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U.S. ELECTION CAMPAIGNS
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U.S. ELECTION CAMPAIGNS A Documentary and Reference Guide
Thomas J. Baldino and Kyle L. Kreider
Documentary and Reference Guides
Copyright 2011 by Thomas J. Baldino and Kyle L. Kreider All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data U.S. election campaigns : a documentary and reference guide / Thomas J. Baldino and Kyle L. Kreider. p. cm.—(Documentary and reference guides) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-313-35304-8 (hbk. : alk. paper) ISBN 978-0-313-35305-5 (ebook) 1. Political campaigns—United States—History—Sources. 2. Election law—United States—History— Sources. 3. Political campaigns—United States—History. 4. Election law—United States— History. I. Baldino, Thomas J. (Thomas Joseph) II. Kreider, Kyle L. JK2281.U34 2011 324.973—dc22 2011011234 ISBN: 978-0-313-35304-8 EISBN: 978-0-313-35305-5 15
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This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. Praeger An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America
To Sandy, the love of my life. —Tom And To Kathryn, who taught me about life. —Kyle
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CONTENTS List of Documents and Sidebars
ix
Reader’s Guide to Related Documents and Sidebars
xi
Foreword by Larry J. Sabato
xv
Preface
xix
Acknowledgments
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Introduction
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Chronology
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1. The 19th Century
1
2. 1900 to 1939
41
3. 1940 to 1969
91
4. 1970 to 1999
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5. 2000 to 2010
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Afterword
333
Selected Resources
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Index
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LIST OF DOCUMENTS AND SIDEBARS Chapter 1: The 19th Century
The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925
The Boston Gazette editorial satirizing the “Gerrymander,” 1812
The Radio Act of 1927
Inaugural Address of President Andrew Jackson, March 4, 1829
The Federal Communications Act of 1934
State of the Union Address of President Andrew Jackson, December 8, 1829
Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934) Sidebar: The Federal Corrupt Practices Act (the Publicity Act) of 1910, 36 Stat. 822 Sidebar: The Radio Act of 1912, PL 62-264
Inaugural Address of President William Henry Harrison, March 4, 1841
Sidebar: The Teapot Dome Scandal
Circular Letter from Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, to Thomas Ewing, Secretary of the Treasury, March 20, 1841
Sidebar: The Federal Courts and the Radio Act of 1927
Naval Appropriations Act of 1867
Sidebar: Political Parties, Radical Ideas, and Ballot Access Sidebar: The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, PL 74-333 49 Stat. 838
President Rutherford B. Hayes’s Executive Order on Assessment and the Political Activities of Federal Employees, June 22, 1877
Chapter 3: 1940 to 1969
Ex Parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882)
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941)
The Civil Service (Pendleton) Act, 1883
The Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947
Sidebar: The Assassination of President Garfield, July 2, 1881, and the Passage of the Civil Service Act
The Fairness Doctrine, 1949
Sidebar: The Omaha Platform of the People’s Party
The 1940 Amendments to the Hatch Act of 1939
United States v. United Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567 (1957) Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968)
Chapter 2: 1900 to 1939
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)
An Act to Prohibit Corporations from Making Money Contributions in Connection with Political Elections (the Tillman Act), 1907
Sidebar: An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities (The Hatch Act of 1939), 53 Stat. 1147
The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1911 United States v. U.S. Brewers’ Association, 239 F. 163 (1916) United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917)
Sidebar: In the Matter of the Mayflower Broadcasting Corporation, Boston, Massachusetts, for Construction Permit, 8 F.C.C. 333, 1938 Sidebar: The War Labor Disputes (Smith-Connally) Act of 1943, PL 78-89 57 Stat. 144
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List of Documents and Sidebars
Sidebar: Labor Unions, Corporations, and Campaign Financing in the 1940s
Sidebar: A State Cannot Require a Closed Primary Against a Party’s Wishes
Sidebar: Amendments of 1959 to the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. Section 315
Sidebar: The 1993 Hatch Act Reform Amendments, PL 103-94
Sidebar: The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966
Sidebar: 1996 Presidential Campaign Scandal and Its Impact on Campaign Rules Sidebar: Minor Party Access to Debates
Chapter 4: 1970 to 1999 Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971)
Chapter 5: 2000 to 2010
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, as amended in 1974, 1976, and 1979
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000)
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973)
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)
Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975) Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983)
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act, Section 204, 2007 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986)
Internal Revenue Tax Code, Title 26, Sections 501(c) and 527, 2010
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986)
Sidebar: Free Speech and Judicial Elections
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)
Sidebar: Political Parties and Campaign Finance
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)
Sidebar: Supreme Court Rulings on State Campaign Finance Schemes
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997)
Sidebar: States Differ Greatly in Their Regulations of Campaign Finance
Sidebar: The Political Broadcast Act of 1970, S. 3637 Sidebar: The Revenue Act of 1971, Titles VII and VIII, PL 92-178
Sidebar: The Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections (DISCLOSE) Act, 111th Congress H.R. 5175 and S. 3628
Sidebar: Watergate’s Impact on Campaign Finance Reform
Sidebar: The Origin and Significance of Super PACs
READER’S GUIDE TO RELATED DOCUMENTS AND SIDEBARS Campaign Communications Statutes Sidebar: The Radio Act of 1912, PL 62-264, Chapter 2 The Radio Act of 1927, Chapter 2 The Federal Communications Act of 1934, Chapter 2 Sidebar: Amendments of 1959 to the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. Section 315, Chapter 3 Sidebar: The Political Broadcast Act of 1970, Chapter 4 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, as amended in 1974, 1976, and 1979, Chapter 4 Sidebar: Minor Party Access to Debates, Chapter 4
The Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Chapter 3 Sidebar: The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966, Chapter 3 Sidebar: The Revenue Act of 1971, Titles VII and VIII, PL 92-178, Chapter 4 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, as amended in 1974, 1976, and 1979, Chapter 4 The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Chapter 5 The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act, Section 204, 2007, Chapter 5
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Chapter 5
Internal Revenue Tax Code, Title 26, Sections 501(c) and 527, 2010, Chapter 5
Campaign Finance Statutes and Regulations
Sidebar: States Differ Greatly in Their Regulations of Campaign Finance, Chapter 5
Naval Appropriations Act of 1867, Chapter 1 An Act to Prohibit Corporations from Making Money Contributions in Connection with Political Elections(the Tillman Act), 1907, Chapter 2 Sidebar: The Federal Corrupt Practices Act (The Publicity Act) of 1910, 36 Stat. 822, Chapter 2
Sidebar: The Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections (DISCLOSE) Act, Chapter 5 Corrupt Campaign Practices and Scandals
The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1911, Chapter 2
Sidebar: The Assassination of President Garfield, July 2, 1881, and the Passage of the Civil Service Act, Chapter 1
Sidebar: The Radio Act of 1912, PL 62-264, Chapter 2
Sidebar: The Teapot Dome Scandal, Chapter 2
The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, Chapter 2
Sidebar: Watergate’s Impact on Campaign Finance Reform, Chapter 4
Sidebar: The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, PL 74-333 49 Stat. 838, Chapter 2 Sidebar: An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities (The Hatch Act of 1939), 53 Stat. 1147, Chapter 3
Sidebar: 1996 Presidential Campaign Scandal and Its Impact on Campaign Rules, Chapter 4
The 1940 Amendments to the Hatch Act of 1939, Chapter 3
Court Decisions: Ballot Access and Minor Parties
Sidebar: The War Labor Disputes (Smith-Connally) Act of 1943, PL 78-89 57 Stat. 144, Chapter 3
Sidebar: Political Parties, Radical Ideas, and Ballot Access, Chapter 2
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Reader’s Guide to Related Documents and Sidebars
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), Chapter 3
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), Chapter 4
Jenness v. Fortson, 03 U.S. 431 (1971), Chapter 4 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), Chapter 4
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986), Chapter 4
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986), Chapter 4
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000), Chapter 5
Court Decisions: Broadcast Regulations
Court Decisions: Party Rights
Sidebar: The Federal Courts and the Radio Act of 1927, Chapter 2
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), Chapter 3
Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934), Chapter 2
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), Chapter 4
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communication Commission, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), Chapter 3
Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975), Chapter 4 Sidebar: A State Cannot Require a Closed Primary Against a Party’s Wishes, Chapter 4
Sidebar: Minor Party Access to Debates, Chapter 4
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997), Chapter 4
Sidebar: Free Speech and Judicial Elections, Chapter 5
Sidebar: Minor Party Access to Debates, Chapter 4
Court Decisions: Campaign Finance
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000), Chapter 5
United States v. U.S. Brewers’ Association, 239 F. 163 (1916), Chapter 2
Sidebar: Political Parties and Campaign Finance, Chapter 5
United States v. United Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567 (1957), Chapter 3
Sidebar: Supreme Court Rulings on State Campaign Finance Schemes, Chapter 5
Sidebar: Labor Unions, Corporations, and Campaign Financing in the 1940s, Chapter 3
Court Decisions: Redistricting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), Chapter 4
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), Chapter 4
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), Chapter 4
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), Chapter 4
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), Chapter 4 McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), Chapter 5 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), Chapter 5
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), Chapter 4 Executive Orders President Rutherford B. Hayes’ Executive Order on Assessment and the Political Activities of Federal Employees, June 22, 1877, Chapter 1
Court Decisions—Corporate Rights
Circular Letter from Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, to Thomas Ewing, Secretary of the Treasury, March 20, 1841, Chapter 1
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), Chapter 4
FCC Broadcast Regulations
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), Chapter 5
Sidebar: In the Matter of the Mayflower Broadcasting Corporation, Boston, Massachusetts, for Construction Permit, 8 F.C.C. 333, 1938, Chapter 3
Court Decisions—Elections
The Fairness Doctrine, 1949, Chapter 3
United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917), Chapter 2
Sidebar: Amendments of 1959 to the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. Section 315, Chapter 3
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), Chapter 3 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), Chapter 3 Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971), Chapter 4 Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975), Chapter 4
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communication Commission, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), Chapter 3 Sidebar: The Political Broadcast Act of 1970, S. 3637, Chapter 4
Reader’s Guide to Related Documents and Sidebars
xiii
Sidebar: The Origin and Significance of Super PACs, Chapter 5
Circular Letter from Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, to Thomas Ewing, Secretary of the Treasury, March 20, 1841, Chapter 1
Patronage
The Civil Service (Pendleton) Act, 1883, Chapter 1
Inaugural Address of President Andrew Jackson, March 4, 1829, Chapter 1
Sidebar: The Omaha Platform of the People’s Party, Chapter 1
State of the Union Address of President Andrew Jackson, December 8, 1829, Chapter 1
Redistricting
Inaugural Address of President William Henry Harrison, March 4, 1841, Chapter 1
The Boston Gazette editorial satirizing the “Gerrymander,” 1812, Chapter 1
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FOREWORD In Abraham Lincoln’s day, campaigning was almost as simple as his famous dictum, “Find ’em and vote ’em.” There were very few codified rules of the game, and the standard for campaign financing and election technique could be summed up as “anything goes.” Campaigning in the United States has come a long way since then. Today we have one of the most complex systems of electioneering in the world, and it takes a great deal of careful study to understand it. Fortunately, with this book, Thomas Baldino and Kyle Kreider have made it much simpler for a student of politics to comprehend the superstructure of U.S. politics. This extraordinarily useful volume takes us through the evolution of campaign regulation from the 19th century forward. The original documents are provided and skillfully parsed for the reader. Too few authors trust the reader with the full text of the laws and orders, preferring merely to interpret them for everyone else, sometimes accurately and sometimes not. Here, the reader can enjoy both the texts and the translations. Best of all, the interpretations are written in English, not political-speak. Baldino and Kreider tell the tale truthfully, one bit and piece at a time. Just as the government had a laissez-faire policy toward the economy and business generally until the 1900s, so too did it have a free-wheeling approach to politics. Parties and candidates reported to no one, raised and spent money as they pleased, and accepted sizable cash contributions from individuals and groups with pressing legislative interests. Every now and then in the nation’s first century, a peep was heard from the executive branch or Congress on the subject: •
In his inaugural address William Henry Harrison denounced the patronage system of his predecessors, Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren. During Harrison’s one-month presidency in 1841, his secretary of state, Daniel Webster, issued a directive that sought to reverse what the Whigs considered sordid practices by the Jacksonian Democrats that enhanced the executive branch of government at the expense of the Whig-preferred legislative branch. xv
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•
•
President Rutherford B. Hayes, who won a highly disputed 1876 election and was called “His Fraudulency” by opponents for the next four years, tried to project an image of probity in office and sought to limit some overt political actions by federal employees. The assassination of Hayes’s successor, President James A. Garfield, by a spurned office seeker in 1881 produced the first comprehensive reform of the spoils system. The Pendleton Act of 1883 instituted federal civil service exams and ended automatic guarantees that the presidential party victors would grab all government jobs.
Yet only with the turn of the 20th century did serious campaign reform become a national cause. The Progressive movement, which took flower in many states beginning in the late 1890s, found a champion in President Theodore Roosevelt. Under his administration, the 1907 Tillman Act was passed, prohibiting corporations and national banks from donating money to federal campaigns. As with many well-intentioned efforts over the decades, the act had escape clauses. The Corrupt Practices Acts of 1911 and 1925 sought to require disclosure of campaign contributions and set spending limits for congressional campaigns, but here too the rules were so full of loopholes that clever politicians were able to drive a Brink’s truck filled with cash through their provisions. Supreme Court decisions sometimes opened new loopholes too. Scandals such as Teapot Dome during the presidential administration of the inept Warren G. Harding (1921–1923) created public and press demand for serious reform, but that rarely produced effective congressional legislation. Congressmen, always fixated on reelection, knew which side of their bread was buttered, and by whom. Sometimes substantial reforms managed to pass, including the Hatch Act of 1939 (banning overt partisan activity by many federal employees) and the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 (mainly aimed at reducing labor union power, but containing various campaign restrictions as well). Yet these acts dealt with small pieces of the overall election process. Comprehensive reform would have to wait for another day. That day came in the 1970s, and the giant Watergate affair provided the impetus. Watergate is mainly remembered for having forced the resignation of President Richard Nixon, but the octopus-like scandal had many tentacles. During the lengthy congressional investigation of Nixon’s 1972 reelection campaign, revelations about milliondollar cash payoffs and big unreported checks filled the newspapers. The American public was outraged and insisted that, this time, Congress enact effective measures. Surprising the cynics, Congress did just that. Building on a skeletal 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act passed before the pieces of Watergate became public knowledge, the federal legislature created an entirely new superstructure for American elections. The primary amending law was passed in 1974, with vital additions in 1976 and 1979. Even the 1971 act made a considerable difference by requiring genuine disclosure of campaign contributions. In 1968, when disclosure was just a pipedream, all Senate and House candidates taken together claimed they had spent a mere $8.5 million. But in 1972, with the disclosure provisions in full force, the same group of candidates reported they had expended $88.9 million—a tenfold increase.
Foreword
The follow-up legislation, given impetus by Watergate’s outcome, accomplished much more. Congress established a governing Federal Election Commission, set contribution limits on gifts to candidates and parties, and regulated political action committees run by corporations, labor unions, and other groups. At the presidential level, public financing of campaigns became a reality, beginning with the 1976 contest between Republican President Gerald Ford and Democrat Jimmy Carter (who ousted Ford). Major candidates could get millions of dollars in matching funds for the party primaries—matching public funds to private, small, individual contributions. In the general election, the Democratic and Republican candidates received tens of millions to spend, all from the federal treasury, eliminating most of the influence wielded by big donors. Over time, this once-successful scheme fell apart, as candidates found ways (usually involving the Internet) to raise far more cash privately than their rivals could possibly get from the public financing setup. A bigger war chest means a greater chance of winning, obviously, so it was inevitable that by 2008 a candidate (Democrat Barack Obama) would raise $750 million in private money, refusing public funds for both primary and general election campaigns and outspending his losing rival, Republican John McCain, by a margin of about two and a half to one. As this revealing volume demonstrates again and again, there is significant and unavoidable interplay between campaign legislation passed by Congress and judicial decisions rendered by the Supreme Court. In cases such as Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) the Court tried to marry citizens’ First Amendment free speech and political association rights with the need to prevent corruption. Buckley forced Congress to try to do so again and again, with mixed success. The legislature also attempted to strengthen the health of political parties with a 1979 law that permitted parties to raise and spend substantial sums on behalf of their candidates for get-out-the-vote activities and the like. Yet this widely praised reform eventually produced a torrent of so-called soft money—gargantuan individual and group donations collected at the national level—that flooded the system and defeated attempts to reduce skyrocketing campaign costs. In turn, this led to yet another major law, the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act—which has also had unintended consequences and been overturned in part by the Supreme Court. And so it goes, as Baldino and Kreider illustrate. No democracy will ever devise a perfect election system. In large part, this is because the fine minds of ambitious men and women drawn to politics as candidates and consultants will always find a way to stretch and bend the rules. The search for the winning edge is endless. So too must be the legal and legislative efforts to keep the participants within reasonable bounds. Deep down, each contender for public office probably shares the fear of thrice-defeated presidential contender Adlai Stevenson. On the campaign trail in his second unsuccessful run for the White House (1956), a woman called out to Stevenson, “You have the vote of every thinking person!” Stevenson replied, “That’s not enough, madam, we need a majority.” In a more thoughtful moment, though, Stevenson spoke a deeper truth that serves as a cautionary tale for candidates and the rest of us. He observed, “The hardest thing about any political campaign is how to win without proving that you are unworthy of winning.”
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The purpose of all the electioneering laws and guidelines in this volume is to produce worthy officeholders. The quality of American government over the centuries is a reflection of the degree to which these laws have succeeded or failed. Larry J. Sabato Director, Center for Politics University of Virginia Charlottesville, Virginia
PREFACE We have organized the book’s documents chronologically to better understand the evolution of and rationale behind America’s campaign laws, regulations, and court interpretation of the laws and to more easily detect trends and themes that emerge over time. Chapter 1 contains documents from the 19th century, which witnessed the emergence of political parties and, with them, the origins of modern campaign practices. Chapter 2 encompasses the period from 1900 to 1939, during which a new form of mass media, radio, was introduced, which parties and candidates quickly adopted for elections. Public reaction to the Teapot Dome scandal as well as state legislative investigations into questionable campaign financing practices coincided with Congress’s efforts to regulate campaign contributions by banning corporate contributions and requiring the disclosure of donors. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statutes during this time generally upheld the legislation’s constitutionality. During the period 1940 to 1969, treated in Chapter 3, yet another new mass medium appeared—television—adding fuel to escalating campaign costs and requiring even greater sums of money to wage successful campaigns. Chapter 4 covers 1970 to 1999, one of the most tumultuous periods for American campaign reform. Another major scandal, Watergate, gave lawmakers, especially Democrats, incentive to pass the Federal Election Campaign Act in 1971 and then amend it significantly several times in subsequent years, once following the landmark Supreme Court decision Buckley v. Valeo (1976). Political action committees (PACs) surfaced as key players in campaigns, while “soft” (unregulated) money became as important to parties as “hard” (regulated) money. The final chapter includes documents from 2000 to 2010, a period that began with the Supreme Court’s continued deference to legislative judgments but concluded with the Supreme Court playing a major role in undoing congressional efforts to stem the flow of regulated “soft” money in elections and with the emergence of Internal Revenue Code section 527 and 501(c) groups and of super PACs as campaign forces. Documents are presented in chronological order within each chapter. Document entries open with basic information about the document: its title, date of origin, and a brief statement explaining the document’s importance. Following the document’s
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original text, an essay discusses how and why the document came to be, explains its language and intent, and analyzes its significance. Among the more than 60 documents are federal statutes, executive orders, Supreme Court decisions, opinions from the Federal Election Commission, and sections of the Internal Revenue Code. Sidebars, such as the “Did You Know?” boxes, provide additional information about documents and court decisions that complement one or more documents. Tables, charts, and graphs also offer supplemental information. Finally, illustrations and political cartoons attempt to give greater depth and context to the documents and the times in which they appeared.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS It would have been exceedingly more difficult for us to complete this book had it not been for the wisdom, guidance, patience, faith, or diligence of a small group of people to whom we will be forever grateful. Whether locating documents, researching bits of information, reading, editing, and commenting on entries or offering simple words of encouragement, this book benefited immensely from their assistance. We, however, bear sole responsibility for its contents and whatever weaknesses it may have. Our editor, Veronica “Sandy” Towers, was once again our captain during this voyage. Having steered us through our first book project with ABC-CLIO, she charted our course through various storms with optimism, good humor, and steadfastness that helped us maintain forward momentum and stay focused on the book’s completion. We were most fortunate to have four Wilkes University undergraduate research assistants over two summers. Adam Szumski and Katie Nealon diligently tracked down documents and images, bits of obscure information, and fact-checked items. Their enthusiasm for the project was at least as great as ours, and we thoroughly enjoyed their participation. Jeremy LaPorte and Sarah Seman joined the project the following summer, compiling and organizing early drafts of tables and charts, the chronology, and other material. Their thorough and timely work as well as their good humor speeded the project’s completion. Guy Jensen and his colleagues at the Legislative Office for Research Liaison of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives were extremely generous with their time in tracking down numerous historical documents that were not immediately available through our library. John Stachacz, dean of Library Services at Wilkes University, and his excellent staff provided valuable assistance in locating key documents and acquiring books and articles necessary for our research. Our friends and colleagues in the social sciences at Wilkes—Mike Garr, Jim Merryman, Andy Miller, Rob Seeley, Ebonie Stringer, and Bob Tuttle—were once again ready to offer advice and encouragement, especially on difficult days. Cheryl Feichter, secretary to the division, graciously transcribed several documents into electronic form, which saved us much time. xxi
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Last but not least, we thank our wives: Sandy and Susanne. For a second time they tolerated our long days at the office and distracted behavior at home, and they listened to our frustrations over many months. This book would not have seen the light of day without their love, patience, and support.
INTRODUCTION Campaigns and elections are critical elements in America’s political system because our Constitution’s Framers opted to create a “republican democracy” rather than a direct one. In a direct democracy, citizens are expected to participate personally in deciding matters of public policy. But the Framers were well aware of the impracticality of such a system in a country as expansive as the United States (even with just 13 states) and with such a relatively large population. By establishing a republican, or representative, democracy, the Framers succeeded in founding the new political system on the people’s will (popular sovereignty) while overcoming the physical limitations of a large geographic area and population. Representative democracies require elections so that citizens can select individuals to represent them in government, whether to executive offices such as the presidency, governorships, and mayoralties or to legislative bodies such as Congress, state legislatures, and councils (city, county, township, or borough). A number of states also elect their judges. While the Constitution vested in the states authority to conduct elections, the document reflected the Framers’ wariness of the malleability of public opinion (particularly by smooth-talking candidates, or demagogues) and their suspicions of factions, or special interest groups, including parties, that might weaken the democratic impulse to achieve the common good by working instead to fulfill their particular needs. See the Federalist Papers Nos. 10 and 51 for Madison’s discussion of these subjects. For these reasons, in the opinion of many scholars, the Framers created a House of Representatives, whose members would be electorally connected to a local constituency, provided for the state legislative appointment of senators, and created an Electoral College to select the president in order to prevent the formation of political parties and nationwide special interest groups. Despite their misgivings, interest groups appeared very early in U.S. history, followed by political parties. The first Congress and the states empowered the electorate and encouraged the free and open dissemination of ideas as well as the freedom to associate with like-minded people when the First Amendment was ratified. Party formation, therefore, was inevitable, and parties became the vehicles by which candidates were recruited for office and citizens were mobilized to vote. Parties presented xxiii
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voters with relatively clear policy choices in their platforms and communicated their policies during campaigns. While parties formed, certain structural conditions contributed to our two-party system. In the founding period and into the early 19th century, many states used their constitutional authority over elections to create single-member congressional districts that diminished the ability of minor parties to form, win multiple offices across the country, or even win in successive elections. A permanent structural disadvantage for minor parties was created in 1842, when Congress required singlemember congressional districts. Likewise, an overwhelming majority of states—now 48 of 50—disperse their Electoral College votes on a winner-take-all basis, another impediment to minor party formation and success. Our objective is to trace the development of campaign rules and regulations that affect candidates, parties, and interest groups that intend to influence election outcomes since the beginning of the 19th century. In an earlier work, Of the People, By the People, For the People: A Documentary Record of Voting Rights and Electoral Reform, we examined the history of elections from the perspective of the voter. In this endeavor, which we see as a complementary volume, we follow election history from the viewpoint of the candidates, parties, and interest groups. We consider the following topics important to election campaigns: redistricting practices, because how and why electoral district boundaries are drawn shape election results; ballot access rules and their interpretation by the courts, because they affect what candidates and parties appear on ballots; federal and state legislation regulating party conventions and primaries, because the methods and reasons behind the parties’ candidate selection mechanisms directly affect voters’ choices and ultimately election results; campaign fundraising, spending, and disclosure regulations, because as Jesse Unruh said in 1966, “money is the mother’s milk of politics” and limits on campaign donations or expenditures impact how campaigns are conducted; and campaign communications rules, because restrictions on campaign ads by candidates, parties, or interest groups impinge on the information voters receive and could alter an election’s result. While we do not offer a thesis or test a hypothesis in this book, we identified several themes that emerged during the course of our research. (Anyone interested in exploring research that tests various theoretical perspectives should see Corrado 1997; Hohenstein 2007; LaRaja 2008; Mutch 1988; and Zelizer 2002.) First, all campaign regulations create winners and losers. Establishing the rules of the game for players in elections may appear neutral, but in reality, some players benefit while others are hindered. Indeed, campaign reformers’ motivations are often transparent, as was the case with underfunded Democrats in the 1960s pushing for public financing of elections, not out of idealism, but because they faced a well-financed GOP. Second, even the most well-intentioned reform has unintended consequences. For example, the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act sought to limit how much individuals, parties, and groups could contribute to candidates and the parties, but corporate trade groups, unions, and interest groups discovered a loophole in the statute that helped PACs proliferate and become enormously significant actors in campaigns. Likewise, the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, which attempted to restrict soft money’s role in election, inadvertently led to other avenues for unregulated money to enter campaigns. Third, there is an implicit assumption in American politics that money has a corrosive or corrupting effect on candidates and ultimately on public policy. When
Introduction
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donations are accepted by candidates, many people assume that the candidate, once elected, will act in the interest of the contributor rather than the public. The larger the contribution, it is believed, the more indebted the candidate becomes to the donor. While there have been instances of wealthy contributors exerting undue influence over candidates, the vast majority of elected officials receiving campaign donations have faithfully served their constituents. Yet the public’s perception remains that money corrupts politicians. Consequently, efforts to regulate money’s role in American politics have been ongoing since the 19th century. This leads to a fourth theme: efforts to regulate campaign money are complicated by human nature and the First Amendment. Candidates and campaign contributors always manage to find each other; or as others have described it, money is like water in that it seeps through cracks and finds its own level, which, in the case of campaigns, is in the pockets of candidates and parties. Plug one campaign funding source and another appears. Every attempt to restrict campaign contributions has not been completely successful. The inability to attain total success is at least partially attributable to the Supreme Court ruling in Buckley v. Valeo (1976), which said that the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech extends to a person’s ability to spend money in order to “speak.” The decision effectively made it unconstitutional to limit spending by private individuals and groups during elections as well as candidates spending from their private accounts. We hope that readers find these documents useful and our analyses enlightening. Ideally, readers will have fresh insights about campaigns and gain a better understanding of contemporary electoral politics.
FURTHER READING Corrado, Anthony. 1997. “Money and Politics: A History of Federal Campaign Finance Law.” In Campaign Finance Reform: A Sourcebook, ed. Anthony Corrado, Thomas E Mann, Daniel R. Ortiz, and Trevor Potter. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Hohenstein, Kurt. 2007. Coining Corruption: The Making of the American Campaign Finance System. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. LaRaja, Raymond. 2008. Small Change: Money, Political Parties, and Campaign Finance Reform. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Mutch, Robert E. 1988. Campaigns, Congress and the Courts: The Making of Federal Campaign Finance Law. New York: Praeger. Zelizer, Julian E. 2002. “Seeds of Cynicism: The Struggle over Campaign Finance, 1956– 1974.” Journal of Policy History 14:73–111.
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CHRONOLOGY March 4, 1809—James Madison inaugurated as fourth president. February 11, 1812—The Massachusetts Redistricting Act of 1812 passed, which was an early example of politically motivated redistricting, later known as gerrymandering. March 26, 1812—The Boston Gazette editorial satirizing the “Gerrymander” appears. June 18, 1812—War of 1812 between United States and Great Britain begins. March 4, 1829—Inaugural Address of President Andrew Jackson delivered in which the president extols the virtues of patronage and the spoils system. December 8, 1829—State of the Union Address of President Andrew Jackson delivered in which the president defends his use of the spoils system. March 4, 1841—Inaugural Address of President William Henry Harrison delivered in which the president criticizes the spoils system and assessment. March 20, 1841—Circular Letter from Daniel Webster, secretary of state, to Thomas Ewing, secretary of the Treasury, issued in which government employees are forbidden to engage in assessment. November 6, 1860—Abraham Lincoln elected as 16th president. 1861–1865—American Civil War. March 2, 1867—Naval Appropriations Act of 1867 passed in which assessment in certain federal departments is made illegal. 1877—Reconstruction ends, as Union troops and military tribunals are withdrawn from the states of the Confederacy. June 22, 1877—President Rutherford B. Hayes issued Executive Order on Assessment and the Political Activities of Federal Employees in which assessment is again made an illegal practice. November 2, 1880—James Garfield elected as 20th president. July 2, 1881—President James Garfield assassinated. xxvii
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December 18, 1882—U.S. Supreme Court decision in Ex Parte Curtis, which upheld the Anti-Assessment Act of 1876. January 16, 1883—The Civil Service (Pendleton) Act passed. It marked the end of the federal patronage system and beginning of merit hiring of civil service employees. 1890—State publicity (disclosure) laws passed in Massachusetts. The laws required that candidates reveal the names of their donors and the amount of their contributions. 1891—State publicity (disclosure) laws passed in Michigan. 1892—State publicity (disclosure) laws passed in New York. July 4, 1892—The Omaha Platform of the People’s (or Populist) Party calls for an end to patronage. 1893—Major financial crisis known as the Panic of 1893. November 3, 1896—William McKinley elected as 25th president. 1897—State publicity (disclosure) laws passed in Nebraska. April 19, 1898—Congress votes to go to war with Spain, beginning the SpanishAmerican War. September 6, 1901—President McKinley assassinated, dying on September 14. Vice President Theodore Roosevelt assumed the presidency the same day. January 26, 1907—An Act to Prohibit Corporations from Making Money Contributions in Connection with Political Elections, also known as the Tillman Act, passed. It banned corporate contributions directly from their treasuries to candidates and parties. August 13, 1912—The Radio Act of 1912 passed, which established federal regulation of radio frequencies. November 5, 1912—Woodrow Wilson elected as 28th president. December 23, 1916—United States v. U.S. Brewers’ Association, 239 F. 163 (1916), a district court ruling that upheld the Tillman Act of 1907. April 6, 1917—United States enters World War I. April 9, 1917—U.S. Supreme Court decision in United States v. Gradwell, which ruled that the federal criminal code was not meant to criminalize voter fraud in congressional primary elections. May 2, 1921—U.S. Supreme Court decision in Newberry v. United States, which held that Congress could not regulate party primary elections. May 7, 1922—New York Times article appears on the illegal financial arrangements involving the Teapot Dome Naval Oil Reserves in Wyoming, which became one of the major political scandals in American history. February 28, 1925—The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 passed, which required the disclosure of contributors and their donations to federal candidates as well as restricting expenditures by candidates. February 23, 1927—The Radio Act of 1927 passed, which created the Federal Radio Commission to regulate the distribution of radio station licenses and
Chronology
to establish rules for the use of the airwaves by broadcasters, including use by candidates. May 16, 1927—U.S. Supreme Court decision in Whitney v. California, which upheld the conviction of a man speaking about overthrowing the U.S. government. Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion, touting the “free marketplace of ideas,” becomes accepted law years later. May 28, 1928—Supplemental report “Leases upon Naval Oil Reserves and Activities of the Continental Trading Co. (Ltd.) of Canada” issued by the Senate committee investigating the Teapot Dome scandal. October 24, 1929—Stock market begins to crash on Wall Street, marking the beginning of the Great Depression. January 6, 1930—Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Commission, 59 App. D.C. 197 (1930), which upheld Congress’s right to regulate radio in the “public interest.” February 2, 1931—KFKB Broadcast Association v. Federal Radio Commission, 60 App. D.C. 79 (1931), which again upheld Congress’s authority to regulate radio in the public interest. November 8, 1932—Franklin Roosevelt elected as 32nd president. November 28, 1932—Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Commission, 61 App. D.C. 311 (1932), which ruled that the Federal Communications Commission can make radio licensing decisions out of concern for the public interest. January 8, 1934—U.S. Supreme Court decision in Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, which upheld the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 against a constitutional challenge. June 19, 1934—The Federal Communications Act of 1934, which created the Federal Communication Commission (replaced the Federal Radio Commission) and outlined rules for the balanced treatment of candidates by broadcasters. August 26, 1935—The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA) passed, which banned holding companies from contributing to federal candidates. August 2, 1939—An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities (the Hatch Act of 1939) passed, which made it illegal for federal employees to participate in electoral campaigns, except for the act of voting. July 19, 1940—Amendments to the Hatch Act (1940) passed, which extended the original 1939 act to state government employees. January 16, 1941—The FCC issued the Mayflower Doctrine, also known as the Fairness Doctrine, as an advisory opinion that required broadcasters that engage in news coverage to do so in a fair and balanced manner. May 26, 1941—United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), which overturned Newberry v. United States (1921), thereby giving Congress the authority to regulate primary elections. December 7, 1941—United States entered World War II by a vote of Congress. May 10, 1943—U.S. Supreme Court decision in NBC, Inc. v. United States, which ruled that the Communications Act of 1934 gave the FCC the authority to regulate
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radio in the public interest. The FCC used this latitude to issue the Fairness Doctrine in 1949. June 25, 1943—The War Labor Disputes (Smith-Connally) Act passed, which banned political contributions to federal candidates by labor unions during World War II. June 23, 1947—The Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947 passed, which made the Smith-Connally Act’s provisions permanent. June 21, 1948—U.S. Supreme Court decision in United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, which ruled that the ban on independent campaign expenditures by labor unions was constitutional. 1949—January 16, 1941—The Fairness Doctrine, also known as the Mayflower Doctrine, was announced in an FCC Advisory Opinion that required broadcasters to devote airtime in a fair and balanced manner to public issues. March 11, 1957—United States v. United Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567 (1957), which upheld the constitutionality of a provision of Taft-Hartley, prohibiting labor unions from spending general treasury funds on independent campaign expenditures. September 14, 1959—Amendments of 1959 to the Federal Communications Act of 1934 passed by Congress, which extended and updated rules for radio broadcasters’ treatment of candidates to television stations. November 22, 1963—President John F. Kennedy assassinated. July 2, 1964—Civil Rights Act of 1964 passed, which was an historic achievement in the advancement of civil rights in the United States. August 2, 1964—The Gulf of Tonkin incident occurs, which triggered the deployment of the U.S. combat troops to Vietnam and marked the start of the Vietnam War. November 13, 1966—The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966 passed and eventually repealed. It created the first public financing mechanism for presidential elections. October 15, 1968—U.S. Supreme Court decision in Williams v. Rhodes, which struck down an Ohio ballot access law that made it extremely difficult for a minor party to gain access to the presidential ballot. November 5, 1968—Richard Nixon elected as 37th president. June 9, 1969—U.S. Supreme Court decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communication Commission, which upheld the FCC’s use of the fairness doctrine. October 12, 1970—The Political Broadcast Act of 1970 vetoed by President Nixon. It would have limited how much all federal candidates could spend on radio and television advertisements and would have suspended the equal time requirement for presidential elections. June 21, 1971—U.S. Supreme Court decision in Jenness v. Fortson, which upheld a stringent ballot access law. December 10, 1971—The Revenue Act of 1971 passed, which established a mechanism—a checkoff box on tax returns—to allow taxpayer money to go to fund presidential campaigns.
Chronology
February 7, 1972—Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971 passed, which set campaign contribution and spending limits for federal elections, replacing the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925. June 17, 1972—The Democratic National Committee’s campaign headquarters in the Watergate Hotel burglarized. Reporting by journalists led to the discovery that the robbery was an act of political espionage and eventually caused President Nixon to resign his office. June 18, 1973—U.S. Supreme Court decision in White v. Regester, which addressed the legal parameters of population deviations in state legislative districts. June 27, 1974—The Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (the Ervin Committee) issued, which listed the many illegal and unethical activities conducted by the Committee for the Reelection of the President, which was Nixon’s campaign committee, as well as recommendations for legislation to prevent future abuses. August 9, 1974—President Nixon resigned the presidency, in anticipation of an impeachment vote by the full House of Representatives as a result his actions taken as a candidate during the 1972 campaign and for alleged abuse of power as president. October 15, 1974—FECA amended and passed, which imposed more sweeping restrictions on campaign contributions to and expenditures by federal candidates. January 15, 1975—U.S. Supreme Court decision in Cousins v. Wigoda, which upheld the National Democratic Party’s choice of delegates from Chicago in the 1972 presidential election. January 30, 1976—U.S. Supreme Court decision in Buckley v. Valeo, which upheld most parts of the FECA amendments of 1974. May 11, 1976—FECA amended and passed in response to the Buckley v. Valeo decision. April 26, 1978—U.S. Supreme Court decision in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, which ruled that corporations’ right to free speech allows for independent expenditures in state ballot initiatives. January 8, 1980—FECA, as amended in 1979, passed. It further refined and perfected the earlier versions of the FECA. November 4, 1980—Ronald Reagan elected as 40th president. April 19, 1983—U.S. Supreme Court decision in Anderson v. Celebrezze, which struck down an Ohio law imposing an early filing deadline for minor party candidates. June 30, 1986—U.S. Supreme Court decision in Davis v. Bandemer, which ruled that political gerrymandering cases were justiciable. December 10, 1986—U.S. Supreme Court decision in Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, which upheld a stringent ballot access law in Washington State. March 27, 1990—U.S. Supreme Court decision in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, which upheld a Michigan campaign finance law that banned corporations from using general treasury funds for independent expenditures in state campaigns.
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June 28, 1993—U.S. Supreme Court decision in Shaw v. Reno, which ruled that racial gerrymanders can be challenged under the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The Court ruled that the North Carolina legislature impermissibly used race as the sole criterion in drawing a congressional district after the 1990 census. October 6, 1993—The Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993 passed, which rolled back many of the restrictions on federal workers’ participation in election campaigns, so long as their activities did not occur on federal property or during their regular work hours. January to November 1996—Questionable and sometime illegal activities were conducted by the Democratic Party, the Clinton-Gore Reelection Campaign Committee, and the president and vice president themselves in their effort to raise campaign funds. June 26, 1996—U.S. Supreme Court decision in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission, which ruled that political parties can spend unlimited money independently of their candidates. April 28, 1997—U.S. Supreme Court decision in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, which upheld state fusion bans. May 18, 1998—U.S. Supreme Court decision in Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, which upheld a public broadcaster’s decision to exclude a minor party candidate from a congressional debate. January 24, 2000—U.S. Supreme Court decision in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, which upheld Missouri’s campaign contribution caps, loosely tied to Buckley v. Valeo (1976) limits. June 26, 2000—U.S. Supreme Court decision in California Democratic Party v. Jones, which declared unconstitutional California’s blanket primary. December 12, 2000—U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore, which ruled that the Florida recount violated the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, thereby giving the presidency to George W. Bush. June 25, 2001—U.S. Supreme Court decision in Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, which upheld caps on expenditures that political parties can coordinate with their candidates. March 27, 2002—The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 passed, which was a major overhaul of the FECA that banned soft, or unregulated, money from federal elections. December 10, 2003—U.S. Supreme Court decision in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, which upheld the BCRA of 2002 against constitutional challenges. June 26, 2006—U.S. Supreme Court decision in Randall v. Sorrell, which struck down Vermont’s strict contribution and expenditure limits on campaigns for state office. September 15, 2007—The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act, section 204, passed, which regulated bundling of campaign contributions. January 21, 2010—U.S. Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, which overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990) and parts of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003).
Chronology
July 22, 2010—The FEC issued two advisory opinions that interpreted and applied the decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission to allow for groups to establish PACs that came to be known as super PACs and had the ability raise and spend unlimited amounts of money. September 27, 2010—The Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections (DISCLOSE) Act killed by filibuster in the Senate. The act would have required full disclosure of campaign contributors and the amounts of their donations in federal elections.
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1 THE 19TH CENTURY Campaigning for elective office has been a feature of American political life since the colonial period, and neither the state constitutions ratified after 1776 nor the federal Constitution of 1787 did much to alter the nature of campaigns. Seeking elected office in the 18th century was primarily a “gentleman’s pursuit” (Mutch 1988, xv). Candidates paid their own expenses and campaigned for their offices passively; that is, they stood for office, eschewing direct appeals to the electorate for their votes. The candidates were most often respected, wealthy men in their communities, preferably with some experience in government service, and the voters, who were white, male property owners, decided on the basis of the candidates’ reputations (see Hofstadter 1969; Mutch 1988; Thayer 1973). When campaigning occurred, it most often took the form of treating the voters; a candidate held a rally at which voters were offered free food and drink (often ale), purchased by the candidate. Campaign expenses were not great, but generally beyond the means of the average citizen, leaving the pool of potential office seekers restricted to people who could self-finance their campaigns, because political parties had not yet formed to assist candidates with fund-raising and mobilizing voters. Two political parties emerged in the 1800s, the Federalists, the party of Washington, Adams, and Hamilton, and the Democratic-Republicans, the party of Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe. These parties’ activities at the state and local levels shaped the course of election campaigns for the next 60 years. One of the earliest partisan actions taken by state legislators was gerrymandering, or the practice of drawing legislative district boundaries to increase the chances of victory for the candidates of the party controlling the legislature (see document). As the size of the electorate grew with the elimination of property requirements as a condition of voting, the cost of campaigns increased. Treating and mobilizing voters to get them to the polls, running stories in newspapers, posting handbills, and printing the ballots (done by the parties until the end of the 19th century) required more money. The complex work also led to the development of professional politicians, people who made their living organizing campaigns. To pay these expenses, parties raised campaign funds, targeting people appointed to government jobs at the local, state, and federal levels for contributions. In a process that came to be called the spoils system, government employees owed their positions to the winning party, and the highest elected executive officers—for example, mayors, governors, and presidents—made the appointments. The first president to employ the spoils system extensively was Andrew Jackson (see documents), and assessment, a practice in
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which government employees were encouraged to donate a percentage of their salaries to their party, became a standard practice of the new Democratic Party, which emerged during the 1828 election. Problems with the spoils system and assessment—unqualified employees compromised in their work by excessive devotion to their party—eventually generated calls for reform by the Whig Party, which had replaced the Federalists as one of the two major parties. President William Henry Harrison, a Whig elected in 1840, stated his position on assessment and used an executive order to stem the practice (see documents). Unfortunately, assessment reappeared with the election of a new administration in 1845, and both parties continued to employ it despite the passage of the Naval Appropriations Act of 1867, which included a section banning assessment (see document), and President Hayes’s executive order of 1877 (see document). Both parties had become heavily dependent on patronage to fill government jobs and the money raised through assessment to fill their campaign coffers. And as campaign costs escalated following the Civil War, both parties ramped up their efforts to secure stable and ever larger sources of income. Thayer described the time from 1876 to 1932 as “the Golden Age of Boodle,” when both parties engaged in questionable, if not outright illegal, behavior to raise money and win elections. For example, New York City’s Tammany Hall demanded all candidates and city government employees pay a percentage of their salaries as a fee, while party organizations in Chicago and St. Louis hired floaters, people who floated among polling stations on election day and voted “early and often” for the party offering them the most money (Thayer 1973, 37–40). The assassination of President James A. Garfield (March 4 to September 19, 1881) and the subsequent passage of the Civil Service (Pendleton) Act in 1883, however, altered the political landscape. Garfield’s murder by a mentally unstable, partisan Republican, who believed he was owed a federal job, galvanized public opinion against the spoils system. Congress responded with the Pendleton Act, which made assessment a federal crime and replaced the spoils system with a merit system for some cabinet department positions. The Civil Service Act (see document) created a commission, somewhat independent of the president and Congress, to oversee the process of staffing parts of the federal bureaucracy. The parties quickly adapted to the rules and developed new sources of funds, namely, wealthy individuals and corporations. For example, in 1883 Boies Penrose (R, PA) pressured businesses in his state for contributions through a method he called “frying the fat” by having Republicans in the state legislature propose a “squeeze bill,” a bill targeting a specific industry for regulation and thereby reducing (or squeezing) the industry’s profits. Rather than risk facing such a regulation, businesses in the targeted industry, for example, coal mine owners, made contributions, and the bill was withdrawn (see Thayer 1973, 37–40; Pollock 1926, 7). Later, Matthew Quay (R, PA), the chairman of his national party in 1888, estimated that he raised 40 percent of the campaign funds for that year’s presidential election from individuals and business just in Pennsylvania (Kehl 1981, 98). When neither of the two major parties appeared responsive to the cries for reform, a third party surfaced in the South and the Great Plains with government reform at its core. The People’s, or Populist, Party held its first convention in 1892, and its platform revealed its commitment to improving government’s responsiveness to the
Chapter 1 • The 19th Century
will of the common folk rather than those who contributed great sums to the parties. It called for expanding the civil service system to the entire federal bureaucracy and the adoption of the tools of direct democracy: initiative, referendum, and recall. The presidential election of 1896 marked a milestone in the history of campaigning, forever changing how parties, candidates, and contributors operated. The Republican Party candidate, William McKinley (OH), employed Ohio businessman Mark Hanna as his campaign manager. Hanna developed an organization and strategy for raising funds and publicizing his candidate that had not been seen before in America on such a scale. With headquarters in New York City, Hanna established fund-raising committees with monetary goals in every state. The money was then sent to the national party office. Hanna also assessed industries on the basis of their respective “stake in the general prosperity.” For example, a high tariff on imported shoes benefited shoe manufacturers, and Hanna calculated how much of the industry’s profits were a function of the tariff supported by congressional Republicans and then expected each shoe company to donate a percentage of its profits accordingly. His operation eventually netted between $6 million and $7 million (equivalent to approximately $85 million to $100 million in 2000). Interestingly, Hanna never made specific promises to deliver favorable legislation in exchange for contributions; instead, he promised access to the president and congressional leaders and maintained detailed records of contributors, which he tracked over time (Thayer 1973, 48–52; LaRaja 2008, 31). Most of the money donated to McKinley and the Republican Party came from America’s wealthiest individuals and most profitable business sectors: Andrew Carnegie, Henry Clay Frick, James J. Hill, Philander Knox, and J. P. Morgan, to name a few; banking, coal, textile, and other manufacturers; and oil, railroad, and steel industries (Thayer 1973, 48–52; LaRaja 2008, 31). Hanna spent his extraordinary war chest on creating the first nationwide advertising campaign to market his candidate. He placed McKinley’s image on billboards, posters, and buttons; issued press releases; had political cartoons created with campaign slogans and handbills printed in foreign languages to reach the newly enfranchised immigrants; and orchestrated the placement of prominent individuals (now called surrogates) to speak on McKinley’s behalf in locations where the candidate had not appeared. The latter was necessary because McKinley spent much of his time on his front porch, with Hanna paying to have groups of voters brought to Canton, Ohio, to hear the candidate speak. Hanna was also the first campaign manager to make use of the telephone to communicate with donors and voters (Thayer 1973, 50–51; LaRaja 2008, 31). Hanna’s strategy was to sell his candidate through means accessible to the masses, and in doing so, he substituted style over substance. Though not an original approach, no one had ever attempted it in a presidential race or with such an array of tools. Voters learned far more about McKinley’s character than they did about his position on the issues. The tactic led Theodore Roosevelt to say of Hanna, “He had advertised McKinley as though he were a patent medicine” (quoted in LaRaja 2008, 31, from Shannon 1959, 33n64). A similar sentiment would be expressed during Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaign and then repeated frequently during subsequent elections at all levels (see McGinniss 1968). McKinley’s opponent, William Jennings Bryan (D, NE), faced a significant financial disadvantage, and though critical of the millionaires and large industries
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supporting Republicans, he raised much of his money from similar, but fewer, sources, most especially Marcus Daly and other Western silver mine operators. By some estimates, Bryan raised and spent between $300,000 and $600,000, far less than McKinley (Thayer 1973, 48–52; LaRaja 2008, 31; Hohenstein 2007, 60). McKinley handily defeated Bryan in 1896 and again in 1900. Reaction to the huge amounts of money raised anonymously by the parties in the last decade of the 19th century caused a number of states to pass laws regulating campaign fund-raising. Several states, notably New York in 1890, Michigan in 1891, and Massachusetts in 1892, passed publicity acts, laws requiring that donors’ names be disclosed. Other states, for example, Florida, Missouri, Nebraska, and Tennessee, modeled their laws after the English Corrupt Practices Act of 1883, which regulated campaign contributions, limited campaign expenditures, and required candidates and parties to disclose their contributors and how much they donated. Nebraska’s 1897 statutes took the added step of prohibiting direct corporate contributions to candidates. These state laws helped provide a foundation for eventual federal legislation in 1907, the Tillman Act (see document).
FURTHER READING Hofstadter, Richard. 1969. The Idea of a Party System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780–1840. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hohenstein, Kurt. 2007. Coining Corruption: The Making of the American Campaign Finance System. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Jensen, Richard. 1971. The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888–1896. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kehl, James A. 1981. Boss Rule in the Gilded Age. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. LaRaja, Raymond J. 2008. Small Change: Money, Political Parties, and Campaign Finance Reform. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. McGinniss, Joe. 1968. The Selling of the President 1968. New York: Pocket Books. Mutch, Robert E. 1988. Campaigns, Congress, and the Courts: The Making of Federal Campaign Finance Law. New York: Praeger. Pollock, James. K. 1926. Party Campaign Funds. New York: Knopf. Pollock, James. K. 1927. “The Regulation of Lobbying.” American Political Science Review 21 (May): 335–41. Shannon, Jasper B. 1959. Money and Politics. New York: Random House. Thayer, George. 1973. Who Shakes the Money Tree? American Campaign Financing Practices from 1789 to the Present. New York: Simon & Schuster.
• Document: The Boston Gazette editorial satirizing the “Gerrymander” • Date: The editorial appeared in the Boston Gazette on March 26, 1812 • Significance: Gerrymandering is the practice by which a majority party draws election district boundaries with the intent of providing its candidates with an advantage over other parties’ candidates. It has a long history in the United States, but the practice came to be known as gerrymandering with the publication of a Massachusetts newspaper editorial that satirized a redistricting act signed by Governor Elbridge Gerry. The author noted that the newly created district resembled a salamander.
DOCUMENT Boston Gazette editorial of March 26, 1812 The Gerry-Mander The horrid Monster of which this drawing is a correct representation, appeared in the County of Essex, during the last session of the Legislature. Various and manifold have been the speculations and conjectures, among learned naturalists respecting the genus and origin of this astonishing production. Some believe it to be the real Basilisk, a creature which had been supposed to exist only in the poet’s imagination. Others pronounce it the Serpens Monocephalus of Pliny, or single-headed Hydra, a terrible animal of pagan extraction. Many are of opinion that it is the Griffin or Hippogriff of romance, which flourished in the dark ages, and has come hither to assist the knight of the rueful countenance in restoring that gloomy period of ignorance, fiction and imposition. Some think it the great Red Dragon, or Bunyun’s Apollyon or the Monsirum Horrendum of Virgil, and all believe it a creature of infernal origin, both from its aspect, and from the circumstance of its birth. 5
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But the learned Doctor Watergruel who is famous for peeping under the skirts of nature, has decided that it belongs to the Salamander tribe, and gives many plausible reasons for this opinion. He says though the Devil himself must undoubtedly have been concerned, either directly or indirectly in the procreation of this monster, yet many powerful causes must have concurred to give it existence, amongst which must be reckoned the present combustible and venomous state of affairs. There have been, (says the Doctor) many fiery ebullitions of party spirit, many explosions of democratic wrath and fulminations of gubernatorial vengeance within the year past, which would naturally produce an uncommon degree of inflammation and acrimony in the body politic. But as the Salamander cannot be generated except in the most potent degree of heat, he thinks these malignant causes, could not alone have produced such diabolical effects. He therefore ascribes the real birth and material existence of this monster, in all its horrors, to the alarm which his Excellency the Governor and his friends experienced last season, while they were under the influence of the Dog-star and the Comet—and while his Excellency was pregnant with his last speech, his libellous message, and a numerous litter of new judges and other animals, of which he has since been happily delivered. This fright and purturbation was occasioned by an incendiary letter threatening him with fire-brands, arrows and death; (if his proclamation is to be credited) which was sent to him by some mischevious wight, probably some rogue of his own party, to try the strength of his Excellency’s mind. Now thrown into a most fearful panic, extremely dangerous to persons in their situation, and calculated to produce the most disastrous effects upon their unborn progeny. From these premises the sagacious Doctor most solemnly avers there can be no doubt that this monster is a genuine Salamnder, though by no means perfect in all its members; a circumstance however which goes far to prove its illegitimacy. But as this creature has been engendered and brought forth under the sublimest auspices, he proposes that a name should be given to it, expressive of its genus, at the same time conveying an elegant and very appropriate compliment to his Excellency the Governor, who is known to be the zealous patron and promoter of whatever is new, astonishing and erratic, especially of domestic growth and manufacture. For these reasons and other valuable considerations, the Doctor has decreed that the monster shall be denominated a Gerry-mander, a name that must exceedingly gratify the parental bosom of our worthy Chief Magistrate, and prove so highly flattering to his ambition, that the Doctor may confidently expect in return for his ingenuity and fidelity, some benefits a little more substantial than the common reward of virtue. That asstute naturalist Lucricostus however in the 26th section of his invaluable notes upon the Salamander, clearly shows that this word is a corruption of the Latin Salimania, expressing the characteristic dislike and almost hydrophobic antipathy of that animal for sea salt: “Oweinge (to use the words of the author) to the properties and virtues of the sayde mineralle, as is well knowen to most folke, in dampeinge the heate of that elemente of fyre, wherin the sayde beaste doth abide, so that if a piece of salt, or any marine thinge be placed neare it, it dothe fret it sorely, and enrage it to such madnesse that it dothe incontinently throw from its mouthe a venemous spittle, which dothe tarnishe and destroy all that is of worth or value that it fallethe upon. A further and most manyfest proofe of which deadlie hatred appearethe in that, whereas, on and neare the renouned salt mountayne, so called, amydst alle the marvells and wonders with which it dothe abounde, not any of this Lizarde species
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hath been discoverable thereyne.” We therefore propose, with the utmost deference to the ingenious Doctor’s opinion, that the term Gerry-mania be substituted for Gerry-mander, as highly descriptive both of the singular ferocity of the monster in question, and the influence which the moon at certain periods, more especially on the approach of April, is supposed to exert over it. A friend of ours has further suggested that there is a peculiar felicity at the present time in adopting the term Gerry-mania, as according to his definition, Gerry is derived from the French Guerre, or the Italian, Guerra, (war) and that it therefore possesses the double advantage of expressing the characteristic ferocity of this monster, and that magnanimous rage for war which seems to have taken such possession of our worthy Chief Magistrate and his friends. But we mention this merely as an ingenious speculation, being well convinced ourselves, notwithstanding appearances, of the truly pacific sentiments of that great man, whose mild and charitable denunciations of his political opponents have had such wonderful effect in convincing their reason, allaying the spirit of party, and in reconciling all conflicting opinions. SOURCE: Massachusetts Historical Society, http://www. masshist.org/objects/query3.cfm?queryID=1816
ANALYSIS
The Gerry-mander. A New Species of Monster which Appeared in Essex South District in Jan. 1812. This anonymous broadside issued in Salem, Massachusetts in 1812 reprints a cartoon that first appears in the March 26, 1812, Boston Gazette. (Courtesy of the Massachusetts Historical Society.)
In representative democracies such as the United States, the people elect from among their number a subset of citizens, representatives, who make decisions on behalf of the people. But the numerical and physical size of the population to be represented by any elected official must somehow be defined. For example, the U.S. president is elected by the people of the 50 states, so the president’s constituency is defined as the entire United States. Likewise, a senator elected in Wyoming represents the people of the state of Wyoming. Each state’s boundaries were established at the time of the state’s entry into the Union, with few modifications over the years. But in the case of the U.S. House of Representatives, representatives’ district boundaries are redrawn by each state every 10 years following the U.S. census. Congress reapportions the number of representatives allotted to each state by a complex formula that ensures that each state’s population is fairly balanced within the House. The Constitution guarantees that each state will receive at least one representative, regardless of the size of its population. Because population growth across the country over any 10-year period is uneven, and because Congress by legislation fixed the size of the House at 435 seats in 1929, the apportionment process often results in some states gaining seats and some losing seats. Following the reapportioning of seats, the states redraw the district boundaries to accommodate the addition or reduction in seats as well as any population shifts within the state that occurred since the last census.
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The Constitution’s Framers probably never anticipated that the redistricting process would become politicized. Most of them feared the rise of political parties, and so they created a governmental system that they thought would mitigate the effects of factions, that is, special interests or parties, as Madison discussed in Federalist No. 10. But two parties did emerge following the presidential election of 1800: the Federalists, the party of Washington and Adams, and the Democratic-Republicans, the party of Jefferson and Madison. The efforts of both parties to gain some advantage in federal and state legislative elections led to the process that has come to be known as gerrymandering. The 1810 census and the subsequent reapportionment of House seats necessitated that each state review its districts. The Massachusetts legislature, which was then controlled by the Democratic-Republican Party, passed its redistricting act in 1812, and the law was signed by Governor Elbridge Gerry, also a member of that party. The 1812 act gave a distinct advantage to Democratic-Republican Party candidates over the Federalists, so much so that Gerry’s party won two-thirds of the state legislature’s seats even though its candidates received less than half the total votes cast in the state (see http://www.masshist.org/objects/query3.cfm?queryID=816). Though it has been argued that gerrymandering was practiced well before the term was devised, the editorial in the Boston Gazette established the word in America’s political vocabulary. The author’s biting satire references biology, mythology, and the Devil in an effort to ridicule the practice. And while Gerry is the main target for the author’s scorn, it is unlikely that the governor was the architect of the redistricting plan. Indeed, he left his post as governor following the presidential election of 1812 to become James Madison’s vice president. Gerrymandering continues to be practiced across the country today despite a series of Supreme Court decisions that declared the practice unconstitutional when used for racial discrimination, benign motivations, or otherwise (see Reno v. Shaw, 509 U.S. 630 [1993] and Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 [1995]), though the Court also argued that it had yet to be presented with sufficient evidence demonstrating that gerrymandering caused an unfair election outcome.
• Documents: Inaugural Address of President Andrew Jackson State of the Union Address of President Andrew Jackson • Dates: Inaugural address delivered on March 4, 1829 State of the Union address delivered on December 8, 1829 • Significance: The use of patronage, as a matter of policy, to fill positions in the federal government became an accepted practice with the presidency of Andrew Jackson. These two pronouncements from Jackson’s first year in office reveal his intention to employ patronage and his justification for doing so.
DOCUMENT Inaugural Address of President Andrew Jackson Fellow-Citizens: About to undertake the arduous duties that I have been appointed to perform by the choice of a free people, I avail myself of this customary and solemn occasion to express the gratitude which their confidence inspires and to acknowledge the accountability which my situation enjoins. While the magnitude of their interests convinces me that no thanks can be adequate to the honor they have conferred, it admonishes me that the best return I can make is the zealous dedication of my humble abilities to their service and their good. . . . In administering the laws of Congress I shall keep steadily in view the limitations as well as the extent of the Executive power, trusting thereby to discharge the functions of my office without transcending its authority. . . . . . . The recent demonstration of public sentiment inscribes on the list of Executive duties, in characters too legible to be overlooked, the task of reform, which will require particularly the correction of those abuses that have brought the patronage of the Federal Government into conflict with the freedom of elections, 9
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and the counteraction of those causes which have disturbed the rightful course of appointment and have placed or continued power in unfaithful or incompetent hands. In the performance of a task thus generally delineated I shall endeavor to select men whose diligence and talents will insure in their respective stations able and faithful cooperation, depending for the advancement of the public service more on the integrity and zeal of the public officers than on their numbers.
DOCUMENT State of the Union Address of President Andrew Jackson Fellow Citizens of the Senate and of the House of Representatives: It affords me pleasure to tender my friendly greetings to you on the occasion of your assembling at the seat of Government to enter upon the important duties to which you have been called by the voice of our country-men. The task devolves on me, under a provision of the Constitution, to present to you, as the Federal Legislature of 24 sovereign States and 12,000,000 happy people, a view of our affairs, and to propose such measures as in the discharge of my official functions have suggested themselves as necessary to promote the objects of our Union. There are, perhaps, few men who can for any great length of time enjoy office and power without being more or less under the influence of feelings unfavorable to the faithful discharge of their public duties. Their integrity may be proof against improper considerations immediately addressed to themselves, but they are apt to acquire a habit of looking with indifference upon the public interests and of tolerating conduct from which an unpracticed man would revolt. Office is considered as a species of property, and government rather as a means of promoting individual interests than as an instrument created solely for the service of the people. Corruption in some and in others a perversion of correct feelings and principles divert government from its legitimate ends and make it an engine for the support of the few at the expense of the many. The duties of all public officers are, or at least admit of being made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance; and I can not but believe that more is lost by the long continuance of men in office than is generally to be gained by their experience. I submit, therefore, to your consideration whether the efficiency of the Government would not be promoted and official industry and integrity better secured by a general extension of the law which limits appointments to four years. In a country where offices are created solely for the benefit of the people no one man has any more intrinsic right to official station than another. Offices were not established to give support to particular men at the public expense. No individual wrong is, therefore, done by removal, since neither appointment to nor continuance in office is a matter of right. The incumbent became an officer with a view to public benefits, and when these require his removal they are not to be sacrificed to private interests. It is the people, and they alone, who have a right to complain when a bad officer is substituted for a good one. He who is removed has the same means of obtaining a living that are enjoyed by the millions who never held office. The proposed limitation would destroy the idea of property now so generally connected
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with official station, and although individual distress may be some times produced, it would, by promoting that rotation which constitutes a leading principle in the republican creed, give healthful action to the system.
ANALYSIS The origins of federal campaign and election laws and regulations may be traced to the politicization of staffing the federal bureaucracy with the inauguration of President Andrew Jackson in 1829. While not the first president to remove executive department employees (including those appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate), he was the first to do so for expressly partisan reasons, thereby initiating the spoils system. “To the victor belong the spoils,” contended William Learned Marcy (1786–1857), a governor and U.S. senator from New York, and with his words, the expression “spoils system” came into the political lexicon. It operated as follows. Following an election in which a new administration took office, most if not all government employees who were not of the same party as the new chief executive (president, governor, or mayor) or who were deemed not to be sufficiently loyal to the new executive were replaced with people who had worked for the party or the executive’s election. When government hires people on the basis of partisan affiliation, it is referred to as patronage. Thomas Nast’s “In Memorium—Our Civil Service as It Was,” a wood engraving print published in Thus, Jackson’s decision to employ the spoils system created a Harper’s Weekly on April 18, 1877, celebrated the link to campaigns and elections via the president’s party. Later impending demise of the Jacksonian spoils system. documents in this chapter demonstrate how the expansion of (Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, the spoils system and the use of patronage to award govern- LC-USZ62–89864.) ment contracts led to some major scandals—and a death—that ultimately produced legislation to control the excesses of the system. Rotation in office—the practice of regularly replacing personnel—began during Washington’s administration and continued through that of Adams. There were no constitutional or statutory limits on how long federal employees could retain their positions until Congress acted on September 24, 1789, to fix at four years the terms of the U.S. district attorneys and marshals (New York Times, December 10, 1883). When Washington and Adams took steps to remove federal officeholders, including cabinet secretaries, their reasons were for incompetence or disloyalty to the president. Presidents Thomas Jefferson (1801–1809) through John Quincy Adams (1825– 1829) continued the practice. Jefferson was the first president to make explicit his desire to fill vacant federal positions with people who shared his political ideas, namely, anti-Federalists or members of the nascent Democratic-Republican Party. However, Jefferson continued the tradition of appointing only those best qualified for government positions. Generally, those appointed were educated, of some wealth and social standing, and with some government experience. But neither Jefferson nor those
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who succeeded him actively replaced federal employees hired by the opposing party, waiting instead for those employees to resign voluntarily. With the Tenure of Office Act of 1820, Congress extended term limits of four years to several categories of federal employees, most of whom were officers empowered to handle public funds, for example, internal revenue and customs collectors. Several years later, the act was expanded to include second- and third-class postmasters (New York Times, February 2, 1892). Jackson’s 1828 presidential campaign was unabashedly populist in tone, extolling the virtues of the common folk and vowing to make the federal government more responsive to the people’s will. In his inaugural address, he claimed that “the patronage of the Federal Government” was somehow undermining “the freedom of elections.” Essentially, Jackson was cleverly suggesting that the public’s wishes were being thwarted because federal workers, appointed by his predecessor and therefore not loyal to Jackson, would not carry out his orders, and therefore not reflective of public opinion. He vowed to appoint only those “men whose diligence and talents will insure in their respective stations able and faithful cooperation,” and undoubtedly, such men would be members of his new Democratic Party. In his first State of the Union address, Jackson embarked on a lengthier and more detailed explanation for his intention to limit additional federal offices to four years, essentially extending the application of the Tenure of Office Act. He argued that federal employment had become the sinecure of the educated and wealthy and that these men came to see their positions as lifetime appointments, which benefited the few at the expense of the many. The people, he claimed, had a right to voice their disapproval when they experienced poor performance by government employees, and the president should have the authority to replace a bad officer with a good one. Jackson sought to replace the privileged with common folk, thereby rewarding average Americans who campaigned and voted for him. Over his eight years in office, Jackson removed between 10 and 20 percent of the federal employees he inherited from President John Quincy Adams. His vice president and successor, Martin Van Buren, continued using the spoils system through 1841. The spoils system did not ensure that Jackson had direct control over the bureaucracy, however; and in fact, it contributed to the weakening of the presidency (Milkis and Nelson 2008, chap. 5). Most of the federal positions were either in the postal system as postmasters, scattered across the United States, or as revenue agents, collecting taxes at customs houses in port cities. Local party organizations laid claim to these jobs and recommended the people whom the president eventually named to the posts. In return, those hired were expected to work and vote for the party. In some cases, party leaders also “requested” that the appointees contribute a percentage of their federal salary to the party, something that would become routine and known as assessment, a practice that Whig president William Henry Harrison, sought to end, as the next documents reveal.
FURTHER READING Eriksson, Erik M. 1927. “The Federal Civil Service under President Jackson.” Mississippi Valley Review 13, no. 4:517– 40.
Chapter 1 • The 19th Century Gerhardt, Michael J. 2000. The Federal Appointments Process: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Lee, Robert D. 1993. Public Personnel Systems. 3rd ed. Gaithersburg, MD: Aspen. Lewis, David E. 2008. The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Milkis, Sidney M., and Michael Nelson. 2008. The American Presidency: Origins and Development, 1776–2007. 5th ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
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• Documents: Inaugural Address of President William Henry Harrison Circular Letter from Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, to Thomas Ewing, Secretary of the Treasury • Dates: Inaugural address delivered on March 4, 1841 Circular letter of March 20, 1841 • Significance: Following 12 years of Democratic administrations, Harrison’s election provided the Whig Party its first opportunity to institute reforms. The president’s inaugural address captured the Whig’s distaste for Jackson’s policies that, in its view, politicized the staffing of the executive branch and corrupted the electoral system. The circular letter from Webster, sent on Harrison’s behalf, is an example of a specific reform, one to end the practice of assessment.
DOCUMENT Inaugural Address President William Henry Harrison Thursday, March 4, 1841 This state of things has been in part effected by causes inherent in the Constitution and in part by the never-failing tendency of political power to increase itself. By making the President the sole distributer of all the patronage of the Government the framers of the Constitution do not appear to have anticipated at how short a period it would become a formidable instrument to control the free operations of the State governments. Of trifling importance at first, it had early in Mr. Jefferson’s Administration become so powerful as to create great alarm in the mind of that patriot from the potent influence it might exert in controlling the freedom of the elective franchise. 14
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If such could have then been the effects of its influence, how much greater must be the danger at this time, quadrupled in amount as it certainly is and more completely under the control of the Executive will than their construction of their powers allowed or the forbearing characters of all the early Presidents permitted them to make. But it is not by the extent of its patronage alone that the executive department has become dangerous, but by the use which it appears may be made of the appointing power to bring under its control the whole revenues of the country. The Constitution has declared it to be the duty of the President to see that the laws are executed, and it makes him the Commander in Chief of the Armies and Navy of the United States. If the opinion of the most approved writers upon that species of mixed government which in modern Europe is termed monarchy in contradistinction to despotism is correct, there was wanting no other addition to the powers of our Chief Magistrate to stamp a monarchical character on our Government but the control of the public finances; and to me it appears strange indeed that anyone should doubt that the entire control which the President possesses over the officers who have the custody of the public money, by the power of removal with or without cause, does, for all mischievous purposes at least, virtually subject the treasure also to his disposal. . . . To this danger to our republican institutions and that created by the influence given to the Executive through the instrumentality of the Federal officers I propose to apply all the remedies which may be at my command. It was certainly a great error in the framers of the Constitution to have made the officer at the head of the Treasury Department entirely independent of the Executive. He should at least have been removable only upon the demand of the popular branch of the Legislature. I have determined never to remove a Secretary of the Treasury without communicating all the circumstances attending such removal to both Houses of Congress. The influence of the Executive in controlling the freedom of the elective franchise through the medium of the public officers can be effectually checked by renewing the prohibition published by Mr. Jefferson forbidding their interference in elections further than giving their own votes, and their own independence secured by an assurance of perfect immunity in exercising this sacred privilege of freemen under the dictates of their own unbiased judgments. Never with my consent shall an officer of the people, compensated for his services out of their pockets, become the pliant instrument of Executive will. SOURCE: University of Oklahoma College of Law, http://www.law.ou.edu/ushistory/ harrison.shtml
DOCUMENT Circular Letter from Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, to Thomas Ewing, Secretary of the Treasury March 20, 1841 Department of State, March 20, 1841 To the Hon. Thomas Ewing, Secretary of the Treasury: Sir: The President is of opinion that it is a great abuse to bring the patronage of the General Government into conflict with the freedom of elections, and that this
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abuse ought to be corrected whenever it may have been permitted to exist, and to be prevented for the future. He, therefore, directs that information be given to all officers and agents in your department of the public service that partisan interference in popular elections, whether of State officers or of officers of this Government, and for whomsoever or against whomsoever it may be exercised, or the payment of any contribution or assessment, or salaries or official compensation, for party or election purposes will be regarded by him as cause of removal. It is not intended that any officer shall be restrained in the free and proper expression and maintenance of his opinions respecting public men or public measures, or in the exercise to the fullest degree of the constitutional rights of suffrage. But persons employed under the Government, and paid for their services out of the public Treasury, are not expected to take an active or officious part in attempts to influence the minds or votes of others, such conduct being deemed inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution and the duties of public agents acting under it, and the President is resolved, so far as depends upon him, that while the exercise of the elective franchise by the people shall be free from undue influence of official station and authority, opinion shall also be free among the officers and agents of the Government. The President wishes it further to be announced and distinctly understood that for all collecting and disbursing officers promptitude in rendering accounts and entire punctuality in paying balances will be rigorously exacted. In his opinion it is time to return in this respect to the early practice of the Government, and to hold any degree of delinquency on the part of those intrusted with the public money just cause of immediate removal. He deems the severe observance of this rule to be essential to the public service, as every dollar lost of the Treasury by unfaithfulness in office creates a necessity for a new charge upon the people. I have the honor to be, Sir, your obedient servant. Daniel Webster (Similar letters have been addressed to other heads of departments.) SOURCE: New York Times, August 9, 1885
ANALYSIS During his administration, President Jackson expanded the presidency’s powers by establishing “rotation in office” for federal employees, which allowed the president to replace workers appointed by the previous administration with his cronies and his party’s followers as a reward for their support. Local party organizations solicited contributions from those newly hired with an implied threat of job loss should a donation not be forthcoming. The practice, labeled assessment, became widespread. The spoils system and assessment were attacked as corrupting both the operation of the executive branch and the electoral system by the Whig Party, which emerged as the major opposition party to the Democrats after the election of 1828. The National Republican Party immediately preceded the Whigs in the aftermath of the 1824 presidential election. That bitterly fought contest divided the DemocraticRepublican Party, as four presidential candidates sought the party’s nomination, and ended with the controversial selection of John Quincy Adams by the House of Representatives, when no candidate had received a majority of the Electoral College vote, rather than Jackson, who had won the popular vote. The disintegration
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of the Democratic-Republican Party marked the end of the Era of Good Feelings (1817–1825) and led Jackson to form the Democratic Party and Henry Clay, formerly the Speaker of the House as a Democratic-Republican, to create the National Republican Party, which backed John Quincy Adams in his unsuccessful bid for reelection in 1828. The Whigs challenged the idea of executive supremacy, favored by Jackson and his party, supporting instead Congress as the proper voice of the people. Whigs sought to build a strong national economy by maintaining the national bank and laying tariffs to protect American industry. But the populist message, first of Jackson and then Van Buren, coupled with the disbursing of government jobs to entice and hold voters made it exceptionally difficult for the Whigs to win the presidency. They were finally successful in 1840, when the party ran a war hero, William Henry Harrison, as its candidate. Harrison’s inaugural address, which Henry Clay and Daniel Webster helped draft (Milkis and Nelson 2008, 135), was long and rambling. Delivered in frigid weather and 90 minutes long, it might have contributed to the pneumonia that killed Harrison after only one month in office. Prominently centered in the speech was the Whig criticism of Jackson’s aggrandizement of presidential power, comparing what Jackson had created to European monarchy and despotism. Of particular concern was “the influence of the Executive in controlling the freedom of the elective franchise through the medium of the public officers,” that is, the use of the spoils system. Harrison vowed to halt the practice, saying, “never with my consent shall an officer of the people, compensated for his services out of their pockets, become the pliant instrument of Executive will.” Harrison believed that by eliminating patronage the performance of government employees would improve, because their loyalty would be to the American people rather than to the president. Not to be overlooked was the partisan consequence: to weaken the Democratic Party by eliminating the spoils system. Webster’s memo, written at Harrison’s behest, was sent to every cabinet secretary and aimed to end assessment. The Whig Party, which controlled the Senate in 1839, considered a bill to make it a federal crime to assess any federal or state employee. Hearings conducted by the House in 1838 discovered that the Democratic Party had assessed employees of the U.S. Custom House in New York City. The bill did not pass, leaving the new Whig administration to issue this memo. Webster wrote, “Partisan interference in popular elections, whether of State officers or of officers of this Government, and for whomsoever or against whomsoever it may be exercised, or the payment of any contribution or assessment, or salaries or official compensation, for party or election purposes will be regarded by him [the president] as cause of removal.” In clear terms, the president demonstrated his seriousness by his willingness to terminate any federal workers caught campaigning in federal or state elections or demanding an assessment from federal workers. Unfortunately for the Whigs, Harrison’s death slowed the reform effort, as Vice President John Tyler, a former Democrat, did not subscribe to the entire agenda of his adopted party, particularly the idea that the president should be subservient to Congress (Mutch 1988, 139). Tyler was denied the Whig presidential nomination at its convention in 1844, which opened the door for James K. Polk, governor of Tennessee, to retake the office for the Democrats. The two parties alternated control of the presidency until 1860, when the Republican Party replaced the Whigs as the second
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major national party and then proceeded to dominate the national political scene for decades after. With slavery dominating the country’s agenda in the years leading to 1860, efforts to correct the spoils system faded to the background.
FURTHER READING Milkis, Sidney M., and Michael Nelson. 2008. The American Presidency: Origins and Development, 1776–2007. 5th ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. Mutch, Robert E. 1988. Campaigns, Congress and Courts. New York: Praeger.
• Document: Naval Appropriations Act of 1867 • Date: Signed into law on March 2, 1867 • Significance: Language included in a naval appropriations act was the first federal law to target a specific method of raising campaign funds, called assessment, and to punish individuals who solicited assessments.
DOCUMENT Naval Appropriations Act of 1867 Sec. 1546. [Requiring contributions for political purposes at navy yards.] No officer or employee of the Government shall require or request any working man in any navy-yard to contribute or pay any money for political purposes, nor shall any working man be removed or discharged for political opinion; and any officer or employee of the Government who shall offend against the provisions of this section shall be dismissed from the service of the United States.
ANALYSIS With the development of a competitive, two-party system across the entire country by 1832, the parties sought predictable sources to fund their organizations and campaigns. Wealthy individuals and businesses made direct contributions to the parties without any limits. But as the costs of campaigns grew, the parties needed more money, and they turned to their members who had been awarded state and federal jobs through the spoils system for contributions equal to a percentage of their salaries. The practice, known as assessment, became widespread and accepted. Parties
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received their “contributions” and cemented the loyalty of their employed members (Corrado 1997, 25–60). Earlier attempts to ban assessment through legislation failed to pass, while executive orders imposed during Whig administrations were removed by subsequent Democratic administrations (see previous documents “Inaugural Address of President William Henry Harrison” and “Circular Letter from Daniel Webster”). With the end of the Civil War, government reformers argued yet again to legislate assessment’s end, and they finally succeeded when this section was added to a naval appropriations bill. It remains a common practice in Congress for an unpopular measure, one that is unlikely to be passed on its own merits, to be inserted in an appropriations bill, because appropriations bills must be passed to fund the government’s operations. Members are likely to bite the bullet and vote for the appropriations bill despite a distasteful provision contained within it. Section 1546’s clear language made it a crime for a government employee to solicit political contributions from other employees in federal navy yards. It was also a criminal offense to terminate the employment of any worker on the basis of the worker’s “political opinion,” or the person’s party affiliation. Punishment for violating the law was the loss of one’s government job. While reformers were excited to have such a law in place, the parties effectively continued to assess workers, because they knew that the act was unlikely to be enforced, which it wasn’t. Since both parties benefited and no obvious harm appeared to be caused by assessment, there was no general public outcry. Widespread government corruption had not yet emerged as a source of concern. The excesses of the spoils system and assessment became terribly apparent, however, with the assassination of President Garfield in 1881.
FURTHER READING Corrado, Anthony, Thomas E. Mann, Daniel R. Ortiz, and Trevor Potter. 1997. Campaign Finance Reform: A Sourcebook. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Hohenstein, Kurt. 2007. Coining Corruption: The Making of the American Campaign Finance System. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Smith, Bradley A. 2001.Unfree Speech: The Folly of Campaign Finance Reform. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Document: President Rutherford B. Hayes’s Executive Order on Assessment and the Political Activities of Federal Employees • Date: Executive order issued on June 22, 1877 • Significance: This is the second attempt by a president to limit the practice of assessment by executive order (the first being President Harrison in 1841; see document). Assessment occurs when a political party requires that people who are given jobs through the spoils system contribute a percentage of their salaries to the political party. Hayes’s executive order took an additional step by protecting federal employees from compulsory political work for the party.
DOCUMENT Rutherford B. Hayes’s Executive Order, June 22, 1877 SIR:* I desire to call your attention to the following paragraph in a letter addressed by me to the Secretary of the Treasury on the conduct to be observed by officers of the General Government in relation to the elections: *Addressed to Federal officers generally, No officer should be required or permitted to take part in the management of political organizations, caucuses, conventions, or election campaigns. Their right to vote and to express their views on public questions, either orally or through the press, is not denied, provided it does not interfere with the discharge of their official duties. No assessment for political purposes on officers or subordinates should be allowed. This rule is applicable to every department of the civil service. It should be understood by every officer of the General Government that he is expected to conform his conduct to its requirements. Very respectfully, R.B. HAYES 21
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Wood engraving print of the assassination of Pres. James A. Garfield from drawings by A. Berghaus and C. Upham, in Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, July 16, 1881. (Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, LC-USZ62–7622.)
SOURCE: The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ index.php?pid=68664
ANALYSIS In the controversial presidential election of 1876, Rutherford B. Hayes was elected when a decision by a congressional commission awarded him the disputed electoral votes from four states—Florida, Louisiana, Oregon, and South Carolina, thereby giving him a majority in the Electoral College, even though the Democratic candidate, Samuel Tilden, won a majority of the popular vote. Hayes had been governor of Ohio, where he initiated reforms in state government, replacing the spoils system with merit hiring, also known as civil service. In his inaugural address, he declared his intent to bring similar reforms to the federal government. Hayes’s views on government staffing made him a Half-Breed, also known as a Reformist or a Liberal Republican, and placed him squarely at odds with a majority of the Republicans in Congress, the Stalwarts. Led by Senator Roscoe Conkling
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(R, NY), who had opposed Hayes’s nomination for the presidency in 1876, the Stalwarts, so called because they favored the tradition of the spoils system, blocked all of Hayes’s cabinet nominees, selections made on the basis of qualifications rather than party affiliation and without consulting with his fellow Republicans. Though they sought to force Hayes to capitulate to their will, the Stalwarts eventually relented and confirmed the entire slate of nominees when public opinion overwhelmingly shifted to Hayes (Milkis and Nelson 2008, 185–91). Hayes’s battles with the Stalwarts had just begun, however. He appointed independent commissions to investigate suspected corruption in federal customs houses in a number of major port cities. Filling the many positions in the customs houses was controlled by local party organizations that gave the jobs to party loyalists, many of whom were unqualified. After the commission’s first report, President Hayes wrote in a letter to Treasury secretary John Sherman on May 26, 1877: It is my wish that the collection of the revenues should be free from partisan control, and organized on a strictly business basis, with the same guaranties for efficiency and fidelity in the selection of the chief and subordinate officers. (Williams 1922, 3:435)
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DID YOU KNOW? The Assassination of President Garfield, July 2, 1881, and the Passage of the Civil Service Act President Rutherford B. Hayes (R, OH) fought members of his own party, known as the Stalwarts, and Democrats, to reduce the spoils system’s corrosive influence and to eliminate assessment. As a Half-Breed Republican, Hayes encountered his stiffest resistance in the Senate, where Roscoe Conkling (R, NY), a leader of the Stalwarts, was determined to preserve the status quo by using senatorial courtesy, through which senators controlled appointments to federal jobs within their states. Senators, at that time selected by the legislatures in most states, controlled federal patronage positions, thereby making senators very powerful figures within their states’ parties. Hayes succeeded in gaining some momentum toward reform, especially assessment (see document, Hayes’s executive order of 1877), but a major legislative success was denied him by Congress. He was not renominated by his party in 1880; instead, divided Republicans chose a compromise candidate, James A. Garfield. Garfield defeated Democrat Winfield Scott Hancock (PA) in the general election by less than 10,000 votes. Garfield’s first important action was to name his cabinet, which he did without consulting the Senate’s leadership. Indeed, Senator Conkling and others had submitted their choices—all Stalwarts—for cabinet posts. Garfield stubbornly refused to concede his power to name his cabinet, while Conkling attempted to defend the tradition of senatorial courtesy. After several months of maneuvering and political intrigue, public anger at the Senate forced the Stalwarts to yield, and the chamber voted to confirm Garfield’s cabinet nominees. In the aftermath of this victory Garfield was shot in July by Charles Guiteau. As newspaper reports made
Changes were eventually made in many cities, but New York City’s custom house resisted reform. About this time, the port brought in approximately twothirds of U.S. tariff revenue and employed over 1,000 (Milkis and Nelson 2008, 187). Hayes decided to remove three top officials, including Collector Chester A. Arthur. All were major players in New York’s Republican Party. From his chairmanship of the Commerce Committee, Senator Conkling blocked Hayes’s nominees to replace the three. Not until February 1879 did Hayes’s candidates gain their positions at the customs house. Hayes issued his executive order on assessment and the politicization of federal employees in the midst of his struggles with the Stalwarts. Realizing that he could not win the passage of a civil service reform bill, he issued the executive order that allowed him to bypass Congress and impose his will and governing philosophy on the federal bureaucracy. Hayes’s order went a step beyond that issued by President Harrison, forbidding anyone from coercing a federal employee to participate in campaign activity or assisting in the management or organization of party functions, such as conventions or caucuses. Unlike Harrison’s order, however, Hayes’s did not make such actions a federal crime.
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DID YOU KNOW? clear, Guiteau believed that he should have received a high-level appointment by Garfield. Indeed, Guiteau’s own words in his letters suggested that he believed he was entitled to a position because of his party loyalty. Though mentally unstable, Guiteau understood the political implications of his act. He anticipated Vice President Arthur’s rise to the presidency, and he expected that Arthur, a fellow Stalwart, would reinstitute the spoils system. A shocked and angry nation had other thoughts, however. Upon taking office, Arthur championed the reforms long sought first by Hayes and then Garfield and oversaw the passage of the Civil Service Act, also known as the Pendleton Act (see document).
Further Reading Ackerman, Kenneth D. 2003. Dark Horse: The Surprising Election and Political Murder of President James A. Garfield. New York: Carroll & Graf.
Hayes fought for his principles during his entire term, but he was not renominated by his party. James Garfield, a compromise nominee, won the election of 1880 but paid dearly for his victory.
FURTHER READING Hohenstein, Kurt. 2007. Coining Corruption: The Making of the American Campaign Finance System. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Howe, George F. 1957. Chester A. Arthur: A Quarter-Century of Machine Politics. New York: Ungar. Milkis, Sidney M., and Michael Nelson. 2008. The Ameri can Presidency: Origins and Development, 1776–2007. 5th ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. Shores, Venila S. 1919. “The Hayes-Conkling Controversy.” Smith College Studies in History 4, no. 4:215–79. Williams, Charles R., ed. 1922. Diary and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes: Nineteenth President of the United States. Columbus: Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Society.
• Document: Ex Parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882) • Date: Decided December 18, 1882 • Significance: By an 8–1 vote, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Anti-Assessment Act of 1876 (see document), a federal law that prohibited federal officials from soliciting or receiving assessments from federal workers. The Supreme Court concluded that the act was a narrowly drawn measure to eradicate a corrupting influence on federal elections, political parties, and the federal workforce.
DOCUMENT Ex Parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882) Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the Court In the act of August 15, 1876, making appropriations for the legislative, executive, and judicial expenses of the government, the following appears as section 6: “Sec. 6. That all executive officers or employees of the United States not appointed by the president, with the advice and consent of the senate, are prohibited from requesting, giving to, or receiving from, any other officer or employee of the government any money or property or other thing of value for political purposes; and any such officer or employee, who shall offend against the provisions of this section, shall be at once discharged from the service of the United States; and he shall also be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be fined in a sum not exceeding $500.” Curtis, the petitioner, an employee of the United States, was indicted in the circuit court for the southern district of New York, and convicted under this act for receiving 25
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money for political purposes from other employees of the government. . . . The important question . . . is whether the act under which the conviction was had is constitutional. The act is not one to prohibit all contributions of money or property by the designated officers and employees of the United States for political purposes. Neither does it prohibit them altogether from receiving or soliciting money or property for such purposes. It simply forbids their receiving from or giving to each other. Beyond this no restrictions are placed on any of their political privileges. That the government of the United States is one of delegated powers only, and that its authority is defined and limited by the constitution, are no longer open questions; but express authority is given Congress by the constitution to make all laws necessary and proper to carry into effect the powers that are delegated. Article 1, 8. Within the legitimate scope of this grant Congress is permitted to determine for itself what is necessary and what is proper. The act now in question is one regulating in some particulars the conduct of certain officers and employees of the United States. It rests on the same principle as that originally passed in 1789 at the first session of the first Congress, which makes it unlawful for certain officers of the treasury department to engage in the business of trade or commerce, or to own a sea vessel, or to purchase public lands or other public property, or to be concerned in the purchase or disposal of the public securities of a state, or of the United States, (Rev. St. 243;) and that passed in 1791, which makes it an offense for a clerk in the same department to carry on trade or business in the funds or debts of the states or of the United States, or in any kind of public property, and that passed in 1812, which makes it unlawful for a judge appointed under the authority of the United States to exercise the profession of counsel or attorney, or to be engaged in the practice of the law, and that passed in 1853, which prohibits every officer of the United States or person holding any place of trust or profit, or discharging any official function under, or in connection with any executive department of the government of the United States, or under the Senate or House of Representatives, from acting as an agent or attorney for the prosecution of any claim against the United States, and that passed in 1863, prohibiting members of Congress from practicing in the court of claims, and that passed in 1867, punishing, by dismissal from service, an officer or employee of the government who requires or requests any working-man in a navy-yard to contribute or pay any money for political purposes, and that passed in 1868, prohibiting members of Congress from being interested in contracts with the United States, and another, passed in 1870, which provides that no officer, clerk, or employee in the government of the United States shall solicit contributions from other officers, clerks, or employees for a gift to those in a superior official position, and that no officials or clerical superiors shall receive any gift or present as a contribution to them from persons in government employ getting a less salary than themselves, and that no officer or clerk shall make a donation as a gift or present to any official superior, Many others of a kindred character might be referred to, but these are enough to show what has been the practice in the legislative department of the government from its organization, and, so far as we know, this is the first time the constitutionality of such legislation has ever been presented for judicial determination. The evident purpose of Congress in all this class of enactments has been to promote efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties, and to maintain proper discipline in the public service. Clearly such a purpose is within the just scope
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of legislative power, and it is not easy to see why the act now under consideration does not come fairly within the legitimate means to such an end. It is true, as is claimed by the counsel for the petitioner, political assessments upon office-holders are not prohibited. The managers of political campaigns, not in the employ of the United States, are just as free now to call on those in office for money to be used for political purposes as ever they were, and those in office can contribute as liberally as they please, provided their payments are not made to any of the prohibited officers or employees. What we are now considering is not whether Congress has gone as far as it may, but whether that which has been done is within the constitutional limits upon its legislative discretion. A feeling of independence under the law conduces to faithful public service, and nothing tends more to take away this feeling than a dread of dismissal. If contributions from those in public employment may be solicited by others in official authority, it is easy to see that what begins as a request may end as a demand, and that a failure to meet the demand may be treated by those having the power of removal as a breach of some supposed duty, growing out of the political relations of the parties. Contributions secured under such circumstances will quite as likely be made to avoid the consequences of the personal displeasure of a superior, as to promote the political views of the contributor—to avoid a discharge from service, not to exercise a political privilege. The law contemplates no restrictions upon either giving or receiving, except so far as may be necessary to protect, in some degree, those in the public service against exactions through fear of personal loss. . . . If there were no other reasons for legislation of this character than such as relate to the protection of those in the public service against unjust exactions, its constitutionality would, in our opinion, be clear; but there are others, to our minds, equally good. If persons in public employ may be called on by those in authority to contribute from their personal income to the expenses of political campaigns, and a refusal may lead to putting good men out of the service, liberal payments may be made the ground for keeping poor ones in. So, too, if a part of the compensation received for public services must be contributed for political purposes, it is easy to see that an increase of compensation may be required to provide the means to make the contribution, and that in this way the government itself may be made to furnish indirectly the money to defray the expenses of keeping the political party in power that happens to have for the time being the control of the public patronage. Political parties must almost necessarily exist under a republican form of government, and when public employment depends to any considerable extent on party success, those in office will naturally be desirous of keeping the party to which they belong in power. The statute we are now considering does not interfere with this. The apparent end of congress will be accomplished if it prevents those in power from requiring help for such purposes as a condition to continued employment. We deem it unnecessary to pursue the subject further. In our opinion the statute under which the petitioner was convicted is constitutional. . . .
Bradley, J., dissenting I cannot concur in the opinion of the court in this case. The law under which the petitioner is imprisoned makes it a penal offense for any executive officer or employee of the United States, not appointed by advice of the senate, [an unimportant distinction, so far as the power to make the law is concerned,] to request, give to, or
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receive from, any other officer or employee of the government any money, or property, or other thing of value, for political purposes; thus, in effect, making it a condition of accepting any employment under the government, that a man shall not, even voluntarily and of his own free will, contribute in any way through or by the hands of any other employee of the government to the political cause which he desires to aid and promote. I do not believe that Congress has any right to impose such a condition upon any citizen of the United States. The offices of the government do not belong to the legislative department to dispose of on any conditions it may choose to impose. The legislature creates most of the offices, it is true, and provides compensation for the discharge of their duties; but that is its duty to do, in order to establish a complete organization of the functions of government. When established, the offices are, or ought to be, open to all. They belong to the United States, and not to Congress, and every citizen having the proper qualifications has the right to accept office, and to be a candidate therefore. This is a fundamental right of which the legislature cannot deprive the citizen, nor clog its exercise with conditions that are repugnant to his other fundamental rights. Such a condition I regard that imposed by the law in question to be. It prevents the citizen from co-operating with other citizens of his own choice in the promotion of his political views. To take an interest in public affairs, and to further and promote those principles which are believed to be vital or important to the general welfare is every citizen’s duty. It is a just complaint that so many good men abstain from taking such an interest. Among the necessary and proper means for promoting political views, or any other views, are association and contribution of money for that purpose, both to aid discussion and to disseminate information and sound doctrine. To deny to a man the privilege of associating and making joint contributions with such other citizens as he may choose, is an unjust restraint of his right to propagate and promote his views on public affairs. The freedom of speech and of the press, and that of assembling together to consult upon and discuss matters of public interest, and to join in petitioning for a redress of grievances, are expressly secured by the constitution. The spirit of this clause covers and embraces the right of every citizen to engage in such discussions, and to promote the views of himself and his associates freely, without being trammeled by inconvenient restrictions. Such restrictions, in my judgment, are imposed by the law in question. Every person accepting any, the most insignificant, employment under the government must withdraw himself from all societies and associations having for object the promotion of political information or opinions. For if one officer may continue his connection, others may do the same, and thus it can hardly fail to happen that some of them will give and some receive funds mutually contributed for the purposes of the association. Congress might just as well, so far as the power is concerned, impose as a condition of taking any employment under the government, entire silence on political subjects, and a prohibition of all conversation thereon between government employees. Nay, it might as well prohibit the discussion of religious questions, or the mutual contribution of funds for missionary or other religious purposes. In former times, when the slavery question was agitated, this would have been a very convenient law to repress all discussion of the subject on either side of Mason and Dixon’s line. At the present time any efficient connection with an association in favor of a prohibitory liquor law, or of a protective tariff, or of greenback currency, or even for the repression of political assessments, would render any government official obnoxious to the penalties of
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the law under consideration. For all these questions have become political in their character and any contributions in aid of the cause would be contributions for political purposes. The whole thing seems to me absurd. Neither men’s mouths nor their purses can be constitutionally tied up in that way. The truth is that public opinion is oftentimes like a pendulum, swinging backward and forward to extreme lengths. We are not unfrequently in danger of becoming purists, instead of wise reformers, in particular directions, and hastily pass inconsiderate laws which overreach the mark they are aimed at, or conflict with rights and privileges that a sober mind would regard as indisputable. It seems to me that the present law, taken in all its breadth, is one of this kind. The legislature may, undoubtedly, pass laws excluding from particular offices those who are engaged in pursuits incompatible with the faithful discharge of the duties of such offices. That is quite another thing. The legislature may make laws ever so stringent to prevent the corrupt use of money in elections, or in political matters generally, or to prevent what are called political assessments on government employees, or any other exercise of undue influence over them by government officials and others. That would be all right. That would clearly be within the province of legislation. It is urged that the law in question is intended, so far as it goes, to effect this very thing. Probably it is. But the end does not always sanctify the means. What I contend is that in adopting this particular mode of restraining an acknowledged evil, congress has overstepped its legitimate powers, and interfered with the substantial rights of the citizen. It is not lawful to do evil that good may come. There are plenty of ways in which wrong may be suppressed without resorting to wrongful measures to do it. No doubt it would often greatly tend to prevent the spread of a contagious and deadly epidemic, if those first taken should be immediately sacrificed to the public good. But such a mode of preventing the evil would hardly be regarded as legitimate in a Christian country. I have no wish to discuss the subject at length, but simply to express the general grounds on which I think the legislation in question is ultra vires. Though as much opposed as any one to the evil sought to be remedied, I do not think the mode adopted is a legitimate or constitutional one, because it interferes too much with the freedom of the citizen in the pursuit of lawful and proper ends. If similar laws have been passed before, that does not make it right. The question is whether the present law, with its sweeping provisions, is within the just powers of congress. As I do not think it is, I dissent from the opinion of the majority of the court.
ANALYSIS The Supreme Court’s first ruling on campaign finance and corruption involved the 1882 arrest of Newton Martin Curtis, a Civil War general and acting New York State Republican Committee treasurer, for violating the 1876 Anti-Assessment Act (see document), a federal statute that prohibited any public officer or employee of the federal government “from requesting, giving to, or receiving from, any other officer or employee of the government any money or property or other thing of value for political purposes.” Specifically, the act sought to eradicate assessment, a practice in which federal employees were expected to pay a small percentage of their income to their party, with the possibility of removal for noncompliance. The
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fundamental reason for assessment centered on the expansion of democracy, that is, the rising costs associated with competitive federal campaigns. While the percentage of federal employees being assessed had declined since the practice began, Congress sought to minimize the corruption that was inherent in its use. Government reformers correctly noted that with assessment the primary allegiance of federal officeholders was not to the common good but was rather to the survival and strength of their political party. Furthermore, the cost of government increased when Congress decided to raise federal salaries to compensate employees for their income lost to assessment, reflecting the increased cost of federal campaigns. Assessments, levied by both political parties, were an easy target for a reformminded Congress, and Curtis was the first to be arrested. The jury found him guilty and fined him $500. On appeal, Curtis alleged that “the congressional regulation of a government employee raising campaign funds in his capacity as a private citizen was beyond the constitutional power of Congress” (Hohenstein 2007, 22). Writing for an eight-member majority upholding the constitutionality of the statute, Chief Justice Waite first noted the narrowness of the act: “The act is not one to prohibit all contributions of money or property by the designated officers and employees of the United States for political purposes. Neither does it prohibit them altogether from receiving or soliciting money or property for such purposes. It simply forbids their receiving from or giving to each other.” In other words, the Anti-Assessment Act was narrowly tailored to address specific instances of corruption. To address Curtis’s claim that Congress was acting outside its constitutional authority, Chief Justice Waite maintained that Congress was seeking “to promote efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties, and to maintain proper discipline in the public service,” an interest “within the just scope of legislative power.” According to the majority, common sense dictated that, while assessments of federal workers might commence as a request, workers would view assessments as a necessary condition for continued employment. Certainly, Congress had the authority to prohibit practices that made federal workers beholden to the political parties and not the common good. Justice Joseph Bradley, an appointee of President Ulysses S. Grant (1869–1877), dissented, arguing that the Anti-Assessment Act of 1876 violated the fundamental First Amendment right to speech and association. Political campaigns are debates about information and policies, and a campaign contribution is one method of demonstrating support for a political viewpoint. By forbidding federal workers from contributing to federal campaigns, Congress deprived an entire class of people its First Amendment right to free speech. While Justice Bradley could have ended his dissent by focusing exclusively on his views of the First Amendment, he intimated that Congress and the Court were swayed by the maelstrom of public opinion and not legal reasoning. Justice Bradley wrote, The whole thing seems to me absurd. Neither men’s mouths nor their purses can be constitutionally tied up in that way. The truth is that public opinion is oftentimes like a pendulum, swinging backward and forward to extreme lengths. We are not unfrequently in danger of becoming purists, instead of wise reformers, in particular directions, and hastily pass inconsiderate laws which overreach the mark they are aimed at, or conflict with rights and privileges that a sober mind would regard as indisputable.
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Though Justice Bradley’s First Amendment concerns and caution over unintended consequences of campaign reform efforts were not shared by a majority of the Court, they do indicate that the Curtis Court’s framing of the issue was strikingly similar to how all campaign finance reform efforts have played out in American history. On one side of the debate are the reformers calling for limits on campaign contributions or expenditures out of concern for political corruption, while on the other side, free speech absolutists vehemently argue that such measures violate fundamental First Amendment freedoms.
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• Document: The Civil Service (Pendleton) Act • Date: Signed by President Arthur on January 16, 1883 • Significance: The Civil Service Act is the first major federal legislation to standardize the hiring process for positions in the government while also criminalizing the practice of assessing federal employees.
DOCUMENT The Civil Service Act of 1883 An act to regulate and improve the civil service of the United States. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SEC. 1. That the President is authorized to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, three persons, not more than two of whom shall be adherents of the same party, as Civil Service Commissioners, and said three commissioners shall constitute the United States Civil Service Commission. Said commissioners shall hold no other official place under the United States. The President may remove any commissioner; and any vacancy in the position of commissioner shall be so filled by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, as to conform to said conditions for the first selection of commissioners. The commissioners shall each receive a salary of three thousand five hundred dollars a year. And each of said commissioners shall be paid his necessary traveling expenses incurred in the discharge of his duty as a commissioner. SEC. 2. That it shall be the duty of said commissioners: FIRST. To aid the President, as he may request, in preparing suitable rules for carrying this act into effect, and when said rules shall have been promulgated it shall be the duty of all officers of the United States in the departments and offices to which 32
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any such rules may relate to aid, in all proper ways, in carrying said rules, and any modifications thereof; into effect. SECOND. And, among other things, said rules shall provide and declare, as nearly as the conditions of good administration will warrant, as follows: First, for open, competitive examinations for testing the fitness of applicants for the public service now classified or to be classified hereunder. Such examinations shall be practical in their character, and so far as may be shall relate to those matters which will fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the persons examined to discharge the duties of the service into which they seek to be appointed. Second, that all the offices, places, and employments so arranged or to be arranged in classes shall be filled by selections according to grade from among those graded highest as the results of such competitive examinations. Third, appointments to the public service aforesaid in the departments at Washington shall be apportioned among the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia upon the basis of population as ascertained at the last preceding census. Every application for an examination shall contain, among other things, a statement, under oath, setting forth his or her actual bona fide residence at the time of making the application, as well as how long he or she has been a resident of such place. Fourth, that there shall be a period of probation before any absolute appointment or employment aforesaid. Fifth, that no person in the public service is for that reason under any obligations to contribute to any political fund, or to render any political service, and that he will not be removed or otherwise prejudiced for refusing to do so. Sixth, that no person in said service has any right to use his official authority or influence to coerce the political action of any person or body. Seventh, there shall be non-competitive examinations in all proper cases before the commission, when competent persons do not compete, after notice has been given of the existence of the vacancy, under such rules as may be prescribed by the commissioners as to the manner of giving notice. Eighth, that notice shall be given in writing by the appointing power to said commission of the persons selected for appointment or employment from among those who have been examined, of the place of residence of such persons, of the rejection of any such persons after probation, of transfers, resignations, and removals and of the date thereof, and a record of the same shall be kept by said commission. And any necessary exceptions from said eight fundamental provisions of the rules shall be set forth in connection with such rules, and the reasons there-for shall be stated in the annual reports of the commission. THIRD. Said commission shall, subject to the rules that may be made by the President, make regulations for, and have control of, such examinations, and, through its members or the examiners, it shall supervise and preserve the records of the same; and said commission shall keep minutes of its own proceedings. FOURTH. Said commission may make investigations concerning the facts, and may report upon all matters touching the enforcement and effects of said rules and regulations, and concerning the action of any examiner or board of examiners hereinafter provided for, and its own subordinates, and those in the public service, in respect to the execution of this act. FIFTH. Said commission shall make an annual report to the President for transmission to Congress, showing its own action, the rules and regulations and the exceptions thereto in force, the practical effects thereof, and any suggestions it may approve for the more effectual accomplishment of the purposes of this act.
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SEC. 3. That said commission is authorized to employ a chief examiner, a part of whose duty it shall be, under its direction, to act with the examining boards, so far as practicable, whether at Washington or elsewhere, and to secure accuracy, uniformity, and justice in all their proceedings, which shall be at all times open to him. The chief examiner shall be entitled to receive a salary at the rate of three thousand dollars a year, and he shall be paid his necessary traveling expenses incurred in the discharge of his duty The commission shall have a secretary, to be appointed by the President, who shall receive a salary of one thousand six hundred dollars per annum. It may, when necessary, employ a stenographer, and a messenger, who shall be paid, when employed, the former at the rate of one thousand six hundred dollars a year, and the latter at the rate of six hundred dollars a year. The commission shall, at Washington, and in one or more places in each State and Territory where examinations are to take place, designate and select a suitable number of persons, not less than three, in the official service of the United States, residing in said State or Territory, after consulting the head of the department or office in which such persons serve, to be members of boards of examiners, and may at any time substitute any other person in said service living in such State or Territory in the place of anyone so selected. Such boards of examiners shall be so located as to make it reasonably convenient and inexpensive for applicants to attend before them; and where there are persons to be examined in any State or Territory, examinations shall be held therein at least twice in each year. It shall be the duty of the collector, postmaster, and other officers of the United States at any place outside of the District of Columbia where examinations are directed by the President or by said board to be held, to allow the reasonable use of the public buildings for holding such examinations, and in all proper ways to facilitate the same. SEC. 4. That it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to cause suitable and convenient rooms and accommodations to be assigned or provided, and to be furnished, heated, and lighted, at the city of Washington, for carrying on the work of said commission and said examinations, and to cause the necessary stationery and other articles to be supplied, and the necessary printing to be done for said commission. SEC. 5. That any said commissioner, examiner, copyist, or messenger, or any person in the public service who shall willfully and corruptly, by himself or in cooperation with one or more other persons, defeat, deceive, or obstruct any person in respect of his or her right of examination according to any such rules or regulations, or who shall willfully, corruptly, and falsely mark, grade, estimate, or report upon the examination or proper standing of any person examined hereunder, or aid in so doing, or who shall willfully and corruptly make any false representations concerning the same or concerning the person examined, or who shall willfully and corruptly furnish to any person any special or secret information for the purpose of either improving or injuring the prospects or chances of any person so examined, or to be examined, being appointed, employed, or promoted, shall for each such offense be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars, nor more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not less than ten days, nor more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment. SEC. 6. That within sixty days after the passage of this act it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury, in as near conformity as may be to the classification of certain clerks now existing under the one hundred and sixty-third section of the
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Revised Statutes to arrange in classes the several clerks and persons employed by the collector, naval officer, surveyor, and appraisers, or either of them, or being in the public service, at their respective offices in each customs district where the whole number of said clerks and persons shall be all together as many as fifty. And thereafter, from time to time, on the direction of the President, said Secretary shall make the like classification or arrangement of clerks and persons so employed, in connection with any said office or offices, in any other customs district. And, upon like request, and for the purposes of this act, said Secretary shall arrange in one or more of said classes, or of existing classes, any other clerks, agents, or persons employed under his department in any said district not now classified; and every such arrangement and classification upon being made shall be reported to the President. . . . Second. Within said sixty days it shall be the duty of the Postmaster-General, in general conformity to said one hundred and sixty-third section, to separately arrange in classes the several clerks and persons employed, or in the public service at each post-office, or under any post- master of the United States, where the whole number of said clerks and persons shall together amount to as many as fifty. And thereafter, from time to time, on the direction of the President, it shall be the duty of the Postmaster-General to arrange in like classes the clerks and persons so employed in the postal service in connection with any other post-office; and every such arrangement and classification upon being made shall be reported to the President. Third. That from time to time said Secretary, the Postmaster-General, and each of the heads of departments mentioned in the one hundred and fifty-eighth section of the Revised Statutes, and each head of an office, shall, on the direction of the President, and for facilitating the execution of this act, respectively revise any then existing classification or arrangement of those in their respective departments and offices, and shall, for the purposes of the examination herein provided for, include in one or more of such classes, so far as practicable, subordinate places, clerks, and officers in the public service pertaining to their respective departments not before classified for examination. SEC. 7. That after the expiration of six months from the passage of this act no officer or clerk shall be appointed, and no person shall be employed to enter or be promoted in either of the said classes now existing, or that may be arranged hereunder pursuant to said rules, until he has passed an examination, or is shown to be specially exempted from such examination in conformity herewith. But nothing herein contained shall be construed to take from those honorably discharged from the military or naval service any preference conferred by the seventeen hundred and fifty-fourth section of the Revised Statutes, nor to take from the President any authority not inconsistent with this act conferred by the seventeen hundred and fifty-third section of said statutes; nor shall any officer not in the executive branch of the government, or any person merely employed as a laborer or workman, be required to be classified hereunder; nor, unless by direction of the Senate, shall any person who has been nominated for confirmation by the Senate be required to be classified or to pass an examination. SEC. 8. That no person habitually using intoxicating beverages to excess shall be appointed to, or retained in, any office, appointment, or employment to which the provisions of this act are applicable. SEC. 9. That whenever there are already two or more members of a family in the public service in the grades covered by this act, no other member of such family shall be eligible to appointment to any of said grades.
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Lithograph, “The Bosses of the Senate,” 1889. (Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, LC-USZ62–9678.)
SEC. 10. That no recommendation of any person who shall apply for office or place under the provisions of this act which may be given by any Senator or member of the House of Representatives, except as to the character or residence of the applicant, shall be received or considered by any person concerned in making any examination or appointment under this act. SEC. 11. That no Senator, or Representative, or Territorial Delegate of the Congress, or Senator, Representative, or Delegate elect, or any officer or employee of either of said houses, and no executive, judicial, military, or naval officer of the United States, and no clerk or employee of any department, branch or bureau of the executive, judicial, or military or naval service of the United States, shall, directly or indirectly, solicit or receive, or be in any manner concerned ill soliciting or receiving, any assessment, subscription, or contribution for any political purpose whatever, from any officer, clerk, or employee of the United States, or any department, branch, or bureau thereof, or from any person receiving any salary or compensation from moneys derived from the Treasury of the United States. SEC. 12. That no person shall, in any room or building occupied in the discharge of official duties by any officer or employee of the United States mentioned in this act, or in any navy-yard, fort, or arsenal, solicit in any manner whatever, or receive any contribution of money or any other thing of value for any political purpose whatever. SEC. 13. No officer or employee of the United States mentioned m this act shall discharge, or promote, or degrade, or in manner change the official rank or compensation of any other officer or employee, or promise or threaten so to do, for giving
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or withholding or neglecting to make any contribution of money or other valuable thing for any political purpose. SEC. 14. That no officer, clerk, or other person in the service of the United States shall, directly or indirectly, give or hand over to any other officer, clerk, or person in the service of the United States, or to any Senator or Member of the House of Representatives, or Territorial Delegate, any money or other valuable thing on account of or to be applied to the promotion of any political object whatever. SEC. 15. That any person who shall be guilty of violating any provision of the four foregoing sections shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or by such fine and imprisonment both, in the discretion of the court.
ANALYSIS It took the assassination of President James A. Garfield to shake the American people from their complacency and demand an end to the spoils system. The reform-minded Garfield’s death at the hands of Charles Guiteau, a deranged and extremely partisan Stalwart Republican, who expected a federal job, galvanized public opinion. Garfield’s vice president, Chester A. Arthur, himself a Stalwart, found it politically expedient to pursue a re- George Hunt Pendleton, Congressman from Ohio, 1850s–1860s. (Brady-Handy Photograph Collection, form agenda. Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, Garfield was a moderate Republican and the compromise LC-DIG-cwpbh-02930.) candidate of the Republican convention in 1880. Once elected, however, he battled the Stalwarts in the Senate for control over appointments to his cabinet and to a number of other major federal posts. Of particular interest was the customs collector for the Port of New York to which Garfield had nominated William Robertson, an ally of Senator James G. Blaine (R, ME) and bitter enemy of Senator Roscoe Conkling (R, NY). By the start of the summer of 1881, Garfield had succeeded in breaking the Stalwart stranglehold on the Senate, and his cabinet nominees were confirmed. But when Vice President Chester A. Arthur, an apparently loyal Stalwart and close associate of Conkling, succeeded to the presidency, most people assumed he would revert to politics as usual and reinstitute the spoils system. Though he may have been predisposed to follow Conkling’s direction, Arthur was nothing if not an astute politician. Conkling’s effort to pressure Arthur to remove Robertson as New York’s customs collector and replace him with a Conkling protégé was too much for the new president to accept, and he said as much in his first State of the Union address in 1882 (Milkis and Nelson 2008, 189–91). When the 1882 elections brought many new Democrats to Congress, Arthur, in his next State of the Union speech, endorsed a bill that had been introduced by Senator George H. Pendleton (D, OH) in 1881: the Civil Service Act. With Arthur’s support, the bill passed Congress with relative ease. The act empowered the president to nominate three members to a Civil Service Commission with the Senate confirming them. The act also required that the
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DID YOU KNOW? The Omaha Platform of the People’s Party The People’s Party, later known as the Populist Party, declared itself a party at its Omaha convention on July 4, 1892. It was dedicated to protecting the rights of working people and farmers and to reforming the political system by, among other things, removing the influence of money on elections and government. The party’s roots were in alliances of small farmers in the South and Great Plains in the 1870s and 1880s. Radicalized farmers, angry with their treatment at the hands of banks and railroads, sought help from their state lawmakers and U.S. congressmen, but received none, and they attributed the lack of responsiveness to the influence of money. They believed that big businesses controlled the votes of legislators through contributions to the two main political parties. Rather than continue working through existing parties, the alliances united in 1892 to form the People’s Party. While much of its platform addressed economic reforms, there were particular items related to election and governmental improvements: the direct election of the president, vice president, and U.S. senators; a one-term limit for the president and vice president; the adoption of initiative and referendum; adoption of the Australian, or secret, ballot; and an open and fair hiring system to fill government positions. Though the Populist Party was never successful in national elections, its candidates did win offices at the state and local levels through the turn of the 20th century. It eventually disintegrated, however, as many of its principles were adopted by the Progressive movement, a far larger and more diverse association that had supporters in both major parties. But Progressives in state and federal government succeeded in winning passage of many of the Populist causes, such as direct election of U.S. senators and the adoption of the secret ballot.
Further Reading Drew, Frank M. 1891. “The Present Farmers’ Movement.” Political Science Quarterly 6, no. 2:282–310. Goodwyn, Lawrence. 1978. The Populist Moment: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in America. New York: Oxford University Press. Hicks, John D. 1931. The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Scott, Roy V. 1958. “Milton George and the Farmers’ Alliance Movement.” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 45, no. 1:90–109.
commission’s membership be bipartisan, something unprecedented for the time. The president could remove a commissioner at his discretion, but vacancies had to be filled so that bipartisanship was retained. The commission was tasked to prepare examinations for all federal positions under its jurisdiction, to create classes of office based on work requirements, and to ensure the residency of applicants. Assessment of federal employees covered by the commission was forbidden. Employees could not be removed from their jobs or coerced with threats of removal for partisan reasons. The act also made it a crime for an applicant to cheat on a civil service examination or for a person to assist an applicant in cheating. The Treasury Department and Postal Service were the first two departments named in the act to have some of their positions fall under the jurisdiction of the commission. The commission was required to develop position classifications (job descriptions), create appropriate examinations, post vacant position notifications publicly, and report to the president on its progress filling positions. Alcoholics were specifically excluded from public employment, and in an attempt to limit nepotism, no more than two members of the same family could be hired in the same office. Congressmen could not offer the names of people to be hired. Anyone caught violating the act’s provisions could be punished with three years in prison and a fine. Though the act’s provisions covered only a small percentage of all federal employees in 1883, it did permit the president to expand the commission’s jurisdiction by executive order, thereby further reducing patronage’s influence. But partisanship continued to bedevil staffing of the federal bureaucracy with the election of Democrat Grover Cleveland (NY) in 1884, a Bourbon, or conservative Democrat, who believed in the principles of Jacksonism, especially the spoils system (Milkis and Nelson 2008, 192–95). One unintended consequence of the act was that, as it reduced the flow of contributions to the parties from federal employees, the parties turned to wealthy individuals and businesses for direct contributions of even larger amounts. Millionaires such as John J. Astor, Andrew Carnegie, Jay Gould, Russell Sage and oil, railroad, and banking companies gave tens of thousands of dollars directly to parties and candidates, all perfectly legal under the law (Thayer 1973).
Chapter 1 • The 19th Century
FURTHER READING Hohenstein, Kurt. 2007. Coining Corruption: The Making of the American Campaign Finance System. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Keller, Morton. 1977. Affairs of State: Public Administration in Late Nineteenth Century America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Milkis, Sidney M., and Michael Nelson. 2008. The American Presidency: Origins and Development, 1776–2007. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press Thayer, George. 1973. Who Shakes the Money Tree? American Campaign Financing Practices from 1789 to the Present. New York: Simon & Schuster.
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2 1900 TO 1939 The start of a new century did not bring an end to the demands of reformers or the general public for curtailing the unseemly influence of big money on elections, candidates, and their campaigns. With every federal election—presidential and congressional—from 1880 forward there were questions about whether and how elected officials’ behaviors were altered by large cash contributions from the nation’s millionaires and largest businesses and industries. As the documents from the 19th century reveal, attempts by presidents, Congresses, and several states to ban assessment and to disclose campaign contributions were modestly successful at best. But stronger, more meaningful legislation restricting the sources and expenditures of campaign funds as well as requiring the publication of campaign finance reports was needed after additional scandals ignited public outrage. As Republicans and Democrats continued operating their campaigns as they always had despite new rules, it wasn’t long before fresh allegations of corruption emerged. The Tillman Act of 1907 (see document) was Congress’s first attempt to curb direct donations to candidates from corporations, and it was passed in response to charges and countercharges by both major parties that their presidential candidates had accepted large donations from corporations and fat cats in exchange for supporting their interests before Congress. In United States v. U.S. Brewers’ Association, 239 F. 163 (1916) (see document), a federal district court upheld the Tillman Act against a constitutional challenge filed by corporations, citing the need for clean, corruption-free elections. Pressure to pass additional reform legislation mounted as New York’s Armstrong Committee investigated the insurance industry’s campaign contributions, uncovering more dubious conduct. Congress responded with the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1910 (also called the Publicity Act) that required only candidates for the House of Representatives to disclose donor names and amounts of their contributions after elections. The act’s shortcomings were obvious, and when the Democrats gained control of the House following the 1910 elections, they pushed through amendments to the Publicity Act, which required all federal candidates to publicize their contributors and expenditures before and after their primary and general elections (see document Federal Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1911). Congress’s pro-reform agenda met resistance in the courts. In United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917) (see document), the Supreme Court ruled that the federal criminal code did not permit the Justice Department to indict 20 people who had conspired to engage in voter fraud in a West Virginia Senate primary election,
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and the Court did not even entertain the argument that the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1911 allowed the federal government to regulate primaries. The Court took up this argument in Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921), in which it ruled that Congress could not regulate primary elections. Radio as a mass medium was in its infancy in the first decades of the 20th century, but many realized its potential to reach large numbers of people quickly and cheaply. For candidates it would be a means of advertising, and for government leaders it would be a tool for shaping public opinion. Congress moved hesitantly to regulate the medium with the passage of the Radio Act of 1912. The law empowered the secretary of Commerce to license broadcasters in order to control the distribution of the limited number of radio frequencies. The broad discretionary authority assigned to the secretary was challenged in federal district court twice, and federal judges declared that the secretary’s powers were unconstitutional. In response to the courts’ decisions, Congress passed the Radio Act of 1927 (see document), which balanced Republican and Democratic concerns about regulating this important medium. It created the Federal Radio Commission and assigned it the power to issue licenses and regulate broadcasters. Congress updated and improved the legislation when it passed the Federal Communications Act of 1934 (see document). While the constitutionality of the Radio Act never reached the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia issued three rulings in three years that upheld the constitutionality of the act. In Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Commission, 59 App. D.C. 197 (1930), KFKB Broadcast Association, Inc. v. Federal Radio Commission, 60 App. D.C. 79 (1931), and Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Commission, 61 App. D.C. 311 (1932) (see documents), the appeals court upheld the Federal Radio Commission’s right to regulate the radio airwaves in the public interest. These decisions provided the legal support for the Federal Radio Commission’s equal time rule, which had a profound impact on campaigns and elections. In 1922 news first emerged of a special lease agreement between the Department of Interior and several oil companies, an event that came to be called the Teapot Dome Scandal. Its profound effect on public opinion cannot be overstated. Besides the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 (see document), the scandal provided ammunition for reformers for decades into the future as an example of the perverse influence of money on politics. The Supreme Court’s changing composition also led to a jurisprudential shift, with the Court now upholding congressional efforts to regulate the electoral process, such as the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925. In Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934), the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ruling that Congress was acting to protect the integrity of our vital institutions by passing this campaign finance legislation. In Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), a seed was planted that would later grow into Supreme Court doctrine that had a profound impact on ballot access rules. At issue in Whitney was the constitutionality of a California antisyndicalism act, which prohibited individuals from joining organizations advocating the overthrow of the government. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brandeis outlined his First Amendment theory, the free marketplace of ideas, which later became controlling First Amendment doctrine. In the context of elections, this doctrine meant that states could not deny ballot access to political parties on the basis of the popularity of their opinions.
Chapter 2 • 1900 to 1939
In the midst of its response to the Great Depression, Congress passed the Public Utilities Holding Company Act (PUHCA) in 1935 to regulate electric and gas utilities and the holding companies that owned them. Included in the legislation were provisions that banned these enterprises from contributing to any person seeking any office, both elected and appointed, at any level of government and that severely restricted these entities from lobbying Congress.
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• Document: An Act to Prohibit Corporations from Making Money Contributions in Connection with Political Elections (the Tillman Act) • Date: Signed into law by President Theodore Roosevelt, January 26, 1907 • Significance: The Tillman Act was the first federal statute to restrict direct contributions by businesses and national banks to candidates seeking federal office. While deemed largely ineffective in limiting the influence of money on elections, it established a model for future federal regulatory legislation.
DOCUMENT An Act to Prohibit Corporations from Making Money Contributions in Connection with Political Elections The Tillman Act 34 Stat. 864; 18 U.S.C. §610 An Act to prohibit corporations from making money contributions in connection with political elections. Be it enacted, That it shall be unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any laws of Congress, to make a money contribution in connection with any election to any political office. It shall also be unlawful for any corporation whatever to make a money contribution in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice-Presidential electors or a Representative in Congress is to be voted for or any election by any State legislature of a United States Senator. Every corporation which shall make any contribution in violation of the foregoing provisions shall be subject to a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, 44
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and every officer or director of any corporation who shall consent to any contribution by the corporation in violation of the foregoing provisions shall upon conviction be punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand and not less than two hundred and fifty dollars, or by imprisonment for a term of not more than one year, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.
ANALYSIS The role of millionaires and large corporations in financing America’s elections emerged as a national issue following the 1896 presidential election in which the Republican candidate, McKinley, and his manager, Mark Hanna, raised approximately $7 million, far more than his Democratic opponent, William Jennings Bryan. The public demanded federal and state legislation to regulate corporate donors and the size of their contributions. In response, several states passed publicity, or disclosure, acts, while four states prohibited direct corporate contributions to candidates. No bills cleared Congress, leaving McKinley and Hanna free to conduct their 1900 campaign as they did in 1896, and “Dollar” Mark Hanna, cartoon by Homer Davenport. (Caroline & Erwin Swann Collection of Caricature & Cartoons, Library of Congress, McKinley once again was triumphant over Bryan. Prints & Photographs Division, LC-USZ62–67546.) McKinley’s assassination in September 1901 brought his vice president, Theodore Roosevelt, into the Oval Office. TR was sympathetic to the views of the Progressive movement, and he was familiar with many of its leading writers, such as Herbert Croly. Progressives argued for reforms to bring government under greater public control (as opposed to its perceived control by big business) and a stronger and more active national government to protect the people from capitalism’s excesses. Investigative journalists, known as muckrakers, sought to expose corruption in business and government, and they were successful in stoking public anger, which provided fertile ground for planting the seeds for reform legislation. Senator William Chandler (R, NH) introduced a bill late in 1901 that proposed limiting contributions to any candidate running for office at any level from all federally chartered corporations and all businesses engaged in interstate commerce. The measure also restricted all corporations from making direct contributions to congressional candidates. The bill cleared the Elections committee, but died before reaching the Senate floor. Chandler was not returned to the Senate by his state legislature in 1902, but he convinced Senator Benjamin R. Tillman (D, SC) to take up the cause (Mutch 1988, 5). During the election of 1904, Roosevelt was accused by his Democratic opponent, Alton B. Parker (NY), and New York papers sympathetic to Parker of accepting large donations from corporations in exchange for promises to block the Justice Department
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from taking antitrust action against them. Roosevelt vigorously denied the allegations and went on to win the election handily, but public agitation grew for reform. In his message to Congress on December 6, 1904, Roosevelt called for federal legislation: The power of the Government to protect the integrity of the elections of its own officials is inherent and has been recognized and affirmed by repeated declarations of the Supreme Court. There is no enemy of free government more dangerous and none so insidious as the corruption of the electorate. . . . I recommend the enactment of a law directed against bribery and corruption in Federal elections. The details of such a law . . . should include severe penalties against him who gives or receives a bribe intended to influence his act or opinion as an elector; and provisions for the publication not only of the expenditures for nominations and elections of all candidates but also of all contributions received and expenditures made by political committees. (http://www. presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29545#axzz1IiSq4dx9) Roosevelt’s request went unheeded by Congress, but Senator Edward W. Carmack (D, TN) introduced a bill to create a commission to probe the allegations of inappropriate contributions during the 1896, 1900, and 1904 elections. His bill died in the Senate (Pollock 1926, 11). In 1905, however, the New York state legislature formed the Armstrong Commission, named for Republican state senator William W. Armstrong, to investigate charges of improper political activity by the insurance industry. Held over several months, the hearings exposed hefty contributions to the Republican Party and its candidates, including Roosevelt, by three of the largest companies, New York Life, Mutual, and Equitable Life. In one notable exchange between Charles Evan Hughes, the commission’s chief counsel, and George W. Perkins, New York Life’s vice president and a partner of J. P. Morgan, Perkins claimed that the company’s contributions were “an absolutely legitimate thing for us to do to protect the securities of these hundreds of thousands of people everywhere” (Mutch 1988, 2). Feeling even greater pressure, Roosevelt again urged Congress in his message of December 5, 1905, to pass legislation: I desire to repeat this recommendation. In political campaigns in a country as large and populous as ours it is inevitable that there should be much expense of an entirely legitimate kind. . . . It is entirely proper both to give and receive them, unless there is an improper motive connected with either gift or reception. If they are extorted by any kind of pressure or promise, express or implied, direct or indirect, in the way of favor or immunity, then the giving or receiving becomes not only improper but criminal. . . . All contributions by corporations to any political committee or for any political purpose should be forbidden by law; directors should not be permitted to use stockholders’ money for such purposes; and, moreover, a prohibition of this kind would be, as far as it went, an effective method of stopping the evils aimed at in corrupt practices acts. Not only should both the National and the several State Legislatures forbid any officer of a corporation from using the money of the corporation in or about any election, but they should also forbid such use of money in connection with any legislation save by the employment of counsel in public manner for
Chapter 2 • 1900 to 1939
distinctly legal services. (http://www.presidency.ucsb. edu/ws/index.php?pid=29546#axzz1IiSq4dx9)
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Two days later, Senator Tillman introduced a resoThe Federal Corrupt Practices Act (the Publicity lution to initiate congressional investigations of all Act) of 1910, 36 Stat. 822 presidential elections since 1896. He also reintroduced Chandler’s bill in March 1906. The committees’ hearPassage of the Tillman Act (see document) did not halt ings uncovered nothing, and his bill stalled for lack of efforts for additional campaign reforms. Relentlessly action (Mutch 1988, 5). searching for ways to embarrass President Theodore The revelations from the Armstrong Commission Roosevelt and old guard (or Stalwart) Republicans, congressional Democrats joined forces with Progressive (or galvanized Progressives and other reformers, and they Insurgent) Republicans to advance a bill requiring discame together to form the National Publicity Bill Orclosure (or publicity) of donors and the amount of their ganization (NPBO). Led by Perry Belmont, Eltwood gifts to all candidates. As more information emerged Pomeroy, Herbert Croly, and Elihu Root, Roosevelt’s about the large donations made by businesses and milsecretary of state, its first meeting was held on Janulionaires to candidates of both parties, but particularly ary 17, 1906, where it issued a statement that demanded Republicans, the muckrakers and reform advocacy groups like the National Publicity Bill Organization full disclosure of all sources of contributions to parties fanned public discontent. Bills were introduced beginand candidates and a complete accounting by parties ning in 1908 by Representative Samuel McCall (R, MA) and candidates of all campaign expenditures (Mutch and by Senator Benjamin Tillman (D, SC) that required 1988, 9). political committees operating in two or more states to With pressure from the NPBO, muckrakers, and disclose their donor lists and the amount of their conthe president, Congress finally considered campaign fitributions both before and after House elections only. While the bill cleared the House, it failed in the Senate. nance regulation in 1906, and by the end of the year, In 1910 McCall reintroduced a bill crafted by Reprethe House had passed a bill but the Senate had not. sentative George Norris (R, NE) in 1908, and it passed Roosevelt’s State of the Union statement of Decemthe House on April 18, 1910. The Senate passed it, but ber 3, 1906, reiterated his support for limiting corporate only after removing the preelection disclosure requirecampaign contributions. ment. The Federal Corrupt Practices Act was signed by In January 1907 support coalesced around Tillman’s President Robert Taft (R, OH) on June 25 (Mutch, 9–12; LaRaja, 52). The act was aimed at the national politibill. Its main provisions were a ban on all corporate cal party committees and their congressional campaign contributions to candidates in all elections, federal and committees, that is, the House committees maintained state. Opponents of the bill challenged its constitutionby each party whose purpose it was (and is to this day) ality, arguing that the federal government lacked the to help members of their parties with fund-raising and authority to regulate state elections, as well as claiming technical expertise. Inclusion of the congressional camthat the act unfairly targeted corporations. The bill was paign committees was significant, as both parties had amended to apply only to federal elections, and it passed Congress (Hohenstein 2007, 71). The Tillman Act was, in reality, a small first step in limiting the influence of money in elections. TR undoubtedly recognized the act’s shortcomings, for he recommended a more dramatic reform—public financing—in his 1907 State of the Union message that was likely influenced by a bill introduced in 1904 by Representative William B. Cockran (D, NY), the first to propose public funding of federal elections but which died in the House (see Mutch 1988; LaRaja 2008): There is a very radical measure which would, I believe, work a substantial improvement in our system of conducting a campaign, although I am well aware that it will take some time for people so to familiarize themselves with such a proposal as to be willing to consider its adoption. The need for collecting large campaign funds would vanish if Congress provided an appropriation for the
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DID YOU KNOW? created the committees in an attempt to evade public scrutiny. Individual candidates’ campaign committees were exempt from the act. Section two required that each committee appoint a chairman and treasurer, with the treasurer compelled to maintain records of all contributors, the exact dollar amount of their contributions, and all expenditures made for campaign purposes. Payments to campaign workers could not be made until the campaign’s chairman and treasurer had been named, an important caveat designed to prevent candidates from compensating workers off the books. Some of the act’s shortcomings were overcome when the 1911 Publicity Act was passed (see document).
proper and legitimate expenses of each of the great national parties, an appropriation ample enough to meet the necessity for thorough organization and machinery, which requires a large expenditure of money. Then the stipulation should be made that no party receiving campaign funds from the Treasury should accept more than a fixed amount from any individual subscriber or donor; and the necessary publicity for receipts and expenditures could without difficulty be provided. (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index. php?pid=29548#axzz1IiSq4dx9)
The act’s weaknesses were significant. It banned only direct contributions from national banks and federally chartered or incorporated businesses, and it therefore had no effect on state banks or businesses incorporated Further Reading by the states, of which there were many. It also failed Hohenstein, Kurt. 2007. Coining Corruption: The Makto limit contributions by individuals, a considerable ing of the American Campaign Finance System. loophole that would be exploited continually until the DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. passage of the 1974 amendments to the Federal ElecLaRaja, Raymond J. 2008. Small Change: Money, Potion Campaign Act (see document). Many argue that litical Parties, and Campaign Finance Reform. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. the Tillman Act was undermined when the Supreme Mutch, Robert E. 1988. Campaigns, Congress, and Court rendered its decision in Citizen’s United v. Federal Courts: The Making of Federal Campaign Finance Election Commission (2010). While the act’s ban on diLaw. New York: Praeger. Pollock, James. K. 1926. Party Campaign Funds. New rect corporate contributions to candidates still stands, York: Knopf. the decision nixed a long-standing law that prohibited corporations from spending their general treasury funds on campaigns. Some reformers believe that the Court’s rationale in protecting corporate independent expenditures from restriction could be used to strike down the Tillman contribution limits as well.
FURTHER READING Hohenstein, Kurt. 2007. Coining Corruption: The Making of the American Campaign Finance System. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. LaRaja, Raymond J. 2008. Small Change: Money, Political Parties, and Campaign Finance Reform. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Mutch, Robert E. 1988. Campaigns, Congress, and Courts: The Making of Federal Campaign Finance Law. New York: Praeger. Pollock, James. K. 1926. Party Campaign Funds. New York: Knopf. Thayer, George. 1973. Who Shakes the Money Tree? American Campaign Financing Practices from 1789 to the Present. New York: Simon & Schuster.
• Document: The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1911, also known as the Amendments to the Publicity Act of 1910, and the 1911 Publicity Act • Date: Signed into law by President William H. Taft on August 19, 1911 • Significance: These amendments to the Publicity Act of 1910 expanded its coverage by requiring that individual House and Senate candidates, as well as party committees, disclose the names and addresses of their donors and the size of their contributions, requiring that they issue campaign reports before the election as well as after, and limiting the campaign expenditures of all congressional candidates.
DOCUMENT The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1911, 37 Stat. 25 An Act to amend an act entitled “An act providing for publicity of contributions made for the purpose of influencing elections at which Representatives in Congress are elected” and extending the same to candidates for nomination and election to the offices of Representative and Senator in the Congress of the United States and limiting the amount of campaign expenses. Be it enacted, That sections five, six, and eight of an Act entitled “An Act providing for publicity of contributions made for the purpose of influencing elections at which Representatives in Congress are elected,” . . . be . . . amended to read as follows: SEC. 5. That the treasurer of every such political committee shall, not more than fifteen days and not less than ten days next before an election at which Representatives in Congress are to be elected in two or more States, file in the office of the Clerk 49
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of the House of Representatives at Washington, District of Columbia, with said Clerk, an itemized detailed statement; and on each sixth day thereafter until such election said treasurer shall file with said Clerk a supplemental itemized detailed statement. Each of said statements shall conform to the requirements of the following section of this Act, except that the supplemental statement herein required need not contain any item of which publicity is given in a previous statement. Each of said statements shall be full and complete, and shall be signed and sworn to by said treasurer. “It shall also be the duty of said treasurer to file a similar statement with said Clerk within thirty days after such election, such final statement also to be signed and sworn to by said treasurer and to conform to the requirements of the following section of this Act. The statements so filed with the Clerk of the House shall be preserved by him for fifteen months and shall be a part of the public records of his office and shall be open to public inspection. SEC. 6. That the statements required by the preceding section of this Act shall state: “First. The name and address of each person, firm, association, or committee who or which has contributed, promised, loaned, or advanced to such political committee, or any officer, member, or agent thereof, either in one or more items, money or its equivalent of the aggregate amount or value of one hundred dollars or more, and the amount or sum contributed, promised, loaned, or advanced by each, . . . “Third. The total sum of all contributions, promises, loans, and advances received by such political committee or any officer, member, or agent thereof, . . . SEC. 8. The word ‘candidate’ as used in this section shall include all persons whose names are presented for nomination for Representative or Senator in the Congress of the United States at any primary election or nominating convention, or for indorsement or election at any general or special election held in connection with the nomination or election of a person to fill such office, whether or not such persons are actually nominated, indorsed, or elected. “Every person who shall be a candidate for nomination at any primary election or nominating convention, or for election at any general or special election, as Representative in the Congress of the United States, shall, not less than ten nor more than fifteen days before the day for holding such primary election or nominating convention, and not less than ten nor more than fifteen days before the day of the general or special election at which candidates for Representatives are to be elected, file with the Clerk of the House of Representatives at Washington, District of Columbia, a full, correct, and itemized statement of all moneys and things of value received by him or by anyone for him with his knowledge and consent, from any source, in aid or support of his candidacy together with the names of all those who have furnished the same in whole or in part; and such statement shall contain a true and itemized account of all moneys and things of value given, contributed, expended, used, or promised by such candidate, or by his agent, representative, or other person for and in his behalf with his knowledge and consent, together with the names of all those to whom any and all such gifts, contribution, payments, or promises were made, for the purpose of procuring his nomination or election. “Every person who shall be a candidate for nomination at any primary election or nomination convention, or for indorsement at any general or special election or election by the legislature of any State, as Senator in the Congress of the United States, shall, not less than ten nor more than fifteen days before the day for holding such
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primary election or nominating convention, and not less than ten nor more than fifteen days before the day of the general or special election at which he is seeking indorsement, and not less than five nor more than ten days before the day upon which the first vote is to be taken in the two houses of the legislature before which he is a candidate for election as Senator, file with the Secretary of the Senate at Washington, District of Columbia, a full, correct, and itemized statement of all moneys and things of value received by him or by anyone for him with his knowledge and consent, from any source, in aid or support of his candidacy, together with the names of all those who have furnished the same in whole or in part; and such statement shall contain a true and itemized account of all moneys and things of value given, contributed, expended, used, or promised by such candidate, or by his agent, representative, or other person for and in his behalf with his knowledge and consent, together with the names of all those to whom any and all such gifts, contribution, payments, or promises were made for the purpose of procuring his nomination or election. “Every such candidate for nomination at any primary election or nominating convention, or for indorsement or election at any general or special election, or for election by the legislature of any State, shall, within fifteen days after such primary election or nominating convention, and within thirty days after any such general or special election, and within thirty days after the day upon which the legislature shall have elected a Senator, file with the Clerk of the House of Representatives or with the Secretary of the Senate, as the case may be, a full, correct, and itemized statement of all moneys and things of value received by him or by anyone for him with his knowledge and consent, from any source, in aid or support of his candidacy, together with the names of all those who have furnished the same in whole or in part; and such statement shall contain a true and itemized account of all moneys and things of value given, contributed, expended, used, or promised by such candidate, or by his agent, representative, or other person for and in his behalf with his knowledge and consent, up to, on and after the day of such primary election, nominating convention, general or special election, or election by the legislature, together with the names of all those to whom any and all such gifts, contributions, payments, or promises were made for the purpose of procuring his nomination, indorsement, or election. “Every such candidate shall include therein a statement of every promise or pledge made by him, or by any one for him with his knowledge and consent or to whom he has given authority to make any such promise or pledge, before the completion of any such primary election or nominating convention or general or special election or election by legislature, relative to the appointment or recommendation for appointment of any person to any position of trust, honor, or profit, either in the county, State, or Nation, or in any political subdivision thereof, or in any private or corporate employment, for the purpose of procuring the support of such person or of any person in his candidacy, and if any such promise or pledge shall have been made the name or names, the address or addresses, and the occupation or occupations, of the person or persons to whom such promise or pledge shall have been made, shall be stated, together with a description of the position relating to which such promise or pledge has been made. In the event that no such promise or pledge has been made by such candidate, that fact shall be distinctly stated. “No candidate for Representative in Congress or for Senator of the United States shall promise any office or position to any person, or to use his influence or to give his support to any person for any office or position for the purpose of procuring the
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support of such person, or of any person, in his candidacy; nor shall any candidate for Senator of the United States give, contribute, expend, use, or promise any money or thing of value to assist in procuring the nomination of election of any particular candidate for the legislature of the State in which he resides, but such candidate may, within the limitation and restrictions and subject to the requirements of this act, contribute to political committees having charge of the disbursement of campaign funds. “No candidate for Representative in Congress or for Senator of the United States shall give, contribute, expend, use, or promise, or cause to be given, contributed, expended, used, or promised, in procuring his nomination and election, any sum, in the aggregate, in excess of the amount which he may lawfully give, contribute, expend, or promise under the laws of the State in which he resides: Provided, That no candidate for Representative in Congress shall give, contribute, expend, use, or promise any sum, in the aggregate, exceeding five thousand dollars in any campaign for his nomination and election; and no candidate for Senator of the United States shall give, contribute, expend, use, or promise any sum, in the aggregate, exceeding ten thousand dollars in any campaign for his nomination and election: Provided further, That money expended by any such candidate to meet and discharge any assessment, fee, or charge made or levied upon candidates by the laws of the State in which he resides, or for his necessary personal expenses, incurred for himself alone, for travel and subsistence, stationery and postage, writing or printing (other than in newspapers), and distributing letters, circulars, and posters, and for telegraph and telephone service, shall not be regarded as an expenditure within the meaning of this section, and shall not be considered any part of the sum herein fixed as the limit of expense and need not be shown in the statements herein required to be filed. . . .”
ANALYSIS Expanding the requirements in the Publicity Act of 1910 was greatly facilitated by the 1910 congressional elections, in which Democrats won control of the House while also gaining Senate seats. Democrats were eager to exploit continuing accounts of Republican presidential and congressional candidates receiving donations of hundreds of thousands of dollars from fat cats, exceptionally wealthy individuals, in every election since 1896. Democrats were convinced that had the public been aware of who was giving what to Republican candidates in advance of these elections, voter indignation would have brought Democratic victories. At its first meeting, the House Democratic caucus announced its desire to move quickly for preelection disclosure reports. An opportunity arose when President William Taft called for a special congressional session in April 1911 to consider a tariff arrangement with Canada, and Speaker James B. “Champ” Clark (D, MO) seized it. On the session’s first day, the Speaker allowed identical bills on the subject to be introduced by Representative William “Judge” Rucker (D, MO), chairman of the Election Committee, and Representative Samuel McCall (R, MA), a Progressive Republican (Mutch, 12). Rucker quickly moved the bill through his committee, but he was challenged on the House floor by Republicans, some seeking more regulation to reduce the
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corrupting influence of campaign money, others simply hoping to kill the bill by presenting amendments DID YOU KNOW? designed to divide Democrats. Representative Fred S. Jackson (R, KS) offered an amendment to extend reThe Radio Act of 1912, PL 62-264 porting requirements to primary and general House elections for all candidates, even those operating their Before the invention of the radio, mass circulation newsown committee in a single state (something not covered papers supplied information to most Americans. It was, under the 1910 act) (Mutch, 13). therefore, logical for candidates to place their campaign Extending any campaign finance regulations to priads in the papers and seek press coverage. Radio, howmary elections was poison to many Democrats, parever, challenged newspapers for the public’s attention, as the new technology offered live coverage of events. ticularly those in the South, because their districts Elected officials and candidates quickly discovered racontained overwhelming Democratic majorities. In dio’s advantages. The Wireless Ship Act of 1910 was the such districts, winning the primary was tantamount to first federal legislation involving radio. For the purpose winning the general election. Southern Democrats also of improving maritime safety, any ship leaving an Amerused primaries to exclude black voters, ensuring that ican port with 50 or more passengers was required to white voters elected white lawmakers. Most Democrats have a radio. Two years later, Congress passed the Radio Act in which radio waves were deemed a limited public based their opposition to federal regulations of primaries resource to be regulated to prevent signal proliferation on the principle of states’ rights, arguing that the Conand interference with governmental transmissions. Secstitution granted the states responsibility for conducting tions one and two gave the Commerce secretary broad all elections within their boundaries. Jackson’s amenddiscretionary authority to issue licenses to private transment, they believed, was an unconstitutional intrusion mitting stations operating in interstate or foreign comon state sovereignty. merce. Private stations broadcasting in only one state were not affected so long as a station’s signal did not The Jackson amendment passed the House, however, interfere with another private signal or governmental 172–131, successfully dividing the Democrats, as only transmission. Within a few years, private radio comnorthern Democrats and Republicans supported it. But panies were vying for licenses and chaffing under the Rucker was not to be outmaneuvered by his opponents. apparent subjectivity exercised by the Commerce secDisplaying mastery of parliamentary rules and an abilretary in awarding them. The secretary’s licensing powity to convince southern Democrats to vote with him, ers were challenged in Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., Inc., 286 F. 1003 (1923). Secretary Hoover had denied he managed to bring his bill back to the floor minus the the plaintiffs a radio license because no wavelength was Jackson amendment, and it passed (Mutch, 14). available for the company that did not interfere with In the Senate, however, Republicans incorporated government signals and those of established broadcastthe Jackson amendment in their bill. The chamber also ers. The district court ruled that the secretary’s powers accepted an amendment from Senator James A. Reed were purely ministerial, meaning that he had no discre(D, MO) that set a $10,000 campaign spending limit, tionary authority to deny the applicant, but he did have a measure intended to reduce the ability of the wealthy to self-finance their campaigns. The Senate also added provisions that applied the act to Senate primary and general elections (Mutch, 14). Earlier in the session, Congress had voted to send the 17th Amendment, which required the direct election of Senators, to the states. To reconcile the differences between the House and Senate bills, a conference committee was formed. To the surprise of many, Rucker, leader of the House conferees, acquiesced to the Senate version with its more extensive requirements. The Senate quickly voted to accept the conference report, and the House followed suit after several days of debate during which Rucker defended the Senate’s amendments. Despite his apparent waffling on the bill, Rucker succeeded in holding the votes of nearly all his Democratic colleagues, and the bill passed 282–27 (Mutch 1988, 15). Section 5 of the 1910 act was amended to incorporate preelection disclosure in which political committees’ treasurers were required to submit detailed statements of
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contributions and expenditures “not more than fifteen days and not less than ten days” prior to an election, DID YOU KNOW? and every six days thereafter until the day of the election. The Democrats’ original goal was achieved. the responsibility to minimize radio interference (Lee, Section 8 contained the Jackson provision. The act 37). Between 1922 and 1925, Hoover held conferences defined candidates to include people seeking their parto foster cooperation and understanding between broadties’ nominations in primary elections or conventions, casters and his office, and he attempted to streamline people running in special elections to fill vacant seats, regulations. His actions, however, were challenged and and people running in general elections. All House and struck down by a district court in United States v. Zenith Senate candidates were required to file detailed stateCorp., 12 F. 2d 614 (1926). The court held that “there is no express grant of power in the act to the Secretary of ments of their campaigns’ contributions and expendiCommerce to establish regulations.” Frustrated, Hoover tures before primary and general elections as stated in sought the attorney general’s support, but he concurred Section 5 and after elections. Post-election reports were with the court’s decision in Zenith, effectively stripping to be filed 15 days after a primary and no more than the Commerce secretary of any power to regulate the 30 days after a general election or 30 days after the date airwaves. Lacking discretionary power and with the airon which a senator was elected by a legislature. waves overcrowded, Hoover sought federal legislation, which led to the Radio Act of 1927 (see document) and The act also required every candidate to divulge any the creation of the Federal Radio Commission. promise or pledge made by the candidate or the candidate’s representative to appoint a person, or recomFurther Reading mend someone for appointment, to any government Craig, Douglas B. (2000). Fireside Politics: Radio and Poor private position to gain that person’s support for the litical Culture in the United States, 1920–1940. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. election of the candidate. Moreover, congressional canLee, Frederic P. (1929). “Federal Radio Legislation.” Andidates were banned from making commitments to use nals of the American Academy of Political and Social their influence to assist people in gaining a government Science 142 (suppl. Radio): 36–44. position. These provisions were clearly intended to address the exchange of campaign endorsements for jobs, even positions outside government. The amended language of the Reed proposal also appeared in Section 8, limiting primary and general election total expenditures by House candidates to $5,000 and senatorial candidates to $10,000. In 1921 these limits were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Newberry v. United States, which led Congress to revisit this act in 1925 with the passage of a new Federal Corrupt Practices Act (see document). In subsequent years, congressional Democrats attempted to make presidential campaign committees and political committees operating in only one state subject to federal disclosure requirements but failed. There was also a move to criminalize bribing voters in federal elections, but it too went nowhere.
FURTHER READING Hohenstein, Kurt. 2007. Coining Corruption: The Making of the American Campaign Finance System. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. LaRaja, Raymond J. 2008. Small Change: Money, Political Parties, and Campaign Finance Reform. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press Mutch, Robert E. 1988. Campaigns, Congress, and Courts: The Making of Federal Campaign Finance Law. New York: Praeger. Overacker, Louise. 1932. Money in Elections. New York: Macmillan. Pollock, James. K. 1926. Party Campaign Funds. New York: Knopf.
• Document: United States v. U.S. Brewers’ Association, 239 F. 163 (1916) • Date: Decided December 23, 1916 • Significance: In United States v. U.S. Brewers’ Association (1916), the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania upheld the Tillman Act of 1907 (see document) against a First Amendment free speech challenge. The court ruled that pursuant to its power to regulate federal elections, Congress could prohibit corporations from contributing money to federal campaigns.
DOCUMENT United States v. U.S. Brewers’ Association, 239 F. 163 (1916) District Judge Thomson delivered the opinion of the court We have here two indictments, one against a large number of Pennsylvania brewing corporations, and the other against a large number of brewing corporations of the state of Pennsylvania, and the United States Brewers’ Association, a corporation of the state of New York. The indictments are similar in form and charge the defendants named therein, under section 37 of the Penal Code, with conspiracy to violate section 83 of the Criminal Code of the United States, prohibiting money contributions to be made by certain corporations in connection with any election at which, among others, Representatives in Congress are to be voted for. To the indictments so found the defendants have . . . filed motions to quash. The motions to quash challenge the constitutionality of section 83 of the act of Congress. . . . These will be dealt with in a single opinion. If section 83 is void because it violates the Constitution, the offense therein prescribed against would not exist, and hence there could be no conspiracy to commit it. Four reasons are
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assigned in the motion to quash, against the validity of the statute under the Constitution: First, section 83 was and is not within the power of Congress to enact; second, that it is void for vagueness and uncertainty; third, that it violates the first amendment to the Constitution, in that it attempts to prohibit, make criminal, and punish, the freedom of speech and of the press in the discussion of candidates and of political questions involved in such elections; fourth, that it is void and beyond the power of Congress, in that it attempts to prohibit, make criminal, and punish money contributions made to a candidate for a state office, or to the agent of such candidate or in connection therewith. In order to keep this opinion within reasonable limits as to length, I shall be compelled to state my conclusions without great elaboration of the reasons upon which these conclusions are based. Section 83 in question provides as follows: “It shall be unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any law of Congress, to make a money contribution in connection with any election to any political office. It shall also be unlawful for any corporation whatever to make a money contribution in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Representative in Congress is to be voted for, or any election by any state legislature of a United States Senator. Every corporation which shall make any contribution in violation of the foregoing provisions shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars; and every officer or director of any corporation who shall consent to any contribution by the corporation in violation of the foregoing provisions shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.” It will be observed that the section deals with two classes of corporations, namely, federal corporations and those chartered under the laws of a state. The former being creatures of federal law, there is no contention as to them that Congress has exceeded its powers. What as to corporations of the state, with which the act also deals? Turning to the Constitution to determine what powers have been given to Congress over the subject in question, we find the following provisions: Article 1, §2, cl. 1, provides as follows: “The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states and the electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state Legislature.” Article 1, §4, cl. 1, provides: “The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators.” Article 1, §8, cl. 18, gives to Congress the power “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.” Article 6, cl. 2, provides: “This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority
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of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.” From these provisions of the Constitution and the interpretations put upon them by the federal courts, certain propositions may be safely asserted: 1. The right to vote for federal officers is conferred by the federal Constitution, the House of Representatives being chosen every second year by the people of the several states, the electors in each state having the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state Legislature. The elector being thus qualified by state laws, but deriving his right to vote for members of Congress from the Constitution of the United States itself, it follows as a necessary conclusion that Congress has the power to protect him in the enjoyment of that right. 2. While under the Constitution the times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the state Legislature thereof, Congress, except as to the places of choosing Senators, may at any time by law make or alter such regulations. Thus the ultimate power was wisely conferred on Congress so that the states might not by any law or obstructive process prevent the election of the Senate and House of Representatives and thus endanger the very existence of the republic itself. . . . 3. In the exercise of this authority, Congress in 1842, to prevent an undue preponderance of power to political party in a state which had a majority of votes however small, enacted that each member should be elected by a separate district composed of contiguous territory. Lest the Legislature of some state should fail to elect Senators at the proper time, Congress by act has compelled two bodies of the Legislature to meet in joint session on a given day, to vote for Senator, and meeting on each day thereafter until a Senator is elected. To remedy certain evils growing out of the election of members of Congress at different times in different states, Congress required all the elections for said members to held on the Tuesday after the first Monday of November of every second year. Most state Legislatures for their own accommodation have fixed the same day for the holding of state elections; otherwise, the election on the day fixed by Congress would have been for the choosing of Congressmen alone. 4. Congress having been vested with power to prescribe the times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, that body has undoubted power to provide laws to regulate those elections. . . . 5. In the exercise of its prerogatives and to secure greater economy and efficiency, the government has thought best that certain artificial bodies should be created with certain fixed and definite powers, and acting within certain prescribed limitations. These artificial creatures are not citizens of the United States, and, so far as the franchise is concerned, must at all times be held subservient and subordinate to the government and the citizenship of which it is composed. 6. It may be said that there are three means of participation in the government so far as its representative nature is concerned, namely: By the
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exercise of the right of suffrage; by persuasion or coercion of the individual possessing that right; and by furnishing the means by which the individual may be persuaded or coerced. The time has not come and probably never will come, when the right of suffrage will be extended to the artificial beings known as corporations. 7. To prevent undue influence by the second and third means, nearly every state has enacted laws commonly called “Corrupt Practices Acts,” prescribing limitations on the exercise of influence over the voter at elections. That the government has equal concern in preserving the freedom of the voter and the purity of the ballot when its Representatives in Congress are to be voted for needs only the statement to be conceded. 8. By various acts Congress has undertaken to control the agencies by which political activities in campaigns may be carried on, the amount of money which a candidate may spend, the purposes for which it may be expended, and the manner of accounting for all such expenditures. Section 83 in question is in line with this wise and beneficent legislation by undertaking to place a prohibition against political activities by those artificial beings who are merely the creatures of the law. That Congress may control those corporations which the federal government has created goes for the saying. 9. And when we reflect that Congress is here dealing with elections at which Representatives in Congress are being voted for; that an election is intended to be the free and untrammeled choice of the electors; that any interference with the right of the elector to make up his mind how he will vote is as much an interference with his right to vote as if prevented from depositing his ballot; that the concerted use of money is one of the many dangerous agencies in corrupting the elector and debauching the election; that any law the purpose of which is to enable a free and intelligent choice, and an untrammeled expression of that choice in the ballot box, is a regulation of the manner of holding the election—the power of Congress to prohibit corporations of the state from making money contributions in connection with any such election appears to follow as a natural and necessary consequence. The second reason assigned in the motion to quash alleges the invalidity of the statute because vague and uncertain, failing to define what contributions shall be considered a money contribution in connection with an election. . . . The words “money contributions” are not vague and uncertain, but, on the contrary, their meaning is plain, and their purpose as used in the act unmistakable. Whether, in any given case, an expenditure by a corporation shall be construed as “a money contribution in connection with any election,” within the spirit, intent, and meaning of the act of Congress, may become a question for the court or jury in the light of all the circumstances of the case. . . . The third reason assigned is that section 83 violates the first amendment to the Constitution, in that it attempts to prohibit, make criminal, and punish the freedom of speech and of the press, in the discussion of candidates and all political questions involved in such election.
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The section itself neither prevents, nor purports to prohibit, the freedom of speech or of the press. Its purpose is to guard elections from corruption, and the electorate from corrupting influences in arriving at their choice. . . . The fourth reason assigned against the validity of the act is that it tends to prohibit, make criminal, and punish money contributions made to a candidate for a state office, or to the agent for such candidate, or in connection with his election. As I understand defendants’ position, this reason is based on the use of the words “any election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors” are “voted for.” If it should be held that Congress exceeded its power in including, among others, elections in which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors are to be voted for, on the ground that they are officers of the state and not of the federal government, that would not, in my opinion, invalidate the act except as to that particular provision. If that which is unconstitutional can be separated from that which is not, the one may be rejected, and the other retained. . . . On the whole, I am of opinion that, in enacting section 83, Congress kept within its constitutional powers. Were I in doubt upon this question, I would resolve that doubt in favor of the constitutionality of the act. . . .
ANALYSIS How to finance political campaigns has been a perennial question for candidates and political parties. Throughout most of the 19th century political parties levied assessments on government workers to finance campaigns. However, with the AntiAssessment Act of 1876 (see document), Congress prohibited political parties from soliciting or receiving assessments from federal workers. The Supreme Court upheld the Anti-Assessment Act against a First Amendment challenge in Ex Parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882) (see document). While reform efforts were successful in ridding assessments from federal campaigns, candidates and parties were left with finding alternative funding sources. The most popular and plentiful source was corporations. As political reformers of the late 19th century focused their efforts on eliminating electoral corruption by targeting political parties, America’s newly formed corporations began to exert their power by making extremely large campaign contributions. Mark Hanna, most famously known as the architect behind William McKinley’s successful 1896 and 1900 presidential campaigns, once remarked, “There are two things that are important in politics. The first is money, and I can’t remember what the second one is.” Because corporations possessed large sums of money, political parties successfully obtained large campaign contributions from them usually in exchange for favorable legislation, whether protective tariffs or lax regulations. By the 20th century, progressive reformers turned their attention to corporate contributions and corruption. The result was the passage of the Tillman Act of 1907 (see document), which barred corporations from contributing money directly to political campaigns. After numerous Pennsylvania breweries and the U.S. Brewers Association, a corporation based in New York, were indicted for violation of the Tillman Act, they alleged that Congress did not have the constitutional authority to pass the Tillman Act. The federal district court ruled that Congress was within its authority to bar corporations from contributing to federal campaigns because the Constitution grants
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Congress the right to regulate federal elections. Specifically, article I, section 4 provides that “the times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations.” If Congress can regulate elections, it can surely pass laws, such as the Tillman Act, that seek to regulate how those elections are funded. The federal court further reasoned that allowing noncitizens, for example, corporations, to contribute unlimited money to federal campaigns impinged on the “free and untrammeled choice of the [people]” by clouding the voters’ judgment about the candidates and issues on the ballot. Finally, the court summarily dismissed the corporations’ First Amendment arguments by suggesting that the Tillman Act “neither prevents, nor purports to prohibit, the freedom of speech or of the press.” Rather, the act sought to eradicate corruption from elections, an exemplary goal. Like Ex Parte Curtis (1882) (see document), United States v. U.S. Brewers’ Association (1916) signified the federal courts’ willingness to uphold early campaign finance legislation against First Amendment challenges. In both cases, the courts concluded that clean, corruption-free elections were essential to democratic efforts to expand suffrage by increasing the integrity of elections. However, as the 20th century progressed, courts became increasingly open to the free speech argument.
• Document: United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917) • Date: Decided April 9, 1917 • Significance: In Gradwell, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the federal criminal code was not meant to criminalize voter fraud in congressional primary elections. The Court ruled that Congress had consistently left the regulation of primary elections to the states, believing such elections were outside the purview of congressional power.
DOCUMENT United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917) Justice Clarke delivered the opinion of the Court These four cases were argued together because the indictments in the first three must be justified, it at all, under the same section of the Criminal Code of the United States while the fourth involves the application of 19 of that Code to the same state of facts which we have in the third case. . . . No. 775 relates to the conduct of a primary election held in the state of West Virginia on the 6th of June, 1916, under a law of that state providing for a state-wide nomination of candidates for the United States Senate. In the indictment twenty defendants are charged with conspiring “to defraud the United States in the matter of its governmental right to have a candidate of the true choice and preference of the Republican and Democratic parties nominated for said office and one of them elected,” by causing and procuring a large number of persons who had not resided in the state a sufficient length of time to entitle them to vote under the state law, to vote at the primary for a candidate named, and also to procure four hundred of such persons to vote more than once at such primary election. 61
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The indictment in No. 776 charges that the same defendants named in No. 775 conspired together to “injure and oppress” White, Sutherland, and Rosenbloom, three candidates for the Republican nomination for United States Senator who were voted for at the primary election held in West Virginia on June 6th, 1916, under a law of that state, by depriving them of the ‘right and privilege of having each Republican voter vote, and vote once only, for some one’ of the Republican candidates for such nomination, and of not having any votes counted at such election except such as were cast by Republican voters duly qualified under the West Virginia law. The charge is that the defendants conspired to accomplish this result by procuring a thousand persons, who were not qualified to vote under the state law, because they had not resided in that state a sufficient length of time, to vote for an opposing candidate, William F. Hite, and many of them to vote more than once, and to have their votes cast, counted, and returned as cast in favor of such candidate. . . . It is plain from the foregoing statement that the indictments in the . . . cases are based solely upon the charge that the defendants conspired ‘to defraud the United States,’ in violation of 37 of the Criminal Code, and that the indictment in No. 776 is based upon the charge that three candidates for the nomination for Senator of the United States were ‘injured and oppressed,’ within the meaning of 19 of the Criminal Code, by a conspiracy on the part of the defendants to compass their defeat by causing illegal voting for an opposing party candidate at the primary election. The applicable portions of 37 and 19 are as follows: ‘Section 37. If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States in any manner for any purpose, . . . each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. ‘Section 19. If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise of enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same, . . . they shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than ten years, and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to any office, or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United States.’ The argument of counsel for plaintiff in error in the first three cases is that the United States government has the right to honest, free, and fair elections, that a conspiracy to corrupt electors by bribery has for its object the denial and defeat of this right, and that it therefore is a scheme to defraud the United States within the meaning of 37. This presents for decision the questions: Is 37 of the Criminal Code applicable to congressional elections, and, if it is, has the United States such an interest or right in the result of such elections that to bribe electors constitutes a fraud upon the government within the meaning of this section? To admit, as it must be admitted, that the people of the United States, and so their government, considered as a political entity, have an interest in and a right to honest and fair elections, advances us but little toward determining whether 37 was enacted to protect that right, and whether a conspiracy to bribe voters is a violation of it. Obviously the government may have this right and yet not have enacted this law
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to protect it. It may be, as is claimed, that Congress intended to rely upon state laws and the administration of them by state officials to secure honest elections, and that this section was enacted for purposes wholly apart from those here claimed for it. To answer the questions presented requires that we look to the origin and history of 37, and that we consider what has been, and is now, the policy of Congress in dealing with the regulation of elections of Representatives in Congress. . . . The power of Congress to deal with the election of Senators and Representatives is derived from 4, article 1, of the Constitution of the United States, providing that: ‘The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators.’ Whatever doubt may at one time have existed as to the extent of the power which Congress may exercise under this constitutional sanction in the prescribing of regulations for the conduct of elections for Representatives in Congress, or in adopting regulations which states have prescribed for that purpose, has been settled by repeated decisions of this court. . . . Although Congress has had this power of regulating the conduct of congressional elections from the organization of the government, our legislative history upon the subject shows that except for about twenty-four of the one hundred and twentyeight years since the government was organized, it has been its policy to leave such regulations almost entirely to the states, whose representatives Congressmen are. For more than fifty years no congressional action whatever was taken on the subject until 1842, when a law was enacted requiring that Representatives be elected by districts . . . , thus doing away with the practice which had prevailed in some states of electing on a single state ticket all of the members of Congress to which the state was entitled. Then followed twenty-four years more before further action was taken on the subject, when Congress provided for the time and mode of electing United States Senators . . . , and it was not until four years later, in 1870, that, for the first time, a comprehensive system for dealing with congressional elections was enacted. . . . These laws provided extensive regulations for the conduct of congressional elections. They made unlawful false registration, bribery, voting without legal right, making false returns of votes cast, interfering in any manner with officers of election, and the neglect by any such officer of any duty required of him by state or Federal law; they provided for appointment by circuit judges of the United States of persons to attend at places of registration and at elections, with authority to challenge any person proposing to register or vote unlawfully, to witness the counting of votes, and to identify by their signatures the registration of voters and election tally sheets; and they made it lawful for the marshals of the United States to appoint special deputies to preserve order at such elections, with authority to arrest for any breach of the peace committed in their view. . . . It will be seen from this statement of the important features of these enactments that Congress by them committed to Federal officers a very full participation in the process of the election of Congressmen, from the registration of voters to the final certifying of the results, and that the control thus established over such elections was
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comprehensive and complete. It is a matter of general as of legal history that Congress, after twenty-four years of experience, returned to its former attitude toward such elections, and repealed all of these laws with the exception of a few sections not relevant here. This repealing act left in effect, as apparently relating to the elective franchise, only the provisions contained in the eight sections of chapter 3 of the Criminal Code, 19 to 26, inclusive, which have not been added to or substantially modified during the twenty-three years which have since elapsed. The policy of thus intrusting the conduct of elections to state laws, administered by state officers, which has prevailed from the foundation of the government to our day, with the exception, as we have seen, of twenty- four years, was proposed by the makers of the Constitution, and was entered upon advisedly by the people who adopted it, as clearly appears from the reply of Madison to Monroe in the debates in the Virginia Convention. . . . With it thus clearly established that the policy of Congress for so great a part of our constitutional life has been, and now is, to leave the conduct of the election of its members to state laws, administered by state officers, and that whenever it has assumed to regulate such elections it has done so by positive and clear statutes. . . . The constitutional warrant under which regulations relating to congressional elections may be provided by Congress is in terms applicable to the ‘times, places, and manner of holding elections (not nominating primaries) for Senators and Representatives.’ Primary elections, such as it is claimed the defendants corrupted, were not only unknown when the Constitution was adopted, but they were equally unknown for many years after the law, now 19, was first enacted. They are a development of comparatively recent years, designed to take the place of the nominating caucus or convention, as these existed before the change, and even yet the new system must be considered in an experimental stage of development, under a variety of state laws. The claim that such a nominating primary, as distinguished from a final election, is included within the provision of the Constitution of the United States, applicable to the election of Senators and Representatives, is by no means indisputable. Many state supreme courts have held that similar provisions of state Constitutions relating to elections do not include a nominating primary. . . . But even if it be admitted that, in general, a primary should be treated as an election within the meaning of the Constitution, which we need not and do not decide, such admission would not be of value in determining the case before us, because of some strikingly unusual features of the West Virginia law under which the primary was held, out of which this prosecution grows. By its terms this law provided that only candidates for Congress belonging to a political party which polled 3 per cent of the vote of the entire state at the last preceding general election could be voted for at this primary, and thereby, it is said at the bar, only Democratic and Republican candidates could be and were voted for, while candidates of the Prohibition and Socialist parties were excluded, as were also independent voters who declined to make oath that they were ‘regular and qualified members and voters’ of one of the greater parties. Even more notable is the provision of the law that, after the nominating primary, candidates, even persons who have failed at the primary, may be nominated by certificate signed by not less than 5 per cent of the entire vote polled at the last preceding election. . . . Such provisions as these, adapted though they may be to the selection of party candidates for office, obviously could not be lawfully applied to a final election
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at which officers are chosen, and it cannot reasonably be said that rights which candidates for the nomination for Senator of the United States may have in such a primary under such a law are derived from the Constitution and laws of the United States. They are derived wholly from the state law, and nothing of the kind can be found in any Federal statute. Even when Congress assumed, as we have seen, to provide an elaborate system of supervision over congressional elections, no action was taken looking to the regulation of nominating caucuses or conventions, which were the nominating agencies in use at the time such laws were enacted. What power Congress would have to make regulations for nominating primaries, or to alter such regulations when made by a state, we need not inquire. . . . The claim that the effect of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, recognizing primary elections and limiting the expenditures of candidates for senator in connection with them, is, in effect, an adoption by Congress of all state primary laws, is too unsubstantial for discussion; and the like claim that the temporary measure enacted by Congress for the conduct of the nomination and election of Senators until other provisions should be made by state legislation cannot be entertained, because this act was superseded by the West Virginia primary election law, passed February 20th, 1914, effective ninety days after its passage. It results that the judgments of the District Court in each of these cases must be affirmed.
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DID YOU KNOW? The Teapot Dome Scandal The events surrounding the scandal named for a rock formation above oil-rich land in Wyoming exposed some of the worst aspects of American politics of the early 20th century: extremely large campaign contributions made covertly by wealthy businessmen to a presidential candidate’s campaign in exchange for special favors. Beginning with the Republican national convention in 1920, a number of the country’s richest men representing its major industries threw their support—and their money—behind the candidacy of Warren G. Harding. Among those endorsing and financially backing Harding were Harry F. Sinclair (of Sinclair Consolidated Oil Company) and Edward F. Doheny (of Pan-American Oil Company). Both wanted access to federal oil reserves in California and Wyoming. The reserves had been placed under the Navy Department by President Taft as a fuel source, making it extraordinary to give a private company access to the land to extract oil for private use. Harding cleverly transferred the oil reserves’ jurisdiction from the Navy Department to the Interior Department, where Albert B. Fall, a Harding crony, was secretary. In April 1921 Fall and Sinclair drafted a lease, with terms favorable to Sinclair and without competitive bidding, giving Sinclair’s company exclusive access to Teapot Dome’s oil. Subsequently, Sinclair transferred Liberty Bonds to Fall valued at over $250,000 and also contributed $75,000 to the Republican National Committee. In December 1922 Fall gave Doheny a similarly generous lease without competitive bidding for the reserves at Elk Hills, California, and in return Fall received $100,000 from Doheny. It wasn’t until February 1924 that an independent investigation was begun by Owen Roberts, a Republican, and Arlee Pomerene, a Democrat, followed later by several congressional investigations. Eventually, only two men were convicted: Sinclair in 1927 and Fall in October 1929. The leases to Sinclair and Doheny were canceled, however, returning nearly $50 million to the Navy. Congress passed the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 (see document).
The specific issue in this case was whether the federal criminal code permitted indictments against 20 people who had conspired to commit voter fraud in West Virginia’s primary elections. These people were accused of defrauding the U.S. government by “procuring a thousand persons,” otherwise ineligible to vote under state Further Reading law, to cast ballots, sometimes more than one, for an opHohenstein, Kurt. 2007. Coining Corruption: The Makposition candidate. The federal government argued that ing of the American Campaign Finance System. the conspiracy’s intent was to “injure and oppress” three DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. candidates for the Republican nomination for U.S. senator. The 20 people were indicted for violating the U.S. Criminal Code’s sections 19 and 37, which respectively prohibit conspiring “to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise” of voting and prohibit conspiring to “commit any offense against the
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United States, or to defraud the United States in any manner for any purpose.” The defendants challenged DID YOU KNOW? the indictments, alleging that the federal criminal code did not extend to primary elections. Teapot Dome’s true legacy, however, is its enduring Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Clarke noted example as a model of corruption, one that continthat, other than an 1842 law mandating that memues to be evoked whenever campaign finance reform bers of the House be elected from single-member disdiscussions begin. tricts and an 1870 law regulating virtually all aspects of Further Reading congressional elections but that had been subsequently repealed, Congress had not attempted to regulate priBates, J. Leonard. 1955. “The Teapot Dome Scandal and the Election of 1924.” American Historical Review maries, instead leaving the regulation of primaries and 60, no. 2:303–22. other nominating methods to the states. Within this Bates, J. Leonard. 1963. The Origins of Teapot Dome: legislative history and context, the Court concluded Progressives, Parties and Petroleum, 1909–1921. Urthat the legislative intent was not to use sections 19 bana: University of Illinois Press. McCartney, Laton. 2008. The Teapot Dome Scandal: How and 37 to control state primary elections. Big Oil Bought the Harding White House and Tried to Having decided that the two sections of federal crimSteal the Country. New York: Random House. inal code in question were intended to protect the civil Noggle, Burl. 1962. Teapot Dome: Oil and Politics in the 1920’s. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univerrights of freed blacks and not to regulate primary elecsity Press. tions, the Court refused to speculate on what powers Ravage, M. E. 1974. The Story of Teapot Dome. New Congress might possess in trying to regulate state priYork: B. Franklin. maries. Finally, while the Court declined to entertain Starr, John, and M. R. Werner. 1959. Teapot Dome. New York: Viking. the argument that the Federal Corrupt Practices Act Stratton, David H. 1998. Tempest over Teapot Dome: of 1911 (see document) had implicitly recognized the The Story of Albert B. Fall. Vol. 16 of The Oklagovernment’s right to regulate primaries when it had homa Western Biographies. Norman: University of placed expenditure limitations on all congressional and Oklahoma Press. Weisner, Herman B. 1988. The Politics of Justice: A.B. senatorial elections, the Court took up this question in Fall and the Teapot Dome Scandal: A New PerspecNewberry v. United States (1921), deciding that Contive. Albuquerque, NM: Creative Designs. gress could not regulate primary elections. Congress declined to regulate primary elections when it passed the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 (see document), but the powers were finally extended to Congress though the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (see document).
• Document: The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 • Date: Signed into law by President Calvin Coolidge on February 28, 1925 • Significance: Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Newberry, Congress revisited the 1911 Federal Corrupt Practices Act and eliminated its provisions for reporting campaign donations and expenditures in primary elections. It also combined, reorganized, and clarified the 1910 and 1911 Corrupt Practices acts, making them easier to interpret and apply. Though weakly enforced, the act remained in effect until the passage of the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act.
DOCUMENT The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 1070 SEC. 301. This title may be cited as the “Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925.” SEC. 302. When used in this title— (a) The term “election” includes a general or special election, and, in the case of a Resident Commissioner from the Philippine Islands, an election by the Philippine Legislature, but does not include a primary election or convention of a political party; (b) The term “candidate” means an individual whose name is presented at an election for election as Senator or Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the Congress of the United States, whether or not such individual is elected; (c) The term “political committee” includes any committee, association, or organization which accepts contributions or makes expenditures for the purpose of influencing or attempting to influence the election of candidates or presidential and vice presidential electors (1) in two or more States, or (2) whether or not in more than 67
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one State if such committee, association, or organization (other than a duly organized State or local committee of a political party) is a branch or subsidiary of a national committee, association, or organization; (d) The term “contribution” includes a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit, of money, or anything of value, and includes a contract, promise, or agreement, whether or not legally enforceable, to make a contribution; (e) The term “expenditure” includes a payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift, of money, or any thing of value, and includes a contract, promise, or agreement, whether or not legally enforceable, to make an expenditure; (f ) The term “person” includes an individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation, and any other organization or group of persons; (g) The term “Clerk” means the Clerk of the House of Representatives of the United States; (h) The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of the Senate of the United States; (i) The term “State” includes Territory and possession of the United States; SEC. 303. (a) Every political committee shall have a chairman and a treasurer. No contribution shall be accepted, and no expenditure made, by or on behalf of a political committee for the purpose of influencing an election until such chairman and treasurer have been chosen. (b) It shall be the duty of the treasurer of a political committee to keep a detailed and exact account of— (1) All contributions made to or for such committee; (2) The name and address of every person making any such contribution, and the date thereof; (3) All expenditures made by or on behalf of such committee; and (4) The name and address of every person to whom any such expenditure is made, and the date thereof. (c) It shall be the duty of the treasurer to obtain and keep a receipted bill, stating the particulars, for every expenditure by or on behalf of a political committee exceeding $10 in amount. The treasurer shall preserve all receipted bills and accounts required to be kept by this section for a period of at least two years from the date of the filing of the statement containing such items. SEC. 304. Every person who receives a contribution for a political committee shall, on demand of the treasurer, and in any event within five days after the receipt of such contribution, render to the treasurer a detailed account thereof, including the name and address of the person making such a contribution, and the date on which received. SEC. 305. (a) The treasurer of a political committee shall file with the Clerk between the 1st and 10th days of March, June, and September, in each year, and also between the 10th and 15th days, and on the 5th day, next preceding the date on which a general election is to be held, at which candidates are to be elected in two or more States, and also on the 1st day of January, a statement containing, complete as of the day next preceding the date of filing— (1) The name and address of each person who has made a contribution to or for such committee in one or more items of the aggregate amount or value,
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(2) (3) (4)
(5) (6)
within the calendar year, of $100 or more, together with the amount and date of such contribution; The total sum of the contributions made to or for such committee during the calendar year and not stated under paragraph (1); The total sum of all contributions made to or for such committee during the calendar year; The name and address of each person to whom an expenditure in one or more items of the aggregate amount or value, within the calendar year, of $10 or more has been made by or on behalf of such committee, and the amount, date, and purpose of such expenditure; The total sum of all expenditures made by or on behalf of such committee during the calendar year and not stated under paragraph (4); The total sum of expenditures made by or on behalf of such committee during the calendar year.
(c) The statement filed on the 1st day of January shall cover the preceding calendar year. SEC. 306. Every person (other than a political committee) who makes an expenditure in one or more items, other than by contribution to a political committee, aggregating $50 or more within a calendar year for the purpose of influencing in two or more States the election of candidates, shall file with the Clerk an itemized detailed statement of such expenditure in the same manner as required of the treasurer of a political committee by section 305. SEC. 307. (a) Every candidate for Senator shall file with the Secretary and every candidate for Representative, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner shall file with the Clerk not less than ten nor more than fifteen days before, and also within thirty days after, the date on which an election is to be held, a statement containing, complete as of the day next preceding the date of filing— (1) A correct and itemized account of each contribution received by him or by any person for him with his knowledge or consent, from any source, in aid or support of his candidacy for election, or for the purpose of influencing the result of the election, together with the name of the person who has made such contribution; (2) A correct and itemized account of each expenditure made by him or by any person for him with his knowledge or consent, in aid or support of his candidacy for election, or for the purpose of influencing the result of the election, together with the name of the person to whom such expenditure was made; except that only the total sum of expenditures for items specified in subdivision (c) of section 309 need be stated; (3) A statement of every promise or pledge made by him or by any person for him with his consent, prior to the closing of the polls on the day of the election, relative to the appointment or recommendation for appointment of any person to any public or private position or employment for the purpose of procuring support in his candidacy, and the name, address, and occupation of every person to whom any such promise or pledge has been made, together with the description of any such position. If no such promise or pledge has been made, that fact shall be specifically stated.
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(b) The statements required to be filed by subdivision (a) shall be cumulative, but where there has been no change in an item reported in a previous statement only the amount need be carried forward. (c) Every candidate shall enclose with his first statement a report, based upon the records of the proper State official, stating the total number of votes cast for all candidates for the office which the candidate seeks, at the general election next preceding the election at which he is a candidate. SEC. 308. A statement required by this title to be filed by a candidate or treasurer of a political committee or other person with the Clerk or Secretary, as the case may be— (a) Shall be verified by the oath or affirmation of the person filing such statement, taken before any officer authorized to administer oaths; (b) Shall be deemed properly filed when deposited in an established post office within the prescribed time, duly stamped, registered, and directed to the Clerk or Secretary at Washington, District of Columbia, but in the event it is not received, a duplicate of such statement shall be promptly filed upon notice by the Clerk or Secretary of its nonreceipt; (c) Shall be preserved by the Clerk or Secretary for a period of two years from the date of filing, shall constitute a part of the public records of his office, and shall be open to public inspection. SEC. 309. (a) A candidate, in his campaign for election, shall not make expenditures in excess of the amount which he may lawfully make under the laws of the state in which he is a candidate, nor in excess of the amount which he may lawfully make under the provisions of this title. (b) Unless the laws of his State prescribe a less amount as the maximum limit of campaign expenditures, a candidate may make expenditures up to— (1) The sum of $10,000 if a candidate for Senator, or the sum of $2,500 if a candidate for Representative, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner; or (2) An amount equal to the amount obtained by multiplying three cents by the total number of votes cast at the last general elections for all candidates for the office which the candidate seeks, but in no event exceeding $25,000 if a candidate for Senator or $5,000 if a candidate for Representative, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner. (c) Money expended by a candidate to meet and discharge any assessment, fee, or charge made or levied upon candidates by the laws of the State in which he resides, or expended for his necessary personal, traveling, or subsistence expenses, or for stationery, postage, writing, or printing (other than for use on billboards or in newspapers), for distributing letters, circulars, or posters, or for telegraph or telephone service, shall not be included in determining whether his expenditures have exceeded the sum fixed by paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b) as the limit of campaign expenses of a candidate. SEC. 310. It is unlawful for any candidate to directly or indirectly promise or pledge the appointment, or the use of his influence or support for the appointment of any person to any public or private position or employment, for the purpose of procuring support in his candidacy. SEC. 311. It is unlawful for any person to make or offer to make an expenditure, or to cause an expenditure to be made or offered, to any person, either to vote or withhold his vote, or to vote for or against any candidate, and it is unlawful for any
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person to solicit, accept, or receive any such expenditure in consideration of his vote or the withholding of his vote. SEC. 312. Section 118 of the act entitled “An Act to codify, revise, and amend the penal laws of the United States,” approved March 4, 1909 is amended to read as follows: “SEC. 118. It is unlawful for any Senator or Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner, or any officer or employee of the United States, or any person receiving any salary or compensation for services from money derived from the Treasury of the United States, to directly or indirectly solicit, receive, or be in any manner concerned in soliciting or receiving, any assessment, subscription, or contribution for any political purpose whatever, from any other such officer, employee, or person.” SEC. 313. It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution in connection with any election to any political office, or for any corporation whatever to make a contribution in connection with any election at which presidential and vice presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, Congress are to be voted for, or for any candidate, political committee, or other person to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this section. Every corporation which makes any contribution in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $5,000; and every officer or director of any corporation who consents to any contribution by the corporation in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. SEC. 314. (a) Any person who violates any of the foregoing provisions of this title, except those for which a specific penalty is imposed by sections 312 and 313, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. (b) Any person who willfully violates any of the foregoing provisions of this title, except those for which a specific penalty is imposed by section 312 and 313, shall be fined not more than $10,000 and imprisoned not more than two years. SEC. 315. This title shall not limit or affect the right of any person to make expenditures for proper legal expenses in contesting the results of an election. SEC. 316. This title shall not be construed to annul the laws of any State relating to the nomination or election of candidates, unless directly inconsistent with the provisions of this title, or to exempt any candidate from complying with such State laws. SEC. 317. If any provision of this title or application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity or the remainder of the Act and of the application of such provision to other persons and circumstances shall not be affected thereby. SEC. 318. The following Acts and parts of Acts are hereby repealed: the Act entitled “An Act providing for publicity of contributions made for the purpose of influencing elections at which Representatives in Congress are elected,” approved June 25, 1910 (chapter 392, Thirty-sixth Statutes, page 822), and the Acts amendatory thereof, approved August 19, 1911 (chapter 33, Thirty-seventh Statutes, page 25) and August 23, 1912 (chapter 349, Thirty-seventh Statutes, page 360); the Act entitled “An Act to prevent corrupt practices in the election of Senators, Representatives, or Delegates in Congress,” approved October 16, 1918 (chapter 187,
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February 1923: Three men throwing ballots, tally sheets, and poll books of the Newberry election of 1918 into a furnace at the U.S. Capitol powerhouse. (National Photo Company Collection, Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, LC-USZ62– 52249.)
Fortieth Statutes, page 1013); and section 83 of the Criminal Code of the United States, approved March 4, 1909 (chapter 321, Thirty-fifth Statutes, page 1088). SEC. 319. This title shall take effect thirty days after its enactment.
ANALYSIS Much of the contentiousness surrounding the passage of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1911 (see document) stemmed from its provisions extending campaign disclosure requirements and spending limits to congressional primary elections. Some lawmakers argued that the regulations violated states’ rights while others contended that Congress did not have the authority to regulate primaries at all, because
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the Constitution referenced only general elections. These questions were somewhat resolved by the SuDID YOU KNOW? preme Court when it rendered its decision in Newberry v. United States (1921), which seemed to declare unconPolitical Parties, Radical Ideas, and Ballot Access stitutional Congress’s authority over primary elections. Though some in Congress, particularly Progressives, Whitney v. California (1927) was a leading First Amendsought to revisit campaign regulation in the Newberry ment case involving a challenge to California’s Crimidecision’s aftermath, Republican congressional leadnal Syndicalism Act, which criminalized the organizing ers and President Harding were less interested. Indeed, or assisting of groups that “advocate, teach or aid and Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty went so far as abet” force or violence against “industrial ownership” or government. The California act was one of many to write a letter to the House in which he stated his across the country that was passed during the first Red opinion that Newberry definitively eliminated priScare (1917–1920), in response to the electoral strength mary elections from Congress’s purview as well as Senexhibited by Socialist Party candidate Eugene Debs in ate elections. Congress’s only legislative option was the first decade of the 20th century and the supposed to extend regulations to the direct election of senathreats that these organizations posed to America’s eftors (Mutch 1988, 19). The position of Harding and forts in World War I. By upholding the California act, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed states to punish already his cabinet was likely influenced by a Senate investiunpopular political parties by prosecuting individuals gation into the campaign expenditures by candidates who joined these groups and by keeping these political from both parties during the 1920 presidential elecparties off state ballots. tion. Led by Senator William S. Kenyon (R, IA), the In what has become a leading defense of the First committee discovered that of the 17 different aspiring Amendment, Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion presidential candidates, announced and unannounced, in Whitney argued that the First Amendment was designed to enhance deliberative democracy. The freeseveral spent no money while one, General Leonard dom to speak and think are “means indispensable to the Wood, spent $1.7 million. The committee also idendiscovery and spread of political truth; that without free tified a number of organizations that raised and spent speech and assembly discussion would be futile,” Jusmoney independently of a candidate’s campaign and tice Brandeis wrote. Fear of danger or unpopular ideas found interaction among state party committees and is not sufficient to limit speech, as “there must be reatheir respective national committees in raising money sonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one.” Justice Brandeis’s views on the First and then transferring funds across levels. In its report, Amendment became known as the free marketplace of the committee recommended a constitutional amendideas theory, which advocates broad protection to unment to allow for greater regulation of campaign money popular speech and places a heavy burden of justifica(Hohenstein 2007, 81–82). tion on the state when it wants to suppress speech. The Teapot Dome scandal, which came to light in 1924, created a major public outcry for reform. The Senate once again charged a committee, this time under Senator William Borah (R, ID), to study fund-raising in the 1924 presidential and senatorial elections. As the Kenyon committee had discovered, Borah found large sums of money raised by the parties in one state that were sent to other states or the national committee. It recommended that this practice be regulated and that the Federal Corrupt Practices Act be updated to adjust senatorial spending limits to reflect a state’s population rather than having a single limit for all states (Hohenstein 2007, 83). Borah attempted to follow his committee’s suggestions and offered a rider to the Postal Salary Increase Act that was already before the Senate. Borah’s rider extended disclosure requirements to all political committees and all individuals seeking elected office at the federal, state, and local levels. All contributors and the amounts of their donations were to be divulged before and after elections. His amendment passed the Senate, but in the House it was doomed. Representative John Cable (R, OH),
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who had offered a campaign finance bill in the prior Congress, presented a much less ambitious bill in place DID YOU KNOW? of Borah’s. It reorganized existing federal campaign finance regulations but did not include primary elections. The free marketplace of ideas theory of the First The House accepted the Cable bill, and in conference Amendment finally received a majority of votes on the committee forced the Senate to accept its version. UnSupreme Court in the 1960s. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, fortunately, Coolidge vetoed the bill because he dis395 U.S. 444 (1969) a unanimous Supreme Court overagreed with the postal bill, not the campaign finance ruled Whitney v. California (1927) and elevated political language. Congress sent the president the Federal Corspeech to its now vaunted status. Because of Brandenrupt Practices Act as a separate bill, which he signed on burg, the end of the red scares, and evolving societal attitudes regarding socialism and communism, no politFebruary 28, 1925. ical party is denied access to the ballot simply because Section 302 specifically excluded all primary elecof its message. Democratic- and Republican-dominated tions from the law’s requirements, something favored state legislatures have imposed structural impediments by President Coolidge and mainstream Republicans. It to the ballot for third parties, such as signature requirealso extended the definition of political committee to any ments and stringent deadlines but are forbidden from committee whose purpose was to influence a presidendenying access based on political viewpoints. tial election, language designed to include those organizations identified by the Kenyon committee. Section 305 provided specific dates rather than time frames for the filing of campaign reports. This small step greatly facilitated submission of the campaign’s finance and spending reports. Section 306 was a small advance in controlling independent expenditures. Any person spending $50 or more in all elections in a year was required to file a report. Spending limits were revised and improved in Section 309, and for the first time incorporated state spending laws. The act stipulated that candidates must obey state limits if less than the federal limits. In the absence of state restrictions, the act’s limits were set at $10,000 and $2,500, respectively, for Senate and House candidates. However, the candidate could spend an amount equal to the total votes in the state’s or the district’s last election multiplied by three cents but not more than $25,000 for a Senate candidate or $5,000 for a House candidate. Thus, in a state lacking campaign spending restrictions, Senate candidates could spend between $10,000 and $25,000 while House candidates could spend between $2,500 and $5,000, depending on how many people voted in the prior election for Senate or House. The remaining sections consolidated and clarified provisions from the 1911 act. Despite concerns about the apparent corrosive influence of money on elections, especially in light of the facts emerging from the Teapot Dome case, neither Congress nor the president was eager to propose stricter regulations on campaign financing. The Watergate scandal in 1973 supplied the motivation for Congress to address the matter once again.
FURTHER READING Hohenstein, Kurt. 2007. Coining Corruption: The Making of the American Campaign Finance System. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. LaRaja, Raymond J. 2008. Small Change: Money, Political Parties, and Campaign Finance Reform. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Mutch, Robert E. 1988. Campaigns, Congress, and Courts: The Making of Federal Campaign Finance Law. New York: Praeger.
• Document: The Radio Act of 1927 • Date: Signed into law by President Coolidge February 23, 1927 • Significance: The Radio Act of 1927 corrected the deficiencies of the 1912 Radio Act while also expanding the power of the federal government to regulate radio. It justified regulating the airwaves as a kind of public utility, created the Federal Radio Commission, and incorporated protections for candidates (the equal time rule) that would appear in later legislation.
DOCUMENT The Radio Act of 1927, PL 69-632 An Act for the regulation of radio communications, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act is intended to regulate all forms of interstate and foreign radio transmissions and communications within the United States, its Territories and possessions; to maintain the control of the United States over all the channels of interstate and foreign radio transmission; and to provide for the use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by individuals, firms, or corporations, for limited periods of time, under licenses granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall be construed to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license. That no person, firm, company, or corporation shall use or operate any apparatus for the transmission of energy or communications or signals by radio (a) from one place in any Territory or possession of the United States, or from the District of Columbia to another place in the same Territory. . . . SEC. 3. That a commission is hereby created and established to be known as the Federal Radio Commission, hereinafter referred to as the commission, which shall be 75
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composed of five commissioners appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and one of whom the President shall designate as chairman: Provided, That chairman thereafter elected shall be chosen by the commission itself. Each member of the commission shall be a citizen of the United States and an actual resident citizen of a State within the zone from which appointed at the time of said appointment. Not more than one commissioner shall be appointed from any zone. No member of the commission shall be financially interested in the manufacture or sale of radio apparatus or in the transmission or operation of radiotelegraphy, radio telephony, or radio broadcasting. Not more than three commissioners shall be members of the same political party. The first commissioners shall be appointed for the terms of two, three, four, five, and six years, respectively, from the date of the taking effect of this Act, the term of each to be designated by the President, but their successors shall be appointed for terms of six years, except that any person chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the unexpired term of the commissioner whom he shall succeed. The first meeting of the commission shall be held in the city of Washington at such time and place as the chairman of the commission may fix. The commission shall convene thereafter at such times and places as the majority of the commission may determine, or upon call of the chairman thereof. . . . SEC. 4. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the commission, from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires, shall— (a) Classify radio stations; (b) Prescribe the nature of the service to be rendered by each class of licensed stations and each station within any class; (c) Assign bands of frequencies or wave lengths to the various classes of stations, and assign frequencies or wave lengths for each individual station and determine the power which each station shall use and the time during which it may operate; (d) Determine the location of classes of stations or individual stations . . . ; (f ) Make such regulations not inconsistent with law as it may deem necessary to prevent interference between stations and to carry out the provisions of this Act . . . ; (g) Have the authority to establish areas or zones to be served by any station . . . ; Sec. 5 (C) To prescribe the qualifications of station operators, to classify them according to the duties to be performed, to fix the forms of such licenses, and to issue them to such persons as he finds qualified. (D) To suspend the license of any operator for a period not exceeding two years upon proof sufficient to satisfy him that the licensee (a) has violated any provision of any Act or treaty binding on the United States which the Secretary of commerce or the commission is authorized by this Act to administer or by any regulation made by the commission or the Secretary of Commerce under any such act or treaty; or (b) has failed to carry out the lawful orders of the master of the vessel on which he is employed; or (c) has willfully damaged or permitted radio apparatus to be damaged; or (d) has transmitted superfluous radio communications or signals or radio communications containing profane or obscene words or language; or (e) has willfully or maliciously interfered with any other radio communications or signals. . . . SEC. 9. The licensing authority, if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby, subject to the limitations of this Act, shall grant to any applicant therefore a station license provided for by this Act. In considering applications for licenses and renewals of licenses, when and in so far as there is a demand for the same, the licensing authority shall make such a
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distribution of licenses, bands of frequency of wave lengths, periods of time for operation, and of power among the different States and communities as to give fair, efficient, and equitable radio service to each of the same. . . . SEC. 11. If upon examination of any application for a station license or for the renewal or modification of a station license the licensing authority shall determine that public interest, convenience, or necessity would be served by the granting thereof, it shall authorize the issuance, renewal, or modification thereof in accordance with said finding. In the event the licensing authority upon examination of any such application does not reach such decision with respect thereto, it shall notify the applicant thereof, shall fix and give notice of a time and place for hearing thereon, and shall afford such applicant an opportunity to be heard under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe. . . . SEC. 13. The licensing authority is hereby directed to refuse a station license and /or the permit hereinafter required for the construction of a station to any person, firm, company, or corporation, or any subsidiary thereof, which has been finally adjudged guilty by a Federal court if unlawfully monopolizing or attempting unlawfully to monopolize, after this Act takes effect, radio communication, directly or indirectly, through the control of the manufacture or sale of radio apparatus, through exclusive traffic arrangements, or by any other means or to have been using unfair methods of competition. The granting of a license shall not stop the United States or any person aggrieved from proceeding against such person, firm, company, or corporation for violating the law against unfair methods of competition or for a violation of the law against unlawful restraints and monopolies and /or combinations, contracts, or agreements in restraint of trade, or from instituting proceedings for the dissolution of such firm, company, or corporation. SEC. 14. Any station license shall be revocable by the commission for false statements either in the application or in the statement of fact which may be required by section 10 hereof, or because of conditions revealed by such statements of fact as may be required from time to time which would warrant the licensing authority in refusing to grant a license on an original application, or for failure to operate substantially as set forth in the license, for violation of or failure to observe any of the restrictions and conditions of this Act, or of any regulation of the licensing authority authorized by this Act or by a treaty ratified by the United States. . . . SEC. 18. If any license shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station, and the licensing authority shall make rules and regulations to carry this provision into effect: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this paragraph. No obligation is hereby imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate. SEC. 19. All matter broadcast by any radio station for which service, money, or any other valuable consideration is directly or indirectly paid, or promised to or charged or accepted by, the station so broadcasting, from any person, firm, company, or corporation, shall, at the time the same is so broadcast, be announced as paid for or furnished, as the case may be, by such person, firm, company, or corporation. . . . SEC. 29. Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the licensing authority the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals
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President Calvin Coolidge addresses radio broadcasters at the White House in October 1924, with Herbert Hoover, then secretary of Commerce and later president, looking on. (National Photo Company Collection, Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, LC-DIG-npcc-26256.)
transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the licensing authority which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communications. No person within the jurisdiction of the United States shall utter any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communications. . . . SEC. 40. This Act shall take effect and be in force upon its passage and approval, except that for and during a period of sixty days after such approval no holder of a license or an extension thereof issued by the Secretary of Commerce under said Act of August 13, 1912, shall be subject to the penalties provided herein for operating a station without the license herein required. SEC. 41. This Act may be referred to and cited as the Radio Act of 1927.
ANALYSIS Congressional concern with the Commerce secretary’s ability to regulate licensing under the Radio Act of 1912 appeared in 1923 following the federal court decision in
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Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., which eliminated the secretary’s discretional authority. Representative Wallace DID YOU KNOW? H. White (R, ME) introduced a bill designed to expand and clarify the Commerce secretary’s licensing authorThe Federal Courts and the Radio Act of 1927 ity, but the bill failed to attract other lawmakers’ interest. At the fourth National Radio Conference organized Political parties have long sought to channel new techby Secretary of Commerce Hoover in 1925, those connologies to their electoral advantage during campaigns. vened called for legislation granting the full authority With the advent of radio in the early 20th century, howto license and regulate the broadcast industry to one ever, many government leaders believed that the public federal agency, but it took the federal court’s ruling in would be harmed if it did not receive the broadest range of opinions over the radio airwaves. Many politicians United States v. Zenith Corporation (1926), which conwere concerned that the public’s capacity to deliberate clusively stripped the secretary of his licensing power, and make informed decisions was severely weakened if to finally move Congress and the president to act. In a the airwaves were controlled by a small segment of the speech to Congress in December 1926, President Calpopulation, namely, wealthy businessowners. vin Coolidge demanded that something be done to With an eye on protecting the public interest and control the radio broadcasters’ expanding numbers beencouraging the free marketplace of ideas over the radio, Congress replaced the Radio Act of 1912 with fore chaos enveloped the industry (Hohenstein 2007, the Radio Act of 1927, which created a five-person Fed111–12). In short order, Senator Clarence Dill (D, WA) eral Radio Commission, whose job it was to grant or introduced a bill to establish an independent commisdeny radio licenses and determine the radio frequencies sion in 1926, while Representative White reintroduced and power levels of licensees. his bill in the House. In three cases before the Court of Appeals for the Partisan differences stalled the bills’ deliberations, District of Columbia—Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Commission (1930), KFDB Broadcast as everyone was aware of radio’s potential as a camAssociation v. Federal Radio Commission (1931), and paign and governing tool. Harding, for example, was Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comthe first of many presidents to broadcast a nationwide mission (1932)—the federal appellate court upheld speech in 1922. Most Democrats and a handful of ReCongress’s decision to give to the Federal Radio Compublicans were, therefore, leery of transferring radio’s mission the power to regulate the radio airwaves in the regulation to the executive branch, as White’s bill propublic interest. While this power raised First Amendment concerns for many broadcasters, the courts have posed. Compromise was achieved with both chambers consistently held that the limited radio frequencies and accepting Dill’s idea of an independent commission, the federal government’s assignment of licenses allows but one that was bipartisan, appointed by the president, Congress to deny radio licenses based on content that is and confirmed by the Senate (see Section 3). President not in the public interest. Coolidge signed the act on February 23, 1927. While these decisions did not directly implicate camSection four empowers the Federal Radio Commission paign activity, they were important because they upheld Congress’s right to regulate in this area. Years later, Con(FRC) to classify and fix the location of radio stations gress passed the Federal Communications Act of 1934, and their broadcast zones to eliminate interference. The which replaced the Federal Radio Commission with the rationale for granting the FRC its powers was placed in Federal Communications Commission and vested it the part f: “to promote public convenience or interest or will power to enforce equal time, a new rule that required serve public necessity or the provisions of this Act.” This any radio licensee to provide equal opportunities to all thinking applied the Progressive idea of a public utility candidates in a race if it gave time to any one of the candidates. The equal time rule quickly became a controto radio, something like water or electricity that is a pubversial federal regulation of political campaigns, leading lic good, limited and regulated to preserve for everyone’s many to argue that Congress was directly infringing on benefit. This wording appeared again in Section 9 that the First Amendment rights of radio broadcasters. dealt with issuing licenses. Attempting to ensure the fair treatment of candidates, section 18 required that any station that provided the candidate of one party the opportunity to use its station must also provide an opportunity for other candidates to do so. The act did not require stations to open
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themselves to political debates, but if a station did so, it could not selectively include or exclude candidates. All candidates must be afforded the same opportunity. This language was a precursor to that appearing in the Federal Communications Act of 1934 as the equal time doctrine. Section 19 required any company or, by extension, candidate buying advertising time on the radio to disclose who the paying sponsor or purchaser was. Section 29 forbade the FRC from censoring radio broadcasts, but the section also went on to say that “no person . . . shall utter any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication.” The Radio Act of 1927 remained in effect until 1934, when the Federal Communications Act (see document) was passed, which perfected and expanded the earlier law.
FURTHER READING Craig, Douglas B. 2000. Fireside Politics: Radio and Political Culture in the United States, 1920– 1940. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Hohenstein, Kurt. 2007. Coining Corruption: The Making of the American Campaign Finance System. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Lee, Frederic P. 1929. “Federal Radio Legislation.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 142 (suppl.: Radio): 36–44.
• Document: Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934) • Date: Decided January 8, 1934 • Significance: By an 8–1 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 against a constitutional challenge filed by two campaign officials who were indicted for not filing campaign contribution statements as required under the law. The Court held that Congress acted to protect the integrity of our vital institutions by passing this campaign finance legislation.
DOCUMENT Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934) Justice Sutherland delivered the opinion of the Court An indictment returned by a grand jury sitting in the District of Columbia charges petitioners, in ten counts, with violations of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925. The pertinent provisions of the act are contained in sections [302, 303, and 304] . . . and in sections [305] and [314]. Section [302] defines the term, ‘political committee,’ as including any organization which accepts contributions for the purpose of influencing or attempting to influence the election of presidential and vice presidential electors in two or more states. Every political committee is required to have a chairman and a treasurer before any contribution may be accepted. One of the duties of the treasurer is to keep a detailed and exact account of all contributions made to or for the committee. Every person who receives a contribution for a political committee is required to render to the treasurer a detailed account thereof, with specified particulars. By section [305], the treasurer is required to file with the clerk of the House of Representatives, at designated times, a statement 81
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containing the name and address of each contributor, date and amount of each contribution, and other particulars, complete as of the day next preceding the date of filing. By section [314](a), penalties of fine and imprisonment are imposed upon any person who violates any of the provisions of the chapter; and, by subdivision (b), increased penalties are imposed upon any person who willfully violates any of those provisions. The first eight counts of the indictment purport to charge petitioners with substantive violations of the act, and the ninth and tenth counts, with conspiracy to violate it—four of the eight counts charging willful violations; the other four merely charging violations, that is to say, unlawful violations. . . . First. We do not stop to describe the eight substantive counts. In the opinion of a majority of the court, there is a failure in each count to charge an offense under the statute. The conspiracy counts we hold are sufficient. The ninth count charges with particularity that the petitioner Burroughs was the treasurer of a designated political committee from July 22, 1928, to and including March 16, 1929, which committee during that period accepted contributions and made expenditures for the purpose of influencing and attempting to influence the election of presidential and vice presidential electors in two states. The several amounts of certain contributions made for the committee are set forth, together with the dates when made and the name of the contributor. The count recites the duty of Burroughs under the statute to make the statements therein prescribed in respect of these contributions, and charges that both petitioners, one as treasurer and the other as chairman of the committee, ‘then well knowing all the premises aforesaid,’ unlawfully and feloniously did conspire together and with other persons to commit ‘the four willfully committed offenses’ charged against Burroughs as treasurer in the first, third, fifth, and seventh counts of the indictment, namely, willful failure to file the statements of such contributions required by section [305], the allegations of those counts being incorporated by reference as fully as if repeated. The count further alleges certain overt acts committed in pursuance of the conspiracy. The tenth count charges in substantially identical language a conspiracy to commit the four offenses not designated as willful, charged in the second, fourth, sixth, and eighth counts of the indictment, namely, unlawful failure to file the required statements, the allegations of those counts being likewise incorporated by reference as fully as if repeated. We are of opinion that these allegations are sufficient in each count to charge a conspiracy to violate the pertinent provisions of the act. Knowledge of the facts constituting the contemplated substantive offenses is sufficiently alleged by the phrase, ‘well knowing all the premises aforesaid.’ . . . And intent unlawfully, or unlawfully and willfully, to evade performance of the statutory duty is clearly enough alleged by the statement that the accused conspired to do so. . . . Moreover, quite apart from the question of their legal sufficiency to charge substantive offenses, the eight counts which are incorporated by description set forth the pertinent facts, and may be considered in determining the adequacy of the conspiracy counts. . . . Second. The only point of the constitutional objection necessary to be considered is that the power of appointment of presidential electors and the manner of their appointment are expressly committed by section 1, art. 2, of the Constitution to the states, and that the congressional authority is thereby limited to determining ‘the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes;
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which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.’ So narrow a view of the powers of Congress in respect of the matter is without warrant. The congressional act under review seeks to preserve the purity of presidential and vice presidential elections. Neither in purpose nor in effect does it interfere with the power of a state to appoint electors or the manner in which their appointment shall be made. It deals with political committees organized for the purpose of influencing elections in two or more states, and with branches or subsidiaries of national committees, and excludes from its operation state or local committees. Its operation, therefore, is confined to situations which, if not beyond the power of the state to deal with at all, are beyond its power to deal with adequately. It in no sense invades any exclusive state power. While presidential electors are not officers or agents of the federal government . . . they exercise federal functions under, and discharge duties in virtue of authority conferred by, the Constitution of the United States. The President is vested with the executive power of the nation. The importance of his election and the vital character of its relationship t