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Transcritique
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Transcritique On Kant and Marx
Kojin Karatani translated by Sabu Kohso
The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England
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© 2003 Massachusetts Institute of Technology All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. This book was set in New Baskerville by UG / GGS Information Services, Inc. and printed and bound in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Karatani, Kojin, 1941– Transcritique on Kant and Marx / Kojin Karatani; translated by Sabu Kohso. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-262-11274-4 (alk. paper) 1. Kant, Immanuel, 1724–1804—Contributions in political science. 2. Kant, Immanuel, 1724–1804—Contributions in economics. 3. Kant, Immanuel, 1724–1804. 4. Marx, Karl, 1818–1883—Contributions in political science. 5. Marx, Karl, 1818–1883—Contributions in economics. 6. Marx, Karl, 1818–1883. I. Title JC181.K3 K37 2003 320.01—dc21
2002038051
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Contents
Preface
vii
Acknowledgments
xv
Introduction: What Is Transcritique?
1
I Kant
27
1 The Kantian Turn 1.1 The Copernican Turn 1.2 Literary Criticism and the Transcendental Critique 1.3 Parallax and the Thing-in-Itself
29 29 35 44
2 The Problematic of Synthetic Judgment 2.1 Mathematical Foundations 2.2 The Linguistic Turn 2.3 Transcendental Apperception
55 55 65 76
3 Transcritique 3.1 Subject and Its Topos 3.2 Transcendental and Transversal 3.3 Singularity and Sociality 3.4 Nature and Freedom
81 81 92 100 112
II Marx
131
4 Transposition and Critique 4.1 Transposition
133 133
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4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5
The System of Representation: Darstellung and Vertretung The Economic Crisis as a Parallax The Micro Difference Marx and Anarchists
142 152 161 165
5 The Crisis of Synthesis 5.1 The Form of Value qua Synthetic Judgment: Ex Ante Facto and Ex Post Facto 5.2 The Form of Value 5.3 Capital’s Drive 5.4 Money and Its Theology, Its Metaphysics 5.5 Credit and Crisis
185 185 193 200 211 217
6 Value Form and Surplus Value 6.1 Value and Surplus Value 6.2 The Linguistic Approach 6.3 Merchant Capital and Industrial Capital 6.4 Surplus Value and Profit 6.5 The Global Nature of Capitalism
223 223 228 234 241 251
7 Toward Transcritical Counteractions 7.1 The State, Capital, and Nation 7.2 A Possible Communism
265 265 283
Notes
307
Index
349
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Preface
This book is in two parts: reflections on Kant and on Marx. Although the two names would appear to split the book, it is in fact thoroughly inseparable; the two parts are interactive through and through. The whole of the project—what I call Transcritique—forms a space of transcodings between the domains of ethics and political economy, between the Kantian critique and the Marxian critique. This is an attempt to read Kant via Marx and Marx via Kant, and to recover the significance of the critique common to both. This critique is something that begins from a scrutiny, a rather elaborate self-scrutiny. Now with respect to the pairing itself. Quite a few thinkers have sought to connect these two since the late nineteenth century. This was an effort to grasp a subjective/ethical moment missing in the materialism called Marxism. It speaks to the fact that Kant was not in the least a bourgeois philosopher. To him, being moral was less a question of good and evil than of being causa sui and hence free, and this compels us to treat other people as free agents. The ultimate message of Kantian moral law lies in the imperative: “Act so that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in any other person, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”1 This is not an abstract doctrine. Kant considered it a task to be realized progressively in the context of historical society. It might be that, in the concrete, his goal was to establish an association of independent small producers in opposition to the civil society dominated by merchant capitalism. This was an ideal conceived in pre-industrial capi-
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talist Germany; later, however, in tandem with the rise of industrial capitalism, the unity of independent small producers was mostly disbanded. But Kant’s moral law survived. Abstract as it might have been, Kant’s position was a precursor to the views of the utopian socialists and anarchists (such as Proudhon). In this precise sense, Hermann Cohen identified Kant as the true primogenitor of German socialism. In the context of a capitalist economy where people treat each other merely as a means to an end, the Kantian “kingdom of freedom” or “kingdom of ends” clearly comes to entail another new meaning, that is, communism. If we think about it, from the beginning, communism could not have been conceptualized without the moral moment inherent in Kant’s thinking. Unfortunately and unfairly, however, Kantian Marxism has been eclipsed by history. I, too, came to connect Kant and Marx, yet in a different context from neo-Kantianism. From the beginning, the Kantian Marxists’ recognition of capitalism appeared to me to be feeble. I felt the same way about anarchists (or associationists). While their sense of freedom and ethical disposition are noteworthy, what was undeniably missing in them was a theoretical approach to the forces of the social relations that compel people. For this reason, their struggles were mostly helpless and miserably defeated. My political stance was once anarchistic, and I was never sympathetic to any Marxist party or state. Yet at the same time, I was deeply in awe of Marx. My admiration for Capital, the book with the subtitle “Kritik der politischen Ökonomie” (Critique of the Economics of Nations) has only intensified year by year. Being a student of political economics and reading Capital closely, sentence by sentence, I was always aware of and discontented with the fact that Marxist philosophers from Lukács to Althusser did not really read it full-heartedly, but instead, only took from it what was suitable to their philosophical concerns. I was also discontented with the majority of political economists who deem Capital simply a book on economy. Meanwhile, I gradually recognized that the Marxian critique was not a mere criticism of capitalism and classical economics, but a project that elucidates the nature and the limit of capital’s drive [Trieb], and furthermore reveals, on the basis of that drive, an essential difficulty entailed in the human act of exchange (or more broadly, communication). Capital does
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not offer an easy exit from capitalism; rather only by its very exitlessness does it suggest a possibility of practical intervention. Along the way, I became increasingly aware of Kant as a thinker who also sought to suggest the possibility of practice—less by a criticism of metaphysics (as is usually thought) than by bravely shedding light on the limit of human reason. Capital is commonly read in relation with Hegelian philosophy. In my case, I came to hold that it is only the Critique of Pure Reason that should be read while cross-referencing Capital. Thus the Marx/Kant intersection. Marx spoke very little of communism, except for the rare occasions on which he criticized others’ discourses on the subject. He even said somewhere that speaking of the future was itself reactionary. Up until the climate change of 1989, I also despised all ideas of possible futures. I believed that the struggle against capitalism and the state would be possible without ideas of a future, and that we should only sustain the struggle endlessly in response to each contradiction arising from a real situation. The collapse of the socialist bloc in 1989 compelled me to change my stance. Until then, I, as many others, had been rebuking Marxist states and communist parties; that criticism had unwittingly taken for granted their solid existence and the appearance that they would endure forever. As long as they survived, we could feel we had done something just by negating them. When they collapsed, I realized that my critical stance had been paradoxically relying on their being. I came to feel that I had to state something positive. It was at this conjuncture that I began to confront Kant. Kant is commonly—and not wrongly—known as a critic of metaphysics. For the development of this line, the influence of Hume’s skeptical empiricism was large; Kant confessed that it was the idea that first interrupted his dogmatic slumber.2 But what is overlooked is that at the time he wrote Critique of Pure Reason, metaphysics was unpopular and even disdained. In the preface, he expressed his regrets: “There was a time when metaphysics was called the queen of all sciences, and if the will be taken for the deed, it deserved this title of honor, on account of the preeminent importance of its object. Now, in accordance with the fashion of the age, the queen proves despised on all sides.”3 It follows that for Kant, the primary
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task of critique was to recover metaphysics’ proper function. This in turn charged Kant with the critique of Hume, who had once so radically stimulated him. I now want to reconsider the relationship between Kant and Hume in the context of the current debate. During the 1980s, a revival of Kant was a discernible phenomenon. In Hannah Arendt’s pioneering work, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, and in Jean-François Lyotard’s L’enthousiasme: La critique kantienne de l’histoire, the return to Kant meant a rereading of Critique of Judgment. The point taken was that ‘universality’—a sine qua non for the judgment of taste—cannot be achieved, in reality, among a multitude of conflicting subjects. At best what one gets is a ‘common sense’ that regulates conflicting tastes case by case. This work appeared to be drastically different from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, which assumed a transcendental subjectivity that watches over universality (a reading that I examine in the following chapters.) The political implications of this new appreciation of Kant were clear, not excepting those of Habermas, who sought to reconsider reason as “communicative rationality”: It was a criticism of communism qua ‘metaphysics’. Marxism has been accused of being rationalist and teleological in its attempt to realize the grand narrative. Stalinism was indeed a consequence of this tendency: The party of intellectuals led the populace by reason embodying the law of history, and thus the infamous tragedy. In opposition to this, the power of reason has been questioned, the superiority of intellectuals has been denied, and the teleology of history negated. The reexamination of Marxism has involved public consensus and negotiation among multiple language games as opposed to the central control of reason, and heterogeneity of experience or complexity of causality as opposed to a rationalist (metaphysical) view of history; on the other hand, the present, which has hitherto been sacrificed by telos, is reaffirmed in its qualitative heterogeneity (or in the sense of Bergsonian duration). I, too, was part of this vast tendency—called deconstruction, or the archaeology of knowledge, and so on—which I realized later could have critical impact only while Marxism actually ruled the people of many nation-states. In the 1990s, this tendency lost its impact, having become mostly a mere agent of the real deconstructive movement of
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capitalism. Skeptical relativism, multiple language games (or public consensus), aesthetic affirmation of the present, empirical historicism, appreciation of subcultures (or cultural studies), and so forth lost their most subversive potencies and hence became the dominant, ruling thought. Today, these have become official doctrine in the most conservative institutions in economically advanced nationstates. All in all, this tendency can be summarized as the appreciation of empiricism (including aestheticism) against rationalism. In this sense, it has become increasingly clear that the return to Kant in recent years has actually been a return to Hume. Meanwhile, it was in the effort of going beyond the empiricist tendency—as a critique of Hume—that I began to read Kant. This, to state it outright, is a project to reconstruct the metaphysics called communism. It was Kant who provided the most lucid insight into metaphysics’ proper role and the inseparable and inevitable tie between faith and reason. “Thus I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith; and the dogmatism of metaphysics, i.e., the prejudice that without criticism reason can make progress in metaphysics, is the true source of all unbelief conflicting with morality, which unbelief is always very dogmatic.”4 With this statement, it is not that Kant sought to recover religion per se; what he affirmed was the aspect of religion that tends toward morality, encouraging us to be moral. In contrast to mainstream Marxists, Marx persistently refused to consider communism as “constitutive idea (or constitutive use of reason)” in Kant’s sense, and he rarely spoke of the future. Thus in The German Ideology, Marx made an addition to the text written by Engels: “Communism for us is not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the now existing premise.”5 Therefore, the dogmatization of communism as a “scientific socialism” was much the kind of metaphysics Marx refuted. But this is not contradictory to the fact that he nurtured communism as “regulative idea (regulative use of reason).” So the young Marx stressed the categorical imperative: “The criticism of religion ends with the teaching that man is the highest being for man, hence
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with the categorical imperative to overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being.”6 For him, communism was a Kantian categorical imperative, that is, practical and moral par excellence. He maintained this stance his whole life, though later he concentrated his efforts on the theoretical search for the historico-material conditions that would enable the categorical imperative to be realized. Meanwhile, the mainstream Marxists, having derided morality and advocated “historical necessity” and “scientific socialism,” ended up constituting a new type of slave society. This was nothing short of what Kant called “all pretensions of reason in general [aller Anmaßungen der Vernunft überhaupt].” Distrust of communism has spread, and the responsibility for “the true source of all unbelief” lies with dogmatic Marxism. One cannot and should not forget the miseries of the twentieth century caused by communism, nor should one take this mistake simply as misfortune. From that juncture onward we have not been allowed to advocate ‘Idea’ of any kind—not even of the New Left, which came into existence by negating Stalinism—with a naive positivity. That is why “in accordance with the fashion of the age, [communism] proves despised on all ideas.” Yet at the same time, other kinds of dogmatism are flourishing in various costumes. Furthermore, while intellectuals of advanced nations have been expressing their distrust of morality, various kinds of religious fundamentalism have begun to gain strength all over the world, and the intellectuals cannot simply scorn them. For these reasons, beginning in the 1990s, my stance, if not my thinking itself, changed fundamentally. I came to believe that theory should not remain in the critical scrutiny of the status quo but should propose something positive to change the reality. At the same time, I reconfirmed the difficulty of doing so. Social democracy to me would not offer any promising prospect, and it was finally around the turn of the new century that I began to see a ray of hope that led me to organize the New Associationist Movement (NAM) in Japan. Certainly innumerable real movements that seek to abolish the status quo are occurring in all corners of the world, inevitably, under the procession of the globalization of world capitalism. But, in order to avoid the repetition of bygone mistakes, I insist that a transcritical recognition is necessary.
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That is to say, a new practice cannot be initiated without a thorough scrutiny of existing theories; and the theories to which I refer are not limited to political ones. I became convinced that there is nothing that is unaffected by or outside of Kantian and Marxian critiques. In this project, henceforth, I did not hesitate to dive into all possible domains including the theory of mathematical foundations, linguistics, aesthetics, and ontological philosophy (i.e., existentialism). I dealt with problems with which only specialists are customarily concerned. Furthermore, part I (on Kant) and part II (on Marx) were written as independent reflections, so their rapport might be ostensible. For this reason, I had to write a rather long introduction in order to make the connection visible, if not to summarize the whole book. Notwithstanding the complexity and variety of the theoretical subjects, however, I believe that the book is accessible to the general reader. The book is based upon a series of essays that were published in the Japanese literary monthly Gunzo, beginning in 1992. They were published alongside novels, which is to say that I did not write them in the enclosure of the academy and scholarly discourse. I wrote them for people who are not grounded in special domains. Thus the nature of the book is not academic. There are many academic papers on Kant and Marx that carefully research historical data, point out their theoretical shortcomings, and propose minute and sophisticated doctrines. I am not interested in doing that. I would not dare to write a book to reveal shortcomings; I would rather write one to praise, and only for praiseworthy works. So it is that I do not quibble with Kant and Marx. I sought to read their texts, focusing on the center of their potencies. But I think that as a consequence no book is more critical of them than this. The main target of the book is the trinity of Capital-Nation-State. I have to admit, however, that my analyses of state and nation are not fully developed; the considerations on the economy and revolution of the underdeveloped (agriculture-centered) and developing countries are not sufficient. These are my future projects. Finally, I include here only a small portion of my reflections on the particular historical context of Japan—the state, its modernity, and its Marxism—in which my thinking was fostered. I plan to deal
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with these in a sequel. In fact, I owe much of my thinking to the “tradition” of Japanese Marxism, and Transcritique was nurtured in the difference between Japanese and Western as well as other Asian contexts, and in my own singular experience of oscillating and tranversing between them. In this volume, however, I did not write about these experiences, but rather expressed them only in line with the texts of Kant and Marx.
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Acknowledgments
In writing this book, I was supported by many people. I would especially like to thank the translators, Sabu Kohso and Judy Geib. I also would like to thank Geoff Waite, who checked the English translation and gave us invaluable suggestions; Fredric Jameson and Masao Miyoshi have given me enduring moral support and constructive advice. I owe Akira Asada, Paul Anderer, Mitsuo Sekii, Indra Levy, the late Yuji Naito, and Lynne Karatani for providing practical and patient encouragement for the realization of the book.
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Introduction: What Is Transcritique?
Kantian philosophy is called transcendental, as distinct from transcendent. Simply stated, the transcendental approach seeks to cast light on the unconscious structure that precedes and shapes experience. And yet, can’t it be said that from its very inception, philosophy itself has always taken just such an introspective approach? If that is the case, then what distinguishes Kantian reflection? Kant’s unique way of reflection appeared in his early work, Dreams of a Visionary. Kant wrote, “Formerly, I viewed human common sense only from the standpoint of my own; now I put myself into the position of another’s reason outside of myself, and observe my judgments, together with their most secret causes, from the point of view of others. It is true that the comparison of both observations results in pronounced parallax, but it is the only means of preventing the optical delusion, and of putting the concept of the power of knowledge in human nature into its true place.” What Kant is saying here is not the platitude that one should see things not only from one’s own point of view, but also from the point of view of others. In fact, it is the reverse. If one’s subjective view is an optical delusion, then the objective perspective or the viewpoint of others cannot but be an optical delusion as well. And if the history of philosophy is nothing but the history of such reflections, then the history of philosophy is itself nothing but optical delusion. The reflection that Kant brought about is the kind that reveals that reflections in the past were optical delusions. This Kantian reflection as a critique of reflection is
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engendered by “pronounced parallax” between the subjective viewpoint and the objective viewpoint. To explain, take an example of a technology that did not exist in Kant’s time. Reflection is often spoken of by way of the metaphor of seeing one’s image in the mirror. In the mirror, one sees one’s own face from the perspective of the other. But in today’s context, photography must also be taken into consideration. Compare the two. Although the mirror image can be identified with the perspective of the other, there is still certain complicity with regard to one’s own viewpoint. After all, people can see their own image in the mirror as they like, while the photograph looks relentlessly “objective.” Of course, the photograph itself is an image (optical delusion) as well. What counts then is the “pronounced parallax” between the mirror image and photographic image. At the time photography was invented, it is said that those who saw their own faces in pictures could not help but feel a kind of abhorrence—just like hearing a tape recording of one’s own voice for the first time. People gradually become accustomed to photographs. In other words, people eventually come to see the image in the photograph as themselves. The crux here is the pronounced parallax that people presumably experience when they “first” see their photographic image. Philosophy begins with introspection as mirror, and that is where it ends. No attempt to introduce the perspective of the other can change this essential fact. In the first place, philosophy began with Socrates’ “dialogue.” But the dialogue itself is trapped within the mirror, so to speak. People alternately criticize Kant for having remained in a subjectivist self-scrutiny, or search for a way out of that in the Critique of Judgment’s introduction of plural subjects. But the truly revolutionary event in philosophy had already occurred in Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant attempted to obliterate the complicity inherent in introspection precisely by confining himself to the introspective framework. Here one can observe the attempt to introduce an objectivity (qua otherness) that is totally alien to the conventional space of introspection mirror. Kant has been criticized for his subjective method, lacking in the other. But in fact, his thought is always haunted by the perspective of the other. Critique of Pure Reason is not written in the self-critical manner of Dreams of a
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Visionary. And yet, “the pronounced parallax” has not disappeared. This emerged in the form of antinomy, which exposes the fact that both thesis and antithesis are nothing more than “optical delusions.” In part I, I reread Kant from this perspective. The same is true of part II. For instance, in The German Ideology Marx criticized the young Hegelians—a group to which he himself had belonged just months before, when he was exiled to France. To Engels, this book presented a new view of history that replaced German idealism with an economic purview. German ideology was nothing more than the discourse of a backward nation, attempting to realize conceptually that which had already become a reality in the advanced nation of England. But for Marx, it was by stepping outside of Germany’s ideology for the first time that he was able to experience an awakening, accompanied by a certain shock. This was to see things neither from his own viewpoint, nor from the viewpoint of others, but to face the reality that is exposed through difference (parallax). When he moved to England, Marx devoted himself to the critique of classical economics, which was then dominant. In Germany, Marx had already carried out the critique of capitalism and classical economics. What was it that endowed Marx with the new critical perspective that came to fruition in Capital? It was an occurrence that, according to the discourse of classical economics, could only be an accident or mistake: the economic crisis, or more precisely, the pronounced parallax brought about by it. What is important is the fact that Marx’s critique was always born from migration and the pronounced parallax that results from it. Hegel criticized Kant’s subjectivism and emphasized objectivity. But in Hegel, the pronounced parallax discovered by Kant is extinguished. Likewise, the pronounced parallax discovered by Marx was extinguished by Engels and other Marxists. As a result, one is left with an image of Kant and Marx as thinkers who constructed solid, immovable systems. A closer reading, however, reveals that they were in fact practicing constant transposition, and that the move to different discursive systems was what brought about the pronounced parallax. This is obvious in the case of the exiled Marx, but the same thing can be observed in Kant as well. Kant was not an exile in spatial terms—he never moved away from his hometown of Königsberg.
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Rather, it was his stance that made him a kind of exile, a man independent from the state: Kant rejected a promotion to a post in Berlin, the center of state academia, instead insisting on cosmopolitanism. Kant is generally understood to have executed the transcendental critique from a place that lies between rationalism and empiricism. However, upon reading his strangely self-deprecating Dreams of a Visionary Explained by Dreams of Metaphysics, one finds it impossible to say that he was simply thinking from a place between these two poles. Instead, it is the “parallax” between positions that acts. Kant, too, performed a critical oscillation: He continuously confronted the dominant rationalism with empiricism, and the dominant empiricism with rationalism. The Kantian critique exists within this movement itself. The transcendental critique is not some kind of stable third position. It cannot exist without a transversal and transpositional movement. It is for this reason that I have chosen to name the dynamic critiques of Kant and Marx—which are both transcendental and transversal—“transcritique.” According to Louis Althusser, Marx made an epistemological break in The German Ideology. But in my transcritical understanding, the break did not occur once, but many times, and this one in particular was not the most significant. It is generally thought that Marx’s break in The German Ideology was the establishment of historical materialism. But in fact that was pioneered by Engels, who wrote the main body of the book. One must therefore look at Marx as a latecomer to the idea; he came to it because of his obsession with a seemingly outmoded problem (to Engels)—the critique of religion. Thus Marx says: “For Germany the criticism of religion is in the main complete, and criticism of religion is the premise of all criticism.”1 He conducted a critique of state and capital as an extension of the critique of religion. In other words, he persistently continued the critique of religion under the names of state and capital. (And this was not merely an application of the Feuerbachian theory of self-alienation that he later abandoned.) The development of industrial capitalism made it possible to see previous history from the vantage point of production. So it is that Adam Smith could already pose a stance akin to historical materialism by the mid-eighteenth century. But historical materialism does
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not have the potency to elucidate the capitalist economy that created it. Capitalism, I believe, is nothing like the economic infrastructure. It is a certain force that regulates humanity beyond its intentionality, a force that divides and recombines human beings. It is a religio-generic entity. This is what Marx sought to decode for the whole of his life. “A commodity appears at first sight an extremely obvious, trivial thing. But its analysis brings out that it is a very strange thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties.”2 Here Marx is no longer questioning and problematizing metaphysics or theology in the narrow sense. Instead, he grasps the knotty problematic as “an extremely obvious, trivial thing.” Thinking this way about Marx, one realizes that an equivalent of historical materialism—or even what is known as Marxism for that matter—could have existed without Marx, while the text Capital could not have existed if not for him. The ‘Marxian turn’—the kind that is truly significant and that one cannot overlook—occurred in his middle career, in the shift from Grundrisse or A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy to Capital: it was the introduction of the theory of “value form.” What provoked Marx’s radical turn, which came after he finished writing Grundrisse, was his initiation to skepticism: It was Bailey’s critique of Ricardo’s labor theory of value. According to David Ricardo, exchange value is inherent in a commodity, which is expressed by money. In other words, money is just an illusion (Schein in Kant). Based upon this recognition, both Ricardian Leftists and Proudhon insisted on abolishing currency and on replacing it with the labor money or the exchange bank. Criticizing them as he did, however, Marx was still relying on the labor theory of value (akin to Ricardo). On the other hand, Bailey criticized the Ricardian position by claiming that the value of a commodity exists only in its relationship with other commodities, and therefore the labor value that Ricardo insists is inherent in a commodity is an illusion. Samuel Bailey’s skepticism is similar to Hume’s criticism that there is nothing like a Cartesian ego cogito; there are just many egos. To this position, Kant responded that yes, an ego is just an illusion, but functioning there is the transcendental apperception X. But what one knows as metaphysics is that which considers the X as
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something substantial. Nevertheless, one cannot really escape from the drive [Trieb] to take it as an empirical substance in various contexts. If so, it is possible to say that an ego is not just an illusion, but a transcendental illusion. Kant achieved this position later in his life; but first his dogmatic slumber had to be interrupted by Hume’s skepticism. And in this precise manner, Marx must have been severely stricken by Bailey’s skepticism. But, again, like Kant, Marx developed this thought into another dimension, which I would like to call the “transcendental reflection on value.” Classical economics held that each commodity internalizes a labor value. But, in reality, commodities can have values only after their relationship is synthesized by money, and each one of them is given its value. In reality only prices exist as the indicators of the mutual relations between commodities. Thus Bailey stressed that the value of a commodity exists only thanks to its relationship with other commodities. But Bailey did not question what expresses price: money. In other words, he did not question what relates commodities to each other and composes the system: that is, money as the general equivalent. Money in this sense is totally irrelevant to money as substance like gold or silver; rather, it is like a Kantian transcendental apperception X, as it were. The stance to see it in relation to its materiality is what Marx called fetishism. After all, money as substance is an illusion, but more correctly, it is a transcendental illusion in the sense that it is hardly possible to discard it. For mercantilists and bullionists—the predecessors of classical economics—money was an object to be revered. This was evidently the fetishism of money. Scorning this, classical economists posited the substance of value in labor in and of itself. But this so-called labor theory of value did not resolve the enigma of money; rather, it reinforced and sustained it. Both Ricardo—the advocate of the labor theory of value—and Bailey—its radical critic (and the unacknowledged primogenitor of neoclassical economics)—managed to erase money only superficially. As Marx said, in times of crisis, people still want money suddenly, going back to bullionism. The Marx of Capital stands on the side of the mercantilist, rather than Ricardo or Bailey. By criticizing both Ricardo and Bailey on such a premise, his critique elucidated a form that constitutes the commodity economy.
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In other words, what Marx focused on was not the objects themselves but the relational system in which the objects are placed. According to Marx, if gold becomes money, that is not because of its immanent material characteristics, but because it is placed in the value form. The value form—consisting of relative value form and equivalent form—makes an object that is placed in it money. Anything—anything—that is exclusively placed in the general equivalent form becomes money; that is, it achieves the right to attain anything in exchange (i.e., its owner can attain anything in exchange). People consider a certain thing (i.e., gold) as sublime, only because it fills the spot of general equivalent. Crucially, Marx begins his reflections on capital with the miser, the one who hoards the right to exchange—in the strict sense, the right to stand in the position of equivalent form—at the expense of use. The desire for money or the right to exchange is different from the desire for commodities themselves. I would call this ‘drive [Trieb]’ in the Freudian sense, to distinguish it from ‘desire’. To put it another way, the drive of a miser is not to own an object, but to stand in the position of equivalent form, even at the expense of the object. The drive is metaphysical in nature; the misers’ goal is to ‘accumulate riches in heaven’, as it were. One tends to scorn the drive of the miser. But capital’s drive to accumulate is essentially the same. Capitalists are nothing but “rational misers” to use Marx’s term. Buying a commodity from someone somewhere and selling it to anyone anywhere, capitalists seek to reproduce and expand their position to exchange, and the purpose is not to attain many ‘uses’. That is to say that the motive drive of capitalism is not in people’s desire. Rather, it is the reverse; for the purpose of attaining the right to exchange, capital has to create people’s desire. This drive of hoarding the right to exchange originates in the precariousness inherent in exchange among others. Historical materialists aim to describe how the relationships between nature and humans as well as among humans themselves transformed/developed throughout history. What is lacking in this endeavor is any reflection upon the capitalist economy that organizes the transformation/development. And to this end, one must take into consideration the dimension of exchange, and why the exchange inexorably takes the form of value. Physiocrats and classical
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economists had the conviction that they could see all aspects of social relations transparently from the vantage point of production. The social exchange, however, is consistently opaque and thus appears as an autonomous force which we can hardly abolish. Engels’s conviction that we should control the anarchic drive of capitalist production and transform it into a planned economy was little more than an extension of classical economists’ thought. And Engels’s stance was, of course, the source of centralist communism. One of the most crucial transpositions/breaks in Marx’s theory of value form lies in its attention to use value or the process of circulation. Say a certain thing becomes valuable only when it has use value to other people; a certain thing—no matter how much labor time is required to make it—has no value if not sold. Marx technically abolished the conventional division between exchange value and use value. No commodity contains exchange value as such. If it fails to relate to others, it will be a victim of “sickness unto death” in the sense of Kierkegaard. Classical economists believe that a commodity is a synthesis between use value and exchange value. But this is only an ex post facto recognition. Lurking behind this synthesis as event is a “fatal leap [salto mortale].” Kierkegaard saw the human being as a synthesis between finity and infinity, reminding us that what is at stake in this synthesis is inevitably ‘faith’. In commodity exchange, the equivalent religious moment appears as ‘credit’. Credit, the treaty of presuming that a commodity can be sold in advance, is an institutionalization of postponing the critical moment of selling a commodity. And the commodity economy, constructed as it is upon credit, inevitably nurtures crisis. Classical economics saw all economic phenomena from the vantage point of production, and insisted that it had managed to demystify everything (other than production) by reasoning that it was all secondary and illusory. As a result, it is mastered by the circulation and credit that it believes itself to have demystified, and thus it can never elucidate why crisis occurs. Crisis is the appearance of the critical moment inherent in the commodity economy, and as such it functions as the most radical critique of the political economy. In this light, it may be said that pronounced parallax brought by crisis led Marx to Capital.
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In the preface to the second edition of Capital, Marx “openly avowed [himself] to be the pupil of that mighty thinker” Hegel.3 In fact, Marx sought to describe the capitalist economy as if it were a self-realization of capital qua the Hegelian Spirit. Notwithstanding the Hegelian descriptive style, however, Capital distinguishes itself from Hegel’s philosophy in its motivation. The end of Capital is never the “absolute Spirit.” Capital reveals the fact that capital, though organizing the world, can never go beyond its own limit. It is a Kantian critique of the illcontained drive of capital/reason to self-realize beyond its limit. And all the enigmas of capital’s drive are inscribed in the theory of value form. The theory of value form is not a historical reflection that follows exchange from barter to the formation of money. Value form is a kind of form that people are not aware of when they are placed within the monetary economy; this is the form that is discovered only transcendentally. In the reverse of his descriptive order— from form of value, money form to miser to merchant capital to industrial capital—one has to read Marx’s retrospective query from the latter to the former. Classical economists rebuked the businesses of bullionists, mercantilists, and merchant capitalists of the previous age and denounced their economic role. They argued that while they earn profit from the difference of unequal exchange, industrial capital makes money from fair, equal exchange: it derives profit from the division of labor and cooperative work. In contrast, Marx thought of capital by returning to the model of merchant capital. He saw capital in the general formula: Money-Commodity-Money. This is to see capital essentially as merchant capital. Capital under this light is a self-increasing, self-reproductive money. This is the movement M-C-M itself. The case of industrial capital—which is usually considered to be totally different—differs only in that the role of C is a complex that consists of raw material, means of production, and labor-power commodity. And this last, labor-power commodity, is truly inherent in industrial capital. For industrial capital earns surplus value not only by making workers work, but also by making them buy back—in totality—what they produce. Classical economists’ claim that merchant capital (or mercantilism) conducts unequal exchange misses the point. The fact is, when merchant capital attains surplus value from the exchange between
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different value systems, each trade—either M-C or C-M—is strictly based upon equal exchange. Merchant capital attains surplus value from spatial difference. Meanwhile, industrial capital attains surplus value by incessantly producing new value systems temporally—that is, with technological innovation. This categorical division does not prevent industrial capital from attaining surplus value from the activity of merchant capital. Whatever the kind, capital is not choosy in how it attains surplus value; it always attains surplus value from the difference of value systems by equal exchange within each deal. But, one of the points I want to pose is that how surplus value is earned—in contrast to how profit is earned—is strictly invisible, and the whole mechanism remains in a black box, as it were. Thus invisibility is also a condition for the struggle within the process of circulation. It is troubling that many Marxists posit surplus value only in the ‘exploitation’ of the production process rather than in the differences between value systems. These Marxists see the relationship between capitalists and wage workers as a (disguised) extension of that between feudal lord and serfs and they believe that this was Marx’s idea. But it originated in the Ricardian Socialists, who drew from Ricardo’s theory of profit the idea that profit making is equal to the exploitation of surplus labor. This became the central theory of the English labor movement in the early nineteenth century. Though it is true that Marx himself said a similar thing time and again and it may entertain a vulgar ear, it should be distinguished from that aspect of Marx that actually elucidated the enigma of surplus value. The best it can do is to explain absolute surplus value (achieved by the elongation of the labor day), but not relative surplus value (achieved by the improvement of labor productivity)—the particular characteristic of industrial capitalism. What is more, seeing the relationship between capitalist and wage worker in comparison with the relationship between feudal lord and serf is seriously misleading: first, it results in envisioning the abolishment of the capitalist economy from the vantage point of the master/slave dialectic; and second, it leads to centralizing the struggle in production process by ignoring the circulation process. The Marx of Capital, in contrast, stresses the priority of the circulation process. In the manner of Kant, Marx points out an antinomy: He
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says, on the one hand, that surplus value (for industrial capital) cannot be attained in the process of production in itself, and, on the other hand, that it cannot be attained in the process of circulation in itself. Hence, “Hic Rhodus, hic salta!” Nevertheless, this antinomy can be undone, that is, only by proposing that the surplus value (for industrial capital) comes from the difference of value systems in the circulation process (like in merchant capital), and yet that the difference is created by technological innovation in the production process. Capital has to discover and create the difference incessantly. This is the driving force for the endless technological innovation in industrial capitalism; it is not that the productionism comes from people’s hope for the progress of civilization as such. It is widely believed that the development of the capitalist economy is caused by our material desires and faith in progress; so it is that it would always seem possible to change our mentality and begin to control the reckless development rationally; and further, it would seem possible to abolish capitalism itself, when we wish. The drive of capitalism, however, is deeply inscribed in our society and culture; or more to the point, our society and culture are created by it; it will never stop by itself. Neither will it be stopped by any rational control or by state intervention. Marx’s Capital does not reveal the necessity of revolution. As the Japanese Marxian political economist, Kozo Uno (1897–1977) pointed out, it only presents the necessity of crisis.4 And crisis, even though it is the peculiar illness of the capitalist economy, is the catalyst for its incessant development; it is part of the whole mechanism. The capitalist economy cannot eradicate the plague, yet neither will it perish because of it. Environmentalists warn that the capitalist economy will cause unprecedented disasters in the future, yet it is not that these disasters will terminate the capitalist economy. Also, it is impossible that capitalism will collapse by the reverse dynamic, when, in the future, commodification is pushed to its limit—it is impossible that it would die a natural death. Finally, the only solution most of us can imagine today is state regulation of capital’s reckless movement. But we should take notice of the fact that the state, like capital, is driven by its own certain autonomous power—which won’t be dissolved by the globalization of
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capitalism. This autonomy should nevertheless be understood in distinction from the sense of historical materialism’s doctrine that state and nation assume superstructure in relationship with economic base; they are relatively autonomous to, though determined by, it. First of all, as I have suggested, the very notion that the capitalist economy is base or infrastructure is itself questionable. As I have tried to elucidate in the book, the world organized by money and credit is rather one of illusion, with a peculiarly religious nature. Saying this from the opposite view, even though state and nation are composed by communal illusion, precisely like capitalism, they inevitably exist thanks to their necessary grounds. Simply put, they are founded on exchanges that are different from the commodity exchange. So it is that no matter how many times one stresses their nature of being “imagined communities,”5 it is impossible to dissolve them. As young Marx pointed out vis-à-vis another bind: “To abolish religion as the illusory happiness of the people is to demand the real happiness. The demand to give up illusions about the existing state of affairs is the demand to give up a state of affairs which needs illusions. The criticism of religion is therefore in embryo the criticism of the vale of tears, the halo of which is religion.”6 The same can be said of state and nation. After reflecting upon “value form,” the Marx of Capital seems to explicate the historical genesis of commodity exchange in the chapter “Process of Exchange.” There he stresses that it began in between communities: “The exchange of commodities begins where communities have their boundaries, at their points of contact with other communities, or with members of the latter. However, as soon as products have become commodities in the external relations of a community, they also, by reaction, become commodities in the internal life of the community.”7 Despite its appearance, this depiction is not strictly of a historical situation, but the form of exchange that is discovered and stipulated only by a transcendental retrospection. Furthermore, Marx’s statement, which I quoted earlier, is in fact based upon the premise that there are other forms of exchange. Commodity exchange is a peculiar form of exchange among other exchanges. First, there is exchange within a community—a reciprocity of gift and return. Though based upon mutual aid, it also
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imposes the community’s code—if one does not return, one will be ostracized—and exclusivity. Second, the original exchange between communities is plunder. And rather it is this plunder that is the basis for other exchanges: For instance, commodity exchange begins only at the point where mutual plunder is given up. In this sense, plunder is deemed a type of exchange. For instance, in order to plunder continuously, it is necessary to protect the plundered from other plunderers, and even nurture economico-industrial growth. This is the prototype of the state. In order to keep on robbing, and robbing more and more, the state guarantees the protection of land and the reproduction of labor power by redistribution. It also promotes agricultural production by public undertakings such as regulating water distribution through public water works. It follows that the state does not appear to be abetting a system of robbery: Farmers think of paying tax as a return (duty) for the protection of the lord; merchants pay tax as a return for the protection of their exchange and commerce. Finally, the state is represented as a supra-class entity of reason. Plunder and redistribution are thus forms of exchange. Inasmuch as human social relations entail the potential of violence, these forms are inevitably present. And the third form is what Marx calls the commodity exchange between communities. As I analyze in detail in the book, this exchange engenders surplus value or capital, though with mutual consent; and it is definitively different from the exchange of plunder/redistribution. Furthermore, and this is the final question of this book, a fourth kind of exchange exists: association. This is a form of mutual aid, yet neither exclusive nor coercive like community. Associationism can be considered as an ethicoeconomic form of human relation that can appear only after a society once passes through the capitalist market economy. It is thought that Proudhon was the first to have theorized it; according to my reading, however, Kant’s ethics already contained it. In his famous book, Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson said that the nation-state is a marriage between nation and state that were originally different in kind. This was certainly an important suggestion. Yet it should not be forgotten that there was another marriage between two entities that were totally heterogeneous—the
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marriage between state and capital. In the feudal ages, state, capital, and nation were clearly separated. They existed distinctively as feudal states (lords, kings, and emperors), cities, and agrarian communities, all based upon different principles of exchange. States were based upon the principle of plunder and redistribution. The agrarian communities that were mutually disconnected and isolated were dominated by states; but, within themselves, they were autonomous, based upon the principle of mutual aid and reciprocal exchange. Between these communities, markets or cities grew; these were based upon monetary exchange relying on mutual consent. What crumbled the feudal system was the total osmosis of the capitalist market economy. But the economic process was realized only in the political form, of the absolutist monarchy. The absolutist monarchical states conspired with the merchant class, monopolized the means of violence by toppling feudal lords (aristocracy), and finally abolished feudal domination (extra-economic domination) entirely. This was the very story of the wedding between state and capital. Protected by the absolutist state, merchant capital (bourgeoisie) grew up and nurtured the identity of the nation for the sake of creating a unified market. Yet this was not all in terms of the formation of the nation. The agrarian communities, that were decomposed along with the permeation of the market economy and by the urbanized culture of enlightenment, had always existed on the foundation of the nation. While individual agrarian communities that had been autarkic and autonomous were decomposed by the osmosis of money, their communalities—mutual aid and reciprocity—themselves were recovered imaginarily within the nation. In contradistinction from what Hegel called the state of understanding (lacking spirit), or the Hobbesian state, the nation is grounded upon the empathy of mutual aid descending from agrarian communities. And this emotion consists of a feeling of indebtedness toward the gift, indicating that it comes out of the relation of exchange. It was amid the bourgeois revolution that these three were legally married. As in the trinity intoned in the French Revolution—liberty, equality, and fraternity—capital, state, and nation copulated and amalgamated themselves into a force forever after inseparable. Hence to be strict the modern state must be called the capitalist
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nation-state. They were made to be mutually complementary, reinforcing each other. When economic liberty becomes excessive and class conflict is sharpened, the state intervenes to redistribute wealth and regulate the economy, and at the same time, the emotion of national unity (mutual aid) fills up the cracks. When facing this fearless trinity, undermining one or the other does not work. If one attempts to overthrow capitalism alone, one has to adapt statism, or one is engulfed by nationalist empathy. It goes without saying that the former appeared as Stalinism and the latter as fascism. Seeing capitalist commodity exchange, nation, and state as forms of exchange is possible only from an economic stance. If the concept of economic infrastructure has significance, it is only in this sense. In the modern period, among the three principles of exchange, it was the commodity exchange that expanded and overpowered the others. Inasmuch as it operated within the trinity, however, it is impossible that the capitalist commodity exchange could monopolize the whole of human relationality. With respect to the reproduction of humans and nature, capital has no choice but to rely on the family and agrarian community; in this sense capital is essentially dependent upon the precapitalist mode of production. Herein exists the ground of the nation. On the other hand, while absolutist monarchs disappeared by bourgeois revolutions, the state itself has remained. The state can never be dissolved and subsumed into the representatives of national sovereignty (i.e., government). For the state, no matter what kind, always exists as the bare sovereign vis-à-vis other states (if not always to its nation); in crises (wars), a powerful leader (the subject of determination) is always called for, as evidenced in Bonapartism and fascism. One frequently hears today that the nation-state will be gradually decomposed by the globalization of capitalism (neo-liberalism). This is impossible. When individual national economies are threatened by the global market, they demand the protection (redistribution) of the state and/or bloc economy, at the same time as appealing to national cultural identity. So it is that any counteraction to capital must also be one targeted against the state and nation (community). The capitalist nation-state is fearless because of its makeup. The denial of one ends up being reabsorbed into the ring
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of the trinity by the power of the other two. Countermovements in the past, such as corporatism, welfare society, and social democracy, resulted in the perfection of the ring rather than its abolition. Marx thought that the socialist revolution would be possible only in the most advanced country, England, because socialism was supposed to be possible only in the stage where bourgeois society was fully ripe, ripe enough to decompose. Nonetheless, in reality it could not have seemed less likely to him that it would occur. In the particular situation where universal suffrage was installed and labor unions strengthened, revolution seemed like it had receded even farther into the distance. What really receded, however, was the revolution that was imagined from the vantage point of and as an extension of bourgeois revolution; the fact was that from that juncture on, a different kind of revolution came to be called for. One should not forget that it was under such circumstances that Marx came to grips with the task of writing Capital. His recognition that a criticism of capitalism would no longer suffice made him write such a monumental piece. After Marx’s death, as the social democratic party in Germany made remarkable advances, Engels came to abandon the classical concept of violent revolution and believe in the possibility of revolution via parliamentary means. This was the path to social democracy, in which the state manages the capitalist economy and redistributes the wealth to the working class. Next, Engels’s disciple Bernstein eliminated the last dregs of the “revolution” fantasy that were still present in Engels. Meanwhile, Marxism was established along the line of Leninism, which rejects such visions of social democracy. However, at the end of the twentieth century, the left has ultimately returned to Bernstein’s way of thinking. Clearly, this is to completely lose sight of the critical need to supersede (aufheben) the capitalist nation-state. In World War I, social democrats not only failed to prevent the war, but also got involved in the frenzy of nationalism. And it is quite possible that they will repeat the same faux pas in the future. Yet, as all of us know well by now, Leninism cannot replace it. Is there an alternative? I would posit that it can be found in Capital, the book Marx wrote as he deliberately remained in England where the possibility of classical revolution was fading away. As I have
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explained, the trinity of capital, nation, and state is rooted in the necessary forms that human exchange could assume, and therefore, it is nearly impossible to get out of the ring. Marx in Capital, however, discovered an exit, the fourth type of exchange: association. The Marxists of the late nineteenth century overlooked the communism of later Marx, the idea that an association of associations would replace the Capital-Nation-State. In The Civil War in France— written as an address to the general council of the international working men’s association—Marx wrote: “If united co-operative societies are to regulate national production upon a common plan, thus taking it under their own control, and putting an end to the constant anarchy and periodical convulsions which are the fatality of capitalist production—what else, gentlemen, would it be but Communism, ‘possible’ Communism?”9 The association of producers’/ consumers’ cooperatives has been conceptualized and practiced by socialists since Robert Owen, and by Proudhonist anarchists. In Capital, too, Marx considers cooperatives in comparison with stock companies and highly appreciates them: While stock companies are only passive abolition [aufhebung] of the capitalist system, the positive abolition is discovered in the cooperative of which stockholders are workers themselves.10 But Marx saw their limits as well. They are destined either to fail in the fierce competition with capital, or to turn themselves into stock companies. For this reason, both Lenin and Engels ignored them or, at best, marginalized them as subordinate to labor movements. On the other hand, and notwithstanding the limits, it was precisely in them that Marx saw the possibility of communism. Bakunin attacked Marx as a centralist thinker by associating him with the state socialist Lassalle. He either did not know or ignored the fact that Marx was critical of Lassalle’s direction (the Gotha Programme) to have the state protect and foster cooperative production. Marx was clear: “That the workers desire to establish the conditions for co-operative production on a social scale, and first of all on a national scale, in their own country, only means that they are working to transform the present conditions of production, and it has nothing in common with the foundation of co-operative societies with state aid. But as far as the present co-operative societies
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are concerned, they are of value only insofar as they are the independent creations of the workers and not protégés either of the government or of the bourgeois.”11 In other words, Marx is stressing that the association of cooperatives itself must take over the leadership from the state, in the place of state-led cooperative movements, whereby capital and state will wither away. And this kind of proposition of principle aside, Marx never said anything in particular about future prospects. All in all, communism for Marx was nothing but associationism, but inasmuch as it was so, he had to forge it by critiquing. Marx’s thinking fell between that of Lassalle and Bakunin. This oscillation allowed later generations to draw either stance from Marx’s thought. But what we should see here is less contradiction or ambiguity than Marx’s transcritique. What was clear to Marx was that it is impossible to counter the autonomous powers of the trinity by simply denouncing them. Based as they are upon certain necessities, they have autonomous powers. In other words, functioning as they are as transcendental apperception, not only are they irresolvable but also even revive stronger. To finally abolish the trinity, a deep scrutiny into (and critique of) them is required. Where can we find the clue to form the countermovement? This, I believe, is in the theory of value form in Capital. In the preface, Marx clarified his stance as follows: To prevent possible misunderstandings, let me say this. I do not by any means depict the capitalist and landowner in rosy colors. But individuals are dealt with here only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, the bearers [Träger] of particular class-relations and interests. My standpoint, from which the development of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for relations whose creature he remains, socially speaking, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them.12
The “economic categories” mentioned here signify the forms of value. Who are capitalists and proletariats is determined by where the individuals are placed: in either relative form of value or equivalent form. This is totally irrespective of what they think. This structuralist view was a necessity. Here Marx did not suffice with simply accusing capitalism of immorality; this is the essence of Marxian
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ethics. In Capital, there is no subjectivity. Even capitalists—especially those in stock companies—are agents of capital’s movement, but not subjects. The same is true of workers. So it is that people either read in Capital the (natural historical) law of history whereby a capitalist society gradually yet apodictically turns into a communist society, or sought motives of revolutionary acts in pre-Capital texts. As is evident, however, neither method worked. Concerning the former, it is totally impossible to assume that capitalism will end autotelically. In principle there cannot be a telos as such in natural history. Concerning the latter, what was discovered in those texts was, more or less, subsumed into a narrative of the Hegelian dialectic of master and slave: that is, proletariat qua slave will finally rebel against bourgeoisie qua master at the extremity of alienation and impoverishment. In this narrative, a workers’ rebellion is supposed to take place in the production process as a general strike, and this would lead to their seizure of state power. I cannot believe that Marx’s position at the time of writing Capital was such. If Capital has been rather shunned by Marxists themselves, it is more because of the difficulty in finding a prospect of revolution therein. And the new revolution would have to be different from those which could happen in various places of the world outside England and North America. Then, how is a revolution possible in the world where there seems to be no moment for subjective intervention to appear? The fact that in value form place determines the nature of the subject who occupies it nevertheless does not prevent capitalists from being subjective. Since capital itself is the subject of a selfreproductive movement, the agents—capitalists—can be active, and this activity is precisely that of money or the position of purchaser (the equivalent form). On the other hand, those who sell the laborpower commodity—workers—have no other choice but to be passive. In this relationality, it is only natural that they can only engage in an economic struggle wherein they negotiate with capitalists over their own commodity price. It is absolutely impossible to expect workers to stand up under such conditions. If this has occurred historically, it has been thanks to social chaos resulting from war, or a situation where employers were particularly villainous. But it is not that workers resistance against capital is totally hopeless. The
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movement of capital M-C-M—namely, the realization of surplus value—is dependent upon whether or not products are sold. And surplus value is realized in principle only by workers in totality buying back what they produce. In the production process, the relationship between capitalist and workers is certainly like that between master and slaves. But the process of capital’s metamorphosis (or transubstantiation) is not so one-dimensional as to be defined by that. Because at the end of the cycle, capital, too, has to stand in the position of selling (the relative form of value), and it is precisely at this moment and this moment only that workers are in the subjective position. This is the place where the commodities of capitalist production are sold—the place of consumption. This is the only place where workers in totality with purchasing power are in the buying position. Marx articulated this: “What precisely distinguishes capital from the master-slave relation is that the worker confronts him as consumer and possessor of exchange values, and that in the form of the possessor of money, in the form of money he becomes a simple center of circulation—one of its infinitely many centers, in which his specificity as worker is extinguished.”13 For capital, consumption is the place where surplus value is finally realized, and for this objective precisely, the only place where it is subordinated to the will of consumers/workers. In the monetary economy, buying and selling as well as production and consumption are separated. This introduces a split in the workers’ subject: as workers (the sellers of labor-power commodity) and consumers (the buyers of capitalist commodities). In consequence, it comes to appear as if corporations and consumers were the only subjects of economic activities. It also segregates the labor and consumers’ movements. In recent history, while labor movements have been stagnant, consumers’ movements have flourished, often incorporating issues of environmental protection, feminism, and minorities. Generally, they take the form of civil acts, and are not connected to, or are sometimes even antagonistic to, the labor movement. After all, though, consumers’ movements are laborers’ movements in transposition, and are important only inasmuch as they are so. Conversely, the labor movement could go beyond the bounds of its ‘specificity’ and become universal inasmuch as it self-consciously
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acts as a consumers’ movement. For, in fact, the process of consumption as a reproduction of labor-power commodity covers a whole range of fronts of our life-world, including child care, education, leisure, and community activities. But what is at stake here is obviously related to, yet clearly different from, the process of reproduction in the sense of Gramsci: the cultural ideological apparati such as family, school, church, and so forth. In this context, it is first and foremost the process of the reproduction of labor-power as a topos of ordeal for capital’s self-realization, and hence the position in which workers can finally be the subject. Marxists failed to grasp the transcritical moment where workers and consumers intersect. And in this sense, the anarcho-sandicalists, who opposed them, were the same. They both saw the specific class relation in the capitalist economy (capitalist and wage workers) as a version of that of feudal lord and serfs. They both believed that what had been evident in the feudal system came to be veiled under the capitalist commodity economy; therefore, the workers are supposed to stand up and overthrow the capitalist system according to the dialectic of master and slave. But in reality, workers do not stand up at all, because, they believe, the workers’ consciousness is reified by the commodity economy, and their task as the vanguard is to awaken workers from the daydream. They believe that the reification is caused by the seduction of consumerist society and/or manipulation by cultural hegemony. Thus, to begin with, what they should and can do is to critically elucidate the mechanism. Or to say it outright, that is the only business left for them today. What Fredric Jameson calls “the cultural turn” is a form of ‘despair’ inherent in the Marxist practice. There are various forms of the despair, but they are, more or less, all the result of production-process centrism. What about civil acts that overlap the consumption front? In keeping a distance from labor movements, they lack a penetrating stance toward the capitalist relation of production. They tend to be absorbed into the social democracy that, approving the market economy, seeks to correct its shortcomings through state regulations as well as redistribution of wealth. I said that Marx of Capital did not present an easy way out of capitalism. But, from the beginning, there is no way for Capital, the
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scrutiny of money that transforms into capital, to present a direct procedure for abolishing/sublating it. The Marxists after Engels, who read the theory of value form merely as an introduction, did not develop any account of money themselves. They imagined that the state regulation and planned economy would abolish the capitalist market economy, brushing aside the fact that abolishing the market economy would be equal to abolishing free exchanges of individuals. Their stance was based totally on the labor theory of value (of classical economics), that is, their vision totally belonged to the domain of the value system of capitalist economy. From this stance, the best we got was the vision of a society where everyone gets what he or she earns. They were blinded to the autonomous dimension of money that Marx tackled in Capital. As I have said, money is not merely a denominator of value, but a mediating function through which all individual commodities are exchanged, and through which the value-relation among all commodities is constantly adjusted and readjusted. For this precise reason, money exists as an organizer of the system of commodities, namely, a transcendental apperception X of human exchange. Certainly in the everyday market economy, money qua illusion is hypostatized. Due to fetishism, the movement of capital occurs as an auto-multiplication of money. Bourgeois economists stress the superiority of the market economy by veiling the aspect of capital’s movement. Yet one cannot abandon the market economy in general. It would result in a total loss. And again, there is no prospect of abolishing capital and state in social democracy that acknowledges but controls the capitalist market economy. The ultimate conclusion of Capital is the antinomy: money should exist; money should not exist. To supersede (aufheben) money equals the creation of a money that would fulfill the conflicting conditions. Marx said nothing about this possible money. All he did was critique Proudhon’s ideas of labor money and exchange bank. Proudhon, too, was based upon the labor theory of value; he sought to make a currency that purely valorizes labor time. Here there was a blind spot: Labor value is conditioned by the social exchanges via money; it is formed as value only after the fact of the exchange. That is to say, the social labor time qua substance of value is formed via money,
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which thus cannot replace money. Labor money would tacitly rely on the existing monetary economy; even if it tried to challenge the existing system, it would just be exchanged with the existing money for the difference in price with the market value. What it could do at best would be to neutralize money. Having this antinomy in mind, the most exciting example to me is LETS (Local Exchange Trading System), devised and practiced by Michael Linton since 1982. It is a multifaceted system of settlement where participants have their own accounts, register the wealth and service that they can offer in the inventory, conduct exchanges freely, and then the results are recorded in their accounts. In contrast to the currency of the state central bank, the currency of LETS is issued each time by those who receive the wealth or service from other participants. And it is so organized that the sum total of the gains and losses of everyone is zero. In this simple system exists a clue to solving the antinomy of money. When compared to the exchange of mutual aid in traditional communities and that of the capitalist commodity economy, the nature of LETS becomes clear. It is, on the one hand, similar to the system of mutual aid in the aspect that it does not impose high prices with high interest, but, on the other hand, closer to the market in that the exchange can occur between those who are mutually far apart and strangers. In contrast to the capitalist market economy, in LETS, money does not transform into capital, not simply because there is no interest, but because it is based upon the zero sum principle. It is organized so that, although exchanges occur actively, ‘money’ does not exist as a result. Therefore, the antinomy—money should exist and money should not exist—is solved. Speaking in the context of Marx’s theory of value form, the currency of LETS is a general equivalent, which however just connects all the wealth and services and does not become an autonomous entity. The fetish of money does not occur. In LETS, there is no need to accumulate money as the potency of exchanges, nor is there worry about an increase of losses. The system of value-relation among wealth and services is generated via the currencies of LETS, but the wealth and services are not unconditionally commensurable, as in state currencies. Finally, among them, labor value as “the common essence” would not be established ex post facto.
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LETS is neither simply economic nor simply ethical. It creates an economico-ethical association. While the mutual aid in traditional communities compels fidelity to them, and the market economies compel the belonging to the communities of currencies (states), the social contract in LETS is like Proudhon’s “association.” Individuals can quit a particular LETS and belong to another LETS anytime. Unlike the currency of a state, the currency of LETS is really currencies— it is a multiplicity. More important, in contrast to other local currencies, LETS offers each participant the right to issue his or her own currency (simply by the act of registering/recording in an account). To say that one aspect of the sovereignty of the state exists in the right to issue currency means that LETS actually offers sovereignty to the multitudes, going far beyond the specious motto ‘sovereignty resides in the people.’ Therefore, the potency of LETS is not just to protect and stimulate the local economy. It engenders an association that entails principles of exchange other than those of the Trinity. The last crucial aspect of LETS is that it is formed in the circulation process, where consumers hold the initiative. While conventional cooperatives of producers as well as consumers tend to falter in the hopeless competition with full-hearted capitalist enterprises, LETS could nurture the free, autonomous subjectivity of consumersas-workers. Only when LETS and the financial system based upon it expand, it should be said, can the noncapitalist producers’ and concumers’ cooperatives autonomously exist. But, in terms of strategy, LETS itself cannot terminate capital’s auto-multiplying movement. It would remain as partial, complementary to the market economy, no matter how popular it would become. For this reason, what is required—aside from the movement that seeks to ex-scendent14 capitalist economy like LETS—is the struggle remaining within the capitalist economy. Where can they be united? It goes without saying that it is in the position where workers appear as consumers, namely, at the front of circulation. In the movement of capital M-C-M, capital has to confront two critical moments: buying labor-power commodity and selling products to workers. Failure in either moment disables capital from achieving surplus value. In other words, it fails to be capital. That is
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to say that in these moments workers can counter capital. The first moment is expressed by Antonio Negri as “Don’t Work!” This really signifies, in our context, “Don’t Sell Your Labor-Power Commodity!” or “Don’t Work as a Wage Laborer!” The second moment says, like Mahatma Gandhi, “Don’t Buy Capitalist Products!” Both of them can occur in the position in which workers can be the subject. But in order for workers/consumers to be able ‘not to work’ and ‘not to buy’, there must be a safety net whereupon they can still work and buy to live. This is the very struggle without the capitalist mode of production: the association consisting of the producers’/consumers’ cooperatives and LETS. The struggle within inexorably requires these cooperatives and LETS as an extra-capitalist mode of production/ consumption; and furthermore, this can accelerate the reorganization of capitalist corporation into cooperative entity. The struggle immanent in and the one ex-scendent to the capitalist mode of production/consumption are combined only in the circulation process, the topos of consumers workers. For it is only there that the moment for individuals to become subject exists. Association cannot exist without the subjective interventions of individuals, and such is possible only having the circulation process as an axis. Karl Polanyi likened capitalism (the market economy) to cancer.15 Coming into existence in the interstice between agrarian communities and feudal states, capitalism invaded the internal cells and transformed their predispositions according to its own physiology. If so, the transnational network of workers qua consumers and consumers qua workers is a culture of anticancer cells, as it were. In order to eliminate capital, it is imperative to eliminate the conditions by which it was produced in the first place. The counteractions against capitalism within and without, having their base in the circulation front, are totally legal and nonviolent; none of the three can interrupt them. According to my reading, Marx’s Capital offers a logical ground for the creation of this culture/movement. That is, the asymmetric relationship inherent in the value form (between commodity and money) produces capital, and it is also here where the transpositional moments that terminate capital can be grasped. And it is the task of transcriticism to make full use of these moments.
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1 The Kantian Turn
1.1 The Copernican Turn When Kant called his new project in Critique of Pure Reason the “Copernican turn,” he was alluding to his own inversion of the subject/object hierarchy: while pre-Kantian metaphysics had maintained that the subject copies the external object, Kant proposed that objects are constituted by the form that the subject projects into the external world. In this sense, the Kantian turn is obviously a shift toward subject-centrism (or anthropocentrism), while the turn known by the name of Copernicus tends toward the opposite: the shift from geocentrism to heliocentrism—a negation of the stance that is earthcentered (identifiable as ego-centered). Did Kant ignore the turn in the latter sense? No, I think not. It is my contention that in his constellation of thought surrounding the “thing-in-itself” and/or “transcendental object,” he was echoing this very essence of the Copernican turn, especially in stressing the passivity of subject in relation with the external, objective world. Kant wrote in Critique of Pure Reason: The sensible faculty of intuition is really only a receptivity for being affected in a certain way with representations, whose relation to one another is a pure intuition of space and time (pure forms of our sensibility), which, insofar as they are connected and determinable in these relations (in space and time) according to laws of the unity of experience, are called object. The non-sensible cause of these representations is entirely unknown to us,
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and therefore we cannot intuit it as an object; for such an object would have to be represented neither in space nor in time (as mere conditions of our sensible representation), without which conditions we cannot think any intuition. Meanwhile we can call the merely intelligible cause of appearances in general the transcendental object, merely so that we may have something corresponding to sensibility as a receptivity. To this transcendental object we can ascribe the whole extent and connection of our possible perceptions, and say that it is given in itself prior to all experience. But appearances are, in accordance with it, given not in themselves but only in this experience, because they are merely representations, which signify a real object only as perceptions, namely when this perception connects up with all others in accordance with the rules of the unity of experience.1
The central concern in this passage is the ‘thing’, which, prior to our act of constituting objects, affects the subject by means of sensibility and provides it with its contents—what appears to be the world. In other words, Kant stresses the passivity or Geworfenheit (thrownness) of the subject. All philosophers after Kant except for Heidegger—even such a faithful Kantian as Schopenhauer—denied the exterior validity of the concept of the thing-in-itself. As a consequence, Kant came to be mistakenly identified as the founder of the philosophy of subjectivity—that which insists upon the subject as actively constituting the world. This interpretation certainly seems to accord with Kant’s implication in regard to the Copernican turn, but Kant himself was quick to deny the simple-minded idealism. If so, what did Kant really seek to do? Did he simply intend to combine rationalism and empiricism critically? In order to grasp the Kantian Copernican turn precisely, one first has to clarify the turn of Copernicus himself. The idea of heliocentrism had existed since ancient times, so it was not his invention. But it was prohibited, and Copernicus was rather hesitant to endorse this ‘new’ cosmological position during his lifetime. According to Thomas Kuhn, Copernicus basically followed the Ptolemaic cosmology even in De Revolutionibus, which was published in 1543, the year he died; it was only the addendum to the book, the part that only astronomers could decipher, that became influential for the coming age. His real contribution here was the proposition that the discrepancy among the revolutions of heavenly bodies, which had dogged geocentricism since Ptolemy, could be solved if and only if we would
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see the globe as revolving around the sun. This hypothesis does not offer positive proof of heliocentrism itself, however, and it took as long as a century for it to be fully accepted as a cosmological principle. Nonetheless, even those who still believed in geocentricism had to rely on the Copernican system of calculation. Although they believed that the truth was that the sun revolves around the earth, for the sake of calculation they still could think ‘as if ’ the opposite were the case. After all, the true significance of the Copernican turn lay in the hypothetical stance itself. In other words, the significance lay not in forcing any choice between geocentricism or heliocentrism, but rather in grasping the solar system as a relational structure —using terms such as ‘earth’ and ‘sun’—that is totally independent of empirically observed objects or events. And only this stance could render the turn toward heliocentrism. Thus the significance of the Copernican turn was twofold. In the same manner Kant managed to get around the basic contradiction in the philosophy of his time, whether it was founded in the empirical senses (as was empiricism) or in rational thinking (as was rationalism). Instead, Kant introduced those structures—that is, forms of sensibility or categories of understanding—of which one is unaware, calling them “transcendental” structures. Words such as ‘sensibility [Sinnlichkeit]’ and ‘understanding [Verstand]’ had long existed as conceptualizations of life experience: ‘to sense’ and ‘to understand’. But Kant completely altered their meanings in a way similar to what Copernicus had done when he rediscovered ‘sun’ and ‘earth’ as terms within the solar system qua reciprocal structure. But here it is not necessary to reiterate Kant’s terminology. What is crucial is this architectonic that is called “transcendental.” And even if these particular words or concepts are not always used in various post-Kantian contexts, the same architectonic can be found there. One notable example is psychoanalysis, in which Thomas Kuhn saw a direct correspondence with the Copernican turn. Because the Copernican theory is in many respects a typical scientific theory, its history can illustrate some of the processes by which scientific concepts evolve and replace their predecessors. In its extrascientific consequences, however, the Copernican theory is not typical: few scientific theories have played so large a role in nonscientific thought. But neither is it unique. In the nineteenth century, Darwin’s theory of evolution raised similar
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extrascientific questions. In our own century, Einstein’s relativity theories and Freud’s psychoanalytic theories provide centers for controversies from which may emerge further radical reorientations of Western thought. Freud himself emphasized the parallel effects of Copernican discovery that the earth was merely a planet and his own discovery that the unconscious controlled much of human behavior.2
For that matter, the revolutionary aspect of Freudian psychoanalysis was not in the idea of the “unconscious controlling much of human behavior”; as presented as early as in Interpretation of Dreams (and this idea had existed since antiquity), it was in his attempt to see what exists in the gap between consciousness and unconscious vis-à-vis the form of language. In the course of this attempt, he came to extract the unconscious qua transcendental structure. While stressing the wide impact of the Copernican turn beyond the domain of the natural sciences, Kuhn ignored Kant’s own use of the figure. For Kuhn, too, was bound by the stereotype about Kant, namely, that the Kantian form and category were based on Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics. Yet this is simply not true. As I will show later, Kant was able to conceptualize form with respect to sensibility only because he had already had a sense of the possibility of a nonEuclidean geometry. All in all, the crux of Kant’s account of science was that scientific cognition is an open system, and that any scientific truth can be no more than a hypothesis (qua phenomenon). But those who identify or criticize Descartes and Kant as subjectivists, automatically posit geocentrism in Kant. Only as long as we are bound by the stereotype does it appear that Kant was an anthropocentrist (or rationalist), and that, in contrast, Freud posited the unconscious (like the sun) as the center by overturning the position that was consciousness-centered (earth-centered). But Kuhn’s own position cannot even distinguish Freud from Jung. In fact for him they are one and the same. While collaborating in his early career with Freud, Jung himself likened the concept of the Oedipus complex to the “stable point outside of our own sphere on which an objective understanding of its currents becomes possible,” comparable to the Copernican revolution. The importance of this realization should not be underestimated, for it teaches us that there is an identity of fundamental human conflicts which is
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independent of time and place. What aroused a feeling of horror in the Greeks still remains true, but it is true for us only if we give up the vain illusion that we are different, i.e., morally better, than the ancients. We have merely succeeded in forgetting that an indissoluble link binds us to the men of antiquity. This truth opens the way to an understanding of the classical spirit such as has never existed before—the way of inner sympathy on the one hand and of intellectual comprehension on the other. [By making the detour through the buried substructure of our own souls, we can seize for ourselves the vital meaning of the culture of antiquity, and by this means thus gain that stable point outside of our own sphere on which an objective understanding of its currents becomes possible.] That at least is the hope we draw from the rediscovery of the immortality of the Oedipus problem.3
This manner of emphasizing the “unconscious”—or, more precisely, the “collective unconscious”—had already become influential in Romanticism, long before Freud and Jung. It was thus not Freud’s property. In fact, Jung quoted from various Romantic poets and thinkers to support his claim. On the other hand, Freud opposed the general notion of “collective unconscious.” Freud’s unconscious is strictly that which is discovered (or produced) in an analysand’s “resistance” during the psychoanalytic dialogue. For Freud, there would be no unconscious if not for resistance [Widerstand] and disavowal [Verleugnung]. He conceptualized the triadic structure of ego, superego, and id, not as something that exists in empirical reality, but rather as a structural mechanism that is methodologically assumed to exist in resistance and disavowal. As Freud’s figures of the “judge” of the superego and the “censor” of the superego clearly express, the triad is structurally similar to a court of law. And, for that matter, Kant, too, persisted in speaking in judicial terms. Jung came to break away from Freud in a way very similar to that in which Herder, Fichte, and Schelling broke away from Kant. Alternatively put, Jung belonged to a lineage of Romanticism epitomized by the same philosophers. Jung’s negation of rationalism certainly constituted a remarkable revolution, and it is true that, by contrast, Freud was faithful to the tradition of the Enlightenment insofar as he retained a rationalistic stance. But it was Freud who finally rendered the truly radical turn, one that is totally irrelevant to the concerns of vulgar Romanticism. Freudian psychoanalysis is as distinct
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from empirical psychology as it is from the collective unconscious. It is, as he claimed, a metapsychology and, in our context, a “transcendental” psychology. Seen from this perspective, the isomorphism between the Kantian faculties (of sensibility and understanding) and the Freudian psychical structure is evident. Both are discoveries of the transcendental query. That is, as a certain function that can be spoken of only as figure ; they are functions about which we can only say that they are at work. And with Lacan, who sought to recover the Freudian sense of transcendental psychology, the triadic structure came to be even more ostensibly Kantian: Kantian illusion/Lacanian imaginary; the form/the symbolic; and the thing-in-itself/the real. But my objective is not to interpret Kant through Freud, but the opposite. Kant is consistently the target of criticism accusing him to be the primogenitor of the philosophy of subjectivity. What Kant really did, however, was to present the boundaries or limits of human subjective faculties, and in so doing criticize metaphysics as an arrogation that oversteps those boundaries. Much like Freud’s ‘id, ego, and superego’, Kant’s ‘sensibility, understanding, and reason’ are not things that exist empirically. In this sense, indeed, they are nothing; which, however, is a ‘nothing’ that exists as a certain function. More precisely, transcendental apperception (or subjectivity) is the ‘function as nothing’ that ‘bundles’ the three faculties together into a single system. “Transcendental” inquiry can be deemed ontological (Heidegger), in the sense that it discovers the function as nothing (qua Being). At the same time, in the specific sense that it designs the structure of which we are unaware, it is also properly structuralist. But this kind of association does not always create new thoughts; perhaps something is always lost in the contextual association. So it is that we persist in the Kantian term, “transcendental,” except that in order to elucidate its dynamism and function further, transcritique has to intervene. Kant’s Copernican turn is not a turn toward the philosophy of subjectivity, but that toward the thing-in-itself by a detour of the scrutiny of subjectivity. It was for this objective and nothing else that Kant elaborated the transcendental structure of subjectivity. Then, what is the concept thing-in-itself ? It has always been concerned with
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the problematic of ethics, even before Critique of Practical Reason took ethics up as subject matter. It is concerned, in other words, with the problematic of the other. Kant did not initiate his whole project with the matter of the other. And neither would I. But one of the most crucial points I would like to address in this book is that the Kantian turn is a revolution toward thought centered on the other, and this turn was more radical than any self-claimed epistemological turn has been since. 1.2 Literary Criticism and the Transcendental Critique Kant’s three critiques targeted three domains consecutively: scientific thought, morality, and the arts (and biology). Kant scrutinized not only the peculiarity of each domain, but also their relationship to each other. But his followers totally forgot that these domains had not existed as such before Kant—they were the discoveries of Kant’s criticism. The sun has existed consistently since before and after Copernicus. It unchangingly rises from the east and sets in the west. But after Copernicus, it came to be another thing: The term took its place within the system of calculation. So now, with respect to the same sun, one has different objects. In the same way, before and after Kant the categorization of scientific thoughts, moralities, and the arts was totally altered. One should not read Kant’s books, therefore, taking his categorizations for granted. One should read the Kantian critique that itself created the categorization. Critique of Judgment (1790), the last of the three Critiques, is said to have posed a solution to problems omitted from the previous two— Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) and Critique of Practical Reason (1788). That is, the third Critique ostensibly bridged the gaps between cognition and morality and between nature and freedom by way of positing art as the mediator. The main subject of the third Critique—the faculty of judgment—is isomorphic to the faculty of imagination-power [Einbildungskraft] that mediates sensibility and understanding in cognition. In Kant’s view, art does not begin from concept but realizes it latently. In other words, art is that which can intuitively (or sensually) realize what cognition and morality are supposed to realize. This notion of art offered an important basis for
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the philosophers of Romanticism and thereafter. They believed that art was the authentic knowledge from which both science and ethics derived; in art, the synthesis of all domains was always already achieved. Hegel posited philosophy as being higher than art—but only after he had aestheticized philosophy. Heidegger, too, considered art (or poetry) as primordial in his “turn” from “Being and time” to “time and Being.” It is evident that Kant posited a clear relationality between science, ethics, and art with his three Critiques. But what is more important is that he ultimately presented the structure in which the three categories form a ring, and that the thematic ring corresponds to the triadic categorical structure on a different level: thing-in-itself, phenomenon, and transcendental illusion, every one of which is indispensable for attaining the structure—or the “Borromean knot,” to adopt a Lacanian term.4 But it is misleading to think that in the third Critique he resolved the impasse he had encountered in the previous two. It is not that the Kantian critique—the discovery of the triadic structure—was brought to a completion by Kant’s account either of art or of the judgment of taste, in the third Critique. Instead, it could be said, from the beginning, the Kantian critique had been derived from the problematic of the artistic experience. There have been a number of etymological inquiries into the origin of Kant’s use of the term ‘critique’, all of which return eventually to ancient Greece. But the problem with etymological retrospection is that it tends to occlude origins of the recent past, the actual historical formation. I rather believe that the Kantian critique came most immediately from ‘criticism’ in the literal sense, that is, commercial journalism—an arena [Kampfplatz]—wherein the classical aesthetics ascribed to Aristotle are no longer relevant, and thus ongoing is the struggle with respect to the assessment of value. Kant confessed that “the remembrance of David Hume [especially his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739)] was the very thing that many years ago first interrupted [the] dogmatic slumber” he was enduring under the influence of Leibniz-Wolffian School.5 Perhaps this is true, but Hume’s influence was not the main source of Kant’s critical position. As Hans Vaihinger pointed out in his Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (2 vols., 1881–1892), what must have
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really awakened Kant was the book by the Scottish critic, Henry Home (1766–1782), titled Element of Criticism (1763–1766). According to Vaihinger, the following remark by Kant indicates why he read Home’s book with such excitement: “Home has more correctly called Aesthetics Criticism, because it does not, like Logic, furnish a priori rules.”6 This suggests that Kant’s use of the term ‘critique’ may indeed have derived from Home. Kant first used the term “critique of reason” in “An Announcement for the Arrangement of the Lectures in the Winter Semester 1765/1766.” 7 In the text, “the critique of reason [die Kritik der Vernunft]” is considered logic in the wide sense, in juxtaposition to “the critique of taste [die Kritik des Geschmacks]”— namely, aesthetics—as that which has a very close affinity of material cause. From this, too, one can presume a nexus shared by Kant’s “critique” and Home’s book with its eponymous “criticism.” With Home, Kant seized the moment to reconsider the possibility of an aesthetic judgment of taste and to investigate its basis. Home had sought a universality of the judgment of taste—a measure of beauty and ugliness—in principles immanent in human essence. He insisted on the a priori nature of human sensibility with respect to beauty and ugliness. At the same time, however, Home employed empirical and inductive methods of observing the general rules of taste, collecting and categorizing materials from all the domains related to art and literature from antiquity to the present. Confronting the necessity of critical judgment, he refused to take any particular principle for granted and charged himself with the task of questioning the foundational principles or infallible measures of criticism. By taking up Home’s term “criticism,” Kant further developed the concept into his own “critique”—a signifier of the fundamental scrutiny of rational human faculties.8 Home had to confront the “element of criticism” particularly in England, because that is where two principles were clashing: on the one hand, there was classicism positing a certain empirical norm in art and literature; and on the other, there was the Romanticist ideal cherishing an individual’s uninhibited expression of emotion. Basically taking the latter standpoint, Home still dared to seek a ground where critical judgment could be universal, and Kant was especially struck by this endeavor. In Critique of Judgment, he dealt tacitly with
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the same thesis and antithesis. Like Home, Kant acknowledged that the judgment of taste had to be subjective (or individual), while believing at the same time that it should also somehow be universal. In Kant’s case, however, he distinguished universality from generality: Thus we will say that someone has taste if he knows how to entertain his guests [at a party] with agreeable things (that they can enjoy by all the senses) in such a way that everyone likes [the party]. But here it is understood that the universality is only comparative, so that the rules are only general (as all empirical rules are), not universal, as are the rules that a judgment about the beautiful takes upon itself [sich unternimmt] or lays claim to.9
A general rule induced from experience cannot be universal. Since Aristotle, aesthetics has been general and not universal, in the same way as physics. Classicism had consistently attempted to extrapolate rules from works that had been given the designation ‘masterpieces’, and make these rules normative. As opposed to this, for Kant, “there [could] be no rule by which someone could be compelled to acknowledge that something is beautiful.”10 Nonetheless, the judgment of taste, which is distinguished from mere comfortableness, must be universal: The judgment of taste itself does not postulate [postuliert] everyone’s agreement (since only a logically universal judgment can do that, because it can adduce reasons); it merely requires this agreement from everyone [es sinnet nur jedermann diese Einstimmung an], as an instance of the rule, an instance regarding which it expects confirmation not from concepts but from the agreement of others. Hence the universal voice is only an idea.11
To make it doubly clear: postulieren means to assume as self-evident, while ansinnen means to make an (unreasonable) request or demand. In the judgment of taste, there is no rule that can compel. At this juncture, Kant introduces “common sense [sensus communis],” that is, socially and historically engendered customs. In The New Science, Giambattista Vico had argued that “common sense [senso commune] is judgment without reflection, shared by an entire class, an entire people, an entire nation, or the entire human race.”12 Common sense is a norm (following which innumerable mediocre works are written). Common sense changes over time; but the change is
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not continuous because it is caused by the violent intervention of individuals (i.e., geniuses) who oppose and deviate from it. For his part, however, Kant restricted this phenomenon to the judgment of taste only, that is, to the fine arts [die schönen Künste]: “In scientific matters, therefore, the greatest discoverer differs from the most arduous imitator and apprentice only in degree, whereas he differs in kind from someone whom nature has endowed for fine art.”13 But there is still a problem. If common sense is a historically transforming social convention, it cannot guarantee the universality of the judgment of taste. Common sense is both historically and presently plural—common senses. If there is universality at all, it must be beyond plural common senses. Did Kant give up, then, on the requirement of universality? Did he mean that in the fine arts one should make do with common senses, since universality may be found in other domains? Of course, such questions are themselves wrong. Kant certainly distinguished among natural science, ethics, and art, but the distinction itself is not his terminus ad quem, for he consistently required universality in each of these domains. In Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason, for example, he sought universal law as opposed to a general rule based upon experience. But, does it mean that scientific thought and ethics contain universal law while art lacks it? No. If universality is unaccounted for in art, it is the same in other domains. Or, at least, Kant began his thinking in this manner. The radicalism of his critique exists in that he reconsidered the question of universality from the vantage of the judgment of taste. In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant detects subjectivity in the autonomous act of understanding, while in Critique of Judgment, he uses the terms subjective versus objective in a highly prosaic manner: in other words, the sensuous in general is considered subjective. It follows that the multitude of individual subjects expresses themselves on the level of feeling: either pleasure or displeasure. Subjectivity as understanding, on the other hand, is considered an impersonal, a priori faculty—in this case, language’s faculty—and does not appear as individual subject. Nonetheless, even though Kant poses the issue of plural subjectivity—beginning from the feeling of pleasure/ displeasure—the problematic in Critique of Judgment is by no means
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confined to the matter of commonly understood cultural taste. In the arena of the judgment of taste, no one can prove the universality of his or her individual standpoint. And, viewed in inverse logic, when people cannot prove the truth of their cognition, they use the figure “judgment of taste,” no matter how serious the object. We say, “Well, it’s just a matter of taste” or even, “Well, it’s all a matter of taste.” Indeed, every judgment ultimately results in a judgment of taste—except analytic judgment. Finally, Kant distinguishes the judgment of taste from the matter of pleasure/displeasure or comfort. Comfort is acknowledged to be an individual matter, while the judgment of taste, from the beginning, is required to prove its universality. In other words, the judgment must be accepted by others. As Wittgenstein might say, comfort is a “private language,” while the judgment of taste belongs to a “common language game.”14 When Kant speaks of “common sense,” this is it. And the real problem lies in the fact that there are many language games in the world. Therefore, the universality of the judgment of taste becomes a problem of communication among people who have different systems of rules, namely, among others. The requirement of universality in the judgment of taste is the sine qua non underlying all synthetic judgments. Therefore, it is wrong to think that Kant discovered an autonomous, peculiar problem in the fine arts. Rather, he sought to reconsider all problematics through “criticism” in the judgment of taste. Kant held that beauty is discovered by disinterest in the object. This is, as it were, a methodological bracketing of the interests. What kind of interests, then, must be bracketed? Intellectual and moral. Confronting a certain object, one judges it in at least three domains simultaneously: true or false; good or bad; pleasurable or displeasurable. Usually these form an intermixed complexity. And only when a certain object is received by bracketing the other concerns (i.e., true or false and good or bad) does it become an aesthetic object. But what Kant characterized with respect to the judgment of taste is applicable also to both cognition and morality. In modern science, the cognition of the object is realized only by bracketing judgments that are moral (good or bad) and aesthetic (pleasurable or displeasurable). In the same way, Kant attempts a purification with respect to
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morality. In this case, it is achieved by bracketing pleasure as well as happiness. It is crucial to keep in mind, however, that bracketing is not the same as negation. If this is the case, it is not outrageous that Kant solved the third antinomy in Critique of Pure Reason by considering that the conflicting terms could stand together. Thesis—Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only one from which all the appearances of the world can be derived. It is also necessary to assume another causality through freedom in order to explain them. Antithesis—There is no freedom, but everything in the world happens solely in accordance with laws of nature.15
The idea that everything is determined by natural cause is made possible by the position that brackets freedom. Conversely, only when the determination by natural cause is bracketed, can the idea of freedom intervene. Which idea is ‘correct’ does not matter, for the very question never arises. One attains the cognitive domain by bracketing moral and aesthetic dimensions, but they must always be unbracketed whenever necessary. The same can be said of moral and aesthetic domains. When one seeks to explain everything from one and the same positionality, one is inexorably confronted by antinomy. I deal with the ethical question of freedom in section 3.4. Here I would stress one tangled problematic: cognitive, moral, and aesthetic domains are all constituted by a change of attitude (i.e., transcendental reduction); and in the beginning these domains do not exist in and of themselves. It follows that in every domain the same problem recurs. For instance, in Critique of Practical Reason, the problem of the other is explicit. But it is implied in Critique of Pure Reason as well. And the very problem of the other is what Kant originally encountered with respect to aesthetic judgment. As I argue later, the “thing-in-itself” is ultimately equal to “the other.” But, in order to reach that point, it is a sine qua non to begin with the problematic of aesthetic judgment. What distinguishes the third Critique from the first two is the appearance of plural subjectivities. To tackle this Kant did not resort to, say, general consciousness or general subjectivity; rather, he scrutinized what kind of agreement could be made among a multitude
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of subjectivities wherein there is “no rule by which someone could be compelled to acknowledge that something is beautiful.” Hannah Arendt granted primary importance to this aspect of the third Critique and sought to read it as a principle of political science.16 JeanFrançois Lyotard observed in it a mediation between language games without the establishment of a meta-language.17 But Lyotard’s reading is a regression to Hume insofar as it considers the issue of universality to be simply one of the coalition among common senses. After all, it is misleading to presume a transition or development between Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Judgment, since the former was already affected by and took into account the aporia posed in the arena of criticism in the journalistic sense. Thus our task is to reread Critique of Pure Reason from this vantage point. Kant’s distinction between universality and generality sprang from the problematic of modern science beginning with Copernicus. This should be distinguished from Francis Bacon’s positions of corroborative evidence and induction exemplified. In the first place, the heliocentricism (of Copernicus) is not the kind of matter that is easily proven. Descartes sought to publish his account of the universe as one sympathetic to Copernicus, but abandoned his plan after learning about Galileo’s prosecution, and then wrote Discourse on Method. As this anecdote might imply, Descartes was not necessarily speculative; rather, he stressed the significance of hypothesis and presented a methodology where hypothesis comes first to be proven later by experimentation (by whomever). But, again, can hypothesis be verified by experimentation at all? It is impossible to induce a law from experience, or it is impossible to extract a universal proposition from singular propositions. A universal proposition is technically an indefinite expansion of conjunctive propositions wherein it is impossible to verify apodictically the infinite chain of elementary propositions. Thus the crux of Hume’s skepticism is that since a universal proposition cannot be constituted, a law is finally no more than a custom. But some held that, while a universal proposition could not be verified positively, at least it could be proven false. And inasmuch as it is not proven false, the universal proposition can be considered true. Karl Popper famously maintained that the universality of the proposition could be claimed if no falsification were possible when
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a proposition is posed in a falsifiable way. Although Popper appreciated the fact that this idea was latent in Kant’s own work, he also accused him of remaining in the subjectivist framework.18 If a certain proposition can be deemed universal at all, it is only insofar as one presumes the existence of the other who may falsify it at present as well as in the future. To Popper, however, Kant appears to have presented a rather different, arguably even opposite, approach—as if universality could be guaranteed by a priori rule! But, one has to be extremely cautious with respect to Kant’s positionality here, for, as we have seen, it was only after having confronted the problematic of the judgment of taste (i.e., the universality in plural language games) that Kant wrote Critique of Pure Reason. Critique of Pure Reason begins by describing a single subjectivity, to be sure. This does not mean, however, that Kant neglected the existence of the multitude of other subjects. Rather, he did not even dream that universality could be attained by an agreement among plural subjectivities, that is, by intersubjectivity. For Kant, who was also a scientist, it was self-evident that an a priori synthetic judgment is not easily attained—and a fortiori not during his lifetime, when heterogeneous hypotheses were very much in conflict in the natural sciences and not merely on “der Kampfplatz der Metaphysik.” An agreement with others—no matter how many, and including a falsification that is based upon prior agreement—hardly guarantees universality. An agreement is customarily made within the realm of common sense, just to reinforce it. If universality at all exists, therefore, it must be something that goes beyond plural common senses. It is small surprise, then, that Popper’s position came to be criticized within the philosophy of science. As Thomas Kuhn argued, there is a possibility that even a proposition posed in a falsifiable way is not always falsified; instead, the institution of proof itself is determined by the “paradigm.”19 Furthermore, as with Paul Feyerabend, the truth-value of scientific cognition tout court is determined by discursive hegemony.20 And so Popper eventually shifted his position to think of the development of science more in the manner of evolutionary theory, that is, that stronger theories survive.21 Was the Kantian critique buried by these later deployments? I think not. First,
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Kuhn’s paradigm closely corresponds to Kant’s common sense. Second, what Kuhn spoke of in reference to his paradigm shift were only those “geniuses”—Copernicus, Newton, and Einstein—not unlike the geniuses who appear already in Kant’s third Critique. Perhaps Kuhn never dreamt of such a coincidence because of the complications: After all, Kant had limited his application of the concepts ‘genius’ and ‘common sense’ to the domain of fine art; and the sharp distinction between natural and cultural sciences made by the neo-Kantians (Heinrich Rickert, among others) became very influential. Meanwhile, the concept ‘paradigm’ is widely accepted against Kuhn’s own design precisely because it addressed a problematic wider than that of natural science, which is to say that it has the impetus of “criticism” or even “literary criticism.” Seen from this standpoint, it might be that contemporary philosophers of science have drawn close to the ground Kant cultivated in Critique of Judgment. But again it must be noted that Kant had already been aware of the problematic inherent in the arena of journalistic criticism when he began writing Critique of Pure Reason. In this first Critique, the other (or the other subject) is ostensibly absent. The book persists in pursuing the introspective mode of inquiry. Those who criticize Kant unexceptionably question if introspective inquiry (i.e., the monologue) is by itself sufficient to scrutinize the foundation of science. It is true that Kant did not seek to introduce the agreement of others, because the agreement itself would not guarantee a universal proposition. Instead, in the concept of the thingin-itself, he implied the future others who could falsify. But this is not to say that our thought could never be universal because of future others. On the contrary, the question of universality could not be posed without taking the others into consideration. In the history of philosophy, Kant was the first to have introduced the problematic of the other in this succinct manner. 1.3 Parallax and the Thing-in-Itself Philosophy begins with introspection. Nonetheless, the kind of introspection that Kant performed in Critique of Pure Reason is quite unique. It is a criticism of introspection. Thinking of this aspect of
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the Kantian introspection, one ought not ignore his rather strange text “Dreams of a Visionary Explained by Dreams of Metaphysics.” Kant wrote this essay in 1766 for a journal in the playful style of eighteenth-century essayists. It was inspired by the famous earthquake that struck Lisbon on November 1, 1755, All Saints Day—the very moment the faithful were at prayer in church. No wonder the event raised such skepticism about the Grace of God. The Lisbon earthquake shook all Europe at its root—the general populace and intellectuals alike. It rent a deep crack between sensibility and understanding, as it were, which, right up to Leibniz, had maintained a relationship of remarkably seamless continuity. The Kantian critique cannot be separated from this profound and multilayered crisis. Several years later, Voltaire wrote Candide, deriding Leibnizian predestined harmony, and Rousseau insisted that the earthquake was punishment for human society’s having lost touch with nature.22 By distinct contrast, Kant (who wrote as many as three analyses of the problem) stressed that the earthquake of 1755 had no religious meaning whatsoever, attributable as it was to natural causes alone. He also advanced scientific hypotheses about the cause of the quake, as well as possible countermeasures to avert future occurrences. It is noteworthy that while even empiricists could not help searching for ‘meanings’ to attribute to the event, Kant did no such thing. But his radical materialism coexisted with the opposite and opposing radicalism that he simultaneously embraced—that is, his concern with metaphysics. That is to say that he was fascinated by the intellect of the visionary Swedenborg, who was said to have ‘predicted’ the earthquake. Kant not only conducted an inquiry into Swedenborg’s purportedly miraculous power, but also wrote a letter in the hope of meeting him.23 Even with his interest in visionary phenomena, however, Kant persisted in his belief in natural causes. The former he considered to be daydreams, or a sort of brain disorder. He maintained that although a vision is in actuality just a thought in the mind, it appears to have come from the outside, by way of the senses.24 At the same time, however, he could not deny Swedenborg’s intellect. While, in many cases, the claim to perceive the supra-sensible through the senses is delusional, there are a very few whose claims of possessing such
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power might in some sense be verifiable. Swedenborg was this exception: a first-class scientist, he was by no means demented; and, here there was credible evidence of his psychic power. Kant had to acknowledge this, but at the same time he had also to negate it. Though he called it a “psychosis,” he could not help taking “the dreams of a visionary” seriously. And yet he problematized his own seriousness: “Therefore, by no means do I blame my readers, if they, instead of acknowledging the visionary as a half citizen of the other world, are quick to write him off as a hospital candidate and thereby shirk from all further inquiry.”25 But this caveat would be less interesting, were it restricted merely to “the visionary’s dreams.” Kant stresses that the same is true of metaphysicists and metaphysics, since they treat thought not deriving from experience as substantial. In this sense, his essay could be read as “Dreams of Metaphysics Explained by Dreams of a Visionary.” He asks, “What kind of folly exists which cannot be brought to the mood of the bottomless world wisdom [philosophy]?” Whereupon he continues: “Therefore, by no means do I blame my readers . . . .” In other words, the dreams of metaphysicists are also first class “folly” and evidence of a “psychosis.” There is no major difference between being obsessed with dreams of metaphysics and with the dreams of a visionary. At this moment of his life, Kant admitted that being obsessed with metaphysics was sheer madness, and yet philosophers could not help but be mad in this sense. Thus his essay is really speaking of a metaphysician in the guise of speaking of a visionary, and the metaphysician in this case was Kant himself—before he encountered Hume, that is. A decade and a half later, Kant opened the 1781 preface to Critique of Pure Reason, with the assertion that “[n]ow, in accordance with the fashion of the age, the queen [read metaphysics] proves despised on all sides,” 26 nonetheless, he added, “it is pointless to affect indifference with respect to such inquiries, to whose object human nature cannot be indifferent. Moreover, however much they may think to make themselves unrecognizable by exchanging the language of the schools for a popular style, these so-called indifferentists, to the extent that they think anything at all, always unavoidably fall back into metaphysical assertions, which they yet professed so much to despise.” 27 But this is precisely Kant’s own split, or rather the one he
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had faced in “Dreams of a Visionary,” where he wrote in a completely self-contradictory (indeed, antinomic) manner. He both affirmed Swedenborg and metaphysics, and scorned this very affirmation. In Critique of Pure Reason, this conflict takes the form of denying reason’s expansion of knowledge beyond its limit, even while acknowledging reason’s drive to do precisely this. In the first Critique, the satiric selfcriticism of “Dreams of a Visionary” thus turns into a critique of reason by reason. Which is to say that, instead of treating this merely as his personal problem, Kant ‘turns’ (by a process that a Freudian or Lacanian might well call ‘transference’) to treat it as a problem “given to [reason] by the nature of reason itself.”28 This, precisely, is the crux of the “transcendental critique,” or one important aspect of what I am calling transcritique. In any case, the transposition from “Dreams of a Visionary” to Critique of Pure Reason is decisive. Yet, in order to read the latter, one must refer to the former. For it is there that Kant’s idiosyncratic manner of reflection is explicit.29 “Formerly,” Kant wrote in “Dreams of a Visionary,” “I viewed human common sense only from the standpoint of my own; now I put myself into the position of another’s reason outside of myself, and observe my judgments, together with their most secret causes, from the point of view of others. It is true that the comparison of both observations results in pronounced parallax, but it is the only means of preventing the optical delusion, and of putting the concept of the power of knowledge in human nature into its true place.”30 Here Kant is not expressing the commonplace, that not only must one see things from one’s own point of view, but also, simultaneously, from the point of view of others. If this is what he meant, it would be run-of-the mill: the history of philosophy is filled with reflections on seeing oneself as others would see. In Kant this “point of view of others” would manifest itself only by way of the “pronounced parallax.” To understand this properly, it is necessary to exemplify a technology that did not exist in Kant’s time. ‘Reflection’ is often spoken of by way of the metaphor of seeing one’s image in the mirror. The mirror image is identified with the image seen by the other. But in today’s context, photography must also be taken into consideration. Let us compare them. At the time
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photography was invented, those who saw their faces in pictures could not help but feel a certain hideousness—just like hearing a tape recording of one’s own voice for the first time. While it had been possible to see one’s own image, whether by reflection in a mirror, water, or in a painted portrait, these methods were too subjective. Although the mirror image can be identified with the image seen by the other, there is still a certain complicity with regard to one’s own viewpoint. After all, we can see our own image in the mirror ‘any way we like’; and the mirror image is not fully fixed (not to mention the fact that it is left/right inverted or inside out). A painted portrait is a depiction by the other, but any hideousness in seeing the image can be ascribed to the subjectivity (read malice) of the other. By contrast, photography sustains a different, much more severe, objectivity. Even though there is always a photographer, his or her subjectivity is less influential than the painter’s, for there is an ineradicable, mechanical distance in the photographic image. Strange as it may be, we cannot see our faces (read the thing-in-itself), except as an image reflected in the mirror (read phenomenon). And only thanks to the advent of photography, did we learn that fact. But again, photography is also an image, and, of course, people eventually get used to the mechanical image, so much so that they eventually come to feel that the image is themselves. But the crux here is the “pronounced parallax”—that which people presumably experience when they ‘first’ see their photographic image. The effect of parallax is evident also in Derrida’s statement that consciousness is equivalent to “hearing oneself speak [s’entendre parler].”31 In regard to this claim, Hegel would say that it is the speaking that objectifies (or externalizes [entäussert]) the self; but this objectified voice (or utterance [Äusserung]) in the Hegelian sense is not objective at all—it is merely my view. To be objective, there must be the displacement or derangement one experiences when one first hears one’s own recorded voice. The hideousness or uncanniness one experiences is due to the viewpoint of others that intervenes therein. When I first see my face and hear my voice from the others’ viewpoint, I think it is not my face nor my voice. In Freudian terms, this would be the “resistance” of the analysand. Eventually, one comes to terms with the visual and audible images; one has to get used to
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them. But in philosophical reflection, this is not the case. The philosophy that begins with introspection-mirror remains snared within the specular abyss of introspection. No matter how it seeks to introduce the other’s stance, this situation never alters. It is said that philosophy began with Socrates’ dialogues. But the dialogue itself is trapped within the mirror. Many have criticized Kant for having remained in a subjectivist self-scrutiny, and suggest that he sought an escape in Critique of Judgment when he introduced plural subjects. But the truly revolutionary event in philosophy had already occurred in Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant attempted to implode the complicity inherent in introspection precisely by confining himself to the introspective framework. Here one can observe the attempt to introduce an objectivity (qua otherness) that is totally alien to the conventional space of introspection-mirror. Most straightforwardly said, what is at stake in “Dreams of a Visionary” is the critical position that Kant himself was in at that time: pursuing rationalist philosophy on the line of Leibniz/Wolff, there was no other choice but to accept Hume’s empiricist skepticism, yet he was not at all satisfied by either. For about ten years after that, up until Critique of Pure Reason, he confined himself in silence. The stance that he called transcendental came into existence sometime during this period. Kant’s approach in Critique of Pure Reason is different not only from subjective introspection, but also from objective scrutiny. Though it is a self-scrutiny through and through, the transcendental reflection inscribes others’ viewpoint. Said inversely, though it is impersonal through and through, the transcendental reflection is still self-scrutiny. One tends to speak of the transcendental stance as a mere method, and worse still, one speaks of the structure of faculties Kant discovered as a given. The transcendental stance, however, could not have appeared if not for the pronounced parallax. Critique of Pure Reason is not written in the mode of self-criticism as is “Dreams of a Visionary,” but the pronounced parallax is present, functioning therein. It came to take the form of “antinomy,” the device to reveal both thesis and antithesis as optical illusions. After the publication of Critique of Pure Reason (A), Kant expressed his realization that the order of his reasoning would have been
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better if he had dealt with the distinction between phenomenon and the thing-in-itself after “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” (in the section “Transcendental Dialectic”).32 In fact, it is true that, because Kant began with the distinction between phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, many readers’ understanding of Kant’s total design (his “Architectonik”) retrogresses to the conventional duality of phenomenon and essence or surface and depth. This is the impression given to both those readers who deny and those who affirm the concept of ‘the thing-in-itself’. Those who reject it as mystical understand it only within the dichotomy, and even those who retain it, like Heidegger, interpret it only in the sense of the ontological depth or “abyss” [Abgrund]. In truth, however, there are no mystical implications in the properly Kantian thing-in-itself.33 It is something like one’s own face in the sense that it undoubtedly exists but cannot be seen except as an image (read phenomenon). What is crucial here is henceforth the antinomy as a pronounced parallax—the sole thing that reveals what is more than an image (phenomenon). In fact Kant poses antinomy not only in the section on the transcendental dialectic but almost everywhere. For instance, as one of the crucial examples, he draws out transcendental subjectivity X from the antinomy between the Cartesian thesis, “There is an identical ego,” and the Humian antithesis, “There is no identical ego.” It is generally understood that in Critique of Pure Reason, Kant considers the thing-in-itself as that which stimulates sensibility and gives it content, while in Critique of Practical Reason, transcendental subjectivity itself is deemed the thing-in-itself. This apparent inconsistency has caused much confusion. And, concomitant with this, there is the common interpretation that the first Critique deals with the theoretical domain while the second deals with the practical. But this division is not accurate. Hannah Arendt refuted this idea, arguing that the counterconcept to the theoretical is not the practical, but the speculative. (As I have clarified with respect to the “third conflict of transcendental ideas,” the theoretical stance that pursues laws of nature and the practical stance that pursues freedom can coexist, if the operation of bracketing one or the other is necessitated.) In point of fact, even scientific theory can be in no other way than practical,
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because it would not even exist were it not for the “regulative idea,” the assumption that nature be elucidated. Kant himself addressed the issue of “the doctrinal faith” (or “beliefs”) [der doktrinale Glaube] that accompanies “theoretical judgments” [theoretische Urteile] as follows: [T]hus there is in merely theoretical judgements an analogous of practical judgements, where taking them to be true is aptly described by the word belief, and which we can all doctrinal beliefs [der doktrinale Glaube]. If it were possible to settle by any sort of experience whether they are inhabitants of at least some of the planets that we see, I might well bet everything that I have on it. Hence I say that it is not merely an opinion but a strong belief (on the correctness of which I would wager many advantages in life) that there are also inhabitants of other worlds.34
The connotation here is that scientific cognition—or synthetic judgment—is not speculation, and yet it inexorably involves a certain spec or bet (though one might also add that it is also a kind of spes, expectation or hope, insofar as it is related to faith). For this reason, scientific cognition can be expansive. However, just as it is misleading to definitively divide the theoretical and the practical, the thing-in-itself can also not be divided into the thing and the other ego (or the other subject). It is not the thing that negates (falsifies) a scientific hypothesis; it is not the thing but the future others who speak. However, while it is the other who can negate our cognition (qua phenomenon), this negation has to be accompanied by the other’s sense-datum (qua the thing). What is crucial here is the otherness, be it of the thing or of the other person. But this otherness is nothing mystical. What Kant implied by the thing-in-itself was the alterity of the other that we can never take for granted and internalize just on our whim or at our convenience. Nor is the point merely that Kant deplored the fact that we are able to know only phenomena and not substance. Rather, the Kantian point is that the universality of phenomena (qua synthetic judgment) is taken into consideration only insofar as we wholeheartedly posit the alterity or otherness of the other. Kant did consider the attitude that anticipates what the alterity would be as “speculative.” On the other hand, however, he also held that even though this attitude—again spes—attains only illusion
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[Schein], it is a sine qua non (vis-à-vis the transcendental illusion). In fact, the regulative idea—that we be able to recognize nature— functions heuristically. The founder of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, who was involved in the Manhattan Project, said that what was treated in the counterintelligence community as the real secret was not the manual for making the atom bomb; it was the fact that it had already been made. When both Germany and Japan were developing the idea of making the bomb, they would have succeeded in its production had they discovered that it was possible. Solving traditional “chess problems” is far easier than playing a real game of chess because the faith that the king can be checkmated is the most helpful clue to the problem’s solution. The notion that the natural world comprises mathematical structure is also an example of ‘theoretical faith’. For the same reason, natural science came into existence only in the modern West thanks to the ‘theoretical faith’ it had nutured. It has also been said that Kant rejected metaphysics/theology in Critique of Pure Reason but recuperated it in Critique of Practical Reason. In reality, he rebuffed it in the latter, too, and in the former he made the point clear that all theories, if they are to be synthetic and expansive, cannot do away with a certain faith. What he sought in the second Critique were the conditions prerequisite to establishing a universal law of ethics as opposed to a general moral order based on empirical data. By taking this approach, Kant rejected the truth claim of religion, but accepted it as a regulative idea. To be sure, one who chose to live strictly according to the universal law of ethics would doubtless lead a tragic life in reality. If not for eternal life and God’s final judgment, such a life would inexorably culminate in absurdity. It follows that Kant had to accept faith as a regulative idea at the same time as he rejected any attempt to prove it theoretically: that is, he rejected this particular aspect of metaphysics. Necessarily misled by the categorical distinctions among the theoretical, the practical, and the aesthetic, one should not overlook the problematics Kant pursued consistently on other, different levels. What is most important is that, in seeking universality, Kant had to introduce the other, and that this other is not one who can be
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identified with the self in any sense of intersubjectivity or common sense. This is not some transcendent other—divine or God—but a transcendental other. Nor is this other a one who introduces relativism into our thinking, but rather the one who makes us face the problem of universality. The rigorous consistency of the Kantian critique, which informs all his work, derives directly from this radical point of departure: the problematic of universality in the judgment of taste, which is also to say, criticism in a journalistic sense.
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2 The Problematic of Synthetic Judgment
2.1 Mathematical Foundations Regarded as he has been as a philosopher of subjectivity, the most organized criticism of Kant understandably sprang up from the philosophy of science. As I have been contending, however, one of the most crucial points of Kant’s scientific thinking was the problematic of the other, and this aspect has been overlooked. Kant’s theory of mathematics in particular has been not simply misunderstood but consistently disdained. Here I would like to argue against this stance vis-à-vis mathematics and illuminate the brilliance of his critique. Kant detected synthetic judgment in every domain of thinking except for logic, the domain of tautology. Mathematics was no exception. Or, more to the point, Kant’s radical contribution here was that he considered even mathematics—the very domain believed to be most stable and certain because of its being analytical—as an a priori synthetic judgment. During his lifetime, it was this stance that earned Kant the worst reputation of all of his ideas, and it has been constantly attacked ever since. But Kant maintained this stance because previous philosophy had insisted that only analytic judgment was apodictic, and accordingly took mathematics—which philosophy was convinced was the most analytic of judgments—as a norm. I would like to shed more direct light on Kant’s intervention by looking into specific instances of this old philosophical conviction.
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Leibniz held that the basis of truth lay in “being identical or reducible to the identical truth,” and he further distinguished between contingent truth (truth of fact) and necessary truth (truth of reasoning). In contingent truth, the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject; nevertheless, contingent truth cannot be reduced to an equivalency or identity between subject and predicate, and thus it can never be proven—what Leibniz expressed as “continued resolution.” Still, according to Leibniz, only analytic judgment is true. Nonetheless, he also came to posit, by way of the “principle of sufficient reason,” that even truths of fact are analytic judgments that are deducible from the subject. For example, in the contingent proposition of fact ‘Caesar crossed the Rubicon’, the phrase ‘crossed the Rubicon’ is contained already (enthymemically, as Leibniz says) in the subject ‘Caesar’. In short, Leibniz believed that all synthetic judgments result in analytic judgments. The early Kant thought in a similar manner. Meanwhile the Hume who “interrupted [Kant’s] dogmatic slumber” with his acute skepticism still believed that only mathematics was analytic. And for this, Kant criticized him: [I]t was nonetheless just as if he had said: Pure mathematics contains only analytic propositions, but metaphysics contains synthetic propositions a priori. Now he erred severely in this, and this error had decisively damaging consequences for his entire conception [concerning the necessary connection between cause and effect]. For had he not done this, he would have expanded his question about the origin of our synthetic judgments far beyond his metaphysical concept of causality and extended it also to the possibility of a priori mathematics; for he would have had to accept mathematics as synthetic as well. But then he would by no means have been able to found his metaphysical propositions on mere experience, for otherwise he would have had to subject the axioms of pure mathematics to experience as well, which he was much too reasonable to do.1
In this respect, it must be said that Hume’s skepticism was indeed inconsistent; he did not move beyond the convention that solely analytical thinking is solid while the synthetic is questionable. By contrast, Kant’s epoch-making contribution lay in his skepticism concerning the analytic nature of mathematics—the very ground of metaphysics since at least Plato. But even those who agreed with Kant’s critique of metaphysics did not understand his insight into
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mathematics as synthetic. As far as this point was concerned, they were too steeped in metaphysical thinking. It was Kant alone who dared to step into, and to subvert, the sacred precinct that the conflicting philosophical poles—rationalism and empiricism—had simply taken for granted. What is more, this radicalism is intimately related to the fact that Kant imagined the possibility of a new mathematics. The so-called crisis of mathematics is said to have begun with two mathematical innovations of the late nineteenth century: nonEuclidean geometry and set theory. To be more precise, Carl Friedrich Gauss (1777–1855) had already thought of both possibilities, including what kind of crises they would cause; but he kept quiet and even discouraged public discourse about them. Therefore, it is not the case that the critical situation of mathematics suddenly surfaced in the late nineteenth century; by the mid eighteenth century, the idea of non-Euclidean geometry was already known. For instance, it had already been demonstrated that from the axiom, ‘the sum total of the three internal angles of a triangle is smaller than that of two right angles’, a system of theorems could be constructed without contradiction. Furthermore, non-Euclidean geometry in the context of the problem of the sphere had also already been conceptualized. As Gottfried Martin points out, Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728–1777), one of the founders of this tendency, was a friend of Kant’s.2 And Kant’s awareness of the possibility of new mathematics is evident in his papers on physics, as I will demonstrate. What Kant sought to ground philosophically was certainly not the mathematics and physics that had already been solidly established in the eighteenth century. A foundational theory would never have to be constructed in the first place if not in response to a crisis of foundation itself. What drives philosophers toward rigorous theoretical grounding is always critical consciousness—as it is precisely exemplified also in Marx’s “critique of political economy,” which would not have come into existence in the absence of actual financial crises. For his part, what drove Kant toward his own foundational theory was a radical sense of crisis, which, however, was far too progressive to be shared or accepted by his contemporaries. And, to a certain degree, it could be said that Kant, like Gauss later, avoided publicly declaring the crisis (so as to avoid the legendary fate of Hippasos).
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If Kant’s texts are so still suggestive today, it is ultimately because of his pioneering sense of the crisis, but also because of his discursive prudence with regard to stating more publicly the depth and implication of this crisis. Hence the need for a transcritical reading of his work.3 When he was twenty-two years old, Kant wrote in his graduate thesis that “If the law changes, the expansion [of space] will also turn to have different properties and dimensions. The science of all the possible space will be without doubt the highest geometry the finite understanding can undertake. Though, as we realize, it is impossible to represent a more than three dimensional space.”4 Now, one of the most influential aspects of The Elements by Euclid (306–283 B.C.E) is the thesis that a theorem can be deduced from an axiom without contradiction. But this claim does not hold for the diverse mathematics that have developed over history. The development of mathematics has been driven more by applied mathematics, or by games, than by any principle. This is because the crux of mathematics has always been located in the practice of grasping the relation of things. As an effect of the Euclidean principle, however, it has been assumed that all mathematical procedures could and should follow the proof as a formal (and analytical) deduction from an axiom. And this is the reason why mathematics has become established as the fountainhead of analytical judgment. Nonetheless, prioritizing analytical judgment was not the specific property of mathematics itself. It is metaphysics that has taken mathematics as the norm because of the presupposition that mathematics is analytical. In other words, it is Plato’s dogma that only analytical thinking is true that made Euclidean geometry possible. Therefore, to undermine Plato’s position, mathematics must be the primary field of critique. And the truth of the matter is that the question of whether or not the Euclidean “elements” are truly analytical has been asked more or less from the inception of mathematics. The Elements consist of definitions, axioms, and postulates, and among these, it is the fifth postulate that has been most controversial: If a straight line crosses two other straight lines so that the sum of the two interior angles on one side of it is less than two right angles, then the two straight lines, if extended far enough, cross on that same side. In the eighteenth century, this was
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restated into a simpler proposition, the famous “parallel postulate”: Through a point P outside a line L there is one and only one line parallel to L. The particular postulate in Euclid’s The Elements was thrown into doubt by the following question: Isn’t this theorem deducible from other postulates and axioms? What non-Euclidean geometry made clear was that Euclid’s fifth postulate is independent of the other Euclidean axioms; and further, not only that this is not intuitively self-evident but also that contradiction will not occur even if other postulates are adopted. For instance, Lobachevsky’s geometry was derived from the proposition The sum total of the three internal angles of a triangle is smaller than that of two right angles, while Riemann’s geometry came from the proposition The sum total of the three internal angles of a triangle is larger than that of two right angles. Using different expressions, Lobachevsky adopted the postulate In a plane, through a point outside a line L, there are an infinite number of lines which do not intersect L, while Riemann chose Through a point P outside a line L there is no line parallel to it; that is, every pair of lines in a plane must intersect. But, to repeat, and as Gottfried Martin also emphasizes, Kant had already thought of the possibilities of non-Euclidean geometry. In fact, when Kant considered mathematics as an “a priori synthetic judgment,” he already had explicitly in mind the very nature of axioms. Kant clearly maintained both that axioms are independent of empirical substance and that they are, at the same time, not sheer constructs of the concept (or understanding). Empirically speaking, for example, since parallel lines do not intersect, it follows that the axiom, parallel lines intersect, is independent of empirical reality. Viewed from the Leibnizian standpoint, within the concept of the triangle (read the subject) what is already included is the predicate: The sum total of the three internal angles of a triangle is equal to that of two right angles. Therefore, non-Euclidean geometry is just a reductio ad absurdum. From the Leibnizian standpoint, axioms as such had been obstacles, so he had sought to do away with them—but in vain. Kant thought of the problematic of axioms in a much more sophisticated manner. He explained the difference between analytic judgment and synthetic judgment in two ways: analytic judgment is where the concept ‘predicate’ is included in the concept ‘subject’, and it can be proven only by the law of contradiction. In contrast,
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synthetic judgment requires something other than the law of contradiction. Which is to say that Kant’s consideration of mathematics as being an a priori synthetic judgment derives rigorously from his consideration of the status of axioms. Thus Kant opposed the reduction of mathematics to logic. Kant notwithstanding, however, the concept that mathematics is an analytic judgment proved itself not to be easily shaken. A notable example is the later nineteenth-century logicism of Frege/Russell, which expressed the clearest conviction that mathematics be logical. Russell, in particular, was this delusion’s prime proponent. On the one hand, he was an empiricist like Hume; on the other, he insisted that mathematics was analytical. As he put it: The proof that all pure mathematics, including Geometry, is nothing but formal logic, is a fatal blow to the Kantian philosophy. Kant, rightly perceiving that Euclid’s propositions could not be deduced from Euclid’s axioms without the help of figures, invented a theory of knowledge to account for this fact; and it accounted so successfully that, when the fact is shown to be a mere defect in Euclid, and not a result of the nature of geometric reasoning, Kant’s theory also has to be abandoned. The whole doctrine of a priori intuitions, by which Kant explained the possibility of pure mathematics, is wholly inapplicable to mathematics in its present form.5
Russell’s seminal account is deeply biased by the erroneous belief that Kant pursued mathematics in the context of pre-non-Euclidean geometry. But Kant’s mathematics was already far beyond the assertion that it was “wholly inapplicable to mathematics in its present form.” At the end of the day, it was sooner Russell’s twentiethcentury logicism—“all pure mathematics are nothing but formal logic”—that had been proleptically ruptured by possibilities conceived in the eighteenth century by Kant. During the twentieth century, the foundational theory of mathematics diverged into three main sects: logicism, formalism, and intuitionism. An intuitionist, Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer (1881–1966), took a finitist stance, as opposed to treating infinity as substance. In his view, although the law of classical logic was based on finite sets, people had mistakenly come to apply it to infinite sets, forgetting its true origin. He further argued that the crucial law of the excluded middle—‘Either a proposition A or its negation non-A must be true’—precisely cannot be applied to infinite sets. The law of the
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excluded middle is used in the manner: ‘If the hypothesis—it is not A—falls into a paradox, the proof—it is A—is achieved.’ This type of proof is functional only in finite cases, but not in the case of infinite sets. Finally, Brouwer held that the paradox that occurs in infinite sets is due to abuse of the law of the excluded middle. And about this, too, Kant had had something important to say. Kantian dialectics in Critique of Pure Reason present how antinomy occurs due to the abuse of the law of the excluded middle. Kant distinguishes between negative judgment—‘he does not die’—and infinite judgment—‘he is immortal’. Although the infinite judgment is an affirmative judgment, it is commonly mistaken for a negative one. Similarly, the proposition—‘the world is not bounded’—is deemed equipollent to the proposition—‘the world is infinite’. The law of the excluded middle is functional in the case of ‘the world is bounded or not bounded’, but not in the proposition ‘the world is bounded or infinite’, in which both propositions can be false. Thus Kant revealed that the law of the excluded middle inexorably falls into paradox with respect to infinity. But arguably the most radical paradox of contemporary mathematics derives from Georg Cantor’s theory of infinite sets—especially his attempt to treat infinity as a number. And this paradox, too (whether Cantor himself was aware of it or not), is intimately connected to Kant’s theory of antinomy. In order for a universal proposition to be established, for instance, it is sine qua non to collect instances indefinitely. And this act will never reach the point where everything is collected, where the infinity is attained. Since ancient Greece, elementary logic has always taken the example of syllogism: “all humans die; Socrates is a human; therefore, Socrates dies.” In the strict sense, the proposition “all humans die” is a generality (indefinity) based upon experience, and not universality (infinity). There may be a man who does not die. But, in terms of the procedure of proof, unless counterevidence that there is a man who does not die is actually posed, the proposition can be deemed a scientific truth. It is totally unlikely that such counterevidence could ever be posed in reality, however, it should still be considered a possibility. It is at this point that ‘the other’ has to intervene as the ultimate ground for a universal proposition to be established. The concept of universality itself inexorably
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introduces the problematic of ‘the other’. The domain of mathematics is not exempted from this, though those who considered mathematics as a type of analytic judgment sought to do away with it. Famously, the paradox of contemporary mathematics derived from Cantor’s theory of sets that sought to grasp infinity itself as a number. And this must have some link to Kant’s theory of antinomy, though Cantor did not think that way. According to Martin, the closest approximation to Kant’s approach among all contemporary theories of mathematical foundations is intuitionism. Intuitionism acknowledges only finite objects, namely, those that can be constituted. In Martin’s words: If we are trying, from today’s point of view, to understand Kant’s explanations about the constructive character of mathematics, then we [have to be] aware that we are using facts which Kant hadn’t yet known in this precise way. Such an explanation of Kant based on our contemporary insights nevertheless seems to be possible because the Intuitionists themselves accept this relationship with the Kantian premises. Given this, the Kantian thesis of the intuitive character of mathematics means the limiting of mathematics to those objects that are constitutable [konstruierbar]. From here, Kant’s position towards Euclidean geometry can be made clear. We have already said that even many Kantians passionately contested the possibility of non-Euclidean geometry. Certainly this protest had a certain justification in Kant’s positions, but things are much more difficult here than one first assumed. They became even more burdened because of the fact that Kant—just like Gauss later—neglected to speak of non-Euclidean geometries. And when we view the battles provoked by the introduction of non-Euclidean geometries, we must indeed say that Kant was right to be cautious. There can be no doubt, however, that Kant himself was quite clear about the fact that, in geometry, what is logically possible goes far beyond the realm of Euclidean geometry. But Kant held fast, even if presumably erroneously, to one thesis. What goes beyond Euclidean geometry is logically possible, it is true, but it is not constitutable. This means that it is not intuitively constitutable. And this means, in turn, that for Kant it does not exist mathematically. Only Euclidean geometry exists in the mathematical sense, whereas all non-Euclidean geometries are mere thought-objects.6
From this standpoint, Martin reinterprets the significance of Kant’s having deemed mathematics constitutive. Intuitive is equal to constitutable. All geometries can be thought without contradiction, whereas
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cognizable ones are limited, and this limitation overlaps finite constitutability. All in all, it was for this reason that Kant set up the distinctions between thing-in-itself and phenomena, thinking and cognition. Therefore, we must acknowledge that Kant’s theory is not in the least obsolete; indeed it assumes a strong position in contemporary theories of mathematical foundations. Kant was aware that by taking up any axiom, an alternative geometry could be produced without contradiction; yet, at the same time, he did consider space and time—the basic forms of sensuous intuition— to be Euclidean. For this reason, he is thought to have grounded Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics philosophically. Moreover, his thinking has even been used as a basis to counter non-Euclidean geometry. But, as I have been arguing, just the opposite is closer to the truth. His starting point was that, in order for non-Euclidean geometry to be constituted, Euclidean geometry was a sine qua non. One of the methods to prove the consistency of an axiomatic system is to appeal to an intuitive model. For example, in Riemannian geometry, the axiomatic system takes the sphere of Euclidean geometry as its model; it then assumes a plane to be a sphere in the Euclidean system, a point to be a point on the sphere, and a straight line to be the greater circle. By so doing, the individual axioms of Riemannian geometry can be transferred into the theorems of Euclidean geometry. Which is to say that, inasmuch as Euclidean geometry is consistent, so too is non-Euclidean geometry. However, since the consistency of Euclidean geometry cannot be proven in and of itself, one has to appeal to intuition, after all. Thus the problematic of non-Euclidean geometry eventually circles back to Euclidean geometry. One should note in passing, however, that the crux of the formalism of David Hilbert (1862–1943) lies in jettisoning this problematic and its procedures. In his Foundations of Geometry [Grundlagen der Geometrie, 1899], he insisted that not only Euclid’s fifth postulate but also other definitions and postulates are by no means self-evident truths, in part because concepts such as ‘point’ and ‘straight line’ have no meaning in and of themselves. So Hilbert formalized mathematics into symbolic logic. This is not to say, however, that just any geometries can be constituted. He set up a precise standard of judgment as
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to whether or not three measures can be satisfied within any axiomatic system: (1)completeness (all theorems can be derived from an axiomatic system); (2) independence (there are theorems which can no longer be proven if any proposition is extracted from an axiomatic system); and (3) consistency (it is impossible to prove mutually contradictory theorems within an axiomatic system). Hereby, Hilbert sought to ground mathematics, not by intuitive selfevidence, but solely by theoretical consistency. For this, he was criticized by intuitionists; but to adhere strictly to intuitionism would inexorably limit the territory of mathematics. In response, therefore, while Hilbert did adopt the finitistic stance advocated by intuitionists, he also still sought to ground mathematics without resorting to intuition. This was the so-called Hilbert’s Program (developed 1917–1925), and it was basically Kantian in inspiration. Finally, however, Kurt Gödel (1906–1978) pushed Hilbert’s Program literally to the limit, by demonstrating that it (particularly its third standard) falls inexorably into self-referential paradox.7 Gödel’s proof (first advanced in 1931) was executed within a persistent formalism in its argument that, inasmuch as formalism is taken for granted as a premise, it automatically reveals its paradox. And this argument also helped implement the rupture of Russellian logicism. The basic lesson of Gödel’s proof is that mathematical truth is not necessarily expressed within the formal axiomatic system; in other words, there can be truths which are not formally grounded. But an additional lesson, arguably equally important, is this: inasmuch as a mathematical system is consistent, it cannot prove its own consistency. Yet we neither need to lament nor get overly excited by the absence of the mathematical ground Gödel revealed. The dream of achieving a solid foundation by way of a formal axiomatic system was never inherent in mathematics itself; this dream was informed by metaphysics, for which only analytic judgment is sound. And it was metaphysics, in this precise sense, that Kant sought to undermine. But inasmuch as metaphysics relies on mathematics, this critique first had to be executed in mathematics—before throwing the result back into philosophy. Gödel’s meta-mathematical critique had such a function in the history of mathematics. In this sense, Gödelian ‘deconstruction’ can be connected to Kant’s
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transcendental critique. In any case, what I want to stress is that, from today’s standpoint, Kant was entirely correct when he deemed mathematics a synthetic judgment. As Kant maintained, synthetic judgment is an expansive judgment [Erweiterungsurteil]. And so it is that mathematics has developed in the past and will continue to do so in the future. In his later years, Wittgenstein spoke of mathematics as a motley bundle of inventions. In this expression, he, too, affirmed with Kant that mathematics is a synthetic judgment. 2.2 The Linguistic Turn Philosophers of the postlinguistic turn tend to accuse Kant of having remained within the philosophy of subjectivity. But this claim is simply not true, and conceals the true radicality of his thought. For what Kant problematized as the activity of subjectivity was in actuality language. Kant’s saying that phenomena are constituted by the form of sensibility and by the category of understanding is equivalent to saying that they are linguistically constituted. Not by chance, a neo-Kantian philosopher like Ernst Cassirer renamed them “symbolic form.” For this reason, the prospect of going ‘beyond’ Kant by appealing to the linguistic turn can only be misleading. To make this point clear, I will refer to Wittgenstein, since he is commonly embraced by linguistic turn thinkers. Returning to Gödel for a brief moment, it is not as if his proof paralyzed the whole practice called mathematics. It rendered obsolete only that part of the system which is infallibly deduced from an axiom. Which is to say that Gödel liberated mathematics from the bind of infallibility with which it had been unfairly charged from without. This didn’t shock Wittgenstein. Here is how he spoke of his position with regard to Russell: “It is my task, not to attack Russell’s logic from within, but from without;” and with regard to Gödel: “My task is not to talk about (e.g.) Gödel’s proof, but to by-pass it.”8 What do those expressions, “from without” and “to by-pass,” mean? That Gödel “attacks Russell’s logic from within” means that he, in effect, deconstructs Russell’s formal system by inducing its undecidability from within. So is Wittgenstein then declaring that he would do the same thing “from without?” Not precisely. The fact that Wittgenstein
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spoke so much about Russell and so little about Gödel, in the climate in which the “Incompleteness Theorem” was giving mathematical society such a salutary shock, only speaks of Wittgenstein’s antipathy toward Gödel’s position, and brings Wittgenstein closer to Kant’s transcendental critique. Gödel was a tacit Platonist. He demonstrated the undecidability of Cantor’s continuum hypothesis, but with respect to the fallacy of that hypothesis, it is said that Gödel claimed he could intuit it through meditation, if not prove it formally. He ‘acted out’ the performance of negatively proving the absence of a foundation by way of formal demonstration only because he believed a priori in the mathematical substance that would require no further foundation. Instead of writing positively, he implies negatively. If so, wasn’t Gödel’s “negative theology”—deconstructing the formal grounding with a make-believe faith—the true target of Wittgenstein’s antagonism, much more than Russell’s wholehearted faith in the foundation?9 In his late career, Wittgenstein focused on a radical reconsideration of the procedure of proof—the premise for Gödel’s undecidability as opposed to decidability. Mathematical thinking is canonically seen as infallible only insofar as it is consistently deduced from an axiom. Wittgenstein thrust two explosive contingencies into this system of faith. The first of these contingencies is the practical and historical nature of mathematics, namely, the index of its heterogeneity and excess, which cannot be reduced to a basic axiomatic system. In the case of Gödel’s proof, it is based upon a translation from the foundations of non-Euclidean geometry: first, into Euclidean geometry, and second, into natural numbers. As Wittgenstein relates this translation: What is it to coordinate one system of proofs with another? It involves a translation rule by means of which proved propositions of the one can be translated into proved propositions of another. Now it is possible to imagine some—or all—of the proof systems of present-day mathematics as having been coordinated in such a way with one system, say that of Russell. So that all proofs could be carried out in the system, even though in a roundabout way. So would there then be only the single system—no longer that many?—But then it must surely be resolved
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into the many—One part of the system will process the properties of trigonometry, another those of algebra, and so on. Thus one can say that different techniques are used in these parts.10
Certainly, Wittgenstein opposed the projects of Russell, inter alia, to ground the whole of mathematical practice in set theory. For instance, according to Russell, ‘1, 2, 3, . . .’ can be translated into ‘1, 1 1, (1 1) 1, . . .’ as a grounding. With this method, however, any even moderately larger equation (say, 84 24 2,016) becomes too cumbersome. According to the Wittgenstein who noted “A mathematical proof must be perspicuous,”11 it is definitely not perspicuous, whereas with the decimal system it becomes perfectly perspicuous. In Russell’s view, calculation in the cardinal system (1, 1 1, [1 1] 1, . . .) is grounded and authentic; in Wittgenstein’s, even calculation using the decimal system is a mathematical invention and a system of proofs in and of itself. “I want to say that: if you have a proof-pattern that cannot be taken in, and by a change in notation you turn it into one that can, then you are producing a proof, where there was none before.”12 For Wittgenstein, it was simply no longer necessary to prove mathematical systems by means of a “general foundation.” As he put it, “it is not something behind the proof, but the proof, that proves.”13 New forms of expression or new mathematical proofs automatically produce new concepts in and by themselves. For example: Now surely one could simply say: if a man had invented calculating in the decimal system—that would have been a mathematical invention!—Even if he had already got Russell’s Principia Mathematica.14 It [mathematics] forms ever new rules: is always building new roads for traffic; by extending the network of the old ones.15 But the mathematician is not a discoverer: he is an inventor.16
From time to time in mathematics it happens that identical theorems arise from different fields and contexts. Rather than considering them as one and the same, however, Wittgenstein, who understood mathematics as consisting of multiple systems, considered that they belong to different systems of rules. It was in this context that he wrote, as we have seen, “I should like to say: mathematics is a MOTLEY of techniques and proof—And upon this
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is based its manifold applicability and its importance.”17 Thus what Wittgenstein objected to was founding multiple systems of rules upon a single system. But this is not to say that mathematical polysystems are completely separate and unrelated. Though they are translatable into (i.e., interchangeable with) each other, they do not share the same system. “Family resemblances” was the name he gave to such “a complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing.”18 Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, but that they are related to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all “language.”19
Likewise, what are grouped together under the umbrella term ‘mathematics’ are polysystems that cannot be centralized. Wittgenstein stressed this heterogeneity not only because mathematics deals with heterogeneous Nature in a practical manner—no less than do the various sciences—but also, and more important, because heterogeneity comes from an acknowledgment of the other who cannot be interiorized. And this is the second contingency, the first being the practical and historical nature of mathematics. Wittgenstein’s critique of formalism was thus focused on its tendency to exclude the otherness of the other, the contingency of the relation to the other. Generally speaking, mathematical proofs appear to be done automatically and peremptorily. But Wittgenstein stressed that, as to subjects following rules, they are less automatic than compulsory. This position is reminiscent of the Plato—though unlike Gödel’s Plato—who associated geometric proof with dialogue. Or more precisely, if Plato made mathematics infallible, it was by way of introducing the proof as a dialogue in the sense of collaborative inquiry. In the Meno, Plato’s Socrates induces a boy who is not welleducated in geometry to prove a theorem. In this demonstration, Socrates proves that there is neither “teaching” nor “learning,” but only “recollection” [anámnesis]. This is known as “Meno’s paradox” or the paradox of pedagogy. The proof is executed in the form of a “dialogue,” but a peculiar one in which the only thing Socrates need
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say is, “You see Meno, that I am not teaching . . . only asking.”20 The prerequisite to the dialogue is a rule that stipulates: ‘Upon the acceptance of a basic premise (axiom), one must do nothing to contradict it’. Proof becomes unattainable at any moment if the boy utters anything contradictory to what he has said previously. In other words, the boy has always already been taught to follow the rules, which he then ‘recollects’. Prior to the dialogue, he already shares the a priori rules. Who taught them to him? There is nothing extraordinary about Socrates’ method. It is based on specific Athenian legal institutions. Nicholas Rescher has reconsidered dialectics in terms of those forms of disputation and courtroom procedure in which an interlocutor (prosecutor) presents his opinion, and an opponent (defendant) counters his point, followed by the interlocutor’s response.21 In this way, the first interlocutor’s point does not have to constitute an absolutely infallible, indisputable thesis. As long as no effective counterproposal is raised against the initial assertion, it is understood to be valid and consequential. In such argumentation, the interlocutor bears the onus probandi, the burden of proof; and the defendant is not required to give testimony. Socrates’ method clearly follows this course. It is significant that Plato began the Meno by describing the case of Socrates himself, who believed so strongly in the dialogic justice that he accepted his own death as a result of a verdict. For the Socratic method, even if the verdict were found to be unjust, it is the process of justice itself that is of primary importance—and Socrates acknowledged as true only what passed through this process. In many courts of law, both opponents must obey a common rule that technically allows the prosecutor and the defense attorney to exchange roles at any time. Those who do not acknowledge and adhere to the legal language game are either ordered out of court or ruled incompetent by the court. In this sort of game, no matter how forcefully or enthusiastically they might oppose one another, neither opponent occupies the position of “the other.” As Rescher notes, this dialogue always has the potential to become a monologue. Indeed, in the works of Aristotle and Hegel, dialectics did become a monologue. And though Plato’s dialogues were written in the form of conversation, finally they, too, must be considered
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dramatic monologues—as Bahktin pointed out in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. Western philosophy thus began as an introspective— that is, monologic—dialogue, or, alternatively, dialogic monologue. Mathematics is privileged because its knowledge has a compelling power far beyond that of the subjectivity I. Which does not mean, however, that the power is due to the characteristics of mathematics in and of itself; rather it is thanks to Plato’s and Euclid’s notion that only that which survives the process of legal argumentation can be deemed mathematics. In this manner, mathematical proof is presumed to be produced by intersubjectivity, that is, by that which lies beyond individual cognition. The true Socratic/Platonic invention is not the idea that reason inheres in the world or the self, as is often claimed, but rather that only that which goes through the dialogic process is rational. Those who refuse dialogue, no matter how deep the truth they may grasp, are irrational. Whether or not the world or the self contains reason in and of itself ultimately counts for nothing; only those who are subjected to dialogue are rational. And this is also the standpoint from which the pre-Socratics are scrutinized. Being rational is equivalent to accepting, as premise, the principle of dialogue with others. Proof, no matter how it be written, assumes a compelling power because it includes collaborative scrutiny with others. Finally, it is thanks to this process that mathematics has been considered as the norm. As I have pointed out, Popper’s concept of ‘proof to the contrary’ is based on this same conviction. And Kant’s position, that mathematics is a synthetic judgment, was its most radical critique. Synthetic judgment is universal only insofar as proof to the contrary is presupposed—not the proof of the other who shares the same system of rules, but of the other who does not share the same system of rules. Kant’s radicalism exists in the fact that he pursued the problem of alterity in communication deep into mathematics, and that he did this by introducing the transcendental other, the other who cannot be internalized into the same system. The transcendental other—as distinct from the transcendent other, the sacred other (God)—is a quintessentially secular other who is everywhere and everytime in front of us. One of later Wittgenstein’s most crucial contributions is his emphasis on precisely this secular other.
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Part of Wittgenstein’s skepticism was aimed at the dialogue that supports the specifically metaphysical foundation of the mathematic proof. The Wittgensteinian skepticism is connected to the cognition that mathematics, qua “motley” of various systems of rules and proofs, cannot be deduced to a single system of rules, if mutual translation is possible. And his target extended beyond mathematics to the “language game” in general. But, at the same time, one should not forget that the privileged position of mathematics, along with its metaphysics of proof, remained his primary target. Without this aspect, what we would have would be just another mundane language game. Wittgenstein was skeptical of the Platonic dialogue because it did not take the true other as its counterpart, and thus could always be converted into a monologue. If a stranger, an ostensible other, can be internalized, it is because he or she shares the common set of rules. Strictly speaking, dialogue has to be with the one that engages the other who does not share the same set of rules. Here is how Wittgenstein posits the other who cannot be internalized: “Someone who did not understand our language, a foreigner, who had fairly often heard someone giving the order: “Bring me a slab!,” might believe that this whole series of sounds was one word corresponding perhaps to the word for “building-stone” in his language.”22 To communicate with foreigners or children is, in other words, to teach a code to someone who does not yet know it. And in such a case, the situation is the same from the other’s standpoint: To the other, I am a foreigner or a child to be taught. Communication with the other who does not share the same set of rules will inexorably take place in a teaching/learning relationship. Conventional theories of communication take for granted a shared system of rules, but in the case of communication with foreigners or children—or psychotics for that matter—such a system is absent from the very outset, or never even possible. This is no exception, but the daily landscape of human lives. As human beings, we are all born children and learn language from our parents (or their equivalents). As a result, we come to share common rules. Likewise, in our daily communication with others, we must always have incommensurable domains, though we do not always remember this surprising fact. Thus communication
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must, in reality, become mutual teaching. If there is a system of common rules, it is achieved only after the event of the teaching/learning relationship. In the beginning, this mutual relationship is asymmetrical. And this is the most fundamental aspect of communication. Again, this is not an anomaly—it is our daily state of affairs. Rather, the anomalies are commonly considered to be the ‘normal’ cases, namely, in the dialogue that takes for granted a common set of rules, as one big merry party or symposium. Therefore, Wittgenstein’s introduction of the other into his reflection on communication is equal to having reintroduced the initial asymmetric relationship—the one so charged with impossible crossings. In this context, “teaching” has nothing to do with authoritarian hierarchy, because the teaching (or psychoanalytic) position is the lesser one, subordinate to the others’ (or analysand’s) demand for understanding. In the context of the political economy, teaching is ‘selling’ one’s knowledge to the other. Marx made this fundamental point very clear in his theory of exchange: The individual commodity never contains the substantial value that classical economists claimed was immanent in it. It cannot have a value (or even use value) if it is not sold (exchanged). And, if not sold, it is a thing to be simply discarded. The “selling” position is subordinated to the ‘choice’ of the buyer (the possessor of money), and their mutual relationship is the epitome of asymmetricity. To Wittgenstein, the “someone who [does] not understand our language, a foreigner,” is not simply one among just any example he might have taken. It is the very other, the sine qua non, in relation to his “methodical doubt.” To borrow an example, when I shout, “Bring me a slab!,” I may believe in the existence of a meaning internal to my utterance, but if it means “building-stone” to the other, the internal signification is proven to be null and void. Wittgenstein’s other is he or she who precisely nullifies this entire internal process—the one who appears as a “bizarre skeptic,” to adopt Saul Kripke’s expression.23 In his early career, Wittgenstein had famously concluded, “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”24 In that case, “whereof one cannot speak” meant art and religion, but not yet science and math. In this issue of categorical distinction, it is fairly
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easy to associate Wittgenstein with Kant. For instance, in Wittgenstein’s Vienna,25 Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin have little trouble in describing how Wittgenstein developed his thinking in the Kantian/ Kierkegaardian atmosphere of Vienna, and the ‘character traits’ he developed there never changed, even throughout his later working life in England, including, initially, with Russell. But what about Wittgenstein’s later work? In his theory of the language game in Philosophical Investigations, he banned the disciplinary division between science, ethics, and art—making it look, perhaps, as if he had finally distanced himself from Kantianism. However, the core of the Kantian critique has nothing substantial to do any categorical divisions; instead, it lies in the introduction of alterity into the architectonic of the categorical universe. If this is true, then the later Wittgenstein is even more Kantian than early Wittgenstein. It is here, in this problematic of alterity—the other who is empirically omnipresent but grasped only transcendentally—that Kant and Wittgenstein, most radically, most transcritically, intersect. There is another canonical perception that Wittgenstein advocated the precedence of social language over private language, namely, solipsism. While this sounds plausible and benevolent, finally it buries the radial crux of his skepticism—nullifying it. Wittgenstein’s “skeptic” really attacks only the tacit solipsistic nature of intersubjectivity or dialogue, whenever it takes the form of “apodictic proof.” It is high time for us to redefine “solipsism.” It is not the idea that only I exist, but that what is true of and for me is common to everyone. This apparently innocuous, but in fact draconian move functions as a tacit politics of internalizing the other. And, as tacit, it is much harder to refute or combat than more explicit moves. Furthermore, and for the same reason, I suggest that it is also high time to redefine “dialogue.” To repeat the main point, strictly speaking it is that which occurs between others who do not share a common set of rules, namely, that which takes place in an irrevocably asymmetrical relationship. And others are just like that, but they are different from what anthropologists call strangers (or the uncanny). As with Freud, unheimlich (uncanny) originally meant the familiar (heimlich). Herein exists the mechanism of self-projection (as in selfimage). Furthermore, our ‘other’ is not the Absolute Other that is
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again a self-projection. What is truly crucial and problematic to us, in contrast, is the otherness of the everyday, relative other. If these points are not taken into consideration, serious confusion will inevitably occur, as has happened with respect to Wittgenstein. His theory has been mistaken as a sort of sociological observation. One salient example is what has happened with his concept of “language game.” Today, it is often conflated with, and usurped by, the Durkheimian fait social or the Saussurean langue. To be sure, in fact Wittgenstein did often use the figure of chess, much like Saussure. In Saussure, the figure shows this: first, that the essence of language exists in a form that is irrespective of the material, such as sounds and letters; and, second, that the meanings of the ‘pieces’ exist in the rules of their movements, and that these are encoded within the relational system (of difference) that encompasses other pieces. For this reason, if the functions and arrangements of the pieces were altered, the ‘identical’ set of pieces would be playing totally different games. In sum, the figure of chess suggests that language is a differential formal system, independent of references and meanings—which are themselves the products of the system. This is formalism, or at least one type. And Wittgenstein’s theory of the language game was precisely poised to undermine the practical and historical nature of mathematics’ very premises of this version of the formalist idea. The figures of chess, indeed of games in general, lead one to draw the inference that a rule can be presented explicitly. For instance, grammar is considered a rule of language. But do those who are able to speak, say, fluent Japanese systematically or systemically know the grammar? Most often not, including myself. Grammar was originally conceptualized as a method for studying foreign or dead classical languages. In a strict sense, grammar is not a rule but a discovered (read also: produced) regularity without which foreigners might never efficiently master a language. On the other hand, fully knowing the grammar of a language one already speaks is not merely unnecessary but also simply impossible for the speaking subject. Before the advent of modern nationalism, people in Europe and elsewhere might never have dreamt that their vernacular languages could have grammars, let alone grammars imposed upon them, not to mention other kinds of rules.
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A rule of a language is discovered from the point of view of foreigners who need to learn—not of those who speak it. Which is to say that “I” do not need to and cannot know the grammar, say, of the “Japanese I am already speaking.” At the same time, however, I can point out the grammatical mistakes in foreigners’ speech. Which is to say that, technically, I do “know” the grammar. Nonetheless, I cannot present a grammatical “basis” to explain the mistakes of foreigners. I can simply point out that “we do not say it that way.” It is in this sense that I “don’t know” Japanese grammar; what do I know is only the “use.” Adults do not and cannot normally teach the rules of language; they simply talk to their infants. When the infants begin to talk, becoming mature, adults either correct their mistakes, or just laugh. While adults do not know the rules as rules, they “practice” them all the time—and by so doing they also “teach.” If ‘we’ can teach children grammar at all, it is only because ‘they’ already ‘know’ that language. It is possible to say this is all that is indicated by “Meno’s paradox.” “I have just said that you are a rascal, and now you ask me if I can teach you, when I say there is no such thing as teaching, only recollection.”26 Though a rule exists, it cannot be explicitly presented. In spite of it all, however, teaching does exist. The boy who has managed to demonstrate a geometric theorem by way of a dialogue with Socrates has already been taught the rule. On the other hand, as Plato also stresses, there is no teaching—in the sense that a teacher cannot present the rules explicitly. Wherein exists teaching/ learning a rule, therein exists something that cannot be rationally elucidated any further. As noted earlier, Plato tried to solve this paradox by appealing to the “doctrine of recollection” [anámnesis]— knowing full well that it was a myth, a “noble lie” [gennaion pseudos], ‘noble’ in the sense of ‘well-bred’, which is in part only to say ‘linguistically competent’—thus tightly closing the tautologous circle. The “doctrine of recollection” is based upon the idea that the identical exists fundamentally within everyone, collectively. So when Kant speaks of the a priori form or category, it sounds as though he were restating the “recollection” of the identical. But Kant, almost uniquely, is not. His formulation of mathematics qua a priori synthetic judgment was really posed in order to refute the very idea that
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mathematics is an analytical judgment, namely, a “proof.” Synthetic judgment is posited with respect to—and to respect—the problematic synthesis of a radically split sensibility and understanding; and what renders this split is the existence of the other, of polysystems. This is what Kant sought to address with his concept the thing-in-itself. 2.3 Transcendental Apperception In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant seems to maintain that cognition (qua synthetic judgment) is established by transcendental subjectivity (or apperception). This does not entail, however, that cognition (e.g., that of natural science) is established without the intervention of other subjects, unlike the case of art. Neither does this entail that synthetic judgment is automatically and easily established. Rather, in his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant focuses on a specific inquiry: If cognition, which must be synthetic judgment, can be established at all, then in what form? Kant’s presupposition of the transcendental subject (or apperception) has also been criticized by postlinguistic turn philosophers. But it is impossible to eradicate the problematic whole proposed by Kant (and, for that matter, by Descartes) by shedding light on thinking or the subject from the vantage point of language alone. Saussure insisted that language is a social system. If so, how can he grasp langue, which is a synchronic system? It is impossible to identify this problematic empirically, quite simply because it is impossible to survey the whole event of langue, that is, all the varieties of words used at this moment. It follows that what Saussure calls langue —to him, as French speaker—is technically the sum of all the French words he knows at this moment. In other words, Saussure’s linguistics really departs from transcendental introspection. He says that langue is not substantive; it exists only in the speaking subject. He rejects the conventional account, according to which a sign expresses a certain meaning, because whenever there is a meaning to a “speaking subject,” then there is also a form that discriminates the meaning—and the reverse is impossible. Langue exists not as an object, but is considered to exist insofar as meanings are mutually communicated. Saussure also spoke of langue as a synchronic system—but
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such a whole is only presumed after the fact, from his own language experience. In the Saussurean system, and its legacy, a word is the “synthesis” of the signifiant (the sensible) and the signifié (the suprasensible). But the crucial point here is that such a synthesis is established only ex post facto—that it makes sense to me. In the end, when Saussure suggested that form (le signifiant) constitutes a differential, relational system, the architectonic of the system tacitly took as a premise what Kant had already called “transcendental apperception.” It is Roman Jakobson who began to clarify this point. He opposed Saussure’s notion that “in language there are only differences, and without positive terms.”27 He thought it would be possible to order the phonetic organization Saussure had left in a jumble by reconstructing it as a bundle of binary oppositions. Modern specialists in the field of acoustics wonder with bewilderment how it is possible that the human ear has no difficulty in recognizing the great variety of sounds in a language given that they are so numerous and their variations so imperceptible. Can it really be that it is a purely auditory faculty that is involved here. No, not at all! What we recognize in spoken language is not sound differences in themselves but the different uses to which they are put by the language, i.e., differences which, though without meaning in themselves, are used in discriminating one from another entities of a higher level (morphemes, words).28
Phonemes are not the same as voice/sounds; they are “form” that comes into existence as differentiality only after entities of a higher level are presupposed. The same can be said of morphemes, words, and even sentences; they, too, are all extracted as differentiality (or form) only when entities of respectively higher levels are presupposed. This means that “structures” always and tacitly are premised on the “transcendental subjectivity” that synthesizes them. Nevertheless, structuralists thought it possible to do away with, and even deny, transcendental subjectivity, because they presumed the existence of a function that, though nonexistent substantially, makes a system a system: Thus the zero sign. Jakobson introduced the zero phoneme in order to complete the phonemic system. “A zerophoneme,” he wrote, “is opposed to all other French phonemes by the absence both of distinctive features and of a consistent sound characteristic. On the other hand, the zero-phoneme is opposed to
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the absence of any phonemes whatsoever.”29 Zero signs of this sort undoubtedly derived from mathematics. For instance, the mathematical structure formulated by Nicolas Bourbaki (André Weil et al.) is a transformational rule that is not visible like form, but is an invisible function. Included as a sine qua non within a transformational rule is a nontransformational function. The zero phoneme Jakobson established corresponds to the unit element e in mathematical transformational groups. Owing to this, a bundle of oppositional relations of phonemes can constitute a structure. Lévi-Strauss was inspired by this assertion of the orderly composition of chaos: “Structural linguistics will certainly play the same renovating role with respect to the social sciences that nuclear physics, for example, has played for the physical sciences.”30 And he applied the Kleinian group (as algebraic structure) in his analysis of the heterogeneous kinship structures among ‘uncivilized’ societies. It was here that structuralism in the narrow sense was born. In the final analysis, however, the zero sign is a restatement of transcendental subjectivity—the nothingness that constitutes the structure of a system—and it is impossible to do away with it. Zero was invented in India, and originally the name for not moving a bead on an abacus-like counting board. If it were not for zero, the numbers, say, 205 and 25 would be indistinguishable. In other words, zero is “opposed to the absence of any number whatsoever.” It introduced the place-value system. In Sanskrit the word for zero is the same as the word for the Buddhist concept of emptiness, sunyata. It is not an exaggeration to say that Buddhist philosophy was developed around this concept.31 When Gilles Deleuze observes that “structuralism is inseparable from a new kind of transcendental philosophy, where places surpass what occupies them,”32 he neglects to add that a transcendental philosophy was already in place in the place-value system. Thus structuralism began with an introduction of the “zero sign,” though thereafter structuralists have not bothered to examine its philosophical implications. Instead, they believed they had managed to clear out the ‘modern thought’ originated in the ego cogito. By the time they thought it possible to do away with subjectivity, however, they had already and tacitly conceived of subjectivity as a premise, and then forgotten it.
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Returning to Saussure, one has to see the significance of his ambiguity—the source of Jakobson’s discontent. Saussure advocated that in language there are only differences. He saw language as value—an idea that represented only chaos for Jakobson. It is important to note, however, that when Saussure saw language as value he had already assumed the existence of the other, that is, different systems of languages (langues). The emphasis on “only differences in language” was not only made in reference to within one relational system (langue), but from the beginning was also addressed without—to the existence of a multitude of relational systems (langues). Which is to say that Saussure discovered langue by way of an introspection, while at the same time presupposing the externality beyond introspection, or the alterity beyond internalization. Saussure’s skeptical approach toward linguistics departed from the very sense of difference. Accordingly, it might be said that Saussure’s linguistics was a Kantian critique of two existing tendencies: on the one hand, Wilhelm von Humboldt’s early nineteenth-century linguistics, which considered languages as Volksgeist, and, on the other, historical linguistics, which observed the transformation of language, as if due to a natural scientific law, as an object independent of consciousness. Against the former, Saussure’s approach rejected the internal coherence of language, and emphasized it against the latter. In other words, his ambivalence lay in the fact that he considered langue as an enclosed synchronic system, even as he negated such an internal coherence. From this perspective, the meaning of Saussure’s statement that language is social becomes clear. He is not simply saying that language is a fait social (Durkheim) beyond individual consciousness; nor is he simply saying that individual terms exist only in a larger relational system. Those accounts consider language only as one langue — one system or community, and as such they are restatements of transcendental subjectivity. But language is properly social only when it is seen as, and in, communication with the other—with those others who belong to other systems of rules (langues) or communities. As I noted earlier, Wittgenstein sought to scrutinize linguistic communication in the context of teaching foreigners. He negated private language not from the conventional position—that language is
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a rule of a community—but from a heterology that sees language in that kind of “social” communication wherein those who belong to different communities encounter each other. Therefore, if there is such a thing at all as the linguistic turn, it exists not in the denial of subjectivity from the vantage point of language, but rather in a discovery of subject within the “doubt” fostered in the field of social difference. Such is the transcritical critical place.
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3.1 Subject and Its Topos Kant’s transcendental critique has been attacked for being a successor to the Cartesian method that constitutes the world by way of the cogito. It is possible to defend Kant against this position by pointing out a number of characteristics that dissociate him from Descartes. But instead of doing this now, I would like to reconsider Descartes himself, who is being nearly unanimously attacked nowadays. In his Discourse on Method (1637), Descartes speaks autobiographically about the motives behind his overall skepticism: reading old books he had learned that discourses on truth vary according to different historical contexts; and by traveling he had learned that truths themselves are the constructs of grammars and customs of communities. He wrote: and, having recognized since then, in traveling, that all those who have sentiments very contrary to ours are not, for that reason, barbarians or savages, but that many of them make use of reason as much as or more than we do; and, having considered how much different one and the same man, with his very same mind, being brought up from his infancy among the French or the Germans, becomes from that which he would be if he had always lived among the Chinese or the cannibals; and how, even down to the very fashions of our clothing, the same thing that pleased us ten years ago, and that will perhaps please us once again ten years hence, now seems to us extravagant and ridiculous—so that it is much more custom and example that persuade us than any certain knowledge, and yet the voices of the majority
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are not a proof that be worth anything for truths even a little difficult to discover, because it is much more likely that one man alone had found them than that a whole people had: having learned, having recognized and having considered all this, I say, I was unable to choose anyone whose opinions might have seemed to me to have to be preferred to those of the others, and I found myself constrained, as it were, to undertake to guide myself by myself.1
It is commonly said that Descartes was a solipsist who closed off dialogue and sought to secure truth by way of his concept of ego. As is evident in the passage just cited, however, Cartesian doubt begins from his realization that the truths people believe in are simply determined by the “example and custom” of the community to which they belong, namely, by shared rules and paradigms. That is to say that Descartes had already been observing the world in the manner of a cultural anthropologist. As I pointed out earlier, many postlinguistic-turn philosophers reject methods such as his, motivated as they appear to be in introspection. But the reason Descartes himself tended toward introspection in the first place was because his predecessors of the philosophia scholastica—whether nominalist or realist— had all thought within the frame of the “grammar” of the Indo-European language group. In this respect, the Cartesian cogito is nothing if not the awareness that our thought is always already bound by language. In Kant’s terminology, this is the “transcendental” standpoint toward language. The transcendental position is equivalent to bracketing the imagined self-evidence of the empirical consciousness in order to reveal the (unconscious) conditions that constitute it. What is crucial here is that the transcendental standpoint inexorably accompanies a certain kind of subjectivity. According to Wittgenstein, as we have also seen, skepticism is made possible by a language game; it is a part of the game. Certainly, today, beginning from Cartesian doubt is already a language game. But what Descartes doubted originally was the specific game of skepticism that had been dominant since antiquity. As he framed the problem of doubt in Discourse on Method, “Not that I were, in order to do this, to imitate the skeptics, who doubt only in order to doubt, and who affect being always undecided: for, on the contrary, my whole plan tended only toward assuring me, and toward casting
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aside the shifting earth and the sand in order to find the rock or the clay.”2 Certainly, today, this doubt is incorporated into modern philosophy, supporting as it does the philosophy of subjectivity. And, isn’t precisely such an institutionalized doubt what Wittgenstein sought to undermine? In fact, Wittgenstein, too, called the proper stance from which to inquire about philosophical issues, from the vantage point of language, “transcendental.”3 Here it is possible to find Wittgenstein’s otherwise concealed “change of attitude,” though he never spoke of it himself. Meanwhile, many of those who advocate the linguistic turn in the philosophical context, though often invoking Wittgenstein, forget the problematic of a certain cogito that is already inexorably involved in the change of attitude. Let us take up the example of another one of Descartes’ major critics, Lévi-Strauss. Speaking of a traditional ethnographer, he criticizes the cogito as follows: “Here they are,” he says of his contemporaries, “unknown strangers, nonbeings to me since they so wished it! But I detached from them and from everything, what am I? This is what remains for me to seek” (First Walk). Paraphrasing Rousseau, the ethnographer could exclaim as he first sets eyes on his chosen savages, “Here they are, then, unknown strangers, non-beings to me, since I wished it so! And I, detached from them and from everything, what am I? This is what I must find out first.” To attain acceptance of oneself in others (the goal assigned to human knowledge by the ethnologist), one must first deny the self in oneself. To Rousseau we owe the discovery of this principle, the only one on which to base the science of man. Yet it was to remain inaccessible and incomprehensible as long as there reigned a philosophy which, taking the Cogito as its point of departure, was imprisoned by the hypothetical evidences of the self; and which could aspire to founding a physics only at the expense of founding sociology and even a biology. Descartes believes that he proceeds directly from a man’s interiority to the exteriority of the world, without seeing that societies, civilizations—in other words, worlds of men— place themselves between these two extremes.4
I return momentarily to Descartes, after noting that while LéviStrauss does pass Descartes off as a villain here, this move is strategic. His real targets are certain successors of Cartesianism in France— Sartre in particular. On the other hand, Discourse on Method had already been written from the standpoint of an anthropologist. The
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Cartesian cogito was originally what James Clifford called an “anthropological Cogito.” Writing as an anthropologist, Descartes continues the passage as follows: It is true that, so long as I did nothing but consider the customs of other men, I found there hardly anything of which to assure myself, and that I noticed there almost as much diversity as I had previously done among the opinions of philosophers. So the greatest profit that I derived therefrom was that, seeing many things that, although they seem to us very extravagant and ridiculous, do not cease to be commonly accepted and approved among other great peoples, I learned not to believe too firmly anything of which I had been persuaded only by example and custom; and thus I delivered myself, little by little, from many errors that can obfuscate our natural light and render us less capable of listening to reason. But, after I had spent some years thus studying in the book of the world and trying to acquire some experience, I one day made the resolution to study within myself, too, and to employ all the powers of my mind in choosing the paths that I should follow. In this I succeeded much better, it would seem to me, than if I had never been away, either from my country or from my book.5
Reading this, it is impossible for us not to associate Descartes with Lévi-Strauss, among the most merciless of his critics. For instance, the retrospective style in Tristes tropiques (1955) is in important respects reminiscent of the Discourse on Method. After receiving his degree in philosophy, as he relates his story, Lévi-Strauss chose to go abroad instead of continuing study in France—he had hoped to go to Japan first, but could not. It is likely that he would have gone anywhere that was not the West. In other words, he did not go abroad as an anthropologist. But at this moment, his anthropological inquiry—albeit informal—had already begun moving “away from his country and his book.” Or, more precisely, this was a commencement less of anthropological research than the continuation of a certain, as yet unnamable, “philosophical investigation.” Descartes’ primary concerns had also not entailed the experience of the plurality of places he traveled; and, for his part, Lévi-Strauss expresses this laconic disclaimer about traveling at the beginning of Tristes Tropiques: “I hate traveling and explorers.” For traveling and exploration simply consume and dissolve difference: by traveling we never encounter the difference or the other who resists our internalization. What Descartes saw in the ‘uncivilized’ people he encountered
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were not fascinating, interesting strangers, but the other who rejects empathy à la Rousseau. Lévi-Strauss adds a further claim in Tristes tropiques: “The fact that so much effort and expenditure has to be wasted on reaching the object of our studies bestows no value on that aspect of our profession, and should be seen rather as its negative side. The truths that we seek so far afield only become valid when they have been separated from this dross.”6 The truths Lévi-Strauss seeks so far afield— precisely as had Descartes before him—exist only when they have been separated out from the pluralism encountered by traveling and expedition. The ultimate weapon Lévi-Strauss uses against this process is precisely what Descartes’ weapon had been: mathematics (structuralism). Lévi-Strauss acknowledges the existence of universal “reason” against/within the various myths and marriage systems he eventually encounters. If so, the Lévi-Strauss who considered Rousseau to be founder of anthropology, seeing in him the “principle, the only one on which to base the science of man,” should have quoted Descartes rather than Rousseau, or anybody else. What is more, Lévi-Strauss encountered the same difficulties as had Descartes. The “unconscious structure” he grasps is a deductive entity; and, for this reason, it has been subjected to innumerable criticisms by positivist anthropologists. For him, contrary to his critics, the last standard upon which to judge the adequacy of hypothetical models lies in whether or not they have a “higher explanatory value” that is “itself consistent.” And it is the role of experimentation to examine this value and internal consistency. This is definitely a different method from any that seeks an inductive theorization adduced from the collection of empirical data. To the precise contrary, this is the Cartesian method par excellence—which is hardly limited to or by the natural sciences in the narrow sense. Lévi-Strauss’s method contributed mightily to an intellectual revolution, the advent of structuralism, very much because he chose to start from the axiomatic (or formal) operation by transcendentally reducing the empirical consciousness of both the observed and the observer. Michel Serres has maintained that “structure” should be defined as a sheerly “imported” concept, namely, from contemporary formal mathematics. Structure as such is achieved “only when the
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formal sets of elements and relations can be extracted” by excluding content (or meaning); and, as he stresses, the structuralist analysis engendered a new methodical spirit and was an important revolution with respect to the question of meaning.7 But what one must acknowledge precisely here is that the founder of structuralism in this sense was neither Saussure nor Marx, and certainly not Rousseau, but Descartes. For he himself innovated mathematics itself instead of just ‘importing’ concepts from mathematics to his philosophy. The axiomatism of contemporary mathematics derived not from Euclid’s geometry but from Descartes’ analytical geometry, which transposed perceptive geometric figures into the coordinate of numbers. This inevitably introduced the problem of “real numbers,” as distinct from natural numbers, and led to the advent of the post-Cantorian theory of sets. So far, I have deliberately tried to defend Descartes from those who attack him as an (hypothetical) enemy. But it is impossible to deny the fact that there was a confusion in Descartes himself which made his accusers almost inevitable. The problem concerns the discrimination between “to doubt [dubitare]” and “to think [cogitare]”. In Discourse on Method, Descartes reflects that the existence of the doubting subject cannot be denied after doubting everything else. But then, just after this, he quickly concludes with his famous, or infamous, “I think, therefore, I am [cogito, ergo sum]”. Nonetheless, “doubting” and “thinking”—or the “subject of doubt [res dubitans]” and the “subject of thinking [res cogitans]”—must be different. Descartes posits “thinking” as the ground of all actions: “But what, then, am I? A thing that thinks. What is a thing that thinks? That is to say, a thing that doubts, perceives, affirms, denies, wills, does not will, that imagines also, and which feels.”8 Kant called this kind of thinking subject a “transcendental subject of thought X.” (This could also be written as the “transcendental subject,” though I do not necessarily like this kind of word play.) To Kant it is apperception that can never be represented, and for him Descartes’ formulation that “it is (or I am) [sum]” is a fallacy. Cartesian cogito is dogged by the ambiguity between “I doubt” and “I think”; furthermore, the ambiguity is inevitable as far as trying to speak of the transcendental ego is concerned. Descartes writes: For a long time I had noticed that, as for morals, it is sometimes necessary to follow opinions that one knows to be quite uncertain, all the same as if
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they were indubitable, as has been said above; but, because I then desired to devote myself solely to the search for the truth, I thought that it was necessary that I were to do completely the contrary, and that I were to reject, as absolutely false, all that in which I could imagine the least doubt, in order to see whether there would remain, after that, something in my beliefs that were entirely indubitable. [. . .] I resolved to feign that all the things that had ever entered my mind were no more true than the illusions of my dreams. But, immediately afterward, I took note that, while I wanted thus to think that everything was false, it necessarily had to be that I, who was thinking this, were something. And noticing that this truth—I think, therefore I am—was so firm and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions of the skeptics were not capable of shaking it, I judged that I could accept it, without scruple, as the first principle of the philosophy that I was seeking.9
Note the sudden jump that occurs between “I doubt” and “I think.” In Descartes, “I doubt” is a personal determination of will. And this “I” is a singular existence—Descartes himself (1). In a sense, (1) is an empirical self, and is simultaneously the doubting subject (2), who doubts the empirical subject (1)—by way of which the transcendental ego (3) is discovered. In Descartes’ discourse, however, the relationship between these three phases of the ego is blurred. When Descartes says, “I am [sum],” if he means that his “transcendental ego exists,” it is a fallacy, as Kant said. For the transcendental ego is something that can only be thought, but cannot be or exist, that is, it cannot be intuited. On the other hand, Spinoza interpreted “I think, therefore I am” as neither a syllogism nor a reasoning but as meaning simply, “I am as I think” or “I am thinking [ego sum cogitans]”; or, even more simply and definitively, “man thinks [homo cogitant]”.10 But, speaking more realistically, the Cartesian, “I think, therefore I am,” means “I am as I doubt [ego sum dubitans].” The “determination” to doubt the self-evidence of the psychological ego cannot simply originate from a psychological ego, but neither can it from the transcendental ego that is discovered by doubt. If this is so, however, what exists? Actually, as I will show later, the correct way of formulating the question is not, “what exists?” but “who is it?” But this move requires a detour through Husserl. The question—What exists?—was hardly irrelevant to Kant. For in the transcendental critique, the “determination” to bracket empirical self-evidence, or “I criticize [reprehendo],” is omnipresent,
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notwithstanding the fact that Kant did not mention it. The ultimate importance of the Discourse on Method lies in the fact that it revealed another problem in the sum: how does the “I” who brackets all self-evidence exist?—though Descartes never touched upon it again after this particular text. (To Kant, too, the problematic of sum was finally imperative. As I touch upon later, the Kantian transcendental critique was not simply abstract and theoretical, but a matter of his own existence.) On the other hand, Husserl criticized Kant, to develop transcendental phenomenology, by returning to Descartes. “Accordingly,” Husserl wrote, “one might almost call transcendental phenomenology a neo-Cartesianism, even though it is obliged—and precisely by its radical development of Cartesian motifs—to reject nearly all the well-known doctrinal content of the Cartesian philosophy.”11 In the place of considering the transcendental ego as apperception, as had Kant, Husserl considered it, as had Descartes, to be a ground from which solid science can be deduced, and thought it imperative to develop this line more persistently and rigorously than had his predecessor. In this context, Husserl made a noteworthy point: We can describe the situation also on the following manner. If the Ego, as naturally immersed in the world, experiencingly and otherwise, is called “interested” in the world, then the phenomenologically altered—and, as so altered, continually maintained—attitude consists in a splitting of the Ego: in that the phenomenological Ego established himself as “disinterested onlooker,” above the naively interested Ego. That this takes place is then itself accessible by means of a new reflection, which, as transcendental, likewise demands the very same attitude of looking on “disinterestedly”—the Ego’s sole remaining interest being to see and to describe adequately what he sees, purely as seen, as what is seen and seen in such and such manner.12
Here Husserl not only distinguishes between psychological ego and phenomenological (or transcendental) ego, but also points out the being of the I who further observes the “splitting of the Ego” as an “onlooker.” This ego exists as a will to phenomenological (or transcendental) reduction—which is, for Husserl, equivalent to the “willing” to forge philosophy into a science built on an absolutely solid ground. In the strict sense, therefore, it is insufficient to point out the existence of only two kinds of ego—psychological and transcendental. Husserl continues, “Obviously it can be said that, as an Ego in the
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natural attitude, I am likewise and at all times a transcendental Ego, but that I know about this only by executing phenomenological reduction.”13 Which is to say that there are three egos: the empirical ego; the ego who seeks to transcendentally reduce that ego; and the ego who is transcendentally discovered as a result. In this account, Husserl recovers the distinction between “I doubt” and “I think” that Descartes had blurred, namely, the distinction between the I who doubts (or executes the transcendental reduction) and the transcendental subjectivity (who is discovered by it). Husserl attempts to constitute the world by the transcendental ego, including other egos, yet he does not consider the ego to be a substance, as had Descartes. The Husserlian transcendental ego is the intentional function (noesis) of consciousness, which intervenes in the intentional object (noema). With this formulation, Husserl thought he had given philosophy the right to constitute beings from consciousness. This is different from Fichte’s earlier attempt, in the more immediate post-Kantian context, to constitute the world by the transcendental ego. For, in Husserl’s case, the transcendental ego is sustained by the “willing”—itself an empirical consciousness—that discovers it by a transcendental change of attitude. But Husserl’s new distinction confronts him with a serious paradox: the world is constituted by the transcendental ego, yet the “I” who wills to doubt everything belongs to the same world. As Husserl himself put it: This is precisely the difficulty. Universal intersubjectivity, into which all objectivity, everything that exists at all, is resolved, can obviously be nothing other than mankind; and the latter is undeniably a component part of the world. How can a component part of the world, its human subjectivity, constitute the whole world, namely, constitute it as its intentional formation, one which has always already become what it is and continues to develop, formed by the universal interconnection of intentionally accomplishing subjectivity, while the latter, the subjects accomplishing in cooperation, are themselves only a partial formation within the total accomplishment. The subjective part of the world swallows up, so to speak, the whole world and thus itself too. What an absurdity!14
Husserl believed that “the paradox of human subjectivity: being a subject of the world at the same time as being an object in the world” was resolvable. He sought to do so by transforming it into a
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new question: “How I can have, beyond my individual self-consciousness, a general, a transcendental-intersubjective consciousness?”15 However, this only leads to yet another aporia: Can the other egos be constituted by the ego? With respect to this question, Husserl first explained the constitution of the other Ego by way of a “self-transposition-into [Selbsthineinversetzen],” a Blickwechsel, toward what appears as the object (or body): “Because of its sense-constitution [the Other] occurs necessarily as an ‘intentional modification’ of that Ego of mine which is the first to be Objectivated, or as an intentional modification of my primordial ‘world’: the Other as phenomenologically a ‘modification’ of myself.”16 After all, for Husserl, the other is no more than a “modification of myself.” He finds the “alterity,” being other, in the self-differentiation (the distinction between self and nonself) within the transcendental ego. There is no doubt that the otherness of the other is absent in this move. Everything occurs inside the transcendental ego: “Within and by means of this ownness the transcendental Ego constitutes, however, the ‘Objective’ world, as a universe of being that is other than himself—and constitutes, at the first level, the other in the mode: alter Ego.”17 Husserl maintains that his solipsism is tentative, heuristic, and methodological—one which should be overcome by an association of monads, namely, intersubjectivity. But, as is already evident, the other whom Husserl sought to constitute cannot be deemed the veritable other in our transcritical context. Earlier I argued that Kant introduced the other in order to attain the universality of science. This otherness appears under the name thing-in-itself, or it is the otherness grasped by way of the passivity of sensibility. Husserl borrowed the term “transcendental” from Kant— but only in order to return to Descartes, ignoring Kant. Husserl could not acknowledge the structures of Kant’s architectonic: sensibility, understanding, and reason; thing-in-itself, phenomenon, and idea (transcendental illusion). If Kant’s transcendental critique appeared to Husserl to be impure, it was precisely because it contained the heterology, the “other’s standpoint.” Kant maintained that one can think of—but not intuit—the thingin-itself, and that, if not for this discrimination, one would be entrapped by antinomy. Thus Husserl’s paradox is just the same as
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what Kant meant by antinomy. For instance, there is nothing new in Husserl’s argument that “grasping the whole world, we are within it; or vice versa: being in the world, we grasp it; saying that we are nowhere but in this world, we are on the meta-level of the world.” Husserl encountered it at the end of his inquiries, but it is the problem he really should have confronted at the very outset. That is to say that “being other” should not be a conclusion, because it is that which motivates the transcendental critique from the first. It should be said that Husserlian phenomenology is ultimately a solipsism that has no way out. In his Speech and Phenomenon, Derrida rebuked Husserlian phenomenology as phonocentrism and West centrism. But the same critique cannot be applied to Kant. As I have said many times, his transcendental position is initiated by a pronounced parallax, that is, notably dogged by otherness. While Husserl saw his philosophical ground in the West since ancient Greece, Kant was a cosmopolitan. He neither traveled nor exiled himself like Descartes; he lectured mainly on geography and anthropology; he refused an invitation from Berlin University and remained in his hometown, Königsberg. In his case, this refusal to move assumed a kind of transposition. In passing, Descartes was not the kind of thinker that Husserl wanted to make of himself. According to Husserl, Descartes has sought to secure the validity of the transcendental ego’s constitution of the world by way of God, instead of intersubjectivity, before moving on to his existential proof of God. There are three kinds of proof in Descartes, two of which are the same as those put forth by Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) and the philosophia scholastica. The one that is original to Descartes is expressed in the following passage from Discourse on Method: [E]ngaging in reflection thereupon that I doubted, and that, as a consequence, my being was not totally perfect, for I clearly saw that it is a greater perfection to know than to doubt, I decided to search for the source from which I had learned to think of something more perfect than I was; and I knew evidently that this had to be from some nature that were, in effect, more perfect.18
Descartes scrutinized this problem further in the third of his Meditations on the First Philosophy (1641), in what might well be called a proof after the effect. This proof for the existence of God by no means belongs on the same level as the previous ones. Descartes had
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demonstrated the validity of the existence of res cogitans by the fact that the doubting self itself remains after doubting everything. In his proof of God’s existence, he again invoked “I doubt [reprehendo].” The difference here, however, is that, instead of the transcendental cogito, a doubting singularity now appears. If so, what does this “proof” really indicate? Punning on Spinoza’s interpretation of cogito, Descartes is saying that I am as I doubt—thanks to the existence of what makes me doubt. What compels Descartes’ doubt is the temporal and spatial heterogeneity of discourses, and in being-other to the community one belongs to. The heterogeneity, the difference, is not what one produces; and it is not that which is grasped from the vantage point of identity. When one says the multitude of cultural systems are different, for example, one tacitly takes for granted the existence of a common, objective world. To Descartes, however, the existence of the objective world had to be founded in the first place. Seen from this perspective, one recognize that what Descartes called God was the very difference that compelled him to doubt, namely, the otherness that can never be internalized. In the final analysis, and from the very beginning, what is hidden under doubting is the alterity—the otherness of the other. Pascal accused Descartes of wanting to do away with God, if possible. And if one really tries to do away with God, one should just restate ‘God’ as ‘the other’—who is not transcendent and absolute, but relative. The crux of Cartesian doubt Cogito is that it was constantly dogged by the other. This crucial problem of transcriticism was effectively lost after Descartes’ Meditations, which corresponded, in turn, to his own loss of “being as doubting” and its external mode of existence. And so it was that Lévi-Strauss, too, lost his “anthropological Cogito” in his later years. Once he stated that his stance would be progressive toward his own culture and conservative toward the objective cultures; finally, he ended up being conservative toward his own culture as well. 3.2 Transcendental and Transversal In Der Verlust der natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit., W. Blankenburg called schizophrenia a “living phenomenological reduction.”
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Phenomenologists methodologically bracket the self-evidence of the life world—that is, I exist and the objective world exists—based upon the premise that they can unbracket it anytime they want. For schizophrenics, on the other hand, the self-evidence is always already lost. Schizophrenics know that they exist and the world exists, but they cannot sense it vividly; for them it is tremendously difficult to live the world of self-evidence, namely, to unbracket phenomenological reduction. And if, in contrast, phenomenologists can bracket and unbracket self-evidence at will, then by what means? Hume radically questioned the Cartesian ego cogito, arguing that there are multiple Is—multiple egos in one person’s being—and that identical subjectivity as such exists only customarily—such as a republic or commonwealth—as an imaginary union of the Is. In regard to this kind of skepticism, he expressed his feelings as follows: “We have, therefore, no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all. For my part, I know not what ought to be done in the present case. I can only observe what is commonly done; which is, that this difficulty is seldom or never thought of; and even where it has once been present to the mind; is quickly forgot, and leaves but a small impression behind it.”19 But then he is quick to correct himself. But what have I here said, that reflections very refined and metaphysical have little or no influence upon us? This opinion I can scarce forbear retracting, and condemning from my present feeling and experience. The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another. Where am I, or what? From what cause do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me? and on whom have I any influence, or who have any influence on me? I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, environed with the deepest darkness, and utterly deprived of the use of every member and faculty. Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse,
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and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hour’s amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any further.20
Even after this correction, however, Hume continues to spell out his contradictory feelings about skepticism: It is just empty and frivolous, it results in self-destruction, and so on. These depictions tell us that, for Hume as for Descartes, to doubt was never merely some sort of intellectual puzzle. It induced in him an almost morbid state of mind. But then, after dining with friends and having other diversions, he manages—somehow—to regain the world of self-evidence. From the Kantian standpoint, what this transformative event points to, if negatively, is that the transcendental Ego (or apperception) exists. The nature of Kantian apperception is that it is revealed as the lack of itself. In the reading of Heidegger, it is nothing as a being but exists as an ontological function. To Hume, practicing transcendental reduction by bracketing the world of self-evidence—and then coming back to the same world by unbracketing—could never be voluntary. If it is true that the only distinction between philosophers and psychotics is that the former can bracket and unbracket freely and the latter cannot, then David Hume definitely belongs to the latter group. If, however, Hume is not a psychotic, it would be wrong to define philosophers—not scholars of philosophy, of course—as free agents of bracketing. In a certain sense, they, too, are compelled to doubt the world of self-evidence. It seems that philosophers intentionally deplete the self-evidence of the world, but perhaps they do so because they have already lost self-evidence from the beginning. I am not trying to say that philosophers are close to or candidates for schizophrenia, but I am suggesting that the transcendental reduction in philosophy cannot merely be a methodology. Socrates attributed the commencement of his skepticism to the oracle of Apollo, while Descartes attributed his to a dream. But these two cases nevertheless indicate the same thing: their doubts are not motivated simply by their spontaneous wills. Doubting is not a game we opt to play, but a produced, constructed experience. Doubting, in tandem with the subject that exists as doubting, ensues from
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realistically existing difference or otherness. Yet this subject is definitely different from the transcendental subject. In contrast to Descartes, Kant spoke little of it, save with respect to the criticizing self. “Now, this is the path—the only one that remained—which I have pursued, and I flatter myself to have found on it the elimination of all the errors that had thus far set reason, as used independently of experience, at variance with itself.”21 The “I” spoken here is this I, namely, Immanuel Kant himself. This is neither a transcendental ego, nor an empirical ego; for this I is the one that doubts the empirical I, and, we shall see in a moment, it is the most crucial to the transcritical context. Unlike Descartes, however, Kant did not confuse the “doubting I” with the “thinking I.” A critique that assesses what our cognitive powers can accomplish a priori does not actually have a domain as regards objects. For it is not a doctrine: its only task is to investigate whether and how our powers allow us (when given their situation) to produce a doctrine. The realm of this critique extends to all the claims that these powers make, in order to place these powers within the boundaries of their rightful [use].22
The transcendental critique is distinct from the faculties discovered by it; it does not belong to any domain of the faculties. So where does the critique come from? From the topos on which Kant was standing—namely, the “interstice” between empiricism and rationalism. For Kant, empiricism and rationalism were not simply two scholastic doctrines. Between them he encountered the paradox between being in the world and being the subject who constitutes the world—the same paradox as the one with which Husserl was to struggle. Taken together, empiricism and rationalism struck Kant as a “pronounced parallax”—and, as I have already mentioned, this is where Kant’s critique began. For him, the “critique” was inseparable from his “being as criticizing,” that is, externalized existence. In contrast to Descartes, Kant did not speak of “I doubt [dubito].” Consequently, the critical cogito after Descartes existed in certain thinkers—including Kant—who kept quiet about it, or even publicly negated it. The first major example is Spinoza, the first of Descartes’ extensive critics. Descartes himself, in his later work, considered thinking
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and extension to be two substances. But, as he put it in Discourse on Method, if thinking is determined by grammar and customs, it is also just a “machine” in the broad sense. The crux of the Cartesian cogito existed only in the “doubts”: What if we are just made to think, while we believe we actively think? What if we are enframed by sham problems charged by language? For his part, Spinoza considered thinking and extension to be two aspects of “one and the same substance.” By this move, however, it is not that Spinoza negated the Cartesian cogito; rather, he sought to recover its critical function. For Spinoza, God is equal to the world; and Descartes’ “free will” and “God,” far from going beyond the world, are just representations produced within the world. In a sense different from Heidegger, Spinoza implied that humans are beings-in-the-world/nature and cannot transcend it. This was a critique of Cartesianism, but not, in the properly transcritical sense, a denial of “being as doubting [dubitans].” In fact, though denying free will, Spinoza thought it possible that humans could be relatively liberated from the rule of passion by revealing the cause of being ruled. In other terms, Spinoza affirmed the freedom of will to cognize the world; yet again, this will should not be spoken of positively, for it cannot be separated from the sum: “being as doubting [dubitans].” Indeed, this is precisely his Ethica. Spinoza was himself a singular cogito who refused to belong to any community; his was an externalized existence. He was not a temporary refugee, like Descartes, but lived in the interstice of nowhere land, having been excommunicated not only from the Christian church but also from the Judaic synagogue. Making the interstice difference itself his world, Spinoza literally lived ego sum dubitans. He never spoke of the cogito, except when he wrote of Descartes. Which, however, does not contradict the fact that he himself existed as a cogito. The one and only substance for Spinoza, God world, implies his transcendentalization of the space in between individual systems; and by this, Spinoza undermines all the grounds of selfevidence inherent in those systems. But our task here is to return Descartes’ dubito to the empirical world from whence it originated—not to recuperate or recontexualize by Husserl’s “transcendental motive,” or by so many philosophers’
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will to understand everything transparently. But return is not the same thing as a straightforward going back to the empirical world. Instead, we have to reconsider Descartes’ sum, especially in the way it is coextensive with dubitans—that is, reconsider sum transcendentally. From this perspective, cogito sum reveals itself as being similar to, but also radically different from, the Being of beings that Heidegger disclosed. Here is Heidegger’s formulation of the problem: If the ‘cogito sum’ is to serve as the point of departure for the existential analytic of Dasein, then it needs to be turned around, and furthermore its content needs new ontologico-phenomenal confirmation. The ‘sum’ is then asserted first, and indeed in the sense that “I am in a world.” As such an entity, ‘I am’ in the possibility of Being towards various ways of comporting myself—namely, cogitationes—as ways of Being alongside entities within-theworld. Descartes, on the contrary, says that cogitanes are present-at-hand, and that in these an ego is present-at-hand too as a worldless res cogitans.23
Heidegger undeniably inverts the order of “cogito” and “sum.” In other words, his starting point is not cogito but “being there [Dasein]” as in being-in-the-world [in-der-Welt-sein]. In this manner, Heidegger believed he had succeeded in overturning the thought initiated in the Cartesian ego. But while this might be a critique of Husserl, it is by no means a critique of either Descartes or Kant. Heidegger transfigured the Kantian distinction between the empirical and transcendental levels to that between the ontic and the ontological, and emphasized this shift as if it were his own invention. He also persisted in stressing the importance of the transcendental ego as nothing, namely, Being—as opposed to the empirical egos of beings. But he never mentioned a word about the external beings who exist between communities. For this reason, his “being there [Dasein]” is at the same time a “Being-with [Mitsein].” Which, for him, however, meant (the German) Volk. And here there is no margin or gap for the doubting cogito, the singular existence, ever to emerge. Still, if one dares to persist in using ontological terms, one could induce ontology from Cartesian doubt in the following manner. Cogito qua dubito is the awareness of the difference between systems, and sum is being in between them. What is really commonly concealed in philosophy is not the difference between beings and Being, as Heidegger claimed, but the transcendental difference or
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the interstice—the very thing Heidegger himself ended up concealing by his political ontology. And so it is also that Heidegger interpreted the Kantian transcendental critique exclusively along its vertical vector, to its depth. For me, by contrast, transcendental critique should be considered and practiced—at the same time—along its transversal vector. And I call this multidimensional oscillating engagement “transcritique.” Now, in criticizing Descartes, Heidegger returned to the preSocratics. To be kept always in mind here, however, is the fact that these thinkers were foreigners to Athens. Being in the Mediterranean space of intercourse, they thought in the interstices, or intermundia— to use Marx’s favorite term from Epicurus.24 They did not depart from any polis as the self-evident premise of their thinking. Parmenides, for example, defied the Gods, and Heraclitus rebuked community rituals. As Ortega y Gasset said, “It was in them [other cities] and not in Athens that this new type of individual was formed.”25 Although it was the center of politics and information, Athens was initially less developed with respect to thinking than were the margins of the Greek world. The people of the Athenian community, who were enjoying their politico-economic hegemony, suddenly experienced an inundation of the paradoxa of previously unknown thinkers. “For a ‘people’ [Athenians] as profoundly reactionary and intensely adherent to traditional beliefs, it was an extremely unsettling experience.”26 In this climate, Socrates occupied quite an ambiguous positionality. Executed by Athenians as a dangerous thinker whose faith was informed by foreign elements, to his mind he was a genuine Athenian, faithful to the polis. Unlike foreigners, he did not charge for his teaching. Instead of purging foreign thought, by means of his dialogue, Socrates scrutinized and internalized it. In actuality, the dialogue itself is the very form that excludes the other heterogeneous as well as the thinker merchant. The fact that Socrates himself was excluded came to conceal his oppression of the other-heterogeneous. In Plato, Socrates’ ‘execution’ assumes the same significance as that of Jesus’ death for the Apostle Paul. Which is to say that Plato dramatized Socrates’ death, one of many contingent executions of the time, as a sacrifice for the whole community of the polis. We can
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never know who Socrates really was, but at least we know what Plato accomplished in Socrates’ name: the way of excluding external thought by internalizing and detoxifying its radicality. In Plato’s philosophy, just as in Hegel’s, all anterior thoughts are superseded [aufheben] or elevated stored abolished. Plato’s dialectics (dialogos), established by the exclusion of otherness, were another monologue (monologos). So when Heidegger praises Parmenides and Heraclitus while attacking Plato, I cannot help but be skeptical about his intentions, as when he writes: “Parmenides stood on the same ground as Heraclitus. Where indeed would we expect these two Greek thinkers, the inaugurators of all philosophy, to stand if not in the being of the essent?”27 What does the expression “in the being [Sein] of the essent [Seiendes]” mean? Heidegger’s sophistic rhetoric and forced etymology blind us to a much more crucial matter—the fact that these philosophers stood in between communities. According to Heidegger, Heraclitus saw Being as “the gathering together of the conflicting,” and Parmenides saw identity as “the belonging-together of antagonisms.”28 In the final analysis, all that this really should mean, however, is that they thought in the world as a heterogeneous space of intermundial intercourse, rather than thinking in the space of a community gathered around a univocal set of rules. From the beginning, it is impossible for those within a community to be “inaugurators of all philosophy.” It was only by standing in between communities that Heraclitus was able to see Being as “the gathering together of the conflicting,” and Parmenides to see identity as “the belonging-together of antagonisms.” It is clear that this radical positionality was lost in the Platonic Socrates, who was firmly rooted in the community of Athens. Problematizing the loss of Being, Heidegger may have attacked Plato as the instigator of this line of thinking, yet his own positionality was isomorphic to Plato’s— excluding the heterogeneity of the thought that comes from the topos of trade, and internalizing the denuded skeleton of that thought. For Heidegger, in the end, the loss of Being was equal to the loss of the German agrarian community. In our own context, if the term “loss of Being” retains any significance at all, it should be as the loss of the topos as difference, the loss of the space of
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intercourse in the intermundia. And precisely this loss is the proper site of transcritique. 3.3 Singularity and Sociality Kant drew a keen distinction between universality and generality, similar to the manner in which Spinoza had distinguished idea from concept. While generality can be abstracted from experience, universality cannot be attained if not for a certain leap. As I have been arguing all along, the condition for a certain cognition to be universal is not necessarily that it be based upon an a priori rule, but that it be exposed to the judgment of others who follow a different set of rules. Thus far, however, I have been speaking mainly of this condition spatially, which will now have to be dealt with temporally. What I particularly want to stress is this point: The veritable others whom we cannot anticipate are the ones who live in the future. Or, more accurately, the future is truly the future only insofar as it is of the other; the future we can anticipate is not the veritable future. (I deal more fully with ‘the other as the future’ in chapter 4 vis-à-vis Kant and Marx.) Thinking in this manner, it is clear that universality can never be grounded by public consensus, because the latter can be pertinent only to a single community, no matter how large. This does not mean, however, that we can abandon the concept ‘public’. Instead, our task is to change the very meaning of ‘public’—which is precisely what Kant did. In his response to the question, What is enlightenment? Kant answered that it is “man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity.” In the concrete, this means becoming a member not (only) of a national community but (also) of a cosmopolitan society. What is noteworthy about this formulation is that Kant shifted the significations of the public/private pair. The public use of man’s reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men; the private use of reason may quite often be very narrowly restricted, however, without undue hindrance to the progress of enlightenment. But by the public use of one’s own reason I mean that use which anyone may make of it as a man of learning addressing the entire reading public. What I term the private use of reason is that which
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a person may make of it in a particular civil post or office with which he is entrusted. [. . .] But in so far as this or that individual who acts as part of the machine also considers himself as a member of a complete commonwealth or even of cosmopolitan society [Weltbürgergesellshaft], and thence a man of learning who may through his writings address a public in the truest sense of the word, he may indeed argue without harming the affairs in which he is employed for some of the time in a passive capacity.29
In common usage, ‘public’, as opposed to ‘private’, is uttered at the level of community or nation, but Kant considered the public in this sense to be the private domain in reverse. Here is another indispensable aspect of the Kantian turn. This turn exists not simply in the fact that Kant emphasized the precedence of the public domain, but in the fact that he radically transformed the meaning of ‘public’. Within a community, paradoxically, being public cosmopolitan appears to be rather individual. In a community, being individual is deemed being private, because it is against the shared public consensus. For Kant, however, being individual is equivalent to being public—in the cosmopolitan sense. Communities and nation-states exist in reality, and so do international organizations centered on certain nation-states, but “cosmopolitan society” or “world-civil-society [Weltbürgergesellshaft]” in the Kantian sense does not exist in reality. People cannot be members of world-civil-society in the same sense that they belong to their communities. If not for an individual’s will to be cosmopolitan or a world citizen, world-civil-society would not exist. Employing reason in regard to the world-civil-society necessitates consideration of the future other, even at the expense of any present public consensus. It is well known that Hegel negated such a stance as the spirit’s abstract, subjective stage; for him, individuals become universal only as members of a nation-state. In order to avoid possible confusion and misunderstanding here, I would like to redefine several pairs of keywords. First, I stress the distinction between universality and generality. These two words are almost always confused, and the same is true of their opposing concepts: singularity and particularity. Gilles Deleuze drew a lucid distinction between universality and generality in Difference and
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Repetition (1968) while touching upon Kierkegaardian repetition: “Generality, as generality of the particular, thus stands opposed to repetition as universality of the singular.”30 His point is that while the connection between particularity and generality requires a mediation or a movement, that between singularity and universality is direct and unmediated. Which is to say, sensu stricto, that while generality and individuality are mediated by particularity, the latter pair can never be mediated. Universality in the sense of Romanticism is the equivalent of generality in our context. For instance, while for Hegel individuality is connected to universality (in his case, universality equals generality for this precise reason) by way of particularity (qua the nation-state), for Kant there is no such mediation. What exists in between the terms is only incessant ethical determination (or, for Deleuze, repetition). This latter way of being individual is precisely the way of being singular. Only the singular man can be universal—this is Kierkegaardian terminology, but it is implicit already in Kant. With respect to sensibility and understanding, Kant invoked what he called the “scheme” as that which synthesizes these terms with imagination. Consider a triangle drawn on a piece of paper. The triangle could be arbitrary and of diverse shape, but we recognize any three lines connected to each other at their endpoints as a triangle in general. Because of the scheme, the individual and the general are synthesized. Later, Ernst Cassirer reformulated this idea as “symbolic form,” just as earlier the Romantics had reconsidered mediation as the particular that synthesizes individuality and universality (equaling generality, in their case). Hegel formulated the problem as follows: “the particular, because it is only the determined universal, is also an individual, and conversely the individual, because it is the determinate universal, is just as much a particular.”31 In other words, the particular includes in itself both the universal and the individual, and constitutes the middle term of the formal syllogism. What the Romantics then introduced—namely, the celebration of language, organicism, nation, and the like—can be seen logically as an orientation of “particularity.” And Georg Lukács criticized Kant for not overcoming the segregation between individuality and universality, between sensibility and understanding. Following Hegel, who, for
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him, went beyond Kant’s distinction, Lukács accounts for particularity in the following way: Because in theoretical recognition the movement in both directions oscillates from one extreme to the other, and the middle, the particular, plays a mediating role in either case, in the case of artistic reflection, the middle becomes literally the center, the focal point, where the movements center themselves. Therefore, herein exist both a movement from particularity to universality (and back) as well as a movement from particularity toward singularity (and back), whereas in both cases the movement towards particularity is the determinant one. Particularity now achieves a non-resolvable fixation [unaufhebbare Fixierung]: and upon this, the world of forms of artworks constructs itself. The mutual overturn [Umschlagen] and fusion [Ineinanderübergehen] of categories are changing: singularity as well as universality appear always resolved [aufgehoben] in particularity.32
But it was not Hegel who had first proposed this recognition of particularity. It had been well nurtured by the Romantics. Already Johann Gottfried Herder’s concept of language had entailed the particularity that synthesizes sensibility and understanding, individuality and universality. From the start, however, the syllogism linking individuality-particularity-universality (or, in the concrete, individualrace-genus) was not necessarily developed as a property specific to language. For one thing, ‘nation’ has always been considered the middle term (particularity) between individuality and humanity. Furthermore, in between the natural and the spiritual—nature and freedom in Kant’s terms—was posited organism (qua life) as particularity. In fact, for Herder, language was always inseparable from the notion of nation qua organism. Wilhelm von Humboldt’s idea that language is an organism was also derived from Herder. For the Romantics, the idea of nation came to be privileged because of a grounding logic according to which particularity synthesizes, even originates, individuality and universality. Within this logic, it is only particularity that assumes the concrete. This idea is most typically expressed in the famous words of Joseph Marie Compte de Maistre: “there is no such thing as man in the world. In the course of my life I have seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians etc.; I know, too, thanks to Montesquieu, that one can be a Persian. But as for man, I declare that I have never met him in my life; if he exists, he is unknown to me.”33
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The individual becomes an individual person primarily within one’s own national language (and nation). The universality of the human being—a human in general—is abstract and empty when the particularity is absent. Hence, the concept ‘cosmopolitan’ has always been scorned, and still is. Yet, for his part, as we now know, Kant never thought of the “world-civil-society” as substance. He never denied that everyone always belongs to a certain community. He simply urged that individuals behave as cosmopolitans in thinking and action. In actuality, being cosmopolitan would be impossible were it not for the struggle of individuals (through enlightenment) within and against their own communities. In the history of philosophy, German Romanticism is customarily categorized as ‘post-Kantian’—after all, it was a movement that came after Kant. But individual thinkers such as Herder and Fichte were in fact Kant’s contemporaries, and often criticized by him.34 Notably, Kant’s “world-civil-society” was a concept coined as a critique of the Romantics’ concept of ‘nation’. Although in Critique of Pure Reason, Kant seems to criticize the metaphysics of the past, his true and more crucial target was the metaphysical drive of reason, as it was being resuscitated in his own time in the form of the nation. Kant maintained that sensibility and understanding are synthesized by the power of imagination [Einbildungskraft], which is to say that, from the reverse perspective, the synthesis is just imaginary. Inverting Lukács’s view that Kant could not get beyond the dichotomous crack, we have seen that Kant deliberately rendered a crack in an imaginary synthesis that had long existed. This, to repeat, is the very crux of the Kantian transcendental critique. Now I return to the distinctions between individuality-generality and singularity-universality. In Kant’s terminology, the former pair is empirical, while the latter is transcendental. The pair singularityuniversality reveals the fact that the synthesis by individuality-generality is merely an imaginary construct. After Hegel, Kierkegaard and Max Stirner introduced the concept of “singularity,” each in his own manner. For Hegel, God is anthropomorphized in Christ because a human is already God, which, in Feuerbach’s terms, is to say that individuals are originally beings of “generic essence,” or “species beings.” It was in order to negate such an uncritical and dangerous synthesis that Kierkegaard invoked his own concept of ‘singularity’
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by seeking to introduce the circuit of singularity-universality in opposition to the circuit of individuality-generality. Singularity is often associated with existentialism, of course, but this is a simpleminded view. In much the same climate as Kierkegaard, Stirner posed the concept of the “single man” or “single ego [der Einzige]” to criticize Feuerbach, who, despite his materialist overturning of Hegel, had remained within the Hegelian framework. For Stirner, this I is singular, containing no generic essence or species being. Refuting both the Hegelian Geist and the Feuerbachian Wesen as ghosts, Stirner advocated a form of communism as a free “social” association of single men or egos [Einzigen]. In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels attempted of course to make Stirner publicly risible, christening him “Saint Max.” But their earlier private correspondence clearly shows Stirner’s importance as a protoform of communism.35 Extending this line of argument, for the Marxian turn to occur, what was required—far beyond any materialist overturning of Hegel—was also the circuit of singularity-universality that severs the double circuit of individual-genus and individuality-generality. (And I return to this later.) It was in the context of his critique of Feuerbach that Marx began to use the adjective ‘social [sozial]’ as a key concept. It goes without saying that Marx’s ‘social’ is employed in contrast to the traditional community (Gemeinschaft), but more importantly, it is distinct from civil society (Gesellschaft), too. In Capital, Marx stressed time and again that the economic exchange begins in the interstice between communities. He reserved the term ‘social’ for the exchange between communities, which is quite distinct from the kinds of exchange based upon the reciprocities of division of labor and gift-giving within a community. It was when the trade with outside worlds was internalized within Gemeinschaft that Gesellschaft was formed. Nevertheless, the latter also came to share the aspects of a community that is shaped around a certain, same set of rules. The ‘social relations’ in the true Marxian sense are the relations with others to which we are tied, though typically without being conscious of the constraint. Men do not therefore bring the products of their labor into relation with each other as values because they see these objects merely as the material integuments of homogeneous human labor. The reverse is true: by equating
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their different products to each other in exchange as values, they equate their different kinds of labor as human labor. They do this without being aware of it.36
For classical economics, exchange value is internalized within individual commodities. But for Marx, as I have already begun to note, particularly the Marx of Capital, commodities do not have exchange value or even use value if they are not sold (exchanged); if not, they are simply discarded. Marx called the jump of commodity into money “the fatal leap [salto mortale] of the commodity.” When he speaks, then, of the “sociality” of the commodity or of the labor that produces it, he unequivocally refers to the fatal leap and the inevitable blindness of ours that accompanies it. The synthesis of the two aspects of commodity—use value and exchange value—is akin to Kierkegaard’s “synthesis of finite and infinite.” Losing the relationship with the other, the unsold commodity is like “the self desperately wanting to be himself.”37 In this sense, Marx’s dialectics is not a simple overturning of Hegel but is instead closer to the Kierkegaardian qualitative dialectics. What is crucial to consider at this point is the fact that, radically inscribed in Marx’s sociality, is the moment of singularity—notwithstanding the fact that he rejected Stirner’s “single ego and his own [der Einzige und sein Eigentum]” as quintessential bourgeois individualism. In his Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Richard Rorty categorizes thinkers from the past as two basic types: those who deal with individuality and those who deal with sociality. He puts Marx squarely in the latter group.38 However, as I have pointed out, things are not nearly so simple, not after having learned that for Marx sociality is inseparable from singularity. Rorty fails to distinguish community— a communication network (or exchange) among those who share the same set of rules—and society—communication between different systems. Singularity, as exemplified by the Cartesian cogito, is the way of existing in social space; hence it is far from being private or introverted, as has been long claimed. With the term ‘social’, Marx pointed to the way in which individuals belonging to different systems/communities are connected by exchange without their being aware of it. This is same critical space Kant identified with his term “world-civil-society.” And it is the space of transcritique.
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Yet we cannot speak directly of singularity. Why not? Because it is the nature of language to pull the circuit of singularity-universality back to the circuit of individuality-generality. No matter how precisely we may try to describe this thing or this I, the description can be no more than a specification of a general concept. We feel that this thing or this I is singular, but, as soon as we speak in the deictic, our discourse results in the limitation of general concept. Hegel criticizes the attitude to persist in the singularity that language cannot grasp: The ‘I’ is merely universal like ‘Now’, ‘Here’, or ‘This’ in general; I do indeed mean a single ‘I’, but I can no more say what I mean in the case of ‘I’ than I can in the case of ‘Now’ and ‘Here’. When I say ‘this Here’, ‘this Now’, or a ‘single item’, I am saying all Thises, Heres, and Nows, all single items. Similarly, when I say ‘I’, this singular ‘I’, I say in general all ‘Is’ (. . .).39
By the same token, for Hegel, the universal is equal to the general. He continues: Consequently, what is called the unutterable is nothing else than the untrue, the irrational, what is merely meant [but is not actually expressed]. If nothing more is said of something than that it is ‘an actual thing’, an ‘external object’, its description is only the most abstract of generalities and in fact expresses its sameness with everything rather than its distinctiveness. When I say: ‘a single thing’, I am really saying what it is from a wholly universal point of view, for everything is a single thing; and likewise ‘this thing’ is anything you like. If we describe it more exactly as ‘this bit of paper’, then I have only uttered the universal all the time. But if I want to help out language—which has the divine nature of directly reversing the meaning of what is said, of making it into something else, and thus not letting what is meant get into words at all—by pointing out this bit of paper, experience teaches me what the truth of sense-certainty in fact is: I point it out as a ‘Here’, which is Here of other Heres, or is in its own self a ‘simple togetherness of many Heres’; i.e., it is a universal.40
What Hegel appears to be trying to say here is this: that the individuality of the Here and Now, inasmuch as it is ‘expressed in language’, already belongs to generality; that any individuality that is not generality is “merely meant”; and that even the ineffable is constituted by language. In other words, singularity exists only as a divine nature of language. The political implication of this statement is that
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cosmopolites as well as world-civil-society are only imagined constructs from the point of view of nation-states; and the individuality that is contradictory to the public is “merely meant” as a phantasm. And in this precise manner, Hegel himself ended up caging the circuit of singularity-universality—precisely the circuit Kant had once opened up—within the circuit of individuality-generality. In the introduction to the Japanese translation of Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy? Ian Hacking argues that it was Hegel who considered language to be public property—as opposed to the Kant who, in Hacking’s view, was trapped in the philosophy of subjectivity. This Hegel is said to have initiated an important shift of emphasis when he stated that language is a self-consciousness as being-for-theother, and that language is an externalized substance. When one recognizes that language is external, public, and social, one at the same time experiences a radical shift also concerning ego and identity.41 Hacking also points out that it was J. G. Hamann, the friend and critic of Kant (who also influenced Herder), who first conceived thi