Urban and Regional Economics: Marxist Perspectives (Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics Series)

Urban and Regional Economics -Marxist Perspectives

Matthew Edel

Queens College oj the City University oj New York

A volume in the Regional and Urban Economics section edited by Richard Amott Boston College, Massachusetts, USA

he ap

harwood academic publishers Switzerland· Australia· Belgium· France' Germany· Gt Britain India· Japan· Malaysia· Netherlands' Russia· Singapore· USA

Copyright © 1992 by Harwood Academic Publishers GmbH, Poststrasse 22, 7000 Chur, Switzerland. All rights reserved. Harwood Academic Publisben Private Bag 8 Camherwell, Victoria 3124 Australia 58, rue Lhomond 75005 Paris France

Glinkastrasse 13-15 0-1086 Berlin Germany

Post Office Box 90 Reading, Berkshire RGI 8JL United Kingdom

3-14-9, Okubo Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169 Japan Emmaplein 5 1075 AW Amsterdam Netherlands

5301 Tacony Street, Drawer 330 Philadelphia, Pennsylvaoia 19137 United States of America

Ubrat)' of Congress C••alogin,·in-Publication Dlta Urban and regional economics: Marxist perspectives I Matthew Edt!'

Edel, Matthew,

p. em. - (Fundamentals of pure and applied economics; v. 47. Regional and urban economics section) Includes bibliographica1 references and index. ISBN 3-718&-5102-5

1. Marxian economics. 2. Urban economics. 3. Regional economics. I. Title. n. Series: Fundamentals of pure and applied economics: v.47. III. Series: Fundamentals of pure and applied economics Regional and urban economics section. HB97.5.E26

1992

335.4--dc20

�! r

91-3351 elP

�:

!

,

No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Printed in the United Kingdom.

...... '''-��y CENTRAL W.ASHlNO'lON UNIVERSITY URG WASHINGTON ENSB ELL

\' , r Ii

l

Ii-' t

�' 1

\

I I f t' !

.,

Contents

Introduction to the Series

1. Introduction 1.1 The critique of orthodox analysis 1.2 Basic tenets of Marxist method

1 1 7

Yalue flows as geographical transfers

18 18 24 25 26 30

3. Uneven Development: Recent Treatments 3.1 General arguments 3.2 Corporate structure and industrial location 3.3 Regions and cities in advanced capitalism 3.4 Regions and cities in less-developed capitalism 3.5 Non-urban regions

34 34 38 43 51 55

4. Rent Theory and Spatial Segregation 4.1 Land rent and accumulation: general

57

2. City 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5

and Region in the Marxist Classics City and country Uneven development Uneven penetration of capital City growth as uneven development

Rent theory and urban location

58 62 70 75 80

5. Urban Services as Social Reproduction 5.1 Social reproduction in Marx's model 5.2 The housing question: Engels 5.3 The housing question: recent treatments 5.4 Transit and the journey to work 5.5 Schooling and education 5.6 Public assistance and social services 5.7 Health and medical care 5.8 Recreation and 'cultural affairs'

89 89 94 97 102 104 106 108 111

considerations

4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5

Marx's categories of rent Urban applications of the rent categories Rent, production and accumulation cycles

v

CONTENTS

vi

5.9 Police and 'criminal justice' 5.10 Common elements in the analysis of reproductive services

6. The Urban Question, Community and the State 6.1 The property rights paradigm and the new questions

6.2 6.3

The local State Community and social movements

Bibliography

Index

113 114 116 117 122 128 134 151

\

Introduction to the Series Drawing on a personal network, an economist can still relatively easily stay well informed in the narrow field in which he works, but to keep up with the development of economics as a whole is a much more formidable challenge. Economists are confronted with difficulties associated with the rapid development of their discipline. There is a risk of 'balkanization' in economics, which may not be favorable to its development.

Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics has been created to meet this problem. The discipline of economics has been subdivided into sections (listed inside). These sections comprise short books, each surveying the state of the art in a given area. Each book starts with the basic elements and goes as far as the most advanced results. Each should be useful to professors needing material for lectures, to graduate students looking for a global view of a particular subject, to professional economists wishing to keep up with the development of their science, and to researchers seeking convenient information on questions that incidentally appear in their work. Each book is thus a presentation of the state of the art in a particular field rather than a step-by-step analysis of the development of the literature. Each is a high-level presentation but accessible to anyone with a solid background in economics, whether engaged in busi­ ness, government, international organizations, teaching, or research in related fields. Three aspects of Fundamentals ofPure and Applied Economics should be emphasized: - First, the project covers the whole field of economics, not only theoretical or mathematical economics. - Second, the project is open-ended and the number of books is not predetermined. If new interesting areas appear, they will generate •

additional books. vii

viii

INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES

- Last, all the books making up each section will later be grouped to constitute one or several volumes of an Encyclopedia of Economics. The editors of the sections are outstanding economists who have selected as authors for lhe series some of the finest specialists in the world. J. Lesourne

H. Sonnenschein

Note from the Section Editor It is with great sadness that I report the untimely death of Matthew Edel shortly after the completion of this book. His work combined exemplary scholarship and profound humanitarian concern. He will be deeply missed. I would also like to thank Kelly Chaston for preparation of the index.

\

Urban and Regional Economics - Marxist Perspectives * MATTHEW EDEL

Queens College of the City University of New York 1.

INTRODUCTION

This essay reviews Marxist approaches to urban and regional poli­ tical economy. The focus is on issues that enter into orthodox urban and regional economics, such as location and urban concentra­ tion, regional growth and decline, rent and housing, segregation and internal colonization, urban services, and the role of local government. Although some of these issues were treated in early works by Marx and his followers, a self-conscious Marxist urban political economy only began to develop in the late 1960s, as a response to perceived weaknesses in mainstream urban studies, and to Marxist neglect of spatial and local phenomena. The new approaches reviewed here can best be understood in the light of these two critiques. Thus, Section 1 will review both the critique of neoclassical approaches, and the general principles of Marxist political economy. 1.1.

The critique of orthodox analysis

Orthodox urban economics, like its Marxist counterpart, was greatly stimulated by the urban crises of the 1960s. Although there had been prior analyses of location, land use, transportation, and local finance, it was only in the 1960s that these were assembled into a formal, unified The author would like to thank Candace Kim Edel and Richard Arnott for ideas and assistance with this study. and to acknowledge the help over the years, in understand� ing aspects of these materials, of David Barkin, Laurence Harris. Steve Hymer. Harry Magdoff, Ann Markusen, Emilio Pradilla, Steve Rose, and Bill Tabb and of the Union for Radical Political Economics and the Conference of Socialist Economists. •

1

2

MAITHEW EDEL

field of specialization [103,322]. But as urban and regional economics evolved into a complex mathematical field, it seemed to ignore the questions of social policy and social criticism that had attracted scholars. Dissenters who doubted its policy-relevance, or objected to its assumptions of market optima, turned to alternative approaches, including historical materialism or Marxism. Dissatisfaction with orthodox approaches was voiced along several lines. By the I 960s, neoclassical micro-economics, sometimes com­ bined with Keynesian macro-economics in a 'neoclassical synthesis', had come to dominate the field, pushing to the margin or beyond alternative 'institutionalist' approaches as well as Marxism. The dominant approaches had proven useful for the analyzing of price phenomena and many allocative issues. Their central message, that market exchanges could increase consumer satisfaction and the efficiency of resource use, was widely held. (Indeed, by the 1960s discussion of the proper design for market socialism had begun to displace the exclusive emphasis on planning among Marxist eco­ nomists.) However, there was also widespread concern with issues that neoclassical economics as an analytical tool (and· the unrestricted market as a policy instrument) could not easily handle. One area of concern was market failure. Certain market failures were widely recognized, and made the subject of separate theories, which then had to be linked somehow to the neoclassical model. Unemployment and inflationary states were treated by Keynesian models [WI), and problems of pollution, co-location and the like by a theory of externalities [97). But these models seemed to treat pervasive social phenomena as limited areas of exception. A later neo­ classical argument, that all would be well if everything from air to zygotes were subjected to property rights, raised ethical issues of who should receive the new properties, or what it would mean to society if every aspect of life were treated as property. A second concern was ineqUality, of power as well as of goods. Uneven income distribution, discrimination, gender domination, monopoly, manipulative advertising, international dominance and dependence, arms races and war were all important social concerns. Market theory could measure many of their costs or consequences, in relation to a presumed Pareto optimum, but it was not really a theory of their causes. Consumer sovereignty could not explain hidden persuasion, nor could measurement of the gains to the discrimina-

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

3

tor, monopolist or imperialist fully explain how such contravenors of the market got the power to do their damage. The market, in its pure form, merely reflected and perhaps amplified prior distributions of resources. Indeed there was even doubt within formal economics, raised by the Sraffa approach, about whether the solution to a general equilibrium market model required additional assumptions about the relative power of labor and capital, even beyond the assumption of an initial property distribution [25]. In addition, the need for social relationships, that complement and restrain market ties, and the issue of worker or consumer alienation, could not be treated by neoclassical economics [301]. By classifying these needs, the issues of power and inequality, as outside of the economic model, the field seemed to deny them their importance. But these were problems that the social sciences needed to confront. To make matters worse, exporting these problems to sociology and political science was impossible, because the orthodox paradigms of those fields (social exchange theory and social ecology, and plura­ list political science) were based upon models of preference and competition derived from the neoclassical economic model. Finally, the neoclassical economic model and its Keynesian amend­ ment were in many ways atemporal and ahistorical. They dealt in instantaneous processes or in short period of time. Although long-term changes could be modelled as series of short steps, this did not seem a useful way of treating long-term historical change. Models focused on the approach to equilibrium seemed particularly inadequate for treating those discontinuous breaks in history that involved changes in institutions or economic systems. Given these complaints, it is not surprising that critiques of neo­ classical economics, and a search for different approaches, emerged in a number of fields. The urban studies field, and its regional counterpart, was no exception. Beginning in the \ 96Os, neoclasfiical urban models and their counterparts (urban social ecology and pluralist political science) were criticized for internal inconsistencies and for lacunae. Like other critics, urban scholars argued that orthodox approaches falsely assumed a social consensus, and posed questions without consideration of distribution, class and monopoly power. Orthodox approaches presented outcomes · as the 'natural' results of technological change or abstract market forces, while the critics argued for recognition of greater causal complexity, including

�

4

MAITHEW EDEL

the importance of special interests or segregatory splits in society. Many examples were ad hoc, but they were nonetheless telling. For example, urban renewal, which had been touted as necessary for efficiency of growth, was shown to promote specific power interests or segregation [94]. The demise of street rail systems, presumed due to inefficiency, was traced to the monopoly power of bus companies [355] . The growth of suburbs was linked to financial or real-estate monopolies, or to national programs for social control, rather than to autonomous consumer choice [338]. Local governments which had been described as reflecting the interests of a plurality of groups were restudied with an eye to power elite domination [91]. The very definitions of such phenomena as crime were shown to reflect class . prejudices [144]. A critique of land-use models argued that, first, any neoclassical model depended on debatable assumptions of rationality, foresight, and individual independence of preferences. These models also took as given and implicitly natural a distribution of capital and 'human capital' that was itself an outcome of class conflict [180]. Furthermore, neoclassical spatial models were prone to error, on their own terms, because of technical market failures. Urban co-location, external dis­ economies, public goods and the like were admitted, even by the orthodox, to be the essence of urban life [ 1 03] . Eventually these ad hoc critiques led to a desire for an alternative approach. That such an approach should be based, at least in part, on ideas drawn from Marxism, was the argument of three notable works, which appeared in the 1 970s, by David Harvey, a British geographer [180], Manuel Castells, a French-trained Spanish sociologist [53], and David Gordon, a US economist [145]. Harvey's early essays were centered on questions of distribution. Even when the market 'worked', Harvey argued, it reinforced unequal power relations. He also criticized the harmony tacitly implied in 'Pareto optimality', and urban sociology's shared 'moral order'. It was, he argued, more useful to use the notion of conflict 'to analyze disequi­ librium in a city system' than to assume equilibrium [180, Part 1]. Harvey then began to move toward an alternative formulation, based on the earliest 'Marxist' urban analysis, Engels' description of Manchester [1 12]. Manchester, a city with few regulations or formal plans, had been built by market forces if any city ever was. Its land-use pattern 'fit' the standard urban economic models of a concentric city·

i

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS, MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

l

with the poor living near the center and the rich on the edge. But, Engels had argued, this free market outcome was also interpretable as a strong, if automatic, display of power. He described the rich as living . .. in free, wholesome country air. in fine, comfortable homes, passed every half or Quarter hour by omnibuses going into the city. And the finest part of the arrangement is this, that the members of the money aristocracy can take the shortest road through the middle of all the labouring districts without ever seeing .. . misery that lurks to the right and left . . . I know very well that this hypocritical plan is more or less common to all great cities; I know. too. that the retail dealers are forced by the nature of their business to take possession of the great highways; 1 know that there are more good buildings than bad ones upon such streets everywhere, and that the value of land is greater near them than in remote districts, but at the same time I have never seen so systematic a shutting out of the working class from the thoroughfares, so tender a conceal­ ment of everything which might affront the eye and the nerves of the bourgeoisie [112, pp.46-7; cited in 180, pp. 132-3J.

Markets, in other words, ratified and hid power relationships. Harvey applied similar considerations to orthodox models of ghetto location, arguing that the market forces they identified ratified discriminatory power relationships. He also began a discussion of the use of Marx's theories of rent to study class and power influences on urban land use [180, Part 2]. Harvey's analysis is developed further in [18 1-184, 186]. Harvey also went beyond the discussion of spatial and economic effects of power and competition, to discuss their cultural conse­ quences. He argued that the market system, even when it operates effectively, has a social cost. To suggest how competition divides and alienates people in cities, he once again drew on a quote from Engels: Londoners have been forced to sacrifice the best qualities of their human nature, to bring to pass all the marvels of civilization which crowd their city .. . The brutal indifference, the unfeeling isolation of each in his private interest becomes the more repellent and offensive, the more these individuals are crowded together within a limited space . . . the social war, the war of each against all, is here openly declared . . . people regard each other only as useful objects. [112, pp. 23-5; cited 180, pp. 133-34J.

� I I I

6

MATTHEW EDEL

Using this example, Harvey related competition and the urban form it generated to social alienation [180]. He thus related urban issues to a critique of capitalist alienation in Marx's [254] and Engels' early writings and in such twentieth century critiques as [238, 245]. Similar arguments about capitalism and urban alienation were developed by Henri Lefebvre [220,221] and Raymond Williams [406]. Harvey has returned to these themes in [185]. A second influential analysis was made in the introduction and design of an anthology by David Gordon [135], who distinguished 'radical' theory from 'conservative' and 'liberal' versions of orthodoxy. He contrasted free market theories with those favoring some govern­ ment intervention, and suggested conflict theories as the radical alternative. This formulation was pedagogically useful, but it led to problems. Some of the 'liberal' theories were conflict theories, although they suggested conflict might have a mediated and mutually beneficial outcome. Thus, what was 'radical' about radical theory was not clear. (Harvey's notion of analyzing disequilibrium to devise policies for equilibrium also failed to distinguish between unresolvable conflict and conflict leading to reform solutions within capitalism.) These ambiguities lent strength to the search for explicitly Marxist formulations, centered on the question of class conflict. Gordon's own version of this attempted to relate specific institutions to a Marxist theory of stages of accumulation (see Section 3), which suggested that the implications of a reform might be different in different periods of accumulation [146-148]. A third major critic, Manuel Castells, examined both market solu­ tions and pro-monopoly state solutions from a class perspective [53]. He argued that both the market and government intervention, rather than being neutral, reflected the relative power of different classes. In addition to examining land use and locational issues, Castells empha­ sized the provision of government social services as a crucial arena for conflict among classes, opening an important area for debate and analysis (see Section 5). Castells also criticized using 'the city' as a unit of analysis, without disaggregating it in class terms [53]. This critique was directed primarily at orthodox urban sociology, which discussed urbanism as having many social consequences, often ignoring class or using 'urbanism' as a euphemism for 'capitalism'. It also was directed at Marxists who had taken 'the city' as a social category, equivalent to

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

7

[220, 221]. But it also added to Harvey's and Gordon's argument class had to be considered explicitly, along with 'market' forces, urban economics. Castells and Harvey also raised arguments over the notion of space implicit in the attempt to apply essentially non-spatial theoretic mo,aels to spatial problems. This led to long debates over the nature of space and the question of what is natural. (For summary see [152, 354, 356].) Taken together, the critiques by Harvey, Gordon and Cas­ tells suggested the insufficiency of neoclassical or orthodox social science approaches for urban analysis. In particular,they emphasized the importance of class conflict as an important factor to consider, and suggested Marxist analysis as a means to consider class. Other authors carried on with the critical analysis, suggesting Marxist analysis might respond to the other neglected items noted above in the orthodox approach. (For a sampling, see the anthologies [6, 45, 66, 75, 81, 93, 145, 166, 167, 168, 269, 293, 295, 302, 303, 341,379].) Some of these works, still primarily criticisms of the orthodox approach, did not really show how far a Marxist alternative could be developed. Developing such an approach would be a long task, made difficult because there were few antecedents. Even neoclassical urban economics was itself a relatively new field. In the US, where that neo­ classical work was advancing fastest, Marxism had undergone severe repression (particularly prior to the late 1960s), and a new generation had to learn and interpret it for itself. Marxism itself had developed as an essentially macroscopic system, so how to fit an urban or regional level of analysis into it would be controversial. Given the initial problems, one cannot yet claim Marxist urban and regional economics as a 'finished' analysis, although it has, I argue, yielded important insights and findings. Sections 3 through 6 below will suggest how far the analysis has come so far. 1 .2.

I I I I I I I

Basic tenets of Marxist method

Before turning to Marxist approaches to urban and regional analysis, a brief general discussion of Marxist political economy is necessary. Marxism essentially adds to the questions of orthodox economics two principal concerns, One is for class and class con/lict; the other is for

I I I I I

, I I I I I I

8

MATTHEW EDEL

the analysis of long-term change as an unfolding process, driven by conflict and contradiction. The analyses of class and change, in turn, are approached using the division of labor as the point of departure for understanding how the economy and the rest of society function. For Marxism, the division of labor not only includes the assignment of technical tasks to different workers within a factory, or their allocation to different industries but also, perhaps even more fundamentally, the division of society into persons with different social relationships to the productive process: owners and employees, landlords and serfs, etc. [264]. (It also includes the division of labor between men and women, in the family as well as the wor kPI�ce ' an asP ect n?t emphasized by Marx, but requiring further analYSIS by iater Mamsts.) The importance of the division of labor is illustrated by a simple comparison. Economics is defmed, in a leading texbook, as the study of 'What is produced? How? and For Whom?' [330]. Political science has been defined as the study of 'Who gets what, when, and how?' [219]. Marxist political economy asks 'Who does what, under whose command and who benefits by that work?' (In any of these cases, the question 'and where?' may be added, but it is in some sense secondary.) The centrality of the division of labor and its interrelation with class domination was put forward in Marx's and Engels' early writings. A particular analysis of the division of labor, value and exploitation in a capitalist economy emerged later, through Marx's critique of classical economics. Thus there are two main strands to Marxist method. Materialism and historical analysis given rise to a periodization of history and a general theory of change; 'Marxist economics', the specific (and potentially quantitative) analysis of capitalism, is an elaboration within this schema, valid only for our particular period of history. 'Marxist economics' and 'Marxist political economy' are imprecise terms, since Marx developed them as a critique of classical political economy. From his viewpoint, the analysis of the economy alone, even through 'Marxist' economics, cannot be a complete analysis of the system. It oversimplifies the analysis of society and the contradic­ tions that lead to historical change. Nonetheless, Marxists analyzing particular historical conjunctures use economic models. Marxist models (and even, for limited purposes, neoclassical models, if they are used for keeping an eye on conflicts of interest between classes)

! ,

.1', ,

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

9

be subsumed within the more general historical materialist

Historical change and periodization 'materialist' analysis of long-term change may be considered first. and Engels formulated what they called a materialist method for �hillos()phical and historical analysis. They drew from Hegel and his follo�len the notion of continual change, derived from contradictions existing order of things. For Hegel, this change had come about ideas (theses) created opposite positions (antitheses) from their jnternal contradictions. This resulted in new ideas (syntheses), which turn would have their own contradictions and antitheses, leading to 'fUirther change. Marx and Engels disagreed that abstract ideas were separate force which moved history or controlled society. They focw,ed on how people produced their 'material life' and how this ch.an.ged over time. The key issue was how particular historic divisions labor (theses) generated opposing forces (antitheses) leading to new di1lisi,ons of labor (syntheses), and, of course, further conflicts [264]. Marx and Engels emphasized the division of labor between work its control. 'Division of labor' had a dual meaning; the technical division between workers doing different things (e.g. smelting metal harvesting grain), and the class division between workers and those them (peasants v. landlords, employees v. employers). i",'"''''Uo; imbalance between industries, or class conflict, could generate for change, but Marx and Engels focused on the latter, tT"C;T'� major historical stages in the division of labor. These are sornet:imes referred to by different forms of ownership (tribal, ancient communal, feudal, and capitalist); sometimes by patterns of control over labor (slavery, feudal tribute tak:ing, capitalist (wage relations) [261, 264]. Property and labor control merge into a notion of a con­ trolling 'mode of production' at each historical stage: primitive communism, ancient slavery, feudalism (and other tribute-taking modes), capitalism, and, by deductive projection, an eventual com­ munism [258, 261, 265]. Each stage is analyzed in terms of its inner workings, and the contradictions that will lead to further change. 1.2.2. The analysis of capitalism Of the different stages posited by Marx and Engels, capitalism is the most carefully defined and analyzed. A political economy of

10

MATTHEW EDEL

capitalism is implicitly developed, through a critique of CI'lSSj.Cai political economy. The basic Marxist definition of capitalism cente:n on the relationship between owners and workers. In capitalism duction is controlled by a capitalist class and actually carried out a class of wage-workers. Four necessary characteristics define a system as capitalist presence of capital as defined by Marx; the position of wage labor a proletariat in the division of labor; the extraction of surplus and the prevalence of commodity exchange). Other chanlct,,,j,;tic! allow analysis of differences between different forms of capitalism. The different characteristics will be described in turn.

Capital The ability to command labor and to maintain power over the use of tools, land, and other means of production is fund,am.entai for the ruling class in any mode of production. In capitalism, control takes the form of ownership and control of a generalized form wealth referred to as 'capital'. Capital includes not merely machines and other 'capital goods' used in production. It is not the same as money net worth. It includes these, but fundamentally it is the ability to command labor and to accumulate more wealth through ownership of wealth. Capital is distinguished from wealth in other modes of production, or from 'capital goods' alone, by two aspects. The first is its flexibility. One's wealth under capitalism may be invested in land, machines, funds for hiring labor, money bank accounts, bonds, inventories and so on. Wealth is transferable from one form to another. Indeed, profit making requires that capital change forms. A capitalist uses money to hire labor, acquire machines and buy raw materials. He then uses the laborers' work to transform the materials, and sells the goods, thus transferring wealth back into the money form. Such a uniform, flexible type of wealth was not characteristic of prior modes of production. The second distinguishing characteristic is capital's relation to labor. Buying and selling alone, without using labor to transform materials, cannot lead to expanded production· and expanded wealth. Capital needs wage labor to function. Thus part oI the definition of capital is that it exists where there is a pool of labor available for hire. The proletariat The proletariat is a class of workers who must rely on work for a wage or salary for their livelihood. In the pure case, they

: lIi" d'.iU

III�!' I't

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

II

�

)ia e nothing to sell but their ability to labor, The situation is not " cballged fundamentally by their ownership of some tools or by spe, ..•,! . .• • SkiliS. or by protective legislation or custom, These may affect ,. . Or working conditions. but education or tools are usable. and wages. , can operate. only if an employer offers work, The worker :"p rotections , n d job, Workers have to hire out to , o

:;i:r�� :����� �������:�.� I� :��rplus

value The basic form of the exploitation of the proletariat

lI,RX capitalists is the production and extraction of surplus value, Marx ;.>!iargues that the daily pay received by laborers. and the amount they . can produce in a day. are determined by two separate processes. The 11;,! paY is determined by the liv�ng standard necessary for the worki,,;g class !'

,

i to subSist and reproduce Itself. ThiS IS not a bIOlOgical subSistence r. '.1e�el; it is determined by 'historical and moral elements'. These include i';1the degree to which capital needs better trained and educated workers.

j

the extent to which labor itself has been able to enforce better mini­ f'lupum standards through class organization and the social definition f" bf the family as the unit of reproduction. Once this social mini­ �.t ,.,,rmum. the 'value of labor power'. is establiShed. competition for jobs ; � {!>'among individual workers will hold wages near this 'subsistence' � floor. f On the other hand. the productivity of a worker in a day is �etermined in part by technology and equipment and in part by how " hard and fast the employer can make workers work. There is no need J :j.: for a day's production to be any specific multiple of a day's pay. "I although if revenue falls below labor costs. the employer will fire the , Workers or go bankrupt. In general. production will exceed pay. and I\: a surplus product will remain as the property of the employer. Thus. � ownership of capital allows the owner to end up with products worth : '" more than the sum expended in putting the process into motion. This ", is what Marx terms surplus value. How much surplus value is produced /" determines what capitalists can spend on consumption. on controlling ! .>!'society. and on new forms of production. " Given a level of subsistence. the magnitude of surplus value can be increased either by speedups or longer working days or by improved technology or more productive organization. Changes can be affected f by capital-labor conflict. which influences both the pace and the orga, nization of work. as well as workers' living standards.

.

..

\';;

"

MAITHEW EDEL

12

!I

�

The capitalist enterprise takes its profits out of surplus value. It ma

also make payments to other non-workers: interest payments for the . " use of borrowed money, rent for the use of land, and perhaps taxes': all of these revenues are considered shares in surplus value because theY' are not payments for labor.

Commodity exchange The existence of capital as flexible, trans: , formable wealth requires that capitalists be able to sell products. If this

!

were not so, each worker would have to receive as wages the goods

he himself produced; surplus value would take the form of unsold.. inventories. The system would collapse. This possibility emerges in"

crises, when large inventories do remain unsold, and production is

)

decreased for want of buyers. Capitalists must 'realize' their profits by selling their goods, in order to keep on hiring workers and producing.

Thus capitalism requires a 'sphere of commodity exchange' in which" goods are bought and sold.

An exchange system using money is more efficient than barter. Thus

capitalists sell their products for money, pay workers with money, and',i use money to buy new equipment. Use of money, however, creates problems. Fluctuations in its supply may interrupt exchange, causing ) inflation or recession. Further, money creates possibilities of making! loans for future repayment. This creates pressures on capitalists and

workers, and risks of default, because debts must be repaid. Vulner- i ability to monetary problems or debt is a necessary aspect of capitalism.

Capitalist systems also have characteristics which vary between different countries or over time. These include:

Landownership

Any

economic

system

requires

procedures

for

managing the use of land and other natural resources. Capitalism requires rules of landownership for two reasons. First, to maintain a subservient proletariat, it is necessary to limit its free access to land. Second, rules are required as to which capitalist owns which resources. However, the forms that property rights take, including large or small private properties or State property, may vary, as may the class composition of the landowning group.

Institutions of social reproduction

For capitalism to survive, the

bourgeoisie and proletariat must be perpetuated from generation to generation. They must reproduce themselves physically, and also pass

:

AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

13

positions, skills and attitudes to their children or new recruits. institutions which take part in or foster this social repro­ including various forms of family, and community, bureau­ religious institutions, can vary greatly among different societies. For capitalism to exist the 'State' or government must pro­ framework for exchange, a guarantee of property rights, and degree of control over subordinate classes. In a crisis, the State controllable by capitalists if their vital interests are at stake. the ways in which the State is constituted and performs its vary. It may be democratic or authoritarian/totalitarian, ,tn,li"ea or decentralized. It may express not only general capita­ in/er",/, but also the particular interests of subgroups of capita­ It may be more or less sensitive to pressures by labor, peasants landing aristocracy. Further, its functionaries - administration, lre.mcrac:y and military-may have power to impose policies in their specific interests. The State's role may vary, in terms of how much imlert'vit owns, what share of production it takes in taxes, or which of production, exchange or reproduction it administers or �gu�ates, as long as this does not interfere with the most vital interests

solidarity A final variable feature is the degree of unity within bourgeoisie and within the proletariat. The internal unit of each involves economic dimensions like the degree to which profit rates unequal in different industries, or wages are unequal for different 'o[J<ers. It also involves institutional dimensions like the existence of nonolPol.y or labor unions, and it involves important dimensions of consciousness by either class. Capitalist processes above elements in a sense define capitalism. But for analysis of that mode of production operates, Marxist analysis centers on two pr,oc(:ss,:s that also distinguish capitalism from historically prior modes production. These are, first, the process of class exploitation by gu.rpllus value creation, with its related processes of alienation, and the process of accumulation, with its related processes of l!!iecc)Uc)mi' c crisis and uneven development. These two processes link the

14

MATIHEW EDEL

shorter-term Marxist model of capitalist political economy to the longer-term historical model, because they account for much of the system's dynamic for change.

Exploitation and alienation

As indicated above, Marx saw the

extraction of surplus value as a fundamental characteristic of capi­ talism. But extraction of surplus value in production amounts, he argues, to a process of exploitation equivalent to the open tribute, taking by landlord, slave-owner or state-dominating classes in the prior feudal, ancient or 'Asiatic' modes of production. This parallel is funda­ mental to Marx's use of the obviously value-laden term 'exploitation' as a technical term, in his fully developed system

[261, Vol. I , Ch. l,

Part 4]. Marx argues that in each of these systems, the division of labor between producers and non-producing owners is such that part of the laborers' time produces goods for themselves and part for the non­ workers. In the case of feudalism, with its open rents, or the 'Asiatic' mode of production, with its open taxes/tributes to the State, it is obvious what portion of the work of the peasant or other laborer is expropriated by the dominant class .. In the case of slavery, it may be. less so, since juridically all of the slave's work belongs to the master, but nonetheless, since slaves, too, must eat to be able to work, some portion of their time may be seen as assigned to producing their own subsistence. In Marx's day, either of these systems would have seemed, to the average person, exploitative. By presenting capitalism as involv­ ing an equivalent division of labor time bet,!"een workers producing their own consumer goods (means of subsistence) and producing surplus for their employers, he demonstrates capitalism can be seen as involving an equivalent process of class exploitation. Marx suggests that this process is hidden, in capitalism, by the treatment of labor power (the ability to work) which is sold like any other commodity. Labor power is sold by the hour or day, for a price (the wage). It thus appears that a simple exchange of equivalent-valued commodities is taking place. Because most purchases and sales are 'voluntary' acts, is appears that everything sells for what it is worth. The worker gets 'a fair day's pay for a fair day's work', at least if there is some competition to guard against arbitrary price setting. But just looking at the act of exchange diverts attention from the possibility that a 'fair day's pay' is determined by class conflict. The exploitative character of capitalist production is thus masked by the apparent

I

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

15

I I

fiii!rness of exchange. In the aggregate, workers produce more for the boiirgeoisie than the bourgeoisie pays them in wages. This exchange mech,mism hides the fact that the retention of surplus value is equi­ to a division of the worker's time into production for self and lidlJction for a dominant class, as in other modes of production. obscuring of exploitation is a feature of what Marx calls :'��!JIlJnodity fetishism', or the belief that the economy is a natural j>iii;cess, not one created by society Gust as an idol or fetish might be seen as made by Gods not by people). This fetishism is one of a set \Qfpn)cesse:s of alienation that Marx attributed to capitalism. Workers, ar2:Uell. were alienated from their own products (by those belonging initially to capitalists), from other workers (who were made into com. not cooperators by labor being a commodity), and from his creative self (since the creative act of production was controlled by the employer not the workers). This would affect the quality of life capitalist society, separating people from each other and from work, although other forces might counter these, leading even­ to a recognition of the hidden elements of cooperation, and to solidarity [254, 258, 261].

� AgcUlnulat,;on and crisis

The other basic process in capitalism is Ilc(:unnuJ.ation, the system's dynamic tendency to growth, and indeed . need to expand or accumulate, and its related tendency toward Accumulation is a persistent drive in capitalism, it from the prior modes of production as much as Yf its defining characteristics. Its modes of crisis are also unique. Capital accumulation in the neoclassical sense means an increase in available physical means of production; in the Marxist sense it an increase in the generalized wealth controlled by capital. Strong pressures in any capitalist system encourage accumulation in . . both senses. Capitalists, as recipients of surplus value, have the means which to reinvest, the power, that is, to set the directions of 'eco'flOlnic growth, allocating labor to producing for future use. This power may instill in them, as individuals and as a class, an orientation '.\o'iVar:d reinvestment for growth. ('Accumulate ! Accumulate! That is their Moses and their Prophets', in Marx's aphorism.) But this future orientation is not unique to capitalists, despite some propaganda to effect. And there are strong forces that pressure capitalists to .invest, whatever their personal orientations [261]. .

.

1I����a�:�t�I"�o;:rJ;c�r�i:s��iS .

J I I

� i

I

I I I

16

MATTHEW EDEL

)

In the first place, competition among capitalists will lead them to try to expand their businesses, reduce costs through investment in new processes and equipment, seek new markets, and the like, to prevent, competitors from driving them out of business. This pressure is rein", forced by a frequent dependence on debt finance, which once adopte requires expansion in order to meet obligations. In larger corporations, competition among rival managers is likely also to take the form 0(1 a search for growth oftheir divisions. These various pressures may lead' businesses merely to buy out existing firms and to grow to the point where monopoly power can be exercised ('concentration an(\" centralization of capital'); their real investments may serve to dis�: place workers by automation rather than to expand production, or to produce socially useless products, if these can find a profitable outlet,i [28]. But in general, the thrust is toward a real expansion of productive> capacity and output. This thrust to accumulation is furthered by the conflict of classes; itself. The capitalist class as a whole has an interest in avoiding i, economic depressions, both to stave off social unrest, and to prevent their own mass bankruptcies. Thus, if they can cooperate politically) at all, despite their internal competition, they use their considerable ! resources to pressure government to favor growth, either through general policies of stimulation, or through specific investments. The working class also may desire growth to prevent mass unemployment! or to raise living standards. If it has any political power, it may thus also press government for growth policies. At the least, when the state is called upon to mediate the rival pressures of capital and labor, the most likely compromise is an attempt to stimulate growth. However, accumulation is not always successful. The very process of accumulation also generates contradictory forces, which lead crisis, depression and the destruction of capital. Marx and later Marxists have developed several plausible explanations of why eco- ', nomic crisis may occur, including tendencies for profit rates to fall as l capital accumulates relative to labor, tendencies ,toward undercon- ! sumption, and tendencies toward profit squeezes imposed by rising ,I rents or labor resistance. Marx also argued that these tendencies or ; imbalances might lead to financial disruption because of the very : nature of monetized commodity exchange and lending. There have J been massive debates among Marxists about which of these tendencies are most important, and whether they make major crisis (and even !

d, ,

\ I

AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

17

breakdown of capitalism) 'inevitable'. But even seen as that may or may not be kept under control by capital, they that capitalism is by its nature prone to instability, to and bust. At times (e.g. the 1930s), propensities to crisis have the capitalist system as an international whole. At other have led to localized depression or stagnation (many areas 1980s). Capitalism thus has been marked by severe temporal of accumulation. It also involves a geographic unevenness IccIJmul!lticm, of particular interest to Marxist analysis of urban � r,egion:al development, discussed in Sections 2 and 3 . Marxism as an analytic perspective have turned to Marxism because of dissatisfaction with the l()classical perspective. This brief review does not try to argue a full for Marxist methodology, although the sections below suggest of its uses. Other works have made the argument at length [374], critics of Marxism have raised objections. Some of these objec­ have been limited to details, or to Marx's specific predictions, in that do not really confront his system as methodology. More slelmatic objections have involved the operationality and consistency proposed system of value calculation, for the case in which industries have different degrees of capital intensity, and in a Sraffa-type analysis shows that Marx's solution, like neo­ .aSSlClO,m, requires an additional assumption about relative shares or power to make it mathematically consistent [215]. The longer Marxian model has also been criticized for preasuming too much lute)m:atielity in the historical process, and ignoring ideas and human as only reflective of the economic base [138]. Some Marxists responded with attempts at a more flexible system, in which class .rg,mi:zat:ion (and other forms of agency) are more autonomous, but with the 'economic base' [15,382]. This also has the merit of Jwviding the missing variable in the value system from a Sraffa

One recent recognition is that perhaps no one analytic system can all questions, and that society, to be understood in all its ]onlpl'exi1ty, must be looked at through multiple lenses. This 'postnoelenn' view sometimes goes to extremes, rejecting any theory like or neoclassicism as dangerously likely to attempt to explain �r, . (The slogan is that there should be no 'master discourse'.) 0J

��:�::�

18

MAITHEW EDEL

A more sensible version suggests that theoretical methods: like Mal xism or neoclassicism, may be used as points of entry for analys) enhancing understanding even if not explaining everything [356, 411] From this perspective, Marxist analysis makes the fundament contributions of insisting, first, that class and class conflicts ai important to the economic and social process, and, second, tli, history never ends, that any situation contains a dynamic for possib, change. Further detailed contributions, to specific analyses of city a ' ' region, are discussed in the remaining sections. 2.

CITY AND REGION IN THE MARXIST CLASSICS

ill

�

A Marxist approach to urban and regi�nal economics cannot s . ply rely on what Marx 'and, Engels srud about cIties or reglOIlll They did not devote systematic study to spatial issues, althou� they discussed them in a number of contexts. Relations betwe� country and city entered into their historical works. In politi debates, as over the strategy of the Paris Commune, they took ge graphical questions seriously [262]. Nonetheless, to derive a Marxi methodology of urban-regional studies, one must synthesize approach out of scattered specific remarks on urban growth regional differentiation, and from more general aspects of Marxi '" theory. As indicated above, Marxist method involves both a study of fordel in long-term change, and a study ofthe specific political economyi class-divided modes of production. This section first discusses t i treatment of cities within Marx's and Engels' historical theory, aIi� then turns to their treatment of capitalism, discussing the role. 01 uneven development and urbanization within their general treatmeIi of accumulation, and the spatial flow of values within their mo.� formal short-period economic model. !

di!

�� �

2. 1 .

City and country

Marx's and Engels' most explicit statement about geography con; cerned cities' role in long-term change. They proposed looking' history in terms of the division of labor between ' town aI1 1 country:

�

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

19

antagonism between town and country begins with the transition from · b31b31ism to civilization, from tribe to State, from locality to nation, and runs through the whole history of civilization to the present day [264, pp. 68-69].

division of city and country was linked to class divisions, liel�inni[tg with the split between urban tribute takers and peasants, and carrving through to the rise of the modern classes, bourgeoisie and pr,oleltariiat, in the specific environment of the late feudal town. Several 1urniT,g points are particularly important in this analysis. 1. Emergence of class society Marx and Engels first suggested that the initial emergence of 'urban . civilization' was related to the replacement of tribal ownership by :qwnelcsh.ip by an upper class community (as in the Greek Polis) or by State (as in the Mesopotamian or Egyptian monarchies). They attri­ this to 'the increase of population, the growth of wants and . . . extension of external relations, both of war and of barter'[264]. formulations emphasize the ability of agricultural production to 'hf()dllCe a surplus in the face of urban demands for tribute. Later nal:eriali"t analyses debated whether the surplus is a prior condition or is a potential only actuated when urban rulers coordinate :.'h)'dnluli.c' works in the rural areas [172, 4 1 1 ] . Engels argued that a particular form of surplus, investible in cattle durable tools which are inheritable was crucial; it created the condi. I in which father-to-son inheritance of wealth becomes imporcausing changes in the family. In Engels' view, the patriarchal , ' family, with enforced female fidelity so that male iul>eritance was undisreplaced older lineage forms of social organization. Along with a territorial form (the State) replaced older kinship-based political [ 1 1 1 ] . Other materialist writers have skipped the controversial maJysis of the family and related the rise of the territorial State, liniltially based on slavery and tribute-payment, directly to surplus [62]. Internal aspects of urban life, including 'the necessity of administrapolice, taxes, etc.; in short, of the municipality and thus of in general', were also studied in relation to class [264] . The ;otlesiion of upper-class communities (e.g. Athens or Sparta) was I; ' attrilbul:ed to the need of the upper class to cooperate (as co-owners) against the large slave population. However, cohesion was limited by

'

.1

.'

I

' . .

•.

J

I

I

-J 20

MAITHEW EDEL

,: , >­

splits in the ruling · community between landowning and mercantW� interests. Urban exploitation of the rural population, and intra-urbani; ruling class divisions, were thus the principal antagonisms in the mode of production that emerged.

2.1.2. Feudalism A second transition, from ancient slave society to feudalism, was carefully analyzed. Marx sometimes suggested an inevitable passage from slavery to feudalism to capitalism [265]. At other times he· suggested a different possible pattern, an 'Asiatic' mode, in which cities', remained as tribute-takers and organizers of public works over system�; of villages, in which a local kinship organization still prevailed [259] ;, Apart from the impact of public works, the villages were not reshaped, as fundamentally as slavery reshaped the subject populations. Mal)P suggested 'Asiatic' systems might be more stable, less rent by contradic-] tions that force evolution, than the slave systems. There is a majorL debate over this formulation [3 1 , 193, 194]. ,'., Marx suggested that in the West the slave system was unable to I sustain the surplus demanded by the large-scale urbanization of empires like Rome, or even to sustain the subject population in the face) of the level of exploitation demanded [259]. Post-Roman Europe and,' the Mediterranean were left with a lower surplus for urbanization! than prevailed in Asia. This required a more localized, rural-centere.d existence for the ruling class. Marx [258] and Engels [ 1 1 1] also suggest the reconstruction of the rural areas reflected pre-slavery communal ! forms, involving village cooperation and individual small property no�i/ found in many Asian-mode villages. Lefebvre finds in Marx th�" I suggestion that Western feudal institutions thus had more potential for, internal contradiction and for the growth of an embryonic capitalism than did the tributary systems elsewhere [222, 223]. This European particularism may represent Marx's limited and' Western-centered sources more than anything else [13]. Later writings!, have weakened the notion of a changeless, 'historyless' non-European" world without internal potentials for change (e.g. [28, 412]). In the absence of a comparative materialist history of the World, differ-i ences between European and non-European feudalism must be judged ." with caution. Whether the origin of capitalism and international ' expansion in Europe - rather than East Asia, the Moslem world or} elsewhere-was a matter of chance (or a few decades or centuries) or '

URllAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

21

ffelrences in the basic mode of production, remains unclear. All is that Europe did get there first. Its resulting expansion was called a 'world historical fact', one that fundamentally the forms of transition possible in other parts of the globe.

The origins of capitalism )velrthI'ow of European feudalism by capitalism was carefully by Marx and Engels. Class formation and conflict in towns, conflict, played central parts in these analyses. had beeen mainly rural. Enserfed peasants were exploited with both groups organized into relatively tight class communities. Marx's materialist analysis suggested ; cemflict also shaped the town's organization: necessity for association against the organized robber nobility, the for communal covered markets in an age when the industrialist was same time a merchant, the growing competition of the escaped serfs :warming into the rising towns. the feudal structure of the whole country: combined to bring about the guilds [264, pp. 45-46].

the towns, class conflict developed between masters and and between these and the 'rabble' left out of the structure. Competition between guilds and between towns also As commerce widened, in part as the result of improved agri­ further divisions of labor emerged. These included the rise of �rchru"t class in the towns, and of manufacturing which extended the guild crafts to the hiring of non-guild weavers (often in the 'putting out system' and then in factories. With the of merchant capital, and its alliance with national monarchs local feudal lords, a new class force come to be felt. The growth merchant capitalist class was furthered by overseas exploration 'oIIqlLeS1C. It acquired a labor force through enclosures and other �lormatI<)ns which uprooted a large part of the rural popula­ growth of capitalism and the dominance of the bourgeoisie the class of town association members) 'completed the victory commercial town over the countryside' [264, p. 78; cf. 265]. 'victory' did not end urban-rural antagonism. Urban-rural and alliances remained important within the bourgeois­ State. In the terminology developed by French structuralist

22

MATTHEW EDEL

Marxists, actual social formations were mixes of a hypothe:ticall:y I capitalist mode of production with elements of feudal precapitalist modes [10, 320]. Spatially, these social fOIm'lticms different urban and rural mixes of modes. Even within the class, there were 'fractions' with investments and interests in distinct sectors of the economy. Rent, an institution not nriiuh," with but kept alive by capitalism, also affected urban-rural Some Marxists have emphasized other aspects that did not directly on European towns. Dobb emphasizes the difIeI'entialtiol classes in the countryside [89]. Others focus on the role of unfree in the colonies, and in Eastern Europe, where rulers feudalism [397, 405]. These phenomena emerged in response to sions of commercial opportunities for primary-producing network of trade and conquest directed from the urban centers. internal dynamics were undoubtedly important; their net effect forced the dominance of North-Atlantic cities and regions. The prospered to the point where Western-non-Western relations seen as a replication of urban-rural conflict, with the capitalist cast as 'metropolis' [82] .

2.1.4. The capitalist city Capitalism recreated the city. The merchant capitalist class remnants of the guilds gave way to new capitalist fractions: and financial capital. More important, the new cities gave the another class, the proletariat. This wage-working class was into the city by the destruction of rural communities. It further accumulation of the capital, as the exploitation of allowed reinvestment [261, 265]. Urban accumulation could also affect class consciousness. expected that urban working conditions and contact members, would give the proletariat the experience to itself as a class [265]. Meanwhile, the linking of different of production through commerce, urban co-location and divisions of labor, would effectively socialize and modernize duction. Eventually the proletariat could aspire to a new communal control over the productive apparatus. Marx and originally believed the revolution would occur in the most and developed centers of capitalism. Only in his later works did consider the possibility of revolution occurring first in the 'n'·Tir,h.

mAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

23

Even when the Bolsheviks directed the first successful 'Marxist' '�iJtltio'n in the periphery, it was centered within the major cities of which Lenin had argued was already capitalist [228]. ',',U'VU'_' of the urban proletariat as the revolutionary class was i,�halle:ngl�d theoretically within the Marxist tradition until the when two alternative currents emerged. The first, reflecting on Chinese and Cuban revolutions, stressed the revolutionary role of classes and rural proletarians in peripheral capitalist countries second focused on the possible revolutionary role of a of the dispossessed spreading beyond the urban proletariat. )J:!Slldelced the destruction of community, society, and environ­ capitalism as contradictions that could lead to change (see 6). Possible socialist cities and Engels avoided detailed blueprints for communism although '_' , ,..... up interim lists of demands for the workers' movement, a proletarian seizure of power (replacing the class or 'dictatorship' of the bourgeois by one by the proletariat) the transition [265] . The eventual society, they argued, need only one class. The direct producers or proletarians would �socia·te in common, like Greek citizens or medieval burghers, not to another class but to direct and co·ordinate their own labor. division of labor between ruling and laboring classes would be bdlished, along with differences in living conditions for those in branches or different places. of this change would be an abolition of the urban-rural :,hotorny. With the end of capitalist forces for centralization of cities for urban domination over rural areas, differences in living )fldliti()fls and residential densities would disappear [liD]. The hous­ question could only be resolved by an end to the urban-rural [1L,�J�Ull1>ll1, because otherwise crowding in cities would prevent ade­ housing (although after a revolution, division of bourgeois pro­ could alleviate the worst problems). Marx argued tliat urban beyond a proper measure was harmful to the natural environ­ a problem which he, too, saw as resolvable only with the end >JcapitaUism [261]. This was a Utopian vision, albeit one that avoided detailed blueprint drawing of those socialists Marx and Engels as mere 'Utopians'. It has inspired some efforts to plan for

;! �

MAITHEW EDEL

24

urban-rural balan.ce in those nations where revolutions inspired by Marxism have seized power. But, as those nations have discover,dr attempts at social reconstruction, including spatial planning, ite difficult matters. A Marxist analysis of efforts to create socialism, and. '''' socialist cities, is very much an embryonic project. 2.2.

Uneven development

Marx and Engels presented the history of city-country antagonismsal a high level of abstraction. For specific modes of production, concrete analyses of the forces that stimulate city growth or regional differe�;. tiation may be made for specific modes of production. Since fo capitalism accumulation is the central driving force, Marxist theori� of regional or urban growth and decline have been formulated in relation to accumulation. Marxists have used the term 'uneven development' or 'unev�ql and combined development' to describe the inherent tendencies in capitalism that lead to different outcomes for various regions 'di'l locations, and their inhabitants. Some actually speak of a 'law of, uneven development', implying an inevitable spatial dimension to · Marx's more general statement that capitalism inevitably amass,!s: wealth and poverty at opposite 'poles' [309, 354]. For example, Erne!,!, Mandel suggests a uniform process that generates spatial unevenneSS: even in the ideal case of a homogeneous beginning.

P

)

The accumulation oj capital itself produces development and underi. development as mutually determining moments oj the uneven and' � combined movement of capital. The lack of homogeneity in the capitali�t economy is a necessary outcome of the unfolding laws of motion capitalism itself [243J.

of':

Other Marxist analyses question whether uneven development prO-. cesses are uniform enough to be called a 'law'. They hold that the 'La : .. . of Uneven Development' is ambiguous on several issues:

W:

a) whether uneven development is necessary to a pure capitaliiN mode of production, or whether its operation stems from geographis: differences in the extent to which capitalism has displaced other modeS': of production.

�

,

i '

AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

25

\Vh.etI1er the unevenness requires widening disparities between over time, or whether periods of convergence (or reversals e' n,lative positions of different areas) are predicted; or whether only refers to the speed with which different areas tread path of development. \vlLetller the 'law' holds similarly for all periods of capitalist )pnrrent, or whether, for example, it may operate differently in )p"riaLlis·t' phase than it did in earlier stages. wlilether similar explanations hold for geographic disparities in or accnmulation between different categories of areas: dis­ between nations, between subnational regions, between cities, sub-metropolitan neighborhoods, between cities and their etc. [93]. its uniformity or inevitability, or lack thereof, Marx and saw uneven development as emergent, at least contingently, capitalism. There are several different explanations for the unevenness of accumulation in Marx's writings on accumula­ are based on the uneven penetration of capital into non­ environments, some based on the role of shared (urban) in productions, and some based on the flows of values in the basic model of capitalism itself. IIn••w.n penetration of capital

to which capitalism penetrated and transformed different or countries was important in Marx's writings. In Europe, an or 'primitive' phase of accumulation of capital had preceded ,xis:tellce of industrial capitalism itself. Peasants had been driven land, and merchant wealth transformed into industrial capi­ . Once this had occurred, further accumulation continued reinvestment of profits. But something like primitive accu­ might continue as an adjunct to capitalist reinvestment, if pre-capitalist areas were available for capital to dominate. relationship was analyzed in Marx's writings on coloniza­ it is also relevant to development within basically capitalist A society recognized as capitalist still contains elements of economic forms, and may even create or reconstruct some such (like commercial slave plantations in the nineteenth century, regrowth of peasantry in some capitalist areas.) Differentiation

26

MATTHEW EDEL

between regions, like that between more and less developed can sometimes be analyzed as an interplay between areas more and converted from slavery or feudalism to capitalist labor orl�anLizlltio Unevenness may also involve the evolution of land ownership tions and the State apparatus, both of which draw lines (of jurisdiction and of property) in the lands in which capitalism emerged. Part of the uneven penetration of capitalism iI ' lva,lve:d t degree to which the capitalist class is able to bend these two capitalist' institutions to its designs. In the classic Marxist literature 'uneven development' was primarily to international relations and independence. The question became an important area of theoretical debate early in twentieth century (e.g. [228, 241, 359, 387]). In a few cases, howe'v, the issue was extended to repressed internal groups or regions, the American Communist Party's discussion of self-determination the 'Black Belt' [289] or the Italian Party's reference to their South an 'internal colony' [155]. Recent Marxist regional literature has debated the internal model in several contexts [236 v. 190]. Critics argue that class rel"Hnr have become more important than spatial relations, and that a focus may obscure these or divide potential class-based m()v€:m.!Ut: But others argue Marx underestimated the power of re��orlaJi: and nationalist movements including those based on spatial nomic advantage [138, 280]. Colonial analogies remain nP<'t;npn where regional separatist movements are advanced (e.g. Quebec or Basque region). Their releveance to Black communities within the is still an open question [378 v. 170]. Even when there is no 'naLtia,na]ii! movement per se, regional differences in institutions may differential development. 2.4.

City growth as uneven development

The growth of cities is a form of uneven development. While was no specific 'theory' of city growth in Marx's and Engels' elements in their treatment of capitalism help to explain the 'h"on,," up' of workers into 'the great towns' [1 12, 261]. Some works have to synthesize a specific Marxist theory of urbanization out of references [53, 55]. Others hold it is unnecessary to construct a theoretical-methodological sphere [309] . Perhaps it is best to hold

, URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

27

of factors are involved in explaining city growth as part of element is found in industry and the industrial labor process. Engels treated the growth of cities as part of the growth b Ii industry and of the proletariat [261]. But what about :itd work impels urbanization? Marx recognized that industrial can take place outside of cities. Indeed, rural workplaces have IV,antages for employers, who fInd cheap labor trapped without alter­ options [1 10]. But the labor process does contain elements that themselv,es to larger cities. suggested several stages in the division of labor, leading up modern factory, including simple cooperation in production, the .complex cooperation involved in the detailed division of labor plant, and the passage from manufacture in the literal sense to ila(:hille manufacture [261]. Each involves what orthodox economics 'economies of scale', although that latter notion takes as a techno­ given what Marx saw as an outcome of capital's struggle to production labor. (As Marglin suggests, one reason for the of the factory, prior to assembly line technology, was that could supervise labor more closely there than under the putting­ system [247] . Even the assembly line can be seen as automating over labor, through machine-pacing, etc.). The factory, in requires if not a big city, enough population to assemble a work­ This tendency, requiring at least the large company town or :cialize:d industrial city, is accentuated when technology further to favor the very large plants and centralized power sources. Besidles the work process internal to the factory, the division of labor "O<WCt;1I firms and branches of industry may also impel co-location. The speed of production and circulation become crucial for profit­ ability and Ilfm viability under capitalist competition. Since different firms and branches must trade with each other, savings on transporta­ cost and time, and the ability to get quick access to a variety of become important. In addition, the transferability between of pools of labor (sometimes skilled, sometimes a reserve of the lnelnployed) may make urban location favorable. These factors have their orthodox counterpart, 'external economies', but . the Marxist vision of uneven accumulation and class strug­ gle points out that these advantages are contingent upon historical dev'elopmlent. For example, the relative advantages of skilled or

� � �����

28

MATTHEW EDEL

unskilled labor pools depend on the degree to which industry succeeded in deskilling tasks, or faces fluctuating markets that require sudden mobilization or demobilization of the labor resenres hand or farther away [334]. A third set of factors relates to the city itself as a 'conditiom'l production' with which labor works. Production requires res'Dur'C( soil and water for agriculture, reserves for mining and energy space for industry and transport, places to build for urban aCIIVltle and existing buildings and utilities. A city gives individual busin.ess, access to certain common resources not available elsewhere. the city itself, not just its location becomes a 'system of supports' [309]. (This was a term originally used by Marx to to natural resources. Marx also used the term 'general COlldiltior of production' to refer to those elements used by industry to value to produced commodities [132], while another term, 'means collective consumption' refers to facilities used by the public ,pc" "" ;, its support of households [53, 235]. Each term names part of system of supports.) While some urban physical con.,tn",t;rm oriented toward the reproduction of the labor force (e.g. ho"pil:als other parts are more clearly directed toward helping industry commerce (e.g. industrial parks); other elements are used by both transportation and utilities). The availability of material and 'supports' of all of these kinds may favor location of both inclivi.duai and capital in cities. A fourth factor is the concentration and centralization of Concentration refers to the growth of existing ' capitalist ho,lding' centralization refers to the grouping of capital into fewer hands. stated that the centralization of capital 'is accomplished by the of the imminent laws of capitalist production itself' [261 , Vol. I; Bankruptcy during crises, mergers for growth, success in com�leti tion all tend to increase centralization. Indeed competition itself, implying that there are winners and losers, would seem to em"",e tendency toward fewer and larger capital holdings. This tendency often stated as a sort of historical law by Marxists, although cases which a proliferation of new small holdings may occur, and even useful to larger capitalists, have been analyzed [84]. Concentration and centralization of ownership does not log:icall� require a concentration of population into urban locations. But suggested that that would be its effect:

AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

29

unprejudiced observer sees that the greater the centralization of the of production, the greater is the corresponding heaping together laborer, within a given space; that therefore the swifter capitalistic ')l1[ml'Ltion, the more miserable are the dwellings of the working people

this implies perpetual worsening of housing, or whether it the quality of housing as a function of the speed of centraliza: UIlci<,ar. Nor is it stated clearly whether cities will grow in direct to the centralization of capital, or whether only a general is proposed. Nonetheless, a relation of centralization to city a part of the Marxist theory of urbanization. o,tralil:ati.on of capital, along with the penetration of capital into m'""" systems (e.g. peasant small-holding areas) also accounts side of urbanization: the outmigration from rural areas. "[e·I.I"d city growth (and the growth of the industrial proletariat) stages of capitalism to the destruction of feudal restraints eviction of large numbers of peasants from the land. In his of Lincolnshire, Ireland and other regions, the outmigration to cities was related to the operation of capitalism in these I]. ntr:aii1:ation also requires cities to become centers of control, a role cities played in earlier modes of production. Once )()r.atil)ns extend beyond the individual plant, headquarters and institutions become important. Cities which become the of these 'business services' will grow, irrespective of the up' of industrial workers. Marx suggested the two roles of his treatment of the Paris commune, differentiating between of the workers, and the Paris of the financiers [262]. A of cities, in terms of industrial and directing roles, is ,lopinlg in some recent Marxist studies [202] . factor involves the State. There are strong pressures on the act in the interest of capitalist accumulation. Capitalists, as iviciuals and as a class, have influence over government. And extent that it is autonomous) the State will seek to increase tax base by facilitating accumulation. The State is also at times, by workers and other classes with results that , faVClr accumulation. In trying to promote accumulation, the may accentuate those pro- or anti-urban trends that seem to be

30

MATTHEW EDEL

growth-promoting. The State's growth also fosters the administrative centers, which, like the centers of ancient em.plfI:,\,,1 become the communities of a ruling group. Marx gave an example this in his treatment of the French government, accompanied remarks about parasitic taxing which would not be out of transposed into Milton Friedman's works [256). How all of factors in city growth interact will vary among different cases. temporary Marxists have developed somewhat different appf()ache from these bases, discussed in Section 3 . 2.5.

Value flows as geographical transfers

Marxist economics envisages the 'transfer' or 'flow' of values place to place as another mechanism of spatial differentiation. 'values' that flow in this interpretation are derived from surplus the excess of value produced over labor cost (labor power's which is produced by workers and appropriated by their emplc)yeJrs',. This value is initially realized by the employers, when they sell commodities produced. After they repay themselves for advanced to the workers, they may transfer values by investing outside of their firm, or by paying off rent, interest, taxes and obligations [261 , 263) . They may just use the values for their consumption, or plow them back as reinvestment. But in an in : ingly integrated economic system, more and more of the produced are likely to be transferred [ 1 25 , 1 60) . Some value transfers are important for urban and regional ferentiation. The flow of profits and interest to corporate and finan,cial headquarters is crucial for some cities, as the flow of taxes political capitals. Regions may be net receivers of new im'esl:m':n !i flows, or net payers of rents, profits or royalties to absentee ow'nelrs:.t These are all 'direct' value transfers [160), in that the value represented by actual payments of money. There may even be flows of values paid by workers out of their wages: migrant worker,i, ' send remittances home, delayed wages (pensions and social s flow to retirement areas, and paychecks go from employment n to residential suburbs. But value transfers are not always such open payments. A poration's foreign subsidiary may transfer profits openly to its by remitting earnings, but it may also transfer profits clandestinely

����1

l l

1

�:�� ;

T,TRRAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

31

Iide:(-iJov()iciing products it sends to the parent corporation, or havmg l fPl!ts it buys from the parent over-invoiced, compared to a hypo­ !e;j

ietii,al'la'!r' market price. That this can occur within firms is not con­ ov��sia�, although what authorities should do about it may be. What

is:c.lntro,'efllial withffi the Marxist literature is whether pricing between

firms (in different branches of industry and different

can ruso involve a transfer of vruues. This is the so-cruled of 'indirect transfer' or 'unequal exchange' [109, 160].

IOmsideir the same subsidiary. Suppose the locru manager buys the �nt'with a loan from the parent company. Instead of remitting the firm transfers vruues as payments on the loan. But suppose had been transferring vruues through under-invoicing, and

becoming nominruly independent, it still sends its products to the firm at the same low price, under the terms of the buy-out

��:;���

eX

:11'

or because of the parent's monopsony (buyer's monopoly) Now is vruue still being transferred, or are commodities

'

fO r. what they are worth?

,

requires a point of reference with which to compare the

For a divested subsidiary, the obvious referent is historical. "l11: w,nar if the history is different but the current situation is the same? example, what if a farm that never was owned from abroad sells same monopsonist?) Neoclassical cost-benefit anruysis copes

the problem of 'dead-weight loss from monopoly' by comparing ilbl:enred prices with an estimated 'perfect market' ruternative. Neo­ ;\al,siclruly inspired economic history compares historicru data with a tl9,I\nl-filcturu conditional', an educated fiction of what might have had events transpired differently. Despite Marxist com-

about the theoreticru guesswork involved m those procedures,

¥!lfXist vruue theory performs a similar act of presumption, by comthe srue price with a presumed transfer of all goods at their vruues.

This is similar to, but not the same as, the neoclassical procedure.

Marxists can, of course, compare actual sales prices to their pre­ I

competitive-market alternative, which Marx calls their 'price of

production'. ,

(This includes both labor vruues, and profits at a stan­ dardized rate, which is set by the relative power of capitru compared �,q.UUl [215, 374]. It is thus equivalent to the Marshallian long-term equilibrium including a 'normru' profit rate:) In this case,

nionopoly mark-ups and monopsony mark-downs can be estimated,

J:."'

32

MATIHEW EDEL

and their incidence traced. But Marx went one step comparing the prices of production themselves with what happen if all sales occurred at value, i.e. in proportion to labor (The two prices are different, if ratios between constant capital . labor power costs differ between branches of industry.) In this he showed that under certain conditions value may be trlmsfef1e between firms [26 1 , Vol. 3; p . 263]. This hypothetical excercise was designed to show that produce surplus value not only for their own employers, employers throughout the economy, whose firms have inl)ut.-out�l.titi relations with the original workers' employers. Implicitly, this tional operation was a way of showing capitalism as a division of in which workers' labor supports a non-worker class. Just as DIlg�!';iI showed that urban market forces can create and mask se�:rel�ation economic power - and just as Marx's simple model of surplus held that even when workers are paid the full value of their power, this recreates and masks a situation where they create "_'Y"".' for their employers -the more complex model with value flows used to argue that even if prices are set by 'free' competition capitalists, so that prices may fall below or rise above labor values, aggregate surplus value relationship still holds. Workers (ccllle,cthlely: are working for capitalists (collectively) [215]. Relating this to spatial units, from the nation down to the incliviidu�:!iI property, involves another step in the 'indirect' value flow m(Jut:J. value can be said to flow from firm to firm, because prices differ estimated labor values, then values, can flow from place to pla,ce�f% i because the work-places where value is created are themselves located..j in different places. Thus if steel sells above labor value, value from steel-using firms elsewhere to steel-making centers. This occur even if no monopoly is involved, because even in co'm�letitio.n 'normal profits' or interest costs and depreciation must be covered the high amount of capital invested in steel mills. Value flows to <"C:tOT" ":! with a 'high organic composition of capital' (Marx's term for a of capital intensity) because these sectors would have lower profit in the absence of exchange and profit-rate equalization. Thus also, if landlords can extract high rents and this affects food prices, value flow from ,city to country, to show up on rents rather than in url,anHlfl mill-owners' profits (See Section 4). The flow of values interpretation enters into regional eccmclmics.1ii

"

i

AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

33

identification of regions with their prevailing industrial section specialized in capital goods with a particular organic 'cQ.n)p'o.sitjon of capital, like the British Midlands or the American laV,"S·I. or a section specialized in agricultures, may be seen as mrl2
������:�

,I I

.1 i

1

34

MATTHEW EDEL

that based on unequal exchange due to subsistence wages predictsa flow of values toward the more developed center, and hence a of uneven development under which disparities widen. A final interpretation involving flows of value is found in ""UAl'� treatments of rent. If a sector is generating value flows to other '""W" ;. because of a lower organic composition of capital or a value of power, these flows can be intercepted within the generating se"tor o' a rent-receiving class (or the State) . If the rents are pervasive enIJUI:n;0 they can force up the price of the sector's commodity over its price of production, preventing other sectors from benefitting. applied this model to the landlord class in early capitalism, treatment of 'absolute rent' (see Section 4). Emmanuel suggests World nations could benefit by charging internationally mobile Cal)ital}", a rent for access to their low-cost labor [109]. The nature of """, �!�, a price for access to a site or location, suggests a geographic pretation for this interruption in value flows (although non-s,patlal analogues, such as patent royalties, can be envisaged) . Sectoral rents seem important as the basic for some interllatioloal 9,1 interregional (urban-rural) antagonisms. South African mining is case where resource rents and rents on access to superexploited are both involved [414]. In the case of petroleum, temporary and term factors have not been fully sorted out by history, but there literature, that sees oil-producing regions and states as beloef'ittilng' from rents on values that would otherwise 'flow' outward [34]. 3.

UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT: RECENT TREATMENTS

Marxists have used several approaches to explain the rise and fall of, regions or cities within capitalist nations. Some focus on industries different locations, and their impact on their regions. Others focus cities or regions themselves, and their stages of development. Before ' turning to these analyses, a general discussion of issues in spatial temporal) analysis is necessary. 3. 1 .

General arguments

3.1.1. Polarization versus equalization The treatment of uneven development, city growth and value flow in the previous section raised the question of whether there is a 'law' of

AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

35

�if.d,evl�loprrlent. The analysis suggests there may be tendencies

�

concentration, toward value flow, toward more capital 'developed' regions, and generally toward greater regional that other models may miss. In particular, neoclassical postulates capital and labor migration toward regions of �'if�tllrn,s , and factor price equalization through trade, suggesting toward greater interregional equality. At first glance, that paradigms seem to make different predictions about

!),,,",,v.'r, the matter is not that simple. Marxist political economy recogilliz,es the trends toward equalization through competition, it does not see them as the only 'natural' tendency of And the Marxist treatment of the uneven penetration of previously non-capitalist regions also suggests an eventual out of conditions, as capital extends its conquests. Thus there no simple trend to convergence or to polarization among Marx's analysis suggests continuing conflict between forces eat, W:ilzr er spatial inequality and forces for equality, at an inter­ �,�,,!U'H'=C or between regions or metropolitan areas of one country. Marxist analysts have focused on the tendency toward ol�rjzati,on. Some invoke the principle of uneven development as a ansal'lfaC'tor, in and of itself. Others have built upon the model of �w.1Llial:ive causation put forward by Myrdal [279), Holland [198, 199J 'dependency theorists' [49, 127, 140). This view suggests iCfl,asine disparity where a 'more developed' region combines finan­ \ a c� with industrial ' and technological supremacy. For l regions and urban ghettos see [206, 4OOJ. iii to :receIlL argument explains polarization by mechanisms dependent size. At the national level, high wages create a market for products, allowing expanded scale in production and greater Amin has argued that this mechanism accounts for disparities between regions of 'autocentric' growth (Le. those their own markets), and export-specialized or 'exocentric' This mechanism is complemented by the possibility of value ('unequal exchange') to ,the high income region [12J. analysis is influential in treatments of relations between nations 0!l, ,;o�Ltin,en1ts, although it is not without critics [12 v. 399) . Because wage disparity assumptions, it is less clearly 'applicable within £�y(Iwpion.s, at least once internal product and labor markets have been

1����1��

�,

��::�� �

36

MAITHEW EDEL

unified by the full penetration of capital. Its applicability debated in the case of the Canadian maritime provinces [390].

US, the model may have held in the late nineteenth century plausible today [93, 126].

But Marxist treatments of specific mechanisms do not .i","v', ",

I,i$4

toward polarization. One counterargument is rooted in Marx's an:alY

of labor markets and of the 'reserve army'. It stresses that 'backvl.� areas' are particularly useful to capital. They hold a pool of exploitable (low cost but productive) labor. This may be the caseJ'i

ti'i

regions where prior slavery or precapitalist subordination existed

191, 242, 289), where political or cultural factors hold areas

'internal colonies' [141, 294, 190), or where antiquated industries declined [193, 3 71 , 372, 293, 266). Capitalists may support pollitiC institutions that keep these areas backward, as in the South

al';J

Civil War or in Northeast Brazil, to keep labor cheap [86, 136).

these areas may also begin to attract investment, so at least

tial convergence is possible. Conversely, industrialized regions become centers of labor organization, with resulting high wages

riJ}'\

barriers against some types of exploitation (union work rules, en'virIJ mental controls). In this case, outmigration of industries may

[40, 251 , 252, 266, 268).

One debate is whether a backward region can become a h"'h-'w,""

center, passing other regions. Perry and Watkins argue that a period of technical or social change, because the newly de'vel'opilll

areas have local institutions and physical infrastructure less closely to currently declining activities, and hence are more likely to

g:i\�

as centers of newly productive activities [293). Gordon agrees, in

but holds that the advantage may only be temporary, since the will themselves eventually become 'burdened' by rigid institutions worker power [147). Recently some writers have suggested the

,!i!i�

viously industrialized centers. may lie fallow for a time, while im'est. ment moves elsewhere. Goodman [143) speaks of 'regional roliation' and Walker [385J of a 'reserve' of places (an analogy to the rp_,erv"';"�

army of labor). Furthermore, apart from the fate of specific nlOce.'. ",13,

the very fact that the mobility of capital is greater than that of

means that uneven development is itself a process which disadvaJltages" labor [371, 372). These arguments presume that capitalists necessarily prefer low-wage region. This, however, is not always the case. In

,

>U'U<. !!�

more profitable industries, dominant large firms may acquiesce in

AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

37

wages Or favorable working conditions, as industry since these may improve productivity or at least exclude competition [25\]. Thus 'rotation', while an important may not always occur. : theOretiCal treatment of tendencies toward polarizathus does not give a uniform prediction. As a of the recent Marxist literature on uneven regional devel­ focused on historically concrete situations, in which of which tendencies will prevail can be approached specific historical analysis requires prior analysis of how ;) is uneven in time. One theoretical stance, centered on of 'long waves' in accumulation, bas been particularly in these analyses.

t����;����::.��

i :,�

��f{h;'� i![lli!;z � ill

TeJ'1!D'or,,1 unevenness and long cycles :\1l):LUilltic)ll is not a smooth process in time, any more than it is in Rather, capital accumulation has been marked by stages or 'long alternating periods of stronger or weaker growth, or of and crisis; and by different investment configurations and social arrangements in different periods. In the 1920s dratieJ'f [21 1 ] related half-century waves of expansion and stagna..to price and monetary movements. Trotsky criticized this for­ as too mechanical [80] . Later, Schumpeter attributed cycles innovation. Keynes sought to supplant cyclical fata­ an optimistic theory of economic control. Even if innova­ and industrial investments were bunched in time, Keynes held, iqverr un',nt could stimulate other economic sectors or expand its own :pel�ding to offset declines. There need be no major cycle in total [pduction and employment [330]. In the 1970s and 1 9808, when Keyncosi,m policies were unable to increase employment without pro­ inflation, the search resumed for those cyclical elements that be too strong for Keynesian control [201, 309] . revival of interest in long cycles includes non-Marxist [325] and [148, 243, 407] variants. Both suggest that on an upswing, a of investments reinforce each other's profitability and generate for further investment. The downswing is marked by the t(ijllvalilability of such mutually reinforcing investments. long-cycle theories focus almost entirely on the technology of iiye:straerLt: textiles in the industrial revolution; railroads and steam

38

MATTHEW EDEL

'�;l�

equipment in .the second cycle; electrical, chemical and m':tailIUlrgi improvements in the third; and petrochemical applications fourth. Schumpeter argued that entrepreneurs' perceptions of innovations set off the boom, aided by credit expansion. The e tion of opportunity for new related innovations marks a turning Investments are by then merely imitative, increasing competition lowering profits. A long recession ensues before new inventions up in sufficient numbers for entrepreneurs to put them together. Marxist theories emphasize the necessity of social institutions, interact dialecticailIy with technologies to create the conditions for long boom. Labor and commodity markets must function to accumulation, political stability must be maintained, wOlrking:-clas( households must survive to supply labor power, and so on. Gordon terms this 'a social structure of accumulation'. He argues long-cycle crises represent capitalism's transition between stages, marked by the stability of such a 'social structure'. Crises occur bec:aUl;e\j! institutions break down due to internal contradictions. Cycles tend to be long because many years are needed for a new and stable set social structures to emerge. It is not the particular length of the that is important, but that 'once the fabric begins to unravel, a new institutional cloth will have to be re-woven [148]'. Relate,j notions are Aglietta's 'structure of regulation', [5] and Walker's 'growth ensemble' [395]. A related formulation, in Marxist value theory, sees the growth period as a historic conjuncture marked by the prevalence of offsets to the tendency of the profit rate to fall. Eventually, this tendency re-emerges as the dominant force, and a crisis occurs. The capitalist class attempts to restructure investments, to recreate the conditions for profitability. Such restructuring includes attempts to reduce workers' standards of living, and to absorb the assets of bankrupt investors into surviving businesses. This may create the conditions for a rise in profit rates and a new boom, although this is not inevitable. This restruc­ turing process is particularly important in recent regional analysis.

P����i���

3.2.

Corporate structure and industrial location

Temporal elements are important in one recent Marxist approach to uneven development, a focus on the locational history of key manufac­ turing and financial activities which are central to long-cycle 'growth

AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

39

This approach links the structure of markets and the firm 'iIt ' ies'tment decisions and location, in a long-cycle context. The

is new in a number of ways. More specific detail on corporate

lcroec:oDlonlic' decision-making is introduced than was typical of Marxist writing. The emphasis is on how institutions are · d.lIre:d to allow accumulation. Compared to neoclassical location

Q

""".""." takes the plant as the unit of analysis this analysis focuses or multifirm group. The neoclassical assumption of a fixed technologies and labor processes that can be applied anywhere

rj�C��f:j�t:��o��

are appropriate, is also rejected.

Markusen has analyzed the rise and decline of regional of high-wage industrial, defense and mining employ­ the American Midwest and in Western 'boom-towns'. In the

case, she demonstrates the interplay between an oligopolistic

structure and a 'profit cycle' or 'product cycle' [251]. In a neo­

"....co... view of this cycle, new industries are marked by high profits

�� at��;� �

( 'p

�

, rents ) , accruing to the firms that introduce new � �� processes. High returns allow firms to expand orL production t

.

jr9,:luction , nlpil:UY, and attract new entrants into the field. Eventually,

xplmsion and competition glut markets and squeeze out producers; rates return to a 'normal' level [391]. But another outcome is J?ps�il)le: the emergence of a few oligopolistic firms, which estab­ I ccmtrol over production, allowing them continued inflated non­

;: Mf:p.mpet:ithie

�::��;:

profits, 'monopolist's rents'. This control may continue

time, until new products or changes in production processes,

the monopolist's hold and reintroduce competition [25 1].

longer, monopolistic form o f the profit cycle i s apt to hold for WhiCh form the center of a long wave of accumulation.

; the monopoly is held by one firm, sometimes jointly by the component firms in one nation, like the British textile

l i;0!tLidu: ;try of the earliest cycle. Markusen links the profit cycle to the rise fall of regional industrial dominance. Rising oligopolies often con­ co,ou:alO production in their 'birth' region. Locational concentra­

facilitates control. Pricing policies, (e.g. pricing steel as if

was shipped from Pittsburgh, wherever the actual production)

a cost advantage to the original location. Industrial power

local government often gives specific advantages - e.g. pre­

ferent:ial tax or environmental laws -not available to producers else-

[251 , 252].

40

MATTHEW EDEL

ills

The local region at first benefits from monopoly income. Some sp over into 'monopoly land rent' (see Section 4). Some will be shared!al local tax revenues. Wages may rise in the oligopoly sector either/as' workers unionize, or to obviate unionization. 'Wage rollout' may oc.cU! as the competition of these jobs pulls up wages in other local activiti.�" But the strength of the industry makes the region less favorablelo other industries, through deliberate local government exclusion of new centers of power. or from other industries' inability to compete with the major one for local resources. Monopoly land rents and wa.ge rollout alone will discourage other industries. Even family struct��, may be reshaped by the dominant industry. ' This specialization makes the area vulnerable to economic down: turn. If the dominant industry begins to decline, 'base multiplier'. theory suggests this will affect other activities. But even beyond this,' specialization may affect the area's ability to find new 'base' activiti� ,11 [25 1 , 252]. Markusen also applies the logic of profit cycles to defense industri�s and defense-related electronics, where she finds the entire cycle speeded up by the rapid built-in obsolescence of weapons systemsl [163]. The boom and bust cycle is even more rapid for minin� , communities. Initial development may create very high rents f or resources. But the dominance of one industry and its allied ren, recipients is even more extreme than in the specialized industrial city',' making diversification difficult. If markets or supplies are exhausted;!.:, there may be no alternative base [250]. Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison's study of New England,!1 analyzes monopolistic institutions in a regional framework [40, 174, . 1 175]. The decline of textile, shoe, and older electrical industries, whic!i)' held oligopoly power in previous cycles, and the expansion of services' l electronics, and other light manufactures have changed the kinds of;; work available. Men hold fewer jobs, women more. Jobs are increas ingly located outside the older cities. And apart from a few technical . jobs, new jobs tend to be lower-waged, short-term or part-time, unlike'! the jobs they replaced. The changes are partially explicable in terms of the profit or product cycle. For example, the textile and shoe industries originally held monopoly position, enforced by tariff policies and shoe machinery leases which preserved a local advantage, but the monopoly has been' '" lost. But Bluestone and Harrison also attribute the loss of better jobs

i{

v

{

41

';s,truc(ure of large, multiplant corporations [40] . These firms plants that would have been viable under the control of firms, to limit total output for oligopolistic price fixing. close viable plants to escape from dealing with strong Or they may have an internal financial structure geared to imJlrovement of growth statistics, which ctiscriminates agallst con­ \ihued operation of reliable but unspectacular investments. Firms may ac" uirecL drained of real assets, used for tax-losses and abandoned. aIJy:'pl,ant closings are thus specifically a result of the institutional of large firms. Bluestone and Harrison's argument, like rlttl<." " . suggests that the institutional structure of monopolies, Wi I : I��the functioning of free markets, is the key element in recent change. (parallel analyses of the Detroit region are found in .ii. which deal in detail with the institutional structure of the It � industry and its local milieu [193, 240, 79] . .E Massey and Richard Meegan's study of location in the considers industrial institutions in a cyclical context. Their , is on capital's attempts to restructure itself in the face of competition, and Britain's relative decline. British firms (and :6 adoPted strategies for the rebuilding of industrial sectors. \t , : a reduction in employment. Massey and Meegan explain '�"gional patterns of job loss on the basis of three major strategies, and local impacts in the particular historic crisis [266, 268].

�::���

����:�

b;;;�:��;��

'Changes designed to increase the productivity of without major new investment or substantial reorganiof production technique' [268], inclucting speedups, work rule and staff reductions to increase profits and competitiveness UJJ:U.U.gll cost cutting. This prevailed in a number of industries where . frrms, producing well-established products, predominated. In employment declined while output remained relatively constant. was increased by reorganization of work areas and tasks. The resulting loss of jobs was spread across many

hVI?Stlnel,t and technical change Job loss can occur 'in the context ,sig;nii'ic,mt investment often related to changes between techniques production' (e.g. automation). New equipment may require less . New plants, with an increased scale of production, may also

�

42

MATTHEW EDEL

increase product per worker, even without new techniques. This was important in a number of capital intensive industries, in large firms were able to obtain funds for new investments (unlike firms that relied on intensification). They were, like New firms, more likely to replace than to reorganize a Jow-profit Regional effects were strong: employment increases in some but larger decreases in others. Although new machinery installed on old sites, it was often installed in new places, plants being closed [268].

Rationalization 'A simple reduction in total capacity', through scrapping of capital equipment, accompanied by cutbacks in the force or plant closure. 'No major reinvestment in plant and maLch:inel or new factory premises, is undertaken'. This occurred in a of industries with apparent initial overcapacity. Small plants large companies were sometimes closed, especially after mergers. bankruptcies also occurred. Older industrial cities seem to have particularly hard hit by the process [268]. Massey and Meegan's analysis suggests that the relative rel,)catj. of employment from older cities to 'development areas' is not a matter of 'runaway shops', work rule variations, or wage tion. Wages and development incentives can influence which lose jobs through rationalization or intensification. But there a complex relationship between restructuring strategies and 10c:atIOI effects. The studies by Massey and Meegan, Harrison and and Markusen primarily concern industry. Similar institutional monopoly factors may affect the location of financial and rate headquarters. Stephen Hymer related the growth of major quarters cities to the growth of multinational corporate rue:ral:cJ [202] . Chandler and Redlich had identified three levels of sion making and policy: the management of single-plant da:�-t,)-d, operations within the framework of corporate policy; field-office coordination of local operations; and top management level that the goals and framework for the lower levels [60]. Hymer ",,'�e·,t, 'a close correspondence between the centralization of control the corporation and centralization of control within the int:enlatio[ economy' [202] . In Hymer's Version, lower level management and production

AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

43

,rnruu,gmJUL the world 'according to the pull of manpower, raw materials'. Intermediate level activities located in centers. These require white-collar workers, communication '"; ; information; 'since their demands are similar, corporadifferent industries tend to place their coordinating offices .-p".."o city', and these activities are more concentrated geograph­ production itself. Finally, head offices must be located near markets, media, governments and each other, in a few major �apitals such as New York or Tokyo [202, cf. 70, 95, 404) . Thus: ___

oal'ao'hieal specialization will come to reflect the hierarchy of corporate

'de.c:isiclD making, and the occupational division of labor in a city or region depend upon its function in the international economic system . . . citizens of capital cities will have the best jobs- allocating men and at the highest level and planning growth and development and will the highest rates of remuneration [202].

argues that this relationship is due to institutional structure, technology. Technology has demanded interdependence, but necessarily a hierarchical structure. to

ommu,nic:ahons linkages could be arranged in the form of a grid in which point was directly connected to many other pOints, permitting lateral ' m ,co Doullic;'ti(lD as well as vertical communication. It is not technology creates inequality; rather it is organization that imposes a ritual l asymmetry on the use of intrinsically symmetrical means of �;��: [202]. I I o

�����

: L'

previous studies focus on the location of specific activities. But !tIIlents in different places affect regional social structures and lUIIllt', although these structures cannot simply be read off from 'cuITeIlt growth industries of an area. Massey describes a geological

'sUl:cessi',e rounds of accumulation deposit layers of industrial sediment geographical space. That sediment comprises both plant and persons, qualities of the latter deposited in one round being of primary .importance at the beginning of tbe next roumd (398, p. 197; paraphrasing 267, 269]. I

44

MATIHEW EDEL

Regional social structures are important in this process. As Masse: indicates, Broader social structures of community. changing patterns of consump tion, the restructuring of spatial forms, the changing national ideologica and political climate and the market patterns of geographical cultura differentiation . . . common with changes in the social relations 0. production in determining both the overall pattern of class structure am the more detailed internal characteristics of those classes [cited 398 p. 197].

1 r

These, in turn, affect the form and location of future waves 0 accumulation. Massey and Meegan use this formulation to study shift; of investment between regions in English history [268]. Similar worl has been conducted in France [219, 231]. US studies have examine< the general shift of investment from the Northeast to the Midwest, te the so-called Sun Belt. These studies consider not only shifts amon! sectors of investment, but also what characteristics of the older region, make them 'inappropriate' for the new investment. David Gordon's analysis of stages of U S city growth uses a similaJ approach [147]. Although his urban work does not cite his works or long cycles [148], the same logic of successive stages is used. Gordor takes account of both technological and investment patterns, and changes in the 'social structure of accumulation', including work relations and consumption relations. He argues that new urban regioru emerged as powerful centers at different times, in relation to period! in capitalist evolution. Gordon characterizes the earliest East coast cities as 'commercial cities', whose growth was related to the dominance of 'merchant capital' - capital whose owners did not directly hire the producers of their trade goods. A second wave of cities is characterized a! 'industrial'. Their growth can be related to transition from merchant to industrial capital, in which capitalists began to hire workers directly for basic goods production. The growth of factories called for a clustering of workers into locations near their work places. Until the advent of the very large automotive, steel, and chemical complexes, all that was required was a moderate-sized town. However, by the early nineteenth century, larger, more specialized industrial cities were growing in England. In

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

45

American Midwest such industrial centers began growing later, but by the late 1 880s, the largest cities in the US were growing more rapidly than medium-sized towns [147]. The traditional literature on agglomeration suggested industries /igroulled together because of the availability of ports and rail nodes, of raw materials, large local markets, concentration of skilled workers, and specialized inputs and technologies in areas that had , existing industries. Gordon suggests further reasons based on capital's to control labor. possessed pools of workers who had migrated away from communities of origin. Apart from sheer numbers they offered employers greater freedom from resistance. Migrants were more dependent on wages, and less able to rely on rural relatives for aid than sm;all-to'l{n workers. Finally, migration meant a break in traditions. argues that workers in smaller cities 'seem to have exhibited militantly preindustrial values than their larger-city cousins' [147] . An example is the resistance by women workers in Lowell, Massachusetts, one of the earliest planned industrial towns [283]. A shift from smaller to larger industrial towns after 1870 may also been favored by the concentration of ownership in many indus­ Until then, many factories had been in local elite hands. As dwnership shifted to national corporations, owners became freer to direct investment away from sites with labor 'troubles', and toward with labor more 'under control' [205]. In the US, this period coincides with the acceleration of growth of the cities. The industrial cities were not merely larger than earlier industrial towns, and all but the largest mercantile cities. They also had different ini<�rn,al spatial and social patterns, which affected labor control and investment. The industrial cities initially crowded workers and 'actori'es into their central districts, driving upper- and middle-class 'esiclents toward a less crowded periphery. This reversed an earlier exodus of the poor toward the outer suburbs. Some of the older ' commercial cities in the southern US, and parts of England responded ,discouragiAg industrialization. The largest commercial centers saw ijie 'er,eation of industrial sub-cities like East London [197]. central concentration of workers limited the eventual growth of 'industrial cities. Like smaller mill towns earlier, big cities became the . scene of labor troubles [ 1 04, 147, 197, 362, 402] . In response, investors �

46

MAITHEW EDEL

turned to new technologies to speed up a commuter exodus, corporations experimented with moving factories to company towns. These responses provided elements for the next of urbanization and suburbanization. Around the turn of the twentieth century, some industries began relocate out of the recently expanded metropolitan center, tovvani y suburban districts or back to small towns. The movement of a families toward the suburbs was accelerated, and extended to of the working class. New cities arose without the crowded resid�:nti; downtowns of the commercial or industrial cities. However, cities, both new and old, developed high-density (and generally rise) office districts at their centers, to fill the higher level cOlltroFt functions mentioned above by Hymer [202] . This development accelerated the depanure of industry from the core, by raising pf()P�,rty; values. In these new cities, government also took on a new and active role in the management of urban affairs, assuming social cOlltro,I.'j of functions previously exercised privately. Gordon relates this city, which he calls 'corporate', to new ownership and imIP"tm,,, patterns, particularly the growth of large corporations [147]. Not all cities, however, made this transition. In those that did where the central business clistrict was not expancling, there was investment in the older urban core. Thus, some cities 'de'in(iU5itriali;,e because of displacement by new control functions, and others because industry declined or moved away. Even though inciustry'! retained its national importance through the upswings of and 1940s-1960s, it tended to deurbanize, moving out of the cities to satellites and small towns, and eventually out of their re!!io][s and out of developed nations entirely. The corporate response to labor demands and unrest, included plant decentralization and working class sul)U1:banil�atiion also included concessions on job conditions and pay to some, but all, workers. The more oligopolistic firms, with preferential access finance and an ability to pass costs on to consumers, could greater job security, fringe benefits and higher pay. Eventually did so, although not without initial resistance. This created a structure of jobs, since the more competitive sectors of industry not as easily make concessions, and the frequency of bankruptcy the consequent instability of jobs in these sectors made unionlizaltio�l , more difficult. Labor-force stratification also included diffel'entia1tjQI

!:�:;�

d'�

,,;

; URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

47

to firms, which sought to control their workers through milletition for promotion and splits based on race or gender. Large also created white-collar and executive jobs, to coordinate their idelY-lscattered production activities, for marketing, and for control 'personnel' [147, 148]. labor-force stratification was matched by a residential ratific;atitlO, with suburbs of different qualities and locations, for lan:ag(lrS, white-collar workers and the better paid manual workers. from the worse jobs were relegated to inner-city neighborhoods, decayed into slums. This pattern placed burdens on the city required an expanded government role. Rel!io:nal changes in the US economy have been linked to the of commercial, industrial and corporate cities [147, 293, 400]. ; citieS are associated with the Northeast, industrial with The recent rise of Southern and Western cities is linked . , �! ability of late-developing areas to build 'purer' corporate-model with fewer crowded inner-city or factory districts to raise costs to encourage organization by the working class or the ethnic poor. similar argument has been raised for France, in studies of the *',eIIDpl:nent of the coastal city of Dunkerque as a center for large 'FPorate industry [58]. association is not entirely correct. New geographic forms do as cities develop new function. Certain cities without older u districts or crowded working-class neighborhoods have had � in the competition for capitalist investment [293, 349]. But e� ! � industrial, commercial, residential and business-service belts also developed around older cities stemming from Gordon's �oIIunerci�ll' and 'industrial' eras [70, 79, 1 1 5, 152, 175, 358]. to call the new cities is a semantic problem. They have been to as 'corporate', 'State capitalist' or 'post-industrial'. Each has Gordon's term, 'corporate' covers cities from the turn;centllry boom, with strong central business districts, to newer letropoli whose suburbs are more independent of downtown offices shopping districts [147]. The term 'State capitalist' captures the �crl�asjing State role in economic and urban planning. But it fails to h between a full identity of State and capitalism (such as is ijt to the USSR by some critics), a tight working alliance :6 ,etween State and hirge capitalists (posited as holding in the West, many European Marxists) and a more diffuse State intervention

�;;'::����

:�;�;

�:��:�

48

MATTHEW EDEL

(posited by US Marxists). Nor is it clear whether cities receiving State interventions are necessarily similar (e.g. Dallas differs rr()m·�� Antonio, where central urban redevelopment was more or"vale. despite similarities in their defense-oriented corporate base) Finally, the term 'post-industrial' reflects distinctions in lIllri"ilrU' ture and social structure between newer cities and those dating earlier industrial booms [293, 419]. But the newer cities are not sarily post-industrial, for all that. They may have major maustm areas, situated in peripheral industrial parks rather than downtovm! Thus, for example, Los Angeles, in some senses the corporate or even 'post-modern' metropolitan area, is a major trial center [356]. And even their business or consumer services accounting to zoo visits) may depend on relations to industrial sectoil elsewhere. Indeed, the whole issue of 'post-industrialism' or 'deinclustri,.li2 tion' has been a source of confusion. 'Post-industrial society' uSllaJIj refers to developed countries, in which consumer and business mation services absorb a large portion of the labor force, with " '---" J. itself highly automated. Such a society is post-industrial in the that the US or Britain is post-agricultural: not without agriculture industry) but able to meet agricultural (or industrial) needs small but highly productive labor force. However, 'pc.st-inclus,trj,al' i also applied to cities, regions or countries, which have shifted to import of industrial products paid for by the export of bm;ine$.1il�� services or the receipts from foreign investment. Such speciaJi,zed rentier activities are possible only because industry has moved els,e',11"I where. In Marxist terms, value must be created somewhere hefm'A i! can be transferred. The recent history of the Asian 'newly indlusllrial:, izing countries' suggests the world as a whole is not 'de:in,lm'trializingtiii even if that broad catch-all category, services, is growing faster industry in global employment [399]. One approach which does relate the reshaping of metropolitan mto new corporate forms is that of Saskia Sassen [334, 335]. Focusing" on the migration of capital and labor, Sassen argues the carlitalist;" economy is being increasmgly internationalized, as a result of the, pClSh.U war boom, and in response to the 1 970s-1980s slump. Not only transnational corporations and financial institutions mvesting internationally; production itself is being internationalized. There more trade in mtermediate goods, rather than finished capital

ll

(11

AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

49

£QIlsuml�r gQods, and more planning and co-ordination of inter­ production. This results in increasing complexity, and indeed �Ificu�ty in determining where any particular item is produced [288, 'U''''I . III this situation, the nation state loses some of its freedom of the individual industrial area faces increasing interregional or ernlational competition for activities, and production and producer are constantly being redeployed. Sassen sees this international­ not oilly as a response to the current slump, but as the form long-<:ycle upswing is starting to take [334]. complex new process of internationalization may be creating �\,sev�'ral new forms of urban region: industrial enclaves drawing on surrounding rural populations, lower-wage industrial or service-export i%)ject,ors in older industrial areas, and very large cities in the less­ Cle"eicIDed capitalist world. Sassen pays most attention to the con­ I\::tiiiiij'in' growth of 'world cities', the 'economic centers from where the is managed or serviced' [335]. These specialize in the export of w ; jtlld er services and form 'nodal points in the new organization of eco,no:my, because they are the sites for the production of global �Lc9,ntrol capability'. This goes beyond Hymer's focus on control within mwtinational corporation [202, 191] or Hall's description of world as trade financial and political centers [151], to a variety of ?/i?,nntrnl activities. �Jj(�;as,;en shows that despite their differences, New York and Los l\h.gei
lDt

:���:::

j·" 1:' ,, I I I

so

MATTHEW EDEL

of traditional middle-income areas [334, 335]. The new low-wage jobs are largely filled by immigrant workers. Gordon, Sassen places an emphasis on labor control. She argnes

��:���

in the context of a highly politicized native low-wage labor supply . acquired expectations of upward mobility, the expansion of low } jobs in growth sectors emerges as problematic. Access to vulnerable immigrants is a rather convenient option. Besides ing to the survival of frrms in decline, tbe availability of an i labor ,upply contributes to the operations of growth - given the cn,,,.e,.," teri,tics of that growth and the circumstances through which it takes [334, p, 246].

For the US, Sassen and Hymer's emphases on the city as center is supported by studies of the distribution of corporate quarters and sales [70], of service labor [360], and of land differences between 'corporate headquarters' cities and other areas [95, 404] . For Europe, not all aspects of the control activities have been explored, but wage patterns and the role of immigrants moving in similar directions. Another aspect of the internationalization of capital is described Lipietz. This involves the development of areas which are directed economic forces into more or less 'permanent' positions in th lee i cycle. Thus certain areas, in some of the developed capitalist c� , become specialized as technical centers for research and de1Iel()prne�L1:., of new products, while other areas are assigned the role production or assembly for products whose production has alrea
����::;:

UK""" AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

51

I

Regions and cities in less-developed capitalism analyses presented above concern cities in the advanced nations. But analysis is also required of spatial change in the nations, where cities have grown at rates rarely ?toaclled in the history of the developed nations. analysis of spatial disparities in the so-called 'Third-World' ;"v,nlv,".' some elements from the approaches applicable to the centers, including the analysis of monopoly and profit cycle in industrial location, and the relation of city growth to stages itc,:un�ulati'Dn. But it also involves emphasis on the extent to which countries have been reshaped by capitalism. Marxists agree that countries cannot be characterized simply as 'traditional' and 'llIlod,:rnize,d'. Their social structures have been shaped by conquest, trade, financial investment, and the like from the centers [12, 49, 127] . But their internal development is affected by the evolution of class struggle and accumulation those social structures, perhaps incorporating local precapitalist [308, 320] . The methodological debate among Marxists is frequ(:ntlly cast in terms of whether the primary force in shaping SUlnullation in less developed countries is the influence of the outside or internal class struggle.

Urban development and marginality extent to which class struggle and accumulation are internal or will affect what roles cities take on. They may be centers of for a national ruling class, or for an imperial power or an oU1fwllfdly-su))p,)rt,ed 'comprador' bourgeoisie. They may be centers of or less modern industry. They may be places of refuge for those dislpla,�ed by disruption of older agrarian systems. Different struc­ of accumulation or stages of national development, including imi.-al1taJrchic hacienda agriculture, export-oriented agriculture and import-substituting industrialization, and export platform ,qusulaulza'uon can bring different phases of city development. important debate concerns whether rapid urban growth has primarily due to the expansion of a marginalized population seeks refuge there, or primarily due to active urban capital WhiCh pulls migrants. In contrast to Malthusian �s� arguments, the Marxist 'push' or 'refuge' argument !

; ;:::�::��':�; ;;\1'

I,

I I j �

52

MATTHEW EDEL

generally emphasizes dependency and marginality. Countries deemed 'dependent' which have little control over their own int:err��.1 processes of production and accumulation [49, 55, 58]. Control come from outside, through the decisions of foreign investors creditors. Local decisions may be restricted, if surplus is siphoned by foreign investors or creditors, or drained by international 'uneq\lal,'l exchange' [12, 109]. The limited size of the domestic market (due low incomes, biased income distribution, and dependence of cO.nsllm<:i, habits on foreign goods) discourages investment in the market industry. This leads to a specialization in export products import activities, and international flight of whatever capital generate. The political weakness of the bourgeoisie may lead them commercial dependence on foreign powers, as part of a politic�l nel�iAd alliance with stronger ruling classes elsewhere. Capitalist errLpl'DYl is limited by slow domestic accumulation, and by a bias toward callita!' :; intensive technologies stemming from dependence on imported technologies and equipment. The likely result of this 'dependent development' is a large pOIPUl:�;!, tion 'marginal' to any capitalist process of accumulation, except reserve army of the unemployed [55, 56, 238]. This population is to migrate to cities due to the disruption of rural areas byy relation, and the collapse of transitory export booms in S l mining or plantation regions (a form of product cycle). The becomes home to parasitic comprador and state bourgeoisies, and marginalized mass, rather than the site of industrial accumulation Other views, however, see urbanization as linked to in(ius:tri,ajI accumulation and the city as the site where surplus value is pnodloce:d; A local bourgeoisie is recognized as having some control over internal accumulation, notwithstanding transfer abroad of part of the .'1I1rOl'u.' [284]. The domestic proletariat may be exploited severely, but it is as growing due to industrialization. That accumulation generates limited employment may not mean that a 'capitalist' sector is too capital-intensive due to technological dependence; it may mean is still not sufficient capital [68, 309]. Even relations to aplparenl:lY\f; precapitalist or 'marginal' sectors can be analyzed in relation to indus­ trial accumulation. These peasant or handicraft sectors may be sources of accumulation for industrial capitalists, providing inputs for try or wage goods for industrial workers very cheaply (a form domestic unequal exchange). Hence they should be seen as at

)�;:;L��,�J:�

'i,ll

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

53

'exploited' rather than 'marginal'. between these positions, on industrialization or on 'in,argimuity', is often carried out in theoretical terms. However, some ,, analyses have been made. Gustavo Garza attempts to the economic role of Mexico City (132). He argues that the a center of industry, as well as state bureaucracy and services. shows that even when the country was most oriented toward during its 1880-1910 cycle of accumulation, Mexico City 1ttJ:'lct�,d industry by concentrating government investment in the conditions of production' (transportation, energy supply, When the country entered a new phase, import-substituting in I t: �; these general conditions (including old industries and labor force, which supported new industries) favored an u, greater concentration of industry there. uses a price approximation to value to argue that because of conditions, the rate of surplus value was higher in Mexico City than elsewhere in the country as of 1970, toward the end cycle of successful import-substituting accumulation. His ugl!estion is that migration, up to that time, was drawn by accumula, , at the center, rather than just marginalized. does suggest that the city may have grown too large in the dbs'eqluellt period of economic crisis, when the import substitution went into crisis, and a new export-oriented model was being within the internationalized economy. The city continued to and its infrastructure costs continued to rise, even though some ;lll�'usitrializ"tic>n of the city began to be apparent, suggesting the link ,growth to industrial success had been weakened. Unfortunately, does not present value profit rate estimates for the period after crisis began (132). �,,)arall'�l argument involves the so-called 'marginal' or 'informal' of the urban economy. This sector was originally defined in terms, within moderruzation theory; its definition has been litelrnaltely used and rejected by Marxists. Marginality was originally in terms of exclusion from the 'modern' sector of a economy. But Marxists who redefined underdevelopment as a created by relations with advanced capitalist centers, saw argiinallity as imposed on the poor [56). even this version has been attacked by Marxists who see the SU]JIX)se,dly marginal sector as intimately connected with capitalist

�:���;�� �:

�:.' '

.

S4

MATIHEW EDEL

relations. The supposedly marginal sector functions as a reserve of the unemployed, keeping wages down through their POlieD1ii�:, competition for available jobs. But they also produce goods capitalists, through simple commodity production, or aUlio-'cOllstlr)li tion of houses. By thus maintaining a part of the labor forc� " extremely precarious conditions, at wages often below the vallue" Or labor power that is socially accepted in the main industrial capitalists are able to obtain some products at extremely low increasing their profitability. Thus these workers are su]pel'-e"pl,oitlld or pauperized, but not 'marginal' [8, 68, 290, 308, 310]. As CO(;kro comments, Far from being marginal, these millions of hungry and overworked constitute a vast fraction of the working class that is the product continual process of pauperization [68, p . 26] .

Even this formulation, while underlining exploitation as a menan of the so-called marginality, does not resolve whether sectors are pauperized because they are only partially incorporated capitalist relations (e.g. able to support themselves at below the of labor power because they receive aid from peasant relatives) whether their condition stems from a continuing development capitalist relations [84, 309]. In some recent works, the 'marginal' sector has been to as the 'informal' sector, a term generally defined by the gality of economic relationships: workers are not covered protective legislation, firms are not officially registered with government, taxes are evaded, etc. From a Marxist viewpoint, terminology is misleading because it substitutes a secondary cha� racteristic (legal status) for more important economic relationships to accumulation. Thus the new terminology is inferior to of 'marginality'. The 'informal' sector is sometimes as providing workers with a chance to improve themselves, side of the damaging effects of bureaucratic control and tion. Marxists comment that this praise amounts to telling unemployed that since they cannot compete successfully with workers for jobs, they ought to compete with capitalists in commodity markets [317].

, i) " ,

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

55

.: Non-urban regions

urban arguments have their equivalents in the study of both areas and broader regions, within either developed or under­ �:d�'yel'Dpc:d countries [30, 86, 252, 267] . The regional analyses cited so ! {far' h:,v. concentrated on urban regions. But regional differentiation affect agricultural and mining areas. indeed the greatest iffereIlti!ltic)O among living conditions may be between rural regions, than between urban areas or even between city and country. . These differences have been subject to many of the same analyses, r'pos!iiblle continuing trends toward polarization or convergence, � at the beginning of this section for urban regions; For the � . , e () : � nations, the neoclassical or modernization literature exp,lailas disparities in terms of a growth of capitalism in some regions, �whOi;e rising incomes leave behind those marginal areas. In theory, ipalriti"s will narrow when capitalist or 'modern' relations eventually Some Marxist writing accepted this view [24 1 , 399]. However, Marxists suggest that in competition between regions (i.e. ibe:tw'�n regionally based capitalist groups), the winners either invest directly widening disparities, or invest in the 'losing' regions, ilirc,ctly widening gaps by creating conditions for the remittance nTofit. to the investing regions. Thus the regional disparity is W:�iependl.nt on the degree of capitalist market competition, and will tend widen over time. As in more developed areas, this presentation of fc,lUIltelracting tendencies within 'uneven and combined' development 309] suggests that increasing or decreasing disparity is not a ;¥i)i,niv,ers:al law. Rather, it may be the outcome of specific models . , accumulation that have been used in different countries. Both iln:POlct-s:ubsti'tuting and export-platform industrial accumulation may to widening regional disparities, but the specific mechanisms of two capitalist patterns are somewhat different [86, 293] . DiffereIlti!ltiC)o within primary production is often neglected in the N/regional and urban' field, where the 'regional' question has been an jj�,jjunct to urban studies. Fortunately, those who study the 'agrarian l' (juestio.n' do pay attention to regional differentiation. The non-urban fi l li,tenllu.re raises issues of whether regional accumulation is directed outside, managed locally by regional bourgeoisies, or blocked by j!i� 9n·capitali:st landowning classes. Regional history may be seen in of stages of accumulation, some of which involve production

�g

1����� ���� ��

-i

56

MATIHEW EDEL

�

"il

,I !

of export staples, and some, accumulation for a more autocentric '/ market. Because much of export production has been agricultural; ' ;

much of the regional literature focuses on how landownership and

�'1

class control have facilitated or impeded capitalist accumulation in cd agriculture [84, 320, 414]. ; How regions have been shaped by primary product exports has been

I, I Markusen and Massey use in looking at local industrial cycles, but , I

the domain of 'Staple Theory', an approach somewhat parallel to that

focused more on the regional effects of export specialization. This " c:; approach suggests the technological and social patterns of dif-, "

ferent export sectors have affected accumulation, class structure and other aspects of regions [203, 401] . Hirschman calls a technological-}!

l

determinist version of t,his theory 'mini-Marxism' [196]. A fulled"

1; export product cycles (like industrial product cycles) have affected ! regions and nations in the underdeveloped world, but would go furthei' ; j

Marxist analysis would draw from staple theory, in looking at how

in terms of the dialectical relationship of technology to class, power i and accumulation. The different histories of coffee and sugar growing areas, are

familiar and well-studied examples [196J. That sugar is more depen-)

j t'

dent on gang labor than coffee, and speeds up a product cycle through " its effects on the soil, is important for regional history. However, one

must also look at broader class history to develop a full analysis. The .,

l

history of Cuba's sugar growing region, and its role in the Cuban .;

revolution, cannot be read off simply from the technology of the crop. ' One must discuss changes over time in relations to the world economy" " and in class and racial consciousness within those areas [29] . Similarly, " analyses of the US South must consider not only the technology and ' j the peculiar class system (slavery) of the cotton industry, but their ! relationship to developing class cultures within the region and to agri-

cultural and industrial capitalism in the North [136]. Uneven regional development may also be analyzed as an aspect of State policy. Government regional policies may be seen in terms of their relations to class struggles in different regions, and to the

;1 " :%

'

'j

l

5 i

expansion and contraction of the capitalist world system, as well as � , to patterns of local accumulation within that system [86]. Much of the 1 , emphasis has been on critique of the rhetoric of State policy, which ;, has presented itseif as technical and neutral, and as concerned raising levels of living and development in backward areas, when it

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

57

biased toward particular class interests. Other works analyze actual pf()graITlS for industrial 'growth poles', agricultural development, or of physical infrastructure. These programs are often not powerful or effective, compared to other forces of r " accumulation. They are shaped by pressures of the local and national bourgeoisies (which may or may not he at odds with each other). If they accomplish anything, it is usually to spread capitalist relations of production, and in the process, to increase inequality [3�, 86] . The State role is, of course, different in those countries where
\:���(��;'���

RENT THEORY AND SPATIAL SEGREGATION

spatially uneven accumulation of capital and labor implies inter­ action with land use. One aspect of this interaction involves land rent (or its capitalized equivalent, land value). As accumulation is drawn to a site, the rent that can be demanded for use of land there may increase, while the rent itself can affect how much accumulation occurs there. (Land rent is to be distinguished from the rent of buildings, includes interest and amortization on the capital invested in the Orthc)dc)x economics generally represents land rent as a passive reflection of the 'productivity' of capital and labor in different sites. Landownership and the attempt to collect rent do not affect equilibrium price or land use, except in limited cases of government or monopoly interference with market processes.

S8

MATIHEW EDEL

In contrast, Marxist political economy depicts a more active role landownership and rent in the economic process. Landownership tutions are necessary for capitalist accumulation, but they nelcessa� also create problems for that accumulation. Conflicts with larldclWIlel complicate the class conflict between capital and labor. The actions landlords and the social institutions of landownership may prices throughout the economy. Land rent may be paid out of ei·the the wages of labor, or the returns to capital (either in generally or particular industrial or financial sectors). Sorting out these possibilities, and their impact on land use, is domain of 'rent theory'. This theory studies the rules that payments for land (and other natural or spatial conditions of tion) and the differential power of landlords in different places, different social conditions or land qualities. It examines the nature incidence of rent and its effects on accumulation. This section reviews rent theory, and suggests how ship institutions and rent affect the location (and particularly segregation) of land uses in cities. An initial section considers how differs from other commodities and the role of landownership and in accumulation. A second examines Marx's categorization of tial, absolute and monopoly rents, reflecting different possible '''- .i)'. nical and power relationships, affecting land use and rent lDC:ld':nce}� Finally, these approaches are applied to urban land use, including redevelopment conflicts and ghetto segregation.

i·n

4.1.

Land rent and accumulation: general considerations

Land rent is accorded separate treatment in Marxist economics, in classical economics, for several reasons. First, land and resources are philosophically distinct from the two main elements the accumulation process, capital and labor. Labor represents human effort, even in its alienated commodity form. Capital sents the accumulation of past labor effort. Even transformed into " , generalized commodity form of wealth (capital), it is still But for Marx and his classical predecessors, natural resources not, in the same sense, results of human effort. They were 'gifts nature', conditions of production which pre-existed the drama of. capitalism. This view has been challenged by an ecological critique of

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

59

dichotomy [354]. But even if this dichotomy is loosened, difference remains between land and other commodities. if land quality is shaped interactively with human effort, and the of location itself interacts with human history (including that of accumulation), land and site location are particularly long-lived ndiltiOIIS of production. Much of their supply is not the result of production, nor can they easily be replicated by expanded odllctiion [183]. In this sense, they are unlike other commodities. say land is not a commodity at all. However, because it can be and sold, land has come to be treated like other commodities tlnan,�ial assets [161, 1 83]. (In the early days of capitalism even this not so.) historical factor is a third difference. Although landownership part of capitalism, it was a precapitalist institution. Feudal rent rent-like tax) was the principal means by which the ruling class 'pnJplcial:ed surplus from the toiling class. In early capitalism, the aristocracy remained a distinct class, although no longer principal regulator and exploiter of production. Under capitalism, main regulating and exploiting process is the employment of power by capital. Surplus is appropriated as surplus value by clmitdal capital' and accumulated by capitalists. The landlord does ,fr,er.F,;ve earnings directly by purchasing labor power and selling its although by owning land necessary for production, he a return for renting it out. Thus, in Marx's view, rent is not ,riInalcy form of surplus in capitalism, but a secondary or derivative like taxes and interest it is a 'tribute', or a 'deduction from value' [261 , Vol. III; 263; cf. 98, 183, 232]. land rent as a deduction suggests it may not really be for capitalism. Some reformers have suggested abolishing to facilitate accumulation, perhaps benefitting both capital and Marx suggested that 'radical bourgeois' might make such a rgesti,)n, even before that proposal was popularized by Henry [137, cf. 99] . But, Marx argued that, although a separate ldowning class might be eliminated, and the amount of rent itself over time, landownership (either individual or by the State) necessary for capitalism. landownership (or some equivalent) was necessary to pre­ the proletariat from turning to independent production instead work. In new settlements, land not needed for production had

60

MATIHEW EDEL

been divided into private properties to prevent slaves, in(ierttulrea' servants or proletarians from leaving their masters or employers become independent farmers [393]. Capitalism would have invent landownership had it not existed [ 1 83, 261]. In Plotkin's Capitalists as a class are defined by their legal power to exclude from direct access to the means of production. Without exclusion, perpetual growth of production for profit would be impossible [300, p.

Landownership implies that owners can collect rent for the use their asset. In certain circumstances, as the neoclassicists explain, can enforce a certain 'efficiency' on capitalists: competition may land toward its 'highest and best' uses, and the need to pay for may require producers to economize on the resource. But in cases, ownership may limit or distort efficiency in production, becal1se.,'l1' . rent can limit how much capital is invested or labor expended different places [21 , 183]. Marx's treatment, based on the agrarian institutions of nillet,eerttl century Britain, identified barriers which landownership placed capital. The aristocracy's ownership of large estates restricted possibili­ ties for investment, and gave landlords enough political power that Parliament could not automatically be bent to the capital's in!e",,!, 'i] on such matters as the 'Corn Laws' (tariffs on grain). Marx argued ownership institutions restricted accumulation and (silmullta.ne,owsl created a markup on rents. There is some question about how well Marx's analysis of cultural rent can be applied to urban land [20] . But at least, a nUlnb,£:�' of barriers may be identified which restrained or continue to restrain investment in urban development, and whose effects can be an:alyze by adapting rent theory [99]. These include:

y)JiiJli: d'jl,

a) the ownership of large estates that constrain city growth thr·ou.�h);iTo refusal to lease or seU land for urbanization, or which limit that to a lesser extent by insistence on rent for marginal urban uses or insistence on leases for periods shorter than the life of buildings. b) control over urbanizable land on the edge of cities by transit utility· monopolies, which refuse to provide their services unless can receive an unusually high land rent . c) the fragmentation of urbanizable lands or of lands within the city::

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

61

additional capital could be invested in redevelopment if large lembli,es of land were available. speculative holding of land by large or small investors, delaying �stluction in the hope of making a better deal later . This can create barriers in the short run. the restriction of development by an integrated capitalist group

controls both industry and some land. Inasmuch as curtail­ own investment may reduce profits, this procedure is only amag"olLS for integrated capital if it will bring them enough rents non-integrated sectors, or if labor in 'company towns' will be less against the reduction of living standards through rising rents to reduced wages. limitation of the area or density of construction by the State health provisions, zoning, greenbelts and so on, either to

fegua,cd the population or the economic system itself, at some cost

'n,eo.ent surplus, or specifically to protect existing properties from

limitation of the flow of capital into urban investments by monopoly or high interest rates. Housing's dependence on

capital, because of the longevity of urban structures, means in the loan market may restrict housing construction, and up the price of buildings and built-upon land [386]. of these barriers are familiar in the literature. But their full are not always obvious. The neoclassical argument, that such are simply removable impediments to market forces, does not why some of them are so persistent. Nor does it explain why barriers, which might be profitable to potential monopolists,

never erected. Marxists suggest that the reason for this lies in dialectical relationship between 'exclusion' and 'accumulation' ability to exclude is a double-edged sword. Capitalism needs >rO]Jerty rights to limit labor's rights; but some 'exclusion' may protect , preserving communities which allow the proletariat to survive 'reproduce its labor power' (see Section 5). Property rights that with accumulation may benefit landowners, be they landlords homeowning workers. However, if the exercise of property rights accumulation, then the landowners may themselves suffer,

MATTHEW EDEL

62

Even the most fervent environmentalists and exclusionary sutmrl)witel· need jobs and paychecks which depend on economic growth [300,

i\:;

The only exception would occur if landowners have a non-c:apitalli source of income (e.g. surviving feudal sectors, in the early days capitalism) [320]. Thus the treatment of landownership and rent as " ' barrier to capital and its accumulation involves complex social actions. It is not merely a monopoly that gets in the way. Similarly, the neoclassical treatment of the results of barriers, as 'dead weight loss' to the economy as a whole, does not fully who bears the burden of the losses or rents created. This is partj(:u1,arly� important if the division of value between labor and capital is seen as affected by conflict. The details of this division, and its relatic)Ij',.: to conflicts between classes, or between significant fractions of (e.g. industrial v. financial v. landlord capital, or privileged v. privileged fractions of labor) form the core of Marx's rent theory: 4.2.

Marx's categories of rent

�;���t�:·:

The specifics of Marx's theory of rent derive from David earlier treatment of the subject, although they come to C conclusions about the causes and effects of rent, due to their difJerefft, treatment of class conflict [321]. In Ricardo's value theory, wages set by a cost of biological subsistence, and rent by tbe between the productivity of labor on individual lands and its nn)dtlC·�· tivity on the worst land whose use in food production was recjuiredl;l the size of the population. Profit was, in some sense, the res:idual this price-setting process, even though, for economic growth it was taken as the source of accumulation (landlords were pn:sum(�d waste, not invest, their returns). Since, for Ricardo, wages equalled the cost of labor's sutlsisten,ce; low grain prices allowed greater profits and more capital acc:u"nul tion. Thus there was a conflict between capitalist and landlord If landlords could force up grain prices, they might cripple mulation. It might pay capitalists to join labor against the landlords. One option might have been land reform (as in the hated French Revolution). However, if rent did not affect prices, ownership from landlords to small capitalist farmers would not do good: the same best land-worst land productivity differential

a�

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

63

set prices. Thus there was a strong political message to Ricardo's nclusi.on that because rent reflected differential labor productivity, is not high because a rent is paid, but a rent is paid because corn [321]. Only technical progress, or free trade to allow use of quality land abroad, could reduce rent, food prices and labor and Ricardo presented growth and free trade as alternatives to revolution. His contemporary, Malthus, implied a harsher 'pll"'�H. Since population growth increased aggregate food requireand forced worse land into use, raising overall rents and accumulation, progress required that the poor not be helped sur'vive and multiply [92]. Marx, the matter did not appear so simple. Instead of Ricardo's category of rent, he described two pairs of categories of rent. pair of categories ('differential rents I and II') rent was enl:iaIly passive as in Ricardo's theory. It was set by competition land users and did not affect quantity or technology of odllction. However, in the other pair ('absolute' and 'monopoly' the attempt to collect rent could affect production, and political conclusions no longer held. (rel"ential rent This initially refers to the case where the value of is determined by the labor required to produce it on the worst in use. If production on better land uses less labor, the saving in or variable capital forms a surplus profit. The landowner his rent from this differential. Thus the revenues paid to ldownlers come directly out of the capitalists' surplus value without prices [261, 263]. is similar to Ricardo's rent, although Marx related differential more clearly to institutions, and to technological changes affected e � i� conflict than did Ricardo. The share of value going to rent could increase or decrease (depending on techno­ I, : progress or the spread of cultivation). It did not necessarily with population growth (as in Ricardo [321]) or with technical (as in George [137]). That differential rent need not increase it less important for Marx than for other theorists. distinguished between two types of differential rent. Differen­ I stems from the different amounts of a good produced using amounts of capital on equal amounts of land with varying

� ���

64

MATIHEW EDEL

fertility or location. Differential rent II comes from differences the additional output obtainable through application of successive: investments on the same plot of land. The second version is not . a recalculation of the first for different technical conditions. It sUI,gesti� that struggles between capital and labor over the capital intensity production will affect rent. Further, different lands may be appropriate at different levels of capital intensity. (Some soils have more natural rainfall but others are better for irrigation; sOl .il nel urban lands are better for small structures, others for ,brscrar.",:.Y, Thus the interplay of capital intensity and land use may be complex: what is the worst (marginal) land in use may be cOlltinuai1 changing. The introduction of capital intensity extends the analysis bevolldj , 1 Ricardo. Recent Marxist authors [19, 183] argue that only differ1en"" tial rent I is equivalent to Ricardian rent. Differential rent II affect how much capital will be applied. The simplest Marxist pretations, like neoclassical models, are seen as taking production granted by treating differential rent as determined by demand. new interpretations of differential rent II require that production be considered, reinforcing Marx's conclusion that the relation technology to rent cannot be simple and unilinear [19, 21]. Ball has suggested that differential rent cannot exist without at some absolute rent being present, in the sense of there being no land, even of the lowest quality [19).

Absolute and monopoly rents Even in these reinterpretations, a

differential rent I is treated as invariant to ownership im:tit1uti,)O besides the mere presence of a market in land use rights. Even simple cases as whether aristocratic traditions, environmental co:nlflols� or land fractioning limit capital investment go beyond the inltensit]l( rent interaction. These land-use barriers pose questions for struggle different from those in Ricardo's analysis. Marx treats using other categories, absolute and monopoly rent.

Absolute rent In Marx's initial definition, this is collected when

the worst land can be withheld by its owners unless some paid. This might be the case if, for example, a landed ari:;tm:nlc: put minimal conditions on any use of their estates for capitali� production, or if the State placed registration fees and land taxes on

u-

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

!

I I

65

the worse lands. An 'absolute rent' surcharge above differential will 'then be paid on all land [26 1 , 263J.

��.�W�

MGlno.pol(y rent Monopoly rent on the other hand, affects land used

particular sector of production: it is received by landowners provide land for the production of goods sold under monopoly "dlllOns. If a product is not subject to competition, its price can be above its value, allowing excess profits. Some of these are claiim,:d by landowners. who control the land needed to produce the . Their control over land of special qualities itself limits '()diuctio,n in some cases; in other cases they benefit from increases induced by monopolists. The high rents or land values in cities key industries are in the very profitable monopoly phase of .YIlilli'rkll"en,', 'profit cycle' would be one example of this (see Section 3). P" VOllld high prices for lands designated for production of crops U"'I'whm;e acreage is limited by government controls. y "m,." differential rent, absolute and monopoly rent may affect r.p'!'I�t'>' and even affect the value of labor power itself. Marx first makes lh,e: rurgc,ment for absolute rent on land producing a staple consumer which may affect the cost of labor power: "

"

n'irf,erential rent has the peculiarity that landed propeny here merely •• illtelrcepts the surplus profit which would otherwise flow into the pocket farmer {Le. the renting capitalist farmer] . . . . On the other hand, worst soil cannot be cultivated - although its cultivation would yield price of production - until it produces something in excess of the price production, rent, then landed property is the creative cause of this rise price. Landed property itself has created rent [261].

I

I

I 'I

argument would hold for monopoly rent in sectors producing staples (like wheat or sugar under agricultural policies that limit ,P,�ILllC'O, in these cases, the rent is passed on in higher prices, labor ap)learS to be in direct conllict with landlords over the amount of �9.!iOhlte rent. This conllict, however, may only be apparent. If the is part of accepted living standards, labor can pass on to �pitalisllS the higher costs of agricultural produce, by insisting on of the value of labor power. (Modern union contracts with :-Olt-llvm,g escalators institutionalize this.) For this reason, Marx

I

I

66

MATTHEW EDEL

suggests absolute rent was most likely to fall on the capitalists' value, by forcing up the value of labor power they hired, as we,ll!\!'i\\;:. taking some surplus value directly from agricultural differential rent does [255J. It is because land monopoly is a potential problem for CaIJit!llisl!(i' that Marx suggested they might support nationalizing land or rents. This reform would transform differential rent from a pa:ymen. to a landed class, to one to an organ of the bourgeoisie. This 11111"'" '�. abolish absolute rent, forcing all land into use. The reform might urged on labor as a means of reducing food prices. But labor's would be limited, if capital could capture the benefit through �=':j� �1 reductions - a strong possibility because the reform would not alter way in which landownership bound labor. The relation of land rent to class struggle was raised in an . .._,;.". context by Engels, who opposed proposals that workers should their own homes, stating that this will not help workers:

!,,;I,1

_

jl�1

Let us assume that in a given industrial area it has become the rule tha.t each worker owns his own little house. In this case the working class that area lives rent free; expenses for rent no longer enter into the of its labor power. Every reduction in the cost of production of power. that is to say, every permanent price reduction in the worker'; necessities of life is equivalent 'on the basis of the iron laws of economy' to a reduction in the value of labor power and will tt finally result in a corresponding faU of wages. Wages would fall on an ,I average corresponding to the average sum saved on rent, that is, worker would pay rent for his own house, but not, as formerly, in money to the house owner, but in unpaid labor to the factory owner whom he works [110].

�;��:�:i:;�

Reforms affecting'the cost of living cannot help the working 'Either they become general and then they are followed by a ponding reduction of wages, or they remain quite isolated eXlperim.enlts, and then their very existence as isolated exceptions proves that the'1!"!Iiil l '! realization on a grand scale is incompatible with the existing capitalist mode of production' [llOJ . This position i s often applied mechanically in treatments of hOl0Sirlg reform, and other consumer issues (see Section 5). However, was writing within a particular debate, and made assumptions WO"lll" to his time. His argument parallels Marx's earlier denial that free trade

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

67

1.���:ssarily benefitted workers by cheapening foodstuffs, as English traders claimed. Marx argued cheap food would allow employers reduce wages [255). If the market drove wages to subsistence, Q1!�ap, ,, food would only help employers. But elsewhere, Marx sug­ that in some circumstances the working class could benefit, for time, from lower rents. In Capital [261) he argues cheap food might �etlm'�s benefit workers: It is not true that consumption of necessities does not increase as they ____...._ cheaper. [261]

Marx argues the abolition of the Corn Laws was a case in point: were possible because the working class did not simply join the :apitalists' crusade for free trade, but maintained enough indepen­ to ally with landed interests over the working day, and, to in and out of Parliament over wages and hours [261). ggle !� :,�!r Thus far, monopoly and absolute rent been treated together, as rents that directly affect production and of the products produced, either in general (absolute rent) Dr particular sectors (monopoly rent). Many Marxists, starting with ,f<��"J', have indeed not bothered to distinguish between the two types. Harvey, for example, initially referred to the two together as monopoly rent' [181].) But Marx argued there was an important gis1tin,:ti()ll, apart from the question of rent collection across sectors marginal lands. Marx's analysis, absolute rent is received when landowners /..' _.'._" ihe flow of capital into a sector of production, so that pro­ are reduced by rent payments rather than by price reduction in cornp,etit:ioll. Marx argued that this may occur when a land-using sector (agriculture, mining or urban housing) has a higher than average . :nelcati.on of surplus value per unit of capital [261, 263]. Capitalists lrrrlaliv desire to invest more in such a sector, until its profit rate .reduced to the average for other industries. But landowners can int.r!·.r. with this investment. If even the owners of the worst land can payment for its use, profits can be reduced to the average w new investment or a reduction of prices. In the process, a value out of the sector (of the sort discussed at the end of Section 2), redirected to landlords in the sector. In this case, although the price

MOlno,pOIY v. absolute rent

__


1

I

I

68

MATTHEW EDEL

remains above the competitive price of production, Marx states the price remains below the value of the product. Thus, absolute only exists for sectors in which the price of production is itself value, i.e. those with a low organic composition of capital. Monopoly rent, however, does not require this value condition hQ11� Although absolute rent can only occur in sectors with a low V,�,4ll\"" composition of capital, monopoly rent may occur in any sector l�u'lI":1 263]. Although Marx considers the distinction important, his arguments for it are not convincingly developed [98]. The th(�or,etic,u possibility that agricultural prices can be pushed above values is ruled out. But practically Marx may be right. If rents drive prices an[,ve"'. value for a large set of goods, average profits will be reduced low level characteristic of the high-organic composition m( IUSUl'�" �:1 Thus, agricultural rent can drive prices above values only if the arrlOugi'1 of rent is small. Marx also assumes that a high organic composition of capital only occur in a sector that capital controls strongly enough to Dn�ven£lllil

1.

another class from exacting tribute. This makes the value relati,oru;hiI'U a proxy for class power. The question is under what c� � � ' powerful landlord class can exist within a dominant capitalist I Some recent Marxist writing has rejected the absolut(�/ n�olloI JOIJ' � rent distinction, considering only differential rents and thc)se in1Io1vi#ir-, some sort of 'class monopoly' as useful categories [99, 1 8 1 ] . emphasize the class effects o f rents, rather than the organic cOlmp'osii tion of capital by sector. A related 'neo-Ricardian' formulation, on Sraffa's model of class conflict over the returns to capital and also follows Marx's rent theory in many respects, but omits absolute/monopoly distinction [25, 26, 346]. However, a focus class effects cannot simply group all monopoly and absolute together, because different rents in this combined category different class effects. The crucial difference is between rents that benefit or harm a small group, and rents that can sustain a landed or cut significantly into profits. Thus new distinctions between have to be invoked. This view leaves the analysis of rent with more categories than originally had (see Table I). An initial distinction separates the differential rents (categories IV and V) from the other categories. latter are divided by two distinctions. The first is between rents

�!�::J!�1

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

69

i tqjmcmo,poHes over specific products or unique sites without interclass 'imTIOTI'an,ce (category III), and rents due to monopolies that can affect working·-cillSS standards of living in a fundamental way and which significant class fractions (categories I and II)_ The second dis­ "tiri,cticln is between those rents limited by the difference between value the price of production (category I), and those rents not so limited_ Table 1

Possible distinctions between types of rent.

'Absolute rent' 'Tribut .. la

Basis

of category

Based on value differential in a model of transformation between prices and values (rent value price of production) =

This category and category I rent are based on the power of a significant ' class fraction, and may affect prices of basic goods in value of labor power (VLP) living standard_ 'Monopoly rent' b 'Absolute and m(mopolly rent, a

v.:,: Rk:ar(lo 'Rent'

This category and categories I and II are rents that may drive prices above the price that would prevail without monopoly. (For this category only, not for basic goods affecting VLP,)

'Differential rent l'

Rent due to differentials in site qual­ ity or location at constant capital composition.

'Differential rent II'

Rent due to differentials in site quality or location only manifest via interaction with changing capital composition.

,,_ _______ may include all lower numbered categories. ,

aeltmea, may include the immediately prior category.

distinction between rents which involve a severe barrier to '�stlmellt (and affect labor-capital conflicts) and rents which do not, " first explored in the urban literature_ Harvey [ 1 8 1 , 186] grouped

I

I 1 I

, 1

70

MATTHEW EDEL

categories I and II, calling them alternatively 'absolute rent' and monopoly rent', while Edel [98] referred to category II as an analogue of absolute rent. Lipietz [230, 232] distinguished 'tribut it Engels' (category II) from 'tribut a la Marx' defined by the vaJ.ue·-prlc relation (category I). Lipietz relates these rents to class conflict. Engels' rent redistribution of social surplus value' already produced and rOllte(l . through various channels, which is 'partially transferred to the Y�' �; /!" II sitical layer of urban property owners'. Rent 'it la Marx' stems surplus value created in the building industry itself, due to its than-average organic composition of capital: Thus, the land tribute 'a la Marx' would distinguish itself by fact that it would be value created in the construction industry would fall into the owner's pocket, while in the case of tribute 'il Engels' this value could have been produced in any branch pp. I44-146].

I

Lipietz argues that the presence of absolute rent shows that existence of landownership exerts its effect right down to the prc)dIIC.;:i�;il tion process', while monopoly rents, including Engels' rent, do imply more than an effect at the level of circulation [232, p. 147]. important question, therefore, is whether land rent is tied to sp�ocific effects in production (construction) processes. In this view, absolut and some instances of monopoly rent involve cases where class stnl•• le implications may be involved, and land reform or rent reduction m"Y'ii.i'. potentially benefit both capital accumulation and labor's standards. But only absolute rent involves cases where the stflog,;le Imay Jm involve the kind of production that occurs, rather than magnitude. The definitional distinction thus corresponds to a dif'fel!ent .,ii'.1 set of political possibilities [99].

e/ll)�1

4.3.

Urban applications of the rent categories

The distinctions between rent categories can be illustrated by a comparison of several urban situations, and their possible effects class struggle and alliance. Compare first the rent analyzed by Engels . .. in The Housing Question [1 10]. As Lipietz notes, nineteenth urban landowners 'could, due to the rural exodus and to the m�,di,)crity of dens, easily extort a "tribut it la Engels" from the working Class' /i,,1

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

71

p. 145]. (This is a category II rent, see Table 1 .) Lipietz follows argument, that the rent raised the cost of labor power, thus a share of the surplus value extracted on industrial capitalists. contrary to Engels view, Edel et al. [104] argue that part of the may have fallen on labor as well, as housing standards were reduc.:d. Thus a broad-scale monopoly rent affected class conflict, both between industrialists and landlords, and perhaps between both these and labor. On the other hand, when capitalists pay more for entry into upper­ neighborhoods, land rent is levied on their incomes. Thus it falls the surplus value from which they have received their incomes. This 'is clearly a case of monopoly rent: the cost of land is high because the price of the houses includes a monopolized commodity: exclusivity j' [386]. Lipietz [232] calls this Engels' rent, because absolute rent is not ,nv,)lv,ed. but it is more properly a more limited monopoly rent (category III in Table 1). The class effects are different from those of En2els' case. Except in cases of displacement of workers from their neighborhoods, because rents from exclusive land uses can drive land values higher than can workers' rents, the high cost of hous­ in exclusive neighborhoods is not a threat to workers living Now compare the housing situation of Engels' day with the present French situation. Abetter, standardized working-class apartment has beC:OlIle an accepted part of the 'market basket' that affects the value labor power. When land for this housing is sold or rented out in that restrict supply, the rent and its associated supply restrictions int,,,","! with the price of housing, and with the work process in bousing. Fractionated properties, and temporal unevenness in the builders' (or the State's) ability to assemble properties limit the extent which production can be rationalized. This keeps production on an 'artisanal basis, limiting the organic composition of capital in house bUilding. Thus a gap between value and price of production is main, tained, and landowners may take it as rent. The cost of workers' housing is kept high both by the taking of rent and by the (simulfit,me:ous) limiting of technological progress. Topalov and Lipietz thus that this is a case of absolute rent or 'tribut 11 la Marx' [232, 386] (ca'te!�ory I in Table I). The degree to which property institutions raise housing prices or worsen housing quality is at least potentially of concern to workers.

I 1

I

;

�

"'1 I

i"

'

�" .. · . .

72

MATIHEW EDEL

A further case involves the interplay between high interest rates housing prices. Much of the recent interest in rent theory ste'rmne( ! from attempts to analyze housing price increases and shortages period of inflation and high interest rates. Initial radical treatments housing prices focused on the relationship between f inancial . and land monopoly, but were apparently self-contradictory. about effects. Thus high rents were blamed alternatively on low levels interest rates, high levels of the same rates, and rapid increases in th(lii:!' levels [ 1 80, 368]. A more careful application of rent theory suggests several possible directions of influence. High interest ral.es carl ...: .. limit housing production, creating monopoly rents (category II or on already-developed land while reducing current values of unbuilC "

?�

�:�������; :lM i'IIlI

�

land (although perhaps not enough to stimulate its use). If int,ere(;('i.ii rates vary among types of developer or ultimate land user (e.g. lower·., . for homeowners because of tax write offs or interest rate sul>si(ly) sectoral monopoly rents may be created. Distortion of pn)dlJctioD, )J technique also raises some possibility of absolute rent. But if interest rates are low because inflation undercuts nominally high and there is expectation of further inflation, the result may either speculative construction (creating oversupply of built space, or deimo,Iishing older space) or speculative holding of unbuilt land (reldu(:ing! ' construction creating 'Engels' style' monopoly rent). Thus rent th(lor:Y))!i suggests there may be effects on class conflicts (and on subdivisions, e.g. between homeowner and renter [102] ). The must be examined in concrete situations, taking into account general state of accumulation as well as institutional details. The effect on class struggle of price differentials between rlif'fe,'ent i':'iiiii

foiY&

J'wIPl @ljM !i

j�::������"i::6

worker neighborhoods is also worth considering. Different prices for .;: housing in different locations are generally classed as differential rents, reflecting accessibility in a passive manner. However Topalov [386] holds that intra-metropolitan locational differences in land rent shOUld be considered as monopoly rents, restricting differential rent to cases where land quality affects construction costs. For luxury housing zones this is no problem. Families are buying segregation, which is itself a monopoly. But Topalov argues that differences by location for working-class housing are also monopoly rents, reflecting monopolies on access to hetter transportation. If such rent differen­ tials are created by transit monopolies, these monopoly rents are clearly of concern to workers as a class, and indeed workers'

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

73

Ii.O\'errlents have long been concerned about transit. But if transit is a monopoly, rent differentials by location may still exist, which struggles over monopoly cannot remove. The question may be , empirical one. Topalov, however, does not argue the case on empirical grounds. he tries to argue that one cannot apply the differential rent to urban site rents, because it is a simple application to housing ,f ,uh·,t originally was an agricultural model, based on the production , , identical commodities in different sites. Wheat may have dif­ production (and transportation) costs when produced at dif­ sites. But identical housing, at different sites, does not have Costs of production because of the siting and is not itself t : : � � �� �:� � � t�� [19, 386). . raises the point that one should not uncritically transfer a model agriculture to housing. But it misses the point of models of land as determined by the journey to work. In urban analogues to Von Jhl�mm's model of the delivery of wheat to a central point, a uniform ;bn�modity is delivered to a central place: labor power. The house is as an input into the production of this commodity, not really a final good. Under those circumstances, the transposition of the 19ri,culltu.ral model holds, but the required circumstances themselves n(1llcal:e the alienated nature of both labor and housing markets in the caI)italist city. The relation of urban and agricultural models is also present in a debate, over whether absolute rent is even possible in an context [234). The existence of a large stock of fixed capital in >WI,UlIlgS seems to argue against a low organic composition of capital. owever, fIXed and constant capital are not interchangeable concepts. buildings are viewed at the moment of their construction, absolute is possible if the organic composition of capital in construction is low. Alternatively, if buildings are considered as fIXed capital, the meaSllfe of constant capital that should be compared with annual rent labor costs is not the building's construction cost but rather its depreciation, which may be low compared to annual labor maintenance costs. Under either argument, the organic composition SOIldition for absolute rent may be met. question , cannot be settIed by appeal to quotes from Marx. rent theory was developed, to explain agricultural rent, but he 'discussed its application to urban land and to sites providing building

�

�

:i

74

MAITHEW EDEL

materials. His distinction between rents was not limited to aglriclJltlll He cited cases of rent from housing monopoly, and he argued absolute rent for land in general would raise urban land rents urban and agricultural land users must compete for space (26 1 ) . Marx did not explicitly indicate t o what extent urban land rent differential, monopoly or absolute rent. These examples basically just classify rents. They suggest =h,;"h:,. combinations of landownership and land use might have an impact interclass distributions of value, and hence on class strug:g gle .� to show in practice how these various rents affect a, distribution and other aspects of urban capitalist systems . . One issue in this is whether the various possible barriers to ment in land listed earlier are operative, and what their effects Much of the literature of raC\icai urban economics in the late 1960s 1970s was devoted to documenting such barriers existed. �•.. �," indicated cases of landlord or developer monopoly, involvement in the land market in support of such monopolies, linkages between financial and land investors [1 1 , 47, 75, 94, 1 19, 177, 276, 302, 3 13, 3 3 1 , 342, 363). The general impression given these studies was that monopolies would restrict investment, pu:shilrr� up rents to workers. In terms of rent theory, the amounts to a clarrtn'\!I!1 that either large scale monopoly rents ('tribut a la Engels'), or ne,·h.", absolute rents ('tribut a la Marx') are received by fractions of the bourgeoisie, often without consideration either of possible distinction between the two classes of rent, or of argument that rent increases might fall on employers rather worker-tenants (or worker-homeowners, if purchase of homes developers was involved). These studies seemed at first sufficient indicate class conflicts were spilling over from the labor market the urban land market, and to suggest possible alliances between movements and (tenant or homeowner) community movements. However, these early studies also were marked by certain inconsis­ tencies in their findings (98) . For example, monopoly factors we,re. mel, general, presumed to increase rents and living costs. But m(lUo1poly ': in the petroleum industry, and the power of auto monopolists government policy, appeared to have led to policies to encourage � ) ;' petroleum use in commuting, which seemed to have increased supply of suburban residential land and possibly reduced housing,) costs. Analyses of developer groups, while finding that in some

��; �It�� ���grnl

�

� � fm! I

I ';

" URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

75

, held back land from development, also found they formed part

[of, po.Jitical 'growth coalitions' that tried to stimulate more develop­

[276, 278]. The confusion over interest rate effects mentioned was yet another example. These anomalies suggested that more j", neeClea than simply to demonstrate the existence of monopoly. was needed of what specific conditions allowed high rents to 'cl1larlgecl, or what the division of cost burdens among workers and employers might be [180, 369, 370]. It was the search for better �analyses of these issues that led to the revival of Marxist rent theory. application of this theory will be discussed in two contexts. The is the overall question of whether there is a landed fraction WAf', oo,n;'o1 and, if not, whether this means rent considerations are for accumulation. The second is the application of rent l\lItimPOJrtaJot I th , eol,etic considerations to issues of urban location.

1(if,

�

Rent, production and accumulation cycles

��;)��7s �:

question of how seriously rent affects accumulation in contem­ capitalism centers on whether rent has become so fused with and interest that it cannot be considered a separate category , allalysis. A related question is whether there is a specific landed or landed fraction of capital.

1. Is there a landed class or fraction? suggested that with the integration of landed and capitalist and with the reduction of land quality differences through absolute and differential rent might disappear. This pos­ is also suggested in Lenin's description of the integration of economic interests in urban development. The specUlative l�vc�lol)ment of the suburbs of rapiClly growing cities, Lenin argued, the work of 'finance capital'. In this development

;

,

The monopoly of the banks merges here with the monopoly of ground rent and with monopoly of the means of communications. since the rise in the price of land and the possibility of selling it profitably in allotments, etc., is mainly dependent on good means of communication with the centre of town; and these means of communication in the hands of large companies which are connected, by means of the holding system and by the distribution of positions on the directorates, with the interested banks [227, p. 65[.

76

MATTHEW EDEL

This suggests that even though ground rent is part of the profit of banks and transit monopolies, there is not particular interest whether profits for the combine as a whole take the form of land increases, interest or transit profits. A similar possibility is raised in recent examinations of wt..tlJer; '� Britain has a landed interest (or a landed fraction of the bourl,ec,isi,,) today, and whether it affects rent. Michael Ball argues that since urban land is now owned by users and a separate landed fraction capital no longer exists, a separate rent component of surplus may not be identifiable. Ball almost goes so far as to say the of land rent is becoming inapplicable [21 ,22]. Massey and Catalano identify a series of landed groups in<:Iu
=

4.4.2. Rent and construction Even in the absence of a separate landed class or fraction, with land absorbed in larger portfolios, landownership may

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

77

Ban suggests one such possible effect, involving the between landownership and building production. He a distinction between house building firms that work on for the land owner, and 'speculative' builders who own land which they build for the general market. In the latter case, there is likely to be some influence of land on the production process. Builders obviously acquire the land because it is profitable to do so; they undertake production for the same reason. The two determinants of profit harmoniously combine or come into conflict. A priori the chance of conflict seems high [21, p. 79J.

conflict actually occur? Ball argues that in 1 9th century

'(the lure of land profits helped to break down the petty commodity production associated with precapitalist craft builders . . . mass pro­ idllct,lon and capitalist-style divisions and control of labor came to house building with the help rather than the hindrance of landed property' [21, �{I p. 80].

However, once the new construction techniques were widely used, sellers of land to the speculative builders began to appropriate the br�Lefits into land prices. The conflict between rent and construction odluctivi'ty became dominant. modern Britain speculative home builders face volatile demand. respond by trying to make profits through a commercial circuit capital, buying cheap and selling dear. Thus their building activities subordinated to the needs of the speculative timing of purchases nd sales' and demand for construction labor fluctuates irregularly as � lI"UIII. 'As a result, small runs of standard units based on simple, :ePI:titive tasks carried out by a casualized workforce characterize this [21, p. 83]. Sirnil:rr interrelationships between tenure, rent and construction can found in other cases, with different patterns of tenure and industrial :of!�anizatio'n of construction interacting in different ways. Studies of land 'promoteurs', construction firms, the State, and public policy in France suggest that firms with large in-house construction staffs act '(ferently from those using casual labor: such firms may pressure the

78

� !

MATTHEW EDEL

State to build moderate-income housing, to keep their pace of tion steady and their land bank investments circulating [3 1 1 , 384, The result is an advance in the scale and industrial technology housing production. In Sweden, industrialization of housing tion was apparently advanced as a result of State policies for banking, associated less with developer demands than with 10t"1T lln;O policies [87]. In the US, the study of construction as an industry inconclusive, with some studies suggesting an artisanal pattern but others suggesting capitalist rationalization [61, 345]. A similar occurs in Mexico, but there the different segments of the industry be reaching different markets [73, 418]. An interplay of construction and landownership or rent cOlosi,ier; tions can occur within the public sector. The C.S.E. Housing argues that whether municipal authorities use contractors or mlmicip employees for construction will affect the form and price of housing constructed [79]. Because the resulting construction costs affect the willingness of municipalities to build public housing, hence acquire land, landownership and rent are interconnected production. The implication of all of these studies is that even if there is overall land monopoly, landownership and rent (or the speculati' hope of higher rent) may affect production and prices of hnn
4.4.3. Rent and accumulation cycles Harvey's position suggests a relationship between rent and terap')[ unevenness in accumulation [1 82, 184]. That there is some rel:ati,msh between rent and cycles or other changes in accumulation standln reason: if rent is part of surplus value, and surplus value itself and falls, either rents must follow, or distributional struggles value recipients must take place. This can be seen historically. When accumulation and pn�dllcti( were disrupted in the 1930s rents fell. Their reduction facilitated acquisition of land for public housing and public works. It led to concentration of land holding in some places and its de,:orLcelntr:atic in others. On the other hand, while the postwar boom in the U.S. to a recovery of land rents, it did not lead to their severe inflation.

URBAN AND ,REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

79

patterns (particularly suburban development) reduced the ",.h,"'v of landed capital to restrict investment or benefit greatly from TITefen,ntli.! locations. The new rent and spatial patterns, by limiting "". "..� of production of housing, contributed to sustained accumula­ [104]. latter stages of the long postwar boom and the 1970s crisis were by land value inflation. This gave rise to intense debates over relatiion between cycles of accumulation and movements of rent Some of the earliest formulations presented rent, capital', as barriers to production, and suggested a link from rent to crisis [90, 368]. However, attention soon to the other direction of causality, positing that a condition of characteristic of incipient crisis had particular on rent [183] . ,,/Overacc:umLUl,ltion' has been defined in different ways. In general, refers to a situation in which capital accumulation has reached a where further accumulation will not be possible on as profitable as previously. In this case, Harvey suggests, capital that might nih.""i." have been invested in saturated sectors of the economy will into the 'built environment'. The resulting construction boom will up land rents, triggering speculation and changing land uses . While the construction induced may yield beneficial use values future time, its initial effects are more disruptive than useful. investment is unlikely to create the conditions for a general round iaclce],,,a'ted accumulation, and the construction and rent boom is to collapse as general crisis deepens. urban theorists have suggested a different link between istlruction and overaccumulation. Because they see a structural between interests of a monopoly fraction of capital and State, they hold the State will respond to overaccumulation programs designed to preserve monopoly sector profits by ow"rirlg profits in other sectors. Often this is done by taking some (from both sectors, but disproportionately from the non­ lpo.nopo:lists) for State investments on which no profit is expected 235]. This is referred to as 'devalorizing' this capital. The may use the devalorized capital for workers' bousing, trans­ lprtatiion systems and other facilities that preserve the work force keeping the value of labor power low (for critique see 380, 381]).

MATTHEW EDEL

80

Devalorization of some capitals may be important even wi"them! fusion of State and monopoly capital. All that is necessacy is tmUei)'•. some capitals' returns ace preserved by the devaluation of other In the US, one acena of devaluation has been the depreciation homeowner assets in older residential areas. Edel, Sclac and acgue this process was important in the postwac boom, a feature of crisis. The building of new suburbs drew re,;id'�n�':J from older suburbs, reducing land values in the latter. homeowners and small-scale landlords had their assets devalued, larger scale developers benefitted directly, and industrial lists benefitted indirectly from " the lowered average cost of [104]. The link between rent, construction and accumulation may between countries, and pacticulacly between the developed 'underdeveloped' capitalist nations. In the latter, rent may be by the general devaluation of those countries' assets (by debt 'unequal exchange') to a degree that goes beyond sectoral in the former. Further, urban land may be totally or partially by squatting or unauthorized subdivision in the face of threats squatting. However, even in some of the poorest countries, centers international capital and exclusive upper-class enclaves may high levels of monopoly rent [310]. •

u��:����;4i

4.5.

Rent theory and urban location

Rent theory is frequently applied, at least informally, to the of urban space into areas used by different classes or social orr.mi,''!'!! The analysis shows how property rights and monopoly rent elem!Oflt are manipulated to shape urban space. More is involved than ostensibly 'natural' market sorting. , showing that macket forces could sepacate out the best street for commerce, and relegate the proletarian masses to hidden loe:ati.ons1 Engels [l iZ] showed that the market concealed deeper power rel:ati(.�,. (see Section 1). But he did not ignore direct class interventions tlu:ough;;' the State, whose housing reforms relegated the working poor to and worse districts. The archetypal intervention, Bacon reconstruction of Pacis," involved the creation of grand with associated land speculation, and the destruction of welTkin!:-clasi housing, so that crowding and costs for the workers increased.

j:.:

�"::,��"�

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

,:r;�����:�� ;J

s

81

'saru'tary' programs of slum clearance only amounted to more [ 1 10].

Urban renewal and gentrification Sirnil,u considerations apply to the analysis of more recent trends in use, both in terms of suburbanization, and of the redevelopment 1L<:emrr.I city land for elite uses, whether by state urban renewal or 'marl,e!' processes of 'gentrification'. The latter is a particularly lpolrtalot case for rent analysis. of urban renewal in the 1960s suggested the demolished 19hbolrhc)odls were not the inherently damaging slums described by ' pnop(ments of clearance, but viable working class communities [94, Follow-up studies on those displaced showed that relocation worse housing conditions [176]. While some studies suggested this damage was the result of bias in planning [33, 52, 142, 365] examined class forces behind urban renewal legislation and lplelmen,tation [338, 342]. many cities, redevelopment responded to specific coalitions E'Q'etwelen elements of the city bureaucracy, upper-class and institutional . users, and real estate investor and construction lobbies. 'Growtb of the local bourgeoisie and government, and locally elements of the national bourgeoisie were involved in both luml cl,earan,ce-·urban renewal programs, and demolitions for highway constnlction, airports and other facilities [l l 5, l l7, l l 8 , 177, 178, 233, 278]. similar literature in France considers State interventions to urban form. Castells shows that demolition in Paris is more to proximity of neighborhoods to bourgeois centers (and demand for space) than to neighborhood condition, although clearance is the official justification [53]. Analyses of class �:a,ll"an.ces in Paris, Dunkerque and elsewhere conclude that redeve­ nOJPffilent there is related to an integration of local with national­ capitals, and the reshaping of space in the interests of the capital. Stuwes are also numerous in other countries [l l , 3 3 1 , i:J

i[�����:I�

These studies have focused more on the causes of urban renewal on its economic effects. Effects of urban renewal on land rents been estimated in detail. And whether new land-use have actually attracted new investment or raised profits has

82

,

fI

MATTHEW EDEL

also not really been demonstrated. In the 1970s, many US attributed investment in 'Sun Belt' cities to their 'post-industrial' 'corporate' form, including patterns of transportation and segregation appropriate to a new era [293, 329]. Not all of these cities, howe'vet'i0 continued to grow rapidly following the fall in oil prices in the 1 980s: And in older cities, there are both cases of successful in';estIDlent;, following renewal and highway building (e.g. Boston) and unsu(:ce"s,1 ful cases (e.g. Detroit).· Rent theory can be used to suggest theoretical reasons why renewal may assist accumulation, and perhaps to measure its Lojkine suggests that small properties may exert a barrier to ac(:urnuiia tion, preventing assembly of large enough tracts for modern COllStlruC· tion [235]. But the extent to which this is dependent on building technologies and really affects productivity is an open Watkins suggests that older cities have out-of-date facilities, in of physical infrastructure and the-co-Iocation of different ec()n()miC sectors, so that major redevelopment may be required for using highest productivity technologies [400, 293]. (The argument is to Gordon's stages of urban development [147].) Harvey makes more general point that capital loses flexibility when it takes the of fIxed capital and a built environment [183]. Change in land uses therefore, a major problem. The possibility of redevelopment wit:hout':) massive State intervention is, however, suggested by recent studies 'gentrification' the displacement of lower income by higher inc:oIfle"! residents [130, 2 1 8 , 419]. These adaptations suggest Harvey's position on the fixity of fixed capital may be overstated. Whatever the need for State intervention to facilitate new land these uses could not exist without demand arising from cities' roles (see Section3). Hymer suggested that the concentration of is concentrating demand for land in a reduced group of key cities This demand allows rent to be realized by landowners, if they transfer their property to uses wanted by fInancial-corporate talists. In the US, land values are higher in larger than in smaller and greater for cities with corporate headquarters than for those purely industrial roles [95, 404] . Neoclassical analysis would say

��'i���:�lli!

� Compare the documentary films, Mi ssion Hill and the Miracle of Boston Poletown Lives on these cases.

i ,!i

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

83

has a high 'marginal productivity' equivalent to a differential rent access to centers of communication. Marxist rent theory would the rent involves monopoly sector corporations' surplus profit, channeled through business services firms, and finally appropriated in part by landowners, who receive a monopoly rent based on the advantages of co-location. Without the concentration of capital there would be no differential between rents in 'corporate' cities and those in smaller or non-corporate centers. Even this analysis is too general. Whether this rent be differential monopoly, its realization may require direct conflict between iOtenl:ial users or redevelopers and prior residents. One must analyze conflict, and how it is resolved, through the market or through political confrontation [94). One must als'o analyze how particular lands are demarcated as the area in which a higher income or status -activity, which can pay a monopoly rent, is accommodated. A his­ : torical materialist analysis of the reuse of old parts of a city, or the ipenir,g of new suburbs must be based on concrete case data, including and cultural factors. : One example is Sharon Zukin's study of the use of old 'lofts' (large floors in multi-story industrial buildings) for prestige residences [419). Zukin traces the process by which industrial land-use demand declined in New York. (She calls this 'deindustrialization', but whether process is global, national local is unclear). The resulting lowered of lofts allowed artists to rent them (illegally at first) as combina­ residences and work spaces. This brought the lofts to the atten­ of developers and municipal officials, who developed a market legal framework for loft residence. Officially reserved for artists, they became part of the general upper-income residential supply. Zukin analyzes the forms of art that led to the initial explora­ tion of these spaces, and the role of wealthy patrons in shaping these art styles and allowing artists the revenue for their real-estate 'demand. Suburbanization and urban expansion development of suburbs, for different strata of workers and bour­ ge
84

MATTHEW EDEL

In Boston, specific areas were set aside for upper-class use, ing developers to reap unusually large capital gains from the (technically, this is a prior realization of monopoly rents). The role large-scale developers and of the State in this process is apparent. the same time, working-class political pressure, and aCI:OInnloliat:iOlli to it by the bourgeoisie and the State, opened other suburban areas . to the workers. In these areas, some rents were created, but the of a monopoly rent for upper-class exclusively meant that de'vel,op!!rs' profits were not as high as in upper-class suburbs [104]. Studies of French property development companies construction affiliates point to both government and roles in spatial subdivision. The developers' incentives to aoorclnriat, monopoly rent by limiting the number 6f upper-class residential contends with their desire to keep their construction capital active, if necessary by building working-class housing. This creates space fOr government support for large-scale complexes for the working c••".""! . The historical pattern of when different lands in the companies' banks and different government funds were available has affected spatial pattern of land use [3 1 1 , 385]. On the other hand, the ability of land in large tracts that can be acquired by the state affected the location of public housing more directly in England and other countries [20, 87, 27 1 , 272]. In underdeveloped capitalist areas, some lands are left open for by the poor, and others are reserved for an exclusive uppel'-ir,come market that generates high monopoly rents. The selection of sn.,cif'ic lands may be based on social and political factors (ownership political enemies of the regime, or non-freehold tenures like Mexican ejido) as well as by the differentiar attributes of locati,ons (mountainous, swampy or desert land, distance from But the overall process, by which squatting and illegal subdivision . legitimated, involves elements of conflict between landed or class fractions, and a mediation role by the government, prompted by industrial capitalists who stand to gain from low costs for workers in a manner similar to that described by Engels 291, 307, 308, 310]. Urban expansion takes yet other forms in countries socialist planning. These efforts have sometimes been proposed on ' exemplars of rational non-market housing provision [27, 339, 351 More careful analyses show complicated patterns [164], For exa,mllie{

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

85

Soviet Union, an absolute rent of the sort enforced by pro­ and artisanal production may have been removed, iiililllClwin2 advances in prefabrication. However, this advance may have neutralized by other inefficiencies in construction, which some attribute to state monopoly in construction, or by suppressed monopoly rents. Limitations on migration to Moscow appear to sustained higher living standards there than in other areas, that some degree of monopoly benefit was received by residents. But this could not take the form of an open mono­ land rent, because apartment rents were subsidized. It remains however, as to whether generalized underinvestment in (compared to popular perceptions of need) was due to national priorities, inefficiencies, or to the general level of deve�ldlpment of the nation, inherited from the prerevolutionary period and more complicated by the Second World War. Cycles in the ,:�!iority of housing investment, to some extent influenced by outside in the surrounding capitalist world market, also -nave an i'i 287 ' 375]. has documented differential housing access for different 'li!: ;�._._. in Hungary, during the period prior to the restoration of allocation [375]. His analysis of their origin suggests one 'm(jnolpo,ly' factor is important. The State's desire to promote growth housing to be allocated to those with 'necessary' skills (and »llJceal"crats may see bureaucrats as necessary). With non-market :m�fh�'ni!;ms dominant, historical contingencies of who was at the top "Qfpri,orilty queues when land and other resources for house building dif:fenent qualities happened to be available, may also determine ends up in what district. Cuba, Hamberg describes some success in the attempt to housing standards between cities and countryside, and classes, in the face of severe shortages of labor and mate­ construction. The reduction of differentials apparently ;,,!e:gul;ed pressure on land demand in Havana. The government has ' shown considerable flexibility in developing mechanisms for construction using a non-permanent labor force (the microbrigades sent to work on housing by factories), allowing individual self-help and some openiy private condespite the official commitment to non-market allocation tt)lC1tiOll, I)

Ulffi"p; �'m

li;�:��:���:! I n�'�:���J[

Ii '

86

MATTHEW EDEL

4.5.3. The ghetto Another type of land use separation also deserves study using insights of rent theory. This is the restriction of the least pnvlll�ged' 'ghetto' neighborhoods. In the US, the issue is one of de segregation of a Black minority. The neoclassical literature this as resulting from a combination Qf barriers to Black entry .

White residential areas (primarily affecting less-poor Blacks) the concentration of the (disproportionately Black) poor by market sorting processes. Some preference by ethnic groups, includip Blacks, for residence with others of their group is occasionally Residential segregation is thus considered a result of other discrimination, or a lack of human and other capital, and not as a dividing force in society. Some Marxists build on these explanations, arguing market and individual demands reflect deeper political economic forces. Harvey [1 80, Ch. 4] proposed that the Von Thunen model might a 'true' theory of land allocation, including ghetto formation, but one should question the conditions that made it true, including on the market to allocate housing. The other Marxists, suggested the Von Thunen-type models were vacuous, rather simply contextual. Inner city concentration of the poor was only possible result of market forces . The poor were equally corlcelltralt� on the periphery of cities in other countries; one had to look to spl�cil�c causes of segregation and suburbanization to explain the US tern. Non-market-focused studies described the barriers to integration with emphasis on corporate developer patterns insurance and mortgage 'redlining', rather than presumed for segregation, sometimes suggesting they created 'housing separate from and as important as classes based on the positions ' production described by Marx [129, 319]. Others stressed State role, including the institutionalization of segregation in housing policy. These studies implied that something other than capitalist mulation was being promoted by segregation, since segregation sort seemed to be disruptive of normal market processes. however, suggested that segregatory mar!<et manipulations (like vocation of panicked 'White flight') might allow for profitable use conversions. Developers made money converting land from to white suburbs, and transferring other lands from white to

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

�:��;�;

'�

,E

87

l use. Because this 'suburban blowout' phenomenon was i : Harvey reasoned it was probably induced rather than

[1 80].

alternative approach suggested that residential segregation " lWLUWLU be explained not on its own separate terms, but as a subsidiary broader pattern of economic segregation. This view proposed i l ing ir.am Y2: the ghetto by analogy to a colonial or underdeveloped 2h "ntrv. The separated ghetto was subject to greater exploitation b t was separated: surplus could flow from it to the outside ; •e : directly or through unequal exchange. Low quality and housing was simply an effect of this separation; taking of from the ghetto by absentee landlords was simply one of its II'' . , v a,riOlls manifestations. analogy led to strategic or policy suggestions. Some studies L:Xl:tlUIOU the possibilities of a 'nationalistic' ghetto development pro­ examining possible investments in industry, commerce, and .)(U��""Lll capital [35, 377, 392] . These studies suggested several possible for a local development, including the mobilization of under­ resources, the removal of monopoly gains to those controning internal markets, and the stimulation of community political and pride, which could in turn mobilize more resources [165]. J�foglran�s for community-controlled or cooperative enterprises were jsugge:ste,d [1 16]. Critics of these, however, drew on traditional Marxist �cri.tiql"eS of 'Utopian' enterprises, to suggest that these programs, at best, create opportunities for a few 'Black capitalists', whose resources would be too limited to elevate their whole commu­ and who would divide it politically [39, 420]. Federal programs criticized as vitiating community spirit, favoring a few individual !IIi'ttrelprenellrs, and generally being mismanaged [36]. However, the alternative to community development, Black suburban­ was also criticized as only likely to move the ghetto to new lOClltio,ns, and serve as fronts for new real-estate manipulations [96,

����:I:i �r!:}��:;����

implied framing of the argument as one between 'development' 'dispersal' was criticized in turn, for exaggerating how separate the was from the rest of the economy. Donald Harris argued that ghetto was already integrated into the economy, as a reservoir labor, as super-exploited rather than being marginal to '§a:pitalism [170]. This cheap labor was, it was presumed, clearly

: i Ii

,

,

i

,

l

I I

88

MATIHEW EDEL

beneficial to capital. Its benefits and costs for white workers '''. 0 ......! controversial. One possible position was that white workers from a monopoly on the best jobs and from unequal ex,:nalnge the ghetto. As against this position, Michael Reich argued that from 'divide and conquer' divisions in class-wide political outweighed shorter term advantages in specific submarkets [315, In either case, the emphasis was still on the primacy of the shaping differences in employment, rather than separation of In the end the idea of the ghetto as integral to the eCQ1nomy widely accepted. But this consensus had a cost. The importance in the maintenance of exploita.tion was overlooked [247, 401 Oversimplistic models of class, assuming a 'declining Si' of race' except perhaps in explaining the persistence of a defined 'underclass' encompassing only the most-marginalized left unfinished the analysis of how segregation, including h01lSiri�· segregation, was related to accumulation. An approach to such an analysis would have to include the taneous analysis of racial differentials in both employment ing, and of their interaction. It might, perhaps, begin with the of the Black/White differentials in real incomes, the so-called tax', analyzing not only who suffers from it but who benefits, impact on accumulation. Sucb an analysis could use rent th'Xlre!ic considerations in a way that the earlier ghettoization and colony debates ignored. This analysis could begin with the general issue of low housing. Some of this housing is provided by a general 'working market. It yields its developers or landlords a 'normal' mix of tial and absolute or 'Engels' rents. Particular circumstances vent part of this potential rent being collected [175]. In some neighborhoods housing is only sold to group members, generally out outside mortgages, and outsiders find the neighborhood uuapll," ing. In these cases, total rent paid out by the community reduced (Harvey [186] says financially-induced 'class mcmopoly is removed). Similar reductions occur in self-built housing ties of underdeveloped countries [307]. This may occur in the ghetto. If outsiders avoid Black areas ghetto area is large enough to avoid crowding, land values _" _" '. '.'''' be low. In these situations, however, funds for investment · ghetto housing are likely to be scarce. This will keep prices L' ..L·'"''

���!��

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

89

housing for Blacks. But reduced land rents may keep prices low seIJ[-repai.red older housing [3]. HClw,:ve:r. many ghettos are land-scarce. Segregation in other areas landlords and 'block busters' a monopoly rent on housing for Thus, theoretically, ghetto rents can be either higher or lower for the rest of the working class. rents differ among workers, how do they affect wages? If only few' w(>rkers benefit from low rents or suffer from panicular housing jFimiination, there may not be much effect on wages. Thus, some may keep the benefits of their lower rent, while others, :.esi(ients of land-scarce ghettos, pay much of their 'Black tax' to However, if ghetto residents dominate in some job markets, or higher rents become widespread, these rents may affect � If job markets are also segregated (which may depend on the ghetto is large and spatially separate enough to sustain a job market) higher or lower ghetto rents may lead to benefits for employers in the separate market. The 'Black tax' may be bet-we,'ll landlords and employers. and wage effects may also reinforce each other. High.;?"-rents lead to a squeeze on minority families, leading to the need to labor supply. Hence more net surplus value may be created as well as landlords. Applying this value analysis to o < ft ' lSI : studies of specific housing and labor markets may indicate patterns actually hold.

l����:::;

��':� �;��

SERVICES AS SOCIAL REPROOUCTION reproduction in Marx's model Jlrc,vi()Us section considered housing as an aspect of rent theory. �Ut ha,usiing is also one of a number of consumer services necessary 'oi :sllrviv'al. These services have sometimes been neglected by Marxist economy, due to the field's prime concern with production But consumer services are necessary for production because these processes require a labor force. The ,.\'�."�O' analysis of capitalist accumulation thus treats consumption p,rullat'ily in terms of its role in the social reproduction of the labor workers and their families [53]. (A secondary analysis treats

��:����:�,���:��:�: �

90

MATTHEW EDEL

consumption as helping capitalists solve problems of 'realization' of commodities produced), but workers' consumption expenditures are not different from other expenditures in this respect [28].) Humans of all classes, in all societies consume and reproduce, working-class consumption has a particular place in Marx's model of capitalism. Workers have to sell their labor power to survive. They their wage income to purchase consumption goods: indeed the term real wage (the value of labor power) is seen as adjusting to the cost of socially necessary consumer goods. If workers' socially accepted consumption standard is reduced, or if the cost of PTlJUI'Clllg' the necessary consumer goods can be reduced, average profits increase. Thus capital has an interest in restricting workers' consump­ tion. But workers' consumption is also 'productive', in that it produces ' more labor power for sale to the capitalists. :: This makes workers' consumption different from capitalists' sumption. If the capitalist consumes more, he puts less capital back · into accumulation. But workers must consume to put labor back into . that process. For the bourgeoisie, consumption beyond the level may be the subject of choice at the margin between (investing) and consumer gratification. But given Marx's view of long ' run wage determination, workers cannot afford any intergenerational' savings [260, 261]. It is therefore pointless to excoriate them inability to 'defer gratification'. Some target savings for old age however, be possible if workers have collectively won the inclusion of retirement as a necessary aspect of consumption [71, 1 7 1 , 209]. Further, since individuals are not automatons, the reproduction workers as workers requires their willingness to accept (at grudgingly) their subordinate role in the system. Hence SO(;iaJ�ulticm is part cif reproduction. This requirement is different from that training a new generation of bourgeoisie (although the latter is without some problems [90] ). Calling consumption activities 'reproduction' is a source of SernaIltic' confusion. Marx and Engels consider their materialist analysis to how a society reproduces the material and social conditions existence [264] . The reproduction of individuals and classes capitalism is part of this. But, Marx also calls the continuation of the capitalist productive apparatus itself 'reproduction'. In this reproduction refers to the replacement or growth of capital. In reproduction' the surplus value produced is used to replace capital

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

91

is used up or depreciated; in 'expanded reproduction' surplus value is sufficient to allow the accumulation of more capital [257, 261]. There . ' logic to the duplicate use of the word. Both processes - reproduc­ tion of capital and reproduction of the labor force- are necessary for the overall reproduction of the system. Further confusion arises because 'reproduction' and 'production' have other meanings. Marxist-feminist writings distinguish a ·,·· ··':nh.ere of production' (paid work outside the home) and a 'sphere of reproduction' (unpaid work or 'domestic labor' in the home) [327] . ;RepnJdllctiion here refers not only to biological maintenance and but to those forms of work assigned to women by H .' patriarchal relations. Reproduction in this sense is related to, but not the same as, social reproduction in the sense of necessary consumption. 1;:'.J:on.sUlmp>tio,n and ideological reproduction occur both inside and "/1>1111<;01. of the home [32, 357]. What is more, within the 'sphere of production' (i.e. paid lahor), . ·Marx distinguishes 'productive' from 'unproductive' labor. 'Productive refers to labor in commodity production that generates surplus 'unproductive labor' to paid work that does not generate surplus . value. The latter includes non-production work for private capitalim (guarding factories, advertising) and work for the State which may . help productivity (teachers) or preserve the social order (pellice). Marx sometimes even includes break-even self-employment, in which no surplus value is produced, as unproductive [263]. In this section, reproduction refers to activities, in and out of the "ULl>"jlUj'�, that are designed to allow the survival and functioning of .. the working class as individuals and families, and to reproduce their social relationships to the mode of production.

1. Social reproduction as an 'urban question' issues occur in any society, urban or not. But some Marxist writing refers to them as 'urban' issues. This identification was %P,Jplllru rize,d by Castells, who complained that Marxism's focus on IFpl:oduction (in the limited sense of the physical 'point of production') neglected other important issues. He noted that urban protests often dealt with housing, education and other services not provided simple purchase of commodities. (They were either government­ or government-regulated because each individual's con­ sumption was interdependent with that of other individuals.) Thus

XRI�prodl�ction

92

MATTHEW EDEL

reproduction became a question involving local collective consump- , ' tion, and hence of places where workers grouped together. So it ' became 'the urban question' [53]. Of course, needs and movements for 'reproductive' activities also occur in rural societies. Rural sociologists have always looked at production and reproduction, since they are clearly present in the same ' location, and often interlinked. In cities, however, home and place are often separated, which may be why reproduction had ignored. Castells' formulation had a negative side. Separating 'the urban question' from production, employment and working (relegated to a 'regional question') ignored many of the com­ plex interactions that occur between consumption and production'! / But Castells' attention to consumption was valuable in that a leet of consumption had been a long-standing problem in Ma,rxist analysis. •

5.1.2. Marx and Engels on consumption The only aspect of consumption that Marx dealt with in detail was supply: how much food the worker got and how reliably, and much work he had to do to get that food. Food's nutritional content, adulteration and cost were important in the politics of the time. held that these consumption questions could not be solved at the level. Rather than the local retaifinstitutions or workers' eating habits emphasized by other reformers, Marx focused on possible national , confrontations over free trade, land rent, urban-rural relations, particularly, the value of labor power itself [255, 257, 260, 261; a modem parallel see 403]. As for other reproduction issues, Marx and Engels called universal primary education, and assumed that better wages shorter working hours would take care of the rest, to the extent improvement was possible under capitalism [265]. When housing brought into the analysis, Engels presented its scarcity as relne,diable only by higher wages, and truly resolvable only by an end to capitalist division of labor [1 10]. Despite this lack of treatment of consumption issues, a fraunlewl)rK for their interpretation can be derived from Marx's general de!;cription' of the economic process [257] . Marx identifies four 'moments' capitalist production:

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

93

production in the narrow sense (the application of labor to the 1V4i}nal<:ing of commodities); b) distribution (of the value created among economic classes, i.e. distribution of income and property); circulation (or the exchange and trade of the commodities created their money equivalents); consumption. These form an overall 'circular flow' of activity. act of consumption is both an aspect of a broader process of social :"reprcldu.ction, and an incident in a cycle of economic production. Four ,,::-:"'"" of consumption can be related directly to this schema, and each specific questions: W)N1Drc1du'ction of the service itself and of the built environments and l'��td;;:; �u,sed in its production: what are the institutions and labor se in the construction and housing maintenance industries, and 1 llllJU'irneS making medical equipment and the like for other services? IA.illl are the institutional relations and labor processes in the con­ service industries - education, health care, transportation etc. the system of ownership by which the service is !ptd'dw:ed and provided in a particular social formation: what efteets IR ��s�� O� f housing tenure-homeownership, private rental, public .d p cooperative tenures etc. - have? What are the effects of :O{:::���transportation or the degree of public v. private provision c � o , health care, etc? '(I!tI'Jir,cul'ation, or the financing of these services: are services paid for 'dir,ectilv by the consumer? Are they paid for by the State, and if so by of government and by the taxes of what classes? If credit is involved, where do the loans fit into the process of circulation? :a' @ilt(?01lSumJ'ticm itself: who gets to consume what commodities? social forces determine the levels of consumption? What is the i!1I1con,mnlpt.ion process' (an analogy to the 'labor process') by which the are consumed? Are these consumed collectively or individually? decides on consumption patterns? What ideologies describe and consumption? 'moments' in the process of social reproduction are related expanded reproduction (accumulation) of capital. Consump­ its fmancing 'form part of flows of value and invest­ Consumption forms pan of the overall social structure of

��

8t'�:;t:�

! I

94

MATTHEW EDEL

j

� ��:����

accumulation. The type, collectiveness and process of c� ) affect the family, community, ability to work, and political ness and activity. Finally, because consumption relates to 'wl,ei",� people live', these issues, while not uniquely 'urban' do have a dimension involving family, community and the local State [101 , 5.2.

The housing question: Engels

Engels' 1872 articles on housing includes these major rubrics. began with what is meant by 'housing shortage'. Housing had , become a policy concern because workers housing was 'bad, crowded and unhealthy'. That shortage was nothing new. It noticeable only when it began to affect other classes. 'The sudden of population to the big cities', raised rents and caused Cf(,w,din,g !'5i the middle class [1 10]. Engels was not merely criticizing fickle policy. He housing shortage was a secondary aspect of capitalism, co,m{)ar'ed'wilh, the direct exploitation of worker by capitalist. Responding to the that 'the tenant is in the same position in relation to the nous�,-o'wll<e( as the wage-worker in relation to the capitalist', Engels replied thllttil� relationships are different. In the wage relationship, surplus created and extracted; in the rental relationship, either a COJllllll0CIj!r is exchanged at its value, or if ground rent and additional go'uging'3re involved, surplus value created elsewhere is transferred. This formed part of a general argument that consumption issues secondary aspects of capitalism [1 10]. If secondary meant completely without importance, there no reason for the other sections of The Housing Question. discussed the costs of housing provision, its place in the circu:latiio*' ! value, and the way in which housing is consumed. He spent consider, able time on the economic and ideological aspects of housing and on their relation to the class struggle and accumulation, thf'T,I;�' providing an outline for studying consumption questions in On housing costs and construction, Engels indicated what ",,,,to '," surplus-value revenues house rent covers:

!9f

rent must not only pay the interest on the building costs, but cover repairs and the average amount of bad debts and unpaid well as the occasional periods when the house is untenanted, must pay off in annual instalhnents the building capital which hasl b�

1!iJ

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

95

invested in a house. which is perishable and which in time becomes uninhabitable and worthless . . . . the rent must also pay interest on the ''', increased value of the land upon which the building is ereeled [1 10, p. 201. long as private property and the capitalist market itself are not bolished, rent may be high even if no particular gouging is involved. whether small investors, 'Big Capital' or 'speculators' provided 'oridng-c:la,;s housing, or even if systems of worker homeownership co,-olpelcative ownership were created, many housing costs would same. Blaming 'speculators' for housing's ills was an edlogilcal diversion of blame from the real problems of insufficient income and the inability of even a free market to provide enough

[1 10].

held that apart from ground rent elements in its cost, the or apartment was an ordinary commodity sold according to the of value. Thus he argued that if housing were cheapened this reduce the general wage level and increase profits, rather than iml)fovirl2 workers' housing conditions (see Section 4). He describes (very poor) quality of workers' housing

[109], but says little about

iII. specific components of building cost or the work process in housing R�J� ,:6nstructjon and maintenance. He suggests that schemes for cheaper 'hgllsinlg might just amount to adulteration of the product, because

is so little excess to cut, short of building barracks (today one list shelters for the homeless) instead of apartments, rooms or

[1 10].

analysis is often seen as a general claim that consumer issues only non-central, they are self-defeating for the working class. -I01I1e';or, as indicated above, this need not always hold. Reducing may open the possibility that workers can make the new sur­ part of their accepted living standard, if they are sufficiently

of!:anize<j, combative and persistent [260, 261]. It is in the absence of , organization that Engels' argument holds. This makes it impor­ consider how the consumer struggle itself, as well as the

�Jfistlribluti,on"1 form of consumption (e.g. housing tenure), affects the

'9rg:anization and consciousness of the workers. q'" a,·I, feared that homeownership, and campaigns for ownership , would weaken workers' class consciousness and militancy. He schemes to ameliorate class conflict which flourished in of the Paris Commune. Proposals to sell cheap housing to

96

MATTHEW EDEL

workers were designed to solve several problems, including the of infectious disease, high rents for the middle class, high labor for employers, and social unrest. Engels argued that they lead to greater control over the workers and to worse standards. The argument posited that homeownership would tie workers and force a reduction in wages. Engels cited the immobile cottage· owning rural proletarians in rural Germany, who worked for ex,:eed· ingly low wages, while For our workers in the big cities, freedom of movement is the first tion of their existence, and landownership could be a hindrance to Give them their own houses, chain them once again to the soil and break their power of resistance to the wage cutting of the factory [110j.

Mortgage debts could strengthen the compulsion to stay in one and weaken labor's pow�r even more. Engels also attempted to make a psychological argument about drawbacks of homeownership. He wrote: In order to create the modern revolutionary class of the proletarian it absolutely necessary to cut the umbilical cord which still bound the of the past to the land. The hand weaver who had his little house, and field along with his loom, was a quiet, contented man in all and respectability despite all misery and despite all political pn'SSllre;; I doffed his cap to the rich, to the priests, and to the officials of the and inwardly was altogether a slave [110j.

Engels argued that homeownership reformers wished to restore and feared that homeownership might make workers servile. These arguments depended on specific historical conditions. argument that homeowning workers would be bound to one errlpl,Jye was rendered obsolete for larger metropolitan areas by public which linked working-class residential areas with multiple job [104]. Even in nineteenth century Europe, homeownership could compatible with militancy [247]. Engels' psychological argument based on a stereotype of peasant docility, reinforced by pe'",.Ill" failure to support the Paris workers in 1848 and 1 87 1 . Nelne"theless his suggestion of possible links between housing tenure and milit1mcy

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

97

and his discussion of housing costs and their incidence, provide a

1!/'ra[nevvork for more recent discussions. 5.3.

The housing question: recent treatments

Marxist treatments of housing have been important in dramatiz­ housing problems. Awareness of homelessness, abandonment, ,nv'iromnlerltal hazard, overcrowding and displacement has been raised an informal fraternity of 'housers', including Marxists and non­ reformers. Michael Stone has been particularly influential in �ollUlarizing the concept of 'shelter poverty', as a particular aspect immiseration, even when incomes, as measured officially, are ·PP'lrelltly not falling [366-370] . There is also work on many aspects production, distribution, exchange and consumption [23, 45, 8 1 , 87, 302, 303, 3 1 3]. Analyses o f the housing production process seem t o mirror uneven . development. Studies in different plaees vary as to whether housing is still provided by small producers or large development-construction firms, and whether the labor process of housebuilding has advance
98

MATIHEW EDEL

[370, p. 44]. Workers cannot buy a house out of current wages, must either become renters or buy on credit. In the former case, landlord (a commercial capitalist) must make the investment in the property, expecting a profit on building rents; in the latter and even perhaps for the landlord, part of the capital takes the of loans (mortgages) secured by the building. These investments tied up for a long period. While these loans are reasonably secure, their profitability · ultimately constrained by workers' ability to pay. In the short what workers pay for housing may not be tied to current wages workers cannot quickly alter their housing situation [370]. But longer run the wage limit to repayment creates a problem. Comp'eti' tion among capitalists, and the pressure for profits, normally leads capitalists to shorten the turnover time on capital. But this cannot done for capital tied up in already-built housing (although it may for capital in housing construction, if newly built housing is sold Unless separate sources or 'circuits of capital', which accept de:ferred and lower returns, provide funding for housing, th�, sect()r rna:� bec()m� inviable from a capitalist viewpoint [183] . The segmentation ment markets, which orthodox economics sees as a problem, is seen by Marxists as a condition which facilitates capitalism's operation! Various forms of segmentation may exist. Topalov suggests that source of low-return long-term capital may be family investors se�,kiJ1.�"1 a safe investment, but not expecting as high returns as other ca]pitlilis These 'patrimonial capitalists' were once important investors in buildings in Paris and other cities [386]. Homeowners' another such fund. Homeowners save on rent, but where home:O\\lDe ship is generalized there is no certain tendency to equalize imputed rate of return with capitalists' returns on capital; indeed returns are frequently smaller [104]. Direct State investment, and State-directed bank loans for are the other main sources of funds. Topalov suggests that since low return on holding housing makes investment unlikely, the must make the investment if capitalists are to have their urban force reproduced. The State takes part of capital, or revenues capital, and 'devalues' it by investing at below market retunlS housing, or other 'conditions of reproduction', like hospitals, transit systems, etc. Some 'devalorized capital' may be invested

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

99

dn" hOllsirlg (e.g. public housing), some loaned out for mortgages. The may induce capitalists to invest in housing at below market ,(,OlIUm" , or banks to lend at concessionary rates, through guarantees i��� The theory that 'devalorized capital' is necessary for it accumulation, and is particularly linked to a stage of State­ . monopoly capitalism, is controversial, but the mechanism of segmen­ lation through State investment is certainly possible [41, 235, 384, 384-·386 v. 309, 380, 3 8 1 ] . . suggests one such mechanism of segmentation, by which savings for old age (in the form of savings accounts or pension may be channeled into housing loans to other workers. Thus 'capital' circulated within the working class, is part of the value oflabor power, and is kept separate from other capitals. Interest rates on housing may therefore be below rates on other investments, and ,workers in turn may receive lower returns on their savings than do capitalists on their investments [ l 7 l ] . the postwar US, a system of workers' savings and housing was kept separate by eligibility requirements for deposit and guarantees, which kept the returns on savings lower for small ,savers [207] . Marglin gives partial confirmation to the segmentation ,hypothesis by showing that if housing is classified as a consumer good ,rather than as capital, the working class (and households generally) do ,eelllIlw,.. e net savings over the lifecycle [248]. This suggests that I'n , 'o,,,, unification of banking services and circuits of capital attempted !� l��i�� will raise the cost of money to housing, and thus j$l t to housing shortage. At the same time, working-class saving not be -increased by higher interest rates on savings accounts, because working-class individuals may be saving on a target basis, to 'obtain a planned amount of housing and retirement income, set by the 'historical and moral elements' in the value of labor power. Analysis of the mortgage system and its impact on housing has �5h,"olm. more precise over the past fifteen years. In the early 1970s, was loose discussion of 'finance capital' as the problem in nou'lll,g, without much analysis of whether the problem was lack of or overindebtedness. Later analyses have sorted out more that at certain times credit limitations restricted housing avail­ ability, while at other times, although abundant credit has expanded honsing availability, it has built up debt burdens to a dangerous level 370].

�:�; �� � ;�

J

�:��;�

lI!f�d:�I�

100

MATTHEW EDEL

The distributional and ideological issues of housing tenure, also been analyzed at length. Angotti complains reformers 'believe the problems of tenants can be solved by simply making everyone homeowner, and independent pioneer in the truest individualist tion'. He criticizes 'absurd proposals . . . to improve ghettos by people to buy up their own deteriorating apartments and homes individually or cooperatively)'. These proposals, he states, make economic sense and cannot eliminate the problem. 'Indeed, how changing the title in any way affect the exploitation of working by capitalists, which is the ultimate source of the major contradictiid: in capitalist society?' [14]. Like Engels, some contemporary Marxists fear that the relonmers seek ideological control. There are those who think that control directly and psychologically. Herbert Marcuse argued that there direct relation between ownership and psychological cooptation working class, who 'find their soul in their automobile, hi-fi set, level home, kitchen equipment' [245, p. 9] . The simplistic view consumerism, as direct psychological manipulation has, however, criticized as assuming too passive a working class [407] . In rn'n'T"d: to this view of homeownership as inherently cooptive, Edel, Sclar Luria suggest it was a compromise. Workers pushed for home:o\lme ship not as an ideal, but as the only feasible means for better hn'II" in. , when other alternatives were blocked. It was a partial victory, but not a complete one [104]. Similarly, Ball suggests British occupation be viewed for its success or failure in providing adequacy, rather than treating it as an ideological control system On the other hand there may be a political cost to the working in terms of the breaking up of geographically concentrated political organizations [239]. Others examine whether differentiation of workers into owners and non-homeowners can be divisive, through splits in material interest, rather than through psychological manipulation. and Moore suggest tbat priority in attaining better quality housing (whether homeownership or subsidized public housing) can de':pen: racial splits [319]. Saunders argues that homeowners may obtain fits from rising house prices [336]. Edel, Sclar and Luria suggest declining relative house prices may sometimes feed racist ba.cklash [104]. Kemeny suggests that homeownership can reinforce privati;, zation of other services by redistributing wealth between workers

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

101

rlif'fer'�nl ages, making social security costs more onerous for younger

;Jfamilies [209] .

,

These arguments sometimes claim that 'housing classes' are distinct Marx's production-based classes [319]. This can be restated in �rtPT"n' of possibilities that housing-based class fractions may exist the working class. Either presumes splits over housing are rnan ent and far-reaching. It remains an open question, however, Pe f !! such splits can exist for more than the short run, given that membership puts an overall limit on what housing illv,estlments workers can make. Another question is to what extent the can exist if they do not reflect prior segmentation of the working [102]. !k n� around rent control and public housing are less well Either can sometimes reduce housing speculation, and Lcl 'lliIninish monopoly land rents; thus, their short-run economic effects on workers living standards may be positive. Neoclassical arguments that rent control or public housing must be bad because they interfere with free markets erroneously exaggerate what may be a minor ceteris paribus disincentive into the source of all housing evils. And despite many critiques of public housing quality, some studies find it can be well built [87, 88, 246, 271, 305]. But the Marxist literature has its own eXllgg;enlticm, in the claim that public housing or rent control are to oe sUPl�orted as forms of the 'decommodification' of housing [36, 179, . The assertion that basic necessities should not be commodities make an important point about what a non-capitalist society be like. But assuming that a rent controlled apartment or public �_ .__•...• ceases to be a commodity - rllther than being a commodity Fsubsi(iiz<,d by taxes or by the landlord, or at best freed of a monopoly markup - is not warranted. These analyses do not generally consider how the house or apart­ ment is used. An analysis of the housing consumption process would " also consider the effects of physical housing type, location, relation of the house to the surrounding neighborhood, tenure and a host of other factors on its use. This analysis has been begun by feminist i'iamlly�;ts who argue that the separation of house from workplace, and the isolation of the nuclear family in a separate housing unit, involve . separation from wider class, community and kinship networks. These be compounded by house design (placement and type of rooms, of privacy, etc.). The argument focuses on the marginalization

�����:

I

! I

102

MATTHEW EDEL

of women, and the claims on their time for housework and community", activities (e.g. transporting children) engendered by isolation of the homes [1 87, 415]. Hayden traces Utopian proposals for communal activities, ranging from common kitchens for an apartment house to communal shared living spaces. It amounts, she argues, to a 'long history of revolt against the single family home' [188]. How that 1C"UlI,, " and its suppression, affected working-class consciousness, bella"IO!' T and organizing remains to be analyzed. In the underdeveloped capitalist countries , divisions have occurred over 'auto-construction'. Non-market construction on purchased is extremely widespread. Turner praises self-help construction, ar:gUlng it is more fitted to working-class family needs than are houses pnDvide(j by governments or landlords [388]. Pradilla and Burgess argue that self-help housing is not lower in real cost than other housing, but rather is built by workers' own unpaid labor, and hence represents self- ' exploitation. The generalized availability of self-help housing, they argue, allows wages to be kept low [48, 307, 3 10]. These arguments, however, fail to account for worker support fan self-help, rent control or government housing, apart from claiming that it represents a mistaken priority for workers' movements. More specific examination suggests that there may be benefits to workers from more control over housing, but also some downward pressure on wages from its availability. Housing movements may sometimes be divisive, but at other times constitute to a broader workers' milit�mcy in both developed and underdeveloped capitalist nations. 5.4

Transit and the journey to work

Analyses of other services may be made paralle(to that for llVU>lll� • • Of these other services, the one most interlinked with housing is that of commuter transit. Transit, unlike housing, is not a universal need. In rural societies, the house may be within the 'workplace' farm while other production, such as weaving, takes place within the house. Mines, military bases and factories, may have dormitories for laborers. Part of the laboL'" reproduction process, the raising of families, may then be separated from the workplace in workers' home villages, but day-to-day rel)ro,- ' duction (eating, sleeping, recreation) is tied to the place of work In the precapitalist city, workshops frequently doubled as homes

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

103

owners' families and as dormitories for workers and appren­ The large-scale separation of family housing from workplaces ial)pe,arl,d in the early cities of mercantile capitalism, and become more e] al1tom()bile and the various forms of public transit. Baran and Sweezy the individually-owned automobile as having been promoted to create effective demand and as an ideological push to further inldh'idllate and divide workers [28]. Others suggest important rela­ > tion,;hiIJS between transport modes and land developers or transport > rnOllOI)olies. Thus, trolley and subway systems have been shown to promoted by those seeking land rents by developing suburbs [104, 124]. The demise of trolley lines has been > to automobile monopolies, which used their financial and /plJlitical power to eliminate a competing mode of transit [355]. Work later periods stresses the power exercised by auto and construction
>f.�:��:��o:t�o

t�;��;�:;: ������

104

MATTHEW EDEL

transit systems may be private, cooperative or municipal. It has been' argued that private automobile ownership and use reinforces SUla�l,\!!" atomization and commodity fetishism, but the issue has not been clusively researched. A large amount of literature has examined possible biases in the choice between modes [103] and particularly the setting of fares public transit [97, 344, 416]. These generally favor individual mobile commuting. Most Marxists accept the neoclassical conclusion that in the presence of economies of scale, profitability or break-even pricing sets fares above marginal cost. Subsidy may therefore beneficial not only to transit users, but to broader accumulation well. In general, Marxists have supported campaigns for greater transit subsidy, e.g. in the defense of the Greater London Council [37]. However, the possibility that commuter subsidies to workers may passed on to employers through lower wages has not been carefully explored. 5.5

Schooling and education

Education is one of a series of 'human services' components of the value of labor power. While education through the family, appren­ ticeships, religious institutions and even formal schools capitalism, the formalizing of education into universal schooling be traced to the expansion of industrial capitalism. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis suggest the importance of working class schooling for the reproduction of capitalism as a system of inequality. They with 'the fact that schools produce workers, [43, p. 10]: Schools contribute to profit through their training functions, and by stabilizing the system through their ideological functions.

I��:;�:��e

On the one hand, by imparting technical and social skills and a� motivations, education increases the productive capacity of the On the other hand, education helps defuse and depoliticize the po'tentially explosive class relations of the production process, and thus serves perpetuate the social, political and economic conditions through a portion of the product of labor is expropriated in the form of profits [43, pp. 10-1 1].

The training function is similar to the traditional view of edlucaLtio,n which 'explains the increased value of an educated worker by treating

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

105

worker as a machine'. But Bowles and Gintis challenge human �cilpH:a] theory for ignoring that education for productivity is also � � ' iDlcuiocatio" of motivations, and willingness to be treated as a machine. explore parallels between the apparent rigidities and stupidities working-class education (e.g. the demand that six-year-olds sit still) the atmosphere of the shop or office floor in hierarchical occu­ . For workers slotted for these positions, education in subser­ is 'appropriate' career education [43, cf. 5 1 , 65]. 'Jlc)wles and.Gintis hold that the school system legitimates inequality, being open and meritocratic, but in practice apportioning in relation to parental class. They demonstrate statistical lation:shi]ps between parental income and offspring's school per­ and eventual occupational rewards. Controlling for IQ it does not alter outcomes (it is probably invalid for measuring !'�:W::anythiIlg but class background). The recognition of social control by the school raises questions of origins of that control. Bowles and Gintis argue that universal sec:ondalry schooling was imposed on workers by the bourgeoisie, to !1I� "4!loeru:ure control and the shaping of skills to specific corporate needs Gorelick, however, argues that workers did fight for more :�l lcation, and that its expansion should be treated as a working-class icoDlqm:st in the face of opposition [1 50], although a gain not free of

1

V�;:������ :

nt

fI

: htra,jictory elements [151]. Both [43, 150] reject the liberal view of �§ <;duication as spread in a conflictless way by economic progress and modernization. further literature concerns the relation of public to private rruLlIlllg, and the division of control between different political juris­ H is almost self-evident that unsubsidized private education meet working-class needs, so the public-private debate is a debate at aU. However, there has been criticism of the ,0 : ct ) of education by large bureaucratic schools. Even studies do not relate schooling to the class system as a whole, or which ,focus only on schooling for oppressed minorities, echo Bowles' and parallel of the school with the factory, in terms of both students' teachers' conditions. The result in US studies is frequently a tdei ital ld for more community control over schools. the existing level of state or municipal control over schools in US appears initially to contrast with the more centralized systems EUlTope. But the outcomes app�ar to be relatively similar in most

�i���; : �

106

MATTHEW EDEL

capitalist countries. American authors are concerned with the of school inequality between cities and suburbs, and between dominantly-white educational jurisdictions and communities of of color. These conflicts have been an important divisive force the working class, and Marxists have debated the extent to school intergration or local control may exacerbate or ameliorate splits [157]. On the other hand, debates in Europe tend to COllcelltra more on central government policy. The main point, as in treatment of housing, concerns the degree to which education create splits in the working class, or ideological mechanisms of as opposed to providing a necessary consumer service. 5.6.

Public assistance and social services

The typical Marxist analysis of public assistance is similar to education. The initial argument attacks a liberal belief that programs are a sign of general progress under capitalism, or of benevolence of the bourgeois State. Programs are seen as a to worker pressure, and thus in part as a victory for the workers, they are also seen as designed to control the working class. The paradigm arguments were made by Piven and Cloward, argued that 'welfare' programs in the US served two functions: to and 'cool out' discontent, and to channel labor to low wage work. compared the British Spenhamland system of the late 1700s, federalization of US relief during the 1930s, and the eXllanlSlG1ll welfare rolls in the 1 960s in the face of Black unrest. They argued the purpose of these programs was to contain and limit threats to system in times of social disruption. But the structure of programs also enforced work discipline on low-waged and employed workers through a number of procedures, in,;lu,dinlg sonal availability of grants in monocrop areas, conditions pl"Ce'J other grants, and a general stigmatization, which made workers to avoid welfare by keeping their jobs no matter how exploitative This generally negative picture is leavened by the authors selves, who argue that welfare was in part a conquest by 'poor movements' and that further action to expand the welfare rolls force reform in a direction more favorable to recipients and [297]. They, and other authors, also note the role of welfare emplo,y, as a group which may push for change, because their work

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

107

them under the same bureaucratic constraints that it places on 'clients' [410]. Recently, Piven and Cloward have been pushed a defense of the welfare system and the welfare State against cOlase.rvaltiv·e attacks on those expenditures. They argue that these prclgnuns, despite their negative aspects, do provide some benefits, malmam some floor under the value of labor power. They further ";:cI�tic:ize the argument that welfare programs are necessarily financed tax burden on employed workers. The argument is consistent with :,Mano', and Engels' value theory, although its value theory assumptions ' not explicit [298]. C,:,' I'arall,,1 debates occur over specific social services (e.g. day care for t)'lc)rking mothers). These systems and services, as well as general relief, .�'ha,'e also come under increasing scrutiny from a feminist perspec­ which suggests their role is to control women as a gender-grouping, as (perhaps) controlling the working class and splitting it gender lines [2]. Services tied to specific employment do have 'cha�n,elirlg effects. They may try to coopt specifically militant sectors the working class, or create islands of privilege among workers (a �-I'!:noro11.1 to privileged housing fractions), but they also represent partial X!9t.ori,es for class and gender struggles. i more technical application of value theory is used to analyze ! private pensions and public social security programs into which workers (or their employers) pay during their working years. Treat­ of these funds either as deferred wages or as savings by workers of their wages, seems to weaken the link between the value of labor and immediate subsistence needs [7 1 , 1 7 1 ] . However, the rela­ �:tii6n:ship may still be stipulated, because the offer of retirement pay fesiPOIlds to a situation in which workers' job performance is enhanced their having some sense of security that they will be taken care of retirement. Pressure for this may come from workers themselves, employers eager to ensure loyalty. (Threat and response are to sort out here, as in the other cases of cooptive reform.) In either the retirement period may become accepted as a necessary part , reproduction, and hence included in the value of labor power. Wtl ;!\s!;un ling retirement benefits are a necessary reproduction cost, payment creates a problem. For pensions to work as part of the they must be linked to past work experience, and records of that be kept bureaucratically. Support of the elderly from current g01lefllment revenues is avoided, beca'"use that would mix the origin of

,R

n'

108

MATTHEW EDEL

these payments with others not linked to past work, and the ideological link between pension support and individual incentive. For this reason, individual companies or national security systems must set funds aside when workers are employed, their later use as retirement annuities [71]. This creates large pools of savings, under the control of representing employers, labor unions, or the State. These funds important in the financing and control of investment. Some aUithor� suggest the result is a form of 'pension fund socialism', but control over the funds may give workers some leverage capitalism, the system still depends on perpetuation of the relationship. Hence these reforms are capitalist by their nature. worker-ownership of housing, pension funds may appear to workers' property but in reality create capital within and for a caJ)it2tli system. Indeed, the two reforms may merge, when pensions are for mortgages for working-class housing [171, 209, 323]. An important aspect of social security or pension funds is the to which they are individual or collective in their application. workers' pensions are tied to particular finns' survival, or different' workers have different pension options, objective bases for dh'isi" n in the working class are created or reinforced, whereas a national system creates an objective incentive for working-class darity. While pension systems may be cooptive to a point, they also represent a conquest by the working class. This appears to be case in which an informal value analysis points to working-class . directions [71]. 5.7. Health and medical care Marxist treatment of health issues goes back to Engels, for public health, like housing, exemplified the narrowness of bOllrgeoil concern. The poor always suffered ill health, but the issue oeloarne public question only because epidemics that began among the ; could spread to the capitalists [1 10, p. 38]. The result was that n.. lo,";;'' health reforms were introduced parallel to housing reforms. (Rece:ntl.y AIDS was also underestimated as long as it could be seen as .ff',c1'in, only stigmatized groups, and ouly later recognized as a wider But Engels also held that capitalist conditions create he�uttl pr'oblenlS'� for the workers,

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

109

drunkenness among the workers is a necessarY product of their living conditions, just as necessary as typhus, crime, vermin, bailiff and other social ills, so necessary in fact that the average figures of those who succumb to inebriety can be calculated in advance [llO , p. 44] .

also cited health problems stemming directly from work fatigue. :Me.delrn Marxist treatments often emphasize that health problems are by job stress and unsafe working conditions. supply and distribution of health care became a central issue Marx's and Engels' day. The experiences of national health in Europe, and the lack of such a system in the US, are a focus. Health care organization came to parallel the housing issue. Private health care was criticized for leading to medical mc>uopoily (limited training of doctors, high costs), and private .payment for health care was shown to leave adequate care beyond workers' means. Thus socialized medicine was advocated. The alter­ native reform, State payment for health care through national health .in;suran(;e or welfare systems was seen as better than nothing, but was criticized for amounting to a traltSfer from the State budget to a medical monopoly, with only minimal trickling down to the workers. :"'Furthennore such reforms, by putting different groups of workers into differellt systems, might split working-class interests [92, 105, 107,

!W

Stuciies of health care production and distribution have examined by pharmaceutical companies, physician organizations, uU'I'''''' centers and other large private 'health empires' [105]. How­ support for a socialized solution has been tempered by the reali",tielU that provision by a capitalist state would be uneven. certain minima had been achieved, medical care in Bri­ tain, for example, was better for the bourgeois than for the workers [92] . John Ehrenreich has summed up much of the Marxist literature on health care as encompassing an 'economic critique': medical care is treated as a commodity like any other; the important things about medical care can then be derived from the general laws for the production and distribution of commodities . . . The primary problems that the political economic critic identifies by this analytical approach, then, are distributional [107, p. 16).

110

MATTHEW EDEL

This critique, however, is only part of the Marxist analysis of he:.ltllr! A second, 'cultural' critique examines processes of production and consumption in medical care, and the very definition of medicine and > health: medical care as we know it-i.e., as it has developed in society-is not just an unambiguously useful commodity like asparagus or shoes or swimming lessons. Like many other more complex com­ modities, it is thoroughly permeated with capitalist priorities and talist social relations. Not merely the distribution, not merely transaction between doctor and patient, but the medical technology (which is based on certain assumption about the nature of processes, the causation and cure of disease, the relations of i� to their own bodies and to social processes) embodies the social created by capitalist society [107].

������:�

This is, of course, parallel to the situation for housing in ways. As Ehrenreich comments:

..«"".u

There are many other cases in which apparently neutral and obJiectiv technology is in fact penetrated by and helps recreate the social rel'.tio'nl which developed it; the single family housing unit presupposes created) a noncollective mode of living; individual automobiles imply entire conception of use of energy. use of time. and spatial organization of society; assembly line production techniques and machinery assume and reinforce the separation and antagonistic relation between m,m,u anu manual labor; and so forth [107].

Indeed, some Marxists argne that there are not merely 'many other cases' of non-neutral technology: the entire notion of autonomous science can be questioned [16]. The medical case is certainly one in which a large number of influences come into play. On the other hand, initial resistance to notion of medicine as intrinsically affected by outside interests has with more resistance than would a statement that housing type is so affected. After all, alternative forms of housing are readily visible within the advanced capitalist nations, but an alternative to mc)de:rn medicine, on first glimpse, seems hopelessly inferior. Nonetheless, critiques of specific medical practices have developed. Mental health care, particularly institutionalizing

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECfIVES

111

!i:p�ltients for a variety of symptoms, was one key area of critique. Critics

went from the specifics of wrongful institutionalization and an analysis of how institutions control patients, to a view that the very definition ImaU'.1 health and mental illness was suspect. Similarly, the feminist nOllenler,t began to examine the medical treatment of women, and from a critique of sexist behavior by doctors in the dispensing , , ofmed.icine, to the clainl that the very definition of medical conditions served to control women, making natural reproductive functions appear as illnesses, limiting behavior, subjecting women to dangerous Ji1,�dil�al procedures, and restricting their resistance in both the work­ and the family [106, 107, 149]. The cultural critique suggests that the very model of individual medical care is inadequate, for ignoring environmental considerations and public health activities [ 1] . It tends to blame patients for having flle ([ise,as!", diverting attention from social causes [106, 107, 281 ] . The of public health campaigns in China helped to dramatize '
�il,{i!

i�,

:I1�.b����:!�C'�� ';Ij

W

Recreation and 'cultural affairs' '"'RecI'eallio:nal activities are, etymologically, part of social reproduction. The importance of time to rest and refresh oneself between stints of labor was clear to Marx, for whom the reduction of the working day " the most important gain that the working class could make, short the achievement of socialism [213, 260, 261]. Later, Baran and " Swe,�zy argued that the expansion of leisure expenditures was part of a general process of the absorption of surplus in certain stages of

112

MATTHEW EDEL

capitalism [28]. Nonetheless, specific leisure activities were analyzed. Recent works on recreation are closer to the cultural criltiqlles medicine than to the economic critiques. They focus on the ideological messages that accompany leisure activities, and the to which these serve social control, or the unification or <er,ar:Hi(ln !"(. workers. Some suggest that mass communications have led individualized patterns of recreation to replace earlier cOlmnlUllai,() intra-class forms, with possible effects on class consciousness 245] . Others suggest some liberation potential in at least some The literature on the content and form of the arts (e.g. on either folk or avant-garde forms can be liberating or cOlltr'olling) large and diverse. The point of agreement among Marxists is a �r"w;ir\. belief in the importance of these cultural issues [15, 69]. Some work has been done on the interplay of class forces and sciousness in specific recreational activities. Historians have sidered the role of sport in the formation of class or na·tion1 consciousness [197, 204], and the ideologies with which parks, . galleries and other such facilities were designed [76, 419]. Some has been shown to involve implicit or explicit attempts at social cOlatriol over the working class. Other cases, as varied as the internal tioning of recreational parks and the organization of popular among oppressed groups, have shown possibilities for the shaping recreational activities in the direction of popular resistance [59, The production and distribution of recreation are related to cultural content in Mario Gaviria's study of Spanish vacation for northern European tourists [134]. Many of these tourists workers who take charter tours on their vacations. Gaviria shows hotels are organized spatially and administratively to ensure tourists will spend most of their time, and their money, at the or on excursions arranged by it. Because hotels are deliberately away from towns, tourists receive a very selective or cOlllplete fictional view of Spanish life, which hides the parallel between usual conditions as industrial workers and that of Spanish The Spain depicted is more underdeveloped than Spain actuallY Gaviria describes it as an image more out of Hollywood's sterecltyt of Mexico than out of Spanish reality. Thus, northern European tionalism and contempt for Spain, rather than international soilid,l.ril'y are reinforced.

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

113

. This cultural exaggeration of the North-South split in Europe ianillels unequal exchange between the two regions. Many workers serve German tourists in the hotels during part of the year migrate { in other seasons as 'guest workers' in agriculture. Thus the y of real and imagined advantages of being northern is both t "cQmplex and controlling for both groups. !fhis study is one of a set of works on 'espacia de ocio' (idleness or leisure space). In other works, Gaviria considers parks built in Spain, Spanish use, examining how their design orients them for different and amplifies either individual or collective patterns of use [133, Gaviria and Lefebvre also discuss the general relation of the '.ca�)italist work-leisure distinction to changing views of urban and rural [133, 221 , 224] .

��:������ ,

Police and 'criminal justice'

further 'service' is often treated apart from the rest, although it in the same budgets as health, education and welfare. Policing 'criminal justice' are not neatly classified as contributions to labor reproduction. In Marx's original formulation, the function of the police was to maintain class rule by the bourgeoisie, through what­ ever repression was necessary. Police work is unproductive labor par a cost of maintaining the system, but yielding neither nor a better quality of work force [ 1 10, 261 , 265]. If the other &i\,.;rv;ce< have a social control dimension, the apparatus of precincts, and prisons is pure social control. control mechanism has not wanted for Marxist study. The use police for strikebreaking, riot control and other forms of repression is well documented. Similarly, the very definition of crime has been studied. Marxist criminology has argued that the 'labeling' of activities crimes, and of crimes as serious or not, function to protect capital, stigmatize and punish the poor. The respective treatment of major C rime and petty individual crime is an example of this. , police treatment and punishment by race, and the gender­ I'I ,)pe:cific definition of certain crimes has also been demonstrated [77, 145, 3 14]. recent years it has become clear that however much police, courts . prisons are used in a class-bound way, and however much crime defined to control the working class, there remains a degree to which

�i������a�c

114

MATIHEW EDEL

the working class needs and expects a degree of safety and stability ' its neighborhoods, which may require pOlicing [77]. Much criminology has ignored real fears of crime while showing the control side of crime control. Even if crime is exaggerated by media, and if the pressures of capitalism generate 'criminal' bellaviorl a core of real victimization and fear exists. Not to address it has the issue of safety to the political right wing [1, 77], But what analysis is needed? Reducing the isolation of crime cOlltr()I! studies from those of other service areas might suggest that ..••••_ .-_.•, work is a polar case in terms of a balance of control versus it shares their tension between system-maintenance (repression) reproduction-serving goals. A study of the origins of programs , juvenile delinquents, for example, is quite parallel to the studies above of welfare and education [299]. The comparison of policing with other services would attention to the work process in police forces, prisons, and 'protective' institutions, and its relation to police ideology [77, Actual police work often involves more intervention in domestic putes than it does crime-solving. Studies suggest the tension incompatible goals and demands on the police shapes an attitude isolation and alienation from the public, The relation of police , communities from which they are recruited and in which they needs careful study. The relation of police to Black ghetto borhoods was well documented in the 1 96Os, and led to calls community control of the police. In the US, police work has a paradigm 'working class' activity, both in the media and in perceptions of white working class communities [16]. What that for social control and social division may need particular study. 5.10. Common elements in the analysis of reproductive services

Juxtaposing the above analyses shows common elements. Some been absorbed from a common Marxist tradition; others have loped independently because problems are parallel. The parallels gest that social services need to be studied as a group, paradigm that relates reproduction to accumulation, and with tion to points made by both 'cultural' and 'economic' critiques. Because 'human services' involve direct contact between Of(lvi(ier' and consumer, the consumption process and the relation of emlpl,)ye:e

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

115

user are more complex than for other commodities. The alienation of teacher from student, doctor from patient, or police officer from .w"clltzen differs from the simple anonymity and loss of control over one's ' labor product that characterizes most capitalist production. There are pOs:sic,ili1:ies of sympathy between producer and consumer, as well as pos:sic,ili1:ies of alienation and conflict. Except in beh:ind-the-scenes as in repair shops and on construction sites, the producer is both allied with and opposed to the user of the service. This personal ambiv­ alence is reinforced by the contradictory nature of the services them­ as helpful to workers but also to accumulation, as service but cooptation [410]. From an economic perspective, the joint analysis of different services is implicit in Castells' argument that the various elements of , social reproduction and its support by the State form a joint 'urban quc:stion' [53]. While Castells' position was couched in general terms, Marx;,.! analyses of the mid-1970s 'fiscal crisis' involved a more­ iennere!e application wh:ich drew on various specific-service studies. The leading analysis of the fiscal crisis, by James O'Connor, began with a statement of the general functions of the domestic state as 'legiti­ ',mlltio'n and accumulation', wh:ich echoed the specific treatment of the out and channeling functions of welfare, or the training and " ',ideological functions of education [285]. O'Connor's 'accumulation function' is wider than Castells' formu­ lation of services as providing for 'collective consumption', since it iIn,:lwles both services to assist the reproduction of labor power and that serve capitalist enterprise directly. His term 'legitimation' be too narrow, unless it is read to include repression as well as ,ideological inanipulation through service benefits. But O'Connor's formulation encapsulates the split roles that bedevil service workers, 'wl,ether they are politically conscious service providers or alienated I, police [285]. , But seeing the commonalities only in terms of 'functions', may be " too limited. It suggests that the entire system fits smoothly into a process of capitalist control [224]. Perhaps at some times it does, but ', sometimes the two functions pull in different directions. Provider­ sympathies can breed alliances; at times, mobilization by clients or on service employees can intervene. In these cases, demanding more ' in the way of services may be possible. This argument is even stronger if reforms to services can also be demanded, along the lines suggested

116

MATIHEW EDEL

by the 'cultural critique', so that better, as well as more, services being demanded. This suggests that consumer issues should not be written off as quickly as Engels seems to suggest, even as it suggests difficulties. But before any final conclusion about possibilities is raised, the entire or urban services must also be looked at through a wider lens, sees reproduction more thoroughly embedded in the mode of pro" duction, and clarifies the nature of the State. 6.

THE URBAN QUESTION. COMMUNITY AND THE STATE

The previous section assumed an analytic separation between social reproduction and commodity production. It also took for gnlllleu" divisions between levels within the sphere of reproduction: the the community, and the State. But neither the relationship "'.'n"•• production and reproduction, nor the complexity of relationship within these spheres, can be assumed away. Analyses that assume these separations are inherently limited. The separate analysis of reproductive services was given pl'WSlOllll) by structuralist analysis, which saw capitalism as at once an ferentiated whole, and a structure made up of substructures mined (or 'overdetermined') by the whole [9, 10]. This approach sought to overcome the limits of a Marxism which only looked at production in a narrow sense. But within the structural whole, it,was possible redivide the field of study in a somewhat arbitrary way. Thus, Ca.steU� implied that social reproduction (the 'urban question') could be apart from capitalist production (the 'regional question') [53]. Po.u­ lantzas was able to unify family, community, and government by defining all of them as the unit of ideological reproduction control, which he identified as 'the State' [306]. This structuralist vision has been criticized for ignoring diction within the structure, and hence having no theory of (compare [194, 195]), and for ignoring struggle and praxis, or human agency [153, 224, 309, 337, 382]. But it not simply a matter of ing struggle and contradiction; rather the unities and divisions production-reproduction, and family-community-State need to seen in a different way. Important new analytical questions on the Marxist agenda COI�ce'rn·

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

117

subjects - thejamily, (including issues of gender and patriarchal Q'olDllll a'CIOIl);' the larger-than-jamilial groupings of peoples (ethnicity, \'c nationality); the community (as a set of non-market, non-State between people that may include family and ethnic ties), and State itself, along with the very question of the productionrelationship. , ,, These questions were placed on the agenda by social movements in !lph,ere of reproduction: community or 'urban' struggles, and liber­ ","'.rlOn movements based on gender, sexuality and sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, religion and nationality [42, 44, 54, 57, 85, 275, 310]. These new movements posed strategic problems for Mar­ w.,..•.o. currents, presenting both opportunities and challenges to older on workplace organization, unions and socialist parties. New ,literatun" on gender relations, racism, nationality, community and :211sci'Dmmess posed fundamental questions of the centrality of pro­ and the working class in Marxist thought and socialist politics. questions also had a spatial dimension. Empirical studies ,un,cmfen,d linkages between the workplace and the family or com­ A new literature of 'labor and community studies' first P ' lhere the link was most obvious: where older blue-collar i were threatened by loss of male jobs to deindustria­ tCi iitic,n [83, 212], or where new female employment expanded [32,

f'ti1!Ulle

6;:�:��� :w�

!lii

. But its questions extended beyond such specific cases, to such

'.;"is!llles as the general relation of urbanization to militancy [197]. The side to new movements also became part of an abstract debate issue of physical space itself [53, 55, 152, 159, 185, 221, 225,

353, 356].

Static separation and grouping of spheres did not resolve the 'qu.estions. The initial result has sometimes been frustration and a aogmaillc search for the primacy of one or the other social split or Qjitraclicl:iOll. But the complex relationship between these questions 7r�"'"' be ignored.

The property rights paradigm and the new questions

I:tn�����

�rle :"pclssible approach may be to look for parallels between these 'questions' and one whose treatment is more developed: the of property ownership and rent discussed earlier. As indicated Section 4 above, landownership and rent were necessary for

�J

118

MATTHEW EDEL

capitalism to function, but they also created difficulties accumulation of capital. As Plotkin argues, 'Capitalism rests on , twin forces of exclusion and expansion' [300, p . 9). 1 \ The system uses landownership, a reworked precapitalist it; �:�lt exclude workers from gaining enough access to resources to their proletarian condition, as well as to regulate resource capitalists and, perhaps, to divide workers into homeowner non-homeowner fractions. But these same property rights divisions are also a problem for capitalist accumulation, capital less flexible, barring some profitable investments, capitalists and burdening some with rents. This situation may be a paradigm for the 'new questions' that Marxist analysis. Family and gender divisions, community, ettmlC:lt race and nationality, and the State also are reworked pn:capital phenomena, which took new roles under capitalism. All necessary for the survival and functioning of capitalism as a yet they also became contradictory to capitalism's functioning perhaps even survival, in a variety of ways.

�::���i�

6. 1.1. The State The parallel is clearest for the State, which like private property, become territorial in its very definition unlike earlier lineage or based units [ I l l) . In precapitalist class societies, the State was the monopolist of force, the highest receiver of rent-like tribute, the protector of more local forms of property, as well as the of borders. But capitalism's origins paralleled the State's transf'orr tion into a specific form, the Nation-State. The Nation-State is at a partially autonomous, tax-fed apparatus; the militarized deferldeiJ borders; the mobilizer of quasi-kin national-ethnic ties; the and supporter of the basic institutions of a new Capitalist order; the arbitrator of class and other conflicts within that order [50, 64, 153, 205, 226, 273, 274, 285, 306, 346). The development of capitalism and of the Nation-State were merely contemporaneous; they reinforced each other although at tirrl each blocked the other's development. Losing a source of power direct receiver of rents, the State achieved new powers. It becalne" receiver of taxes and a regulator of accumulation. Capitalists see it as a barrier to accumulation, but it was also a pflDmlot.:r accumulation [285). Its specific roles as capitalist State, as

��!41

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

119

'plli'''"'g committee for the bourgeoisie, as mediator between them and , the proletariat or the land-based gentry, and as structure supporting �ccumlUlllticm and legitimation, are all important parts of its existence. it has its own coherence as apparatus, as defender of territory and 9fi!antizf'f of nationality, and as defender of its own existence [138]. State might not be able to survive in its present forms if it were 'useful' for capital. But it would not instantaneously wither away capital's absence or in the face of capital's enmtity. The capitalist ,."' "'�" apparatus may be more or less tied to the specific and conscious '» '�gesires of a capitalist ruling class [273, 274]. But it is always at least "partilllly autonomous. This autonomy is useful to capital, up to a +lI:,�,p'Jml, because this lets the State function mare smoothly in capital's tll!.llt lon!:-te:rm interests [306] . But it can never be fully autonomous because financing depends on the accumulation process [38, 286]. Thus the as a whole, has a history and a contradictory role, needed and "'reviled by capital. Tw'entie1:h century experience has shown there is a similar problem for attempts to construct a Sociallst order. The State has a contra­ , dietory role in a society dominated by the proletariat, which needs a apparatus to defend itself and coordinate production, but risks ",,",m•• n to domination by the State bureaucracy, which may even begin act like a new class [1 1 , 138, 375]. This makes the question of State particularly important for Marxist theory in the present

{

The family and gender similar approach may be taken in the case of the other elements of reproduction. One set of elements involves the system of gender t ' and its relalionship to the family as a system of social . Gender relationships, of course, are not only involved the family. Workplace stratification by gender is both important to ;'CalJitalist labor supply regulation and social control, and, at times, a to effective use of labor and hence to accumulation. But this of stratification is generally linked also to the division of labor .»� 1l , itl,in the family, which may itself take on many forms: nuclear or nenaea, consanguinal or constructed in other ways. The family also � ,�rlte(lat'!S capitalism, but has been greatly reshaped by the rise of ,caIJitlllism, and by changes between the social structures of accumu­ in different periods of capitalism.

�; ;��!����:�:� I

I 'I

'I

I

'i

120

MATTHEW EDEL

Feminists argue that patriarchy, or some form of gender do.mi:m tion, has survived changes in the mode of production, from society to the present, including recent attempts to establish SO':1aJllS societies [l08, 304, 327, 339, 357]. Some feminists therefore see division and reproduction as involving different questions from class, while others attempt to develop a parallel historical rialist model, based on division of labor in child rearing, and reproduction from generation through generation [63, 324]. But argue that most societies have been male-dominated for at least as as they have been class-divided leaves open questions about whletlj(, there have been stages in genderdomination, synchronous or non-1;yn· chronous with changes among class modes of production. The parallel to the transformations of property suggests patriarchal domination was transformed by capitalism, rather created out of whole cloth; that capitalism is both restricted supported by gender domination; and that while capitalist institlItic)tl. support patriarchy (although challenging some of its m�mil'esl:atioI1$ they are not its sole support. 6.1.3. Race/ethnicity/nationality A parallel analysis may also be possible for 'race', ethnicity nationality. Each of these purports to be a grouping of people than the family, but based somehow on quasi-familial ties of traditio or 'blood'. Groupings of people into perceived units ('we' as oppose to 'they') antedate capitalism, but capitalism and its associated in migration, labor patterns and State borders have affected in the definitions of specific 'ethnic' and 'national' groups, even the very definitions of 'ethnic' and 'national' membership. approach parallel to that for the evolution of property rights look at the transformation of earlier forms of group delnarcaltio inclusion/exclusion and xenophobia, and their specific tra.nslforitIi: tions into racism, ethnocentrism and nationalism in relation to the of capitalism. Current theoretical debate centers particularly on whether race separate and autonomous category for analysis, parallel to class gender, and indeed on whether there is any biological basis to categorization of human variation into a taxonomy of a few [154]. Here, again, the categories are socially constructed. The biological definition of race as a categorization of humanity into

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

121

few racial categories appeared in its present form only with the rise of capitalism and European expansionism. Within capitalism, certainly, there is reason to see racism as both something that has become so strong that (like patriarchy) it might outlast capitalism if separately confronted and as a phenomenon that has changed its 160l"tel"t in response to changes in capitalism [139]. A similar analysis of the rise and fall of other ethnic categories [364] and of national identification and ideology can also be made. And recent experience shows that these, too, are serious problems for attempts to create so·cialist movements or systems. In the gender and racial-ethnic cases, the parallels to property exclusion do not only involve issues of historical origin and change. They also involve tension between the functionality and disfunction­ ality of these elements for capitalism. Both racial/ethnic domination, female subordination (and other manifestations of gender domi­ like the oppression of homosexuality, or the general repression of sexuality) may be useful to capitalism as means of control, division of opposition, channeling of labor, and provision of 'unpaid' labor (by housewives, slaves etc.). But at times these dominations become p � caPital's ability to expand, as barriers to female or minority �� in certain parts of the labor force slow down proletarian­ jj ; iZation or the retraining of the proletariat. Repression can breed resis­ tance to the entire social order. And capital's attempts to moderate racial-ethnic or sexual barriers, out of a need either to cool off dissent, to overcome barriers to labor recruitment and accumulation, can th"m!,ei1res create costly new institutional arrangements. The same 'COllfusion of forces iliat occurs over land-use control occurs over such . racial/ethnic/national issues as affirmative action, desegregation, inunigration policy, etc. Indeed, many land-use control disputes are :t!tthelns('lv'�s specifically related to these other conflicts.

���; �;::t;o�

The community question .A final parallel concerns the notion of 'community', the general question of whether there can be socially effective ties between people . from market or State relationships. This question is important the local level, but also applicable to broader levels of society. There is a tendency in the social sciences to see the breakdown of all forms of association, apart from participation in commodity relationships, as an inevitable and unidirectional result of capitalist

122

MATIHEW EDEL

expansion. The sociological tradition focuses on local community which are seen as having involved non-instrumental roles, ties affection, and the like [352]. As Gottdiener [153] points out, Marx capitalism as needing to weaken these ties, which allowed some from the need to sell labor power, and limited capital's freedom action. But some local community ties, as well as some bf()acle: networks of community-type relationships, continue to exist. These associational ties involve elements of non-commodity rial support, through informal networks as well as formal na:rtj"j: patory organizations. As supports to daily life, they may play important role in social reproduction. This role can include fostering of networks of resistance to capital, but also the efficient (i.e. low cost) reproduction of labor, and the refocusing of discontent efforts at local community building. Thus, once again, it can be "",no.,_ that capital has a contradictory relationship with a set of ins,(itl�tiIJn!: of social reproduction; it sometimes finds community to be a but sometimes a need. The State, which sometimes suppresses munity, may sometimes also seek to encourage it, at least limited and specified channels [18, 3 1 8] . And while there is a ten,dency for market forces (commodification) and State bureaucratization weaken the community, labor resistance tp capital sometimes retmilds community institutions [7, 42, 44, 85]. Society's reproductive and perhaps a basic human need for affiliation, also press in direction. Marxists have had a contradictory attitude toward movements preserve or restore community, sometimes seeing them as re!;istan,ce ll,� capital or the State, sometimes attacking them as hackoward-lo(lking, divisive of the working class (hy fostering localisms and ethnic or by allying local sectors of the working class with local Cal)it�tlislts This contradictory attitude reflects the contradictory roles that munity and social networks may play [74, 208, 3 1 8] . 6.2.

The local State

These issues of reproduction and their relation to production together in the study of local and regional government and community-based social movements. The question of the nfll�J·e.,,:i\ potential of local government and of local social movements has central to urban analysis and praxis since the 1960s.

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

123

The juridical nature of local government, and controls over the local state by the Nation-State, vary from country to country. Similarly, the influence of labor and other movements over local government varies within the capitalist nations. These differences have affected Marxist analysis of local government. 6.2.1 . Limits to the local State Marx did not devote much attention to the local State. He presumed localist forces, like the small kingdoms being absorbed into and Italy, would be dissolved by capitalist nationalism and j internationalism. Even the Paris Commune, now recog­ � ; as representing a complex mix of home rule and class demands, seen by Marx primarily in class terms; localism might oppose working-class or worker-peasant unity and was to be opposed [262] . Late 19th century working-class politics frequently used local government as a terrain of.struggle. Marxist parties had to define their -attitudes toward struggles for local office and influence. In the US, a tradition of local electoral and administrative activism, sometimes referred to as 'sewer socialism' developed; it had its European labor and socialist party counterparts as well. This trend culminated with the Sh_on:-te:rm successes of Social Democratic government in Vienna and cities in the 1910s and 19205. However, arguments for local -p:irtiicillation were never fully worked out. It was sufficient to organize w,ork:er< where they were and win what was possible. Some Marxists [Ollposed such participation as non-revolutionary, on grounds parallel Engels' rejection of housing reform. But neither proponents nor oP1POIlents really differentiated local from national politics at a theore­ level [87, 104, 239, 246, 361]. When attention turned to the nat:iOIlal level in the 1930s, it was because local remedies were insigni­ against the Depression or Fascism, rather than because of new -thl�or'etical critiques of localism. When attention turned back to local government in the 19605, Marxist analysis focused (as in other areas) on the critique of liberal theory. Mainstream 'pluralist' theory saw local government as an ;,,,,,e:Ken1pl:ilf of democracy [78]. Marxist scholars, and activists facing repression by local government, rejected the optimism of this view, and suggested that local government was dominated by reactionary power [91, 284] . Many radicals saw national politics as potentially more 'pflogressive than local politics, as when the US government confronted

���::��

124

MATTHEW EDEL

local segregationist administrations. Even after New Left aCltivi,sts began to develop programs for 'pluralistic' local organization [7] singled out city halls to make 'winnable' demands [85], radical scholrurs' continued to focus on the critique of pluralist theory. Eventually, the rather broad notion of an elite was merged into a Marxist view of capitalist class rule. The notion of a specifically capitalist state was developed in national level studies, with two variants. One saw the State as an instrument for direct control by the agents of capital [273, 274]; the other saw indirect structural forces as making the State serve capitalist needs [306]. Applied to the local notions of the local State as conscious agent of capital were directly applicable in the case of cities dominated by one industry or company [1 14, 158]. The alternative notion of the local State as formally independent and perhaps relatively autonomous, but funda­ mentally compelled to do things functional for capital, is implicit in the studies of specific local services discussed above (e.g.[43, 296] ). specific treatment of the local State as involved in capital restrtlctlJrilng in the interest of accumulation is found in [67, 229]. These positions are 'society-centered' views. They see the State primarily doing what capital needs, just as some non-Marxist theories see the State as passively following democratic commands. Society-' centered views have been criticized for ignoring the role of State func­ tionaries as agents, and the State itself as an institution or apparatus [64] . Some alternative 'State-centered' approaches depict elected offi­ cials or bureaucrats as pursuing their own interests or those of the State organization or party, and only partially responsive to pressures incentives from society or its component classes. It is here that the notion that the State predates capitalism, and was given new power by the rise of capitalism, comes into play. 'State-centered' Marxist views relate the State's desire for its own reproduction to forces acting upon the State from the capitalist system [153]. The balance of pressures can vary, resulting in differences between State forms under capitalism (from liberal democracy through fascism) [101]. Fundamental to many of the State-centered theories of a sp"cificailly capitalist State is a notion that the State needs capitalism to gelner·atr�/ its revenues. Hence, even when acting at its most independent, State agents must be mindful of a need to facilitate accumulation and the generation of surplus value, out of which taxes flow. If they fail to preserve this source of revenue, the result will be an economic crisis

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

125

which can lead to a reduction of State revenues, or to political upheavals against incumbent State agents [38, 286]. That this check on the State is always present has been argued by critics of electoral socialist strategies, who argue that reformist regimes cannot take truly revolutionary steps because this will provoke crisis [217]. It has similarly been argued that intense international competition for investment can lead to the imposition of 'bureaucratic authoritarian' regimes, that discipline labor harshly to maintain international competitiveness [72]. On the other hand, the latitude allowed for State independence, within the constraint that accumulation must be maintained, means that the ruling class need not rule directly [38]. The State may act in the long-run interests of capital in ways that individual investors, or a State as conscious agents of these, might not be able to. These arguments about State independence within limits are fre­ quently stated for society as a whole. But they hold particularly for the local state, whose revenue base is even more precarious. Experiences of local government reforms antagonizing investors into flight or rebellion are legion [6, 373, 378]. In trying to secure their tax bases local governments are led to compete with each other for invest­ ment by essentially non-competitive capital, making local government 'the last [competitive] entrepreneurs' [143]. Similarly, because residen­ ,tial jurisdictions compete for inhabitants, cities that seek to aid labor or redistribute will lose taxpayers to affluent suburbs [17, 229, 249]. Historically, local governments could play the role of mediator between capital and labor, at a time when neither was mobile. Workers' political movements had a stake in local electoral politics, which could give them some say over the mediator [104, 128, 240] . Even when capital became mobile enough to flee the strongest pro­ labor localities, and labor's direct stake in local control diminished, some capital immobility still allowed benefits of better locations to be reserved for some workers through local political machines, which formally and informally taxed corporations and the land they used [104]. But with the rise of the national corporation, and more mobile capital generally, the local State could only attract jobs by providing a 'better business climate' through disciplining labor. Progressive local policy became even more unlikely to succeed [153, 300, 373]. In this situation, local government tended to become an alliance between professional politicians, and those groups that still had some stake in decisions involving the most immobile local resource: land

126

I

l

MATTHEW EDEL

and access to public utilities. The expansion, collection and redistribu· tion of monopoly and differential rents became the business of local government. In the US, the result was a real-estate-oriented local block, which might at times appropriate rents for favoritism and corruption [282]. At other times 'growth coalitions' or 'growth machines' of State personnel and developers might try to rebuild cities through urban renewal, gentrification and other forms of redevelop­ ment [233, 276, 277, 278]. There is some question of the extent to which the specific US pattern is repeated elsewhere, where national level State or party control is tighter. Some French studies argue that redevelopment favors national or .continental level business over local fractions of the bourgeoisie [235]. Attention to the making of policy suggests that a political block between government and large-scale capital exists. The result is somewhere between Poulantzas and Miliband's original positions, in terms of the interplay of structure and agency. The State, acting some ways independently, none the less favors the strong, in capitalist terms. For British equivalents see [67]. This overview of local State functions, like the social control interpretation of specific services, might seem to suggest that local government is a lost cause, not worth fighting over. But, in the new interpretations suggested local government might play a more progressive role.

6.2.2. Local State progressivity? One argument developed in Western Erope where 'Ellfo'-C()mmllDii,t!: and socialist movements were involved in local electoral politics. argued that local govermnent was not only an expedient arena for organization, but also a place where services had to be provided for workers. Local services formed part of the social wage. Expanding local services was an increase in the wage share or variable Cal)itlu, not just a redistribution of surplus value [324] . A workers' party, expanding the local State, might provide both more and better services. By building upon a soci!ll need for collective consumption at the local level, it might demonstrate the usefulness of socialism, as well as testing its own competence in search of greater acceptance of so(:ialis' ideas [41, 42, 53, 235]. Another strand in this position arose in reaction to reductions in social expenditure. These began first at the local level, as in the New

<

.

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

127

York 'fiscal crisis' and in tax limitattion policies introduced in California and other states. These cutbacks were generally interpreted by Marxists as attacks on working-class living standards, even when the same Marxists had been criticizing the implementation of service delivery. A large literature developed to this effect on the New York case [6, 100, 229, 282, 378]; the defense of the Greater London Council was a later instance [37, 156]. When similar austerity programs were carried to the national level by Thatcher, Reagan and others, Marxist critiques replicated on the national level the arguments developed at the local level. These critiques generally continued to argue for support to localities as part of national spending programs [285, 298, 376, 383]. Analyses of racial and ethnic factors also focused on local and regional government. Black consciousness (and other ethnic movements) in the US and regional 'nationalism' in Europe, led to struggles for control of city government in the former case, and for the development of regional subgovernments in the latter. The initial Marxist reaction was to see these movements as progressive, because they represented action by the oppressed, although there was also fear that these movements might divide or preempt the possibility of class­ based movements [129, 318]. Because Marxist theory has not really resolved issues of the relationship of class to race/ethnicity, these • questions could not be resolved theoretically. But a literature of case studies emerged [85, 158]. The various localist movements did not lead to revolutionary breakthroughs, despite accomplishments. In part this was because the movements came in a period of general retrenchment, when internationalization was increasing and even the national State came under pressure from economic competition. But the disappointments also gave a hearing to arguments that the local State was, theoretically, not a promising focus for workers' action. Some arguments held that Castells and others had been wrong in seeing local services as an analytically separate domain from other functions; hence, supporting them as particularly progressive was illusory [309, 310, 380]. Others held that, even if there were a potentially progressive side to local services, the local State apparatus was necessarily too limited and too comprised by built-in interests to do much [208, 275]. Gottdiener has denied the progressivity of the local State at two levels. First, he reiterates that local government is too weak to do much .in an arena of world-wide capital mobility and big nation states. At

128

MATTHEW EDEL

best, it is asked to engage in redistributive activities in favor of workers, or the oppressed. But its borders are too narrow to do much redistribution, as the better off have mobility to escape. But second, reliance on the local State, or any branch of the State, cannot be revolutionary because it further legitimates and strengthens the State itself. For Gottdiener, despite the importance and partial indepen­ dence of the State apparatus, and despite the possibilities of some State redistribution or innovation, the State is fundamentally a support of capitalist property rights [153J. Gottdiener argues that the capitalist State exists at two levels. At one, it is a taxing and spending (or redistributing) body, which may or may not do a little good for the working class. But at another level, it is part of the very economic base of capitalism, as the guarantor (through laws and force) of private property and the wage labor system. This is not only its function, in some abstract sense, it is also in the State's own interest, if one thinks of the State as an instihltic)U .. or agent. Not only does the State need accumulation for its revenues, it also has been transformed into a kind of corporation itself, whose existence in its present form depends on maintaining rules of the game . that allow corporations to exist and prosper. (This is explicit for governments, which in the US are legally corporations, but is implicit for all levels of government.) To rely upon the State, locally or nationally, is thus, for Gottdiener, to strengthen capitalism [153J. 6.3.

Community and social movements

If this is so, then what struggle is possible? Some Marxists see a return to struggle at the workplace as the only hope. But workplace or union organization can itself be limited to the presentation of , ' demands within a domain marked as possible by the extent of the market. As the market becomes more internationalized and competi' tion more acute, local union struggles became more difficult. with the strength of the market as a unifying world institution of States that control pieces of the globe within that competition, and of the ideological power of capital, some strains of Marxism have be,;onne theories of pessimism about modern life [245]. There is, however, one other avenue which may be explored. This involves the so-called 'new social movements', struggles around of life other than the workplace and outside of government [42,

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

129

57, 85). These struggles were essential to the massive social movements of the 196Os, and after. Some were explicitly focused on the local level, through community organization, (and at times parallel struggles for workplace reform). Others responded to the oppression of racial or ethnic groups, which might be spatially concentrated or diffuse. Still other movements focused on issues of reproduction in relation to the State at a broader level (e.g. student movements, movements of welfare recipients or the retired, or health and environmental movements), or on groups defined through their relation to the sphere of reproduction (women's rights, gay and lesbian rights). The analysis of community movements is not easy. First, analyzing any movements involves issues of consciousness that go beyond the normal domain of political economy. Second, what is meant by community is problematical: is community defined by location of residence (as in the concept of neighborhood) or by some other community of interest which may or may not be spatial? Is a neigh­ borhood that cuts across class lines a community? Third, communities vary in their internal nature, interests, class composition and con­ sciousness. There is a tendency to define only those communities that one agrees with politically as truly communities, and to focus on those community movements that one sees as having potential. The organizational issue was sometimes posed as one of community versus class struggle [74). One Marxist response was to object to the focus on community, as cutting across class lines in ways that would . weaken workers' struggles P18); another was to suggest that struggles over community issues would bring communities face-to-face with opposition by monopoly or financial capital, and drive them into an alliance with class-based movements [184, 185). These were ad hoc " arguments, since neither community nor other bases of the new social :!*!i' tne,vements were well defined. But the debates and case studies established two very important points. These new movements could mobilize strong social forces against the status quo, but there were dangers of divisiveness and cooptation [57, 85). The debate has <'deepel�ed with the emergence of two alternative analyses of potential , in community movements.

�'''

"" ,V.J",. Social movement demands on the State

first alternative saw new social movements as focused on State , services in the sphere of reproduction as in Castells' original writings

130

MATTHEW EDEL

[53, 54]. Castells' definition of 'the urban' as the sphere of repro­ duction, and his analysis of the local State as progressive, suggest that urban social movements have a material base in a real need for services. They can build upon this base, and merge with other movements based on workplace needs into a unified movement in favor of more and better social services for a broad coalition of classes. Castells foresees a working-class-led movement (or political party), in which the needs ' of non-monopolist fractions of the bourgeois would be compatible with workers' needs in opposition to transnational monopolies. In this view also, workplace and community needs, and the needs of different communities (or ethnic/racial and gender groups) are not seen incompatible: all can be assisted by a broad-based coalitional move­ ment [53, 409]. Some objections to this optimistic projection are clear in comments already made on Castells' notions about the local State, and on his assumption of independence between the urban and re!�iolnaI domains which hide the problem that the local State may depend the success of local capitalism for its tax base. Gottdiener's argument against any reliance on or strengthening of the State, as co.ntriblltirlg to strengthen capital's institutional base is also relevant. Nonetheless, these arguments are not completely convincing. They ignore the possibility of demands which not only are for more services or redistribution to be provided in familiar form by the State as exists, but which incorporate what Section 5 refers to as the 'c"It"..1 critique', applied to services and perhaps even the State a itself. Recall that the 'cultural critique' suggests that services c t repress workers, or are compromised by negative sides to their labor and consumption processes. These critiques seem initially to suggest that mobilization to pn,selry�! or expand services is misguided. However, John Ehrenreich argues that it is self-defeating to put off changes suggested by the cultural critique for some post-revolutionary, post-scarcity future. mass movements develop to press for both more and less rally alienating services can reforms be won. The absence of movements leads both to scarcity of resources and cOlntilnwlti()Q ql! 'culturally' poor care.

�i�����

..

it seems to me hard to imagine that any large and effective mClvelntl!!: could develop if it did not emphasize both the need for more services

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECfIVES

131

the need for a different approach to health altogether. A movement cannot develop if it does not offer people the hope of meeting perceived needs which now go unmet. But if people also perceive that there is something very wrong with even the services that they have, they will not be drawn into a movement that only offers them more of the same. The lack of mass enthusiam (although not of vague, passive support) for national health insurance is instructive: why should anyone get excited about another bureaucracy to help them pay for services which they know are inadequate? [99, pp. 24-26] One might add, support by health care workers for changes in the way they have to serve their patients is most likely as part of a mass movement for more services. In such a case, if their old jobs are lost, least the field as a whole will expand. Thus a social movement for more and better services can have more impact than a movement for only one of these goals. Similar logic might prevail also for public assistance (would it not be more effective to push for general programs employment and social support than just to have particular groups of recipients demand more funding for existing programs), for housing and transportation, and for other service areas [409]. The question arises as to whether such a recipient-provider alliance could bec:Ollle part of a wider cultural critique and movement for democra­

J.tizatiem of the State itself, presumably at both local and national levels.

{h(,ther the State is capable of such fundamental reform remains at an open and difficult question.

Community movements other main argument was put forward most eloquently by Henri . Le:febvre [220, 221, 224] , synthesizing some of the ideas of the New " F' L,eII, [273] and has been restated in more skeptical terms by Gottdiener 153]. Both draw upon an argument that capitalism has not only (proletarianized and exploited labor; it has also estranged its workers each other, from their communities and from themselves. presented this argument in his theory of alienation. This mc<�mpru;s..1, first, workers' loss of control over their work process product, and hence of their own creativity and, second, on their separation from each other (as alienation within the work process, and for work, hid the underlying cooperative side of the 'divisioln of labor) [254, 258]. This latter element is incorporated in later writings on the 'fetishism of commodities', which may be

132

MATTHEW EDEL

defined as a tendency to see products of human effort, be they goods or institutions, as results of inevitable and impersonal forces [261]. Theories of the breakdown of community as a result of urban and industrial divisions of labor were also developed by Weber, Sirnrnel, Durkheim and other sociologists [352, 353]. Building on these argu­ ments, Georg Lukacs, argued that capitalism pushed workers '0''''.''0 seeing themselves as commodities, whose aim in life was to seek a as efficiently as possible [238]. Karl Polanyi developed a similar of the opposition of the 'market' to society itself [301]. In the 1960s, the theme of capitalist alienation became part of explanation for why community and revolution were needed. building on Polanyi, presented State redistribution and planning natives to commodity relations and the market [169]. Much of ·'-- '>-"" Left, however, was suspicious of bureaucracy, and less sanguine the sufficiency of the State to overcome alienation. Lefebvre that a diversity of community resistance was progressive. He called for a recreation of non-market, non-State ties, that would address the effects of capitalist accumulation on society [220, 224]. In Lefebvre's view, the extension of individuation and alienation engender a demand for their abolition - a demand for cOlmnlUruty Lefebvre symbolizes this in hUs concept of a demand for the 'right the city', a right to community and centrality in participation broader decisions [220, 221, 224] . Lefebvre suggests that the cOlltnl} j dictions raised by capitalism's assault on community can be T",'OlrL tionary. In addition to engendering the proletariat (defined Tny'oll.n production) as its potential grave-digger, capitalism's expansion engenders a movement for community (defined perhaps prinlarily terms of reproduction, but linking production to daily life). Lefebvre's argument suggests that two advantages may be gained community demands can become political and be linked with letarian demands for economic power. Demands for comnlurLity may keep workers' movements from falling into narrow economistic reformism. Conversely, linkage to a class-based movement may keep the new movements from dwelling primarily on community versus community disputes. Lefebvre's work was initially presented in spatial terms [220, 221]. He argued that capitalism had underminded the advantages community present in the precapitalist city, replacing physical munities with sprawl, even as it destroyed communal social relation

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

133

ships. This identification between spatial and social, while it focused needed attention on the relationship between the two, was criticized as too rigid. Castells attacked Lefebvre's position as spatial deter­ minism, while Gottdiener accepted Lefebvre's concern about the loss of community, but rejected his identification of community with central city density [53, 152). Gottdiener's work also includes a sympathetic but skeptical deve­ lopment of Lefebvre's position on the progressivity of commu­ nity. Gottdiener builds on Marx, but also on theorists who see the analysis of ideology, politics and community as not always analytically reducible to class and production [138, 159, 337). Thus he sees the loss of community as not simply a determined result of capitalism; the growth of capitalism and the loss of community (and of local political culture) are intertwined and mutually reinforcing [153). Gottdiener relates lack of participation in local governance to a decline in the variety of local 'associational ties' that marked the pre­ capitalist city. Local government has been given a corporate form, and a limited role of defending property rights and narrowly defined economic development. This came about in part because capitalism had a need to destroy independent sources of livelihood and power, an argument taken from Marx. But Gottdiener does not see this loss as foreordained; specific political history was involved. Thus there is possible opening for using new forms of association as part of an attack on the State itself, as well as on capital, from local bases. This he presents as an alternative to a Castellsian strategy of demands on or capture of the local State. Gottdiener vacillates on whether this strategy really offers hope. At times he calls for replacing economistic reformism with 'a more trans­ formative social subject, the radicalization of community life paired the class struggle [152, p. 28 1 ) , and suggests a chance for 'rescuing' local politics [153, p. 38J . While he follows Marx in arguing that capital dissolved 'community networks and self-help schemes' [153, 200), he eschews notions of inevitability. Although a struggle to recreate these forms of association would be difficult, and local • p'Jtil:ics alone is insufficient, he suggests some hope if 'forms of self­ i! man�Lgelmellt apd participation in the neighborhood [are) be connected to those at the workplace as well' [153, p. 42). However, Gottdiener , also calls Lefebvre's hopes 'Utopian' [153, p. 267) and suggests that the will not permit rival forms of association, except for limited cost-

ii

,!

134

MATTHEW EDEL

saving purposes. 'Today one can speak realistically only of the decline of political culture, not its prospects for rebirth at some future tiIiie' [15, p. 285). But this dismissal seems too abrupt after his other arguments. As a result, Gottdiener can be read as opening the door to further debate on this approach, not as foreclosing it. The debate will be important. The new social movements sometimes seen in opposition to movements defined by class workplace. At other times, however, parallels have existed some of these movements and local struggles for workers control. least one new social movement (environmentalism) encompasses

:e���.:� ��i

reproduction and production. All of these specific movements themselves as opposed to the status quo of capitalism and:! th State. In the 1 960s, they often thought of themselves as e�� one 'Movement' , although the role of labor in that movement often uncertain. The 1 970s and 1980s showed that movements oppose each other, or that their potential alliance may be eXloressed in incoherent coalitions. How they may relate to each other, th"oref' ically and in practice, will require a greater understanding of how different domains (production and reproduction; the economy and the State; class, gender and race/ethnicity) fit together in an overafI, historical materialist model. This unification is a crucial challenge Marxist analysis in the decade ahead.

Bibliography

[1] Abad Gomez, H., 'Public health problems in Medellin', in Cities in Crisis: Urban Challenge in LatinAmerica, ed. by M. Edel and R. G. Hellman. BUdner Center for Western Hemisphere Studies, City University of New 1989, 103-114, [2] Abramowitz. M., Regulating the Lives of Women. Boston: South End Press, i for the Poor. New York: Praeger, 1970. [3] Abrams, C., Home Ownershp [4] Acosta, M. and J. E. Hardoy, Urban Reform in Revolutionary Cuba. Haven: Yale University Antilles Research Program, 1971. (5) Aglietta, M., Theory o/Capitalist Regulation: Through US Experience. Lonae,": ", ' New Left Books, 1979. (6) AlcaJy, R. and D. Mermelstein, (eds), The Fiscal Crisis oj American Cities. New '-,' York: Vintage, 1977. [7] Alinsky, S. . Rules for Radicals. New York: Random House, 1971. [8] Alonso, J., Lucha Urbana y Acumulation de Capital. Mexico City: Ediciones d� ' 1a Casa ebata. 1980. [9] Althusser. L.. For Marx. London: New Left Books. 1968. [10] Althusser, L. and E. Balibar, Reading 'Capital'. London: New Left Books, [11] Ambrose, P., and B. Colenutt, The Property Machine. Penguin, 1975, _

_-__0

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

135

[12] Amin, S., Unequal Development. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976. [13] Amin, S., Eurocentrism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989. [14] Angotti, T., 'The housing question: Engels and after', Monthly Review 29:5. (October 1977), 39-6l. [15) Aronowitz, S . , The Crisis in Historical Materialism: Class, Politics and Culture in Marxist Theory. New York: Praeger, 1981. (16] Aronowitz, S., Science as Power. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988. [17) Ashton, P. J., 'The political economy of suburban development', in Marxism and the Metropoiis, ed. by W. K. Tabb and L. Sawers, pp. 64-89. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. Bagley. B. and M. Edel. 'Popular mobilization programs of the National Front:

[19]

cooptation and radicalization'. in Politics of Compromise: Coalition Government in Colombia', ed. by R. A Berry, R. G. Hellman and M. Solaun, pp. 257-284. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1980. Ball, M., 'Differential rent and the role of landed property', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 1:3, (October 1977), 380-402.

[20] Ball, M., Housing Policy and Economic Power: the Political Economy o/ Owner Occupation. London: Methuen, 1983. [21] Ball, M., 'Land rent and the construction industry', in Land Rent, Housing and Urban Planning, ed. by M. Ball et 01., pp. 71-86. London: Croom Helm, 1985. [221 Ball, M., 'The urban rent Question', Environment and Planning A, 17 (1985), 503-525. [231 Ball. M., V. Bentivegna, M. Edwards and M. Folin, (eds), Land Rent, Housing and Urban Planning: 0 European Perspective. London: Croom Helm, 1985. [241 Ball, M., M. Harloe, and M. Martens, Housing and Social Change in Europe and the USA . London: Routledge, 1988. [25} Bandyopdahyay, P., 'Neo-Ricardianism in urban analysis', International Journal Urban and Regional Research, 6:2 (June 1982), 277-282. [261 Bandyopadahyay, P., 'Marxist urban analysis and the economic theory of rent\ Science and Society, XLVI:2 (Summer 1982). 162-196. Baran, P., The Political Economy of Growth. New York: Monthly Review Press,

1965. Baran, P. A. and P. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966. Barkin, D., 'Confronting the separation oftown and country in Cuba', in Marxism and the Metropolis, edT by W. K. Tabb and L. Sawers, pp. 317-337. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. [30} Barkin, D. and T. King, Regional Economic Development: the River Basic Approach in Mexico. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. [31] Bartra, R., El Modo de Produccion Asiatico. Mexico: Era, 1969. (32) Beneria, L. and M. Roldan, The Crossroads of Class and Gender. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. [33) Berman, M., All That is Solid Melrs inro Air. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982. [34] Bina, C., The Economics of Oil Crisis. New York: St Martins, 1985. [35] Blauner, R., 'Internal colonialism and the ghetto revolt', Social Problems, 16 (1%9), 393-498. [36] Blaustein, A. and O. Faux. Star Spangled Hustle. Garden City: Doubleday, 1972. [37] Blazyca, G., Planning is Goodfor You: the Case for Popular Control. London: Pluto Press, 1983.

136

MA'ITHEW EDEL

[38] Block, F 'The ruling class does not rule: notes on the Marxist theory of the State'. SOcialist Review, 33 (May-June 1977), 6-28. ..,..1 > [39] Bluestone, B., 'Black capitalism: the path to black liberation?' Review or " ,,, Political Economics, 1:1 (May 1969), 36-55. [40] Bluestone, B. and B. Harrison. The Deindustrialization ofAmerica. New Basic Books. 1982. [41) Boccara, P., Capital Monopolista de Estado. Mexico: Grijalbo. 1970. [42J Borja, J't Movimientos Sodales Urbanos. Buenos Aires: SlAP. 1975. {43] Bowles, S. and H. Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America. New York: Basic Book" 1976. [44} Boyte, H.t The Backyard Revolution. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980. [45] Bratt, R., C. Hartman, and A. Meyerson, Critical Perspectives on Housing. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1986. [461 Browne, R., 'Cash flows in a ghetto economy', Review of Black ru'uuCUI Economy. 1:3 (Winter-Spring 1971). 28-39. [47] Brugman, B. and X. Stetteland. The Ultimate Righrise. San Francisco: Guardian Books, 1971. [481 Burgess, R., 'Self-help housing: a new imperialist strategy?' Antipode, 9:2 50-59. [49] Cardoso, F. H. and E. Falleto, Dependency and Development in Latin America. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. [50] Carnoy, M., The State and Political Theory. Princeton: Princeton Ur.iv,:rsi,tY Press, 1984. [51] Carnoy, M. (ed.), Schooling in a Corporate Society. New York: David McKay, 1972. [52] Caro, R., The Power BrOker: Robert Moses and the Fall ojNew York. New "n.I', Knopf, 1974, [53J Castells, M" La Question Urbaine, Paris: Maspero, 1972. [English translation, The Urban Question, London: Edward Arnold, 1977]. [54] Castells, M., Luttes Urbaines. Paris: Maspero, 1973. [551 castells, M., City, Class and Power. New York: Macmillan, 1978. [56J Castells, M., Crisis Urbana y Cambio Social, Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1981. [57] Castells, M., The City and the Grassroots. Berkeley: University of Calife,rni,a ( Press, 1983. [58] Castells, M. and F. Godard, Monopolyille: Analyse des Rapports entre rEnter­ .•

prise, l'Etat et J'Urbaine a Partir d'un Enquete JUr 10 Croissance /ndustrielle et Urbaine de Ie Region de Dunkerque. Paris: Mouton, 1974.

[59] Cerullo, M. and P. Ewen, 'Having a good time, the American family camping,' Radical Amer;ca, 16:1-2 (Jan-Apr 1982), 13-44. [6O} Chandler A, D. and F. Redlich, 'recent developments in American business administration and their conceptualization', Business History Review, 1961. [61] Checkoway. B., 'Large Builders, Federal Housing Programs. Suburbanization', in Critical Perspectives on Housing, ed. Hartman, and A. Meyerson, pp. 1 19-138. Philadelphia: Temple Un;v,r,ilty 1986. [62] Childe, V: G Man Makes Himself. New York: New American Library, [63) Chodorow, N., The Reproduction oj Mothering. Berkeley: University California Press, 1978. [64] Clark, O. and M. Dear, Stale Apparatus; StruclI"es ami L,mgualre OJ'L"gilim"cy.) London: George Allen and Unwin. 1984. .•

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECfIVES

�

137

[65] Clarke, A., Growing Up Stupid Under the Union Jack. Havana: Casa de las Americas, 1980. [66] Clavel, P., J. Forester, and W. W. Goldsmith, Urban and Regional Planning in an Age oj Austerity. New York: Pergamon, 1980. [67) Cockburn, C., The Local State. London: Pluto Press. 1977. [68] Cockroft ], D., 'Pauperizacion, no marginalizaci6n'. Coyoaean: Revista Marxista Lotinoamericana, 15 (Jan-June 1983), 25-64. (69) Cockroft, J. D. and E. S. Cockroft, 'People's art and social change: the community mural movement', Radical America 12:2 (March 1978), 7-14. Cohen, R. B., 'The international division of labor. multinational corporations and urban hierarchy', in Urbanization and Urban Planning in Capitalist Society, ed. by M. Dear and A. Scott, pp. 287-ooo. London: Methuen, 1981. Cohen, S. S. and C. Goldfinger, 'From permacrisis to real crisis in french social security: the limits to national politics', in Stress and Contradiction in Modem Capitalism, ed. by L. N. Lindberg et al., pp. 57-98. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975. [72] Collier, D. (ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979. [73] Connolly, P., 'Inversion publica en el medio construido: redisrrihucion de functiones estatales?' in Mexico: Problemas urbano regionales, ed. by G. Boils, pp. 205-242. Mexico: GV Editores, 1987. Cowley, J., A. Kaye, M. Mayo and M. Thompson, Community or Class Struggle? London: Stage I , 1977. Cox, K. (ed.), Urbanization and Conflict in Market Societies. Chicago: Maaroufa, 1978. 176) Cranz, G., The Politics oj Park Design. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982. (77) Currie, E., Confronting Crime: an American Challenge. New York: Pantheon, 1985. (78] Dahl, R., Who Governs? New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961. (79] Darden, J. T., R. C. Hill, J. Thomas and R. Thomas, Detroit: Race and Uneven Development. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987. [80] Day, R., 'The theory of the long cycle: Kondratieff, Trotsky, Mandel', New Left Review, 99 (1976), 67-82. Dear, M. and A. Scott (eds), Urbanization and Urban Planning in Capitalist Society. London: Methuen, 1981. Debray, R., Revolution in the Revolution. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967. [83] DeFazio, W., Longshoremen: Community and Resistance on the Brooklyn Waterfront. South Hadley: Bergin and Garvey, 1986. DeJanvry, A., The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America. Balti­ more: Johns Hopkins Press, 1982. 'Delgado, G., Organizing the Movement. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986. De Oliveira, F., Elegia para uma Re(/i)giao: SUDENE, Nordeste, Planejamento e Conflito de Closes. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1977. [Spanish edition, Mexico: Fonda de Cultura Economica. 19821 Dickens, P., S. Duncan, M. Goodwin and F. Gray. Housing, States and Local­ ities. London: Methuen, 1985. (88J Direct Labor Collective, Building with Direct Labour: Local Authority Building and the Crisis in the Construction Industry. London: Conference of Socialist Economists, 1978.

MATTHEW EDEL

138

[891 Dobb. M., Studies in the Development ol Capitalism, New York: International Publisher<. 1947. [90] Domhoff, O. W., The Bohemian Grove and Other Retreats. New York: Harper and Row, 1974. [91] Domhoff, O. W" Who Realty Rules? New Brunswick. N. J . : Transaction Books, 1978. [92i Doyal, L. and 1. Pennell. The Political Economy of Health. Boston: South End Press, 1979. [93] Edel, C. K. et aI., 'Uneven regional development: an introduction,' Review of Radical Political Economics: Special Issue on Uneven Regional Development,

10:3 (Fall 1976). 1-12. {94] Edel. M., 'Urban renewal and land use conflicts: Review of Radical Political economics, 3:3 (Summer 1971), 76-89. [95] Edel, M., 'Land values and the cost of urban congestion: measurement and distribution', in The Polilical Economy ofEnvironment: Problems of Method, ed. by I. Sachs. pp. 61-90. Hague: Mouton. 1972. [96] Edel, M., 'Development v. dispersal: approaches to ghetto poverty,' in Readings in Urban Economics, ed. by M. Edel and J. Rothenberg, pp. 307-325. New York: Macmillan, 1972. [97] Edel, M., Economies and the Environment. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall. 1973. [98] Edel, M., 'Marx's theory of rent: urban applications', Kapita/istate, 4-5 (1976), 100-124. [99] Edel, M., 'Rent theory and labor strategy: Marx, George and the urban crisis,' Review of Radical Political Economics 9 (1977). 1-15. [100] Edel. M., 'The New York crisis as economic history', in The Fiscal Crisis of American Cities, ed. by R. Alcaly and D. Mermelstein, pp. 228-245. New York: Vintage, 1917. [101] Edel, M., 'Capitalism, accumulation and the explanation of urban phenomena', in Urbanization and Urban Planning in Capitalist SOciety, ed. by M. Dear and A. J. Scott, pp. 19-44. London: Methuen, 1981. [102] Edel, M., 'Home ownership and working class unity', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. 6:2 (1982), 205-221. [103] Edel, M. and J. Rothenberg (eds.), Readings in Urban Economics. New York: Macmillan, 1972. [104] Edel, M., E. Sclar and D. Luria, Shaky Palaces: Home Ownership and Social Mobility in Boston's Suburbanization. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984. [105] Ehrenreich, B. and J. Ehrenreich. The American Health Empire. New Ybrk: Health PAC Inc. and Random House, 1970. {106] Ehrenreich, B. and D. English, Complaints and Disorders: the Sexual Politics oj Sickness. Old Westbury, N.Y.: The Feminist Press, 1973. (107] Ehrenreich, 1. (ed.), The Cultural Criss i ojModern Medicine. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978. [108] Eisenstein, Z. (ed.), Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism. New York:: Monthly Review Press, 1979. [109] Emmanuel, A., Unequal Exchange. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972. [110] Engels, F., The Housing Question. New York: International Publishers n.d. [111] Engels, F 'The origin of the family, private property and the state', in K. andF. Engels Selected Works, pp. 468-576. New York: International Publishers, 1968. 468-576. .

.•

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

119

[112] Engels, F., The Condition of the Working Class in England. Moscow: Progress . Publishers. 1973. (113] Ewen, L. A., Corporate Power and Urban Crisis in Detroit. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978. (114] Ewen, S., Captains oj Consciousness. New York: McGraw Hill, 1976. [115] Fainstein. S. et al., Restructuring the City. New York: Longman, 1983. [116] Faux, 0., CDC's: New Hope/or the Inner City. New York: Twentieth Century Fund. 1971. {II7] Feldman, M., 'A contribution to the critique of urban political economy: the Journey to Work', Antipode, 9:1 (Sept 1977). IllS] Feldman. M., The Political Economy of Cities and the Journey /0 Work, PhD Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1981. [1 191 Fellmeth. R. C., Politics oj Land. New York: Grossman, 1973. (120] Fernandez, R., The United States-Mexico Border: a Politico-Economic Profile. Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1977. [121] Fernandez Kelly, M. P., For We Are Sold, J and My People. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983. (122] Fine, B" 'On Marx's theory of agricultural rent'. Economy and Society, 8 (1979), 241-278. [123] Fine, B" 'Land, capital and the British coal industry prior to World War II', in LandRent. Housing and Urban Planning: a European Perspective, ed. by M. Ball et al., pp. 107-125. London: Croom Helm, 1985. [124] Fitch, R., 'Planning New York', in The Fiscal Crisis of American Cities, ed, by R. Alealy and D. Mermelstein, pp. 246-285, New York: Vintage, 1977. [125] Forbes. D. K. and p, J, Rimmer (eds.), Uneven Development and the Geographical Transfer of Value. Canberra: Australian National University. 1984. [126] Fox, K., 'Uneven regional development in the United States', Review of Radical Political Economics. 10:3 (Fall 1978). 68-86. [127] Frank, A. G., 'The development of underdevelopment', Monthly Review, 18:4 (September 1968). 17-31. (128] Frisch, M. H., 'The community elite and the emergence of urban politics: Springfield, Massachusetts, 1840-1880', in Nineteenth Century Cities, ed, by S, Thernstrom and R. Sennett, pp. 277-297. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969. [129] Fusfeld, D., The Basic Economics of the Urban Racial Crisis. New York: Holt, Reinhardt and Winston, 1973. [130] Gale, D:. Washington D.C.: lnner-city Revitalization and Minority Subur­ banization, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987. {l3J) Gans, H" The Urban Yillagers. New York: The Free Press, 1962. [132] Garza, G., EI proceso de industrializacion en fa dudad de Mexico: /821-1970. Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico, 1985. [l33] Gaviria, M., Campo, urbe y espado del ocio. Madrid: Siglo XXI de Espana. 1971. (134] Gaviria, M., &pana a Go-Go: Turismo charter y neocolonialismo del espado. Madrid: Ediciones Turner, 1974. [135] Gaviria, M., Ecologismo y ordenacion del territorio en Espana. Madrid: Cuadernos para el Diaiogo, 1976. [l36] Genovese, E., The Political Economy oj Slavery. New York: Pantheon, 1965. (137) George, H., Progress and Poverty. New York: Modern Library, 1938. [138] Giddens, A., A Contemporary Critique oj Historical Materialism. Berkeley: University of california Press. 1981.

140

MATIHEW EDEL

(139) Gilroy. P. There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack: the Cultural Politics of 'Race' and Not;on. London: Hutchinson, 1987. (140) Gonzalez Casanova. P., La Democracia en Mexico. Mexico City: Era, 1%5. (141) Gonzalez Casanova. P., 'Internal colonialism and national development', Studies ;n Comparative International Development, 1:4 (1965), 27-37. (142] Goodman, R.o After the Planners. New York: Simon 'and Schuster, 1971. [143) Goodman, R., The Last Entrepreneurs. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979. [144] Gordon. D. M., 'Class and the economics of crime', Review 0/ Radical Political Economics, 3:3 (Summer 1971). 50-75. [145] Gordon, D. M. (cd.), Problems in Political Economy: an. Urban Perspective. Lexington: D. C. Heath. 1971. [146) Gordon, D. M., Theories oj Poverty and Underemployment. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1972. [147] Gordon, D. M., 'Class struggle and the stages of urban development', in The Rise of the Sunbelt Cities, ed. by D. Pc;rry and A. Watkins, pp. 55-82. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977. [148] Gordon, D. M. , 'Up and down the long railer coaster', in U.S. Capitalism in Crisis, pp. 22-35. New York: Union for Radical Political Economics, 1978. [149] Gordon. L., 'The politics of birth control, 1920-1940', in The Cultural Crisis of Modem Medicine, ed. by J. Ehrenreich, pp. 144-184. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978 .. (150] Gorelick. S., 'Undermining hierarchy: problems of schooling in capitalist America', Monthly Review, 29:S (October 1977), 20-36. [151) Gorelick. S., City College and the Jewish Poor. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1981. (152) Gottdiener, M., The Social Production oj Space. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985. [153} Gottdiener, M., The Decline oj Urban Politics: Political Theory and the Crisis 0/ the Local State. Newbury Park, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1987. (1.54] Gould, S. J., 'Human equality is a contingent fact of history', in The Flamingo's Smile, pp. 18.5-198. New York: Norton, 1985. [155] Gramsci, A., The Modern Prince and Other Writings. New York: International Publishers, 1957. [1561 Greater London Council Economic Policy Group, Jobs jor a Change. London: GLC, 1983. [157] Green, J. and A. Hunter, 'Racism and busing in Boston', in Marxism and the Metropolis, ed. by W. K. Tabb and L. Sawers, pp. 271-296. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. [158] Greer, E., Big Steel: Black Politics and Corporate Power in Gary, Indiana. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979. (1591 Gregory, D. and J. Urry, (eds.), Social Relations and Spatial Structures. New York: St Martin's, 1985. (160] Hadjimichalis, C., The Geographical Transfer oj Value: a Comparat;ve Analysis 0/ Regional Development in Southern Europe, PhD Dissenation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1980. (161) Haila, A., 'Land as a financial asset: Antipode. 20:2 (1988), 79-101. [1621 Hall, P., The World Cities. New York: McGraw Hill, 1966. (163) Hall, P. and A. Markusen (eds.), Silicon Landscapes. Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985. [164} Hamberg, J., 'The dynamics of Cuban housing policy', in Critical Perspectives on Housing, ed. by R. O. Bratt, C. Hartman and A. Meyerson, pp. 558-585. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986.

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

141

[165] Hampden-Turner, C., From Poverty to Dignity. Garden City. N.Y.: Anchor, 1974. (166) Harloe, M. (ed.), Captive Cities. New York: John Wiley, 1977. {161} Harloe. M. (ed.), New Perspectives on Urban Change and Conflict. New York: Holmes and Meier. 1982. [1681 Harloe, M. and E. Lebas (eds.), City Class and Capital. New York: Homes and Meier, 1981. (169] Harring, S. L., 'The police institution as a class question: Milwaukee socialists and the police, 1900-1915', Science and Society. 46:2 (Summer 1982), 97-221. [170] Harris. D. J., 'The black ghetto as 'internal colony': a theoretical critique and reformulation', Review oj Black Political Economy. 2:4 (Summer 1972), 00-00. [171] Harris. L., 'Interest, credit and capital', Economy and Society, 5:2 (May 1976), 14l-177. [172] Harris, M., Cannibals and Kings. New York: Random House, 1977. [173] Harrison, B., Urban Economic Development: Suburbanization, Minority Oppor­ tunity and the Condition of the Central City. Washington: The Urban Institute, 1974. [174] Harrison, B., The Transformation of the New Eng/and Economy. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT-Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies, working paper, 1981. [175] Harrison, B., 'Regional restructuring and 'good business climates-the economic transformation of New England'�in SunbeltlSnowbelt, ed. by L. Sawers and W. Tabb, pp. 48-96. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984. (176] Hartman, C. W., 'The housing of relocated families,' in Urban Renewal: the Record and the Controversy. ed. by l. O. Wilson. pp. 291-335. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966. [1771 Hanman, C. W., Yerba Buena: Land Grab and Community Resistance in San Francisco. San Francisco: Glide Publications, 1974. [178] Hartman, C. W., The Transformation 'of San Francisco. Totowa: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984. [179] Hartman, C. W. (ed.), America's Housing Crisis. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983. [180] Harvey, D., Social Justice and the City. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1973. [181] Harvey, D., 'Class-monopoly rent, finance capital and the urban revolution', Regiona/ Studies, 8:3 (1974), 239-255. [182] Harvey, D., 'The political economy of urbanization in advanced capitalism', in The Social Economy of Cities, ed. by X. Gappert and X. Rose, pp. 1 19-164. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975. [183) Harvey, D., The Limits to Capital. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. [184] Harvey, D., The Urbanization of Capital. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. (185] Harvey. D., Consciousness and the Urban Experience. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1981. [186) Harvey. D. and L. Chatterjee, 'Absolute rent and the structuring of space by governmental and financial institutions'. Antipode. 6:1 (1974), 22-36. (187) Hayden, D., 'Redesigning the domestic workplace', in New Spacefor Women, ed. by 0. Wekerle, R. Peterson and D. Morley, pp. 101-124. Boulder: Westview Press, 1980. (188) Hayden, D., The Grand Domestic Revolution. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981. [189] Hays, S., 'The politics of reform in municipal government in the progressive era', Pacific Northwest Quarterly, 55 (October 1964), 157-169. [190] l:Iechter, M., Internal Colonialism: the Celtic Fringe in British National Develop­ ment JS36-J966. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

142

MATTHEW EDEL

[191] Hell. B., 'Sunbelt migration', in U.S. Capitalism in Crisis. ed. by Political Education Project, pp. 87-101. New York, Union for Radical Political Eco­ nomics. 1978. [192] Henderson, J. and M. Castells (eds), Global Restructuring and Territorial Development. London: Sage Publications, 1987. [193] Hill. R. C., 'Fiscal collapse and political struggle in decaying central cities', in Marxism and the Metropolis, ed. byW. K. Tabb and L. Sawers. pp. 213-240. New York: Oxford University Press. 1978. [194] Hindess. B. and P. Hirst, Pre-capitaiist Modes ojProduction. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975. (195) Hindess, B. and P. Hirst, Modes ojProduction and Social Formation. London: Macmillan, 1977. [1961 Hirschman A. 0., 'A generalized linkage approach to development with special reference to Staples', in' Essays in Economic Development and Cultural Change in Honor of Bert F. Hoselitz. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. [197) H,obsbawm, E. I., 'Labour in the Great City', New Left Review, 166 (1987), 39-52. [I98J Holland, S., The Regional Problem. London: Macmillan, 1976. [1991 Holland, S., Capital versus the Regions. London: Macmillan, 1976. [200] Horn. J., Away with all Pests. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971. {201] Hunt, E. K., Property and Prophets. New York: Harper and Row, 1986. [202} Hymer, S., 'The multinational corporation and the law of uneven development', in Economics and World Order, ed. by J . Bhagwati, pp. 113-140. New York: Macmillan. 1971. [203) Innis, H., The Fur Trade in Canada. New Haven: Ya1e University Press, 1930. [2041 James, C. L. R., Beyond a Boundary. London: Hutchinson, 1963. [2051 Jessop, B., The Capitalist State. New York: NYU Press, 1982. [206} Joffe, J., 'The limits of urban policy', Review ofRadical PoliticalEconomics, IV:2 (Summer 1972), 100-109. [207) "Kane, E., 'Short-<:hanging the small saver', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2 (1970), 513-522. [208] Katznelson, 1., City Trenches. New York: Pantheon, 1981. [209] Kemeny, 1., 'Home ownership and privatization', International Journal oj Urban and Regional Research, 4:3 (1980), 372.388. [210] Klitgaard, K. A., 'The Subordination oj Labor to Capital and the Residential Construction Industry', Paper presented, annual meetings, Union for Radical Political Economics, 1988. [211] Kondratieff, N. D., 'The long waves in economic life', Reviews o/Economics and Statistics, 17:6 (1935), 105-115. [2121 Kornblum, W., Blue Collar Community. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974. [213J Lafargue, P., The Right to be Lazy. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1907. [214) Lafont. J., D. Leborgue and A. Lipietz, Redeploiment Industriel et £Space Economique: une Elude intersectorieJle Comparative. Paris: Cepremap. 1980. [215) Laibman, D., 'Va1ues and prices of production: the political economy of the transformation problem', Science and Society, 37:4 (Winter 1973-74), 404-437. [216} Lamb, R. K., 'The entrepreneur and the community', in Men in Business, ed. by W. Miller. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1952. [217] Lange, 0., On the Economic Theory of Socialism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1938. [218J Laska, S. B. and D. Spain (eds.), Back to the City. New York: Pergamon, 1980.

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

�

143

[219] Lasswell, H., Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. New York: McGraw Hill, 1936. [220] Lefebvre, H., Le Droit a fa Ville. Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1968. [221] Lefebvre, H., La Revolution Urbaine. Paris: Gallimard. 1970. [222] Lefebvre, R., La PenseeMarxisteet fa Vii/e. Tournai, Belgium: Casterman, 1972. [Spanish translation, EI Pensamiento Marxista y /a Ciudad. Mexico City: Ed. Contemporaneous, 1973). (223] Lefebvre, H" Escape el Politique: Le Droit a la Ville - II. Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1972. [224] Lefebvre, H., The Survival oj Capitalism. London: Allison and Busby. 1973. , [225] Lefebvre, H., La Production de { Espace. Paris: Anthropos, 1974. [226] Lenin, V. I., The State and Revolution. New York: International Publishers, 1932. [227] Lenin, V. I., Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism. New York: Inter­ national Publishers, 1939. [228] Lenin, V. I., The Development of Capitalism in Russia. Moscow: Progress, 1956. [229) Lichten, E., Class, Power and Austerity: the New York City Fiscal Crisis. South Hadley: Bergin and Garvey. 1986. [230] Lipietz, A., Le Tribut Fancier Urbain. Paris: Maspero, 1974. [231) Lipietz, A., Le Capital et son £Space Paris: Maspero, 1977. [Spanish translation El Capital y su Espado. Mexico City: Siglo XXI. 1979]. [232] Lipietz, A., 'A Marxist approach to urban ground rent', in Land Rent, Housing and Planning: a European Perspective. London: Croom Helm, 1985, 129-155. [233] Logan, J. R. and H. L. Molotch, Urban Fortunes: the Political Economy of Place. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. [234] Lojldne, J., 'Existe la renta del suelo urbano', Economio Politico, 10 (1973), 101-108. (235) Lojkine, J., Le Marxisme, I'etat et la Question Urbaine, Paris: Presses Univer­ sitaires de France. 1977. [236] Lomnitz, L. A., Networks and Marginality. New York: Academic Press, 1977. [237J Lovering, J., 'The theory of the 'internal colony' and the political economy of Wales', Review of Radical Political Economics, 10:3 (Fall 1978), 55-67. [238] Lukacs, G., History and Class Consciousness. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971. [239] Luria, D., 'Suburbanization, ethnicity and the party base,' Antipode, 11:3 (1979), 76-80. [240] Luria, D. and J. Russell, 'Motor city changeover', in SunbeltlSnowbelt. ed. by L. Sawers and W. Tabb, pp. 217-313. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984. [241) Luxemburg, R., The Industrial Development ofPoland. New York: Campaigner, 1977. [242} Ma1izia, E., 'Organizing to overcome uneven development: the case of the US south', Review 0/ Radical Political Economics, 10:3 (Fall 1978). 87-94. [243] Mandel, E., Late Capitalism, London: New Left Books, 1915. [244] Marable, M. How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America, Boston: South End Press, 1983. [245) Marcuse, H., One-dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964. (246) Marcuse, P., 'A useful installment of socialist work: housing in red vienna in the 1920s', in Critical Perspectives on Housing, ed. by R. G. Bratt, C. Hartman and A. Meyerson, pp. 558-585. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986. [247] Marglin, S., 'What do bosses do? -part I', Review alRadical Political Economics, 6:2 (1 974), 33-60. (248) Marglin, S., 'What do bosses do?-part II', Review of Radical Political Eco­ nomics, 7:1 (1975), 20-37.

144

MATIHEW EDEL

[249] Markusen, A. R.o 'Class and urban social expenditures: a Marxist metropolitan government', in Marxism and the Metropolis, ed. by W. K. and L. Sawers, Pl'. 90-112. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. [2:50] Markusen, A. R.t 'Class rent and sectoral conflicts: uneven de'velopmen! western US boom towns'. Review ofRadical Political Economics, 1 17-129. (251] Markusen, A. R., Profit Cycles, Oligopoly and Regional Development. bridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985. [2:52] Mark.usen, A. R.t Regions: the Economics and Politics of Territory. N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987. [253] Martinez Prado. M. (ed.), Estudios Sabre 10 Renta del Sue/a. Madrid: Com'lnielad de Madrid, 1985. [254] Marx, K., 'On the Jewish Question', in Early Writings, pp. 211-242. New Vintage, 1975. [2551 Marx, K., 'Onthe question of free trade', in The Poverty ofPhilosophy, appe"dix. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956. [256} Marx, K 'The eighteenth brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', in K. MarxandF. Selected Works . pp. 97-168. New York: International Publishers, 1%8. [257) Marx, K., 'Introduction'. in A Contribution to the Critique 0/Political Econom;�­ Chicago: Charles Kerr and Co., 1904. [258] Marx, K., Grundrisse. Penguin: Harmondsworth. 1973. [259] Marx, K., Precapitalist Economic Forma';ons. New York: International lishers, 1964. [260] Marx, K., ·Wages. price and profit', in K. Marx and F. Engels Selected pp. 186-229. New York: International Publishers, 1968. [261] Marx, K., Capital, Three Vols. New York: International Publishers, 1967. [262] Marx, K., The Civil War in France, ed. by Hal Draper. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972. (263) Marx, K., Theories 0/ Surplus Value, Three Vats Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1963. [264) Marx, K. and F. Engels, Ther German Ideology, abridged and ed. by C. J. Arth'"'' New York: International Publishers, 1970. [265J Marx, K. and F. Engels, 'Manifesto of the communist party', in K. Marx Engels Selected Works, pp. 35-63. New York: International Publishers, [266] Massey, D., 'Capital and loeational change: The U.K. Electrical engineering electronics industries', Review ofRadical Political Economics, 10:3 (Fall 1978), 39-54. [267] Massey, D., 'Survey: regionalism: some current issues', Capital and Class, 6 (1978), 106-125. (268) Massey, D. and R. Meegan, The Anatomy 0/Job Loss. London: Methuen. 1982. [2691 Massey, D. and R. Meegan (eds), Politics and Method: Contrasting Studies in Industrial Geography. London: Methuen, 1985. [270J Massey, D. and A. Catalano, Capital and Land: Landownership by Capital Great Britain. London: Edward Arnold, 1978. [271] Merrett, S., State Housing in Britain. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, [272] Merrett, S., Owner Occupation in Britain. London: Routledge & Kegan 1982. [273J Miliband, R., �Poulantzas and the capitalist State', New Left Review, 81 (1973), 83-93. [274) Miliband, R., The State in Capitalist Society. New York: Basic Books, 1%9. [275J Mingione, E., Social Conflict and the City. New York: St Martin's, 1981. {276J Mollenkopf, J" 'The postwar Politics of urban development', in Marxism and .•

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

145

ed. by W. K. Tabb and L. Sawers. pp. 117-152. New York: Oxford University Press. 1978. • [277] Mollenkopf. J.t The Contested City. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. [278} Molotch. H" 'The city as a growth machine: toward a political economy of place,' American Journal of Sociology. 82 (Sept 1976), 309-330. [279] Myrdal. G., Economic Theory and the Underdeveloped Regions. London: Duckworth, 1957. [280} Nairn, T., The Break-Up 0/ Britain. London: New Left Books, 1977. [281) Navarro, V., Medicine Under Capita/ism. New York: Prodist, 1976. (282] Newfield, 1. and P. DuBruhl, The Abuse of Power. New York: Penguin, 1978. [283] Nisonoff, L., 'Bread and roses: the proletarianization of women workers in New England textile mills, 1827-1848', Historical Journal of Massachusetts, 9:1 (Jan 1981), 3-14. [284] Ocampo, J. F., Dominio de Clase en la Cuidad Colombiana. Medellin: Oveja Negra, 1982. [285] O'Connor, J., The Fiscal Crisis 0/ the State. New York: St Martins. 1973. [286] Offe, C. and V. Rouge, 'Theses on the theory of the State', New German Critique, 6 (1975), 137-145. [287] PaW, R., Whose City. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975. [288] Palloix, P., L'/nternationalisation du Capital. Paris: Maspero, 1975. [2891 Peery, N., The Negro National Colonial Question. Chicago: Workers Press, 1972. [290) Perlman, J., The Myth of Marginality. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. [291] Perlo Cohen, M., Estado, Vivienda y Estructura Urbana en el Cardenismo. Mexico: Universidad Autonoma Naciorra1 de Mexico, 1981. [2921 Perlo Cohen, M., 'Effecto.s espaciales de Ia intemacionalizacion de la econo­ mia mexicana', in Mexico: problemas Urbano Regionales, ed. by G. Boils, pp. 289-338. Mexico City: GV Editores, 1987. 289-338. 1293J Perry, D. C. and A. Watkins, (eds.), The Rise ofthe Sunbelt Cities. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977. [294] Persky, J., 'The South: a colony at home', Southern Exposure, 1:2 (1973). 14-22. [295] Pickvance, C. G. (ed.), Urban Sociology: Critical Essays. New York: St Martins, 1976. (296) Piven F. F. and R. A. Cloward, Regulating 'he Poor. New York: Pantheon, 1971. (297] Piven F. F. and R. A. Cloward, Poor Peoples Movements. New York, Pantheon, 1977. [298] Piven, F. F. and R. A. Cloward, The New Class War. New York: Pantheon, 1982. [299] Platt, A. M., The Child Savers. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979. (300) Plotkin, S., Keep Out: the Struggle for Land Use Control. Berkeley: University of california Press, 1987. [3011 Polanyi, K., The Great Trans/ormation. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. [302] Political Economy of Housing Workshop, Political Economy and the Housing Question. London: Conference of Socialist Economists, 1975. [3031 Political Economy of Housing Workshop, HOUSing and Class in Britain. London: Conference of Socialist Economists, 1976. [304J Political Economy of Women Collective, 'Special issue: the Political economy of women', Review of RadicQI Political Economics, 16:1 (Spring 1984). the Metropolis.

MATTHEW EDEL

146

(305] Popenoe, D., The Suburban Environment: Sweden and the United States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. [306] Poulantzas. N., Political Power and Social Classes. London: New Left Books; 1973. [3071 Pradilla Cobos, E., 'Notas acerca del problema de la vivienda'. Ideo/agio y Sociedad, 16 (1976), 70-107. [308) Pradilla Cobos, E. (ed.), Ensayos Sabre el Problema de fa Vivienda en America Latina. Xochimilco, Mexico: Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana, 1982. [3091 Pradilla Cobos. E., Contribucion a 10 Critica de fa Teoria Urbana', Xochimilco, Mexico: Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana. 1984. [310] Pradilla Cobos, E., Capital, £Stada y Vj"�ienda en America Latina. Mexico City: Fontamara. 1987. [311] Preteceille, E., La Production des Grandes Ensembles. Paris: Mouton, 1973. [3121 Preteceille, E. and 1. P. Terail, Capitalism, Consumption and Needs. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985. [313] P},noos, J., R. Schafer and C. Hartman, (eds.), Housing in Urban America. York: Aldine, 1980. [314] Quinney, R., Critique of Legal Order. Boston: Little Brown, 1974. {315] Reich, M., 'The economics of racism', in Problems in Political lic, o� "mv: ; Urban Perspective, ed. by D. Gordon, pp. 107-112. Lexington: D. C. 1971. t316] Reich, M., Racial Inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981. [3171 Rendon, T. and Salas, C., 'Notas criticas sabre algunos conceptos en el ._.".,. " , de la ocupacion', Ensayos; Economia Politico y Historica, U:7 20-27. [318] Repo, M., 'The fallacy of community control,' in Community or CI,,,,, .Stru."I'i' .i ed. by J. Cowley et 01., pp. 47-64. London: Stage One, 1977. [319] Rex, J. and R. Moore, Race, Community and Conflict. London: University Press, 1967. (320] Rey, P. P., Les Alliances des Classes. Paris: Maspero, 1973. [3211 Ricardo. D., Principles oj Political Economy and Taxation, ed. by P. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951. [322] Richardson, R., The. 'New' Urban Economics-and Alternatives. London: 1972. [323] ruCkin, J. and R. Barber, The North Will Rise Again. Boston: Beacon 1978. [324] Rose, S., A Theory of State Expenditures, PhD Dissertation, Gty University New York, 1975. I [325] Rostow, W. W 'Regional change and. the fifth kondratieff upswing', in 1n.e 1(S' of the Sunbelt Cities, ed. by D. C. Perry and A. J. Watkins. pp. 83-103. Hills: Sage Publications, 1977. [3261 Rothschild, E., Paradise Lost: the Decline ojthe Auto-industrial Age. New Random House, 1973. [327] Rowbotham, S., Women. Resistance and Revolution. New York: Panthea'L, : 1972. [328] Rubin, G., 'The traffic in women', in Toward andAnthropology oj Women, by R. Reiter, pp. 157-210. New York: Monthly Review Press. 1975. (329) Sale, K., Power Shift. New York: Random House, 1975. [330] Samuelson. P. A., Economics. New York: McGraw Hill, 1948. (3311 Sandercock, L.. Cities jor Sale. Melbourne: Melbourne University 1975. (332] Sanderson, S. E. (ed.), The Americas ;� the New International Division of New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985. .•

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

147

[333] Sargent. L. (ed.), Women and Revolution. Boston: South End Press, 1981. [3341 Sassen, S., The Mobility ofLabor and Capital. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988, [335] Sassen�Koob, S., 'The new labor demand in global cities'. in Cities in Transformation, ed. by M. P. Smith, pp. 139-1 7 1 . Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 1984. [336] Saunders. p" 'Domestic property and social class', International Journal oj Urban and Regional Research, 2:2 (June 1978), 233-251 . [337] Saunders, p" Social Theory and the Urban Question. London: Hutchinson, 1981. [338] Sawers, L., 'Urban form and the mode of production', Review ofRadical Political Economics, 7:1 (Spring 1975), 52--68. [339] Sawers. L., 'Cities and countryside in the Soviet Union and China', in Marxism and the Metropolis, ed. by W. K. Tabb and L. Sawers, pp. 338-364. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. [3401 Sawers, L., 'The political economy of urban transportation: an interpretive essay', in Marxism and the Metropolis, ed. by W. K. Tabb and L. Sawen, 2nd edn, pp. 223-254. New York: Oxford University Press. [341] Sawers, L. and W. Tabb, (eds.), Sunhelt/Snowbelt. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984. [342] Sawers, L. and H. M. Wachtel, 'Who benefits from federal housing policies?' in Problems in PoliticalEconomy; an Urban Perspective, ed. by D. M. Gordon, 2nd edn, pp. 501-507. Lexington: D C Heath, 1977. [343} Saxenian, A., 'The urban contradictions of Silicon Valley', in SunbeltlSnowbelt, ed. by L. Sawers and W. K. Tabb, pp. 163-197. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984. (344) Schaeffer, K. H. and E. Selar, Accessjor All. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. [345] Schlesinger, T. and M. Ehrlich, 'Housing: the industry capitalism didn't forget', Critical Perspectives on Housing, ed. by R. Bratt, C. Hartman and A. Meyerson, pp. 139-164. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986. [346J Scott, A., The Urban Land Nexus and the State. London: Pion, 1980. [347] Scou, 1. W., 'The glassworkers of Carmaux, 1850-1900', in Nineteenth Cen­ tury Cities, ed. by S. Thernstrom and R. Sennett, pp. 3-48. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969. [3481 Shanin, T., Late Marx and the Russian Rood. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983. [349J Shelton, B. A. et 01., Houston: Growth and Decline in a Sunbelt Boomtown. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989. [350] Shulman, S., lRace, class and occupational stratification', Review oj Radical Political Economics, 13:3 (Fall 1981), 21-31. [351) Sidel, R., Families oj Fengsheng. Harmondsworth: Penguin,)974. (352) Smith, M. P., The City and Social Theory. New York: 5t Martin's, 1983. (353] Smith, M. P., City, State and Market. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988. [354} Smith, N., Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production o.j Space. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984. [355) Snell, B., American Ground Transportation, US Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1974. [356} Soja, E. W., Postmodern Geographies. London: Verso. 1989. 1357] Sokoloff, N. J., Between Money and Love: the Dialectics oj Women:S Home and Market Work. New York: Prager, 1980. [358) Squires, G. D., et 01., Chicago: Race, Class and the Response to Urban Decline. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987.

Iii ,

MATTHEW EDEL

148

Stalin, J Marxism and the National Question. New York: International Pub­ lishers, 1942. [360] Stanback. T. M. Jr and T. J. NoyeJle. Cities in Transition. Totowa, N. J.: All.nhe1d. Osmun. 1982. [361] Stave, B. M. (ed.), Socia/ism and the Cities. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press. 1975. [362] Stedman Jones. G., Outcast London. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971. [363] Stein, P. L., Toronto jor So/e. Toronto: New Press, 1972. [364] Steinberg, S., The Ethnic Myth. New York: Athenaeum, 1981. [365] Stone. H.t Workbook oj an Unsuccessful Architect. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973. [366] Stone, M., 'Reconstructing American housing', Paper presemed, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington D.C., 1973. [367] Stone, M., 'The housing crisis, mortgage lending and class struggle', Antipode, 7:2 (September 1974). [368] Stone, M., 'The Politics of housing: mortgage bankers', Transaction/Society, 9:9 (June-Aug 1972). 31-37. [369] Stone, M., 'Housing, mortgage lending and the contradictions of capitalism,' in Marxism and the Metropolis, ed. byW. K. Tabb and L. Sawers, pp. 179-207. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. [370] Stone, M., 'Housing and the dynamics of U.S. capitalism', in Critical Perspec­ tives on HOU$ing, ed. by R. Bratt, C. Hartman and A. Meyerson, pp. 41-67. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986. [371] Storper, M. and R. Walker, 'The theory of labor and the theory of location', International Journal oj Urban and Regional Research, 7:1 (1983), 1-41. [372] Storper, M. and R. Walker, 'The spatial divison of labor: labor and the location of industries', in Sunbelt/Snowbelt, ed. by L. Sawers and W. Tabb, pp. 19-47. New York: Oxford University Press. 1984. [373] Students for a Democratic Society, Pon Huron Statement, 1963. [373.] Swanstrom, T., The Crisis of Growth Politics. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1985. [374] Sweezy, P. M., The Theory oj Capitalist Development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942. [375] Szelenyi, I., Urban Inequalities Under State Socialism. New York: Oxford Uni­ versity Press, 1983. [376] Szelenyi, I. (ed.), Cities in Recession. Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1984. [377] Tabb, W. K. The Political Economy oj the Black Ghetto. New York: W. W. Norton, 1970. [378] Tabb, W. K., The Long Default: New York City and the Urban Fiscal New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982. [379] Tabb, W. K. and L. Sawers, (cds.), Marxism and the Metropolis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. [380] Theret, B., 'Collective means of consumption, capital accumulation, and urban question', International Journal oj Urban and Regional Research, (1982). 345-371. [381] Theret, B. and M. Wieviorka, Critique de fa Theorie du Monopoliste d'Etat. Paris: Maspero, 1978. 1382] Thompson, E. P., The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays. London: Merlin,. 1978. [383] Tomaskovic�Devey, D., and S. M. Miller, 'BUsineSs rationality and barriers capitalization', in Cities in Recession ed. by I. Szelenyi, pp. 46-68. London: Publications, 1984. [359]

.•

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS: MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

149

[3841 Topalov. C., Capital et Propriete Fonciere. Paris: Centre de Sociologie Urbaine. 1973. [38S} Topalov, C., Les Promoteurs Immobiliers. Paris: Mouton, 1974. [386] Topa1ov, C., Le Profit, 10 Rente ella Ville. Paris: Centre de Sociologie Urbaine, 1981. [387] Trotsky, L., The Russian Revolution. Garden City: Anchor, 1959. [388] Turner, J. F. C., Housing By People. New York: Pantheon, 1976. (3891 Urban Planning Aid, Community Development Corporations: the Empty Promise. Cambridge. Mass.: Urban Planning Aid. Inc., 1973. [390) Veltmeyer, H., 'The underdevelopment of Atlantic Canada', Review of Radical Political Economics. 10:3 (Fall 1978). 95-105. 1391] Vernon, R.o 'International investment and international trade in the product cycle', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80 (1966), 190-207. [392] Vietorisz, T. and B. Harrison, TheEconomic Development ofHarlem. New York: Praeger. 1970. 1393] Wakefield, E. G England and America. London, 1833. 1394J Walker, R. A., The Suburban Solution: Urban Geography and Urban Reform in .•

the Capitalist Development 0/ the United States, PhD Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1977. [395] Walker, R. A., 'Two sources of uneven development under advanced capitalism: spatial differentiation and capital mobility', Review of Radical Politcal i Eco­

nomics. 10:3 (1978). 28-37. 1396] Walker. R. A 'A theory of suburbanization: capitalism and tbe construction of

urban space in the United States'. in Urbanization and Urban Planning in Capi­ .•

talist Society, ed. by M. Dear andA. Scott, pp. 383-429. London: Methuen, 1981. [397] Wallerstein, I., The Modern World-system. New York: Academic Press, 1976. [398] Warde, A., 'Spatial change, politics and�he division of labour', in Social Relations and Spatial Structures. ed. by D. Gregory and J. Urry, pp. 190-212. New York: 8t Martins, 1985. [399) Warren, B., 'Imperialism and capitalist industrialization', New Left Review, 81 (Sept-Oct 1973). (400] Watkins. A. J., The Practice oj Urban Economics. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980. 1401] Watkins, M., 'A staple theory of economic growth', Canadian Journal oj Economics and Political Science, May 1963. 1402] Weinberg, D. S., The Social Relations oj Living: London 18305-1880s: The

of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., 1974.

Dialectics 0/ Urban Living and City Form, M .C.P. Thesis, Massachusetts Institute

1403] Weisskoff, R.t Factories and Food Stamps: the Puerto Rico Model oj Develop­ ment. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1985. [404] Wheeler. D. R., Economic Control and Urban Growth, PhD Dissertation. Mas­ sachusetts Institute of Technology, 1974. 1405] Williams, E., Capitalism and Slavery. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944. 1406] Williams, R., The Country and the City. New York: Oxford University Press. 1973. [4071 Willis, E., 'Consumerism and women,' Socialist Revolution, 1:3 (May-June 1970), 76-82. [408] Wilson, W. J., The Declining Significance of Race. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. 1409J Wilson, W. J. The Truly Disadvantaged. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.

.1

ii

,. , ,i "

.,

i

150

MATTHEW EDEL

f4lO1 Wineman, S., The Politics of Human Services. Boston: South End Press, 1984. (411J Wittfege1, K. A. Oriental Despotism: a Comparotive Study of Total Power. New Haven: Yale University press, 1957 [412] Wolf, E. Europe and the People without History. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982. [413] Wolff. R. D. and S. R. Resnick, Economics: Marxism v. Neoclassicism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1987. {414] Wolpe, R.o 'Capitalism and cheap labour-power in South Africa: from segre­ gation to apartheid', in The Articulation of Modes 0/ Production , ed. by H. Wolpe, pp. 289-319. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980. [415] Wright, G., Building the Dream. New York: Pantheon, 1981. [416] Yago, G., The Decline a/ Transit. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980. [417] Zevin, R. B., 'The political economy of the American empire, 1984', in Radical Perspectives on the Economic CriSis ofMonopoly Capitalism, pp. 131-137. New York: U.R.P.E., 1975. [4181 Ziccardi, A., 'La industria de la construccion y el estado cliente', in Mexico: Problems Urbano Regionales, ed. by G. Boils, pp. 339-387. Mexico City: OV Editores, 1987. (419) Zukin, S., Loft Living. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1982. [420] Zweig, M., 'The dialectics of black capitalism', Review of Block Political Economics, 3:1 (Fall, 1972), 42-57.

I ndex

Accumulation 15-17, 25. 38, 43 and consumer services 89-90 and cycles 37. 75-80 import substitution and 53, 55 export platform and 53, 5S and local government 124 process of 13 and property rights l iS and reO[ 57. 78-80 and social services 114- t i S stages of 6, 5 I urban 22 and regional growth 24 Aglietta. M. 38 Agriculture 56 American Communist Party 26 Amin, S. 35 Angotti. T. 100 Automation 16. 41 'Asiatic' mode 20 Austerity programs 127 Ball, Michael 76, 77 Baran 103, I I I Base multiplier theory 40 Bourgeoisie 19, 21. 52, 53 Bluestone, Barry 40, 4 1 . 42 Boston 82, 84 Bowles. S. 104, lOS Burgess. R. 102 Capital: centralization of 28-29 concentration of 28, 39 and land demand 82-83 immobility and local government 124-125 intensity 64 intensification of 36 internationalization of 50 international flight of 52 merchant 44

mobility of 36 uneven penetration of 25 organic composition of 67 and housing 73 and social movements 129 and social services 114-115 Capitalism: and the community 122, 132-133 and the nation-state 1 1 8 and race/ethnicity 120-121 origin of 20, 21-22 California. and taxes 127 Capitalist alienation 6 Capitalist agriculture 66 Castells, Manuel 4, 6, 7. 81, 91-92, liS, 116, 127, 129-130, 133 Catalano 76 Central business district 46 Chandler, A. O. 42 China 57. I I I Circulation 93 and housing resale 97 Cities: as centers of control 29 and country 18 centralization of 23 commercial 44, 47 corporate 46, 47 growth of 26. 44, 45. S1 industrial 42, 44. 45, 47 'post industrial' 47, 48 socialist 22 'state capitalist' 22, 47 suburbs of 75 world 49 Class: alienation 13, 14 conflict 6, 7. 16, 58, 62 and the countryside 22 and towns 21 urban-rural 21 western v. nonwestern 22 151