flank. Taylor ordered forward two regiments of Arkansas and Kentucky cavalry and a battalion of Indiana infantry and, after some small fighting and adjustments to the line, was confident the position was strong. Still concerned about his vulnerable rear, Taylor returned that night to Saltillo to supervise operations there.
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Early the next morning, Santa Anna attacked in force. When Taylor returned on the scene at about 9:00 a.m., success appeared to be within Santa Anna’s grasp. Wool reported, “General, we are whipped,” to which Taylor replied, “That is for me to determine.”12 Davis’s Mississippi Rifles had ridden forward from Saltillo with Taylor, and now Taylor ordered them to rally the fleeing Second Indiana and hold the faltering east flank. The Mississippians and other reinforcements were able to halt the Mexican advance, but the battle was far from over. At this point, Santa Anna decided to send his uncommitted division along the third avenue of approach on the extreme American east flank. Taylor detected Santa Anna’s move and immediately sent Davis’s Mississippi Rifles and the Third Indiana to intercept. According to the accepted tactics of the day, the classic infantry defense against a cavalry attack was to form a hollow square. Instead Davis positioned the two regiments in an unorthodox but highly effective inverted V formation on top of a ridge overlooking the Mexican approach. The V was formed by the Indiana troops lining the south edge of the ravine and the Mississippi regiment on the side that extended from the edge of the ravine into the north plateau. The two sides met at an angle of about 120 degrees with the open end facing the Mexicans. Davis personally took a position at the left end of the Mississippi line, where he placed an artillery piece delivered by Captain Thomas Sherman. There Davis waited. Davis’s men were ready. A meticulous trainer, Davis had spent hours drilling his men on the use of the rifle.13 In fact, the Model 1841 was so new that the army had no prescribed manual of arms for it. Davis had had to develop his own procedures for the percussion cap system.14 Davis’s men clearly appreciated what they had. In contrast to the Mexicans, who were notorious for their poor maintenance of their weapons, the Mississippians took great pride in, and care of, their rifles.15 One soldier wrote home, “We have named our rifles after our damsels—and you know they will not kick.”16 Even General Taylor seemed impressed by the First Mississippi’s weapons. According to one soldier, Taylor was “delighted with our rifles,” which he considered to be “beautiful arms.”17 Davis’s men were well armed and well trained. Now all they needed was the opportunity provided by Davis’s ingenuous tactic. The V formation
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In this print for the National Guard Heritage Series, Ken Riley depicts the First Mississippi Regiment using their Mississippi rifles and Bowie knives to rout the Mexicans at Buena Vista. Courtesy National Guard Bureau, Historical Services Division.
would act as a funnel, channeling the Mexicans into a deadly crossfire from the two sides. Still, firepower was critical. Davis could muster only 368 soldiers, so he had issued rifles to junior officers and flag bearers to compensate for his shortage of manpower.18 Against this meager defense, Davis faced an enemy force of two thousand, but he and his men did not waver. Davis reported that he was “confident of success, and anxious to obtain the full advantage of a cross fire at a short distance, I repeatedly called to the men not to shoot.” Finally, when the enemy was perhaps eighty yards away, both sides of the V “instantly poured in a volley so destructive, that the mass yielded to the blow, and the survivors fled.”19 The Mexican advance dissolved, and the Mississippians descended on the remnants with their Bowie knives, which by now had become a “southern institution,” according to one soldier in the war.20 The same observer recorded that the Mississippians “threw down their rifles, and with frightful cries dashed on the astonished horsemen, who seemed helpless now
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their charge had failed. Catching the horses by the bits they backed them onto their haunches and knifed the stupefied riders, who as soon as they could turned and fled with shouts of Diabolos—Camisas colorados!” meaning “Devils—Red Shirts,” a reference to the uniform tops of the Mississippians.21 Only a sudden thunderstorm saved the Mexicans from even greater destruction.22 Several factors influenced the First Mississippi’s success, including the unit’s excellent training and Davis’s superior leadership. Russell Weigley goes so far as to consider the First Mississippi perhaps “the best of all volunteer regiments” that served in Mexico.23 However, the Mississippians’ weapons advantage was no doubt critical to the outcome. The Mexican infantry was equipped primarily with the “Indian Pattern” Brown Bess musket, a weapon known for its unreliability and inaccuracy. Mexican cavalry carried either lances or the escopeta, a cut-down version of the Brown Bess. To further degrade these weapons, Mexican powder was of notoriously poor quality. The Mexicans tried to compensate for this deficiency by increasing the powder charges, but this measure so increased the weapon’s recoil that accuracy suffered in the process.24 Buena Vista proved to be a close call for Taylor, but when the sun came up on February 24, the Americans found Santa Anna had withdrawn during the night. It was an impressive victory, and Davis deserved his share of the credit for his aggressive and innovative tactics. Indeed, even the Duke of Wellington, who had been closely following the progress of the war, took notice of Davis’s exploits.25 Perhaps, however, the most telling decision Davis made to affect the outcome of the battle occurred not on the field of Buena Vista but back in Washington when he insisted on arming his regiment with the Model 1841 rifle.
O B S E RVATI O NS CONCE RNING WE APONS O F M IS SI SS IP PI ANS IN ME X ICO Buena Vista was Santa Anna’s sole offensive of the war. That it was in large part thwarted by Davis’s use of the rifle in the defense was an important
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The invention of the minié ball added range and accuracy to the rifled musket. Courtesy Scottsville Museum, Scottsville, Virginia.
harbinger for the tactics of the Civil War. By then, rifles would be the battlefield rule rather than the exception, and their presence would change the relationship between the offense and the defense. When Davis became secretary of war in 1853, he spurred the army to adopt the rifled infantry musket. By this time, a French army captain named Claude Étienne Minié had developed a way to load a rifled musket as easily as a smoothbore. This invention was the “minié ball,” a cylindro-conoidal bullet that was slightly smaller in diameter than the barrel and could thus easily be dropped down it. One end, however, was hollow, and when the rifle was fired, expanding gas widened the sides of this hollow end so that the bullet would grip the rifling and create the spinning effect needed for accuracy. The United States adapted the Model 1855 Springfield rifle to take .58 caliber minié ammunition, and the national armories began manufacturing only rifles and started converting smoothbores into rifles. The difference was significant. The smoothbore musket had a range of 100 to 200 yards. The new Springfield .58 was effective from 400 to 600 yards. Still, the work progressed slowly. By the end of 1858, the Springfield and Harper’s Ferry armories had produced just four thousand of the new rifles. The looming Civil War would create a demand for many thousands more.26 Before then, the United States had the opportunity to observe the impact of the rifle during the Crimean War. Convinced that America still had much to learn from Europe, Davis sent a military commission led by Major Robert Delafield to observe the Crimean War in particular and European armies in general. The commission’s report was well received and widely circulated. Common themes were the need for professional
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officers and the virtues of methodical warfare that emphasized engineering and artillery. The report, however, was not without its shortcomings. Perhaps the most serious was its failure to fully appreciate the impact of the rifled musket. Commission member and future Civil War general George McClellan observed the “terrible losses” incurred during the Russian attacks, but instead of attributing them to the new rifle, he blamed the Russians’ employment of “too heavy and unwieldy masses.” The true impact of the rifle and the subsequent need for tactical change would be realized only after costly experiences in the Civil War.27 The Delafield commission’s report illustrated the dangers of tactics not keeping up with weapons technology. As secretary of war, Davis had directed light-infantry tactics for all units that would reduce the line of infantry from three ranks to two and place an increased emphasis on skirmishers. Formations remained rigidly shoulder to shoulder, however, and intervals between units were small. These relatively dense concentrations of men would present vulnerable targets in the early days of the Civil War until generals realized the need for a change.28 Perhaps one of the biggest results of the Mississippi Rifles’ performance at Buena Vista was that it propelled Jefferson Davis to national prominence. He was seriously considered as the Democratic candidate for president in 1860, and in the South he assumed the mantle of leadership once held by John Calhoun. Davis’s elevated stature ultimately resulted in his becoming president of the Confederate States of America, but his presidency is often criticized as lacking strategic vision. Had it not been for Buena Vista, Davis would not likely even have been considered for such a position. Indeed, as the Civil War drew to a close, the Richmond Examiner, a long-standing critic of Davis, commented on the series of events that had resulted from his success at Buena Vista by lamenting, “If we perish, the verdict of posterity will be, ‘Died of a V.’ ”
6 IRONCL AD S AND TOR P E DOE S W EAPONS ON THE WATER I N CIVIL WAR MISSISSIPPI
At the time of the Civil War, the Mississippi River was the single most important economic feature of the continent, but the Confederate stronghold at Vicksburg had closed the river to navigation, posing a serious threat to Northern commercial interests. Lamenting the situation, President Abraham Lincoln said, “See what a lot of land these fellows hold, of which Vicksburg is the key! The war can never be brought to a close until that key is in our pocket. . . . We can take all the northern ports of the Confederacy, and they can defy us from Vicksburg. . . . I am acquainted with that region and know what I am talking about, and as valuable as New Orleans will be to us, Vicksburg will be more so.”1 Vicksburg also represented the link between the eastern and western halves of the Confederacy. In the western half, Texas led the nation in cattle, with an estimated three and a half million head. As a point of comparison, Virginia and Georgia, the next-largest Confederate cattle-producing states, counted slightly more than one million each. Texas ranked behind only Tennessee in the number of horses and mules, fourth in the number of sheep, and seventh in the production of swine. Texas was a significant source of livestock for armies in the east, but that could remain the case 71
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only so long as those animals could cross the river safely. Federal success at Vicksburg would deny the eastern Confederacy access to these and other supplies. Furthermore, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas (as well as the Indian Territory) accounted for almost half of the Confederacy’s total land mass. Federal control of the Mississippi River would separate the western and eastern halves of the Confederacy. Given these considerations, Major General Ulysses Grant’s mission was to seize Vicksburg to control the Mississippi River and divide the Confederacy in two. His Army of the Tennessee consisted of a maneuver force of ten divisions with a total of 44,000 effectives. Of equal importance was Grant’s naval counterpart, the Mississippi River Squadron commanded by Flag Officer David Porter. Porter had at his disposal about sixty armed vessels, of which twenty to twenty-five would support the Vicksburg operation at any one time. Critical to this force were thirteen ironclads. This Federal naval advantage was decisive, and the ironclads represent one of the most significant weapons of the war for control of Mississippi’s waterways. On the Confederate side, Lieutenant General John Pemberton commanded five divisions totaling 43,000 effectives. While the Confederates had a tremendous advantage in the defendable terrain, unlike Grant, Pemberton had almost no naval force. By 1863, the Federal navy had virtually destroyed the Confederate “River Defense Fleet” in fighting below New Orleans and above Memphis. Only five of twenty-five gunboats survived into 1863, mostly by hiding upstream in tributaries such as the Red, Arkansas, White, and Yazoo rivers. The last ironclad, the Arkansas, was scuttled by its own crew in August 1862 after her steam engines failed. Thus, at the time of the Vicksburg campaign, there were no Confederate ironclads and only a handful of gunboats on the western rivers. In the absence of a navy of their own, the Confederates made skillful use of naval mines, “torpedoes” in the lexicon of the day, and shore-based snipers to harass the Federal navy. Some forty Federal vessels struck mines, the most famous being the USS Cairo, which sailed up the Yazoo River on December 12, 1862, to destroy Confederate batteries and clear the channel of torpedoes. Instead, seven miles north of Vicksburg, the Cairo itself fell
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victim to the torpedoes it intended to clear, as two explosions tore gaping holes in the ship’s hull. Within twelve minutes the ironclad sank. It is often cited as being the first ship in history to be sunk by an electrically detonated torpedo, but a growing amount of scholarship, largely based on contemporary testimony, argues that the torpedo may in fact have been detonated by a trip-wire device using a friction primer.2 The wreck was located in 1956 and raised in 1964 and now is on display at the Vicksburg National Military Park. There it stands as a silent testimony to the creativity and effectiveness of the Confederates in developing a weapon to counter the Federal naval advantage. The Vicksburg campaign served as a proving ground for both sides as they developed new weapons in their efforts to control the Mississippi. Superior technology gave the Federals a tremendous advantage in ironclads. Unable to match this threat symmetrically, the Confederates developed the asymmetric response of torpedoes. It is a classic example of action and counteraction in the deadly game of the weapons in war.
FE D E RA L NAVAL S UPE RIORIT Y The Federal fleet on the Mississippi River was a fine mix of vessels that each served a special purpose. Ably commanded by Admiral David Porter, the Federal fleet showed the Federal capability of projecting naval power upriver into the heart of the Confederacy. Using a combination of ironclads, rams, mortar boats, and tinclads, the Federal navy was a decisive factor in Grant’s success at Vicksburg. As early as 1822, naval theorists had begun proposing that wooden ships be replaced with iron ones. The French had employed ironclads during the Crimean War, but they attracted little attention in America. On the eve of the Civil War, the United States still relied on wooden ships. That all changed when two ironclads clashed in the Battle of Hampton Roads off the coast of Virginia in 1862. On the Confederate side was the Virginia, once a 350-ton, 40-gun U.S. steam frigate named the Merrimack, which the Federals burned and scuttled when they abandoned
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Gosport Navy Yard on April 20, 1861. Confederate engineers raised the hulk and began its conversion to an ironclad in hopes of breaking the evertightening Federal naval blockade. The result was a new weapon of the sea that “made obsolete the navies of the world.”3 Having learned of the Confederates’ efforts to build an ironclad, the Federals, led by the Swedish American inventor John Ericsson, began a similar project. Overcoming a three-month Confederate head start, Ericsson built the Monitor in less than one hundred days and rushed it south just in time to prevent the Virginia from single-handedly destroying the Federal fleet. On March 9, 1862, the two strange-looking monsters battled to a tactical draw and ushered in a new era in naval warfare. The chief role of the ironclads in the Vicksburg campaign was to defeat the Confederate fortified batteries. Usually the ironclads attacked the fort head-on to take advantage of the protection provided by the vessels’ thickest armor. Ideally they attacked from the downstream side to improve maneuverability and to allow the ironclad to drift safely away if disabled. Many engagements were within one hundred yards of the fortification, with the ironclad blasting the position with grapeshot and exploding shells in an attempt to break down the earthen parapet of the fort and disable its guns.4 Grapeshot was made by putting together a number of iron balls, usually nine. The balls were attached in one of two ways. Sometimes they were held in place by two iron plates, two rings, and an iron pin that passed through the top and bottom plates. In other cases, the balls were placed in tiers around an iron pin. This pin was attached to an iron plug or tampion at the bottom, and the whole load was placed in a canvas bag. A strong cord held the balls in place. Grapeshot was effective at ranges of about one thousand yards, making it a good medium between canister and shell. Although largely superseded by canister in 1861, grape continued to be used in 8-inch howitzers and Columbiads.5 Exploding shell, the other projectile commonly fired by the gunners aboard ironclads, contained a bursting charge of powder. Poor fuses, especially in the Confederate army, and failure of the black powder bursting charge to properly fragment the cast-iron “shell,” limited the munition’s effectiveness.6 Shell ammunition could be spherical or oblong and is not to be confused with another type of projectile called “shot.” Unlike shell, shot
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contained no explosive and was spherical for smoothbores and oblong for rifles. It was most commonly used to batter down fortifications.7 In addition to the ironclads, a variety of rams saw action on the Mississippi River during the Vicksburg campaign. These vessels were old riverboats that had been converted by reinforcing their hulls and filling their bows with timber so that they could survive deliberate collisions with enemy boats. They existed strictly for combat against other boats. Since they carried little or no armament other than their rams, they were of limited utility to the Federals once the Confederate fleet had ceased to be an immediate threat.8 Mortar boats, however, maintained an active role in the campaign right up to the surrender. These vessels were unpowered scows or rafts, each carrying one squat, kettle-shaped 13-inch siege mortar, which weighed 17,120 pounds. With a full 20-pound charge, the weapon could lob a 200-pound shell a distance of over two miles. The mortar boats saw valuable service during the siege of Vicksburg.9 If mortar boats were the most specialized vessels in the Federal fleet, tinclads were the most versatile. They were modified riverboats that had been covered with 1/2 inch to 3/4 inch iron plating that protected the power plant and pilot house from small-arms fire. These vessels could double as troop transports in joint operations, with each one carrying up to two hundred infantrymen. Tinclads provided the naval presence that kept Mississippi waterways under Federal control, even when the riverbanks belonged to the Confederates. To meet this threat from the banks, the typical tinclad had six 24-pounder howitzers mounted facing the sides to drive off “bushwhackers.” The vessel’s shallow draft enabled it to prowl waterways inaccessible to heavier war vessels. In fact, some tinclads could float in as little as eighteen inches of water when lightly loaded.10 They were a handy addition to the Federal fleet.
CONFEDERATE ASYMMETRIC RESPONSE Because of the scant Confederate naval assets, the greatest potential threat to the Federal navy during the Vicksburg campaign was from its own
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vessels falling into Confederate hands. This eventuality came to pass in February 1863 when the ram Queen of the West and the ironclad Indianola ran downstream past the Vicksburg batteries. The Confederates captured the Queen of the West when she ran aground, and then used her to disable the Indianola. The Queen of the West was later destroyed in action on the Atchafalaya River, and the Confederates squandered their good fortune in capturing the Indianola when they scuttled it for fear of a Federal “monitor” that ran the Vicksburg batteries, as if on its way to recapture the Indianola. This “monitor” was in fact an unmanned, unpowered barge rigged out to resemble an ironclad. With no ships to contest the Federal navy, the Confederates turned to an asymmetric response. Lieutenant Isaac Brown had ably commanded the Arkansas and used it to successfully challenge the initial Federal naval blockade of Vicksburg. However, during the Battle of Baton Rouge, the ship suffered engine damage, and on August 6, 1862, it was destroyed to prevent capture. Without the Arkansas, Brown faced a quandary as to how to guard the Yazoo until he was approached by acting masters Zere McDaniel and Francis Ewing, who told him of their experiments with naval mines. Brigadier General Gabriel Rains had earlier pioneered the use of land mines by burying artillery shells along the roads and beach when the Confederates evacuated Yorktown, Virginia, in May 1862. Both Federal and Confederate commanders criticized this “barbaric” method of warfare, and Rains was assigned to the river defenses, where the use of his torpedoes was “clearly admissible.”11 In fact, Rains went on to be instrumental in planning the torpedo-laden defense of Mobile Bay. Brown did not fully understand the technology behind this new weapon, but he was willing to give it a try. He gave McDaniel and Ewing permission to develop their plan. The pair obtained five-gallon glass demijohns, filled them with black powder, and placed an artillery friction primer into the necks of the containers. The friction primer took the form of a short tube with an explosive compound in tube’s top. Inserted into the compound was a roughened wire that protruded out of the top. On the bottom of the tube was a small gunpowder charge. Tugging hard on the wire pulled it through the explosive compound and caused it to ignite. This action caused the gunpowder
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Typical rigging of a torpedo. The wooden float is what drew the attention of the crew of the Marmora on the day the Cairo was sunk. Illustration by Harry Smith.
charge to burn. The sequence was completed when the tube directed the flame into the main demijohn filled with black powder. When artillerists used this device, the gunner pulled a lanyard to provide the tug on the wire. To adapt this procedure to their purposes, McDaniel and Ewing connected the roughened wires in the friction primers to an external trigger line that joined pairs of demijohns. The idea was that when an enemy boat hit the trigger line, it would pull it tight and in the process provide the hard tug needed to start the explosive process. Operators used a creative system of floats, weighted pulleys, and adjustment lines to keep the torpedoes hidden just below the surface of the water.12
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McDaniel and Ewing’s innovation saw action on December 12 when a five-vessel Federal flotilla consisting of the Marmora, Signal, Queen of the West, Pittsburgh, and Cairo was patrolling the Yazoo. The Marmora and the Signal had patrolled the Yazoo the day before and seen numerous scows and floats that indicated torpedoes. One had exploded near the Signal, and the Marmora had successfully exploded another at a safe distance by rifle fire. The situation on the Yazoo was no doubt dangerous, and the Pittsburgh and Cairo, both ironclads, had been added to the force to provide extra support for the December 12 operation.13 The mission began with the tinclad Marmora in the lead until the fleet heard what Commander Thomas Selfridge, on board the Cairo, thought was small arms fire being directed from the shore against the Marmora. In reality, the noise was sailors aboard the Marmora firing at floating blocks of wood they thought were torpedoes but actually were buoys that held demijohns in place. Unaware of the true situation, the aggressive Selfridge ordered his ironclad Cairo ahead to provide support. Things quickly spiraled out of control for Selfridge. Under orders not to run his vessels among torpedoes, Selfridge instead directed small boats be lowered to search for the devices. As Selfridge watched, an ensign on board the Marmora’s cutter found a line, most likely a trigger line, and cut it with his sword. A glass demijohn popped to the surface and revealed an adjustment line connecting it to the shore. Selfridge ordered this line cut. In the midst of this excitement, no one noticed that the Cairo had drifted dangerously close to shore. When Selfridge saw what had happened, he ordered the engines reversed and called for the Marmora to get under way. The Marmora’s lieutenant was wary because of the torpedoes he had just seen, and he hesitated, which frustrated Selfridge. Selfridge repeated his order to the Marmora and then impetuously ordered the Cairo to push ahead. Almost immediately the Cairo was rocked by two explosions in quick succession. According to what is probably the most accurate account, the torpedo was detonated by a friction primer, and Selfridge had run into a trigger line that exploded one torpedo under the port bow and the linked torpedo just off the port quarter.14 Although the crew escaped with their
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Typical emplacement of torpedoes joined two demijohns filled with explosives. The design was such that when an enemy ship ran into the connecting trigger line, the two torpedoes would explode against both sides of the vessel. Illustration by Harry Smith.
lives, in just twelve minutes, the Cairo sank with only her smokestacks and flagstaff visible above the water. A fourteen-year-old crewmen remembered that water “rushed in like Niagara.”15 It was the first naval vessel in history to be sunk by a mine.16 The sinking of the Cairo is an excellent example of asymmetric warfare. Asymmetric warfare occurs when the weaker of two unevenly matched opponents adopts new techniques to exploit the dissimilarity.17 The Federal navy on the Mississippi reflected the latest technology, whereas, by the time of the Vicksburg campaign, the Confederate conventional naval threat there had all but ceased to exist. Symmetrically, the Confederates did not have a chance. The Cairo serves as a good example of the mismatch. This vessel was a state-of-the-art gunboat designed specifically for combat in the waters
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The USS Cairo was a formidable enemy that the Confederates countered with asymmetric warfare. Courtesy of the Naval History and Heritage Command.
of the western theater. She was designed to have a shallow draft of just six feet, and at 175 feet long and 51 feet wide, she was broader for her length than an oceangoing vessel. She had two steam engines that drove a centermounted paddle wheel, and her engines had a voracious appetite for coal, burning nearly one ton an hour, but with them the Cairo could reach a top speed of approximately six knots. The Cairo and other steam-powered ships were a part of a revolution in naval warfare that marked the Civil War. It had long been held as a military dictum that coastal forts were superior to ships, so much so that one gun on land was considered to be equal to four on water. Steam power, by freeing ships from the restrictions of wind and current, altered the balance between ships and forts. This was bad news for the Confederacy, which had hoped to offset its lack of ships with the superiority of its forts.18 Steam power allowed ships to fire on the move, and the Cairo had a varied assortment of weapons to fire, including three 7-inch rifles, three
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8-inch smoothbores, six 32-pounder smoothbores, and one 30-pounder Parrott rifle. The guns were located in a slope-sided casemate with three ports facing forward, four to each side, and two to the stern. The casemate was protected by two and one-half inches of armor fixed over timbers two feet thick. It had rounded corners with railroad rails providing additional protection. The octagonal pilothouse was protected by one and one-half inches of iron over timbers. The Cairo’s weak areas were in its rear and under the surface, which were both essentially unarmored.19 Obviously the Confederates had no ability to go toe-to-toe against such a formidable weapon. Instead the Confederates adopted a form of guerrilla warfare in which bushwhackers harassed Federal boats working the rivers. McDaniel and Ewing’s use of torpedoes to sink the Cairo is perhaps the best example of riverine asymmetric warfare during the Vicksburg campaign. The recovery of the Cairo is a story in and of itself and is of particular interest to the study of the preservation of the weapons of Mississippi. By examining contemporary documents and maps, Vicksburg National Military Park historian Edwin Bearss determined the approximate site of the wreck. Then Bearss, Don Jacks, and Warren Grabau used a pocket compass and iron bar probes to pinpoint the location with reasonable certainty in 1956. Difficult river conditions thwarted divers’ efforts to explore the site, but in 1960 the pilothouse, an 8-inch smoothbore cannon, its white oak carriage, and other artifacts, all well preserved by the Yazoo mud, were recovered. After an attempt in October 1964 to raise the Cairo intact failed, the painful decision was made to cut the ship into three sections and save as much of it as possible. By the end of December, the remains of the Cairo had been raised, placed on barges, and towed to Vicksburg. In the summer of 1965, the barges were towed to Ingalls Shipyard in Pascagoula, where efforts were made to preserve the armor, engines, and sections of the hull. In 1972 congressional legislation authorized the National Park Service to accept title of the Cairo and restore it for display at the Vicksburg National Military Park. After numerous funding delays, the vessel
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was finally transported to the park in June 1977 and partially reconstructed on a concrete foundation near the Vicksburg National Cemetery, where it is on display today.20
O B S E RVATI O NS CONCE RNING WE APONS O N T HE WAT E R I N CIVIL WAR MIS S IS SIPPI Like the Mississippi Indians facing the Europeans, Confederate Mississippians, albeit to a lesser degree, struggled against a more centralized and industrialized enemy. In 1860, Northern states had 110,000 manufacturing establishments, while the Southern states had only 18,000. To make matters worse, the South had become dependent on Northern technical skill and know-how.21 Shipbuilding was a principal Confederate weakness, and the early loss of ports like Norfolk and New Orleans set the effort back even further. The industrial discrepancy between North and South became pronounced in the fight for control of the Mississippi River. At the beginning of the Civil War, the U.S. Navy numbered some 90 ships of all types, but by 1864 that number had grown to 670. The Confederate navy started out with no ships and grew to about 130.22 Starting from scratch, the Confederacy simply lacked the industrial shipbuilding capacity to keep up with the North. The Federal navy’s superior strength allowed it not only to control the coastline but to use steam power to penetrate into the heart of the Confederacy via large rivers like the Mississippi. Using a variety of warships and support vessels, the Federal navy could move with the army, providing logistical support and joining attacks at Vicksburg and elsewhere. Without an adequate naval force to challenge the Federals, the Confederates in Mississippi resorted to guerrilla tactics. Local intelligence, terrain, and surprise favored the Confederates, but even these assets could only make a dent in the Northern advantage. The sinking of the Cairo was a moral victory and an innovation in technology and asymmetric warfare, but the fact remained that the Cairo was just one ironclad in Porter’s fleet
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of thirteen. The Confederates simply could not overcome such odds with guerrilla tactics and torpedoes. In the final analysis, both the Federals and Confederates in Mississippi struggled for control of the Mississippi River. The contest was decided by weapons, and thanks to superior centralization and technology, the Federals had a marked advantage. Like the Indians before them, Confederate Mississippians succumbed to the more advanced weapons and organization of an outside power.
7 S IE GE GUNS AND SAB E R S WEAPONS ON THE LAND I N CIVIL WAR MISSISSIPPI
Even the diverse array of ironclads, rams, mortar boats, tinclads, and other vessels that worked Mississippi’s Civil War waterways could not match the hodgepodge of weapons used to fight the state’s land battles. In terms of small arms and artillery, the vast assembly of weapons lacked uniformity, not just between the Federals and Confederates but within the two armies as well. The types and quality of the weapons illustrate the Federal advantage in industrial production and technology as the two sides struggled for control of their nations’ destinies. Grant’s Army of the Tennessee had a variety of firearms that can be categorized as first, second, or third class. Most of the Federals, approximately 75 percent, possessed first-class weapons. There were several varieties, but the most common was the British 1853 Enfield rifled musket. Of the remaining 25 percent of Grant’s regiments, most had second-class weapons of domestic and European origin. Only one Federal regiment, the 101st Illinois Infantry, had third-class weapons, which consisted of a variety of smoothbore muskets. Like the Federals, most Confederates were armed with British Enfields. Also like the Federals, other Confederates carried a variety of calibers, 84
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models, and types of firearms. This lack of standardization on both sides undoubtedly created a logistical nightmare for unit quartermasters tasked with supplying a variety of ammunition types. While both sides were relatively equally matched in terms of shoulderfired weapons, the Federals enjoyed a huge advantage in artillery. When Grant began his siege operation at Vicksburg, he had about 180 cannons. The superior Federal logistics system raised that total to 247, of which 13 were heavy guns and 234 were fieldpieces, before the Confederates surrendered. At Vicksburg, smoothbores outnumbered rifles by a margin of two to one. The revolution in military affairs that so impacted rifled muskets and infantry tactics did not extend significantly to rifled artillery in the Civil War. But Grant’s artillery advantage included naval as well as land forces. Porter’s vessels carried guns ranging from 12-pounder howitzers to 11-inch Dahlgren shellguns. During the siege, thirteen mortar boats anchored on the western side of De Soto Point and maintained a steady barrage. Naval guns also served ashore as siege artillery. On the Confederate side, Pemberton’s besieged force counted 172 cannons distributed among 103 fieldpieces and 69 siege weapons. Among the most interesting Confederate pieces were the large river-defense weapons, which included twenty smoothbores, ranging in size from 32-pounder siege guns to 10-inch Columbiads, including an 18-inch gun called “Whistling Dick,” and seventeen rifled pieces, ranging from a 2.75-inch Whitworth to a 7.44-inch cannon known as the “Widow Blakely.” Throughout the Vicksburg siege, the Federal artillery usually demonstrated its superiority over its Confederate counterpart. While the Federals created massed batteries to concentrate fire, the Confederates scattered their artillery to repel Federal assaults that could come from most anywhere. As much as any other factor, Grant’s artillery firepower sealed the Federal victory at Vicksburg.1 Elsewhere in Mississippi, however, the Confederates enjoyed an advantage in cavalry thanks to the superior generalship of Nathan Bedford Forrest. Forrest’s daring raids threatened Grant’s communications during the Vicksburg campaign as well as William Sherman’s during the
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Atlanta campaign. Forrest so plagued Sherman that he called Forrest “the very devil.” Forrest realized that in the age of modern warfare, cavalry charges with sabers could no longer be effective against infantry defending with rifles. Still, Forrest’s tactics relied on the shock and speed facilitated by the cavalry, and he used a variety of weapons to advance on the enemy. Lieutenant William Witherspoon described Forrest’s tactics as follows: When you were near enough for our rifles to do good work we commenced pumping lead. Some of you were firing occasionally, but the greater part of you were intent on holding that rein and sabre. As you got within seventy-five yards we dropped our carbines (which were strung by a strap across the shoulder), drew the navy sixes, one in each hand—we had discharged the sabres as a fighting weapon— then we fed you on lead so fast and furious you whirled with your backs to us. Then it was again with the carbine until you got back into the woods and we saw you were forming again.2 Forrest’s greatest victory, and a stellar example of his techniques for cavalry charges and his use of a variety of weapons, occurred at the Battle of Brice’s Crossroads. The historian Edwin Bearss credits Forrest’s victory there to his “use of cavalry as mounted infantry.”3 By this Bearss means Forrest used horses and mules for mobility to get his men quickly to the decisive point where they would dismount and fight. This tactic showed that Forrest truly understood the capabilities of the weapons at his disposal. The dominant weapon of the cavalry was no longer the saber. It was the rifle. However, this is not to say that Forrest also did not fight in a closequarters fashion. Forrest was a fearsome warrior who could always be found at the part of the battlefield where the fighting was thickest. He was wounded four times, had twenty-nine horses shot from underneath him, and killed at least thirty enemy soldiers in hand-to-hand combat, more than any other general in American history.4 For close-in fighting, Forrest carried two six-shooters and a Model 1840 saber that he had sharpened
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on both sides to increase its effectiveness. He showed his ability to use these close-combat weapons at Okolona, where he personally killed three Federals. From siege guns to sabers, the Civil War brought a great variety of weapons to Mississippi soil. The themes are the same as those on the water. There is a clear demonstration of the ability of weapons to control, whether the situation was Grant controlling the besieged town of Vicksburg or Forrest controlling a hand-to-hand fight at Okolona. The Federals again show the advantages of technology, resulting in weapons of greater lethality, range, and efficiency. Finally, the greater Federal industrial might once again shows the advantage that more-centralized societies have in the manufacturing and production of weapons. The end result was that the quality and quantity of weapons available to each side played a significant role in the way both Confederate and Federal armies fought in Mississippi.
R IFL E S AND C RE ATIVE WE APONS D UR I NG TH E S I E GE OF VICK S BURG The Enfield rifle was the most common weapon in both armies at Vicksburg. The British army had adopted the Enfield in 1855 as its general infantry weapon, and because of the Southern states’ weak industrial base, the Confederacy relied on Britain to supply a significant portion of its weapons. In fact, Confederate blockade runners delivered some 600,000 stands of arms to the South, most of which were Enfields. Caleb Huse was dispatched to Britain to secure rifles and ended up purchasing more than 100,000 Enfields for the Confederacy. Still Huse’s efforts were hamstrung by a limited amount of specie and the Federal blockade. In addition to the overseas efforts of Huse, Josiah Gorgas, the industrious chief of the Confederate Ordnance Bureau, energetically tackled the difficult task of expanding the South’s domestic manufacturing base. A Holly Springs firm, McElwaine and Company, known before the war as Marshall County Manufacturing Company, was part of Gorgas’s effort.
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The 1861 Springfield was the principal infantry weapon of the Civil War and was used by Federals and Confederates alike. Rifle courtesy of the Mississippi Armed Forces Museum, Burnelle B. McMahan Collection. Photograph by Jay Van Orsdol.
The company’s activity began in July 1861 when the Mississippi legislature encouraged McElwaine to begin manufacturing Model 1841 Mississippi rifles. The next month, the Confederate government contacted the company to produce 30,000 of the rifles. McElwaine and Company may have been the first firm to receive an arms-making contract from Richmond.5 The North also took steps to acquire weapons quickly and imported nearly half a million Enfields before domestic production could meet the requirements. Because the aggressive Huse had contracted for most of the London Armory machine-made British Enfields with interchangeable parts, most of the federally purchased Enfields were assembled from parts forwarded to a consortium from a number of small contractors. The result was a lack of interchangeability of parts and a varying degree of quality in many of the Enfields used by Northern soldiers.6 The Enfield was a muzzleloader that had a bore diameter of .577 inch and was designed to fire a bullet similar to the minié ball called the Pritchett. The rifle’s tolerances were such that it could accommodate the .58 caliber bullet designed for Springfield rifles, but this practice inevitably led to a certain amount of clogging.7 The Enfield had an effective range of 400 to 600 yards and a theoretical rate of fire of three rounds per minute.8 According to Bell Wiley, the Enfield was “perhaps the most popular gun in Confederate service and one of the most effective.”9 The Enfield weighed nine pounds and three ounces, including its bayonet.10 Most infantry bayonets were triangular and were attached to the barrel by means of a socket that slipped over the muzzle. Though the bayonet was a fearsome weapon, it inflicted few casualties in the war. Bayonet attacks were rare, although one did occur in Mississippi at Corinth on
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October 3, 1862. There Brigadier General John McArthur ordered the Seventeenth Wisconsin Regiment “to charge with the bayonet en echelon of battalion from the right” and drove a Confederate brigade from the field.11 In addition to the Enfield, another of the first-class weapons used by both sides at Vicksburg was the Springfield rifle, built for the Federals at the Springfield Arsenal in Springfield, Massachusetts. A variety of private contractors produced Springfields for the South, and Confederate soldiers also obtained the rifle by capture. The Model 1855 was the first U.S. Army regulation rifle to use the hollow-base .58 caliber minié bullet. The slightly modified Model 1861, which reached the field in large numbers in the latter part of 1862 and early 1863, was the principal infantry weapon of the Civil War. It was 56 inches long, had a 40-inch barrel secured to the stock by three iron bands, and weighed 8.75 pounds. It was a muzzleloader and could be fitted with a bayonet with an 18-inch blade and a 3-inch socket. The Model 1861 packed a punch and was able to penetrate eleven inches of white pine board at 200 yards. Its maximum effective range was about 500 yards, the distance to which the rear sight was graduated, but at 1,000 yards, the Model 1861 could still penetrate three and three-fourths inches of white pine. As a point of reference, the capability to penetrate one inch of white pine was considered sufficient to disable a man.12 The Enfields, Springfields, and other rifles at Vicksburg and elsewhere made the defense tactically stronger than the offense. The increased range and accuracy of the rifle afforded defenders, especially when protected by breastworks, a great advantage. Frontal attacks against entrenched defenders were generally ripped to pieces as Fredericksburg, Pickett’s Charge, Kennesaw Mountain, and Cold Harbor showed. Vicksburg would also show the impact the rifle had on strengthening the defense. After a brilliant campaign of maneuver that saw Grant march his army down the Louisiana side of the Mississippi River, cross unopposed at Bruinsburg, and isolate Vicksburg with a victory at Jackson, Pemberton retreated to his Vicksburg defenses after a decisive defeat at Champion Hill. Grant hurried his men to pursue the fleeing Confederates, hoping to catch them while they were still disorganized and before they could improve their already formidable defenses. On May 19 and then again on
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May 22, 1863, Grant launched assaults against Vicksburg, but both were repulsed, and Grant was forced to resort to siege tactics. Rifles played a big role in the defeat of both of Grant’s attacks. In addition to their greater range and accuracy, rifles had the effect of increasing the relative number of defenders because flank positions could deliver enfilading fire against assaulting troops. Many attacks occurred in successive waves, and defenders usually broke the first line of the attack before the second could come up and provide support. The result was an intermingling of the successive lines of attack that destroyed the cohesiveness of the formations and hindered command and control.13 Such was the case during Sherman’s attack against Stockade Redan on May 19. A redan is a V-shaped fortification open in the rear, and a lunette is a small outwork, often crescent-shaped, usually positioned on the flank of a larger fortification. The Confederate defense at Vicksburg took advantage of these two types of positions to create a defense that took on the shape of the number 7. Stockade Redan, manned by the Thirty-sixth Mississippi Regiment with reinforcements, constituted the apex of the 7. The redan was protected by a parapet seventeen feet high and twenty feet thick. In front of the parapet was a ditch six feet deep and eight feet wide. It was a formidable position, made even stronger by the presence of Green’s Lunette, about 75 yards to the south of the redan, and the Twenty-seventh Louisiana Lunette, approximately 150 yards to the west. The result was that the lunettes provided excellent enfilading fire in front of the redan.14 Major General Francis Blair’s division of Sherman’s corps comprised the main effort of the Federal attack on Stockade Redan. The attack was preceded by an artillery preparation that lasted from 9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. Blair’s men then attacked in three brigade formations, but they quickly became entangled in abatis, wire, and other obstacles and were subjected to a murderous fire from front and flank. One Confederate described the scene to his wife: They come now in startling proximity to our works—Not a musket yet has been fired by our men—They have received orders to wait until they can see the whites of their eyes—Not a single head is seen
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above the works, except now and then a solitary sentinel who stands ready to give the fatal signal—They come now within seventy yards of our lines—Now a thousand heads are above the earthworks—A thousand deadly guns are aimed and the whole lines are lighted up with a continuous flash of firearms and even the hill seems to be a burning smoking volcano. The enemy’s solid columns reel and totter before this galling fire—like grass before the mowing scythe they fall.15 Against such a hailstorm of fire, only one Federal regiment reached the objective, but even it could not breach the parapet and had to withdraw under cover of darkness. Sherman had 134 killed, 571 wounded, and eight missing in the futile attack. Undeterred, Grant tried again on May 22 with a more deliberate attack. This time he used his entire army with all three corps attacking along the Confederate line. As on May 19, Sherman was to attack Stockade Redan, and in the predawn hours of May 22, his sharpshooters worked their way into the ravine in front of the defenses. From these forward positions, they would attempt to suppress the deadly Confederate rifles when the attack began. At dawn the Federals began an artillery barrage that lasted until 10:00 a.m., when the infantry attacked. In spite of these preparations, the results were no different from the May 19 attack. For the most part, the defenders held their fire until the Federals emerged into an open area some four hundred feet to the front. Then the Confederates “rose from their reclining position behind the works, and gave them such a terrible volley of musketry” that the attack was halted in its tracks. Even Sherman recognized the futility, ending the carnage by reportedly ordering, “This is murder. Stop those men.” Sherman had 150 killed, 666 wounded, and 42 missing. All told, 502 of Grant’s command were killed, 2,550 were wounded, and 147 were missing.16 In addition to a murderous enfilading small arms fire, the Confederate defenders used hand grenades and artillery shells to repel both Federal attacks. During the May 22 attack in particular, the Confederates took 12-pounder shells, lit the fuse, and rolled them down into a ditch
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where one of the Federal storming parties had taken refuge. The Federals succeeded in pitching some of the improvised weapons back toward the Confederates, but the defenders responded by cutting the fuses shorter. As a countermeasure, the quick-thinking Federals found some fence rails and pushed them forward, extended and balanced on the points of their bayoneted weapons. The Federals then slowly crawled forward, with many grenades exploding harmlessly against the rail. The system was effective, but not perfect. One grenade bypassed the rail intended to intercept it, and Sergeant Richard Haney threw himself on it, saving many of his comrades but sacrificing his own life in the process.17 The ingenious Confederate use of modified weapons and the Federal response were not the only examples of creative tactics during the siege. After the failure of the May 19 and 22 attacks, the Federals continued to pressure the Confederates. In several instances, the Federals dug mines underneath the Confederate positions and packed them with explosives in an effort to blast a hole in the defense. It was a tactic that would later be used in the Battle of the Crater during the siege of Petersburg on July 30, 1864. One objective for these Federal mining operations was the Third Louisiana Redan. There, on May 26, Major General John Logan’s division began digging a zigzag approach trench, eight feet wide and seven feet deep, toward the Confederate position. By June 22 the Federals reached the base of the redan. Then they began digging under the redan, excavating a forty-five-foot-long tunnel, which at its end branched into three galleries, each fifteen feet in length. Into these galleries, the Federals packed 2,200 pounds of black powder that had been provided by the navy. Each charge was wired with two strands of fuse in the event one failed to burn. The work was done by thirty-six handpicked soldiers who had experience as coal miners. Throughout the digging of the approach, the Federals were subjected to harassing fire by the Confederates. The engineers tried to protect themselves by means of a movable railroad car loaded with bales of cotton to provide cover, but Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Russell of the Third Louisiana developed a creative solution to counter this measure. He had his men wrap their musket balls with flax or hemp fibers that had been soaked in
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turpentine. When fired into the cotton bales, these modified munitions caused a fire to ignite, and Confederate sharpshooters then prevented the Federals from extinguishing the flames. Russell reported destroying a railcar loaded with twenty bales of cotton by using this technique.18 To make matters worse for the Federals, it was difficult for their sharpshooters to engage the well-protected Confederates with direct fire, and artillery fire had too flat a trajectory to reach targets just inside the Confederate parapet. This time it was the Federals’ turn to develop a creative weapon, the “Coehorn mortar,” to meet the needs of the situation. These devices were made from short sections of gum tree logs bored out and banded with iron hoops. A genuine Coehorn mortar was the bronze Model 1841 named for the seventeenth-century Dutch artillerist Menno, baron van Coehoorn. Weighing just 296 pounds and equipped with handles to allow two men to carry it short distances, the Model 1841 was well suited to throw projectiles at a high arc into enemy trenches. It could fire a 24-pounder shell a maximum range of 1,200 yards. The knockoff Coehorns employed at Vicksburg lobbed 6- or 12-pound shells 300 to 450 feet to land just over the parapet with great effect.19 Lieutenant Henry “Coonskin” Foster, so nicknamed for his distinctive nonregulation headgear, developed another makeshift way of protecting the Federal sappers. Foster was known to take his rifle, ammunition, and several days’ rations and creep forward at night into the no-man’s-land between the two lines. There he would build an underground position with a loophole through which he could fire at unsuspecting Confederates. Seeking something a little more permanent, Foster used railroad ties salvaged from the dismantled Jackson and Vicksburg line to build a tower with the construction technique common to a log cabin. The Federals could use the height of “Coonskin’s Tower” to fire down on the Confederate position from the spaces in between the railroad ties.20 Coonskin’s Tower and the Coehorn mortars helped work on the mine proceed without serious interruption. Foster’s effort was just one example of the sharpshooters employed by both sides at Vicksburg. Their accurate fire was highly effective. Toward the end of the siege, Confederate Brigadier General Martin Green was
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felled by a sharpshooter moments after he bragged “a bullet has not yet been molded that will kill me.” Grant praised his sharpshooters, who he felt “were always on the alert and ready to fire at a head whenever it showed itself above the rebel works.”21 One of Grant’s sharpshooters, Edward Downs of the Twentieth Ohio Volunteer Infantry Regiment, reports buying a Henry rifle with his own money and using it to great effect as a sharpshooter at Vicksburg. Downs was introduced to the rifle when he examined one belonging to a steamboat captain at Berry’s Landing, five miles above Lake Providence, Louisiana, in April 1863. For Downs such a rifle was the answer to a long-held desire. He claims to have reenlisted upon the promise of getting a better weapon, and in the process he was able to exchange his musket for an Enfield. Still, he desired “a first-class rifle of the most modern improvement.”22 After obtaining permission from both Grant and Major General James McPherson, Downs returned to the steamboat captain and persuaded him to sell the Henry for $65. Thus Downs obtained the “most beautiful piece,” just in time for the start of Grant’s grand move against Vicksburg.23 On one occasion during the siege, Downs’s regiment was receiving “very annoying fire” from Confederate artillery, so he asked his commander, Colonel Force, if he “might go and try my hand at silencing the guns with my rifle.” Receiving Force’s permission and words of caution, Downs advanced along the cover of a ridge until he was within range of the enemy. There he found an oak log large enough to provide him protection. He dug a hole under the log that provided him a firing aperture and then “commenced to pick off the gunners.” Downs reports successively killing each gunner who advanced to fill a fallen comrade’s place until the Confederates decided to abandon their position.24 Downs returned to Colonel Force and brought him forward to witness the value of the position. When Downs picked off another Confederate, Force declared, “That’s a valuable piece,” referring to Downs’s rifle, and proceeded to bring forward additional sharpshooters and have them prepare rifle pits at the location. From there the sharpshooters continued to harass Confederate artillerymen as well as protect Federal work parties who were digging siege lines.25
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Downs’s prize rifle was a Henry repeating rifle, the first magazine rifle used in great numbers by the Federal army. It was invented by B. Tyler Henry, plant superintendent of Oliver Winchester’s New Haven Arms Company in 1860, and it was its magazine that made the Henry special. Tubular in shape, the magazine fit under the barrel and held fifteen rimfire copper cartridges of .44 caliber. Pulling the trigger guard down and returning it to its position ejected the spent shell and loaded a new one. Confederates complained that the Henry “can be loaded on Sunday and fired all week.”26 Not all the sharpshooters at Vicksburg were as informal as Downs. Specific units such as the Twelfth Arkansas (or Rapley’s) Sharpshooters and the First Mississippi Battalion Sharpshooters served on the Confederate side. Sharpshooters often acted as skirmishers, and the Vicksburg National Military Park displays monuments marking the sharpshooters’ lines of Federal units like the Forty-first and Ninety-fifth Illinois. In addition to the Henry used by Downs, Civil War sharpshooters used a variety of rifles including the Enfield, Springfield, Sharps, Spencer, Whitworth, and Kerr. The Sharps especially is associated with sharpshooters because of the misconception that it was this rifle that gave birth to the term used to describe these types of soldiers. Instead the word “sharpshooter” goes back to eighteenth-century Europe as a means of describing a precision marksman. The Sharps rifle did, however, make the shooting process much more efficient, because, although rifling and the minié ball had greatly improved weapons’ accuracy and range, muzzle-loading still presented a problem. One of the first successful breech-loading systems designed to improve this process was patented by Christian Sharps in 1848. The system worked by pushing forward a lever that doubled as the trigger guard to lower the breech block. This action gave access to the chamber, where a paper or linen cartridge could be loaded. When the breech block was closed, it cut open the end of the cartridge with a sharp edge to facilitate ignition. At first, the Federal government resisted breechloaders in general and the Sharps in particular. When Colonel Hiram Berdan developed the idea of forming two specially selected regiments of expert marksman,
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he requested they be equipped with Sharps rifles. General-in-Chief Winfield Scott and Chief of Ordnance Brigadier General James Ripley insisted instead on Springfield muzzleloaders. The traditionalist Scott, it will be remembered, had also resisted Colonel Jefferson Davis’s efforts to arm his regiment with Mississippi rifles in the Mexican War. After personally witnessing an impressive marksmanship exhibition by Berdan, President Abraham Lincoln intervened, and the sharpshooter regiments were issued Sharps. The Federals ultimately purchased 9,141 Sharps rifles and 80,512 Sharps carbines during the war. The Confederates also bought 1,600 Sharps rifles and manufactured their own version as well. The rifles went to sharpshooter units, and the carbine went to the cavalry. Both were generally .52 caliber, although .427 and .373 were also common bore sizes. The weapon was accurate to six hundred yards. More importantly, it could be loaded at a rate of up to ten rounds per minute, three times faster than a muzzleloader.27 The Whitworth and the Kerr were especially popular among the Confederates and saw service in the western theater, although not at Vicksburg. At one point late in the war Major General Patrick Cleburne’s division included a sharpshooter unit armed with thirty Whitworths and sixteen Kerrs. The British-made Whitworth had a short, heavy barrel and an overall length of forty-nine inches. It was relatively light and thus easily portable, but it packed a heavy kick. The rifle was a .451 caliber and was deadly at ranges of one thousand yards and beyond. The Kerr rifle was also of British origin. At fifty-three inches it was longer than the Whitworth and featured an elevated rear sight and a folding front sight. It had a thirtyseven-inch, .446 caliber barrel but lacked the Whitworth’s carrying power at long range.28 At Vicksburg, overcoming the efforts of Confederate sharpshooters, the Federals detonated their mine on June 25. It blasted a crater forty feet wide and twelve feet deep where the redan once stood. A Federal regiment attacked into the void, only to find that the Confederates had earlier detected the Federal work and evacuated to a new position to the rear of the redan. This alternate position was soon reinforced, and the Federal attack
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This print shows the enormous crater created by the Federal detonation of a mine under the Confederate defenses at Vicksburg. Courtesy of the Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division.
repulsed. Logan then began work on another mine, which was detonated on July 1. This second blast completed the destruction of the redan but was not followed by an assault. Other mining operations continued until Vicksburg’s surrender.29 Like the Confederate use of torpedoes against the superior Federal naval assets, the underground explosions represent a Federal asymmetric response to the seemingly impenetrable Confederate defensive line. Rifles made the defense stronger than the offense in the Civil War, especially at places like Vicksburg, where the terrain favored the defender and fortifications improved the naturally strong defenses. Thus, in spite of two attempts, Vicksburg would not fall to an assault. During those assaults and throughout the siege, both Federals and Confederates showed great ingenuity in developing and modifying weapons to try to gain an advantage or counter an enemy innovation. It was a game of cat and mouse that led to stalemate. But if the rifle gave the Confederates at Vicksburg
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a defensive advantage, superior Federal artillery drastically contributed to the Confederate demise.
ARTILLERY DURING THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG During siege operations, an army surrounds and blockades a city with the intent of compelling the enemy occupants to surrender by exhausting their supplies. During the Civil War, sieges were conducted in the formal European style, which had remained relatively unchanged for two centuries.30 Grant’s men dug trenches around Vicksburg to prevent both escape and reinforcement and then pounded the city with fire from both land and water. Pemberton’s men also entrenched and used their own sizable artillery capability to try to lift the siege. To meet the specific firepower needs of siege warfare, the United States had by 1861 developed eleven different types of siege ordnance. The principal siege weapons were the 4.5-inch rifle, 18- and 24-pounder guns, a 24-pounder howitzer and two types of 8-inch howitzers, and several types of 8- and 10-inch mortars.31 However, as Grant began his siege of Vicksburg, he complained of having no siege guns save six 32-pounders, and having none available in the western theater to draw from. Instead Grant was forced to rely on his naval counterpart, Admiral David Porter, who supplied him with large-caliber navy guns. Grant used these and his own field artillery to begin the siege.32 To meet Grant’s need for fire support, Porter reports, “Five 8-inch, four 9-inch, two 42-pounder rifled guns and four 32-pounder shell guns were landed at different points during the siege at the request of the officers commanding divisions, or of General Grant, and whenever officers and men could be spared from the fleet they were sent ashore to work the guns.”33 One of the most active of these locations was Battery Selfridge, a position directed first by Lieutenant Commander Thomas Selfridge, who had commanded the Cairo when it was struck by a mine in December 1862, and then Lieutenant Commander John Walker. Among the pieces at Battery Selfridge were 4.2-inch army Parrott rifles and two 8-inch Columbiads.
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Battery Selfridge contained the only land-based artillery pieces served by naval gunners during the siege.34 The 4.2-inch Parrott was the product of Robert Parrott, an 1824 graduate of the United States Military Academy who served as an artillery and ordnance officer before resigning from the army in 1836. From that time until 1867, he served as superintendent of the West Point Foundry, which became a leading producer of ordnance for both the army and the navy. As a private contractor, Parrott was unrestrained by government bureaucracy and budget, and he began experimenting early with rifled cannons. Parrotts of all calibers are basically the same. They have a long castiron tube with a wrought-iron reinforcing band over the breech. Bands were nothing new, but Parrott’s contribution to the process was the method of attaching the band. In most cases, the band of metal was heated, slipped on the tube, and then allowed to cool. During the procedure, the tube remained stationary. Parrott’s innovation was to rotate the tube horizontally on rollers and keep its inside cool with a stream of water. As the hot band was slipped on, the tube rotation caused the band to clamp uniformly to the breech instead of hanging from one spot and cooling there first, as happened with a stationary tube. Parrott believed this process gave his rifles superior strength.35 Both the army and the navy had versions of the Parrott. The army version was 132.5 inches long and weighed 4,200 pounds. The navy version was slightly smaller at 112 inches and 3,550 pounds. The army 4.2-inch fired a 30-pound shell, and the navy model fired shells ranging from 25 to 30 pounds.36 In many cases, however, the navy simply adopted rifles that were essentially identical to army models, which explains the presence of the army version at Battery Selfridge.37 Also at Battery Selfridge were two 8-inch Columbiads. Columbiads saw their first wartime service during the War of 1812 and are considered the first piece of purely American-designed ordnance. They were long, large-caliber pieces, but their distinguishing features were elevating ratchets that ran all the way up the face of the breech. This design allowed Columbiads to elevate to thirty-nine inches as opposed to the fifteen inches permitted by guns with elevating mechanisms placed under the breech. Because Columbiads could
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fire heavy charges at high angles of elevation, they were ideal for seacoast defense.38 The 8-inch Columbiad was 124 inches long and weighed 9,240 pounds. It was an iron smoothbore that fired a 64-pound shell. Columbiads were improved by the work of Thomas Rodman, who developed a method of making cannons by casting in iron around a wateror air-chilled core. This technique caused the inside of the barrel to cool first and compress because of the contraction of the outside metal. The result was a gun that could stand more internal pressure without breaking.39 In addition to these large pieces provided by the navy, the Federal lines contained numerous artillery emplacements that hosted smaller guns. Of these, Battery De Golyer was the largest with twenty-two cannons. It was established on May 25 and named for its commander, Captain Samuel De Golyer, who was considered by many to be the finest artillerist in the army. Unfortunately, De Golyer was killed during the siege, cut down by a Confederate sharpshooter during an artillery duel on May 26.40 Battery De Golyer consisted of guns from the Eighth Battery Michigan Light Artillery; Yost’s Independent Ohio Battery; Battery L, Second Illinois Light Artillery; and the Third Battery Ohio Light Artillery. De Golyer’s own Eighth Battery Michigan Light Artillery comprised two 12-pounder howitzers and four James rifles. These weapons represent the light artillery pieces that made up much of Grant’s force. Although the terms are often used interchangeably, there is a difference between a gun and a howitzer. Guns have a relatively flat trajectory, while howitzers have a greater arc. Additionally, howitzers have a chamber in the bore to limit the amount of powder that can be used to charge the piece. Guns do not have chambers.41 The howitzers used in the Civil War were typically smoothbore cannons that were generally lighter than guns of the same caliber and, at short ranges, considerably more effective. Their higher trajectory made them more useful in sieges such as Vicksburg.42 The 12-pounders in De Golyer’s battery had a tube length of 58.6 inches and a range of 1,072 yards.43 In addition to the 12-pounder howitzers, De Golyer had four 3.8-inch James rifles, named for Major General Charles James and produced at the Ames Manufacturing Company of Chicopee, Massachusetts. James was mortally wounded in October 1862 when a new shell he was testing
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exploded prematurely. Indeed, James appears to have been more involved with projectiles than the rifles that shot them.44 James rifles were a result of efforts to reclaim worn-out smoothbores by improving them with rifling. In 1860, Secretary of War John Floyd reported: Experimental firing with rifle cannon leaves no doubt that the accuracy and effectiveness of our artillery may be vastly increased at comparatively small expense without discarding from use the good and serviceable cannon of our present models; requiring only that they be rifle-grooved to adapt them to use as rifled cannon with James’ elongated expanding projectiles. This easy and cheap mode will convert the smooth-bored into rifled cannon, throwing nearly double the weight of metal without increasing strain.45 The James’s caliber of 3.8 was the result of the fact that damaged 6-pounder bronze smoothbores could be reamed out to that uniform size and rifled.46 The James rifle fired a 14-pound elongated shell and was accurate up to 1,700 yards. However, the James was not one of the Civil War’s more common pieces, perhaps because the bronze rifling eroded too quickly.47 In fact, rifled pieces in general were relatively rare in the Federal army at Vicksburg, with smoothbores outnumbering rifles two to one.48 Of particular utility during the siege of Vicksburg were the mortars. Whereas guns fire on a fairly flat trajectory and howitzers have a slightly greater elevation, mortar rounds travel in a pronounced arc. This path makes the mortar especially useful in reaching defilade positions. Mortars at Vicksburg included the 10-inch that could lob a 87.5-pound shell 2,028 yards at an elevation of 45 degrees, and the 13-inch naval mortar that fired a 200-pound shell 4,200 yards at the same elevation.49 The naval mortars showcase the contribution made by Porter’s fleet during the bombardment. Porter had long championed using naval mortars to shell forts. At New Orleans in 1862, he had mounted 13-inch mortars on modified schooners in hopes of shelling Fort Jackson and Fort St. Philip into submission. On April 18, he began a ten-hour bombardment during which each of his
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twenty-one schooners fired a round every ten minutes for a total of nearly three thousand shells. Porter continued his efforts until April 20, when his commander, Admiral David Farragut, determined that New Orleans would not fall by bombardment alone, and developed a plan to attack. Porter was disappointed, but Vicksburg gave him a chance to use his mortars again. Porter emplaced three mortar scows opposite Vicksburg at De Soto Point. From there he lobbed projectiles from his 13-inch mortars into the city. He also placed three heavy guns, one 9-inch, one 10-inch, and a 100-pounder, on scows a mile from Vicksburg. These kept up what Porter deems “an incessant and accurate fire for fourteen days.”50 Most Confederate soldiers found the mortar fire only a mild nuisance. In spite of Porter’s claims, the mortars were wildly inaccurate, and the shells lacked effective fragmentation. They did, however, create holes almost fifteen feet deep,51 leaving hardened soldiers to mock the mortars as only being “good for digging cisterns.”52 For Vicksburg’s citizens, however, the mortars represented an indiscriminate weapon of terror. One round, for example, landed in the city’s hospital, killing eight and wounding fifteen.53 Many of Vicksburg’s civilians took to living in caves to escape the hazards of the bombardment. Mary Loughborough described the terror of enduring a shelling from her cave refuge: My heart stood still as we would hear the reports from the guns, and the rushing and fearful sound of the shell as it came toward us. As it neared, the noise became deafening; the air was full of the rushing sound; pains darted through my temples; my ears were full of the confusing noise; and, as it exploded, the report flashed through my head like an electric shock, leaving me in a quiet state of terror the most painful I can imagine—cowering in a corner, holding my child to my heart—the only feeling of my life being the choking throbs of my heart, that rendered me almost breathless.54 Loughborough reported that the mortar shells, which she called “our old and relentless enemies,” in particular caused “extreme terror”55 because of their ability to cut into the earth and breach the safety of the cave.56
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Porter’s thirteen shore-based naval guns fired 4,500 rounds during the siege. His mortars added another 7,000 from their river location.57 Nonetheless the caves served their purpose well. Loughborough considered it “strange so few casualties occur during these projectile storms.”58 Indeed, fewer than twenty Vicksburg civilians were killed during the siege. But the Confederates expected to do more than just absorb the Federal pounding. Pemberton was himself an artillery officer, and the defenders of Vicksburg were well equipped with their own artillery to resist the Federals. In fact, the strength of the Vicksburg position rested on its ability to command the river with artillery well placed on the high bluffs. Vicksburg was among a handful of places where the Mississippi River met the line of bluffs that runs from Kentucky to Louisiana. Such locations were excellent places to position artillery, which could command the channel and close it to Federal navigation. The hairpin turn the channel made at Vicksburg further complicated navigation and increased the vulnerability of ships.59 The Confederates had thirty-seven large-caliber cannons, of which twenty were smoothbore and seventeen rifled, strategically placed along the Vicksburg shore and bluff.60 The defenders’ great faith in these batteries’ ability to dominate the river was shattered on the night of April 16, 1863, when Porter ran the gauntlet and led seven gunboats and three transports downriver. The Confederate batteries lit up the river with flares and opened fire, but only one of Porter’s vessels was lost. On April 26, the Federals pushed six more transports past the batteries. These passages demonstrated the unrealistic confidence the Confederates had in their artillery. There were simply too few guns to cover the large stretch of river, and the artillery had of necessity been widely dispersed. Moreover, the guns could not depress sufficiently to hit the vessels that hugged the eastern shoreline, a problem exacerbated by the thick parapets that protected the gunners.61 With Grant’s force now south of Vicksburg, the Federals were able to maneuver to great advantage. If Confederate artillery was unable to block Grant’s passage down the river, it still figured heavily in Pemberton’s efforts to withstand the siege. Like the Federals, the Confederates possessed an eclectic assortment of
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pieces. Two of the most famous were the “Whistling Dick” and the “Widow Blakely.” Whistling Dick was an 18-pounder smoothbore that had been rifled and reinforced with a jacket at the breech. Warren Ripley surmises it was a Model 1839, a weapon that was rather outmoded by the time of the Civil War.62 It got its name from “the peculiar whizzing noise the projectiles made when fired.”63 Named guns are common in wars, but Whistling Dick was one of the few called the same name by both sides. There is, however, some uncertainty whether the Federals and Confederates were always referring to the same gun when they used that name. In fact, there has been much mystery surrounding the exact identity of Whistling Dick, although the Vicksburg historian Edwin Bearss has unraveled most of it.64 Bearss suggests that “probably no artillery piece of the Civil War has been the object of more comment and conjecture than ‘Whistling Dick’— beloved weapon of the Vicksburg defenders.”65 Whistling Dick was part of a battery in the First Louisiana Artillery commanded by Lieutenant Colonel D. Beltzhoover. During Grant’s May 22 assault on the Vicksburg defenses, Beltzhoover’s batteries delivered a steady stream of accurate fire against Porter’s gunboats that were supporting the attack. However, from the battery’s position at the Marine Hospital on practically riverbank level, the Confederates could not deliver plunging fire. This inability was a great equalizing factor for Porter’s gunboats, and they received little damage in spite of the fire being “the hottest the gunboats had yet endured.”66 After this exchange, Whistling Dick was moved to a new location in the rear of Brigadier General Stephen D. Lee’s brigade on May 29.67 The Widow Blakely was a 7.44-inch rifled cannon so named because of its uniqueness among the Confederate artillery.68 Blakely rifles were cast at the Low-Moor Iron works in England according to specifications established by Captain Alexander T. Blakely. Some four hundred Blakely rifles were exported during the Civil War era, and many were purchased by the Confederacy.69 On May 22, the Widow Blakely joined other guns in the heated contest with five of Porter’s gunboats. Two of the Federal ironclads received extensive damage, but the Widow Blakely also did not escape unharmed.
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A shell prematurely exploded inside the gun’s tube, ripping part of the barrel off. Not wanting to lose the valuable piece, the Confederates repaired it by trimming the barrel at the break, and the Widow Blakely continued to serve the Confederate defenders of Vicksburg as a mortar.70 The Widow Blakely was captured along with other Confederate ordnance when Vicksburg surrendered. It was transported to New Orleans and then to West Point, New York, where it arrived on May 11, 1865. The piece remained on display there, incorrectly identified as “Whistling Dick,” until 1959, when it was returned to the Vicksburg National Military Park. It is now located in the park at Louisiana Circle, about a mile south of its original position.71 As for the real Whistling Dick, its whereabouts remain unknown. According to an unlikely legend, it was buried in the Mississippi River before Vicksburg’s surrender.72 More probably, it was melted down and sold as scrap.73
W E A PO NS O F FO RRE S T ’S C AVALRY With Vicksburg in Federal hands, Major General William Sherman did not want to idly wait for the spring campaigning season. On February 3, 1864, he departed Vicksburg and began an operation “to break up the enemy’s railroads at and about Meridian, and to do the enemy as much damage as possible in the month of February.” As part of this raid, Sherman ordered Brigadier General William Sooy Smith to bring his large force from Memphis southeast to arrive at Meridian by February 10. Sherman instructed Smith not to be encumbered by “minor objects” but instead to concentrate on destroying bridges, railroads, and “corn not wanted.”74 Instead, Smith failed to reach Meridian, which was a source of great frustration for Sherman. Sherman wrote that “Smith did not fulfill his orders, which were clear and specific,”75 but the problem from Smith’s point of view was that he ran into Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest and his cavalry. The result was that Smith turned back toward Memphis and left Sherman to deal with Meridian by himself.
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Vengeance at Okolona, a print by John Paul Strain, shows Forrest leading the charge at Okolona with his Model 1840 saber drawn while several of his escort brandish their sixshooters. Courtesy John Paul Strain.
After delays that clearly violated Sherman’s orders, Smith finally got moving, and by February 20 he was near West Point. There he clashed with advance elements of Forrest’s cavalry, who succeeded in drawing Smith into a swamp west of the Tombigbee River. As additional Confederates arrived, Smith realized he was being led into a trap. He ordered a withdrawal and was having some success extricating his force when Forrest arrived and ordered a pursuit. Skirmishing occurred throughout February 21, and at sunrise on February 22, Forrest attacked Smith just south of Okolona. Forrest ordered his bugler, Jacob Gaus, to sound the charge, and Forrest and his small escort drove hard into the Federal line. The Federals broke and then reformed farther to the rear. Forrest continued to press the attack, now accompanied by an even smaller band of men who could keep up with their hard-charging leader. The fight now was hand-to-hand with saber and pistol. Forrest’s passionate biographer John Allan Wyeth notes that these conditions favored Forrest, “whose skillful horsemanship,
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dexterity with the saber, and great muscular strength stood him well in hand in these frequent combats at close quarters.”76 The saber carried by Forrest was a Model 1840 United States Dragoon pattern “wrist-breaker” that he had captured during a raid on a Federal depot at Trenton, Tennessee, on December 20, 1862. Forrest had it sharpened to a razor edge on both sides. Although naturally left-handed, Forrest trained himself to be ambidextrous but still preferred to wield his saber with his left hand.77 He was so skilled with the weapon that it has been called “magic.” He bequeathed it to his son, reportedly with the proviso that it be drawn only on behalf of a reunited country.78 Forrest’s brother Jeffrey had been killed in the early action at Okolona, and Nathan Bedford was filled with rage and emotion. Forrest had two horses shot from underneath him, but he was unstoppable, reportedly killing three men himself.79 Forrest’s attack was finally halted some ten miles outside Pontotoc when the Federals reformed in three lines and launched a counterattack, which Forrest described as being “the grandest cavalry charge I have ever witnessed.”80 Captain Charles Bowman of the Fourth U.S. Cavalry led the attack with the command “Draw saber!” and “Charge!” However, the attack showed the limitations of such a tactic on the modern battlefield. The main body of the Confederates was protected by a high rail fence that forced the attacking cavalrymen to sheath their sabers and draw their pistols. With rifles and pistols, Forrest’s men repulsed the Federal charge. As darkness was approaching and with his men nearly out of ammunition, Forrest broke off the fight.81 The Battle of Okolona showed Forrest as a fierce close-quarters fighter and master of the weapons associated with hand-to-hand combat. Another example of Forrest’s use of weapons is his spectacular Battle of Brice’s Crossroads in Lee County. As Sherman set out on his Atlanta campaign, Forrest recognized the opportunity to raid into middle Tennessee and Kentucky to cut Sherman’s line of communications. However, Sherman, well aware of this threat, dispatched Brigadier General Samuel Sturgis to occupy Forrest. The two met at Brice’s Crossroads on June 10, 1864. Because of the South’s limited industrial capacity, Confederate cavalrymen had difficulty arming themselves with the latest weapons available
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The Sharps and Spencer were two examples of the various models of carbines used during the Civil War. Rifles courtesy of the Mississippi Armed Forces Museum, Burnelle B. McMahan Collection. Photograph by Jay Van Orsdol.
to their Northern counterparts. In late 1862, Forrest’s men were still armed with an assortment of shotguns, squirrel rifles, and smoothbore flintlock muskets, but they gradually acquired better weapons, and by the time of Brice’s Crossroads, most were carrying .58 caliber Enfield style rifles made in Ashville, North Carolina, .54 caliber Mississippi rifles, or captured Sharps carbines.82 Some of Forrest’s men even captured the highly prized Spencer repeaters, but they were generally unable to use them because the Confederacy could not manufacture the special self-contained cartridges the Spencer required.83 The Spencer repeating carbine was patented by Christopher Spencer in 1860. It was the first successful breech-loading repeating rifled carbine. It used a trigger guard lever system similar to the Sharps and had a tubular magazine like the Henry. The Spencer’s magazine was passed through the butt of the stock and held seven copper rimfire .52 caliber cartridges. Ten extra magazines could be carried in a special box, giving the soldier quick access to seventy rounds of ammunition. Weighing just eight and onequarter pounds and being just thirty-nine inches in length, the carbine was well suited for cavalry operations. However, since its cartridge contained only forty-five grains of black powder, it lacked the range and muzzle
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power of some other weapons. By 1864, the Spencer became the standard arm of the Federal cavalry, and by the fall of that year it began appearing in infantry brigades. Throughout the war, the Federals purchased 77,181 Spencers.84 Among this assortment of weapons, Forrest personally preferred the Enfield rifle because he felt that its short length made it easy to carry on horseback, yet it was more accurate than the still shorter Enfield carbine, which was adopted as the regulation Confederate cavalry weapon in October 1863. Federal General Sooy Smith seemed to support Forrest’s preference, arguing before he took off in support of Sherman’s Meridian campaign that “the ground was so obstructed as to make it absolutely necessary that we should fight dismounted, and for this kind of fighting, the enemy, armed with Enfield and Austrian rifles, was better prepared than our force, armed mainly with carbines.”85 The carbines to which Smith referred were similar to rifles but usually shorter in length and lower in muzzle velocity. Their main advantage for the cavalryman was that the shorter length made them easier to handle while riding and in close combat. A factory was established at Tallassee, Alabama, to produce the Enfield carbines for the Confederacy, but it did not ship its first batch until April 1865—too late to have any impact.86 For the most part, the Enfields Forrest’s men carried had been captured from the Federals. To help facilitate loading, the cavalrymen attached the weapon’s ramrod on a swivel hinge. Still, like all muzzleloaders, the Enfield was hard to load on horseback.87 To overcome this difficulty, in addition to rifles, Forrest’s men routinely carried more easily manipulated six-shooter revolvers, the most popular in the Confederacy being the Colt Navy Model 1851. While some Mississippians had original models, many had copies that became known as “Confederate Colts.” These variations closely resembled the original except for a “dragoon type” barrel that was part round rather than fully octagonal. This modification made the revolvers easier to manufacture and therefore cut production times. Perhaps the premier Confederate Colts were manufactured by Thomas Leech and Charles H. Rigdon, identified by the “Leech & Rigdon CSA” stamp on the flat top of the barrel frame.
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The Colt Navy Model 1851 was the most popular six-shooter among Confederate troops. Pistols courtesy of the Mississippi Armed Forces Museum, Burnelle B. McMahan Collection. Photograph by Jay Van Orsdol.
Leech and Rigdon revolvers were all six-shot, .36 caliber with steel frames, brass backstraps, and trigger guards.88 Rigdon was originally a scales maker in St. Louis, Missouri, but his Confederate sympathies brought him to Memphis, Tennessee. There he met Leech, who worked as a cotton broker. In 1862 the pair secured a contract to produce Colt revolvers for the Confederate government, but with the fall of Fort Donelson in February, Memphis became a vulnerable position. In March, General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard began making arrangements to move all ordnance property further south, and it is unlikely that Leech and Rigdon produced any revolvers while in Memphis. Instead the operation moved to Mississippi, where Grenada was selected as an ammunition depot, and Columbus housed an arsenal.89 The Columbus operation was a large one and employed thirty-two gunsmiths, sixteen stockers, and eight machinists by June.90 In November another fifty gunsmiths were sent there,91 but Lieutenant General Pemberton soon feared for the position and suggested the machinery and ordnance stores be relocated deeper in the interior of Mississippi.92 By January 1, 1863, the arsenal and machinery had been moved,93 and Leech and Rigdon eventually resumed operations in Greensboro, Georgia.94 Nonetheless
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it was at Columbus that the pair began producing Confederate Colts.95 In fact, they ran an advertisement in the Jackson Daily Mississippian on November 7, 1862, announcing, “We have on hand and ready for delivery, 100 Navy Repeaters, (Colt’s patent) and are manufacturing them at the rate of thirty per week. Price for a single Pistol, $75, or when for companies of not less than forty $65.” The advertisement also offered “a few very fine Staff Swords, and some extra fine Spurs.”96 Thus armed with this array of sabers, rifles, and revolvers, Forrest developed a plan to defeat the Federal cavalry first and then deal with the slower-moving infantry later. The battle began when Sturgis’s cavalry routed a Confederate patrol about a mile and a half from Brice’s Crossroads. Forrest then rallied his men behind a heavy rail fence that enclosed a field surrounded by dense undergrowth. Still Forrest did not assume an exclusively defensive posture. He ordered Brigadier General Hylan Lyon to charge dismounted as a feint, and the ruse worked, causing the Federals to dismount and remain in position. Lyon then used the hiatus to prepare his own position with rails, logs, and whatever else he could find. As more Confederates arrived, Lyon launched another attack. The battle was growing, but Forrest’s plan was working. In a desperate fight, Forrest’s determined men succeeded in defeating the Federal cavalry before the infantry could arrive. But by early afternoon Sturgis’s infantry did reach the field and began the process of drawing itself in a close semicircle around the crossroads. Now Forrest proceeded to the second part of his plan—defeating the Federal infantry. To do so, he ordered Brigadier General Tyree Bell to charge on the left, and the entanglements of blackjack and brushwood there soon reduced the fight to hand-to-hand combat. According to Lieutenant Witherspoon, “guns once fired were used as clubs, and pistols were brought into play.”97 Forrest was in the thick of it, dismounted with pistol in hand. Colonel Edmund Rucker and his men were also in a close fight. Against Federal soldiers with fixed bayonets, Rucker calmly ordered, “Kneel on the ground men, draw your six-shooters, and don’t run.” Edwin Bearss laconically summarizes the bloody hand-to-hand combat, saying, “The bayonet was no match for the six-shooter.”98
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At Brice’s Crossroads, all weapons seem to be used in an extremely personal way. Captain John Morton even brought forward four brass 6-pounder artillery pieces that he double-shotted with canister and fired at musket range.99 These guns were the same Model 1841 6-pounders that had served the artillery corps well in Mexico. In fact, 6-pounders had played a critical role in supporting Colonel Jefferson Davis’s Mississippi Rifles at Buena Vista.100 The guns were in wide distribution at the outbreak of the Civil War, but in 1857 a new and more versatile piece, the 12-pounder gun-howitzer Model 1857, had been introduced. Limited production of the Model 1857, however, made the 6-pounder a fixture in the inventories of both armies, especially in the western theater.101 Mobility of these and other artillery pieces on the Civil War battlefield was achieved by manpower. Without recoil mechanisms, the only way to absorb recoil was to allow the entire piece to run back between two and thirty yards on the gun carriage wheels and trail. Then crews would manhandle the gun back into battery. Crews also pushed the guns over short distances into different positions. Strategic mobility was accomplished by horses or mules.102 The 6-pounder was well suited for Forrest, because at a weight of just nine hundred pounds, the gun’s relative ease of transportation and mobility facilitated Forrest’s fast-paced operations. The 6-pounder had a maximum effective range of 1,523 yards. The tubes were mounted on carriages made of wood and iron, and each carriage hooked up to a limber. The limber was usually attached to four horses, and each limber carried an ammunition chest that doubled as a seat for two or three of the gun crew during transit. The ammunition chest weighed about five hundred pounds and opened to the rear. For a 6-pounder, the chest held about sixty complete cartridges, each ready for loading down the muzzle in one piece.103 A 6-pounder could fire solid shot, shell, spherical case, grapeshot, and canister rounds.104 The battery commander usually chose the type of ammunition based on the situation at hand, and in this particular case, Morton fired canister. Canister consisted of iron top and bottom plates over which were bent the ends of a cylinder made from sheet tin. Inside were four tiers of iron balls, each tier containing seven balls. One centered
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ball was surrounded by the other six, and solidly packed sawdust kept the balls from moving. To accommodate the rivets for the handle, the center ball on the top tier was left out. The result was a count of twenty-seven balls per round in a 6-pounder.105 “Double-shot,” as used in this case, meant two rounds were loaded and fired simultaneously using a single charge. Canister turned smoothbores into formidable weapons at short ranges such as on the Brice’s Crossroads battlefield. The balls scattered in the form of a cone immediately upon leaving the muzzle, resulting in a shotgun effect that was especially deadly at ranges between 100 and 200 yards. Beyond that, the dispersal diminished the impact, although canister was still effective out to 400 yards.106 Forrest had an excellent appreciation for artillery. After the battle, he gave great credit to Morton, saying, “Well, John, I think your guns won the battle for us.” Morton conceded that he had been worried that his guns were so far forward without infantry. Indeed, it was unusual in the Civil War for artillery to be used in such a way, but such had not always been the case. In fact, the Mexican War had been full of examples of artillery being used in short-range offensive role. The Napoleonic tactics of that earlier era used artillery to create a breach in the enemy’s defenses through which infantry could attack. This was possible because of artillery’s advantage in “standoff.” Standoff is achieved when one weapon has a longer range than the one opposing it. In this particular case, the infantry musket of the Mexican War was inaccurate even against massed targets beyond one hundred yards, while artillery was extremely deadly firing canister at about four hundred yards. With such a differential in their favor, artillerists in the war with Mexico were able to leisurely work their guns without much fear of infantry muskets endangering them.107 But the increased range of rifles in the Civil War, especially when being fired by protected defenders, prevented artillery from getting close enough to have the desired effect with canister without exposing the gunners to defensive fire. Furthermore, even the increased range of Civil War cannons provided no real advantage in the broken and wooded terrain common on so many Civil War battlefields. Thus in the Civil War, both technology and
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terrain cost artillery the assumed standoff advantage over the infantry it had enjoyed in Mexico. Consequently most successful Civil War artillery actions were defensive rather than offensive.108 Forrest, however, was not a defensive fighter, believing one man in motion was worth two standing to receive an attack.109 At Brice’s Crossroads, he was able to use his artillery in the close-in offensive role that was uncommon in the Civil War. Forrest’s bold charge on the heels of Morton’s artillery fire succeeded in breaking the Federal line, and Sturgis’s men took flight. Forrest’s plan now entered its pursuit phase. Again the longer-ranged weapons such as artillery and rifles returned to the fore. The rout was complete, with Sturgis musing wistfully, “If Mr. Forrest will let me alone, I will let him alone.” Not sharing Sturgis’s attitude, Forrest maintained his pressure into the next day, and by the time Sturgis limped back to Memphis, he had lost 223 killed, 394 wounded, and 1,623 missing. In addition to the personnel losses, the Federals lost numerous weapons to the Confederates. Forrest reported capturing sixteen cannons and 1,500 stands of small arms.110 These prizes were an effective means of supplementing the meager Confederate manufacturing output. But in spite of the tactical defeat, Sturgis could take some consolation in having accomplished his chief object of distracting Forrest from Sherman’s communications.111
O B S E RVATI O NS CONCE RNING WE APONS O N T HE L AND I N CIVIL WAR MIS S IS SIPPI Artillery and mortars were key to the struggle for Vicksburg and, with it, control of the Mississippi River. The Confederates placed great faith— unwarranted, as it turned out—on artillery’s ability to block Federal passage of the river. However, the strength of the defense, afforded largely by the rifle, allowed Pemberton’s men to withstand direct Federal assault. During two attacks and throughout the siege, Federals and Confederates used a variety of inventive weapons such as artillery shells modified to serve as hand grenades, Coehorn mortars made out of wood, and underground explosions to battle each other. These novel weapons follow in the creative
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tradition of the torpedoes the Confederates used to sink the Cairo. Both sides pummeled each other with artillery fire, but in the end, the Federals’ concentrated fire was of greater effect. In the process, the duel highlighted a variety of interesting weapons ranging from siege pieces to mortars to naval guns. It was an impressive array of the wide range of artillery pieces that served in Mississippi during the Civil War. Elsewhere in Mississippi, Nathan Bedford Forrest demonstrated the type of weapons used by the cavalry under circumstances much less formal than the siege. Although he had no classical military education, Forrest had a remarkable grasp of weapons. He understood that the rifle had changed the role of cavalry, transforming the horse-mounted soldier’s most effective contribution to that of a dragoon who used the horse for mobility and then fought dismounted. Thus Forrest used the horse to deliver his men to battle, where they then used an assortment of rifles, carbines, and shotguns to fight at a relatively long range. When the time was right, Forrest would remount his men to charge the enemy. He realized that in the close-in fight, six-shooters were more effective weapons than sabers, although Forrest’s strength and skill allowed him to personally be deadly with most any weapon in a hand-to-hand fight. Warfare was personal for Forrest, and he even used his artillery in a direct and close-range manner. Once his charge had broken the enemy, Forrest mounted a vigorous pursuit on horseback, again using his longer-range weapons and mounted mobility to damage the fleeing enemy. Perhaps as much as anyone else on land in Mississippi during the Civil War, Forrest showed a mastery of using each weapon available to him in a specific way that maximized its effectiveness.
8 R IFLE S, B OWS, AN D GU N S W EAPONS OF MISSISSIPPI H UNTERS AND PRIVATE CITIZENS
Hunting has long been a part of life in Mississippi, as demonstrated by the skills and weapons of the native Mississippians. Today the state boasts more than two million acres of wild game habitat for species such as white-tailed deer, eastern wild turkey, migratory waterfowl, mourning dove, quail, squirrel, and rabbit. Mississippi hunters use primitive weapons, conventional guns and rifles, and bows to hunt during specified seasons on a managed system of thirty-eight state wildlife management areas, fourteen national wildlife refuges, and six national forests, as well as many private hunting lands. During Mississippi’s history many factors have divided its residents, but a love of hunting seems to cross age, racial, and economic lines in an unusual and positive way that unites Mississippians.1 The National Rifle Association is well represented in Mississippi, and Dick Kingsafer, senior NRA field representative for Louisiana and south Mississippi, reports that some thirty thousand Mississippians belong to the organization.2 Perhaps the easiest way to gain a quick appreciation for Mississippians’ love of weapons is to attend one of the numerous gun shows where weapons enthusiasts of all types meet to buy, sell, trade, and 116
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admire a variety of weapons. Many of the shows are two-day affairs that attract vendors from across the region. They depict the wide variety of weapons used by individual Mississippians for hunting, sport shooting, protection, and collecting. Private gun ownership in Mississippi says much about the state and its residents. It is a testimony to Mississippians’ self-reliance, whether that means putting food on the family table or protecting oneself from criminals. It is an extension of the state’s martial spirit that associates skill with firearms and outdoorsmanship with masculinity and honor. Hunting is all made possible by the state’s largely rural character, which has preserved the wildlife habitat. Owning guns is a Mississippi tradition for many of its citizens, and Mississippians are typically a traditional people.
DEER Many Mississippians either hunt or know someone who does, and deer are unquestionably the most popular big-game species in the state. Deer can be found all over Mississippi, but perhaps the part of the state with the longest tradition is the Delta. To get an idea of the importance of deer hunting there, one need do no more than make a casual survey of place names: Deer Slough, Deer Creek, Deer Creek Road, Deer Island, Deer Lake, and Deer Ridge all attest to the role deer have played in the Delta, and deer hunters there have long had a oneness with the land. The wealthy antebellum landowner in the Delta often held large tracts of undeveloped land, and because geography and the institution of slavery left him relatively isolated, he spent much of his leisure time in the woods. The result was an intimate knowledge of the terrain and a faithfulness to a specific hunting spot that had proved lucrative to several generations. This connection was particularly strong in the nineteenth century, when deer hunting in the South in general and the Mississippi Delta in particular “maintained a dignity not found in other parts of the country.” Robert Wegner, a specialist in the cultural history of deer hunting, explains that deer hunting in the Delta “entailed a long-lasting legacy of land, family and
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tradition; and of honor, pride and independence.”3 Deer hunting was not something men in the Delta simply did in the 1800s. It was much of what they were. This era and phenomenon are perhaps best captured by William Faulkner in “The Old People,” a story in the collection Go Down, Moses. The story opens with Sam Fathers, a seventy-year-old man born into slavery as the son of a black slave and a Chickasaw chief, coaching twelveyear-old Isaac McCaslin as a hunter. “Now, shoot quick, and slow,” Fathers counsels.4 The young McCaslin lives to be eighty and grows to be a great hunter, but this is his first buck. In the time-honored tradition, Fathers initiates McCaslin into the brotherhood by wiping the boy’s face with the steaming blood of the fresh-killed deer.5 The relationship between Fathers and McCaslin symbolizes the way hunting connects people. The two characters are of different age, social class, and race, but the young white boy patiently submits to the wisdom and authority of the old ex-slave of mixed Indian and black heritage. Fathers teaches the boy “the woods, to hunt, when to shoot and when not to shoot, when to kill and when not to kill, and better, what to do with it afterward.”6 Fathers tells McCaslin so much about the old times that they “would cease to be old times and would become part of the boy’s present, not only as if they had happened yesterday but as if they were still happening.”7 Hunting, or at least the stories and lore of the hunt, connects past, present, and future generations. For tradition-minded Mississippians, this is much of the sport’s attraction. Like Isaac McCaslin, many young Mississippians are exposed to hunting at an early age by a more seasoned hunter. When Forrest Burris, now a sixteen-year-old living in Hattiesburg, was just five, he was already sitting in the deer stand with his father. He remembers this initial experience as “kinda cold and boring,” and his main concern was when they were going to eat breakfast. Still, hunting got into young Burris’s blood. He started really liking the camouflaged hunting clothes and began wearing them to school. He accumulated all the hunting paraphernalia, including a grunt call and a pair of binoculars he would wear around his neck in and out of the woods. In his words, he was “getting hooked,” a phrase many hunters use to describe their passion for the sport.
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What attracted Burris to hunting at such a young age was “just sitting out there and watching all the wildlife—watching the sun hit the trees. I liked that so much I didn’t even care if I got a deer.” By the time he was ten, he was carrying a rifle on hunts with his father, and by eleven Burris was hunting by himself. He loved to “go sit in the tree stand all day and watch the wildlife run around and feel the wind blow and think about stuff.” Before he was even a teenager, Burris was filled with the wonder of the outdoors and the special connection between the hunter and nature. Burris was twelve when he got his first deer while hunting in Runnelstown in Perry County. It had been a long day, and Burris fell asleep, only to wake up just before dark with three deer in his sights. He admits to aiming for the one in the middle but hitting the one on the left. Regardless, he had his first deer, an experience he describes as “exhilarating.” “That,” he says, “is when I really got hooked.” Burris was hunting that day with his older brother Bennett, whom he credits with teaching him most of what he knows about hunting. They hung the deer over the old swing set in their backyard, and some of Bennett’s friends came over to help them clean it. In a slight modification to the sacred tradition of smearing the hunter’s face with the blood of his first deer, Bennett and his friends dumped a bucket of deer guts over the unsuspecting Burris. The result was the same. A new hunter was initiated into the brotherhood. The rifle Burris used to get his first kill was a Savage Arms .243 Winchester Youth Model. Because it is important for beginning hunters to be comfortable with their first rifle, youth rifles generally have a length of pull (the distance from the trigger to the end of the stock) an inch or so shorter than regular models. Burris’s .243 is a bolt-action rifle. Bolt-action rifles have a small handle, usually on the right-hand side of the weapon, that when pulled unlocks the bolt and opens the breech. The spent casing is ejected, and a new round is loaded in the breech. The bolt is then closed, and the rifle is ready to fire. Bolt-action rifles are extremely popular, in part for their superior accuracy. “Action” is the way a rifle mechanically loads and ejects ammunition. Common types in addition to bolt action are slide or pump, lever, and semiautomatic. Any flexing or bending of a rifle’s action lessens accuracy, and
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the symmetrical locking arrangement of most bolt-action rifles gives them an inherent stiffness, as does the one-piece stock. Bolt action works slower than other types, but most deer hunters like Burris are willing to trade a reduced rate of fire for the punch and accuracy bolt-action rifles deliver.8 Burris has since picked up an arsenal of hunting weapons he inherited from his grandfather, including a .30-06 Browning Safari and a Weatherby Mark V, but the affinity he has for his first rifle is obvious. He calls the Savage “a dead-on gun” and claims to have never missed a deer with it. It is a rifle he will likely give to his own son someday, because Burris is already planning to continue the family hunting tradition. “Hunting was passed on to me,” he says, “and I plan to keep it alive in my family.”
M IS SI SS IP PI H UNTING AS A S OCIAL PHENO M ENO N Hunting connects not just generations but many other segments of society, and there is perhaps nothing more special in the social life of a hunter than the deer camp. To the uninitiated, the phrase “deer camp” seems to describe a place. Hunters know that in reality, deer camp is more an experience. It is a sacred ritual spoken of with a rare mix of excitement and reverence, pride and confidentiality, anticipation and nostalgia. It is at once the manliest of settings and a time when men become boys. It is “a holy place where hunters experience self-renewal, spiritual communion and a sense of brotherhood.”9 Physically, the deer camp can be anything from a tar-paper shack to a trailer to a well-constructed cabin. Whatever the structure is, it is surrounded by a parking lot of pickup trucks, jeeps, and four-wheelers. In their purest form, a form that perhaps exists today best in the recesses of nostalgia, deer camps are heated by a potbelly stove and illuminated by lanterns. Even in the rudimentary camps of Faulkner’s day, however, there was usually one luxury—electricity enough to keep both the meat and the beer cool. Deer camp is a monumental social event. It is endless talk of rifles, stands, camouflage, trophies, recipes, phantom bucks, game wardens, and
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food plots where fact, legend, and myth coexist in a seamless blend. It is a living link between hunting’s past, present, and future. It is one of the key vehicles by which hunting transcends a sport and becomes a culture. Deer camp is also a great social equalizer. While some modern deer camps have become embarrassingly comfortable, the experience is still a retreat from broader civilization into a close band of brothers communally sharing the rigors of outdoor life. It is among the most democratic of all social endeavors. Class, occupation, age, income, and even gender carry no weight at the deer camp. The duties of cooking, cleaning, and tending the fire are all divided up with a sense of equality that would have delighted the Utopians.10 One of the most legendary deer camps of the Mississippi Delta was the Ten Point Deer Camp located in the Steele Bayou backwoods of Issaquena County. Ten Point traces its roots to 1927, when Paul King and Florence Huffman first came to the area on a squirrel-hunting trip. The couple began spending more and more time there, including in the off-season. In 1939 they founded the Ten Point Deer Club, and in 1952 they moved to the club’s rustic camp house to live year-round.11 Ten Point remained a wooded stronghold in the Mississippi Delta until the early 1960s. The beginning of the end came in 1962 when a bridge opened across Steele Bayou, and a new, paved highway sprang up in view of the clubhouse. Then came power lines, telephones, and the inevitable surge of development. By the end of 1963, the Army Corps of Engineers had forcibly bought the land on which the clubhouse stood to build a floodgate and a system of levees that would ultimately consume what was left of the old woods. In the words of Alan Huffman, grandson of Ten Point’s founders, “Suddenly, the world that had given Ten Point its highest value was closing in for the kill.”12 Faulkner describes a similar phenomenon of paradise lost in the story “Delta Woods.” What was once an impenetrable jungle gave way first to cotton patches, then to fields, then to plantations. Paths made by deer and bear became roads and highways, and towns sprang up along them. After making some six-odd November trips into the Delta, old “Uncle Ike” McCaslin successively had “farther and farther to drive, the territory in which game still existed drawing yearly inward.”13 By the time of this last
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trip, a man had to drive “two hundred miles from Jefferson before he found wilderness to hunt in.”14 Until the unwelcome arrival of civilization, however, Ten Point served as a rendezvous for a diverse group of lawyers, doctors, businessmen, their employees and their wives, as well as cooks, mechanics, fishermen, housewives, handymen, and others. The members of this broad cross section of humanity had one thing in common—a love of hunting deer in the Mississippi Delta. Were it not for Ten Point, most of these people’s paths would never have crossed.15 Florence “Mama” Huffman was a tireless chronicler of Ten Point’s history. She took more than four thousand black-and-white photographs of all aspects of camp life. Many of these photos are now housed in the Mississippi Department of Archives and History.16 They are an important legacy to a fast-disappearing, if not already extinct, slice of Mississippiana. But Florence was more than a recorder of Ten Point’s history. She was also a part of it. While she and other women were not official members of the club and could not vote on its affairs, they did hunt. They also took part in Ten Point’s traditions, such as the one in which a hunter who missed a shot was penalized by having his shirttail cut off, with the amount removed varying based on the egregiousness of the offense. In the egalitarian tradition of a deer camp, even Mama Florence paid this price.17 One Mississippian that continues Florence Huffman’s tradition of female hunters is Deanna Latham, a nineteen-year-old sports management major at the University of Southern Mississippi. Latham is a selfproclaimed “daddy’s girl” who began hunting when she was nine with her father, Billy Ray Parker, a man she describes as her “hunting buddy.” Latham says that growing up she always did everything with her father, so naturally that included hunting. She describes hunting as a special time with her father, one that created a “close bond that took us away from the world and allowed us to just spend time together.” Like Forrest Burris and many other first-time hunters, Latham got off to a rough start. She was hunting with her father at their old deer camp in their hometown of Pelahatchie in Rankin County, and Latham made the mistake of taking off her boots. It had rained the day before and soaked the
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Deanna Latham poses with her first buck while her father Billy Ray Parker proudly looks on. Courtesy of Deanna Latham.
carpet in their deer stand. Pretty soon Latham’s feet were soaked too. She was “cold and miserable and knew right then I was not going to come back again.” Even though hunters were bagging deer all around them, Latham and her dad had to head home early to get her dried out. In spite of this inauspicious beginning, Latham was soon back in the woods, and by the time she was twelve, she got her first deer. This time she was hunting during youth weekend at their deer camp in Hazelhurst. One local homeowner did not particularly like hunters and used to make a habit of cutting his grass during prime hunting time, a nuisance that was particularly frustrating to young Latham. Shortly after 5:00 p.m., she was about ready to give up when a doe came into view. Latham “dropped it in its tracks” for her first kill. Her friends spared her the blood bath Burris enjoyed, but they did “make me spread some of it on my face.” Three years later, Latham was hunting for the first time by herself. She was in a ground blind her Dad had set out for her, and she was busily texting her friends to tell them that she was hunting. She had just told a friend that she had not seen anything and was ready to go home when suddenly, “twenty-five feet in front of me, a huge buck was looking me straight
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in the eyes and walking toward me.” Latham admits to being scared, but she put down her cell phone, grabbed her rifle, and shot. Immediately she called her dad on her walkie-talkie. He was about three hundred yards away and asked her what she shot. Excitedly she told him that “she just knew it had horns.” It was a ten pointer, not bad for her first buck. Later, Latham’s family bought the land where they had hunted that day, and together Latham and her dad built a cabin that sits on the exact spot where she killed her first buck. She describes it as “a special place to me because I have such wonderful memories there of me and my dad.” Latham says her “family is all from the country, so a female hunter is nothing new for us,” but she does get the occasional snide remark from others, “mostly from guys who are jealous I’ve killed more and bigger deer than them.” With a smile she adds, “They hate to admit that a girl can do something better than they can.” Latham’s boyfriend does not seem to mind. She introduced him to hunting, and they were hunting together when he killed his first deer. Latham killed her first deer with her cousin’s .270 Remington. Many consider the .270 to be America’s classic deer rifle, although proponents of the .30-06 will put up a passionate counterargument. Latham likes the .270 because it “is not real loud to me or kicks bad.”18 The legendary hunter and writer Jack O’Connor would agree with this assessment.19 In Outdoor Life magazine and several books, O’Connor sang the praises of the .270. The result, according to one of O’Connor’s biographers, is that if you “mention the name Jack O’Connor to many hunters and shooters of today, . . . they’ll likely say, ‘Oh, yeah, the .270 guy!’ ”20 Many shooters like to reload ammunition, and this money-saving procedure is possible with a centerfire cartridge like the .270. In a centerfire cartridge, the firing pin strikes the primer cap located in the center of the cartridge. The primer, however, is a separate and replaceable component, while the brass c