VALUE CREATION IN MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE REVIEW Series Editor: J. Jay Choi Volume 1:
Asian Financial Crisis: Financial, Structural and International Dimensions Edited by: J. J. Choi
Volume 2:
European Monetary Union and Capital Markets Edited by: J. J. Choi & J. Wrase
Volume 3: Global Risk Management: Financial, Operational & Insurance Strategies Edited by: J. J. Choi & M. Powers Volume 4:
The Japanese Finance: Corporate Finance and Capital Markets in Changing Japan Edited by: J. J. Choi & T. Hiraki
Volume 5:
Latin American Financial Markets: Developments in Financial Innovations Edited by: H. Arbela´ez & R. W. Click
Volume 6:
Emerging European Financial Markets: Independence and Integration Post-Enlargement Edited by: J. A. Batten & C. Kearney
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE REVIEW VOLUME 7
VALUE CREATION IN MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE EDITED BY
J. JAY CHOI Temple University
REID W. CLICK George Washington University
Amsterdam – Boston – Heidelberg – London – New York – Oxford Paris – San Diego – San Francisco – Singapore – Sydney – Tokyo JAI Press is an imprint of Elsevier
JAI Press is an imprint of Elsevier The Boulevard, Langford Lane, Kidlington, Oxford OX5 1GB, UK Radarweg 29, PO Box 211, 1000 AE Amsterdam, The Netherlands 525 B Street, Suite 1900, San Diego, CA 92101-4495, USA First edition 2007 Copyright r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publisher Permissions may be sought directly from Elsevier’s Science & Technology Rights Department in Oxford, UK: phone (+44) (0) 1865 843830; fax (+44) (0) 1865 853333; email:
[email protected]. Alternatively you can submit your request online by visiting the Elsevier web site at http://elsevier.com/locate/permissions, and selecting Obtaining permission to use Elsevier material Notice No responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions or ideas contained in the material herein. Because of rapid advances in the medical sciences, in particular, independent verification of diagnoses and drug dosages should be made British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN-13: 978-0-7623-1392-1 ISBN-10: 0-7623-1392-7 ISSN: 1569-3767 For information on all JAI Press publications visit our website at books.elsevier.com Printed and bound in The Netherlands 07 08 09 10 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
CONTENTS ABOUT THE SERIES
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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
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PART I: AN OVERVIEW INTRODUCTION TO VALUE CREATION IN MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE J. Jay Choi and Reid W. Click
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PART II: MULTINATIONALS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT STRATEGIC AND FINANCIAL DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS Jongmoo Jay Choi and Eric C. Tsai
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MODELING THE EVOLUTIONARY SEQUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES Elmar Lukas
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NEW TRENDS AND PERFORMANCES OF KOREAN OUTWARD FDI AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS Seong-Bong Lee
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CONTENTS
PART III: STRATEGIES AND FIRM PERFORMANCE THE VALUE CREATION PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT Reid W. Click
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OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY, AND PERFORMANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR ASIAN EMERGING MARKET MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES Juichuan Chang
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SUCCESSFUL ADAPTATION STRATEGIES OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE Roxana Wright
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES AND PERFORMANCE: THE CASE OF THE FORTUNE 500 Nicole Avdelidou-Fischer
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PART IV: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS DIFFICULTIES IN VALUE CREATION: TELECOM NEW ZEALAND’S ACQUISITION OF AAPT LTD Alireza Tourani-Rad and Zoltan Toth
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ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL COMPETITORS’ REACTION TO MEGA MERGER ANNOUNCEMENTS BY AN MNC: THE CASE OF THE CITICORP–TRAVELERS MERGER Isaac Otchere and Suhadi Mustopo
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Contents
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A COMBINED CASCADE MODEL TO EXPLAIN INDUSTRIAL CONSOLIDATION: THEORY AND AN APPLICATION TO STEEL Huaichuan Rui
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PART V: FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE MEASURING AND MANAGING THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE EXPOSURE OF CHINESE COMPANIES Patrick J. Schena UK MEASURES OF FIRM-LIVED EQUITY DURATION Richard A. Lewin, Marc J. Sardy and Stephen E. Satchell
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MULTINATIONALS AND EXCHANGE RATE PASS-THROUGH Alexandra Lai and Oana Secrieru
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN RUSSIA: A CASE STUDY OF TIMELINESS OF FINANCIAL REPORTING IN THE TELECOM INDUSTRY Robert W. McGee
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PART VI: THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR MERGERS AND CONSOLIDATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICE FIRMS: GLOBAL TRENDS AND STRATEGIES FOR VALUE CREATION Edward C. Boyer and Jongmoo Jay Choi
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CROSS-BORDER INVESTMENT IN THE LATIN AMERICAN BANKING SECTOR Jesu´s Arteaga-Ortiz, Harvey Arbela´ez and Wendy M. Jeffus
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PART VII: THE INFLUENCE OF THE STATE GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL RISK Arvind K. Jain
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STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY FOR SMALL STATES: A POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE Jaleel Ahmad
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STRATEGIC IPO UNDERPRICING: THE ROLE OF CHINESE STATE OWNERSHIP Yong Wang and Xiaotian (Tina) Zhang
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MULTINATIONAL VERSUS STATE POWER IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: THE CASE OF MICROSOFT IN CHINA, 1987–2004 Jean-Marc F. Blanchard
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INTERNATIONALIZATION AND VALUE CREATION IN THE GLOBAL TEXTILES AND APPAREL INDUSTRY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LITHUANIA AND MOLDOVA Sanford L. Moskowitz
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STRATEGY DURING AN INDUSTRY CRISIS: THE POST-QUOTA EXPERIENCE OF TURKISH APPAREL MANUFACTURERS Liesl Riddle
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ABOUT THE SERIES International Finance Review is an annual book series in the international finance area (IFR, broadly defined). The IFR will publish theoretical, empirical, institutional or policy-oriented articles on multinational business finance and strategies, global capital markets and investments, global risk management, global corporate finance and institutions, currency markets and international financial economics, emerging market finance, or related regional or country-specific issues. In general, each volume will have a particular theme. Those interested in contributing an article or editing a volume should contact the Series Editor, J. Jay Choi at E-mail:
[email protected]
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD M. Adler Columbia University NY, USA
V. Errunza McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada
W. Bailey Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA
R. Grosse Thunderbird Business School, Glendale, AZ, USA
I. Cooper London Business School, UK
Y. Hamao University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA
J. Doukas Old Dominion University/European Financial Management, Norfolk, VA, USA
C. R. Harvey Duke University, Durham, NC, USA
G. Dufey University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
R. Hawkins Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA ix
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ABOUT THE SERIES
J. E. Hodder University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA
R. Marston University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
M. Levi University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B C, Canada
R. Roll University of California at Los Angeles, CA, USA
D. Logue Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA
A. Saunders New York University, NY, USA
J. Lothian Fordham University, NY, USA
R. Sweeney Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Jaleel Ahmad
Concordia University, Montreal, Canada
Harvey Arbela´ez
Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA, USA; Groupe ESC Lille, Lille, France
Jesu´s Arteaga-Ortiz
Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Spain
Nicole Avdelidou-Fischer
Queen Mary, University of London, London, UK
Jean-Marc F. Blanchard
San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA, USA
Edward C. Boyer
Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Juichuan Chang
Ling Tung University, Taichung City, Taiwan
J. Jay Choi
Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Reid W. Click
George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA
Arvind K. Jain
Concordia University, Montreal, Canada
Wendy M. Jeffus
Southern New Hampshire University, Manchester, NH, USA
Alexandra Lai
Bank of Canada, Ottawa, Canada
Seong-Bong Lee
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, Seoul, Korea
Richard A. Lewin
University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK xi
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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Elmar Lukas
University of Paderborn, Paderborn, Germany
Robert W. McGee
Barry University, Miami Shores, FL, USA
Sanford L. Moskowitz
Saint John’s University, Collegeville, MN, USA
Suhadi Mustopo
Deutsche Bank AG, Jakarta, Indonesia
Isaac Otchere
Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada
Liesl Riddle
George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA
Huaichuan Rui
Brunel University, Uxbridge, UK
Marc J. Sardy
Rollins College, Winter Park, FL, USA
Stephen E. Satchell
University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
Patrick J. Schena
The Fletcher School, Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA
Oana Secrieru
Bank of Canada, Ottawa, ON, Canada
Zoltan Toth
Auckland University of Technology, Auckland, New Zealand
Alireza Tourani-Rad
Auckland University of Technology, Auckland, New Zealand
Eric C. Tsai
State University of New York at Oswego, Oswego, NY, USA
Yong Wang
Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Roxana Wright
Keene State College, Keene, NH, USA
Xiaotian (Tina) Zhang
Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA
PART I: AN OVERVIEW
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INTRODUCTION TO VALUE CREATION IN MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE J. Jay Choi and Reid W. Click OVERVIEW In a fundamental sense, creation of value is the purpose of a firm. Values – measured by profits, cash flows, stock prices, or some strategic objectives – are the ultimate reasons why a firm exists. The ongoing and ever-expanding discussion of globalization, whether based on trade flows or financial flows, draws attention to the value of multinational enterprise. Existing empirical work on the impact of multinational firms, however, is inconclusive. Some observers point to the valuation discount with international operations due to the costs of agency and control and the difficulty of coordinating complex organizations and cultures. Others emphasize the value of a multinational network and the operational efficiency of a multinational enterprise (MNE). Thus, issues related to value creation are important and lively areas of business and finance. In fact, value creation is now at the frontier between the functional areas of finance and strategy. In international finance, the topic also interacts with economics in the areas of strategic trade policy and exchange rate behavior, as well as business strategy, as it relates to the management of an MNE. The role of government policy is also part of the debate, because the importance of public policy and the behavior of Value Creation in Multinational Enterprise International Finance Review, Volume 7, 3–15 Copyright r 2007 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1569-3767/doi:10.1016/S1569-3767(06)07001-4
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policymakers are elevated when finance and business become international, as evidenced by consistent attention to political risk. The papers in this volume of International Finance Review provide a reflection on the role of international finance – and its relationship to strategy, economics, political science, and public policy – in examining value creation in multinational enterprise. These are 22 original papers, not published elsewhere, submitted specifically for this volume based on its theme. The papers present a breadth of methodologies, including theoretical, empirical, conceptual, and case study approaches. Several papers offer combinations of these different categories. Among the empirical papers, there are many kinds of data sets analyzed, ranging from macroeconomic data to firm-level financial data to survey data. In addition, the data sets are rigorously analyzed in many different ways. This volume also takes a broad perspective on multinational enterprise, which not only allows discussion of traditional areas in the study of MNEs as corporations but also includes topics related to multinational enterprise as an undertaking and not just as corporation. For example, there is attention to small- and medium-sized companies as well as larger MNEs. There are also papers that consider exporting enterprises and the environment of multinational enterprise. In this spirit, the volume covers multinational enterprise from a variety of perspectives, including views from private corporations and government policymakers, and the authors of the papers include both academics and practitioners. Altogether, the papers offer insights into value creation through a variety of lenses. One prominent feature of the volume is that the papers collectively cover nearly all areas of the world. As some acknowledgment of its current importance in the world economy, there are four papers on China, ranging from financial studies to industry studies. There are specific country inquiries for Korea, Russia, the U.K., Spain, Turkey, Lithuania and Moldova, and Australia and New Zealand. There are also regional studies of Asia, Latin America, and Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, four papers consider general foreign operations of U.S. enterprises. Another feature of the volume is that many different industries are examined. There are naturally several papers on financial services, but there are also papers on telecommunications firms, the steel industry, and textiles and apparel. The papers are divided into seven parts, including, as Part I, this overview. Part II begins our examination of value creation in multinational enterprise with broad attention to MNEs and foreign direct investment (FDI). In Part III, there is greater focus on strategies and firm performance. Parts IV–VI offer deeper analysis in three specific, yet prominent, areas of
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value creation and MNEs: mergers and acquisitions, finance and governance, and the financial services sector. Part VII returns to a broader picture, examining the influence of the state in value creation in multinational enterprise, as a way to wrap up the volume.
MULTINATIONALS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT Part II examines multinationals and FDI from both empirical and theoretical perspectives. Jay Choi and Eric Tsai open the discussion with ‘‘Strategic and Financial Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments.’’ They point out that conventional theories regard FDIs as strategic moves based on operational or industrial organization considerations. Choi and Tsai, however, demonstrate that financial factors are also important in corporate FDI decisions. The paper offers a comprehensive assessment through an integrated model with both strategic and financial factors, and empirically investigates the factors using firm-level data from the FDIs of U.S. corporations. The financial factors concern internal capital market strength and corporate governance and include exchange rate changes, internal and external financing cost, risk diversification, and agency costs. The results of the study demonstrate that there is variability in the significance of financial variables depending on industries and destinations. The integrated model with both strategic and financial factors is shown to be superior to either component model in explaining FDIs, and financial factors are shown to be no less important in their ability to explain the prevailing FDI phenomena than strategic or operational variables. Specific attention to international joint ventures is provided in Elmar Lukas’s ‘‘Modeling the Evolutionary Sequence of International Joint Ventures.’’ The paper is a theoretical contribution to the literature on FDI under uncertainty and underscores the importance of modeling the evolutionary sequence pattern of foreign market entry. The model in the paper helps refine the application of real options in the international joint venture context by providing a closed-form solution in continuous time to value their overall strategic flexibility. Moreover, the analysis provides a novel perspective on existing empirical results and generates a number of new testable predictions. The final paper in this section is an examination of FDI from a different part of the world. Seong-Bong Lee examines the empirical patterns of
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Korean FDI in ‘‘New Trends and Performances of Korean Outward FDI after the Financial Crisis’’ using macroeconomic data and firm-level data aggregated to the macro level. Korean outward FDI increased rapidly during the 1990s, and the Korean chaebols were the main players in this increase. However, Lee points out that outward FDI decreased significantly during the three to four years after the financial crisis and then reversed in 2002, increasing once again. Lee documents that a feature of the current rise in outward FDI is that not only are large enterprises engaging in FDI, but small and medium-sized companies are too. Therefore, Korean outward FDI now shows a mixed investment pattern in which two different types of investment coexist: one is performed by big companies to secure large local markets and the other by small- and medium-sized companies attempting to ensure low labor costs. This new pattern reflects structural changes in the Korean economy as well as the growing trend of reciprocal influences. Lee not only analyzes these new outward FDI patterns, but also examines the performance of outward FDI after the financial crisis in Korea. Lee also offers a concluding discussion of the anticipated impact of these changes in outward FDI on the Korean economy.
STRATEGIES AND FIRM PERFORMANCE With a broad picture generally established, Part III moves on to consider strategies and firm performance. The four papers in this section address the issue of value creation in MNEs through empirical investigations. Two papers utilize data on the foreign operations of U.S. MNEs and the other two utilize data from the Asia/Pacific and Central/Eastern European regions. A general background to strategy and firm performance is provided in the first paper of this section, ‘‘The Value Creation Perspective of International Strategic Management.’’ In this paper, Reid W. Click uses the principle of value creation to analyze the strategic management of MNEs. International strategic management is first defined as the process through which value is created by managers operating across a national border. The domain of international strategic management is thus determined by activities that distinguish international management from domestic management in the process of value creation. Click then uses this perspective on value creation to answer three questions pertaining to international strategic management. First, how important is international strategic management? Simple statistics presented in the paper demonstrate that the international component of value creation is important in the U.S. economy. Second, what is the
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domain of international strategic management? The paper presents a framework in which international strategic management is the aggregation of value created through international production, marketing, and financial activities, and reveals that the domain of international management is vast. Third, does international strategic management make the whole MNE worth more than the sum of its parts? Empirical evidence uncovered using stock market returns suggests that the answer is yes, at least for U.S. multinationals in the early 1990s. The second paper in this section builds upon the first paper by addressing ‘‘Ownership Structure, Diversification Strategy and Performance: Implications for Asian Emerging Market Multinational Enterprises.’’ Juichuan Chang, the author, presents additional discussion of the issues and turns our attention to a different part of the world. Chang provides an integrated framework that conceptualizes the antecedents of international expansion by emerging market businesses in relation to firm performance. The data set uses 115 MNEs from four Asian countries: Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore. The methodology develops multiple-item measures of multiple dimensions to clarify ownership structure and categorizes three diversification strategies. Chang then tests how ownership structure and diversification strategy affect the financial performance of emerging market MNEs using return on assets and return on sales. The results indicate that the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance is nonlinear (in fact, an S shape). The results also indicate that excessive international diversification, product diversification, or geographic scope of the expansion process negatively moderate the impact of Asian MNEs’ performance. The third paper in this section moves the discussion to a different part of the world. Roxana Wright examines the ‘‘Successful Adaptation Strategies of Multinational Enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe.’’ The paper explores strategies of adaptation to the environment as employed by multinational corporations and empirically investigates determinants of success using a sample of 100 MNE subsidiaries operating in 19 Central and Eastern European countries. Organizations are treated as adaptive systems that have to match the complexity of their environments. The research recognizes the complex nature of the market institutions emerging from transition, which emphasizes the need for new managerial frameworks. Adaptive approaches such as vertical integration and/or value chain development, leveraging autonomy and integration, local knowledge acquisition, and embedding in the social and political environment are explored in their relationship to success in the region.
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The last paper in this section on strategy and performance moves the discussion back to the U.S. in an empirical investigation of the Fortune 500 companies. ‘‘The Relationship Between Organizational Structures and Performance: The Case of the Fortune 500,’’ by Nicole Avdelidou-Fischer, focuses on Fortune 500 companies because they have generally been among the most profitable and admired in the world. After a discussion of whether companies should organize regionally, nationally, or globally, the important assumption is made that each structural type utilizes resources differently in generating profit. Performance is conceptualized as return on capital employed and return per employee. Statistical tests reveal that structural types are positively related to financial performance, calculated as return on capital employed, with multidivisional-structured companies outperforming functional-structured ones. Tests also suggest that structural types are not related to human resource performance, calculated as return per employee.
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Part IV considers a specific aspect of the investigation of value creation and MNEs: mergers and acquisitions. Three papers in this section demonstrate that we can learn a lot about value creation in MNEs by studying large, perhaps extreme, events. The papers, in fact, consider mergers and acquisitions in three very different industries: telecommunications, financial services, and steel. Alireza Tourani-Rad and Zoltan Toth take a case study approach and examine a single acquisition that proved to be generally unsuccessful. Their paper, ‘‘Difficulties in Value Creation: Telecom New Zealand’s Acquisition of AAPT Ltd.,’’ begins with an overview of the Australian and New Zealand telecommunications markets and Telecom New Zealand’s (TCNZ) NZ$2 billion acquisition of AAPT Ltd., Australia’s third largest telecommunications firm, in 2000. The paper documents that a few years later, after writing off approximately NZ$1 billion, TCNZ is considering a sell-off at a considerable loss. Tourani-Rad and Toth discuss the strategic reasons behind the acquisition and explain how smaller telecom companies are struggling to compete with the incumbent telecom in Australia. They further conduct an event study to assess the impact of the acquisition on both TCNZ’s and AAPT’s share prices and look at some of the post-acquisition issues. In a second case study, ‘‘Analysis of Global Competitors’ Reaction to Mega Merger Announcements by an MNC: The Case of the Citicorp
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Travelers Merger,’’ Isaac Otchere and Suhadi Mutopo find that global competitors, especially banks in Europe and the U.S., reacted positively to the Citicorp and Travelers merger announcements in 1998. Uncertainties created by investigations into the merger proposal had a significant impact on competitors’ stock price. The announcement that the merger had been consummated also elicited a significantly positive reaction from the rivals following the resolution of uncertainties emanating from the regulatory challenges. The positive reaction by competitors suggests that the merger was a wealth-creating event for the large firms in the financial services industry. The expected benefits outweighed any competitive effects resulting from the merger. The competitors’ reaction was, however, not homogenous. Cross-sectional analysis in the paper shows that the abnormal returns earned by the competitors were higher the larger the competitor. In addition, the abnormal returns were greater for the U.S. rivals. Otchere and Mutopo conclude that the fact that global competitors reacted positively to the Citicorp–Travelers mega merger announcement is consistent with their assertion that the merger had ramifications that go beyond regulatory concerns in the U.S. Huaichuan Rui’s paper, ‘‘A Combined Cascade Model to Explain Industrial Consolidation: Theory and an Application to Steel,’’ offers a rigorous theoretical examination of mergers and acquisitions along with a test of the theory using data from the global steel industry and, particularly, the steel industry in China. Rui points out that expansion through mergers and acquisitions continues to be a viable international strategy utilized by industrial firms. A striking feature of this is that global giant firms lead the wave and generate an unimaginable impact on relatively small and weak firms across sectors and even nations. Rui observes that there seems to be a ‘‘cascade effect’’ between the industrial consolidations in these areas. A combined cascade model developed in the paper explains that the power imbalance caused by the degree of consolidation of the players within a firm’s value system determines the movement and direction of the cascade effect. Rui concludes that with the existence of such an effect, mergers and acquisitions will be a mutually interdependent, dynamic, reversible, and endless process among industries.
FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE Following on the heels of our detailed discussions of mergers and acquisitions, Part V offers detailed discussion of finance and governance in
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MNEs. There is one theoretical paper, and the others offer empirical investigations of China, the U.K., and Russia. Patrick J. Schena examines the traditional topic of foreign exchange exposure for a new set of companies in ‘‘Measuring and Managing the Foreign Exchange Exposure of Chinese Companies.’’ Specifically, the paper explores the sensitivity of Chinese stock returns to changes in trade-weighted indices of the Chinese currency (the RMB) and the currencies of China’s trading partners from 1999 to 2003. The paper analyzes an exposure elasticity crosssectionally using accounting variables to proxy for size and costs of financial distress. Schena finds that internationally oriented Chinese companies have experienced exchange exposure particularly against the Japanese yen. He also finds that, against a trade-weighted index, there is no empirical evidence that Chinese firms are engaged in hedging activities. However, when exposures are measured in yen terms, Schena finds that Chinese firms, particularly exporters, engage in active currency hedging. A second type of exposure, interest rate exposure, is examined in ‘‘U.K. Measures of Firm-Lived Equity Duration’’ by Richard Lewin, Marc Sardy, and Stephen Satchell. Investors often have much of their portfolios invested in equities that are exposed to interest rate risk. Hedging underlying equity exposures is not easy; in contrast, fixed-income investors have duration to immunize bond portfolios from small fluctuations in interest rates. U.S. equity duration estimates from a dividend discount model result in long durations – often in excess of 50 years. Based on U.K. data, Lewin, Sardy, and Satchell develop an alternative approach to generate equity duration as a by-product of asset pricing. Their analysis suggests that the equity premium puzzle may comprise an important element in reconciling this approach to equity duration with traditional dividend discount model alternatives. Alexandra Lai and Oana Secrieru study another traditional topic in international finance that is closely related to foreign exchange exposure: exchange rate pass-through. Their paper, ‘‘Multinationals and Exchange Rate Pass-Through,’’ offers a rigorous theoretical approach to the topic. The paper examines the impact an MNE has on the degree of exchange rate pass-through when it engages in Cournot competition with domestic and foreign rivals. The MNE can locate its production for the foreign market domestically – resulting in intra-firm trade – or in the foreign country – resulting in international production. In addition to incomplete exchange rate pass-through, Lai and Secrieru show that an MNE increases the sensitivity of domestic market prices and reduces the sensitivity of foreign market prices to exchange rate movements. In addition, Lai and Secrieru
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show that intra-firm trade prices are more sensitive to exchange rate movements than their international production counterparts and react in the opposite direction. The final paper in this section considers the role of financial information within the context of corporate governance in a transitional country. In ‘‘Corporate Governance in Russia: A Case Study of Timeliness of Financial Reporting in the Telecom Industry,’’ Robert McGee address timeliness of financial reporting as an important element of transparency. Specifically, McGee looks at the telecommunications industry in Russia and computes the number of days it takes companies to receive an audit opinion, then compares the time lag to the number of days it takes non-Russian companies in the telecommunications industry to receive an audit opinion. McGee finds that Russian companies take longer to report financial results than do nonRussian companies. In addition, larger Russian companies take less time to report their financial condition than do small Russian firms, but the difference is not significant. Companies using Russian Accounting Standards take significantly less time to report financial results than companies using either International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). In addition, companies using IFRS take significantly longer to report financial results than companies using U.S. GAAP. McGee also finds that the dominant auditor in the Russian telecommunications industry did not complete audits in significantly less time than did non-dominant auditors. Finally, in discussion, McGee concludes that although Russian companies take far less time to issue financial statements now than they did a few years ago, it is premature to definitively conclude that the improvement is significant due to the limited data set.
THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR The financial services sector receives particular attention in Part VI. The two papers in this section offer a detailed discussion of many issues already introduced in this volume, including mergers and acquisitions, and macrolevel data on capital flows. Edward Boyer and Jay Choi take up the issue of rapid consolidation globally in the financial services industry in ‘‘Mergers and Consolidation of Financial Service Firms: Global Trends and Strategies for Value Creation.’’ Consolidation has proceeded not only in the same market but also across different market segments and across national boundaries. Boyer and Choi
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begin by outlining the general trend of the mergers and acquisitions and consolidation of the financial service industry in both the U.S. and the global economy. They next identify and analyze the reasons that contribute to the consolidation of the financial service industry, and examine some cases of successful and unsuccessful financial service mergers and acquisitions. Finally, they draw some strategic implications. The second paper builds on the first paper in this part by looking at the same phenomenon in a specific area of the world. Wendy Jeffus, Jesu´s Arteaga-Ortiz, and Harvey Arbela´ez look at ‘‘Cross-Border Investment in the Latin American Banking Sector.’’ They point out that cross-border investment in the banking sector has been a large part of overall merger and acquisition activity in Latin America. Spain and the U.S. have been the largest investors, participating in almost 70% of the total transaction value. Specifically, the total value of Spanish investment within that region is over 50 billion dollars. After an introduction and an explanation of the importance of FDI and the implications for cross-border investment in banking, the paper focuses on the largest investor in the Latin American banking sector and attempts to find an explanation for the increasing participation of Spanish banks. Jeffus, Arteaga-Ortiz, and Arbela´ez discuss a potential new reality: Latin America could be the geographic location where major contenders in the banking industry worldwide will be engaged in battles for global dominance. The data for this analysis consist of worldwide investment in Latin America from 1985 to 2002.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE STATE The final section of the volume, Part VII, more closely addresses the influence of the state, although the range of discussion is quite broad. The topic has come up in several other papers. For example, the paper by Otchere and Mutopo in Part IV demonstrated the influence of the U.S. government in the Citicorp–Travelers merger through regulation. The papers in this section offer more detail and depth on the influence of the state and consider countries other than the U.S. The first paper, Arvind Jain’s ‘‘Governance and Political Risk,’’ looks at corruption. Jain sees political risk as arising from renegotiation of implicit or explicit contracts under which foreign investors enter a host country. Governments will legitimately enter into renegotiation to increase the share of rents earned by society. Corrupt political leaders, however, will use their powers to extract rents from foreign investors for personal gains rather than
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for the good of society. Jain, therefore, recommends that political risk assessment should assess the intentions of government as well as the strengths of political and social institutions that keep leaders under control. In addition, he points out that firms should also understand that their own actions may contribute to creating political risk. In the second paper, Jaleel Ahmad addresses ‘‘Strategic Trade Policy for Small States: A Political Economy Perspective.’’ Ahmad points out that there is a literature on strategic trade policy dealing with industries and sectors characterized by international rivalry for market shares and the struggle to capture ‘‘rents’’ over and above normal factor rewards. Ahmad builds on this literature by exploring the validity and implications of strategic trade policy for small states and small firms that are not major players in international markets. The smallness of the firms may, in fact, be an advantage rather than a hindrance. The implications of smallness for strategic behavior are examined in a simple game-theoretic framework. The insights become sharper when extended to intra-industry trade in differentiated products. Ahmad concludes that the desirable policy interventions for small countries and firms are quite different from those for large firms. The third paper considers a traditional topic in finance, the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs), and demonstrates that in certain circumstances the influence of the state is very important. Yong Wang and Xiaotian (Tina) Zhang extend the traditional finance topic to account for the role of the state in ‘‘Strategic IPO Underpricing: The Role of Chinese State Ownership.’’ Wang and Zhang point out that the stock markets in emerging economies are attractive to international investors but their unique characteristics need to be examined. In particular, Chinese stock markets experienced much more significant IPO underpricing than most other stock markets in the world. The paper offers a two-period wealth maximum model to explain the strategic IPO underpricing by state owners. Given the fact that the entire IPO procedure (including the IPO price) is regulated and controlled by state owners, Wang and Zhang argue that state owners strategically underprice the IPO because they care less about the IPO proceeds and more about the wealth gain after IPO. Empirically, Wang and Zhang find a positive relationship between IPO underpricing and state ownership in the Chinese stock market, and this is consistent with the wealth maximization hypothesis of IPO pricing. Jean-Marc Blanchard considers another approach to the issue of the influence of the state in ‘‘Multinational versus State Power in an Era of Globalization: The Case of Microsoft in China, 1987–2004’’ the fourth paper in this section. Blanchard examines relative power by comparing and
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contrasting two schools of thought: a ‘‘multinationals in command’’ perspective and a ‘‘states in command’’ perspective. The paper offers an alternative analytical framework, a modified bargaining power model highlighting three factors as playing a decisive role in shaping the power relationship between states and multinationals: the balance of needs, allies/ adversaries, and the institutional environment. To illustrate the model and demonstrate its explanatory value, Blanchard examines the experience of Microsoft in China. In the fifth paper on the influence of the state, ‘‘Internationalization and Value Creation in the Global Textiles and Apparel Industry: A Comparative Analysis of Lithuania and Moldova,’’ Sanford Moskowitz considers the political affiliations of the state as a determinant of the success of local industries. The study examines the internationalization process within the textiles and apparel industry and shows how the evolution of an industry toward greater internationalization is intricately linked to its ability to move up its specific value chain. The analysis compares and contrasts the ability of this industry within a Western European country that is a member of the European Union (Lithuania) and a non-accession Eastern European country (Moldova) to move up the textiles and apparel value chain and so achieve higher levels of internationalization. In examining and relating the relevant factors, the analysis provides insights into – and suggests important modifications to – such important concepts and themes as the stage theory of internationalization, the role of ‘‘inward–outward’’ linkages in the value creation process, the mechanism of small- and medium-size firm internationalization, and the part played by the European Union in the internationalization (and thus globalization) process. Liesl Riddle builds on the discussion of the textile and apparel industry in the sixth and final paper in this part, ‘‘Strategy During an Industry Crisis: The Post-Quota Experience of Turkish Apparel Manufacturers.’’ Riddle points out that discussions about the impact of quota elimination in the apparel industry have focused on countries that obviously benefit from their elimination (such as China) and those that clearly are harmed by their demise (such as the sub-Saharan African countries). However, the global production landscape of the apparel trading system also includes numerous countries for which the post-quota environment is uncertain – and vital, but little attention has been paid to the specific impact of the quota elimination on these countries. At the dawn of quota elimination, uncertainty loomed particularly large for Turkey, the world’s fourth largest apparel exporting nation. Riddle’s investigation draws on secondary data and a survey of Turkish clothing exporters to chronicle Turkey’s quota elimination
Introduction to Value Creation in Multinational Enterprise
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experience during 2005 and 2006. The results indicate that most Turkish apparel exporters expected their market share in the European Union and the U.S. to remain the same or improve in 2005. The reality was far worse: by 2006 the industry had incurred large losses and production had declined sharply. The case provides fashion managers and scholars with insight into the experience of a country for which the post-quota elimination future was uncertain but for whom the apparel industry was vital in 2005.
CONCLUSION Taken together, the 23 original papers in this volume cover a rich array of topics and capture the excitement of studying value creation in MNEs. They provide lessons that are applicable to a variety of participants, ranging from managers in firms to public policymakers. The wide spectrum of fields represented and methodologies implemented suggests that researchers are looking at value creation in MNEs from many different perspectives. Thanks to the generosity of the contributing authors, this volume of International Finance Review captures the essence of current thought on value creation in MNEs, and hopefully will stimulate further investigation of the topic in the future.
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PART II: MULTINATIONALS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
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STRATEGIC AND FINANCIAL DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS Jongmoo Jay Choi and Eric C. Tsai ABSTRACT Conventional foreign direct investment (FDI) theories regard FDIs as strategic moves based on operational or industrial organization considerations. We demonstrate that financial factors are also important in corporate FDI decisions. The financial factors concern internal capital market strength and corporate governance and include exchange rate changes, internal and external financing cost, risk diversification, and agency costs. There is variability in the significance of financial variables depending on industries and destinations. The integrated model with both strategic and financial factors is superior to either component model in explaining FDIs. However, financial factors are no less important in explaining the prevailing FDI phenomena than strategic or operational variables.
1. INTRODUCTION The mainstream theory of foreign direct investments (FDIs) grew out of international trade and industrial organization traditions. International Value Creation in Multinational Enterprise International Finance Review, Volume 7, 19–60 Copyright r 2007 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1569-3767/doi:10.1016/S1569-3767(06)07002-6
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trade theory indicates that international differences in locational endowments lead to international trade. Industrial organization theory suggests firm-specific ownership factors as the primary reasons why multinational corporations (MNCs) can overcome entry costs in making investments abroad. These endowment-focused theories (of either location or firm ownership) can explain FDI flows from developed to less-developed regions of the world. To explain the vast majority of FDI flows between developed countries (DCs), internalization theory was developed.1 It suggests that, in some areas, MNCs as institutions may be more operationally efficient as arbiters of resource allocation than markets. To achieve efficient global resource allocation, i.e., foreign production, an MNC can create its own internal markets to reduce transaction costs and to prevent valuation loss associated with external transactions, especially for information-intensive products in which MNCs specialize. Dunning (1977) suggests an eclectic theory that combines international trade, industrial organization, and internalization theories in an integrated general strategic framework. The advantages for MNCs are due to three strategic sources: ownership, location, and internalization (OLI). The integrated strategic theory is a milestone in the FDI theory, but it leaves some issues unanswered. First of all, the OLI framework does not explain why the most common entry mode of FDIs is international mergers and acquisitions (M&As) rather than greenfield investments. Second, internalization is theoretically beneficial to MNCs regardless of where investment occurs. Internalization therefore does not seem to justify the phenomenon that most FDIs occur between DCs. Third, significant bilateral short-term FDI swings are frequently observed, and it is not clear whether these swings correspond to changes in those strategic factors. Finally, as Itaki (1991) notes, Dunning’s OLI framework does not include any financial factors at all. This is in contrast to normative decision making in practice that usually includes both strategic and financial factors in international investment decisions. Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) suggest three hypotheses for cross-border investments: (a) imperfections in product and factor markets, (b) biases in government and regulatory policies, and (c) imperfections in capital markets. Their empirical work, however, only examined the first hypothesis – which is actually the core of the conventional strategic FDI theories. In this paper, we focus on examining the third hypothesis with the intention of relating it to the first. We do that by introducing the financial variables, as well as the structural ones, as determinants of FDIs. Our financial model depicts FDIs as the consequence of the ‘‘interaction’’ between a strong ‘‘internal’’ capital market and ‘‘internal’’ corporate
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governance. We show that both financial and strategic variables are significant in explaining corporate international investment behavior, and that these results are fairly robust across industries and for different specifications. We suggest then that the neglect of financial variables in the FDI model may constitute a misspecification of the model. However, compared to the strategic model, the financial model exhibits greater variability depending on the industry sector and investment destinations. By incorporating financial variables, we show that Dunning’s ‘‘eclectic’’ theory would be even more eclectic. Beyond this implication for the academic FDI literature, this paper should demonstrate the usefulness of our integrated model for corporate practitioners who may be examining strategic and financial reasons for investing abroad or for policymakers who may be interested in providing incentives to attract foreign investments. The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 presents the estimation framework and Section 4 describes data used in the empirical work. Empirical results are then presented in Section 5. Section 6 includes a summary conclusion.
2. REVIEW OF RELATED WORK 2.1. Strategic Perspectives on FDIs Traditional international trade theory that emphasizes location endowments as determinants of FDIs is insufficient as a theory of FDI because it cannot explain why international investment takes place in addition to international trade. The modern strategic theory of FDI, developed by Hymer (1976), Kindleberger (1969), and Caves (1971), starts with the notion that excess profit projects are created by ‘‘structural imperfections’’ of some kind in goods or factor markets. FDIs take place when MNCs take on those projects as they try to utilize their firm-specific ownership endowments, such as proprietary technology and others, to generate greater returns (despite their disadvantage of facing significant entry costs) than those of indigenous local firms. MNCs can produce greater profit by switching from an international exchange business (export) to a foreign production business (FDI). Buckley and Casson (1976), Dunning (1977), and Casson (1979) point out that the internalization of intermediate goods markets gives an advantage to a firm that can reduce or eliminate the transaction costs caused by ‘‘natural market imperfections.’’ Furthermore, the uncertainty in the valuation of intangible investments or information-intensive products in the open market
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implies that internalization is a way of appropriating the potential value of research and development within the firm. Thus, the ability of an MNC to generate rents due to its ownership endowments is enhanced by the benefits of an internal market created within a firm, and when these benefits are important, FDIs make more sense rather than exporting or licensing. Dunning (1977, 1980, 1988) consolidated different strands of mainstream FDI theories in an integrated eclectic framework that combines OLI factors conducive to FDIs. 2.2. Financial Perspectives on FDIs The market imperfection paradigm assumed in the mainstream strategic theory of FDI by Hymer (1976), Kindleberger (1969), and Caves (1971) does not exclude imperfections in financial markets. In addition, the internalization theory emphasizes the distinction between external and internal transactions, which could include financial transactions. Therefore, a financial perspective on FDIs is entirely consistent with the assumptions behind the mainstream strategic FDI theories in the industrial organization framework. From a financial standpoint, variables of major interest include valuation, cost, and risk. For instance, why is a given foreign project valued more for an MNC than for an indigenous firm? Otherwise no FDI will take place. Table 1 indicates that about three-quarters of all direct investments abroad by U.S. firms between 1992 and 1998 are in the form of M&As rather than greenfield investments. The choice between M&As and greenfields would depend, among other things, on how the firm is valued in the market place as opposed to the value of the firm’s assets. If both financial and real markets are efficient and in perfect equilibrium, then there is no disparity in valuation and there is little incentive to utilize M&As versus greenfields or, for that matter, little difference between investing at home and abroad. Aliber (1970) was the first to suggest that FDIs can take place because of financial factors in an environment of partially segmented international capital markets. MNCs generally have superior access to financing in the stable currency zone in international capital markets while the indigenous firm can only raise funds in the relatively weak currency unit. The stability of currency means a lower currency risk premium, and hence a lower cost of capital, for MNCs than for local indigenous firms. As such, Aliber (1970) suggested the possibility that a multinational firm can obtain a higher valuation than an indigenous firm from the same project due to the advantage of lower cost of capital.
Outward and Inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Flows and Stocks of the United States. 1986–1991 Annual Average
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1992–1998 Annual Average
Panel A: Outward and Inward FDI Flows of the U.S. Outward flows 26.0 U.S. as % of world 14.4 Inward flows 49.0 U.S. as % of world 30.8
39.0 19.4 18.9 10.8
74.8 31.1 43.5 20.0
73.3 25.8 45.1 18.6
92.1 26.1 58.8 17.8
74.8 19.7 76.5 21.3
110.0 23.2 109.3 23.5
132.8 20.5 193.4 30.0
85.3 23.1 77.9 22.4
1980
1985
1990
1995
1997
1998
Panel B: Outward and Inward FDI Stocks of the U.S. Outflow stock 220.2 251.0 U.S. as % of world 42.9 36.6 Inward stock 83.0 184.6 U.S. as % of world 16.4 23.6
435.2 25.4 394.9 22.3
696.1 24.5 535.6 19.2
860.7 25.1 681.7 19.8
993.6 24.1 875.0 21.4
Note: FDI figures are in billions of U.S. dollars. Data Source: Various issues of World Investment Report, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
Strategic and Financial Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments
Table 1.
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The differential access to financing is further attributed to information asymmetry by Froot and Stein (1991). With the presence of information imperfection in otherwise globally integrated capital markets, using an auction example in which a U.S. target firm was sold to the highest bidder, they show that a depreciation of the host country currency systematically reduces the relative wealth of host country agents, facilitating acquisitions of local firms or assets by foreign firms. In their view, information imperfections in capital markets cause external financing to be more expensive because of monitoring costs. No firm, therefore, is able to borrow, without incurring additional cost, the full amount of the project or the value of the acquisition target. Since complete external financing is costly, the relative corporate wealth between foreign and domestic bidders as a source of internal financing becomes relevant. A depreciation of the host country currency systematically raises the relative wealth of foreign firms, who in turn can outbid indigenous local firms. Nonetheless, given additional operational costs associated with FDIs, their explanations based on financing do not extend to why FDIs are sustainable in the long run. Given partially segmented international capital markets and/or the presence of agency costs, the two-country corporate valuation model of Choi (1989) shows that corporate international investment decisions depend on two major factors: (a) the real foreign exchange risk, which affects the cost of capital, and (b) the gains from diversification of operational cash flows, which are necessary at the corporate level given agency costs or market imperfections. The models by Black (1978) and Stulz (1983) emphasize the change in relative distribution of wealth globally as a factor inducing foreign investments. In the empirical literature, exchange rates received the most attention but the results on them are somewhat mixed. A significant linkage is shown between exchange rates and U.S. FDIs in the empirical work of Froot and Stein (1991), Grosse and Trevino (1996), Caves (1989), Ray (1989), and Swenson (1994). Klein and Rosengren (1994) also find real exchange rate and relative wealth to be significant determinants of direct investment inflows in the U.S., but the effects of relative wage rates are insignificant. Choi and Jeon (2006) find a significant cointegrating relationship between real exchange rates and direct investment flows of G-7 countries. Their multivariate cointegration analysis also establishes a linkage between direct investment flows and several financial variables including the cost of capital and real wealth in addition to real exchange rates. Healy and Palepu (1993), however, find the coefficients of both the contemporaneous and lagged changes in exchange rates to be insignificant on
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FDIs. Stevens (1998) estimates the Froot and Stein (1991) model but finds only weak support for the relationship between FDIs and foreign exchange rates. Dewenter (1995), using the survey data of foreign acquisitions of U.S. targets, finds that, after controlling for relative corporate wealth, the relationship between foreign exchange rate level and foreign investment relative to domestic investment (acquisition activity) is statistically insignificant. Blonigen (1997) suggests that the mixed support for the relationship between FDIs and exchange rates may be related to firm-specific assets. If involved in international acquisitions, firm-specific assets can generate returns in currencies other than that used for purchase, and thus subject acquisitions to exchange risk. He reports that Japanese acquisitions in the U.S. are correlated with real dollar depreciation in industries that tend to have more firm-specific assets, such as manufacturing industries. Cushman (1985) maintains that the reduced cost of capital is a consequence of riskadjusted expected real currency appreciation of the source country, which in turn will stimulate FDIs. However, the net effect also depends on an increase in output prices versus input costs caused by exchange rate changes. That is, the foreign exchange effect is generally ambiguous depending on their effects through output and input markets. Cushman’s pooled estimation results show that FDIs are negatively related to an expected real appreciation of the source country currency and positively related to exchange rate volatility. This implies that the use of aggregate data may obscure the differential effects of foreign exchange rates on FDIs. The literature on financial determinants of FDIs as discussed thus far has centered on the issues of differential valuation or cost. What has rarely been studied is the aspect that FDIs could also be triggered by agency behaviors. Recent studies on the diversification discount, however, offer some parallel comparisons to this issue. Although they make no distinction between the types of diversification (industrial versus global) in examining why managers diversify their firms, Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) argue that agents enjoy risk reduction and private benefits from diversification. It is the private benefits such as improved career prospects, prestige, power, perquisites, compensation, and managerial entrenchment that in many cases drive managers to diversify. If this is the case, global diversification theoretically could offer managers a greater degree of risk reduction and private benefits. Click and Harrison (2000) find a negative correlation between multinationality and management-owned equity and conclude that private gains are the reason for globalization and the global diversification discount. All these are in line with our proposition that agency issues are one of the driving forces for FDIs.
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In this paper, we intend to establish that financial factors are as important as strategic ones in explaining FDIs. In fact, our results support FDIs as being driven by the interaction between internal capital market strength and internal corporate governance. We achieve this by examining firm-level data, which have not been used in existing literature on financial determinants of FDIs. In contrast to existing work that focus on strategic factors only or those that focus on a single financial variable, we suggest an integrated financial model of FDIs that include agency issues as well as valuation, cost, exchange rates, and risk diversification.
3. ESTIMATING FRAMEWORK The above discussion of existing literature suggests two different views regarding the determinants of FDIs. One hypothesis is strategic in that FDIs take place as a result of a firm’s strategic move to take advantage of market imperfections and differential costs in product and factor markets. This view is represented by the OLI model, which indicates that corporate FDIs increase with favorable location factors and strong firm-specific ownership endowments, and out of the efficiency of internal markets within an MNC setting. Even though the main focus in this paper is on the financial determinants of FDIs, it is imperative to first verify whether OLI theory maintains its validity in explaining FDIs in the 1990s. H1 (Strategic Hypothesis). Corporate FDIs are determined by strategic considerations pertinent to location factors, ownership endowments, and efficiency of internalization. The other is a financial hypothesis, which depends on imperfections and asymmetries in capital markets. Given the imperfect integration of international financial markets, MNCs may have an advantage because of their superior access to lower cost of financing or in stable currency units. To the extent that there exist deviations from purchasing power parity, uncertain changes in exchange rates would have a real impact on international investments. In addition, given information asymmetry that favors internal over external financing, exchange rates may influence the relative wealth of the firm, which may influence the propensity to acquire international firms. In sum, the existing literature on the financial determinants of FDIs primarily pursues this line of inquiry, namely the interaction of foreign exchange rates, internal financing, and corporate wealth on FDIs. Theoretically, although its scope is a bit narrow, it is plausible.
Strategic and Financial Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments
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In light of the mainstream view of FDI as a strategic one, some additional remarks and justifications on the financial perspectives may be in order. Our financial model depicts that the combination of internal capital market strength and internal corporate governance factors motivates FDIs. First, to overcome their additional costs, the occurrence of FDIs requires internal capital market strength. A firm could actively take advantage of a relative corporate wealth increase due to foreign exchange rate movements. Of course, it also could be the result of corporate free cash flow building up and the lack of domestic investment opportunity. Regardless of the reasons, however, a stronger internal capital market does provide MNCs an edge over the indigenous local firms in the host country. Given imperfect or informationally asymmetric capital markets, a depreciation of the host country currency effectively raises relative wealth of the foreign MNCs. Given the costly external financing due to monitoring costs, an increased wealth implies an advantage of using cheaper internal source of capital. This financing advantage puts MNCs in a better position than indigenous local firms during bidding competitions. It is a plausible explanation for the dominance of M&As as a mode of entry for FDIs. In comparison, the financing advantage for greenfield investments may be relatively less compelling outside the bidding scenario. Greenfield investments would have a greater operational risk than M&As as well as the uncertainty in valuation. Nevertheless, with or without the influence from foreign exchange, imperfectly integrated international capital markets imply a differential access to financing, which gives an advantage to one group of firms (i.e., MNCs) over the other (i.e., local indigenous firms). Second, internal capital market strength, however, does not necessarily lead to FDIs. Depending on managerial objectives and agency behaviors, it is up to the management to exploit the internal capital market strength for globalization, so FDI is also a consequence of internal corporate governance. One can argue that MNCs’ financial advantages from internal capital market strength are short term in nature. That may well be, although there is no evidence that financial effects are necessarily short-lived. It is well documented that, in the presence of agency costs and other financial market imperfections, diversification can provide a risk-reduction benefit to the firm. International diversification allows overall corporate risk to be lowered through reduction in financial or business risk. If so, it may well be the compelling reason for the firm to initiate and sustain FDIs over the long run despite the added cost and risk associated with operating abroad. Even though risk reduction is a legitimate reason for cross-border investments, it is not at all farfetched that FDIs are conducted for the sake of
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managers’ pursuit of private benefits at the expense of shareholders and lead to unintended global diversification. Earlier studies have suggested various agency problems pertinent to investments. For instance, investment can deviate from its optimal level due to agency problems, such as the underinvestment and substitution problems suggested by Myers (1977) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). Regardless of whether any given level of international investment is optimal, agency problems can still influence certain investment decisions. And it is not obvious that the agency problems are of short-term nature because they depend on long-standing and internationally dissimilar practices of corporate governance and industrial organization. At the higher level, managers’ pursuit of personal benefits, such as gains in prestige, power, human capital, perquisites and compensation, and entrenchment, can be the predominant force driving cross-border investments. This, of course, directs us to believe that agency behavior could lead to FDI. Although FDI driven by agency behavior has not yet been explicitly proposed and tested, recent studies on the diversification discount are consistent with this suggestion. Again, the existing studies on financial determinants of FDIs extend their research primarily within the scope of factors related to internal capital markets. It is, of course, critical, but not necessarily a sufficient condition. Our financial model describes both the necessary and sufficient conditions for FDI occurrence and provides a more comprehensive framework for explaining FDI behaviors from finance perspectives. In the present estimation, the financial factors related to internal capital market strength include foreign exchange rate movement, corporate free cash flow, and cost of capital (relevant if internal funding is insufficient). The other financial factors related to internal corporate governance are international diversification, financial and business risk, and agency cost. In short, FDI outflows may be affected positively by currency depreciation of the host country, internal financing capacity of the firm, and benefits from international diversification, and negatively by agency cost and the cost of external financing. H2 (Financial Hypothesis). Corporate FDIs are determined by financial factors such as foreign exchange rate movements, financing methods, corporate risks, international diversification, and agency costs. We do not think that either hypothesis, standing alone, is sufficient to fully explain actual direct investment decisions by the firm. We think that an exclusive emphasis on either hypothesis may be indicative of the field of specialization of a researcher more than a complete depiction of reality. After all, it is undisputable that no major corporate decisions are being
Strategic and Financial Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments
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made regarding international investments without considering both strategic and financial dimensions of the project. More importantly, we consider both theories to be conceptually consistent. The mainstream strategic models are based on imperfections in goods and factor markets, which create an advantage for one class of firms as opposed to another. Similarly, if imperfections and information asymmetry exist in international capital markets, one class of firms may have a financial advantage over another. Recourse to market imperfections of some kind is the same either way. In fact, Oxelheim, Stonehill, and Randoy (2001) classify financial factors within the OLI framework. Thus, we state an integrated hypothesis that includes both strategic and financial factors. H3 (Integrated Hypothesis). Corporate FDIs, in general, are determined by both strategic and financial considerations jointly. The relative importance of these factors, however, may vary depending on industry sectors or the context in which investments are made. To summarize, we can characterize FDI in the following general functional form: FDI ¼ f ðStrategicfactors; Financialfactors; ControlvariablesÞ
(1)
where Strategic factors ¼ ½location factors; ownership endowments, internalization variables, Financial factors ¼ ½internal capital market factors, internal corporate governance factors or more specifically, Financial factors ¼ ½exchange rate; internal and external financial profile,
risk and diversification; agency cost.
Eq. (1) is estimated for a subset as well as for the entire sample. The specific list of variables used in the empirical work is discussed in the next section. Whether a strategic model is sufficient to explain FDIs or whether financial variables are needed in addition is an empirical issue. We use the firm-level panel data to investigate different hypotheses in various ways. Panel data analysis could reveal more information over time and crosssectionally. However, a pooled regression of all panel data across all firms and all time periods horizontally, FDI it ¼ a þ bDit þ it (where D is a vector
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JONGMOO JAY CHOI AND ERIC C. TSAI
of financial determinants, i indicates a firm, and t time), shows various degrees of autocorrelation. Hence, the results of pooled estimations are not reported in the interest of space. The identification of correct functional form, however, might resolve this problem. Based on the panel data analysis methodologies developed, we also tried alternative functional forms, which include fixed effect and random effect models, FDI it ¼ ai þ bDit þ it : These estimations assume a common slope but can take different assumptions on the distributions of the intercepts. However, heteroskedasticity is found to be present along with autocorrelation in some cases. To reduce these problems, we assume the stable relationship between the means of each explanatory variable for that is, we estimate FDI i ¼ a þ bDi þ i ; P individual firms,P where FDI i ¼ ðFDIit =TÞ; Di ¼ ðDit =TÞ; and T is the number of estimation periods.
4. DATA SOURCES AND DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES Perhaps due to data convenience, the existing empirical work on the financial determinants of FDIs is typically based on aggregate national or industry data, such as common macroeconomic measures for the cost of capital or exchange rates (e.g., U.S. dollar per SDR for exchange rate and three-month T-Bill rate for cost of capital). To test our proposed financial hypothesis, firm-specific data are required, because the aggregate data can mask important differences that may exist at the level of firms. For instance, the effect of foreign exchange volatility on relative corporate wealth and cost of capital cannot be precisely measured, given the diversity of corporate international investment activities and dissimilarity of firm characteristics. This may help explain why the existing studies have mixed results. In our analysis, we use disaggregated firm-level data in corporate FDI, and explanatory variables such as firm-specific cost of capital as well as the exchange rate computed as a weighted average that reflects the extent and diversity of international investments by individual firms. We retrieve most of the data for sample firms from the Standard and Poor’s CompuStat Research Insight dataset. The criterion for inclusion in the sample is U.S. incorporations showing an ownership of foreign assets between 1992 and 1998.2 Table 2 shows descriptive characteristics for these firms. A total of 1,838 firms are selected, of which 1,131 (62%) are in manufacturing industries, and 1,551 (84%) and 1,014 (55%) had direct investments in DCs and less developed countries (LDCs), respectively. The
Strategic and Financial Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments
Table 2.
Descriptive Characteristics for the Sample of U.S. Corporations.
Total assets Foreign assets Foreign asset ratio (%) Total sales Foreign sales Foreign operating profits EBIT Earnings volatility (%) Beta Debt ratio (%) Free cash flow Cash reinvestment ratio (%) Agency cost (%) WACC (%)
31
Full Sample (N ¼ 1,838)
Manufacturing Industries (N ¼ 1,131)
Other Industries (N ¼ 621)
3307.00 (16360.00) 936.64 (5372.00) 24.43 (20.68) 2086.00 (8123.00) 659.60 (3704.00) 65.15 (287.00) 257.02 (1062.00) 9.45 (35.45) 0.64 (0.12) 21.55 (31.86) 130.09 (873.00) 4.03 (1.98) 38.79 (22.55) 11.32 (16.44)
2447.00 (13959.00) 810.72 (4548.00) 24.79 (19.27) 2114.00 (8768.00) 831.41 (4596.00) 79.99 (337.00) 228.77 (946.00) 9.25 (39.39) 0.57 (0.17) 20.49 (31.34) 142.26 (1026.00) 3.38 (1.48) 40.95 (20.21) 11.65 (18.89)
2232.00 (15741.00) 514.48 (5225.00) 24.21 (23.29) 1845.00 (6925.00) 333.17 (1039.00) 31.95 (153.00) 187.40 (1021.00) 9.61 (23.13) 1.14 (0.69) 21.64 (33.03) 79.57 (441.00) 5.14 (3.05) 36.85 (26.01) 10.99 (23.00)
Note: This descriptive statistics table shows means of each sample groups of U.S. corporations (standard deviations are in parentheses). Total assets, foreign assets, total sales, foreign sales, earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), and free cash flow are in millions of U.S. dollars. Free cash flow comprises income before extraordinary items, depreciation, amortization, deferred taxes, equity in earnings of unconsolidated subsidiaries, extraordinary items and discontinued operations, and minority interest. Standard & Poor’s CompuStat Research Insight Database is the data source for all raw data that is the basis of computing other ratios. Foreign asset ratio is foreign assets divided by total assets. Earnings volatility is the standard deviation of EBIT scaled by the mean of total assets. Betas are computed by CompuStat. Debt ratio is long-term debts over total assets. Agency cost is measured by the ratio of operating expense to total sales. The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is a weighted cost of equity (as measured by capital asset pricing model) and tax-adjusted cost of debt. Manufacturing industries comprise firms with SIC between 2,000 and 3,999. Other industries exclude these manufacturing firms as well as financial firms with SIC between 6,000 and 6,999.
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JONGMOO JAY CHOI AND ERIC C. TSAI
computation of several explanatory variables requires certain macroeconomic data, such as exchange rates, risk-free rate, and gross domestic products. They are obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics dataset. Finally, geographic distance is obtained from World Almanac and World Atlas. Table 3 summarizes the definitions of all variables, their specific data sources and expected signs, along with a correlation matrix for financial variables. Beyond that, a brief discussion and some justification for the variables selected and their anticipated signs are in order. 4.1. Dependent Variable To analyze financial determinants of FDI, firm-level data representing FDI activities are essential. Another relevant issue is the use of FDI flows or FDI stocks. The distinction is crucial but the choice of FDI stocks is obvious: FDI flows reflect the sum invested in affiliates by foreign companies during a specific time period, which affiliates may spend to accumulate fixed and current assets, to repay past borrowings, or for some other objectives. However, the FDI stock represents the total value of assets attributable to the foreign investor. Thus, the FDI stock is an indicator for the value of assets engaged in international production. (Stephan & Pfaffmann, 2001).
Conventional FDI data collected by government agencies in each country (e.g., U.S. Department of Commerce) or international institutions (e.g., IMF, OECD, or UNCTAD) are available for sectors and regions with some degree of disaggregation, but not to the firm level. Fortunately, the availability of corporate foreign assets in the CompuStat dataset provides a direct measure of FDI stock. In this study, the dependent variable, FDIi, is foreign assets of firm i in natural logarithm form, which is consistent with existing FDI studies such as in Miller and Reuer (1998), where foreign assets are used as an explanatory variable in examining the effect of FDI on exchange exposure of the firm, and FDI in natural logarithm form serves its intended purposes in Buckley, Clegg, Forsans, and Reilly (2001). Independent variables include strategic and financial variables as well as control variables. 4.2. Strategic Variables The strategic framework for FDI tested in this paper follows the mainstream OLI model. As such, the selection of these variables is in accordance with empirical OLI studies. An obvious location factor is production cost (PC).
Definitions and Expected Signs of Variables and Correlation Matrix for Financial Variables.
Variable Name
Description
Expected Sign
Panel A: Summary of Variable Definitions and Expected Signs Dependent variable FDIi (foreign direct Foreign assets of firm i associated with foreign operations identified as ‘‘Identifiable investment) Assets’’ in the Geographic Segment of CompuStat, in natural logarithm Strategic variables PCi (production cost) TCi (transportation cost)
XARi (fixed asset ratio) RDRi (R&D ratio) FSRi (foreign sales ratio) IARi (intangible asset ratio) SERi (sales expense ratio) Financial variables WFXi,t (weighted foreign exchange composite)
Cost of goods sold divided by total sales of firm i Weighted average of geographic distance in miles (in natural logarithm): X FI j TC i ¼ ln Dj ; TF I i j
+ +
where FIj is foreign investment (foreign assets) in country j; TFIi,t is total foreign direct investment (total foreign assets) of firm i in a particular year; Dj is the distance in miles between U.S. and country j where the firm operates in the specific year Fixed assets scaled by total assets of firm i Research and development expense as a percent of total sales of firm i Foreign sales divided by total sales of firm i Intangible assets divided by total assets of firm i
+ + + +
Sales expense divided by total expense of firm i
+
Weighted multilateral foreign exchange rate change for firm i in year t: X FI j;t ej;t WF X i;t ¼ ln ; TF I t ej;t1 j
33
where FIj is foreign assets in country j; TFIt is total foreign direct investment stock of firm i in year t; ej,t (home currency per foreign currency) is the annual bilateral foreign exchange rate between U.S. and country j in which the firm operates in year t
Strategic and Financial Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments
Table 3.
34
Table 3. (Continued ) Variable Name IFi (internal financing)
ACEi (agency cost expense ratio) ACAi (agency cost asset utilization ratio) Control variables Si (firm size) CONi (concentration ratio) USW (U.S. wealth) HCWi (host country wealth)
Free cash flow of firm i including income before extraordinary items, depreciation, amortization, deferred taxes, equity in earnings of unconsolidated subsidiaries, extraordinary items and discontinued operations, and minority interest Weighted average cost of equity and tax-adjusted cost of debt of firm i The number of geographic segments in which firm i operates Long-term debt ratio representing firm i’s capital structure The standard deviation of firm i’s earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) scaled by the mean of its total assets to avoid size bias Operating expense over total sales of firm i
Expected Sign +
+ +/ /+ +
Total sales divided by total assets of firm i
Total sales of firm i in natural logarithm Total sales of four largest firms in the industry of firm i divided by total sales of the industry The gross domestic products (GDP) of the U.S. in natural logarithm Weighted average GDP (in natural logarithm) of all host countries in which the firm operates: X FI j HCW i ¼ ln GDPj ; TF I i j
+
where FIj is the foreign assets in country j. TFIt is the level of total foreign direct investment of firm i in the particular year
JONGMOO JAY CHOI AND ERIC C. TSAI
EFi (external financing) IDi (international diversification) FRi (financial risk) BRi (business risk)
Description
IFi
EFi
IDi
FRi
BRi
ACEi
ACAi
Panel B: Correlation Matrix for Financial and Control Variables Financial Variables IFi 0.06 1.00 (o.01) EFi 0.02 0.01 1.00 (0.09) (0.42) IDi 0.06 0.20 0.01 1.00 (o.01) (o.01) (0.21) FRi 0.03 0.21 0.04 0.06 1.00 (0.02) (o.01) (o.01) (o.01) BRi o.01 0.25 0.01 0.01 0.04 (0.91) (o.01) (0.90) (0.42) (o.01) ACEi o.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 (0.99) (0.13) (0.90) (0.06) (o.01) ACAi 0.02 0.19 0.04 0.04 0.11 (0.09) (o.01) (o.01) (0.01) (o.01)
0.03 (o.01) 0.01 (0.43)
0.05 (o.01)
1.00
Control Variables Si 0.09 (o.01) CONi 0.03 (0.02)
0.09 (o.01) 0.01 (0.47)
0.13 (o.01) 0.02 (0.05)
0.10 (o.01) 0.04 (o.01)
0.75 (o.01) 0.06 (o.01)
0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.88)
0.31 (o.01) 0.06 (o.01)
0.27 (o.01) 0.03 (o.01)
Si
CONi
1.00 1.00
1.00 0.05 (o.01)
1.00
USW
Strategic and Financial Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments
WFXi
35
USW HCWi
36
Table 3. (Continued ) WFXi
IFi
EFi
IDi
FRi
BRi
ACEi
ACAi
Si
CONi
USW
0.15 (o.01) 0.30 (o.01)
0.12 (o.01) 0.04 (o.01)
0.01 (0.70) 0.01 (0.29)
0.11 (o.01) 0.03 (0.02)
0.01 (0.36) 0.06 (o.01)
0.03 (o.01) 0.01 (0.84)
0.01 (0.23) 0.04 (o.01)
0.03 (o.01) 0.05 (o.01)
0.07 (o.01) 0.05 (o.01)
0.26 (o.01) 0.10 (o.01)
1.00 0.11 (o.01)
JONGMOO JAY CHOI AND ERIC C. TSAI
Note: Panel B shows Pearson correlation coefficients between variables. In parentheses is the p value under H0: r ¼ 0, and o.01 indicates the p value is less than 0.01. Data sources: FDI is available from the CompuStat Geographic Segment database. CompuStat defines Identifiable Assets in a geographic segment or country as the tangible and intangible assets that are used by, or directly associated with, each geographic segment or country. The seven geographic segments as classified by CompuStat are Africa, Asia, Europe, Pacific, South America, North America, and Other Foreign Operations. CompuStat only identifies 10 countries with heaviest U.S. foreign investments, South Africa, Japan, Philippines, Great Britain, France, Germany, Australia, Brazil, Canada, and Mexico. To compute TC, geographic distance in miles is obtained from World Almanac and World Atlas. However, if some of a firm’s foreign operation is identified only in a geographic segment or only as foreign, for that portion of investment, the average distance in miles to that region or the total average miles is used. ID is available from the CompuStat Geographic Segment database. CompuStat reports the actual number of geographic segments disclosed by the firms. To compute WFX, bilateral exchange rates are obtained from International Financial Statistics (IFS) dataset. However, if some of a firm’s foreign operation is identified only in a geographic segment or only as foreign, for that portion of investment, the average exchange rate change in that segment or the rate of USD per SDR is used, respectively. To compute USW and HCW, GDPs are obtained from IFS dataset by IMF. In calculating HCW, however, if some of a firm’s foreign operation is identified only in a geographic segment or only as foreign, for that portion of investment, the average GDP of the countries in that region or the average world GDP is used. To calculate all other strategic, financial, and control variables, the accounting data are retrieved from CompuStat dataset.
Strategic and Financial Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments
37
Some empirical work in location analysis (e.g., Culem, 1988; Kravis & Lipsey, 1982; Maki & Meredith, 1986) uses wage rates or unit labor cost. However, several researchers, such as Huang (1997), argue that the labor cost may not be an accurate measure of location cost since the proportion of labor cost in the total production cost has been decreasing. Another location factor, transportation cost (TC), is frequently measured in empirical work (e.g., Grosse & Trevino, 1996) by geographic distance. As for ownership factors, the fixed asset ratio (XAR) is in line with the notion that corporations with higher operating leverage tend to have a greater ownership advantage in expanding their foreign production due to an oligopolistic edge such as economies of scale. Quite common in related work (e.g., Dunning, 1980; Pugel, Kragas, & Kimura, 1996), research and development expense ratio (RDR) measures a firm’s ownership advantage through its investment in knowledge production and technology know-how, which give the firm a competitive edge in the global market. Internalization variables comprise foreign sales ratio (FSR), measuring the degree of foreign involvement; intangible asset ratio (IAR), measuring the level of information-based assets; and sales expense ratio (SER), measuring operating efficiency. Internalization gains through FDIs derive from a higher level of informationbased assets, a greater degree of foreign involvement, and improving operational efficiency. IAR gauges the need for internalization, because internalization reduces loss of efficiency and uncertainty in the valuation of intangible or information-based assets given the market imperfection for such assets in the external markets.3 FSR represents a corporation’s degree of foreign involvement in many empirical studies (e.g., Click & Harrison, 2000; Duru & Reeb, 2001).4 Overall, conventional FDI theories, OLI in particular, would suggest positive effects on FDI and thus positive expected signs for these strategic variables. More favorable location, ownership, and internalization conditions motivate firms to step up their cross-border direct investments. 4.3. Financial Variables ‘‘Internal’’ capital market factors include foreign exchange rate, free cash flow, and cost of capital. In particular, the weighted foreign exchange composite (WFX) takes into account different FDI compositions of firms, and a negative sign for its coefficient is anticipated. Host country currency depreciation encourages FDI due to stronger internal capital markets for MNCs. Financing method variables include those that capture the profile of internal financing (IF) and external financing (EF). Consistent with existing
38
JONGMOO JAY CHOI AND ERIC C. TSAI
literature in corporate finance, free cash flow represents corporate wealth or internal financing capacity. We expect a positive sign for it, because the buildup of free cash flow (stronger internal capital market) offers firms an edge in the international bidding scenario. We estimate cost of capital for each firm and a negative sign is anticipated since, if internal funding is insufficient, a higher cost of external financing deters foreign investments.5 ‘‘Internal’’ corporate governance factors are related to managerial objectives or agency behaviors that lead to cross-border expansion and diversification. They include international diversification (ID), an overall measure for global diversification; financial risk (FR) and business risk (BR), measures of intended diversification for risk reduction; and expense ratio (ACE) and asset utilization ratio (ACA), measures for agency costs. International diversification (ID) measures a firm’s intention to spread its operations globally and thereby achieve risk-reduction benefits of a more diverse operating cash flow. It should be noted that even when diversification is not a primary objective, any international investment—whether intended or not—has a diversification dimension. We measure the extent of international diversification by the number of geographic segments in which a firm has FDIs (foreign assets). Other than country count, it is most frequently used in geographic diversification studies (e.g., Bodnar, Tang, & Weintrop, 1999; Duru & Reeb, 2001). Overall, there should exist a positive relationship between international diversification and FDI. More specifically, the intent of global diversification is to reduce risk in either business or financial dimension. As is common in the finance literature, we use longterm debt ratio, representing the firm’s capital structure, as a measure of financial risk. Business risk is measured by earnings volatility, the standard deviation of a firm’s earnings before interests and taxes but scaled by the mean of its total assets to avoid size bias. Given a certain level of total risk a firm can or will assume, it is unclear whether firms are more interested in diversifying financial or business risk. However, it appears that the goal of reducing a particular type of risk through FDI commands a positive sign for its coefficient. Furthermore, since they work as substitutes, the other one would have a negative coefficient. Regardless of its significance, the type of risk with a negative sign may be simply irrelevant in a firm’s diversification decision because the negativity is a consequence of the firm assuming a certain level of total risk. As for agency cost, a commonly used proxy for agency cost in the finance literature (e.g., Ang, Cole, & Lin, 2000) is the operating expense ratio (ACE), measuring how well the management controls operating costs including expenditure on excessive perquisites and
Strategic and Financial Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments
39
other direct agency costs.6 Another agency cost measure is the asset utilization ratio (ACA) measuring how well firms deploy and utilize their assets. Generally, low asset utilization ratio, or high expense ratio, indicates the presence of a more severe agency problem. If private benefits encourage managers to diversify their firms globally, ACE is expected to be positive and ACA negative. In the interest of parsimony, however, ACE is our primary measure of agency cost in estimation. These financial variables are selected in accordance with existing empirical literature as well as econometric considerations. However, the effect of agency behavior on FDI has not been tested at all in existing literature. Furthermore, a comprehensive analysis of financial determinants of FDIs based on firm-level data has not yet been done. It is imperative to verify that the collection of financial variables in our estimating framework is appropriate in a certain statistical sense. Panel B of Table 3 shows the correlation matrix for financial variables. The null hypothesis of no correlation cannot be rejected at any significance level for most of the pairs. For those few rejected, the magnitude of correlation is only about 0.02 or less. 4.4. Control Variables We use control variables at different levels: firm size (S) at the firm level, concentration ratio (CON) at the industry level, and the U.S. (USW) and host country wealth (HCW) at the country level. These variables take into account a firm’s resources, competition in the industry, and wealth of home and host countries. Given different patterns of global asset deployment among firms, the computation of certain variables, including WFX, TC, and HCW, is necessary to reflect each firm’s distinctive foreign investment activities. Their weighting schemes are identical as detailed in Table 3.
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 5.1. Strategic Factors Table 4 shows the estimation results of the strategic model. Most of the strategic variables in the OLI model are statistically significant and have the expected signs. For the full sample, except for sales expense ratio, all variables are significant at the 1% level and have the expected signs.7 Thus, overall the strategic motives for FDI, as indicated by the OLI model, appear
40
Table 4.
Strategic Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments FDIi ¼ a þ b1 PCi þ b2 TCi þ b3 XARi þ b4 RDRi þ b5 FSRi þ b6 IARi þ b7 SERi þ b8 Si þ b9 CONi þ b10 USW þ b11 HCWi þ i
Full Sample (N ¼ 1,838)
C (intercept) Strategic variables Location variables PC (production cost) TC (transportation cost) Ownership variables XAR (fixed asset ratio) RDR (R&D ratio)
5.63 (2.39)
Manufacturing Industries (N ¼ 1,131) 2.20 (0.88)
Other Industries (N ¼ 621) 17.67 (2.94)
DCs (N ¼ 1,551) 10.02 (3.70)
LDCs (N ¼ 1,014)
2.63 (0.55)
0.18 (9.43) 0.34 (5.74)
0.17 (8.67) 0.27 (4.17)
0.53 (2.90) 0.55 (4.07)
0.21 (9.85) 0.00004 (2.57)
0.01 (4.20) 0.0001 (2.53)
0.73 (4.36) 0.07 (3.92)
0.71 (3.80) 0.15 (2.91)
0.66 (1.74) 0.04 (1.55)
1.03 (7.04)
1.27 (5.22)
JONGMOO JAY CHOI AND ERIC C. TSAI
The dependent variable, foreign direct investment (FDI), is corporate foreign asset in natural logarithm. Corporate foreign asset is defined as identifiable asset (including both tangible and intangible assets) used by or directly associated with foreign operations outside the U.S.
IAR (intangible asset ratio) SER (sales expense ratio) Control variables S (firm size) CON (four-firm concentration ratio) USW (U.S. GDP) HCW (weighted host country GDPs) Adjusted R2 LM heteroskedasticity test (H0: homoskedasticity)
2.82 (27.76) 0.96 (5.33) 0.29 (1.66)
3.06 (26.59) 1.11 (5.82) 0.21 (1.09)
2.21 (10.07) 0.14 (0.30) 0.23 (0.56)
2.52 (21.19) 0.96 (4.99)
1.88 (9.46) 0.16 (0.44)
0.98 (81.19) 0.002
0.99 (71.24) 0.005
0.94 (35.24) 0.008
0.99 (76.32) 0.004
0.93 (44.77) 0.001
(0.98) 0.04 (0.17) 0.04 (1.71)
(1.72) 0.28 (1.04) 0.05 (1.74)
(1.95) 1.14 (1.71) 0.008 (0.13)
(2.18) 0.70 (2.31) 0.11 (2.99)
(0.35) 0.32 (0.06) 0.17 (3.96)
0.91 4.94a
0.92 5.20a
0.87 0.41c
0.83 2.52c
0.73 3.82b
Note: LM heteroskedasticity test follows w2 distribution with one degree of freedom. Manufacturing industries comprise firms with SIC between 2,000 and 3,999. Other industries exclude these manufacturing firms as well as financial firms with SIC between 6,000 and 6,999. DCs and LDCs refer to foreign direct investments in developed and less developed countries, respectively. The classification of developed and developing countries is according to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Significant at 1% level. Significant at 5% level. Significant at 10% level. The t-statistics are in parentheses. a The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected at the 5% level, but not rejected at the 1% level. b The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected at the l0% level, but not rejected at the 5% level. c The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is not rejected at any of the conventional 10%, 5%, or 1% level.
Strategic and Financial Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments
Internalization variables FSR (foreign sales ratio)
41
42
JONGMOO JAY CHOI AND ERIC C. TSAI
to be strong during the sample period of 1992–1998. Similarly, all OLI variables are significant for manufacturing industries at the 1% level except for sales expense ratio, with additional significance shown for three control variables (firm size, concentration ratio, and host country GDP). In contrast, other industries (non-manufacturing/non-financing) have their FDI most directly related to location variables. Two out of three internalization variables (intangible asset ratio and sales expense ratio) and one ownership variable (R&D ratio) are insignificant for the other industry category. In addition, the other ownership variable is only marginally significant. This makes sense because compared to manufacturing firms, non-manufacturing firms do not produce products that are heavily embedded with firm-specific ownership assets. They possess less ownership advantage and thus have a lesser need for internalization. It appears that location is the major concern in their FDI decisions. Table 4 further shows the behavioral pattern of FDI by U.S. firms depending on destinations, DCs versus LDCs. There does not exist distinctive patterns between FDI in DCs and in LDCs.8 Again, conventional FDI theories, internalization included, fail to explain the phenomenon that most FDIs occur between DCs. 5.2. Financial Factors Table 5 on the financial model of FDI indicates the general validity of the model. The results for the full sample show all financial variables having the expected signs at a high significance level except for foreign exchange, which is significant for the manufacturing industries and investments in DCs. However, compared to the strategic model, there is a greater variation in the results depending on industry sector and host country. The overall results, nevertheless, support our proposition that FDI is the consequence of the interaction between a stronger internal capital market and internal corporate governance. In sum, home currency appreciation, accumulation of corporate free cash flow, managerial objectives for risk reduction, and agency behavior, collectively, are the driving forces for FDI. Models with various combinations of variables, as shown in Table 6, are also estimated on the full sample and two conclusions may be drawn. First, except for foreign exchange, the results including signs and significance for the variables vary little across different equations. Clearly, as indicated in the previous correlation matrix, these variables do not interact with each other much and our results are relatively robust. Second, the foreign exchange variable has a much greater variability in its significance across the equations but always maintains the correct sign. It seems that the effect of
Financial Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments FDIi ¼ a þ b1 WFXi þ b2 IFi þ b3 EFi þ b4 IDi þ b5 FRi þ b6 BRi þ b7 ACEi þ b8 ACAi þ b9 Si þ b10 CONi þ b11 USW þ b12 HCWi þ i
The dependent variable, foreign direct investment (FDI), is corporate foreign asset in natural logarithm form. Corporate foreign asset is defined as identifiable asset used by or directly associated with foreign operations outside the U.S. Full Sample (N ¼ 1,838)
C (intercept)
0.82 (0.28)
Other Industries (N ¼ 621)
DCs (N ¼ 1,551)
LDCs (N ¼ 1,014)
2.53 (0.39)
7.47 (2.18)
1.91 (0.35)
0.47 (1.61) 0.13 (5.89) 0.17 (2.40)
0.52 (1.92) 0.07 (2.83) 0.14 (2.04)
0.93 (0.96) 0.19 (3.86) 0.05 (0.22)
2.02 (3.75) 0.12 (4.62) 0.02 (0.14)
0.09 (0.28) 0.13 (3.32) 0.30 (2.60)
0.43 (10.39)
0.42 (9.41)
0.50 (5.80)
0.18 (3.61)
0.32 (4.25)
43
Financial variables ‘‘Internal’’ capital market WFX (FDI-weighted foreign exchange composite) IF (internal financing: corporate free cash flow) EF (external financing: cost of capital) ‘‘Internal’’ corporate governance ID (international diversification)
3.27 (1.16)
Manufacturing Industries (N ¼ 1,131)
Strategic and Financial Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments
Table 5.
44
Table 5. (Continued )
FR (financial risk: capital structure) BR (business risk: earnings volatility) ACE (agency cost: expense ratio)
CON (four-firm concentration ratio) USW (U.S. GDP) HCW (weighted host country GDP) Adjusted R2 LM heteroskedasticity test (H0: homoskedasticity)
Manufacturing Industries (N ¼ 1,131)
Other Industries (N ¼ 621)
DCs (N ¼ 1,551)
LDCs (N ¼ 1,014)
0.55 (4.81) 0.92 (2.14) 0.07 (4.67)
0.35 (2.99) 0.66 (1.47) 0.09 (6.37)
0.53 (2.02) 0.63 (0.71) 0.29 (1.28)
0.69 (5.10) 1.03 (2.12) 0.10 (5.73)
0.24 (1.12) 1.65 (1.93) 0.19 (0.84)
0.85 (33.28) 0.0004 (0.16) 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (2.28)
0.94 (34.31) 0.01 (3.76) 0.37 (1.13) 0.06 (1.44)
0.68 (12.14) 0.0004 (0.09) 0.07 (0.09) 0.08 (1.00)
0.85 (27.64) 0.003 (0.94) 0.37 (0.97) 0.32 (6.04)
0.96 (20.49) 0.006 (1.29) 0.22 (0.36) 0.26 (5.19)
0.79 5.32a
0.84 5.32a
0.68 4.45a
0.73 2.30b
0.69 5.29a
Note: LM heteroskedasticity test follows w2 distribution with one degree of freedom. Manufacturing industries comprise firms with SIC between 2,000 and 3,999. Other industries exclude these manufacturing firms as well as financial firms with SIC between 6,000 and 6,999. DCs and LDCs refer to foreign direct investments in developed and less developed countries, respectively. The classification of developed and developing countries is according to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Significant at 1% level. Significant at 5% level. Significant at 10% level. The t-statistics are in parentheses. a The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected at the 5% level, but not rejected at the 1% level. b The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is not rejected at any of the 10%, 5%, or 1% conventional level.
JONGMOO JAY CHOI AND ERIC C. TSAI
Control variables S (firm size)
Full Sample (N ¼ 1,838)
Further Testing on Financial Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments FDIi ¼ a þ b1 WFXi þ b2 IFi þ b3 EFi þ b4 IDi þ b5 FRi þ b6 BRi þ b7 ACEi þ b8 ACAi þ b9 Si þ b10 CONi þ b11 USW þ b12 HCWi þ i
The dependent variable, foreign direct investment (FDI), is corporate foreign asset in natural logarithm form. Corporate foreign asset is defined as identifiable asset used by or directly associated with foreign operations outside the U.S. Full Sample (N ¼ 1,838) (1) C (intercept)
0.43
3.27 (1.16)
(1.83)
0.47 (1.61) 0.13 (5.89) 0.17 (2.40)
1.30 (3.45) 0.62 (28.94) 0.24 (2.43)
0.43 (10.39)
0.73 (13.09)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(9.13)
2.83 (0.96)
6.11 (2.21)
0.03 (1.67) 0.03 (0.51)
0.69 (2.52) 0.13 (5.89) 0.16 (2.20)
0.46 (1.59) 0.13 (5.92) 0.17 (2.40)
0.58 (1.90) 0.12 (5.38) 0.20 (2.61)
0.66 (2.32) 0.13 (6.09) 0.06 (0.93)
0.39 (10.83)
0.43 (10.27)
0.43 (10.40)
0.77 (0.31)
2.99 (17.37)
2.50
0.43 (10.88)
45
Financial variables ‘‘Internal’’ capital market WFX (FDI-weighted foreign exchange composite) IF (internal financing: corporate free cash flow) EF (external financing: cost of capital) ‘‘Internal’’ corporate governance ID (international diversification)
(2)
Strategic and Financial Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments
Table 6.
46
Table 6. (Continued ) Full Sample (N ¼ 1,838) (1) FR (financial risk: capital structure) BR (business risk: earnings volatility) ACE (agency cost: expense ratio) ACA (agency cost: asset utilization)
CON (four-firm concentration ratio) USW (U.S. GDP) HCW (weighted host country GDP) Adjusted R2 LM heteroskedasticity test (H0: homoskedasticity)
1.08
(4.81) 0.92 (2.14) 0.07 (4.67)
(6.95) 3.91 (6.91) 0.24 (3.79)
0.85 (33.28) 0.0004 (0.16) 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (2.28) 0.79 5.32a
0.59 0.51b
(3)
(4)
0.22
0.56
0.55
0.50
(4.95) 1.00 (2.34) 0.07 (4.69)
(4.85) 0.92 (2.15) 0.07 (4.67)
(4.16) 0.77 (1.72) 0.09 (5.40)
0.96 (43.17) 0.001 (0.53) 0.11 (0.42) 0.09 (3.26)
0.85 (33.36)
0.85 (33.39)
0.08 (2.29)
0.91 (34.99) 0.0003 (0.11) 0.16 (0.49) 0.06 (1.61)
0.87 (36.09) 0.001 (0.59) 0.38 (1.25) 0.09 (2.72)
0.83 6.56a
0.79 6.31a
0.79 5.36a
0.77 1.28b
0.79 4.24a
(2.34) 0.06 (4.40) 0.69 (17.68)
(5)
Note: LM heteroskedasticity test follows w2 distribution with one degree of freedom.
Significant at 1% level. Significant at 5% level. Significant at 10% level. The t-statistics are in parentheses. a
The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected at the 5% level, but not rejected at the 1% level. The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is not rejected at any of the 10%, 5%, or 1% conventional level.
b
(6)
(7) 0.49 (4.80) 0.07 (4.34)
JONGMOO JAY CHOI AND ERIC C. TSAI
Control variables S (firm size)
(2)
0.55
Strategic and Financial Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments
47
foreign exchange on FDI is consistent but its importance is lessened with the presence of some factors. To have a more comprehensive discussion on the proposition in this paper, we shall discuss the results of each financial factor individually both on the full sample and across different industry sectors and destinations. 5.2.1. Foreign Exchange The impact of the foreign exchange effect on FDI is via home currency appreciation, creating a stronger internal capital market for MNCs. In full sample estimations, the FDI-weighted foreign exchange composite variable has statistically significant coefficients with negative signs in most cases, meaning that a depreciation in the foreign currency or an appreciation in the U.S. dollar results in an increase in outward FDI by U.S. firms. This is also true for firms in the manufacturing industry, but the effect is insignificant for the ‘‘other’’ industries. These results are consistent with the view of Blonigen (1997), who argues that the exchange rate effect depends on firm-specific assets, which are more pronounced in manufacturing firms than in nonmanufacturing firms. In the context of acquisition, firm-specific assets can generate returns in currencies other than that used for purchase, and thus subject the acquiring firm to exchange risk. Hence, the exchange rate effect on FDI is more significant for manufacturing than for non-manufacturing firms. It is also interesting that there are significant differences in exchange rate impacts depending on destinations. The results for FDI in DCs are the same as those for manufacturing industry, i.e., outward FDI by U.S. firms is positively impacted by a strong dollar. However, the exchange rate is not a significant factor for FDI in LDCs. This is attributable to the fact that many currencies of the LDCs are effectively fixed or managed by the government. That is, there is little variability in observed data and hence little observed exchange rate impact. However, it does not mean that there is no risk or no risk management problem in developing countries, only that the risk is postponed and resolved ultimately by an eruption of crises or crashes as happened in the Asian financial crisis of 1997. In addition, DCs have more firms with advanced technologies or information-based assets. In the case of international acquisitions, firm-specific assets can be relevant to the effect of foreign exchange. Another point worth mentioning for the full sample estimations in Table 6 is that some factors seem to overshadow foreign exchange. It appears that, without controlling for firm size, foreign exchange is a very important factor (Eq. (2)). However, after controlling for firm size and host
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country GDP and with the presence of international diversification and business risk, the exchange rate is not a factor for FDI (Eqs. (1) and (5)). One possible explanation for its lesser importance for large firms is that they tend to have more resource and expertise in managing foreign exchange risk and may need less help from home currency appreciation to improve their internal capital markets. Furthermore, when large firms consider various factors simultaneously (e.g., international diversification, business risk, and host country wealth), foreign exchange seems to take a back seat in the FDI decision. These two reasons, foreign exchange being overshadowed by some other factors and the link between firm-specific assets and foreign exchange, may explain why the results of foreign exchange in the existing FDI studies are mixed. 5.2.2. Internal and External Financing Internal financing capacity shows the strength of a corporation’s internal capital market, but external financing becomes relevant when internal funding is insufficient. Internal financing or corporate wealth is usually measured in empirical work by corporate free cash flow. With an increase in free cash flow, a firm is likely to conduct more FDI, especially if it runs out of domestic investment opportunities. If a firm requires external financing, typically measured by its cost of capital, the higher rate undoubtedly hinders its ability to make cross-border investments. Both these financing effects, positive for internal and negative for external financing, are confirmed for the full sample, but internal financing tends to be more significant than external financing. These results are consistent with the view of Froot and Stein (1991) that internal financing is more important than external financing in international acquisitions. The internal financing variable is significantly positive both across all industry sectors and regardless of destinations. The effects of external financing are more selective. The coefficients are significant for manufacturing industries but insignificant for ‘‘other’’ industries. Utility firms (which are included in the other category) would raise equity capital to support initial investments, and given relatively stable income, their need for external financing might be relatively small on an ongoing basis. Manufacturing firms, in contrast, emphasize growth and the requirement of a higher degree of operating leverage could mean less free cash flow during the expansion stage. As a result, external financing is relatively more important.9 In addition, the internal financing variable is significant for FDI in both DCs and LDCs. However, the coefficient of external financing is significant
Strategic and Financial Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments
49
only in LDCs. This appears to be related to country risk. Given the complexity of FDI in LDCs, more funding, management expertise, experience in international business, and resource base for risk management may be required.10 It is entirely likely that firms with FDIs in LDCs must also rely on external financing. Another possibility, although further investigation is necessary, is the corporate concern for country risk or mere government regulation. As a means of minimizing their country risk exposure, multinational firms may prefer partial local financing for their investments in LDCs. In addition, some host country governments may limit the percentage of ownership by foreign investors. 5.2.3. International Diversification and Risk Reduction International diversification has both intended and unintended dimensions. The intended global diversification, in general, is regarded as the consequence of risk reduction in that operations are spread out over various countries or regions. The international diversification variable is highly significant and has the expected positive sign across the board – for the full sample, for all industry sectors, and for both DCs and LDCs. Most international investments, as it seems, are motivated by the desire to diversify globally for financial or business risk-reduction purposes. Of course, it is also possible that, for some investments, such a result is unintended. That is, even if diversification does not figure prominently in terms of motivation, these international investments, nonetheless, achieve a degree of geographical diversification. The underlying goal, however, could have a serious effect if managers are set to pursue their own personal gains at the expense of shareholders, which is to be discussed in the next section. In Table 6, financial risk and business risk variables are both significant and have exactly opposite signs as expected in all the equations in the full sample estimation. This is due to the fact that, to an extent, both risks work as substitutes. For a given amount of total risk a firm is willing or able to take, a firm with lower business risk can afford to increase its financial risk, or vice versa. However, since financial risk has a positive coefficient with greater significance, it appears that the target for risk reduction, if intended, is financial risk. Furthermore, for both manufacturing and other industries, financial risk is significant but business risk is not. Another plausible interpretation of this result is that risk diversification may apply to financial risk rather than business risk. This interpretation is consistent with the finding of Burgman (1996), who shows that international diversification does not necessarily lower earnings volatility – a measure of business risk – for MNCs.
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JONGMOO JAY CHOI AND ERIC C. TSAI
Furthermore, financial risk is relevant only for FDIs in DCs but not for those in LDCs. Apparently, firms consider DCs the better destination for their financial risk diversification. This is not surprising because most international acquisitions are financed by cash or equity swaps. DCs have well-developed capital markets that facilitate fair equity valuation. The notion that diversifying financial risk through investments in DCs would lower MNCs’ debt ratio over time is consistent with results of Lee and Kwok (1988) and Fatemi (1988), who suggest that MNCs have a lower debt ratio than domestic firms. 5.2.4. Agency Cost Agency problem could lead to unintended global diversification as well as potential firm value destruction. Of the two measures for agency cost, the expense ratio is the primary proxy in the interest of parsimony. However, in the full sample estimation, positive expense ratio and negative asset utilization ratio coefficients point in the same direction, a positive link between agency costs and FDI – more severe agency problems leading to higher FDI. Given the strong significant and consistent results on the full sample, it is not at all difficult to conclude that FDI is also driven by agency behavior – the pursuit of managers’ private benefits. This is obviously consistent with the findings in recent diversification discount studies. For instance, Click and Harrison (2000) establish the inverse relationship between multinationality and managerial equity ownership, and Duru and Reeb (2001) find managers diversify their firms in part due to their private benefits. It is also in line with the finding of Lee and Kwok (1988) that MNCs tend to have higher agency cost.11 The grouping results in Table 5 indicate that, after controlling for firm size, the agency problem exists only for manufacturing industries and for FDI in DCs. One plausible explanation is that the agency problem is more severe for corporations with more firm-specific or information-based assets. Given the relative abundance of these kinds of assets in manufacturing firms, in particular, such firms face more complex potential agency conflicts. These assets also make corporations less transparent and create more difficulty for corporate governance and monitoring. This explanation is in line with the finding in Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) that cross-border takeovers are more likely to take place in R&D intensive industries (more likely manufacturing). The result on DCs can be similarly understood. DCs have more advanced manufacturing firms (with greater firm-specific and information-based assets) than LDCs. Firms with such assets are preferable targets for managers of acquiring firms who pursue their own personal gains.
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Overall, the financial factors appear to be important in FDI decisions in addition to strategic factors. Given imperfections and information asymmetry in international capital markets, corporate FDIs are influenced by such financial variables related to internal capital markets and internal corporate governance. However, relative to strategic variables, there appears to be greater variability in the level of significance across industry sectors and destinations of investments for financial variables. In addition, all these financial variables are significant in the full sample estimations, but financial considerations on FDI appear to be more critical for manufacturing than for other industries and more essential for FDI in developed than in LDCs.12 5.3. An Integrated Model To put the relative importance of strategic and financial factors into perspective, we now combine these two sets of variables, in addition to control variables, in an integrated empirical model. Estimation results of an integrated model generally preserve the previous results obtained in each of the two models, especially for the full sample and FDI in DCs and LDCs.13 On the full sample, Table 7 shows that financial factors are as important as strategic factors for FDI by U.S. firms, with virtually all the variables significant. The table shows the same result – an equal importance of financial and strategic factors – for manufacturing. The performance of the integrated model declines a bit for other industries, but here strategic variables appear to be much more important than financial variables. The integrated model performs better for U.S. FDIs in DCs than for those in LDCs. However, there is no clear evidence in terms of the relative importance of strategic and financial variables in either region. We also calculated Schwartz’s Bayesian criterion for the three representative models: strategic, financial, and integrated.14 The Bayesian criterion should be as small as possible because the addition of an independent variable would raise this score if there is no incremental explanatory power. By this criterion, the strategic model performs better than the financial model for other industries. For the manufacturing industries, both models perform just about equally. The integrated model works best for the full sample. We did not pursue this line of inquiry in depth in this paper because, technically, it is contingent on the selection of a representative strategic or financial model. We are content, in this paper, with establishing the basic point that financial variables are necessary in addition to strategic variables in understanding FDI decisions fully, and leave the exact determination of their relative contribution for future research.
52
Table 7.
Strategic and Financial Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments
FDIi ¼ a þ b1 WFXi þ b2 IFi þ b3 EFi þ b4 IDi þ b5 FRi þ b6 BRi þ b7 ACEi þ b8 PCi þ b9 TGCDi þ b10 XARi þ b11 RDRi þ b12 FSRi þ b13 IARi þ b14 SERi þ b15 ACAUi þ b16 Si þ b17 CONi þ b18 USW þ b19 HCWi þ i
Full Sample (N ¼ 1,838)
C (intercept) Financial variables WFX (weighted foreign exchange) internal capital market variable IF (internal financing) internal capital market variable EF (external financing) – internal capital market variable ID (international diversification) – internal corp. governance var. FR (financial risk) – internal corporate governance variable
4.32 (1.88) 0.19 (0.63) 0.07 (3.85) 0.24 (3.99) 0.14 (3.90) 0.24 (2.49)
Manufacturing Industries (N ¼ 1,131) 0.83 (0.35) 0.09 (0.31) 0.07 (3.52) 0.33 (5.68) 0.16 (4.15) 0.24 (2.48)
Other Industries (N ¼ 621)
DCs (N ¼ 1,551)
LDCs (N ¼ 1,014)
13.16 (2.40)
1.71 (0.61)
4.37 (0.82)
0.96 (1.16) 0.08 (1.82) 0.02 (0.14) 0.08 (1.07) 0.25 (1.06)
0.23 (0.48) 0.05 (2.22) 0.12 (1.37) 0.12 (2.75) 0.24 (2.02)
0.10 (0.28) 0.04 (0.86) 0.45 (3.50) 0.60 (7.72) 0.08 (0.40)
JONGMOO JAY CHOI AND ERIC C. TSAI
The dependent variable, FDI, is corporate foreign asset in natural logarithm. Corporate foreign asset is identifiable asset, tangible or intangible, used by or directly associated with foreign operations occurring outside the U.S.
0.80 (2.35) 0.12 (4.16)
0.62 (1.75) 0.03 (0.95)
0.91 (1.23) 0.29 (1.06)
1.65 (4.13) 0.23 (6.40)
1.78 (1.92) 0.02 (0.04)
Strategic variables PC (production cost) – location variable TC (transportation cost) – location variable XAR (fixed asset ratio) – ownership variable FSR (foreign sales ratio) – internalization variable IAR (intangible asset ratio) – internalization variable SER (sales expense ratio) – internalization variable
0.27 (2.74) 0.20 (3.71) 1.59 (10.28) 2.90 (24.90) 0.83 (4.24) 0.22 (1.34)
0.06 (0.57) 0.19 (3.36) 0.97 (5.44) 2.96 (23.29) 0.97 (4.66) 0.38 (2.00)
1.17 (2.94) 0.31 (2.54) 2.02 (5.90) 2.89 (12.22) 0.47 (1.10) 0.15 (0.43)
0.57 (4.98) 0.12 (1.85) 1.35 (6.99) 2.91 (20.70) 1.33 (5.85) 0.45 (2.19)
1.34 (2.61) 0.32 (2.21) 2.14 (5.64) 2.59 (9.87) 0.14 (0.30) 0.48 (1.20)
0.89 (39.93) 0.002 (1.00) 0.02 (0.06) 0.02 (0.71)
0.91 (38.44) 0.01 (2.72) 0.53 (2.07) 0.07 (2.07)
0.89 (16.97) 0.003 (0.92) 0.82 (1.37) 0.09 (1.34)
0.90 (33.57) 0.003 (1.06) 0.12 (0.39) 0.01 (0.21)
0.99 (20.72) 0.002 (0.36) 0.28 (0.48) 0.21 (4.00)
0.88
0.92
0.84
0.77
Control variables S (firm size) CON (four-firm concentration ratio) USW (U.S. GDP) HCW (weighted host country GDP) Adjusted R2
0.82
Strategic and Financial Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments
BR (business risk) – internal corporate governance variable ACE (agency cost: expense ratio) – internal corp. governance var.
53
54
Table 7. (Continued )
LM heteroskedasticity test (H0: homoskedasticity)
Full Sample (N ¼ 1,838)
Manufacturing Industries (N ¼ 1,131)
Other Industries (N ¼ 621)
DCs (N ¼ 1,551)
LDCs (N ¼ 1,014)
5.10a
1.12c
3.82b
0.41c
6.40a
JONGMOO JAY CHOI AND ERIC C. TSAI
Note: LM heteroskedasticity test follows w2 distribution with one degree of freedom. Other industries exclude manufacturing and financial firms. DCs and LDCs refer to FDIs in developed and less developed countries, respectively. Significant at 1% level. Significant at 5% level. Significant at 10% level. The t-statistics are in parentheses. a The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected at the 5% level, but not rejected at the 1% level. b The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected at the l0% level, but not rejected at the 5% or 1% level. c The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is not rejected at any of the conventional 10%, 5%, or 1% level.
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS The mainstream FDI literature emphasizes strategic factors. This almost exclusive emphasis on strategic factors does not seem to be justified in practice. We introduce financial factors in addition to strategic factors as determinants of FDI. The estimation based on 1,838 U.S. firms for the period from1992 to 1998 indicates that the traditional OLI strategic factors are in fact significant in explaining FDI behavior in full sample estimations. The results do not differ much across destinations, although evidence suggests that strategic considerations have been more important for manufacturing than other industries. At the same time, evidence strongly indicates the importance of financial factors as well. The relevance of financial variables in FDI decisions is based on the assumption of imperfections in financial markets. Hence, the financial model of FDI shares the same assumption – market imperfections of some kind – with the mainstream FDI literature in the industrial organization framework. Estimations show that almost all financial variables identified – foreign exchange rate, profile of internal and external financing, risk and diversification variables, and agency costs – are significant for the full sample, for firms in manufacturing industries, and for investments in DCs. In general, these results support the basic notion underlying our financial model that FDI is the consequence of interaction between a stronger internal capital market and internal corporate governance. International diversification and internal financing variables, in particular, are important in all estimations regardless of destinations or industries. FDI in other industries is dependent only on the firm’s financial risk in addition to these two variables. The fact that FDI made by manufacturing industries (but not other industries) is significantly affected by foreign exchange appears to be related to the presence of firm-specific assets. Beyond the two common financial determinants – international diversification and internal financing – an additional list of financial variables is significant for FDI in DCs: foreign exchange, financial risk, and agency cost. For LDCs, only external financing is relevant in addition to internal financing and diversification. This reflects a different degree of development of capital markets and country risk in developed and developing countries. If one has to choose, there is a sense in which, overall, the strategic factors are the slightly more important considerations in FDI decisions. However, we also show that financial factors are important in FDI decisions in addition to strategic factors. Empirically, our financial model works quite well
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JONGMOO JAY CHOI AND ERIC C. TSAI
by itself or in conjunction with the OLI factors. Given imperfections and information asymmetry in international capital markets, generally, FDIs are influenced by such financial variables as foreign exchange, internal and external financing, risk and diversification, and agency problems of the concerned parties. However, relative to strategic variables, there appears to be greater variability in the level of significance of financial variables across industry sectors and across investment destinations. Most importantly, however, our financial model is better than the mainstream OLI framework in one sense – in that it is able to explain the prevailing FDI phenomena when OLI factors fail. First of all, why is the most popular FDI entry mode consistently and predominantly M&As rather than greenfield investments? It could be explained by the strength of the internal capital market and the consequence of internal corporate governance. Host country currency depreciation or corporate free cash flow buildup leads to a stronger internal capital market. It favors foreign acquisitions because the edge from currency movement could be short-lived and there is no reason not to use up the excess capacity from free cash flow quick, thus eliminating the inefficiency. Typically, greenfield investment is a longer-term project to plan, deploy, and complete. Agency behavior also favors foreign acquisitions simply because it is easier and quicker for managers to gauge and materialize their potential gains from acquiring an established firm than by building one from scratch. Second, why most FDIs occur between DCs can similarly be explained from financial perspectives. A stronger internal capital market facilitated by host country currency devaluation is more likely to happen in DCs than in LDCs because the foreign exchange rate oftentimes is fixed or managed by LDC governments. International acquisitions driven by agency behavior also favor DCs, where there resides a larger set of ideal targets for maximizing managers’ personal benefits. Another relevant point is that the popularity of M&A as the primary entry mode implies that DCs are the ideal destinations, as M&A is more likely to occur in a country having well-developed capital markets and legal systems. In addition, our evidence also shows that DCs are the destinations for firms to diversify their financial risk through foreign investments. Finally, financial factors are logical candidates to explain the often-observed short-term bilateral FDI swings between two countries. After all, financial variables such as foreign exchange, free cash flow, and cost of capital could vary significantly in a short period of time. Ever changing managerial objectives regarding global diversification and agency behavior in pursuing private benefits also assure that FDI is not likely to be a constant toward a particular country for an extended period of time.
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NOTES 1. For instance, in 1998, 91.6% of all FDI outflows were from developed countries and 71.5% of all FDI inflows were to developed countries. Source: World Investment Report, 1999, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2. Foreign assets are defined as identifiable assets, which include both tangible and intangible assets, used by or directly associated with operations abroad by U.S. firms. 3. Intangible assets in CompuStat dataset include a variety of patents, rights and agreements, licenses, goodwill, designs and drawings, franchises, quotas, subscription and client lists, and trademark. 4. One legitimate concern here is the potential problem of simultaneity. Granted, foreign sales are generated through both domestic and foreign productions. However, internalization focuses on the need for MNCs to switch from export (domestic production) to FDI (foreign production) to improve efficiency. If the sole purpose of FDI is to boost foreign sales, total sales go up too. FSR does not necessarily change significantly, especially if the ratio is relatively large. Therefore, simultaneity may be of little concern because the variable is measured by ratio rather than level. 5. The cost of equity is estimated by the capital asset pricing model, where the market risk beta is estimated for each firm based on the monthly data for the previous 60-month period, which is reported by CompuStat. The weights are based on the market value of equity and the book value of debt. 6. In comparison, the agency cost in Myers (1977) is advertising and R&D expenses divided by total sales. We did not use this because it blurs the distinction with internalization or ownership advantage. R&D expenses are often used as a measure of internalization or ownership factor. 7. Although the intercept is significant, it is negative, which is simply an indication that the starting point of FDI is relatively small given the dependent variable in natural logarithm form. The same goes for other equations with significant and negative intercepts. 8. Choi, Kim, and Chandran (1995) provide a summary of literature regarding ‘‘conventional’’ and ‘‘non-conventional’’ FDIs by multinationals from developed and developing countries, respectively. 9. As Table 2 shows, manufacturing industry has a lower cash reinvestment ratio – roughly 60% of that for ‘‘other’’ industry. 10. Not surprisingly, the significance of external financing on FDIs made by manufacturing firms and in LDCs is consistent with firm size effect (S). The size effects are greater for both groups than their counterparts. 11. To entertain classic agency theories, the agency problem related to FDIs is likely to be a substitution problem due to foreign exchange risk and country risk involved in international investments. If a foreign project is riskier than a comparable domestic project, the agency problem is more of the substitution problem as illustrated in Jensen and Meckling (1977) rather than underinvestment problem as posited in Myers (1978). The substitution problem describes the tendency of the management to substitute a riskier for a safer project for the interest of certain parties (in this case, their own).
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12. Incidentally, the firm size has a positive impact on FDI for the full sample and across all industry sectors and destinations. However, there is evidence that the absolute magnitudes of the size coefficients are somewhat larger for manufacturing than for other industries, indicating the scale of resources necessary for FDI. The size effects are greater for LDCs than for DCs, suggesting a notion that operations in LDCs generally require a larger resource base for risk management and experience in international business. 13. A couple of different variables does lose their significance for manufacturing and other industries and weighted foreign exchange also becomes insignificant for manufacturing firms and FDIs in DCs. However, this is not considered severe, given that all other results are consistent with previous estimations and that foreign exchange is overshadowed by firm size and few other variables. 14. Schwartz’s Bayesian criterion is believed to be superior to Akaike’s information criterion because it is asymptotically consistent for large sample (see Wei, 1990).
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Lee, K., & Kwok, C. (1988). Multinational corporations vs. domestic corporations’ international environmental factors and determinants of capital structure. Journal of International Business Studies,, 19, 195–217. Maki, D. R., & Meredith, L. N. (1986). Production cost differentials and foreign direct investment: A test of two models. Applied Economics, 18, 1127–1134. Miller, K. D., & Reuer, J. J. (1998). Firm strategy and economic exposure to foreign exchange rate movements. Journal of International Business Studies, 29, 493–514. Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 5, 147–175. Oxelheim, L., Stonehill, A., & Randoy, T. (2001). On the treatment of finance specific factors within the OLI paradigm. International Business Review, 10, 381–398. Pugel, T. A., Kragas, E. S., & Kimura, Y. (1996). Further evidence on Japanese direct investment in U.S. manufacturing. Review of Economics and Statistics, 78, 208–213. Ray, E. J. (1989). The determinants of foreign direct investment in the United States, 1979–85. In: R. C. Feenstra (Ed.), Trade policies for international competitiveness. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Stephan, M., & Pfaffmann, E. (2001). Detecting the pitfalls of data on foreign direct investment: Scope and limit s of FDI data. Management International Review, 41, 189–218. Stevens, G. V. G. (1998). Exchange rates and foreign direct investment: A note. Journal of Policy Modeling, 20, 393–401. Stulz, R. (1983). On the determinants of net foreign investment. Journal of Finance, 38, 459–468. Swenson, D. L. (1994). Impact of U.S. tax reform on foreign direct investment in the United States. Journal of Public Economics, 54, 243–266. Wei, W. W. S. (1990). Time series analysis: Univariate and multivariate methods. Redwood City, CA: Addison-Wesley.
MODELING THE EVOLUTIONARY SEQUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES Elmar Lukas ABSTRACT This paper contributes to the literature on foreign direct investment under uncertainty and underscores the importance of modeling the evolutionary sequence pattern of foreign market entry. The model presented helps to refine the application of real options in the international joint venture context by providing a closed-form solution in continuous time to value their overall strategic flexibility. Moreover, the analysis provides a novel perspective on existing empirical results and generates a number of new testable predictions.
1. INTRODUCTION As a result of an increasingly volatile economic environment, one of the main changes in the nature of multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) operations is related to the institutional choice of achieving access to foreign markets. Unlike identifying situations where a MNE can achieve majority control,
Value Creation in Multinational Enterprise International Finance Review, Volume 7, 61–73 Copyright r 2007 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1569-3767/doi:10.1016/S1569-3767(06)07003-8
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globalization forces have affected the need for firms to cooperate. Due to increased competition and the rapid pace of technological development, inter-company collaboration is now crucial to the pursuit of competitive advantage. As a consequence, the number of international joint ventures (IJVs), both horizontal (between competing companies) and vertical (between companies within a given value chain), has risen dramatically during the past two decades, especially when firms operate in highly uncertain industries (e.g., Broll & Marjit, 2005; Dunning & Narula, 2004; Todeva & Knoke, 2005). The increase is, however, not only driven by achieving access to markets but by seeking foreign tangible or intangible assets as well. Hence, sourcing of complementary assets internationally favors the choice of IJVs and acts as an ever-growing driving force for international collaboration in general (e.g., Hagedoorn, 2002). A joint venture (JV) is a legal organization formed by two or more parties to undertake jointly economic activity for mutual benefit. One can broadly distinguish between two basic organizational modes: equity JV and nonequity JV. The former is created when each partner has an equity share in the new venture. Non-equity JVs, in contrast, are agreements to cooperate in some way, but they do not involve the creation of new firms.1 A JV becomes international if at least one partner has its headquarter outside the venture’s country of operation or if the venture has a significant level of operation in more than one country (Geringer & Hebert, 1991). The search for determinants that drive the use and success of IJVs has a long tradition in the business and economics literature.2 The research conducted was primarily empirically in nature (e.g., Blodgett, 1992; Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Hennart, Kim, & Zeng, 1998; Kogut & Chang, 1996; Leung, 1997). While being extensively analyzed empirically, less effort, however, has been made in scrutinizing the properties of IJVs through rigorous theoretical modeling (e.g., Buckley & Casson, 1996; Marjit, Broll, & Mallick, 1995). Further, all attempts do not account for the fact that a firm’s commitment to invest into a new market is associated with sunk costs that cannot be recovered once the project is initiated. Moreover, foreign direct investment (FDI) decisions are to a large portion investment decisions under uncertainty and are only the first commitment of subsequent expansion. Hence, with respect to the initial switching decision, i.e., whether to abandon export or not, one has additionally to consider the impetus of subsequent expansion (Gilroy & Lukas, 2006). Another criticism stems results from the fact that these models only consider the unidirectional case. Thus, they lack explanation of divestment or strategic reorientation (e.g., Buckley & Tse, 1996; Rivoli & Salorio, 1996).
Modeling the Evolutionary Sequence of International Joint Ventures
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In the last decade, researchers have highlighted the importance of a more dynamic perspective in FDI theory. Consequently, real options theory has gained significant attention in the international business field because it not only captures dynamic aspects of decision theory but also represents an advance in conceptualizing and measuring the value of strategy under uncertainty (e.g., Chi & Seth, 2002). In brief, real options theory suggests viewing real investments as options buying the firm the rights such as to make investments later, the right to defer or alter scale or to initiate subsequent investments.3 Besides others, Buckley and Casson (1998) have drawn attention to this by arguing that the existing models do value FDI decisions only with respect to their immediate effects rather than in terms of possible new investment opportunities. In other words, in most cases initial foreign production serves as a platform for expansion abroad, indicating that the initial investments carry a high option value due to possible new investment opportunities, e.g., regional technology platforms (e.g., Chang & Rosenzweig, 2001; Howells & Wood, 1993; Kogut & Chang, 1996). It is clear that this fact is most obvious for IJVs and it is Kogut (1991) who puts this thought further. Possible project interdependencies within the IJV allow for strategic flexibility, calling for an interpretation of IJVs as platform investments. Thus, although unprofitable from a stand-alone perspective, the value of a JV can be much higher due to the flexibility to acquire later stakes of the venture in the future. Consequently, the termination of an IJV does not indicate its failure but the exploitation of its flexibility. Based on a two-stage binomial model, Chi and McGuire (1996) model a situation in which the MNE has the option to acquire or sell out the partner’s stake in an equity JV.4 They depict that both options create economic value for the partners, especially if the partners foresee different valuation expectations of the venture ex post and in the presence of transactions costs. By treating two sources of uncertainty explicitly in their model, the authors were also able to show how the options serve to diminish the risk of misappropriation and thus alleviate the difficulty of JV contracting under information asymmetry. Besides the theoretical analysis, the authors also present a number of testable hypotheses related to their work. In a more advanced model setting, Pennings and Sleuwaegen (2004) design an option model where both the timing of market entry and the entry mode are determined simultaneously. The switch from export, whether to a wholly owned subsidiary, a JV, or to licensing, is dependent on uncertainty of payoffs, cost structure, competitive stance of incumbents, tax differences, and the degree of cooperation between the JV partners. In particular, the timing of a JV is related to transfer prices, amount of equity share, market
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structure, and to the degree of governmental regulation. However, possible subsequent actions were neglected. While the option idea has become a building block for empirical research on IJVs lately (e.g., Folta & Miller, 2002; Reuer & Leiblein, 2000; Reuer & Tong, 2005), in-depth research is still lacking in the international business literature with respect to the consequent modeling of the evolutionary sequence pattern of an IJV. Thus, the goal of this paper is to model a JV induced market entry under uncertainty in a continuous time setting. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we will present the model: a two-phase market entry sequence. The main results are presented in Section 3, which also provides a synopsis of major comparative-static results. Finally, Section 4 summarizes the main findings and provides suggestions for further research.
2. THE MODEL This paper focuses on a representative equity-based JV between two private firms. Both firms combine complementary resources comprising firmspecific knowledge, which is either related to technology or marketing expertise or both. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that only a subset of overall knowledge is shared, however, in an amount that secures the agreed objective, such as R&D collaboration. Moreover, it is assumed that only one firm is a foreigner to the new market, namely the MNE, which has chosen a local partner in the host country. The choice of which entry strategy an enterprise chooses has no influence on the profit rates of other enterprises in the foreign market. Moreover, the value of the chosen FDI mode v(t) is ex ante unknown and follows a geometric Brownian motion. Assuming a perfect capital market, the existence of a unique martingale measure Q can be used to modify the stochastic differential equation, which results in dv=v ¼ ðr dÞ dt þ s dZ Q
(1) 2
where rd is the growth rate of the project value, s designates the variance of dv/v, r is the risk-free interest rate, d represents the opportunity cost of waiting, and dZQ indicates a Wiener process with non-zero drift. Let e refer to the initial equity stake the MNE investor has invested in and ¯ be the country-specific upper boundary for owning equity stakes held by foreign investors in a given country.5 Consequently, this initial strategy generates two exclusive strategic options. However, it is worthwhile to
Modeling the Evolutionary Sequence of International Joint Ventures
65
consider a time span in which the partners become acquainted and can check if joint work is possible for the sake of the venture. We account for this by assuming that the MNE has a certain time period [0,t1] in which it can decide how to continue with its market entry strategy. At the end of this period of length T, the MNE can decide whether it prefers to continue collaboration with the host partner by receiving the right to convert the IJV into a cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A), i.e., by acquiring the remaining shares ð¯ Þ at a later date. Counterbalancing this, the MNE might prefer the right to dissolve the IJV over the growth option by selling its own interest e to the local partner at a later date.6 Let us denote the optimal threshold separating both strategies with c. The option value F, the optimal trigger points vU, vL (representing the actual timing of the subsequent investment/divestment), and c may be solved recursively. From Dixit and Pindyck (1994) as well as Merton (1973) the results for a perpetual investment option and a perpetual divestment option, respectively, are commonly known. Thus, they are just summarized briefly. Under the assumption of a perpetual time to maturity and aforementioned boundary conditions the solution for a perpetual call option results in ( Avb1 vovU CðvÞ ¼ (2) ð¯ Þv I v vU with I as the corresponding cost for acquiring the rest of the equity stake ð¯ Þ; ð1b1 Þ ð¯ Þ 1 b1 I A¼ and b1 ð¯ Þ b1 1 sffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi 1 ðr dÞ ðr dÞ 1 2 2r þ þ 2 b1 ¼ 2 s2 s2 2 s as constants.7 From this, the optimal trigger value vU for the M&A strategy can be deduced, which results in vU ¼
1 b1 I ð¯ Þ b1 1
(3)
On the other hand, if the MNE decides to dissolve the IJV it will receive a perpetual put option. To be more precise, on exercising the second stage the MNE gives up an existing project with value ev and receives its abandonment value k (see, e.g., Chi, 2000). The value of this strategic option is thus
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given by
( PðvÞ ¼
Bvb2 k v
v4vL v vL
(4)
whereby s ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi 1 b2 k 1b2 1 ðr dÞ ðr dÞ 1 2 2r and b2 ¼ þ 2 B¼ b2 ðb2 1Þ 2 s2 s2 2 s are again constants. The corresponding optimal threshold value vL for initiating a divestment strategy results in vL ¼
b2 k b2 1
(5)
Consequently, the value of the chooser option is determined by F ¼ erT E Q ½maxfPðvÞ; CðvÞg
(6)
Q
with E [y] as the expectations operator under the martingale measure Q. This results in solving the following integral: 2 v ZL Zc rT 4 F ¼e ðk vÞ dPðvÞ þ Bvb2 dPðvÞ vL
1
Zvu þ
Avb1 dPðvÞ þ
c
Z1
3
_ 7 ðð Þv IÞ dPðvÞ5
ð7Þ
vu
where dP(v) denotes the implied probability measure. To derive a closedform solution for the complex chooser option one has to determine the aforementioned optimal threshold c. Thus, c is determined by the intersection of P(c) and C(c). From Acb1 ¼ Bcb2 ; we get !1=g 1b b1 vL 2 c¼ (8) 1 ð¯ Þ b2 v1b U with g ¼ b1 b2 : Solving Eq. (7) results in F ¼ kerT Nðd 3 Þ vedT Nðd 4 Þ þ Bvb2 Nðd 7 Þ Bvb2 Nðd 8 Þ þ Avb1 Nðd 5 Þ Avb1 Nðd 6 Þ þ ð¯ ÞvedT Nðd 1 Þ IerT Nðd 2 Þ
ð9Þ
Modeling the Evolutionary Sequence of International Joint Ventures
67
with v as the value of the overall IJV at time 0, N(y) as the cumulative normal distribution and v 1 v 1 ln ln þ r d þ s2 T þ r d s2 T vU 2 vU 2 pffiffiffiffi pffiffiffiffi d1 ¼ ; d2 ¼ s T s T ln d3 ¼
v 1 L r d s2 T 2 v pffiffiffiffi ; s T
b1 ln d5 ¼
v U
v
1 r þ b21 s2 T 2 pffiffiffiffi ; sb1 T
c 1 2 2 b2 ln r þ b2 s T v 2 pffiffiffiffi d7 ¼ ; sb2 T
v 1 L ln r d þ s2 T 2 v pffiffiffiffi d4 ¼ s T b1 ln d6 ¼
c 1 r þ b21 s2 T v 2 pffiffiffiffi sb1 T
v 1 2 2 L b2 ln r þ b2 s T 2 v pffiffiffiffi d8 ¼ sb2 T
Given the derived results, we can state that the MNE will initiate its foreign expansion strategy via the establishment of an IJV if the expanded net present value, i.e., the net present value rule adjusted by the value of subsequent flexibility exceeds the associated costs of entry. Thus, the MNE’s timing decision results in v þ F ðvÞ K 0
(10)
where K comprises the costs for setting up such a market entry strategy and ev designates the initial value of the IJV.
3. RESULTS This section presents a summarization of the results and the comparativestatic analysis. If not noted specifically, we will assume the following values: r ¼ 0.055, s ¼ 0.4, d ¼ 0.01, and k ¼ 0.8. The value of the IJV’s flexibility F is composed of the option value to dissolve the IJV (i.e., the first to fourth terms) and the growth option value, which reflects the value of the subsequent cross-border M&A strategy (i.e., the remaining terms). As the result indicates, F increases with uncertainty, abandonment value, and time to
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0.85 0.80 0.75
F(v)
0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 T 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Fig. 1.
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
v(t)
Value of Combined Acquisition/Divestment Option F With Respect to v(t) and Time of Joint Collaboration T.
maturity T ¼ t1. In addition, the value of the IJV’s flexibility decreases with high initial equity shares, i.e., the lower the initial equity share the more valuable is the option, and higher acquisition costs for the remaining shares. Fig. 1 summarizes some of the results graphically. The comparative-static results for the trigger values vL, and vU are wellknown from the standard literature.8 The threshold value vU becomes larger and so does the propensity to wait when turning the IJV into a merger; the higher the costs of acquiring the remaining shares I are, the smaller b1 is. Moreover, an increase in involved aggregate investment uncertainty leads to an increase in vU. In addition, the trigger value is also dependent on the size of equity share e. If the MNE already holds a majority in the IJV, 1=ð¯ Þ becomes significantly large, thus indicating an increased propensity to wait before acquiring the remaining shares (i.e., higher threshold value). Due to the concavity of vU(s), the effect of e and I is more significant when the aggregate uncertainty of the overall project is higher. The opposite can be observed for the trigger value of the divestment stage. Low uncertainties correlate with a high threshold value. Due to the dependence of b2 on s, vL decreases as uncertainty increases, indicating that the propensity to wait also increases. This effect is further amplified, the lower the initial equity share e
Modeling the Evolutionary Sequence of International Joint Ventures
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or the higher the recovery value k is. However, due to the convexity of vL(s), the effect of k and e is more significant the lower the aggregate uncertainty of the overall project is. The chooser option is a path-dependent derivative. Hence, implications about the kind of termination the MNE chooses at time t1 can only be made in conjunction with the threshold c. As noted earlier, at t1 the MNE chooses that strategy, giving maximum return option value according to maxfCðvÞ; PðvÞg: Consequently, if vt1 is greater than c, the MNE will stick to its current strategy and further collaborate until the above-mentioned threshold vU is reached, turning it into a merger. If vt1 is lower than c, the MNE will further collaborate while at the same time preferring to dissolve the IJV. From the results derived, c shows now two different trends with respect to its dependence on project uncertainty. If the MNE holds a majority in the IJV, the threshold increases the higher the aggregate uncertainty is. Consequently, with increased uncertainty there is a perceived trend toward sell out because the MNE demands a higher project value for compensating the associated risks accompanied with a merger strategy. For minority IJVs, however, c is inversely dependent on project uncertainty. Thus, the chance for a subsequent merger is even greater the higher the project uncertainty becomes. Furthermore, given the fact that c is (not) reached, the propensity to initiate the investment (divestment) is even faster the lower the uncertainty s is (i.e., because only small upward (downward) movements of v(t) are needed to hit the corresponding threshold value). Both trends are dampened by a decrease in recovery value k. Fig. 2 depicts graphically the dependence of c on uncertainty and equity stake. In most cases, host governments are concerned about the actual amount invested in their country. While waiting for new information generally improves the overall risk exposure of the MNE in such a setting, i.e., given sunk costs and uncertainty, value for the host country is only generated if the firm exercises its real options right. Treating the initial decision of whether to start the IJV or not as an option right, the firm will invest as soon as Eq. (10) is satisfied. Because F(v) is always positive, the generated flexibility can offset the transaction cost comprised by K, which is, e.g., the case for highly uncertain projects (see, e.g., Sanchez, 1993).
4. SUMMARY The expansion of MNEs is a path-dependent process that is reflected in the fact that the observed internationalization processes of MNEs are not only a
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2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.0
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.1
0.7 0.6
0.2 0.3
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.5 0.6 0.7
Fig. 2.
0.3
Critical Threshold Value c(r,d,s,e,I,k) for the IJV Termination Strategy With Respect to Uncertainty s and Equity Stake 咞 1Þ:
unidirectional paths. Therefore, strategic reorientation, divestment, or withdrawal must also be considered as serious strategies. The results show the new complementary insight that the evolutionary sequence of market entry via IJVs is not only driven by the growth option, as commonly modeled in the literature, but also by the flexibility to dissolve the JV. While it has been commonly agreed that IJVs are a transitional form of foreign market expansion, less emphasis has been placed on what triggers the choice of termination form. Consequently, the model provides a solution that allows revealing which kind of termination is chosen by the MNE given the initial equity stake in the venture and uncertainty. Moreover, implications for governmental policies to attract FDI can be deduced from the model. The study presented provides new opportunities for further empirical research under an option framework or to extend the model by introducing, e.g., tax differentials.
NOTES 1. See Glaister, Husan, and Buckley (1998). However, in non-equity JVs sharing or exchange of equity may occur between partners (see ibid, p. 170).
Modeling the Evolutionary Sequence of International Joint Ventures
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2. See, e.g., Gilroy (1993). 3. A detailed introduction to real options is given by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Trigeorgis (1998). 4. Although not explicitly stated, this model can be interpreted as a chooser option, albeit only two discrete states are considered. 5. Thus, the venture will be an equity joint venture JV if 0:05oo¯ (see, e.g., Gomes-Casseres, 1987). 6. The last step may be justified because a subsequent innovation renders an existing partner’s technology obsolete or due to misappropriation risk. Consequently, the venture is abandoned for the sake of a new venture or for withdrawal from the foreign market. 7. It is assumed that the acquisition price is fixed right from the start. For a justification of this assumption refer to, e.g., Chi and McGuire (1996). 8. See, e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author would like to thank Udo Broll, B. Michael Gilroy, and participants of 4th Korea and the World Economy Conference in Seattle for helpful comments and discussions. Any remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the author.
REFERENCES Blodgett, L. L. (1992). Factors in the instability of international joint ventures: An event history analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 13(6), 475–481. Broll, U., & Marjit, S. (2005). Foreign investment and the role of joint ventures. South African Journal of Economics, 73(3), 474–481. Buckley, A., & Tse, K. (1996). Real operating options and foreign direct investment: A synthetic approach. European Management Journal, 14(3), 304–314. Buckley, P. J., & Casson, M. C. (1996). An economic model of international joint venture strategy. Journal of International Business Studies, 27, 849–876. Buckley, P. J., & Casson, M. C. (1998). Models of the multinational enterprise. Journal of International Business Studies, 29(1), 21–44. Chang, S. J., & Rosenzweig, P. (2001). The choice of entry mode in sequential foreign direct investment. Strategic Management Journal, 22(8), 747–776. Chi, T. (2000). Option to acquire or divest a joint venture. Strategic Management Journal, 21(6), 665–687. Chi, T., & McGuire, D. J. (1996). Collaborative ventures and value of learning: Integrating the transaction cost and strategic option perspectives on the choice of market entry modes. Journal of International Business Studies, 27(2), 285–307.
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Chi, T., & Seth, A. (2002). Joint ventures through a real options lens. In: F. J. Contractor & P. Lorange (Eds), Cooperative strategies and alliances: What we know 15 years later (pp. 71–87). Amsterdam: Elsevier. Dixit, A. K., & Pindyck, R. S. (1994). Investment under uncertainty. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Dunning, J. H., & Narula, R. (2004). Multinationals and industrial competitiveness: A new agenda. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Folta, T. B., & Miller, K. D. (2002). Real options in equity partnerships. Strategic Management Journal, 23(1), 77–88. Gatignon, H., & Anderson, E. (1988). The multinational corporation’s degree of control over foreign subsidiaries: An empirical test of a transaction cost explanation. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 4, 305–336. Geringer, M., & Hebert, L. (1991). Measuring performance in international joint ventures. Journal of International Business Studies, 22(2), 249–263. Gilroy, B. M. (1993). Networking in multinational enterprises: The importance of strategic alliances. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. Gilroy, B. M., & Lukas, E. (2006). The choice between greenfield investment and cross-border acquisition: A real option approach. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 46(3), 447–465. Glaister, K. W., Husan, R., & Buckley, P. J. (1998). UK international joint ventures with the triad: Evidence for the 1990s. British Journal of Management, 9(3), 169–180. Gomes-Casseres, B. (1987). Joint venture instability: Is it a problem? Columbia Journal of World Business, 22(2), 97–102. Hagedoorn, J. (2002). Inter-firm R&D partnerships: An overview of major trends and patterns since the 1960. Research Policy, 31(4), 477–492. Hennart, J.-F., Kim, D.-J., & Zeng, M. (1998). The impact of joint ventures on the longevity of Japanese stakes in the U.S. manufacturing affiliates. Organization Science, 9(3), 382–395. Howells, J., & Wood, M. (1993). The globalisation of production and technology. London: Belhaven Press. Kogut, B. (1991). Joint ventures and the option to expand and acquire. Management Science, 37(1), 19–33. Kogut, B., & Chang, S. J. (1996). Platform investments and volatile exchange rates: Direct investment in the U.S. by Japanese electronic companies. Review of Economics and Statistics, 78(2), 221–231. Leung, W. F. (1997). The duration of international joint ventures and foreign wholly-owned subsidiaries. Applied Economics, 29(10), 1255–1269. Marjit, S., Broll, U., & Mallick, I. (1995). A theory of overseas joint ventures. Economics Letters, 47(3–4), 367–370. Merton, R. C. (1973). Theory of rational option pricing. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 4, 141–183. Pennings, E., & Sleuwaegen, L. (2004). The choice and timing of foreign market entry under uncertainty. Economic Modelling, 21(6), 1101–1115. Reuer, J. J., & Leiblein, M. J. (2000). Downside risk implications of multinationality and international joint ventures. Academy of Management Journal, 43(2), 203–214. Reuer, J. J., & Tong, T. (2005). Real options in international joint ventures. Journal of Management, 31(3), 403–423.
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Rivoli, P., & Salorio, E. (1996). Foreign direct investment and investment under uncertainty. Journal of International Business Studies, 27, 335–357. Sanchez, R. (1993). Strategic flexibility, firm organization, and managerial work in dynamic markets: A strategic options perspective. Advances in Strategic Management, 9, 251–291. Todeva, E., & Knoke, D. (2005). Strategic alliances and models of collaboration. Management Decision, 43(1), 123–148. Trigeorgis, L. (1998). Real options: Managerial flexibility and strategy in resource allocation. Cambridge: MIT Press.
APPENDIX A While the first two and the last two integrals of Eq. (7) are similar to the Black–Scholes integral and are solved for accordingly, one has to apply Itoˆ’s lemma to dvb and vb, respectively, to solve the remaining integrals. Thus, neglecting dividends this time we get dvb ¼ rvb dt þ sbvb dZ Q
(A.1)
b TþsbZQ T
(A.2)
vbT ¼ vb erT1=2s
2 2
The last two terms of the exponential function can be substituted into a stochastic process XV Nð1=2s2 b2 T; s2 b2 TÞ: Exemplarily, the solution is drafted for only one integral. The resulting integral e
rT
ZvU
Avb1 dPðvÞ
(A.3)
c
can be transformed by substituting Eq. (A.2) into ¼e
rT
Zb
Avb1 erTþs f Nð1=2s2 b2 T; s2 b2 TÞ ðsÞ ds
(A.4)
a
with a ¼ b1 lnðc=vÞ rT and b ¼ b1 lnðvU =vÞ rT as lower and upper boundaries. Utilizing the symmetry features of the normal distribution, i.e., Rb Rb Ra a f ðxÞ dx ¼ 1 f ðxÞ dx 1 f ðxÞ dx; the integral can easily be solved.
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NEW TRENDS AND PERFORMANCES OF KOREAN OUTWARD FDI AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS Seong-Bong Lee ABSTRACT This paper analyzes new outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) patterns, OFDI performance after the financial crisis in Korea, and the anticipated impact of these changes in OFDI on the Korean economy. This paper examines current trends in Korean OFDI activities from various viewpoints, including the geographical distribution of investments, industry, size, and investors’ equity share. This paper also verifies the relationship between OFDI and the Korean economy through an in-depth analysis of motives, performance, and prospects of Korean OFDI. Finally, two emerging issues regarding Korean OFDI are discussed.
1. INTRODUCTION Korean outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) increased rapidly during the 1990s. The Korean chaebols were main players in this OFDI increase (Bae & Hwang, 1997; Dent & Randerson, 1997; Park, 2000). However, it Value Creation in Multinational Enterprise International Finance Review, Volume 7, 75–96 Copyright r 2007 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1569-3767/doi:10.1016/S1569-3767(06)07004-X
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decreased significantly during the three to four years after the financial crisis (Lee, 2000), and then reversed in 2002, increasing once again. One feature of the current rise in OFDI is that not only are large enterprises engaging in OFDI but also small- and medium-size companies. Therefore, Korean OFDI now shows a mixed investment pattern in which two different types of investment coexist: one performed by big companies, including Samsung, LG, and Hyundai Motors, to secure large local markets such as the United States and the European Union; the other by small- and medium-size companies to ensure low labor costs. This new pattern of OFDI reflects structural changes in the Korean economy as well as the growing trend of reciprocal influences. This paper analyzes new OFDI patterns, OFDI performance after the financial crisis in Korea, and the anticipated impact of these changes in OFDI on the Korean economy. The first part of this paper gives a brief historical overview and talks about recent developments in Korean OFDI policy. The following part examines current trends in Korean OFDI activities from various viewpoints, including the geographical distribution of investments, industry, size, and investors’ equity share. This paper also verifies the relationship between OFDI and the Korean economy through an in-depth analysis of motives, performance, and prospects of Korean OFDI. Finally, two emerging issues regarding Korean OFDI are discussed.
2. TREND OF KOREAN OUTWARD FDI 2.1. OFDI Policy in Korea During the late 1980s, the Korean economy was booming, emerging from the lack of foreign currency that characterized the previous period, and Korean local firms, which matured rapidly under an export-led economic system, started to engage in active market-seeking activities, which directly led to a large increase in OFDI. From the late 1980s until the mid-1990s, Korean OFDI activities showed constant progress. Korea became a member of the OECD in 1996 and, from an institutional perspective, developed a freer market system and executed the switchover from an approval system to a notification system regarding its OFDI rules in August 1997 (Park, 2000). From the 1997 financial crisis until 2001, however, Korea showed an overall decline or stagnation in its OFDI activities. A large number of Korean firms closed or sold off their overseas subsidiaries. A particular
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characteristic of that time is that many overseas subsidiaries had a heavily indebted capital structure, which required parent companies to feed them in the form of loan guarantees. As a result, the Korean government introduced a system limiting the amount of loan guarantees from Korean parent companies in overseas capital investment to achieve a higher degree of soundness in OFDI activities. The limit for a loan guarantee was set at 95 percent of the outstanding level of guarantee, which only applied to affiliates of the 30 largest chaebols. Since 2002, Korean OFDI has been increasing, with a foreign exchange reserve of over $200 billion. The Korean government has also changed its OFDI policy to be less limiting to promote more OFDI. The limit on loan guarantees will be abolished in 2006. The current Korean policy for supporting OFDI can be categorized into the following three policies: loan programs, information provisions, and the reduction of non-commercial risks. The first policy, loan programs, consists of a loan program of the Export-Import Bank of Korea for financing of OFDI (up to 80 percent of the OFDI amount) and a loan program from the international economic cooperation fund of the Korean government, which is applicable to OFDI in developing countries with a long-term return period (The Ministry of Finance and Economy, 2002). The Export-Import Bank of Korea is a representative of the institutions that provide Korean overseas investors with useful information on the economic, business, and living conditions in host countries. The Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency provides, through its branch offices in each country, information to Korean firms that are investing in a particular region. In addition, the Korean Export Insurance Corporation offers export insurance to investors to reduce the non-commercial risks of OFDI, such as losses from war, nationalization, and so forth. The Korean government signed the ‘‘Investment Protection Agreement’’ with more than 70 countries to provide a more secure legal shelter for Korean OFDI. It also signed tax treaties with 62 countries to avoid possible international double taxation on the incomes of Korean subsidiaries abroad. 2.2. Overall OFDI Trends Clear differences between pre- and post-crisis trends in Korean OFDI over the past decade can be observed. Before the crisis of 1997, OFDI, led by Korean firms, was consistently rising. In 1994, it started increasing by nearly $1 billion per year due to the fact that large Korean firms, especially chaebols, began actively engaging in OFDI in accordance with global
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business strategies. However, a radical restructuring of Korean firms during and after the crisis resulted in a sharp decline in OFDI performance, a trend that would reverse after 2002. The net outstanding invested amount of Korean OFDI is now $43.5 billion (October 31, 2005). Another important characteristic of post-crisis Korean OFDI is the sharp increase in OFDI withdrawal from 1998 to 2001. The annual average amount of OFDI withdrawal during the 1993–1997 period equals about $350 million (Table 1). During the post-crisis period, it exceeded $1 billion in 1998 and $3.3 billion in 2001. Then the amount began to decline in 2002, and eventually fell to $760 million in 2004. The total amount of OFDI withdrawal during 1998–2002, when the firm restructuring process was most extensive, equals $8 billion, which amounts to no less than 64.5 percent of $12.3 billion, the total OFDI withdrawal during the whole period from 1968 to the end of October 2005. This statistic shows that many Korean firms closed their foreign subsidiaries during the restructuring period. The net outstanding invested amount, which is the amount invested subtracted by the amount withdrawn, has demonstrated a recovery since 2002. This can be interpreted as Korean firms resuming active OFDI with the near-completion of the restructuring process. Table 1. Year Until 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005a Total
Korean OFDI Trends (Thousands of Dollars). Invested Amount
Withdrawn Amount
Net Amount
5,221,230 1,264,637 2,304,511 3,139,923 4,450,375 3,677,605 4,792,703 3,329,688 5,051,696 5,139,834 3,681,759 4,019,355 5,932,860 3,821,552
802,300 245,226 273,031 313,458 652,512 267,082 1,066,117 1,057,325 1,450,319 3,292,283 1,091,841 693,268 766,537 364,932
4,418,930 1,019,411 2,031,480 2,826,465 3,797,863 3,410,523 3,726,586 2,272,363 3,601,377 1,847,551 2,589,918 3,326,087 5,166,323 3,456,620
55,827,728
12,336,231
43,491,497
Source: The Export-Import Bank of Korea, Overseas Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, each year. a Until October 31, 2005.
Millions of Dollars
OFDI Performance after the Financial Crisis in Korea
6,000 5,500 5,000 4,500 4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0
Others Latin America Europe North America Asia
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Fig. 1.
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2004
Korean OFDI by Region (In Years). Source: The Export-Import Bank of Korea, Overseas Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, each Year.
2.3. OFDI by Region By 2004, Korean OFDI in Asian countries was $16.8 billion, which accounted for 43 percent of the total net outstanding invested amount of OFDI. North America ranked second with $10.8 and accounted for 27 percent. European countries made up 17 percent with $6.7 billion and Korean OFDI in Latin American countries was $3.4, 9 percent of Korea’s total OFDI. Fig. 1 shows OFDI trends by location. Most interesting is the fact that Korean OFDI in Asia has increased in recent years. This increased investment is closely related to rapidly increased investment in China. Fig. 2 shows figures for Korean investment in China. According to this graph, there has been rapid growth, or 54 percent of annual growth, since 2001: $0.6 billion in 2001, $1.2 billion in 2002, $1.63 billion in 2003, and $2.2 billion in 2004. In 2002, China became the primary recipient of Korean investment, occupying the United States’ former position. Investments in the United States were $0.57 billion in 2002, $1.05 billion in 2003 and $1.34 billion in 2004, exhibiting a widening investment gap between the United States and China. 2.4. OFDI by Industry If we look at the outstanding net amount invested by industry, the manufacturing sector occupies the largest piece of the pie at 53 percent ($21 billion). The second largest belongs to wholesale and retail, which takes up 22 percent ($8.7 billion). The mining industry follows, holding 6 percent
2,200 2,000 1,800 1,600 1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200 0
04
03
20
01
02
20
20
00
20
99
20
98
19
97
19
96
19
94
95
19
19
93
Total invested projects
19
Fig. 2.
2,200 2,000 1,800 1,600 1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200 0
Total invested amount
Projects
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19
Millions of Dollars
80
Korean OFDI Trends in China. Source: The Export-Import Bank of Korea, Overseas Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, each Year.
Fig. 3. Korean OFDI in the Manufacturing Sector by Type and Region. Source: The Export-Import Bank of Korea, Overseas Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, each Year.
($2.1 billion), and other sectors including the service industry take up 19 percent of the total. This shows that firms in the manufacturing sector have been the driving force behind Korean OFDI. In other words, Korean investment is concentrated in ensuring overseas production facilities (53 percent) or market expansion to increase sales (22 percent). However, a low degree of investment in the service sector compared to that of the manufacturing sector shows that Korea has relatively weak competitiveness in the world services market. Analyzing investment in ‘‘manufacturing’’ and ‘‘trade and retail’’ by subcategorizing and observing them by region (Figs. 3 and 4) produces
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Fig. 4. Korean OFDI in the Trade and Retail Sector by Type and Region. Source: The Export-Import Bank of Korea, Overseas Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, each Year.
interesting figures. ‘‘Electronics and telecommunication equipment’’ comprises 33 percent of the total net outstanding invested amount in manufacturing sector, with $6.8 billion, and ‘‘motors and equipment’’ follows it taking up 12 percent with $2.5 billion. It becomes clear that Korean OFDI in manufacturing is primarily led by electronics and automobile firms. When divided by region, Asia leads with $11.5 billion, or 55 percent of the total net outstanding invested amount in the manufacturing sector, North America with $4.4 billion or 21 percent, and Europe with $4 billion or 19 percent of total manufacturing investment. Such regional disparity demonstrates that Korean manufacturing firms aim for cost minimization when engaging in OFDI. In other words, the fact that more than half of investments in Asia go to China and South-East Asian countries makes clear the importance of cost minimization through the capitalization of the relatively low wages in those countries. Investment in the North American and European regions can be accounted for by Korean firms’ desire for costeffective measures in those markets, such as tariff and non-tariff trade barrier evasions and the reduction of transportation costs. In the case of ‘‘trade and retail’’ investments by Korean firms, 34 percent of the total net outstanding invested amount ($7.1 billion) was achieved by electronics and equipment firms at the end of 2004, and 21 percent ($4.4 billion) by automobile firms. This means that the aggregate amount invested in foreign sales subsidiaries by electronics and automobile firms takes up 55 percent of the total overseas investment. Therefore, this implies that Korean firms, particularly exporters of electronics and automobile industries, have a clear motive behind developing overseas markets. The geographical dispersal of trade and retail investment shows that 43 percent of the total amount invested ($9 billion) goes to North America,
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while Europe and Asia receive 25 percent each. This implies that investment in this sector can be fully characterized as a market-seeking investment with the purpose of increasing exports to the target market. 2.5. OFDI by Investing Enterprise
Millions of Dollars
The investing firms can be classified as large enterprises and small and medium enterprises (SMEs). By 2004, the net outstanding invested amount by large enterprises was $27.37 billion, which accounted for 69 percent of the total amount of investments. In comparison, SMEs accounted for 27 percent with $10.7 billion, and other individual investors accounted for 4 percent with $1.5 billion. However, the project basis distribution is different: 61 percent for SMEs, 29 percent for other individual investors, and 10 percent for large enterprises. Large enterprises invested a large amount of money in a few projects, which accounts for the disparity in distribution between amounts and project bases (Fig. 5). This can be observed more clearly when looking at OFDI by invested amount per project. By the end of 2004, the sum of investments over $50 million per project was $14.25 billion, which accounted for 36 percent of the total net outstanding invested amount, and the sum of investments from $10 million to $50 million was $10.29 billion, making up 26 percent of the total. The sum of these two investment types was $24.44 billion, which accounted for 65 percent of total net outstanding invested amount, similar to the 69 percent of the amount invested by large enterprises. The interesting thing is that the share of OFDI by SMEs continues to increase from year to year. From 2000 to 2004, the share of investments by SMEs increased by 33.7 6,000 5,500 5,000 4,500 4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0
Others SME Large enterprise
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Fig. 5. Korean OFDI by Investing Enterprise and Year. Source: The Export-Import Bank of Korea, Overseas Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, each Year.
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percent of annual average growth. This growth rate was two times higher than that of 17.5 percent during 1993–1999. It means that SMEs have been actively participating in FDI in the past five years. The amount of investments per project by SMEs is also increasing. From 1993 to 1999, the average investment amount per project by SMEs was $701,000, whereas from 2000 to 2004, it increased to $1.1 million. Increasing SME investment, both in project numbers and monetary value, implies that more and more Korean SMEs are not just trying to secure efficient manufacturing facilities at low costs, but rather struggling to survive by moving most of their value chains to foreign countries. 2.6. Management Control over Foreign Subsidiaries of Korean Firms One of the most used indicators for management control over foreign subsidiaries of Korean firms (Guillen, 2003) is statistics on OFDI by the investor’s equity ratio. On a project basis, wholly owned foreign subsidiaries account for 62 percent, and subsidiaries with 50–100 percent shares by Korean parents were 15 percent of the total number of OFDI projects (Fig. 6). The sum of these two cases is 75 percent and it implies that Korean enterprises are pursuing management control in most OFDI by majority shareholding. On a net outstanding invested amount basis, wholly owned subsidiaries accounted for 66 percent, and subsidiaries with 50–100 percent shareholding were 20 percent. The sum of these two ratios is 86 percent. It is noticeable that the share of majority shareholdings on an amount basis is 11 percent higher than that calculated on a project basis. It implies that there could be more majority shareholding investments from larger enterprises than from SMEs. It implies that large enterprises prefer to have more control over their foreign subsidiaries than SMEs. This tendency could be interpreted to mean
Fig. 6.
Korean OFDI by Investors’ Equity Ratio. Source: The Export-Import Bank of Korea, Overseas Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, each Year.
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that large Korean firms have their own significant competitive advantages over competitors in foreign markets, and therefore prefer carrying out business themselves. Meanwhile, SMEs are pursuing a cooperative strategy with local partners in foreign markets to a greater degree than large enterprises (Tallman & Shenkar, 1990).
3. MOTIVES AND PERFORMANCES OF KOREAN OFDI 3.1. Motives for Korean OFDI According to an analysis done by The Export-Import Bank of Korea (2004) on motivating factors behind OFDI, written by the investors in the form of a notice to the Korean government, the primary factor was to secure or develop local or third-country markets (about 50 percent of total notices), and a secondary motivator was to take advantage of low labor costs in the host country. Table 2 shows other motives for Korean OFDI. Until 1993, the development of natural resources was the main objective of investment. This statistic is based on amount invested, and a large part of investments during that time was for the development of natural resources. Meanwhile, we can see that the importance of the motive of utilizing low labor costs increased when comparing motives in the period 1997–2001 and after 2002. This corresponds to the fact that OFDI by SMEs has been increasing rapidly since 2002, with intensive concentration in China and other Asian countries. If we look at motives for OFDI by destination and industry (Table 3) from 2002 to November 2004, the trend mentioned above is more clearly Table 2.
Motivation of Korean OFDI by Period (Percent).
Securing or developing local or third-country markets Utilizing local labor costs Avoiding trade barriers Securing raw materials Acquiring advanced technology or management know-how Developing natural resources
1968–1993
1994–1996
1997–2001
After 2002
28.9
50.2
52.4
47.1
14.7 1.7 3.8 1.1
37.2 2.5 4.8 2.6
30.3 2.3 3.9 7.7
38.5 3.1 4.4 4.1
49.9
2.7
3.3
2.8
Source: The Export-Import Bank of Korea (2004).
Motivation of Korean OFDI by Destination and Industry (Percent).
Motive
Destination
Industry
China United States Europe Manufacturing
Securing local or third-country markets Utilizing local labor costs Avoiding trade barriers Securing raw materials Acquiring advanced technology/ management know-how Developing natural resources
Electronics and Telecom Automobiles Equipment
Textiles and Clothes
41.2
65.1
66.7
43.5
50.9
50.7
41.0
47.9 3.2 4.6 1.1
4.7 2.3 3.5 21.2
8.8 0.7 4.8 11.6
45.1 3.4 4.2 2.1
41.7 2.9 0.6 2.5
38.7 4.4 0.9 4.4
52.1 3.2 2.1 0.8
2.1
3.2
7.5
1.8
1.4
0.9
0.7
OFDI Performance after the Financial Crisis in Korea
Table 3.
Source: The Export-Import Bank of Korea (2004).
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identifiable. According to this table, the primary motive for Korean OFDI in China was to take advantage of low labor costs (47.9 percent of total). In contrast, the most important motive for Korean OFDI in the United States and Europe was to secure the local market, weighing in at 65.1 and 66.7 percent, respectively. Meanwhile, acquiring advanced technology or management know-how was the second most important reason for Korean OFDI in the United States (21.2 percent) and Europe (11.6 percent). If we look into OFDI motives by industry, the manufacturing industry’s most important investment motive was to make use of low labor costs (45.1 percent of the total). However, in the case of OFDI in globally competitive industries such as the electronic communications equipment industry and the automobile industry, securing or developing local or third-country markets was the most important motive for investment. Meanwhile, in less competitive industries, like the textile and clothing industries, utilizing low local labor costs was the most important motive for investment. While this analysis of OFDI motives does not include the differences between investments by large companies and those of SMEs, another analysis (The Export-Import Bank of Korea, 2004) of 318 cases of OFDI that amount to more than $10 million in outstanding invested amounts at the end of 2003 – mostly carried out by large companies – revealed that securing or developing local or third-country markets was the primary motive in all destinations, creating a great gap in the motive of utilizing low labor costs. If we reverse these results, it indirectly confirms that most OFDI by Korean SMEs were aimed at utilizing local labor costs. 3.2. Performances of Korean OFDI 3.2.1. Performances of Large Foreign Subsidiaries of Korean Firms For all foreign subsidiaries with an invested amount of more than $10 million, the Korean foreign exchange regulation obliges investors to submit an annual report, including financial statements of foreign subsidiaries, to the Korean government. The Export-Import Bank of Korea has done annual analyses of these reports and financial statements of foreign subsidiaries since 1999 (in other words, for the subsidiaries’ financial performance for the accounting year 1998). In 2005, the Bank’s analysis report included an annual comparative analysis of financial performances from 1998 to 2004. In this paper, we explain some meaningful results of this analysis, including financial performance trends and trade effects. Among the foreign subsidiaries whose invested amount was over $10 million at the end of each year, those with reliable financial statements were analyzed.
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Therefore, for this seven-year period, sample foreign subsidiaries may differ from year to year. 3.2.1.1. Overall Features of Sample Subsidiaries for Performance Analysis. Table 4 shows overall features of sample subsidiaries for each year. The average amount invested for sample subsidiaries has decreased, but average sales and average net income have clearly increased over the past three years. Among the sample foreign subsidiaries during this period, the portion of wholly owned subsidiaries increased from 60 percent in 2002 to over 70 percent in 2003 and 2004. This figure is based on the number of subsidiaries and amount of equity balance. This shows that large Korean firms have come to prefer controlling all resources for investment and business in foreign markets to collaborating with local partners. 3.2.1.2. Annual Comparison of Financial Performance. Table 5 shows some selected indicators for the financial performances of sample foreign subsidiaries. First of all, the average of the capital stock maintenance ratio, which is calculated by subtracting 1 from the ratio of total equity capital to the capital stock of each subsidiary, was recorded as –38.7 percent in 1998 and – 51.1 percent in 2000. Then the ratio increased to –17.3 percent in 2004. These figures reveal a trend of increasing net income of foreign subsidiaries, while cumulatively remaining in a condition of capital depletion. The financial stability of foreign subsidiaries seems to have improved: the debt ratio was 522.4 percent in 2000 but decreased to 293.8 percent in 2004. Profitability has also been improving, based on the ratio of net income to stockholders’ equity, which reversed to surplus figures and reached 13.3 percent in 2004. Since 2002, subsidiaries’ annual growth (the growth rate of sales and the growth rate of total assets) has remained over two digits Table 4. Year
Overall Features on Sample Subsidiaries for Performance Analysis (Millions of Dollars). 1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Cases of foreign subsidiaries 290 318 276 311 318 319 377 Investment balance account 11,657 16,395 16,482 17,844 16,941 17,692 18,232 Average investment amount 40 52 60 57 53 55 48 Average sales 174 222 290 226 262 327 383 Average net income 10 6 1 3 0 1 6 Percent of wholly owned OFDI (%) – 61.4 62.6 65.0 61.9 72.4 75.6 Source: Export-Import Bank of Korea (2005).
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Table 5. Annual Comparison of Financial Performances of Foreign Subsidiaries with over $10 Million Invested (Percent). Year
Source: Export-Import Bank of Korea (2005).
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
38.7
38.3
51.1
48.5
42.2
35.7
17.3
400.1 98.8
492.4 109.4
522.4 115.5
453.2 121.5
358.7 101.3
329.2 99.5
293.8 91.2
2.8 28.9
0.7 20.4
2.0 5.1
0.6 12.0
1.2 6.2
1.9 4.8
1.8 13.3
1.2 6.5
24.4 7.9
24.4 8.2
9.8 7.4
10.5 4.3
27.5 17.3
33.8 23.8
1.0 8.6 –
1.3 11.2 21.4
1.6 12.0 13.5
1.5 10.2 24.0
1.8 11.0 7.6
2.3 12.2 10.0
2.6 14.2 16.7
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Maintenance ratio of capital stock Indicators concerning financial stability Debt ratio Fixed assets to stockholders equity and long-term liabilities Indicators concerning profitability Operating income to sales Net income to stockholders equity Indicators concerning growth Growth rate of sales Growth rate of total assets Turnover of assets (times) Total assets turnover Inventory turnover Return on investment
1998
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and their sales growth rate is larger than their total asset growth rate. Total assets and inventories turnover, which indicate the utilization of assets, have also been constantly increasing since 2001. From 1999 to 2001, the average annual return on investment was –19.6 percent. In 2002, return on investment figures reversed to positive ratios and has since been rapidly increasing. 3.2.1.3. Annual Comparison of Trade Surplus Effects. The positive effect of foreign subsidiaries in stimulating Korean exports has been well proved by previous research (Lim & Moon, 2001). The effect, calculated by the ExportImport Bank of Korea as the ratio of exports to foreign subsidiaries to the net outstanding invested amount, was recorded as 134.5 percent in 1998 and then continued to increase to over 200 percent after 2003 (Table 6). Foreign subsidiaries’ import-arousing effect, which is calculated as the ratio of imported amount from foreign subsidiaries to Korea to the net outstanding invested amount of them, reached 34.3 percent in 1998 and continued to increase to reach 125.2 percent in 2004. The improving effect of trade balance during the last seven years, calculated by subtracting the import-arousing effect from the export-arousing effect, was 130 percent, on average. This figure reached 141 percent in 2004, perhaps due to foreign investment. 3.2.2. Comparison of Foreign Subsidiary Performance by Size At the end of 2004, The Export-Import Bank of Korea conducted a comparative study of the financial statuses (The Export-Import Bank of Korea, 2005, pp. 99–106) of 646 small- and medium-size subsidiaries that invested less than $10 million and a group of 377 large-size subsidiaries that invested more than $10 million. Those 1,023 foreign subsidiaries were selected from 3,265 foreign subsidiaries whose investment balance was over $1 million, according to financial statements submitted to the Korean government. Table 6.
Annual Comparison of the Trade Surplus Effectsa of Foreign Subsidiaries (Percent).
Year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Export-arousing effect Import-arousing effect Trade surplus effect
134.5 34.3 100.2
158.5 35.6 122.9
188.6 61.0 127.6
154.8 44.0 110.8
156.1 48.8 107.3
229.2 65.5 163.7
266.1 125.2 141.0
Source: The Export-Import Bank of Korea (2005). a Trade surplus effect is the ratio of exports to foreign subsidiaries to the net outstanding invested amount.
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The statistical overview of this sample (Table 7) accurately represents the overall trends of Korean OFDI as reviewed in Chapter 2. When looking at the regional distribution of sample small- and medium-size subsidiaries in terms of net outstanding invested amount, 74.6 percent of them are located in Asian regions, especially in China (48.2 percent) and in ASEAN countries (13.3 percent). That ratio in the European and North American regions together is just 19.8 percent. For large subsidiaries, locations in Europe and North America together account for 51.5 percent, and 41.3 percent in Asia, mainly in China (20.5 percent) and ASEAN countries (10.3 percent). Table 8 compares selected financial ratios between both groups. According to this comparison, the small- and medium-size subsidiaries had more favorable figures in stability and growth, while in terms of profitability and operation the large-size subsidiaries were identified as better than small- and medium-size subsidiaries. In comparing financial ratios, both groups exhibited negative values in capital stock maintenance ratios. This means that in 2004, subsidiaries of Korean companies were still at a level of capital depletion. The small- and medium-size subsidiaries’ capital stock maintenance ratio was –1 percent, which is relatively high, but the capital stock maintenance ratio of the group of large-size subsidiaries was very low and reached –17.3 percent. In terms of the debt ratio and the stability ratio, the small- and mediumsize subsidiaries showed better values than the group of large-size subsidiaries. This can be interpreted in two ways: first, because small- and medium-size enterprises have relatively less experience in foreign investment, this group tends to avoid potential business risks; second, this result reflects the fact that small- and medium-size enterprises are less able than large-size enterprises to finance funds through borrowing. The profitability of the small- and medium-size subsidiaries group is worse than the group of large-size subsidiaries. The reason is that competition among small- and medium-size subsidiaries is very strong in local markets, so profit margins for sales are low. And due to the lack of experience in running a foreign business, sales and administration costs are high. Among the 646 small- and medium-size subsidiaries, 322 subsidiaries resulted in an operating loss. Meanwhile, in terms of return on investment, large-size subsidiaries were almost three times better than the small- and medium-size subsidiaries. The growth rate of the group of small- and medium-size subsidiaries was higher than the group of large-size subsidiaries, whereas the group of largesize subsidiaries showed higher turnover of assets and capital. Since the difference of these two indicators is between the two groups, it is difficult to find significance in this difference.
Overall Features on Sample Subsidiaries for Comparative Analysis by Size.
Region
Investment of Less Than $10 Million Cases (Number, %)
Investment of More Than $10 Million
Invested Amount (Millions of Dollars, %)
Cases (Number, %)
Invested Amount (Millions of Dollars, %)
Asia China Hong Kong Japan ASEAN North America Europe EU South America Oceania Africa
498 327 25 25 91 85 37 31 13 9 4
(77.1) (50.6) (3.9) (3.9) (14.1) (13.2) (5.7) (4.8) (2.0) (1.4) (0.6)
1,662 1,074 89 95 297 313 129 114 71 34 19
(74.6) (48.2) (4.0) (4.3) (13.3) (14.0) (5.8) (5.1) (3.2) (1.5) (0.9)
215 118 19 10 58 81 50 46 18 11 2
(57.0) (31.3) (5.0) (2.7) (15.4) (21.5) (13.3) (12.2) (4.8) (2.9) (0.5)
7,531 3,729 1,007 338 1,872 6,691 2,703 2,465 586 516 205
(41.3) (20.5) (5.5) (1.9) (10.3) (36.7) (14.8) (13.5) (3.2) (2.8) (1.1)
Total
646
(100.0)
2,227
(100.0)
377
(100.0)
18,232
(100.0)
OFDI Performance after the Financial Crisis in Korea
Table 7.
Source: The Export-Import Bank of Korea (2005, 100).
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Table 8.
Comparison of Financial Performances of Foreign Subsidiaries by Size (Percent).
Average of Selected Indicators
Maintenance ratio of capital stock 100% shareholding subsidiaries Subsidiaries with 50–100% shareholding Subsidiaries with shareholding less than 50% Indicators concerning financial stability Debt ratio Fixed assets to stockholders’ equity and long-term liabilities Indicators concerning profitability Operating income to sales Net income to stockholders’ equity Indicators concerning growth Growth rate of sales Growth rate of total assets Turnover of assets Total assets turnover Inventories turnover Return on investment
Investment of Less Than $10 Million
Investment of More Than $10 Million
1.0 1.5 18.6
17.3 19.9 12.0
10.0
12.4
177.9 83.7
293.8 91.2
0.3 1.5
1.8 13.3
56.6 28.5
33.8 23.8
2.0 9.7 6.4
2.6 14.2 16.7
Source: The Export-Import Bank of Korea (2005, pp. 103–104).
Table 9.
Comparison of Trade Effects of Foreign Subsidiaries by Size.
Export-arousing effect Import-arousing effect Trade surplus effect
Investment of Less Than $10 Million
Investment of More Than $10 Million
431.8 133.1 298.6
266.2 125.2 141.0
Source: The Export-Import Bank of Korea (2005, p. 104).
One interesting fact is that the trade surplus effects of the group of smalland medium-size subsidiaries are superior to those of the large-size subsidiaries group. Table 9 compares the trade surplus effects between the two groups. The group of small- and medium-size subsidiaries showed 431.8 percent in export-arousing effect and the large-size subsidiaries group showed 266.2 percent. Also, the export-arousing effects of the small- and
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medium-size group are much higher and the import-arousing effects of the two groups are similar. From this result, it can be concluded that the contribution to trade surplus per unit investments of small and medium size is higher than for large-size investments. This can be attributed to the fact that small- and medium-size enterprises usually procure a large amount of raw material, by-products, and equipment from Korea, manufacture the products locally at lower labor costs, and sell the products to local Korean largesize subsidiaries or export to other countries.
4. SUMMARY AND EMERGING ISSUES REGARDING KOREAN OUTWARD FDI This paper conducts an in-depth analysis on current Korean OFDI and trends, performance, and impact on the Korean economy. Important characteristics of recent Korean OFDI trends can be summarized as follows. First, Korea has increased the amount of its OFDI activities in Asia. In particular, China has become the primary destination of Korean OFDI, relegating the United States to second place. This reflects a global trend in which China is gaining recognition as a favored FDI destination. Second, a large part of FDI is concentrated in the manufacturing sectors, of which some limited industries such as electronics and automobile constitute a large part. This trend reflects the fact that Korea is considerably competitive in these two industries in the global market. Third, it is observed that in the past three years OFDI by small- and medium-size companies has largely increased. This can be interpreted in light of the loss of Korean domestic cost competitiveness, especially for SMEs, which resulted in an increase in OFDI of SMEs to other Asian countries, especially China, in order to ensure lower labor costs (Zhan, 2005). Fourth, investments are motivated by both market-seeking purposes and low labor cost seeking purposes, and the importance of each of the purposes can be differentiated by the size of investment: larger investments are for mainly market-seeking purposes, while small and medium types of investments seek low labor costs. In the case of OFDI to developed countries such as the United States and European countries, the second motive after market-seeking was found to be to ‘‘[learn] advanced technology or know-how.’’ Fifth, overseas legal subsidiaries of Korean firms improved their financial performance remarkably in the past seven years. In the case of small and medium types of investments, however, returns on investments are far lower than those of large-scale investments.
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Sixth, OFDI actually contributes to the improvement of the Korean trade balance, which is accurate when evaluating data limited to each foreign subsidiary-related export and import. However, this analysis is limited in that it did not include any spillover effects of OFDI toward the trade of other Korean firms. Meanwhile, statistics suggest that small- and mediumsize investments create bigger export-arousing effects. However, as the data include transferred parts of existing production facilities in Korea into export items, it is necessary to evaluate the net export-arousing effect that excludes the transfer of existing facilities. Moreover, there has been no study that clearly and comprehensively evaluates the crowding-out effects of Korean OFDI on domestic investment. Finally, Korean firms perceive their competitiveness in foreign markets as quite positive. However, with the exception of some large-scale investments, a large number of investment activities do not have good profitability, which actually renders the mid- and long-term competitiveness of Korean firms rather gloomy. In spite of all this, Korean firms are expected to consistently expand their overseas investment. This expectation is derived from two facts: first, internationally, the Korean economy is now more strongly linked to the global economic system due to increasing international trade and investment; second, domestically, Korea has been undergoing an industrial restructuring process with a rise in costs of production factors such as labor, land, and so forth. Considering this analysis on current trends, it is estimated that Korean OFDI is about to face two issues. The first issue is the polarization of OFDI between large firms and SMEs. Investment by large firms, which consists of high value-added fields in value chains such as R&D and design activities, are mainly carried out within Korea, while investments for low value-added activities including assembly are made largely in response to the requirements of cost-effectiveness with the goal of reinforcing global competitiveness from the viewpoint of rationalized production. On the contrary, a remarkable aspect of Korean SMEs is that many of them, as a way of survival, have moved their entire production facilities to a foreign country, giving up the Korean market because of a loss in competitive edge due to an overall rise in Korean production costs. The impact of OFDI by SMEs to long-term enhancement of firms’ competitiveness is not considerable. In the case of SMEs, therefore, other changes in the management environment such as increased production costs in the local market are likely to affect the very existence of the company. The second issue is the problem of imbalance between OFDI in manufacturing sectors and that in service sectors. So far, Korean OFDI has
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mainly focused on manufacturing sectors, and even in service sectors it has been ‘‘trade and retail’’ that has been important. Moreover, Korean investment in this ‘‘trade and retail’’ part is actually for the purpose of sales of electronic and automobile products in overseas markets. This trend clearly reflects the weakness of Korean OFDI in specific service industries, such as banking or distribution. Despite a highly complementary relationship between OFDI in the banking and financial or distribution sectors and that of the manufacturing sectors, actual foreign investment by Korean banks or logistics companies does not meet the demand of large Korean firms for financial and distribution services. From the fact that growth in the service sectors is a key element for sustainable growth in the Korean economy, it is high time for Korea to improve its competitiveness in the service sectors through more positive OFDI activities. Although these challenges should be overcome on the level of the individual firm, there should be specific measures thoroughly examined and implemented on the governmental level. To achieve high quality of OFDI by SMEs, it is crucial to fortify cooperation between large firms and SMEs, which will consequently minimize the negative effects of SME OFDI in reducing their investment in domestic markets. In addition, the Korean government should ease regulations that hinder investment to pave the way for boosting OFDI activities in the service industries.
REFERENCES Bae, C. S., & Hwang, S. (1997). An empirical analysis of outward FDI of Korea and Japan. Multinational Business Review, 5(2), 71–80. Dent, M. C., & Randerson, C. (1997). Enter the chaebol: The escalation of Korean direct investment in Europe. European Business Journal, 9(4), 31–39. Guillen, F. M. (2003). Experience, imitation and the sequence of foreign entry: Wholly owned and joint-venture manufacturing by South Korean firms and business groups in China, 1987–1995. Journal of International Business Studies, 34(2), 185–198. Lee, S.-B. (2000). Korea’s overseas direct investment: Evaluation of performances and future challenges. Korea Institute for International Economic Policy Working Paper 00-12. Lim, S.-H., & Moon, H.-C. (2001). Effects of outward FDI on home country exports: The case of Korean firms. Multinational Business Review, 9(1), 42–49. Park, Y. S. (2000). The Korean chaebols’ dash for globalization: Has it really been driven by government policy? Korea Observer, 31(4), 579–605. Tallman, B. S., & Shenkar, O. (1990). International cooperative venture strategies: Outward investment and small firms from NICs. Management International Review, 30(4), 299–315. The Export-Import Bank of Korea (2004). A Way to Promote Outward Foreign Direct Investment of Korea (in Korean).
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The Export-Import Bank of Korea (2005). Analysis of Business Performances of Foreign Subsidiaries of Korean OFDI (in Korean). The Export-Import Bank of Korea, Overseas Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, Each Year. The Ministry of Finance and Economy (2002). Regulations on the Outward Foreign Direct Investment (in Korean). Zhan, X. (2005). Analysis of South Korea’s direct investment in China. China & World Economy, 1, 94–104.
PART III: STRATEGIES AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
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THE VALUE CREATION PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT$ Reid W. Click ABSTRACT This paper applies the concept of value creation to examine the strategic management of multinational enterprises. ‘‘International strategic management’’ is first defined as the process through which value is created by managers operating across a national border. The domain of international strategic management is thus determined by activities that distinguish international management from domestic management in the process of value creation. This perspective on value creation is used to answer three questions pertaining to international strategic management. First, how important is international strategic management? Simple statistics presented here demonstrate that the international component of value creation is important in the U.S. economy. Second, what is the domain of international strategic management? The paper presents a framework in which international strategic management is the aggregation of value
$
An earlier version of this paper, entitled ‘‘Strategic Management of Multinational Enterprises and Value Creation,’’ was presented at the Eighth International Conference on Multinational Enterprises at the Chinese Culture University in Taipei, Taiwan, March 2006. I am grateful for comments from the conference participants.
Value Creation in Multinational Enterprise International Finance Review, Volume 7, 99–123 Copyright r 2007 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1569-3767/doi:10.1016/S1569-3767(06)07005-1
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created through international production, marketing, and financial activities, and reveals that the domain of international management is vast. Third, does international strategic management make the whole multinational enterprise worth more than the sum of its parts? Empirical evidence suggests that the answer is yes, at least for U.S. multinationals in the early 1990s.
1. INTRODUCTION Management is the process through which value is created by an individual or a group of individuals, and international management is the process through which value is created by an individual or group of individuals operating across a national border. Since the meanings of ‘‘international,’’ ‘‘management,’’ and ‘‘international management’’ are apparently in dispute, or are at least under-understood (see Boddewyn, 1999, and references therein), these simple introductory definitions require further examination. A dictionary definition of ‘‘management’’ is ‘‘the act, manner, or practice of managing, handling or controlling something’’ (Morris, 1975, p. 192). In recognition of a raison d’eˆtre for the individuals who manage something, a normative version of the definition is ‘‘the act, manner, or practice of managing, handling or controlling something in order to create value or wealth.’’ Although the normative appendage is disputable, managers must recognize that the things worth doing are the ones that create value. This is the overarching message conveyed in modern business school curricula. As Harrigan (1992) points out, ‘‘Business schools exist to improve management practice. All scholarly research, development of teaching materials, testing of theories, and other activities carried on by faculties of business schools should help managers develop tools for coping with the problems of international value creation’’ (p. 251). The rest of this paper tackles the essence of value creation, so the definition being offered is the starting point for discussion rather than a definitive statement. Since ‘‘international’’ is ‘‘relating to, or involving two or more nations or nationalities’’ (Morris, 1975, p. 685), ‘‘international management’’ is ‘‘the act, manner, or practice of managing, handling, or controlling something involving two or more nations.’’ Hence, incorporating the normative element offered in this paper, international management is the process through which value is created by an individual or group of individuals operating across a national border.
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In attempting to circumscribe the domain of international management, the definition of international management provides guidance for two reasons. First, it distinguishes international management from general management with the phrase ‘‘operating across a national border.’’ Second, it distinguishes international management, being focused on the ‘‘process through which value is created’’ internationally, from international business, which encompasses anything related to international commercial activity (such as elements of the operating environment). The domain of international management – as opposed to the domain of management or the domain of international business – should therefore be identified based on the value created by managerial actions across national borders. Without denying that domestic management is complicated, international management is often distinguished from domestic management by its additional complexities. For example, while domestic management requires a vast knowledge base in accounting, finance, production, human resources, marketing, economics, law, public policy, behavioral psychology, and so on, international management requires a commensurately larger knowledge base as the traditional areas become internationalized (and thus become part of the domain of international business) to account for additional governments, legal systems, cultural orientations, languages, and the like. In addition, international management requires knowledge of disciplines typically ignored in domestic business, such as international political economy, foreign affairs, and geographic area studies, which are important components of international business. Hence, the complexities that distinguish international management from domestic management result from operating across borders and having to deal with multiple economies, societies, and governments. Mastering international management can be a Herculean task if the domain is too broad, so some priorities must be set to focus on the most germane activities of international value creation. The focus on valuecreating activities is in fact what distinguishes international management from the broader concept of international business. This paper adopts a strategy approach to international management by considering a back-to-basics framework in which international management is the aggregation of value created through international production, marketing, and financial activities. The framework is not a simple internationalization of the functional areas of business, but is instead a broadening of the perspective to analyze production, marketing, and financial activities in a larger global context. Other elements of international business can be put into this framework if they create value. For example, foreign languages and geographic area
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studies are often included in the domain of international business. The framework presented here requires specification of the value created by having such managerial knowledge to be included in the more exclusive domain of international management. If knowledge of a foreign language facilitates management–labor communication at a foreign plant and thereby increases production efficiency, or if the talent improves relations with customers and thereby increases sales revenue abroad, it creates value and is within the domain of international management. However, the importance of the knowledge is directly related to the value created, and foreign languages and area studies are not automatically part of the domain of international management. The concept of value creation is used in this paper to answer three questions pertaining to strategic management of multinational enterprises (MNEs). After this introduction, Section 2 broadly examines value creation and the question, ‘‘How important is international strategic management?’’ Section 3 develops the strategy framework for analyzing international management and asks ‘‘What is the domain of international strategic management?’’ Discussions of international production, marketing, and financial activities suggest that international management requires an outward-looking perspective rather than an inward-looking perspective to maximize the value of the MNE, and reveal that the domain of international management is very broad. Section 4 ties the elements of value creation strategy together by asking, ‘‘Does international strategic management make the whole multinational enterprise worth more than the sum of its parts?’’ Empirical evidence from U.S. multinationals in the early 1990s indicates that the answer is yes.
2. VALUE CREATION AND THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT Production and marketing operations represent the two main areas of business activity. Porter (1985) described these as the ‘‘primary activities’’ in the firm’s ‘‘value chain.’’ The production operations are the ‘‘upstream activities,’’ such as inbound logistics, operations, and the initiation of outbound logistics, which represent the ‘‘cost side’’ or ‘‘supply side’’ of the firm. The marketing operations are the ‘‘downstream activities,’’ such as the distribution activities of outbound logistics, marketing and sales, and after-sales service, which represent the ‘‘revenue side’’ or ‘‘demand side’’ of the firm.
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Often, the objective of managing the supply side is to minimize the costs of producing goods and services, and this requires analysis of competitors and industry structures. A firm with production advantages, such as a proprietary production technology that utilizes lower quantities of inputs than competitors, is a low-cost producer in the industry and is able to pursue a ‘‘cost-based strategy.’’ The objective of managing the demand side is to maximize the revenues from selling goods and services, which requires analysis of customers and markets. A firm with a marketing advantage, such as brand recognition or unique products, emerges with market power and is able to pursue a ‘‘differentiation strategy’’ or ‘‘revenue-based strategy.’’ Production and marketing decisions clearly need to be mutually consistent to produce an equilibrium. For additional discussion, see Besanko, Dranove, Shanley, and Schafer (2003). Discussion of value creation in international strategic management must also distinguish international production and marketing from domestic production and marketing. In considering the internationalization of the value chain, Porter (1986a) more specifically asserts: The distinctive issues in international, as contrasted to domestic, strategy can be summarized in two key dimensions of how a firm competes internationally. The first is what I term the configuration of a firm’s activities worldwide, or where in the world each activity in the value chain is performed, including how many places. The second dimension is what I term coordination, which refers to how like activities in different countries are coordinated with each other. (p. 17)
Porter then considers various combinations of geographically dispersed or concentrated configurations versus high or low coordination of activities. By the end of the article, Porter (1986a) suggests that ‘‘today’s game of global strategy seems increasingly to be a game of coordination – getting more and more dispersed production facilities, R&D laboratories, and marketing activities to truly work together’’ (p. 36). These ideas are further developed in Porter (1986b, 1990). In a variation on the issue of coordination, Kogut (1985) asserts that international strategic management is distinguished from domestic management by the importance of flexibility: ‘‘the unique content of a global versus a purely domestic strategy lies less in the methods to design long-term strategic plans than in the construction of flexibility which permits a firm to exploit the uncertainty over future changes in exchange rates, competitive moves, or government policy’’ (p. 27). Kogut then considers coordination of activities internationally to reap the benefits of flexibility, not just to manage risk and uncertainty, but to profit from them as well. There has subsequently
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been considerable attention to pre-planned flexibility and international strategic investments; see, for example, de Meza and van der Ploeg (1987), Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994), and Amran and Kulatilaka (1999). The ideas presented in Porter and Kogut relating to configuration, coordination, and flexibility suggest that strategic management of MNEs creates value. Many other articles have also made this assertion in one way or another, including the seminal works of Hamel and Prahalad (1985), Prahalad and Doz (1987), and Ghoshal and Bartlett (1990). The subject begs the question, ‘‘How important is international strategic management?’’ Although difficult to answer definitively, some simple statistics illuminate the importance. A first way to consider the importance of international management relative to domestic management is to examine macroeconomic aggregates. Net domestic product (NDP), a measure of valued created by all factors in a particular country, amounted to $10.3 trillion in the U.S. in 2004 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2005). Factor income from abroad, which is predominantly earnings on direct investment, was $53.7 billion, representing 0.5% of NDP. Hence, the pure foreign value creation does not appear very large, but further examination suggests that international activities are in fact important. Table 1 shows the breakdown of NDP into its basic components, and corporate profits (before taxes) amount to $1161.5 billion. (Note that this figure is not a measure of economic value added because part of corporate profits represents the required rate of return to shareholders.) Factor income from abroad thus represents 4.6% of total corporate profits. In addition, these figures exclude the contributions of exports to domestic profits and the contribution of imported inputs in reducing production costs. Export receipts amounted to 11.4% of NDP, and although the value created from these exports cannot be determined, the gross magnitude suggests that international management is indeed important. Some value is also created by using imported inputs to reduce production costs. Imports amounted to 17.5% of NDP, and although the portion attributable to inputs cannot be determined, this gross magnitude again suggests that international management is important. A second way to evaluate the relative importance of international strategic management is to examine firm-level data. Data are widely available for the subset of all firms that are publicly traded, and although this subset likely contains more MNEs than the subset of firms not publicly traded, the available data are useful in analyzing value creation. In the Compustat database (Standard and Poor’s Corporation, 1997), 6,345 nonfinancial U.S. firms report operating profits for 1994 amounting to $503.1 billion. Of these
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Table 1. Value Creation in the U.S. Based on Net Domestic Product, 2004. Type of Income Compensation of employees Corporate profits Proprietors’ and rental income Net interest and dividends Net taxes on production and imports, net business current transfer payments, and statistical discrepancy Net domestic product (NDP) Factor income from abroad Exports of goods and services Imports of goods and services
Billions of Dollars
Percent of Total
6693.4 1161.5 1023.8
65.0 11.3 9.9
446.0 974.3
4.3 9.5
10,299.0
100.0
53.7 1173.8
0.05 11.4
1797.8
17.5
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, August 2005, pp. 36–172.
firms, 1,215 report operating profits of foreign operations in addition to total operating profit, and operating profits from foreign operations amount to $74.3 billion from total operating profits of $261.8 billion, or 28.4%. The $74.3 billion in profits from foreign operations represents 14.8% of the aggregate profits of $503.1 billion, although this understates the relative profits from foreign operations because not all firms with foreign operations report profits from foreign operations when they report total profits. In addition, the figure does not include profits from exports, licensing/franchising agreements, or any form of international business other than direct foreign investment. A third way of capturing the importance of international strategic management is to more broadly consider the sales revenues of the U.S. firms. A total of 6,345 nonfinancial firms report sales for 1994 amounting to $5 trillion. Table 2 presents some decomposition of this, indicating that 1,634 firms report export sales and 1,341 firms report sales from foreign operations. Because only 563 firms report both export sales and sales from foreign operations, a total of 2,412 firms report some form of foreign sales. Hence, 38% of the 6,364 firms are labeled MNEs and 62% appear to be purely domestic corporations. Since MNEs are larger, however, they account for
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Table 2.
Sales of U.S. Corporations, 1994.
Sales Export sales Sales from foreign operations Total foreign sales Total multinational enterprise sales Total domestic enterprise sales
Number of Firms
Millions of Dollars
6,364 1,634 1,341 2,412 2,412 3,952
5,124,123 149,430 899,993 1,049,423 3,059,468 2,064,655
Source: Compustat and author’s calculations.
60% of total sales and domestic firms account for 40%. Foreign sales reported by the 6,364 firms amount to $1 trillion, or 20% of total sales. Among the 2,412 MNEs, the foreign sales account for 34.3% of total sales. Furthermore, the data are again understated because not all firms with exports or foreign operations report segment sales. Of course, the focus on sales highlights the marketing side of the business and ignores the production side, but comparable data on costs are much harder to get than the data on revenues and so cannot be examined here. Financial activities also create value, although these are a little more suspicious than value creation through production and marketing activities since financial management does not obviously contribute either to the sales revenues of the firm or savings in the production costs of the firm. Porter (1985, 1986a, 1986b) implicitly considers financial management as a ‘‘support activity’’ rather than as a primary activity and hardly addresses the issue. However, some of the most interesting questions in management relate to whether value is created through financial advantages, debt capacity, risk management, and so on. In addition, there are firms that exclusively create value through financial activities – such as banks and brokerage houses. Recognizing the difficulty of subjecting these financial firms to the same ‘‘supply side’’ and ‘‘demand side’’ analysis as nonfinancial firms, this paper considers the activities of financial firms in the category of financial activities. Hence, two categories of value created through financial activities are the financial activities of nonfinancial firms and the activities of financial firms. One way to assess the importance of international financial activities is to examine the performance of U.S. financial firms. In the Compustat database, the operating profits of 714 financial firms amount to $137 billion. Of these, 109 firms report profits from foreign operations at $4.6 billion from total profits of $61.1 billion, or 7.5%, which also represents 3.4% of total financial industry profits. Thus, international financial management might
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be marginally important, but this figure again understates the importance of profits on foreign involvement because it does not capture the profit on international capital flows booked at home – such as profits on foreign deposits in the U.S. or profits on foreign loans made from the U.S., and similar transactions in the bond and stock markets. International capital flows in the form of intermediated investment and portfolio investment are quite important compared to direct foreign investment, and firms managing these international capital flows are likely creating value through financial activities. Based on these simple statistics for the U.S., we can conclude that strategic management of multinational firms is indeed important. Although it is not true that ‘‘all management is international’’ in the U.S., international management is important in terms of its contributions at the margin when compared to domestic management, and is therefore well worth investigating.
3. VALUE CREATION AND THE DOMAIN OF INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT Having discussed value creation in terms of production, marketing, and financial activities, this section combines these three categories into a basic strategy framework designed to examine the domain of international strategic management. Discussion is particularly focused on identifying the additional complexities resulting from crossing national borders that distinguish international management from domestic management. Each one of these areas could constitute a paper (or book) on its own, so the discussion is general rather than exhaustive, and references to additional literature are provided to fill gaps. A framework for analyzing strategic management of MNEs is presented in Table 3. This summarizes the distinctive issues in international strategic management, elements in the domain of international strategic management, and some representative studies. The table suggests that areas in the domain of international production are international trade theory (comparative advantage), international political economy, foreign affairs, and geographic area studies (political risk), international financial theory (exchange rates and risk), and area studies, law, sociology, anthropology, religion, psychology, and language (applied to human resources management). Elements in the domain of international marketing are geographic area studies, sociology, anthropology, religion, and psychology (cultural
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Table 3.
A Strategy Framework for Analyzing International Management.
Distinctive Issues in International Management
The Domain of International Management
Representative Studies
Production activities
Source inputs domestically or internationally, including supplier relations Produce domestically or internationally International alliance (licensing, franchising, joint venture) versus wholly owned DFI International site selection decisions, including number and size of plants Input mix abroad (capital, unskilled labor, skilled labor, raw materials) Foreign production technology and equipment selection Human resources management in foreign countries Inventory management and crossborder transportation logistics R&D in process technologies
International trade theory, including comparative advantage, analysis of transportation costs, tariffs, and nontariff barriers International political economy and foreign affairs Geographic area studies International financial theory, particularly exchange rate behavior and risk analysis International law Sociology/anthropology/religion Psychology Languages
Stobaugh (1969a, 1969b) Flaherty (1986) Flaherty (1996) Dunning (1988) Ferdows (1997) Karrenbrock (1990) Hofstede (1984) Adler (1996) Quelch and Bloom (1999)
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International Value Creation Activities
International market selection, including number of foreign markets Market service and distribution methods (choosing exporting, international alliances, or DFI) Development of product attributes in different markets, including R&D into product technologies Product pricing internationally, including currency effects Promotional activities internationally, including language translation
Cultural studies Geographic area studies Sociology/anthropology/religion Psychology International financial theory, particularly exchange rate determination and behavior Languages
Levitt (1983) Quelch and Hoff (1986) Douglas and Craig (1989) Hout, Porter, and Rudden (1982) Kashani and Quelch (1990) Ricks (1993) Knetter (1994)
Financial activities
Foreign project evaluation (international capital budgeting) International cost-of-capital analysis and capital structure decisions, including capital structure of foreign subsidiaries Risk management for foreign exchange risk and foreign interest rate/inflation rate risk, including diversification and hedging strategies International financing and the debt denomination decision International tax management
International macroeconomics International financial theory, particularly exchange rate and international interest rate behavior and risk analysis International political economy and foreign affairs Geographic area studies International portfolio theory International financial markets International tax law
Shapiro (1983) Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994) Adler and Dumas (1984) Lessard and Lightstone (1986) Dufey and Srinivasulu (1983) Aliber (1989)
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Marketing activities
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determinants of product demand, product attributes, and promotional programs), international financial theory (exchange rates and pricing in different currencies), and language (promotional activities). The domain of international financial activities includes international political economy, foreign affairs, and geographic area studies (political risk), international financial theory and international macroeconomics (exchange rates and interest rates), international tax law (focusing on financing), and international portfolio theory and international financial markets (risk management and hedging). Clearly, the domain of international strategic management is quite broad even under the criterion of value creation. Indeed, the diversity of international management is one appealing aspect that draws many managers into the field. References to additional literature are provided since space limitations preclude additional discussion here.
4. DOES INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT MAKE THE WHOLE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE WORTH MORE THAN THE SUM OF ITS PARTS? By this point, the notion that international management creates value in ways somewhat different from domestic management is firmly established. After the discussion of production, marketing, and finance activities covered in the strategy framework of Section 3, a return to the more general issue of value creation is now warranted. Rather than focus on specific tasks that distinguish international management from domestic management, recall that Porter and Kogut discuss the distinction in more generic terms focusing on coordination and flexibility. In addition to indicating that international management creates value, both imply that the whole of the MNE is worth more than the sum of its parts; having n international subsidiaries is worth more as an MNE than the summation of the separate values of the n subsidiaries, as long as they are coordinated and are flexible enough to profit from changes in the environment. Several reasons why the whole may be worth more than the sum of its parts have been developed in the international management literature. Kogut (1985) identifies several ‘‘arbitrage’’ opportunities for international management to create value: production shifting, tax minimization, financial market imperfections, and information arbitrage. Kogut also identifies a
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couple of ‘‘leverage’’ opportunities: coordination and political risk management. Profits from arbitrage result from ‘‘moving’’ something from one place to another, but profits from leverage result from using a position in one national market to enhance a position in another market. For example, global coordination can build a coalition of suppliers in one country to improve the position of the firm with respect to a rival in another, and with regard to political risk the position of a subsidiary in one country is likely to affect the firm’s bargaining power vis-a`-vis the government in another. A second, more strategic reason for the whole to be worth more than the sum of the parts is due to cross-subsidization of operations. Hamel and Prahalad (1985) provide the example of competition in the tire industry: Michelin attacked Goodyear’s U.S. market by financing an aggressive marketing campaign using the profits from its European market, but rather than confine the competition to the U.S. Goodyear attacked Michelin’s European market by financing market expansion in Europe using the profits from its U.S. market. International cash flows may thus create value, such that Michelin (or Goodyear) is worth more than a simple summation of its operations in Europe and the U.S. would suggest because one operation can be defended by the other. (Without the second operation, the first would have to sink or swim on its own.) Necessarily, the cross-subsidization must not entail throwing good money into an unprofitable situation, but must be a temporary response to a situation that retains a positive present value. Economies of scope from global distribution systems and synergies from knowledge created in different environments provide additional reasons for an MNE to be worth more than the sum of its parts; see, for example Ghoshal (1987) and Douglas and Craig (1989). Economies of scope create value due to an ability to share investments across products and markets, as when two products sharing one distribution channel have a lower cost of joint distribution than the total cost of distributing the two products separately. Synergy is the ability to make two operations work better together than they would separately, and can result from learning; a production operation in one country might be improved by knowledge developed in a second country, and simultaneously the production operation in the second country might be improved by knowledge from the first country. Given all this theoretical discussion of the value of the whole in relation to the sum of the parts, a natural question to ask is whether there is empirical evidence that the whole of an MNE is worth more than the sum of its subsidiary parts. If so, this is further testimony to the importance of studying international management. Unfortunately, the question has not been
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extensively researched. In a purely domestic setting, empirical evidence in Berger and Ofek (1995) and Comment and Jarrell (1995) reveals that product diversification destroys value because conglomerates lose focus, but literature considering international diversification is relatively scarce (however, see Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997; Quian & Li, 1998). One way to approach the question is to consider whether an MNE creates more value than otherwise similar domestic firms. If so, the additional shareholder value is most likely created through international strategic management, the activities that otherwise similar domestic firms do not undertake. 4.1. Data and Empirical Methodology Data are widely available for the subset of all firms that are publicly traded. This study utilizes the Compustat database of publicly traded U.S. firms to compare firms engaged in international business to their domestic counterparts. In particular, it relies on the geographic segment files to distinguish exports from sales of foreign operations and to identify the regions in which sales from foreign operations occur. The Compustat data are likely the highest quality available for U.S. firms. However, they understate the true importance of multinational operations because not all firms with exports or foreign operations report segment sales. Since there is no way to correct for this, analysis proceeds under the assumption that any understatement is small. Of course, the focus on sales highlights the marketing side of the business and ignores the production side, but comparable data on costs are much harder to obtain than the data on revenues and so cannot be examined here. Although there are many possible measures of firm performance, the most common measure in the field of finance is the total return to shareholders (capital appreciation and dividend payments). This return is construed as a summary measure of all the information available on the firm – including all other performance measures such as the return on assets (ROA) frequently studied in the management literature, as in Hitt et al. (1997). In finance, the total return is typically described as an increasing function of the firm’s ‘‘beta’’ from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). In a series of papers, Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995) show that for U.S. data, beta in fact does not contain much cross-section information when firm size and the ratio of book equity to market equity are included as determinants of returns. Financial leverage may have additional explanatory value as well. This paper therefore controls for all of these variables in the investigation of the effects of international business.
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One way to determine whether an international enterprise has different performance than an otherwise similar domestic firm is to determine whether measures of international involvement are significant determinants of total return, controlling for other characteristics known to affect firm performance. This paper specifically considers five variables measuring international involvement based on exports, sales from foreign operations, and the geographic diversification of sales, and considers their contributions to total returns in cross-section regressions controlling for beta, firm size, the ratio of book equity to market equity, and financial leverage. The measures of international involvement are derived from the Compustat data described above. The simplest type of international involvement is to export some domestic output. Bernard and Jensen (1999) revealed that exporting firms have superior performance when compared to nonexporting firms. Based on this, the empirical analysis here considers the effect of exporting on firm returns by using the Compustat data on export sales to form both a dummy variable for firms reporting exports and the ratio of export sales to the firm’s total sales (the ‘‘export ratio’’). The dummy variable will capture the differential return for exporting firms vis-a`-vis nonexporting firms. If exporting firms have higher (lower) returns than nonexporting firms, the coefficient on the dummy variable will be positive (negative). The export ratio will indicate whether the relative magnitude of exports contributes to differential performance. If exporting firms have higher (lower) returns than nonexporting firms, returns might also be an increasing (decreasing) function of the proportion of exports in total sales. A more complicated type of international involvement is to operate facilities in foreign countries, and this is what is typically studied to help assess whether ‘‘multinationality’’ affects firm performance. The literature in finance is generally inconclusive with respect to the empirical effects of multinationality on total returns. One of the earliest studies, Mikhail and Shawkey (1979), reports that multinational shares outperform domestic shares. However, Brewer (1981) subsequent study reports no significant difference in returns between multinational and domestic firms. After that, Fatemi (1984) reports that returns are identical between multinational and domestic firms except when the multinational operates in competitive foreign markets, in which case shareholder returns are lower for multinationals than for domestic firms. Subsequent research is equally inconclusive, so there is no consensus in the profession on the effects of multinationality on shareholder returns. Empirical analysis here uses the Compustat data on sales of foreign operations to form both a dummy variable for firms with foreign operations
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and the ratio of sales from foreign operations to the firm’s total sales (the ‘‘multinational sales ratio’’). If MNEs have higher (lower) returns than otherwise similar purely domestic firms, the coefficient on the dummy variable will be positive (negative). In addition, the degree of multinationality might be important, such that returns might be an increasing (decreasing) function of the proportion of sales from foreign operations in relation to total sales. The dummy variable and ratio for sales from foreign operations capture basic information as to whether a firm is an MNE and the overall degree of its multinationality. However, the variables do not capture the degree to which the firm is diversified with respect to its multinational activities. The value of multinationality is often associated with an integrated empire of operations, such that the whole is worth more than the sum of the parts. To the extent that international involvement makes the whole of the MNE worth more than the sum of its parts, it is because there are many parts, in many geographic areas throughout the world. Hence, the degree of geographic diversification is potentially the single most important determinant of shareholder returns due to international involvement. The most common measure of geographic diversification is the entropy measure associated with Theil (1967): ENTROPY ¼
n X
S i ln ð1=S i Þ ¼
i¼1
n X
S i ln ðS i Þ
i¼1
where Si represents the share of operations in the ith region relative to total operations. Sales are typically used as the measure of operations. Compustat reports 1994 sales data broken into seven geographic regions (U.S., non-U.S. North America, South America, Europe, Asia, Oceania, and Africa) for 1,221 firms. With seven geographic regions, entropy theoretically ranges from 0, which represents sales entirely in one region, to a maximum of 1.95, representing sales equally distributed among the seven regions. For the 1,221 firms reporting geographic segment data, entropy empirically ranges from 0 to 1.37 and has a mean of 0.567. A central feature of the entropy statistic is that it contains information not contained in the multinational sales ratio, as distinctions can be made among firms at a particular multinational sales ratio based on the dispersion of the sales from foreign operations. Fig. 1 plots entropy against the multinational sales ratio, revealing of an inverted U shape. A regression estimating entropy as a quadratic function of the foreign sales ratio reveals: ENTROPY ¼ 3:479 RATIO 3:271 RATIO2 ð:260Þ
ð:400Þ
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1.4
ENTROPY
1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 0
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 RATIO OF SALES OF FOREIGN OPERATIONS TO TOTAL SALES
Fig. 1. Entropy as a Function of the Ratio of Sales of Foreign Operations to Total Sales.
with an adjusted R2 ¼ 0.79. This equation implies that on average entropy reaches a maximum at 53% multinational sales. To determine the significance of international business the regressions control for other firm characteristics known to determine shareholder return, at least ex post. The first is the CAPM beta, measuring the risk of the stock against the marketwide portfolio. Compustat reports stock betas estimated by Standard & Poor’s Corporation with five years of monthly data. As an independent variable, beta is expected to have a positive coefficient, such that riskier firms have higher returns. A lagged value of beta is used in order to reduce endogeneity. Guided by findings from Fama and French, several additional control variables are included. Market size is the log of the lagged values of total market equity, which is expected to have a negative coefficient when small firms outperform large firms. The ratio of the book equity to market equity of the firm is the log of the lagged value, and is expected to have a positive coefficient since firms with high book equity in relation to market equity outperform firms with low book- to market-equity. Financial leverage is the lagged value of the ratio of long-term debt to the sum of long-term debt and the market value of equity. The leverage variable is included in both level and squared form, which are expected to have positive and negative coefficients, respectively, suggesting that increasing leverage raises returns but at a decreasing rate and will even lower returns after some maximum.
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Regressions also control for industry using a set of 13 industry dummy variables based on SIC code. This setup allows the constant in the regressions to vary by industry, since the industrial composition of MNEs is generally shown to be different from that of domestic corporations. The industries covered are agriculture; mining and construction; food and tobacco; textiles and apparel; lumber, furniture, and paper; chemicals; rubber, leather, stone, and glass; metals; machinery, computers, and electronics; transportation equipment; transportation and communications; wholesale and retail trade; and services. 4.2. Results Tables 4 and 5 present cross-section regression results examining determinants of the return to shareholders of nonfinancial firms. Table 4 contains results using the return for 1994 in a sample of 3,678 firms for which data are available. Table 5 contains results using the annual average return for the five-year period 1990–1994 in a sample of 2,891 firms. The independent variables capturing international involvement are based on data for 1994. The dummy variables and ratios for export sales and foreign sales are as described above. Entropy is based on the formula given above; for any firms reporting zero sales from foreign operations, entropy is set equal to zero since all their sales therefore occur in the U.S. To conserve space, Tables 4 and 5 report fairly comprehensive equations containing the main combinations of the five variables representing international involvement. Many other combinations of variables were considered, but are not reported here because the results are consistent with these main combinations. Note that, as is typical in studies of returns, the adjusted R2 of the equations is fairly low – at approximately 11% for 1994 and 6% for 1990–1994. To determine the significance of international involvement, the regressions control for other firm characteristics usually thought to determine shareholder return. Prominent among these variables is beta. For regressions in Table 4 using the 1994 return, beta is based on the period 1990– 1994. For regressions in Table 5 using the 1990–1994 returns, beta is based on the period 1985–1989. The instability of coefficients on beta in crosssection regressions is reflected in the results presented in Tables 4 and 5. Using the single-year returns for 1994, beta is shown to have a negative coefficient, which is an ‘‘incorrect’’ sign according to the CAPM, and is statistically significant. For average annual returns for 1990–1994, however, the sign is positive and significant. According to these results, 1994 was thus
1 Dummy for exports Dummy for multinational sales Export sales ratio Multinational sales ratio Entropy Beta ln(market equity) ln(book/market equity) Leverage Leverage2 Observations Adjusted R2 SEE
8.258 (2.081) 5.899 (2.025)
0.472 (0.133) 4.278 (0.519) 18.182 (1.572) 10.833 (12.815) 25.315 (20.922) 3,678 0.11 50.340
2
3
21.808 (8.417) 10.366 (5.908)
20.870 (8.408)
0.433 (0.135) 4.542 (0.508) 18.531 (1.572) 14.150 (12.932) 29.632 (21.015) 3,676 0.11 50.440
0.412 (0.136) 4.774 (0.477) 18.608 (1.567) 14.822 (12.978) 30.175 (21.074) 3,678 0.11 50.460
Note: Regressions also include industry dummy variables. Significant at 10% level. Significant at 5% level.
4
9.361 (5.905) 0.424 (0.133) 4.530 (0.508) 18.590 (1.573) 11.068 (12.911) 26.623 (20.996) 3,676 0.11 50.487
5
12.531 (3.199) 0.481 (0.128) 4.440 (0.587) 18.831 (1.758) 11.597 (14.246) 30.294 (22.928) 2,974 0.12 50.552
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Table 4. Determinants of Shareholder Returns, 1994 (Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors in Parentheses).
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Table 5. Determinants of Average Annual Shareholder Returns, 1990–1994 (Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors in Parentheses). 1 Dummy for exports Dummy for multinational sales Export sales ratio Multinational sales ratio Entropy Beta ln(market equity) ln(book/market equity) Leverage Leverage2 Observations Adjusted R2 SEE
2
3
4
5
1.177 (0.873) 1.515 (0.886) 4.033 (3.589) 4.340 (2.408) 1.742 0.439 5.063 13.472 25.519 2,891 0.06 19.749
(0.778) (0.199) (0.608) (5.969) (9.095)
1.755 0.459 5.078 14.426 26.743 2,889 0.06 19.744
1.790 0.564 5.137 14.041 26.320 2,891 0.06 19.759
(0.779) (0.185) (0.608) (5.989) (9.112)
4.146 (2.398) 1.794 0.451 5.088 14.074 26.495 2,889 0.06 19.745
(0.779) (0.195) (0.608) (5.967) (9.100)
2.891 (1.149) 1.825 (0.871) 0.478 (0.230) 5.459 (0.696) 12.565 (5.967) 26.399 (10.447) 2,335 0.07 20.002
REID W. CLICK
Note: Regressions also include industry dummy variables. Significant at 10% level. Significant at 5% level.
(0.778) (0.195) (0.607) (5.982) (9.105)
3.630 (3.575)
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a year in which riskier stocks performed poorly, although the period 1990– 1994 was generally one in which riskier stocks outperformed safer ones. The Fama and French variables have consistent coefficients, but not necessarily conforming to earlier findings. The coefficient on size is positive in both tables, indicating that larger firms outperformed small firms during the early 1990s. This sign contradicts the Fama and French findings, although it is not unusual because the effect of size on firm returns is the subject of some debate in the finance literature. The positive sign on the ratio of book equity to market equity is the ‘‘right sign.’’ This ratio is typically regarded as a more robust determinant of returns in the finance literature, so the result somewhat reaffirms this robustness. The effect of leverage is also as expected: there is a positive coefficient on the variable and a negative coefficient on its square, and the variables are jointly significant. The maximum return occurs in the range of 19–27% leverage. The significance of international involvement as a determinant of shareholder returns is demonstrated by the results provided in the upper rows of Tables 4 and 5. Note that all of the signs are positive, indicating that shareholder returns are consistently positively related to international involvement. Nearly all of the coefficients in Table 4 are statistically significant at the 5% level, and only the multinational sales ratio seems to be a relatively weak determinant. The coefficients in Table 5 are more often insignificant or are only weakly significant (i.e., only at the 10% level). Exporting firms appear to have superior performance when compared to nonexporting firms for 1994, though not for the 1990–1994 period as a whole. For 1994, the dummy variable suggests that exporters had returns 814 percentage points above nonexporters. The export sales ratio suggests that returns were an increasing function of the proportion of exports, such that each percentage point of exports increased returns by 21–22 basis points. MNEs appear to have superior performance when compared to domestic enterprises. The results for 1994 are stronger, both in magnitude and statistical significance, but the results for 1990–1994 still affirm the finding. For 1994, the dummy variable suggests that multinationals had returns nearly 6 percentage points higher than domestics, and the comparable figure for 1990–1994 is 112 percentage points. Although weaker than the results for the dummy variable, the coefficients on the multinational sales ratio suggest that returns were an increasing function of multinationality, such that each percentage point of sales from foreign operations increased returns by about 10 basis points in 1994 or 4 basis points during 1990–1994. Among all the variables capturing international involvement, entropy might be the most important. The coefficient on entropy is statistically
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significantly positive at the 5% level in both tables, suggesting that multinational diversification increases the total shareholder return. The average firm with an entropy value of 0.567 had a return 7.1 percentage points higher in 1994, and an average return 1.6 percentage points higher over 1990–1994, than an otherwise similar domestic firm (i.e., a firm in the same industry, with the same beta, of the same size, with the same book- to market-equity ratio, and the same leverage). This is strong evidence that the value of international involvement is tied to the degree of diversification in the firm, such that a MNE as a whole is worth more than the sum of its subsidiary parts. Further discussion of this is provided in the conclusion.
5. SUMMARY International strategic management is the process through which value is created by an individual or group of individuals operating across a national border. This definition thus distinguishes international strategic management from general management with the phrase ‘‘operating across a national border,’’ and distinguishes international management from international business by being focused on the ‘‘process through which value is created’’ internationally. This paper answers three questions from the premise that skills creating the most value in cross-border management are the most important elements in the domain of international strategic management. First, how important is international management? The relative importance of international management is determined by the value created internationally compared to that created domestically, and Section 2 presents several statistics that reveal the importance of international activities. Factor income from abroad, which is predominantly profits on direct foreign investment, represents 4.6% of total corporate profits in the U.S. Among publicly traded nonfinancial firms, sales and profits from foreign operations amount to 34% and 24% of corporate sales and profits (respectively) for MNEs, and 20% and 15% of aggregate sales and profits of all U.S. firms. In addition, financial firms create value from their international financial activities. Second, what is the domain of international management? Since the domain is potentially unbounded under the definition provided here, this paper considers a strategy approach in which international management is the aggregation of value created through international production, marketing, and financial activities. Section 3 develops this framework and uses it to
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define the core domain of international management. The conclusion is that the domain of international management is quite broad even under the criterion of value creation. Indeed, the diversity of international management is one appealing aspect that draws many managers into the field. Third, does international management make the whole multinational corporation worth more than the sum of its parts? Effective management of production, marketing, and financial activities is capable of creating more value in an MNE than in an otherwise similar purely domestic firm. Section 4 presents some preliminary empirical evidence that this is indeed the case for U.S. firms by showing that shareholder returns are positively related to measures of international involvement (and, by inference, the amount of international management). In particular, shareholder returns are positively related to the firm’s geographic diversification; the average firm with an entropy value of 0.567 had a return 7.1 percentage points higher in 1994 (and an average return 1.6 percentage points higher over 1990–1994) than an otherwise similar domestic firm.
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OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY, AND PERFORMANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR ASIAN EMERGING MARKET MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES Juichuan Chang ABSTRACT The purpose of this study is to provide an integrated framework that conceptualizes multifaceted antecedents pertaining to international expansion of emerging market businesses in relation to firm performance. This paper develops multiple-item measures of multiple dimensions to clarify ownership structure and three diversification strategy relationships to performance. We test how ownership structure and diversification strategy affect emerging market multinational enterprises’ financial performance. The result shows that the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance is a nonlinear relationship (S shape). We also found that excessive international diversification, product diversification, and geographic scope of the expansion process negatively moderate the impact of Asia Pacific multinational enterprises’ performance. Value Creation in Multinational Enterprise International Finance Review, Volume 7, 125–148 Copyright r 2007 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1569-3767/doi:10.1016/S1569-3767(06)07006-3
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1. INTRODUCTION International expansion is accompanied by both opportunities and threats. However, empirical research and theory development have traditionally focused on US and European multinational company data, which may reflect features of the corporate behavior of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in developed countries. However, the rise of emerging market multinational firms is a more recent phenomenon and has attracted limited empirical research attention (Pananond & Zeithaml, 1998). It seems that existing corporate internationalization literature lacks an integrated framework that conceptualizes multifaceted antecedents pertaining to international expansion of emerging market businesses in relation to firm performance. Therefore, the primary purpose of this study is to fill this gap in the context of multinational firms. Asian emerging market MNEs are expected to internationalize and globalize at a faster pace in the future. They enhance their competitive cost advantages and tap foreign markets. Some of Asia MNEs are moving outside their Asian bases to North America and Europe to strategically position themselves for new markets and technologies in the 21st century. Some studies suggest that there are good reasons to believe that firms from lessdeveloped countries differ in their internationalization from firms in developed countries. Therefore, we build a theoretical argument and examine the effects of ownership structure, three diversification strategies – international diversification strategy, geographic scope, and production diversification strategy – of MNEs’ international expansion process in a sample of Asian emerging market MNEs over the period 1998–2002. In particular, our hypotheses were tested on panel data on 115 Asia Pacific MNEs (Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea) that expanded abroad. The concept model we test is illustrated in Fig. 1.
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 2.1. Ownership Structure and Performance Numerous empirical studies have tried to highlight evidence of the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance. According to agency theory, several categories of shareholders can have an influence on the managers’ efficiency: the managerial shareholders, the financial shareholders, and the institutional shareholders. In this paper, we only focus on
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Outside Block Ownership Ownership Structure Managerial Ownership
Diversification Strategy
H1
International Diversification
H2
Product Diversification
H3
Interaction of International and Product Diversification
Performance
H7
H4
Geographic Diversification
H5 H6
Intra-market Extra-market
Fig. 1. Conceptual Model.
managerial ownership. McConnell and Servaes (1990) defined management ownership as equity owned by corporate officers and members of the board of directors. Now three main hypotheses exist to explain the relationship between ownership structure and performance: convergence in interest hypothesis, neutrality hypothesis, and entrenchment hypothesis. The first is Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) ‘‘convergence in interest hypothesis.’’ They show that managerial ownership increases a firm’s value by reducing agency costs. When managers own a large proportion of the firm’s shares, they benefit to a larger extent of the benefits of their effort. The second is Demsetz’s (1983) hypothesis, which shows that corporate performance depends on environmental constraints. This hypothesis is known as the ‘‘neutrality hypothesis.’’ The third is Shleifer and Vishny’s (1989) hypothesis, which suggests that the greater the percentage of shares held by the manager, the less the other shareholders can compel him to manage the firm in their interests. This hypothesis is known as the ‘‘entrenchment hypothesis.’’
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The nonlinear relation between a firm’s ownership and performance is confirmed by different empirical studies. For example, Morck et al. (1988) indicate that corporate value rises first with increases of internal ownership below 5 percent, decreases between 5 and 25 percent, and finally increases slightly when internal ownership exceeds 25 percent. McConnell and Servaes (1990) show a negative effect of internal ownership between 5 and 25 percent and a nonsignificant one for ownership values exceeding 25 percent. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argue that the positive relationship between Tobin’s Q and managerial ownership is sustained at higher levels of ownership for small firms than it is for large firms. Empirical research and theory development have traditionally focused on US and European multinational company data; there may also be good reasons to believe that the relationship between ownership structure and performance is different for firms in emerging market MNEs. Therefore, we hypothesize the relationship between the financial performance of Asian emerging market MNEs and their ownership structure as follows: Hypothesis 1. There is a nonlinear relationship (S shaped) between managerial ownership and performance in Asian emerging market MNEs. In this paper, we focus on three diversification strategies: international diversification, geographic diversification, and product diversification. 2.2. The Effect of International Diversification Strategy on Performance There may also be good reasons to believe that the internationalization– performance relationship is different for firms in emerging market MNEs. First, firms in developing countries are generally less advanced in managerial and technological knowledge in comparison with firms in developed countries (Tolentino, 1993). Second, they may face different macroeconomic conditions and institutional environments compared with firms in developed countries (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). Third, developed countries and developing countries differ in international competitiveness by sector (Nachum, 2004). Some studies have found a positive relationship between internationalization and firm performance (Geringer et al., 1989; Rugman et al., 2000). Some studies have found a negative relationship (Kumar, 1984; Michel & Shaked, 1986). However, recent studies suggest that the form of the relationship is an inverted U-relationship (Geringer et al., 1989; Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997). More recently, Ruigrok and Wagner (2003) have found a standard U-shape relationship between internationalization and firm performance.
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In stage 1, the relationship is a negative slope as costs and barriers to initial international expansion outweigh the benefits. Initially, the emerging market MNEs typically have large learning costs because of unfamiliarity with foreign markets, cultures, and environments. Second, the emerging market early internationalizers often suffer from less efficient production and less internationally competitive knowledge-base industries; they also often suffer from weak or non-existing institutions (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001) as well as underdeveloped capital markets (Singh, 1995). Apart from economic and legal barriers, barriers to emerging market MNEs internationalization include cultural distance (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) and establishing the firm’s legitimacy abroad (Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). For early emerging market internationalizers, the small scale of global operations is insufficient to recoup costs of creating an internationalization (Gongming, 1998; Hitt et al., 1997). In stage 2, the relationship becomes positive as benefits of emerging market MNEs’ international expansion are now realized. Further geographical expansion makes possible efficiencies that improve resource utilization (Kim, Hwang, & Burgers, 1989; Porter, 1985). While market-seeking firms are better able to scan for market opportunities, the incremental benefits of further international expansion are now greater than the incremental costs of a further stage 2 expansion. Other benefits of stage 2 international expansion are the ability of some companies to exercise global market power (Grant, 1987) and to extend the product cycle (Vernon, 1966). Vernon argues that competitive advantages of developing country MNEs do not lie in frontier technology. Rather, they can take the form of adaptation of imported technology, development of products suitable for developing countries, or innovations of small-scale production techniques. For instance, while the manufacturing and commodity sectors have seen a decline in many industrialized countries, the manufacturing and commodity sectors have been growing in many developing countries. Young, Wansley, and Lane (1999) indicate that some unique features of Asia Pacific emerging market MNEs’ internationalization strategies can be highlighted in stage 2: (1) sectoral specialization through vertical integration, (2) diversification into unrelated businesses, and (3) family ownership and management. Therefore, we hypothesize the relationship between performance of a multinational firm and its internationalization as follows: Hypothesis 2. Moderate levels of internationalization are positively related with firm performance, but a high-level internationalization should be negatively related with the firm’s performance.
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2.3. Product Diversification Strategy and Performance The relationship between product diversification and firm performance has long been studied by management scholars although the results are puzzling, given that most are theoretical arguments. Salter and Weinhold (1981) indicate that a diversified firm can apply particularly skills and knowledge acquired in one business to solve problems and exploit opportunities in other business. Wrigley (1974) distinguished two modes of product diversification: related and unrelated diversification. Then, Hitt and Ireland (1986) found that related diversification facilitates the sharing of activities and the transfer of skills across businesses to increase firm value; therefore, related diversification has potential sources of value increases at both the corporate and business levels. Conversely, unrelated diversification provides few operational synergies and, therefore, must rely on financial synergies for increasing value. Wrigley (1974) suggested that related diversified firms emphasize strategic control to achieve superior performance and that unrelated diversified firms emphasize financial controls to achieve superior performance. However, at some point these efforts are also associated with major costs. For example, Grant, Jammine, and Thomas (1988) highlight the growing strain on top management as it tries to manage an increasingly disparate and less familiar portfolio of businesses. Markides (1992) identifies other costs, such as control and effort losses (due to increased shirking), coordination costs, and other diseconomies related to organization, inefficiencies from conflicting ‘‘dominant logics’’ between businesses, and internal capital market inefficiencies. However, some researchers argue for a curvilinear relationship between product diversification and performance with net benefits increasing to a maximum and decreasing as costs increase. Therefore, we hypothesize that the emerging market MNEs’ moderate levels of product diversification have a beneficial influence on their performance when they did not engage heavily in product diversification, but when emerging market MNEs go far beyond their original industries, then their performance turned out to be negative with further high levels of product diversification. The effect of diversification on business group performance is as follows: Hypothesis 3. Moderate levels of product diversification are positively related with emerging market MNEs’ performance, but a higher product diversification is negatively related with the emerging market MNEs’ performance.
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2.4. Geographic Diversification of Emerging Market MNEs’ Operation In this study, we examine geographic scope effects on the relationship between internationalization and Asian emerging market MNEs’ performance. There are good reasons to believe that the internationalization– performance shape of the curve may vary with the country of origin of the firm and the markets it enters. The Uppsala model of internationalization (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) proposed that firms internationalize incrementally from ‘‘psychically close’’ countries to ‘‘psychically distant’’ countries. This would predict a pattern of internationalization in which one would find internationalization in familiar countries in the first stage and internationalization in less familiar countries in the latter stages. By definition, intraregional markets are located at a closer distance. When emerging market businesses first internationalize, they usually enter countries whose culture and business customs most resemble their home (OECD, 1997). If they are in the same time zone, it is also easier to coordinate activities and reduce transportation costs, the costs of coordination, as compared to extraregionally dispersed operations. By concentrating on markets in the same region, firms may also avoid diseconomies of time compression (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). Finally, markets in the same region are also likely to be part of the same trade blocs and so benefit from reduced market entry barriers. Therefore, a regional strategy may allow emerging market MNEs to achieve a better balance between the two demands, gaining some of the benefits of globalization while remaining responsive to local market needs (Ghemawat, 2003; Ghoshal, 1987). However, Ghoshal (1987) suggests that as firms concentrate on extra-regional international markets, more exposure to foreign exchange fluctuations systematically increases the foreign exchange risk, and then the agency problem, communication, coordination, and motivation problems stemming from cultural diversity in the MNEs. Therefore, the relationship between internationalization and firm’s performance is a crucial question for researchers. We assume that these effects seem to be confirmed by the preponderance of regionalization strategies among Asia emerging market MNEs. The logic described above suggests the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 4. A higher geographic diversification negatively moderates the relationship between international diversification and the firm’s performance. Hypothesis 5. The internationalization of intra-regional operations will be positively related to the firm’s performance.
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Hypothesis 6. The internationalization of extra-regional operations will be negatively related to the firm’s performance. 2.5. The Interaction Effects of International Diversification and Product Diversification on a Firm’s Performance It is now widely recognized that internationalization and diversification effects are related. A small number of existing studies have examined the combined effects of product diversification and internationalization. Geringer et al. (1989) found that the effect of the interaction of product diversification and internationalization on a firm’s performance has no significant effects. Franko (1989) indicates that a high level of product diversification in geographically diverse internationalization leads to lower performance. Kim et al. (1989) suggested no effect of global diversification on related diversified firm performance. Hitt et al. (1997) found that high levels of product diversification will raise the cost of governing firms; therefore, excessively high degrees of product and international diversification together should depress performance. The interactive and direct influence of product diversification on international operations has also been elaborated in many previous studies (Geringer et al., 1989; Grant et al., 1988; Hitt et al., 1997; Kim et al., 1989). Overall, these studies indicate that significant interactive effects exist between international diversification and product diversification. We argue that moderate levels of product diversification and internationalization are positively related with firm performance, but a high level of diversification and internationalization should be negatively related with a firm’s performance. Therefore, we hypothesize the interaction effects of internationalization and diversification on business groups as follows: Hypothesis 7. Moderate interaction of international diversification and product diversification are positively related with emerging market MNEs’ performance, but a higher interaction of the expansion process is negatively related with the emerging market MNEs’ performance.
3. METHODOLOGY 3.1. Sample and Data collection First, we identified the Asian emerging market multinational companies from The Forbes 2000, a comprehensive ranking of the world’s top 2000
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largest companies over the period 1998–2002, measured by a composite of sales, profits, assets, and market value. Second, data on ownership structure, the international operations (foreign sales/total sales and foreign asset/total asset), and return on sales. Returns on asset were obtained from stock exchanges of Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore, company annual reports, and supplementary materials comprising group founders’ biographies, governmental statistics, corporation disclosure statements, and business newspaper and journal reports. Firms used in this study had to have a least 10 percent of their sales originating overseas, an implicit criterion used in many of the previous studies (see, e.g., Daniels & Bracker, 1989; Geringer, Tallman, & Olsen, 2000). Companies that did not distinguish between export and foreign subsidiary sales and those that did not provide the figures necessary for calculating the ratio were removed from the sample. Table 1 shows the distribution by four countries and across seven industries. The final sample amounted to 115 multinational firms in Asia Pacific MNEs (Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore) over the period 1998–2002. The breakdown by country and industry sector is shown in Tables 1a and 1b, respectively. Table 1a.
Sample Distribution of Asia Pacific MNEs across Countries.
Asia Pacific MNEs
Total Samples
Hong Kong Taiwan South Korea Singapore
43 29 33 10
Total
Table 1b.
115
Sample Distribution of Asia Pacific MNEs across Industries.
No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Industry
Asia Pacific MNEs
Conglomerates Consumer goods Food Primary manufacturing Secondary manufacturing Service Utility
7 18 10 15 35 26 4
Total
115
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3.2. Variables and Measures 3.2.1. Dependent Variable Performance: We measured firm performance by two methods: (1) Return on assets (ROA): income before extraordinary item, divided by total assets. (2) Return on sales (ROS): income before extraordinary item, divided by total sales revenue 3.2.2. Independent Variables Managerial ownership: We define managerial ownership as the percentage of share held by the firm’s board of directors. Degree of internationalization (DOI) was measured using the sum of foreign sales as a percentage of total sales, FSTS (e.g., Grant, 1987) and foreign assets as a percentage of total assets, FATA (Gomes & Ramaswamy, 1999). DOI (degree of internationalization) ¼ FSTS+FATA Intra-regional: Asia Pacific region Extra-regional: outside Asia Pacific region Global region: intra-region+extra-region Product diversification index: We use a Herfindahl-type quantitative index as a measure of firm diversification (Grant et al., 1988). The index satisfies the following important requirements: it varies directly with the number of different products produced; it varies inversely with the increasingly unequal distribution of products across product lines; and it is bounded between zero and unity. The product diversification index takes into account the number of segments in which a firm operates and the relative importance of each segment in sales. X Product Diversification Index ¼ 1 ðsiÞ2 where si is the proportion of a firm’s sales reported in product group i. Geographic diversification: the number of countries in which the firm operates. 3.2.3. Control Variables Size: This was measured by the natural logarithm of number of employees (Gomes & Ramaswamy, 1999) and was used to control for the potential
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effect of scale economy differences. Logarithmic transformation makes the results easier to interpret, because the changes in the logarithm domain represents the relative (percentage) changes in the original metric and also makes the distribution of data closer to normality. Debt: To control for changes in the firms’ capital structure, we include a leverage variable, measured by total debt over total assets. Table 2 indicates the operationalization of variables, the sources of information, and its previous usage. 3.3. The Empirical Model We use a cross-sectional heteroskedastic, timewise autoregressive model, which makes it possible to reveal individual exploratory variables as well as the dynamics over time. The multiple regression analysis was carried out on five-year (1998–2002) averaged data for internationalization, performance, and other control variables. To test Hypothesis 1, we used a cubic regression model with first-, second, and third-order terms for degree of ownership as follows: Performance ¼ a þ b1 ðmanagerial ownershipit Þ þ b2 ðmanagerial ownershipit Þ2 þ b3 ðmanagerial ownershipit Þ3 þ S b3þm I m þ b3þmaxðmÞþ1 C 1 þ b4 ðoutside block ownershipÞ þ b5 ðSizeÞ þ b6 ðDebt ratioÞ þ it MARS model. In the second stage, we used the Multivariate Adaptive Regression Spline (MARS) methodology developed by Friedman (1991) to determine the turning points in the ownership–performance relationship. The piecewise linear regression model allowing for two changes in the slope coefficient of the degree of internationalization is as follows: Degree of managerial ownership: DMO Performance ¼ a þ b1 ðDMO1i Þ þ b2 ðDMO2i Þ þ b3 ðDMO3i Þ þ b4 ðSizeÞ þ i
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Table 2. Definition of Variables and Data Sources. Variable Dependent variables Performance
Managerial ownership Outside block Ownership Im m I t
Definition
Adapted From
(1) Return on assets (ROA): income before extraordinary item, divided by total assets (2) Return on sales (ROS): income before extraordinary item, divided by total sales revenue The percentage of shares held by the firm’s board of directors The percentage of shares held by institutions and other external ownership interests Set of dummy variables to control sub-sector effects Knowledge and capital intensive service sector Represents the companies in the study (cross-sectional component) Corresponds to the different years (timeseries component)
Dunning (1995), Grant (1987), Daniels and Bracker (1989)
McConnell and Servaes (1990) McConnell and Servaes (1990) Contractor et al. (2002) Contractor et al. (2002) Contractor et al. (2002) Contractor et al. (2002)
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Independent variables International diversification ¼ FSTS+FATA ¼ DOI (degree of internationalization), Sullivan (1994) FSTS Foreign sales as a percentage of total sales Rugman (1986), Haar (1990) FATA Foreign assets as a percentage of total assets Daniels and Bracker (1989), Sambharya (1996) (International diversification)2 Quadratic of international diversification Contractor et al. (2002) P 2 Product diversification Product diversification index ¼ 1 (si) si is the proportion of a firm’s sales in Grant et al. (1988) product group i
Size Debt ratio
The number of countries in which the firm operates Natural log of number of employees Total debt over total assets
Grazialetto-Gilies (1998)
Industries dummies I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6
Using the Utility sector as the baseline variable, to reach lowest Cronbach’s alphas 1 ¼ Conglomerates 1 ¼ Consumer goods 1 ¼ Food 1 ¼ Primary manufacturing 1 ¼ Secondary manufacturing 1 ¼ Service
Haveman (1993) Hitt et al. (1997)
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If If If If If If If
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DMOiolevel one then DMO1i ¼ DMOi DMOi>level one then DMO1i ¼ level one DMOiolevel one then DMO2i ¼ 0 level onerDMOiolevel two then DMO2i ¼ DMOilevel one DMOiZlevel two then DMO2i ¼ level twolevel one DMOiolevel two then DMO3i ¼ 0 DMOiZlevel two then DMO3i ¼ DMOlevel two
4. RESULTS 4.1. The Relationship between Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: A Nonlinear Relationship (S Shape) Table 3 and Fig. 2 confirm Hypothesis 1. The results show that the relationship between a firm’s performance and managerial ownership is a nonlinear relationship (S shape). The results of Models 1 (see Table 3) are strongly significant, with high F-values. The results (Fig. 2 and Model 1) indicate that corporate performance (ROA) rises first with increases of managerial ownership below 8 percent (beta ¼ 0.163, po0.01), decreases between 8 and 23 percent (beta ¼ 1.018, po0.05), and finally increases when managerial ownership exceeds 23 percent (beta ¼ 2.213, po0.001). Hence, the results are in accordance with those obtained by Morck et al. (1988). In the second step, we use a cross-sectional heteroskedastic, timewise autoregressive model and the MARS methodology to determine the turning points in the ownership–performance relationship (Fig. 2). Initially, as the managerial ownership increase, the corporate performance improves. But we also find that the square of the level of managerial ownership is negatively related to a firm’s performance (8 percentomanagerial ownershipo23 percent). As managerial ownership exceeds 23 percent, the managerial ownership is likely to benefit corporate performance because mangers who own enough stock to dominate the board of directors could get entrenched. Therefore, managerial ownership increases a firm’s value by reducing agency costs. As the greater the percentage of shares held by managers, the lesser the other shareholders can compel him to manage the firm in their interest. The results of Table 3 also show that a firm’s performance is positively related to outside block ownership (beta ¼ 0.142, po0.05), indicating that outsider owners are active in monitoring management. The results also show that a firm’s performance is positively related to the firm’s size and negatively related to debt ratio.
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Table 3.
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Regression of Asia Pacific MNEs’ Performance (Samples N ¼ 115) (Cubic Regression Model).
ROA (Dependent variable) (Test Hypothesis 1) Intercept Managerial ownership (Managerial ownership)2 (Managerial ownership)3 Outside block ownership I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 Firm size Debt ratio R2 F
Model 1 1.891 0.163 1.018 2.213 0.142 0.028 0.414 0.136 0.125 0.053 0.079 0.542 0.173 5.394 7.027
Notes: I1: sector effect (dummy, 1 ¼ Conglomerates; 0 ¼ otherwise). I2: sector effect (dummy, 1 ¼ Consumer goods; 0 ¼ otherwise). I3: sector effect (dummy, 1 ¼ Food; 0 ¼ otherwise). I4: sector effect (dummy, 1 ¼ Primary manufacturing; 0 ¼ otherwise). I5: sector effect (dummy, 1 ¼ Secondary manufacturing; 0 ¼ otherwise). I6: sector effect (dummy, 1 ¼ Service; 0 ¼ otherwise). Using the Utility sector as the baseline variable to reach lowest Cronbach’s alphas. po0.05; po0.01; po0.001.
4.2. The Interaction Effects of International Diversification and Product Diversification on a Firm’s Performance In Table 4, Model 3 revealed a clear quadratic relationship between international diversification and performance. The results of Model 3 are strongly significant, with high F-values. International diversification and performance were significantly positively related up to a point in the 0–64 percent range (beta ¼ 1.367, po0.001), after which an increase in international diversification was associated with declining performance (beta ¼ 1.068, po0.01). Therefore, the results support Hypothesis 2. In the case of product diversification, the quadratic term was also similar.
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