Transitions from School to Work: Globalization, Individualization, and Patterns of Diversity (The Jacobs Foundation Series on Adolescence)

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TRANSITIONS FROM SCHOOL TO WORK Globalization, Individualization, and Patterns of Diversity This book makes an important contribution to the growing literature on the transition from school to work. It provides a unique perspective on the global changes that have transformed school-to-work transitions since the 1970s; offers an integrative conceptual framework for analysis; and promotes a comparative, cross-national understanding of school-to-work transitions in a changing social context. The chapters in this volume compare and assess variations in school-to-work transitions across Europe and North America, providing empirical evidence on how young people negotiate the different options and opportunities available and assessing the costs and returns associated with different transition strategies. Unlike many other books on this subject – which are pitched at either the macro or micro level – this volume attempts to integrate both perspectives, capturing the complexity of this critical life-course transition. Furthermore, the authors address policies aimed at improving the capacity of individuals to make effective transitions and at enabling societies to better coordinate educational and occupational institutions. Ingrid Schoon is Professor of Human Development and Social Policy at the Institute of Education, University of London. Her research interests focus on issues of human development across the life course – in particular, the transition from dependent childhood to productive adulthood; the study of risk and resilience; the realization of individual potential in a changing sociohistorical context; social inequalities in attainment, health, and well-being; and the intergenerational transmission of (dis)advantage. Schoon is currently involved in two major UK interdisciplinary research networks funded by the Economic and Research Council (ESRC): the Priority Network on Gender Inequality and Production (GeNet), and the Centre for the Study of Learning and Life Chances in the Knowledge Economies (Llakes). She is also Director of PATHWAYS, an International Postdoctoral Fellowship Programme for the Comparative Study of Productive Youth Development, which is funded by The Jacobs Foundation, in collaboration with colleagues from the Universities of Michigan, Stockholm, Helsinki, and Jena and the Max Planck Institute in Berlin. She has published widely, including her recent publication with Cambridge University Press, Risk and Resilience: Adaptations in Changing Times. Rainer K. Silbereisen is Professor and Head of Developmental Psychology at the Institute of Psychology of the University of Jena, Adjunct Professor of Human Development and Family Studies at The Pennsylvania State University, and Director of the Center for Applied Developmental Science, Jena. He is currently the President of the International Union of Psychological Science. His main research interests focus on human development across the life span – particularly concerning adolescence and early adulthood – the theoretical framework of which focuses on dynamic interactionism, stressing the combined role of biological, psychological, and socio-cultural determinants of human development. Trained as a psychologist, he has been involved in interdisciplinary, largescale research on the role of social change in positive and maladaptive human development, such as the German Collaborative Research Center on Social Development in Post-Socialist Societies (SFB 580) and the German–Israeli Research Consortium on Migration and Societal Integration. He has published widely, including the recently edited book (with Richard Lerner) Approaches to Positive Youth Development.

THE JACOBS FOUNDATION SERIES ON ADOLESCENCE Series Editors: J¨urgen Baumert, Marta Tienda The Jacobs Foundation Series on Adolescence addresses the question of what can be done to promote healthy development around the world. The series views this important question from different disciplines in the social sciences. Economists and sociologists may consider how we can promote human capital over time – specifically, an individual’s ability to become educated and to develop earning power; demographers and sociologists may analyze development patterns over generations; and psychiatrists and psychologists may tackle the problem of how much change is possible in psychological health during the life course and over generations. Drawing from these different domains of inquiry into human development, The Jacobs Foundation Series on Adolescence examines the potential for change across generations and during the life course in three areas: (1) human capital, (2) partnership behavior, and (3) psychological health and the rearing of children. The purpose of the series is to further the goals of The Jacobs Foundation: to contribute to the welfare and social productivity of the current and future generations of young people. Alison Clarke-Stewart and Judy Dunn, eds., Families Count: Effects on Child and Adolescent Development Michael Rutter and Marta Tienda, eds., Ethnicity and Causal Mechanisms P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale, Kathleen Kiernan, and Ruth J. Friedman, eds., Human Development across Lives and Generations: The Potential for Change Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont et al., eds., Joining Society: Social Interaction and Learning in Adolescence and Youth Marta Tienda and William Julius Wilson, eds., Youth in Cities: A Cross-National Perspective Roland Vandenberghe and A. Michael Huberman, eds., Understanding and Preventing Teacher Burnout: A Sourcebook of International Research and Practice Ruby Takanishi and David A. Hamburg, eds., Preparing Adolescents for the Twenty-First Century: Challenges Facing Europe and the United States Albert Bandura, ed., Self-Efficacy in Changing Societies Michael Rutter, ed., Psychosocial Disturbances in Young People: Challenges for Prevention Anne C. Petersen and Jeylan T. Mortimer, eds., Youth Unemployment and Society

RANSITIONS FROM SCHOOL T TO WORK Globalization, Individualization, and Patterns of Diversity

Edited by

Ingrid Schoon Institute of Education University of London

Rainer K. Silbereisen Institute of Psychology University of Jena

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521490689 © Cambridge University Press 2009 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2009

ISBN-13

978-0-511-60506-2

eBook (NetLibrary)

ISBN-13

978-0-521-49068-9

Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. Information regarding prices, travel timetables, and other factual information given in this work are correct at the time of first printing, but Cambridge University Press does not guarantee the accuracy of such information thereafter.

We dedicate this book to the memory of Klaus J. Jacobs, who in 1988 set up The Jacobs Foundation to create a brighter future for young people the world over.

Contents

List of Illustrations

page xi

List of Tables

xiii

Contributors

xvii

Acknowledgments

xix

I. Introduction 1. Conceptualising School-to-Work Transitions in Context Ingrid Schoon and Rainer K. Silbereisen 2. Thinking about the Transition to Adulthood: From Grand Narratives to Useful Theories Michael J. Shanahan and Kyle C. Longest

3

30

II. Transitions and Global Change 3. Is Stable Employment Becoming More Elusive for Young Men? Mary Corcoran and Jordan Matsudaira 4. Youth Outcomes in the Labour Markets of Advanced Economies: Decline, Deterioration, and Causes Rebekka Christopoulou and Paul Ryan 5. Uncertain and Unable to Commit: A Fourteen-Country Comparison of the Impact of Globalization on the Early Life Course Melinda Mills and Hans-Peter Blossfeld

45

67

95

III. Individual Decision Making 6. ‘It Was Not My Choice, You Know?’: Young People’s Subjective Views and Decision-Making Processes in Biographical Transitions Andreas Walther

121

ix

x

Contents

7. From Paradigm to Paradox: Parental Support and Transitions to Independence Gill Jones

145

8. Job Attitudes and Job Aspirations in a Changing Labor Market: Germany, 1991–2006 Christian Ebner and Jutta Allmendinger

165

9. Escaping the Gender Trap: Young Women’s Transition into Nontraditional Occupations Marlis Buchmann and Irene Kriesi

193

IV. Mapping Diversity and Change 10. Sequences, Patterns, and Variations in the Assumption of Work and Family-Related Roles: Evidence from Two British Birth Cohorts Ingrid Schoon, Andy Ross, and Peter Martin 11. Transition to Adulthood: Linking Late-Adolescent Lifestyles to Family and Work Status in the Mid-Twenties Jessica L. Garrett and Jacquelynne S. Eccles 12. Challenges of Transitioning into Adulthood Barbara Schneider

219

243 265

V. Interventions and Policies 13. School-Related Burnout During Educational Tracks: Antecedents and Consequences Katariina Salmela-Aro 14. Building Skills for Positive Developmental Pathways and Successful Vocational Careers in Adulthood: Intervention Programs Within the School Context Karina Weichold

293

312

15. Integrated Transition Policies for European Young Adults: Contradictions and Solutions Manuela du Bois-Reymond

331

16. The Future at Work: Labor-Market Realities and the Transition to Adulthood Lynn A. Karoly

352

Index

385

List of Illustrations

1.1. Developmental Contextual Model of Transition Demands and Their Resolution. page 8 3.1. Men’s Major Activity in Week Prior to March CPS Interview: All Men Ages 20 to 40.

50

3.2. Men’s Major Activity in Week Prior to March CPS Interview: Men Ages 20 to 40 with a High School Degree or Less.

51

3.3. Fraction of Men Working at Least One Week Last Year by Birth Cohort and Race: Ages 20 to 40.

54

3.4. Fraction of Men with High School Degree or Less Working at Least One Week Last Year by Birth Cohort and Race: Ages 20 to 40.

54

3.5. Fraction of Men Working at Least One Week Last Year by Birth Cohort and Race: 1968 to 2006.

56

3.6. Fraction of Men with High School Degree or Less Working at Least One Week Last Year by Birth Cohort and Race: 1968 to 2006.

57

4.1. Economic Analysis of Youth-Related Trends in the Labour Market.

72

4.2. Average Annual Rates of Change in Pay and Employment of Young Adults Relative to Prime-Age Adults During Cyclically Neutral Sub-Periods: Male Employees in 13 Advanced Economies (% p.a.).

74

xi

xii

List of Illustrations

4.3. Simulation of the Path of Relative Unemployment Rate Towards Equilibrium by Country Group.

88

5.1. Globalization and Increasing Uncertainty in the Transition to Adulthood.

97

8.1. Unemployment Rates in Germany Since 1970, by Region and Age Group.

167

8.2. Unemployment Rates in Western and Eastern Germany, by Educational Achievement, 1991–2005.

169

8.3. Germany: The Importance of Job Security, 1991 and 2006, by Region and Age Group.

179

8.4. Germany: The Importance of an Interesting Job, 1991 and 2006, by Region and Age Group.

180

11.1. Cluster Analysis of Engagement Across Five Late-Adolescent Social Contexts.

253

16.1. Actual and Projected Growth of U.S. Workforce by Decade: 1950s to 2020s.

354

16.2. Labor Utilization in Selected Countries: 1998.

358

16.3. Composition of Expenditures by Age Group: 2003.

359

16.4. Composition of Population Ages 25 to 34 by Educational Attainment: 1940–2006.

360

16.5. Economy-wide Measure of Occupational Task Input: 1960–1998.

367

16.6. Real Median Hourly Wage by Education: 1973–2005.

369

16.7. Gross Return to Tertiary Education for Male Workers in Selected OECD Countries: 2001.

370

16.8. Value of World Merchandise and Services Exports: 1950–2006.

372

16.9. BLS Projected Top 20 Four-Digit Occupations with Fastest Employment Growth: 2006–2016.

377

16.10. BLS Projected Top 20 Four-Digit Occupations with Largest Employment Growth: 2006–2016.

378

List of Tables

3.1. Fraction of Men in Four Activity Categories in Week Prior to March CPS Interview by Year of Birth Cohort, Race, and Age for Men with High School Degree or Less page 52 3.2. Fraction of Men with High School Degree or Less Reporting Any Work in Previous Year by Year of Birth Cohort and Age

55

3.3. Distribution of Total Weeks of Nonwork: Ages 28–30 by Year of Birth and Race

59

3.4. Distribution of Total Weeks of Nonwork: Ages 28–30 by Year of Birth and Race, Men with High School Degree or Less

60

4.1. Pay-Setting Institutions and Changes in Youth Relative Pay

76

4.2. Educational Participation and Student Employment, Young Adult Males

78

4.3. Predicted Qualitative Effects on Labour-Market Outcomes of Adverse Trends in Demand or Supply, by National Institutions of Pay-Setting

79

4.4. Econometric Results

83

5.1. Summary of Main Results: Rising Uncertainty in the Labor Market and Impact on Partnership and Parenthood Behavior

109

6.1. Transition Regimes Across Europe

134

6.2. Most Important Source of Income (in %) Indicated by Young People (15–30) in 2006

139

7.1. Parents’ Beliefs about Their Legal Responsibilities in the United Kingdom

150 xiii

xiv

List of Tables

8.1. Distributions of Sociodemographic Variables in the Samples of 1991 and 2006

174

8.2. Importance of “Job Security” and “Interesting Job”: Differences Between Western and Eastern Germany, 1991

175

8.3. Importance of “Job Security” and “Interesting Job”: Differences Between Western and Eastern Germany, 2006

176

8.4. The Importance of “Job Security” and “Interesting Job,” Controlled for Sociodemographic Variables: Differences Between Western and Eastern Germany, 1991 and 2006 (Ordinary Least Squares Regression)

178

8.5. Importance and Perceived Reality of “Job Security” and “Interesting Job” as Job Aspects Among Persons with Regular Gainful Employment in Germany, 2006

181

8.6. Determinants of Perceived Job Security and Interesting Job, 2006 (Binary Logistic Regression)

182

8.7. The Impact of Job-Security Congruence/Incongruence on Job Satisfaction and Organizational Commitment, 2006 (Binary Logistic Regression)

185

8.8. The Impact of Interesting-Job Congruence/Incongruence on Job Satisfaction and Organizational Commitment, 2006 (Binary Logistic Regression)

186

9.1. Descriptive Statistics for All Study Variables

204

9.2. Determinants of Aspiring to a Nontraditional Occupation (15-Year-Olds) and of a Nontraditional Job/Occupational Training (21-Year-Olds)

206

10.1. Classification of Economic Activity Sequences

225

10.2. Precursors of Transition Pathways: Parental Social Class and Mother’s Education

229

10.3. Time Trends in the Distribution of Status Configurations: Percentage of Cohort Members in Each of the Four Latent Classes

231

10.4. Association of Transition Sequences (Age 16–29, OMA) and Status Configurations at Age 30/33 (LCA) Expressed as a Ratio of Observed-to-Expected Probabilities – Men

234

List of Tables

xv

10.5. Association of Transition Sequences (Age 16–29, OMA) and Status Configurations at Age 30/33 (LCA) Expressed as a Ratio of Observed-to-Expected Probabilities – Women

235

11.1. Correlations of Measures of Engagement in Five Late-Adolescent Social Contexts

248

11.2. Measures of Engagement in Late-Adolescent Social Contexts for Each Cluster

253

11.3. Measures of Psychological Well-Being for Each Cluster

255

13.1. Factors Related to School Burnout

307

14.1. Employability and Life Skills

317

16.1. Indicators of Aging in Selected Countries: 2000, 2025, and 2050

356

16.2. Percentage of College Graduates Among Persons 25 to 29 by Sex and Race/Ethnicity, 2003

361

16.3. OECD Student Performance on PISA 2006, Science Scale

363

16.4. OECD Student Performance on PISA 2006, Mathematical Scale

364

16.5. Performance of Adults 16 to 65 on the IALS 1994–1998, Prose Score

365

Contributors

Editors Ingrid Schoon, Institute of Education, University of London (UK) Rainer K. Silbereisen, Institute of Psychology, University of Jena (Germany)

Contributors Jutta Allmendinger, Wissenschaftszentrum f¨ur Sozialforschung (Social Science Research Center), Berlin (Germany) Hans-Peter Blossfeld, University of Bamberg (Germany) Marlis Buchmann, The Jacobs Center for Productive Youth Development, University of Z¨urich (Switzerland) Rebekka Christopoulou, European Institute, London School of Economics (UK) Mary Corcoran, University of Michigan (USA) Manuela du Bois-Reymond, University of Leiden (The Netherlands) Christian Ebner, Wissenschaftszentrum f¨ur Sozialforschung (Social Science Research Center), Berlin (Germany) Jacquelynne S. Eccles, University of Michigan (USA) Jessica L. Garrett, University of Michigan (USA) Gill Jones, Keele University (UK) xvii

xviii

Contributors

Lynn A. Karoly, RAND, Washington, DC (USA) Irene Kriesi, The Jacobs Center for Productive Youth Development, University of Z¨urich (Switzerland) Kyle C. Longest, University of North Carolina (USA) Peter Martin, City University, London (UK) Jordan Matsudaira, University of California, Berkeley (USA) Melinda Mills, University of Groningen (The Netherlands) Andy Ross, National Centre for Social Research, London (UK) Paul Ryan, King’s College, London (UK) Katariina Salmela-Aro, University of Jyv¨askyl¨a and University of Helsinki (Finland) Barbara Schneider, Michigan State University (USA) Michael J. Shanahan, University of North Carolina (USA) Andreas Walther, Institute for Regional Innovation and Social Research (IRISev), T¨ubingen (Germany) Karina Weichold, University of Jena (Germany)

Acknowledgments

We would like to express our gratitude to The Jacobs Foundation for facilitating an international conference on the topic of “Transitions from School to Work,” held in April 2007 at Marbach Castle, which led to the production of this book. In particular, we are grateful to the late Klaus J. Jacobs, the founder of The Jacobs Foundation, and to Christian Jacobs, chairman of the board of The Jacobs Foundation, for their generous support toward bringing this volume to fruition. We want to thank Marta Tienda and J¨urgen Baumert for their insightful and encouraging guidance in developing the conference and this book. We also want to express our appreciation for the dedication and help provided by Bernd Ebersold and Simon Sommer in preparing both the conference and the publication of this book. We wish to acknowledge the constructive comments and advice offered by the conference participants and the reviewers, as well as the authors who responded to the challenges posed with their imaginative responses and continued efforts to improve their chapters. We were also very pleased about the participation of a group of outstanding young scholars whose research contributed to advancing the conference and the contributions to this volume. We are sure that outstanding research can be expected of these scholars in the future: Doris Beer, Rebekka Christopoulou, Claudia M. Haase, Angel L. Harris, Marita Jacob, Corinna Kleinert, Joseph Lah Lo-oh, Ricardo Sabates, Deepali Sharma, and Jeremy Staff. Special thanks are due to Helen Cheng, Wendy Robbins, Annett Weise, and Sebastian Gr¨umer, who helped us in preparing the document for publication.

xix

I INTRODUCTION

1

Conceptualising School-to-Work Transitions in Context Ingrid Schoon and Rainer K. Silbereisen

Introduction The transition from school to work is one of the most crucial periods in the life of a young person. It generally spans the phase between completion of full-time education or training and entry into continuous full-time employment. It can be a very turbulent phase, involving various attempts and different routes trying to establish oneself in the labour market, or it can be a rather smooth transition. It involves a number of important decisions, such as whether to continue with further education or to leave school directly after completion of compulsory education; what type of job or career to choose; and how best to respond to opportunities and constraints in the labour market. Which path a young person takes during this transition period can have long-term consequences regarding his or her future career and subsequent working life but can also impact other interlinked transitions, such as leaving the parental home and taking the step into partnership and family formation. Transition experiences are dependent on individual decision making but are also largely shaped by opportunities and constraints presented by the sociohistorical context and economic conditions. In the past four decades, employment opportunities in most Western countries have changed dramatically following the introduction of new technologies, the disappearance of manual jobs, and the increasing participation of women in the labour market. Compared to the early 1970s, unemployment rates in almost all developed countries have risen, especially in Europe (International Labour Organization, 2008; M¨uller & Gangl, 2003). Furthermore, in most developed countries, the number and proportion of full-time employees 3

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Ingrid Schoon and Rainer K. Silbereisen

with contracts of indeterminate duration have decreased continually since the mid-1980s, and there has been a shift towards more flexible working arrangements. Young people have been hit particularly hard by this downturn economic trend because unemployment and flexible employment among the young (i.e., younger than twenty-five) are generally higher than average (Blossfeld, Klijzing, Mills, & Kurz, 2005; O’Higgins, 2004). There are, however, national variations in the extent to which young people have been affected by those changes, associated with different ‘institutional filters’ such as regulations regarding opportunities for employment and education, welfare regimes, and the family (for more details, see Chapters 4 to 7 in this volume). Most developed countries responded to the economic changes by placing greater emphasis on participation in education and training in order to equip young people with the necessary skills for making the transition into the world of work. However, countries differ in regulating access to further education. Given the required school grades, some countries (particularly Scandinavian countries) provide free access to further education, whereas others charge fees (general or means-tested). In most countries, increasing enrolment in formal education has acted as a buffer, softening the impact of the downward trend in employment opportunities. Yet, not all young people are participating in further education beyond compulsory-schoolleaving age, even if they meet the necessary cognitive and academic ability level. Decisions about whether to leave school early or to continue with full-time education are influenced not only by individual ability levels and motivation but also by the family context, available economic resources, and macroeconomic conditions (Breen & Goldthorpe, 1999; Erikson & Jonsson, 1996; Jencks, 1979; Schoon, 2008). In summary, the processes shaping transition experiences of young people are multifaceted, including macroeconomic conditions, institutional structures, social background, gender, and ethnicity, as well as individual resources such as ability, motivation, and aspirations. For a better understanding of transition experiences of young people making their way to economic independence, a unifying, interdisciplinary framework is needed that focuses on human development in context. Most previous work on this topic, as well as most policy strategies, look on the school-to-work transition as a single, isolated event that is more or less independent from other transitions, such as the step into independent living, partnership formation, and parenthood. In this book, we bring together contributions from different disciplines that examine multiple sources of influence and transition experiences in different contexts. Our goal is to provide a more

Conceptualising School-to-Work Transitions in Context

5

complete understanding of the dynamic interplay of transitions across multiple life domains and their embeddedness in multiple interacting spheres of influence.

Towards a Unifying Framework for the Study of Transitions in Times of Social Change In the history of social science research, there have been persistent attempts to develop such a common interdisciplinary or even transdisciplinary theoretical framework for the study of human development in context, bringing together expertise from the fields of economics, sociology, and psychology (Baltes, 1997; Diewald & Mayer, 2008; Elder & Caspi, 1990; Featherman & Lerner, 1985). Commonalities of concern include, first, the acknowledgement that development takes time and that transition patterns are seen to reflect cumulative experiences (e.g., the accumulation of educational credentials). Second, transition experiences are embedded within social contexts, ranging from interactions with significant others to macrosocial circumstances. Third, specific transitions, such as from school to work, are seen as developmental tasks that challenge individual actors as well as institutional regulations. Fourth, individual decision making is bounded by social institutions and the wider macrosocial conditions. Despite these commonalities, there continues to be a discipline-specific focus on dominant explanatory factors and guiding concepts. Economic models of youth transitions focus mainly on the supply and demand side of the labour market and examine transition experiences in terms of ‘rational choice’ based on a cost–benefit analysis that aims to maximise personal profit. Yet, as argued by Jones and Walther (see Chapters 6 and 7 in this volume), the notion of rational choice does not necessarily take into account the role of social and cultural resources, individual values, or preferences. Cultural variations and the role of social structures in human development are the primary focus of sociology, whereas the multiple facets of individual functioning are the main concern of psychology. The disciplines meet where they aim to examine the interactions between individual and context. This interconnection had been recognised; yet, research has developed independently in recent decades. Within sociology, research has focused on the study of the life course as externally shaped by institutions, structural opportunities, and historical change, in which life-course dynamics and expressions of individual agency are contingent on a given sociohistorical context (Elder, 1998). Psychology, conversely, has concentrated on the study of individual adaptation and development across the life span,

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Ingrid Schoon and Rainer K. Silbereisen

conceptualised as lifelong adaptive processes. Its interests lie within the study of principles of self-regulation and psychological functioning, such as the model of selective optimisation and compensation (Baltes, 1997). Although the malleability of individual development and functioning through social influences is acknowledged within psychology, the focus is mostly on the more proximal social contexts, such as the family, social networks, and peers, rather than on more distal sociohistorical or institutional influences (Roberts, 2007). For psychologists to take into account the role of institutions and social structures might contribute to a better understanding of individual adaptation in times of social change and provide the means to assess how social and institutional change is affecting individual functioning. For sociologists and economists to take into account individual motivation and preferences will result in a better understanding of individual decision making and choice, processes involved in skill acquisition, and modes of individual agency. An integrated approach would enhance our understanding of human behaviour in a changing social context and enable us to answer questions such as: How do young people adjust to a changing labour market? Do macroeconomic changes influence individual functioning? What are the strategies and coping mechanisms adopted to respond to a downturn in employment opportunities or increased pressure to continue with further education? Have perceptions and attitudes towards work changed among cohorts of young workers? Given the differences in preferred explanatory factors and processes, it might take some time for a joint and integrated paradigm to emerge. In the meantime, the formulation of an integrative research paradigm and the encouragement of a dialogue among the disciplines can be achieved. Shanahan and Longest (see Chapter 2 in this volume) suggest developing multidisciplinary, middle-range theories that enable the formulation of testable hypotheses and empirical evidence in order to arrive at an adequate description and understanding of school-to-work transitions. Much work in this direction has already been accomplished, as evidenced in the rich descriptions and analyses of school-to-work transitions presented in this book. Thus, we want to go a step further and call for an integrative paradigm for the study of youth transitions, bringing together assumptions about process, context, structure, and individual functioning within a developmental contextual framework. We suggest a framework for the study of the negotiation of the schoolto-work transition in our times of rapid social change. It is inspired by three sources: Elder’s (1985, 1998) notion of control cycles as linkage between change on the macrolevel and individual adaptation; Bronfenbrenner’s

Conceptualising School-to-Work Transitions in Context

7

(1979) concept of multiple ecological layers influencing human development; and theories of developmental regulation (Baltes, 1997) or control striving (Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995). These three elements led us to a comprehensive model, shown in Figure 1.1, that represents the blueprint for the following discussion, underlined by topics and insights from the chapters of this book. Seen against the backdrop of ongoing development across the life span and embedded in the multiple layers of ecological systems relevant for the negotiation of the school-to-work transition, the core of developmental regulation is characterised by what we call demands, resources, coping, and psychosocial outcomes (see also Pinquart & Silbereisen, 2004). Transition demands are individual-level representations of challenges concerning the assumption of new social roles regarding education, work, and family formation in the face of rapid social changes on the structure level. Examples of the latter are depicted, including globalisation, demographic and economic change, changes in life-course regimes, demand/ supply versatility concerning youth labour, and changing political priorities. These changes come to young peoples’ life in a cascaded, multiple-‘filtered’ fashion that emphasises or attenuates their impact (see also Chapters 4 to 7 in this volume). Such filters relevant for the school-to-work transition are institutional regulations regarding access to education and the labour market or the provision of supports. So-called welfare regimes adopt institutional arrangements aiming to protect against the possible risks for individuals’ economic and personal well-being due to uncertainties on the structural level. Another filter considered here is the role of family systems that can act as a buffer or an impediment in shaping individual responses to transition demands. It also has to be considered that the filtering process may differ depending on gender, race, status attainment, or life stage, with some social groups or individuals being more directly impacted by social change than others. What is experienced as new demands at the individual level reflects more or less accentuated changes of past normative expectations and behaviours regarding the transition into adult roles and the move into independent adulthood. In the face of rapid social change, young people need to negotiate untested and opaque territory characterised by uncertainties about the possible aims and means. Although this requires capabilities and skills for exploration of the unknown, there are also rather clearly defined new learning requirements that can be achieved in ways known from the past. Nevertheless, the match between what one brings to the school-to-work– transition phase in terms of resources and what seemingly is expected anew will be experienced as either a healthy challenge or a painful stressor. The

8

Distal Social Change

E c o l o g i c a l

including pattern of early experiences regarding schooling and work, parental support, ability, and motivation

Personal, Social, and Economic Resources

Figure 1.1. Developmental Contextual Model of Transition Demands and Their Resolution.

Transition Phase

Generally related to uncertainty and the need for new learning regarding career and personal development

Transition Demands

Variation by gender, race, life cycle, status attainment, and their interaction.

Institutional Filtering

Early Socialisation

(e.g., globalisation, demographic change, changing labour markets, demand/supply, political priorities)

H i g h er – O r d e r

S y s t e m s

Adulthood

(e.g., socioemotional adaptation, beliefs and life goals, career paths, intimate relationships)

Psychosocial Outcomes

(e.g., engagement, disengagement with transition demand)

Individual Coping and Adjustment

(e.g., macroeconomic conditions, cultural belief systems, welfare regimes, social institutions, and their interactions)

Conceptualising School-to-Work Transitions in Context

9

resources that individuals bring to a situation may be of a personal, intergenerational, or social nature and may reflect results of earlier socialisation experiences. Of particular relevance for our focus on the transition to gainful employment are vocational interests and other work-related prerequisites, such as ability and motivation. Both demands and resources comprise the input for attempts to deal with the new claims and are, in turn, shaped by experiences of individual coping or adjustment. Above and beyond many possible specific reactions, we believe that one needs to distinguish between behaviours and motivations that focus on the tasks to be engaged with and resolved, and those indicating disengagement and resignation. Individuals engaged in pursuing a transition demand are likely to pursue the task with full effort and, in case of failure, begin to rally for support, whereas disengaged individuals give in when confronted with obstacles by negating the necessity for action or looking for excuses that ‘save face’. Both reactions have their merits – the first is likely to bring about resolution of the transition demand (in most circumstances); the second is adequate in situations in which the lack of opportunities makes active coping obsolete and in which leaving the field is better, as long as it means saving energy for success in dealing with other issues or later attempts for reengagement. Concerning the school-to-work transition, one can imagine many distinct manifestations of these two basic kinds of adaptive reactions, depending on the timing of or stage in the transition, as well as many other constraints (e.g., personal resources and contextual supports). Of course, it is also relevant whether one refers to situation-specific exchanges or more molar habits of dealing with insecurities. Both resources and coping behaviours have a dual face when it comes to their role in linking demands and psychosocial outcomes. They may have a direct effect of their own; that is, people better equipped with resources or adaptive reactions to match the situation at hand will fare better during and after the transition. In addition, resources and coping processes can have a protective effect by reducing the potential impact of transition demands on individual developmental outcomes, by either shielding the individual from the demand characteristic or reducing its threat level. The psychosocial outcomes are manifold in nature and, beyond the resolution or disengagement from the transition, entail various manifestations of adaptive (or maladaptive) developments, such as beliefs and expectations concerning one’s life, success in other biographical tasks, or general well-being. According to our model, current outcomes may represent the beginning of feedback cycles that change other components of

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developmental regulation, from the coping processes that may be optimised to the resources that often need reinforcement during the transition process to the demands themselves that, once resolved, may either reduce or even increase the vulnerability to new demands of a different nature. Thus, failure in dealing with the requirements of finding a job under difficult circumstances may, for example, carry over to difficulties in the marriage market, making it more difficult to meet the expectations that a partner has in terms of economic accomplishments. Seen in long-term perspective, repeated failures to achieve psychosocial outcomes matching transition demands ultimately may lead to a change of the sources of the demands at the structural level, such as societal changes brought about by collective action in social movements. Potential indications for such a feedback loop might be the decreasing fertility levels, especially among well-educated women, and demands for improved child-care provision for young families. An important aspect of the framework must be mentioned here. The regulation of the school-to-work transitions occurring during adolescence and young adulthood and the challenges and achievements of this period in the life span do not happen in isolation but rather in close interaction with achievements in other domains (e.g., transitions into family formation and parenthood). Together with experiences of earlier socialisation, the processes and outcomes of this developmental period represent, in part, the essential components of transition-related resources and coping capabilities. Furthermore, the repertoire of resources and coping built up during negotiation of the school-to-work transition stimulates (or hinders) the progression of development in other fields (e.g., the transition to independent living or the formation of intimate relationships). In the following chapters, we present different views and current debates as well as empirical evidence that maps transition experiences of young people in various developed countries. The chapters of this book provide insights to the structural context, institutional regulations, and individuallevel experiences associated with global changes that have transformed school-to-work transitions since the 1970s.

Organisation of the Book We selected contributions by experts from various backgrounds, covering the fields of sociology, economics, psychology, education, and social policy. Evidence is presented from large-scale longitudinal and census data as well as qualitative studies, thereby approaching transition experiences from

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a variety of perspectives. Instead of focusing only on single transitions, multiple, interlinked transitions are considered, providing information on the nexus among education, employment, and family transitions. Furthermore, we offer analysis of multiple levels of influence, from the macro to the micro level. Macroeconomic changes since the 1970s are described and analysis is provided to assess the impact of macro-level change on micro-level experiences and decision making. The book aims to advance our understanding of transition experiences in times of global change and to assess the interactions between a changing social context and changing individuals. Furthermore, we present theory-based and empirically tested intervention studies that aim to facilitate the school-to-work transition and related levels of well-being. What integrates the different chapters is their contribution to different aspects of the developmental contextual model of transition demands and their resolution discussed previously. Outline of the Chapters The book is arranged in five parts, organised around a set of interlinking issues that pose different questions. First, we introduce conceptual and thematic frameworks for the study of school-to-work transitions in times of social change. Second, we describe changing labour-market conditions in the developed world since the 1970s. Third, individual decision making is examined in more detail. Fourth, we assess multiple, interlinked transitions across different domains and examine individual development over time. Last, we discuss interventions and policies that aim to promote successful transitions and positive youth development. Together, the contributions construct a picture of the processes and mechanisms underlying changes in transition experiences from the 1970s (or sometimes earlier) into the twenty-first century and the associated outcomes. Conceptual and Thematic Frameworks. In addition to the introduction in this chapter, Shanahan and Longest assess current theorising of youth transition in Chapter 2. The authors argue that we should move away from totalising ‘grand narratives’ of human development (e.g., Arnett’s [2000] concept of emerging adulthood) and endorse more mid-range ‘useful theories’ that facilitate the formulation of testable hypotheses. Their chapter criticises the use of all-encompassing, potentially misleading descriptions that do not consider the diversity and multiplicity of experiences that young people encounter in their transition to adulthood and that are not specific enough to subject them to empirical test. Shanahan and Longest suggest that useful theories need to follow six desiderata; that is, they must (1) be

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retroductive (based on a combination of inductive and deductive theorising); (2) be mid-range (generating several hypotheses related to particular categories of behaviours); (3) be developmental (taking into account mechanisms of change and continuity); (4) address psychological functions (personal attributes that promote or interfere with adaptation); (5) be interactive (distinguish groups or contexts by configurations of variables); and (6) have a multidisciplinary perspective (reflecting the role of economic, political, or social contexts as well as psychological factors). The key issue is to arrive at an empirically based and theoretically sound conceptualisation of changing transition experiences. Changing Labour Markets. The second part of the book describes differences and similarities in transition experiences for different age cohorts across different countries and for different subgroups in the population. The three chapters comprising this part draw primarily on the fields of economics and sociology to address questions regarding employment transitions and trajectories. Have employment opportunities improved or declined for younger cohorts making their way into the labour market? Has it become more difficult to succeed? Does global social change have a similar impact on individuals or are there differential effects as a function of life stage, gender, and other conditions? What is the role of institutions in supporting transition experiences of young people? Seen against the backdrop of our model, these chapters primarily address the challenges of rapid social and economic changes and the institutional filtering that is taking place, thereby buffering or amplifying the effects of the challenges on the transition demands and, ultimately, the success in dealing with them. In Chapter 3, Corcoran and Matsudaira compare men’s employment activities using data from the 1967 to 2006 Current Population Surveys (CPS) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to map the work trajectories of men between the ages of twenty and forty, covering four successive cohorts born in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. The main result is that across the more recent cohorts, the proportion of men encountering difficulties in achieving stable employment has increased, particularly among African Americans and those with fewer than twelve years of education. The economic boom of the 1990s helped reduce the rate of unemployment. The authors argue that changes in the economy constitute the major driver of changing employment experiences. Yet, economic growth alone is insufficient to solve the problem of young men’s detachment from work because the economic boom of the 1990s helped mainly better-educated and white men. Corcoran and Matsudaira suggest the implementation of a mix of

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educational programs designed to meet the diverse needs of disconnected youth as well as a set of strategies to ‘make work pay’. Christopoulou and Ryan examine the trend in demand for youth labour in thirteen advanced economies during the final quarter of the twentieth century, utilising Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) statistics; United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Statistical Yearbooks; and Penn World tables. The results show an overall downward trend in the demand for youth labour; however, the trend is less pronounced in some countries, such as Sweden, Finland, South Korea, Germany, and Japan. A distinction is made between ‘market liberal’ and ‘coordinated markets’ that reflects differences in national institutions of pay-setting. The findings suggest that coordinated pay-setting provides a buffer against the decline in youth outcomes. The primary buffer, however, was a reduction of youth labour supply, associated with increased enrolment in formal education. Chapter 4 raises key issues regarding international comparisons of labour-market trends and the simultaneous consideration of multiple influences. It discusses concerns regarding reliability, validity, and comparability of data and their implication for empirical analysis of global trends, and it emphasises the need for methods that enable the simultaneous analysis of multiple factors that jointly influence youth outcomes. Chapter 5 by Mills and Blossfeld describes findings from an impressive large-scale project using panel data collected in fourteen countries across Europe and North and Central America since the 1980s to assess the impact of globalisation on the transition to adulthood (i.e., GLOBALIFE). The findings suggest that across nations, young people experience an increasingly unstable entry into the world of work, manifesting itself in a rise of parttime work, fixed-term contracts, and precarious jobs. The authors argue that manifestations of globalisation on the individual level correspond to individual strategies, such as postponing transitions to employment and family formation. How this happens in principle is specified in a multilevel model, in which globalisation changes markets such that innovation rates increase, transactions accelerate, and volatility grows. Taken together, these changes reflect an increasing uncertainty on the macro-level. The impact of macro-level changes on individual response is assumed to be filtered by institutions (e.g., work, education, welfare, and family) – filtering uncertainties in a dual sense – amplifying uncertainties and directing them to particular groups, bypassing others. Mills and Blossfeld argue that the institutional filters result in differentiated effects of globalisation across countries and for various groups of young people. Better educated youth, for example,

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are affected less. Education also shapes observed gender-specific effects, as reflected in women’s family or career orientation. The three studies reported in Part II provide a better understanding of the changing labour market and employment opportunities for young people in Western countries making their way into the world of work. The general picture is that of increasing difficulties and problems for young people trying to establish themselves in the labour market. Yet, changing labour-market opportunities have not affected all young people in the same way. There is heterogeneity in the impact of global changes for different countries and for different subgroups of the population, defined by gender, race, and levels of education. All three studies highlight the role of education as a potential buffer against the negative influences of globalisation, and they point to the importance of institutions in filtering the impact of globalisation onto individual-level experiences. A key leverage point for global policy makers is to encourage extended education and the acquisition of job-relevant skills. How can these aims be achieved and implemented; and how are these policy targets perceived by young people and their parents? Individual Decision Making and Coping. In Part III, a more in-depth analysis of how individuals negotiate the school-to-work transition in different institutional contexts and settings is provided, drawing on expertise in the fields of sociology, psychology, and social policy. The four chapters discuss the link between structural contexts and individual decision making and adjustment. Does individual decision making and coping differ across different institutionalised transition regimes? What is the role of individualagency processes in shaping transition pathways and career outcomes? What is the role of interactions with parents and the wider social context in shaping individual response and agency? How do young people perceive the world of work? What type of jobs do they desire and how are those desires met by the reality of working life? These four chapters more closely refer to the coping and adjustment part of our model, focusing on the nature and role of particular individual coping styles as well as the interplay between social resources (e.g., intergenerational support) and ways of dealing with transition demands. As throughout the book, all processes are discussed against the backdrop of the higher order ecological systems, such as established belief systems concerning individual or societal responsibilities for the school-to-work transition. In Chapter 6, Walther examines the complexity of individual decision making under conditions of uncertainty and explores the varying scopes for action offered within different institutional contexts. Based on qualitative,

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comparative analysis of young people’s transition experiences in different European countries, the chapter provides a rich and insightful analysis of ‘biographical dilemmas’ arising from often-competing demands to priorities of individual needs regarding education, work, and pay. Young people are confronted with a ‘planning paradox’ that requires them to make decisions despite a lack of reliable prescribed pathways and under conditions of uncertainty. Decisions made in these circumstances are not sufficiently described by models of rational choice. Instead, the author identifies a number of different coping styles, each based on a unique constellation of perceptions, motivations, and actions. Walther then goes on to examine how different institutional arrangements shape opportunities for young people to negotiate the transition from school to work. A typology of welfare regimes across Europe is developed, differentiating among universalistic, liberal, employment-centred, and sub-protective regimes based on variations in national pay-setting, access to social security, and educational and training structures. He argues that different institutional structures build on different cultural values, expectations for young people, and meaning of ‘success’ with regard to youth transitions. The extent to which the different institutionalised regimes facilitate different coping styles is discussed. Focusing on experiences in the United Kingdom, Chapter 7 by Jones examines whether globally driven economic policies are sufficiently sensitive to localised individual concerns. Eroding youth labour markets and prolonged periods spent in full-time education have placed increasing demands on young people and their parents as state support has been gradually reduced. Jones argues that for social policy to succeed in increasing the participation in further education, especially among disadvantaged youth, attention must be given to beliefs held regarding intergenerational support. Lucid analysis and telling examples of reciprocity, fairness, and legitimacy in the negotiation of support between the generations are a major strength of the chapter. Jones’s analysis of social-class differences in perceived long-term costs and benefits of different transition strategies suggests a polarisation of experience for young people, and it highlights the role of both economic and cultural resources in the reproduction of advantage and disadvantage, as well as the importance of individual goals and transition-related negotiations within families. Jones argues that social policy first needs to help change the belief systems related to intergenerational support and that such a change needs to address the psychological composition of common norms and expectations. Several policy recommendations are derived. First, parental support cannot be taken for granted by policy makers. Parents need evidence that investing in their children’s education

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is worthwhile; however, providing this evidence becomes more difficult in a climate of over-credentialism. Second, structures of state support need to be improved. Third, individuals need the chance to reenter the educational system and opportunities for lifelong learning. In Chapter 8, Ebner and Allmendinger examine whether and how changing labour markets have affected young workers’ job priorities and expectations. They provide answers to intriguing questions: What jobs do people want? What jobs do people get? What happens if one does not get the job one wants? Utilising the large-scale German General Social Survey (GGSS), the authors provide evidence of the changing employment opportunities in the western and eastern regions of Germany, following German Reunification (capturing developments between 1991 and 2006). The findings suggest that, first, both job security and interesting work were valued highly in East and West Germany in both 1991 and 2006. Second, the emphasis on interesting jobs declined over the years, possibly reflecting increasing uncertainty and insecurity in the face of rising unemployment. Third, the emphasis on the intrinsic value of work was higher among better educated people. Fourth, what people wish is difficult to achieve, particularly concerning the desire for a secure job. This is more pronounced in East Germany and among those with low educational attainments. Fifth, congruence between the desire for a secure and interesting job and actual job attainment is associated with job satisfaction, willingness to work hard, and commitment to an employer or company. Findings are discussed in terms of Inglehart’s theory of value change and theories of cognitive dissonance. The authors assess implications of findings for policy development, arguing in particular for enhancing human capital and training opportunities for employees, offering the workforce a share in corporate turnover and profits, and the importance of job-placement processes to improve early vocational orientation. In Chapter 9, Buchmann and Kriesi address persisting gender differences in occupational choice, focusing on the role of social background, socialisation experiences, and individual characteristics in career choice. A sequence model of career choice is tested, differentiating between career preferences among fifteen-year-old girls still in school versus preferences of twenty-oneyear-old women after entry into occupational training programs or jobs. The particular emphasis is on females aspiring to and entering nontraditional jobs – that is, preference for pursuing an occupation chosen by less than 65 percent of the female sample population. The analysis is based on the first wave of an ongoing multi-cohort, longitudinal study in Switzerland (i.e., Competence and Context, COCON), although the data used are

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cross-sectional, enabling the assessment of age-graded preferences but not the analysis of career development over time. The study suggests that nontraditional career choices are associated with higher levels of parental education, own educational achievement, and ability beliefs. There were two unexpected main results. First, the role model of a nontraditional occupation of the mother was irrelevant for the younger age group, whereas for the older age group, the opposite was true. Those women with mothers employed in nontraditional jobs had chosen more traditional occupations. A second surprising finding was that women with higher social competencies were seemingly drawn to traditionally female-dominated occupations. This was expected only for the younger girls still in school, not for the adult women. It is obvious that the stereotypes were stronger than expected; here, a cohort effect may have played a role. What becomes evident from the chapters in Part III is that changes in the structural context seep into the institutional fabric and are influencing individual behaviours and values. This transformative process, however, cannot be understood as a unidirectional, top-down transmission or as an instantaneous process. It takes time for macrostructural changes to manifest on the individual level and vice versa, making it necessary to think in terms of ‘transition societies’ as well as ‘transition phases’. Furthermore, the interaction between different levels of influence is multidirectional, involving top-down, bottom-up, and interactive processes. Change of social structures and forms of interaction is not driven solely by external forces but also through reciprocal interactions among multiple levels and actors within the social system. Focusing on only one level of influence does not provide sufficient information and tends to underestimate the role of other contexts. The findings point to an important role of macroeconomic conditions and institutional filters in setting the context and shaping opportunities and obstacles for the transition process. Decisions about which pathway to choose or which strategy to adopt, in turn, are influenced through direct interactions among young people and significant others in their immediate context (e.g., their parents, peers, and teachers) and are shaped by individual preferences, goals, and values. The assumption that one level in isolation can be regarded as the prime mover of change is not a useful one, and we should aim to conceptualise transition experiences within multiple, interacting levels of influence. Multiple, Interlinked Transitions. In Part IV, different conceptual and methodological approaches are introduced that examine functioning across multiple contexts as well as continuity and change of transition experiences

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over time. All three chapters in this section use longitudinal data: Have transition experiences become destandardised, more varied, and less predictable? How do young people combine different social roles when making the transition to adult life? Is the assumption of multiple social roles beneficial or burdensome when making the transition to independent adult life? How can successful transitions be conceptualised? Can we predict transition outcomes based on earlier experiences? The three chapters in Part IV stress the interplay between various transitions during adolescence and early adulthood; in particular, they address the role of earlier socialisation in accumulating resources and ways of coping, thereby revealing the tremendous path-dependency of how people deal with transition demands under conditions of rapid social change. Most noteworthy, it becomes clear that the analysis of longitudinal patterns of adaptation and development is crucial for new insights. Comparing transition experiences across two nationally representative British birth cohorts born in 1958 and 1970 in Chapter 10, Schoon, Ross, and Martin assess both conceptually and empirically the destandardisation hypothesis. Sequence analysis and latent class analysis are used to capture sequences and patterns in the dynamics of multiple interlocking transitions regarding work and family formation between the ages of sixteen and thirty-three. The findings suggest both stability and change in transition experiences, providing mixed evidence regarding the destandardisation hypothesis. Standardised life-course patterns continue to exist, particularly regarding educational transitions, although they have changed. The greatest changes occurred regarding partnership and family formation as women became more attached to the labour market, even after childbirth. Another interesting finding points to an increasing number of men in their thirties who have remained single without children and are living with their parents. Transition experiences continue to be associated with structural factors, such as social background and gender, suggesting that traditional constraints are still in place. The authors show that there is a polarisation into fast versus slow transitions, each calling for different strategies to cope successfully with the ensuing demands. They emphasise the need for a more pluralistic, dynamic, and multilevel conceptualisation of transition experiences, as well as the recognition of variation in appropriate coping mechanisms between and within different social groups in the population. In Chapter 11, Garrett and Eccles focus more on the psychological functioning of young people and examine whether the level and quality of functioning across multiple social contexts (i.e., family, friends, school, work, and romance) at age eighteen has implications for educational and occupational

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success, family outcomes, and psychological health at age twenty-five. The authors use cluster analysis to identify patterns of functioning at eighteen, which are then linked to outcomes at twenty-five. The five clusters found are labelled well-rounded, late bloomers, early starters, workers, and daters. These different lifestyle patterns established in high school were found to lead to quite different trajectories into adulthood. Early starters followed a pathway typical of the traditional working-class pattern, with early movement into the labour market and family formation. Late bloomers invested primarily in their education and delayed the assumption of work and family roles. Well-rounded adolescents who excelled in all domains while in high school did not follow a distinct pathway to adulthood but rather left their options open. The daters and workers who had begun to invest in adult domains during their high school years appeared to show more problematic transitions, characterised by low levels of well-being and low expectations regarding partnership and family formation. Findings are discussed in terms of Baltes’s (1997) model of developmental regulation and Arnett’s (2000) concept of emerging adulthood, suggesting that multiple investments and engagement with transition demands are beneficial, whereas limited and undiversified investments do not lead to a successful transition. Garrett and Eccles conclude that there is not one ‘right’ pattern of transitioning and that we should adopt a broader definition of successfully reaching adulthood. Most adolescents express high aspirations concerning success in school and work but, by far, not all are able to translate their expectations into reality. In Chapter 12, Schneider explores how early perceptions of work shape future strategies in negotiating different life transitions. The approach chosen is unique. A group of (soon-to-be) high school graduates, selected from a large representative sample (i.e., the Sloan Study), was studied with the Experience Sampling Method (ESM) to obtain reports on subjective experiences of individuals interacting in their natural environment. Additional information about specific plans after high school were used to derive four types, labelled idlers, players, workers, and strategists, to describe variations in self-categorisation of activities. A follow-up of the students occurred five years after they left high school. In a series of face-to-face interviews, case profiles were constructed to describe the long-term outcomes and trajectories for each of the four types. The findings suggest that there are different ways to realise one’s ambition; yet, without goals and realistic plans, transition experiences become more problematic. The most compelling result is that the high school based classification into four groups foreshadowed differences in lifestyle and attitudes at age twenty-five. In other words, there appears to be a programming effect, probably rooted in the rather stable

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influence of the time-use and planning habits in individuals’ transactions with the environment. The three chapters in Part IV indicate that the transition from school to work develops over time and is not an instantaneous step. Furthermore, transition experiences are not single, isolated events. Young people may focus and concentrate their investments and energies into one domain, such as education and training; however, most often, they have to balance different interests and priorities in the domains of school, work, romance, and independence. There is not one right pattern of reaching and absorbing adult social roles; there is not one norm or standard that fits all young people; there are different ways to successfully engage in the transition demands encountered. Although there are differences and variations in the pathways followed, this does not mean that transition experiences have become less predictable. Early experiences were found to predicate individual preferences and capacity for action, and transition outcomes have to be conceptualised as cumulative experiences. Gender, parental social background, and variations in psychological functioning all impact on the preferences and coping strategies adopted. For example, young people from less privileged backgrounds tend to make their transitions earlier, whereas those from more privileged homes are more likely to delay entry into full-time employment and family formation. Each strategy is associated with its own challenges and opportunities in trying to successfully resolve the transition demands. To enable a better understanding of the trials and tribulations encountered in making the transition to independent adulthood, one must consider that not all young people have the same resources and support structures available, and they must adjust their coping and adjustment strategies to the circumstances they encounter. Interventions and Policies. In the concluding Part V, we address questions about how to promote individual development and competence of young people in their transition to adult roles. The chapter authors discuss strategies of how to improve the acquisition of individual competencies as well as policy implications. How can school-related adjustment be supported and advanced? How can the acquisition of general personal competencies that enhance employability be facilitated? What skills are needed for the jobs of the future? What are the demands on policy makers who aim to prepare young people for the transition into adult roles? Which policies are most likely to succeed in facilitating the transition from school to work in a changing global context? The four chapters build on the insights provided thus far, addressing options for improvements of either the young people’s

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capabilities or the opportunity structures on the macro level. Concerning capabilities, it is specifically the resources and ways of coping, such as the belief in one’s own competence and the ability to find structure in complex and opaque decision situations. The opportunity structures addressed by the authors refer to the higher order ecological systems in the model, with particular emphasis on visions concerning the future development of societal challenges and what needs to be done to meet them. In Chapter 13, Salmela-Aro examines the role of school burnout and maladjustment in the context of the Finnish school system. The concept of burnout, which until now has been an issue of ‘graduate-school burnout’, is transferred to the secondary-school setting, and the antecedents and consequences of experiencing burnout are examined. Although Finland has come out on top in the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), demonstrating high levels of school performance across a number of study topics, Finnish students also experience high levels of school burnout, especially those in upper secondary high school (i.e., those on the academic track of postcompulsory education). Based on findings of an ongoing longitudinal study (i.e., FinEdu), the author illustrates that girls are at particular risk for burnout, as are students with success-orientation, whereas those with mastery-orientation are less afflicted. Being part of a supportive peer group seems to protect against burnout, as does receiving positive support from teachers and the school staff, such as on-site health professionals. A negative school climate, in contrast, and lack of support at school increase levels of burnout. The findings are discussed in terms of policy implications and the importance of building guidance systems for young people making the transition from the education system into work. In Chapter 14, Weichold introduces a school-based life-skills program that can be useful for building up general personal competencies relevant for increasing employability of young people, that are also useful in enabling them to cope with stressful and demanding situations. Weichold argues that employers are increasingly requiring not only job-specific skills but also adaptability and flexibility of their workers (i.e., basic life skills), which should be taught in the school environment. Theoretical models regarding successful school-to-work transitions and positive career development are reviewed, identifying general individual competencies (subsumed as ‘soft skills’) such as interpersonal skills, motivation, selfefficacy, and decision making as key predictors for doing well in the transition. The author argues that these competencies can be taught within a universal approach that promotes positive development, to be implemented in the school context. Evidence of the successful implementation

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of such a school-based life-skills program (i.e., IPSY) is presented, drawing on findings that emerge from an ongoing intervention study in Germany. Weichold concludes that a life-skills program may be an effective starting point for fostering transition success, especially in combination with training in career-specific skills and knowledge. Chapters 15 and 16 examine the challenges posed for policy makers by changing youth transitions and future trends in labour-market realities. In Chapter 15, Du Bois-Raymond provides an analysis of key problems to be faced by policy makers in Europe (although the same problems apply to other developed countries as well). She identifies the lack of bridges between school and work, the lack of opportunities for outsiders such as young migrants, and the problems with work–life balance concerning young parenthood as the key areas for attention. She provides a description of how issues are linked and how European Union (EU) political bodies have reacted to these interlinked problems. The author points out a lack of attempts to react to the three challenges in an aligned and coherent way, and suggests ways to address this problem. Concerning schools, the main problem seems to be a mismatch between the motivation of the young and the old formalised structures of educational systems and curricula. Solutions envisioned refer to better and broader preschool education, adding ‘non-formal’ (i.e., experience-oriented or community-related) elements to the curriculum and better preparation for students on vocational tracks. Concerning migrants, the basic problem is that in all European countries, they are placed in the lowest segment of school, often due to language problems, disregarding their actual ability and potential. Finally, the issue of work–life balance is not appropriately addressed across Europe, mostly due to too few part-time jobs and lack of affordable child-care facilities for young mothers with children. Work–life balance policies, however, should focus not only on the relationship and tension between care tasks but also on adequate and affordable housing for young families. In Chapter 16, Karoly provides a comprehensive review of recent and projected future trends in the supply and demand sides of a changing global labour market. On the supply side, she identifies an eminent trend towards slower workforce growth coupled with an aging population (which implies improved chances for employment for young people but also increasing burdens on national social-insurance systems and possibly an increase in immigration), as well as less rapid advances in educational attainment and acquisition of skills. Two key factors shaping changes on the demand side of the labour market are rapid technological change and global integration. These changes lead to changes in skill requirements – specifically in

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higher level, nonroutine, and self-reliant working skills that characterise the knowledgeable worker – as well as the need for lifelong learning. The need for and return to education are likely to remain higher in the United States than in other countries; however, there is also an increase in low-skilled jobs, especially personal and home-care aides, including home-health aides. All workers will bear more risks as access to traditional workplace benefits become more selective, especially in light of increasing freelance occupations. The implications for the transition from school to work require a rethinking of existing education and training institutions and the interaction between labour-market changes and aspects of family life (both also discussed in Chapter 15). Workers are required to maintain a motivation for lifelong learning and to build up basic skills (especially in math and science) as well as critical-thinking skills, ability to work in a team, and effective communication skills (see also Chapter 14 in this volume). Chapter 16 concludes with suggestions about the role of technology in supporting lifelong learning, emphasising the need for interlinked thinking about demographic changes, technological advances, and global competition and their impact on work and family life.

Conclusions The chapters of this book indicate that young people making the transition from school to work are experiencing increasing difficulties and uncertainties. However, given current demographic trends towards a slowdown in population growth and population aging in the developed world, prospects for young people might look better in the future. Conversely, the current economic downturn as well as increasing immigration might shift the balance of experiences. It is obvious that not all variables and processes depicted in our model are equally represented in this book, and this probably applies more generally to the pertinent research. Although we tried not to leave any obvious gaps, current research is relatively weak concerning the interplay across time and transitions between the various levels and layers of the multiple processes involved, as well as with regard to the dependency on earlier development and socialisation. Any further analyses will require multilevel models utilising longitudinal designs and the shared expertise from various disciplines. A key factor that supports a smooth transition into the labour market is educational attainment. When compared to their less educated peers, young people with higher level qualifications are generally encountering fewer

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problems in establishing themselves in the labour market. They are less likely to experience extended periods of unemployment or job loss, which in turn have been linked to lasting negative effects on employment and earning – the so-called scarring effect (Clark, Georgellis, & Sanfey, 2001). There is also evidence to suggest that problems in establishing oneself in the labour market are, in turn, associated with problems in attracting a suitable partner for marriage (Blossfeld & Timm, 2003). Generally, the findings suggest variation and diversity in the pathways taken. There are differences between as well as within different countries regarding access to and selection of different pathways, depending on institutional filters, structural factors (e.g., social background, race, and gender), and individual differences and capabilities. These differences are especially obvious regarding entry into tertiary education and a smooth transition into the labour market (see Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 10 in this volume) but are already evident in the selection processes during compulsory schooling (see Chapters 9, 11, 12, and 13 in this volume). Considering the ordering, timing, and combination of multiple social roles during the transition from dependent childhood to independent adulthood, the heterogeneity in transition pathways becomes even more obvious (see Chapters 5, 6, 10, and 11 in this volume). The findings presented in this book thus contribute to a better understanding of how lives unfold in multidimensional ways and enhance the discussion regarding the assumption of increasing destandardisation of transition experiences. It has been argued that life-course transitions, such as taking the step into economic independence, have become more variable and less uniform; that the transition into employment has been prolonged; that it takes longer for young people to establish themselves in the labour market than it was the case thirty years ago (Arnett, 2000; Shanahan, 2000); and that in comparison to the relatively well defined transitions from school to work experienced by young men during the post–World War II economic boom, transition experiences have now become destandardised, less constrained by sociocultural expectations and more dependent on individual decision making (Beck, 1992; Buchmann, 1989; Shanahan, 2000). The processes underlying such a trend towards destandardisation of transition experiences and whether such a trend even exists, are the subjects of debate. For example, in an analysis of the German Life History Study, Br¨uckner and Mayer (2005) concluded that there is little evidence for destandardisation in the transition from education to employment. Likewise, a study of changes in the timing and sequencing of major life transitions in Australia showed that the majority of Australians followed well-established conventional life-course pathways (Martin, 2007).

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Evidence of stability regarding the timing, prevalence, and spread of role acquisitions of young Mexicans in their transition to adulthood was also reported by Fussel (2005) using Mexican census data for 1970 and 2000. Evidence from the British birth cohort studies (see Chapter 10 in this volume) suggests mixed findings, indicating both stability and change in transition experiences and variations between as well as within social groups. All these studies report that transition experiences of young people have remained highly structured through institutional or social forces. What does this mean for the conceptualisation and empirical study of the transition from school to work? Taking a closer look at how the transition actually unfolds, instead of conceptualising it as one assumes it to be, leads to a more differentiated yet nonetheless structured view. Contemporary youth transitions appear to be variable in the context of sociohistorical conditions and social location, yet they also remain highly structured. Here we argue that standardised transition patterns continue to exist but that they have changed. Standardised models of the life course have never captured the experience of everyone, but they serve as models to describe the sequencing and ordering of life events. Researchers are guided by these models in how they conceptualise their studies, and policy makers make their decisions about how institutions and regulations should be designed based on their assumptions about the standardised life course. The findings presented in this book show changing labour-market opportunities, yet they also indicate differences in the way these changes have affected young people depending on social background, gender, race, location, and personal competencies. It is argued that current policies affecting young people appear to be based on rigid, outmoded constructions of youth and family life, often involving universal models that do not recognise cultural diversity, multiple obligations, and competing priorities (see Chapters 6, 7, 15, and 16 in this volume). Adopting existing ‘standardised’ models of youth transitions without questioning or empirically testing their appropriateness can lead to unintended consequences and to not being able to respond adequately to the needs of either young people making the transition or their parents, teachers, or prospective employers. It appears that structural and institutional processes produce heterogeneity instead of homogeneity in life-course patterns. According to Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, the face of society is changing dramatically, with a clear distinction between individuals at the very top and the very bottom of society, the permanently underprivileged (which ‘is no longer really a bottom but an outside’), and those in between who have to bear the brunt of ambivalences and uncertainty, striving to move into the top category or to remain in control of their life but being in constant danger of falling down

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(2002, pp. 49–51). It is interesting to note that these tensions can already be manifest in the school context, as discussed by Salmela-Aro in Chapter 13, especially among those who opted for the more competitive academic track within the Finnish school system and who are experiencing raised levels of burnout. Insecurity prevails at every location in society. The number of those excluded might be growing, yet there is also much movement in and out of poverty (characterised by indicators such as income, education, housing, employment, and temporal horizons). Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) suggested that it becomes necessary to develop new concepts and research methods to address typologically these fluid categories, differentiating between those at the very top and bottom of the social ladder and the new hybrids located in between. Two chapters in this book (i.e., Chapters 10 and 11) apply such methods and show the diverse ways in which social roles combine within individuals and the way in which different typologies are associated with transition strategies. In Chapter 11, Garret and Eccles demonstrate that limited and undiversified investments were associated with more problematic transitions, whereas both focused and broad investments in different domains were beneficial to the transition process. In Chapter 10, Schoon et al. show that traditional templates are changing and that there is a polarisation of transition experiences into fast versus slow transitions, making it necessary to adopt a more process-oriented rather than age-fixed approach to account for variations in role combinations at specific life phases, and to acknowledge variations in appropriate coping mechanisms. Future labour markets might accentuate this polarisation of transitioning because the changing nature of job requirements calls for higher level skills, on the one hand, and increasing demand for low-skilled jobs, on the other – especially regarding jobs in the retail trade and in personal-care services (see Chapter 16 in this volume). Crucial to both types of jobs is the need to constantly update one’s skills and to learn new skills throughout one’s career. A single training period before entry into the labour market will no longer be sufficient, and future workers must be prepared for continuous learning , for upgrading of skills, or reskilling throughout their working life. Policies that can respond adequately to these changes should adopt a broader and longer term view, informed by empirical evidence on the multiple influences on transition processes and their dynamic interaction over time. Research should aim to obtain a clearer and more detailed understanding of the multiple interacting factors shaping the school-to-work transitions and the embeddedness of these transitions in other domains of

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experience. Young workers in the future might increasingly have to combine the roles of student, worker, partner, and parent and maintain a keenness to learn new skills throughout their working life. Promoting participation in education is a key leverage for social policy makers to facilitate the school-to-work transition. There are, however, national differences in how related measures are implemented and individual differences in how such policies are perceived and responded to (see, for example, Chapters 6 and 7 in this volume). Moreover, there appear to be continued differences in educational participation based on social background, race, and gender, with young people from disadvantaged backgrounds being less likely to pursue further education, regardless of their actual abilities. A mix of high quality educational programs is required to meet the diverse needs of young people. Furthermore, it is vital to motivate young people to engage in education and to provide the necessary resources and scaffolding that enable lifelong learning. Considering the role of early and cumulative socialisation experiences in shaping transition experiences, interventions need to start early – ideally at the preschool level – and provide continued support for children and learners throughout their school career as well as during transition periods. In order to create sustainable support structures and to improve the effectiveness of intervention programs, it is recommended that schools form coalitions with parents, employers, and the wider community to build a support network and facilitate exposure to multiple positive influences from different sources. What is needed for effective policies to support the school-to-work transition includes (1) an integrated policy approach, instead of a concentration of efforts on selected problems; (2) a developmental focus, recognising cumulative socialisation experiences; (3) consideration for the interaction between labour-market changes and other aspects of the transition to adulthood, such as living arrangements and family formation; (4) consideration of ‘outsiders’ and minority groups and approaches that facilitate participation, integration, and empowerment; (5) support for second chances, enabling recovery and repair after a problematic start; and (6) opportunities for lifelong learning that facilitate the upgrading of skills as well as reskilling. REFERENCES

Arnett, J. J. (2000). Emerging adulthood: A theory of development from the late teens to the late twenties. American Psychologist, 55(5), 469–480. Baltes, P. B. (1997). On the incomplete architecture of human ontogeny: Selection, optimization, and compensation as foundation of development theory. American Psychologist, 52, 366–380.

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Beck, U. (1992). Risk society: Towards a new modernity. London: Sage Publications. Beck, U., & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2002). Individualization. London: Sage Publications. Blossfeld, H. P., Klijzing, E., Mills, M., & Kurz, K. (Eds.). (2005). Globalization, uncertainty and youth in society. London: Routledge. Blossfeld, H.-P., & Timm, A. (2003). Who marries whom? Educational systems as marriage markets in modern societies. Dordrecht and London: Kluwer Academic. Breen, R., & Goldthorpe, J. H. (1999). Class, mobility, and merit: The experience of two British birth cohorts. European Sociological Review, 17, 81–101. Bronfenbrenner, U. (1979). The ecology of human development: Experiments by nature and design. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Br¨uckner, H., & Mayer, K. U. (2005). Destandardization of the life course: What does it mean? And if it means anything, whether it actually took place? In R. Macmillan (Ed.), The structure of the life course: Standardized? Individualized? Differentiated? (pp. 27–54). Amsterdam: Elsevier. Buchmann, M. (1989). The script of life in modern society: Entry into adulthood in a changing world. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Clark, A., Georgellis, Y., & Sanfey, P. (2001). Scarring: The psychological impact of past unemployment. Economica, 68, 221–241. Diewald, M., & Mayer, K. U. (2008). The sociology of the life course and life span psychology. Berlin: Deutsches Institut f¨ur Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW). Discussion Paper 772. Elder, G. H. (Ed.). (1985). Life course dynamics: Trajectories and transitions. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Elder, G. H. (1998). The life course as developmental theory. Child Development, 69(1), 1–12. Elder, G. H., & Caspi, A. (1990). Studying lives in a changing society: Sociological and personological explorations. In R. A. Zucker, A. I. Rabin, J. Aronoff, & S. J. Frank (Eds.), Personality structure in the life course (pp. 276–322). New York: Springer. Erikson, R., & Jonsson, J. O. (1996). Explaining class inequality in education: The Swedish test case. In R. Erikson & J. O. Jonsson (Eds.), Can education be equalized? The Swedish case in comparative perspective (pp. 1–63). Boulder, CO, and Oxford: Westview Press. Featherman, D. L., & Lerner, R. M. (1985). Ontogenesis and sociogenesis: Problematics for theory and research about development and socialization across the lifespan. American Sociological Review, 50(5), 659–676. Fussel, E. (2005). Measuring the early adult life course in Mexico: An application of the entropy index. In R. Macmillan (Ed.), The structure of the life course: Standardized? Individualized? Differentiated? (pp. 91–122). Amsterdam: Elsevier. Heckhausen, J., & Schulz, R. (1995). A life-span theory of control. Psychological Review, 102, 284–304. International Labour Organisation. (2008). Labour market trends and globalization’s impact on them. Retrieved 2 September 2008 from www-old.itcilo.org/actrav/actravenglish/telearn/global/ilo/seura/mains.htm. Jencks, C. (1979). Who gets ahead? The determinants of economic success in America. New York: Basic Books. Martin, B. (2007). Skill acquisition and use across the life course: Current trends, future prospects. Adelaide: Australian Government, National Institute of Labour Studies. M¨uller, W., & Gangl, M. (2003). Transitions from education to work in Europe: The integration of youth into EU labour markets. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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O’Higgins, N. (2004). Recent trends in youth labour markets and youth employment policy in Europe and Central Asia. Journal of Economics, 107(2), 439–479. Pinquart, M., & Silbereisen, R. K. (2004). Human development in times of social change: Theoretical considerations and research needs. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 28, 289–298. Roberts, B. W. (2007). Contextualising personality psychology. Journal of Personality, 75, 1071–1082. Schoon, I. (2008). A transgenerational model of status attainment: The potential mediating role of school motivation and education. National Institute Economic Review, 205, 72–82. Shanahan, M. J. (2000). Pathways to adulthood in changing societies: Variability and mechanisms in life course perspective. Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 667–692.

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Thinking about the Transition to Adulthood From Grand Narratives to Useful Theories Michael J. Shanahan and Kyle C. Longest

The study of adolescence and young adulthood has been markedly influenced by “grand narratives” that purport to offer encompassing descriptions of these periods of life. Most organismic theories of development – which view the biography as a progression through universal stages – count as grand narratives. According to such theories, all humans must proceed through a sequence of stages that reflect a “maturational unfolding” of qualities that everyone shares. For example, Erikson (1968) maintained that everyone must pass through the stages of industry versus inferiority and then intimacy versus isolation, reflecting the intrinsic nature of ego development. A more recent example is Arnett’s (2000) concept of “emerging adulthood,” which he proposed as a new phase of the life course between adolescence and adulthood. According to his conceptualization, during emerging adulthood, youth explore roles and identities with little commitment. Although emerging adulthood is not an organismic theory of development that supposes a universally shared set of experiences, the concept has been proposed as a new phase of the life course in contemporary Western societies. Thus, it has the “across-the-board” quality of a grand narrative. In fact, emerging adulthood has become common currency among researchers and policy makers. Arnett’s seminal article on emerging adulthood in American Psychologist has been cited, according to the Google Scholar, more than seven hundred times as of mid-2008, and the concept has been the organizing principle of regularly held conferences, edited volumes, and an international encyclopedia. In the popular media, emerging adulthood has been discussed in favorable terms in leading outlets, including a cover story in Time Magazine, the New York Times Sunday Magazine, 30

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and The Times (London), to name just a few. A search of government publications likewise revealed references to emerging adulthood in both the United States and England, suggesting its influence in political circles. In this chapter, we argue that (1) such theories are representations of youth that are inherently misleading because they gloss over the diversity of experiences among young people, and (2) behavioral scientists and policy makers would be better served by conceptualizations that emphasize the multiplicity of youth experiences. In the first section, we explain the intrinsically fallacious character of grand narratives and then illustrate this point with the concept of emerging adulthood in the second section. In contrast, we offer several criteria that define useful theories of late adolescence and early adulthood in the third section. In keeping with the theme of this book, we consider grand narratives and useful theories with respect to the transition from school to work.

Grand Narratives and Diversity Lost Kett’s (1977) Rites of Passage charts a history of adolescence in the United States from 1790 to about 1960 and, in so doing, introduces a new way of thinking about adolescence as a social construction. His message can be summarized by three points. First, in the early republic, the experience of adolescence was often markedly distinct across regions. Within regions, the experience of adolescence was further qualified by sex, race, and socioeconomic status. The result was that region, social class, gender, and race joined in complex ways to create a multitude of “adolescences.” Second, although little was actually known about adolescence, authors of popular conduct-of-life books, sermons, and newspaper and magazine articles had much to say about it anyway. These were the “representers” of youth, and each group of representers became affiliated with one central theme. According to the pilgrims who settled the United States, for example, youth were sexually charged and promiscuous. As the nineteenth century began, adolescents would become a threat to the moral order of cities. By the late nineteenth century, a science of adolescence emerged – most visibly in the person of G. Stanley Hall (1904, 1906) in the United States – and behavioral scientists joined the ranks of the representers. Since that time, the science of adolescence and popular culture has held adolescence to be unhygienic (early twentieth century), rebellious (mid-twentieth century), and then anomic (late-twentieth century). These days, we are told that the American adolescent is a narcissist who is incapable of ever achieving adulthood (Cˆot´e, 2000). However, this vision competes with several other

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representations, including that the adolescent is too childlike and, ironically, that the adolescent is too adultlike (Graff, 1995). Third, because of the diversity of adolescent experiences, these representations never were (and never will be) entirely true. Typically, they begin with an element of truth that is then magnified greatly by the moral concerns of the person making the representation. It is no coincidence, for example, that the Puritan minister, Cotton Mather, represented adolescence as a sexually charged period of life prone to sin. However, it is obvious that this portrayal has its empirical limits. In this way, representations of youth often said as much (or more) about the preoccupations of middle- and upper-class adults – the representers – than they did about youth themselves. Kett’s main point, then, is that one’s position in society creates many different adolescences; that representers of youth tend to be “monochromatic” in their themes; and, therefore, their views always are constrained and misleading. In effect, Kett’s analysis is a cautionary note to eschew representations of youth that “totalize” their world by claiming – with little if any empirical justification – that youth, en masse, are uniformly alike.

Emerging Adulthood as a Grand Narrative The recent widespread adoption of the image of emerging adulthood is an example of a grand narrative that works to obscure diversity in the experiences of youth. It competes with several representations of youth but, as noted previously, it has achieved considerable traction among academics and policy makers. Arnett (2001) proposed that emerging adulthood now constitutes a phase of the life course that extends from adolescence to adulthood. Emerging adulthood is characterized by relative independence from age-normative tasks, experimentation with social roles, and little meaningful commitment to one’s relationships and organizational involvements. In the context of emerging adulthood, young people identify individualistic, psychological achievements of maturity (e.g., independent decision making) as the new markers of whether one is an adult. According to this view, the socalled demographic markers – completion of school, commencement of one’s occupational career, leaving home, marriage, and parenthood – are ˆ e (2000) sugdeemed substantially less important by youth. Similarly, Cot´ gested “youthhood” as a new phase of life during which “psychological adulthood” is hopefully attained through personal strivings. Coˆ t´e likewise maintained that the importance of role markers has declined significantly,

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largely replaced by emotional and cognitive maturity and an advanced sense of ethics. According to Arnett and Taber (1994), the contrast between the traditional conception of adulthood and emerging adulthood reflects the distinction between broad and narrow socialization. Broad socialization – which characterizes large segments of the contemporary West, including Europe, Canada, and the United States – refers to the encouragement of multiple routes through the life course, consistent with values emphasizing independence, individualism, and self-expression. Narrow socialization – which characterizes preindustrialized societies – refers to the restriction of lifecourse patterns to a narrowly defined range. Conformity to expectations is emphasized, with punitive measures for unconventional life-course patterns. Arnett and Taber argued that this distinction – which primarily occurs during the processes of acquisition of knowledge, emotional development, and behavioral expectations – is crucial for understanding the transition to adulthood according to cognitive, emotional, and behavioral trajectories. In preindustrialized societies, the acquisition and application of knowledge begins in early childhood and continues to accumulate through the early life course. The majority of youth in these societies is heavily involved in work, which is performed under the supervision of adults. In these circumstances, according to Arnett and Taber, youth exhibit little variability in their moral outlook, which is a relatively continuous trajectory that prioritizes a concern for others and a sense of interdependence beginning in early childhood. Thus, in these narrow-socialization societies, cognitive development is not a crucial indicator of adulthood because interdependence and responsibility do not emerge in an abrupt manner. In contrast, youth in societies with broad socialization attend schools that foster individualism and independence. In these circumstances, one observes substantial variability of when youth actually achieve responsibility and interdependence; therefore, these psychological factors can distinguish adolescents from adults. Emotionally, Arnett and Taber argued, the typical Western view that adulthood is indicated by autonomy from parents and intimacy in a committed love relationship is not observed in societies characterized by narrow socialization. These societies typically emphasize rigid conformity to gender roles and marriage based on agreement. Marriage and other emotional maturations often reflect traditional, practical considerations rather than romantic love. In the case of males, narrow emotional socialization often involves intense physical rituals marking manhood and then marriage; for females, dependence is transferred from the family of origin to the family

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of procreation through an economic transaction. In contrast, in societies marked by broad socialization, intimacy and autonomy are valued, yet these desired outcomes are not the assured, predetermined results of socialization. Rather, the achievement of autonomy and intimacy is based on the circumstances and successes of personal development. Behaviorally, contemporary adulthood is widely held to be indicated by self-control and compliance with social conventions. Under conditions of narrow socialization, with its emphasis on intergenerational interdependence through daily interactions in work and play, youth rarely engage in reckless behavior. Self-control and compliance are exhibited early in life because of social intolerance for behaviors that do not conform to expectations. In contrast, the youth of broad socialization exhibit comparatively high levels of reckless behavior. Pressures to conform are relatively low and many youth experiment with various forms of deviance. The cessation of reckless behavior and acts of deviance is thus thought to indicate the onset of adulthood in societies characterized by broad socialization. Thus, for youth growing up in societies marked by narrow socialization, autonomy, interdependence, and conformist behaviors are exhibited early in life and, therefore, are not good markers of a discontinuous break between adolescence and adulthood. Moreover, these skills culminate in marriage, which – coupled with the abilities “to provide, protect, and procreate” – are regarded as indicating adulthood (Arnett, 1998). Conversely, among contemporary youth, individualistic criteria – a sense of autonomy and independence, the achievement of intimacy in a close and enduring relationship, and the cessation of reckless behaviors – distinguish adolescence from adulthood. Like Erikson’s proposed identity crisis, emerging adulthood was introduced with little empirical evidence for its existence, and such evidence is still lacking today. Let us consider each primary tenet of emerging adulthood in turn. Emerging adulthood is a time of “relative independence from age norms.” There is little rigorous empirical research concerning age norms – typically defined as age-based expectations about the appropriateness of specific behaviors and punitive measures for the violation of these expectations – and the sparse investigations generally conclude that meaningful age norms do not exist (Settersten, 2003). Even if the presented data could be construed to support the existence of broadly defined age expectations, there is consensus among life-course scholars that such expectations, when violated, are not accompanied by disapprobation. Emerging adulthood is also thought to be a time of “experimentation with social roles.” It is unclear how one would measure this concept;

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nevertheless, there is no empirical evidence that this time of life is marked by such experimentation. Moreover, the implication that experimentation is especially salient at this time when compared to other phases of life is an incredible claim; common experience tells us that people are constantly enacting and modifying social roles in fluid and dynamic ways across the life course (see George, 1993, for a review of the extensive literature supporting this observation). There is also ample empirical evidence suggesting that many adolescents and young adults – particularly racial and ethnic minorities and those who are impoverished – do not experiment with social roles because their social environments constrain alternative options. Finally, emerging adulthood is defined as a “lack of commitment to personal relationships and organizational involvements.” With respect to education, there is no compelling evidence that students in the tertiary system are not committed to their school. Indeed, given the cost of higher education and its potential rewards, commitment is likely to be strong. With respect to work, empirical evidence suggests that many young people are committed to their job, which provides the income to attend school and meet their basic needs. Adolescents starting their career are likewise highly committed. (One notable exception might be workers in “lower end” jobs such as food service; however, some ethnographic evidence suggests that the adolescents’ low commitment reflects, at least in part, poor working conditions.) In any event, there is little solid evidence to suggest that young people lack commitment to social institutions or personal ties.1 Although the empirical basis for emerging adulthood is wanting, it also has unnecessarily constrained research in several ways. First, the theory maintains that the demographic transition markers have become much less important to young people (particularly with respect to whether they feel like an adult) because of delays in marriage and parenthood. In the case of the United States, the latter half of the twentieth century is thought to correspond to a shift from narrow to broad socialization, which, in turn, led to greater variance in how youth entered adult roles and the postponement of familial transitions. In turn, “this rise [in age of marriage between 1960 and 1990], along with the corresponding strength in American individualism . . . led ultimately to the demise of marriage as a significant marker of the transition to adulthood, in favor of the individualistic character qualities . . . ” (Arnett, 1998, p. 301). In an age of supposed interdisciplinarity, 1

Arnett (2004) modified his original definitional criteria of emerging adulthood, which, surprisingly, includes only one of the definitional criteria that he originally stated in earlier works. These new criteria likewise have no empirical foundations.

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Arnett has written that sociological markers are now of little consequence in studying the transition from adolescence to young adulthood, despite evidence that role transitions are significant predictors of both what individuals believe it takes to be an adult (Westberg, 2004) and feeling like adults themselves (Shanahan et al., 2005). Indeed, it seems odd that a perspective would emphasize experimentation with roles but also claim that role transitions are not worthy of attention. Second, emerging adulthood is conceptualized as a nondevelopmental phase in the life course. During a specified age range (roughly eighteen to twenty-eight), non-normative behaviors, role exploration, and lack of commitment proliferate; the theory is silent about experiences prior to this age range and anticipated futures. Moreover, the theory implies that these same criteria are unimportant – or, at least, less important – at other times in the life course. These claims direct attention away from life-course and life-span perspectives that consistently maintain and demonstrate the importance of both continuity and change across the life phases. The concept also has undermined an appreciation for diversity in young adulthood. By stripping away connections to social context, time, and place, emerging adulthood has notably sanguine elements that direct attention away from disadvantaged populations. For example, Arnett described it as “the age of possibilities” and “the age of identity exploration, of trying out various possibilities, especially in love and work” (2004, p. 8). It is not surprising that he contended that this phase of life is characterized by a relatively high level of optimism. Yet, in the United States, we are well aware of the large groups of young people who essentially are excluded from exploratory roles and activities such as college students, those in full-time employment, and marriage partners (McLeod, 1987). In Europe, social scientists have also noted tendencies toward exclusion from mainstream society (e.g., Bynner & Silbereisen, 2000) and, in the developing world, perhaps the majority of youth faces highly limited possibilities. In summary, emerging adulthood has little empirical basis and serious conceptual limitations. With respect to the transition from school to work, the concept suggests role experimentation and lack of commitment, but there is little empirical evidence that these are prominent features of this phase of life. Moreover, emerging adulthood ignores the social dimensions of school, workplace, and interpersonal relationships, as well as the developmental influence of prior experiences and consequences for anticipated futures. Finally, the concept directs attention away from the significant inequalities that characterize pathways into adulthood. These problems are clearly illustrated by studies of the transition from school to work. From life-course and economic perspectives, pathways from

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school to work have long been of interest. These approaches emphasize such themes as the person as a decision maker with goals; the person as embedded in social circumstances, including educational systems, labor markets, and families; the matching of worker to job; and the long-term, multifaceted implications of specific pathways into work. Such themes are not accorded importance by emerging adulthood, which views youth as experimenters amid myriad choices. The kernel of truth to this perspective is that some youth do experiment with various roles and relationships, but such experimentation must be contextualized by the social realities of the life course. That is, such experimentation is part of decision making, is embedded in social circumstances, is one part of the process whereby a worker is matched to a job, and has long-term implications.

From Totalizing Theory to Useful Theory In line with Kett’s (1977) admonition, the study of adolescence and the transition to adulthood would do well to move away from grand narratives because they detract from an appreciation for diversity, social context, and development. In contrast, the field needs theories and research that are firmly based in empirical evidence and testable hypotheses. We now turn to the identification of several desiderata of theories that are likely to contribute to this goal. These criteria are based on our reading of the many excellent empirical studies of young people. No theory is likely to satisfy all of these criteria; however, in various constellations, they will likely characterize scientifically useful theories. Retroductive Retroductive theory reflects the constant interplay between induction (i.e., observations that then suggest theoretical propositions) and deduction (i.e., theoretical propositions that suggest observations). Retroduction is attractive because it recognizes that deduction and induction have their own strengths and limitations. One problem with deductive theorizing is that it is often simply a complicated restatement of common experience, thereby reflecting the social position, limited experiences, and psychological attributes of the theorizer (sometimes called the “bias of the theorizer”). The principle strengths of deduction, however, include directing attention to potential analyses and organizing a large body of observations. Inductive theorizing is limited because the scientist has no formal basis for making specific observations without guidance from theory, which gives rise to an inductive variant of the bias-of-the-theorizer problem. The principal strength of induction is that it helps address a typical weakness

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of theories: namely, that they are usually silent about myriad statistical assumptions (e.g., linearity) that will be relied on in the test of the theory. Furthermore, there are many practical research questions that simply have little if any theoretical inspiration. Retroduction involves the creative interplay between induction and deduction in an effort to capitalize on their respective strengths and minimize their respective limitations. Middle Range Middle-range theories do not have totalizing tendencies like Erikson’s (1968) epigenetic life-cycle model or Arnett’s (2000) concept of emerging adulthood, and neither are they limited to minor hypotheses. Rather, in the words of Robert Merton, the middle range refers to “theories intermediate to the minor working hypotheses . . . in abundance during . . . dayby-day . . . research, and the all-inclusive speculations comprising a master conceptual scheme . . . ” (1957, p. 5). Middle-range theories avoid the generalization problems associated with grand narratives such as those proposed by Erikson and Arnett. At the same time, they generate more than one hypothesis, usually referring to categories of behavior such as risk behaviors, stressors, agency, plans for the future, and so on. Developmental The developmental literature is rich in concepts and ideas that promote thinking about change and constancy. This criterion refers to both developmental aspects of the person and patterns of change and continuity in his or her context. This latter focal point is uncommon. Life-span psychology, life-course sociology, systems theory, the person–environment fit model, and Heckhausen’s (1999) model of assimilation and accommodation are all examples of frameworks that offer concepts and ideas promoting the study of development and the dynamic nature of context during the transition to adulthood. Psychologically Functional Functional psychology, one of the premises of life-span psychology, directs attention to specific attributes of the person that are implicated in adaptation to his or her setting. Which qualities of the person help him or her to construe the past, to formulate goals about the future, and to take action in the present? For example, efficacy, work values, aspirations and ambitions, intelligence, and planful competence are well-established individual differences related to the transition to adulthood. Such an orientation calls for the conceptualization and measurement of specific, relevant attributes of the person.

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Interactive Theories ideally should include provision for mixtures in the population – that is, distinct groups. An interactive focus can range from hypotheses involving simple interactions to multidimensional configurations of variables that define types of people or types of contexts as contemplated by, for example, Magnusson and Bergman (1988). Multiple Points of Entry The study of people’s lives in context necessarily requires that research questions be formulated with multiple disciplinary perspectives in mind. That is, interdisciplinarity begins with the formulation of the problem. Clearly, issues of context – perhaps defined economically, perhaps socially, perhaps politically – are relevant but, by themselves, they obviously neglect the person as an actor with complex psychological attributes. Similarly, research questions that are psychological in nature neglect the powerful ways that socially defined pathways shape trajectories. The evidence is abundant that both contextual and psychological factors are necessary to an appreciation of the life course; thus, research questions should reflect the multiple points of entry. That is, useful research will be (indeed, has been) based on middle-range, retroductive conceptual models that address multifaceted research questions that give explicit attention to issues of change and continuity (in both person and context), adaptation, and diversity. As applied to the transition from school to work, these criteria can be used to explore the principal themes of young adults as purposive negotiators of their circumstances. What is especially lacking thus far is a fine-grained analysis of how people use their experiences at school and in the workplace to formulate and then revise their goals (for an exception, see the work of Jeylan Mortimer [2003]). That is, the person is seen as a psychologically complex and adaptive decision maker who is embedded in close interpersonal relationships, labor markets, and specific educational and workplace settings.

Concluding Remarks The study of late adolescence and the transition to adulthood has been surprisingly open to grand narratives that have little empirical basis but that significantly inform the types of research questions that we have asked. Undoubtedly, grand narratives such as emerging adulthood have created compelling images and rhetorical devices. However, as Kett’s (1977) analysis suggested and our chapter explores with respect to emerging adulthood, such totalizing representations are almost certainly misleading. Instead, we

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should nurture research that is retroductive, middle-range, developmental, psychologically functional, and interactive and that reflects multiple points of entry. Significant research along these lines has been and is being conducted. Nevertheless, the study of adolescence and the transition to adulthood needs to be self-conscious about the nature of its theories and conceptualizations. Too much has been made of the claims of grand narratives, whereas connections between adolescence and young adulthood (e.g., the transition from school to work) are only just beginning to be adequately described.

REFERENCES

Arnett, J. J. (1998). Learning to stand alone: The contemporary American transition to adulthood in cultural and historical context. Human Development, 41, 295–315. Arnett, J. J. (2000). Emerging adulthood: A theory of development from the late teens through the twenties. American Psychologist, 55, 469–480. Arnett, J. J. (2001). Adolescence and emerging adulthood: A cultural approach. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Arnett, J. J. (2004). Emerging adulthood: The winding road from the late teens through the twenties. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Arnett, J. J., & Taber, S. (1994). Adolescence terminable and interminable: When does adolescence end? Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 23, 517–537. Bynner, J., & Silbereisen, R. (Eds.). (2000). Adversity and challenge in life in the new Germany and England. London: Macmillan. ˆ e, J. E. (2000). Arrested adulthood: The changing nature of identity and maturity in Cot´ the late-modern world. New York: New York University Press. Erikson, E. (1968). Identity: Youth and crisis. New York: W. W. Norton. George, L. K. (1993). Sociological perspectives on life transitions. Annual Review of Sociology, 19, 353–373. Graff, H. (1995). Growing up in America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hall, G. S. (1904). Adolescence: Its psychology and its relations to physiology, anthropology, sociology, sex, crime, religion, and education. 2 vols. New York: Appleton. Hall, G. S. (1906). Youth: Its education, regiment, and hygiene. New York: Appleton. Heckhausen, J. (1999). Developmental regulation in adulthood: Age-normative and sociostructural constraints as adaptive challenges. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kett, J. (1977). Rites of passage: Adolescence in America, 1790 to present. New York: Basic Books. MacLeod, J. (1987). Ain’t no making it: Leveled aspirations in a low income neighborhood. San Diego, CA: Westwood Press. Magnusson, D., & Bergman, L. R. (1988). Individual and variable-based approaches to longitudinal research on early risk factors. In M. Rutter (Ed.), Studies of psychosocial risk: The power of longitudinal data (pp. 45–61). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thinking about the Transition to Adulthood

41

Marcia, J. E. (1966). Development and validation of ego identity status. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 3, 551–558. Merton, R. K. (1957). On sociological theory: Five essays, old and new. New York: Free Press. Mortimer, J. T. (2003). Working and growing up in America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Settersten, R. A., Jr. (2003). Age structuring and the rhythm of the life course. In J. T. Mortimer and M. Shanahan (Eds.), Handbook of the life course (pp. 81–102). New York: Plenum. Shanahan, M., Porfeli, E., Mortimer, J. T., & Erickson, L. (2005). Subjective age identity and the transition to adulthood: When do adolescents become adults. In R. A. Settersten, F. F. Furstenberg, & R. G. Rumbaut (Eds.), On the frontier of adulthood: Theory, research, and public policy (pp. 225–255). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Smelser, N. J. (1998). Erik Erikson as social scientist. In R. S. Wallerstein & L. Goldberger (Eds.), Ideas and identities: The life and work of Erik Erikson (pp. 49–66). Madison, CT: International Universities Press. Westberg, A. (2004). Forever young? Young people’s conception of adulthood: The Swedish case. Journal of Youth Studies, 7, 35–53.

II TRANSITIONS AND GLOBAL CHANGE

3

Is Stable Employment Becoming More Elusive for Young Men? Mary Corcoran and Jordan Matsudaira

Stable employment is a key indicator of a man’s successful transition from school to work. By their late twenties, men are expected to work on a regular basis. Erratic employment early in a man’s labor-market career can permanently lower his lifetime earnings. Topel and Ward (1992) estimated that three quarters of men’s lifetime wage growth occurs in their first ten years of work. Scholars contend that in the United States, young men – particularly those with low levels of schooling and African American men – are increasingly becoming disconnected from employment (Besharov, 1999; Corcoran & Matsudaira, 2005; Devereux, 2003; Edelman, Holzer, & Offner, 2006; Freeman & Holzer, 1986; Handel, 2003; Holzer, Offner, & Sorenson, 2005; Juhn, 1992; Juhn & Potter, 2006; Mincy, 2006; Wilson, 1987, 1996). Edelman et al. (2006, p. 18) estimated that in 1999, “just over a third of young black male high school dropouts are employed.” Analysts are divided in their explanations for this phenomenon. Some researchers suggested that the changes are due to the development of new norms about the transition to adulthood that have encouraged young adults to be less seriously engaged in the labor market. In contrast, other researchers point to economic and structural factors that limit young adults’ employment prospects. In this chapter, we provide further documentation on the decline in stable employment among young men in the United States. We build on past research by showing how men’s work trajectories in the twenty-one years between the ages of twenty and forty have changed across four birth cohorts using the 1967 to 2006 March Current Population Surveys (CPS). We then use the 1970 to 2001 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to calculate and measure the long-term disconnection from work 45

46

Mary Corcoran and Jordan Matsudaira

for six birth cohorts of men. Although the evidence presented is primarily descriptive, we comment on whether the data seem to support explanations involving culture differences between cohorts or whether economic factors seem more relevant.

Background Since the late 1970s, there have been several striking changes in the structure of jobs in the United States. The number of jobs in the manufacturing sector has declined, and the number of jobs in the service and the “knowledge” sectors has increased (Andersson, Holzer, & Lane, 2006; Blank, 1998; Bound & Holzer, 1993; Danziger & Gottschalk, 1995; Juhn, 1992; Levy & Murnane, 1992; Royalty, 1998; Wilson, 1996). One explanation offered for these changes is globalization: firms have increasingly moved production facilities overseas to reduce labor costs. Another potential explanation is that technological changes, particularly computers, have eliminated some low-skill jobs, reduced the skill requirements for other jobs, and increased the number of jobs with high-skill requirements (Autor, Levy, & Murnane, 2002; Bound & Freeman, 1992; Juhn, Murphy, & Pierce, 1997; Morris & Western, 1999; Powell & Snellman, 2004). This has led to increases in the demand for and in returns to cognitive skills, technical skills, and communication/management skills and has led to decreases in both the pay and the number of jobs available to people with low to moderate skills (Bound & Johnson, 1992; Juhn, 1992; Juhn & Potter, 2006; Katz & Murphy, 1992). For instance, between 1967 and 1987, the ratio of employment to population among male high school dropouts dropped from 0.89 to 0.75, and the real wages of men in the bottom decile of the wage distribution dropped by 6 percent (Juhn, 1992). Decreases in union membership rates, increases in contingent jobs, and high rates of immigration may have further weakened the prospects of lowskilled workers. According to Hollister (2004), the percentage of workers who are members of unions has been declining steadily since the 1960s. A primary function of a union is to bargain with management for job security, benefits, and wages. As union membership declines, low- and moderateskilled workers may be less protected against job losses (Bound & Freeman, 1992; Hollister, 2004). Contingent work allows employers to respond to labor-market fluctuations by hiring workers when demand is high and letting those workers go when demand declines (Autor et al., 2002; Blank, 1998), which increases employer flexibility but also can contribute to job instability. Some scholars

Is Stable Employment Becoming More Elusive for Young Men?

47

contend that another way in which contingent work may contribute to job instability is by trapping workers in a “revolving door” between “temp” jobs, nonwork, and dead-end jobs, thus inhibiting their abilities to establish continuous work records (Autor & Houseman, 2006). The influx of low-skilled immigrants has increased the pool of workers competing for low-skilled jobs. Since the 1965 U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act was fully enforced starting in 1969, the numbers of Hispanic and Asian immigrants with low levels of schooling entering the United States have risen (Lobo & Salvo, 1998). Some analysts assert that lowskilled immigrants, both legal and illegal, crowd out native-born workers with low skills and that employers may view such low-skilled immigrants as “less trouble” or “more accommodating” than low-skilled native-born workers. Wilson (1996) contended that although the job opportunities of all low-skilled workers have declined due to globalization, deindustrialization, technological upgrading, decreases in union coverage, and immigration, the declines were largest for minority males residing in predominantly poor inner-city neighborhoods. Several studies have documented that decreases in work and increases in nonwork are disproportionately high for black male high school dropouts (Bound & Holzer, 1993; Edelman et al., 2006; Holzer & Offner, 2004; Holzer, Offner, & Sorenson, 2005; Juhn, 1992). At the same time that labor-market options were declining for lowskilled workers, policies such as freezes of the minimum wage, mandatory sentencing laws, and mandatory child support also may have reduced lowskilled men’s ability to get jobs and the economic returns to low-skilled work. The minimum wage was unchanged during the 1980s and was not increased from 1997, thus sharply eroding its real value and real wages in low-wage jobs. Mandatory sentencing laws have increased the percentage of low-skilled men with criminal records (Edelman et al., 2006; Grogger, 1998; Holzer, Offner, & Sorenson, 2005; Pattillo, Weiman, & Western, 2006). According to Western et al. (2006), the federal and state incarceration rate increased from 93 to 470 per 100,000 between 1972 and 2001. Western et al. (2006) estimated that in 1994, the cumulative risk of having been imprisoned by age thirty to thirty-four was 18 percent for black male high school graduates and 59 percent for black male high school dropouts. Jail time interrupts young men’s work and schooling, and a criminal record can be a barrier to employment (Harding, 2003; Holzer et al., 2005; Holzer, Raphael, & Stoll, 2006; Pager, 2003; Western, 2006).

48

Mary Corcoran and Jordan Matsudaira

Wage-garnishing due to mandatory child support reduces low-skilled men’s disposable income from work and thus reduces their incentive to work (Edelman et al., 2006; Freeman & Waldfogel, 1998, 2001; Holzer, Offner, & Sorenson, 2005). Federal law allows states to garnish up to 65 percent of wages for delinquent child support (Holzer et al., 2005). Childsupport orders typically constitute 20 to 30 percent of a noncustodial father’s income (Holzer et al., 2005). Past researchers examined changes in men’s connections to the labor market by documenting the extent to which the employment rates of men in a given age range vary over time. Thus, Juhn (1992) showed that the employment rate of men aged sixteen to fifty-four dropped from 0.93 to 0.87 between 1967 and 1987. Similarly, Holzer et al. (2005) examined the employment rates for two groups of men – those aged eighteen to twentyfour and those aged twenty-five to thirty-four for each year between 1979 and 2000 and showed that employment rates declined sharply for black men and modestly for white men between 1979 and 1993. Employment rates for both black and white men in these age groups rose between 1993 and 1999; however, employment rates for black men were lower in 1999 than in 1979. The employment rate of black men aged eighteen to twenty-four was 61.5 percent in 1979 and 51.3 percent in 1999; the employment rate of black men aged twenty-five to thirty-four was 81.3 percent in 1979 and 74.2 percent in 1999. In what follows, we build on the literature discussed previously by investigating three sets of questions: 1. What do men’s patterns of work activity look like between the ages of twenty and forty as they transition from school to work and establish careers? By what age are most men working on a regular basis? 2. Have patterns of work activity during these age ranges changed across different birth cohorts of men? Did men’s work patterns become more erratic across cohorts? Did it take longer for men to achieve stable employment? Did larger percentages of men fail to reach stable employment? Were men who turned twenty in the late 1970s more likely to be disconnected from work than men who turned twenty in the late 1960s? Did the proportion of economically inactive men drop much during and after the 1993–1999 economic expansion? 3. What proportion of men still has not achieved stable employment by their late twenties? What is the incidence of long-term nonwork among men during the three years from age twenty-eight to thirty? How has long-term disconnection from work changed over time?

Is Stable Employment Becoming More Elusive for Young Men?

49

CPS Sample and Definitions We first used the 1967 to 2006 March CPS surveys to construct a synthetic picture of men’s employment activities for each year between the ages of twenty and forty as they move from school to work. We did this for four birth cohorts of white men and four birth cohorts of black men born in 1947–1949, 1957–1959, 1967–1969, and 1977–1979. To understand how we did this, consider men born in 1947. These men were twenty years old in 1967, twenty-one years old in 1968, and forty years old in 1987. For each age between twenty and forty, we estimated the work activities of men born in 1947 using the relevant year of the March CPS; that is, we used the 1967 March CPS to calculate work activities at age twenty, the 1968 March CPS to calculate at age twenty-one, and the 1987 March CPS to calculate at age forty. Thus, for men born from 1947 to 1949, we used the 1967 to 1989 March CPS surveys to examine work activities at ages twenty to forty. For men born from 1957 to 1959, we used the 1977 to 1999 March CPS surveys to calculate work activities at age twenty to forty. For men born from 1967 to 1969, we used the 1987 to 2006 surveys to calculate work activities at age twenty to thirty-seven. For men born from 1977 to 1979, we used the 1997 to 2006 March CPS surveys to calculate work activities at age twenty to twenty-seven. The March CPS asks respondents about their employment status in the week prior to the interview and about weeks worked during the past calendar year. We constructed two measures of men’s connections to work with the CPS data. The first describes men’s work activities in the week prior to the interview. We categorized men into one of four mutually exclusive activities: (1) worked last week; (2) was in school and not in the labor force; (3) was unemployed but in the labor force last week; and (4) was neither in the labor force nor in school last week. The CPS does not ask respondents twenty-five years and older about school attendance; therefore, no men were assigned to the second category after age twenty-four. The fourth category provides an indicator of disconnection from work. Men ages twenty to twenty-five in this category are not working, not looking for work, and not in school. Men twenty-five and older in this category are not working and not looking for work, although a small fraction of them may be in school. The second measure of connection to work is a dummy variable indicating men’s employment during the past calendar year. This variable is assigned a value of 1 if the respondent worked in at least one week in the past calendar year and a value of zero if the respondent did not work at all in the past year.

50

Mary Corcoran and Jordan Matsudaira White, YOB=1957-59

White, YOB=1967-69

White, YOB=1977-79

Black, YOB=1947-49

Black, YOB=1957-59

Black, YOB=1967-69

Black, YOB=1977-79

20

20

20

20

.25

.50

.75

1

.25

.50

.75

1

White, YOB=1947-49

25

30

35

25

30

35

25

30

35

25

30

Age NILF, Not in School

Unemployed, In LF

In School, NILF

Working

Figure 3.1. Men’s Major Activity in Week Prior to March CPS Interview: All Men Ages 20 to 40. Source: Authors’ tabulations of 1962 to 2006 March Current Population Survey.

CPS Results We began by constructing figures depicting changes during the ages from twenty to thirty-five in the fraction of men in each of the four activities described previously for four different year-of-birth cohorts using the CPS data on employment status in the week prior to the interview. Figure 3.1 reports results for the full sample of men; Figure 3.2 reports results for men with twelve or fewer years of schooling. There are eight panels in each figure: four for white men and four for black men in each birth cohort. The panels show how men’s mix of labor-market activities changes from age twenty to age thirty-five as a race-birth cohort of men moves from school to employment. Comparisons of the panels for black and white men in the same birth cohort provide information on within-cohort black–white differences in men’s transitions from school to work. Comparisons of work activities across different birth cohorts provide information about whether men become less connected to work over time. The timing of men’s school-to-work trajectories from age twenty to thirty-five is similar in each race-birth cohort in both Figures 3.1 and 3.2. Because changes are most pronounced for men with twelve or fewer years of

35

Is Stable Employment Becoming More Elusive for Young Men?

51

White, YOB=1957-59

White, YOB=1967-69

White, YOB=1977-79

Black, YOB=1947-49

Black, YOB=1957-59

Black, YOB=1967-69

Black, YOB=1977-79

20

20

20

20

.25

.50

.75

1

.25

.50

.75

1

White, YOB=1947-49

25

30

35

25

30

35

25

30

35

25

30

Age NILF, Not in School

Unemployed, In LF

In School, NILF

Working

Figure 3.2. Men’s Major Activity in Week Prior to March CPS Interview: Men Ages 20 to 40 with a High School Degree or Less. Source: Authors’ tabulations of 1962 to 2006 March Current Population Survey.

schooling, we focus on the panels in Figure 3.2 in the discussion of results. In each cohort, the proportion of men not working and in school declines sharply in the early twenties and the proportion of men working rises sharply during the same age range. Men’s employment rises more slowly during their twenties and stabilizes by the late twenties. The school-to-work transition takes a while and, after the late twenties, there is no consistent pattern of increases in the proportions of men who worked in the previous week. Although the general timing of school-to-work trajectories is similar across the eight race-birth cohorts of men with twelve or fewer years of schooling, patterns of work do change across cohorts. One change is that men’s work trajectories in the early years after leaving school are more erratic in the later birth cohorts. Men in the last three birth cohorts (i.e., 1957–1959, 1967–1969, and 1977–1979) are less likely to work and are more likely to be disconnected from school and work (i.e., out of the labor force and not in school) from age twenty to twenty-seven than men in the 1947– 1949 birth cohort. For instance, as depicted in Table 3.1, in the later two birth cohorts, between 7.5 and 10.5 percent of white men and between 15 and 20 percent of black men with twelve or fewer years of schooling were

35

52

0.785 0.781 0.773 0.778 0.719 0.791 0.737 0.738

0.730 0.688 0.558 0.571 0.418 0.541 0.401 0.447

YOB = 1942–44 YOB = 1947–49 YOB = 1952–54 YOB = 1957–59 YOB = 1962–64 YOB = 1967–69 YOB = 1972–74 YOB = 1977–79

YOB = 1942–44 YOB = 1947–49 YOB = 1952–54 YOB = 1957–59 YOB = 1962–64 YOB = 1967–69 YOB = 1972–74 YOB = 1977–79

0.882 0.716 0.698 0.645 0.720 0.661 0.649 0.682

0.917 0.875 0.855 0.817 0.874 0.827 0.847 0.820

25

0.884 0.755 0.703 0.745 0.743 0.806 0.670

0.914 0.886 0.847 0.890 0.856 0.857 0.841

30

Working

0.853 0.731 0.728 0.724 0.719 0.754

0.903 0.869 0.883 0.853 0.869 0.853

35

0.758 0.667 0.702 0.752 0.730

0.867 0.878 0.862 0.867 0.844

40

0.063 0.117 0.129 0.088 0.095 0.077 0.142 0.182

0.070 0.098 0.048 0.044 0.053 0.056 0.057 0.064

20

In School

0.031 0.098 0.177 0.115 0.088 0.068 0.086

Black Men 0.101 0.097 0.136 0.178 0.181 0.173 0.220 0.223 0.151 0.126 0.178 0.187 0.132 0.108 0.163 0.118

30 0.048 0.060 0.101 0.061 0.076 0.057 0.061

25

White Men 0.038 0.041 0.069 0.072 0.088 0.098 0.166 0.132 0.084 0.066 0.130 0.099 0.075 0.078 0.088 0.074

20

0.045 0.166 0.109 0.096 0.063 0.093

0.053 0.073 0.061 0.072 0.039 0.057

35

0.105 0.119 0.129 0.043 0.083

0.072 0.051 0.062 0.039 0.056

40

In Labor Force, Unemployed

Source: Authors’ tabulations of 1962 to 2006 March Current Population Survey.

20

Year of Birth Cohort/Age

0.143 0.107 0.052 0.120 0.155 0.155 0.198 0.189

0.045 0.049 0.045 0.058 0.072 0.049 0.076 0.091

20

0.021 0.107 0.129 0.132 0.155 0.152 0.243 0.200

0.042 0.053 0.047 0.050 0.059 0.075 0.076 0.105

25

0.085 0.147 0.120 0.141 0.169 0.126 0.244

0.038 0.055 0.052 0.050 0.069 0.086 0.098

30

0.103 0.103 0.163 0.179 0.219 0.153

0.044 0.058 0.056 0.074 0.092 0.089

35

0.137 0.214 0.170 0.205 0.187

0.061 0.071 0.076 0.094 0.100

40

Not In Labor Force, Not in School

154 179 194 197 193 151 128 161

1,229 1,229 1,433 1,495 1,223 856 667 683

Average N

Table 3.1. Fraction of Men in Four Activity Categories in Week Prior to March CPS Interview by Year of Birth Cohort, Race, and Age for Men with High School Degree or Less

Is Stable Employment Becoming More Elusive for Young Men?

53

out of the labor force at age twenty-five. A second change is that more men in later cohorts are still disconnected from work from age twenty-eight to thirty-five. Men born in the late 1950s and late 1960s are more likely than those born in the late 1940s to be neither working nor looking for work at ages twenty-eight to thirty-five. These changes are modest for white men but striking for black men. Only 10.3 percent of black men with twelve or fewer years of schooling who were born in the late 1940s cohort were out of the labor force at age thirty-five. In contrast, almost 17.9 and 15.3 percent of black men with twelve or fewer years of schooling in the late 1950s and late 1960s birth cohort, respectively, were out of the labor force at age thirty-five. Black–white differences in the work activities of men with twelve or fewer years of schooling are sizeable in each birth cohort. At each age in each birth cohort, black men are less likely to be working, more likely to be unemployed, and more likely to be economically inactive (i.e., not working, not looking for work, and not in school) than white men. Black–white differences in the proportions of men who are employed and men who are out of the labor force are larger in the last three birth cohorts than in the late 1940s birth cohort. Black–white differences in the proportion of men with twelve or fewer years of schooling who are out of the labor force at age twenty-eight to thirty-five are somewhat smaller for men born in the late 1960s than for men born in the late 1950s, but the differences are still significant. The panels in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show men’s labor-force status in the week prior to the March CPS interview for each year between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five for eight race-birth cohorts. We next examined whether men worked in at least one week of the calendar year prior to their March CPS interviews. We calculated this measure for each age from twenty to forty for men in each of the eight race-birth cohorts. These measures are plotted in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 Each figure includes two sets of graphs: one set for the four birth cohorts of white men and one set for the four birth cohorts of black men. Figure 3.3 reports results for all men; Figure 3.4 reports results for men with twelve or fewer years of schooling. The graphs in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 tell much the same story about the timing of school-to-work transitions as Figures 3.1 and 3.2 Because a year of nonwork is more prevalent among men with twelve or fewer years of schooling than among men in the general population, we primarily discuss the findings presented in Figure 3.4. In all eight race-birth cohorts, the proportion of men who worked in at least one week during the past year rises rapidly in the early twenties, increases more slowly until the late twenties, and then levels off thereafter. Until the mid-twenties, substantial minorities

Black

.8 .7 .6

Worked Last Year

.9

1

White

20

25

30

35

40 20

25

30

35

40

Age YOB=1947-49

YOB=1957-59

YOB=1967-69

YOB=1977-79

Figure 3.3. Fraction of Men Working at Least One Week Last Year by Birth Cohort and Race: Ages 20 to 40. Source: Authors’ tabulations of 1962 to 2006 March Current Population Survey. Black

.8 .7 .6

Worked Last Year

.9

1

White

20

25

30

35

40 20

25

30

35

40

Age YOB=1947-49

YOB=1957-59

YOB=1967-69

YOB=1977-79

Figure 3.4. Fraction of Men with High School Degree or Less Working at Least One Week Last Year by Birth Cohort and Race: Ages 20 to 40. Source: Authors’ tabulations of 1962 to 2006 March Current Population Survey. 54

Is Stable Employment Becoming More Elusive for Young Men?

55

Table 3.2. Fraction of Men with High School Degree or Less Reporting Any Work in Previous Year by Year of Birth Cohort and Age Year of Birth Cohort/Age

20

25

YOB = 1942–44 YOB = 1947–49 YOB = 1952–54 YOB = 1957–59 YOB = 1962–64 YOB = 1967–69 YOB = 1972–74 YOB = 1977–79

0.843 0.913 0.935 0.947 0.893 0.938 0.887 0.874

0.981 0.957 0.955 0.946 0.957 0.933 0.933 0.893

YOB = 1942–44 YOB = 1947–49 YOB = 1952–54 YOB = 1957–59 YOB = 1962–64 YOB = 1967–69 YOB = 1972–74 YOB = 1977–79

0.778 0.878 0.854 0.766 0.658 0.709 0.617 0.642

0.969 0.911 0.867 0.826 0.826 0.789 0.775 0.785

30

35

White Men 0.976 0.958 0.951 0.934 0.952 0.945 0.959 0.929 0.935 0.917 0.931 0.923 0.918 Black Men 0.922 0.923 0.848 0.863 0.859 0.853 0.870 0.808 0.791 0.750 0.864 0.820 0.751

40

Average N

0.927 0.942 0.926 0.915 0.909

1,229 1,229 1,433 1,495 1,223 856 667 683

0.850 0.799 0.801 0.814 0.778

154 179 194 197 193 151 128 161

Source: Authors’ tabulations of 1962 to 2006 March Current Population Survey.

of black and white men with twelve or fewer years of schooling experience a full year of nonwork as they leave school and enter the work world. Figure 3.4 shows the same cross-cohort changes in black men’s connections to work as Figure 3.2. At most ages between twenty and forty, black men with twelve or fewer years of schooling who were born in the last three birth cohorts are more likely than those born from 1947 to 1949 to have not worked at all in the prior year. For instance, at age thirty-eight, about 22 to 24 percent of black male high school graduates and dropouts born in the late 1950s and 1960s did not work at all in the previous year. Race gaps in disconnections from work are large among men with twelve or fewer years of schooling. In virtually every year between age twenty and forty, black men are more likely than white men to report a year of nonwork. For each birth cohort, the graphs that depict men’s work trajectories rise smoothly with age for white men but are less smooth for black men. By the time men reach their late twenties, a year of nonwork is uncommon among white men but less so among black men. As shown in Table 3.2, in each year between the ages of thirty and forty, roughly 3 to 8 percent of white men report having not worked at all in the past year. By contrast, in each

Mary Corcoran and Jordan Matsudaira

.6

.7

.8

.9

1

56

1968

1978 YOB=1947-49

1988 YOB=1957-59 White Men

1998 YOB=1967-69 Black Men

2008

YOB=1977-79

Figure 3.5. Fraction of Men Working at Least One Week Last Year by Birth Cohort and Race: 1968 to 2006. Source: Authors’ tabulations of 1962 to 2006 March Current Population Survey. Shaded areas represent NBER peak-to-trough recessionary periods.

year between the same ages, roughly 8 to 25 percent of black men report having not worked at all in the previous year. Black–white gaps in men’s connections to work widen between the 1950s and 1940s birth cohorts and remain significant in the 1960s and 1970s cohorts. To show how employment varies with economic upturns and downturns, Figures 3.5 and 3.6 plot the age twenty to forty work trajectories of the eight race-birth cohorts of men by calendar years instead of by age. Figure 3.5 reports results for men in the general population and Figure 3.6 reports results for men with twelve or fewer years of schooling. Because men with less schooling are more affected by economic changes, we focus our discussion on Figure 3.6. There are three patterns in the graphs in Figure 3.6. First, as expected, black men’s employment responds more to economic cycles than does that of white men. Second, even at the height of the 1990s expansion, many black men in their late twenties and thirties did not work at all in the given year. For example, one in ten black men with twelve or fewer years of schooling from age twenty-nine to thirty-one (i.e., the 1967–1969 birth cohort) did not work a single week in 1998. Third, black men in the late 1970s

57

.7

.8

.9

1

Is Stable Employment Becoming More Elusive for Young Men?

1968

1978 YOB=1947-49

1988 YOB=1957-59 White Men

1998 YOB=1967-69 Black Men

2008

YOB=1977-79

Figure 3.6. Fraction of Men with High School Degree or Less Working at Least One Week Last Year by Birth Cohort and Race: 1968 to 2006. Source: Authors’ tabulations of 1962 to 2006 March Current Population Survey. Shaded areas represent NBER peak-to-trough recessionary periods.

birth cohort have high rates of disconnection from work. Almost one in four black men with twelve or fewer years of schooling between the ages of twenty-seven and twenty-nine in 2006 did not work a single week in 2005. The patterns in Figures 3.5 and 3.6 may also shed light on the debate about why young men appear to be less attached to the labor force. Many sociological explanations have focused on how later cohorts may be exceptional in their norms or attitudes toward work. In Figure 3.6, however, we see that the decline in employment is not only a cohort-specific phenomenon; for both white and black men, employment between the ages of twenty and forty is declining within cohorts as well. For example, it is true that twenty- or twenty-five-year-old black men born in 1967 were less likely to be working at that age than men born ten years earlier in 1957. However, employment declined for the 1957 birth cohort between the ages of twentyfive and thirty-five as well. Although this does not refute the importance of new attitudes about adulthood in explaining changes in employment, it does suggest that young men do not uniquely experience the decline in

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employment. In other words, the data do not require explanations based on the exceptionalism of younger cohorts.

PSID Sample and Definition of Nonwork The CPS data allowed us to measure men’s disconnections from work during a week and during a year. We used the PSID to construct a measure of men’s disconnections from work during three years: the number of weeks of nonwork between the ages of twenty-eight and thirty. We chose this age range because the CPS analyses suggested that men’s employment rates during the past week and past year level off by their late twenties. Using the 1970 to 2001 waves of the PSID, we examined men’s weeks of nonwork during the three years between the ages of twenty-eight and thirty for men in six five-year birth cohorts: 1941–1945, 1946–1950, 1951–1955, 1956–1960, 1961–1965, and 1966–1970. As in the CPS analyses, we constructed birth cohorts separately for white and black men for a total of twelve race-birth cohorts. Because the PSID interviews a head of household about his weeks worked, weeks on strike, and weeks on sick leave in the prior calendar year, our samples included white and black men in those cohorts who were a head of household at age twenty-nine to thirty-one. We constructed our measure of nonwork from age twenty-eight to thirty as the sum of weeks worked subtracted from 156. We experimented with an alternative definition that counted weeks on sick leave, paid vacation, and on strike as time spent working but found few differences across the race and cohort comparisons. We used the measure based only on weeks of work because the latter measure was available for fewer years during the period. The nonwork measure can range from zero for men who were working every week during the three-year period to 156 for men who reported no weeks worked during the entire three-year period.

The PSID Results Table 3.3 reports the distributions of weeks of nonwork for the twelve racebirth cohorts of men. In each cohort, there was considerable variation in the total weeks of nonwork that men accumulated between the ages of twenty-eight and thirty, and this variation was greater for blacks than for whites. Many men worked steadily between the ages of twenty-eight and thirty. In each cohort, more than 75 percent of white men and more than 49 percent of black men accumulated fewer than twenty-six weeks of nonwork between the ages of twenty-eight and thirty. However, in each cohort, a small minority of white men and a much larger minority of black men

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Table 3.3. Distribution of Total Weeks of Nonwork: Ages 28–30 by Year of Birth and Race YOB

0–12 Weeks

13–25 Weeks

26–52 Weeks

1–2 Years

>2 Years

# Obs

1941–45 1946–50 1951–55 1956–60 1961–65 1966–70

64.19 56.41 50.15 63.74 61.41 77.36

20.70 20.25 25.41 17.08 20.23 11.49

White Men 8.26 13.93 14.89 12.10 10.89 5.98

6.29 7.84 5.78 5.56 5.22 4.05

0.55 1.58 3.77 1.53 2.26 1.12

299 503 540 539 453 325

1941–45 1946–50 1951–55 1956–60 1961–65 1966–70

50.42 46.36 35.01 37.76 57.68 69.43

20.10 26.30 14.67 25.37 9.08 6.53

Black Men 20.21 16.11 22.20 9.64 10.11 5.33

4.01 5.59 19.92 19.61 12.63 15.12

5.27 5.64 8.21 7.62 10.50 3.59

102 206 302 285 226 109

Source: Authors’ tabulations of Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

experienced a year or more of nonwork during the three years between the ages of twenty-eight and thirty. Changes in the distribution of nonwork across the birth cohorts are small for white men but large for black men. Black men born in the 1950s (i.e., 1951–1960) are less likely to work steadily and more likely to accumulate substantial nonwork than black men born in the 1940s (i.e., 1941–1950). About 70 to 72 percent of black men born in the 1940s but only 50 to 63 percent of black men born in the 1950s accumulated fewer than twenty-six weeks of nonwork from age twenty-eight to thirty. About 9 to 11 percent of black men born in the 1940s but 28 percent of black men born in the 1950s accumulated a year or more of nonwork from age twenty-eight to thirty. Black men born in the 1960s, particularly the late 1960s (i.e., 1966 to 1970), fare better than black men born in the 1950s. About 75 percent of black men born in the late 1960s reported fewer than twenty-six weeks of nonwork from age twenty-eight to thirty. However, a significant percentage of black men born in the late 1960s still accumulated a year or more of nonwork. For instance, 19 percent of black men born from 1966 to 1970 accumulated a year or more of nonwork from age twenty-eight to thirty. This is worrisome, given that the men in this birth cohort were twenty-eight to thirty years old during the 1994–2000 economic expansion. In Table 3.3, we report distributions of nonwork for all men, regardless of educational level. In Table 3.4, we report the same information for men

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Table 3.4. Distribution of Total Weeks of Nonwork: Ages 28–30 by Year of Birth and Race, Men with High School Degree or Less 0–12 Weeks

13–25 Weeks

26–52 Weeks

1–2 Years

>2 Years

# Obs

1941–45 1946–50 1951–55 1956–60 1961–65

69.21 55.36 43.49 59.37 54.98

18.20 19.09 25.43 19.60 20.79

White Men 5.05 12.98 16.84 12.52 12.65

6.88 10.55 8.42 6.97 7.13

0.65 2.03 5.82 1.54 4.44

142 206 276 258 207

1941–45 1946–50 1951–55 1956–60 1961–65

49.47 38.79 32.50 28.59 58.56

22.62 25.97 13.05 25.96 12.40

Black Men 19.25 22.59 25.94 11.59 6.93

3.94 3.07 18.04 25.49 11.48

4.72 9.58 10.47 8.37 10.62

81 152 219 186 155

Source: Authors’ tabulations of Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

with a high school diploma or less. We omit the 1966–1970 birth cohort from Table 3.4 because of small sizes. Men with twelve or fewer years of schooling were somewhat more likely to accumulate substantial nonwork than men across all educational levels. Black–white differences in nonwork tend to be smaller in Table 3.4 than in Table 3.3 but are still significant.

Discussion This chapter shows that men, particularly black men, found it more difficult to achieve stable employment in recent decades than in the past and fewer men achieved stable employment by their late twenties. Black men born in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s were more likely than those born in the late 1940s to be economically inactive in a given year and to report at least a year of nonwork during the three years between the ages of twenty-eight and thirty. Why has stable employment become more elusive? One explanation currently in vogue highlights changing norms and attitudes toward work among the younger generation. For example, Flanagan et al. (2006) reported increases in the fraction of high school seniors saying that they “feel hesitant about taking a full-time job and becoming part of the ‘adult’ world.” They also document a decline in seniors’ interest in having a career, as well as the degree to which they define their self-concept in reference to a particular career. These differences in attitudes, the argument goes, may have resulted in young Americans opting to take more time wading into the labor market compared to earlier cohorts or to work less often altogether.

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The analyses presented herein cast doubt on explanations that emphasize differences in attitudes and norms across cohorts. Decreases in work occurred within cohorts as well as across cohorts. Therefore, whereas young men are less likely to be working today than young men twenty years ago, older men still in their prime working years are less likely to be working today than they themselves were twenty years ago. This suggests that the changes in the structure of the economy over time discussed previously are reducing opportunities for stable employment for younger and older workers alike. Another finding highlighted in this chapter is that race differences in men’s disconnection from work have become significant. Most black and white men born in the 1940s were stably employed by their late twenties, and race differences in long-term nonwork were not significant for this cohort. In the 1940s birth cohort, 7 to 9 percent of white men and 9 to 11 percent of black men reported a year or more of nonwork between the ages of twenty-eight and thirty. In contrast, 28 percent of black men in the 1950s birth cohort and 19 to 23 percent in the 1960s birth cohort reported a year or more of nonwork between the ages of twenty-eight and thirty, whereas only 5 to 10 percent of white men in these cohorts reported a year or more of nonwork between the same ages. There is some good news in these results. Steady work from ages twentyeight to thirty is more common for both white and black men born in the late 1960s than for those born in the 1950s or 1940s, presumably due to the 1990s economic expansion. In the late 1960s birth cohort, 91 percent of white men and 75 percent of black men experienced fewer than twenty-six weeks of nonwork, and 77 percent of white men and 59 percent of black men experienced fewer than thirteen weeks of nonwork. Extensive nonwork from age twenty-eight to thirty is less common among white and black men in the late 1960s cohort than among those in the late 1950s cohort. However, despite this improvement, many black men born in the late 1960s remain disconnected from work in their late twenties and thirties. Almost one in five black men born in the late 1960s experienced a year or more of nonwork from age twenty-eight to thirty, and roughly one in ten born in the late 1960s did not work a single week in the year they turned forty.

Conclusion: Implications for Public Policy A small minority of white men and a large minority of black men are disconnected from work in their late twenties and thirties, long after leaving school. How can we increase men’s connections to work? If, as we argue

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herein, the causes of the decline in stable employment are primarily related to the opportunity structure rather than changing norms and attitudes among the new generation, then policies should be targeted accordingly. A standard answer is economic growth: “A rising tide lifts all boats.” Economic growth clearly helps. During the 1990s expansion, rates of extensive male nonwork from the ages of twenty-eight to thirty fell by one third. However, economic growth alone cannot completely eliminate this disconnection from work. Although unemployment rates reached thirty-year lows in the 1990s expansion, 4 percent of white men and 19 percent of black men were out of work for a year or more between the ages of twenty-eight and thirty. A “rising tide” did not “lift all boats.” Another standard policy solution is education and training policies. There is currently widespread agreement among policy researchers and analysts that the U.S. economy has changed profoundly since the late 1970s. The number of manufacturing jobs that pay good wages to workers with no postsecondary schooling and that provide benefits and employment stability has dropped, and these jobs are not coming back. Schooling, cognitive skills, technological training, and communication skills have increasingly become prerequisites for jobs. Returns to schooling, cognitive skills, and early work experience rose throughout the 1980s and early 1990s and remain high. If men are to become connected to work, they need the skills to get jobs. A mix of educational programs is required to meet the diverse needs of disconnected youth and youth at risk for disconnection. Given the high labor-market returns to associate’s and bachelor’s degrees, subsidizing the costs of postsecondary schooling by expanding the funding for Pell Grants is an important component of an education strategy. However, not all disconnected young men will choose this route (Cohen & Besharov, 2004). In Reconnecting Disadvantaged Young Men, Edelman et al. (2006) reviewed and evaluated U.S. school and labor-market programs designed to improve young men’s work skills and school-to-work transitions. They recommended the expansion of programs with proven track records and good cost–benefit ratios. The “proven” programs they recommended include mentoring and after-school programs (e.g., Big Brothers, Big Sisters), small high schools with career themes (e.g., Career Academics), and job-training programs for out-of-school youth (e.g., Job Corps). Edelman et al. (2006) also identified several initiatives as promising but not “proven” – apprenticeships, internships, and career and technical education in high schools and charter schools – and recommended that these initiatives be rigorously evaluated.

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A third set of strategies is to “make work pay.” A worker who works full time, year-round should have enough income after paying work expenses (e.g., transportation and child care) and taxes to live above the poverty level with health coverage. This is not the case for many low-skilled men in the United States. How might one make work pay? Raising the minimum wage is one strategy, and the U.S. Congress has recently enacted a series of increases in the minimum wage to reach $7.25 by July 2009 after it remained fixed at $5.15 per hour between 1997 and 2007. Edelman et al. (2006) further proposed raising incomes of low-wage workers through wage subsidies, raising the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) for childless adults, and extending the EITC to noncustodial parents who pay child support. Milwaukee’s New Hope Experiment provides another model. New Hope guaranteed workingpoor families subsidized health care, subsidized child care, and an income supplement that raised their income above the poverty line if a parent worked at least thirty hours per week. Programs that focus on youth incarceration are another strategy that may help. In the 1990s, crime rates dropped in the United States but incarceration rates remained high. Edelman et al. (2006, p. 129) estimated that by age thirty-four, “perhaps up to 30 percent of black men will have been to prison.” It is well documented that criminal records are barriers to employment. Edelman et al. (2006) recommended programs that divert youth from crime, reduce incarceration rates, increase the availability of education and training programs offered in prisons, and provide services and support for prisoners reentering the workforce. A recent issue in U.S. policy debates about male nonwork is the extent to which garnishing the wages of noncustodial fathers for delinquent child support reduces male work effort in the legitimate labor market. Garnishing wages clearly reduces returns from work that are already low for low-skilled workers. This can have the unintended consequences of inducing some men to quit their job. These men may then fall even farther behind in childsupport payments, and they may become even more disconnected from work and from their children.

REFERENCES

Andersson, F., Holzer, H. J., & Lane, J. (2003). Worker advancement in the low-wage labor market: The importance of “good jobs.” Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, Center for Urban and Metropolitan Policy.

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Andersson, F., Holzer, H. J., & Lane, J. I. (2006). Moving up or moving on: Employment and job stability among less educated workers. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Autor, D. H., & Houseman, S. (2006). Temporary agency employment: A way out of poverty? In R. M. Blank, S. Danziger, & R. Schoeni (Eds.), Working and poor: How economic and policy changes are affecting low-wage workers (pp. 312–337). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Autor, D. H., Levy, F., & Murnane, R. J. (2002). Upstairs, downstairs: Computers and skills on two floors of a large bank. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 55, 432– 447. Besharov, D. J. (Ed.) (1999). America’s disconnected youth: Toward a preventive strategy. Washington, DC: CWLA Press. Blank, R. (1998). Contingent work in a changing labor market. In R. Freeman & P. Gottschalk (Eds.), Generating jobs: How to increase demand for less-skilled workers (pp. 258–294). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Bound, J., & Freeman, R. (1992). What went wrong? The erosion of black relative wage gains. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(1), 201–232. Bound, J., & Holzer, H. (1993). Industrial shifts, skill levels, and the labor market for white and black males. Review of Economics and Statistics, 75(3), 387–394. Bound, J., & Johnson, G. (1992). Changes in the structure of wages in the 1980’s: An evaluation of alternative explanations. American Economic Review, 82(3), 371– 392. Cohen, M., & Besharov, D. J. (2004). The important role of career and technical education: Implications for federal policy. College Park, MD: University of Maryland Welfare Reform Academy. Corcoran, M., & Matsudaira, J. (2005). Is it getting harder to get ahead? In R. A. Settersten, Jr., F. F. Furstenberg, Jr., & R. G. Rumbaut (Eds.), On the frontier of adulthood: Theory, research and public policy (pp. 356–395). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Danziger, S., & Gottschalk, P. (1995). America unequal. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Devereux, P. (2003). Changes in male labor supply and wages. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 56(3), 409–428. Edelman, P., Holzer, H. J., & Offner, P. (2006). Reconnecting disadvantaged young men. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press. Flanagan, C. D., Osgood, W., Briddell, L., Wray, L., & Syvertsen, A. (2006). The changing social contract at the transition to adulthood: Implications for individuals and the polity. Network on Transitions to Adulthood Research Network Working Paper. Freeman, R., & Holzer, H. (Eds.) (1986). The black youth employment crisis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Freeman, R., & Rodgers, W. (2000). Area economic conditions and the labor market outcomes of young men in the 1990s expansion. In R. Cherry & W. Rodgers (Eds.), Prosperity for all? The economic boom and African Americans (pp. 50–87). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

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Freeman, R., & Waldfogel, J. (1998). Does child support enforcement policy affect male labor supply? In I. Garfinkel, S. McLanahan, D. Meyer, & J. Seltzer (Eds.), Fathers under fire (pp. 94–127). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Freeman, R., & Waldfogel, J. (2001). Dunning delinquent dads. Journal of Human Resources, 36(2), 207–225. Grogger, J. (1998). Market wages and youth crime. Journal of Labor Economics, 16(4), 756–791. Handel, M. (2003). Skills mismatch in the labor market. Annual Review of Sociology, 29, 135–165. Harding, D. (2003). Jean Valjean’s dilemma: The management of ex-convict identity in the search for employment. Deviant Behavior, 24(6), 571–595. Hollister, M. (2004). Does firm size matter anymore? The new economy and firm size wage effects. American Sociological Review, 69(5), 659–677. Holzer, H. J., & Offner, P. (2004). The puzzle of black male unemployment. The Public Interest, 154, 74–85. Holzer, H. J., Offner, P., & Sorensen, E. (2005). Declining employment among young black less-educated men: The role of incarceration and child support. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 24(2), 329–350. Holzer, H. J., Raphael, S., & Stoll, M. (2006). Will employers hire former offenders? In M. Pattillo, D. Weiman, & B. Western (Eds.), Imprisoning America: The social effects of mass incarceration (pp. 205–246). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Juhn, C. (1992). The decline in male labor force participation: The role of declining market opportunities. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 79–121. Juhn, C. (2003). Labor market dropouts and trends in the wages of black and white men. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 56(4), 643–662. Juhn, C. , Murphy, K. M., & Pierce, B. (1997). Wage inequality and the rise in returns to skill. Journal of Political Economy, 101(3), 410–442. Juhn, C., & Potter, S. (2006). Changes in labor force participation in the United States. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(3), 27–46. Katz, L. F., & Murphy, K. M. (1992). Changes in relative wages, 1963–1978: Supply and demand factors. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 35–78. Levy, F., & Murnane, R.J. (1992). U.S. Earnings levels and earnings inequality: A review of recent trends and proposed explanations. Journal of Economic Literature, 30(3), 1333–1381. Lobo, A. P., & Salvo, J. J. (1998). Changing U.S. immigration law and the occupational selectivity of Asian immigrants. International Migration Review, 32, 737–760. Mincy, R. B. (2006). Black males left behind. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press. Morris, M., & Western, B. (1999). Inequality in earnings at the close of the twentieth century. Annual Review of Sociology, 25, 623–657. Pager, D. (2003). The mark of a criminal record. American Journal of Sociology, 108(5), 937–975. Pattillo, M., Weiman, D., & Western, B. (Eds.) (2006). Imprisoning America: The social effects of mass incarceration. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Powell, W., & Snellman, K. (2004). The knowledge economy. Annual Review of Sociology, 30, 199–204.

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Royalty, A. (1998). Job-to-job and job-to-non-employment turnover by gender and education level. Journal of Labor Economics, 16(2), 392–443. Topel, R. H., & Ward, M. P. (1992). Job mobility and the careers of young men. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2), 439–479. Western, B. (2006). Punishment and inequality in America. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Wilson, W. J. (1987). The truly disadvantaged: The inner city, the underclass and public policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Wilson, W. J. (1996). When work disappears: The world of the new urban poor. New York: Alfred Knopf.

4

Youth Outcomes in the Labour Markets of Advanced Economies Decline, Deterioration, and Causes Rebekka Christopoulou and Paul Ryan

Introduction In recent decades, things appear to have gone wrong for young workers in advanced economies. Young people find it harder to get jobs, even in unskilled work, than did their parents and grandparents. The symptoms include extensive unemployment and inactivity. The unemployment rate of 15- to 24-year-olds has averaged more than 20 percent in France since the early 1980s. In the United Kingdom, around one in ten 16- to 25-year-olds has been inactive – that is, out of school, training, and the labour market – since the mid-1980s.1 Levy and Murnane (1992) documented a marked deterioration in youth outcomes in the U.S. labour market, starting as far back as the mid-1970s. Since that landmark study, the problems of youth have attracted considerable attention.2 Blanchflower and Freeman claim that since the 1970s youth outcomes have deteriorated in ‘virtually all OECD countries’ (2000, p. 3). These problems came as something of a surprise. The general expectation in the late 1970s was that falling population shares, rising educational attainment, and the growth of the service sector would improve the position of young workers. The failure of these expectations to come about has been attributed variously to macroeconomic stagnation, new technology, and globalisation. 1

Ryan (2001), Figure 1, Table 1; OECD (2006), Table C; Prince’s Trust (2007). Ryan, Garonna, and Edwards (1991); O’Higgins (2001). We thank the editors, Gregory DeFreitas, Niall O’Higgins, and the participants at the Marbach Conference for comments and suggestions. 2

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Macroeconomic interpretations build on the tendency for young workers to be the last to be hired and the first to be fired, which exposes them disproportionately to cyclical downturns in labour demand, and results in ‘super-cyclicality’ in youth employment and unemployment. In this vein, Blanchflower and Freeman (2000) viewed persistent slack in aggregate labour markets as the principal reason for the deterioration of youth outcomes. The second and third factors, innovation and globalisation, are widely seen as having caused a skill-biased trend in the demand for labour – that is, as having recomposed demand in favour of more skilled workers, at the expense of less skilled ones. In this line of interpretation, the successful use of new technologies requires employers to replace less skilled workers with more skilled ones. In principle, changes in technology and trade can move the demand curve for less skilled labour in either direction. Classical economists, notably Smith and Marx, expected technical change to increase the relative demand for less skilled labour, because employers used mechanisation to deskill craft work and increase their control over production. Nowadays, however, the predominant effect appears to be to automate the work of less skilled employees, while increasing the demand for the more skilled employees who design, install, and maintain new equipment. The skill-biased technical change (hence, ‘skill bias’) hypothesis took hold in the 1990s as an explanation of the contrast between the growth of unemployment in Europe and the growth of pay inequality in the United States. Krugman (1994) depicted both Europe and the United States as experiencing similar skill-biased shifts in labour demand, which were directed onto employment and pay outcomes, respectively, as a result of differences in labour market institutions. ‘Rigid’ institutions prevented wages from falling in Europe, resulting in increased unemployment. ‘Flexible’ institutions allowed pay to adjust in the United States, widening pay differences between more skilled and less skilled workers, but avoided an increase in unemployment. The skill bias hypothesis has been favoured by many economists: for example, ‘relative demand shifts favouring more skilled workers are . . . essential to understanding longer-run changes in the U.S. wage structure’ (Katz & Autor, 1999, p. 1513). The hypothesis has however been contested, and direct evidence on it remains limited.3 Doubts about its validity have 3

Nickell and Bell (1995); Card and DiNardo (2002). The existence of an underlying economic trend unfavourable to youth has even been questioned (OECD, 2002, pp. 20–29).

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fostered a variant: the ‘routinisation’ hypothesis. Trends in technology and trade are seen as displacing less skilled workers in jobs where the content can be routinised – a category that includes assembly and bookkeeping work – but not in other jobs, including not just more skilled ones (e.g., technician) but also many less skilled ones (e.g., sales assistant, and customer-care agent). The result is a polarisation rather than a simple upgrading of skill requirements.4 On the trade side of the issue, as advanced economies export to the rest of the world the more skill-intensive types of goods and services, and import from it the less skill-intensive ones, the growth of international trade is also expected to decrease the relative demand for less skilled workers (Wood, 1994). In the debates over skill bias, skill has usually been interpreted simply in terms of educational attainment. Its experience dimension (i.e., differences between young and adult workers) has attracted only secondary attention,5 and is the focus here. The demand for youth labour may also be adversely affected by changes in technology and trade, and for similar reasons to the demand for less educated labour. Ryan (2001) reported evidence for youth labour market outcomes consistent with the skill-bias hypothesis; however, he suggested that the outcome depends not only on institutions of pay-setting but also on institutions governing the school-to-work transition. In the same vein, we analyse youth outcomes in the labour markets of advanced economies, focusing on whether trends in the demand for labour have hurt young people. The data we use do not permit us to separate the education and experience components of skill; rather they require us to analyse outcomes for young workers as a whole, across all levels of educational attainment. We adopt two empirical approaches: graphical nonparametric methods and econometrics. The former approach defines variables and chooses periods so as implicitly to hold constant other causal variables; the latter uses a formal model to estimate the role of the causal variables and the interactions between the outcome variables. Graphical analysis is less restrictive and more readily understandable; econometric modelling is more potent, in that it uses all the data available and captures more of the complexities of a highly multivariate phenomenon. The findings of the two approaches prove mostly complementary. 4 5

Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003); Goos and Manning (2007). Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2002); Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2007).

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The following section reviews the evidence on the relative pay and employment of young workers in recent decades. The third section discusses theoretical and empirical techniques. The fourth section presents the results of the non-parametric analysis; the fifth section discusses the econometric results; and the final section concludes.

The Pattern of Youth Outcomes in Countries’ Labour Markets Our point of departure is the analysis by Ryan (2001, section 5.1) of trends in the pay and employment of young adult males relative to those of prime age adult males in seven advanced economies during the final quarter of the twentieth century. Female youth were excluded because of the difficulty in controlling for changes in adult female participation in the labour force, as were teenagers, because of serious data inadequacies. The evidence suggested that labour market outcomes had indeed declined for young workers relative to those of adults in the seven economies taken as a whole. At the same time, national experiences diverged in two respects. First, some countries showed no decline: in Germany and the Netherlands, relative outcomes remained broadly stable; in Japan, they declined but only modestly. Second, in the other four economies, where major declines occurred, its locus differed between two country pairs. In the United Kingdom and the United States, the decline focused entirely on relative pay; in France and Sweden, entirely on relative employment. Three potential determinants of changes in the labour market fortunes of youth were distinguished. First, in all countries, young workers faced an adverse trend in the demand for their labour, with changes in technology and trade as the presumptive cause. Second, the extent to which the trend affected young workers’ employment as opposed to their pay depended on national institutions of pay-setting – with a broad contrast between high pay flexibility in the English-speaking countries and low pay flexibility (and, therefore, employment-based adjustment) in the continental European ones.6 Third, the absence of any substantial adverse trend in Germany, the Netherlands, and – to a lesser extent – Japan suggests that nationally specific school-to-work institutions offset the underlying adverse trend in the demand for youth labour. Christopoulou (2007a, 2008) extended the analysis by including six more countries and covering a longer time period, typically from the 1970s to the early 2000s. The pattern remained largely unchanged. Most of the additional 6

Blau and Kahn (1999); OECD (2004, tables 3.8, 3.9).

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countries showed some decline in one or both dimensions of youth relative outcomes. Australia and Canada joined the United Kingdom and the United States as countries in which only relative pay deteriorated. Again, most continental European countries showed a fall in relative employment but little change in relative pay. The distribution of countries in pay-employment space still adhered to the axes; that is, cases of substantial decline involved either pay or employment but not both. If the pattern remained strikingly simple, the evidence remained limited. Moreover, in our previous research, we imposed only partial controls for other influences on youth outcomes, on both the demand and the supply side. We neutralised changes in the age structure of the labour force by measuring employment relative to population within each age group. We did not impose controls for cyclical changes in labour demand, nor for increased educational participation, nor did we allow for potential interactions between the labour market situation and educational participation. This chapter corrects these limitations, using both more targeted evidence and a more thorough analysis of the evidence.

Analytical Method This section outlines the methods, economic and statistical, with which we analyse changes in youth outcomes in the labour market. Economics We adopt the ‘supply, demand, institutions’ analytical framework that informs much contemporary economic research on pay and skills (Freeman & Katz, 1995; Katz & Autor, 1999). The key ingredients are the demand curve, the supply curve, and the way price is set (Figure 4.1). The outcome variables – youth pay and employment – are analysed throughout in relative terms (vis-`a-vis their adult counterparts). We assume that there exist single-valued economy-wide relative demand and supply curves for youth labour, independent of the scale of economic activity. On the demand side, young workers are assumed to be (imperfect) substitutes for adults in production, so that the demand curve slopes down (e.g., D1 in Figure 4.1): employers switch employment between young and adult workers according to their relative price. The position of the demand curve depends on macroeconomic conditions, on the one hand, and technology and international trade, on the other, as outlined in the previous section. The supply of labour may be expected to increase with pay, which raises the ‘price’ of alternative activities (i.e., education, leisure, and inactivity),

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Rebekka Christopoulou and Paul Ryan Rw S D1 D2

R w1, R w3

γ

R w2

α

β

R L3

R L1, RL2

RL

Figure 4.1. Economic analysis of youth-related trends in the labour market. Note: Rw is the relative pay of unskilled and skilled labour (Wu /Ws ); RL , their relative employment (Lu /Ls ). Initial equilibrium is at point α. Equilibrium after an adverse change in demand (represented by the shift of D1 to D2 ) is at β under full wage flexibility, and at γ under full wage rigidity.

and may do so more strongly for young people than for adults. However, for simplicity, the supply curve (S) in Figure 4.1 is vertical; that is, the absolute effect of higher pay on labour supply, if any, is assumed to be the same for youths and for adults. The position of the relative supply curve depends on demography (i.e., relative youth population) and the educational decisions of young people. Concerning pay-setting, two polar cases are postulated: competitive and noncompetitive (speaking loosely, ‘institutionalised’) pay-setting, associated with pay flexibility and pay rigidity, respectively. In the competitive scenario, the pay of young workers moves rapidly in the direction of market clearing in response to any difference between supply and demand at current pay rates. Starting with demand and supply curves D1 and S, equilibrium is then at point α, with the pay and employment of young workers at Rw1 and RL1 on the vertical and horizontal axes, respectively. In the noncompetitive scenario, pay is assumed to be completely rigid with respect to the difference between supply and demand. Thus, if the relevant supply and demand curves are S and D2 , and pay is arbitrarily or historically fixed at Rw1 , the outcome is at γ. The absence of price adjustment then means excess supply of youth labour (RL1 − RL3 ).

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Assuming that the youth market starts from equilibrium at α, a fall in the demand for young workers – as shown by the shift from D1 to D2 – causes youth outcomes to deteriorate. Whether the deterioration involves price or quantity (i.e., pay or employment) depends on the way pay is set. Under competition and pay flexibility, the new equilibrium is at β, with unchanged employment but lower pay (Rw2 ); under pay rigidity it is at γ, with unchanged pay but lower employment (RL3 ). Intermediate outcomes, involving falls in both pay and employment are also possible, as when pay flexibility is limited or, under full wage flexibility, when the supply of youth labour is affected by youth pay. The analysis becomes more complicated if the supply curve also moves, as well as if changes occur in the share of young people in the population or the proportion of young people enrolled full-time in education. The key issues, then, are the direction of the shift in supply and, if it is the same as that in demand, which of the changes is the larger. Statistics We use two approaches to isolate empirically the postulated adverse trend in the demand for youth labour. The first approach is graphical nonparametric analysis. The key variables are plotted against each other in order to show any relationship between them. Graphical methods, with their limitation to two dimensions, might be considered hopelessly ineffective, given that most economic phenomena have multiple causes – and the potential determinants of youth outcomes are certainly numerous. The traction attainable with graphical analysis, however, can be increased by defining variables and selecting subsets of the available data so as to hold constant other influences on youth outcomes. If suitable data are available or can be generated, the approach approximates a natural experiment, and bivariate graphical analysis suffices to identify the relationship in question (e.g., Card & Krueger, 1995). Otherwise, the relationship of interest is likely to be obscured by uncontrolled variation in other causal variables.7 The second approach is econometric analysis. A multi-equation model of pay, employment, and educational activity is formulated and estimated, setting the relationship of interest within a multivariate context, parameterising it, and holding other influences statistically constant. The strengths of 7

Bivariate graphical analysis dominated first-level undergraduate courses in applied economics and statistics in the United Kingdom in the early postwar decades. At Cambridge University, it was known as the Reddaway method, after W. B. Reddaway, its principal practitioner and teacher.

Rebekka Christopoulou and Paul Ryan

Relative Pay: Change in Ratio of 20- to 24- and 25- to 54-Year-Olds Mean Pay (Mean Rate of Change p.a.)

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0.50

KOR GER FIN

-1.50 FRA

-1.00

BEL -0.50

SWE

JAP

0.00 0.00

NED -0.50

0.50

CAN AUS

US UK ITA

-1.00 Relative Employment: Change in Rates of 20- to 24- and 25- to 54-Year-Olds (Mean Rate of Change p.a.)

Figure 4.2. Average annual rates of change in pay and employment of young adults relative to prime-age adults during cyclically neutral sub-periods: male employees in thirteen advanced economies (% p.a.). Note: Country-specific periods during 1983–1997 (see appendix).

econometric modelling lie in utilising all available data, not just an experimentally relevant subset thereof, in explicitly including multiple influences on the outcome of interest, and in allowing for interactions with other outcomes of interest. Its limitations include the potential sensitivity of the results to implicit, untested and even implausible assumptions, both economic and statistical, and the biases that missing variables potentially cause – a particular concern here, given that satisfactory direct measures of some determinants (notably technical change) are not available. These difficulties affect graphical as well as econometric methods, but the former do at least avoid the restrictive parameterisation of the key relationships.

Graphical Non-parametric Analysis Figure 4.2 shows changes in the relative pay and employment of young workers in thirteen advanced economies during nationally specific periods in the 1980s and 1990s. The periods are chosen to maximise information about the underlying trend in the demand for youth labour.

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The potential effect of macroeconomic fluctuations on youth outcomes is controlled in Figure 4.2 by selecting for each country a subperiod, centred on the 1980s, at the end of which the state of the aggregate national labour market was broadly the same as it had been at the start. Removing the distorting effects of any super-cyclicality in the demand for youth labour should give a clearer view of its trend component. The adult-male unemployment rate is used to indicate the state of the aggregate labour market. The widespread rise in adult unemployment after the mid-1970s limits the duration of the longest period that meets this criterion. The resulting duration varies between seven years (Italy) and twelve years (Australia, Canada, and Japan).8 Longer periods would have been desirable for the measurement of trend changes, but that option is denied to us by the trend rise in labour market slack in most countries. Figure 4.2 shows that adjusting for the state of the aggregate labour market does not fundamentally alter the preestablished pattern. First, evidence of substantial decline in youth outcomes remains present for eight of the thirteen countries. Second, those declines again involve either employment (France and Belgium) or pay (Canada, Australia, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States), but not both; that is, no country shows a substantial change in both dimensions. Third, the five countries showing no significant decline in either pay or employment now include Sweden, Finland, and South Korea, in addition to Germany and Japan. The principal effect of controlling for the aggregate economic cycle is the absence of any trend decline through 1990 for Sweden and Finland. Clearly, therefore, the large falls in youth employment that showed up previously for both countries in data that extended into the 1990s reflected the sharp cyclical downturns of the start of that decade rather than any trend decline – until that point, at least. The evidence remains consistent with an influence for national institutions of pay-setting on the extent to which adverse trends in the demand for youth labour affect pay as opposed to employment. The contrast between liberal and coordinated market economies, in the terminology popularised by Hall and Soskice (2001), is sharpened by the arrival of Australia and Canada alongside the United Kingdom and the United States in the former category, and of Belgium alongside France in the latter. Table 4.1 provides additional evidence of an institutional effect on youth pay: the change in 8

It was not possible to pick a start year and an end year with the same rate of adult-male unemployment for either Finland or France, where the adult-male rate was 2 points lower and 1 point higher, respectively, at the end than at the start of the period used here.

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Table 4.1. Pay-Setting Institutions and Changes in Youth Relative Pay

Australia Belgium Canada Finland France Germany Italy Japan Korea The Netherlands Sweden United Kingdom United States Rank correlation with (1)

(1) Change in Relative Pay of Young Male Adults (%)

(2) Labour Market Coordination Ranking (Undated)

(3) Pay-Setting Coordination Index 1990–1994c

(4) Trade Union Membership Density (%) 1990

(5) Collective Bargaining Coverage (%)b 1990

−0.68 −0.03 −0.53 0.08 0.01 0.20 −0.93 0 0.37 −0.47 0.07 −0.82 −0.66

9 6 11 3 7 2 5 1 n.a. 8 4 10 12 −0.66a

4 2 5 1 4 2 3 2 5 2 3 5 5 −0.35

40 54 33 72 10 31 39 25 17 25 80 39 15 −0.09

80 90 90 90 80 80 20 20 20 70 80 40 18 0.25

Notes: The scales in columns (2) and (3) are inversions of the originals. a p = 0.02, n = 12 (Korea excluded). b Minima (e.g., ‘80+’ is taken to be 80). c The Hall–Gingerich index is based on a factor analysis for the period 1985–95 of the level and extent of coordination in pay-setting (three categories each) and the rate of labour turnover in the economy as a whole. Sources: Col. (1): Figure 2; (2): Hall and Gingerich (2004), Figure 1; (3)-(5): OECD (2004), Tables 3.3, 3.5.

youth pay is significantly associated across countries with a standard index of the extent of nonmarket coordination of labour relations. The more coordinated are a country’s pay-setting institutions, the larger the rate of change (i.e., in most cases, the smaller the fall) in youth pay. The evidence is however only suggestive, because the sample is small and none of the other institutional measures in Table 4.1, including trade-union membership and bargaining coverage, is significantly associated with the change in youth pay. Two further issues must be considered before drawing any inferences about the hypothesised trend in the demand for youth labour: school-towork institutions and educational participation. The evidence for a positive effect of national school-to-work institutions on the demand for youth labour comprises the absence in Figure 4.2 of any decline in youth outcomes in Germany and Japan. The pattern is consistent with the importance of apprenticeship in West Germany and of schoolemployer hiring networks in Japan – during the periods studied here, that

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is. Although the fall in the coverage of school-leaver hiring networks in Japan dates from the early 1980s, it gathered momentum only from the mid-1990s.9 The Netherlands no longer appears in the ‘no decline’ category. The appearance in that category of Sweden and Finland, however, is problematic, because those countries’ reliance on full-time upper-secondary education is associated with comparatively difficult school-to-work transitions (Shavit & M¨uller, 1998). Second, increases in educational enrolments potentially affect youth pay and employment by reducing youth labour supply. Any ensuing decline in youth employment need not however imply any deterioration in youth outcomes. The increase in educational participation may reflect future-oriented choices by young people, such as an increased demand for education as an investment good. If, however, increased participation is caused by adverse conditions in the contemporary labour market, making it harder for young people to find jobs, the demand side is indeed at fault, and declines in youth outcomes represent genuine deterioration.10 Thus, Verdier (2001) attributes the increase in educational enrolments in France during the 1980s largely to deterioration in the demand for youth labour. Changes in educational participation potentially cloud the evidence. Not only does a substantial share of young adults participate in education but also the share has increased rapidly in many countries. In 1996, between one quarter and one half of young adults were enrolled in a formal course of education (Table 4.2, column 4). In the absence of survey data for earlier years, we use a proxy enrolment rate: the ratio of tertiary enrolments (all ages) to the young adult population. During the periods used here, the national increase in participation varied between five and thirty five percentage points (ibid., column 3). The picture is complicated further by changes in student employment. When the share of students who work while studying rises, an increase in enrolments need not mean a fall in the supply of youth labour. The share of students in work varied in 1996 from three percent in Italy to sixty five percent in Australia (Table 4.2, column 5). Changes in student employment are not included here, in the absence of systematic cross-country data. Some reassurance on this count, however, is provided by Juhn and Potter 9 10

Mitani (1999); Kosugi (2008). Analysis of microdata suggests that although the relationship between educational participation and youth unemployment is positive in some countries, it is weak or absent in others, including Sweden and the United Kingdom (McIntosh, 2001).

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Table 4.2. Educational Participation and Student Employment, Young Adult Males (1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Educational Participation Rate (%)a Period Australia Belgium Canada Finland France Germany Italy Japan Korea (S) The Netherlands Sweden United Kingdom United States

1983–93 1985–94 1983–92 1983–93 1987–97 1984–94 1987–95 1987–96 1984–95 1985–95 1984–93e 1984–93e 1983–92

Initial Ratec 28.3 29.5 46.5 32.5 30.7 40.5 28.2 37.4 67.3 36.9 31.0 24.2 59.4

Changec (% pts) 1996d 35.1 16.6 34.2 26.1 19.1 5.4 10.7 5.6 27.6 8.9 5.0 14.2 10.5

31.7 38.0 36.6 44.2 48.5 31.3 29.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. 35.9 27.2 32.3

(5) Student Employment Rate (%)b 1996d 64.7 7.4 41.0 26.7 5.6 11.5 3.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 15.3 37.9 58.8

Notes: a Share of young adult male population. b Share of young adult male student population. c Total enrolments (part-time and full-time) in tertiary education (ISCED levels 5–7) as a percentage of 20- to 24-year-old population (males only), taken from the most recent edition of the UNESCO Yearbook that includes the relevant data. When data are available for both years from OECD and UNESCO, the former source is preferred. Periodisation as in Column (1). d Based on national household-based labour-force surveys. e Adjusted by one year from that in Figure 4.3 in order to avoid break in series (Sweden) or because of a gap in the population series (United Kingdom). Sources: Cols. (1)–(3): UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, various years (Paris: UNESCO); Cols. (4, 5) OECD (1999), Table D1.2 and OECD online database.

(2006, table 6), who find that the employment rate of 20- to 24-year-old students in the United States changed little after 1989. Graphical methods face at this point the impossibility of controlling for changes in educational enrolments along the lines used for macroeconomic fluctuations: that is, to use for each country a period across the variable changed little. The difficulty is partly that the periods across which the change in enrolments and the change in macroeconomic conditions were each negligible are unlikely to coincide. It is also that the universality of the increase in enrolment rates makes it impossible to choose for any country a subperiod with the same participation rate at its start and finish. Consequently, graphical nonparametric methods cannot identify the pure trend in the demand for youth labour. Nevertheless, particular combinations of changes in youth outcomes and in educational participation may

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Table 4.3. Predicted Qualitative Effects on Labour Market Outcomes of Adverse Trends in Demand or Supply, by National Institutions of Pay-Setting

Trend

Change in Youth Relative Outcome

Supply (e.g., educational participation)

Pay Employment Unemployment

Demand (e.g., skill-biased technical change)

Pay Employment Unemployment

a

Pay-Setting Institutions Competitive

Coordinated

+ 0 − (C) − 0 0 -----------------------------------− 0 (B) 0 (D) − 0 + (A)

Notes: The wage-elasticity of supply is assumed to be zero. a Autonomous leftward move in relative demand or supply curve. The sign in the matrix indicates the direction of change in the relevant scenario.

reveal any net trend deterioration on the demand side – that is, in Figure 4.1, the extent to which an inward shift in demand outstrips any inward shift in the supply curve induced by increased educational participation. When the quantity traded in a market falls, the change in price potentially indicates whether a net negative trend has occurred on the supply side or the demand side. For example, given that the relative pay of more educated workers rose alongside their relative employment in the United States in the 1980s, the demand for more educated labour is taken to have increased more rapidly than its supply (Katz & Autor, 1999). Such inferences implicitly assume competitive pay-setting and high pay flexibility, as represented by scenarios A and B in Table 4.3. The four Englishspeaking countries, along with Italy and the Netherlands, correspond to scenario B: marked falls in youth pay suggest not only a trend deterioration on the demand side, but also one strong enough to dominate any fall in labour supply caused by any autonomous increase in educational participation.11 Under coordinated pay-setting and pay rigidity, by contrast, net changes in labour demand are not indicated by changes in youth pay, because youth pay may not be affected by excess supply. The relevant indicator is now unemployment. If youth pay remains unchanged but youth (relative) unemployment rises – despite an increase in educational participation – a net adverse movement on the demand side can be inferred, as in panel C in Table 4.3. The countries in this category are Belgium and France, in which the ratio of young adult to mature adult unemployment rose from 2.7 to 3.2 11

The presence in five of the six countries of a modest rise – rather than a fall – in youth employment, despite a large increase in educational participation (see Table 4.2), is harder to interpret. It may reflect growth in students’ employment rates.

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and from 2.6 to 2.8, respectively, during the periods in question.12 Because the increase was undoubtedly weakened in both countries by the expansion and youth-orientation of labour market programmes, a deterioration in the net demand for youth labour is therefore inferred. For the remaining five countries – Finland, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Sweden – all of which show little trend change in youth outcomes, it is not possible to disentangle the contributions, if any, of demand-side deterioration and supply-side changes. The graphical nonparametric analysis therefore indicates the presence of an adverse trend in the demand for youth labour in at least eight countries. It can however go no farther, so econometric analysis is now used to extend our findings.

Econometric Analysis: Results We now formulate and estimate an econometric model of the determination of labour market outcomes for young people. Econometric analysis uses more of the available information than does graphical analysis – in terms, firstly, of using the maximum period for which data are available for each country rather than just the longest sub-period without a cyclical component and, secondly, of using changes within that period rather than just the difference between its start and end points. Two options are available for the choice of estimation method. The first is the structural one: to estimate a set of simultaneous equations that explicitly explains the endogenous variables (i.e., youth employment, youth pay, wage adjustment, and educational participation) jointly, in terms of a set of exogenous variables. The second is the reduced-form one: to estimate for each of the endogenous variables a single equation that contains all of the exogenous (and predetermined endogenous) variables in the system, and none of the other endogenous ones. The structural approach faces the greater estimation problems, but it maintains the closer connection with economic theory.13 The statistical literature on youth labour markets shows that both approaches have achieved only limited explanatory success. Studies that take the structural approach, which were conducted mostly in the 1970s and 1980s, used overly simple specifications. In particular, while youth pay and employment were both treated as endogenous, educational participation remained exogenous, and 12 13

stats.oecd.org/wbos/default.aspx?DatasetCode-LFS D (OECD Labour Force Statistics). Greene (2003), chapter 15.

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the demand equations did not estimate the effects of changes in trade and technology. The studies were confined to time-series evidence for a single country (the United Kingdom). That meant small sample sizes, few degrees of freedom, and the exclusion of pay-setting institutions, which vary more by country than by time.14 By contrast, the reduced-form approach, which has dominated recent research, has involved the use of multicountry panel data and the analysis of institutional effects.15 However, the studies that have taken this route have analysed only one dimension of youth outcomes, either employment or unemployment; and they have not analysed relative pay and educational participation, even though relative employment, on which they have focused, is in principle jointly determined with both variables (Katz & Autor, 1999). We therefore adopt a structural approach, using the supply-demandinstitutions analysis (see section on analytical methods) to specify a structural model comprising four simultaneous equations: labour demand, labour supply, educational participation, and wage adjustment. All outcomes except educational participation are defined in relative terms, as ratios of youth to adult outcomes. Wage effects are included in the supply and demand equations. Instead of market-clearing, we assume demandconstrained disequilibrium; that is, that labour markets are characterised in all countries and years by an excess relative supply of young workers. This, in turn, assumes pay rigidity; that is, non-instantaneous adjustment of pay to its equilibrium level. The assumption of excess supply is broadly consistent with the pattern of unemployment by age in advanced economies since the mid-1970s. The principal potential exception is the United States, which has seen no clear trend in relative youth unemployment since the 1970s. The model is estimated by Two Stage Least Squares, the standard method of analysing jointly-dependent variables.16 We use an unbalanced panel that 14 15

16

Merrilees and Wilson (1979); Wells (1983); Rice (1986). Blanchard and Wolfers (2000); Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2002); OECD (2004); Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2007). Two Stage Least Squares, viewed as an instrumental variable method, replaces the actual values of any endogenous variable that is used as an explanatory variable in any structural equation by its predicted values, taken from an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of the relevant reduced-form equation, and then re-estimates the structural equations by OLS. There can then be no correlation in any equation between any regressor and the disturbance term, as would occur under direct OLS estimation of the structural equation with an endogenous variable as an explanatory variable. 2SLS is preferred to other full-information methods, notably Three Stage Least Squares, because it confines any specification biases to the relevant equation, rather than propagating them throughout the entire system.

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comprises the ten advanced economies for which continuous annual data on both relative pay and employment are available for at least nine consecutive years between 1974 and 2000. The average duration of the period is 19.5 years, as compared to 10.3 in the graphical analysis (see previous section). The countries, periods and variables involved are described in the Appendix. Full details of the model, estimation method, and data sources are provided in Christopoulou (2007a, 2007b). Institutional attributes are assumed to differ across countries but to remain constant over time. The assumption is restrictive because institutions not only may change over time, but also do so in response to labour market conditions (Freeman & Katz, 1995). Nevertheless, the restriction reduces the high degree of endogeneity in the model, and it is consistent with the greater variability of institutional attributes across countries than across time. A second institution-related restriction is the exclusion of institutional attributes for which measures of youth-specific content are not available. The attributes in question are the statutory minimum wage and employment-protection law, for which adequate data are not available on the extent and generosity of youth-specific derogations (i.e., the youth sub-minimum wage and youth-specific temporary contracts, respectively). The model requires that all independent variables have the same effect on outcomes across both countries and time. The results therefore represent the situation in the typical advanced economy, that is, in the group of economies taken as a whole. Considerable heterogeneity, however, is permitted in that all equations include a full set of intercept dummy variables by country as well as by year. The estimation results, presented in Table 4.4, are now discussed equation by equation. Labour Demand. The demand for youth labour is taken (Table 4.4, row 1) to depend on youth pay, macroeconomic conditions (the output gap), international trade (openness), technical change (spending on research and development, [R&D]), and apprenticeship training (school-to-work institutions). The results are broadly as hypothesised. Relative pay has a significantly negative association with relative employment, consistent with a downward-sloping demand curve, albeit one with a steep slope (i.e., a low elasticity). The coefficients on the output gap, international trade, and apprenticeship, are all significantly nonzero and all have the expected signs. Spending on R&D proves insignificant. A separate potential measure of technical change is provided by the time-dummy variables, which capture unobserved factors that are year-specific but common to all countries

83

Educpart

13.4∗∗ 15.6∗∗

= −1.579 Relative pay + 0.170 ALMP + 0.218 Yunemp (t-1) (0.460∗∗ ) (0.034∗∗ ) (0.043∗∗ )

= −0.065 Runemp + 0.144 Cbcov + 0.0003 Unden − 0.011 Coord (0.029∗∗ ) (0.068∗∗ ) (0.0002) (0.008)

13.2∗∗

Notes: Two Stage Least Squares estimates (2SLS), with standard errors in parentheses. Statistically significant differences from zero are indicated by asterisks (∗ : p = 0.10; ∗∗ : p = 0.05). n = 195. Variable definitions: see appendix. All variables are subscripted by country and year (with t-1 indicating a one-year lag) and measured in natural logarithms, except for those that are time-invariant (i.e., App, ALMP, Cbcov, Unden, Cooord) or take negative values (i.e., Outgap). All equations include country and time dummies (not reported here). The Sargan statistic tests instrument validity, under the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid and the system is, at worst, over-specified.

Pay adjustment Change in relative pay

Educational participation

Relative employment + = −0.732 Relative pay −1.149 Educpart + 0.810 Relpop + 0.233 ALMP relative unemployment (0.635) (0.269∗∗ ) (0.212∗∗ ) (0.051∗∗ )

Supply

Sargan Statistic

= − 0.556 Relative pay + 0.021 Outgap − 0.621 Openness + 0.440
R & D + 0.210 App 160.6 (0.345∗ ) (0.004∗∗ ) (0.090∗∗ ) (0.313) (0.045∗∗ )

Relative employment

Demand

Independent Variables and Estimated Coefficients

Dependent Variable

Equation

Table 4.4. Econometric Results

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and can, therefore, be plausibly associated with technical change. All have negative coefficients, and those for the 1990s are significantly larger (absolutely) than those for the mid-1970s. The implication is a negative trend in the relative demand for youth labour in the typical advanced economy. Holding other determinants constant, the cumulative time-effect is estimated at −17.1 percent over the ten years (i.e., 1987 to 1996) for which full data are available for all ten countries. Labour Supply. The supply of youth labour is measured by the sum of employment and unemployment. Equation 2 explains it in terms of two endogenous variables, relative pay and educational participation, and two exogenous ones, the youth population share and spending on active labour market policy (ALMP). The estimates for the exogenous variables correspond to expectation. Relative population has a close (possibly one-to-one) relationship with labour supply. More spending on labour market programmes is associated with increased labour supply. The latter result may involve two-way causality: more spending on ALMP may induce more young people into the labour market but, given that the ALMP variable is time-invariant, countries with greater youth unemployment may spend more on ALMP. The coefficient on youth pay has the wrong sign, but it is statistically insignificant. Youth pay does, however, affect supply indirectly through its effect on educational participation, given that labour supply is negatively associated with participation. Educational Participation. The third equation determines educational participation in terms of youth relative pay, spending on labour market programmes, and youth unemployment. More young people are expected to make themselves available to work when youth pay is higher, when fewer young people are jobless, and when the government spends more on labour market programmes. The results suggest that youth unemployment does affect educational participation and that its effect involves a one-year lag. The effect is positive and statistically significant, consistent with the hypothesis that a greater difficulty of finding work increases the share of young people who enter or remain in formal education. The effect of labour market programmes on educational participation also proves statistically significant but with the ‘wrong’ sign: insofar as such programmes offer young people an alternative to remaining in education, a negative relationship would be expected. Even were young people do view the two activities as poor substitutes – as the

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difference in their content and constituencies might suggest (Ryan, 1999) – a zero, not a positive, coefficient would be expected. The coefficient on youth pay is not only negative and statistically significant but also large: a 1 percent decrease in pay increases the enrolment rate by 1.6 percent. Considered together with the estimated supply equation, the overall effect of a 1 percent fall in youth pay is a reduction in youth labour supply of 1.1 percent – all of it indirect via increased educational participation.17 The estimate is, however, highly imprecise because the (direct) pay effect in the supply equation is not statistically significant. We noted in the previous section that the general increase in educational participation in these countries may reflect changes on the supply side, and not just those on the demand side (i.e., current unemployment) or in market prices (i.e., youth relative pay). The results are consistent with that hypothesis in that the coefficients on the time-dummy variables in the participation equation increase between 1987 and 1996. Although the increase is not statistically well defined (i.e., not significantly different from zero), it is estimated at 25.4 percent for the ten economies as a whole. Pay Adjustment. The fourth equation models the change in youth pay as a function of unemployment, based on the hypothesis that greater excess supply in a market causes a larger fall in pay. The equation also contains three widely used indicators of the strength of the constraints imposed on pay adjustment by national institutions of pay-setting: collective-bargaining coverage, trade-union membership, and the extent to which pay-setting is coordinated across employers and sectors. Higher youth unemployment is expected to cause a larger fall in youth pay. The coefficient on unemployment is negative (as expected) and statistically significant, but it is not large in absolute terms. The implications are that relative youth pay does adjust in response to excess demand and supply but that the adjustment is neither rapid nor strong. Collective-bargaining coverage – one of three potential indicators of non-competitive pay setting – proves statistically significant. Countries with greater bargaining coverage experience less pay adjustment, given the youth unemployment rate. This finding is consistent with the orthodox view of collective bargaining as an impediment to pay flexibility, in that greater coverage allows trade unions to resist pay cuts more effectively. 17

Because the coefficient on pay in the supply equation is negative, the positive estimated effect of pay on supply arises entirely from the participation equation, as reflected in the components of the combined effect: [−0.73 + (1.58∗ 1.15)].

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Reality may however be more complex. Pay flexibility may also be affected by the centralisation of pay-setting, and in the opposite direction to the effect of bargaining coverage; that is, given bargaining coverage, more centralised systems may show greater pay flexibility than less centralised ones. The difference is consistent with greater incentive to negotiators to consider the effects of their decisions on nonmembers when they bargain at more centralised levels. Such an effect has been found for the flexibility of the aggregate real wage in response to unemployment.18 There is evidence that it also applies to the flexibility of relative pay between youth and adult workers.19 However, our results are not informative on the issue. A centralisation-type variable is significantly associated with changes in youth pay (see Table 4.1). Centralisation also has the anticipated sign in equation 4 but its coefficient is not statistically significant. The theory may be wrong; alternatively, our data may simply not be rich enough to reveal this aspect of institutional effects on youth pay. Overview. The econometric results underline the need to analyse simultaneously not only the quantity dimension of youth labour market outcomes but also their price dimension and educational participation when seeking to isolate the trend in the demand for youth labour. Taking the ten economies as a whole, a substantial adverse trend in the demand for youth labour is apparent. When the changes in all noncyclical exogenous variables are incorporated, the inward shift in the demand curve amounts to 28.7 percent over an average period of 20 years. The fall in youth outcomes, in terms of relative pay and employment, does therefore represent deterioration, not just decline. However, the causes of the adverse trend cannot be determined clearly with the data available, as it is dominated by a simple time trend, without any plausible direct measure of technical change and with only a marginal contribution from the increase in international trade. The change in the output gap, which captures the effect of macroeconomic fluctuations, had a small and positive effect overall: a 2.1 percent increase in demand over twenty years. Super-cyclicality in the demand for youth labour, therefore, favoured young workers, albeit only modestly. By contrast, Blanchflower and Freeman (2000) concluded, for a slightly earlier period and using aggregate unemployment as the cyclical indicator, 18 19

Calmfors and Driffill (1988); Nickell (1997). OECD (2004).

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that super-cyclicality in the demand for youth labour had caused a major deterioration in youth labour market outcomes after the mid-1970s. The decline in demand was partially offset by a fall in supply, associated with increased educational participation (itself caused partly by the fall in demand) and a fall in youth pay. Holding constant both youth pay and demand-side effects (notably, the effect of unemployment on educational participation), the inward shift in supply over the same twenty year period averaged 13.9 percent. Around three fifths of that fall is attributed to shrinkage in the youth population share; around two fifths, to a pure time effect, which we interpret in terms of unmeasured trends in uncontrolled supply-side influences on educational participation, including an increase in the average pay difference between more and less educated adults. These results are consistent with the inference drawn from the graphical analysis in the previous section, that in most countries the fall in the demand for youth labour outstripped the fall in its supply. At the same time, it is clear that, without the contraction in relative supply, the youth labour market problem would have become even more severe. The adjustment of pay to the net decline in the demand for youth labour was weak overall. We now analyse this further by relaxing the assumption of constant rates of pay adjustment across countries. Different institutions of pay-setting may mean different rates of pay adjustment from country to country. The data are too limited to reveal credible country-specific adjustment rates. We therefore class countries into two groups – the (market) liberal and coordinated categories (see previous section), comprising respectively the English speaking and the continental European countries – and allow the effect of unemployment on pay to differ between the two groups. The difference between the results for the two country groups is statistically significant and economically striking. Figure 4.3 shows the results of a simulation of the time path of youth relative unemployment, moving to equilibrium from a common initial extent of excess supply, and with its movement depending entirely on pay adjustment. The rate of adjustment is around four times stronger in the liberal than in the coordinated group. In the former category it takes around twelve years for 90 percent of the total adjustment to occur; in the latter one, more than 50 years. Pay flexibility, therefore, is as expected: greater in the liberal than in the coordinated economies. At the same time, it is far from powerful in either group.

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185

192

187

194

Liberal 189

196 Coordinated

191

198

88

t+1

t+10

t+20

t+30

Years

Liberal Coordinated Figure 4.3. Simulation of the path of relative unemployment rate towards equilibrium by country group. Note: n = 144. The liberal group comprises Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom; the coordinated one, France, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden. The United States and Japan are excluded in view of the assumption of excess supply of youth labour and limited data validity, respectively. Institutional variables are excluded and any time-invariant institutional effects on pay adjustment are captured by country-specific dummy variables. The instrumental variables are all the exogenous and predetermined variables in the demand, supply, and participation equations. The starting years for the simulations are set at 1988 for the liberal group and 1995 for the coordinated group, thereby ensuring similar initial deviations from equilibrium in the two groups, at 0.06 and 0.05 log points, respectively. The coefficients (standard errors) on relative unemployment in the pay adjustment equation are −0.102(0.041) and −0.026(0.025); the equilibrium relative unemployment rates are 185.1 and 190.6 (5.22 and 5.25 in logarithms), for the liberal and coordinated groups respectively. The estimation results for the other equations in the model remain broadly unchanged by the respecification of the pay equation.

Conclusions We have examined trends in the situation of youths in the labour markets of advanced economies using two methods: graphical nonparametric analysis and econometric modelling. The findings of the two approaches overlap and mostly complement each other. Both approaches suggest the presence of a youth-unfriendly trend in labour demand, such as might be expected from skill-biased trends in

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production technology and international trade. The econometric analysis suggests the presence of an adverse trend in the relative demand for youth labour in advanced economies as a whole during a period that lasted eighteen years on average. The nonparametric analysis infers a fall in relative net demand – net that is of any contraction in relative supply – for eight economies over an average of eleven years, centred around 1990, but it cannot reach any conclusions for the other five economies. The econometric results suggest that the adverse effects of the downward trend in labour demand on youth pay and employment, relative to their adult counterparts, were softened by changes on the supply side and by price adjustment. The primary ‘softener’ was a contraction of youth labour supply, associated with increased enrolment in formal education, which was itself augmented by the decline in youth relative pay. Otherwise, the contribution of lower youth pay appears to have been marginal; the direct effect of youth pay on youth supply appears to be weak, if statistically ill defined, and youth pay itself responds only sluggishly to excess labour supply. At the same time, the rate of pay adjustment appears to be influenced by national institutions of pay-setting. In the English-speaking economies, the flexibility of youth relative pay is moderately high, in association with more deregulated and decentralised pay-setting. By contrast, it is low in the continental European economies, in association with a greater role for collective bargaining. National school-to-work institutions may have offset the adverse trend in labour demand in particular countries, notably Germany and Japan. The former case appears to be the better established because the econometric results suggest that a larger national apprenticeship system means greater relative demand for youth labour. Some limitations of our data and analysis render the conclusions tentative. One problem is that the average quality of young workers may have fallen, relative to that of their adult counterparts, alongside the growth in educational participation: the youth labour force has increasingly comprised the less able, motivated and advantaged members of the youth population. This factor could have caused youth relative outcomes to decline without there being any underlying deterioration for young workers of given attributes. The marked differences in the change in youth pay across countries, however, are less readily interpreted in such terms. A second difficulty is that the validity of the data on youth outcomes is not assured. This is particularly marked for Japan, for which the data on pay and employment exclude the disproportionate growth of nonregular

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employment for young workers and, consequently, overstate the change in relative pay and understate the change in relative employment.20 Finally, a further potential influence on the demand for youth labour has not been considered here: immigration. The deterioration of labour market prospects for unqualified young people in some countries, notably the United Kingdom and the United States, has been widely attributed to large-scale immigration. Immigrants, many of whom are also young, are often viewed as more motivated and attractive to employers than are native-born young people with low educational attainments. Our exclusion of this potential influence causes less concern for the periods studied here, which centre on 1980–2000, than it would for recent years. Even then, other evidence suggests that the damage to the demand for native-born youth has been done more by competition from adult labour in general than by that from immigrant labour (De Freitas, 2008).

APPENDIX Sources and Variables Sources (a) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Labour Force Survey by sex and age (b) UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks and OECD education and training database (c) Penn World Tables (d) OECD Economic Outlook database (e) OECD R&D database (f) Blanchard and Wolfers (2000)

Variables Relative employment. Employment rate of 20- to 24-year-old males as a percentage of that of 25- to 54-year-old males; Source: (a). 20

Japan’s Basic Survey of Wage Structure excludes temporary, part-time, dispatched, contract, and entrusted employment, which increased disproportionately for young workers after the late 1980s and which involves lower pay than does regular employment (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Employment Status Survey, various years; Miyamoto & Ryan, 2005).

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Relative pay. Mean (median for Belgium) earnings of 20- to 24-year-old males as percentage of those of 25- to 54-year-old males. Earnings are measured on a weekly (Australia, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the United States), monthly (Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea) or annual basis (Canada, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Sweden). Source: (a). Youth unemployment (Yunemp). Unemployment rate of 20- to 24year-old males. Source: (a). Relative unemployment (Runemp). Unemployment rate of 20- to 24year-old males as percentage of that of 25- to 54-year-old males. Source: (a). Educational participation (Educpart). Enrolment (stock) in tertiary education (ISCED 5–7) divided by the size of the population aged 20 to 24 (percent). Missing values are estimated by linear interpolation. Source: (b). Openness. Exports plus imports divided by gross domestic product (GDP); that is, total foreign trade as a percentage of national income. Source: (c). Output gap (Outgap). The deviation of actual GDP from potential GDP (percent). Source: (d). Relative youth population (Relpop). 20- to 24-year old male population as percentage of that of 25- to 54-year-old males. Source: (a). R&D spending per capita (
R&D). Change in total national spending on research and development in constant dollars (at 1995 prices and purchasing power parities), divided by total population. Sources: (e), (a). Apprenticeship (App). Apprentices (all ages) as percentage of the 20to 24-year-old cohort in particular years. Various national sources (Christopoulou, 2008). Spending on active labour market policy (ALMP). Public expenditure on active labour market assistance per unemployed person (early 1990s). Source: (f). Collective bargaining coverage (Cbcov). The share of employees covered by collective (union) bargaining (early 1990s), ranked on the scale: 3 (over 70 percent), 2 (25 to 70 percent), 1 (less than 25 percent). Source: (f). Union membership density (Unden). Trade-union membership as percentage of all wage and salary earners (early 1990s). Source: (f). Bargaining coordination (Coord). Extent of employer and union coordination in wage-bargaining (early 1990s), ranked on a scale of 1 to 3. Source: (f).

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Age groups. The adult category for Sweden and France is 35 to 44 years; for Korea, 40 to 44 years. For the Netherlands, the youth category is 25 to 29 years; the adult one 40 to 44 years.

Countries and Periods Australia Belgium Canada Finland France Germany Italy Japan Korea (South) The Netherlands Sweden United Kingdom United States Mean number of years

Figure 4.2

Table 4.4

1983–1994 1985–1994 1983–1994 1980–1990 1984–1991 1984–1993 1987–1993 1983–1994 1988–1997 1987–1995 1980–1990 1982–1993 1984–1993 10.3

1976–1998 excl. 1978–2000 1981–2000 1975–1998 1985–1998 excl. 1975–2000 excl. 1988–1996 1981–1999 1985–1996 1974–1998 19.5

Note: ‘excl.’ indicates exclusion on grounds of data inadequacies

REFERENCES

Autor, D. H., Levy, F., & Murnane, R. J. (2003). The skill content of recent technological change: An empirical exploration. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 1279–1333. Bertola, G., Blau, F. D., & Kahn, L. M. (2007). Labour market institutions and demographic employment patterns. Journal of Population Economics, 20, 833–867. Blanchard, O., & Wolfers, J. (2000). The role of shocks and institutions in the rise of European unemployment: The aggregate evidence. Economic Journal, 110, C1–C33. Blanchflower, D. G., & Freeman, R. B. (2000). Youth unemployment and joblessness in advanced countries. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research. Blau, F. D., & Kahn, L. (1999). Institutions and laws in the labour market. In O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (Eds.), Handbook of labour economics, vol. 3b (pp. 1400–1461). Amsterdam: North Holland Elsevier. Calmfors, L., & Driffill, J. (1988). Centralisation of wage bargaining. Economic Policy, 3, 13–61. Card, D., & DiNardo, J. E. (2002). Skill-biased technological change and rising wage inequality: Some problems and puzzles. Journal of Labour Economics, 20, 733–783. Card, D., & Krueger, A. B. (1995). Myth and measurement: The new economics of the minimum wage. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Christopoulou, R. (2007a). Revisiting the youth labour market problem in advanced countries. Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge.

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Christopoulou, R. (2007b). Flexibility and inequality: Changes in youth labour outcomes in advanced economies. Paper presented to XXII National Conference of Labour Economics, Economics Faculty, University of Naples. Christopoulou, R. (2008). The youth labour market problem in cross-country perspective. In. G. De Freitas (Ed.), Young workers in the global economy: Job challenges in North America, Europe and Japan (pp. 21–58). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. De Freitas, G. (Ed.). (2008). Young workers in the global economy: Job challenges in North America, Europe and Japan. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Freeman, R. B., & Katz, L. (1995). Introduction and summary. In R. B. Freeman & L. Katz (Eds.), Differences and changes in wage structures (pp. 1–22). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Goos, M., & Manning, A. (2007). Lousy and lovely jobs: The rising polarization of work in Britain. Review of Economics and Statistics, 89, 118–133. Greene, W. H. (2003). Econometric analysis, 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education. Hall, P. A., & Gingerich, D. W. (2004). Varieties of capitalism and institutional complementarities in the macroeconomy. Working Paper MPIfG 04/05. Cologne: Max-Planck Instit¨ut f¨ur Gesellschaftsforschung. Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (2001). Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Jimeno, J. F., & Rodriguez-Palenzuela, D. (2002). Youth unemployment in the OECD: Demographic shifts, labour market institutions and macroeconomic shocks. European Central Bank, Working Paper 155. Juhn, C., & Potter, S. (2006). Changes in labour force participation in the United States. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20, 27–46. Katz, L., & Autor, D. (1999). Changes in wage structure and earnings inequality. In O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (Eds.), Handbook of labour economics, vol. 3b (pp. 1463–1555). Amsterdam: North Holland Elsevier. Kosugi, R. (2008). Escape from work: Freelancing youth and the challenge to corporate Japan. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press. Krugman, P. (1994). Past and prospective causes of high unemployment. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, 79, 23–43. Levy, F., & Murnane, R. (1992). US earnings levels and earnings inequality: A review of recent trends and proposed explanations. Journal of Economic Literature, 30, 1333– 1381. McIntosh, S. (2001). The demand for post-compulsory education in four European countries. Education Economics, 9, 69–93. Merrilees, W., & Wilson, R. (1979). Disequilibrium in the labour market for young people in Great Britain. Discussion Paper No. 10, Manpower Research Group, Warwick University. Mitani, N. (1999). The Japanese employment system and youth labour market. In OECD, Preparing youth for the 21st century: The transition from education to the labour market. OECD: Paris. Miyamoto, D., & Ryan, P. (2005). The pay and employment of young workers in Japan, 1988–2003. Paper presented to Conference on Youth Employment in the Global Economy, Hofstra University, New York, September.

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5

Uncertain and Unable to Commit A Fourteen-Country Comparison of the Impact of Globalization on the Early Life Course Melinda Mills and Hans-Peter Blossfeld

Introduction Young people in industrialized nations have experienced significant changes in the transition to adulthood in recent decades. Globalization, via the (1) internationalization and importance of markets, (2) intensified competition, (3) accelerated spread of networks and knowledge via new technologies, and (4) increasing dependence on random shocks, has transformed the transition to adulthood. The purpose of this chapter is to ask to what extent these changes have influenced young people’s ability to establish themselves as independent adults when making the school-to-work transition, forming partnerships, and becoming parents. Has globalization produced a fundamental shift in the behavior of youths as they cope with increasing uncertainty about the future? How do different domestic institutions filter these transformations? This chapter develops a multilevel conceptual framework of how globalization impacts the transition to adulthood and summarizes the main results from the first phase of the international research project GLOBALIFE (Life Courses in the Globalization Process) (Blossfeld, Klizjing, Mills, & Kurz, 2005). The study includes fourteen country-specific studies, from Canada (Mills, 2005), the United States (King, 2005), Great Britain (Francesconi & Golsch, 2005), Germany (Kurz, Steinhage, & Golsch, 2005), the Netherlands (Liefbroer, 2005), France (Kieffer, Marry, Meron, & Solaz, 2005), Norway (Nilsen, 2005), Sweden (Bygren, Duvander, & Hultin, 2005), Italy (Bernardi & Nazio, 2005), Spain (Simo´ Noguera, Castro Mart´ın, & Soro Bonmat´ı, 2005), Mexico (Parrado, 2005), Ireland (Layte, O’Connell, Fahey, & McCoy, 2005), Estonia (Katus, Purr, & Sakkeus, 2005), and Hun´ gary (Robert & Bukodi, 2005). 95

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For our purposes, we defined the transition to adulthood as a stepwise process in which young people adopt specific roles and participate in certain activities. We particularly focus on the age-graded character of labor-market entry, the transition to first partnership (i.e., cohabitation or marriage), and entry into parenthood. The study of the impact of globalization during this critical and turbulent phase of the early life course is important because at this phase, youth are generally unprotected by seniority or experience and are typically “outsiders” in the labor market. For this reason, they are expected to experience more directly the recent shifts toward globalization.

Globalization and Increasing Uncertainty Globalization is an inherently complex concept. Yet, in recent years, it has become a central point of reference for the media, politicians, academics, and policy makers to understand social change. Our concept of globalization can be summarized in four interrelated structural shifts that have affected life courses in modern societies in the last two decades. These shifts, and the mechanisms that link globalization to the transition to adulthood, are summarized in Figure 5.1. First, globalization refers to the internationalization of markets and subsequent decline of national borders. It is connected with changes in laws, institutions, or practices that render various transactions (i.e., in terms of commodities, labor, services, and capital) easier or less expensive across national borders. An important consequence is that political agreements have generally liberalized financial markets (Fligstein, 1998). Some have argued that this decline of national borders undermines the authority or even heralds the fall of the nation-state (Beck, 2000; Ohmae, 1990). Our position is that the nation-state and, in particular, institutions that shape the lives of youth, do not lose their significance but rather generate countryspecific problems that call for country-specific solutions and transformations (Sassen, 1996). Internationalization of markets also means the integration of previously “isolated” nations into the world economy. Second, globalization relates to the intensification of competition – that is, the notion that capital and labor are increasingly mobile and force firms and national economies to continuously adjust. Within nation-states, this is reflected in the increased importance of governments to make their national economies internationally competitive. These policy measures include the improvement of the functioning of markets through the removal or relaxation of government regulation of economic activities (i.e., deregulation). It also suggests a shift toward relying on the price mechanism to coordinate

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GLOBALIZATION

Internationalization of markets

Intensification of competition based on deregulation, privatization, liberalization

Endogenous intensification of innovation, increasing rate of economic and social change

Spread of global networks and knowledge via new ICTs

Rising importance of markets and their dependence on random shocks

Accelerating market transactions

Increasing volatility of market

Increasing uncertainty

INSTITUTIONAL FILTERS Employment systems

Educational systems

Welfare regimes

Family systems

Channel uncertainty to specific social groups such as youth to impact: Level of unemployment, employment stability or security, flexibility

Timing and ease of labor-market entry

Safety net, active employmentsustaining policies, etc.

Level of nonmarital cohabitation, fertility postponement, etc.

MICRO LEVEL Rational decision making under increasing uncertainty Employment decisions (type of job)

Partnership decisions (type and timing)

Parenthood decisions (timing)

Figure 5.1. Globalization and increasing uncertainty in the transition to adulthood. Note: Adapted from Mills and Blossfeld (2005).

economic activities (i.e., liberalization) and a transfer to private ownership and control of assets or enterprises that were previously under public ownership (i.e., privatization). This neo-liberal shift demands efficiency, productivity, and profitability and often means a push to adjust prices, products, technologies, and human resources more rapidly and extensively (Montanari, 2001; Regini, 2000).

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A third feature of globalization is the spread of global networks of people and firms linked by information communication technologies (ICTs) such as microcomputers and the Internet. These ICTs, together with modern mass media, instantaneously transmit messages and images from the largest city to the smallest village on every continent and allow a faster diffusion of information and knowledge over long distances. ICTs increasingly allow people to share information in order to connect and create an instant, common, worldwide standard of comparison. Modern ICTs influence communications among individuals, organizations, and communities by effectively rendering physical space and distance irrelevant. Thus, although the introduction of technology is not unique in itself, recent ICTs have fundamentally altered the scope (i.e., widening the reach of networks of social activity and power), intensity (i.e., regularized connections), velocity (i.e., accelerating interactions and processes), and impact (i.e., local impacts global) of transformations (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999). Finally, globalization is inherently related to the rise in the importance and growing volatility of markets. Globalization not only accelerates the process of exchange and communication across national borders but, due to the intensification of global competition, it also increases the relevance of markets in the coordination of decisions in all modern societies. These developments inherently strengthen the worldwide interdependence of decision making. As a consequence of these structural developments, market prices and their changes increasingly convey information about the global demand for various goods, services, and assets, as well as the worldwide relative costs of producing and offering them. In a globalizing market, individual suppliers and consumers are increasingly exposed to a rising number of traders on each side of the market and become “price-takers” – that is, able to buy and sell any quantity at a price that they, in essence, cannot influence. Thus, prices produced by globalizing markets increasingly set the standards with which individuals, firms, and nation-states then try to comply. However, globalization does not only mean that actors are increasingly in the hands of anonymous global markets. What is equally important is that the changes within these markets are becoming more dynamic and less predictable. First, the globalization of markets endogenously intensifies competition among firms, forcing them to be innovative, to use new technological developments, and to invent new products. This, in turn, increases the instability of markets (Streeck, 1987). Second, modern ICTs and deregulation and liberalization measures allow individuals, firms, and governments to react faster to observed market changes and simultaneously accelerate market transactions (Castells, 1996). This, in turn, makes

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long-term developments of globalizing markets inherently more difficult to predict. Third, global prices tend to become exogenously more liable to fluctuations because worldwide supply, demand, or both are becoming increasingly susceptible to random shocks caused somewhere on the globe (e.g., major scientific discoveries, technical inventions, new consumer fashions, major political upsets such as wars and revolutions, and economic upsets). The accelerated market dynamics and the rising dependence of prices on random events happening somewhere on the globe produce a higher frequency of surprises and lead to market prices that are different to an important extent from that which people reasonably could have expected, given the restricted information available to them. In other words, the increasing dynamics and volatility of outcomes of globalizing markets render it more difficult for individuals, firms, and governments to predict the future and to choose among different alternatives and strategies. Increasing uncertainty about economic and social developments, therefore, is a definitive feature of globalization in advanced economies.

Globalization and Institutional Filters It is not essentially increasing uncertainty as such that is important if we analyze the consequences of globalization; rather, it is how rising uncertainty is “institutionally filtered” and channeled toward specific social groups in various countries. Increasing uncertainty does not impact all regions, states, organizations, and individuals in the same way. There are institutional settings and social structures – historically grown and country-specific – that determine the degree to which people are affected by rising uncertainty (DiPrete, de Graaf, Luijkx, Tahlin, & Blossfeld, 1997). These institutions have a certain inertial tendency to persist (Esping-Andersen, 1993; Nelson, 1995) and act as a sort of intervening variable between global macro forces and responses at the micro level (Hurrell & Woods, 1995; Regini, 2000) (see Figure 5.1). Thus, we do not expect that increasing uncertainty leads to a rapid convergence of life courses in all modern societies, as claimed, for example, by neo-institutionalists (Meyer, Ramirez, & Soysal, 1992) or the proponents of the modernization hypothesis (Treiman, 1970; Treiman & Yip, 1989). Rather, we claim that there are path-dependent developments within countries (Mayer, 2001; Mills, Blossfeld, Buchholz, Hof¨acker, Bernardi, & Hofmeister, 2008). The institutions with the most impact on the life course of youth are employment relations, educational systems, national welfare-state regimes, and the family.

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Employment Relations Given the specific phase of the life course, we expect that in all countries, the global increase of uncertainty is experienced more directly by youth entering the labor market. Youth are unprotected by seniority and experience, do not yet have strong ties to work organizations, and – in general – all youth entering the labor market are more exposed to global uncertainty. In contrast, we assume that global forces should have less impact on people who are already established in their career or have already gained several years of labor-force experience. However, countries also differ significantly with respect to the nature of employment relations between employers and workers, thereby making it more or less easy for youth to establish themselves in the labor market. These country-specific differences surface in elements such as types of work councils, collective-bargaining systems, strength of unions versus employer organizations, labor legislation, and administrative regulations. They produce distinct national variations of occupational structures and industries, patterns of labor–capital negotiations, strike frequencies and collective agreements on wages, job security, labor conditions, and work hours (Soskice, 1993; Streeck, 1992). How these systems diverge has been characterized as “coordinated” and “uncoordinated” market economies (Soskice, 1998), “individualist” or “collective” regimes (DiPrete et al., 1997), and “open” and “closed” employment relations (Sørensen, 1983). Based on these systems, we propose an employment-relations hypothesis regarding the early labor-market experiences of youth in various countries. We expect that the main consequences of open employment relations for young people will be (1) comparatively low economic security (e.g., wages and benefits) for most jobs; (2) an environment that fosters precarious employment and labor-market flexibility to the extent that it becomes more widespread among various social groups; (3) increased importance of individual human-capital resources; (4) relatively easy entry into the labor market; (5) unemployment of a shorter duration; and (6) a relatively high rate of job mobility (i.e., the hire-and-fire principle). The central impact of closed employment relations is expected to be that (1) precarious employment forms (e.g., fixed-term contracts and part-time work) are highly concentrated among specific groups seeking access to the labor market (i.e., youth, women, and unemployed people); (2) individual human-capital resources are less important; (3) entry into the labor force is problematic, particularly under conditions of high general unemployment; (4) unemployment is usually of a longer duration; and (5) the rate of job mobility is relatively low. Within these systems, most of the already employed workers,

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the so-called insiders – which, in most cases, are mid-career men – will be relatively shielded against the growing uncertainty and flexibility demands of the world market. Globalization in these countries tends to create a new kind of underclass of the socially excluded, whereas employed people have high levels of job security with relatively high wages, reminiscent of dual and segmented labor-market theories (Fine, 1998; Piore, 1970). In addition, we propose a labor-market–flexibility hypothesis, which contends that firms implement different types of flexibility depending on the rigidity of the employment-relations system. Not only the level or type of flexibility will differ but also the meaning and function attributed to it. Our anticipation is that in rigid closed labor markets, functional flexibility for labor-market insiders is often the primary option for employers (Mills & Blossfeld, 2005). However, for outsiders such as youth, one way to implement flexibility will be a combination of numerical–temporal flexibility in the form of fixed-term or temporary contracts. Furthermore, externalization – related to the growing number of self-employed youth not bound to a contract of employment – also may serve an increasingly important purpose (Bernardi & Nazio, 2005). Whereas more deregulated open labor markets are built on the premises of flexibility, market economic relations, and a noninterventionist state (Mayer, 2001), we expect flexibility to pervade in many forms. As new labor-market entrants, youth are a party to numerical flexibility and are often the last hired and first fired – a pattern likely to be accentuated during periods of economic recession. Educational Systems In a globalized, knowledge-based society, education and labor-force experience become the most important types of human capital. Because youth are generally lacking the latter, they have to focus on the former, which is evident in educational expansion across most of the industrialized world (Klijzing, 2005). We therefore propose a human-capital hypothesis that gauges the significance of characteristics required in all knowledge-based economies. Educational attainment and occupational standing measure human capital, which may increase with labor-force experience and age. The expectation is that those lacking human capital – such as youth with lower education, weak occupational standing, or lack of experience – will feel the impact of globalization more immensely in all modern societies. In other words, they are at a higher risk to enter a more precarious, flexible, and uncertain employment situation (e.g., fixed-term contract, part-time, or irregular hours). Conversely, those with higher education, or the “knowledge workers,” conceivably will have more favorable experiences.

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However, we expect that white-collar workers are not entirely immune to changes such as the use of temporary short-term contracts. Thus, there also may be a change for those in higher occupations or higher education. Yet, the main difference is that for them, unstable or inadequate work may serve as a bridge, whereas for lower-skilled wage-workers, it may become a trap (Bernardi & Nazio, 2005; Layte et al., 2005). Therefore, a second general expectation is that globalization accentuates or even cultivates inequality by offering better opportunities to better-educated youth and constraining the chances of less-educated youth. A related point is the degree of educational expansion in each country. When we examine the cohort-specific attendance rates across various levels of education for the fourteen countries in this study, a prolonged extension of school participation over time is evident (Klijzing, 2005). A longer stay in school works as a proxy for the degree to which the transition to economic independence has been postponed across birth cohorts in different countries. This belated timing in reaching economic independence is particularly important for our study of partnership formation and the transition to parenthood. There is a link between educational expansion and increasing youth unemployment, or an alternative-role hypothesis. This identifies a tendency among young adults to opt – if this is structurally possible in a given educational system – for the role as student instead of becoming unemployed in the process of transition from youth to adulthood. The educational system then serves as a reservoir for otherwise unemployed youth, which is increasingly significant in Southern European countries such as Italy and Spain, and there is likely a relationship to the national support systems for young adults who prefer to stay in school. Some countries, such as Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, have a more generous system of educational grants and loans, which is limited (e.g., Canada, Great Britain, France, post-1990s Estonia, and Ireland), highly insufficient (e.g., United States), or virtually nonexistent in others (e.g., Italy, Spain, Hungary, and Mexico). Welfare Regimes and the Family The impact of increasing uncertainty on social inequality among young people is strongly affected by the welfare state. Modern countries have created different welfare regimes, which imply diverse national ideologies about social solidarity (Flora & Alber, 1981) as well as gender and social inequality (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Orloff, 1996). The five welfare-regime categorizations are liberal, social-democratic, conservative, family-oriented, and post-socialistic. Differences between welfare regimes manifest in the

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priority of (1) active employment-sustaining labor-market policies (e.g., the commitment to full employment); (2) welfare-sustaining employment exit policies (e.g., support for those who are outside of the labor market such as youth, unemployed, ill, poor, family-care workers, and pensioners); (3) the scope and generosity of family allowances and services (e.g., maternity and paternity leave and child care) (Gauthier, 1996); and (4) the share of the public sector in the labor force. Together, these differences form a welfare-regime hypothesis. The expectations of the impact of each regime on the lives of youth are formulated following the description of each regime. To varying degrees, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada are viewed as liberal welfare regimes characterized by passive labor-market policies, moderate support for underprivileged people, and relatively limited public-sector employment. The comparatively high employment performance in these regimes is related to the reduction of rigidities such as union power, restrictive labor legislation, and general flexibility of the labor market. Because of these factors, our expectation is that although there will be an overall higher employment level for youth, it will be at the expense of greater inequality and poverty. This is the result of an environment of passive employment policies, a marginal safety net (e.g., limited or highly conditional unemployment benefits), and mixed (i.e., generous child allowance and limited parental leave in Ireland) or means-tested (i.e., Canada and the United States) family benefits and more exposure to the competitive private sector. Norway and Sweden, in contrast, are characteristic of the socialdemocratic welfare-regime model. Active labor-market and taxation policies in these countries are aimed at full employment, gender equality at the workplace as well as at home, and a “fair” income distribution with a high degree of wage compression. Achieving full employment is mostly attempted by a combination of Keynesian demand policies and mobility-stimulating measures such as retraining, mobility grants, and temporary jobs. The large participation of (married) women in full-time employment in these welfare regimes rests on two factors: (1) the rapid expansion of job opportunities in the service and public sector, engendered in particular by the demands of social services (i.e., kindergartens, schools, hospitals, day-care centers, and homes for the elderly); and (2) the highly progressive individual income tax, which makes a second household income necessary for most families if they want to enjoy the products of a technologically advanced service society (Blossfeld & Drobniˇc, 2001). In this welfare regime, the government tries to achieve full employment through an expanding public-service sector with relatively low wages for public employees and a high rate of female

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employment, in particular. Our expectation is that youth making the transition to adulthood in this context can fall back on a relatively generous safety net that, combined with other factors such as gender equality and full employment, better enables them to combine work with family formation (i.e., forming a partnership and becoming a parent). Germany and the Netherlands are often cited as examples of conservative welfare regimes. Social policies in these countries are not so much designed to promote employment opportunities, job mobility, and full employment by Keynesian demand policy measures as to ensure that those workers who leave employment because of job loss, disability, or, in some cases, part of an early-retirement program are protected against serious declines in living standards. Of course, this is costly and leads to tax increases, particularly during periods of high unemployment; therefore, this type of welfare regime is strongly transfer-oriented, with decommodifying effects for those who are economically inactive. It is also committed to the traditional division of labor in the family that makes wives economically dependent on their husband, often referred to as the “male-breadwinner model.” In particular, it supports wives and mothers who give priority to family activities (i.e., taking care of children and elderly relatives) and seek to work only part-time. Correspondingly, welfare-state provisions (e.g., day care) are far less developed than in the social-democratic model and female economic-activity rates are considerably lower and mostly restricted to part-time jobs (Blossfeld & Hakim, 1997). Our main prediction is that increased economic uncertainty combined with the lack of public support will impact the decision to enter parenthood for certain groups of youth who, due to an inability to combine education or labor-force participation with family careers, will increasingly postpone or even forgo parenthood (Blossfeld & Drobniˇc, 2001). France is difficult to classify because it reflects features of various welfare regimes. We place it next to the conservative regimes but expect that it will exhibit sharp contrasts due to pronatalistic policies as well as measures that promote female employment and the combination of work and family careers (Blossfeld, 1995). Southern European countries such as Italy and Spain as well as, to some extent, Mexico and Ireland, also share common features. They have developed a welfare-regime model that is best characterized as familyoriented (Guerrero, 1995). In terms of labor-market policy, support for less-privileged people, and the importance of public-sector employment, this welfare regime is similar to the liberal regime. Unlike the latter, however, it is characterized by a strong ideological and, indeed, practical involvement of family and kinship networks in protecting its members against economic

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and social risks. Due to the meager or nonexistent safety net (e.g., family support and unemployment benefits), the state shifts responsibility for support of unemployed people and other vulnerable “outsider” groups to families and kinship networks. This model is based on the deeply rooted cultural view that family and kinship represent an important institution of reciprocal help and that family members should thus support each other. Guerrero (1995) argued that the long stay of youth in the parental home in Southern Europe is “closely associated with the high labor market risks and the lukewarm protection that the state provides against them.” In reality, however, this family support is mostly provided by women, with two important consequences: (1) their labor-force participation (including part-time work), by international standards, is extremely low (Blossfeld & Hakim, 1997); and (2) especially if young women want to have a career, there is a particularly severe conflict between family tasks and (mostly fulltime) job requirements. This leads to exorbitantly low fertility levels in Spain and Italy, for example (Mills, Mencarini, Tanturri, & Begall, 2008). Thus, a paradoxical result in the family-oriented Mediterranean welfare regime appears to be that the extended family is rapidly disappearing. Finally, the post-socialistic welfare regime includes countries in the former socialist Eastern Europe, which in this study include Estonia and Hungary. However, we note that the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe have taken increasingly diverse paths. Hungary is perhaps closer to the social-democratic regime, characterized by both egalitarianism and defamilialization. There is relatively more generous support for the family – with the dual-earner family model favored by fiscal arrangements – but with a highly conditional to limited degree of support for unemployed ´ youth (Robert & Bukodi, 2005). Estonia has limited and almost nonexistent unemployment and family benefits for youth (Katus, Puur, & Sakkeus, 2005). Considering the rapid transformations after 1990 and throughout the last two decades, the trajectory of these welfare regimes is still evolving.

Micro-Level Response to Increasing Uncertainty Many decisions in the early life course have long-term implications. People have to opt for educational and professional tracks, enter job careers, and make long-term binding family and fertility decisions. However, higher levels of uncertainty for youth generate insecurity and potential conflict, rendering it increasingly difficult to make such choices. Young people respond and adapt to the complex structural shifts brought about by globalization. A central hypothesis of this study is that the uncertainty generated by

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globalization at the social–structural level reduces or delays the propensity of youth to enter long-term binding commitments such as a partnership and parenthood (see Figure 5.1). Our attention thus turns to changes in rational decision making under conditions of increasing uncertainty and descriptions of the schema developed to measure uncertainty at the individual level. Uncertainty in the Transition to Adulthood Because a main premise of this study was to either find evidence or dispute the impact of globalization on the early life course, we required an empirical research design that offered tangible findings. We therefore devised a measurement that captures our theoretical suppositions and thus is able to empirically gauge the impact of uncertainty that arises from globalization factors on individual transitions in the early life course. The schema consists of three types of uncertainty: economic, temporal, and employment relation. First, economic uncertainty is defined as the caliber of economic precariousness of an individual’s employment and educational enrollment circumstances (Bernardi, 2000). We anticipate that labor-market positions with high degrees of economic uncertainty will inhibit youth when they make long-term binding commitments such as a partnership and particularly marriage or parenthood that require a secure economic basis (Oppenheimer, 1988; Oppenheimer, Kalmijn, & Lim, 1997). Youth require a necessary minimum, or what Rindfuss and Vandenheuvel (1990) referred to as the “affordability clause,” to enter into a binding relationship or have a child. In agreement with Oppenheimer (1988), we expect that youth will avoid commitment such as marriage and parenthood but still desire the rewards of having a relationship (i.e., a consensual union). In this study, economic uncertainty is measured in four central ways. First, an activity status indicator of education and employment measures it. A second dimension is occupational class, using Erikson and Goldthorpe’s (1992) class schema. Our expectation is that compared to the higher-level service or routine white-collar classes, the lower classes such as unskilled manual workers are more likely to be in an economically precarious situation. In other words, skilled occupations (and, as we argue herein, stable employment) can reduce uncertainties (Oppenheimer et al., 1997). Whether individuals receive extra benefits with their job (e.g., a pension) is a third measure of economic uncertainty used in some of the country studies. A final measure included in several studies (e.g., France and Hungary) is earnings. Thus, the comparative yardstick to measure economic uncertainty is against the “certainty” of youth who are in a comparatively

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secure economic position. Those in a more secure status would be, for instance, those who are employed and are in higher occupational classes or having higher earnings. In some of the liberal countries, additional security means they also receive health and pension benefits as part of their job. Youth enrolled in education would have relatively higher short-term economic uncertainty, but in the long-term may benefit from obtaining a higher education. Second, according to Breen (1997, p. 477), “Temporal uncertainty reduces the attractiveness of long-term commitment and increases that of contingent asymmetric commitment.” In other words, due to temporal uncertainty, youth are less able to make long-term binding commitments that may translate, for example, into opting for cohabitation instead of marriage or forgoing partnership and parenthood until they feel they have obtained adequate certainty for their future life path (Kurz et al., 2005). Temporal uncertainty, which is measured via the presence of a temporary contract, also has a highly contingent and asymmetric basis of commitment. A temporary contract is based on a relationship in which one party of the agreement (i.e., the employer) retains the option to withdraw from the relationship at any time, whereas the other party (i.e., the youth) can only comply with that which the first party requests. Temporal uncertainty and the concept of “long-term commitment” are reminiscent of Elster’s (1979) notion of “self-binding.” To reduce choice complexity of long-term courses of action under uncertainty, individuals tend to constrain or bind their own future actions (i.e., commit themselves to a specific action in the future). Self-binding is an effective technique to make one’s promises to significant others (e.g., partners or actors in industrial relationships) more credible. This technique makes communication about what one is going to do under still unknown future conditions more reliable. According to Elster (1979), this credibility enhances the trust that actors will have in each other and enables them to interact and cooperate more effectively than without such self-binding commitments. Self-binding, however, is also paradoxical, particularly in a life phase in which the transition to adulthood takes place. On the one hand, it is a prerequisite for creating certainty for young people as well as credibility and trust in their dealings with others. On the other hand, it diminishes the ability to react in a flexible manner during later stages of the life course, which clashes with the rapidly changing demands of a globalizing society. We expect that the effects of uncertainty, however, will differ for men and women, particularly those from conservative welfare regimes. A gender hypothesis supposes that in countries where the male-breadwinner model is

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predominant, it will be more important for males to establish themselves in a more secure job than females (Oppenheimer et al., 1997). For this reason, we predict a stronger effect of uncertainty on men than on women, which will be particularly evident in the male-breadwinner countries of the conservative and family-oriented welfare regimes.

Data and Methods Our intention to search for empirical evidence to either confirm or refute the impact of globalization on the lives of youth led to the use of individualbased event-history data and longitudinal analytical methods and techniques (Blossfeld & Rohwer, 2002). The majority of data used in this study came from retrospective or longitudinal panel surveys conducted in the 1990s, which included the German Socio-Economic Panel (1984–1998); data pooled from seven retrospective life-history surveys and the Panel Study of Social Integration (1987, 1989, 1991, and 1995) for the Netherlands; and the Young People and Careers Survey (1997) for France. The Swedish analysis drew on the Swedish Level of Living Survey (1991); Norway used KIRUT (i.e., a 10 percent sample of public-register data, 1989–1996) and the Database of Generations (1950–1990). The Hungarian study employed the Way of Life and Time Use Survey (1999–2000) and the General Youth Survey (2000). Both Estonia and Spain used the Fertility and Family Survey from 1994 and 1995, respectively. The British Household Panel Survey (1991– 1999) was used for the United Kingdom; the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (1993–1998) for Canada; the National Survey of Family Growth (1995, women only) for the United States; and the National Retrospective Demographic Survey (1989, women only) for Mexico. The Italian analysis was based on the Italian Longitudinal Household Survey (1997). The Irish study used both the Irish School Leavers Survey (1987–1993 and 1992–1998) and the Follow-up of the School Leavers Survey (1992 and 1998).

Results This section summarizes key empirical findings from the fourteen countries included in this study and confronts our expectations and theoretical assumptions outlined previously. The Emergence of Uncertainty The first central finding is that in a globalizing world, youth are increasingly vulnerable to more uncertainty when making the transition into

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Table 5.1. Summary of Main Results: Rising Uncertainty in the Labor Market and Impact on Partnership and Parenthood Behavior Rising Uncertainty in Early Life Course Impact of Employment Uncertainty on Hazard of Welfare Regime and Country

Uncertain Labor Market Position for Younger Cohorts

Men

Women

Men

Women

Conservative Germany The Netherlands France

↑ ↑ ↑

↓ ↓ ↓

↑ ↑ ↑/↔

↓ ↓ ↓

↑ ↑ ↑/↓

Social-Democratic Sweden Norway

↑ ↑

↓/↔ ↓

↓/↔ ↓

↓ ↓

↓ ↓

Post-Socialistic Hungary Estonia∗

↑ ↑

↓ ↓/↔

↓ ↓/↔

↓ ↓/↔

↑ ↓/↔

Liberal Britain Canada United States♀

↑ ↑ ↑

↔ ↓ –

↑ ↓ ↓

Family-Oriented Mexico♀ Italy Spain Ireland

↑ ↑ ↑ ↓

– ↓ ↓ –

↔ ↑ ↑ ↔

Partnerships

Parenthood

↔(c) ↓(m) ↓(c) ↔(m) ↓ ↓ – ↓ – ↓ ↓ –

↔ ↑ ↑ ↔

Symbols: ↑ = increase in hazard, ↔ = no significantly observed effect, ↓ = decrease in hazard, – = not examined, ♀ = only women examined, (m) = marriage, (c) = consensual union. ∗ Analysis was not divided by gender. Note: Adapted from Mills and Blossfeld (2005).

employment across all countries. This materializes in more precarious and lower-quality employment such as fixed-term contracts, part-time or irregular work hours, and lower occupational standing (Table 5.1). This, in turn, bestows the youngest labor-market entrants with a more uncertain future. Youth, who have less labor-market experience and who are not yet shielded by internal labor markets, are more strongly exposed to the forces of globalization, which makes them the “losers” of globalization. This is in contrast to some groups, such as mid-career men, who generally surface as “winners” in the globalization process. As insiders, mid-career men, to a large extent, are shielded by labor-force experience, internal labor markets, and existing power structures. The forces of globalization, therefore, are shifted to outsiders such as youth. The fourteen studies provided evidence for youth’s increased exposure to globalization in diverse ways. Young Spanish and Italian workers

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experienced fixed-term contracts and high unemployment, whereas British and Hungarian youth are increasingly more likely to start their employment career in nonstandard temporary jobs or as self-employed workers. As Table 5.1 demonstrates, of the fourteen countries, there was only one exception: Ireland experienced an unprecedented economic boom in the 1990s that actually reduced uncertainty for youth. The increased certainty generated by the Irish “economic miracle” and its relationship to the globalization process is discussed in more detail relative to institutional filters. We found strong support for our expectation that human capital would be an important asset to protect youth against uncertainty, particularly in the more liberal welfare regimes (DiPrete et al., 1997). Empirical findings for Britain, for instance, show that education and labor-market experience protected youth from falling into unemployment (Francesconi & Golsch, 2005; King, 2005; Mills, 2005). Consequences of Uncertainty for Family Formation An uncertain educational and labor-market activity status also had clear consequences for family formation. The lowest rate of entry into fatherhood in Spain was for those men in the most uncertain position of all – the unemployed (Simo´ Noguera et al., 2005). As Table 5.1 illustrates, there were mixed findings about the impact of uncertainty for Swedish youth. Unemployment (after labor-market entry) in Sweden had no effect on union formation and parenthood, which supports our hypothesis that welfare regimes with generous benefits can cushion economic uncertainty for youth (Bygren et al., 2005). The degree of security youth possessed in their employment relationship and degree of temporal uncertainty also had real consequences for family formation. The impact of having a fixed-term contract was expected to result in higher temporal and employment-relation uncertainty, which had a particularly strong effect on men (Bernardi & Nazio, 2005; Kieffer et al., ´ 2005; Robert & Bukodi, 2005). As Table 5.1 illustrates, several patterns of the impact of uncertainty on family formation emerged in the fourteen countries. First, there are clear gender-specific effects, discussed in detail herein. Second, there was a marginal impact of labor-market uncertainty on family formation in Mexico and Ireland, albeit for different reasons. In these family-oriented regimes, partnership and fertility remained as bastions of security. Due to the relatively better economic situation brought about by globalization, Irish youth actually opted to form partnerships and have children more so than before (Layte et al., 2005). As a rational reply to uncertainty in the Mexican context, women often worked to diversify the

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source of income and spread uncertainty over a larger base in order to support the family (Parrado, 2005). Another strategy reflects the shift from more permanent marital unions to nonmarital cohabitation. In many of the countries, such as Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and – more recently – Hungary and Estonia, there has been a significant shift among adults born in and after the 1960s to choose unmarried cohabitation rather than marriage. This supports our expectation that when there is growing uncertainty about behavioral outcomes and the implications of long-term commitments, a rational reaction for youth is to choose a relationship that has less of a binding obligation. There appeared to be two general groups that have a higher propensity to cohabitate across the countries for different reasons. One group was youth with a high degree of human capital and good labor-market prospects, who likely viewed cohabitation as a flexible and nonbinding commitment that did not clash with their career. The other group was disadvantaged youth, who used it as a strategy and rational reaction to uncertainty as a flexible and nonbinding way to combine resources in the face of uncertain future labor-market success (Katus ´ et al., 2005; King, 2005; Robert & Bukodi, 2005). The final striking finding was the development of gender-specific strategies in male-breadwinner societies. The first gender-specific finding is that men in uncertain positions opted to postpone family formation (see Table 5.1). A precarious employment status or lack of human capital for men had a negative impact on entry into a partnership and especially parenthood, a finding that was exaggerated in the male-breadwinner nations (Bernardi & Nazio, 2005; Kieffer et al., 2005; Liefbroer, 2005; Simo´ Noguera et al., 2005). When we examine the findings for women, we can identify two categories: family-oriented and career-oriented. Particularly in male-breadwinner societies and conservative and family-oriented welfare regimes, certain types of women tended to enter into a marriage and have children faster (Friedman, Hechter, & Kanazawa, 1994). Here, in order to reduce uncertainty, family formation and taking the domestic role of housewife and/or mother appears to be a particular strategy for young women with less human capital. Several studies found that women who were employed part-time (e.g., Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom), at a very low starting pay (e.g., France and Hungary), or who were inactive or unemployed (e.g., Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, France, and the United Kingdom) were more likely to enter a union (often marriage) or have a child. There are perhaps three underlying reasons for the presence of the familyoriented group of women. First, worse types of jobs have few prospects for

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career advancement, which prompts women to opt for motherhood to reduce their own insecurity or as a way of giving meaning and structure to their lives. Second, these women may have been already less attached to the labor force and already found domestic life more appealing. Third, following the uncertainty-reduction theory of Friedman et al. (1994), being married and having children could serve as a strategy to reduce uncertainty, particularly among those who have limited or blocked alternatives to reduce uncertainty in another way. According to this theory, a stable and successful career is an important source of certainty for some, thereby lowering their likelihood to form a family. Those with marginal career prospects opt for certainty in the family realm, a strategy that may be particularly relevant for women in male-breadwinner societies. The second group of women adopted a different tactic and sought to obtain more individual human capital and invest in a career, which – depending on the institutional context – either enabled or constrained them to form a family. Women with more education were either less likely to experience or experienced later entry into partnerships and parenthood in countries where interdependent careers were institutionally impeded (e.g., Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain). This provides support for Becker’s (1981) theory of increased economic autonomy but only in countries where the interdependence between family and career is incompatible. This division in the gender-specific impact of uncertainty did not hold in liberal and social-democratic regimes in which the dual-earner model prevails (see Table 5.1)(Bygren et al., 2005; Mills, 2005). In Sweden, economic self-sufficiency has long been recognized as an important factor for increasing union formation for both men and women (Bracher & Santow, 1998). The high level of security afforded by the Swedish welfare state allows youth, particularly mothers, to combine work and fertility, resulting in both strong labor-market attachment coupled with high fertility rates. It is not the accumulation of human capital that is important for many women but rather the incompatibility of employment or educational and domestic roles. In many countries, entry into marriage and labor-market participation does not appear to present a conflict anymore for many young women (Blossfeld, 1995). This is likely due to the fact that the domestic division of labor does not change after entry into marriage but rather after the birth of the first child. Furthermore, highly educated women do not seem, in general, to have a lower rate of overall entry into motherhood; rather, as Blossfeld and Huinink (1991) argued, they simply postpone it. In Sweden and Norway, for example, men and women with the highest levels

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of education also had the lowest propensity to enter a first union, yet they still showed comparatively high first-birth rates after entry.

Conclusion This comparative study examined the impact of globalization on the early life course of youth in fourteen countries. A central finding is that youth have experienced increasingly higher levels of uncertainty in the school-to-work transition, which has a tangible impact on the further transition to the family spheres of partnership and parenthood. We first sketched the mechanisms that connected the globalization process to rising uncertainty in the lives of youth. Globalization was characterized by the (1) internationalization of markets; (2) rapid intensification of competition based on deregulation, privatization, and liberalization; (3) accelerated diffusion of knowledge and new ICTs; and (4) rising importance of markets and their dependence on random shocks. Together, these elements generated an unprecedented level of uncertainty that directly impacts the life course of youth. Rising uncertainty was institutionally filtered, with some groups more directly impacted than others. Institutions pertinent to transitions in the early life course include employment relations, education, welfare regime, and family systems. We then examined the micro level or individual response to these developments and found that youth develop context-specific strategies via rational decision making under conditions of uncertainty. Youth react by developing various strategies such as postponement of life events, remaining in school, engaging only in flexible relationships, and taking on multiple roles. In the male-breadwinner societies, young men and women are not only impacted differently by the uncertainty that globalization brings, but they also develop different coping strategies. The study shows that in the era of globalization, youth experience increased economic, temporal, and employment-relation uncertainty in their early labor-market career, which in turn enters into their decision to form a family.

REFERENCES

Beck, U. (2000). What is globalization? Cambridge: Polity Press. Becker, G. S. (1981). A treatise on the family. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Bernardi, F. (2000). Employment flexibility, class and risk at entry into the labor market: Patterns of early careers in Italy. GLOBALIFE Working Paper No. 7. University of Bielefeld, Germany.

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Bernardi, F., & Nazio, T. (2005). Globalization and the transition to adulthood in Italy. In H. P. Blossfeld, E. Klizjing, M. Mills, & K. Kurz (Eds.), Globalization, uncertainty and youth in society (pp. 349–374). London and New York: Routledge. Blossfeld, H. P. (Ed.). (1995). The new role of women: Family formation in modern societies. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Blossfeld, H. P., & Drobniˇc, S. (Eds.). (2001). Careers of couples in contemporary societies: From male breadwinner to dual-earner families. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Blossfeld, H. P., & Hakim, C. (Eds.). (1997). Between equalization and marginalization: Women working part-time in Europe and the United States of America. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Blossfeld, H. P., & Huinink, J. (1991). Human capital investments or norms of role transitions? How women’s schooling and career affect the process of family formation. American Journal of Sociology, 97, 143–168. Blossfeld, H. P., Klizjing, E., Mills, M., & Kurz, K. (Eds.). (2005). Globalization, uncertainty and youth in society. London and New York: Routledge. Blossfeld, H. P., & Rohwer, G. (2002). Techniques of event history modeling: New approaches to causal analysis, second edition. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum Associates. Bracher, M., & Santow, G. (1998). Economic independence and union formation in Sweden. Population Studies, 52, 275–294. Breen, R. (1997). Risk, recommodification and stratification. Sociology, 31(3), 473–498. Bygren, M., Duvander, A. Z., & Hultin, M. (2005). Elements of uncertainty in life courses: Transitions to adulthood in Sweden. In H. P. Blossfeld, E. Klizjing, M. Mills, & K. Kurz (Eds.), Globalization, uncertainty and youth in society (pp. 135–158). London and New York: Routledge. Castells, M. (1996). The rise of the network society. The information age: Economy, society, and culture, Volume I. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. DiPrete, T. A., de Graaf, P. M., Luijkx, R., Tahlin, M., & Blossfeld, H. P. (1997). Collectivist versus individualist mobility regimes? Structural change and job mobility in four countries. American Journal of Sociology, 103(2), 318–358. Elster, J. (1979). Ulysses and the Sirens. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Erikson, R., & Goldthorpe, J. H. (1992). The constant flux: A study of class mobility in industrial societies. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Esping-Andersen, G. (1993). Post-industrial class structures: An analytical framework. In G. Esping-Andersen (Ed.), Changing classes (pp. 7–31). London: Sage Publications. Esping-Andersen, G. (1999). Social foundations of postindustrial economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fine, B. (1998). From dual to segmented labour markets theory: Labour market theory. London and New York: Routledge. Fligstein, N. (1998). Is globalization the cause of the crises of welfare states? European University Institute Working Paper SPS No. 98/5, San Domenico, Italy. Flora, P., & Alber, J. (1981). The development of welfare states in Western Europe. In P. Flora & A. J. Heidenheimer (Eds.), The development of welfare states in Europe and America (pp. 37–80). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Francesconi, M., & Golsch, K. (2005). The process of globalization and transitions to adulthood in Britain. In H. P. Blossfeld, E. Klizjing, M. Mills, & K. Kurz (Eds.), Globalization, uncertainty and youth in society (pp. 249–278). London and New York: Routledge.

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III INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING

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‘It Was Not My Choice, You Know?’ Young People’s Subjective Views and Decision-Making Processes in Biographical Transitions Andreas Walther

Introduction There is a broad spectrum of empirical evidence showing that young people’s transitions from school to work are structured by class, education, gender, ethnicity, and region. Recently, increasing scientific attention has been given to the biographical aspects of youth transitions. The notion of ‘structured individualisation’ refers to the fact that individuals have access to different resources and opportunities in navigating through their lives, while social inequalities are being increasingly reproduced through individual decision making, such as whether to continue with education or to drop out at an early stage (Ball, Maguire, & Macrae, 2000; du Bois-Reymond & Chisholm, 2006; European Group for Integrated Social Research, 2001; Furlong & Cartmel, 1997; Henderson, Holland, McGrellis, Sharpe, & Thomson, 2006). Moreover, consequences of social inequality have changed. The implications of social inequality now reach beyond young people being allocated to different careers depending on their social status. Increasing risks of social exclusion imply that transitions can also fail (Castel, 2000). The view of institutional actors tends to reduce transitions exclusively to the achievement of educational qualifications and to labour-market entry. They ascribe success and failure in this respect to individuals’ responsibility and rationality in making decisions regarding education, training, and job search. Recently, this has been reflected by a policy trend towards activation aimed at influencing individuals’ adaptive behaviour (Harsløf, 2005; Lødemel & Trickey, 2001; McNeish & Loncle, 2003; Pohl & Walther, 2007; Serrano, 2004; van Berkel & Møller, 2002). This perspective is reflected and partly reproduced by transition research, which focuses on the question, 121

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‘Who gets how far?’, within existing transition systems. This perspective looks specifically at the effects of social mobility through education or at the structural factors contributing to uncertain trajectories and unemployment (Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997; Hammer, 2003; Shavit & M¨uller, 1998). While such perspectives are necessary and fruitful for the analysis of persisting structures of social inequality in youth transitions, they fail to explain how they influence and interact with young people’s subjective motivation. This chapter is concerned with understanding how young people make decisions in their transitions from school to work. It focuses on the biographical aspects of their decision-making processes, that is, the subjective meaning that certain options and their conditions have for them. The underlying qualitative findings reviewed in this chapter result from the following two European projects carried out within the framework of the European Group for Integrated Social Research (EGRIS) network: r Youth Policy and Participation (YOYO) (2001–2004) was concerned with

young people’s motivational careers relative to their transitions to work and the potential of participatory approaches for enhancing motivation. In country reports, the national transition systems were described. In individual and focus-group interviews, young people were asked to elaborate on their transition experiences (N = 365). In twenty-eight case studies, projects addressing youth transitions were analysed using document analysis, expert interviews (N = 140), and a second round of interviews with most of the young people (N = 290) (Walther, du Bois-Reymond, & Biggart, 2006). r Families and Transitions in Europe (FATE) (2001–2004) investigated the role of families in youth transitions in terms of support and dependency. The study consisted of country reports and an institutional survey with young people (N = 1,800) at the end of their education or training (i.e., quota sample). Then, in each of the nine regions, approximately forty qualitative interviews (N = 360) were conducted with young people and thirty of their parents (N = 270) (Biggart & Kovacheva, 2006). This chapter reviews findings from the two studies exploring the complexity of young men and women’s decision making and coping in transitions to work and the varying scopes of action within different institutional contexts. The chapter begins with a discussion about the destandardisation of transitions, the biographical dilemmas that this implies for young people, and their motivation for making career decisions. Four central modes of agency then are presented which are seen as key requirements for coping with

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destandardised transitions: choice, keeping options open, reconciliation, and self-presentation. From the level of individual biographies, the perspective shifts to an international comparison of transition systems, or transition regimes, across Europe. Different institutional contexts are analysed as to what extent they provide possibilities for biographical agency. Finally, it is argued that transition research should integrate these different perspectives to overcome the risk of reducing youth transitions to simple successes or failures with regard to predefined and linear trajectories.

Destandardisation of Youth Transitions: From Linear Passages to Yo-Yo Movements Since the 1970s, economic flexibilisation and the increase of individual qualifications, especially among young women, have contributed to a destandardisation of life courses. In particular, the transitions of youth have been affected by the decoupling of education from employment (Marshall, Heinz, Krueger, & Verma, 2001). Transitions are prolonged due to longer education and training programmes but also due to longer job searches and periods of unemployment. They have also become reversible because steps towards independence may have to be taken back: in cases of unemployment, partnership breakup, or another option appearing to be more attractive. Moreover, transitions have become fragmented, considering that housing transitions, family transitions, partnership transitions, citizenship transitions, and lifestyle transitions are no longer a direct consequence of the school-to-work-transition but rather have their own individual rhythm and logic. Compared to the Fordist assumption of linear status passages, the reversibility and fragmentation of transitions can be characterised using a metaphor of the ‘yo-yo’. This analogy fits well because increasingly more young people find it difficult to associate themselves exclusively with youth or adulthood. Instead, they see themselves somewhere in between, as described by this young German woman (EGRIS, 2001; Walther et al., 2002): I am not adult because of my financial dependency which hinders me from living my own life. But, of course, as regards to my development, I am adult! (R., thirty-one, female, Germany, FATE).

Destandardisation also refers to a diversification of transitions. Although for many young people, work and family continue to represent key elements

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of their life plans, their trajectories can change underway, as declining birth rates suggest. The YOYO study identified a range of different transition patterns (Evans, 2002) among the young people who were interviewed (Walther et al., 2006), as follows: r Smooth transitions without major interruptions, which are in line with r

r

r

r

r

the institutional logic, can be found on all educational levels but they are increasingly less frequent, especially among unskilled youth. Upward mobility corresponds to institutional promises of equal opportunities but requires additional motivation to accept longer routes and to leave behind familiar social contexts. Institutionally repaired transitions characterise transitions with interruptions (e.g., early school-leaving or unemployment) which have then been overcome by remedial intervention. Alternative transitions depart from the institutional logic (at least, partially) due to subjective identification with individually created trajectories, such as dropping out from higher education to enter into selfemployment. Stagnant transitions describe cases in which progress is blocked by interruptions and in-and-out movements reinforcing both risks of social exclusion and disengagement. Downward or damaged transitions are characterised by the accumulation of risks in different areas of life, thereby leading to and increasing marginalisation.

Because the method of theoretical sampling was applied in the YOYO study, there is no information about the distribution according to socioeconomic status and national context. Nonetheless, the findings may serve as an exploratory device for potential representative and longitudinal research of young people’s trajectories into adulthood. Moreover, the typology is relative inasmuch as it reflects the diversification of transitions in relation to national assumptions of normality and standard trajectories from school, training, into employment. It reveals the increase of nonlinear transition patterns. The more distant these patterns are from the respective standard life course, the more risks they bring which are not covered by education or welfare. At the same time, the diversity of transition patterns implies that they do not depend on structural forces alone but are also mediated by individual agency and decision making. In increasingly more situations, individuals are confronted with the need to make decisions, and they are increasingly alone in making them because their trajectories differ from

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those of their parents as well as their peers. What applies for one may not apply for another, at least with regard to individual moments of decision making. The ‘biographisation’ of the life course implies that individuals have to constantly assess the fit between their subjective needs and interests and the external demands and possibilities by asking: What does a certain option mean for me? (Alheit & Dausien, 2002; Henderson et al., 2006). Therefore, destandardised transitions confront young men and women with a ‘planning paradox’ (Stauber & Walther, 2006): the lack of a reliable prescribed pathway requires them to make their own life plan, the viability and end result of which, however, are highly uncertain (see Chapters 5 and 10 in this volume). One key factor of successful transition may be the biographical competence, or ‘biographicity’, to reflect on and make decisions which are both meaningful and viable (Alheit & Dausien, 2002). Another factor is the subjective motivation of young people to make a decision between more than one option or to make any decision at all. Without understanding how young people perceive their situation and arrive at certain decisions, institutional gatekeepers tend to disregard their coping strategies and categorise them as solely deviant or harmful.

Excursus: Motivational Careers in Biographical Transitions Different approaches in motivation psychology may be summarised by highlighting the relevance of two main factors in understanding and explaining individual motivation. The first factor is the subjective incentive to strive toward a certain goal, which results from a fundamental need or subjective interest (Heckhausen 1991; Krapp, 2002; Maslow, 1970; Vygotskij, 1962). Within the field of motivation psychology, there is general consensus in distinguishing intrinsic and extrinsic motivation according to internal or external incentives. Intrinsic motivation refers to an activity that is done for its own sake; it provides meaning and authenticity for the actor and is self-determined (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Extrinsic motivation relates to indirect effects of activities, particularly when imposed by somebody else. When adapted to transition decisions: Do I want to work as a carpenter because I enjoy woodworking (intrinsic motivation), because there are no other jobs available, I need the money, or otherwise I lose my entitlement to benefits (extrinsic motivation)? It is obvious that extrinsic motivation is less sustainable because it decreases as soon as the indirect effects are achieved or the external pressure decreases (Bandura, 1977).

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The second important factor in understanding motivation is the subjective belief in one’s own ability to reach a goal. Does a person locate the control over his or her experiences inside or outside of himself or herself? Does he or she have a sense of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997)? Motivation is not static but rather dynamic and process-oriented. It develops in terms of motivational careers, a concept adopted in analogy to the one of ‘learning careers’ which ‘constrain and . . . enable future experiences’. They are composed of . . . events, activities and meanings, and the making and remaking of meanings . . . and of relationships and the constant making and remaking of relationships. (Bloomer & Hodkinson, 2000, pp. 589–590)

Experiences can either reinforce initial directions of such careers towards motivation or demotivation, or they can represent critical moments of motivational change, in which an individual either discovers (or loses) interest for a certain activity or experiences, or an increase (or decrease) in relevant resources or competence. Motivation is not only a personal disposition; rather, it evolves from experiences within social contexts. The fact that access to subjectively meaningful goals as well as to resources, skills, and experiences of control are interrelated with social structure justifies the reference to a social inequality of motivation (Ahl, 2006; Henderson et al., 2006; Walther et al., 2006). With regard to the transition patterns, one may argue that alternative transitions are specifically characterised by a high level of intrinsic motivation. However, this is also a crucial prerequisite for repaired transitions because they depend on one actively taking second-chance opportunities. Smooth transitions require either (1) a low level of motivation if the relationship between career aspirations and qualifications is balanced; or (2) enormous motivation to compensate for a lack of resources or increasing demands. High motivation, however, tends to be taken for granted and thereby often goes unnoticed in cases of success. Even stagnant transition patterns may hide considerable individual efforts, which are constantly frustrated by structural constraints (e.g., a lack of jobs) (Walther et al., 2006). Arguably, under conditions of destandardisation, individuals need more intrinsic motivation to navigate their transitions towards an uncertain future. Institutional actors such as employment-service officers or representatives of education and training programmes tend to interpret this in terms of ‘rational choice’, referring to an economic and profit-oriented interpretation of individual decision making (Becker, 1976). On the one hand, young people are often addressed as thinking too much in economic terms if they

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refuse a job or a place in a training program which offers little monetary reward. On the other hand, young people are expected to think more economically when it comes to investing in education. Goldthorpe’s adaptation of rational choice to a sociological model of ‘rational action’ extended the rationality inherent to individual decision making to subjective rationalities, while also taking into account the constraints and restrictions regarding resources and opportunities (Goldthorpe, 2000). However, in its application to the analysis of educational decisions (Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997) the model proves to be one-dimensional and static rather than open for the complexities and dynamics of modern biographies (Cruickshank, 2000). Although this understanding of individual decision making as resulting from subjective rationality is certainly plausible, the methodological individualism underlying models of rational choice or rational action neglect the interaction between structure and agency in the emergence of needs, interests, and preferences (Giddens, 1984; Parker, 2000). Moreover, the models fail to explain what is perceived as subjectively relevant in a specific ‘decision-making moment’. In fact, young men and women in transition often find it impossible to quantify their needs and interests so as to bring them into a clear hierarchy of preferences. Feeling forced to prioritise among demands from different life spheres which are at times contradictory, young people are confronted with biographical dilemmas, which may result from contradictory external demands – for example, whether to increase qualifications, enter the labour market, or to choose from options that neither meet subjective interests nor guarantee labour-market integration. In particular, when barriers resulting from inequality and discrimination are added to past experiences of failure, biographical dilemmas may result in a generalised demotivation and lead to a feeling of not having any choice at all (Leccardi, 2005; Pais, 2003; Walther et al., 2006). A concept which appears more appropriate for understanding decision making in such biographical dilemmas is the concept of coping. Originally developed with regard to individuals’ attempts to maintain or regain active control in critical life events (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), coping has been extended to everyday life management and self-identity in terms of having a ‘sense of coherence’ under conditions of uncertainty and risk (Antonovsky, 1987; Keupp et al., 1999). B¨ohnisch (2001) conceptualised biographical coping as the interaction between subjective motivation and structurally accessible resources and opportunities. It is argued that young people’s coping strategies provide access to understanding their motivation and decision-making processes in destandardised transitions.

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Agency and Biographical Dilemmas in Destandardised Transitions If one looks into quantitative or qualitative studies on the values that young people attach to work, which may be regarded as their initial motive in transition, two key findings seem to represent a rather general trend across different European contexts. First, most of their life plans are still oriented towards the standard biography from school, training, to employment. Second, in contrast to public stereotypes, nonmaterial aspects such as social contacts, self-realisation, and the actualisation of one’s own potential are the highest values. Where an instrumental meaning of work prevails, it relates to realising a standard biography rather than to exaggerated income aspirations (Eurobarometer, 2007; German Shell, 2006; Henderson et al., 2006; Walther et al., 2006): It should be a job which I look forward to when I get up in the morning . . . Of course, money is important. You cannot live without it, sure. But I prefer a company where the atmosphere is OK and that work is fun. (O., male, twenty-three, Germany, YOYO)

However, such general orientations have to prove their validity in concrete biographical situations – that is, in biographical dilemmas in which they compete with often-contradictory demands from other life spheres. In the following discussion, a set of modes of agency is presented which has been identified in previous research (Walther, 2000) and can be reconstructed from the FATE and the YOYO interviews. These modes do not represent different coping strategies as such but rather principles inherent to the coping strategies of young people confronted with destandardised transitions – in other words, conditions which individual coping strategies have to meet in order to provide a subjective sense of coherence. Choice. A first principle in the coping strategies of young men and women is their belief in their right to choose. First, choice is part of the cultural foundations of individualised late-modern societies, whether one sees them as democracies or as consumer societies. Second, individuals are continually asked to choose and decide for themselves because collective patterns of life planning are no longer available. Third, individuals know that they ultimately will be responsible for their decisions. Finally, under conditions of individualisation and uncertainty, identification with biographical decisions becomes even more important (Ball, Maguire, & Macrae, 2000; Bauman, 1995; Evans, 2002). As to the emergence of ‘choice biographies’ (du Bois-Reymond, 1998), choice is also crucial with regard to work. Here, however, the level of income is not the most important criterion; in fact,

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money only becomes dominant when there is a need to compensate for second-choice careers or when nonmaterial aspects such as social and communicative qualities and ‘fun’ are absent. This is often interpreted mistakenly as a superficial and hedonistic orientation of young people. A closer look, however, reveals that it is the young people’s cultural expression of self-realisation and authenticity: I would like to do something that is fun. That is important. That’s what work means for me. (S., female, twenty-four, Germany, YOYO)

The mere fact of having a choice proves to be as important as specific qualities of work. Decisions which appear as irrational and as contributing to marginalisation, such as dropping out of school or withdrawing from institutional support (i.e., the so-called status zer0 youth), need to be interpreted as active choices made by those who feel they have no real choice but still need to maintain a self-concept as authors of their life history (Williamson, 1997): It wasn’t my choice, you know?. . . . In fact, I didn’t have any choice . . . and at a certain point, you do not see any sense in continuing applying for training or jobs. (I., male, nineteen, Germany, YOYO)

Keeping options open. Another requirement of coping strategies, which results from the fact that available resources and life-course trajectories often neither correspond to young people’s original interests nor guarantee their viability in the future, is that they allow one to keep options open. Yet, for most young men and women, this is the only option available. As a result, they do not engage wholeheartedly in formal pathways in order to remain flexible in case other opportunities arise which correspond more to their own interests – or if the institutional career promises do not materialise. Keeping options open is a response to both the individualisation and flexibilisation of transitions. It corresponds to the fact that postmodern identity work, as Bauman (1995) stated in contrast to modern concepts, means to keep the identity fluid and open for change rather than aiming for stability (du Bois-Reymond, 1998). This, however, makes it more difficult to motivate oneself to take advantage of the available resources, such as education or training: I still feel torn, I don’t know yet what I really do want for the next years. . . . For the next months, I am doing theatre; perhaps something

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Andreas Walther will come up . . . but I haven’t taken any concrete decisions for myself. (S., female, twenty-two, Germany, YOYO)

Reconciliation. Another aspect related to the fragmentation of life-course transitions and the fact that not all transitions result directly from labourmarket entry is that work-related coping strategies need to be reconciled with other demands. Transitions in different life spheres are decoupled from each other and pose different demands, which have to be coped with individually (Thomson et al., 2002). Reconciliation tends to be seen as a demand related to family and work, particularly in the female life course: I am responsible for my brother. His mother died and I slipped into this role. That makes me feel more adult. . . . Once he completes his apprenticeship, I will do my own things. . . . You need to be an egoist. (N., female, twenty-six, Germany, YOYO)

Provided that most young women anticipate the burden of reconciliation, the choice of careers referred to as typically female points to the fact that other occupations do not allow for the double socialisation that characterises female life courses. This is often neglected by institutional actors who are concerned with increasing female participation in typically male professions. In a more general perspective, however, reconciliation is not only a demand in female life courses. In a concrete situation, it is no longer easy to decide whether a qualification, quick money, family obligations, a partnership, or standards of peers are more important. Often, transitions imply decisions which from an institutional or economic perspective do not necessarily appear as rational (Henderson et al., 2006). Self-presentation. The demand of reconciliation therefore also relates to the relationship between career and one’s cultural image or lifestyle. Identification with a certain life plan or an occupational choice requires one to imagine oneself as a man or a woman in the future – and that one likes the picture emerging from this imagination (Goffman, 1959). Standard biographical blueprints increasingly allow less for such imagination and contradict the images developed in peer cultures and those displayed in the media. Moreover, under conditions of uncertainty, the perpetually gendered identity questions – Who am I? Who do I want to be? – need to be constantly posed anew. Coping strategies, therefore, must allow for self-presentation, or the ‘staging’ of one’s own self, so that individuals can experiment with developing their own lifestyle and receiving feedback from others during the processes of identity work (Stauber, 2004): We were sitting with the friends and I said that I had found an apprenticeship. The others: As what? Me: Road works. The others: Oh, shit. Me:

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Guys, that’s what I thought in the beginning. But it is not that bad. You do not only stand there with the shovel. . . . You also have to use your brains. (M., male, nineteen, Germany, YOYO)

It is obvious that even with sufficient resources, there are no reliable or predictable ways to put these principles into practice and to reconcile them with the demands of the formal transition system. In fact, according to Bonß and Zinn (2004), individuals under conditions of uncertainty rely increasingly on what seem to be irrational criteria in decision making: advice from trusted rather than expert advisors (see Chapter 7 in this volume), the ‘feeling’ that a specific option stimulates, or avoidance criteria such as luck: Some of the people in this (prevocational) course made it into an apprenticeship . . . if you were lucky enough, I simply wasn’t, but some of us were. (I., male, nineteen, Germany, YOYO)

At the same time, it is obvious that young men and women with higher qualifications, more affluent family backgrounds, and stronger social networks, which are both dense and widespread, have fewer difficulties with constructing their biographies according to these principles. They follow smooth or upward transition patterns or they feel self-confident enough to opt for alternative transitions, knowing that in case of failure, they still have the chance to reorient towards more conventional careers. One question, however – apart from socioeconomic structures – is whether variations in institutional arrangements also account for differences in this regard. Although the qualitative data of the YOYO and FATE studies do not allow for a cross-national analysis of distribution of transition patterns, motivation, and modes of agency inherent to young people’s coping strategies, comparative analysis of national transition systems may indicate to what extent different institutional arrangements are more favourable for coping strategies based on these principles.

Varying Scopes for Biographical Agency in Different Transition Regimes Across Europe One might argue that coping with destandardised transitions is easier within institutional transition structures that provide alternative options to choose from and identify with, that are flexible enough for individual biographical patchworks, and that provide all young people with the material and immaterial resources they need. It is suggested that international comparison can provide insight into whether different ways of shaping youth transitions – in

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terms of structuring education, training, and welfare support – allow for different scopes of biographical agency. In comparing transition structures, one may start from EspingAndersen’s seminal ‘three worlds of welfare capitalism’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Whereas comparative welfare research focuses on differences in compensating for a loss of income from paid work, the notion of ‘regimes’ in a more general perspective refers to different forms of institutionalising the roles of state, market, and family in regulating the relationship between society and an individual. Regimes result from historical processes and mechanisms of path dependency and show considerable stability over time. Based on the relationship between individual entitlements and collective demands, welfare regimes stand for ‘climates of normality’ which also influence biographical orientations and which therefore also can be interpreted as ‘life-course regimes’ (Lessenich, 1995). The regime model implies a generalisation in terms of ideal types, whereas differences between countries of the same regime type are just as neglected as the fact that national transition systems contain traits of all regime types – but just to different extents. Rather than describing specific national systems, groups of countries are clustered according to overall rationales in regulating the life course. In the following discussion, reference is made to the modification of Esping-Andersen’s model by Gallie and Paugam (2000), who distinguish four welfare regimes according to their regulation of access to social security: the universalistic regime in the Scandinavian countries, the liberal regime representing the Anglo-Saxon countries, the employment-centred regime of Continental Europe, and the sub-protective regime type of the Mediterranean countries (see also Chapter 5 in this volume). It is obvious that the interpretative value of such a model is primarily heuristic. It may help in the selection of countries to be compared and it may simplify the interpretations of differences. However, ongoing comparative analysis is needed for it to adapt to changing realities such as those resulting from destandardisation or those following the global trend towards activation policies. Thus far, the typology is limited to Western Europe; Central and Eastern European countries can neither be included into existing regime types because their socialist heritage prevails in specific norms (e.g., regarding female employment), nor do they form a single ‘post-socialist’ regime because the dynamics of transformation lead to increasingly heterogeneous policies (Walther & Pohl, 2005). To apply a typology of welfare regimes to the comparison of youth transition contexts, it needs to be extended. Although social security remains

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important, structures of education and training also need to be considered, especially with regard to dimensions of stratification and standardisation (Allmendinger, 1989). Likewise, it is necessary that the relationship of education and training to concepts of work and structures of labour-market entry (M¨uller & Gangl, 2003), also as far as gender is concerned, be considered (Sainsbury, 1999). Such structures are reflected by the particular design of programmes for unemployed youth. Underneath such policies, dominant interpretations of ‘disadvantaged youth’ emerge according to the ascription of transition problems to either individual deficits or structures of labour-market segmentation. Such cultural patterns also influence individual biographical processes. In fact, different transition structures are reflected in young people’s narratives about their transition experiences. In the following discussion, the main traits of four transition regimes are summarised (Table 6.1) (McNeish & Loncle, 2003; Walther, 2006; Walther et al., 2006; Walther & Pohl, 2005). The universalistic transition regime in Nordic countries such as Denmark is based on an inclusive education system. Four out of five school-leavers earn certificates which give them access to higher education. Although education and training are standardised, they are flexible and allow for individual learning plans. At the welfare level, individual rights are based on citizenship status and embedded in collective social responsibility. The right to social assistance applies to young people from the age of eighteen onwards, regardless of the socioeconomic situation of their families. If they participate in formal education or training, they receive an educational allowance. The employment regime is characterised by an extended public sector, which goes along with broad access options and high rates of female employment. Due to generous public childcare, young women do not have to anticipate a high burden of reconciling family and work. In the broad sense of personal development, education is the focus of transition policies. Counselling is widely institutionalised throughout all stages of education, training, and transition to employment and is primarily orientated so as to reinforce an individual’s motivation. Whereas disadvantage refers to individuals not being ready to engage in an individualised choice biography, most second-chance measures aim at (re-)opening access to established and respected options rather than forcing an individual to scale back his or her aspirations and adapt to low-status careers. Although the scope of labourmarket programmes has recently started to narrow, their activation is based on a broad understanding of being active and having choice as central for individual motivation. In general, individualised education and welfare options encourage and support young adults in experimenting with yo-yo

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Denmark

Germany Netherlands

United Kingdom Ireland

Universalistic

Employmentcentred

Liberal

School

Training State

State/ family

Not Low Family selective standards and coverage

Not Flexible, low selective standards

Selective Standardised State/ family

Not Flexible selective standards

Closed High risks Informal work

Open High risks

Closed Risks at the margins

Open Low risks

Low

High

Medium

High

Without distinct status

Early economic independence

Adaptation to social positions

Personal development Citizenship

Social Employment Female Concept of Security Regime Employment Youth

Segmented labour market, lack of training

Culture of dependency

Disadvantage (deficit model)

‘Not foreseen’

Focus of Transition Policies

Structurerelated

Individualised

Individualised

‘Some’ status (work, education, or training)

Employability

(Pre-) vocational training

Mixed Education (individualised/ Activation structurerelated)

Concept of Youth Concept of Unemployment Disadvantage

Notes on methodology: Classification is based both on comparative literature on welfare, education, and training, and activation policies, as well as own research. Sources include national reports on the institutional structures prepared for the YOYO and FATE projects, the expert interviews within the study ‘Integration through Training? (funded under the Leonardo da Vinci programme 1999–2001 [see McNeish & Loncle, 2003]), and the analysis of programme descriptions within the Thematic Study on Policy Measures Concerning Disadvantaged Youth carried out for the European Commission’s Directorate General for Employment and Social Affairs (Walther & Pohl, 2005).

∗

Sub-protective Italy Spain Portugal

Countries

Regime

Table 6.1. Transition Regimes Across Europe∗

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transitions – as long as it is done within the system. Some young people experience this as natural: It is my education, and I have to use it for something, so I have to work it out . . . it is me who decides. (M, female, eighteen, Denmark, YOYO)

Others realise the freedom of choice they have: A lot of students did that: changed their plans. This shows that you have matured and developed . . . and then it is good that you can change it. (F., female, nineteen, Denmark, YOYO)

The liberal transition regime model predominates in the United Kingdom – is less accentuated in Ireland – and values individual rights and responsibilities more than collective provisions. In most parts of the United Kingdom, schooling is largely organised comprehensively until the age of sixteen, whereas in Ireland, differentiated routes exist. In recent decades, post– compulsory education and training programmes have greatly diversified and moved towards a more flexible system, with a variety of entrance and exit options. This system has replaced a situation in which, until the early 1980s, the majority of young people would directly enter the labour market after leaving school at the age of sixteen. Since then, labour-market flexibilisation has facilitated the shift from manufacturing towards service jobs, with significant increases in female employment, but also in precarious work. Although benefit entitlements are tied to citizenship status, the level of benefits is low, increasingly limited in time, and conditional on an active job search. Thus, universal access to welfare coincides with a highly individualised responsibility for one’s own life course and an individualised attribution of disadvantage to a culture of welfare dependency, which some young people – in the sense of a self-fulfilling prophecy – have internalised: Being on benefits for three years, I had begun to lose sight of my personal goals. I was afraid to come off benefits, to go back to work; afraid to set goals but, most of all, afraid to fail. (L., female, twenty-three, United Kingdom, YOYO)

In youth-unemployment programmes, immediate labour-market entrance is still the main goal, whereas education and training options are often short-term and lack reliable quality standards: You fill in forms . . . and then you hear nothing, unless they have a proxy job going where there’s no money and you’re treated like a slave. (J., male, eighteen, Ireland)

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Activation policies like the New Deal for Young People can be characterised as ‘workfare’ in the sense that they are primarily a means to control and apply pressure with regard to an individual’s active job search. After a gateway phase for orientation, job seekers have to choose among subsidised employment, training, voluntary, and environmental engagement. If they do not comply, sanctions are put into place. In the context of the liberal transition regime, yo-yo transitions result from the flexibility of education and employment and from the risks that young people encounter. In summary, recent trends in youth transitions can be interpreted as public investments in preparing individuals for becoming self-responsible ‘entrepreneurs’ of their own labour force (see Chapter 7 in this volume). The employment-centred transition regime accounts for Continental European countries such as Germany and the Netherlands; the latter represents a hybrid of liberal and universalistic traits. In this regime type, school is organised more selectively, allocating the younger generation towards specific occupational careers and social positions. As a consequence, in Germany, only one third of school-leavers hold an education certificate which makes them eligible for higher education. Vocational training, which can be company-based (e.g., the dual-apprenticeship system in Germany) or mixed (e.g., in the Netherlands), plays a central role. It is relatively standardised and thus reproduces a highly regulated employment regime which, in Germany, is linked to the normative concept of work as ‘vocation’. Labour markets are divided into a highly standardised and protected core – with women clearly underrepresented – and precarious peripheries; a particular phenomenon in this regard is the Dutch part-time labour market. Whereas young people in the Netherlands are automatically entitled to benefits, this is not the case in Germany, where social security distinguishes between a high level of compensation for those included in social insurance and a residual social-assistance system. Therefore, activation policies are still limited in scope and coverage. They mainly function as mechanisms to recruit job seekers for a narrow range of measures, which does not allow for choice: It [the Employment Service] . . . is an administration, after all. They are not in the mood for working. Just staring into your file, going blah, blah, treating you like a cow. (O., male, twenty-three, Germany, YOYO)

Disadvantage and youth unemployment are interpreted as young people not being ready for this socialisation and allocation process because of learning or social deficits (e.g., in Germany, those failing to enter regular training are referred to as ‘not [yet] trainable’). Separated prevocational

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measures aim at compensation for these deficits – often, without providing any form of income – rather than leading to regular qualifications or jobs. Yo-yo transitions in this regime mean that young adults are torn between restricted options for individual choice and strong demands and implications of standard trajectories, a process of reconciliation which they have to pursue individually against the normative power of institutional facts: Yes, in secondary school you get pressure. They always tell you, you must have vocational training, training, training; without it, you will never make it. . . . Many only because of pressure . . . start some vocational training. (J., female, twenty-one, Germany, YOYO)

The sub-protective transition regime applies primarily to Southern European countries such as Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Due to the low share of standard work arrangements and the high rate of unprotected living conditions, the family and informal work play a significant role. School is structured comprehensively and many achieve upper-secondary certificates. Nevertheless, until recently, the rate of early school-leaving in order to work was high, as exemplified by the phenomenon of child labour (especially in Portugal). Vocational training is not well developed and mainly provided by professional schools, and the involvement of companies is low. Due to the economic weakness of many regions and the orientation of labour law towards (male) breadwinners, youth transitions are structured by a long waiting phase during which young people depend primarily on their families. Not entitled to social benefits, they engage in precarious jobs – either in the informal economy, such as in Italy, or in fixed-term contracts, which are extremely prevalent in Spain. Labour-market segmentation and a lack of training contribute to high rates of youth unemployment, which particularly affect young women. Higher education plays an important role in providing young people with a status in this waiting phase, although many either drop out before reaching the end of their degree or become overqualified. Policies addressing youth transitions can be characterised by the discrepancy between comprehensive reform plans and a structural deficit in implementing those reforms, which also applies to activation policies. Most important, policy objectives aim at prolonging school attendance and modernising vocational training, whereas labour-market policies focus on job creation through incentives for employers and assistance to those who decide to be self-employed. The general objective behind such policies can be characterised as providing youth with ‘some’ official status.

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Unlike in other regimes, yo-yo transitions do not develop against dominant assumptions of youth but rather emerge from a social vacuum: We are alone. . . . If you have friends, fine, otherwise. . . . (G., female, nineteen, Italy)

It could be stated that the transition system provides neither choice nor flexibility nor security; instead, individuals depend on the extent of family support. Some young people seem to have perfectly adapted to a neo-liberal labour market: Oh sure, . . . there’s no work, but keeping complaining and day-dreaming about the ‘permanent job’ seems to me a waste of time. . . . You have to create your job yourself, inventing new professions, considering your own wishes. (P., female, twenty-one, Italy)

The obvious structural differences raise the question of how this is reflected by young people’s decision-making processes and transition patterns across transition regimes. Unfortunately, to this day, no comparative longitudinal research which includes such dimensions has been conducted. Anglo–German comparison suggests a higher proportion of smooth, repaired, and stagnant transitions in Germany and a higher share of upward, alternative, and downward transitions in the United Kingdom (Evans, 2002). However, the validity of such findings is necessarily restricted because the typology builds on the relationship between individual trajectories and the standard life-course models dominating in the given transition system. What may be ‘alternative’ in the employment-centred regime type might be smooth and normal in the universalistic regime type. However, different transition regimes may be analysed to understand the extent to which their institutional structure allows for choice, keeping options open, reconciliation, and self-presentation. The different transition regimes are built on different cultural values and interpretations of social reality, thereby implying different meanings of success with regard to youth transitions. Behind the different concepts of ‘disadvantaged youth’, different notions of youth can be identified. That is, societal expectations for young people impact the models of motivation applied in addressing youth transitions. The importance of choice and motivation in the universalistic transition regime reflects that youth is – first and foremost – associated with personal development. This implies a broader definition of success than merely becoming part of the labour force. Youth is not seen only as a potential resource for society but also for young people themselves. The state

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Table 6.2. Most Important Source of Income (in %) Indicated by Young People (15–30) in 2006

Regular job Benefits Allowances/grants Relatives, partner Casual work Other, don’t know

Denmark

Germany

Italy

United Kingdom

57 5 22 5 5 5

35 6 13 26 15 4

37 0 2 50 9 1

56 11 11 14 5 3

Source: Eurobarometer, 2007.

provides support not only for growing up but also for ‘being young’. This system includes flexibility for individual solutions that allow for reconciliation with other aspects of life. This is much less the case in the liberal transition regime, which is governed by the assumption that youth transitions should lead as directly as possible to economic independence. Here, choice depends on individual resources and local opportunities, and reconciliation with other life demands is the responsibility of the individual. The employment-centred regime shows a similar pattern, in which success is also narrowly defined, but here it is in terms of socialisation for and allocation to defined occupational positions. Compared with the liberal regime type, success is defined not only in economic terms but also in normative terms related to a given social order. In this way, possibilities for self-presentation are also restricted. In the sub-protective regime type, structural deficits and family dependency contribute to a status vacuum for youth, in which inclusion into any system is considered a success – whether it is education, training, or employment. In principle, the structural deficit of the transition system implies spaces which are open for individual agency. However, this is only true for those young people whose families can afford to cushion long periods of waiting and/or experimentation, whereas the others are confronted with precariousness (Walther, 2006). Table 6.2 is an indicative picture of how different institutional arrangements provide different scopes for young people’s biographical agency. Although such illustrations of narrower or broader notions of success and scopes of agency in different regimes of youth transitions are certainly ideal– typical, they can be related to harder systemic definitions of success, such as young people’s economic independence (see Table 6.2). It is interesting that Denmark, where young people enjoy a broader scope for experimentation, has the highest percentage of young people living on their own income from paid work. In Germany, in contrast, a relatively high proportion of

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young people report casual work as their main source of income. This reflects the long-term decline of the dual system in securing the social and labour-market integration of the younger generation. The fact that in Italy most young people depend on relatives is not surprising if one considers the structural deficit of the transition system. Another interesting difference results from comparison between the United Kingdom and Denmark. Both countries show a strong tendency towards activation policies but differ in terms of income paid by public institutions. In Denmark, every fifth young person refers to educational allowances as his or her main source of income, which gives evidence of their position in society as ‘learning citizens’. In contrast, the United Kingdom, with its emphasis of individual independence, takes the lead with regard to those living on benefits.

Conclusions This chapter is concerned with challenging a one-dimensional institutional perspective which reduces youth transitions to successes or failures according to linear standard trajectories. The assumptions of normality underlying these perspectives are increasingly different from the social reality experienced by young men and women. First and foremost, institutional perspectives on youth transitions have been confronted by the increasing diversity of transition patterns emerging both within and beyond the linear life course. Second, the subjective relevance of institutional trajectories for young people has been questioned by reflecting on the dynamics and the social inequality of their motivational careers. Third, it has been argued that the decision-making processes of young men and women in transition should not be interpreted in terms of one-dimensional investments and returns. In fact, their transitions imply increasingly more biographical dilemmas. It has become more difficult to find out and decide what transition success means in individual cases, which is reflected by the coping strategies that young people develop with regard to transitions. Choice, keeping options open, reconciliation, and self-presentation are key requirements of young people’s agency and decision making in destandardised transitions. These requirements are characterised by the often-contradictory demand to adapt to an increasingly more flexible and precarious labour market and, at the same time, the need to balance their identity and maintain a sense of coherence. Social inequalities determine the extent to which young people are able to cope with transition demands according to such principles. Rather than adding more to the evidence of socioeconomic factors, such as education, class, gender, and ethnicity, the chapter analysed the different

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scopes that transition systems provide for the biographical agency of young men and women. Comparative analysis allowed for the identification of different transition regimes according to institutional structures of education, welfare, and labour market, as well as cultural patterns such as the meaning of youth and, more specifically, disadvantage. These regime types are more or less favourable to the principles inherent to young people’s coping strategies and motivation. Although these conclusions are based on empirical research, the qualitative nature of the presented data does not provide any information regarding the distribution of transition patterns, motivation, and coping strategies across different socioeconomic status and transition regimes. Such an analysis would require a longitudinal panel survey on individual trajectories informed by findings from exploratory research as presented here. Moreover, such an analysis may contribute to a more comprehensive view of young people’s transition processes and inform policies that enable young people to become authors of their own biographies – complex and contradictory as they may be.

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¨ Walther, A. (2000). Spielr¨aume im Ubergang in die Arbeit. Junge Erwachsene im Wandel der Arbeitsgesellschaft in Deutschland, Großbritannien und Italien. Weinheim et al.: Juventa. Walther, A. (2006). Regimes of youth transitions: Choice, flexibility and security in young people’s experiences across different European contexts. Young, 14(2), 119–141. ´ Walther, A., Stauber, B., Biggart, A., du Bois-Reymond, M., Furlong, A., Lopez Blasco, A., Mørch, S. & Pais, J. M. (Eds.). (2002). Misleading trajectories. Integration policies for young adults in Europe? Opladen: Leske & Budrich. Walther, A., du Bois-Reymond, M., & Biggart, A. (Eds.). (2006). Participation in transition: Motivation of young adults in Europe for learning and working. Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang. Walther, A., & Pohl, A. (2005). Thematic study on policy measures concerning disadvantaged youth: Final report for the European Commission. Available at www.europa.eu.int/comm/employment social/social inclusion/studies en.htm. Accessed December 1, 2007. Williamson, H. (1997). Status zer0 youth and the ‘underclass’: Some considerations. In R. MacDonald (Ed.), Youth, the ‘underclass’ and social exclusion (pp. 70–82). London: Routledge.

7

From Paradigm to Paradox Parental Support and Transitions to Independence Gill Jones

Introduction In the late modern age, there is an increasing tension between the global and the local, as commentators such as Bauman (1998) and Giddens (1990) suggest. This tension is apparent in the field of youth policy. Because national economies must compete on a world stage, they have to produce workforces suited to this global purpose. Because of global demographic changes in the age composition of societies, with a resulting imbalance to the ‘dependency ratio’, there is increased pressure on welfare states to reduce dependence on the state. The effect on young people is that they are expected to gain the qualifications needed nationally in terms of global competition and are seen as the main means of reducing the dependence which is associated with poverty and social exclusion, whether or not they share these objectives. The question, therefore, is whether globally driven economic policies, when translated into national education and welfare policies, can be sufficiently sensitive to local – even individual – concerns or whether the ‘local’ dimension will prove to be resistant to proposed governmental change. This chapter is concerned with problems associated with the translation of policy into practice. Young people in the United Kingdom are now expected by policy makers to stay in education and training beyond the statutory minimum school-leaving age and, therefore, to defer their entry into the full-time labour market. The youth labour market has eroded to a state in which there are few viable jobs, while both state support for students and state protection for young people have been gradually reduced. There are new expectations: that parents will accept extended financial responsibility for post-sixteen children and that young adults will be able and willing 145

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to claim a continuation of their childhood dependence. Both expectations are unrealistic. First, generational change in the last thirty years has been so great that parents with no personal experience of post-school education and training have increased power to determine their children’s access to it, because they control the necessary financial resources. The danger is that they may prevent it and intergenerational cycles of disadvantage will continue. Second, although a series of policies has over the decades continually increased the age at which young people can become independent, there has been no parallel legislation in family law increasing the age limit for parental responsibility. Given the reduction in state support, this leaves a gaping hole in social-protection arrangements for those unable to access parental support, thereby increasing the risks associated with an already risky part of the life course. Third, policies affecting young people appear to be based on rigid and outmoded constructions of youth and family life which bear little resemblance to the realities of late modernity. The policies tend to be based on universal paradigms which fail to recognize cultural diversity; conceptualising transitions to adulthood as unitary and linear, rather than complex and reversible; behaviour patterns of young people and their parents as rational, epistemological, and economic rather than subject to emotive or other factors; and, above all, perhaps, young people as autonomous agents without social context and therefore devoid of its attendant dynamics of obligation and reciprocity. Policy makers should instead be questioning whether young people can be treated as independent actors motivated by long-term individual economic gain and consider how they are to gain access to the resources needed. Young people’s ability to make their own choices and construct their own biographies is compromised by their status as dependants (Jones, 2009). Nevertheless, success and failure are increasingly seen as the responsibility of the individual, who is blamed for failure (Beck, 1992; and see Chapter 6 in this volume). In proposing his individualisation thesis, Beck (1992) argued that young people have to create their own adult identities, but he has also apparently contradicted this idea by describing late modern society as ‘a paradoxical collectivity of reciprocal individualisation’ (Beck & BeckGernsheim, 2002, p. xxi). We should question whether young people have the autonomy to achieve the tasks involved in the transition to adulthood on an individual basis. The ‘precarious freedom’ referred to by Beck (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002) may refer specifically to those who are unable to claim connectedness and mutual obligation.

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In this chapter, I shall move away from the individual perspective – which forms the focus of much transitions research – to explore the social context and in particular the relationship between changing patterns of transition and beliefs and practices surrounding (in)dependence and support. I begin by mapping changes in the structures of social support for young people, identifying the assumptions that underlie them and the objectives that drive them. The discussion then shifts to the family level and explores beliefs and practices concerning parental support for transitions to adult independence. The chapter identifies some of the reasons why there is variation in access to parental support and concludes that policy makers seeking to extend education and training must persuade not only young people but also their parents that the investment of time, effort and money will be worth it – and, moreover, still be prepared to provide state support where it is needed.

The Data This chapter is based on the author’s research on young people’s transitions to adulthood in their family and policy contexts. Much of my research in the last few decades has been about the elements contributing to risk and vulnerability in youth and the ways in which young people respond to them. The scene-setting material comes from documentary policy evidence provided through a study of the UK policy legislation which, first, has structured young people’s dependence and independence and, second, has provided the basis of the division of responsibility between the state and the family for economic support during youth (Jones & Bell, 2000; for a chronological summary of this policy legislation, see Bell & Jones, 2002). The material on the way young people and their parents approach the problem of extended dependence comes from a recent qualitative study, The Parenting of Youth, which examined beliefs and behaviour relative to parental support for young people aged sixteen to twenty-five years.1 The study was based in two contrasting English towns and their environs: Cambridge (relatively affluent) and Stoke-on-Trent (relatively disadvantaged). 1

The Parenting of Youth project was funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (R000238379) and based in the School of Social Relations, Keele University, United Kingdom. Julia Rouse and Ann O’Sullivan were co-researchers on the project, which was directed by the author. I am grateful to them and to all who helped with this research, especially the young people and their parents who generously shared their beliefs and experiences with us. Full details of the project are in the End-of-Award Report (Jones, 2004).

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The main sample, matched in the two localities, consisted of seventy young men and women between the ages of sixteen and twenty-five who were in education or training, in full-time employment or unemployed, or who were themselves parents. These young people were interviewed in 2001. Thirty sets of their parents, including some step-parents, were interviewed in 2002. The aim of the purposive sampling strategy was to explore a range of different needs and responses in different economic and family circumstances. The in-depth interviews were transcribed and analysed using WinMAX and SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences). Illustrative anonymised data from this study are used here.

The Changing Framework of Support Walther shows in Chapter 6 of this volume how different welfare structures shape young people’s transition ‘choices’, but they also involve different paradigms of support. In the case of the ‘liberal’ regime (to use EspingAnderson’s 1990 terminology) of the United Kingdom (UK), the state now relies on public–private partnerships. It is within this policy framework that responsibility for the welfare of young people is increasingly laid at the door of their parents or carers while state support is targeted on the most visibly disadvantaged. This approach puts double-pronged pressure on parents, described as the middle ‘pivot’ generation by Attias-Donfut (2000), because they may be expected to shoulder responsibilities for the generations above and below them. Parental support for young people is seen by policy makers as socially desirable, in part because it has the potential to increase parental control. Before the development of the welfare state, there had been concern that working-class families in the UK were neglecting their duties towards their older adolescent children (Finch, 1989). The welfare state was therefore constructed around the idea that the first port of call for children should be their parents, with the state intervening only when necessary. Do family and state complement one another or compete with one another? The neo-liberal policy argument of the 1980s and 1990s was that kin systems of obligation and reciprocity, which form the basis for social solidarities, would break down if the ‘nanny state’ took over. More recently, others have argued that the welfare state opened up new opportunities for family life, including its democratisation. Beck proposed that the welfare state allowed family ties to be loosened and processes of individualisation to occur (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). Kohli (1999) argued that state systems could

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enhance family systems, and Attias-Donfut and Wolff (2000) suggested that state and family complement one another. Debate about the interface between the family and the state responsibilities to support youth transitions misses a central issue, however: there is a third stakeholder. In practice, most young people’s transitions to adulthood in the UK were typically self-supported through their earnings from employment. The picture is, of course, dominated by the working-class pattern. However, it contrasts with both Northern European countries where, broadly speaking, the welfare state plays a more significant role and Mediterranean countries, where families continue to offer the main support often well into adulthood (Holdsworth & Morgan, 2005; Jones, 2005). The UK government plans to make all young people stay in education or training until the age of eighteen. For many, this legal extension of dependence will come as a culture shock. ‘Youth’ can be theorised as a shift from private dependence to dependence in the public sphere (Sennett, 2004), but economic independence is achieved over time and in a variety of ways. This complexity creates problems for policy makers. The dependant–contributor dichotomy entrenched in the welfare state is misleading. In fact, youth did not exist as a welfare category in postwar Britain (Dean, 1995). Since then, however, state support had begun to move towards treating young people as individual ‘welfare citizens’ (in Marshall’s, 1950, terminology). This policy trend was halted in the 1980s under the Thatcher government (Jones & Bell, 2000; Jones & Wallace, 1992) when, on the assumption that young people could return to dependence on their families for support if needed, the right to social security was withdrawn from under-eighteens. The unanticipated consequence – an increase in extreme destitution, including homelessness among young people – led to ‘sticking plaster’ state provision (in the form of the Severe Hardship Allowance) for those who were estranged from their parents and could not access parental support. There is still ambivalence in current policy thinking about whether incentives should be paid directly to young people or to their parents (Bynner, Londra, & Jones, 2004; Jones & Bell, 2000).

Legal Frameworks of Parental Responsibility Legal frameworks for parental support give inadequate and confusing ‘guidance’ to parents and young people. UK family law has failed to parallel policies extending the period of dependence in youth with legislation extending

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Table 7.1. Parents’ Beliefs about Their Legal Responsibilities in England Legal Responsibility Ends at

To Provide Food and Clothes %

To Provide Housing %

To Pay for Education %

To Subsidize Wages %

16/17 18 21 ‘When they start work’ ‘No idea’ ‘No obligation’ ALL (=100%)

53 24 5 8 11 0 (38)

59 23 5 0 13 0 (39)

3 8 0 0 63 26 (38)

0 0 0 0 26 74 (38)

Source: The Parenting of Youth project (Jones, 2004).

parental responsibility. In England and Wales, although parents have a legal responsibility for children under the age of eighteen, they are not required by law to care for a child beyond the age of sixteen (Jones & Bell, 2000). The issue of legal responsibility is further confused when ‘parent’ might mean a lone parent, an absent parent, a step-parent, or a foster parent. The prevailing policy belief is that despite changed patterns of family formation and dissolution, the ‘traditional’ nuclear family should remain inviolable, static and effective (Smart, 1997). Although closeness in families has been found to be more significant than the structure of kin relationships for family support (Finch, 1989), family breakdown or the death of a parent can affect levels of family support for young people (Johnston, MacDonald, Mason, Ridley, & Webster, 2000; McDowell, 2001) as can the repartnering of a parent (Jones, 1995). Where the state has been acting in loco parentis, the situation is often worse, and care-leavers in their teens are expected to be able to function with minimal support. There is no European consensus on the legal obligations of parents (Jones, 2005). In some countries, the cutoff comes with age (eighteen in Norway, twenty-one in the Netherlands, twenty-six in Italy, and twenty-seven in Germany); in some countries such as Austria and Hungary it comes with the completion of education or training; while in others, including the United Kingdom, responsibility is largely left to individual constructions of family obligation. There have been legal battles over parental responsibility in recent years in Italy and Spain, as well as the UK, and it is likely that parents and adult children will increasingly seek clarification through litigation (Jones, 2005). In our recent study, we asked parents in England when they thought that their legal responsibilities for their children ended (Table 7.1). Their responses reflect the ambiguity in the law: although many thought eighteen

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was the limit, some thought it was sixteen (Holdsworth & Morgan, 2005, also comment on this point). There is confusion about whether parents should provide a home and whether young people in employment should be able to claim family support. In all, 37 percent of parents thought they had no legal obligation to contribute to their children’s post-eighteen education. The legislation does not provide a knowledge base for parents wondering whether to provide support. Whether they do so therefore depends on other factors, mediated – as we will see – by the quality of their relationships. Young people are equally unclear about the legal responsibility of their parents and therefore lack a solid basis for claiming support (Finch, 1989). Nevertheless, those in our study did not generally think that the answer was statutory clarification and enforcement of parental responsibility. Instead, several emphasised young people’s continued responsibility to support themselves: Alex (aged twenty, a car mechanic retraining as a teacher): If the parents have got money, then they should help their children out financially, but if the parents haven’t got money, then it’s up to the children to get a job, part-time work and help themselves out a bit, I’d say. Jane (aged twenty-three, in employment since leaving school): It really depends on what the child’s doing. I mean, if you’re just going to say, ‘I’m not going to get a job ‘cause my parents are going to look after me’, then [parents] shouldn’t have to.

The Central Paradox of Support This leads me to the central paradox of support. The problem is that the fostering of independence and responsibility is central to parent–child relationships (Allatt & Yeandle, 1992; Hutson & Jenkins, 1989; Jones & Wallace, 1992). Parsons and Bales (1956) indicated that although childhood dependence provided the context for primary socialisation, parents later had an obligation to facilitate their child’s transition to independence. The workingclass expectation that young people will ‘stand on their own two feet’ does not represent neglect of parental responsibility, therefore. The continued extension of the period of dependent youth goes against the grain for parents who see their role as enabling independence, as well as for young people seeking it. Both sides are ambivalent about dependence and independence. Finch (1989) described the difficulty in achieving ‘the desired blend of dependence and independence’. Too much parental support can feel like interference, so

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parents have to tread a fine line (Jones et al., 2006). As young people move towards adulthood, their relationship with their parents becomes more companionate and democratic, as Giddens (1991, 1992) observed. However, in late adolescence, when they may be most in need of support, young people’s relationships with their parents may be at their lowest ebb. For young people to negotiate their life courses and develop their own biographies involves the constant successful renegotiation of family relationships. This, in turn, makes demands on families to function in more open and democratic ways; unfortunately, not all are able to do this.

Social-Class Differences Differences in patterns of transition and patterns of support reflect longstanding social-class cultures as well as differential economic resources, but these cultural differences tend to be overlooked in current policy paradigms for family support. ‘Youth’ was the prerogative of the middle classes (Bourdieu, 1980). A generation or so ago, middle-class young people typically stayed longer in education and deferred family formation, whereas workingclass young people tended to leave education at the minimum age and marry and start families at a younger age (Jones & Wallace, 1992). Middle-class families provided economic support for their children until well into adulthood (Bell, 1968). In contrast, working-class families operated on an earlier cutoff point for financial support (because young people were starting work in their mid-teens), tending thereafter to provide material support such as help with setting up home or with childcare (Harris, 1983; Leonard, 1980). The traditional working-class pattern of transition did not involve returns to dependence (Galland, 1995; Jones, 1995). For working-class families in England, among whom the work ethic is strong, a return to dependence is still regarded as a failure, especially if associated with unemployment, as our data illustrate. Charlotte left school at fifteen and worked for two years before becoming unemployed. Carol left school and home at sixteen and is now a lone mother with two children. Charlotte (aged nineteen, on New Deal): When I had the job, then I felt independent, but for the last two years I’ve sort of been feeling a bit crap ‘cause I haven’t really felt independent at all. . . . It’s not nice actually when you have to rely on other people. Carol (aged twenty-four): If I had have done [gone back to her parents], I’d have been a failure, wouldn’t I, with my tail between my legs.

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Working-class families are now expected to function according to middleclass norms of extended support, despite differences in economic and cultural resources (Jones, 1995, 2005). It comes as no surprise, therefore, that social class and family background remain critical factors in education and work outcomes (Bynner, Elias, McKnight, Pan, & Pierre, 2002; Forsyth & Furlong, 2001). McKnight (2002) suggested that the link between parental income and labour-market success may have strengthened because of the increased cost of assisting young people into ‘good jobs’. Whereas for many the pathways to adulthood are getting longer, for others adult autonomy comes early, bringing a ‘precarious freedom’ (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002) – the effect in some cases of attempting to repeat traditional workingclass patterns in a changed socioeconomic environment (Bynner et al., 2002; McDowell, 2001). Social-class differences in patterns of transition and support for transition are outcomes of inequalities not only in wealth (economic capital) but also in the social and cultural capital held in families (following Bourdieu, 1986).

The Problem of Rational Action Policy makers seem to assume that individuals in all social groups employ rational thinking – assessing costs and benefits and developing strategies towards a long-term goal – in a linear approach. Goldthorpe’s (1998) version of ‘Rational Action Theory’ (RAT) attempted to explain why class differences in educational attainment persist. He argued that people with similar goals nevertheless may take different steps towards achieving them, their actions being conditioned by the distribution of resources, opportunities and constraints produced by the social-class structure as a whole. Even when parents and their adult children have shared aims, it does not necessarily lead to collective strategies for financial support, especially when resources are scarce (Forsyth & Furlong, 2001). Disadvantaged families need greater assurance of success before ambitious (and costly) education options are pursued (Goldthorpe, 1996). Giddens (1994) warned that in late modernity, choice is involved in so many day-to-day activities that it has become virtually obligatory; decision making, on the other hand, involves expert knowledge and is a medium of power and stratification. RAT has been criticised for overstressing the economic and neglecting the role of cultural resources (Savage, 2000). Sennett (2004) pointed out that young people from privileged backgrounds have safety nets in the form of cultural capital which allow them to ignore risk.

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Before policy makers turn their attention to persuading parents to extend their support, they need to consider whether the mobilisation and distribution of family resources reflect strategic thinking. Research casts doubt on this. Few British parents give regular financial support to sixteen- to twenty-five-year-olds – those that do are mainly middle-class parents supporting students. More common are irregular payments or help in kind for specific needs, such as setting up home or baby equipment, or ‘safety-net’ support when things go wrong (Jones, 2004; Jones et al., 2006; Seavers & Hutton, 2002). Much parental support can thus be seen as crisis management rather than strategic family practice. Holdsworth and Morgan (2005) distinguished between ‘help up’ as a strategy to support independence and ‘handouts’ that are more associated with maintaining dependence. Savage (2000, p. 86) questioned the validity of instrumental rationality in these circumstances: What instrumental reasons might parents have for sacrificing their own well-being (in terms of childrearing, work, financial support, etc.) to their children’s disposal? Would parents in a rationally acting household choose to devote all resources towards one child’s education, so minimizing the chances of other children in the household, or share the risk?

Action may also be based on habit or tradition, be representative of an impulsive emotional response – or, indeed, be oriented to noneconomic benefits, such as social approval and intrinsic satisfaction. Value rationality can play a part in parental thinking about support for their children. For example, Leonard (1980, p. 63) found ‘instrumental spoiling’ by parents – support which went beyond the sphere of parental obligation and formed the basis of an obligation by the child to ‘keep close’. Often, however, parent–child relationships in early adulthood can be fraught with emotional tensions which interfere with rational thinking. As a young person becomes adult, a more companionate and equal relationship sometimes develops with his or her parents (Giddens, 1992). The period of greatest economic need in a young person’s life thus comes at the most difficult time for asking and offering. The initiative for support rests with the provider and asking for help is shaming (Finch & Mason, 1993; Jones et al., 2006). A young woman in a Scottish study (Jones, 1995, p. 98) described the shame and the strings attached to requested support: Amy (aged twenty-one or twenty-two): I’ve got too much pride about asking people for money. . . . I’m so independent, I want to do it all myself. I don’t want anybody turning round and saying: ‘Do you remember we got you this flat?’ or ‘Who got you this or that?’ – casting it up to me.

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Parents and young people may feel the need to fall back on other resources – deriving from their social and cultural capital – to provide a source for their beliefs and to help them resolve the paradox.

The Social Construction of Parental Obligations Belief systems – rather than legal frameworks – act as a resource to help families negotiate matters of dependence and support. Finch (1989) concluded that the ‘sense of obligation’ which distinguishes kin relationships ‘derives from commitments built up between real people over many years’ rather than from an abstract set of moral values. It is largely through negotiation that obligations are defined and redefined (Finch, 1989; Giddens, 1992), which is essentially why it is difficult to anticipate and legislate for family support. Tradition Parents vary in their ability to negotiate, however. Parental obligations are partly constructed according to the prevailing ethos within the family or community, drawing on precedent, history, and partly on the quality of family relationships (Allatt & Yeandle, 1992). These are different forms of cultural capital that may correspond to class-based cultural beliefs. Although generational change means that many parents’ own experiences of transition to adulthood were very different from the transitions their children are experiencing now, their own experience is nevertheless the default influence informing their approach to support their children. Some of the parents (and young people) in our study were aware of social change but limited in their ability to understand it: Samantha (nineteen, unemployed for two and a half years): They don’t really know, parents – when they were younger – it’s all changed now. . . . You’ve got to have a decent education now to really go far. When they were all kids, it was like get any job to get food on the table, kind of thing.

Some parents still exercise ‘traditional or habitual action’ associated with their family or class cultures rather than rational choice (cf. Giddens, 1994). Analysis of support for young couples shows how some parents still construct their own experience as the traditional and ‘right way’ to do things and have little awareness of how their parenting beliefs and practices might need to respond to social change (Jones et al., 2006). Our research reveals wide variation between families operating in a democratic way in which discussion and even cooperative strategy were possible and

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other families in which parenting was tradition-based and inflexible, with parent–child conflict more likely and discussion of needs and resources nonexistent. Notions of reciprocity, fairness and legitimacy guide parents and young people in their constructions of appropriate support, but an element of flexibility is needed. Reciprocity Reciprocity, or mutual obligation, is a fundamental normative belief underlying family support (Finch, 1989) that helps us understand attempts at the equalisation of power relations between young people and their parents. Most commentators – arguing that the balance of reciprocity is achieved only in the longer term – tend to overlook young people’s current obligations towards their parents, as do policy makers. However, there are many examples of UK family practices involving mutual obligation, or interdependence. Young people may help in a family business or be involved in caring for a parent or a sibling. Nearly all those who have left full-time education but still live in the parental home pay board money to their parents (Allatt & Yeandle, 1992; Jones, 1995; Jones & Wallace, 1992; Seavers & Hutton, 2001). The practice is constructed as a form of reciprocity, helping to mitigate the shame of dependence and making it easier for young people to ask for help when they need it. Sennett (2004) has argued that the shame and guilt commonly attached to dependency are misplaced and that autonomy should be constructed as the acceptance of mutual and interdependent relationships. Research on young people suggests that they see adulthood in terms of obligations towards others as well as autonomy (Holdsworth & Morgan, 2005; Hutson & Jenkins, 1989; Jones, O’Sullivan, & Rouse, 2004; Lahelma & Gordon, 2008). Board money is an example of the link between autonomy and interdependence. Thus, Michelle (aged twenty-two) told us that although she lives with her parents, she feels independent because paying board has made her relationship with her parents less one-way and hierarchical. As young people get older, they expect to pay board. Amanda has returned to further education (FE) after two years in employment. She feels guilt at her dependence and wants to pay board, but her parents will not let her: Amanda (nineteen): Me mum and dad pay for the majority of everything for me and I think now I’m nineteen I should be at least paying a bit of board. . . . We have discussed it quite a few – well, a couple of weeks ago, we discussed it ’cause I want to pay board because my friends were, but they’re fine about it. They say they don’t want no money off me.

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The reduction of state support means that students and trainees often have to live with their parents. Inability to pay board strains family relationships and can result in both eviction from the family home and dropping out of education (Jones et al., 2004; Smith, Gilford, & O’Sullivan, 1998). Adam wanted to go to college, but his father had just been made redundant and expected him to get a job and pay board. Kirsty had to get a job. Adam (twenty-two, unemployed and homeless): It put a lot of pressure on me because I wanted to go full time college to do computers and I had a bit of a row with me dad, ’cause he wasn’t going to support me while I went there. He said, ‘Either get a job or get out’, so I disagreed with him. My mum disagreed with that ’cause mum wanted me go through college. So I ended up leaving home and I said I’d do it the hard way, and ended up in a hostel then. Kirsty (aged twenty, lone mother): She [her mother]’d say ‘You’re not living at home with no board and no wages’. She wouldn’t have thrown me out – it was just like – it was her way of making sure I went back to work. . . . When I was young, I just thought she was being nasty. Now I realise she was just being fair really.

Fairness The concept of fairness provides one of the basic guiding principles of family support (Allatt & Yeandle, 1992), allowing parents to moderate conflicting demands and also allowing young people to see their own needs in a broader family context of need. This is how parents do not ‘put all their eggs in one basket’ (c.f. Savage, 2000) and why young people may limit their claims. Middle-aged parents may be trying to make arrangements for the care of older relatives, for their own pension schemes, or for the various needs of their different children. Parents have only a limited budget and they need to be able to prioritise, but they need also to be seen as fair. It is important to parents that they can justify their support behaviour to others (Jones et al., 2004, 2006). Allatt and Yeandle (1992) drew a useful distinction between equality and equity in the distribution of resources among children, indicating circumstances in which parents may justify differential treatment of their children. Parents can pigeonhole their children in terms of their academic ability and support them accordingly – thus, one child may ‘deserve’ support for extended education whereas another child may not. This distinction between deserving and undeserving children overrides the legitimacy of the need itself. Thus, Kirsty’s mother is proud of her other daughter (an ‘A star student’) but has not supported Kirsty’s education plans: Kirsty’s mother: She wanted to go to college to do her A levels and I wouldn’t let her. I said, ‘No, you’ll just be wasting two years. You haven’t

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Young people may also apply a notion of fairness and not ask ‘too much’ of their parents (Allatt & Yeandle, 1992). Thus, some young people recognise the needs of younger siblings ‘coming up’ or of parents themselves (Jones et al., 2004). Charlotte: You know, at twenty, I don’t really like to sort of ask ’cause I know my little sister and maybe my brother are a greater priority than me. Darren (aged twenty): I don’t think it’s fair, looking at my parents. You know, they brought us up and then, when we get to a point where we can start earning our own money, it’s not fair that they then have to keep pouring more of their money – especially at an age where they’re starting to wind down a little bit and they should be saving for like their retirement and stuff.

Legitimacy Parental support also depends on the parents’ constructions of a request for help as legitimate (Allatt & Yeandle, 1992; Jones, 1995). Young people too are aware that they have to prove their case for support. It is therefore important that young people’s own life plans reflect the ethos prevailing in their families and communities. If there is a strong work ethic but no family ethos supporting higher education, then parents may not be willing to take on the expense. Parental views on education are likely to be powerful influences on young people’s behaviour (Forsyth & Furlong, 2001). There are many cases in which the generational divide in aspirations between parents and their adult children is only too apparent, especially when parents rigidly hold onto ‘traditional’ views. Support for extended education requires parents to believe either in the intrinsic value of education or its instrumental value in leading to better jobs (Jones et al., 2004). Because only a small proportion of (mainly middleclass) parents themselves continued into higher education on leaving school, many parents may lack the cultural capital needed to support the belief that education has an intrinsic value. Increasingly, their approaches to support reflect long-term instrumentality, although there are social-class differences. As Goldthorpe (1996) argued, disadvantaged families need more convincing that the outcomes warrant the costs. The dilemma here is that the traditional working-class means of upward mobility has been through working one’s way up from the shop floor, and many people still believe that the work route is the best way to get on.

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Charles comes from a working-class family. His father reported that despite graduating from ‘the best car design course in the country’, Charles was now working at a call centre. His father said, ‘You don’t go to university so that you can just get by’, and Charles wishes he had done an apprenticeship instead: Charles (aged twenty-three): Even though I’ve got like a degree now, if I start work, essentially I’m just going to be an apprentice. I’m just going to be like the junior and it doesn’t mean anything really.

Fiona (aged twenty-one and working in a hotel) was one of many who opted for work experience rather than university. She resisted pressure from her father to go to university (‘so he could say his daughter went to university’) because ‘I always thought that work experience paid off, unless you had a particular career in mind like nursing or anything like that’. Fiona’s mother: Seeing what a lot of her friends at the time have done, I think she probably made the right decision. Because they did their A levels, the jobs weren’t that great they got after that, and I’m thinking of two in particular, they’ve both got children now . . . and, you know, the careers have gone anyway.

According to her mother, Carrie changed her mind about university when she met final-year students who were ‘struggling to get work because they hadn’t got any experience’. Carrie now recognises that she ‘couldn’t really see that far in advance at that time’. For young people, the decision to defer independence for the sake of qualifications requires not only the prospect of immediate support but also a longer-term and more strategic perspective on risk.

Mobilising and Accessing Economic Capital If all the hurdles of tradition, emotional baggage, fairness, reciprocity and legitimacy – and, indeed, ‘short-termism’ – can be overcome, the next question is financial resources. At the very least, staying on in education means the loss to family budgets of contributions to board. Carrie explained that one of the reasons she did not go to university was because her father had been made redundant ‘that many times that it’s eaten into their savings that maybe they would have had for us to go away to university’. For Tony’s middle-class parents, education had intrinsic value (‘we value education and I think he’s known that all along’), and there is evidence of long-term strategic thinking to fund him when he goes to university. His mother is saving for his university education, and although Tony expects to

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get into debt, he can see the potential long-term value of the investment he and his family will make, as well as the risks: Tony (aged eighteen): Because if there is one thing that isn’t right, and you go to university and don’t finish the course, or you sort of come out and you’ve got low grades, then it isn’t worth it. But if everything is right and you do come out with good grades, then you will go into a good job after. Then I think it is worth getting into some debt, because for the rest of your life, once you’ve paid that debt off, you get a better quality of life.

Strategies – if the term is really appropriate – used by other parents to find the resources to put children through university included the father doing overtime, the mother taking on a part-time job, selling shares, and cashing in savings. In other words, they have to dig deep. In many families, as we have seen, financial support is rationed and targeted so that limited resources can be allocated more fairly among family members. Ruth’s parents made sacrifices to help her through university but are now supporting a student son as well, so Ruth will have to fund her postgraduate study – to become a solicitor – herself. Ruth (aged twenty-one): My mum had to get a second job to finance me going through university, so it comes out of their joint account and they couldn’t really afford to give me any more. All three of us discussed it between ourselves – that’s why mum got a second job. . . . I feel really guilty because I know she goes out to work to give the money to me.

Part-time work by students can increase the risk associated with the investment that students and parents are making (Christie, Munro, & Rettig, 2002; Forsyth & Furlong, 2001; Jones et al., 2004). This makes many students reluctant to combine their studies with part-time jobs. Ruth has already done part-time work, but the sacrifice her parents are making puts pressure on her to do well (‘If I come out of university with a bad degree class, I don’t want to have to say the reason was because I was working in a pub’). The situation is even more difficult for FE students living at home, who (like Adam) are expected to work in order to pay board, or leave home. For higher-education students, the alternative is huge and long-term debts. Michael’s mother explained his decision not to go to university in terms of the student debt (‘“too much debt”, he said, and Michael doesn’t like debt’). Where there is agreement that postschool education is worth the cost, we see the extent to which young people and their parents draw on their own and each other’s resources in order to pay. The fear of failure – failing to justify the cost – becomes acute.

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In other cases, the end is not seen to justify the means, education is not compared favourably with work experience, or a job now is prized above the remote possibility of a better job later. There are also many cases in which parents and their children have such a poor relationship that there is no question of support beyond the minimum. Too often, young people are left to their own resources and become unemployed and homeless, in need of – and only sometimes getting – support from the state (Jones, 1995; Jones et al., 2004; Smith et al., 1998).

Policy Implications Young people need the support of their parents if they are to achieve in education and employment, but there are social costs attached to the policy assumption that there is consensus about education and parental obligations. Increased stress can make family relationships that are already strained break down completely, as parents ‘wash their hands’ of responsibility, or as their adult children attempt self-sufficiency rather than suffer the shame of asking for support. Given the high incidence of young people falling through the safety net, there is a need to improve structures of state support in a way which recognises family practices and the beliefs that underlie them. The alternative of enforcing extended parental responsibility is a political nonstarter but also, in cutting across cultural beliefs, would have drastic consequences. Policies based on outdated models – of youth as unitary and linear and of adulthood as a status to be achieved; of young people as autonomous rational actors and decision makers; or of their families as policy-supporting, sharing, and democratic – are bound to have unanticipated consequences. Youth in late modernity is complex and responses to the needs of young people, whether by their families or by the state welfare and education systems, must contain flexibility. The problem of transition from dependence has always been a ‘thorn in the flesh’ of policy makers and may not be resolvable, but there should be evidence-based debate about when young people can and should be treated as adult individuals (welfare citizens), including whether this should be based on the criteria of age, economic/marital/parental status or domestic circumstances. If more young people and parents are to be brought on board policy agendas to extend and expand postschool education and training, then they need real evidence, local and immediate, that their investment will be worthwhile. This becomes more difficult in a climate of overcredentialism. But appealing to economic rationality is not enough. There are still the

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barriers to support which arise because of differences in cultural beliefs. Whereas some families may be willing to experiment with new constructions of obligation and dependence in order to achieve long-term aims, others lack the social and cultural capital to do so. Research on young adults (Furlong & Cartmel, 2004; Jones et al., 2004; MacDonald & Marsh, 2004) reveals the value of opportunities for second chances. I suggest that this is because as they become older, young people become freer of the constraints associated with dependence on their families of origin. At the same time, they form new social relationships with new forms of mutual commitment, and they begin to re-evaluate their lives in the light of these relationships. They may become more able to take a broader, better-informed, and longer-term view. It is therefore critical that adequate support for ‘second chances’ in young adulthood is available for those who were unable to take advantage of opportunities when they were younger – and support for these lifelong learning opportunities may need to come from the state.

REFERENCES

Allatt, P., & Yeandle, S. (1992). Youth unemployment and the family: Voices of disordered times. London: Routledge. Attias-Donfut, C. (2000). Equity and solidarity across the generations. In S. Arber & C. Attias-Donfut (Eds.), The myth of generational conflict: The family and state in ageing societies (pp. 1–21). London: Routledge. Attias-Donfut, C., & Wolff, F.-C. (2000). Complementarity between public and private transfers. In S. Arber & C. Attias-Donfut (Eds.), The myth of generational conflict: Family and state in ageing societies (pp. 47–68). London: Routledge. Bauman, Z. (1998) Globalization: The human consequences. New York: Columbia University Press. Beck, U. (1992). The risk society. London: Sage Publications. Beck, U., & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2002). Individualization. London: Sage Publications. Bell, C. (1968). Middle-class families. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Bell, R., & Jones, G. (2002). Youth policies in the UK: A chronological map (second edition). Available at www.keele.ac.uk/depts/so/youthchron/index.htm. Bourdieu, P. (1980). La jeunesse n’est qu’un mot. In Questions de Sociologie. Paris: Editions de Minuit. Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In J. Richardson (Ed.), Handbook of theory and research for the sociology of education (pp. 241–258). New York: Greenwood Press. Bynner, J., Elias, P., McKnight, A., Pan, H., & Pierre, G. (2002). Young people’s changing routes to independence. York, England: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Bynner, J., Londra, M., & Jones, G. (2004). The impact of government policy on social exclusion among young people: A review of the literature for the Social Exclusion Unit, Breaking the Cycle series. London: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister.

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Christie, H., Munro, M., & Rettig, H. (2002). Making ends meet: Student incomes and debt. Studies in Higher Education, 26(3), 363–383. Dean, H. (1995). Paying for children. In H. Dean (Ed.), Parents’ duties, children’s debts (pp. 15–33). Aldershot: Arena. Esping Anderson, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press. Finch, J. (1989). Family obligations and social change. Cambridge: Polity Press. Finch, J., & Mason, J. (1993). Negotiating family responsibilities. London: Routledge. Forsyth, A., & Furlong, A. (2001). Socioeconomic disadvantage and experience in further and higher education. Bristol, England: Policy Press and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Furlong, A., & Cartmel, F. (2004). Vulnerable young men in fragile labour markets: Employment, unemployment and the search for long-term security. York, England: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Galland, O. (1995). Changing family transitions: Young people and new ways of life in France. In L. Chisholm, P. B¨uchner, H.-H. Kr¨uger, & M. du-Bois Reymond (Eds.), Growing up in Europe (pp. 133–143). Berlin and New York: de Gruyter. Giddens, A. (1990). The consequences of modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press. Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the Late Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity Press. Giddens, A. (1992). The transformation of intimacy. Cambridge: Polity Press. Giddens, A. (1994). Living in a post-traditional society. In U. Beck, A. Giddens, & S. Lash (Eds.), Reflexive modernization: Politics, tradition and aesthetics in the modern social order (pp. 56–109). Cambridge: Polity Press. Goldthorpe, J. H. (1996). Class analysis and the reorientation of class theory: The case of persisting differences in educational attainment. British Journal of Sociology, 47(3), 481–505. Goldthorpe, J. H. (1998). Rational action theory for sociology. British Journal of Sociology, 49(2), 167–192. Harris, C. C. (1983). The family and industrial society. London: George Allen and Unwin. Holdsworth, C., & Morgan, D. (2005). Transitions in context: Independence, adulthood and home. Buckingham, England: Open University Press. Hutson, S., & Jenkins, R. (1989). Taking the strain: Families, unemployment and the transition to adulthood. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. Johnston, L., MacDonald, R., Mason, P., Ridley, L., & Webster, C. (2000). Snakes and ladders: Young people, transitions and alternative careers. Bristol, England: Polity Press. Jones, G. (1995). Leaving home. Buckingham, England: Open University Press. Jones, G. (2004). The parenting of youth: Economic dependence and social protection. R000238379. End-of-award report to the Economic and Social Research Council. Jones, G. (2005). Social protection policies for young people: A cross-national comparison. In H. Bradley & J. van Hoof (Eds.), Young people in Europe: Labour markets and citizenship (pp. 41–62). Bristol, England: Polity Press. Jones, G. (2009). Youth. Cambridge: Polity Press. Jones, G., & Bell, R. (2000). Balancing acts? Youth, parenting and public policy. York, England: York Publishing. Jones, G., O’Sullivan, A., & Rouse, J. (2004). Because it’s worth it? Education beliefs among young people and their parents in the UK. Youth and Society 36(2), 203–226.

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Jones, G., O’Sullivan, A., & Rouse, J. (2006). Young adults, partners and parents: Individual agency and the problem of support. Journal of Youth Studies, 9(4), 375–392. Jones, G., & Wallace, C. (1992). Youth, family and citizenship. Basingstoke, England: Open University Press. Kohli, M. (1999). Private and public transfers between generations: Linking the family and the state. European Societies, 1(1), 81–104. Lahelma, E., & Gordon, T. (2008). Resources and in(ter)dependence: Young people’s reflections on parents. Young, 16(2), 209–226. Leonard, D. (1980). Sex and generation: A study of courtship and weddings. London: Tavistock. MacDonald, R., & Marsh, J. (2004). Missing school: Educational engagement, youth transitions and social exclusion. Youth and Society, 36(2), 143–162. Marshall, T. H. (1950). Citizenship and social class and other essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McDowell, L. (2001). Young men leaving school: White working-class masculinity. Leicester, England: Youth Work Press and Joseph Rowntree Foundation. McKnight, A. (2002). From childhood poverty to labour market disadvantage. In J. Bynner, P. Elias, A. McKnight, H. Pan, & G. Pierre (Eds.), Young people’s changing routes to independence (pp. 49–66). York, England: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Parsons, T., & Bales, R. F. (1956). Family: Socialization and interaction process. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Savage, M. (2000). Class analysis and social transformation. Buckingham, England: Open University Press. Seavers, J., & Hutton, S. (2002). With a little help from their parents? Money, young people, and family support. Leicester, England: Youth Work Press and Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Sennett, R. (2004) Respect. London: Penguin. Smart, C. (1997). Wishful thinking and harmful tinkering? Sociological reflections on family policy. Journal of Social Policy, 26(3), 301–321. Smith, J., Gilford, S., & O’Sullivan, A. (1998). The family lives of homeless young people. London: Family Policy Studies Centre.

8

Job Attitudes and Job Aspirations in a Changing Labor Market Germany, 1991–2006 Christian Ebner and Jutta Allmendinger

The perception and importance of work have undergone changes throughout history and have varied among societies. The ancient Greeks and Romans saw work as something to be avoided or, at least, minimized for themselves, for they associated it with slavery (Grint, 1991). With Christianity and the New Testament, work acquired a different status. Physical work became increasingly respected (Oexle, 2000). For Protestants, especially Calvinists, success in working life and accumulation of a fortune in one’s lifetime was a sign of having been chosen by God. Weber (1988) saw the Protestant Work Ethic as the basis of modern capitalism. From today’s perspective, it is difficult to say what the underlying mechanisms of changing work values have been. In modern times, however, work is clearly seen as something desirable. Studies indicate that most people would continue working even if they win or inherit enough money to live a comfortable life (Harpaz, 1989). According to the latest results of the European Values Study, the proportion of Europeans who consider work unimportant is less than 10 percent – a small minority (Halman, Luijkx, & van Zundert, 2005, p. 46). More than half of all Germans consider work to be very important. At the same time, the situation in the German labor market has changed dramatically since 1991 for young and older people, with unemployment rates, “marginal” part-time work, and fixed-term employment on the rise. Jobs have become increasingly insecure. Certainly, it would prove to be exceedingly difficult to predict future developments in the German labor market and corresponding values and attitudes; however, it is possible to ask retrospectively how notions of a good job have changed over time. Do young and older people want secure jobs? Or do they tend to want interesting jobs 165

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instead? Do their responses depend on economic development? Does job security mean more to people when the world around them has become uncertain? Or do people adapt to uncertainty? Do they see it as part of normality? How important are desire and reality for job satisfaction in the first place? We address these questions for the period from 1991 through 2006, drawing on data from official statistics and the German General Social Survey (GGSS), which is a repeated representative cross-section survey containing static and variable questions on several topics relevant to the social sciences.1 We particularly emphasize the differences and commonalities between western and eastern Germany and use these observations to build a double comparative framework. Starting from completely different social experiences, the nation’s basic social conditions have converged during the last fifteen years, but the labor markets have drifted apart. We begin by outlining this development, then defining our underlying theoretical approaches, and describing the empirical database that we used. In the results section, we first show which jobs people want at all and compare those desires with the reality of working life, asking whether divergence between desire and reality has an impact on job satisfaction and organizational commitment. We conclude with a summary and a discussion of the value that the results may have in the present discourse. This chapter focuses particularly on young people; however, the tables and figures also include results relating to older respondents in order to contextualize our findings and allow for their proper assessment.

The German Labor Market, 1991–2006 Escalating unemployment has been a general trend marking all developed industrialized countries since the beginning of the 1970s. Nevertheless, major differences exist among nations. Whereas Denmark, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States managed to lower their unemployment rates during the 1990s, Germany did not (Schmid, 2002, pp. 27–30). Until October 3, 1990, Germany was divided into the western state known as the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the eastern state called the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The FRG, or West Germany, was a social-market economy. The GDR, or East Germany, was what can be described as a socialist state with a planned economy, with the state 1

Allgemeine Bev¨olkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften (ALLBUS).

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Figure 8.1. Unemployment Rates in Germany Since 1970, by Region and Age Group. Notes: Unemployment rates are calculated as the percentage of the experienced civilian labor force (gainfully employed people + unemployed people) accounted for by unemployed persons registered with the German Federal Employment Agency. The unemployment rates refer to dependent civilian gainfully employed people (excluding self-employed people and unpaid family workers). Official data from the German Federal Employment Agency for unemployment rates among youth (people 15–24 years of age) in eastern and western Germany are available only as of 1993. The calculation of youth unemployment rates for 1991 and 1992 is based on data from the German Federal Statistical Office. Data adapted from online statistics of the German Federal Employment Agency. Retrieved February 25, 2008, from www.pub.arbeitsamt.de/hst/ services/statistik/000000/html/start/detail.shtml.

directing and controlling all economic processes centrally. Using the trajectory of the unemployment rate as a key basic variable of our study (and remembering that only West German figures were reliable prior to unification), we note that the West German demand for labor in the early 1970s was high and unemployment was mainly either seasonal or frictional.2 The unemployment rates ran at about 1 percent (Figure 8.1). Until 1991, the starting point of our study, the overall unemployment rate rose in waves, reaching 6.3 percent in West Germany. In East Germany 2

Seasonal unemployment arises mainly in occupations that depend on weather conditions, such as agriculture and construction. Frictional unemployment is the result of search processes in the labor market. Even with a perfect match between supply and demand, vacant jobs and unemployment will always exist to a certain degree.

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before unification, there was no unemployment officially. However, hidden unemployment did exist as “unemployment at the workplace” (M¨uller, 2003, p. 450). In 1991, unemployment in eastern Germany was already higher than in western Germany – this was particularly the case for young people. Fifteen years later, the situation was even worse. In 2006, the youth unemployment rate was 9.1 percent in western Germany and a figure nearly twice that (17.2 percent) in the new L¨ander (i.e., federal states), which had been formed in the territory of the former GDR. Thus, smooth transitions from the educational system to the employment system are comparably rare in the new L¨ander. In addition to the obvious east–west divergence of the unemployment rate in Germany, it differed by level of education (Figure 8.2). Academics in both parts of the nation had a relatively good chance in the labor market and still do. In 2005,3 the unemployment rate of this group was 3.5 percent in western Germany compared to 3.1 percent in 1991; in eastern Germany, it was 6 percent compared to 7.2 percent in 1991. People who never completed their vocational training have been hit the hardest by unemployment. In western Germany, their unemployment rate in 2005 was 23.7 percent compared to 12.8 percent in 1991; in eastern Germany, the corresponding figures were 41.5 and 31 percent. People who completed an apprenticeship or fulltime study at a vocational school occupied the middle ground in Germany. In both western and eastern Germany, however, their chances in the labor market since unification deteriorated slightly but relatively steadily. In 1991, people with a vocational degree in western Germany had an unemployment rate of 3.7 percent compared to 11.2 percent in eastern Germany. In 2005, the corresponding figures were 7.4 and 17.5 percent. The structure and scale of unemployment are not all that have changed; employment has as well. Full-time employment has generally decreased in Germany, whereas the importance of part-time employment and “marginal” part-time work has increased (Allmendinger & Ebner, 2006). Despite being well qualified, women still account for a high percentage in the latter two categories and for almost no managerial positions (Kleinert, Kohaut, Brader, & Lewerenz, 2007). Nevertheless, the number of families 3

At the time of this writing, calculations of Germany’s 2006 unemployment rates for specific qualifications were not available. Moreover, the calculations of the western German unemployment rates in 2005 do not include Berlin, whereas West Berlin had been counted as part of West Germany in the preceding years. This statistical discontinuity is due to the changing database and leads to a reduced unemployment rate for low-skilled eastern Germans in 2005.

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Eastern Germany 60

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Figure 8.2. Unemployment Rates in Western and Eastern Germany, by Educational Achievement, 1991–2005. Notes: Calculations of unemployment rates for people in the different qualification groups are based on data from the German Federal Employment Agency and the German Microcensus, an annual household sample survey on population and economic activity. A discontinuity occurs in the time series because the calculations of the western German unemployment rates include Berlin only through 2004. The altered basis for calculation also accounts for the steep decline in the eastern German unemployment rate among low-skilled people in 2005. Data adapted from Reinberg & Hummel (2007).

in which a man is the only breadwinner is dwindling. There is a trend toward fixed-term employment and temporary work found through employment agencies (Jahn, 2007). Breaks in the course of people’s careers occur more often than they used to, and a growing share of the labor force works

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for more than one employer (Dundler & M¨uller, 2006; Hirschenauer & Wiessner, 2006). Overall, the standard employment relationship, the Normalarbeitsverh¨altnis (M¨uckenberger, 1985), appears to be steadily eroding, and secure jobs are in ever shorter supply.

Theoretical Background How do changes in employment opportunities influence individual preferences and attitudes toward work and employment? According to Inglehart (1971), value orientations in the developed industrialized countries change as the wealth of those countries grows. In turn, this change in value orientations facilitates additional social and political developments in societies. More specifically, if welfare states can absorb risks that an individual faces in life, then people will cease attaching excessive importance to materialist values, such as material security. They will orient themselves instead to postmaterialist values, such as self-realization or concern for society. The postmaterialist argument recalls older theories that posit a hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1954), by which people give priority to meeting deficiency needs such as physiological and safety needs and then shift to higherorder needs such as self-realization (i.e., self-actualization) as the lowerorder needs are met. Inglehart (1990) based his theory of value change on the following two key hypotheses: 1. A scarcity hypothesis. An individual’s priorities reflect the socioeconomic environment: One places the greatest subjective value on those things that are in relatively short supply. 2. A socialization hypothesis. The relationship between socioeconomic environment and value priorities is not one of immediate adjustment: A substantial time lag is involved because to a large extent, one’s basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one’s pre-adult years (Inglehart, 1990, p. 68). In other words, value change occurs largely as one generation replaces an older one in a society’s adult population. How does Inglehart’s (1990) theory relate to the sphere of work? His response (p. 169) was that people with materialist values tend to emphasize economic forms of achievement (e.g., a secure job and a good salary), whereas people with postmaterialist values prefer noneconomic forms of achievement (e.g., a job that provides a feeling of accomplishment). Given this theoretical underpinning, there are two reasons that one would expect the importance of materialist values and secure jobs to have increased among

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Germans since 1991, especially those from the former East Germany. The first reason is related to change that has occurred in Germany’s welfare state, which by 2006 offered far less security for preserving one’s personal status and required more personal initiative than it had fifteen years earlier. The second reason, related to the first, lies in the level of Germany’s unemployment, which has increased since 1991, and in declining job security. One would therefore expect the importance of having an interesting job to have waned in Germany. In addition to this general change in attitude, one would also expect to find differences between eastern and western Germany in terms of qualification levels, gender, and age. A second theoretical approach leads to somewhat different forecasts. It holds that if people want something but do not get it easily, the result is cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) or stress (Pearlin, 1989). One way to make it easier to cope with situations of that nature would be to attach less weight to whatever it is that one wants. It is difficult to transfer these approaches to empirical expectations. One could assume that the erosion of the standard employment relationship and the escalation of unemployment eventually silence articulation of the desire for job security and promote the desire for an interesting job instead. This displacement, however, would not be a sign of postmaterialist attitudes but rather of sheer helplessness. In this chapter’s empirical analysis, we address these theoretical approaches and look at how the importance of job security and having an interesting job are expressed in Germany. We expect to find major differences in educational level and, accordingly, in both the risk of unemployment (see the previous section) and the level of income. On average in Germany, the income of university graduates is higher than that of graduates from vocational institutions; people without vocational qualifications earn the least (Konsortium Bildungsberichterstattung, 2006). In addition to the difference in unemployment risk, these facts influence the expectations and aspiration levels of people in different qualification groups. Empirical studies (Gallie, 2007) usually conclude that highly skilled people have stronger postmaterialist job preferences than low-skilled people.4 In addition to positing that

4

In different studies, the same variables, such as the importance of job security or of high income, are labeled “materialist,” “extrinsic,” or “instrumental,” and the importance of having an interesting or independent job is characterized as “postmaterialist,” “intrinsic,” or “expressive.” Throughout this chapter, we use the terms materialist and postmaterialist.

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higher expected material security might lower materialist and raise postmaterialist job preferences, one could argue, as Rose (2005) did, that the longer a person’s exposure is to the specific socialization in educational systems, the stronger that person’s postmaterialist preferences will be. With Germany being a male-breadwinner society, one can further assume that materialist job aspects such as job security or high income are more important for men than for women and that women value postmaterialist job aspects more than men. However, we expect to find differences between western and eastern Germany because women in eastern Germany were socialized to expect full-time uninterrupted work trajectories. An additional detailed east–west comparative study on job preferences, gender, and employment is beyond the scope of this chapter, however, we briefly mention gender as a variable. Finally, if the socialization hypothesis is correct, we should ascertain a difference between younger and older age groups. Because the histories of eastern and western Germany differ, we include a detailed intra-German comparison beginning shortly after unification. Unfortunately, data on job preferences among East Germans before that time are not available. Western and eastern Germany are then compared at a point fifteen years later (i.e., 2006) to determine whether potential differences between the two parts of the nation have disappeared or widened over time. People with different socialization have now been exposed to the same economic system for a moderately long period. Review of the relevant empirical research shows that international comparative studies tend to disagree on how much value people in different societies attach to particular job characteristics. Drawing on data from the European Values Study, Halman et al. (2005, p. 48) found that Europeans generally consider materialist job aspects slightly more important than postmaterialist aspects. However, substantial variance exists among European countries. In Northern and Western Europe, people are slightly in favor of postmaterialist work values, whereas materialist work values tend to dominate in other parts of Europe. Gallie’s (2007) rather detailed study on job preferences in Denmark, Finland, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Sweden – countries with contrasting institutional regimes – showed that postmaterialist job preferences clearly predominate in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden and that in the United Kingdom and Germany, materialist values are stronger than postmaterialist values. Some of the differences between the countries have been traced back partly to sociodemographic structure – more precisely, to personal characteristics, especially the level of educational achievement.

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Data and Variables Data are taken from the 1991 and 2006 GGSS. Participants were living in Germany and at least eighteen years old. Since 1991, the GGSS has also covered eastern Germany, which once constituted the territory of Germany’s former socialist state, the GDR. Respondents from that region have been oversampled to allow meaningful in-depth analyses for this “new,” smaller part of the nation. Computer-assisted personal interviewing has been conducted since 2000, before which time people were interviewed personally with standardized questionnaires (i.e., paper-and-pencil interviewing).5 For our analysis of job preferences in Germany, all people we selected were of working age (eighteen to sixty-four years old). In 1991, the total number of respondents was 2,578. The 2006 GGSS included variables from the 2005 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) on work orientations and the 2006 ISSP on the role of government. A major advantage for our analyses is that the ISSP module on work orientations provides several additional items for the evaluation of jobs and job attitudes. All this input, however, entails the disadvantage that only half of the GGSS respondents answered questions on work orientations; the other half was asked about the role of government. In other words, data from only 1,306 respondents of working age were available in 2006. For the following analyses, we defined eighteento thirty-four-year-olds as “younger persons” and thirty-five- to sixty-fouryear-olds as “older persons.” In national statistics such as those on German unemployment, young people are frequently defined as “under twenty-five years of age.” For our research purposes, we defined them as “under thirtyfive years of age.” This expansion of the age category is primarily due to the fact that many young people in Germany have not completed their training by the age of twenty-four; therefore, no transition into working life has occurred yet for them. The average age of completion of the first university degree was just under twenty-eight years (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2007, p. 476). We distinguish among three levels of general educational achievement. The Hauptschule is the school with the lowest qualification level in Germany. Graduates from that institution and people who do not complete formal education constituted the low category. The Realschule represents the middle level of qualification. Graduates from this type of school were assigned to the intermediate category. Graduates of the Gymnasium have the highest level of general qualification and thus have access to universities. 5

More detailed information on dataset, sampling methods, and institutions in charge is available at www.gesis.org/en/social˙monitoring/allbus/index.htm.

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Table 8.1. Distributions of Sociodemographic Variables in the Samples of 1991 and 2006 Variable

Category

1991 (%)

2006 (%)

Age

Younger (18–34 years) Older (35–64 years) West East Female Male Low Intermediate High Full-time Part-time No regular employment

38.8 61.2 48.4 51.6 51.4 48.6 41.0 37.8 21.2 55.5 5.8 38.7

28.3 71.7 65.3 34.7 51.4 48.6 29.7 44.0 26.3 51.8 10.2 38.0

Region Sex Education

Employment

Note: In both years, respondents are of working age (18- to 64-year-olds). In 1991, the total number of respondents was 2,578; in 2006, the number was 1,306. The category “no regular employment” includes labor-market inactive people as well as marginal part-time employment and unemployment. Missing values are not reflected in the calculation of the percentages.

They were classified into the high category. Table 8.1 shows the distribution of sociodemographic variables for 1991 and 2006. In 1991, the dependent variables (i.e., the importance of job security and the importance of having an interesting job) were measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not important at all) to 7 (very important). In 2006, the interviewees had to respond to the same items, but this time they used a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (very important) to 5 (not important at all). To compare the 1991 and 2006 results, we reversed the 2006 scale so that it ranged from 1 (not important at all) to 5 (very important). To formulate an idea of how job preferences change over time, we transformed the 2006 scale by using a method suggested by Henss (1989). After this linear transformation, the 2006 scales ranged from 1.2 to 6.8 with the same intermediate category (“4”) as in the 1991 scale.6 6

Henss (1989) compared two common linear models for transforming rating scales having different numbers of categories. The first model matches the midpoints of the end categories; the second model matches the lower and upper limits of the scales, respectively. According to Henss, the second model, which we adopt in this chapter, has proved superior to the first model. The applied linear transformation formula is yi ∗ = yl b + (xi − 0.5)

yub − yl b , xub − xl b

with x representing the 5-point 2006 scales; y, the 7-point 1991 scales; yi∗ , the transformed value; ylb , the lower limit of y (in this case, 0.5); yub , the upper limit of y (7.5); xlb , the lower limit of x; xub , the upper limit of x (5.5); and xi , the manifest rating in 2006.

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Table 8.2. Importance of “Job Security” and “Interesting Job”: Differences Between Western and Eastern Germany, 1991 Item

Region

M

SD

t-Test

18- to 64-year-olds Job security Job security Interesting job Interesting job

West East West East

6.14 6.61 6.15 6.21

1.15 0.92 0.96 1.00

−11.63∗∗∗ −1.53

0.03

18- to 34-year-olds Job security Job security Interesting job Interesting job

West East West East

5.99 6.59 6.25 6.24

1.18 0.99 0.88 1.02

−8.77∗∗∗

0.27∗∗∗

35- to 64-year-olds Job security Job security Interesting job Interesting job

West East West East

6.24 6.62 6.07 6.19

1.11 0.88 1.02 1.00

−7.42∗∗∗

0.19∗∗∗

−2.43∗

0.06∗

0.27

Pearson’s r 0.23∗∗∗

−0.01

n 1,247 1,322 1,245 1,324 537 460 537 462 710 862 708 862

Note: In 1991, the importance of job security and an interesting job was measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not important at all) to 7 (very important). ∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.

Results In this section, we first analyse whether people want job security and/or an interesting job. We then compare those desires with the reality of working life and ask whether divergence between desire and reality has an impact on job satisfaction and organizational commitment. What Jobs Do People Want? Our discussion first considers results for 1991 (Table 8.2). The answer to the intriguing question of whether job security or an interesting job is important was clearly “both” for the working-age population (eighteen to sixty-four years old) of both western and eastern Germany. The respondents in these two groups ranked them at more than 6 points on the 7-point scale. Nonetheless, at this high level, we found a significant east–west difference. In the new L¨ander, the importance of job security was perceptibly higher than in the old L¨ander. For 1991, it can be explained by the fact that eastern Germans had been used to job security for decades and that they felt this guaranteed livelihood was being undermined in 1991. The job security to which they had been accustomed had become a scarce good. The observation of an east–west difference was true of both the older and the younger age

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Table 8.3. Importance of “Job Security” and “Interesting Job”: Differences Between Western and Eastern Germany, 2006 Item

Region

M

SD

t-Test

Pearson’s r

18- to 64-year-olds Job security Job security Interesting job Interesting job

West East West East

4.60 4.74 4.42 4.44

0.60 0.49 0.64 0.61

−4.43∗∗∗

0.12∗∗∗

−0.70

0.02

18- to 34-year-olds Job security Job security Interesting job Interesting job

West East West East

4.68 4.72 4.49 4.47

0.52 0.49 0.63 0.59

−0.76

0.04

0.27

−0.01

35- to 64-year-olds Job security Job security Interesting job Interesting job

West East West East

4.57 4.75 4.39 4.44

0.63 0.50 0.64 0.61

−4.69∗∗∗

0.14∗∗∗

−1.04

0.04

n 842 449 840 451 246 122 245 122 596 327 595 329

Note: In 2006, the importance of job security and an interesting job was measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not important at all) to 5 (very important). ∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.

groups; however, particularly regarding the latter group, the difference was remarkable. It is interesting that young western Germans showed a comparably low desire for job security. The aspiration of having an interesting job was almost equally relevant to both western and eastern Germans of working age. Overall, job security was not as important to the younger age group in western Germany as it was to young eastern Germans and was even less important to the former group than having an interesting job. By contrast, having a secure job was far more important to young eastern Germans than having an interesting job. In 2006, fifteen years later, the results are similar (Table 8.3), that is, based on a 5-point rather than a 7-point scale. Again, the importance of having job security and an interesting job was extremely high, and job security was more important to people in the new L¨ander than to those in the old; however, this difference had weakened over the years. Younger cohorts exhibited no more differences in this regard. (We subsequently discuss the question of whether western Germans moved in their attitudes toward eastern Germans or vice versa.) We discerned no differences between western and eastern Germany with respect to the

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importance of having an interesting job. Unlike in 1991, the desire for job security was higher than the desire for an interesting job for all observed groups. As Table 8.4 shows, the differences and similarities between eastern and western Germany in 1991 persisted in 2006 even when we controlled for sociodemographic variables (i.e., age, gender, employment, and educational achievement). In addition to the regional differences, effects of education were particularly notable. At both observation times, job security was less important to highly skilled people than to low-skilled people. The opposite was true of the value attached to interesting jobs, which were more important to well-educated people than to less-well-educated people. This finding bears out the theoretical assumption that the preference for interesting jobs does not emerge until job security is established. Well-qualified people did not face a high risk of losing their job in either the old or the new L¨ander. In 2006, the younger age group attached significantly more importance to job security than the older age group, although the effect was weak. However, we did not expect the gender effect that we found. It arose only in 2006 and related only to the importance of having an interesting job. Interesting jobs were of less importance to women than to men, which may be explained by the increasingly precarious employment relationships encountered by women over the years. However, detailed analyses of job preferences and gender are beyond the scope of this chapter; further research is needed on these two aspects. To take a more precise look at temporal development from 1991 to 2006, we refer to the transformed scale for 2006. Figure 8.3 illustrates that the diminished east–west difference in the value attached to job security was attributable to convergence on the part of western and eastern Germany. At a very high level, job security became more important in the old L¨ander and less important in the new L¨ander in those fifteen years. Closer examination of this result reveals age-specific shifts. The importance of job security rose, especially among young people in western Germany. The shock and unprecedented experience of unemployment among East Germans shortly after unification in 1991 might have led to ceiling effects, meaning in practice that only the West Germans were able to increase their scores in the importance-of-job-security scale over the years. Nevertheless, indications of a development in the opposite direction were evident in eastern Germany: the importance of job security ebbed slightly. For young eastern Germans (i.e., eighteen to thirty-four years old), the difference between 1991 and 2005 was just beyond the level of significance. However, closer

178

East 35–64 Female Intermediate High Employed

0.46 0.22 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.02 −0.12∗ −0.06 −0.48∗∗∗ −0.18 0.09∗ 0.04 6.17∗∗∗ 0.08 2,540

0.11 −0.07 −0.03 −0.01 −0.10 0.07

4.67∗∗∗ 0.03 1,289

0.14 −0.08∗ −0.03 −0.02 −0.13∗∗ 0.08∗

∗∗∗

Job Security

Job Security

∗∗∗

2006

1991

0.05 0.03 −0.05 −0.03 −0.02 −0.01 0.19∗∗∗ 0.09 0.26∗∗∗ 0.11 0.01 0.01 6.05∗∗∗ 0.02 2,540

Interesting Job

1991

0.01 0.01 −0.05 −0.03 −0.11∗∗ −0.09 0.13∗∗ 0.11 0.30∗∗∗ 0.21 0.02 0.01 4.37∗∗∗ 0.04 1,289

Interesting Job

2006

Notes: The first column of numbers for each dependent variable shows the nonstandardized coefficients; the second column shows the standardized coefficients (ordinary least squares regression). In 1991, the importance of job security and an interesting job was measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not important at all) to 7 (very important). In 2006, the scale ranged from 1 (not important at all) to 5 (very important). Reference categories are western Germany, 18–34 years, male, low general education, not employed. ∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.

Employment Constant R2 N

Region Age group Gender General education

Independent Variables

Table 8.4. The Importance of “Job Security” and “Interesting Job,” Controlled for Sociodemographic Variables: Differences Between Western and Eastern Germany, 1991 and 2006 (Ordinary Least Squares Regression)

Job Attitudes and Job Aspirations in a Changing Labor Market

Scale Points

6.8 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.4 6.3 6.2 6.1 6.0 5.9 5.8 1991

2006

179

Eastern Germany (35–64 years) Eastern Germany (18–64 years) Eastern Germany (18–34 years) Western Germany (18–34 years) Western Germany (18–64 years) Western Germany (35-64 years)

Year

Figure 8.3. The Importance of Job Security, 1991 and 2006, by Region and Age Group. Note: A t-test showed no significant change from 1991 to 2006 for either the 35- to 64-year-old western Germans or the 18- to 34-year-old eastern Germans but did show significant change (p < 0.05) for all other groups.

examination of this younger age group revealed different developments for eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds and twenty-five- to thirty-four-yearolds: in the latter age group, the 2006 figure was significantly lower than the 1991 figure. Among the former age group, however, the 2006 and 1991 figures were about equally high, with the 2006 value being significantly higher in that age group than in the others. This result also seems interesting in light of the fact that the eighteen- to twenty-four-year-old eastern Germans interviewed in 2006 hardly remember the time before the country’s unification and were socialized in a social-market economy, whereas their twenty-fiveto thirty-four-year-old compatriots had grown up for a longer period in the former GDR. These differences between the age groups are thus also explicable in terms of a regime-specific socialization effect. This hypothesis is indirectly supported by the fact that the development of the eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds and twenty-five- to thirty-four-year-olds did not differ in western Germany, where the social-market economy was established well before unification and where an upward trend was evident in both age groups. The importance of having an interesting job also changed over time, declining in both parts of Germany and for both age cohorts (Figure 8.4). Poor development of the labor market coincided with a moderation of what people expected of a job. We found no significant differences between western and eastern Germany in terms of the development of eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds and twenty-five- to thirty-four-year-olds.

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6.8 6.7

Eastern Germany (18–34 years)

Scale Points

6.6

Eastern Germany (18–64 years)

6.5 6.4

Eastern Germany (35–64 years) Western Germany (18–34 years)

6.3 6.2 6.1 6.0

Western Germany (18–64 years)

5.9 5.8 1991

2006

Western Germany (35-64 years)

Year

Figure 8.4. The Importance of an Interesting Job, 1991 and 2006, by Region and Age Group. Note: A t-test showed no significant change (p < 0.05) among 18- to 34-year-old eastern Germans from 1991 to 2006 but did show significant change (p < 0.05) for all other groups.

What Jobs Do People Get? Clearly, many people in Germany wanted a secure and interesting job. Were their expectations met? What was the perceived reality of these two aspects of their job? The 2006 GGSS included variables to measure that perception. Using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree), employed respondents indicated whether they perceived their job as secure and interesting. The gap between the importance and the perceived reality of one’s job is illustrated for job security in the left-hand panel of Table 8.5. The righthand panel presents results of responses to items inquiring about desire and reality in terms of having an interesting job. A solid majority (64.9 percent) of the respondents considered their own job as secure, and 84.4 percent felt that their own job was interesting. These figures are high. However, the figures on people who desired job security were even higher – exceeding 98 percent. Stated differently, just under two thirds (64.7 percent) of the respondents had achieved the job security they sought (materialist congruence, field 1), and about one third (35.3 percent) of the respondents who viewed job security as important felt that their desire had not been met (materialist incongruence, field 2). By contrast, 85.4 percent of the respondents had been able to satisfy their desire for an interesting job (postmaterialist congruence, field 1). Accordingly, “only” 14.6 percent had not satisfied their aspiration for an interesting

181




Indifference/ no

Yes

(4) Materialist Congruence 0.4% (N = 3)

35.1% (N = 274)

64.9% (N = 508)

35.3%

64.7%

(3) Materialist Incongruence 1.5% (N = 12)

(2) Materialist Incongruence 34.7% (N = 271)

(1) Materialist Congruence 63.4% (N = 496)

Indifference/ Disagreement

100.0% (N = 782)

1.9% (N = 15)

100.0%

98.1% (N = 767)


Importance of interesting job?




Indifference/ no

Yes

84.4% (N = 674)

(3) Postmaterialist Incongruence 2.3% (N = 18)

85.4%

(1) Postmaterialist Congruence 82.1% (N = 656)

Agreement

15.6% (N = 125)

(4) Postmaterialist Congruence 1.6% (N = 13)

14.6%

(2) Postmaterialist Incongruence 14.0% (N = 112)

Indifference/ Disagreement

100.0% (N=799)

3.9% (N = 31)

100.0%

96.1% (N = 68)




Statement: My Job is Interesting

Notes: The analysis is confined to people with regular full- or part-time jobs. For items on the importance of having job security and an interesting job, the responses “very important” and “important” were combined into a “Yes” category, and the responses “neither-nor” “not important,” and “not important at all” were combined into an “Indifference/No” category. For items on the perceived reality of job security and job interest, the responses “strongly agree” and “agree” were combined into an “Agreement” category, and the responses “neither-nor,” “disagree,” and “strongly disagree” were combined into an “Indifference/Disagreement” category.

Importance of job security?

Agreement

Statement: My Job is Secure

Table 8.5. Importance and Perceived Reality of “Job Security” and “Interesting Job” as Job Aspects Among Persons with Regular Gainful Employment in Germany, 2006

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Table 8.6. Determinants of Perceived Job Security and Interesting Job, 2006 (Binary Logistic Regression) Independent Variables Region Age group Gender General education Working time

Eastern Germany 35–64 years Female Medium High Full-time R2 (Nagelkerke) N

Perceived Job Security (yes = 1)

Perceived Interesting Job (yes = 1)

0.50∗∗∗ 1.24 1.26 0.87 1.59∗ 1.17 0.06 766

1.08 1.82∗∗ 1.21 1.64∗ 2.54∗∗ 2.32∗∗ 0.06 767

Notes: All coefficients in this table express odds ratios. Reference categories are western Germany, 18–34 years, male, low general education, part-time employment. Only people who reported that job security was important to them were included in the analysis of perceived “job security” as a dependent variable. Only people who reported that an interesting job was important to them were included in the analysis of perceived “interesting job” as a dependent variable. ∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.

job (postmaterialist incongruence, field 2). Evidently, interesting jobs were easier to find in Germany than secure jobs. It could also be simply that people found what they were doing interesting. The groups of people not striving for job security or an interesting job (fields 3 and 4, respectively, in Table 8.5) are also interesting from the perspective of social science, but the small sample precludes in-depth analysis in the following treatment of survey results. We therefore focus on the people with regular jobs to whom it is important to have job security and an interesting job. Did responses about perceived job reality in terms of job security and having an interesting job differ by age group (Table 8.6)? Controlling for region, gender, educational achievement, and working time, the chance of a job being considered interesting is 1.8 times greater among older than among younger employees. There is a need to inquire further about the extent to which the quality of jobs in which people are placed has deteriorated or the degree to which the rising unemployment rate “forces” young people to do less interesting jobs. In terms of educational achievement as a variable, the chance of having a secure and interesting job was significantly higher for people with a high level of qualification than it was for those in the lowest category of education. High-skilled people do not only face lower risks of being fired; their jobs also seem to be less routine and, hence, more interesting than jobs for low-skilled workers. Moreover, controlling for the other variables, we found that the chance of classifying one’s job in eastern Germany as secure was half as much compared to western

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183

Germany. This finding comes as no surprise, given that unemployment in eastern Germany was (and remains) higher than in western Germany.

The Impact of Job Security and Job Interest on Job Attitudes For both society and industry, the low level of perceived job security in comparison to the high desire for it may be momentous. The same conjecture may apply to the gap that emerged between the desire for interesting jobs and their availability. This conclusion was also reached by several organizational research studies, indicating that incongruence adversely affects people’s job satisfaction and the companies in which they work (Medgyesi & ´ Robert, 2003; Swaney & Prediger, 1985). As a high-wage country specializing in high-quality products, Germany is particularly dependent on motivated, satisfied employees strongly committed to their organizations. We now expand on this discussion using the ISSP module on work orientations that was added to the 2006 GGSS. The module contains items on job satisfaction and organizational commitment and therefore can be tied to the previous analyses. Only people with regular jobs are included. Nearly 90 percent of the respondents probed were satisfied with their job.7 We found no significant difference between the responses to this item by eastern and western Germans. Three additional questions about organizational commitment were asked.8 Just under one third (64.9 percent) of the respondents agreed with the statement, “I am willing to work harder than I have to in order to help the firm or organization I work for to succeed” (hereafter, “work hard”). The responses to this item also showed no significant differences between eastern and western Germany. Somewhat more than two thirds of the respondents (69.1 percent) agreed with the statement, “I am proud to be working for my firm or organization” (hereafter, “organizational pride”). A significant difference between Germany’s new and old L¨ander surfaced in the responses to this item, with organizational 7

8

This item reads: “How satisfied are you in your (main) job?” The scale ranged from 1 (completely satisfied) to 7 (completely dissatisfied). We found that 87.6 percent of employed people were either completely satisfied (1), satisfied (2), or rather satisfied (3). The responses to all three questions were measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). Answer categories 1 (strongly agree) and 2 (agree) were combined into a single category (agreement). Answer categories 3 (neither-nor), 4 (disagree), and 5 (strongly disagree) were also combined into a single category (indifference/ disagreement). In some studies (Hult & Svallfors, 2002; Svallfors, Halvorsen, & Goul Andersen, 2001), all three items were combined into an index labeled “organizational commitment.” Because the variables affecting the three items differ – some of them considerably – we decided not to create an index for our study.

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pride being somewhat more likely among eastern Germans than western Germans (r = 0.15; p < 0.001). Reservation was expressed by the respondents solely when it came to the statement, “I would turn down another job that offered quite a bit more pay in order to stay with this organization” (hereafter, “rejection of an offer”); only about one third (34.1 percent) agreed. From the employer’s perspective, therefore, it seems hardest to keep people in an organization if they have an offer of a well-paid job from another company. In this regard, too, there was a small but significant regional difference. Eastern Germans would be even less likely than western Germans to reject an offer of a well-paid job (r = −0.10; p < 0.01). These results need closer analysis. Nonetheless, we venture that eastern Germans show some organizational pride in their eastern German companies but that they are not satisfied with their low wages and therefore might be more difficult for their employers to retain. What is the impact on job satisfaction and organizational commitment if desired job security and the desire for an interesting job are perceived to be unfulfilled? Are there differences regarding job attitudes between younger and older workers? To answer these questions, we draw on the 2006 GGSS data on Germany. Table 8.7 shows results for all surveyed people with a regular job who stated that job security was important to them. If there is congruence, it means that the respondents considered their job secure. This assessment had significant influence on job satisfaction, organizational pride, and the chance that a person would reject an offer of a better-paid job. Results are shown before (model 1) and after (model 2) we controlled for the variables of region, age group, gender, educational achievement, and working time. As model 2 shows, the chance of job satisfaction is 2.6 times greater among people who are confident of job security than among those who are not. The chance of feeling organizational pride is 1.7 times greater and the chance of rejecting an offer of a better-paid job is 2.5 times greater. However, the effect of job security on willingness to work harder for an employer is just beyond the level of significance. Job satisfaction and organizational commitment also were affected by whether a job was assessed as interesting (Table 8.8). Again, the analysis encompasses only people holding a regular job and who stated that having an interesting job is important to them. The chance of experiencing job satisfaction (see model 2) was more than eight times greater among people who found their job interesting than among those who did not. The perceived-interest factor of a job also had a definite impact on willingness to work hard (3.2 times greater chance), pride in one’s own organization

185

Yes East 35–64 Female Medium High Full-time R2 (Nagelkerke) N 0.04 761

2.46

∗∗∗

Model 1a 2.64 1,13 1.73∗ 1.40 2.06∗ 1.41 1.45 0.08 760

∗∗∗

Model 2b

0.00 740

1.28

Model 1 1.34 1.23 0.72 0.92 1.23 1.33 1.22 0.03 739

Model 2

Work Hard (yes = 1)

0.01 732

1.49

∗

Model 1

1.71 2.15∗∗∗ 1.30 1.28 1.02 0.96 1.63∗ 0.07 731

∗∗

Model 2

Organizational Pride (yes = 1)

0.06 709

2.60

∗∗∗

Model 1

2.49∗∗∗ 0.66∗ 1.52∗ 0.94 0.88 0.82 1.77∗ 0.09 708

Model 2

Rejection of job Offer (yes = 1)

Notes: All coefficients express odds ratios. Reference categories are no job security congruence, western Germany, 18–34 years, male, low general education, part-time employment. Only people holding regular jobs and stating that job security is important to them are included in this analysis. a Before controlling for region, age group, gender, educational achievement, and working time. b After controlling for region, age group, gender, educational achievement, and working time. ∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.

Working time

Job security congruence Region Age group Sex General education

Independent Variables

Job Satisfaction (yes = 1)

Table 8.7. The Impact of Job-Security Congruence/Incongruence on Job Satisfaction and Organizational Commitment, 2006 (Binary Logistic Regression)

186

Yes East 35–64 Female Medium High Full-time R2 (Nagelkerke) N 0.17 760

8.35

∗∗∗

Model 1a 8.08 0.88 1.61 1.45 1.58 1.09 1.38 0.19 759

∗∗∗

Model 2b

0.05 740

3.10

∗∗∗

Model 1 3.20 1.19 0.61∗ 0.92 1.17 1.31 1.12 0.08 739

∗∗∗

Model 2

Work Hard (yes = 1)

0.08 731

4.26

∗∗∗

Model 1

4.26 1.94∗∗ 1.25 1.48 0.87 0.80 1.76∗ 0.13 730

∗∗∗

Model 2

Organizational Pride (yes = 1)

0.04 708

3.45

∗∗∗

Model 1

3.53∗∗∗ 0.64∗ 1.36 1.05 0.68 0.70 1.72∗ 0.08 707

Model 2

Rejection of job Offer (yes = 1)

Notes: All coefficients express odds ratios. Reference categories are no interesting job congruence, western Germany, 18–34 years, male, low general education, part-time employment. Only people holding regular jobs and stating that job security is important to them are included in this analysis. a Before controlling for region, age group, gender, educational achievement, and working time. b After controlling for region, age group, gender, educational achievement, and working time. ∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.

Working time

Interesting job congruence Region Age group Sex General education

Independent Variables

Job Satisfaction (yes = 1)

Table 8.8. The Impact of Interesting-Job Congruence/Incongruence on Job Satisfaction and Organizational Commitment, 2006 (Binary Logistic Regression)

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(4.3 times greater chance), and likelihood of rejecting another company’s offer of a better-paid job (3.5 times greater chance). The effects were much stronger than in the preceding job-security study. However, the group of people in Germany who did not have an interesting job was much smaller than the group of those who did not have job security (discussed in the previous section). From Tables 8.7 and 8.8, it is apparent that the variables bearing on congruence and incongruence are not the only variables relevant to job satisfaction and organizational commitment (model 2 in both tables). However, age did not play a major role here; the effects are weak. The age variable is significant or close beyond significance with regard to three variables: job satisfaction, work hard, and rejection of job offer. The chances of turning down an offer of a better-paid job and of being satisfied were somewhat greater for older than for younger workers. In contrast, the chance of being among those willing to work hard to help the organization succeed was somewhat lower for older than for younger people. General education had hardly any effect on job satisfaction and organizational commitment. At first glance, this finding might not seem to make sense, for people with a good education are better off than those without (Konsortium Bildungsberichterstattung, 2006, p. 302) and therefore could be expected to have satisfaction scores higher than they did. However, aspiration levels gradually adjust to perceived circumstances and subjective satisfaction reflects the gap between one’s aspiration level and one’s perceived situation (Campbell, Converse, & Rodgers, 1976). Another possible explanation lies in reference-group theory, which holds that people’s judgments are based on experiences that they have with friends or co-workers (Merton, 1968). In highly segregated societies, this explanation may be especially germane.

Conclusion Since German unification in 1991, unemployment has risen considerably in both parts of the nation. The situation is extraordinarily critical in eastern Germany and for low-skilled people. The standard employment relationship has steadily eroded and jobs are becoming increasingly more insecure. We therefore examined whether this trend toward insecure jobs affects people’s judgment about the importance of job security as a materialist characteristic and of interesting work as a postmaterialist characteristic of employment in eastern and western Germany.

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We found that job security and interesting work were extremely important to all western and eastern Germans in 1991 and 2006 and for all age groups in our study. We nevertheless ascertained a relatively clear difference between these two regions of Germany when it came to job security. East Germans, for whom unemployment had been all but unprecedented under the GDR’s socialist regime, were suddenly confronted by the facts of a capitalist labor market and high job insecurity. This circumstance could plausibly explain the initially extreme salience of job security in Germany’s new L¨ander. Fifteen years later, in 2006, eastern and western Germany had achieved near parity. With the increasingly uncertain situation for young people in both western and eastern Germany since the country’s unification in October 1990, we were also interested in the direction of change in job aspirations. A pronounced change in the desire for job security is especially apparent among western Germans from eighteen to thirty-four years of age. Job security was far more important to them in 2006 than in 1991. This finding bears out Inglehart’s (1990) prediction that people are particularly inclined to attach great importance to things that are relatively scarce (i.e., the scarcity theory). No such escalation is evident for young eastern Germans. Among the eighteen- to thirty-four-year-olds as well as the thirty-five- to sixty-fouryear olds, the importance of job security declined significantly from 1991 to 2006. That kind of development is aligned more with the predictions of Festinger (1957) and Pearlin (1989), who assumed that people lower their expectations in order to cope better with the situation at hand. At first glance, the differing development of job aspirations in western and eastern Germany seems contradictory and raises questions. Two main explanatory approaches seem plausible. First, eastern Germans who grew up in the socialist system of the former GDR were used to absolute job security. To them, job security was enormously important in 1991, a response that led to ceiling effects in that year. It was all but impossible for job security to be more important to that group of Germans in 2006 than it had been in 1991. Second, the level and persistence of unemployment in eastern Germany may have been causal. Comparatively high and stubborn unemployment in that region of the country may have led to a certain degree of resignation. Among eastern Germans younger than twenty-five, there was no change in the importance of job security from 1991 to 2006. The ratings remained steady at a high level and were significantly higher in 2006 for that group than for the other groups. The pattern could be a reflection of a socialization effect because the eastern German interviewees younger than twenty-five

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grew up largely in a social-market economy. It also may be that this group has simply not yet given up hope of a secure job. Despite the divergent development in the importance of job security in western and eastern Germany, there was a parallel development in the importance of having an interesting job. Across all age groups, the deteriorating situation in the labor market coincided with a slight decline in the desire for an interesting job. This pattern is in keeping with the assumption that postmaterialist values emerge only from a bedrock of security. As the example of eastern Germany shows, however, materialist and postmaterialist values need not always develop as mirror images of each other; “more” of one does not necessarily lead to “less” of the other. Most important, general education is a key factor in the explanation of the significance that job characteristics have. Graduates of the highest level of general education tend to attach less importance to job security and more to having an interesting job compared to people with lower levels of education. Although a very high proportion of people living in Germany want a secure and interesting job, not everyone’s desire is met. Our study for 2006 showed that it is much easier in Germany to find an interesting job than it is to find a secure one. Eastern Germans in particular and people with relatively low levels of education are more likely to consider their job to be insecure. People with a low level of education tend to respond that their job is less interesting as well. The risk of holding an uninteresting job is particularly high for part-time workers and young people. The degree to which job placement has worsened and to which growing unemployment forces young people to do less interesting jobs needs further examination. Finally, we studied the effects on job satisfaction and organizational commitment when working people feel that their desire for a secure and interesting job has been and has not been met. Congruence and incongruence do matter in individual job attitudes. Congruence has positive effects on job satisfaction, on the willingness to work hard for an employer, on pride in working for an organization, and on the chance of rejecting another company’s offer of a well-paid job. Moreover, these intriguing findings raise questions about demands on German social policy because Germany, which is a high-wage country specializing in high-quality products, depends heavily on motivated and satisfied employees who are strongly committed to their organizations. How can high productivity and an organizational culture dependent on employee cooperation be achieved under conditions that no longer

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guarantee the job security desired by the working population? Why should members of the workforce in that situation make the effort to attain the goals of the organization? Why should they give their best? There are only small answers to these big questions. One answer is the finding that highly qualified people may well attach more value to having an interesting job than to job security. In other words, a business strategy could entail training employees so well that they retain their employability and, hence, the confidence that they are able to change employment at any time. Enhancing the human capital of the employees would eventually free them from reliance on the security of dependent employment. Indisputably, a second possibility to cultivate employee cooperation is to guarantee that the workforce can share in corporate turnover and profits. This approach also would afford the working population a measure of assurance that their work effort would gain for them benefits beyond their direct salaries. The fact that increasingly more young people find themselves doing a job that is uninteresting raises questions about job-placement processes and early vocational orientation. The chances that young people will find a job interesting to them could be enhanced by giving students the opportunity to participate in several internships or other work experiences in companies to ascertain which jobs could be rewarding. Ultimately, however, it is necessary to improve basic training for young people. Poorly trained and poorly educated young people stand little chance of ever participating in a satisfying working life. Society cannot be left to simply drift along. A job is interesting only if it is offered on the premise of basic certainties. If the vitiation of this certainty continues indefinitely, however, it will undermine the foundations of Germany’s own national economy. Social scientists have a keen interest in studying how people are socialized in different regimes and to what extent individuals differ in their values, attitudes, and preferences. The different histories of eastern and western Germany and of the nation’s unification make for a natural experiment. Unfortunately, however, there are no available data on job desires in East Germany before unification. Moreover, cross-sectional data sharply limit causal reasoning. Panel data on the change in job desires, characteristics, and attitudes would be fruitful for future discussion. Finally, small numbers of cases do not allow deep analysis of several interesting groups. It would be instructive to expand knowledge about the employed people who do not think that job security is important or who do not think that a job has to be interesting. Because the German labor force consists of approximately forty

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million people, 2 percent of the dataset represents a sizeable group. How does congruence and incongruence affect job attitudes of the people in it?

REFERENCES

Allmendinger, J., & Ebner, C. (2006). Arbeitsmarkt und demografischer Wandel: Die Zukunft der Besch¨aftigung in Deutschland. Zeitschrift f¨ur Arbeits- und Organisationspsychologie, 50, 227–239. Campbell, A., Converse, P., & Rodgers, W. (1976). The quality of life. New York: Russell Sage. Dundler, A., & M¨uller, D. (2006). Erwerbsverl¨aufe im Wandel: Ein Leben ohne Arbeitslosigkeit – nur noch Fiktion? (IAB-Kurzbericht Nr. 27). Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Gallie, D. (2007). Welfare regimes, employment systems and job preference orientations. European Sociological Review, 23, 279–293. Grint, K. (1991). The sociology of work: An introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press. Halman, L., Luijkx, R., & van Zundert, M. (2005). Atlas of European values. Brill: Leiden. Harpaz, I. (1989). Non-financial employment commitment: A cross-national comparison. Journal of Occupational Psychology, 62, 147–150. Henss, R. (1989). Zur Vergleichbarkeit von Ratingskalen mit unterschiedlicher Kategorienzahl. Psychologische Beitr¨age, 31, 264–284. Hirschenauer, F., & Wiessner, F. (2006). Mehrfachbesch¨aftigung: Ein Job ist nicht genug (IAB-Kurzbericht, Nr. 22). Hult, C., & Svallfors, S. (2002). Production regimes and work orientations: A comparison of six Western countries. European Sociological Review, 18, 315–331. Inglehart, R. (1971). The silent revolution in Europe: Intergenerational change in postindustrial societies. American Political Science Review, 65, 991–1017. Inglehart, R. (1990). Culture shift in advanced industrial society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jahn, E. (2007). Ph¨onix aus der Asche? Entwicklung der Leiharbeit in Deutschland. In G. von M¨unchhausen (Ed.), Kompetenzentwicklung in der Zeitarbeit. Potenziale und Grenzen (pp. 21–44). Bielefeld: W. Bertelsmann. Kleinert, C., Kohaut, S., Brader, D., & Lewerenz, J. (2007). Frauen an der Spitze: Arbeitsbedingungen und Lebenslagen weiblicher F¨uhrungskr¨afte. Frankfurt am Main: Campus. Konsortium Bildungsberichterstattung (Ed.). (2006). Bildung in Deutschland. Bielefeld: W. Bertelsmann. Maslow, A. (1954). Motivation and personality. New York: Harper. ´ Medgyesi, M., & Robert, P. (2003). Satisfaction with work in a European perspective: Center and periphery, “old” and “new” market economies compared. Review of Sociology of the Hungarian Sociological Association, 9, 43–68. Merton, R. (1968). Social theory and social structure. New York: Free Press. M¨uckenberger, U. (1985). Die Krise des Normalarbeitsverh¨altnisses: Hat das Arbeitsrecht noch eine Zukunft? Zeitschrift f¨ur Sozialreform, 31, 415–434. M¨uller, H. (2003). Schlaglichter der deutschen Geschichte. (Derlih: Bundeszentrale f¨ur politische Bildung, Schriftenreihe, Bd. 402).

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Oexle, O. (2000). Arbeit, Armut, Stand im Mittelalter. In J. Kocka & C. Offe (Eds.), Geschichte und Zukunft der Arbeit. Frankfurt am Main: Campus. Pearlin, L. (1989). The sociological study of stress. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 30, 241–256. Reinberg, A., & Hummel, M. (2007). Qualifikationsspezifische Arbeitslosigkeit im Jahr 2005 und die Einf¨uhrung der Hartz-IV Reform. IAB-Forschungsbericht, 9, 1–45. Rose, M. (2005). Do rising levels of qualification alter work ethic, work orientation and organizational commitment for the worse? Evidence from the UK, 1985–2001. Journal of Education and Work, 18, 133–166. ¨ Schmid, G. (2002). Wege in eine neue Vollbesch¨aftigung: Ubergangsarbeitsm¨ arkte und aktivierende Arbeitsmarktpolitik. Frankfurt am Main: Campus. Statistisches Bundesamt (2007). Bildung und Kultur: Nichtmonet¨are hochschulstatistische Kennzahlen 1980–2006 (Fachserie 11, Reihe 4.3.1). Wiesbaden. Svallfors, S., Halvorsen, K., & Goul Andersen, J. (2001). Work orientations in Scandinavia: Employment commitment and organizational commitment in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Acta Sociologica, 44, 139–156. Swaney, K., & Prediger, D. (1985). The relationship between interest-occupation congruence and job satisfaction. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 26, 13–24. Weber, M. (1988). Gesammelte Aufs¨atze zur Religionssoziologie, 1. Stuttgart: UTB.

9

Escaping the Gender Trap Young Women’s Transition into Nontraditional Occupations Marlis Buchmann and Irene Kriesi

Introduction Despite the fact that women have gained much in terms of educational attainment in recent decades in Switzerland, their occupational opportunities still lag far behind those of men. A major factor that accounts for the inequalities between the sexes in the Swiss labor market is occupational sex-segregation (Buchmann & Kriesi, 2008; Charles, 2005a; Charles & Grusky, 2004). The unequal distribution of men and women between occupations is to a large degree responsible for women’s lower pay, lower upwardmobility chances, and fewer opportunities for continuous training and tertiary-level further education (Buchmann, Sacchi, Lamprecht, & Stamm, 2007). Occupational sex-segregation has been revealed as a highly stable phenomenon (Buchmann & Kriesi, 2008 Charles, 2005a; Gottschall, 1995). Women continue to choose from a narrow range of occupations and crowd into a few female-dominated occupations characterized by inferior rewards and prospects (Brown, Eisenberg, & Sawilowsky, 1997). This raises the question of how young women manage to avoid the “gender trap” at the time when they are selecting educational programs and making career choices. In particular, we need to better understand what supports women in choosing non-female-typed occupations (i.e., the incumbents of which are either predominantly men or equally men and women). Typical examples are journalists, photographers, legal professionals, and medical doctors, to name just a few. In contrast, the incumbents of femaletyped occupations are predominantly women (e.g., office clerks, primary school teachers, nurses, and sales workers). Our research question is analyzed for representative samples of fifteen- and twenty-one-year-old young 193

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women residing in the German- and French-speaking part of Switzerland. These two age groups are at different stages of the career-choice process. The structure of the Swiss educational system and its institutionalized links to the labor market make this process a long and complex phase marked by various decision points. The differences between the two age groups in the overall life situation and the respective demands, opportunities, and constraints are likely to affect how young women view schooling and work, which in turn shapes their decisions about engaging in traditional or nontraditional occupational fields. The comparison of the two age groups allows us to shed light on the factors that shape nontraditional occupational choices at early and later stages of the career-choice process.

The Career-Choice Process in the Context of the Swiss Educational System and Labor Market The literature proposes various models of the career-choice process. Some models conceptualize this process as a match between characteristics of an occupation and personality (Holland, 1973) or individual interests (Super, 1980). Others view it as an allocation process shaped by socioeconomic opportunity structures (Kr¨uger, 1991; Scharmann, 1965). More complex approaches combine individual choice and structural constraints by conceptualizing occupational choice as a dynamic interplay of individual agency and opportunity structures (Heinz, Kelle, & Witzel, 1998; Vondracek, Lerner, & Schulenberg, 1986). Opportunity structures as well as the pattern and temporal sequence of the career-choice process are strongly shaped by the educational system and its institutionalized links to the labor market. Early selection, multiple tracking, and tight links to the labor market are the outstanding institutional characteristics of the Swiss educational system. After six years of elementary schooling, children are tracked into several lower-secondarylevel school types according to their academic performance. After completion of compulsory schooling with ninth grade (at the age of fifteen or sixteen), young people are confronted with major decisions. The options vary among further general education in the Gymnasium, which leads to the “Matura,” the educational credential providing eligibility for university entry; vocational training by either serving an apprenticeship or attending a full-time vocational school; and directly entering the labor market. Currently, about a quarter of a birth cohort chooses further general education. About two thirds (66.4 percent) complete vocational training and receive

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an occupation-specific credential.1 These credentials channel young people into particular segments of the labor market because most of the occupations cannot be practiced without the corresponding credentials (Buchmann & Sacchi, 1998). Young people’s early career choices thus have long-lasting effects on their occupational careers. Against the highly differentiated structure of the Swiss educational system, imposing very early career decision points, the career-choice model developed by Herzog, Neuenschwander, and Wannack (2006) based on the work of Heinz (1984) is most appropriate. It is a sequence model of occupational choice for the Swiss context, distinguishing six empirically tested stages. In the early first phase, children develop preferences for occupations that change quickly and have little relation to reality. In the second phase, which typically begins after entry into a secondary school type, young people develop more realistic and concrete occupational preferences based on interests, values, recommendations, and available information. The third phase is dominated by the search for an apprenticeship position or school. In the fourth phase, young people enter a consolidation stage during which they evaluate their choices. The fifth phase consists of entering and completing the chosen vocational training or school. The sixth and last phase involves the transition to the labor market.2 Young people may pass through the stages repeatedly and at slightly different ages, depending on their type of secondary school and the linearity of their educational trajectory. However, the majority of a birth cohort finds themselves at a similar stage at age fifteen or twenty-one. According to the model proposed by Herzog et al. (2006), most fifteen-year-olds are in the second phase of deciding about a desired occupation. Fifteen-year-old girls are still in obligatory schooling, albeit shortly before an important career decision point. With the end of obligatory schooling approaching, they have to decide whether to continue schooling or choose some type of occupation-specific training. Therefore, this is the time when they formulate concrete and more or less realistic preferences for particular occupations, eventually materializing in occupational choices. Twenty-one-year-old young women, by contrast, are mostly at the fifth or sixth stage of the career-choice process when decisions about tertiary education, some other type of education, and entering the labor market are pending or recently have been made. 1

2

www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/15/02/key/ind5.indicator.50102.514.html? open=1#1. Stage 5 is skipped by the few individuals who enter the labor market directly after compulsory school.

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Theoretical Considerations We embed our arguments about the occupational choices young women make at different stages of their career-choice process in the framework of cultural and occupational gender stereotypes. Of interest are how the social contexts young women are exposed to and the ways in which these contexts embody gender stereotypes affect their career aspirations and choices. Likewise, we argue that young women’s characteristics and how they relate to occupational stereotypes shape their career decisions.

Gender Stereotypes and Occupational Stereotypes A deeply rooted ideological principle still prevailing in today’s advanced market economies is gender essentialism (Charles, 2005b; Epstein, 1988). This ideology embodies widely shared beliefs “that men and women are naturally and fundamentally different and that women are better suited than men for tasks involving service, nurturance, and social interaction” (Charles, 2005b, p. 300). Based on this ideology, occupations become labeled according to whether they embody characteristics and tasks that are stereotypically either female or male. Young women and their families may differ, however, in the extent to which they have internalized and live up to these stereotypes. Depending on the degree of internalization, the stereotypical beliefs influence individual preferences and affect (biased) self-evaluations regarding occupational aspirations (Correll, 2001, 2004; Gottfredson & Lapan, 1997). Explaining how such cultural constraints affect young people’s career aspirations, Correll (2004, p. 95) argued that “individuals must believe they have the skills necessary for a given career in order to develop preferences for that career.” Cultural beliefs about the gendered nature of competencies affect how individuals self-assess their competencies, which in turn will shape their preferences. Individuals’ preferences will eventually impact on their competencies. A particular element of the stereotypical view of female-dominated occupations is that the proper exercise of the respective tasks requires welldeveloped social skills and competencies, which are commonly typed as “female.” Among the high-ranking stereotypical qualities of femaledominated occupations are empathy and the ability to work with and help people. Making use of Correll’s (2004) argument, we posit an affinity between young women’s level of social competencies and their occupational choices. High levels of social skills, empathy in particular, affect young women’s assessment of what they are good at and in what they are interested, thus pulling them into female-dominated occupations whose stereotypical

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images embody these qualities and pushing them away from other types of occupations. If this were the case, young women with well-developed social skills – that is, desired personal qualities – would encounter occupational disadvantages because of the stereotypical occupational images. Socialization Experiences, Parental Support, and Role Models To understand why young women opt for nontraditional occupational choices, we draw on the assumption that career decision points are the major gateway for social background and socialization influences (Schnabel, Alfeld, Eccles, K¨oller, & Baumert, 2002). We further assume that the well-documented associations among social background, educational attainment, and occupational aspirations are mainly mediated through the family environment by providing different opportunities (i.e., material, financial, and informational) as well as different expectations and encouragement (Bryant, Zvonkovic, & Reynolds, 2006; Schoon & Parsons, 2002). We therefore focus our argument on the significance of the proximal characteristics of the family environment for young women’s nontraditional occupational choices and show how their importance may differ for the two different stages of the career-choice process selected for this analysis. Previous research has shown that gender-role socialization influences young women’s career choices by providing information regarding which behaviors and roles are appropriate for their sex (Eccles, 1987; Ji, Lapan, & Tate, 2004; Steele & Barling, 1996). According to Bandura’s (1977) sociallearning theory, children imitate their parents, who function as role models. Along this line of reasoning, we posit that parental education, beliefs, and behaviors, as well as their function as role models, affect offspring’s occupational choices. Families differ, however, in the extent to which they exert pressure and live up to gender stereotypes, thus procuring varied socialization experiences. Social-learning theory would posit that young women’s nontraditional behaviors relative to career choices are explained as being encouraged by parents. Highly educated parents, known to be most genderegalitarian in attitudes and behaviors, may exert a positive influence on their daughters’ nontraditional occupational choices at earlier and later stages of this process (Dryler, 1998). Likewise, nontraditional parental expectations, such as the importance attributed to a daughter’s math performance, encourage young women to perform well despite the fact that mathematics is probably the task domain in which girls and young women face negativeability stereotypes (Correll, 2004; Steele, 1997). A mother’s occupational experiences are likely to serve as a role model for her daughters. A mother who trained and work(ed) in non-female-dominated occupations is able

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to provide (practical) information, occupational appreciation, and contacts for her daughters, thus encouraging them to make nontraditional career choices. This should be particularly relevant with regard to the four later stages of the career-choice process. Competencies and School Tracks Turning to the significance of young women’s academic and cognitive competencies for career choices at earlier and later stages of this process, we should remember the stereotypical image of traditional female occupations, which holds that female occupations require inherent, nonacademic, “female” abilities and skills (Rabe-Kleberg, 1987). They are regarded as academically less demanding compared to many male and integrated occupations.3 For the two early stages of the career-choice process, we therefore expect young women who do well in school and show high levels of academic and cognitive performance to prefer nontraditional rather than typically female occupations. Academic and cognitive competencies should play a lesser role from the third stage onward, when choices are put into practice and real requirements of occupations have to be met – which, on average, should not differ among female, male, and integrated occupations. Young women’s social competencies capture another important capability domain. Previously, we argued that the stereotypical view of femaledominated occupations emphasizes the importance of social skills for the appropriate performance of the occupational tasks. Eccles et al. (1983) maintained that individuals attribute more value to tasks that are perceived to provide better opportunities to confirm components of one’s self-image. Against this background, we posit that young women with high levels of social competencies – empathy in particular – are drawn to femaledominated occupations because the stereotypical view of these occupations requires these skills and, therefore, allows them to confirm their self-image. Similarly, the theoretical perspective that conceives of occupational choice as an expression of personality and self-image assumes that individuals look for those occupational fields with characteristics and affordances that match their particular personality traits and competencies (McLean & Kalin, 1994;

3

Historically, the tasks predominantly performed in female-dominated occupations used to be done by women within the family (Gottschall, 1995; Solga & Konietzka, 2000). These tasks have not been conceived as requiring sophisticated skills to be acquired in lengthy processes of formal education. In the vocation-oriented Swiss educational system, this is also reflected in the limited opportunities of female-dominated occupations for tertiary-level vocational education (Buchmann, Sacchi, Lamprecht, & Stamm, 2007).

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for a discussion, see Eccles et al., 1983). Along this line of reasoning, we expect young women showing high levels of empathy to be more drawn to female-dominated occupations whose stereotypical image places high value on these social skills. Because stereotypes should play a more pervasive role at earlier stages of the career-choice process, we expect this to hold for fifteen-year-old girls especially. In the highly differentiated and occupation-oriented Swiss educational system, school tracking is likely to play an important role for career choices beyond cognitive capabilities. In this type of system, the number of years of schooling matters to a lesser degree for various labor-market–related outcomes and to a greater degree for the type of schooling (Buchmann & Sacchi, 1998). Academically more demanding school tracks grant easier access to integrated and male-dominated occupational-training programs. This is particularly the case for school tracks in general education, providing the educational certificate of the Matura and making students eligible for university entry. These tracks also instill young women with professional occupational aspirations that draw them away from allegedly less-demanding female-dominated occupations, which should hold at earlier as well as later stages of the career-choice process. Ability Beliefs, Values, and Goals From the perspective of individual agency, women are actively involved in their career choices as ability beliefs, values, and goals shape their career aspirations. We hypothesize that higher ability beliefs are associated with lower propensities to aspire to female-dominated occupations. The basic assumption about ability beliefs across different theoretical traditions is that the higher individuals rate their abilities, the more they expect of themselves.4 Higher ability beliefs do not match the constricted career prospects of female-dominated occupations (Boylard, 2005; Mau, Domnick, & Ellsworth, 1995) and the perceived lower academic and intellectual requirements of them. We expect ability beliefs to play a more important role at later stages when young women are in a better position to evaluate the potential relevance of their perceived abilities relative to occupation-specific tasks and demands. Beyond young women’s ability beliefs, their value orientations are influential for career aspirations. In particular, gender differences in work values 4

Ability beliefs were conceptualized in Eccles’s expectancy-value theory of achievementrelated choices (Wiegfield & Eccles, 2000), in various motivation theories (Eccles et al., 1998), in the tradition of the self-concept of one’s ability (Marsh, 1989), and Bandura’s (1997) concept of self-efficacy.

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and life goals have been related to gendered achievement-related choices (Wiegfield & Eccles, 2000). What young people value as their life goals and the relative importance they attribute to various life domains affect how they value paid work in general. This, in turn, shapes their preferences for career choices. Finally, the types of tasks, opportunities, and prospects they value in their (future) jobs act as powerful guiding principles for making career-related choices by shaping occupational interests. We argue that the more young women value the sphere of work over family and leisure time, the more likely they are to aspire to nontraditional occupational careers. The greater the subjective significance attributed to paid work, the higher are young women’s occupational aspirations. With limited career prospects, female-dominated occupations are less likely than integrated or male-dominated occupations to fulfill the career aspirations of young women who greatly value the world of work. By contrast, women who value more the family sphere may make occupational choices that are driven by the desire for family–work compatibility. Despite contradicting empirical evidence (Glass, 1990), a rampant stereotype holds that female-dominated occupations are better suited to make the two life spheres of work and family compatible. Finally, with regard to occupational values, women who do not attribute great importance to typically female-stereotyped attributes of work (e.g., especially working with people and helping others) are less likely to be drawn into these types of occupational careers. If young women value highly having a job that allows one to help other people, they are pushed away from occupations that do not embody these characteristics and are pulled toward jobs that do. In general, we expect values and goals to be more important at later stages of the career-choice process. The more advanced that young women are in this process, the better they know what they really want and the better they are able to relate their own values and preferences to the occupational realities. At earlier stages, given the absence of work experiences, young women’s preferences seem to be guided to a greater extent by prevailing stereotypes. Data and Methods Our analyses are based on data from the Competence and Context (COCON) longitudinal study (Buchmann & Fend, 2004). This study included a CAPI-survey of representative samples of fifteen- and twentyone-year-old young women and men residing in the German- and Frenchspeaking part of Switzerland. The fifteen-year-old respondents (N = 1,258) were born between September 1, 1990, and April 30, 1991. The twentyone-year-old respondents (N = 584) were born between September 1,

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1984, and April 30, 1985. The first wave of the survey was conducted in 2006 and included detailed information on the respondents’ social situation and biography; family context; cognitive, social, and productive competencies; goals and values; and personality characteristics.5 The analyses presented herein are based on samples that were weighted to correct for an over-sampling of particular community types; non-response; and moderate under-representation of lower educational strata, nationality, and community type. Because we included women only in the analysis, the final sample size was 596 for the fifteen-year-olds and 265 for the twenty-one-year-olds. The fifteen-year-old girls’ nontraditional career aspirations were measured as the preference for an occupation whose proportion of female incumbents is less than 65 percent.6 We used the same definition for coding the twenty-one-year-old women’s nontraditional occupational training or job.7 In our sample, the ten most popular nontraditional occupations were medical doctor (3.4 percent); legal professional (2.9 percent); fashion designer (2.4 percent); athlete, coach, and trainer (2.2 percent); veterinarian (2.1 percent); singer and actress (2.1 percent); journalist and editor (1.9 percent); historian and archeologist (1.3 percent); hotel and restaurant manager (1.3 percent); and photographer (1.1 percent). The ten most popular traditional occupations were office clerk (10.2 percent), nurse (4.7 percent), primary school teacher (3.8 percent), sales worker (3.3 percent), kindergarten teacher (3.1 percent), educator and governess (3.1 percent), 5

6

7

The samples were drawn by a two-stage method in which 131 communities (broken down by community type and community size) were selected. Cohort members residing in the selected communities were then randomly sampled on the basis of information provided by the official register of community residents. The final response rate was above 60 percent for the cohort of the fifteen-year olds and slightly more than 45 percent for the twentyone-year-olds. The proportion of female incumbents in occupations is based on the 2000 Swiss Census data. Contrary to the well-established practice of defining occupations with more than 70 percent women as female-dominated (Charles & Buchmann, 1994; Jacobs, 1989), we already consider occupations with 65 to 70 percent female workers as female-dominated (e.g., sales personnel and translators). They are in the process of rapid feminization due to a large influx of young cohorts of women. We also tested whether maternal employment status (i.e., employed/not employed at respondent’s age of fifteen years) might play a role for the choice of nontraditional occupations. Because this was not the case, we did not include the variable in the final models. For working women (36.6 percent), we used the current occupation. For women in training (63.4 percent), we resorted to the type of occupation of current training. The few women who are neither working nor training at the time of data collection (e.g., due to unemployment, household activities) are excluded from the analyses.

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hairdresser (2.1 percent), medical assistant (1.9 percent), dental assistant (1.7 percent), and pharmacy assistant (1.7 percent). The respondents’ family background and socialization context were measured by three variables. First, a parent’s highest education – referring to the parent with the highest educational attainment irrespective of gender – was coded using four categories: obligatory schooling only, apprenticeship (i.e., the reference category due to its highest frequency), intermediatelevel general, and tertiary-level schooling (i.e., vocational tertiary education and university). Second, the mother’s (last) type of occupation follows the established definition of male, female, and integrated occupations (Jacobs, 1989), with integrated (30 to 69 percent women) and male-dominated (zero to 29 percent women) occupations being the reference category.8 This variable was indicative of a same-sex role model. Third, for fifteen-year-old girls, we have information on perceived parental expectations regarding math performance, measured on a 10-point scale, in which higher numbers indicate higher perceived expectations. This variable measured nontraditional parental expectations. Fourth, the measure for respondent’s education distinguishes among school tracks that provide (or provided) for the Matura (i.e., the educational credential providing eligibility for university entry), upper and lower secondary education. For the fifteen-year-old girls available information included their combined grades in math and German, indicating the respondent’s academic performance. Higher scores indicated higher grades. The respondents’ ability beliefs related to their scholastic self-efficacy (both age groups) and work-related self-efficacy (twenty-one-year-olds).9 The respective items were taken from the LifE study (Fend, Berger, & Grob, 2008). The reliability of the scales was satisfactory (i.e., Cronbach’s α was 0.63 for fifteen-year-olds and 0.66 for twenty-one-year-olds). To account for respondents’ competencies, we included two measures. Respondents’ cognitive competencies were assessed by half of a subscale provided by Weiss’s Grundintelligenztest (Skala 2.4.) (Weiss, 1998). Higher scores indicated higher cognitive competencies. Empathy, the socioemotional competency of putting oneself sympathetically in the position of another, was assessed by a revised scale adapted from Zhou, Valiente, and Eisenberg’s (2003) well-known empathy measurement. The internal consistency of the scale was good (i.e., Cronbach’s α was 0.72 8

9

For a substantial number of twenty-one-year-old respondents, this information is missing. A category for missing information is therefore included in the logistic regression. Depending on the main activity of the twenty-one-year olds, self-efficacy is work or school related.

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for fifteen-year-olds and 0.75 for twenty-one-year-olds). The scores ranged from 1 to 6, with higher scores indicating higher empathy levels. Two variables indicated the respondents’ value orientations. The first assessed the relevance attributed to three life domains by weighting the spheres of work, family, and leisure. Respondents were asked to distribute ten points to the three life spheres; the higher the number of points, the greater the relevance attributed to that life sphere. The reference category was work. The second variable referred to work values. Respondents were asked to rate the relative importance of three value domains by distributing ten points among the dimensions of nonroutine work, advancement opportunities, and helping others (i.e., the reference category). The descriptives of all dependent and independent variables are displayed separately for fifteen- and twenty-oneyear-olds in Table 9.1. To determine the factors that help women escape the “gender trap” when making occupational decisions, we ran separate logistical regressions for fifteen-year-old girls’ type of occupational preference and twenty-one-yearold women’s type of educational/occupational training or job (i.e., female versus non-female-dominated occupations). For the younger cohort, we ran two models: one was identical to the model for the older cohort for reasons of comparability; the other included two additional variables (i.e., perceived parental expectation regarding math performance and grades in math and German) that were not available for the twenty-one-year-olds. To test whether observed differences between the two cohorts were systematic and significant, we imposed cross-model equality constraints and calculated corresponding Wald tests (Long & Freese, 2006). We tested for equality of individual variables across cohorts. In the next section, we summarize the descriptive findings and then describe and discuss results for the fifteen-year-old girls, followed by those for their twenty-one-year-old counterparts. Due to the relatively small sample size of the twenty-one-year-olds, we also interpreted coefficients that were statistically significant at the 10 percent level only. We discuss differences between the two cohorts together with the findings for the twentyone-year-olds. Results Descriptive results showed that just under half of the fifteen-year-old girls (47.4 percent) aspired to nontraditional occupations (i.e., non-femaledominated occupations). Among twenty-one-year-old women, the proportion who work or train in a non-female occupation was 41.6 percent.

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Table 9.1. Descriptive Statistics for All Study Variables (N = 596/253) 15-Year-Olds Nontraditional occupation

Mean

SD

Min

0.47

0.50

0

Mean

SD

Min

1

0.42

0.49

0

1

0 0 0 0

1 1 1 1

0.09 0.10 0.47 0.34

0.29 0.30 0.50 0.47

0 0 0 0

1 1 1 1

0 0 0 3.25

1 1 1 6

0.23 0.37 0.40

0.42 0.48 0.49

0 0 0

1 1 1

0 0 0 1

1 1 1 10

0.20 0.67 0.13

0.40 0.47 0.34

0 0 0

1 1 1 6

0 2

6 6

3.64 5.02

1.60 0.61

0 3.2

6 6

1.03

1

6

4.67

1.00

1.67

6

1.10 1.18 0.93

0 1 0

8 8 6

3.01 4.15 2.84

0.87 1.03 0.88

0 0 0

6 10 7

1.21 1.52 1.36

0 0 0

8 9 10

2.33 3.51 4.16

1.11 1.46 1.28

0 0 0

8 10 6

Social Background and Socialization Context Parent’s highest education Obligatory school 0.12 0.33 Intermediate 0.07 0.25 Apprenticeship 0.47 0.50 Tertiary 0.34 0.48 Mother’s type of occupation Integrated/male 0.40 0.49 Female-dominated 0.49 0.50 Missing 0.11 0.31 4.60 0.49 Perceived parental expectation regarding math performance School Track and Competencies School track Lower secondary 0.24 0.42 Upper secondary 0.66 0.47 Matura 0.10 0.30 Grades in math and 6.15 2.62 German Cognitive competencies 3.24 1.45 Empathy 4.98 0.72 Ability Believes, Values, and Goals Academic self-efficacy 4.09 Relevance of life domains Work 3.39 Family 4.15 Leisure 2.46 Work values Helping others 2.79 Nonroutine work 3.55 Advancement 3.67 opportunities

21-Year-Olds Max

Max

The trend toward a lower proportion of nontraditional occupational choices across stages of the career-choice process may be regarded as an indication that different factors and mechanisms account for decisions being made at earlier and later stages of this process.

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Fifteen-Year-Old Girls’ Occupational Aspirations For fifteen-year-old girls’ occupational aspirations, highest parental education showed some relevance. Compared to parents who served an apprenticeship (i.e., the reference category), those who completed tertiary schooling raise daughters who are more likely to aspire to nontraditional careers. Given that parental educational background is indicative of a family’s cultural capital, those with tertiary-level education may adhere more strongly to nontraditional gender roles and stereotypes. In this capacity, they are more likely to support their daughters in making nontraditional occupational choices. A mother’s type of occupation does not have the predicted impact on her daughter’s career aspirations. When parental education was controlled for, there was no additional impact of the mother being a potential role model by holding a nontraditional occupation.10 For the early stage of the career-choice process, higher education of the parents seemed to be the more important structural background factor. The degree to which parents hold gender-stereotypical expectations visa` -vis daughters is indeed important for their occupational aspirations. The higher the perceived parental importance attributed to their daughter’s math performance, the more likely the daughter is to aspire to a nontraditional career. This type of parental encouragement probably helps young women to overcome negative-ability stereotypes. When turning to fifteen-year-old girls’ schooling, competencies, ability beliefs, and value orientations, the findings showed that the educational credential of the Matura was a strong predictor for nontraditional career aspirations when the perceived parental expectations regarding math performance and the grades in math and German were controlled for (see Model I in Table 9.2). This finding underscores the significance of particular types of education in the highly differentiated and track-segmented Swiss educational system. Parental expectations and achieved grades being equal, fifteen-year-old girls, when aiming for the Matura credential, are apparently aware of the types of occupational opportunities that are available with the educational track they are pursuing. Young women’s academic performance as measured by their school grades (in math and German) has a significant impact. The better their grades are, the more young women aspire to nontraditional occupations. Likewise, cognitive competencies are highly important in assessing fifteen-year-old girls’ occupational choices. 10

The statistically significant effect of the missing category is difficult to interpret. It consists of a few never-employed mothers and mothers whose occupation could not be coded.

206 0.20 0.32 0.04

0.08 −0.74∗ 0.10∗∗

−0.17 0.75∗ 0.41∗ 0.28∗∗∗ −0.25+

School Track and Competencies School Track (lower secondary) Upper secondary Matura Grades in math & German Cognitive competencies Empathy

0.08 0.08 1.31

0.25∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ −3.50∗∗∗ −365 95∗∗∗ 16 0.20 596

Log-likelihood Chi2 df Nagelkerkes R2 N

p ≤ 0.10; ∗ p ≤ 0.05; ∗∗ p ≤ 0.01; ∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.001.

0.09 0.11

−0.05 −0.10

+

0.10

−0.10

Ability Believes, Values, and Goals Academic self-efficacy Relevance of life domains (work) Family Leisure Work values (helping others) Nonroutine work Advancement opportunities Constant

0.24 0.38 0.20 0.07 0.13

0.32 0.37 0.21

s.e.

−0.11 −0.07 0.42∗

B0

Model II

−371 82∗∗∗ 14 0.17 596

0.24∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ −1.42

−0.05 −0.07

0.07 0.08 1.08

0.09 0.11

0.09

0.07 0.13

0.29∗∗∗ −0.21+ −0.02

0.24 0.37

0.20 0.32

0.31 0.37 0.21

s.e.

−0.30 0.49

0.08 −0.70∗

−0.02 0.04 0.48∗

B1

15-Year-Olds

Social Background and Socialization Context Parent’s highest education (apprenticeship) Obligatory school Intermediate Tertiary Mother’s type of occupation (integrated/male) Female-dominated Missing Perceived parental expectation regarding math performance

Logistic Regression

Model I

−127 107∗∗∗ 14 0.45 265

0.70∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ −3.70+

−0.31 −0.68∗∗

+

0.30+

0.10 −0.39+

0.15 0.16 2.33

0.20 0.25

0.18

0.11 0.26

0.51 0.71

0.43 0.42

0.86∗ 0.32

1.42∗∗ 3.06∗∗∗

0.65 0.66 0.35

s.e.

1.42∗ 1.20+ 0.63+

B2

Model III

21-Year-Olds

6.38∗∗ 2.13+

1.20 4.72∗

0.37

2.93+ 1.19

6.84∗∗ 9.03∗∗∗

2.19+ 2.78+

3.27+ 1.07 0.12

∆b 2 , b 3 b2 = b3 Chi 2

Table 9.2. Determinants of Aspiring to a Nontraditional Occupation (15-Year-Olds) and of a Nontraditional Job/Occupational Training (21-Year-Olds)

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The better cognitively equipped young women are, the less likely they are to aspire to female-dominated occupations. We believe that the stereotypical view of female-typed occupations as intellectually less demanding is responsible for these results. Young women’s social competencies in the form of their level of empathy were also related to their career aspirations – albeit rather weakly. The higher their empathy was, the more they aspired to female-dominated occupations. The stereotypical view of female-dominated occupations holds that the proper performance of the task usually requires the ability to sympathize with others and to share their feelings. At the early stage of fifteen-year-olds making career choices, the stereotypical view of occupations still seems to act as a guiding principle for them. The finding also supported the assumption advanced by Eccles et al. (1983) that individuals attribute more value to tasks that are perceived to provide better opportunities to confirm components of one’s personality or self-image. Young women’s ability beliefs, measured as scholastic self-efficacy, did not seem to matter for their career choices. It appears that for career preferences at this early stage, actual performance was more important than their beliefs about what they can accomplish. Alternatively, at this early stage, it might be difficult for young women to make a profound assessment of how their self-evaluated abilities relate to the realities of occupations. The relative importance attributed to the three life spheres of work, family, and leisure showed no effect on fifteen-year-old girls’ career aspirations. Young women at this age may not yet attribute much importance to the types of occupations that may be more or less compatible with their preferences for organizing their future adult life. Their occupational values and interests were significantly associated, however, with the type of career preferences. Compared to counterparts who value highly “helping others” in their future job, those preferring “nonroutine work” or “advancement opportunities” were much more likely to aspire to nontraditional occupations. This result seemed to indicate that young women at this age have some knowledge about the limited opportunities and low status of femaledominated occupations. Twenty-One-Year-Old Women’s Occupational Training or Job Model III shown in Table 9.2 yields results for the twenty-one-year-old women. We focus our discussion on those findings of the later stage in the career-choice process for which we predicted a different outcome compared to the earlier stage. When interpreting these differences, a final decision about whether they imply career-choice stage, age, or cohort effects was not

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feasible because of the cross-sectional nature of our data. Longitudinal data are needed to distinguish between competing interpretations. Starting again with social background and socialization experiences, a parent’s highest education showed a significant overall effect. In line with our theoretical expectations, daughters of highly educated parents were rather more likely to engage in nontraditional occupations compared to daughters of parents with an apprenticeship (i.e., the reference group). This confirmed our hypothesis that highly educated parents hold more gender-egalitarian beliefs and support their daughters’ nontraditional career choices. Contrary to the fifteen-year-olds, young women with parents who completed compulsory school only were more likely to work or train in a non-female occupation. However, due to the small group of young women in this category, the finding must be viewed with caution. Further research is needed to establish its robustness and underlying reasons. Everything else being equal, a mother’s occupational type was associated with the sex-type of her daughter’s occupational training or job. It was not in the direction we expected, however. Daughters whose mothers are engaged in traditional occupations were more likely to choose a nontraditional training program or job compared to their counterparts whose mothers hold nontraditional occupations. Thus, our hypothesis of mothers serving as positive role models was not confirmed for either age group. Rather, the significant opposite effect for the twenty-one-year-olds implied a reverse interpretation: mothers in female-dominated occupations may serve as negative role models. At the particular step in the long careerchoice process when young women choose their occupational training or their job, the limited opportunities of female-dominated occupations – as represented by their mothers’ occupational experiences – may pull them away from these types of occupations. The statistically significant differences between the two birth cohorts implies that at earlier stages of the career-choice process, most young women may still lack the experience necessary to perceive the disadvantageous working conditions of their mother’s occupation. Turning to twenty-one-year-old women’s schooling and competencies as well as ability beliefs and value orientations, the importance of the respondents’ education for choosing nontraditional occupational training programs or jobs reveal an interesting twist compared to the fifteen-yearolds. Not only do the women who attended the highest school track of Matura show a higher propensity to choose a nontraditional occupation – as was the case for the fifteen-year-olds. Young women with upper-secondary

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education also manage to avoid female-dominated occupations more often than their counterparts with only lower-secondary education. The coefficients, which were significantly stronger for the older cohort, revealed that the chance of ending up in a nontraditional occupation rises steeply with more demanding school tracks. Higher school tracks provide access to many occupations that have traditionally been integrated or male-dominated. It is interesting that this did not hold for the Matura track only. The differences between the two cohorts indicated that occupational opportunities associated with specific school tracks become more important at later stages of the career-choice process when decisions about entering a specific vocational training, school, or job are made. Twenty-one-year-old women’s cognitive competencies were not related to their type of occupational training or job, which is equivalent to saying that the cognitive competencies of women working or training in femaletyped occupations do not differ from their counterparts working or training in integrated or male-typed occupations. The finding was not surprising and supports the claim that traditional female occupations are still underrated compared to integrated and male-dominated occupations. Taken together, the differing findings for the two age groups supported our hypothesis that stereotypes play a more pervasive role at earlier stages of the career-choice process. With regard to empathy, the measure for social competencies, twentyone-year-olds with well-developed empathy were also more likely to be drawn to traditional training programs or holding traditional jobs. We did not predict this finding; on the contrary, we expected career choices at later stages of this process to be less related to stereotypical features of occupations. We conclude that empathy must be such a pervasive feature of the stereotypical view of female-dominated occupations that it overrides other assessments. Ability beliefs, measured as work- or training-related self-efficacy, matter for the type of occupation in which twenty-one-year-olds receive their training or hold jobs. Net of the factual cognitive competency level, respondents with a positive assessment of what they can achieve with their abilities were more likely to choose nontraditional occupations. Despite the lack of statistical significance in the cohort comparison, the results implied that for the fifteen-year-olds, it was factual ability that matters and not the beliefs about how much they can accomplish. The reversal of the association pattern may point to a life-course effect. In the process of growing up, young people’s capacity to convert their (real) abilities into achievement-related

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performance becomes more important. Apparently, the assessment of one’s own achievement potential is a significant factor in this conversion process; however, longitudinal data are needed to corroborate this interpretation. Alternatively, the twenty-one-year-old women’s successful choice of nontraditional occupations, going along on average with higher prestige and income, may boost their self-efficacy. For fifteen-year-old girls, this potential mechanism cannot play a role because they have not yet begun particular educational or occupational training programs. Compared to women who value highly the sphere of work, twenty-oneyear-olds who attribute higher importance to the family sphere and to leisure time, in particular, were less likely to be in nontraditional training programs or hold nontraditional jobs. The reason may be that part-time jobs – which facilitate compatibility among family obligations, leisure, and work – are less prevalent in nontraditional compared to female-dominated occupations. The finding for the leisure domain differed significantly from that found for the fifteen-year-olds, which may indicate a life-course effect – although we cannot exclude a cohort effect. At the age of fifteen, occupational choices may not yet be driven by considerations about the future organization of one’s adult life. Alternatively, the limited opportunities encountered by twenty-one-year-old women in female-dominated occupational-training programs or jobs may result in the higher importance attributed to the sphere of leisure. In line with the findings for the fifteen-year-olds, occupational values and preferences greatly predict whether twenty-one-year-old women are following nontraditional occupational careers. Compared to those who value highly social aspects of work, such as helping others, those who prefer nonroutine work or good advancement opportunities are much more likely to follow nontraditional careers. It is interesting that the relationship between occupational values and occupational choice was significantly stronger for the older cohort.

Conclusions This chapter investigated the importance of social background, socialization experiences, and individual characteristics for a particular occupationrelated outcome at two different stages of the career-choice process. We examined fifteen-year-old girls’ preferences for nontraditional occupations and twenty-one-year-old women’s integration into nontraditional occupational-training programs or jobs. We focus our concluding discussion on the similarities and differences in the significance of the factors considered for the two stages of the career-choice process.

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Comparing the significance of socialization experiences for earlier and later stages of the career-choice process, we were able to shed light on the more immediate and long-term effects of opportunities and obstacles young women encounter(ed) in their family context. In general, a parent’s highest education plays the expected role, indicating that higher parental education goes hand in hand with support for choosing nontraditional occupations. This seems to hold particularly for the highest educated parents with tertiary education. High (perceived) parental expectations regarding math performance – a skill domain running counter to the gender stereotype of ability – pulls young women away from traditional occupations. This type of parental support seems to matter at early phases of the careerchoice process. The function attributed to a mother’s type of occupation – namely, serving as positive role model – could not be confirmed for either age group. At early phases of the career-choice process, it does not seem to matter and, at later stages, the function is reversed. A mother’s occupational experiences seem to act as a negative role model and pulls a twenty-oneyear-old woman away from the type of occupation her mother held or is holding. Before drawing any final conclusions, future research should shed light on the conditions under which a mother’s occupational experience provides a positive role model for her daughters and the conditions under which the negative role model prevails. At both stages of the career-choice process, the respondents’ educational achievement mattered. The educational credential of the Matura, providing eligibility for university studies, was strongly associated with nontraditional career choices. Many non-female dominated occupations, granting women fairly unlimited access to integrated and male-dominated occupationaltraining programs, are located at the higher echelons of the educational hierarchy. Compared to many male-dominated apprenticeships with good career prospects (at the upper-secondary level), the informal access barriers for women at the tertiary level seem to be much less pronounced. Particularly at later stages of the career-choice process, young women seem to be aware of these circumstances and tailor their choices accordingly. Those with lower educational achievement end up in female-dominated jobs and the gendered career-choice process pulls them away from lower-status nontraditional occupations. This seemed to be particularly the case for women with lowersecondary education only, as findings for the twenty-one-year-olds revealed. With regard to ability beliefs and real cognitive ability, the results suggested that for twenty-one-year-olds, ability beliefs seem to matter more than real ability; for fifteen-year-olds, the reverse seems to be true. A lifecourse–related interpretation would stress the increasing importance of

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young people’s capability to convert ability into performance as they grow older. Alternatively, twenty-one-year-old women’s successful choice of nontraditional occupations may be a boost for their ability beliefs. Contrary to our expectations, well-developed social competencies draw even young women at a later stage of the career-choice process toward traditional occupational choices. The stereotypical image of associating social skills with female-dominated occupations is apparently so strong that it affects even later stages of the career-choice process. Across both age groups, young women’s value orientations were closely associated with the type of occupational choices, although there were substantial differences in their importance as well as in the particular value realms that matter. Consistently, occupational value orientations strongly shaped career choices. Young women who value highly stereotypically female-connoted realms of work were much more likely to choose femaledominated occupations. For twenty-one-year-olds, work values, together with the school track, were the strongest predictors for entering non-female occupations. The net impact of value orientations on occupational choices attests to the importance of cultural factors in the career-choice process. Whether young women make career choices in traditional or nontraditional occupations is likely to have long-lasting effects on their professional life. By comparing a young woman’s career-choice process at earlier and later stages, we were able to shed light on factors that affect nontraditional occupational choices at both stages and those that are specific for each stage. The important insights we gained need to be corroborated on the basis of longitudinal data – that is, when the fifteen-year-olds turn twenty-one and we can conduct the same analysis for a later stage in the career-choice process. REFERENCES

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Heinz, W. R., Kelle, U., & Witzel, A. (1998). Vocational training and career development in Germany: Results from a longitudinal study. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 22, 77–101. Herzog, W., Neuenschwander, M. P., & Wannack, E. (2006). Berufswahlprozess. Wie sich Jugendliche auf ihren Beruf vorbereiten. Bern: Haupt. Holland, J. L. (1973). Making vocational choices: A theory of vocational personalities and work environments. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Jacobs, J. A. (1989). Revolving doors: Sex segregation and women’s careers. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Ji, P. Y., Lapan, R. T., & Tate, K. (2004). Vocational interests and career efficacy expectations in relation to occupational sex-typing beliefs for eighth grade students. Journal of Career Development, 31, 143–154. Kr¨uger, H. (1991). Doing gender: Geschlecht als Statuszuweisung im Berufsbildungssystem. In D. Brock, B. Hantsche, G. K¨uhnlein, H. Meulemann, & K. Schober ¨ (Eds.), Uberg¨ ange in den Beruf. Zwischenbilanz zum Forschungsstand, (pp. 136–169). M¨unchen: DJI Verlag Deutsches Jugendinstitut. Long, J. S., & Freese, J. (2006). Regression models for categorical dependent variables using stata. College Station, TX: Stata Press. Marsh, H. W. (1989). Age and sex effects in multiple dimensions of self-concept: Preadolescence to early adulthood. Journal of Educational Psychology, 81, 417–430. Mau, W. C. J., Domnick, M., & Ellsworth, R. (1995). Characteristics of students who aspire to science and engineering or homemaking occupations. The Career Development Quarterly, 43, 323–337. McLean, H. M., & Kalin, R. (1994). Congruence between self-image and occupational stereotypes in students entering gender-dominated occupations. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science-Revue, 26, 142–162. Rabe-Kleberg, U. (1987). Frauenberufe – Zur Segmentierung der Berufswelt. Bielefeld: B. Kleine Verlag. Scharmann, T. (1965). Jugend in Arbeit und Beruf. M¨unchen: Juventa. Schnabel, K. U., Alfeld, C., Eccles, J. S., K¨oller, O., & Baumert, J. (2002). Parental influence on students’ educational choices in the United States and Germany: Different ramification – same effect? Journal of Vocational Behavior, 60, 178–198. Schoon, I., & Parsons, S. (2002). Teenage aspirations for future careers and occupational outcomes. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 60, 262–288. Solga, H., & Konietzka, D. (2000). Das Berufsprinzip des deutschen Arbeitsmarktes: Ein geschlechtsneutraler Allokationsmechanismus? Schweizerische Zeitschrift f¨ur Soziologie, 26, 111–147. Steele, C. M. (1997). A threat in the air: How stereotypes shape intellectual identity and performance. American Psychologist, 52, 613–629. Steele, J., & Barling, J. (1996). Influence of maternal gender-role beliefs and role satisfaction on daughters’ vocational interests. Sex Roles, 34, 637–648. Super, D. E. (1980). A life-span, life approach to career development. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 16, 282–298. Vondracek, F. W., Lerner, R. M., & Schulenberg, J. E. (1986). Career development: A life-span developmental approach. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Weiss, R. H. (1998). Grundintelligenztest Skala 2 CFT 20. Braunschweig: Westermann.

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Wiegfield, A., & Eccles, J. S. (2000). Expectancy-value theory of achievement motivation. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 25, 68–81. Zhou, Q., Valiente, C., & Eisenberg, N. (2003). Empathy and its measurement. In S. J. Lopez & C. R. Snyder (Eds.), Positive psychological assessment: A handbook of models and measures (pp. 269–284). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

IV MAPPING DIVERSITY AND CHANGE

10 Sequences, Patterns, and Variations in the Assumption of Work and Family-Related Roles Evidence from Two British Birth Cohorts Ingrid Schoon, Andy Ross, and Peter Martin

New, more global, and pluralistic views regarding the nature of transitions into adulthood are emerging. It has been argued that since the 1970s, transitions into adulthood have become destandardised (i.e., more variable and protracted and less norm-conforming) due to the expansion of the education system, decoupling of educational qualifications and employment, changing gender relationships, and increased risk of youth unemployment. Much of the current debate reflects ongoing speculations about the way in which life courses are changing. There is, however, a lack of systematic empirical research on historical change and social diversity in life-course patterns (Elder & Shanahan, 2007; Macmillan, 2005). The examination of changes in life-course patterns requires longitudinal data collected across multiple domains from representative samples in a series of birth cohorts. Such data are rarely available. In this chapter, we exploit the opportunity provided by two British birth cohorts born in 1958 and 1970, aiming to fill the evidence gap. Following the lives of more than twenty thousand individuals, we map variations in transitions from adolescence to adult life and examine the ways in which transitions have been reshaping in times of social change. We examine hypotheses regarding the destandardisation of life courses in different, recent historical contexts and across different subgroups in the population. We also address methodological challenges in examining life-course changes and offer approaches on how to operationalise ideas concerning the transformation and variation in life courses in a changing socio-historical context. In particular, this chapter draws on our recent work in applying Optimal Matching Analysis (OMA) (Martin, Schoon, & Ross, 2008) and latent class modelling (Ross, Schoon, Martin, & Sacker, 2009) to map transitions over time, and we extend these studies to 219

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identify patterns and variations in transition experiences. The findings indicate stability and change in transition experiences, as well as the continued influence of social background and gender. Social change has affected all, but not all in the same way.

Conceptualising Transitions Within a Life-Course Perspective Within life-course theory (Elder, 1985), transitions denote changes in status or social roles, such as leaving school and entering full-time employment. Transitions are usually short in duration and indicate a change in a single status position, moving from one social role to another. Transitions are embedded within trajectories that give them form and meaning. Trajectories take place over an extended period and capture sequences and duration of particular roles and experiences. Work-related trajectories, for example, can involve moving into continuous paid employment immediately after compulsory schooling. Alternatively, the trajectories might be characterised by participation in further education and training, graduation, or a combination of casual employment and repeated periods of unemployment. The life course is not defined by single transitions but rather is characterised by the interplay of multiple role transitions and trajectories involving, for example, the combination of work- and family-related roles. The combination of multiple social roles at a given time has been conceptualised by the notion of role or status configurations, which describe combinations of different social roles occupied by individuals at given points in the life course (Macmillan & Eliason, 2003). Life-course dynamics arise in part from the dynamic and interconnected unfolding of multiple role transitions and trajectories over time, which has been described in terms of social pathways (Elder, 1985). The notion of social pathways integrates the assumption of role configurations with those of transitions and trajectories (Macmillan & Copher, 2005). Within a given society, pathways through life are shaped by a set of formal or normative timetables that reflect social expectations regarding appropriate times and ages for important life transitions (Elder, 1994). Early in the second half of the twentieth century, a standard male life course involved a sequence of leaving school, starting work, leaving home, getting married, and having children. These normative timetables, or ‘scripts of life’, provided models for both role behaviours and the linking of roles and pathways over time (Buchmann, 1989). They defined access to status positions according to age, prescribed the sequencing of roles, and ascribed associated rights and obligations. The life course was thus socially structured by a set of formal

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or institutionalised rules. Such normative patterns, however, are subject to change. Changes can be brought about through influences from the wider sociohistorical context in which the pathways are embedded (Elder, Johnson, & Crosnoe, 2003). Since the early 1970s, young people in industrialised nations have experienced rapid and profound social and cultural transformations. It has been argued that the time spent in education and training has become more extended and intermittent, creating a longer transition time between adolescence and adulthood (Arnett, 2000); working lives have become more unstable and precarious; and patterns of family formation are more variable and less uniform, leading to a destandardisation of the life course (Shanahan, 2000). However, the notion of destandardisation of the transition into adult roles remains contested. It has been challenged on three accounts. First, it has been argued that postwar transitions were not as straightforward as the argument suggests (Goodwin & O’Connor, 2005). Second, it has been stated that although social change has affected all young people, it has not affected all in the same way, and there has been a differentiation of life-course transitions across social groups (Bynner, 2006; Jones, 2002). A polarisation has opened up between those who can afford to invest in further education – who take a slower route to adulthood involving longer education and delayed assumption of adult roles – and those who follow the traditional fast-track transition, leaving school at the minimum age, followed by early entry into the labour market and family formation. Third, scholars have noted the lack of systematic empirical evidence and lack of precision in the concepts employed (Br¨uckner & Mayer, 2005; Shanahan, 2000).

Transitions in Context In the following, we assess transition experiences of young people born in the United Kingdom before and after the proclaimed onset of these major changes. We analyse data from the National Child Development Study (NCDS), which follows a cohort born in 1958, and from the British Cohort Study 1970 (BCS70), which follows a cohort born in 1970 (Ferri, Bynner, & Wadsworth, 2003; Schoon, 2006). Although only born 12 years apart, the two cohorts experienced a dramatically changed socio-historical context. The 1958 cohort grew up during a period of extraordinary economic growth and social transformation described by Hobsbawm (1995) as a ‘Golden Age’, which came to an end during the 1970s. The 1970 birth cohort, in contrast, grew up in an era of increasing instability and insecurity – ‘the Crisis Decades’ (Hobsbawm, 1995), characterised by two major

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recessions and the sharpest rise in unemployment since World War II, especially among young people (Gallie, White, Cheng, & Tomlinson, 1998). During the same period, there were far-reaching transformations in the sphere of work and the necessary skills to succeed (Gallie, 2000). Employment in manufacturing industries declined and was superseded by rapid growth in service industries. The fast spread of new technologies led to an increasing demand for highly qualified recruits. Successive governments responded to these fundamental changes in the labour market by expanding higher education and implementing new training programmes. These changes in the labour market were accompanied by a dramatic increase in women participating in the workforce (Gallie, 2000). Women’s lives were generally greatly transformed in the second half of the twentieth century, and the reinvigoration of feminism advanced the narrowing of gender gaps in educational and occupational opportunities. In the early 1970s, young women tended to gain fewer formal qualifications and were generally underrepresented in the universities. By the early 1980s, the situation started to change. Girls were more likely than boys to obtain school-leaving qualifications and were increasingly participating in higher education (Department of Education and Science, 1993). Other demographic changes concern the dramatic increase of cohabitation as a precursor or alternative to marriage, the rise in divorce rates, and changes in the timing and context of parenthood (Ferri & Smith, 2003). As in most other Western countries, there has been a trend towards fewer births and the postponement or even rejection of parenthood (Coleman, 2000). How have these changes influenced the transition into and assumption of adult roles? Has there been an increasing destandardisation of transition pathways, characterised by greater heterogeneity in the timing and sequencing of role transitions, or changing prevalences of certain states and role configurations at specific ages?

Methodological Challenges Although the proliferation of longitudinal surveys in recent decades has provided many possibilities to analyse sequential data on large samples of individuals, conceptualising the life course as a multifaceted, dynamic, and diverse process poses major methodological challenges for empirical research (Macmillan, 2005; Mortimer & Shanahan, 2004; Phelps, Furstenberg, & Colby, 2002). Standard approaches, such as event history or regression models, cannot easily accommodate theoretical issues regarding interlocking trajectories, heterogeneity in life courses, and the dynamic

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interplay between person and context unfolding over time. Moreover, many aspects of the transition to adulthood are reversible. For example, young people may start full-time work directly after leaving school but may return to education to gain further qualifications. To capture the dynamics of multiple interlocking pathways in the transitions to adulthood, the use of optimal matching as well as latent constructs has been recommended (Shanahan, 2000). Both methods allow us to identify patterns and heterogeneity in transitions and their precursors. In the following both methods are applied to examine diversity and change in the assumption of adult roles. The combination of these methods allows us to identify patterns of transitions and to examine changes in sequencing and constellations of adult roles, as well as their precursors and interlinkages. Much previous research on transitions into adult roles tended to concentrate on only one transition at a time, such as the school-to-work transition. In contrast, we investigate the simultaneous interlocking of multiple transitions as well as their unfolding over time. In addition, comparing experiences of individuals born twelve years apart makes it possible to assess the influence of sociohistorical change because the birth year of a cohort locates it in a specific historical time.

Mapping Transitions over Time: Application of Sequence Analysis Our first analysis investigates the passage from school to work and other economic activities, looking at a broad slice of time from the end of compulsory schooling until the late twenties. Post–World War II, the standard normative trajectory for young men involved taking up full-time work after leaving school. Young women typically were expected to leave employment to care for the family home once they married. Of course, empirical passages are much more diverse, even for the older cohort. However, if the life course has become destandardised, we would expect the passages into adulthood to be more variable in BCS70 (i.e., the 1970 cohort) than in NCDS (i.e., the 1958 cohort). Increasing variability implies that formerly normative trajectories characterise an ever smaller part of a population (Br¨uckner & Mayer, 2005). To operationalise this hypothesis, we defined the passage into adulthood as a sequence of states of economic activities. Sequence analysis offers an approach to examine such sequences as whole units. In combination with cluster analysis, sequence analysis enables us to develop a typology of passages into adulthood. Because we do not concentrate on single transitions, we can focus attention on atypical passages that might include U-turns (i.e., the reversal of a transition already made) and

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multiple transitions – passages that we expect to find in nonstandard life courses. Optimal Matching Analysis In this section, we summarise recent work (Martin, Schoon, & Ross, 2008) that used OMA (MacIndoe & Abbott, 2004), a type of sequence analysis that is gradually becoming established in social science. Our aim in this analysis is to identify and compare typical transition patterns in both cohorts in order to assess the impact of social change on transition experiences. The sequences are defined by fourteen states, representing a cohort member’s economic activities for each year from ages sixteen through twenty-nine. These states were recorded in October of each year from 1974 to 1987 in NCDS and from 1986 to 2000 in BCS70 (Martin, Schoon, & Ross, 2008). We distinguished six states of economic activity: full-time employment, parttime employment, full-time education, government training, unemployed seeking work, and out of the labour force. The analysis is based on data indicating the economic activities of 22,212 individuals, consisting of 11,130 cohort members in NCDS and 11,082 in BCS70. OMA proceeds in two steps. First, a measure of dissimilarity, or distance, is calculated for each pair of sequences.1 Second, the resulting distance matrix is subjected to cluster analysis to develop a typology of sequences. We tested different cluster analytical procedures and selected the typology that had the best fit to the data (Martin, Schoon, & Ross, 2008). In the following section, we discuss the classification of economic activity sequences for the two birth cohorts. The separate datasets for each cohort were pooled into one for the analyses. Although most men and women in both cohorts are likely, in general, to follow one of a few standard trajectories, the hypothesis of destandardisation suggests that a number of significant ‘new’ trajectories would emerge among the BCS70 cohort. In our analysis, we thus give particular attention to small groups, which signal the erosion of standard passages into adulthood. Typology of Transition Pathways Between Ages Sixteen and Twenty-Nine We identified seventeen clusters representing different types of passages, as well as a diverse group of ‘idiosyncratic’ individuals. Table 10.1 shows the classification of economic-activity sequences and the percentages of 1

For the distance calculation, we used the Transition Data Analysis (TDA) software developed by Blossfeld, Rohwer, & Ebrary, Inc., 2002.

225

Continuous full-time work A-levels into full-time work Degree into full-time work Postgraduate studies Intermediate unemployment Severe unemployment Return to education Training into full-time work Part-time into full-time work Part-time career Interrupted career: OLF/PT work Degree into FT into OLF or PT work Full-time into part-time work From full-time via OLF to part-time Drop-out of labour force: mid-20s Drop-out of labour force: early 20s Drop-out of labour force: teens Idiosyncratic N

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

ffffffffffffff eee fffffffffff eeeeee ffffffff eeeeeeeee fffff ffffff uuu fffff fffff uuuuuuuuu ee fffff eee ffff ttt fffffffffff ee pppp ffffffff e f pppppppppppp fffff ooo pp ffff eeeeee ffff oo pp fffffff ppppppp ffff ooooo ppppp ffffffffff oooo fffffff ooooooo ff oooooooooooo –

Ideal Type 61.2 13.8 11.1 3.0 4.1 2.3 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.3 5557

NCDS

Men

46.6 14.6 11.5 6.2 1.6 2.0 2.0 8.2 1.8 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 5372

BCS70 21.3 11.8 9.3 1.5 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.1 1.2 0.9 2.2 3.4 6.6 4.5 10.2 14.9 8.6 0.5 5573

21.6 15.8 10.8 5.1 0.4 1.0 1.7 3.9 1.7 4.5 1.0 2.1 6.8 2.3 5.8 7.0 7.1 1.4 5710

BCS70

Women NCDS

Percentages

Notes: Adapted from Martin, Schoon, & Ross (2008). This table shows employment activities for each year (fourteen states) between the ages of sixteen and twenty-nine, as follows: f = full-time employment; p = part-time employment; e = full-time education; o = out of the labour force; u = unemployment; t = government training scheme

Cluster

No.

Table 10.1. Classification of Economic Activity Sequences (N = 22,212)

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group membership by gender and cohort. Each cluster is represented by an ideal-typical sequence. In Table 10.1, these ideal types are symbolized by a series of fourteen letters (i.e., one for every year). The combination ‘ffff ooooo ppppp’, for example, represents a sequence of four years of full-time employment followed by five years out of the labour force followed by five years of part-time employment. Many individuals’ sequences do not exactly match the ideal type under which they are subsumed. However, the typology represents the data reasonably well and has the advantage of providing a concise description, on the basis of which we can compare the two cohorts (for a more detailed description of the analytic procedure, see Martin et al., 2008). Does Table 10.1 demonstrate destandardisation – that is, a process of lifecourse diversification – in the twelve years that separate the two cohorts? We believe that it does, although the change is moderate rather than groundbreaking. Furthermore, diversification does not mean the same for men as it does for women. Our indicator of diversity is the number of clusters we need to describe most individuals of a cohort (separately for each gender). For example, we can count the number of clusters that contain more than 1 percent of men and women in each cohort. Percentages greater than 1 percent are boldfaced in Table 10.1. It turns out that there are only six clusters greater than 1 percent among NCDS men but nine for BCS70 men. Conversely, NCDS women are classified into eleven clusters greater than 1 percent, compared to sixteen for BCS70 women. Admittedly, our chosen cut-off point is arbitrary. However, other cut-off points (e.g., 2 or 5 percent) yield substantially similar results: the number of significant clusters among BCS70 men or women is always either the same or slightly higher than in NCDS. Thus, the number of minorities who do not follow one of several standard normative paths into adulthood is slightly higher in BCS70 than in NCDS. We learn more about the nature of this change by examining the typology more closely. Most men and women in both cohorts have followed one of four standard trajectories that involve a straightforward transition from school to work (clusters 1 through 4). The educational expansion is reflected in the relatively larger size of the clusters with longer periods of education among BCS70 men and women. A significant minority of both NCDS and BCS70 men experienced sustained periods of unemployment (clusters 5 and 6). The diversification of the male experience is demonstrated particularly by clusters 7 through 9. The BCS70 cohort came of age in a period of high youth-unemployment

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rates and was among the first to be covered by government-funded training schemes introduced in the late 1980s with the aim to alleviate the dire prospects many school-leavers faced. Cluster 8 reflects the take-up of these schemes by the BCS70 cohort. The increased importance of educational qualifications for employment is also likely to have played a role in bringing about the trend towards a return to education, which is reflected in cluster 7. Cluster 9 describes a small group of BCS70 cohort members that started full-time work several years after finishing school, bridging the gap with part-time work. Women’s passages are more diverse than those of men in both cohorts. In addition to the four clusters representing straightforward school-towork transitions, female life courses are described by a variety of clusters characterised by leaving full-time work, to either work part-time or drop out of the labour force altogether (clusters 11 through 17). These groups reflect two types of adult roles that young women are likely to take on: workers as well as mothers and caregivers. Social change, of course, is not only visible in the increased number of significant clusters in BCS70 but also in changed proportions in the large groups: compared to NCDS, fewer BCS70 women follow one of the ‘typically female’ passages represented by clusters 11 through 17, whereas more BCS70 women are found in the ‘adult worker’ clusters 1 through 4. Like the BCS70 men, BCS70 women also sought the opportunities that training schemes and a return to education promised to provide (clusters 7 and 8). In addition, we found evidence for a trend towards part-time work. Specifically, some BCS70 women followed a previously almost unknown trajectory of a ‘part-time career’ (cluster 10): these women remain in the labour market but rarely, if at all, work full-time. As discussed in the following, these women combine their part-time work with family commitments. We can speculate that many are supplementing their partner’s income, although they might also be motivated by the independence that their own job and the attachment to the labour market might bring. Our sequence analysis demonstrated that, indeed, the younger cohort followed more diverse passages into adulthood, driven by changes in education participation and increasing female attachment to the labour market, even after childbirth. However, the changes are not as dramatic as often implied in the literature and mostly apply only to minority groups. The majority of men and women move into continuous full-time employment after leaving school, although more cohort members born in 1970 engage in postgraduate studies before doing so.

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Precursors of Transition Pathways The clusters are clearly related to the social-class background of the cohort members, as Table 10.2 illustrates. Our assessment of social background is based on a dichotomous variable indicating whether the cohort members were born into a family in which the head of the household (usually the father) was employed in a semi-skilled or unskilled occupation and whether the mother had participated in further education after compulsory schooling. Transition pathways characterised by extended participation in further education (clusters 2 through 4 and 12) or return to education (cluster 7) are associated with a more-privileged family social background and higher maternal education. In contrast, cohort members from less-privileged families are more likely to be found in activity sequences indicating interrupted transition patterns, specifically those marked by long-term unemployment (clusters 5 through 6), dropping out from the labour market (clusters 15 through 17), interrupted careers (cluster 11), and part-time employment (clusters 10, 13, and 14). Thus, it might be that changes in transition experiences reflect an increasing polarisation into fast- versus slow-track transitions based on the socioeconomic resources available to the young person. Young people from more-privileged backgrounds are more likely to participate in further education before entering full-time employment and are less likely to experience interrupted careers when compared to their lessprivileged peers. Notably, mothers of BCS70 cohort members were less likely to leave school early compared to mothers of cohort members born in 1958 (64 versus 74 percent), suggesting that a higher proportion of the parent generation was better educated, thereby providing better education-related resources for their children. Those born to less-educated parents in 1970 thus might be relatively more disadvantaged than those born into similar circumstances twelve years earlier.

Outcomes of Transition Pathways: The Work–Family Nexus What are the outcomes of these economic transition pathways in terms of the work–family nexus? So far, we have gained a better understanding of the timing and sequencing of economic activities in two birth cohorts. Now, we examine how these transition sequences combine with other social roles, specifically family-related careers. We consider variations and combinations in various types of outcomes, associated with the combination of work- and family-related roles. We applied a latent class approach to identify

229

% 24 12 6 7 30 37 11 41 17 26 22 5 25 25 25 24 34 21 21

(n) (4,386) (1,323) (1,055) (236) (268) (166) (84) (17) (48) (137) (49) (183) (356) (286) (606) (782) (467) (24) (10,473)

82 59 41 42 86 88 54 89 77 85 69 47 80 83 82 83 85 88 74

% (4,424) (1,336) (1,058) (236) (272) (170) (84) (18) (48) (138) (49) (184) (357) (286) (611) (788) (472) (24) (10,555)

(n)

Mother’s Education: Left School at Minimum Age % 23 15 8 12 31 43 17 27 21 35 28 12 25 37 23 27 40 40 21

(n) (3,463) (1,528) (1,103) (537) (107) (152) (184) (649) (137) (74) (210) (129) (378) (143) (361) (376) (410) (82) (10,023)

73 56 34 33 69 75 52 78 64 79 67 35 74 72 74 78 82 77 64

%

(3,490) (1,539) (1,107) (542) (107) (153) (190) (657) (138) (78) (213) (130) (379) (141) (362) (387) (413) (82) (10,108)

(n)

Mother’s Education: Left School at Minimum Age

BCS70 Head of Household’s Occupation at Birth: Semi- or Unskilled

Note: Changes in the overall sample sizes (n) are due to missing data on parental social class and mother’s education.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 –

a

Cluster

Continuous full-time work A-levels into full-time work Degree into full-time work Postgraduate studies Intermediate unemployment Severe unemployment Return to education Training into full-time work Part-time into full-time work Part-time career Interrupted career: OLF/PT work Degree into FT into OLF or PT Full-time into part-time work From Full-time via OLF to part-time Drop out of labour force: mid-20s Drop out of labour force: early 20s Drop out of labour force: teens Idiosyncratic totalsa

No.

Head of Household’s Occupation at Birth: Semi- or Unskilled

NCDS

Table 10.2. Precursors of Transition Pathways: Parental Social Class and Mother’s Education

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how different indicators of adult social status combine within individuals. The usefulness of latent class analysis (LCA) to map out diversity and heterogeneity in role configurations was demonstrated in previous studies (Macmillan & Copher, 2005; Osgood, Ruth, Eccles, Jacobs, & Barber, 2005; Sandefur, Eggerling-Boeck, & Park, 2005). Latent Class Analysis LCA is a statistical method that enables us to identify a set of latent (i.e., unobserved) classes that account for the distribution of cases that occur within a cross-tabulation of observed discrete variables (McCutcheon, 1987). It can be used to examine whether the association between a set of observed (or manifest) categorical variables can be explained by an unobserved (or latent) typology (Goodman, 1974; Lazarsfeld & Henry, 1968). LCA uses observed data to estimate the prevalence of each subpopulation or latent class and conditional-response probabilities which describe the classes in terms of their distribution across the observed indicators (Clogg, 1995; for more details about the methodology, see Ross et al., 2009). We analysed combinations of status indicators across five domains, describing cohort members in their early thirties (i.e., thirty in BCS70 and thirty-three in NCDS). The five status indicators used in the analysis include partnership status (i.e., single, cohabitating, or married); parenthood (i.e., no children, one or two children, or three or more children); housing position (i.e., lives in parental home, renting, or owner-occupier); economic activity (i.e., works full-time, works part-time, looks after the home, is unemployed, or other); and highest qualifications (i.e., none, up to O-level [end of compulsory schooling], A-level [further education], or degree-level qualifications). Model parameters were estimated using maximum likelihood criterion, as implemented in the statistical software package, Mplus 4.1 (Muth´en & Muth´en, 2004). Typology of Role Combinations in the Early Thirties We identified four distinct patterns of role combinations in both cohorts, which we labelled Traditional Families, Career No Children, Disadvantaged Families, and Singles (for a more detailed description of the analytic strategy and resulting typology, see Ross et al., 2009). The distribution in the two cohorts is shown in Table 10.3. Traditional Families. Members of the Traditional Families class are typically married, own their own home, and have one or two children. In both cohorts, women comprise slightly more than half of the class members. The

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Table 10.3. Time Trends in the Distribution of Status Configurations: Percentage of Cohort Members in Each of the Four Latent Classes Status Configuration

NCDS

BCS70

Traditional Families Career No Children Disadvantaged Families Singles Totals (Base)

52% 23% 18% 7% 100% (10,706)

32% 37% 14% 17% 100% (11,005)

Note: Table based on results from Ross, Schoon, Martin, & Sacker (2009).

level of educational attainment varies, yet most have gained some qualifications. More than half are in full-time employment, yet a considerable proportion is in part-time work or is caring for the home (mostly women). Traditional Families are by far the largest class in NCDS, with 52 percent of the cohort predicted to be in it, compared to 32 percent in BCS70. Career No Children. The typical member of this class is in full-time employment, has no children, and owns his or her home. Partnership status among members is mixed, including single, cohabitating, and married individuals. Members of this class, on average, are more highly educated than those of any other class. In both cohorts, women comprise slightly less than half of the class members. The Career No Children class is the second largest in NCDS with a 22 percent membership probability; in BCS70, it is the largest class, with 37 percent of the cohort members. Disadvantaged Families. Members of this class are most likely to live in rented accommodations and are the least educated: this class, more than any other, has more people without any formal qualification. Compared to all other classes, individuals in the Disadvantaged Families class are least likely to be in full-time employment: considerable proportions are unemployed, work part-time, or care for the home. Compared to the Traditional Families class, more members in the Disadvantaged Families class have not only one or two but three or more children. Women comprise approximately two thirds of class members in both cohorts. The Disadvantaged Families class comprises 18 percent of cohort members in NCDS and 14 percent in BCS70. Singles. Members of this class are typically unmarried, childless, living either with their parents or in rented accommodations, and are either in

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full-time employment or unemployed. This group has more than doubled in the later-born cohort, increasing from 7 percent in NCDS to 17 percent in BCS70. The educational profile of this class varies considerably between cohorts: in NCDS, only a third of the Singles have A-level or higher qualifications, whereas in BCS70, more than half have A-level or higher qualifications. Previous studies showed that those still living at home in their early thirties were more likely disabled or had a long-term illness (DiSalvo, 1996). However, the class of Singles identified here does not have large proportions of cohort members with disabilities (approximately 7 percent of Singles in both cohorts). The data suggest that the cohorts share similar ‘templates’ for youth transitions but that their distribution has changed. We found no evidence for a diversification of role combinations because the number of latent classes needed to adequately describe the data is the same in both cohorts. However, the changing prevalence of role combinations in the two birth cohorts can be understood to indicate a destandardisation of transition patterns. Whereas transition outcomes in NCDS, especially among women, were dominated by the Traditional Families model, in BCS70, about a third of cohort members could be characterised by either Career No Children or the Traditional Families pattern. It appears that a ‘dual normative’ pattern has replaced a single dominant pattern. There also has been an increase of Singles in the later-born cohort, as reflected in the growing proportion of unmarried young people (mostly men) who either stay in the parental home or are living in rented accommodations. The increasing prevalence of Singles in the later-born cohort confirms the demographic shift towards a delayed assumption of adult roles. In particular, it suggests an increasing diversity of ‘single lifestyles’, implying either an increasing preference for ‘solo living’ or a prolonged – or, at least, periodic – dependence on one’s parents. The group of Singles might represent cohort members who are in an extended period of exploration characterising emerging adulthood (Arnett, 2000) – which, however, is not the majority group in our sample. The proportion of cohort members in the Disadvantaged Families class has slightly decreased, although in the later-born cohort, these families were characterised by less stable and more precarious employment and living conditions than in the earlier-born cohort. This group has the greatest proportion of single mothers, especially so in the later-born cohort (i.e., 18 percent single mothers in NCDS versus 32 percent in BCS70), suggesting persisting or even increasing gender inequalities in labour-market opportunities for young women with children.

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Linking Transition Pathways to Work- and Family-Related Role Combinations Aiming to gain a better understanding of the pathways leading to the combination of adult roles within individual lives, we linked the typology emerging from the economic-activity sequence analysis to the four status configurations found in early adulthood. Tables 10.4 and 10.5 present the associations between the economic-activity sequences and the status configurations of cohort members in their early thirties (i.e., thirty in BCS70 and thirty-three in NCDS), identified by the latent class solutions based on a simple crosstabulation. Tables 10.4 and 10.5 examine the associations among men and among women, respectively. The coefficients express the ratio of observed to expected probabilities. For example, for men in NCDS who followed a pattern of continuous full-time work after leaving school at age sixteen – the probability for being in the Traditional Families class – was 1.08 times greater than expected under the assumption of independence of the two variables. Among BCS70 men following the same trajectory, the probability was 1.27 times greater than expected. Both tables illustrate that life-course transitions are marked by considerable variability in successive outcomes and a diversity of developmental pathways. Reviewing the transition sequences of men in both cohorts (see Table 10.4), men in the Traditional Families class are more likely to have entered continuous full-time work directly after leaving school at age sixteen. They are less likely to have participated in further education and less likely to have experienced extended periods of unemployment or early drop-out from the labour force. Men in the Career No Children class are most likely to have participated in further education and are less likely to have started work early or to have experienced extended periods of unemployment. Cohort differences in this group suggest a more distinct grouping in the later-born cohort, characterised by the reduced chance of an interrupted career progression. Men in the Disadvantaged Families class, in contrast – especially men in the later-born cohort – are likely to have experienced an interrupted and precarious employment career, characterised by prolonged periods of unemployment or a complete drop-out from the labour force. Entry into the Singles class, in turn, is surprisingly not associated with extended participation in further education but rather with an interrupted employment career, suggesting difficulties in establishing oneself in the labour market. It is interesting that in the 1958 cohort, men in the Singles class were more likely to have participated in extended training after leaving school, which seems to be associated with delayed assumption of adult roles or possible

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Continuous full-time work A-levels into full-time work Degree into full-time work Postgraduate studies Intermediate unemployment Severe unemployment Return to education Training into full-time work Part-time to full-time work Part-time career Interrupted career: OLF/PT work Degree into FT into OLF or PT Full-time into part-time work From full-time via OLF to part-time Drop-out of labour force: mid-20s Drop-out of labour force: early 20s Drop-out of labour force: teens Idiosyncratic N

1.08 1.00 1.05 0.71 0.79 0.27 0.75 0.75 0.51 1.13 0.75 0.66 0.72 0.00 0.68 0.07 0.13 0.27 2,614

Traditional Families 0.85 1.30 1.43 1.76 0.76 0.43 1.77 0.37 1.00 0.74 1.47 1.52 0.85 0.00 0.29 0.57 0.25 0.00 1,332

Career No Children 1.12 0.42 0.09 0.13 2.23 4.05 0.20 1.01 0.92 2.01 0.00 0.59 2.32 0.00 3.63 3.10 0.67 4.32 487

Disadv. Families 0.88 0.76 0.48 1.34 1.58 3.52 1.04 4.15 3.77 0.00 2.07 1.83 1.60 0.00 2.07 5.19 8.30 4.45 473

Singles 1.27 1.01 0.65 0.54 0.71 0.23 0.40 1.09 0.73 0.29 0.74 0.61 0.54 0.00 0.42 0.26 0.15 0.29 1,494

Traditional Families 0.90 1.16 1.57 1.51 0.52 0.18 1.27 0.68 0.96 0.91 0.89 0.84 0.56 0.97 0.40 0.41 0.21 0.39 2,171

Career No Children

1.05 0.48 0.11 0.16 2.38 3.51 0.38 1.47 0.84 2.75 1.39 0.57 3.04 2.64 4.08 4.82 2.80 2.85 399

Disadv. Families

BCS70 Men

0.82 0.87 0.70 0.94 1.78 2.63 1.47 1.32 1.47 1.47 1.39 1.91 1.69 1.76 1.78 1.72 2.90 2.38 1,194

Singles

Note: Boldface indicates adjusted residuals >2.58. Assuming that the adjusted residuals are normally distributed with ␮ = 0 and ␴ = 1, boldfaced figures indicate a significant deviation of the observed from the expected value for the cell at the ␣ < 0.01 level (Everitt, 1992). We chose this strict alpha-level because of the large number of cells in the table.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

No.

NCDS Men

Table 10.4. Association of Transition Sequences (Age 16–29, OMA) and Status Configurations at Age 30/33 (LCA) Expressed as a Ratio of Observed-to-Expected Probabilities – Men

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Continuous full-time work A-levels into full-time work Degree into full-time work Postgraduate studies Intermediate unemployment Severe unemployment Return to education Training into full-time work Part-time into full-time work Part-time career Interrupted career: OLF/PT work Degree into FT into OLF or PT Full-time into part-time work From full-time via OLF to part-time work Drop-out of labour force: mid-20s Drop-out of labour force: early 20s Drop-out of labour force: teens Idiosyncratic N

Note: See note in Table 10.4.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

No. 0.79 0.95 0.82 0.85 0.65 0.46 1.31 1.06 1.08 0.96 1.13 1.51 1.35 1.12 1.36 1.10 0.64 0.93 2,883

Traditional Families 1.89 1.83 2.59 2.23 0.49 0.38 1.17 1.05 0.88 0.15 0.30 0.34 0.20 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.55 968

Career No Children 0.52 0.23 0.05 0.14 0.86 1.89 0.18 0.99 0.55 1.84 1.34 0.35 0.95 1.68 1.03 1.76 3.00 1.30 1,030

Disadv. Families

NCDS Women

2.03 1.60 0.82 1.62 4.00 6.57 0.00 0.00 2.55 1.31 0.75 0.27 0.21 0.16 0.08 0.22 0.62 2.42 222

Singles 0.84 0.91 0.57 0.44 0.76 0.10 0.48 0.84 1.03 1.75 1.23 1.91 1.97 1.44 1.75 1.24 0.53 0.71 2,021

Traditional Families 1.47 1.41 1.94 1.77 0.53 0.20 1.57 1.31 1.11 0.26 0.33 0.42 0.18 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.17 1,940

Career No Children

0.30 0.29 0.09 0.17 0.73 3.77 0.22 0.44 0.66 1.18 1.66 0.59 1.03 2.37 1.71 2.65 3.87 2.61 1,055

Disadv. Families

BCS70 Women

1.25 1.22 1.03 1.83 3.79 1.76 2.27 1.52 1.15 0.55 1.21 0.55 0.34 0.24 0.24 0.38 0.58 1.82 607

Singles

Table 10.5. Association of Transition Sequences (Age 16–29, OMA) and Status Configurations at Age 30/33 (LCA) Expressed as a Ratio of Observed-to-Expected Probabilities – Women

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problems in establishing oneself financially. In the later-born cohort, men in the Singles class were more likely to have returned to education, possibly trying to improve their employment prospects. In summary, among men, participation in further education is associated with career orientation without children. Early school-leaving followed by continuous full-time employment is linked to entry into Traditional Families forms, suggesting that men following this transition sequence could afford to buy their own home and to start a family, especially in the 1958 cohort. Interrupted employment sequences, in contrast, are associated with more precarious living circumstances, or a delayed assumption of partnership and family formation and prolonged dependence on one’s parents. Table 10.5 shows transition sequences among women and their outcomes. It appears that in both cohorts, women in the Traditional Families class are likely to have started their family formation in their early to mid-twenties. They are less likely to have engaged in continuous full-time employment either directly after leaving school at age sixteen or after extended education. They are more likely to have dropped out of the labour force in their early to mid-twenties or to have taken on part-time work. There also are interesting cohort differences for women in the Traditional Families class, suggesting that women in the later-born cohort are more attached to the labour market, even after childbirth, as indicated by increased probabilities of either being in a continuous part-time career or resuming part-time employment. Women in the Career No Children class, in contrast, are more attached to a continuous full-time career and are less likely to have experienced interrupted employment sequences. It is interesting that career orientation without children is not the preserve of women who participated in further education but is also more likely among women experiencing continuous full-time employment after leaving school early. Furthermore, in the laterborn cohort, we found that women in this class are more likely to have participated in extended training or to have returned to education, possibly to improve their employment prospects. Women in the Disadvantaged Families class, in turn, are least likely to have participated in continuous full-time employment and are the most likely to have experienced interrupted employment careers or early dropout from the labour market. Women in the Singles class are also likely to have encountered interrupted employment careers, specifically prolonged unemployment, or to

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have completely dropped out of the labour market. Furthermore, in the later-born cohort, we found an association between membership in the Singles class and return to education, as well as participation in extended training. In both cohorts, we found an association between leaving school at age sixteen followed by continuous full-time employment and a delayed assumption of partnership and parenting roles (i.e., being single without children). This finding again indicates that it is not only women participating in further education who are delaying the step into family formation but also those who are fully attached to the labour market. It also suggests a stark, albeit unsurprising, gender difference: whereas men find it easy to combine full-time employment with the Traditional Families form of status combinations, women with full-time employment careers are typically childless at age thirty or thirty-three and are likely to be in either the Career No Children or the Singles class.

Conclusion The empirical examination of transition experiences requires detailed life histories across various life domains and across a series of representative birth cohorts – as well as appropriate methods to map continuity, change, and variation in transition experiences. This chapter illustrates how sequence analysis and the latent class approach can serve as useful techniques for mapping diversity and heterogeneity in transition pathways. Sequence analysis enables us to examine simultaneously the volatility of transition sequences for different social roles and to classify individuals into groups that can be described by ‘ideal types’. These, in turn, can be associated with individual or institutional factors to obtain a better grasp of how young people arrived at particular status combinations in their early thirties. We found both stability and change in transition experiences and mixed evidence regarding the destandardisation hypothesis. Standardised lifecourse patterns continue to exist (especially in school-to-work transitions), but they also have changed (especially in partnership and family transitions). Certain sequences and events, such as continuous full-time work after compulsory schooling, characterise a smaller (yet, by far, the largest) proportion of men in the later-born cohort, and more cohort members born in 1970 are engaging in postgraduate studies. However, the pattern of continuous full-time employment after leaving full-time education remains the majority sequence for both men and women. New sequences, such as

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training that leads to full-time employment, are emerging, yet they can be understood as a variation of the progression from postsecondary education to employment, especially because they correspond to institutional initiatives and policies aimed at facilitating the school-to-work transition. Thus, the observed changes in education-to-employment transitions can be understood as changing ‘standardised’ patterns. Furthermore, there are remarkable gender differences in transition experiences. Women’s transitions are generally more diverse than men’s transitions, and they are increasingly combining child-rearing with paid work (although often part-time). Some women are adopting a more ‘male’ pattern of career orientation without children, yet the majority of women have become mothers by the age of thirty and are facing the challenge of balancing multiple roles. The traditional breadwinner–homemaker template, therefore, must be revised to account for new forms of living arrangements and enable the combination of work and family commitments. Another important observation is that transition experiences continue to be associated with structural factors, such as social background. There is evidence of polarised transition experiences, in which young people from a more-privileged background are more likely to participate in extended education and to delay the step into parenthood, whereas their less-privileged peers follow the traditional fast-track transitions, characterised by early assumption of adult roles, specifically family-related transitions. Each pathway requires different strategies to successfully meet the ensuing demands and can lead to different and yet equally positive trajectories and social pathways. For some, early school-leaving is followed by continuous employment and successfully making the step onto the housing ladder by age thirty. For women in this group of early school-leavers, successful transitioning is associated with a delay in taking the step into parenthood and continued attachment to the labour market. Those who encountered difficulties in establishing themselves in the labour market after leaving school early, became parents early, or completely dropped out of the labour market, conversely, encountered more precarious living conditions in their early thirties (especially those in the Disadvantaged Families class). Furthermore, although extended education and delayed parenthood are associated with independent living for some – especially those who also made the step onto the housing ladder by their early thirties – for others, it is associated with prolonged dependence on their parents. Some members in the Singles class, particularly some women, might simply be ‘taking it slow’, preferring

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to study rather than settle down with a family and/or to earn enough money to buy a house. However, many who are in the Singles class in their early thirties look back on a difficult start to working life, characterised by either a long period in training schemes or long-term unemployment (especially men). Thus, the findings emphasise the role of resources in facilitating the resolution of transition demands and highlight the need for broader definitions of ‘successful’ transitioning (see Chapters 6 and 11 in this volume). Transition templates must be revised to meet the realities of young people’s lives and to enable the combination of work and family roles for those between age sixteen and their early thirties (see Chapters 15 and 16 in this volume). Furthermore, it is crucial to provide second chances and opportunities for lifelong learning, enabling those who initially encountered difficulties in the transition to independent adulthood to provide for themselves and their prospective families. In their prolonged transition to independence, they might also need the continued support of their parents, which raises the issue of intergenerational models of obligation and dependence – a topic discussed in more detail in Chapter 7 in this volume. In summary, the findings indicate heterogeneity in transition experiences between and within different social groups in the population and draw attention to the need for a more dynamic and multilevel conceptualisation of school-to-work transitions. Focusing on combinations of multiple social roles gives us a better understanding of the problems and risks facing young people, who at similar ages in their life course are nonetheless at different life stages. Normative timetables linking social roles and pathways over time are subject to change, yet there is not one general majority trend. Rather, a ‘dual normative’ pattern is emerging, reflecting a polarisation of transition patterns into fast versus slow transitions, as well as differentiation within these groups. In our aim to better understand the changing nature of life-course transitions, we must learn more about how different aspects of the transitions to adulthood weave together in people’s lives and how they develop over time. We have only scratched the surface in appreciating the processes and mechanisms that produce the varied life-course patterns that we observe. Yet, recognising the interdependence of life-course transitions, their dynamics, and the role of the wider sociohistorical context in shaping individual transitions offers new avenues for future research on the changing structure of the life course and its implications for social and individual development.

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Acknowledgments The analysis and writing of this chapter were supported by grants from the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC): L326253061, RES225–25-2001, and RES-594–28-0001. Data from the cohort studies were provided by the ESRC Data Archive. Those who conducted the original collection of the data bear no responsibility for its further analysis and interpretation.

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11 Transition to Adulthood Linking Late-Adolescent Lifestyles to Family and Work Status in the Mid-Twenties Jessica L. Garrett and Jacquelynne S. Eccles

The transition to adulthood should no longer be conceptualized as a predetermined passage from one social institution to another, like school to workplace or singlehood to marriage (Andres, 1999). There is a need for new perspectives that look more broadly at the transition to adulthood, taking into account the multiple contexts that affect and are affected by the transition, and a broader definition of successfully reaching “adulthood.” Such a perspective requires a focus on patterns of functioning across multiple domains (i.e., school, family, peers, dating, and work roles) as well as on continuity and change across time. We consider the transition to adulthood to be a continuous process grounded in the daily choices youth make regarding the focusing of their energies across the multiple social contexts of family, friends, school, work, and romance. We believe that the level and quality of functioning in each of these contexts during adolescence have implications for the skills and the educational, occupational, and familial plans that youth acquire and then act out. We explore these fundamental propositions using a person-centered analytical approach.

Primary Domains of Functioning During Late Adolescence Most psychologists point to family, school, work, romantic relationships, peers, and extracurricular activities as critical contexts of development (Brown, 1990; Eccles, Barber, Stone, & Templeton, 2002; Elder & Conger, 2000; Jessor, 1993; Larson, 2000). Despite major changes in the nature of parent–child relationships during the transition to adulthood, the overall quality of the natal family relationship is critical (Barber & Olsen, 1997; Buchanan, Eccles, & Becker, 1992; Collins, 1990). Parents’ involvement in 243

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their adolescent children’s academic, social, and sports activities remains a strong predictor of the adolescents’ subsequent interest and success (Eccles, 1994), as well their well-being (Roberts & Bengtson, 1996). Similarly, the successful navigation of secondary school is critical to the successful transition to adulthood. Disengagement from school can seriously reduce an adolescent’s chance of obtaining a well-paying job in the future (Entwisle, 1990; Finn, 1989; Roeser, Eccles, & Sameroff, 1998). Disengagement is also linked to other indicators of less than optimal development during the adolescent years. In the United States, part-time employment during adolescence has become an integral piece of the relatively unstructured transition from education to work (Mortimer & Johnson, 1999). Like school engagement, experiences in the labor market also relate to subsequent educational attainment, peer networks, and family formation. Controversy about the advisability of work during the high school years continues. On the one hand, too much work (i.e., more than twenty hours a week), particularly in lowquality jobs, can undermine school achievement and encourage the taking on of adult roles and responsibilities without adequate coping skills, which sometimes leads to increased involvement in problem behaviors (Finch, Mortimer, & Ryu, 1997; Steinberg & Dornbusch, 1991). On the other hand, experiences in the workplace can provide excellent opportunities to develop skills and social connections linked to success in the labor market (Finch et al., 1997; Mortimer, Finch, Shanahan, & Ryu, 1992). Adolescents who are stably employed for a limited number of hours (i.e., fewer than twenty hours a week) achieve more postsecondary education than those with more or no labor-force participation during high school (Mortimer & Johnson, 1998). In addition to paid work, many adolescents have chores and unpaid responsibilities within the family (Elder & Conger, 2000; Grusec, Goodnow, & Cohen, 1996). Research shows that developmentally appropriate chores have a wide range of benefits, ranging from acquiring sound work habits to developing a sense of helping others and having responsibility for the welfare of others to a sense of agency and an appreciation of the needs and feeling of others (Grusec et al., 1996). Experiences with peers and in the peer culture more generally comprise another key part of the transition into adulthood (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1984). By the end of high school, both males and females rate their relationship with their best friend as more important than any other relationship, including those with family members, romantic partners, and school adults (Brown, Dolcini, & Leventhal, 1997). For most adolescents,

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these ties are positive and support a smooth transition to adult patterns of social relationships. For some adolescents, however, peer acceptance and activities become more important than academic achievement or family ties, which can lead to a decline in academic performance and involvement in behaviors that can compromise the transition to adulthood (Fuligni, Eccles, Barber, & Clements, 2001). A fifth domain, romantic partnerships, becomes increasingly important during adolescence and the transition to adulthood as shifts in friendships are accompanied by new orientations toward romance and sexual activity (Brown et al., 1997). Involvement in high-quality romantic relationships in late adolescence and early adulthood is related to greater mental health and physical well-being for both sexes, as well as high-quality intimate relationships in adulthood (Dimitrovsky, Schapira-Beck, & Itskowitz, 1994; Moeller & Stattin, 2001; Werner & Smith, 1992). Much less is known about the characteristics and outcomes of early marriage and cohabitation. Workingclass life trajectories and early maturation are both associated with earlier romantic partnering, whereas more middle-class trajectories and higher education are associated with later commitments to romantic partnerships (Eccles et al., 2002). In summary, there is strong evidence that the quality of functioning in each domain during adolescence has consequences for the quality of young people’s transition to adulthood. Little is known, however, about how patterns of functioning across these domains relate to pathways into adulthood. Providing such information is our goal.

Functioning Across Domains in Late Adolescence Baltes’s (1997) Selection, Optimization, and Compensation Model (SOC Model) of development provides a general theoretical framework for understanding the process of developmental regulation across domains of functioning and across the life span, including a well-defined structure for operationalizing components of an individual’s interaction within the context. These components include (1) selection of goals and preferences within constraints (e.g., goal systems or hierarchies and goal commitment); (2) optimization of goal-relevant means (e.g., effort and energy); and (3) compensation for counteracting decline in goal-relevant means (Baltes, 1997). The SOC Model has been applied most often to aging populations, but several studies with younger populations show its flexibility and usefulness for understanding the transition to adulthood (Freund & Baltes, 2002; Wiese, Freund, & Baltes, 2000, 2002).

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Within the SOC Model conceptualization, adolescents who focus their investment of attention and resources on a more narrow range of contexts – in other words, those who select and optimize fewer contexts – would have the resources to excel in those contexts. Those who fail to select but instead attempt to optimize all domains would fail to master any of those domains. Conversely, Arnett’s (2000) conceptualization of the transition to adulthood is that of extended postadolescence. Arnett argued that these “emerging adulthood” years are “the most volitional years of life” for most people and that, having left the dependency of adolescence but not yet having entered the relative stability of adulthood, emerging adulthood is a time of exploring ever-more-complex options and “trying on” life roles in love, work, and worldviews. Thus, emerging adolescents may be best served by investing positively in as many domains as possible while continuing to explore adult-identity possibilities. Although we may agree that many distinct, complicated life changes and decisions coalesce in the transition to adulthood, it may be untrue to assume that such a protracted trying-on period between adolescence and adulthood exists for the majority of nonprivileged, non-college-bound youth.

What Indicates the Transition to Adulthood? Researchers use a wide range of criteria to define a successful transition to adulthood. Some used successful employment as a marker (Heinz, 1999; Shanahan, 2000); others focused on marriage and relationship patterns (Clarkberg, Stolzenberg, & Waite, 1995; Larson, 2000). Osgood et al. (2005) listed the five major role domains of young adulthood as romantic relationships, residence, parenthood, employment, and education. In this study, we focus on five indicators of the transition to adulthood: educational attainment, employment, income, relationship status, and parenthood. Trajectories in each domain are likely to be influenced by the demographic characteristics of individuals. Csikszentmihalyi & Schneider (2000) found that gender, race, and ethnicity make little difference in the path a young person takes one year after leaving high school. Social class, however, was strongly related to postsecondary education (Csikszentmihalyi & Schneider, 2000). Regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, or social class, adolescents expect to work, marry, have children, and retire at age sixty-five (Csikszentmihalyi & Schneider, 2000). In this chapter, we assess the relationship of demographic characteristics, educational and occupational attainment, income, relationship status, and parenthood across the transition to adulthood. Finally, because high self-esteem and low depressive affect

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(Eccles et al., 2002; Harter, Waters, & Whitesell, 1998; Way & Pahl, 2001) are important predictors of a successful transition to adulthood, we include indicators of both in our analyses to control for the extent to which the link between patterns of late-adolescent functions across the five domains and the transition to adulthood is primarily a consequence of mental health.

Hypotheses Research on adolescence points to family, school, work, romantic relationships, and peers as five critical domains of development that influence the transition to adulthood. We hypothesize that these domains work together to describe specific clusters of adolescents, which are indicators of developmental trajectories as defined by positive engagement in a selection of developmental contexts. We also hypothesize that these clusters are related to psychological functioning and trajectories through the transition to adulthood. In addition, contrary to a strict interpretation of Arnett’s notion of emerging adulthood (2000) or a strict interpretation of Baltes’s SOC Model (1997), we hypothesize that many different patterns of positive engagement in adolescence – both broadly and narrowly focused – are beneficial for the transition to adulthood.

Method In order to test our hypotheses, we first measure competency in five domains of late adolescence, then do a cluster analysis of positive functioning across those five domains, and then measure outcomes of work and education as well as family outcomes. Description of Larger Study and Sample The data in this study are from the Michigan Study of Adolescent Life Transitions (MSALT) dataset (Barber & Eccles, 1999). A detailed discussion on methods and procedures of the entire sample and data collection is on the MSALT Web site (Gender and Achievement Research Program, 2003). The majority of the participants (87 percent) are white and from workingor middle-class families in small communities in Southeast Michigan. At Time 1, in 1990, participants were high school seniors (N = 1,384); these adolescents were followed as they made the transition to adulthood. In 1996, mailed questionnaires were used to gather follow-up data. In this study, we only used data from the 895 participants with complete data at the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. As with all longitudinal studies,

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Table 11.1. Correlations of Measures of Engagement in Five Late-Adolescent Social Contexts Work Work

School

Peers

Family

Dating

Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N

School

Peers

Family

Dating

1 1,211 −0.002 0.939 1,045 0.074 0.018 1,021 0.048 0.145 941 0.024 0.467 956

1 1,596 0.183 0.000 1,193 0.139 0.000 1,005 0.058 0.067 1,009

1 1,251 0.169 0.000 996 0.082 0.008 1,044

1 1,006 0.214 0.000 933

1 1,048

missing data and attrition were a concern. Two issues may have biased the sample: (1) because participants were required to have data for each of the domain measures included in the cluster analysis, participants missing more than half of the variables in any particular domain were not included in the analysis; and (2) participant attrition occurred unevenly throughout the sample, skewing longitudinal samples toward the better-functioning participants. Despite these concerns, the 895 participants included in the analysis nearly mirrored the broader sample in terms of gender (53 percent female in total population; 58 percent female in analyzed population), race (13 percent minority in total population; 9 percent minority in analyzed population), and mother’s education level (32 percent had at least a college degree in total population; 29 percent had at least a college degree in analyzed population). The missing participants were more likely to be minority males with a college-educated mother.

Measures All scales except grade-point average (GPA) were taken from youth selfreport questionnaires (Table 11.1 shows correlations between domains). Measuring Competence in the Five Domains at Age Eighteen The domain scores are aggregates of multiple scales. Each domain score was calculated using the following three steps: (1) each scale was averaged

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allowing for 33 percent missing items; (2) z-scores were created for each scale; and (3) z-scores of scales were averaged to obtain a final domain score. Work Domain. Two scales were used to measure positive engagement in the work domain. A positive part-time job was defined as one that allows the adolescent to learn new skills in a supportive environment (␣ = 0.71). This three-item Likert-scale included items such as “I can learn new skills at my job (1 = not at all true; 7 = very true)”. A positive chore experience at home was defined as feeling valued and counted on for one’s work in the home (␣ = 0.78). This two-item Likert-scale included items such as “If I did not do my chores, it would be very difficult for my family (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).” School Domain. Positive school engagement was assessed by achievement (overall GPA obtained from school records) and school enjoyment (a selfreport enjoyment scale, ␣ = 0.82, with two items: “How much do you like school this year? [1 = not at all; 7 = very much]”). Peer Domain. Positive engagement in the peer domain was defined as choosing peers that support good decision making (i.e., the Socially Supportive Peer Group Scale, α = 0.77), choosing peers who are not antisocial or delinquent (i.e., the Anti-Social Peer Group Scale, ␣ = 0.80), and not succumbing to negative peer influences (␣ = 0.68). The Socially Supportive Peer Group Scale consisted of five Likert-scale items, including “My friends encourage me to make the right choices (1 = never true; 7 = always true).” The Anti-Social Peer Group Scale was reverse-coded to indicate a desirable non-anti-social peer group and consisted of seven Likert-scale items, including: “What percentage of your friends does the following: Regularly use drugs (1 = none; 3 = half; 5 = all).” Negative peer influence was measured with four items from the Extreme Peer Focus Scale (Fuligni et al., 2001), including: “It’s okay to break parents’ rules to keep your friends (1 = never; 7 = always).” These items were reverse-coded. Family Domain. Positive engagement in the family environment was indicated by measures of connectedness, appropriate expressions of autonomy, and lack of parental psychological control. Connectedness and autonomy were assessed with three items in the Connection with Family scale (α = 0.76), including “Our family enjoys doing things together (1 = never true; 7 = always true).” Lack of psychological control was assessed with

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six items from the Lack of Parental Psychological Control scale (α = 0.82), including “My parents encourage me to give my ideas and opinions even if we might disagree (1 = never true; 7 = always true)” (Barber & Olsen, 1997). Dating Domain. For an adolescent to be positively engaged in exploring the dating domain, he or she must first have experiences in this domain, either with a quality partner or through active dating. We defined a competent “dater” as one who either has (1) no steady partner but an active dating life, or (2) a steady partner of whom one’s parents approve. These characteristics were assessed using three variables: “How often do you go out on dates without other couples or friends? (1 = never; 3 = very often)”; “Are you currently going out with only one person? (1 = no; 2 = yes)”; and “How much do your parents approve of this person? (1 = not very much; 3 = very much).” Although parents may not always make correct judgments about partner quality, parental approval is an important indicator of a quality partner, and it was the only variable in this wave of the dataset that allowed for such a partner-quality assessment. Positive engagement in the dating domain was scored as a dichotomous variable (1 = quality experience; 2 = no quality experience). An adolescent with a steady partner was scored “1” only if he or she indicated approving parents with a “2” or “3” score. An adolescent without a steady partner was scored “1” only if he or she indicated active dating with a “2” or “3” score. Gender and Mother’s Educational Attainment Gender was measured by self-report with self-reported “sex” (female = 1; male = 2). Family socioeconomic status (SES), based on adolescents’ reports of their mother’s highest education level, was dichotomized into two levels (low = high school or less; high = some college or more) (M¨uller & Shavit, 1998). Psychological Variables Measured at ages eighteen and twenty-five, self-esteem and depressive affect were both means of three 7-point Likert scale items. The self-esteem items included “How often do you feel good about yourself?” and “How often do you feel satisfied with yourself the way you are?” (αage18 = 0.81; αage25 = 0.83). The depressed-mood scale included items such as “How often do you feel difficulties are piling up so high they can’t be overcome?” These items were reverse-coded to assess low depressive affect (αage18 = 0.73; αage25 = 0.73).

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Education and Work Outcomes All status variable data at age twenty-five were obtained from mailed, self-report questionnaires. Educational Attainment was measured with the question, “What is the last year of school you have completed?” CollegeMajor Choice was asked of those participants who attended college with the question, “What is your first major?” The response was coded as either Math/Engineering/Physical Science, Allied Medicine, Skilled Labor, Business, Social Sciences, Education, or Humanities. Career Choice was measured with the question, “Currently, what is your main job or occupation?” The response was coded as Retail/Clerical (Pink Collar; e.g., hotel clerk, sales), Blue Collar (e.g., steel worker, truck driver), Human Services (White Collar; e.g., hairdresser, health aid), Management/Administrative (White Collar; e.g., foreman, bookkeeper), or Advanced Degree Required (e.g., engineer, doctor). Household Income was assessed with the question, “Please indicate your total household income (1 = less than $5,000; 3 = between $10,000 and $19,000; 5 = between $30,000 and $39,000; 7 = more than $50,000).” Family Outcomes Relationship status at age twenty-five was measured with a single item asking participants to indicate “I am married”; “I am living with someone in a steady, marriage-like relationship”; “I am not living with him or her, but I have a steady, romantic relationship with one person”; or “None of the above.” We combined the married and cohabitating categories. Perceived Likelihood of Marriage was measured with one item: “How likely is it that you will get married? (1 = not likely at all; 7 = very likely).” Pregnancy history was measured with the question, “Have you (or your partner) ever been pregnant? (1 = yes; 2 = no).” Perceived Likelihood of Having Children was measured with one item: “How likely is it that you will have children? (1 = not likely at all; 7 = very likely).”

Analyses To better understand how patterns of positive engagement in late adolescence are related to trajectories of development across the transition to adulthood, we used three types of analyses. First, we used person-centered cluster analysis to differentiate profiles of competence across the five adolescent domains assessed at Time 1. We used the Ward agglomeration procedure to increase the variance between groups and decrease the variance within groups, thus creating clusters with more clearly differentiated profiles

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(Blashfield & Aldenderfer, 1978). We used the Euclidian metric method to calculate the distance matrix because the correlations across domains are quite small (i.e., less than 0.22). We selected the five-cluster solution because it created the most theoretically coherent groups. More clusters split meaningful groups into less theoretically interesting subgroups, and fewer clusters created profiles that were too large and amorphous to be meaningful. Following the cluster analysis, we used analyses of variance (ANOVA) and chi-square analyses to assess the relation of cluster membership to (1) initial demographic characteristics, (2) psychological variables at both waves, and (3) adulthood status variables six years later. We used Tukey post-hoc analyses to find significant mean differences between the cluster scores on psychological measures.

Results First, we report results of the cluster analyses and the relationship between cluster membership and psychological well-being. Next, we report results demonstrating the relationship between cluster membership and work and education outcomes, including college attainment and career choice, and family outcomes, including marriage and children. Derivation and Replication of Profiles of Competence Using Ward cluster analysis on age eighteen data, we identified five distinct profiles of competence across the five domains (Figure 11.1 and Table 11.2). We used ANOVA with these competence indicators to describe each of the five profiles. Early Starters (N = 81) were disengaged from school but had positive scores in the more “adult” domains of work and dating, as well as in the family domain. Late Bloomers (N = 193) had high scores in the school, family, and peers domains but were not yet very involved in the dating and work domains. Well-Rounded Adolescents (N = 169) had high scores in the four domains except work, in which they were only slightly above average. Workers (N = 232) showed high levels of engagement only in the work domain; they had very low scores in the dating domain and below-average scores in the family and peers domains. Finally, Daters (N = 220) had high scores in the dating domain and below-average scores in the family and peers domains. To confirm the cluster solution, we used a subsample procedure, randomly selecting a two-thirds subsample of 547 subjects and re-running the Ward procedure, resulting in closely comparable clusters. The resulting subsample clusters were significantly associated with the original cluster

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Table 11.2. Measures of Engagement in Late-Adolescent Social Contexts for Each Cluster Social Contexts Clusters Late Bloomers

Daters

Workers

Well-Rounded Adolescents

Early Starters

Totals

Family

School

Work

Peers

Dating

Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean

0.527 193 0.680 −0.598 220 0.944 −0.520 232 0.862 0.646

0.705 193 0.600 0.099 220 0.754 −0.078 232 0.917 0.683

−0.073 193 0.850 0.008 220 0.867 0.279 232 0.908 0.195

0.474 193 0.746 −0.558 220 0.779 −0.485 232 0.895 0.696

−0.448 193 0.604 0.498 220 0.647 −1.121 232 0.371 1.139

N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD

169 0.769 0.711 81 0.608 0.018 895 0.998

169 0.536 −1.18 81 0.643 0.178 895 0.905

169 1.05 0.691 81 0.862 0.158 895 0.934

169 0.662 −0.050 81 0.736 −0.034 895 0.939

169 0.225 0.583 81 0.771 0.003 895 0.993

Figure 11.1. Cluster Analysis of Engagement Across Five Late-Adolescent Social Contexts.

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solution, ␹ 2 (16, N = 547) = 750.84, p = 0.00, confirming its stability and replicability. Cluster Demographics We used ANOVA to examine the relationship of gender and Mother’s Educational Attainment with the age eighteen life domains that were assessed with continuous scales: family, school, peers, and work. Scores in both the family and peers domains were significantly associated with gender: F(1, 563) = 8.07, p = 0.005, and F(1, 563) = 85.63, p = 0.000, respectively. Females had higher scores than males in the family (Female M = 0.08, SD = 1.05; Male M = −0.06, SD = 0.93) and peers domains (Female M = 0.24, SD = 0.87; Males M = −0 .41, SD = 0.91). Neither Mother’s Educational Attainment nor any of the interactions between Mother’s Educational Attainment and gender were significantly associated with any of the domains. Next, we used a series of chi-square analyses and ANOVA to explore the relationships of each competence cluster with gender. Gender was significantly associated with cluster membership, ␹ 2 (4, N = 895) = 30.33, p = 0.00. Females were overrepresented in the Well-Rounded Adolescents (Standardized Residual [R] = 22.8) and Early Starter (R = 7.4) groups; males were overrepresented in the Worker (R = 12.5) and Dater (R = 24.6) groups. Late Bloomers were evenly divided between the sexes. Mother’s Educational Attainment was not significantly related to cluster membership ␹ 2 (4, N = 895) = 6.89, p = 0.55. Assessing the Relationships of Cluster-Group Membership to Psychological Functioning We used ANOVA to explore the relationships of cluster-group membership with both self-esteem and depressive affect at ages eighteen and twentyfive. Interaction effects of gender and Mother’s Educational Attainment with each cluster were also assessed. Cluster membership was associated with psychological functioning at ages eighteen and twenty-five (Table 11.3 lists means and standard deviations for psychological variables by each domain). Late Bloomers and Well-Rounded Adolescents had significantly better psychological functioning than Daters and Workers at age eighteen. Six years later, Late Bloomers and Well-Rounded Adolescents continued to report the highest levels of psychological functioning. Exploring the Relationships of Cluster-Group Membership to Educational and Occupational Outcomes We used chi-square analysis and ANOVA to assess the relationship of age eighteen cluster membership to age twenty-five Educational Attainment,

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Table 11.3. Measures of Psychological Well-Being for Each Cluster Depressive Affect Age 18

Self-Esteem Age 18

Depressive Affect Age 25

Self-Esteem Age 25

Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean

4.78b,c 193 1.10 4.26a,d 220 1.24 4.22a,d 232 1.23 4.81b,c

5.07b,c ,d 193 1.08 4.70a,d 220 1.120 4.55a,d 232 1.27 5.49a,b,c ,e

4.94c 136 1.11 4.72 132 0.96 4.55a,d 129 0.97 4.94c

5.01 136 1.21 4.79 132 1.07 4.65d 129 1.09 5.07c

N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD

168 1.03 4.44 81 1.30 4.48 894 1.20

168 1.17 4.89d 81 1.46 4.91 894 1.26

121 1.06 4.57 37 1.06 4.77 555 1.04

121 1.18 4.68 37 1.28 4.86 555 1.16

Clusters Late Bloomers

Daters

Workers

Well-Rounded Adolescents

Early Starters

Totals

Notes: Superscripts indicate significant differences with a = Late Bloomers; b = Daters; c = Workers; d = Well-Rounded Adolescents; e = Early Starters, as indicated by Tukey Post-Hoc analysis.

College-Major Choice, Occupation Choice, and Income. A significant relationship emerged between cluster membership and Educational Attainment 2 at age twenty-five for women, ␹ female (20, N = 381) = 40.99, p = 0.004 but not for men. Late Bloomers were overrepresented among graduate students (R = 3.0). Workers were overrepresented among those who stopped their education with a high school diploma (R = 1.9). Early Starters were marginally underrepresented among those who had completed any graduate school by age twenty-five (R = −1.7). It is interesting that there were no cluster differences in obtaining a bachelor’s degree. A significant relationship also emerged between cluster membership and 2 College-Major Choice at age twenty-five for women, ␹ female (24, N = 277) = 2 35.76, p = 0.058, but not for men, ␹ male (24, N = 157) = 24.92, p = 0.410. Recall that these analyses were conducted for only those participants who were or had been in college. The significant difference for women was within the social sciences: Late Bloomers were marginally less likely than expected to major in social sciences (R = −1.6), whereas Daters were more likely than expected to choose a social science major (R = 2.7). Additionally, Well-Rounded Adolescents were more likely than expected to have a skilled-labor major (R = 2.2).

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A significant relationship emerged between cluster membership and 2 Occupation Choice at age twenty-five for women, ␹ female (16, N = 341) = 2 28.78, p = 0.025, and a trend emerged for men, ␹ male (16, N = 224) = 24.94, p = 0.071. Late Bloomers of both genders were overrepresented in Advanced Degree Required occupations (Rfemale = 3.1; Rmale = 2.7). Among the males, Late Bloomers were less likely than expected to be in a Blue Collar job (R = −2.1), whereas Early Starters were more likely than expected to be in a Blue Collar job (R = 1.7). Among the females, Daters were marginally less likely than expected to be in an Advanced Degree Required job (R = −1.7). At age twenty-five, cluster membership was not significantly related to total household income, F (4, 537) = 1.09, p = 0.36. Exploring Relationships Between Cluster Membership and Family Outcomes A significant relationship existed between cluster membership and relationship status at age twenty-five, ␹ 2 (8, N = 659) = 25.4, p = 0.001. The most striking findings were differences between Early Starters and Late Bloomers. As expected, Late Bloomers were significantly underrepresented in the married or cohabitating status category (R = −2.0). In addition, the Well-Rounded Adolescents were underrepresented among the singles (R = −2.6). Of all the contexts, the impact of high school dating on the transition to adulthood should be particularly likely to differ by gender and Mother’s Educational Attainment because SES differences in gender roles in male–female romantic relationships are especially impervious to historical changes in gender-role identities (Moen & Orrange, 2002). Therefore, we conducted chi-square analyses for each gender and for gender by Mother’s Educational Attainment categories. Adult relationship status and high school cluster membership were significantly related only for women with lesseducated mothers, ␹ 2 (8, N = 135) = 18.09, p = 0.02. As expected, Early Starter women with low Mother’s Educational Attainment were more likely than expected to be married or cohabitating (R = 1.8). Daters were overrepresented in the singles category (R = 2.1). A significant relationship between cluster membership and Perceived Likelihood of Marriage also existed at age twenty-five for women, F = 2.68(4), p = 0.040, but not for men, F = 1.60(4), p = 1.832. Among the women, Well-Rounded Adolescents (M = 5.57), Early Starters (M = 5.47), and Late Bloomers (M = 5.40) reported a higher Perceived Likelihood of Marriage than Workers (M = 4.95) or Daters (M = 4.59).

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Finally, a significant relationship between cluster membership and Perceived Likelihood of Having Children existed at age twenty-five for women, F = 2.27(4), p = 0.064, but not for men, F = 1.35(4), p = 0.253. Among the women, Well-Rounded Adolescents (M = 5.55), Early Starters (M = 5.56), and Late Bloomers (M = 5.45) reported higher Perceived Likelihood of Having Children than Workers (M = 4.27) or Daters (M = 4.12). It is interesting that there were no significant cluster differences in the likelihood of having had a child due to the fact that so few youth in any of the clusters had already become a parent.

Discussion In our study, we had two main hypotheses: (1) it would be possible to identify theoretically meaningful clusters of engagement in the five key domains of functioning at age eighteen; and (2) membership in these clusters would relate meaningfully to work and family status in the mid-twenties. The results confirmed these basic hypotheses. Clearly, individuals can be clustered according to their functioning across the five critical domains of late adolescence: school, family, peers, dating, and work roles. Five theoretically meaningful clusters emerged, and each cluster represented a unique pattern of functioning. One group, labeled Well-Rounded Adolescents, excelled in all five domains. This group also reported the highest levels of psychological functioning at both time points. It is interesting that there was no evidence of members of this group having any particularly unique pathways into adulthood; they did not stand out in any of the adult-status categories assessed. Thus, this group may best represent the transitional process that Arnett (2000) called emerging adulthood. The other four groups showed more differentiated patterns of functioning at Time 1 (i.e., senior year in high school). These patterns are consistent with Baltes’s (1997) SOC theory. Two of the clusters, Early Starters and Late Bloomers, represent positive but different types of SOC patterns. Although Late Bloomers reported slightly higher psychological well-being at both time points, the differences were not significant and both groups reported quite positive levels. As seniors, Early Starters seemed to have moved beyond the more “adolescent” lifestyle domains of peers and school and were investing their energy in the more “adult” domains of work and dating. At age twenty-five, the lower SES females in this cluster were particularly likely to be married or cohabitating and the males were particularly likely to be employed full time in blue-collar, skilled occupations. For both females and males, these youth appear to have transitioned into adulthood along an

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easily identified and positive pathway – a pathway characterized by early movement into the labor market and early family formation. This pathway is reminiscent of the traditional working-class pattern. In contrast, as seniors, Late Bloomers were primarily invested in the school, natal family, and peers domains, optimizing their success in these domains; they were not yet very involved in either work or dating. It is not surprising that at age twenty-five, the females in this group were particularly unlikely to be married or cohabitating, and both the males and females were most likely to be in graduate school. Again, both the males and females appear to have transitioned into adulthood along an easily identified and positive pathway – a pathway characterized by strong investments in their educational capital at the expense of investments in marriage and moving directly into the labor market. This group, then, also illustrates what Arnett (2000) called emerging adulthood. In contrast to these more positive pathways, the remaining two clusters appear to be more problematic at both time points. Both Workers and Daters excelled in only one domain and had low scores in two or three of the other domains, particularly peers and family relationships. They also reported the lowest levels of psychological well-being at both time points and the lowest levels of success in the school domain at Time 1. Workers seemed to be a particularly problematic pathway, showing the least-wellfunctioning pattern at both time points. It is likely that difficulties at home undermined the developmental progress of both groups (Sameroff et al., 1998). The fact that neither cluster has a strongly supportive, pro-social peer network is likely to have compounded the difficulties. Cluster Membership and Academic and Work Transitions As expected, Late Bloomers stayed in school the longest and comprised the only group in which most individuals had earned a bachelor’s degree by age twenty-five. In addition, of those who had completed college and entered the workforce, Late Bloomers also were overrepresented in the Advanced Degree Required occupations and underrepresented in blue-collar jobs. Clearly, they had been on an academically oriented track since high school and had laid the foundation for a professional track – investing extensively in their own psychological capital rather than romantic relationships. Again, it seems that lifestyle paths established by adolescents in high school predict lifestyle choices during the transition to adulthood. Somewhat to our surprise, the groups did not differ in total household income at age twenty-five. This likely reflects the fact that individuals with

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the most earning potential are just entering the labor force, whereas Early Starters are well established in a skilled-labor career trajectory. As a result, income streams have not yet become fully differentiated. However, because educational attainment is a good predictor of lifetime income (M¨uller & Shavit, 1998), we can expect income levels among clusters to differentiate as participants continue the transition to adulthood. Cluster Membership and Family Transitions The women in the Late Bloomer cluster were the least likely to be married or cohabitating. Late Bloomer women but not Late Bloomer men were also far more likely than expected to obtain some post-baccalaureate education, as well as having high expectations for future marriage and parenthood. This result supports the conclusion that women in the Late Bloomer cluster were focused on investing in their own psychological capital during their early twenties. Although Well-Rounded Adolescent and Late Bloomer women were the least likely to be married or cohabitating at age twenty-five, both groups were above the mean at Time 2 in their expectations of marriage in the future. Early Starters who had already shown a propensity toward marriage at age twenty-five were also above the mean in their expectation of getting married. In contrast, although Workers and Daters had begun to invest in adult domains at age eighteen, they were below the mean in their expectation of getting married in the future at age twenty-five. These two groups also reported the lowest expectation of having children. Perhaps the expectation of marriage and family in the future is an indication of optimism. Therefore, whereas both Workers and Daters had invested in adult domains at the end of high school, this “choice” did not indicate maturity or choice of lifestyle track but rather that they were unable to build or find a supportive developmental environment and thus invested in the only positive environments available to them. In the case of both Daters and Workers, there was neither a diversification of supportive contexts nor a lack of balance between social and vocational investments. These lifestyle choices and environmental supports undoubtedly were related to earlier choices in adolescence and childhood and the environments in which the individuals developed. Compared with other groups, Daters and Workers reported lower feelings of well-being. When some supports are failing, an individual can be buttressed by compensatory relationships – that is, a person or context that compensates for other failing contexts, thus fostering resiliency. Daters and Workers focused on only one context in

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high school, which did not allow for a healthy diversification of family and occupational development through the transition to work and family. By focusing on the groups that made positive transitions to work and family, we can see that different lifestyle patterns established in high school can lead to quite different and yet equally positive trajectories to young adulthood. Late Bloomers and Well-Rounded Adolescents reported high wellbeing in high school. Early Starters were at the mean of well-being. Through the transition to adulthood, both Late Bloomers and Well-Rounded Adolescents maintained their high well-being, whereas Early Starters declined slightly. Nonetheless, in terms of making normative transitions to the work and family domains, all three groups established patterns that served them well in terms of a pattern of choreographed transitions. Many Well-Rounded Adolescents and Late Bloomers earned bachelor’s and advanced degrees; although they expected to be married and have children, few were as of yet. In contrast, at age twenty-five, Early Starters were far less likely to have earned a bachelor’s or more advanced college degree; they were more likely to be in a blue-collar job that did not require such a degree, and they were likely to be married. Each of these educational choices, when viewed in conjunction with family choices, makes sense for the groups’ trajectories. We can conclude that our call for a broader definition of successfully transitioning into adulthood is important to understand the full range of positive developmental choices. The notion of emerging adulthood, which runs parallel to our Well-Rounded Adolescent cluster, was a successful pattern for those individuals who chose it. Likewise, the Late Bloomer and Early Starter patterns – which are closer to patterns of successful investment prescribed by the SOC Model – were also successful for those individuals. Although patterns of limited, undiversified investment did not lead to a successful transition, no one lifestyle pattern is the “right” pattern. It would be interesting to follow up with these clusters to determine whether those who were married with children earlier are happier in middle age when their children are grown and on their own than those who chose to postpone marriage and childbearing and might be involved in stressful, later-life childrearing. Although cluster analyses allow for an important, revealing, personcentered view of trajectories through the transition to adulthood, such methods are exploratory in nature. Clustering allows us to see patterns and ascertain a more nuanced understanding of how individuals construct their lives. However, we should be careful not to interpret the resulting clusters as a standard typology. Rather, they are examples of participant groupings that allow us to test our hypotheses regarding the link

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between such patterns of functioning in late adolescence, however described, and family and work outcomes in young adulthood. Our analyses call for a continued exploration of how patterns of positive investment across many domains before a transition continue to shape lives after the transition. However, we can draw policy recommendations from the present data that we believe are broadly useful. It seems clear that adolescents who invest all positive resources in one domain, failing to diversify at all, have not built a sufficiently sturdy foundation to support a successful transition to adulthood. That stated, we do not conclude that any specialization is negative; in fact, those late adolescents who specialize in a few select domains demonstrated distinct and positive transition trajectories. The selection of domains in which late adolescents choose to invest is important for later trajectories. For example, those who wish to complete a high level of education may do well to postpone serious dating in high school. In general, late adolescents should be encouraged to “try on” roles available to them while also considering how those choices will impact their longer-term future transition to adulthood.

REFERENCES

Andres, L. (1999). Multiple life-sphere participation by young adults. In W. Heinz (Ed.), From education to work: Cross-national perspectives (pp. 149–170). New York: Cambridge University Press. Arnett, J. J. (2000). Emerging adulthood: A theory of development from the late teens through the twenties. American Psychologist, 55, 469–480. Baltes, P. B. (1997). On the incomplete architecture of human ontogeny: Selection, optimization, and compensation as foundation of developmental theory. American Psychologist, 52(4), 366–380. Barber, B. L., & Eccles, J. S. (1999). Round holes, square pegs, rocky roads, and sore feet: Adolescents’ education and their transition to adulthood. Spencer Foundation Grant No. N00129, Subcontract No. Y541616. Tucson: University of Arizona. Barber, B. K., & Olsen, J. A. (1997). Socialization in context: Connection, regulation, and autonomy in the family, school, and neighborhood, and with peers. Journal of Adolescent Research (Special Issue). Adolescent Socialization in Context: Connection, Regulation, and Autonomy in Multiple Contexts, Part II, 12(2), 287–315. Blashfield, R. K., & Aldenderfer, M. S. (1978). The literature on cluster analysis. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 13(3), 271–295. Brown, B. B. (1990). Peer groups and peer cultures. In S. S. Feldman & G. R. Elliott (Eds.), At the threshold: The developing adolescent (pp. 171–196). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Brown, B. B., Dolcini, M. M., & Leventhal, A. (1997). Transformations in peer relationships at adolescence: Implications for health-related behavior. In J. Schulenberg,

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J. Maggs, & K. Hurrelmann (Eds.), Health risks and developmental transitions during adolescence (pp. 161–189). New York: Cambridge University Press. Buchanan, C. M., Eccles, J. S., & Becker, J. B. (1992). Are adolescents the victims of raging hormones? Evidence for activational effects of hormones on moods and behavior at adolescence. Psychological Bulletin, 111(1), 62–107. Clarkberg, M., Stolzenberg, R. M., & Waite, L. J. (1995). Attitudes, values, and entrance into cohabitational versus marital unions. Social Forces, 74(2), 609–632. Collins, W. A. (1990). Parent–child relationships in the transition to adolescence: Continuity and change in interaction, affect, and cognition. In R. Montemayor, G. R. Adams, & T. P. Gullotta (Eds.), From childhood to adolescence: A transitional period? (pp. 85–106), Advances in Adolescent Development, an annual book series, Vol. 102. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. Csikszentmihalyi, M., & Larson, R. (1984). Being adolescent: Conflict and growth in the teenage years. New York: Basic Books. Csikszentmihalyi, M., & Schneider, B. (2000). Becoming adult: How teenagers prepare for the world of work. New York: Basic Books, Inc. Dimitrovsky, L., Schapira-Beck, E., & Itskowitz, R. (1994). Locus of control of Israeli women during the transition to marriage. Journal of Psychology, 128(5), 537– 545. Eccles, J. S. (1994). Understanding women’s educational and occupational choices: Applying the Eccles et al. model of achievement-related choices. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 18, 585–609. Eccles, J. S., Barber, B., Stone, M., & Templeton, J. (2002). Adolescence and emerging adulthood: The critical passage ways to adulthood. In C. Keyes (Ed.), Well-being: Positive development across the lifespan (pp. 383–406). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Press. Elder, G. H., & Conger, R. D. (2000). Children of the land: Adversity and success in rural America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Entwisle, D. R. (1990). Schooling and the adolescent. In S. S. Feldman & G. R. Elliott (Ed.), At the threshold: The developing adolescent (pp. 197–224). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Finch, M. D., Mortimer, J. T., & Ryu, S. (1997). Transition into part-time work: Health risks and opportunities. In J. Schulenberg, J. Maggs, & K. Hurrelmann (Eds.), Health risks and developmental transitions during adolescence (pp. 321–344). New York: Cambridge University Press. Finn, J. D. (1989). Withdrawing from school. Review of Educational Research, 59(2), 117–142. Freund, A. M., & Baltes, P. B. (2002). Life-management strategies of selection, optimization, and compensation: Measurement by self-report and construct validity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(4), 642–662. Fuligni, A. J., Eccles, J. S., Barber, B. L., & Clements, P. (2001). Early adolescent peer orientation and adjustment during high school. Developmental Psychology (Special Issue), 37(1), 28–36. Gender and Achievement Research Program. (2003). Retrieved July 2007; available at www.rcgd.isr.umich.edu/msalt. Grusec, J. E., Goodnow, J. J., & Cohen, L. (1996). Household work and the development of concern for others. Developmental Psychology, 32(6), 999–1007.

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Harter, S., Waters, P., & Whitesell, N. R. (1998). Relational self-worth: Differences in perceived worth as a person across interpersonal contexts among adolescents. Child Development, 69(3), 756–766. Heinz, W. R. (Ed.). (1999). From education to work: Cross-national perspectives. New York: Cambridge University Press. Jessor, R. (1993). Successful adolescent development among youth in high-risk settings. American Psychologist, 48, 117–126. Larson, R. (2000). Toward a psychology of positive youth development. American Psychologist, 55(1), 170–183. Moeller, K., & Stattin, H. (2001). Are close relationships in adolescence linked with partner relationship in midlife? A longitudinal, prospective study. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 25(1), 69–77. Moen, P., & Orrange, R. M. (2002). Careers and lives: Socialization, structural lag, and gendered ambivalence. In R. A. Settersten & T. J. Owens (Eds.), New frontiers in socialization, Vol. 7 (pp. 213–260). Oxford: Elsevier Science. Mortimer, J. T., Finch, M., Shanahan, M., & Ryu, S. (1992). Work experience, mental health, and behavioral adjustment in adolescence. Journal of Research on Adolescence, 2(1), 25–57. Mortimer, J. T., & Johnson, M. K. (1998). New perspectives on adolescent work and the transition to adulthood. In R. Jessor (Ed.), New perspectives on adolescent risk behavior (pp. 425–496). New York: Cambridge University Press. Mortimer, J. T., & Johnson, M. K. (1999). Adolescent part-time work and postsecondary transition pathways in the United States. In W. R. Heinz (Ed.), From education to work: Cross-national perspectives (pp. 111–148). New York: Cambridge University Press. M¨uller, W., & Shavit, Y. (1998). The institutional embeddedness of the stratification process: A comparative study of qualifications and occupations in thirteen countries. In Y. Shavit & W. Mueller (Eds.), From school to work: A comparative study of educational qualifications and occupational destinations (pp. 1–48). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Osgood, D. W., Ruth, G., Eccles, J. S., Jacobs, J. E., & Barber, B. L. (2005). Six paths to adulthood: Fast starters, parents without careers, educated partners, educated singles, working singles, and slow starters. In R. A. Settersten, F. F. Furstenberg, & R. G. Rumbaut (Eds.), On the frontier of adulthood: Theory, research, and public policy (pp. 320–355). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Roberts, R. E. L., & Bengtson, V. L. (1996). Affective ties to parents in early adulthood and self-esteem across 20 years. Social Psychology Quarterly, 59(1), 96–106. Roeser, R. W., Eccles, J. S., & Sameroff, A. J. (1998). Academic and emotional functioning in early adolescence: Longitudinal relations, patterns, and prediction by experience in middle school. Development & Psychopathology, 10(2), 321–352. Sameroff, A. J., Bartko, W. T., Baldwin, A., Baldwin, C., & Seifer, R. (1998). Family and social influences on the development of child competence. In C. Feiring (Ed.), Families, risk and competence (pp. 161–186). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Shanahan, M. J. (2000). Pathways to adulthood in changing societies: Variability and mechanisms in life-course perspective. Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 667–692. Steinberg, L., & Dornbusch, S. M. (1991). Negative correlates of part-time employment during adolescence: Replication and elaboration. Developmental Psychology, 27(2), 304–313.

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Way, N., & Pahl, K. (2001). Individual and contextual predictors of perceived friendship quality among ethnic minority, low-income adolescents. Journal of Research on Adolescence, 11(4), 325–349. Werner, E. E., & Smith, R. S. (1992). Overcoming the odds: High-risk children from birth to adulthood. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Wiese, B. S., Freund, A. M., & Baltes, P. B. (2000). Selection, Optimization, and Compensation: An action-related approach to work and partnership. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 57, 273–300. Wiese, B. S., Freund, A. M., & Baltes, P. B. (2002). Subjective Career Success and Emotional Well-Being: Longitudinal predictive power of selection, optimization, and compensation. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 60, 321–335.

12 Challenges of Transitioning into Adulthood Barbara Schneider

The ambitions of young people play an integral role in the likelihood of their successful transition into adulthood (Schneider & Stevenson, 1999). Social scientists have shown that the expectations children (and their parents) have for their futures profoundly influence later educational and occupational success (Hauser & Anderson, 1991; Kerckhoff, 1976; Schoon, Martin, & Ross, 2007; Schoon & Parsons, 2002; Sewell, Haller, & Ohlendorf, 1970). Many of these studies were conducted when only a third of adolescents in high school planned to attend college. What has changed dramatically in the past fifty years is that the overwhelming majority of parents expect their teenagers will not only attend college but also will receive a bachelor’s degree (National Center for Education Statistics [NCES], 2005). These high educational expectations are not merely a U.S. phenomenon; the same trends are evident among many industrialized countries throughout the world (Carnoy, 2001). In South Korea, for example, where demand for postsecondary education exceeds supply, there has been a dramatic expansion in shadow education activities – such as tutors and special classes – that wealthier families are using to help their adolescents achieve a competitive advantage for the few selected slots at the most prestigious universities (Lee, Park, & Lee, 2009). In the United States, high educational expectations are found among all teenagers regardless of their racial and ethnic background and the economic and social resources of their families. For many students, these high ambitions have been partially realized and enrollment rates at four- and two-year colleges have been steadily increasing (NCES, 2005). In a typical U.S. high school, nearly 70 percent of the senior class will begin a postsecondary experience in the fall following their high school graduation. 265

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However, these high enrollments are not materializing into postsecondary degrees at either the associate or baccalaureate level. Only a third of entering postsecondary students will complete a degree in a seven-year period (NCES, 2007). This failure to convert ambitions into success is particularly problematic in today’s global economy, in which a college degree has become the new standard requirement for employment. Mastery of the Internet, foreign-language proficiency, and other skills taught at advanced levels of schooling are all becoming a necessity not only for social mobility but also for economic survival. The growing pressure for young people to attain high levels of educational achievement emphasizes the importance of identifying mechanisms through which ambitions become a reality. The disconnect between ambitions and achievement is evident in the failure of many young people to earn a postsecondary degree despite their high expectations, which suggests that many young adults do not know how to achieve their academic goals or make successful occupational choices. They are often directionless and unrealistic about the world of work, the knowledge and skills they need to obtain a job, and the steps for securing stable employment. However, this is not always the case – there are some young adults who are successful in reaching their educational and occupational goals. The transition to adulthood has been identified as a unique life stage: it is that time when young adults leave home, start a full-time job, and form deep romantic relationships that lead to marriage and a family (Arnett, 2000; Settersten, Furstenberg, & Rumbaut, 2005). However, for many young people today, these benchmarks for reaching adulthood have been altered. Many young people even five or six years after graduating from high school still consider themselves as college students either finishing a degree or beginning a new one. Those who entered the labor force immediately after high school are working in jobs that are unstable and unlikely to result in promotions (Deil-Amen & Rosenbaum, 2002; Grubb & Lazerson, 2005). If romantic relationships materialize, they are likely to result in cohabitation that may not necessarily lead to marriage (Smock, 2000). Although scholars tend to agree on the changing markers of adulthood, they have not focused as much attention to the meaning young adults construct to describe their future actions, failures, and successes. It is the young adults’ evaluation of their prior adolescent experiences that are important indicators of connections they make between their past and future activities. This is particularly the situation with respect to forming an orientation toward work and occupational choices. The connection between perceptions of what constitutes “work” during adolescence and its relationship to subsequent occupational choices have received minor attention from

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researchers. Based on data from a ten-year national longitudinal study that followed a group of more than one thousand U.S. adolescents into adulthood, this chapter describes how adolescents define work, which experiences they perceive as work-like, how they feel when engaged in work, and how these definitions and subjective perceptions are related to the early career choices they make in their mid-twenties.

High School “Work” Experiences and the Foreshadowing of Occupational Choices Adolescents actively or passively engage in a wide range of daily experiences that are embedded in multiple social interactions. The meanings that adolescents attribute to these experiences can be realized through descriptions of the activities in which they are engaged as well as how they feel about them. Learning and self-reflection occur when the meanings of these experiences are integrated into life narratives. These subjective evaluations of daily experiences and the personal interpretation that adolescents use to describe their actions indicate the connections they are drawing between the present and the future (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1984). For example, the meaning an adolescent gives to doing homework could reflect more than just completing an assignment because the teacher required it. One student may perceive a reading assignment as providing an opportunity to reinforce learning and better prepare oneself for an exam and, ultimately, college; another may see little value in the assignment and “blow it off,” failing to complete it or doing so with minimal effort and concentration. Young people who can differentiate activities as potentially useful for their future are more aware of the consequences of participating in these activities and motivated to put forth considerable effort to achieve success. However, not all activities that adolescents engage in are strictly academic; social activities also become an integral part of their experiential narrative. The interpretations that adolescents give to their experiences in high school, at home, and with their peers can be traced to their expectations and motivations, actions, and subjective ratings of their experiences not only in high school but also after graduation, in college, and on entry into the labor force. One set of experiences that young people engage in that has been studied rarely is those activities they perceive as “work” and the distinctions that they make between these activities and others perceived as more like “play.” For adults, work is commonly regarded as an individual’s principal means of self-expression and source of life satisfaction (Csikszentmihalyi & LeFevre, 1989; Furnham, 1991). The emotional satisfaction – primarily challenge,

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concentration, and satisfaction – achieved while working is an experience for both men and women that does not occur in any other aspect of their lives (Larson & Richards, 1994; Sexton, 2005). For adolescents, it is not clear which activities they regard as work, how much time they devote to these types of activities, or how they feel when engaged in these experiences. Yet, the importance of how adolescents perceive work has been underscored by scholars who argue that subsequent career decisions are influenced to some extent by exposure to work activities that young people perceive as boring or lacking in flexibility (Bordin, 1943; Schmidt, 2005). One might expect that adolescents who regard their schoolwork as challenging and enjoy doing it may be more likely as adults to seek experiences that replicate the subjective states they experienced as teenagers. Similarly, experiences perceived in adolescence as boring or unengaging may be those to be avoided in adulthood. Feelings of being challenged also occur in other aspects of one’s life, and these moments – whether while playing sports, listening to music, or being a counselor at a camp – all become part of one’s life experiences. However, if an individual finds an activity uninteresting, requiring skills that he or she may not have, that person may develop a low threshold for becoming engaged. Research has shown that when young people become engaged and/or achieve a state of “flow” (i.e., when the challenge and skill of an activity are balanced), they find the experience more satisfying (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, 1993, 1996, 1997). It is suspected that adolescents who find more opportunities to be “in flow” are more likely to seek other flow-like experiences as young adults. These momentary experiences that help stimulate creativity, perfection, and other intrinsic feelings of self-accomplishment or efficacy are typically not considered fundamental to the development of a work ethic. Rather, much of the vocational literature tends to focus on socializing young people into work by stressing organizational components, such as being responsible, punctual, flexible, and personal. Yet, the subjective components of flow, including the ability to spend long periods on activities in which flow occurs, suggest that traditional orientations to understanding an adolescent’s socialization into work may be misguided – especially if those adolescents who spend more time in those activities tend to be more strategic in pursuing goals that reinforce this productive state.

Studying the Meaning of Work Among Adolescents If one is interested in work, then one also has to learn which activities adolescents perceive as play, which activities contain elements of both, and

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which activities are neither work nor play. This type of information is not easily extracted from surveys and requires a different approach. The Alfred P. Sloan Study of Youth and Social Development (SSYSD), a longitudinal study that began in the 1990s and continues today, was originally designed to understand how adolescents’ conceptions of work are formed and develop over time (Csikszentmihalyi & Schneider, 2000; Schneider & Stevenson, 1999). More than one thousand adolescents in twelve different geographical locations throughout the United States participated in this study. Adolescents were followed as they changed schools or residences, graduated from high school, and went on to work or college. The data were collected in three waves: 1992–1993 (Year 1), 1994–1995 (Year 3), and 1996–1997 (Year 5). Additional data collections have occurred from 1998 to the present.1 Whereas many earlier studies of career development in the United States targeted primarily white students, the sampling frame of the SSYSD was specifically designed to ensure a racially and ethnically diverse adolescent population. In addition to the longitudinal student database, information was obtained from other students in the sampled middle schools and high schools, including more than seven thousand students. The study sample selection occurred in three stages: communities, then the public middle and high schools within each location, followed by students within the schools. Communities were chosen based on geographic location, level of urbanization, racial and ethnic composition, labor force characteristics, and economic stability. The resulting site-selection process resulted in twelve communities in eight states that included a majority of urban areas, three of the largest urban populations in the United States, several medium-sized cities, and suburban and rural communities. The sites differed in the degree to which their local economies are concentrated in the manufacturing or service sectors and their economic prospects for growth, stability, or decline based on census information from the 1990s.2 School Selections Within each community, only a small number of schools could be studied. Based on information from the superintendent and other data sources, the schools that best represented the overall population characteristics of the community were selected. The twelve sites included thirty-three schools 1

2

The SSYSD datasets Years 1–5 are on the ICPSR Web site, www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ ICPSR/STUDY?04551.xm1#bibliographic-description. Additional information on the follow-up interviews has yet to be released. Full descriptions of the community and school sites are in Csikszentmihalyi and Schneider (2000).

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(i.e., twenty middle schools and thirteen high schools). Middle school students comprised approximately 30 to 60 percent of the entering freshman class in all but two of the high schools in the sample. To ensure diversity of school types, two specialized schools were included: a specialized high school for students who showed exceptional abilities in mathematics and science, and a magnet language academy. Schools received an honorarium for their participation. Student Sample Two samples of students were selected for the study: focal and cohort. Focal students were chosen from full-enrollment lists (prepared by the school) of students in grades six, eight, ten, and twelve. Student-selection criteria included gender, race, ethnicity, and level of academic performance. Based on student records and teacher ratings, the focal sample for each grade included approximately one-third of those identified as academically successful, one-third at grade level, and one-third having academic problems. From these lists, twenty-four students were selected from each ability category for the targeted grades within each school. The cohort students were all those in the same grade in each school in which a panel of focal students was enrolled. Cohort students were not followed longitudinally and participated only in the survey component of the study. If a school grade enrolled more than 150 students (which was the case in most of the high schools identified in the school-selection process), then a random sample of fifty students was selected from grade enrollment lists, stratified by gender, race, and achievement level. The base year sample included more than 4,000 individuals: 1,215 focal and 3,604 cohort students. The student sample reported in this chapter included sixth-, eighth-, tenth-, and twelfth-graders from the base year who completed all of the instruments used to collect information on their perceptions, attitudes, academic performance, friends, and future plans (N = 849 students).3 A series of tests was conducted on the missing cases to ensure that the sample retained its representative characteristics. No significant differences were 3

Six hundred from the base-year sample were followed up in telephone interviews during the past ten years. The cases in this chapter were part of the 600 follow-up sample. As with the 849 sample, analyses were conducted to determine any issues of selection bias. One problem similar to those found in national longitudinal samples in the United States is sample attrition, particularly for students with limited resources. To date, the 600 sample contains approximately the same proportion of students from the communities that were found in the base-year sample (N = 16 percent).

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found between those missing information and the 849 students on the basis of grade, gender, race, or ethnicity. There was a slight difference with respect to social class, although not enough to employ weights for those students from communities with limited economic and social resources. Analyses also were conducted comparing the 849 students with larger national samples on key items such as education expectations and time use; again, no significant differences were found.4 Instrumentation To collect information on these adolescents, a variety of instruments was used. Information was obtained from multiple in-depth interviews conducted with the adolescents and their parents, teachers, and school administrators, including their college counselors. These young people also participated in surveys to ascertain their perceptions and attitudes toward their school, their school performance (including grades and courses taken), their friends, and their future.5 A new career instrument was developed that explored adolescents’ knowledge of the world of work, including role models, and personal assessments of their particular talents, skills, and proclivities for different types of adult work conditions. After the students graduated from high school, a new set of telephone interview protocols was developed to verify a participant’s status on a series of dimensions, including education (i.e., in-school full-time or part-time), employment (i.e., full-time, part-time, or not employed), romantic relationships (i.e., married or cohabitating), and general health. In addition, participants were asked about their emotional state and satisfaction with their lives. One of the unique instruments of the SSYSD was the Experience Sampling Method (ESM), developed by Csikszentmihalyi (Hektner, Schmidt, & Csikszentmihalyi, 2007). The ESM employs a time-sensitive signaling device that is especially useful for obtaining the subjective experiences of individuals interacting in their natural environment. During the course of a week, the adolescents wore wristwatches that were pre-programmed to beep eight times each day. When beeped, the adolescent completed a form that indicated the time, location, other persons present, and his or her thoughts 4

5

For a detailed description of comparisons between the SSYSD sample and the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988, see Mulligan, Wolfe, and Schneider (2005). Issues related to sampling bias with respect to social class of the communities are in Guest and Schneider (2003). Many of the questions used in the surveys were taken from U.S. national longitudinal studies to allow for comparative analyses with larger samples.

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and feelings. Adolescents in the same history class, listening to the teacher lecture, will have different feelings about the activity and what it means for their future. The ESM is a window into the different subjective experiences the individual has during the course of a day while participating in different activities.6 With respect to the ESM, there are measures that indicate one’s emotional state, such as feeling happy or relaxed; cognitive involvement, such as being engaged or challenged; and personal assessment, such as feeling positive about oneself.7 Identifying Workers, Players, Idlers, and Strategists One set of questions in the ESM asks students to record whether the specific activity they were engaged in when beeped was “more like work,” “more like play,” “like both work and play,” or “like neither work nor play.” Based on these responses, an aggregated file was created that identified the percentage of overall time that adolescents spent on activities reported as work, play, neither, or both. From these responses, a population standardized score was created (i.e., mean of zero and standard deviation of 1).8 Students with response scores of 1 or higher for each of the four categories were then classified into that respective grouping. If a student had one or more responses with scores higher than 1, he or she was placed into the higher category, thus assuring that there was no double counting of a student across more than one category. This procedure resulted in the identification of 187 workers, 227 players, 272 idlers (i.e., those reporting that the activity was neither work nor play), and 163 strategists (i.e., those reporting that the activity was both work and play). Demographically, Asians are more likely to be workers (28 percent) followed by Hispanics (22 percent), African Americans (23 percent), and whites (21 percent).9 The group of Native Americans was so small (N = 9) that they were excluded from these analyses because statistical comparisons 6

7

8 9

The ESM measures are based on 10-point scales that indicate the extent to which an individual found the activity to have positive or negative affect, self-esteem, flow, rolesalience, and intrinsic motivation. Descriptions of these variables are in Csikszentmihalyi and Schneider (2000, pp. 244–249). A subsample of the base year tenth and twelfth grades also participated in an ESM study five years after graduating from high school. Responses to the ESM and other information were used as supplementary material in describing the case materials in this chapter. The original construction of these categories was conceived by Schmidt and Rich (2000). Analyses not shown are available from the author on request, and also in Schmidt (2000), although the sample used here are those base-year students for whom Year 2 information was available; hence, a smaller N (Schmidt 2005; N = 863; herein, N = 848).

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using this distinction proved unstable for other comparisons. Whites, conversely, are more likely to be players (31 percent). Strategists tended to be approximately equally distributed among the racial and ethnic groups, with the exception of Hispanics. Furthermore, Hispanics and African Americans were more likely to be represented in the idler group than whites and Asians. With respect to social-class differences, workers tended to be nearly equally dispersed among those students whose parents had high school education through those who had graduate and professional degrees. The player model was bimodal; students whose parents had the least education and students whose parents had the most education represented the highest proportion of adolescents designated as players. Strategists followed a linear pattern; parents with the highest education were more likely to have teenagers in the strategists group, although differences among parent education levels were not significant. Finally, among the idlers, their parents were less likely to have degrees above a master’s. Time Spent Among the Four Groups Among all four groups, activities identified as work occurred when students were in school, at jobs, and doing housework.10 Workers tended to report their participation in these types of activities (and others) more than adolescents in any of the three other groups. Play activities included watching television, listening to music, and “hanging out” with friends; players were more likely to engage in these types of activities as well as to view their schoolwork as more like play. Idlers were more likely to spend time relaxing, eating, involved in personal grooming, commuting, or just “milling about.” Idlers were less likely to report that school-related activities were more like work. Strategists were more likely to report that their schoolwork – participating in discussion, taking notes, doing homework or lab work, and participating in extracurricular activities – tended to be both work and play. 10

One caveat is important here. While the groups were constructed by estimating the frequency of times an individual reported his or her activities as being work, play, neither, or both, the activities they identified associated with these labels did not differ with respect to gender, race, ethnicity, grade, or socioeconomic status, suggesting that teenagers are very clear on what constitutes work and play. An individual seen as a worker does not mean that this person did not have play, or work and play experiences. On average, adolescents spend nearly equal amounts of time in activities they identify as work, play, or neither. Work and play activities are identified less often, approximately 9 percent of the time; analyses are not shown.

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Idlers, Players, Workers, and Strategists Five Years Later As these young people left high school, we continued to follow them, conducting a series of face-to-face interviews in 1996 and 1997, mainly telephone interviews and Internet surveys. Of the 849 sample (i.e., those who participated in the ESM), 600 continue to be interviewed (not included in the 600 are those who have died or are incarcerated; N = 5).11 To determine if these high school patterns were related to later young-adult outcomes – primarily expectations about the future, work, and personal relationships – the next step involved generating lists of workers, players, idlers, and strategists from which individuals were randomly selected for follow-up studies. The review of responses to questions focused on work status, expectations, relationships, and life satisfaction from three rounds of subsequent interviews, and a series of case profiles was constructed. The case material presented here also draws from base-year information and subsequent interviews, surveys, and the ESM. To be confident that these cases matched others in their groups, mean tallies of outcome measures were established for each group, including college attendance, work status, general health, marital situation, and life satisfaction. The cases described in the following represent the overall patterns in each respective group.12 What is perhaps most surprising about these types of individuals was how their time-use patterns in high school appeared to have persisting influences on their life choices in their mid-twenties. By their mid-twenties, workers and strategists were more likely to be engaged in activities they found challenging and rewarding and had a higher sense of self-efficacy than idlers, who reported lower engagement, self-esteem, and self-efficacy. Two, four, and seven years after high school graduation, early patterns of time use and planning were associated with differences in lifestyle and attitudes when these adolescents were in their twenties.

Where Does the Time Go? Idlers and Players The two groups most similar to one another are the idlers and the players. Young adults in these two groups had the most unrealistic career choices, were the least informed about what adult work entailed, and were more 11

12

This results in approximately 71 percent of the sample being retained from the initial base year to the present, which is higher than most national surveys in which the sample attrition sometimes hovers at slightly more than 50 percent. These cases are based on the lives of individual sample members; they are representative types in the style used by Bellah et al. (1996).

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likely to change their career goals throughout the decade after high school. In high school, they worked in menial jobs, often with friends, and frequently changed their place of employment. Even for adolescents who planned on working after high school, few were employed in jobs that were likely to lead to full-time stable employment. If they attended college, they were the students most likely not to obtain an associate’s or bachelor’s degree. The problem of commitment and fulfilling responsibilities also carried over into their personal life. Among these groups were those who were more likely to cohabitate, have children, and remain single parents. They struggled with their personal identities, frequently changing their career or romantic commitments.

Idlers Carla Rogers13 was first interviewed in high school. An average student – who was in one advanced level course – she rarely viewed the tasks at school or at her job as challenging or requiring specific skills. Throughout most of her days, she floated along, unable to differentiate how she felt about the activities she participated in and how she would characterize them relative to her own expectations and those of her parents or teachers. Aspiring to attend postsecondary school, her college dreams were more about with whom and where she would live than the school or program to which she wanted to apply: “I want to go to college so me and my friend can get an apartment together.”14 When asked about her plans for the future, Carla answered, “I think I would like to be an animator. I wouldn’t want to be like those who work at Disney, I just want to work with my own ideas.” Probed more on what animators do on the job, Carla explained that “animators have to draw pictures over and over, to make a film, and come up with ideas. You have to see them in your mind and then draw them. Once I saw and loved this cartoon, I never thought about being an animator before then.” Idlers, for the most part, tend to have incomplete or erroneous knowledge of specific jobs; rather, they entertain a broad fanciful conception of what specific work may entail. Not understanding her role in charting her own career course, Carla – like other idlers – tended to passively approach learning about job interests by relying on television, movies, and her own limited 13 14

Students have been pseudo-named in order to protect their identities. The quotes have been slightly edited for clarity and to avoid natural parts of language such as the overuse of “um” and “what.”

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experiences. Lacking strong social networks, either in their families or with friends and other adults, idlers’ views were rarely challenged or enhanced by additional knowledge. Among the SSYSD sample, idlers were the least likely in high school to have aligned ambitions. They were unable to make a realistic connection between the job they wanted to have as an adult and the education and or training the job required. When we next interviewed Carla, she was in her third year at a local fouryear college (her parents had discouraged her from attending a college away from home). She was in the process of changing her major from graphic design to photography, “which I always thought about.” Armed with a good camera, she hoped to work “freelance but [doesn’t] want to start out shooting weddings and stuff.” What she would like to do is “still photos for movies and special effects, and documentaries, maybe.” As a consequence of changing her college major, Carla suspected that it would be several more years before she would graduate. To help defray the costs of college, she was also working almost full-time at an amusement-park restaurant. Repeating the same pattern with respect to her career interests in high school, she now wanted to pursue a career with limited knowledge, contacts, or sense of what the job of being a photographer involves. Three years later, Carla was married with two children, ages eighteen months and two months. Planning on returning to college someday when her children are older, she had a part-time job at the same amusement park she worked at while in high school. Questioned about how she makes sense of the world, Carla commented, I guess I just don’t worry about what’s out there, just worry about my own life. If something terrible happened, I would try and make things better again. But you cannot really make sense of why things happen, they just do.

When it comes to the day-to-day challenges of life, idlers often feel they are not in control to change things. Explanations for the circumstances of their present situation are described in general terms, in which they perceive themselves to have limited agency in changing the course or direction of their lives. Not recognizing the importance of planning or thinking ahead, they hold on to unrealistic dreams regardless of their present circumstances – in this instance, an unwanted pregnancy and an early marriage. Carla still has the idea that she would like “You know, to have a career in art, somehow, computers and art.” Two years later, at age twenty-seven, Carla was enrolled in a two-year college across the street from her house, taking a class with hope of receiving a certificate in graphic design. “I like art and it’s something that I can do

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from home. We do projects, and I guess I spend about four hours a week working on them.” When asked what the certificate would enable her to do, she was unsure, only that she liked art and, by going to college, “you have a better chance of getting a good job when you graduate.” What idlers have the most trouble with is assessing their strengths and limitations or their ability to reshape plans. They often hold onto goals, regardless of how unrealistic they may be, and organize their lives to achieve them by selecting the paths of least resistance – often accepting the circumstances of their lives as a matter of fate.

Players Kevin Brown spent his childhood and adolescence on a farm that his father operated while his mother worked as an insurance adjustor. His older brother, an excellent student, transferred to a boarding school for students gifted in mathematics and science when Kevin started high school. His brother’s academic success is a point of serious angst for Kevin. He is convinced that his slightly above average performance in secondary school can be linked in part to the unreasonable expectations of his teachers, who were always comparing his academic performance to his brother’s. Players are more likely to view their successes or problems in school as the consequence of the actions of others, the organization of the school, or the quality of programs rather than accepting responsibility for themselves. Students identified as being in the player group were more likely to perceive twelfth grade as the time to “take a breath,” enrolling in courses that were less demanding and not necessarily part of the college sequence, with the hard competitive work of high school basically perceived as over. In twelfth grade, Kevin was enrolled in a two-hour graphic design class that he found “pretty low key.” According to Kevin, the classroom equipment was obsolete and he figured he would have to start learning about graphic design from “scratch” when he attended college. What is it like to be a teenager? For the players, their quest for independence and desire for freedom from parents, teachers, and other adults were more evident than among the other three groups. Perceiving the world as one of opportunity and choice, these students believe that there is less of a sense of urgency in making choices about what college to attend or what to study when they get there. They report less of a need to plan, optimistically expecting that academic and career opportunities will unfold. Their focus is on their friends and having a good time. Many describe high school as the “best time of their lives” before they have to undertake the real

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responsibilities of college and work. These are the students who really “don’t want to think about the future. Just take it as it comes.” As Kevin explained: The best thing about being a teenager, it is the space where you’re sort of free to do stuff that you want because, while you’re a kid, your parents don’t really give you any responsibility because you can’t cross the street unless you’re holding their hand. And then once you get into college, you have to study like crazy. And then once you get out, you have to work for the rest of your life. So I guess this is kind of the time where you get some freedom, just hang out and do nothing. Kind of enjoy yourself, I guess.

In contrast to idlers, players have a sense of the need to achieve academically, but they are somewhat resistant to making the effort and allocating the time that accompanies getting good grades and meeting the expectations of others. Although projecting a carefree demeanor, these students tend to be unsure of themselves and their ability to meet the expectations that others have for them. As Kevin stated: The hardest part of being a teenager is all the pressures of life. Like your parents, not just parents, your teachers expecting you to be something. To do something. And if it’s not what you want to do or if you’re not living up to their expectations, it is just a big hassle. And I guess that is the hardest part, it’s just trying to live up to people’s expectations when you really don’t want to.

When asked about the differences between work and play, Kevin’s answers demonstrated how players perceive their lives. Beginning first with work, Kevin sees work as something you have no control over: Work is something that you do and get paid for it. Well, not necessarily, you don’t necessarily have to get paid. . . . mean it’s like schoolwork, I guess work is something that somebody tells you to do, that you don’t; you wouldn’t really choose to do if somebody didn’t tell you.

Among adolescent players, paid work is usually a job in a fast-food restaurant. Players often take these jobs because friends work there or they can get hours that accommodate their school and family responsibilities. Players tend not to perceive these jobs as anything other than the source of extra spending money, and they have little commitment to the work or the employer. It is not surprising that employers find teenage workers somewhat unreliable and lacking in a work ethic or sufficient skills. Paid work can be distinguished from schoolwork or play because it is something for which you get paid, which is why these adolescents are willing to put up with it. As Kevin said:

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I don’t really mind it. But if it is a job that I don’t like to do and I’m not getting paid, then I am usually pretty pissed. Even if I don’t like to do it, but I am getting paid, I just kind of say, Hey, well, I’m getting money, so I might as well just put up or shut up, you know.

For all the students, regardless of their time orientation, play is something perceived of as an enjoyable experience. For those who are players, the experience does not have to be focused on a specific activity but could be seen as time when you just “hang out”: Play is anything that relaxes you, I guess, even if it is just sitting down and staring out the window, I consider that play. If you’re not doing something that needs to be done, I guess that would be play. There can be pressure in play, like if I get in a contest or something, there’s a little pressure there. But as long as you’re having fun.

With respect to the question “is a particular activity perceived as work and play,” Kevin’s response was skateboarding, “because, you know, it’s just like . . . you’re having fun, but . . . after a really tough day, your body feels it. Um, I guess it would probably be more than play.” This definition captures something challenging and yet enjoyable that is also the emotional response that strategists give to activities that they perceive as both work and play. Players are more likely to give this response for activities that are not related to future goals, whereas strategists report these emotional experiences in activities that are not necessarily strictly recreational but could be practicing the piano, writing a short story, or tutoring other students. In instances where time was characterized as neither work nor play, Kevin began the conversation by relating how he feels when writing creative stories. His description of a “neither” activity (not characteristic of other players’ “neither” activities) describes the experiential feeling that captures the balance of work and play: I don’t think my writing would really be either work or play because I don’t consider it work because I really like to do it. But, I wouldn’t really consider it play because I don’t know, I don’t really, I get enjoyment out of it, you know. But it’s not really stress-relieving because sometimes, it will cause more stress when you’re trying to think of what will happen here, you get stuck.

In some sense, this is the precursor to the feeling of balance that is characteristic of strategists. If they never experience this time, it is much more difficult for players to reach a threshold in which they recognize this type of feeling. What makes the balance of work and play so unique is the challenge and sense of accomplishment and enjoyment, an enjoyment that

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is not necessarily how we describe happiness but more a sense of losing one’s self in the challenge of the task – that state that Csikszentmihalyi (1990) referred to as flow. Just as the sense of challenge comes from this experience, the sense of drudgery comes with work at a fast-food restaurant, where Kevin worked part-time in high school: Work sucks, I get in my car and I say, man, I don’t want to go to work but once I get there I’m alright. I might as well make the best of it.

Most players attend some type of postsecondary school, and Kevin had these same plans. In eleventh grade, he took the ACT (i.e., American College Testing Program), made the honor roll for a semester, and began to seriously think about college. His choice was a two-year community college rather than a four-year institution. I was starting to think a little more seriously about going to a four-year college rather than a two-year one and then transferring over. But I thought if I went to the four-year one, I would be a little fish in a big pond. I mean it still will be like that over at the two-year school, but it would be you know, it just seems that being at a junior college it would be a littler smaller group of people and I’d have a little bit more space to work.

What happened to Kevin? At twenty-eight, he had a job working in a print shop that paid more than $50,000 a year. He went to junior college for three years, where he majored in graphic arts but never received his degree. When he dropped out of school, he worked in a tattoo shop and then took a job in a graphic-art firm, where he has been for eight years. He describes himself as someone who hates and loves his job. When he started, he was in a rather boring position, doing the same thing over and over again. He reported feeling stupid and stagnant. However, when computers started taking over, the business changed and he now is in a place where “I can show other people what to do.” Thinking about the future, Kevin said, In two years, I imagine I’ll probably be doing the same thing; whether it’ll be for the same company or not, I can’t say. I don’t know. There was some talk about a career change. My father’s health is not so good; there was talk about me taking over the farm. But I don’t know anything about farming, so, it is going to be kind of rough.

How does Kevin envision the future? As he stated, “Trying to roll with it as it goes.” He has no career goals and hopes he will be able to support himself and make his own decisions. In some sense, Kevin is somewhat

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of an exaggerated player. He fits the profile of someone who has a low threshold for work that is challenging and enjoyable and who is unable to visualize a future. Work is viewed as fairly routine, and Kevin does not want to break from a pattern of convenience and comfort. As much as the players find themselves going along with their lives with minimum ambition, the workers have so much ambition that it can be paralyzing in some aspects.

Can One Plan Too Much? Workers and Strategists The two categories most alike are those identified as workers or strategists. In some ways, it is nearly impossible to become a strategist without considerable attention to work – that is, being actively involved in one’s present career. Yet, there are differences between the two groups, albeit these differences are at the low end of the probability scale for being placed in one group or another. Workers are more focused on their careers and they are willing to sustain the requirements and obligations of their paid employment even though, internally, they report feeling dissatisfied with their lives and the school and work choices they have made.

Working Hard In the twelfth grade, Michael Greene lived in a major urban city with his mother, a musician; his father, a computer programmer; and a younger brother, whose care was primarily Michael’s responsibility. He described himself as very shy and an excellent student, who studied more than two hours a night. Michael did not work during high school, but he received an allowance that was cut if he received poor grades. Michael had two passions in high school: music – he played the violin and viola – and geography, and he was unsure what he wanted to do when he was older. His interest in geography led him into advanced math and science classes, including a course in computer-aided design. Most workers are very good students, who spend more than the average amount of time on homework or other activities, such as working with a tutor to improve their grades and test scores. When asked about differences in work and play, Michael made these distinctions. Thinking about ideas and feelings associated with the word work, Michael replied, “Homework. I guess, playing music is sort of, both.” Work to him meant “doing an activity that’s necessary to do.” Play, on the other hand, meant “I guess watching TV, playing on the computer, or reading something that I want to read.” Thinking about an activity that

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is both work and play, Michael responded, “ . . . playing music. Sometimes, you’re obligated to do it and sometimes, you want to do it.” For workers and players, work is expected to be more important to them when they become adults because of the money. Players expect that they will value play even more because they will have less time for it. Workers hope to be in a position to be able to play. Although having a deep interest in music, knowing musicians, and playing in an orchestra, when it came time to make a decision about college, Michael chose to pursue his passion for geography, selecting a highly competitive small liberal arts college in the East. When I was thinking about colleges, I was thinking about majoring in geography. I was interested in that. And, I was told that this college had a really good program. That’s one of the reasons that I decided to go here. Also, it’s fairly small. There’s like, two thousand total people. I like it being pretty small. And also, that it’s a bit away from home, but not too far away.

Workers take the issue of college choice very seriously; they are likely to make multiple visits to colleges and intensively study course options and degree programs. At this school, he was able to pursue a bachelor’s degree in geography and minor in music – a secondary interest but not a career option. Since I was in elementary school, I enjoyed looking at maps and learning where places were. I’m still interested in maps and stuff, but it’s a little bit different than what I thought before. But, I still like it. It’s not just place names and stuff. It’s more like social issues and social, economic stuff. At this college, I was also able to minor in music.

With workers, there is the deep concentration on maximizing opportunities for enhancing their career options. The focus on career options is not only in academic classes; these young people also tend to participate in any activities that enhance their knowledge and also build their portfolios in careers they are interested in pursuing. This pre-career preparation is characteristic of both workers and strategists; however, in the case of workers, it tends to be narrower and more focused. In Michael’s case, it was joining academic clubs including the Geography Student Organization in college, working independently with professors on urban planning projects, and interning during the school year and summers at a governmental transportation agency. Maintaining such a busy schedule is further complicated by the fact that most workers devote considerable time to their schoolwork,

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studying five to seven hours a night – especially those college freshmen whose singular goal is to be admitted to a prestigious graduate program. By Michael’s senior year of college, he became increasingly concerned about the future and the job he would have at age thirty. He decided to direct his energy and resources to choosing a major that would eventuate in a career. The choice was urban planning, relegating his involvement in music to relaxation and enjoyment. Many workers choose a singular career path over another, given their own personal resources including time, energy, and focus. Often, this choice is more about money and job security than what they find more intellectually challenging and satisfying. Two years after college, Michael was studying city planning in graduate school at a major prestigious private research university. Just as workers prepare for college, they also prepare for graduate school; in Michael’s case, he took a highly competitive internship at an urban city office – arranged by his college professors – and starting school a “bit early to be able to participate in some summer pre-classes.” Most workers tend to stay on a career track and, although Michael’s focus changed somewhat to urban planning, he described it as the “practical side of geography.” Preparing for a career today requires a dedication and commitment to learning of which workers are well aware; they put in the long hours of study, invest their time in activities related to their careers, and are willing to make considerable sacrifices to achieve their goals. Michael is confident he will pursue a Ph.D. and work in an occupation related to urban planning, government planning, or transportation. In one sense, Michael exemplifies workers in that he has continued with the same interests he had in high school through graduate school, but he has expanded his understanding of how his interests can be channeled in a somewhat related field – one that maximizes his chances for employability. The largest proportion of young people who attend college and graduate are workers. Whereas Michael appears contented with his life, many others who dedicated themselves to earning good grades and pursuing what they think they will want to do as adults graduate from college somewhat disillusioned. They face a competitive world in which even though they may have excelled at their work, there are many other competent individuals pursuing either the same career or position in graduate school. The implication is not to discourage these young people from working hard but rather to explore the idea that work can be enjoyable and to raise awareness of the risks that any career or schooling option has. It is important to emphasize that these categories are fluid and that workers who find enjoyment in their work are more likely to move into

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the next and final category – strategists. Strategists represent the smallest proportion of adolescents; they are more likely to find work challenging and enjoyable more frequently than workers, players, and idlers. These groups could be seen as somewhat hierarchical, in that for idlers the threshold of engaging in work that is both enjoyable and challenging is considerably lower than the three other classifications. Idlers were also less likely to have experienced these emotions in their formative adolescent years. On the other end of the spectrum, strategists have had these types of experiences and seek them continually throughout young adulthood.

Lessening the Odds: Strategists and Work Ricardo Chavez lives in a major Midwestern city and attended an academically selective high school. The oldest child in his family, he has a younger brother and sister. Education is important to his family: his father attended college and is an engineer for an electric company; his mother graduated from high school and works as a secretary at the local elementary school. Very involved in their children’s education, Ricardo’s parents frequently attended school events and volunteered at the school. His home exemplifies the cultural-capital profile of the middle class, filled with books, newspapers, magazines, and computers. When Ricardo needed to study, he had his own room and a computer equipped with the latest technological software. Ricardo’s home is clearly a household in which the emphasis is on academics; conversations often centered on school and grades, and poor performance resulted in a loss of privileges. Ricardo was an exceptional student and began taking college-level courses when he was in junior high school. By his senior year in high school, he was the top student in his class, a class officer, and the recipient of a number of academic honors. When asked about the importance of receiving good grades and doing well in college, Ricardo stated, that “from high school through college, my academic work has been my life, my livelihood.” Parents are a major factor in how strategists think about their lives. Even if the parents may not have the requisite knowledge base, they are nevertheless supportive and try to find opportunities for their children to learn things with which they may be unfamiliar. “My parents have always supported me to do whatever I wanted, so whatever I said I wanted to do, they would try and help me out as much as possible. They often gave me their perspectives on life, having been there before.” Ricardo’s parents expected him to become a professional and closely monitored not only his schoolwork but also the activities of his friends, and they maintained relationships with his friends’ parents.

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For as long as he can remember, Ricardo planned on becoming a lawyer, even though his experience with lawyers was limited. By college, he had decided to become an international business lawyer, articulating differences in the types of law that individuals pursue and why they would not be suitable for him. Becoming an international business lawyer not only has prestige and monetary benefits, it also would allow him the flexibility to travel and learn about problems in other countries. Family pride is part of his motivation, and he believes that a major reason he wanted to become a lawyer is to make his family proud and pay them back for the support they have given him. In planning for college, Ricardo examined several universities that had dual programs in economics and business. He applied to several colleges, but Ricardo decided to attend the local state university despite the fact that his college entrance exams and high school academic grades made him a competitive applicant at universities more selective than the one to which he was admitted. The major reason he chose this school was economic: he was fully funded and would be able to graduate with two degrees. The most important reason for going to this university is it allowed me to get out of college in three years at no cost to myself or to my parents and at the same time, it’s a very respectable school with a very respectable business and economics program and so, they’ll stand up on their own when I need them to.

Two characteristics that differentiate strategists from others are that they are flexible in their career interests and tend to pursue dual degrees and postgraduate degrees. Strategists often do this because they believe that they are likely to change jobs, because their interests may change, and the marketplace may require different skills. As Ricardo mentioned, “I pretty much told myself that I’ll face a few jobs in my life. I don’t know how many, but you know, at least a few. I am trying to get the best education I can right now to diversify myself enough so that I can pursue the job that I want to or the jobs that will be out there.” Strategists are also actively involved in extracurricular activities that complement their career interests. Their involvement is not merely for portfolio purposes but also to learn new information about career options, placements, and connections. Strategists see considerable value in extending their social networks beyond their familial networks. It is important to emphasize that this interest in learning new information outside of their family and school networks applies not only to those who are immigrants, or whose parents never attended college, but also to students whose families may have deep knowledge of specific fields. Strategists exhibit an interest

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and desire to acquire as much information as they can to make strategic choices in their lives – choices that give them several options to pursue. Strategists carefully weigh their options, making choices based on their priorities. These priorities may not be only about academics, but it is a process whereby strategists fully judge the best options not only for the present but also for their future. When asked about the differences between work and play, work is described not as an end to itself nor the inverse of play. For the most part, strategists put into their own words the definition of flow; as Ricardo explained: Work is just pursuing any justifiable or advantageous type of idea or principle or something like that. To me, it’s just putting effort into something that you enjoy doing and so if you’re enjoying doing it, at the same time, you could call it playing, but it’s not.

In Ricardo’s point of view, when working, you should be enjoying it or you are not “providing your best to what needs to be done.” Without enjoying what you are doing, there is something missing, something that detracts you from being deeply involved in the tasks at hand. Strategists should not be perceived as simply fitting the rationalchoice paradigm, as is often the situation with workers. They tend to be community-minded and involved in civic issues and the world around them. Ricardo commented, I guess I’ve just seen people back in my own community where I think maybe they’d be somewhere else if they hadn’t grown up the way they did or you know, lived in the place they lived in or just had someone there to talk to. I think they may have turned out differently. So I just figure, you know, I’m going to try and help as much as possible.

It is in this group that one is more likely to hear phrases like, “doing things to help me become a better person” and “knowing who I am.” It is the ability not only to differentiate time use but also to differentiate their own skills, talents, and shortcomings that exemplifies the strategists. At twenty-four, Ricardo received high grades in law school, passed the bar, and is now working in a claims-adjustor law office. He has learned that in the area of law he wanted to pursue, the firms he wanted to work at tended to hire from primarily Eastern schools. He believes his youthful appearance and age work against him. He is now examining the possibility of also obtaining an MBA to make him a more competitive applicant in the larger prestigious law firms that specialize in international law. Many

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of the decisions Ricardo made were constrained by the available resources he could mobilize to achieve his goals. Strategists, especially those with limited connections, are constantly maneuvering their talents and resources to overcome unequal positions on the “playing field.”

Concluding Reflections on Being an Idler, Player, Worker, and Strategist These four groups of individuals realized their ambitions quite differentially, exercising different plans and resources to achieve their goals. Idlers, who in high school were unable to differentiate their time use and draw boundaries around their life activities, continue to have these same boundary issues, especially related to the type of work they want to pursue and making a workable plan to achieve it. Players could differentiate their time but when in high school, they chose to focus their attention on activities they found enjoyable at the expense of other forms of work and civic responsibilities. In some sense, many players have the luxury of choice without consequence because respondents in this group tend to have families with considerable resources that can provide them with multiple safety nets if their choices prove to be personally unsatisfying and problematic for future career options. As young adults, they continue to seek work that they find enjoyable and have a low tolerance for schoolwork or jobs that they do not find interesting. Workers in high school could differentiate the nature and quality of how they spent their time but chose to spend more than average amounts of time on activities perceived as work-like, such as schoolwork and paid work. As young adults, some can alter their goals to those they feel good about or they can maintain their single-minded dreams, only to become disillusioned with their choices as young adults. Strategists are those who, early in their lives, engaged in activities they perceived as work-like and play-like. Having had these feelings, they are comfortable in revisiting and reevaluating their ambitions, career choices, and next steps that help them achieve more of the flow balance in their lives. It is important to recognize that these categories are not finite groupings but rather serve primarily heuristic purposes. Most people have times when they are more like idlers than workers. Even when a pattern is dominant, the categories are not intractable, and people move from one group to another. Regardless of the category that individuals group into, life for all these young adults in their mid- or late twenties is particularly complex. However, one is more likely to make a successful transition into adulthood being a worker or a strategist than being an idler or a player. Without goals and

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realistic plans, work is perceived as simply work, and the tedium and routine dampens the enjoyment and challenge of being cognitively and socially involved. How one constructs a life path is not exclusively determined by personal predilections, cognitive abilities, and social competencies. Families, schools, friends, and communities all help to shape how individuals use their time, plan their lives, and achieve their goals. What is illustrated by these cases is that there are certain skills that young people who make a more successful transition appear to exhibit. These skills are not mere objective measures, such as earning good grades in high school and college or going to the most selective colleges and universities. Rather, they comprise an orientation to the world as a place of uncertainty in which individuals need to develop skills for coping with those challenges. Those who have these skills are the individuals most comfortable with themselves – not because they are super-human but rather because they can reasonably assess their own strengths and weaknesses. These young adults can visualize their lives and crystallize their life plans into concrete options that build on their own particular set of personal strengths and limitations. Their ability to do so is formed by the worlds in which they live and the resources and opportunities they are afforded. REFERENCES

Arnett, J. J. (2000). Emerging adulthood: A theory of development from the late teens through the twenties. American Psychologist, 55, 469–480. Bellah, R., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W., Swidler, A., & Tipton, S. (1996). Habits of the heart: Individualism and commitment in American life. Berkeley: University of California Press. Bordin, E. S. (1943). A theory of vocational interests as dynamic phenomena. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 3, 49–65. Carnoy, M. (2001). The role of the state in the new global economy. In J. Muller, N. Cloete, & S. Badat (Eds.), Challenges of globalization: South African debates with Manual Castells (pp. 22–34). Cape Town, South Africa: Maskew Miller Longman. Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1990). Flow: The psychology of optimal experience. New York: HarperCollins. Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1993). The evolving self: A psychology for the third millennium. New York: HarperCollins. Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1996). Flow and the psychology of discovery and invention. New York: HarperCollins. Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1997). Finding flow: The psychology of engagement with everyday life. New York: Basic Books. Csikszentmihalyi, M., & Larson, R. (1984). Being adolescent: Conflict and growth in the teenage years. New York: Basic Books.

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Csikszentmihalyi, M., & LeFevre, J. (1989). Optimal experience in work and leisure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 815–822. Csikszentmihalyi, M., & Schneider, B. (2000). Becoming adult: How teenagers prepare for the world of work. New York: Basic Books. Deil-Amen, R., & Rosenbaum, J. (2002). The unintended consequences of stigma-free remediation. Sociology of Education, 75, 249–268. Furnham, A. (1991). Work and leisure satisfaction. In F. Strack, M. Argyle, & N. Schwartz (Eds.), Subjective well-being: An interdisciplinary perspective (pp. 235–260). Oxford, UK: Pergamon. Grubb, W. N., & Lazerson, M. (2005). The education gospel and the role of vocationalism in American education. American Journal of Education, 111, 297–320. Guest, A., & Schneider, B. (2003). Adolescents’ extracurricular participation in context: The mediating effects of schools, communities, and identity. Sociology of Education, 76, 89–109. Hauser, R., & Anderson, D. (1991). Post-high school plans and aspirations of black and white high school seniors: 1976–86. Sociology of Education, 64, 263–277. Hektner, J. M., Schmidt, J., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2007). Experience sampling method: Measuring the quality of everyday life. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Kerckhoff, A. C. (1976). The status attainment process: Socialization or allocation? Social Forces, 55, 368–381. Larson, R., & Richards, M. (1994). Divergent realities: The emotional lives of mothers, fathers, and adolescents. New York: Basic Books. Lee, C. J., Park, H. J., & Lee, H. (2009). Shadow education systems. In G. Sykes, B. Schneider, & D. Plank (Eds.), The AERA handbook on educational policy research (pp. 901–919). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Mulligan, C., Wolfe, R., & Schneider, B. (2005). Non-response and population representation in studies of adolescent time use. Electronic International Journal of Time Use Research, 2(1), 33–53. National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). (2005). Digest of Education Statistics 2004 (NCES 2005–025). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). (2007). Digest of Education Statistics 2007 (NCES 2008–022). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Schmidt, J. (2005). Religiosity, emotional well-being, and family processes in working Families. In B. Schneider & L. Waite (Eds.), Being together, working apart: Dual-career families and the work-life balance (pp. 303–324). New York: Cambridge University Press. Schmidt, J., & Rich, G. (2000). Images of work and play. In M. Csikszentmihalyi & B. Schneider (Eds.), Becoming adult: How teenagers prepare for the world of work (pp. 67–94). New York: Basic Books. Schneider, B., & Stevenson, D. (1999). The ambitious generation: America’s teenagers, motivated but directionless. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Schoon, I., Martin, R., & Ross, A. (2007). Career transitions in times of social change: His and her story. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 70, 78–96. Schoon, I., & Parsons, S. (2002). Teenage aspirations for future careers and occupational outcomes. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 60, 262–288. Settersten, R. A., Jr., Furstenberg, F. F., & Rumbaut, R. G. (Eds.). (2005). On the frontier of adulthood: Theory, research, and public policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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Sewell, W., Haller, A. O., & Ohlendorf, G. W. (1970). The educational and early occupational status attainment process: Replication and revision. American Sociological Review, 35, 1014–1027. Sexton, H. (2005). Spending time at work and at home: What workers do, how they feel about it, and how these emotions affect family life. In B. Schneider & L. Waite (Eds.), Being together, working apart: Dual-career families and the work–life balance (pp. 49–71). New York: Cambridge University Press. Smock, P. J. (2000). Cohabitation in the United States: An appraisal of research themes, findings, and implications. Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 1–20. Weber, M. (1958/1904). The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism (T. Parsons, Trans.). New York: Charles Scribner and Sons.

V INTERVENTIONS AND POLICIES

13 School-Related Burnout During Educational Tracks Antecedents and Consequences Katariina Salmela-Aro

Although they do not like school, Finnish students do well at school, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2003) Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). Feelings about school are important though in influencing individuals’ future decisions concerning their education and work career and, thus, the entire life course (Salmela-Aro, Aunola, & Nurmi, 2008; Salmela-Aro & Nurmi, 2007). This chapter applies a new approach to school-related adjustment that is conceptualized in terms of school-related burnout. Although a substantial number of studies have been carried out on adjustment in the school context (Konu, Lintonen, & Autio, 2002; Roeser, 1998; Wigfield & Eccles, 1994), little of the research has focused specifically on how adolescents’ think and feel about going to school. School burnout is defined along three dimensions: exhaustion due to school demands, cynical and detached attitude toward school, and feelings of inadequacy as a student (Salmela-Aro, Kiuru, Leskinen, & Nurmi, 2009; Schaufeli, Mart´ınez, Pinto, Salanova, & Bakker, 2002). In this chapter, I discuss some of the antecedents and consequences of school-related burnout by reviewing the findings of the ongoing FinEdu study, in which adolescents have been followed intensively in their transition from comprehensive to postcomprehensive education. Rather than viewing it as a syndrome, I focus on school burnout as a continuum from mild to severe. I also introduce a specific intervention program called “Towards Working Life,” the aim of which is to facilitate the schoolto-work transition and decrease school burnout. First, however, I briefly describe the Finnish school system and the concept of school burnout. This study was supported by the Academy of Finland Grant 1210319.

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Schooling in Finland In Finland, more than 99 percent of comprehensive schools are run by local municipalities and schooling is tuition-free; thus, the number of private schools is very low. Finnish students performed very well in the PISA comparison studies (OECD, 2003). Moreover, teachers are highly qualified (i.e., university degree) and held in high esteem. Students have access to school health care to which they can turn if they have school-related or other problems affecting their well-being. The school health-care service consists of a qualified nurse, welfare officer, psychologist, and physician. In the year that they reach age seven, Finnish children start comprehensive school, which lasts nine years. Up to age sixteen, all Finnish adolescents receive a similar basic education. The transition from comprehensive to postcomprehensive education is demanding for many young people. In Finland, the majority of young people continue their education after comprehensive school at the age of fifteen or sixteen on either an academic (upper-secondary high school) or a vocational school track (55 and 37 percent, respectively); two percent remain in their comprehensive school to a voluntary tenth grade (e.g., to improve their grades); and six percent exit formal education (School Statistics, Central Statistical Office of Finland, 2003). Entry into the academic track is based on a student’s grade-point average (GPA) at the end of comprehensive school. An average-level GPA is required to enter most of the upper-secondary high schools. To enter some of the more prestigious upper-secondary high schools, however, excellent grades are needed. Entry into the vocational track likewise is based on GPA, but a student’s special skills and interests also are considered. In this chapter, I focus particularly on the end of comprehensive school and the transition from comprehensive school to either the academic track (i.e., entering upper-secondary high school) or the vocational track (i.e., entering vocational school). Entry into the academic track can be experienced as challenging and stressful because students often face unfamiliar expectations. For example, the academic workload increases rapidly, the length of the school day increases, and, at the same time, social support from teachers and peers decreases because in upper-secondary high school classes and teachers in the comprehensive model no longer exist. In addition, the social norms encouraged by parents and schools might increase risk behaviors. Many young people in upper-secondary high school begin to perform more poorly academically; this, in turn, can have a strong impact on their school engagement (Roderick & Camburn, 1999).

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In the Finnish educational system, the ninth grade of comprehensive school already can be assumed to be stressful for students because of the high academic achievement required to enter the upper-secondary high school system and some vocational schools. After the age of sixteen, following comprehensive school, only about six percent of students do not continue in any formal education; these young people enter the labor market directly with no further training. Those who enter the vocational track are finished after three or four years and then enter the job market. Those students who enter the academic track earn their high school diploma in various compulsory and elective subjects after three or four years. After finishing upper-secondary high school, students can apply for admission to a university. Admission is based on various factors, including results of the upper-secondary high school examinations and the relevant university department entrance examination. Students start their university studies at about the age of twenty or twenty-one and, on average, graduate about six years later. After upper-secondary high school, about 30 percent of this school-leaving group continue at university and 40 percent at polytechnic schools. For many students, the transition to working life is challenging and may include shifts among periods of fixed-term or temporary employment, part-time employment, education, and unemployment. However, the rate of unemployment among young people has decreased in recent years. Moreover, for many there is the challenge of combining the sphere of work with other key life domains, such as starting cohabitation or marriage and having children. How can this transition be facilitated by experiences in the school context?

School Burnout and Maladjustment at School Maladjustment and lack of well-being at school have been described by many concepts, such as low academic achievement and motivation, poor selfesteem, and internal and external problem behavior (Rudolph, Lambert, Clark, & Kurlakowsky, 2001; Wentzel, Barry, & Caldwell, 2004; Zimmerman & Schmeelk-Cone, 2003). However, less research has been carried out on how adolescents think and feel about going to school. The present study examines adolescents’ maladjustment and disengagement at school using the concept of school burnout. Although “burnout” is primarily regarded as a work-related disorder, it is also a useful concept in the school context: school is the context in which students work. Although students are not employed as such, from a

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psychological perspective, their core activities at school can be considered as “work.” They attend classes and do assignments in order to pass exams and acquire, for example, a degree. Consequently, the concept has been extended to studies of university students (Schaufeli et al., 2002), as well as to the school context (Kiuru, Aunola, Nurmi, Leskinen, & Salmela-Aro, 2008; Salmela-Aro, Kiuru, & Nurmi, 2008). School burnout can be defined as consisting of three dimensions: exhaustion due to school demands, cynical and detached attitude toward school (i.e., loss of interest in school), and feelings of inadequacy as a student (Salmela-Aro et al., 2009). School provides an important developmental context for adolescents (Eccles, 2004). It has been found that adolescents’ perceptions and experiences of school are associated with various adjustment outcomes. For example, students who dislike school are more likely to exhibit internal and external problem behaviors as well as psychosomatic problems and experience a reduced quality of life (Jessor, 1991; Kasen, Johnson, & Cohen, 1990). Poor academic performance and academic failures are associated with psychological stress and negative affect (Cole, Peeke, Dolezal, Murray, & Canzoniero, 1999; Crystal et al., 1994) and low self-esteem (Harter, 1996; Masi et al., 2000). By contrast, high academic achievement predicts high emotional well-being and protects against maladjustment (Gerard & Buehler, 2004; Seroczynski, Cole, & Maxwell, 1997), although it might also bring with it increased stress and pressure to maintain performance. Ongoing research (i.e., the FinEdu study) has established five factors that are particularly related to school burnout: (1) background, such as gender and academic achievement; (2) individual factors, such as motivation; (3) peer-related factors, such as peer group; (4) school-related variables, such as teachers’ ability to motivate students; and (5) impact of the educational track chosen after comprehensive school.

The Roles of Gender and Academic Achievement in School Burnout Previous research has shown gender differences in academic achievement and adjustment. For example, girls tend to perform better at school than boys (Dwyer & Johnson, 1997; Pomerantz, Altermatt, & Saxon, 2002) and to attribute greater importance to academic achievement compared to boys (Berndt & Miller, 1990; Murberg & Bru, 2004). However, girls also experience higher levels of stress (Ge, Lorenz, Conger, Elder, & Simons, 1994; Jose & Ratcliffe, 2004) and internalized symptoms (Hoffmann, Powlishta,

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& White, 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema & Girgus, 1994; Pomerantz, Altermatt, & Saxon, 2002). As adolescents make the transition to upper-secondary high school, they perceive their classrooms as more competitive. There is some evidence to suggest that girls respond more negatively to competitive learning conditions and attribute greater importance to academic achievement. In line with this, research shows that girls are not only more exposed to stressful life events but also are more vulnerable to their negative effects (Ge et al., 1994; Kessler & McLeod, 1984; Turner, Wheaton, & Lloyd, 1995). Moreover, courses are often taught in a manner that females find either boring or irrelevant to their interests (Eccles & Midgley, 1989). In our recent study, we examined gender differences in school burnout. The results of Kiuru et al. (2008) showed that girls experienced more school burnout; they had higher levels of exhaustion, cynicism, and inadequacy than boys (see also Salmela-Aro, Savolainen & Holopainen, in press). This result supports earlier findings according to which success at school is more important for girls than boys; and that girls are more vulnerable to school burnout.

The Role of Achievement Motivation for School Burnout One possible factor related to school burnout is the type of achievement motivation shown by a student. Tuominen, Salmela-Aro, and Niemivirta (2008) recently investigated, using FinEdu data, how comprehensive and upper-secondary high school students with different achievement-goalorientation profiles differed with respect to the three components of schoolrelated burnout. Six groups of students with different motivational orientations were identified on the basis of latent profile analysis: indifferent, mastery-oriented, success-oriented, performance-oriented, disengaged, and avoidance-oriented. Results showed that these orientations differed according to the three components of school burnout: success-oriented students scored higher on exhaustion at school than all the other students; disengaged students were the least exhausted; and avoidance-oriented students expressed significantly more cynicism and inadequacy toward school than other students. Mastery-oriented students, about 22 percent of the total, experienced low levels of cynicism and inadequacy at school. Their scores for exhaustion at school were average. Hence, overall, the students in the mastery-oriented group showed a low level of school burnout and an adaptive motivational pattern. Success-oriented students, about 10 percent of the total, were characterized by a striving for absolute and relative success, although they considered

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the goals of learning and understanding important as well. Academic success for these students serves as either an index of mastery or instrumental value as such. However, the presence of such preferences nevertheless seems to entail some degree of psychological distress for them. Compared with mastery-oriented students, success-oriented students – although committed to studying and their educational goals – displayed more exhaustion and a sense of inadequacy at school. This pattern of motivation and school adjustment is in line with findings linking stress, perceived study demands, and the pursuit of success (Smith, Sinclair, & Chapman, 2002). It also supports the assumption that self-worth based on external contingencies indicates relatively controlled motivation and is thus associated with feelings of pressure and stress (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Consequently, if prolonged, this pattern of motivation may put these students at risk of exhaustion. Disengaged students, about 10 percent of the total, resembled the group labeled “poor academic value” by Roeser, Strobel, and Quihuis (2002). These students reported relatively positive academic efficacy and mental health but placed a low value on academic achievement. Thus, it seems that these students, to some extent, are psychologically detached from school and that their well-being is more influenced by experiences other than schoolrelated experiences. Because these students’ school achievement was also relatively low, this particular group might represent the type of students that Seifert (2004) labeled “bright but bored.” Avoidance-oriented students, about six percent of the total, displayed high levels of cynicism and inadequacy at school. It is likely that for these students, not only has meaning and interest in their schoolwork been lost but also the feeling that they are capable of mastering school tasks (Seifert & O’Keefe, 2001). In contrast to mastery-oriented students with multiple strengths, these students represent an unfortunate group of adolescents at multiple risks (Roeser et al., 2002). Students view their schoolwork and educational aspirations with quite different motivational mindsets. It is crucial to understand that lack of motivation is only one of the numerous motivational and affective hindrances to effective studying. For example, cynicism, exhaustion, and inadequacy at school are all different but are significant symptoms of maladjustment to one’s own expectations and/or those of the environment. As a response to these challenges, we should learn to focus attention on groups of students with different types of problems and risks and support their adjustment to school by creating learning settings that more appropriately meet their different needs and goals. However, along with individual factors, context might play a key role in school burnout. It is to this issue that I turn next.

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The Role of Peers in School-Related Burnout Peer groups are among the most significant social contexts in adolescence (Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 1998). Previous research has shown that the members of adolescents’ peer groups are similar with respect to many characteristics and behaviors, such as in internalizing and externalizing problem behavior (Hogue & Steinberg, 1995). Research in academic settings has shown that peer group members are also similar with respect to academic achievement, school adjustment, and learning motivation (Kinderman, McCollam, & Gibson, 1996). These similarities have been explained by reference to two processes: peer influence and selection. In the FinEdu study, we recently examined the role of peers for school burnout and school engagement. The results showed in a longitudinal setting that members of adolescents’ peer groups were similar in terms of school burnout (Kiuru et al., 2008). These results extend the previous research, suggesting that in addition to school achievement and motivation (Kinderman et al., 1996), externalizing (Kiesner, Poulin, & Nicotra, 2003) and internalizing problem behaviors (Hogue & Steinberg, 1995), adolescents’ peer groups also play a role in how adolescents think and feel about school – in this case, relative to school burnout. The results of Kiuru et al. (2008) suggest socialization effects, in that peer-group members became more similar over time regarding their level of school burnout, and also experienced similar changes, with levels of school burnout either increasing or decreasing. There are several processes, such as observational learning and desires or pressures to conform (Berndt, 1999), that may be responsible for peer-group influence on adolescents’ school burnout. For example, if some members of a peer group feel overwhelmed by the demands of school, it is possible that they communicate it to other group members, thereby increasing the latter’s likelihood of feeling the same. Peer-group members may also reciprocally reinforce one another’s burnout in their mutual communication. Pressures to conform may operate less directly in the case of school burnout. Although it is unlikely that peer groups overtly expect school burnout from their members, it is possible that an increase or a decrease in burnout shared in a peer group results from unconscious tendencies to conform to the school-burnout atmosphere typical of that peer group. However, in another recent study, based on the FinEdu dataset (Kiuru, Nurmi, Aunola & Salmela-Aro, 2009), we found evidence for the importance of peer selection relative to school engagement. After the transition from comprehensive to postcomprehensive education, members of the new peer groups have been found to resemble each other in terms of school engagement. This is an important finding showing the influence of peer

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effects in school maladjustment (i.e., school burnout), whereas selection effects play a role in school adjustment (i.e., school engagement). Clearly, more research is needed to confirm findings such as these.

The Role of School in School Burnout Along with peers, the school context itself also may play a role in school burnout. Research on between-school differences during adolescence has typically focused on nonpsychological outcomes, such as academic achievement and behavioral issues. For example, the PISA study (OECD, 2003) analyzed between- and within-school variation in performance among twenty-eight countries, including Finland, and showed that countries differed widely in between-school variance in performance. In Finland, performance was largely unrelated to the schools in which students were enrolled. Only a few studies have been conducted on psychological outcomes (Roeser, 1998), such as belonging (Anderman, 2002) and well-being at school (Konu et al., 2002). Recently, however, some studies also examined adjustment at the school level. The relative influence of classes and schools on achievement seems to be higher than the influence of well-being. In line with this, Konu et al. (2002) found that the school-level variance for well-being was small. In turn, Anderman (2002) found that the relationship of students’ perceived school belonging to psychological outcomes varied across schools. However, even a small degree of between-school variance might play an important role in school burnout. The importance of shared-learning environments among adolescents attending the same school might also play a critical role in students’ school maladjustment in the context of school-related burnout. Salmela-Aro, Kiuru, Pietik¨ainen, and Jokela (2008) recently examined between-school differences in school-related burnout (using a short version of the School Burnout Inventory) and its predictors for two large nationally representative samples of adolescents. The results revealed, first, that overall, the between-school differences were relatively small for school burnout and, second, at the school level, a negative school climate, characterized by indicators such as haste and restlessness, positively predicted, whereas support from the school (e.g., provision of school health care) shared among school members negatively predicted school-related burnout among those at comprehensive school. In turn, teachers’ positive motivation of students, indicated through fairness and encouragement, protected upper-secondary high school students from school-related burnout. Third, at the individual level, a negative school climate positively predicted, whereas support from the school and teachers’ positive motivation of students protected from burnout among comprehensive-school and upper-secondary high school

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students. Comprehensive-school students particularly experience burnout when they perceive the school climate as negative and when they have difficulties in finding support from adults at the school, including support from health-care professionals. In turn, students in upper-secondary high school, in particular, need positive motivation such as encouragement, interest shown in them, and fairness from their teachers to prevent them from burning out at school. However, the results were based on crosssectional data; therefore, a longitudinal study is needed. Generally, it seems that countries that performed well in the PISA study also showed low levels of between-school variance, suggesting that securing similar student performance among schools is a policy goal that is both important in itself and compatible with the goal of high performance standards. Between-school variance is likely to reflect the structural features of schools and educational systems, educational policies, and practices of teachers (OECD, 2003). In Finnish schools, the variation in students’ school-related burnout occurred mostly at the individual level. Parents in Finland can be less concerned about school choice in seeking to enhance their children’s schoolrelated adjustment and can be confident of high and consistent standards of well-being throughout the entire educational system. Both educators and school welfare-service staff, however, must remember that psychological phenomena – in this case, school-related burnout – can vary, if only slightly, as a function of the school environment. Thus, school-related burnout to some extent may be a more salient issue in some schools than in others. Support from a school’s adults, such as teachers and health-care professionals, and positive teacher motivation of students have buffering effects on school burnout, whereas difficulty in gaining access to school health-care services, negative school climate, and lack of support increase the level of maladjustment – in this case, school-related burnout. Thus, it is important that teachers can positively motivate students in order to act as a possible buffer against negative psychological outcomes. If school personnel can do more to create caring communities for adolescents (Battistich, Solomon, Watson, & Schaps, 1997), then students might be less likely to experience psychological distress, exhaustion, cynicism, and a sense of inadequacy in the school context.

Educational Track and School Burnout The transition from comprehensive school to either an academic or a vocational track is the key educational change during adolescence in many

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European educational systems. Tracking determines the quality and type of learning opportunities that each student receives. It also determines exposure to different peers and, thus, to a certain degree, the nature of social relationships that young people form in school. Comprehensive schools are frequently referred to as “neighborhood” schools, with the students spending most of the school day with one set of peers and teachers; secondary schools, in most cases, are larger and less supportive than comprehensive schools. School transitions can be approached by means of the stage–environment fit theory (Eccles & Midgley, 1989). According to this theory, positive outcomes result if the changes in school opportunities are in alignment with the changes in adolescents’ needs, whereas unfavorable outcomes result if adolescents’ needs do not fit the opportunities provided by the school. Thus, students should be more motivated to learn if the material they are asked to master is shifted to their current level of competence and interests. There is substantial evidence of a decline in academic motivation, attachment to school, and academic achievement during the previous school transition in early adolescence (i.e., the transition to middle school or junior high school) (Eccles & Midgley, 1989; Maehr & Midgley, 1996). However, little is known about what happens during the school transition in late adolescence – for example, the transition from comprehensive school to upper-secondary high school or vocational school. The nature of the respective environments of the academic and vocational tracks, rather than the transition per se, might have important implications for changes in how an adolescent thinks and feels at school (Entwisle, 1990; Wigfield, Eccles, & Pintrich, 1996). Eccles and Midgley (1989) proposed that negative developmental changes may result if schools do not provide developmentally appropriate educational environments for adolescents. Such changes and negative developmental matching might lead to alienation and cynicism. Upper-secondary high schools are typically larger and more bureaucratic than comprehensive schools, providing fewer opportunities than the latter for students and teachers to get to know each other. This situation is reflected in distrust between teachers and students, as well as low attachment to common goals and values. There is also little opportunity for students to form mentor-like relationships with a nonfamiliar adult. Such environments are likely to undermine further the motivation and involvement of many students, especially those not doing particularly well academically. Previous research has shown that many young people seem to show a decrease in school engagement during school transitions (Roderick & Camburn, 1999). Moreover, on the academic track in upper-secondary

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high school, the pressure to succeed and the workload both increase. This might be expected to lead to increased levels of exhaustion. Moreover, the transition to upper-secondary high school has been associated with a decline in grades, an increase in disciplinary problems and dropping out, as well as poorer attendance (Barone, Aquirre-Deandries, & Trickett, 1991). These signs of disaffection might be early signs of impending school failure, school dropout, and risk behaviors later on (Finn, 1989), and they might be manifested in school-related burnout in terms of an increased level of cynicism and reduced inefficacy among those on the academic track. By comparison, the vocational track focuses more on hands-on and practical activities. Relative to school-related burnout, this might lead to a decreased level of cynicism and increase in efficacy, particularly among students who have not been high achievers in comprehensive school. We examined changes in the three dimensions of school burnout during the transition from comprehensive school to the postcomprehensive educational track (Salmela-Aro, Kiuru, & Nurmi, 2008). Our results revealed, first, that adolescents on a vocational track experienced a higher initial level of cynicism than their counterparts on an academic track. However, cynicism among those on a vocational track increased before the transition from comprehensive school but then decreased after the transition to vocational school. Second, the results showed that among adolescents on an academic track, the level of cynicism increased across time during the transition from comprehensive school to upper-secondary high school. On the basis of the school-stage–fit theory (Eccles, 2004), it might be assumed that transition to a vocational education promotes well-being – particularly among those who have difficulties in a more academic context – whereas the challenges of an academic track might lead to school burnout. Findings concerning adolescents’ cynicism during this school transition also tend to support the stage–environment-fit theory (Eccles & Midgley, 1989). Students should be more motivated to learn if the material they are asked to master is appropriate for their current level of competence and interests. Eccles and Midgley (1989) proposed that negative developmental changes result if schools do not provide developmentally appropriate educational environments for adolescents. Such changes and negative developmental matching seem to increase alienation and cynicism during the transition from comprehensive school to further education. Second, adolescents on the vocational track experienced higher initial levels of inadequacy at comprehensive school than their counterparts who moved to the academic track (Salmela-Aro, Kiuru, & Nurmi, 2008). However, among adolescents on the vocational track, inadequacy decreased over

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time, whereas among adolescents on the academic track, the level of sense of inadequacy decreased at comprehensive school and then increased after the transition to upper-secondary high school. An explanation in addition to the stage–environment-fit theory regarding results concerning the academic track is the “little-fish-in-a-big-pond” effect. When students move to upper-secondary high school, their reference group changes: the students they now compare themselves with are students whose academic achievement and competencies tend to be much higher than those of their comprehensive-school peers. Third, adolescents on the academic track experienced a higher initial overall level of exhaustion throughout the transition period than those on the vocational track. Among girls on the academic track, the sense of inadequacy decreased before but then increased again after the transition to upper-secondary high school, whereas among boys on the academic track, the sense of inadequacy increased across time (Salmela-Aro, Kiuru, & Nurmi, 2008). These results seem to suggest that there is evidence of gendered trajectories in school burnout from comprehensive school to both the academic and vocational tracks. Consequently, care is necessary when interpreting results related to adjustment and maladjustment at school, if gender has not been taken into account. We should also consider the practical implications of these findings. The results emphasize the need for more support to be given to students on the academic track to prevent burnout. Moreover, school burnout on the academic track might lead to dropping out from school later. Consequently, it would be important to identify students at risk for school burnout as well as to seek to change the school context in such a way that it would lead to greater school engagement (Schaufeli et al., 2002). My final aim in this chapter is to introduce one such intervention program aiming to increase school engagement and adjustment, which was conducted recently in Finland (Vuori, Koivisto, Mutanen, Jokisaari, & Salmela-Aro, 2008).

Promoting the Transition from Comprehensive School Young people are faced with increasing demands when they make the transition from comprehensive to postcomprehensive education and, subsequently, working life. Succeeding in a rapidly changing labor market calls for a good basic education and the continuous development of professional skills (Gangl, 2002). Simultaneously, young people who drop out are at increased risk for low-quality occupational careers, underemployment, unemployment, and even exclusion from the labor market (Bynner,

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1998). Therefore, building guidance systems for young people facing the transition from comprehensive school to an academic or vocational career path is a major challenge facing today’s postindustrial economies. Moreover, a successful educational transition could promote school adjustment and decrease maladjustment, such as school burnout. In Finland, as in many other European countries, the transition from comprehensive to other forms of education and work is a rather challenging period. Many students feel that they do not receive enough information and guidance when it comes to making their career decisions; therefore, they often decide on their futures quite randomly. Of those who find their way to vocational schools, only 10 percent believe they have made the right choice. Because of the lack of resources available for vocational guidance, many young people feel that they are left without adequate knowledge of the occupational and educational possibilities that exist when they have to decide what to do next. Self-efficacies related to career management, career goals and motivation, and career strategies (Lent, Hackett, & Brown, 1999), as well as support and guidance, influence the choice young people make after comprehensive school – that is, whether to continue their education on an academic or a vocational track, and thus their subsequent career development (Lent et al., 1999; Nurmi, Salmela-Aro, & Koivisto, 2002). These factors are of special importance for students who frequently experience difficulties and setbacks in their school career. At particular risk are students who suffer from school burnout. An intervention called the “Towards Working Life Group Method” (Vuori et al., 2008) was developed to assist ninth-graders during their transition from comprehensive to postcomprehensive education. The aims were to increase preparedness for the transition to the secondary-level studies, to gain a sense of the students’ own vision and goals for their future, to develop strategies to attain these goals, and to decrease school maladjustment in terms of school burnout. The objective was to help students achieve a role change from being a career drifter to becoming a proactive student actively engaged in shaping their own career choices, or to use the classification introduced in Chapter 12, to change from being a idler or player to become a strategist. The intervention applied active learning processes in seeking to increase participants’ career-choice preparedness. This means the degree of confidence students have in their own ability to successfully perform essential career-choice activities, such as defining personal strengths and career interests, seeking guidance and information about interesting professions and educational pathways, and constructing concrete goals and plans to

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promote their own career. Moreover, the aim was to provide students with the ability to anticipate setbacks and, when encountered, the skills to cope with them, maintain their motivation, and perform in difficult situations (Lent et al., 1999). The development of the group method was based on the Michigan Prevention Research Center (MPRC) group-training principles (Price, Friedland, Choi, & Caplan, 1998). These principles consist of five essential components that formed the basis of the “Towards Working Life Group Method” intervention. The first component is career-management skills training, which means that in workshops, participants are encouraged to define and practice career-management skills. The second component is active teaching and learning methods such as small- and large-group discussions, role-playing, and other activities. A supportive learning environment is the third essential component. The purpose of the fourth component – inoculation against setbacks – was to focus on factors such as unrealistic career choice and lack of confidence in the success of one’s planned educational pathway. Finally, implementation of the group model requires good knowledge of the other four components and the requisite teaching techniques. Consequently, skilled trainers comprise the fifth essential component of the method (Price et al., 1998). Trainers are educated to build trust and work together in pairs to facilitate group processes that promote the learning of career-management skills. The outcome showed that the intervention promoted positive motivation toward future education. This increase in motivation was also related to increased consideration regarding their future careers (Salmela-Aro, Mutanen, Koivisto & Vuori, 2008). On the basis of these changes, the intervention can be said to have increased adolescents’ preparedness for their future education and career. Moreover, the participants perceived more internal motivation with respect to their future education and career. In addition, among risk groups of young people such as those suffering from school burnout, symptoms decreased later on (Vuori et al., 2008). Thus, the intervention both promoted young people’s adjustment to the transition and decreased school burnout, particularly among risk groups, suggesting that it might be possible to provide scaffolding for positive development.

Conclusion This chapter conceptualized school maladjustment in terms of schoolrelated burnout, which is defined as consisting of three dimensions: exhaustion due to school demands, cynical and detached attitude toward school,

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Table 13.1. Factors Related to School Burnout

Gender Grades Motivation Peers School atmosphere Teachers attitude School health School track

Increased Risk of Burnout

Reduced Risk of Burnout

Girl Low academic achievement Success orientation Avoidance Peers suffering from burnout Haste, restlessness Unfairness, lack of motivation Lack of school health personnel Academic track

Boy High academic achievement Mastery orientation Supportive peers Restful atmosphere Fairness, encouragement Access to school health personnel Vocational track

and feelings of inadequacy as a student (Salmela-Aro et al., 2009; Schaufeli et al., 2002). In this chapter, I approached school burnout as a continuum from mild to severe rather than as a syndrome. It seems that both individual and contextual factors play a role in influencing school burnout (Table 13.1). Girls are more at risk for burnout than boys. It might be that for girls, it is more important to be successful at school than for boys. Second, motivational orientation is related to school burnout: students with a success orientation seem to be at particular risk for school burnout. Along with individual factors, context also seems to play a key role regarding school burnout. For example, peer groups seem to play a key role in influencing change in school burnout. Among members of the same peer group school burnout changes, and can increase or decrease. A supportive peer group seems to protect the group from an increase in school burnout. However, for school engagement, a selection effect was found. Students select similar school-engaged peers but school burnout influences their peers. The school context is also important for school burnout. Although Finnish schools do not seem to vary in school burnout, the role of teachers and school health services seem to be a key factor in preventing school burnout. A negative school atmosphere, particularly in comprehensive school, seems to produce school burnout. Moreover, the transition from comprehensive school to the next stage of education is an important context for change in burnout. The transition from comprehensive school to an academic track seems to increase school burnout, whereas the transition to a vocational track seems to decrease it. Therefore, building guidance systems for young people facing the transition from comprehensive school to an academic or vocational career path is a major challenge in today’s world. In this connection, the chapter concluded by introducing a recently developed one-week intervention program called “Towards Working Life Group Method,” which

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seemed to reduce school burnout during the transition from comprehensive to postcomprehensive education.

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14 Building Skills for Positive Developmental Pathways and Successful Vocational Careers in Adulthood Intervention Programs Within the School Context Karina Weichold

Introduction In times of social change characterized by opening of labor markets, increasing job insecurity, reduced job and training opportunities, and high rates of unemployment, a smooth and successful transition from school to work life becomes a salient developmental task for adolescents. Successful transitions to work life and successful career pathways have long-term significance for psychosocial adaptation, health, and well-being (Roisman, Masten, Coatsworth, & Tellegen, 2004). A successful transition to work and a positive career pathway are defined by extrinsic and intrinsic characteristics of occupational success. Extrinsic markers refer to stable working relationships and short times of unemployment (e.g., a short time span between finishing school and entering work life and related education), but also to high occupational status, promotions, and high income. Intrinsic criteria of occupational success include personal characteristics such as high job satisfaction (Judge & Higgins, 1999). Extrinsic and intrinsic markers for successful occupational careers are interrelated, such as occupational success and job satisfaction (Judge, Thoresen, Bono, & Patton, 2001). Today’s employers and enterprises seek trade-oriented young people with clearly defined skills, abilities, and dispositions (Taylor, 2005). They look for future employees that have an understanding of the employer’s requirements and expectations, share high work ethics, show a high willingness to work, have a keenness to learn, are punctual and honest, and exhibit appropriate personal behaviors. In addition, employers expect basic skills (i.e., literacy, numeracy, teamwork, communication skills, and problem-solving skills) and the ability to use equipment and technology. Moreover, employers want 312

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young people who show high initiative, maturity, trainability, cleanliness, good manners, an interest in the job, and respect for authority. In summary, to be a desirable future employee and to be successful in the labor market seems to depend on a broad range of generic, essential employability skills. Because deficits in a variety of these skills were identified in novice workers (Smith & Comyn, 2004), the industry, as future employer, calls for better job-related preparation and training provided by schools. Contrary to that, employers distrust schools regarding their grading of skills and prefer to provide specific occupational skills via training on the job (Smith & Comyn, 2004; Taylor, 2005). However, the promotion of employability skills, as they appear to be perceived by employers, also may be tackled by schools. This has implications for schooling insofar as there is a need for more career education. The following section summarizes findings on theoretical models and predictors of positive adaptation in adolescence and young adulthood with an explicit focus on successful school-to-work transition and positive career development. Knowledge of the theoretical underpinnings and empirical findings is essential for the development of effective programs for career education.

Theoretical Models and Predictors of Successful School-to-Work Transition and Positive Career Development The first and most comprehensive theory dealing with school-to-work transition (Blustein, 1999) concerns the role of social-cognitive variables (specifically self-efficacy) and its influences on effort and interest in getting a particular job. In Social Cognitive Career Theory, Lent, Hackett, and Brown (1999) focused on several agentic variables (i.e., self-efficacy, outcome expectations, and goals) and their interaction with other persons and environments. The basic assumption is that the school-to-work transition is a process (rather than an event; Super, 1980) that unfolds gradually during the school years and beyond and that is embedded in the larger fabric of the career-development process. A successful transition, therefore, depends on how well students navigate multiple career tasks. Six interrelated processes were distinguished: (1) acquisition of positive and realistic outcome expectations, (2) development of academic and career interests, (3) formation of the interconnection between interests and career-related goals, (4) translation of goals into action, (5) development of skills, and (6) negotiation for social supports and barriers that affect the pursuit of preferred career goals. These processes are iterative and ongoing during the school years and beyond.

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The model states that personal inputs (e.g., gender, predispositions, and health status) and background (e.g., contextual affordances) influence sources of self-efficacy (e.g., mastery experiences and performance experiences) that, in turn, affect self-efficacy and outcome expectations. Both constructs are seen as central to the cultivation of interests, formation of goals, and associated actions, which are also modulated by contextual influences (i.e., environmental supports and barriers) (Lent et al., 1999). Based on this theory, developmentally appropriate interventions to promote successful career pathways might best be implemented throughout the school years. Also, the authors stress the importance of developing self-efficacy and competence in more generic skill domains (e.g., teamwork, leadership, and employability skills) that are needed to translate goals into actions and to negotiate barriers and supports. Another theory concerns the definition of work personality (Strauser, Waldrop, & Ketz, 1999) and focuses on the relationship among occupational interests, personality characteristics, and possible occupational environments (Holland, 1997). Here, six types of individuals with distinct personality-characteristics and interests (e.g., domain-specific interests, self-efficacy, and skills) were differentiated and matched to relating occupational environments (e.g., conventional, social, or artistic type). Working in a well-fitting occupational environment according to skills and interests predicted stable work careers and higher job satisfaction (Spokane, Meir, & Catalano, 2000). Based on this theory, the identification and promotion of interests and skills becomes important for career-development programs and for assistance in making career choices. Finally, the concept of employability subsumes a host of person-centered constructs needed to deal effectively with career-related demands. According to Fugate, Kinicki, and Ashford (2004), employability relates to a psychosocial construct that “embodies individual characteristics that foster adaptive cognition, behavior, and affect, and enhance the individual-work interface.” Employability enables individuals to react and successfully adapt to the changing demands of their work-related environment (Chan, Lai, Ko, & Boey, 2000) and integrates three components: career identity, personal adaptability, and social and human capital (Fugate et al., 2004). Career identity refers to hopes, personal goals, values, beliefs, norms, and interaction styles and is interpreted as an assimilation of experiences into meaningful and useful structures (Meijers, 1998). Career identity is reflected in an individual’s identity style in the way that information orientation (i.e., proactive search and receptiveness for information) relates to improvements in vocational careers (Ashforth, 2001), less job turnover, and better coping with unemployment (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1997).

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Personal adaptability is found in individuals who are willing and able to change dispositions and behaviors in order to meet situational demands (i.e., proactive adaptive efforts). Foundations of personal adaptability lie in the concepts of optimism, propensity to learn, openness to change or new experiences, internal locus of control, and generalized self-efficacy. These various aspects of personal adaptability were empirically associated with positive career-related outcomes, such as career success, organizational performance, positive perceptions of one’s adaptive capacity, and high attractiveness to employers (Fugate et al., 2004). Finally, social and human capital refers to social networking. In the context of career development, high social capital promotes, for example, the utilization of informal as well as formal job search networks. Human capital summarizes a variety of factors such as age, education, intelligence, and experience. Empirical findings suggest that education (i.e., level of education, degree, and grades) and experience (i.e., “portable skills”) are particularly linked with positive vocational outcomes, such as career progression and job satisfaction (Judge, Cable, Boudreau, & Bretz, 1995). In summary, all three theoretical approaches have in common that they focus on the individual who faces the school-to-work transition and that they emphasize developmental aspects. Central to the three theoretical concepts is that individual competencies, personal attributes, and general skills promote successful career pathways. They can be subsumed as “soft” skills needed in the vocational context, defined as skills, abilities, and traits that pertain to personality and behavior. Two clusters of soft skills focus on interactions (i.e., ability to interact with others; e.g., friendliness, teamwork, and appropriate affect) and motivation (i.e., characteristics such as enthusiasm, commitment, and willingness to learn). Conversely, “hard” skills include basic skills (i.e., math, reading, and writing), specific knowledge required in a certain job, educational attainment, and analytical skills (Coll & Zegwaard, 2006; Moss & Tilly, 1996). It has been discussed that such skills and personal attributes are not specific to the work context but rather resemble fundamental competencies essential for positive adaptation in society (i.e., are transferable to different contexts). In this way, soft skills, employability skills, and other personal attributes that seem to be important for success at work, in fact, may be life skills (Taylor, 2005). Life skills are important for effective person–context interactions and for coping with developmental challenges and tasks (Darden, Gazda, & Ginter, 1996; World Health Organization [WHO], 1997). Life skills form the basis for effective development, including vocational development, and they encompass interpersonal/human relationships (e.g., communication,

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intimacy, and the ability to establish and maintain positive social relationships) and personal competencies (e.g., self-efficacy and positive selfconcept, effective problem solving, and decision making). Empirical findings show that life skills promote positive outcomes in school and that they relate to higher educational aspirations in adolescents. For instance, social relationships of high quality, acceptance, and support with peers and teachers (which often result from high levels of life skills in the interpersonal area) were linked to higher academic achievement, better grades, and a lower likelihood of moving down in the educational track system (Lubbers et al., 2006). Moreover, students with supportive relationships show higher school attendance, higher satisfaction and engagement in school, and higher self-efficacy (Rosenfeld, Richman, & Bowen, 2000). As well as having an effect on variables such as involvement in deviant activities, substance misuse, or life plans, life skills also positively affect career choices of young people (Gardner & Jewler, 1997). Furthermore, Pinquart, Juang, and Silbereisen (2003) showed that in addition to school grades, academic selfefficacy beliefs (i.e., for ages twelve through fifteen) were associated with low unemployment and high job satisfaction in early adulthood. The association between self-efficacy and unemployment was mediated by higher career-related motivation and less perceived application stress. Returning to the concepts of soft skills (with a focus on employability skills) that have been shown to promote a successful school-to-work transition in adolescence, we see that an overlap with the competencies listed under life skills and employability skills is evident (Table 14.1). First, generic life skills in the personal area, particularly positive selfevaluations and decision-making skills, resemble features of a positive career identity (e.g., “Who am I?”). High levels of self-awareness, for instance, also may promote self-reflection on a future career. Second, interpersonal life skills, such as effective communication, assertiveness, and the ability to establish and maintain positive and supportive relationships, refer to the human- and social-capital component of employability. For instance, positive relationships with others may help to build and use informal networks for finding a desired job. Moreover, to communicate efficiently is one of the core competencies needed during job interviews, which is also true for empathy and assertiveness. Third, the interactive mode of facilitation and positive feedback from others in a nonthreatening context (which is typical for Life Skills programs) also may provide experiences for adolescents allowing to build human and social capital. Finally, additional components of life-skills programs that focus on the school context and effective learning may stimulate educational aspirations and a close and positive relationship

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Table 14.1. Employability and Life Skills Employability (Fugate et al., 2004)

Life Skills (WHO, 1997)

Career Identity Who am I? Who do I want to become?

Personal Competencies Positive self-evaluation Coping with emotions and stress Creative and critical thinking Decision making Problem solving Interpersonal Competencies Effective communication Assertiveness/resistance skills Positive interpersonal relationships Empathy Modes of Facilitation of Programs Interactive teaching methods Resource-oriented Focus on positive reinforcement Additional Program Components Relationships to school, teacher, and class Learning in school Structured leisure-time activities

Personal Adaptability Optimism Propensity to learn Openness Internal locus of control Self-efficacy Human and Social Capital Education Experiences Informal networks

to school, teachers, and classmates, thereby promoting personal adaptability as a component of employability. Taken together, theoretical concepts and empirical studies have stressed the importance of soft skills, personal attributes, and work personality as a key to successful interaction between the individual and work context, including a successful school-to-work transition. Competencies such as employability skills and work personality develop and shape over time, in interaction with family and peers, and in the school context. It seems that individual soft skills (i.e., employability skills) are not confined to the vocational context; they also contribute to successful adaptation in all spheres of life in today’s society and, thus, are similar to life skills. Knowledge of antecedents to successful transitions to work and positive career pathways is the basis for developing effective programs that target the “right” risk and protective factors. As demonstrated, soft skills seem to be a central predictor of successful career pathways and, therefore, may be a central element of career guidance for young people. The following section explores the current state of career-education programs in the school context with a particular focus on the promotion of soft skills.

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Application to Promotion Attempts Although programs aimed at successful school-to-work transitions are particularly needed for those who are at risk and who lack skills and education (i.e., selective intervention approaches) (Gordon, 1983), in times of labor-market restructuring and extreme structural barriers to successful vocational development, population-wide approaches should also be developed and implemented (i.e., universal programs). A universal approach also would be in line with guidelines for the promotion of positive youth development in general (Lerner, 2000; Perkins et al., 2003; Weichold, 2007). The most appropriate context for implementing universal strategies for adolescents is that of the school. Career Education in School Context School is assumed to offer various options for generating and supporting personal strengths and is known to be one of the major asset-building contexts of young people (Benson, 2002). Generally, teachers seem to play a crucial role: their behaviors, skills, and social interactions influence students’ academic achievement and various aspects of the classroom (Wright, Horn, & Sanders, 1997). Thus, the training of teachers (optimally over a longer period) is an important feature of school-based interventions because they can gain self-efficacy, perceive the school environment more positively (Shechtman, Levy, & Leichtentritt, 2005), and therefore are more motivated to act as key change agents and catalysts for the implementation of promotion programs (Granger, 2002; Weichold, 2007). Today it is even suggested that schools must support a positive transition to work life including broad career development, lifelong learning, employability, and cognitive skills, and that career-education programs should be compulsory for students (Mullen & Kohan, 2002; Ogawa & Okada, 2005). Guidelines were defined for how career education in school should appear: strategies should be based on holistic models of development and should provide for career exploration and planning, for the enhancement of academic achievement and motivation to learn, for the development of generic skills, and for the establishment of pathways into continuing education. Moreover, school-based career-development programs should include components that focus on coping with stress and should support positive relationships with family, school, and other developmental contexts. Because the school-to-work transition can be understood as a process that gradually unfolds throughout the school years, all adolescents may require support regarding their academic achievement, self-efficacy expectations, goal

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formation, soft skills, systematic exploration of career-related opportunities, and active engagement in the process of crystallizing and implementing vocational interests during several years of schooling. Current State of School-Based Career Development Interventions The exploration of existing publications (based on the PsycINFO data basis) on school-based programs aiming at career development revealed, first, that there are relatively few studies published on school-based programs that explicitly focus on career development and the promotion of a successful school-to-work transition. For instance, from 1990 to 2007, fewer than 150 papers were found using the key words career education and program and school (about 20 referred to the age group 6 to 12, and about 70 to the age group 13 to 17). In contrast, more than five thousand articles and book chapters were published with a focus on prevention programs in school (1990–2007). Second, closer inspection of the publications on school-based career-education programs revealed that relatively few programs were evaluated according to scientific standards (i.e., based on a quasi-experimental design involving control and intervention groups, including follow-up measurements). Moreover, a strong theoretical basis is mostly lacking, which makes it difficult to assess and compare the programs’ effectiveness. This observation is also shared by authors of earlier reviews and metaanalyses on career-education programs (Prideaux, Creed, Muller, & Patton, 2000). Third, the majority of the publications during recent years dealt with programs that are selective in nature, thereby focusing on facilitating skills for students with special needs. Based on the literature search described herein, this was especially true about programs for the age group thirteen to seventeen, as more than 60 percent of the published evaluation studies dealt with students with special needs (e.g., deaf and blind students and those with learning disabilities), students at risk for underachievement and less successful career pathways (e.g., students belonging to ethnic minorities or from disadvantaged background), and gifted adolescents. Two examples of career-education programs for adolescents with selected groups show possible intervention approaches. The first example concerns an intervention to support the transition to adult roles for students with emotional and behavioral disturbances (i.e., the Steps-to-Success Program; Karpur, Clark, Caproni, & Sterner, 2005) via person-centered interventions. By using existing state and program data (e.g., on unemployment or postsecondary education), the program has been proven to exert positive effects on the participants.

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A second exemplary program (i.e., the Career Horizons Program; O’Brien et al., 1999) was implemented as a one-week summer program for seventh-graders (age twelve) at risk for vocational underachievement. The intervention combined career classes with team-building activities. The evaluation showed enhancements in confidence of task performance related to investigating, selecting, and implementing a career choice. Also, after the intervention, participants considered a greater number of careers congruent with their interests. As discussed previously, contrary to the larger number of programs that focus on students of high-risk groups, fewer programs use universal intervention approaches by targeting larger population groups such as an entire school class. Three examples of universal career-education programs are introduced in the following discussion. They exemplify different approaches of promoting successful career development with an entire school class. Lapan, Tucker, Kim, and Kosciulek (2003) evaluated strategies aimed at the promotion of successful post–high school transitions in American rural adolescents (i.e., grades eight, ten, and twelve). The program components focused on (1) organizing classes around a career goal, (2) demonstrating to students the relevance of the program for their future careers, (3) teaching work-based learning experiences, and (4) experiencing connected learning activities. Furthermore, students reflected on emotional and instrumental support by stakeholders (e.g., teachers and parents). Evaluation results suggest that students improved in some aspects that are important for positive career development (e.g., goal-setting or social skills). Moreover, students were more satisfied that school provides better preparation for achieving educational and vocational goals in the future, and they increased their educational and career-related aspirations. Another program in the area of career education focused on crystallizing enterprising interest in German adolescents (Schr¨oder & SchmittRodermund, 2006). The aim of the program was to help young people (i.e., ages fourteen to twenty-five) explore their interest in setting up their own enterprise as a career option. This program was taught by trained teachers using a structured manual. The curriculum focused on topics like leadership, problem solving, and achievement orientation; exploring own interest in economic interrelations; and activities to explore own levels of risk-taking. Evaluation findings show that the program, at least in the short term, was able to support the young people’s exploration of future career options. Finally, other programs focused on the role of apprenticeships and learning in the workplace (which is a common model in the European vocational

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education context) by promoting employability and successful career pathways. In their study, Hamilton and Hamilton (2000) tested the effects of such a program in American adolescents. Apprenticeships in three occupational areas (i.e., administration and office technology, health care, and manufacturing and engineering technology) were developed in conjunction with local employers and schools in a community. Interested high school students applied for positions in the different programs, which spanned four years of combined classes and work. The evaluation study showed that students taking part in apprenticeships (compared to those who had jobs while attending school but not related to the apprenticeship program) gained work-related and social competencies such as initiative, self-confidence, motivation, responsibility, and teamwork skills. Moreover, they were more likely to find work meaningful and educational and to associate their working experiences with a higher likelihood of finding employment in the future. The examples of evaluated (selective and universal) career-education programs show that the intervention targets and strategies in school vary greatly, ranging from the promotion of soft and work-related skills to crystallizing future career plans. Moreover, in some cases, schools also formed coalitions with the community to involve employers or stakeholders in planning and implementing their intervention attempts. In addition to illustrating what can be done in the school context concerning career education, the question remains whether such programs are generally effective. Several meta-analyses and reviews summarized the effectiveness of these interventions. The analyses are difficult because of the lack of a theoretical basis, comprehensiveness, and methodologically sound research designs (Baker & Taylor, 1998; Prideaux et al., 2000). However, school-based career-development programs seem to have positive effects on the acquisition and use of knowledge, skills, and attitudes for making work meaningful for adolescents (Baker & Taylor, 1998, based on twelve studies published between 1983 and 1996; effect size = 0.39) and on their academic achievement (Evans & Bruck, 1992, based on sixty-seven studies published between 1966 and 1991; effect size = 0.16). These effect sizes point to small to medium effects that were higher if the program was facilitated over several years of schooling with higher numbers of units. Also, students with average ability seem to profit most regarding improvements in academic achievement, compared to those with low and high abilities, because they may be capable of higher achievements but lack motivation and effort. Conversely, low-achieving students may be the least motivated because of their persistent experience of failure; therefore, they may need

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additional measures promoting skills and self-efficacy (Evans & Bruck, 1992). In summary, there are relatively few well-evaluated career-education programs for the school context compared to other intervention programs (e.g., focusing on the prevention of problem behavior). All programs introduced in this chapter serve as illustrative examples dealing with certain aspects of employability, soft skills (e.g., self-efficacy), or occupational choices. They have in common that most of them contain a component that focuses on the enhancement of soft or life skills. Skills-training is often approached in school through life-skills programs, which is also the most successful approach to prevent problem behaviors including substance misuse during adolescence (Tobler & Stratton, 1997). Experiences made in that area of research also can be beneficial for identifying the most suitable strategies for improving skills within comprehensive career-development programs. In the following section, the usefulness of life-skills programs for promoting successful school-to-work transitions of young people is discussed.

The Usefulness of the Life-Skills Approach in Career Education Life skills refer to competencies that enable adolescents to effectively cope with challenges of their everyday life and to deal adequately with developmental tasks (Darden et al., 1996; WHO, 1997). In addition to the training of generic life skills (Table 14.1), life skill programs have a problem-specific component (e.g., focusing on substance misuse, depression, or aggression) in which skills and knowledge specific to the target issue are conveyed (Weichold, 2007). Life-skills programs are typically implemented within the school context via a trained teacher. Highly interactive teaching methods are used (e.g., role-playing, group discussions, and presentations) and teachers explicitly focus on positive-reinforcement strategies while interacting with students. Optimally, life-skills programs include several booster sessions and span several years of schooling. The life-skills model states that through the intervention, knowledge, attitudes, and values are positively influenced and psychosocial competence increases. However, psychosocial competence and healthy behaviors of the students will develop over time only within a positive, reinforcing context characterized by enduring support of the new behavioral alternatives (WHO, 1997). Empirical findings show that life-skills programs can affect (even long term) psychosocial adaptation (especially in the area of substance misuse) (Skara & Sussman, 2003). Moreover, it has been demonstrated that

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the programs improve knowledge about generic life skills such as problem solving and communication and that students use these skills to a greater extent than controls within their daily interactions (B¨uhler, Schr¨oder, & Silbereisen, 2007). Programs developed based on the life-skills model were also discussed as a useful strategy to improve employability in young people (Picklesimer, Hooper, & Ginter, 1998). Based on an example from our own research, the question of whether life-skills programs can contribute to career education in young people is explored in the next section. An Example: The School-Based Life Skills Program IPSY The German Life Skills program IPSY (i.e., IPSY = Information + Psychosocial Competence = Protection) (Weichold, 2008) aims to promote generic and substance-use–specific life skills, as well as the delay of onset and reduction in the age-typical increase in consumption of alcohol and tobacco during adolescence. The basic training of IPSY was developed for fifth-graders (ages ten and eleven); two booster sessions follow at grades six and seven. The theoretical basis for the program was the model for life-skills education (WHO, 1997), as well as developmental psychological models and empirical findings on risk and protective factors for adolescent development. IPSY is a universal comprehensive program that combines social and resistance skills training, generic intra- and interpersonal life-skills training (e.g., self-awareness, stress and problem coping strategies, assertiveness, and communication skills). Moreover, IPSY conveys substance-specific skills, provides information (i.e., prevalence, short-term effects, and advertising), and focuses on strengthening ties to the classroom and school (Weichold, 2008). IPSY is taught by teachers who have participated in a one-day facilitator workshop based on a well-structured manual. The program utilizes highly interactive teaching methods (e.g., role-playing, small-group interaction, and group discussion) with an explicit emphasis on resource-orientation. Teachers are trained to work intensively with reinforcement strategies to promote the acquisition of skills and the identification of positive features in each student. Students with negative school achievement, who therefore often receive negative feedback in the classroom, particularly may profit from this method. Since 2003, following a successful pilot intervention, the IPSY program has been evaluated based on a large-scale study involving forty schools (college-bound and lower-school track; N = 1.686 at T1) of a German federal state (i.e., Thuringia). This ongoing study utilizes an intervention

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and control-group design with multiple measurement points. The initial findings based on pre–post test comparison (Weichold, 2008; Weichold et al., 2006; Wenzel et al., 2007) and three measurement points, including the first follow-up, seem to be promising. Evaluation findings of the IPSY program showed that it was well implemented and accepted in grades five and six (Weichold et al., 2007; Weichold, 2008). For the outcome evaluation, changes in the dependent variables over three measurement points were compared between intervention and control groups. Data analyses revealed that the IPSY program was able to positively influence a student’s skills, knowledge, and school-related adaptation from grade five to grade six. More specifically, after taking part in the intervention, students showed a greater increase in psychosocial competencies and knowledge of general communication rules and assertiveness, and a lower susceptibility to peer pressure compared to students who did not participate in the program. Furthermore, IPSY students showed less of the age typical decrease in their positive perceptions of the classroom climate and bonding to school compared to control students, who declined in these measures. The program was also effective in positively influencing students’ consumption behaviors (i.e., alcohol and tobacco use) in both nonusers and users at T1. The mean effect size was 0.20 for life skills, knowledge, and schoolrelated outcomes and 0.26 for substance use. The positive effect of program participation on substance use was mainly mediated by improvements in positive and close bonds to the school following the intervention (Weichold et al., 2007). Although the aim of the IPSY program was not primarily to exert positive influence on school achievement of the adolescents, we nevertheless investigated the association among life skills, problem behaviors, and school bonding with academic achievement, and we also tested for program effects on school grades. Correlation analyses showed that students who performed well in school at age ten (and who are more likely to show better career pathways in later life) were skillful in various personal and interpersonal aspects; had more positive bonds to their school, classmates, and teachers; and were less likely to be involved in substance-use activities during early adolescence. Moreover, findings of regression analyses showed a significant effect of program participation on grades at the end of grade six (T3), controlled by academic achievement at T1 (B = 0.10, T = 2.01, p < 0.05). This was particularly true for math grades, suggesting that students (independent from their achievements at the beginning of grade five) improved in their math grades at the end of grade six after participating in the intervention. ANOVA comparing the development of math grades during the

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three measurement points performed separately by different school types revealed that positive effects of the program on math grades were found especially among students on the college-bound track (F(2, 1244) = 3.13, p < 0.05). In summary, the findings based on an example of the widespread schoolbased life-skills programs suggest that they are effective not only in preventing early substance misuse, promoting life skills, and school bonding, they also exert a positive influence on school achievement. Thus, in addition to their preventive purpose, life-skills programs may contribute to the preparation of young people with soft (e.g., social) and hard (e.g., academic achievement) skills for the school-to-work transition.1 Therefore, these programs may be a useful component of the comprehensive efforts of career education in school.

Integration As demonstrated, school seems to be an adequate context for career education and can be a source for promoting employability and life skills that support positive transitions into work life. Theoretical concepts stress the role of such soft skills in predicting successful career pathways; therefore, soft-skills promotion seems to be an integral component of career education. Moreover, developmental aspects of career development (i.e., competencies and interests shape and unfold during school years) highlight the need to implement programs over several years of schooling. Existing career-education programs are rare for entire school classes and often not well evaluated, but they have positive effects on the acquisition of skills and knowledge, positive work attitudes, and hard skills (i.e., academic achievement). Life-skills programs have been extensively implemented and evaluated as a universal prevention strategy in schools. Such research can deliver expertise and experiences to program developers of career-education programs, including skills-training components. Teachers and school counselors should take responsibility for helping adolescents plan their future and acquire both soft and hard skills needed 1

Unfortunately, there is no study on the evaluation of a school-based life skills program that focuses of the long-term effects with reference to school-to-work transition or educational and vocational careers. The students taking part in the ongoing IPSY evaluation study reported herein are still in their early adolescent years. Therefore, we are not yet able to test at this point in time whether indeed the intervention group has a smoother transition into work life and shows more successful vocational outcomes. To answer these questions, further longitudinal research is needed.

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for lifelong success (Feller & Daly, 1992). To achieve this, innovative changes must be introduced in schools. This may best be accomplished by developing a task force, adopting a systematic approach to tasks, and implementing a developmental approach that continuously supports students (versus shortterm programs) in acquiring academic, soft, and life skills (Staley & Carey, 1997). Today’s school-based life skills programs can be a first step in the right direction, but they obviously do not promote all skills that are important for success in the labor market, and they do not convey knowledge that forms the basis for education- or career-related decisions. Thus, existing effective life-skills programs may be enriched with additional components tailored specifically to supporting young people’s transition to work. Ideas for new program components can be drawn from existing (and positively evaluated) programs on vocational development that focus on aspects other than generic and soft skills – for example, specific skills (e.g., career planning) and specific knowledge (e.g., knowledge about career options). The principle of combining soft-skills training with specific-skills training and knowledge is a common concept in life-skills education (Schmitt-Rodermund, 1999). Specific skill-enhancement components for career-education purposes should focus on the following points. First, they should include the promotion of career- and self-awareness. By promoting students’ positive view on their lives and unfolding openness to attractive opportunities, a positive motivational process may be stimulated (Staley & Carley, 1997). Second, components should include a systematic exploration of possible vocational careers. Planning one’s own career pathway must be promoted (Ogawa & Okada, 2005). Within this process, the identification of personal goals seems to be an important feature (Laplan et al., 2003; Salmela-Aro & Vuori, 2007). Third, components also should focus on the promotion of specific knowledge, relating to strategies that identify and explore options within the educational and vocational system, information on possible barriers when entering work life, and strategies that support a smooth transition into work (e.g., including application training). Finally, students should be supported in the crystallizing process of vocational interests and career options (Schr¨oder & Schmitt-Rodermund, 2006). To support adolescents’ school-to-work transitions, school-based programs focusing on the facilitation of soft skills, in combination with specific components for career education (e.g., hard skills and knowledge), seem to be an effective and comprehensive intervention strategy. Because it is known that involving contexts other than school (e.g., family) increases program effectiveness (Spoth, Redmond, Trudeau, & Shin, 2002), schools should form coalitions with communities, employers, and parents so that

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students receive positive influences on their career pathways within different spheres of life. Examples for strategies implemented in the community that accompany life-skills trainings include job-shadowing, apprenticeships, and employer interviews (Feller, 1991; Hamilton & Hamilton, 2000). Finally, parents are best involved in the promotion of positive educational and vocational career pathways of their children through parent education programs or home-schooling collaboration programs (Cox, 2005). REFERENCES

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Weichold, K. (2007). Prevention against substance misuse: Life skills and positive youth development. In R. K. Silbereisen & R. M. Lerner (Eds.), Approaches to positive youth development (pp. 293–310). London: Sage Publications. Weichold, K. (2008). Alkoholpr¨avention durch Lebenskompetenzprogramme. In P. Tossmann & N. H. Weber (Eds.). Alkoholpr¨avention in Erziehung und Unterricht (pp. 102–114). Herbholzheim: Centaurus-Verlag. Weichold, K., Giannotta, F., Silbereisen, R. K., Ciairano, S., & Wenzel, V. (2006). Crosscultural evaluation of a life-skills program to combat adolescent substance misuse. Sucht – German Journal for Addiction Research and Practice, 52(4), 268–278. Weichold, K., Wenzel, V., & Silbereisen, R. K. (2007). Long-term effects of a life skills programs against adolescent substance use: What are the mediators? Paper presented at the Biennial Meeting of the Society for Research on Adolescence, March 27–31, 2007, Boston. Wenzel, V., Weichold, K., & Silbereisen, R. K. (2007). Schultypspezifische Wirksamkeit eines Lebenskompetenzprogramms (School branch specific effectiveness of a lifeskills program). Sucht – German Journal for Addiction Research and Practice, 53(6), 335–346. World Health Organization (WHO). (1997). Life skills education in schools. Geneva: WHO. Wright, S. P., Horn, S. P., & Sanders, W. L. (1997). Teacher and classroom context effects on student achievement: Implications for teacher evaluation. Journal of Personnel Evaluation in Education, 11, 57–67.

15 Integrated Transition Policies for European Young Adults Contradictions and Solutions Manuela du Bois-Reymond

Introduction We have gotten used to thinking of youth and young people not only in national categories – for example, young English, young Poles – but also in the European context. The White Paper, ‘A New Impetus for European Youth’ (European Commission [EC], 2001), is an influential document for envisioning a comprehensive policy framework for the 75 million young Europeans presently living in the twenty-seven EU member states. It has since been cited as a key to integrating educational and youth policy under the umbrella of participation and social inclusion. Another growing concern of the European Union (EU) is how to make Europe the most competitive knowledge-based economy in the world no later than 2010, as outlined in the Lisbon Summit of 2000 (EC 2001). The new generation of EU educational and youth programs for 2007–2013 and the emphatically stressed commitment to do everything possible to implement the Lisbon goal expressed in the ‘Youth Pact’ all testify to that concern. In this chapter, I discuss three constellations of young people in transition and the implications for youth policies and future research (du Bois-Reymond & Chisholm 2006). The first constellation concerns young people’s learning environments that, although different in the various EU member states, nevertheless have common features, a most significant one being the erosion of the school-to-work transition. Educational policies on national and European levels promote new combinations of formal and nonformal learning–teaching approaches to repair old and to build new bridges between educational systems and labour markets. Will these

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policies succeed in making the school-to-work transition easier for young people and draw them closer into the knowledge society? The second constellation addresses the fact that even though there are major differences among the EU member states, few if any European countries have a homogeneous indigenous population. In general Western European societies have become more ethnically diverse, not only regarding nonwhite people who continue to immigrate mainly from Mediterranean, African, and increasingly other non-European countries; but there are also and especially more recently, immigrants from the new EU member countries including Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic States. The newcomers are not always welcomed by established inhabitants; new fears and xenophobia is a problem among various societal groups. Educational and labour-market policies, both national and European, are ill prepared to mitigate the tensions and ascertain the learning and working potential of the new generations. How can the receiving countries make the young migrants feel at home and allow them to participate in the labour market and society at large? The third constellation refers to young families who must cope not only with the transition to occupational careers but also with multiple transition demands: finding adequate housing, maintaining their partnerships while raising their children, improving their qualifications, updating their networks and social contacts, engaging in their neighborhoods, and participating in the cultural opportunities of a consumer society. In brief, young couples and parents must fabricate a satisfactory work–learning–family–life balance while facing growing insecurity about their future careers and life prospects. Aging European societies have become aware of problems resulting from distorted population pyramids and have begun to develop more active policies for young parents. In this chapter, I expand on the inherent contradictions in and between these various youth transitions and comment on existing youth policies. I finish by drawing conclusions for a better integrated European transition policy.

New Learners in Old Schools Let me first offer an explanation for the adjectives new and old. In this chapter, new refers to three different aspects of young people. First, it refers to the students as members of new cohorts who enter and leave the educational system. Second, new refers to students from different countries and cultural backgrounds that meet in classrooms and other learning sites. Finally, new

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refers to new learners, meaning that today’s children and young people use learning environments, formal as well as informal, in new ways and also relate to their teachers and pedagogues in new ways. By contrast, old has basically only one meaning, albeit with complex and far-reaching consequences for students: the educational systems in most European member states are ill equipped to face the challenges of the knowledge economies and civic societies. It is common knowledge by now among educational practitioners and researchers, as well as a growing numbers of politicians that contemporary schools no longer productively and adequately relate to the social and cultural worlds of its student populations. The rift broadens between the educational system and new cohorts of the ‘digital generation’ students with new learning requirements and capacities.1 Schools in most EU countries are organised in such a way that the eagerness of students to learn is smothered in the course of their educational trajectory.2 This is manifested in the embarrassingly high dropout rates and low qualification levels for substantial numbers of students, mainly those who achieve relatively low grades.3 However, many more fortunate students also find school boring and uninspiring, especially when it comes to their own interests and hobbies which are more likely realised outside than inside school (Diepstraten, du Bois-Reymond, & Vinken, 2006). Finally, despite the fact that European schools have been populated for more than thirty years with migrant students, educational systems have not proved able to develop convincing models to integrate these young people into the educational and social system of their respective new homeland (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2006).4 Inasmuch as international benchmarking becomes widespread, educational systems which score at the lower end of the scales of excellence get pressed into reforms. Pressure is mounting from two sides: from above, the EU and the OECD; and from below, the nation-states that compete among 1

2

3 4

The latest 2007 UNICEF report computed PISA figures for twenty-five OECD countries about the educational achievement of fifteen-year-olds in the subjects of reading, mathematics, and scientific literacy. Although Finland scores the best, many European countries score below average, among them such developed and rich EU member states as Germany, Austria, and Denmark. Southern European countries score especially low (i.e., Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Greece). See Lave & Wenger (1991), Evans (2003), and The Handbook of Experiential Learning (Silberman, 2007). See OECD (2005), Chapter C, Access to Education, Participation and Progression. In the Netherlands, 70 percent of all Moroccan 17- to 23-year-olds finish their ‘education’ without having gained sufficient starting qualifications (NRC Handelsblad, 5 April 2007).

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themselves. The solution is sought in enriching formal with nonformal education which should result in lifelong learning and which is therefore propagated as the most promising strategy for young people to enhance their chances in the labour market and react to the destandardisation of modern life courses. The OECD in particular is promoting the linking of educational aims to the requirements of a knowledge economy and pushing for benchmarking (Rizvi & Lingard, 2006). Although the ideological superstructure spreads optimism, the basis (i.e., school administrators and teachers) remains reserved towards far-reaching educational reforms. What happens instead is selective modernisation of the old school, setting into motion new forms and dynamics of inclusion and exclusion.5 Present-day neo-liberal ideology and policies tend to place responsibility for school success (or failure) on the shoulders of individual students (and their parents), thus relieving the school from its societal task to guarantee adequate and democratic education for all.6 Students with little social and cultural capital are still caught in the trap that Willis (1977) described thirty years ago, except that the premise of getting a job, regardless of how bad one’s grades were in school, does not hold in post–Fordist societies any longer.7 The problem that existing educational systems must solve is how to motivate today’s young people in such a way that they all learn more – and more extensively than they did in the old classroom and do in the present school system. Giving low achievers bad grades and placing responsibility for their learning careers on them does not satisfy the needs of knowledge societies in the long term or those of the students in the short term. Knowledge societies need students who acquire a learning habit early in their young lives that becomes deeply rooted in their personality and lasts a lifetime. In other words, learning is not supposed to stop at a certain moment and then be transformed into working routines; it must be kept active throughout one’s working life. Inasmuch as today’s work and private spheres tend to be less separated from one another, learning readiness pertains not only to work but to other life situations as well. 5

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7

In a mind-searching article on changes in knowledge production and its implications on curricula, Young cites Apple’s concept of ‘conservative modernisation’ that refers to the fact that innovation is by no means always progressive (Young, 2008, p. 9). Social analysts of the New Deal policy of the United Kingdom speak of the ‘responsibilised citizen’ (see Clarke, 2005). Closer analysis of the living conditions of young people shows that a categorisation according to the welfare-state regime is only a first rough means to indicate educational and work opportunities of young people in Europe (see Chapter 6 in this volume).

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The growing economic demand for a more flexible labour force is observed with trepidation by social scientists – including Sennett (1998) among many others (Edwards, 2002) – as well as politicians who fear uprooting and a loss of commonly shared values. The EU discourses on lifelong learning and nonformal education are now entering national reform agendas (Nicoll, 2006). The following three points in the educational system are targeted: r enlargement of preschool education (Education For All [EFA] Global

Monitoring Report 2007; EURYDICE, 2004)

r introduction of nonformal elements in the formal curricula (first stated

forcefully by the EC, 2001)

r better preparation of vocational students for the labour market and

increasing the rate of students in higher education, preferably in the natural sciences (Programme for International Student Assessment [PISA] studies; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2005a, b). The EU is committed to achieving the following main educational goals by 2010: r The average proportion of young people who leave school early should

not exceed 10 percent.

r At least 85 percent of young people at age twenty-two should have com-

pleted upper-secondary education (EURYDICE, 2004, p. 13). The recent arguments of educational psychologists as well as practitioners and politicians for more and better preschool education have been stated more urgently than in previous years. First, there is the renewed insight that learning drawbacks resulting in failing school careers and consecutive transition problems begin early in school and, therefore, should be addressed early. This is especially true for children from migrant families in developing language proficiency. Second, there is the growing pressure of young mothers in tandem with labour-market needs to facilitate childcare outside the home (see subsequent discussion). Although concrete EU policies for better preschool education are not distinct and powerful – small children are attached to families, and family policies fall outside the scope of direct EU intervention – some initiatives to establish a safety net for early childcare are occurring on a national level in many European countries; however, by no means are the costs of quality care met.

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Regarding the second point, the relationship between formal and nonformal education, EU policies are more explicit, propagating a better integration of the two since the PISA studies demonstrated severe deficits in many European educational systems. There are many variants of attempts to reform the old school by enriching the formal curriculum with nonformal elements. In its successful variants, the new comprehensive school is part of active community life; it is open not only to students but also to parents and other community members as a place to exchange ideas and participate in civic activities. The Netherlands and other countries are successfully developing such schools (du Bois-Reymond, 2008a; Wetzel, 2006). However, that should not obstruct the view on the structural shortcomings of these renewals: the problems of segregated educational career paths and wasted talent remain despite the entrance of nonformal learning opportunities in the ‘old school’. The modernisation of vocational education and a better output of students who go on to higher education comprise the third target point of EU educational policies. The measures taken are closest to problems of young people in transition and, therefore, dominate national as well as EU agendas, because at this point in the youthful life course, it shows who can and cannot find work related to their education.8 The YOYO project9 demonstrated under which conditions young people can be motivated and reassured to turn misleading school and working careers into trajectories which give them more self-satisfaction and opportunities for social inclusion. The project showed that the chances lie more outside than inside formal education; that is, in contexts of nonformal education provided by youth employment and participatory requalification measures. Yet, formal vocational education could – and occasionally does – apply methods which are traditionally rooted in youth-work and other nonformal approaches, taking into account the needs and capacities of students. There are also experiments with local community alliances, bringing together educational institutions, local enterprises, nongovernmental organisations, and other societal actors. These are promising initiatives which resonate with EU prospects and expectations. Conversely, social scientists and youth researchers point to the growing tendency to misuse nonformal education for workforce approaches which hamper the effects of voluntary learning (Bekerman, 2006; Colley, 2003; Davies, 2000; Field, 2002). 8

9

Youth unemployment in the EU amounts to about 20 percent – with fluctuations over short periods and significant variations among countries. See Walther et al. (2006) and Chapter 6 in this volume.

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A resolution of the EC10 refers to the Joint Report of the Council and the Commission, Modernizing Education and Training, which emphasises the importance of achieving a balance between the social and economic objectives of education and training policies and of developing diverse learning partnerships which include those engaged in both formal and non-formal sectors. However, the same resolution makes it clear that the relationship between formal and nonformal education must be complementary and not of full integration; the general and vocational systems will remain separate, and young people’s personal needs and interests should be addressed mainly in the nonformal rather than formal sector. On the local level, there are experiments with the integration of general and vocational education, but there are no general EU policies that promote a hybridisation of educational systems. EU agencies are bound to the principle of subsidiarity and therefore have no means other than benchmarking and the ‘method of open coordination’ to influence educational policies of the member states. There is a growing trend of a further separation and subcategorisation of student populations and the semi-privatisation of educational facilities. In summary, selective modernisation means, first, that the educational systems of the EU member states respond to economic and other systemic pressures and demands not with a thorough renewal from preschool to vocational and higher education. Rather, they concentrate on the solution of selected problems, such as renewing curricula in specific subject areas and adding nonformal elements to the formal learning structure. This contradicts the need of knowledge societies for a more extensive exploitation of learning capital.11 None of the proposed and partially realised reforms have led to a democratic education for all children and students, which contradicts and undermines the legitimating ground of civic societies. The perspective of the student – or of the teacher, for that matter – is not prevalent in reforms. It seems that the potential of nonformal education is realised where the roles of students and teachers/coaches are not fixed in a rigid manner but rather allow for situational crossovers; where there is more room for relevant learning experiences in such a way that the drawbacks in

10

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Resolution 2006/C 168/01 of 20 July 2006. See Forum 21, European Journal on Youth Policy, No. 7–8, 11/2006, 165–169. This does not mean that knowledge societies do not also need low-qualified personnel for repetitive labour. However, people who must stay their entire life in that sector will be at risk of temporary or permanent exclusion, as Gallie (2002) and others have pointed out saliently.

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formal education – that is, too little durable motivation on the side of the student and the teacher – can be mediated. Taken together, the efforts of modernising European educational and vocational systems do not prevent misleading trajectories of young people, and more could be achieved if the reforms were tested more thoroughly.

The Established and the Outsiders When Norbert Elias and his English colleague, John Scotson (1965), wrote their book about the established and the outsiders more than forty years ago, they described the world of a small English town. Today, the established and the outsiders populate European societies in all types and combinations. It is only recently that EU educational and labour policies have focussed attention on young people with a migrant background – and that attention is minimal.12 However, there are efforts being made by EU agencies to assemble data on the life situation of migrants in the member states. The primary problem with the data is the lack of comparability and relevance. Comparability depends on equivalent datasets, which not all countries can provide. Relevance depends on the ability to contextualise data, which runs counter to the quantification of data. Also, there is the problem of too few respondents per country, which prevents the comprehensive analysis of subgroups in the population. Although well-known studies such as the Eurobarometer do not consider migrants and the European Social Survey (ESS) has too few numbers, there are two interconnected projects to produce relevant comparisons: the European Monitoring on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) and the European Information Network on Racism and Xenophobia (RAXEN). Taken together, these projects provide the EU and individual member states with reliable data on racism and all types of overt actions against foreigners. Both function as a monitoring system and provide examples and models of ‘good practices’ (Siegert, 2006), as well as information on the life situation of young migrants in particular. Until the 1970s, European educational systems were ill prepared to take in large numbers of migrant children with various levels of language deficiencies in the dominant teaching language. These students began to populate the lowest layers of the educational system, together with other low 12

EU immigration policy in general should be seen in the light of the Lisbon Summit 2000 when the EU set the objective for the decade ahead of becoming the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world.

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achievers. In essence, that pattern remains today, despite the growing educational achievement of migrant students (EURYDICE, 2004; Skrobanek, 2006; Vedder, Horenczyk, Liebkind, & Nickmans, 2006). The majority still enter the labour market with not enough knowledge to compete with the better-educated workforce. Not only are unemployment rates in the EU consistently higher for youth than for the entire working population, they are double for migrant compared to nonmigrant youth. An OECD study on achievement and motivation of immigrant students revealed puzzling results: whereas in some EU countries, second-generation immigrant students did better than the parent generation – which is to be expected – in other EU countries, Denmark and Germany among them, second-generation students did worse than the parent generation (PISA, 2006; Kalami, 2000). If nothing else, this demonstrates how extremely vulnerable country comparisons are; so many variables are involved that controlling them over a large number of countries is almost impossible. The EURYDICE study (2004), which lists the types of educational measures the respective EU member states have issued and introduced to integrate immigrant children into their school systems, shows the many national-level differences and how differently they are handled. At the same time, it is the explicit aim of the EU to develop common indicators, laws, and measures to make educational systems and their integration policies more alike and comparable. So far, integration policies have largely failed in practically all European countries dealing with large and diverse numbers of immigrants and migrants. PISA data from 2003 (PISA, 2006) estimated that between 25 and 40 percent of fifteen-year-old first- and second-generation immigrant students13 performed below the established basic level 2 in mathematic skills, although the same study found that immigrant students have a stronger learning disposition and a higher level of motivation than the native school population. ‘The consistency of this finding is striking given that there are substantial differences between countries’ (PISA, 2006, p. 8). The formerly silent outsiders have developed a double identity which makes them feel ‘in’ and ‘out’ at the same time, and they begin to have their voices heard by the majority society. Also, they have become a much differentiated group in themselves, including the children and grandchildren of the first and second generations, nationalised versus not yet nationalised 13

First-generation students were born outside the country of assessment as were their parents; second-generation students were born in the country of assessment and their parents were born in a different country.

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groups, immigrants from the new member states (NMS) EU countries, asylum-seekers from war areas, and an unknown number of illegal young people, with or without their families. All these different groups and in-group differences make integration a hazardous affair: new political constellations, new identifications, new reactions of the host society to migrants due to changes in the labour market – all these forces influence the sphere of living apart or together. For example, in the Netherlands: within seven years, between 1999 and 2006, feelings of alienation of young Turks and Moroccans (eighteen to thirty years old) in Dutch society increased rather than decreased, notwithstanding the fact that these young people had acquired more language proficiency and were better educated than their contemporaries in 1999. According to a study by Enzinger and Dourleijn (2008) in Rotterdam, one of the four major cities with a significant proportion of migrants, ‘Integration makes progress while the cultural distance grows’.14 The 1970s idea of multicultural optimism – that integration of immigrants would progress in a linear way and in the direction of adaptation to Western values and practices – has proven much too simplistic for contemporary complex European societies. A growing body of social-science literature has produced new concepts15 to describe that complexity (Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006; Kymlicka, 2007; Laden & Owen, 2007). Young immigrants search for new identities and many find them in religion. Feelings of alienation are intensified when young people with migrant backgrounds experience severe discrimination in the labour market – which many do as demonstrated in project UP2YOUTH (du Bois-Reymond, 2008a). Not only do low-educated young migrants have more difficulty in finding training programmes and jobs, the well-educated immigrants are ‘hitting the glass ceiling’ (Heath & Cheung, 2007). The previously mentioned projects, EUMC and RAXEN, stress the general importance of education and labour-market factors for the integration of migrants, but make no reference to specific needs of young migrants and do not differentiate, on an aggregate level, between the genders. Also, the highly relevant meaning of peer groups and other social contacts which help or hinder social integration is neglected. Recently, the EU commissioned a study on policy measures concerning disadvantaged youth (Institute for Regional Innovation and Social Research 14 15

Quoted in NRC Handelsblad 6 April 2008. Foremost is the notion of ‘multiple identities’ – which itself is a dubious concept because it may refer to more than one identity (e.g., Dutch and Turk) but also to partial identities (e.g., a Dutch in the labour market and Turkish in a partnership).

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[IRIS], 2006). Educational, vocational, and other transition policies for these young people are described and evaluated for thirteen countries.16 Two features emerge: (1) most countries do not explicitly differentiate between disadvantaged indigenous and disadvantaged migrant groups; and (2) as an implicit consequence, migrants therefore are subsumed under the broad category of ‘disadvantaged’.17 Briefly, it can be stated that all the problems nonmigrant students have in and with school are doubled for migrant students, making their transition to the labour market more difficult. When they make that transition, they have more risks than nonmigrants because they must struggle not only with educational drawbacks but also with overt or covert discrimination from potential employers. The problem is aggravated by the tendency of segregated neighbourhoods and housing markets, with well-to-do families leaving the ‘coloured’ inner-city quarters and finding better housing and education elsewhere. In the IRIS study, good examples of EU policies aimed at disadvantaged young people are described for each of the researched countries. The policies address essentially three target points: preschool education, formal–nonformal education, and vocational measures, giving each a different emphasis. Preschool measures are mentioned only sporadically, while most emphasis is given to approaches addressing incomplete school trajectories and facilitate labour-market entrance through additional training and counselling as well as other nonformal learning opportunities, among them providing work experience. The most convincing examples reported in the IRIS study are those which develop holistic pedagogical and political approaches with a cross-sectional policy perspective.18 That is, the educational system must be heavily supported through outside measures in order to disclose wasted or never exploited learning capital; evidently, it cannot do the job alone any longer. The ‘solution’ to the problem of multicoloured and multicultured European societies remains the selective social inclusion and exclusion in school 16

17

18

Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, UK. Research on ‘gifted disadvantaged’, gifted minority students among them, pays attention to a group of students who are not represented in international educational comparative studies, as usually a deficiency perspective is applied (Wert & Pennel, 2003). Connexion Service of the UK is an example of such an holistic joint up policy perspective which cuts across traditional departmental boundaries of education, youth work and labor market policies and which is applicable in principle to all 13–19-year-olds to provide general career, education and training information with more specific intervention for those deemed most at risk. It also has a participatory element in it in that the projects involve young people in the design and delivery of the respective measure.

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and in the labour market by increasing the pressure to perform according to achievement standards of the respective institutions of host countries: the school, the training and job centres, and the firms. Those young migrant people who are able to make use of institutional and informal support systems will be included; those who cannot will continue to be excluded.

New Families in Aging Societies Since it became evident that Europe’s societies are below the reproduction level, young people are seen not only as a resourceful or problematic group regarding their future work careers and labour-market integration but also as potential parents who will contribute to a better population balance.19 The fact that in all European countries, birth rates are falling and the age of first-birth rises points to structural as well as individual changes (Bradshaw & Hatland, 2006; Lutz, Richter, & Wilson, 2006). Although not exclusively, due to longer educational trajectories for the majority of young people and especially young women, parenthood is generally delayed. Most young female Europeans become mothers in the second half of their twenties, increasingly their early thirties. Young women want to convert their educational capital into careers that pay off before having children. The window for bearing children is thus narrowing. Promising careers develop between the ages of twenty and thirty-five, precisely the typical childbearing years. Young women who want to have children may suffer from threatening career drawbacks, pay gaps, and rigid work schedules. They also are confronted with opposing expectations to be a full-time mother, on the one hand, and by labour-demand implications, to be a full-time employee on the other (Casey & Alach, 2004; McKie & Cunningham-Burley, 2005). These difficulties and dilemmas are less harsh for young men and fathers who still contribute less than an equal share of household chores and childcare. However, they are also under pressure and now are more often (and encouraged by their female partners) participating in household tasks and childcare. There is a growing body of literature on this ‘new father’ model, its strengths and limitations (O’Brien, 2006). The ‘contract between the generations’, by which the younger generations are large enough to carry the costs of the older generations, is in danger of breaking; European societies are aging faster than they are 19

MacKellar (2006) draws the conclusion that only substantial immigration can slow down the trend of declining birth rates.

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producing children. At the same time, international migration causes selective population growth in Europe, albeit with different impacts in the respective twenty-seven EU member states and locations20 which have different migrant groups and immigration policies. For the future prospects of knowledge societies, this development has far-reaching consequences. As discussed earlier, educational policies are not geared to disclose the learning potential of migrant students; the majority end up in lower educational tracks and insecure jobs. Growth in this part of the population could mean growth of a low-qualified workforce – an insight pointed out by demographers much sooner than educational politicians realised.21 Demographic dynamics with decreasing fertility rates and increasing aging populations set in motion active family policies in many European countries.22 Two main strategies, which are interconnected, are being discussed to work out a reversal of the trend of declining birth rates: (1) help more (young) women to enter the labour market, and (2) provide more childcare facilities outside the family, thus reconciling labourmarket demands with individual life plans (Pfau-Effinger & Geissler, 2005). Although European countries differ as to preferred family–work models and availability of day-care facilities, most countries share the problem of not enough part-time jobs and publicly financed facilities available to enable a satisfactory combination of work and family for both young mothers and fathers. At the same time, there is a political–ideological switch in countries that lack childcare facilities, including the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, and Italy. The change is from strongly held traditional motherhood ideologies to more liberal attitudes and policies vis-`a-vis working mothers, leading to a policy of providing more facilities and extended parental leave. The transition to parenthood takes place within these demographic variables, labour-market logics, national policies, cultures and ideologies, and the life plans of young people, especially women. A recently

20

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22

In the three biggest cities in the Netherlands, migrant youth is in the majority already. Almost two out of three children with migrant background are born in the big cities (SCP, 2004), and that is the trend in many other countries as well. Heinsohn (2003) shows the relationship between wars and differential birth rates in old and young continents, the latter of which having exceeding birth rates and being unable to ‘insert’ all young males into profitable societal positions with the effect that there is a huge surplus of young males ready for militant violent actions in absence of viable alternatives. Europe-wide demographic changes will lead to a 44% increase of the 65–79-year-old population between 2005 and 2050, while the rate of young people will shrink by 25% in the same period (quoted after Rappengl¨uck, 2006); see also van Nimegen & Beets (2005).

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EU-commissioned project addressed that topic.23 By focusing on the transition to parenthood, we paid attention to the complex transition patterns of modern young people. It is in planning for parenthood that the simultaneity of status passages most significantly impacts the life courses of young people. They have to work for a living, they may still be in higher education and/or need further qualification to advance their career, they begin to look for more permanent housing on a market disadvantageous to new starters, they are seeking a permanent partner, and they begin thinking about starting a family (or have already done so), and they are inexperienced with all these new tasks and obligations. The transition to young parenthood demonstrates the complexity of postmodern life courses. The goal of the project ‘Young Parenthood’ (du Bois-Reymond, 2008) is to compare individual strategies of young parents and childcare policies in six countries, representing different welfare-state systems.24 Initial results show that despite major differences among the research countries, all young Europeans in transition to parenthood face similar difficulties: none of the countries has solved the work–life balance to the satisfaction of the young parents. There are too few part-time jobs to allow young men to become ‘new fathers’, thereby balancing the uneven task loads between the genders. In addition, there is too little flexibility in part-time as well as full-time work to allow for nuanced time schedules to be negotiated among employers, young parents, and their colleagues in the workplace. The term work–life balance used in the discussion of demographic decline, gendered labour markets and flexible work schedules, public care and intrafamily negotiation for a more egalitarian distribution of workloads has become a catch-all phrase and should be differentiated according to the specific aspects under discussion. However, the basic notion underlying the term is the idea that in late-modern societies, the former gender division – that is, women take the role of mother and housewife, while men are the full-time breadwinners – is under pressure. The boundaries between formerly neatly separated life spheres – work, family, private life, and public 23

24

UP2YOUTH. Youth – actor of social change. Contract Number 028317 (2006–2008). The project deals with three interconnected themes: participation, ethnic minority youth and young parenthood. In total, fifteen EU countries participated. It is conducted by the EGRIS group (European Group for Integrated Social Research) which is specialized in transition research (see Chapter 6 in this volume; du Bois-Reymond & Chrisholm, 2006). Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Slovenia, UK, Bulgaria (du Bois-Reymond, 2008).

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life – tend to blur (Jurczyk & Lange, 2007). That may be an advantage for young parents (e.g., working at home with self-administered work schedules), but it also may be a disadvantage (e.g., when work flexibility is enforced by the employer and work intrudes into private life).25 In many European countries, a battle with many actors is being fought for a more even work–life–family balance. The combatants are young mothers and fathers, fighting for a more family-friendly policy in the workplace, employers that do or do not comply with such wishes, and politicians who look for solutions to the shrinking population growth.

New Transition Policies for Young Europeans If we view the three transition constellations of education/labour market, migrant youth, and young parenthood in light of transition policies, we find that there is no coherent policy to interconnect these constellations, neither on a European nor a national level. Yet, there is growing recognition of the necessity to do something about it, as becomes evident in the intentions of the Youth Pact and other recent documents of the EU. Since the White Paper of 2001, youth has been defined not as problem category but rather as a resource, and European initiatives are reiterating that continuously. The EGRIS project UP2YOUTH departs precisely from this notion of youth as a resource and young people as actors. The relationship between structure and agency lies at the core of youth research: What are the chances and barriers for young people when they shape their life courses in postindustrial societies? What does ‘participation’ – a key notion in EU documents and rhetoric – entail for their transitions? Contemporary European societies all produce a tension between neo-liberal labour markets and welfare policies, and they seek to ease that tension through activating their populations, young people in particular. Young people are not only identified as responsible and capable workers with corresponding neonormal life courses, they are also addressed as citizens who must give meaning to active citizenship in their lives and in society at large. The crucial question arises whether young people in transition have enough power and resources to accomplish all that. Here transition policy enters the scene; it should be judged according to the action space it provides for or withholds from young people. 25

See the EU project ‘Transitions’ about the work-family boundary (Lewis & Smithson, 2006).

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The first part of the chapter concluded by stating that European educational systems modernise selectively, not thoroughly. Convincing new curricula that systematically combine formal, nonformal, and informal learning in order to disclose as much hitherto unused or underused learning capital as possible are scarce. It does not appear that such integration is intended, despite much rhetoric about lifelong learning. The EU youth programs could and should be used by formal and informal educators for advancing models of nonformal learning which might also be introduced into formal education. This would be particularly advantageous for the integration of migrant and nonmigrant young people.26 Information about long-term effects and the surplus value of the programs regarding informally acquired knowledge and integration of different groups is scarce (Thomas & Chang, 2006). Here is unused potential for a European integrated transition policy as well as further research. The second topic of this chapter – migrant youth – was concerned with the lack of data on the European level and the absence of a coherent policy to promote full integration of migrants in their respective host societies. However, the EC apparently is beginning to focus on the problem. The chapter touched on the danger of growing, not diminishing, tensions between outsiders and insiders. What specifically is missing are educational and youth-related policies to create sites and situations for young people of different origins and cultures to meet and spend time together. The notions of participation and citizenship, which figure so prominently in European discourses (Lister, Middleton, & Smith, 2002), must still be translated into concrete policies and politics to counteract threatening social exclusion and to promote social inclusion. Finally, we discussed new tasks and obligations of young parenthood which demand a new work–life–family balance. We explained the great urgency on a national as well as an EU level to work out a new balance and how many diverse and sometimes controversial actors and actions are involved in its realisation. Two strong concepts take the lead in national and European discourses which are relevant for integrated transition policies: transitional labour markets and ‘flexicurity’ (van Lieshout & Wilthagen, 2003), as well as work–life balance (Flagan, 2003). The idea behind transitional labour markets and flexicurity is a greater permeability of labour markets to allow for combinations of paid employment with other useful activities, such as volunteering 26

Neither national nor EU-financed youth projects are visited by migrant youth proportionally to their percentages in the whole population.

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and parenting. In this way, various income sources are combined – for example, labour wages and state benefits. Transitional labour markets imply that there are legally enforceable entitlements for young people to choose among different options according to their needs; fiscal incentives should encourage employment rather than state-financed unemployment. By applying these principles, various transitions become possible and young people can switch between them, depending on their life situation. This includes transitions between part-time and full-time employment, which would facilitate wishes or demands from an employer for acquiring additional qualifications; the decision to begin a family while temporarily stopping work; and transitions between wage work and self-employment. Transitional labour markets in this sense strengthen participation and citizenship and are prone to integrate different transition statuses of young people. Related to the transitional labour market is the concept of flexicurity, which provides a basic income for young people in transition who are confronted with the insecurities of flexi-jobs and who are denied working contracts (Stauber, Kovacheva, & van Lieshout, 2003). This policy concept – with which the Netherlands, among others, has experimented – has great potential for integrating various transition constellations. Flexicurity in combination with transitional labour markets lowers the barriers among education, vocational training, and work; it facilitates labour-market entry for migrant youth by allowing for alternative routes; and it would be a solution for young parents who want to adjust their work life to changing family needs. Work–life-balance policies aim for similar solutions. Family and gender relationships are more directly addressed, especially the relationship between female work and female childcare relative to male work and male childcare. However, work–life-balance policies should not only emphasise the relationship and tension between childcare tasks and work demands; they also should address other life areas of young parents, such as the needs for adequate and affordable housing and for more flexible childcare arrangements. What is painfully missing is how work–life-balance policies work out for young migrant parents who often adhere to non–Western cultural norms and values and are predominantly found in lower labour-market segments with less secure work contracts. Overall, it seems that the EC and associated institutions would have to develop a reflective attitude to create a viable European Social Model (Giddens, Diamond & Liddle, 2006) and to reflect their actions and measures more deliberately in terms of integration and participation, especially where youth in transition are concerned.

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Flagan, C. (2003). Working-time preferences and work–life balance in the EU: Some policy considerations for enhancing the quality of life. Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. Gallie, D. (2002). The quality of working life in welfare strategy. In G. Esping-Andersen, D. Gallie A. Hemerijk, J. Myles, (Eds.) Why we need a new welfare state (pp. 96–129). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Giddens, A., Diamond, P., & Liddle, R. (Eds.). (2006). Global Europe, social Europe. Cambridge: Polity. Heath, A. F., & Cheung, S. Y. (2007). Unequal chances: Ethnic minorities in Western labour markets. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Heinsohn, G. (2003). S¨ohne und Weltmacht: Terror und Fall der Nationen (Sons and world power: Terror and decline of nations). Bern: Orell F¨ussli Verlag. Institute for Regional Innovation and Social Research (IRIS). (2006). Thematic study on policy measures concerning disadvantaged youth. Final Report (coordinated by Andreas Walther & Axel Pohl), T¨ubingen: IRIS. Jurczyk, K., & Lange, A. (2007). Blurring boundaries of family and work – challenges for children. In H. Zeiher, D. Devine, A.T. Kjørholt & H. Strandell (Eds.), Flexible childhood? Exploring children’s welfare in time and space (pp. 215–38). Denmark: University Press of Southern Denmark. Kalami, M. (2000). The role of educational institutions in the clientization of immigrants: The Swedish case. International Education, 2, 179–195. Kovacheva, S. (Ed.). (2008). Work-life dilemmas: Changes in work and family life in the enlarged Europe. Social Problems. Special Issue. Kymlicka, W. (2007). Multicultural odysseys: Navigating the new international politics of diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Laden, A. S., & Owen, D. (Eds.). (2007). Multiculturalism and political theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lave, J., & Wenger, E. (1991). Situated learning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lewis, S., & Smithson, J. (2006). Transitions. Final report on the project “Gender, Parenthood and the Changing European Workplace: Young Adults Negotiating the Work-Family Boundary” available at www.workliferesearch.org/transitions. Lister, R., Middleton, S., & Smith, N. (2002). Young people’s voices: Citizenship education. Leicester, England: Youth Work Press. Lutz, W., Richter, R., & Wilson, C. (Eds.). (2006). The new generations of Europeans: Demography and families in the enlarged European Union. London: IIASA/ Earthscan. MacKellar, L. (2006). Europe’s future generations: Closing thoughts. In W. Lutz, R. Richter, & C. Wilson (Eds.), The new generations of Europeans: Demography and families in the Enlarged European Union (pp. 353–374). London: IIASA/Earthscan. McKie, L., & Cunningham-Burley, S. (Eds.). (2005). Families in society: Boundaries and relationships. Bristol, England: Polity Press. Nicoll, K. (2006). Flexibility and lifelong learning: Policy, discourse and politics. London and New York: Routledge. O’Brien, M. (2006). Fathers, family life, and work: Can fathers have it all? Paper presented at the Second WELLCHI Conference, The Well-Being of Children and Labour Markets in Europe. Hamburg, March 31–April 1.

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16 The Future at Work Labor-Market Realities and the Transition to Adulthood1 Lynn A. Karoly

Introduction Young people making the transition from school to work in the twentyfirst century in the United States and other developed economies can be expected to face a very different world of work than their parents’ generation. Consider, for example, the U.S. economy in the 1970s. During that decade, the “pig in the python” baby-boom cohort was having its peak growth effect on the size of the labor force, while Richard Freeman chronicled “the overeducated American” and the falling returns to a college education (Freeman, 1976; Toossi, 2006). Stocks of computer equipment and peripherals had only recently appeared in data produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis and, by the end of the 1970s, would not even reach one percent of the level that would be attained by the turn of the century. The microprocessor, invented in 1971, would eventually lead to the information age but in the 1970s, the economy was still driven by technologies of the industrial age. To the extent that the U.S. economy was affected by trade, it was still below the level – as a share of the economy – reached on the eve of World War I (Karoly & Panis, 2004). Thus, globalization was not in the vocabulary of the typical American worker. Fast-forward to the turn of the twenty-first century and the picture is substantially different. Again, using the example of the United States, the demographic reality of slower population growth and population aging means a workforce that will grow more slowly than in the past. The rapid 1

The opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the author and not necessarily those of RAND or its sponsors.

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pace of technological change has pushed the demand for highly skilled workers beyond the current supply, leading to a significant increase in the premium for a college education or advanced degree. The phenomenon of globalization – manifested in the flow of goods and services, capital, knowledge, and people across international boundaries – has implications for a broader swath of the economy, touching sectors previously insulated from global competition. Each of these factors, alone and in combination, has implications for the composition of the workforce, the nature of work, and the features of the workplace. In just a few short decades, there have been dramatic changes in demographics, technology, and global integration that have shaped and will continue to shape the future workforce and workplace. The objective of this chapter is to review the importance of these three factors in shaping the world of work and to draw out the implications for workers entering the labor market in the next ten to fifteen years. Although much of the focus is on the United States, drawing on previous work with my co-author Stan Panis (Karoly & Panis, 2004; Karoly, 2007), the forces shaping the world of work and their implications cut across national boundaries and are mirrored in changes taking place across other developed countries. Where possible, this chapter presents internationally comparable data to illustrate the common forces at work in the United States, Europe, and other advanced economies. In the sections that follow, the organizing principle is an economic framework that views the labor market from both the supply and the demand sides. The supply side captures who is available to work and the skills they bring to the workplace. The demand side is reflected in the types of workers required by employers to produce goods and services for consumption at home and abroad. After discussing the future direction that demographic change, technological advances, and the path of globalization are expected to take, we then focus on the implications of these forces for the future labor market and the school-to-work transition.

Forces Shaping the Future World of Work A number of important forces will affect the workforce and the workplace in the coming decades as the next generations of young people make the transition from school to work. In this section, we highlight some of these key changes, first considering those that will affect the supply side of the labor market, followed by a discussion of those that can be classified as demandside factors.

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Annual Growth Rate (percent)

2.5

2 1.7

1.6

1.5

1.3 1.1 0.9

1

0.6 0.4

0.5

0 1950s

1960s

1970s

1980s

1990s

2000s

2010s

2020s

|-----------Projected------------|

Figure 16.1. Actual and Projected Growth of U.S. Workforce by Decade: 1950s to 2020s. Source: Toossi (2006), Table 4.

On the Supply Side The supply side of the labor market encompasses who is available for work and the skills and other characteristics they bring to the marketplace. In this section, we draw attention to the role that demographic shifts will play in future workforce growth, as well as the implications of educational attainment and skills acquisition for the capabilities that workers bring to their jobs. Slower Workforce Growth with Population Aging. One of the most striking demographic shifts that will affect the U.S. workforce in the next several decades is the anticipated slowdown in the growth rate of the labor force.2 As illustrated in Figure 16.1, the U.S. workforce grew at an average annual rate of 2.6 percent during the 1970s, after more modest growth of 1.1 and 1.7 percent annually in the 1950s and 1960s, respectively (Toossi, 2006). The growth rate has slowed in each successive decade since the 1970s peak and is projected to reach a trough of just 0.4 percent annual growth by the 2

Karoly and Panis (2004) discussed other demographic shifts as well that will affect the U.S. workforce in the next ten to fifteen years, including the increased labor-force participation of women and the greater diversity of the workforce in terms of the race and ethnic composition.

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2020s.3 This pattern reflects the major influence of the baby boom, first on the growth of the workforce and then the slowdown associated with the subsequent baby bust. The entrance of women into the labor market in greater numbers also contributed to labor-force growth, while the trend toward younger retirement among men contributed to the downward trend. To the extent that the U.S. workforce has been growing at all, it has largely been the result of increasing labor-force participation of women and a sizeable influx of immigrants. To some extent, this slowdown in labor-force growth will be a boon to new labor-force entrants in the coming decades. In contrast to the crowded labor market of the 1970s, young workers entering the workforce may face less competition and employers may compete for the workers who best meet their labor needs. Conversely, a workforce that is growing more slowly, coupled with an aging population, will increase the burden of the nation’s social-insurance system on the relatively smaller workforce base. Thus, younger workers could face higher taxes or reductions in their future benefits in order to support the promises made to past generations in terms of Social Security and other social insurance (e.g., Medicare and disability benefits). The phenomenon of workforce and population aging is not limited to the United States but rather is a factor affecting developed economies around the world. Even lower-income countries will experience rapid population aging as well. Table 16.1 provides projections for 2025 and 2050 for the median age and the old-age dependency ratio for selected countries in North America, Europe, and Asia. The median age of the U.S. population is projected to rise from just over thirty-five in 2000 to thirty-nine by 2025 and nearly forty-one by 2050. The old-age dependency ratio is expected to almost double, from about nineteen people aged sixty-five and older for every hundred people of working age (aged fifteen to sixty-four) to about thirty-five old-age dependents per hundred people of working age (i.e., about three working-age adults per elderly dependent). However, in comparison to many of the other countries listed in Table 16.1, the U.S. population will remain relative young. Striking contrasts are seen in countries like Japan, Austria, Italy, and Spain, where the median age by 2050 is projected to exceed that of the United States by more than ten years, and the old-age dependency ratio will be nearly double or more than double the U.S. rate. In these and other rapidly aging countries, there will be fewer than two adults of working age for every elderly dependent. With the exception of Ireland and Luxembourg, the other European countries shown in 3

The extended forecast through 2050 shows a slightly higher rate of growth, 0.6 percent per year, during the 2030s and 2040s (Toossi, 2006).

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Table 16.1. Indicators of Aging in Selected Countries: 2000, 2025, and 2050 Median Age (Years) United States Canada Mexico Europe Austria Belgium Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Luxembourg The Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Russia Slovakia Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom China India Japan Korea Turkey

Old-Age Dependency Ratio

2000

2025

2050

2000

2025

2050

35.5 36.9 23.3 37.7 38.4 39.1 37.6 38.7 39.4 37.6 40.1 39.1 38.1 32.9 31.9 40.2 37.7 37.7 37.2 35.2 37.0 36.8 34.0 37.7 39.7 40.2 37.7 30.0 23.7 41.2 29.4 24.9

39.3 42.9 32.5 45.4 49.2 46.2 47.2 45.4 45.7 43.3 48.5 48.4 45.7 39.7 38.5 50.7 39.3 45.3 43.7 43.6 45.8 43.8 43.6 49.2 47.2 49.8 44.5 39.0 31.3 50.0 34.8 33.2

40.7 44.0 39.5 49.5 53.7 48.7 52.4 46.5 47.7 45.2 50.9 52.3 49.8 43.1 40.5 54.1 40.0 46.9 46.0 48.0 48.6 50.0 50.2 55.2 51.2 52.0 47.4 43.8 38.0 53.1 38.1 38.7

18.6 18.5 7.6 21.7 22.9 25.9 19.8 22.5 22.3 24.5 24.1 26.0 21.4 17.9 16.9 26.7 21.5 20.1 23.7 17.7 23.1 18.0 16.5 24.8 27.1 23.8 24.1 10.0 8.1 25.2 8.7 9.0

29.3 32.6 13.8 33.2 37.9 38.0 35.6 35.8 41.8 36.2 39.0 38.1 32.5 28.3 24.5 40.6 28.5 34.3 35.0 31.1 31.7 27.6 27.3 36.1 41.5 44.8 34.8 19.4 12.1 49.0 15.0 14.0

34.9 40.9 30.0 51.4 62.5 51.2 60.8 43.8 48.8 46.7 54.7 64.6 51.2 39.7 37.2 68.1 31.4 45.0 45.3 49.5 53.5 47.1 49.8 73.8 54.5 57.3 47.3 37.2 22.6 71.3 26.1 28.7

Notes: The old-age dependency ratio is defined as the number of elderly (age 65 and older) per 100 working-age adults (age 15 to 64). Europe includes all countries in Eastern, Northern, Southern, and Western Europe, from Norway to Greece and Iceland to Russia. Only a subset of these countries is listed individually in the table. Source: United Nations (2001).

Table 16.1 will have an older population than the United States and one in which the working population will have to support a greater number of old-age dependents. For the few lower-income countries listed in Table 16.1, such as Mexico, China, and Turkey, the measures of aging – that is, median age and old-age dependency ratio – will nearly match those of the United States by 2050, with median ages between thirty-eight and forty

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and dependency ratios from twenty-three to thirty. However, the shift from 2000 for these countries will be even more dramatic than the U.S. changes because they start from much younger populations in 2000. The slowdown in labor-force growth could potentially be ameliorated to the extent that work effort among the working-age population can be increased, such as through a higher labor-force participation rate, lower unemployment, and increased number of hours among workers. Promoting great labor utilization may be an effective strategy for some countries but, as seen in Figure 16.2, there is no uniform scope for expansion. The figure plots labor-utilization rates as of 1998 for selected countries, relative to the United States, accounting for labor-force participation rates, unemployment rates, work hours, and standardizing on age structure.4 The United States is indexed to equal 100 so that a country with a rate of 100 has the same age-specific structure of labor-force participation, unemployment, and annual hours as the United States, even if the age structure differs. Countries above 100 have a higher standardized utilization rate than the United States, whereas the reverse is true for those countries below 100. Overall, Korea and Japan have the highest standardized utilization rates relative to the United States, whereas France, Belgium, and Italy are among the lowest. The Czech Republic, Iceland, and Luxembourg are the European countries that come closest to matching the U.S. rate and Switzerland, Portugal, Poland, and Turkey fall in the 90 to 100 percent range. For these countries, there may be less room to increase labor utilization rates to address workforce shortages. For the other European countries listed in Figure 16.2 with considerably lower utilization rates, there is potential scope for augmenting the labor effort of the working-age population to counteract declining rates of workforce growth. Population aging also has implications for shifts in consumption patterns and, therefore, the composition of the goods and services produced by the economy and the workforce needs of employers. As illustrated in Figure 16.3 for U.S. consumers, the distribution of the goods and services consumed shifts with age. One of the most salient changes is the increase in the share of consumption for health care, from less than 3 percent for those under age twenty-five to nearly 15 percent for those aged seventy-five and older. Consequently, shares in other categories such as apparel, transportation, and the residual “other” group are lower for older compared with younger people. The implications of these shifts will be evident in the subsequent discussion about occupations that will be in high demand in the future. 4

Data are available for almost all of the countries included in Table 16.1. The exceptions are China, India, Mexico, and Russia.

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107

Japan

104

Czech Republic

102

Iceland

102

United States

100

Luxembourg

100

Switzerland

96

Portugal

95

Canada

94 92

Poland Turkey

90

Denmark

89

Greece

88

Ireland

86

United Kingdom

85

Hungary

84

Finland

84 81

Sweden Austria

79

Germany

79

Norway

77

European Union

77

Spain

75

The Netherlands

74

France

67

Belgium

65

Italy

65 0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

Labor Utilization Rate (United States = 100)

Figure 16.2. Labor Utilization in Selected Countries: 1998. Source: Author’s calculations based on Scarpetta, Bassanini, Pilat, & Schreyer (2000), Table 9.

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100%

90%

Other Apparel Transportation Entertainment Food and Alcohol

Cumulative Percentage of Expenditures

80%

Insurance and Pensions

70%

Housing 60%

Contributions Health

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% <25

25-34

35-44

45-54

55-64

65-74

75+

Age Group

Figure 16.3. Composition of Expenditures by Age Group: 2003. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2006, Table 47. Available online at www.bls.gov/cex/2006/share/age.pdf. Note: Other categories include personal-care products and services, reading, education, tobacco products and smoking supplies, and miscellaneous.

Less Rapid Advances in Educational Attainment and Skill Levels That Trail Other Developed Countries. For much of the twentieth century, the U.S. labor market benefited from a steady increase in the educational attainment of the population and, therefore, the workforce. Figure 16.4 shows the composition of the population aged twenty-five to thirty-four by educational attainment, tracing the trend from 1940 through successive years to 2006. At the start of the period, just over one in three persons between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-four had at least a high school diploma, and the fraction with a college degree or higher was just 6 percent. In the four decades that followed, until the early 1980s, the education of the population rapidly expanded, with nearly four of five people aged twenty-five to thirtyfour having at least a high school diploma and 24 percent having a college

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100%

Percentage of 25- to 34-Year-Olds

90%

College graduate or more

80% 70% Some college

60% 50% 40% 30%

High school graduate 20% 10%

High school dropout 2005

2000

1995

1990

1985

1980

1975

1970

1965

1960

1955

1950

1945

1940

0%

Year

Figure 16.4. Composition of Population Age 25 to 34 by Educational Attainment: 1940–2006. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Educational Attainment, Historical Tables, Table A-1. Available online at www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/ educ-attn.html. Note: Data available for selected years between 1940 and 1964.

diploma by 1980. At that point, further advances in educational upgrading stalled, with almost no growth in the share having a college degree until the mid-1990s. Some growth in high school graduate rates and college-degree attainment followed, but the upward trend again reached a plateau at the turn of the century. The period of rapid growth of educational attainment coincided with the entry of the baby-boom generation into the labor market. Consequently, the relatively large cohorts of entering workers with higher educational attainment replaced smaller retiring cohorts with much lower educational levels. This further contributed to a rise in average educational levels of the workforce. However, just as educational upgrading has slowed, the large and more educated baby-boom cohorts are starting to retire and the cohorts that are following have a much smaller educational advantage than in the past. Thus, the overall educational level of the workforce is not expected to grow as fast, if at all.

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Table 16.2. Percentage of College Graduates among Persons 25 to 29 by Sex and Race/Ethnicity, 2003 Percentage College Graduates Among People Ages 25 to 29 Race/Ethnicity

Male

Female

Total

Non-Hispanic white Non-Hispanic black Hispanic Totals

31.4 14.9 6.9 25.3

37.2 21.6 12.8 31.6

34.3 18.6 9.5 28.4

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Educational Attainment, Historical Tables, Table A-2. Available online at www.census.gov/population/www/ socdemo/educ-attn.html.

The future trend in educational attainment of the population and workforce is a function of the educational attainment of population subgroups. As seen in Table 16.2, college completion rates in the United States of those aged twenty-five to twenty-nine vary considerably by gender, race, and ethnicity. Across all race-ethnic groups, females have higher college-completion rates than males, a six percentage point advantage overall. Furthermore, for both males and females, college-completion rates are lower for African Americans and Latinos, by as much as a factor of 4 to 1, compared with whites.5 Given that the demographic composition of the U.S. population is projected to shift toward more persons of color, these differentials in educational attainment suggest that overall education levels are not likely to rise as fast as in the past (Karoly & Panis, 2009). However, rising laborforce participation among women favors more educational growth as their college-completion rates outpace their male counterparts. Given these countervailing forces, there are mixed predictions for the future educational attainment of the U.S. population or workforce. Day and Bauman (2000) argued against educational stagflation, although they projected an overall slowdown in the growth rate of the education of the population. They noted that when successive age cohorts are compared at the same ages, there is still educational upgrading across cohorts in the United States. As a result, they projected that over the next twenty-five years, the share of the population aged twenty-five and older with a high school degree will rise from 83 percent to 87 to 90 percent. The fraction completing college will rise four to five points beyond the current rate of 24 percent. A more pessimistic future is offered by Ellwood (2001), who argued that 5

The low levels of educational attainment for Latinos results, in part, from immigration patterns. See Karoly and Panis (2009) for further discussion.

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when accounting for labor-force participation rates and the relative sizes of entering and leaving cohorts, the educational attainment of the workforce will stagnate in coming years. Elwood projected that the share of college graduates in the labor force will grow from 30 percent to 32 to 35 percent by 2020 at best, in contrast to the increase from 22 to 30 percent between 1980 and 2000. Educational attainment, in many respects, is only a proxy for the skill level of the workforce, so it is also important to consider other measures of skill, such as those captured by achievement tests and tests of workplace skills. Here, the news is equally problematic for the future U.S. workforce. In recent years, several rounds of internationally comparable assessments have been completed by students and workers across a diverse set of countries. Those assessments uniformly show that U.S. students and workers trail their counterparts in other developed countries, often scoring, at best, in the middle of the pack. Tables 16.3 and 16.4 show results from the 2006 round of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). In that year, representative samples of fifteen-year-old students from fifty-seven countries took internationally comparable standardized tests in scientific and mathematical “literacy” designed to assess “the capacity of students to extrapolate from what they have learned and to analyze and reason as they pose, solve, and interpret problems in a variety of situations” (OECD, 2007, p. 7).6 The two tables show the rankings across thirty OECD countries by mean score on science and mathematics batteries, respectively, scaled so that the average student score in OECD countries is 500 with a standard deviation of 100. Tables 16.3 and 16.4 also report the fraction of students at Level 1 or below (out of a possible six levels), as well as the ratio of the 90th percentile to the 10th percentile, a measure of dispersion. In terms of science literacy, the United States ranks twenty-first and, with the exception of Turkey and Mexico, has the highest fraction scoring at Level 1 (nearly 8 percent). At that level, students “have such a limited scientific knowledge that it can only be applied to a few familiar situations” (OECD, 2007, p. 14). The United States also has the highest level of dispersion across all thirty countries. In mathematics, the United States ranks even lower than in science: twenty-fifth out of thirty. Dispersion is nearly as high as 6

Reading was also assessed in PISA 2006 but the United States did not participate. Reading was the main focus of PISA 2000 and was also assessed in 2003. See Karoly and Panis (2009) for a discussion of the 2003 results, which are very similar for the United States to those discussed here for science and mathematics.

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Table 16.3. OECD Student Performance on PISA 2006, Science Scale

Country

Mean Score

Level 1 or Below (Percentage)

Ratio 90th Percentile to 10th Percentile

Finland Canada Japan New Zealand Australia The Netherlands Korea Germany United Kingdom Czech Republic Switzerland Austria Belgium Ireland Hungary Sweden Poland Denmark France Iceland United States Slovak Republic Spain Norway Luxembourg Italy Portugal Greece Turkey Mexico

563 534 531 530 527 525 522 516 515 513 512 511 510 508 504 503 498 496 495 491 489 488 488 487 486 475 474 473 424 410

0.5 2.2 3.2 4.0 3.0 2.3 2.5 4.1 4.8 3.5 4.5 4.3 4.8 3.5 2.7 3.8 3.2 4.3 6.6 5.8 7.6 5.2 4.7 5.9 6.5 7.3 5.8 7.2 12.9 18.2

1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7

Source: OECD (2007), Tables 2.1a and 2.1c. Note: Countries are ranked by mean score.

in science, but numerous other countries have a comparable 90–10 ratio. Likewise, the fraction scoring at Level 1 is nearly 10 percent, but that share is even larger for Portugal, Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Mexico. On both the science and mathematics assessments, several European countries top the list, including Finland and the Netherlands in science, and Finland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland in mathematics. At the same time, several other European countries trail the United States, such

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Table 16.4. OECD Student Performance on PISA 2006, Mathematical Scale

Country

Mean Score

Level 1 or Below (Percentage)

Ratio 90th Percentile to 10th Percentile

Finland Korea The Netherlands Switzerland Canada Japan New Zealand Belgium Australia Denmark Czech Republic Iceland Austria Germany Sweden Ireland France United Kingdom Poland Slovak Republic Hungary Luxembourg Norway Spain United States Portugal Italy Greece Turkey Mexico

548 547 531 530 527 523 522 520 520 513 510 506 505 504 502 501 496 495 495 492 491 490 490 480 474 466 462 459 424 406

1.1 2.3 2.4 4.6 2.8 3.9 4.0 7.1 3.3 3.6 7.2 5.1 7.5 7.3 5.4 4.1 8.4 5.9 5.7 8.1 6.7 8.3 7.3 8.6 9.9 12.0 13.5 13.3 24.0 28.4

1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7

Note: Countries are ranked by mean score. Source: OECD (2007), Tables 6.2a and 6.2c.

as Norway and Spain in science only, and Greece, Italy, and Portugal in both science and mathematics. The poor performance of U.S. students in international comparisons is mirrored in the rankings of U.S. adults aged sixteen to sixty-five on an international assessment of literacy skills. The OECD International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) evaluated literacy skills in three areas relevant for performing in white-collar jobs: prose literacy (i.e., the ability to process narrative text); document literacy (i.e., the ability to process forms, charts,

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Table 16.5. Performance of Adults 16 to 65 on the IALS 1994–1998, Prose Score

Country

Mean Score

Level 1 (Percentage)

Ratio 90th Percentile to 10th Percentile

Sweden Finland Norway The Netherlands Canada Germany New Zealand Denmark Australia United States Belgium United Kingdom Ireland

301.3 288.6 288.5 282.7 278.8 275.9 275.2 275.0 274.2 273.7 271.8 266.7 265.7

7.5 10.4 8.5 10.5 16.6 14.4 18.4 9.6 17.0 20.7 18.4 21.8 22.6

1.51 1.54 1.44 1.48 1.78 1.51 NA 1.39 1.69 1.90 1.68 1.75 1.71

Notes: Countries are ranked by mean score. NA = not available Source: OECD (2000), Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 4.13.

tables, schedules, and maps); and quantitative literacy (i.e., the ability to perform practical arithmetic operations) (OECD, 2000). Table 16.5 focuses on the prose score from the 1994–1998 assessments, comparing results for thirteen countries, including the United States. Again, the United States ranks near the bottom, this time passing only Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Ireland in terms of mean prose score. With nearly 21 percent scoring at Level 1 – an indication that an individual may be unable to determine the correct dosage of medicine to give a child based on information printed on the package – the United States also ranks near the bottom of the countries assessed. The fractions at Level 1 are equally high for document literacy (nearly 24 percent) and quantitative literacy (21 percent). The level of dispersion on the prose score is again the highest across the countries shown. Ultimately, as discussed further herein, given the shifts under way in terms of the demand side of the labor market, future labor-market entrants in the United States are likely to face greater demand for skill and greater international competition, just at a time when educational attainment may be stagnating and the underlying skills of even those with a postsecondary education may not be up to international standards. For young people in various European countries, the picture may be equally problematic or it may be more promising. Especially in those countries that score high on international assessments, the prospects for sustaining a competitive

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workforce are high. However, other European countries may be found to have skill levels that are not on a par with the demands of the twenty-firstcentury workplace. On the Demand Side The changes on the demand side of the labor market are equally profound, and we highlight two factors that are affecting the world of work: (1) the remarkable pace of technological change, particularly for information technology (IT); and (2) the new era of global integration. Rapid Technological Change. As the economy has shifted from one based on production to one based on information, the new technologies have influenced the goods and services supplied in the economy; affected how capital, material, and labor inputs are combined to produce those goods and services; and shaped how businesses are organized, how work is performed, and where work is conducted. Perhaps the most salient aspect of technological change in recent decades has been the rapid shifts in the incorporation of IT into the economy. As predicted by Moore’s Law, computing capacity has kept pace with a doubling every eighteen months, and experts expect that rate of growth to continue for at least the next ten to fifteen years (Congressional Budget Office [CBO], 2002). Advances in computing capacity have been accompanied by expanded capacity for data storage, data-transmission speeds, and network connectivity. Furthermore, falling hardware costs and greater user-friendliness of software have prompted businesses in all industries to incorporate these new technologies, from the front office to the back office, from the factory floor to the storefront. As of 2001, slightly more than half of all U.S. workers reported using a computer in their job, more than double the rate just seven years earlier in 1994 (Freeman, 2002; Hipple & Kosanovich, 2003). Beyond communication and ITs, other evolutionary and revolutionary technologies are on the horizon (Karoly & Panis, 2004). For example, biotechnology and nanotechnology are two areas that are likely to have equally profound effects on the future of advanced economies. In the biotechnology field, the medical advances associated with the Human Genome Project and other disease-specific research are expected to further extend life expectancy and improve the quality of life for those with chronic illnesses or disabilities – often, in ways that may enhance productive capacity in the workplace. Nanotechnology – that is, the manipulation of matter at the atomic scale – could afford even more drastic revolutions in products, services, and the quality of life in the next fifty years (National Science

Mean Task Input in Percentiles of 1970 Task Distribution

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65 Nonroutine interactive Nonroutine analytic Routine manual Routine cognitive Nonroutine manual

60

55

50

45

40

35 1960

1970

1980

1990

1998

Year

Figure 16.5. Economy-wide Measure of Occupational Task Input: 1960–1998. Source: Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), Table II. Note: Data for 1960 and 1970 are from the U.S. Census; data for 1980, 1990, and 1998 are from the Current Population Survey.

Foundation [NSF], 2001; National Nanotechnology Initiative [NNI], 2005). As a crosscutting technology, nanotechnology will facilitate technological change that extends and enhances existing technologies – further computing power for semiconductors, for example – as well as more revolutionary applications (e.g., computers no bigger than a bacterium). In the next ten to fifteen years, we can expect to see more advances in the first category, with the revolutionary applications farther in the future. One important consequence of the technological advances and the adoption of new technologies in the production of goods and services has been the changing nature of job requirements. However, scientists, engineers, designers, and other skilled workers are required to develop the new technologies, refine the applications, and bring the resulting products to market. Higher-level skills are often needed, as well, to use the technologies in the workplace – some of which replace tasks previously performed by humans whereas others require higher skills to integrate the technologies into the workplace and process the resulting information. Figure 16.5 provides insight into the changes over time in the skill requirements of U.S. jobs as measured by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) during

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a forty-year period, from 1960 to 1998.7 The researchers defined five broad categories of skills that combined routine versus nonroutine skills and manual versus cognitive (i.e., analytic) or interactive (i.e., communication) skills. The two lines with the sharpest upward trend capture those associated with the nonroutine cognitive and interactive skills. In other words, the mix of jobs in the economy in 1998 required a much larger share of workers with the ability to solve problems, work in teams, and effectively communicate with co-workers, clients, and customers. The downward trending lines represent skills that are routine – and, therefore, more readily programmable for performance by computers or other machinery – as well as those that are manual. The pattern charted in Figure 16.5 is likely to be conservative because it reflects only the role of occupational shifts over time and does not account for the rising skill content over time within occupations. As a result of the trends illustrated in Figure 16.5, there is increased emphasis on the need for “knowledge workers” who are responsible for analysis, problem solution, and communication of the information needed for decision making (Reich, 2001). The rising demand for skilled workers, coupled with the less rapid growth of educational attainment discussed previously, has led to an increase in the labor market return to education in the United States. Figure 16.6 plots the trend line in real (i.e., adjusted for inflation) median hourly wages for five groups of U.S. workers defined by educational level, from high school dropouts to those with post-baccalaureate degrees. Wage levels were indexed to be the same (i.e., 100) as of 1979. The education premium is reflected in the fanning out of the trend in real wages across educational levels. For example, between 1979 and 2005, the wage premium for a college degree compared with a high school diploma increased more than 30 percentage points, from 40 to 74 percent. It is important to remember that the high and rising education premium in the United States is not replicated across other developed countries. Figure 16.7 plots the education premium as of 2001 for a tertiary degree compared with an upper-secondary degree for male workers in seventeen OECD countries with comparable household data on hourly wages analyzed by Strauss and de la Maisonneuve (2007). The United States stands out with the highest return, estimated by these authors at 92 percent. Portugal and the United Kingdom follow next at 65 to 66 percent, and the lowest premium occurs in Spain at 27 percent. Moreover, not all countries 7

Each line in the figure plots the mean task input in each year as a percentile of the base-year (i.e., 1960) distribution.

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Index of Real Median Hourly Wage (1979 = 100)

140 130

Advanced degree

120 College graduate 110 Some college 100 90

High school graduate

80 High school dropout 70 1973

1978

1983

1988 Year

1993

1998

2003

Figure 16.6. Real Median Hourly Wage by Education: 1973–2005. Source: Author’s calculations based on Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto (2007), Table 3.17. Available online at www.epi.org/content.cfm/datazone dznational.

have seen an increase in wage inequality in recent decades. Earlier studies focusing on wage distribution trends in the 1980s found that the United States and the United Kingdom had the largest increases in educational differentials, whereas there were more modest increases in several other countries including Australia, Canada, Japan, and Sweden, or no rise in wage disparities for other Continental European countries (Freeman & Katz, 1994, 1995; Gottschalk & Joyce, 1998; Nickell & Bell, 1996). Although economists have yet to reach a consensus to explain these differential patterns in wage trends across developed economies, it is likely that several factors can account for the recent patterns. Two leading hypotheses are the differential role of wage-setting institutions in affecting the wage structure and variation across countries in the supply of skilled workers. The first explanation stems from the observation that many of the countries with little or no change in wage inequality are those with stronger collectivebargaining systems that limit the growth in wage disparities (Fortin & Lemieux, 1997). Gottschalk and Joyce (1998), however, place more weight on market forces over institutions, with empirical evidence that differential supply shifts can explain the variation across countries in the returns to skill.

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United States Portugal

65.8

United Kingdom

65.2 58.8

France

54.3

Ireland

53.8

Austria

52.6

Finland

50.9

Italy

49.5

Canada

47.6

Denmark

46.3

Germany

42.1

Australia

41.7

The Netherlands

40.2

Belgium Poland

35.8

Greece

35.3 26.9

Spain 0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

Gross Tertiary Wage Premium (Percentage)

Figure 16.7. Gross Return to Tertiary Education for Male Workers in Selected OECD Countries: 2001. Source: Strauss and de la Maisonneuve (2007), Table 4. Notes: Gross return measures the percentage hourly wage advantage for those with a tertiary-level degree compared with upper-secondary degree holders. The estimates are based on a Mincerian wage equation that includes controls for gender, marital status, job tenure, type of work contract, public- versus private-sector employment, and plant size. Data for Poland are for 2000.

In other words, there is some indication that countries with larger increases in the education premium had smaller increases in the relative supply of more educated workers. Acemoglu (2003) argued that both explanations likely have merit but together cannot fully explain the observed patterns. Instead, he posited that the compressed wage structure in many European economies led firms to adopt technologies that were complementary to unskilled workers. As a result, the relative demand for skilled workers did not increase to the same extent in other European countries as it did in the United States and the United Kingdom. In other words, differences in

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technology adoption and, therefore, differential shifts in the relative demand for skills mean that the skill-based technological change manifested in the United States was not replicated in other advanced countries. Research in the United States indicates that technology can have other effects on the labor market as well. The adoption of new technologies in the United States has shifted the ways that firms are organized and conduct their businesses – in both traditional goods-producing sectors, such as steel and machine tools industries, and services-producing industries, such as retailing, trucking, and banking (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, & Hitt, 2000, 2002). One element of the change in business organization is the movement away from vertically integrated firms, as companies shed non-core functions through outsourcing in order to focus on specialized products and services that define their core competencies (Malone & Laubacher, 1998). ITs are also associated with the movement toward more participatory “high-performance” work systems that give workers more authority, flexibility, and opportunities to work in teams. Performance-based pay, for example, is an element of decentralized organizations that is attributable to the power of ITs and their associated networks to coordinate and control across and within organizations in a less centralized manner (Kruse & Blasi, 1998). Technology also supports telecommuting and other forms of distance work such as long-distance teams (Autor, 2001). About 15 percent of U.S. workers report that they usually do some work at home, at least one day a week, as part of their primary job (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2005b). Those who work at home are more likely to come from the managerial ranks or other positions with more authority and autonomy. Finally, while new technologies are driving up demand for more skilled workers, technology is also providing some of the tools that can be used to support the ongoing education and training of the workforce. Approaches such as computer-based instruction, distance learning, and other methods of customized learning are facilitated by the same technologies that require a more highly skilled workforce. ITs potentially allow access to instructional materials any place and any time, individually tailored and optimized for an individual’s knowledge base (Karoly & Panis, 2004). Expanded Reach of Globalization. With the growth of economic globalization in recent decades, the economies of the world are tied together even more than in the past. In the decades ahead, the continuation of this trend will affect the size of the markets for which countries produce, the mix

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800

Current U.S. Dollars (1980 = 100)

700

Commercial Services Exports Merchandise Exports

600 500 400 300 200 100 0 1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

Year

Figure 16.8. Value of World Merchandise and Services Exports: 1950–2006. Source: Author’s calculations based on World Trade Organization Statistics Database. Available online at www.wto.org/English/res e/statis e/statis e.html. Note: Commercial-services data begin at 1980.

of products consumed, and the nature of competition in the global marketplace. As illustrated in Figure 16.8, recent decades have been marked by dramatic increases in worldwide trade.8 Total trade activity – measured here by the value of world merchandise exports and world commercial-services exports – has grown nearly sixfold for the former and closer to eightfold for the latter. The more rapid growth in the value of services exports demonstrates an important aspect of recent trade growth – a shift in the sectoral composition of trade to encompass a greater share of trade coming from the services sector. Another important aspect of trade patterns is the increase in so-called vertical trade, whereby finished products may be composed of inputs produced and assembled in stages in different countries, which allows firms to divide the production process into various stages performed where it is most 8

Of course, globalization represents more than just trade in goods and services but is also captured by more rapid flows of capital, labor, and knowledge across international borders. See Karoly and Panis (2004) for a discussion of these other dimensions of globalization.

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advantageous (Feenstra, 1998; Hummels, Ishii, & Yi, 2001; Krugman, 1995). This pattern of specialization extends on a global scale the vertical disintegration of the firm discussed previously in the context of technological change. In the past several years, particularly in the United States, attention has also been drawn to another recent trade phenomenon: the outsourcing of higher-skilled white-collar services jobs, such as those related to IT and communications fields (e.g., programmers and call-center operators) and business-processing services (Brainard & Litan, 2004; Mann, 2005). Thus, globalization is now affecting segments of the economy that were relatively insulated in the past. This trend toward greater global integration and the extension into diverse sectors of the economy is enabled by ITs: because the work products in many IT-enabled industries can be readily transmitted over telephone lines or high-speed computer networks, the physical location of the workforce is increasingly less relevant (Karoly & Panis, 2004). In the future, companies may choose to blend onshore and offshore models to offer lower cost and greater flexibility, as well as the capacity to work around the clock. Although the expectation is that globalization will continue to be a major force in the world economy, the pace of global integration and the reach across countries may depend on the future of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. Such agreements in recent decades have reduced tariffs and other trade barriers. However, there may be setbacks in future efforts to promote freer trade, especially between high- and low-income countries, as concerns by the former about labor standards, the environment, and human rights are pitted against the concerns of the latter about agricultural subsidies and debt forgiveness. Globalization can be considered a form of international specialization, with resulting changes in the mix of labor demanded and the size of the labor pool that competes with domestic labor for jobs. Although greater integration in world trade and capital markets can enhance welfare at the national level and over the long term, there can be short-term and longer-term consequences for particular segments of a country’s economy and workforce (Burtless, Lawrence, Litan, & Shapiro, 1998). In the United States, those industries facing greater import competition have experienced employment losses, with the associated consequences for affected workers in terms of unemployment and wage losses, even on reemployment (Kletzer, 1998, 2000, 2002). At the same time, trade generates new jobs for U.S. workers in domestic exporting industries. For example, as of the late 1990s, more than one third of jobs in computers and electronic products were tied to exports (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2001). On balance, the research to

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date has tended to indicate that the effect of trade on overall employment levels is small, with job losses caused by import competition counterbalanced by job gains that stem from expanding exports (Karoly & Panis, 2004).

Implications for the Labor Market and the Transition to Adulthood The forces shaping the future world of work have implications for the nature of work and organization of the workplace in coming decades. In this concluding section, I focus on implications for the changing nature of work as manifested in the organization of production, employment relationships, and nature of work and job-skill requirements.9 The implications for individuals making the transition from school to work also are discussed. These issues are relevant from the perspective of current and future workers who want to anticipate future trends and how to respond to them, and to the organizations that represent these workers. The issues are pertinent for employers as well as public- and private-sector educational and training institutions. These issues are also relevant for policy makers at all levels of government who make decisions that shape the laws and regulations governing the workplace and other policies that affect the various actors in the labor market. Decentralization and Alternative Work Arrangements The future course of technological change and globalization is likely to move many firms toward a model of greater specialization than in the past. As discussed previously, for many sectors, the new mode of organization involves greater specialization within a firm as compared with vertically integrated firms of the past. Non-core functions are outsourced in order to exploit a company’s comparative advantage. Decentralized decision making is also a feature of the new form of organization. In such settings, a premium is associated with knowledge-generation as a way of achieving a competitive advantage. These same forces are also changing the nature of traditional employer– employee relationships. The adoption of high-performance workplace practices effectively blurs the distinction between “labor” and “management.” 9

Karoly and Panis (2004) also discussed the implications of the labor-market trends for workplace safety, security, and privacy; the size and composition of the labor force; and compensation.

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Striking the right balance between empowerment and control will be an important management element in the future workplace. One view is that corporations will serve less of a “command and control” function and instead provide the rules, standards, and culture that define the environment within which more autonomous workers operate. The same forces driving the reorganization of production are also expected to result in a greater share of the labor force in nonstandard work arrangements such as self-employment, contract work, temporary help, part-time work, and so on. Already, about one in four U.S. workers is in such a nontraditional arrangement (Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS], 2005a). Such arrangements may be expected to grow as a result of further advances in technology, as well as greater demand for more flexible work arrangements on the part of subgroups of workers such as older people, disabled people, and those caring for dependent family members – whether young children or aging parents. Likewise, we can expect growth in home-based work and telecommuting, facilitated by technological change and demanded by workers looking for ease in balancing work and family commitments. Indeed, as traditional employers compete for workers in economies with slower labor-force growth – especially for skilled workers or population subgroups with lower rates of labor-force participation, such as women – greater attention may be given to nonwage benefits such as those that address the work–family life balance through more flexible hours, distance work, and family-related benefits (e.g., subsidized childcare). One projected outcome of these trends is the evolution in some sectors toward numerous IT-enabled, networked entrepreneurs, or “e-lancers” (Malone, 2004; Malone & Laubacher, 1998). The e-lancer model envisions individuals who compete in the marketplace – potentially on a global scale – using the power of communications networks to link buyers and sellers, identify collaborators, and build and maintain reputations. In the United States, one interesting example of these interrelated phenomena – individual home-based entrepreneurs, connected through the Internet yet operating within the rules and culture of a larger institution – is eBay. Recent estimates indicate that an estimated 430,000 of eBay’s 55 million active buyers and sellers report eBay to be their primary source of income. If eBay actually employed these individuals, it would be the second largest private employer in the country, after Wal-Mart (Malone, 2005). Emphasis on Skill, but Growth in Low-Skill Jobs Too Just as technological change in the recent past has raised the demand for a skilled workforce, we can expect the ongoing rapid pace of technological

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change to continue to need a workforce that is capable of developing and marketing the new technologies and delivering the products and services produced with the technologies. At the same time, the demographic trends discussed previously – particularly the aging of the population and the increased labor-force participation of women – will increase the demand for lower-skilled jobs in retail trade, health care, and other personal services. Many of these jobs do not require postsecondary education, although training is often an important component of job preparation, and new technologies are likely to be incorporated into these jobs as well, although often with intuitive interfaces. To illustrate these countervailing forces generating demand for both lower- and higher-skilled jobs, Figures 16.9 and 16.10 plot the twenty occupations projected by the BLS to have the fastest growth (in percentage terms) and the largest growth (in absolute terms). The education and training requirements for these occupations are indicated with asterisks in the bar-chart labels. The bars with dark shading indicate those occupations that require a postsecondary degree (i.e., associate level or higher). Starting first with the occupations projected to grow the fastest shown in Figure 16.9, twelve of the twenty occupations require at least an associate’s degree, whereas three require more than a bachelor’s degree.10 These occupations include those related to computing software and systems, high-end personal services (e.g., financial services and veterinary care), and health specialists (e.g., dentistry, mental health, and physical therapy). Many of the remaining occupations are jobs in the health-care sector that require less training (e.g., home-health workers, medical assistants, and pharmacy technicians). Considering those occupations projected to have the largest absolute growth shown in Figure 16.10, there is a greater concentration of occupations that do not require a higher education degree (i.e., fifteen of twenty). Again, occupations in the health-care sector predominate, along with personal and household services. The mix of occupations in both figures reflects the importance of technology in the workplace and technology-dominated sectors, as well as the shifts in demand associated with demographic factors such as more women in the workforce and an aging population. Regardless of the formal-training requirements associated with various occupations, one shared expectation for workers in the future is that they will need to be capable of learning new skills throughout their labor-market 10

Overall, all occupations are projected to grow 10.3 percent between 2006 and 2016. The twenty fastest-growing occupations in Figure 16.9 exceed the average growth rate by a factor of 3 to 5.

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Network systems & data communications analysts** (402)

51

Personal & home-care aides (1,156)

49

Home-health aides (1,171) 45

Computer software engineers, applications** (733)

41

Veterinary technologists & technicians* (100)

41

Personal financial advisors** (248)

40

Make-up artists, theatrical & performance (3) Medical assistants (565)

35

Veterinarians*** (84)

35

Substance-abuse & behavioral-disorder counselors** (112)

35

Skin-care specialists (51)

34

Financial analysts** (295)

34

Social & human-service assistants (453)

34

Gaming surveillance officers/investigators (12)

34

Physical-therapist assistants* (80)

32

Pharmacy technicians (376)

32

Forensic-science technicians** (17)

31

Dental hygienists* (217)

30

Mental-health counselors*** (130)

30 30

Mental-health & substance-abuse social workers*** (159) 0

20

40

60

Percent Change 2006–2016

Figure 16.9. BLS Projected Top 20 Four-Digit Occupations with Fastest Employment Growth: 2006–2016. Source: Dome and Shniper (2007), Table 2. Notes: Number in parentheses next to bar label is absolute employment level (in thousands) projected for 2016. Education or training level required by most workers to become fully qualified in the occupation is an ∗ associate’s degree, ∗∗ bachelor’s degree, or ∗∗∗ master’s, doctoral, or first professional degree. Dark-shaded bars require a postsecondary degree. Bars with lighter shading and no asterisk on the label may require a postsecondary vocational award or varying levels of work experience or on-the-job training.

career (Karoly & Panis, 2004). It will no longer be sufficient to engage in one phase of education and training followed by a lifetime of work. Given the changes in technology and the shifts in employment demand, workers will need to be able to adapt to changes in their chosen occupation or shift to new lines of work when the old one becomes obsolete. In summary, workforce education and training in the future will involve continuous learning throughout the working life. One consequence is that education and training systems need to adjust to a model that imparts the needed skills to enter the labor market, as well as provide opportunities for lifetime

80

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Lynn A. Karoly Registered nurses* (3,092)

587

Retail salespersons (5,034)

557

Customer-service representatives (2,747)

545

Combined food prep. & serving wkrs., incl. fast food (2,955)

452

Office clerks, general (3,604)

404

Personal & home-care aides (1,156)

389

Home-health aides (1,171)

384

Postsecondary teachers*** (2,054)

382

Janitors & cleaners, except maids & housekeeping (2,732)

345

Nursing aides, orderlies, & attendants (1,711)

264

Bookkeeping, accounting, & auditing clerks (2,377)

264

Waiters & waitresses (2,615)

255

Childcare workers (1,636)

248

Executive secretaries & administrative assistants (1,857)

239

Computer software engineers, applications** (733)

226

Accountants & auditors** (1,500)

226

Landscaping & groundskeeping workers (1,441)

221

Elementary schoolteachers, except special ed.** (1,749)

209

Receptionists & information clerks (1,375)

202

Truck drivers, heavy & tractor-trailer (2,053)

193 0

100

200 300 400 500 600

700 800

Absolute Change 2006–2016 (1,000s)

Figure 16.10. BLS Projected Top 20 Four-Digit Occupations with Largest Employment Growth: 2006–2016. Source: Dome and Shniper (2007), Table 3. Notes: Number in parentheses next to bar label is absolute employment level (in thousands) projected for 2016. Education or training level required by most workers to become fully qualified in the occupation is an ∗ associate’s degree, ∗∗ bachelor’s degree, or ∗∗∗ master’s, doctoral, or first professional degree. Dark-shaded bars require a postsecondary degree. Bars with lighter shading and no asterisk on the label may require a postsecondary vocational award or varying levels of work experience or on-the-job training.

learning – whether through formal and informal training programs offered by employers or education and training institutions in the public and private sectors. Workers Will Bear More Risks To the extent that nonstandard work arrangements expand in the future, in economies such as the United States, it will be important to address access to and delivery of traditional workplace benefits such as health, life, and disability insurance; pensions; education and training; and various aspects of professional development. We can contrast two extremes. One

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paradigm consists of explicit or implicit contracts that confer long-term stable employer–employee relationships governed by the internal labor market of the firm. The other paradigm is the e-lancer model of independent freelance work that takes place over weeks and months – often in collaborative project teams that form and then dissolve – and all governed by the marketplace and institutional rules. In the first paradigm, the employment relationship confers both employment continuity and economic security, ensuring the worker to some extent against fluctuations in demand. There are opportunities for career progression and constraints on the distribution of wages based on the internal wage structure of a firm. At the other extreme, individuals are responsible for generating the demand for their skills and for riding out periods of slack demand. There is no career ladder and the rewards may be more extreme, with those who do not succeed contrasted to the “winners who take all.” Ultimately, the nature of the changes in the organization of work and employer–employee relationships all point in the direction of requiring workers to bear more labor-market risk compared with the past – in other words, shifting from the first to the second paradigm. In the United States, this is expected to take the form of more workers in nontraditional employment relationships (e.g., more freelancers or self-employed people) who could face greater variation in their labor-market income, more expensive health-insurance costs, and lower rates of saving for retirement. Such workers need to be motivated to upgrade their skills, seek out professional opportunities, and generate demand for their products or services when they do not have an employer to provide the related workplace benefits. Even workers who continue in more traditional employment relationships are likely to face less stability during their working life in terms of tenure with a given employer and tenure within a given occupation. As employers shift to performance-based pay and other variable pay systems, workers also will bear more of the risk associated with fluctuations in productivity or product demand. Uncertainties and Opportunities in the School-to-Work Transition These various trends and their implications present both uncertainties and opportunities for young people making the transition to adulthood in the United States and other advanced economies in the coming decade. One domain of uncertainty is whether primary and secondary education, vocational training, and higher-education institutions can adapt to the changing needs of the workplace in terms of preparing young people to enter the labor market and then succeed during their career. In many countries, education

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and training institutions are still functioning with models designed to serve a twentieth-century labor market and are only gradually responding to new labor-market realities. At the primary and secondary level, this means focusing on improving educational outcomes in math and the sciences, especially in those countries that perform poorly on international assessments of these skills, which are critical in light of the expected pace of technological change and the reach of global competition. For both college and non-college-bound youth, there is a need to impart critical-thinking skills, the ability to work in collaborative teams, the capacity to communicate effectively, and the motivation to be a lifelong learner. As individuals transition to the world of work, education and training institutions need to respond to the need for opportunities to upgrade skills or acquire new skills in the face of technological advances and shifting competition. Support will be needed for displaced workers and mid-career job-changers. To be most effective, linkages among employers, schools, and training institutions need to be strengthened so that education and training providers can respond quickly to changes in future needs of the labor market. A related challenge is to ensure that opportunities for education and training are available for all. In the United States, research indicates that access to employer-provided training increases with the educational level of the employee, such that less-educated workers have more limited opportunities for skill-upgrading compared with their more-educated counterparts (Ahlstrand, Bassi, & McMurrer, 2003). Likewise, public schools in low-income communities are often inferior to those of more economically advantaged children, which leads to the wide achievement gaps discussed previously. In many cases, demographic trends in many developed countries will lead to an increase in immigration in order to respond to workforce shortages; however, such workers typically have more limited opportunities for improving their labor market skills over time. The children of these immigrants will be among the next generation of labor-market entrants, and the quality of their education and training opportunities will determine whether there is economic assimilation or socioeconomic stratification. One area of opportunity is the role that technology can play in supporting the need for lifelong learning (Karoly & Panis, 2004). Technologymediated learning can take several forms and be exploited by individuals across their lifetime. Applications of computers and other ITs in support of education and training include computer-based instruction, Internetbased instruction, and other methods for customized learning. These tools

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can be used in traditional classroom settings, in the workplace as part of training programs or ongoing skill acquisition, or by individuals at home or on the road. Interesting applications in use today include the distancelearning opportunities provided by the U.S. military for personnel stationed overseas (or even on the seas), and the use of wearable computer devices that provide real-time access to information needed on the job to perform complex, dynamic tasks. Skill acquisition can also take place using simulation tools, with applications in high-tech occupations but also in more low-tech fields, such as for training and evaluating performance of sales personnel in their interaction with customers. The tools are expected to become more sophisticated over time with advances in software and hardware, allowing for the application of artificial intelligence, voice recognition, and natural language comprehension. Intelligent tutoring systems will support self-paced individually tailored educational and training programs. By allowing individuals to learn according to their own schedule, these various forms of technology-mediated learning can reduce the time costs associated with acquiring new skills and create a more efficient learning environment. They also provide more flexibility and, therefore, the potential to mediate tensions between family life and skill-upgrading. Of course, ensuring access to these new learning technologies across population subgroups will be as much of an issue as it is for traditional forms of education and training. Uncertainties in the labor market and the school-to-work transition also have implications for other aspects of the transition to adulthood, including living arrangements, union formation, childbearing, and residential location. As discussed in other chapters in this volume (e.g., Chapters 5, 7, 10, and 15), there are equally significant shifts taking place in advanced economies in how long youths remain dependent on their parents, the timing of cohabitation and marriage, the extent and timing of childbearing, and residential mobility. Some of these changes result from the realities of the extended schooling process, the nature of competition and the resulting labor-market opportunities facing young people, and the degree of uncertainty in the life course. In other cases, independent social forces are shaping life-course trajectories that then have implications for the ways in which workers need to balance the demands of their job or need for life learning with their desire to have stable partnerships and time for caregiving. Again, shifts in technology – such as greater use of distance work and distance learning or increases in nontraditional employment relationships – may offer opportunities to ensure a productive workforce while supporting other adult roles.

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Because many developed countries face the same or similar issues in terms of demographic changes, technological advances, and global competition, there are opportunities to learn from their successes and failures as they seek to respond to new labor-market realities, especially for young people making the transition to work and other adult roles. In many cases, there will be a need to rethink the basic institutional structures that have been put in place to provide education and training, to regulate the workplace, to organize workers for collective bargaining, to support families in achieving work–family life balance, and to provide social supports and other safety-net protections for workers. There is a need to assess whether the future evolution of the workforce and workplace means that existing policies distort the labor market or have unintended consequences, that new labor-market failures have emerged, or that distributional consequences can justify government intervention in the marketplace. Moreover, as discussed herein, in many countries, these changes in the labor market will be compounded by other shifts in social structures that accompany the transition to adulthood (e.g., marriage and family formation). Consideration must then be given to the interaction between the labor-market changes and other aspects of family life. These are some of the issues that merit greater attention as coming generations navigate the future of work in the twenty-first century. REFERENCES

Acemoglu, D. (2003). Cross-county inequality trends. Economic Journal, 113(485), 121– 149. Ahlstrand, A. L., Bassi, L. J., & McMurrer, D. P. (2003). Workplace education for low-wage workers. Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. Autor, D. H. (2001). Wiring the labor market. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(1), 25–40. Autor, D. H., Levy, F., & Murnane, R. (2003). The skill content of recent technological change: An empirical exploration. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1279–1333. Brainard, L., & Litan, R. E. (2004). Offshoring service jobs: Bane or boon and what to do? Brookings Institution Policy Brief No. 132. Available online at www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb132.htm. Bresnahan, T. F., Brynjolfsson, E., & Hitt, L. M. (2000). Technology, organization, and the demand for skilled labor. In M. M. Blair & T. A. Kochan (Eds.), The new relationship: Human capital in the American corporation (pp. 145–184). Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Bresnahan, T. F., Brynjolfsson, E., & Hitt, L. M. (2002). Information technology, workplace organization, and the demand for skilled labor: Firm-level evidence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1), 339–376. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). (2005a). Contingent and alternative employment arrangements. BLS News Release, July 27, 2005.

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Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). (2005b). Work at home summary. BLS News Release, September 22, 2005. Burtless, G., Lawrence, R. Z., Litan, R. E., & Shapiro, R. J. (1998). Globaphobia: Confronting fears about open trade. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press. Congressional Budget Office (CBO). (2002). The role of computer technology in the growth of productivity. Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office. Day, J. C., & Bauman, K. J. (2000). Have we reached the top? Educational attainment projections of the U.S. population. Working Paper Series No. 43, Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census. Dome, A., & Shniper, L. (2007). Occupational employment projections to 2016. Monthly Labor Review, 130(11), 86–125. Ellwood, D. (2001). The sputtering labor force of the 21st century: Can social policy help? Working Paper No. 8321. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. Feenstra, R. C. (1998). Integration of trade and disintegration of production in the global economy. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(4), 31–50. Fortin, N. M., & Lemieux, T. (1997). Institutional changes and rising wage inequality: Is there a linkage? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(2), 75–96. Freeman, R. B. (1976). The over-educated American. New York: Academic Press. Freeman, R. B. (2002). The labour market in the new information economy. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 18(3), 288–305. Freeman, R. B., & Katz, L. (1994). Rising wage inequality: The United States vs. Other Advanced Countries. In R. B. Freeman (Ed.), Working under different rules (pp. 29–62). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Freeman, R. B., & Katz, L. (Eds.). (1995). Differences and changes in wage structures. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Gottschalk, P., & Joyce, M. (1998). Cross-national differences in the rise in earnings inequality: Market and institutional factors. Review of Economics and Statistics, 80(4), 489–502. Hipple, S., & Kosanovich, K. (2003). Computer and Internet use at work in 2001. Monthly Labor Review, 126(2), 26–35. Hummels, D., Ishii, J., & Yi, K. M. (2001). The nature and growth of vertical specialization in world trade. Journal of International Economics, 54(1), 75–96. Karoly, L. A. (2007). Forces shaping the future U.S. workforce and workplace. Testimony for the hearing on Strengthening America’s Middle Class before the Committee on Education and Labor, U.S. House of Representatives, February 7, 2007. Reprinted as CT-273, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Karoly, L. A., & Panis, C. W. A. (2004). The 21st century at work: Forces shaping the future workforce and workplace in the United States. MG-164, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Karoly, L. A., & Panis, C.W.A. (2009). Supply of and demand for skilled labor in the United States. In J. Bhagwati & G. Hanson (Eds.), Skilled immigration today: Prospects, problems and policies, (pp. 15–52). New York: Oxford University Press. Kletzer, L. G. (1998). Job displacement. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(1), 115– 136. Kletzer, L. G. (2000). Trade and job loss in U.S. manufacturing, 1979–94. In R. C. Feenstra (Ed.), The impact of international trade on wages, (pp. 349–396). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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Kletzer, L. G. (2002). Imports, exports, and jobs. Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. Krugman, P. (1995). Growing world trade: Causes and consequences. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1995(1), 327–362. Kruse, D., & Blasi, J. (1998). The new employee–employer relationship. Paper prepared for the Aspen Institute Domestic Strategy Group. Available online at www.aspeninstitute.org/Programt2.asp?bid=870. Malone, T. (2005). Best of both worlds? A view of the changing workplace. RAND Review, 25(3), 8–9. Malone, T. W. (2004). The future of work: How the new order of business will shape your organization, your management style and your life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Malone, T. W., & Laubacher, R. J. (1998). The dawn of the e-lance economy, Harvard Business Review, September–October 1998, 145–152. Mann, C. L. (2005). Offshore outsourcing and the globalization of U.S. services: Why now, how important, and what policy implications. In C. Fred Bergsten and the Institute for International Economics, The United States and the world economy: Foreign economic policy for the next decade (pp. 281–311).Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. Mishel, L., Bernstein, J., & Allegretto, S. (2007). The state of working America 2006/2007. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI). (2005). The National Nanotechnology Initiative at Five Years: Assessment and Recommendations of the National Nanotechnology Advisory Panel, President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. May 2005. Available online at www.nano.gov/final pcast nano report.pdf. National Science Foundation (NSF). (2001). Societal implications of nanoscience and nanotechnology. Washington, DC: National Science Foundation, March 2001. Nickell, S., & Bell, B. (1996). The collapse in demand for the unskilled and unemployment across the OECD. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 11, 40–62. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). (2000). Literacy in the information age: Final report of the International Adult Literacy Survey. Paris: OECD. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). (2007). Science competencies for tomorrow’s world, Volumes I and II. Paris: OECD. Reich, R. B. (2001). The future of success. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Scarpetta, S., Bassanini, A., Pilat, D., & Schreyer, P. (2000). Economic growth in the OECD area: Recent trends at the aggregate and sectoral level. Working Paper No. 248, OECD Economics Department. Strauss, H., & de la Maisonneuve, C. (2007). The wage premium on tertiary education: New estimates for 21 OECD countries. OECD Working Paper No. 589, December 2007. Available online at www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2007doc.nsf/linkto/eco-wkp(2007)49. Toossi, M. (2006). A new look at long-term labor force projections to 2050. Monthly Labor Review, 129(11), 19–39. U.S. Department of Commerce. (2001). U.S. jobs from exports. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, February 2001.

Index

ability. See competence beliefs, 17, 126, 199, 202, 205, 211 adaptation, 5, 12, 18, 38, 312, 315, 317, 322, 324, 340 adaptability, 21, 314, 317 adaptive behavior, 6, 9, 121, 314 adulthood emerging, 11, 19, 30, 232, 246, 257, 260 markers of, 32, 34, 35, 266 age aging society. See social change, demographic shift cohort, 6, 11–12, 16, 18, 45, 102, 179, 194, 208, 209, 219, 221, 223, 227, 230, 333, 360 agency, 5, 14, 38, 122, 123, 124, 127, 131, 139, 194, 199, 244, 276, 345 apprenticeship, 62, 76, 82, 89, 136, 159, 168, 194, 208, 211, 320, 321, 327 autonomy, 33, 146, 153, 156, 249, 371 big-fish-in-a-little-pond-effect, 280, 304 biography biographical agency. See agency biographical dilemmas, 122, 127, 140 birth cohort. See age, cohort capital cultural, 5, 15, 129, 152–153, 158, 162, 205, 284, 334 economic, 4, 15, 146, 152, 153, 159, 265, 271

educational, 258, 337, 341, 346 human, 16, 100, 110, 190, 314–315. See also resources, personal social, 162, 314. See also resources, social career aspirations, 19, 126, 133, 171, 176, 180, 188, 195–196, 320 choice, 16, 110, 130, 193, 251, 266, 274, 287, 314, 316, 320, 322 employment, 32, 100, 105, 110, 136, 195, 199–200, 210, 233, 304, 312, 332 family. See family, career identity, 314, 316 trajectories, 12, 45, 50, 172, 259 competence academic, 4, 157, 198 cognitive, 4, 198, 202, 205, 209, 368 social, 23, 196, 198, 207, 209, 212, 316, 322, 368 control striving, 7, 25 coping, 6, 14, 17–18, 113, 122, 125, 127, 140, 244, 288, 314, 318, 323 decision making, 3, 5, 11, 14, 21, 24, 32, 37, 98, 106, 121, 131, 138, 140, 153, 249, 305, 315–316, 368, 374 dependence extended, 147, 149, 232, 238 return to, 149, 152 dependency ratio, 355

385

386 development adolescent, 244, 251, 318, 323 life-span, 5, 7, 36 regulation, 6, 10, 19, 245, 257 ecological system, 6–7, 14, 21 economic boom, 12, 24, 110 recession, 101, 222 education enrollment, 4, 13, 76–77, 85, 89, 91 formal, 4, 13, 84, 89, 133, 173, 294, 336, 338, 346 non-formal, 334 postsecondary, 61–62, 246, 265, 275, 280, 319, 376 qualification, 230 value of, 158, 159, 298 wage premium on, 368 educational attainment, 16, 22, 23, 67, 90, 101, 153, 193, 197, 202, 231, 244, 246, 251, 315, 354–359 curricula, 22, 335, 337, 346 expectation, 265, 271, 277, 294 participation, 27, 71, 75–76 qualification, 23, 121, 219, 227, 231, 333, 344 track, 205, 208–209, 212, 294, 302, 316, 343 employment employability, 20, 190, 283, 312–313 flexible, 4, 101, 136, 140, 335, 375 opportunities, 3, 6, 12, 14, 16, 104, 170 precarious, 13, 100, 106, 109, 111, 135, 137, 140, 177, 221, 232 stable, 12, 45, 48, 60, 106, 266, 275 unemployment. See unemployment family. See also parenthood career, 104 ethos, 155, 158 formation, 3, 7, 10, 13, 18, 27, 104, 110, 150, 152, 221, 236, 244, 258, 382 law, 146, 149 practices, 156, 161

Index gender expectations, 205 roles, 33, 205, 256 stereotypes, 196, 205, 209, 211 globalization, 7, 13, 46, 47, 67, 68, 95, 101, 105–106, 108, 352, 371 heterogeneity in transition. See transition, heterogeneity in housing home ownership, 239 independent living, 4, 10, 238 transition. See transition, housing immigration, 22, 46, 90, 343, 380 incarceration, 47, 63 income, 26, 48, 62–63, 103, 111, 128, 132, 137, 139, 153, 171, 210, 227, 246, 259, 312, 346–347, 355, 375, 380 individualization, 121, 128, 146, 148, 162 institutional filters, 4, 7, 13, 17, 24, 110 regulations, 5, 7, 10 structures, 4, 15, 138, 141, 382 intervention programs, 11, 22, 27, 293, 304, 307, 318, 320, 322, 323 job attitudes, 6, 57, 60, 165, 170, 173, 184, 189–190, 321, 325 career. See career, see employment commitment, 16, 35, 166, 183, 189, 238, 278, 375 nontraditional, 16, 194, 197, 200, 203, 379, 381 preferences, 16, 170, 177, 199–200, 207 satisfaction, 16, 165–166, 183, 189, 312, 314, 316 security, 16, 46, 100, 108, 165, 166, 170, 283 labour demand, 5, 67–68, 71, 79, 81, 88, 342, 373, 375 supply, 13, 22, 71, 77, 79, 81, 82–84, 89 utilization, 355–357 labour market deterioration, 77, 80, 87, 90 flexibility, 100, 103

Index learning environments, 300, 306, 331, 333, 381 life course dynamics, 5, 220 patterns, 18, 25, 33, 219, 237, 239 life goals, 200 life-long learning, 23, 27, 239, 335, 380 marriage, 24, 32, 96, 106, 111, 222, 243, 245, 246, 251, 259, 260, 266, 276, 381, 382 methodological challenges cluster analysis, 19, 69, 248, 251 comparative analysis, 15, 113, 122, 131, 141, 172 econometric analysis, 69, 73, 80, 89 graphical non-parametrical analysis, 69, 73, 80, 88 latent class analysis, 18, 219, 230 optimal matching analysis, 219, 223–224 sequence analysis, 18, 223–226, 227, 233, 237 modernization, 99, 334, 336, 337 motivation achievement, 297 extrinsic, 125 intrinsic, 125 occupational choice. See career, choice stereotypes, 197 organizational commitment. See job, commitment parental beliefs, 197 control, 148 expectations, 197, 202, 205, 211 responsibility, 146, 149–150, 161 support, 15, 145–146, 151, 154, 158, 211 parenthood, 4, 10, 22, 32, 35, 96, 102, 104, 110, 222, 238, 246, 259, 343–344, 346 pay setting competetive, 72, 79 coordinated, 13, 79, 85 institutions of, 13, 70, 76, 85, 87 peer groups, 21, 296, 299, 307, 340 planning career, 285, 318, 326

387 life, 128 paradox, 15, 125 polarization, 15, 18, 26, 69, 221, 228, 239 prevention programs, 319. See also intervention programs Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), 21, 294, 300, 301, 336, 339, 362 race, 7, 14, 24, 25, 31, 53, 58, 61, 246, 248, 270, 361 rational choice, 5, 15, 126, 155 relationships dating, 243, 250, 256, 261 employment, 100, 170, 187, 374, 379, 381 family, 152, 155, 243, 258 romantic, 33, 106, 243, 251, 256, 258, 266, 271 social, 36, 39, 162, 245, 302, 315–316 supportive, 315–316 resources cultural. See capital, cultural economic. See capital, economic personal, 4, 7–9, 20, 139, 283 social, 5, 9, 14, 20, 147, 153–154, 265, 271, 294, 313, 382 satisfaction with life. See subjective well-being school attitudes, 271, 293, 295–296, 306 burnout, 20–21, 26, 293 disengagement, 244, 295 drop-out, 121, 137, 157, 304 leaving, 4, 51, 61, 124, 135, 137, 145, 158, 219–220, 227, 232–233 self-efficacy, 126, 202, 207, 209, 313, 318, 322 self-esteem, 246, 250, 254, 274, 295 skills acquisition, 6, 22, 323, 325, 381 bias, 68 life-skills, 21, 315, 322 requirement, 22, 46, 69, 367, 374 training, 306, 322, 323, 325 social background social class, 15, 31, 151–153, 164, 228, 246, 271, 273 social exclusion, 121, 124, 145, 346

388 social background (cont.) social inequality, 102, 121, 126, 140 social structures, 5, 17, 99, 126, 382 social change demographic shift, 22, 145, 222, 232, 343, 353, 376, 382 German Reunification, 16, 167, 177, 179, 187, 190 model of, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 21, 23 technological change, 22, 46, 353, 366, 373, 374–376 social context distal, 6 proximal, 6. See also family, peer groups social networks, 6, 131, 276, 285 social responsibility, 133 socialization broad, 32–33 cumulative, 27 experiences, 9, 16, 197, 208, 210, 211 narrow, 33 stress, 21, 161, 171, 260, 294, 316, 318, 323 subjective well-being, 7, 9, 11, 19, 154, 244, 257, 259, 267, 274, 294, 295, 296, 298, 300, 301, 303, 312 support intergenerational, 14 social. See resources, social support beliefs fairness, 15, 156, 159 legitimacy, 15, 156, 157, 159 reciprocity, 15, 156, 159 time tables, 239 transition demands, 7, 12, 14, 18, 19, 20, 140, 239, 332

Index from school to work, 3, 5, 15, 20, 22–23, 25, 31, 36, 39, 48, 51, 53, 95, 113, 226, 238, 260, 295, 312, 316, 325–326, 332, 352, 353, 374, 381 heterogeneity in, 24, 25, 222, 237, 239 housing, 123 interlinked, 3, 10–11, 18 patterns, 5, 19, 25, 124, 126, 131, 138, 140, 152, 224, 228, 232, 239, 344 policies. See transition, regimes regimes, 14, 123, 132–133, 332, 341, 345 role, 36, 220, 222 successful, 11, 18, 19, 45, 125, 238, 244, 246, 260, 265, 287, 312, 313, 316 timing of, 9, 24, 50, 222, 288, 381 unemployment effects of, 24, 86, 103, 105, 110 increase in, 16, 68, 75, 79, 100, 166, 171, 177, 182, 187, 189, 222 long-term. See unemployment, periods of periods of, 81, 104, 123, 220, 226, 228, 233, 236, 239 rate, 3, 12, 62, 67, 75, 85, 137, 165, 312, 339, 357 youth, 4, 67, 79, 102, 110, 124, 135, 168, 173, 219, 226 welfare regimes, 4, 7, 15, 99, 102, 107, 110, 132, 145, 147–148, 169–170, 344 work. See also job trajectories. See career, trajectories work arrangements, 4, 137, 375, 378 workforce growth, 22, 352 work-life balance, 22, 332, 343–344, 375, 382