Walled Towns and the Shaping of France: From the Medieval to the Early Modern Era

Walled Towns and the Shaping of France From the Medieval to the Early Modern Era

Michael Wolfe

WALLED TOWNS AND THE SHAPING OF FRANCE

Copyright © Michael Wolfe, 2009. All rights reserved. First published in 2009 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–60812–2 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Wolfe, Michael. Walled towns and the shaping of France : from the medieval to the early modern era / Michael Wolfe. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–230–60812–4 1. City and town life—France—History. 2. City walls—Social aspects—France—History. 3. Cities and towns—France—History. 4. Fortification—France—History. 5. Authority—Social aspects— France—History. 6. France—Social life and customs. 7. France— History—Medieval period, 987–1515. 8. France—History—16th century. 9. France—History—Bourbons, 1589–1789. I. Title. DC33.2.W65 2009 944⬘.02—dc22

2009002650

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: September 2009 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

C on t e n t s

List of Maps and Illustrations

iv

Preface

v Part I

The Walls Go Up (900–1325)

1 Urban Legacies and Medieval Trends up to 1100 2 Lords and Towns (1100–1225) 3 Capetian Expansion and New Urbanism, 1225–1325 Part II

3 19 39

The Walls Move Outward (1325–1600)

4 Bonnes Villes and the Hundred Years’ War 5 Royal Rulers and Bastioned Towns 6 Walled Towns during the Wars of Religion

57 75 97

Part III The Walls Come Down (1600–1750) 7 State Building and Urban Fortifications 8 Opening Towns, Closing Frontiers

123 147

Conclusion Palimpsests and Modern Trajectories

171

Notes

175

Select Bibliography

223

Index

251

M a ps a n d I l lust r at ions

Cover Henri IV before Amiens, 1597. By permission of the Bibliothèque Nationale (B.N. G151474).

Maps 1.1 2.1 3.1 4.1 6.1 8.1

Walled towns in Roman Gaul. France, 1150–1250. Bonnes Villes and Bastides, 1300. Hundred Years’ War. Wars of Religion, 1561–1629. France, 1650–1710.

4 26 43 59 101 152

Figures 1.1 Vestiges of the Gallo-Roman theater in Poitiers. By permission of the Bibliothèque Nationale (B.N. M74188). 5.1 Villefranche. By permission of the Bibliothèque Nationale (B.N. M73577). 6.1 Fortifications of La Rochelle, 1573. By permission of the Bibliothèque Nationale (B.N. 87C 131083). 7.1 Views of Calais, Guigne, and Ardres by Joachim Du Wiert, 1611. By permission of the Bibliothèque Nationale (B.N. Vx 23 2989). 7.2 Surrender of La Rochelle, 1628. By permission of the Bibliothèque Nationale (B.N. 152878). 8.1 Tours in the late seventeenth century. By permission of the Bibliothèque Nationale (B.N. M74008 B15).

5 83 106

124 135 160

P r e fac e

The history of France can be read on the walls of its towns, even though most of

these walls no longer exist. Towns have played a decisive, yet changing set of roles in the country’s history. This book focuses on these urban experiences, assessing the ways in which social and political practices, military technologies, physical geography, and shifting regional networks shaped the emergence of new forms of public authority and civic life. Towns and territorial rulers, chief among them the monarchy, together constituted the “state” understood as a set of mutual relationships based on agreed upon rules and shared interests. These relationships became embodied above all in the “wall,” an image at once both intensely physical and deeply symbolic. This study presents a synthetic analysis based on an exhaustive study of the vast secondary literature on French urbanism in general and hundreds of individual towns. It begins with a review of medieval towns and traces their ensuing evolution to the eighteenth century when they began to be released from the confines of their walls. A dynamic new kind of modern urban community began to take shape in advance of the revolutionary upheavals in politics and industry after 1789. This long-term perspective offers a new interpretive framework centered on urban fortifications, for how they were built, the contests to control them, and how they shaped the lives of people both inside and outside them, all tell us a great deal about the making of France. The book has three parts. Part one, “The Walls Go Up (900–1325),” examines the Gallo-Roman urban legacy and the rise of walled towns from the tenth century to the onset of the Hundred Years’ War. Part two, “The Walls Move Outward (1325–1600),” explores how that conflict, together with new forms of monarchical state authority, gunpowder weapons, and new fortification design theories from Italy, all shaped towns up through the Wars of Religion. Finally, part three, “The Walls Come Down (1600–1750),” charts the impact that a now dominant royal state had on urban forms and communities, the emergence of a royal fortification service, new ways of envisioning urban communities, and attempts to spur town economic life, all of which required an expanded perimeter of fortified places in Vauban’s ceinture de fer while towns in the “interior” began to be opened up for new modern forms and practices of civic life to emerge. This study contends that the historical genesis of modern France was over the last millennium a largely ongoing urban phenomenon. Networks of urban communities, in relation first with feudatory powers and then the monarchy, gradually defined from an ever widening regional ambit much of the country’s economic, political, and cultural life. The distinction between “urban” and “royal” begins to collapse as towns and the crown instead stood along a continuum of nascent public forms and statist forces that—through conflict and accommodation—created so much of the France we see today.

vi

P r e fac e

I wish to thank all the people and institutions whose generous support helped me write this book. Both St. John’s University and Pennsylvania State University provided me the generous time and resources necessary for research and writing. The National Endowment for the Humanities gave me a summer grant years ago that initiated this project. Another happy summer of research at the Newberry Library, and repeated trips to the Bibliothèque Nationale and regional archives in Amiens, Bourges, La Rochelle, Montauban, and Nîmes, as well as the Library of Congress, the Widener Library at Harvard University, the Harlan Hatcher Graduate Library at the University of Michigan, and the Huntingdon Library in San Marino, California, all afforded me opportunities to delve into the rich documentary history of urban fortifications. Inter-loan librarians, especially the late Cathy Wagner at Penn State, were tireless in tracking down all kinds of obscure French titles for me on this town and that. And over the years, many colleagues and friends—you know who you all are!—have read portions of this work or patiently listened to me go on and on about my walls. My deep gratitude goes to you all. Finally, to my family, who endured my long absences and the even longer time I spent sequestered within the walls of my office, along with gratitude comes my love. I dedicate this book to my lovely wife and best friend, Amy, with the promise that which Fate has joined no walls will ever rend asunder.

Pa r t I

Th e Wa l l s G o Up (9 0 0 – 1 3 2 5)

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Ch apter 1

U rban Lega cies and Medieval Trends u p to 1100 Gallo-Roman and Early Medieval Urban Legacies The contradictory impulse to be apart from yet also connected to the outside world shaped the first Neolithic fortified settlements in what became France five thousand years ago. This ambivalence became more pronounced in the timbered stockades around later Celtic villages, described first by Julius Caesar. Roman military encampments laid out by priests with the intersecting lines of the cardo and decumanus defined a central enclosed space yet pointed to the world at large. These fortified sites evolved after the second century CE into walled towns known as oppida.1 Situated on rivers for trade and defense, Gallo-Roman oppida began as simple quadrilateral enclosures pierced by gated ways. The massive brick walls and towers that later ringed them arose as Roman power weakened in the third century CE.2 Over one hundred oppida existed across greater Gaul, along with smaller walled places known as castrums (castra; see map 1.1). Later Germanic invaders often maintained and even bolstered these fortified places.3 In the fifth century, Visigoths transformed the Roman amphitheater in Nîmes into a little town by closing off the entrances and using the stadium’s upper tiers as ramparts. Shops, churches, and residences for some two thousand people eventually went up inside the arena. The amphitheaters in Poitiers and Arles underwent similar alterations that lasted into the nineteenth century (see figure 1.1). Roman temples sometimes became converted into fortified redoubts known as castellums.4 Gallo-Roman fortifications often disappeared because they served as stone quarries for later medieval building projects.5 Traces of oppida abound in French towns today or in street names while their distinctive roseate walls still stand in Le Mans and Valence.6 Late Antique walls fell into disrepair as towns shrank under Frankish rule in the early Middle Ages. As a result, the Frankish nobility gradually assumed more direct control of walled towns and fortified places. The Catholic Church also played a pivotal role in shaping early urban enceintes to shield God’s people. Thick-walled Romanesque churches, often built by monasteries, offered refuge in towns as well as the countryside. Episcopal sees also established protective zones in cathedral precincts. Church buildings provided a place to store food and munitions as churchmen assumed local military authority. In 898, for example, King Charles the Simple granted permission to the bishop of Noyon to rebuild the

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Map 1.1

Wa l l e d Tow ns a n d t h e Sh a p i ng of F r a nc e

Walled towns in Roman Gaul.

old fortifications of Tournai. Concessions of authority to local nobility and clergy surged as Carolingian power waned in the ninth and tenth centuries.7 While Gallo-Roman brick enceintes persisted in many places, new proto-urban defensive works after the ninth century were mainly wooden stockades similar to the rudimentary moat and bailey structures found in the countryside. Historians must rely on archaeology to understand these sites, which usually consisted of a circular enceinte composed of deep ditches fronting earthen walls topped with a wooden palisade. Vestiges of these defenses still subsist in some street plans.8 After 900, rising commercial activity along rivers and coastlines renewed interest in building fortifications in burgs from the Seine basin north to the Scheldt estuary. Viking raids also stimulated fortification construction in places that then evolved into trading centers. While Gallo-Roman continuities held sway in some areas, the seeds of a new, expanded urbanism took root after 900.9 Gallo-Roman walled towns had developed primarily as political and military centers, whereas medieval

Figure 1.1

Vestiges of the Gallo-Roman theater in Poitiers. By permission of the Bibliothèque Nationale (B.N. M74188).

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towns began as marketplaces and manufacturing centers. Another difference was that Gallo-Roman walled towns diminished in number as one moved north, while urban growth in the Middle Ages began most intensely in the north and generally lessened as one moved south. The partition of the Carolingian Empire in the ninth century into different rulerships separated Aquitaine and Gascony from Neustria to the north. It fostered in each area over time a sense of distinctive identity as a natio or gens sharing a common descent but still belonging to a larger kingdom. This heritage of historic connectedness survived as real public authority disintegrated among local feudatories, including the newly elected dynasty of Hugh Capet. Defensive relationships and forms adapted to these new conditions. Indeed, notions of public authority, if they survived at all, did so in arguments over control of fortifications. Local lords known as castellans asserted their rights by building simple quadriangular castles (châteaux-forts) over these incipient towns to manifest their military and administrative authority as seigneur.10 Ensconced in this redoubt, a lord and his retainers offered protection to residents over whom they also exerted domination.11 Waves of castle-building occurred with the collapse of Neustria as the Normans used stone towers and rubble-filled walls as instruments to claim and dominate territory. These practices followed them into England after 1066 and eventually the Mediterranean and Holy Land.12 Usually situated on higher ground, the châteaufort frequently spurred urban growth beneath its base as a lower town (basse ville) developed as a residential quarters and market and manufacturing district. Nascent urban communities after 900 arose in response to commercial opportunities, the emergence of local feudatory powers, and an abiding need for refuge. These factors shaped their ensuing morphology as new towns appeared across what later became France, with the heaviest urbanizing zones in the flatlands of Picardy and Flanders, Normandy, and the Loire valley. These early towns went by a variety of names. In the southwest, such a new settlement became called a castelnau. The settlement of merchants and workers seeking a lord’s protection became known as a faubourg or portus just beyond the castle or abbey gate; a self-contained community outside the castle was sometimes called the urbs mercatorum.13 Abbeys and monasteries also prompted urban development by building fortified church complexes known as sauvetés to provide sanctuary to passing pilgrims.14 Last, fortified farm houses in the wheat-growing region north of the Loire and the flatlands of Champagne further testified to prevailing insecurities and the localization of selfdefense in the ninth and tenth centuries.15 The seigniorial authority of feudal nobles and churchmen over early towns slowly waned after 1000 as population growth, a more dynamic economy, and new sense of security emerged. Accelerating urbanization fueled the desire for more communal autonomy. The château-fort or abbey church compound soon became sites of tension between seigneur and local community groups. Seigneurial rivalries also played out in urban areas, particularly in southern France where noble families often erected private towers to stake a claim over neighborhoods. Spatial distance between the lord’s keep and the burg sometimes rendered the château-fort a threat rather than a boon to local residents.16 While fortified churches and castles consisted of stone, earthen ramparts topped by wooden palisades mainly protected early towns after 1000. These modest enceintes, together with the nascent tissue of streets, stone gates, marketplaces, and other public spaces, created a new kind of civic space in medieval Europe.

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Urban growth after 1000 posed new challenges of governance and defense that eventually led to the rise of communes. Aspiring municipal leaders discovered a new rhetoric of the “public good” to justify authority over markets, public events, and local health and safety, including defense against outside aggressors. The ensuing “reconquest” of public space proceeded in a piecemeal, sometimes violent manner but in time resulted in greater community control over urban life.17 The patterns and relationships between these early towns and territorial rulers set the framework for the subsequent development of Francia into France.

Regional Patterns and Shifting Frontiers, 950–1150 In the tenth and eleventh centuries, the lands of northern and western Francia came to be dominated by rival feudatory lords who through dynastic marriage, warfare, and the accidents of succession vied for power. These families included the counts, dukes, and barons of lordships that stretched from Flanders and Brabant to Picardy, Normandy, and the Ile-de-France and on to the Loire valley, Brittany, and Champagne and then the vast Midi, greater Aquitaine, and, finally, Provence. The evolving relationships between lords and their towns settled into enduring regional patterns. Their success in dealing with unruly barons and castellans hinged in large part on any aid they received from these early urban communities. Except for places where Gallo-Roman walls remained intact, most urban settlements after the tenth century possessed, at most, simple but effective earthen ramparts, wooden stockades, and perhaps a few stone towers and fortified gates. Yet even these modest defenses represented a substantial investment of scarce resources and a strong measure of communal consensus. Control of fortified burgs, like castles, was decisive in the quest to command a territory and its people. As towns developed, they articulated their own aspirations for greater independence. A three-cornered competition for influence in both old and newly established towns after the tenth century pitted burghers, nobles, and clergymen against each other, though with differing outcomes. Tempestuous communal movements in Flanders and parts of Picardy contrasted with the more orderly emergence of consular regimes in the Midi and the gradual emancipation of towns in the Ile-de-France, Loire, and Berry, while urban communities remained embryonic in Brittany until the late fourteenth century.18 While open conflict between seigneurial and urban interests certainly occurred, less dramatic pragmatic negotiations more usually led lay and ecclesiastical lords to shift more responsibility over self-governance to urban residents in their domains. Magnates, particularly the Capetians, encouraged this process wherever possible through devising courts of law for appeals and arbitration. The patterns of contest and cooperation set in motion among early towns and aspiring feudatory rulers proved of enduring significance. Nowhere was urban development more precocious than in the areas comprising the extensive system of navigable rivers from the Scheldt, whose tributaries connected the Rhine and Meuse, southward to the Somme and Seine basins. A highly productive agricultural economy in these regions fueled population growth and urbanization after the tenth century. However, few documentary descriptions exist of early urban defenses in these areas before the thirteenth century. Feudatory rulers initially benefited from urban growth, none more so than those in Flanders, Brabant, Hainault, and Artois. In the tenth century, burgs in greater Flanders and

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Picardy burgeoned along these waterways that connected the hinterland to the sea. Artisans and merchants chose defensible sites, often close to a castellan’s tower, from which to manufacture and sell their goods. In the second half of the tenth century, the counts of Flanders authorized certain towns to hold fairs to encourage commerce. Bruges, Ghent, Ypres, and Tournai soon became bustling urban centers dominated by reinforced citadels built by the twelfth-century counts of Flanders, Thierry d’Alsace and Philippe d’Alsace. Especially impressive were the piles in Ghent and Douai. A massive oval wall and gate encircled the castle keep at Ghent. Its one-acre enclosure contained residences for the count, his servants, and guards, and a central three-story tower (donjon), the oldest of its kind in western Europe.19 The town proper of Ghent remained without walls until the thirteenth century but did enjoy intricate water defenses in its canals. By contrast, Douai’s first enceinte dated from the late tenth century and enclosed an area of one hundred acres that proved able to accommodate much of this early dynamic growth. Tensions with the counts rose as Douai prospered. Almost certainly under Philip of Alsace, the comtal château-fort underwent significant renovation and reinforcement, including a moat to protect it against attack from both inside and outside the burg.20 Other towns subject to the counts of Flanders, such as Cambrai and Lille, underwent much the same experience.21 The counts of Flanders also initiated in the twelfth century the construction of new ports at Damme and NieuwPort (Gravelines), while along the Meuse river the towns of Huy, Namur, Dinant, and Liège soon grew beyond their original Carolingian settlements.22 Enceintes largely remained secondary to commercial pursuits in towns in the domains of the counts of Flanders until the thirteenth century when dynamic urban growth and the intrusive, grasping ambition of the counts became a volatile combination. More inland areas in the duchy of Brabant, such as Brussels, Louvain, and Malines, urbanized only toward the end of the tenth century, with Nivelles as a notable exception. The dukes of Brabant also founded new towns to secure control of rivers in their territories to supplement the already established Walloon burgs of Mons, Binche, and Fosses-la-Ville.23 As these towns flourished, the dukes of Brabant and regional magnates began to bestow upon them privileges and obligations, including the shared responsibility of local defense, in charters. The earliest such charter in the region was granted by the bishop-count of Liège to the town of Huy in 1066. By 1100, most of these towns began to construct their first permanent enceintes of earthen ramparts topped by wooden palisades. Commerce and more robust forms of feudatory lordship also shaped towns and their defenses in Hainault and Artois. Towns in Hainault were among the first anywhere to begin the shift from earthen ramparts to soaring stone walls in the twelfth century under Count Baudouin IV, known as “the Builder” (le Bâtisseur).24 The towns of Binche and Le Quesnoy typified Baudouin’s approach as he added a tower to the comtal château-fort and erected a crenellated curtain wall with fronting ditches around the burg.25 Urban growth in area towns, such as Valenciennes, required regular expansion of the enceinte.26 Landrecies grew up around a ninthcentury tower built by the counts of Avesnes and received more permanent defenses only after the count sacked the town in 1185 for failure to acknowledge his suzerainty.27 Much the same pattern occurred in the Artois. An exception was the important port of Calais, which received its first enceinte in the eleventh century thanks to episcopal leadership.28 A short distance south was the port of Boulogne-sur-Mer, an important Gallo-Roman oppidium from which Julius Caesar had launched his

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invasion of Britain, whose solid and high fourth-century walls still stood 900 years later. Thus by 1200, dynamic urban growth across Flanders, Brabant, Hainault, and Artois fueled the rise of feudatory rulers whose power rested in large part on controlling towns to tap into their wealth. They did so through a mix of coercion, bluster, and occasional compromise. The most impressive fortified place continued to be the comtal or ducal château-fort, which stood as a potent symbol of these ambitions. Urban defenses, where they existed, mainly consisted of earthen ramparts with stone towers and fortified gates for protection. Investment in stone and brick curtain walls, indicators of rising wealth and insecurities, remained highly exceptional until 1200. New burgs proliferated to the south in the domains of the Capetians across Picardy and the Ile-de-France. Earthen ramparts with timbered fences were again typical, along with stone keeps and fortified gates.29 The Capetians, like lesser lords in these areas, devoted their limited resources to castle construction, some close to these new burgs, but most not.30 Their main goal was to control regional transit points, not towns. Even their capital in Paris possessed but the remains of the original Gallo-Roman enceinte. Exceptions can be found, of course. In Soissons, a bishop in the ninth century added a new enceinte to replace the dilapidated GalloRoman one. The small burg of Crépy-en-Valois became fortified by Gautier II, count of Vexin, in the early eleventh century, while the counts of Champagne expanded the castle enceinte at Château-Thierry to enclose a new burg in the tenth century. Elsewhere in Picardy, the original Gallo-Roman fortifications of Amiens, Beauvais, and Corbie only underwent extensive repair and modification in the early thirteenth century, as did the old Carolingian enceinte surrounding Compiègne. Prior to 1150, Capetian territorial ambitions remained perforce modest and concentrated on asserting control in their core domains. As a result, their relations with towns generally relied on mutual cooperation rather than confrontation, unlike most other feudatory rulers at the time. No starker contrast to Capetian relations with towns existed than in the vast complex of areas to the west that came to form in the twelfth century the AngloNorman “empire” of the Angevins. Some historians have argued that vestiges of Carolingian public authority remained strongest in ducal Normandy, as regalian rights over fortifications and mints never became fully usurped there by castellans. Power instead remained more territorialized than localized as dukes of Normandy preserved the authority to regulate nobles’ construction of castles and conduct of private warfare through their ducal courts.31 Other historians attribute the source of ducal power in Normandy in malleable, aggressive forms of Germanic kinship.32 Kinship provided the main idiom for building political cohesion among clients and claiming material resources for expansion. Carolingian public traditions in fact complemented Germanic kinship practices to position the early dukes of Normandy and their Angevin successors for expanded territorial control. Inveterate castle builders, the Angevin dukes of Normandy invested little in fortifying the new bustling burgs in this agriculturally rich region prior to the 1180s.33 Instead, they poured resources into massive, innovative polygonal châteaux-forts that dominated early Norman towns as much as they protected them. Significant among these were the castles built in the eleventh century at Gisors and Fécamp. The original moat-and-bailey fort at Arques, protecting the approach to the key port town of Dieppe, became replaced by Henry I Plantagenet in the early twelfth century by a formidable new square enceinte and stone keep.

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Together these and other castles formed an integrated defensive frontier system known as a march.34 The major exceptions in Normandy, though for different reasons, were Caen, Falaise, and Rouen. Around 1060, Guillaume le Bâtard built a citadel on a stony outcropping overlooking the burg of Caen, which, together with the newly constructed Abbaye-aux-Hommes and Abbaye-aux-Dames, defined the general parameters within which the town later developed.35 Robert II Curthose built both a new castle and a stone fortified enceinte around Falaise, the birthplace of his father, William the Conqueror. The castle underwent considerable expansion and reinforcement under Henry I, king of England, though not the enceinte. By contrast, Rouen still possessed much of its original third-century Gallo-Roman fortifications circling the old castrum, though rapid population and economic growth after 1100 quickly spilled over these confines. A new expanded earthen palisaded enceinte went up after 1150 to incorporate the new outlying suburban parishes. As a result, the size of the enclosed urban area nearly tripled before 1200.36 Urban growth in Normandy strengthened ducal authority as it subordinated castellans and the bishops. Further to the west was Brittany. The Carolingians never subdued the restless Bretons who in the ninth century, under the leadership the Celtic chieftain Nominoë, became an independent kingdom and then duchy. While the duchy expanded briefly into Normandy and the Loire valley, its dukes later maintained their autonomy by pitting the Capetians and Angevins against each other until the early thirteenth century. Ducal authority in Brittany faced formidable resistance from local baronial lords entrenched in moat-and-bailey castles throughout these rugged lands. Starting with Alain II in the tenth century, Breton dukes concentrated on building or securing these castles, such as the one at La Roche Goyon. They also built ducal castles, which spawned the growth of a dozen or so small towns across the Armorican peninsula. Baronial clans responded in kind, with the barons of Clisson, for example, building their own strongholds in places such as Josselin in the Morbihan region.37 The remote areas along the western coast of Finistière proved especially hard to secure until the fifteenth century.38 In the east, towns such as Fougères and Rennes became heavily contested by the dukes of Normandy and Anjou.39 Breton castles and small towns possessed little more than the simple but effective defense provided by moat-and-baileys and earthen palisaded ramparts until replaced by stone walls and towers in the thirteenth century.40 Medieval Breton towns fell into three general categories. One set consisted of older Gallo-Roman castrums, such as Dinan, Rennes, Carhaix, Vannes, and Nantes. Despite recent decline, they remained under ducal control as leading urban centers in the region.41 They usually lay along land routes, particularly at river crossings, although maritime and fluvial conditions, with the exception of the Loire, Vilaine, and Rance rivers, militated against easy travel and exchange. A second set of towns sprang up around the castles and fortified abbeys along the duchy’s frontier marches abutting Normandy, Maine, Anjou, and Poitou. The violence experienced along the Franco-Breton borderland at the time became reflected in toponyms that included “la Bataille,” “la Terre gaste,” and “la Désertine.” A final third category of Breton towns grew up as isolated burgs around monasteries and seigneurial and ducal strongholds in the duchy’s rugged interior. Most such places passed under ducal control in the eleventh century.42 As elsewhere, the countervailing impulses of separation and connection shaped the site selection of Breton

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towns, as barons and monasteries strove for the latter while ducal authorities vied to broaden territorial rulership. Along the coast to the south, the Saintonge and Aunis most resembled Brittany as local castellans built moat-and-bailey redoubts. Some of these castles became rebuilt starting in the mid-eleventh century. Little urbanization occurred in this region during the Gallo-Roman period. New burgs, such as La Rochelle founded in 1130, relied mainly on natural obstacles, such as salt marshes, for protection.43 Eastward in the middle Loire Basin, including the Beauce and Berry, the contrast between riverine urban settlements and hinterlands dominated by castellans became sharper. Dozens of original Gallo-Roman castrums and oppida survived across this region. Many places, such as Le Mans, Angers, Bourges, and Orléans, still possessed substantial portions of their third-century brick walls nearly a millennium later. In Bourges, remains of these walls remain visible along the “Promenade des Remparts” behind the new Hôtel-de-Ville and at the foot of Jacques Coeur’s Palace. The streets of the upper old town still follow the arc of the Late Antique enceinte.44 In Orléans, Gallo-Roman walls from the fourth century jut out today near the cathedral, while the street layout retains the distinctive intersection of the cardo and decumanus. Smaller burgs developed after the ninth century up the various tributaries of the Loire, often near the castles of local castellans and abbeys. After Carolingian authority collapsed, comtal leaders initially assumed responsibility for castle and fortification construction. Ninth-century Meung-sur-Loire, for example, received a stockade and towers. In the tenth century, Thibault III, count of Chartres and Blois, had castles, usually stone dungeons, erected at Châteaudun, Chinon, and Janville and enclosed the burg of Blois. However, the weakly defended town of Chartres fell to Robert I, duke of Normandy, one of his many adversaries, after a short siege in 963 and suffered a terrible sack as a consequence.45 Expanded stone complexes became built in the twelfth century by Count Thibault V as he sought to navigate the conflict between the Capetians and Angevins. The one at Châteaudun remains standing today over one hundred feet high with the walls at the base some thirty-five feet thick. Among the earliest successful attempts at building up a cohesive feudatory lordship was the county of Anjou. The county of Anjou is often regarded as a model small feudal state that preserved aspects of public authority into the eleventh century. In the late tenth century, Fulk Nerra, count of Anjou, became known as “le grand bâtisseur” in the middle Loire valley for the some thirty major fortifications, most stone castles, he had erected in places such as Angers, Durtal, MontreuilBellay, and Langeais.46 He also had built scores of moat-and-bailey strongholds, most along the Breton and Norman frontiers, that formed a thick defense-in-depth system to safeguard his domains from armed incursions. Finally, Fulk Nerra also fielded a formidable army, for its day, of up to six thousand fighters, a third of whom were mounted knights, which he used to vanquish his rivals, such as Breton Count Conan of Rennes at the battle of Conquéril in 996 and Count Odo II of Blois in 1016. His military campaigns suggest an awareness of De re militari by Vegetius, a late Roman writer who also addressed the subject of fortifications.47 The bestknown and most impressive of Fulk’s dungeons was the massive keep at Loches. It was his principal residence and soared over one hundred feet high. Fulk Nerra’s successors further expanded Angevin sway throughout the greater Loire valley. His son, Count Geoffrey II, known as “The Hammer” (le Martel), waged war with his

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neighbors and secured Angevin control over Maine and, though short-lived, the Saintonge. Geoffroy also began to replace earthen and timbered ramparts around some burgs with more permanent stone and brick fortifications. In Saumur, for example, he ordered a stone enceinte built to protect the town from the count of Poitiers.48 Important towns, such as Tours and Vendôme, remained without even simple earthen ramparts until the thirteenth century, however.49 Comtal authority quickly disintegrated after Geoffrey Martel’s death in 1060 when castellans seized castles and attributes of lordship. Angevin fortunes briefly waned as a result of the succession struggle against Geoffrey III that eventually brought to power Count Fulk IV. Fulk IV spent most of his long rule recovering lost domains and positioning the Angevins to extend their holdings through warfare to the south over the unruly barons of Poitou; to the east into Touraine at the expense of the counts of Blois; and through marriage to the north into the county of Maine.50 His recapture of Tours, an important market town and vital communications center, consolidated Angevin control of the middle Loire, which he further secured through significantly enhancing the great castles of Chinon, Loches, and Loudun. Fewer Gallo-Roman fortified settlements existed the further east one moved, apart from the emplacements along the Rhine. The flatlands of ChampagneArdennes actually contained fewer than a dozen oppida. Only the Gallo-Roman walls of Langres remained in decent condition by the eleventh century. The fourth-century walls at Châlon-sur-Marne, for example, while still extant during the Merovingian era, were woefully dilapidated by the thirteenth century, while Mézières was reduced to little more than a fortified wooden bridge on the Meuse river. Rheims remained the chief town in the region in the Middle Ages mainly as an episcopal center and site of royal coronations. Few of its Gallo-Roman walls remained in serviceable condition by the eleventh century. In 1125, Count Thibaut II of Blois inherited the county of Champaigne. Along with Rheims, the towns of Bar-sur-Aube, Troyes, Lagny-sur-Marne, and Provins chosen by Count Thibaut II to host the celebrated Fairs of Champagne possessed sufficient wealth and importance to merit the construction of a vastly expanded fortified enceintes.51 The remaining burgs in Champagne possessed only modest defenses prior to the thirteenth century. Until then, the counts of Champagne concentrated on castle construction, though rarely did these consist of much more than simple moatand-bailey forts apart from exceptions at places such as Rethel, Donchéry, and Chaumont-en-Bassigny.52 Patterns of urban development and forms of fortifications to the east in Lorraine and Alsace, which formed part of the Empire until the seventeenth century, resembled those in Champagne. Moat-and-bailey castles and fortified farms and churches predominated under the control of regional lords, such as the counts of Bar. Power became even more diffuse through subinfeodation following the collapse of the Kingdom of Lotharingia in the tenth century. The most advanced castle enceintes were built at Bitche and Givet in the twelfth century.53 The only Gallo-Roman urban centers of any real note in Lorraine were Metz and Verdun.54 While Verdun became a middling ecclesiastical center, Metz remained preeminent through the Middle Ages. Nancy was only a hamlet until the eleventh century when Gérard I, count of Metz, erected a castle nearby that in time helped to make Nancy the ducal capital.55 Mézières and Thionville arose as Carolingian strongholds in the ninth century and remained behind earthen ramparts until the 1200s.56 The Capetian

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toehold in Vaucouleurs in western Lorraine received in the twelfth century a stone enceinte with seventeen towers built by Robert de Joinville at the behest of Louis VI of France. The only major urban fortifications in Alsace prior to the thirteenth century existed in Strasbourg, a key transit point across the Rhine. Because of its swampy location, Strasbourg’s defenses at first largely consisted of water defenses supplemented by earthen ramparts and fortified gates.57 Smaller burgs slowly developed after the tenth century in and around castles and monasteries. As a result, feudatory lordship remained quite fragmented in Lorraine and Alsace and the overall level of urbanization low until the thirteenth century. South in the county and duchy of Burgundy, urban fortifications as well as rural castles were more developed before 1200 because of its growing economic prosperity.58 A number of Burgundian towns had once been important Gallo-Roman oppida. Autun, originally named Augustodunum after the first Roman emperor, still had substantial portions of its Gallo-Roman enceinte standing, including numerous semi-circular towers and four fortified gates.59 Dijon was another Gallo-Roman oppidium whose original walls and towers remained basically intact until 1150 when Eude II, count of Champagne, ordered a new expanded enceinte built to accommodate recent growth in Dijon. These new works included eighteen stone towers and eleven fortified gates.60 Auxerre, Mâcon, and Vienne also adapted their old Gallo-Roman defenses to meet new needs. In twelfth-century Auxerre, Guillaume IV, count of Mâcon, authorized an enlarged enceinte, as did the counts of Nevers at Cosne-sur-Loire. Auxonne, by contrast, shrank so much it built a smaller earthen ramparted area within the original Gallo-Roman walls in the tenth century. The Gallo-Roman citadel at Besançon survived relatively intact until Eudes II replaced it with a new castle in 1153. He also ordered defenses built around the new burg below the castle on the right bank of the Doubs river. Eudes II also ordered the construction of the first stone castle at Dole to secure control of the eastern part of the duchy.61 New towns in Burgundy developed at places such as Montbard and Chablis to include wooden stockades and earthen ramparts. Finally, ecclesiastical authorities also sponsored the construction of fortified churches and abbeys, as at the Benedictine priory at La Charité-sur-Loire in 1164, around which grew up burgs. Further south lay Lyons, located at the vital confluence of the Rhône and Sâone rivers. Originally known as Lugdunum and once of the preeminent oppida in all of Gaul, Lyons served as the chief transit point between Burgundy and points south in Provence and Italy. Despite recent growth, Gallo-Roman walls built in the first century remained Lyons’ principal line of defense a millennium later. Urban development elsewhere in the upper Rhône valley was modest. In higher elevations, as elsewhere, castles proliferated to reflect the fragmented nature of political power. In remote areas of the Midi such as Auvergne, castle construction flourished while urban growth was unremarkable prior to 1200. A handful of towns, such Moissac and Clermont, began as Gallo-Roman castra, while a few new burgs at places such as Cusset and Montferrand emerged after the ninth century.62 The ensemble of fortification at Aurillac typified much of the region. Its castral donjon dated to the eleventh century and underwent substantial rebuilding in the twelfth century, receiving new stone towers, while earthen palisaded ramparts surrounded the burg. Apart from its episcopal castle, Clermont’s third-century walls remained the sole line of defense for the town until the fourteenth century. The new adjoining burg of Montferrand, encouraged by the counts of Auvergne, likewise possessed

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little more than a donjon prior to the late fourteenth century. An earthen rampart ringed Cusset by the twelfth century. Evidence indicates that Riom and Saint-Flour only erected defenses to supplement their natural site advantages in the thirteenth century.63 Poverty and isolation accounted for the tardy urbanism of Auvergne prior to 1200. Across southern France stretched the vast, complicated lands of greater Occitania. This region comprised the duchy of Aquitaine, the county of Toulouse, and marquisate and county of Provence, as well as an assemblage of lesser feudal entities, especially along the northern slope of the Pyrenees. Provence technically remained part of the Empire and a number of its towns, such as Arles, Avignon, and Marseille, enjoyed special privileges as Imperial cities. This region had been the mostly highly urbanized in all of Roman Gaul, especially along rivers in the east and the Mediterranean littoral. Narbonne, Montpellier, Nîmes, and Marseille remained fairly prosperous and regularly invested in the upkeep and expansion of their Gallo-Roman walls to fend off Muslim raids. More modest new burgs, such as Lorgues, Digne, and Sisteron, did the same.64 Rural villages also erected walls or constructed dwellings to form an enclosed perimeter.65 Indeed, the state of urban fortifications in Provence prior to 1200 well surpassed that of Flanders in scale and sophistication. In fact, the counts of Provence expanded their territorial rulership after 1000 largely in alliance with walled towns, whose charters—most granted in the twelfth century—routinely confirmed municipal control over the ramparts.66 Outside Provence, Occitan towns prior to 1200 enjoyed considerable independence as local nobles, clergymen, and burghers vied for dominance. In Narbonne, power became divided among these groups, while in Toulouse merchants dominated. In Montpellier, noble families held sway, while church prelates assumed lordship over the towns of Mende, Viviers, Le Puy, and Rodez.67 The continuing influence of Roman law and the practice of partible inheritance stunted the emergence of the feudal relations found north of the Loire, where comtal authority remained potent. As a result, local noble families, such as the Trencavels, viscounts of Béziers, routinely defied their nominal overlords, the counts of Toulouse. The counts of Toulouse thus relied even more on assistance from local towns to check noble ambitions and the territorial aspirations of the kings of Majorica, which required in turn further confirmation of urban autonomy across greater Occitania.68 Inland towns, such as Toulouse and Montauban, the latter established only in the mid-twelfth century, relied mainly on natural topography for protection.69 Claims that towns and villages founded after 1000 across lower Occitania adhered to a planned circular form remain controversial, though their defenses in either case generally remained quite rudimentary.70 Southwestern France from Poitou to the Pyrenees comprised the sparsely populated remainder of the duchy of Aquitaine. Few towns of any major size existed before 1200. Local ecclesiastical and lay lords, such as the Plantagenets, sowed the seeds for later urbanization by building scores of castles and fortified churches.71 On the Touraine-Poitou border along La Creuse river was the castle at La Guerche, a word that derives from the Frankish word for fortifications (werki).72 To the north of the Dordogne river in Poitou was Poitiers, a fortified town originally settled in the Gallo-Roman era. The Capetians rebuilt its defenses after capturing it in the mid-twelfth century. The new burg of Thouars also possessed a fortified enceinte in the twelfth century.73 Further south in Périgord, the town of Périgueux became the principal residence of the counts of Poitou in the twelfth century.

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Together with the bishop, they oversaw the construction of the new comtal castle Barrière and an enceinte for the burg with twenty-eight stone towers and four fortified gates.74 Finally there was the bustling port city of Bordeaux, founded by the Romans in the first century as Burdigala. A quadrilateral enceinte with some one hundred towers ringed Bordeaux by the end of the third century as the Germanic menace mounted. Bordeaux shrank so much thereafter that in the seventh century its residents took refuge in the old amphitheater. Its fortunes improved after 1000 even though Bordeaux did not begin to fortify its burgeoning neighborhoods until the mid-thirteenth century. Like many other growing towns across France at the time, dynamic growth coupled with the lack of any serious military threats militated against investments in new defenses beyond simple earthen ramparts that threatened to obstruct expansion.75 Design innovations in castle construction became apparent around 1100. Until then, castle towers used for both defense and as residences usually took upright rectangular forms, as at Langeais and Loches and in the huge keep at Ghent. This design form carried decided drawbacks because its corners created dead angles that enemies could exploit, while the verticality of the walls made them vulnerable to attack by improved siege engines. An early response to these problems can be found in the huge polygonal castle tower built by the Anglo-Normans at Gisors in the late eleventh century. The quadrifoil keep erected by Amaury II, lord of Montfort, at Houdan and the convergent cylinders of the mid-twelfth-century donjon at Étampes introduced more articulated fronts that mitigated these vulnerabilities. These more sophisticated—and expensive—forms of castle design provided a model when generalized later to solve problems encountered in building fortifications to protect the bustling towns of the High Middle Ages. Prior to 1200, fortifications in France for the new towns growing up around the castles of local lords usually consisted of earthen ramparts topped by timbered palisades, reinforced at most with a few square stone towers and fortified gates. The only significant exceptions were the Gallo-Roman walls, often of indifferent condition, of older established towns. Earthen ramparts around these burgs represented an extension of the moat-and-bailey model of early castle construction. As such, it was highly pragmatic solution to the early needs of urban defense. For a society plagued by widespread scarcity and poverty, it was also cheap to build. Local authorities often lacked effective means to tap, mobilize, and direct resources. Expanding the scale and design complexity of fortifications thus required substantial economic and political changes. Increasing economic activity and population growth after 1000 created pressures and opened opportunities for both feudatory rulers and these early medieval towns. By the eleventh century, a number of these competing lordships from Flanders all the way to greater Occitania held sway over unstable, yet increasingly potent coalitions of towns, castellans, and churchmen. Their spheres of influence, while fluctuating, became demarcated in terms of hereditary holdings and riverine systems. Medieval frontiers should be thought of not as linear boundaries but rather as a mosaic of overlapping jurisdictional zones and competing family and feudal interests. This explains why the contest for territory consisted of endless legal wrangling, complex patterns of intermarriage, and claims to service and fealty. Reasserting the old precept of the “rendability” of a castle’s parapets or a town’s walls to its local lord or ratifying its concession loomed large because castles and walled towns played the most pivotal roles in translating claims to territory into actual control.76

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The Origins of the B ONNES VILLES The emergence of these “good towns” (bonnes villes) as key players in regional politics found ready encouragement from French kings and feudal magnates.77 The bonnes villes, in turn, leveraged political and fiscal concessions from these territorial rulers to enhance their autonomy. A potent measure of the increasing power and stature of towns lay in the quality of their walls. Most towns and burgs in 1100 possessed earthen ramparts and stockade fences. By 1300, almost all boasted crenellated stone and brick enceintes bristling with mighty towers and fortified gates. The transition to more permanent and substantial urban defenses required if not the permission then at least the acquiescence of local lords. It also needed a sufficient level of economic development to generate the wealth necessary for such a huge, ongoing investment, as well as municipal institutions and communal consensus to bring about such work.78 The rise of bonnes villes coincided with the emergence after 1100 of communes of freemen who formed partnerships with great territorial magnates expressed in agreements called charters.79 Charters spelled out the privileges and responsibilities that made a place a free town or ville franche. That freedom also defined the limits of authority that local churchmen and lay lords exercised over the town. No right was more cherished than self-defense as embodied in a town’s walls and militia. Guilds and neighborhood associations generally assumed these duties as part of their control of municipal government.80 Municipal regimes took varying form. Some towns elected officers to a council (échevanage); others relied on a selfselecting committee (consulat); while others became subject to appointed officials known as provosts (prévôts).81 In practice, most towns shared features of all three types as defined in the charter. What mattered most was the image that a town projected to the outside world, and nothing spoke more loudly than solid, massive walls and towers.82 All that medieval writers might laud about a town flowed from this guarantee of security. After 1100, the existence of walls so defined bonnes villes that “closed town” (ville fermée) soon became a synonymous term for them. Medieval gardening practices echoed this new urban culture. Like towns, gardens began by an act of enclosure formed by a fronting ditch, an embankment of piled soil topped by a paling fence, live hedge, or stone wall.83 Like a town’s walls, garden boundaries demarcated legal jurisdictions and private property holdings. Above all, towns and gardens offered sanctuaries where order and abundance prevailed so long as inhabitants performed their duty.84 Failure to do so opened the way for savage, wild nature to invade. While not planned, medieval towns usually conformed to a mix of rectilinear and radial layouts depending on topography and the disposition of anchor points, such as a church, marketplace, or castle.85 Walls also defined a fiscal zone, with excise taxes levied at the gates from which the main thoroughfares led to the markets. These revenues, in turn, underwrote the construction and maintenance of municipal defenses. Murage taxes began to appear after 1100 along with the establishment of militias as urban defense became institutionalized.86 Medieval towns also often had to cope with water management problems such as flood control, unstable foundations due to a high water table, and the provisioning of potable water and ridding of waste.87 The articulation of the urban enceinte shaped the disposition of streets, marketplaces, fountains, churches, and civic buildings. More informal means of access and egress across the defensive perimeter came in

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the form of private doors known as posterns; drainage channels and pipes also cut through the walls to flush storm water and refuse out of town. Medieval towns organized space into distinctive zones for occupational specialties, residential districts, university quarters, enclaves for family and clientele networks. Each town was a complex mosaic of many pieces, some better integrated into communities than others.88 A town’s walls established a social topography between an “inside” and “outside” world. Walls served to seal a town off from the outside world to which streets otherwise sought connection.89 The rapport between inside and outside became figuratively expressed in debates over who belonged to a town’s active citizenry. Among the most visible expressions of the coveted status of bourgeois was the privilege to enter freely through a town’s gates. In general, the rise of the communes after 1100 broadened the body of active citizens to include artisans along with merchants and professional groups, such as lawyers and doctors.90 Political rights went to persons whose skills and ability to produce wealth served the town. Responsibility for self-defense made it incumbent to draw on these groups to man walls and guard gates and organize the wherewithal to construct them. Montpellier in late twelfth century offers an early example with the establishment of the Oeuvre de la Commune Clôture, which took on the task of building and maintaining fortifications.91 Defending a town thus required the mobilization of substantial human and material resources that in turn shaped the sense of civic community found in the bonnes villes. While a royal captain or sergeant seated in the château-fort might try to check the independent aspirations of townspeople, local feudatories usually sought out accommodations with the towns. The appearance of more permanent and formidable defenses around medieval towns did not represent a defiance of state authority but an early manifestation of it. The relations between towns and great feudatory lords, including the Capetians, recognized the expertise and decision-making authority of municipal regimes for their locales. The regulation of trade and manufactures, the provision of public services, such as water and waste management, and the maintenance of public ways and places fell under the purview of the towns, as did the duty to uphold public order and maintain urban defenses. The crown and great lords limited their interference in such matters because they relied upon support from the towns to maintain and possibly expand their domains. The evolving nexus of relations between towns and feudatory rulers saw the towns implement broad policy mandates from the lords in fairly autonomous ways adapted to local needs and circumstances. Fortifications, along with militias and military supply, formed the most important and costly area of this shared concern. As a result, new areas of legislation and legal procedures opened up in the towns that further defined the early contours of the medieval state that in time transformed old Francia into a new regime known as France.92

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Ch apter 2

L ords a nd Towns (1100–1225)

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fter 1100, municipal self-governance advanced in tandem with the great feudatories across Francia as they all pursued sustained and increasingly aggressive programs to consolidate and expand their domains. Some, such as the Angevin dukes of Normandy and greater Anjou and the counts of Flanders, enjoyed spectacular if fleeting success. Others, such as the dukes of Brittany and Burgundy and the counts of Champagne and Toulouse, enjoyed modest but enduring gains. And then there were the Capetians, whose early prudence and good stewardship set the stage for dramatic progress in the thirteenth century. These assertions of power required mounting military campaigns against local castellans and rival feudatories, pursuing advantageous dynastic marriages, averting or exploiting succession crises, and, finally, knitting alliances with the emerging towns. The altered scale and makeup of urban enceintes mirrored the reemergence of public governance. The control of church appointments, especially to episcopal sees, was particularly decisive and affected towns as much as it did feudatory rulers. On this score, the Capetians held a clear advantage in the regalian sees concentrated to the north and east of Paris. More hegemonic than territorial in its nature, medieval rulership rested upon a core area of direct control, such as the royal demesne or patrimonial holdings, reinforced by networks of close clients and vassals among the local nobility and townspeople, to realize claims—ambiguous, fragmentary, and often highly contested—based on seigneurial or dynastic right. Common to all feudatory rulers was a relentless drive to establish law and order in their domains. This goal required articulating fuller justifications of public law and marshaling resources to enforce it. In both respects, the relationship between feudatory rulers and walled towns proved crucial because towns provided fixed, stable points of authority in the form of incipient law courts and stockpiled supplies to bolster the migratory nature of feudatory rulership and support the lord’s troops. The Capetians held a major advantage in the realm of public law due to their undisputed royal dignity. And under Louis VI and Louis VII, they began to exploit it. With the able assistance of Abbot Suger, Louis VI encouraged communal movements in his domains that in turn supported his efforts to diminish the influence of local lords in their affairs. Louis VI especially cultivated communal movements along the outer fringes of the Ile-de-France. The charters that he granted to them recorded and defined rights and practices in the areas of justice, finance, commerce, governance, and defense. The Capetians thus extended their influence by fostering urban government. Towns in the historical core of the Ile-de-France, such as Paris, never received royal authorization to establish communal associations or received formal charters. As a result, their municipal regimes became subject to greater

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direct domination by the crown. Support from all these towns helped Louis VI to subdue defiant castellans, such as Ebbes de Roucy in 1102, Enguerrand de Coucy in 1117, and Thomas de Marle in 1130. The ensuing confiscations and purchases enlarged the royal domain to include Corbeil, Montlhéry, and Mantes. Louis VII continued these practices when he granted a charter to Lorris, located in Loire valley near Orléans. This charter became a model for others that he granted to selected towns in Aquitaine, Poitou, Gascony, and the Auvergne as Capetian ambitions moved south of the Loire. In granting a charter, the Capetians usually insisted on building a tower close to but not within a town’s walled perimeter to ensure a nearby royal presence. In 1181, for example, Louis VII prevented the commune of Soissons from incorporating the fortress of Saint-Médard into the urban enceinte in order to maintain the royal castle’s independence. The expansion of Capetian power beyond the Ile-de-France can be measured by the growth of administrative districts known as prévôtés from twenty-five to forty by 1150. Most of these royal officials took up residence in towns, such as Bourges, Compiègne, Étampes, Laon, Orléans, Paris, Poissy, and Sens, where they worked with municipal officials and feudal lords to collect royal income from local tolls, excise levies, and land rents. They also oversaw the execution of royal justice. Louis VII began to employ new officials known as bailiffs (baillis), again based in towns, to supervise the prévôts. As he secured his base in these towns and outlying castles, Louis VII continued to wage campaigns to secure new territorial claims. In 1169, the bishop of Puy appealed to him for protection from the viscount of Polignac, who routinely harassed pilgrims and travelers making their way through the Auvergne. Louis VII besieged the viscount’s stronghold of Nonette and later converted it into prévôté. He also invaded the lands of Thibaud V, count of Blois, during which his soldiers burned a church in Vitry killing several hundred persons who had taken refuge inside. This atrocity caused problems with the papacy, for which Louis VII atoned by undertaking the Second Crusade. Dynastic marriages further advantaged the Capetians. Louis VI’s marriage in 1115 to Adélaïde of Savoy forged closer ties with the papacy and brought the French crown’s influence into the Rhône valley. The celebrated marriage in 1137 of Louis VI’s son, the future Louis VII, to Eleanor of Aquitaine, positioned—until he repudiated her—the Capetians to project royal influence to the southwest toward Bordeaux and Toulouse. Louis VII mended fences with the house of Champagne by marrying Adela of Champagne in 1160. Five years later, she bore his heir, Philip. Louis VII then sought closer relations with the count of Flanders by arranging for his son to marry Isabella of Hainault, the count’s niece. He also forged key diplomatic alliances, none more so than with Count Raymond V of Toulouse, who married the king’s sister Constance in 1154, to parry Angevin claims in the region. Averting or exploiting succession crises further helped to shape regional power alignments. Louis VI’s unsuccessful bid in 1106 to oust Henri I Beauclerc from the Norman succession opened up a seesaw struggle with first the Angevins and then the English that lasted until 1450. As fraught was the complex power struggle over the southern Low Countries following the assassination of Count Charles the Good of Flanders in 1127. To the west, the union of the House of Anjou with the Anglo-Norman realm was brought about by the marriage of Geoffrey of Anjou and Matilda, heiress to the English throne. Henry I’s death in 1135 set the stage for further struggles between Matilda and Stephen of Blois over the Anglo-Norman inheritance.

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This process of state formation was thus equally at work in neighboring lands owing fealty to the French crown. The counts of Flanders ruled the wealthiest and most urbanized area of northern Europe over which they deployed an elaborate administrative system to control towns and the countryside. Attempts to formalize relations between the counts of Flanders and these towns in charters quelled though never permanently settled disputes over the balance between municipal autonomy and comtal control. Similar dynamics affected the evolving authority of feudatories in Hainault, Brabant, and Artois. To the east, the house of Champagne claimed right to dispersed lands across Champagne centered in the towns of Meaux, Provins, and Troyes. To the west, they held through earlier marriages with the houses of Vermandois and Blois territories in the upper Loire and the Beauce based in the towns of Blois, Chartres, Sancerre, and Châteaudun. In 1153, Count Thibault II demanded Tours in exchange for recognizing Henry II as duke of Normandy, but finally settled on acquiring the fortresses of Amboise and Fréteval for a five-year period before restoring them to Angevin control. Although the counts of Champagne benefited from the celebrated fairs held in Troyes, Provins, Lagny, and Bar-sur-Aube, they lacked sufficient resources to begin consolidating their sprawling domains, checked in part, too, because of the complex and multiple feudal allegiances they, like the counts of Flanders and dukes of Burgundy, owed not just to the Capetians but also to the German emperor.1 Much the same pattern can be discerned in the lands of the counts of Toulouse, who advanced their authority in alliance with walled towns. In 1144, in fact, Alphonse de Jourdain, count of Toulouse, sponsored the founding of Montauban, choosing a formidable site overlooking the Tarn River along the road between Toulouse and Cahors. Montauban benefited from the natural defenses provided by the Tarn and two of its tributaries, the Tescou and the Garrigue, and the deep ravines along the northern and western approaches of the urban core. Walls, towers, and fortified gates further reinforced the strength of the site, blending almost imperceptibly with its existing features.2

The Rise of the Angevin “Empire” under Henry II The most spectacular, if short-lived of these twelfth-century feudatory states was the Angevin “empire.” Its sudden emergence under Henry of Anjou in the 1150s profoundly upset the delicate balance of power in northwestern Europe. Its rise actually grew out of earlier succession struggles over Normandy by Stephen of Blois in the 1130s. Control of castles and alliances with towns powerfully shaped these conflicts and their eventual resolution.3 Stephen of Blois’ military campaigns across northern Maine and southern Normandy inflicted much damage to the towns. His allies burned Lisieux to the ground in 1136, for example. In 1137, Stephen sought Capetian aid by granting two vital frontier castles, Moulins-la-Marche and Bonmoulins, to Rotrou III, count of Perche, a close ally of Louis VII. Meanwhile, Geoffrey of Anjou won easy control of Caen and Bayeux in 1138. Falaise held out as did other parts of Lower Normandy. The succession conflict only ended with Stephen’s capture at the Battle of Lincoln on February 2, 1141. Stephen of Blois’ demise allowed Geoffrey of Anjou to effect the final union under the Plantagenets of Anjou, Normandy, and England. Geoffrey began by targeting key Norman towns and castles in the Avranchin and Stephen’s own county of Martain. Geoffrey completed the conquest of western Normandy in 1143 with

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the fall of Cherbourg. The last holdout, Arques, finally capitulated to the new duke of Normandy in 1145. Geoffrey faced considerable resistance, however, from barons such as Gerald Berlay, lord of Montreuil-Bellay, in the Poitevin borderlands between Anjou and the duchy of Aquitaine. It took four years of bitter siege for Geoffrey to finally capture this key castle, a conflict that involved many of his neighbors, including Louis VII of France, who had appointed Gerald as seneschal of Poitou.4 Geoffrey’s death in 1151 brought a vast, but problematical succession to his son, Henry of Anjou. Henry received recognition that same year as duke of Normandy from Louis VII but only after temporarily ceding to the Capetians the Vexin borderlands between Normandy and the Ile-de-France. Henry obtained Anjou through patrimonial succession from his father, Geoffrey. He dramatically enlarged his family domains even further by marrying Eleanor of Aquitaine in 1152—a mere six weeks after Louis VII ill-advisedly had repudiated her. Finally, he won the English throne in 1154 to become King Henry II. Fabulously wealthy and politically astute, Henry II now overshadowed his nominal overlord, King Louis VII of France, and sparked worry and eventual rebellion among the barons across his domains south of the Loire. Despite its wealth, the size and variegated nature of the new Angevin empire rendered its continental holdings highly unstable.5 Henry II ruled a vast, complex territory that stretched from the borders of Scotland all the way to the Pyrenees, encompassing on the continent the duchy of Normandy, duchy of Brittany, Anjou and Maine, and the vast duchy of Aquitaine obtained through his marriage to Eleanor of Aquitaine. He exercised considerable centralized authority in the AngloNorman core through a royal-ducal administration based in towns and castles. Outside of these domains, however, the Plantagenets lacked the requisite presence in towns and castles, apart from a string of castles in the lower Loire valley and near Anjou and Maine, such as Gorron, Ambrières, and Châtillon, to make their titular authority real. In the mid-1170s, Henry II established four seneschals over his main Continental holdings in Anjou, Poitou, Brittany, and Aquitaine, but they could do little to enhance his central authority. Coins collected in England and Normandy found their way to the treasuries at Chinon and Loches castles, where they paid for armies to fight the Capetians and barons of Poitou. The Angevins used patronage and, if necessary, force to capture castles and maintain loyalties. Towns became perhaps the most consistent supporters of the Angevins, who also fostered municipal government through charters but—unlike the Capetians—did not often build new keeps.6 The only exceptions were in Bayonne, where they erected the ChâteauVieux, a dungeon constructed in Niort, and the Château-Vauclair they had built in La Rochelle. Instead, the Angevins readily allowed towns, such as Parthenay, to collect local taxes to enhance their own defenses. Henry II spent much of the 1150s and 1160s enforcing his rights over Chinon, Loudun, and castles across Maine. He relied on a patchwork of officials—counts, provosts, and seneschals—based in castles in towns in the lower Loire valley and in western Touraine, such as Tours, Chinon, Baugé, Beaufort, Brissac, Angers, Saumur, Loudun, Loches, Langeais, and Montbazon. Much of southern Anjou and Maine remained dominated by fiercely independent barons who offered the Angevins support only begrudgingly and for a price. Leading families in these areas included the lords of Craon and Chemillé in Anjou and those of Mayenne in Maine, the viscounts of Beaumont-sur-Sarthe and the lords of Laval, the lordship of Chaumont, and finally the county of Vendôme. Henry II granted charters to

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newly established communes in the towns of Le Mans and Angers in exchange for their backing ducal power.7 Normandy was by far the most securely administered of the Angevin’s continental domains. Following the Capetian model, Henry II supplanted local prévôts and viscounts with newly empowered baillis who exercised judicial and military authority in twenty-eight bailliages. These bailliages resembled the English shires and were strongest in the western duchy, while castellanies and towns became more predominant as one moved east. Ducal control over the Norman church also was a significant feature of Angevin power. Under the Angevins, Rouen emerged as the capital of Normandy and the second largest town in France after Paris, with a population of thirty thousand–forty thousand. The charter issued to Rouen by Henry II in 1150, known as the Establissements de Rouen, became a model that Richard and John later use with other towns in Angevin lands.8 This agreement replaced land taxes (tailles) for customs duties (octrois). It was chiefly cash collected in England and Normandy that bought the professional soldiers and siege equipment needed to demolish castles in Angevin domains south of the Loire. This explains why the later loss of Normandy to the Capetians in the 1190s proved so devastating to Angevin power.9 Louis VII and Henry II clashed over Normandy, especially in the Vexin, where Capetian soldiers captured Neufmarché-sur-Epte in July 1152. As a result, several Normand marcher lords, including Hugh of Gournay, Hugh of Chateauneuf, and Richer de L’Aigle, temporarily renounced their recent Angevin allegiances. In 1153, with the assistance of Thierry I, count of Flanders, Louis VII wrested out of Henry II’s grasp the town of Vernon, which controlled a strategic bridge across the Seine.10 Louis VII also was active along the Loire, encouraging Henry’s younger brother Geoffrey of Anjou. Louis VII also invited appeals for protection, as occurred with the viscountess of Narbonne, even if he was not in a real position to lend it. In 1154, he relaxed his assaults on the Angevin domains when Henry II did homage for Normandy, Anjou, and Aquitaine. This move enabled Henry II to quell his brother’s revolt by capturing Chinon, Loudun, and Mirebeau in 1156. He cemented his control over the lower Loire that same year when the citizens of Nantes asked for his assistance in their rebellion against their lord, the count of Hoël, count of Nantes. Henry II mended fences with the new count of Perche, Routrou IV, in 1158 by recognizing him as lord of the Norman seigneurie of Bellême; in return, Henry regained the former ducal castles of Moulins-la-Marche and Bonmoulins.11 Geoffrey’s death in 1158 removed a familial threat, while his grant of Boulogne in 1159 to Matthew of Alsace, the son of Thierry, count of Flanders, paved the way for a military alliance four years later against the Capetians, even though the counts of Flanders technically served as vassals to the French crown. Henry II went on the offensive against Louis VII in 1167 when he marched an army into Auvergne, where he claimed several lordships; in 1170, he even mounted an audacious coup to seize Bourges, the chief city in Berry and a key to extending influence to the upper Loire. Diplomacy, patronage, and military success thus enabled Henry II to weather the first serious challenge to his rule. But it was not to be the last. Henry II’s marriage to Eleanor of Aquitaine caused him even more grief, not only because their relations soon soured but also because her ancestors had lost considerable power in Aquitaine the previous century as castellans rose to dominance.12 Despite occasional opposition from his wife, Henry II worked hard to expand ducal authority in Aquitaine, particularly in the crucial Poitou borderlands

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in La Marche, by expanding the number of prévôts from ten to fifteen in the 1170s. In Gascony, ducal officials exercised authority in the Entre-deux-Mers and BayonneDax regions and up the Garonne valley as far as Agen.13 Aquitaine and Guyenne comprised a confusing collection of counties including Poitou and Berry in the north, La Marche, the Limousin, Angoumois, Périgord, Saintonge and Aunis, and Uzerches in the center, and in the south, Agenais, Quercy, Rouergue, and Auvergne. Endemic small-scale warfare racked the region through the eleventh and twelfth centuries and occasionally coalesced into full-scale rebellions against the countsdukes of Aquitaine. Castellans dominated the countryside, while powerful baronial families controlled the towns of Angoulême, Thouars, and, to a lesser extent, the bishopics of Limoges and Périguieux.14 The viscounts of Thouars, for example, held over a dozen castles south of Saumur on the Loire all the way to the Ile d’Oléron off the Atlantic coast, while the viscounty of Châtellerault—Eleanor’s homeland—lay along the route from Poitiers to Tours. Similar such lordships lay scattered throughout the region to constrain comtal-ducal authority.15 Finally, ducal influence over church appointments in Aquitaine-Guyenne was quite limited. Over time, the number of castles controlled by the count-dukes of Aquitaine steadily decreased. In 1190s, Richard only controlled about 20 percent of the ninety or so castles in Poitou, and even fewer in adjoining territories. Nine distinct rebellions broke out in Aquitaine against the Plantagenet between 1168 and 1199. Leaders of these rebellions varyingly included the Taillefer counts of Angoulême, the counts of Périgord, and the viscounts of Limoges as well as the lords of Lusignan and lords of Rancon. While the Angevins tried to raze Poitevin castles whenever possible, these places, such as the castle of Taillebourg, soon rose again from the rubble in defiance.16 The eastern marches along the Aquitaine-Guyenne frontier became flashpoints for conflict with the Capetians to the north and the counts of Toulouse to the south. Angevin rule in these areas largely consisted of brutal punitive raids. Castellans held sway further south in Gascony; indeed, many held title to castles as allodial property free of the tenurial rights of a feudal overlord.17 Angevin wars with the counts of Toulouse over Quercy, especially its chief town Cahors, raged throughout the twelfth century.18 Indeed, Henry II mustered his largest army ever in 1159 to enforce his wife’s claim to the county of Toulouse. Count Raymond V of Toulouse managed, however, to hold out in large part because of the support he received from the inhabitants of Toulouse. Nevertheless, Henry II and his allies, the Trencavels and Ramon Bereguer IV, count of Barcelona, peeled away from Raymond V’s control a number of castles in the upper Garonne valley and in Quercy. Thus began the so-called forty years’ war between the Angevins and the counts of Toulouse. Even had he been successful, Henry II was in no position to enforce Aquitanian claims to lordship over Béarn, Bigorre, Comminges, Armagnac, and Fezensac located in the Pyrenean uplands lest he risk alienating his ally, the king of Aragon. As a result, Angevin power in Aquitaine became even more dependent on towns. Urban growth across the region increased in the twelfth century in places such as Niort and Saintes in the north and Bayonne to the south, all key stops along the pilgrimage route to Compestella. Bordeaux, in particular, thrived as commerce down the Garonne River increased. As their influence over barons and castellans diminished, Richard and John granted more and more charters to establish communes in key towns, including some seventeen in Normandy and a number across greater Aquitaine, such as Bordeaux, La Rochelle, Bayonne, Dax, Oléron, Niort,

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Saint-Jean-d’Angély, Saintes, and Saint-Émilion. Revenues from tallages and customs levies proved lucrative for the count-dukes as well as local barons who held urban lordships. Even so, the lands of Aquitaine became a serious financial liability for the Angevins. Brittany became a Plantagenet satellite after Duke Conan IV, also earl of Richmond in England, acknowledged Henry II as his lord.19 In 1166, Henry II claimed the county of Nantes for his son, Geoffrey. He then subjugated the Breton nobility in 1167–1169, forcing Duke Conan IV to abdicate, after which he married the ducal heiress Constance to Geoffrey, who he installed as duke in 1181. Though occasionally intrusive, as seen in the creation of the office of seneschal of Brittany, Geoffrey’s authority ultimately rested on placating the Breton nobility, maintaining goods relations with Nantes, and securing the vital borderlands along the Breton-Norman frontier. In doing so, it provided him a power base from which to challenge his father. Indeed, Henry II’s efforts to enhance the cohesion of Angevin patrimonial titles and lands constantly ran afoul as his and Eleanor’s sons Henry, Richard, Geoffrey, and John grew to manhood, because each of them demanded a dynastic apportionment commensurate with their soaring ambitions.20 The intrigues of his estranged wife and the wily young Philip II of France only inflamed these family troubles for Henry II and exposed the inherent weaknesses of the Angevin edifice. Castellans and towns played important roles in these internecine struggles. When Richard provoked a rebellion among the Poitevin barons in 1173, for example, the towns of La Rochelle and Saintes slammed their gates shut in his face, forcing him to take refuge in the nearby castle at Taillebourg as Henry II reasserted control over Poitou. In reward, Henry II confirmed and expanded La Rochelle’s municipal liberties. Two years later, once father and son reconciled, Henry II gave Richard an army to conquer the very Poitevin barons with whom he had just allied. He moved against the castle of Le Puy de Castillon in the county of Agen, capturing and demolishing it after a two-month siege. In 1176, he attacked Aimar V, viscount of Limoges, taking his castle at Aixe and then the city of Limoges itself after a short siege. Richard then shifted attention to Gascony and occupied the towns of Dax and Bayonne. He eventually stopped on the Iberian border after he seized the castle of Saint-Pierre, which he then had razed. In 1178–1179, Richard responded to a rebellion in the Aunis and Saintonge by Geoffrey III, lord of Rancon, by besieging and capturing a string of castles lying in the Charente valley. Unable to take Pons, he eventually captured the castle of Richemond and several other fortresses in the region. His military prowess earned him the enduring sobriquet Lionheart (Coeur de Lion). Louis VII’s death in 1080 opened up opportunities for Henry II to reassert his authority without Capetian meddling. Egged on by Henry II, powerful neighbors of the Capetians soon ravaged the borderlands of the fifteen-year-old new king, Philip II, forcing him to take refuge in the royal castle in Compiègne. However, within a decade Philip II reversed his bad fortunes through inheritance, diplomacy, and military conquest. After Philip of Alsace, count of Flanders, besieged Corbie but failed to capture it in 1184, Philip II reached an accord with him that brought under Capetian control key areas of Picardy and lands along the southern border of Flanders. These included the Valois area around the town of Crépy, the Vermandois towns of Péronne, Ribemont, Saint-Quentin, and Montdidier, the large town of Amiens and its adjoining hinterland. Finally, they agreed that upon

Map 2.1

France, 1150–1250.

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Philip of Alsace’s death, which came on crusade in 1191, the towns of Arras, Douai, Bapaume, Saint-Omer, and Aire in Artois would pass on to the French crown. No sooner did Philip II make these gains then he began establishing prévôts and baillis, as well as control over castles and town enceintes, building them anew or reinforcing them. His accord with the count of Flanders enabled him to shift his attention against the Angevins. Richard’s provocative move in 1181 against the count of Sancerre ignited another revolt by the Poitevin barons. As a preemptive measure, Richard seized Périgieux before the rebellion got off the ground, yet brewing troubles with his brother Henry, especially over Richard’s new castle of Clairvaux just below the Loire River, forced him to return to the Poitevin frontier. Plantagenet domains fractured further along fraternal as well as feudal lines as Geoffrey of Brittany now joined the fray. The February 1183 siege of Limoges pitted the quarreling Angevins and their respective Poitevin allies against each other. Henry II finally captured the citadel of Saint-Martial in Limoges in June and promptly razed it to the ground. Behind all this fractious conflict among the Angevins was Philip II. Sensing a propitious moment, the French king invaded the Vexin, but the campaign proved fruitless. He enjoyed greater success in Berry where he gained footholds across the Loire in Issoudun and Graçay. He made further headway in the duchy of Burgundy, capturing through siege the stronghold of Châtillon-sur-Seine; he also gained through wardship the county of Nevers. Finally, as Henry II lay dying in June 1189 Philip took control of Le Mans and its surrounding region of Maine. In the next month, Tours—the lynchpin to the Loire which was, in turn, the key to Angevin dominions on the continent—fell to the young Capetian king, who now clearly enjoyed the advantage as Richard I came to power (see map 2.1).

Castles and the Collapse of the Angevin Empire The ensuing struggles between Philip II and Henry II’s successors, Richard I and John I, marked a decisive turning point in the formation of feudatory principalities and the evolution of medieval France. Philip II sought to extend Capetian power beyond the Ile-de-France to Picardy in the north, westward to the Vexin and Normandy, and then in a southerly arc into Maine, the Loire valley, and Berry. His success enabled him to implement new governmental practices in justice and finance that established the medieval foundations of the French state. Walled towns played a pivotal role in effecting these changes; indeed, towns served as both sites and agents of royal state power.21 New more hierarchical modes of thought among Parisian theologians began to influence Capetian rulers and their officials to conceptualize royal authority as an orderly system of feudal lords and vassals at the head of which stood their suzerain, the king, to whom they all owed homage but he to no one. Philip II was the first Capetian king to make regular use of these ideas to subordinate his rivals among the great feudatories, above all the Angevins, in his law courts located in the towns.22 Despite its feudal trappings, French kingship under Philip II and his successors grew out of and depended upon support of the king’s bonnes villes. The final showdown between the Capetians and Angevins began in 1190 when Richard I and Philip II, as well as a number of other great feudal princes, answered papal calls to rescue the Holy Land from Muslim domination. Each king made extensive plans and agreements before embarking on the Third Crusade. Richard I hoped a marriage alliance with Sancho VI of Navarre would secure his southern

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holdings from Raymond V of Toulouse. As the price for recognizing Richard I’s installation as duke of Normandy in 1189, Philip II had demanded Norman Vexin but settled for Angevin recognition of his lordship over Issoudun and Graçay in Berry and a withdrawal of future claims to lordships in Auvergne. Richard I and Philip II vied with each other while on crusade, which was rather typical of noble behavior at the time. Illness and opportunity following Philip of Alsace’s death brought Philip II back to his kingdom in fall 1191. Richard I, who arrived in the Holy Land rather late, was avid to win glory and remained on to fight the infidels for another fifteen months. In the meantime, despite promises to respect earlier agreements, Philip II set about making inroads in the Eure and Avre valleys in order to capture the gateway to Normandy, the Vexin. It was Philip II’s good fortune that Leopold V, duke of Austria, seized Richard I on Christmas Day 1192, as he passed through Vienna on his way home. Leopold V of Monteferrat threw him into prison for reputed involvement in the murder of his cousin Conrad of Montferrat, and for slights he had suffered from the English king at the siege of Acre in 1191. Richard I did not win his release until February 1194 and only after his mother paid a huge ransom. Philip II busily plied favors and took military action to extend his influence into the Vexin and down the Loire. He won over Richard I’s younger, overly cunning brother, John, whose lack of an inheritance from his father lent him the nickname “Lackland” (Sans Terre). John persuaded a number of local barons and castellans to open their castles to the Capetian king, including the great fortress of Gisors, thus opening the way to Rouen.23 Desperate to win his release, Richard even borrowed twenty thousand marks from Philip II by granting him as surety the castles of Drincourt and Arques in eastern Normandy and Loches and Châtillon-sur-Indre in the Touraine. Although Philip II never reached Rouen, he did capture Dieppe in 1194. He demolished the new citadel built six years earlier by Richard I and torched the town before withdrawing. Faced with mounting opposition in England, John obtained more French support in January 1194 in exchange for surrendering Angevin claims to Tours and key castles in the Touraine as well as all of Normandy east of the Seine, except for Rouen, along with Vaudreuil, Verneuil, and Evreux. Finally, John granted Moulins and Bonmoulins to the counts of Perche and Vendôme to Louis of Blois, both allies of Philip II. But French gains proved transitory, for upon his return to England in March 1194, Richard I quickly used his English support to raise an army to reclaim continental possessions lost during his imprisonment. Richard I launched his campaign in two directions, Touraine and Aquitaine, capturing the town of Angoulême on July 22, 1194. As his military successes mounted, former vassals, especially the Norman marcher lords, and his wayward brother John rallied to his standard. As a sign of his loyalty, John ordered the Capetian garrison in Evreux executed when he handed the place over to his brother. Richard I also mended fences with Raymond VI of Toulouse, who married his sister Joan, by ceding him both Quercy and the county of Agen. By 1196, Philip II was increasingly on the defensive especially after he lost Aumale and the lordships of Tillières and L’Aigle along the Epte River that bisected the Vexin.24 Because Richard I could not count on the divided loyalties of the Vexin nobles, he created new ducal castles—none more imposing than the one erected at Gaillard in Les Andeleys in 1197—to intimidate the local nobility. But these moves only served to alienate them further.25 Richard I intended the castle at Gaillard to block any future Capetian advances down the Seine toward Rouen. This castle was the most sophisticated and costly

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fortification complex of its day.26 Built in just two years on a rocky tor overlooking the river, elements of Château Gaillard’s design influenced future fortification construction by the use of concentric rings of defense and a more compact defensive perimeter. Like any fortified place, Château Gaillard also required an adequate garrison and the means to endure a lengthy siege. Providing such men and materials, in turn, relied on Richard I’s firm leadership. The hazards of war, however, brought Richard I to a surprising end on April 6, 1199, when a random crossbow bolt fired during the otherwise inconsequential siege of the small castle of Châlus-Chabrol near Limoges, mortally wounded him. This turn of fate brought the Angevin inheritance to John Lackland, a man whose ruthlessness and lack of principle quickly estranged long-time Angevin supporters and opened the way for Philip II to smash Angevin power once and for all. Philip II began by inviting John I’s vassals to appeal to his royal law court (curia regis) for justice against the last Angevin.27 John I’s refusal to submit to the ensuing judicial sentences provided Philip II all the legal pretext he needed to invade his disobedient vassal’s lands. Beginning in 1201, the Capetian king again peeled away barons and castellans across upper Normandy and in Anjou and Maine. He also encouraged John I’s impressionable young nephew, Arthur of Brittany, to defy his uncle, who captured him in August 1202 at Mirebeau. Arthur became even more useful to Philip II when he died, presumably on his uncle’s orders, sometime in the next nine months. This shocking murder sparked a group of barons, led by Guillaume des Roches, from across Anjou, Maine, Touraine, and Poitou to switch allegiance to Philip II. Brittany also staunchly opposed the Angevins as it now came under control of the Poitevin baron and ally of Philip II, Guy de Thouars, the new husband of Constance of Brittany. Philip II’s brief incursion into Poitou, though it irked Thouars, succeeded in touching off a revolt by the Lusignans against John I, who now faced trouble on multiple fronts.28 With these gains in the lower Loire valley, Philip II turned to his main objective, Normandy.29 Earlier that January, after playing host to the visiting King of England, Count Robert of Sées suddenly opened the town of Alençon to Capetian forces, thus signaling a general revolt against John I that soon stretched across southern Normandy and Maine all the way to the Breton marches. In return, Robert apparently received the title of count of Alençon from the French king.30 Castles along Normandy’s eastern frontier—Boutavant, Eu, Aumale, Drincourt, Mortemer, Lion-la-Forêt, and Gournay—quickly fell after Philip II’s invasion in May 1202, leaving only Château Gaillard, ably commanded by Roger de Lacy, constable of Chester, blocking the way to Rouen. Philip II initially moved to cut Château Gaillard off by capturing surrounding fortresses. The fall of the mighty castle of Vaudreuil in June without a fight severed Gaillard’s ties to Rouen along the left bank of the Seine. John I attempted to recoup his fortunes by besieging Alençon in August, but after that failed he decided to quit Normandy for good. Isolated and inadequately garrisoned, Château Gaillard valiantly resisted the sappers and siege engines that Philip II deployed in a siege that lasted until March 1204. After Château Gaillard capitulated, Philip II swept across Normandy in April and easily captured Verneuil and Arques. By May, he controlled Argentan, Falaise, Caen, Bayeux, Conches, and Lisieux, while his Breton allies seized the Mont-SaintMichel and Avranches. Finally, on June 4, 1204, Rouen opened its gates to the triumphant Philip II, who celebrated his conquest of the Norman capital by razing the ducal castle and replacing it with a new royal citadel.

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John I’s continental empire collapsed like a house of cards.31 In 1202, Guillaume des Roches and a coalition of Angevin barons, among them Juhel de Mayenne and Robert de Vitré, seized towns across Anjou, Maine, and Touraine, places such as Angers, Beaufort, Châteauneuf-sur-Sarthe, Le Mans, and Saumur. By the next summer, Philip II subdued the last stubborn Angevin garrison in Tours and consolidated his control of the Loire valley when he captured the great castles at Loches and Chinon. Eleanor of Aquitaine’s death on March 31, 1204, further hastened capitulations to the Capetian ruler across Poitou, Saintonge, and Aunis. By Christmas 1204, only the towns of La Rochelle and Oléron remained loyal to John I in Poitou. Further south in Guyenne, Bordeaux, Bayonne, Bazas, Saint-Émilion, and La Réole held firm for the moment. However, Alfonso VIII of Castile, abetted by local prelates and counts, took advantage of the collapse of ducal authority in Aquitaine to establish Castilian garrisons in key castles north of the Gironde. Only Bordeaux held out, thanks to the leadership of its archbishop. With all of Normandy, Anjou, Maine, Touraine, and Poitou under his control, Philip II graciously concluded a peace with John I in October 1206. The French monarchy was now the new hegemon of Western Europe.

Early Challenges to Capetian Power The sudden growth of Capetian power brought about a realignment of the great fiefs. Contested successions in Champagne, Brittany, and Auvergne left their ruling families little choice but to acquiesce to greater Capetian dominance. Philip’s relations with Champagne through his mother remained close. Many scions of the house of Champagne died on crusade, including most recently Count Thibaut III in 1201. His widow, Blanche of Navarre, then pregnant with the future Thibaut IV, was in no position to resist Philip II’s demand to be guardian for her children. He extracted from her and later young Thibaut IV promises not to fortify the key towns of Coulommiers, Lagny, Meaux, and Provins in Champagne.32 In Brittany, Guy de Thouars’s difficulties in quelling the restless Breton baronage made him more dependent on Philip II, who in 1211 forced him to affiance his eldest daughter, Alix, to Pierre de Dreux, second son of a royal cousin, Robert II, count of Dreux. Brittany passed from Thouars to Pierre de Dreux in 1213. Real power in the duchy, however, still remained very much in the hands of the Breton baronage, as Pierre de Dreux later discovered. In Auvergne in 1209, Philip II confiscated most of the lands of Count Guy II, who no longer had the Angevins to protect him. Four years later, the French king sent a royal army under Guy de Dampierre to occupy Riom, Nonette, and Tournoël and replaced the ousted Count Guy II. Philip II placed clients in charge of Flanders and Boulogne who he hoped would be pliable. Yet Renaud de Dammartin, count of Boulogne since 1191, despite extracting additional titles and territories in Picardy and Artois from Philip II, made overtures to John I in 1210 after Philip II forced him to affiance his daughter to the king’s bastard son by Agnès de Méran, Philippe Hurepel. Hurepel became count after his stepfather’s death at Bouvines in 1214. Crusading zeal in the house of Flanders opened up opportunities for Philip II to manipulate the Flemish succession in Capetian favor, first promoting as the new count Philip, marquis of Namur, in 1206, followed by Ferrand of Portugal in 1212. Yet Ferrand soon turned against his patron when the king’s bellicose son, the future Louis VIII, seized Saint-Omer and Aire from Flemish control.

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Philip II’s attempt to influence the Imperial election following Philip of Swabia’s assassination in 1208 proved much less successful, as Pope Innocent III backed Otto of Brunswick, a nephew of John I who had just pledged fealty to the Roman pontiff. The election of Otto persuaded him and John I to try to convert rising anti-Capetian sentiment into an open coalition after 1212. A measure of Capetian ambition was Philip II’s daring plan to invade England thwarted only by the destruction of his expeditionary craft at Damme in May 1213. Nevertheless, Philip II went on to seize Bruges, Ghent, Ypres, and Douai over the next year. Meanwhile, John I and Emperor Otto IV rallied opponents and erstwhile allies of the Capetians for a two-pronged attack in spring 1214, with John I leading a force from Poitou to invade the Loire valley, while Otto IV and the count of Flanders assembled an army to confront the French in the Artois. John I lost his nerve, however, at the siege of the castle of La Roche-au-Moine near Angers in April, when he fled before a small relief force led by Prince Louis. John I’s sudden exit convinced Philip II to gamble on a pitched battle at the little town of Bouvines on July 27, 1214—something he had studiously avoided during his long reign. The French victory at Bouvines paved the way for further Capetian advances in the thirteenth century, advances that again shaped the physical makeup of walled towns and their place in both the kingdom and adjoining fiefdoms. The truce at Chinon in 1214 between Philip II and John I secured Capetian control of nearly all Angevin lands north of the Loire. Rebellious Poitou was to become part of the Capetian inheritance upon John I’s death. After long years of war, Philip II recognized the need for peace to secure the monarchy’s newly won lands. Prince Louis, however, wished to continue his father’s bellicose policies. After all, it was his seizure of Saint-Omer and Aire that had pushed the one-time French protégé, Count Ferrand of Flanders, into the waiting arms of the anti-Capetian coalition. Prince Louis also meddled in affairs south of the Loire. In 1215, French lawyers and disgruntled English barons concocted for Prince Louis a French claim to the English throne, which led him the next May to invade England from Calais. He laid siege to Dover and Windsor in July as he moved toward London. Yet the death of the hated King John in October together with papal condemnation of the invasion led a number of English barons to rally to the side of the infant King Henry III of England. This turn of events forced Prince Louis to withdraw the next year after signing the Treaty of Lambeth. Upon returning to France, Louis joined forces with Simon IV de Montfort for a crusade against the religious dissidents in Occitania, the Albigensians. These wars introduced a new, more savage kind of warfare into Western Europe. Simon IV de Montfort’s improbable conquest of most of the county of Toulouse and portions of the duchy of Aquitaine in the Albigensian Crusades (1209–1255) brought the lands of Occitania under eventual Capetian control.33 The localized nature of Occitan politics nurtured the spread of Catharism in the twelfth century. Indeed, the name Albigensian derived from the town of Albi, thought to be the epicenter of the movement. The counts of Toulouse and a good number of Occitan prelates generally tolerated the Albigensians, despite mounting pressure from Rome. Violence rose in 1181 when a papal legate aroused local Catholic nobles to attack the Cathar town of Lavaur in the Trecavel domains, but the siege failed to stop the movement’s spread. Papal entreaties for action went mostly to Philip II, but he was in no position to invade Aquitaine in the 1180s. The Angevin collapse in 1204, however, left Raymond VI of Toulouse isolated and vulnerable to French

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depredations, especially after the 1207 murder of the legate, Pierre de Castelnau, who had excommunicated the count and placed his lands under interdict. In reaction, Pope Innocent III declared a crusade against the heretics and appealed for support from the Capetian king. It took Philip II two years to authorize the duke of Burgundy and the counts of Nevers, St. Pol, and Boulogne to lead a modest contingent of knights, among them Simon IV, lord of Montfort, to fight the Albigensians. These French crusaders enjoyed surprising success thanks to the foolhardiness of their adversaries. An ill-considered sortie by the inhabitants of Béziers, the main redoubt of Raymond-Roger of Trencavel, allowed them to enter on July 22, 1209, whereupon they massacred most of the populace. Loaded with booty, the crusaders moved to besiege Carcassonne. Well-fortified with stone walls and some twenty-six towers, Carcassonne was quite formidable. However, refugees overwhelmed the city as the food and water supply soon became perilous in the sweltering August heat. On August 7, the besiegers captured the city’s two main suburbs. Faced with the prospect of another massacre and no relief from his protector, Pedro II of Aragon, Raymond-Roger reached terms with the crusaders for an orderly evacuation and pillaging on August 15. The new papal legate, Arnaud Amaury, however, had him arrested and all the Trencavel family’s domains confiscated. He even hawked the title of viscount to Catholic princes in the crusading army, all of whom spurned his offer. Indeed, once the obligatory service of forty days was up for them, most wanted nothing more than to go home with their booty. All, that is, except Simon de Montfort, who hailed from a small seigneury in the Ile-de-France. Ambitious, talented, and ruthless, Simon IV de Montfort stayed on to lead a small but battle-hardened army against the larger, but disunited forces of Occitan lords, which included the reluctant Count Raymond VI, who still hoped for reconciliation with the pope. The legate conferred the title of viscount upon Simon IV in October; Raymond-Roger Trencavel’s death in prison in November enabled him to consolidate control over domainal castles in Aude region around Carcassonne.34 In December, Monfort even won recognition from Pope Innocent III as a direct vassal of the papacy. Montfort’s campaign in 1209–1210 enjoyed further success as a number of Trencavel towns opened their gates to him without a fight. Emboldened, he went on to attack and capture fortified places in the lands of the counts of Foix. Fearing the worse, local Occitan lords and Cathar refugees launched counterattacks against Montfort’s overstretched force in spring 1210, sparking revolts in recently taken places such as Castres, Lombers, and Montréal. Montfort’s reaction was ferocious, as he burned any Cathars who refused to abjure their beliefs (which meant most of them); he also routinely mutilated prisoners, such as the one hundred or so he took after the siege of the castle of Bram in early 1210. His use of terror against the four castles of Lastours-Cabaret—Cabaret, Tour Régine, Surdespine, and Quertinbeaux—which lay just to the north of Carcassonne, was typical. This imposing redoubt dominated the valley of the Orbieu River and provided a haven for fleeing Cathars and Trencavel loyalists. After Pierre-Roger de Cabaret, a Trencavel vassal, repulsed Montfort’s initial attack in early summer 1210, a pitiful spectacle unfolded as Montfort forced a band of enchained prisoners, their ears and lips hacked off and eyes gouged out, led by a lone one-eyed unfortunate who told the defenders of Latours and Cabaret that the same fate awaited them if they did not immediately surrender. Unfazed, the defenders refused. Montfort instead

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moved to capture Minerve and Termes in late 1210, which ended the last major centers of resistance in the southern parts of his new domains. Encouraged by Montfort’s startling success, Arnaud Amaury, now archbishop of Narbonne, in March 1211 issued an ultimatum to the beleaguered Raymond VI of Toulouse to either eradicate heresy in his lands or risk their confiscation. In response, Pedro II of Aragon rallied the Occitan lords of Foix and Comminges into a coalition to resist the threat of a complete takeover of the region by Montfort. In May, Montfort returned to besiege and capture the last two Trencavel strongholds of Cabaret and Lavaur. He inflicted atrocities so horrific on the poor residents of Lavaur that dozens of towns and castles around Toulouse surrendered to him without a fight. Montfort then turned his attention in June to taking Toulouse. The largest town in Occitania and fiercely independent, Toulouse had a population of twenty-five thousand and an imposing set of defenses that proved impossible to breach, however. Montfort’s failure allowed Raymond VI and his allies to take the initiative, chasing Montfort and his dwindling army through the lands of the count of Foix, which he ravaged along the way. In September, they finally cornered Montfort in the town of Castelnaudary, where he found himself now besieged. In a daring sortie against considerable odds, Montfort inflicted a stunning defeat on Raymond VI and thus escaped almost certain capture.35 Raymond VI soon recovered and went on to recapture upward of sixty places held by Montfort across the county of Toulouse toward Carcassonne. The conflict seesawed over the next year as a new infusion of French crusaders came to assist Montfort. In 1213, Pedro II intervened with an Aragonese army, which besieged Montfort’s stronghold at Muret, just south of Toulouse. Again, Montfort sallied forth and trounced the panicstricken Aragonese and their allies, slaughtering most of the Toulousan infantry. Raymond VI fled to the court of King John I the next year after Philip II’s victory at Bouvines in late July. These decisive shifts in the balance of power both to the north and south of the Loire whetted Capetian expansionist ambitions in greater Occitania, especially after Simon de Montfort’s successful campaign in the Dordogne River valley in 1214 brought southern Poitou into his sphere of influence. In spring 1215, Philip II had Prince Louis lead a Capetian army to join Montfort in a push to take Toulouse, which opened its gates to them in May. He also commanded Toulouse to destroy its walls, fill in its moats, and prepare to accept Montfort as its lord. Yet this seeming triumph of Montfort and the French was short-lived. Narbonne, dominated by its archbishop Arnaud Amaury, who was also papal legate, refused him entry, as did Montpellier held by the Aragonese. Prince Louis imprudently interfered in the region on Montfort’s behalf, forcing Narbonne in May 1215 to swear allegiance to Montfort and to raze its fortifications. In November, after much debate, Pope Innocent III finally acceded to pressures from the French to recognize Simon de Montfort as the new count of Toulouse, together with the titles of duke of Narbonne and viscount of Béziers and Carcassonne. Montfort returned to Paris in early 1216, rendering homage to Philip II for his fiefs in April. Yet French ambitions in England and growing problems with the papacy militated against any further support by the Capetians of Montfort. Montfort therefore turned his attention eastward to Provence, which served as a rallying point for his enemies among the Occitan nobility and townspeople who challenged him at every turn with raids and revolts, especially after Raymond VI

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arrived in Marseille in April 1216 with his son, who became Raymond VII when his father conceded to him the comtal title to Toulouse and the marquisate of Provence. The county of Provence, which encompassed most of the southern region, including Marseille, was held by the House of Aragon, which also pledged its support to Raymond VII. Together they led a new Occitan coalition in May against the garrison that Montfort had recently installed in Beaucaire, located on the Provençal side of the Rhône. Nearby Avignon contributed a particularly large contingent. Unable to relieve Beaucaire over the next three months, Montfort suffered his first major military defeat when the garrison surrendered to Raymond VII in August. Unrest soon broke out across Montfort’s domains, beginning with an uprising in Toulouse. In 1216, while Montfort tried to put these disturbances down, he also led an army into the Pyrenean foothills in an effort to knock out the counts of Comminges and Foix and thus block another Aragonese intervention. Montfort’s siege of Toulouse, which began in September 1217, went poorly and dragged on into the next year largely because he lacked the requisite manpower and funds given his other pressing obligations. Fearing the worst if Simon took the city, a chronicler described how “[e]veryone began to rebuild the walls. Knights and burgesses, ladies and squires, boys and girls, great and small carried up the hewn stones singing ballads and songs.”36 On June 25, 1218, after several desperate attempts to capture the suburb of St. Cyprien and thus control the river, Montfort mounted an all-out attack on the walls and was killed when a stone hurled from the parapets crushed his skull. Simon IV de Montfort’s death dramatically changed the nature of the struggle in Occitania. His achievements soon unraveled after Pope Honorius III’s call to Philip II and Prince Louis to intervene to prop up Montfort’s son, Amaury, essentially went unanswered. The result was Amaury’s resounding defeat by the combined forces of Raymond VII of Toulouse and the count of Foix at battle of Baziège in 1219. Prince Louis and Amaury briefly joined forces later that year in the massacre at Marmande, located on the border between the Agenais and English holdings around Bordeaux. However, the French king recalled his son from the upcoming effort to take Toulouse, which failed as a result. Raymond VII wasted little time, retaking numerous towns and castles, including Castelnaudary and Montréal, in 1220. Amaury made one last effort to recoup his losses by mounting a siege against Castelnaudary that lasted from July 1220 to March 1221. His failure left him little choice but to abandon his father’s hard-won domains. In fact, both Amaury and Raymond VII offered the county of Toulouse to Philip II in 1222, but he refused lest he become mired in the deadly quagmire of Occitania. A generation of warriors passed away over the next eighteen months, among them Raymond VI of Toulouse. His death reaffirmed his son Raymond VII’s claims to the titles. Upon his death in 1223, Philip II bequeathed to Louis VIII a kingdom more than double its size since his accession nearly a half-century earlier. Capetian domains north of the Loire rested firmly in royal control, though the ever turbulent barons of Poitou, led by Geoffrey IV of Rancon, lord of Gençay, soon mounted a challenge to the new king—just as they had to the Angevins—that quickly spread to neighboring Saintonge and Aunis. Meanwhile, the powerful Hugh of Lusignan and Savaric of Mauléon, lord of Talmont, extended their sway over areas of northern Aquitaine.37 Why the expanded Capetian kingdom did not suffer the same fate as the Angevin empire rested principally on the different roles that walled towns and castles came to play under Philip II.

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Urban Enceintes and Castle Construction under Philip II Philip II’s relations with walled towns and castles proved decisive for both the conquest and consolidation of the expanded royal desmesne. He continued in more systematic fashion the established Capetian practice of granting charters to urban communes in neighboring fiefdoms in advance of their absorption. Walled towns provided a base from which to project royal influence through the prévôts and baillis established to enforce royal justice and collect royal taxes. Indeed, the decline of independent castellan families after 1200 became more marked as efficient, centralized royal government grew.38 The revenues raised by towns not only paid for walls and the hire of mercenaries, but also for urban militias largely composed of new crossbow contingents.39 Already in the twelfth century, observers such as the jongleur Guiot of Provins lamented that the noble knight had ceded his place of honor on the battlefield to “the miners, engineers, crossbowmen, and artillerymen,” all of whom played essential roles in the new siege warfare.40 In the charters he granted, Philip II usually favored the interests of urban merchant and professional groups over those of local churchmen and nobles. An exception was Étampes, which saw its charter annulled by the king in 1199 when the commune infringed upon the rights of local lords in the town.41 Capetian influence over episcopal appointments in regalian sees based in towns represented an ancillary urban policy that furthered royal aims. Bishops owed the crown military services as well as other obligations. Controversy over the metropolitan status of Dol in Brittany, for example, stemmed from Angevin fears that it could provide the Capetians a toehold from which to extend their influence.42 While Henry II’s and Richard Lionheart’s heavy exactions on churches and abbeys won them few friends among the clergy, the tensions between ducal and clerical regimes, even in the Norman Church, did not contribute significantly to the weakening of Angevin power or pave the way for the Capetian ascendancy.43 Philip II continued the practice of issuing charters of protection to prelates, often at a great distance from Paris, for it established a justification for later intervention. The growth of the medieval state under Philip II thus hinged on the vital partnership among walled towns, episcopal sees, and the monarchy. Control of castles amplified the regional position the crown achieved in the walled towns. Castleguard service received close attention in the registers inventorying military services to the crown. Indeed, well-organized castellanies served as anchor points in towns and their surrounding hinterlands. Until the Battle of Bouvines in 1214, Philip II’s military campaigns revolved almost exclusively around sieges of castles. A survey conducted between 1206 and 1210 identified 113 castles in the possession of the Capetian king; after Bouvines, this number grew considerably.44 He had new castles built and older ones, as at Chinon, substantially modified.45 The thickest concentrations of fortified places existed in an arc extending eastward from the coast of the Pas-de-Calais along the Flemish frontier before dipping south to the Thiérache and Laon. Another network of castles lay south of Paris between Orléans and Sens, while a third line of them extended up the Seine valley from Paris to Rouen, particularly in the much contested Vexin. When Philip II took Rouen in 1204, he ordered its walls razed and a new citadel constructed to the north of the burg. A final grouping of castles was located along the Franco-Norman frontier to the north in the Beauvaisis. It should also be noted that Philip II held outlying

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castles further afield in Poitou and Auvergne and to the east in Champagne. These places effectively marked the course of future Capetian expansion.46 Reinforcing this pattern were the massive royal keeps and stone crenellated walls that Philip II had built in towns he chartered. He aimed to protect the vital core of his kingdom centered on Paris by fortifying places in the major river valleys that served as arteries of commerce as well as potential invasion routes. The lower and upper Seine understandably received early attention, while areas along the Somme and upper Loire assumed increasing importance after the collapse of Angevin power in 1204. Areas to the east along the Marne proved, at least for the time being, less worrisome given Philip II’s close relations with the House of Champagne. The scale of these constructions, and the investment it all represented, was unprecedented as Philip II enclosed nearly every major burg within the royal demesne by the end of his reign. Royal expenditures on urban fortifications represented the costliest item in the king’s budget. Philip II sponsored wholly new sets of stone fortifications for Compiègne, Corbeil, Laon, Mantes, and Melun. Other enceintes, as in Normandy and the Artois, became revamped with the addition of rounded towers and formidable new gates. Such construction projects required an adequate tax base for funding as well as the organizational capacity to marshal the necessary men and resources. For these, the cooperation of newly empowered municipal communes was essential. If necessary, as in Rheims and Châlon-sur-Marne in Champagne, Philip II even lent local authorities the funding necessary to realize such projects.47 Fortification construction under Philip II achieved a remarkable level of efficiency that enabled him to build more with less than the Angevins. The king also only entrusted castles in towns and the countryside to castellans of proven loyalty or circumscribed their prerogatives when he made them seneschal. Fortifications under Philip II incorporated important architectural innovations that first began in Angevin lands before reaching their fullest expression in the Capetian desmesne.48 One by one, older-style moat-and-bailey castles either became eliminated or replaced after 1150 with huge stone keeps surrounded by walls and moats. The most innovative was Richard Lionheart’s castle complex at ChâteauGaillard. It tailored a sophisticated defensive system for a very formidable terrain. It was approachable from only one side and laid out a defense-in-depth composed of three-walled layers along a single axis. Its outer machicolated wall sported on its flanks an articulated, elliptical facing designed to eliminate dead angles, within which lay a trapezoidal curtain wall buttressed by four rounded towers. Protecting the castle’s most vulnerable side was a huge triangular fort with powerful towers at its points and fronted by a deep ditch.49 While none of Philip II’s fortifications achieved the design complexity of Gaillard, the one built by his close ally Guy de La Roche, on a bend of the Seine near Mantes, did approach it. The castle complex of La Roche-Guyon melded the overall design schema of the fortress with the rocky escarpment, highlighted by a subterranean passageway chiseled through solid bedrock connecting the lower eleventh-century keep near the river and a new upper castle. The lower keep also received enhancement in the form of an advanced system of defense-in-depth that commanded—in the name of the king—the most important river in the Ile-de-France.50 By contrast, the common design of Philip II’s fortification projects articulated simpler forms that could still be built fairly efficiently and for far less expense.

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The similarity of these keeps reflected increased central oversight of design and execution. Rectangular keeps in towns gave way first to polygonal towers during the twelfth century and then to rounded ones under Philip II. Strengthening spurs, known as becs, buttressed the sides of these rounded castles. Irregular polygonal forms nevertheless persisted in the castles built in Montreuil-sur-Mer, Yèvresle-Châtel, and Dourdan.51 In Laon, located on a high promontory overlooking the Picard plain, Philip II replaced the square donjon erected by his father with a massive new rounded keep. He did the same in places he conquered, such as Pontde-l’Arche and Falaise, and inherited, such as Montargis and Ribemont. One of the best surviving of Philip II’s keeps is in Étampes. With its distinctive cloverleaf floor plan, it loomed over the burg below and was accessible by a drawbridge that spanned a deep dry ditch. They were often three storeys in height and composed of converging cylinders, as at Étampes and Ambleny, or one massive cylinder, as at Châteaudun. Their rounded façades and evenly spaced arrow slits improved defensive fields of fire and mitigated the impact of missile attacks.52 The king’s close ally, Simon IV de Montfort, built a similarly innovative castle at Houdan.53 Starting in 1216, Adam II de Chailly, viscount of Melun, adapted the philippean fortification system to his ancestral castle at Blandy-les-Tours to the east of Paris, adding three huge cylindrical fronting towers. The spread of crossbows in urban defense shifted the earlier emphasis of strengthening the inner keep to bolstering defensive firepower along the outer walls. Town defenses in modest burgs such as Villeneuve-sur-Yonne became more sophisticated and systematized in terms of all their component parts, as walls, towers, gates, and firing stations became integrated into mutually supportive ensembles.54 Quadrilateral enclosures for castles, with rounded towers at the corners as in Caen, introduced greater regularity and foreshadowed the later design forms of the bastides built in Occitania.55 Walls became much thicker, up to twelve feet, thus necessitating more substantial foundation work; moats, too, became wider and deeper, utilizing water features wherever feasible. Drawbridges and fortified gates became multilayered defenses, often utilizing a proto-bastion known as a barbican. Troyes and Provins, as well as an older one on Bar-sur-Aube, indicate the existence by the early thirteenth century of formidable machicolated curtain walls protected by rounded watch towers and fortified gates, all meant to provide merchants a strong sense of security as they went about their business.56 The increased sophistication of urban defenses was nowhere more apparent than in Paris, whose GalloRoman walls only ever protected the Ile-de-la-Cité.57 Before leaving on crusade in 1190, Philip II ordered the rebuilding of the royal castle and residence of the Louvre, which served as a prototype for other urban citadels built during his reign, such as the keep erected at Dun-le-Roi in Berry by its local lord. He also had a formidable fifteen-hundred-meter circuit of walls erected to enclose sprawling new neighborhoods on both the Right and Left Banks, leaving room in the expanded periphery for future growth.58 Philip II authorized these new kinds of enceintes throughout his lands at places such as Bourges, Melun, Compiègne, and Péronne. Those not finished in his lifetime, Prince Louis later saw to completion.59 Philip II’s reign thus marked a turning point for the French monarchy and its bonnes villes. It also provided a model for other feudatory princes to emulate in the face of future Capetian aggression. The impetus behind improving urban fortifications came mainly from rulers as they sought to secure control of territory. Crenellation

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first served as a symbol of princely domination before it became a sign of municipal independence.60 Townspeople generally cooperated because they received in return confirmation and expansion of their town’s liberties in charters. Municipal institutions and the urban economy certainly possessed the capacity to execute and fund these substantial—and expensive—public works projects. However, siege warfare was largely directed against castles, not towns, though there were certainly notable exceptions. The expensive transition to stone enceintes, while definitely well underway in the first part of the thirteenth century was therefore far from ubiquitous, especially in lands north of the Loire River. Rising wealth and population fueled dynamic growth as old urban cores gave way to sprawling faubourgs. The politics of just where to draw the line defining a town’s edge became further compounded by the competing claims of crown, church, and local seigneurs over jurisdiction. Any decisions to expand municipal walls to incorporate suburbs represented a significant modification of the city’s identity and social topography by its reallocation of bourgeois rights. Municipal ordinances commonly referred to their jurisdiction as “la ville et les faubourgs,” which was at once associative and dissociative, and became confirmed every day with the ritual opening and locking of the town gates. The faubourg served as a transitional zone to the burg proper and represented a town’s colonization of lands along the axes of roads leading from the main gates. Militarizing the urban edge further thus carried important, often irrevocable implications for a town’s relationship with the outside world.61 Unless otherwise prompted by feudatory rulers, most towns still found sufficient comfort in their old earthen ramparts and stockades. Any desire to close towns off ran headlong into strong incentives to be open to the outside world. Yet the new, more brutal forms of war unleashed on towns in Occitania during the Albigensian Crusades pointed to a dark future for urban communities. As insecurities steadily rose over the next century, towns underwent profound alteration to their makeup and attitudes.

Ch apter 3

Ca pet ia n Ex pansion and New Urba nism, 12 2 5–1325

The evolving relationship between towns and feudatory princes took more sta-

ble institutional form in the thirteenth century. As such, it provided an essential framework for the return of public governance in the lands of old Francia. Leading the way were the Capetians, whose ascendancy prompted like efforts by other regional rulers, such as the counts of Flanders, Champagne, and Toulouse, the dukes of Brittany and Burgundy, and, above all, the kings of England in their continental domains. Urban economies produced more wealth that, in turn, whetted bourgeois ambitions to realize more self-rule and flaunt their self-importance. Perhaps the most potent expression of these urban aspirations came in the grand cathedrals that merchants and artisans paid so dearly to erect. These huge, soaring edifices dramatically changed the entire visual aspect of medieval cityscapes even more than royal keeps or old lordly châteaux-forts. Yet as competition among feudatory rulers continued, and more brutal, large-scale forms of warfare visited new horrors on communities, towns began to invest more heavily in massive stone walls and towers for security. In time, the great age of cathedrals gave way to the hard times embodied in the fully militarized urban edge. The Capetian monarchy underwent significant institutional change in the thirteenth century. One telling expression came in the more systematic use of apanages. An apanage was a concession of a fief to a cadet son for his lifetime, after which it reverted to the crown. Primogeniture meant the royal dignity passed fully to the eldest son. Apanages thus maintained the integrity of the royal domain while mitigating the possibility of destabilizing fraternal strife in the royal family. Louis VI and Philip II had made limited use of them, while Louis VIII broadened the practice to avert the kinds of dynastic rivalries among his sons that had torn the Angevin house apart. His first-born son, the future Louis IX, born in 1214, was the next in line to the throne. In 1224, Louis VIII granted the county of Artois as an apanage to his second son, Robert; the counties of Anjou and Maine went to his third son, John, while the county of Poitou went to his youngest son, who became known as Alphonse of Poitiers. What began as a familial solution touching dynastic patrimony became a fundamental law of the kingdom over time. The legal doctrine of inalienability of the royal domain rendered the French monarchy a public office, not a personal possession of the king’s family.1 Forms of public governance both in the towns and the crown thus matured in tandem during the thirteenth century.

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Capetian Expansion to the Treaty of Paris (1259) Upon his accession in 1223, Louis VIII took steps to carry the momentum of Capetian conquests into the Auvergne and Aquitaine. Using force and patronage, he first aimed to subdue the Poitevin baronage. He won over Hugh of Lusignan, count of La Marche, in June 1224 by offering him hereditary right over the towns of Saintes and Oléron; he even promised him the lordship of Bordeaux if he captured it from the English. With memories of the recent massacre at Marmande still fresh, Louis VIII easily captured the towns of Niort, Saint-Jean d’Angély, and La Rochelle later that summer. That left only the ports of Saint-Malo and Royan north of Gascony in Plantagenet control, though neither of them proved suitable to support invasions later in 1230 and 1242. Meanwhile, Hugh led a Capetian army into Gascony, which prompted the towns of Saint-Émilion, Saint-Macaire, Langon, La Réole, and Bazas to surrender, but significantly not Bordeaux, which became the Plantagenet’s principal toehold on the continent. Louis VIII next turned his sights to Occitania, which still remained unsettled in the aftermath of Simon IV de Montfort’s recent conquests. Despite initial papal misgivings, the Capetian king proclaimed a third crusade against the Albigensians from Bourges in January 1226. He set out in May down the Rhône valley, but his way became blocked by Avignon, an independent provençal town that feared French domination.2 Its bridge over the Rhône was a key to the Capetian campaign into Occitania. Even though the town council had just added a new rampart to its old Gallo-Roman walls, it agreed in early June to open its gates to Louis VIII and pay an indemnity of six thousand marks. Louis VIII ordered Avignon’s walls torn down and its ditches filled in, but the work did not progress very far. Another sign of Capetian presence in Avignon came when Catholic authorities established new religious houses along the town’s edge. Other towns in Provence, such as Beaucaire and Marseille, followed Avignon’s example by surrendering to the pope and accepting French garrisons. Defections from among Raymond VII’s supporters across the Rhône soon included the towns of Béziers, Carcassonne, and Nîmes. In western Occitania, however, the city of Toulouse rallied, as it had in the past, for the beleaguered count of Toulouse. A handful of smaller strongholds, such as Montségur, also held fast. In September 1226, Louis VIII prepared the ground for conquest by transferring the county of Toulouse to his youngest son, Alphonse of Poitiers. Unexpectedly, however, the king contracted dysentery the next month and died on November 8, leaving the crown to the twelve-year-old Louis IX and his mother, Blanche of Castile, who became regent. The Capetian gains of the last half-century now suddenly seemed quite precarious. That recent Capetian advances survived this crisis largely reflected the resiliency of the French’s crowns relations with towns, even in lands just newly won. Louis IX received renewed pledges of allegiance in 1227 and 1228 from towns in the old Trencavel lands, such as Albi, Carcassonne, and Béziers, and places along the lower Rhône. The split in Occitania between a French dominated east and a truncated county of Toulouse to the west became formalized in the Treaty of Paris in 1229. This agreement between Blanche and Raymond VII divided the hereditary lands of the counts of Toulouse into the seneschalcies (sénéchaussées) of Beaucaire and Carcassonne. Furthermore, Raymond VII agreed to marry his daughter, Jeanne of Toulouse, to Louis IX’s brother, Alphonse of Poitiers. The treaty recognized Raymond VII’s title as count of Toulouse, including Agenais,

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Rouergue, and parts of Albigeois and Quercy, during his lifetime, after which it would pass to Jeanne and Alphonse, and then their children. In the event they died childless, the county of Toulouse would revert to the French crown. The treaty also reconciled Raymond VII to the Church. As a further precaution against revolt, Blanche required Raymond VII to turn over all his remaining castles and fortified towns for the next ten years, among them Castelnaudery, Lavaur, Montcuq, Penne d’Agenais, Cordes, Peyrusse, Verdun-sur-Garonne, and Villemur. He was also forbidden to establish new towns, known as bastides. Last, Raymond VII had to reward about thirty towns, chief among them Toulouse, that had remained loyal to him by demolishing their walls and filling in their ditches. Although Raymond VII hoped a change in fortune would enable him or a new successor to revisit these treaty provisions, the reality of Capetian power in Occitania only became firmer over the next twenty years. Settling the crown’s affairs in Occitania enabled Blanche and Louis IX to deal with opposition elsewhere. One threat lay to the east of Paris from the vigorous young count of Champagne, Thibaut IV. Anticipating a clash with his Capetian cousin, Thibaut IV had bolstered the key fortified towns and castles in his domains since the early 1220s.3 But Thibaut IV never raised the standard of revolt. Instead, that came from an uprising among the barons of Poitou in 1235 against Alphonse, and by implication his brother the king, instigated by their uncle Pierre de Dreux, duke of Brittany. With the help of towns along the Loire and loyal barons, such as Geoffrey IV of Rancon, Blanche subdued these threats as her son neared his majority in 1240. To secure control of this unsettled region, she authorized the construction of massive new citadels, such as the one at Angers that had a walled perimeter of over one thousand yards, seventeen huge rounded towers, and a cavernous fronting ditch. Yet unrest continued to roil Poitou. The most serious threat to Capetian power under Louis IX began on Christmas day, 1241. Spurred on by King Henry III of England, the powerful baron of Lusignan, Hugh X, led another Poitevin rebellion against Alphonse. Alphonse and Louis IX, again with the assistance of Geoffrey IV of Rancon, quickly raised an army of thirty thousand men. Equipped with siege engines, they methodically pried control of baronial castles along the Charente River, including Hugh X’s ancestral castle at Montreuil-en-Gâtine. Their goal was the Lusignan stronghold of Saintes. Henry III landed a relief force at Royan while Count Raymond VII of Toulouse, anxious to reverse his 1229 concessions, moved north to assist the Poitevin barons. In July, these forces converged on the castle of Taillebourg, where Louis IX and Alphonse were encamped. Much of the castle remained in ruins since its destruction by Richard Lionheart in 1194. Situated at a vital crossing on the Charente River between Saint-Jean-d’Angély and Saintes, Taillebourg was effectively the gateway south into Aquitaine. On July 21, Louis IX and Alphonse defeated the anti- Capetian coalition at the battle of Taillebourg and again two days later at Saintes. Henry III withdrew to England, while the duke of Brittany and the Poitevin barons reconciled with the victorious French king. Alphonse chased Raymond VII back into Gascony. A papal excommunication of the count of Toulouse prompted a new wave of defections, including the count of Foix, who pledged his allegiance to Louis IX. In what proved to be the last major military action of the Albigensian Crusades, the French captured the seemingly impregnable stronghold of Montségur after a grueling siege that lasted from March 1243 to March 1244. Raymond VII’s death five years later brought

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about the transfer of the county of Toulouse to his daughter Jeanne and her husband, Alphonse of Poitiers. Occitania henceforth became known in Paris for its regional dialect as Languedoc, sandwiched between Provence and Aquitaine. In 1246, the county of Provence passed to Louis IX’s brother Charles of Anjou and his descendants, though it still held ties to the Empire and the House of Savoy. Capetian authority developed most fully in the county of Toulouse under Alphonse. He organized it into five seneschalcies based in Périgord-Quercy, Rouergue, Toulouse-Albi, Carcassonne-Béziers, and Beaucaire-Nîmes. He astutely kept on capable men to head these posts, such as Sicard d’Alaman, who had worked for Raymond VII, and southern men of proven loyalty, such as Jordan IV, lord of Isle-Jourdain located in the Gers, and Eustache de Beaumarchais, a minor lord from Auvergne. Alphonse also transplanted established Capetian institutions in his capital of Toulouse, such as a Parlement to dispense royal justice and a Chambre de Comptes to monitor finances. Finally, he encouraged the formation of a regional assembly or estates (états) in which Occitan towns played a leading role.4 Local legal and linguistic practices prevailed as the Capetians made no real effort to “frankify” Languedoc. A treaty with Aragon in 1258 ceded to the Capetians all lands north of the Pyrenees, with the exception of the lordship of Montpellier. The Capetians now controlled nearly half of Occitania and enjoyed their broadest support from the towns. In 1259, Henry III of England finally came to terms with Louis IX in the Treaty of Paris. It confirmed English possession of Quercy, Limousin and Saintonge, while it reaffirmed Capetian claims to Poitou, Maine, Anjou, and Normandy. He also agreed to recognize the French king as his liege lord. Through confiscations and forced marriages, Louis IX and Alphonse advanced the position of their Poitevin allies in the region. The main opponents of Capetian power in Occitania henceforth became the Pyrenean barons and counts of Béarn, Foix, and Comminges. The geographic confines of Capetian rule now embraced most of the lands that later became modern France. In all its diversity, the most consistent unifying feature of this expanded medieval polity was the monarchy’s partnership with towns.

New Urbanism in Southern France: Bastides As these struggles over territory raged in greater Occitania, a new kind of planned urban community known as a bastide developed and spread that profoundly transformed this vast region. While other parts of France saw new towns established after 1220, those failed to compare with the scale of activity in Aquitaine and the Midi where upward of six hundred bastides were founded (see map 3.1).5 Most bastides were fairly modest in size, ranging from several hundred to perhaps two thousand residents. Like elsewhere in France, population growth and the desire to develop an area’s economic potential lay behind the establishment of new towns. Indeed, the establishment of bastides declined after the staggering population losses caused by the Black Death in the late 1340s. Like north of the Loire after the ninth century, new towns in greater Occitania after 1200 often grew up in close proximity to castles and fortified abbeys. Some of them eventually became bastides, while others did not; often it was a question of semantics. The biggest difference lay in how much self-rule a new town enjoyed as expressed in its charter.6 In some cases, modest villages evolved into bastides

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Map 3.1

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Bonnes Villes and Bastides, 1300.

through the intervention of the crown or lords. A good number of bastides actually represented new communities, as indicated in the frequency of the toponyms “Villeneuve” or “Labastide.”7 Some place names evoked site features, such as a promontory (“mont”) or river (“sur-Lot”), while others referenced important towns in Spain (“Barcelone”) or Italy (“Pavie”) where nobles from Occitania had recently campaigned.8 A few bastides even carried the names of their founders. Briatexte, for example, was established in 1287 by Simon de Briseteste, seneschal of Carcassonne, on the site of the Cathar village of Toueilles that Simon de Montfort had razed to the ground in 1212.9 Many motives lay behind the establishment of bastides. Economics was often paramount as local lords hoped to attract settlers to cultivate the land, harvest timber, and develop manufactures. Bastide charters offered manorial peasants a chance to escape their servile status, and the manorial dues that went with it; they could even own and bequeath property. Grain cultivation, timbering, viniculture, and

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manufactures promised profits for residents in bastides and the lords sponsoring them. Site selection, usually along rivers, had to strike a balance between defensibility and commercial exchange.10 Bastides also promoted the rule of public law, while the foundation of Catholic religious houses and parish churches helped stem the tide of Albigensianism. Last, bastides provided islands of refuge and security in an often violent world. The juridical foundation of a bastide took several possible forms. One way was when a local lay or clerical lord, or cartels of smaller fief holders, directly authorized it. Another occurred when a suzerain, usually the French or English king, acquired a territory through transfer (cession) from the local lord; while the third came about through a usufruct agreement known as an acte de paréage between the suzerain and the local lord. These initial agreements later became formulated in the bastide’s charter.11 In general, paréage agreements curtailed the autonomy of local castellans. Bastides thus helped to establish a royal legal and fiscal presence (both French and English) by serving as seats for jugeries, vigueries, and baillis. Alphonse of Poitiers was particularly adept at using royal judicial officers to adjudicate legal differences with local lords. Indeed, by 1271 the French crown had established its political presence in Languedoc largely through acts of paréage with local abbeys, priories, and lay lords. Economic and fiscal provisions came in articles on the disposition of arable land, building lots, labor dues, markets, and guilds. Other provisions defined municipal administration, usually under elected jurats or consuls, who handled local justice and regulations, tax collection, and public works, including fortifications. Local defense became further addressed in articles establishing a militia.12 Bastide charters lacked regularity until Alphonse began to model them after the ones he granted to Villefranche-de-Rouergue and Monclar d’Agenais. His seneschal Eustache de Beaumarchais was even more systematic, using prototypes based on the charters he granted to Gimont and Najac. Upon finalizing an act of paréage or cession, the first step in actually building a bastide came with the fixatio pali. This ceremony consisted of planting a large pole on the spot destined to become the marketplace, affixed atop of which were banners displaying the coats-of-arms of the king or great lord who sponsored the bastide’s foundation. The founder’s agents, usually clergymen, supervised the surveyors who laid out the bastide according to the terms of the paréage.13 Notaries, judges, bailiffs, the seneschal, and even the bishop also often attended. Next came the préconisatio or proclamation of privileges outlined in the charter that public criers broadcast across the land to attract settlers. Surveyors then staked out the building parcels, garden plots, and arable lands, separating each area with ditches and earthen mounds. The measurements needed to be precise because they determined a person’s tax rates. The principal avenues of a bastide were wide enough for two carts to pass. Commercial establishments and public buildings set up shop along these thoroughfares, which led to the central marketplace. Narrower streets for one-way traffic bisected these avenues to create the residential districts. Finally, there were the walkways and sunken channels to funnel waste out of the bastide.14 The founding lord normally assumed responsibility for constructing communal buildings, such as the parish church (often fortified), municipal hall, marketplace, mills, bakeries, and, where possible, fish ponds. Residents had to build their houses within a stipulated amount of time, usually one year. Most were two storeys, with a shop on the ground level and the domicile up above. A courtyard in the rear served as a latrine. The charters often stipulated the materials to be used, features

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of the façade, street alignment and dimensions.15 Functionality and efficiency thus guided these new models of medieval urbanism. Bastide designs varied regionally in orthogonal and, on occasion, radial schemas fitted to local topographical conditions. Like castles, many bastides were built on promontories with streets fitted to a place’s hilly contours.16 Others grew up at key river crossings with a main avenue perpendicular to the river.17 Bastides in Quercy often had single main avenues bisected by streets much like rungs on a ladder.18 Several types of bastides developed in Armagnac and Périgord. Some had fairly regular grids formed by residential blocks intersected by avenues and streets.19 Others had elongated yet still orthogonal grids laid out along a principal avenue flanked by two side streets.20 A further type in Gascony was characterized by a central square formed by two sets of intersecting perpendicular avenues off of which went side streets to form the residential blocks.21 Establishing a bastide often altered the local balance of power as well.22 In fact, the expansion of the county of Toulouse in the twelfth century largely depended on the foundation of new towns. Count Alphonse de Jordan of Toulouse founded the first bastide in 1144 in Montauban to extend his authority into Quercy.23 His successor, Count Raymond V established bastides in the 1170s in Castelnau-deMontmiral in the Albigeois, Lauzerte in Quercy, and Puymirol, Tournon, Penne, and Pujols in the Agenais.24 After the setbacks of the first Albigensian Crusade, Count Raymond VII created the bastide of Cordes in 1222 to signal his independence from the Capetians.25 His seneschal, Sicard d’Alaman, became particularly active by founding dozens of bastides in the 1240s and later served Alphonse of Poitiers in the same capacity.26 Henry III of England’s officials in Gascony also hurriedly built castles and established bastides after 1230 to secure what remained of their holdings in Aquitaine. The English also subsidized local allies to establish bastides.27 Finally, they reined in factionalism among the notables of Bordeaux when it threatened to destabilize this vital base of operations in Anglo-Gascony.28 Local lords and counts, especially in the Pyrenean highlands, remained active in founding bastides into the fourteenth century to block creeping French and English influence.29 The counts of Armagnac, Pardiac, and Astarac sponsored over twentyfive bastides in their ancestral lands, while the neighboring counts of Comminges founded ten.30 Finally, the fiercely independent counts of Béarn and Foix also established new towns to secure their domains.31 The establishment of bastides brought a much greater level of localized state rule to southwestern France. Nowhere was this more evident than in the central roles played by seneschals. Raymond VII of Toulouse led the way by employing first Doat d’Alaman and then his son Sicard to found over a dozen bastides in the 1230s and 1240s. Other counts in the region, such as the houses of Foix, Béarn, and Bigorre, emulated this practice into the early fourteenth century. Alphonse of Poitiers made perhaps the most ample use of these officials who devised an almost formulaic process for creating a bastide. During his long rule in Toulouse, he and his seneschals established over one hundred bastides. These men included Pierre de Landreville and Gui de Caprari, who oversaw Rouergue, Thome de Novilla, Blaise Le Loup, and Jourdain de Lubret in Toulouse, Simon de Briseteste in Carcassaonne, Guichard de Marziac in Périgord and Quercy, Jean de Trie and Guillaume de Carsan, and finally the indefatigable Eustache de Beaumarchais, who became responsible at the end of Alphonse’s lifetime for the Toulousain and the Albigeois. Beaumarchais went on to serve Philip III and Philip IV.32 English

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monarchs also relied heavily on seneschals for the foundation of bastides throughout greater Aquitaine and Gascony.33 The seneschals of Guyenne included Jean de Lalinde, Lucas de Thanay, Jean de Grailly, Bonet de Saint Quentin, and Geoffrey de Rondeboeuf. In Gascony, there were Robert de Leyburn and John de Hastings d’Eu, while Alméric de Créon, A. de Genoa, and Guillaume de Montaigut also served as seneschals but it remains unknown where they did so.34 The Treaty of Paris in 1259 defined the Anglo-French frontier across Aquitaine largely in terms of these castles and bastides. Mutual mistrust and difficulty in controlling local lords, especially in the Agenais and Quercy, quickly undermined the agreement, as did continuing efforts by both sides to encroach on each other’s domains by founding new bastides. In the 1240s, for example, Alphonse of Poitiers established bastides between the Lot and Garonne up to the Tarn as a buffer zone in Gascony to protect the Toulousian inheritance.35 He also built bastides further along the Tarn River near Villemur abutting the lands of the Roger IV, count of Foix, while to the northeast in Aveyron he initiated the foundation of a number of important bastides, such as Villefrance-de-Rouergue.36 Alphonse also completed a number of bastides started earlier by Raymond VII at Gémil, Le Fousseret, and Carbonne. He used judicial appeals to the new Parlement of Toulouse and generous subsidies to influence the allegiance of local lords across Aquitaine.37 Some local fief holders and ecclesiastical foundations, especially abbeys, sought out Capetian protection from aggressive feudatories, such as the counts of Pardiac and Armagnac, who also sponsored bastides. As a result, nearly fifty lordly and comtal bastides became affiliated with the seneschalcy of Toulouse alone.38 All this maneuvering by Alphonse paid off for the Capetians when he and his wife died childless in 1271 and the county of Toulouse reverted to the new French king, Philip III.39 With the able assistance of the seneschal of Toulouse Eustache de Beaumarchais, Philip III pushed further westward along the Lot, Garonne, and Dordogne Rivers toward the Agenais after Henry III died in 1272. However, the new English king, Edward I, forced Philip III to cede the Agenais back.40 After Philip III’s death in 1285, the number of bastides established by the French diminished while those founded by the English steadily increased. With the assistance of his seneschal Jean de Grailly, Edward I of England founded thirty-five new bastides, principally along the Lot and Garonne Rivers, during his long reign, while his French counterparts created only eight new ones.41 Indeed, the Gascon war started in 1294 by Philip IV aimed to roll back recent English advances by seizing newly fortified places in Aquitaine while Edward I was embroiled with the Scots.42 However, the French disaster at Courtrai in 1302, when Flemish urban militias resoundingly defeated an army of mounted knights, forced Philip IV to return these places to the English.43 The warring parties reached an accord that technically restored the status quo but left unresolved nagging differences now almost a century old. Indeed, the Anglo-French clash in 1323 over the fixatio pali for the new bastide of Saint-Sardos in the Lot and Garonne region marked the opening salvo of the Hundred Years’ War.44

New Directions for Castles and Urban Enceintes The visible aspect of medieval towns changed profoundly during the thirteenth century as earthen ramparts progressively gave way to enceintes built of stone and brick. In time, these new ramparts and towers defined, together with the soaring

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church spires, the distinctive, individual profile of a town, much like a person’s face.45 These innovations in municipal fortification design grew out of the new directions in castle construction already well underway by 1200. The novel design realized at Château Gaillard in the 1190s, in particular, heralded the new premium placed on defense-in-depth that over time became generalized across France, indeed all of Western Europe. Typical was the castle of Saint- Gobain in the Laonnais.46 This new castle integrated the huge rounded towers and machicolated walls of this new design with more amenities for the residential quarters. The towers, for example, dedicated the top two levels to defense, with a firing and observation platform on top and arrow slits on each floor to cover approach angles. All of this was then superimposed upon a ground floor that provided living quarters with fireplaces and sleeping areas. The castle complex of Blanquefort in the Gironde incorporated these kinds of features, as did revamped castles across Poitou, the Charente, and Saintonge and the Aunis.47 The military functions of castles diminished, indeed almost disappeared in the imaginary visions of “fantastic castles” (châteauxfantastiques) found in Books of Hours that combined elements of Gothic cathedral design and Moorish architecture encountered while in crusade.48 The growing sophistication of fortifications, in turn, required more elaborate techniques of siege warfare. Manuscript copies in Latin of Vegetius’s De re militari circulated widely after the eleventh century and it was translated into French in 1284 and 1290 by Jean de Meung and Jean Priorat. Vegetius was a great proponent of siege towers. Another source of inspiration came from experience on crusade in the Middle East, whence also came perhaps as early as the 1290s the first encounters with gunpowder weapons. The transition to urban enceintes in stone and brick began where urban development was most precocious, namely, Flanders, Brabant, Hainault, and the Artois.49 A new approach to securing control of a newly conquered place came a century later in 1298, when Philip IV ordered the construction of a royal citadel known as the Château de Courtrai on the outskirts of Lille’s enceinte.50 Feudatory princes usually initiated the conversion and expansion of these defensive ensembles to safeguard as well as dominate the towns upon which so much of their power rested. They often devoted their earliest attention, and considerable expense, in strengthening the château-fort found in or just on the outskirts of these towns as, for example, in Tournai, and Lille.51 Some towns, Ghent in particular, chafed under this more intrusive princely presence in their midst. Towns complained less vociferously about the costs of reinforcing their outer wall and gates, or in improving their militias. By the mid-thirteenth century, Namur, for example, boasted a new double-walled enceinte with four towers, two of which remain extant today, namely, the Tour aux Chartes and the Tour au Four.52 Bruges created an innovative fortification system that integrated brick ramparts with its intricate waterways.53 Fortified gates, always a vulnerable spot, began to receive fronting outworks known as barbicans in the thirteenth century; these proto-bastions heralded perhaps most clearly the new premium placed on defense-in-depth. The scale and expense entailed by these vast public works proved comparable and as long in duration as raising a Gothic cathedral. Lille is among the beststudied examples of what these projects entailed.54 Planning teams headed by master masons and municipal revenue officers organized huge work sites that employed hundreds of skilled and unskilled laborers, procured cut stone from quarries or set up kilns to fire hundreds of thousands of bricks, and managed massive excavations

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that frequently required complex drainage and pumping technologies.55 In the process, suburbs were razed or relocated, neighborhoods cleared or recast, and public places expanded or reoriented.56 Building new stone and brick fortifications often initiated a cascade of ensuing infrastructure changes in medieval towns, as in Douai, which left them transformed both on the edge and inside.57 Rebuilding urban enceintes in stone and brick generally diminished the further one moved south from Flanders and Brabant. Yet examples of such new fortified ensembles still abound. In Calais in 1229, for example, Philippe Hurepel, count of Burgundy, built a massive château-fort and restored the adjoining fortifications of the upper town.58 The enceinte of the Capetian maritime stronghold of Montreuilsur-Mer received new crenellated walls and several new towers.59 Hurpel also oversaw the construction of the first major enceinte around the port of St-Omer. A short distance south was the port of Boulogne-sur-Mer, whose solid and high GalloRoman walls underwent considerable repair and expansion under Hurpel in the 1220s. The restored enceinte stretched some fourteen hundred yards with four fortified gateways and some twenty towers protecting the now crenellated curtain wall. The castle conformed to the new polygonal plan emerging at the time, absent a dungeon, with nine towers flanking the compound’s angled exterior.60 In Normandy, the Capetians also authorized and helped pay for rebuilding expanded enceintes for a number of towns, and royal châteaux-forts even more. For example, twenty years after Philip II had Rouen’s enceinte razed, the city began work on new-style crenellated curtain walls, dozens of stone towers, and six fortified gates to enclose additional suburbs, nearly doubling the enclosed area yet again. However, Beauvais and Noyon located to the north of Paris remained virtually open towns throughout the thirteenth century. In part, the choice often came down to building a new cathedral or new walls. Less wealthy feudatory rulers could not undertake such measures to fortify their towns. In comtal Champagne, towns sometimes began new fortifications projects that they never completed. In Châlons-sur-Marne, for example, large gaping sections of the enceinte, which began in the 1220s at the initiative of Thibault IV, remained unbuilt at the end of the century. Even though it hosted important trade fairs, Troyes still only possessed earthen mounds topped with a wooden fence on the eve of the Hundred Years’ War. Major towns in the Loire, such as Tours, and Poitiers in Poitou were in similar straits, though as insecurities mounted after 1300 so did their earnestness to erect new stone and brick fortifications.61 Périguieux stands out in this respect.62 Further to the west in ducal Brittany, urban fortifications remained largely earthen ramparts and wooden palisades. Urban fortifications there after 1200 mostly took the form of ducal and baronial keeps, some of which incorporated polygonal elements. Yet there were exceptions. Under Pierre de Dreux, duke of Brittany and count of Penthièvre from 1212 to 1237, Nantes witnessed the building of a considerably expanded and strengthened enceinte that enclosed nearly seventy-five acres surrounded by twenty-three hundred yards of curtain walls and towers. As a measure of the builders’ technical prowess, the sections along the Erdre and Loire rivers had to overcome particularly daunting hydrological problems. The defenses at Rennes received newly reinforced gates, a deeper, wider ditch, and a new irregular hexagonal enceinte that encompassed over twentytwo acres. Pierre de Dreux apparently received his sobriquet “Mauclerc” because some of this construction intruded upon church properties. This flurry of activity slowed considerably after 1286 and only resumed after the outbreak of the Breton

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War of Succession, which lasted from 1341 to 1365. One exception was in 1308 in Saint-Malo, shortly after it had passed into French royal control, when residents asked the king for permission to revamp the town’s fortifications in the new style found in the towns of their trading partners in Flanders. Philip IV refused to allow them, fearing the town would be more difficult to control if its walls became stronger. Whereas a century before, feudatory rulers almost always initiated new urban enceintes, in the fourteenth century it was the towns that pursued them most avidly as they assumed more and more of the burden—and accompanying opportunities—of self-defense. In Gascony and Languedoc, competition between the English and French, as well as ambitions of local feudatory lords to preserve if not increase their own territories, encouraged a number of important new-style fortification projects in towns over the thirteenth century. Edward I was quite adroit in adopting this new approach in Gascony, which provided a later springboard for expanded English influence on the continent. The English devoted considerable attention to strengthening the defenses and their sway over municipal institutions in Bordeaux.63 The French did likewise in Carcassonne, where the crown sent builders in the 1240s to revamp its defenses in order to make it their base for controlling lower Languedoc. Carcassonne’s new defenses used the old Visigothic enceinte where feasible. Once completed, another ringed enceinte, replete with massive towers and fortified gates, was erected. Louis IX also furnished generous subsidies for improvements to Carcassonne’s enceinte starting in the 1230s, which eventually resulted in its distinctive set of concentric walls with huge towers and gates reinforced with iron grills. In the process, Carcassonne razed two extramural suburbs in 1240 for a new town laid out in an orthogonal grid that became incorporated into the expanded enceinte.64 Philip III ordered such work in the county of Toulouse when it reverted to the monarchy in 1271 upon the deaths of Alphonse and Jeanne. Philip IV did the same in the eastern part of the kingdom in Provins and Château-Thierry after the reunion of the county of Champagne. In Nîmes, new fortified gates became built in the 1220s and a new royal château-fort a century later, though otherwise the town still mainly relied on its original GalloRoman walls for protection. Even the kings of Majorca got involved in sponsoring new fortifications in Perpignan.65 Capetian expansionism in the Auvergne and the Bourbonnais and further south of the Ardèche into Languedoc and Provence in the thirteenth century altered both the form of municipal government and the fabric of towns.66 Both sides of the Rhône witnessed the further consolidation of consular regimes that began to undertake more ambitious projects of urban amelioration, including the erection of formidable curtain walls and towers built in mortared stone and brick. Louis VIII’s prohibition to the municipal council of Avignon against restoring its walls lapsed in 1234, not long after the king’s death, as the town began work on a new imposing set of stone fortifications one hundred feet beyond the Gallo-Roman enceinte to form a double ring of defenses. However, in 1251, Alphonse of Poitiers ordered the definitive destruction of Avignon’s ramparts, leaving only its exposed older curtain wall until the papacy assumed control of the town in the fourteenth century and had them rebuilt as they appear today.67 Like towns long since established across France, the fortifications of most bastides typically consisted of little more than wooden palisades atop earthen mounds fronted by shallow ditches. Had building fortifications been required for every new

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bastide, far fewer would have been founded because of the crippling cost. Many bastides, in fact, never grew large or wealthy enough to afford stone walls. The economic development of a bastide in terms of trade, manufacturing, and agriculture provided the necessary fiscal foundation to support an enceinte and militia. Funding the construction and subsequent upkeep of bastide fortifications often required negotiations and accommodation between the founding lords and local residents. Promises by the founding lord to underwrite these expenses, while perhaps well-intentioned and meant to attract settlers, frequently went unfulfilled. Stone fortifications thus served as a sign of tutelage, not independence for a bastide.68 In turn, residents often resisted shouldering the expenses, which meant construction could drag on for years. In Libourne, for example, the fortified enceinte begun in 1281 was only completed sixty years later. More common was the decision of founder-lords to reserve the right to erect a castle or keep in or near a bastide. Whether it became viewed as a source of sanctuary or symbol of the founder-lord’s power depended on circumstances, above all the latter’s temperament. Only forty of the 125 bastides founded by the English in Gascony after 1259, for example, ever erected permanent fortifications.69 By contrast, the French crown frequently authorized sophisticated stone fortifications, including fortified gates, curtain walls, archer stations, and a chemin de ronde, for bastides and established towns as they pushed into Gascony and southwest Aquitaine.70 It appears that only with the outbreak of the Hundred Years’ War in 1337 did there exist enough incentive to finish the task of fortifying, often when the lord ceded control of local revenues to the municipality with the understanding that they were to be used to erect defenses. As insecurities increased in the 1290s, however, the pace of founding new bastides lessened but not pressures to erect or enhance the defenses of those places already established. Stone walls first went up for bastides situated along contested frontiers, such as the Lot and Dordogne Rivers. Charters rarely mentioned bastide fortifications before 1290. Even if a bastide’s residents wished to erect defenses, they still needed special permission from the crown or local suzerain, which was not always forthcoming. Yet by the 1320s, lords granted charters that left the decision (and costs) for fortifications almost entirely to the discretion of local officials. New castle construction also seemed to rise at the time, as Anglo-French relations entered a tenser and ultimately more violent phase with the onset of the Hundred Years’ War.71 When bastides did invest in enceintes, they often became the town’s most impressive and distinctive feature. The fortifications of Aigues-Mortes, a bastide founded by Louis IX along the Mediterranean to support his crusading activities, remain the most exemplary surviving example today.72 Another is Beaumont-de-Lomagne, which possessed by the early fifteenth century an imposing, thick machicolated curtain wall nearly twenty-five feet high that ran more than three thousand feet in circumference. Square towers guarded the gates topped by firing stations (hourds), while rounded ones with arrow slits (meutrières) punctuated the periphery of the wall at prescribed intervals. A water-filled moat some thirty feet wide ringed an enceinte spanned by drawbridges. Private entrances (poternes) occasionally pierced a town’s walls and prompted concerns about security. In some places, such as Cordes, population growth quickly spilled out beyond the walls built in the 1220s, necessitating in time the construction of second ring of fortifications in the 1340s, a third in the early 1400s, and a fourth set of walls in the 1440s.73 Fortified houses, one adjoined to the other, sometimes formed the enceinte, with individual property

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owners responsible for their upkeep. The walls of some bastides became irregular or discontinuous as a result. The further militarization of urban communities in these areas actually set the stage for conflicts between these better fortified and armed towns and feudatory princes. In the 1290s starting in Languedoc, the relationship between the Capetians and walled towns in their domains entered a more contentious and increasingly bureaucratic set of relationships. Growing fiscal demands from the crown to fights its wars with the English, particular its efforts to convert customary aids into permanent forms of taxation, became seen by the towns as contrary to their chartered franchises. Resistance in the south centered on Toulouse and Albi and required granting new charters with expanded privileges for these burgs.74 As a result, towns began to form regional leagues to militate for their common interests.75 Anglo-French rivalries centered primarily on control of Guyenne. In 1294, they went to war, which the French won fairly easily, overrunning Flanders and Guyenne. However, Philip IV found it impossible to hold to these conquests, as an uprising of cloth workers in Flanders led to his crushing defeat at Courtrai in 1302, which forced him to restore much of Guyenne to Edward I. A struggle between the papacy and the French Crown over clerical taxation, which Philip IV eventually won, nevertheless diplomatically isolated the French after 1305. The suppression of these conflicts often led to orders to demolish these new enceintes. The FrancoFlemish war of the 1320s, for example, resulted in the demolition of walls of captured rebel towns such as Douai and Tournai. But no sooner did the walls go down than towns set about to rebuild them larger and stronger than before. Weakened as a result of these setbacks, Philip IV and his advisors became by necessity open to a different kind of relationship with walled towns. Coercion increasingly gave way to compromise as crown and towns slowly devised new ways to structure their historical partnership. Solutions varied from one town to the next, and in different regions, though among the most common results was the formation of local assemblies (états) from their earlier leagues that could express collective viewpoints and with which the king could consult as circumstances dictated. Walled towns in France after 1300 thus helped to establish an institutional framework that profoundly shaped the development of the French monarchical state over the next five hundred years. Towns played a vital role alongside the clergy and nobility in these gatherings of estates. The succession of short-lived and general weak kings in the ensuing transition to Valois rule furthered these developments.76 In 1321, Philip V convoked a kingdom-wide assembly of estates—or Estates General—where he proposed sweeping reforms to recover alienated royal domains and coinage rights, as well as a first-time bid for a war subsidy during peace-time that failed to achieve much of anything. Instead, the crown resorted to the long-standing piecemeal approach of arm-twisting Jews and Italians and negotiating separate deals (compositions) with local elites in towns and the countryside, all of which further reinforced the particularized nature of medieval state authority in France. Prior to the emergencies of the Hundred Years’ War, the French monarchy generally found it difficult to raise a steady, adequate amount of revenues with which to finance its ambitions. The spark that ignited the conflagration in fact came when the English forces, led by the lord of Montpezat, violently thwarted the French attempt in the 1320s to build a bastide at Saint-Sardos near Bordeaux.77 Legal proceedings in the Parlement

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of Paris failed to extract an oath of homage from Edward II. This led in July 1324 to a French invasion of the Agenais against Montpézat, besieging and capturing La Réole. In preparation for the expected full-scale war as well as renewed rebellion in Flemish towns, Charles IV stepped up his efforts to raise war subsidies and levying new taxes on wine and wool. He also ordered his seneschals in Toulouse, Périgord, Beaucaire, and Carcassonne to summon local contingents from the towns; apart from areas in upper Languedoc, many burgs apparently preferred to pay a lump sum rather than actually mobilize sergeants. Invoking claims of evident necessity, the French crown initiated a wellcoordinated series of fiscal-military preparations in 1324–1325 to exploit potential sources of revenue by empowering royal enquêteurs-réformateurs to bargain more successful subsidy agreements from the towns and crack down on fraudulent fief transfers. The towns, in turn, ferociously defended their chartered privileges even as they began to further institutionalize the mechanisms of revenue extraction by apportioning the demands by hearth (feu) in local districts (jugeries). Negotiations proved acrimonious and protracted. Complaints to Paris took time to yield any restraints on local royal officials who zealously pursued their charges by selectively issuing military summons as a pressure tactic to speed the collection of a tax, even after the war ended.78 In northern France, by contrast, towns responded to these tax requests mainly through indirect taxes (aides). The crown also began to regularize levies through forced loans imposed on royal officials, such as notaries and sergeants. Yet difficulties of collection persisted, which the crown dealt with by convoking assemblies of barons, clergymen, and town leaders as well as by pushing local royal commissioners to be even more assiduous. This mix of diligence and caution continued to characterize the actions of the new Valois dynasty after 1328. In 1329, for example, anticipating hostilities with the new English king Edward III who delayed his homage, the French king ordered his bailiffs and seneschals to seek a war subsidy from the towns and châtellenies of their respective jurisdictions, promising that all collections would be stored locally until war actually broke out. When the threat of conflict receded, Philip VI ordered his officials to return what revenues had already been collected.79 In 1333, the crown ordered bailiffs and seneschals to inspect the fortresses and naval ports in the kingdom and report on their condition. With this information in hand, it then set about to raise royal and municipal taxes to defray the costs of repair, though the revenues collected yielded much less than was necessary to achieve full military preparedness. As a result of the crown’s miserable fiscal predicament, more and more of the burden of defense fell by necessity on to the shoulders of the localities most affected, forcing upon them then the difficult decision of whether or not to raise the monies needed to improve security. Preparations for war, along with occasional clashes, continued over the next eight years. In 1331, Charles of Alençon led a French force against the town of Saintes, while in 1335, Mile de Noyers, a Burgundian in service of the French, seized the stronghold of Sainte-Colombe across the imperial frontier in the east near Vienne, which he quickly garrisoned. Tensions mounted most acutely, as they always seemed to do, in Gascony. In 1335, Cordes upgraded its defenses against Anglo-Gascon marauders, who also attacked places across Béarn. The count of Foix led French forces in the taking of the town and castle of Puymirol; the French also bolstered their garrisons in key castles. English machinations in the Low Countries in 1336 so exasperated Philip VI that he ordered the confiscation of Guyenne in

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May 1337. Unbeknownst to people at the time, this decision marked the onset of the Hundred Years’ War, a conflict that in time lent further momentum to the patterns and developments already underway since the late thirteenth century. As France entered the Hundred Years’ War, no uniform system of public taxation emerged but instead there developed a wide range of varying practices and expedient understandings on fiscal matters, though patterns and habits were beginning to take root, particularly in the towns that later helped to shape the further development of urban fortifications. In effect, the French crown began to cede to the towns the right to collect established war subsidies for the purposes of local security that the crown could no longer guarantee. An early example of this trend occurred when Tournai escaped royal taxation in 1328 in order to prepare local defenses.80 The transition to stone and brick fortifications along the edges of these medieval towns reflected the growing complexity of the urban communities within them. Within the walls, there developed intramural rivalries and conflicts between competing groups within the urban elite as well as wider social tensions, and occasional violence with popular classes. Striving for more independence meant more responsibilities for municipal governments, particularly in self-defense. The organization of civic militias usually accompanied the demarcation of the militarized perimeter; shops specializing in the manufacture and sale of arms also proliferated to provide the wherewithal for defense. All of this depended on the continuing development of a market system. Urban economies continued to grow and diversify as commercial ties deepened both locally and regionally. New guilds and professional groupings, such as lawyers and notaries, continued to form. In this dynamic society, communal unity often proved very fragile but also surprisingly resilient. Soaring crenellated walls and mighty fortified gates created a greater sense of separation between towns and the outside world that began in the suburbs then radiated outward into plat pays and beyond. This estrangement imbued the culture of the bonnes villes with a strong sense of identity that became expressed in parchment charters embossed with great wax seals, heraldic devices, and special insignia, and its new skyline defined by walls, towers, and church spires. These interconnected urban networks knit the kingdom together in terms of economics, social values, and civic culture even as the competing dynastic claims of the French and English crowns tore it apart during the long and complex struggle waged over the next century.

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Th e Wa l l s Mov e O u t wa r d (1 3 2 5 – 16 0 0)

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B O N N E S V I L L E S and the Hundred Years’ W ar

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o one in the 1330s knew it marked the beginning of the Hundred Years’ War. Apart from the succession dispute, the main reasons for fighting—to secure land and men’s loyalties—remained little changed since the twelfth century. Yet for towns in France, this period brought decisive change in their governance and appearance. The crisis and near collapse of royal authority, particularly under Charles VI and the minority of his son, the Dauphin, together with the escalating scale of war and the advent of gunpowder, altered both the rule of kings and the social order. These conflicts made possible, indeed necessary, ever greater urban independence and expenditure as towns assumed more responsibility for their own security. The result was the imposing crenellated stone and brick walls and towers considered today so archetypical of medieval towns.

The Crisis of Royal Authority Towns usually do not spring to mind when thinking about the Hundred Years’ War.1 Instead, dramatic battles and personalities vividly color historical narratives that first began in the contemporary works of Froissart and Christine de Pisan.2 Efforts to control territory, however, largely hinged on either concessions to towns or sieges to take them. Concessions took the form of expanded liberties and tax powers, while siege warfare increased in scale and complexity. The dukes of Burgundy, for example, prospered by playing to the urban crowd, whereas the counts of Flanders did not. English success partly derived from adjusting early on to the new power of towns. When Charles VII followed suit after 1430, French resurgence soon followed.3 Until then, aristocratic disdain for bourgeois culture was particularly pronounced at the new Valois court.4 Indeed, the French disasters at Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt arose out of an excess of noble élan. While these battles affected the course of the war, sieges largely shaped its ebb and flow given the critical importance of walled towns as places to garrison soldiers and muster companies, stockpile food and armaments, assemble a skilled work force, and procure a ready source of cash. In the fourteenth century, war finance destabilized public order through excessive borrowing and periodic currency devaluations. A telling indicator of the extent of the French crown’s taxing powers can be seen in the census of hearths and parishes conducted in 1327–1328. The lands excluded from it included the remaining apanages of Alençon, Artois, Bourbon, and Evreux, and a few great

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fiefs, namely, Blois, Brittany, Burgundy, Flanders, Nevers, and Guyenne.5 Urban leaders responded by assuming even more responsibility over local governance. An early example occurred in February 1335 when forty-four northern French towns met to discuss the closure of the royal mints, as did towns in the south.6 While regional assemblies offered initial great promise, this devolution of public authority to walled towns occurred in more fragmented fashion, especially after the Estates General of 1357 brought about the revolt in Paris led by Étienne Marcel.7 Indeed, late medieval state-building in France arose from below in a piecemeal process of negotiation and resistance that profoundly altered the governance and physical aspect of walled towns.8 This shift toward local self-governance also reflected the limited ability of either side to secure fortified places but for a short time, which in turn affected war finances.9 The French crown mainly relied on Paris and Rouen to fill its coffers, but faced rising resistance there and elsewhere to its requests for more revenues as conflict with the English escalated after 1337. Philip VI’s attempt to impose a hearth tax in Languedoc sparked wide unrest. His ensuing negotiations with towns confirmed their privileges in exchange for a reduced lump sum payment to the crown, sometimes euphemistically styled a “loan.” Local municipal officials also gained more control over tax collection. In their protests, towns across the kingdom often cited the deficiencies of their fortifications to argue for keeping any money raised locally to meet local needs first. In 1340, Périgueux, for example, levied a special tax for its fortifications that the crown effectively covered by granting the town an exemption for a like amount.10 As setbacks mounted for Philip VI in the 1340s, he thus ceded to his bonnes villes greater measures of self-rule.11 English ambitions on the continent initially suffered more from overreach than from a lack of resources. When Edward III annulled his oath of homage to Philip VI and proclaimed himself King of France in 1337, he sent an expeditionary force to Aquitaine under Henry of Lancaster, duke of Derby. This army quickly conquered Périgord and the Agenais by successfully besieging bastides and castles.12 Few places put up a fight lest they suffer brutal reprisals. These early, easy gains soon unraveled because of Edward III’s preoccupation with the Low Countries, however.13 While his forces ravaged the Thiérache in 1339, he lost control of Ponthieu and areas north of the Gironde. The French pushed south through Saintonge toward Bordeaux as the last English footholds in the Agenais surrendered. Meanwhile, Philip VI’s main ally in Gascony, Gaston III, count of Foix, laid waste to lands south of the Adour but ultimately failed to capture any significant English fortresses or bastides. Yet Valois’s gains in the south opened the way for Flanders, by far the kingdom’s richest province, to join up with the English. Walled towns in France responded to the fluidity of these conflicts by fending for themselves because the king’s armies could not protect them.14 This emphasis on self-defense explains why the French defeats at Crécy in 1346 and Poitiers in 1356, where King John II was captured, did not result in a significant loss of territory.15 After 1415, it was English cannons blasting away at Norman towns more than the battle of Agincourt that opened the way for Henry V’s successes (see map 4.1). In the fourteenth century, the basic framework governing the French crown’s fiscal relations with town burghers became established and endured until the end of the Old Regime. Royal domains constituted the principal ordinary source of income, after which clerical tenths, feudal aids from the nobility, and war subsidies from towns made up the king’s “extraordinary” revenues. New arguments based

Map 4.1

Hundred Years’ War.

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on public necessity provided added justification.16 Feudal aids levied to ransom John II in the 1360s solidified the trend toward commuting the military service of the nobility and towns into cash payments to hire mercenaries. Royal bailiffs and seneschals, men closely tied to local urban and noble families, exacted dues, particularly on domainal lands. Periodic attempts at more central control, particularly through the king’s Chambres des Comptes, never seriously challenged increasing local control over the royal tax system.17 In contrast to the French crown, English rulers enjoyed advantages beyond the much vaunted longbow. Their better financial footing based on the wool trade reliably supplied revenues for its fight against the French.18 Second, their long hostilities with the Welsh and Scots gave the English considerable experience with defending a frontier and dealing with small-scale insurgency so typical of the Hundred Years’ War.19 Finally came the early recognition that control of Normandy and Gascony began in the major towns such as Bordeaux, Rouen, and Caen where they cultivated close relations with merchant groups and local urban notables.20 Commercial exemptions and preferments inspired the allegiance of Gascon and Norman towns, particularly among wine producers in the Bordelais and cloth merchants in Rouen.21 One of Edward III’s first acts after the capture of Calais in 1347 was to grant the city a privileged position for the transit of English cloth, lead, and tin.22 In turn, these trade relations generated revenues for fortification work.23 Towns also formed regional trade networks that over time became paramilitary organizations.24 Even after Henry V’s invasion of northern France in 1415, Gascony still depended on the urban league organized by Bordeaux rather than an English army for its protection against the Dauphinists.25 Larger towns sometimes tried to shift the burden of their own defense to smaller burgs, which only bred resentment. The duke of Bedford’s like efforts to create regional leagues in Anglo-Normandy around Caen and Rouen proved much less successful in large part because he could not quell the riotous behavior of his soldiers.26 A common reaction, particularly in Anglo-Gascony and Anglo-Normandy, was to launch an appeal to the Parlement of Paris, which gave the French Crown a convenient excuse to intervene. When Anglo-Gascon towns fell to the French in the 1440s, they occasionally sought indemnities from Paris to cover the additional cost of shipping wine to England.27 The laws of war at the time recognized for towns that the local necessity of self-defense often trumped broader loyalties to lords and kings.28 In addition, the greater independence towns enjoyed from outside interference rose as their stone and brick walls became higher and thicker.29 Broad principles of royal sovereignty became articulated by the king’s lawyers, but real policy relied on pragmatic negotiation with local elites, especially over taxation.30 After the disasters of the 1340s, the French crown gradually transferred to towns, along with the right to levy taxes, greater control over their assessment. In time, town finances relied upon annual auctions of municipal tax farms over octroi and aides, rental properties, guild fees, and fines. The bulk of these revenues went into local fortifications, although the monarchy still occasionally demanded cash payments and forced loans, all of which usually required confirmation of chartered privileges. Even Charles VII prudently concentrated on taxing the countryside rather than towns to support his new standing army in the 1430s.31 Towns began sustained investment in new stone and brick fortifications just as France entered a prolonged period of economic stagnation and heightened mortality

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caused by the Black Death.32 One response was better record-keeping tracking how towns spent this money.33 Another was the formation of public debt. Start-up costs often relied on the sale of life annuities (rentes viagères) bought by local elites who benefited from better security and the 3–5 percent rate of return.34 Managing public debt thus accompanied the assumption of greater control over local taxes. All this also required an increase in the size and jurisdictional competence of municipal government. While fortification construction dominated municipal account books after 1300, towns undertook lots of related infrastructure projects for civic buildings, street improvements, new fountains, and marketplaces. The physical aspect of towns both inside and on the edge thus changed dramatically in the late Middle Ages.35 The shift from taxes on real property to indirect excises effectively meant peasant producers and urban consumers paid for most municipal building projects, not wealthy elites.36 Town fathers tried to promote among the populace a broader commitment to the common good to justify such sacrifices; they also punished tax evaders and shirkers whenever possible. This sense of the public good often crumbled most tragically during a protracted siege. At the 1446 siege of Rouen, for example, town officials, anxious to stretch food supplies, expelled peasant refugees, women, children, and the urban poor whom they considered to be “useless mouths” (bouches inutiles).37 Rarely did a besieging army allow these poor wretches through their lines; instead, they suffered a piteous fate trapped outside the very walls they had helped to build through their labor and taxes. Urban strife frequently turned on questions of taxation and commodity prices.38 With military successes in the 1370s, Charles V enjoyed a fleeting period of fiscal solvency that led him, shortly before his death in 1380, to decree the elimination of the hearth tax (fouage) established in 1327. Subsequent financial problems and Charles VI’s ill-advised decision to reestablish even higher levies resulted in France’s first widespread tax revolt.39 It began in Rouen with an uprising known as the Harelle. Residents saw the rise in excises on salt and wine as a direct contravention of the town’s recent new charter accorded by Louis X in 1315. The civic militia did little to suppress the ensuing unrest. When the French crown finally restored order in 1391, it severely curtailed Rouen’s autonomy and demolished its oldest tower to symbolize its subjugation. Rouen’s welcome of English occupation twenty-five years later stemmed from lingering hard feelings. In the Massif Central after 1382, armed bands known as the Tuchins also refused to pay new royal taxes and attacked royal officials before their eventual suppression several years later by Jean, duke of Berry.40 Finally, and perhaps most spectacularly, was the revolt of the Maillotins in Paris. Also sparked by the reestablishment of recently abolished taxes, the Maillotins—named after the lead hammers (mailles) rioters wielded—attacked royal tax collectors and money-lenders before their brutal suppression by the king’s soldiers.41 All these agitations confirmed the French crown’s diminishing ability to monitor municipal finances as new stone-and-brick fortifications went up around the bonnes villes during the Hundred Years’ War. While factions in towns sometimes clashed over how to pay for new fortifications, the willingness of towns to invest in self-defense rose in tandem with heightened insecurities after 1340.42 Banditry, Free Companies of marauding soldiers known as “flayers” (écorcheurs) and fearsome raids (chevauchées) sowed panic across the kingdom.43 With payments perpetually in arrears, company captains, such as Jean V de Bueil, count of Sancerre, known as the “fléau des Anglais” (plague of

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the English), relished attacking towns for the rich spoils they offered.44 The sack of Poitiers in 1346 by English raiders and the pillaging of Amiens in 1358 after artillery bombardment by the king of Navarre convinced both towns to reorganize and expand their militias.45 The 1355 chevauchée by the Black Prince was especially infamous. In mid-summer, he set out with several hundred men from Bordeaux to ravage Languedoc as he worked his way back through southern Gascony laying waste to upward of five hundred towns and villages not loyal to England.46 Violent struggles in Provence as comtal power collapsed after 1348 continued intermittently over the next fifty years. As a result, local lords such as Raymond de Turenne were able to hold sway over and extort money (pâtis) from vulnerable communities through controlling a system of fortresses in the countryside.47 French soldiers did much the same to Burgundy twenty years earlier.48 Rural revolts, such as the Jacqueries, stoked fears in towns too.49 These heightened insecurities fueled local willingness to invest in self-defense.

Walling Towns in Stone and Brick At the outset of the Hundred Years’ War, most French towns possessed defenses that ranged from barely adequate to woefully deficient. A 1335 general survey revealed the deplorable condition of so many places across the kingdom. The enceintes of Saint-Quentin and Rheims, for example, which guarded the main approaches toward Paris from the north and east, remained only half-completed. A century later, however, most French towns possessed sophisticated, multilayered defenses already beginning to adapt to new gunpowder weapons. This transformation of the urban fabric recast the composition of communities within these enhanced walls as well as their relations with regional and royal authorities. The Hundred Years’ War was no simple struggle between the French and English but rather a congeries of regional conflicts often only loosely related to dynastic interests. The resulting violence reinforced these earlier regional patterns and forms of urban development. On occasion, the French crown asserted it age-old regalian right to control the walls of towns in the kingdom. In 1320, the monarchy appointed two masters of works to every province to work with municipal officials to improve urban defenses.50 Following the Treaty of Bretigny in 1360, which marked the highpoint of English hegemony on the Continent, the French crown continued to push its bonnes villes to repair and expand their enceintes. Charles V issued an edict in Sens on July 19, 1367, that ordered all his bonnes villes to repair their fortifications immediately. He even gave special permission to towns to harvest timber from domainal forests. An informal royal fortification service began to take shape on January 31, 1371, when he ordered every bailli in the kingdom to hire two or three men with military experience, called chevaliers in the decree, to inspect all fortifications in their districts.51 Few bonnes villes resisted the crown’s entreaties given their recent experiences and recognition that the best defense began at home. Such emergency decrees could not mask the fact that towns controlled their enceintes, not agents of the crown until at least the 1430s. The shift to stone-and-brick enceintes in towns thus largely occurred at the local level and on local initiative. One exception for the Capetians was La Rochelle. Attacks by the Black Prince in the 1350s convinced La Rochelle to shift its allegiance to Charles V in 1372. In return, the French crown lavished even more privileges on the town and placed its municipal government under local merchants and professionals. Charles V

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appointed a royal governor in 1373 to oversee a revamping of the town’s defenses. The old royal castle was torn down in the late fourteenth century and its stones used to extend and strengthen the enceinte. The crown periodically expanded La Rochelle’s privileges in the fifteenth century to build, maintain, and upgrade defenses that eventually became among the most sophisticated of any bonne ville in France. While the Capetians ceded more control to towns over their fortifications, other feudatory lords remained fully engaged in directing (and paying for) work on urban defenses in their domains. None were more active than the dukes of Burgundy, who between 1363 and 1419 sent their agents on regular inspection tours, writing reports and making recommendations not only on military matters but also on how to improve commerce and attract new residents.52 The dukes insisted that any alteration to a town’s fortifications required their authorization.53 Towns in Hainault had to submit their plans for inspection and approval before any contracts could be issued.54 Bolstering ducal authority, in fact, sometimes appeared to be the principal objective, as, for example, in the rebuilding of the châteaux in Écluse in 1384 and Coutrai in 1386. They also at times commanded persons living in the vicinity of a walled towns, the so-called retrayants, to shoulder some of the costs of building fortifications, arguing that they could take refuge there in case of emergency.55 In 1412, in Dole, for example, Duke Jean the Fearless agreed to pay a lump sum of three hundred livres annually for work on the enceinte, provided the town contributed six hundred livres toward the same end.56 Burgundian dukes thus leveraged their own resources to convince towns to commit to costly fortification projects. Even so, insecurity remained high and local commitment to invest in self-defense rose accordingly.57 Ducal suzerainty in Brittany became recognized across most of the Armorican peninsula by 1300. The decision by Duke Jean III in 1317 to reconstitute the apanage of Penthièvre for his younger brother, Guy, split the duchy and paved the way twenty-five years later for the War of Ducal Succession. This conflict pitted Jean de Montfort, supported by the English, against Charles de Blois, backed by the French. On the eve of that conflict, local lords and increasingly the duke dominated Breton towns. But just as occurred in towns in Capetian domains, war opened the ways for Breton towns to acquire greater control over their own self-defense as ducal authority weakened. Jean de Montfort and Charles de Blois both encouraged municipal independence to win the loyalty of townspeople. In fact, Jeanne de Penthièvre, Charles’ wife, convoked a meeting of the Estates General of Brittany in 1352 where for the first time towns sent delegates to represent the Third Estate. Municipal governance of Breton towns became shared between elected councils and military commanders (capitaines) appointed by the ruling seigneur, usually the duke but not always.58 Together, the capitaine and town officials assumed control over local revenues to fund new fortifications since the Breton War of Succession mainly consisted of sieges. Rennes changed hands three times in the 1350s, while Vannes underwent four sieges in 1342 followed by a twenty-year occupation by the English, for example. Urban fortifications in stone and brick went up around many Breton towns after 1350s in response to these insecurities, though a number still relied in the 1400s on earthen ramparts and wooden stockades. Despite their low level of commercial development, Breton towns in general undertook significant modernization of their fortifications comparable to trends in wealthier, more urbanized areas of the kingdom.

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The triumph of the Montforts in 1364, with English help, brought efforts to roll back these recent gains in municipal liberty by restoring ducal authority over Breton towns. In response, many Breton towns opened their gates to the French.59 Charles V of France, however, pushed the Breton towns right back into the arms of Duke Jean IV when his constable Olivier Clisson tried to annex the duchy by force in 1379. Over the next half-century, the Montfort dukes of Brittany sponsored the construction of new or expanded ducal citadels in over two dozen Breton towns. Breton baronial families, such as the Lavals, Rohans, and Rieux, did the same in burgs under their lordship. Examples include the Château de l’Hermine in Vannes, the Tour Neuve in Nantes, and new donjons erected in Dinan, Brest, and Saint-Malo. In exchange, Breton dukes and lords granted these towns fiscal selfgovernance and the right to fortify and raise militias so long as they paid for them. Their mutual relationship thus remained a partnership that affirmed ducal and seigneurial suzerainty in exchange for confirming a reduced, but still significant measure of municipal autonomy in the shift to stone and brick enceintes. In Normandy, the most important urban fortification project of the fourteenth century focused on Rouen. In 1346, Philip VI authorized a new expanded stone and brick enclosure around the old town and selected suburbs. Work began on westside neighborhoods of Saint-Eloi, Sainte-Hilaire, and Aubevoie and then extended eastward until it enclosed an area twice the size contained within the earlier twelfth-century enceinte. As Rouen’s periphery became solidified, its militia was reorganized under the command of the mayor. Despite their wealth, few other towns in Normandy received the right to erect new, more formidable defenses—a factor that contributed to the province’s easy conquest by the English in 1410s and the French in the 1440s.60 Fortification projects reflected the dramatic increase in municipal state power perhaps most fully.61 Town councils needed to decide about where to build, what to demolish, what businesses to be relocated—all of which required expanded statutory and enforcement powers. They appointed new kinds of public functionaries, such as comptrollers and masters of works, to oversee these projects, subcontracting different tasks to specialized groups such as masons, carpenters, ropemakers, and haulers.62 Work gangs of up to one thousand persons strong, including women and children, needed to be organized to excavate and haul materials. The resulting stone towers and brick walls testified to the remarkable capacity of urban authorities to mobilize vast resources for self-defense.63 The pace of construction, as well as its extent and complexity, depended on the commitment of a town’s residents to finance their enceinte. Amiens, for example, already possessed considerable newstyle defenses by the 1350s, while Lisieux, by contrast, did not seriously invest in them until the 1420s, and then largely at the prompting of the duke of Bedford. Towns assumed direct responsibility for their own fortification as part of their traditional duties or devoirs de cloison.64 These duties included managing entry and egress, raising bridges and opening gates, and the regulation of markets and manufactures. In Nantes, taxes known as the méage, a word that derived from muid, a measure for grains and beverages, and the “farthing for a pound” (denier par livre) underwrote fortification costs.65 Other special levies for paving (devoirs de pavaige) and streets (droit de passage) raised funds too. Borrowing through bonds or rentes also became necessary. Administering these finances in turn spawned the expansion of municipal government to employ more officers and define more regulations as local state authority grew.

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Fortification construction and maintenance consumed huge amounts of resources.66 Lille was typical of many as nearly 50 percent of its annual revenues went into its stone-and-brick enceinte during the fourteenth century; when hostilities ebbed in the mid-fifteenth century, it still spent nearly half the amount on its walls and intricate system of water defenses. Determining the wall’s circumference meant balancing projected costs with anticipated revenues; deciding which faubourgs, if any, could be incorporated within the walls; and arranging the unpleasant expropriations to clear away private residences and church buildings standing in the way.67 Towns sought to economize by recycling materials wherever possible; the demolitions of buildings necessary to expand a town’s defensive perimeter provided fill and salvageable brick, wood, and metal for immediate reuse. The new walls built for both Orléans and Bourges in the fourteenth century even contained Gallo-Roman detritus. Sometimes the demolitions that came as a consequence of military defeat opened the way for advances in fortification design and sophistication when they were rebuilt.68 Tours saw crossbow platforms (hourds) built along the perimeter of its citadel in 1365. The expanded military periphery opened up commercial opportunities for towns to exploit. Towns often leased out towers and gatehouses and sold fishing and pastorage rights to moats and the glacis. Mention is even found of rabbit warrens in ditches. Municipal authorities had to police the periphery to prevent unlicensed use or even theft of stone and timber. Town officials invoked the idea of the public good to argue for the common obligation of all inhabitants to build and maintain ramparts, a symbol of municipal liberty. The share of such costs fell disproportionately on the lower classes. Direct taxes on property owners provided a fairly insubstantial part of the funds necessary for building, in large part because those who held wealth usually enjoyed various exemptions that the crown confirmed in a town’s charter.69 In lieu of paying taxes, urban notables made voluntary bequests to the town or, in an emergency, forced loans. Churchmen often resisted, claiming clerical immunity, even though the crown regularly denied it.70 Although the crown sometimes threatened to confiscate church property for failure to pay, clergy commonly found it possible to have their contributions construed as a free gift (don gratuit) to preserve at least a fictitious exemption. These amounts hardly approached the sums generated by excise taxes on essentials such as wine, beer, and salt.71 The inelasticity of these products together with a town’s role as regional market center put urban officials in a privileged position to reach into the pockets of consumers, rich and poor alike.72 Wine and beer taxes alone provided upward of 50 percent of a town’s revenues; indeed, the mighty walls of late medieval towns stood as sober testimony to their inhabitants’ unquenchable thirst for alcoholic beverages. Municipal surveillance of markets and taverns sought compliance but encouraged subterfuge. The very walls and gates built with these revenues furthered their collection. The regressive character of excise taxes expanded the boundaries of the urban community, as did the conscription of labor gangs, known as pioneers, from among the urban poor and the forced contributions of surrounding peasant villages to work on a town’s walls.73 Tax evasion or efforts to shift the burdens of a town’s defense to other neighboring burgs or villages in the countryside increased as the Hundred Years’ War went on, as did open resistance to the tax collector. Yet open resistance paled in comparison to the silent compliance to increasing levels of taxation during the Hundred Years’ War, for the ability of town governments to undertake such large-scale projects hinged on the willingness of residents

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to make these tremendous, ongoing investments of capital and labor. In this way, a town’s walls stood first and foremost as evidence of local public spiritedness that gave real life to the puffed-up rhetoric about civic liberty long found in municipal charters. This commitment sometimes proved to be episodic, rising in tandem with insecurity and diminishing in times of peace. Public support also frayed when law suits held up construction if property owners sought either to block expropriations or win higher indemnities. Such communal cooperation also informed fortification construction in peasant villages and bastides.74 This massive investment in protection, while not a guarantee against a successful siege, raised considerably the stakes of such an undertaking by the enemy, be he a local seigneur, marauding mercenary commander, or the king. Localized state power in towns thus became stronger than that exercised by territorial rulers at the time. When circumstances finally compelled townspeople to begin building walls, they did so in earnest after the mid-fourteenth century. The age of cathedrals then gave way to the age of urban fortifications, which permanently changed the country’s political landscape. By the mid-fifteenth century, virtually every bonne ville possessed the distinctive curtain wall, often machicolated and replete with towers and fortified gates, fronted by either a ditch or a moat. If funds permitted, faubourgs were often encompassed by the works, along with adjoining pastures, cultivated fields, and vineyards. As urban fortifications became more substantial, it was not long before residents began to petition for the right to build up against or even atop them; failing that, people sometimes simply arrogated rights to the enceinte by pilfering materials, punching through drain pipes, or even hidden entryways. The demographic collapse after 1350 at best temporarily relieved pressures to burst out of the restraints imposed by the newly militarized urban edge.

The Advent of Gunpowder Weapons Gunpowder was invented in Song China and used for both ceremonial and military purposes, as it would in Europe. Several sources suggest knowledge of how to make gunpowder arrived in the West after the mid-thirteenth century. In 1249, Roger Bacon alluded to a mysterious compound that resembles gunpowder in his Epistolae de secretis operibus. Twenty years later, in his Opus tritium, Bacon provided a reasonably correct formula for its manufacture as well as warned about the mixture’s explosive power. The polymath Albert the Great left a compilation from around 1270 that included a piece attributed to a certain “Marcus Graecus,” entitled Liber Igneum ad comburendos hostes. In it can be found several recipes for making gunpowder. Murky references to wartime applications of gunpowder appear during the early fourteenth century in the Low Countries, Spain, and Italy. Only in the late 1330s do the first indications of gunpowder weapons, the so-called pot-de-fer guns, begin to show up in France.75 Over the next several decades, evidence of gunpowder weapons in Western Europe quickly proliferates as do signs of the first responses in fortification design. In 1345, the French had two dozen cannons made in Cahors for use at the siege of Aiguillon. Thirty years later at the siege of Saint-Sauveur, the French reportedly deployed over thirty guns. The Burgundians reportedly used 140 cannons that fired stone balls during the siege of Odruik in 1377, though that same year Charles V of France captured 134 places in Guyenne without the use of a single gun.76 In the 1411 siege of Ham, forces under Jean II the Fearless reportedly fired

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three shots from a bombard known as Griet, built in Saint-Omer, upon which the town capitulated. Christine de Pisan mentioned gunpowder weapons several times in her history of the reign of Charles V composed around 1410. Weapons and fortifications underwent both transitional adaptation and radical invention during the Hundred Years’ War. For example, the trebuchet was long used mainly against soft targets such as gates and battlements, and continued alongside gunpowder artillery well into the fifteenth century; similarly, crossbows, invented in the eleventh century, persisted in the early modern period and greatly shaped the design of hand-held gunpowder weapons. Heavy artillery in the form of bombards and mortars complemented rather than supplemented traditional siege engines such as the battering ram and trebuchet. They gradually tipped the scales in favor of the attack once a besieging force deployed and supplied enough guns to pulverize a town’s thick walls. Traditions of technological innovation remained vibrant even before the full advent of gunpowder, as, for example, in the notebooks of the physician and engineer Guido de Vigevano, who entered the service of Philip VI in 1335. Vigevano offered to build novel military machines, such as self-propelled wagons and siege engines. This same imagination allied with craft expertise in metallurgy fueled the rapid technological development of gunpowder weapons after 1350. Early gunpowder weaponry fell into three general categories: hand-held guns, varying in size and appellation, such the arquebus and culverin; light cannon, known as a veuglaire, capable of firing balls up to one hundred pounds at a range of 400–650 yards; and heavy mortars that launched balls of up to eight hundred pounds over 600 yards, though only twice per day because loading was a complicated, time-consuming process. At first, cannons consisted of wooden tubes reinforced by iron rings, something a wheelwright built. Prone to frightening explosions, cannon crews likely prayed fervently to St. Barbara, their patron saint, before lighting the touch hole. By the early fourteenth century, single-cast barrels out of iron began to be forged, then in bronze, which held up very well to the stress of repeated firings. Improvements in gun carriages, which by the 1430s became regularly equipped with wheels, lent greater mobility to such weaponry while on campaign. While lead balls are mentioned as early as 1368, stone balls remained in use into the early fifteenth century, when they first began to be wrapped in iron then eventually entirely cast in iron. Difficulties in deployment, slow rates of fire and inaccuracy, gas leaks that sapped a shot’s velocity, the unreliability of poorly corned gunpowder, all hindered the effectiveness of gunpowder artillery in siege warfare. As these problems were overcome, so the new technology became increasingly decisive in sieges and field engagements. Casting cannon and shot opened the way for calibration, which brought greater efficiency, though the full benefits of standardizing gun bores and missiles was not realized until the seventeenth century. Finally, improvements in the corning of gunpowder made it burn more evenly, which both reduced the chance of an accident and improved a gun’s accuracy. Yet refinements in the assault potential of gunpowder weapons, both cannons and hand-held guns, also carried over into their use to defend a place. Henry V’s campaign in Normandy in the 1410s marked the first time gunpowder weapons played a decisive role in the Hundred Years’ War. The campaign largely consisted of the slow, methodical besieging and capture of fortified places, beginning with Harfleur.77 Most Norman towns possessed antiquated defenses and readily surrendered, such as Caen. An exception was Rouen, whose recently rebuilt

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defenses withstood an English siege from July 1418 to January 1419.78 Rouen’s suburbs and fortifications suffered heavy damage from English cannons that took decades to repair. The town of Montargis similarly suffered during its 1427 siege by the English.79 At the siege of Orléans in 1428–1429, the duke of Bedford decided against taking guns from English-held towns, especially Paris, and instead opted to starve out the Dauphinist garrison.80 This misdirected siege strategy set the stage for Jeanne d’Arc’s dramatic rescue of the city. The English also never took the MontSaint-Michel despite a long siege from 1434 to 1435 because the citadel was out of range of enemy gun emplacements on the mainland.81 The effective use of artillery in field battles came later at the battles of Formigny in 1450 and Castillon in 1453 because of improved gun carriages. In both cases, however, a charge of heavy cavalry, not the guns, turned the tide in favor of the French. The enhanced mobility of French artillery also enabled Charles VII to concentrate it effectively during his campaign to retake Normandy, as at Pontoise in 1441 and Dieppe in 1443. Noble commanders in the Hundred Years’ War, such as Jean de Bueil, count of Sancerre, already recognized that successful sieges—both for the attacker and defenders—hinged on a sustained concentration of resources, technologies, and new forms of organization, all key tenets in the emergence of modern warfare.82 Design innovations perhaps derived in part from growing familiarity with classical military theory and practices. Early treatises on military engineering, such as Fra Egidio Colonna’s De regimine principum libri tre, composed in 1285, and Fra Bartolomeo Carusi’s Tractatus de re bellica, which appeared in 1345, circulated in France and provided readers an introduction to classical Greco-Roman writers, particularly Vegetius, Frontinus, and Aineas the Tactician, on the subjects of fortifications and siege warfare.83 In fact, Colonna even dedicated his work to Philip IV of France. Fortification design remained largely in the hands of indigenous skilled artisans who drew on their own local craft traditions for inspiration. Familiarity with gunpowder weapons not only arose from new forms of urban warfare, but towns also pioneered this new technology in terms of its manufacture in foundries and saltpeter works. Towns thus made possible the very technology that threatened to destroy them.84 The impact of gunpowder technology on fortification design was evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Debates over these architectural responses arise because gunpowder weaponry prompted piecemeal adaptation of established fortification features rather than new designs until the development in fifteenth-century Italy of the bastioned trace. These modifications occurred as municipal defenses continued their late medieval transition to stone and brick.85 These fortification features, present beginning in the mid-thirteenth century, offered improved fields of fire for crossbows and then guns as well as distance to keep siege engines and then cannons at bay. Stricter enforcement and expansion of the non aedificandi zone outside the enceinte up to one hundred yards represented one of the earliest responses to gunpowder weaponry, despite constant pressures by residents to intrude upon this vital space separating the town from the outside world. Existing masonry techniques allowed builders to reinforce fortifications in the face of gunpowder weapons. Laying bricks in interlocking angled rows, with cut stone on all corners, top edging, base, and interspersed in the walls—sometimes vertically or in arcs—added reinforcement. The initial premium placed on a wall’s height gradually gave way over the fifteenth century to an emphasis on a more horizontally oriented defense-in-depth. The profile of the outer walls also began

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to slope slightly inward and became thickened with a terraced rampart up against the interior side to withstand artillery barrages as the force of the cannon balls became absorbed into the pile. The wall in effect became a sort of skin covering the earthen rampart. Gates received a good deal of attention as they were potentially the most vulnerable spots along the enceinte. Fronting ditches increased in depth and width, which helped to provide the material for the earthen rampart; they also became more articulated with respect to maximizing fields of fire and bolstering outworks, such as barbicans, boulevards, and half-moons, which became increasingly common features in urban fortifications after the mid-fifteenth century. Covered wooden firing stations hanging atop the walls (hourds) were replaced by stone galleries that provided protected defensive fire from small and medium guns both straight ahead and along the wall’s flanks. Intermediate defensive works included the escarpment, counter-escarpment, and occasionally a low-lying parapet (fausse braie) that ran between the base of the ramparted enceinte and the main ditch. Builders also modified firing slits (archères) to meet the needs of hand-held guns and artillery (cannonières). Covered firing galleries (casemates) built into the base of the rampart, ventilated to remove the smoke of spent gunpowder, also began to appear during the fifteenth century, as did artillery platforms, often placed on cropped towers. Beyond the counter-escarpment lay the glacis, which steadily increased in size to keep pace with improved gun ranges. Ditches also diminished the exposed profile of the enceinte since much of it lay below the lip of the ditch. Many towns, especially in northern France and the Low Countries, took advantage of water in urban defenses through moats and controlled floods. A very sophisticated system of defense-in-depth developed, posing multiple obstacles in the path of any attacker, from the portcullis to the drawbridge, postern, and fronted by detached forts and blockhouses as walled towns responded to the threat posed by gunpowder weaponry in the fifteenth century. Little evidence of these early adaptations, such as the massive earthworks raised around Paris under Charles V, exists today. On the Right Bank, the most likely direction of approach by an invader, these dirt mounds rose over thirty-five feet high and were crowned by a wooden palisade and fronted by a watery moat. Only in scale, not design, did these fortifications really differ from those found around early medieval burgs in the tenth century. On the east of Paris, Charles V also had erected the massive fortified citadel known as the Bastille to protect the Porte Saint-Antoine, while to the southeast rose the Château de Vincennes. While the capital’s periphery became strengthened, the original royal palace at the Louvre gradually lost its military features and instead became primarily a residence for the royal family and the court. None of these fortified works in Paris demonstrated a knowing adaptation to gunpowder weapons, which in any event neither side ever deployed against the capital during the long conflict. Ample architectural and textual evidence of early adaptations to gunpowder weapons exists in towns from the Low Countries all the way south to Gascony and Languedoc. Fortifications sometimes adapted older forms for new purposes. A detached artillery outwork (boulevard d’artillerie) became devised during the Armagnac siege of Arras in 1414. Additional constructions in timber and packed earth transformed two barbicans into bastions to protect the town’s main gates. In the 1420s, the first artillery towers appeared in Douai by cropping and reinforcing the Tour des Dames, while crossbow firing platforms became gunner’s stations.86 At the Porte Notre-Dame, a series of interlocked guardhouses, reinforced entryways,

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some thirty gunslits, chains, and portcullises came together to form a fortified gate designed to protect from outside attack as well as potential betrayal within. Lille was attacked in 1411 and 1414 during the war between the Armagnacs and Burgundians.87 In advance of the 1411 Armagnac siege, Jean II, duke of Burgundy, ordered the town to remove all trees and gardens around the town’s four-mile-long perimeter and had the ditches cleared of debris. Six of Lille’s eight gates already had barbicans in brick with firing slits for crossbowmen. Records from 1414 mention the construction of two bastions (bollewers) out of packed earth and timber, similar to the ones at Douai, to protect the Porte Saint-Pierre and Porte Saint-Sauveur. Firing slits for cannons in new blockhouses began to appear in the lower portions of some towers. Lille’s royal château of Courtrai, built in the early thirteenth century, underwent extensive remodeling in the early 1400s to meet the gunpowder challenge.88 Similar trends in architectural adaptation and innovation can be found in Normandy.89 In Rouen, the English erected in the 1420s a new citadel on the southwestern corner of the city that came to be called the Vieux Palais. It featured traditional turrets with innovative gun slits. In 1419, they built a fort known as the Barbicane on a small island to protect the bridge over the Seine from artillery fire.90 They established a foundry in the Halles in the 1430s to produce cannon and shot. Elsewhere across Normandy, however, towns remained woefully underprepared to defend against gunpowder and suffered accordingly during the last decade of the Hundred Years’ War.91 Architectural responses to gunpowder only first became evident in Brittany in the 1450s under Duke François II. By that time, more integrated defensive ensembles could be erected based on past experience elsewhere in France and Flanders. Dinan provides a case in point. Improvements to its enceinte came when the Maréchal de Rieux, the duke’s second in command, commanded Jean II de Coëtquen, ducal captain of Dinan, the Master of Artillery Jean de Mauhurgeon, and Olivier Baud, war treasurer, to undertake the repairs to accommodate gunpowder weapons.92 Bastions (boulleverts) became incorporated into Dinan’s defenses along with the construction of pentagonal barbicans to guard two of the town’s four main gates. Five horseshoe-shaped artillery towers were added. Existing towers became converted into artillery blockhouses (cannonières). Rennes saw its walls greatly enhanced during the first half of the fifteenth century to enclose two new adjoining faubourgs. This new fortification construction largely adhered to the existing defensive framework, adding to it and adapting it to meet the gunpowder challenge later in the century. Older square towers became converted into artillery platforms, while rounded towers received new gunslits to provide flanking fire along the curtain wall.93 Nantes erected two new sets of expanded defenses between 1421 and 1476, which incorporated some of these new design features. Evidence of these trends can also be found in the Loire valley. The fortifications of Orléans, for example, incorporated a mix of forms prior to the siege of 1428–1429. Rebuilt and expanded in stone and brick in 1356, its enceinte added four earthwork bastions (boulevards) in 1414 to protect its main gates from artillery attack. Both the French and English also built detached forts (bastilles) along the river and around the town. Jeanne d’Arc’s daring frontal assaults on several of these forts established her early reputation as a fearless, inspired leader.94 Further to the south among the bastides, these trends became apparent by mid-century. Some, such as Bonnegarde and Arouille in the Landes disappeared entirely as a result of this conflict; others such as Aiguillon and Saint-Foy-la-Grande suffered terrible damage

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from which they scarcely recovered. Bordeaux threw up boulevards in 1450–1451 to fend off the threat of French cannon. Such labors went unrewarded as the city fell in early 1451.95 Some local lords sponsored building projects to protect against gunpowder weapons. Parthenay, for example, withstood a four-month-long siege by the Dauphin in 1419 but eventually fell in 1427 to Arthur de Richemont, constable of France and future duke of Brittany. One of his first acts was to strengthen the château; fifteen years later came mention of a bastion to protect it from artillery attack.96 Older towers were cropped and transformed into artillery platforms later in the century. Lisieux’s defenses after 1420 also used a mix of materials and forms to enhance its enceinte. Thirteenth-century stone towers guarded the gates, while the perimeter was a hybrid of masonry work and wooden palisades with fronting ditches. Lisieux’s eastern edge actually still rested on its fourth-century Gallo-Roman wall. An effort was made to reduce the vulnerability to cannonfire of the stockaded portions of the wall by articulating outworks in the forms of firing stations (guarites) and small timbered blockhouses (barbaquennes). To the east in Burgundy, even the defenses of small towns such as Chablis underwent substantial modification during the Hundred Years’ War.97 In 1370, the royal prévôt, the Sire de Noyers, added a square stone tower named the Tour du Roy to reinforce the tenth-century walls around the lower town. Even the monks of nearby Saint-Cosme erected a tower and strengthened the walls around their monastery to protect against pillage.98 In Lorraine, Nancy’s eleventh-century enceinte expanded in the fourteenth century under ducal leadership to enclose adjoining suburbs into a more complex girdle of fortifications.99 Adaptations to gunpowder weaponry appeared in 1435 in the form of bastions (bellewarts) and the establishment in 1458 of an artillery depot (grange). The popular modern image of the medieval city as an unplanned, overcrowded jumble more appropriately fits cities during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, as the swelling defense-in-depth associated with the bastioned trace stifled any tendency toward urban growth by militarizing substantial acreage on the periphery. This shift from the vertical emphasis of medieval fortifications to the horizontal orientation of early modern defenses began during the Hundred Years’ War. It represented the single most significant structuring factor in shaping the form and character of late medieval and early modern French towns.

Royal Resurgence and the B ONNES VILLES after 1430 After 1430, Charles VII and Louis XI used gunpowder weapons to excellent effect to expel the English, subdue the Burgundians, and renew royal attempts to project its full authority across the kingdom and beyond. Walled towns both contributed to this royal agenda and represented a potential obstacle to it. In some places, the monarchy constructed new royal citadels to dominate towns; in others it sponsored the construction of new enceintes; while in yet others it actively demolished the walls of towns and castles. The partnership between the French crown and its bonnes villes thus became increasingly problematic after the close of the Hundred Years’ War.100 These changes coincided with the creation of a standing army and a royal artillery service. The Estates General of 1439 marked a watershed when it affirmed the king’s monopoly over declaring war and peace, minting money, and authorized the creation of the first standing army based on a permanent land tax, the taille, which

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largely fell on the peasantry. Returning to an earlier initiative by Charles V in the 1370s, Charles VII established in 1445 royal financial administrators who oversaw all fortification projects that used royal revenues.101 This decree coincided with the creation of heavy cavalry units (compagnies d’ordonnance) composed largely of noblemen. Regularly paid and trained, the compagnies d’ordonnance furnished a better disciplined and sustainable force to fight the king’s wars without terrorizing his subjects.102 An artillery service also became organized thanks to the tireless efforts of Pierre Bessoneau, France’s first maître de l’artillerie, and the Bureau brothers who helped turn the tide against the English after 1435. In the 1450 campaign of Normandy, French troops with substantial artillery support captured in one year over sixty fortified towns and castles, many of which had taken the English several months to seize a generation before.103 In fact, Caen, despite its sizeable garrison, capitulated immediately after the first barrage of Charles VII’s heavy guns. Some English strongholds attempted to mount a credible defense, but in vain. Artillery technology underscored the crucial role assumed by the bonnes villes by the end of the Hundred Years’ War. Together these urban centers, now more independent yet in prudent partnership with the crown, provided the infrastructure upon which French military power rested in the early modern period, complementing rather than countering the monarchy’s moves under Charles VII and his successors to build a standing army and strengthen the crown’s fiscal hold on the peasantry.104 In meeting the challenge of siege warfare, town governments secured greater control over the local population and economy to marshal the resources necessary to build walls, develop armament industries, form urban militias, and requisition food supplies from the countryside for the king’s army. In exchange, the crown acknowledged the towns’ relative autonomy.105 Royal citadels garrisoned with troops under royal command had been used to mixed effect in the fourteenth century in places such as Paris, Courtrai, and Lille. They began again to play an important role in the crown’s efforts to control towns under Charles VII after his conquest of Normandy in 1435 and Aquitaine in 1453. In the case of English Guyenne, Charles VII sought to construct new or rebuild old castles located along the Adour and Gironde rivers in order to impede English naval traffic. Louis XI continued this policy in Roussillon after 1462, Burgundy in 1477, and Artois, also in 1477. Royal citadels usually became built near the most strategically situated gate and on appropriated lands, preferably ecclesiastical properties of a necessary size. Louis XI considered royal citadels as much needed administrative centers for running newly conquered lands as military bases from which to launch new invasions, as occurred in Brittany from Pouancé and Angers; FrancheComté from Dijon, Auxonne, and Beaune; Flanders from Arras; and Catalonia from Perpignan, Collioure, and Puigcerdà. The first mention of the word “citadelle,” which comes from the Italian citadella (little city), can be found in Jean Le Meingre’s Livre des faits du maréchal Boucicaut, written around 1420.106 Walled towns resented and sometimes resisted but could not always stop the construction of royal citadels. Citadels evoked criticism from military theorists, such as Machiavelli who strongly condemned them as symbols of a prince’s weakness and wickedness. The best citadel, by contrast, was for the prince not to incur the people’s hatred, he argued. Charles VII invoked the principle of “seureté universelle” to justify his confiscation of urban keeps and donjons as well as his assertion of the monarchy’s direct jurisdictional authority over all fortifications in the kingdom.107

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The end of the Hundred Years’ War ushered in a century of peace that began for the first time to demarcate the modern “interior” and “frontier” areas of what became modern France. A measure of this change was the rapidity with which English influence—a factor in Continental politics since the early twelfth century— became confined after 1450 to a few coastal toeholds.108 Another was the establishment under Louis XI of a postal courier service to improve communication and thus royal control of the kingdom. After the Hundred Years’ War, the social makeup of urban elites further narrowed into closed oligarchies that over time became more entangled in the widening royal administration, creating within the towns growing ties but also tensions between Ville and État. One of Louis XI’s maxims addressed the crown’s new commitment to military preparedness during times of peace: “A long peace is often dangerous to a state, unless the sovereign takes care to keep the youth continually prepared, to have always a well disciplined body of troops, to conserve good officers, and to guard that his fortifications do not decay, that his arsenals and magazines are not depleted, and to keep an open eye to know what is happening to his neighbors.”109 Louis XI only mentioned urban fortifications nineteen times in all of his correspondence in reference to seven bonnes villes, namely, Amboise, Amiens, Beauvais, Laon, Lyon, Poitiers, and Rheims. Nevertheless, under him, a royal fortification service headed by specially trained architects began to emerge after the 1472 siege of Beauvais.110 Vauzy de Saint-Martin, a master of works in the town of Cusset, was hired between 1476 and 1483 to oversee the reconstruction of fortifications in Cusset as well as other places across the Bourbonnais, such as Beaune, Auxonne, and Dijon. He created an innovative type of gunport that allowed easier pivoting of the cannon across a larger field of fire. He also incorporated water-filled galleries under the drawbridges to counter enemy attempts to mine these vital entrances. The monarchy assumed a much more forceful approach to dealing with towns under Louis XI. Along with an improved artillery and fortification service, Louis XI also strove to maintain a peacetime army of abut twenty-four thousand. With these instruments he pursued aggressive campaigns against his enemies and their towns. Jean de Haynin’s memoirs recount in detail the brutality of the 1465 siege of Montlhéry.111 In the 1460s, Louis XI pursued much firmer policies toward the dukes of Brittany and Burgundy. When the king annexed Roussillon in 1462, he faced an insurrection in Perpignan that he brutally repressed. Sixteen years later, he had the early fourteenth-century keep built by the Aragonese transformed into a citadel, replete with cannon openings trained both on and outside the town. At the same time, he sponsored major improvements to the enceinte, such as brick fronting bastions before the gates and artillery platforms at regular intervals around the curtain wall. Louis XI’s success against the Burgundians in the 1470s allowed him to seize the prosperous towns in the southern Low Countries and Lorraine that the French had long coveted.112 The death of Duke Charles the Bold before the gates of Nancy on January 5, 1477, cleared the way for substantial territorial gains by the French monarchy. In response, towns in these regions redoubled their efforts to strengthen their defenses by adding outworks to thwart enemy cannon. Demolitions proved as significant as new construction under Louis XI. Lisieux, for example, saw its fortifications dismantled as a result of the Seigneur de Parthenay’s plotting against Louis XI during the Guerre Folle (1485–1487), though Charles VIII soon thereafter authorized their reconstruction, which began in 1492

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and lasted until 1523.113 A number of Burgundian towns also witnessed systematic dismantlement of just enough of their enceintes to render them easily vulnerable to royal action. Charles VIII’s order in July 1488 to destroy the castle of Saint-Aubindu-Cormier, located in the Breton marches, was doubly symbolic. First, it created a physical reminder of ducal independence following the recent Breton defeat by severing the castle keep in two, leaving only the side facing France intact. In the seventeenth century, the grounds even became part of a garden complex for the royal provincial governor who maintained it as an archaic attraction. But not all demolitions were punitive in nature. In Amiens, for example, Louis ordered the demolition of the town’s original twelfth-century fortifications between 1479 and 1482 to open the way for improvements to the expanded stone-and-brick enceinte begun in the late fourteenth century. It included the completion of the strongly fortified the Porte of Montécu, begun in the 1390s, on the crucial north side of the city, which symbolized Amiens’ importance as a formidable frontier city.114 During the Hundred Years’ War, the bonnes villes of France became more independent as they assumed more responsibility for local self-defense and governance. Overall, the French crown, except during the reign of Charles V, could do little but accept this devolution of authority following military defeats and the ensuing crisis of royal government. As a result, regional patterns of urban development across the kingdom became even further solidified as the walls became remade into brick and stone. Medieval fortification design proved sufficiently plastic to meet the early challenge of gunpowder weaponry, though such adaptations failed to keep pace with advances in the accuracy, mobility, and firepower of these guns. Starting in the 1430s, the French crown under Charles VIII and Louis XI implemented measures to raise France’s first standing army, create a permanent artillery service, and ensure adequate revenues to support campaigns that drove the English, the Burgundians, and the Aragonese out of its claimed domains.115 In the process, it began to redefine its relations with the ruling elites of the bonnes villes, and also with the nobility and the clergy, through a combination of cajoling, cooption, and outright coercion. As the fifteenth century came to a close, the French monarchy stood poised to embark on an era of expansionism that proceeded in fits and starts down to the early nineteenth century.

Ch apter 5

Roy a l Rulers and Bastioned Towns

The French invasion of Italy in 1494 altered the balance of power across Europe,

setting in motion a series of wars that raged over the next sixty years. Yet the insecurity caused by these conflicts remained largely confined along the expanded frontiers of the kingdom following the Hundred Years’ War and Burgundian War.1 Inside these boundaries the long domestic peace that France enjoyed discouraged the previous high commitment to strengthening urban enceintes. In his La Monarchie de France, published in 1515, the Piedmontese Claude de Seyssel distinguished between the kingdom’s periphery and interior when it came to security, arguing that the latter needed to contribute to strengthening the former. That was why, he argued, the crown should encourage economic development inside the kingdom, such as Lyon, in order to generate the necessary wealth.2 In time, the impetus for municipal fortification projects steadily moved from the bonnes villes to the crown. Renewed economic and demographic growth after 1500 saw many towns simply outgrow their walled confines.3 As in the thirteenth century, older towns expanded and new ones were founded, such as Brouage on the Atlantic coast and Navarrins in the Pyrenees, after 1470.4 No concerted program to upgrade municipal fortifications, except for places identified by the crown in the borderlands, accompanied this new period of urban growth until the 1550s.5 Novel approaches to fortification design began in Italy after 1450 and soon spread across Europe through itinerant Italian architect-engineers and printed works on fortification design, surveying, and mathematics. The bastioned trace, when adopted, further closed off towns from the outside world by expanding the militarized periphery. Its geometric scheme merged the aesthetic and practical to bolster a town’s prestige and strengthen it against artillery attack.6 The adoption of the bastioned trace in France grew out of the long wars between the Valois and the Hapsburgs and became adapted to local conditions and medieval building traditions. Urban society continued to stratify and be dominated by ever narrower hereditary oligarchies who mediated relations with the crown. A new figure, the professional engineer and architect, emerged to create new kinds of built spaces in towns that reshaped urban life in the early modern period. Financing fortification projects after 1500 required reversing the highly localized revenue system established over the past two centuries to redirect funds from inside the kingdom to its emerging edge.7 But the bonnes villes often resisted these attempts. The crown also began in the sixteenth century to create a better system of payment and supply known as the étapes based in walled towns.8 Bound up in the changing role of towns in the kingdom was the monarchy’s relationship with urban oligarchies, which it increasingly co-opted through the conferral

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of nobility, the growth of venal offices in finance and the judiciary, and ties of credit. As in the Middle Ages, tax exemptions continued to figure prominently. Accompanying these realignments were new forms of urban factionalism between families still ensconced in the Ville and those who increasingly identified with the monarchical État.9 Warfare changed after 1500, so much so that some historians refer to it as a “Military Revolution.”10 New forms of bastioned fortification design, known in French as the trace italienne, developed to counter artillery and the early modern state’s escalating capacity to make war. Contrasting Charles VIII’s invasion of Italy in 1494 with François I’s descent twenty years later tellingly reflects the rapidly changing nature of siege warfare. While artillery made up only a modest portion of Charles VIII’s original force, François I relied on the technical assistance provided by the Spanish engineer Pedro Novarro and his pioneers to bring in upward of fifty siege guns, thirty carts loaded with shot and powder, and twenty-five hundred horses requisitioned for the arduous trek through the Alps. Field fortifications built for these large infantry armies yielded another place for experimental design innovations by skilled military engineers who relied on large crews of conscripted pioneers to move earth and even divert rivers.11 The use of bastions in temporary field fortifications was evident at the battles of Ravenna in 1512 and Verona in 1516. The hordes of pikemen found in European armies after 1450 transformed them into mobile fortifications whose tactical maneuvers prompted new thinking about articulated urban defenses. The impact of the Italian Wars on fortification design in France derived both from experiences while on campaign and increasingly through the circulation of foreign engineers and printed manuals in the kingdom.

Changing Fortification Design Medieval design mainly changed as a result of Renaissance practices of disegno and linear perspective in their modes of visual representation and use of projective geometry.12 Renaissance visual naturalism relied on illusion, on an ability to trick the viewer into thinking something artificial was real; the artist and the engineer thus became a sort of magician able to conjure something out of nothing. Changes in nomenclature reflected this shift. The word engineer was derived from the Latin ingenium, whose root geno referred to the innate “genius” that all natural objects possessed according to Aristotelian philosophy. This implied knowledge of how to manipulate wood, stone, and metal. Ingenium also connoted the capacity to give life in the sense of engendering, which meant the ability to create artifice. Similarly, the word technology comes from the Greek techneˉ, which also signified the ability to invent something unique. In the Middle Ages, the specialists in constructing military machines or “engines,” such as siege towers and trebuchets, came to be called the ingeniarius or, in medieval French, engegneor.13 In the fourteenth century, with the advent of gunpowder weaponry, the term artillator came to designate the person who built devices and managed arsenals. Town records in the fifteenth century mention the hire of maîtres artillators who collaborated with master masons and carpenters on fortifications. By contrast, the term architectus fell into disuse in the Middle Ages as master builders no longer needed the formal education required in Antiquity.14 Instead of the kinds of projective drawings identified by the Roman encyclopedist

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Vitruvius—the ichnographia (plan), orthographia (elevation), and scaenographia (perspective)—medieval builders superimposed a design plan directly at the worksite using templates.15 The difference thus lay more in modes of graphic representation than in actual technique. Indeed, the use of discrete, repetitive units added together for the vertical articulation of space in Gothic cathedrals resembled the horizontal organization of space in the bastioned trace.16 In both cases, builders relied on mathematics, mainly Euclidean geometry.17 After 1450, knowledge of the ideas and practices in Antiquity became amplified and imitated through the texts and illustrations contained in new print editions.18 Renaissance engineering thus became an ambivalent combination of art and science.19 It represented a reevaluation, not abandonment of medieval building traditions, which relied primarily on empirical, not theoretical knowledge.20 It also entailed a gradual separation of the roles of engineer and skilled artisan in both the design and building process. Different kinds of workplace cultures slowly developed for design decisions and execution, aspects of which remained medieval while others became decidedly new. The persistence of classifying military engineers as craftsmen until after 1650 reflected the enduring essential value of manual expertise and knowledge of materials for the creative adaptation of an ideal design plan.21 The new bastioned trace required realizing the geometrical possibilities of a particular place to create a distinctive solution to meet defensive needs. Applied mathematics lent solutions of greater precision but did not yield axiomatic principles to make engineering a science until the eighteenth century. Early Renaissance architectural theory drew on a variety of Greco-Roman sources to inform design. Principal among them were Euclid’s geometry and Vitruvius’s principles on right proportion.22 Other ancients included Archimedes, Frontius, Livy, Pliny the Elder, Caesar, and Vegetius.23 While medieval references to these writers existed, their use in the Renaissance relied on more critically accurate and available editions of their works, thanks to humanist scholarship and print. Craft knowledge once reliant on oral transmission became converted into bookish knowledge elaborated through textual, notational, and illustrated techniques. Applications of Euclidean geometry to fortification design became common in Italy after 1450 in first manuscripts and then printed manuals as artist-designers, such as Filarete, Sangallo, and Da Vinci, recognized the utility of polygonal forms to counter artillery fire.24 Mathematics education also improved over the course of 1500, especially with the Jesuits. These treatments of the bastioned trace become more theoretical and systematic over time as fortification design morphed from an art into a science.25 Printing helped bridge the divide between learned university culture and the craft trades. Local craft practices became transformed into discursive disciplines as workshop-trained artists fashioned a new identity as architect-engineers whose skill combined manual, experiential knowledge with text-based learning, especially in mathematics. Leon Battista Alberti stands out as the pivotal thinker in this transition toward new forms of urban design and fortifications. Drawing on Plato and Pythagoras, Alberti’s substitution of the geometer for the statesman or philosopher privileged mathematics as the form of intellection most akin to God’s manner of viewing the universe.26 It afforded a deeper sense of self-realization that in turn informed moral choice and duty. Archimedes became an exemplar of moral virtue because the study of mechanics represented mathematics in action to transform the

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world. Indeed, Alberti prescribed mastery of the art of “moving weight and joining of bodies” as the first quality for architects that set them apart from mere craftsmen, slavishly bound by manual techniques.27 Alberti’s Ten Books of Architecture of 1452 exerted an enormous influence through its dicta on subsequent discussions of architectural and urban design, including fortifications.28 In it, Alberti proposed the creation of a completely new type of architectural language inspired by the classical idiom of Vitruvius. For Alberti, the three main goals of design were firmitas (strength), utilitas (utility), and venustas (beauty). In turn, they required the application of the concepts of ordinatio (order), disposito (arrangement), eurythmia (proportion), symmetria (symmetry), decorum (decor), and distributio (distribution) for realization. Subsequent debates over the meaning of these terms did not blunt their significance in both civic and military architecture. Urban planning became a form of communication akin to rhetoric, which enhanced a city’s capacity for virtue, reinforced social hierarchies, and conveyed a sense of grandeur.29 Enclosure or openness in design carried political meaning. A tyrant strove for separation, he argued, by dividing a city with great walls overlooking his subjects’ houses, whereas a republic relied on a winding network of streets that afforded citizens unobstructed views of each other. Surveillance and accessibility became centralized in a tyrant’s city and mutually linked in a republican one.30 In the Italian edition of Re aedifiatori, Cosimo Bartoli translated the word structura as muramenti (walling) to emphasize Alberti’s intention to reduce all raised structures to the walls of fortifications on the edge, with civic buildings and neighborhoods within, and even the domestic spaces of private residences. Architecture reclaimed its place among the liberal arts, rather than as a set of craft skills, though Alberti linked it strongly to the field of mechanics, thus joining skill (ingegnio) and learning (disciplina). Alberti was perhaps the first to consider the problem of depicting the totality of a visual field. The challenge, faced by cartographers as well as architects, was to reconcile the mathematical abstraction of bird’seye or ichnographic views with empirical observation of a town’s profile against the horizon by an earthly viewer. An early attempt to systematize the processes of measurement involved in such a task was Alberti’s Ludi Matematici. Military engineers, in particular, realized early on the inestimable value of improving the accuracy of measuring visual fields for both fortification design and ballistics. Yet while Alberti considered the skills of the architect-engineer as often more decisive than the leadership of generals in achieving victory, he reaffirmed the traditional hierarchy of building forms that he believed (wrongly) had existed in Antiquity, starting at the bottom with the most functional structures, such as city walls, then moving upward to more ornate and expensive buildings, such as churches and palaces. As a result, military architecture continued to be viewed as a mechanical art until the late sixteenth century when it finally became mathematically grounded. Until then, a fortress or fortified city existed as a kind of machine or engine, at least in theory, designed and operated by specialists known as engineers. In fact, the same designers took the appellation of architect when treating higher status structures and assumed the name of engineer when discussing the new bastioned trace fortifications.31 Alberti’s revival of Vitruvian architectural theory, especially the core notion that craftwork and construction had to be informed and guided by reason and mathematics, came to France primarily through print and translations. Giovanni Sulpicius’s first printed edition of Vitruvius’s De architectura in Venice in 1486

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quickly spawned numerous editions, translations, and commentaries that circulated across Western Europe.32 In 1511, Fra Giovanni Giocondo published a folio edition of Vitruvius in Venice that used his philological skills to restore Vitruvius’s original Greek terms and correct much of the Latin. His version made it possible for reliable translations of Vitruvius to be published, first in Italian then in other European languages, including French.33 Illustrations in his Vitruvius mainly concerned machines used in construction and war, along with ancient buildings and the five Orders. Cesare Cesariano brought out another better illustrated Italian translation in 1521. Trained as a painter and architect, he also worked as a military engineer. In his commentary on Vitruvius, Cesariano elaborated at length on the relationship between reason (ratiocinatio) and building (fabrica).34 Architecture, he argued, literally represented a concrete manifestation of ideal forms mathematical at base. Mechanical devices that assisted architecture to realize this goal also reflected this close relationship. The first French translation came in 1526 from a prior Spanish translation and introduced Vitruvius to a French audience for the first time in the vernacular.35 By the 1540s, the craft of building as expressed in print was a vibrant discursive field. Classical urbanism also inspired proponents of the ideal city to propose new ways to think about the spatial and functional relationships among a city’s military, economic, social, and political aspects, emphasizing regularity, harmony, and beauty as the desired normative qualities.36 New towns, such as Vitry-le-Français in France and Palmanova in the Veneto, offered an opportunity to experiment with radiocentric forms.37 Existing towns proved much less amenable to the dictates of ideal city design, however. Except for wide main streets leading to squares and marketplaces, there tended to be a disconnection between radially configured newstyle bastioned fortifications on the periphery and the orthogonal layout within the walls. As the urban edge became more articulated and extended outward, it further impeded day-to-day functional needs of the town based on circulation and exchange. Most historians contend that the new bastioned trace first appeared in fifteenthcentury Italy.38 They cite Filippo Brunelleschi, who designed the innovative pentagonal fortifications at Vicopisano in the 1420s, hailed in its day as the most advanced in Europe, and likely took part in building new fortifications at Pisa in 1424. Yet evidence outside of Italy suggests comparable developments in reticulated fortification design were already underway among the Ottoman Turks and in northern France and the Low Countries. In fact, the Italian military engineer Bonaiuto Lorini attributed in 1596 the invention of new-style bastioned fortifications to the French.39 The straightforward story found in Italian architectural treatises must be distinguished from the more complicated one revealed at fortification building sites in France where medieval design practices converged with, rather than became displaced by, the more systematic radial geometric aesthetic coming out of Renaissance Italy. The impulse to indent and project along a circular defensive perimeter sprang not from the compelling classicized elegance of geometry, which held the circle as the most perfect form, but rather from the practical necessity to enhance flanking fire along the curtain walls and maximize fields of fire covering approaches. The celebrated shift to pentagonal forms in fifteenth-century Italy appears overstated when comparing firing slits in fourteenth-century Flemish towers to similar ones depicted in the plans for Sforzinda by Antonio Averlino, known as “Filarete.”40 This

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iconic new Renaissance town actually mirrored the spatial arrangements found in late medieval cities in the Po valley, such as Pavia and Lodi.41 The radial design used by Filarete also resembled the depiction of Milan found in a fourteenth-century map accompanying a history of the city by the Dominican friar and chronicler Galvano Fiamma.42 Experimentation in design occurred most fully not in stone but rather in the notebook sketches of artists.43 Early Italian architectural treatises, some in manuscript notebooks and others eventually published, helped to establish the crucial textual and visual parameters for experimentation in fortification design over the next two centuries. Even before they began to appear in print, designs of new-style bastioned trace fortifications circulated quite widely in Italy and then the rest of Europe, with copying considered a high form of flattery. The Sienese Mariano Taccola’s De ingensis, composed over the first half of the fifteenth century, reflected the continuing vitality of craft traditions of innovation.44 Another early source for military technology was Roberto Valturio’s treatise Elenchus et index rerum militarium, written between 1455 and 1460 but eventually published in Verona in 1472, which became the best-known military book of the fifteenth century. Building his arguments out of a deep and thorough study of ancient Greek and Latin sources, Valturio used profuse illustrations to demonstrate techniques of defense and attack.45 Even more influential was Francesco di Giorgio, who analogized urban design with the human body in the 1480s and 1490s. Trained in Siena as a painter and sculptor, di Giorgio became one of the most widely respected architect-engineers in Italy in his day. He also later gave advice and prepared plans for fortifications built by Duke Federico da Montefeltro in Urbino in the Opusculum de architectura, which contained hundred of drawings of machines and fortifications.46 His interest in mechanical devices or ingegni came out most clearly in his small notebook of sketches, composed around 1465, known as the Codicetto. It contains drawings of war machines, pumps, and cranes used in construction, and fortifications designed to resist gunpowder weaponry. He introduced the innovative idea of slanting fortification walls in order to deflect the impact of a cannonball. He also experimented with different polygonal forms. Di Giorgio expanded on these topics in the Trattati, which treated architecture, engineering, urban planning, and the military arts in an integrated fashion.47 In these two tracts, he evinced a deep interest in maximizing defensive fields of fire and solving problems encountered in construction. Alongside radial designs are found designs proposing a centralized orthogonal city with a central plaza, ideas perhaps inspired by Pope Nicholas V’s remodeling of Rome in the 1460s. Di Giorgio exercised a wide influence on later architects in Italy, including Sebastiano Serlio, who later worked in France in the 1540s.48 Other better-known Italian artist-designers built on di Giorgio’s legacy to varying degrees. Although Leonardo da Vinci demonstrated in the Madid Codex I and the Codices Atlanticus a deep interest in mechanical devices, including machines of war, he did not link it explicitly to urban design and fortifications.49 Breakthroughs in the application of Euclidean geometry to painting, as in Piero della Francesca’s De prospective pingendi, written around 1470, powerfully influenced not just painting but also printed illustrations, including fortification design.50 Michelangelo’s notebooks also clearly demonstrated his appreciation of the geometric foundations of fortification design. But he had to wait until the

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1520s to actually realize them on the ground, best seen in the Fortezza de Basso, after he assumed responsibility for rebuilding the bastioned defenses of his native Florence during its siege in 1529.51 Antonio da Sangallo the Younger is usually credited with defining the classical form of the Italian bastioned trace or citadella sangallesca.52 His schematics for pentagonal bastions contain a plethora of descriptive text to accompany the drawings to better instruct the reader in how the mathematics of his “system” of layered defense-in-depth worked. Antonio collaborated with his uncle Giuliano, a well-accomplished military engineer and architect in his own right, on the construction of the bastioned Fortezza Nuova at Pisa and bastioned fortresses (rocca) in the Papal States. By the 1520s, other Italian cities such as Siena and Lucca followed suit in erecting reticulated bastioned defenses in stone, brick, and packed earth. Although Italians dominated new theories of fortification design, important contributions from other countries indicate the vitality of fortification design outside Italy. The novel design of the Fort of Salses by the Spanish engineer Ramio Lopez in 1498 is a case in point.53 Yet not all observers thought security could be found in sturdy walls. Machiavelli was not alone in arguing that fortifications were a potent sign of a prince’s weakness, not strength.54

Bastioned Fortification in Valois France Urban enceintes in France first began to be modified according to the new Italian idea of the bastioned trace in the 1520s. High costs and the lack of immediate threats convinced most towns not to undertake such projects, however. Moreover, while fortification manuals disparaged medieval curtain walls and towers, these established features of urban defense retained considerable value during the early modern period. Some towns, such as Parthenay in the 1520s, built new fortifications that purposely harked back to earlier medieval forms of high, imposing towers, aiming more toward ostentation than practical defense. As late as the 1580s, Brantôme still extolled the tried-and-true old curtain walls as preferable to newstyle brick bastions, and a whole lot cheaper to build. Urban fortifications evolved as composite forms, incorporating elements of antiquated defenses into newly refurbished works. Late medieval urban fortifications modified established features of active defense to parry the threat of gunpowder weaponry. Even though the machicolated gallery lost its raison-d’être due to the increased firepower of artillery, it still possessed aesthetic value as many towns continued to maintain and even build them until the end of the sixteenth century. The decorative value of galleries found at the château of Azay-le-Rideau, built in 1518, can be seen in the fact that they did not even have firing holes. While Italy was the main theater of conflict, the Valois-Hapsburg confrontation shifted in the 1520s to include the Low Countries and the west bank of the Rhine. New-style bastioned traces largely appeared in the borderlands as both sides undertook to upgrade and better organize defenses. Italian engineers figured prominently in most of these projects.55 The French first encountered the new Italian theories of fortification design following Charles VIII’s invasion of Italy. The subsequent service of Italian military engineers to the crown and the growing influx of print publications on fortifications and mathematics brought these ideas to France.56 The movement of masons and architects across the Southern Alps was quite common in the Middle Ages, and Italian military engineers and

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architects followed in their paths.57 Among the motivations behind publishing was an author’s desire to attract a patron, which was certainly the case of the Veronese designer and scholar Fra Giovanni Giocondo. A close associate of di Giorgio, Fra Giocondo was an expert in hydraulics, fortresses, and bridges as well as an accomplished architect and philologist. A Neapolitan record of payment in 1492 indicates that Fra Giocondo and a painter named Antonello da Capua copied 126 drawings from two notebooks by Francesco di Giorgio, one on architectural and the other on military engineering.58 He presented public lectures and tutored aspiring architects in Vitruvian theory while in Paris from 1495 to 1505. The French humanist Guillaume Budé referred to him as an architectus regius for his service to Charles VIII. In 1509, Fra Giocondo participated in the French siege of Parma; he also probably designed at the time the semicircular bastions for Padua and Treviso.59 Later, he reputedly designed gardens and waterworks at Chambord for François I. However, there is no evidence that Fra Giocondo actually ever designed any fortifications for construction in France during his tenure there. French interest in Italian-style bastioned defenses rose around the time of François I’s capture at Pavia in 1525 and two-year stay at the Hapsburg court in Madrid. The Imperial siege of Mézières in 1521, stoutly defended by Bayard, brought about a decision afterward to begin construction of a bastioned trace.60 The duke of Vendôme’s decision in 1522 to raze castles in the Artois convinced towns in Hainault and Flanders to improve their defenses along Italian lines. Meanwhile, an Anglo-Imperial invasion from the north marched on Paris while a Spanish force moved against Bayonne.61 While Paris took steps to shore up its fourteenth-century defenses, Toulouse hired Anchise da Bologna in 1525 to design a half-moon outwork in case of Spanish attack. Thirteen years later Antonio da Castello and Fabrizio Cecliano da Napoli added another to the city’s enceinte. The 1524 Imperial invasion of Provence aimed to besiege Marseille because it was so poorly defended.62 In response, the French crown ordered the immediate construction of sloped earthen ramparts and artillery platforms, which gangs of soldiers and civilians, including women and children, threw up in three frantic days of work.63 After François I regained his freedom in 1525, he set about to strengthen the defenses of towns along his realm’s frontiers. To underwrite these expenses, he created new tax, the crues de taille, on towns in the interior. On the northern Flemish frontier, work quickly got underway to create a two-tiered layer of fortified places composed first of an outer ring in upper Picardy in Ardres, Thérouanne, Montreuil, Doullens, and Guise shielding an inner array of walled towns made up of Amiens, Saint-Quentin, Vervins, and Mézières.64 Rebuilding urban fortifications in Rouen and Caen, both still damaged from the Hundred Years’ War, got underway in Normandy to avert possible English incursions.65 Further to the west, reconstruction projects began as Brittany became integrated into the realm.66 To the east, Chaumont, Troyes, Langres, Vitry, and Villefranche in Champagne received attention to block Imperial threats from Lorraine, as did Dijon, Beaune, and Chalons in Burgundy across from Franche-Comté and Lyon, Saint-Paul-de-Vence, and Marseille, which faced Savoy and the Piedmont (see figure 5.1).67 To protect approaches across the Pyrenees, the enceintes of Bayonne and Narbonne underwent extensive rebuilding in the late 1520s and 1530s.68 Repairs also continued across a number of towns and castles in greater Guyenne, all heavily damaged during the Hundred Years’ War.69 Port towns received defensive upgrades, with the construction of a new fortified enceinte at Le Havre-de-Grace and new bastioned elements added to the walls of La

Figure 5.1

Villefranche. By permission of the Bibliothèque Nationale (B.N. M73577).

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Rochelle. It was an impressive start to consolidating France behind what Cardinal Richelieu and then Sébastien Le Prestre, lord of Vauban referred to later in the seventeenth century as the well-defined and well-defended borders of the pré carré.70 The Imperial invasion of Provence and Picardy in 1536 prompted renewed efforts by the French to fortify places along these vital frontiers. Towns across Dauphiné saw their fortifications revamped.71 In lower Provence, the provincial governor Anne duke of Montmorency, worked to strengthen the defenses of Arles, Tarascon, Beaucaire, Marseille, Avignon, and Aix. After a hasty inspection, Montmorency decided to abandon Avignon and Aix in order to concentrate on shoring up Arles and Marseille. In Arles, six new earthen bastions rose up along the town’s periphery, while the Roman arena was converted into an artillery platform.72 Experienced military engineers helped supervise these projects.73 Meanwhile, in Picardy, the French began in August 1536 to upgrade the defenses of Laon and Saint- Quentin, while Imperial forces moved against Péronne, recently bastioned in the 1520s, to use for an attack on Paris.74 In a panic, the bishop of Paris, the cardinal Du Bellay, organized and paid for with church funds new earthwork defenses. Péronne managed to repulse the Imperial attack; Montreuil-sur-Mer, on the other hand, fell the next year with scarcely any resistance.75 The military situation along these borderlands was very fluid, like the condition of fortified places, as both sides scrambled to meet their mutual threat. Italian military engineers began regularly showing up in French service in the 1530s. Among the most accomplished was Girolamo Bellarmato, an exile from Siena who in 1538 became a royal engineer with skills in mathematics and cartography. He claimed credit for completing the fortifications at Le Havre-de-Grâce originally begun in 1518. In 1544, he was working on Dieppe’s port defenses when the crown hurriedly called him to help protect Paris, which was threatened by another Imperial invasion. Bellarmato had the walls of the capital again reinforced with earthen ramparts and new outworks and artillery platforms.76 In March 1547, and again in 1550, Bellarmato was in Burgundy where he designed a citadel for Châlons-sur-Sâone and a new castle for Bresse. In between he traveled to Picardy to inspect the king’s fortifications. Bellarmato is likely the author of the anonymous treatise Delle fortificazioni, a work that begins with a long disquisition on arithmetic, geometry, and surveying followed by a section on designing bastions to suit any polygonal form.77 Another prominent Italian military engineer active on France’s eastern frontier was Girolamo Marini, who hailed from Treviso, a small town near Modena. He entered French service in the Piedmont campaign of 1537 and provided advice, along with several other “fortificateurs,” on reinforcing the defenses of Pinerolo. Blaise de Monluc praised Marini’s expertise and credited him with teaching him, while on campaign together in the Piedmont, the new mathematical techniques of calculating artillery trajectories that Monluc used to such good effect at the 1542 siege of Perpignan.78 For his outstanding service, the king granted him the rank of captain (chevalier). Italian military engineers also appeared along the kingdom’s northern borders in the mid-1530s. Antonio da Castello took his name after the city of Castello in Umbria and began his career in service to the duke of Urbino. In 1536, he entered French employ and designed new bastioned defenses for StPol in Artois. Although soldiers and pioneers labored intensely to erect the works in three short months, the place still quickly fell to Imperial forces. The French blamed the inadequacy of the design, while the Italians attributed the defeat to

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French cowardice.79 Gian-Battista Belluci da San Marino, known as “Il Camerini” who later designed the massive fortifications in Sasso, Italy, also reportedly served in France in the late 1530s.80 In the 1540s, French use of the bastioned trace became more evident in its northern Italian campaign and along the northern and eastern frontiers of the kingdom. Italian military engineers figured prominently in much of this work. Mario Savorgnano, from near Pescara, for example, entered French employ in 1543 and helped redesign Landrecies’ fortifications following an Imperial siege.81 Later in the early years of Henri II’s reign, Savorgnano, along with his brother Germanico, prepared reports on Italian fortifications in anticipation of a possible French campaign to reclaim Naples. In the early 1540s, Guillaume Du Bellay, François I’s commander in northern Italy, counseled François I to fortify towns and castles in the Piedmont in the Italian style to consolidate control over the territory. This included new bastioned works in Turin, Pinerolo, Savigliano, and Cherasco.82 Du Bellay apparently used plans, long since lost, prepared by Girolamo Marini and brought to Paris by the lord of Villegaignon in May 1541.83 Marini’s vast enceinte in Turin became celebrated in the writings of both Tartaglia and Rabelais.84 The result was a fortified city considered by many observers at the time as the most advanced in all of Italy, if not Europe.85 It anchored the line of permanent defenses that François I envisioned erecting along all the exposed frontiers of the kingdom so that, as Rabelais put, “henceforth France will be superbly bound and the French peacefully secured.”86 In fact, François Rabelais chronicled his patron Guillaume du Bellay’s campaigns in Piedmont in a 1542 work (now lost) called Stategemata after Frontinus. These new lines of fortified places in the emerging borderlands helped bring about the failure of the 1544 Anglo-Imperial invasion of France. Charles V and Henry VIII agreed on a two-pronged invasion that bypassed fortified French towns in order to converge on Paris. Monluc, for one, seriously questioned the wisdom of this strategy, since these fortified places could easily interdict communications and supplies. Ensuing events proved him right.87 The English no sooner invaded than they realized they needed to secure Boulogne to ensure access to the sea. But it took them nearly two months to capture, and then it only fell because of the ineptitude of its French commander.88 Interestingly, the French attempt to retake Boulogne three years later revealed the limits of some these supposed Italian experts, for example, Antonio Mellone. He was a mason’s son from Cremona who entered French service in 1536. In 1542, he assisted in strengthening the defenses of Boulogne and returned with the French in 1545 to retake Boulogne. Using plans drawn up by Girolamo Marini, he built a new bastioned fort across the harbor known as Fort d’Outreau. Mellone’s command of mathematics and surveying became dubious when he omitted to account for the slope of the talus, which meant the artillery could not fit on the parapets.89 Mellone then relocated the fort in such a way that it could not adequately cover approaches to the harbor. To his credit, he did the honorable thing and died during the ensuing siege. To the east, François I expected Charles V in 1544 to march toward Paris along the valley of the Marne. He therefore ordered the Dauphin to reinforce Châlons, a place “hardly fortified,” as was Troyes in Champagne.90 Instead, Charles V besieged Saint-Dizier, which some sources suggest was an open town while others mention its new bastioned defenses.91 Likely, these were hastily erected earthen works of the kind commonly found at other frontier towns. Despite furious assaults, Imperial

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forces failed to capture Saint-Dizier, which suffered heavy damage during the siege. With the English invasion force bogged down before Boulogne, the two-pronged assault on Paris was doomed, leaving a furious Charles V no choice but to make peace with the French in September 1544. Once again with peace, François I turned to strengthening places-fortes along the frontiers by sending the duke of Vendôme to Picardy and Martin du Bellay to Champagne.92 Du Bellay visited extensively across the province to report on the places most in need of attention. He took with him Girolamo Marini. The report called for upgrading the fortifications of Mézières and Mouzon as well as building a new fortified place opposite Stenay on the Meuse River, which reverted to the duke of Lorraine. Marini also provided advice on rebuilding the city of Luxembourg after its capture in 1543 and overhauling the defenses of Saint-Dizier with three new bastions in advance of the Imperial invasion in 1544.93 François I selected Marini to design the new town of Vitry-le-Français, which replaced Vitryen-Perthois after a devastating Imperial siege in 1544. Marini eschewed the opportunity to create de novo the first thoroughly integrated and symmetrical bastioned urban enceinte in France and instead fell back on the time-honored, and more practical, orthogonal grid.94 Finally also in Champagne, the French bolstered the defenses of the château of Saint-Menhoult; Chaumont-en-Bassigny also began new fortifications; while in Coissy he started to erect a citadel. In summer 1546, after concluding peace with the English, François I sent out on an arduous tour of these fortified places that likely hastened his death in March 1547. Italian military engineers also served the Anglo-Imperial cause in the Low Countries and in other Hapsburg lands. In 1535, Charles V hired the Italian architect-engineer Benedeto da Ravenna to oversee a design program for the enceinte of Perpignan that incorporated features of the new trace italienne. Baldassare Vianello, another Italian, contributed as well. A siege by the French in 1542, which ultimately failed, exposed weaknesses in the design that Philip II eventually addressed in 1564 when a detached citadel was added, again designed by Italians, Giambatista Calvi and Giorgio Setara, both from Milan. The articulated periphery of the bastioned trace became folded into the established enceinte in a process, like in France, of adaptation rather than outright replacement. Assisting the English at the 1542 siege of Boulogne was Girolamo Pennacchi from Treviso.95 Pennacchi, in fact, is commonly credited with introducing the bastioned trace to England. Trained as a painter, Pennacchi began his career serving Venice and the papacy, notably on the defenses of Bologna.96 Another was Donato Buono de’ Pellizzuoli who came from Bergamo and designed the citadels built at Ghent and Cambrai.97 Yet another was Gabrio Serbelloni from Milan who in the 1560s accompanied the duke of Alba to the Spanish Netherlands where he contributed fortification designs and assisted in planning sieges.98 Finally, there was Chiapino Vitelli from Castello in Le Marche. He worked for the Spanish on a variety of projects in Italy before going briefly to the Low Countries in 1567 to serve the duke of Alba. The French tried unsuccessfully to entice him to join them.99 The dukes of Lorraine also hired Italian military engineers and architects to design fortifications for the duchy, dangerously caught between the ambitions of the Valois and Hapsburgs. The ducal house of Guise devoted most of its attention to bolstering the defenses of the ducal capital, Nancy, to meet the threat of siege guns. Signs of ruin from the Burgundian wars of the 1470s could still be found fifty years later. In the late 1520s, Duke Antoine had two stone-and-brick bastions

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constructed to protect the town’s two main gates. While it is unclear if Italian military engineers assisted him, Antoine had campaigned in Italy with Imperial forces during the 1520s where he had witnessed first-hand the new trends in fortification design. In 1544, the Italian engineer Bathazare da Padova visited the duchy for several months, inspecting fortified sites, including Nancy, and composing a report containing his recommendations. He had worked several years earlier in Spain and on the defenses at Perpignan. Another Italian engineer named Ambrosio Principiano, who hailed from Genoa, came to Lorraine in 1546. He had served Antoine Perronet de Granvelle since 1539, working on projects such as the fortifications at Dole. Two years later, Antonio da Bergamo became the leading engineering consultant on what was now a complete makeover of Nancy, a position he held on and off over the next fourteen years. Balthasar Paduano, about whom little is known, apparently assisted him. In 1552, Henri II of France gained control of the Trois-Évêchés of Toul, Metz, and Verdun, which brought Lorraine much more into the French sphere of influence, as did the marriage of Charles III, duke of Lorraine, to his daughter, Claude de France. As a result, Nancy after 1550 boasted of some of the most advanced bastioned fortifications in all of Europe. Indeed, Lorraine continued to play a leading role in sponsoring new urban and military design well into the seventeenth century. Henri d’Albret, king of Navarre on the Pyrenean border with Spain, hired a French military engineer named Robert Chinon in the 1550s. Chinon later participated in the 1573 siege of La Rochelle. The accession of Henri II in 1547 saw a continuation of the monarchy’s commitment to strengthening fortified places along these nascent frontiers.100 Even the capital underwent its most significant defensive upgrade since the reign of Charles V under the leadership of Antoine Duprat, the garde de la prévôté, with the reinforcement of its existing ramparts and the addition of new outworks, especially along the city’s northern edge.101 The spread of Calvinism among the nobility and to a number of the bonnes villes created new lines of division both confessional and geographical. Walled enceintes came to play a critical role in the ensuing Wars of Religion in France after Henri II’s sudden death in 1559. Until then, Henri II saw through to completion many of the fortification projects in the borderland begun by his father. Along the Flemish frontier, Henri II encouraged further progress on the bastioned enceintes of Corbie, Péronne, and Amiens. After Charles V captured Thérouanne in 1553, a key town in the Artois, Henri II had Hesdin’s recently razed defenses replaced by a full trace italienne designed by the Flemish military engineer, Sebastien Van Noyen.102 Two of Girolamo Marini’s sons, Camillo and Gieronimo, served Henri II in the 1550s. Camillo furnished important advice along with a French engineer named Jean de Saint-Rémy to the duke of Guise at the siege of Metz in 1552, while Gieronimo held the post of royal fortification engineer in Picardy where he consulted on fortification projects at Amiens, Corbie, and Péronne along the northern frontier.103 In the northeast toward Luxembourg and Lorraine, the king had Mariembourg rebuilt in 1552 using a quadrangular layout and Philippebourg and Rocroi in 1554 according to a pentagonal schema. In 1550, La Rochelle began construction of a massive bastion on its northern perimeter called the Boulevard de Ludde, later renamed Boulevard de l’Évangile in 1562 after the Calvinist party controlled the city. Henri II placed even more importance on royal citadels, such as the one built in Mézières (1550), Metz (1552), La Rochelle (1555), and Calais (1558). All of them proved so massive that whole neighborhoods

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had to be demolished, causing much consternation and resentment. Friction with the bonnes villes was definitely on the rise on the eve of the Wars of Religion. The career of several Italian military engineers bridged the last of the HapsburgValois Wars and the beginning of the Wars of Religion. One was Jacopo Fusto from Urbino. Nicknamed Il Castrioto after an unfortunate groin wound, Fusto long served the papacy before joining the French in the mid-1550s. His advice to upgrade the defenses of Saint-Quentin was pointedly ignored in the run-up to the disaster of 1556. In 1558, the Constable Montmorency recommended that Henri II employ Fusto and another engineer, Vincenzo Locatelli, to design three forts to be built in Navarre to counter rising Huguenot sentiment.104 After the fall of Calais to the French in 1558, Fusto drew up plans to bolster the port city’s defenses. He proposed an octagonal bastioned enceinte, using the old wall in places and constructing new ones where necessary, adding casemates and deeper ditches. Fusto was captured by Imperial forces during the French siege of Gravelines in 1558 but released soon after. Later that same year, Fusto conducted a survey of the defenses of Amiens for Henri II; in 1559, he received the title of inspector general of all the realm’s fortifications. He left designs and models for fortifications in places in Languedoc, Provence, the Lyonnais, Champagne, Picardy, and Normandy, most never built, however, as detailed in the book he coauthored with Girolamo Maggi, Delle fortificatione delle città, which appear in 1564. Vincenzo Locatelli, a native of Cremona, also entered the service of Henri II as a military engineer in 1556. His first commission consisted of restoring the king’s fortresses in Picardy. He along with two other Italian military engineers assisted the French campaign led by the duke of Guise to recapture Calais in 1558.105 Locatelli also conducted inspections of Bordeaux, Bayonne, and La Rochelle. Locatelli proposed the construction of a royal citadel at La Rochelle to quell its turbulent populace, but local opposition from churches and residents whose properties would be expropriated and intrigues at court derailed the project. He fell out of favor with the French court after the death of Henri II, thereafter working intermittently for the king of Spain and Emmanuel Philibert, duke of Savoy, eventually settling in the mid-1560s into the service of the duke of Alba. Sallustio Peruzzi came from Florence and was the son of the celebrated Baldassar Peruzzi. In 1561, he designed bastioned defenses for Avignon lest it fall to Huguenot forces in southern France.106 Also arriving in the 1550s was Agostino Ramelli from Ponta Tresa in Lombardy, who became more famous for his wondrous book of mechanical devices published later in the 1580s. Fleeting mention can be found of others, such as Jacomo Seghizzi from Modena; Bartolomeo Campi, who later died at 1579 siege of Maastricht; Francesco Paciotto, who fortified Mons in the 1550s and died years later at the siege of Arras107; Maggi da Anghiari, who later became one of Henri III’s chief architects; Gabrio Serpelloni from Milan; and Marco Aurelio da Pasino,108 who in 1570 designed the fortifications at Sedan. Some just exist as simple names, otherwise unknown, such as Giantomaso Scala, Gioachino da Comno, Giacomo Orologio, and Bernardino da Vimercate. Many others likely disappeared from the record. Taken as a group, these itinerant Italian military engineers helped bring to France through their work and collaborations the new design forms of the bastioned trace. The effectiveness of even hastily constructed bastioned fortifications in vanquishing a huge besieging army can be seen most vividly in the Imperial siege of

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Metz in late 1552. It was the largest military action undertaken by any European power during the sixteenth century. The Imperial army that eventually gathered before Mez totaled around 45,000 infantry, made up of 17,000 Spanish and Italian infantry and 28,000 Landsknechte, some 7,000 cavalry, and another 5,500 pioneers. The some 150 assorted cannons brought to besiege Metz ranged from light field guns to heavy Mauerbrechern (wall-smashers).109 Adequate shot and powder were on hand. Metz’s main defenses still largely relied upon thirteenth-century curtain walls and towers raised overtop of the original Gallo-Roman enceinte. Canals and marshes also provided significant water defenses for the city. Most of these various works were in a state of considerable disrepair when the French arrived in the spring.110 With the assistance of Camillo Marini, François, duke of Guise, revamped its defenses in summer 1552 in advance of the Imperial invasion by adding expanded earthworks and a new citadel on the exposed southwestern flank. Even so, Metz remained quite vulnerable. Yet strategic and diplomatic blunders combined with a logistical breakdown to thwart an Imperial force ten times the size of the French garrison in Metz.111 Another important aspect of the siege of Metz was its representation in print culture and its impact on public opinion across Europe.112 The information side of warfare, from propaganda to journalism to policy making, became another significant feature of the early modern Military Revolution as seen in both the French disaster at Saint-Quentin in 1557, which so discredited Constable Montmorency, and the French victory at Thionville, where Pietro Strozzi died, and Calais in 1558, which heightened the prestige of the duke of Guise.113 These changing fortunes played out further during the upcoming Wars of Religion.

Engineers and Innovation in France up to 1560 The development of new Italian-inspired fortification design in France up to 1560 relied on more than the labors of itinerant Italian military engineers working for the French crown and its adversaries. Continuing developments in the areas of applied mathematics, mechanics, improved instrumentation, and better modes of graphic and textual representation in print gave further and broader impetus to the spread of the bastioned trace as military engineering began to claim a scientific character.114 After 1500, princes took a keen interest in practical applications of mathematics to ballistics and fortification design both to secure territory and to associate their legitimacy with rational principles. The monarchy’s drive to redirect and increase tax revenues for these purposes and the sustained beginnings of France’s first royal fortification service contributed to turning the crown’s ambitions into reality on the ground. These new pressures to bend the kingdom to the monarch’s will elicited a variety of responses that affected its relations with all groups in French society, most particularly the notability of the bonnes villes. Since the early 1500s, printed works in Latin, Italian, and increasingly French made available new design ideas and mathematical applications for fortifications and ballistics to a wide readership that included noblemen, humanist savants, and skilled artisans such as masons, carpenters, and sculptors. Military manuals intended for the “perfect” captain, dozens of which appeared in the century, invariably addressed these subjects, if sometimes confusedly. Works on engineering and practical mathematics also proliferated and usually touted their value by showing how to solve difficult calculation problems related to war. Still other works

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discussed the latest instruments and clever devices to assist in performing these tasks. Most of these manuals provided ready critiques of various forms advocated by other theorists in the emerging market of engineering ideas. At base, most of these treatises eschewed prescriptive formulae and instead strove to train readers how to think critically. Arithmetic primers and geometry manuals printed in French after 1500, while certainly influenced by Italian trends, exhibited a less abstract nature on the crucial subject of perspective geometry. This pragmatic approach to the representation of realistic architectural space can be seen in the work of an obscure canon from Toul, Jean Pélerin, who wrote under the name “Viator” (voyager). In 1505, he published the first French work exclusively devoted to Euclidean geometry, De Artificiali perspectiva. The perspective renderings in the text, however, bore no relationship with the perspective geometry discussed in the text.115 Pélerin’s approach to linear perspective was much simpler than the ones already developed in Italy. He presented a formulaic but effective three-point system using a series of pyramids with the apexes along the horizontal (or “pyramidal”) line. Indeed, Pélerin made no effort to maintain the illusion of a vanishing point in the rear of the picture. His form of perspective image thus did not record the objective world but instead reproduced it through a specific method of construction. Pragmatic applications mattered more for him that theoretical accuracy, as it did also for military engineers at the time. Pragmatism always competed with general principle in applied mathematics and fortifications design. Writers and practitioners wrestled with this problem and came up with varying solutions. Some emphasized geometric rigor; others went into construction techniques and the qualities of materials; while still others stressed military tactics. One of the earliest printed manuals on military engineering, Battista della Valle’s Libro continente appertinente ad Capitanii, married interest in the bastioned trace and urban planning with explosives and a multitude of other topics ranging from uniforms and signaling systems to the psychology of soldiers. He also discusses how to attack a fortified place, touching on the deployment of artillery, digging trench works, and even describing the various kinds of gabions that can be used in different situations. The apparent crudeness and simplicity of the woodcuts belie their value in explaining the function of various offensive and defensive operations. First published in Naples in 1521, this treatise went through eleven editions in thirty-seven years, including a French translation in 1526. Della Valle served the dukes of Urbino, as did a number of other Italian military engineers who later served in France. Another early printed work in fortification design was Albrecht Dürer’s Etliche underrict zu befestigung der Stett/Schloss/und Flecken, which appeared in Nuremberg in 1527. Dürer promoted large-scale urban fortifications as a way to employ a city’s poor. He also discussed the methods of building bastions and the king’s citadel, going into the relationship between site selection and design features for not only a city’s military defenses but also the location of various craft industries and activities as well as civic buildings and places, all predicated on reinforcing the ruler’s authority. His book also offered an illustration using a panoramic bird’seye view of a besieged city.116 Finally, Vannoccio Biringuccio’s Pirotechnia offered expert descriptions, accompanied by excellent illustrations of the latest techniques involved in mining, metallurgy, and gun founding. His work helped to disseminate new knowledge that reflected the rapidly improved production and performance of gunpowder weaponry during the mid-sixteenth century.117

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Among these early publications, the most important work affecting fortification design in the sixteenth century was Nicolò Tartaglia’s La nova scientia, published in 1539. Tartaglia bridged the craft and university worlds. He worked in foundries in his hometown of Brescia and taught himself advanced mathematics. His exploration of the practical mathematics of gunnery and Aristotelian physics significantly advanced understanding of ballistics, which, in turn, prompted a rethinking of the Euclidean foundations of fortification design.118 The Nova scientia is divided into five books, only three of which Tartaglia ever published. His analysis of parabolic flight and the uniform movement of all projectiles forced designers to recalculate the contours of the outworks and talus using rules of perspective to establish proper lines of sight. The need to calculate distances and terrains properly to ensure a shot’s accuracy established a connection with cartography and surveying, which Tartaglia discussed here and in later publications. In 1543, he edited a Latin compilation of works by Archimedes on mechanics and hydrostatics.119 He published the first vernacular edition of Euclid’s Elements specially annotated for artisans and engineers, no matter how mediocre. Finally, his La gionta del sesto libro di quesiti, et inventioni diverse in 1554 discussed a wide range of topics related to siege warfare, boasting—much as Vauban would in the next century—that with this knowledge a commander could take any city no matter how supposedly impregnable. More scientific and mathematically based methods of siege warfare soon ensued in the wake of Tartaglia’s publications.120 His influence was most readily visible in the works of the Novarese engineer Girolamo Cataneo—Dell’Arte Militare, published in 1559, and Opera nuova di fortificare, published in 1564, which appeared in French ten years later. It discussed the geometrical principles of fortification design, surveying techniques for the proper construction of a bastion, and tactical considerations from both the defensive and offensive viewpoints. The effective military engineer had to know how to formulate objectives, evaluate constraints, weigh alternatives, and come up with the best solutions to problems as they arose. Cataneo thus still strove to strike a balance between general theory and actual practice. Another early work inspired by Tartaglia, but of negligible influence, was Giovan Battista Belluci’s Nuova invenzione di fabricar fortezze, written around 1550 but not published until 1598. The Italian military engineer Giacomo Lanteri, also from Brescia, worked on the practical implications of Tartaglia’s ideas.121 In his 1557 Due dialoghi . . . del modo di disegnare le piante delle fortezze secondo Euclide, he used the supple form of the dialogue to convey his lessons about warfare through the refined, genteel conversation among educated, well-bred gentlemen, which included Girolamo Cataneo. In the book, Lanteri wrestled with how to construct polygonal fortifications, tackling problems such as the optimal spacing and orientation of artillery platforms and the best ways to use surveying instruments. Lanteri proclaimed that Euclid held the answer to every fortification design problem. He recommended in particular the use of models as test devices.122 Lanteri’s practical bent came through two years later in another work touting the advantages of earthen ramparts—a practice long since perfected in Northern France and the Low Countries.123 He also addressed how to organize a workplace, site logistics and materials, and complex devices, such as pumps and levers. His work became a useful handbook for novice military engineers and also acquainted noble readers and rulers with practical aspects of constructing bastioned fortifications.

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A third important Italian military engineer who wrote on the subject in the 1550s was Giovan Battista de’ Zanchi from Pesaro. His Del modo di forticar le città, published in 1554, dealt exclusively with bastioned defenses.124 Zanchi discussed site considerations when evaluating different design schemas articulating the enceinte’s edge. Like other practitioners, he stressed empirical experience over rigid formulaic theory. Tartaglia’s ideas came to France via Zanchi’s work with the publication in 1556 in Lyon of Jean de La Treille’s French translation entitled La manière de fortifier villes, chasteux et autres lieux forts. Over the next fifty years, a distinctive school of French fortification design developed, inspired by these and other Italian works, which culminated in the innovations of Jean Errard and Claude Flamand in the 1590s. Advances beyond Pélerin’s methods of rendering perspective came from the influence of Italian painters brought to France in the 1530s to work on Fontainebleau. They include Rosso Fiorentino, Francesco Primaticcio, and Giacomo Barrozi da Vignola, all proficient in perspective whose work can still be seen today in the palace. Most important, however, was Sebastiano Serlio, whose books on architecture became so popular in France that he became François I’s chief architect in the early 1540s. Serlio devised another easily accessible technique to render perspective for stage scenery. He provided particularly good guidance for properly using a compass to delineate curved lines in ovoid spaces.125 And he wrote a manual on fortification design, though it did not circulate widely.126 Subsequent draftsmen in France, such as Philibert de l’Orme and Jacques Androuet du Cerceau, expanded further upon Pélerin’s approach. Androuet du Cerceau’s Leçons de perspective positive, published in 1576, complemented his earlier collection on architecture and the building trades, Excellents bâtiments de France. In it, he presents sixty lessons in a do-it-yourself format, complete with easy-to-follow illustrations to guide the student or builder.127 Du Cerceau purposely omits mention of Euclidean geometry in his primer, as he strove for readers to master applied technique rather than bookish knowledge. By contrast, the use of more advanced perspective geometry comes through in the work—both built and written—of Philibert de L’Orme. A close look at the trompe that L’Orme built at the château of Anet between 1549 and 1551 featured in his Premier tome de l’architecture sixteen years later, reveals the ongoing innovations possible in the craft tradition.128 As the name suggests, a trompe aimed to appear to flout the laws of gravity. The techniques featured by L’Orme grew out of the stonecutting traditions of the masons; his father, in fact, was a master mason.129 In the introduction to the Premier tome, L’Orme insists on the importance for both architects and masons to know geometry. Indeed, no built work can begin without the fundamental—and foundational— act of squaring up. The difference now was the increasing appearance of this craft knowledge in print and in connection with discussions of advanced mathematics that eventually led to the breakthroughs of algebraic geometry and the calculus in the next century. Works devoted to mathematical theory also contained practical information for builders and merchants. The first such book printed in French was Larismetique by Étienne de La Roche, published in Lyon in 1520. From Villefranche, La Roche studied under Nicolas Chuquet, known for his work in algebraic notation, and taught commercial mathematics for twenty-five years in Lyon. Lyon offered a wellestablished book market that introduced mathematical work by Italians to a French audience.130 Larismetique was essentially a pastiche of basic algebra drawn from

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Chuquet, Luca Pacioli, and a Lyonnais banker named Philippe Frescobaldi.131 It included solutions using algebra for problems familiar to merchants and builders, such as calculating volumes. True advances in geometry only came in 1542 when Charles de Bouelles published his work in practical geometry.132 Reprinted four times in the next twenty years, this work aimed to teach its readers the rudiments of Euclidean geometry, covering general principles, angular figures, squaring the circle, dimensions of solids, and the cubic volume of the sphere. The renowned cartographer Oronce Finé provided the book’s many woodcuts, visually illustrating principles logically notated in the text.133 Bouelles provided a much more powerful combination of advanced projective geometry focused on a variety of practical problems. Another important figure in advancing mathematical knowledge in France was Jacques Peletier. He wrote a primer on arithmetic in 1549, a short introduction to algebra in 1554, and later translated several of Finé’s Latin manuals on practical geometry. In 1573, he composed his own work on geometry, De l’usage de géometrie, explicitly aimed at practitioners. After a brief résumé of basic Euclidean theorems, Peletier provides several dozen examples of practical applications for surveyors, such as measuring a building, a plot of land, or a mountain.134 He also pointed out flaws in some of Euclid’s original proofs. Another major theorist of perspective in sixteenth-century France was the artist Jean Cousin. Cousin also bridged the craft world of applied mathematics and the learned culture of court. What Cousin’s treatise lacked in originality was made up for in clarity of expression and practicality of application.135 In his 1560 Livre de perspective, he achieved complex results using fairly simple means long used by craftsmen. The Netherlands also boasted of its own experts, who wrote in French or had their works translated into French. The most noteworthy was the Flemish fortification expert Simon Stevin, whose French editions of treatises on arithmetic and algebra appeared in Leiden in 1585.136 His work on perspective looks at a number of innovations such as the case of calculating the perspective for making a drawing on a canvas that is not perpendicular to the ground, and the case of inverse perspective. A substantial body of printed works on practical mathematics, surveying, and fortification design thus existed in France before 1560. Much of this material was Italian in origin or inspiration, though over time French expertise in these various fields began to emerge. Together, they offered a variety of techniques, some old and some new, to solve practical problems.137 Writers often trained in universities approached these problems from a more theoretical perspective, while others, frequently artisans steeped in traditional building techniques, published manuals and treatises on applied mathematics. Both of these groups together defined the parameters of the emerging professions of “architect” and “engineer.” Italian innovations on built forms and enduring craft traditions of building practice also became evident in the actual bastioned fortifications constructed in sixteenth-century France. While artist-engineers designed, it was still masons and carpenters who dominated most phases of design execution into the seventeenth century.138 Since 1500, an embryonic royal fortification service took shape in the Administration of Royal Buildings (bâtiments royaux) to oversee a growing number of urban projects that by the 1530s included large-scale fortifications financed by the crown. The crown used provincial governors and their lieutenants to oversee these efforts and created in 1515 comptrollers (contrôlleurs) in most major towns to ensure money was properly spent. In the 1520s, there came new general taxes

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for fortifications and garrisons in the frontier regions of Picardy, Champagne, and Provence. In 1532, the crown tapped half the local excise taxes, lamely referred to as loans, earmarked for town walls in the Ile-de-France, Normandy, and the Loire valley for these projects. Many towns refused to comply with the decision to export their revenues to other locales. Two years later, François I renewed this order, demanding this time that all these funds be sent immediately to Paris for eventual disbursement later. He also committed all proceeds from the droits féodaux for the next six years to defray the costs of fortification construction in towns along the frontier. To ensure further oversight of work sites, long the purview of masons who served as masters-of-work, the crown appointed business administrators (intendants des bâtiments royaux) and then in 1536 the office of the Surintendant, first held by Philibert de la Bourdaisière, the king’s chief finance minister. In 1537, François I inspected walled towns across Languedoc and Provence, while he ordered the Italian military engineer Antonio Castello to do the same in Picardy. Some historians, in fact, attribute the success of the Valois in capturing and fortifying so many places after 1530 to their superior administrative and financial organization.139 Another reason for taking a geographic approach lay in the fact that regional administrative responsibility for fortifications was in the mid-sixteenth century divided among the four royal secretaries of state who, together with the provincial governors, initiated inspections, reviewed reports, and saw through to completion repairs and construction.140 Parallel efforts to organize the royal artillery service got underway during François I’s reign as well.141 The hardening of France’s frontiers under the Valois impeded traditional networks of commercial exchange along rivers and disrupted industries, particularly textiles. Rising fiscal demands on the bonnes villes bred resistance and resentment as towns found the king loath to confirm, let alone expand, municipal privileges in exchange for cash. Meeting these obligations led urban oligarchs, eager to preserve their own tax-exemptions, to pass these new burdens onto groups lower down the pecking order or villages and secondary towns in the region. Social antagonisms rose correspondingly and the nature of royal rule changed with time.142 La Rochelle presented a case in point as François I revamped a narrowed municipal council to do his bidding while ordering walled towns in the Aunis to bolster coastal defenses and pick up half the cost of La Rochelle’s new fortifications.143 The Rochelais rebelled in 1542 over an increase in the salt tax (gabelle); he reluctantly eased the tax and pardoned them the next year as they, in turn, promised never again to defy royal authority.144 Much the same occurred on a larger scale in 1548 when higher salt taxes ignited unrest up and down the greater Loire valley and in the salt-producing areas along the coast.145 Valois’ pragmatism thus usually trumped obstinate assertions of royal prerogatives if local resistance became too strong. And stronger it certainly became, not only in La Rochelle but across the kingdom, as a result of the spread of Calvinism during the 1540s. While the 1559 Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis saw Henri II and Philip II trade nearly two hundred fortified places with each other in an effort to better clarify the contested frontier regions between them, the kingdom’s interior remained as highly militarized as it was during the Middle Ages. Most towns still possessed formidable if antiquated walls, motivated militias, and arsenals brimming with firearms, cannons, gunpowder, and shot. The monarchy’s capacity to wage war had always been a function

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of the readiness of nobles and towns to fight for it. Now this capacity to make war was turned on the kingdom when Henri II suddenly died on July 10, 1559. France quickly fell prey to noble factionalism, urban unrest, and simmering confessional hostilities as none of the sons who succeeded him, nor his wife and queen Catherine de Médici, proved able to stop the kingdom’s descent into the maelstrom of violence known as the Wars of Religion.

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Ch apter 6

Walled Towns du ring the Wars of R eligion

A fter 1560, France experienced violence on a scale comparable to the horrors of

the Hundred Years’ War. Sieges framed these conflicts beginning with the 1562 massacre in a barricaded barn in Vassy and ending with La Rochelle’s dramatic fall in 1628. These struggles brought profound physical changes to towns and altered their relationship with the crown. While most sieges took place against Protestant strongholds, the consequences of urban insecurity in time touched all towns in France. The experience of urban warfare in France during the Wars of Religion unfolded in three main phases. The first period, from 1559 to 1598, encompassed first Calvinist and then Catholic resistance in towns until the conversion and triumph of Henri IV in the 1590s. The ensuing twenty-year interlude of peace saw the monarchy inaugurate a new set of relationships with the bonnes villes. Finally, in the early 1620s conflict with Huguenot towns resumed and only ended after a series of sieges that redefined relations between those towns and the crown. While the bonnes villes sought at first to refortify their walls, they faced with the eventual establishment of peace a monarchy committed to tearing them down.1 The rapidity of the urban response to rising insecurities after 1560, from rebuilding walls to expanding militias, reflected the continuing importance of towns in the making of war. As in the Hundred Years’ War, the need for self-defense also offered towns an occasion to realize a broader sense of community, subject to factions to be sure, but also capable of sustained bursts of public unity that transcended class and confession. The image of humble fishermen working side-by-side with great merchants in repairing and defending the walls of La Rochelle in 1628 offers a compelling, though hardly unique example. It is essential to realize that townspeople did not see these as conflicts with their king. The bonnes villes much preferred strong kings to weak ones, believing that their cherished liberties could only be secure if the monarchy was stable. Municipal fortifications, therefore, never represented an intentional defiance of the crown’s authority, but rather a localized expression of public governance connected ultimately to the king. The monarchy did not seek to subjugate towns through sieges in order to become “absolute”; indeed, the interests of urban elites still largely coincided with the monarchy as they had during the Middle Ages. Towns took complicated positions depending on a host of mainly local factors; indeed, most bonnes villes never actually resisted the king’s men during the Wars of Religion. The crown’s efforts to subdue Calvinist towns, such as La Rochelle and Nîmes, or Catholic Paris under the League relied upon the active, often quite enthusiastic support of nearby towns, Catholic and

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Calvinist. When resistance did become explicitly anti-royalist, it was shocking to most contemporaries.2 Arguments that Calvinist sympathies in southern France represented some sort of broader proto-nationalist identity overlook these complicated regional cleavages and dynamics.3 Urban factionalism in both Calvinist and Catholic towns revolved not only around confessional issues but also around the continuing cooption of urban elites into royal administration. The relentless narrowing of the urban notability across the bonnes villes of France from the late fifteenth through the seventeenth centuries, though open to the occasional inclusion of new families from commerce or even the rural nobility, created a virtual monopoly by these families over customary municipal posts and royal judicial and fiscal offices. Indeed, this control became institutionalized through the proliferating practice of venality. The shift in towns from regimes based on customary liberties to legal ones predicated on the royal prerogative thus elicited complex reactions from urban notables ranging from resistance to complicity.4 New fiscal relations offered added opportunities to intertwine local elite and royal interest through tax polices and credit. Until the 1620s, urban elites and the monarchy strove to perfect, not break, the traditional partnership that had tied them together for so long.5 The disintegration of royal authority after 1559, just as in the Hundred Years’ War, saw municipal officials once again assume more direct responsibility for security, self-governance, and religious affairs, which for some meant embracing Calvinism while for others it entailed a commitment to militant Catholicism. The crown was at first loath to move any gendarme companies stationed in citadels and fortified towns along the kingdom’s frontiers to the interior. Mobilizing such auxiliary forces for a field army constantly broke down due to insufficient funds and poor recruiting methods.6 As revenues to the royal treasury dwindled, so company captains failed to pay their men, who in turn seized their payments directly—and often brutally—from the local populace. Such direct plunder in lieu of payment prevailed during the Wars of Religion through the Thirty Years’ War until the royal administration finally organized a more effective system to pay and supply its troops.7 Proven warriors, such as Michel de Castelnau and François de la Noue, deplored the decidedly ignoble behavior of these “gens-pillent-hommes” and “gens-tuent-hommes.”8 Men of law called for the rule of law, compassion, and the values associated with urban living, not brute force. Such sentiments fueled criticism of aristocratic dueling, which challenged the king’s claimed monopoly on the use of violence.9 Measuring the impact of sectarian violence on French society is no easy task. Attempts to quantify the damage have relied on printed sources of dubious reliability, while local studies raise questions about typicality. Even so, most historians agree France suffered demographic and economic declines due to violence comparable to those experienced in the Hundred Years’ War.10 The burst of urban fortification construction after 1560 can still be seen today in the boulevards and large plazas that ring the older downtown districts of provincial towns such as Amiens, Bourges, Nîmes, and Montauban. The medieval curtain walls and towers typically found around most towns now received the more articulated edge of the bastioned trace. Towns in the kingdom’s interior suddenly in the 1560s began to devote attention to their defenses after a near century of neglect. Municipal officials in Bourges and the local provincial governor the marquis of La Châtre raised resources to expand the enceinte to include outlying faubourgs. Town fathers in Orléans eschewed the offer of lower taxes to raze the walls and

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instead agreed to higher levies to rebuild them.11 Some towns, such as Blois, had already converted sections along their periphery to leisure and commercial pursuits.12 Castles, too, underwent modernization where funding permitted. Just as in the Middle Ages, the duty of building and protecting a city’s walls fell on virtually everyone who lived within them and nearby outside. Repair and reconstruction also took place for many castles and villages originally fortified in the late Middle Ages.13 Fortified churches also again became common in areas such as the Thiérache, Lorraine, and Gascony.14 Despite factional infighting, most towns— Catholic and Calvinist—quickly managed to modernize their defenses under the direction of architect-engineers familiar with the new Italian fortification designs. War readiness also entailed stockpiling food to victual passing armies. The crown authorized towns to exercise new procurement powers to enhance the regulation of the local grain market and bread prices. Wholesale merchants, attracted by tax exemptions and financial guarantees, contracted through local officials with the crown to provide the vast quantities of grain, wine, and meat necessary to feed the king’s soldiers. Lack of administrative oversight, however, led to a great deal of fraud and mismanagement.15 In the absence of coin, company captains sometimes paid their men in loaves of bread.16 It is therefore all the more remarkable to note the occasions when the monarchy overcame such procurement challenges. The effects of supporting long sieges or large field armies strained regional logistical networks shaped by market relations, coercion, and bureaucratic fiat. Overall, the crown’s ability to sustain such operations improved over the course of the Wars of Religion.17 Towns also provided skilled and unskilled laborers who the crown mobilized to assist the army, particularly during a siege. The success or failure of such a complex operation often depended on the availability of pioneers to dig the trenches, build the artillery platforms, and handle the onerous manual tasks that soldiers found so distasteful. Conscription was often necessary in the absence of adequate pay. Inclement weather, lack of food, and the hazards of attacking a well-armed bastion with only a shovel often quickly diminished their numbers, as happened at La Rochelle in 1573.18 Municipal officials sometimes met the crown’s demands for work gangs, and rid the town of a nuisance, by using the burgeoning poor rolls. Skilled workers, such as carpenters, masons, and teamsters, also had to be forced to assist the king’s army lest they be imprisoned or lose their property. Contracts provided no guarantee of payment once operations ended, however. Finally, town furnished militia companies, often quite reluctantly, to aid the king’s army. Towns served as centers for the production and stockpiling of armaments. Most towns possessed well-stocked armories. At the outset of the wars, Bourges, for example, had hundreds of firearms, pikes, halberds, corselets, helmets, daggers, and swords, together with ample supplies of ammunition and powder.19 Most, if not all of these tools of war were produced locally. Even local religious houses became involved, especially in the manufacture of saltpeter. Intended for the local militia and garrison, these war materials could be sold or, as often occurred, requisitioned by the crown but often never paid for. Regional arms centers existed in Tours, Breteuil, Saint-Étienne, Forez and Lyon, together with foreign suppliers in Milan, Brescia, and Liège.20 The rapid emergence of a formidable Huguenot military machine, first seen at the Battle of Dreux in December 1562, reflects the prevailing level of militarization in French society.21 Another is the ubiquity of arms in the hands of the general

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populace, though determining precise numbers is difficult. Urban militias, though socially restrictive, clearly offered men of fairly substantial means the opportunity to learn how to handle a weapon and work together as a team, whether by simply guarding the city’s walls and gates, or marching out to meet the enemy. Just how well trained they were remains open to question, as some militia company statutes had to explain the dangers of pointing loaded weapons at each other’s heads. Hefty fines and repeated warnings apparently did not dissuade members from pilfering weapons and shot from company stores. Meant to maintain order, urban militias occasionally contributed to the mayhem as, for example, in the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacres in Paris and provincial towns.22 Weapons lay close at hand for more humble members of society. University students had upon matriculation to register not only their names and places of birth, but also any arms they carried. Rowdy street gangs of young men, some brandishing firearms, became such a public menace that some towns established curfews and mounted armed patrols. Local inns required guests to register their weapons with municipal officials or face expulsion from the city. Even peasants, often seen as hapless victims, possessed weapons such as crossbows and spears. In the 1570s, peasants in Dauphiné formed an association known as “les Defenseurs de la Cause Commune” dedicated to repulse any soldier foolish enough to invade their area.23 Similar organizations existed in neighboring Provence as well as in other parts of France.24 Indeed, the various leagues and armed unions that swept across the country during the Wars of Religion endured into the next century with movements such as the Croquants and Nupieds.25

Confessional Politics and Conflict in the B ONNES VILLES For towns, the Wars of Religion occurred as much as conflicts within urban communities as between them. No bonne ville, not even the putative bastions of Calvinism or the Catholic League, ever became a confessional monolith during the Wars of Religion. The religious culture of urban France remained remarkably heterogeneous; while confessional politics in the towns often sought to align municipal and ecclesiastical institutions, they rarely attempted to realize internal uniformity through force. La Rochelle, for example, tolerated and at times persecuted its sizeable Catholic minority, just as Calvinists experienced much the same treatment in Catholic Orléans and Lyon. The advent of the Reformation had divisive consequences in towns as factions within them vied through political maneuvering and outright violence for control. These conflicts quickly assumed broader regional and countrywide dimensions through the networks of alliance and influence that permeated the kingdom. The cases of La Rochelle and Nîmes are instructive. In the early 1560s, conflicts within La Rochelle brought about royal intervention with the installation of a garrison of some twelve hundred soldiers, a threat to raze the enceinte, and a move by the crown to seize municipal revenues to build a citadel. In Nîmes, sectarian disputes revolved around the intrusions by the Parlement of Toulouse in municipal affairs, especially the establishment of a Présidial court in the 1550s.26 Tensions finally exploded in the 1567 Michelade massacre set off by the crown’s decision, at the behest of local Catholics, to lodge soldiers in Huguenot households.27 The course of the religious wars and the fragile interludes of peace between them revolved in large part around the control of walled towns (see Map 6.1). Local

Map 6.1

Wars of Religion, 1561–1629.

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studies reveal underlying patterns, such as the social appeal of Calvinism among artisans and certain kinds of merchants, as well as the close rapport between noble leaders and members of the clergy. At the same time, they also show that each place experienced the Reformation in its own way. In the first War of Religion from April 1562 to March 1563, the Huguenots initially enjoyed spectacular successes by seizing important bonnes villes in the greater Loire valley and Berry, such as Orléans, Blois, Tours, Angers, Le Mans, and Bourges, while Nantes managed to fend off a Huguenot attack.28 Sectarian strife swept across Champagne, Burgundy, Provence, and Dauphiné to the south and Normandy and Picardy to the north.29 Closer to Paris the town of Meaux was sacked by Huguenot raiders. In Normandy, by far the kingdom’s richest province, Louis, prince of Condé and local sympathizers seized Rouen and a number of other important strongholds. Amiens, the single most important walled town facing Spanish Flanders, seemed for a while poised to embrace Calvinism. Huguenot unrest in the southwest from the Midi to the Pyrenees grew out of the long Aquitanian traditions of urban revolt dating back to the Albigensian Crusades.30 Parthenay suffered extensive damage when Huguenots set fire to the town in 1562, as did a number of original bastides. The appeal of Calvinism became strong in small towns such as Condom or major cities such as Bordeaux, and spread quickly across whole regions, particularly in Armagnac and the Landes. Religious rioting shook Toulouse and Sisteron in 1562, provoking intense Catholic responses.31 Marseille, too, was wracked by divisions.32 In Lyon, the appeal of Calvinism inflamed local labor divisions and catapulted the Huguenots into control for a brief time. By late summer, Huguenots led by Condé, seemed poised to take over significant portions of the kingdom. However, the eventual royal and broader Catholic reaction to these early Calvinist successes gave a foretaste of the long confessional struggles ahead. Huguenot iconoclasts ransacked Catholic worship sites in many towns despite disapproval by local Calvinist authorities. Like the king, Condé encountered resistance where he tried to raise funds in captured towns, such as Orléans, to pay his soldiers. Catholic hegemony was established in Tours by judicial fiat.33 After some initial hesitation, La Rochelle opted to embrace Condé’s party when the crown tried to install a royal garrison in the town. In response, the crown ordered Monluc to raise an army to subdue La Rochelle, and even called on cities such as Bordeaux, Nantes, and Toulouse to lend him men and material. The response was desultory at best, as Monluc’s siege soon failed. Some of the greatest violence attended the Huguenot seizure of Rouen in April 1562. In early October, a royal army of over thirty thousand men besieged Rouen and took it in an assault on October 19 that resulted in the city’s sack and the death of some one thousand residents as well as a leading prince of the blood, Antoine de Bourbon.34 The crown then ordered the destruction of the fort on Mont Ste. Catherine. Royal forces also retook Bourges, while the duke of Guise besieged Orléans. Meanwhile, in Gascony, Monluc waged a brutal campaign of massacres and summary executions against the Huguenots; such decisive action, he claims, saved Bordeaux and Toulouse, “these two strong bastions that allow us to hold the region,” from the peril of heresy.35 The Huguenots also briefly seized the new port of Le Havre, even welcoming in an English garrison of three thousand men. Nevertheless, a hard fought siege by Montmorency retook the town in July 1563; in gratitude for the Catholic victory, the port town’s name was changed to Havre-de-Grâce. A plan of fortifications and siege lines shows an enceinte with four bastions and four new artillery platforms,

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against which royal forces reportedly deployed sixty cannons.36 The new trace italienne fortifications thus affected the course of the first War of Religion and only increased in importance as the conflicts endured into the next century. After hostilities came to a fleeting close in the Edict of Amboise in March 1563, the crown quickly moved in a series of edicts to assert its control over the bonnes villes and their walls. In the Edict of Amboise, it sought to regulate religious practice in terms of their proximity to towns and their suburbs. Later in October, Charles IX ordered the demolition of fortifications in towns, paid for locally, not along the frontier in order to secure the realm after the recent troubles. No surprise that this unfunded mandate from Paris resulted in few demolitions. If towns sometimes balked at raising money to rebuild their walls, they positively refused to do so to tear them down. In 1564, the king invoked his right in the Edict of Crémieu to appoint mayors, aldermen, and consuls in towns as he visited them during his upcoming grand tour.37 Resentment remained muted at first though most towns eventually regained control over municipal elections as the crown’s sway continued to disintegrate. Ceremony often conveyed this message as well. For example, prior to Charles IX’s visit to La Rochelle in September 1565, Montmorency removed all artillery from the walls that thus prevented its customary salvos to greet the king, who then refused to confirm, as was customary, the town’s privileges as a condition for entry. Instead, Montmorency simply cut the blue ribbon tied across the gate that “barred” the king’s entry, saying such customs were now obsolete. The message was clear: be silent and obey the king.38 An even more explicit bid for permanent control of town walls came in the 1565 Edict of Moulins when Charles IX ordered annual inspections of all frontier fortifications by teams of royal military engineers under the supervision of provincial governors and their lieutenants. The edict aimed to establish greater central oversight by requiring the annual submission of reports and accounts for fortification projects to the Chambre des Comptes in Paris.39 Periodic inspections by royal military engineers sought to validate the work thus reported. A ruling in 1567 gave municipal officials the task to watch the royal military engineers for any abuses, such as graft or lax duty.40 A makeshift system of accountability and checks-and-balances thus began to evolve in the emerging royal fortification service in the aftermath of the first religious war. The monarchy’s brief flirtation with a policy of toleration ended in September 1567 with the renewal of sectarian warfare. Calvinists seized Orléans in late September together with other strategic towns. The Huguenot capture of Chartres in 1568 resulted in a long, brutal siege before the crown finally regained control. In the Battle of Saint-Denis in November, where the constable Montmorency was mortally wounded, superior Catholic forces drove Condé’s Huguenot cavalry away from Paris. Yet this victory only enhanced the prestige of Catholic militants led by the Guises. In response, Catherine de Médici convinced her son to concede even more fortified towns and privileges to worship to the Huguenot party in the Peace of Longjumeau the following March, which in turn only emboldened its leaders to seek to secure fortified towns across the lower Seine and the Saintonge in the ensuing third War of Religion. After Condé died at the Battle of Jarnac in March 1569, the mantle of leadership passed on to Gaspard de Coligny. His partisans planned to seize Nantes in 1569 but apparently lost nerve thinking the town’s defenses too formidable.41 They also attempted to surprise Bourges, but likewise failed. The Huguenots did, however, capture Saint-Jean-d’Angély, whose municipal council had reformist sympathizers;

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they used rubble from the churches they demolished to strengthen its enceinte. Control of this key town opened the way to extend their position in the Limousin, especially after Coligny’s victory at the Battle of La Roche d’Abeille in June 1569.42 Coligny besieged Poitiers, which occasioned virulent Catholic attacks on the admiral as the polemical war of words also escalated.43 To the south in the Pyrenees, Huguenot forces also lay siege to Navarrenx. Only the Catholic victory at the Battle of Moncontour in October stemmed the Huguenot tide as royal forces went on to recapture Niort, Fontenay-le-Comte, Saint-Maixent, and Saint-Jean-d’Angély in the greater Saintonge.44 Refugees poured into La Rochelle, which further radicalized this bastion of the Reformed religion in France. As the 1560s came to close, and after three religious wars, the longtime rule of war that control of territory hinged on controlling walled towns never seemed truer. The use of fortified towns as the currency of power in the Wars of Religion became abundantly evident in the Peace of St. Germain in August 1570, which for the first time identified four “safe towns” (places de sûreté) for Huguenots, namely, La Rochelle, Montauban, Cognac, and La Charité. Other towns, including the capital Paris, became designated as exclusively Catholic towns. The renewal of war after the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacres in 1572, overwhelmingly urban in nature, saw the struggle turn even more on sieges of walled towns.45 The crown targeted the major urban centers of Huguenot resistance, such as La Rochelle, Montauban, and Sancerre. Its leadership decimated and its membership demoralized, Reformed congregations relied as a result even more on the walls of their towns for survival.

Fortifications and Sieges after the St. Bartholomew’s Massacres Since the outbreak of war in 1562, both sides had worked frantically, though not always successfully, to strengthen the defenses of walled towns in their control or to mount operations by force or stealth to capture an opponent’s fortified places. Improvements to municipal defenses, while desired by most towns, yielded mixed results due to the lack of money, insufficient direction, or contradictory signals from leaders, including the king. Towns relied on special levies, forced loans, property seizures, and other expedients to underwrite the costs of these new defensive works. Some towns, such as La Rochelle and Amiens, added significant bastioned features to their enceintes; others such as Rouen proposed construction projects that, for a variety of reasons, never got built. In Nantes, in 1571, Charles IX ordered new fortifications around the faubourg Saint-Similien, while the town council preferred to demolish that suburb and instead devote scarce resources to enclosing the La Fosse neighborhood. This difference of opinion meant any overhaul of Nantes’ fortifications languished, for when hostilities in the lower Loire finally ended in 1598 only two bastions were near completion. The most dramatic changes to urban defenses occurred in Huguenot strongholds, beginning with La Rochelle, the anchor for the Reformed faith in the west and chief link to England across the Channel. The revamping of its defenses, mainly the citadel, was already underway in Henri II’s reign. Like many towns, La Rochelle’s defenses folded the new bastioned trace into older medieval elements as seen in contemporary views.46 The Porte de Cougnes, the main gate into the city, for example, dated back to the late twelfth century and integrated part of the older

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Cluniac priory of Notre-Dame de Cougnes with the Tour d’Aix covering its flank. It was rebuilt in 1411 with a reinforced portal and two new protective towers; in 1472–1474, a fronting brick bastion was added. Further repairs to the wall joining the priory and the Tour d’Aix took place over the next thirty years. Finally, on the eve of the religious wars in 1558, municipal officials ordered a much larger earthen bastion boulevard built on the priory’s cemetery, which had to be relocated. The 1562 siege exposed serious weaknesses in La Rochelle’s defenses, which a newly installed Calvinist municipal council addressed in earnest in 1568. It commandeered royal revenues, extracted forced loans from local Catholics, and conscripted labor from nearby villages to raze the faubourgs, rip up Catholic cemeteries, and demolish Catholic churches and chapels, using the rubble for new bastioned outworks and ramparts. This work continued intermittently over the next five years. These improvements to La Rochelle’s fortifications reinforced the existing thirteenth-century curtain walls in places and added new bastioned features, especially on its vulnerable approaches to the north and east. Forced loans also raised money for a Huguenot navy that later proved crucial in protecting La Rochelle’s access to the sea. New-style Italian fortification features began to be introduced more systematically after La Rochelle hired the Friulian engineer, Scipio Vergano, in 1569. Four years later, ironically, the crown paid Vergano to direct siege operations against the Calvinist stronghold. By that time, La Rochelle had replaced him with Robert Chinon, an engineer who had overseen several projects for Henri d’Albret, king of Navarre and governor of Guyenne in the early 1550s. In October 1572, Robert Chinon designed and oversaw the building of a counter-escarpment in front of the fortified gate. Vergano oversaw initial construction on a massive bastion called the Boulevard Neuf or des Dames to guard approaches to the Porte Maubec on the eastern, landward perimeter of the city. In 1570, Jeanne d’Albret, queen of Navarre, Henri I, prince of Condé, and Gaspard de Coligny urged city officials to continue work on the enceinte with the addition of the Bastion du Gabut (or des Vases) that flanked the Tour Saint-Nicolas guarding the mouth to the harbor. Funerary stones from the Church of St. Sauveur apparently adorned its seaward façade. In fact, four parish churches were razed along with another four ecclesiastical buildings just outside the walls; the belfry of the priory church became converted into an artillery platform, with casemates eventually constructed behind the altar. An orillon was then built across the drawbridge to protect it from flanking fire, which contained decorative stones from the demolished priory and the royal coat-of-arms, along with the suddenly ironic inscription Le bon Roy entretiendra son people en paix (see figure 6.1). The 1573 siege of La Rochelle lasted from January to June 1573. The inability of the crown to take the place reflected the hard limits of royal power when it came to siege warfare. First was the insufficiency of the royal army led by Henri, duke of Anjou and the future Henri III, who arrived with his entourage, which included Henri de Navarre and Condé, both recent converts to Catholicism. The royal besieging force numbered only twelve thousand men, not the forty thousand promised by his brother Charles IX. Anjou had to draw pioneers, though never enough of them, from as far away as Normandy and Berry, while the powder and artillery he assembled came from armories in Picardy and Burgundy. The French navy, such as it was, failed to cut off La Rochelle by the sea, which meant the town’s provisions would never run short. By contrast, La Rochelle possessed daunting fortifications that bristled with nearly two hundred cannon and were manned by a

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Figure 6.1 Fortifications of La Rochelle, 1573. By permission of the Bibliothèque Nationale (B.N. 87C 131083).

large, well-motivated militia and English contingents, all ably led by the celebrated warrior François de la Noue. Horrible weather eroded the morale and ranks of the besiegers, while time became an ally of the besieged. The closest the Catholics came to capturing the city was on April 4 when they opened a breach in the Bastion de l’Évangile. However, the Huguenots quickly filled it with bales of wool, bolts of cloth, beds, barrels, and sacks of dirt. With that, the monarchy’s moment for victory passed.

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Technical experts assisted Anjou during the siege. Besides Scipio Vergano, other Italian engineers included Paolo Emilio Fieschi and Greghetto Guistiniani, both from Genoa, and Agostino Ramelli. They prepared sketches of La Rochelle’s defenses, helped properly deploy artillery and plan approach trenches, and lay mines under walls and bastions. The French military engineer Ambroise Bachot was also apparently present during the siege, though in what capacity is uncertain. The impact of these experts on siege operations appears negligible. Indeed, the inadvertent early explosion of a mine set by Ramelli, which killed nearly two hundred men, suggests the limits of their expertise. At this moment, defenses informed by the latest engineering acumen held a distinct advantage over similarly informed modes of attack, as they would until well into the next century. Propaganda also played a role, albeit a minor one, in the siege. A short anonymous pamphlet, Discours et recueil du siege, covered the highlights of the siege from a royalist point of view.47 It justified the operation as a punishment against seditious heretics and said La Rochelle would have surrendered if the “foreigners” inside did not hold the town in thrall. Finally, it appealed to all gentilshommes to risk their lives and wealth for the king. However, royal publicists found no real incentive to publicize the many difficulties and diminishing chances for success experienced by Anjou’s besieging force. When the siege finally ended, there were some thirteen hundred estimated dead in La Rochelle and up to six thousand casualties in the royal army. In the July 11 accord, the crown confirmed all of La Rochelle’s privileges into perpetuity and pardoned its inhabitants. The stout resistance of one walled town thus doomed the monarchy’s hopes of reclaiming control of its entire kingdom. Despite its successful resistance, La Rochelle quickly fell prey again to intense factional rivalry. Like many bonnes villes, La Rochelle was dominated by a narrow oligarchy bounded together by ties of family, business, and faith. Yet when dealing with outside powers, the Rochellais—Catholic, Calvinist, or foreign residents alike—usually closed ranks quickly. In the Treaty of Beaulieu, concluded on May 6, 1576, to end the fifth War of Religion, the new king Henri III again confirmed all of La Rochelle’s privileges and pledged that the town would never be subject to a royal governor ever again. Town fathers also imposed all kinds of conditions on visits by Huguenot lords, such as Henri de Navarre, newly returned to Calvinism. Condé’s request in 1577 to La Rochelle for support beyond the town’s immediate needs required substantial concessions. La Rochelle’s interests remained above all quite local as seen in its involvement in the 1587 War of the Three Henris. Its main interest was to close the port of Brouage, a nearby competitor for maritime commerce, where in 1586 it sank twenty ships loaded with stone in the main harbor channel, an act that foreshadowed the great sea dike constructed by the crown in 1628 during the final siege of La Rochelle. After the 1573 siege, the Rochelais quickly set about rebuilding the Bastion de l’Évangile, which had borne the brunt of the attack, reinforcing it with a masonryfaced counterscarp. A ravelin named after La Noue was built in front of the Boulevard de l’Épître. The work that received the most attention and funding was reinforcing the Porte de Cougne on the northeastern corner of the city. Besides its inherent vulnerability, this gate also held symbolic importance, since it opened on the road that eventually led to Paris and through which royal officials and occasionally the king made their ceremonial entries. Finally, they also authorized the construction

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of the Fort de Saint-Nicolas. These projects continued for the next half-century and were only finally completed as civil conflicts reignited in the 1620s. The fortifications of Montauban, a major Huguenot stronghold located in the heart of Languedoc, also underwent dramatic change during the early Wars of Religion that dissuaded the crown from besieging it after the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre.48 Since the 1562 siege by Blaise de Monluc, Montauban had committed huge resources to enhancing its security. While ambitious plans for upgrading Montauban’s defenses went back to the early 1540s, much of the work remained incomplete twenty years later, as, for example, the brick bastion at the Porte de Campagnes begun in 1541. Also needing completion were the bastions at Porte Moustier, while a 1555 inspection revealed a large section of the wall near the bridge across the Tarn had fallen down. The city was thus open to easy capture by any determined enemy. Work on Montauban’s defenses only resumed in earnest when the Calvinists came to power in 1557.49 Among the municipal council’s first actions, as occurred in La Rochelle and other Huguenot towns, was the move to convert the Jacobin church into an artillery platform to guard approaches across the Tarn. It also had a defensive trench dug around the faubourg located across the Tarn.50 Bastioned outworks also went up around the town’s other gates, thus extending the enceinte beyond the original medieval core. Although unfinished, the town’s defenses held off Monluc’s siege in 1562 long enough to reach a deal with the crown, but only after municipal officials had agreed to demolish the enceinte. Three years later when Charles IX visited Montauban during his grand tour, the walls and new outworks remained standing. Work on them began anew in 1568 and continued into the late 1580s, giving Montauban in the end among the most modern defenses in all of France. As occurred elsewhere, elements of the new-style Italian trace became added to reinforce the existing enceinte’s most vulnerable spots, resulting in an uneven but overall considerable expansion of the town’s militarized periphery. Three new bastions went up across the Tarn in the 1580s around the newly named suburb of Villebourbon, after Henri de Navarre who helped pay for them.51 These were earthen works, much less expensive than brick-faced ones but still effective. A gateway across the fronting ditch was protected by a half-moon. Work also began on fortifications planned for the suburbs around the rest of Montauban with the addition of horn-works and ravelins.52 While certainly inspired by Italian design concepts, Montauban’s fortifications departed from them in many important, pragmatic aspects. For example, the angles of its bastions were sometimes obtuse, sometimes acute. This irregularity contrasts with the noted preference given to right-angles by the Italians. In fact, the ratio of bastion to curtain resembled ideas of engineers who had worked under the Alsatian military engineer and architect Daniel Specklin, whose work in Strasbourg was possibly familiar to some Calvinist refugees in Montauban.53 As a result of all this work, while occasionally menaced after 1562, Montauban was not again besieged until 1621 during the final phase of the Wars of Religion. These massive investments in self-defense thus bought its residents nearly sixty years of security. The monarchy’s limited ability to prosecute a successful siege can be seen in the difficulties it encountered and finally overcame in the case of Sancerre, a small hilltop town on the upper Loire near Nevers. A hasty siege in 1568 saw three local royal governors, François, count of Entragues, and François de Balzac, marquis

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of Orléans, and La Châtre of Bourges, assemble their garrisons to march against Sancerre. They failed. The better known siege of 1572–1573 took place against the background of the St. Bartholomew Day massacres as refugees from Orléans and Bourges flooded into Sancerre. Perched high on a peak overlooking the Loire, Sancerre was ringed by walls measuring only a half mile in circumference pierced by four gates, the Porte-Vieille, the Porte-Feuhard, the Porte Saint-André, and the Porte-Oison. Twenty-three towers attached to private residences within the walls further enhanced the town’s defenses in case of a breach. Its total population, including refugees, was around three thousand. It was by comparison with most bonnes villes a decidedly small town. What was most famous about the siege was the textual account it yielded by the Calvinist pastor Jean de Léry.54 In late 1572, shortly before La Châtre arrived with army, a Catholic faction inside Sancerre tried to seize a fortified tower located on the eastern edge of the town facing the river. Had they succeeded, the ensuing siege would likely have been much shorter. Resistance in Sancerre was bi-confessional, as Catholics who had not fled joined ranks with Huguenots to fight the king’s troops. André Johanneau, a lawyer, served as governor of the town, a post he had held since the outbreak of the troubles more than a decade before. He thought that the crown would be too occupied with the siege of La Rochelle and its campaign in Languedoc to devote much attention and resources against Sancerre. As a result, food was not sufficiently stockpiled, surrounding villages remained standing to provide shelter for the besiegers, and reinforcement of the town’s fortifications proceeded laxly. Only in late December did town authorities show more alacrity in preparing for the impending conflict, requisitioning food from nearby villages. Military operations against Sancerre began in early January 1573 as La Châtre’s forces, some seven thousand strong, converged to take up positions. It was thus half the size of the army before La Rochelle for a place nearly seven times smaller. Those facts and the lack of preparation on the part of Sancerrois gave a decided but by no means guaranteed advantage to La Châtre. On January 13, La Châtre sent a herald to summon the town to surrender. Johanneau seized the unfortunate and had him put to death—a breach of military etiquette that La Châtre never forgave. In early February, La Châtre began to position his artillery in Saint- Satur at the base of the promontory atop which sat Sancerre. Local masons and carpenters, not Italian military engineers, provided technical expertise for both attackers and defenders. The artillery barrage from mid-February to early March softened up the town’s defenses but never breached them. La Châtre abandoned this approach in favor of starving Sancerre into submission because Anjou ordered him to send most of his cannons down the Loire and then on to La Rochelle. High rates of desertions, a common problem for besiegers, also plagued La Châtre.55 From March to June, royal forces cordoned off Sancerre, whose food supplies soon disappeared. As famine set in, news came on June 2 that Nîmes had sent a relief force of one hundred horses and one thousand arquebusiers to rescue Sancerre. In a bid to hold out longer, the defenders expelled the “useless mouths” along with desperate residents who hoped to escape starvation, but royal forces refused to let them pass through the lines. Their fate was a piteous one.56 By early August, conditions became so desperate inside Sancerre that the town’s leaders finally agreed to open surrender talks with La Châtre. La Châtre eventually offered them the same conditions accepted on July 11 by La Rochelle, Montauban, and Nîmes plus sixty thousand livres as compensation, which he later reduced

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to forty thousand. Amazingly in light of the recent famine conditions, the town raised these funds by selling one thousand barrels of its celebrated wine hidden away in municipal cellars. La Châtre had the leaders of the resistance, among them Léry, escorted away for their own safety to Blet. Johanneau, however, remained only to be assassinated on September 12, his body found in pit near the market hall. Catholic priests celebrated a Te Deum after a solemn procession to the Halle as La Châtre reestablished Catholic service in newly consecrated churches across town. Protestants worship became confined to private homes. La Châtre had the town’s gates burned, ditches filled in, and walls and towers knocked down. He also removed the town’s clock and bell, which dated to 1509, from the belfry and transported them to his château in Nançay as spoils of war. In these ways, La Châtre stripped Sancerre of its marks as a bonne ville. La Châtre finally returned to Bourges in late October after the king named Antoine de Bar, lord of Buranlure, as the new governor of Sancerre. It was a hard fought royal victory, the last major one for the Valois dynasty before its collapse in 1589. The 1573 Edict of Boulogne recognized the results of the crown’s inability to take Huguenot strongholds, with the exception of Sancerre, by granting the rejuvenated members of the Reformed movement eight places de seurété. Synods raise money and men in a system akin to the emerging royal one that tried to distribute war costs as broadly as possible. Within a year, war broke out again, only this time the Huguenots took the offensive in Normandy and Champagne. Long sieges, such as the fifteen-month ordeal at Ménérbes in 1574–1575, remained the norm for both sides as the advantage overwhelmingly rested with the besieged. Many Huguenot and Catholic towns accordingly redoubled their efforts to strengthen their defenses. Modest towns, such as Lisle d’Albigeois near Montauban, invested considerable resources into their fortifications. Condom did the same. Catholic governors encouraged the construction of new citadels, as in Mâcon. Huguenot unrest rose markedly after 1575 in places such as Charité-sur-Loire, near Sancerre, and Romans in Dauphiné, and Albi near Montauban.57 As divisions grew, Henri III called an assembly of the Estates General in Blois in 1576, but it only accelerated the further disintegration of royal authority by focusing criticism on the crown.

The Catholic League and Fortified Towns Nowhere was this crisis more evident than in the emergence and subsequent spread of a militant Catholic insurgency known as the Holy League. Over the next twenty years, scores of decidedly Catholic bonnes villes turned away from the Valois and the first Bourbon king and instead sought security, as they had since the fourteenth century, behind their own walls. While aristocratic leaders such as the Guises often dominate literature about the Holy League, the nobility in general felt rather ambivalent about involvement in Catholic militancy. Instead, the movement was primarily urban in nature and oriented toward local issues and concerns, except naturally in Paris where discourse and action embraced the entire kingdom.58 Even so, the ascendancy of the Holy League in the capital was still largely keyed to neighborhood and institutional dynamics within the city, particularly the Hôtelde-Ville and the Parlement, which went back to the 1550s.59 The movement began in Picardy in 1576 with a sworn association known as the League of Péronne. Henri III tried but failed to co-opt the movement, which instead turned for leadership to the Guise family. Even so, the sustaining force and orientation of Catholic

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militancy initially rested in minor towns, such Abbeville and Péronne.60 Economic troubles certainly compounded the prevailing religious and political anxieties and contributed to their spread, even among the peasantry and opened up opportunities for political action by women.61 By the 1580s, the Wars of Religion as conflicts on the ground became more complex socially and actually represented a shifting amalgamation of struggles over largely local issues loosely informed at best by the controversies over high court politics and the king’s religion. Local studies since the nineteenth century reveal the varieties of civil and religious strife tearing France apart. One near constant across the kingdom was the central role of walled towns. Nearly all wrestled with the problem of communal solidarity in the face of internal tensions and external pressures. Some became anchors of militant Catholicism, while others tried to maintain biconfessional harmony. In Picardy, urban alliances in the 1580s even knitted towns together with foreign powers.62 Towns in Champagne sought to dampen Catholic enthusiasm as a way to keep the power of the Guise family at bay.63 In Burgundy, similar dynamics pitted municipal officials and, in the case of Dijon, judges in the Parlement against not just the Huguenots but intrusions from Charles de Lorraine, duke of Mayenne.64 Annonay and Belleville in remote areas of the upper Rhone also raised the standard of the League in a bid to receive outside help. In Normandy, sympathy for the Catholic League was animated by deep concerns over security and became amply evident in small burgs and large towns as Huguenot raiders remained active in the province.65 Saint-Malo, for example, cultivated more of a republican than a frankly religious spirit to shore up communal solidarity.66 In April 1589, François de Bourbon, duke of Montpensier, led a royalist force to capture Caen then marched northward seizing town after town until he finally entered Honfleur in June. The Leaguer takeover of Rouen in February 1589 did not position them to control all of Normandy, however. Indeed, the conflict over control of the lower Seine in the 1580s and early 1590s closely paralleled the Capetian and Angevin contests of the twelfth century. Another such parallel was further to the south where the Loire valley from Nantes all the way into the Velay was effectively a frontier between the Huguenot south and Catholic north of the kingdom. Provincial governors, such as La Châtre, encouraged the movement to strengthen their positions in key towns, such as Orléans.67 The Holy League also found considerable support in Brittany, a place largely untouched by Calvinism. Local barons used Leaguer rhetoric as an excuse for old fashioned brigandage.68 In other instances, the provincial governor, the Duc de Mercoeur, a member of the Guise family, proved instrumental.69 Even so, Breton bonnes villes like Nantes managed, albeit with difficulty, to maintain some measure of their customary autonomy as they struggled to maintain communal unity in the face of rising sectarianism.70 Across the Loire to the south, Leaguer sympathies found ready root in the Midi in Aurillac. In Poitou and the Limousin, places such as Limoges took up the cause of militant Catholicism at the behest of local preachers and the radical press.71 Henri de Navarre spent much of his time campaigning in Guyenne.72 In the Agenais, his estranged wife, Marguerite de Valois, played a particularly noticeable role as did recent memories of savage violence, such as the massacres at the castle of Semens near La Réole in 1580. In Languedoc, the Politique provincial governor Henri de Damville, duke of Montmorency, tried to steer a middle course between Calvinism and militant Catholicism. Some towns there, such as Toulouse, sided with the League

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because of the conservatism of the judges in the Parlement as well as long-standing rivalry with nearby Calvinist Montauban.73 Much the same combination of factors lay behind the embrace of the Leaguer cause by Aix-en-Provence and Marseille.74 Toulon became the site of especially nasty conflict between the pro-Leaguer town council and its governor, the pro-Valois Jean-Louis de Nogaret de la Valette, duke of Épernon. In Dauphiné, intercommunal struggles pitted leading cities such as Grenoble against lesser towns such as Mure. Finally was the case of Lyon. Once a hotbed of Calvinism, it now became in the 1580s a leading center of Catholic militancy under the leadership of its provincial governor, Charles-Emmanuel of Savoy, duke of Nemours, and archbishop, Jacques de Pellevé. In the 1580s, the destruction wreaked by sectarian conflict became even more generalized across France, from Rocroi on the Flemish border and Jametz in Lorraine all the way south to the foothills of the Pyrenees. The most vulnerable places were castles, small towns, and rural villages, though even these sites could prove daunting. As was the case in the earlier religious wars, indeed even as far back as the Hundred Years’ War and the Albigensian Crusades, some of the most brutal violence occurred in the southwest. Huguenots successfully besieged Castellane in upper Provence. Men under Charles de Gontaut, duke of Biron, for example, completely destroyed the small town of Gontaud and put its populace to the sword in 1580. Henri, duke of Joyeuse, waged similarly pitiless campaigns in the mid-1580s in Rouergue and the Saintonge, even launching a surprise attack on La Rochelle. The most common response to insecurity, if more difficult to execute because of poor economic conditions, was for a community to strengthen its fortifications. This was true for large bonnes villes, noble castles, and peasant villages. Perhaps the most stunning urban transformation in the late sixteenth century was of Nancy in Lorraine.75 A massive new Italian trace began around the ducal capital incorporating suburbs and redesigning plazas and boulevards to showcase the ruler’s power and grandeur. Towns in the French kingdom held no such ambitions and instead worked to repair their existing, still largely medieval curtained enceintes. In Châtillon-sur-Seine in Burgundy, for example, in the 1580s under the leadership of local militia captain Sebastien Noirot, fortification work included demolition of the town’s decrepit castle so that it could not be used to garrison Mayenne’s soldiers. Mention of a “gros boullevert” suggests the place already possessed some elements of the bastioned trace. Some towns, such as Chalons, managed to use the stationing of garrisons to their advantage. In Brittany, the rise of the Catholic League spurred improvements to the fortifications of Nantes including the building of new bastions and outworks, all of which required greater exploitation of the surrounding hinterland. In Dinan, Mercoeur ordered in 1582 two of its four gates permanently closed and had bastions and half-moons incorporated into its enceinte, although lack of funds hampered these plans. Rather than build or repair fortifications, instances of systematic demolition begin to occur, as, for example, in late 1588 and early 1589 when Catholic troops under Louis de Gonzague, duke of Nevers, razed to the ground the castles of Montaigu and La Garnache to prevent Huguenots from using them again. In Nantes, Mercoeur’s wife, Marie de Luxembourg, duchess of Penthièvre, took a prominent role in Nantais affairs inspecting the garrison, stockpiling munitions, supporting campaigns, such as the successful one against Blain in November 1591. She also ordered the demolition of maisons-fortes in Poitou. Steps were taken to strengthen Nantes’ fifteenth-century ramparts with the addition of bastioned elements at key areas along the enceinte.76

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Although present across the kingdom, the Holy Catholic League was by no means a cohesive movement but rather a highly localized phenomenon shaped largely by local factors in which walled towns played a central role. As in the early fourteenth century, Catholic towns in the 1580s began, much as Huguenot communities had in the 1560s in their synods, to create new kinds of regional assemblies or takeover existing ones to coordinate their actions.77 Also evident was a growing readiness by local parties, Catholic and Huguenot, to arrange their own local truces outside of royal supervision.78 Another response consisted of stricter enforcement of militia obligations, which often proved more trouble that it was worth, as did the special taxes levied to guard against the heretics. The balance between worries over security and the will to sacrifice varied from community to community and became based on the circumstances of any given moment. And no moment seemed more perilous than the period from the Leaguer takeover of Paris in May 1588 to the assassination of Henri III in August the following year, which brought the Calvinist leader Henri de Navarre to the Catholic throne of France.

Early Bourbon Rule and the B ONNES VILLES While the ruling dynasty changed, the nature of the religious wars generally did not alter much after 1589. Royalists and Leaguers largely vied to hold on to fortified places or capture their opponent’s places. Even before he came to power, Henri de Navarre besieged towns and castles across the Touraine, culminating in the sack of Vendôme. After the regicide, Huguenots seized castles across lower Languedoc and Périgord. Meanwhile, League forces based in Orléans attacked Châtillon-surLoire. Further to the south, Joyeuse sent out his Catholic forces in Toulouse to besiege the tiny town of Jegon. The war remained a highly localized phenomenon as field engagements by now much smaller armies than clashed in the 1560s brought no resolution to the conflict at the battles of Arques in September 1589 and Ivry in March 1590. Perhaps the most telling continuity lay in the limits of the new king’s ability to realize a military solution after Ivry when he besieged Leaguer Paris. Henri IV prepared for the siege by first capturing Corbeil, Melun, and Montereau on the upper Seine to interdict river traffic into Paris. Even though his commanders pressed him, especially the Huguenot ones, to launch a direct attack against Paris, Henri IV preferred to starve the city into submission by accepting a peace accord that recognized his royal authority without subjecting his capital to a brutal sack. Agostino Ramelli apparently lent his technical expertise—such as it was—to the king, as did Ambroise Bachot.79 Only at the end of the summer was the dreadful siege finally brought to an inconclusive end when Alessandro Farnese, duke of Parma, marched from the Netherlands with a relief force. Unable to take Paris, Henri IV concentrated his military efforts in spring 1591 on securing the key walled towns that commanded the main supply lines to the capital. He began with Chartres in the Beauce, the principal source of grain for Paris. Successfully besieged by the Prince de Condé back in 1568, Chartres held out for two-and–a-half months before it fell. The decisive moment came when the royal commander had a special covered pontoon bridge built by an Italian engineer named Vergano, likely a relative of the eponymous Scipio who died in the 1573 siege of La Rochelle. This “nouvelle machine,” the roof of which was protected by thick layers of sod to absorb cannon fire, allowed the king’s men to attack across an

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open ditch into a breach, only to be repulsed. A few days later, with no sign of help on the way, town officials agreed to open their gates to Henri IV, who treated them and the League garrison with exceptional generosity by allowing it to march out with their arms and baggage. It indicated again the new king’s desire to forge relations with his rebellious Catholic subjects based on gentleness (douceur), not force. In Dauphiné, the Huguenot commander François de Bonne, duke of Lesdiguières, enjoyed similar success when he besieged Digne in 1591. The siege of Rouen from January to April 1592 fitted this same pattern. Henri IV hoped to cut off the town and make its situation so hopeless that it had no choice but to submit to him. Divisions between the municipal council and the Leaguer commandant, André de Branca, marquis of Villars, gave the royalists cause to rethink a negotiated surrender might be possible. Over much of 1591, Villars had the town’s defenses strengthened by the addition of artillery platforms and expanded fronting ditches. He even had a new fort built on Mont Ste-Catherine to replace the one destroyed in the aftermath of the 1562 siege. Yet Rouen still lacked an articulated bastioned edge to provide flanking fire to cover the main approaches to the enceinte. These incomplete fortifications meant Villars had to carry out an active defense using his guns and sorties to prevent Henri IV’s forces from positioning their guns in such a way as to blast their way into the city. What Villars could not anticipate was the good fortune to have such a small royalist force, only some ten thousand men, deployed against Rouen. Under the able command of Biron, this army was unable either to circumvallate the town or concentrate sufficient force to take advantage of any breaches. Henri IV had to split his forces again because of the likely intervention by Parma from the Spanish Netherlands. Engineering ingenuity offered one possible solution to the manpower shortage. One of the most intriguing aspects of this siege of Rouen was the attempt to construct a floating artillery platform from which to pummel, from the middle of the Seine, the city into submission. It would also block all river traffic to Rouen. Edmund Yorke, an English engineer, headed up this elaborate and time-consuming scheme, which he had first proposed back in July. Only in mid-March 1592 was the barge finally completed from materials carried downstream from Pont de l’Arche. But Yorke miscalculated the size and angle of approach of the trench works approaching the Thuringe bulwark; the trenches also lacked sufficient redoubts from which to repel sorties by the defenders. The siege of Rouen thus formed part of an overall strategic and tactical challenge that was beyond Henri IV’s current military capabilities to overcome.80 Sieges became much more effectively fought out in print than on the ground during the Wars of Religion. They generated an enormous occasional literature and signaled the rising importance of influencing public opinion.81 These printed materials took a wide variety of forms depending upon the audiences targeted. Simple leaflets and placards were suitable for quick distribution in the streets or posting in public places. Others took the form of eyewitness accounts or memoirs, such as Léry’s famous description of the 1573 siege of Sancerre, to lend the narrative verisimilitude and thus veracity.82 Noblemen composed their own types of memoirs, often modeled after Caesar’s Gallic Wars, while judges such as Jacques-Auguste de Thou wrote histories after the manner of Cicero and Tacitus. And finally a new kind of proto-journalism began to emerge, sometimes in serial fashion, presenting a mix of description and partisan analysis. Novel forms of mixed media combining text and images shaped public perceptions of events and in turn broader opinion.83 Until the conversion of Henri IV in 1593, a rough balance existed between

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pamphlets sympathetic to Huguenot and Leaguer towns, often produced by printers within the walls of the very towns besieged by the crown, and publications promoting a royalist perspective of events.84 More effective censorship policies under Henri IV and self-policing in the print trade gradually tipped the balance over the control of information in the crown’s favor after 1600. Henri IV accomplished the conquest of his kingdom after 1593 not by military means but through carefully crafted images and ceremonies that conveyed messages of clemency and reconciliation, not hatred and vengeance.85 Not that sieges, most noticeably at Laon in 1594, and skirmishes came to a complete end. It was more that the soft powers of persuasion rather than the hard force of arms mainly shaped the end of the Wars of Religion under Henri IV. Reconciliation with Leaguer towns after 1593 assumed a highly ritualized and predictable character that emphasized the king’s sincerity as a Catholic and magnanimity as a ruler, on one side, and the undying devotion and good intentions of his subjects on the other. This basic, traditional message, not artillery cannonades, opened the bonnes villes to the first Bourbon king. The first was Meaux on January 1, 1594. Others, such as Orléans (February 1) and Pontoise (February 11), soon did the same, followed by the spectacular rendition of Paris (March 22), after which there came a general wave over the spring of places such as Troyes (March 29), Rouen (March 30), Havre-de-Grâce (April 8), and Lyon (May 10), to name just a few. These agreements borrowed generously from past edicts of pacification.86 The difference now lay in the readiness of Catholics to forget their recent differences and accept Henri IV as Catholic king, and the Huguenots’ increasingly nervous trust in their erstwhile protector. Urban notables of both confessions affirmed the historic partnership between their bonnes villes and the monarchy in the language of chartered liberties, which, in some cases, went back to the twelfth century.87 The restoration of bonhomie between the king and his towns, though ostensibly a return to the past, actually set the stage for a fundamental reshaping of the relationship between the monarchy and urban communities.88 In a selective but quite decisive manner, Henri IV’s government began to target individual towns for “reform” of their finances and municipal elections. Municipal reform under Henri IV varied from town to town. Citing the disruptions in revenue collection caused by the past wars, the crown argued it was necessary to put urban finances back in good order. The crown forgave some portion of past debts, restructured the rest, and restored regular revenue collection to ensure future payments. To be implemented properly, these reforms required empowering new royal treasurers and comptrollers at the local level with improved central auditing oversight and record-keeping by the Chambre des Comptes in Paris. In the 1590s, Henri IV made permanent in lands he controlled the grande crue or crue des garnisons originally established by François I to cover the cost of maintaining gendarme companies in garrisons. He extended these practices to Champagne in 1594, the pays d’élection in 1597, and Brittany and Languedoc in 1598. They enabled Henri IV to disband most of his army by keeping a fixed number of men stationed in garrisons throughout the country; in some places, the crue surpassed the taille. Finally, the king also began to demilitarize select areas by ordering the demolition of castles—a policy his successors later sought to generalize across the kingdom.89 Town indebtedness loomed as a large problem in the 1590s, much of it the result of bearing the costs of war, particularly fortification construction and maintenance. Municipal indebtedness threatened the political stability of the towns, upon which

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the crown’s general pacification of the kingdom largely depended. To ensure the good management of a town’s finances and other affairs, Henri IV also reformed municipal elections in such a manner to further entrenched urban oligarchies into self-selected hereditary dynasties holding venal and appointed royal offices. Civic militias, if not outright disbanded, became largely honorific associations of little military worth but considerable social prestige. These changes matured into the seventeenth century and epitomized the diminished military role of towns, except along the frontiers, and the closer mutuality of interest that bound urban elites together even more with the crown. Henri IV’s municipal reforms thus largely retained as a façade the traditional forms while ensuring that positions of responsibility went to men of demonstrable loyalty to the regime.90 Under Henri IV, the monarchy created an enduring royal fortification service headed by Francophone experts who brought science and bureaucracy together to reshape the kingdom and its urban communities. The episodic visits of Italian engineers typical under the Valois soon became replaced by more permanent missions by French experts. This shift grew out of several factors. A generation of young men, including nobles, for example, had received mathematics education in the curriculum of Jesuit secondary schools since the late 1550s.91 Among the advocates of this new kind of curriculum in academies for nobles established by the crown were Pierre d’Origny, François de la Noue, Jean de Saulx-Tavannes, and Alexandre de Pontaymery. The first such academy was likely the one founded just outside Paris by Antoine de Pluvinel in 1594. It joined traditional elements of the older warrior ethos, embodied in such disciplines as equitation, fencing, and dance, with a new premium on professionalism and technical training in history, geography, mathematics, and the art of fortification. Autodidacts among literate skilled artisans used manuals in French, some translations while others original compositions, on practical geometry, pyrotechnics, and the construction of mensuration instruments to teach themselves. In the 1570s, publications by French specialists on surveying and design began to appear in greater number. Derivative in nature, they marked the widening ambit through which the new approaches pioneered by the Italians spread to literate artisans in the building trades. By the 1590s, a sufficient number of men versed in a common technical culture existed for Maximilien de Béthune, duke of Sully to begin to organize them into a formal royal fortification service. They could be relied upon to draw reliable maps and city plans as well as execute projects involving hydraulics, mechanics, stereonomy, surveying, and measuring heights and distances.92 While professional jealousies persisted between school-trained engineers and artisanal experts, most practitioners of the military arts appreciated the importance of both approaches. Experience of how materials such as stone, brick, and wood behaved under different conditions easily coexisted with discussions of Archimedean mechanics and Euclidean geometry. Explanations of how to manipulate instruments of mensuration used in the field, from simple squares, compasses, to plumbs to more complex devices such as astrolabes, sextants, and new tools, yielded practical applications as well as leaps of imagination on the ideal city. French military engineering writers in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries searched for ways to render qualitative experience into quantitative systems in order to make the best choices and decisions. Increasing sophistication in technical design illustration fostered broader appreciation and understanding among patrons and practitioners. Jacques Besson’s

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Theatrum instrumentorum et machinarum was published in 1571 and he was soon invited to Paris to serve as the king’s “master of engines.”93 A Huguenot, Besson fled to England the next year after the massacres. The work was elegantly conceived and so popular that François de Béroalde de Verville published an expanded edition in 1578. However, it still lacked the technical sophistication found in Agostino Ramelli’s classic work Le diverse et artificiose machine, published in Paris in 1588. He began his career serving the condottiere Gian Giacomo de’ Medici in the Italian wars of the 1550s and later became a royal military engineer to the kings of France. Written in both Italian and French, this book rightly marks an important turning point in the history of technology and technical illustration, especially in its use of exploded views for all sorts of devices.94 Like Besson, Ramelli praised the “excellence” of mathematics in engineering but showed no real knowledge of it. He still very much worked within the craft tradition blending practical solutions with occasional flights of fancy. His illustrations were not blueprints but rather mechanical puzzles for readers to figure out. In his introduction, Ramelli bemoans the theft by a close, unnamed associate of drawings he had laboriously prepared on the subject of fortification design. Recent research suggests the culprit was none other than Amboise Bachot, who had long worked as Ramelli’s engraver and occasional military engineer.95 These were likely the forty-three illustrations of military machines and fortifications found in Bachot’s Le Timon, published in 1587, and in which he hailed Ramelli as the new Archimedes and another Daedelus. Bachot presents himself as the captain of the “guerriers mathématiques,” ready to lead his men forth armed with compasses and plumb lines. Bachot’s Le Gouvernail (“The Rudder”) offered a nautical image usually associated with the king who directed the ship of state. Published in 1598, it expanded further, though not very originally, on fortification design along with shorter sections on geometry, perspective, surveying instruments, and military machines. Though he shows up earlier in some records, Bachot entered royal service on a more permanent basis in 1590 through the patronage of Jacques le Roy, lord of La Grange, who governed Melun, a key town southwest of Paris. Le Roy hired Bachot to revamp the town’s dilapidated fortifications. He arguably became the first Frenchmen to head the nascent royal fortification service. Historians have long identified the first distinctly French school of fortification design with architect-engineer Jean Errard, and, to a lesser extent, Claude Flamand. This, however, is misleading on several counts. To begin, neither man was even French. Errard was from Bar-le-Duc in Lorraine, which formed part of the Holy Roman Empire, while Flamand, as his name bespeaks, was from Flanders. Although a Calvinist, Errard received his initial training at the Catholic court of Charles III, duke of Lorraine, then went to work for Henri de La Tour, duke of Bouillon, a fellow Calvinist, while Flamand spent a number of years in the service of the Duke of Würtemberg. A confluence of European influences shaped both men’s careers. Early in his career, Errard collaborated closely with the Italian military engineer Orfeo da Galliani. His design approach reflected the continuing predominance of Italian design practices, although Dutch influences become discernible later in his career. Flamand’s guide to fortifications likewise derived from his own study of Italian and Dutch treatises on the subject as well as his own wartime experiences.96 In many ways, Jean Errard brought together the worlds of skilled artisans, the textual traditions of Italian engineers, and nascent royal bureaucracy.97 Like most

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fortification engineers after 1550, Errard received solid training in mathematics, surveying, and mechanics. Indeed, it was in these areas, not fortification design, which came later, that French technical writers first excelled. Errard’s initial publication in 1583 was a translation of portions of Euclid’s Elements. In it, he treated the mathematical applications of mechanical instruments and devices, such as the Archimedean screw and cylindrical cams. His later treatises on fortifications built upon these earlier, practical foundations.98 These works were supplemented by “do-it-yourself” lesson books in practical mathematics and geometry, which helped local artisans adapt new bastion designs the existing urban fabric. Actual projects on the ground in the bonnes villes during the Wars of Religion showed that this process of adoption and adaptation usually proceeded independently of the crown. The common assumption that the new technologies and “scientific” expertise associated with the Military Revolution only benefited the state at the expense of groups in society such as townspeople bears reconsideration. Errard’s Fortification, published in 1594, focused much more directly and consistently on the pragmatic aspects of military engineering. This included geometrical principles of design and ballistics, as well as knowledge of materials used in masonry. A good deal of the work treats irregular polygonal fortifications, receiving particular inspiration from Bonaiuto Lorini. Errard’s La fortification réduite en art et démontrée of 1600, addressed to the nobility, proposed that a place’s defenses rested more on its garrisoned infantry, equipped with muskets, than its artillery, which consumed enormous amounts of powder. Infantry was more maneuverable and capable of more rapid rates of fire. Errard therefore recommended that enormous bastions be built, manned by lots of individual shooters and spaced about every two hundred meters, which was the effective range of handguns at the time. He also advised very high escarpments and the construction of covered firing galleries and half-moons in the outworks, again to increase firepower. In his preface, Errard made clear his intention to persuade both the king and nobility of the importance of mathematics in war. Thus there was a strong rhetorical element in the “proofs,” which cited Alberti’s humanist tenets of utility, beauty, and power. Contemporaries of Errard broadly echoed these themes of high-minded pretense and mundane practicality. For example, Henri de Suberville’s treatise on the “henrymètre,” named after the first Bourbon king, offered a new device designed to capture and coordinate different measurements to more accurately and simply calculate volume and proportion from one fixed position. Suberville promised that his instrument would help when besieging a place. He went beyond Bachot in likening the military engineer to a king who commanded his troops in the field of battle.99 Joseph Boillot also elaborated on the connection between geometry, instruments, and solving problems on the ground. His 1598 manual on instruments of war cited the human eye as the most excellent one of all, followed next by the hand, which then manipulated various tools guided by the eye to discern “le vrai lieu” (the true place).100 Boillot’s invocation of seeking “divine proportions” introduced Neoplatonic, metaphysical elements absent in Errard. A more frankly religious cast came the Savoyard mathematician and Huguenot Jacques Perret de Chambéry folio of plates, composed in 1594, which invoked Scripture in his designs of fortifications and war machines. Perret entered Henri IV’s service after the French conquest of the duchy in 1600. A year later, he published a magnificently illustrated book on idealized fortified towns.101 Modeled after Filarete’s radiocentric plan for Sforzinda, his designs ornamented town walls with biblical

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quotations drawn mainly from the Psalms, much as Bernard Palissy had done in his work on gardens published nearly forty years earlier. Artillery treatises in French by David Rivault de Flurance, among others, encouraged innovation and spread valuable technical information, while Jacques de Fumée’s derivative compendium on military science in 1613 advanced the knowledge of practitioners in the field.102 Finally, advances in cartography in late-sixteenth-century France had clear political and military applications. The works of Maurice Bouguereau and Nicolai de Nicolay stand out in particular in this regard.103 The birth of a new royal fortification service and the monarchy’s new policies toward the bonnes villes converged most dramatically in Amiens after its near disastrous seizure by Spain in 1597.104 Disgruntled former Leaguers and slipshod security by town officials allowed a small band of Spanish cavalry to take Amiens, where Henri IV had stockpiled huge amounts of cannon, powder, and shot for his planned invasion of the Spanish Netherlands. Its capture allowed the aged Philip II of Spain to win a more favorable peace from the French the next year at Vervins, for Henri IV had to forestall his invasion plans in order to retake the most strategic walled town in northern France. Once he regained control of Amiens, he stripped the municipal government of much of its autonomy. For reasons that remain obscure, Henri IV sent not Bachot but rather Jean Errard to the city to oversee repairs to the fortifications and begin design of a royal citadel.105 Errard’s imposing royal citadel just north of the Somme absorbed the Porte de Montrécu to form a pentagon with brick escarpments that soared sixty feet in height. It both protected and loomed over the city, much as the Bourbons strove to do elsewhere in the century ahead. The spring of 1598 brought peace to France in the forms of the Edict of Nantes in April and the Treaty of Vervins in May. Both accords enabled the kingdom to enjoy an unprecedented generation of relative calm until religious wars and the conflict with the Hapsburgs resumed in the 1620s. Although less celebrated than the treaties of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559) and of the Pyrenees (1669), the Peace of Vervins represented an important turning point in the long struggle between the early modern rulers of France and Spain. Intimately connected to the Edict of Nantes, the Peace of Vervins contributed enormously to France’s recovery under Henri IV, just as it marked the final defeat of Philip II, who had long tried to promote Hapsburg dynastic interests by championing militant Catholicism. In retrospect, historians can now see that this treaty signaled the beginning of the Spanish monarchy’s long decline as a hegemonic power and France’s corresponding rise to prominence during the Grand Siècle. It enabled Henri IV and his chief minister, Sully, to embark on an ambitious series of reforms known as the “Grand Projet” to transform the monarchy and, with it, French society. Maintaining religious peace was critical. The Edict of Nantes achieved this end most imperfectly and only temporarily.106 Yet it must still be counted a great success despite deep misgivings about it by Huguenots and Catholics alike. As in the earlier settlement between Henri IV and Leaguer towns, the Edict of Nantes reaffirmed many of the barriers between Catholic France and the Huguenot minority, barriers that virtually foreclosed any eventual integration between the two except by conversion to the dominant religion. The special courts or Chambres de l’Édit erected to implement the decree’s provisions, though limited in scope, channeled sectarian conflict into the king’s courts whenever possible.107 The edict thus provided a means by which to contain the Huguenot community within the

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framework of royal institutions and laws. The urban edge became one of the chief means by which to define these confessional barriers. Provisions in the edict delineated rights of worships largely by reference to towns and their suburbs. Moreover, besides the king’s word, fortifications subsidized by the crown figured as the strongest guarantee of security for the Huguenots. The secret brevet or articles granted by Henri IV on April 30 ensured Huguenot control of over two hundred “safe places” already in their jurisdiction. Nearly half of them were fortified towns garrisoned by troops paid for by the crown or guarded by a local civic militia. The king granted these concessions for eight years, subject to renewal. Thus was created what Cardinal Richelieu later called in the 1620s the Huguenot “state within the state” (see map 6.1).

Pa r t I I I

Th e Wa l l s C om e D ow n (16 0 0 – 1750)

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Ch apter 7

S t at e Building and Urban Fortif ications

Peace after 1598 allowed the kingdom a chance to begin to recover from the mis-

ery and devastation inflicted by nearly forty years of civil war and ever recurring conflicts with the Hapsburgs. Henri IV and his ministers, led by Sully, embarked on an ambitious program to change how the monarchy ruled the country.1 These changes touched institutions at the center in Paris and across France as a whole, particularly in the towns. Centralization certainly increased, but also did the renewal of traditional partnerships with the social elites in the nobility, clergy, and urban notability. Indeed, as had been the case since the twelfth century, the growth of royal rule again relied on the active cooperation of towns, which continued to be the engines of commerce and mainstays of the crown’s military system. By 1609, Henri IV seemed confident enough to resume the European contest with the Hapsburgs. However, his untimely assassination in 1610 forestalled French intervention in the Empire and soon gave rise to weak royal rule, noble factions, and confessional unrest that yet again plunged France into religious war. The difference this time was the rapidity and finality with which the monarchy settled these problems in the 1620s, a period of crucial transition.2 No change was more decisive in the monarchy’s success than its greatly enhanced ability to mobilize and sustain a major military campaign, which it did against La Rochelle in 1628 and then against the Hapsburgs after 1635. While its roots arguably went back to the crucial reforms undertaken by Charles VII and Louis XI in the fifteenth century, the more immediate cause was Sully’s administrative consolidation of the crown’s war making apparatus following the debacle at Amiens in 1597. In 1601, Sully proposed to the king the goal of strengthening frontier fortifications by building polygonal enceintes, no doubt an allusion to Jean Errard’s ideas (see figure 7.1). Three years later came a survey of the condition of all these places, along with the grand règlement of 1604, in which Sully proposed organizing military engineers, who numbered between eighteen and twenty-four along with local contrôleurs des fortifications, by defining their duties and assigning them to specific territories. He ordered them to make regular inspections of fortifications in their areas and report recommended construction or demolition projects. He appointed a chief engineer to direct inspections and construction projects in four vital frontier provinces, Picardy, Champagne, Dauphiné, and Provence. In the wake of the 1594 siege, Henri IV had some of Laon’s walls removed and erected a new bastioned citadel near the old Porte Saint-Georges.3 In the seventeenth century, its ditches became filled in and the old Capetian keep was demolished, while the eighteenth

Figure 7.1 Views of Calais, Guigne, and Ardres by Joachim Du Wiert, 1611. By permission of the Bibliothèque Nationale (B.N. Vx 23 2989).

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century witnessed the gradual carving away of the ramparts for new houses and new leisure areas. In 1602, Henri IV ordered Rennes to dismantle the Porte aux Foulons. Civic militias began to lose military relevance in a number of French towns after 1600 and continued to do so into the Regency when in 1613 Marie de Médici suppressed them in much of Normandy and the Ile-de-France, the longstanding obligation for residents to guard walls now slated for demolition. Militias thereafter endured despite the gradual disappearance of walls as venal offices that carried honorific benefits. It became general practice under Henri IV for the crown to assume initial construction costs of new urban fortifications, leaving maintenance costs to municipal authorities. The crown could do this because fiscal reforms stabilized revenue collection and built up financial reserves for it to invest, though just how much remains difficult to establish.4 In this manner, the crown gained much greater control over deciding where and how to modernize fortifications. Sully paired military engineers with better trained cartographers in teams responsible for maps of specific regions and towns of strategic importance.5 Men such as Jean de Beins, Claude Chastillon, Jacques Fougeu, and François Martilleur set up in workshops and created hundreds of plans and maps that enabled leaders in the central government literally to see and thus govern the kingdom more effectively.6 Powerful officials known as intendants also began to be used more systematically in the army and provinces. Sully merged these various functions together in part because he held the important posts of superintendent of finance, superintendent of buildings, superintendent of fortifications, and grand master of the artillery. He was also royal governor of the citadels of Amiens, Calais, Ponthieu, and the Trois-Évêchés in Lorraine.7 Through bureaucratic reform and personal consolidation of key offices, Sully thus created for the crown a basic framework for projecting military power abroad and safeguarding the borderlands at home. The question for the monarchy was about what had to be done to the scores of walled towns held by the Huguenots across the kingdom following the Edict of Nantes.

Siege Warfare and the End of the Wars of Religion The assassination of Henri IV in 1610 sparked rising confessional tensions, noble unrest, controversies in the parlements, anxiety in the bonnes villes, and insurrections in the countryside.8 The Estates General of 1614, rather than solve these problems, only revealed their intractability during the unstable Regency of Marie de Médici. The first sign of trouble came in 1611 when Huguenots at the Assembly of Saumur, fearful the Edict of Nantes would be overturned, created the Union Protestante to organize paramilitary “assemblées de cercle” based in fortified towns. The young Louis XIII promised to uphold his father’s security guarantees but declared all such assemblies seditious.9 Defections of Huguenot nobles through Catholic conversion further weakened the Huguenot bonnes villes and opened the way for new, decidedly less religiously motivated leadership of the Reformed cause under Henri II, duke of Rohan.10 The Regency’s clumsy meddling in Huguenot affairs only worsened these suspicions, as when it attempted in 1612 to remove Rohan as governor of Saint-Jean-d’Angély and rig the mayoral election in La Rochelle.11 Emboldened by the ascent of the Catholic devout party in the Regency, Catholics used the law courts and outright coercion to reclaim sites of Catholic worship

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in Huguenot areas by destroying Calvinist temples and cemeteries. Huguenots responded by waging iconoclastic campaigns once again against Catholic churches and shrines. In Montpellier, they even sent bells from local Catholic churches to foundries to be rendered into cannon. Huguenots towns, led by Montauban and Nîmes in the south and La Rochelle in the west, prepared for war by rearming and repairing their fortifications.12 A closer look at La Rochelle and Montauban reveals the final phase of urban self-defense in France. A 1621 view of La Rochelle identified in its accompanying description the present state of the city’s defenses as well as its history and privileges. In the lower left are what appear to be three soldiers surveying the city’s militarized perimeter.13 The city’s medieval curtain walls became refashioned in the Dutch style between 1596 and 1612. Marshes and waterways continued to protect the city on all sides except the north, where imposing new bastions went up. The Tour de Saint-Nicolas, the Tour de la Chaine, and the Tour du Garrot or la Lanterne, all newly repaired, guarded the mouth of the harbor. In the southwest corner rose the new Tour de Moureilles; it housed the city’s treasury and records of the Reformed Church. Angled outworks, particularly in front of gates, bristled along the perimeter. La Rochelle’s defiance became encapsulated in a stone inscription over the old Porte des Cougnes that read Dieu m’a béni pour la retraite des Siens (“God has blessed me to protect his children”).14 All this work again required the razing of the faubourgs of Tasdon, Saint-Éloi, and Fronsac, which only exacerbated the problem of overcrowding in the old town.15 The newly walled faubourg Ville Neuve, further bolstered by a new bastion protecting the Porte de Maubec, failed to alleviate this problem. Indeed, that the gate did not connect to any of the streets laid out in the Ville Neuve reflects the lack of concern for residential needs.16 Royalist publicists naturally presented these actions as evidence of Huguenot plans to rebel against the king.17 Montauban’s defenses also underwent significant change in the early seventeenth century. Municipal officials inspected it defenses on May 20, 1610, just days after news arrived of Henri IV’s assassination. They carefully justified the inspection as a precautionary step against unnamed threats in and outside the kingdom; they also cited the example of other towns in the region. The inspection revealed the distressing degradation of the city’s defenses since the end of hostilities in the 1590s. Consuls authorized but apparently never collected a special levy of four thousand livres on residents for repairs; how much work resulted before 1620 remains unclear. Whether that failure was local opposition to new taxes or action by the crown also remains unclear. Only in October 1620 as open war resumed did repair work begin in earnest on five large bastions and horn works from the Lagarrigue rivulet along the perimeter of Villenouvelle. In some places, medieval curtain walls still offered viable defenses, especially in high elevated areas or where bedrock complicated attempts at mining. Topography and geology thus still mattered, often decisively.18 Over the next ten years, many other Huguenot walled towns followed suit. Even small burgs fortified anew. The Huguenot stronghold of Layrac in Aquitaine, for example, threw up three earthen bastions, possibly brick-faced and with a wooden palisade, set in a ditch “à la huguenotte,” behind which stood a medieval curtain wall composed of stone and brick along with several towers. Over the main gate stood the “citadel,” which was just a large tower.19 The defenses of Huguenot towns often became a flashpoint of contention. In the 1615, for example, the royal

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law court in Castres ordered the one-time bastide of Brusquès in the Aveyron to demolish its fortifications.20 The Huguenot stronghold refused to comply and led the creation in 1621 of a regional alliance with the neighboring towns of SaintAffrique, Belmont, Lacaune, and Silvanès known as the Union de Brusquès. It was the political struggle over who controlled the walls, towers, and gates more than confessional differences that rendered Huguenot towns the target of royal military repression in the 1620s. La Rochelle offers a case in point of the infighting among urban notables and rising conflicts with the crown. Social tensions among disgruntled bourgeois who demanded a broader share of municipal offices had roiled La Rochelle since the 1590s until they exploded into open revolt in 1614. The resulting divisions compromised the town’s efforts to defend its independence in the 1620s.21 Contention was especially sharp over control of the militia, which still remained important there, and arsenals. The insurrection in 1614 began with the seizure of the Tour Maubec, which housed an arsenal, and the installation of new padlocks on several key gates. Ensuing negotiations between the leaders of the opposition and the town council centered on these locks and keys.22 Sully, as governor of Poitou, notified the new governing group in La Rochelle, known as the Council of Forty-Eight, of the crown’s unwillingness to recognize these forced changes. Similar factional divisions plagued other Huguenot and even some Catholic towns as they wrestled with the question of whether to defy or seek accommodations with the crown.23 The year 1614 also witnessed a noble rebellion led by Henri II, prince of Condé. These developments were not unrelated, for a good many Huguenot nobles in the southwest, prompted by Rohan, joined Condé’s rebellion despite his Catholic faith. On December 10, Condé even met with the new-installed burghers of La Rochelle to discuss an alliance, though the Rochelais prudently kept their distance. In a show of force, the civic militia—some fifteen hundred strong—turned out for review by the prince, all fully armed and ready for battle. Cannons boomed from the artillery towers ringing the city. Louis XIII eventually settled the rebellion by making concessions in the Treaty at Loudon in 1616, which showered Condé and the Huguenots with money and confirmed their privileges, though it also renewed the call to reestablish Catholicism in Béarn. Rohan became governor of Poitou, a post that Sully had given up. The Regent Marie de Médici also reconfirmed the terms of the Edict of Nantes, agreed to pay pastors and garrisons more, and extended Huguenot control of places de sûreté for another six years. The treaty did not calm the situation but instead harkened back to the weak rule of the last Valois. Civil war most threatened to break out in western France where the rapacious duke of Épernon, governor of Saintonge, and his allies aspired for greater local control. On November 17, 1616, the armed circle of Brittany, Poitou, and Saintonge assembled in La Rochelle to consider how to parry Épernon’s threat to install royal garrisons in western towns. Épernon’s ally, César, duke of Vendôme, fomented intrigue in Brittany, entering the walled town of Vannes with fifteen hundred troops in June. He also ordered repairs to the ramparts in Lamballe and Guingamp in his duchy of Penthiève. Henri, duke of Retz, fortified for him Machecoul and Belle-Ile, while the others organized the defense of Vannes and Hennebont. In response, the Breton estates signaled their loyalty to the Regent by ordering the demolition of a dozen châteaux and disarming the châteaux of Ancenis and Machecoul. In January 1616, troops under Benjamin de Rohan, duke of Soubise, and the duke of Vendôme threatened Nantes, though the Treaty of Loudun on May 3 temporarily calmed the

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situation. In January 1617, the crown tried to placate the western Huguenots by ordering Épernon to remove the garrisons in Tonay- Charente and Surgères as well as dismantle their fortifications and those of Rochefort. Meanwhile, La Rochelle readied for war by deepening its ditches and reinforcing dilapidated sections of its walls. In response, Louis XIII mobilized area urban militias on his side, as at Nantes. Unrest also became evident in the northern French town of Rethel, which prompted a short royal siege.24 It seemed just a matter of time before the conflict became white hot. War finally came in 1620 when Louis XIII, despite opposition from the Huguenots as well as his mother (for more personal reasons), sought to reestablish the Catholic Church in Béarn. The plan was for the king to march with a force of ten thousand men from Caen in Normandy to Pau at the foot of the Pyrenees, establishing garrisons along the way. He began by brushing aside Huguenot armed opposition in Normandy and easily defeated Marie de Médici’s paltry force at the battle of Pont-de-Cé. Catholic armies consolidated their conquest of Huguenot towns by lodging soldiers, enticing residents to convert with exemptions from quartering. They also reestablished or opened new religious houses from which to preach and monitor devotional behavior. While the Huguenots committed atrocities out of mounting desperation, Catholic forces cruelly imposed the faith through wanton violence as military momentum shifted in their favor. The laws of siege warfare continued to receive scant respect during these last, perhaps most violent of the French wars of religion.25 In December 1620, deputies from French Reformed churches assembled in La Rochelle to rally against this latest Catholic threat, even though Louis XIII declared the assembly illegal. They called for the eight circles to raise armies and collect funds. But the response among Huguenot nobles, their ranks thinned by Catholic conversion, failed to materialize, which left the onus of defending the cause on Huguenot towns, led by La Rochelle and Montauban. The royal campaign enjoyed early success when it captured Saint-Jean-d’Angély on June 24, 1621. Louis XIII had the town’s walls razed and its communal government abolished; he even tried to change its name to Bourg Louis.26 From this base, the king’s favorite and former falconer, Charles, duke of Luynes, advised Louis XIII to secure control of fortified places across Touraine and Poitou before moving ahead in late summer. Earlier in April, Condé, now fighting for the king, had moved into the Midi to besiege Montpellier. But Louis XIII only invaded the Vendée in late July, while the duke of Mayenne arrived before Montauban in August. This delay gave Huguenot towns that were further away crucial additional time to prepare their defenses. On March 1, 1621, the wife of the mayor of La Rochelle along with more than three thousand women and girls, marching to drumbeats carrying their own special banner, began work on a fort to protect the Porte Neuve.27 In May 1621, the faubourgs surrounding La Rochelle began to be torn down. On July 7, the company from the Saint-Nicolas quartier tore down the royal château. Yet the crown decided to split its attention between La Rochelle and the Huguenot strongholds in Languedoc, reasoning that Rohan’s small army could not be at two places at once. Épernon headed up the attack against La Rochelle, where the Italian engineer Pompée Targoni designed a quadrilateral fort a half league from the city’s wall appropriately enough named Fort Louis. On September 11, Épernon launched a four thousand–five thousand men strong assault against the Coureilles side of the city, which was repulsed by a daring sortie of some fifteen hundred Rochelais.

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The Rochelais flotilla under Jean Guiton inflicted a severe defeat upon the superior royal navy under Charles I, duke of Guise.28 In a surprise attack, Soubise managed to capture Olonne in the Vendée. As a result, a stalemate quickly developed before the walls of La Rochelle. The crown’s strategy foundered less, however, on the situation at La Rochelle and more on events to the south in Montauban. Work on Montauban’s defenses was far from finished when Mayenne arrived before the city.29 This situation influenced the duke’s plan to have Charles de Valois, duke of Angoulême, attack from the west, for the town’s Huguenot commander Henri Nompar de Caumont, duke of La Force, also mobilized a troop of women under fire that dawn to unload six hundred barrels filled with earth to build a rampart to bolster the partiallybuilt hornwork there.30 Even as Mayenne’s forces swelled to nearly twenty-five thousand by late August, the lines of circumvallation around the city could not be closed.31 The besiegers methodically approached the walls in zigzag trenches until September 1 when Mayenne had deployed several dozen cannons against the town’s main bastions and outworks. As quickly as royalist cannonades weakened Montauban’s defenses, La Force had them rebuilt. Attempts to breach were repulsed with heavy losses each time. A few weeks later, a musket ball to the head killed Mayenne while he inspected the advanced trenches. Undaunted, the new royal commander François de Bassompierre pressed forward in several places using artillery and sappers over the next bloody weeks, but with little progress.32 In late September, the tables turned when a relief force under Rohan moved south to outmaneuver Angoulême’s cavalry screen and take the nearby stronghold of Saint-Antonin.33 The besiegers now risked becoming the besieged, subject to attack in two directions while Rohan’s forces also harassed supply lines and interdicted foraging parties. As a result, Luynes opened negotiations with Rohan on October 8. Rohan quickly agreed to the construction of a royal citadel in Montauban so long as he could guard it, while Luynes, in a bid to divide the Huguenot opposition, sought a promise from Rohan not to provide any future support to La Rochelle.34 While negotiations took place, François Bassompierre decided to concentrate his forces for a massive attack on Bastion du Moustier. Although his guns managed to breach the bastion walls on October 17, the ensuing frontal assault met ferocious resistance from the near entirety of Montauban’s garrison, which included a company of women.35 Talks dragged on for another two weeks before the king decided to lift the siege. Once again, morale and tactical acumen, both in battle and repairing damaged fortifications, prevailed over the superior numbers and gunpowder technology of the crown. Condé’s long siege of Montpellier likewise failed in late September for similar reasons. Despite these setbacks, the renewal of war with the Huguenots otherwise went well for the monarchy, for elsewhere it captured a number of important Huguenot walled towns. These marginal gains can be seen in the Treaty of Montpellier, reached in November 1621. Preparations for further conflict accompanied this putative peace. While it reconfirmed the Edict of Nantes and authorized periodic Huguenot synods, it also proscribed the assemblies of circles, removed twenty-four places de sûreté from Huguenot control, and ordered the demolition of key castles and fortifications at Nîmes, Castres, Uzès, and Millau, allowing only La Rochelle and Montauban to retain their defenses.36 In a further gesture to the Rochelais, Louis XIII offered an empty promise to raze Fort Louis and the fort on the Ile-de-Ré, even though work continued on both over the next five years. Meanwhile, the duke

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of Guise established royal naval control of the Ile-de-Ré. Rohan and his younger brother, Soubise, refused to sign the agreement. On May 10, 1622, royal forces defeated Soubise at the battle of Saint-Hilaire-de-Riez, capturing six hundred Huguenot prisoners who became briefly interned at Nantes. As a result, Rohan had to surrender to the king on May 11, 1622. In June, Louis de Bourbon, count of Soissons, began work on another fort near La Rochelle, which began shelling in July.37 In 1622, the crown appointed Charles Leber Du Carlo, a royal engineer and cartographer, to redesign the fortifications of Brouage, which it hoped would replace La Rochelle as the kingdom’s premier maritime commercial center on the Atlantic.38 In response, La Rochelle launched its own ambitious naval armament program and began to stockpile powder and shot. The city council also levied special excises and raised loans to pay for lodging foreign soldiers, mostly English and Dutch. Local obstruction and espionage proved endemic. In May 1621, for example, Rochelais officials arrested a local Catholic nobleman and his son who tried to obstruct work on La Rochelle’s defenses. They also expelled Catholic priests from the town.39 Montauban enjoyed three years of relative calm as both sides prepared for renewed conflict. Royal forces remained nearby at Montech, while the Montalbanais repaired and reinforced their fortifications. When Épernon led a royal army into the region in 1626, authorities in Montauban reached an accord that promised them no hostilities if they, in turn, refused to lend assistance to La Rochelle during the upcoming royal siege where the fate of the Reformed cause soon became decided. Cardinal Richelieu’s ascendancy at the royal court after 1624 brought added energy to the crown’s long-standing desire to subdue Huguenot fortified towns and buy off those Huguenot noblemen it could not co-opt through conversion. War came in 1625 when the hotheaded Soubise seized the Ile-de-Ré. Rohan reluctantly joined him, though his efforts to raise troops in Languedoc fared miserably as towns such as Nîmes, Uzès, and Alès refused to open their gates to him. In September, the royal navy seriously damaged La Rochelle’s fleet when it tried to run the blockade. Richelieu ordered Jean de Saint-Bonnet, lord of Toiras, to retake Ré, which he did in a daring attack that sent Soubise into exile in England. La Rochelle resisted Richelieu’s overtures to settle hostilities and instead in December 1625 erected a fort at Tasdon between the town’s walls and the Coureilles point, sent envoys to England to forge an alliance with Charles I, and stockpiled food for the inevitable siege. Meanwhile, Henri III, duke of La Trémoïlle, a Huguenot commander sent by the crown, tendered peace overtures to the Rochelais who rejected them out of hand because they called for the public practice of Catholicism and demolition of the town’s walls. La Rochelle’s ties with the English, while dictated by necessity, compromised efforts by the city to defend its cause as bon françois. Yet the English had their own agenda, for their emissaries in March 1626 concluded an accord with the French crown that very much disadvantaged La Rochelle, even though it proved shortlived. In April, demolition of Fort Tasdon began. Controversies over the English alliance fueled further factionalism inside the city. Indeed, Buckingham’s foolhardy expedition to seize the Ile-de-Ré in June 1627 provided Richelieu all the excuse he needed to declare war against La Rochelle. Toiras dug in and held out against English attackers, as Richelieu reckoned that a successful siege hinged on controlling the island. Meanwhile, Angoulême tightened control over key places around the town and began to dig lines of circumvallation. The Rochelais responded by

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building a new fort between the Porte Saint-Nicolas and Tasdon. School buildings became converted into arsenals. In September, guards on the city ramparts noted the construction of two new forts by the royal forces at Bongraine and la Moulinette and the beginning of another one, the Fort de La Mothe, between Fort Louis and Porte des Deux-Moulins. The mayor ordered city batteries to fire upon these encroaching menaces on September 10. The last siege of La Rochelle had begun.40 The dramatic siege of La Rochelle in 1627–1628 marked a key turning point in the monarchy’s relations with the Huguenot community and marked the final end of independence for the bonnes villes.41 Under Richelieu’s leadership, the royal victory became possible because of the crown’s expanded capacity to mobilize military force and technological expertise as well as shape public perceptions of the conflict through a concerted propaganda campaign. Indeed, the pamphlet literature on military and political events is more voluminous on the 1628 siege of La Rochelle than any other episode in early modern France. The Rochelais tried to rally Huguenot opinion in Languedoc with pamphlets that decried the crown’s aim to establish citadels within the walls of their towns.42 Royal propagandists liked to tout the presence of Huguenot nobles in the king’s army as evidence the conflict did not concern religion. However, public conversions of these same noblemen to Catholicism belied this conceit. None was more spectacular than La Trémoille’s abjuration of Calvinism on July 18 in a ceremony hosted by Cardinal Richelieu in the royal camp. Jacques Callot’s monumental engraving of the siege allowed viewers a panoramic virtual experience of the conflict.43 The Bibliothèque Nationale alone possesses nearly three thousand separate pieces that relate different aspects of the siege. Granted, many are reprints of earlier tracts or pastiches of several already published, with light additions of new material; some of these publications treat very circumscribed time periods, while others approached the siege allegorically. It was an unprecedented attempt to mold public opinion in favor of the king’s arms. The main goal for the besieged, as in past sieges, was to draw out the conflict to win concessions from the crown, especially the destruction of Fort Louis. In August 1627, Louis XIII appointed his scheming brother, Gaston d’Orléans, as commander of the royal army sent to besiege La Rochelle, though he could issue no orders without explicit permission from the king or cardinal. Jealousies and rivalries among aristocratic commanders plagued the royal effort throughout the siege. Louis XIII’s arrival on September 12 enabled him to attend personally to many details of the siege. He and Richelieu strove to pay the soldiers on a regular basis, keep them well housed and well supplied; they also imposed strict discipline. The army they deployed eventually swelled to 18,000 men and 800 horses by summer 1628, while 250 ships of varying sizes and sorts, 13 of them ships of the line, participated in the siege.44 The total cost of the operation was around forty million livres—a full year’s revenues, to which should be added the personal sums spent by noble grandees. The pope authorized clerical revenues for the siege that French prelates only begrudgingly began to transfer in summer 1628 as “free gifts” (dons gratuits). As a result, Richelieu and the surintendant Antoine Ruzé d’Effiat borrowed huge sums to keep the siege going. Besieging La Rochelle posed immense technical and logistical difficulties. The besieging force drew its supplies from a wide regional ambit based in urban centers such as Poitiers and Niort. River traffic down the Sèvre as far as Sérigny regularly

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delivered munitions that carters then hauled to La Rochelle. The town’s formidable defenses made a direct assault almost certain suicide. The decision was therefore to starve the town into submission, which meant building and maintaining long lines of circumvallation and a seawall during the winter. All this work required a vast workforce and much stone and timber; special machines had to be built to hoist and place these materials into position. The most daunting technical challenge was without question blockading La Rochelle’s harbor. Earlier that spring, the crown hired the Italian engineer Pompeo Targoni to solve this problem. As far back as 1621, Targoni had proposed using special machines to bar the port; in April 1627, in fact, he tested a prototype on the Seine called an estacade. It consisted of floating barges with cannons strung together by an immense chain supported by barrel buoys tethered to wooden pilings.45 Targoni proposed stretching a net across the channel to prevent fish from entering the harbor, thus cutting off one of the few remaining sources of food for the city. Several observers expressed skepticism about Targoni’s plan and pushed for a cruder solution, which the king embraced on November 19 when he ordered forty ships from Bordeaux sunk in the channel. A fierce storm three days later, however, smashed the makeshift dike to pieces. Meanwhile, Targoni fell from favor and the next year actually was thrown into prison, along with his family, on trumped up charges of spying for Spain.46 In November 1627, Richelieu passed the seawall project to the architectengineer Clément Métézeau and the master mason Jean Thiriot.47 Expanding on Targoni’s initial scheme, they envisioned a monumental stone dike fifty-five feet wide at the base and twenty-five feet high that stretched nearly a mile in length, with a six-hundred yard opening in the middle to accommodate the tides. Work began in January 1628, as did problems. Skilled artisans dragooned from elsewhere soon deserted. A storm on January 10 swept away the wooden pilings set in place the previous fall because they lacked a sufficient foundation. A week later, Rochelais saboteurs destroyed the flotilla of boats sent out to repair them. Yet repairs resumed right away. Richelieu also ordered iron chains from Bordeaux, Niort, Saintes, Angoulême, Poitiers, and other places to be twisted about the cables suspended across the channel. On January 21, nine more ships from Bordeaux were sunk to strengthen the foundation. The next night, a Rochelais raiding party stole out under cover of fog in rowboats with ladders to cut the cables. The attack failed, however, because most of the sailors involved arrived drunk. The dike eventually became more stabilized when Métézeau realized he needed to taper the platforms, much like a pyramid, down to the seafloor and array them in a zigzag pattern across the harbor mouth. Two stone jetties shaped like scorpion’s claws guarded the channel bisecting the dike.48 The seawall in effect became an underwater bastion. Between them were stone pylons, barricades of wooden beams connected by iron rings atop barrels to ships lashed together by chains. Finally in April, under the direction of Bernard du Plessis-Besançon, came the construction of a huge system of some two-hundred stone and wooden obstacles deployed between the seawall and La Rochelle to impede an enemy attack. Du Plessis-Besançon had them built in workshops set up in Saintes, floated down the Charente, and then hauled to the harbor of La Rochelle.49 Illustrations of these “chandeliers du PlessisBesançon,” as contemporaries referred to them, can be found in images of the siege depicting the seawall with its floating artillery platforms and system of interlocking timber trusses.50 Despite all these monumental labors, a fierce storm on July 29 still destroyed portions of the dike and dispersed the floating fence. Métézeau and

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Du Plessis-Besançon remained undaunted and undertook repairs immediately lest the English tried to take advantage of the situation to relieve the city. Assistance from other Huguenot communities, so vital in the past, proved desultory despite ongoing efforts by Rohan and Soubise. Castres actually refused them entry, while Montauban, long a hotbed of militancy, remained on the sidelines until March when Millau revolted and Rohan briefly seized Pamiers. Although several other towns soon declared for the Huguenot cause, the momentum of resistance petered out in early summer 1628 as a force under Condé joined Henri II, duke of Montmorency, in chasing Rohan’s small army out of Pamiers. Condé and the aged Épernon besieged the town of Saint-Affrique in the Aveyron. Accounts of the siege highlight the role of the town’s women, who repaired the walls and fought like Amazons. Another siege at Mirabel in the Vivarais also saw royal forces prevail.51 Ensuing defeats at Nîmes and Alès left Rohan in no position to relieve La Rochelle, which remained the sole site of Huguenot resistance to the might of the French crown. Sealed off and alone, La Rochelle became doomed as a result of the monarchy’s combination of engineering acumen, superior resources and sheer doggedness. La Rochelle’s necessary reliance on the English continued to create problems. Its alliance with Charles I of England in late February required a promise not to consider any talk of peace with the king of France without the English king’s explicit consent. Upon learning of this condition, Richelieu’s propagandists derided the Rochelais’ claim to be bon François. By May 1628, food supplies ran perilously low and promises of English help never materialized. Buckingham’s arrest in June and eventual assassination in August further weakened English interest in mounting a determined relief effort. Letters to Charles I seeking relief noted the growing stranglehold on the city.52 In late 1627, a special war council headed by the mayor Jean de Godefoy and composed of four aldermen, four peers, eight burghers, and two councilors from the Présidial court became created and invested with extraordinary powers to deal with all military matters. Later friction between the war council, headed by Jean Guiton since his election as mayor in April, and the Présidial court headed by Raphäel Colin over jurisdictional competence and authority became so bad that each faction tried to arrest the other on charges of treason.53 This factionalism only compounded La Rochelle’s mounting desperation as spring turned to summer and food shortages gave way to starvation. Richelieu tried to inflame social tensions in the city by spreading handbills that claimed the rich in La Rochelle had plenty to eat while the poor went without. Price controls on food failed to stem inflation. At the siege’s height, a dog’s head went for ten livres, an egg also for up to ten livres, and a single grape for one livre eight sous—all many times an average day’s pay.54 Anyone caught hoarding food or selling it above these designated prices risked imprisonment and confiscation of all their goods. As the situation worsened for La Rochelle, desertion among its defenders became more common. If caught by royal forces, deserters were stripped of all their possessions and sent back naked to the city, where they lingered before its walls knowing full well they faced hanging if they went inside. Women captured collecting herbs or shellfish just outside the walls were cruelly raped and also sent back naked. Royal sharpshooters picked off children in sport if espied doing the same. In August, Richelieu issued an order to shoot on the spot anyone caught outside the city wall. Cases became reported of starving Rochelais offering themselves as objects of debauchery to royal troops in exchange for a crust of bread. In September, people

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resorted to plaster, carrion, bones dug from graves and dung for food. In October came reports of cannibalism as well as descriptions of well-off merchants who climbed into coffins placed in churches with prayers to God on their lips as they prepared to die. The siege also took its toll on the royal forces into the fall as supplies dwindled, desertions increased and morale flagged. The siege of La Rochelle, like most sieges, became a grim contest of attrition and endurance. Official calls for La Rochelle to surrender became a recurring ritual upon Louis XIII’s return to the siege on April 25. At first, they occurred each week and then in August each day as a herald-at-arms accompanied by two trumpeters dutifully marched up before the main gate in the morning demanding it be opened. Elaborate refusals by the mayor and city officials from the parapets, who mixed cordiality with bravura, formed the requisite counterpoint to these encounters. In late September, all hope for La Rochelle vanished when the English fleet under Lord Lindsey finally arrived but kept its distance from the French batteries overlooking the harbor. Informal talks with Richelieu soon opened but made little headway, as the cardinal insisted upon a triumphal entry while the Rochelais insisted on meeting the king in front of the gate. Upon these ceremonial differences turned a highly significant shift in the relationship between the crown and this last of the great independent bonnes villes. Richelieu insisted the surrender be unconditional and utter and that the town beg for the king’s “grâce.” When Daniel de la Goutte, speaking on behalf of the city, recalled to the king La Rochelle’s past support of his father, Louis XIII reportedly replied: “I pray to God that you render your honor not because of the straits to which you have been reduced. I know well that you have always been trouble makers, full of tricks and ready to do anything to challenge my authority. I therefore pardon your rebellion with the promise that if you are henceforth good and faithful subjects, I will be a good king” (see figure 7.2).55 With the monarchy’s triumph at La Rochelle arrived an opportunity for Catholics in southern France to exact revenge against the Huguenots. Recognizing the volatility of the situation, Richelieu moved quickly in 1629 to provide royal safeguards for the beleaguered Huguenots while rendering them militarily impotent. He achieved this goal in the peace treaty known as the Grace of Alès. Located near Nîmes in lower Languedoc, Alès was one of the last Huguenot places besieged by Louis XIII. After it capitulated on June 17, 1629, Richelieu issued the eponymous treaty eleven days later to conclude France’s last War of Religion. While it confirmed the right to hold Calvinist services in selected sites, it called for the immediate destruction of the thirty-eight fortified places still held by the Huguenots. Few places, however, actually fully lost their defenses right away, if at all. In many ways, the announcement of the intention to demolish town walls rather than actually carrying it out allowed the monarchy to make the momentous point that henceforth its authority was paramount and unquestioned in the kingdom. The fall of La Rochelle marked a decisive turning point in the monarchy’s relations with the bonnes villes and the kingdom at large. Of the estimated twentyeight thousand inhabitants at the start of the siege, only some fifty-four hundred remained alive at the end. By 1636, it had rebounded to eighteen thousand and eventually surpassed its original size by 1700.56 Symbolic monuments in print and onsite presented a simple picture of urban submission and royal magnanimity.57 The reality of pacification unfolded in a more complex manner in the months and years ahead, at times reflecting the crown’s preeminence while at others signaling the enduring importance of local interests. No town underwent more thorough, if

Figure 7.2

Surrender of La Rochelle, 1628. By permission of the Bibliothèque Nationale (B.N. 152878).

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still, partial demilitarization under Louis XIII than La Rochelle. In this respect, it provides a benchmark for the ensuing grand rasement (“great demolition”). La Rochelle’s pacification began with a triumphal procession through the city on October 29 and the public reestablishment of Catholicism on All Saints Day when Louis XIII attended a mass celebrated by Richelieu at the church of SainteMarguerite, a former arsenal during the siege. Over the next several weeks, the crown expanded its local prerogatives, curtailed municipal liberties, and strengthened its dispenser of royal justice in the Présidial Court. The temple in the Place du Château was converted into a Catholic cathedral. No one could own or sell weapons without special royal permission. All artillery and munitions were transferred to Brouage.58 The crown sought to make Rochefort into its main western naval base, despite perpetual silting problems in the Charente that required constant dredging. However, by the early 1640s, La Rochelle again possessed a reconstituted civic militia and cannons to provide welcoming salvos to visiting dignitaries.59 Administration of the city henceforth lay in the hands of royal officers attached to the office of seneschal. The king appointed Gaspard Cougnet, lord of La Tuilerie, to serve as intendant of La Rochelle in November 1628 with jurisdiction over the Aunis and Saintonge. The Présidial court absorbed many of the functions once the purview of the town council. Municipal government was overhauled, with the crown exercising much more direct control over staff and jurisdictional matters. A royal garrison was also established. At the same time, Louis XIII and Richelieu allowed for Rochelais notables once prominent in the resistance, such as Jean Guiton, to make amends and reenter public service.60 Only Charles Venier La Grossetière, former page to the king who served in the Rochelais army, was executed. Most telling of all was what happened—and did not happen—to La Rochelle’s fortifications. Louis XIII apparently resolved to dismantle all fortifications not facing the sea during an after-dinner walk on his first day in the city. Two days later, accompanied by Richelieu and leading court nobles, the king again went forth into the streets only this time all residents had been ordered to stand before their houses along the promenade route. The excursion culminated when the royal party watched the wall between the Porte de Maubec and the Porte de Saint-Nicolas torn down.61 Two weeks later, a royal proclamation abolished the city’s privileges, suppressed its governing apparatus, confiscated its cannons and melted down its bells, and ordered the immediate demolition of all its defenses except the towers guarding approaches from the sea. Yet this work of destruction never began as attention instead turned to removing the network of forts and lines the besiegers had put in place around La Rochelle so it would not longer be cut off from the immediate hinterland. The sea dike also required dismantling, especially after a ship foundered and sank on December 12 while trying to cross it. All land covered by La Rochelle’s fortifications, including those in the Neuve Ville, were given to Claude de Rouvroy, lord of Saint-Simon and Grand Louvetier de France, who was Louis XIII’s favorite at the time. The king made this grant on December 30, 1628, and the property came to be known as the Fief Saint Louis, comprising some one hundred and thirty acres, including all of the Neuve Ville.62 The grant entitled Saint-Simon to all building materials in the domain and established seigniorial rents and dues that ratified the eradication of La Rochelle’s franchises. Many of the contracts drawn up between renters and Saint-Simon reveal plans to improve these properties for commercial, manufacturing, and residential

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purposes.63 However, Saint-Simon soon sold this property, estimated to be worth over eighty thousand livres, to a local tax farmer named Louis Martin for some forty-two thousand livres. Apparently this transaction greatly peeved the king because it effectively transferred control of property encircling the city back to the Rochelais.64 After 1628, demolition of parts of the fortified gate complex began, with much of the rubble used to help reconstruct the priory church, vestiges of which, such as embrasures, remain visible to this day.65 The Neuve Ville area became the center of Counter-Reformation activity in La Rochelle. Walls and outworks became replaced by Catholic religious houses and a new fiscal barrier. The fortified gate at the Porte de Maubec survived as the entryway into a garden pavilion for a new noble townhouse.66 Fortification areas were put to new purposes. Fronting ditches to the west of the rue Chef-de-Ville became the site of a new Protestant cemetery in 1635; another area near the Pont de la Courbeille comprised part of the property ceded to the Chartrains in 1646 for the Hôpital Saint-Barthélémy.67 In these ways, the militarized periphery gave way to a new kind of city. Nothing reflected La Rochelle’s new status as a frontier town in the kingdom than Louis XIV’s decision in the 1690s to rebuild its westward facing defenses while leaving the quarters facing east open.

The G R A ND R ASEMENT Finally able after 1629 to remove town walls without armed resistance, the Bourbon monarchy now faced the reality that it was no longer so pressingly necessary to do so. Since the twelfth century, the threat of rasement was made and, much less often, acted upon during the course of countless conflicts. Indeed, during the Wars of Religion, it occurred with considerable regularity in the case of castles.68 For the bonnes villes, it was a more problematical proposition both in terms of expense and political consequences. As urban notables became more involved in the office-holding, credit, and social networks related to the monarchy, so their interests became more bound together with it in their capacity as middling officials of the crown.69 For those reasons, explicit demilitarization of the urban edge as La Rochelle experienced, and a select handful of other towns, was altogether exceptional. Demilitarization of a different sort nevertheless transpired for towns not along the kingdom’s frontiers. It was a process of deferred maintenance and then outright neglect, or misappropriation or revamping for new uses. Once proud symbols of urban prestige, town walls eventually served as archaic reminders of a past that now lived most vividly on the pages of antiquarian histories. Not that the crown had not threatened rasement of the defenses of any town that defied it during the last Huguenot war. In 1622, for example, Montmorency’s order to raze Nîmes’s enceinte never got off the ground until after 1630. Demolition of Montauban’s wall began in 1628 but remained incomplete.70 The peace accord with Montauban on August 17, 1629, required the town to dismantle its fortifications.71 However, a petition from the consuls shortly after Richelieu’s triumphant entry combined soft obstruction with careful negotiation to blunt the crown’s attempt to tear down its walls.72 When it became clear the demolitions would go ahead, town officials shifted tack and argued, this time successfully, that the costs be spread out across Guyenne.73 As it turned out, Montauban’s walls actually underwent repairs authorized by the crown during the Fronde. In 1628, Richelieu had

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walls brought down at Saintes, Niort and the Ile-de-Ré. Castles and fortified towns in Poitou, such as Lusignan, Montaigu, and Saint-Gilles-Croix-de-Vie, underwent dismantlement as far back as the 1590s. This practice resumed in 1622 as a result of Soubise’s revolt in lower Poitou but only became systematic following the fall of La Rochelle.74 Towns that remained loyal to the crown, such as Parthenay, Bressuire, and Thouars, were spared, while others such as Fontenay-le-Comte retained walls because they retained operational importance. Huguenot places de sûreté, such as Loudon and Saint-Maixent, saw their walls torn down, as did the former Leaguer stronghold of Tiffauges. The walls of other towns, some of which went back to the twelfth-century, such as Talmont, La Roche-sur-Yon, Commequiers, and Maillezais, either became demolished entirely or more symbolically reduced by having their ditches filled and towers cropped. Demolitions of castles and fortified churches in Languedoc accelerated after Montmorency’s revolt in 1632. The fortified church of Maguelone, which went back to the eleventh century, was dismantled as a defensive structure—in effect, demilitarized—upon orders by Richelieu in 1632.75 The small burg of Maugio near Montpellier saw its status reduced to a village following the demolition of its walls and filling of its ditches, while a collegial church in Montréal saw its walls torn down.76 Local sentiment favored demolition, mainly to remove a constant financial drain on nearby villages, while the crown desired to remove a potential obstacle to its authority. Some castles in the heart of the kingdom even saw their fortifications modernized in the early 1600. The castle of Saint-Amand-Montrond in the Cher, for example, originally built in 1225 and recently updated by Sully in 1606 underwent further expansion after 1621 when it passed into the possession of the Condé family. An engineer named Jean Sarrazin oversaw this work, which continued intermittently to mid-century. However, in the Fronde this stronghold came under royal siege and eventually capitulated on September 1, 1652. Mazarin ordered its immediate destruction, as he did castles of other nobles who had defied him and the crown. Curiously, much the same contracting process occurred to demolish walls as to build them. A contract awarded in November 1633 to take down fortifications in Montauban went to the mason Jean Bourgeois, who six years earlier had received the contract to repair them.77 When Richelieu ordered the walls of Montflanquin demolished in 1632, he had the stones used to rebuild an Augustinian convent that the Huguenots had partially destroyed in the 1560s. The outlines of a more comprehensive approach to the kingdom’s defenses took shape under Richelieu and accelerated following the fall of La Rochelle. In 1625, the cardinal put in place a policy of construction and demolition that designated fortified places to strengthen and those “in the heart of the realm” (au coeur du royaume) to demolish for the sake of the king’s état.78 Toward these ends, he reshaped and expanded the royal fortification service along the lines already established by Sully. In the vital area of finances, he called for the creation of three general comptrollers whose sole duty was every year to audit all accounts of fortification expenses. Costs of demolitions were usually borne locally, which caused resentment or obstruction. Richelieu also proposed establishing a royal engineer along with a team of assistants, such as surveyors and draftsmen, in every major city in the realm. He subordinated them to the intendants of the army and no longer the provincial governors to ensure greater central control. As a result, the crown devoted increased attention after 1630 to shoring up frontier defenses from Flanders to the Pyrenees.79 In the east, along with walled towns, fortified churches found renewed

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purposes in Lorraine and the Thiérache during the brutal campaigns of the Thirty Years’ War.80 In a royal declaration of July 31, 1626, Louis XIII announced his intention to review the status of all fortified places. An Assembly of Notables met in Paris in December 1626 to February 1627 to consider this same question. In his celebrated Avis au Roi of January 11, 1629, Richelieu called for the demolition of fortifications except those along the kingdom’s frontiers. These edicts distinguished recently built stone-and-brick bastions, which they slated for destruction, from the older curtain walls and earthen ramparts, which they ordered not to be touched.81 Other memos from the 1640s echoed this distinction when detailing additional demolitions.82 The cardinal envisioned a defensive system of specially fortified and garrisoned towns and places that formed a vast glacis around the realm further reinforced through diplomatic alliances and judiciously distributed subsidies. Towns generally welcomed the crown’s efforts to raze châteaux-forts as decreed in 1626, despite the order’s indifferent implementation.83 One reason for the failure to follow through with this intention lay with the crown, which found new purposes for the older medieval castles inside the enceintes. In Loches, Angers and Bourges, they served to lodge royal governors; in Angoulême, Tours, Saumur, Dax, Lourdes and Niort, they provided hospitals and prisons; while in Troyes, Foix and Tarascon, they became simply prisons. Citadels also housed royal garrisons of varying sizes to maintain local oversight by crown. The crown’s ambitious program of rasement thus failed to be realized for a variety of reasons, not least of which was France’s formal entry into the Thirty Years’ War in 1635. Louis XIII and Richelieu also initiated their fair share of new fortification projects along the frontier incorporating the latest designs. The port town of Brouage was of special interest to the cardinal. After the fall of La Rochelle, he ordered Charles Leber du Carlo to design a citadel for this strategic site that served as the chief naval arsenal and hospital along the Atlantic coast. Illness prevented Carlo from overseeing construction, which fell to Pierre de Conti, lord of La Motte d’Argencourt. The new enceinte represented the most up-to-date bastion design, though Vauban later criticized it as unnecessarily excessive. It also strove for aesthetic expression in the multicolored brick patterns and ornamentation, all of which reflected the power and grandeur of the French monarchy. Yet silting proved relentless, which explains why later Louis XIV and his minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, decided to construct a new fortified port on France’s western coast, Rochefort, even though Vauban erected new fortifications for Brouage just as it became superseded. When the walls began to be torn down or, as more often occurred, allowed to fall into desuetude after 1630, urban notables fairly quickly recognized the pecuniary and proprietary advantages afforded by converting the vast acreage consumed by “defense-in-depth” to more lucrative uses. As a result, the long-standing image of the fortified bonne ville gradually gave way to a new discourse on la commerce and the city after 1650, where it has remained by and large down to the present. Signs of this new kind of townscape can already be discerned during the Wars of Religion. Fortification projects occasionally opened up opportunities for a fuller revamping of urban space beyond immediate military needs. The scale of such operations usually depended on the money and commitment of powers behind them. Parceled allotments raised much of the necessary capital, supplemented by infusions by the crown or wealthy investor syndicates, to underwrite these projects. In fact, the foundation process was not markedly different from that of a

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medieval bastide. In the process, the militarized edge, long the dominant feature of French towns, slowly yielded to new urban forms fashioned to reflect the values of public pageantry, commerce, and greater leisure and hygiene. Growing interest in roads, canals, and bridges bespoke this new sensibility. In 1605, for example, work began on a canal connecting Briare, located on the Loire, and Montargis to the north. This project ultimately aimed to join the Loire and Seine. This first link, known as the canal de Briare, employed up to twelve thousand laborers at a time over the next near forty years until the canal opened in 1642. This project was entirely financed by a consortium of private investors. Centuries of seeking security through enclosure thus gradually gave way in the early 1600s to the pursuit of a more open engagement with the outside world. The shift toward this new urbanism at first reflected a mix of princely and mercantile interests mediated through new ideas about architectural grandeur and elegance. At its core was the great square.84 Perhaps the most precocious experiment was in Nancy, the capital of the Duchy of Lorraine. Nancy’s transformation into a ducal showcase began in the 1560s. Over the next fifty years, Nancy’s new walls connecting the bastioned perimeter exhibited polychromatic geometric patterns made out of red, green, and black bricks. Cut stone was used on all the edges (parements), while a sophisticated hydraulic system connected to the Meuse allowed regulation of the water levels in the surrounding ditches. To accommodate its growing population, ducal officials planned a new town (Ville Neuve) for Nancy, though debates continue over whether Italians or local masons designed it. The plan eventually called for the razing of the two older faubourgs south of the city, as well as the village of Saint-Dizier to the north, replaced by the Ville Neuve laid out orthogonally with six streets running north to south, traversed by four streets going east to west. Surrounding this new district, which quadrupled the size of the city, was an imposing new enceinte composed of eight massive bastions replete with halfmoons, a large ditch, and glacis.85 Duke Charles III poured huge sums of money into this ambitious project, which continued on until 1620, twelve years after his death. Some medieval features, such as the towers found on some of the gates in the old town, survived despite these wholesale changes. Despite all this expense, Nancy offered virtually no resistance when French forces conquered it in 1633. Paris under Henri IV witnessed several other significant attempts to elevate the grandeur of the king’s capital, particularly the Place Dauphine, the Place Royale, the Hôpital Saint-Louis, the Place de France, and the Pont Neuf.86 Under Louis XIII, the Île Saint-Louis underwent significant change, as did the Pré-auxClercs and the neighborhood in and around Richelieu’s Palais Royal. In nearly every instance, these urban rebuilding campaigns cleared out dwellings and businesses occupied by artisans and even humbler residents and replaced them with housing and shops for the wealthy. Urban renewal projects in the seventeenth century reinforced the trend toward greater social stratification. These projects also concentrated on lightly built areas inside the old city walls, with the exception of projects that took place in the suburbs. Areas such Saint- Germain held potential, but high property prices or the difficulties of relocating influential religious houses impeded urban development. Even earlier royal legislation, such as the edicts issued by Henri II in 1548 and 1554 forbidding any construction outside the city’s walls, remained in effect until 1638 when the royal government loosened this stricture by allowing building within an expanded perimeter outside the walls known as the bornage, demarcated by stone markers.

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New towns became built elsewhere in France in the early seventeenth century. On the Meuse River across from Mézières was erected in 1608 a huge new palacecity named Charleville, after its patron Charles de Gonzague, count of Rethel and Nevers. The architect was probably Claude Métézeau, later famous for the dike at La Rochelle.87 Inspired by the Italian città ideale, its checkerboard pattern had at its center an elegant square dominated by the ducal palace and aristocratic townhouses. Its close resemblance to the Place Royale (now des Vosges) in Paris was due to the fact that Métézeau’s brother Louis designed it. Sully planned another new town, Henrichemont, in 1608 on land that he had purchased north of Bourges. Intended as a Huguenot place de sûreté, Henrichemont took a radiocentric form with one large central plaza surrounded by four subsidiary ones. The town remained only partially built as a result of its namesake’s assassination in 1610 and Sully’s subsequent fall from power. An interesting early example of this neoclassical urbanism where the mercantile character dominated was in Montauban. Ravaged by fire in the early 1600s, municipal officials undertook an ambitious rebuilding of the commercial heart of the town, creating an arcaded square for shops and residences in 1614. Indeed, one of the reasons Montauban neglected its enceinte before 1620 was because of its financial commitment to this project.88 These trends continued under Louis XIII. The continuity comes through well in the case of Havre-de-Grâce. After nearly forty years of decline following the 1563 siege, this important port town began its renewal in September 1603 when Henri IV ordered work to restore the harbor as part of a larger plan to revitalize commerce on the Seine. Finally in the 1630s, due to Richelieu’s continuing commitment to the project, Havre-de-Grâce became firmly established as the vital link between the Seine and the sea. The cardinal-minister sought to delineate the port town’s military and commercial functions, reserving the Bassin du Roy for ships-ofthe-line, built in the huge new naval dockyards that he had erected, while confining commercial craft to just outside the harbor and along the main quay. Richelieu had a chance to express his own urban vision in the eponymous ville-residence he started in 1625. Located in the borderlands between Poitou and Touraine at his ancestral château, it received a bold new design by Jacques Lemercier, a royal architect, after Louis XIII elevated Richelieu to the peerage in 1631. Lemercier’s brothers, Pierre and Nicolas, oversaw the project. Completed in 1642, the town of Richelieu resembled in many respects a typical medieval bastide. Walls enclosed a quadrilateral layout pierced by three monumental gates, while the fourth was a false gate constructed for the sake of symmetry. It had two main squares: the Place Royale, subsequently renamed the Place des Religieuses for its academy for boys and a convent for girls, and the Place du Cardinal, later known as the Place du Marché, which was the commercial and political center of the town. Upon the cardinal’s death, the new town ceased to grow though visitors frequented it over the next century, including Louis XIV, Jean de La Fontaine and Voltaire.

Warmaking after 1630 In the 1620s, Philippe Dupuy, one of the king’s librarians, composed a memoir that asserted there had not been twenty consecutive years of peace in France since the establishment of monarchy under Pharamond.89 Behind this grim observation lay the historical development of the fiscal-military state in France, an entity best defined as an unstable yet enduring set of social relationships and institutions

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that reached their high point under the monarchy in the reign of Louis XIV. The Bourbon triumph at La Rochelle reflected the outmost limits at the time of the monarchy’s ability to field and wage effective warfare. Its success sprang as much from engineering as from the logistical network that sustained, at enormous expense, the royal armies assembled there and in Huguenot Languedoc for those many months. Historians now doubt whether a Military Revolution of the kind that occurred in Sweden and the Dutch Netherlands adequately describes developments in seventeenth-century France. The fragility of royal military power under the late Valois, and even the modest size of the French army under Henri IV, reflected France’s real limitations as an armed power into the 1620s. Despite moves under Sully to create a more effective military bureaucracy, the armies fielded by Richelieu against the Huguenots and then the Hapsburgs still largely relied on clientele networks, ad hoc financing, and creative cajoling.90 Patronage and venality buttressed and amplified the informal, yet powerful bureaucratic mechanisms of influence and obedience wielded by the crown.91 The increasing use of army intendants considerably enhanced the central control of Richelieu and his war ministers, Abel Servien and François Sublet de Noyers.92 As a result, the royal army under Louis XIII grew, though estimates by historians range from eighty thousand to two hundred thousand.93 A major reason why these coercive powers of mobilizing men and material for war became more effective under Louis XIII and his son lay in the continuing development of engineering science and professional engineers. Even after Jean Errard’s death in 1611, French military engineering practice still drew heavily on Italian and Dutch writings on general architecture and fortifications, which emphasized the significance of geographical location, political context, and rituals of foundation when constructing fortifications.94 Translations proved common and apparently sold well.95 Most of these writers tended either to privilege theory or praxis, but rarely both. The Dutch mathematician and engineer Simon Stevin was an exception. His La Castramétation, published in 1618, stressed efficiency and low cost rather than geometric regularity in the design of military encampments and fortified enceintes, while in his Oeuvres Mathématiques, which appeared in 1634, he pointed the way toward the analytic geometry of Descartes and Desargues.96 Writers who tended toward high-minded discussions of cosmology and universal truth found inspiration in the work of Vincenzo Scamozzi, especially his remarkable bastionededged radial design for Palmanova. He also strove to create a functioning city, balancing its residential and commercial needs with those of humane governance.97 Scamozzi’s interest in Hermeticism resonated with the mysterious Rosicrucian movement popular among intellectuals, artists, and craftsmen in France, where he actually spent some time.98 One of them was the accomplished engineer Samuel Marolais, whose books on fortifications and practical geometry glossed Dutch and Italian works, presenting impassioned discussion of anthropomorphic analogies and the magical powers of the compass and other surveying instruments but no real mention of any actual applications to built forms.99 Dilettantes, such as the moralist Honorat de Meynier, also dabbled on the subject of fortifications, trying to make it fashionable for a decidedly civilian audience.100 On the other end of the spectrum were the do-it-yourself architectural and surveying manuals that continued to be reprinted and emulated until the midseventeenth century. A manual on practical geometry attributed to the sixteenthcentury Toulousain alchemist Denis Zacarie, styled in the frontipiece as a “professor

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of mathematics,” appeared in 1618 and included a treatise on the compass.101 Using his pseudonyms Clément Cyriaque de Mangin and Denis Henrion, Pierre Hérigone published numerous treatises on advanced and practical mathematics during Louis XIII’s reign.102 New editions of Euclid’s Elements regularly poured off the presses.103 Despite Errard’s modest design innovations, continuity and conservatism generally prevailed in architectural and urban design until 1650. Rational calculations of size, capacity, and cost increasingly drove architectural design from individual buildings to entire cities and their fortifications. In 1624, for example, the king’s physician, Louis Savoit, published his Architecture française des bastimens particuliers, which later was edited and reissued by no less an expert than François Blondel in 1673 and 1685. Pierre Le Muet’s Manière de bastir pour toutes sortes de personnes, printed in 1623 and reissued four times, like Du Cerceau, presented plans of different kinds of residences suited to purpose, status, and available acreage. Mathurin Jousse’s handbook for stonecutters and carpenters on the basics of stereonomy, Le Secret de l’Architecture, signified a final displacement, begun the previous century by De l’Orme, of traditional craft methods learned in shops by bookish knowledge from published experts. A similar desire to impart a mathematical foundation to the treatment of basic materials essential to construction animated Josse’s L’Art de la Charpenterie. Works on surveying, explosives, and ballistics appeared by the dozen.104 While such manuals still proffered advice to men in the building trades, they increasingly pitched their message to would-be patrons, including royal officials, as well as common soldiers.105 They merged technical expertise with managerial skills to train, in time, military engineers capable of serving in the top echelons of the royal government. This kind of technocratic profile increasingly characterized men involved in the royal fortification service under Louis XIII. In the 1620s, Jean Fabre, an engineer in the Valtelline campaign, wrote a short work on fortifications that appeared in 1629.106 Pierre de Conty d’Argencour served at the 1628 siege of La Rochelle and designed the new royal citadel.107 Conty d’Argencour became Richelieu’s favorite engineer and oversaw the completion of the celebrated coastal defenses of the port towns of Brouage and Havre-de-Grâce in the 1630s. He also oversaw fortification repairs in Péronne in 1632. Another was Abraham Fabert, the son of a printer from Metz, who enjoyed a career remarkably similar to that of Vauban a generation later. Despite his humble background, Fabert received a solid training in mathematics and drawing that enabled him to become one of the premier military engineers of his day, though he never published on the subject. His skill and bravery brought him rapid promotion during campaigns against the Huguenots in the 1620s, the war against the Duchy of Lorraine in the early 1630s, and continued service in the Thirty Years War in 1635 until its conclusion at the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659. He also participated in the Fronde of the princes in the early 1650s. In 1633, Fabert became governor of Metz, received the title of marquis in 1650, and a year later was named lieutenant-général of the royal armies. His career reached its zenith with his appointment in 1658 as marshal. Fabert created a number of regional maps during the 1620s, particularly of the emerging eastern frontier from the Ardennes south through Champagne.108 Another highly capable man versed in engineering and management was Antoine de Ville from Toulouse. De Ville brought a high level of mathematical expertise to his designs, using both advanced geometry and logarithms, newly invented in the

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early seventeenth century.109 His career took him across much of western Europe. He participated in the crown’s campaigns against Huguenot towns in southern France and the 1628 siege of La Rochelle In 1624, he entered the service of the Dutch and a year later joined Savoyard forces in the Piedmont. He took part in many sieges, experiences that later powerfully influenced his theory of fortification design and ideas about conducting siege warfare. After France’s formal entry into the Thirty Years’ War in 1635, De Ville entered the employ of Cardinal Richelieu, working with French forces in Picardy and Hainault, where he again lent technical assistance in sieges at Landrecies, Castelet, and Hesdin. De Ville mentioned an engineer named Capitaine Le Rasle, who served in the regiment of Champagne in fortified works in that region and along the Meuse. Antoine de Ville was France’s most original fortification design theorist since Jean Errard, whose work he knew well since he was involved in the publication of an edition of Errard’s original treatise in 1620. In his own published works, De Ville aimed to educate officers in the new technical aspects of war “à la moderne,” integrating discussion of resource management with advanced geometry and surveying. It also contained a brief section on fortifications, a subject he delved into in great detail in his massive treatise published in 1636.110 He grouped his treatment into three main points that covered bastion design, construction, and an active defense. He emphasized adapting designs to the contours of the terrain as much as possible, a feature noticeable in his plan in 1643 for the defenses of SaintJean-Pied-de-Portis. In his book on a commander’s duties, De Ville examined the proper deployment of men, weapons, and supplies in scrupulous planning that foreshadowed Vauban’s later statistical formulations.111 He also discussed the need to build citadels to safeguard frontier towns against foreign enemies or a recalcitrant population. Under Louis XIII, cartographers and geographers for the king continued to work closely with royal military engineers. They honed their techniques for greater accuracy and complexity to guide both the prosecution of war and propagandistic depictions of it to influence public opinion. Among them were Jacques Maretz, Pierre Bertius, and the extraordinary Jacques Callot and Sébastien de Beaulieu in the 1620s and 1630s.112 As a result, conceptions about urban place and territorial space profoundly altered as each could now be effectively captured in an image that guided its capture or secured its rule.113 More sophisticated languages of visual representation and powerful forms of mathematics, like the calculus, eventually developed as did refined methods of etching for expensive printing projects, such as atlases and huge wall maps that diffused new modes of seeing “like a state.”114 The transformation of classical mechanics into the engineering sciences during this period also played an important role. At one level, there occurred a gradual shift away from Aristotelian notions of attribute and qualities toward more materialistic explanations that emphasized form and movement seen as the displacement of matter in space and time. The scholastic terminology of Aristotelianism became replaced by the precise language of mathematics, which paved the way for many key scientific breakthroughs. The use of mathematics and physics to explain physical phenomena enabled seventeenth-century engineers to move beyond the empirical craft traditions that for so long had informed the techniques of defense and attack. Here the work of the mathematician Merin Mersenne figured prominently, for through his translations several of Galileo’s most important treatises become known in France. Publications on warfare and practical mathematics only increased

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after 1630, among them René Descartes’ famous treatise on method.115 The inveterate bibliographer Gabriel Naudé’s Syntagma de Studio militari, published in Rome in 1637, was the earliest compendium of books with which any student of military matters should be familiar. A popular manual that many engineers later working for Vauban undoubtedly used was the Elementa geometrie praticae, published in 1654 by the André Tacquet, who taught at the Jesuit colleges in Louvain and Antwerp. The lessons were organized in such a manner that the assiduous student could teach himself basic geometry and algebra. In the late 1640s, Blaise de Pagan further underscored the importance of taking topography into account when designing defenses-in-depth, with a tight integration and coordination of all elements in the enceinte and its outworks. He also advised that the flanks of bastions be perpendicular to the line of defense to allow for more effective enfilade firing.116 Throughout the seventeenth century, the overwhelming majority of treatises on or related to military architecture equated geometry with reality. Count Pagan’s works on architecture allied its underpinning mathematical principles with the geometrical order expressed in the Copernican theory of the cosmos, as he elaborated on in his books on the planets and astrology. This spatial dimension in Pagan’s work led him to recommend to study the geometry of defense-in-depth—a notion that Vauban, a close reader of Pagan, later took to heart. While towns continued to quarter soldiers, provide supply depots, and manufacture armaments as before, what changed was the greater central direction under the Ministry of War through the army intendants. The decision in 1643 to create commissaires généraux des vivres to inspect and supervise victuallers hired by the crown to supply the troops when garrisoned or on the march at étapes preserved the entrepreneurial aspect but increased royal oversight and control. In the 1630s, Servien prepared instructions for conducting a comprehensive inventory of resources in each généralité for use in the Thirty Years’ War. In 1645, Pierre Fortin, lord of La Hoguette, renewed the call for such a survey in his Catéchisme Royale. In addition, regular reports by war commissars (commissaires de la guerre) in 1630s and 1640s provided the crown with a comprehensive view of the state of the kingdom’s fortifications. In 1645, Michel Le Tellier created new intendants des fortifications to review and oversee the implementation of plans drawn up by royal military engineers. As venal offices, they proved of limited effectiveness, however.117 Alongside the continuing development of the royal fortification service were significant changes in war finance during the Thirty Years’ War. Tax levels rose precipitously under Louis XIII, perhaps as much as 400 percent; greater recourse to short-term credit, forced loans, and the sale of offices funneled even more money into the king’s coffers.118 After 1635, France nevertheless still encountered serious, intractable problems in meeting military payrolls, supply needs, and discipline among its burgeoning numbers of troops.119 Challenges to the soaring “tax of violence” of the fiscal-military state erupted across France during the Thirty Years’ War and ensuing conflict with Spain, which only ended in 1659.120 While this treasure underwrote the crown’s involvement in the Thirty Years’ War and war with Spain, its collection took a devastating toll on a society “in crisis” experiencing economic distress and stagnant population growth both in towns and the countryside.121 Peasant revolts and uprisings in towns and eventually among the nobility in the Fronde rocked France from the late 1630s to the mid-1650s as a result.122

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Areas of the kingdom that became theaters of war suffered especially deleterious effects.123 Nowhere was this destruction more pronounced than in Lorraine, as Jacques Callot’s etchings made graphically clear. Richelieu’s death in 1642 and Louis XIII’s the next year left the throne to a minor king, the young Louis XIV, and the regency of his mother, Anne of Austria, and her chief minister (and paramour), Cardinal Mazarin. However, perhaps the most significant aspect of this “revolutionary moment” was that these social disorders remained episodic and fragmented. Indeed, urban communities—with a few major exceptions, such as Paris and Bordeaux—stood steadfastly by the crown during these years of strain and weakness, even most tellingly the Huguenot towns. The absence of widespread opposition in the towns, and their general commitment to sustaining the royal war machine, largely account for France’s triumph over the Hapsburgs in the 1648 Peace of Westphalia and the 1659 Treaty of the Pyrenees. Their fundamental commitment to the regime and the key roles that urban notables played in the areas of finance, law, and commerce strengthened the monarchy as never before. As a result, the coercive powers necessary for waging wage in the early modern era advanced most in France under Louis XIV, as the rest of Europe soon discovered.124

Ch apter 8

O peni ng Towns , Closing Frontiers

Les grandes villes sont fort du goût du gouvernement absolu . . . —Louis-Sébastien Mercier

Changes after 1650 opened up a new distinctive phase of urban development that

eventually ushered in the modern city in France.1 Peace inside the kingdom raised questions about the need to keep up urban enceintes. Local choices often coincided with royal interests, though benign neglect probably brought down more walls than active demolition. The collaborative nature of relations between the crown and towns became increasingly coercive under Louis XIV and his successors.2 The crown’s growing monopoly on violence after the Fronde and discursive claims to sovereignty, together with the growing oversight of royal intendants in municipal affairs, brought about a steady loss of municipal independence.3 Urban notables usually proved pliable because they became even more closely tied to royal officialdom as Ville and État merged. Royal cooptation of municipal officials culminated in the 1690s when the crown, strapped for money to fund its wars, converted most municipal posts into venal offices, though later in 1717 the Regency moved to roll back these measures. The exclusion of middling urban groups from town councils and royal offices over the eighteenth century together with higher fiscal exactions through forced loans bred resentment and eventually contributed to the monarchy’s overthrow in 1789.4 These social and institutional changes must be seen against the Sun King’s foreign policy. Louis XIV sought to extend and secure his territories, especially in the Low Countries and the west bank of the Rhine. Building and capturing fortified places were key components of this strategy, which the great Sebastien Le Prestre, lord of Vauban, formulated and executed for the king. Louis XIV’s initial military successes against the Dutch spurred the creation of European coalitions against France that eventually rolled back territorial gains in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1668, the Peace of Nijmegen in 1678, and Truce of Ratisbon in 1684.5 Along the crucial northeast frontier, the royal fortification service led by Vauban worked assiduously to defend these frontiers through a vast interconnected fortification system paid for by the transfer of resources from interior regions. Security in effect became nationalized. The ensuing coalitions against France severely tested this system. The Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 forced France to surrender recent gains in the Low Countries and the Franche-Comté. Later in the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, Louis XIV renounced additional claims in the Artois and Flanders.6 War and diplomacy continued throughout the eighteenth century to modify these boundaries, which largely remained stable until the French Revolution.

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The Royal Fortification Service after 1650 Louis XIV was intimately involved in royal fortification policy.7 In fact, he spent four times as much on fortifications as civilian buildings, including Versailles.8 Overall, the proportion of royal expenditures on the army and fortifications steadily rose from 47 percent in 1683 to 73 in 1691, while for the navy it went from 9.5 to 16 percent. Added to all this was the direct costs borne by communities for quartering soldiers.9 By the time of the War of Spanish Succession, it is safe to say that upwards of 85 percent of all royal revenues went for war. The growth of bureaucracy, where the royal fortification service was but a small key part, mirrored this rise in spending. In 1658, Mazarin assigned to Michel Le Tellier the newly created office of commissaire général des fortifications held by Louis-Nicolas de Clerville, who had assumed the title in 1652. In 1661, the king further reorganized royal fortification services by shifting responsibility away from the four secretaries of state to his two chief ministers, Le Tellier and Jean-Baptiste Colbert. Family dynasties dominated the royal fortification service like the rest of royal government. Family ties and clientage yielded little ground to merit, though men of considerable ability did come to the fore.10 The Le Tellier and Colbert clans only differed in the scale of their success. Michel Le Tellier was succeeded in 1666 by his son, François-Michel, marquis of Louvois, whom the king entrusted with fortifications in newly conquered areas and existing frontier provinces. Colbert, who headed royal commerce and finances, supervised the fortification of ports and coastal regions.11 Over the next twenty years, this territorial distribution changed in accordance with the shifting frontier. Newly occupied areas, such as Flanders in 1667 and Franche-Comté in 1674, came under the war ministry, while interior provinces went to Colbert and his successors. Louvois and Colbert approached the question of defense differently in the areas they managed. Nearly every year as head of the Ministry of War, Louvois toured some frontier area to gain first-hand knowledge of conditions.12 He was especially interested in integrating the fortified places along the frontier into a systematic ensemble. As a result, the distinction between frontier and interior areas grew administratively sharper until the eighteenth century when the Ministry of War formally assumed full responsibility over the frontier provinces while interior ones fell to the Maison du Roi, tellingly renamed the Ministry of the Interior after 1789. Royal legislation discriminated between these two zones as well. The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, for example, did not apply to frontier provinces in the north and east of France where substantial populations of new Calvinist and Lutheran subjects lived. Military engineers generally worked for Le Tellier and Louvois, while architects found employ more often with Colbert.13 Whereas Louvois entrusted the inspection of fortifications to provincial intendants, Colbert established three intendants of fortifications, which were venal offices, to inspect places under his jurisdiction. Where Colbert appointed for each important place a chief engineer and a small team of assistants, Louvois preferred to shift his engineering personnel around in four brigades he organized to assist during siege campaigns. Redundancy and professional jealousies hampered relations between these bureaucratic cliques. In fact, Vauban nearly suffered professional disaster in the early 1660s when he became implicated in pecuniary improprieties at Brisach committed by Charles Colbert, lord of Saint-Marc, intendant of Alsace and cousin of the great Colbert. As a result, Vauban gravitated into Louvois’s orbit. In 1690, shortly before his death, Louvois

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gained control over all coastal fortifications and confided these combined duties to his cousin Michel Le Peletier de Souzy, who became directeur général des fortifications des places de terre et de mer for the entire realm. Vauban was apparently never seriously considered for this position but enjoyed an excellent working relationship with Souzy.14 The rise of Vauban to head up Louis XIV’s royal fortification service culminated a process of professional evolution that went back to the late sixteenth century.15 Born in Burgundy on May 15, 1633, Vauban joined the royal army during the Fronde at age eighteen and eventually rose to the rank of Marshal of France in 1703. Vauban began his military career serving the frondeur Louis II de Bourbon, prince of Condé, in 1653, but soon went into royal service when he was named an ingénieur ordinaire du roi in 1655. In 1667, at Louvois’s instigation, Vauban submitted an alternative plan to Clerville’s design for the crucial citadel at Lille that favorably impressed Louis XIV. Henceforth, Vauban became the king’s preferred military engineer though he only assumed the office of commissaire général des fortifications in 1678, a year after Clerville’s death. While pushing to help Louvois centralize the royal engineering corps, Vauban faced increasing difficulties after his patron’s death in 1691 in gaining access to the king. Instead, he now had to work through men such as Louis François Marie Le Tellier, marquis of Barbezieux, who was Louvois’s son and successor as secretary of state for war; Louis Phélypeaux, count of Pontchartrain, contrôleur général des finances from 1689 to 1699; and Michel de Chamillart, contrôleur général des finances from 1699 to 1709 and secretary of war from 1701 to 1709.16 Vauban developed his ideas on reforming the training and operations of the royal engineering corps in a service manual written in the early 1670s.17 A chief engineer (ingénieur en chef ) was appointed to each généralité and was responsible for developing proposals for repairs and new projects that he submitted to Vauban for review. Vauban then consulted with the appropriate minister and sometimes the king for final approval and funding. Vauban also helped to coordinate the implementation of treaties by working with local intendants, legists familiar with local laws, and engineers who had the surveying and cartographic skills essential to ensure proper execution of a treaty’s terms. Vauban’s interests in reform extended to fiscal policies that set aside social privilege in favor of common obligations.18 He was a resolute empiricist steeped in the writings and currents related to his fields of interest. He embraced the tendency to quantify, yet remained pragmatically attuned to the nuances of circumstance and situation. He constantly sought out information, but eschewed grand pronouncements of infallible theory. And he acknowledged the materialist nature of reality promoted by the mechanical philosophy.19 Devoid of any underlying metaphysical or cosmological meaning, design for Vauban was all a matter of lines, angles, and volumes adapted to solve discrete problems. He rejected dogmatic statements in favor of what one architectural historian has called “quantitative rational planning.”20 In sum, Vauban was the first enlightened technocrat. Instructional manuals printed after 1650, including Vauban’s, reflected this shift.21 Claude-François Milliet Dechales, a Jesuit from Savoy, for example, underscored the importance of Euclidean geometry and dynamics in his discussion of building materials and structures, especially carpentry, in his frequently republished 1674 treatise Cursus, seu mundus mathematicus. His L’Art de Fortifier of 1677 went so far as to reduce all military problems to questions of lines and angles.

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Unlike architecture and engineering, hydraulics continued to depend on intuition and individual experience when it came to water defenses, canal building, or garden fountains until it, too, became more scientifically oriented in the eighteenth century.22 Further refinements in printed technical manuals after 1650 broadened the range of instructional materials for tutors or autodidacts to use to learn about fortification design and ballistics. Sébastien Le Clerc’s Pratique de la géométrie sur le papier et sur le terrain: ov par vne méthode nouvelle, printed in 1669, for example, conveyed most of its lessons through a page of text opposite an easy-tofollow illustration. Teams of experts pooled their talents for publications. A royal engineer, engraver, and professor of mathematics, for example, collaborated on the composition of L’expérience de l’architecture militaire, which appeared in 1687 and incorporated emblematic elements along with text and illustrations, as did the 1693 book by the mathematician Jacques Ozanam, Méthode de lever les plans et les cartes de terre et de mer, which contained detailed illustrations showing all kinds of surveying instruments. Another avenue for promoting interest and discussion about these subjects came with the founding of the Journal des Savants in 1665. The new style of French classicism imparted greater uniformity in urban design, including fortifications. Its genesis formed part of what came to be called the quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns. The architect Claude Perrault developed a new modern style inspired by Vitruvian precepts but guided by its own rationality.23 He began his career as an anatomist and later disparaged the notion that the human body epitomized ideal architectural proportion. Perrault’s own research into ancient monuments convinced him that there existed no prescribed Roman style but instead a variety of them in different regions of the Empire. Unlike earlier interpreters of Vitruvius, Perrault refused to allow for optical adjustments in his designs, asserting instead the Cartesian concept about the purity of human vision. Architects should instead be free to realize the unique and self-sufficient rationality of the built form itself. François Blondel, another noted architectural theorist at the time, challenged Perrault claims for a new modern style by affirming the superiority of ancient forms. While Blondel enjoyed considerable support at court, Perrault’s ideas encouraged a more historicist appreciation of different styles in the past, including the long reviled Gothic.24 Thus began a long debate about France’s national identity as expressed in public architecture that endures to this day. Claude Perrault viewed architecture as a profession that required specialized training and mastery of a range of technical disciplines before actually trying to build something. Mathematics was critical, especially Euclidean geometry, as a tool to remake physical reality.25 Geometry thus became steadily reduced to rules of operation stripped of symbolic significance in the new French classicism and military engineering. The gradual abandonment of Vitruvian mysticism in France became complete when Jean Dubreuil and Gérard Desargues developed more powerful applications of geometry, now known as algebraic geometry, to a whole range of both practical and abstract problems that in time severed the once hallowed link between the macrocosm and microcosm. With the invention of calculus by Newton and Leibniz in the 1680s, mathematics became a potent tool for architects and engineers to use to forge new understandings of the natural world as well as the means to reshape it to fit human needs. The French royal state utilized these techniques for its own dynastic purposes. Vauban agreed with the stipulation for training military engineers by beginning with theory before practice. As such, he reversed the medieval methods of

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apprenticeship that privileged experience over theory. Training included not just drawing, but also an understanding of materials, such as stone and wood, practical geometry, and the art of surveying, which in turn required geometry, trigonometry, mechanics, hydraulics, and cost accounting. Craft experience and intuition had been replaced by the engineer’s mastery of mathematics and structural dynamics. This new type of education for the architect-engineer eventually became institutionalized with Blondel’s Cours de l’architecture, which appeared between 1675 and 1683 and were originally delivered as lectures at the Royal Academy of Architecture. Created in 1671 by Colbert, the Royal Academy of Architecture aimed to form a distinctly French canon of architectural principles guided by reason and elegance.26 It became increasingly involved in devising proposals to ameliorate urban conditions, calling for improved public lighting, marketplaces, public baths, fountains, prisons, hospitals, and so on. The creation of public parks also became important. And French neoclassical gardening design contained obvious parallels with the emerging cartographic rhetoric of the pré carré.27 Engineers involved in military design projects often contributed their talents to such horticultural undertakings.28 While outside France the older metaphysical orientation of practical geometry remained prevalent during the eighteenth century, the methods developed by the French in the 1600s promoted in the royal academies and emerging polytechnic schools eventually became the basis for planning and construction in the industrial era.

The C EINTURE

DE

F ER and the P RÉ C A RRÉ

The ambition to secure France’s borders through an integrated system of fortified places goes back to at least the sixteenth century, if not earlier. Under Louis XIV, realization of this strategic vision lay as much with Louvois as it did Vauban (see map 8.1).29 Vauban’s famous letter in January 1673 to Louvois articulated anew the goal to render the kingdom a pré carré (“dueling field”) whose boundaries would be secured by a ceinture de fer (“belt of iron”) composed of newly fortified places.30 Vauban conceived of the frontier as a spatial ensemble, not a line, shaped by local traditions and topography. During his career, Vauban modified the fortifications of over 160 cities and planned 9 new towns, all them tied together in a system that ringed the kingdom. Work on the ceinture de fer began in earnest following the Treaty of Nijmegen in 1678 and continued into the eighteenth century to create through conquest and diplomacy a dense network of frontier defenses. It eventually consisted of two lines of fortified places, the first made up of fourteen places from Dunkirk to Givet31 and the second of sixteen places that stretched from Calais to Stenay.32 Another forty-two places stretched from Langres through Alsace and the Franche-Comté then southward down the Rhône to the Mediterranean.33 Fifteen redoubts lay in the Alps and another twelve guarded the frontier along the Pyrenees.34 Finally, seventeen fortified places protected France’s coast lines.35 In the northern areas, the two lines of fortified places ran perpendicular to the rivers and main land routes. Mobility of garrisons for mutual defense relied upon improved roads, bridges, and waterways. Vauban had special maps prepared to inventory local resources, such as fortresses, forges, mills, quarries, and forests. Defense of any one place really thus depended on the entire ensemble of fortified places. The territorial ebb and flow of Louis XIV’s many wars resulted in fortification projects whose utility and importance varied greatly.36 Imperial towns captured by

Map 8.1

France, 1650–1710.

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the French underwent a variety of experiences. In 1661, after the formal annexation of Lorraine, Louis XIV ordered Nancy’s elaborate bastioned defenses razed to the ground only to turn around eighteen years later and order Vauban to rebuild them, this time more hastily and with less concern for their aesthetic appearance. Yet in 1698, when Lorraine again became part of the Empire, its fortifications came down anew, this time permanently. In the case of Metz, Vauban’s designs had to wait until the 1730s and 1740s to be completed by Louis de Cormontaigne.37 Luxembourg City’s fortifications became substantially modified first by the Spanish between 1671 and 1684 and then by the French under Vauban. Strasbourg had steadily added bastioned elements to its medieval enceinte since the fifteenth century, though it only began an integrated bastioned trace in the 1630s. Work continued on it until 1681 when the city opened its gates to Louis XIV without a fight. Vauban then proceeded to strengthen its enceinte even further. Across the Rhine, the new town of Neuf-Brisach, while significant in terms of design, was essentially a waste of money when it came to actual defense. In the Franche-Comté, fortifications went up and down several times. Dole, for example, saw the French begin to demolish it fortifications in 1668; a year later, the Spanish retook the town and set about repairing them. Finally in 1688, Louis XIV recaptured Dole and ordered their permanent destruction after deciding to retain only Besançon and Belfort as fortified places in the duchy.38 Vauban, however, spared Dole’s bastion guarding the bridge and part of the curtain wall, still visible today in private gardens. Models and maps provided the king and the broader public a ready-made opportunity to grasp the monumentality of the ceinture de fer. Early on in 1668, Louvois ordered Vauban to oversee the creation of models of places, or plan-reliefs, ceded to France in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle to show to the king. The collection began with the royal cartographer and engineer Alain Manesson-Mallet’s model of Pinerolo and grew over the next thirty years to some 144 models of 101 different captured towns.39 Built precisely to scale and with great attention to topography by specially selected royal engineers, the models enabled the king to see the individual pieces of the great ceinture de fer constructed by Vauban. Vauban used them to show the king details of proposed projects; they also served as symbolic expressions of the Sun King’s military prowess. In 1686, Charles de Pène was named director of this group of royal engineers dedicated to building plans-reliefs. The models thus served as another tool to help realize France’s military ambitions. Much like maps, these models mediated a new kind of relationship between ruler and place, now rendered into a miniaturized version rather than an actual site to visit.40 Literature on fortifications published in the latter part of Louis XIV’s reign reflected the growing emphasis on detached forts and mighty citadels rather than heavily bastioned city walls. From 1683 to 1686, Vauban personally supervised the drawing and compilation of 240 of France’s cities into three volumes that he intended as a gift for Louis XIV. Nicolas de Fer’s Atlas royal, for example, published between 1699 and 1702, provided its readers a compendium of maps and plans depicting nearly two hundred fortified places along the frontiers of the kingdom. In 1702, he published a collection of maps and geographical descriptions related to the War of Spanish Succession. That same year, a collection related to military action in Italy was printed, while three years later another collection appeared with maps and plans connected to the war in the Empire. These collections allowed the French public an opportunity to follow the campaigns, recount engagements, and envision specific places mentioned in news publications, such as the Gazette de

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France. Other similar publications by De Fer went under the title of “théâtres de la guerre” that reflected their spectacular nature.41 The ceinture de fer ultimately relied upon the monarchy’s ability to conduct or resist a siege. During his long career as a military engineer, Vauban worked on hundreds of fortresses and directed forty sieges, all of them successful. Much of his “system,” at least as deduced by his pupils later on, can be found in his Traité de l’attaque des places, written after his last siege at the age of seventy. It was a secret document not intended for publication, but composed for Louis of France, duke of Burgundy, grandson of Louis XIV. In 1706, he wrote Traité de la défence des places, which presented three “systems” of defense that showed continuities with earlier traditions as well as original contributions to the art of siege warfare. The first system refined earlier Italian and French designs of the bastioned trace, the second introduced detached bastions around the perimeter, while the third, epitomized by the expensive works at Neuf-Brisach, added a further set of elaborate outworks to the detached bastions.42 The vast majority of fortification projects initiated under Vauban until well into the eighteenth century subscribed to the traditional format of the first system. For all intents and purposes, therefore, continuity rather than change characterized fortification design practices under Louis XIV. Vauban’s tenure as superintendent of royal fortifications witnessed as much demolition as building with the constant clearing away old defenses considered financial liabilities or potential threats to the king’s authority.43 Vauban’s real genius lay in formulating an empirical basis for attack.44 He honed his skills throughout his long career.45 The geometry of attack took advantage of the inevitable geometric limits of defense-in-depth through the use of parallels to approach, slowly but surely, within firing range of the enemy’s defenses without exposure to deadly flanking fire. The familiar zigzags on graphic depictions of siege operations at the time bear this method out quite well. It became so wellorganized that Vauban could eventually predict with great accuracy the exact time the assault would be ready since once he knew the terrain and the size of the labor force on hand, he could calculate the rate of the parallels’ progress down to the foot. Even though he resisted theory and systematization, Vauban nevertheless posited several general principles to guide the course of a siege. In fortification design, Vauban largely emulated, as seen in Strasbourg, Jean Errard’s huge bastions with supporting half-moon outworks from which massed infantry could fire. He also took up at Belfort and Landau, for example, Pagan’s idea to add another line of detached bastions with casemates and artillery emplacements connected to the main enceinte by low covered passages called tenailles. At Neuf-Brisach, Vauban laid out the curtain walls between two bastions in a broken fashion to improve flanking fire. He also added another set of half-moon outworks to the detached bastions outside the main ditch. Depending on money and time, Vauban sometimes combined these elements using local materials and terrain features to the best advantage. But siege warfare theory did not always correspond to its actual practice, as considerations of time and expense often pushed commanders later in the War of Spanish Succession to opt for an all out assault rather than the methodical yet costly efficiency of Vauban.46 Intendants’ reports to the duke of Burgundy in the late 1690s reflected a new awareness of France’s “natural” frontiers defining the pré carré. Together they articulated a sharp distinction between the more militarized zone of a “France périphérique” and the demilitarized areas of the “France intérieure.”47 They also

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commented on the changing urban forms in each zone. Most towns appeared to remain enclosed within walls and ramparts that no longer possessed any military importance. Some intendants cited impracticality and expense as reasons not to fortify towns in the interior.48 Others recalled past civil wars when commenting on recent demolitions. Most reports described in detail local fortifications, noting where they had disappeared or become absorbed into the changing urban fabric. Some noted how gardens had sprung up along the base of old walls, where houses now intruded. Intendants in frontier provinces boasted about the massive new citadels and the garrisons they housed. Castles still dotted the countryside, many quite dilapidated and others but ruins, while along the frontier modern forts controlled the countryside between larger villes fortes.49

The C ITÉ - C ASERNE on the Frontier The military character of frontier towns became most inscribed in their parade grounds, citadels, and gates. In his Les Travaux de Mars, ou l’art de la guerre, published in 1684, Manesson-Mallet formulated rules on where to situate parade grounds to ensure protection and control of the city. Efficient circulation of soldiers meant demolishing cul-de-sacs to open up the city. Rather than the urban center, the best location for a citadel was on the periphery where it could reinforce the enceinte and dominate the town. Under Louis XIV, royal citadels in frontier towns served as bases for launch conquests abroad and protected the kingdom from invasion. Sometimes geography required establishing more than one citadel, such as occurred in Besançon, which was bisected by a river; fear of sedition sometimes made the same argument, as was the case in Bordeaux, which had three royal fortresses, and Marseille, which boasted four. Classically designed arches in towns bespoke this sense of collective security provided by cités-casernes with inscriptions such as the motto Securitati perpetuae.50 The impetus behind barracks derived from the general push under Louis XIV to professionalize the royal army and shield the populace from excessive contact with it. Popular protest had long arisen over issues related to the military, such as fiscal exactions, quartering soldiers, or insults to local pride.51 Antitax movements erupted throughout the kingdom after 1660. The crown still largely relied on poorly trained local militias and armed posses raised by local nobles to quell domestic disturbances. Louis XIV extended his control over urban militias mainly to raise revenue by selling service exemptions to wealthy notables. On rare occasion, such as the dragonnades against Huguenots in 1685 and the quelling of the armed insurgency in the Cévennes in 1702, the crown used the troops of the line to enforce its religious policies but with little success and much bad press.52 Although not averse to using troops against the populace, Louis XIV’s military reforms aimed to improve their day-to-day relationship.53 Accountability in mustering and payments reflected improved administrative oversight.54 As a result, the life of common soldiers markedly improved, especially for the wounded and invalids, as did their discipline.55 Towns remained the lynchpin for warmaking under Louis XIV and his successors.56 Requisitioning from towns such items as uniforms, bread, meat, wine, munitions, and men was increasingly regularized during Louis XIV’s reign thanks to the reforms of Le Tellier and Louvois.57 An ordinance issued on July 20, 1660, regularized the material support (utensile) due the king’s soldiers from civilians,

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which included a bed, bed linens, a pot, glass, spoon, a place by the fire, and a candle. The utensile finally became converted into a general tax in 1690. Towns could be relieved of the logement obligation if they agreed to pay for the construction of barracks using designs by the king’s military engineers. However, in practice, most barracks usually consisted simply of abandoned houses bought by municipal authorities. In time, economic interests led some town actually to solicit the establishment of royal garrison.58 Yet private interest was not entirely eliminated.59 Barracks, usually situated along the inner edge of the walls, physically separated soldiers from civilians and thus contributed to alleviating conflicts between these two groups. Vauban famously took a great interest in barracks, supplies, and support services for garrison forces. In this, the French followed the innovations of the Spanish. The first such separate housing for soldiers and officers was in the citadels of Lille and Arras after 1668. An arsenal and hospital were also commonly situated in the military precincts, along with food depots, water cisterns, and refuse pits that enhanced the garrison’s self-sufficiency. The powder magazine was placed within adequate reach for the garrison on the town’s outskirts, but not too close in the event there was an accident. Sentry posts at the gates of frontier towns fell exclusively under the garrison’s jurisdiction. Other public buildings in the city also contributed to the garrison’s welfare. Churches in town provided for the soldiers’ spiritual needs, as did the chapel specially situated within the military compound. The Hôtel de Ville closely worked with the garrison’s command, while marketplaces provided an informal area for civilians and soldiers to interact. Local garrison commanders also took a keen interest in bridges, canals, and hydraulic works, all of which carried immediate significance for transport, supply, and defense. Overall, the distinction between military and civilian spheres became sharper as towns saw their once independent role diminish and eventually disappear after 1650.60 The cité-caserne in effect embodied the absolutist aspirations of royal rule in the kingdom at large.61 A telling indicator of the towns’ new place came after the 1659 Peace of Pyrenees when the crown commandeered all municipal cannons in interior towns for deployment on the frontier. A system of royal artillery arsenals similar to Sully’s earlier scheme developed. Towns sought indemnification, not always successfully, for the loss of their cannon. Their loss was palpable and implicated urban identity, as the individuality of each piece, their appearance, sound, name, conveyed a historical connection between the town and its past. Some towns attempted to hide or disable cannons so they would not be moved. In Epernay, a cannon named the “chien d’Orléans,” said to be used during Henri IV’s campaigns nearly a century before, “accidently” fell from its tower platform. It smashed into pieces, which then some townspeople stole and hid in their homes, piteous reminders of the lost independence of this bonne ville.62 The cités-casernes designed by Vauban usually sought to integrate the historic layout of towns with the geometric dictates of fortification design, even in the nine new towns he created between 1678 and 1698.63 These new towns eschewed the Renaissance radial design in favor of the “checkerboard” pattern of older bastides. Beyond the bastioned edge of most frontier towns lay a glacis that stretched up to five hundred yards long. Its construction sometimes required the demolition of faubourgs and prohibitions against new suburbs from developing. As a result, towns along the ceinture de fer usually became more densely populated unless the circuit of the bastioned enceinte incorporated new residential areas, as in Lille.

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This bastioned citadel was the first of eleven new ones designed by Vauban for Louis XIV.64 He also remodeled many others. His use of local artisans to build these citadels and new towns fostered syntheses of French and local indigenous architectural styles.65 Vauban also oversaw the construction of smaller, detached fortresses at strategic sites in this defensive zone, such as on the hilltop of Haurs overlooking the Meuse River. In most cases, quadrilateral streets and a uniform building code characterized new neighborhoods added to the expanded urban perimeter of frontier towns. Similar developments took place along the kingdom’s maritime edge. Colbert had new ports created because he wanted to avoid placing royal naval facilities in towns with a history of resisting royal authority, such as La Rochelle and Marseille.66 In 1664, he sent Clerville and Charles Colbert de Terron to inspect France’s coastline to identify the best sites for new ports. In 1670, he proposed the new port town of Sète as primarily a commercial center on the southern end of the Canal du Midi, while Toulon, established earlier in the century by Henri IV, would be France’s main naval base on the Mediterranean.67 On the Breton coast, Lorient was intended in 1666 to be the main base of the Compagnie des Indes Orientales, though that changed in the early 1700 when the company moved operations to Havre-de-Grâce.68 Vauban also developed plans for Saint-Malo.69 Finally, Rochefort in 1669 and Brest in 1681 became France’s main naval yards for the royal fleet along the Atlantic littoral.70 Silting problems at Rochefort led Colbert to decide to transfer main naval functions for the Atlantic and Channel to Brest. Port towns experienced a special tension between overseas commercial engagement and defending the kingdom. In the early 1700s, Havre-de- Grâce became headquarters of the Compagnie du Sénegal and the Compagne de l’Inde and came to enjoy by the 1750s an enviable level of prosperity, despite the occasional damage inflicted on it by English naval bombardments. Merchant ships competed with the royal navy for access to quays and naval stores. For Colbert, port design emphasized the shipbuilding functions at the expense of the civilian sector, which he sought to separate into distinct zones. His organization of the royal forests also related to naval policies.71 The master plan for Rochefort by Clerville, with assistance from Louis Le Vau, best realized Colbert’s inflexible and ultimately impractical urban vision. The other three new ports departed from this viewpoint in the hands of Vauban, who redesigned Brest and Lorient.72 Fortifications for these ports tended to be weak, though in the case of Brest an effort was made to enclose the port town out of fear of a local uprising, which actually came in 1675 with the revolt of the “bonnets rouges” when peasants sacked the town. Vauban got involved in building Brest after Colbert’s death in 1683. He helped to solve its defensive problems by constructing a string of mutually reinforced forts beyond the walls of the town. Brest’s isolation made it commercially very weak and thus without an economic basis on which to develop its infrastructure, as opposed to the case of Lille. Vauban’s design for parts of Brest paid scrupulous attention to topography as he sought to increase circulation and regularity in appearance. Finally, both Colbert and Vauban also devoted a good deal of attention to strengthening the enceintes of well-established port towns, such as Calais, Dunkirk, and Gravelines, as they came into French control as a result of Louis XIV’s wars. In 1692, Louis XIV even ordered the château and fortifications of Cherbourg razed to make way for commercial warehouses.73 La Rochelle underwent a different experience because much of its enceinte had been demolished

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under Louis XIII. In 1689, the crown authorized new fortifications facing seaward against the threat of Anglo-Dutch attack. He also wanted the forts on the Ile-de-Ré and Il-d’Oléron repaired.74 La Rochelle’s new defenses mainly consisted of an elevated earthen rampart, not unlike the barriers erected around medieval towns in the twelfth century.75 These ramparts received masonry facing along the street level, while the area above was planted with grass and trees and became a parkland necklace over the eighteenth century. Following a revolt against the royal governor in Marseille in 1660, Colbert worked closely with the royal intendant of the king’s galleys, Pierre Arnoul, on expanding the enclosed urban core and adding a royal citadel. His motives combined hygienic concerns about overcrowding with the need to support the crown’s naval presence in the Mediterranean. His order in 1666 to demolish the old walls elicited fierce opposition from city officials who feared property depreciation and loss of rents. However, as terms became negotiated more in their favor they joined Colbert’s effort to remake the port city to include a splendid new neighborhood for the wealthy and cramped slums for the urban poor in the old town. Defending coastal ports and the national frontier against the threat of invasion remained high priorities during the eighteenth century. Concerns about improving defensibility dovetailed with the new litmus desire to make towns more salubrious environments. These twin demands on frontier towns continued into the eighteenth century. The alpine town of Briançon, which faced the Piedmont held by the Austrians after the 1713 Peace of Utrecht, saw the engineer Heuriance design four forts around the town’s perimeter between 1720 and 1735 as well as the famous Pont d’Asfeld spanning the Durance river. In Lorraine, the engineer Louis de Cormontaigne undertook to reinforce the already considerable defenses of Metz and Thionville between 1728 and 1752, increasing the overall size of each town by about a tenth. The architect Jacques-François Blondel designed the new expanded parade grounds in the heart of Metz, taking that opportunity to widen and align several important streets to facilitate the circulation of men and materiel. Military needs thus dominated design considerations for frontier towns.

Opening Towns Greater efficiency and accelerating modes of exchange became the litmus of urban vitality, not walls of stone and imposing gates. As population pressures and economic incentives grew to favor opening towns, old attitudes persisted that the walled enceinte provided protection from attack and contagion, as well as a fiscal boundary to collect excise taxes, to maintain public order, and discourage revolt. Urban renewal projects on the edge or inside the enceinte occurred in a sporadic, fragmentary fashion until the eighteenth century when more comprehensive plans began to be pursued.76 Real estate speculation often shaped the changing urban edge more than royal policy. Land on the periphery was often quite valuable. Local clergy and notables vied for it for splendid new community or private residences or hospitals, while merchants and manufacturers sought to realize commercial opportunities. Local entrepreneurs in royal fortification projects, be they construction or demolitions, handled huge sums of money and became open to graft and corruption. Municipal officials and taxpayers gradually came to see the enceinte no longer as a source of security but as a colossal waste of money. Urban discourse instead now privileged enhanced circulation and communication provided by improved

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streets, bridges, and docks. Improving urban water supplies also became a priority for public health, while the introduction of street lights transformed urban night life (see figure 8.1). The novelty of the urban forms that emerged after 1650 must not be overstated. Terrain and historic infrastructure still constrained urban renewal possibilities. The old adage “belles fortifications, bel urbanisme” continued to hold sway in many minds and this created obstacles to achieving a harmonious neoclassical aesthetic. “New” towns often became loosely integrated appendages to “old” towns, while suburbs continued to sprawl according to their own dynamics. The diminishing importance of the militarized edge only gave greater impetus to the centrifugal forces long at play in urban life. The new direction of urban development in France after 1650 was by no means the product of state plans and oversight.77 Socioeconomic forces and enduring commercial networks established by habit as much as geography continued to shape the new modern aspect of towns. Urban demography still rested, as it did since the Middle Ages, on regular immigration from the countryside. Social stratification continued as oligarchies narrowed even further.78 With the loss of walls came a loss of corporate cohesion, too, as groups and neighborhoods that once built, maintained, and defended them lost an opportunity to affirm sociability.79 Civic pride now resided in the open prospects of squares and avenues and other signs of commercial prosperity. Antiquarian interest in towns rose as their autonomy declined, too. Efforts to maintain distinctive urban identities retreated into the retrievable, and imagined, past.80 In France, the decision to preserve a town’s walls usually depended on its proximity to the frontiers.81 Police functions once associated with town walls now shifted from local authorities to the crown. In times past, towns elected prominent citizens in each neighborhood to oversee street cleaning and repairs as well as to uphold law and order. After 1660, beginning in Paris, a powerful police administration controlled by the crown replaced this system. Provincial towns, such as Rouen, expanded the number of inspectors and waste haulers to improve sanitation conditions.82 An edict of 1681 ordered the sale of debris from razed wall with profits to king, though in fact often such money was used to plant public gardens and construct tree-lined roads and alleys. The olfactory sensibilities of Frenchmen and women became more acute as cultural attitudes changed, searching for agreeable smells and decrying offensive ones. Contemporary medical theory stressed the importance of circulation in the body and the salutary effects of airing out dank urban places. New forms of sociability, such as coffee salons, dining clubs, reading circles, and freemasons’ lodges, encouraged mixing and mingling. Movement soon began to surpass the impetus toward separation in urban life. Colbert’s mercantilist policies similarly aimed to clear away internal obstacles to trade and erect new ones along the kingdom’s edge. The urban landscape began to change profoundly over the seventeenth century as towns became more open to the outside world. The shift from closed to open cities was a Europe-wide phenomenon in the seventeenth century. Few French towns saw their urban cores radically altered. Instead, most renewal projects consisted of grand gates, triumphal arches, and the building of grand places royales. Even Vauban’s design programs for frontier towns remained wedded to the dictates of each place’s historic layout. Few towns in the interior actually saw their walls completely razed. More often, the loss of the urban edge’s military function was a piecemeal process of private appropriation or benign neglect.

Figure 8.1

Tours in the late seventeenth century. By permission of the Bibliothèque Nationale (B.N. M74008 B15).

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Royal urbanism after 1650 became more concerned about bon police than local defense. Public order increasingly became conceived in terms of ameliorative programs that addressed aesthetic, moral, medical, and economic problems for which gardens, promenades, and better drainage systems, not walls and cannons, often provided the most effective answer. What differed from medieval practices of urbanism was the more integrated, systematic approach taken by the central government and cadres of professional experts, rather than local notables and artisans, to reshape the urban ensemble. The availability of printed treatises on classical architecture, more uniformly trained architects and engineers, and greater bureaucratic oversight from the royal court encouraged the idiom of the ville néoclassique to develop.83 Local municipal authorities readily embraced the new style and used resources once dedicated to self-defense to realize it. Public squares also became highlighted as they served as display spaces for the theater of royal civic culture.84 The influence of the royal court on French neoclassical urbanism was profound, and it was no coincidence that many of the new city planners rising to the fore after 1650 were also scenic designers. Paris provides a noteworthy though by no mean unique example.85 The capital’s rapid growth prompted a reassessment of its defensive needs under Richelieu, who, in 1631, ordered built the first significant expansion beyond the 1370s enceinte of Charles V. The contract stipulated a tree-lined promenade just inside the perimeter, much like south of the Porte St. Antoine in the gardens of the Arsenal. Nothing came of Richelieu’s order until 1670 when Louis XIV had all fortifications on the Right Bank razed, likely at the instigation of the architect François Blondel. Louis XIV briefly considered a plan to build outlying detached fortresses connected by trenches, an approach taken up later in 1840. However, costs and fears of their potential use against his own troops convinced Louis XIV to entrust the city’s defense to Vauban’s ceinture de fer on the kingdom’s frontier. The new open look of Paris was captured in the huge detailed plan by Pierre Bullet and François Blondel in 1676. The remodeling of urban space to showcase “absolutist” power and advance commercial exchange centered on the grande place, epitomized by the circular Place des Victoires.86 In lieu of walls, a new rampart planted with trees, known as the boulevard St. Antoine, rose up about twelve feet along the northeast perimeter of the city from the Porte St Antoine to the Porte St. Denis on eventually to the Tuileries. In this way, the word boulevard shifted to signify a broad avenue, not bastion. The Portes St. Denis and St. Martin received triumphal arches celebrating Louis XIV’s victories in the Dutch War. Trees planted along all these ramparts in four rows formed a central drive wide enough to accommodate carriage traffic easily, with two adjoining lanes for pedestrians. The Luxembourg Gardens still partially retains this schema today. In 1679, commercial traffic was forbidden on these new avenues and instead directed to the Rue Basse du Rempart just outside the elevated ring road. Attempts to erect new ramparts later during the War of Spanish Succession could not keep up with the exploding growth of the capital city. In 1705, Louis XIV finally replaced remaining fortifications on the Right Bank in Paris with a large promenade. It became increasingly difficult for authorities to determine just where Paris began and ended.87 In the eighteenth century, cafés, cabarets, and other public houses sprang up along the boulevards, along with places for entertainment.88 Paris’s obsolete fortifications thus became converted to new leisure uses, with improved police supervision, and as a tariff barrier.89 Tree-lined avenues crisscrossed Paris and

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radiated outward to the vast Bois de Vincennes and de Boulogne, once the king’s preserves but now public parks. A new tree-lined avenue known as the Champs Élysées connected the Tuileries to the circle at Étoile. Designed by André Le Nôtre and eventually completed in 1724, it provided the Parisian bourgeoisie a promenade similar to the one created at Versailles to glorify the king. The full makeover of Paris envisioned in the seventeenth century never occurred as Versailles instead consumed most of the king’s attention and expenditures. The transformation of Paris had to wait for Napoléon I and Napoléon III in the nineteenth century to realize completion.90 Versailles became the first purposely designed open town in France.91 Several earlier models inspired this great ville-residence: the new town of Richelieu of the 1630s, Nicolas Fouquet’s dazzling palace of Vaux-le-Vicomte of the 1650s, and even Pope Sixtus V’s redesign of Rome in the 1580s. Designed by the team of Le Nôtre and the architects Louis Le Vau and François d’Orbay, Versailles never had a wall or ditch but instead assumed the shape of an orderly ensemble of palace, town, and garden that radiated forth into the world. Intended as a showcase for the Sun King, Versailles required extensive demolitions and reshaping of the landscape to achieve its final form. Strict regulation of residential and commercial building facades, together with efforts to segregate occupational groups from the more exalted class, proved impossible to enforce, however, because of the spectacular success of Versailles as a ville neuve.92 After 1700, towns increasingly asked permission to tear down their walls, citing new enlightened notions of the public good. Rouen, for example, had last experienced military action of any importance during Henri IV’s siege in 1592. A 1773 military memorandum by a royal engineer presents a detailed picture of the enceinte’s woeful deterioration since then. The Vieux Palais remained essentially intact, while little remained of the Château de Bouvreuil beyond a couple of crumbling towers. An island fort built by the English in 1419 also remained intact. The great ditches fronting the enceinte, while still in evidence, no longer held water but instead decades of accumulated garbage. The five heavily fortified gates facing landward remained in place. Elsewhere gapping holes pierced the walls, sections of which had collapsed. Houses encroached in many places, as did kitchen gardens.93 The human pressures long pressing against the militarized edge finally began to overwhelm it in towns no longer of military importance.

Connecting the Kingdom The first comprehensive survey map of the kingdom’s landforms and waterways began in 1679 at Colbert’s order by the astronomer Jean Picard.94 Picard developed a novel method of triangulation based in the Observatory he had built in Paris. The project languished until 1738 when the controlleur-général, Jean Orry, out of concern to improve postal deliveries, took it over for the purpose of the new centralized administration through the École des Ponts-et-Chaussées.95 It eventually continued to completion under Jean-Dominique Cassini and produced an accurate map in eighteen sheets available upon subscription. The Cassini map proved useful to engineers and buttressed the monarchy’s territorial claims by “scientifically” defining the frontiers. The detailed maps created by the royal engineer Claude Masse charting the frontier abutting the Austrian Netherlands as well as interior lands epitomized this attempt to capture and represent useful knowledge for the

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king.96 Maps composed for competitions in the 1770s and 1780s showed how engineers renewed their commitment to aesthetics.97 The mapping competitions at the École reflected this new vision of place and space subjected to human reason to serve human needs. These experts played a central role in the modern economic development of the country and introduced into the public arena a new emphasis on uniformity, equality, and standardization, concepts antithetical to Old Regime norms. This enlightened rhetoric of public utility expanded upon Errard’s original emphasis on “demonstrated” (démontrés) principles for fortification design to encompass the entire kingdom. The inaccuracies and distortions of eighteenthcentury French maps came about because these engineers were surveyors, not cartographers. The Cassini map of France represented the accumulated measurements of nearly thirty years worth of work, rendering it the cartographic equivalent of an overexposed photograph.98 The cartographic imagination expressed in these maps rendered them as much vehicles of ambition as instruments of accuracy. While fortification construction remained vitally important along the country’s emerging frontier, public works projects inside this perimeter increasingly emphasized openness and integration. Improved communications to integrate the kingdom went back to 1629 when the crown created the position of postmaster general, first held by Hiérosme de Nouveau until his death in 1665 after falling from horse.99 In the 1640s, Le Tellier established an office that dealt exclusively with roads and marching orders for the king’s army.100 Louvois went on to receive this post in 1668. Sorely understaffed, the royal postal service exercised inadequate control over couriers and local postal agents, and suffered serious competition from alternative mail services run by universities, towns, and private firms. These concerns only became resolved at the end of the eighteenth century. Few beyond Louvois took an interest in improving roads and bridges.101 The focus instead was on navigable waterways. Indeed, Colbert special order in 1664 proposed examining rivers, canals, and ports, but not roads; Vauban wrote frequently about waterways, but never roads. No mention of roads can be found in any of the intendant memoirs for the young duke of Burgundy in the late 1690s even though responsibility for their upkeep fell to the intendants. Canal projects figured most prominently in the crown’s calculus to enhance the transportation network. The Canal de Briare begun under Henri IV finally opened in 1642. In 1662, Louis XIV and Colbert undertook the ambitious project, first suggested by PierrePaul Riquet, a salt tax administrator and army intendant, to connect the Garonne River to the Mediterranean in the Canal des Deux-Mers, comprised of the Canal du Midi (originally called the Canal Royal until 1790) from the Mediterranean and the so-called Lateral Canal connected to the Garonne River, built later in the nineteenth century.102 The Canal Royal opened in 1681, while the smaller but no less important Canal d’Orléans did in 1691. Creating a systematic, interconnected set of waterways required more accurate and comprehensive topographical surveys, which only began to be undertaken in the last part of Louis XIV’s reign. They also required the great technical finesse and innovation of a corps of professional engineers as well as labor gangs truly pharaonic in scale. Much of all this had to wait until the eighteenth century. Mercantile and military interests argued in favor of developing a canal system that connected towns along France’s northern frontier whose rivers otherwise continued their course in lands held by the Dutch or Hapsburgs. In 1693, for example, the Canal de La Haute-Deûle linked the Deûle

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and Scarpe rivers, which, in turn, connected Lille to Valenciennes and Douai, thus bypassing Ghent in the Spanish Netherlands. Vauban envisioned a canal system that would tie together the major fortified sites from Lille all the way to Dunkirk on the coast. He also designed the sluices and channels in these hydraulic systems to enable frontier towns along this axis to use controlled flooding, a longtime Dutch tactic, in their defenses. Regional transportation studies began in 1715, first in the généralité of Montauban then later in Franche-Comté (1737), Berry (1739), Burgundy (1740), and Champagne (1742). A desire to promote commerce led the monarchy to expand the road system in 1720s. It began when the Ministry of War sent a questionnaire to intendants asking them to assess the condition of waterways and major roads in their généralités. Information about the existing road system largely came from maps created by the royal postal service. In 1738, the Contrôleur Général Orry issued the Mémoire instructif sur la réparation des chemins that established the corvée des routes that peasants deeply resented and that critics decried as a return to hated feudalism. Orry’s memoir also set up a new nomenclature (and with it a hierarchy) by which to designate different kinds of roads: grandes routes, routes, grands chemins, chemins royaux, chemins de traverse, each with its own specifications.103 This trend toward standardization increased over time. In the 1760s, a new inspector general of the corps Pierre-Marie-Jérôme Trésaguet replaced the maligned corvée system with a special road tax levied on communities said to benefit from a particular project. Enlightened public works still required expropriations, which as always generated resentment and law suits. Roads still remained subordinate to waterways until after 1750. Daniel-Charles Trudaine created between 1745 and 1780 a staggering sixty-two volume atlas of France with more than three thousand plates. In it, he delineated the highways and byways that connected the country and identified the repairs necessary to improve transportation and thus commerce. As road work proceeded ahead, travel times shrank. By 1789, Paris was linked by roads to all the main towns in the kingdom; they, in turn, began to be interlinked by new routes. Paris also embarked on building its own intra-urban transport system, first conceived by Blaise Pascal a century before.104 Secondary roads at the provincial level largely remained on the drawing board for another century. Use of statistical tables to resolve engineering problems grew out of debates over calculating the corvée and modes of financing road and bridge construction.105 Developing statistical formulae to ensure the accurate estimates thus became a necessity. It also provided the impetus behind the decision in 1786 to conduct a statistical survey of the condition of all roads and bridges, which continued into the revolutionary era.

Enlightened Engineering and Urbanism After 1700, engineering training continued to become more professional and scientific, while engineers—military and civil—became more firmly entrenched in the royal bureaucracy. Claude-François Bidal, marquis of Asfeld, was appointed by the Regency in 1718 to serve as general director of fortifications. During his tenure, references to “la génie” appeared for the first time as royal engineers worked to complete Vauban’s plan to encircle the kingdom with a network of interconnected fortified places. The abolition of this office in 1743 arose partly because of administrative jealousies, particularly among the secretaries of state, as well as the rapidly

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changing scope and complexities of the royal engineering service. A brief experiment of entrusting inspection responsibilities to maréchaux de camp proved a fiasco during the War of Austrian Succession, so much so that in 1746 Marie-Pierre de Voyer de Palmy, count of Argenson pressed the king to reinstate the former system headed by royal engineers. Eleven years later the office of director of the artillery service was created, and even that only lasted a short time. Henceforth, the royal engineering service became an essential part of the king’s government. In 1761, a central war archives (dépôt de la Guerre) was formed to serve as a repository for all the different engineering plans and maps drawn up over the years. In 1774, Emmanuel-Armand de Richelieu, duke of Aiguillon ordered all regional directors of fortifications to prepare an atlas composed of plans for every place in the kingdom, depositing a copy at the bureau des fortifications in Paris and keeping another in local archives. The organization of information became a vital tool for reengineering the kingdom. On February 1, 1716, the Regency headed by Philippe d’Orléans organized a group of royal engineers devoted to civil engineering projects known as the corps des Ponts-et-Chaussées. They soon vied with the engineers in the fortification corps after which it was modeled. Over the next twenty year, this new branch of government extended into every généralite. In these early years, the new corps operated in a flexible, decentralized manner, undertaking projects in a generally haphazard, uncoordinated manner. Criticism soon arose over the lack of professional competency standards when recruiting engineers. Finally, in 1744, Daniel-Charles Trudaine, the intendant of finances in charge of the corps, decided to remedy this problem by creating a design review board in Paris to vet all road and bridgework proposals submitted by engineers working for the corps. Three years later, Trudaine appointed the engineer assigned to the généralité of Alençon, Jean-Rodolphe Perronet, to head up the review board and added to its tasks the training of new engineers.106 This new pedagogical mission marked the beginning of the École des Ponts-et-Chaussées founded in 1747.107 At first, it enjoyed considerable autonomy but eventually came under the intendant des finances, first François, marquis of Ormesson and then Trudaine. The École des Ponts-et-Chaussées established a guiding professional ethos devoted to the enlightened ideals of public utility that harked back to the original Renaissance design notion of utilitas. As a result, the word “engineer” came to designate a technician who worked on all types of machines applicable to civil architecture, transportation, and manufacturing.108 The civil engineers quickly became vocal critics of the king’s military engineers, who formed their own school, the celebrated École Royale de Génie de Mézières in 1748.109 Thus was institutionalized the long-standing tension between ameliorating and defending towns. This infighting also reflected the crown’s conflicting priorities between building infrastructure for commerce or war, though after 1750 these two spheres became seen as interconnected. The curriculum called for classroom study during the winter and summers in the field assisting with public works projects. In 1775, the minister Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot ordered the creation of standardized tests that all engineering students had to pass in order to be licensed. In the 1770s, the school started annual competitions that asked graduating students to prepare essays and design projects on improving commerce and agriculture. The trend toward specialization and standardization in engineering training eventually culminated in the 1790s in the founding of the École Polytechnique.110 Architectural design theory mirrored these changes in French technical education. After 1700, French architects and engineers perceived Vauban as a rigid

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theorist rather than as a flexible pragmatist.111 This new perception likely sprang from the fact that most of Vauban’s writing on the subjects of sieges and fortifications did not appear until well after his death.112 Louis de Cormontaigne’s Architecture Militaire early on transformed Vauban’s methods of defense and attack into a scientific system.113 Joseph de Fallois’s L’École de la Fortification, published in 1748, offered a “natural history” of fortifications that derived from primitive man’s need to protect himself from wild animals and his fellow man.114 One of Vauban’s earliest promoters was Bernard Forest de Bélidor, professor of mathematics in the royal artillery school and the writer of several important treatises on engineering. His La science des ingénieurs of 1729 eschewed universal formula and instead approached building from the perspective of structural dynamics of walls not in terms of angles of fire but in relation to the thrust of the earth and the spacing between their buttresses. Like Vauban, Bélidor stressed the need to follow every stage of the project, from tracing the design, to procuring materials, to managing the construction site. Bélidor’s Nouveau Cour de Mathématique, which appeared in 1725, dealt with the general mathematical and physical characteristics of fortified cities and military buildings. For him, the fundamental value was “convenience,” which consisted of the engineer’s ability to translate every detail of the project into the rational organization of the master plan (devis). Bélidor’s books became widely used textbooks for training engineers throughout the eighteenth century. Another prolific writer on engineering subjects was Louis-Charles Dupain de Montesson, an army officer and royal ingénieur-géographe. His Construction de la fortification, published in Paris in 1741, presented an almost axiomatic approach to fortification design that did not live up to its promises when put into practice. His reduction of engineering to pure mathematics became further apparent in his various works on design and surveying, such as the Science des ombres (1746), Le dessinateur au cabinet et à l’armée (1753), L’Art de lever les plans (1763), and La Science de l’arpenteur (1766). These manuals, together with textbooks on mathematics he published at the end of his career, reflected his temperament as a pedagogue and the transformation of engineering into technical sciences based on trigonometry and calculus. While royal military engineers continued to adhere to Vauban’s vision of the pré carré, new strategic thinking after the Seven Years’ War began to place a greater emphasis on the speed and mobility of attack rather than on the virtues of stationary defense. The ideas of Marc-René de Montalembert were most central in this change. Montalembert shifted the defense of a place to outlying detached fortresses, thus allowing towns even on the frontier to begin to break out of their constricting enceintes. Montalembert also emphasized, like Errard, fire power over the thickness of its walls. He advocated what he called perpendicular fortifications consisting of heavily protected blockhouses set at right angles to each other and bristling with cannons.115 Étienne-François, duke of Choiseul, reorganized the French army after 1763 with these new principles in mind, as did Jean-Baptiste Vaquette de Gribeauval who revamped the royal artillery corps. J.-A.-H. de Guibert’s Essai général de la tactique in 1772 pushed this new military thinking even further, championing the superiority of citizen soldiers over professionals and war based on movement rather than stationary defenses—an approach Napoleon eventually embraced.116 Communitarian notions of the bonne ville gradually collapsed, like the walls, after 1650. After 1700, travel literature and printed descriptions of towns associated medieval urban features, such as timber and wattle construction, sinuous, winding alleys, and boisterous marketplaces, with filth, overcrowding, and

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disorder.117 Towns became perceived as a hostile wilderness that could only be redeemed through rational renewal.118 The new discourse denouncing Gothic urbanism called for wholesale clearances to promote more healthful conditions by improving the circulation of air, water, and human and animal traffic. It touted rational rather than religious solutions to public health problems and social ills such as poverty, prostitution, and child abandonment. Once viewed as repositories of civilized virtue, towns now became perceived as places rife with filth and corruption.119 Nicolas Restif de la Bretonne described streets in the popular neighborhoods of Paris with deep revulsion, as did Jean-Baptiste Louvet de Couvray in his book Les amours du chevalier Faublas published in 1787. Jacques-Vincent Delacroix’s Lettres d’un philosophe sensible of 1769 and Constant d’Orville’s Sophie of 1779 described large cities as cancers on the body politic. Pierre de Marivaux and Jean-Jacques Rousseau also heaped disdain on urban dwellers and life in much of their writings. Louis-Sébastien Mercier’s futuristic Le tableau de Paris painted a devastating picture of a contemporary city life that all disappeared in his imaginary Paris of the twentyfifth century. Writers even lauded the benefits of suburbs beyond the old enceinte. The merging of ville with faubourg then plat pays fostered a reversal of perspectives. The countryside, long reviled as a dim, barbarous place, became over the eighteenth century the new touchstone of French identity as au fonds agrarian. The landscape, both built and natural, became a metaphorical garden, to be cultivated and nurtured by enlightened engineers. New formal gardening styles after 1650 initially reflected the impulse toward rational order; however, the move toward greater openness in urban design nourished interest in the naturalness of English gardens as a way to contrast the urban and pastoral worlds. Works by Pierre Patte and Antoine-Nicolas Dézallier d’Argenville argued in favor of opening up both gardens and cities, clearing away clutter to create vast open spaces. Mapping exercises and competitions sponsored by the École des Ponts-et-Chaussées preserved these geometric elements in fanciful, quasi-utopian designs alongside more irregular, “natural” designs drawing on the English garden tradition inspired by topographical renderings. Georges-Louis Le Rouge’s Les jardins anglo-chinois, published in 1776, presented imaginative designs that incorporated geometric and irregular elements to form dreamscapes (reveries) mixing urban and bucolic features. The Physiocratic view of the countryside as the engine of economic progress merged with these pastoral sensibilities of early Romanticism to recast views of city. Neuf-Brisach was the last new town built by the French in continental Europe during the eighteenth century; however, plans for new towns, some of them executed, can be found in France’s colonial holdings, such as Haiti, Louisiana, and Canada.120 French towns became remodeled to varying degrees according to the new principles of “enlightened” architecture. Among the grandes villes were Lyon, Marseille, Nantes, Caen, and Bordeaux. Particularly evocative was the construction of percées or “breakthrough streets” that literally cut through the old enceinte to the suburbs and beyond.121 One obvious measure of this change came when towns replaced buildings of wood with stone ones. Besides aesthetic considerations, fear of fire and the rising price of timber made durable stone a more attractive choice for the long run. Fires also cleared the way for wide renewal. A fire in Châteaudun in 1723 provided a rebuilding commission to Jules Hardouin Mansart, who designed a layout still very evident today. After its disastrous fire of 1720, Rennes was rebuilt by the architect Jacques Gabriel who took steps to make it a more open town by aligning streets and straightening the course of the Vilaine River.122 Sometimes the

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local fortification service led the way, as when Nîmes in the 1740s nearly doubled in size to accommodate growth fueled by the new silk industry. Caen also experienced considerable growth as it opened up and became modern, seeing its population nearly double during the eighteenth century.123 These trends also shaped frontier towns. With most of its formidable enceinte gone, Nancy underwent transformation from a ducal capital into a royal town in the French style.124 In the 1780s, Mézières petitioned to open up its walls to expand manufacturing activities to better compete with its local rival, Charleville, which did not carry the same defensive obligations.125 Outward urban expansion sometimes outstripped a municipality’s established means of collecting revenues. Bordeaux, for example, continued to collect tolls, as it always had, at its original medieval gates even though the city sprawled far beyond them after 1750. In Paris, the fortified gates located at the Porte Saint-Honoré, Porte de la Conférence, Porte Saint-Antoine, and Porte Saint-Bernard came down between 1730 and 1787. In 1785, a “mur des fermiers généraux” was constructed as a wooden palisade by Claude-Nicolas Ledoux, who installed sixty-two elaborate and quite expensive toll booths (“barrières”) to collect taxes on goods coming into the city. This situation did not sit well with Parisians as reflected in the quip, “le mur murant Paris rend les Parisiens murmurant.”126 In 1787, Ledoux was fired for excessive cost overruns; during the Revolution, many of the toll booths became among the first targets of crowd violence in Paris.127 Neoclassical idea of symmetry and harmony reshaped many French towns during the eighteenth century. The alignment of streets often brought improved paving, drainage, and even occasionally sidewalks, the first of which appeared in Paris in 1781 on the Pont-Neuf. An edict in 1786 ordered the demolition of all houses and shops on bridges in Paris that impeded traffic. Despite the demise in 1677 of Pascal’s scheme for a public transport system in Paris, other forms of travel for hire became available in the form of open-air carriages called calèches or closed ones known as fiacres. Neoclassical townhouses for royal officers and merchants went up in posh districts, none more so than the Place Vendôme.128 The conversion of urban peripheries to leisure zones, which began in select towns in the seventeenth century, became more generalized in the 1700s. Bordeaux, for example, in 1745 built a tree-lined promenade, the Allées de Tourny, on the glacis of the citadel. During 1772–1780, a theater was also built there; after 1780, when the citadel was demolished, a new quarter was laid out.129 Funds once earmarked for defenses now underwrote the new course of urban circulation. The periphery no longer barred entry but now facilitated it by directing traffic to specific quarters or, conversely, allowed it to bypass the city rather than traverse it. New public squares arose where mighty bastions once stood, providing for the transfer of particularly noisome markets, such as livestock, to the old edge along with new retail establishments. Manufacturing establishments also easily relocated to the new outer suburbs, which became common in the upcoming industrial era. River traffic also benefited from improved urban transport, as goods sent or delivered from the docks could more easily be channeled out along the ring road.130 New wider gates that allowed two carts to pass through at once replaced the imposing piles that had long guarded urban entries. Elegant building facades eventually adorned buildings facing the riverfronts, harbors, and some main avenues. The ebb and flow of people and goods rendered urban communities into dynamic, inherently unstable entities, nowhere more so than in the burgeoning metropolis of Paris.131

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The advent of public street lights in the late seventeenth century enabled the development of new forms of nocturnal sociability that reshaped age-old patterns of work and leisure. Paris led the way in 1667 at Colbert’s initiative.132 New lighting technologies for the stage and street brought about the creation of modern night culture. More activities associated with business and pleasure moved into the evening, so the time for activities such as closing of the city gates became more and more late. A royal edict in 1697 mandated publicly funded street lights in some thirty provincial cities, though not without some resistance concerning cost. Rouen apparently took up the order for public illumination with zeal, installing in three short years over 800 lanterns.133 In Caen, the number of street lanterns rose from 257 in 1745 to 500 in 1785. As French towns installed large candle lanterns, they opened up new ways to think about and act in urban space.134 Public lighting served political purposes when shone upon symbols of royal and municipal authority. Street lights created clear, uniform spaces intended to promote law and order as well as beautify the city, which encouraged new ideas and practices of policing to develop.135 Groups that had long sought the cover of dark for their illicit or immodest activities, such as young men, servants, apprentices, prostitutes, and the like, resented the intrusion of lights into their world.136 Lantern smashing quickly became common, with a royal decree issued as early as 1699 promising stiff punishment. Accompanying illumination was the adoption of street numbering systems to identify addresses more accurately and thus further rationalize urban space. The regulation of public space in turn allowed for the delineation of a private domestic sphere to more fully develop.137 If one word epitomized enlightened urbanism, it was the notion of embellissement (beautification). In this respect, the urban ideals of voluptas and commoditas derived from Vitruvius and touted since the Renaissance still held sway.138 Beauty bespoke well-being, which in turn, as reformers from the abbot of Saint-Pierre to the Physiocrats all argued, depended on an increasing volume and velocity of circulation of men and goods.139 These also provided the foundations of the monarchy’s military power, which became conceived in terms of agrarian production, population, commercial exchange, and manufacturing capacity. Improved communication and transportation networks played crucial roles furthering these goals. Royal civil engineers thus made it their mission to create markets for the freer circulation of goods and ideas that advanced the public interest and the king’s authority. Yet royal provincial administrators, particularly the intendants, constantly encountered obstruction to these plans from local interests and habits.140 The economic benefits of opening up towns also became a common theme in descriptions of French towns after 1750 where discussions of local manufactures and industries replaced earlier paeans about a place’s potent towers and walls. Commercial exchange gradually replaced the mercantilist bias in favor of manufacturing as the chief measure of a town’s vitality.141 Étienne Condillac’s Le commerce et le gouvernement considérées relativement l’un à l’autre, written in 1776, emphasized the importance of geographic location and good roads as key factors in promoting exchange that expanded markets and led to increased division of labor and production. Towns thus had good reason to vie for royal funds and support of transportation projects that benefited them. Engineers conceived of towns as villesmachines in which the natural and human components worked like a clock. The neoclassical emphasis on immutability and static order gave way to ideals stressing

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dynamism and fecundity. This process culminated in the laws promulgated during the Revolution. In the eighteenth century, spatial extension, not containment, characterized the city. It also opened up urban politics. The prominent place of the walled enceinte faded behind the burgeoning sprawl of the suburbs, as in the 1768 engravings of Rouen by Jacques Bacheley.142 Cityscapes and plans highlighted the outward radiating thrust of avenues from the old urban core through the enceinte into the wider world as the urban periphery became a zone of engagement, not separation.143 Investors sought commercial opportunities in urban and suburban property that accelerated the pace of redevelopment and a host of ensuing social dislocations and stresses.144 One prime site where these changes became evident was the workplace. As architecture and engineering assumed a more enlightened character, so their advocates began to question the expertise of guild masters in building trades.145 The Encyclopédie included construction under the mechanical arts, while treatises regularly aimed to formulate a scientific basis for improved building practices.146 The theorists, known in Paris as the architectes-experts-bourgeois, suffered a setback in 1775 when Turgot returned the authority to conduct building inspections to the master builders. The tension between statist oversight and a more market-oriented approach swung back with Turgot’s fall in 1776 as the government consolidated the building guilds and placed them under the lieutenant général de police.147 These disputes also raged in the provinces.148 Attempts to strike a balance between liberal and statist tendencies proved unstable as friction mounted, eventually resulting in widespread work stoppages in 1785 by journeymen and workers in the building trades. Along with new politics came new social practices nurtured by the new kinds of mobility and sociability of the Enlightenment. The new secular sciences promoted changes to the city’s cultural geography with the building of laboratories, observatories, botanical gardens, menageries, and such new sites for the production and display of knowledge.149 They also remained the crucibles of royal power for the manufacture of arms and munitions.150 While neoclassicism certainly left its imprint on French towns during the eighteenth century, it did not obliterate the traditional pell-mell, medieval character still so alive in the urban fabric. The dictates of enlightened urbanism framed the shaping of urban space to convey the Revolution’s ideologies of change after 1789.151 And it continued into the nineteenth century in state-inspired renewal projects and the process of industrialization, which in time obliterated so much of the established urban landscape that in centuries before had so powerfully shaped the contours of France.152

C onc lusion

Pa li mp sests and M odern Tra jectories

In 1851, Eugène Viollet-le-Duc, himself originally trained as a sapper, actually

convinced the Ministry of War to finance his restoration of the “medieval” walls of Carcassonne, a town located sixty miles from the Spanish frontier (hardly a hostile power at the time), with the clever argument that he was adapting them for modern weaponry. It was his successor, Raymond-Adolphe Séré de Rivières, the future “Vauban of the Revanche,” who added detached artillery bunkers outside Viollet-le-Duc’s Romantic fantasy and today’s popular tourist destination. It is anyone’s guess against whom he intended to direct them. On the opposite end of France, Lille retained great military significance into the early twentieth century, though that role since the mid-eighteenth century had constantly run up against pressures to expand the city’s industrial enterprises and transportation network, especially railroads.1 At the outset of World War I, the French government declared Lille a ville-ouverte in the hope of sparing its destruction. It worked, thus nullifying the massive efforts over the past two centuries to make it France’s bulwark of the north. Ports such as Rochefort began to tear down their early modern fortifications in the 1920s and only completed the work in the 1970s. 2 Despite these precedents, as is well known, France remained adamantly committed to an enceinte for the nation with the ultimately pointless construction of the Maginot Line in the 1930s. Today it offers chic housing opportunities and another spot for tourists to spend their time and money, some of which no doubt helps to underwrite its maintenance.3 These cautionary tales about modern walls, large and small, must not blind us to their earlier historical significance in the making of France. This study has highlighted the distinctly urban origins of much of what makes France so distinct. In doing so, it certainly does not intend to diminish the contributions of other groups, such as the nobility, clergy, or peasantry. Yet it does contend that medieval walled towns constituted much of the essential scaffolding for the construction of this modern national community. The networks of relationships within these urban communities and the ties of commercial trade and social exchange that bound them together along rivers and across the land represent perhaps the most perdurable feature of France over the last millennium. While geography may not entirely be destiny, it does powerfully shape the contours of human communities. The walls that went up around these communities—from the simple wooden palisades of the early Middle Ages to the sophisticated bastioned enceintes of Vauban—powerfully expressed the sense of common purpose and emerging local

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identities that eventually coalesced into la France, in all its geographical, cultural, and once linguistic diversity. Historians have long recognized that medieval feudatories, such as the counts of Flanders, dukes of Normandy, and Capetian kings, played pivotal roles in binding these diverse areas together under their authority. The exercise of this authority mixed collaborative and coercive methods depending on circumstances and local traditions; yet out of this complex process both the “state” and this broader sense of “France” in time arose. Many of the essential tools of public governance in the areas of justice, finance, and war developed in medieval walled towns. These bonnes villes provided territorial rulers, none more so than Philip II, sites for controlling territory in exchange for recognition of local liberties. The ensuing contests with the English in Aquitaine and greater Occitania turned in large part on the competition to create new towns known as bastides. Medieval towns also served as a setting for the emergence of a civic culture predicated on new cultural values and intellectual skills. These values and skills increasingly made it possible for towns to undertake grand public projects, such as cathedrals and curtained enceintes. Soaring spires and machicolated towers reflected a powerful new sense of public duty that only grew during the tumult of the Hundred Years’ War as towns embraced the necessary burdens of self-taxation and self-defense even further. With the French triumph in the fifteenth century, towns provided even more the essential infrastructure to support the crown’s new standing army and industries of the gunpowder age. The conquest of Burgundy and long wars against the Hapsburgs in Italy ensued as the monarchy now embarked on an ambitious program of territorial aggrandizement. While the changing nature of war benefited the monarchy, it also prompted towns to adapt and in time reinvent the ways they designed their defenses to meet the new challenges of siege warfare. The rise of the new bastioned trace, which began in Italy, required greater levels of technical expertise and more substantial investments of resources to achieve. Until the mid-sixteenth century, the Valois supported their bonnes villes in these efforts as a nascent royal fortification service took shape. They did so particularly along the hotly contested borderlands between France and Hapsburg holdings in the Low Countries, Lorraine, Savoy, and the Pyrenees. In fact, by 1550, the familiar hexagon of modern France was already clearly recognizable in early maps of the kingdom. And fortified places in these borderlands became the principal markers of possession. Military engineering from Italy and even homegrown expertise continued to push urban enceintes ever outward as defense-in-depth became the order of the day. As a result, towns began to be encased within their own fortifications, separated even further from the hostile world without. As new forms of urban self-defense developed, so traditions of urban autonomy began to become circumscribed by the crown. The monarchy’s creeping dominance over towns also arose because increasing numbers of the urban notability construed familial advancement in terms of holding royal offices. Urban divisions became exacerbated with the advent of the Reformation after 1550 as Calvinist and Catholic walled towns defied the last Valois kings, often in the name of the monarchy, during the Wars of Religion. These struggles frequently turned on the contest over fortified towns, while attempts at peace—culminating eventually in the 1598 Edict of Nantes—measured security in terms of who controlled specific “safe places” across the kingdom. After 1600, the Bourbon kings and their ministers took halting but eventually decisive steps in establishing the crown’s sovereign

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claims over France. This change, in part, developed because of the increased bureaucratic means, including a permanent royal fortification service, at its disposal. The potential for a relapse to the disorders of the past persisted into the 1620s when Louis XIII and Richelieu finally subdued the last major obstacle to royal supremacy, the Huguenot walled towns. With the fall of La Rochelle in 1628, France stood positioned to pursue its territorial ambitions once again. Its success over the next sixty years in large part relied upon the willing collaboration of elites, first Catholic and then Calvinist. Leading the way, as seen during the Fronde, were the merchants, professionals, and officials in the towns. One indicator of this more unitary, yet still deeply shared sense of public purpose under royal leadership came in the clearer definition of the “interior” and “frontier” areas of the realm. A physical marker of this distinction increasingly became the condition or even presence of walls around towns. Over the seventeenth century, the crown redirected more and more revenues once earmarked for urban fortifications in the newly designated interior towns to the fortified towns and places that created the kingdom’s celebrated ceinture de fer. This massive effort to render France into one gigantic walled town also required the training and mobilization of engineering experts to defend the kingdom and subdue the walled towns of its adversaries. Vauban led this initiative, with the support of Louis XIV and his war minister Louvois. Vauban also epitomized the new premium the monarchy placed on technical sciences and technology. This trend broadened in the eighteenth century to include not just military matters but also civil projects, such as roads, bridges, and urban renewal that strove to integrate France’s disparate regions even more. As a result, pressures for town walls to come down grew as urban vitality—and that of the kingdom—became defined in terms of circulation, openness, and exchange. These enlightened values received further reinforcement and amplification in the revolutions after 1789, both political and industrial. In the nineteenth century, the periphery of major cities remained distinct from the urban core as industries and working-class and eventually immigrant neighborhoods in sprawling bidonvilles became viewed as sites of danger and filth by the bourgeoisie and governing authorities, as remains the case to this day in the wake of the recent riots along the outskirts of Paris and several other major towns. Traditional aspects of life also persisted on the urban edge into the twentieth century. It still served as a semi-agricultural zone, with small gardens, orchards, and small livestock freely roaming in the old outworks, which formed a sort of green-belt of upward of one hundred years around the city. Public executions even continued to take place, as they had since the Middle Ages, at the barrière Saint-Jacques in Paris until 1870. Looking at any modern map of France’s road and railroads systems one can see a radial schema for France centered on Paris remarkably similar to some of the Ideal City plans found in Renaissance treatises. As if to defy Charles Baudelaire’s bold claim, later reinforced by Walter Benjamin, that Paris was the quintessential modern city, the French national government during the July Monarchy undertook the massive reconstruction of the capital’s fortifications.4 Even when these fortifications eventually came down, the network of interlocking boulevards that replaced them—the Maréchaux, named after Napoléon’s marshals—thus became inscribed with memories of France’s military past. Ironically, the only real time these fortifications actually became used was during the Communard revolt of 1870–1871—a revolt the French government only managed to subdue with the help of the hated Prussians.5 The last remnants of the July Monarchy’s fortifications around Paris

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came down after World War I, thus opening up a twenty-five-mile-long swath of undeveloped land over four hundred yards deep. Initially a green belt was contemplated, but it fell before the crushing need to build affordable housing for the city’s burgeoning population. Later in the 1970s, the present péréphérique highway was built, which serves to this day to “contain” the capital city.6 Sometimes time and the forces of nature dictated the fate of a town’s fortifications. Montreuil-sur-Mer’s ancient enceinte became overtaken by vegetation after 1800 and today forms a charming park, while the royal citadel built at Amiens in 1597 is now an arboretum. Most French towns preserve palimpsests of their old enceintes in the familiar ring road and large squares that drivers must negotiate as they seek to enter the quaint “vieilles villes” today. Since the nineteenth century, it has been local antiquarians and now businesses dependent on tourism who have become the greatest defenders of these walls as vital parts of France’s patrimoine. Gates and towers have been among the easiest sites to preserve because they could be transformed into monuments glorifying the city’s past as the remaining walls and other vestiges became subsumed by the modern city. With guidebooks galore, visitors can at least still travel back in time to a past when town walls really mattered.7

N otes Chapter 1 1. Robert Eric Mortimer Wheeler and Katherine M. Richardson, Hill-Forts of Northern France: Reports of the Research Committee of the Society of Antiquaries of London No. XIX (The Society of Antiquaries, London, 1957); and Ian Ralston, “The Use of Timber in Hill-Fort Defenses in France,” in Graeme Guilbert, ed., Hill-Fort Studies: Essays for A. H. A. Hogg (Leicester University Press: Leicester, 1981), pp. 78–103. 2. Jon Maloney and Biran Hobley, eds, Roman Urban Defenses in the West: A Review of Current Research on Urban Defenses in the Roman Empire, with Special Reference to the Western Provinces (Council of British Archaeology: London, 1983); and Ronald M. Butler, “Late Roman Town Walls in Gaul,” Archaeological Journal, 66 (1959): 25–50. 3. Ferdinand Lot, Recherches sur la population et la superficie des cités remontant à la période gallo-romaine (Libraire ancienne Honoré Champion: Paris, 1946–1953), 3 volumes. 4. Pierre Varène, Pierre and Jacques Bigot, L’enceinte gallo-romaine de Nîmes. Les murs et les tours (Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique: Paris, 1992). 5. E. Will, “Les remparts romains de Boulogne-sur-Mer,” Revue du Nord, 42 (1960): 363–380; and Claude Seillier, “Les enceintes romaines de Boulogne-sur-Mer,” Revue du Nord 260/66 (1984): 169–180. 6. J. Mertens, “La destinée des centres urbains gallo-romaines à la lumière de l’archéologie et des texts,” in La genèse et les premiers siècles des villes médiévales dans les Pays-Bas méridionaux (Crédit Communal: Brussels, 1990), pp. 54–72; and Charles Pietri and Noël Duval, La topographie chrétienne des cités de la Gaule: des origines à la fin du VIIe siècle (Centre de recherches sur l’antiquité tardive et le haut moyen âge: Paris, 1975–), 4 volumes. 7. Bernard S. Bachrach, “Military Organization in Aquitaine under the Early Carolingians,” Speculum, 49/1 (1974): 1–33; and Charles L. H. Coulson, “Fortresses and Social Responsibility in late Carolingian France,” Zeitschrift für Archäologie des Mittelalters, 4 (1976): 29–36. 8. Collectif. “Les fortifications de terre en Europe occidentale du Xe au XIIe siècle (Colloque de Caen, 1980),” Archéologie médiévale, 11 (1981): 5–123. 9. Adriaan Verhulst, The Rise of Cities in North-West Europe (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999); and Pierre Demolen, Henri Galinié, and Frans Verhaeghe, eds, Archéologie des villes dans le nord de l’Europe (VIIe–XIIIe siècle) (Société archéologique de Douai: Douai, 1994), pp. 83–91. 10. There is a vast literature on châteaux-forts. See André Chatelain, Châteaux forts, images de pierre des guerres médiévales (Rempart: Paris, 1983); André Debord, Andrés Bazzana, and J. M. Poisson, Aristocratie et pouvoir. Le rôle du château dans

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11. 12.

13.

14.

15. 16.

17. 18. 19.

20. 21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

No t e s la France médiévale (Picard: Paris, 2000); and Jean-Pierre Panouillé, Les châteaux forts dans la France du Moyen Age (Ouest-France: Rennes, 2003). R. J. Bartlett, “Technique militaire et pouvoir politique, 900–1300,” Annales, économies, sociétés civilisations, 41 (1986): 1135 –1159. John H. Beeler, “Castles and Strategy in Norman and Early Angevin England,” Speculum, 31/4 (1956): 581–601; and Pierre Héliot, “La genèse des châteaux de plan quadrangulaire en France et en Angleterre,” Bulletin de la société nationale des Antiquaires de France (1965): 238–257. Marcel Grandjean, “Villes neuves et bourgs médiévaux. Fondement de l’urbanisme régional,” L’Homme dans la ville (Cours général de l’UNIL: Lausanne, 1984), pp. 61–100; and Philippe Contamine, Nicolas Faucherre, Gilles Blieck, and Jean Mesqui, eds, Le château et la ville. Conjonctions, oppositions, juxtapositions (XIeXVIIIe siècles) (Éditions du CTHS: Paris, 2002). For a general overview of this relationship, see David Abulafia, et al., eds, Church and City, 1000–1500: Essays in Honour of Christopher Brooke (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1992). More specific regional studies include Sheila Bonde, Fortress-Churches of Languedoc: Architecture, Religion and Conflict in the High Middle Ages (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994); and Stephen Gardner, “The Influence of Castle Building on Ecclesiastical Architecture in the Paris Region, 1130–1150,” in Kathryn L. Reyerson and Faye Powe, The Medieval Castle: Romance and Reality (Center for Medieval Studies: Minneapolis, Minn., 1984), pp. 97–123. V. Hunger, ed., La Maison forte au Moyen Age (Éditions du CNRS: Paris, 1986). Pierre Charbonnier, “Le château seigneurial: protection ou oppression?” in Philippe Contamine and Olivier Guyotjeannin, eds, La Guerre, la violence et les gens du Moyen Age (Éditions du CTHS: Paris, 1996), 2 volumes, v. I, pp. 223–234. Jacques Heers, ed., Fortifications, portres de villes, places publiques dans le monde méditerranéen (Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, Paris, 1985), p. 325. David Abulafia, and Nora Berend, eds, Medieval Frontiers: Concepts and Practices (Ashgate: Aldershot, Hampshire, 2002). See M. C. Laleman, “Gand et ses enceintes urbaines médiévales,” Annales de la Fédération historique et archéologique de Belgique, XLVIIe congrès, Nivelles, 1984 (Nivelles, 1984), 2 volumes, v. II, 201–211. Pierre Demolon, Douai, cité médiévale: bilan d’archéologie et d’histoire (Société archéologique de Douai: Douai, 1990). M. Roche, “Topographie historique de Cambrai durant le Haut Moyen Age (V–XIe siècles),” Revue historique Nord de la France, Belgique, Pays-Bas, 57 (1976): 339– 365; and L. Vanderstraeten, “Recherches sur les fortifications de Lille au Moyen Age,” Revue du Nord, 70 (1988): 107–122. G. Despy, “Naissance des villes et des bourgades,” in Hervé Hasquin, ed., La Wallonie. Le pays et les hommes (La Renaissance du Livre: Brussels, 1975), 3 volumes, v. I, pp. 93–192. G. Despy, “Les phénomènes urbains dans le Brabant wallon jusqu’aux environs de 1300,” in Wavre 1222–1972. 750e anniversaire des libertés communales. Colloque historique. Actes (Cercle historique et archéologique de Wavre et de la Région: Wavre, 1973), pp. 21–53. Michel de Waha, “L’apparition de fortifications seigneuriales à l’enceinte en Hainaut belge aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles,” in Recueil d’études d’histoire hainuyère offertes à M. A. Arnould (Hannonia: Mons, 1983), 2 volumes, v. II, pp. 121–142. Alan Salamagne, “Les fortifications médiévales de la ville du Quesnoy,” Revue du Nord, 63 (1981): 997–1008.

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26. Henri Patelle, “Le développement de Valenciennes du Xe au XIIIe siècle. Le castrum, les bourgs, les enceintes. Étude topographique,” Mémoires du Cercle archéologique et Historique de Valenciennes, 9 (1976): 21–52; and Alan Salamagne, “La construction des enceintes médiévales. L’exemple de la troisième enceinte de Valenciennes (XIIe siècle),” Valentiana, 9 (1992): 53–66. 27. Philippe Fournez, Histoire d’une forteresse Landrecies d’après des documents inédits (Perrin: Paris, 1911), pp. 11–36. 28. F. Lennel, Calais au Moyen Age, des origines au siège de 1346 (Lille, 1908), pp. 38–44. 29. Charles Higounet, Défrichements et villeneuves du Bassin parisien, XIe–XIVe siècles (Éd. du CNRS: Paris, 1990). 30. André Châtelain, Châteaux forts et féodalité en Ile-de-France, du XIème au XIIIème siècle (Créer: Nonette, 1983); Jean Mesqui, Ile-de-France gothique (Picard: Paris, 1988), two volumes, v. I, Les Demeures seigneuriales; and Christian Corvisier and Malika Turin, L’Ile-de-France des châteaux forts (Parigramme: Paris, 2004). 31. Lucien Musset, Jean-Michel Bouvris, and Jean-Marie Maillefer, Autour du pouvoir ducal normand, Xe-XIIe siècles (Annales de Normandie: Caen, 1985). 32. Eleanor Searle, Predatory Kinship and the Creation of Norman Power, 840–1066 (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1988). 33. J. Broussard, “Hypothèse sur la fondation des bourgs et des communes en Normandie,” Annales de Normandie, 8 (1958): 27–53. On Norman castles, see Bernard Beck, Châteaux-forts de Normandie (Ouest-France: Rennes, 1986). 34. Marie-Madeleine Azard-Malourie, Château Gaillard et Gisors, citadelles du Vexin (Édition du Cadran: Paris, 1963). 35. Jean-Marie Laurence, Caen aux XIe et XIIe siècles: espace urbain, pouvoirs et société (La Mandragore: Condé-sur-Noireau, 2000). 36. Charles Richard, Recherches historiques sur Rouen. Fortifications-Porte Martin ville (Rouen, 1844); and L.-R. Delsalle, “Les anciennes portes de Rouen,” Bulletin des Amis des monuments rouennais (1995–1996): 13–37. 37. Michael E. Jones, “The Defence of Medieval Brittany: A Survey of the Establishment of Fortified Towns, Castles and Frontiers from the Gallo-Roman Period to the End of the Middle Ages,” Archaeological Journal, 138 (1981): 149–204; and André Chédeville and Noël-Yves Tonnerre, La Bretagne féodale: XIe–XIIIe siècle (Ouest France: Rennes, 1987). 38. Francis Michaud, Châteaux de Bretagne (Éditions Patrimoines & medias: Chauray-Niort, 1996); and Patrick Kernevez, Les fortifications médiévales du Finistère. Mottes, enceintes et châteaux (Centre regional d’archéologie d’Ale: Rennes, 1997). 39. C. Gillot, “Les fortifications de Fougères,” Bulletins et mémoires de la société archéologique et historique de l’arrondissement de Fougères, 7 (1963): 81–104. 40. Exceptional indeed was the stone castle in Gueméné-sur-Scorff built by the Rohans in the twelfth century. In general, see the relevant chapters on this period in Philippe Guigon and André Chedeville, Les fortifications du haut Moyen-Age en Bretagne (Centre regional d’archéologie d’Alet: Rennes, 1997); and Arthur Le Moyne de La Borderie and René Sanquier, L’architecture militaire du Moyen-Age en Bretagne (Éditions “Rue des Scribes”: Rennes, 1991). 41. Jean-Marie Leguay, Un réseau urbain au moyen âge: les villes du duché de Bretagne aux XIVe–XVe siècles (Maloine: Paris, 1981), chapters 1–2; Lionel Pirault and Isabelle Rouaud-Rouaze, “La muraille gallo-romaine de Nantes,” Arts, Recherches, et Créations, 54 (1997): 12–25; and P. de Contenson, “Les ramparts de Rennes,” Bulletin monumental (1907): 431–444.

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42. H. Bourde de la Rogerie, “Les fondations de villes et de bourgs en Bretagne du XIe au XIIIe siècles,” Mémoires de la société d’histoire et d’archéologie en Bretagne, 9 (1928): 69–106. 43. Jean Noël Luc, Jean Combes, and Michel Luc, La Charente-Maritime: l’Aunis et la Saintonge des origines à nos jours (Éditions Bordessoules: Saint-Jean-d’Angély, 1981); and Robert Colle, Châteaux, manoirs et forteresses d’Aunis et de Saintonge (Éditions Rupella: La Rochelle), 1984, 3 volumes. On La Rochelle, see Isabelle Warmoes, “Les fortifications médiévales de La Rochelle. Étude des documents iconographiques,” Mémoire de maîtrise d’archéologie, Université de Paris I, 1991, 2 volumes. One hundred illustrations compose volume II. 44. H. Boyer, “Les enceintes de Bourges,” Mémoires de la société historique, littéraire, artistique et scientifique du Cher, 4 (1888–1889): 108–142; and Claude Dietrich, Topographie und Verfassung der Städte Bourges und Poitiers bis in das 11 Jahrhundert (Mathiesen Verlag: Lübeck, 1960). 45. André Chédeville, Chartres et ses campagnes, XIe–XIIIe siècles (Klincksieck: Paris, 1973). 46. Bernard S. Bachrach, Fulk Nerra, the Neo-Roman Consul, 987–1040: A Political Biography of the Angevin Count (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1993). 47. Marcel Deyres, “Le donjon de Langeais,” Bulletin monumental, 128 (1970): 179–193; F. Lesueur, “Le château de Langeais,” Congrès archéologique de France, 106 (1948): 378–400; Jean Vallery-Badot, “Loches,” Congrès archéologique de France, 106 (1948): 111–125; and Pierre Héliot, “L’Évolution du donjon dans le nord-ouest de la France et en Angleterre au XIIe siècle,” Bulletin archéologique du Comité des Travaux Historiques et Scientifiques, 5 (1969): 141–194. 48. Gustave d’Espinay, Congrès archéologique de France, Angers (Angers, 1871), pp. 202–203. 49. Bernard Chevalier, Tours ville royale, 1356–1520. Origine et développement d’une capitale à la fin du moyen âge (Nauwelaerts: Paris, 1975), pp. 8–13; and JeanClaude Pasquier, Le château de Vendôme: une histoire douce-amère (Éditions du Cherche-Lune: Vendôme, 2000). 50. Sidney Painter, “Castellans of the Plain of Poitou in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries,” in Fred A. Cazel, Jr., ed., Feudalism and Liberty: Articles and Addresses of Sidney Painter (Oxford University Press: London, 1961), pp. 17–40; Marcel Garaud, Les châtelains de Poitou et l’avènement du régime féodal, XIe et XIIe siècles (Mémoires de la société des antiquitaires de l’Ouest: Poitier, 1964). 51. Elizabeth Chapin, Les villes de foires de Champagne, des origines au début du XIVe siècle (Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1976). Originally published in 1937. 52. J.-P. Boureux, R. Threis, and D. Bodovillé, Vestiges d’habitat seigneurial fortifié en Champagne centrale (A.R.E.R.S.: Reims, 1987); and Jean Mesqui, Châteaux-forts et fortifications de France (Flammarion: Paris, 1998), pp. 436–447. 53. Gérard Giuliato, Châteaux et maisons fortes en Lorraine centrale (Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme: Paris, 1992); and Marc Greder, Villes et villages fortifiées d’Alsace. Histoire, description, photographes et plans (Éditions Salvator: Mulhouse), 1993. 54. Claude Turrel, Metz: Deux mille ans d’architecture militaire (Éditions Serpenoises: Metz, 1986); and La fortification en Lorraine: de l’enceinte gauloise de Metz à la ligne Maginot (Association d’Histoirens de l’Est: Metz, 2003). 55. J.-L. Fray, “Nancy du XIe au début du XVe siècle. Naissance et évolution de la ville médiévale,” Le Pays lorrain, 68 (1987): 21–39. 56. Alain Sartelet, Les fortifications de Mézières (Itinéraires du Patrimoine: Paris, 2003), pp. 4–19; and Histoire de la fortification dans le pays de Thionville, des origines à la ligne Maginot (La Municipalité: Thionville, 1970), pp. 3–5.f

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57. Jean-Pierre Klein and Jean-Jacques Schwien, “Strasbourg et ses fortifications au Moyen Âge et à l’époque moderne. Mise au point et essai de synthèse,” in Vivre au Moyen Âge. 30 d’archéologie médiévale en Alsace (Catalogue des Musées de Strasbourg: Strasbourg, 1990), pp. 21–31. 58. Guy Le Hallé, Histoire des fortifications en Bourgogne (Martelle Éditions: Amiens, 1990); and Yves Jeannin, Les enceintes médiévales des villes et bourgs de FrancheComté (Direction des Antiquités historiques de Franche-Comté: Besançon, 1981). 59. Émile Thevenot, Autun, cité romaine & chrétienne: histoire-monuments-sites (L. Taverne and Charles Chandioux: Autun, 1932). 60. Jean Richard, “Les murailles de Dijon, du XIIe au XIVe siècle,” Mémoires de la Commission des antiquités de la Côte-d’Or, 22 (1940–1946): 316–329. 61. Claude Fohlen, Histoire de Besançon (Nouvelle Librairie de France: Paris, 1964– 1965), 2 volumes, v. I, pp. 23–42. 62. Philip Bruno, Seigneurs et bâtisseurs: le château et l’habitat seigneurial en HauteAuvergne et Brivadois entre le XIe et le XVe siècle (Presses Universitaires BlaisePascal: Clermont-Ferrand, 2000). 63. Gabriel Fournier, “Les bourgs fortifiés de l’Auvergne,” Bulletin du Centre d’Études et Recherches Archéologique Aérienne, 1 (1979): 15–36. 64. J. L. Taupin, “Les murs d’Avignon,” Les monuments historiques de la France (CNMH: Paris, 1971), n. 2–3, pp. 141–186; and Odile Blum, Fortifications à Marseilles (Edisud: Aix-en-Provence, 1990). 65. Monique Bourin-Derruau, Villages médiévaux en Bas-Languedoc: Genèse d’une sociabilité (Xe–XIVe siècle), 2 volumes (L’Harmattan: Paris, 1987). 66. P.-A Février, Le développement urbain en Provence de l’époque romaine à la fin du XIVe siècle (Fréjus: Paris, 1964). 67. Archibald Ross Lewis, “The Development of Town Government in TwelfthCentury Montpellier,” Speculum, 22/1 (1947): 51–67; and Jean Combes, Montpellier et Le Languedoc au Moyen Age (Société Archéologique de Montpellier: Montpellier, 1990). 68. Kathryn L. Reyerson and John Drendel, eds, Urban and Rural Communities in Medieval France: Provence and Languedoc, 1000–1500 (Brill: Leiden, 1998). 69. René Caïrou, Narbonne: vingt siècles de fortifications (Commission archéologique de Narbonne: Narbonne, 1979); and Pierre Varène and Jacques Bigot, L’enceinte gallo-romaine de Nîmes: les murs et les tours (Éd. du CNRS: Paris, 1992). 70. Krzysztof Pawlowski revived nineteenth-century arguments in favor of indigenous urban forms in the Midi prior to Capetian domination in his Circulades languedociennes de l’An mille: naissance de l’urbanisme européen (Presses du Languedoc: Montpellier, 1992). 71. Joseph de Pous, “L’architecture militaire occitane (IXe–XIVe siècles),” Bulletin archéologique du Comité des travaux historiques, 5 (1969), 41–139; and R. Crozet, “Les églises fortifiées du Poitou, de l’Angoumois, de l’Aunis et de la Saintonge,” Bulletin de la société des antiquités de l’Ouest, ser. 4, 1 (1951): 813–820. 72. Francis Michaud and Michel Garnier, Châteaux en Aquitaine (Éditions Patrimoines & medias: Chauray-Niort, 1997); Sites défensifs et sites fortifiés au Moyen Age entre Loire et Pyrénées: Actes du premier colloque Aquitaine, Limoges, 20–22 mai 1987 (Fédération Aquitaine, Bordeaux, 1990); and Jean-Paul Gaillard, Guide des châteaux et anciennes demeures de la Charente (Librairie B. Sepulchre: Paris, 1994). 73. Michel Granger, Poitiers. La pierre, l’homme et la cité (Geste Éditions: Poitiers, 1993); Hugues Imbert, Histoire de Thouars (Laffite: Marseille, 1976/1871); and Marie-Pierre Baudry, Les fortifications des Plantagenêts en Poitou, 1154–1242 (Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques: Paris, 2001).

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74. Arlette Higounet-Nadal, Périgueux, Dordogne: plan et notice élaborés (Éditions du CNRS: Paris, 1984). 75. Charles Higounet, Histoire de Bordeaux (Fédération historique du Sud-Ouest: Bordeaux, 1962), 8 volumes, v. II. 76. Charles L. H. Coulson, “Rendability and Castellation in Medieval France,” Château Gaillard, 6 (1973): 59–67; and Jacques Boussard, “Service féodaux, milices et mercenaires dans les armées en France aux Xe et XIe siècles,” in Ordinamenti militari in Occidente 15e Settimane di Spolete 1967 (Centro Studi Alto Medioevo: Spoleto 1968), v. I, pp. 131–168, 22–228. 77. The seminal study remains Bernard Chevalier, Les bonnes villes de France du XIVe au XVIe siècle (Aubier: Paris, 1982). Ten years later, their origins became pushed back two centuries. See Monique Bourin, ed., Villes, bonnes villes, cités et capitals: études d’histoire urbaine (XIIe–XVIIIe siècle) offertes à Bernard Chevalier (Paradigme: Caen, 1993). On the etymology of the appellation, see G. Maudvech, “La ‘bone ville’: origine et sens de l’expression,” Annales economies, sociétés et civilizations, 27 (1972): 1441–1448. 78. Raymond Ritter, Châteaux-donjons et places fortes: l’architecture militaire française (Larousse: Paris, 1954); and J. F. Finò, Forteresses de la France médévale, 3rd ed. (A. & J. Picard: Paris, 1967), pp. 253–298. 79. David Nicholas, The Growth of the Medieval City: From Late Antiquity to the Early Fourteenth Century (Longman: New York, 1997); and Charles Petit-Dutaillis, The French Communes in the Middle Ages (North Holland Publishing Co.: Amsterdam/ New York, 1978). 80. On the early evolution of municipal liberties and city charters, see Les origines des libertés urbaines: Actes du XVIe Congrès des historiens médiévistes de l’enseignement supérieur (Rouen 7–8 juin 1985) (Presses Universitaires de Rouen: Rouen, 1990). 81. Albert Rigaudière, Gouverner la ville au Moyen Age (Anthropos: Paris, 1993), pp. 21–50; and P.-C. Timbal, “Les villes de consulat dans le midi de la France,” in Les villes (Société Jean Bodin: Brussels, 1955), v. I. 82. Albert Rigaudière, Penser et construire l’État dans la France du Moyen Age: (XIIIe– XVe siècle) (Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France: Paris, 2003). 83. A twelfth-century encyclopedia defined a garden (ortus) as a space “surrounded by ditches and hedges” (circumfoditur et circumsepitur) that separated it from the wilder, uncultivated lands without. De bestiis et aliis rebus libri quatuor, chapter 13, pl. 177, col. 154. 84. A. Higounet-Nadal, “Les jardins urbains dans la France médiévale,” Flaran 9 Auch (1989): 68–89; Le Paysage urbain au Moyen Age (Presses Universitaires de Lyon: Lyon, 1981); and Vito Fumagalli, Landscapes of Fear: Perceptions of Nature and the City in the Middle Ages (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1994). 85. P. Lavedan, Histoire de l’urbanisme (Henri Laurens: Paris, 1952), 3 volumes, v. II, p. 238. Rural villages evinced much the same pattern of spatial development. See Ghiselaine Fabre, Morphogenèse du village médiéval (IXe–XIIe siècle): Actes de la table ronde de Montpellier, 22–23 février 1993 (Association pour la connaissance du patrimoine du Languedoc-Roussillon: Montpellier, 1996). 86. Philippe Contamine, Jean Kerhervé, and Albert Rigaudière, eds, L’impôt au Moyen Age: l’impôt public et le prélèvement seigneurial, fin XIIe–début XVIe siècle, 3 volumes (Comité pour l’Histoire Economique et Financière de la France: Paris, 2003). 87. André Guillerm, The Age of Water: The Urban Environment in the North of France, A.D. 300–1800 (Texas A & M University Press: College Station, 1988); and

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88. 89. 90.

91. 92.

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Jean-Pierre Leguay, L’eau dans la ville au Moyen Age (Presses Universitaires de Rennes: Rennes, 2002). Jean-Pierre Leguay, La rue au Moyen Age (Ouest-France: Rouen, 1984). Barbara Hanawalt and Michael Kobliaka, eds, Medieval Practices of Space (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 2000). Albert Rigaudière, “Hiérarchie socio-professionnelle et gestion municipale dans les villes du Midi français au bas Moyen Age,” in Rigaudière, Gouverner la ville au Moyen Age, pp. 167–214. Lewis, “The Development of Town Government” pp. 55–58. Joseph Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 1970); and Rees Davis, “The Medieval State: The Tyranny of a Concept?,” Journal of Historical Sociology, 16/2 (2003): 280–300.

Chapter 2 1. J. Richard, Les ducs de Bourgogne et la formation du duché du XIe au XIVe siècles (Société des Belles Lettres: Paris, 1954). 2. Roger Genty, Les Comtes de Toulouse: Histoire et Traditions (Éditions de Poliphile: Ferrières, 1987). 3. Heather J. Tanner, “Reassessing King Stephen’s Continental Strategies,” Medievalia et Humanistica: Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Culture, 26 (1999): 101–117. 4. In general, see Jacques Boussard, “Aspects particuliers de la féodalité dans l’empire plantagenêt,” Bulletin de la société des antiquitaires de l’Ouest, 4/7 (1963): 29–47. 5. Ralph V. Turner, “The Problem of Survival for the Angevin ‘Empire’: Henry II’s and His Sons’ Vision versus Late Twelfth-Century Realities,” American Historical Review, 100/1 (1995): 78–96. 6. John Gillingham, The Angevin Empire (Oxford University Press: New York, 2001), second ed., p. 64. 7. R. Latouche, “La commune du Mans (1070),” Mélanges d’histoire du moyen âge dédiés à la mémoire de Louis Halphen (Presses universitaires de France: Paris, 1950), pp. 38–52; and H. Miyamtsu, “A-t-il existé une commune à Angers au XIIe siècle?” Journal of Medieval History, 21 (1995): 117–152. 8. D. Bates, “Rouen from 900 to 1204: From Scandinavian Settlement to Angevin ‘Capital,’ ” in J. Stratford, ed., Medieval Art, Architecture, and Archaeology at Rouen, British Archaeological Association, Transactions, 12 (1993): 1–11. 9. J. C. Holt, “The Loss of Normandy and Royal Finances,” in J. Gillingham and J. C. Holt, eds, War and Government in the Middle Ages (Boydell & Brewer: Woodbridge, 1984), pp. 72–94. 10. Jacques Le Maho, “Fortifications de siège et ‘contre-châteaux’ en Normandie (xie– xiie s.),” Château Gaillard, 19 (1998): 24–41. 11. Kathleen Thompson, Power and Border Lordships: The Count of the Perche (1000– 1226) (Boydell: Rochester, NY, 2002). 12. Marie-Pierre Baudry, “Les châteaux d’Aliénor: palais, fortifications ou prisons?,” Aliénor d’Aquitaine (2004): 119–127. 13. Robert Hajdu, “Castles, Castellans and the Structure of Politics in Poitou, 1152– 1271,” Journal of Medieval History 4 (1978): 27–54. 14. M. Garaud, “Les Châtelains de Poitou et l’avènement du régime feudal, XIe et XIIe siècles,” Mémoires de la Société des Antiquaires de l’Ouest, 4 (1964): 34–61. 15. Pierre Bauduin, “Entre deux courtines de châteaux: une frontière entre Périgord et Quercy au Moyen Âge?,” in Yves Guéna, ed., Château et territoire: limites et mouvances (Diffusion les Belles Lettres: Paris, 1995), pp. 39–54.

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16. Hajdu, “Castles,” pp. 27–54. 17. C. Higounet, “En Bordelaise: ‘Principes castella tenentes,’ ” in P. Contamine, ed., La Noblesse du moyen âge, Xie–XVe siècles: Essais à la mémoire de Robert Boutruche (Presses Universitaires de France: Paris, 1976), pp. 81–101. 18. R. Benjamin, “A Forty Years War: Toulouse and the Plantagenets, 1156–1196,” Historical Research, 61 (1988): 270–283. 19. J. A. Everard, Brittany and the Angevins: Province and Empire, 1158–1203 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2000). 20. In 1183, encouraged by Geoffrey of Brittany, the young Henry joined a rebellion led by the viscount of Limoges and Geoffrey of Lusignan to unseat Richard as duke of Aquitaine. Gillingham, The Angevin Empire, p. 37. 21. John W. Baldwin, The Government of Philip Augustus: Foundations of French Royal Power in the Middle Ages (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1983); and Jim Bradbury, Philip Augustus, King of France, 1180–1223 (Longman: New York, 1998). 22. Jean-Pierre Poly and Eric Bournazel, La mutation féodale, Xe–XIIe siècles (Presses Universitaire de France: Paris, 1980); Gabrielle Spiegel, “The Cult of Saint Denis and the Capetian King,” Journal of Medieval History, 1 (1975): 43–70; and idem, “ ‘Defense of the Realm’: Evolution of a Capetian Propaganda Slogan,” Journal of Medieval History, 3 (1977): 115–145. 23. Vincent Moss, “The Defence of Normandy, 1193–8,” Anglo-Norman Studies, 24 (2002): 67–84. 24. J. Green, “Lords of the Norman Vexin,” in War and Government in the Middle Ages, pp. 27–49. 25. Charles L. H. Coulson, “Fortress-Policy in Capetian Tradition and Angevin Practice: Aspects of the Conquest of Normandy by Philip II,” Anglo-Norman Studies, 6 (1984): 15–34. 26. Ralph V. Turner and Richard R. Heiser, The Reign of Richard the Lionhearted: Ruler of the Angevin Empire, 1189–99 (Pearson Education Limited: Edinburgh, 2000), pp. 235–240. 27. J. C. Holt, “The Casus Regis: The Law and Politics of Succession in the Plantagenet Dominions, 1185–1247,” in Edward B. King, ed., Law in Medieval Life and Thought (University of the South: Sewanee, Tenn., 1990), pp. 24–43. 28. Hajdu, “Castles,” p. 38. 29. Coulson, “Fortress Policy in Capetian Tradition I,” 13–38. 30. Daniel Power, “The End of Angevin Normandy: The Revolt of Alençon (1203),” Historical Research, 74/196 (2001): 444–464. 31. J. C. Holt, “The End of the Anglo-Norman Realm,” Proceedings of the British Academy 61 (1975): 112–134. 32. Theodore Evergates, Feudal society in the bailliage of Troyes under the Counts of Champagne, 1152–1284 (The Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, Md., 1990), second ed. 33. Joseph R. Strayer, The Albigensian Crusades (Dial Press: New York, 1971); Jonathan Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade (Faber: London/Boston, 1978); and Michel Roquebert, Histoire des cathares. Hérésies, croisade, inquisition du XIe au XIVe siècle (Perrin: Paris, 2002). 34. Henri-Paul Eydoux, “Châteaux des pays de l’Aude,” Congrès archéologique des pays l’Aude, 131 (1973): 211–236. 35. Joseph Salvat, “Castelnaudary pendant la guerre des Albigeois,” Bulletin de la Société des Études (1930): 47–68. 36. Guillaume de Tudèle, Chanson de la croisade contre les Albigeois, E. Martin-Chabot, ed. (Les Belles Lettres: Paris, 1931–1957), v. I, chapter 15, p. 46.

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37. Sidney Painter, “The Houses of Lusignan and Châtelleraut, 1150–1250,” in Fred A. Cazel, Jr., ed., Feudalism and Liberty: Articles and Addresses of Sidney Painter (Oxford University Press: London, 1961), pp. 73–89. 38. Robert Hadju, “Family and Feudal Ties in Poitou, 1100–1300,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 8/1 (1977): 117–139, esp. 122–123. 39. Susan J. Kupper, “Town and Crown: Philip Augustus and the Towns of France,” dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 1976. 40. J. Orr, ed., Les Oeuvres (Manchester, 1915), vv. 180–200, pp. 14–16. 41. Mazime Legrand, Histoire d’Étampes (Res universes: Paris, 2003 [1902]), pp. 112–118. 42. Baldwin, The Government of Philip Augustus, pp. 69–70. 43. R. V. Turner, “Richard Lionheart and the Episcopate in his French Domains,” French Historical Studies, 21 (1998): 517–542; and Daniel Power, “The Norman Church and the Angevin and Capetian Kings,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 56/2 (2005): 205–234. 44. Charles L. H. Coulson, “The Impact of Bouvines upon the Fortress-Policy of Philip Augustus,” in Richard Eales, ed., Anglo-Norman Castles (Boydell: Rochester, N.Y., 2003), pp. 367–388. 45. Stéphane Rocheteau, “Le château de Chinon aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles,” in Martin Aurell, ed., La cour Plantagenêt (1154–1204) (CESM: Poitiers, 2000), pp. 315–355. 46. Charles L. H. Coulson, “The Sanctioning of Fortresses in France: ‘Feudal Anarchy’ or ‘Seigneurial Amity’?,” Nottingham Medieval Studies, 42 (1998): 38–104. 47. Baldwin, The Government of Philip Augustus, pp. 69–70. 48. A. Erlande-Brandenburg, “L’architecture militaire au temps de Philippe Auguste: une nouvelle conception de la défense,” in Robert-Henri Bautier, ed., La France de Philippe Auguste. Le temps des mutations (CNRS: Paris, 1982), pp. 595–603 ; and André Chatelain, “Recherches sur les châteaux de Philippe Auguste,” Archéologie médiévale (1991): 115–169. 49. Pierre Héliot, “Le Château-Gaillard et les forteresses des XIIe et XIIIe siècles en Europe occidentale,” Château-Gaillard. Études de castellogie européenne, 1 (1962): 53–75; Bernard Beck, Châteaux forts de Normandie (Éditions Ouest-France: Rennes, 1986), pp. 56–72; Joseph Decaens, “Le Château-Gaillard,” in L’Architecture normande au Moyen-Age (Édition Corlet: Caen, 1997), v. II, pp. 62–81. 50. Alain Quenneville and Thierry Delahaye, Le château de La Roche-Guyon: des grottes au siècle des Lumières (Édition du Valhermeil: Saint-Ouen-l’Aumôme, 1993). 51. Jean-Claude Routier, “Les ramparts de Montreuil-sur-Mer,” Revue du Nord, 71 (1989): 205–214; Jean Vallery-Radot, “Yèvre-le-Châtel,” Congrès archéologique de France, 90 (1930): 401–413; and Denise Humbert, “Le château de Dourdan,” Congrès archéologique de France, 103 (1944): 236–245. 52. Pierre Héliot, “L’Age des donjons d’Étampes et de Provins,” Bulletin de la Société Nationale des Antiquitaires de France (1967): 289–309; and E. Lefèvre-Pontalis, “Le donjon quadrilobé d’Ambleny,” Bulletin monumental, 74 (1910): 69–74. 53. Jacques Harmand, “Houdan et l’évolution des donjons au XIIe siècle,” Bulletin monumental, 127 (1969): 187–207. 54. Jean Vallery-Radot, “Le donjon de Philippe Auguste à Villeneuve-sur-Yonne et son devis,” in Château Gaillard, Studien zur mittelalterlichen Wehrbau und Siedlungsforschung, no. 2 (Graz: Cologne, 1967), pp. 106–112. 55. Pierre Héliot, “La genèse des châteaux de plan quadrangulaire en France et en Angleterre,” Bulletin de la Société Nationale des Antiquitaires de France (1965): 238–257; and Jean Vallery-Radot, “Note sur l’enceinte quadrangulaire du château de Caen,” Bulletin monumental, 121 (1963): 69–73.

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56. Brice Collet, “Une ville fortifiée. Troyes du XIIe au XIXe siècle,” La vie en Champagne, 389 (1988), special issue; Jean Mesqui, Provins: la fortification d’une ville au Moyen Age (Droz: Geneva, 1979); and H. d’Arbois de Jubainville, Histoire de Bar-sur-Aube sous les comtes de Champagne, 1077–1284 (Paris, 1859). 57. Considerable archeological work has been conducted on the fortifications of Paris since the mid-nineteenth century when Haussmann’s demolitions exposed large portions of the original medieval and Gallo-Roman city. These studies are ongoing and make the enceinte of Paris perhaps the most thoroughly investigated defensive ensemble in all of France. This rich literature begins with Alfred Bonnardot’s study Dissertations archéologiques sur les anciens enceintes de Paris, suivies de recherches sur les portes fortifiées qui dependaient de ces enceintes (Paris, 1852). 58. Maurice Berry and Michel Fleury, L’enceinte et le Louvre de Philippe Auguste, La Délégation: Paris, 1988; Aimé Grimault, Anciennes enceintes et limites de Paris (DAAP: Paris, 1988); Guy Le Hallé, Histoire des fortifications de Paris et leur extension en Ile-de-France (Éditions Horvath: Lyon, 1995); and Roger Rottmann, Murs et mémoires. La construction de Paris (Syros-Altérnatives: Paris, 1988). 59. Jean Vallery-Radot, “Quelques donjons de Philippe Auguste,” Bulletin de la Société Nationale des Antiquitaires de France (1964): 155–160. 60. Charles L. H. Coulson, “Hierarchism and Conventual Crenellation: An Essay in the Sociology and Metaphysics of Medieval Fortification,” Medieval Archaeology, 26 (1982): 69–100. 61. P. Lardin and J.-L. Roch, eds, La ville médiévale en deçà et au-delà de ses murs. Mélanges offerts à Jean-Pierre Leguay (Presses de l’Université de Rouen: Rouen, 2000).

Chapter 3 1. Charles T. Wood, The French Apanages and the Capetian Monarchy, 1224–1328 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1966); and Andrew W. Lewis, The Royal Succession in Capetian France: Studies on Familial Order and the State (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1982). 2. Jacques de Romefort, “Le Rhône de l’Ardèche à la mer, frontière des Capétiens au XIIIe siècle,” Revue historique, 54/161 (1929): 161–220. 3. Charles L. H. Coulson, “Castellation in the County of Champagne in the Thirteenth Century,” Château-Gaillard. Études de castellogie européenne, 9–10(1979–1980): 347–364. 4. Later in the Hundred Years’ War, Périgord-Quercy and Rouergue became English possessions and thus not a part of the eventual Estates of Languedoc. As a result, these two northern regions in old Occitania diverged historically from the eventual royal province of Languedoc. 5. There is a vast literature on bastides. For overviews, see Alain Lauret, ed., Bastides: villes nouvelles du Moyen Age (Édition Milan: Toulouse, 1992); and James Bentley, Fort Towns of France: The Bastides of the Dordogne and Aquitaine (Tauris Parke Books: London, 1993). 6. Benoît Cursente, Les castelnaux de la Gascogne médiévale: Gascogne gersoise (Fédération historique du Sud- Ouest: Bordeaux, 1980). 7. Gilles Bernard, “Bastides et villeneuves,” in Charles Higounet, ed., Paysages et villages neufs au moyen âge (Fédération historique du sud-ouest: Bordeaux, 1975), pp. 65–83. 8. Bénédicte Fénié and Jean-Jacques Fénié, Toponymie occitain (Sud-Ouest Université: Bordeaux, 1996).

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Chapter 4 1. Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War, volume I, Trial by Battle (Faber & Faber: London, 1990) and volume II, Trial by Fire (University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, 1999); and C. T. Allmand, The Hundred Years War: England and France at War, c. 1300–c. 1450 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1988). 2. Peter F. Ainsworth, Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History: Truth, Myth and Fiction in the Chroniques (Clarendon: Oxford, 1990); Christine de Pisan, Le livre de fais et bonnes meurs du sage roy Charles Quint, ed. S. Solente, 2 volumes

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56. Bertrand Schnerb et al., eds., Les enceintes urbaines XIIIe–XVIe siècle (CTHS: Paris, 1999), p. 350. 57. G. Deloffre, “Guerres et brigandages au XVe siècle en Hainaut, Pays d’Avesnes, Thiérache et Ardennes,” Mémoire de la Société archéologique et historique de l’Arrondissement d’Avesnes, 29 (1985): 263–514. 58. Jean-Pierre Leguay, La rue au Moyen Age (Ouest-France: Rouen, 1984), pp. 97–102. 59. Michael Jones, Between France and England. Politics, Power and Society in Late Medieval Brittany (Ashgate: Aldershot and Burlington Vt, 2003). 60. Philippe Lardin, “Le financement des fortifications dans les principales villes de Normandie (XIV–XVe),” in Actes du XXIXe congrès des sociétés historiques et archéologiques de Normandie tenu à Elbeuf du 20 au 23 octbore 1994 (Société d’histoire d’Elbeuf, 1994), pp. 74–89. 61. J. Mesqui, Provins. La fortification d’une ville au Moyen Age (Droz: Geneva, 1979). 62. S. Roux, “La construction courante à Paris au milieu du XIVe siècle à la fin du XVe siècle,” in La construction au Moyen Age (Les Belles Lettres: Paris, 1973), pp. 175–189. 63. A. Rigaudière, “Le financement des fortifications urbaines en France du milieu du XIVe siècle à la fin du XVe siècle,” Revue historique, 273 (1985): 19–95. 64. Leguay, La rue, pp. 122–164. 65. M. Le Mené, Villes et campagnes de l’ouest de France au moyen âge (Éditions de l’Ouest: Nantes, 1961), pp. 136–151. 66. Philippe Contamine, “Les fortifications urbaines en France à la fin du Moyen Age: aspects financiers et économiques,” Revue historique, 260 (1978): 23–47. 67. A. Higuounet, “Le financement des travaux publics à Périguieux au Moyen Age,” in Les constructions civiles d’intérêt public dans les villes d’Europe au Moyen Age et sous l’Ancien Régime et leur financement (Pro Civitate: Brussels, 1971), pp. 147–173. 68. Jacques Paviot, “La destruction des enceintes urbaines dans les anciens Pays-Bas (XIVe-XVe s.),” in Gilles Blieck, ed., La forteresse à l’épreuve du temps: destruction, dissolution, dénaturation, XIe–XXe siècle (CTHS: Paris, 2007), pp. 19–28. 69. Philippe Contamine, Jean Kerhervé, and Albert Rigaudière, eds, L’impôt au Moyen Age: l’impôt public et le prélèvement seigneurial, fin XIIe-début XVIe siècle (Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France: Paris, 2003), 3 volumes. 70. Bibliothèque Municipale Amiens EE.265–EE.267. 71. Albert Rigaudière, Saint Flour ville d’Auvergne au bas Moyen Age. Étude d’histoire administrative et financière (Presses Universitaire de France: Paris, 1982), 2 volumes. 72. Rigaudière, “Le financement,” pp. 75–86. 73. M. Bécet, “Comment on fortifiait une petite ville pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans,” Annales de Bourgogne, 21 (1919): 3–39. 74. Alain Giradot, “Les forteresses paysannes dans le duché de Bar aux XIVe et XVe siècles,” Annales de l’Est, 38 (1986): 3–55; R. Truttmann, “Églises fortifiées de l’Est de la France,” Le pays lorrain, 1 (1959): 1–46; and A. Columbet, “Les églises fortifiées de Bourgogne,” Annales de Bourgogne, 61 (1959): 250–258. 75. Philippe Contamine, Guerre, état et société à la fin du moyen âge. Étude sur les armées des rois de France, 1337–1494 (École Pratique des Hautes Études: Paris, 1972). 76. Kelly DeVries and Robert D. Smith, The Artillery of the Dukes of Burgundy, 1363– 1477 (The Boydell Press: Woodbridge, 2005). 77. C. T. Allmand, “Henry V the Soldier and the War in France,” in G. L. Harriss, ed., Henry V: The Practice of Kingship (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1985), pp. 117–135.

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78. R. A. Newhall, The English Conquest of Normandy, 1416–1424 (Yale University Press: New Haven, Conn., 1924). 79. F. Dupuis, Mémoire sur le siège de Montargis en 1427 (Orléans, 1853). 80. C. T. Allmand, “L’artillerie de l’armée anglaise et son organisation à l’époque de Jeanne d’Arc,” in Jeanne d’Arc: Une époque, pp. 73–81; and L. Douët d’Arcq, ed., “Inventaire de la Bastille de l’an 1428,” Revue archéologique, 12 (1855–1856): 321–349. 81. C. de Merindol, “Saint Michel et la monarchie française à la fin du Moyen Age dans le conf lit franco-anglais,” in La ‘France anglaise’ au Moyen Age, pp. 513–542. 82. Jean de Bueil, count of Sancerre, Le Jouvencel, Camille Favre, ed. (Paris, 1887), v. II, pp. 31–54. 83. Horst de la Croix, “The Literature on Fortifications in Renaissance Italy,” Technology and Culture, 4/1 (1963): 30–50. 84. Claude Gaier, L’industrie et le commerce des armes dans les anciennes principautés belges du XIIIe à la fin du XVe siècle (Presses Universitaires de France: Paris, 1973). 85. Kelly DeVries, “ ‘The Walls Come Tumbling Down’: The Myth of Fortification Vulnerability to Early Gunpowder Weapons,” in L. J. Andrew Villahon and Donald Kagay, eds, The Hundred Years War (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 429–446; and idem, “Facing the New Military Technology: Non-Trace Italienne Anti-Gunpowder Weaponry Defenses, 1350–1550,” in Brett Steele and Tamara Dorland, eds, Heirs of Archimedes: Science and the Art of War through the Age of Enlightenment (The MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass, 2005), pp. 37–71. 86. Salamagne, Construire, pp. 220–258. 87. Gilles Blieck and Bertrand Schnerb, Les Armagnacs et le Bourguignons. La maudite guerre (Librairie académique: Paris, 1988). 88. Schnerb, Les enceintes urbaines, pp. 303–308. 89. P. Lardin, “Le financement des fortifications en Normandie orientale à la fin du Moyen Âge,” in Les Normands et le fisc. Actes du XXIXe congrès des Sociétés historiques et archéologiques de Normandie (Société d’histoire d’Elbeuf: Elbeuf, 1996), pp. 47–58. 90. Michael K. Jones, “The Battle of Verneuil (17 August 1424): Toward a History of Courage,” War in History 9/4 (2002): 375–413. 91. M. H. Keen, “English Diplomacy and the Sack of Fougères in 1449,” History, 59 (1974): 3–27; and J. Le Patourel, “Le rôle de la ville de Caen dans l’histoire de l’Angleterre,” Annales de Normandie, 11 (1961): 11–31. 92. Schnerb, Les enceintes urbaines, p. 38. 93. Leguay, La rue, pp. 39–58. 94. Kelly DeVries, Joan of Arc: A Military Leader (Sutton Publishing: Stroud, 1999). 95. M. G. A. Vale, “New Techniques and Old Ideals: The Impact of Artillery on War and Chivalry at the End of the Hundred Years War,” in C. T. Allmand and G. W. Coopland, eds, War, Literature and Politics in the Late Middle Ages (Liverpool University Press: Liverpool, 1976), pp. 57–72. 96. Schnerb, Les enceintes urbaines, p. 19. 97. M. Bécet, “Les fortifications de Chablis au XVe siècle (comment on fortifiait une petite ville pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans),” Annales de Bourgogne, 21 (1949): 3–39. 98. H. Denifle, La Guerre de Cent Ans et les désolations des églises, monastères et hôpitaux en France, vol. 1, Paris 1899. 99. Schnerb, Les enceintes urbaines, p. 262.

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100. David Rivaud, Les villes et le roi. Les municipalités de Bourges, Poitiers et Tours et l’émergence de l’état moderne (v. 1440–v.1560) (Presses Universitaires de Rennes: Rennes, 2007). 101. Louis XII renewed it in 1508, as did François I in 1515 and 1516. Philippe Contamine, “Naissance de l’infanterie française (milieu XVe-milieu XVIe siècle),” in Quatrième centenaire de la bataille de Coutras (Association Henri IV: Pau, 1989), pp. 63–88. 102. Paul Solon, “Popular Response to Standing Military Forces in Fifteenth- Century France,” Studies in the Renaissance, 19 (1972): 78111. 103. Paul Solon, “Valois Military Administration on the Norman Frontier, 1445– 1461,” Speculum, 51 (1976): 91–111. 104. Philippe Contamine, “Guerre, fiscalité royale et économie en France (deuxième moitié du XVe siècle),” in M. Flinn, ed., Proceedings of the Seventh International Economic Congress (Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh, 1978), 2 volumes, v. 2, pp. 266–273. 105. P. S. Lewis, ed., The Recovery of France in the Fifteenth Century (Blackwell: London, 1971). 106. Denis Lalande, Jean II le Meingre, dit Boucicaut: (1366–1421). Étude d’une biographie héroïque (Droz: Geneva. 1988). 107. Anne Blanchard, Les Ingénieurs du roy de Louis XIV à Louis XVI. Étude du corps des fortifications (Université Paul Valéry: Montpellier, 1979), p. 41. 108. David Garrett, ed., The English Experience in France, c. 1450–1558 (Ashgate: Aldershot, Hampshire, 2002). 109. Cited in Charles Pinot Duclos, Histoire de Louis XI, v. IV, pp. 476–477. 110. See BN ff ms 20492 for documents detailing fortification repairs ordered by Louis XI. 111. Jean de Haynin, Mémoires de Jean, Sire de Haynin et de Luvignies, 1465–1477, D. D. Brouwers, ed. (Liège, 1905), 2 volumes, v. I, pp. 59–73. 112. Michel Bur, “Châteaux et places fortes en Lorraine au temps du Téméraire,” Le Pays Lorrain, 1 (1977): 53–67; and E. Perroy, “L’artillerie de Louis XI dans la campagne d’Artois (1477),” Revue du Nord, 26 (1943): 171–196, 263–296. 113. Henri Eugène Sée, Louis XI et les villes (Slatkine-Megariotis Reprints: Geneva, 1974 [1891]). 114. J. M. Currin, “ ‘The King’s Army into the Partes of Bretaigne’: Henry VII and the Breton Wars, 1489–1492,” War in History 7/4 (2000): 379–412; and David Grummit, “The Defence of Calais and the Development of Gunpowder Weaponry in England in the Late Fifteenth Century,” War in History 7/3 (2000): 253–272. 115. J. R. Lander, “The Hundred Years War and Edward IV’s 1475 Campaign in France,” in A. J. Slavin, ed., Tudor Men and Institutions: Studies in English Law and Government (Louisiana State University Press: Baton Rouge, 1972), pp. 23–41; and Philippe Contamine, “L’artillerie royale à la veille des guerres d’Italie,” Annales de Bretagne, 71 (1964): 221–261.

Chapter 5 1. A majority of the king’s gendarme companies were stationed along the periphery of the kingdom in garrisons in Picardy, the Pays Messin, and the Piedmont throughout most of the sixteenth century. See David L. Potter, War and Government in the French Provinces, 1470–1560 (Cambridge University Press: New York, 1993).

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2. Richard Gascon, Grand commerce et vie urbaine au XVIe siècle. Lyon et ses marchands (Mouton: Paris, 1971), 2 volumes. 3. Between 1500 and 1700, it is estimated that urban dwellers as a percentage of total population rose from 10 to 20 percent. See Renée Plouin, “Cités françaises au XVIe siècle. Créations et reorganization,” in Marie Thérèse Jones-Davies, ed., Les Cités au temps de la Renaissance (Université de Paris-Sorbonne: Paris, 1977), pp. 46–67. 4. Charles Gailly de Taurines, “Les bastions de Navarrenx et les origines italiennes de la fortification moderne au XVIe siècle,” Bulletin de la société de Pau, 48 (1925): 5–24; and P. Lavedan, Histoire de l’urbanisme (Henri Laurens: Paris, 1952), 3 volumes, v. III, pp. 72–73. 5. Gaston Zeller, L’organisation défensive des frontières du Nord et de l’est au XVIe siècle (Berger-Levrault: Paris, 1928). 6. Simon Power, “Firepower and the Design of Renaissance Fortifications,” Fort, 10 (1982): 93–104. 7. Philippe Hamon, Jean Jacquart, and Françoise Bayard, L’argent du roi. Les finances sous François I (Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France: Paris, 1994); and Martin Wolfe, The Fiscal System of Renaissance France (Yale University Press: New Haven, Conn., 1972). 8. Paul Solon, “From Appatis to Étape: Institutional Innovation in Renaissance Languedoc,” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History, 21 (1994): 69–91. 9. N. Bulst and J.-P. Genet, La ville, la bourgeoisie et la genèse de l’état moderne, XIIe– XVIIIe siècles (CTHS: Paris, 1988). 10. Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1988). 11. Michael Mallett, Mercenaries and Their Masters: Warfare in Renaissance Italy (Rowman and Littlefield: Totowa, NJ, 1974), pp. 251–255. 12. Martin Kemp, The Science of Art: Optical Themes in Western Art from Brunelleschi to Seurat (Yale University Press: New Haven, Conn., 1990). 13. Hélène Vérin, La gloire des ingénieurs. L’intelligence technique du XVIe au XVIIIe siècles (Albin Michel: Paris, 1993), pp. 19–23. 14. N. Pevsner, “The Term ‘Architect’ in the Middle Ages,” Speculum, 17 (1942): 549–562; and idem, “Terms of Architectural Planning in the Middle Ages,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 5 (1942): 232–237. 15. K. J. Conant, “The After-Life of Vitruvius in the Middle Ages,” Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, 27 (1968): 33–38; and François Bucher, “Medieval Architectural Design Methods, 800–1500,” Gesta XI (1973): 37–51. 16. Charles M. Radding and William W. Clark, Medieval Architecture, Medieval Learning: Builders and Masters in the Age of the Romanesque and Gothic (Yale University Press: New Haven, Conn., 1992), p. 34. 17. Xavier Malverti and Pierre Pinon, eds, La ville régulière. Modèles et tracés: actes du colloque (Picard: Paris, 1997). 18. Mario Carpo, Architecture in the Age of Printing: Orality, Writing, Typography, and Printed Images in the History of Architectural Theory, Sarah Benson, trans. (MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass., 2001). 19. J. R. Hale, Renaissance Fortification: Art or Engineering? (Thames & Hudson: London, 1978). 20. Pamela Long, Openness, Secrecy, Authorship: Technical Arts and the Culture of Knowledge from Antiquity to the Renaissance (Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, Md, 2001), pp. 30–31.

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21. Bernardino Rocco’s Des enterprises et ruses de guerre (Paris, 1570), underscored the dangers of rigid thinking in favor of flexible pragmatism. 22. Joseph Rykwert, “On the Oral Transmission of Architectural Theory,” Anthropology and Aesthetics, 5 (1983): 14–27. 23. Philippe Richardot, “La réception de Végèce dans l’Italie de la Renaissance: entre humanisme et culture technique,” Studi Umanistici Piceni, 15 (1995): 195–214. 24. Vaughan Hart with Peter Hicks, eds, Paper Palaces: The Rise of the Renaissance Architectural Treatise (Yale University Press: New Haven, Conn., 1998). 25. Martha D. Pollak, Military Architecture: Cartography and the Representation of the Early Modern City: A Checklist of Treatises on Fortification in the Newberry Library (The Newberry Library: Chicago, Ill., 1991). 26. For this, he drew upon Aristotle’s Metaphysics (I.i.14–16) and Nicomachean Ethics (X.viii.7). In general see, Christine Smith, Architecture in the Culture of Early Humanism: Ethics, Aesthetics, and Eloquence, 1400–1470 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1992). 27. Leon Battista Alberti, On the Art of Building in Ten Books of Architecture, Joseph Rykwaert, ed. (MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1991), Prologue, p. 7. 28. It circulated as a manuscript after 1450 and was only published in 1486. Alberti first discussed architecture in his Profugiorum ab aerumna, libri III or Della tranquillità dell’animo, composed in the early 1440s. 29. Carroll William Westfall, In this Most Perfect Paradise: Alberti, Nicholas V and the Invention of Conscious Urban Planning in Rome, 1447–1455 (Pennsylvania State University Press: University Park, 1974). 30. Alberti, Ten Books, book V, chapter 1 and book IV, chapter 5. 31. Horst de La Croix, “The Literature on Fortification in Renaissance Italy,” Technology and Culture, 4 (1963): 30–50; and Amelio Fara, Il sistema e la città. Architettura fortificata dell’Europa moderna dai tratati alle realizzazioni 1464– 1794 (Sagep Editrice: Genoa, 1989). 32. Laura Marcucci, “Giovanni Sulpicio e la prima edizione del De architectura di Vitruvio,” Studi e Documenti di Architettura, 8 (1978): 185–195; and Ingrid D. Rowland, “Vitruvius in Print and in Vernacular Translation: Fra Giocondo, Bramate, Raphael and Cesare Cesariano,” in Hart and Hicks, Paper Palaces, pp. 105–121. 33. Vladimir Jurˇen, “Fra Giovanni Giocondo et les débuts des études vitruviennes en France,” Rinascimento, 14 (1974): 101–115. 34. Francesco Paolo Fiore, “La traduzione vitruviana di Cesare Cesariano,” in Silvia Danesi Squarzina, ed., Roma, centro ideale della cultura dell’antico nei secoli XV e XVI da Martino V al sacco di Romma, 1517–1527 (Electa: Milan, 1989), pp. 458–466. 35. Diego de Sagredo, Raison d’architecture antique, extraicte de Vitruve et aultres anciens architecteurs, nouvellement traduit d’espaignol en françoys à l’utilité de ceulx qui se delectent en edifices (Paris, 1526). 36. Luigi Firpo, La città ideale del Rinasciemento (UTET: Turin, 1974). 37. Horst de La Croix, “Military Architecture and the Radial City Plan in SixteenthCentury Italy,” Art Bulletin, 42 (1960): 263–290. 38. J. R. Hale, “The Development of the Bastion: An Italian Chronology,” in J. R. Hale, et al., eds, Europe in the Late Middle Ages (Faber: London, 1965), pp. 27–43. 39. Lorini, Delle fortificationi (Venice, 1596), bk. III, chapter V, p. 156. 40. Luisa Giordano, “On Filarete’s Libro architettonico,” in Hart and Hicks, Paper Palaces, pp. 51–65. Filarete also wrote the first vernacular architectural treatise in 1460 and dedicated it to Sforza.

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41. Nadia Corvini, “L’urbanistica e la fortificazione della città in epoca sforzesca,” in Paola Medioli Masotti, ed., Parma e l’umanesimo italiano, Atti del Convegno Internazionale di studi umanistici, Parma 20 ottobre 1984 (Antenore: Padua, 1986), pp. 39–54. 42. Giordano, “On Filarete,” p. 65. 43. Aemilo Fara, Bernardo Buontalenti (Electa: Milan, 1996), pp. 73–131. 44. Lon R. Shelby, “Mariano Taccola and His Books on Engines and Machines,” Technology and Culture, 16/3 (1975): 466–475. 45. Pier Luig Bassignana, ed., Le machine di Valturio nei documenti dell’Archivio Storico AMMA (Umberto Allemandi: Turin, 1988). 46. M. Dezzi Bardeschi, “Le rocche di Francesco di Giorgio nel ducato di Urbino,” Castellum, 8 (1968): 97–140. 47. Simon Pepper and Quentin Hughes, “Fortification in late 15th Century Italy: The Treatise of Francesco di Giorgio Martini,” British Archaeological Reports, Supplementary Series, 41 (1978): 541–560; and Paolo Francesco Fiore, Città e macchine nel’400 nei disegni de Francesco di Giorgio Martini (L. S. Olschki: Florence, 1978). 48. Paolo Francesco Fiore, “The Trattati on Architecture by Francesco di Giorgio,” in Hart and Hicks, Paper Palaces, pp. 66–85. 49. Pieto C. Marani, L’architettura fortificata negli studi de Leonardo da Vinci. Con il catalogo complete dei disegni (L. S. Olschki: Florence, 1984); and idem, ed., Disegni di fortificazioni da Leonardo a Michelangelo (Casa Buonarroti: Florence, 1984). 50. Margaret Daly Davis, Piero della Francesca’s Mathematical Treatises: The “Trattato d’abaco” and “Libellus de quinque corporibus regularibus” (Longo Editore: Ravenna, 1977). 51. Manetti Renzo, Michelangelo: le fortificazioni per l’assedio di Firenze (Libreria editrice fiorentina: Florence, 1980). 52. Christoph L. Frommel and Nicholas Adams, eds, The Architectural Drawings of Antonio da Sangallo the Younger and His Circle, vol. 1, Fortifications, Machines, and Festive Architecture (MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1994). 53. René Quatrefages, “La fortification en Espagne à l’époque de la Renaissance,” Les cahiers de Montpellier, 11 (1985): 33–58. The trace italienne came to Portugal via the Netherlands, as discussed in John B. Bury, “Francisco de Holanda: A Little Known Source for the History of Fortification in the Sixteenth Century,” Arquivo do Centro Cultural Português, 14 (1979): 163–202. 54. J. R. Hale, “To Fortify or Not to Fortify? Machiavelli’s Contribution to a Renaissance Debate,” in Brian Bond and Ian Roy, eds, War and Society: A Yearbook of Military History (Holmes & Meier: New York, 1975), pp. 1–23; and Richard J. Tuttle, “Against Fortification: The Defense of Renaissance Bologna,” Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, 41 (1982): 189–201. 55. J. Muller, “Les ingénieurs militaires dans le Pay-Bas espagnols (1500–1575),” Revue internationale d’histoire militaire, 20 (1959): 467–478. 56. Jean-Michel Sallmann, “L’évolution des techniques de guerre pendant les guerres d’Italie (14941530),” in Jean Balsamo, ed., Passer les monts: Français en Italie—l’Italie en France (Éditions Honore Champion: Paris, 1998), pp. 59–81. For much of what follows, consult Marino Viganò, ed., Architetti e ingegneri militari italiani all’estero dal XV e XVIII secolo (Sillabe: Livorno, 1994–1999), 2 volumes; E. Rocchi, “Gli ingegneri militari italiani in Francia nel secolo XVI,” Rivista Esercito e Nazione, 3 (1928): 125–138; and the still invaluable Carlo Promis, Biografie di ingegneri militari italiani dal secolo XIV alla metà del XVII (Turin, 1874).

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57. Marcel Grandjean, “Les architectes ‘génévois’ hors des frontières suisses à la fin de l’époque gothique,” Nos monuments d’art et d’histoire, 1 (1992): 85–109; and idem, “Maçons et architectes ‘lombards’ et piémontais en Suisse romande du XIVe siècle à la Réforme,” in L. Golay, et al., eds, Florilegium. Scritti di storia dell’arte in onore di Carlo Bertelli (Electa: Milan 1995), pp. 78–89. 58. Richard J. Betts, “On the Chronology of Francesco di Giorgio’s Treatises: New Evidence from an Unpublished Manuscript,” Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, 36 (1977): 3–14, p. 12. 59. A. Lenci, “L’assedio di Padova del 1509: questioni militari e implicazioni urbanistiche nella strategia difensiva veneziana all’indomani di Agnadello,” Bollettino del Museo Civico di Padova, 63 (1981): 123–155. 60. A. Chiquet, Bayard à Mézières (Nancy, 1893); and Guillaume Du Bellay, Ogdoade (Paris, 1838), pp. 92–98. 61. Martin Du Bellay, Mémoires (Paris, 1838), v. I, p. 211; S. J. Gunn, “The Duke of Suffolk’s March on Paris in 1523,” The English Historical Review, 101/400 (1986): 596–634; and Jules Aubert, “Le siège de Bayonne. Les Impériaux dans le sud-ouest de la France en 1523,” Bulletin de la société historique de Bayonne (1929): 416–447. 62. Pierre Bartas, “Les défenseurs de Marseille en 1524,” Provincia, 6 (1926): 171–200. 63. Du Bellay, Mémoires, v. I, p. 317. 64. J. de Meulemeester, “La fortification de terre et son influence sur le développement urbain de quelques villes des Pays-Bas méridionaux,” Revue du Nord, 74 (1992): 13–28. 65. D. Angers, “Le redressement difficile d’une capitale régionale après la guerre de Cent Ans. Caen, 1450–1550,” in Commerce, finances et société (XIe–XVIe siècles). Recueil de travaux d’histoire médiévale offerts à M. le professeur Henri Dubois (Univesité de Paris-I: Paris, 1993), pp. 84–103. 66. Dominique Le Page and Michel Nassiet, L’union de la Bretagne à la France (Skol Vreizh: Morlaix, 2003). 67. Brice Collet, “Troyes, Châlons, Reims et leurs fortifications au début du XVIe siècle,” La vie en Champagne, 445 (1993): special issue; and idem, “Les artistes troyens au service de la fortification au XVIe siècle,” La vie en Champagne, 448 (1993): 14–16; Françoise Niellon, “Les forts de Villefranche et l’architecture militaire au milieu du XVIe siècle,” Archeologia, 147 (1980): 55–62; and Kathryn A. Edwards, Families and Frontiers: Re-Creating Communities and Boundaries in the Early Modern Burgundies (Brill: Leiden, 2002). 68. Paul Solon, “War and the Bonnes Villes: The Case of Narbonne, ca. 1450–1550,” Proceedings of the 20th Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History, 17 (1990): 65–73. 69. Jean Lartigaut, Le Quercy après la guerre de cent ans: aux origines du Quercy actuel (Éditions Quercy Recherche: Cahors, 2001) and R. Roudié, “Documents sur la fortification des places fortes en Guyenne au début du XVIe siècle,” Annales du Midi, 12 (1960): 43–47. 70. Daniel Nordman, Frontières de France. De l’espace au territoire, XVIe–XIXe siècles (Gallimard: Paris, 1998). 71. Llewain Scott Van Doren, “Military Administration and Intercommunal Relations in Dauphiné, 1494–1559,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 130/1 (1986): 79–100. 72. Du Bellay, Mémoires, v. III, pp. 177, 256. 73. Ibid., p. 194.

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74. Pierre Fenier, Relation du siège mémorable de la ville de Péronne en 1536, J. Techener, ed. (Paris, 1862 [1683]). 75. Nicolas Faucherre, Montreuil, ville fortifiée (Association des conservateurs de musées du Nord-Pas-de-Calais: Pas-de-Calais, 1993). 76. René Herval, “Un ingénieur siennois en France au XVIe siècle: Girolamo Bellarmati et la creation du Havre,” Études normandes, 40 (1960): 33–43. 77. Bibliothèque Nationale, Fond de Béthune, ms. 7744. 78. Blaise de Monluc, Commentaires, 1521–1575 (Gallimard: Paris, 1964), p. 71; and Sébastien Silvani, “L’Aragon et la Corse. Les sièges de Perpignan en 1542 et 1597,” Reflets Roussillon, 71 (1970): 38–43. 79. Du Bellay, Mémoires, v. IV, p. 213; and Promis, Biografie, pp. 333–334. 80. Anne Blanchard, Les Ingénieurs du roy de Louis XIV à Louis XVI. Étude du corps des fortifications (Université Paul Valéry: Montpellier, 1979), p. 50. 81. Promis, Biografie, pp. 385–386. 82. Du Bellay to François I, September 7, 1542, B.N. ms fr 5152, fol. 7 and Du Bellay to d’Annebault, October 13, 1542, B.N. ms fr 5153, fol. 88. 83. Du Bellay to Montmorency, May 7, 1541, B.N. ms fr. 5152, fol. 2 and D’Annebault to Du Bellay, April 7, 1541, B.N. ms fr. 5155, fol. 31. In general, see Martha D. Pollak, Turin 1564–1680: Urban Design, Military Culture and the Creation of the Absolutist Capital (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, Ill., 1991). 84. Nicolò. Tartaglia, Quesiti et inventioni diverse (Venice, 1546), VI quesito 2, quesito 8 and Rabelais, Quart Livre, 1 xiv, pp. 60–61. 85. Tartaglia, Quesiti, VI, quesito 2, pp. 64–65. 86. Tiers Livre, v. I, p. 317. 87. Monluc, Commentaires, p. 170. See also Henri Luguet, “L’invasion de 1544 dans le Soissonnais et le Laonnais,” Bulletin de la Société Historique de Haute-Picardie, 5 (1927): 97–139. 88. David Potter, Un homme de guerre au temps de la Renaissance: La vie et les lettres d’Oudart de Biez, Maréchal de France, Gouverneur de Boulogne et de Picardie (vers 1475–1553) (Artois Presses Université: Lille, 2002). 89. Du Bellay, Mémoires, v. IV, pp. 306–307; and Promis, Biografie, pp. 362–363. 90. Du Bellay, Mémoires, v. IV, p. 261. 91. Ibid., p. 259. See also A. Rozet and J. F. Lembey, L’invasion de la France et le siège de Saint-Dizier par Charles-Quint en 1544 (Plong: Paris, 1910); and Yvette Quenot, “Une vue cavalière inédite du siège de Saint-Dizier en 1544,” Annales de l’Est, 2 (1956): 83–92. 92. Du Bellay, Mémoires, v. IV, p. 323. 93. A. Rozet and J.-F. Lembey, L’invasion de la France et le siège de Saint-Dizier (Paris, 1910). A plan of Saint-Dizier’s fortifications can be found in Charles-Hippolye Paillard and Georges Hérelle, L’invasion allemande en 1544: fragments d’une histoire militaire et diplomatique de l’expédition de Charles Quint (Paris, 1884), pp. 123–125. 94. René Crozet, “Une ville neuve du XVIe siècle: Vitry-le-François,” La vie urbaine, 5 (1923): 291–309. 95. Lynn H. White argued this distinction belonged to the humanist reformer and diplomat Jacopo Aconcio, who designed for Elizabeth I new bastions at Berwick on the Scottish frontier. See “Jacopo Aconcio as an Engineer,” The American Historical Review, 72/2 (1967): 425–444. 96. Promis, Biografie, pp. 138–140. 97. Ben Roosens, “Guerres, fortifications et ingénieurs dans les anciens Pays-Bas à l’époque de Charles Quint,” Château Gaillard, 19 (1998): 37–53; and C. van den

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98. 99. 100. 101. 102.

103.

104. 105. 106. 107.

108. 109. 110.

111.

112.

113.

114. 115.

No t e s Heuvel, “Papiere Bolwercken”: De introductie van de Italiaane stedeen vestingbouw in de Nederlanden (1540–1609) en het bebruik van tekeningen (Alphen aan den Rijn: Caneletto, 1991). Promis, Biografie, pp. 208–247. Ibid., pp. 437–439. Frederick Baumgartner, Henry II King of France 1547–1559 (Duke University Press: Durham, NC, 1988). BN ff 18781, fol. 23–25. Jean Lestocquoy, “Les sièges de Thérouanne et Vieil-Hesdin d’après les dépêches du nonce pour la paix Santa-Croce (1552–1554),” Revue du Nord, 37 (1955): 115–124. Carlo Promis, “La patria et la famiglia di Girolamo Marini, ingegnere militare del secolo XVI,” in Atti e memorie della R. Deputazione di storia patria per le provincie di Romagna, 3rd series, v. XIX (Bologna, 1871), pp. 188–203. Promis, Biografie, pp. 304–305. Ibid., pp. 278–281. Ibid., p. 353. George Kubler, “Francesco Paciotto, architect,” in Lucy Freeman Sandier, ed., Essays in Memory of Karl Lehmann (Institute of Fine Arts: New York, 1964), pp. 176–188. A. Philippoteaux, Recherches sur la vie et l’oeuvre de M. Aurelio de Pasino (1533– 1585), architecte italien des La Marche (Imprimerie André Suzaine: Sedan, 1930). E. Finot, “Le siège de Metz et les finances de Charles-Quint,” Bulletin historique et philologique du Comité des travaux historiques (1897): 260–270. Jean Thiriot, Portes, tours et murailles de la cité de Metz. Une évocation de l’enceinte urbaine aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles (Est-Imprimerie: Metz, 1970); and Claude Turrel, Metz: Deux mille ans d’architecture militaire (Éditions Serpenoises, Metz, 1986). Michael Wolfe, “Au-delà des limites possibles. Comprenant la défaite impériale au siège de Metz (1552),” in Jean-Pierre Poussou and Roger Baury, eds, Les monarchies européennes à l’époque moderne (Presses Universitaires de France: Paris, 2005), pp. 219–232; and Gaston Zeller, Le siège de Metz par Charles-Quint (octobre-décembre 1552) (Société d’Impressions Typographiques: Nancy, 1943). Our best French source on the siege is Bertrand de Salignac’s “Brief discours du siège de Metz en Lorraine, rédigé par escript, de jour en jour, par un soldat à la requeste d’un sien amy,” in L. Cimber and F. Danjou, eds, Archives curieuses de l’histoire de France depuis Louis XI jusqu’à Louis XVIII (Paris, 1835), v. III, pp. 119–138. Nicolas Horfa Rodriguez, “La bataille de Saint-Quentin,” Histoire militaire, 3 (1959): 7–60; Gabriel Stiller, Relation du siège de Thionville de 1558. Une apologie de François de Guise (Éditions Le Lorrain: Metz, 1959); and David L. Potter, “The duc de Guise and the Fall of Calais, 1557–1558,” The English Historical Review, 98/388 (1983): 481–512. Rodney Palmer and Thomas Frangenberg, eds, The Rise of the Image: Essays on the History of the Illustrated Art Book (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003). Thomas Frangenberg, “The Image and the Moving Eye: Jean Pélerin (Viator) to Guidobaldo del Monte,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 49 (1986): 150–171; and L. Brion-Guerry, Jean Pélerin Viator. Sa place dans l’histoire de la perspective (Les Belles Lettres: Paris, 1962), which provides Pélerin’s full text on pp. 217–227.

No t e s

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116. Giovanni Maria Fara, Albrecht Dürer teorico dell’archittetura: una storia italiana (Leo S. Olschski Editore: Florence, 1999). 117. Vannoccio Biringuccio, Pirotechnia (Venice, 1540). 118. Serafina Cuomo, “Shooting by the Book: Notes on Niccolò Tartaglia’s Nova scientia,” History of Science, 35 (1997): 155–188; and Mary J. Henninger-Voss, “How the ‘New Science’ of Cannons Shook up the Aristotelian Cosmos,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 63/3 (2002): 371–397. 119. Giovanni Battista Gabrieli, Nicolò Tartaglia: Invenzioni, disfide e sfortune (Università degli Studi: Siena, 1986). 120. Stillman Drake and I. E. Drabkin, Mechanics in Sixteenth-Century Italy: Selections from Tartaglia, Benedetti, Guido Ubaldo, and Galileo (University of Wisconsin Press: Madison, 1960). 121. Gloria Fivenza, “Giacomo Lanteri da Paratico e il problema delle fortificazioni nel secolo XVI,” Economia e Storia, 4 (1975): 503–538. 122. Giacomo Lanteri, Due dialoghi (Venice, 1557), p. 54. 123. Due libri del modo di fare le fortificazione di terra intorno alle città, & alle castella per fortificare (Venice, 1559). 124. Vérin, La gloire, pp. 137–138. 125. Vaughan Hart, “Serlio and the Representation of Architecture,” in Hart and Hicks, Paper Places, pp. 170–185. 126. Nicholas Adams, “Sebastiano Serlio, Military Architect?” in Christof Theones, ed., Sebastiano Serlio, Sesto Seminario Internazionale di Storia dell’Architectura, Centro Internazionale di Studi de Architettura ‘Andrea Palladio’ di Vicenza (Electa: Milan, 1989), pp. 222–227; and June Gwendolyn Johnson, “Sebastiano Serlio’s Treatise on Military Architecture (Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Munich, Codex icon. 190),” dissertation, UCLA, 1984. 127. David Thomson, Jacques Androuet Du Cerceau, les plus excellents bastiments de France (Sand & Conti: London, 1988); and Françoise Boudon, “Les livres d’architecture de Jacques Androuet Du Cerceau,” in Jean Guillaume, Les Traités d’architecture de la Renaissance (Picard: Paris, 1986), pp. 367–396. 128. Jean-Marie Perouse de Montclos, Philibert De l’Orme: Architecte du roi (1514– 1570) (Mengès: Paris, 2000). 129. Joseph Rykwert, The Dancing Column: On Order in Architecture (MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1996). 130. Warren van Egmond, “How Algebra Came to France,” in Cynthia Hay, ed., Mathematics from Manuscript to Print 1300–1600 (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1988), pp. 127–144. On Chuquet, see G. Flegg, C. Hay, and B. Moss, eds, Nicolas Chuquet, Renaissance Mathematician (Reidel: Dordrecht, 1985). 131. Étienne de La Roche, Larismetique (Lyon, 1520). 132. Charles de Bouelles, Géometrie practique (Paris, 1542), reprinted in 1547. 133. Numa Broc, “Quelle est la plus ancienne carte ‘moderne’ de la France?” Annales de Géographie, 92 (1983): 513–530. 134. Peletier, De l’usage de géometrie (Paris, 1549). 135. Jean Cousin, Livre de Perspective (Paris, 1560). 136. R. Hooykaas and M. G. J. Minnaert, eds, Simon Stevin: Science in the Netherlands around 1600 (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1970); and K. Andersen, “Stevin’s Theory of Perspective: The Origin of a Dutch Academic Approach to Perspective,” Tractrix, 2 (1990): 25–62. 137. Frederick B. Artz, The Development of Technical Education in France, 1500–1850 (The MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1966).

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138. Michael Wolfe, “Building a Bastion in Early Modern Amiens,” Proceedings of the Western Society for French History, 25 (1998): 36–48. 139. Blanchard, Ingénieurs, p. 46. 140. David Buisseret, Ingénieurs et fortifications avant Vauban. L’organisation d’un service royale aux XVIe-XVIIe siècles (CTHS Géographie: Paris, 2000). 141. Maximilien Buffenoir, “La famille d’Estrées, XVIe siècle, les grands maîtres de l’artillerie,” Bulletin de la société historique et scientifique de Soissons, 2 (1957– 1960): 18–86. 142. J. Russell Major, From Renaissance Monarchy to Absolute Monarchy: French Kings, Nobles and Estates (Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, Md., 1994). 143. Kevin Robbins, City on the Ocean Sea: La Rochelle, 1530–1650. Urban Society, Religion and Politics on the French Atlantic Frontier (Brill: Leiden, 1997), pp. 81–82. 144. Du Bellay, Mémoires, v. IV, pp. 100–106. See also the pamphlet entitled Voyage du roy Françoys Ier en sa ville de La Rochelle l’an 1542 (Paris, 1542). 145. Jonathan Powis, “Guyenne 1548: The Crown, the Province, and Social Order,” European Studies Review, 12 (1982): 1–16.

Chapter 6 1. Mack Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 1562–1629 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1995). 2. Kathleen Parrow, From Defense to Resistance: Justification of Violence during the French Wars of Religion (American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, Penn., 1993), vol. 3, pt. 6; and Arlette Jouanna, Le devoir du révolte. La noblesse française et la gestation de l’État moderne, 1559–1661 (Fayard: Paris, 1989). 3. Janine Garrisson, Protestants du Midi, 1559–1598 (Privat: Toulouse, 1980); and Miriam Yardeni, “Histoires de villes, histoire de provinces et naissance d’une identité française au XVIe siècle,” Journal des Savants (1993): 111–134, for these contrasting interpretations. 4. While this transition varied according to province, an excellent study of the regional dynamics involved can be found in James B. Collins, Classes, Estates, and Orders in Early-Modern Brittany (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1994). 5. Daniel Hickey, The Coming of French Absolutism: The Struggle for Tax Reform in theProvince of Dauphiné, 1540–1640 (University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1986); L. Scott Van Doren, “Civil War Taxation and the Foundations of Fiscal Absolutism,” Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History, 3 (1976): 35–43; idem, “Military Administration and Intercommunal Relations in Dauphiné,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 130/1 (1986): 79–100. 6. Claude Michaud, “Finances et guerres de religion en France,” Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 28 (1981): 572–596. 7. James B. Wood, The King’s Army, Warfare, Soldiers and Society During the Early Wars of Religion in France, 1526–76 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1996); and David Parrott, Richelieu’s Army: War, Government and Society in France (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2001). 8. See Madeleine Lazard, “Deux guerriers pacifists: Michel de Castelnau et François de la Noue,” in Gabriel-Andre Perouse, Andre Thierry, and Andre Tournon, eds, L’homme de guerre au XVIe siècle (Publications de l’Université de Saint-Étienne: Saint-Étienne, 1992), pp. 51–60.

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9. François Billacois, The Duel in Early Modern France (Yale University Press: New Haven, Conn., 1990). 10. James B. Woods, “The Impact of the Wars of Religion: A View of France in 1581,” Sixteenth Century Journal, 15 (1984): 131–168; and Jean Prouzet, Les guerres de religion dans les pays de l’Aude 1560–1596 (E. Ogier: Tulle, 1975). 11. A.D. Orléans, A. 2185, n. 12, October 18, 1563, and n. 16, Charles IX to Maire et Écheveins de la ville d’Orléans, February 16, 1564, Paris. 12. B.N. Fonds français ms 15381, unpaginated. 13. Jean-Pierre Brancourt, “La monarchie et les châteaux du XVIe au XVIIe siècles,” XVIIe Siècle, 30 (1978): 25–36. 14. Jean-Paul Meuret, Les églises fortifiées de la Thiérache (Société archéologique et historique de Vervins et de la Thiérache: Vervins, 1977); and Gabriel Loirette, “Fortifications des églises girondines au XVIe siècle,” Bulletin et mémoire de la société archéologique de Bordeaux, 46 (1935): 33–44. 15. Jean-Eric Iung, “Le poids des guerres de religion en basse Auvergne, la nourriture des troupes royales de 1567 à 1588,” Revue de la Haute-Auvergne, 65 (2003): 317–339. 16. Marie-Louise Fracard, “Les activités d’un munitionnaire au XVIe siècle. Le Niortais Amaury Bourguignon, seigneur de La Barberie,” Bulletin philologique (1977): 95–112. 17. Jean-Eric Iung, “L’organisation du service des vivres aux armées de 1550 à 1650,” Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes, 141 (1983): 269–306. 18. B.N. Fonds Français mss 4765, fol. 15–54. 19. B. M. Bourges, EE 7. 20. Bert S. Hall, Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe (The Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, Md., 1997). 21. David L. Potter, “The French Protestant Nobility in 1562: The ‘Associacion de Monseigneur le Prince de Condé,’ ” French History, 15 (2001): 307– 328; and Jean de Pablo, “Contribution à l’étude de l’histoire des institutions militaires huguenotes,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte, 47 (1956): 64–76; 48 (1957): 192–216. 22. Barbara Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in SixteenthCentury Paris (Oxford University Press: New York, 1991), pp. 160–171; and Philip Benedict, “The Saint-Bartholomew’s Day Massacre in the Provinces,” Historical Journal, 21 (1978): 205–226. 23. Roger Pierre, “Un episode peu connu des guerres dites ‘de religion’: ‘Les Défenseurs de la Cause Commune,” Association universitaire d’études drômoises, 15 (1968): 6–14; and B. Quesnal, “Paysannerie et gens de guerre au XVIe siècle,” Comptesrendus à l’Académie agriculturelle française, 66 (1980): 45–62. 24. Guillaume Barles, “Un episode des guerres de religion en Provence: Carcistes et Razats (1575–1579),” Bulletin de la société d’études scientifiques et archéologiques de Draguignan et du Var, 23 & 24 (1978–1979): 29–55; and J. H. M. Salmon, “Peasant Revolt in Vivarais, 1575–1580,” French Historical Studies, 11 (1979): 1–28. 25. See Yves-Marie Bercé, Croquants et Nu-Pieds (Seuil: Paris, 1974); and René Pillorget, Les mouvements insurrectionels de Provence entre 1594 et 1715 (A. Pedone: Paris, 1975). 26. Robert Sauzet, Chroniques des frères ennemis: catholiques et protestants à Nîmes du XVIe au XVIIIe siècle (Paradigme: Caen, 1992). 27. Joshua Evans Millet, “A City Converted: The Protestant Reform in Nîmes 1532– 1567,” PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 2000, pp. 217–219. A.D. Gard, Bib. Mun. Nîmes ms 185 (13837): “Enqête sur le massacre dit la Michelade.”

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28. J.-J. Meunier, “Un fait divers du siège de Bourges en 1562 raconté par un témoin de marque, Ambroise Paré,” Cahiers archéologique et historique de Berry, 19 (1969/1970): 35–37; and Vicomte de Brimont, Le XVIe siècle et les guerres de la réforme en Berry (Bourges, 1905). 29. Mark W. Konnert, Civic Agendas and Religious Passion: Chalons-Sur-Marne during the French Wars of Religion, 1560–1594 (Truman State University Press: Kirksville, Mo., 1994); and Penny Roberts, A City in Conflict: Troyes during the Wars of Religion (Manchester University Press: Manchester, 1996). 30. Garrison, Protestants du Midi, pp. 37–56; and Jacques Dubourg, Les guerres de religion dans le sud-ouest (Éditions de Sud- Ouest: Bordeaux, 1992). 31. Mark Greengrass, “The Anatomy of a Religious Riot in Toulouse in May 1562,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 34 (1983): 367–382. 32. Kaiser Wolfgang, Marseille au temps des troubles (1559–1596). Morphologie sociale et lutte des factions (Presses de l’EHESS: Paris, 1992); and Ellery Schalk, “Marseille and the Urban Experience in Sixteenth- Century France: Communal Values, Religious Reform, and Absolutism,” Historical Reflections, 27 (2001): 241–300. 33. David Nicholls, “Protestants, Catholics, and Magistrates in Tours, 1562–1572. The Making of a Catholic City during the Religious Wars,” French History 8 (1994): 14–33. 34. Philip Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge/New York, 1981), pp. 49–71. 35. Blaise de Monluc, Commentaires, 1521–1575 (Gallimard: Paris, 1964), p. 513; and Arnaud d’Antin de Vaillac, “Monluc face à une guerre insurrectionelle (1562– 1569),” Bulletin de la société archéologique et historique du Gers, 78 (1977): 482– 495; 79 (1978): 53–66. 36. B.N. Fonds français ms. 15381, unpaginated. 37. Jean Boutier, Alain Dewerpe, and Daniel Nordman, eds, Un tour de France royal. Le voyage de Charles IX (1565–1566) (Aubier Montaigne: Paris, 1984), pp. 250–251. 38. Kevin Robbins, City on the Ocean Sea: La Rochelle, 1530–-1650. Urban Society, Religion and Politics on the French Atlantic Frontier (Brill: Leiden, 1997), p. 195. 39. BM Amiens EE.273 and BN Fonds français ms 18781, fol. 21. 40. A. Fontanon, Les édits et ordonnances des rois de France (Paris, 1611), v. 1, pp. 411–427. 41. Jean de Pablo, “La troisième guerre de religion (1568–1570),” Bulletin de la société d’histoire du protestantisme français, 102 (1956): 57–91. 42. Jean de Pablo, “La bataille de la Roche l’Abeille,” Bulletin de la société d’histoire du protestantisme français, 101 (1955): 1–25. 43. Marin Liberge, Discours du succes des affaires passez au siège de Poictiers (Paris, 1569) and his fuller account, almost a martyrology, the next year, Le siège de Poictiers (Poitiers, 1570). 44. Clovis Boutin, “La bataille de Moncontour, 3 octobre 1569,” Bulletin de la société scientifique de Châtellerault, 33 (1984): 33–46. 45. Janine Garrrison-Estèbe, “Les Saint Barthélemys des villes du Midi,” in Colloque l’amiral de Coligny et son temps, Paris, 1972 (Société de l’Histoire du Protestantisme Français: Paris, 1974), pp. 717–729, 748–752. 46. See BN 87C 131083 and BN G150827 for these contrasting views. 47. Anonymous, Discours et recueil du siège de la Rochelle en l’année 1573 (Lyon, 1573). 48. See Philip Conner, Huguenot Heartland: Montauban and Southern French Calvinism during the Wars of Religion (Ashate: Burlington, Vt., 2002).

No t e s

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49. Hélène Guicharnauld, “Les fortifications de Montauban,” Bulletin de la société archéologique et historique de Tarn-et-Garonne, 103 (1978): 7–23. 50. Le commandant Delaval, “Les anciennes fortifications de Montauban et le siège de 1621,” Bulletin de la société archéologique et historique de Tarn-et-Garonne, 31 (1904): 73–90, 193–209, and 357–382, p. 79, n. 4. 51. Hector Joly, Histoire particulière des plus memorables choses qui se sont passées au siège de Montauban et de l’acheminement d’icelui (np, 1624), p. 6. Joly was a Calvinist pastor. 52. Guicharnauld, “Les fortifications,” pp. 20–22. 53. See Albert Fischer, Daniel Specklin aus Strassburg (1536–1589): Festungsbaumeister, Ingenieur und Kartograph (Jan Thorbecke Verlag: Sigmaringen, 1996). 54. Géralde Nakam, Au lendemain de la Saint Barthélemy: Guerre civile et famine: Histoire mémorable du siège de Sancerre (1573) de Jean de Léry (Éditions Anthropos: Paris, 1975); and Véronique Larcade, “Jean du Léry au siège de Sancerre,” in Histoire d’un voyage en la terre de Brésil (Université Michel de Montaigne Bordeaux 3: Pessac, 2000), pp. 49–87. 55. BM Bourges GG 124. Frank Delteil, “Le siège de Sancerre, 1573,” Bulletin de la société d’histoire du protestantisme français, 120 (1974): 494–498. 56. Janet Whatley, “Food and the Limits of Civility: The Testimony of Jean de Léry,” Sixteenth Century Journal, 15 (1984): 387–400. 57. L. Scott Van Doren, “Revolt and Reaction in the City of Romans, Dauphiné (1579–80),” Sixteenth Century Journal, 5 (1974): 71–100; and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Carnival in Romans (George Braziller: New York, 1979), trans., Mary Feeney. 58. Peter Ascoli, “French Provincial Cities and the Catholic League,” Occasional Papers of the American Society for Reformation Research, 1 (1977): 15–37; and Wolfgang Kaiser, “Die ‘bonnes villes’ und die ‘Sainte Union’. Neuere Forschungen über die Endphase der französischen Bürgerkriege,” Francia, 13 (1985): 638–650. 59. Robert Descimon and Élie Barnavi, Qui étaient les Seize? (Fédération des sociétés historiques et archéologiques de Paris et l’Ile-de-France: Paris, 1984). 60. Ernest Prarond, La ligue à Abbeville, 1576–1594 (Dumouline: Paris, 1873), 3 volumes. 61. Annette Finley-Croswhite, “Engendering the Wars of Religion: Female Agency during the Catholic League in Dijon,” French Historical Studies, 20 (1997): 127–154. 62. Edward Dickerman, “A Neglected Phase of the Spanish Armada: The Catholic League’s Picard Offensive of 1587,” Canadian Journal of History, 11 (1976): 19–24; and Annette Finley-Croswhite, “Confederates and Rivals: Picard Urban Alliances during the Catholic League, 1588–1594,” Canadian Journal of History, 31 (1996): 359–376. 63. Mark W. Konnert, Local Politics in the French Wars of Religion: The Towns of Champagne, the Duc de Guise, and the Catholic League, 1560–95 (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2006). 64. Henri Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne: étude sur la Ligue (Privat: Paris and Dijon, 1937). 65. Jean Canu, “Les guerres de religion et le protestantisme dans la Manche,” Revue départementale de la Manche, 14 (1972): 225–326. 66. Gilles Foucqueran, “Les prémises de la République malouine (1585–1590),” Annales de la société historique et archéologique de St-Malo (1985): 265–282.

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67. François Hauchecorne, “Orléans ligueur en 1591,” Actes 93e Congrès Soc. Savantes Tours, 1968, Bulletin philologique (Université François Rabelais: Tours, 1971), v. II, pp. 845–859. 68. Bernadatte Lécureux, “Une ville bretonne sous la dictature d’un governement ligueur: Morlaix en 1589–1590,” Mémoires de la société d’histoire et d’archéologie de Bretagne, 66 (1989): 137–155. 69. B. Taylor, “La Bretagne et la première révolte de la Ligue (1584–1585),” Mémoires de la société historique et archéologique de Bretagne, 49 (1969): 39–70. 70. Elizabeth Tingle, “Nantes and the Origins of the Catholic League of 1589,” Sixteenth Century Journal, 33 (2002): 109–128. 71. Louis Guibert, La Ligue à Limoges (Imprimerie-Libraire Ducourtieux: Limoges, 1884). 72. Christian Desplat, “Le rôle de Guyenne dans la conquête du royaume (1576– 1589),” in Colloque Henri IV—le roi et la reconstruction du royaume, sept. 1989 (J & D. Éditions: Pau, 1990), pp. 125–144. 73. Mark Greengrass, “The Saint Union in the Provinces: The Case of Toulouse,” The Sixteenth Century Journal, 14 (1983): 469–496. 74. Claire Dolan, “Des images en actions. Cité, pouvoir municipal et crises pendant les guerres de religion à Aix-en-Provence,” in L. Turgeon, ed., Les productions symboliques de pouvoir XVIe–XVIIe siècle (Sillery: Quebec, 1990), pp. 65–86. 75. Pierre Pinon, “La capitale ducale de Charles III à Charles IV: Ville-Neuvre et architecture nouvelle,” in L’Art en Lorraine au temps de Jacques Callot (Réunion des musées nationaux: Nancy, 1992), pp. 69–94. 76. Alain Croix, Nantes et le pays nantais au XVIe siècle (S.E.V.P.E.N.: Paris, 1974); and La ville construite: Nantes, XVIe–XXe siècle (ARDEPA: Nantes, 1991). 77. Francine Leclercq, “Les État provinciaux et la Ligue en Basse Auvergne de 1589 à 1594,” Bulletin philologique et historique, 2 (1966): 913–930; and Henri Drouot, “Les conseils provinciaux de la Sainte-Union (1589–1595),” Annales du Midi, 65 (1953): 415–433. 78. Pierre Dardel, “Convention entre les habitants de Bolbec et les sieurs de Prêtreval, Bobestre et Orange. Épisode de la Ligue en Normandie [1592],” Bulletin de la société de l’histoire de Normandie, 16 (1968): 303–310. 79. A. Dufour, “Histoire du siège de Paris sous Henri IV en 1590,” Mémoires de la société historique de Paris, 7 (1880): 175–270. 80. Hugh A. Lloyd, The Rouen Campaign, 1590–1592: Politics, Warfare and the Early Modern State (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973); and Benedict, Rouen, pp. 217–222. 81. Luc Racaut, Hatred in Print: Catholic Propaganda and Protestant Identify during the French Wars of Religion (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2002). 82. Michael Wolfe, “Writing the City under Attack during the French Wars of Religions,” in Carlo de Dottor, ed., Situazioni d’assedio (CARLE: Siena, 2002), pp. 179–183. 83. Philip Benedict, Graphic History: The Wars, Massacres and Troubles of Tortorel and Perrissin (Droz: Geneva, 2007). 84. Denis Pallier, Recherches sur l’imprimerie à Paris pendant la Ligue (1585–1594) (Droz: Geneva, 1976). 85. Michel de Waele, “Image de force, perception de faiblesse: La clémence d’Henri IV,” Renaissance and Reform/Réforme et Renaissance, 17 (1993): 51–60; and Michael Wolfe, “Amnesty and Oubliance in the French Wars of Religion.” Cahiers d’histoire: La Revue du Département d’Histoire de l’Université de Montréal, 4 (16) (1997): 45–68.

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86. Annette Finley-Croswhite, Henry IV and the Towns: The Pursuit of Legitimacy in French Urban Society, 1589–1610 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 87. Yves Durand, “Les républicains urbains en France à la fin du XVIe siècle,” Société d’histoire et d’archéologie de l’arrondissement de Saint-Malo (1990): 205–244. 88. The following discussion rests largely on the work of Finley-Croswhite, Henri IV and the Towns. 89. Michel Duval, “La démilitarisation des forteresses au lendemain des guerres de la Ligue (1593–1628),” Mémoires de la Société d’histoire et d’archéologie de Bretagne, 69 (1992): 283–305. 90. A case in point was Nantes, the last major town to submit to Henri IV. Guy Saupin, Nantes au temps de l’édit (Geste Éditions: La Crèche, 1998). 91. François de Dainville, “L’enseignement des mathématiques dans les collèges jésuites de France du seizième au dix-huitième siècle,” Revue d’histoire des sciences et de leurs applications, 7 (1954): 6–21, 109–121; and Numa Broc, La Géographie de la Renaissance (1420–1620) (Édition du C.T.H.S.: Paris, 1986). 92. Much of the discussion that follows is based upon the seminal work of David Buisseret. See in particular his Ingénieurs et fortifications avant Vauban. L’organisation d’un service royal aux XVIe–XVIIe siècles (CTHS: Paris, 2000). 93. Alex Keller, A Theater of Machines (Chapman & Hall: London, 1965); and Natalie Zemon Davis, “The Protestantism of Jacques Besson,” Technology and Culture, 7/4 (1966): 509–515. 94. Agostino Ramelli, The Diverse and Ingenious Machines, Martha Track Gnudi, ed. and trans. (The Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, Md., 1976). 95. Martha Track Gnudi, “Agostino Ramelli and Ambroise Bachot,” Technology and Culture, 15/4 (1974): 614–625. 96. Claude Flamand, La guide des fortifications (Montbéliard: 1597). His two books on mathematics appeared in 1612. 97. Stéphan Gaber, “Jean Errard de Bar-le-Duc, ingénieur des fortifications du roi de France Henri IV,” Le Pays lorrain (1990): 105–118; and Hughes Marsat, “Jean Errard, entre loyauté dynastique et engagement confessional,” Bulletin de la Société d’Histoire du Protestantisme Français, 153/1 (2007): 9–19. 98. Jean Errard, Le premier livre des instruments mathematiques (Nancy, 1584); Les six premiers livres des elemens d’Euclide (Paris, 1598), and Les neuf premiers livrees des elemens d’Euclide (Paris, 1605). 99. Henri de Suberville, L’Henry-metre, instrument royale, et universal (Paris, 1598). 100. Joseph Boillot, Modelles artifices de fev et divers instrvmes de gverre (Chaumonten-Bassing, 1598), p. 10. 101. Jacques Perret, Des fortifications et artifices, architecture et perspective de Jacques Perret (Paris, 1602); engravings by Thomas de Leu. 102. David Rivault, sieur de Flurance, Les elemens de l’artillerie (Paris, 1608) and Jacques de Fumée, L’arcenal de la milicie françoise (Paris, 1613). 103. François Dainville, “Le Théâtre françois de M. Bouguereau, 1594. Premier atlas national de France,” in Actes du 85e Congrès national des sociétés savantes (Paris, 1961), pp. 3–50; and Roger Hervé, “L’oeuvre cartographique de Nicolas de Nicolay et d’Antoine de Laval (1544–1619),” Bulletin de la Section de Géographie du Comité des Travaux historiques et scientifiques, 1955 (1956): 223–263. 104. Michael Wolfe, “Prélude à la paix: le siège d’Amiens (1597) et ses conséquences militaries et diplomatiques,” in Jean-François Labourdette, Jean-Pierre Poussou, and Marie-Catherine Vignal, eds, Le Traité de Vervins (Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne: Paris, 2000), pp. 61–79.

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105. Roger Agache, “Images du siège d’Amiens de 1597 ou l’émphemère célébrité du maleur,” Terre Picardie, 9 (1985): 32–40; idem, “La poliorcétique revue d’avion. Le cas du siège d’Amiens par Henri IV,” Revue d’archéologie moderne, 4 (1986): 15–32. 106. Richard L. Goodbar, ed., The Edict of Nantes: Five Essays and a New Translation (The National Huguenot Society: Bloominton, Minn., 1998). 107. Diane Margolf, Religion and Royal Justice in Early Modern France: The Paris Chambre de l’Édit, 1598–1665 (Truman State University Press: Kirksville, Mo., 2003).

Chapter 7 1. Maximilien de Bethune, Duke of Sully, Les Oeconomies royales, Bernard Barbiche and David Buisseret, eds (Klinksieck: Paris, 1970), elaborates on this vision of reform. 2. A.D. Lubinskaya, French Absolutism: The Crucial Phase, 1620–1629 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1968). 3. Suzanne Martinet, “Le siège de Laon sous Henri IV 1594,” Société historique de Haute-Picardie, 23 (1978): 83–96. 4. James Collins, “Un problème toujours mal connu: Les finances d’Henri IV,” in Henri IV. Le Roi et la reconstruction du royaume (L’Association Henri IV: Pau, 1989), pp. 145–164. 5. David Buisseret, “Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps in France before the Accession of Louis XIV,” in Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps: The Emergence of Cartography as a Tool of Government in Early Modern Europe (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, Ill., 1992), pp. 99–123. 6. Michel Desbrière, “L’oeuvre de Jacques Fougeu relative à la Champagne septentrionale pendant le règne de Henri IV,” in Catherine Bousquet-Bressolier, ed., L’oeil du cartographe. La représentation géographique de Moyen Âge à nos jours (CTHS: Paris, 1995), pp. 233–244; David Buissert, “L’atelier cartographique de Sully à Bontin: l’oeuvre de Jacques Fougeu,” XVIe Siècle, 174 (1992): 109–116; François Boudon, “La Topographie française de Claude Chastillon. Proposition pour une grille d’analyse des gravures,” Les Cahiers de la recherche architecturale, 18 (1985): 54–73; and François Dainville, Le Dauphiné et ses confins vus par l’ingénieur d’Henri IV Jean de Beins (Droz: Geneva, 1968). 7. David Buisseret, Sully and the Growth of Centralized Government in France, 1598–1610 (Eyre and Spottiswoode: London, 1968). 8. Yves-Marie Bercé, Revolt and Revolution in Early Modern Europe: An Essay on the History of Political Violence, trans. Joseph Bergin (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1987). 9. Alan James, “Huguenot Militancy and the Seventeenth-Century Wars of Religion,” in Raymond A. Mentzer and Andrew Spicer, eds, Society and Culture in the Huguenot World, 1559–1685 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 209–223. 10. J. H. M. Salmon, “Rohan and Interest of State,” in Staatsräson. international Kolloquium (Tübingen, 1974), pp. 152–179; and H. Dubled, “Le duc Henri de Rohan et la révolte des Protestants du Midi jusqu’à la paix d’Alès (1617–1629),” in Annales du Midi, 99 (1987): 53–78. 11. Kevin Robbins, City on the Ocean Sea: La Rochelle, 1530–1650. Urban Society, Religion and Politics on the French Atlantic Frontier (Brill: Leiden, 1997), pp. 251–253.

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12. BM de Nîmes ms 158–159 (13822) and “Plan de la ville de Nismes avec ses fortifications” (1629) in BN 84C 122237. 13. BN 95 C 212804 and “Diaire de Joseph Guillaudeau, sieur de Beaupréau (1584– 1643),” Archives historiques de la Saintonge et de l’Aunis, 38 (1908): 1–39, p. 37. 14. Liliane Crété, La Rochelle au temps du grand siège, 1627–1628 (Perrin: Paris, 2001), pp. 40–43. 15. Some twenty-four thousand residents, five thousand of them Catholics, became packed into core neighborhoods that comprised less than a half-square mile. Robbins, City on the Ocean Sea, pp. 48–49. 16. Bertrand Schnerb, ed., Les enceintes urbaines XIIIe–XVIe siècle (CTHS: Paris, 1999), p. 238. 17. Anonymous, Les desseins et entreprise faicts à La Rochelle (Paris 1621). 18. Jean-François Fau and Jean Claude Fau, Montauban, Tarn-et-Garonne: plan et notice (Éditions du CNRS: Paris, 1983). 19. François Dainville, “Cartes des places protestantes en 1620 dessinées à la fin du règne de Louis XIII,” Journal des Savants (1968): 214–243. 20. Jean-François Bouyssou, “La composition sociale de révoltés de Rohan à Castres (1610–1629),” Revue du Tarn, 58 (1970): 145–167. 21. Robbins, City on the Ocean Sea, pp. 241–243. 22. Ibid., pp. 278–291. 23. Georges Viard, “Catholiques et protestants à Langres au début du XVIIe siècle. L’émotion du 2 janvier 1613,” Bulletin de la société historique et archéologique de Langre, 17 (1977): 27–45. 24. Albert Baudon, “Le siège de Rethel en 1617,” Annales du Marne, 63 (1921): 155–166. 25. Brian Sandberg, “ ‘The Furious Persecutions that God’s Churches Suffer in This Region’: Religious Violence and Coercion in Early Seventeenth- Century France,” Proceedings of the Western Society for French History, 29 (2003): 42–52. 26. Denys d’Aussy, “Henri de Rohan et le siège de Saint-Jean-d’Angély 1611–1621,” Revue des questions historiques, 32 (1882): 98–146. 27. “Diaire de Joseph Guillaudeau,” p. 179. 28. Ibid., pp. 188–190. 29. Jean-Pierre Amalric, “L’épreuve de force entre Montauban et le pouvoir royal vue par la diplomatie espagnole,” Bulletin de la société de Tarn-et-Garonne, 108 (1983): 25–40. 30. Delaval, “Les anciennes fortifications de Montauban et le siège de 1621,” Bulletin de la société archéologique de Tarn-et-Garonne, 32 (1904): 73–90, 193–209, 357– 382, 374. 31. Ibid., pp. 195–198. 32. Ibid., p. 206. 33. Ibid., pp. 257–362. 34. Ibid., pp. 367–368. On Luynes, see Sharon Kettering, Power and Reputation at the Court of Louis XIII: Charles d’Albert, duc de Luynes (1578–1621) (Manchester University Press: Manchester, 2008). 35. Delaval, “Les anciennes fortifications,” p. 370. 36. P. Coste, “Démolition des châteaux de Tartas et de Mont-de-Marsan en 1622. Siège de Saint-Sever en 1622,” Bulletin de la société Borda, 44 (1920): 9–17. 37. “Diarie de Joseph Guillaudeau,” p. 211. 38. Alan James, “The Development of French Naval Policy in the Seventeenth Century: Richelieu’s Early Aims and Ambitions,” French History 12/4 (1998): 384–402.

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39. Anonymous, Le banissement des prêtres de l’Oratoire hor de La Rochelle (Paris, 1621). 40. “Ordinances et proclamations, 147,” in Liliane Crété, La vie quotidienne à La Rochelle au temps du grand siège (Hachette: Paris, 1987), p. 120. 41. David Parker, La Rochelle and the French Monarchy: Conflict and Order in Seventeenth-Century France (Royal Historical Society: London, 1980) remains the definitive account upon which much of the ensuing analysis relies. 42. Anonymous, Manifeste contenant les cause et les raisons (La Rochelle, 1627). 43. Jacques Vichot, Les gravures des sièges de Ré et La Rochelle (1625–1628). Deux chefs d’oeuvres de Jacques Callot. Étude historique et descriptive (Association des amis des musées de la marine—Palais de Chaillot: Paris, 1971). 44. L. Battifol, “Au temps du siège de La Rochelle,” Revue de Paris (1902): 118–155. 45. SHAT Génie mss 208a. 46. Crété, La Rochelle, pp. 148–149. 47. Printed portraits of Métézeau after the siege compared him to Archimedes. See BN G152876. 48. Targoni proposed stretching a net across the channel to prevent fish from entering the harbor, thus cutting off one of the few remaining sources of food for the starving city. 49. Horric de Beaucaire, “Les machines de Du Plessis-Besançon au siège de La Rochelle en 1628,” Archives historiques de la Saintonge et de l’Aunis, 18 (1890): 368–387. 50. See BN P12380 and BN P12371 for examples. 51. J. Favre, “Le siège de Mirabel en 1628,” Revue Vivarais, 30 (1923): 229–233, 267–275; 31 (1924): 17–20. 52. Calendar of State Papers—Domestic, v. 101, n. 47III April 28, 1628, Plymouth and Callot, p. 99. 53. P. S. Callot, Jean Guiton, dernier maire de l’ancienne commune de La Rochelle, 1628 (Quartier Latin: La Rochelle, 1967 [1880]). 54. “Diarie de Joseph Guillaudeau,” pp. 377–379. 55. Le Mercure Français, n. 14, part 2, p. 719. 56. Callot, Jean Guiton, p. 50. 57. BN G152861. 58. Natalie Fiquet and François-Yves Le Blanc, Brouage. Ville royale (Éditions patrimoines & medias: Chauray, 1996). 59. “Diarie de Joseph Guillaudeau,” pp. 405–407. 60. Callot, Jean Guiton, p. 129. 61. “Diarie de Joseph Guillaudeau,” p. 380. 62. Robbins, City on the Ocean Sea, pp. 359–367. 63. Ibid., p. 366. 64. In 1636, Louis XIII again used the same procedures in Rouen. Jean-Pierre Bardet, Rouen aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles: La mutation d’un espace social (Presses Universitaires de France: Paris, 1983), p. 77. 65. A contract issued by the city in November 1627 for work on the city’s defenses; six years later, one of the masons who bid on this contract, a certain Jean Bourgeois, was awarded one to tear down these very same walls. A.D. Tarn et Garonne, 3 EE1 fol. 224, liasse 4–6. 66. Schnerb, Les enceintes urbaines, pp. 231–238. 67. Callot, Jean Guiton, p. 110. 68. Jean-Pierre Brancourt, “La monarchie et les châteaux du XVIe au XVIIe siècles,” XVIIe Siècle, 30 (1978): 25–36.

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69. François-Joseph Ruggiu, Les élites et les villes moyennes en France et en Angleterre (XVIIe–XVIIIe siècles) (L’Harmattan: Paris and Montréal, 1997); Christophe Blanquie, Les présidiaux de Richelieu: Justice et venalité (Éditions Christian: Paris, 2000); and Michel Cassan, ed., Les officiers “moyens” à l’époque moderne: pouvoir, culture, identité (Presses Universitaires de Limoges: Limoges, 1998). 70. A.D. Tarn et Garonne, G 3 EE 1 (unpaginated). 71. A painting of Richelieu receiving the town’s surrender hangs in Versailles. 72. A.D. Tarn et Garonne, AA6 Livre Jaune fol. 85 r. “Articles presentez au Roy par les Deputez de la ville en l’an 1629 [22 August] et la réponse audits articles en marge.” 73. A.D. Tarn et Garonne, G EE 1 (unpaginated). 74. P. Coste, “Démolition des châteaux de Tartas et de Mont-de-Marsan en 1622. Siège de Saint-Sever en 1622,” Bulletin de la société Borda, 44 (1920): 9–17. 75. Sheila Bonde, Fortress-Churches of Languedoc: Architecture, Religion and Conflict in the High Middle Ages (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994), p. 119. 76. B.N. ff. ms 3150 and Roger Nègre, “Ce qu’il advent des fortifications de la collégiale Saint-Vincent à Montréal après le départ des partisans de Monsieur et du duc de Montmorency en 1632,” Bulletin de la société des études scientifiques de l’Aude 1969, 68 (1968): 243–276. 77. A.D. Tarn et Garonne, 3 EE1 fol. 224, liasse 24. 78. G. d’Avenel, Lettres, Instructions Diplomatiques, et Papiers d’État du cardinal de Richelieu (Paris, 1853), v. 5, p. 129. 79. René Souriac, ed., Décentralisation administrative dans l’ancienne France. Autonomie commingeoise et pouvoir d’État, 1540–1630 (Association les Amis des Archives de la Haute Garonne: Toulouse, 1992), 2 volumes; Hélène Vésian, Evelyne Falvard, and Claude Gouron, eds, Châteaux et bastides en Haute Provence aux XVIe, XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Aubanel: Avignon, 1991); and Nicolas Faucherre, “Fortifications royales [du pays basque, Pyrénées-Atlantiques] XVIe–XVIIIe siècles,” Les Monuments historiques, 147 (1986): 11–16. 80. Edmond Moppert, “Au pays messin en 1635–38. Pourquoi les églises fortifiées?” Voix lorraine (1969): 18–19; and Jean-Paul Meuret, Les églises fortifiées de la Thiérache (Société archéologique et historique de Vervins et de la Thiérache: Vervins, 1977). 81. B.M. Nîmes ms 57 (13944), also in M. Germain, Mémoires de la société archéologiques de Montpellier, 7 (1877): 1–100. 82. B.N. FF ms 22205–22221 provides information on specific demolition projects from Picardy to Languedoc. 83. Philippe Trottman, Les derniers châteaux-forts: les prolongements de la fortification médiévale en France, 1634–1914 (G. Klopp: Thionville, 1993). 84. Richard Louis Cleary, The Place Royale and Urban Design in the Ancien Régime (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1999); and Ilaria Valente, Figure dello spazio aperto. La place royale e l’architettura urbana in Francia (UNICOPLI: Milan, 2000). 85. M. Georges-Leroy, “Nancy-ENSIC,” Bilan scientifique 1993-DRAC Lorraine, Service régional de l’archéologie, 1994. 86. Hilary Ballon, The Paris of Henry IV: Architecture and Urbanism (The MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1994). 87. Émil Baudon, Un urbaniste au XVIIe siècle, Clément Métézeau (Les Cahiers d’études ardennaises: Mézières, 1956). 88. Hélène Guicharnauld, Montauban au XVIIe siècle. Architecture et urbanisme, 1560–1685 (Picard: Paris, 1991).

212

No t e s

89. B.N. Coll. Dupuy v. 550, fol. 46, “Mémoire pour faire voir que depuis l’establissement de la monarchie françoise, l’Estat n’a pas eu vingt ans de paix conséquetifs.” 90. Orest Ranum, Richelieu and the Councilors of Louis XIII (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1963); and Robert Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite: The Provincial Governors of Early Modern France (Yale University Press: New Haven, Conn., 1978). 91. Sharon Kettering, Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1986). 92. Richard Bonney, Political Change in France under Richelieu and Mazarin, 1624– 1660 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); and Douglas Baxter, Servants of the Sword: French Military Intendants of the Army, 1630–1670 (University of Illinois Press: Urbana, 1976). 93. David A. Parrott, Richelieu’s Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624–1642 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2001) argues for the lower number, whereas John A. Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610–1715 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1997) posits the latter. 94. Gabrielo Busca, Architettura Militare (Milan, 1619); and P. A. Barca, Avertimenti e Regole (Milan, 1620). 95. See, e.g., Hendrik Hondius, Description & brève déclaration des règles générales de la fortification (The Hague, 1625). 96. On Stevin, see J. T. Devreese and G. Vanden Berghe, Wonder en is gheen wonder. De geniale wereld van Simon Stevin 1548–1620 (Davidsfonds: Louvain, 2003). 97. Vincenzo Scamozzi, L’Idea della architetuttura universale (Venice, 1615). 98. Francis Yates, The Rosicrucian Enlightenment (Routedge & Kegan Paul: London, 1972); and P. Choné, “La Lorraine vue par un architecte italien. Le voyage de Vincenzo Scamozzi, 28 mars–15 avril, 1600,” Le pays lorrain, 1 (1982): 65–88. 99. Samuel Marolais, Fortification ou Architecture Militaire (The Hague, 1615); and Géometrie . . . Nécessaire à la Fortification (The Hague, 1628) contain finely rendered illustrations to accompany its glosses on Dutch and Italian works. 100. Honorat de Meynier, Les nouvelles inventions de fortifier les places (Paris, 1626). 101. Denis Zacarie, Traicté d’arithmétique, géométrie (Paris, 1618). See T. L. Davis, “The Autobiography of Denis Zacharie: An Account of an Alchemist’s Life,” Isis 2 (1926): 287–299. 102. They were collected in his Mémoires mathématiques (Paris, 1613–1627), 2 volumes. See also Denis Henrion, L’vsage dv mécomètre (Paris, 1630). 103. See, for one among many examples, Pierre Le Mardelé, Les quinze livres des éléments géométriques d’Euclide (Paris, 1622), reprinted in expanded editions in 1632 and 1645. 104. Surveying works, all reprinted many times, include Jean Tarde, Les usages du quadrant à l’esguille (Paris, 1621); Jean Boulenger, La géométrie (Paris: 1623); and Michel Coignet, La géométrie (Paris, 1626). On explosives, see among others, Jean Appier Hanzelet, La pyrotechnique (Pont-à-Mousson, 1630). 105. René Le Normant, Discours pour le restablissement de la milice de France (Rouen, 1632). 106. Jean Fabre, Les practiques . . . sur l’ordre et reigle de fortifier (Paris, 1629). 107. Jean-François Pernot, “L’ingénieur Pierre d’Argencourt, le fidèle du cardinal,” in Mélanges Corvisier: Le Soldat, la Stratégie, la Mort (Economica: Paris, 1989), pp. 54–62. 108. B.N. C & Pl, Ge CC715(31) and Ge DD4121(62), of areas around Metz.

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109. Jean-François Pernot, “La guerre et l’infrastructure de l’état moderne: Antoine de Ville, ingénieur du Roi (1596?–1656?), la pensée d’un technician au service de la mobilization totale du royaume,” Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 121 (1987): 404–426. 110. Antoine de Ville, Les fortifications (Lyon, 1636). 111. Antoine de Ville, De la charge des gouverneurs des places (Paris, 1639). 112. Myriem Foncin, “La collection des cartes d’un château bourguignon, le château de Bontin,” Actes du 93e Congrès National des Sociétés Savantes (Paris, 1970), pp. 43–75; idem and M. de la Roncière, “Jacques Martez et la cartographie des côtes de Provence au XVIIe siècle,” Actes du 90e Congrès national des Sociétés Savantes (Nice. 1965), pp. 9–28; Antoine de Roux, “Sébastien de Beaulieu: le cartographe des sièges et batailles de la guerre de Trente Ans,” Bulletin du Comité français de cartographie, 130 (1991): 23–27; and Jean-Marc Depluvez, “Noble Jacques Callot, ingénieur de son altesse de Lorraine,” in Jacques Callot (1592– 1635) (R.M.N.: Paris, 1992), pp. 181–198. 113. Claude Petitfrère, ed., Images et imaginaires de la ville à l’époque moderne (Maison des sciences de la ville: Tours, 1998); and David Buisseret, Envisioning the City: Six Studies in Urban Cartography (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1998). 114. Catherine Bousquet-Bressolier, “Le langage de la peinture dans la cartographie topographique,” in idem, L’œil du cartographe, pp. 53–70; and Amir R. Alexander, Geometrical Landscapes: The Voyages of Discovery and the Transformation of Mathematical Practice (Stanford University Press: Stanford, Cal., 2002). 115. René Descartes, Discours de la méthode (Leiden, 1637). 116. Blaise de Pagan, Les fortifications du comte de Pagan (Paris, 1645). 117. Louis André, Michel Le Tellier et l’organisation de l’armée monarchique (Slatkine Reprints: Geneva, 1980 [Paris, 1906]); and idem, Michel Le Tellier et Louvois (A. Colin: Paris, 1942). 118. Richard Bonney, The King’s Debts: Finance and Politics in France, 1589–1661 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1981); and Julian Dent, Crisis in France: Crown, Financiers, and Society in Seventeenth-Century France (St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1973). 119. Bernard Kroener, Les routes et les étapes. Die Versorgung der französischen Armeen in Nordostfrankreich. Ein Beintrag zur Verwaltungsgeschichte des Ancien Regime (1635–1661) (Aschendorff: Münster, 1980). 120. John Lynn, “How War Fed War: The Tax of Violence during the Grand Siècle,” The Journal of Modern History, 65/2 (1993): 286–310. 121. Jean-Pierre Bardet, “La démographie des villes de la modernité (XVIe–XVIIIe siècles): mythes et réalités,” Annales de démographie historique, 1974 (101–126); and F. Lebrun, “Les crises démographiques en France aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles,” Annales économies, sociétés, civilizations (1980): 205–234. 122. Madeleine Foisil, La révolte des nu-pieds et les révoltes en normandes de 1639 (Presses Universitaires de France: Paris, 1970); and Orest Ranum, The Fronde: A French Revolution, 1648–1652 (W. W. Norton: New York, 1993). 123. Quentin Outram, “The Demographic Effects of Early Modern Warfare,” Social Science History, 26/2 (2002): 245–272; and Myron P. Gutmann, War and Rural Life in the Early Modern Low Countries (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1980). 124. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1990), pp. 67–87.

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Chapter 8 1. Joseph Konvitz, “Does the Century 1650–1750 Constitute a Period in French Urban History? The French Evidence Reviewed,” Journal of Urban History, 14 (1988): 419–454. 2. Fanny Cosandey and Robert Descimon, L’absolutisme en France, histoire et historiographie (Seuil: Paris, 2002); and William Beik, “The Absolutism of Louis XIV as Social Collaboration,” Past and Present, 188 (2005): 195–224, which updates his seminal Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1985). For a recent case study, see Michael Breen, Law, City and King: Legal Culture, Municipal Politics and State Formation in Early Modern Dijon (University of Rochester Press: Rochester, NY, 2007). 3. Joël Cornette, Le Roi de Guerre. Essai sur la souveraineté dans la France du Grand Siècle (Payot/Rivages: Paris, 1993). 4. Gail Bossenga, “City and State: An Urban Perspective on the Origins of the French Revolution,” in The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture. vol. 1, The Political Culture of the Old Regime, Keith Baker, ed. (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987), pp. 115–140. 5. Paul Sonnino, Louis XIV and the Origins of the Dutch War (Cambridge University Press: New York, 1988); and Carl J. Ekberg, The Failure of Louis XIV’s Dutch War (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 1979). 6. C. De Seze, “Comment Louis XIV a perdu Tournai,” Revue du Nord 183/46 (1964): 217–224. 7. Nicole Salat and Thierry Sarmant, eds, Politique, guerre et fortification au Grand Siècle: Lettres de Louvois à Louis XIV (1679–1691) (Droz: Geneva, 2007). 8. André Corvisier, Louvois (Fayard: Paris, 1983), p. 519. 9. Ibid., p. 330. 10. Mark Potter, Corps and Clienteles: Public Finance and Political Change in France, 1688–1715 (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2003). 11. Joseph Konvitz, Cities and the Sea: Port City Planning in Early Modern Europe (Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 1978). 12. Corvisier, Louvois, pp. 170–176. 13. Anne Blanchard, Les Ingénieurs du roy de Louis XIV à Louis XVI. Étude du corps des fortifications (Université Paul Valéry: Montpellier, 1979); and idem, Dictionnaire des ingénieurs militaires (1691–1791) (Université Paul Valéry: Montpellier, 1981). 14. All of this is well covered in Ben Scott Trotter, “Marshal Vauban and the Administration of Fortifications under Louis XIV (to 1691),” PhD dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1993, pp. 95–140. His “Vauban and the French Administration during the Second Period of Reform, 1691–1707,” MA thesis, The Ohio State University, 1973, p. 98. 15. See Anne Blanchard, Vauban (Fayard: Paris, 1996) for the most recent biography. 16. Emmanuel Pénicaut, Michel Chamillart, ministre et secrétaire d’État de la guerre de Louis XIV (1654–1721): Faveur et pouvoir au tournant du Grand Siècle (Droz: Geneva, 2004). 17. Le Directeur général des fortifications ou Mémoire concernant les functions des différents officiers employés dans les fortifications was later published in Holland in 1702. 18. Nicolas Faucherre and Catherine Brisac, eds, Vauban réformateur. Actes du colloque du Decembre 15–17 au Musée Guimet (Association Vauban: Paris, 1983).

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19. Victoria Sanger, “Military Town Planning under Louis XIV: Vauban’s Method and Practice (1668–1707),” PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 2000, pp. 255–258. 20. Alberto Pérez-Gómez, Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science (MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1983), pp. 212–213. 21. Ibid, pp. 87–128. 22. See A. Picon, “Entre science et l’art de l’ingénieur. L’enseignement de Navier à l’École des Ponts et Chaussées,” in Patricia Radelet-de-Grave and Edoardo Benvenuto, eds, Between Mechanics and Architecture (Birkhäuser: Basel, 1994), pp. 257–274. 23. He articulated his ideas in his new translation of Vitruvius’s De Architectura (Paris, 1673), which supplanted Martin’s 1547 translation, and his seminal Ordonnance des cinq espèce de colonnes (Paris, 1683). 24. Jean-François Félibien, Recueil historique de la vie et desouvrages des plus célèbres architects (Paris, 1687). 25. Indra Kagis McEwen, “On Claude Perrault: Modernising Vitruvius,” in Vaughan Hart with Peter Hicks, eds, Paper Palaces: The Rise of the Renaissance Architectural Treatise (Yale University Press: New Haven, Conn., 1998), pp. 321–337. 26. Hanno-Walter Kruft, A History of Architectural Theory from Vitruvius to the Present (Zwemmer: London, 1994), pp. 128–141. 27. Chandra Mukerji, Territorial Ambitions and the Gardens of Versailles (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1997); and Vincent Scully, “The Shape of France: Gardens, Fortifications, and Modern Urbanism,” in his Architecture: The Natural and the Manmade (Yale University Press: New Haven, Conn., 1991), chapter 10. 28. Hélène Vérin, “La Technologie et le parc: ingénieurs et jardiniers en France au XVIIe siècle,” in M. Mosser and G. Teyssot, eds, Histoire des jardins de la Renaissance à nos jours (Flammarion: Paris, 1991), pp. 131–139. 29. Corvisier, Louvois, p. 372; and Anne Blanchard, “La bonne sûreté du royaume” and “Vers la ceinture de fer,” in André Corvisier, ed., Histoire militaire de la France, v. I, pp. 134–148 and pp. 178–193. 30. Vauban to Louvois, January 20, 1673, in Vauban, Les Oisivetés de Monsieur de Vauban, Michèle Virol, ed. (Septentrion: Villeneuve d’Ascq, 2000), v. II, p. 89. 31. Alain Salamagne, Vauban en Flandre et Artois. Les places de l’intérieur (Association des amis de la Maison Vauban: Saint-Léger-Vauban, 1995). 32. Vauban et ses successeurs en Hainaut et d’Entre-Sambre-et-Meuse (Association Vauban: Paris, 1994). 33. J. Reussner, “Strasbourg, place de guerre. Étude et project de fortification par Vauban, octobre, 1681,” Annuaire de la Société des amis du vieux Strasbourg, 11 (1981): 49–88; and Maurice Gresset, Vauban et la Franche-Comté (Les amis de la maison Vauban: Saint-Léger-Vauban, 1996). 34. Vauban et ses successeurs en Briançonnais (Association Vauban: Paris, 1995); Vauban et ses successeurs dans les Alpes-de-Haute-Provence (Association Vauban: Paris, 1992); Nicolas Faucherre and Philippe Dangles, “Les fortifications du Bourgneuf à Bayonne. État de la questions, nouvelles hypothèses,” Revue d’histoire de Bayonne, du Pays basque et du Bas-Adour, 146 (1990): 43–82; and Georges Hachon, Vauban et le Roussillon (Association des amis de la maison Vauban: Saint-Léger-Vauban, 1991). 35. Nicolas Faucherre and Jean-Marie Fontenau, eds, Vauban à Belle-Ile: Trois cents ans de fortification cotière en Morbihan (Éditions Gondi: Paris, 1990); Nathalie Moreau, Vauban et la côte atlantique entre Loire et Gironde (Association des amis

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48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

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No t e s de la maison Vauban Saint-Leger-Vauban, 1993); and Vauban et ses successeurs en Charente-Maritime (Association Vauban: Paris, 1997). Christopher Duffy, Fortifications in the Age of Louis XIV and Frederick the Great (Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1985); and Paddy Griffith and Peter Dennis, The Vauban Fortifications of France (Osprey: Oxford, 2006). Jean Thiriot, Portes, tours et murailles de la cité de Metz. Une évocation de l’enceinte urbaine aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles (Est-Imprimerie: Metz, 1970), pp. 17–19. Mémoires et documents inédits pour servir à l’histoire de la Franche-Comté (Académie de Besançon: Besançon, 2001), v. XV. Vauban prepared a catalog in 1697. Antoine de Roux, Les plans en relief des places du roi (A. Biro: Paris, 1989). Nicolas Faucherre and Antoine De Roux, “Le ‘coup d’oeil militaire à la Galerie des Plans et reliefs: L’Estat de 1696,” in Jacques Guillerme, ed., Les collections: fables et programmes (Champ Vallon: Seyssel, 1993), pp. 144–162. Marie Anne de Villèle, “Les Naudin et la cartographie militaire française de 1688 à 1744,” in Catherine Bousquet-Bressolier, ed., L’oeil du cartographe et la représentation géographique du moyen âge à nos jours (Éditions du CTHS: Paris, 1995), pp. 147–173. Alphonse Halter, Le chef-d’oeuvre inachevé de Vauban, Neuf-Brisach (La Nuée Bleue: Strasbourg, 1992). He detailed all this in two memoranda: Mémoire sur les places dont le Roi pourrait faire démanteler ou restituer plutôt que les faire prendre (1693) and Places du Royaume à disarmer . . . comme peu nécessaires et à la charge de l’Etat (1697). Nicolas Faucherre and Philippe Prost, Le triomphe de la méthode. Le traité de l’attaque des places de Monsieur de Vauban ingénieur du roi (Gallimard: Paris, 1992). Sanger, “Military Town Planning,” p. 18. Jamel Ostwald, Vauban under Siege: Engineering Efficiency and Martial Vigor in the War of Spanish Succession (Brill: Leiden and Boston, 2007). Anette Smedley-Weill, Les intendants de Louis XIV (Fayard: Paris, 1995); and L. Trendard, Les Mémoires des intendants pour l’instruction du duc de Bourgogne (1698) (C.T.H.S.: Paris, 1975). B.N. ff ms 12381, fol. 29v. André Corvisier, Les français et l’armée sous Louis XIV d’après les Mémoires des Intendants (Université de Paris-Sorbonne: Paris, 1975), pp. 33–41, 108. Victoria Sanger and Isabelle Warmoes, “The City Gates of Louis XIV,” Journal of Urban History, 30/1 (2003): 50–69. William Beik, Urban Protest in Seventeenth-Century France: The Culture of Retribution (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1997). Roy L. McCullough, Coercion, Conversion and Counterinsurgency in Louis XIV’s France (Brill: Leiden, 2007). John A. Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610–1715 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1997); and André Corvisier, L’armée française de la fin du XVIIe siècle au ministère de Choiseul: le soldat (Presses Univeristaires de France: Paris, 1964), two volumes. André Corvisier, Les contrôles de troupes de l’Ancien Régime (Ministère des armées: Paris, 1968–1970). André Corvisier, “Anciens soldats, oblats, mortes-payes et mendiants de guerre au XVIIe siècle,” Actes du Congrès national des sociétés savantes, Nantes (CNRS: Paris, 1978), v. I, pp. 7–30.

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56. André Corvisier, “Le pouvoir militaire et les villes,” in Georges Livet and Bernard Vogler, eds, Pouvoir, ville et société en Europe, 1650–1750. Colloque international du C.N.R.S. (octobre 1981) actes (Éditions Ophrys: Paris, 1983), pp. 11–20; and Nicolas Faucherre, “Des villes libres au pré carré. Genèse de l’état monarchique en France,” in Antoine Picon, ed., La ville et la guerre (Éditions de l’Imprimeur: Paris, 1996), pp. 65–87. 57. G. Perjées, “Army Provisioning, Logistics and Strategy in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century,” Acta Historica Academiae Scientarium Hungaricae, 16 (1970): 56–81. 58. Claude C. Sturgill, “Changing Garrisons: The French System of Étapes,” Canadian Journal of History, 20/2 (1985): 193–202. 59. Guy Rowlands, The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661–1701 (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2003). 60. Philippe Truttmann, Fortification, architecture et urbanisme aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles. Essai sur l’oeuvre artistique et technique des ingéniers militaires sous Louis XIV et Louis XV (Service culturel de la ville de Thionville: Thionville, 1976), pp. 15–16, 31–47. 61. Sanger, “Military Town Planning,” pp. 178, 207. 62. Auguste Nicaise, ed., Journal de Bertin du Rocheret (Paris, 1865), p. 105. 63. They were Longwy, Sarrelouis, Huningue, Fort-Louis, Montlouis, Montdauphin, Montroyal, Phalsbourg, and Neuf-Brisach. 64. Sanger, “Military Town Planning,” pp. 108–110. The others were Arras, Bayonne, Besançon, Fort-Louis, Marseilles, Montlouis, Saint-Martin-de-Ré, Strasbourg, and Tournai. 65. Dominique Foussard, “De Vauban à Chaussard. Heurts, circuits et competition de modèles architecturaux allogènes et autochtones en terre flamande,” Revue du Nord, 68 (1986): 769–790. 66. Joseph Konvitz, “Grandeur in French City Planning under Louis XIV: Rochefort and Marseille,” Journal of Urban History, 2 (1975): 3–42; and Martine Acerra, Rochefort et la construction navale française, 1661–1815 (Libraire de l’Inde: Paris, 1993). 67. Alain Degage, “Les fortifications du port de Sète du XVIe siècle à nos jours,” Revue de l’histoire des armées, 4 (1980): 45–63; and Jean Peter, Le port et l’arsenal de Toulon sous Louis XIV (Economica: Paris, 1996). 68. Armel de Wismes, La vie quotidienne dans les ports bretons aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Nantes, Brest, Saint-Malo, Lorient) (Hachette: Paris, 1973). 69. Jean Peter, Vauban et Saint-Malo. Polémiques autour d’une stratégie de défense, 1686–1770 (Economica: Paris, 1999). 70. Jean Peter, Le port et l’arsenal de Brest sous Louis XIV (Economica: Paris, 1998). 71. Daniel Dessert, La Royale. Vaisseaux et marin du roi-soleil (Fayard: Paris, 1996); and Roger Hervé, “Les plans de forêts de la grande réformation colbertienne, 1661–1690,” Bulletin de la Section de géographie du Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques, 34 (1961): 143–171. 72. Alain Boulaire, Brest au temps de la Royale (Éditions de la Cité: Brest, 1989); and Annie Henwood, “La ville dans ses murs,” in Brest alias Brest, trois siècles d’urbanisme (Mardaga: Liège, 1976), pp. 56–69. 73. Alain Demangeon and Bruo Fortier, Les vaisseaux et les villes. L’arsenal de Cherbourg (Pierre Mardaga: Brussels/Liège, 1978). 74. Monique Moulin, L’architecture civile et militaire a XVIIIe siècle en Aunis et Saintonge (Quartice Latin: La Rochelle, 1972).

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75. Bibliothèque Municipale de La Rochelle, ms. 60. Claude Masse, Histoire abrégée de la ville de la Rochelle, fol. 23, contains a 1689 plan of town that shows these new works. 76. Philip Benedict, “More than Market and Manufactory: The Cities of Early Modern France,” French Historical Studies, 20/3 (1997): 511–538. 77. Bernard Lepetit, The Pre-Industrial Urban System: France, 1740–1840 (Cambridge University Press: New York, 1994). 78. For contrasting views, see Philip Benedict, “Was the Eighteenth Century an Era of Urbanization in France?” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 21 (1990): 179–215; and Bernard Lepetit, “Urbanization in Eighteenth-Century France: A Comment,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 23 (1992): 73–85; and Philip Benedict, “Urbanization in Eighteenth-Century France: A Reply,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 23/1 (1992): 87–95. 79. Jean Meyer, Études sur les villes: milieu du XVIIe siècle à la veille de la Révolution française (Société d’édition d’enseignement supérieur: Paris, 1983), p. 269. 80. H. Sauval, Paris ancien et moderne contenant une description exacte et particulière de Paris (Paris, 1654); and idem, Histoire et recherches des antiquitez de Paris (Paris, 1724). 81. Jean Meyer referred to this process as “la ‘déstructuration’ des forces d’autodéfense.” Études, p. 12. 82. Jean-Pierre Bardet, Rouen aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles: La mutation d’un espace social (Presses Universitaires de France: Paris, 1983), pp. 107–110. 83. Antoine de Roux, Villes neuves. Urbanisme classique (Rempart: Paris, 1997). 84. Allan Braham, The Architecture of the French Enlightenment (University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1980). 85. Andrew Trout, City on the Seine: Paris in the Time of Richelieu and Louis XIV (St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1996). 86. Rochelle Zisken, “The Place de Nos Conquêtes and the Unraveling of the Myth of Louis XIV,” Art Bulletin, 76 (1994): 147–162. 87. Jeanne Pronteau and Isabelle Dérens, Introduction générale au Travail des Limites de la ville et faubourgs de Paris, 1724–1729 (Paris musées: Paris, 1998). 88. Henry H. Lawrence, “Origins of the Tree-Lined Boulevard,” Geographical Review, 78/4 (1988): 355–374. 89. Elizabeth Kugler, “The Promenade as Performance: A Study of the Landscape and Literature of Seventeenth-Century Paris,” PhD dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 1998. 90. David P. Jordan, Transforming Paris: The Life and Labors of Baron Haussman (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, Ill., 1995). 91. K. Burlen, et al., Versailles, lecture d’une ville. Développement morphologique et typologie architecturale de la ville de Versailles (CORDA: Paris, 1978). 92. Frédéric Tiberghien, Versailles, le chantier de Louis XIV: 1662–1715 (Perrin: Paris, 2002). 93. Archives du Génie, carton Rouen. 94. Joseph Konvitz, Cartography in France, 1660–1848: Science, Engineering, and Statecraft (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, Ill., 1987). 95. Guy Arbelot, “Le réseau des routes de poste objet des premières cartes thématiques de la France moderne,” Actes du 104e Congrès national des Sociétés savantes. Bordeaux 1979. Section d’Histoire moderne et contemporaine (Imprimerie national: Paris, 1982), v. I, pp. 97–115. 96. Claire Lemoine-Isabeau, Les militaires et la cartographie des Pays-Bas méridonaux et de la principauté de Liège à la fin du XVIIe et au XVIIIe siècle (Musée royale de l’armée: Brussels, 1984).

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97. Antoine Picon and Michel Yvon, L’ingénieur-artiste. Dessins anciens de l’École des Ponts et Chaussées (Presses de l’École Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées: Paris, 1989). 98. Bernard Lepetit, Chemins de terre et voies d’eau. Réseaux de transport et organisation de l’espace en France, 1740–1840 (Éditions de l’EHESS: Paris, 1984). 99. The full title was Surintendance générale des Postes et relais de France et des chevaucheurs de l’Écurie du roi. Georges Livet, “Les routes françaises aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles. État des questions et directions de recherches,” in L’homme et la route en Europe occidentale au Moyen Âge et temps modernes (Flaran: Auch, 1982), pp. 107–149. 100. Corvisier, Louvois, p. 86. 101. J. Petot, Histoire de l’administration des Ponts et Chaussées, 1599–1815 (M. Rivière: Paris, 1958). 102. André Maiste, Le Canal des deux mers, canal royal du Languedoc, 1666–1810 (Privat: Toulouse, 1968). 103. Lepetit, Chemins, p. 20. Guy Arbelot, “La grande mutation des routes de France au milieu du XVIIIème siècle,” Annales économies, sociétés, civilizations, 38 (1973): 765–791. 104. Nicolas Papayanis, Horse-drawn Cabs and Omnibuses in Paris: The Idea of Circulation and the Business of Public Transit (Louisiana State University Press: Baton Rouge, 1996). 105. Lepetit, Chemins, pp. 24–26. 106. Guy Arbelot, “Les tournées de Jean-Rodolphe Perronet sur les routes de France, 1764–1763,” Annales des Ponts et Chaussées, 27 (1981): 64–71. 107. Antoine Picon, L’Invention de l’ingénieur moderne. L’École des Ponts et Chaussées 1747–1851 (Paris: Presses de ENPC: Paris, 1992). 108. Antoine Picon, French Architects and Engineers in the Age of Enlightenment, trans. Martin Thom (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1992); and Hélène Vérin, La gloire des ingénieurs. L’intelligence technique du XVIe au XVIIIe siècles (Albin Michel: Paris, 1993), pp. 33–39. 109. René Taton, “L’École royale du Génie de Mézières,” in René Taton, ed., Enseignement et diffusion des sciences en France au XVIIIe siècle (Hermann: Paris, 1964), pp. 46–62. 110. B. Belhoste, “Les Origines de l’École polytechnique. Des anciennes écoles d’ingénieurs à l’École centrale des travaux publics,” Histoire de l’education, 42 (1989): 13–53. 111. Jean Chagniot, “Vauban et la pensée militarie en France au XVIIIe siècle,” Journal des savants, 132 (1982): 56–71. 112. His De l’attaque et de la defense des place, written in 1704, was only published in the The Hague in 1737, while the Mémoire pour sevir d’instruction dans la conduite des sieges et dans la defense des places, which appeared in Leiden in 1740, was originally penned in the early 1670s for Louvois. 113. This book was written in 1714 but only published in 1741. 114. Pérez-Gómez, Architecture, p. 221. 115. Janis Langis, Conserving the Enlightenment: French Military Engineering from Vauban to the Revolution (MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass., 2004). 116. Ken Alder, Engineering the Revolution: Arms and Enlightenment in France, 1763– 1815 (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 1997). 117. See the scathing remarks of Thomas Corneille about his native Rouen in his Dictionnaire universel géographique et historique (Paris, 1708), v. I, pp. 298–301. 118. Richard Etlin, Symbolic Space: French Enlightenment Architecture and Its Legacy (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, Ill., 1994).

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119. Sabine Barles, La Ville délétère. Médecins et ingénieurs dans l’espace urbain, 18e– 19e siècle (Champ Vallon: Seyssel, 1999). 120. Marc Grignon, Laing du soleil: Architectural Practice in Quebec City during the French Regime (Peter Lang: New York, 1997). 121. B. Huet, et al., Mécanique de la percée urbaine de 1750–1900. Les trois percées d’Orléans (Ville Recherche Diffusion: Paris, 1988). 122. Charles Nières, La reconstruction d’une ville au XVIIIe siècle (Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes, 1973). 123. Jean-Claude Perrot, Genèse d’une ville moderne. Caen au XVIIIe siècle (Mouton: Paris, 1975). 124. Roger Kain, “Classical Urban Design in France: The Transformation of Nancy in the Eighteenth Century,” The Connaisseur, 26 (1979): 190–197. 125. The fact that Joseph II was dismantling Imperial fortified places in the Austrian Netherlands no doubt added weight to Mézières’s pleas. See Philippe Guignet, Le pouvoir dans la ville au XVIIIe siècle. Pratiques politiques, notabilité et éthique sociale de part et d’autre de la frontière franco-belge (Éditions de l’École des hautes études en sciences sociales: Paris, 1990). Mézières had to wait until the end of the Franco-Prussian War for permission to dismantle its fortifications. 126. Daniel Roche, Le peuple de Paris: Essai sur la culture populaire au XVIIIe siècle (Aubier: Paris, 1981). 127. The Directory eventually resurrected them. See Guy Arbelot, “Les barrières de l’an VII,” Annales economies, sociétés, civilizations, 32 (1975): 745–772. 128. Rochelle Zisken, The Place Vendôme: Architecture and Social Mobility in Eighteenth-Century Paris (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1999). 129. Stephanie Whitlock, “Between Crown and Commerce: Architecture and Urbanism in Eighteenth-Century Bordeaux,” PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 2001. 130. Bardet, Rouen, pp. 157–159. 131. David Garrioch, Neighbourhood and Community in Paris, 1740–1790 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge/New York, 1986). 132. Lanternes d’éclairage public, XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles. Potences d’enseignes et de lanternes du XVe au XIXe siècle (Centre de recherches sur les monuments historiques: Paris, 1986). 133. Bardet, Rouen, pp. 125–127. 134. C. Koslofsky, “Court Culture and Street Lighting in Seventeenth- Century Europe,” Journal of Urban History, 28 (2002): 743–768. 135. Stéphane Van Damme, ed., “Discipliner la ville: L’émergence des savoirs urbains (17e-20e siècle),” Revue d’histoire des sciences humaines, 12 (2005): 3–140; and Alan Williams, “The Police and the Administration of 18th-Century Paris,” Journal of Urban History, 4 (1978): 157–182. 136. E. Pitou, “Jeunesse et désordre social: Les coureurs de nuit à Laval au XVIIIe siècle,” Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 47 (2000): 69–92. 137. Natacha Coquery, L’espace du pouvoir. De la demeure privée à l’édifice public, Paris 1700–1790 (Seli Arslan: Paris, 2000). 138. L. Dufour, et al, Urbanistique et société baroque (Institut d’Études et de Recherches Architecturales et Urbaines: Paris, 1977). 139. Jean-Louis Harouel, L’embellissement des villes. L’urbanisme français au XVIIIe siècle (Picard: Paris, 1993). 140. François-Xavier Emmanuelli, Un mythe de l’absolutisme bourbonien. L’intendance, du milieu du XVIIème siècle à la fin du XVIIIème siècle: France, Espagne, Amérique (H. Champion: Paris, 1981).

No t e s

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141. See the excellent case study by Robert Schneider, The Commercial City: Toulouse Observed, 1738–1780 (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 1994). 142. Bardet, Rouen, pp. 63–64. 143. M. Bonilla, et al., Cartes et plans. Saint-Étienne du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours (École d’Architecture de Saint-Étienne, Saint-Étienne, 1989) offers a case in point. 144. See the classic study by Maurice Garden, Lyon et les lyonnais au XVIIIe siècle (Les Belles-lettres: Paris, 1975); and Daniel Roche, Le peuple de Paris: Essai sur la culture populaire au XVIIIe siècle (Aubier: Paris, 1981). 145. Michael Sonenscher, Work and Wages: Natural Law, Politics, and the EighteenthCentury French Trades (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1989); and Allan Potofsky, “The Construction of Paris and the Crises of the Ancien Régime: the Police and the People of the Parisian Building Sites, 1750–1789,” French Historical Studies, 27 (2004): 9–48. 146. Liliane Hilaire-Pérez, L’invention technique au siècle des Lumières (Albin Michel: Paris, 2000). 147. Robert Carvais, “L’Ancien droit de l’urbanisme et ses composantes constructive et architecturale, socle d’un nouvel ‘ars’ urbain aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles. Jalons pour une histoire totale du droit de l’urbanisme,” Revue d’Histoire des Sciences Humaines, 12/1 (2005): 17–54. 148. Pierre Bodineau, L’urbanisme dans la Bourgogne des Lumières (Université de Bourgogne: Dijon, 1986). 149. Stéphane Van Damme, “The world is too large”: Philosophical Mobility and Urban Space in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Paris,” French Historical Studies, 29/3 (2006): 379–406. 150. Alder, Engineering the Revolution. 151. James Leith, Space and Revolution: Projects for Monuments, Squares, and Public Buildings in France, 1789–1799 (McGill-Queen’s University Press: Montreal, 1991). 152. Louis Bergeron and Marc Roncayolo, “De la ville pré-industrielle à la ville industrielle: essai sur l’historiographie française,” Quaderni Storici (1974): 827–876.

Conclusion 1. Gail Bossenga, The Politics of Privilege: Old Regime and Revolution in Lille (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1991). 2. Roger Tessier, “La démolition des remparts de Rochefort. Première partie (1921–1925),” Roccafortis, third series/n. 28 (2001): 353–363; and idem, “La démolition des remparts de Rochefort (suite) (1925–1971),” Roccafortis, third series/n. 31 (2003): 283–290. 3. P. Rocolle, “La fin des cités guerrières au XIXe siècle dans la France du Nord: Essai de synthèse,” Revue du Nord, 84 (2002): 51–67. 4. John Merriman, The Margins of City: Explorations on the French Urban Frontier, 1815–1851 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1991). 5. Patricia O’Brien, “L’Embastillement de Paris: The Fortification of Paris during the July Monarchy,” French Historical Studies, 9/1 (1975): 63–82. 6. Jean-Louis Cohen and André Lortie, Des fortifs au périf. Paris, les seuils de la ville (Picard Editeur: Paris, 1991). 7. For recent sumptuous examples, see Jean Dutourd, Sentinelles de pierre: forts & citadelles sur les frontières de France (Somogy Éditions d’art: Paris, 1996); and François Dellamagne, Patrimoine militaire (Édition SCALA: Paris, 2002).

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I n de x

Abbeville, 111 Acre, siege of (1191), 28 Adela of Champagne, queen of France, 20 Adélaïde of Savoy, 20 Adour River, 58, 72 Agen and Agenais, 24, 28, 34, 40, 46, 52, 58, 111 Agincourt, battle of (1415), 57–58 Aigues-Mortes, 50 Aiguillon, siege of (1345), 66, 70 Aiguillon, Emmanuel-Armand de Richlieu, duke of, 165 Aineas the Tactician, 68 Aire, 27, 30–31 Aix-en-Provence, 84, 112 Aix-la-Chapelle, treaty of (1668), 147, 153 Aixe, 25 Alaman, Doat d’, 45 Alaman, Sicard d’, 42, 45 Alba, Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, duke of, 86, 88 Albert the Great, 66 Alberti, Leon Battista, 77–78, 118 Albi, 31, 40–42, 110 Albigeois, 41, 45 Albigensian Crusades, 31–32, 38–45, 102, 112 Alençon, 29, 57, 165 Alençon, Charles II, count of, 52 Alès, 130, 133 Grace of (1629), 134 Alfonso VIII, king of Castile, 30 Alps, 76, 81, 151 Alsace, 12–13, 148, 151 Amaury, Arnaud, 32–33 Ambleny, 37 Amboise, 21, 73 Edict of (1563), 103

Ambrières, 22 Amiens, 9, 25, 62, 64, 73–74, 82, 87–88, 98, 102, 104, 125, 174 siege of (1597), 119 Ancenis, 127 Angers, 11, 22–23, 30, 31, 41, 72, 102, 139 Anghiari, Maggi da, 88 Angoulême, 24, 28, 132, 139 Angoulême, Charles de Valois, duke of, 129–130 Angoumois, 24 Anjou, 22, 29–30, 42 Anjou, counts and dukes of, 9, 11, 19 Anjou, Fulk III, count of, 11 Anjou, Fulk, IV, count of, 12 Anjou, Geoffrey II, count of, 11–12 Anjou, Geoffrey III, count of, 12 Anjou, Geoffrey V, count of, 20–22 Anjou, Henri, duke of, see Henri III, king of France Anjou and Maine, John, count of, 39 Anne of Austria, queen of France, 146 Annonay, 111 Antoine de Bourbon, duke of Vendôme and king of Navarre, 86, 102 Antwerp, 145 Aquitaine, 6–7, 14, 20–25, 28–31, 34, 40–42, 45–46, 50, 58, 72, 126, 172 Aragon, kingdom of, 24, 34, 42, 73–74 Archimedes, 77, 91, 116, 118 Ardèche River, 49 Ardennes, 12, 143 Ardres, 82 Argenson, Marie-Pierre de Voyer de Palmy, count of, 165 Argentan, 29 Aristotle and Aristotelianism, 91, 144

252

I n de x

Arles, 3, 14, 84 Armagnac, 24, 45, 102 counts of, 45–46, 69–70 Arnoul, Pierre, 158 Arouille, 70 Arques, 9, 22, 28–29 battle of (1589), 113 Arras, 27, 72, 88, 156 siege of (1414), 69 Arthur I, duke of Brittany, 28 Arthur III, duke of Brittany, 71 Artois, 7, 21, 27, 30–31, 36, 47, 57, 72, 82, 84, 87, 147 Artois, Robert, count of, 39 Asfeld, Claude-François Bidal, marquis d’, 164 Asfeld, Pont d’, 158 Astarac, counts of, 45 Athens, Guy de La Roche, duke of, 36 Atlantic Ocean, 24, 75, 130, 139, 157 Aumale, 28, 29 Aunis, 11, 24–25, 30, 34, 47 Aurillac, 13, 111 Austria and Austrians, 158 Austria, Leopold V, duke of, 28 Autun, 13 Auvergne, 13–14, 20, 23–24, 28, 30, 36, 40, 42, 49 Auvergne, counts of, 13 Auvergne, Guy II, count of, 30 Auxerre, 13 Auxonne, 13, 72–73 Averlino, Pietro Antonio di, see Filarete Avesnes, counts of, 8 Aveyron, 46, 127, 133 Avignon, 14, 34, 40, 49, 84 Avre River, 28 Azay-le-Rideau, 81 Bacheley, Jacques, 170 Bachot, Amboise, 107, 113, 117–119 Bacon, Roger, 66 baillis and bailliages, 20, 23, 27, 35, 44, 60, 62 Bapaume, 27 Bar, counts of, 12 Bar-le-Duc, 117 Bar-sur-Aube, 12, 21, 37 Barcelona, Ramon Berenguer IV, count of, 24

Barrière, 15 Bartoli, Cosimo, 78 Bartolomeo, Fra, 68 Bassompierre, François de, 129 bastides, 37, 42–50, 58, 66, 102, 140–141, 156, 172 Bastille, 69 Baud, Olivier, 70 Baudelaire, Charles, 173 Baugé, 22 Bayard, Pierre Terrail, lord of, 82 Bayeux, 21, 29 Bayonne, 22, 24–25, 30, 82, 88 Bazas, 30, 40 Baziège, battle of (1219), 34 Béarn, 24, 42, 52, 127, 128 Beaucaire, 34, 40, 42, 52, 84 Beauce, 11, 21, 113 Beaufort, 22, 30 Beaulieu, Treaty of (1576), 107 Beaulieu, Sébastien de, 144 Beaumarchais, Eustache de, 42, 44–46 Beaumont-de-Lomagne, 50 Beaumont-sur-Sarthe, viscounts of, 22 Beaune, 72–73, 82 Beauvais, 9, 48, 73 siege of (1472), 73 Beauvaisis, 35 Bedford, John, duke of, 60, 68 Beins, Jean de, 125 Belfort, 153–154 Bélidor, Bernard Forest de, 166 Bellarmato, Girolamo, 84 Belle-Ile, 127 Bellême, 23 Belleville, 111 Belluci, Giovan Battista, 91 Belmont, 127 Benjamin, Walter, 173 Bergamo, 86 Bergamo, Antonio da, 87 Béroalde de Verville, François de, 117 Berry, 7, 11, 23–24, 27, 37, 102, 105, 164 Berry, Jean I, duke of, 61 Bertius, Pierre, 144 Besançon, 13, 153, 155 Besson, Jacques, 116 Bessoneau, Pierre, 72 Béziers, 32–33, 40, 42

I n de x Bigorre, 24, 45 Binche, 8 Biringuccio, Vannoccio, 90 Biron, Charles de Gontaut, duke of, 112 Bitche, 12 Black Death, 42, 61 Blain, 112 Blaise le Loup, 45 Blanche of Castile, queen of France, 40–41 Blandy-les-Tours, 37 Blanquefort, 47 Blois, 11, 21, 58, 99, 102 Blois, counts of, 12, 21 Blois, Louis I, count of, 28 Blois, Odo II, count of, 11 Blondel, François, 150–151, 161 Blondel, Jean-François, 158 Boillot, Joseph, 118 Bologna, 86 Bologna, Anchise da, 82 Bonet de Saint Quentin, 46 Bonmoulins, 21, 23, 28 Bonnegarde, 70 Bordeaux, 15, 20, 24, 30, 34, 40, 45, 49, 51, 58, 60, 62, 71, 88, 102, 132, 146, 155, 167, 168 Bouelles, Charles de, 93 Bouguereau, Maurice, 119 Bouillon, Henri de La Tour, duke of, 117 Boulogne, 23, 30, 32 Boulogne, Matthew of Alsace, count of, 23 Boulogne, Renaud de Dammartin, count of, 30 Boulogne-sur-Mer, 8, 48, 85–86 Edict of (1573), 110 siege of (1542), 86 Bourbonnais, 49, 57, 73 Bourdaisière, Philibert de la, 94 Bourgeois, Jean, 138 Bourges, 11, 20, 23, 37, 40, 65, 98–99, 102–103, 109, 139, 141 Boutavant, 29 Bouvines, battle of (1214), 30–33, 35 Brabant, 7, 21, 47, 48 Brabant, dukes of, 8 Brancaccio, G. C., 88 Bram, siege of (1210), 32

253

Brantôme, Pierre de Bourdeille, lord of, 81 Brescia, 91, 99 Bresse, 84 Bressuire, 138 Brest, 64, 157 Breteuil, 99 Bretigny, treaty of (1360), 62 Briançon, 158 Briare, 140 Canal de, 163 Briatexte, 43 Brissac, 22 Briseteste, Simon de, 43, 45 Britain, see England Brittany, 7, 10, 22, 25, 29–30, 35, 48, 55, 63, 72, 82, 111, 112, 115, 127, 157 Brittany, dukes of, 10, 19, 32, 39, 63, 66, 73 Brittany, Alain II, duke of, 10 Brittany, Charles of Blois, duke of, 63 Brittany, Conan IV, count of, 25 Brittany, Constance, duchess of, 25, 29 Brittany, François II, duke of, 70 Brittany, Geoffrey Plantagenet, duke of, 25, 27 Brittany, Guy de Thouars, duke of, 29–30 Brittany, Jean III, duke of, 63 Brittany, Jean IV of Montfort, duke of, 63–64 Brittany, Pierre de Dreux, duke of, 30, 41, 48 Brouage, 75, 107, 130, 136, 139, 144 Bruges, 8, 31 Brunelleschi, Filippo, 79 Brusquès, 127 Brussels, 8, 47 Buckingham, George Villiers, duke of, 133 Budé, Guillaume, 82 Bullet, Pierre, 161 Buranlure, Antoine de Bar, lord of, 110 Bureau brothers, 72 Burgundy, 13, 27, 48, 58, 62, 72, 84, 102, 105, 111–112, 149, 164, 172, see also Franche-Comté Burgundy, dukes of, 19, 21, 39, 57, 70, 73, 74

254

I n de x

Burgundy, Charles I, duke of, 73 Burgundy, Jean II the Fearless, duke of, 63, 66, 70 Burgundy, Louis of France, duke of, 154, 163 Cabaret, 32, 33 Caen, 10, 21, 29, 37, 60, 67, 72, 82, 111, 128, 167–169 Cahors, 21, 24, 66 Calais, 8, 31, 48, 60, 87, 125, 151, 157 siege of (1346), 48 siege of (1558), 88, 89 Callot, Jacques, 131, 144, 146 Calvi, Giambatista, 86 Calvinists and Calvinism, 87, 94, 97–121, 125–143, 155, 172–173 Cambrai, 8, 86 Campi, Bartolomeo de, 88 Canal du Midi, 157 Canada, 167 Caprari, Gui de, 45 Capua, Antonello da, 82 Carbonne, 46 Carcassonne, 32–33, 40, 42, 49, 52, 171 Carcassonne, Raymond-Robert of Trencavel, viscount of, 32 Carhaix, 10 Carlo, Charles Leber du, 130, 139 Carolingians, 4, 6, 9, 11, 12 Carsan, Guillaume de, 45 Cassini, Jean-Dominique, 162–163 Castelet, siege of (1637), 144 Castellane, 112 castellans, 6–10, 19–20, 23–24, 29, 35–36 Castello, Antonio da, 82, 84, 94 Castelnau, Michel de, 98 Castelnau, Pierre de, 32 Castelnau-de-Montmiral, 45 Castelnaudery, 33–34, 41 Castillon, battle of (1453), 68 Castres, 32, 127, 129 Catalonia, 72 Cataneo, Girolamo, 91 Cateau-Cambrésis, Treaty of (1559), 94, 119 Cathars, see Albigensian Crusades Cerceau, Jacques Androuet du, 92, 143 Cesariano, Cesare, 79

Cévennes, 155 Chablis, 71 Chalons, 82, 85, 112 Châlons-sur-Marne, 12, 36, 48 Châlons-sur-Sâone, 84 Châlus-Chabrol, siege of (1199), 29 Chambord, 82 chambres des comptes, 42, 103, 115 Chamillart, Michel de, 149 Champagne, 6–9, 12, 30, 36, 48–49, 85–86, 88, 94, 102, 110–111, 115, 123, 143, 164 Champagne, counts of, 19–21, 39 Champagne, Eude II, count of, 13 Champagne, Thibaut III, count of, 30 Champagne, Thibaut IV, count of, 30, 41, 48 Champagne, Blanche of Navarre, countess of, 30 Charente River, 25, 41, 47, 132, 136 Charité-sur-Loire, 110 Charles V, emperor, 85–89 Charles I, king of England, 130, 133 Charles III, king of Western Francia, 3 Charles IV, king of France, 52 Charles V, king of France, 62, 64, 66, 69, 72, 74, 161 Charles VI, king of France, 61 Charles VI, king of France, 57, 61 Charles VII, king of France, 57, 60, 68, 71–72, 123 Charles VIII, king of France, 73–76, 81–82 Charles IX, king of France, 103–105, 108 Charleville, 141, 168 Charters, 8, 16, 19–23, 38, 44, 50 Chartres, 11, 21, 103, 113 Chartres and Blois, Thibault II, count of, 11–12, 21 Chartres and Blois, Thibault V, count of, 11, 20 Chastillon, Claude, 125 Château-Thierry, 9, 49 Châteaudun, 11, 21, 37, 167 Châteauneuf, Hugh, lord of, 23 Châteauneuf-sur-Sarthe, 30 Châtellerault, 24 Châtillon, 22 Châtillon-sur-Indre, 28

I n de x Châtillon-sur-Loire, 113 Châtillon-sur-Seine, 27, 112 Chaumont, 82 Chaumont, lords of, 22 Chaumont-en-Bassigny, 12, 86 Chemillé, lords of, 22 Cher River, 138 Cherasco, 8 Cherbourg, 22, 157 China, 66 Chinon, 11–12, 22–23, 30, 35 truce of (1214), 31 Chinon, Robert, 87, 105 Choiseul, Étienne-François, duke of, 166 Chuquet, Nicolas, 92–93 Cicero, 114 citadels, 6, 8–9, 17, 22, 35–38, 47, 63, 69, 72, 86–87, 98, 119, 143–144, 149, 155–158 Clairvaux, 27 Claude de France, 87 Clermont, 13 Clerville, Louis-Nicolas de, 148–149, 157 Clisson, barons of, 10, 64 Cognac, 104 Coissy, 86 Colbert, Charles, lord of Saint-Marc, 148 Colbert, Jean-Baptiste, 139, 148, 151, 157–159, 162–163, 169 Colbert de Terron, Charles, 157 Coligny, Gaspard de, 103–105 Colin, Raphäel, 133 Collioure, 72 Colonna, Fra Egidio, 68 Commequiers, 138 Comminges, lords of, 24, 33–34, 42, 45 Comno, Gioachino, 88 Compagne de l’Inde, 157 Compagnie des Indes Orientales, 157 Compagnie du Sénégal, 157 Compestella, 24 Compiègne, 9, 20, 25, 36–37 Conches, 29 Condé, Henri I de Bourbon, prince of, 105, 113 Condé, Henri II de Bourbon, prince of, 127–129, 133, 138

255

Condé, Louis I de Bourbon, prince of, 102 Condé, Louis II de Bourbon, prince of, 149 Condillac, Étienne, 169 Condom, 102 Conquéril, battle of (996), 11 Conrad of Montferrat, 28 Conty d’Argencour, Pierre de, 143–144 Corbeil, 20, 36, 113 Corbie, 9, 25, 87 Cordes, 41, 45, 50, 52 Cormontaigne, Louis de, 153, 158, 166 Cosne-sur-Loire, 13 Coucy, Enguerrand de, 20 Coulommiers, 30 Cousin, Jean, 93 Coutrai, 47, 63, 72 battle of (1302), 46, 51 Craon, lords of, 22 Crécy, battle of (1346), 57–58 Cremieu, edit of (1563), 103 Cremona, 88 Créon, Alméric de, 46 Crépy-en-Valois, 9, 25 Croquants, 100 Crusade Second, 20 Third, 27 Cusset, 13, 73 Cyriaque de Mangin, Clément, see Pierre Hérigone Damme, 8, 31 Dauphiné, 84, 100–102, 110, 112, 114, 123 Dax, 24–25, 139 Delacroix, Jacques-Vincent, 167 Derby, Henry of Lancaster, duke of, 58 Desargues, Gérard, 142, 150 Descartes, René, 142, 145 Deûle River, 163 Deux-Mers, Canal de, 163 Dézallier d’Argenville, Antoine-Nicolas, 167 Dieppe, 9, 28, 84 siege of (1443), 68 Digne, 14, 114 Dijon, 13, 72–73, 82, 111 Dinan, 10, 64, 70, 112

256

I n de x

Dinant, 8 Dol, 35 Dole, 63, 87, 153 Donchéry, 12 Dordogne River, 14, 33, 46, 50 Douai, 8, 27, 31, 48, 51, 69–70, 164 Doullens, 82 Dourdan, 37 Dover, siege of (1215), 31 Dreux, battle of (1562), 99 Drincourt, 28–29 Du Bellay, Jean, 84 Du Bellay, Guillaume, 85 Du Bellay, Martin, 86 Dubreuil, Jean, 150 Dun-le-Roi, 37 Dunkirk, 151, 157, 164 Dupain de Montesson, Louis-Charles, 166 Duprat, Antoine, 87 Dupuy, Philippe, 141 Durance River, 158 Dürer, Albrecht, 90 Durtal, 11 Dutch, see Low Countries Ebbes de Roucy, 20 Écluse, 63 École Polytechnique, 165 École des Ponts-et-Chaussées, 162, 165 École Royale de Génie de Mézières, 165 Edward I, king of England, 46, 49, 51 Edward II, king of England, 52 Edward III, king of England, 52, 58, 60 Edward, the Black Prince of Wales, 62 Effiat, Antoine Ruzé d’, 131 Eleanor of Aquitaine, 20–23, 25, 30 England and English, 6, 9, 22, 31, 39, 41, 86, 102, 117, 130, 133, 157, 172 Entragues, François de Balzac, marquis of, 108 Entre-deux-Mers, 24 Épernay, 156 Épernon, Jean Louis de Nogaret de la Valette, duke of, 112, 127–128, 130, 133 Epte River, 28 Erdre River, 48

Errard, Jean, 92, 117–119, 123, 142–144, 154, 163, 166 Étampes, 20, 35, 37 Estates-General, 51, 58, 63, 71, 110, 125 Eu, 29 Eu, John de Hastings d’, 46 Euclid, and Euclidean geometry, 77, 80, 90–93, 116, 118, 143, 150 Eure River, 28 Evreux, 28, 57 Fabert, Abraham, 143 Fabre, Jean, 143 Falaise, 10, 21, 29, 37 Fallois, Joseph de, 166 Fécamp, 9 Fer, Nicolas de, 153–154 Fezenac, 24 Fiamma, Galvano, 80 Fieschi, Paolo Emilio, 107 Filarete, 77, 79–80, 118 Finé, Oronce, 93 Finistière, 10 Fiorentino, Rosso, 92 Flamand, Claude, 92, 117 Flanders, 7–9, 14–15, 25, 30, 35, 47–51, 58, 70, 72, 82, 87, 138, 147, 148 Flanders, counts of, 8, 19–21, 39, 57, 172 Flanders, Charles I, count of, 20 Flanders, Ferrand of Portugal, count of, 30–31 Flanders, Philip of Alsace, count of, 8, 25–26, 28 Flanders, Thierry I of Alsace, count of, 8, 23 Florence, 81, 88 Foix, 139 Foix, counts of, 32–34, 41–42, 45, 52 Foix, Gaston III, count of, 58 Foix, Roger IV, count of, 46 Fontenay-le-Comte, 104, 138 Forez, 99 Formigny, battle of (1450), 68 Fortin, Pierre, lord of La Hoguette, 145 Fosse-la-Ville, 8 Fougères, 10 Fougeu, Jacques, 125 Fouquet, Nicolas, 162 Francesca, Piero della, 80

I n de x Franche-Comté, 72, 82, 147–148, 151, 153, 164 Francia, 7, 16 François I, king of France, 76, 82, 85–86, 94, 115 Franks, 3 French Revolution, 147, 168, 170 Frescobaldi, 93 Fréteval, 21 Froissart, Jean, 57 Fronde, 137–138, 143, 145, 147, 149 Frontinus, 68, 77, 85 Fumée, Jacques de, 119 Fusto, Jacopo, 88 Gabriel, Jacques, 167 Gaillard, 28–29, 36, 47 Galileo Galilei, 144 Galliani, Orfeo da, 117 Gallo-Roman fortifications, 3–15, 37, 40, 48–49, 65, 71, 89 Garonne River, 24, 46, 163 Gascony, 6, 20, 24–25, 40–41, 45–46, 49–52, 58, 60, 62, 69, 99 Gémil, 46 Genoa, 87, 107 Germany, see Holy Roman Empire Gers, 42 Ghent, 8, 14, 31, 47, 86, 164 Gimont, 44 Giocondo, Fra Giovanni, 79, 82 Giorgio, Francesco di, 80, 82 Gironde River, 30, 58, 72 Gisors, 9, 15, 28 Givet, 12, 151 Godefoy, Jean de, 133 Gontaud, 112 Gorron, 22 Gournay, 29 Gournay, Hugh, lord of, 23 Goutte, Daniel de la, 134 Graçay, 27–28 Graily, Jean de, 46 Granvelle, Antoine Perronet de, 87 Gravelines, 8, 157 siege of (1558), 88 Grenoble, 112 Gribeauval, Jean-Baptiste Vaquette de, 166 Guibert, J.-A.-H. de, 166

257

Guingamp, 127 Guiot of Provins, 35 Guise, 82 Guise, dukes of, 86, 103, 110–111 Guise, Antoine I, duke of, 86 Guise, Charles I, duke of, 129–130 Guise, François, duke of, 87–89, 102 Guistiniani, Greghetto, 107 Guiton, Jean, 129, 133, 136 Guy de Dampierre, 30 Guyenne, 24, 30, 51, 52, 58, 66, 72, 82, 105, 111, 137 Hainault, 7, 8, 21, 47, 82, 144 Hainault, counts of, 8 Hainault, Baudouin IV, count of, 8 Haiti, 167 Ham, siege of (1411), 66 Hapsburgs, 75, 81, 82, 86, 119, 123, 142, 146, 163, 172 Harelle Revolt (1382), 61 Harfleur, siege of (1415), 67 Haurs, 157 Havre-de-Grâce, see Le Havre Haynin, Jean de, 73 Hennebont, 127 Henri II, king of France, 85, 87, 88, 94, 95, 140 Henri III, king of France, 88, 105, 107, 110, 113 Henri IV, king of France, 97, 105, 108, 111, 113–115, 118–120, 123–126, 140–142, 157, 163 Henri d’Albret, king of Navarre, 87, 105 Henrichemont, 141 Henrion, Denis, see Pierre Hérigone Henry I, king of England, 20 Henry II, king of England, 9, 10, 21–27, 35 Henry III, king of England, 31, 41, 42, 45, 46 Henry V, king of England, 58, 60, 67 Henry VIII, king of England, 85 Henry Plantagenet, the Young King, 25 Hérigone, Pierre, 143 Hesdin, 87 siege of (1640), 144 Holy Land, 6, 14, 27, 28 Holy League, 97, 100, 110–115

258

I n de x

Holy Roman Empire, 12, 14, 21, 42, 117, 153 Honfleur, 111 Honorius III, pope, 34 Houdan, 15, 37 Hugh Capet, King, 6 Huguenots, see Calvinists Hurepel, Philippe, 30 Huy, 8 Ile-de-France, 7, 9, 19, 20, 22, 27, 32, 36, 94, 125 Ile-d’Oléron, 24, 158 Ile-de-Ré, 129, 130, 138, 158 Innocent III, pope, 31, 32, 33 intendants, 125, 136, 138, 142, 145–149, 154–155, 158, 163, 164, 169 Isabella of Hainault, 20 Isle-Jourdain, Jordan IV, lord of, 42 Issoudun, 27, 28 Italy, 66, 77, 79, 80, 81, 85, 90, 153, 172 Ivry, battle of (1590), 113 Jacquerie, 62 Jametz, 112 Janville, 11 Jarnac, battle of (1569), 103 Jeanne d’Albret, queen of Navarre, 105 Jeanne d’Arc, 68, 70 Jegon, 113 Jesuits, 116, 145, 149 Johanneau, André, 109, 110 John I, king of England, 23–31 John II, king of France, 58, 60 Joinville, Robert de, 13 Josselin, 10 Jousse, Mathurin, 143 Joyeuse, Henri, duke of, 112, 113 Julius Caesar, 3, 8, 77, 114 July Monarchy, 173 L’Aigle, 28 La Charité, 104 La Châtre, Claude, marquis of, 98, 109–111 La Creuse River, 14 La Fontaine, Jean de, 141 La Force, Nompar de Caumont, Henri, duke of, 129

La Garnache, 112 La Grossetière, Charles Vernier, 136 La Guerche, 14 La Haute-Deûle, Canal de, 163 La Marche, 24 La Motte d’Argencourt, Pierre de Conti, lord of, 139 La Réole, 30, 40, 52, 111 La Roche, Étienne de, 92 La Roche-au-Moine, siege of (1214), 31 La Roche d’Abeille, battle of (1569), 104 La Roche Goyon, 10 La Roche-Guyon, 36 La Roche-sur-Yon, 138 La Rochelle, 11, 22, 24, 25, 30, 40, 62–63, 82, 87–88, 94, 100–104, 108, 112, 125–130, 138–140, 157, 158 siege of (1562), 102 siege of (1572–1573), 99, 104–108, 113 siege of (1627–1628), 97, 123, 131–137, 142, 143, 173 La Tuilerie, Garpard Cougnet, lord of, 136 Lacaune, 127 Lacy, Roger de, 29 Lagny, 12, 21, 30 Lalinde, Jean, 46 Lamballe, 127 Lambeth, Treaty of (1215), 31 Landau, 154 Landes, 70, 102 Landrecies, 8 siege of (1542), 85 siege of (1637), 144 Landreville, Pierre de, 45 Langeais, 11, 15, 22 Langon, 40 Langres, 12, 13, 82, 151 Languedoc, 42, 44, 49, 51, 52, 58, 62, 69, 88, 94, 109, 111, 113, 115, 131, 138, 142 Lanteri, Giacomo, 91 Laon, 20, 35, 36–37, 73, 84 siege of (1594), 115, 123 Lastours-Cabaret, 32 Lauzerte, 45 Laval, lords of, 22, 64 Lavaur, 31, 33, 41

I n de x Layrac, 126 Le Clerc, Sébastien, 150 Le Fousseret, 46 Le Havre, 82, 84, 115, 144, 157 siege of (1563), 102, 141 Le Mans, 3, 11, 23, 27, 30, 102 Le Marche, 86 Le Meingre, Jean, 72 Le Muet, Pierre, 143 Le Nôtre, André, 162 Le Peletier de Souzy, Michel, 149 Le Puy, 14 Le Puy de Castillon, 25 Le Quesnoy, 8 Le Rouge, Georges-Louis, 167 Le Roy, Jacques, lord of La Grange, 117 Le Tellier, François-Michel, marquis of Louvois, 148, 149, 151, 153, 155, 163, 173 Le Tellier, Louis-François Marie, marquis of Barbezieux, 149 Le Tellier, Michel, 145, 148, 155, 163 Le Vau, Louis, 157, 162 Ledoux, Claude-Nicolas, 168 Leibniz, Gottfried, 150 Leiden, 93 Lemercier, Jacques, 141 Lemercier, Nicolas, 141 Lemercier, Pierre, 141 Léry, Jean de, 109, 114 Les Andeleys, 28 Lesdiguières, François de Bonne, duke of, 114 Leyburn, Robert de, 46 Libourne, 50 Liège, 8, 99 bishop-count of, 8 Lille, 8, 47, 65, 70, 72, 149, 156, 157, 164, 171 Limoges, 24, 29, 111 siege of (1183), 27 viscounts of, 24 Limoges, Aimar V, viscount of, 25 Limousin, 24, 42, 103, 111 Lincoln, battle of, 21 Lindsey, Robert Bertie, lord of, 134 Lion-la-Forêt, 29 Lisieux, 21, 29, 64, 71, 73 Lisle d’Albigeois, 110 Livy, 77

259

Locatelli, Vincenzo, engineer, 88 Loches, 11, 12, 15, 22, 28, 30, 139 Lodi, 80 Loire River, 6–7, 10–14, 20–42, 48, 70, 94, 102, 108, 109, 111, 140 Lombardy, 88 Lombers, 32 Longjumeau, Peace of (1569), 103 Lopez, Ramio, engieneer, 81 Lorgues, 14 Lorient, 157 Lorini, Bonaiuto, 79, 118 Lorraine, 12, 13, 71, 73, 82, 87, 99, 112, 117, 125, 139, 140, 143, 146, 153, 158, 172 Lorraine, Charles III, duke of, 87, 117, 140 Lorris, 20 Lot River, 46, 50 Lotharingia, 12 Loudun, 12, 22, 23, 138 Treaty of (1616), 127 Louis VI, king of France, 13, 19–20, 39 Louis VII, king of France, 19–25 Louis VIII, king of France, 30–34, 37, 39, 40, 49 Louis IX, king of France, 39–42, 49, 50 Louis X, king of France, 61 Louis XI, king of France, 71–74, 123 Louis XIII, king of France, 125–135, 139–146, 158, 173 Louis XIV, king of France, 137, 139–142, 146–161, 173 Louisiana, 167 Lourdes, 139 Louvain, 8, 145 Louvet de Couvray, Jean-Baptiste, 167 Louvois, see François-Michel Le Tellier Louvre, 37 Low Countries, 58, 66, 69, 73, 79, 81, 86, 91, 93, 114, 119, 142, 147, 162–164, 172 Lubret, Jourdain de, 45 Lucca, 81 Lusignan, 138 Lusignan, Hugh IX, lord of, 34 Lusignan, Hugh X, lord of, 40–41 Lusignan, lords of, 24, 29 Luynes, Charles, duke of, 128, 129

260

I n de x

Lyon, 73, 75, 82, 92, 99–102, 112, 115, 167 Lyonnais, 88 Luxembourg, 86, 87, 153 Maastricht, siege of (1579), 88 Machecoul, 127 Machiavelli, Nicolò, 72, 81 Mâcon, 13, 110 Mâcon, Guillaume II, count of, 13 Madrid, 82 Maggi, Girolamo, 88 Maginot Line, 171 Maguelone, 138 Maillezais, 138 Maillotin Revolt (1382), 61 Maine, 10, 12, 21–22, 27, 29–30, 42 Majorica, kingdom of, 14, 49 Malines, 8 Manesson-Mallet, Alain, 153, 155 Mansard, Jules Hardouin, 167 Mantes, 20, 36 Marcel, Étienne, 58 Maretz, Jacques, 144 Marguerite de Valois, 111 Mariembourg, 87 Marini, Camillo, 87, 89 Marini, Gieronimo, 87 Marini, Girolamo, 84–87 Marmande, 34, 40 Marne River, 36, 85 Marolais, Samuel, 142 Marseille, 14, 34, 40, 82, 84, 102, 112, 155, 157–158, 167 Martain, county of, 21 Martilleur, François, 125 Martin, Louis, 137 Martinengue, François, count of, 108 Marivaux, Pierre de, 167 Marziac, Guichard de, 45 Masse, Claude, 162 Matilda, queen of England, 20 Mauhurgeon, Jean de, 70 Mayenne lords of, 22 Mayenne, Charles of Lorraine, duke of, 111–112 Mayenne, Henri of Lorraine, duke of, 128–129 Mayenne, Juhel I, lord of, 30

Mazarin, Jules, cardinal, 138, 146 Meaux, 21, 30, 102, 115 Médici, Catherine de, 95, 103 Medici, Gian Giacomo de’, 117 Médici, Marie de, 125, 127, 128 Mediterranean Sea, 6, 14, 50, 151, 157–158, 163 Mellone, Antonio, 85 Melun, 36–37, 113, 117 Melun, Adam II de Chailly, viscount of, 37 Mende, 14 Ménérbes, siege of (1574–1575), 110 Méran, Agnès de, 30 Mercier, Louis-Sébastien, 147, 167 Mercoeur, Philippe-Emmanuel of Lorraine, duke of, 111–112 Merovingians, 12 Mersenne, Merin, 144 Métézeau, Claude, 132, 141 Métézeau, Louis, 141 Metz, 12, 87, 89, 143, 153, 158 Metz, Gerald I, count of, 12 Meung, Jean de, 47 Meung-sur-Loire, 11 Meuse River, 7–8, 12, 86, 141, 144, 156 Meynier, Honorat de, 142 Mézières, 12, 82, 86, 141, 168 siege of (1521), 82 Michelangelo, 80 Midi, 7, 13, 42, 102, 111, 128 Canal du, 163 Milan, 80, 86, 88, 99 Military Revolution, 142 Militias, 16, 35, 44, 127, 155 Millau, 129, 133 Milliet, Claude-François Deschales, 149 Minerve, 33 Mirabel, 133 Mirebeau, 23, 29 Modena, 84, 88 Moissac, 13 Monclar d’Agenais, 44 Monluc, Blaise de, 84, 85, 102, 108 Mons, 8, 88 Montalembert, Marc-René de, 166 Montargis, 37, 140 siege of (1427), 68 Montaigu, 112, 138 Montaigut, Guillaume de, 46

I n de x Montauban, 14, 21, 45, 98, 104, 109, 112, 126, 128, 130, 137–138, 141, 164 siege of (1562), 108 siege of (1621), 129 Montbazon, 22 Montcontour, battle of (1569), 104 Montcuq, 1 Montdidier, 25 Montech, 130 Montereau, 113 Montferrand, 13 Montflanquin, 138 Montfort, Amaury II, lord of, 15 Montfort, Amaury VI, lord of, 34 Montmorency, Anne, duke of, 84, 88–89, 102–103 Montmorency, Henri de Damville, duke of, 111 Montmorency, Henri II, duke of, 133, 137–138 Montpellier, 14, 16, 33, 42, 126, 138 siege of (1621), 128–129 Treaty of (1621), 129 Montpensier, François de Bourbon, duke of, 111 Montpézat, 51–52 Mont-Saint-Michel, 29, 68 Montlhéry, 20 siege of (1465), 73 Montréal, 32, 34, 138 Montreuil-Bellay, 11 Montreuil-Bellay, Gerald Berlay, lord of, 22 Montreuil-en-Gâtine, 41 Montreuil-sur-Mer, 37, 48, 82, 84, 174 Montségur, 40–41 Morbihan, 10 Mortain, Robert of Sées, lord of, 29 Mortemer, 29 Moulins, 28 Edict of (1565), 103 Moulins-la-Marche, 21, 23 Mouzon, 86 Mure, 112 Muret, 33 Najac, 44 Namur, 8, 47 Namur, Philip I, marquis of, 30

261

Nançay, 110 Nancy, 12, 71, 73, 86–87, 112, 140, 153 Nantes, 10, 23, 25, 48, 64, 70, 102–104, 111–112, 128, 130, 167–168 Edict of (1598), 119, 125, 127, 129, 172 Revocation (1685), 148 Nantes, Geoffrey of Anjou, count of, 23 Nantes, Hoël, count of, 23 Naples, 85, 90 Napoléon Bonaparte, 162, 173 Napoléon, Louis, 162 Napoli, Fabrizio Ceciliano da, 82 Narbonne, 14, 33, 82 Naudé, Gabriel, 145 Navarre, kingdom of, 62, 88 Navarre, Henri de, see Henri IV, king of France Navarrenx, siege of (1569), 104 Navarrins, 75 Nemours, Charles-Emmanuel of Savoy, duke of, 112 Netherlands, see Low Countries Neuf-Brisach, 153–154, 167 Neufmarché-sur-Epte, 23 Neustria, 6 Nevers, 58, 108 Nevers, counts of, 13, 27, 32 Never, Charles de Gonzague, count of Rethel and duke of, 141 Nevers, Louis de Gonzague, duke of, 112 Newton, Isaac, 150 Nicholas V, pope, 80 Nicolay, Nicolai de, 119 Nieuw-Port, see Gravelines Nijmegen, Peace of (1678), 147, 151 Nîmes, 3, 14, 40, 49, 97–98, 109, 126, 129–130, 133–134, 137, 168 Michelade massacre (1567), 100 siege of (1573), 104 Niort, 22, 24, 40, 42, 104, 131–132, 138–139 Nivelles, 8 Noirot, Sébastien, 112 Nominoë, Breton chief, 10 Nonette, 20, 30

262

I n de x

Normandy, 6–10, 19–23, 28–30, 35–36, 42, 48, 60, 64, 67, 70, 72, 82, 88, 94, 102, 105, 110–111, 125, 128 Normandy, dukes of, 9, 10, 172 Normandy, Guillaume le Bâtard, duke of, 10 Normandy, Robert I, duke of, 11 Normandy, Robert II, duke of, 10 Normans, 4, 6 Noue, François de la, 98, 106–107, 116 Nouveau, Hiérosme de, 163 Novarro, Pedro, 76 Novilla, Thome de, 45 Noyers, Mile de, 52 Noyon, 3, 48 Nupieds, 100 Occitania, 14–15, 31, 33–34, 37–38, 40–43, 172 Odruik, siege of (1377), 66 Oléron, 30, 40 Olonne, 129 oppida, see fortifications, Gallo-Roman Orbay, François d’, 162 Orbieu River, 32 Origny, Pierre d’, 116 Orléans, 11, 20, 35, 65, 98, 100, 103, 109, 113, 115 Canal d’, 163 siege of (1428–29), 68, 70 siege of (1562), 102 Orléans, Gaston, duke of, 131 Orléans, Philippe, duke of, 165 Orme, Philibert de l’, 92, 143 Ormesson, François, 165 Orologio, Giacomo, 88 Orry, Jean, 162, 164 Orville, Constant d’, 167 Otto of Brunswick, emperor, 31 Ottomans, 79 Ozanam, Jacques, 150 Pacioli, Luca, 93 Paciotto, Francesco, 88 Padova, Bathazare da, 87 Padua, 82 Pagan, Blaise de, 145 Palissy, Bernard, 119 Palmanova, 79, 142 Pamiers, 133

Pardiac, counts of, 45, 46 Paris, 9, 19–20, 23, 35–37, 41, 48, 58, 61–62, 69, 72, 82, 84–86, 94, 97, 100–104, 107, 110, 113, 115–117, 123, 140–141, 146, 159, 161–170, 173 Assembly of Notables (1626–1627), 139 treaty of (1229), 40 treaty of (1259), 42, 46 parlement, 42, 46, 52, 60, 100, 110, 111, 125 Parma, siege of (1509), 82 Parma, Alessandro Farnese, duke of, 113–114 Parthenay, 22, 71, 73, 81, 102, 138 Pas-de-Calais, 35 Pascal, Blaise, 164, 168 Pasino, Marco Aurelio da, 88 Patte, Pierre, 167 Pau, 128 Pavia, 80 battle of (1525), 82 Pedro II, king of Aragon, 32–33 Pélerin, Jean, 90, 92 Peletier, Jacques, 93 Pellevé, Jacques de, 112 Pellizzuoli, Donato Buono de’, 86 Pène, Charles de, 153 Pennacchi, Girolamo, 86 Penne d’Agenais, 41, 45 Penthièvre, counts and duke of, 48, 63, 127 Penthièvre, Marie de Luxembourg, duchess of, 112 Perche, Geoffrey III, count of, 28 Perche, Rotrou III, count of, 21 Perche, Rotrou IV, count of, 23 Périgueux, 14, 24, 58 Périgord, 14, 24, 27, 42, 45, 52, 58, 113 Périgord, counts of, 24 Péronne, 25, 37, 84, 87, 144 League of, 110 Perpignan, 49, 72–73, 86, 87 siege of (1542), 84 Perrault, Claude, 150 Perret de Chambéry, Jacques, 118 Perronet, Jean-Rodolphe, 165 Peruzzi, Baldassar, 88 Peruzzi, Sallustio, 88

I n de x Pesaro, 92 Pescara, 85 Peyrusse, 41 Philip II, king of France, 20, 25–39, 48, 172 Philip III, king of France, 45–46, 49 Philip IV, king of France, 45–47, 49, 51, 68 Philip VI, king of France, 52, 58, 64, 67 Philip II, king of Spain, 86, 94, 119 Philip of Swabia, German emperor, 31 Philippebourg, 87 Physiocrats, 167, 169 Picard, Jean, 162 Picardy, 6–9, 25, 27, 30, 37, 82, 84, 86–88, 94, 102, 105, 110–111, 123, 144 Piedmont, 82, 84–85, 144, 158 Pinerolo, 84–85, 153 Pisa, 81 Pisan, Christine de, 57, 67 places de sûreté, 104, 110, 120, 127, 138, 141 Plato, 77 Plessis-Besançon, Bernard du, 132–133 Pliny the Elder, 77 Pluvinel, Antoine de, 116 Po River, 80 Poissy, 20 Poitiers, 3, 12, 14, 24, 48, 62, 131, 132 battle of (1356), 57, 58 siege of (1569), 104 Poitou, 10, 14, 20–25, 29–33, 36, 42, 47–48, 73, 111–112, 127–128, 138, 141 Poitou, barons of, 12, 22, 25, 27, 34, 40 Polignac, viscount of, 20 Politiques, 111 Pontchartrain, Phélypeaux, Louis, count of, 149 Pons, 25 Pont-de-Cé, battle of (1620), 128 Pont-de-l’Arche, 37, 114 Pontaymery, Alexandre de, 116 Ponthieu, 58, 125 Pontoise, 115 siege of (1441), 68 Pouancé, 72 prévôts, and prévôtés, 16, 20, 23, 27, 35 Primaticci, Francesco, 92 Principiano, Ambrosio, 87

263

Priorat, Jean, 47 Provence, 7, 14, 33–34, 42, 49, 62, 82, 84, 88, 94, 100–102, 112, 123 Provence, Charles of Anjou, count of, 42 Provins, 12, 21, 30, 37, 49 Puigcerdà, 72 Pujols, 45 Puymirol, 45, 52 Pyrenees, 14, 22, 24, 34, 42, 45, 75, 82, 87, 102, 104, 112, 128, 138, 151, 172 Treaty of (1659), 119, 143, 146, 156 Pythagoras, 77 Quercy, 24, 28, 41–42, 45–46 Quertinbeaux, 32 Rabelais, François, 85 Ramelli, Agostino, 88, 107, 113, 117 Rance River, 10 Rancon, lords of, 24, 25 Rancon, Geoffrey III, lord of, 25 Rancon, Geoffrey IV, lord of, 34, 41 Ratisbon, Truce of (1684), 147 Ravenna, battle of (1512), 76 Ravenna, Benedeto da, 86 Regency, 164–165 Rennes, 10, 48, 63, 70, 125, 167 Rennes, Conan, count of, 11 Restif de la Bretonne, Nicolas, 167 Rethel, 12, 128 Retz, Henri, duke of, 127 Rheims, 12, 36, 62, 73 Rhine River, 7, 12–13, 81, 147, 153 Rhône River, 13, 20, 34, 40, 49, 111, 151 Ribemont, 25, 37 Richard I, king of England, 23–24, 27–29, 35–36 Richelieu, 141 Richelieu, Armand-Jean du Plessis, cardinal, 84, 130–146, 161, 173 Richemond, 25 Richier de l’Aigle, 23 Rieux, lords of, 64, 70 Riquet, Pierre-Paul, 163 Riom, 14, 30 Rivault de Flurance, David, 119 Rochefort, 128, 136, 139, 157, 171 Roches, Guillaume des, 29–30 Rocroi, 87, 112

264

I n de x

Rodez, 14 Rohan, lords of, 64 Rohan, Henri II, duke of, 125, 127–130, 133 Romans, 110 Rome, 80, 145, 162 Rondeboeuf, Geoffrey de, 46 Rouen, 10, 23, 28–29, 35, 48, 58, 60, 64, 70, 82, 102, 104, 111, 115, 159, 162, 169 siege of (1418–19), 67–68 siege of (1446), 61 siege of (1562), 102 siege of (1592), 114 Rouergue, 24, 41–42, 45, 112 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 167 Roussillon, 72–73 Royan, 40 Ryswick, Treaty of (1697), 147 Saint-Affrique, 127, 133 Saint-Amand-Montrond, 138 Saint-Antonin, 129 Saint-Aubin-du-Cormier, 74 St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacres (1572), 100, 104, 108–109 Sainte-Colombe, 52 Saint-Cosme, abbey of, 71 Saint-Denis, battle of (1568), 103 Saint-Dizier siege of (1544), 85, 86 Saint-Émilion, 25, 30, 40 Saint-Étienne, 99 Saint-Flour, 14 Saint-Foy-la-Grande, 70 Saint-Germain, Peace of (1570), 104 Sainte-Gilles-Croix-de-Vie, 138 Saint-Gobain, 47 Saint-Hilaire-de-Riez, battle of (1622), 130 Saint-Jean d’Angély, 25, 40, 41, 103, 104 siege of (1621), 128 Saint-Jean-Pied-de-Portis, 144 Saint-Macaire, 40 Saint-Maixent, 104, 138 Saint-Malo, 40, 49, 64, 111, 157 Saint-Martin, Vauzy de, 73 Saint-Médard, 20 Saint-Menhoult, 86 Saint-Omer, 27, 30, 31, 48, 67

Saint-Paul-de-Vence, 82 Saint-Pierre, 25 Saint-Pierre, Charles Irénée Castel, abbot of, 169 St-Pol, 84 counts of, 32 Saint-Quentin, 25, 62, 82, 84 battle of (1557), 88–89 Saint-Rémy, Jean de, 87 Saint-Sardos, 46, 51 Saint-Satur, 109 Saint-Sauveur, siege of (1375), 66 Saint-Simon, Claude de Rouvroy, lord of, 136–137 Saintes, 24–25, 40, 41, 52, 132, 138 Saintonge, 11, 12, 24–25, 30, 34, 42, 47, 58, 103–104, 112, 127 Salses, 81 San Marino, Gian-Battista da, 85 Sancerre, 21, 104 counts of, 27 siege of (1572–1573), 108–110, 114 Sancerre, Jean V de Bueil, count of, 61, 68 Sancho VI, king of Navarre, 27 Sangallo, Antonio da, 77, 81 Sangallo, Giuliano, 81 Sarrazin, Jean, 138 Sasso, 85 Saulx-Tavannes, Jean de, 116 Saumur, 12, 22, 24, 30, 139 Assembly of (1611), 125 Savaric of Mauléon, lord of Talmont, 34 Savigliano, 85 Savoit, Louis, 143 Savorgnano, Germanico, 85 Savorgnano, Mario, 85 Savoy, duchy of, 42, 82, 118, 144, 149, 172 Savoy, Emmanuel Philibert, duke of, 88 Scala, Giantomaso, 88 Scamozzi, Vincenzo, 142 Scarpe River, 164 Scheldt, River, 4, 7 Scotland and Scots, 22, 46, 60 Sedan, 88 Seghizzi, Jacomo, 88 Seine River, 4, 7, 23, 28–29, 35, 36, 70, 103, 111, 132, 140–141

I n de x Semens, 111 seneschals (sénéchaux), 21, 22, 25, 40, 42, 45–46, 52, 60, 136 Sens, 20, 35, 62 Serbelloni, Gabrio, 86 Séré de Rivières, Raymond-Adolphe, 171 Sérigny, 131 Serlio, Sebastiano, 80 Serpelloni, Gabrio, 88 Servien, Abel, 142 Setara, Giorgio, 86 Sète, 157 Sèvre River, 131 Seyssel, Claude de, 75 Sforzinda, 79, 118 Siena, 80, 81, 84 Silvanès, 127 Simon IV, lord of Montfort, 31–34, 37, 40, 43 Sisteron, 14, 102 Sixtus V, pope, 162 Soissons, 9 Soissons, Louis de Bourbon, count of, 130 Somme River, 7, 36, 119 Soubise, Benjamin de Rohan, duke of, 127, 130, 133, 138 Spain, 25, 66, 87, 119, 132, 145 Specklin, Daniel, 108 Stenay, 86, 151 Stephen of Blois, king of England, 20, 21 Stevin, Simon, 93, 142 Strasbourg, 13, 108, 153 Strozzi, Piero, 89 Suberville, Henri de, 118 Sublet de Noyers, François, 142 suburbs, 6, 38, 65, 66, 156, 159, 167, 170, 173 Suger, Abbot, 19 Sully, Maximilien de Béthune, duke of, 116, 119, 123, 127, 138, 141 Sulpicius, Giovanni, 78 Surdespine, 32 Surgères, 128 Sweden, 142 Taccola, Mariano, 80 Tacitus, 114 Tacquet, André, 145

265

Taillebourg, 24, 25 battle of (1241), 41 Taillefer, counts of Angoulême, 24 Talmont, 138–139 Tarascon, 84 Targoni, Pompée, 128, 132 Tarn River, 21, 46, 108 Tartaglia, Nicolò, 85, 91, 92 taxes, 16, 23, 52, 58, 60–61, 64, 65, 72, 94, 114, 126, 145, 156 Termes, 33 Thanay, Lucas de, 46 Thérouanne, 82, 87 Thiérache, 35, 58, 99, 139 Thionville, 12, 158 battle of (1557), 89 Thiriot, Jean, 132 Thirty Years’ War, 137–145 Thomas de Marle, 20 Thou, Jacques-Auguste de, 114 Thouars, 14, 24, 138 Thouars, viscounts of, 24 Tiffauges, 138 Tillières, 28 Toiras, Jean de Saint-Bonnet, lord of, 130 Tonay-Charente, 128 Toueiles, 43 Toul, 87 Toulon, 112, 157 Toulouse, 14, 20–21, 24, 33, 40, 51, 82, 102, 111, 113 siege of (1217), 34 Toulouse, counts of, 14, 19, 21, 24, 39 Toulouse, Alphonse of Jourdain, count of, 21, 45 Toulouse, Alphonse of Poitiers, count of, 39–46, 49 Toulouse, Raymond V, count of, 20, 24, 28, 45 Toulouse, Raymond VI, count of, 28, 31, 33 Toulouse, Raymond VII, count of, 34, 40–42, 45–46 Toulouse, Jeanne, countess of, 40–42, 49 Toulouse, county of, 14, 31, 40–42, 45–46, 49, 52 Touraine, 12, 14, 22, 28–30, 113, 128, 141 Tournai, 4, 47, 51, 53

266

I n de x

Tournoël, 30 Tournon, 45 Tour-Régine, 32 Tours, 12, 21–22, 24, 28, 48, 65, 99, 102, 139 Treille, Jean de la, 92 Trémoïlle, Henri III, duke of La, 130 Trencavels, viscounts of Béziers, 14, 24, 40 Trésaguet, Pierre-Marie-Jérôme, 164 Treviso, 82, 84, 86 Trie, Jean de, 45 Troyes, 12, 21, 37, 48, 82, 85, 115, 139 Trudaine, Charles Daniel, 164–165 Tuchin Revolt (1382), 61 Turenne, Raymond, viscount of, 62 Turgot, Anne-Robert Jacques, 165, 170 Turin, 85 Urbino, 84, 88, 90 Urbino, Montefeltro, Federcio da, duke of, 80 Utrecht, Treaty of (1713), 147, 158 Uzerches, 24 Uzès, 129–130 Valence, 3 Valenciennes, 8, 164 Valle, Battista della, 90 Valois, 25 Valtelline, 143 Valturio, Roberto, 80 Van Noyen, Sébastien, 87 Vannes, 10, 63–64, 127 Vassy, massacre at (1562), 97 Vauban, Sébastien Le Prestre, lord of, 84, 139, 143–159, 164–165, 171, 173 Vaucouleurs, 13 Vaudreuil, 28, 29 Vaux-le-Vicomte, 162 Vegetius, 11, 47, 68, 77 Vendée, 128, 129 Vendôme, 12, 22, 28, 113 Vendôme, César, duke of, 127 Vendôme, Charles IV, duke of, 82 Venice, 78, 86 Verdun, 12, 87 Verdun-sur-Garonne, 41 Vergano, Scipio, 105–107, 113 Vermandois, counts of, 21

Verneuil, 28 Vernon, 23 Verona, battle of (1516), 76 Versailles, 162 Vervins, 82 treaty of (1598), 119 Vexin, 22, 27–28, 35 Vexin, Gauthier II, count of, 9 Vianello, Baldassare, 86 Vicopisano, 79 Vienna, 28 Vienne, 52 Vigevano, Guido de, 67 Vignola, Giacomo Barrozi da, 92 Vikings, see Normans Vilaine River, 10, 167 Villars, André de Branca, marquis of, 114 Ville, Antoine de, 143–144 Villefranche (Champagne), 82, 92 Villefranche-de-Rouergue, 44, 46 Villemur, 41, 46 Villeneuve-sur-Yonne, 37 Vimercate, Bernardino da, 88 Vincennes, château de, 69 Vinci, Leonardo da, 77, 80 Viollet-le-Duc, Eugène, 171 Visigoths, 3, 49 Vitelli, Chiapino, 86 Vitruvius, 77–79, 82, 150, 169 Vitry, 20, 82 Vitry-en-Perthois, siege of (1544), 86 Vitry-le-Français, 79, 86 Vivarais, 133 Viviers, 14 Voltaire, 141 Wales and Welsh, 60 Westphalia, Peace of (1648), 146 William, duke of Normandy, king of England, 10 Winsor, siege of (1215), 31 World War I, 171, 174 Würtemberg, 117 Yèvres-le-Châtel, 37 Yorke, Edmund, 114 Ypres, 8, 31 Zacarie, Denis, 142 Zanchi, Giovan Battista de’, 92