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Truth and Realism Patrick Greenough (Editor), Michael P. Lynch (Editor) end p.i
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Truth and Realism CLARENDON PRESS · OXFORD end p.iii
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © the several contributors 2006 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2006 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate
reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available ISBN 0-19-928887-9 978-0-19-928887-8 ISBN 0-19-928888-7 (Pbk.) 978-0-19-928888-5 (Pbk.) 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2 end p.iv
Contents
List of Contributors vii Acknowledgments viii Introduction 1 I Truth and Relativism 1. What is Relativism? 13 Paul Boghossian 2. Intuitionism, Realism, Relativism and Rhubarb 38 Crispin Wright 3. Modelling the ‘Ordinary View’ 61 JC Beall II Realism and Antirealism 4. Realism: What's Left? 77 Michael Williams 5. Scientific Realism 100 Michael Devitt 6. Scientific Realism as an Issue in Semantics125 Christopher Gauker 7. Abundant Truth in an Austere World 137 Terry Horgan and Matja Potr 8. Context, Vagueness, and Ontology 162 Mark Richard III Methodology and the Nature of the Debates 9. Must Do Better 177 Timothy Williamson 10. A World without Isms 188 Paul Horwich 11. Horwich's World 203 Marian David end p.v
12. Intuitions and Truth 208 Ernest Sosa 13. Trusting Intuitions 227 Michael P. Lynch 14. Truth and Realism: Remarks at St Andrews 239 Richard Rorty Index 249 end p.vi
List of Contributors JC Beall is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut, and Arché Associate Fellow, University of St Andrews. Paul Boghossian is Professor of Philosophy at New York University. Marian David is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. Michael Devitt is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at The Graduate Center, The City University of New York. Christopher Gauker is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cincinnati. Terry Horgan is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. Paul Horwich is Professor of Philosophy at New York University. Michael P. Lynch is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut, and Arché Associate Fellow, University of St Andrews. Matja Potr is Full Professor and the Chair of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Cognition, Department of Philosophy, The University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. Mark Richard is Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University. Richard Rorty is Professor of Comparative Literature and, by courtesy, of Philosophy at Stanford University. Ernest Sosa is Romeo Elton Professor of Natural Theology and Professor of Philosophy at Brown University, and a Distinguished Visiting Professor at Rutgers University. Michael Williams is Krieger-Eisenhower Professor in the Department of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University. Timothy Williamson, FBA, FRSE, is Wykeham Professor of Logic at Oxford University. Crispin Wright, FBA, is Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, Wardlaw Professor, and Director of Arché, University of St Andrews, and Global Distinguished Professor at New York University. end p.vii
Acknowledgements The papers in this collection, with the exception of Paul Boghossian's paper ‘What is Relativism?’, were all presented at the conference on Truth and Realism, held at the University of St Andrews, Scotland, 17–20 June 2004. For invaluable financial assistance with this conference we would like to thank: the Arts and Humanities Research Council, the Arché Research Centre at the University of St Andrews, the Department of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews, the British Academy, the Scots Philosophical Club, the Mind Association, and the Analysis Trust. We would like to give warm thanks to all the participants at the conference, and particularly, the main speakers, Robert Brandom, Michael Devitt, Terry Horgan, Paul Horwich, John McDowell, Ernest Sosa and Michael Williams, and Crispin Wright; the commentators, Dorothy Edgington, Christopher Gauker, Mark Richard, Marian David, Jane Heal, Michael Lynch, John Hawthorne and JC Beall; the conference commentators, Simon Blackburn, Paul Boghossian, Richard Rorty and Timothy Williamson; the chairpersons, Tad Szubka, Sven Rosenkranz, Jennifer Hornsby, Brian Weatherson, Kit Fine, Pascal Engel, Ralph Wedgwood and Alessandra Tanesini; and the invited discussants, Bob Barnard, Paul Bloomfield, Andrew Cortens, Steven Hales, Henry Jackman, Max Kölbel, Philip Percival, Barry Smith and James Woodbridge. Thanks also to all those who spoke at the Postgraduate Truth and Realism Preconference: Michael Devitt, Terry Horgan, Frank Jackson, James Ladyman, Michael Lynch, John McDowell, Panu Raatikainen, Sven Rosenkranz and David Velleman. Many people went out of their way to help in all sorts of ways in the organization of both conferences. Special thanks go to Eline Busck and Nikolaj Pedersen for co-organizing the Preconference. They were paragons of efficiency and propped both of us up throughout. The following people were stalwart helpers: Elizabeth Barnes, Ross Cameron, Roy Cook, Tom
Cunningham, Philip Ebert, Sune Holm, Amy Hughes, Chris Kelp, Anne Manolakas, Mary McKay, Paula Milne, Walter Pedriali, Simon Robertson, Marcus Rossberg, Markus Schlosser, Margarita Stapleton, David Ward, Michael Weh and Robbie Williams. Peter Momtchiloff of Oxford University Press proved to be patient, forgiving and immensely helpful. Thanks, Peter. end p.viii
Thanks also to Peter Clark, John Haldane and Crispin Wright for much invaluable advice and support. Untold thanks to Terry Berthelot and Maxine Greenough who helped beyond measure. Patrick Greenough Michael P. Lynch end p.ix
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Introduction
Is truth objective or relative? What exists independently of our minds? This book is about these two questions. The essays in its pages variously defend and critique answers to each, grapple over the proper methodology for addressing them, and wonder whether either question is worth pursuing. In so doing, they not only enter debates that have been the focus of much recent philosopical and cultural interest, they carry on a long and esteemed tradition—for our two questions have vexed almost every major philosopher, from Plato, to Kant to Wittgenstein. The volume is organized into three parts: “Truth and Relativism”; “Realism and Antirealism”; and “Methodology and the Nature of the Debates”. Given the interrelated nature of the topics, the distinction between the parts is of course not precise, but the essays collected in the first two parts primarily address the book's two questions, while those in the third part pull back and focus on the debates themselves, and our methods (or lack thereof ) for solving them. Moreover, all three parts have a uniform structure. Each begins with a lead-off essay that frames the question under discussion and provides a brief overview of the terrain. These essays are in no way merely “introductory”; rather, they offer a sophisticated and opinionated take on the issues from a major figure in the field. Subsequent papers in each part come in pairs, offering substantial positions and then critiques of those positions, as thus capturing the dialectical nature of philosophical debate. In what follows, we offer a brief, part by part overview of the volume's topics along with some remarks about the papers in each part. Since the papers are mostly self-sustaining and require little insider knowledge, we don't offer detailed elaborations or critiques of their individual arguments. Rather, our aim is to introduce the issues the papers address.
Truth and Relativism The question “what is truth?” is a classical philosophical conundrum, and the answer that truth is relative is both familiar and ancient, going back to Protagoras' end p.1
thought that man is the measure of all things, and finding a faint if confused echo in the first-year university student's plaintive cry that “what is true for you isn't true for me.” The core idea behind alethic relativism is that propositions are only true or false relative to some parameter, whether that parameter consists of the views of a particular person, culture, form of life or conceptual scheme. Relativist views about truth continue to grip the contemporary imagination, and are discussed not just in philosophy but throughout the academy, appearing, for example, at the center of the debate over postmodernist literary theory. Alethic relativism is opposed by alethic realism, according to which truth depends not on us and our beliefs, concepts, and so on, but on the way the world actually is. As Aristotle put the thought: to say of what is, that it is, is true. Often this remark is glossed as encapsulating the correspondence theory of truth. According to this theory a proposition is true just when it corresponds to reality, where “correspondence” is understood variously in terms of structural isomorphism between our thought and the world, or reduced to the referential relationships that obtain between the elements of our thoughts and the objects those thoughts are about. Jostling around with these views are other contenders for the title of the truth about truth. The coherence theory of truth holds that beliefs are true just when they cohere with other (often a particular privileged set of ) beliefs. Classical pragmatists, on the other hand, maintain that true beliefs are those that would be accepted at an ideal limit of inquiry, or which would be practically useful in helping us meet our goals in the long run. Finally, deflationary conceptions of truth reject all of the above options as misguided. According to deflationists, truth has no nature to discover. We understand truth simply by grasping instances of the T-schema: (TS): The proposition that p is true if and only if p. Thus, the concept of truth doesn't pick out a robust relation between mind or world (relative or otherwise), but is merely a logical device, useful because it allows us to make generalizations over potentially infinite numbers of propositions (such as the generalization that every proposition is either true or false). Paul Boghossian's lead-off essay delves into the nature of relativism. He begins by noting that most philosophers believe that global relativism is straightforwardly incoherent. Global relativism, after all, is the idea that all truths are relative, and that claim is itself only relatively true or it is absolutely true and therefore false. But as Boghossian says, most philosophers also believe that one can coherently restrict relativism to a local domain. Thus various philosophers have adopted relativism, for example, about morality or epistemic justification. Boghossian's surprising argument is that this second assumption is unfounded. His argument rests on the claim that a coherent relativism about a particular kind of facts K has these three ingredients: first, the relativist claims that there are no absolute facts of kind K; second, she recommends that we stop asserting end p 2
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absolute propositions which purport to be about such facts and assert only relational or relative propositions; and third, she offers a constraint on the values that the relativization parameter for those propositions and their truthconditions can take. Boghossian thinks there are coherent local relativisms about various kinds of facts (such as the facts about motion) that have these three features, but he argues the kinds of facts that philosophers have been interested in resist relativization in this way. Consequently, the prospects for a philosophically exciting relativism about morality—to name just one example—are much dimmer than previously thought. Crispin Wright's paper focuses on what he calls disputes of inclination, such as a dispute over whether something is delicious or attractive or funny. What Wright sees as the “ordinary view” of such disputes is that they involve the following three key elements: that the subjects can have conflicting incompatible attitudes, that no one is necessarily mistaken, and yet that both sides can rationally maintain their position. Maintaining the ordinary view is what lies at the root of relativism, Wright thinks. Moreover, disputes of this sort, and the ordinary view of them, arise in more philosophically interesting cases, as well: over what is right or wrong, or what is justified or not, for example. Therefore, he argues, understanding whether the ordinary view of these disputes is coherent, and what sort of theory of truth it entails, will help us understand similar disputes in ethics or epistemology. After pointing out that the three elements of the ordinary view are in manifest tension with one another, Wright canvasses and rejects several ways of resolving this tension. He then suggests his own novel solution to the problem, one arising out of his position that truth can itself come in different forms. If this is so, Wright argues, then one is free to understand truth in some domains—such as the domains that give rise to disputes of inclination—as superassertibility, or sustained justification without defeaters. According to Wright, suitably understood and applied, superassertibility can be invoked to explain a defensible, albeit local relativism about truth. Rather than critiquing Wright's view directly, JC Beall offers two other ways to understand or model the three seemingly incompatible elements of the ordinary view of disputes of inclination. First, Beall argues, rather than making “is true” relative, one can semantically descend and underwrite the ordinary view by adopting a relativism about the non-semantic predicates involved in the dispute in question, such as “is delicious.” Beall wonders what virtues Wright's relativism involving superassertibility could have that this view wouldn't. Leaving that issue open, Beall then argues that Wright and other philosophers have overlooked the possibility that one could be a relativist and a correspondence theorist of truth at once, by adopting what Beall calls the “polarity” view of facts or states of affairs. The core thought is that a statement is true in virtue of the way the world is, but how the world is happens to be relative to a person's attitudes. While stopping well short of endorsing the position, Beall suggests that its end p 3
very possibility illustrates that the philosophical terrain is more complicated than previously thought.
Realism and Antirealism The word “realism” is used in many different ways. As we've already seen, it can be used to characterize objective views of truth. But it can also be used—and perhaps should primarily be used—to describe certain views about what exists. In this, metaphysical, sense “realism” names a position which, roughly speaking, holds that most of what exists in a certain domain does so mind-independently. Something exists mind-independently at some time when it would continue to exist were there no minds. Following Michael Devitt's influential distinction, we can say that two of the most common forms of realism are these: Common-sense realism: most of the physical, “middle-sized dry goods” posited by common sense (trees, mountains, cats, and cars, etc.) exist mind-independently. Scientific realism: most of the unobservable entities posited by our best scientific theories (electrons, quarks, etc.) exist mind-independently. Of course, one can be a realist in other domains as well, and live debates occur over realism about moral properties, mathematical objects like sets and numbers and more recherché objects like propositions and possible worlds. And one can be a realist about some of these entities while being antirealist about others. The mind-independence feature of realism means that any sort of realism is always opposed to idealism which holds, classically, that everything that exists is either a mind or dependent on a mind. And realists within a given domain are opposed to more local antirealisms, such as views which simply deny that entities of a given type exist, or claim that they are, in an appropriately explicated sense, merely “fictional” in nature. Moreover, some philosophers—if by no means all—also claim that realism is opposed to conceptual relativism, which holds (in relation to a particular domain) that most of what exists only does so relative to the conceptual schemes humans employ to categorize the world. Michael Williams begins his essay by asking two key questions: What is realism? And is there an issue here still worth arguing about? Williams' preferred answer to the first question is minimal or deflationary in spirit: realism is simply the view that most current common-sense and scientific objects exist and most claims about such objects are true. Such a view, Williams argues, is realist enough: it allows one to avoid classic “antirealisms” (such as idealism), while avoiding the metaphysical extravagancies of the correspondence theory of truth and “mind-independent” existence. Perhaps not surprisingly, Williams then answers negatively to his second question. For him, what remains of the realist issue is the question of naturalism; we should be concerned less with what exists end p.4
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mind-independently than with the question of whether (and in what sense) all that exists is natural or physical in character. Williams situates his discussion within what he sees as a division between two major camps of philosophers: those like himself whom he calls the neo-pragmatists, and those like Michael Devitt or Philip Kitcher whom he calls the neo-Cartesians. While both camps reject skepticism and classical robust foundationalism, the neo-Cartesian takes a “metaphysics first” approach and takes realism about truth seriously, while the neo-pragmatist keeps Descartes' epistemological orientation (start reflection by wondering what and how you know) and adopts a deflationary theory of truth. Michael Devitt is a realist if there ever was one, both about common sense and about the unobservable entities of scientific theory. Here, Devitt aims to defend realism of the second type. Devitt characteristically sees scientific realism as a metaphysical, rather than a semantic doctrine. It is the thesis that most of the unobservable entities posited by our best scientific theories actually exist, and exist independent of our minds, conceptual schemes, and the like. Devitt discusses and defends one basic type of argument for, and two arguments against, this sort of realism. The basic type of argument that Devitt takes to support realism is a version of what is sometimes called the “success argument.” The root idea is that the best explanation of a scientific theory's success is that the unobservables posited by the theory exist and have roughly the properties specified by the theory. Such an argument, Devitt points out, requires the use of abduction, but as long as the realist is granted that, he argues, she can make a strong case for her view. Devitt then goes on to defend scientific realism against two prominent objections: the classic “undetermination argument”—which he sees as a non-starter, and the “pessimistic induction” argument, which claims that on the basis of past theoretic failures, we have no reason to think that the entities posited by our current scientific theories actually exist. While admitting this is a more difficult argument to defeat, Devitt suggests its force is sufficiently blunted by what he takes to be the plausible view that our ability to chart the unobservables has improved. Christopher Gauker takes issue with Devitt's core assumption that the debate over scientific realism is primarily about what exists as opposed to how we represent what exists. As Gauker's title suggests, he argues that a debate over scientific realism is primarily a debate over deep semantic issues—such as the plausibility of the causal theory of reference—a theory which Devitt accepts and Gauker rejects. Moreover, Gauker questions Devitt's core view that unobservables posited by a theory exist just when the theory has succeeded in giving good explanations. Rather, Gauker suggests, it often works the other way around: theories are said to give good explanations just when it is found that their posits exist. Terry Horgan and Matja Potr 's paper intentionally defies easy characterization along the usual realist and antirealist lines. The position they defend straightforwardly denies common sense and scientific realism as defined above: end p 5
it claims that most of the posits of common sense and science simply do not exist. Nonetheless they do not deny that there is a mind-independent world—it simply contains much less than we normally think it does. Thus their name for their position: austere metaphysical realism. Horgan and Potr , however, conjoin their metaphysical position with a position on truth, one which affirms that despite the fact that common sense posits entities that don't exist, its claims are nonetheless perfectly capable of being true. According to what they call contextual semantics, truth is correct affirmability—and what such affirmability amounts to can vary depending on the context. For most of the statements we make, their semantic correctness consists in what the authors call their indirect correspondence with the world. A statement can indirectly correspond to the world (and hence be true) even if the ultimately correct ontology fails to contain the objects that statement purportedly is about. The overall position is a novel one: combining an austere ontology with a robust contextualist account of truth, which as Mark Richard points out, bears certain affinities with contextualist accounts of knowledge. Richard criticizes Horgan and Potr 's position along several fronts. A principal criticism is this. Horgan and Potr 's theory of contextual semantics, Richard argues, requires that we are cognizant in some way of shifts in semantic context, which allows us to subtly interpret utterances as true or false depending on our evaluation of which is the appropriate context at the moment. But if so, then we should be sensitive to the possibility that some claims of the form that there are Fs are true even when the ultimate “real” ontology would reject Fs as nonexistent. Richard takes it to be implausible that we are sensitive to such a possibility. Richard ends his paper with a reflection on, appropriately enough, a topic that brings us to the next section: the methodology of the realism debate.
Methodology and the Nature of the Debates When debates get entrenched, the opposing sides dig in, and minefields are laid, it is always wise to pull back and take a look at the issue from afar. Is the issue really worth pursuing? Is all the effort—intellectual or otherwise —justified by a noble goal or wasted on a dead end? And if the dispute is a real one, then how might we better pursue it? It is wise to take a hard look, in other words, at both the nature of the debate and one's methodologies for prosecuting it. This advice informs the topic of the third section of this volume. Not surprisingly, given the age of the debates over truth and realism, meta-philosophical and methodological questions are an increasingly prominent aspect of the current philosophical landscape with regard to these issues. It is also, again not surprisingly, where many of the
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deepest disagreements emerge. end p 6
As with so many philosophical debates, disputes over truth and realism and second-order discussions about these disputes and the best methodology for pursuing them are constantly intertwined. The contents of this section reflect this fact—the authors of these essays not only argue over methodology and so on, they have their own realist or antirealist agendas. Reflecting this fact, as well as the importance of these debates, we've chosen to include in this section both a “lead-off” and a “capstone” paper, each representing radically different perspectives not only on realism and truth, but on the nature of the debates over these topics. Timothy Williamson begins his lead-off paper by reminding us that while the fruitfulness of many philosophical debates has been called into question, those debates have often resulted in significant intellectual advances. This, Williamson argues, is, to some extent, the case with debates over truth and realism, issues about which we know more now than we did forty years ago. The reason we know more, Williamson suggests, is that we have made important strides in articulating our philosophical intuitions with extreme logical precision. Nonetheless, in Williamson's eyes, we can and must do much better in this regard. In his view, we must adopt a methodology largely inspired by mathematics, one that prizes clarity, rigor, and open-eyed reflection on the sorts of constraints—including logical constraints—that should be held to fix the contours of the debate. Only by doing so, Williamson argues, can we hope to make philosophical progress. Paul Horwich's paper, in stark contrast, amounts to something of a frontal assault on the very idea of a significant debate between realists and antirealists. For Horwich, philosophical progress on these matters is not possible because there is no meaningful debate to be had. In Horwich's view, disputes over whether a fact “really” exists or not emerge out of the desire to avoid allegedly “weird” facts—like those about morality, mathematics, or art. So-called weird facts are so, Horwich claims, only because they seem so different from the facts with which we are more familiar in our everyday life—facts about cats, cars, kettles, and cradles, and so on. As a result of this dissimilarity, we are tempted into constructing theories which explain the “nature” of such facts, or somehow explain them away—even while allowing that our talk about such facts is in some sense legitimate. But in Horwich's view, all such attempts fail because they cannot explain a distinction they need: the distinction between a fact being real and really
REAL.
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Horwich suggests we either abandon or re-cast these debates, and give up on the idea that it makes sense to worry over the nature of reality as it is in itself. In his response to Horwich, Marian David argues first that Horwich has failed to make the case that he isn't actually taking sides in the very debate that he rejects as meaningful. In particular, David takes Horwich to be committed to end p.7
a form of non-reductive realism about all the “weird” sorts of facts mentioned above. Second, David claims that Horwich's arguments for his non-reductive realism are not compelling. In his view, Horwich moves too quickly from a point about language and concepts to a point about the world and the facts it contains. Those who doubt the seriousness of debates over truth and realism often point out that such disputes come down to “conflicts of intuition.” A realist attempts to refute an antirealist position by showing that it conflicts with the intuition that if there were no minds, there would still be chairs; while another maintains that the opposition unintuitively denies the law of excluded middle, and so on. In his contribution, Ernest Sosa defends the appeal to intuition in philosophical debate. Sosa articulates and defends an account of intuitions according to which, roughly, to intuit is to be inclined, on the basis of a reliable ability, to believe a modally strong or self-presenting proposition without appeal to the usual sorts of evidence. As such, intuitions can be gainfully used as evidence for and against philosophical positions and philosophers should therefore not shy away from their use of intuitions as a methodological strategy. Although agreeing with Sosa that intuitions are useful and perhaps indispensable philosophical tools for solving debates over realism, truth, and the like, Michael Lynch questions Sosa's account along several lines. He argues, for example, that Sosa's account of intuitions is too limited—that it can't account for the wide variety of propositions (including contingent propositions) that philosophers frequently call “intuitions.” Moreover, he worries that Sosa's account requires the existence of a distinct “faculty of intuition” over and above the more usual faculties, including our conceptual faculties. Finally, Lynch suggests an alternative, “minimalist,” model of intuitions, one according to which an intuition is merely something one finds believable without knowing why one finds it believable. On this view, intuitions may indeed be the result of reliable belief-forming abilities, but those abilities may be nothing more mysterious than a conjunction of the usual sources of our beliefs. Truth and Realism ends, fittingly enough, with a paper by a philosopher who has been at the center of these debates for over thirty years. In Richard Rorty's summary paper, he comments on several of the papers included in the volume, dividing them between those like Williams, Horwich and himself who see debates over what's ultimately real or true to be misguided, and those like Williamson, Devitt, Horgan and Sosa who see the traditional questions as having important value and significant answers. In Rorty's view, the lesson of the last millennia of philosophy is not that we must do better at answering the questions we have, as Williamson suggests, but rather that we must come up with different questions. So what is the state of the debates over realism and truth today? Are they vigorously moving forward, opening new
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theoretical doors, as Wright, Boghossian, end p 8
Williamson, Horgan and others suggest? Or are such debates more like doors to overly cluttered rooms that should be shut (and perhaps boarded over) as Williams, Horwich and Rorty might be seen to suggest? These are issues for the reader to decide for him or herself. We add only a modest plea for a theoretical modus vivendi and a simple reminder: let us give new answers to old questions, and let us ask new questions in place of old; but let us not fool ourselves into thinking that there is always a clear dividing line between them. A thousand flowers can bloom in a garden of old soil. Patrick Greenough University of St Andrews Michael P. Lynch University of Connecticut end p.9 end p.10
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Part I Truth and Relativism end p.11 end p.12
1 What is Relativism? * For comments on an earlier draft, I am grateful to Kit Fine, Paul Horwich, Stephen Schiffer, Crispin Wright and the participants in the Summer School in Analytic Philosophy in Florence 2004.
Introduction Few philosophers have been tempted to be relativists about absolutely everything—although, we are told, there have been some notable exceptions (Protagoras). Many philosophers, however, have been tempted to be relativists about specific domains of discourse, especially about those domains that have a normative character. Gilbert Harman, for example, has defended a relativistic view of morality, Richard Rorty a relativistic view of epistemic justification, and Crispin Wright a relativistic view of judgments of taste. 1
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See Gilbert Harman and J. J. Thomson, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of
Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Crispin Wright, ‘Intuitionism, Realism, Relativism and Rhubarb,’ this volume, Ch. 2.
But what exactly is it to be a relativist about a given domain of discourse? The term “relativism” has, of course, been used in a bewildering variety of senses and it is not my aim to discuss each and every one of those senses here. Rather, what interests me is the notion that is characterized by the following core idea: the relativist about a given domain, D, purports to have discovered that the truths of D involve an unexpected relation to a parameter. This idea lies at the heart of the most important and successful relativistic theses ever proposed. Thus, Galileo discovered that the truths about motion are unexpectedly relational in that the motion of an object is always relative to a variable frame of reference. And Einstein discovered that the truths about mass are unexpectedly relational in that the mass of an object is always relative to a variable frame of reference. In this paper, I will develop a model for how such discoveries should be understood. And I will then consider to what extent that model gives us a purchase on the sorts of relativistic theses—about morality, for example, or epistemic justification—which have most interested philosophers. end p.13
Relational Meanings Galileo, we may suppose, discovered that truths about motion are unexpectedly relative to a frame of reference. What does that mean? A natural first thought is that the unexpected relationality is to be found in the propositions expressed by ordinary motion sentences. On this view, whereas we might have been tempted to construe a sentence like: (1) “The Earth moves” as expressing a proposition involving the monadic concept of moving, after Galileo we know that it really expresses a proposition involving the relational concept of moving relative to a frame of reference, with the variable frame of reference being contextually supplied. On this view, then, what Galileo discovered is that a form of contextualism is true for motion sentences: the proposition expressed by a given motion sentence varies as a function of the context in which it is used. Let us consider a case for which such a contextualist proposal is tailor-made, the case of the spatial relation expressed by the phrase ‘. . . to the left of . . .’ How does this work? Here is a first stab. Whenever someone utters a sentence of the form: (2) “A is to the left of B” he doesn't express the proposition: (3) A is to the left of B but rather the proposition: (4) A is to the left of B relative to reference point F, where F is some contextually supplied frame of reference. Delicacy is called for in stating this view. We can't just say that whenever someone uses the sentence:
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“S” he ends up expressing not the proposition: S but rather the proposition: S relative to F for, then, any utterance of “S” will end up expressing the hopelessly infinitary proposition: end p.14
. . . (((S relative to F) relative to F) relative to F) relative to F) . . . The correct way to formulate the view we are after is to say, rather, that anyone uttering the sentence “A is to the left of B” intends that utterance to be elliptical for the sentence: (5) “A is to the left of B relative to reference point F.” With that qualification, we then get the contextualism we were after. Now, such a view is fine for the predicate ‘. . . to the left of . . . ’ because it is plausible that any competent user of that predicate knows that it is in fact a three-place and not a two-place predicate. It is, therefore, not implausible to say that any competent user of (2) would intend it to be elliptical for (5). But it is not similarly plausible to claim that any competent user of the predicate “moves” knows that it expresses the concept of a relation rather than the concept of a monadic property. As Harman correctly notes, it would be wrong to claim that when people said: “The Earth moves” they intended their remark to be elliptical for: “The Earth moves relative to a frame of reference F.” Some perfectly competent possessors of the concept of motion were unaware that the only truths there are about motion are relational ones and so had no reason to mean only the relational judgment. And if that doesn't seem obvious in the case of motion, it should certainly seem obvious in the cases of mass and simultaneity. It is simply not psychologically plausible to claim that, before Einstein, ordinary users of such sentences as: (6) “x has mass M” and: (7) “e1 is simultaneous with e2” intended their utterances to be elliptical for, respectively: (8) “x has mass M relative to reference frame F” and (9) “e1 is simultaneous with e2 relative to reference frame F”. No one before Einstein knew that there are no absolute facts about mass and simultaneity but only relational facts and so no one would have intended their utterances to be elliptical for the corresponding relational statements. Intuitively, then, it would be wrong to construe the discovery of relativism about a given domain as the discovery that the characteristic sentences of that end p.15
domain express unexpectedly relational propositions. That construal wouldn't fit the classic cases drawn from physics. Nor, intuitively, would it fit the cases that most interest philosophers, namely, the ones concerning morality or epistemic justification. The relativist about morality, too, claims to have discovered some sort of unsuspected relationism in the moral domain. But it would be utterly implausible to construe that as the claim that when ordinary speakers assert such sentences as: (10) “It is morally wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car.” they intend their remarks to be elliptical for some relational sentence like: (11) “In relation to moral code M, it is morally wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car.” Relativism about morality, if true, is not vouchsafed by the relativistic intentions of the makers of moral judgments.
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Harman: Relational Truth Conditions If the discovery of relativism about a given domain is not a discovery about the kinds of propositions that are expressed by the characteristic sentences of that domain, what sort of discovery is it, then? Gilbert Harman has proposed an alternative answer: his idea is that we should take Einstein to have discovered something not about the propositions expressed by the characteristic sentences of that domain but about their truthconditions. He says: Einstein's relativistic conception of mass involves the following claim about the truth conditions of judgments of mass: For the purposes of assigning truth conditions, a judgment of the form, the mass of X is M has to be understood as elliptical for a judgment of the form, in relation to spatio-temporal framework F the mass of X is M.
Switching back to the example of motion, Harman's idea seems to be, then, that to be a relativist about motion is to claim that, although the proposition expressed by (1) is just the disquoted non-relational proposition: (12) The Earth moves the truth-condition of that sentence is not just the disquoted truth-condition: (13) The Earth moves which attributes to the Earth the monadic property of moving, but is rather the relational truth-condition, end p.16
(14) The Earth moves relative to the frame of reference F, which attributes to the Earth the relational property of moving relative to a frame of reference F. Put in somewhat other terms, Harman's view seems to be that although our concept of motion may just be the concept of a non-relational property, the property denoted by that concept is the relational property of moving relative to a reference frame. On the way I am reading Harman, then, to discover that relativism is true about a given domain is to discover not that the sentences of that domain express propositions that contain a reference to a hidden parameter, but to discover that their truth-conditions do. But can we really discover that although the sentence: “p” expresses: p, its truth-condition is not just the disquoted condition: p, but, rather, the relational condition: p relative to F? Do we really understand what it would be to abandon the platitude that: The proposition that p is true if and only if p? And whether or not we are able ultimately to make sense of this, is that really a plausible description of what Einstein discovered about mass or Galileo about motion? Harman's main argument for his view is that while it would be implausible to attribute to our ancestors a relational meaning, it would be “mean-spirited” not to attribute to them the relational truth-condition. For if we didn't attribute that relational truth-condition to them, we would end up accusing them of massive and systematic untruth—since nothing has the monadic property of moving that they keep attributing to things—and that, apparently, would not be very nice. While I don't much like being called mean-spirited, I've never been sure how much weight to assign its avoidance in philosophical theorizing. I mean: if I am willing to be mean-spirited, does that mean that I get to reject a relativism about motion? At any rate, I don't think the charge is fair: I think we can be perfectly nice to our ancestors even while we accuse them of systematic error in certain domains. end p.17
Notice, to begin with, that even Harman's account will have to attribute a serious error to our ancestors, for he is
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going to have to say that they didn't know what the truth-conditions of their own thoughts were, that when they stated those truth-conditions simply by disquoting, they said something false. So there's no avoiding the imputation of some error and the only question is: which is the more plausible imputation? To think that it must be better to impute to them false beliefs about the truth-conditions of their thoughts, rather than just false beliefs about the world, is to endorse a peculiar version of the Principle of Charity as a constitutive constraint on the attribution of truth-conditions, though not on the attribution of meaning. Now, I have never been a big fan of the Principle of Charity; but certainly not when it is understood—as it has to be here—to apply only to the truth-conditions and not to the meaning. Even in its original version, as a constraint on the attribution of meaning, I never saw any justification for Charity over the Principle of Humanity, according to which we are allowed to impute error in our interpretations of other people provided those errors are rationally explicable. And, surely, Humanity is all that is needed for the purposes of being nice, for it's consistent with our ancestors' having false views that those views were justified and even ingenious. But Humanity would certainly not give one any grounds for reconstruing the truth-conditions in the motion case: the error involved—of not realizing the need for frames of reference—is certainly rationally explicable. And, in any event, I certainly don't see the justification for applying Charity selectively, only to the truth-conditions but not to the meaning. Think of what a peculiar result that would yield in a host of other cases. For example, our ancestors also spoke of the soul departing the body. What they meant is that there is a non-physical substance which leaves the body at the moment of bodily death. But, of course, we could, if we wanted, assign those remarks such truth-conditions—involving the loss of consciousness and so forth—as would make them come out true. But that would, of course, be absurd. Why should matters stand differently with motion or mass?
Factual Relativism If the preceding considerations are correct, it is implausible to construe relativism about a given domain either as the claim that the propositions of that domain are unexpectedly relational in character or as the claim that, while its propositions aren't, its truth-conditions are. In a sense, a difficulty with such construals of relativism should have been evident from the start, prior to a detailed investigation of their prospects. The point is that it is hard to see how an adequate formulation of relativism about a given domain could, in the first instance, be a claim about the contents of the end p.18
sentences of that domain. Any such formulation, it seems to me, would leave open a possibility that any real relativism should foreclose upon. I shall illustrate this point using the propositional construal, but similar remarks apply to Harman's truth-conditional suggestion. On the propositional construal, to say that moral relativism is true is to say that typical moral sentences like (10) do not express such absolute propositions as: (15) It is morally wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car but, rather, such unexpectedly relational propositions as: (16) In relation to moral code M, it is morally wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car. Now, the trouble is that, on such a view, moral relativism is merely a view about what typical moral sentences mean. It is merely a claim about the nature of the discourse as we have come to develop it. And that claim would appear to leave it wide open that—out there—there are perfectly objective absolute facts about what ought and ought not to be done, facts that our discourse, as we have come to develop it, fails to talk about, but which some other possible discourse, that we have not yet developed, could talk about. In other words, this propositionalist construal of moral relativism seems consistent with something that one would have expected any real relativism to foreclose upon, namely, that there are objective moral facts out there waiting to be represented by our language and which we have up to now somehow managed to overlook. 2
2
I heard Kit Fine make a similar point in an oral presentation on John MacFarlane's rather different formulation of relativism. There will be a problem, of
course, about how we are to express those missing facts, given the relativist's thesis about the meanings of ordinary moral terms, but there are obvious strategies for getting around this difficulty.
A correct construal of relativism about a given domain, D, cannot locate the unexpected relationality in the contents of D's sentences. It must locate it, rather, in the facts. Relativism cannot properly be seen as correcting our view of what our sentences mean; it must rather be seen as correcting our view of what the facts are. In other words, the relativist's project must be seen to be a reforming project, designed to convince us that we should abandon the absolutist discourse we currently have in favor of a discourse which accommodates his conviction that the only facts in the vicinity of that discourse are certain kinds of relational fact. Thus, in the case of motion, the relativist must be seen as urging us to abandon talk of something's merely moving in favor of talk about its moving
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relative to a variable frame of reference. And in the case of mass, he must be seen as urging us to abandon talk of something's having mass in favor of talk about its having mass relative to a frame of reference. And so forth. If we collect our various observations together, we get the following picture of a relativistic view of motion: end p.19
(a) The sentence “The Earth moves” expresses the proposition The Earth moves which is true if and only if the Earth has the monadic property of moving. (b) Because nothing has—or can have—such a property, all such utterances are strictly speaking untrue. (c) The closest truths in the vicinity are relational truths of the form: x moves relative to frame of reference F. Therefore, (d) If our motion utterances are to have any prospect of being true, we should not make judgments of the form: x moves but only judgments of the form: x moves relative to F. Finally, (e) No one of these frames is more correct for the purposes of determining the facts about motion than any of the others. This last clause, emphasizing that there is nothing that privileges one of these frames over any of the others, as far as determining the facts about motion is concerned, is important because without it, it would be possible to satisfy clauses (a) through (d) by supposing that the relativist is insisting on relativizing facts about motion to some particular privileged frame of reference, say, the center of Earth. So understood, then, a relativism about motion consists of three central ingredients: a metaphysical insight—that there are no absolute facts of a certain kind but only certain kinds of related relational fact; a recommendation—that we stop asserting the absolute propositions that report on those absolute facts but assert only the appropriate relational propositions; and a constraint—on the values that the relativization parameter is allowed to assume (in the case of the motion, there are no constraints). Generalizing this picture, we can say that a relativism about a monadic property P is the view that: (A) “x is P” expresses the proposition x is P which is true if and only if x has the monadic property expressed by “P.” (B) Because nothing has (or can have) the property P, all such utterances are condemned to untruth. (C) The closest truths in the vicinity are related relational truths of the form: end p 20
x is P relative to F where “F” names some appropriate parameter. (D) If our P-utterances are to have any prospect of being true, we should not make judgments of the form: x is P but only those of the form: x is P relative to F. (E) There are the following constraints on the values that F may assume: . . . The fewer constraints there are on F, the more extreme the relativism. In light of its reforming nature, we may dub a relativism based on such a template “Replacement Relativism.”
Moral Relativism Let me now turn to examining what sorts of theses Replacement Relativism leads to when it is applied to the sorts of domains—morality for example, or epistemic justification—which have most interested philosophers. I will concentrate on the moral case, but everything I say could easily be adapted to the epistemic case. Applying the template just developed, we get the following Replacement view of moral relativism. i. An ordinary assertion of “It is wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car” expresses the proposition that It would be wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car, a proposition which is true if and only if Paul's stealing Mark's car has the monadic property of being wrong. ii. Because nothing has or can have the monadic property of being wrong, all such assertions are condemned to untruth. iii. The closest truths in the vicinity are related relational truths of the form: It is wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car relative to F,
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where “F” names some appropriate parameter. (iv) If our moral assertions are to have any prospect of being true, we should not make judgments of the form: It would be wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car. but only those of the form: It would be wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car relative to F. end p 21
(v) There are the following constraints on the values that F may assume: . . . In outline, anyway, this seems to capture fairly well what most moral relativists have intuitively wanted to hold. An important question is: what should we take F to be? To what does the moral relativist propose to relativize ordinary moral judgments? The almost universal answer, given by friend and foe alike, is that the moral relativist proposes to relativize moral judgments to moral codes or frameworks. As Harman puts it: For the purposes of assigning truth conditions, a judgment of the form, it would be morally wrong of P to D, has to be understood as elliptical for a judgment of the form, in relation to moral framework M, it would be morally wrong of P to D. Similarly for other moral judgments. 3
3
Harman and Thomson, p. 4.
Adapted to my terminology, the idea is that we are to see the moral relativist as recommending that we give up as untrue all propositions of the form: It would be wrong of P to D and replace them instead with propositions of the form: In relation to moral framework M, it would be wrong of P to D where “M” names some appropriately salient moral framework, typically the speaker's own. 4
4
An analogous view, with epistemic systems in place of moral frameworks—systems that specify how different kinds of information bear on the epistemic
justification of different kinds of belief—captures what many have wanted to call a relativism about justification.
Why is it so natural to construe the relativist as urging us to relativize moral judgments to moral codes or frameworks? The answer is that it is a natural elaboration of the central thought behind moral relativism—namely, that different people bring different moral standards to bear on the morality of a given act and that there is no objectively choosing between these different standards. A ‘mora code’ is just what codifies these standards. Hat is why it is the relativization parameter of choice.
Moral Codes as Propositions So far, so good. Now, however, we face the question: what could moral codes be such that they could perform the function that the moral relativist expects of them? Let us split this question into two: A. What is a moral code or framework? B. What is it for P's doing D, to be “prohibited relative to a particular moral code M?” end p 22
Starting with the first question, there are two possible conceptions of moral codes: as sets of general propositions or as sets of imperatives. I will begin by discussing the propositional construal deferring until later in the paper an examination of the imperatival construal. When most people think of moral codes, they think of them as sets of general propositions which encode particular conceptions of right and wrong, of moral prohibition and permission, with different societies accepting different sets of such propositions and so adhering to different moral codes. Thus, Harman, in describing the moral diversity which he finds in the world at large, says: Members of different cultures often have very different beliefs about right and wrong and often act quite differently on their beliefs . . . . Some societies allow slavery, some have caste systems, which they take to be morally satisfactory, others reject both slavery and caste systems as grossly unjust.
5
5 Harman and Thomson, p. 8.
Or consider the following characterization, picked more or less at random from the web, due to an organization called “ReligiousTolerance.org”: The purpose of this essay is to show the wide diversity of moral codes that exist today and in the past. . . . The result of this diversity is that one group of people may consider an action moral, while another group will
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regard it as morally neutral, and a third group may decide that it is profoundly immoral. Each will be following their own moral code. Of course, it may take a certain amount of reflection for a person to be able to formulate the beliefs which constitute his moral code. In that sense, moral codes might exist more as tacit beliefs than as explicit ones. But that is no reason not to take them to be at bottom propositional attitudes. Not only is it in general very natural to take moral codes to be sets of propositions; there are special reasons for the relativist to insist on this construal and this brings us to the second question. Recall that the relativist urges us not to assert that: It would be wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car but only that: In relation to moral code M, it would be wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car. But what could “in relation to moral code M” mean if not “is entailed by moral code M?” How else are we to think of a moral code ruling on the correctness of a potential infinity of particular moral judgments except either by entailing them or by failing to entail them? If there is, indeed, no alternative to this picture, then the propositionalist picture of moral codes is forced, for that is the only way in which we can make sense of moral codes as standing in entailment relations to particular moral judgments. end p 23
The answer to our two questions, then, is this: moral codes are sets of general propositions specifying alternative conceptions of moral right and wrong. These codes entail particular moral judgments about specific acts. According to moral relativism, then, we should speak not of what is and is not morally prohibited simpliciter, but only of what is and is not prohibited by particular codes. I will call any relativistic view that is characterized by this pair of features—the relativization parameter consists of a set of general propositions and these propositions stand in entailment relations to the target proposition—a Fictionalist brand of Replacement Relativism. (Compare truths about fictional characters: there are no truths of the form Sherlock Holmes lived on Baker Street, but only ones of the form According to the stories of Arthur Conan Doyle, Sherlock Holmes lived on Baker Street.)
Problems for Fictionalist Moral Relativism I believe that this Fictionalist view of morality captures well what many have wanted to mean by the phrase “relativism about morality.” However, no sooner is it stated than it begins to come apart. One problem seems immediate. The judgment: It would be wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car seems appropriately normative; but the judgment: In relation to moral code M, it would be wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car seems just to be a logical remark about the relation between two sets of propositions. It seems to have no normative impact whatsoever: even someone who was in no way motivated to avoid stealing Mark's car could agree with the claim that, in relation to a given moral code, it would be wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car. So, right away, there is a difficulty seeing how we could adopt the relativist's recommendation in this case without this being tantamount to our giving up on moral judgments altogether, rather than merely relativizing them.
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6 J. J. Thomson makes a similar point in her response to Harman.
It might be thought that the relativist has an easy fix to this objection. After all, it's part of his story that although there are many possible moral codes, a particular person will accept a particular one of these while rejecting all the others. It also seems plausible that when someone makes one of the relativist's relational judgments involving a code that he accepts, that judgment will have a special normative pull on him. Thus, the relativist would appear well-advised to revise his view to bring this acceptance of particular moral codes into the picture. He should recommend that the replacing proposition be not: In relation to moral code M, it would be wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car but, rather, end p 24
(17) In relation to moral code M, which I, the speaker, accept, it would be wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car. How effective is this modification in dealing with the bruited objection? It's not clear. Whereas:
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It would be wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car is clearly normative, I believe that it would be wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car which is, in effect, what (17) states, looks to be just a description of one's own mental states. But whatever one thinks of the effectiveness of this patch, the deeper question is whether we are able to make sense of a thinker's endorsing a particular moral code, once he has accepted the guiding thought behind moral relativism. To see the problem here, let us turn our attention to the particular moral judgment: It would be wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car that we are supposed to relativize to moral codes. There are no absolute facts about moral prohibition or permission, we have said, so all statements of this form are condemned to untruth. If we are to hang on to moral discourse, we must reform it so that we talk not about these nonexistent absolute facts but only about the code-related relational facts. Now, there are, of course, two ways for a statement to be untrue. On the one hand, a statement may be untrue because it is false; and, on the other, it may be untrue because the proposition it expresses is somehow incomplete, so that it doesn't specify a fully evaluable truth-condition. Let us call the first option an Error Theory about the target utterance and the second an Incompleteness Claim about it. Now, it should be fairly clear that our Fictionalist relativism about morality will work best on an Error Theory of moral utterances and not so well with an Incompleteness Claim about them. For if we are recommending that we stop judging “x is morally prohibited” but only make judgments of the form: M entails that x is morally prohibited we cannot very well be thinking of: “x is morally prohibited” as expressing an incomplete, non-truth-evaluable proposition: it is not possible, I take it, for an incomplete proposition like: end p 25
Tom is taller than . . . to be entailed by a set of propositions. In and of itself, though, I do not regard the commitment to an Error Theory to be a problem. As I have already indicated, I don't regard Error Theories as intrinsically implausible. And, given a choice between an Error Theory and a Non-Factualism about a particular sentence, there is, I believe, strong reason to prefer the Error Theory, all other things being equal. The view that speakers who have been trying to make absolutist claims about motion, mass or morality, and who have developed an internally disciplined discourse about these subject matters, have nevertheless not succeeded in so much as making a complete claim is not particularly plausible. It would be far more plausible to say that they had succeeded in making such claims, but that those claims have turned out to be false in certain systematic ways. Unfortunately, though, an Error Theory of moral discourse turns out to be a problematic commitment for Fictionalist relativism in a variety of different ways. To begin with, if we say that the target judgments, like: It would be wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car are false, we will have to say that the propositions which make up the code to which this judgment is to be relativized are also false, for these are very general propositions of much the same type. Whereas an ordinary moral judgment will speak about the permissibility of stealing some particular person's particular item of personal property, a code will speak much more generally about the permissibility of damaging anyone's possessions. But if there are no absolute facts with which to confirm particular moral judgments, there won't be any general moral facts with which to confirm these more general moral judgments. Now, however, a serious puzzle emerges for the moral relativist. Our only idea, you may recall, about how to preserve the normative character of moral judgments, on a relativist view of them, involves giving a central place to our acceptance of moral codes. But how could we be expected both to accept the relativist's claim that the target judgments are false, which clearly implies that the propositions constituting the code are also false, and to continue accepting those codes in the way required to make sense of the relativist's picture? Moral codes, we have said, are composed of general moral propositions. To accept such propositions is, presumably, to believe them and act on their basis. However, once we have come to agree with the relativist that there are no absolute moral facts, we seem committed to concluding that the propositions that make up the codes are false as well. How, at that point, are we supposed to continue believing them? How does one continue to believe a proposition that
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one believes to be false? Some may be tempted at this point to invoke a distinction advocated by constructive empiricists, between acceptance and belief. To believe a proposition, end p 26
they may say, is to hold it to be true. But to accept it need not require that. One can accept a proposition in the sense of being willing to use it as a premiss in one's reasoning without taking it to be true. 7
7
See Bastian C. van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
Perhaps the relativist can help himself to this distinction, insisting that we can go on accepting codes even while we disbelieve what they say. I, myself, am quite suspicious of the cogency of this distinction. But whatever its general merits, it seems to me that a puzzle would remain even if we were allowed full use of it. The puzzle would be to explain how any particular code could continue to have any special normative authority over us, once we have come to think of all the codes as uniformly false. How could we be motivated to follow one set of precepts as opposed to another, when we have come to think of all of them as uniformly false? Of course, one remedy would be to allow that some propositions in the codes can be true. But that would not help rescue moral relativism because it would involve acknowledging the existence of some absolute moral truths and that is precisely what the relativist needs to deny. But even if we were to put this powerful point to one side, the relativist faces a further difficulty avoiding commitment to the existence of some absolute moral truths, on a Fictionalist picture. Recall that we are operating with the assumption that ordinary moral judgments express complete truth-evaluable propositions that are false, and that, as a result, so too are the propositions which make up the moral codes. But how could all codes be equally false? Suppose we have one code, M1, which says: M1: Slavery is prohibited. And another moral code, M2, which says: M2: Slavery is permitted. If we take the view that M1 is false, doesn't that require us to say that M2 is true? At least the way the matter is usually taught, it is an analytic truth about moral prohibitions that if it is false to say that x is morally prohibited then it must be true to say that not-x is morally permitted. But the relativist about morality no more wishes to say that there are absolute facts about moral permission than he wishes to say that there are absolute facts about moral prohibitions. And so, once again, a commitment to the falsity of one absolute moral proposition seems to commit us to the truth of some other absolute moral proposition. Now, I suppose that there have been philosophers who have denied that prohibition and permission are duals of each other in this sense. But it would be odd to think that whether a relativistic view of morality is so much as available turns on whether this widely believed conceptual claim is rejected. It would be better if end p 27
we could find a conception of relativism which did not depend on something so tendentious.
Completion Relativism All of these problems for a Fictionalist relativism about morality trace back to the assumption that our target utterance: “It would be wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car” expresses a complete truth-evaluable proposition. Once that assumption is in place, there is no alternative but to embrace an Error Theory of that utterance, and, given a propositional construal of moral codes, no alternative but to take a relativistic conception of it as involving its entailment by a set of similar, though more general, false propositions. The question, therefore, quickly suggests itself: is that assumption optional? To get away from absolute facts about morality, all we really need is for judgments of the form: It would be wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car to be untrue; we don't have to think of them as false. An obvious alternative, then, is to think of the relativist as having discovered that the target judgments suffer not from Error but from Incompleteness, and so as calling for their completion by reference to moral codes. Call this Completion Relativism. Couldn't we use Completion Relativism to generate a more plausible model for moral relativism? In contrast with the view I earlier attributed to him, Judith Jarvis Thomson reads Harman as endorsing precisely such
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a Completion view. She describes him as claiming that: Moral sentences (such as “It would be wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car”) are in a certain way incomplete; indeed, it is because [such] sentences are incomplete in that way that they lack truth values. . . . Non-moral sentences such as [“In relation to moral code M, it would be wrong to steal Mark's car”] are completions of moral sentences. 8
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Harman and Thomson, p. 190.
So perhaps we simply got off on the wrong track, using the case of motion to motivate a Fictionalist Relativism about morality rather than a Completion Relativism about it. Well, suppose we say that a proposition of the form: It would be wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car is an incomplete proposition, in much the way that: Tom is taller than . . . end p 28
is clearly incomplete. And suppose we try to complete it with: In relation to moral code M, it would be wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car. Once again, though, it is hard to see how to make sense of this. First, we are still operating under the assumption that moral codes are sets of propositions which encode a particular conception of moral prohibition and requirement. That means that a moral code must be seen as consisting in propositions of the form: x is morally wrong. But since we have just finished saying that particular propositions of the form: x is morally wrong are semantically incomplete, we would have to say the same thing about the more general propositions which are supposed to constitute the moral code, for they are basically propositions of the same general type. But just as it was hard to see how anyone could believe a set of propositions that they knew to be false, so it is hard to see how anyone could believe a set of propositions they knew to be incomplete. Second, if the propositions that constitute the code are incomplete, it is very hard to see how they could constitute a conception of anything, let alone a conception of right and wrong. Before they could be said to amount to a conception of anything, they would have to be completed. But our only idea about how to complete them is by reference to moral codes! And now we would seem to have embarked on a vicious regress in which we never succeed in specifying the conception of permission and prohibition which is supposed to constitute a particular community's moral code. Third, how are we to understand the phrase “relative to moral code M”? Since we have said both that the propositions which constitute a moral code as well as the target propositions are incomplete, that relation cannot be the relation of logical entailment. “Relative to moral code M,” then, must be understood as expressing some non-logical relation that obtains between x's being morally prohibited and some moral code. But what could such a non-logical relation possibly be? For all of these reasons, then, it looks as though Completion Relativism is not a cogent option either.
What Has Gone Wrong? The preceding argument establishes, I believe, that if moral relativism consists in the claim that ordinary moral judgments are to be relativized to moral codes, where moral codes consist in general propositions of much the same ilk as the judgments that are to be relativized to them, then there is nothing very coherent end p 29
for moral relativism to be. Yet this is, of course, a very familiar conception of moral relativism. What has gone wrong? Why would moral relativism turn out to be not even coherently assertible when the relativisms on which it is based—those concerning mass, motion and simultaneity—are not only coherent but true? The first thing to say in response to this question is that the sense in which a Fictionalist Relativism about morality is similar to the successful relativisms drawn from physics is very superficial. The two cases look alike but in fact have very different logical properties. Thus, in the motion case, we say that we have discovered that: “x moves” is untrue, and needs to be replaced by:
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“x moves relative to F.” And in the moral case we say that we have discovered that: “x is wrong” is untrue and needs to be replaced by: “x is wrong relative to moral code M.” However, this similarity in surface grammar masks a deep difference in the underlying logical forms. In the moral case, we are moving from a judgment of the form: x is P to a judgment of the form: (x is P) bears R to S. In other words, in the moral case, the replacing proposition is built up out of the old proposition in a quite literal sense: the replacing proposition consists in the claim that the old proposition stands in some sort of contentual relation to a set of propositions that constitute a code. This feature is crucial to the thought that lies at the core of standard conceptions of moral relativism that although we can no longer assert moral judgments in some unqualified way, we can truthfully talk about which of those judgments are permitted by different moral codes. In the physics cases, by contrast, while the proposition expressed by “The Earth moves” is of the form: x is P the proposition expressed by the replacing sentence “The Earth moves relative to F” is of the form: x R y; end p 30
the concept of a monadic property moves has been replaced by the concept of a relational property moves-relative-to, a concept which no more contains moves as a proper part than the concept alternative contains the concept native as a proper part. There is no way to understand the replacing proposition in this case as built up out of the old proposition in the manner that is presupposed by a Fictionalist view of morality. This difference at the level of logical form leads to the problems that attend Fictionalist Relativism. Because, in such a view, the old proposition is retained intact in the new proposition, it carries with it the charge of untruth that launches a relativistic conception. Because the new proposition places the old absolute proposition into a contentual relation to a set of propositions of a very similar nature, that charge carries over to the parameter to which the truth of moral propositions is being relativized. The result becomes something barely intelligible. The moral relativist's best shot is to say that the original absolute propositions are complete but false. On this option, however, he faces the difficulty of explaining how we are able to accept a set of propositions that we know to be false; and the difficulty of explaining how he avoids commitment to there being some absolute moral facts somewhere after all, because the falsity of moral prohibitions seems to entail the existence of moral permissions. If he now attempts to retreat to the view that the target propositions are incomplete, his problems get even worse: for now he faces the difficulty of saying how alternative moral codes could be alternative conceptions of the moral facts and how proposition fragments could complete, in the required way, the incomplete character of the target propositions. None of these problems arise in the physics cases because in those cases the old proposition is discarded and is simply replaced with a new relational proposition, which, it turns out, is the only truth that there is in the vicinity of the old judgments.
Codes as Imperatives Well, why isn't the lesson of these considerations that we should hew to the physics model far more closely? Why couldn't we formulate a satisfactory moral relativism by saying that in the moral case, It would be wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car is discovered to be untrue and is to be replaced not by: [It would be wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car] is entailed by moral code M but rather by: Paul stealing Mark's car is wrong-relative-to M, end p 31
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where the hyphenation makes clear that we are now talking about a replacement proposition of the form “xRy”? We will turn to looking at what this might mean in a moment, but before we do so, we should pause to remark on a small puzzle that attends the cases that are drawn from physics. The puzzle can be put as follows. If my account of the physics cases is correct, classical motion judgments are untrue. If anything in their vicinity is true, it is not those original motion judgments but some other judgments, with a different logical form and involving distinct concepts. But how could the truth of these other judgments, which do not themselves involve the concept of motion, amount to the discovery that a relativism about motion is true? If I replace talk of phlogiston with talk of oxygen, that is not a way of discovering the atomic nature of phlogiston. Why do we take ourselves to have discovered that motion is relative? In the usual account of things, there is supposed to be a distinction between eliminativism and relativism. In the case of the former, we respond to the discovery that a domain of discourse is systematically untrue by rejecting that discourse and, possibly, substituting some other discourse in its place. In the case of the latter, we respond by declaring that we have discovered the truths in that domain to be relative in nature. But how are we to make out this distinction between eliminativism and relativism if, even in the classic cases of alleged relativism, what we get is the wholesale replacement of one set of judgments by another? Why aren't all cases, including the famous ones from physics, just cases of eliminativism? This puzzle would be solved if, say in the case of motion, there were a more general concept,
MOTION,
itself neither
absolutist nor relativist, such that both the absolutist and the relativistic notions could be seen to be subspecies of it. I think it is likely that there is such a concept, but I won't attempt to define one now. It will suffice for present purposes to point out that, given that a relativist view of a given domain always involves the replacement of the original absolute judgments by certain relational judgments, we need to be shown that these two sets of judgments are sufficiently intimately related to each other, in the sense just gestured at, to justify our saying that what we have on our hands is relativism and not eliminativism. Let us call this the requirement of intimacy. Let us turn, now, to the question of what moral relativism would look like if it assumed a non-Fictionalist form of Replacement Relativism. The two central questions we face are: what relation could “is-wrong-relative-to” be? And what parameter could “M” designate such that specific acts of stealing might or might not bear that relation to it? It is already clear from the foregoing considerations, that whatever a moral code is going to be, it cannot consist of a set of propositions. A natural alternative conception, as I've already noted, is to think of it as a set of imperatives, rather than propositions. So let us see how far we can take that idea, which, in any event, might be thought to have independent appeal. end p 32
If moral code M consists of a set of imperatives of the form: Don't do x! how should we think of the relation “is-wrong-relative-to”? A natural suggestion would be that it means “is one of the acts prohibited by.” If we put all this together, and we remind ourselves of the importance of including a reference to the speaker's endorsement of a particular code, we get the following account: “Paul's stealing Mark's car is wrong-relative-to M” means: Paul's stealing Mark's car is one of the acts prohibited by the set of imperatives, M, which I, the speaker, accept. How well does this proposal fare?
Problems for Imperatival Moral Relativism One immediate question concerns the requirement of intimacy. How are we going to show that the replacing and replaced propositions are sufficiently intimately related to justify our saying that we have shown moral truths to be relative? How are we to ward off the suggestion that what we have here instead is just moral nihilism, with moral discourse discarded in favor of some replacement where we talk not of what is good and bad but only of what is and is not permitted according to imperatives that we accept and choose to live our lives by? This story would be easier to fill in, if we could explain what makes a given set of imperatives moral imperatives. The relativist's idea is that moral judgments need to be relativized to moral codes. On the propositional construal, it was quite clear what made the relevant codes moral: they were constituted by propositions which encoded particular conceptions of moral right and wrong. That conception of moral codes, however, proved unworkable for the purposes of relativism. On the imperatival construal, however, we simply have a set of imperatives without any distinctive moral content. What makes these imperatives moral imperatives as opposed to some other sort of injunction? Clearly, we would have to look not to the imperatives themselves, but to their acceptance by agents to see what
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might distinguish them from imperatives of another variety—prudential imperatives, for example, or aesthetic ones. There had better be something distinctive about the acceptance of moral imperatives for otherwise we would not have pinned down that we are relativizing to a specifically moral code. But it is far from clear that there is such a distinctive state of mind.
9
9 For a particularly sophisticated account see Allan Gibbard, Thinking How to Live (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).
end p 33
A further problem that attends the imperatival construal concerns its ability to capture norms of permission. Let me explain. As we have already had occasion to note, moral norms might be either norms of permission or norms of requirement. We may be required to do something, A, under particular conditions, C, or simply permitted to do it. Imperatives, however, are, by definition, of the form: If C, do A. It is this logical form that marks them out as non-propositional—incapable of assessment as true or false. However, it is not clear how something of imperatival form is going to capture a norm of permission, a norm that merely allows doing A if C but does not require it. If I issue the imperative: “If that car doesn't belong to you, don't scratch it” I am requiring you not to scratch it, not merely permitting it. For that reason, it is very hard to see how imperatives alone could constitute a fully satisfactory construal of what moral codes are. A further problem for the imperatival construal will be familiar from our discussion of the propositional construal. In that discussion, we saw that the relativist had difficulty accommodating the normative character of moral judgments, even after the thinker's endorsement of a particular moral code is brought into the picture. (17) In relation to (propositional) moral code M, which I, the speaker, accept, it would be wrong of Paul to steal Mark's car. As I pointed out, this still seems to be a descriptive remark about which beliefs one has, rather than a genuinely normative remark about what ought and ought not to be done. This problem, it seems to me, only intensifies on the imperatival construal whose counterpart of (17) is: In relation to the set of imperatives, M, which, I, the speaker, accept, it is prohibited for Paul to steal Mark's car. The final and probably most important objection to the imperatival construal derives from an observation we had occasion to make earlier—namely, that moral codes are normally expressed through the use of indicative sentences that are themselves just more general versions of the sentences by which particular moral judgments are expressed. Thus, it would be natural to say that our moral code, which contains a prohibition against stealing, would be expressed by the sentence: (17) “Stealing is wrong.” And this sentence is itself just a general version of the various particular sentences by which we express ordinary moral judgments such as: end p 34
(18) “Paul's stealing Mark's car is wrong.” Now, though, if (17) is taken to express an imperatival content roughly given by: Don't Steal! it's very hard to see how (18) could have any other sort of content because they are both sentences of exactly the same type, the only difference being that (17) is a generalization of (18). In other words, if the imperatival construal of moral codes is correct, we would appear to have no choice but to take (18) to express the content: (19) Don't steal Mark's car, Paul! (18), though, is just the sort of ordinary, unqualified, absolutist sentence that the relativist is going to seek to replace by relational sentences of the form: (20) “Paul stealing Mark's car is wrong-relative-to M.” on the grounds that there are no absolute facts about morality with which to confirm the absolutist sentences. However, if it is really true that (18) expresses an imperatival content of the kind specified by (19), then it is very hard to see what motive there could be to replace it, or how the discovery that there are no absolute moral facts could
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be relevant to it in any way. Since it just expresses the imperatival content: Don't Steal Mark's car, Paul! it has not made any claim; and since it has not made any claim it can hardly be true that it is condemned to having made a false claim; and since it is not condemned to having made a false claim, it can hardly be true that it needs to be replaced on the grounds that it is so condemned. The imperatival construal of moral codes, then, far from showing us how coherently to implement a relativistic view of morality seems rather to make relativism irrelevant and inapplicable.
Conclusion In this paper, I have attempted to explain how a relativistic conception of a given domain should be understood. And I have then tried to outline the obstacles that stand in the way of extending such a conception to the domains that have most interested philosophers—those of morality and epistemic justification. 10
10
In this paper, I have confined myself to talking about the moral case; the epistemic case is treated explicitly in my book Fear of Knowledge (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006), chs 5–7.
end p.35
It is natural to wonder whether there is an alternative conception of relativism that would serve some of these traditional philosophical preoccupations better. The main alternative to the account I have been exploring is provided by the idea that a relativistic conception of a given domain consists in the claim that there can be faultless disagreement in that domain. Here is Crispin Wright: Imagine that Tim Williamson thinks that stewed rhubarb is delicious and that I beg to differ, finding its dry acidity highly disagreeable. There is, on the face of it, no reason to deny that this is a genuine disagreement—each holding to a view that the other rejects. But it is a disagreement about which, at least at first pass, the Latin proverb—de gustibus non est disputandum—seems apt. It is, we feel—or is likely to be—a disagreement which there is no point in trying to settle, because it concerns no real matter of fact but is merely an expression of different, permissibly idiosyncratic tastes. Nobody's wrong. Tim and I should just agree to disagree. Call such a disagreement a dispute of inclination. The view of such disputes just gestured at . . . combines three elements: That they involve genuinely incompatible attitudes (Contradiction); That nobody need be mistaken or otherwise at fault (Faultlessness), and That the antagonists may, perfectly rationally, stick to their respective views even after the disagreement comes to light and impresses as intractable (Sustainability).
According to this characterization, then, relativism about a given domain is the view that there may be faultless disagreement in that domain. One person may assert p and the other not-p, yet it needn't be the case that either of them is at fault, not merely in the sense that both might be equally rational, but in the far more demanding sense that both might have said something true. But how could any domain pull off such a trick? How could it turn out that a proposition and its negation might both come out true? Remarkably enough, a number of writers have recently proposed answers to this question. Wright proposes to make sense of the combination of Contradiction and Faultlessness by invoking his view of truth as super-assertibility. Kit Fine has suggested that we could make sense of it by regarding the opposed judgments as targeting “different realities” (though Fine proposes his solution only in connection with issues about the passage of time and not necessarily in connection with other subject matters). And John MacFarlane has explored the idea that we can make sense of it by regarding the truth of a proposition as settled not just by a world and a time but also by a “context of assessment.”
11
11 Crispin Wright, ‘Intuitionism, Realism, Relativism and Rhubarb,’ this volume (Ch. 2); Kit Fine, ‘Tense and Reality,’ in his Papers on Tense and Reality
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); John MacFarlane, ‘Making Sense of Relative Truth,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2003.
I am doubtful that we can ultimately make sense of the notion of a proposition that can sustain faultless disagreement. I don't see how any such proposition end p 36
could serve as the plausible object of belief, the very thing for which the notion of a proposition is needed. I also believe that many of the arguments developed in this paper, about the difficulty of coming up with a satisfactory characterization of the “standards” to which moral or epistemic judgments are to be relativized, will carry over to the conceptions of relativism characterized by faultless disagreement. However, many important questions remain unexplored and there is much interesting work that remains to be done. end p 37
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2 Intuitionism, Realism, Relativism and Rhubarb
1 The Ordinary View of Disputes of Inclination Imagine that Tim Williamson thinks that stewed rhubarb is delicious and that I beg to differ, finding its dry acidity highly disagreeable. There is, on the face of it, no reason to deny that this is a genuine disagreement—each holding to a view that the other rejects. But it is a disagreement about which, at least at first pass, the Latin proverb—de gustibus non est disputandum—seems apt. It is, we feel—or is likely to be—a disagreement which there is no point in trying to settle, because it concerns no real matter of fact but is merely an expression of different, permissibly idiosyncratic tastes. Nobody's wrong. Tim and I should just agree to disagree. Call such a disagreement a dispute of inclination. The view of such disputes just gestured at—I'll call it the Ordinary View—combines three elements: 1. that they involve genuinely incompatible attitudes (Contradiction); 2. that nobody need be mistaken or otherwise at fault (Faultlessness); and 3. that the antagonists may, perfectly rationally, stick to their respective views even after the disagreement comes to light and impresses as intractable (Sustainability). Assuming that there are indeed disputes as so characterized, it is of course an important and controversial issue how far they extend—whether, for example, certain differences of opinion about ethics, or aesthetics, or justification, or even theoretical science, come within range. But my question here is more basic: it is whether the three noted elements can be combined coherently—whether there are any disputes of inclination, as characterized by the Ordinary View, at all. The question is given urgency by the fact that the four most salient alternatives to the Ordinary View all seem rebarbative or misconceived. There is, first, the rampant realist proposal—an analogue of the epistemic conception of vagueness. Rampant realism holds that there have to be facts of the matter which end p 38
either Tim or I are missing. Rhubarb just has to be either delicious or not, so one of us has to be mistaken, even if there is no way of knowing who. Such a view is vulnerable to a charge of semantical and metaphysical superstition. It also arguably precludes Sustainability—the possibility of persisting in the dispute with rational integrity—since neither Tim nor I have the slightest reason to think that our own tastes reflect the putative real facts about deliciousness, once rampant—realistically conceived. Realism need not be rampant. A more moderate realism might try to domesticate the relevant facts by attempting to construe them as, in one way or another, response dependent—proposing, for instance, that what is delicious is what (a majority of) well-qualified judges find to be so. But this seems a misdirection too: for one thing, I don't think we really believe in ‘well-qualifiedness’ in basic matters of taste—that's the point of the Latin proverb. For another, the proposal promises no better than its rampant counterpart in accommodating Faultlessness and Sustainability. Recoiling from these views, one may be tempted by the thought that perhaps no genuine dispute is involved after all. Perhaps the impression to the contrary is somehow an artefact of language. One—expressivist—version of that idea has it that we are misled by the indicative surface of the dispute: maybe Tim's avowal that rhubarb is delicious serves merely to give expression to the pleasure he takes in the stuff and is thus something with no properly negatable content; maybe my avowal to the contrary serves merely to give expression to my corresponding distaste for it. Such a proposal will face all the familiar difficulties in the philosophy of language—difficulties for example in accounting for routine conditional, disjunctive, tensed and attitudinal constructions embedding such apparent indicative contents —which are faced by strict expressivist proposals in other areas, and to which many believe they have no satisfactory response. An alternative strategy for denying that there is any genuine disagreement is to take the indicative appearances at face value, but hold that the contents in question are not really in conflict—for instance, that they are elliptical and that when the ellipsis is unpacked, the impression of incompatibility vanishes. It may be suggested, for instance, that Tim's view is properly characterized as being that rhubarb is delicious by his standards, and that I am saying that rhubarb is not delicious by mine. So we are talking past each other and may both well be right. This suggestion is open to the charge that it distorts the meaning of what we intend to say when we give voice to judgements of taste. There is, for example, a challenge involved in the question: ‘If, as you say, rhubarb is delicious, how come nobody but you here likes it?’, which goes missing if the proper construal of it mentions an explicit standard-relativity in the antecedent. So it looks as though a larger package will be called for, involving not just hidden constituents but an error-theory concerning our ordinary understanding of the relevant kinds end p 39
of claim. A related consideration points out that, on our ordinary understanding, the explicitly standard-relativized kind of formulation represents a fall-back claim if the original, unqualified claim gets into difficulty—a puzzling phenomenon if they coincide in content.
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There are other forms of semantic contextualism, of course, besides those which postulate ellipsis or hidden constituents. But the awkwardnesses just noted will remain on any such view. If Tim's and my differing tastes are sufficient, one way or another, to ensure that we express different concepts of the delicious in our respective assessments of rhubarb, and hence that there is no obstacle to our both being right, then why will we each be inclined to withdraw if suitably many others don't concur? Why doesn't the contextualist explanation of why my judgement is not in conflict with Tim's survive as a means to explain why I can be right no matter how idiosyncratic my view? And why fall back on an explicitly standard-relativized claim if the content of my original claim was already implicitly relativized? Each of the four views canvassed—that there is a real but undetectable fact of the matter about whether rhubarb is delicious, that there is a real but response-dependent fact of the matter, that there is no real matter in dispute because no truth-evaluable content is involved, and that there is no real dispute because the contents involved are elliptical, or otherwise contextually distinct—each of these four views not merely involves compromise of one or more of the three components of the Ordinary View but seems open to additional objection. If we want to avoid metaphysical hypostasis, snobbery in matters of taste, unplayable philosophy of language, or misrepresentation of linguistic practice, then we should want the Ordinary View. So it comes as an unpleasant surprise that it seems, under quite modest pressure, to collapse.
2 The Simple Deduction The collapsing argument is what in earlier work I dubbed the Simple Deduction. 1
1
Wright (2001, 2002).
It is disarmingly straightforward. The idea that there is genuine disagreement involved in the dispute goes with the idea that there is a genuinely indicative content, capable of featuring in attitudes and standing in relations of incompatibility to other such contents. Any such genuine content can also be supposed. So: suppose that rhubarb is delicious. Then I'm mistaken. But the Ordinary View has it that no one is mistaken (Faultlessness). So rhubarb isn't delicious. But then Tim is mistaken. So someone has to be mistaken after all. Contradiction precludes Faultlessness. end p.40
More explicitly: 1
(1) A accepts P
——
Assumption
2
(2) B accepts Not-P
——
Assumption
3
(3) A's and B's disagreement involves no mistake
——
Assumption
4
(4) P
——
Assumption
2, 4
(5) B is making a mistake
——
2, 4
2, 3
(6) Not-P
——
4, 5, 3 Reductio
1, 2, 3
(7) A is making a mistake
——
1, 6
1,2
(8) Not-[3]
——
3, 3, 7 Reductio
The occurrence of genuine disagreement seems to demand, by elementary and uncontroversial logical moves, the existence of mistakes. 2
2
Note in particular that there is no appeal to the Law of Excluded Middle.
Further, once that's recognized, it becomes impossible to see how Tim and I can persist in our disagreement with rational integrity. Apparently one of us has to be mistaken. But if one of us is mistaken, how can we tell who? Isn't it just a conceit to think it has to be the other? So Sustainability is compromised too. Thus the three components in the Ordinary View fall apart. Faced with this difficulty, the natural temptation for a proponent of the Ordinary View is to try to refine the second component—to qualify Faultlessness. Maybe it's too much to demand that there need be no mistake involved in the dispute. Maybe the most that can be asked is that there be no epistemically blameworthy mistake. Perhaps Faultlessness should be replaced by something like the idea that neither Tim nor I need have done anything which would have opened our opinions to proper suspicion when considered in isolation, by someone with no view on the matter in hand but otherwise as knowledgeable as you like. Or something like that. But this suggestion doesn't really help. For one thing, part of the attraction of Faultlessness is that, while we want to acknowledge that there may be no settling a dispute of inclination, we precisely don't want that acknowledgement to commit us to the idea of potentially unknowable facts of the matter—that's why the rampant realist proposal strikes us as so bizarre. The rhetoric of ‘no fact of the matter’ expresses the natural, folk-philosophical view: such disputes are potentially irresolvable, we think, not because the facts in question can transcend our impressions but because the impressions themselves are in some way basic and constitutive; so when they conflict, there need be no further court of appeal. If that thought can be reconciled with the idea of truth at all, then truth—at least in matters of taste—had better be per se knowable. But then the Simple Deduction is easily emended to argue not just that Tim's and my disagreement must involve a mistake but that it must involve a cognitive shortcoming in the stronger sense proposed, since one of us fails to know something that can be known. 3
3
For elaboration, see the ‘EC-Deduction’ at p. 60 of Wright (2001).
Note in particular that there is no appeal to the Law of Excluded Middle.
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And indeed, even if the Ordinary View can somehow avoid commitment to evidential constraint, the situation is still not stable. For the conclusion of the end p.41
Simple Deduction, that there is a mistake—false belief—involved in any such dispute, still stands unchallenged, even if no cognitive blame need attach to either disputant. And now, since for all I can tell it may as well be me who has a false belief as Tim, and since Tim is in an analogous position, it still seems impossible to understand how it can be rationally acceptable for us to agree to differ and persist in our respective views. The threat to Sustainability is already posed by the concession that Faultlessness in the weak sense is precluded by Contradiction. So far I've not said anything about relativism. It may be thought that the Ordinary View—the suggestion of the possibility of genuine but fault-free disagreements in which the protagonists are fully rationally entitled to persist in their conflicting opinions—is tantamount to relativism—specifically, to the idea that truth in the region of discourse in which the dispute is articulated should be viewed as relative to the differences in standard, or context, or whatever, which generate the disagreement in the first place. But this is not correct. Relativism, I want to suggest, is best viewed as a theoretical attempt to underwrite and reconcile the elements in the Ordinary View. It is a response to the problem, rather than merely a label for the amalgam of ideas which gives rise to it. Whether it is an adequate, or theoretically attractive, response remains to be seen.
3 An Intuitionistic Response First I want to table a different response. The Simple Deduction—exploiting, be it noted, only the most elementary logic and placing no reliance on any distinctively classical moves—elicits a contradiction from the three assumptions, that Williamson believes that rhubarb is delicious, that Wright believes that rhubarb is not delicious, and that nobody is mistaken. The conclusion seems to be forced, accordingly, that somebody has to be mistaken in any genuine such dispute. But it's not forced. There is a distinctively classical move involved in the interpretation of the reductio as indicative that mistake always has to be involved. Specifically, take the third assumption as that: It is not the case that Williamson is mistaken and it is not the case the Wright is mistaken. Then to interpret the reductio as showing that someone must have made a mistake is to take it that the negation of that conjunction licenses us in concluding: Either Williamson is mistaken or Wright is mistaken. That's to make an inferential transition of the form:
—a pattern whose classical validation demands elimination of double negations, and which is not in general intuitionistically valid. end p.42
Very well. But so what? How might sticking at the intuitionistically valid conclusion—the negated conjunction—put us in a position to accommodate the components in the Ordinary View, and to reconcile them with each other? And even if resisting the transition to the disjunction would help, how might intuitionistic restrictions sufficient to block the relevant de Morgan Law be motivated in the type of context at hand? Let's consider the second question first. The key issue, as always, concerns the status of the principle of Bivalence for statements of the relevant kind. For since: Not (Not A & Not B) is, by uncontroversial steps, equivalent to: Not Not (A V B),
4
4 Assume Not (Not A & Not B) and Not (A V B). Use the latter, vel-intro and Reductio to derive each of Not A and Not B. Conjoin them to derive
a contradiction with Not (Not A & Not B), and discharge Not (A V B) by a further Reductio. Assume Not Not (A V B) and Not A & Not B. Assume A V B and reason by vel-elim and Reductio to Not [Not A & Not B]. A further step of Reductio yields Not [A V B] on Not A & Not B as assumption. One more step of Reductio then gives Not [Not A & Not B] on Not Not (A V B) as assumption.
the move at which it is being suggested we may balk is tantamount to double negation elimination for disjunctions. If this class of cases of double negation elimination is accepted, Excluded Middle will hold quite generally, since its own double negation may likewise be established by wholly uncontroversial steps. Thus assuming—as we may in this dialectical context
5
5 To explain: the present dialectical context is one in which we are assuming that disjunction is distributive—that the truth of a disjunction requires the
truth of at least one of its disjuncts in particular. Otherwise, the conclusion that either Tim is mistaken about rhubarb or I am carries no implication of the actual existence of a mistake. But where disjunction is distributive, the validity of Excluded Middle rests on Bivalence.
—that Excluded Middle rests upon Bivalence, the defensibility of the transition from the thesis that Tim and I cannot
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both be right to the uncomfortable claim that someone in particular—either Tim or me—is mistaken about rhubarb, rests on the defensibility of Bivalence for claims like: ‘rhubarb is delicious’. In intuitionistic mathematics, the challenge to Bivalence is best seen as flowing from a combination of two claims: first an insistence on a form of evidential constraint—that truth in mathematics may not defensively be supposed to outrun decidability in principle by a certain loosely characterized class of constructively acceptable methods; second that, for any theory at least as rich as number theory, we possess no guarantee that any given statement is indeed decidable by such methods. Simply put: if Bivalence holds for Goldbach's conjecture—if either the conjecture or its negation is true—then, by evidential constraint, one or the other will be verifiable by intuitionistically acceptable methods. So since we do not, in our present state of information, know that either can be so verified, we do not, in our present state of information, have any right to claim that end p.43
Bivalence holds for Goldbach's conjecture, nor therefore throughout number-theoretic statements as a class. The intuitionistic reservation about Bivalence is thus one of agnosticism. But it is not an agnosticism based on the spectre of third possibilities—additional truth-values, or truth-value gaps. Rather it is based on our inability to guarantee the possibility of knowledge, along with the thesis—held for independent reasons—that truth requires that possibility for the type of statement for which the validity of Bivalence is under review. Either of these claims may of course be contested for a given class of statements. But both may seem attractive for each of two non-mathematical kinds of example, for which, accordingly, the validity of Bivalence may consequently come into question. One comprises those vague statements typified by predications of adjectives like ‘red’ and ‘bald’. The other is precisely our present focus: judgements of taste and other matters of inclination. In both these cases we are antipathetic to the idea that truth has no implication of ascertainability; but in both cases we are likewise uneasy with the suggestion that claims have to be decidable, one way or the other. In the terminology I have used in earlier work, borderline cases of vague predications, and predications of concepts of taste, are, no less than mathematical statements like Goldbach's conjecture, liable to present quandaries: examples where we may be uncertain not merely what it may be correct to think but even whether there is any metaphysical space for knowledge, or all-thingsconsidered best opinion, properly so-termed. These two pressures—evidential constraint and the potentiality for quandary—squeeze out an unqualified acceptance of Bivalence over the two classes of statements in question; but they put no pressure on a continued adherence to the law of non-contradiction. So we should not, in reasoning among these statements, rely on a logic which forces us to be insensitive to the distinction between them which, it appears, had better be made. This comparison—between statements like Goldbach's conjecture, borderline predications of vague concepts and judgements of taste—has been misunderstood by at least one commentator 6
6
Kölbel (unpublished).
so further clarification may help. Undeniably, there is the following difference. While no one knows whether knowledge either of Goldbach's conjecture or its negation is metaphysically possible and—it is tempting to add—no one is really entitled to an opinion (contrast: a hunch) about the matter, borderline cases of vague predicates may quite unobjectionably give rise to weak, qualified opinions. And matters of taste, for their part, may give rise to strong ones. So what is the intended analogy between the three kinds of statements? What similarity is the notion of quandary meant to mark? The answer is: a similarity which is manifested by each of the three kinds of statement as a class. Sure, any particular statement of each of the three kinds in question is such that we cannot rule out the possibility of a competent determinate—positive or end p.44
negative—view of it (though with statements about borderline cases of vague concepts we can, admittedly, rule out the possibility of a competent but strong view). But nor, in each of the three kinds of case, do we have any grounds for thinking that knowledge, or in all things considered best opinion, has to be possible for every example. In particular, while I may indeed have many opinions on matters of taste, and consider them competent, or even superior, I have to acknowledge that I know nothing which ensures that a determinate knowledgeable or best opinion is possible about every matter of taste or inclination generally. That would be a guarantee that all disputes of inclination have a winner. We have no such guarantee. There, then—in the combination of quandary and evidential constraint—is one kind of motivation for broadly intuitionistic reservations about classical logic in general, and about the (in my formulation above, implicit) final step in the Simple Deduction. If accepted, it allows us to stop short of letting the Simple Deduction conclude that someone has to be mistaken in any dispute of inclination—indeed in any dispute about a genuinely indicative content. Maybe the foregoing train of thought is of most interest in a context in which the primary question is whether the intuitionists' ideas about the logic appropriate to mathematics can be generalized to other regions of discourse. Anything properly viewed as an extension of their ideas will have to involve some kind of play with evidential constraint, since that is the role, in the mathematical case, of their very constructivism. However we should not overlook another, simpler, and perhaps yet more compelling line of reservation about Bivalence in the cases that concern us, which puts evidential constraint to one side. Reflect that the opinion that Bivalence holds, of necessity,
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throughout vague discourse is a commitment to holding that each vague predicate is associated with a property of absolutely sharply bounded extension as its semantic value. But for a very wide class of such expressions—including especially predicates of Lockean secondary qualities—we have no clear idea what kinds of properties these may be. Nor, in general, do we have any clear idea how the required semantic associations might have been established. A commitment to Bivalence holding of necessity in all such cases is a commitment to postulating a kind of arcane natural history of semantic relationships for which we have absolutely no evidence. And it's just the same with predications of taste. There is just the same semantic mystery, just the same puzzlement, in a wide class of cases, about the nature of the properties that would be fit to discharge the demanded role. What is deliciousness if it is to be possible for normally competent speakers, like Tim and me, to go so completely astray about it in a perfectly ordinary case? The idea that there is a mandate for unrestricted Bivalence is, one way or another, a commitment to philosophical obligations—perhaps rampant realist, perhaps response-dependence realist—which we simply do not know how to meet. Surely the mere idea that Tim and I hold contradictory opinions about rhubarb ought to impose no such obligations. The reductio carried out in the Simple Deduction properly end p.45
takes us no further than to the conclusion that our opinions cannot both be true. It is classical logic that is responsible for muddying the distinction between that and the idea that one in particular of us is missing the real fact.
4 Can the Intuitionistic Response Rescue Faultlessness and Sustainability? As remarked, however, it is one question whether there is a well-motivated intuitionistic distinction to draw, in the service of stabilizing the Ordinary View, between the claim that Tim and I cannot both be right about rhubarb and the claim that one of us in particular must be wrong. Even if so, it is a further question whether we thereby secure the means to say something effective in stabilizing the Ordinary View of disputes of inclination. The challenge was to harmonize the three ingredients—Contradiction, Faultlessness and Sustainability. And the point hasn't gone away that if it is insisted that a dispute can be regarded as fault-free only if it's open to us to suppose that each antagonist has a correct view, then a mere acceptance that the dispute is genuine—so involves contradictory opinions—precludes regarding it as fault-free. Punkt. The question, of course, is what, in regarding such a dispute as potentially fault-free, we really intend to maintain. Well, each will have to examine their own preconceptions. But my own impression is that the principal point is to contrast the case with situations where, should attempts at resolution fail, the mere existence of a contrary opinion, no worse supported than one's own, is sufficient to put one at fault in persisting in one's view. That will be a characteristic of the rhubarb dispute once the Simple Deduction is allowed to establish the disjunctive conclusion: either Tim is mistaken or I am. As soon as it is accepted that one of us has to be mistaken, the fact that neither of us is able to make his opinion prevail ought to encourage the worry that the mistaken party could as well be him as his antagonist. And once one recognizes that, then it should seem at best pig-headed not to withdraw from one's initial opinion. If this is right, then the really important thing about the idea of fault-free disagreement in such cases is actually its implication of Sustainability—its implication of the idea that the opinions in a dispute of inclination may justifiably be persisted in, even when it is clear that it is a stalemate. This comes close to but is not quite the same thing as suggesting that the essence of the Ordinary View can be captured just by the first and third components—Contradiction and Sustainability. But that conclusion is not right. There are readily conceivable cases where Contradiction and Sustainability are satisfied but where there is—or may be, depending on one's view—no proper comparison with disputes of inclination. Consider for instance two rival scientific theories which match in their empirical, explanatory and other virtues, which are unsurpassed by any other extant theory, and for which we've yet to end p.46
devise a crucial experiment. It is debatable whether it should be regarded as irrational for a supporter of either theory to persist in holding to it even after he becomes aware of the credentials of the other. After all, there is, by hypothesis, no sufficient reason to adopt the opposing view—there is, by hypothesis, parity of virtue. And merely to abandon either theory without putting anything in its place would mean restoring all the disadvantages, whatever they may be, of having no theory of the subject matter in question at all. In such a case, then, regarding the dispute as genuine and factual is quite consistent with Sustainability. If so, then even if the intuitionistic response can indeed save Sustainability—I will address that in a minute—the scientific example shows us is that we need something extra, something to play the role of Faultlessness, if we are to explain the difference between the two kinds of case. And we are still no wiser about what that extra might be, consistently with the Simple Deduction, nor about whether the intuitionistic setting can provide it. The difference between the two kinds of case—rhubarb and the scientific theoretical disagreement—consists in the way in which Sustainability is supported. In the scientific example, there is reason to accept (at least if one is scientific realist) the disjunctive claim: one theory or the other—and perhaps both—will be false to the facts. One in particular —perhaps both—of the rival theorists will be proposing a misrepresentation of Nature. And the point is then that, notwithstanding that consideration, there are nevertheless overriding pragmatic reasons, grounded in the desirability of having a theory in the first place, for each to persist in their respective views—so that we have Sustainability
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anyway. In the rhubarb dispute, by contrast, there is—according to intuitionistic proposal—no impartial reason to suppose that one disputant in particular—Tim or me—is making a mistake; and it is because there is no reason so to suppose that we have Sustainability. So the suggestion at which we arrive is this: disputes of inclination may indeed be stably characterized by ascribing to them versions of all three features proposed by the Ordinary View: they are genuine disputes in which conflicting opinions are held; they may be fault-free; and they may be rationally sustained even after it becomes clear that they are stand-offs. The refinements we need to add are, first, that in disputes of inclination Sustainability is properly seen as grounded in Faultlessness; in disputes of fact, by contrast, Sustainability, where it occurs, is grounded otherwise—in the scientific theoretical example, for instance, it is grounded pragmatically. Second, Faultlessness needs to be interpreted not as something flatly inconsistent with genuine conflict—with Contradiction—but rather as something that resides in the unavailability of any impartial reason to make (the relevant analogue of ) the disjunctive claim: to insist that there is fault somewhere. What counts against rationally sustaining a dispute, once debate is exhausted without producing a winner, is the thought, roughly, that someone is mistaken here and, for all that has emerged, ‘it could as well be me’. Once it is granted that someone has to be mistaken, that thought locates a concern that rationally ought to occur to each of the antagonists. The concern may still not end p.47
mandate withdrawal if, as in the scientific theory case, there are overriding reasons that license retaining a view. But—the crucial point—it does not get off the ground without independent
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7 Independent, that is, of one's view of the matter in hand.
reason for the disjunctive claim. It is by refusing the disjunctive claim that the intuitionistic proposal rescues Sustainability, and grounds it on Faultlessness, with the latter now understood precisely as located in the shortfall between the negated conjunction—which, it is conceded on all hands, the Simple Deduction establishes—and the stronger disjunctive claim which is what it takes to implicate error on one side or the other. This proposed way of developing the Ordinary View and staving off the threat posed by the Simple Deduction seems to me to be stable this far. The question is whether there is any serious additional cause for dissatisfaction with it.
5 A Problem for the Intuitionistic Rescue The intuitionistic rescue reconciles Contradiction with Faultlessness by insisting that it is insufficient for a dispute to involve Fault, merely that it be a genuine dispute—genuinely involving contrary or contradictory opinions. Conflict of opinion—it is contended—suffices for the presence of mistake only when Bivalence is guaranteed to hold for the discourse of the dispute; and that, it is argued, is something for which there is—in the cases which concern us—no guarantee. Someone who is sympathetic to intuitionistic ideas is not likely to find this a particularly controversial application of them. And indeed I would suggest that this also makes for an argument in the opposite direction. Absent a better kind of proposal, the need to make sense of the Ordinary View, and the apparent impossibility of doing so in a classical framework, provides a powerful argument for sympathy with intuitionistic distinctions and for further work on them. There is, however, a problem with the approach which, if we are convinced that coherent provision must be made for the Ordinary View, threatens to force us to look further afield. Simply stated, it is this: that since the Ordinary View is inconsistent with rampant realism, no justice can have been done to it by an account that is consistent with the possibility that rampant realism is correct. But the intuitionistic proposal merely leaves us in a position of agnosticism about that. The response to the Simple Deduction was to argue that there is no justification for the relevant transition of the form:
Even granting the proposed interpretation of Faultlessness, that is merely to say that there is no extant justification for regarding either Tim or me as having a end p.48
mistaken opinion. But to say that there's no justification for regarding the dispute as involving a mistake is not to say that it's not the case that the dispute involves a mistake. Yet surely, the objection says, Faultlessness should involve the latter. Yet the latter—the negation of the disjunction—does entail, even intuitionistically, the negations of both disjuncts. And those, conjoined, are then inconsistent with the intermediate conclusion—the negated conjunction —which, everyone agrees, the Simple Deduction does establish (and indeed inconsistent in their own right). So, a critic may contend, the intuitionistic rescue has not really saved Faultlessness in any intuitively sufficient sense. The most that has been saved is justification for our reluctance to attribute fault in relevant cases, consistently with acknowledging the Simple Deduction. This leaves it epistemically open that there is indeed a determinate fact of the matter in the rhubarb dispute, and indeed in such disputes in general, and hence that there is indeed a determinate fault on one side or the other. And that is exactly what we—most of us—are reluctant to believe. It is good if the intuitionistic proposal can save us from being forced to think it true just by elementary logic. But we would like to be
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in a position to think it false. A supporter of the intuitionistic rescue may rejoin that it is no serious shortcoming in the proposal that it leaves us at most unsympathetically agnostic towards the rampant realist view of the dispute. After all, that, as it may seem, just is the extent of the justified position. The rampant realist view calls for the association of the predicate ‘delicious’, understood as by both Tim and me, with a property that determinately applies or fails to apply to stewed rhubarb. We may not believe there is, as a matter of metaphysics, any suitable such property, much less that our linguistic practices somehow enthrone such a property as the Bedeutung of ‘delicious’. But come on: we do not know that these things are not so—not if knowing requires being in a position to prove it. The honest objection to rampant realism is not that we know that its presuppositions are not met but that there is not the slightest reason to regard it as true. If the preconceptions that underwrite the Ordinary View slur that distinction, they are not to be respected to the letter. We should stick to what we can justify. This reply, though, only partially addresses the objection. Maybe we do not, strictly, know that rampant realism is false. But at the level of analysis displayed by the Simple Deduction, even with intuitionistic distinctions superimposed, the point remains that no space is left for a coherent belief that neither Tim nor I is mistaken in the original dispute. In particular, no way whatever has been offered of recovering a content for the idea that there is no ‘fact of the matter’ to be mistaken about. Even if we don't know that the rampant realist's insistence that there is indeed a fact of the matter is itself mistaken, it may yet be felt as a very serious limitation of the intuitionistic treatment if it does not, so far, allow us so much as to attach content to the idea of that mistake. The worst mistake of which we have been empowered to make sense is an epistemic mistake: one of lack of end p.49
warrant—the unwarranted insistence that the world and the relevant concepts are bound to conspire to render true one of the disputed opinions or the other. But nothing has been said to explain how, or in what respect, rampant realism might be incorrect, rather than merely unjustified. The intuitionistic rescue provides theoretically respectable houseroom for our reluctance to be press-ganged into realism by the Simple Deduction. But it does not offer—and it seems has no resources to offer—any account of what it would be for (rampant) realism to be, not merely not imposed, but false: a misrepresentation in its own right. Surely, it may be felt, a satisfactory account of disputes of inclination should explain how it is possible that this might be so, even if we are forced to grant that, in the end, we are not in position to show, once and for all, that it is so.
6 The Intuitionistic Rescue Rescued? The objection may seem convincing. But in fact it runs together two distinct complaints and arguably derives some of its force from the conflation. One complaint is that the intuitionistic rescue treats the transition from the conjunction: It is not the case that neither Williamson nor Wright is mistaken to the disjunctive conclusion: Williamson is mistaken or Wright is mistaken merely as a non-sequitur, whereas someone who takes the Ordinary View will want to reserve space for the belief—even if conceded not to be a strictly knowledgeable belief—that the disjunctive conclusion is incorrect: that nobody need be mistaken. Since there is no provision within an intuitionistic framework for a coherent denial of the disjunction, it appears that the intuitionistic rescue cannot do justice to the Ordinary View. However a second, distinct complaint is that the intuitionistic rescue cannot so much as provide for a coherent belief that rampant realism is false—even if it were granted that such disbelief would involve a degree of presumption. Since the Ordinary View is indeed inconsistent with rampant realism, the two complaints converge on the thought that the intuitionistic rescue cannot do justice to the Ordinary View. Nevertheless the complaints are not the same—for the straightforward reason that denial of the disjunction is not required by the denial of rampant realism. What are their relations? Well, rampant realism is—presumably—committed to the disjunction; conversely, an acceptance that the disjunction follows just from the premiss that Tim and I have contradictory views is, arguably, a commitment to rampant realism. But that is not to say that only a framework that provides for a coherent denial of the disjunction can provide for a coherent disbelief in the metaphysical and semantic postulations of rampant realism. That end p 50
would be true only if disbelief in rampant realism were a commitment to denying the disjunction. But that cannot be correct: after all, both Tim and I accept the disjunction, presumably (since each thinks the other is mistaken)—but at most one of us is a rampant realist about matters of basic taste in desserts! It is not—the point is—an acceptance of the disjunction qua propositional content that commits to rampant realism; it is an acceptance that its truth is ensured simply by the fact of Tim's and my respective views being contradictories. In fact, anyone with a determinate—positive or negative—view on whether stewed rhubarb is delicious should accept the
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disjunction; no philosophical commitment is entrained. A philosophical commitment is entered into only when one regards the disjunction as imposed by the nature of the subject matter and the kind of content carried by claims of the kind in dispute. One may therefore reject a rampant realist—indeed, any form of realist—view about those matters without commitment to any particular attitude to the disjunction. The second of the two complaints is accordingly misconceived. A supporter of the intuitionistic rescue is quite at liberty to deny rampant realism. It is not true that he can go no further than agnosticism about the point. He thereby denies that the truth of the disjunction is guaranteed in the way rampant realism supposes. The dialectical situation is, in fact, exactly analogous to that in the philosophy of mathematics, where the intuitionist may quite coherently—if he wishes—deny the Platonist metaphysics of a crystalline world of determinate mathematical structures, potentially conferring truth and falsity upon our mathematical statements in ways transcending all possibility of proof. That denial commits him to denying that Excluded Middle holds of necessity for reasons connected with that metaphysics. But it does not commit him to denying Excluded Middle itself, still less any instance of it. Rather, in the absence of justification for the principle of any other kind, he merely regards it as unacceptable. The first complaint still stands, though: the thought that the intuitionistic rescue leaves no space for a coherent belief that neither Tim nor I is mistaken in the original dispute. The closest the intuitionistic rescue gets to this is in establishing a position from which it can be allowed that the presence of error is dictated neither by elementary logic and the contradictoriness of the attitudes involved nor—I have just argued—by the semantics and metaphysics of discourse of taste. So we save a negative modal claim: there doesn't have to be error for those reasons at least. But we don't, it seems, give sense to the idea that there doesn't have to be error tout court, nor therefore provide any possibility for someone coherently to believe that there isn't any error in the case in point. But wasn't that suggestion just the force of the Latin proverb? Recall that we initially glossed the Ordinary View with the words, ‘Nobody's wrong. Tim and I should just agree to disagree.’ It is easy, of course, to dismiss the idea that there is any such coherent belief, stronger than any of the beliefs that the intuitionistic rescue can accommodate and still remaining to be made sense of. After all, Tim and I do disagree. So Tim end p 51
must think, presumably, that my view is mistaken. And I must think that his is mistaken. So someone who thinks that nobody actually is mistaken is committed to disagreeing with us both—and so to regarding everybody as mistaken: Tim, me, and indeed themselves! If there is a way further forward, it must consist in finding the means to deny that Tim and I must, in fact, each regard the other's view as mistaken—this despite the fact that our views are genuinely contradictory. So in a certain sense, their contradictoriness notwithstanding, we have to agree that our views are not in conflict—that we do not disagree. This extra step is inaccessible on the intuitionistic treatment, and it is unquestionably of interest to consider what kind of position could possibly accommodate an insistence on it while avoiding aporia. One may well think that, for all we have so far seen, the intuitionistic treatment delivers enough to rank as a satisfactory explication of the Ordinary View. But if there is a stable account which manages the extra step—which can somehow allow that while Tim and I have genuinely contradictory attitudes, neither of us need regard the other as mistaken—it may well be felt to offer progress.
7 True Relativism That is the prospectus that what I will call the True Relativist exegesis of the Ordinary View aims to fill. According to true relativism, it can be the case that Tim and I are both right even though we understand the claim that rhubarb is delicious in the same way, and even though we are making incompatible judgements about it. And the reason is because there are no absolute facts about taste—what it is true to say about taste depends upon a stance, or a set of standards, or a set of affective dispositions. The very same claim can be true for Tim and false for me—and that it is so can be something that is available to us both. Familiarly, the idea that truth is globally relative—that some form of relativity is of the nature of truth—has often been held to implicate dialectical incoherence, or worse. Whatever the fact about that, our questions are more specific: whether relative truth is even locally coherent; whether, if so, it can accommodate each of Contradiction, Faultlessness and Sustainability at all; and whether it can do so without undue metaphysical cost, and in particular in a way which allows for more robust understanding of Faultlessness than could be secured by the intuitionistic proposal—a way which allows for a consistent profession that Tim's and my views can both be correct. Obviously, in order to accomplish the last of these things, true relativism has to have the means to block the Simple Deduction before it reaches the problematical line: It's not the case that (it's not the case that Williamson is mistaken and it's not the case that Wright is mistaken). end p 52
It is clear how the attempt should be made. The true relativist must insist that, for statements of the kind that
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concern us, we may no longer validly infer from the supposition that P that someone who holds that not-P is making a mistake. A mistake will be implicated only if the judgement that not-P is held accountable to the same standards, or perspective, or whatever, that are implicated in the (hypothetical) supposition that P is true. Very simply: if P is true by one set of standards, or whatever the relativistic parameter is, and I judge it false by another, then what makes P true need not be something which, in judging that it is not true, I mistakenly judge not to obtain. That, then, will be the shape of the true relativist response to the Simple Deduction. The question is whether it can be made sense of. There is a temptation to think that making sense of it is easier than it really is which we need to expose straight away. A philosopher seeking to stabilize the Ordinary View should not be interested in relativity—as a function of context of utterance, or whatever else—in the truth-conditions, and hence the truth-values, of sentences. The relativity that needs to be made out is relativity in the truth of thoughts, or propositions. If we identify a proposition by its truth-conditions, the relevant form of relativity is relativity in the question whether those very truth-conditions are satisfied. Suppose that in the course of a medical procedure, a surgeon says of a scalpel that's been poorly prepared: ‘This instrument is dangerously blunt.’ Later, when the instrument is about to be re-sharpened and sterilized, his assistant may warn an inexperienced orderly: ‘Watch out when you handle that—it's dangerously sharp.’ Granted, it would be crass to say that the surgeon and his assistant mean different things by ‘sharp’ and ‘blunt’ respectively. What is true is that there is a relativity of standard: the surgeon's needs require a much finer edge on the blade than would suffice to justify his assistant's subsequent warning. A similar set-up is illustrated by the kind of attributer-contextualist accounts of knowledge proposed by writers such as Keith DeRose and Stewart Cohen. 8
8
See, for instance, DeRose (1992, 2002), and Cohen (1999).
The point to note, however, is that the kind of relativity involved in these examples—plausible in the case of the scalpel, more controversial in the case of knowledge-contextualism—is not at all to our present purpose. For while it would be crass to see them as involving anything comparable to simple ambiguity in ‘sharp’ or ‘knows’, they do involve that the truth-conditions of ascriptions of sharpness and knowledge are so affected by contextual or other relevant parameters that there is no single content respectively affirmed and denied by the surgeon's claim and that of his assistant, or—to cut a long story short—by G. E. Moore's claim that he knows he has a hand and the sceptical claim that he does not. These views might naturally, if perhaps a little loosely, be described as involving relativism about sharpness, or knowledge. But true relativism is relativism about truth. It is not the thesis that the content of a certain kind of ascription can vary as a function of varying standards, or contexts, or other end p 53
parameters. That's a thesis that, applied to our present problem, simply gives up on the attempt to satisfy Contradiction and so holds out no comfort to the Ordinary View. True relativism is the thesis—to repeat—that after the truth-conditions of an utterance have been settled, there can be relativity in the question whether they are satisfied. It is a thesis that engages at the level of content, rather than at the level of speech-acts. Or if it is not, then it's merely a slightly more sophisticated cousin of the simple indexical relativist proposal I canvassed at the start—a variant which holds that while a statement on which a dispute of inclination is targeted is indeed not an ellipsis for something which explicitly mentions some parametric standard or perspective, etc., it is nevertheless something whose content is implicitly fixed by reference to such a parameter, so that—as before—Tim and I will have no genuine conflict of opinion about rhubarb. A true relativist accommodation of the Ordinary View must demand that it is the very same proposition that Tim affirms and that I deny—and at the same time that neither the affirmation nor the denial need be mistaken, with this a point which the antagonists themselves can coherently take on board. The latter point is entirely unproblematical if it is not really the same proposition that is involved. What the relativist has to explain, in contrast, is how to maintain the point alongside the claim that there is a single proposition affirmed and denied respectively. What is the relevant notion of propositional identity, and how is it possible rationally to affirm the truth of such a proposition consistently with allowing that someone else's denial of it is also true? It is not, it seems to me, at all straightforward to see that the demanded notion of relative truth—relative truth at the level of propositions—is fully intelligible. But the difficulties are especially daunting if we essay to think of truth as correspondence, in a robust sense of correspondence with calls for an internal relation between a proposition, conceived as an articulated abstract entity, and some correspondingly articulated aspect of non-propositional reality. On any such picture of truth and truth-conferral, it seems impossible to make room for the additional parameter which relativism posits; the internal structural relationship between propositions and the things that make them true or false is so conceived as to be essentially dyadic. It's like the congruence in form between a head-and-shoulders sculpture and the model who posed for it. No doubt the former may be an accurate representation, or not, relative to the conventions of representation, but we are looking for something to illuminate an alleged relativity which bites after the conventions of representation have been fixed. And we draw a blank. The unavoidable conclusion seems to be that, while particular such conventions may allow of degrees of accuracy in representation, the degree to which there is accuracy is something which supervenes entirely upon the respective physiognomies of the statue and the sitter. There is no place for a third term in the relation.
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9 As JC Beall points out in his contribution to this volume, this conclusion is good only if one assumes that a single world furnishes the facts to which the
propositions at issue are liable to (mis)-correspond. If sense could somehow be made of the Goodmanian figure of distinct worlds to correspond to distinct sensibilities, Tim and I could each be thinking the literal (correspondence-) truth about our respective worlds.
end p 54
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If that is correct, the immediate lesson to draw is merely the unremarkable one that to attempt to think of truth— propositional truth—relativistically is to foreclose on thinking of it as correspondence. That's an objection to relativism only if it's impossible to think of truth in any other viable way. Suppose on the contrary that, at least in some regions of thought, truth may satisfyingly be construed as consisting in some kind of coherence relation, with coherence an internal, analytic relationship, fixed by the content of the propositions among which it obtains. Let it be proposed, for example, that the truth of a proposition consists in its participation within a maximal, coherent system of propositions incorporating some specified base class of propositions, B. Then depending on the choice of B, a proposition may be true or not—may be a member of the relevant maximal set of coherent propositions or not—even after its content is fully fixed. Such a conception of truth may only locally have any attraction at all—one might, for example, think of truth in pure set theory along such lines—but it provides at least a prima facie model of how a truth predicate for propositions may intelligibly be conceived as relative. 10
10
For the credentials of coherence, so conceived, to count as truth, and for more general discussion of what it takes for a predicate to express the
concept of truth, see Wright (1998).
No such coherentist model is presumably wanted for the notion of truth that is to engage disputes of taste and other matters of inclination. Still, the example suggests that once one begins to think of truth along the kind of pluralist lines that a number of philosophers, myself included, have canvassed in recent work,
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11 See especially Wright (1992, 1998); and Michael Lynch (2001, 2004).
it may be possible to come closer to a stable working-out of true relativism than one might otherwise suspect.
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12 The tension between correspondence truth and relativistic truth, and indeed an implicit pluralism about truth, is actually close to the surface, it seems to
me, in several of the treatments canvassed in the recent revival of sympathetic discussion of relativism within analytical philosophy. John MacFarlane, for example, in a growing series of important discussions (for instance, MacFarlane (2003, 2005 and forthcoming) has tended to promote a conception of the conferrers of relativistic truth as consisting in ordered pairs of a world and a ‘context of assessment’. Likewise Max Kölbel (2002, 2004) proposes that truth is relative to what he terms ‘perspective’—where the very word conjures the idea of an argument-place: something the perspective is a perspective on. These proposals are, of course, partly formal: what may vary with variation in the context of assessment, or the perspective, is just whatever truth is being conceived as relative to—perhaps standards, perhaps taste, perhaps information, perhaps time. But it is unintelligible what contribution a world is supposed to make except as providing an input of unreconstructed states of affairs, things standing thus-and-so. The very intellig bility—even prima facie intelligibility—of the kind of framework MacFarlane explicitly, and Kölbel implicitly, propose thus seems to call for a prior domain of circumstances—the kind of thing a ‘world’ contributes to the ordered pair, or what a perspective is exercised on—of which, presumably, there is no obstacle in principle to an independent self-standing statement. For such statements there will then be no need—and, on pain of vicious regress, ultimately no space—for a relativistic conception of truth.
I'll conclude by outlining one specific suggestion in that direction. end p 55
8 Relativism and Idealized Assertibility Assertibility 13
13
I use ‘assertibility’, as is customary if a little unhappy, as a shorthand for warranted assertibility, where the relevant notion of warrant relates just to the
acceptance of the content asserted and has no other bearing on the justifiability of (publicly) asserting it.
is manifestly a relative notion: a statement may be assertible relative to one state of information and not to another. Might notions of truth arrived at by idealization of assertibility retain this, or a kindred, relativity? There are two principal such proposed idealizations to be found in the literature. The first, in the Peircean tradition and associated with Hilary Putnam's latterly renounced ‘internal realism’, idealizes on the state of information: what is true is what is assertible in a state of information incorporating all possible relevant data for the proposition in question. It's obvious that this proposal, whatever we might want to say pro- or anti- the credentials of the resulting truth predicate, holds out no interesting prospect of relativism, since the whole point of the idealization involved is that it is supposed to ensure convergence. Either a proposition is assertible at the relevant Peircean limit of information gathering—in which case it is true simpliciter—or, even at the limit, its credentials are matched by a rival, in which case it is neither assertible nor—for internal realism—true. Matters may turn out interestingly differently, however, if the idealization assumes the form proposed in the notion of superassertibility.
14
14 See C. Wright (1992, 1998).
Superassertibility is the property not of being assertible in some ideal—perhaps limiting—state of information, but of being assertible in some ordinary, accessible state of information and then remaining so no matter what additions or improvements are made to it. When superassertibility for a given class of statements is taken to be truth, then truth is held to consist not in assertibility at some ideal limit of information gathering but in enduring assertibility over indefinite improvements. Does superassertibility offer the prospect of an interesting relativity? More specifically: can this happen—that in a single world one thinker, Hero, is in position to accept P, and another, Heroine, is in position to accept not-P, and that each can retain their respective situations no matter what improvements or enlargements are made to their states of information? Well, not if Hero's and Heroine's respective bodies of information allow of pooling, and if it is determinate and unique what the resulting pooled state of information should be, and determinate whether it supports P, or not-P, or neither.
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But those conditions may not all be met. When Hero and Heroine bring their respective bodies of information together, it may be that there is more than one equally rationally defensible way for accommodating the components into a unified state, each maybe involving some discards, with none superior to the others in virtue of the number or kind of discards involved or the quality of the information remaining. It may also happen that some of the resulting end p 56
enlarged states of information continue to warrant acceptance of P, and others acceptance of not-P. And once granted to be possible at all, it's difficult to see how to exclude the thought that such a situation might persist indefinitely. In that case superassertibility would be relative to a starting point, an initial basis for acceptance or rejection. If one were satisfied there were no other obstacles to the identification of truth with superassertibility over the region of discourse in question, that would be a kind of relativity of truth. However, the kind of case which is our main focus—disputes of taste—is marked by the following peculiarity: that the basic form of assertibility condition for statements of the relevant kind is given by a subject's finding herself in a certain type of non-cognitive affective state: liking the taste of rhubarb, for instance. The basic form of assertibility condition, that is to say, for the impersonal statement—about the vegetable—coincides with that for the self-ascription of a subjective state that is not conceived—at least not by anyone attracted to the Ordinary View—as a cognitive response. In that case Hero and Heroine may respectively be in a position to assert P and to assert not-P, not because they possess differing initial information bases but just by virtue of differing in their non-cognitive responses to things—and because these responses are non-cognitive, there will be no clear sense to the idea of ’pooling’ their respective starting points and determining what is warranted by the result. Of course there is such a thing as enlarging one's information by the addition of the datum that others do not share a particular non-cognitive response. But if that datum is not treated per se as a defeater, then there will be no immediate threat to the superassertibility of the original claim. Much more would need to be said if a satisfying proposal in this direction is to be developed. In particular, if a content is to be associated with the impersonal statement—‘Rhubarb is delicious’—contrasting with that of a subjective report, then something has to be said about how the contrast between the two is sustained. Presumably such an account will give central place to asymmetries in the conditions of defeat, with the assertibility of, for example, ‘I relish eating rhubarb,’ surviving in circumstances where that of ‘Rhubarb is delicious’ is lost. It's hard to envisage how the story might plausibly go without some kind of play with intersubjective accord: what purposes could be served by our having the impersonal form of statement if one could seldom reliably encourage expectations in an audience about their own affective states and responses? Still, if one's own tastes are not too idiosyncratic—if enough of a constituency goes along with them—then that may be enough to license a claim, even if significantly many may, with the same license, dissent from it. And in that case there may be theoretical advantages in representing the situation as one in which conflicting claims are each true relative to varying parameters of taste, with truth construed as superassertibility on the basis of a notion of assertibility grounded on the relevant non-cognitive affect. end p 57
Such a proposal looks to be promisingly placed to handle Faultlessness and Sustainability. But matters may seem less clear with Contradiction—the claim that genuinely incompatible opinions are involved: how exactly does the proposal promise a better accommodation of the Ordinary View in this respect than the kind of position, illustrated by the examples of the blunt scalpel and knowledge-attributions when construed along contextualist lines, which effectively diagnoses disputes of inclination as illusory? What can be said, in the spirit of the superassertibilist-relativist proposal, to support the idea that it is the same content that, as it may be, is superassertible for Tim but not for me? To think of truth in some area of discourse as constituted by superassertibility no doubt leaves considerable latitude when it comes to theorizing about propositional content. I shall not here attempt such a theory. However, if Tim and I do have an understanding in common of the proposition that rhubarb is delicious, as it occurs in our respective affirmation and denial, it would be natural to locate the commonality in a shared conception of basic, sufficient—if defeasible—grounds for accepting the proposition (one's enjoying rhubarb, presumably) and a shared conception of the consequences of regarding it as correct. Among the latter might be, for example, the desirability of regular harvesting of one's rhubarb crop when in season, a high ranking for choosing a dessert in a German restaurant identified to one as rhubarb crumble, a high priority assigned to the rhubarb patch in the reorganization of the vegetable garden, and so on. Commonality of understanding will involve that my negative view, by contrast, will lead to corresponding low priorities and opposed choices. This is the pre-theoretic background against which it seems intuitive to say that Tim and I have genuinely conflicting views about a single proposition. An explicit theory subserving the point would be one in the broad tradition deriving from Gentzen's work on the logical constants which locates the individuation of content in canonical grounds and consequences. Against this kind of background, it's salient that the situation contrasts with the case of the rejected scalpel. Baldly, suitable grounds for the attribution of sharpness that the surgeon denies would be quite different to those sufficient for the attribution of sharpness that the orderly affirms. When the latter asserts that the scalpel is (dangerously) sharp he is not challenging the surgeon's judgement that it is not—as indeed the surgeon is not challenging the orderly's judgement that great care is necessary in handling it and preparing it for sharpening and sterilization. But more: each can quite coherently accept and, in various ways, appropriately act on the other's claim while still maintaining his own—surely a conclusive consideration in favour of the point that different, and compatible, contents
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are involved. By contrast, that Tim and I are involved in genuine disagreement is borne out by the fact that we agree about the, loosely described, consequences of each other's views and then sustain our disagreement through our respective acceptance or rejection of those consequences and the courses of action involved. Tim orders the crumble; I don't. Tim designs his vegetable patch end p 58
in a certain way; I don't. 15
15
Notice that attributor contextualism—which proposes to construe ‘x knows that p’ as comparable to ‘that instrument is dangerously sharp’, rather than
to ‘rhubarb is delicious’, understood as by the Ordinary View—has work to do with this point. A third party can accept not merely that the surgeon's and the orderly's claims are both correct in context: she can, as it were, take both claims on board—indeed the orderly does so, in effect, by replacing the knife with a better prepared one for the purposes of the surgery and then taking appropriate personal care while he sharpens and steriliz es the rejected knife. But what would it be to take on board the claims both of G. E. Moore and a Sceptic: how would one act out a simultaneous acceptance of both claims?
Rational action on either of the views excludes rational action on the other. So here's the package: Tim and I are in genuine disagreement about whether rhubarb is delicious. Our opinions are incompatible. And the common understanding, necessary to ground that incompatibility, is based on a common conception of the assertibility conditions of the claim—that, absent defeating considerations, it may be asserted just if one relishes eating rhubarb—and on a shared conception of a range of consequences, both analytical and practical, which attend its correctness. Our disagreement can be faultless because it can be based on our respectively perfectly proper responses to our respective non-cognitive propensities. And it can be sustainable because—precisely—neither claim has been defeated nor has to be defeasible. Finally, the Simple Deduction is blocked in exactly the way prefigured: when truth is conceived as superassertibility relative to a subject's non-cognitive responses, the supposition that P is true will be answerable to the corresponding responses of a tacitly understood constituency of subjects; and it will implicate a mistake in the opinion of one who takes it that not-P is true only if their opinion is properly held answerable to the responses of the same constituency. If all this is soundly conceived, then a relativism about truth, fashioned along the indicated lines, may be the natural companion of non-cognitivist conceptions of competence in particular regions of discourse. But here I must be content merely to have outlined the approach. References Cohen, Stewart (1999) ‘Contextualism, Skepticism and the Structure of Reasons’, Philosophical Perspectives 13: 57–89. DeRose, Keith (1992) ‘Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 913–29. —— (2002) ‘Assertion, Knowledge, and Context’, Philosophical Review 111: 167–203. Kölbel, Max (2002) Truth Without Objectivity, London: Routledge. —— (2004) ‘Faultless Disagreement’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104: 53–73. —— (Unpublished) ‘Wright on Disputes of Inclination’, available as a PDF file at: http://www.philosophy.bham.ac.uk /staff/Kölbel.htm . Lynch, Michael (2001) ‘A Functionalist Theory of Truth’, in M. Lynch (ed.), The Nature of Truth, Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford/MIT, pp. 723–49. end p 59
Lynch, Michael (2004) ‘Truth and Multiple Realisability’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82: 384–408. MacFarlane, John (2003) ‘Future Contingents and Relative Truth’, Philosophical Quarterly 53: 321–36. —— (2005) ‘Making Sense of Relative Truth’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105: 321–39. —— (Forthcoming) ‘The Assessment-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions’, in Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wright, Crispin (1992) Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. —— (1998) ‘Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed’, in supplementary volume 24 (1998) of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy on Pragmatism, guest edited by Cheryl Misak, pp. 31–74. —— (2001) ‘On Being in a Quandary: Relativism, Vagueness, Logical Revisionism’, Mind CX: 45–98. —— (2002) ‘Relativism and Classical Logic’, in Logic, Language and Thought, ed. Anthony O' Hear, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 95–118. end p 60
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3 Modelling the ‘Ordinary View’ * For useful discussion I thank Patrick Greenough, Michael Lynch, Daniel Nolan, Crispin Wright, and various attendees at the 2004 St. Andrews Truth and Realism conference.
Abstract. This paper is a response to Crispin Wright's attempt to model (what he calls) ‘the ordinary view’ of ‘disputes of inclination’. Familiarity with Wright's paper (Chapter 2 of this volume) is assumed. I propose and briefly discuss two models that Wright neglects, a (non-relative) paraconsistent model and a version of truth-relativism where truth is correspondence.
I Taste-Function Relativism Consider the following (apparent) dispute: B RUCE: Vegemite is delicious. JOEY : Vegemite is not delicious. I believe that the most natural response to this apparent dispute is to treat it as merely apparent, and indeed invoke some sort of relativism—parameterization—with respect to ‘is delicious’. The natural response invokes a ‘taste-function’, as it were, which takes some sort of input—say, Vegemite—and yields a value (which we can take to be a natural number). Simple taste-function relativism maintains that each person has such a taste-function, and ‘is delicious’ contains an implicit parameter over taste-functions: ‘x is delicioust’ is satisfied exactly if t(x)=n where n m for some threshold m. In turn, assertibility conditions—which are relative to a state of information or, more generally, a state (or agent) —likewise invoke such taste-functions (and some threshold m): that Vegemite is delicioust is assertible by an agent b exactly if b's taste-function t is such that t(Vegemite)=n (for n m). end p 61
As a first go, such taste-function relativism, it seems to me, is a viable approach to ‘disputes of taste’—and ‘disputes of humour’, and so on. No doubt, more needs to be said, but the general idea is clear enough and, it seems to me, fairly plausible. But Crispin Wright (p. 39) objects. O BJECTION: That sort of simple relativism about taste clashes against the challenge implicit in what is otherwise a sensible question, namely: If, as you say, Vegemite is delicious, how come nobody at this conference but you likes it? Such a question—on the proposed (taste-function) relativism—betrays incompetence (a failure to recognize the hidden parameter), but such alleged incompetence seems not to be present in such ordinary questions. REPLY : The given challenge (question) needn't betray incompetence; it can betray a ‘limit sense’ of taste-relative terms. In particular, it may well be that there's a use of ‘delicious’—an absolute but nonetheless indexed usage—according to which: ‘x is delicioust’ is satisfied exactly if t (x)=n (where n m for some threshold m) for all ‘accessible’ tastefunctions t , where ‘accessible’ can be cashed out in some standard contextualist fashion. In a context in which such a ‘limit sense’ of ‘delicious’ is in play—or is taken to be in play by the parties in the conversation—the given question is straightforwardly competent. For all that Wright has said, I do not see why such simple taste-function relativism isn't an appropriate account of ‘matters of taste’—or humour or whatnot. But for now, it is best to put Wright's chief task squarely on the table.
2 Wright's Aim: The Ordinary View Whether taste-function relativism (or some variant) is ultimately the best approach to ‘disputes of taste’ is in many ways beside Wright's chief task. Wright's task, I take it, is not to find the most plausible account of ‘disputes of taste’ but, rather, to find a ‘coherent’ account of the ‘Ordinary View’ of such (apparent) disputes. What Wright calls ‘disputes of inclination’ constitute the target of the ‘Ordinary View’, and whether (apparent) disputes of taste are ultimately disputes of inclination is an open question. Wright's main task is to give a plausible account—a plausible model—of the Ordinary View, where the Ordinary View essentially involves four features: • Existence: There are ‘disputes of inclination’. • Contradiction: Such disputes involve genuinely incompatible attitudes (and the conjunction of what the disputants believe is a formal contradiction). end p 62
• Faultlessness: Nobody need be mistaken in such disputes.
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• Sustainability: The antagonists may, perfectly rationally, stick to their respective views even after the disagreement comes to light and impresses (them) as intractable. Wright's task, then, is simply cashing out the Ordinary View in a ‘coherent’ fashion—either in a non-parametric or a parametric (relativistic) fashion.
1
1 Some might think that Wright's task is thereby the task of cashing out a coherent version of truth-relativism, but Wright maintains that truth-relativism is
actually a theoretical attempt to cash out the Ordinary View, and so it is worth exploring non-parametric accounts of the Ordinary View.
The given task is constrained by (what Wright calls) the simple deduction, where a and b are agents and, letting context dictate use-mention, ¬ is the negation of : 1. a accepts
[Assumption]
2. b accepts ¬ [Assumption] 3. a and b's disagreement involves no mistake [Assumption] 4.
[Assumption]
5. b is guilty of a mistake [2,4] 6. ¬ [3–5, Reductio] 7. a is guilty of a mistake [1,6] 8. The negation of (3) is true [3,5,7]. Note that the conclusion of the simple deduction, at least as I understand it, is: 9. Either a is mistaken or b is mistaken. And (9) is supposed to follow directly from (8), which is intended to have the form: ¬(¬Ma ¬Mb) with ¬Ma ¬Mb being the (intended) form of (3). 2
Think of M as is mistaken (with respect to
2
).
So understood, the simple deduction seems to bar the Ordinary View from coherent formulation, apparently showing that at least one of the disputants is mistaken, contrary to ‘faultlessness’. The constraint, then, is to block the simple deduction, so that both contradiction and faultlessness may stand up. Towards cashing out the Ordinary View, Wright proposes two approaches, the first a non-parametric (intuitionistic) approach, the second a parametric one. I briefly comment on each proposal, but my main aim is to propose a few options that Wright neglects. end p 63
3 Intuitionistic Approach If the task is to give a coherent model of some view, then one should not prejudge the issue with one's favoured logical theory. Suppose, for example, that we are trying to give a coherent but accurate model of inconsistent fictions. In that case, a natural first step would not invoke classical logic (or, for that matter, intuitionistic logic) but, rather, some version or other of paraconsistent logic. In the present case—namely, modelling the ‘Ordinary View’—Wright pursues an intuitionistic framework. Wright's intuitionistic response blocks the Simple Deduction by blocking the step from (8) to (9): the step from ¬(¬Ma ¬Mb) to Ma Mb is intuitionistically invalid. Moreover, the intuitionistic model of the Ordinary View can be motivated in ways that Wright discusses—taking ‘disputes of inclination’ to be situations in which neither party has suitable warrant for claiming that the other's view is false (or untrue). (See Chapter 2 for further discussion.) Another virtue of the approach is that it doesn't require a truth-relativism or, for that matter, any significant relativism at all. The approach is one that cashes out the Ordinary View as a non-relativistic view—a non-parametric view. Despite its virtues, the intuionistic model confronts problems. The proposal's chief problem, as Wright himself points out, is (in effect) an explanatory one. We want an explanation of how the disputants can be faultless when they believe ‘contradictory’ claims, of how they are ‘faultless’ when they have at least contrary attitudes towards one and the same claim (or proposition, and so on). What is it about such special claims/propositions that affords faultlessness (and sustainability)? The most natural answer invokes absence of ‘mistake-makers’ (if you will)—the absence of any ‘fact of the matter’ that, as it were, would otherwise make a mistake of your belief. The trouble, as Wright points out, is that the intuitionistic proposal cannot take that line, since it cannot make the claim that neither party's (given) belief is untrue—the claim equivalent to (3) in the simple deduction. 3
3
Actually, it isn't clear to me that the intuitionistic line is stuck here. What one needs is some negation-like device that serves—perhaps in concert with
intuitionistic negation—to express ‘no fact of the matter’ but for which some step in the ‘simple deduction’ fa ls (e g., reductio). I suspect that such a device can be—perhaps has been—constructed, but I will not pursue it here.
What would be better is a model of the Ordinary View that not only blocks the simple deduction but also allows for the ‘no fact of the matter’ explanation of faultlessness. That, in the end, is what Wright's parametric proposal—his ‘true relativism’—attempts to achieve. But before turning to that proposal, I think it's worth noting a non-parametric option that Wright neglects—a paraconsistent option. end p 64
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4 Paraconsistent Proposal(s) Recall the challenge of Wright's main task. As he puts it: The challenge [is] to harmonize the three ingredients—Contradiction, Faultlessness, and Sustainability. And the point hasn't gone away that if it is insisted that a dispute can be regarded as fault-free only if it's open to us to suppose that each antagonist has a correct view, then a mere acceptance that the dispute is genuine—so involves contradictory opinions—precludes regarding it as fault-free. Punkt. (p. 46) Harmonizing the three ingredients, it seems to me, immediately suggests that the most faithful, natural model of the Ordinary View is a paraconsistent one. Recall the task: namely, to give a coherent model of the Ordinary View, one that ‘harmonizes the three ingredients’. ‘Coherent’ need not mean consistent, as far as I can see; it needs to be non-trivial, but needn't be entirely consistent. And that is what paraconsistency promises: inconsistent but non-trivial theories. A distinction is worth drawing: weak paraconsistentists are those who take paraconsistent logics seriously as a means of modelling a particular domain of discourse (e.g., naive semantic theories, etc.); they do not accept that such models reflect genuine possibilities, certainly not actualities. Strong paraconsistentists, on the other hand, are those who believe that such inconsistencies are genuinely possible—that there may well be truths with true negations. (Strong paraconsistentists are often dialetheists, those who think that there's some truth the negation of which is true.) For present purposes, Wright's task calls only for weak paraconsistency—merely modelling the Ordinary View in an inconsistent fashion. Towards that end, two approaches immediately suggest themselves. I (very) briefly consider each in turn. 4
4
Actually, there are many approaches that suggest themselves, including the Brandom–Rescher approach (Brandon and Rescher 1979) to inconsistent
discourse, as we l as the Da Costa C-systems (Da Costa and Alves 1977), and perhaps especially Batens' so-called ‘adaptive paraconsistent systems’ (References: 3). And others. See also Brown's discussion (Brown 2002).
4.1 Simple Paraconsistent Semantics For present purposes, we can concentrate on a single (and simple) paraconsistent logic. Let semantic values, and let our ‘designated values’ be
={1,.5,0} comprise our
={1,.5}. Concentrating on the propositional level, we take
valuations (or interpretations) to be functions from the atomics into
, and then extend such valuations along
so-called Strong Kleene lines (see Table 3.1). With interpretations in hand, a (semantic) consequence relation
is defined in the usual (many-valued) way, where
comprises sentences of the language: end p 65
Table 3.1 K
3
and LP Operator Diagrams 1
.5
0
1
.5
1
0
1
1
.5
0
1
1
1
1
.5
.5
.5
.5
.5
0
.5
1
.5
.5
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
.5
0
¬
A iff for any interpretation
,
(A)
if
(B)
for all B in
0
.
In turn, valid sentences (or logical truths) may be defined in terms of
by saying that A is valid iff
A.
This is what Priest calls ‘the logic of paradox’ (LP) (Priest 1979), which is just the ‘gap’-free fragment of Anderson and Belnap's four-valued semantics (Anderson and Belnap 1975). (One ‘transforms’ Strong Kleene into LP by designating the third value.) For present purposes, the pressing question is not so much the logic (which will suffice with respect to blocking the simple deduction) but, rather, the philosophical story—the extent to which the Ordinary View can be ‘coherently formulated’ along such paraconsistent lines.
4.2 Dialetheic Story One obvious way to get the three ingredients is via a dialetheic model according to which ‘judgements of taste’ are—to use Kit Fine's term—gluts, that ‘Vegemite is delicious’ and its negation are true. In that case, we have the ingredient of ‘contradiction’ in the sense that conjoining the disputants' beliefs yields something of the form
¬ , and the
disputants take conflicting attitudes towards each of the conjuncts. Moreover, we have a straightforward sense of faultlessness and sustainability: both disputants have true beliefs, and so such beliefs may rationally be sustained. One problem with the dialetheic model is that it, like Wright's intuitionistic proposal, seems unable to ground faultlessness in the ‘absence of mistake-makers’, in there being ‘no fact of the matter’ with respect to matters of taste (or humour, and so on). After all, if both disputants have true beliefs, then, at least in some minimal sense, there's a fact of the matter ‘grounding’ such true beliefs—at the very least, that Vegemite is delicious and that it's not! The dialetheic model (logic plus philosophical story) improves on Wright's intuitionistic model. The former, but not the
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latter, has a straightforward explanation of how ‘beliefs of inclination’ (as it were) can be faultless and, in turn, sustainable: they're true. (They're also false on the dialetheic line, but that doesn't take away from their truth!) But both models, as above, fail to achieve the desired ‘no fact of the matter’ feature of the Ordinary View. While that feature is not end p 66
essential to the Ordinary View (at least as Wright defines it), it's nonetheless a desideratum. On that score, the dialetheic model fails.
4.3 Analetheic Interpretation If we want to employ LP but also have some sense in which ‘there's no fact of the matter’ with respect to the given class of claims, then we might want to take a different route. In particular, we could take what has been called an analetheic route (Beall and Ripley 2004), where the analetheist thinks that some ‘untrue’ claims—in this case, ones for which there's no fact of the matter—are properly assertible. With respect to LP, dialetheists (informally) read the middle value as both true and false. For our analetheic purposes, we can (informally) construe the third value as at least not false—or, if you wish, mistake-maker-free. The idea, in a nutshell, is just this: some claims—for example, those involved in ‘disputes of inclination’—are such that there's no fact of the matter, and so such claims are at least not false. On the analetheic model, Ordinary Viewers —those who embrace the Ordinary View—drop the familiar dictum that one ought (rationally) only believe what is true; the Ordinary View's (analetheic) dictum is: A NALETHEIC DICTUM: One ought (rationally) only believe what is at least not false. Coupled with the dictum is a constraint on consistency: DEFAULT CONSISTENCY : One ought (rationally) to minimize inconsistent beliefs. 5
5
Incidentally, this can—and, when properly filled out, would—be cashed out in terms of what Batens (Batens 2000) calls an ‘adaptive logic’, a
non-monotonic paraconsistent logic. Such adaptive logics provide a clear sense to the idea of ‘minimizing inconsistent be iefs’.
With those two principles, the analetheic model of the Ordinary View has many virtues. Indeed, the virtues of such a paraconsistent account are as many as the desiderata that Wright propounds: V1. It upholds all three essential features in a straightforward way: (a) Contradiction: The disputants’ beliefs are ‘in contradiction’ both in the formal sense and in that the disputants have ‘opposing’ attitudes towards one and the same claim. (b) Faultlessness: There is no fault, since there's simply no fact of the matter to make for mistakes. The given beliefs are at least not false. (Recall the analetheic dictum.) (c) Sustainability: Since there's no fault, there's nothing blocking sustainability. (Recall the dictum.) V2. It blocks ‘the simple deduction’ exactly as one would expect: Reductio is invalid over the target class of claims. end p 67
V3. It gives flat-footed content to the falsity of ‘Rampant Realism’. The Rampant Realist, as Wright construes them, thinks that there is some fact of the matter that ‘makes true’ or ‘makes false’ the ‘claims of inclination’, but there is no such fact, according to the analetheist. What makes such claims assertible is that they are at least not false. Note that I'm not arguing for analetheism with respect to ‘disputes of inclination’. I'm suggesting only that—given Wright's task—analetheism is a viable model of the Ordinary View (assuming there is such a view), and also that, at least at first blush, it seems to be superior to the intuitionistic model. But I'll leave that for further debate. For now, the tentative conclusion is that if we want a non-parametric approach, we ought to pursue a paraconsistent (and, it seems, analetheic) option. The question is: why not explore a parametric option? Wright does just that.
5 True Relativism: Superassertibility Given the problem confronting his intuitionistic (non-parametric) model, Wright pursues a relativistic option—‘true relativism’—where the aim is to get relativism about propositional truth. Wright suggests that there's no hope in getting relativism about propositional truth if truth is construed along ‘robust correspondence’.
6
6 But see § 6 of this chapter.
But that is not the end of the project. If, as Wright suggests, we enjoy a truth pluralism, we can construe truth as something other than correspondence. Wright suggests that superassertability is a promising option. While superassertibility is clear enough (just think of Kripke-constructions for intuitionistic logic), I am not entirely clear on the overall proposal. In particular, it isn't clear how the account—aside from explicitly invoking superassertibility—differs from a simple taste-function relativism that indexes ‘true’ instead of ‘delicious’. The debate, which I here leave open, will turn on what superassertibility adds to the Ordinary View that a crude taste-
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function truth relativism doesn't. For now, a simple taste-function truth relativism would run thus, simply shifting the parameter from ‘is delicious’ to ‘is true’: that Vegemite is delicious is truet exactly if t (Vegemite)=n (for n m, threshold m), where ‘truet’ abbreviates ‘true relative to taste-function t’. How, aside from the differences that may arise from the semantics of ‘truet’ and ‘superassertibility’, is Wright's account different from above? The answer isn't clear, at least not without further details of ‘true relativism’. Wright's ‘true relativism’ is supposed to afford: end p 68
representing [a dispute of inclination] as one in which conflicting claims are each true relative to certain parameters of taste, with truth construed as superassertibility on the basis of a notion of assertibility grounded on the relevant non-cognitive affect. (p. 57) Again, aside from explicitly invoking superassertibility, such a representation is exactly as the simple taste-function relativism suggests—where the ‘parameter of taste’ is simply a taste-function, and assertibility will be tied to the value of such a function (some of that value, perhaps, being determined in part by ‘non-cognitive affect’). One place of substantial difference—again, aside from the difference of explicitly invoking superassertibility—might arise with respect to ‘Contradiction’. How does Wright's ‘true relativist’ achieve ‘Contradiction’? The idea is that the disputants reflect conflicting attitudes towards the same proposition by assigning different priorities—different values—to the ‘consequences of regarding it as correct’ (p. 58). For example, one who understands the assertibilityconditions of ‘Vegemite is delicious’ and who ‘regards it as correct’ will assign high values to practices Down Under (whatever those practices may be), while one who ‘regards it as incorrect’ will assign low values to such practices. But what, now, is ‘regarding as correct’? As far as I can see, it is little more than ‘true relative to a taste-function’—true relative to some (perhaps non-cognitive) assignment of (if you will) ‘taste values’. If, as I've suggested, simple taste-function truth-relativism differs from Wright's ‘true relativism’ only in that the latter invokes superassertibility, the merits of the two must be measured on the basis of what superassertibility offers over simple (taste-function) truth-relativism. On the surface, superassertibility seems a bit more complicated than the simple (and, indeed, rather crude) truth-relativism tied to a taste-function, but debate will tell whether it affords significant virtues over the simple-minded sort of relativism. For present purposes, I leave that issue open. I shall turn to the idea that Wright dismisses: namely, modelling the Ordinary View via a truth-relativism where truth is propositional, correspondence truth.
6 Relative Correspondence Truth If there is an ‘Ordinary View’, presumably it is tied to correspondence inasmuch as ‘ordinary intuitions’—before they're properly tutored in the glories of disquotationalism—tend towards correspondence. Wright (p. 54) claims that the prospects of achieving relative propositional truth, where truth is robust correspondence, are dim. I suggest that Wright is wrong on that score. I suggest that there is a route towards achieving relativism about propositional correspondence truth, one that—suitably tweaked—respects all ingredients of the Ordinary View. end p 69
The Rampant Realist, as the Ordinary Viewers have her, is one who thinks that there are determinate facts about ‘deliciousness’ just as there are with our best scientific facts. Ordinary Viewers reject that there are such facts—at least, they're not like those facts, the facts that make our thoughts true independently of what we think. But the trouble with Ordinary Viewers is that they also think that thoughts about deliciousness are, in some sense, true—it just depends, a bit, on what we think (or on features of us). The task, as Wright set it out, is to make sense of all this. In the present context, the task is to get relativism about propositional truth but construe truth as ‘robust correspondence’.
6.1 The Polarity View One way to respect the correspondence intuition is via what I've elsewhere called the ‘Polarity View’ (Beall 2000). Physicists posit all sorts of polarities, and metaphysicians—not that I'm really one of them, I should point out—are sometimes pulled to do the same. The Polarity View is a view of truthmakers; it posits a ‘positive polarity’ and a ‘negative polarity’, and is perhaps best motivated by concerns over ‘negative truthmakers’ (but I shall not dwell on that here). The Polarity View can be modelled in a simple way, and it will help to have a basic picture.
7
7 I borrow this from earlier work (Beall 2000).
Ancestors of the model include van Fraassen's atomic facts (van Fraassen 1969), and more recently the situation semantics of Barwise and Perry (1983). The model is straightforward. Reality, relations, , a set of objects,
, and a set of polarities,
, comprises a set of properties and
={1,0}. Each property rn
represented by n in ‘rn’. From these ingredients come atomic facts:
has a degree, which is
p
p y
p
p
p
rn, d1 ,. . ., dn, i where rn
, and d1 ,. . .,dn
, and
. Intuitively, rn,d1 ,. . .,dn,1 is the fact that d1,. . .,dn are rn-related;
rn,d1,. . .,dn,0 is the fact that d1,. . .,dn are not rn-related. rn,d1 ,. . .,dn,i is a positive fact if and only if i=1; otherwise, rn,d1 ,. . .,dn,i is a negative fact. From here, we define what it is for statements to be true in reality or false in reality. Suppose that Pn is an n-place predicate and c1 ,. . .,cn are singular terms. We let (Pn) be an element of
and let (cj) be in
. Then the sentence
Pnc1 ,. . .,cn is true in reality if and only if reality comprises the following fact: (Pn), (c1),. . ., (cn), 1 ; the given sentence is false in reality if and only if reality comprises the following fact: (Pn), (c1),. . ., (cn), 0 . end p.70
Once these atomic sentences have truth-values the compound sentences gain truth-values in the usual way. Letting T
and
8
The clauses for conjunction are the usual dual ones.
F
stand for true in reality and false in reality, respectively, we have the familiar clauses:
T¬
iff
F
F¬
iff
T
T
iff
T
or
F
iff
F
and
8
T F
So goes the formal picture. The informal story is equally straightforward. In short, truth consists in correspondence with truthmakers, where the truthmakers are positive and negative facts. With truth and facts—or ‘states of the world’—so conceived, we can characterize the Rampant Realist as thinking that all facts are ‘absolutely fixed’ in the sense that the given polarities are fixed independently of us. Truth is simply correspondence to the facts, with truth of negations being true in virtue of negative facts. There's no call from the Rampant Realists for ‘relative truth’. The call, as above, comes from Ordinary Viewers.
6.2 Relatively Positive/Negative States Ordinary Viewers agree that truth is simply correspondence; however, as Wright suggests, they nonetheless call for a bit of relativity with respect to such (propositional) truth. They can get it, I suggest, by recognizing—for lack of a better term—relatively positive and relatively negative ‘states’ of the world. The idea, in short, is that the states making ‘claims (propositions) of inclination’ true (false) are themselves relative to (say) taste-functions—or some such function that assigns either a positive or negative polarity to the state. In other words, Ordinary Viewers recognize a proper sub-class of ‘states’—the ones corresponding to ‘claims of inclination’—the polarity of which is relative to taste-functions. There are various ways of tweaking the polarity story to add such relativity, and the best account will be a matter of future debate (should there be any interest at all!). 9
9
After seeing my initial proposal, which is below, Daniel Nolan and Crispin Wright both suggested alternatives, each carrying potential virtues with respect
to modelling the Ordinary View. (Given space considerations, I'll limit the discussion to just one proposal.)
One route, for example, might be to add new polarities that somehow reflect the requisite relativity. For present purposes, I will add no new polarities but, rather, ‘polarity maps’. The idea runs as follows. As before,
(reality) comprises a set
of properties and relations, a set
of objects, and a set
={1,0} of polarities.
The difference is that we now also add end p.71
‘polarity maps’ that comprise pairs t,p , where t is a taste-function and p
. States of the world, then, have the
structure: rn, d1 ,. . ., dn, i where, now, i
(a polarity) or i= (a polarity map). When i=1 we call the state an absolutely positive fact, and
similarly an absolutely negative fact when i=0. When i= , such states are neither positive facts nor negative facts independently of a given taste-function; they are (as it were) ‘neutral states’ that are (relative) facts—have a polarity—only relative to some taste-function or other. The difference between Rampant Realists and Ordinary Viewers is that the former acknowledge no polarity maps in ‘facts’, the latter do. The Rampant Realist thinks that every fact is absolutely positive or absolutely negative; she needn't be told about ‘taste-functions’ or the like. Ordinary Viewers are different: for some facts, there's no sense to the question of whether the facts are positive or negative—at least not until you've specified a given taste-function. Inasmuch as some such facts are relative (to taste-functions), truth—being correspondence—is similarly relative, but
p
p y
p
p
p
it's ‘robust correspondence truth’ for all that.
6.3 The Ordinary View Whether such an account of relative correspondence truth (with respect to propositions) affords the best model of the Ordinary View is something I leave open, but I think it's fairly clear that the account affords all three ingredients of the Ordinary View in a coherent way: • Contradiction: both disputants have incompatible beliefs with respect to the same proposition. 10 To make the incompatibility ‘really’ plain, stipulate that for no
do we have
T
10
F , thereby making the ‘falsity clauses’ in § 6.1
and
redundant. (This adjustment forces explosion, ex falso quodlibet.)
• Fautlessness: so long as disputants aren't at fault for having their respective taste-functions, fault is hard to press, in general. After all, we have relative truth, and each disputant's belief is true relative to the way the world is (which, again, is in part a function of their individual taste-functions).
11
11 Along this vein, the colloquial sense of Wright's quoted proverb—de gustibus non est disputandum—is on target: there's no accounting for tastes.
• Sustainability: short of changing their respective taste-functions, there seems to be little challenge against sustainability. The proposed ‘relative correspondence’ model, I think, is promising. On the other hand, recalling the trouble with Wright's intuitionistic model and, similarly, the dialetheic model, one might worry about the ‘no fact of the matter’ desideratum. In the current context, all ‘claims of taste’ are true or false, 12 Here, I'm assuming that we stipulate as much with respect to
T and
12
F.
and so end p.72
there is a fact of the matter with respect to disputes of inclination. Nonetheless, the desideratum is achieved, or at least duly respected on the current model: • There are no absolutely positive (negative) facts of the matter—only relative facts—with respect to ‘claims of inclination’. And now the ‘no fact of the matter’ has good sense: Ordinary Viewers accept that there's a fact of the matter as to whether Vegemite is delicious; it's just that, according to the Ordinary View (as here modelled), there's no absolutely positive (negative) fact of the matter.
7 Closing Remarks Wright set the task of modelling the Ordinary View. I have suggested that if we want to model the view via a non-parametric approach, then a paraconsistent account is probably more natural than Wright's intuitionistic account. On the other hand, if we want to model the view on a parametric account, there seem to be various options, one of which, as sketched, takes truth to be relative correspondence—where the relativity shows up only with respect to ‘disputes of inclination’. Inasmuch as Ordinary Viewers tend towards correspondence ‘intuitions’, the relative correspondence version is a better overall model than either Wright's ‘true relativism’ or the crude (taste-function) relativism that I sketched. But, for space-considerations, I leave the matter there.
13
13 As for the truth of such matters—matters of taste or the like—I'm still inclined towards a simple taste-function relativism that puts an index on terms
like ‘delicious’. But that—the truth of the matter—is not the issue on the table, despite what some taste-functions might prefer.
References Anderson, Alan Ross and Belnap, Nuel D. 1975. Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, volume 1. Princeton University Press, Princeton. Barwise, Jon and Perry, John. 1983. Situations and Attitudes. MIT Press, Bradford Books, Cambridge, MA. Batens, Diderik. 2000. ‘A Survey of Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics’. In D. Batens, C. Mortensen, G. Priest, and J.-P. Van Bendegem (eds), Frontiers of Paraconsistency, pages 49–73. Research Studies Press, King's College Publications, Baldock. Beall, JC. 2000. ‘On Truthmakers for Negative Truths’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78: 264–68. Beall, JC and Ripley, David. 2004. ‘Analetheism and dialetheism’. Analysis, 64(1): 30–35. Brown, Bryson. 2002. ‘On Paraconsistency’. In Dale Jacquette (ed.), A Companion to Philosophical Logic, 628–50. Blackwell, Oxford. Da Costa, N. C. A. and Alves, E. H. 1977. ‘A Semantical Analysis of the Calculi Cn’. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 18: 621–30. end p.73
Priest, Graham. 1979. ‘The Logic of Paradox’. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8: 219–41.
p
p y
p
p
p
Rescher, Nicholas and Robert Brandom. 1979. The Logic of Inconsistency. Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, NJ. van Fraassen, Bas C. 1969. ‘Facts and Tautological Entailments’. Journal of Philosophy, 66: 477–87. Reprinted in Entailment Volume 1 (References: 1). end p.74
p
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p
p
p
end p.76
4 Realism: What's Left?
1. In Search of a Problem What is realism? Why is realism a philosophical issue? And why is it still an issue today? Or more pointedly, is there a “realism” issue still worth arguing about? The last question is the one that interests me; but to explain why, I need to say something about the first two. Some philosophers present realism as a doctrine concerning the existence of certain kinds of things. A realist is someone who think that things of the kind in question exist “objectively” or “independently of the mental.” By itself, however, this characterization does not put us in sight of anything worth calling a philosophical issue. On this conception of realism, there will be lots of categories of things that one might or might not be a “realist” about. I'm not a realist about unicorns, the heavenly spheres, or UFOs. Unicorns are mythical; the heavenly spheres are posits of an exploded theory; and UFOs are illusions (or delusions). No such things exist “independently of the mental”: they exist in fiction, history books, or people's imaginations. That is, they don't exist. But I doubt that my “anti-realist” convictions strike anyone as philosophically interesting. A distinguishing feature of philosophical realism and anti-realism is an odd kind of hyper-generality. As a philosopher, I may be a realist (or not) about things belonging to certain very broad categories. So for example, I might be a realist with respect to objects in the external world. Or I might be some kind of non-realist: an idealist perhaps. Categories like “things in the external world” are rarely (if ever) encountered outside philosophical discussions. In this spirit, Michael Devitt suggests that we distinguish two forms of realism: common-sense and scientific. Thus: Common-sense RealismE. Tokens of most current observable common-sense and scientific physical types objectively exist independently of the mental. Scientific RealismE. Tokens of most current unobservable scientific physical types objectively exist independently of the mental. 1
1
Michael Devitt, Truth and Realism, 2nd edn (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). Quotation, p. 24. The subscripts are mine.
end p.77
I could quibble. “Objectively” strikes me as redundant: just another word for “independently of the mental.” As for “physical,” Devitt inserts it to exclude “some of the more bizarre posits of folk theory.”
2
2 Devitt, Truth and Realism, p. 24.
However, “most” already takes care of them; and there is no common-sense interdict against bizarre physical posits. That said, however, Devitt's distinction is a good one and I shall work with it. I will even leave “physical” in the formulation to indicate that I will be most concerned with realism concerning things in the world around us, and not, for example, with psychological states and process, which obviously do not exist “independently of the mental.” Some philosophers prefer to state realism in terms of truth. Thus: RealismT. Most current common-sense and scientific physical claims are true (or approximately true). We can, of course, divide this doctrine into common-sense and scientific components, as above. The qualification “or approximately true” applies principally to the latter. No one thinks that our current scientific theories are the last word, even if they are on right lines. I don't see much difference between the formulation of realism in terms of existence and that in terms of truth. Things are identified by their properties. So in claiming that certain things exist, we commit ourselves to the truth of lots of claims about them. Conversely, in taking claims, including singular claims, about certain things to be (straightforwardly) true, we imply that those things exist. But from here on, the formulation in terms of truth is the one I shall have in mind when discussing common-sense or scientific realism (dropping the subscripts). I take this tack because questions about truth are central to recent discussions of realism, so we might as well have questions about truth plainly on the table. Many philosophers who think of themselves as realists would say that, unsupplemented, my truth-centered formulation of realism is inadequate. To be a “real realist,” in Philip Kitcher's phrase, it is not enough to hold that lots of common-sense and scientific claims are straightforwardly true: we have to add that “true” is to be understood as “robust correspondence truth.” 3
3
Philip Kitcher, ‘Real Realism; the Galilean Strategy,’ Philosophical Review, 110/2 (Apr l 2001): 151–97. Some philosophers of this persuasion may hold
that this requirement is not really an addition: for example, if they think that truth as correspondence is implicitly required by genuine “independence from the mental.” Kitcher himself thinks something of the sort.
So we get: RealismC. Most current common-sense and scientific physical claims are true (or approximately true) in a robust, correspondence sense of “true.”
p
p y
p
p
p
I don't much care for talk of “real realism.” This way of talking suggests—and is of course meant to suggest—that anything less (or other) than this inflated form end p.78
of realism is somehow ersatz. Since this is just what I shall deny, I will tend to keep the phrase “real realism” in scare quotes. I will have a good deal to say about Kitcher's case for “real realism” later in the paper. But for now, the idea of “real realism” helps with one of my introductory questions. For since the correspondence theory of truth is controversial, bringing it into a discussion of realism gets us to a philosophical issue. However, we have not yet got to what has generally been taken to be the issue. To do so, we need to go beyond the metaphysical or semantic doctrines enunciated so far. We need to bring epistemology into the picture, by going back to the idea that the world exists independently of the mental. In one way, it is trivial to claim that some things in the world exist independently of the mental. There is no such thing as telekinesis, or creation ex nihilo by thought alone. But no contemporary anti-realist supposes we need think otherwise. It is equally trivial to point out that many objects in the world do not exist independently of the mental. Many things are human creations; and for good or ill, even the natural world has been reshaped by human activity. As for the objects of scientific study, these too are often artifacts: there were no stable electric currents before the invention of the Leyden Jar. The world is full of things that would not have existed but for thoughtful human activity. But no contemporary realist would disagree. This is because the independence from the mental involved in debates over realism is not causal or empirical but “transcendental” or “logical.” Objects in the world are not logical constructions out of sense-data; to talk of the truth about the world is not to talk about what we happen to be able to verify, even in ideal circumstances; and so on. Hence the well-known members of the anti-realist family: (subjective) idealism, verificationism, “epistemic” conceptions of truth, and all the rest.
4
4 Wh le it is important to separate the causal and transcendental conceptions of independence, perhaps they are not a together unconnected. Realists tend
to sense an air of spookiness in anti-realist doctrines. The world existed long before we came on the scene (in geological time, an eyeblink ago), and will be here long after we have gone. It would have been here even if neither we nor any other intelligent life had evolved. It seems strange to say that, in talking about such things as the world before we showed up, we are really talking about the experiences we would have had if, per impossible, we had been around after all. Hylas said as much to Philonous, and no realist has ever been satisfied w th Philonous's reply. Of course, Berkeley really did think that the world was a mental production, though God's rather than ours, going so far as to deny that ideas were produced by the brain. Modern versions of Berkeley's view, such as phenomenalism, are supposedly less flamboyantly metaphysical. However, common-sense realists are dubious about the gains of expressing such views in the formal mode.
Anti-realists are anti-skeptics, connecting truth with evidence, or truth-conditions with assertibility-conditions, so as to secure the possibility of knowledge. Realists are anti-skeptics too, holding that lots of common-sense and scientific claims are not just true (perhaps in a robust correspondence-to-reality way) but known to be true. But how can this be—or how can we assure ourselves that it is so—if the world and our beliefs about it are radically independent of end p.79
one another? This is the traditional problem for realists: to sketch a conception of mind and world that allows for the world's knowability, without compromising its independence. This way of putting the problem connects issues of realism with issues of skepticism. But for this very reason, it may not do such issues any favors. The fact is, many philosophers today are impatient with skepticism. They see skeptical arguments, not as bringing to light problems inherent in the human condition, but trading on contentious and dispensable philosophical commitments.
5
5 For an extended defense of this diagnostic approach to skepticism, see my Unnatural Doubts, revised edn (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
Is this the right attitude towards “realism” too? Is one enough of a “realist” if one avoids “anti-realism” of one sort or another? This is what I intended when I asked why realism is still an issue today. Not to make a mystery of things, I think that the answer to my question is “Yes.” Avoiding classical forms of “anti-realism” gives us all the realism we need. What remains of the “realism” issue is the question of whether we ought to be thoroughgoing naturalists. Mixing up this question with traditional debates over realism is a bad idea. My approach to this tangle of issues will involve examining it against the background of an important division in contemporary anglophone philosophy. This division is between philosophers that I shall call “neo-Pragmatists” and others that I shall call “neo-Cartesians.” I think that just about all philosophers interested in realism fall into one camp or the other. The problem of the relation between “mind and world” is perhaps the central problem of modern philosophy, and certainly the matrix within which questions about “realism” emerge most clearly. Descartes decisively shaped this problem by making a strikingly original combination of moves: • He gave philosophy an epistemological turn, introducing methodological skepticism. • He promoted the representative theory of mind, at the expense of Aristotelian hylomorphism. One distinctive feature of the mental was thus intentionality or “aboutness”. • He attempted to secure the foundations of knowledge by making incorrigibility another distinctive feature of the mental. Thoughts and sensations were known immediately, by being present to the mind, and so potentially
p
p y
p
p
p
knowable with certainty and completeness. The material world was not immediately knowable. Knowledge of the world required accurate representation. This is the epistemic face of Descartes's metaphysical dualism. • He took intentionality—representation—for granted. Intentionality was an intrinsic and irrreducible characteristic of ideas. In particular, none of the characteristics of ideas—their “aboutness”, the logical mode of combination into judgments, or the inferential connections between judgments—could end p 80
be understood in causal-mechanical terms. This is the metaphysical/semantic face of Cartesian dualism. Neo-Pragmatism and neo-Cartesianism can be understood in terms of what each rejects and preserves from the legacy of Descartes. In the broadest terms, neo-Pragmatists keep the epistemological orientation, while rejecting the representative theory of mind. Neo-Cartesians do the opposite. But while this fundamental difference produces strikingly distinct constellations of philosophical commitments, there is important common ground. Neither school of thought has much time for either skepticism or dualism. This is because neither is inclined to take intentionality for granted. Our question thus becomes whether either outlook preserves enough of the Cartesian matrix to keep issues about realism alive. My suspicion is that neither does. Given a pragmatist perspective on knowledge, truth and meaning, it is not clear what “realism” issues are left to argue about. Indeed, there may be none. And while at least some neo-Cartesians are inclined to criticize neo-Pragmatists for turning away from such issues, they are not well placed to make their complaint stick.
2. Neo-Pragmatism Neo-Pragmatism can be understood in terms of a methodological orientation and two general theoretical commitments that flow naturally from it. (i) Epistemological orientation. As already suggested, neo-Pragmatism's methodological orientation is fundamentally epistemological rather than metaphysical. This claim needs explanation, since neo-Pragmatists often show scant interest in standard-issue epistemological questions. For example, Sellars clearly thinks—and Brandom and McDowell both follow him in this—that questions in the philosophy of mind and language cut deeper than the questions that occupy epistemologists. Some neo-Pragmatists—Rorty comes to mind—are even associated with talk of the death of epistemology. But while my characterization of neo-Pragmatists as epistemologically oriented might seem to be in tension with this apparent disdain for standard epistemological issues, the tension dissolves when we realize that “epistemologically oriented” need not mean “skeptically oriented.” When Descartes gave philosophy an epistemological turn, he did so in a special way: he introduced methodological skepticism. With respect to this move, neo-Pragmatists are strongly anti-Cartesian. Like their classical forebears, they are dubious about making skeptical problems philosophy's first order of business. They tend to see concern with skepticism as either the flip-side of a hankering after foundations for knowledge, or as a regrettable obsession with problems which, while once possessed of broad philosophical significance, have long end p 81
since degenerated into scholastic puzzles. Skeptical arguments may continue to intrigue us, by seeming intuitively plausible. But neo-Pragmatists think that their air of intuitiveness is to be explained away. To the extent that we take it seriously, skepticism is to be approached diagnostically rather than constructively. However, despite this skepticism about skepticism, neo-Pragmatists remain epistemologically oriented. In approaching the question of “mind and world,” they do not start with semantic notions, such as reference or truth, hoping to get a grip on knowledge and belief. Still less do they start with a notion of truth already linked to metaphysical ideas like “reality” or “the worldin-itself”. Rather, they start with thoroughly epistemological notions, such as Brandom's “game of giving and asking for reasons,” offering to illuminate semantic content in terms of them. In general, they approach knowledge, belief, and meaning by way of locating claims to/attributions of knowledge and belief in human practices of inquiry, argument, communication, interpretation, and deliberation. This methodological orientation presupposes a non-skeptical starting point: in trying to make sense of ourselves, we start where we are, making use of whatever knowledge we have managed to accumulate. But while resolutely anti-skeptical, this methodological orientation is epistemological (or practical-epistemological) rather than metaphysical. (ii) Deflationism about truth. The original pragmatists thought that their epistemological orientation mandated an epistemological account of truth: “truth in action,” the true as whatever was “good in the way of belief” or “assertible at the end of inquiry.” According to neo-Pragmatists, this was a mistake. Epistemic accounts of truth are both unnecessarily revisionary of ordinary truth-talk and fraught with metaphysical temptations of their own. The philosophical aporiai connected with truth are better avoided by approaching the concept of truth in a deflationary spirit. A typical deflationist view of truth is that the meaning of “true” is fixed by the (non-paradoxical) instances of some equivalence schema. For Quine, who treats “true” as a predicate of sentences, the schema is: (TS) “p” is true if and only if p; yielding as instances:
p
p y
p
p
p
p
“Grass is green” is true if and only if grass is green; “E=mc2 ” is true if and only if E=mc2 . . . and so on. For Horwich, who thinks that truth is more properly predicated of propositions, the schema is: (TP) p is true if and only if p. (“ p ” stands for “the proposition that p.”) end p 82
But both philosophers are deflationists in maintaining that an underived inclination to accept the relevant biconditionals exhausts our grasp of the concept of truth. The concept is useful because we often need to endorse or reject sentences (or propositions) that we cannot severally assert: we may not know exactly what they are, or there may be too many of them. As a device for semantic ascent, truth-talk lets us do just this. We can say, “Whatever the Dean told you about the budget, you can be sure that it is true” or “Every sentence (proposition) of the form ‘p v
p’
is true.” “True” thus adds significantly to our expressive resources. But that is all it does. The function of truth-talk is exclusively expressive. Commitment to deflationism constrains how neo-Pragmatists approach the whole range of semantic concepts. It would not do to explain meaning or reference in ways that allowed for the construction of a richer concept of truth than they are willing to countenance. This brings us to the third aspect of the neo-Pragmatist outlook. (iii) Inferentialism about meaning. Reflecting their practical-epistemological orientation, neo-Pragmatists take an “interpretavist” approach to meaning and belief, treating meaning as whatever emerges from our practices of interpretation and rationalization. The picture of belief and meaning that emerges from this approach takes the form that Robert Brandom calls “broad inferentialism.” 6
6
Brandom develops this approach to meaning in Making It Explicit (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). For “broad inferentialism,” see p.
130ff.
On this view, beliefs derive their content from the ways in which they relate to other beliefs—licensing them and being licensed in their turn—but also from being observationally licensed, and by licensing actions. The inclusion of observations and actions among the “conditions and consequences” of beliefs is what makes inferentialism “broad.” Here neo-Pragmatists remain close to their forerunners. Pragmatists old and new see beliefs as mediating between perception and action. This idea accords well with the constraints imposed by commitment to deflationism about truth. It is important to be clear about what the neo-Pragmatist outlook does and does not imply. First, it is sometimes suggested that, since no two people have identical belief systems, inferentialists must hold that no two people ever hold the same belief as anyone else. 7
7
Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore, Holism: A Shopper's Guide (Oxford: Blackwe l, 1992), p.17ff.
This objection assumes that inferentialists take meanings more seriously than they do (or should). While willing to talk about what makes for meaningfulness (intentionality-in-general), neo-Pragmatists are generally not well-disposed to meanings. This is because, for inferentialists, “thinking the same thought” is a matter of sharing contextually relevant inferential and practical commitments. Outside of particular interpretative contexts, there need be no end p 83
principled way of separating commitments that fix meaning from those reflecting collateral information. Second, while inferentialism entails a limited semantic holism—we need lots of beliefs to have any beliefs at all—we should not exaggerate its holistic aspect. While some inferentialists speak of our “web of belief” or “total view,” the idea of a single, tightly integrated system is not an essential component of inferentialism. Inferentialism about content is compatible with our belief system's displaying considerable modularity: that is, with its consisting of a number of largely independent sub-systems. Inferentialism does not encourage monism, the idea that everything we do and think should ideally be encompassed by a single, neat conceptual package. Third, while neo-Pragmatists sometimes present themselves as offering an “anti-representationalist” conception of mind and language, inferentialism does not imply hostility to the idea of representation as such. Inferentialists need not eschew representational idioms, or deny that thought and language have a representational dimension. Rather, their “anti-representationalism” is a matter of the sorts of notions they take as theoretically fundamental. Some neo-Pragmatists muddy the waters here, seeming on occasion to repudiate the very idea of representation. 8
8
Thus Rorty writes approvingly of “Davidson's central contribution to the philosophy of mind and language: his insistence that the idea of ‘accurate
representation of reality’ is . . . dispensable.” Richard Rorty, ‘Robert Brandom on Social Practices and Representations,’ in Rorty, Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 122–37. Quotation p. 128. In the same vein, we find Brandom claiming that “reference is not a relation,” so presumably not a word-world relation. See Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit, p. 325ff. There is some irony here, since Brandom has done as much as anyone to make clear that “anti-representationalism” is entirely concerned with the order of explanation.
No such repudiation is required, though a degree of deflation may be in order. (Compare the neo-Pragmatist attitude to truth-as-correspondence.) Neo-Pragmatism is radically anti-Cartesian. Not only is it anti-skeptical, substantively as well as methodologically, it is anti-dualist. Neo-Pragmatism replaces the Cartesian picture of “mind” cut off from and confronting “world” with one in which our mindedness requires our being always already involved with things around us. Obviously, such an outlook
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encourages us to wonder whether much remains of debates over realism.
3. Neo-Cartesianism Neo-Cartesians are at one with neo-Pragmatists in turning away from methodological skepticism and the quest for foundations for knowledge. Like neo-Pragmatists, they want to understand the relation between mind and world starting from where we are now, making use of all relevant scientific knowledge. end p 84
They are not trying—or should not be trying—to ensure mind's contact with the world, viewing mind and world “from sideways on.” 9
9
A phrase used by John McDowell in Mind and World (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). See p. 34ff.
Again like neo-Pragmatists, neo-Cartesians repudiate both Descartes's foundational epistemology and his dualist metaphysics. However, where the neo-Pragmatist rejection of Cartesian dualism is bound up with anti-representationalism, neo-Cartesians want to preserve, or rehabilitate, the Representative Theory of Mind, which they see as the enduring element in Descartes's legacy, by naturalizing it. Typically, neo-Cartesians hope that some fundamental semantic relation, such as reference, will prove to be analyzable naturalistically, perhaps in causalphysical terms. 10
10
Devitt and Kitcher both entertain such hopes.
As for epistemology, they hope to show that knowledge too is “a natural phenomenon,” by explaining it as belief that is truth-reliable. 11
11
For an extended defense of the idea that knowledge is a natural phenomenon, see Hilary Kornblith, Knowledge and Its Place in Nature (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002). Kornblith has some sharp criticisms of various neo-Pragmatists, myself included. I reply to Kornblith in ‘Is Knowledge a Natural Phenomenon?’, in The Externalist Challenge, Richard Schantz (ed.) (Amsterdam: De Gruyter, forthcoming).
A naturalistic account of reference promises more than a way of draining Cartesian spookiness from the Representative Theory of Mind: it promises a “robust” notion of correspondence truth, which, pace deflationists, will be available for explanatory purposes. Naturally, these ambitions lead neo-Cartesians to favor “real realism.” Finally, neo-Cartesianism reflects a definite metaphysical orientation. This claim may be more controversial. Neo-Cartesians tend to think of themselves as hard-headed and scientifically minded, and so in a way they are. But being anti-dualist does not mean being anti-metaphysical. Rather, neo-Cartesians tend to want to replace dualism with a physicalistic monism, or more liberally with “scientific naturalism” (if naturalization doesn't demand reduction to the vocabulary of physics). 12
12
Kitcher notes (op. cit., p. 194, n. 66) that he does not “see a naturalistic account of reference as necessarily involving reduction to a physicalist
vocabulary. Naturalists who are anti-reductionists with respect to some sciences (for example, parts of biology) should allow that the basis for a reduction of the notion may outstrip the resources of physics.” But presumably not the resources of the natural sciences. Anyway, I use “scientific naturalism” to acknowledge that not all neo-Cartesians commit themselves to strict physicalism.
Commitment to scientific naturalism amounts to more than being pro-science. It is the view that the facts uncovered by the natural sciences constitute all the facts there are. This is why epistemology, philosophy of mind, and the theory of meaning need to be naturalized. This methodological orientation embodies a definite metaphysical commitment, one that is not mandated by science itself. Neo-Pragmatists can be pro-science too. But they do not think that science is everything. They are not convinced that ways of talking, or forms of end p 85
explanation, have to be naturalized to be respectable. Nor are they convinced that “non-natural-scientific” equals “mysterious.” Naturally, this attitude strikes neo-Cartesians as an evasion of “serious metaphysics.” 13
13
The phrase “serious metaphysics” comes from Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), ch. 1.
On the other hand, as scientific naturalists, neo-Cartesians are no more interested in skeptical issues than are neo-Pragmatists. Accordingly, it is not clear why neo-Cartesians should feel that much remains of traditional, epistemologically centered worries surrounding realism and anti-realism. Perhaps disputes over reductionism are all that survive.
4. Realism Again What issues concerning realism do philosophers find still worth discussing? In a recent and impressive defense of “real realism,” Philip Kitcher distinguishes two themes. His distinction is helpful. But it also helps us see that there may be less remaining in debates over realism than Kitcher, and philosophers who think like him, would have us believe. Kitcher's first theme continues a long-standing debate in which realists confront empiricists (instrumentalists, fictionalists, positivists) over the question of the proper attitude towards (or understanding of) certain scientific theories. According to Kitcher, this dispute takes place against a background of shared views. Both sides agree that statements about observable things (events, processes) are straightforwardly true or false; and to the extent that the
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disputants agree that certain statements count as “observation statements,” they will attribute the same truth-values to them. Furthermore, they agree, or at least do not argue about, the account of truth that is appropriate for these statements. Where they part company is over whether their shared attitude towards observation statements is appropriately extended to statements that contain “theoretical terms,” apparently referring to unobservables. Where scientific realists happily countenance the extension, anti-realists resist. In various ways, they are dubious about reference to unobservables. Accordingly, they are dubious about treating “theoretical” statements as straightforwardly true or false, in the way that observation statements are agreed to be. 14
14
“Anti-realism” comes in several flavors. Reductionist anti-realists think that statements apparently making reference to unobservables can be translated
into statements that refer only to things we can observe. So while “theoretical” statements may be true or false, they are not about what they seem to be about. By contrast, instrumentalist anti-rea ists doubt whether theoretical “statements” are straightforwardly true or false, preferring to see theories as devices for making predictions: i.e. for linking observation statements with further observation statements. A somewhat different view is van Fraassen's “constructive empiricism.” Whereas reductionism and instrumentalism depart from a “face-value” interpretation of scientific theories, van Fraassen recommends that scientific theories be understood as “realists” understand them. However, where realists think that we are (often) entitled to believe that some scientific theory is true, van Fraassen advocates a more modest stance: all we should ever believe of a given, currently successful theory is that it is “empirically adequate.” See Bas van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
end p 86
Kitcher's second “prominent anti-realist theme” has to do with the semantics of factual statements generally. Anti-realists of the second type may be happy to extend to theoretical statements the privilege (of being straightforwardly true or false) that empiricists withhold. Their objection is to that privilege's presumed character. Their contention is that “realists and empiricists alike went astray in their assumption about the truth and falsity in the elite class, specifically in the proposal that truth could be understood in terms of correspondence to a mind-independent world.”
15
15 ‘Real Realism,’ Philosophical Review, 110/2: 152.
. Kitcher takes this talk of truth-as-correspondence very seriously. For Kitcher, not only does truth depend on reference, but reference is to be understood naturalistically in terms of causal relations between “language and mind-independent objects.” A “real realist” is thus a realist on both counts: willing to treat theoretical statements as straightforwardly true, and committed to understanding truth in terms of a robust notion of correspondence. While Kitcher's two themes are immediately recognizable, and presented in familiar ways, from a neo-Pragmatist standpoint, his presentation of both themes is misleading, even tendentious. In presenting his first theme, Kitcher suggests that realists and anti-realists do not argue about observation statements: their dispute is only over whether to extend the privileges accorded to observation statements to statements containing “theoretical” terms. This isn't true at all. What neo-Pragmatists object to about empiricism is precisely its treatment of observation statements, which they see as wrong-headed both epistemologically and semantically. In the case of the second theme, the picture of “realists” confronting “anti-realists” is acceptable only if we have already decided that neo-Pragmatism is somehow anti-realist. The question of how to understand truth is centrally important here. Avowed anti-realists (of the second type) reject a correspondence theory of truth in favor of an epistemic theory. Since neo-Pragmatists, as deflationists, reject epistemic conceptions of truth, by this standard they are not anti-realists. Of course, they reject robust correspondence theories too. But their principal objection is to robustness. Since they think that a suitable equivalence-schema captures all there is to the idea of truth as correspondence to fact, they do not so much reject this idea as render it theoretically anodyne. They are not realists of Kitcher's second type because, in Kitcher's presentation of the second theme, the notion of “realism” already incorporates the entire neo-Cartesian bag of tricks. Obviously, neo-Pragmatism is “anti-realist” by this standard. But such definitional maneuvers get us nowhere. Going back to Kitcher's first theme, we can be “realists” by being anti-empiricists. If we go no farther, choosing to approach truth in a deflationary end p 87
spirit, we reach a position we can call “minimal” or “deflationary” realism.
16
16 I don't much care for the phrase “deflationary truth.” What deflationists intend to deflate are philosophical theories of truth. “Deflationary truth”
suggests that truth is prima facie a “substantive” notion, so that the burden is on the deflationist to let the air out of the balloon. At least as far as questions about realism go, I think that things are the other way around: why does the notion of truth need inflating?
Why isn't his realism enough? A glance at neo-Pragmatist objections to empiricism suggests that arguing for a more-than-minimal realism is no easy task.
5. Against Empiricism Anti-realists of Kitcher's first type are traditional empiricists. (There are non-traditional empiricists—van Fraasen, for example—but the first theme continues “an older debate”.) Traditional empiricists are foundationalists. That is their problem. Like neo-Pragmatists generally, Sellars (who still sets the industry standard for neo-Pragmatist critiques of
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empiricism) regards the quest for empirical foundations as a misguided way of responding to the legitimate demand. 17
17
Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, with a Study Guide by Robert Brandom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978). See
especially section VIII.
Our beliefs about the world must be subject to observational constraint. Without such constraint, they would lack empirical content, which is to say they would lack content. To this extent, empiricists are right to insist that observational knowledge is epistemically distinguished. They go wrong in converting the demand for knowledge that is epistemologically distinguished into a demand that is epistemologically basic. The quest for basic knowledge is a quest for knowledge that is absolutely non-inferential. Such knowledge will be expressed by judgments that are intrinsically credible. The idea of intrinsic credibility imposes constraints, epistemic and semantic, so severe as to be unmeetable. Epistemically, judgments expressing basic knowledge cannot derive their authority from any further commitments that we might hold. For example, they cannot derive their authority from our knowledge that (in favorable circumstances, with familiar objects, etc.), we are reliable reporters on the passing scene. To connect the authority of observation-reports with reliability-commitments (which are non-basic, because general) would compromise the claim of such reports to be non-inferential. But neither can their authority derive from the mere fact of reliability, as contemporary externalists suppose. Empiricist foundationalism is driven by the “internalist” demand that the authority of a judgment be (potentially) evident to the person who makes it. 18
18
Internalism creates pressure to suppose that basic judgments must be not just credible (in the sense of likely to be true) but incorrigible. If the class of
basic judgments contained non-veridical members, which were in no way marked out, in trusting such judgments we would again be relying on our general reliability. More than that, perhaps, on any occasion of judgment, it would be mere luck if our judgment were true. But knowledge is supposed to exclude luck.
end p 88
Semantically, if basic judgments are to be the ultimate court of appeal, it must be possible to enter them, knowledgeably or not, without taking for granted any non-basic commitments. Basic observational knowledge must therefore be semantically autonomous: it must be possible for a person to have only such knowledge. But even this isn't sufficient. If basic judgments are to furnish absolute terminating points for justificatory chains, they must be semantically independent even of other basic judgments. Traditional empiricism takes seriously the idea of a first item of knowledge. The knowledge expressed by basic judgments is epistemically and semantically encapsulated. Empiricists try to fulfill the demand for encapsulated knowledge via an account of how basic observational judgments get their content. First, such judgments embody a demonstrative element: so in making such a judgment, we focus our attention on something present to consciousness. Second, the descriptive element in such a judgment involves a term the use of which is fixed ostensively, as, for example, the meaning of “red” is supposedly learned by exposure to examples of redness. An instance of a basic observation-judgment is thus “This is red now.” In the case of a judgment like this, if we are paying proper attention, following the rules for the use of “this” and “red”, we cannot be mistaken. In this account of basic judgments, we find verification by confrontation, justified by meaning-constitution by pure ostension. Empiricism of this stamp builds in the fully fledged Cartesian idea that mental contents (here the contents of “immediate experience”) are in some way “known” merely by being “present to the mind.” Suffice it to say that neither neo-Pragmatists nor neo-Cartesians can take this seriously for a moment.
19
19 There are disturbing signs that such ideas may be making a comeback. See the essay by Laurence BonJour in Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa,
Epistemic Justification (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003). Sosa's essay offers a powerful critique of BonJour. For my take on the whole idea of basic beliefs, see ‘Doing without Basic Beliefs,’ in Matthias Steup (ed.), Epistemology: Central Debates (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005).
As an alternative to the empiricist idea of verification by confrontation, Sellars offers what Brandom calls a “two-ply” account of non-inferential observational knowledge.
20
20 Robert Brandom, Tales of the Mighty Dead (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), ch. 12.
Sellars develops this account in terms of the making of explicit observation-reports. For simplicity, I shall stick with this presentation, ignoring how the account can be extended to non-verbal “inner episodes,” such as “seeings.” The two strands in the account correspond to what Brandom calls the “sentient” and “sapient” aspects of observational knowledge. According to Sellars, we have a primitive capacity for making discriminative responses to environmental circumstances. In virtue of this capacity, mere sentience, we are able to acquire reliable reporting dispositions: for example, the disposition to reliably produce end p 89
tokens of “That's red” in the presence of red things. But while such reliable reporting dispositions are logically necessary preconditions for the expression of basic non-inferential knowledge, they are not sufficient. Unsupplemented, such reactions are mere “parroting,” devoid of content. This brings us to the second strand. Genuine observation-reports differ from mere conditioned responses in virtue of what we do with them, which, for Sellars, means using them in inferences. Only with inferential involvement does knowledge, “sapience,” enter the picture. Sellars argues for involvement in two kinds of inferences: “same-level” and “trans-level.” Involvement in “same-level” inferences excludes encapsulation. Involvement in “trans-level” inferences excludes semantic autonomy.
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In same-level inferences, we treat observation-reports as evidence for further claims, some of which will be non-observational. “That's red” implies “That's not green.” But given suitable collateral information, it can imply more arcane conclusions: “So it's Schumacher's car.” For traditional empiricists, the latter inference would already involve level-jumping. But when Sellars refers to trans-level inferences, he has something different in mind. Trans-level inferences involve commitments concerning our reliability as reporters. In a same-level inference, we use an observation-report to license a conclusion. In so doing, we treat the report as authoritative: credible. But in treating a report as credible, we incur a commitment to our reliability as reporters, a commitment that can be codified in a “reliability inference.” This does not mean that the authority of the report derives epistemically from such commitments. When produced by accredited language-users, in appropriate circumstances, observation-reports are default-credible, thus genuinely non-inferential. 21
21
This aspect of Sellars's account of non-inferential reporting raises difficult issues that deserve more extended discussion. I offer a detailed exploration of
the problems, interpretative and philosophical, in ‘Knowledge, Reasons and Causes: Sellars and Skepticism,’ in Skepticism in Context, James Conant and Andrea Kern (eds) (London: Routledge, forthcoming).
Nevertheless, observation-reports are essentially subject to epistemic evaluation by reporters themselves. This entails our knowing about the sorts of errors we are subject to, how observation reports can be challenged, how such challenges can be met, when reports must be withdrawn, and so on. The presupposition of such extensive reliabilityknowledge precludes the semantic autonomy that observation-reports were traditionally thought to enjoy. 22
22
The problem with the metaphor of foundations is that it “keeps us from seeing that if there is a logical dimension in which other empirical propositions
rest on observation reports, there is another logical dimension in which the latter rest on the former” (Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, p. 78). In connection with n. 18 above, our reliability is imperfect and sensitive to circumstances; and competent speakers know this. So incorrigibility goes by the board too.
Putting these ideas together, no one could have only basic observational knowledge. But—and this is Sellars's main point—semantic autonomy is not required by epistemic distinction. Observational knowledge can be genuinely non-inferential without being free-standing, epistemically or semantically. If Sellars is right to insist on combining reliable responsiveness to circumstances end p.90
with two kinds of inferential involvement (same-level and trans-level), observation-reports do not constitute an autonomous stratum of knowledge, and so cannot be foundational, by empiricist standards. At the same time, by linking genuine sapience with a capacity for epistemic assessment, hence with reliability-knowledge, Sellars excludes pure externalism, along with more traditional forms of foundationalism, thus posing a challenge to neo-Cartesian hopes for naturalizing epistemology. 23
23
For further thoughts on this issue, see my ‘Mythology of the Given: Sosa, Sellars and the Task of Epistemology,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, supplementary volume (2003); also in Sosa and his Critics, John Greco (ed.) (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005).
Given our prior discussion, this should come as no surprise. Sellars does not suppose that empiricism is wholly pointless. Rather, he regards the quest for empirical foundations as a misguided response to a legitimate demand. The legitimate demand is that our beliefs about the world be subject to observational constraint. In some sense, the tribunal of experience is and must be the ultimate court of appeal for justifying claims about the world, and for more than narrowly epistemic reasons: without observational constraint, our beliefs would lack empirical content. Where the quest for foundations goes astray is in presupposing that, to be genuinely non-inferential, observation-reports (or beliefs) must be logically independent of all non-observational commitments. 24
24
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, p. 78
Now the problem of our knowledge of the external world is indissolubly linked to a phenomenal conception of evidence, itself the hallmark of traditional empiricism.
25
25 The phrase “phenomenal conception of evidence” is used by Timothy Williamson in Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
That there is such an essential connection is the main theme of Unnatural Doubts.
Since we could be mistaken about the colour of a physical object, the “red” in “This is red now” must refer to “phenomenal” redness, so that “is” has more the force of “appears.” Accordingly, in so far as the quest for basic knowledge enforces a demand for basic judgments, it suggests that “observational” is to be identified as “experiential.” By contrast, on a Sellarsian account, non-inferential observation-reports concern ordinary objects and events (and their properties). Everyday things do not lurk behind the veil-of-perception. There is no veil. If the Sellarsian approach to observational knowledge is on anything like the right lines, the problem of “our knowledge of the external world” disappears completely, and with it any problems about defending common-sense realism. Sellars's account of observation does not simply raise the level at which the foundations of the empirical are properly set. Rather, he challenges the whole foundationalist picture. This picture is not purely structural. It is not the view, that in any concrete context of inquiry or justification, some commitments are justifiably held, without our having had to infer them from, prior reasons. Foundationalism is the view that empirical knowledge is arranged in “levels,” according to a general and natural order of epistemic priority, each level being distinguished end p.91
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by some broad content-related feature of beliefs belonging to it. So in the traditional empiricist version, beliefs about “theoretical” entities depend on beliefs about ordinary objects, which depend on experiential beliefs. At each level, one can have knowledge, independently of what commitments, if any, one entertains at higher levels. But if observational knowledge does not constitute a semantically autonomous stratum, independent of all non-observational commitments, the picture of knowledge as arranged in distinct levels goes by the board. Furthermore, on the Sellarsian account, the distinction between observational and non-observational is methodological rather than substantive. What we can observe— in the sense of non-inferentially report on—depends on what we can be trained to respond to in a sufficiently reliable way. So non-inferential observational knowledge is not associated with any particular content. These conclusions bear on issues of “scientific” realism. Traditional empiricist concerns about scientific realism simply replicate—higher up the structure, as it were—worries about common-sense realism. However, with the idea of such a structure in abeyance (deflationary) scientific realism becomes an option. Provided that it is subject to observational constraint, talk about “theoretical” entities is not obviously in worse shape epistemically than talk about anything else. Some things can be seen with the naked eye, others only with the aid of instruments; and others still are too little to see at all. But size doesn't matter. Some things are too far away to see (ever), or too old to have been seen. There is no need for invidious distinctions. We are not yet done. Sellars's approach to empirical knowledge cuts deeper still, showing the rewards of not taking intentionality for granted. Descartes says in effect: Here I am with all these beliefs about the world around me—I wonder if any of them are true? Inferentialists say: without lots of true beliefs, you lack beliefs altogether, since you lack conceptual capacities. This seems obvious enough with respect to, say, elementary mathematical concepts. A person who cannot count, or do simple sums, does not have idiosyncratic views about numerical relationships: he has not learned his numbers. Sellars shows that the same goes for concepts with reporting (observational) uses, hence for knowledge of things around us. Reliable discriminative responses and the ability to make good inferential use of them is a possession-condition for concepts of that type. Having lots of justified beliefs about the world around us is a precondition for having any beliefs about it. We could put it like this: for Sellars, and for neo-Pragmatists generally, mind is world-involving. Finally, the two-ply approach to non-inferential reporting neither requires nor allows for a reductive naturalization of either knowledge or belief. Mere reliability is not sufficient for knowledge. More than that, merely being keyed to environmental circumstances is insufficient to confer conceptual content—even on a word with a reporting use. So there is no suggestion that semantic notions could be reduced to causal-physical (or biological) notions. Nor, from the standpoint of defending common-sense realism from empiricist assaults, is there any reason to end p.92
seek such a reduction. The limited world-involvement contained in the two-ply account already gives us everything we need. It even gives us the option of being scientific realists. For the purpose of arguing for “real realism,” independently of antecedent metaphysical commitments, the bar has been set very high.
6. From Science to (Real) Realism Kitcher is aware of the “deflationary realist” option and argues that it is unstable. Science itself—not extra-scientific metaphysical commitments—pushes us beyond minimal realism. This argument has the right shape. That said, it fails: in superficial ways through equivocation; but more deeply and interestingly through seriously underestimating the resources available to deflationary realists. Kitcher finds a version of deflationary realism in Arthur Fine's commendation of the “Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA).”
26
26 Arthur Fine, The Shaky Game (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). See also Fine, ‘Unnatural Attitudes: Realist and Instrumentalist
Attachments to Science,’ Mind 95 (1986): 149–79.
In the spirit of neo-Pragmatism, Fine urges us to take science seriously, but in a “homely” way: that is, without philosophical commentary, especially of the realist or anti-realist variety. However, Kitcher argues that NOA undermines itself. If we “take the scientific picture of nature seriously,” we are quickly led to what he calls “the Natural Epistemological Attitude” or NEA. 27
27
‘Real Realism,’ Philosophical Review, 110/2: 153.
NEA then leads us to “a position much more ambitious than NOA.” 28
28
Ibid. 155.
Here is the first step, from NOA-science to NEA: Physics, physiology, and psychology, even in relatively humdrum and elementary forms, combine to give us a view of the relations between human beings (and also other sentient organisms) and their environments. We are animals that form representations of the things around us; that is, the world sometimes puts human beings into states that bear content. Those states, in turn, guide our behaviour. In observing, or thinking about, other people, we take it for granted that their representational states sometimes adequately and accurately represent objects, facts, and events that we can also identify. We understand that among such objects are
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things that are only detected with difficulty. In some instances, people misrepresent the panoply of things around them. This Natural Epistemological Attitude has been commonplace at least since the early modern period, and it involves no weighty metaphysics.
29
29 Ibid. 153–4. 29 29
Ibid. 153–4.
I don't believe a word of it. Shades of the Holy Roman Empire: NEA is neither natural nor epistemological nor an attitude. In calling it “natural,” Kitcher means that NEA has become part of common sense. No arcane scientific knowledge is presupposed; just “humdrum and elementary” ideas. Now, there is a trivial reading of what Kitcher claims here: end p.93
people have beliefs, which help them deal with the world around them; some of their beliefs come from their observing things in their surroundings; people in the same place will recognize many of the same things; but people also go wrong, sometimes badly. Of course, Kitcher does not phrase these commonplace remarks in commonplace terms. He prefers the quasi-technical jargon of “representation.”
30
30 In his classic deconstruction of the sense-datum theory, Austin complains that the theory depends less on serious arguments than on a certain style of
“blinkered philosophical English.” In Austin's view, philosophers like Ayer operate with ill-defined, technical terms, such as “directly perceive,” whose character they conceal by putting them into the mouth of “the plain man.” Austin's point applies to Kitcher's use of “representation.”
This allows him to elide the distinction between admitting ordinary “representational” idioms and adopting a representationalist order of explanation. The latter is a choice of theoretical orientation certainly not mandated by “physics, physiology and psychology.”
31
31 Kitcher's elision may have been encouraged by careless “anti-representationalist” talk on the part of some neo-Pragmatists.
What is epistemological about NEA? Perhaps there is a concept of “representation” that is useful for psychology. But it is not immediately obvious that such a notion would be of epistemological significance. Epistemology concerns knowledge and justification. Commonsensically, epistemological concepts are normative: for example, knowledge involves belief that is “epistemically appropriate.” While we can argue about what this appropriateness consists in, and whether it can ultimately be “naturalized,” Kitcher dismisses the normative dimension of epistemological concepts, using rhetorical sleight-of-hand. Notice the reference to “human beings and other sentient organisms,” as if mere sentience, and not sapience, were the key to understanding what is involved in the ways that human beings represent their world. In the same vein, Kitcher tells us that “we are animals that form representations.” So we are. But this does not establish that we can understand semantic content calling only on concepts developed to describe our animal nature. We are also animals that engage in complicated financial transactions. It does not follow that economics can be reduced to biology. Neo-Pragmatists do not deny any of Kitcher's commonplaces. According to Sellarsian inferentialism, with its two-ply account of observation-reporting, the world indeed “puts human beings in states that bear content,” since observing involves causal interaction with the things observed. But this does not mean that the ways in which such states “bear content” can be reductively explicated in “scientific” terms. Maybe they can and maybe they can't. But the supposition that they can is not required by taking science seriously. 32
32
Pace Kitcher, the naturalistic view he implies is not even part of early modern formulations of the representative theory of mind.
The idea that they can defines a philosophical research program, not a natural attitude. Our representations are sometimes accurate and sometimes not. Agreed: sometimes our beliefs are true and sometimes they aren't. But science alone does not end p.94
tell us that there is more to “accuracy and adequacy” than having lots of true beliefs, in a deflationary sense of “true.” Science doesn't tell us that truth either can or needs to be illuminated by talk of accurate representation. To be fair, at this stage, Kitcher doesn't exactly claim that it does, though he makes it clear later that he favors a causal theory of reference.
33
33 ‘Real Realism,’ Philosophical Review, 110/2: 194, n. 66.
But with respect to NOA, and to deflationary realism generally, the effect of his way of talking about representation is to create a strong suggestio falsi, making the transition to “real realism” seem that much easier. It is perhaps not accidental that Kitcher refers, not to definite scientific results, but to “the scientific picture of nature.” That seems right. Kitcher uses quasi-scientific jargon to insinuate a philosophical outlook—scientific naturalism—for which he does not argue and with respect to which science itself is silent. NEA is not a natural epistemological attitude, but a set of controversial metaphysical commitments. Science doesn't lead to NEA. Accordingly, NOA doesn't undermine itself by encouraging us to take science seriously. The argument so far defends deflationary realism from the charge of self-destruction. But the transition from NEA to “real realism” is also instructive.
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Once we get to NEA, it is supposed to be a short step to a form of realism much richer than NOA: Consider a paradigm situation in which we observe . . . another person who is responding to an environment that we can also observe. . . . The subject may form representations that are either accurate or inaccurate, for there are entities independent of her of which they may or may not be correct. Further, we appreciate the force of the suggestion that our subject's successes in responding to and shaping the environment would be inexplicable unless some of her representations were accurate. . . . What difference does our presence (or imagined presence) make? If we were absent would her representation vanish, would the relations between those representations and the independent entities be altered, would her successes disappear, or would the connection between success and accuracy of representations be affected? It would be presumptuous to think so. We observe what is going on, but our presence isn't critical to the things the subject does or to the properties of her representations. But we too could be viewed from the outside and assessed in a similar fashion. We thus envisage a world of entities independent not just of each of us but of all of us, a world that we represent more or less accurately, and we suppose that what we identify as our successes signal the approximate correctness of some of our representation. So we arrive at real realism. 34
34
Ibid. 154–5.
What are we imagining when we envisage “a world of entities . . . independent of all of us”? Perhaps we think that the world is a big, complicated place, and that maybe there are things about it that we will never get right. Maybe there are matters about which we will remain permanently in error even if we never realize it. But who claims otherwise? Inferentialists do not claim that “p” is equivalent to “We all believe that p.” In general, claims about the world, and end p.95
claims about what we all believe, have distinct inferential powers. But since inferentialists are not real realists, Kitcher must be looking for a stronger sense of “independence.” Neo-Pragmatists see limits to how far we can get outside our own skins, even in our imaginations. Consonant with their deflationary realism, neo-Pragmatists are inferentialists about meaning, and inferentialists cannot suppose that all our beliefs could be false. Still less can they make sense of the suggestion that our entire system of concepts might be woefully inadequate for representing reality. Without lots of straightforwardly true beliefs, we would have no beliefs at all. This commitment to Davidsonian charity is visible in Sellars's two-ply account of observation-reports, though the point is quite general. 35
35
Here I imply that Davidson's approach to meaning is compatible with a deflationary approach to truth. For a defense of this claim, see my ‘Meaning and
Deflationary Truth,’ Journal of Philosophy, 96 (1999): 945–64.
So to Kitcher's question “What difference does our imagined presence make?”, the answer is that anyone usefully describable in intentional terms must at least be interpretable, whether or not anyone is around to do the interpreting.
36
36 Meaning is thus at least public. Whether it is, in some stronger sense, “social” is a question that raises issues I cannot go into here.
Perhaps Kitcher's notion of the “independence” of the world is meant to imply that we can imagine that all our beliefs are false, or our concepts inadequate. However, this thought points to a strange idea of “the world.” Arthur Fine calls it “the World,” and makes attachment to the idea of the World a defining characteristic of realists.
37
37 ‘Unnatural Attitudes,’ p. 150.
The World is not our world of familiar things—shoes and ships and sealing-wax—but a world wholly independent of all of common-sense and scientific beliefs and concepts. As Richard Rorty says, this idea of the World is “the notion of something completely unspecified and unspecifiable—the thing in itself in fact.”
38
38 Richard Rorty, ‘The World Well Lost,’ Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1972): 649–65. Reprinted in Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1982).
All pragmatists will agree with Rorty that such a world is “well lost.” If this is Kitcher's notion of “world,” he has certainly put some distance between him and his deflationary-minded opponents. But if Kitcher is thinking along these lines, he shouldn't be. No neo-Cartesian should. Neo-Cartesians hope to naturalize epistemological and semantic notions: for example, Kitcher hopes to flesh out a robust correspondence conception of truth by developing a causal theory of reference. So consider the semantics of terms with “reporting” uses, and go back (for the last time) to Sellars's two-ply account of observation-reporting. The first strand in this account insists on reliable discriminative responsiveness. The second strand adds inferential engagement. Seeking a more purely causal account, neo-Cartesians will want to modify or even eliminate the second strand. But the first strand is not up for elimination. Neo-Cartesians are as end p.96
committed as Sellars to the reliability of our reporting dispositions. Without such dispositions, there would be no causal patterns to work with. This said, certain things Kitcher says suggest that his world is indeed Fine's World after all. The World is radically independent of anything we happen to think about it, or any way that we happen to conceive it. This picture of “mind”
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confronting “world” seems to invite skeptical questions. That Kitcher is working with this picture is therefore strongly indicated by his being moved to offer anti-skeptical reassurance, as when he tells us that “what we identify as our successes” give us reason to suppose that our ways of thinking are not wholly misguided. Notice that he does not claim that our successes give us reason to suppose, but only “what we think of” as our successes. If skepticism is in the air, this is as it should be. To credit ourselves with success in dealing with the everyday world would be to leave the World, begging the skeptic's question. If we are to raise and answer a fully general skeptical question, we cannot take the everyday world for granted: we have to argue from features of our representations to the conclusion that these representations more or less accurately mirror the World. We must argue from “what we think of as our successes”—i.e. our representations of successes—and not from successes themselves, just as Kitcher does. Such hints notwithstanding, in the end Kitcher's world is not Fine's World, or not officially. First, Kitcher repudiates the classical Cartesian picture of the mind's “immediately” knowing only its own representations, and so seeking reassurance that they correspond to a world beyond them. “When we perceive,” he tells us, “we are in causal contact with physical objects, and although this contact is mediated by our having certain kinds of psychological states, we don't perceive by perceiving those states (or their contents).” 39
39
‘Real Realism,’ Philosophical Review, 110/2: 157.
If this claim seems to beg the question against the skeptic, so much the worse for skepticism. Thus Kitcher disclaims any interest in answering general skepticism: “It's impossible to throw away all our beliefs, start from scratch, and justify the claim that the objects about which we form perceptual beliefs are as we represent them—we need our contemporary amalgam of physics, physiology and psychology to advance any picture of perception.” 40
40
Ibid. 158.
But if this is so, it is not clear how we reach real realism, since Kitcher's “double extrapolation” to the idea of “an independent world” now seems to stretch no farther than deflationary realists are willing and able to go. What is Kitcher's “independent” world? Our familiar world, or Fine's World? I think that the answer is both and neither. When needing to distance himself from deflationary realists, he edges towards Fine's World. But when disclaiming interest in the skeptical-foundational view associated with this way of thinking, he rushes back in the other direction. So the argument from NOA to real realism depends on two elisions: an elision of the distinction between science and scientific naturalism, to get us to NEA, and an elision of that between world and end p.97
World, to get us from NEA to real realism. Deflationary realists have no cause for concern. I have examined Kitcher's argument in some detail because it represents a very recent and very sophisticated attempt to breathe life into “serious” realism. 41
41
The argument I discuss here amounts to only a small part of Kitcher's subtle and comprehensive defense of “real realism.” However, since he presents
the argument as providing a general strategy for confronting a large variety of “anti-realist” strategies, it deserves special attention. I should add, however, that I am not sure that all Kitcher's anti-anti-realist moves, several of which I applaud, really depend on his argument for real realism. I would like to detach his useful strategies against anti-realists from his arguments for an inflationary version of realism.
But Kitcher's problems point to some quite general lessons. Both neo-Pragmatism and neo-Cartesianism are anti-skeptical to the core. Both schools recommend starting from where we are, sketching an understanding of “mind and world” that calls on whatever knowledge is to hand. Neither school supposes that we could throw away all our knowledge of the world, in the hope of legitimating it in a wholesale way. But this means that Cartesian “real realists” cannot distance themselves from neo-Pragmatist deflationary realists by claiming to have articulated a more robust notion of an “independent” world than neo-Pragmatists can allow. At least, they cannot do so if such a notion would have to be so robust as to rehabilitate all the skeptical conundrums that have supposedly been set aside. The upshot is that the only “realism” issue left is not the traditional problem of reconciling knowledge with the “mindindependence” of the world, but simply the feasibility—and more importantly the desirability—of articulating a thoroughly “naturalistic” conception of the world and our place in it. This issue needs to be detached completely from traditional epistemologically centered issues. Real realism, in so far as it is advanced on epistemological grounds, is a blind alley. Of course, the neo-Pragmatist ideas I favor suggest that scientific naturalism is also something we could do without. And while I cannot, on this occasion, make a case for this view, I will say a few words about the issue, for it is important not to suppose that the neo-Pragmatist attitude is just an evasion of an obviously pressing concern. First, since neo-Pragmatist inferentialism already treats “mind” as “world-involving,” as in Sellars's two-ply account of observation-reporting, the issue of “naturalizing” the mind is not about whether causal interaction with things around us needs to be incorporated into our picture of intentionality, but about whether notions like reference and truth need to be reduced to causal-physical or some other broadly “scientific” notions. However, setting traditional epistemological issues aside, as I have argued we should, makes the need for such a reduction harder to argue for, at least in ways that have much chance of making headway against neo-Pragmatists. end p.98
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What we run into here is a fundamental difference in philosophical temperament. Neo-Cartesians are monists, whereas neo-Pragmatists—though anti-Cartesian-dualist—generally aren't. Neo-Pragmatists see intentional explanation as bound up with rationalization. When we explain a person's actions in terms of his beliefs, desires, etc., we represent him as engaged in something that, at least from his point of view, in his situation, and so on, it makes sense to do. If a person were so wholly illogical that his actions could never be seen as even minimally sensible, there would be no point in regarding him as having beliefs and desires, in fact no possibility of so doing. But “making sense” is a normative notion. This is why meaning cannot be “naturalized”: not because mentality involves ghostly doings, but because intentionality, in Sellars's phrase, is “fraught with ought.” Neo-Pragmatists thus see causal-nomological explanation and intentional explanation as each sui generis, with distinct uses. Whereas the understanding provided by natural laws is useful for predicting and controlling natural processes, taking the intentional stance is more appropriate when dealing with other people or deliberating about one's own actions. Neither form of explanation needs to be reduced to the other. Are neo-Pragmatists anti-naturalist? It depends. Neo-Pragmatists see “natural” as having two antonyms: “supernatural” (physis versus hyperphysis) and “normative” (physis versus nomos). If the question is whether mind and meaning need to be naturalized, the latter contrast is the relevant one. Neo-Pragmatist anti-reductionism has nothing to do with a sneaking regard for ghost-stuff. Standards of reasonableness have nothing spooky about them. We set them and sometimes revise them. We are responsible both to and for them. This does not set us free to believe what we like. Observational constraint ensures that the world takes a hand in shaping our thoughts. If we are playing “Who is the naturalist here?”, we need to further distinguish kinds of naturalism: methodological and metaphysical. Methodological naturalism is just anti-apriorism. In trying to make sense of anything, we can make use of whatever putative knowledge is to hand, provided we are willing to revise our views with the progress of inquiry. In this respect, neo-Pragmatists are thoroughgoing naturalists. But scientific (dogmatic) naturalism is a different kettle of fish, a substantive metaphysical commitment that pragmatists old and new see no reason to make. end p.99
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5 Scientific Realism * Versions of this paper have been delivered in many places, starting with a conference, “Logic and Metaphysics,” held in Genoa in September 2001. I am indebted to these audiences for comments. I am also indebted to Radu Dudau for helpful advice on the literature, to Peter Godfrey-Smith for a helpful prior exchange on the topic, to the members of my graduate class on scientific realism in Fall 2001, and to the following for comments on a draft: Jeff Bub, Radu Dudau, Frank Jackson, Mikael Karlsson, Andre Kukla, Jarrett Leplin, David Papineau, Stathis Psillos, and Howard Sankey. . The paper was first published in Jackson and Smith 2005
What is scientific realism? The literature provides a bewildering variety of answers. I shall start by addressing this question (section 1). I shall go on to discuss the most influential arguments for and against scientific realism. The arguments for are the “success argument” and related explanationist arguments (section 2). The arguments against are the “underdetermination argument” which starts from the claim that theories always have empirically equivalent rivals; and the “pessimistic meta-induction” which starts from a bleak view of the accuracy of past scientific theories (section 3). My approach is naturalistic.
1 What is Scientific Realism? Science appears to be committed to the existence of a variety of unobservable entities—to atoms, viruses, photons, and the like—and to these entities having certain properties. The central idea of scientific realism is that science really is committed and is, for the most part, right in its commitments. As Hilary Putnam once put it, realism takes science at “face value” (1978: 37). So, for the most part, those scientific entities exist and have those properties. We might call this the “existence dimension” of realism. It is opposed by those who are skeptical that science is giving us an accurate picture of reality. Scientific realism is about unobservable entities. Science appears also to be committed to lots of observable entities—to a variety of plants, molluscs, moons, and the like. Folk theory appears to be committed to observables like stones, trees, and cats. A skepticism that extends to observables is extreme, “Cartesian,” skepticism. It yields the issue of “realism about the external world.” This issue is both different from and prior to the issue of scientific realism. It addresses doubts end p.100
about the very clearest cases of knowledge about observables, doubts occasioned by skeptical hypotheses such as that we are manipulated by an evil demon. The issue of scientific realism arises only once such doubts about the observable world have, somehow or other, been allayed. Given the obvious truth of the following weak underdetermination thesis: WU: Any theory has rivals that entail the same actual given observational evidence, allaying those doubts will involve accepting some method of nondeductive ampliative inference. Not even a theory about observables can be simply deduced from any given body of evidence; indeed, not even the very existence of an observable can be deduced “from experience.” If we are to put extreme skepticism behind us and gain any knowledge about the world, we need some ampliative method of inference. Armed with that method, and confident enough about the observable world, there is thought to be a further problem believing what science says about unobservables. So the defense of scientific realism does not require that we refight the battle with extreme skepticism, just that we respond to this special skepticism about unobservables. We shall see that this point has not been kept firmly enough in mind. The general doctrine of realism about the external world is committed not only to the existence of this world but also to its “mind-independence”: it is not made up of “ideas” or “sense data” and does not depend for its existence and nature on the cognitive activities and capacities of our minds. Scientific realism is committed to the unobservable world enjoying this independence. We might call this the “independence dimension” of realism. The very influential philosophers of science, Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, think that scientific entities are not independent but are somehow “constructed” by the theories we have of them. This “constructivism” has its roots in the philosophy of Kant and is extremely influential. An important feature of constructivism, for the purposes of this paper, is that it applies in the first instance to observables: there is no special problem about the independence of unobservables (as there is thought to be about their existence).
1
1 But what about quantum theory? The notorious Copenhagen interpretation responds to the mysterious picture of the world suggested by quantum
theory by taking the quantum world to be observer-dependent. This would offend against the independence dimension of realism. But, of course, this interpretation of the theory is not obligatory. Many interpretations have been proposed that do not involve observer dependence. I'm told that all of these are somewhat weird in one way or another. Some philosophers respond to the mysteries by taking quantum theory instrumentally and hence not as an accurate guide to rea ity; so, the existence dimension of rea ism is not embraced for the theory. But the enormous success of the theory makes this a difficult choice (see section 2 below on the significance of success). In brief, controversy rages (see, for example, the papers in Cushing and McMullin 1989 and Cushing, Fine, and Goldstein 1996). This situation is both fascinating and worrying. What conclusions should we draw from it about scientific realism? In my view, we should draw none until the dust begins to settle.
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The struggle between constructivism and realism is end p.101
appropriately conducted at the level of observables. I shall therefore not engage in it here. 2
2
Elsewhere (1991, 1999, 2001) I take a very dim view of constructivism.
Before attempting a “definition” of scientific realism, some further clarification is called for. First, talk of the commitments “of science” is vague. In the context of the realism debate it means the commitments of current scientific theories. The realist's attitude to past theories will be the concern of section 3.2. Second, the realist holds that science is right, “for the most part.” It would be foolhardy to hold that current science is not making any mistakes and no realist would hold this. Third, this caution does not seem to go far enough: it comes too close to a blanket endorsement of the claims of science. Yet scientists themselves have many epistemic attitudes to their theories. These attitudes range from outright disbelief in a few theories that are useful for predictions but known to be false, through agnosticism about exciting speculations at the frontiers, to a strong commitment to thoroughly tested and well-established theories. The realist is not less skeptical than the scientist: she is committed only to the claims of the latter theories. Furthermore, realism has a critical aspect. Theories may posit unobservables that, given their purposes, they need not posit. Realism is committed only to “essential” unobservables. In brief, realism is a cautious and critical generalization of the commitments of well-established current theories. More clarification would be appropriate but this will have to do. Utilizing the language of the clarification we can define a doctrine of scientific realism as follows: SR: Most of the essential unobservables of well-established current scientific theories exist mind-independently. With a commitment to the existence of a certain unobservable goes an implicit commitment to its having whatever properties are essential to its nature as that unobservable. But, beyond that, SR is noncommittal on the properties of the unobservables, on the scientific “facts.” Yet the scientific realist is often committed not only to the entity realism of SR but to a stronger “fact” realism:
3
3 The scare quotes around “facts” are to indicate that the use of the term can be regarded as a mere manner of speaking, not reflecting any commitment
to the existence of what many regard as very dubious entities. Ian Hacking (1983) calls this sort of doctrine “theory realism.” I prefer to talk of “facts” rather than theories to emphasiz e that the doctrine is about the world itself not our account of it.
SSR: Most of the essential unobservables of well-established current scientific theories exist mind-independently and mostly have the properties attributed to them by science. The existence dimensions of these doctrines are opposed by those who are skeptical of what science is revealing; the independence dimension is opposed by the constructivists. end p.102
Although not generally skeptical of scientific theories, SR and SSR do reflect some skepticism. By varying the amount of skepticism, we could define some other doctrines; for example, instead of claiming that most of the unobservables exist we could claim that a large proportion do or, even weaker, that some do. Clearly there is room for argument about how strong a position should be defended against the skeptic. Related to this, but less interesting, there is room for argument about which doctrines warrant the label “scientific realism.” But this does not prepare one for the bewildering variety of definitions of scientific realism in the literature, many of them very different from SR and SSR. SR and SSR are about what the world is like, they are metaphysical (or ontological). Some philosophers favor epistemic definitions of scientific realism.
4
4 For example, Kukla (1998: 10); see also Psillos (1999: xix–xxi).
Thus, instead of claiming that most of the unobservables of science exist, one could claim that a belief that they do is justified; or, instead of claiming SSR, one could claim that SSR is justified. This illustrates that epistemic definitions are generally parasitic on metaphysical ones. And although the epistemic ones are clearly different from metaphysical ones, they are not different in a way that is significant for the realism debate. For, if one believes that, say, SSR is justified, one should believe SSR. On the other hand, if one believes SSR, one should be able to produce a justification for it. And someone who urges SSR in the realism debate would produce (what she hopes is) a justification because she would argue for SSR. A metaphysical doctrine of scientific realism and the epistemic one that is parasitic on it stand or fall epistemically together. 5
5
Indeed, one can generalize: (p)((p is justified) is justified iff p is justified). (Talk of justification here should be construed broadly so that “externalist”
accounts of knowledge are not ruled out.) Jarrett Leplin (1997: 26) has defined an epistemic doctrine, “minimal epistemic realism,” that is not parasitic on a metaphysical one. This doctrine does not claim that a belief in any of the claims of science is justified, just that such a belief could be justified. A realism that concedes this much to the skeptic is indeed minimal (although still too strong for an antirealist like Bas van Fraassen).
It is common to propose what may seem to be semantic definitions of scientific realism, definitions using the terms “refer” and “true”.
6
6 For example: Hesse (1967: 407); Hooker (1974: 409); Papineau (1979: 126); Ellis (1979: 28); Boyd (1984: 41–2); Leplin (1984b: 1–7); Fales
(1988: 253–4); Jennings (1989: 240); Matheson (1989).
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For example, we might propose: “Most of the theoretical terms of currently well-established scientific theories refer to mind-independent entities and the theories' statements about those entities are approximately true.” This should be seen as simply a paraphrase of the metaphysical SSR, exploiting only the “disquotational” properties of “refer” and “true” captured in the schemas “ ‘F’ refers iff Fs exist” and “ ‘S’ is true iff S.” Such paraphrases are often convenient but they do not change the subject matter away from atoms, viruses, photons, and the like. They are not in any interesting sense semantic. In particular, they do not involve commitment to a causal theory of reference or a correspondence theory of truth, nor to any other end p.103
theory of reference or truth. Indeed, they are compatible with a totally deflationary view of reference and truth: a deflationist can be a scientific realist.
7
7 Horwich (1998).
So there are epistemic and apparently semantic definitions of scientific realism which do not differ in any significant way from straightforwardly metaphysical definitions like SR and SSR. However, there are others that do differ significantly. Most important are the ones that really have a semantic component. “Scientific realism” is often now taken to refer to some combination of a metaphysical doctrine like SSR with a correspondence theory of truth.
8
8 See, for example, Putnam (1978: 18–20, 123–25; 1987: 15–16); Fine (1986a: 115–16, 136–7); Miller (1987); Kitcher (1993: 127–33); Brown
(1994). Arthur Fine dismisses the realism issue a together because he takes it to involve an issue about truth. Despite this dismissal, Fine urges the mysterious “Natural Ontological Attitude” (1986a, 1986b) which often seems to be a realist doctrine like SSR! However, some passages (1986b: 163–5) make it hard to take Fine as a realist.
The combination is strange. Skepticism about unobservables, which is indubitably at the center of the realism debate, is simply not about the nature of truth. The issue of that nature is surely fascinating but is orthogonal to the realism issue. 9
9
This objection also counts against definitions of realism that include the idea that truth is the aim of science (e g. van Fraassen (1980: 8)) wherever this
talk of truth is taken to commit realism to correspondence truth. Even if the talk does not have that commitment, and so is acceptable to a deflationist, such definitions have problems. On the one hand, if the idea that truth is the aim of science is added to a doctrine like SSR, the addition is uninteresting: if science is discovering the truth, nobody is going to propose that it is not aiming to, that truth is a happy accident. On the other hand, if the idea is not added to a doctrine like SSR, the definition will be too weak: realism will require that science aims for truth w thout any commitment to it ever having achieved that aim. Indeed, if science had never achieved that aim despite the efforts of the last few centuries, it would hardly be rational now to have the aim. In the distant past, of course, the situation was different (as Howard Sankey has emphasized to me). Then the realistically inclined philosopher should have had the aim without the commitment. But now she should have the commitment with the result that the aim goes without saying.
Of course there may be evidential connections between the two issues: there may be evidential connections between any issues (Duhem–Quine). But no doctrine of truth is constitutive of metaphysical doctrines of scientific realism. 10
10
For more on this and other matters to do with defining realism, see my 1991, particularly chs 2–4; 1997, part I; and 1999, part I.
Here are two excuses for the intrusion of semantics into the definition of scientific realism. (1) We seem to need semantics to capture the “nonfactualist” antirealism of classical positivistic instrumentalism (for a learned account of the history of this instrumentalism, see Psillos (1999, ch. 3)). This instrumentalism is like the moral antirealism of “noncognitivism” in claiming that what appear to be descriptive and factual statements are not rea ly so. So these “statements” are not really committed to what they appear to be committed to. I argue that these antirea isms are, nonetheless, at bottom metaphysical not semantic (1997: part II). Aside from that, positivistic instrumentalism is no longer a player in the dispute over scientific realism (although instrumentalism in general certainly is, for it simply involves doubting the theoretical claims of science without reinterpreting them). (2) Although a doctrine like SSR need not be combined with a correspondence theory of truth it very likely cannot be plausibly combined with an epistemic theory of truth. But still a nonepistemic theory is not constitutive of SSR (1991: 4.3).
In what follows I shall be concerned simply with the latter, using SR and SSR as my examples. end p.104
We move on to consider the explanationist arguments for scientific realism, and the underdetermination argument and the pessimistic meta-induction against realism.
2 Arguments for Scientific Realism 2.1 The Success Argument The most famous argument for realism is the argument from the success of science. The argument has its origins in the work of Grover Maxwell (1962) and J. J. C. Smart (1963) but its most influential expression is by Putnam (1978: 18–19) drawing on Richard Boyd. Scientific theories tend to be successful in that their observational predictions tend to come out true: if a theory says that S then the world tends to be observationally as if S. Why are theories thus successful? The best explanation, the realist claims, is that the theories’ theoretical terms typically refer—SR—and the theories are approximately true—SSR: the world is observationally as if S because, approximately, S. 11
11
Note that although this argument is usua ly stated using “refer” and “true,” this is not essential. And such usage should be seen as exploiting only the
disquotational properties of the terms with no commitment to a robust correspondence relation between language and the world. The realist argument should be that success is explained by the properties of unobservables, not by the properties of truth and reference. (“Truth, like Mae West's goodness, has nothing to do with it”; Levin (1984: 124).) So the argument could be urged by a deflationist (Devitt (1991: 113–17)).
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For example, why are all the observations we make just the sort we would make if there were atoms? Answer: because there are atoms. Sometimes the realist goes further: it would be “a miracle” that theories were so successful if they weren't approximately true. Realism does not just have the best explanation of success, it has the only good explanation. Larry Laudan (1981, 1984, 1996) has mounted a sustained attack on this argument. In the first prong of this attack, Laudan offers a list of past theories—phlogiston theory is a favorite example—that were successful but are now known not to be approximately true. The realist has a number of responses. First, the success of a theory can be challenged: although it was thought to be successful, it was not really so (McAllister 1993). But unless the criterion of success is put so high that not even contemporary theories will qualify, some theories on Laudan's list will surely survive. Second, it can be argued that a theory was not, in the appropriate sense, well-established and hence not the sort that the realist is committed to; or that entities it posited were not essential to its success (Kitcher 1993: 140–9). But surely some theories on the list will survive this test too. Third, the realist can insist that there are many other past theories, ones not on Laudan's list, for which the realist's explanation of success works fine (McMullin 1984). end p.105
Still, what about the theories that survive on Laudan's list? The realist must offer some other explanation of their success. So even if the approximate truth of most theories is the best, perhaps only, explanation of their success, it cannot be so for all theories. But then the realist should not have needed to struggle with Laudan's list to discover this need to modify the success argument. After all, the sensible realist does not suppose that no well-established scientific theory has ever been very wrong in its entities and its claims about them. And some theories that have been very wrong have surely been successful; indeed, scientists sometimes continue to use theories known to be false simply because they are so successful. So the realist must offer some explanation of this success that does not depend on the rightness of the theories. Here is a suggestion that is very much in the spirit of the original success argument. The success of a theory T that is very wrong is explained by the approximate truth of a replacement theory T .
12
12 Laudan is scornful of the realists’ appeal to the explanatory role of approximate truth. He complains that the notion is undefined. He acknowledges that
many scientifically useful notions are undefined, but thinks that approximate truth is so specially unclear that the realists’ appeal to it is “so much mumbojumbo” (1981: 32). This is excessive. First, approximately true theories can have fully true parts that do the explaining. Second, the talk of approximate truth is simply a convenience (note 11). The claim that the approximate truth of “a is F” explains an observation amounts to the claim that a's being approximately F explains it. Science and life are replete with such explanations; for example, a's being approximately spherical explains why it rolls.
It is because the unobservables posited by T exist and have approximately the properties attributed to them that T is successful. Indeed, we expect the very same theory that shows T to be wrong also to explain T's observational success. 13
13
This expectation should not be construed as a requirement on a replacement theory: that no theory should replace T until it has explained T's success.
Laudan rightly objects to this requirement (1981: 44–5).
So the realist modifies the success argument: the best explanation of a theory's success is mostly that its unobservables exist and have approximately the properties specified by the theory; otherwise, the best explanation is that the unobservables of a replacement theory exist and have approximately the properties specified by that theory. Furthermore, the realist may insist, the only way to explain the success of a theory is by appeal to its unobservables or those of another theory. The three earlier realist responses greatly reduce the challenge that Laudan's list poses for the original success argument. Still, some theories on the list will survive these responses. The modified argument offers an explanation of the success of those theories and is sufficient to support SR and SSR. 14
14
Insofar as we have reason to believe that the success of a current theory is to be explained by some as yet unknown future theory, that success
provides no reason to believe in the current theory's entities or approximate truth. So the modified success argument's support for SR and SSR does depend on the three earlier responses showing that it is mostly the case that the success of a past theory can be explained by the reference of its terms and its approximate truth. (I am indebted to Mathias Frisch for drawing my attention to this.)
end p.106
Now, of course, this modification that accepts past mistakes raises the specter of the pessimistic meta-induction.
15
15 Peter Lewis (2002) summarizes Laudan's discussion as a meta-induction (which differs from the meta-induction we shall be considering):
Many false past theories were successful.
So the success of a theory is not a reliable test for its truth. Lewis argues persuasively that Laudan's meta-induction exemplifies “the false positives paradox.” To establish his conclusion, Laudan needs to find periods of science where most theories were successful and yet most were false.
We shall consider that later (section 3.2). Meanwhile the modification does seem to save the success argument. But perhaps antirealists can explain success? There have been attempts. (1) Bas van Fraassen has offered a Darwinian explanation: “any scientific theory is born into a life of fierce competition, a jungle red in tooth and claw. Only the successful theories survive” (1980: 39). But this explanation is not relevant because it is not explaining the
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same thing as the realist's success argument. It is explaining why we humans hold successful theories. It is not explaining why those particular theories are successful (Lipton 1991: 170–2; Devitt 1991: 116; Kitcher 1993: 155–7; Leplin 1997: 7–9). (2) Arthur Fine claims that antirealism can explain success as well as realism can by appealing to a theory's instrumental reliability (1986b; Fine is not committed to this antirealist explanation). Jarrett Leplin (1987, 1997) develops this proposal and labels it “surrealism.” The basic idea is that although the world has a “deep structure” this structure is “not experientially accessible.” “The explanation of the success of any theory . . . is that the actual structure of the world operates at the experiential level as if the theory represented it correctly” (1997: 26). Leplin goes on to argue, in my view convincingly, that the surrealist explanation is not a successful alternative to the realist one.
16
16
For more on this, see Kukla (1998: 20–4); Psillos (1999: 90–3).
In the second prong of his attack on realism, Laudan (1981: 45–6) has criticized the realist's success argument for its dependence on inference to the best explanation, or “abduction.” Fine (1986a: 113–22) has made a similar criticism.
17
17 Realists tend to be fond of abduction; for example, Glymour (1984), Boyd (1984), McMullin (1984), Musgrave (1985), and Leplin (1997).
In presenting this criticism they charge the realist with “question-begging.” This charge is not apt. The realist argument could be question-begging only if it assumed abduction and the dispute with the antirealist was over abduction. But the primary dispute, at least, is not over abduction but over a doctrine like SSR. So, presented in this way, the criticism seems to miss its target. (One wonders if the cause of this mistake is that the many definitions of scientific realism have left the target unclear.) end p.107
The criticism should be simply that the realist argument relies on abduction and this is a method of inference that an antirealist might reject. Van Fraassen (1980, 1989), for one, does reject it. Is the realist entitled to rely on abduction? Boyd (1984: 65–75) has argued that the antirealists are not in a position to deny entitlement because scientists regularly use abduction to draw conclusions about observables. Boyd's argument illustrates an important, and quite general, realist strategy to defend unobservables against discrimination, to defend “unobservable rights.”
18
18 For examples of this strategy, see Churchland (1985), Gutting (1985), Musgrave (1985), Clendinnen (1989), Devitt (1991: 147–53), and Ps llos
(1999: 186–91). Van Fraassen (1985) responds to the first three of these.
The realist starts by reminding the antirealist that the debate is not over extreme skepticism: the antirealist claims to have knowledge of observables (section 1 above). The realist then examines the antirealist's justification for this knowledge. Using this justification she attempts to show, positively, that the epistemology it involves also justifies knowledge of unobservables. And, she attempts to show, negatively, that the case for skepticism about unobservables produced by the antirealist is no better than the case for skepticism about observables, a skepticism that all parties to the scientific realism dispute have rejected. So the antirealist's criticism of the success argument leaves him with the task of showing that he can save his beliefs about observables without using abduction. If he cannot manage this, the criticism fails. If he can—and van Fraassen (1989) has made an attempt—then the realist seems to face the task of justifying abduction. How concerned should the realist be about this? Perhaps not as much as many suppose. After all, the antirealist must rely on some methods of ampliative inference, even if not on abduction, to overcome extreme skepticism. How are those methods justified? The antirealist may well have little to say about this, relying on the fact that these methods are widely and successfully used in science and ordinary life and on there being no apparent reason to abandon them. But, of course, that seems to be true of abduction as well. If further justification for a method is required, where could we find it? 19
19
One problem in finding it is that we cannot give a precise specification of any of these methods: as Georges Rey says, “no one yet has an adequate
theory of our knowledge of much of anything” (1998: 29).
The naturalistically inclined will have trouble with any attempt at an a priori justification. And it is hard to see how an a priori approach could be effective either for or against abduction. What about an empirical justification within a naturalized epistemology? Any justification must of course use some methods of inference. If it uses the very method it seeks to justify, circularity threatens. Stathis Psillos argues that this circularity is not vicious (1999: 81–90). Be that as it may, Neurath's famous image of rebuilding a boat while staying afloat on it suggests another procedure for justifying a method: we hold fast to all other methods and use them to justify the method end p.108
in contention. So, perhaps we can justify abduction using the methods of induction and deduction. Indeed, perhaps the very success of abduction in science and everyday life—its tendency to produce conclusions that are later observationally confirmed—provides the basis for such an inductive justification.
20
20 The suggestion is that experience, according to the empiricist “the sole legitimate source of information about the world” (van Fraassen (1985: 286)),
supports abduction. For arguments in favor of abduction see Boyd (1984), McMullin (1984), Lipton (1991), Devitt (1991: 111–13), and Leplin (1997:
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116–20). Analogous problems arise, of course, over the justification of deduction; see Field (1996, 1998); Rey (1998); Devitt (1998). Van Fraassen (2000: 261–71) seems to misunderstand the relation of naturalized epistemology to science. It goes without saying that epistemology implies the methods of science. But van Fraassen seems to take the naturalist view to be that basic science, or special sciences like biology, medicine, and psychology, imply the methods of science, a view that he rejects. This view misrepresents naturalism. Naturalism holds that epistemology is itself a special science. As such it is no more simply imp ied by another science than is any other special science: it has the same sort of relative autonomy, and yet dependence on basic science, as other special sciences. Naturalized epistemology, like any special science, applies the usual methods of science, whatever they may be, mostly taking established science for granted, to investigate its special realm. In the case of epistemology that realm is those very methods of science. The aim is to discover empirically how we humans learn, and should learn, about the world (Devitt (1991: 75–9)). We have no reason to suppose that the methods that have yielded knowledge elsewhere cannot yield knowledge in epistemology.
In any case it is not obvious that the justification of abduction will be more problematic than the justification of the methods of inference relied on by the antirealists.
2.2 The Success of Methodology Argument Our scientific methodology is “instrumentally reliable” in that it leads to successful theories, theories that make true observational predictions. Everyone agrees that our methodology does this. Why does it? What is the explanation? Boyd (1973; 1984; 1985) has posed this question and offered an answer that is both realist and naturalist: the methodology is based in a dialectical way on our theories and those theories are approximately true. He argues that antirealists of various sorts cannot explain this methodological success satisfactorily and so his realist explanation is the best. I think that he is probably right. Like the earlier success argument this argument relies on abduction, but it has a different explanandum. Where the earlier argument sought to explain the success of theories, this one seeks to explain the success of scientific methodology in producing successful theories.
2.3 The Basic Abductive Argument The two abductive arguments for realism that we have considered are somewhat sophisticated. A more basic argument is strangely overlooked: by supposing that the unobservables of science exist, we can give good explanations of the behavior and characteristics of observed entities, behavior and characteristics which end p.109
would otherwise remain inexplicable. This basic argument differs from the success argument in the following way. Where the success argument uses realism to explain the observational success of theories, the basic argument uses realism to explain observed phenomena. This is not to say that observational success is unimportant to the basic argument: the explanation of observed phenomena, like any explanation, is tested by its observational success. So according to the basic argument, realism is successful; according to the popular one, it explains success. 21
21
Devitt (1991: 113–17). Hacking's arguments (1983) for the reality of entities manipulated in experiments and perceived under a microscope are
persuasive examples of the basic argument (a though he, strangely, does not regard them as abductions). Hacking's point about manipulation is clearly related to Alan Musgrave's (1988) insistence that novel predictions give us the best reason for believing a theory. Ernan McMullin (1991), responding to Fine (1991), provides some nice examples of the basic argument in geology, biology, and astrophysics. An advantage of the basic argument is that it makes clear that, contrary to Fine's frequent claims, the use of abduction to justify realism is not at some “philosophical” level above science: “the argument is properly carried on at one level only, the level of the scientist” (McMullin (1991: 104)).
In sum, there are some good arguments for scientific realism provided the realist is allowed abduction. Some critics reject abduction but this rejection seems dubious. Perhaps our knowledge of observables depends on abduction. In any case, abduction seems to be on an equal footing, at least, with other ampliative methods of inference.
3 Arguments against Scientific Realism 3.1 The Underdetermination Argument There is an appealing and influential empiricist argument against scientific realism that starts from a doctrine of empirical equivalence. 22
22
My discussion of this argument draws on a more detailed one in my 2002.
Let T be any theory committed to unobservables. Then: EE: T has empirically equivalent rivals. This is taken to imply the strong underdetermination thesis: SU: T has rivals that are equally supported by all possible observational evidence for it. So, realist doctrines like SR and SSR are unjustified. 23
23
The argument has no one clear source. But see Duhem (1906), Quine (1960, 1961 (“Two Dogmas”), and 1975); van Fraassen (1980), Putnam
(1983 (“Equivalence”)).
Some preliminaries. First, what exactly is it for two theories to be “empirically equivalent”? The basic idea is that they
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have the same observational consequences. We shall later see the importance of looking very closely at this basic idea. end p.110
Second, where EE talks simply of T having equivalent rivals, the premiss of the argument is sometimes that T has indefinitely many rivals (e.g. Kukla 1998: 58) and sometimes, that it has at least one (e.g. Psillos 1999: 164). For convenience, I shall mostly treat EE as if it were only committed to one rival because its commitment to more does not seem to make a significant difference to the conclusions we should draw. Third, SU should not be confused with various other underdetermination theses
24
24 My presentation reflects the influence of Laudan's excellent discussion of this variety (1996: ch. 2).
including the weak and obviously true one, mentioned in section 1, that leads to the challenge of extreme skepticism: WU: Any theory has rivals that entail the same actual given observational evidence. SU is stronger than WU in two respects. First, SU concerns an ampliative relation between theories and evidence and not merely a deductive one. Second, SU is concerned with T's relation to all possible evidence, not merely to the given evidence.
25
25 So the premiss about empirical equivalence that is supposed to support SU in the underdetermination argument must also concern all possible
evidence. Psillos’ version of the argument fa ls on this score. It starts: “for any theory T and any body of observational evidence E, there is another theory T such that T and T are empirically equivalent with respect to E” (1999: 164). The quantifiers need to be reordered if this is to support SU: for any theory T, there is another theory T such that for any (possible) body of observational evidence E, T and T are empirically equivalent with respect to E.
If we are to avoid skepticism in the face of WU, we noted, some ampliative method of inference must be accepted. But if SU is true, we face a further challenge: ampliative methods do not support T over its rivals on the given evidence nor even on all possible evidence. So what T says about the unobservable world can make no evidential difference. Surely, then, commitment to what the theory says is a piece of misguided metaphysics. Even with extreme skepticism behind us, realism is threatened. Now, consider EE. A good reason for believing EE is that there is an empiricist algorithm for constructing an equivalent rival to T. Consider To, the theory that the observational consequences of T are true. To is obviously empirically equivalent to T. Still, it may not count as a rival because it is consistent with T. That is easily fixed: T* is the theory that To is true but T is not. T* is an empirically equivalent rival to T. So EE is established. It is tempting to respond that T* is produced by trickery and is not a genuine rival to T (Laudan and Leplin 1991; Hoefer and Rosenberg 1994). But this response seems question-begging and unconvincing, as Andre Kukla argues (1998: 66–81). A better response is that, in counting theories generated by the empiricist algorithm as rivals, EE, as it stands, is too weak to sustain SU. For, with extreme skepticism behind us, we are justified in choosing T over T*. end p.111
In considering this choice, the first half of T*, To, is key. In van Fraassen's terminology, To is the claim that T is “empirically adequate.” He has some famous remarks comparing this claim with the bolder claim that T is true: “the empirical adequacy of an empirical theory must always be more credible than its truth” (1985: 247); “it is not an epistemological principle that one may as well hang for a sheep as for a lamb” (p. 254). The extra boldness of T comes, of course, from its realist commitment to certain truths about unobservables. Because van Fraassen thinks that T takes no further empirical risk than To, he claims that this extra boldness “is but empty strutting and posturing,” a “display of courage not under fire” (p. 255). We should prefer the weaker To. Now if van Fraassen were right about this, no evidence could justify a move from To to the bolder T. So it could not justify a preference for T over its rival T* (= To & not-T). SU would be established. Here is a reason for thinking that van Fraassen is not right. If it were really the case that we were only ever justified in adopting the weakest theory compatible with the possible evidence for T, we would have to surrender to extreme skepticism. For, To is far from being the weakest such theory. For example, consider Te , the theory that T is “experientially adequate.” Where To claims that the observable world is as if T, Te claims only that the observable world appears to be as if T. Te is much weaker than To: it does not require that there be an observable world at all; perhaps an evil demon is at work. Those, like van Fraassen, who believe theories of the observable world, are displaying courage not under fire all the time. 26
26
I develop this argument more thoroughly in my 1991: 150–3.
This argument exemplifies the negative side of the realist strategy described earlier: arguing that the case for skepticism about unobservables produced by the antirealist is no better than the case for skepticism about observables. We can apply the positive side of the strategy too. Any methods of ampliative inference that support the move from Te to To and free us from extreme skepticism must justify the dismissal of the evil-demon hypothesis and a whole lot of others. The methods must justify many singular hypotheses about unobserved objects and many general hypotheses that cover such objects (“All ravens are black” and the like). Whether or not these methods alone support the further move to T, hence support scientific realism, they will surely justify the dismissal of T's rival T*, produced by the
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empiricist algorithm. And they will justify the dismissal of another empirically equivalent rival produced by Kukla's algorithm according to which the world changes when unobserved (1993). It would be nice to know, of course, what these methods are. But it is a strategic error for the scientific realist to attempt to say what such methods are in responding to the antirealist. For, the antirealist believes in observables and whatever end p.112
ampliative inferences support that belief will justify the dismissal of the likes of T*. The antirealist might, of course, simply insist that inferences that work for observables do not work for unobservables. Certainly there is no logical inconsistency in this insistence.
27
27 Kukla emphasizes this (1998: 25–6, 84).
Nevertheless, the insistence is arbitrary and unprincipled. The realist need say no more. 28
28
However, I think that an examination of the epistemic significance of observation helps to bring out the arbitrariness (1991: 143–7).
We conclude that EE as it stands cannot sustain SU: T is indeed justified over empirically equivalent rivals like T*. If the underdetermination argument is to work, it needs to start from a stronger equivalence thesis, one that does not count any theory as a rival to T that can be dismissed by whatever ampliative inferences enable us to avoid extreme skepticism. Let us say that the rivals that can be thus dismissed are not “genuine.” T* and the output of Kukla's algorithm are surely not genuine. Precisely how far we can go in thus dismissing rivals remains to be seen, of course, pending an account of how to avoid extreme skepticism. And, given the realist strategy, the account that matters is the one given by the antirealist. With EE now restricted to genuine rivals, the next step in assessing the underdetermination argument is a careful consideration of how to interpret EE's talk of empirical equivalence. The basic idea is that empirically equivalent theories have the same observational consequences. What does this amount to? A natural first stab at an answer is that the theories entail the same observations. This yields the following version of EE: EE1: T has genuine rivals that entail the same possible observational evidence. Whether or not EE1 is true, it is easy to see that it is inadequate to support SU. This inadequacy arises from the fact that T is likely to entail few observations on its own and yet the conjunction of T with auxiliary hypotheses, theories of instruments, background assumptions, and so on—briefly, its conjunction with “auxiliaries”—is likely to entail many observations. T does not face the tribunal of experience alone (Duhem–Quine). By failing to take account of these joint consequences, EE1 leaves many ways in which evidence could favor T over its rivals, contrary to SU. To sustain SU and challenge realism, we need another interpretation of EE. Consider Laudan and Leplin's influential critique of the underdetermination argument (1991). They propose the thesis, “The Instability of Auxiliary Assumptions” according to which “auxiliary information providing premises for the derivation of observational consequences from theory is unstable in two respects: it is defeasible and it is augmentable” (p. 57). 29
29
See also Ellis (1985) and Devitt (1991: 117–21).
As the accepted end p.113
auxiliaries that can be conjoined with T change, so do its consequences. So, any determination of T's empirical consequence class “must be relativized to a particular state of science,” the state that supplies the auxiliary hypotheses. Thus “any finding of empirical equivalence is both contextual and defeasible” (p. 58). To determine the consequences of T we need more than logic, we need to know which auxiliaries are acceptable, an “inescapably epistemic” matter (p. 59). To avoid the consequences of this argument, Kukla (1993) proposed an answer to our interpretative question along the following lines: for two theories to be empirically equivalent at time T is for them to entail the same observations when conjoined with At, the auxiliaries that are accepted at T. This yields: EE2: T has genuine rivals which are such that when T and any of the rivals are conjoined with At they entail the same possible observational evidence. Set aside for a moment whether or not EE2 is any threat at all to realism. It is clearly too weak to sustain the threat posed by SU. Let T be an empirically equivalent rival to T according to this interpretation. So T& At and T & At entail the same observations. This sort of equivalence is relative to At, to the auxiliaries accepted at a certain time. It amounts to the claim that T and T cannot be discriminated observationally if conjoined only with those auxiliaries. But this does not show that T and T could not be distinguished when conjoined with any acceptable auxiliaries at any time. And that is what is needed, at least, to sustain the claim that T and T cannot be discriminated by any possible evidence, as SU requires. SU demands a much stronger answer to the interpretative question: for two theories to be empirically equivalent is for them to entail the same observations when conjoined with any (possible) acceptable auxiliaries. 30
30
This demand arises out of a liberal and, it seems to me, intuitive view of what counts as “possible evidence.” Quine and van Fraassen have a more
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resticted view which I discuss in my 2002, sec. 13.
This yields: EE3: T has genuine rivals which are such that when T and any of the rivals are conjoined with any possible acceptable auxiliaries they entail the same possible observational evidence. If T and T were thus related they would be empirically equivalent not just relative to certain auxiliaries but tout court, absolutely equivalent. Only then would they be observationally indiscriminable. So if EE is to support SU, it must be interpreted as EE3.
31
31 Tim Williamson pointed out to me a problem with EE3 as it stands. Suppose that T1 and T2 are two allegedly equivalent rivals and that A1 is an
acceptable auxiliary relative to T1 but not T2 and A2 is an acceptable auxiliary relative to T2 but not T1. Thus A1 might be a theory of a testing instrument from the perspective of T1 and A2 a theory of that instrument from the perspective of T2. So the acceptability of the auxiliaries is not independent of the theories being tested. Now suppose that T1&A1 and T2&A1 have different observational consequences. That alone should not show that T1 and T2 are not empirically equivalent. For, T1&A1 and T2&A2 might have the same observational consequences. Clearly, what needs to be assessed for empirical equivalence are theories together with their dependent auxiliaries. And EE3 should be taken as referring to any possible independently acceptable auxiliaries.
end p.114
The main point of Laudan and Leplin's critique can be put simply: we have no reason to believe EE3.
32
32 Note that this is not the claim that EE3 is “demonstratively false”; cf. Kukla (1998: 58).
If T and T cannot be discriminated observationally relative to, say, currently accepted auxiliaries, they may well be so relative to some future accepted auxiliaries. Some currently accepted auxiliaries may cease to be accepted and some new auxiliaries are likely to become accepted. This point becomes particularly persuasive, in my view (1991: 119), when we note our capacity to invent new instruments and experiments to test theories. With a new instrument and experiment comes new auxiliaries, including a theory of the instrument and assumptions about the experimental situation. Given that we can thus create evidence, the set of observational consequences of any theory seems totally open. Of course, there is no guarantee of successful discrimination by these means: a theory may really face a genuine empirically equivalent rival. Still, we are unlikely to have sufficient reason for believing this of any particular theory. 33
33
For some theories where we may have sufficient reason, and for some past ones where we wrongly thought we had, see Psillos (1999: 166–8) and
the works he cites.
More importantly, we have no reason at all for believing it of all theories, as EE3 requires. We will seldom, if ever, have a basis for concluding that two genuine rivals are empirically equivalent in the absolute sense required by EE3. This argument against EE3 does not depend on any assumption about the breadth of T. So EE3 cannot be saved by taking it to apply to “total sciences” (Boyd 1984: 50). Should such a broad conjunction of theories seem to face an equivalent rival at a certain time, we are unlikely to have sufficient reason for believing that experimental developments will not enable us to discriminate the conjunction from its rival by supplying new auxiliaries. There is no known limit to our capacity to generate acceptable auxiliaries. I have argued that we have no reason to believe EE3. But suppose, nonetheless, that EE3 were true. Would this establish SU and undermine scientific realism? It might well do so.
34
34 Laudan and Leplin (1991: 63–8) think not, arguing that T can be indirectly supported over its rival by evidence that confirms another theory that entails
T but not its rival; and that some consequences of T and its rival might support only T. But, as Kukla points out (1998: 84–90), this argument begs the question: if EE3 really were true, this evidential support would seem to disappear.
If EE3 were true, realists would have to appeal to “nonempirical virtues” to choose between empirically equivalent theories. Empirical virtue is a matter of entailing (in conjunction with accepted auxiliaries) observational truths and not entailing observational falsehoods. The nonempirical virtues are explanatory power, simplicity, and the like. For the reason indicated earlier in discussing abduction (section 2), I think that the realist is entitled to appeal to explanatory virtues, at least. But if it really were the case that all theories faced genuine rivals equally compatible with all possible evidence, the appeal to these end p.115
virtues would seem epistemologically dubious.
35
35 I emphasize that since it has not been established that all theories do face such rivals, it might well be appropriate to appeal to explanatory virtues, or
indeed to the evidential support mentioned by Laudan and Leplin (1991: 63–8), to prefer some theory that does face such a rival.
For, in those circumstances, there could be no way to judge the empirical success of these virtues, no way to show, for example, that theories that provide the best explanation tend to be observationally confirmed. So the defense of realism might well depend on there being no good reason for believing EE3. What about EE2? We have already seen that EE2 will not sustain SU. But perhaps it is otherwise threatening to realism. So, first, we need to consider whether it is true; then, whether, if it were, it would undermine realism. There are surely some theories that face a genuine rival that is empirically equivalent relative to the accepted auxiliaries at a certain time. But do all theories face such rivals at that time, let alone at all times? EE2 guarantees
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that all theories do at all times. But the ampliative methods, whatever they may be, that support our knowledge of the observable world and avoid extreme skepticism will count many rivals as not genuine, so many as to make this guarantee seem baseless. How could we know a priori that T must always face such a genuine rival? Suppose, nonetheless, that EE2 were true. So, if T and its rivals are restricted to the accepted auxiliaries at a certain time, T could not be justified over some rivals on the basis only of the observations that the theories and auxiliaries entail and the ampliative methods that save us from extreme skepticism. So, without recourse to some further ampliative methods, T would be underdetermined by the evidence that the restriction allows into play. Of course, once new acceptable auxiliaries were discovered and the restriction changed, the further methods might well not be needed to justify T over those old rivals. So this underdetermination would not be as serious as SU, but it would be serious enough: at any time, we would not know what to be realist about. But then perhaps the realist would be entitled to the further ampliative methods that would remove this underdetermination. For the reasons already indicated, and given that the case for EE3 has not been made, I think that the realist might be so entitled.
36
36 In a reply to Kukla (1993), Leplin and Laudan (1993: 10), in effect, doubt EE2 but in any case emphasiz e that EE3 is what matters to the
underdetermination argument. Kukla disagrees, claiming, in effect, that EE2, when applied to total sciences, “brings in its train all the epistemological problems that were ever ascribed to the doctrine of EE” (1998: 64). According to my discussion, EE2 would bring some epistemological problems if it were true, but they are not as extreme as those that would be brought by EE3 if it were true.
In sum, we have no reason to believe EE2 or EE3 and so the underdetermination argument fails. However, if EE3 were true, it might well undermine scientific realism and if EE2 were true, it could. Once we have set aside extreme skepticism, then, contrary to received opinion, the nonempirical virtues are not central to defending realism from the underdetermination argument; the rejection of the equivalence thesis is. In drawing these conclusions I have mostly construed EE2 and EE3 as if they were committed only end p.116
to T having at least one genuine empirically equivalent rival. Their actual commitment to more rivals does not significantly change the conclusions we should draw.
3.2 The Pessimistic Meta-Induction The most powerful argument against scientific realism, in my view, is what Putnam (1978) calls a “meta-induction.” It does not rest on a prejudice against abduction or exaggerated concerns about underdetermination. It rests on plausible claims about the history of science. The basic version of the argument is aimed at an entity realism like SR: the unobservables posited by past theories do not exist; so, probably the unobservables posited by present theories do not exist. Another version, largely dependent on the basic one, is aimed at a “fact” realism like SSR: past scientific theories are not approximately true; so, probably present theories are not approximately true. (This is an example of the convenience of exploiting the disquotational property of “true” to talk about the world.) Both versions of the argument rest on a claim about past theories from the perspective of our present theory. 37
37
So there is a “tension” in the argument: it seems to rest on a realist view of present science and yet concludes that this realist view is mistaken; see
Leplin (1997: 141–5). I suppose that we should see the meta-induction as some sort of reductio.
And the pessimistic suggestion is that, from a future perspective, we will have a similarly critical view of our present theories. Laudan (1981, 1984, 1996) has supported these claims about the past with a list of theoretical failures. Laudan's list is the one used to discuss the realist's success argument (section 2.1), but the purpose of the list is different here. The purpose before was to show that past theories were successful without being true, thus undermining the argument for realism that “realism explains success.” The list's purpose here is to show that past theories were not approximately true and their unobservables did not exist, thus establishing the premiss of an argument against realism, against the view that present theories are approximately true and their unobservables exist. Scientific realism already concedes something to the meta-induction in exhibiting some skepticism about the claims of science. It holds that science is more or less right but not totally so. It is committed only to well-established theories not exciting speculations. It leaves room for a theoretical posit to be dismissed as inessential to the theory. According to the meta-induction, reflection on the track record of science shows that this skepticism has not gone nearly far enough. The realist can respond to the meta-induction by attacking the premiss or the inference. Concerning the premiss, the realist can, on the one hand, resist the bleak assessment of the theories on Laudan's list, claiming that while some of the unobservables posited by these theories do not exist, others do; or claiming that while there is a deal of falsehood in these theories, there is a deal of truth end p.117
too (Worrall 1989; 38
38
Worrall takes the truth to be not about the nature of entities but about structures that contain the entities. For a critical discussion of this “structural
realism,” see Psi los (1999: ch. 7).
Kitcher 1993: 140–9; Psillos 1999: chs 5–6). On the other hand, the realist can claim that the list is
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unrepresentative, that other past theories do seem to be approximately true and to posit entities that do exist (McMullin 1984). In the light of history, some skepticism about the claims of science is clearly appropriate. The argument is over how much, the mild skepticism of the realist, or the sweeping skepticism of the meta-induction. Settling the argument requires close attention to the historical details. This is not, of course, something that I shall be attempting. However, I shall make some general remarks about the attempt. How can we tell whether Fs, posited by a past theory, exist? Given the disquotational schema, “ ‘F’ refers iff Fs exist,” many approach this question by considering another: How do we tell whether “F” refers? This common approach would be harmless if it exploited only the disquotational property of “refer” captured by the schema, a property acceptable to the deflationist. For then the reference question is just a paraphrase of the existence question. However, it is usual (and, in my view, right) to take “refer” to pick out a substantive semantic relation between “F” and the world, a relation that needs to be explained by a theory of reference. So it is natural to take the reference question to concern this substantive relation and to be answered by appealing to some theory of reference. But then the common approach is far from harmless. The first problem is that the theory of reference appealed to on this approach is usually a description theory. According to this theory, the reference of “F” depends on the descriptions (other terms) that its containing theory associates with it: it refers to whatever those descriptions pick out. It is likely that, from our present scientific perspective, those descriptions do not pick anything out. So, the conclusion is drawn that “F” does not refer and hence there are no Fs. 39
39
See Kuhn (1962) for an argument along these lines. Stephen Stich (1983) and others have argued similarly for various forms of eliminativism about
the mind. Stich has since recanted (1996: 3–90).
Yet, the arguments of Saul Kripke (1980) and others have made it likely that reference for some terms, at least, is to be explained not by a description theory but by a theory that links a term to its referent in a more direct causal way.
40
40
For a summary and development of these and other moves in the theory of reference see Devitt and Sterelny (1999).
So it may well be that a description theory is the wrong theory for “F”. This points to the second, deeper, problem with the common approach: in attempting to answer the existence question by answering the reference question, the approach has its epistemic priorities all wrong. For, we know far less about reference, particularly about when to apply a description theory and when to apply a causal theory, than we know about what exists. In light of this, the rational procedure is to let our end p.118
view of what exists guide our theories of reference rather than let our theories of reference determine what exists. 41
41
My 1991 argues for this prior ty. There is, of course, a truth underlying the mistaken approach: to determine whether the posits of a theory exist we
have to know what those pos ts are and for that we have to understand the language of the theory (pp. 50–3). But understanding a language is a practical skill that does not require theoretical knowledge about the language, else we would understand very little (pp. 270–5).
So, we should not use a theory of reference to answer our existence question. How then should we answer it? Consider how, in general, we argue directly for the nonexistence of Fs. On the basis of the established view of Fs, we start, implicitly if not explicitly, with an assumption about the nature of Fs: something would not be an F unless it were G. Then we argue that nothing is G. So, there are no Fs. Very often this argument is persuasive and generally accepted. But someone might respond by denying the assumption about nature. “Fs do not have to be G, they are just mistakenly thought to be G. So the argument proves nothing.” How do we settle this disagreement? It may be difficult. We can try saying more about the established view of Fs, but this may not do the trick. After all, the responder does not deny that Fs are thought to be G, just that being G is part of the nature of being an F. And the established view may not be clear on the nature issue. We may be left with nothing but a “clash of intuitions” over that issue. In such a situation, we should wonder whether there is a genuine issue to settle: there may be no determinate matter of fact about the nature issue. If there is not, then there is no determinate matter of fact about whether the absence of G things establishes the nonexistence of Fs. Consider two humdrum examples. Most people are antirealist about witches because they believe that nothing casts spells, rides on a broomstick through the sky, and so on. Some people may be antirealist about God because they are convinced by the Problem of Evil that nothing is both all powerful and all good. But these are grounds for antirealism only if casting of spells, riding on broomsticks, and so on, and being all powerful and all good, are essential to witches and God, respectively. There may be disagreement about that. And there is room for worry that disagreement may not be entirely over matters of fact. In light of this, we can expect that close attention to the historical details about past unobservables will reveal some ontologically determinate cases but very likely some indeterminate ones too. The determinate cases will surely include some of nonexistence; phlogiston is a good candidate. But it will surely also include some of existence; the atoms posited in the nineteenth century are good candidates. 42
42
Also molecules and microbes; see Miller (1987).
So, we should conclude that the premiss of the meta-induction is overstated, at least. But how much is it overstated?
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That depends on the “success ratio” of past theories, the ratio of the determinately existents to the determinately nonexistents+indeterminates. Where is this ratio likely to leave scientific realism? To answer this we need to consider the meta-induction's inference. end p.119
I think (1991: 162–5) that there is a good reason for being dubious about the inference. Suppose that our past theories have indeed failed rather badly to get the unobservable world right. Why would that show that our present theories are failing similarly? It clearly would show this if we supposed that we are no better at finding out about unobservables now than we were in the past. But why suppose that? Just the opposite seems more plausible: we are now much better at finding out about unobservables. A naturalized epistemology would surely show that science has for two or three centuries been getting better and better at this. Scientific progress is, to a large degree, a matter of improving scientific methodologies often based on new technologies that provide new instruments for investigating the world. If this is so—and it seems fairly indubitable—then we should expect an examination of the historical details to show improvement over time in our success ratio for unobservables. If the details do show this, it will not matter to realism that the ratio for, say, two centuries ago was poor. What will matter is that we have been improving enough to now have the sort of confidence reflected by SR.
43
43 So this realist response does not take the failures of “immature” science to be irrelevant to the defense of rea ism, thus threatening the defense with
“vacuity” (Laudan (1981: 34)). Rather, it takes the relevance of a science's failures (and successes) to that defense to increase with the degree of that science's maturity, a degree assessed by an empirical epistemology.
And if we have been improving, but not fast enough for SR, the realist can fall back to a more moderate commitment to, say, a high proportion of the unobservables of currently well-established theories. Improvements in scientific methodologies make it much harder to mount a case against realism than seems to have been appreciated. For the appeal to historical details has to show not only that we were nearly always wrong in our unobservable posits but that, despite methodological improvements, we have not been getting significantly righter. It seems to me most unlikely that this case can be made.
4 Conclusions Scientific realism is best seen as a straightforwardly metaphysical doctrine along the lines of SR or SSR. Various explanationist arguments for scientific realism succeed provided that the realist is entitled to abduction. I have suggested that the realist is entitled to this. The underdetermination argument against realism fails because we have no good reason to believe an empirical equivalence thesis that would serve as its premiss. The pessimistic meta-induction, with its attention to past theoretical failures, does pose a problem for realism. But the problem may be manageable. For, the antirealist must argue that the historical record shows not only that past failures are extensive but also that we have not improved our capacity to describe the unobservable world sufficiently to justify confidence that end p.120
the accounts given by our current well-established theories are to a large extent right. This is a hard case to make. References Boyd, Richard N. 1973. ‘Realism, Underdetermination and a Causal Theory of Evidence.’ Nous, 7: 1–12. Boyd, Richard N. 1984. ‘The Current Status of Scientific Realism.’ In Leplin, 1984a: 41–82. Boyd, Richard N. 1985. Lex Orandi est Lex Credendi. In Churchland and Hooker, 1985: 3–34. Brown, James Robert. 1994. Smoke and Mirrors: How Science Reflects Reality. New York: Routledge. Churchland, Paul M. 1985. ‘The Ontological Status of Observables: In Praise of the Superempirical Virtues.’ In Churchland and Hooker, 1985: 35–47. Churchland, Paul M., and Hooker, Clifford A. (eds). 1985. Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism, with a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Clendinnen, F. J. 1989. ‘Realism and the Underdetermination of Theory.’ Synthese, 81: 63–90. Cushing, James T., and McMullin, Ernan (eds). 1989. Philosophical Consequences of Quantum Theory. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Cushing, James T., Fine, A., and Goldstein, S. (eds). 1996. Bohmian Mechanics and Quantum Theory: An Appraisal, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 184. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Devitt, Michael. 1991. Realism and Truth. 2nd edn (1st edn, 1984). Oxford: Blackwell. Devitt, Michael. 1997. ‘Afterword.’ In a reprint of Devitt, 1991. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 302–45. Devitt, Michael. 1998. ‘Naturalism and the A Priori.’ Philosophical Studies, 92: 45–65.
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Devitt, Michael. 1999. ‘A Naturalistic Defense of Realism.’ In Metaphysics: Contemporary Reading