Untimely Politics
Titles in the Taking on the Political series include: Polemicization: The Contingency of the Common...
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Untimely Politics
Titles in the Taking on the Political series include: Polemicization: The Contingency of the Commonplace Benj amin Arditi and Jeremy Valentine
Post-Marxism Versus Cultural Studies Paul Bowman
Untimely Politics
Sarnuel A. Chambers
Cinematic Political Thought
Michael Shapiro
Politics and Aesthetics
Jon Simons
American Morality from 9/11 to Gul{ War 11 Cynthia Weber
Unti
ly
I i tics
Samuel A. Chambers
Edinburgh University Press
© Samuel A. Chambers, 2003 Edinburgh University Press Ltd 22 George Square, Edinburgh Typeset in 11 on 13 Sabon by Hewer Text Ltd, Edinburgh, and printed and bound in Great Britain by The Cromwell Press, Trowbridge, Wilts A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 0 7486 1766 3 (hardback) The right of Samuel A. Chambers to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
Contents
Acknowledgements
Vll
Introduction: 'Time is Out of Joint'
1
1 Language and the 'Burden' of Politics
10
2 Experiencing Language, Broaching Untimeliness
35
3 Spectral History, Untimely Theory
72
4 Untimely Reading: Foucault's Evasive Maneuvers
98
5 Untimely Agency: Having the Historical Sense to 'Bypass' Psychoanalytic Theory
127
6 The Untimely Politics of DOMA
155
Bibliography Index
1 76 193
For Jackie and Tim
Acknowledgements
I always thought authors were speaking figuratively when they made claims such as 'this book would not have been possible' without the help and support of all those listed in the acknowledgements . Now, as I reach the final stages of the proj ect, I sometirnes balk at the very idea of calling this book 'mine' . I suppose that is why the other cliche of the acknowledgements is to clairn responsibility for any remaining errors or weaknesses. In the end, I am left with only the mistakes - so much for authorial intention. Mike Shapiro helped this book to see the light of day well at the end of the project; for that, I thank him first. I am also grateful to Benj amin Arditi for his help and support, and for some very productive long- distance exchanges on political theory. I also thank Nicola Carr, at Edinburgh University Press, for keeping me informed and making the publication process as smooth as possible. I am grateful for the support, criticism, and dialogue produced by the numerous audiences to which I presented earlier arguments, drafts, and portions of the book. I owe debts to panel members over the years at the Midwest, Western, and American political science association meetings, particularly Steven Gerencser; to political science depart ment members at St. Olaf College; to panel mernbers at the 'How Queer are we Here ? ' conference at the University of Minnesota; and to audience members at the University of Delaware. I also thank the St. Mary's College of Maryland surnmer writing group for their enthu siasm. A much earlier version of Chapter 3 appeared in Theory and Event 3 .4 (2000), and a version of Chapter 4 appeared in Angelaki 6 . 3 (200 1 ) ; thanks g o t o the anonymous reviewers o f those journals and to the readers who offered feedback and criticism. A number of people read the complete manuscript, at various j unctures along the way, and their comments proved invaluable. I
vi i i
U nti mely Pol itics
thank Mary Dietz, Kennan Ferguson, Brian Mogck, August Nimtz, Naorni Scheman, Ed Schiappa, Greg Weight, John Zumbrunnen, and two anonyrnous reviewers at Edinburgh University Press. Ruth Fein gold has the dubious honor of going through the manuscript twice; her rneticulousness, her eye for language, and her capacity to cite the Chicago Manual of Style all prove second to none. Lisa Disch read too rnany drafts of too many chapters for either of us to be able to keep count. As I struggle, here, to come up with words that can express my gratitude to her, I find myself wondering if I can have her read a draft of the acknowledgements . I believe, though I honestly cannot recall with certitude, that the idea of untimeliness originally came fro1n her. I can say for certain that she will see pieces of her ideas, arguments, and phrasings all over the book. She already knows that what she has given to the project has made this a better book, but her writing, her example, her friendship, and her collegiality have all made me a better person. This book was sustained in many other ways, ones that often had little to do with reading drafts or arguing political theory. I thank Michael Warner for his powerful and critical reading of a much earlier draft of Chapter 5, but I owe my biggest debt to him for his insightful tips on how to describe the project after the fact. Sandy Schram always lifted my spirits when I was most certain I had reached the end of the road, and his own work is exemplary of the role a political theorist can play. I thank Roddey Reid for the not infrequent bra instorming sessions, and for his constant collegiality. This book looks quite a bit different than it 1night have, were it not for the work of David Halperin. I am greatly indebted to him for inspiring me with his own writing and for offering unflagging support for my scholarship. My own writing of the book depended on the support of so many individuals who had little or no involvement with the project itself. First, I want to acknowledge D an Hope, simply for his refusal to let political theory be anything less than the noble endeavor we had once all believed it to be. I thank Hal Janney for his friendship. Hal's confidence in both this book and in 1ny work as a political theorist never flagged, even though he saw both only from the outside. I also owe a debt to John Bies: in a way, this book would not have been possible without his help in navigating the waters of political theory within the academy. Finally, by dedicating the book to them, I try to express here some small portion of my overall gratitude to my parents . I doubt they expected this book, as the fruit of their sacrifices, and yet I know they will be proud of it.
Preface
1x
Without doubt, I owe my greatest debt to Rebecca Brown; indeed, that debt only continues to grow larger. No one has put more into this book than she; anyone who doubts that clairn should sitnply ask her, an art historian, to explain the ontological difference. Rebecca has carefully and perspicaciously read draft after draft, been a sounding board for even the craziest of argurnents, and, throughout, always remained certain of the future this book had. Her faith in this project mirrored her faith in me, and neither ever seems to wane - both facts that often completely bewilder me. In the future I plan to pay back some of my debts, and I hope for more bewilderment in !'a-venir.
Introduction: 'Time
iS
Out of Joint'
At the beginning of the twenty-first century political change happens quickly and the face of democratic politics transforms rapidly. As some corrnnentators have already noted, the loss of stable political referents occasioned by the end of the Cold War has created a shifting political landscape. That landscape is marked, on the one hand, by conflict, turmoil, and violence - frorn the continually renegotiated and re-interrupted 'peace' of the Middle East to the plight of the Balkans and, on the other, by political/media events of disproportion - from 0. J . Simpson to Monica Lewinsky. Writers atterr1pting to come to grips with the rneaning and implications of these constant changes have accused political theorists of being unable to keep up with the tirnes, of neglecting current political events in order to explore the latest arcane philosophical trend (Benhabib 1 995c; Rorty 1 9 8 6; Isaac 1 995; Seery 1 9 9 6 ) . Terence Ball, for example, goes so far as to 'wonder what is even remotely "political" about political theory' ( 1 99 5 : 54 ) . And when Jeffrey Isaac labels the failure of political theorists to address the revolutions of 1 9 8 9 a 'missed opportunity', he effectively accuses them of tardiness ( 1 99 5 : 6 8 2 ) . A t first glance, 'tardiness' does not sound like such a damning critique, but in this sense being 'too late' implies not merely political irrelevance but political irresponsibility - and there can be no graver indictment than that. Or can there be ? What must be presupposed about political theory, political agency, even language itself, to give this charge its force ? To condemn a theory or argument as being 'too late' presupposes a modern conception of political agency, one that takes its bearings from a linear notion of history, thought as a certain unfolding of events . Traditional conservatisrn, for example, firmly lodges the political agent within a historical tradition and then asks
2
U nti mely Pol itics
that agent to make only minor political corrections in response to the problems given up by history . Alternatively, liberal conceptions as sume (or sometimes simply neglect) a certain background of histori cally accumulated political meaning, but they insist that the political agent ren1ain free to act out of or against that background. The political actor in liberalism gets not only to respond to past problems but also to solve future ones, by dictating the course of history to c01ne. Finally, marxists typically conceive of agency with respect to history as an unfolding of stages that will lead to emancipation in the future. Despite the undeniably significant differences among then1, all of these cases presuppose history as a sort of linear movement and they characterize politics as a timely enterprise - one designed to solve the problerns created by history and/or chart its future progress . This book proposes to consider political theory and politics as untimely endeavors, thus it does not seek merely to discuss one particular type of already given politics. Untimely Politics names an effort to expand the very domain of the political. The contempor ary landscape is dotted with interlocutors who - drawing on the work of important twentieth-century philosophers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and D errida - gesture towards what I will specify as an untirnely approach to political theory. Those thinkers who insist on denaturalizing given concepts and categories, who refuse to turn political thought into a problem-solving endeavor, all help to outline the contours of untimely theory . Lisa Disch suggests that Hannah Arendt saw political theory as an untimely pursuit, and that criticisms of Arendt's work tend to miss their mark precisely because they carry the expectation of timeliness ( 1 99 6 ) ; likewise, Bonnie Honig's recent work on the 'foreignness' at the heart of democracy expresses the very spirit of untimeliness that I wish to evoke here (2001 ). Diana Coole's recent rereading of a non-Hegelian dialectics relies on an implicitly untimely and ghostly conception of ternporality (2000 ) . Perhaps rnost significantly, Ernesto Laclau's project of reconceptualizing both free dom and universalism through a politics of hegen10nic articulations embodies the very thinking of untimeliness that I will try to articulate ( 1 990, 1 996, Butler et al. 2000 ) . It is significant to stress, however, that despite a handful of pr01nising remarks in scattered texts, a self conscious conception of untirneliness has not even begun to be built in political theory. This work begins that building process by explicitly articulating a political theory of untimeliness. Any straightforward explanation of untimeliness would, at this point, only run counter to my intended use of the concept within this
Introd u ction: 'Ti me is Out of Joi nt'
3
work. And since I hope for this proj ect to open the field toward further considerations of a politics of untimeliness, any simple definition could only serve to assimilate the meaning of untimeliness to our intuitive and everyday notions of time as linear progress. A more complex and subtle understanding of what untimeliness in political theory might mean will only begin to ernerge gradually within the project; for now, it will suffice to demarcate the field in which untirneliness might emerge or, in other words, to say what it is not rather than what it is . One must rigorously distinguish untirneliness from both the ahis torical and the a punctual. A politics of untimely agency would have to begin by rejecting the various linear understandings of history in its relation to the political agent that I enumerated above. The concern of a politics of untimeliness lies with the very possibility of history. Untiineliness therefore should not suggest a dismissal of history. But it also should not connote an arriving too late or too early, since both of these notions only make sense in relation to a linear notion of time. For example, the Soviet revolution rnight have come 'too soon' from the perspective of marxist theory, but it was not for that reason 'untimely' . 'Too soon' and 'too late' presuppose the very linear notions of history that untimeliness attempts to get past. Untimeliness, in contrast, requires a political theory of ghosts, and a ghostly theory of politics always proves proble1natic. That is, its sense of temporality means that an untirnely theory cannot simply solve problems produced along a linear model of time. Rather, an untimely theory holds the capacity to render problematic that which, in the current context, does not appear to be a problem. This capacity to problematize means that untimeliness may disturb our most assured convictions; it shakes even the solid ground of ontology by calling into question the very distinction between the actual and the spectral. A political theory of untimeliness operates in the reahn of hauntology, not ontology. Hauntology would serve as the theory of being for untimely politics, but, unlike traditional ontology, a hauntology grants the possibility that ghosts exist. An untimely political theory - a political theory that can speak to ghosts - will have to maintain a healthy skepticisrn about any simple distinction between the real and the unreal. In the face of recent efforts to narrow the domain of politics and to restrict the scope of contemporary political struggles, my work attempts to carve out a space from which a politics of untimeliness can flourish. I initiate this process, in Chapter 1, by surveying the terms of the \
4
U nti mely Pol itics
constructivist debate, which I take as the point of departure for rny proj ect. I begin by considering the paradoxical notion of 'construc tion', a word that has been thrown about so carelessly by recent writings in social, feminist, and political theory as to evacuate the term of any real rneaning. 'Construction' evokes the imagery of building, seemingly suggesting that a constructivist description of human sub jectivity or political agency would provide an account of a maste� builder, the one responsible for manufacturing subjectivity. Upon this comrnon-sense notion of construction, critics of constructivism have built forceful critiques of any philosophical investigation into lan guage; they argue that hermeneutic or genealogical analyses lead to a linguistic determinisrn by trapping the political actor within language. I relieve the 'political burden' placed on such investigations of language by showing that it is, in fact, an illusion created by the critics of construction, since their very arguments for cordoning off the political and literary realms depend upon an implicit, neo-Aristotelian theory concerning the relation between language and politics. This model silently invokes a rather instrurnental view of language, as it implicitly presupposes language as a tool to be used by political agents. Because it remains tacit, I refer to this as the as-if-objectified (AIO ) rnodel of language. I aim not to deny but to challenge the dominance of the AIO model and to enable the process of transform ing the discursive practices that it supports. This challenge, I maintain, must be seen not ( as the critics might have it) as a literary pursuit, but as an expressly political act. To talk about language is not, I show, merely to talk about or write literature. The political burden placed on philosophical investigations into language serves to constrain the terms of debate in political theory. I seek to reopen those debates, and, by lifting that burden, I can turn in Chapter 2 to one such close consideration of language. I look to the writings of Heidegger to find the first strands of an alternative to the AIO model of language. I sidestep traditional approaches to and critiques of Heidegger by tapping the resources of his later writings on language for my own political purposes. Within Heidegger' s later writings it is possible to excavate a coun ter-rnodel to the neo-Aristotelian notion of language as a faculty possessed by 'man', the rational anirnal. Heidegger insists that we can never really say what language is, for language may always prove to be j ust that which exceeds our grasp. In Heideggerian terminology, language can never be reducible to Being; language both makes possible and belongs together with Being - it is thus 'beyond Being'.
I n trod u ction: 'Ti me is Out of Joi nt'
5
This Heideggerian insight has crucial implications for my analysis. It irnplies that once one rejects the Aristotelian model of language as a faculty possessed by human beings, one must also abandon the notion that language could ever simply be used as a tool for political purposes . Language may have political implications and ramifications outside of the use to which a political actor puts it - an insight that serves to displace what I will describe as the timely constraints placed upon theories of politics. Language precedes human subjects not j ust temporally, but, more importantly, ontologically; therefore, the rela tion between the political agent and language can never be direct, instrumental, or timely. Conceiving of language in this manner urges a redirection of political analysis toward the level of language and its effects in history. I will show in the chapters that follow that these effects turn out to be rather untimely; they can never be predicted in advance or completely controlled after the fact. And Heidegger himself argues that 'all essential philosophical questioning is necessa rily untimely' ( 1 95 9 : 8 ) . Heidegger's alternative t o the AIO model lays the foundation for building a specifically untirnely approach to politics. I begin to theorize a politics of untimeliness in Chapter 3, by challenging Isaac's vision for the role of the political theorist. Isaac asks that political theory be precisely what Heidegger says philosophy can never be. He admonishes his colleagues in the discipline for their utter neglect and 'avoidance' of the revolutionary events of 1 9 8 9, arguing forcefully that political theory must eschew what he calls 'second-order inquiry' - the type of textual and interpretive work that concerns a large portion of the field. Instead, Isaac suggests that political theory turn toward 'first-order inquiry' : unmediated efforts to explain recent empirical events in order to facilitate resolution through a program of problem-solving ( 1 99 5 ) . Isaac insists that political theory remain timely by rej ecting philosophical fashions in favor of political ex IgenCies . I argue that the political problems we will face in the twenty--first century may well require political theorists to develop a much more subtle understanding of history than that offered by Isaac's first-order/ second-order dichotomy. Therefore, political theorists will have to play a much more expansive and variegated role than that of 'pro blem-solver', to which Isaac relegates us. In Chapter 3, I describe both that understanding of history - in the form of historicity - and that role for the political theorist, in the form of untimeliness. Carrying out each of these tasks requires an approach to language outside the
6
U nti m ely Pol itics
confines of the AIO model. Indeed, the conception of untimely politics that begins to emerge in this chapter rests upon the Heideggerian alternative to the AIO rnodel, so even though I leave direct meditations on language behind after Chapter 2, the problem of thinking language outside the terms of the AIO continues to inform my efforts at building a politics of untimeliness. Within the terms of the AIO model, unti1neliness can never even manifest itself, much less flourish. Isaac's categories and schemas prove overly restrictive for the field of political theory (the first-order/second-order dichotorny is a false one) because they rely on a notion of timeliness, and although language appears to be of no concern to Isaac, his sharp distinction between first--order and second-order inquiry tacitly relies upon the AIO rnodel of language. To break free of these timely categories, I turn toward Derrida's hauntology : a preliminary effort to formulate the notion of historicity as an alternative conception of history. Derridean hauntology proves to be 'beyond Being' in much the sa1ne way as Heideggerian language, and I use the latter in order to develop the former into a concept of spectral history. Spectral history requires a steadfast refusal to treat language either as an object of knowledge for the subject or as a tool for the political agent. Defined as 'the possibility of history itself', historicity provides s01ne of the underlayment for building a notion of untimeliness that can remain distinct fro1n linear notions of time. Untimeliness, that is, should be considered neither too late nor too early, but, as Hamlet says, 'out of j oint'. Chapter 4 concretely demonstrates one necessary implication of reconsidering political theory as untimely: rethinking the practices of textual interpretation that dominate the field. Through an in-depth explication of Foucault's work on reading, writing, interpretation, and history, I attempt to render problematic the most common method of intellectual historiography as practiced in the history of political thought. Precisely because political theorists research and teach through and in reference to this history, a set of implicit ground rules governs most approaches to authors in the canon. These un stated rules help to guide c01nmentators in their search for textual meaning: ( 1 ) by directing them to focus on those texts that seem to contain the most explicit theoretical and methodological statements on politics as such (this rule explains, for exa1nple, why an undeniably canonized text such as John Locke's Two Treatises of Government is almost never read in its entirety; instructors only assign the second of the two treatises ) ; (2) by emphasizing previous influences as the single biggest key to understanding (for example, Hegel serves to explain
I ntrod u ction: 'Ti me is Out of Joi nt'
7
Marx's notion of stages in history, Hobbes serves to explain Locke's state of nature) ; or (3) by, sometirr1es in contrast to (2), emphasizing the author's own life experiences to explain his or her text (so the seventeenth-century exclusion crisis and the Glorious Revolution not Hobbes - explain Locke's text). My reading of Foucault shows that all of the above rr1ethods of interpretation seek to situate an author and his or her work within a web of previous influences and intentionality, or sometimes within the author's own reuvre (hence political theory's numbering system: Wittgenstein I and II, Heidegger I and II) . Yet the writings of Foucault, along with those of a number of other contemporary authors, work against j ust this type of effort. What I call Foucault's 'evasive rnan euvers' constitute strategic attempts on his part to avoid being pinned down by the traditional interpretive approaches; he thereby challenges and changes the very ground rules of intellectual historiography that are so often presupposed by his critics. And yet, Foucault does not casually dismiss careful and sophisticated textual readings; in fact, his critique of interpretation simultaneously demands even more rigorous and prudent reading. This practice of reading - as brought to light by Foucault's evasive maneuvers - turns out to be an untimely one that follows the path of a text on its own terms (which does not necessarily mean outside its context) and draws political implications from those textual effects rather than from a set of pre-given categories. While Chapters 3 and 4 investigate the implications of untimeliness for the practice of political theory, Chapter 5 builds on those devel opments as I defend a specific conception of political agency. The argument centers on an extended engagement with, and critique of, Judith Butler's work on subj ectivity and political agency. In The Psychic Life of Power, Butler suggests that an adequate and tenable account of political agency depends upon reconciling Foucault's discursive analysis with the psychoanalytic theory of Freud and Lacan. I argue that Butler's attempt at reconciliation not only fails on its own terms, but also comes at far too high a political price. Butler's proj ect of j oining Freud to Foucault tends to dehistoricize Foucault's genea logical accounts of subjectivity, robbing those accounts of the Nietzschean 'historical sense' that gives thern their descriptive power and political efficacy. In rejecting Butler's effort to build what I call a 'timeless' theory of subj ectivity, I suggest that we follow Foucault in trying to hold on to a certain historical sense. Historical sense can play an important role in building an adequate account of political resis tance, an untimely understanding of agency more appropriate to
8
U nti mely Politics
today's untimely political struggles. This untimely conception of agency must maintain a keen Nietzschean sense of the effects of history. To build a philosophical 'theory of subject' Butler says we need Freud to prop up Foucault, but the politics of producing and transforrning historical subj ectivities depends upon a discursive, un timely conception of subjectivity embedded within history. In Chapter 6 I address the political battle over gay marriage in the US . I root the political payoff of my proj ect the advantages of an untimely theory - in an analysis of the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) by the 1 04th Congress. My account of DOMA tries to circumnavigate the narrow debate between tradition and rights as staged on the floors of the House and Senate - so as to ernphasize issues of structural and institutional heterosexism. In short, at the core of the politics of DOMA one finds a necessarily untimely battle over language. Simply denouncing D OMA as a homophobic act, as some on the left would like to do, fails to comprehend the rnanner in which this piece of legislation attempts, often unsuccess fully, to block the structural transformation of discursive practices that lesbian, gay, and sometimes academic communities have accom plished by recognizing and accepting relationships between people that are not legally 'marriages'. A traditional approach to the debate over and events leading up to this bill fails to grasp both the political stakes of DOMA itself and the political actions to which D OMA responds. I argue that the importance of DOMA cannot be reduced to tradition (the argument from the political right), rights (political left), or even homophobia ( academic left) . From the basis of my alternative conception of language, I interpret DOMA as a political act of structural and discursive heterosexism. DOMA attempts both to thwart and to turn back the changes in discursive practices that have been occurring throughout those corn munities that I refer to above. The act tries, through legislative decree, to prevent those uses of the terrns 'husband', 'wife', and 'spouse' that do not square with 'traditional' understandings of relationships and sexuality. The irony of the act lies in the fact that one can no more legislate the use of words (the French Academy notwithstanding) than one can legislate sexual practice. But the battle over changes in discursive practices is nonetheless a thoroughly political one, and the political stakes cannot be reduced to an effort to gain civil rights (though by no means do I deny the importance of those gains, if and when they come to gays and lesbians), because the issues of status, recognition, and often political subjectivity go beyond rights issues.
I n trod uction: 'Ti me is Out of Joint'
9
The effort to so reduce the political potential of D OMA amounts to an assirnilation of DOMA to the narrow political terms of the AIO model. The significance of DOMA for my purposes lies in its capacity to call the AIO model up short. Only an untimely political theory that pays close attention to the discursive politics of DOMA can move past the limited and limiting debate over tradition, rights, and even homophobia; only an untimely agency can continue the struggle against D OMA outside of the legislative and judicial arenas. But 1nost significantly, it is precisely an untimely approach to DOMA that reveals the politics in a discursive interpretation of this political battle. I end with some reflections on the issues of language, history, and untimeliness with which I began. How does one do political theory outside the confines of the AIO model ? How can political theorists maintain the ability to discourse with specters ? What, exactly, would a politics of untimeliness look like, and how could it expand our impoverished notions of politics at this particular historical j uncture ? My analysis o f DOMA provides the beginnings o f answers to important questions such as these. It serves to demonstrate that accusations of tardiness in political theory not only miss their mark but also deflect our attention from more helpful approaches to the issues we must face in twenty-first century politics.
1
languag
and the 'Burden' of Politics
This book contributes to a number of important debates that make up the field of contemporary political theory today, yet many of those debates can fairly be characterized as 'polernical' in the sense sug gested by Jacques Ranciere. Ranciere describes a pole1nic as occurring not when one party asserts X and the other party Y, but rather when each party construes the ground of the argument, the objects within it, and the very identity of the interlocutors differently (Ranciere 1 9 9 8 : xi; cf. Arditi and Valentine 1 9 9 9 ) . Obviously, polemics i n this sense make for poor debates, since the parties to the debates can hardly even be considered to be talking to one another. My overall project to build a politics of untimeliness will simultaneously attempt to speak across these divides - or, in Ranciere's terms, to reconceptualize the very terrain of the debate. The debate between constructivists and their critics certainly looks like a polemic, since one party to it sees language as central to any conception of politics, while the other envisions a fundamental dis tinction between language and politics. In this chapter I make my own polemical intervention in that debate, as I try to show that a specific, and rather unhelpful, model of the language/politics relation (the AIO model) holds sway in the field. My argument is not that the entire field has fallen under the sway of the AIO model. Rather, I aim to demonstrate that the impact this presupposed relation between lan guage and politics has on the field as a whole serves to make invisible the very interlocutors who would challenge or reject this 1nodel. Thus, I attempt to reopen this debate by carving out a space for those philosophical investigations into language to emerge . This effort operates by way of a description and critique of the AIO model.
La ng uage a n d the ' B u rden' of Politics
11
The L an g u a g e of C o n s tr u ction One hears a lot about 'construction' these days. In fact, given the rnultitude of references to the term, the unassuming reader who picks up a book in political, feminist, or cultural theory might make the honest mistake of thinking that he or she were reading a strangely written carpentry manual. If only it were that simple. For if 'con struction' were a basic matter of building something, and 'deconstruc tion' a matter of tearing it down, a great deal of contentious ( and often exasperated) debate might be eliminated from these fields. As matters stand now, the meaning of 'construction' as both a word and a practice proves far from clear, and yet many authors continue to employ the term as if its definition were as straightforward as I have jocularly suggested. Spending a bit more titne with recent works in political theory reveals that the term construction stands as a central issue of debate within these texts, with numerous authors condemning construction by arguing against the idea that it could be a viable asset to theorizing the political. A sensible set of criticisms flows directly from my brief and crude characterization of construction, 1 for if the practice of construction functioned as I have described it above, then any con struction would certainly require a 'constructor'. That is to say, if one takes construction as a simple matter of making something, then no doubt there must be a subject behind the making, 2 a subject doing the constructing itself - in sum, a subject in the fullest sense of the word. 3 However, as critics of constructivism have argued forcefully, it turns out that this constructing subject proves to be wholly lacking in the theories expounded by constructivists (Benhabib 1 995a; Fraser 1 995 ) . In short, the constructivists have failed to understand the very nature of construction, and thus they proceed to analyze the 'social constructions ' of various cultural and political phenomena while remaining wholly inattentive to the 'who' or 'what' that is doing the constructing (Taylor 1 9 85b, 1 995; Rorty 1 9 9 1 ) . Such criticisms thereby expose a certain irony at the heart of 'constructivism'; more irr1portantly, they charge constructivism with a significant political and ethical danger. 4 This danger is often brought into focus by citing a now infamous line from Jacques Derrida, who once wrote: 'there is nothing outside the text' ( 1 974 : 1 5 8 ) . 5 In context, this sentence constitutes one move among many within a complex philosophical argument, but out of its context the claim has had multiple deleterious effects 6 on the
12
U ntimely Pol itics
perception and understanding of a radical constructivist position. The sentence is taken to assert that there is nothing real but words, and it therefore provides evidence that the critique of the subject has gone too far. In attempting to deny the ultimate sovereignty and autonomy of a Cartesian subj ect, constructivism has eliminated the thinking and acting subject altogether. If the subj ect is but the product of language caused, created, and determined by discourse - then no room remains for the undeniable physicality of human beings nor for the unavoid able necessity of action by and for those individuals . Critics who hold to this line of argument take radical constructivists quite literally at their word when they suggest that 'sex' or 'nature' are the effects of language, produced by discourse ( see Halperin 1 9 9 0 ) . Pursuing this argurnent t o its logical conclusion, this criticism o f constructivism obj ects t o the idea that language could b e a first cause or a ground. 'If everything is discourse, what about the body ? ' (Butler 1 993 : 6 ) . How can one deny the irrefutable fact that bodies eat and sleep, live and die, and feel pleasure and pain ? These basic biological phenomena cannot be reduced to the mere effects of language. Viewed from this line of critique, constructivism turns into a sort of cultural determinism, with everything reducible to the source-point of lan guage, and with a great deal of irrefutable human experience thrown to the wayside. As Seyla Benhabib puts it, 'the subject thus dissolves into the chain of significations of which it was supposed to be the initiator' ( 1 995 a : 2 0 ) . Not only does this form of linguistic monism deny the materiality of the human being itself, its deterministic element eliminates all forms of human agency . Therefore, constructivism is said to undermine the ground of political action by putting language as the agent in the place of human beings acting together in the public (or any other) sphere. As if this criticism alone were not enough to rej ect the radical constructivist theory outright, coupled with it comes another formid able line of questioning: If the subject is a product of construction, then who stands behind the process doing the constructing ? Must there not be an agent that lies at the root of construction - for, as I suggested earlier, is not construction the very act of building some thing, and does not any building require a builder ? This argument turns the first obj ection to constructivis1n on its head by suggesting that a radical constructivist position in fact presupposes a voluntarist subject - an agent with free will who 'constructs' . Theories of gender as performativity provide the perfect target for this second line of critique: thinking of gender as something one performs tends to reduce
La nguage a n d the ' Bu rden ' of Pol i ti cs
13
to the idea that one acts freely (as a voluntary subject) to choose whatever gender one wishes . 7 Thus, those theorists who started out by criticizing a Cartesian, autonomous, and sovereign subject have been forced to rely (however tacitly) on precisely such a subject in order for their theories to retain even the slightest degree of intelligibility. 8 No matter which line of argument one chooses, one will wind up concluding that constructivist theories prove apolitical not only unconcerned with political matters, but also lacking entirely in any political significance or relevance. Constructivism might thereby lead to a sort of nihilism. That is to say, by focusing on the categories that constrain us, constructivist approaches to politics actually produce social determinism by robbing human beings of a free realm for choices and action, thus stripping them of political agency (a crucial political concept that I will grapple with in the text below) . Construction not only contributes little or nothing to politics, it also plays the role of a potentially dangerous antagonist to political action. By way of under cutting the ground for political agency - or worse, putting language in its place - constructivist approaches to politics and agency have little to offer politics ( in both theory and practice), and what they do offer proves to do more harn1 than good. On the grounds of these claims, critics of constructivisrn suggest that constructivist studies should remain in the realm of literary, not political, theory . Political B urdens These far-reaching criticisms of constructivism leave any attempt to theorize the relation between language and politics with a certain 'political burden'. My project here rests on j ust such an atternpt: I explore alternative approaches to language as an opening toward thinking political theory as untimely. But before I can even begin to take on these tasks, I must face squarely the 'political burden' left by these imposing and impressive critiques of constructivism. I will do so by demonstrating that the criticisn1s of constructivism rely upon a certain conception of language and its relation to politics; that is, the approaches to politics that criticize radical constructivism actually rest upon an unstated theory of the relation between language and the political agent. Uncovering this theory, as I will do below, proves that the relationship between language and the subject can no longer be taken as given; thus, a philosophical investigation of language that seeks to explore the question of agency will no longer appear to lie outside the realm of politics.
14
U nti mely Politics
Constructivism offers one (very broad) theory of this relation between the subj ect and language. To take an example, one can read Sitnone de Beauvoir's most famous line: 'one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman' ( 1 9 8 9 : 2 6 7 ) . Beauvoir expresses a key insight of constructivism by arguing that only 'civilization as a whole' not biology or psychology - can produce 'wornan' . Beauvoir suggests that the very category of 'woman' as a human subj ect is not a natural one that precedes that subject's entry into culture and language; rather, 'woman' as subj ect is produced by culture, society, and various 'myths of femininity' (267). Nevertheless, the lived existence of actual 'women' never corresponds directly or seamlessly with this social and discursive category of 'woman' (cf. de Lauretis 1 9 84 ) . The linguistic and discursive category of woman precedes but also exceeds the birth of a biological female. Beauvoir nicely expresses this complex relation between the bodies of women and the category of woman when she asserts that the 'body is not enough to define her as woman; there is no true living reality except as manifested by the conscious individual through activities in the bosom of society' ( 1 9 8 9 : 3 7) . It is only in this rather complicated sense that gender for Beauvoir is socially ( and therefore discursively) constructed.9 Constructivists wish to argue that human subjectivity cannot be conceived of as a given, nor assmned as a starting point. Far from being the ground from which all choices and actions proceed, con structivists argue that subjectivity results from a series of cultural, social, and linguistic processes . Subj ectivity and hence agency are the outcome of a process of construction, but this outcome is never a final product. Subjectivity and agency always remain caught up in a process of recreation, alteration, and even transformation. The terms of construction stay open to renegotiation. Subjectivity is thereby con structed, but not in the manner of building a house (d. Halperin 1 990: 4 1 -5 ) . Critics of constructivism fear that contemporary radical construc tivist accounts have gone too far in privileging linguistic categories over human action - from the grounds of this fear they build the critiques I summarized in the first section. 1 0 These critics respond to constructivist arguments by asking after the active agent responsible for this process of construction. And, if no agent can be found behind this process, then must construction not result in determinism? I think not. In response to these arguments, I want to suggest that the general criticisms of constructivism and this specific question both view agency itself through the lens of a certain kind of grarr1mar. That
La ng uage a n d the ' B u rden' of Pol itics
15
is, the critics of constructivism uncritically assume that any process of construction - just like any sentence - requires a subject, 'an "I" or a "we" who enacts or perforrns that construction' (Butler 1 993: 7 ) . Like any good US high school English teacher, critics of constructivism stringently prohibit the use of passive voice. Thus, for these instruc tors, the sentence 'gender is socially constructed' must be re-written in the active voice with an agent taking up the subject position. In refusing to modify their theories by editing out the passive voice of 'agency is constructed', critics suggest that constructivists make a mistake rnuch graver than grammar. However, this editorial demand for active voice (that is, the critical call for an agent doing the constructing) presumes that the process of construction either requires an active agent responsible for the process of construction or that construction renders that human agent utterly passive - immediately unappealing and ultimately nihilistic conclusions. I draw upon authors who have suggested a third choice, by trying to conceive of construction as a process that is neither active nor passive. The grammatical notion of the middle voice can help here to clarify the terms of this murky debate. Charles Scott argues that the passive and (especially ) the active voice dorninate not only western languages but also western philosophical thought. The middle voice which has almost no role in modern languages, though it can still be found in ancient Greek and Sanskrit 'yields a different way of thinking that is marked by undergoing a movement rather than by either active assertion or passive reception' (Scott 1 99 0 : 1 9 ) . In the active voice, the action of the verb is carried out by a subject and usually refers to an other or others. In the passive voice, the verb itself 'acts on the subject', but (as almost all of our English teachers stressed) passive constructions can usually be rewrit ten in the active voice. For example, in the case of the sentence, 'the jewels are protected with a sophisticated alarm system', an instructor or editor (or computer prograrn) rnight suggest as an alternative, 'the museum curators protect the jewels with a sophisticated alarm sys tem. ' Critics of constructivism ask only for a similar change in response to the sentence, 'the subject is constructed', but however simple the request, it is still misplaced. I contend that the middle voice offers a richer and more fruitful way of conceptualizing the process of construction; constructivisrr1 is itself 'middle-voiced' . Scott argues that 'the middle voice is used when the subject is in some way specifically implicated in the result of the action but is neither the active subject nor the passive object of the action.,t 1
16
U nti mely Pol itics
Without making reference to the middle voice, many constructivists have recently argued that this formulation precisely captures the situation of the human subject within the process of construction . For example, There is no ontologically intact reflexivity to the subject which is then placed within a cultural context; that cultural context, as it were, is already there as the disarticulated process of that subject's production, one that is concealed by the frame that would situate a ready-made subject in an external web of cultural relations ...But to claim that the subject is constituted is not to claim that it is determined; on the contrary, the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its agency. (Butler 1995: 46)
In a sense then, the subject 'undergoes' agency without ever fully possessing it; agency is precisely that which is implicated in the process of construction. The metaphysical seduction of grammar seems to have prevented critics of constructivism from hearing such a response as an answer to their queries, but reconsidering construction through the terms of the middle voice provides a simple and also highly intelligible response to the set of criticisms I summarized in the first section above. By thinking of 'subjectivity as constructed' in terms of the middle voice (that is, not in the terms of the active or passive voices) one ends up with a tangible grasp on the process of construc tion while simultaneously specifying the actual dangers of the n1eta physical seduction of grammar ( something Butler and even Nietzsche often fail to do) . The grammar in which we norn1ally write and think (active and passive voices ) precludes a dear understanding of what is at stake in construction; that is to say, the 'ready-made subj ect', with which an analysis often starts, obscures the very conditions of its discursive production and reproduction. The subject always remains 'caught up' in language, never fully its possessor but never fully possessed by it. The middle voice - itself an element of grammar cannot free one from the metaphysical seduction of grammar, but it can help one to see a way out by capturing this extent to which the human subject is never simply subject nor object in the grammatical sense. 12 The AIO M o d el Does the above line of reasoning merely overlay a discussion of language on top of a fundamentally, and solely, political argument?
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17
To respond to this criticism requires one to see how a certain conception of language is itself constitutive of conceptions of politics. Language is thereby not merely a problem for politics but a problem of politics. This basic point goes back at least to Aristotle, but since his Politics rnany political theorists have implicitly presupposed the rela tion between language and political agency that he explicitly thema tizes. That is, the fact that a relation between language and politics is an explicit aspect of Aristotle's political theory provides conternporary readers with a rare glimpse of the implicit presuppositions of his translators/interpreters (that is, contemporary social and political theorists ) . 1 3 Aristotle's 'theory of the household' is well known. The polis, for Aristotle, is the natural conclusion in growth from the village and the farnily. Moreover, and most famously, he claims that 'man is by physis an animal intended to live in a polis' ( 1 95 8 : 5 ) . Or, in more commonly heard terms, man is a political animal; politics lies at the heart of what it means to be a human being and those creatures who fall outside of the polis (the proper realm of the political) can only be beasts or gods. Aristotle's crucial justification for his enormous claim about the nature of 'man' gets repeated somewhat less often, but it proves of utmost importance for my purposes. For Aristotle, the reason man must be taken as a political animal is 'evident', and he explains why in a passage that appears at line 1253a of the Politica ( 1 957). My concern in looking closely at the English translations of these passages lies not with what Aristotle 'meant to say', or what is in the text. Rather, I focus on what contemporary political theorists (explicitly or tacitly ) take from Aristotle. In looking at the translations of this passage I will simultaneously uncover a relation between language and politics that plays a dominant role in much current political theoriz ing. It is in this sense that one could suggest that many critics of constructivism are 'neo-Aristotelians ' : not because they are close followers of a theory of Aristotle's, but because they take up or simply presuppose a relation between language and politics that can be extracted from Aristotle's texts. 1 4 Ernest Barker, the rnost popular translator of Aristotle's Politics for use in teaching the history of political thought, translates the passage rather loosely. In Barker's text it reads as follows : Nature, according to our theory, makes nothing in vain; and man alone of the animals is furnished with the faculty of language.The mere making of sounds serves to indicate pleasure and pain, and is thus a faculty that
18
U ntimely Pol itics
belongs to animals in general ...But language serves to declare what is advantageous and what is the reverse. ( 1958: 6)
The more literal and classic translation, by Rackham, reads this way: For nature, as we declare, does nothing without purpose; and man alone of the animals possesses speech. The mere voice, it is true, can indicate pain and pleasure, and therefore is possessed by the other animals as well ... but speech is designed to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for it is the special property of man in distinction from other animals. ( 1944: line 1253a)
These translations characterize language as some quality of human beings (a 'faculty'), but also as something that people have and hold as a personal asset ( their 'property' ) . In these interpretations/transla tions, 1 5 then, Aristotle conceives of anthropos, the human animal, as the only being who 'possesses' the faculty of logos, reasoned speech. 'Man', for Aristotle ( or, at least for his translators), is that rational animal who holds the tool of language and can use it to distinguish between good and bad. 1 6 The idea o f the logos a s a property t o b e possessed turns language into an object, an entity that man comes to hold on to, thereby marking him as distinct from those other animals that can merely make sounds. In possessing this tool of language, man becomes the only properly political animal. Aristotle understands politics as an active engagement in the life of the polis that centers on the citizens' functions of deliberation and j udgement. Thus, politics for Aristotle is a matter of action (praxis) resting on phronesis as a practical form of knowledge directed toward the particulars in the world. For citizens to fulfill their functions - their telos as members of a polis - of j udgement and deliberation they need the tool of language; 1 7 only language can make j udgement and deliberation, indeed politics, possible. The very nature of the political thereby comes to rest upon a certain conception of language, because the political nature of Aristotle's citizens would prove unrealizable without language - the properly political faculty of man as a properly political animal. This received view of Aristotle provides its readers with a clear and concise formulation of the complex relation between language, the subject ( 'man'), and politics: man possesses language as a tool for engagement in politics. I propose that those who reject radical con structivism on the grounds of its political liabilities do so by silently presupposing a conception of language ( and its relation to politics and agency) similar to this one. They assume that language can be taken as
La n g u a g e a nd the ' B u rd e n ' of Pol itics
19
an obj ect - an object graspable, possessable, and usually controllable by human subjects. Numerous contemporary writers whose theories often diverge wildly in rnany other respects tend to share this approach to language as an obj ect. These writers do not usually focus on questions of language, so they rarely, if ever, try to theorize language as an obj ect like a book, a ball, or any other. Nevertheless, they still tend to treat language in j ust this way, focusing, sometimes only tacitly, on its use or function for human subjects. For the purposes of analytic clarity, and for lack of a better term, I will refer to this 'neo Aristotelian' understanding of the relation between language and the subj ect as the as-if-objectified model of language, or AIO for short. Few theorists intentionally attempt to develop this model, but, as I will show, numerous authors implicitly rely upon it when they assume that language can or should be put to a certain use. To reiterate: my concern lies not with the validity or tenability of this specific interpretation of Aristotle, and I have little interest in Aristotle's own intentions. What does concern me here is the way in which this, of all possible interpretations of Aristotle, plays a tacit role in criticisms of constructivism. These translations/interpretations of Aristotle prove significant because they can help to illuminate the AIO model of language - a model that, by definition, usually remains in the dark. But, even when shrouded in darkness, the AIO model provides criticisms of constructivism with critical leverage. If one takes lan guage to be a capacity or faculty - in short, an obj ect - that human beings possess and use for their own purposes, then one will neces sarily find the accounts of most radical constructivists wholly lacking since radical constructivists conduct their studies of language and discourse without describing the possessor of this language, or the user of it ( see, for example, Derrida 1 9 82 : 3 20 ) . The logic that rejects such studies proves straightforward: if language is a faculty possessed by human beings, then any account of language must include a direct discussion of the subjects who utilize that language. In short, the metaphysical seduction of language which tempts one to ask after the subject who is out there doing the constructing remains inextricably intertwined with a conception of language as an ownable and utiliz able object. 1 8 While its presence often proves less obvious, one can see appro priations of this model in contemporary thought. For example, in speech act theory, as Austin famously claimed in the title of his work, we, as human beings, do things with words ( 1 962; cf. Searle 1 969 ) . Speech, according t o Austin and certain writers who appropriate his
20
U nti m ely Pol itics
understanding, 19 is like action because we can use it to serve various human (often political) purposes. In speech act theory, language becomes an instrument for action. As Austin puts it: 'when we perform a locutionary act, we use speech' ( 1 962 : 9 9 ) . Thus, in saying 'the sidewalk is icy', not only do I provide a description (locution), I also act by warning you ( illocutionary force), and that action can have certain real (perlocutionary ) effects you rnight walk on the grass instead. As with the translation/interpretation of Aristotle articulated above, contemporary speech act theorists conceptualize a very specific and consequential relationship between language and politics. This understanding appears in the most unexpected of places. Even among those twentieth-century philosophers who hold anything but commonplace views, one can still see traces of the AIO model. For example, and despite some uncharitable critical interpretations to the contrary, Habermas holds an explicitly anti-instrumentalist and post positivist conception of human rationality, and his project valiantly seeks to treat all human subjects as ends rather than means. None theless, Habermas may well subscribe to the AIO model of language, for while he does not attempt to take language explicitly as an object, he continually and consistently presupposes that language is nothing more than that - something to be put to use by political actors in their search for consensus. In his theory of communicative action, inter locutors use language as a tool for the coordination of their action. Habermas's theory attempts to prove that 'the idea of coming to a rationally motivated mutual understanding is to be found in the very structure of language' ( 1 9 8 4 : 9 6 ) . Habermas goes so far as t o s a y that, i n coordinating their action comrnunicatively, individuals are able to 'master' the structure of language from within it. Language for Habermas plays a crucial role for politics, but it always does so in such a way as to serve the needs of political actors : 'language is thereby introduced as a mechanism for coordinating action' ( 1 9 84 : 94, emphasis added ) . Habermas's theory remains wedded to the AIO model, for, despite his rather sophisticated understanding of hurnan rationality, the fact remains that human beings in his theory both possess speech and use it as the fundamental instrument of politics 'communicative action presupposes language as the rnedium for a kind of reaching understanding' ( 1 9 8 4 : 9 8 ) . The example of Habermas can serve as a rej oinder to those who would wish to reject the AIO model out of hand, on the grounds that its very construction creates only straw figures to be knocked down. As one of the last we would expect to subscribe to the model ( intentionally or
La ng uage a n d the ' B u rden ' of Pol itics
21
not) , Habermas shows j ust how ubiquitous this conception really is ( see Flynn 1 992 ) . Even rnore startling might b e the case o f Ludwig Wittgenstein, a philosopher who, in rejecting any sirr1ple correspondence theory of language, provides his readers with the crucial insight that language is more than communication. Wittgenstein dismisses as mostly senseless the notion that language 'signifies', and he insists on the richer and more productive understanding of language as a form of life. His demand to focus specifically on the form language takes in human life leads Wittgenstein to analyze language only in its use by human beings . But in turning to language use, Wittgenstein may well allow the AIO model back on the scene. 2 ° For Wittgenstein, the 'more' in 'more than communication' means that language, as a form of life, has more functions than merely that of communicating; we can do more things with language than simply convey inforrnation from one person to another (or various others ) . Despite the important strides that Wittgenstein's understanding of language takes away from a crude notion of correspondence between signifer and signified, his analysis still rests on the idea that language works like an object with certain capacities and purposes, and that humans use this language to achieve their own ends. Wittgenstein goes so far as to tell his own readers to think of language as 'tools in a tool-box' - 'there is a hammer, a screw driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws ' - and goes on to clairn that 'the functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects' (Wittgenstein 1 9 5 8 : 6e; Wittgenstein 1 970: 1, quoted in Shapiro 1 9 8 1 : 47). 21 The AIO model proves so commonplace that it undergirds not only the most substantial criticisms of constructivisrr1, but also the more sophisticated philosophies of Habermas, Wittgenstein, and others . This i s not (yet) t o criticize this understanding o f language o r those who employ it, but the analysis does illuminate one absolutely crucial aspect of the debate: namely, its fundamentally political nature. As the discussion of Aristotle and now of rr1ore contemporary theorists rnakes clear, one's circumscription of the realm of politics remains bound up with one's understanding of the nature of language and its relation to the political agent. More concretely, one cannot define politics without also saying - or, at the least, assuming - what language is and how language is related to the subject. Criticisms of radical constructivism therefore hinge upon their own conception of language, but this very conception often remains tacitly presupposed and thereby shielded from critical questioning. If one
22
U nti mely Pol i tics
takes the relation between language and the subject to be an essentially political one, then it proves impossible to rej ect any conception of language as apolitical from the outset. In this way the criticisms - on political grounds of radical constructivism actually wind up resting upon issues of language. And finally, this account also helps to substantiate the point I suggested above: if we cannot simply assume a certain relation between language and the subj ect, then a reconcep tualization of that relation can no longer be presurned to lie outside of the realm of the political. Political Returns My discussion thus far has focused on the relation between language and the subject, but a third term has made a periodic, yet unexplained appearance - agency. The word agency, referring almost always to political agency, proves to be a rather common terrr1 in studies of politics, but rarely do theorists find it necessary to define the term. Usually, agency stands for the capacity for action, as opposed to action itself. Thus, in an idealized view of democracy each and every citizen would always be endowed with political agency - the ability to participate freely and actively in the political community - but not every citizen would take political action, not every citizen would need to. With respect to the debate over constructivism, it is just this sort of agency that critics of constructivism feel is taken away by constructi vist theories of politics. Saying that constructivism robs subjects of their agency is just the opposite side of the coin that accuses con structivisrn of social determinism. Hence critics of constructivism recapitulate long-standing arguments in the structure/agency debates by arguing that constructivism privileges structure (that is, determin isrn) over agency. A political theory of untirneliness will show that agency, as that capacity to take political action, turns out to be possible without a strong, grounded theory of the subject. Subjectivity often proves to be a philosophical concern, dealing with existential and ontological matters; agency, on the other hand, is mostly a political matter. The conceptual confusion arises because rr1odern thinkers have too often conflated the two thinking that there can be no political agency without a theory of subj ectivity. Moreover, modern thought typically conceives of agency itself within the terms of the AIO model: a ready made subj ect who possesses language (and any other faculties neces sary for political action) then consciously and willfully chooses to act
La nguage and the ' B u rden' of Pol itics
23
i n the political realm. A politics o f untimeliness not only recognizes but also insists upon the distinction between subjectivity and agency. Outside the confines of the AIO model, and when thought concretely and simply as the capacity for action, agency becomes a rnuch less loaded tenn. How to elucidate these untimely conceptions of agency ? How to demonstrate that they do, indeed, rnatter politically ? To answer these questions I look here at the act of 'coming out' .2 2 On the AIO model, the subject precedes language, and language is thereby the instrument of liberation. As one commentator, describing the e1nerging gay move1nent of the 1 9 70s, puts it: 'we were discovering . . . our identities' through a 'willingness to burst out of the closet and to come out in a public, uncompromising way' (D'Emilio 1 992: xiv, emphasis added) . Within this instrutnental view, declaring one's authentic identity as gay is a liberatory act that dernonstrates self acceptance and simultaneously demands recognition from others. Language functions as the instrument of this act of freedom, just as it serves as a tool to coordinate political action within the public sphere. That is, the self-expressive capacity made possible by the faculty of language that the gay person possesses serves as the instrument for this act of emancipation much in the same way as the faculty of language served as a human tool for deliberating and judging within Aristotelian terrns . Coming out constitutes the para digmatic act of political agency within the terms of a gay liberationist model in which the political goal of gay people diverges little from that of straight people: all seek full civil rights and equality under the law. However, this is by no rneans the only way to theorize the political agency involved in coming out. Indeed, David Halperin argues that coming out is precisely not an act of liberation. With great emphasis, he writes : 'coming out is an act of freedom:> then:> not in the sense of liberation but in the sense of resistance' ( 1 99 5 : 3 0 ) . His intriguing formulation begs the question, of course, of the difference between liberation and resistance. For Halperin, the difference relies on Foucault's understanding of power relations : coming out does not liberate one from Power but instead allows one to enter into a different set of power relations than before. I would argue that we can better elucidate this distinction by seeing, as I have described above, that under the terms of the AIO model, coming out is liberation, but under a thinking of language and agency that rejects the instrumentalist tenns of the AIO model, coming out is resistance. By taking the history of homosexuality seriously and thereby taking
24
U n ti mely Pol itics
into account the transformation of discursive practices within the nineteenth century that, in fact, produced the stable category of the 'hmnosexual' (Foucault 1 97 8 : 4 3 ; cf. Edelman 1 994), we can see why corning out could never offer liberation, but might well involve the political action of resistance. If language is not merely a tool for use by political agents, if language - through the sedimentary effects of history and the changes in discursive practices - helps to create the very category of the homosexual, then corning out can no longer be seen as an act of authentic expression of identity by an already gay political subject. If a gay man finds himself caught up within a linguistic construction that forces him either into or out of the closet, then he can no longer straightforwardly use language to express an identity that is somehow already there?3 Outside the AIO model, then, there is no simple liberation, since the 'out' homosexual still takes up the position of marginality. The gay person who 'comes out' still retains a certain proximity to the closet as that dark, alien, and specter-like place of the in- or non-human that the unrnarked heterosexual never has to confront, except, of course, through the medium of paranoia. To be 'out' of the closet is still to be associated with an abject space that heterosexual culture constantly reconstitutes and from which it continually distances itself. This position of the gay subject with respect to the closet recalls the middle voice. The gay subject, whether he or she is 'in' or 'out' of the closet, is always a lready implicated in a relation to the closet and caught within the discursive practices that construct the closet, but the gay subject is never wholly determined by that discourse nor the master of it. Corning out is neither an active escape from the closet, nor a passive confinement to it - the subj ect 'in' the closet is middle-voiced. But to reject the idea that corning out offers liberation is not to reject corning out as an act of political agency. Corning out precisely illustrates the capacity for political action (that is, agency) outside the terms of the AIO rnodel. Here we can return to John D'Ernilio's commentary and include sections previously edited out: 'we were discovering, even inventing, our identities - especially as gay or lesbian political beings' ( 1 992: xiv, emphasis added) . Thus, on this account corning out no longer designates an authentic proclamation of an ontologically-grounded identity, and it cannot constitute a simple declaration of freedom. Yet it does signify a form of political resistance to the very sets of heterosexist discursive practices that continue to reconstitute the category of the homosexual as the marked and binary other to the unmarked and natural heterosexual: 'It itnplies that
La nguage a nd the ' B u rden' of Pol itics
25
categories of homosexual and heterosexual are not imrnutable, not fixed, not given' (xxii-xxiii ) . Coming out i s a matter o f political action precisely because i t offers resistance to the very categories of sexuality and gender; by exposing the historically and discursively contingent nature of those categories, coming out can also strive to make possible their future transforma tion. The fact that the gay subject always 'undergoes' a relation to the closet makes possible the resistance involved in coming out. Coming out does not liberate the political actor. Thus, under the terms of the AIO rnodel, there would be no political agency. Outside that model we see that the political agency involved in coming out centers precisely on resistance, on a certain questioning of the discursive categories that are taken to be natural. At root, coming out is therefore a rnatter of politicizing those very categories. In doing so it draws every individual (straight or gay ) into a certain connection with the closet, into a certain relation to the homo/heterosexual rnatrix, 24 thereby revealing the constructed and contested nature of the category of heterosexual as well a term that only arose in discourse after homosexual ( Edelman 1 994 ) . The significance of this 'example' lies in its ability to reveal a different thinking of political agency that results from a different starting point with respect to conceptions of language. 2 5 And this starting point is also a point of departure for moving toward a politics of untimeliness. L a n g u a g e , Temp o r a lity , P o litic s I n this chapter I have tried to relieve the political burden o n investiga tions into language by denaturalizing the AIO model. Of course, there is nothing particularly new or necessarily unique about challenging the field of political theory for the mainstream treatment of the relation between language and politics . Just over two decades ago Michael Shapiro ( 1 9 8 1 ) also urged a reconsideration of what he calls the relationship between language and political inquiry, by suggesting that the study of politics continues to rely (implicitly or explicitly ) upon outdated and incorrect correspondence models of language. Almost a decade ago, Anne Norton recognized the political burden of language analysis and chastised the field of political science for repeatedly, unnecessarily, and counterproductively adding to that burden: 'the recognition that . . . in speech we are always, already part of the political order . . . extends the reach of political thought and reveals new fields of political action and analysis. The repeated
26
U nti mely Pol i tics
dismissal of those who recognize the constitutive power of language as apolitical is therefore inappropriate, if not disingenuous' (Norton 1 993 : 1 60 ) . And in recent writings, the debate over constructivism has been entered by countless authors, many of whom I have cited here. No doubt these proj ects certainly run parallel to mine. They lend support to my project here, and I would hope that my work, in turn, can further their general efforts . Yet my undertaking never really intersects with theirs, because lifting the political burden proves to be but the first step in the project of working out a political theory of untimeliness. What, then, is the connection between theories of language and temporality ? I will begin to draw out these links in the next chapter, as I read Heidegger's quasi-concept of Ereignis, a notion intirnately connected to both a non-AIO thinking of language and an untimely approach to history . It will prove helpful at this juncture, however, both to point out the constitutive link between language and temporality, and to point to some of those writings in contemporary political theory that are already working with and gesturing toward an untirnely conception of politics. This chapter has made a number of seemingly 'deconstructive' moves: it has denaturalized the AIO model; it has shown that the conditions of possibility for the critique of constructivism (a pre supposed model of language/politics) are also always already their conditions of impossibility; thereby, it has undone the critique that would seek to separate language from politics. It is important to specify, then, both the affinities with and distance from so-called deconstruction. Here I would follow Arditi and Valentine rather closely. They write: we are not engaging in yet another argument that proposes that decon struction should be linked to politics.In our opinion, the link is already there and in this sense we take deconstruction for granted in that we aim to deepen its presence. At the same time, we are mindful of the way that deconstruction is taken for granted in practice - for example, through its reduction to something like a method of analysis or explanation, or a verb or adjective.In not dwelling on deconstruction we simply seek to establish some distance from its reduction to a commonplace or popular position. ( 1999: xi)
I, too, wish to distinguish deconstruction from a popular conception of critique, but I am most concerned with the translation of that popular conception into political theory. That is, the distance I wish to rnaintain and to broaden is that between the writings of Derrida (the
La ng uage a n d the ' B u rd e n ' of Pol itics
27
very notion of differance) and a certain 'application' of 'deconstruc tion' to politics. 26 IVlore important for rny proj ect is the fact that within this difference between dif(erance and the application of deconstruction we see mirrored the distinction between a timely and an untimely politics. While I will not attempt to develop an untimely theory in earnest until Chapter 3, looking at examples here of timely and untimely projects will prove very helpful in mapping out that future trajectory. William Connolly's writings have proved most effective in applying the in sights of deconstruction to the field of political theory, yet there is something about the directness of his application of deconstruction to politics that leaves me uneasy, because it resonates too closely with the sort of timely politics from which I wish to distance my own project. In contrast, I will look to the work of Diana Coole - who, in fact, distances herself from poststructuralism - as an example of a reading of differance that illuminates the space of untimeliness that I will seek to probe. Connolly argues that a serious investigation of the identity/differ ence relation must transform the field of political theory. Every identity, he argues, necessarily establishes itself in relation to some set of differences, and every identity in fact requires these differences to maintain its own existence. In short, 'identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty' ( 1 9 9 1 a : 64 ) . Given this identity/difference problematic, democracy must be reconfigured in order to create spaces in which difference can establish itself as ' alter-identity' . Such a transformation thereby creates 'agonistic democracy', which 'affirms the indispensability of identity to life, disturbs the dogmatization of identity, and folds care for the protean diversity of human life into the strife and interdependence of identity\difference' (x) . Connolly's analytic o f 'identity\difference' tries t o reveal the critical political purchase of rethinking what we have previously understood as identity, and quite clearly the broad and profound influence of his work has provided a significant contribution to political science (and the rnultiple subfields to which Connolly directly speaks ) . 2 7 But might something be lost in this direct translation of 'deconstruction' to the political realm ? First, the negotiation of identity and difference that Connolly details tends to mask the historical and linguistic produc tions of those very categories of identity with which Connolly works. Connolly states that 'my identity is what I am'; and, while he seeks to understand how that identity creates otherness, he does not inquire
28
U nti mely Politics
into the conditions of possibility of the 'I am' in the first place. What creates the categories that make the being of the 'I am' possible ? For Connolly, identity actively creates differences by seeking out its own self-security, but this analysis obscures the ways in which the rela tional categories of identity and difference are constituted apart from that subj ect who seeks his or her own identity. Thus, for example, while the native citizen may in fact create the differences of foreigners in order to establish his or her own certain identity, it may also be the case that a set of discursive practices creates and maintains the categories of 'citizen' and 'immigrant' apart from the intentional acts of native citizens. Second, and building on this first forfeiture, Connolly's analysis also tends to obscure the very relationality of identity and difference because he conceives of the relation as an always active negotiation. Connolly thus views identity as self-same and autonomous, and through the transfiguration of democracy he seeks to create spaces in which difference can also manifest itself as a self-sa1ne 'alter identity' . Yet this formulation can quickly reduce to a simple for mulation of liberal tolerance, in which the rnaj ority atternpts to secure free spaces for a rninority (Helminski and Steiner 1 9 9 8 ) . What this political logic excludes is an analysis of the Derridean notion of the 'constitutive outside' ( 1 9 8 2 ) , helpfully appropriated by Laclau and Mouffe to show that, within relations of identity/difference, identity itself is always already transformed ( 1 9 8 5 ) . Thus it is not, as Connolly would say, that 'rr1y identity is what I am', but rather that 'my identity is only ever that which I am becorning in relation to a field of differences' . Inquiry into the very relationality of identity/difference may expose the impossibility of any self-same identity, may reveal the production of the abject other within any discursive or intentional creation of identity. 'There can only be a "politics of identity" in so far as the political dimension is located within identity itself, which is to say the existence of an identity is in question' (Arditi and Valentine 1 999: 8 9 ) . In short, Connolly's democratic agonisrn of identity and alter-identity may only be possible within the hopes of a liberal individualisrr1 that Connolly himself eschews . Connolly's thinking of identity proves too timely, such that in applying deconstruction, the importance of language, of writing, of discursivity, seems to have evaporated. Within Derrida's 'differance' that concept that is not a concept, that word that is not a word - one can witness both the intrinsic politics of writing and a radical thinking of temporality ( 1 9 82 ) . The graphic mark of the a proves central to
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29
dif{erance, since in the spoken French the a cannot be heard, that is, there is no difference between difference and differance. Derrida thereby attempts, temporarily, tentatively, to invert the classical privilege of speech over writing; in speech, differance is nothing it is beyond Being and cannot be recuperated by ontology. The meaning of differance can never be fixed, but it suggests two separate infinitives : to differ (spacings ) and to defer (tirnings ) ( 1 9 8 1b, 1 9 82 ) . The difference o f differance i s thereby always already a temporal difference; differance gestures toward the radical thinking of histori city - a thinking that always undoes teleology and progressivism - that I will explore in the chapters that follow. As Coole writes, 'there is no progressive, temporal succession' (2000: 77); and, as Derrida suggests elsewhere, diflerance disrupts presence and comes 'before the alter native of presence and absence' ( 1 97 8 : 292; also quoted in Coole ) . Through this reading, w e witness here, a s w e will again i n the next chapter, the condensation of alternative theories of language with a radical thinking of time: differance is the writing of untimeliness. Coole is no mere Derridean, yet I point toward her reading of differance so as to maintain that space between the untimely thinking of Derrida and the timely application of deconstruction. Coole's own work makes no attempt to 'apply' Derrida 's thought, yet it proves exernplary in working with an untimely thinking of the political. In her broader thesis Coole insists that a politically productive thinking of negativity requires a dialectical rendering. But this is not the absolute closure of a certain Hegelian teleology. Indeed, Coole's reading of the dialectic consistently relies on a certain untimeliness; a generative negativity without closure, and a dialectics with no end of history, both require untimeliness. Coole does not specify this un timeliness, but she hints at it without fail through her continual references to rhythm and tempo . This 'differential rhythm' generates a negativity more attuned to the 'tempo of politics' (2000: 23 0 ) . I would suggest that this is an untimely negativity, since its 'differential tempo' continually thwarts the progressive telos of a totalizing dia lectic (244 ) . This and other 'untimely' writing i n political theory (for example, Ranciere 1 9 9 8 ; Honig 200 1 ) clearly goes on outside the confines of the AIO model of language, since the reading of differance already requires a displacement of that model. For precisely this reason, the stakes for relieving the burden of politics placed on investigations into language prove so high for my project of moving toward a politics of untimeliness. Yet, having relieved the burden of politics, I cannot
30
U ntimely Pol itics
move directly to untitnely theory. I need first to explore one specific alternative to the AIO 1nodel through what Heidegger will call an 'experience' with language. From the murky waters of Heidegger's later writings on language, I hope to dredge a conception of language wholly at odds with the one uncovered in neo-Aristotelian critiques of constructivism. Heidegger aims his work on language directly at all philosophies of language that attempt to describe language as an object (and Heidegger too sees this theory of language in Aristotle's writings); he thereby offers one of the starkest counter-exarnples to the AIO 1nodel. Moreover, through the thought of Ereignis, Heidegger's later writings on language will help me to begin germinating the nascent concepts of untimeliness and historicity - notions that I will argue in later chapters prove absolutely essential both to understand ing conte1nporary politics and to building a politics of untimeliness. N ot e s 1 . I borrow some insights into the various lines o f critique against 'construction' fr01n Judith Butler's discussion of critics of con structivism ( 1 993 ). Butler carries out her detailed discussion of the constructivism debate without ever really telling her readers who the players are. Unlike Butler, I try to point out a number of these players in the debate as I go along, but her discussion reveals a fundarnental point for my argument: natnely, that the debate is also about unexa1nined preconceptions concerning language and its relationship to politics. 2. Here I paraphrase Nietzsche ( 1 994: 2 8 ) . 3 . That is, a 'subj ect' a s i n a sovereign individual who acts, a s well as a grammatical 'subject', an 'I' or 'we' placed in the subject position of a sentence. 4. One sees precisely this charge directed repeatedly at Michel Foucault with his emphasis on discursive practices rather than human subjects. For examples, see Fraser ( 1 9 8 1 , 1 9 8 3 , 1 9 8 5 ) and Visker ( 1 995 ) . My discussions in Chapters 4 and 5 will address these issues in much detail. David Halperin argues in his intro duction to Saint Foucault that the strongest critiques of social constructivism in the field of queer theory are rooted in the fear of this danger ( 1 995 ) . In this context see also Mohr ( 1 992) and Bersani ( 1 995 ) . 5 . This sentence might b e better translated as, 'there i s no "extra text" .' Derrida hitnself clarifies the sentence as, 'There is nothing
La nguage a nd the ' B u rden' of Pol itics
6.
7. 8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
31
outside of context' ( 1 9 8 8 : 1 3 6 ) . For an elucidation of the 'general text' see Positions ( 1 9 8 1 b ) . Rodolphe Gasche provides an intri guing discussion of the rneaning of this sentence within the context of Derrida's work, and an interesting assessrnent of those critics who tear it from that context ( 1 9 8 6 : 278-9 3 ) . I point t o these 'effects' i n a n oblique, but nevertheless important, way; it proves quite common for those who reveal the 'problems of construction' to cite Derrida as evidence of these problems. That is, taking Derrida out of his own philosophical context often constitutes a simple way to 'substantiate' one's criticis1ns of deconstruction. Habermas takes up the idea of the general text as a favorite target for his critique of Derrida (Habermas 1 992: ch 7; see also Rorty 1 9 8 9 ) . For a summary o f this critique, a s directed against her own work, see Butler ( 1 995 ) . Butler calls this the 'Cartesian ghost' that w e have inherited through Sartrean existentialism. The legacy proves to be a parti cular burden for fe1ninists who have had it handed down by Sirnone de Beauvoir (Butler 1 9 8 7) . For one of the strongest criticisms of performativity, see Tyler ( 1 9 9 1 : 5 3-4 ) . For contin ued debate on this issue see also (Butler 1 99 1 ; Cohen 1 9 9 1 ; Edelman 1 99 1 ) . Beauvoir, a s i s well known, rnaintains a fairly rigorous and natural distinction between biological males and fe1nales; gender is the social construction of nature, but nature re1nains nature. Here is not the place to go into the differences between con structivist accounts that hold on to a conception of nature that precedes culture and constructivist accounts that conceptualize the nature/culture distinction as itself a product of social dis course. Butler, Foucault, and Derrida are cited as common exarnples of 'going too far'. For example, see Charles Taylor's essays on language and agency, in which Derrida - whose texts are never read or discussed by Taylor frequently rnarks the li1nit that a discussion of politics and language should not reach. Taylor repeatedly echoes the trope that Derrida (along with others ) h a s 'crossed the line' ( 1 9 8 5 a ) . For example: 'Pacati i n the active voice o f Sanskrit means " (the cook) cooks ( something) for another. " Pacate in the middle voice means " (the cook) cooks for himself" ' (Scott 1 990: 1 9 ) . Therefore, I a m trying to d o more here than merely complexify
32
13. 14.
15.
16. 1 7.
18.
19.
U nti m ely Pol itics
the very grammar by which we are always seduced. The answer to the relationship between the subject and language lies not in a more sophisticated grammatical vocabulary, but in trying to think past the relationship that our ordinary gratnmar would suggest. The middle voice is but a first (albeit itnportant) step in this 'thinking past' . On this point, I owe a debt to Rebecca Brown. My thanks to John Zumbrunnen for help in formulating this important point. On a sirnilar distinction between ancient Greek sophists and contemporary neo-sophistic rhetoric, see Edward Schiappa ( 1 990 ) . Of course, I atn arguing that a t this point one need not distinguish between the translation of Aristotle's text by these translators and the interpretive appropriation of a certain relation between language and politics by a number of contemporary political theorists . The translation enables the interpretation, but the interpretation may also influence the translation. The hermeneu tic circle turns. In the end, a certain conception of language and politics emerges, and this conception re1nains my point of con cern. Hannah Arendt puts it even more succinctly: 'speech is what makes man a political being' ( 1 95 8 : 3 ) . Neither of the translations I cite uses the word 'tool', but I want to argue that this is j ust how language is thought of by certain contetnporary theorists who owe a debt of sorts to this Aristo telian conception. This argument already makes it possible to suggest that if one can think language without making it into a property to be owned and used, then the 'way out' of the metaphysical seduction of language may lie in reconceptualizing language itself. The various appropriations of Austin's initial insights have been diverse, to say the least. Sorne recent readings of Austin within contemporary social and political theory have atten1pted to develop a conception of perfonnativity that leads to a decentering of the subj ect. By etnphasizing the conventionality of all linguistic contexts, political theorists such as Butler and Honig articulate an understanding of action that occurs in the doing itself and not in the being of the subject - thereby displacing the subj ect into the contexts in which he or she may act. Putting Austin to these uses 1night make rny reading of speech act theory seem excessively narrow. This path, however, is not the only one that can develop
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33
out o f Austin's work. More significantly, I find it important to stress that Austin's own arguments in his famous lectures on perforrnativity strive not to decenter the subject but to recenter and situate that subject within those contexts in which perfor rnativity is possible. Austin's text insists on locating perforrna tivity within what he calls 'the appropriate circumstances' ( 1 3 ) . If anything, Austin not only centers but also anchors the subject within the domain of intentionality, since for Austin all perfor Inative speech acts 1nust be traced back to the intention of the speaking or writing subject. Austin argues that a speech act cannot really count as proper without this intentionality : 'where . . . the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts, feelings, or intentions . . . then a person parti cipating in and so invoking the procedure must in f'a ct have those thoughts, feelings, or intentions' ( 3 8 , emphasis added) . Austin stresses that perforrnativity will be void if not spoken by the proper individual. The speech act is not enough to guarantee perfonnativity, and thus the doing cannot make it so without the validation of a being behind the doing. Austin is no Nietzschean. For developn1ents in Austin's theory which tend to remain faithful to this account of intentionality, see Skinner ( 1 9 8 8 ) . For devel opments that depart, sorneti1nes radically, from this model of intentionality see Davidson ( 1 9 84) and Martin ( 1 992). Finally, for appropriations of speech act theory used to decenter the subject, see Honig ( 1 9 9 3 ) , who ad1nittedly relies on Derrida 's deconstructive reading of Austin's text. This likely explains how on her reading Austin can contribute to a very Nietzschean project (Derrida 1 9 82 ) . The most radical approach to Austin that I know of, also influenced by Derrida, is found in Butler ( 1 997b ) . 2 0 . However, o n this point, see Michael Shapiro's rather radical rereading of 'use' in the work of the ordinary-language philoso phers ( 1 9 8 1 ) . 2 1 . Given my point o f departure concerning the question o f 'con struction', it can be taken as either ironic or serendipitous that Wittgenstein begins his Philosophical Investigations ( 1 95 8 ) by hypothesizing a simple language composed of only the few words necessary for use by carpenters in building a house. 22. D'Ernilio contends that 'it was the radicals of the Stonewall era who molded for the rest of us "corning out" ' - thereby politiciz- ing the act in a crucial way ( 1 992: xxviii) . Of course, 'the act of
34
23 . 24 .
25 .
26.
27.
U nti mely Pol itics
coming out' can still be a matter of accepting one's sexuality and sharing it either with other gay men and lesbians or with family and friends. For numerous examples of such acts see the anon yrnous letters in Eichberg ( 1 99 0 ) . My emphasis, however, will necessarily remain confined to the (post-Stonewall) possible rr1eanings of coining out as a political act, and the discussion in the text below therefore attempts to specify and contrast two different rr1eanings of coming out in this sense. For a very different argument against onto logically grounding sexual identity, see Derrida ( 1 9 8 3 ) . This point can b e exemplified just b y analyzing the way i n which 'the closet' has been appropriated by 'rnainstream' culture, so that one can be, for example, a 'closet Knicks fan'. Sedgwick argues that this is not simply a matter of separating the phrase from its gay origins, but of revealing the deep-rooted connections between western culture and the 'historical specificity of homosocial! h01nosexual definitions' ( 1 990: 72 ) . As Gregory Weight puts the connection, the person is 'not only a Knicks fan, but also a fag' ( 1 997: 7) . Upon these two different accounts of coming out as political agency one can also illustrate the important distinctions between 'gay' and 'queer' as they have been elaborated in (some) queer theory. 'Unlike gay identity, which, though deliberately pro claimed in an act of affirmation, is nonetheless rooted in the positive fact of h01nosexual obj ect-choice, queer identity need not be grounded in any positive truth or in any stable reality' (Halperin 1 9 9 5 : 62 ) . Derrida would argue that the latter thinking would rej ect the former proj ect outright: as Arditi and Valentine insist, 'the link is already there'. Connolly's efforts to theorize this agonistic forrn of democracy have taken him into the works of Foucault, through the field of democratic theory, up against the legacy of Augustinianism, and even into the fray of international relations theory ( 1 9 8 5 ; 1 99 1 b; 1 993a; 1 995b; see also Honig 1 993; Simons 1 995 ) .
C ha pter 2
Experiencing Lang u age, Broaching U ntim el iness
Positive appropriations 1 of Heidegger's philosophy in the field of political theory have tended to focus on a small number of particular ideas in his work that appear most relevant for politics . First, Hei degger's early quarrel with Descartes seems to offer a critique of subjectivity - a challenge to the modernist conception of man as standing apart fr01n, and then 1nastering, nature through the use of instrumental rationality. Heidegger's Being-in-the-world challenges Descartes' cogito ergo sum on the most basic of levels. In addition, some of Heidegger's later works question the role of modern technol ogy, exploring the relation between modern subj ects and the tools we wield - clearly a line of analysis still relevant for political theory today (see Villa 1 996) . The problem with these C01n1non political themes in Heidegger's work proves twofold. On the one hand, both of these positive political elements in Heidegger's writings have nasty undersides: Heidegger's critique of 'das Man' and 'the they' often seerr1s horribly elitist and anti-democratic, while his challenge to modern technology fails to offer any leverage for critique given that Heidegger dared to compare gas cha1nbers to combines. On the other hand, both of these the1nes for which Heidegger is co1nmonly known in political theory have been developed at much greater length - and without nearly so 1nuch negative baggage by the Frankfurt school Critical Theorists . If one wants resources for thinking about modern technology in the twentieth century, why turn to the few pages that Heidegger wrote when one has a wealth of writings fro1n Horkhei1ner, Adorno, and Marcuse (not to mention Weber and Marx) ? I turn to Heidegger in search of a c01npletely different sort of resource: namely, a different way to think about the relation between language and the subj ect. As the arguments from Chapter 1 should
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already make clear, this resource proves more difficult to locate in political theory. This chapter will suggest that one can find an alternative thinking of language in Heidegger's writing, and it will begin the arduous task of mining that resource. The payoff for this process will come in subsequent chapters, which use Heidegger's understanding of language to develop a political theory of untimeli ness. The possibility of untimely politics depends upon the exploration here of an alternative to the AIO model. Heidegger's understanding of language centers on what he calls an 'experience with language' . To think language nontnetaphysically means encountering or experiencing language, rather than 1nodeling language as a tool for human use. Heidegger refuses to develop such a 1nodel that would explain language; he rejects the request to tell his readers what language is. What Heidegger calls a nonmetaphysical thinking of language, I would prefer to think of as an alternative to the AIO tnodel of the relation between language and the subj ect described in the preceding chapter. Throughout this chapter I will take Heidegger's own terminology quite seriously, trying to show what it means for Heidegger to describe language as nonmetaphysical. But while I will insist that it is important to grapple with Heidegger's terminology, I see no reason to rnake it my own. The history of tnetaphysics was of utrnost concern to Heidegger, and to get at his understanding of language one needs to see how and why . But it is that alternative understanding of language - particularly in what it might have to offer to theories of politics ( in how it might enable a politics of untimeliness) - that will remain rny concern. Following the recom mendation that Heidegger makes, in his better mornents at least, I will try to leave metaphysics to itself. Heidegger provides a way into language that avoids the AIO rnodel because he consistently resists the tendency to take language as an object fit for human appropriation. Language, on the contrary, might be j ust that which cannot be reducible to Being. Language is 'beyond Being'. In conceiving of language in this way Heidegger works to exceed the clutches of a tnetaphysical conception that would take language as an object of knowledge. And by articulating what he wants to think of as a 'nonmetaphysical' conception of language, Heidegger sin1ultaneously develops a rich resource for reconsidering the relation between language and politics outside the terms of the AIO model.
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The E n d of Metaphy s i c s ? By his own account, Heidegger writes at 'the end of metaphysics' . Some writers have taken this phrase t o mean that w e are now simply beyond rnetaphysics, that metaphysics is over and done with. On this view, metaphysics, like a movie, would have ended, and now some thing else shall begin. Or worse: meta physics, like a fashion, would be not only over but also out of style. Reading 'the end of metaphysics' in this vein informs those cavalier repudiations of all works in philoso phy that might be seen as not in step with the times . However, Heidegger's writings on the end of metaphysics have little if anything to do with suggestions such as these. For Heidegger, the end of metaphysics marks primarily a concern with, rather than a dismissal of, metaphysics. More importantly, 'the end of metaphysics brings the very sense of end - hence, its own sense - into question' (Sallis 1 995 : 1 7) . In claiming to write at the end of metaphysics Heidegger situates his work in the context of so many other authors who have taken metaphysics' end seriously; he does not, however, proclaim that metaphysics has stopped. Heidegger's references to the end of meta physics serve not to announce a termination but rather to contextua lize Heidegger's own thought. And this means that, for Heidegger, the 'end' of metaphysics does not rnake his own work nonmetaphysical by default. Rather, by placing his writings within the context of the end of metaphysics, Heidegger puts a greater weight upon the task of thinking ( 1 972 ) . Seen from Heidegger's location within the history o f Continental thought, it would seem that metaphysics has been ending for hundreds of years ( Sallis 1 995; cf. Bataille 1 9 8 5 ) . Kant may have been the first modern philosopher to announce - and, in his case, project the end of metaphysics as its completion. Metaphysics will end, according to Kant, not because it ceases to be, but because the project of rnetaphysics shall be completed through critique. Kant writes: 'metaphysics . . . will attain, and this in a short time, such completion as will leave no task to our successors' ( 1 96 5 : A xx) . Kant believes that the end of metaphysics as a philosophical endeavor will restore it to its proper place above the rest of the sciences, and he feels quite certain that his work accomplishes such completion (A xiii ) . Hegel, too, takes the end o f meta physics t o be its completion and he sets himself the task of carrying out this project - which, for Hegel (and despite Kant's proud claims to the contrary), remains unfinished. Hegel goes further, marking the very end of history : 'what 1nakes
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Hegel's grasp of the ending more profound is his awareness that the end cannot be extrinsic to the history that it cmnpletes . . . With Hegel, metaphysics would come to its end in the sense that its history would be gathered into the full actuality of spirit' (Sallis 1 995: 2 0 ) . The world--historical march of Geist completes rnetaphysics b y com pleting its history. While Kant tries to place metaphysics in its rightful place above the rest of the sciences, Hegel heightens the culminating moment of metaphysics, reaching its zenith with the Gennany of Hegel's day. In response to the difficulty of outdoing Hegel, Nietzsche announces (rather than projects ) the end of meta physics as its termination. Yet even this termination proves to be no simple matter: Nietzsche's writings consistently refuse to make the end of metaphysics either basic or uncomplicated. Instead, his work renders this ending both complicated and problematic at alrnost every turn? It is tempting to try to summarize Nietzsche's impact on philosophy with just those three little words, ' God is dead' - hence the termination of metaphy sics - but one cannot forget that for Nietzsche the death of God is a cmnplex affair. Rather than comfort, the end of rnetaphysics offers a whole new host of chores. In The Gay Science Nietzsche elaborates on these 'new struggles' : 'God is dead; but given the ways of rnen, there will perhaps be caves for millennia to cmne, in which his shadow will be shown. - And we - we still have to overcome his shadow too' ( 1 92 1 : 147, my translation; quoted in Sallis 1 995: 1 9 ) . Nietzsche, unlike Hegel, does not wish to cornplete the rnetaphysical project. But even Nietzsche's call for the tennination of metaphysics remains intimately related to rnetaphysics to the extent that a Nietzschean free spirit must continue, possibly 'for thousands of years', to fight against the long shadows cast by rnetaphysics . With Heidegger, one might say metaphysics continues to end. Heidegger is at pains to challenge any simple or singular under standing of end. End should not be thought as 'as a rnere stopping', much less as 'decline and irnpotence' ( 1 972: 5 6 ) . Heidegger appears to accept the notion of metaphysics' completion within German Ideal ism, but he rej ects the idea that the end of metaphysics marks its completion in the form of a classical telos . As Sallis puts it, 'it is not a rnatter of metaphysics' corning to an end in which its highest perfec tion would be attained. Its end is not the locus, the place, of its perfection but rather the place of a radically different kind of gather ing' ( 1 995 : 2 1 ) . Heidegger gives to the end of metaphysics the sense of this gathering.
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After Nietzsche, Heidegger is forced to reconceptualize what it will mean for metaphysics to end, so he refuses to think of end in any sort of linear sense of time. End is not an end point for Heidegger, not a telos . This notion of end gestures toward untimeliness. Heidegger writes in his own lecture on the end of philosophy: 'the end of philosophy is the place, that place in which the whole of philosophy's history is gathered into its most extreme possibility. End as completion means this gathering' ( 1 972: 5 7 ) . The sense of gathering that Heidegger wants here to attribute to end takes on the connotations of the death of Dasein in Being and Time. Heidegger calls death Dasein's 'ownrnost potentiality-for-being' ( 1 9 62 : 294 ) . Or, as Sallis paraphrases, death is 'Dasein's extreme possibility' ( 1 995: 22) . Death marks a limit that can never be sirnply transgressed; it is 'a possibility that withdraws all possibilities' . The end of rr1etaphysics is the gather ing of metaphysics into its own extreme possibility - an untimely end in that it cannot be fixed or located at any particular point in time (cf. Derrida 1 993 ) . Heidegger insists that h e writes a t the end of metaphysics because metaphysics' possibilities have been both exhausted and raised to their extreme by those writers who precede Heidegger himself. Metaphysics is not terminated or completed at its end, but gathered into this extreme-1nost possibility. Within this gathering, Heidegger attempts to delineate a nonmetaphysical conception of language. He does so not with a disregard for metaphysics or with the assumption that metaphysics has ended. Just the opposite: Heidegger, like Nietzsche, remains acutely aware that metaphysics at its end remains in some cases very much intact. Heidegger stresses this point in his lectures on Nietzsche, where he argues that in the future people will still live and think metaphysically ( 1 9 8 7: 1 4 8 ; partially quoted in Sallis 1 995: 23, and Flynn 1 992: 4). But the end means that 'the essential possibilities of rnetaphysics are exhausted' (Heidegger 1 9 8 7: 1 4 8 ) . Heidegger makes his case concerning the history o f metaphysics on the basis of historical claims, arguing that we remain 'above' neither history nor metaphysics ( 1 9 8 7: 1 49 ) . Placing Heidegger's arguments within the context of the recent history of Continental philosophy goes a long way toward showing why Heidegger wishes to character ize his conception of language as nonmetaphysical. However, before one can say how this is so, one will need to engage in a detailed reading of Heidegger's later writings in order to elucidate the ramifications of his thinking of language for politics and political theory, particularly as I reconceive therr1 as untimely endeavors.
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C ategori e s and S chemati c s : F o r e s t alling an Exp erience with L a n g u a g e 'The three lectures that follow bear the title "The Nature of Lan guage." They are intended to bring us face to face with the possibility of undergoing an experience with language' (Heidegger 1 97 1 b : 57) . The claim defended here is at once simple and complex: to grasp the import of Heidegger's thinking of language one needs only to rnake sense of what it rneans to undergo an 'experience with language'. And yet, 'bringing us before the possibility of an experience with language is not a matter of making things more concrete or more sensible' (Fynsk 1 99 6 : 6 5 ) . Understanding an 'experience with language' first requires placing these writings within the context of Heidegger's earlier departure from the analytic of Dasein and the project of fundamental ontology explicated in his most important work, Being and Time. Only then can one begin to consider Heidegger's critique of the metaphysical logic of identity, his thinking of relationality, and, most importantly, the event of appropriation, Ereignis. Once this background work has been carried out, a close reading of Heidegger's writings on language will throw 1nuch light on undergoing 'an experience with language'. Political theorists, however, have not even begun to do this work. Instead, most approach these dense writings on language by way of a shortcut. They begin not with a reading of Heidegger, but instead with a general framework or schematic for 'theories of language', only secondarily (and hastily) inserting Heidegger into one of these pre fabricated categories - a round peg in a square hole indeed. Richard Rorty's work offers an interesting example: his thoughts on Heidegger appear in a volume titled Essays on Heidegger and Others, which is ironic since they rarely address what Heidegger actually wrote ( 1 99 1 ) . Instead, Rorty seems content to read Heidegger only for what a pragmatist can get out of him (Spinosa 1 992: 270; cf. Rorty 1 99 1 : 2 7) - perhaps not a n illegitimate reading, but also not a helpful one in terms of approaching Heidegger's understanding of language. Rorty already has a cornplete model of language provided him by pragma tism, and his neo-pragmatist 1nodel of language is directly at odds with the conception of language that Heidegger seeks to articulate in his later writings. Indeed, Rorty's model rr1akes precisely the rnove diagnosed in Chapter 1 - of separating out the literary and the political when conceptualizing language. In short, Rorty does not 1nerely fall back upon the AIO rr1odel in a tacit way; because of his
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commitment to pragmatism, he goes so far as to instrumentalize language explicitly while simultaneously dismissing Heidegger's own thoughts on language as apolitical. Given their so-called tnystical fixation on the depths of Being and Language, Heidegger's writings on language can only be considered poetry, not politics, according to Rorty. A curious and intriguing symmetry develops between the accounts of language given by Heidegger and Rorty, for each author will see the other as trapped in the clutches of metaphysics . Rorty believes that language is nothing more than a game we play: he rejects any correspondence theory that would have language somehow represent ing a reality, out there. Language, for Rorty, can be open to a variety of descriptions, but in general it provides 'a reservoir of surplus symbols available for artistic or pragmatic consumption' (Thiele 1 99 5 : 122 ) . Of course, the notion that human speech remains subject to use and manipulation by human subj ects concisely characterizes metaphysics, in Heidegger's view. On the other hand, any under standings that give language a depth beyond such manipulation would characterize metaphysics, in Rorty's view ( Caputo 1 9 8 5 : 257). The importance of this intersecting conflict lies not in a debate over which author has the 'correct' view of metaphysics. The point is rather to demonstrate that Rorty's pragmatism requires him to reject Heidegger's understanding of language, and in this case precludes him from even engaging with Heidegger's notion of an 'experience' with language. Rorty's neo-pragmatist model of language rests on a simple prin ciple: 'language is a set of tools' ( 1 99 1 : 3 ) . 3 Rorty insists that we not allow language to become anything more than this. set of instruments, things useful for human needs, wants, and actions. Only tnysticistn and the 'reification of language' would prevent one from seeing the obvious : that language is 'capable of being described in the same terms in which we describe tables, trees, and atoms' ( 4 ) . For Rorty, language is an instrument that helps people (pragmatists, at least) do things, nothing more. Thus, Heideggerian philosophy proves inc01npatible with the political concerns of a pragmatist, since Rorty will draw a distinct line between philosophy and poetry. Rorty argues that only the pragmatist gives a political answer to the question of how 'we should conceive of our relation to the Western philosophical tradi tion.' The Heideggerian answer is purely poetic (Rorty 1 99 1 : 9 ) . 4 Rorty develops a scherne to explain Heideggerian thinking on language that proves so simple it can easily be reduced to a
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three-part mathematical fonnula : ( 1 ) A ::: Late Wittgenstein = Early Heidegger, (2) B = Early Wittgenstein = Late Heidegger, and ( 3 ) A > B. 5 Both the early Heidegger and the late Wittgenstein had a pragmatist's appreciation for the finitude of hmnan existence, while the late Heidegger and the early Wittgenstein made the mistake of thinking that the essence or structure of language itself was something that could transcend our own existence in the world (Rorty 1 99 1 : 50-65 ) . Rorty fills out the contours of this schematization, and he lays great stress on the merits of the pragrnatist strand found within these twentieth-century philosophers. However, when it comes to the 'reification of language' claim, Rorty makes no argmnent. Rorty provides but one quotation frorn all of Heidegger's writings, taking it as evidence that Heidegger turned language into a 'quasi-divinity' in his later years. Clearly, if one begins having settled the issue of language in favor of an instrumental conception, and if one presumes from the beginning that Heidegger' s philosophy is poetic, not political, then it really does not make much sense to spend time poring over phrases such as 'language speaks' . Heidegger says that his writings on language are designed to prepare us to undergo an experience with language, but Rorty's neo-pragmatist categories preclude such a possibility. Rorty's work exemplifies an effort to categorize Heidegger's writings without necessarily reading them, yet he is no straw man. Even Charles Taylor seems to bypass Heidegger' s own writings on language by placing them within a category created by Taylor himself. Taylor's approach to Heidegger on language begins with two questionable moves. First, he assumes that Heidegger's later writings can be viewed as containing a 'philosophy of language' ( 1 992; reprinted in 1 995: 1 00-2 6 ) . This description appears rather ironic, given that throughout those writings Heidegger is at pains to reject all philosophy of language and to distinguish his project from such an approach ( for example, 1 97 1 b : 5 8 ) . This move proves telling, because i t displays Taylor's tendency to ignore Heidegger's own philosophical project. 6 Taylor states rather unabashedly that Heidegger's 'doctrine of language' - which has 'language speaking, rather than human beings' - j ust does not make much sense (Taylor 1 992: 248 ) . One can therefore only understand what Heidegger is up to by placing him within the 'expressive-constitutive' tradition of thought on language . The expressive-constitutive tradition must be counterposed to 'en frarning' theories ? Enframing 'theories of language treat language in much the same manner as Rorty and other neo-pragmatists: "on this
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view language is conceived as a n instrument" ' (24 8 ) . Expressive constitutive conceptions of language allow for precisely what enfram ing theories exclude: they characterize the very framework of human life as partially constituted by and through language (cf. Shapiro 1 9 8 1 ) . I leave aside Taylor's rich description of this tradition, focusing only on the fact that the expressive-constitutivist view of language - as it has been developed by Herder, Hurnboldt, and Taylor himself rejects the enframing conception that limits language's capacity to its uses by human beings. Instead, language opens up new horizons of meaning and action and makes possible the very association of human beings; language allows for the constitution of meaning and the expression of hurnan needs, wants, feelings, principles, 8 and desires. 9 Taylor's interpretation of Heidegger can now be boiled down to a sentence: 'Heidegger is a constitutive theorist' ( 1 992: 25 6 ) . Taylor wants to argue that Heidegger's claims about 'language speaking' are actually much more modest claims about the nature of expression than they would first appear. Thus, Taylor suggests that when it comes to the issue of the 'nature of expression' Heidegger lines up quite nicely with the Humboldtian view concerning expression. Heidegger's radicality, Taylor contends, lies in the issue of the physical space of expression, or the clearing. To make this argurnent, Taylor invokes Heidegger's understanding of the ontological difference: the difference between actual beings in the world (like people, trees, and stones) and Being, the very existence of those beings. This is the distinction between the ontic and the ontological that Heidegger develops and relies upon from the very beginning of Being and Time. Taylor would like to apply the ontological difference to Heidegger's thinking of language ( or expression, as Taylor has translated it) as the linchpin of his argument. Heidegger's understanding of the power of expression fits squarely into the expressive-constitutive tradition, but Heidegger, according to Taylor, insists that the space of expression the clearing (Lichtung) - remain ontologically grounded, not ontically founded. The space of expression is a space of Being, not of individual beings . The problem with Taylor's interpretation is that while the Lichtung plays a key role in the analytic of Dasein articulated by Heidegger within Being and Time, it has no centrality to Heidegger's later writings on language. More significantly, by applying the ontological difference to Heidegger's later writings on language, Taylor misses the very point of Heidegger's abandoning the project of fundamental ontology . In turning away from fundamental ontology Heidegger
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seeks to think Being outside the ontological difference. 10 The central point of Heidegger's later writings is to continue considering the question of Being, but to do so without relying upon the difference between beings and Being - the ontological difference. Heidegger drops the ontological difference precisely as he tries to prepare his readers to 'undergo an experience with language' . 1 1 Ignoring this move entirely, Taylor imposes on Heidegger's later writings a framework from his early work. This earlier framework will not fit Heidegger's later thinking; 1nore importantly, Heidegger strives in those later works to 'twist free' from that very context (see Sallis 1 9 90 ) . In short, Heidegger's statement that 'language speaks' simply cannot be reduced to a 'de-onticized view of the clearing'. Not only are the two not sirr1ply equivalent, but Heidegger's watchword is an explicit attempt to 1nove past the philosophical thinking of Taylor's formulation. To grasp how and why this transition occurs will require one to look deeper into the writings in which claims such as 'language speaks' occur, and this Taylor does not do. In refusing to take Heidegger's later writings on language on their own terms - rather than the terms and framework Taylor constructs - Taylor (much like Rorty) forestalls the possibility of an experience with language. The irony of this 1nove resides in the fact that in preparing his readers to undergo an experience with language Heidegger would like to think he is partially escaping the confining categories of thought imposed by 1netaphysical conceptions. The readings provided by Rorty and Taylor only serve to snare Heidegger in a new set of categorical constructs. In the end, the idea of preparing to undergo an experience with language goes not only unclarified, but totally unmentioned. It is now time to leave these categories and frarr1eworks behind. O n th e W a y to An Exp eri e n c e With L an g u a g e
Identity and The San1e Reading Heidegger's texts on language requires a number of steps back, all intended to help grasp a few crucial ideas that Heidegger develops in works not directly addressing language. In 'The Principle of Identity' Heidegger attetnpts a reformulation of the logic of identity 'the first law of thought' ( 1 96 0 : 1 3 ) . The principle of identity can be succinctly stated in the formula A=A, but Heidegger argues that such a formula properly defines the principle of equality - not identity. The equation of equality constitutes a mere logical truis1n in which one A
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equals another A, but in identity A is A. More to the point, each A with respect to itself is the same. Already, Heidegger rather dramatically claims, we have moved from an empty concept to a statement about Being itself: 'To every Existent as such belongs identity, oneness with itself' ( 1 6 ) . Hence, within the common, 'metaphysical' view, identity issues from Being. Heidegger, however, sees the potential for more 'boundless scope' in the notion of identity, and to meditate on this potential he returns to ancient Greek conceptions of the Same. 12 This move is necessitated by the emptiness of merely calling identity a product of Being or by repeating that every A is with respect to itself the Same. In Parmenides, Heidegger finds a more direct attempt to think the Same in its own essence: 'the Same is, to wit, Perceiving (Thinking) as well as Being' ( 1 960: 1 7) . Heidegger finds this a puzzling attempt to convey the meaning of the Greek to aut6, but, importantly, he sees it as 'a puzzle we ought not try to circumvent' ( 1 7) . In thinking through this puzzle Heidegger believes we may arrive at a deeper understanding of the principle of identity itself. In a first attempt to articulate the saying in the Parmenides fragment Heidegger arrives at the following formula : 'Thinking and Being together belong to the Sarne, and together they stem fro1n the Same' ( 1 8 ) . Already one can see that the Parmenidean conception of the Sa1ne makes it irnpossible to rely on the metaphysical understanding of identity as founded on Being, because Parmenides's formulation refuses to reduce thinking to Being. Thinking and Being here both 'belong to' and 'stem from' the 'Same', so thinking is not simply coordinated to Being. Rather, there is a 'belonging-together' of the two ( 1 8 ; cf. Heidegger 1 992b ) . Heidegger suggests two ways to think about this belonging-together which constitutes the Same. In the first, one places emphasis on the togetherness, that is, belonging-together. This way of viewing the term relegates belonging to togetherness and hence to unity; it thereby accomplishes a coordination of one thing to another. A more radical way to view the relationship lies in thinking of the belonging-together of belonging-together. In this way belonging determines the togetherness . This difference is not a mere play upon words, because it relates more primordially to the expression of Parrnenides's saying. Thinking and Being belong to the Sa1ne; it is not a unity or coordination that determines the relationship, for the belonging itself plays the essential role. One might legitimately view the argument thus far as mere question--begging. What does Heidegger mean by Being ? Or, for that
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rnatter, what does he mean by rnan? Yet, for Heidegger, these questions can only obscure the matter because they irnmediately return us to the realm of metaphysics from which he is trying to twist free. One cannot start with rnan 1 3 or with Being and then coordinate one to the other, for man is the relationship to Being and nothing more: 'The distinct feature of Man consists in that he, as that thinking being which is receptive to Being, is confronted by Being, ren1ains oriented to Being and thus corresponds to Being. Man in reality is this reference to correspondence, and that is all he is ( 1 960: 21; cf. Heidegger 1 962: 32). The crux of Heidegger's argument proceeds as follows : rather than attempting to think rnan or Being and then their coordination (and hence arrive at an understanding of the Same), we must first realize that man and Being belong to the Sarne and are detennined by this relationship of belonging-together. If it is only possible to understand man and Being as belonging to the Same, one may still be tempted to ask how we can understand the relation of belonging-together itself. In this essay Heidegger only hints toward a way. 1 4 To enter into the relation we must first leave behind metaphysical notions. One must take what Heidegger calls the 'step back', by refusing rnerely to adopt traditional concepts and categories. This step - precisely the move that Heidegger's inter preters often refuse to take - 'is a bounding away from and a leaving behind of the familiar concept of Man as the animal rationale, the rational animal' ( 1 960: 2 3 ) . The step back abandons the Aristotelian conception of Man as a rational animal who possesses language. From this point, Heidegger then makes the briefest remarks about belonging-together as made possible by the event of appropriation - Ereignis: 1 5 Er-eignis is the internally oscillating realm through which Man and Being touch each other . . . by divesting themselves of these determinations which metaphysics imputed to them ...In metaphysical doctrine identity is presented as a basic character of Being.But now it turns out that Being belongs together with Thought into an identity whose essence derives from that causative belonging-together which we call Ereignis. The essence of identity is a property of Er-eignis. (2 8 )
Heidegger has now radically transformed the principle o f identity with which he began. On this reading, identity can no longer be reduced to an empty concept or issuance from Being. However, Heidegger has given only a partial and preliminary sketch of Ereignis, a term that proves crucial to elucidating this transformation. To help clarify this
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notion I now want to turn to one of Heidegger's much later works, 1 6 i n which h e develops more fully the idea o f Ereignis.
On Time and Being: Ereignis In On Time and Being ( 1 972 ) Heidegger seeks to move beyond the ontological difference by thinking Being without regard to any grounding in terms of beings . In this way, the title does mark the reversal of Being and Time in that the analytic of Dasein has been abandoned. However, such a reversal does not constitute a rejection of fundamental ontology; it is rather an atternpt to complete the project inaugurated by fundamental ontology . The ernphasis on Being re mains the same, but Heidegger now believes that the ontological difference, which had earlier made it possible to reawaken the ques tion of the meaning of Being, must now be left behind in order to inquire into Being rnore deeply. This move requires overturning the concepts of Being and Time, but without rejecting the fundamental project of that text. And to 'overturn' those concepts requires they be thought in a more originary manner - not merely rejected out of hand. 1 7 On Time and Being provides one effort at reconceptualizing the metaphysical concepts of time and Being in a nonmetaphysical way. What is Being ? What is time ? And how are they related? For Heidegger, the questions seerr1 rnisplaced, for their answers can only lead us to a metaphysical understanding of the terms . The metaphy sical answers may be briefly stated as follows. Time, since Aristotle, is conceived of as the succession of nows . Being is presencing, that is, what is present, is . Being is determined by presence in time. Moving beyond these fonnulations, however, requires one to question the questions . The first question asks what Being is, but is Being at all? My computer is, this printed paper is, but is Being ? Any search for Being will only be in vain, for 'nowhere arr1ong things do we find Being' ( 1 972: 3 ). To the extent that Being is, we can only say that it is in time. As for tirr1e, one can conceive of it as that in which things perish. Everything has its time; time and the temporal are that within which beings pass away . Yet, though time itself passes away, it does so constantly - time always remains as time . To remain would be to presence, and time would therefore be determined by a kind of Being. We thus arrive at a brief sketch of time, Being, and their relationship: 'Being is not a thing, thus nothing temporal, and yet it is determined by
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time as presence. Time is not a thing, thus nothing which is, and yet it remains constant in its passing away without being something temporal like the beings in ti1ne' ( 3 ) . Being and time are therefore the matters for discussion, but the argument thus far forces Heidegger to be cautious about declaring what they are. We cannot say Being or time is, rather we formulate the idea as 'there is Being, there is time'. 1 8 Es gibt (It gives) Being; es gibt (It gives) time. Much like the transition from identity to the Same, Heidegger has here only changed wording, but this transition makes it possible to think Being and tirne in their own 'essence', that is, to think Being without regard to beings. Heidegger will attempt to work out this task by meditating on the It that gives Being and the It that gives time. In 'It gives Being' we can hear Being as the gift of the It that gives. As such, this gift shows itself as what Heidegger calls 'letting-presence' : 'To let presence means: to unconceal, to bring into openness' ( 5 ) . Heidegger urges his readers to resist the metaphysical temptation to think of this letting-presence only as Being - that is, as presence itself. 'It gives' is the letting-presence that grants the gift of Being, but because the It that gives always withdraws in favor of its gift - Being western metaphysics always thinks Being with regard to beings rather than as a gift granted by the letting-presence of the It that gives. The history of Being is the sending or destining of the gift of Being: 'the history of Being means destiny of Being in whose sendings both the sending and the It which sends forth hold back with their self manifestation' ( 9 ) . Yet Heidegger still has not answered explicitly what the It is which gives Being. One might find time as the obvious answer to this question, and it is this possibility that leads Heidegger into a discussion of time, and of the It that gives time. In 'It gives time' we hear time also as a gift of the It that gives. In this case the giving is the 'nearing nearness' in which time extends itself and opens up tirne-space. The di1nensionality that Heidegger describes here serves as a precursor to untimeliness: 'dimensionality consists in a reaching out that opens up, in which futural approaching brings about what has been, what has been brings about futural approaching, and the reciprocal relation of both brings about the opening up of open ness' ( 1 4 ). The unity of this three-dimensionality of time consists in the interplay of each dimension toward the others, and this interplay constitutes the fourth dimension of true time as well as the It that gives time itself. 1 9 In giving the gift of time itself, true time withdraws and conceals in the very act of giving. Metaphysics concerns itself only
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with time as an uninterrupted series of now-points because it remains oblivious to the It that gives time. 'As extending is itself a giving, the giving of a giving is concealed in true time' ( 1 6 ) . The giving in 'It gives time' lies in the extending and opening of the dimensionality of time what Heidegger calls 'the four dimensional realm' . This discussion of the It that gives time may seem to have passed over the question of time as the It that gives Being. On the contrary, it has rnade an answer to this question possible, for as itself granted by a gift, time cannot be simply considered the giving of Being. As Heidegger puts it, 'The destiny in which It gives Being lies in the extending of time. Does this reference show tirr1e to be the "It" that gives Being ? By no means. For time itself remains the gift of an "It gives" whose giving preserves the realm in which presence is extended' ( 1 7) . Thus, after such a lengthy discussion of the giving of both time and Being, the puzzle of the 'It' that gives still rernains . Heidegger argues that the preceding discussion has shown, if anything, that the It that gives cannot be thought in isolation from the gift that it gives . To think the essence of the It we must think it in relation to the gift of time and Being. Here one should see striking similarities to the discussion of man and Being in 'The Principle of Identity' ( 1 9 6 0 ) . Heidegger says one must think the pair (whether it be man and Being or Being and time) in their relation if one wants to gain a greater understanding of their essence. Therefore, Heidegger's discussion of time and Being turns directly to the question of their relation - both to each other, and to the It that grants them as a gift. My preceding discussion of identity has already prefigured the answer to the question of the relation of time and Being. Heidegger makes the transition as follows: How else are we to bring the 'It' into view which we say when we say 'It gives Being', 'It gives time'? Simply by thinking the 'It' in the light of the kind of giving that belongs to it: giving as destiny, giving as an opening up which reaches out.Both belong together, inasmuch as the former, destiny, lies in the latter, extending opening up. ( 1972: 19, emphasis added)
With my emphasis on belong, one already sees Ereignis at work, so to speak: 'What determines both, time and Being, in their own, that is, in their belonging together, we shall call: Ereignis, the event of appro priation' ( 1 9 ) . The It that gives both Being and time in their relation of belonging-together turns out to be Ereignis?0 Yet, though this state ment strikes at the heart of the matter, it also obscures the matter in posing Ereignis as a being. We cannot ask what is Ereignis, for in
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doing so we ask for Ereignis in terms of Being. But Being itself belongs together with time to Ereignis. At his most frustrating moments Heidegger will say only the following about Ereignis: 'das Ereignis ereignit' (Appropriation appropriates) (24 ) . At other moments, Heidegger does open a way toward under standing Ereignis. While Ereignis cannot be understood as sorne general logical construct that subsumes Being and time, it must be understood in the way it makes both of them possible. In this way Heidegger again demonstrates his striving to twist free from meta physics - without, of course, overcoming or ignoring metaphysics . In the following passage, Heidegger argues that to take Ereignis as simply another species of Being is to misunderstand it. Ereignis does not constitute just a different way of thinking Being, for Being itself belongs to Ereignis: If we do what was attempted, and think Being in the sense of the presencing and allowing-to-presence that are there in destiny - which in turn lies in the extending of true time which opens and conceals - then Being belongs into Ereignis. Giving and its gift receive their determination from Ereignis. In that case, Being would be a species of Ereignis, and not the other way around. (21)
As belonging together within Ereignis, neither time nor Being can determine the other. Ereignis is the It that gives the gift of both time and Being, yet in the very act of giving it withdraws and conceals itself in favor of its gift. Therefore, Being itself 'belongs into Ereignis'. With this formulation, Heidegger has gone a great way toward a new (nonmetaphysical) conception of time and Being. To put it simply, he has elucidated and illuminated the 'matters' of tirr1e and Being without saying what they are, or even that they are, as a metaphysical account would have to do. Ereignis sets the stage for a new experience with language. But Ereignis - to anticipate my argument to come in the following chapters - also points toward untimeliness: the belonging-together of Being and time prevents precisely any timely determination of Being. In both disclosing Being and withdrawing in that very dis closure, Ereignis opens Being into a historicity that can never be determined or fixed by a linear time. The temporality of Being as determined by Ereignis consists in the mutual belonging-together of Being and time, a belonging-together that Heidegger insists can never be reduced to a coordination of Being to time ( or vice versa ) . The metaphysical coordination of Being to time, requires a linear concept
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of time, while the temporality of Being in Ereignis suggests a nonlinear untimeliness .
Language Speaks In his works on language Heidegger almost never fails to mention the 'conventional view', a view that will clearly fall within the broad outlines of the AIO model. Our first intuition about language is that it is an expression - an expression of rnan. Everywhere we look we encounter language and always as the result of some human activity ( 1 97 1 a : 1 92 ) . On this view, language exists as the external expression of something internal to human beings . This metaphysical view has flourished since its first articulation by Aristotle: 'Now, what (takes place) in the making of vocal sounds is a show of what there is in the soul in the way of passions, and "what is written is a show of the vocal sounds' ( 1 971 b: 1 14; quoting Aristotle 1 949 ). Language is always merely the mimesis of what is found in the soul. As such, language is always the faculty of human beings : 'Language manifests itself in speaking, as a phenomenon that occurs in man' ( 1 97 1 b : 9 6 ) . Speech is the activity of man man speaks, and he always speaks some language or languages ( 1 97 1 a: 1 92 ) . Heidegger suggests that this conventional conception of language can be found in Aris totle and the Greeks, but it is not merely an antiquated view: it finds its clearest expression in Humboldt's nineteenth-century writings . From this perspective language itself must be subordinate to the Being of beings. 2 1 That is to say, primordial human understanding of the world phenomenologically precedes man's use of language. Language is subordinate to Being, and is, in fact, almost derived from it. Within the view that Heidegger designates as metaphysical, then, we see language as secondary to Being and speech as a possession of man as the rational animal ( 1 9 77: 2 1 0 ) . It i s precisely the distance that Heidegger takes from the conven tional view, along with his rejection of the Aristotelian conception that I discussed in Chapter 1 , that makes Heidegger's thought a valuable asset for reconsidering the relation between language and politics; it also makes Taylor's reading untenable. 22 To reiterate, by forcing him into a tradition from which he wishes to depart, Taylor's approach to Heidegger only forestalls the possibility for which Heidegger would like to prepare his readers. Heidegger wants to show that once one accepts the conventional view of language, one makes possible a whole set of discourses about language. If language is relegated to
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the service of communication ( 1 977: 1 9 6 ) , then all sorts of information gathering proj ects about language become prorninent. That is to say, the philosophy of language is necessarily shot through completely with metaphysics. 23 In discussing the philosophical project of produ cing 'metalinguistics' Heidegger concludes: 'that sounds like meta physics - not only sounds like it, it is metaphysics' ( 1 97 1 b: 5 8 ) . Heidegger has n o intentions o f doing philosophy o f language, for to do so would be to accept the conventional/metaphysical view of language. Just as in the discussion of identity ( and the meditation on tirne and Being), Heidegger will attempt to move beyond meta physics - again, without completely rej ecting it. To do so, Heidegger's conception of language requires what I will call a ' doubling' of language. This doubling allows Heidegger to distance his conception from the conventional view while also pre venting the creation of a new metaphysical construct, subject to the same metaphysical questions of 'what is' discussed earlier. Heidegger will have to demonstrate a double movement of language - a transla tion of language into 'language' - in order to keep twisting free from metaphysics and to prepare his readers to undergo an experience with language. In contrast to the metaphysical conception of language, Heidegger will first boldly propose an inversion of the understanding of language as something that man has. 24 In the essay 'Language' Heidegger uses as a guide word the claim that 'Language Speaks'. It is not human beings that bring about language, but rather language that brings about rnan. Just as metaphysics always thought Being in relation to some beings, it also always tries to think language as the possession of man. But, in attempting to think language qua language, 2 5 Heidegger will come to the radical conclusion that language itself speaks. If we try to consider language itself we are forced down this path: 'we speak of language, but constantly seem to be speaking merely about lan guage, while in fact we are alrea dy letting language, from within language, speak to us, in language, of itself, saying its nature' ( 1 9 7 1 b : 8 5 ) . I n speaking, language brings m a n into his own Being - ' it i s language that first brings m a n about, brings him into existence' ( 1 9 7 1 a : 1 92 ) . Heidegger repeatedly quotes the final line from a Stefan George poem: 'where word breaks off no thing may be' ( 1 9 7 1 b ) . Only the word (language) can first make Being possible. Here we see an explicit reversal of the conventional view, and in it language becomes phenomenologically prior to any Being of beings . Yet what can it really mean to say that language speaks, other
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than a s a n empty poetic metaphor ? Some would wish to relegate Heidegger's thoughts on language to just that level. However, the background provided by my preceding discussion of time and Being as belonging together in the Same of Ereignis, allows for a more rigorous articulation of Heidegger's conception. To state the conclusion bluntly in the language of metaphysics that it resists, one would say the following: language is the It that gives Being and time. But, of course, one cannot say that language is . Therefore, one must hear the calling of language as the mode of Saying in Ereignis. Saying, for Heidegger, 'tneans to show, to let appear, to let be seen and heard [and] the essential being of language is Saying as Showing' ( 1 971 b: 1 22-3 ) . As a Saying-Showing, language can let be seen, can unconceal Being. This letting-be proves to be the granting of the gift of Being: 'Language, as Saying, is the mode of Ereignis' ( 1 3 5 ) . Through Ereignis language grants the gift of Being; thus, the way to language is Ereignis. Heidegger draws the crucial connection to Ereignis as follows: The moving force in Showing of Saying is Owning (Eigenen) . It is what brings all present and absent beings each into their own, from where they show themselves in what they are, and where they abide according to their kind.This owning which brings them there, and which moves Saying as Showing in its showing we call Ereignis. ( 1 27)
Ereignis 'operates', for lack of a better word, through the Saying
Showing of language. Or, in less instrumental and more Heideggerian language, the happening of Ereignis occurs through the force of language. In this manner language - not man - speaks. Heidegger thus presents language as the It that gives Being. In the 'Letter on Humanism' Heidegger had already said this explicitly : 'In its essence language is not the utterance of an organism; nor is it the expression of a living thing. Language is the lighting-concealing advent of Being itself ( 1 977: 206, emphasis added) . At first glance, it seems quite simple: language speaks, and in so doing it brings about Being itself. The metaphysical conception of language has therefore been toppled. However, such a straightforward inversion of meta physical constructs only lands one back in the realm of metaphysics. Fran�oise Dastur makes the point as follows : 'such a reversal of the metaphysical viewpoint could only lead - as Heidegger himself points out in the Letter on Humanism with the example of Sartrean ex istentialism - to a new form of metaphysics and not at all to its destitution' ( 1 993 : 363 ) . If Heidegger only inverts the conventional view then he has merely provided a new ground, that is, the essence of
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language. Yet, as I will attempt to show, Heidegger's thought proves rnore cornplex than the simple notion that language speaks. Heidegger's way to language is certainly not the search for a new ground; this fact becomes clear when we focus on the movement of Ereignis rather than the guide word 'Language speaks' . In analyzing Ereignis Dastur argues that 'the way to language' can no longer be conceived as an ahistorical essence of language, but must be thought historically ( 3 64 ) . In granting the gift of Being Ereignis always with draws and conceals itself. As a happening-occurrence that appears and withdraws, Ereignis anticipates the ghosts of the next chapter: both are untimely events. This ghostly quality of Ereignis prevents it from ever functioning as a Inetaphysical ground, for Ereignis cannot exist as a ground - it cannot be reduced to a being that presences. We cannot ask for that ground as such, because we cannot ask what Ereignis is . Even Being itself becomes exposed to the 'happening of lighting' of Ereignis that draws Being and man into their own. The notion of Ereignis atternpts to rnove past all such metaphysical grounding. Most importantly, as the mode of Ereignis, language is that which grants the gift of 'language' . That is to say, through Ereignis there comes about a doubling of language itself (cf. Sallis 1 990: 1 9 5 ) . One language withdraws with Ereignis in favor of the gift that it gives. 'The peculiarity of language, accordingly, conceals itself in the way in which Saying allows those who listen to it to reach language' ( 1 97 1 b : 1 2 6 ) . But while this language withdraws and conceals itself with the It that gives, it sends its own gift and grants us a second 'language'. Our language (here without the quotes ) thus belongs together with Being as a response to language. Heidegger hints toward both of these points in the following passage: 'thus our saying - always an answering remains forever relational. Relation is thought of here in terms of das Ereignis, and no longer conceived in the form of a mere reference' ( 1 97 1 b: 1 3 5 ) . While language speaks it grants the gift of 'language' even as it withdraws and conceals itself in favor of this gift. When we speak, we are always responding to this gift: 'Language speaks. Man speaks in that he responds to language' ( 1 97 1 a : 2 1 0 ) . 'Language' belongs together with Being to the Same as the gift of language. There is, it gives Being; there is, it gives 'language'. Or, as Heidegger puts it: ' "There is the word" - we mean "by virtue of the gift of the word there is, the word gives . . . " ' ( 1 97 1 b : 8 8 ) . Only 'language' (the doubling of language, the ghost of language) can ever appear as the sending gift of language. Through Ereignis and the doubling of language Heidegger again
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works to twist free frorn 1netaphysics. Yet, even as the gift of language, 'language' is no longer secondary to Being or rnan, for 'language' itself is in the relation of belonging-together with Being. Man thus responds to language through language (and now I drop the quotes entirely) , but, because he rnust respond, language can n o longer b e relegated to subsidiary status : 'The being of language, as Saying that shows, rests on Ereignis which makes us humans over to the releasement in which we can listen freely' ( 1 97 1 b : 1 3 0 ) . Ereignis makes language and Being possible; we might therefore say that only through language may we find the way to language. By translating language into language (our language) 26 Heidegger goes well beyond a mere inversion of the traditional metaphysical notions. Because of this doubling, language is not a ground, but through its translation in Ereignis language grants both the gift of Being and the gift of language ( in its relation with Being) with which man can respond to language. In reading language through Ereignis, Heidegger' s conception allows one to get past the dead-end debate, discussed at length in Chapter 1, between language as a mere object or language as its own agent (cf. Butler 1 99 3 ) . ' Our' language is never wholly ours because it always remains a 'taking up' of something already said, which is why Heidegger asserts that our saying is always an answering. We do not merely use language, nor are we defined and determined by language. That is to say, on the one hand, we are not free to put language to any and every use we see fit, because our language forever rerr1ains a response. On the other hand, language does not attain pure agency either - it belongs together with rr1an through the gift-granting of Ereignis. Neither language nor the agent comes 'first', because the relation retains priority?7 Koto
Ba
To experience language in this Heideggerian sense, one 1nust grasp the belonging-together of human beings and language. We 'experience' language when we appreciate this belonging-together. But even this way of putting the matter obscures it somewhat, since this experience happens to us rather than depending upon us . We experience language by responding to the language that precedes us our way to language always runs through this call. Our relation to, and experience of, language can never be direct it is always untimely so in a sense we can only ever be on the way to an experience with language since that very experience is never something that we could properly have.
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Reading Heidegger's conceptualization of Ereignis and the doubling of language prepares one for an experience with language, and the essay 'A Dialogue on Language' shows its readers what an experience with language might look like. The dialogue form of this essay proves significant because it pre vents Heidegger from taking language as a mere obj ect of knowledge, one to be probed, experimented with, and eventually explained - an approach Heidegger will always reject (for example, 1 97 1 b : 1 3 ) . Heidegger refuses to write a straightforward expository argument because that form of essay undermines the possibility of an experience with language: 'Speaking about language turns language almost inevitably into an obj ect' ( 5 0 ) . The best alternative to speaking about language is to speak from language. The need to speak from language therefore prescribes the literary style: 'a speaking from language could only be a dialogue' (5 1 ) . Heidegger thus returns to the Platonic form for doing philosophy, but he does so in a rather ironic that is to say, wholly non-Platonistic - way . 'A Dialogue on Language' has but two characters, a 'Japanese' man and an 'Inquirer' (with the latter surely standing in for Heidegger himself) , whose discussion walks back and forth along two different paths - hermeneutics and language. The conversation wanders be tween the 'Inquirer' (Heidegger) asking questions concerning the Japanese notion of language, and the 'Japanese' asking questions about hermeneutics. Significantly, in the investigation on hermeneu-c tics language always arises, and in the discussion of language herme neutics constantly appears. The gradual movement from one topic to the other prevents either subj ect of the dialogue from becoming an object of knowledge. The Inquirer makes it clear from the outset that he has never abandoned the hermeneutic proj ect, for even in Being and Time his investigation was only on the 'way'. However, in order to describe hermeneutics he feels compelled to turn to the question of language, since in the beginning his ' questions circled around the problem of language and Being. ' This problem determined the path his thinking took from the beginning ( 1 97 1 b : 6-7) . Thus, as far back as his dissertation, even when his writing did not engage language explicitly, he says, 'it seems to me that the fundamental theme, "Language and Being," stayed there in the background' ( 6 ) . From the outset of the dialogue it becomes clear that language was always at issue, even when Heidegger's work seerned most 'hermeneutical'. The Inquirer's suggestions here thus call into question those accounts of Heidegger's
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work that would locate a drarnatic break between Being and Time and the later writings on language (see Rorty 1 99 1 ) . At this point, the focus o f the discussion turns - though not abruptly, it wanders - to the attempts by members of Japanese society to use European languages to express the experience of Japanese art and poetry . Both interlocutors keep returning to the inherent danger that the European language might destroy that primordial experience itself. The conceptual categories of western language and thinking might distill the experience of Japanese art, but only in a way that strips it of what remains most important. The Inquirer repeatedly draws parallels between this hazard and the danger of discussing language in a nonmetaphysical way, for the discussion itself threatens to destroy the possible experience with language - hence the need for a dialogue rather than a formal argument ( 1 97 1 b : 1 5 ) . European aesthetics, the interlocutors agree, rests on the metaphysical distinc tion between the sensuous and the suprasensuous, so a discussion of Japanese art in this language will always force the experience with that art to conform to metaphysical norms. Likewise, any discussion about language runs the risk of turning language into an obj ect, rather than allowing a speaking or Saying that comes from language. Taking language as an object of knowledge cuts off the possibility of our saying-response to language. The Inquirer wants the Japanese to tell him the Japanese word for language because he seeks a word that can illuminate the showing force of language without reducing it to a forrnal concept. But the Japanese hesitates, afraid of the dangers they have rnentioned - afraid that the translation into western terms will rob the word of its essence, will prevent an experience with language that the term rnight otherwise make possible. In this hesitation the dialogue makes its way back again to hermeneutics. The Japanese feels that the term hermeneutics helps to describe the originary Saying of the Japanese word for language, but the full force of the term rerr1ains puzzling to him. He asks the Inquirer to provide more detail about the meaning of the term and the Inquirer's early use of it. 'By a playful thinking' the Inquirer returns to the Greek sense of the term in order to bring its meaning into brighter light. 2 8 Here the two paths of the dialogue begin to intertwine: J: Why do you stress this original sense of hermeneuein ? I: Because it was this original sense which prompted me to use it in defining the phenomenological thinking that opened the way to Being and Time for me.What mattered then, and still does, is to bring out the Being of beings - though no longer in the manner of metaphysics, but
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Language defines the hermeneutic relation. J: Thus when I ask you about hermeneutics, and when you ask me what our word is for what you call language, we ask each other the Same. ( 1971b: 30, emphasis added)
At this j uncture the dialogue reaches the crux of the matter - the
relation between language and hermeneutics - and it is here that one
may glimpse an experience with language. Heidegger links the dis cussion of language back to his work from B eing and Time by relating hermeneutics to the god Hermes, the divine messenger: 'Hermeneuein is that exposition which brings tidings because it can listen to a message' ( 1 97 1 b : 2 9 ) . As the above section on language makes clear, only through language can man listen to this message and respond to the call of the two-fold. Language defines the hermeneutic relation because it makes possible a response to this call ( see Caputo 1 9 8 7 ) . Hermeneutics only becomes possible as man's language responds to the two-fold, responds to the gift of language through Ereignis. The Japanese thus calls hermeneutics and language the Same, and this exchange in the dialogue brightly illuminates the relation between the two. One will be tempted to hear in this claim the belonging together of language and hermeneutics - and rightly so, for later on in the dialogue the J apanese will make this point unambiguous : 'herrr1e·· neutics and language belong together' ( 1 97 1 b : 42 ) . Through the attempt to make possible a new nonmetaphysical experience with language, Heidegger performs a repetition and rewriting of his earlier hermeneutics. In belonging--together, hermeneutics and language each make up separate sites along the 'way' of thinking toward an experi ence with language. And, through their belonging-together, neither can be thought without the other neither can be derived from, nor merely correspond with, the other. 29 Heidegger drops the use of the term hermeneutics ( in his writings after B eing and Time) not to change standpoints, but to move along this 'way' ( 1 97 1 b: 1 2 ) . Now that the Inquirer h a s expanded upon his notion o f herme neutics, the way of the dialogue will turn back to the Japanese word for language which the Inquirer hopes can help to capture the relationality of language. In the exchange between the two concerning the word for language, an experience with language comes about. The
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Japanese can withhold the term no longer; it is Koto ba. He elaborates: ba means leaves, including and especially the leaves of a blossom petals. Think of cherry blossoms or plum blossoms . . . [as to what Koto means,] it is easier now to attempt an answer because we have ventured to explain Iki: the pure delight of the beckoning stillness. The breath of the stillness that makes this beckoning delight come into its own is the reign under which that delight is made to come.But Koto always also names that which in the event gives delight, itself, that which uniquely in each unrepeatable moment comes to radiance in the fullness of grace. ( 1971b: 45)
The Inquirer immediately follows this definition that goes beyond the bounds of definitions by saying: 'Koto, then, would be the appropriating occurrence of the lightening message of grace' (45 ) . 'Appropriating occurrence', i n attempting t o translate Koto, itself translates Heidegger's Gerrnan, Ereignis. Koto ba, the Japanese word for language, returns us to Ereignis as the event of appropriation that makes possible both man in his relation to Being, and language - the It that gives the gift of man and the language that 'he' speaks. The Inquirer goes further in drawing the parallels between this 'wondrous word' and his own term Saying. Both point in a non metaphysical way to the happening lighting-concealing of Being by language. The 'dialogue' stages the interaction, the relationality, between the hermeneutic relation (or Saying) and 'the petals that stern frorn Koto'. The back and forth movement of the dialogue, the wandering frorn path to path, brings forth an experience with lan guage. But here again, experience must be conceived of in a different light. An experience with language is not the Erlebnis of metaphysics an experience that an individual would have as his or her own. It must instead be understood as an Erfahrung, something that comes over subj ects and happens to them, an experience that one undergoes. 30 This distinction plays an important, if subtle, role in Heidegger's move away from metaphysical understandings and toward an experience (Erfahrung) with language. 3 1 Christopher Fynsk elaborates on Heidegger's understanding of 'experience' in the following way: 'when we speak of undergoing an experience, Heidegger says, we designate not an occurrence of which we are and remain the subject but rather an event by which something comes over us, overwhelms and trans forms us' ( 1 99 6 : 3 9 ) . Language, far from being a tool for our use or an obj ect for our manipulation, must be conceived as something with which we undergo an experience. Language, thought here as Koto ba, overwhelms us, transforms us, and grants the gift of Being.
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L an g u a g e , M e t a p hy s i c s , and Political Philo s ophy Heidegger articulates a non1netaphysical language, even while he refuses to offer up a concrete model for what language is or does indeed, this refusal is a fundamental part of his conception. In these writings Heidegger grants his readers the capacity to conceive of language outside the simple set of choices often offered to political theorists . In preparing to undergo an experience with language, one comes to see language beyond the designative, constitutive, and expressive options provided by Taylor (see also Connolly 1 9 8 7) and outside the terms of the AIO model. Once one reconsiders the relation between Being and language in the radical way Heidegger suggests, then one calls into question any simple configuration of the relationship between language and politics. On his own terms, then, Heidegger has developed (or at least hinted at) a nonmetaphysical conception of language, but he refuses to identify or categorize this conception. He will argue that the rnove ment is away from metaphysics. But toward what does it move ? 'We leave it without a name' ( 1 97 1 b : 3 0 ) . Rather than naming the non or postrnetaphysical Heidegger will attempt to write at the end of metaphysics . To do so means, for Heidegger, atternpting to think philosophically at that moment in history when metaphysics has met its most extreme possibility. Heidegger wants to avoid the recapitula tion of the metaphysical concepts whose resources have already been exhausted (that is, completed ) by German Idealism. In An Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger does ( at least) two things : he presents a detailed discussion of 'the question of metaphy sics' and he attempts to ask that question in a serious manner. Heidegger opens the book by suggesting that the question of meta physics is: 'why are there beings rather than nothing ?' ( 1 95 9 : 1 ) . 32 As a philosophical investigation that inquires specifically into the realm of beings, this question opens into the territory of metaphysics. Heidegger explains by drawing on the Greek: 'in Greek, "beyond something" is expressed by the word meta. Philosophical inquiry into the realm of Being as such is meta ta physika; this inquiry goes beyond beings, it is metaphysics' ( 1 959: 1 7) . Heidegger argues that 'why are there beings rather than nothing? ' asks the fundamental question of metaphysics - itself the 'core of all philosophy'. Heidegger wishes to give a description of metaphysics that locates it within his own framework of fundamental ontology from Being and Time. In articulating this fundamental question Heidegger
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argues that metaphysics asks the question of Being; it goes beyond ' beings' to Being. However, in a transformation of his argu1nents within Being and Time, Heidegger now suggests that metaphysics can only raise the question of Being within the confines of the ontological difference. Metaphysical questioning concerning Being remains trapped by the ontological difference and thereby forced to raise the question of Being always and only in terrns of beings. Heidegger would now like to take a step past Being and Time and consider the question of Being as such . That is, he would like to contemplate Being outside and beyond the terms of the ontological difference - to think Being itself rather than the Being of particular beings . Moreover, he wants to distinguish this new sort of inquiry from metaphysics by arguing that metaphysics can only raise the question of Being in the terms of the ontological difference. This discussion merely recapitulates the work of On Time and Being, where the thought of Ereignis serves to think Being outside the ontological difference, that is, nonmetaphysically. Heidegger suggests that within the ambit of metaphysics, the question of Being merely repeats the question of beings. In other words, within the terms of metaphysics no fruitful discussion of Being can take place because all such discussions will be limited by the framework of the ontological difference. All questions concerning Being will be relegated to the terms of beings, so within the confines of the ontological difference the question of Being will merely repeat a set of questions about beings . Heidegger applies this very criticism to his own work in Being and Time because that text failed to see the possibility of thinking Being outside of the ontological difference. Therefore, it had no right to accuse metaphysics of remaining forgetful of the question of Being: 'it is pointed out - quite correctly that metaphysics inquires into the Being of beings and that it is therefore an obvious absurdity to impute a forgetfulness of Being to metaphysics' ( 1 95 9 : 1 8 ) . However, Heidegger continues : 'if we consider the ques tion of Being in the sense of an inquiry into Being as such [that is, not an inquiry into the Being of beings] , it becomes clear . . . that Being as such is precisely hidden from metaphysics, and remains forgotten' ( 19). Heidegger's writings o n language all strive t o disclose Being, to ' inquire into Being as such', by conceptualizing Being outside of the ontological difference. Heidegger's discussion illuminates and clarifies his characterization of these later works as 'nonmetaphysical' . By trying to articulate the b elo nging together of Being and language -
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through the quasi-concept of Ereignis, Heidegger provides a way to think about Being outside of the terms of the ontological difference. Thus, he refuses to allow either Being or language to be reducible to beings . Being is not always the Being of beings, and language is not the possession of human beings. Through Ereignis, language can grant the gift of Being without itself being coordinated directly to beings. The language of beings, 'our' language, always remains a response, an answering. As Heidegger puts it, 'our saying remains forever rela tional' and the relation between language and our saying-response to it can never be circumscribed by the ontological difference. Ereignis reveals the relation of belonging-together between Being and language in a way that can never be determined by, or lirnited to, the speaking of human beings . Language through Ereignis asks the question of the meaning of Being ( it thereby continues the work of Being and Time), but it does so outside the terms of the ontological difference (thus overturning the terms of fundamental ontology) . By asking the ques tion of Being in this more radical way, Heidegger seeks to twist out of the grips of 1netaphysics. However, Heidegger has no desire whatsoever to overturn, over come, or transcend metaphysics - this task is not j ust futile, but thoroughly rnetaphysical. One misconstrues Heidegger if one thinks that he wishes the complete end of metaphysics, for he is the first to realize the impossibility of any such attempt: 'our task is to cease all overcoming, and leave metaphysics to itself' ( 1 972 : 24 ) . Heidegger's articulation of a nonrnetaphysical conception of language plays a part in leaving 'metaphysics to itself' , but it has little to do with any grand schemes to surpass the entirety of the history of western philosophical thinking. Heidegger does, however, have a particular vision for a philosophical thinking that exceeds metaphysical con cepts . In building from the ground of Heidegger's nonrnetaphysical articulation of language we rr1ove toward a vision, elucidated in the next chapter, of untirneliness. Following Nietzsche ( but not citing him), Heidegger argues that 'all essential philosophical questioning is necessarily untimely' ( 1 95 9 : 8 ) . 3 3 Because of its untimeliness, philosophy can never have a specific and directed task; philosophy cannot be applied. For Heidegger, untimely philosophy still holds an important force and a significant weight. Yet the fact that it can never be applied directly to solve the problems of the day leads to two misinterpreta tions of philosophy. The first sterns from the demand that philosophy provide the foundations from which the goals of a culture and a
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society can proceed. Heidegger replies, ' but this is beyond the power of philosophy . . . Philosophy can never directly supply the energies and create the opportunities and rnethods that bring about a histor ical change' ( 1 95 9 : 1 0 ) . However, this does not make philosophy trivial or insignificant. Philosophy, under Heidegger's understand ing, can be great even without being useful in any ordinary sense of the word: 'What philosophy essentially can and must be is this: a thinking that breaks the paths and opens the perspectives of the knowledge that sets the norms and hierarchies ' ( 1 0 ) . Philosophy, for Heidegger, does not confirrr1 the Being of beings: 'It is in the very nature of philosophy never to make things easier but only rnore difficult' ( 1 1 ) . In contrast, we will see in the next chapter that, through solving problems, a timely political theory tries precisely to make things simpler, easier. Throughout this discussion of the role of philosophy Heidegger never once uses the word 'critical' or 'criticism', but his articulation undoubtedly resonates with an understanding of philosophy as carry ing out a critical task. Certainly Heidegger sees philosophy performing a critical role, but he refuses to reduce his understanding of philosophy to this role. Philosophy for Heidegger must be allowed to remain greater than the use that any human subjects rr1ight put it to (even a critical one); philosophy's inquiry into Being as such moves it beyond j ust such a reduction to beings . One must resist the urge to respond directly to those whose derr1ands on philosophy misunderstand it in the first place: You hear remarks such as 'Philosophy leads to nothing', 'You can't do anything with philosophy', and readily imagine that they confirm an experience of your own.There is no denying the soundness of these two phrases, particularly common among scientists and teachers of science. Any attempt to refute them by proving that after all it does 'lead to something' merely strengthens the prevailing misinterpretation to the effect that the everyday standards by which we judge bicycles or sulphur baths are applicable to philosophy ... granted that we cannot do any thing with philosophy, might not philosophy, if we concern ourselves with it do something with us ? ( 1959: 12)
In sharing with his readers his understanding of the role of a nonmetaphysical philosophy, Heidegger provides no easy outlines to trace in considering a nonmetaphysical political philosophy. This is probably for the best, since I have no intention of modeling a concep tion of political theory directly upon Heidegger's remarks. 3 4 I do believe, however, that Heidegger's articulation of what he calls a
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'nonmetaphysical' conception of language provides an alternative to the AIO model of language that proves to be both dominant and, ironically, implicit in contemporary political theory. Heidegger's 'ex perience with language' offers a starting point from which to develop the theme of historicity and to begin to elaborate on the significance of untimeliness for the study of politics. Without remaining in Heidegger's realm any longer, and as a means of beginning to process the ore that I have mined here, I will now turn toward a recent contemporary debate that takes up a number of fundamental issues in political theory. With the political burden now lifted and with the Heideggerian alternative to the AIO model of language in place, I can approach this debate as a vehicle for working toward a politics of untimeliness . Notes 1. I leave aside entirely the absolutely enormous quantity of criticism in political theory directed toward both an elucidation of Heideg ger's personal involvement in National Socialism and an explora tion of the possible affinities between his philosophy and fascism. I do so for two interrelated reasons. First, this topic has been exhaustively debated already (Farias 1 9 89; Wolin 1 990; Spanos 1 993 ). Second, and possibly more important, the question of Heidegger's relation to Nazism proves most pertinent if one wishes to achieve some sort of direct application of Heidegger's work to politics, and this, in no uncertain terms, is not my intent. Any such effort at directly applying Heidegger to politics will likely stumble upon Heidegger's own attempt to apply his thought to politics, via National Socialis1n, but it will also bump against Heidegger's more consistent claims that his philosophy cannot and should not be applied in this way to begin with. Finally, I point interested readers in the direction of Leslie Paul Thiele's recent work ( 1 995 ) . Thiele tries valiantly, as the book j acket claims, to 'make Heidegger's philosophical works speak directly to politics in a postmodern world'; along the way, Thiele gives a concise overview of the Nazi controversy and a brave response to the criticisms. It will become clear as my own conception of untimely agency begins to develop that I disagree profoundly if not with Thiele's arguments then certainly with the spin given them on the back of his book, but for readers in political theory interested in Heidegger and National Socialism Thiele's book has 1nuch to offer. See also Neske and Kettering ( 1 990 ) .
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2. I am trying to suggest here that it is both possible yet highly 3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
implausible to take from Nietzsche the idea that 'rnetaphysics is no more ! ' (Sallis 1 99 5 : 1 8 ) . For Rorty, the only alternative to thinking o f language in this obviously instrumental fashion is to reify it, and the problem with the reification of language (something Rorty simply never defines except in the circular sense of attributing this reification to the work of Heidegger and Derrida ) lies in its capacity to mask the proper understanding of language as tool. Many years before Rorty drew such distinctions, Sarah Kofman suggested that they were invalid. Kofman argues that, starting with Nietzsche, a nonmetaphysical philosophy must risk being mistaken for poetry: 'Nietzsche inaugurates a type of philosophy which deliberately uses metaphors, at the risk of being confused with poetry. Such a confusion would not be regrettable in Nietzsche's eyes: for the opposition between philosophy and poetry derives from metaphysical thinking' ( 1 99 3 : 1 7) . Though he does not address the issue directly, Shapiro ( 1 9 8 1 ) seems to imply that the we can find an affinity between the later Wittgenstein and the later Heidegger. Despite Shapiro's provo cative suggestions, Rorty's (and many others' ) pragmatic appro priation of Wittgenstein makes it extremely difficult to reconcile Wittgenstein and Heidegger on language - a task I will not attempt. The essays on language within Taylor's more recent collection ( 1 995 ) all build upon, refine, and often modify Taylor's earlier arguments ( 1 9 8 5 b ) . I have chosen to emphasize only Taylor's more recent writings because, in part, they are developments of the earlier ones and because rny focus here is not to trace the development of Taylor's thought, but to capture its current formation. Taylor's 'expressive-constitutive' versus 'enframing' schema re places his earlier framework of 'expressive' versus 'designative'. In a footnote to his more recent formulation Taylor suggests that 'expressive', 'constitutive', and 'expressive-constitutive' are all appropriate terms for this tradition of thought. In another at ternpt at creating categories for conceptions of language, William Connolly ( 1 9 8 7) tries to distinguish between 'constitutive' the ories, which he very loosely associates with Heidegger, and 'expressive' theories, which he directly ties to Taylor. I will not atternpt to disentangle the overlaps and/or inconsistencies
66
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
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between these different naming schemes; 1nine will be an effort to call into question the schemes thernselves . I include 'principles' in this list to emphasize the Aristotelian point, which Taylor wholeheartedly endorses, that language is the human faculty that rnakes it possible to distinguish not just between good and bad, but between right and wrong, just and unj ust. Normativity derives from the faculty of language. In Taylor's 'expressive-constitutivist' model, the former term always, in the final analysis ( and despite Taylor's vacillating terminology), retains precedence over the latter; the constitutive aspects of language can always be drawn back to the expression of human subj ects. Heidegger disagrees. While Taylor will insist that humans must be ultimately responsible for these meanings, principles, and intentions, Heidegger sees no reason to remain dogmatic on this point. In his otherwise illuminating discussion of Heidegger on lan guage, Thiele seems either unable or unwilling to recognize this fundatnental point. Thiele stresses 1nany of the same central themes and principles that I focus on here - most importantly, that Heidegger's notion of language is meant primarily as an alternative to the dominant manner of thinking about language as if it were a tool for use by humans ( 1 995 ) . However, Thiele never acknowledges that Heidegger's developrr1ent of this understand ing of language goes hand in hand with the effort in his later writings to think Being outside the ontological difference - a crucial connection for my analysis . Sometitnes Heidegger goes so far as to propose a 'new difference' : the difference between the Being o f the ontological difference and a Being outside that difference. He writes that his work appreci ates 'with full clarity the difference between "Being" as "the Being of beings," and "Being" as "Being" in respect of its proper sense, that is, in respect of its truth' ( 1 97 1 b : 20 ) . 'The identical, i n Latin idem, i s called i n Greek to aut6. Translated into the German language, to aut6 is called das Selbe, the Sarr1e' ( 1 960: 1 3 ) . Once Heidegger moves to the Greek notions he usually refers to 'the Same', but his concern lies with the philo sophical (not j ust linguistic) translation from Identity to the Same. Heidegger's approach necessitates the use of a singular term to represent hurnan beings, yet because of the importance of 'being' for Heidegger's thought the term 'human beings' will not work. I have chosen to follow Heidegger's own texts and use the term
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14.
15.
16.
1 7.
18.
19.
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'man', since it makes little sense to try to attribute to Heidegger a gender inclusivity that he probably never intended. While in my own writing I would prefer to use gender-neutral terms, I have no desire to either defend or alter Heidegger's text so as to deflect what may well be valid critiques of the gendered aspects in his writings. Heidegger constantly refers to his later work as on the 'way' or the path of thinking. 'The way allows us to reach what concerns us, in that dornain where we are already staying' ( 1 97 1 b : 92-3 ) . If one looks up Ereignis i n a German-English dictionary, one will discover words such as 'event, occurrence, happening' (Betteridge 1 96 6 : 63 ). The tenn has been variously translated as 'e-vent', 'con-cern', 'manifestness', and 'owning', but most Heidegger scholars now accept 'event of appropriation' (though always in the singular) as the most plausible English translation for Ereignis. However, it has become more common merely to leave the term untranslated, much like Dasein. See, for example, Emad ( 1 99 3 ) ; hereafter, I too will not translate the word. The complex relation between the early and later Heidegger has been tnuch debated. Willia1n Richardson went so far as to propose the categories 'Heidegger I' and 'Heidegger II' in order to simplify tnatters. However, the relation is by no 1neans this straightforward and Heidegger hitnself complicated it by arguing for a reverse diachrony - understanding 'Heidegger I' frorn 'Heidegger II' - in his 'Letter to Richardson', which stands as the preface to Richardson's book ( 1 963 ) . O n nmnerous occasions Heidegger states that to leave meta physics behind one cannot simply create or adopt an altogether new language - 'the metaphysical manner of forming ideas is in a certain respect unavoidable' ( 1 97 1 b: 25 ) . 'There i s ' translates the German idiom 'es gibt' - literally 'It gives' as I use it in the text. However, much like il y a in French, it retains the idiomatic rneaning of 'there is' without using the verb 'to be' . These two expressions come a s close a s modern languages can to replicating the middle voice. The notion of historicity as I discuss it in Chapter 3 resonates with the opening up, interplay, and dimensionality of time that Heidegger ernphasizes here. Thus, Heidegger's language of 'true time' - as an effort to think the 1netaphysical concept of time in a more originary, that is, nonmetaphysical, manner - will be displaced later by the concept of untimeliness .
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20. Given the rather pej orative connotations, in English usage, of the word 'appropriation', it may sound like a strange translation of that which determines a 'belonging-together'. Rather than hear ing a form of taking in the word appropriation, one needs to focus on a determination of that which is proper, an owning, as in the German Eigenen. 2 1 . Some interpreters have even read this conception of language back into Heidegger's own Being and Time; see Ricoeur ( 1 99 1 ) . 22 . Taylor says that Herder, Humboldt, and Hamann created a theory that 'has been taken up in our day by Heidegger' (Taylor 1 9 8 5b: 255 ) . On the contrary, Heidegger explicitly contrasts his conception with Taylor's metaphysical view: 'though it had its beginnings in Greek antiquity . . . this [conventional] view of language reaches its peak in Wilhelm von Humboldt's reflections on language . . . Humboldt puts language into language as one kind and fonn of the world view worked out in human sub jectivity. Into what language ? Into a series of assertions that speak the language of the rnetaphysics of his tirne' ( 1 971 b : 1 1 6-9 ) . 2 3 . Hence the obfuscation created b y Taylor's references to Heideg ger's 'philosophy of language'. To borrow from the jargon of psychoanalysis, 1netaphysics is not 1nerely interjected, but intro jected into the philosophy of language - so one could never hope to remove metaphysics from philosophy of language. Heidegger did not c01ne to this position only late in his career: 'philosophical research will have to dispense with the "philosophy of language" ' ( 1 962: 209 ) . 24 . This first step o f inverting the concepts o f 1netaphysics parallels Derrida's first move1nent of deconstruction (Derrida 1 9 8 1 b ) . 25 . 'When we reflect o n language qua language, we have abandoned the traditional procedure of language study' (Heidegger 1 971 b: 1 19). 2 6 . It must b e stressed that even this translation o f language - our language - is in no way equivalent to the conventional view. This language cannot be derived from Being, because it belongs together with Being in Ereignis. 2 7. Butler has tried to work out of the impasse of agency by calling on a similar relational notion in Althusser's understanding of the 'call'. Butler concludes her reading of Althusser by suggesting that the relation to language remains antecedent to both the subject who speaks a language and to the discourse within which the subject always finds him- or herself. Butler's reading of the 'call' in
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28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
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interpellation and Heidegger's writings on the 'response' to the saying-showing of Ereignis both serve to emphasize this relation and its priority (Butler 1 997a: ch 4 ) . Heidegger i s well aware that the story o f Hermes, used t o define the word hermeneuein, is in all likelihood apocryphal, but he still finds it useful to appropriate this story in elaborating on his own meaning in using the term. For Heidegger, the originary sense of the term hermeneutics defines the hermeneutic relation as a responding to a sending or destining, and thus it cannot do without language. Man can only respond to the gift of Being (or language, or the two-fold, etc . ) through language. Language must always be caught up within the hermeneutic relation through man's responding to the call in Saying ( 1 97 1 b : 3 2 ) . Gadamer places a great deal o f philosophical weight upon the distinction between Erlebnis and Erfahrung by looking back at the history of its use ( 1 9 8 9 : 55-8 1 , 3 4 1-62) . For an elaboration on the distinction between an experience as something you have (Erlebnis) and something you undergo (Erfahrung), see Weinsheimer and Marshall's preface to Truth and Method ( 1 989: xiii-xiv ) . Erfahrung, as a process, once again recalls the rniddle voice: an Erfahrung is a thoroughly middle-voiced experience. Heidegger, unlike Gadamer, does not present a fonnal discussion of the words Erlebnis and Erfahrung, but both he and Gadamer point to Dilthey's Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung (Experience and Poetry) for examples of the use of Erlebnis. See Gadamer ( 1 9 8 9 : 6 1 ; cf. Heidegger 1 9 7 1 b : 3 5 ) . Simply put, translating Heidegger i s a nightmare. Faced with myriad problems, Manheim chooses to translate Seindes by coin ing the word 'essents' . This allows him to sidestep the confusion of having three or four different variations of 'being' in the English translation. Even Macquarrie and Robinson decide to translate Seindes as 'entities' so as to minimize confusions . How ever, Heidegger remains centrally concerned throughout his writ ings with the ontic/ontological difference: the difference between das Seinde (that which is, beings ) and das Sein (that by virtue of which beings are beings, Being) . The question of why there are Seindes rather than nothing relates directly to the difference between beings and Being. To translate Seindes as 'essents' or even 'entities' obscures this focal point. Therefore, I will add 1ny own translation of Seindes simply as ' beings' (or sometimes
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'being' with a lowercase 'b') to elucidate and sirnplify my reading of Heidegger concerning his position on the ontological difference in his later writings. To avoid more confusion, I have also followed Macquarrie and Robinson in translating Sein as 'Being' (with a capital 'B' ) . This makes it possible to distinguish in English between das Sein and das Seinde. 3 3 . Heidegger takes this point to its extreme: 'when a philosophy becomes fashionable, either it is no real philosophy or it has been misinterpreted and misused for ephemeral and extraneous pur poses' ( 1 959: 8 ) . Heidegger seetns to echo here Nietzsche's views on Schopenhauer's status in Gennany. At any rate, it seems plausible to gain some insight from Heidegger's conception of philosophy as an important force that rr1ay not be directly useful in an instrumental sense, without, however, accepting Heideg ger's somewhat elitist conception of philosophy as only accessible by the few. 34. Because he insists upon finding a direct and integral relationship between Heidegger's philosophy and his politics, Habermas appears to treat Heidegger's philosophy in precisely the manner that Heidegger warns his readers about. Dana Villa, on the other hand, rejects Habermas' attempt to collapse the political and the philosophical in Heidegger, and he refuses to accept Arendt's effort at fully separating the two spheres through her later claim that Heidegger is simply an apolitical thinker. Heidegger's thought, Villa shows, contains resources that can be appropriated for the task of rethinking politics. However, Villa looks to Heidegger to reconsider praxis, an area of thought that, on my reading, was of almost no concern to Heidegger. Villa seems to allow for a political appropriation of Heidegger's work only if that appropriation runs through Arendt, so the overall structure of Villa's argument winds up reducing the political possibilities in Heidegger solely to those elements of his thought that either influenced, or help to illuminate, Arendt's retrieval of praxis. The benefits this approach yields in Villa's radical rereading of Arendt against the teleological tradition proves substantial, but the cost comes with Villa's apparent eagerness to accept the Haberrnasian and Arendtian critiques of Heidegger, thereby rej ecting the salience of the vast maj ority of his work as a resource for political theory. In short, I fear that Villa sacrifices many other resources in Heidegger's thought so as to make his reading of Arendt through Heidegger 1nore palatable to his skeptical readers,
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that is, those already convinced that nothing in I-leidegger's thought could prove valuable for political thinking. Along the way, it seems that Villa spends more time mired in the various Heidegger debates than he does highlighting his important inter pretation of Arendt. My own effort to take Heidegger's sugges tions about untimeliness seriously lead me to avoid those debates and to focus on language as a resource in Heidegger's philosophy that was of great concern to him and can have significant i1nplications for politics (even if those implications were not Heidegger's concern) .
C ha pter 3
S pectral H istory, U ntimely Theory
It would probably be self-defeating for members of the discipline of political theory to reiterate those claims, mentioned by Heidegger in the preceding chapter, that 'philosophy leads to nothing', since, after all, they are political philosophers. Nevertheless, I think one finds an echo of these suggestions in recent remarks by political theorists who demand from the field a greater emphasis on real, concrete, historical and political events in the world, and who castigate their colleagues for always arriving on the scene of politics too late. Indeed, their criticisms cry for theories of politics to become and remain more 'timely', and it is thus a certain sort of 'untimeliness' that comes under attack from these commentators. In this chapter I will challenge the notion that political theory must be a tirnely endeavor, and I will offer an alternative conception of untirnely theory, one that I think can better achieve even the ends sought by those who demand timeliness. An untimely politics can do more, for it greatly exceeds the narrow vision of 'timely' theorists, a vision that often focuses solely upon a restricted set of problems to be solved. A political theory of untimely agency may also 1nake it possible to see new or different political ends than those imagined on the problem-solving model. When considered in a new light, untimeliness can move beyond problem-solving toward a richer and less confining understanding of politics and history. This conception of untimeliness that I wish to fortify must be placed and viewed in stark contrast to the 'too late' (or even 'too early') that recent commentators have criti cized. This distinction between, on the one hand, untimeliness as falling on the wrong point along a linear model of time, and, on the other, untimeliness in the sense that time is 'out of j oint', depends upon thinking of history in the sense of historicity. Historicity, as an understanding of history that both rejects a Hegelian philosophy of
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history and rej ects the thesis that history has come to an end, under girds the untimely theory of politics that I wish to defend. But historicity can only be thought, and untimely theory can only be done, outside the terms of the AIO model of language. So the work of the preceding two chapters proves preparatory to my efforts to articulate a politics of untimeliness. As I demonstrated in Chapter 1 , the AIO model o f language lends itself easily to a theory o f politics that centers on parliamentary practices and pluralist compromise. The timely conceptions of politics that I will challenge in this chapter rest implicitly on the assumption that the relationship between language and politics has been settled. Precisely in unsettling that assumption and in reconsidering that relation can one move toward an untimely politics. Untimeliness, as I introduce it in this chapter and develop it in those that follow, will always depend upon and continually reanimate noninstrumental (Heidegger would say nonmetaphysical) conceptions of language. To put it starkly: only after and through an experience with language can one speak effectively to ghosts . In both cases one must operate 'beyond Being'. As a way of explicating the notions of historicity and untimeliness, I begin this chapter by looking closely at Jeffrey Isaac's recent demand for an attention to history that will produce timely theory. Isaac's particular argmnents are not so much my concern, but they exemplify the tendencies I have alluded to above. His critique of the field for avoiding the revolutionary events of 1 9 8 9 serves to reopen the fundarnental question of the role of political theory and theorists ( 1 995 : 6 8 2 ) . I see no reason to rehash the debate over that essential question, but I do want to take as my point of departure Isaac's call for political theory to turn toward 'concrete, empirical, historical work' ( 645 ) . In calling for a shift in the direction of 'first-order inquiry', Isaac makes a number of significant assumptions about the very nature of theory and of history, and he goes on to specify a certain conception of their appropriate relation. Along the way, I will argue, Isaac partially articulates and partially presupposes a theory/history relation that proves debilitating to political theorists because it forcibly locates them on one side or the other of such sterile oppositions as that between 'first-order' and 'second-order' inquiry. To lever the political theorist out of such oppositions requires the articulation of a more subtle and sophisticated understanding of history than that which Isaac rests upon; it will therefore demand untimeliness.
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D emanding H i s tory : Timely Theory The notion of 'demanding history', as it has been suggested by Geoff Bennington ( 1 9 8 7), provides a helpful lens through which to view the arguments of Isaac and his interlocutors without entering into the very debate that they stage. The phrase 'demanding history' can be read, straightforwardly enough, in two different ways. In the first, demand ing modifies history to give us a type of history, a difficult, troubling, and constantly problematic one. History as historicity will turn out to be history of a very demanding sort. At this point I want to focus on the second way of reading the phrase: in it, we hear demanding no longer as an adjective but as a gerund, so that the phrase becomes an action, a demand itself: 'Here history is not the sender of the demand, but only its referent: an unspecified sender says, "Talk about history," to an unspecified addressee' (Bennington 1 9 8 7: 1 6 ) . This formulation proves significant for my purposes because the demand to 'talk about history' often takes the form of a demand for timeliness, saying not simply to discuss history but to respond to history in a timely fashion. In his plea to his colleagues to answer the problems of 1 9 8 9 Isaac clearly takes the position of the sender of the demand as he calls for a turn toward 'historical inquiry', 'first-order questions', and 'actual politics' . Isaac demands that political theory take seriously the monu mental historical events that the revolutions of 1 9 8 9 constitute. Or, 1nore to the point, he asks a question and lays a charge after the fact: 'why haven't you talked about history, and isn't this a probletn ? ' Isaac realizes that his demand circles back upon its sender as a part of the addressee; in demanding history of political theorists he dernands it of himself ( 6 8 2 ) . Isaac's interlocutors attack, defend, and modify his position on a number of different fronts, but they all fail to address, in any direct 1nanner, the nature of this demand. 1 Thus, they beg what for my argument remains the most important question: is history something that can be dernanded of the field of political theory? Does the demand presuppose a certain, timely conception of theory ? In short, what motivates such a demand, and what version of theory and history does this demand necessarily entail ? Isaac tells his readers clearly in his 'rej oinder' that he caine to write 'The Strange Silence of Political Theory' after finding himself shocked at the paucity ( if not absence) of interpretations of the revolutions of 1 9 89 in the 1naj or j ournals of political theory. This discovery led him to a discussion of the basic question of 'what political theory is and should be.' For Isaac, the field of political theory has become a
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stagnant pool of Kuhnian 'normal science', 'focusing on approved topics' and 'following acadetnic conventions' ( 642; cf. Seery 1 996: 3 ) . Rather than remaining academic 'puzzle solvers', fixated on secondary textual issues, Isaac exhorts political theorists to solve our own real world problems . Engaging in first-order inquiry for Isaac means turning toward 'practical political problems' and 'confronting poli tical reality' (643, 645 ) . In sum, It is thus incumbent upon us to acknowledge this world as a source of intellectual and practical problems, to engage it in all of its empirical and historical messiness, to demonstrate that our categories help to illuminate this political reality and even, dare I say, to improve it ...Real political problems ought not to be the pretext for scholarly investigations of other things; they should be what drives our inquiries. ( 646)
The main text of the political theorist ought to be the 'real' world, since this is the only text that produces problems worthy of our attention. The political theorist, according to Isaac, must face this world through first-order engagements, rather than hiding fro1n that world in the texts of others, thereby reducing political theory to a second-order pursuit (see Gunnell 1 9 9 8 ; Schram 2002 ) . 2 While theory should not be an activity concerned with solving the puzzles of Kuhnian normal science, it turns out that it must strive to solve proble1ns - the problems it confronts in actual political reality. 3 We can also tease Isaac's conception of history (and concomitantly, time) out of this formula for describing what political theory should be. If theory is designed to solve problems, then history is that raw material that both creates these problems and also affords theorists the tools needed in order to solve them. In assuming that history both offers up problems and gives us the chance to fix them, Isaac appears to fall back on what Habermas has called 'modern time consciousness', in which time is 'a scarce resource for the mastery of problems' (Habermas 1 9 8 7: 6 ) . Whether we think of time/history as a line, a circle, or even a dialectical movement, this understanding of the two insists upon a timely conception of theory. That is, it insists that theory respond 'at the right time' - not too soon or too late to solve the (political) problems that constantly arise within titne/history. Within this etnerging understanding, 'untimeliness' can only be assimilated to 'at the wrong time' either too late to do any good, or too early (as so many obituaries describe a person's death) . Isaac makes a series o f tacit assumptions while formulating his critique of the field. As he demands history and urges timeliness, Isaac
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repeatedly strings together the practical, the empirical, and the histor ical - at least implicitly suggesting a chain of equivalence between history and the empirical. And yet (the question almost arises from within the assumption), can one so easily equate the empirical with the historical? What if, as Derrida will suggest, history proves to be full of ghosts, and what if history - precisely because of its ghostly nature prevents us from telling the difference between the empirically given and the nonreal or nonactual ? If history turns out to be of the demanding variety, if it turns out to be a spectral history, then a timely theory that responds directly to concrete events in history becmnes no longer possible or desirable. For one can never speak directly to ghosts, and one never knows when they will appear. Putting aside for now both these possibilities and questions, I want first to note that Isaac himself ignores these issues by way of a rather offhand dismissal. Isaac cuts off any questioning of the conception of history which he presupposes by rejecting those thinkers who might provide the theoretical resources for thinking history differently. Isaac presents this dismissal in the forrn of another criticism of American political theorists . He writes: 'many American theorists remain cur iously caught in the orbit of Heidegger and Habermas, Foucault and Derrida, working through the offshoots of a critique of a rnarxism that is now for all practical purposes dead' ( 64 8 ) . According to Isaac, in focusing on the philosophical proble1ns in the works of these authors rather than on the 'real' political problerns in Central Europe, Amer ican political theorists remain second-order theorists solving Kuhnian puzzles (concerning 'offshoots' of an outdated theory) rather than first-order theorists who would solve real problems . Thus, Isaac's rhetoric would imply the following: having reached the death of marxism, one no longer needs to engage critically with alternative ways of theorizing history . History after H e g e l : H i s t o ri city Within Isaac's schema such latter alternatives are nothing more than second--order issues, so Isaac's formula - whether or not one sub scribes to theses about the 'death' or 'end' of history - tends to relegate any serious theoretical consideration of conceptions of history to inferior status . The subordination of a theory of history to the second-order, coupled with Isaac's strenuous urgings to focus on first-order inquiry, tends to reduce one's choices concerning history to two: history can be taken either as the teleological unfolding of
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world reason (Hegel or Marx) or as the messy, empirical world that confronts the theorist with problems. But if one forages into the realm of second-order theorizing (and risks the dangers lurking therein), it might be possible to locate within the legacy of marxism a thinking of history that subscribes neither to Hegelian or marxist teleology nor to naive assumptions about the 'death' or 'end' of those very philoso phies of history. I will proffer a reading of Jacques Derrida's Specters of Marx his own response to the extraordinary events of 1 9 8 9 - that helps me to explicate just such a thinking of history. Derrida's notion of 'histori city' provides my analysis with the conditions for reconstructing a different conception of theory in its relation to history . Historicity provides the underlayment for my effort to consider the possibilities of an untirnely political theory . Derrida's own work on history begins (and some would say, ends ) by considering Hegelian philosophy in all seriousness - 'taking Hegel at his word' (Martin 1 992: 4 7). In bringing the philosophical thought of Reason to the study of history, Hegel rather (in)famously suggests that the world-historical rr1arch of Geist 1nust sacrifice individuals for its grander purposes. Derrida succinctly synthesizes as follows: 'man . . . is the site of teleological reason's unfolding, that is, history' ( 1 9 8 2 : 1 22 ) . The 'end' o f history dubiously achieved by Hegel depends on his own contemporary context, on his assumption that the inauguration of modernity in western Europe provides the conditions of possibility for the 'completion' of history . Hegel views the culminating point of world-history, the fulfillment of its telos, lying within the horizon of the Germany of his day. Nietzsche puts a critical and ironic edge on this Hegelian position, yet still 1nanages to summarize it helpfully: 'for Hegel the climax and terminus of the world-process coincided with his own existence in Berlin. Indeed, he ought to have said that everything that came after hi1n was properly to be considered merely a musical coda to the world-historical rondo or, even more properly, as super fluous' ( 1 9 8 3 : 1 04 ) . In less sarcastic tones, Hegel believed that by reaching the fourth level of human historical development (the 'Christian' world), 'the stage is set for this completion' of history ( 1 9 8 8 : 92-8; cf. Martin 1 992: 3 4 ) . That very completion only lacked the philosophy of history that Hegel himself set out. But what can we say, today, about the status of these conditions for the completion of history ? What has happened to world history and philosophical/political conceptions of history after this supposed completion of history ? Some would suggest that we conceive of this
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continuation of history after its Hegelian end as postrnodernity (Martin 1 992 ) . But the name or category seems unimportant: recall Heidegger's refusal to narne the nonmetaphysical and his insistence to think at the end of metaphysics . If history has gone on ( and it surely seems to us that it has gone on), then how has it done so and how have people thought history after the Hegelian philosophy of history announced its imrninent ending ? Calling the continuation of history 'postrnodernity' helps us little in trying to corne to grips with a way to conceptualize history after Hegel. 4 Derrida's understanding of 'historicity' constitutes an attempt to accornplish just this task, and the relation of historicity to theoretical/philosophical inquiry speaks clearly - though rather indirectly - to the important questions raised by the Political Theory symposium. Most significantly, the notion of a spectral history as an interpretation of historicity allows me to broach a more serious consideration of the possibilities for, and irnplications of, untimely theory. In Specters of Marx Derrida makes his most explicit effort to articulate a post-Hegelian understanding of history by way of his reading of the tradition of marxism and his thinking of 'historicity', 5 yet thirty years earlier Derrida had already used the word in a specific and unique way within his critique of Foucault's Folie et deraison ( 1 9 6 1 ) . 6 Because it offers a rather radical alternative to our intuitive approaches to temporality and history, 'historicity' serves as the hub out of which I will spin both my challenge to the conception of political theory as a timely, problem-solving discipline, and my beginning efforts to formulate a coherent conception of untimeliness. But describing the meaning, content, and implications of historicity turns out to be no simple task, precisely because traditional under standings of history prove so intuitively ingrained - in our common sense understandings and in the field of political theory. Entering into the debate between Derrida and Foucault on the question of writing history can both serve to distance us frorn our everyday thinking with respect to history and go a long way toward clarifying what a post Hegelian theory of history might look like. The point here is not sirnply to show what Derrida does for Hegel and history, nor is it intended to decide the old ( and now possibly stale) debate between Foucault and Derrida. Rather I aim to demonstrate what that rethink ing of Hegel and history, historicity, might do for the field of political theory, to show how it can help to fashion a conception of untimely theory. Derrida begins where Foucault begins, reading him as follows:
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'Foucault wanted to write a history of madness itself, that is madness speaking on the basis of its own experience and under its own authority, and not a history of madness described frorn within the language of reason' ( 1 97 8 : 34 ) ? On this main point, Derrida poses a fundamental question to Foucault, summarized by one helpful com mentator as follows: 'if history is a rational concept, how is it possible to write a history of madness ? ' (Wordsworth 1 9 8 7: 1 1 7). Derrida's critique, and his understanding of historicity, hinges upon the un folding of this query. Derrida emphasizes a point that Foucault freely admits: one cannot write this history of madness itself without engaging with the history of reason. One can unravel Derrida's argument by focusing on this very phrase, 'history of reason'. Foucault has a sophisticated under standing of the phrase, but also a specific understanding of it. Foucault knows well that reason has a history (reason's history ) : most of his earlier works can be understood as an attempt to explicate, fore ground, and critically question this history with its episternological breaks, ruptures, and transformations . Derrida emphasizes, however, another way of reading the phrase the genitive is clearly double here. Derrida does not deny reason's history, but he wants to emphasize history's reason - Reason is in history (as Hegel says ), history is of Reason. Most importantly, exactly this Reason of history renders highly problematic the endeavor to write a history of madness itself, outside of the language of reason. I will quote Derrida's most important argument here at length, for it foreshadows, and is haunted by, a spectral history: The misfortune of the mad ...is that their best spokesmen are those who betray them best; which is to say that when one attempts to convey their silence itself, one has already passed over to the side of the enemy, the side of order, [the side of reason] ...The unsurpassable, unique, and imperial grandeur of the order of reason, that which makes it not just another actual order or structure, is that one cannot speak out against it except by being for it, that one can protest it only from within it; and within its domain, Reason leaves us only the recourse to stratagems and strategies. The revolution against Reason, in the historical form of classical reason (but the latter is only a determined form of Reason in general.And because of this oneness of Reason the expression 'history of reason' is difficult to conceptualize, as is also, consequently, a 'history of madness'), the revolution against reason can be made only within it, in accordance with a Hegelian law to which I myself was very sensitive in Foucault's book. ( 1 978: 36)
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To write a history of madness itself Foucault knew that he also had to write a history of reason ( hence his engagement with the Cartesian cogito) , but if ( 'taking Hegel at his word' ) reason is in fact in history then there can be no simple history of reason - Reason is of history and no sirnple history of madness either. According to Derrida, Foucault's attempt to write a history of unreason (deraison) cannot avoid its implication within the Hegelian law of Reason in history. 8 Derrida hereby implicates the entire proj ect of archaeology: 'a history, that is, an archaeology against reason doubtless cannot be written, for, despite all appearances to the contrary, the concept of history has always been a rational one' ( 1 978: 3 6 ) . The cunning of reason would appear to have appropriated the project of archaeology for its own grander purposes . From the position of this, his strongest criticism, Derrida hints at an alternative angle for approaching this problematic: 'It is the meaning of "history" or archia that should have been questioned first, perhaps' ( 3 6 ) . This claim constitutes Derrida 's initial move toward the formulation of historicity as an attempt to think the historical nature of reason without getting caught up in a Hegelian dialectical movement that would subsume this thinking into the Reason of history. To exceed Hegel's grasp, he suggests, we must question his concept of history directly. Thus, Derrida and Foucault share the 'goal' of understanding the historical nature of reason, and for this very reason Derrida's conception of historicity develops out of Foucault. Derrida states plainly that 'historicity [is] the possibility of history itself' ( 3 1 0, note 2 8 ) . One can take a first step toward clarifying this fon11ula by viewing historicity as Derrida's effort to translate part of Foucault's arguments into the frame of Derrida's own thinking. 9 Foucault argues that an epistemological break occurred between the medieval and classical periods : before the classical period reason and madness were never sharply, dichotomously distinguished, but the Age of Reason was founded upon the silencing and exclusion of madness ( 1 965, 1 973a; cf. Wordsworth 1 9 8 7 ) . The banishment and exile of madness (that is, the banishment and exile of the mad in the form of their incarceration) created the autonomy and sovereignty of reason. Foucault attributes this monumental shift to a great partage, a deciding gesture that separated madness from reason. 1 0 Derrida emphasizes this partage by quoting Foucault as follows: 'the necessity of madness, throughout the history of the West, is linked to the partage which detaches from the background noise,. and from its continuous monotony, a meaningful language that is transmitted and
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consummated in time; briefly, it is linked to the possibility of' history' (Foucault 1 9 6 1 ; quoted in Derrida 1 97 8 : 42) . 1 1 Of course, just this possibility interests Derrida the rnost. To follow a Derridean convention by stating the conclusion at the beginning, one could say: the fundamental difference between Derrida and Foucault lies in their reading of the partage. Foucault presents the partage as a moment within history a moment that inaugurates the classical age (the Age of Reason) while Derrida tries to think the partage in its structural systematicity. As Foucault says, the partage is linked to the very possibility of history, what Derrida will call historicity . Yet Foucault also argues that we see the partage as an event within the boundaries of history. Derrida suggests otherwise by arguing forcefully that the partage cannot both inaugurate historicity (the possibility of history itself) and be merely a moment of history. In short, historicity can have no proper history. To anticipate the argument to come, one might say that the partage is too untimely to be taken as a single point in time. Derrida asks: 'if this great partage is the possibility of history itself, the historicity of history, what does it mean, here, "to write the history of this division ?" To write the history of historicity ? To write the history of the origin of history? ' ( 1 9 82: 43 ) . The very possibility o f history can only b e thought, Derrida claims, on the structural level that inquires into the conditions of possibility (and impossibility) of history itself. In Derrida's reading of the above quotation, Foucault claims that he has found the possibility of history within history, but to do so he would have to presuppose history itself otherwise he would be unable to write a history of madness, or of reason. Derrida argues, as I suggest above, that in presupposing history Foucault unwittingly entangles himself in a Hegelian concep tion of history as the world-historical march of Geist. An archaeology thus cannot approach an understanding of historicity: 'if there is a historicity proper to reason in general, the history of reason cannot be the history of its origin (which, for a start, demands the historicity of reason in general), but must be that of one of its determined figures ' ( 4 3 ) . B y reading the partage i n its systematicity that i s , b y thinking the partage as a structural condition of history - Derrida provides a conceptual understanding of history that can evade the Hegelian reach. In other words, as the possibility of history itself, historicity makes possible the same history that Hegel would appropriate to the Reason of philosophy. Historicity as a structural possibility therefore comes 'before' Hegel, without taking the place of some sort of authentic origin - that is, without attempting to out-Hegel Hegel.
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In sum, historicity as a non--Hegelian approach to history comes 'before' and 'after' Hegel. Historicity is untirr1ely. S p e ctral History It therefore becomes possible, after a necessary deferral, to turn to Derrida's most direct statements concerning a conception of history (as historicity ) in its relation to the role of the theorist/philosopher. Derrida's concern in Specters of Marx lies both with a reflection on the events of 1 9 8 9 and with a thinking of the very notion of the event in light of the discourse of the end of history. Derrida will argue that only by assuming a certain 'inheritance of Marxism' can one come to understand our responsibility to the revolutions of 1 9 8 9 . This in heritance, I will argue, requires untirr1eliness; it requires a thinking of history 'beyond Being' .12 How to think the continuation of history past its end ? How to conceptualize history after Hegel without falling prey to Hegel's very philosophy of history ? Derrida weaves an answer to these questions with the warp and weft of Hamlet and Marx. He begins with Hamlet (I, iii ) : Hamlet waits for the return of the ghost, his father. In this scene, Hamlet will see the ghost, the ghost of his father, for the first time. Yet, this is no appearance pure and simple - it will quickly become obvious that there can be no brute sense-data of the ghost for the ghost has already appeared the night before. He appears this time only by returning, by coming again. Derrida insists that the specter always returns, the specter is a revenant: 'one can never distinguish between ta-venir (the future-to-come) and revenant (the coming back) of a specter' ( 1 994: 3 8 ) . This scene then marks the appearance of the ghost, the return of the ghost, and the return of Hamlet's father in/as the ghost. As Hamlet will say ( and Derrida will often repeat), the time is already 'out of joint', for his father, the ghost, appears for the first time only by appearing again. The specter can only be considered untimely, and this untimeliness broaches the possibility of history, historicity. 'Repetition and first time: this is perhaps the question of the event as question of the ghost' ( 1 0 ) . 1 3 To conceptualize the event as ghostlike means to conceive of the event after the end of history, and therefore to conceptualize history after Hegel without recapitulating a Hegelian philosophy of history: 'If we have been insisting so much since the beginning on the logic of the ghost, it is because it points toward a thinking of the event that necessarily exceeds a binary or dialectical logic' (Derrida 1 994: 63 ). A
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binary o r a dialectical logic must assume that history moves i n a timely fashion that involves either a linear progression (or regression), or a dialectical rnarch upward from stage to stage, with negative mornents being subsumed along the way. But what Derrida refers to here as the 'logic of the ghost', and what I am calling a spectral notion of history/ 4 interrupts this timely movement of history because the ghost can never be located, placed, or fixed in time. Since the specter's appearance always turns out to be a reappearance, that very appear ance can never be found within a timely conception of history. The untimeliness of the specter calls for an untimely thinking of history. Derrida gives a name to the thinking that would work through this logic of the ghost. He calls it historicity or hauntology: 'it would harbor within itself, but like circurnscribed places or particular effects, eschatology and teleology themselves . It would comprehend them, but incomprehensibly. How to comprehend in fact the discourse of the end or the discourse about the end ? ' ( 1 0 ) . To 'comprehend incom prehensibly' means to think beyond Being by developing a notion of history after Hegel without trying to exceed ( in metaphysical fashion) Hegel's philosophy of history . My previous elaboration on the idea of historicity can throw some light on these claims; historicity incom prehensibly cornprehends the discourse on the end because historicity lays the conditions of possibility for a Hegelian philosophy of history without attempting to outdo the Hegelian Aufhebung. 15 The question of the ghost (the ghost as event, the event as ghost) supplements this first understanding of historicity by building upon it. Derrida draws two conclusions about spectral history: ( 1 ) to think the event after the end of history requires us to consider the event in its ghostlike appearance, in its spectrality, but (2) and most importantly, the 'scholar' will always wish to avoid any association with ghosts. 1 6 The scholar - the philosopher, the theorist refuses to seriously consider that ghosts rnight appear, that is, reappear. The dismissal of ghosts as falling outside the purview of serious investigation (out side the realm of knowledge) is one of the first steps of 'scholarship': There has never been a scholar who, a s such, does not believe i n the sharp distinction between the real and the unreal, the actual and the inactual, the living and the non-living, being and non-being ('to be or not to be', in the conventional reading), in the opposition between what is present and what is not, for example in the form of objectivity. (Derrida 1 994: 1 1 )
Or, to continue the trope, there has never been a scholar who, as a scholar, did not believe in the fundamental nature of the distinction
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between 'first-order' and 'second-order' inquiry, 'the concrete, em pirical world' and the 'meta theoretical level', the 'actual political world' and 'remote theoretical constructs' . I have no desire to accuse Isaac of any sort of naive empiricism, but clearly the conception of political theory as problem-solver entrenches itself on this foundering foundation of the actual/inactual distinction. As a scholar, Isaac tells the field to stop playing with ghosts and get down to the serious business of political theory, but one concrete implication of a spectral history may lie precisely in illuminating the importance of untimely theory as a 'serious' endeavor. To take seriously the notion that historical events might retain a certain ghostly or spectral quality requires one to reconsider the role of theory beyond merely its relation to past problems that history has given us to solve. Spectral history demands a theory that considers the ghosts of the past and the specters (and events ) to come. In other writings ( 1 992b ) Derrida has made a subtle but crucially important distinction between the future as simply future present and the future as the yet-to-come, avenir. The future as future present is nothing more than a point 'upstream' in the river of time, a point that will soon arrive and become present; it is the future as thought through a linear or dialectical conception of time. Of course, almost all conceptions of time and of history must contain some notion of the future, but a spectral history eschews the future present for an avenir, a yet-to come, since ghosts might always return or disappear. One could say that specters are always yet-to-come, but the present tense, 'are always', would rob the sentence of its sense of avenir. Thus, one rr1ight do better to write specters are always already yet-to-come. Conj oining 'always ' and 'already' serves to highlight the untimeliness of specters. 1 7 In his discussion of Hamlet, Derrida augments this notion by writing l'a-venir, which the translators choose to render in English as the future-to-come. That is, the future to come, the future not in the sense of a future present but in the sense of a yet-to-come. L'a-venir, an untimely future. At this point Derrida brings in the writings of Marx, arguing that they contain their own sense of untimeliness through a notion of l'a-venir. Marx and Engels call for the very transformation of their theories in the future, in a future that is yet-to-come. Writing in 1 994, Derrida cites as one example the case of ' Engels' Preface to the 1 8 8 8 re-edition' of the Manifesto ( 1 3 ), 1 8 and today one can also look to Eric Hobsbawrr1's reintroduction to the 1 5 0th anniversary edition of the Manifesto. Hobsbawm points out that a number of the theses
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enumerated i n the Manifesto 'became obsolete almost immediately' ( 1 99 8 : 1 1 ) . In a sense, then, the Manifesto was not timely, as it could not solve the political problems of the day, and Marx and then Engels continued to reprint the Manifesto even though it contained references to practical politics that were no longer valid or meaningful. None theless, Hobsbawm rerr1ains convinced that Marx's critique of capi talist society proves even more significant today, in the face of the collapse of Soviet-style communism after the revolutions of 1 9 89, than it did in the mid-nineteenth century. Derrida echoes this sentirnent, and he also highlights what is so important about the untimeliness of the Manifesto: I know of few texts in the philosophical tradition, perhaps none, whose lesson seemed more urgent today, provided that one take into account what Marx and Engels themselves say about their own possible aging and their intrinsically irreducible historicity. What other thinker has ever issued a similar warning in such an explicit fashion? Who has ever called for the transformation to come of his own theses ? ( 1994: 13)
In other words, what makes the Manifesto's message so compelling today - and so important for contemporary politics - is precisely its untimeliness, its ability to await the return of specters to come. While Marx and Engels certainly addressed the pressing political issues of their own time directly, they insisted that the 'problems' their theories would solve might well be future problems - future in the sense of l'a-venir, a future-to-come witnessed only by their ghosts. One has to inherit the untimely spirit in marxisrr1 in order to 'keep faith with what has always rnade marxism in principle and first of all a radical critique, namely a procedure ready to undertake its self critique. This critique wants itself to be in principle and explicitly open to its own transformation, re-evaluation, self-reinterpretation' ( 8 8 ) . This openness to l'a-venir constitutes one of the primary marks of untimely theory; it gives that theory the ability to negotiate and even converse with specters, without trying vainly to silence or eliminate them - or worse, to pretend they are not 'there', that is, that they will not return. To believe in the distinction between first-order and second-order inquiry - or, more naively, to think that history could come to an end one would have to presume that ghosts could be arrested and silenced so that their meanings could be exhaustively interpreted once and for all. Derrida comments at length on this theme in Hamlet, noting the guards' repeated request for Horatio to call out and question the
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specter of Ha1nlet's father: 'thou art a scholar, speak to it, Horatio'. As a scholar himself, Isaac's concern often centers on denying the spectral quality of history, as he calls on political theorists to get the rneanings in history sorted out. Isaac speaks repeatedly of theorists' 'reticence to interpret current events' and continually criticizes theorists for not offering up their 'interpretation' of the 'meanings of 1 9 8 9' ( 1 995 : 63 7, 63 9 ) . For Isaac, theory must rernain timely . I t must solve the problems that the 'actual political world' confronts it with in the present. It must answer these problems at the right time, and in the present. And to 1naintain this timeliness, political theory must ignore the traces of ghosts and assume that time could never be 'out of j oint' . Given the persistence of this theme in his argument, Isaac construes any lack of timeliness as tardiness . He assumes that if theory is not on time, it can at best be too early, while at worst, and more often, it will be too late. He writes, for example, 'the failure of political theory to address [the revolutions of 1 9 8 9] represents a missed opportunity' ( 649 ) . Unless theory remains attentive to the problems that the political world gives up, Isaac argues that it loses its significance. And yet, surely a space can and should be carved and preserved for theory as an untimely endeavor that both opens up a thinking toward the future and calls into question any assured interpretations of the meanings of the past. Once untimeliness is thought - along the lines I have been suggesting outside the terms of a linear or dialectical conception of history, it can no longer be so easily dismissed as rnerely arriving on the scene too late. Untimely political theory calls our attention to political problems that we never foresaw; it stays attentive to l'a-venir, aware that the specter, as a revenant, might always return. So even the problerns that seem 'solved' may still contain lurking ghosts. Isaac's framework has no patience for these games with ghosts; it seeks, if not to eli1ninate untimely theory altogether, then at least to relegate it to 'second-order' status. However, the 'problem' with being sure that one can simply interpret the events of 1 9 8 9 (or any other events in history ) and explain their meaning lies in the way this approach leads one to rest one's position, along with that of other 'scholars', upon the actual/ inactual distinction - irnplying along the way at least a weak version of the end-of-history thesis . Derrida suggests that this discourse on the end of history, re-invigorated by the events of 1 9 89 and Francis Fukuyarna's interpretation of them ( 1 992), seems itself to have come a bit late - it lacks timeliness given the proclamations of the 'ends of
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man', 'end of Marxism', 'end of history', and 'last man' as far back as the 1 95 0s ( 1 994: 1 4 ) . Derrida frames this phenomenon as follows: As for those who abandon themselves to that discourse [on the end of history] with the jubilation of youthful enthusiasm, they look like late corners, a little as if it were possible to take still the last train after the last train and yet be late to the end of history.How can one be late to the end of history? A question for today. It is serious because it obliges one to reflect again, as we have been doing since Hegel, on what happens and deserves the name event, after history; it obliges one to wonder if the end of history is but the end of a certain concept of history. ( 15)
Derrida's ironic reference to being 'late to the end of history' serves to highlight the connections, which have been present throughout this discussion, between historicity and untimeliness . Only by focusing on untimeliness not as 'missing the train' but in the sense of Hamlet's lament that 'the time is out of joint' does one begin to glitnpse historicity as the possibility of history itself. How can one be late to the end of history ? If the time is out of j oint, then maybe one will always already be late to the end of history. If the time is out of joint, how could one ever arrive at the end of history on time? In a linear or dialectical model of time, the end of history would have to be just that: the end point on the line or the culmination of the dialectic. But if history continues to go on - and given the popularity of Fukuyama's work, continues to end then one can only understand how it does so by turning to a different thinking of tirne. Thus, Heidegger's response to the continual ending of metaphysics, that is, a nonmetaphysical thinking of language, serves as a clue to an untirr1ely response to the end of history. As I have repeatedly suggested, both Heideggerian 'language' and untimeliness are 'beyond Being' in the sense that they are outside the metaphysical terms of an instrumental conception and outside the linear stream of time. A spectral thinking of the historical event tends to strengthen the point I only hinted at above: namely, that Isaac's conception of theory and history in the particular relation he articulates cuts off the very possibility of proposing a different concept of history after Hegel. And, if the path has been blocked for theorists to think history differently, then we are faced with the totally debilitating choice of either endorsing a Hegelian conception of history or loudly announ cing its utter demise (which amounts to the same thing, since to propose the end of history also means to accept a I-Iegelian history a point exemplified by Fukuyama, who does both explicitly ) .
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My reading of Derridean historicity as untimeliness provides po litical theorists with an alternative way to approach history and therefore a less constrictive way of considering what 'theory is and should be' . However, it proves absolutely crucial to stress here that Derrida's 'alternative' proves neither programmatic nor explicit. Historicity gives us a way to conceptualize and understand history after Hegel (and in his wake) ; it gets us out of Isaac's confining binaries, but where we go from there remains an important choice, a deciding gesture (partage) . Derrida gives some suggestions for possible directions, and most importantly he insists that historicity makes possible a future history - possibly even a 'post-history' - full of its own specters: Whatever may be its indetermination, be it that of 'there must be the future-to-come' [ 'il faut l'a-venir'] , there is some future and some history, there is perhaps even the beginning of historicity for post-historical Man, beyond man and beyond history such as they have been represented up until now.We must insist on this specific point precisely because it points to an essential lack of specificity, an indetermination that remains the ultimate mark of the future: whatever may be the case concerning the modality or the content of this duty, this necessity, this prescription or this injunction, this pledge, this task, also therefore this promise, this necessary promise, this 'it is necessary' is necessary, and that is the law. This indifference to content here is not an indifference, it is not an attitude of indifference, on the contrary.Marking an opening to the event and to the future as such, it therefore conditions the interest in and not the indifference to anything whatsoever, to all content in general.Without it, there would be neither intention, nor need, nor desire, and so on. (73, translation modified)
If 'there is some future and some history' beyond any pronouncement of their ends, and if that future--to-come retains the possibility of ghosts, then we cannot ignore the possibility that one of those specters will be that of Marx. For Derrida, we cannot but consider our possible inheritance of a certain spirit of marxism. This inheritance, this thinking of temporality, makes possible a future historicity, a continuation of history beyond its end. 1 8 But this future history necessarily demands a future responsibility, a respon sibility to the future-to-come, il faut l'a-venir. Spectral history requires a responsibility to ghosts, and this responsibility concomitantly entails untimely theory, since one can never be on time when it comes to the specter. Derrida suggests that such responsibility might entail a challenge to the triumphal discourse of the end of history and the
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death of marxism. With the hegemony of these discourses comes an enervating narrowing of political choices, as only political liberalism seerns a viable option ( 5 2 ) . Derrida argues with sorne urgency that we are witnessing the installation of a dominant discourse, 'an unprece dented form of hegemony', that takes the death of marxisn1 and the end of history as its substructure. Only by taking the event of the 'end of history' in a different theoretical trajectory can one open the space for political resistance to this hegemony - thereby finding a place for the responsibility to an untimely future. Thus, Derrida suggests that 'where history is finished, there where a certain determined concept of history comes to an end, precisely there the historicity of history begins, there finally it has the chance of heralding itself' (7 4 ). As Nietzsche says, only after the death of God does His shadow begin to play on the walls of the cave ( 1 92 1 : 1 4 7). The ending of history does not make history simply over and done with; it gathers history into its extren1e possibility. The shadows of history, the continuation of history beyond its end, actuates historicity. And just as the death of God called for new struggles on the part of Nietzschean free spirits, the shadows at the end of history require that political theorists grapple with historicity - an untimely encounter indeed. The struggle against the hegemonic triumph of western liberal capitalism must take the form, according to Derrida, of the possibility for the New International. Following from the lengthy quotation above, this New International lacks a substantive content in Derrida's argument precisely because it remains open to a future histor( icit)y, and because it refuses to accept the received (end of history ) view of the past. Derrida 's inheritance of a certain spirit of marxism insists that the attempt to bury marxism forever will necessarily fail. This for two reasons: first, because, echoing Marx, 'never, never in history, has the horizon of the thing whose survival is being celebrated (namely, all the old models of the capitalist and liberal world) been as dark, threatening, and threatened' ( 72 ) ; and second, because even from the grave (that is, as ghosts ) Marx and marxism will wield an undeniable power ( 9 7 ) . Derrida's untin1ely approach to the end of history declines to assun1e either a stable meaning of the past or a stable direction for the future, but 'at the same time' it refuses to eschew the responsibility to history a history full of ghosts, a spectral history . I contend that Derrida's differently-oriented thinking of history, after the 'end' of history, makes possible exactly this untimely re sponsibility to history as historicity. In order specifically to keep open
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this type of responsibility, spectral history refuses to accept any sort of clean distinction between the real and nonreal, the actual and nonactual. Ultimately, accepting such dichotorr1ies only 'locks up, neutralizes, and finally cancels historicity' ( 74 ) . When he rests his argument so heavily upon the first-order/second-order distinction, Isaac does j ust this. He demands a timely response to historical events that either ignores ghosts or tries to arrest them. But a conversation with ghosts can never be titnely since we never know when they are going to show up, nor if they will even speak when they do appear. In ignoring the possibilities for untimeliness, Isaac's argument relegates the role of the contemporary theorist to a (only marginally different) form of the Kuhnian puzzle-solver now problem-solver - of which he is so rightly critical. The critical force of political theory thereby slips out from under the political theorist, and with it goes the possibility of practical change that Isaac so urgently calls for. The responsibility of the theorist must be something more, and maybe something less, than simply a response to the 'problems ' that the real, actual world gives up. An Untimely R e s p o n s ib ility to 1 9 8 9 Derrida will elaborate on his own version of responsibility in a variety of ways, rnany of which prove significant for the responsibility of the political theorist to history in general, and to the events of 1 9 8 9 in particular. Moreover, it would appear, strangely enough, that when it comes to the question of responsibility, Derrida and Isaac may actually have quite a bit in common. Underlying Isaac's critique of the discipline of political theory one detects the overwhelming sentiment that we owe a certain responsibility to the events of 1 9 89, as well as to the emerging and fragile democracies created by those events . As I discuss above, Isaac articulates the importance of this responsibility by expressing his 'shock' at finding almost no attention paid to these events within the political theory literature. Derrida, too, will repeat edly emphasize political responsibility to 1 9 89, and here their texts converge. But the convergence proves both temporary and illusory, because of the nature of the responsibility that each author defends. It is in fact the differences between them that prove rr1ost helpful in confronting the issue - broached by Isaac but far exceeding the scope of his arguments of the role of the political theorist. Isaac urges a responsibility to 1 9 8 9 that turns out to be a responsibility to the
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present, to solving political problems today. For this reason, Isaac accuses political theorists of tardiness, of not responding at the right tirne; for Isaac, time is running out. On the other hand, the political responsibility urged by Derrida can be appropriated to help develop an understanding of political theory as an untimely enterprise. For an untimely theory, the concept of political responsibility must include a responsibility not only to the present and past but also to the future - a responsibility to l'a-venir. Derrida's point of departure lies in a certain responsibility to respond to the events of 1 9 8 9 - his reading of Marx and Hamlet appears in the form of a keynote address to a conference organized specifically to focus on the international political environment constituted in the wake of the revolutions of 1 9 8 9 and for just this reason his presentation takes the tack of inquiring into the very possibility of 'the event', in light of those particular events . More specifically and more significantly, Derrida continually affirms the necessity of maintaining a certain political responsibility in his reading of Marx. He aims his criticisms at those who would take the ' death of Marxisrr1' as an opportunity to re appropriate Marx for the halls of academe, at 'people who would be ready to accept the return of Marx or the return to Marx, on the condition that a silence is maintained about Marx's inj unction not just to decipher but to act and to make the deciphering (the interpretation) into a transformation that "changes the world" ' (32; quoting Marx 1 97 8 : 1 4 5 ) . Derrida characterizes this move as an attempt to choose Marx over marxism - or Marxology over either (Nimtz 2000) - with its long and tumultuous political history. This sort of appropriation operates precisely by denying the untimeliness of marxism. As I show above, what Derrida points to as radical in the thought of Marx and Engels - their calls for the transformation of their own arguments are exactly those untimely elements of their writings. But choosing Marx over marxism runs the risk of 'neutraliz[ing] ' or at least 'muffl[ing] ' the 'political imperative' in their work, because it freezes that work in place, puts it in a time capsule, and squeezes it into a particular corner of the canon. In contrast, Derrida will suggest the necessity of maintaining a responsibility to the political gesture always present in Marx's work ( and, Derrida would argue, in his own as well) : to insist even more on what commands us today, without delay, to do everything we can so as to avoid the neutralizing anesthesia of a new theoreticism, and to prevent a philosophico-philological return to Marx from prevailing. Let us spell things out, let us insist: to do everything we can so that it does not prevail, but not to avoid its taking place, because it
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remains just as necessary. This will cause me, for the moment, to give priority to the political gesture I am making here. (32)
Only a certain vigilance in retaining this gesture will prevent the above appropriation of Marx into the canon of 'great philosophers', and simultaneous removal of his thought and work from the political field. No doubt, the understanding of the political that Derrida stresses here lies a great distance fro1n the problems to be solved by politics in Isaac's conception. Derrida urges responsibility not j ust to the past events of 1 9 89, but to the future as well. And again, this future cannot be merely a future present, it must be an avenir. Thus, Derrida urges a responsibility to the ghosts of 1 9 8 9 that may return again (including the specters of Marx) . In short, he wants to articulate a political responsibility while simultaneously refusing to play the scholar who would attempt to extract a specific meaning from those events or develop a programmatic form of politics. This sort of responsibility depends upon a politics of untimely agency, and its untimeliness makes such responsibility appear necessarily quite distinct from that advocated by Isaac. Nevertheless, untimely responsibility, il {aut l'a-venir, re1nains a crucial political responsibility exactly because it can never have matters over and done with. The responsibility of an untirnely politics consists of the need to remain ever vigilant, given its commitment to the possible (re)appearance of specters. The untimely theorist might go so far as to reread Jefferson's famous quote, 'eternal vigilance is the price of liberty', as a reference to the ghosts that democracy nourishes and sustains . Attentiveness to historicity must thereby heighten our political responsibility, while insisting on the untimeliness of that responsibility as well - an absolutely central point that Derrida captures with the repetition of the phrase that I too have begun to echo, il {aut l'a-venir. Historicity cannot be demanded in any exact form since it is not an object that could ever be given up in its full presence. Ghosts can never be fully arrested and interrogated, and even the meaning of their appearance can never be fixed once and for all. Yet one can remain attentive to the effects of historicity and one can still discourse with the ghosts of 1 9 89 ( but only, of course) while remaining aware that they are ghosts. And ghosts, like shadows on the wall, may return, or disappear, or never even show up at all: 'ha's this thing appear'd againe tonight? ' ( 1 1 ; citing Hamlet: I, i ) . From Isaac's point o f view this would make Derrida's political gesture an untimely one in the sense of being too little too late -
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because it provides no direct answers to the pressing political problems faced by the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and the fonner Soviet Union. Derrida's reading - as Isaac might emphasize it, and as I will emphasize in the next chapter 1 9 - of Hamlet and Marx would thereby constitute a second-order form of inquiry, and therefore yet another 'missed opportunity'. Maybe so. But an untimely theory of politics in the sense that time is 'out of joint' - provides an entirely new lens for viewing Derrida's position here: to characterize Derrida's political gesture as untimely should not lead one to conclude (as Isaac might want to) that his argument can thereby be relegated to the sphere of the non- or apolitical. The untimeliness of Derrida's claims and contentions prevents one from listing their specific political content, but precisely this openness to an unspecifiable ( and ghostly ) future, coupled with a putting-into question of the past, prevents one from foreclosing the political domain in Derrida's writings. Indeed, it is exactly the untimely openness, an openness to l'a-venir, that expands the political im plications of those writings . For Derrida, the events of 1 9 8 9 will always return to haunt not only contemporary political theorists but also current political events - the very locus of concern for Isaac and his respondents. This perpetual recurrence makes Isaac's attempt to arrest the events, to speak to them, and to 'interpret the[ir] meaning' ineffective and ill-advised. The constraints applied to the political theorist by the distinction between first-order and second-order inquiry prove too restrictive for the field. Isaac's desire to respond to the events of 1 9 8 9 is an admirable one, but turning political theory into a problem-solving activity that confronts the 'real world' will not serve to achieve Isaac's goals of changing that world. History must be taken as something much more than simply a scarce resource for solving problems; political theorists must consider seriously its spectral effects. This irnplies that theory must be able to look to these spectral effects of historicity, to communicate with ghosts without trying to arrest thern. By thinking carefully and critically through a non-Hegelian approach to history, political theorists can relieve themselves of the burden imposed by Isaac's recapitulation of a Hegelian conception and begin to consider the possibilities offered by a politics of untimeliness. Only then maybe, finally, can theorists begin to examine or possibly solve certain problems in the world. More importantly, only then can political theory break free both from the disciplinary confinements that Isaac criticizes and from the problem-solving matrix that he tries to impose.
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Only then can political theorists start to render problen1atic that which in the present does not even appear as a problem. [Enter Ghost] HAMLET:
Angels and ministers of grace defend us! B e thou a spirit o f health or goblin damn'd, Bring with thee airs from heaven or blasts from hell, Be thy intents wicked or charitable, Thou comest in such a questionable shape That I will speak to thee: I'll call thee Hamlet, King, father, royal Dane: 0, answer me! Let me not burst in ignorance; but tell Why thy canonized bones, hearsed in death, Have burst their cerements; why the sepulchre, Wherein we saw thee quietly inurn'd, Hath oped his ponderous and marble jaws, To cast thee up again. What may this mean, That thou, dead corpse, again in complete steel Revisit'st thus the glimpses of the moon, Making night hideous; and we fools of nature So horridly to shake our disposition With thoughts beyond the reaches of our souls ? Say, why is this ? wherefore? what should we do? [Ghost beckons] Act I, Scene v.
N ot e s 1. Connolly's ( 1 995 a ) concern lies with the addressee of Isaac's piece, by asking why Isaac's charges seem directed rnainly at a group of 'posties' ( Connolly's word) . McClure ( 1 995) asks about the very scope of political theory: should it be confined to what gets published in narrowly-defined theory j ournals, or might the field be better defined by the work done by those who call themselves political theorists ? Connolly broaches an important internal debate and McClure raises some important questions about interdisciplinary and multi-genre work, but neither respon dent investigates the core of Isaac's demand directly. 2. One is led to wonder to what extent Isaac's first-order/second order distinction privileges the work of contemporary political theorists. Would the work of someone who studies Thucydides or Montaigne automatically be relegated to second-order status ?
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3 . Before moving on, one could intervene here with a 'practical' set of questions for Isaac and problem-solving theory: does political theory really ever solve political problems ? Does the political theorist provide policy prescriptions that allow politicians to overcome legislative impasses ? Or, are 'real, practical' problerns always grappled with inside of 'the political arena' ? Doesn't the political theorist ask questions ? Doesn't the political theorist rnake it possible to think a bout political problems from a new or unique perspective, or to see what is problematic (or even political) in a different light - and simultaneously, to allow students (whose cornplete absence in the debate over the role of the political theorist strikes me as somewhat strange) to think differently/critically/carefully ? None of this is to say that what the political theorist does will not somehow, sorneday, lead to the solving of problems, but whether solving problems ought to be the first task of the theorist is another question entirely. More over, if Isaac takes his own conception of political theory ser iously, it seems highly conspicuous that rather than solve problems himself he tends to rnerely call on his colleagues to read a different set of authors ('Havel, Michnik, Lipski, Konrad, Szelenyi, Sakharov and others' (63 9 ) ) than the ones 'we' read now. Within Isaac's own framework for understanding political theory this would seem to constitute not a shift from second-order to first-order inquiry, but merely a switch from one type of second-order inquiry to another. 4. Martin suggests many diverse authors who have proposed various versions of post-Hegelian history: Marx, Nietzsche, Baudrillard, Althusser, and finally Derrida. But after setting up this context, Martin provides little to fill in Derrida's concept of history as post-Hegelian; instead, he turns to other tasks . See also Gasche ( 1 9 8 6 ) . 5 . Like differance and all the other Derridean infrastructures, historicity is neither a word nor a concept: 'no longer simply a concept, but rather the possibility of conceptuality, of a concep tual process and system in general . . . not simply a word, that is, what is generally represented as the calm, present, and self referential unity of concept and phonic material' ( 1 982: 1 1 ) . 6. I cite the French edition because i t first appeared with a n eleven page preface to which most of Derrida's criticisms refer. The second French edition ( 1 972a) changed the title of the work and completely eliminated this preface. The English translation ( 1 965)
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8.
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is based upon the first edition, but it is also an abridged version of the text and most of the key passages to which Den·ida refers have been edited out. Therefore, the brunt of Derrida's critique of Foucault focuses on passages that have never, to my knowledge, been published in English. Foucault writes: 'what is in question is not a history of knowledge but rather the basic rnovements of an experience. A history, not of psychiatry, but of madness itself in its vivacity, before any capture of knowledge' ( 1 96 1 : vii, quoted in Cook 1 99 3 ) . I presurr1e that this translation is Cook's herself, but she does not note this explicitly. Foucault also remained sensitive to the length of the shadow cast by Hegel. In his inaugural lecture at the College de France Foucault defined the rnodern condition by its effort to escape Hegel's pervasive influence ( Cook 1 99 3 : 2 ) . This translation comes a t a price: i n gaining a more general understanding of historicity, Den·ida sacrifices Foucault's histor ical specificity. Of course, the partage is not the 'deciding gesture' of an indivi dual or group of individuals; rather, it marks a structural shift at the level of discursive practices. Derrida fails to provide the page number for the citation. In the end, historicity and untimeliness will prove to be opposite sides of the same coin: 'what is said here about time is also valid, consequently and by the sa1ne token, for history' (Derrida 1 994: 18). A further point that Derrida fails to mention: Hamlet and the ghost share the sarr1e nan1e, as Hamlet says to the ghost 'I'll call thee Hamlet.' So, in a sense, Hamlet himself is the ghost; his agency must already be untimely. Here I owe a debt to Gregory Weight. It should be noted from ahnost the outset that a 'spectral' history is itself a history of spirit, of esprit - that is, of Geist, of Hegel. Spectral history, in opposing itself to a Hegelian philosophy of history, certainly 'takes Hegel at his word' . Meaning, all a t once, t o lift up, relieve, cancel out, and annihilate, Aufhebung is often translated as sublate, and even more often left untranslated. The Aufhebung constitutes the dialectical logic that characterizes the teleological movement of Geist, because the Aufhebung can comprehend and synthesize all the positive and negative elements in history that precede it. Only through the
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Aufhebung can history reach its c01npletion in Hegel's philoso phy. For this reason, a reconsideration of history after Hegel requires one to both reflect on the Aufhebung and avoid reiter ating it in another guise. 'There has never been a scholar who really, and as scholar, deals with ghosts. A traditional scholar does not believe in ghosts' (Derrida 1 994: 1 1 ) . Derrida writes, 'what i s the time and what i s the history of a specter ? Is there a present of the specter ? ' ( 1 994: 3 9 ) . I d o not tnean the empirical fact o f history's end, but rather the structural litnits of the philosophical conception of history announced by Hegel and consciously or unconsciously reiterated by so many others . As the discussion of Foucault, above, makes clear, history's end in this sense certainly could not occur in history. Isaac's hypothetical emphasis on reading would serve to distin guish reading frorn doing, second-order inquiry from first-order inquiry . In Chapter 4, I will try to distinguish reading from interpreting, not in order to separate two different sorts of second-order inquiry, but to articulate a different type of political criticistn. Having already rejected Isaac's first-order/second-order distinction, I will e1nphasize reading so as to develop this vision of political criticisn1 as a different way of doing political theory. While Isaac and I are definitely not following the same path, to the extent that we share this latter goal we are certainly headed in the same direction.
Cha
4
Untimely Reading: Foucault's Evasive Maneuvers
The standard practice of intellectual historiography in the field of political theory tends to rema in 'timely' to the extent that it follows an established, often canonized, timeline. Teaching the history of political thought chronologically necessarily draws instructors of political philosophy toward a focus on influence, prolepsis, and the creation of coherent doctrines. How did author A influence or anticipate the work of author B? How does the work of both authors contribute to a certain political doctrine ? These sorts of questions presuppose time liness because they assmne a certain inevitability to the doctrine in question. Of course, those who study the history of political thought have already critically challenged this approach on the grounds that it imposes a backward-looking and false coherence upon disparate texts. 1 Nevertheless, from the perspective I wish to articulate here, the alternative method of intellectual historiography - a focus on historical context seeking to uncover the actual intentions of the author - falls prey to the same, timely, problems : both 1nethods of intellectual historiography atternpt to situate an author and his or her work within a rather rigid web of influence or meaning. Explicitly or implicitly, then, these methods uphold a notion of general interpreta tion that can eventually exhaust the rneaning of not just the author's writings but even the author as well. It is with these broader questions of intellectual historiography in mind that I would like to consider the problem of reading the writings of Foucault. Gary Gutting has recently remarked that the works of Foucault call immediately for sorne sort of general interpretation, 'but the need to interpret Foucault sits ill with his own desire to escape general interpretive categories' ( 1 994: 1 , emphasis added ) . 2 The compulsion to play the intellectual historian in reading Foucault proves particularly strong among those who have treated the relation
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of Foucault to Nietzsche. In particular, attempts to place Foucault within the history of thought often end up tracing Foucault's position back to Nietzsche. By resting the interpretation of Foucault upon his 'Nietzscheanisrn', this kind of intellectual historiography functions as an enabling device for the strongest and most compelling criticisrns of Foucault. After all, most of these accounts take Nietzsche's supposed skeptical-relativism as a given; so if Foucault turns out to be a Nietzschean he also turns out to be a 'cryptonormativist' at best, a nihilist at worst. No sensitive reader of Foucault attempts to reject all of his insights, but many, especially political theorists, tend to turn sharply away frmn Foucault precisely as Foucault himself turns toward Nietzsche. As Jiirgen Habermas, possibly Foucault's best critic, puts it: 'only in the context of his interpretation of Nietzsche does Foucault yield to the farniliar melody of professing irrationalism' ( 1 9 8 7: 277 ) . 3 This chapter provides a closer reading of Foucault that calls into question both the reduction of his thought to Nietzscheanism and the very practice of interpretation by which his thought is so reduced. Foucault engages in a set of maneuvers that evade the atte1npt to pin him down in this way; he thus challenges precisely the rules of the game of the intellectual historian to which Habermas and others subject him. Charting the course of these evasive maneu vers 1nakes it possible to grasp the nature of Foucault's challenge to interpretation and therefore to render problematic the dominant criticisms of Foucault within political thought. Those criticisms, I will suggest, presuppose ti1neliness, while Foucault's writings on history, authorship, and interpretation lead to a notion of 'untimely reading' that can provide a key cmnponent for a politics of untimeli ness. R e a ding F o u cault, Rej e cting Nietz s ch e There i s nothing necessarily new about resisting the tendency to call Foucault a 'Nietzschean', since no one was more averse to such a strategy of labeling than Foucault himself: 'the only valid tribute to thought such as Nietzsche's is precisely to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest. And if commentators then say that I atn being faithful or unfaithful to Nietzsche, that is of absolutely no interest' ( 1 9 8 0 a : 53-4 ) . Yet this remark by Foucault has not deterred his 'cmnmentators' in the least. Many of them have been concerned not merely to test the authenticity of his appropriation of Nietzsche, but, more significantly, to use this ostensible appropriation as a tool for
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dismissing Foucault's work - and specifically for maligning its poli tical significance. The practice of such commentary leads to a rejection of Foucault and a denunciation of his political relevance via a pre supposed critique of Nietzsche ( see Gutting 1 9 8 9 : 277; cf. Allen 1 99 1 ) . This tendency t o read Foucault and reject Nietzsche i s shared both by some of Foucault's most important critics (Rorty 1 9 86; McCarthy 1 990b; Habermas 1 9 8 7; Taylor 1 9 8 6 ) and even his apparent defen ders (Norris 1 995; Visker 1 995; Simons 1 995 ) . Critics use the rejec tion of Nietzsche as a critique of Foucault, while defenders use Nietzschean epistemological problerns as the limit of Foucault's thought - the place where they part company with Foucault. In briefly documenting this pattern of reducing Foucault to his Nietzscheanism, I will focus only on the former group, since the latter tacitly assu1nes the validity of the fonTler's critique. Taylor probably a1nasses more references to Foucault's Nietzscheanism than any other commentator (with at least fifteen in his brief article) , but Rorty's corntnentary offers perhaps the most straightforward case of reading Foucault and rejecting Nietzsche. Rorty argues ( 1 9 8 6 ) , against Hacking ( 1 979), that Foucault's early engagement with Kant ( 1 973 a ) cannot produce a coherent and tenable epistemology. Close readers of Foucault tnight wish to question Rorty's very point of departure, since Foucault consistently insisted that he sought not a 'theory' of knowledge or of power but an understanding of their historical and dynatnic interdependence; Foucault's writings offer cautionary tnethodological prescriptions and historical analytics, never theories . Yet Rorty's argument may prove illuminating none theless, particularly in what it reveals about the tendency to reduce Foucault's thought to the supposed relativism of Nietzsche. Rorty divides epistemology into three possible branches - Cartesian, Hege lian, and Nietzschean and then suggests that we might think of Foucault as a Hegelian epistemologist, who rejects the fixed and obj ective reality of Cartesianisrn and argues instead that rationality always remains historically and sociologically constructed. But Rorty quickly dismisses this possibility: his argument turns critical when he explains that Foucault's epistemology is, in fact, Nietzschean. One might j ustifiably ask how Rorty makes the transi tion frorr1 the possibility that Foucault is a Hegelian to the conclusive claim that he is a Nietzschean. The answer appears to be that Rorty stacked the deck against Foucault, since Rorty only toys with the idea that Foucault's epistemology would prove Hegelian; the Nietzschean
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conclusion seems inevitable in Rorty's interpretation. Rorty's own emphasis here is clear: 'Foucault's Nietzschean attitude towards the idea of epistemology is that there is nothing optimistic to say . . . The Nietzschean wants to abandon the striving for objectivity and intui tion that Truth is One, not to redescribe or to ground it' (Rorty 1 9 8 6 : 4 6 ) . I n short, according t o Rorty, because Foucault i s truly a Nietzschean he 'abandons' obj ectivity, truth, and rationality and therefore has 'nothing optimistic to say'; following Rorty, 'we' will therefore have no reason to follow Foucault in his Nietzschean nihilism. Given what Rorty sees as the tainted status of Foucault's 'Nietzschean' claims, Rorty himself has very little optimistic to say about Foucault's thought. Rorty sweepingly dismisses Foucault's 'Nietzschean bravura' as 'so-called "anarchism" ', 'self-indulgent ra dical chic', and 'anarchist claptrap' (47). I am not the first to question Rorty's excessive reading or his excessive rhetoric; even Foucault's most careful and cautious biographer submits that Rorty's judgement 'suggests little concrete knowledge and a lot of credit in hearsay' (Macey 1 99 3 : 43 1 ; see also Halperin 1 995 : 24). My main point of ernphasis here lies in showing that only where Rorty turns Foucault into a Nietzschean does he both rej ect Foucault philosophically and slander him rhetorically . Within Rorty's argument, Foucault's lack of a coherent epistemology, his absence of a positive political theory, and his nihilistic political tendencies all hinge on his Nietzscheanisrn. Habermas's reading of Foucault may well be the starkest example of this same phenomenon of repudiating Foucault for his Nietzschean ism, but it also proves the most cornplicated. Habermas's critique of Foucault must be traced back to his reading of Hegel as that thinker who first identified modernity as a 'problem' . Hegel thereby left to us 'late moderns' a choice of paths to follow. The first trail attempts to resurrect reason in 'a more modest fashion' and it has been followed closely by the thinkers of the Frankfurt school (Habermas : 1 9 8 7: 43 ) . All other paths derive from two Nietzschean strategies - skeptical genealogy and deconstruction - both designed to 'reduce everything that is and should be to the aesthetic dimension' and thereby to do away with reason in its entirety (95 ) . Habermas thus erects a complex and sophisticated framework that makes Foucault an heir to one of the failed trajectories (via Bataille) that develops out of Nietzsche. As such, Foucault is predestined to the 'relativism, presentism, and cryptonormativism' of which Habermas accuses him. Habermas's placement of Nietzsche within 'the philo-
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sophical discourses of modernity' as the denier of reason, and there fore 1nodernity itself, constitutes the very bedrock of his critique of Foucault - not to 1nention his critique of Heidegger, Derrida, and Bataille. As descendent to the legacy of Nietzschean irrationalism, it only makes sense that Foucault himself would prove to be 'incoherent' (cf. Fraser 1 9 8 1 ) . Habermas's reading of Foucault and rej ection of Nietzsche proves quite nuanced and cmnplex. Nonetheless, his cri tique of Foucault only holds if Foucault is in fact the Nietzschean that Haberrnas makes hi1n out to be ( see also Taylor 1 9 8 6; Connolly 1 9 85; Patton 1 9 8 9 ) . I a m not making a general o r empirical clairr1 that all political theorists who criticize Foucault do so based upon the claim of his Nietzscheanism; I am only trying to establish the primary significance of Foucault's Nietzscheanism to some of the most irnportant critiques of Foucault. But in 'documenting' this trend to read Foucault and reject Nietzsche, one must resist taking up the very role of corrlmen tator that Foucault calls into question. In 'L'ordre du discours', Foucault delineates the three internal mechanisms of discourse that police and order its structure. The first of these is commentary, an internal rule of discourse that upholds the hierarchy of primary and secondary text even as it pretends not to: cmnmentary 'gives us the opportunity to say something other than the text itself, but on condition that it is the text itself which is uttered, and in some ways, finalized' ( 1 972b: 22 1 ) . I have characterized Rorty and Habermas as 'commentators' in order to suggest that their interpretations of Foucault follow these very rules of corr1mentary, by describing Foucault's texts as secondary relative to Nietzsche's. The rule of commentary therefore dictates that while Foucault may appear to say something unique or new, he really only, in the end, winds up repeating the skeptical relativism of Nietzsche. In their work on Foucault, the readings of Habermas, Rorty and Taylor all follow this rule of commentary. Yet, in trying to document the trend to reduce Foucault to Nietzsche I am seduced into the very same interpretive tactic that I want to argue Foucault atterr1pts to evade: the practice of tracing intellectual influences and authorial relations, and then posi tion