Towards a New Literary Humanism
Also by Andy Mousley: RE-HUMANISING SHAKESPEARE: Literary Humanism, Wisdom and Modern...
114 downloads
2173 Views
2MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
Towards a New Literary Humanism
Also by Andy Mousley: RE-HUMANISING SHAKESPEARE: Literary Humanism, Wisdom and Modernity CRITICAL HUMANISMS: Humanist/Anti-Humanist Dialogues (with Martin Halliwell) RENAISSANCE DRAMA AND CONTEMPORARY LITERARY THEORY NEW CASEBOOKS: John Donne (editor) He is also series co-editor of Edinburgh Critical Guides to Literature
Towards a New Literary Humanism Edited by
Andy Mousley
Selection and editorial matter © Andy Mousley 2011 Individual chapters © contributors 2011 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2011 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978–0–230–23815–2
hardback
This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne
For Debbie
This page intentionally left blank
Contents Acknowledgements
ix
List of Contributors
x
Introduction Andy Mousley
1
Part I Literature as Ersatz Theology: Deep Selves Introduction Andy Mousley
23
1 Faith, Feeling, Reality: Anne Brontë as an Existentialist Poet Rebecca Styler
28
2 Virginia Woolf, Sympathy and Feeling for the Human Kirsty Martin
44
3 Being Human and Being Animal in Twentieth-Century Horse-Whispering Writings: ‘Word-Bound Creatures’ and ‘the Breath of Horses’ Elspeth Graham 4 Judith Butler and the Catachretic Human Inge Arteel
59 77
Part II Scepticism, or Humanism at the Limit Introduction Andy Mousley
93
5 Shakespeare’s Refusers: Humanism at the Limit Richard Chamberlain
98
6 Why Eliot Killed Lydgate: ‘Joyful Cruelty’ in Middlemarch Steven Earnshaw
113
7 Atomised: Mary Midgley and Michel Houellebecq Jeff Wallace
127
8 Humanity Without Itself: Robert Musil, Giorgio Agamben and Posthumanism Ivan Callus and Stefan Herbrechter
vii
143
viii Contents
Part III Literature, Democracy, Humanisms from Below Introduction Andy Mousley 9
Mobilising Unbribable Life: The Politics of Contemporary Poetry in Bosnia and Herzegovina Damir Arsenijevic´
10
HUM (-an, -ane, -anity, -anities, -anism, -anise) Mark Robson
11
Humanising Marx: Theory and Fiction in the Fin de Siècle British Socialist Periodical Deborah Mutch
12
Civic Humanism: Said, Brecht and Coriolanus Nigel Wood
161
166 181
197 212
References
228
Index
239
Acknowledgements I am grateful to De Montfort University for granting me research leave to complete this book. Thanks to all the contributors for their chapters and support, and to Deborah Mutch, Steven Earnshaw and Jeff Wallace for their comments on the proposal and early drafts of the Introduction. Thanks also to Alex Keen for his fine proofreading under pressure, to Jane Dowson and Martin Halliwell for their insights, and to Paula Kennedy, Ben Doyle and Jon Lloyd at Palgrave Macmillan for their support, advice and efficiency. Special thanks go to Debbie and Dan for the kind of love and forbearance that allowed me to follow them round the house reading bits out (occasionally). Formal acknowledgments regarding work reprinted from other sources in this volume are as follows: Chapter 10: Rainer Maria Rilke, ‘Orchards: 1’ and ‘The Valaisian Quatrains: 28’, from The Complete French Poems of Rainer Maria Rilke, translated by A. Poulin, Jr. English translation copyright © 1979, 1982, 1984, 1986 A. Poulin, Jr. Reprinted with the permission of Graywolf Press, Minneapolis, Minnesota, www. graywolfpress.org. Chapter 10: Jo Shapcott, ‘Gilwern Lane’ and ‘Song’, from Tender Taxes, reprinted with the permission of Faber & Faber Ltd.
ix
List of Contributors Damir Arsenijevic´ is Lecturer in Cultural and Literary Studies at Tuzla University, Bosnia and Herzegovina and is the author of Forgotten Future: The Politics of Poetry in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2010). He is a critic, theorist, translator and international cultural projects worker whose activities span the fields of cultural, gender and literary studies. His research and art-theory political interventions examine as well as impact upon the terror of inequality, the solidarity of unbribable life, the production of knowledge and material memories of war and genocide. He is a member of artistic-theory Grupa Spomenik and is one of the founders of the international platform Yugoslav Studies – an arena for the interaction of art, theory, education and politics. Inge Arteel is Postdoctoral Research Fellow of the Flemish Research Fund at the Free University of Brussels. Her research interests include contemporary German and Austrian literature and drama, subject theory and gender theory. Her current research project concentrates on grotesque representations of violence in relation to humanist/posthumanist debates. Recent publications include: with Heidy Margrit Müller (eds), Elfriede Jelinek: Stücke für oder gegen das Theater? (2008); and ‘Nach dem Bilder- und Berührungsverbot. Kunst und Erotik in “die Umarmung, nach Picasso”’, in Alexandra Strohmaier (ed.), Buchstabendelirien. Zur Literatur Friederike Mayröckers (2009). Ivan Callus is Associate Professor and Head of the Department of English at the University of Malta, where he teaches courses in contemporary narrative and literary theory. With Stefan Herbrechter (Coventry University), he is the editor of Rodopi’s monograph series, Critical Posthumanisms. The first volume in the series, co-written with Stefan Herbrechter, is due to appear in 2011. His other research, both published and forthcoming, centres on poststructuralism and deconstruction, on contemporary fiction and on the anagram notebooks of Ferdinand de Saussure. Richard Chamberlain is Lecturer in English at the University of Northampton, where he teaches Shakespeare and Renaissance Literature. He is the author of Radical Spenser: Pastoral, Politics and the New Aestheticism (2005) and is working on a new book, Shakespeare’s Refusers. x
List of Contributors xi
Steven Earnshaw is Professor of English at Sheffield Hallam University. His most recent book is Beginning Realism (Manchester University Press, forthcoming). Previous publications include The Handbook of Creative Writing (ed., 2007) and Existentialism (2006). He is currently working on ‘names and naming’ in literature and philosophy. Elspeth Graham is Head of English at Liverpool John Moores University. She has published on self-writing, religious radicalism and cultures of sport and play in the early modern period, as well as on contemporary fiction and literary theory. Stefan Herbrechter is Reader in Cultural Theory at Coventry University. He is the author, co-author, editor and co-editor of several books, including Critical Posthumanism (with Ivan Callus, 2011), Posthumanismus – Eine kritische Einführung (2009), Cy-Borges: Memories of the Posthuman in the Work of Jorge Luis Borges (with Ivan Callus, 2009), The Matrix in Theory (with Myriam Diocaretz, 2006), Returning (to) Communities (with Michael Higgins, 2006), Metaphors of Economy (with Nicole Bracker (2005), Discipline and Practice: The (Ir)resistibility of Theory (with Ivan Callus, 2004), Cultural Studies: Interdisciplinarity and Translation (2002) and Lawrence Durrell: Postmodernism and the Ethics of Alterity (1999). His work has appeared in the journals Angelaki, Parallax, Polygraph and Subject Matters, and he has translated works by Derrida, Cixous and Bernard Stiegler. Kirsty Martin is Junior Research Fellow at Linacre College, University of Oxford. Her research focuses on literature and emotion and she is currently working on a book on ideas of sympathy in the novels of Vernon Lee, Virginia Woolf and D.H. Lawrence. She is planning a further book project on understandings of happiness in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century novel. Deborah Mutch is Senior Lecturer in English at De Montfort University, Leicester. Her field of research is focused on the fiction published in the British socialist periodicals of the late-nineteenth/early-twentieth centuries. She has published English Socialist Periodicals, 1880–1900: A Reference Source (2005) and a number of articles in journals such as Victorian Periodicals Review and Literature and History. She is currently working on the development of a website of socialist periodicals and is researching the influence of form on socialist fiction. Mark Robson teaches in the School of English Studies at the University of Nottingham, where he is also Director of the Analysis of Democratic Cultures Research Group. He is the author of Stephen Greenblatt (2008)
xii List of Contributors
and The Sense of Early Modern Writing (2006), co-author of Shakespeare, Jonson and the Claims of the Performative (2010, with James Loxley) and Language in Theory (2005, with Peter Stockwell), and editor of Jacques Rancière: Aesthetics, Politics, Philosophy (2005), Hester Pulter, Poems (2010) and What is Literature? (forthcoming, 2011). Rebecca Styler is Lecturer in English at the University of Lincoln. She researches women’s religious writing of the nineteenth century, which is the focus of her book Literary Theology by Women Writers of the Nineteenth Century (2010). She has also published articles on Victorian women’s spiritual autobiography and biography, and on Elizabeth Gaskell’s Gothic tales. She is currently developing a book on religious Gothic. Jeff Wallace is Professor of Literature and Cultural History and Head of the Department of English, Film, Communication and Media at Anglia Ruskin University. He is the author of D.H. Lawrence, Science and the Posthuman (2005) and Beginning Modernism (2011), and is co-editor of Gothic Modernisms (with Andrew Smith, 2001), Raymond Williams Now (with Rod Jones and Sophie Nield, 1997) and Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays (with David Amigoni, 1995). He is currently writing on the concept of abstraction in modern literary studies and visual arts. Nigel Wood is Professor of Literature at Loughborough University. He is author of Swift (1986) and many essays on eighteenth-century and theoretical topics. He has also edited a selection of Frances Burney’s journals (1989), compiled and introduced the Longmans Critical Reader volume on Jonathan Swift (1999), and, most recently, edited She Stoops to Conquer and other Comedies (2007) for Oxford University Press. He was General Editor of the Theory in Practice series (1993–7) and edited 11 of the volumes. Alongside David Lodge, he is editor of the second and third editions of Modern Literary Criticism and Theory for Longmans (2001, 2008). He is at present a member of the team editing Alexander Pope’s poetry for the Longmans Annotated Poets series.
Introduction Andy Mousley
Utilitarian governmental initiatives, driven as all else is by that unintelligible modern god called ‘the economy’, may yet succeed in reducing education to skills, thereby endangering some of the traditional humanist imperatives of education. However, ‘we’ (meaning, for the purpose of this volume, ‘we’ of the academic community of English) may now, albeit belatedly, be reaching a position of being able to explicitly defend such imperatives instead of acquiescing (or seeming to) in their demise. Once vilified by anti-humanist theorists as bourgeois, essentialist and outdated – part of a waning episteme, according to Michel Foucault in The Order of Things (Foucault 1970, 387) – the terms ‘human’ and ‘humanism’ are currently being recuperated within literary studies and across the humanities more generally.1 These changed conditions of theoretical and critical discourse now make it possible to claim that humanism and the academic discipline of English have always belonged to one another, that the nature of this belonging has doubtless changed over time and has come under pressure from other developments within the subject, but that ‘English-as-humanism’ survived, albeit often incognito throughout the theory years, to emerge into the present where it now lives and breathes more openly. But what I mean here by humanism will need to be carefully spelt out because it is a concept which has been and continues to be variously defined (see Davies 1997; Halliwell and Mousley 2003). For example, concern – formulated independently of a religious paradigm – for the dignity and sanctity of all human life is as much a humanist stance as the idea, often voiced in the Renaissance, that human beings occupy a special place in the order of God’s creation. In a similar vein, some humanists, for whom Enlightenment ideas are a touchstone, may embrace science as an icon of human achievement, whilst others of a 1
2
Towards a New Literary Humanism
more broadly ‘Romantic’ persuasion may reject science on the grounds that it reduces the richness, complexity and imaginative faculties of human beings. The problem of even generously setting the parameters of humanism can be acutely felt when a thinker such as Nietzsche can be viewed as anti-humanist from one perspective and humanist from another: anti-humanist because he attacks Enlightenment confidence in human rationality and progress, but humanist because of the impulsive human creativity that is released by the death of rationality on the one hand and God on the other. Even when a tenet such as that of human agency seems inalienable from the humanist project, it can serve as the basis for wildly differing world views: Marx is as much a humanist as Marlowe’s Tamburlaine, and the line in John Lennon’s song ‘Give Peace a Chance’ is as much a humanist credo as the advice given by Victoria Beckham in her autobiography: ‘If you want something, go and get it. If you want to wear something, so what if no one else is wearing it, just wear what you want to wear. Do your make-up and your hair how you want, and sod everything’ (Beckham 2001, 136–7). In order to identify the kind of humanism that has always been wedded, though not always harmoniously or self-evidently, to literary studies, I will need to glance briefly at the history and pre-history of English, before addressing the question of what makes the literary humanism proposed in this volume ‘new’.
The double track of English: specialists and generalists English, broadly speaking, has two ‘tracks’, two trajectories. One is a specialist track, while the other is generalist and therefore, as I will argue, ‘humanist’. These tracks have sometimes converged and sometimes diverged. The extent to which they have done one or the other is partly a matter of perception. Some critics may complain that English has become over-specialised and out of tune with the pleasures and provocations of reading experienced by the ‘common reader’, but specialisation, as I will also argue, has sometimes been accommodated within the broad generalist ethos of English. All academic disciplines, literary studies included, grow their own specialisms. From bibliographical scholarship to New Criticism, and beyond New Criticism to the technical vocabularies of the 1970s drawn largely from continental philosophy, literary studies has developed a range of professional and specialised competences. In more recent years, the turn away from ‘High Theory’ to history (a move that was implied in some versions of theory) has spawned a variety of historicisms,
Introduction 3
including cultural materialism, new historicism, materialist feminism, the new economic criticism and presentism, each of which has contributed its own specialised or semi-specialised terminology to the way in which history is conceptualised and studied. In addition to these sub-specialist theoretical branches of historicism, which attempt to make explicit the terms on which history is or should be examined, is the panoply of more practical and eclectic (in terms of their theoretical provenance) excavations of literary and cultural context/s. These contexts contribute to the pluralisation of historical perspective, such that it is now necessary to speak not of one homogeneous ‘modernism’, ‘Romanticism’ or ‘Renaissance’, but of modernisms, Romanticisms and so forth. Such pluralisation is healthily democratic, as hitherto underrepresented aspects of a period, movement or cultural phenomenon are made visible. But pluralisation is also arguably driven by the tendency of intellectual work to become ever more specialised, ever more Aristotelian in its parcelling of concepts (including, but not exclusive to, period concepts) into divisions and subdivisions. The specialist literary/cultural contextualiser is supposed to know his or her corner of the universe – his or her five seconds of literary/cultural history – better than anyone else, which is of course admirable, and enhances the diversity and vitality of the discipline, but it can also contribute to the sense that ‘English’ is in danger of decomposing into fragmented expertises and of generating little ‘postmodern’ specialised narratives at the expense of anything grander. Cue humanism and, as one early example of what subsequently became a resilient part of the humanist ethos of English, the ‘generalism’ of Renaissance humanism (or at least of one aspect of it), as exemplified, amongst others, by Erasmus. Erasmus was in some respects a ‘specialiser’, for as a critical philologist, he was aware of the complexity of the human transmission of texts, arguing in his Letter to Martin Dorp of 1515 for care and attention to detail in the attempt to restore both classical and religious texts to some kind of authenticity (Erasmus 1971, 241–52). However, the ultimate aim of philology for Erasmus was not scholarship for scholarship’s sake, for that would have been to have repeated the mistakes of the scholastic past. In his Praise of Folly (1509), the narrator Folly ridicules late-medieval scholasticism for its super-subtle intellectualism which results in over-interpretation of the Bible. The satire on medieval scholastics’ ‘subtle refinement of subtleties’ depends upon the recognition that the theologians’ professional over-concern with technicalities has taken them far away from the spirit of the Bible and its perceived relevance to human experience (Erasmus 1971, 156).
4
Towards a New Literary Humanism
Erasmus wants a Bible which is accessible and speaks to people’s need for meaning, purpose and sustenance. He has little use for a Bible as the exclusive property of professional critics. Erasmus wants theologians to come out of their ivory towers (or monastic equivalent) and proselytise, as a way of reversing the tendency for ideas to become so specialised that they cannot be transported beyond the realm of professional interpreters. The morally enlightened – as they saw it – advice offered to princes and statesmen which Renaissance humanists derived from classical authors was another aspect of a worldliness that could no doubt warp into a narrow kind of pragmatism, but at its best affirmed an intimate relationship between literature and life, books and ‘selves’. As English literature began to compete for credibility with classical literature during the latter half of the seventeenth century, laying the foundation for its eventual transformation into an object thought worthy of academic study, so the ‘generalist’ figure of the literary critic emerged as someone with a wide spectrum of knowledge drawn from literary (but not only literary) texts thought broadly relevant to ‘life’. The critical histories of English which have appeared since Terry Eagleton’s The Function of Criticism (1984), including, most notably, Gerald Graff’s Professing Literature (1987) and Chris Baldick’s Criticism and Literary Theory: 1890 to the Present (1996), support the view that English during the period of its formation (and well into the twentieth century) was ‘humanist’ in this sense of ‘generalist’ and an antidote to the compartmentalisation of knowledge which threatened it from both within and without. While the technical vocabularies of ‘Theory’ can be taken as contributing to subject specialisation and sub-specialisation, the theory years and their aftermath can also be seen as maintaining, even as revitalising, the link between English and ‘humanism’, meaning (for the moment, still) generalism. The repertoire and range of English was exponentially expanded in the 1970s by its borrowings from linguistics, philosophy, anthropology, sociology, psychoanalysis, feminism and Marxism. The study of literature at this time was anything but narrowly compartmentalised, even as it demanded engagement with a variety of ‘in-house’ specialist vocabularies by means of which literature’s relevance to (socially and linguistically constructed) ‘life’ was to be understood (ideology, signifier and signified, langue and parole, écriture féminine, etc.). It is true that the broad relevance of literature to life was thought about in mainly social terms, thereby severing literature’s connection to deeper and more fundamental questions of human existence (or eliding such questions with questions of social existence). And it is
Introduction 5
also true that much theory and theorising from this period activated what has widely been referred to as a ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’, frequently targeted at the literary canon itself and literature’s supposedly timeless powers of revelation. Such a hermeneutics tended to privilege impersonally critical distance over intimate communing with books endowed with the capacity to ‘reveal us to ourselves’, as Helen Gardner once put it (Gardner 1973, 242). Notwithstanding these caveats, to study literature via Theory at this time was for many, including myself, to study an exhilarating range of life-affecting thought. And ‘after’ Theory? What happened then? ‘Everyone was thinking small’ writes Eagleton in After Theory of the postmodern cultural theorists of the 1980s (Eagleton 2003, 45). Looking less far back in time, Jean Howard and Scott Cutler Shershow, in their introduction to Marxist Shakespeares, make the similar claim that: ‘The postmodern critique of master narratives has spawned its own demon fry – forms of criticism that fetishize the local, the particular … at the expense of considering the “big picture”, or at least the bigger picture’ (Howard and Shershow 2001, 3). These accounts tell part of the story ‘after theory’, but it is unlikely that the critic/theorist as generalist was or will ever be entirely extinguished. The chapters in this volume testify to this, as does the general resurgence of interest (to which this volume contributes) in large-scale issues, as these issues are currently being mediated through discussion of humanism, posthumanism, ‘new humanism’, ethics and aesthetics. Yes, the chapters collected here are specialised, but with the help of the literary texts they examine, they are also committed to asking expansive questions. Where there has been a tendency for the various historicisms in literary studies to restrict the ‘meaning of meaning’ to the culturally specific generation of meaning, these chapters reanimate the ‘meaning of meaning’ to elicit questions about who (we think) we are, why we are here, and how the significances, past and present, attached to human life are challenged by humanity’s traditionally excluded ‘others’, as well as by our own obliquities.
Humanism/literature as ersatz theology (1) So much for the longstanding, evolving, sometimes strained (because of specialising tendencies) bond between English and humanismas-generalism. What of English’s object of study, literature itself? Is literature immanently humanist or is this the way English has constructed it? To answer this, we need to revise the terms of the discussion and say, in shorthand for the moment, that a key component of humanism’s
6
Towards a New Literary Humanism
broad, generalist ethos is the role it has within modernity (as outlined below) as a surrogate form of theology, the richest and most complex expression of which is literature. What I mean (in a positive way) by the term ‘surrogate theology’, and why it can be used to describe humanism notwithstanding some secular humanists’ outright rejection of religion, will once again need to be carefully spelt out, initially by saying what, in my advocacy of a new literary humanism, I don’t want to embrace by the term (or at least not without some significant qualification). What I don’t want a new literary humanism unequivocally to embrace is the fundamentalist ‘religion’ that humanism has sometimes made of humanity. This religion has an inflated, god-like conception of ‘man’ at its centre, vested in an overly optimistic faith in human agency, progress and capabilities, whether these capabilities are located in rationality (for Enlightenment humanists), in the imagination (for Romantic humanists) or in the innate humaneness of humanity (for a range of ethical humanists). The Enlightenment version of this theology is summarised by Iain Chambers in Culture After Humanism (2001) as: ‘an inherited sense of the world in which the human subject is considered sovereign, language the transparent medium of its agency, and truth the representation of its rationalism’ (Chambers 2001, 2–3). This and all other cocksure versions of humanism as ersatz theology can justifiably be accused of: gender bias (because ‘man’ is taken to be the touchstone for the human); species narcissism (because the human is taken to be superior to other species thereby rendered exploitable and expendable); and simplification (because our barbarity is edited out from our supposedly ‘better selves’). They have resulted in numerous questionable actions and ideologies, uncompromisingly called ‘crimes’ by Alain Finkielkraut in In the Name of Humanity, which have been, he writes, ‘committed in the name of higher values – in particular, humanity’ (Finkielkraut 2001, 90). There are numerous literary texts which advance – or at least represent – selves with an overblown conception of their human abilities, the spectacular individualists of the Renaissance stage providing some prime examples (Shakespeare’s Iago and Richard III, Marlowe’s Tamburlaine and Dr Faustus, John Ford’s Giovanni in ’Tis Pity She’s a Whore). But these self-appointed masters of creation (and their numerous successors), who are literature’s embodiment of what Claude Lévi-Strauss once called ‘unbridled humanism’ (quoted in Todorov 1993, 66–7), do not – as I shall argue in the next section – exhaust the meaning of the ersatz theology that humanism is, especially as mediated by literature.
Introduction 7
Before we take our leave of these confident, quasi-theological expressions of belief in humanity, we need to ask whether their optimism, aspiration and high-mindedness are in any way redeemable. Does scepticism of the kind expressed by Finkielkraut about the religion that humanists have sometimes made of humanity mean that we should relinquish all hope that humans beings can make a better, more just, more humane and fulfilling world? I can think of plenty of situations where to speak ‘in the name of the human’ still seems politically and ethically necessary: people are still objectified, quantified, commodified, de-humanised, de-personalised, denied all agency and ‘human-ness’ – a term which I know I am appealing to intuitively for the moment. To wax more parochial, about my own profession, speaking ‘in the name of the human’ could, as I suggested at the outset, be the basis for resisting recurring governmental attempts to reduce education to skills or for opposing the bureaucratic terminology of ‘learning outcomes’ as well as the management-speak of hitting ‘targets’. I don’t want impersonal bureaucratic processes to triumph over human/humanised engagement with literary texts and the questions they pose. Nor do I want to end up teaching students how to write advertising copy. I want education to be ‘deep and wide’. I want to encourage students to develop as ‘human beings’ and not just be cogs in the capitalist machine. Polemical statements of this kind, made ‘in the name of humanity’, no doubt occupy a high moral ground which needs to be tempered by an awareness of the way humans err, fail, are prone to inhumanity (including the inhumanity of bureaucratic self-reduction) and can often be misguided in their ideals and aspirations. But to end up despairing totally of the human condition would be a bleak conclusion. Taken as a whole, the chapters in this volume fall somewhere between optimism and pessimism, from those chapters (by Damir Arsenijevic´ and Deborah Mutch) which invest hope (though far from naïvely) in specifically socialist-humanist ideals to those (by Inge Arteel, Elspeth Graham, Kirsty Martin, Mark Robson, Rebecca Styler and Nigel Wood) broadly committed to democratic and/or ethical ideals of one kind or another, and to those (by Ivan Callus and Stefan Herbrechter, Richard Chamberlain, Steven Earnshaw and Jeff Wallace) which express varying degrees and kinds of scepticism (from posthumanist but not only posthumanist perspectives) about the possibility as well as desirability of all such benign (or apparently benign) collective endeavours. Excessive faith in humanity thereby placed centre-stage in the scheme of things and elevated above other species is also strongly mitigated by those
8
Towards a New Literary Humanism
chapters which call into question strict divisions between the species (see the chapters by Graham and Robson). Hope, then, is balanced by scepticism, as it needs to be if humanism’s religion of humanity is to avoid being a blind faith. But now I want to move to a different way of conceiving of humanism as a surrogate theology, one that will draw us closer to more specifically literary matters.
Humanism/literature as ersatz theology (2) There is nothing new in claiming that literature itself is ersatz theology, is theology carried on in different wise from theology ‘proper’. As various critics have pointed out, the term ‘canon’ in ‘literary canon’, to refer to a revered body of writing, has distinct religious connotations which suggest parallels between the sacredness ascribed to texts in religious traditions and the quasi-sacredness ascribed to literary texts (see, for example, Guillory 1995). At stake here, though, is how literature as ersatz theology can be conceptualised in a way which avoids some of the positions that are usually staked out when such an analogy is invoked: of unthinking reverence towards the icons of the literary tradition on the one hand and irreverent demystification – canon-trashing – on the other. These foror-against positions are unhelpful because they do not allow for a more neutral description of how literature came to arrogate from religion some of religion’s key functions. A broad sense of the historical context and significance of modernity is important here, for it is with the irregularly phased onset of modernity (from at least the so-called ‘early modern’ period) that not only religion but also other traditional sources of meaning and identity are weakened and/or threatened. This broad-brush (generalist’s) conception of modernity can be filled out to give a sense of the different shapes and sizes in which ‘modernity’ comes, as well as the differing degrees of intensity with which it confronts ‘pre-modern’ mindsets (which, it should also be added, do not suddenly die out, but survive, mutated, into ‘the modern’): 1. The disenchantment, de-traditionalisation and de-sacralisation of world views set in motion either by the exercise of a sceptical critical reason or by instrumental rationality, or both. 2. The denaturing of the so-called natural, accompanied by the replacement of animist conceptions of nature by a secular, instrumental attitude towards nature as an inert resource: ‘the disenchantment of the world is the extirpation of animism’ (Adorno and Horkheimer 1979, 5).
Introduction 9
3.
The replacement of charismatic or customary authority by the need for rationally justified authority. 4. The opening up of gaps between values and facts, mind and world, knower and known. 5. Sceptical and/or ironic detachment from received ideas, habits and customs. In its postmodern form, sceptical detachment might be seen as manifesting itself in the widely appealed-to notion that meanings are always and everywhere constructed through society and language rather than given, and in a hermeneutics of suspicion which doubts the existence of any foundational principles, including human nature. 6. Specialisation and the division of the spheres of art, morality and science (implying a scepticism about the universality of any one of them). 7. The separation of ‘roles’, viewed as inauthentic and merely external, from ‘selves’. 8. Alienation, anomie and the sense that modern life has lost direction, foundations, meaning and telos. 9. Various attempts to ‘re-enchant’ the world and fill it with meaning and telos, humanism as a ‘religion of humanity’ constituting one such attempt. Literature, unlike religion (or some varieties of it), does not answer the various problems and challenges of modernity, as outlined above, but it stages them, throws them into relief, intensifies them. In doing so, it urges us to consider, yet not only to consider, but to feelingly experience the question of the meaning and purpose of human life. The newly important role of literature within modernity is therefore that of mediating ontology where religion had previously monopolised this role. Books come to matter intensely to ‘selves’ (and treated as lifelong sources of guidance, inspiration or provocation) because it is through books that we attempt to work out who we are and what the significance of life might be. It is the urgent sense of books ‘mattering’ to us which prompts Valentine Cunningham in Reading after Theory to draw an analogy between close, engaged reading, such as literature promotes, and the experience of the Eucharist: The Word of God, the body of Christ, become you: to your emotional, ethical, spiritual benefit. And so it is with reading where this model of reading as a selving, self-making process has prevailed. On
10
Towards a New Literary Humanism
this plan the words of the text that you seriously and closely engage with become you, get into you, have personal effect. (Cunningham 2002, 148) Less explicitly Christian, and more mindful of the context (of modernity again) in which reading literature assumes the kind of importance attributed to it by Cunningham, is this insight of Rita Felski’s from her Uses of Literature. ‘Cut loose’, she writes, ‘from the bonds of tradition and rigid social hierarchies, individuals are called to the burdensome freedom of choreographing their life and endowing it with a purpose. As selfhood becomes self-reflexive, literature comes to assume a crucial role in exploring what it means to be a person’ (Felski 2008, 25). As traditional bonds weaken, so literature acts as a form of surrogate community, as well as, as Felski implies, constituting an intimate psychological space in which questions traditionally ‘answered’ by religion – who are we and why are we here? – are taken over by literature and to varying degrees personalised: who am I and why am I here? These varying degrees of personalisation are also reflected in the elasticity as well as the contestation of the literary canon, such that different readers may derive ‘meaning’ from different books and petition for their inclusion within a continually reconstituted canon. Thus, if literature is ersatz theology, then the theology which it carries over is non-conformist in orientation. I have differentiated between two senses in which humanism/ literature can be taken to be surrogate theologies: one inflates humanity by making a religion of it; the other engages us in a ‘non-inflated’ way with meaning-of-life questions. There is reason to question this distinction, but that I shall leave for later.
The specialist track rejoined Thus far, I have discussed the nature of English’s (and literature’s) broad reach in quite broad ways, offering overviews of the nature, history and pre-history of English and, as part of this, of modernity as well. Overviews, by definition, are an attempt to make sense of the heterogeneous assortment of ‘stuff’ that is in the world, which, in a world as complex as ours, is probably as necessary as it is foolhardy. The foolhardiness is because overviews may iron out or ignore complexities, or, in the case of the overviews offered here, make it difficult to see how the general perspectives translate into practical criticism and specific engagements with literary texts. It is all very well to say that
Introduction 11
literature, as ersatz theology, confronts us with heavy-duty questions about the meaning and significance of human life, but how, in more concrete terms, does this bear upon, say, the representation of nature in Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream or the novelistic structure of George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss? Talk of how literary texts engage us on a human level and provoke us to ponder portentous ‘life issues’ may all seem rather vague and difficult to apply to particular cases. So, now I want to rejoin English’s specialist ‘track’ and suggest that what its counterpart – humanist English – needs, as I have recently argued elsewhere (Mousley 2010), is a semi-technical vocabulary (‘semi’technical because overly technical would not be in the generalist spirit of the humanism proposed here). Unlike other critical discourses, humanist literary criticism, past and present, lacks any precise critical vocabulary. As I noted earlier, the numerous approaches to the study of literature that have emerged since the 1970s have each developed their own specialised concepts and technical terms. These may not always have been originally intended specifically for literary analysis, but students do use them in this way and are encouraged to do so by those critical theory primers that explain and model them. Examples of such terms include: mimicry, hybridity and orientalism for postcolonialism; patriarchal binary thought, écriture féminine and the sex versus gender distinction for feminism; ideology and commodification for Marxism; signifier and signified, langue and parole, and binary opposition for structuralism; discourse, deferral and undecidability for poststructuralism. These are teachable and usable tools of analysis which when employed well are not only specialist tools, but concepts which expand and often transform students’ political, social and literary awareness. When used badly, however, I feel complicit in that phoney kind of specialisation we call ‘jargon’, and complicit also in the narrowing of education to a set of quantifiable skills. From this perspective, the provision of specialist terms for a new literary humanism might be accused of a reductive kind of instrumentalism (akin to rolling a ‘business plan’), and one which is paradoxically both ‘anti-human’ and anti-literary. Notwithstanding these various caveats, if humanist English is to survive in – and cut across – the ever-diversifying marketplace of theories and approaches, then it needs to make its origins and premises explicit and develop from those origins and premises a critical vocabulary which stands up to intellectual scrutiny. Humanist literary criticism will thereby be able to enter the modern world of academia and line up with other approaches whose premises are made explicit (and are debatable/negotiable because they have been made so). Moreover, and to take
12
Towards a New Literary Humanism
up once again the broad historical perspective on modernity outlined above, appeals to ‘the human’ and the ‘human’ value of literature have tended to be talismanic, magical, intuitive, immune to the scepticisms of modernity. ‘Of course’ we know what being human means. We do not have to spell it out. But we do need to do such spelling out if humanist literary criticism is to be more than a half-baked series of platitudes. Below, therefore, are eight cursorily elaborated principles, accompanied by some semi-technical, again cursorily elaborated terms, in italics, for a new literary humanism. Because I have developed – and applied – these terms more fully elsewhere, I will not do so here, but offer them, alongside the terms used in the individual chapters in this volume, as examples of what a common critical vocabulary for humanist English might look like. Some of this vocabulary is drawn somewhat eclectically from a range of other theories, such as Marxism and psychoanalysis. One implication of this is that these other theories, despite the anti-humanist rhetoric in which they have sometimes been couched, express humanist ideas that can be used on behalf of the literary humanism proposed here.
The new literary humanism: key critical terms and principles 1.
2.
Reading can be an immersive experience. Readers habitually speak of being ‘gripped’, captivated, by books. Books can thereby become objects of attachment (surrogates for the maternal body in psychoanalytic terms) and function as an antidote to the alienation, characteristic of modernity, of subjects from objects. The ‘object’, when it takes the form of an aesthetic image, writes the Marxist theorist Theodor Adorno, ‘instead of following the bidding of the alienated world and persisting obdurately in a state of reification’ is ‘spontaneously absorbed into the subject’ (Adorno 1980, 160). Such spontaneous absorption is due to literature’s sensuous and emotional appeal. Although emotions and bodily sensations are subject to changing cultural perceptions, expressions and evaluations, certain primary emotions/sensations, according to neurological theorists of the emotions such as Antonio Damasio, are ‘biologically determined processes … laid down by a long evolutionary history’ (Damasio 2000, 51). However, this does not mean that what comes ‘naturally’ cannot be forgotten, lost or transformed. Literary texts are complicit in such forgetfulness, loss and transformation, but provide enough emotional and sensuous ‘hooks’ to engage us in the first place.
Introduction 13
3.
The attachment-encouraging difference between a literary text and a fact- or concept-based discourse is thus, to borrow a phrase from Charles Altieri, its ‘affectively charged sensuousness’ (Altieri 2007, 72, emphasis added), its incarnation or embodiment of facts or ideas in characters who simulate rudimentary human feelings/sensations/urges (pain, pleasure, joy, sadness, anger). If you want a systematically developed, concept-driven theory of capitalism, read Karl Marx’s Capital. If you want to vicariously experience how early twentiethcentury capitalism affected a particular working-class individual and his community, read Jack Common’s autobiographical novel Kiddar’s Luck (Common 1990). Marx abstracts for analytical purposes what he takes to be the concepts that drive the economic and social system of capitalism (use value, exchange value, etc.). Common’s book demonstrates how some of those concepts were lived out, embodied, incarnated. It is a record of how ‘the world [struck] the body on its sensory surfaces’, to appropriate a phrase from Eagleton in The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Eagleton 1990, 13). 4. Literature (often, but not always) constitutes an advanced form of emotional and sensuous immersion because it represents complex and often conflicting emotional states/urges. Thus, if literature’s mimesis of ‘life’ often takes the form of a condensation, as in intensification, of life, then this condensation does not equate to a reduction, because of literature’s creative impulse to explore all the facets of an emotion, theme or subject. It is this impulse which gives literature its richness and depth, thereby provoking thought, debate and commentary. Literature, then, is at once an immersive and distancing experience, one that elicits both emotion and thought. At various times in literary history, some writers/movements have favoured one over the other: the Romantics tending to privilege emotion and subjective intensity; the modernist Brecht, on the other hand, resisting emotional ‘wallowing’ (which he thought of as the dangerous vehicle of right-wing propaganda) in favour of understanding. Nevertheless, literary texts have often been valued for their organic yoking together of thought and feeling. Put in traditional moralistic terms, reaching back to classical conceptions of the role of the poet/orator, literature simultaneously moves and instructs. 5. It is literature’s unique ability to bring thought to feeling and feeling to thought (and both feeling and thought to ethics), which makes literature a form of ‘whole-person engagement’ (Cunningham 2002, 147, emphasis added) and helps to reverse modernity’s damaging separation of life into distinct spheres (as diagnosed by, amongst others, Immanuel Kant, Max Weber and Jürgen Habermas).
14
Towards a New Literary Humanism
6.
Alongside the universality of primary emotions/sensations, it is possible and usefully nuanced to speak of the ‘near-universality’ of certain human needs, urges and anxieties such as, to take one iconic example, in Shakespeare’s King Lear: the fear of abandonment, the chronic sense of insecurity arising from a world that has become utterly inhospitable; the fear that the human, natural and supernatural worlds have become entirely unpredictable; the fear that the human condition is a condition of metaphysical homelessness or, as Lear suggests, absurdity – ‘When we are born, we cry that we are come/To this great stage of fools’ (Shakespeare 2005, King Lear: The Folio Text, 4.5.178–9). 7. Such ‘universals’ or ‘near-universals’ are partly the product of literature’s deployment of resonating particulars. If metaphor, as Mark Currie has suggested, is ‘a figure constitutively split between its particularity and its equivalence to something else’ (Currie 2003, 299), then ‘metaphoricity’ is the mechanism which aids and abets literature’s expansiveness, such that, for example, the opening lines of Hamlet – ‘Who’s there?’ – resonate beyond their particular context to imply questions about the (in)stability of identity in Elsinore, and beyond that, for some critics, to the precariousness of human identity in general (Shakespeare 2005, Hamlet, 1.1.1). The above needs qualifying: the passage from particular to general is not always smooth or obvious, and some literary texts stubbornly refuse to find the general within the particular. Nevertheless, such refusal is often elevated to a general ‘statement’ about particulars that will not be drawn into the field of shared metaphoric/symbolic significance (sometimes a rose is a rose is a rose). 8. If literature (as previous points suggest) is a means of developing ‘deep’, rich and complex selves, then these qualities are also often cultivated by the way that literary texts may sometimes estrange us, may take us out of ourselves, may transport us (to use a religious term appropriate to the ersatz theology that literature arguably is). Estrangement may be seen as a recurring literary trope or archetype, in that in (virtually) any narrative, there is an element of danger, and in narratives of estrangement, the danger is the threat posed to human identity – a danger which may also constitute an opportunity. It would be possible to develop a taxonomy of literature-as-estrangement, identifying different types of estrangement (which do not always produce ‘depth’) based on the literary or sub-literary genres and/or movements where they typically reside. Such a taxonomy might include: • estrangement as dispossession: this includes tales of gods, demons, monsters; gothic narratives; science fiction and its stories of
Introduction 15
androids, cyborgs, and human-machine or human-animal hybrids. In narratives of these kinds, the ‘human’ is dispossessed of its (supposedly) distinguishing features and morphs into its inhuman or non-human others. As Callus and Herbrechter argue in their chapter in this volume, science fiction has become a key literary (or ‘sub-literary’) canon for one influential strand of posthumanism; • estrangement as ‘expanded consciousness’: this includes some forms of quest narrative, Romantic poetry (in its leaning towards subjective intensity and heightened states of consciousness), comingof-age narratives, the Bildungsroman, tragedies and comedies in which psychological enlightenment/development is key. The list could go on because ‘literature’ has come to be defined and defines itself in terms of the notion that it expands and deepens our cognitive/emotional/psychological repertoires, and, as a crucially important adjunct to this emerging from contemporary political criticism and theory (such as Marxism, feminism and postcolonialism), our political and ethical imaginations. As Robson argues in this volume, because of the impurity of its mimetic ability, its unbounded powers of representation, literature may indeed be inherently democratic; • estrangement as ennui/depleted consciousness: this includes, most conspicuously, modernist texts. ‘The human’ here is represented as under siege, beleaguered, enervated, exhausted, diminished, depleted, unable to withstand the pressures of modernity (see Callus and Herbrechter’s chapter in this volume). However, what we witness (in, for example, Robert Musil’s monumental The Man without Qualities as discussed by Herbrechter and Callus) is the painful process of the depletion of the human. That is to say, we witness and are made aware of what the human was and how it has deteriorated. There is an undoubtedly a tension or, as I would prefer to call it, a dialectic between essentialist and anti-essentialist perspectives in the above, with sensuousness, ‘near-universals’, primary emotions and so forth suggesting the former, and the concept of estrangement the latter. Exploration of this dialectic will thread itself throughout the book in its introductions to each section and in the chapters themselves. The ‘mantra’ I have been repeating is that literature is a form of surrogate theology in that it takes over from religion fundamental questions
16
Towards a New Literary Humanism
about the nature and meaning of human life. Literary books therefore come to matter intensely to selves (as sacred books once did or still do). What this grandiose conception of literature lacks, however, is any precise critical terminology. The above terms and principles – and the book as a whole – are an attempt to make good this deficiency. They also fulfil that aspect of modernity (see above) in which the exercise of critical reason is crucial to gaining assent for a particular viewpoint, at the same time as they support the notion that literature’s role within modernity is to compensate for (some of the) damage done by it.
The new literary humanism as a reflexive, sceptical humanism The use of critical reason is one feature of modernity. Scepticism is another, as in, to recall another of the aspects of modernity outlined above: ‘sceptical and/or ironic detachment from received ideas, habits and customs. In its postmodern form, sceptical detachment might be seen as manifesting itself in the widely appealed-to notion that meanings are always and everywhere constructed through society and language rather than given, and in a hermeneutics of suspicion which doubts the existence of any foundational principles, including human nature’. Any ‘new humanism’ needs to be internally robust (by explicitly developing critical terms and principles), but it has also to be reflexive, sceptical and aware of counter-perspectives that are external to or at a critical distance from it. So, on a sceptical note (but not to the point of unravelling everything that has so far been said), and glancing at some of the chapters in this volume (which are more properly introduced in the prefaces to each section), I want to deal briefly with some important caveats in the argument for the new literary humanism I have been proposing. The first caveat is that human beings might not correspond to the picture which I have suggested literature paints of them. That picture is – mainly – positive: we are deep, we are complex, proven by our pursuit of meaning, significance and purpose through the surrogate religion of literature. This may be an inflated conception – one more variation on humanism’s tendency to make a religion out of humanity – which confers importance, dignity and gravitas upon us. Anyone who has seen Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life (1983) or read Douglas Adams’s The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy (1979) might think it not only foolhardy to take seriously the question of the ‘meaning of life’, but also, given the comic belittlement of humans in both these examples, a sign of an overly self-important
Introduction 17
view of humanity. Perhaps we should not take ourselves quite so seriously. And perhaps we no longer do, for according to Jean-François Lyotard we have entered a period of slackening, where the big questions do not matter anymore. Now that ‘eclecticism is the degree zero of contemporary general culture’, writes Lyotard, ‘it’s time to relax’ (Lyotard 1992, 17). In answer to this, I would say that if the thirst for spiritual and other kinds of self-help books is anything to go by, people still seem to be in search of ‘meaning’. What the new humanist literary criticism proposed here is attempting to do is to reclaim ‘what-is-the-meaning-of-life’ questions from the triteness with which they can be often treated in the self-help genre. But still, tritely or otherwise dealt with, questions about who are and why we are here lend us self-important depth (even if ‘depth’ is superficially produced), which perhaps we do not intrinsically have (see Wallace’s chapter) or deserve. The ‘richness and complexity’ of the human condition is from this perspective the product of the high literary canon (see Callus and Herbrechter’s chapter) and is not universal. The second caveat, related to the one above, is that literature’s human/ humanistic value might be accused, along with all other humanisms, of a species narcissism which is blind to, and exploitative of, other species and/or which ignores the continuities between the human and nonhuman (see the chapters by Graham and Robson). The third caveat is that literature may not have a monopoly on complexity or may put such complexity into question by showing how we reduce ourselves or can be reduced (see Wallace’s chapter). The fourth caveat is that whatever (positive) description is given to ‘the human’ (whether rich, complex, deep, dignified, caring, humane, reasonable, emotional, etc.), ‘the human’ can still seem like a club with rules of membership and oppressive norms (see the chapters by Chamberlain and Arteel). This book is a broad church, which allows for heresy as far as the ersatz religions of literature and humanity are concerned. I’m not sure how it could be otherwise, when the academic community of English is itself such a broad church. But the scepticism, perceptive and corrosive as it sometimes is, is balanced by the sense conveyed by all the contributors to this volume that literature has something sufficiently important to say to us to be worth attending to.
The chapters in overview and the structure of the volume I have not asked the contributors to the new literary humanism proposed in this Introduction to ‘sign up’ to the critical terminology described
18
Towards a New Literary Humanism
above. I did politely ask them, for the sake of the intellectual coherence of the book, to engage with an earlier version of the Introduction ‘in some way’, but that does not mean ‘agree with it’ or ‘subscribe to its terms’. Some chapters (Arteel, Earnshaw, Martin, Mutch, Styler, Wallace and Wood) make some use of some of the above terminology. Some engage with the more general current of ideas attached here or by other recent theorists to the literary and/or human (such as the importance to both of the emotions), and develop these ideas in their own way (Styler and Martin). Some develop their own specific terms: ‘unbribable life’ (Arsenijevic´); or terms used by other thinkers: ‘“grievable lives”’ (Arteel, using Judith Butler); ‘“joyful cruelty”’ (Earnshaw, using Clément Rosset). A common critical language which can be used to specify literature’s human/humanist importance will not suddenly drop down from the sky, ready-made, as a template. It will be discussed, negotiated, contested, even to the point of wholesale refusal (see Chamberlain’s chapter). The book is divided into three parts, each with its own separate introduction précising the chapters, drawing connections between them and showing how they fit in with and develop the theme/s of the part in which they have been placed. The section headings correspond with some of the principal ideas, questions and/or critical terms developed in the Introduction. So, Part I, ‘Literature as Ersatz Theology: Deep Selves’, comprises chapters which demonstrate literature’s cultivation, often through the process of estrangement (see above), of ‘deep’, rich and complex selves devoted to the difficult pursuit of ontologically freighted meaning. Part II, ‘Scepticism, or Humanism at the Limit’, represents those already-referred-to sceptical perspectives which a volume on ‘new humanism’ needs if it is to be self-critical and reflexive: are all appeals to ‘the human’ an attempt to enforce membership? Do literary texts always cultivate depth? Is humanism too optimistically affirming of the human and a better, more humane future? These are the kinds of question posed by the chapters in this section. Part III, ‘Literature, Democracy, Humanisms from Below’, offers a countervailing perspective to Part II, in that the chapters included in this final part of the volume embrace (though not simplistically) one or another form of egalitarian/democratic politics and the hope for a better future which accompanies such politics. These chapters, like all the others, also focus upon specifically literary questions, and in particular the difference made to political and ethical commitments when mediated through literature.
Introduction 19
Note 1. Examples across a range of disciplines of a resurgence of interest in humanism include: Comparative Criticism (2001); Davies (1997); Diogenes (2005); Halliwell and Mousley (2003); Janicaid (2005); Norman (2004); Said (2004); Seidman and Murphy (2004); and Todorov (2002). For examples within literary studies, see Carey (2005); Cunningham (2002); Docherty (2003); Eagleton (2003); Felski (2008); Harpham (2005); Morris (2000); Mousley (2000a, 2000b, 2005, 2007, 2010); Showalter (2003); and Watson (1988).
This page intentionally left blank
Part I Literature as Ersatz Theology: Deep Selves
This page intentionally left blank
Introduction Andy Mousley
I suggested in the general Introduction that the newly important role of literature within modernity is that of mediating ontology where religion had previously monopolised this role. Books come to matter intensely to ‘selves’ (and are treated as lifelong sources of guidance, inspiration or provocation) because it is through books that we attempt to work out fundamental questions about who we are and what the significance of life might be. To put it summarily, literature as surrogate theology engages us in deep and complex soul-searching. An important aspect of literature’s cultivation of ‘deep selves’ is its ability to expand our cognitive, emotional and psychological repertoires (see Styler and Martin, below), and, as an important adjunct to this emerging from contemporary criticism and theory, our political and ethical imaginations (see Graham and Arteel). Contemporary theory has frequently exposed the political and ethical assumptions of received humanist tenets, and insisted on rethinking them (if not rejecting them outright). Aspects of conventional Enlightenment humanism, which promote a rational, autonomous, integrated self, are thus questioned in some of the chapters in this section from gender, ecological, interspecies and intersubjective perspectives. In each case, literature is taken to be an ally in estranging us in positive ways in order to reach towards a better, more inclusive and holistic way of being, one which avoids the Scylla of a complacently integrated self and the Charybdis of complete disintegration.
Rebecca Styler, ‘Faith, Feeling, Reality: Anne Brontë as an Existentialist Poet’ Rebecca Styler’s chapter is about Anne Brontë’s struggles with her religious faith, and so is about ‘theology proper’. But it is also about 23
24
Towards a New Literary Humanism
literature’s quasi-religious power to connect us with fundamental problems of existence. Styler by no means ignores the particular, historically specific discourses which shaped Brontë’s religious sensibility, but she also focuses on the ‘depiction of emotional conflict and of states of being which transcend the cultural discourses through which [Brontë] expresses them’. To this end, Styler harnesses the ideas of a variety of existentialist philosophers, and Brontë herself as an existentialist poet, who begin not with ‘“a collection of fine theories”’, but with existence itself. ‘Existence itself’ is subtly and richly characterised by Styler through her analyses of Brontë’s poetry, but at its kernel are feelings of lack and alienation, and the desire to overcome these through meaningful, as in heartfelt, personally experienced connection (with God, in Christian terms). Existentialism is a particularly apposite philosophical medium for Styler to use because it not only enables her to draw out the theistic (as contrasted with atheistic) strands of existentialism, but it also enables her to demonstrate how, in a world in which even for a ‘believer’ meaning was often absent, Brontë’s poetry constitutes a complex and difficult search for meaning, self, wholeness. Through the ‘keenly conscious emotional reasoning’, which is her poetry, ‘in a never-completed project of self-formation’, Anne Brontë, concludes Styler, ‘works out her salvation’.
Kirsty Martin, ‘Virginia Woolf, Sympathy and Feeling for the Human’ Kirsty Martin’s chapter engages with the claims made in the Introduction to this volume that: a) emotion and the senses are central to the experience of being human (though this is not to say that emotion is species-specific); b) literature’s appeal is its emotional/sensuous appeal; c) literature constitutes an ‘advanced’ form of emotional engagement because of the way in which it often deals with emotional complexities of one kind or another (and/or treats human emotions as inherently complex). There are innumerable writers who one might turn to for their rich description and deployment of emotion, but one who claims particular attention, and the one discussed here by Martin, is Virginia Woolf. Taking as her starting point the work of Martha Nussbaum, a recent influential theorist of the emotions and their centrality to literature, Martin makes the case that Nussbaum’s cognitive theory of the emotions is not really complex enough and that ‘Woolf’s thinking both on emotion and on sympathy offers a more suggestive, poised sense
Introduction to Part I 25
of the human’. Nussbaum, for Martin, is too protective of a rationally grounded, Enlightenment humanist self for whom emotions provide a useful kind of knowledge. Martin via Woolf is keen to introduce a little more mystery and ‘wonder’ into the emotions, whilst acknowledging their ‘physical groundedness’. If emotion translates into knowledge, it is not an exact translation. Moreover, ‘the bodily nature of emotion’, writes Martin, ‘suggests that emotions might be at once intimately immediate and yet might gesture to something beyond the individual, centred in the individual but poised on the edge of sympathetic transcendence’. The word Martin uses here – ‘edge’ – is telling. Emotions take us ‘into’ but also ‘out of’ ourselves and towards a feeling for others that is itself inexact. Emotions in Woolf do not translate easily between one person and another (or between reader and text): Woolf’s interior monologues in Mrs Dalloway, writes Martin, ‘contain sudden obliquities, barriers to a complete intimacy of character and reader’. Woolf, in Martin’s discussion of her, emerges as perhaps one of the most subtle writers of emotion, and one who also exemplifies the power of literature to extend our thinking about feeling beyond the familiar.
Elspeth Graham, ‘Being Human and Being Animal in Twentieth-Century Horse-Whispering Writings: “Word-Bound Creatures” and “the Breath of Horses”’ The broad question with which Elspeth Graham’s chapter engages is ‘how a new literary humanism might speak to and for a de-integrated, de-centralised, but still meaningful, human-ness’. Using Freud, Lacan, Levinas, and Deleuze and Guittarri to discuss a selection of latetwentieth century ‘horse-whispering’ narratives (Tess Gallagher’s ‘The Lover of Horses’, Nicholas Evans’ The Horse Whisperer and Cormac McCarthy’s All the Pretty Horses), Graham’s chapter remedies the complacent species narcissism which by definition all humanisms might be accused of advancing. However, what Graham is careful not to do is to dislodge the human so much as to empty it entirely of meaning and a sense of what might count as a fulfilling human life. Focusing on the ‘mediatory position between human and non-human animals’ occupied by the figure of the horse whisperer, Graham explores aspects of our species being in terms of our interspecies relationships, which she sees as a way of realising ‘our humanness-in-the-world’. Graham shows how the encounter between humans and horses represented in the texts she discusses estranges characters from their ‘wordbounded’ selves. There they find possibilities of ‘freedom, ‘intuitive
26
Towards a New Literary Humanism
connectedness’ and ‘bodily sympathy’ which are taken back into the human world to exercise a ‘therapeutic effect’ upon it. But estrangement taken to the point of ‘absolute alterity’ can also threaten the total dissolution of the self, discussed by Graham in terms of Freud’s theory of the death drive. A third, ethically oriented model of estrangement, examined via Levinas, and Deleuze and Guittari, is a state of what might be called perpetual suspension, where we are neither overwhelmed by ‘otherness’ nor tame it for our own purposes, but become attuned to the way that responsibility for the always unassimilable other ‘produces the self, not death’. This principle of an open encounter is enacted in McCarthy’s All the Pretty Horses, a text which according to Graham ‘strives to exploit … the flexibility of imaginative prose writing, to embody … the “inter” of interspecies relationships’.
Inge Arteel, ‘Judith Butler and the Catachretic Human’ Graham questions anthropocentrism in the name of interspecies sensitivity without discarding ideas of what it might be to lead a meaningful human life. Similarly, Inge Arteel, via the work of Judith Butler, questions philosophies of the subject (Hegel’s, principally), in the name of an intersubjectivity which estranges us from our supposedly autonomous selves, as well as from notions of our human-ness, without entirely abandoning such notions. Arteel’s is the only chapter in the collection to focus on the work of a single influential thinker. This is instructive, for, as Arteel notes, the way Butler’s thinking develops – ‘from an apparently anti-humanist position to a revisionary humanist one’ – is representative of numerous other contemporary theorists. It shows that ‘Theory’ was always at least a potential ally for a critically reflexive humanism. In Arteel’s discussion, Butler’s early poststructuralist feminism looks irredeemably anti-humanist (because humanism legislates oppressive norms supporting the heterosexual status quo) and antagonistic towards subjectivity (because subjectivity spells ‘subjection’), but Arteel is alert to various hidden humanist agendas in Butler’s early work, agendas which become more visible in her later writing. Butler’s anti-humanism can therefore be understood as a provocation to achieve a better kind of humanism, one that releases us from the cramped condition of subjection into a fuller responsiveness to what Butler increasingly takes to be the shared human experience of vulnerability and dependency. A pivotal concept here is again the concept of estrangement or, in Butler’s language, ecstasy, the experience of being, as Arteel explains,
Introduction to Part I 27
‘beside oneself, being dispossessed or “undone”’. Although Butler, as Arteel points out, does not write extensively about literature, literature (via Butler’s reading of Sophocles’s play Antigone) is drawn increasingly into Arteel’s discussion, for literature is, as Arteel puts it, an ‘exploratory site for re-imagining the human’. Reading disorients us, estranges us, is a catachrestic experience because we do not know for sure what the word ‘human’ means anymore. Therein lies the possibility that the term is completely emptied, but also the condition for its replenishment. Out of destruction comes (re)creation. The same might be said of Butler’s work itself, as meticulously interpreted and illuminated by Arteel.
1 Faith, Feeling, Reality: Anne Brontë as an Existentialist Poet Rebecca Styler
I How are we to approach the religious poetry of Anne Brontë? Written in the 1840s, her collection of short lyrics and longer didactic verse appear somewhat alien to the modern reader. Drenched in the language of evangelical belief, the poems swing between spiritual ecstasy, guilt, doubt and resignation, demonstrating a religious intensity alien to the secular reader and even, I think, to many modern readers who do hold a position of faith. On first impressions, Brontë’s work appears bound to her historical moment, of significance only in relation to the religious discourses current in the early to mid-nineteenth century. We hear echoes of Methodist enthusiasm and the hymns of Charles Wesley, of Puritan self-disgust such as that evinced by William Cowper and John Bunyan, of the Romantic epiphany familiar to readers of Wordsworth, and of the agonised inquiry into God’s nature and existence which fed into the stream of Victorian doubt. If we assume, as does J.R. de J. Jackson, that the goal of the historicist critic is ‘to read past works of literature in the way in which they were read when they were new’ (quoted in Hawthorn 1996, 76), then it is in these contexts that Brontë’s work must be understood; as historically-minded critics, our task is to appreciate Brontë’s writing as a rich engagement with understandings of faith in her own era (see, for example, Styler 2010). But is this all we can do with her work? To assign it only a historical interest, having no connection with readers beyond the point of its origins? Does Brontë’s poetry say anything about a human condition which might be recognised by others, non-Victorians, non-religionists even, in another cultural context? In other words, can we recover a human in the text? In recent years, calls have been made in literary 28
Rebecca Styler 29
studies to rediscover the personal connection between reader and text which has been significantly undermined by the theoretical approaches that have prevailed within the discipline for the last few decades. Both political and historicist perspectives tend to emphasise the disparity of human experience on the grounds that material and social factors shape subjectivity in radically different ways: people of different gender, class and race backgrounds, or simply of a different historical moment, cannot lay claim to a common human experience that can be universally understood. Furthermore, theories of the semiotics of language have raised serious doubts about a text’s ability to refer to a world outside the text, and thus to serve as a means of communication between one mind and another about ‘reality’. The net effect has been criticised by some (such as Valentine Cunningham and Rita Felski) as ‘a hermeneutics of suspicion’, a deep scepticism about the possibilities of human connection, and about the positive capacity of texts to engender this connection. Such a critical ethos, complains Cunningham, has ‘battered the notion of literary communication almost to death’ and goes against what most people (including those outside the academy) think that reading is about: ‘communication, description of the real and the human, insight, knowledge, companionship, consolation, moral effect, emotional effect’ (Cunningham 2002, 60). Without wanting to ignore the varieties of social experience which shape writers and readers in different ways, and while recognising a degree of instability in linguistic meaning, Cunningham nonetheless has faith in the capacity for texts to become part of us and to change our sense of our selves in the world (148). Rita Felski makes a defence for the experience of ‘recognition’ in reading, not in the sense of a naïve identification which ignores the differences between the world of the text and that of the reader, but one which nonetheless acknowledges ‘likeness and difference in one fell swoop’ (Felski 2008, 25). Reading produces a new self-knowledge: Suddenly and without warning a flash of connection leaps across the gap between text and reader; an affinity or an attunement is brought to light ... I cannot help seeing traces of myself in the pages I am reading. Indisputably, something has changed; my perspective has shifted; I see something that I did not see before. (23) Likewise, Jeremy Hawthorn reclaims readerly connection with texts of the past, in place of a traditional historicism which assumes that a text’s meanings simply diminish as its moment of origin recedes. Both
30
Towards a New Literary Humanism
‘immersion’ and ‘alienation’ are experienced in the textual engagement (Hawthorn 1996, 83). It becomes possible to restore recognition to a reading of Brontë’s poetry if we focus on her depiction of emotional conflict and of states of being which transcend the cultural discourses through which she expresses them. While her work is overtly Christian, her portrayal of inner life centres on feeling, and on that we can gain a purchase. Theorists of emotion in recent decades have concluded that: ‘In all places, and at all times, human beings have shared the same basic emotional repertoire’, a repertoire which includes ‘joy, distress, anger, fear, surprise, and disgust’ (Evans 2001, 8, 3; see also Damasio 2000, 50–1). These might be expressed in various ways from culture to culture, and they may have different significance attributed to them, but nonetheless the responses are innate, hard-wired into the human brain. Andy Mousley in the Introduction to this volume argues that literature can be regarded as ‘incarnating’ rudimentary feelings and impulses that are recognisable to a significant degree by many readers, and that texts embody rich and deep explorations of an emotion or theme, provoking reflection. Brontë’s religious poetry is also emotional discourse. This is not to suggest that the feelings Brontë writes of can be understood exactly as she experienced them, or to try to make them appear fashionably secular. But there can be some meeting of horizons, the recognition of something familiar as well as the shock of difference, which can make reading the poems meaningful and provocative. Through 20 or so poems written between 1840 and her death in 1849, Brontë works towards a religious world view that takes account of her subjective reality and presents an urgent challenge to her conceptual beliefs about God. In addition to the theories of emotion already referred to, the transhistorical dimension of this poetry can be illuminated by the reflections of existentialist philosophers, because while they often overtly refute a pre-defined notion of the human, they reason from a commonly felt experience of emotional conflict to find a subjective ‘truth’ which is valid for the individual. Brontë takes existence as her philosophical starting point, ‘[her] immediate sense of [her]self’, rather than ‘a collection of fine theories’ (Sartre 1980, 44). Although she never surrenders Christian doctrine, her sense of what salvation is and what the self can become is redefined through the personal struggle recorded in her poetry. Jean-Paul Sartre famously denied that existentialism was humanism in the sense of accepting pre-determined conceptions of what it is to be human. Nonetheless, he concedes that existentialist thought reveals ‘a human universality of condition ... the limitations which a priori
Rebecca Styler 31
define man’s fundamental situation in the universe’, out of which every human being is challenged to form a meaningful selfhood (Sartre 1980, 46). Brontë dramatises such a quest for self-realisation, and thus her work takes its place in the longstanding dialogue between Christianity and existentialism. She presents a sense of the human condition and an intense quest for emotional and psychological salvation, which have resonance beyond her specific terms of reference. ‘What use would it be if truth were to stand there before me, cold and naked, not caring whether I acknowledged it or not ...?’ So demands Søren Kierkegaard, frustrated with his culture’s faith in objective knowledge as the answer to humanity’s concerns (Kierkegaard 1996, 33). The kind of truth that provides personal meaning is not, he argues, to be found in systems of knowledge, but instead has to be forged from within the individual’s inner life. Truth in its profoundest sense is thus not objective, but subjective: ‘the thing is to find a truth which is truth for me, to find the idea for which I am willing to live and die’ (32). Sartre concurs that ‘man cannot pass beyond human subjectivity’ to possess an objective reality, and that only from inner experience can authentic personal truth be forged (Sartre 1980, 29). He contrasts factual knowledge (savoir) with a kind of knowledge that signifies intimacy, connection and appropriation (connaître). Nicolai Berdyaev, a Christian existentialist, makes a similar distinction between the knowledge which is mere ‘obedience’ to external facts versus knowing as a ‘creative perceptive act’, that is, ‘the giving of meaning to what comes from the object’. Hence, he argues that the philosophy needed is ‘not that which investigates objects, but that which is tormented about the meaning of life and of personal destiny’ (Berdyaev 1965, 131–2, 126).
II Brontë’s poetry confronts the experience that conceptual truth proves increasingly inadequate to feed her inner world. Her understanding of the nature of God is an essentially optimistic one, since she eschews the Calvinist image of God which influenced Victorian orthodoxy and which troubled many sensitive minds. To Calvinists, God was above all a judge, who operated according to mysterious criteria and was more to be feared than loved. But Brontë was a rationalist Christian humanist and drew on eighteenth-century rational philosophers who proclaimed God’s disinterested benevolence and reasonableness. Hence, her God is ‘the source of every good, ... purity ... gentle charity’ (Brontë 1979, ‘To Cowper’, 84–5). She satirises the Calvinists’ narrow sympathies, as she
32
Towards a New Literary Humanism
asks with mock incredulity: ‘Is yours the God of justice and of love …?’ Brontë went as far as to claim universal salvation, a controversial theological position in the 1840s, since her notion of God as ‘love’ could not countenance eternal damnation as anyone’s fate (Brontë 1979, ‘A Word to the Elect’, 89). In theory, then, Brontë’s religious ideas are benign and comforting, presenting her with none of the anxieties which led many other Victorians into doubt. The problem she voices is an emotional, not an intellectual one: how to subjectively appropriate this benign reality. God may be good, but is he accessible? At times, Brontë recounts joyous experiences when she is able to internalise the divine object of her belief, and this becomes a source of personal wholeness and fulfilment. ‘Faith’ is defined in emotional terms, as an intense feeling of divine intimacy and an accompanying sense of assurance. She celebrates the moment when intellectual knowing transfigures into feeling. The sensory stimuli of wind and sunshine become channels of the spiritual, and create: ... a rapture deep and strong Expanding in my mind! … a glimpse of truth divine ... I knew there was a God on high By whom all things were made I saw his wisdom and his power In all his works displayed. ... And while I wondered and adored His wisdom so divine, I did not tremble at his power, I felt that God was mine. ... I felt that I should rise again To immortality. (Brontë 1979, ‘In Memory of a Happy Day in February’, 82–3, emphasis added) Terms of perception first acknowledge the God of Christian doctrine, and the First Cause of external evidences which rationalist theologians argued were present in the natural and moral order. But contentment is only achieved when this progresses to felt conviction, and the poet
Rebecca Styler 33
escapes self-consciousness as her inner world unites with the divine reality that lies beyond herself. Feeling at one with God brings about respite from external conflict and inner self-division – ‘earthly cares’ and ‘restless wandering thoughts’ – and creates a sense of healing from the fragmentation which characterises present reality (Brontë 1979, ‘Retirement’, 77). The poet escapes temporal and corporeal limitations to reach a sense of her true self, which is located in the platonic realms of eternity. In the terms of her era, Brontë is drawing on the discourses of Evangelical and Romantic spirituality, which both centre on a moment of ecstatic communion with the divine other. Charles Wesley’s hymns celebrate the experience of being ‘lost’ in God and the ensuing sense of ‘perfect liberty’, declaring with full confidence ‘I know, I feel thee mine’ (Ferguson et al. 2005, ‘Hymn’, 652). Wordsworth, himself influenced by Methodist enthusiasm as well as by the culture of sensibility from which that and Romanticism both derived, likewise claims to ‘have felt/A presence that disturbs me ... a sense sublime/Of something far more deeply interfused ... that ... rolls through all things’ (Wu 2006, ‘Lines Written a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey’, 409–10). In this religious climax, the self communes with an external spiritual reality and is overwhelmed. But beneath the specifics, there lies the fundamental desire to escape self-consciousness and to regain the primal, pre-verbal unity between subjective and objective worlds. It is a pre-lapsarian state of union which is belied by everyday reality, as well as by orthodox Christian doctrine of the fall which envisions such ecstatic union as attainable only after death. While Brontë’s ecstasy is to some extent modified by orthodoxy (she anticipates a fuller participation after death ‘without the veil between’), faith as anticipation alone is not enough. She craves the experience of this heaven here and now, in a salvation which is psychological as much as spiritual. Far more often, Brontë mourns the utter severance of inner and outer worlds, and her failure to appropriate the religious reality in which she believes. She uses the language of sin and guilt to describe this predicament, as if the problem is a moral one, but what she essentially bewails is a failure of feeling: I have gone backward in the work, The labour has not sped, Drowsy and dark my spirit lies, Heavy and dull as lead. How can I rouse my sinking soul From such a lethargy?
34
Towards a New Literary Humanism
How can I break these iron chains, And set my spirit free? ... My sins increase, my love grows cold, And Hope within me dies, And Faith itself is wavering now, O how shall I arise! (Brontë 1979, ‘Despondency’, 80) Brontë describes her dull spirits and a sense of bondage. ‘Sin’ is equated with the loss of emotional warmth, which cannot be reinvigorated by an act of will. Imagery of darkness, heaviness, lethargy and entrapment characterise a psychological condition from which the suppliant cannot escape. ‘Faith’ is again aligned with the moment of intense conviction and well-being, and its absence is bewildering and uncontrollable. The terms of puritan guilt are misleading, since what Brontë diagnoses is a sense of distance from God and from her ideal self, which leaves her feeling fragmented and lost. Like some of Coleridge’s poems of inner dislocation, this presents a condition which could be termed depression, given in terms that predate clinical vocabulary. The poetry’s terms transcend the specifics of Christian discourse. Underlying Brontë’s presentation of religious life is a dialectical pattern of imagery, which structures emotional experience around the binary extremes of height and depth. Using images of the elements, she portrays joy in terms of uplift and expansion, and through the tropes of sky, light, warmth, sunshine and flight. Conversely, distress is figured in terms of downwardness, entrapment, earthliness, darkness and cold. This metaphor implies structures of consciousness which go beyond any particular religious tradition. It draws on the mythic oppositions of heaven and hell, sun-god and underworld, and also the underlying ‘concept metaphor’ embedded in English idiom that associates height and expansion with well-being, and descent and confinement with its absence (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 4, 14–18). The contrast of warmth and coldness likewise draws on deep-seated primal associations with comfort and deprivation. Every poem is a drama in which the speaker attempts to rise and connect, and to depart from the given earthly condition in which she feels abandoned. Thus, Brontë metaphorically suggests structures of feeling which surpass exclusively Christian, or even religious, reference. She writes of communion and isolation, wholeness and brokenness, coherence and conflict as the poles of emotional life.
Rebecca Styler 35
It is not only that Brontë dramatises the momentary highs and lows of inner experience. The overall drift of her poems is to present a prevailing condition in which personal needs are continually frustrated. Disappointment is the norm, and existence is marked by a painful disparity between longings and fulfilment which at times reaches the absurd – ‘the unreasonable silence of the world’ which confronts human longing, as Albert Camus described it. More fully, Camus explains: It is that divorce between the mind that desires and the world that disappoints, my nostalgia for unity, this fragmented universe and the contradiction that binds them together. (Quoted in Solomon 1972, 279) This ‘divorce’ is demonstrated in poems such as ‘Fluctuations’, a bleak parody of the desire to connect and escape. Subjectivity is presented as hell, bereft of intimacy with the other for which the speaker longs, and without which there is no happiness. Whether this other is human or divine is left open by the suggestive metaphors employed, with the speaker alone in a night-time landscape, mourning the passing of the sun. She gazes at the moon, which appears but passes from view, then a star, and finally a pathetic meteor, hungry for the energy which she needs to draw from them for her inner sustenance. Hope becomes despair as the celestial bodies not only pass out of the sky, but even when present are inadequate to compensate for the primary loss: I thought such wan and lifeless beams Could ne’er my heart repay For the bright sun’s most transient gleams That cheered me through the day. ... Thick vapours snatched her from my sight And I was darkling left, All in the cold and gloomy night Of light and hope bereft. (Brontë 1979, ‘Fluctuations’, 103–4) Whether this deprivation is because of the innate weakness of the heavenly bodies or the star-gazer’s inability to appropriate their energy is unclear. Subjective and objective blur, but not in a way that resolves the viewer’s isolation: epithets are transferred between landscape and speaker, both described as ‘faint’ and ‘wan’, ‘trembl[ing]’ and ‘darkling’.
36
Towards a New Literary Humanism
Her ‘tearful gaze’ mirrors ‘the dim horizon’s haze’ in agonised psychic atrophy. Unable to transcend, she remains ‘locked in the prison of her own consciousness’, confronted by a ‘terrifying absence’, as did other nineteenth-century poets who mourned the disappearance of God from their immediate world (Miller 1963, 2–8). This fundamental lack, or alienation, is the given condition which the poet longs to but cannot transcend, and it is this experience which overwhelmingly constitutes Brontë’s poetic reality. For existentialist thinkers, emotional states have ontological value or, as John MacQuarrie puts it, they are ‘disclosive of being’ (MacQuarrie 1973, 126). How the world feels says something important about personal meaning, which is not resolved with reference to bald statements of belief. This fundamental feeling of being ‘not at home’ in the world is a sensibility which some Christian philosophers equate with ‘sin’ – not in terms of individual sins or moral failings, but as the given condition of original sin into which human beings are born. This is interpreted as alienation, as a person’s separation from God, from others and from his or her true self; it is the incompleteness or fundamental absence which is evident in the human condition (see MacQuarrie 1966, 128–32). The problem inherent in existence is therefore not so much a moral or supernatural phenomenon as an emotional and psychological one. Berdyaev defines the fall as ‘the rise of consciousness with its tormenting duality’, torn between the desire for Paradise and the reality of disappointment and suffering (Berdyaev 1965, 203). Out of this condition of estrangement the individual must aspire to reach an authentic selfhood. Brontë does not turn to promises of redemption or afterlife as a source of healing, even though she firmly believes in both. Hers is an existential, not a theological, problem, which demands a different kind of answer.
III Man is nothing else but what he purposes, he exists only in so far as he realises himself, he is therefore nothing else but the sum of his actions, nothing else but what his life is. (Sartre 1980, 410) For existentialist philosophers, the answer to the question of how to live meaningfully in a world from which meaning is absent becomes located in the will and in action. The true self is not inherent in the given state of existence – it must be forged by each individual’s efforts. Authentic being is achieved through a decisive commitment to a way
Rebecca Styler 37
of life, in which the whole self is invested. For the existentialist thinker, truth is therefore ‘performative’, not cognitive, realised in the self as agent (Solomon 1972, 79). In actions lie healing possibilities, since in them a person ‘is projecting and realising an image of personhood’; the lived-out commitment repairs personal fragmentation on a pragmatic level and in day-to-day actions ‘pulls the self into a coherent unity’ (MacQuarrie 1973, 136–7, 170). The Christian notion of salvation has in a sense always been existentialist, demanding a commitment to a person and to a way of life rather than assent to propositions of belief. ‘If I have all the gifts of prophecy and can fathom all mysteries and all knowledge ... but have not love, I am nothing’, wrote the apostle Paul (Bible 1611, 1 Corinthians 13:2). ‘What good is it, my brothers, if a man claims to have faith but has no deeds?’ adds James, and ‘[c]an such a faith save him?’ (Bible 1611, James 2:14). Kierkegaard was therefore not new in insisting that ‘Christianity is no doctrine ... but an existential communication’ to be possessed only through its ‘actualisation’ in experience (Kierkegaard 1996, 323, 400). And Christian thinkers have found helpful secularised definitions of faith as ‘resolution’ and ‘commitment’, emphasising the individual’s choice of a way of life rather than a supernatural object to which belief is directed (MacQuarrie 1966, 134). For an atheist thinker such as Sartre, following any religion is contrary to the radical freedom which he claims to forge the self’s meanings; however, theistic existentialists acknowledge that a person might choose to draw on a religious tradition, recognising value in a collective wisdom acquired by a community over generations. If these are not adopted thoughtlessly, but taken on independently and applied with heartfeltness, custom can be part of authentic self-realisation. In her poetry of the late 1840s, Brontë abandons her escapist spiritual quest, and instead the theme of the ‘self as agent’ comes to the fore. The dialectical imagery of extreme states recedes, to be replaced by the dominant metaphor of the path and of life as a pilgrimage. The poetic speaker is no longer a passive, feeling subject, hoping for a supernatural invasion to redeem her desolate world. Rather, she is a traveller who self-consciously chooses her way and the guides who will direct her on her journey. This new religious philosophy invests the here and now with a value, albeit a modest one, which to a degree reconciles her to being in the world. To achieve this, Brontë turns away from emotional spirituality to an alternative (then more old-fashioned) Christian tradition in which the will was more important than the emotions. Counter to the Romantic faith in spontaneous feeling stood an Anglican scepticism of the passions and an insistence on disciplining impulse in order
38
Towards a New Literary Humanism
to do right. Herself a vicar’s daughter, Anne Brontë would have regularly recited the confession that ‘we have followed too much the devices and desire of our own hearts ... and there is no health in us’ (Book of Common Prayer 1662). As a more adequate philosophy of selfhood, Brontë adopts a code of moral effort and self-discipline which is bracing compared with the quest for ecstatic surrender, but is also realistic in accepting the conditions of existence. ‘Faith’ undergoes redefinition and becomes a practice through which a Christian self comes into being. Brontë’s poetry therefore takes a didactic turn, moving away from the previously dominant lyrical form. Poems such as ‘The Narrow Way’ are full of bracing imperatives, in which the pilgrim is enjoined to work for her or his reward, to ‘Watch …Toil … Crush pride into the dust ... Waive pleasure ... To labour and to love,/To pardon and endure’ (Brontë 1979, 161–2). This ethic invests the journey itself with a firm sense of purpose, in contrast to the desolation of the given world in ‘Fluctuations’. The theme of making one’s own life meaningful, in the face of the world’s ‘unreasonable silence’, is articulated in another poem (‘Vanitas Vanitatis’), which states the classic Puritan vanitas theme of earthly futility and the transience of human joys. Nature itself is characterised by restless repetition, such as the ever-thirsty ocean which ever ‘craves for more’, and the waves of human beings who pointlessly ‘come and go like ocean tides’. But in spite of this pessimistic sense of a world without telos, the poem takes an unexpectedly positive turn: What then remains for wretched man? To use life’s comforts while he can: Enjoy the blessings God bestows, Assist his friends, forgive his foes, Trust God and keep his statutes still ... Fixing his firmest hopes on Heaven. (Brontë 1979, ‘Vanitas Vanitatis’, 123–4) This is a kind of moral carpe diem, a decision to live for the moment in the face of unanswerable metaphysical questions. It demonstrates the ‘stern optimism’ which Sartre advocates, or the ‘courage and enthusiasm’ which Kierkegaard recommends as the only practical answer to the absurdity of the human situation (Sartre 1980, 42; Kierkegaard 1996, 459). Brontë endows life with value through wholehearted commitment to practical and relational Christian living, forged in the day to day. Conventional religious rules take on a deeply personal value when they are turned to as a way of resolving the struggle for meaning – not simply
Rebecca Styler 39
as a way to evade the bigger issue, but as an alternative understanding of where salvation is to be found. Brontë was deeply conscious of accusations that she returned to unthinking convention, unable to face the challenges of reality with an independent mind. This included her sister Emily, who continued to espouse an ecstatic, individualistic spirituality, longing for escape from the ordinary into the eternal realm through imaginative flight or death. Indeed, the tendency of many existentialist philosophers is ‘aristocratic’, insisting on the need to stand aloof from the common experience and form an intense individualism as a requirement for authentic being (MacQuarrie 1973, 144). To rise above the herd is presented as the only way to become a whole person. But Brontë makes a distinctive contribution to existentialist Christian reflection, claiming identification with the collective as the more humble, compassionate way. She imagines the voice of transcendent spirituality mocking those who ‘[w]alk on the common sod’ and who ‘trace, with timid foot and eye,/The steps that others trod’. She feels accused of being a ‘[c]oward’ who lacks the courage to ‘soar’ above average human cares (Brontë 1979, ‘The Three Guides’, 146–7). But the response of Brontë’s pilgrim is to criticise the ecstatic stance (which once so deeply appealed) for being arrogant and exclusive, and for leaving no room for the vulnerable and struggling, amongst whom she firmly locates herself. Her pragmatic solution to the problem of existence is also an ethical one, committed to everyday social morality and impatient of romantic, ‘aristocratic’ posturing. By re-identifying with the collective and with commonplace morality, Brontë finds an authentic mode of being which takes into account life’s realities more fully than does the desire to transcend the ordinary. However, this is not a straightforward solution. Brontë depicts the self in continual process, struggling to negotiate competing impulses. The duality dramatised in her earlier poetry is still often present, above all in the dialogue poems in which the pilgrim speaker debates with competing guides on how best to live. The final position is reached only through much persuasion and is often tentative, to be opened up and renegotiated again. The major voices in these dramas embody the emotional extremes of her earlier poems, emphasising fantastic possibility on the one hand and bleak reductivism on the other. But instead of being wholly immersed in one viewpoint or another, the poetic speaker considers the two and adjudicates between them as ways to approach life. State of mind becomes a matter of choice, at least to a degree. So the voice of ‘Youth’ competes with ‘Experience’ (‘Views of Life’) and
40
Towards a New Literary Humanism
the ‘Spirit of Pride’ counters the ‘Spirit of Earth’ (‘The Three Guides’). This negotiation resonates with what Sartre describes as seeking a balance between ‘facticity’ and ‘transcendence’ – the factors of the given condition which determine existence and the possibility of reaching beyond them to realise a self in which there is some autonomy. To surrender to either one aspect of experience is a form of ‘bad faith’, as it neglects the other important dimension. While it is delusional to dwell in a fantasy that the limiting conditions of existence can be wholly escaped, it is also defeatist to surrender entirely to those conditions and to fail to assert some control over how one responds to them. Sartre argues that the individual has the liberty and responsibility to choose their attitude even in very limiting or conflictual circumstances, ‘free’ (as Robert Solomon paraphrases) ‘to impose their own interpretations on the situation in which they find themselves’ (Solomon 1972, 281; see also Sartre 1980, 38–9). There is of course a particular imperative for the Christian to refuse to surrender to mere actuality. If there is a God, then the immediate world is not all there is, and salvation, whatever it means, entails a transfiguration of the state in which a human being finds himself or herself. Karl Jaspers insists that: Brute fact is not reality without possibility. If we remove possibility from any immanent being and then absolutely posit it as a knowable reality, we cause transcendence to disappear, freedom to weaken, and we deceive ourselves about reality. (Jaspers 1971, 77) Transcendence is therefore neither an escape nor a supernatural invasion by the sacred object: it is the possibilities discovered by the subject within his or her given situation. Saving grace is understood as ‘a perceptual capacity’ which is brought to bear on ‘sensibility and empirical actuality’, so that positive possibilities can be realised within the given conditions of existence (Jaspers 1971, 79, 84–5). So, Brontë evaluates both escapist spirituality and nihilism as inadequate ‘views’ of life, and seeks to mediate these extremes in order to find personal meaning within everyday reality. She modifies the counsel of ‘Youth’, who blithely promises that ‘summer’s glorious ray/Would chase those vapours all away,/And scatter glories round’, but also distances herself from ‘Experience’ who sees ‘a yawning tomb/Where bowers and palaces should be’, and who denies the value of human joys because they are imperfect and temporary (Brontë 1979, ‘Views of Life’, 117, 115). For Brontë’s pilgrim, the solution is a carefully nuanced negotiation
Rebecca Styler 41
of these extremes, in which she recognises that she is not fully at home in the world, but also that, if the right attitude is adopted, touches of homeliness can be found within it. She corrects Experience’s cynicism: Tell him that earth is not our rest, Its joys are empty, frail at best; And point beyond the sky; But gleams of light may reach us here, And hope the roughest path can cheer: Then do not bid it fly. (118) The attitude of hope is self-consciously adopted, since ‘itself a brightness throws/O’er all our labours and our woes’; there is no need, the pilgrim argues, to ‘enhance our doom’ by despising the gleams of grace that can be found within the mundane. The imagery of light and darkness which structured Brontë’s earlier mythical mode of thought here becomes a choice of lenses through which life can be perceived. This is a highly modified transcendence, compared to the ecstasy of her earlier imaginings, but one which can realistically be encountered within the path, and over which the individual can exert a measure of control. An important aspect of Brontë’s coming to terms with existence is the acceptance that it is time-bound. Her early poetry conceptualises the self in platonic terms as the soul unbound in infinity, compared to which earth is a ‘prison-house of the spirit’ (as Wordsworth describes it in ‘Ode: Intimations of Immortality’: Wu 2006, 539). According to this philosophy, true selfhood is only attained when the subject loses its consciousness of the contingencies of time and place, and imaginatively or spiritually partakes of eternity. This notion of the self is abandoned in Brontë’s later work and is replaced by a sense that being is temporally bound, an idea foregrounded by the trope of the path prevailing over that of ascent. The authentic self is the product of experience gained over time, whose riches are culled through responsible reflection. While the pilgrim’s instinct is to bewail time’s passing and the pressing fact of mortality, her wise guide embraces the experience of being-in-time: Nay, though [Time] steals thy years away, Their memory is left thee still, And every month and every day Leaves some effect of good or ill. The wise will find in Memory’s store A help for that which lies before
42
Towards a New Literary Humanism
To guide their course aright. (Brontë 1979, ‘Self-Communion’, 153) Memory becomes an important element in this revised sense of faith, not in terms of preserving the lingering glories of a pre-natal realm (as in Wordsworth’s ‘Ode: Intimations of Immortality’), but rather as cumulative wisdom which is used to shape response to the present and future. This sense of the time-bound self also takes into account mortality as a personal and imminent reality. Brontë’s pilgrim poems, like many hymns, end with mention of the ‘awful river’ which must inevitably be crossed. Martin Heidegger, whose ideas have influenced existentialist theologians, emphasises authentic living as ‘being-towards-death’. He argues for ‘an existential interpretation of death’ as one in which the subject embraces his or her own mortality (Heidegger 1962, 292). This inner recognition of death as a horizon towards which one travels is necessary for true being, since it liberates the subject into a realistic understanding of life’s possibilities. Instead of dwelling imaginatively in a realm of afterlife bliss, the individual focuses their energies on the here and now, and the everyday present becomes invested with particular intensity and significance once it is recognised as finite and unique (305–11). For Heidegger, ‘the this-world ontological interpretation of death takes precedence over any ontical other-worldly speculation’ (292). While Brontë often looks forward to a better life after death where ‘bliss shall reign for evermore’, it is not in a way that denies the importance of her earthly life. Incorporating death into her horizon of understanding intensifies the importance of that which must come to pass: ‘while we journey on our way,/We’ll notice every lovely thing,/ And ever as they pass away,/To memory and hope we’ll cling’, the poet enthuses (Brontë 1979, ‘Views of Life’, 119). Most poignantly, in an untitled poem written during her last illness, Brontë refrains from any mention of afterlife as a source of encouragement and instead prays ‘let me serve Thee now’ (Brontë 1979, 164). Through her commitment to the discipline of her inner life, the immediate moment becomes the site of spiritual value, where personal meaning is continually forged and struggled for. Brontë’s rethinking of Christian faith is humanist in the sense that she interprets its central tenets in terms of her emotional and psychological needs, rather than subduing her inner conflicts to fit a model of selfhood pre-determined by a theocentric world view. Her resolution is existentialist in that she works towards an understanding of religion
Rebecca Styler 43
that makes sense of how life feels, in which subjective criteria take precedence over propositional statements about the divine nature. The doctrines of redemption, and ideals of a transcendent God, are always upheld, but alone are found insufficient to grant personal meaning. For this, another, in a sense more secular, kind of truth must be sought which abandons the hope of supernatural intervention and instead locates grace substantially within the believer’s own efforts. Salvation becomes a matter of commitment to ethical action and the choice of a hopeful approach to life in order to realise its potential for meaning. For Brontë, this means re-engagement with the collective and common experience, not distance from it. However, this is no easy solution, nor is it ever a completely satisfying one. The argument is often hard-won through much self-persuasion and protest, and its resolution is precarious: the longing for an epiphany of wholeness often bursts plaintively through the grinding effort to discipline feeling. As Jaspers says, personal philosophy is ‘a never ending task which must ever be repeated’ (Jaspers 1971, 94). Through this keenly conscious emotional reasoning, in a never-completed project of self-formation, Anne Brontë works out her salvation.
2 Virginia Woolf, Sympathy and Feeling for the Human Kirsty Martin
In her ‘Sketch of the Past’, Virginia Woolf tried to capture ‘the most important of all my memories’: If life has a base that it stands upon, if it is a bowl that one fills and fills and fills – then my bowl without a doubt stands upon this memory. It is of lying half asleep, half awake, in bed at the nursery at St Ives. It is of hearing the waves breaking, one, two, one, two, and sending a splash of water over the beach; and then breaking, one, two, one, two, behind a yellow blind. It is of hearing the blind draw its little acorn across the floor as the wind blew the blind out. It is of lying and hearing this splash and seeing this light, and feeling, it is almost impossible that I should be here; of feeling the purest ecstasy I can conceive. (Woolf 2002, 78–9) Woolf is describing a feeling of immediate sensation, rendered through present participles and the steady repetition of ‘this’: ‘hearing this splash and seeing this light’, and yet her feelings take her beyond herself, to the ‘purest ecstasy I can conceive’. The moment strains expression: ‘I could spend hours trying to write that as it should be written’ (79), and part of its difficulty is connected to the problem of describing a person: Woolf feels that she would only have caught the moment successfully if ‘I had begun by describing Virginia herself’ (79). For Woolf, considerations of the human needed to take into account the capacity of human feeling to balance between physical groundedness and intimations of transcendence. Woolf’s thinking on emotion shaped an intricate sense of what it is to be human and what it is to understand another human being. In this chapter I will explore Woolf’s sense of feeling, and especially her sense 44
Kirsty Martin 45
of feeling for others, of sympathy; in addition, I will trace connections between her work and contemporary thinking on the body, soul and spirit. Through this I will present one intriguing historical perspective on the human, but I will also analyse the implications of Woolf’s work for debate today. The Introduction to this volume has proposed that emotion is foundational to thinking about a new literary humanism. Woolf’s work suggests that whilst emotion might be crucial to any understanding of the human, it also has the propensity to unsettle some of traditional humanism’s central tenets, such as the belief in the rationality and autonomy of the individual. Andy Mousley touches on various tensions at work in emotion, stressing both sensuousness and the possibility of ‘self-forgetfulness’. This chapter will look further at these and related tensions in an attempt to suggest the complexity of what it is to feel, and how literature might allow us to feel for the human.
Martha Nussbaum, humanism and emotion I begin with Martha Nussbaum because her emphasis on the emotions and literature’s power to stir the emotions are central to some of the concerns of this volume. Nussbaum’s influential work can be understood as recuperating emotion on behalf of a traditional-looking, Enlightenment humanism, referred to by Geoffrey Galt Harpham as ‘unmoderated’ (Harpham 2002, 57). This part of the chapter will argue that Nussbaum’s theory of emotion fails to account fully for the vitality of our emotional experience, and especially fails to take into account the delicacy of sympathy. By contrast, Woolf’s thinking both on emotion and on sympathy offers a more suggestive, poised sense of the human, and indicates that the traditional humanism represented by Nussbaum may need to be reshaped. Nussbaum’s humanism is manifest in her sense that literature is able to depict the concrete experience of life in a way that is ethically educative (an ideal partly echoed in this volume’s Introduction). In Love’s Knowledge, Nussbaum, following an Aristotelian insistence on ‘fine tuned concreteness in ethical attention’, suggests that ‘there may be some views of the world and how one should live in it … that cannot be fully and adequately stated in the language of conventional philosophical prose … but only in a language and in forms themselves more complex, more allusive, more attentive to particulars’ (Nussbaum 1990, 38, 3). Nussbaum urges that literature provides such a form and that its capacity to record human life can be morally useful because the reader responds emotionally to literature’s depictions of life, sympathising with characters and situations. Nussbaum’s view of literature as prompting ethical
46
Towards a New Literary Humanism
sympathy through a concrete, particularised depiction of life is sustained by her conception of emotion, as expounded further in Upheavals of Thought (2001). For her, the emotions expressed and prompted by literature matter ethically because emotions are not ‘animal energies’ but are cognitively important, connected to our ‘thoughts, imaginings, and appraisals’ (Nussbaum 2001, 1). She argues that emotions are not merely internal states but are always ‘about something: they have an object’ (27). The particular urgency connected with emotion is not irrational, but instead is a sign of the object’s importance to the feeling subject. Thus, Nussbaum argues that emotion can be seen as a ‘judgement’ about the world: her grief at her mother’s death, for example, is directed at her mother and forms a judgement about her mother’s importance to her. Nussbaum’s view of emotion as cognitive supports her humanism because it suggests that emotions are rational, grounded phenomena which respond best to concrete depictions, and because it suggests that in feeling for fiction we respond rationally, maintaining our moral autonomy and making ethical judgements. Yet is emotion really as Nussbaum describes it? And if it is not, what might this mean for Nussbaum’s ideal of the self, for her sense of how we understand the emotions for others, and for her humanist expectations of literature? Sophie Ratcliffe has pointed out that Nussbaum’s sense of emotion supports, and is supported by, a ‘post-Freudian, rationalist view of the “human self”’ (Ratcliffe 2008, 15), but that when one considers certain types of emotional experience, this view of the self doesn’t seem quite right. Nussbaum’s theory – that emotions reveal the feeling subject’s valuation of objects – implies that things are important to us because they relate to our cognitive self rather than because they take us beyond ourselves. Yet, Ratcliffe argues, states such as the sympathetic ideal of feeling another’s emotions are difficult to discuss without touching on ideas of transcendence. Sympathy might involve something like wonder, which unsettles the idea of an autonomous human self, suggesting something at odds with liberal humanism (see Ratcliffe 2008, 18–19). Because Woolf’s sense of feeling as shown in her St Ives description suggests transcendence but also dwells on the sensory, her work reveals an added complexity in thinking about emotion. One of the acknowledged complications in Nussbaum’s argument is the possibility of a wondrous element to emotion, but another is her treatment of the body. Nussbaum urges that emotion is not solely bodily: what element in me is it that experiences the terrible shock of grief? I think of my mother; I embrace in my mind the fact that she will
Kirsty Martin 47
never be with me again – and I am shaken. How and where? Do we imagine the thought causing a fluttering in my hands, or a trembling in my stomach? And if we do, do we really want to say that this fluttering or trembling is my grief about my mother’s death? (Nussbaum 2001, 44) What troubles Nussbaum is the question of possession, evinced in the shifting of her italics. She focuses first on what emotion ‘is’ and is driven to think of the body, yet in doing so she is uncertain about whether this is ‘my grief’. Embodiment is a predicament because it means that one’s individual emotions might seem to be things which are not under the control of the self: one is not in total command of one’s own body. Recognising the bodily nature of emotion also suggests that emotions might be at once intimately immediate and yet might gesture to something beyond the individual, centred in the individual but poised on the edge of sympathetic transcendence. Both the role of the body and of sympathy complicate Nussbaum’s ideas of emotion, and thus complicate her humanism, placing in question her idea of the human and her expectations of literature. The work of Virginia Woolf offers a way of thinking through such issues. I shall now turn to Woolf’s work, briefly rehearsing first how it has been seen as challenging expectations when it comes to the portrayal of human beings.
Virginia Woolf, humans and characters E.M. Forster felt that Woolf failed on an important point as a novelist. For him, novels must be about human beings and ‘if one is writing about human beings, one does want them to seem alive’. Forster felt that Woolf’s characters were too often mere ‘wraiths’ (Noble 1972, 191–2). Lee Oser argues that modernist writers generally were fundamentally opposed to the Aristotelian humanism espoused by Nussbaum: In contrast to the Aristotelian body, what I shall call the modernist body is an aesthetic body. It is an image in the mind, an incorporeal voice, a ghost of style. It is epitomized by the persona or mask. (Oser 2007, 9) Such etherealising of the human seems to preclude humanist ethics in the terms of Aristotle and Nussbaum, where a reader might sympathise through seeing people embodied in the text.
48
Towards a New Literary Humanism
However, attention to Woolf’s own comments reveals a more subtle re-positioning of characterisation, which challenges Oser’s assertion. Woolf described the characters of Victorian literature thus: The character is rubbed into us indelibly because its features are so few and so prominent. We are given the keyword (Mr Dick has King Charles’s head; Mr Brooke, ‘I went into that a great deal at one time’; Mrs Micawber, ‘I will never desert Mr Micawber’). (Woolf 1988, 386) Whilst Woolf can empathise with those who have turned away from this mode of characterisation – ‘[t]here was … (if we think ourselves into the mind of a writer contemplating fiction about the year 1900), something plausible, superficial, unreal in all this abundance’ – her own literary practice suggests a delicate transformation of such techniques (Woolf 1988, 386). In Jacob’s Room (1922), Woolf offers her own version of the ‘keyword’ as she meditates on the necessity of ‘character-mongering’: After all, what does it matter – that Fanny Elmer was all sentiment and sensation, and Mrs Durrant hard as iron? that Clara, owing (so the character-mongers said) largely to her mother’s influence, never yet had the chance to do anything off her own bat, and only to very observant eyes displayed deeps of feeling which were positively alarming; and would certainly throw herself away upon someone unworthy of her one of these days unless, so the character-mongers said, she had a spark of her mother’s spirit in her – was somehow heroic. (Woolf 2008a, 214) The poignant crescendo to Woolf’s sense of Clara’s character as ‘somehow heroic’ urges that such characterisation does matter, and her brief character sketches suggest what parts of the human matter most. The summaries – ‘all sentiment and sensation’, ‘as hard as iron’ – suggest the prominent features of Victorian characters. Yet whilst the Victorian keywords relate to habits of speech or external features, Woolf’s suggest something less easily discerned. Woolf’s descriptions emphasise aspects of the inner life made manifest in material qualities: ‘as hard as iron’. She balances between inner and outer character traits. Woolf was interested in something in human beings which both continued and transformed a humanist tradition; turning to Woolf’s description of feeling, and feeling for others, reveals exactly what conception of the human this entailed.
Kirsty Martin 49
Mrs Dalloway: emotion, physiology and vitalism ‘Few things in Virginia Woolf’s fiction have received so much attention from critics as her methods of treating the inner lives of her characters’, James Naremore has noted in discussing Mrs Dalloway (Naremore 1973, 60). Yet close attention to Mrs Dalloway (1925) and the contemporary debates it touches on reveals more about what exactly the ‘inner life’ was for Woolf. In ‘Character in Fiction’ (1924), Woolf suggested that in portraying character, a Russian writer ‘would pierce through the flesh; would reveal the soul’ (Woolf 1988, 426). By contrast, Woolf’s interior monologues in Mrs Dalloway contain sudden obliquities, barriers to a complete intimacy of character and reader. Walking through London, Mrs Dalloway is filled with joy: For Heaven only knows why one loves it so, how one sees it so, making it up, building it round one, tumbling it, creating it every moment afresh; but the veriest frumps, the most dejected of miseries sitting on doorsteps (drink their downfall) do the same; can’t be dealt with, she felt positive, by Acts of Parliament for that very reason: they love life. In people’s eyes, in the swing, tramp and trudge; in the bellow and the uproar; the carriages, motor cars, omnibuses, vans, sandwich men shuffling and swinging; brass bands; barrel organs; in the triumph and the jingle and the strange high singing of some aeroplane overhead was what she loved; life; London; this moment of June. (Woolf 2008b, 4) There is something highly wrought in Mrs Dalloway’s insistences: ‘Heaven only knows’, ‘she felt positive’, and something alienating about her over-certain judgements: ‘(drink their downfall)’, which puts the reader on edge instead of drawing them in. Yet, whilst the reader may not assent to the sentiments expressed, the rhythm cradles the reader’s attention – the punctuated listing of ‘people’s eyes, in the swing, tramp, and trudge’ conveys a darting attention before breaking into declarative certainty: ‘was what she loved’. Our contact with Mrs Dalloway is anchored in rhythm, and this anchoring reveals something about the nature of the ‘inner life’ for Woolf that has yet to be recognised. The reasons for Woolf’s rhythmic presentation of others’ feelings can be further brought into focus by exploring more of her understanding of how emotion might be presented. The writer she felt was most able to ‘pierce through the flesh’ and reveal the soul was Dostoevsky.1 However,
50
Towards a New Literary Humanism
she found Dostoevsky’s portrayal of his characters’ emotions in The Possessed wearying, writing in ‘Phases of Fiction’ (1929) of how: Everything is done to suggest the intensity of their emotions. They turn pale; they shake with terror; they go into hysterics … Yet though they stamp and scream, we hear the sound as if it went on next door. (Woolf 2009, 69–70) The emotional transparency of the bodies of Dostoevsky’s characters exhausts Woolf. Her critique of his stamping figures suggests implicitly that there is something about the human that does not translate easily between mind and body. The nature of this aspect of the human becomes clearer through Woolf’s more expansive and fretful language of emotion. Whilst Dostoevsky in the scene which Woolf is discussing reflects emotion through voice tone, describing for instance Praskovya Ivanovna’s ‘breaking voice’ (Dostoevsky 1970, 146), Woolf, showing Clarissa meeting Peter Walsh for the first time in years, depicts a more tortuous passage of emotion: ‘Do you remember the lake?’ she said, in an abrupt voice, under the pressure of an emotion which caught her heart, made the muscles of her throat stiff, and contracted her lips in a spasm as she said ‘lake’. (Woolf 2008b, 36) Woolf carefully tracks Clarissa’s emotion to her heart, throat and lips. Yet emotion is something known in the convulsive resistances of her body rather than displayed exactly through it. Moreover, the emotion itself, the cause of all this wrenching pressure, retains a degree of ethereality – it moves through the body, but its exact relation to the body is unspecified. Woolf’s awareness of the difficulty of the relationship between mind and body, and her gesturing towards the ‘pressure’ of emotion, point to her awareness of contemporary debates over the nature of the human. During the nineteenth century, there had been advances in understanding the mind and emotion as properties of the body.2 Theo Hyslop, one of Woolf’s physicians, expressed this materialist bent in the title of his book on Mental Physiology (1895). However, as he noted, there were still people who believed in a ‘spiritual theory’ that our feelings and thoughts cannot be understood solely through understanding bodily process (Hyslop 1895, 15). Woolf was writing at a time when such debates were still potent. Such ideas ranged from dualist suggestions
Kirsty Martin 51
that there was a soul in opposition to the body, to the theory of vitalism. Vitalism, mediating between dualist and materialist ideas, suggested that there was something in every living thing which science could not understand, a type of vital spirit which defined and created life, and which was manifest as a type of energy infused in flesh.3 It is this conception of what it is to be alive that seems most attuned to Woolf’s sense of the energy implicit in the ‘pressure’ of emotion, in the energies of emotion expressed in the rhythm of her monologues and in her subtle sense of the body. Only one critic has hitherto called Woolf a vitalist: Craig A. Gordon has argued that Woolf’s representation of Jinny in The Waves (1931) is ‘consonant with a well-established tradition of vitalistic reaction to the deterministic effects of positivist science’ (Gordon 2007, 163). Gordon is interested in how Woolf’s vitalism opposes the neuroscientific claim of how individuals develop habits which fix them in social roles, and how it allows ‘less a form of relation between fixedly discrete individuals than a process of merging’ – yet vitalism is also important for fundamental thinking about how we understand the human at all, and for thinking about the delicacy of feeling for others (164). Woolf’s vitalism grounded her conviction of the difficulty of knowing others and of knowing oneself. One aspect of Mrs Dalloway’s response to contemporary physiology is its depiction of the relation between the nerves and the heart. Scientists had recently explained that diagnoses of heart disease and ‘nervous exhaustion’ might be confused as the nerves and the heart were interdependent, the nerves of the heart controlling its beating.4 Woolf seems to know this as she describes Clarissa’s emotions at her party: Indeed, Clarissa felt, the Prime Minister had been good to come. And, walking down the room with him, with Sally there and Peter there and Richard very pleased, with all those people rather inclined, perhaps, to envy, she had felt that intoxication of the moment, that dilatation of the nerves of the heart itself until it seemed to quiver, steeped, upright; – yes, but after all it was what other people felt, that; for, though she loved it and felt it tingle and sting, still these semblances, these triumphs (dear old Peter, for example, thinking her so brilliant), had a hollowness; at arm’s length they were, not in the heart. (Woolf 2008b, 148) Woolf is concerned to ground Clarissa’s feelings in a scientific description of the workings of her internal organs: ‘the dilatation of the nerves of the heart’, but again there are gaps in such description. Woolf’s
52
Towards a New Literary Humanism
description is vitalist in its intimation that ultimately physiological description is inadequate and that homely cliché better captures emotion: ‘at arm’s length they were, not in the heart’. Woolf’s divergence from medical orthodoxy insists that we might feel alienated from our own feelings even as they sweep our nerves, that there is something about our own feelings which might seem not to belong to us. It suggests, too, that there is something difficult to know about others, as the reference to Peter ‘thinking her [Clarissa] so brilliant’ extends the tissue of misunderstanding to relations between people. The intractable sense of alienation about feeling corresponds to a vitalist sense of the human as filled with mysterious animation. Woolf imagines the essence of oneself and one’s emotion as both forming the core of one’s being and being beyond one’s control. Vitalism thus unsettles questions of human identity; moreover, it suggests how people might be connected to each other. Whilst Clarissa and Peter struggle to understand each other, Woolf does suggest Clarissa is in touch with others, strangely inhabited by ‘what other people felt’. This suggestion is further expanded within Mrs Dalloway through the relation between Clarissa and Septimus, which shows how complete communication between people might be possible. Clarissa lies on her sofa: So on a summer’s day waves collect, overbalance, and fall; collect and fall; and the whole world seems to be saying ‘that is all’ more and more ponderously, until even the heart in the body which lies in the sun on the beach says too, that is all. Fear no more, says the heart. Fear no more, says the heart, committing its burden to some sea, which sighs collectively for all sorrows, and renews, begins, collects, lets fall. (34) And Septimus falls into tune with her: Every power poured its treasures on his head, and his hand lay there on the back of the sofa, as he had seen his hand lie when he was bathing, floating, on the top of the waves, while far away on shore he heard dogs barking and barking far away. Fear no more, says the heart in the body; fear no more. (118) Septimus and Clarissa are connected by rhythm and by something inherent in their bodies – ‘the heart in the body which lies in the sun on the beach’ – and yet belongs to neither of them: ‘the body’. Vitalism suggested people’s individuality lay in an energy implicit in their bodies – this meant,
Kirsty Martin 53
as is clear at Clarissa’s party, that it is hard to understand others, but it also meant that understanding another might mean coming into contact with their ‘spirit’, not just their thoughts and feelings, but the shape and rhythm of these thoughts and feelings. It suggests that one understands another by somehow falling into tune with them. Woolf’s descriptions of feeling, and feeling for others, imply that human individuality is subtly enfleshed and that understanding the human involves an intuitive, bodily form of response and a rhythmic form of writing.
Sea anemones and the remains of humanism What then does Woolf’s vitalist, rhythmic sense of individuality and her intuitive, bodily sense of sympathy mean for the idea of the human suggested by Nussbaum? One perspective on such questions can be found in another of Woolf’s St Ives’ memories, that of finding ‘red and yellow anemones flourishing their antennae; or stuck like blobs of jelly to the rocks’ (Woolf 2002, 133). Sea anemones focus the complex balance between body, energy and transcendence that I have explored in Woolf’s thinking on emotion and identity: the creatures are both insistently fleshly (‘like lumps of jelly’) and translucently responsive (‘flourishing their antennae’). The anemones became one of Woolf’s favourite images for discussing the emotional life, and they are suggestive of her sense of the human. In Woolf’s short story ‘Together and Apart’, the anemones are used to convey how we feel for people, as Woolf’s central character muses on how her feelings towards those around her take shape: Fibres of her were floated capriciously this way and that, like the tentacles of a sea anemone, now thrilled, now snubbed, and her brain, miles away, cool and distant, received messages which it would sum up in time so that when people talked about Roderick Serle (and he was a bit of a figure) she would say unhesitatingly: ‘I like him’, or ‘I don’t like him’, and her opinion would be made up for ever. An odd thought; a solemn thought; throwing a queer light on what human fellowship consisted of. (Woolf 1986, 185) The sending of messages from fibres to brain suggests a neuroscientific understanding of feeling, but Woolf disrupts the physiological description, dislocating fibres and brain, and complicating matters by an expression of kinship to the anemone. The image suggests that feeling, and feeling for the human, is a matter at once fleshly and translucent, bodily and yet strangely disembodied. The sea anemone suggests the
54
Towards a New Literary Humanism
distance between Woolf’s idea of the human and that of Nussbaum. Emotion here is cognitive only in a subtle sense (complicating the unity of the head and the heart) and emotion is less a matter of autonomous judgement than bodily responsiveness. Woolf continued to use the image of the sea anemone throughout her career, and this section will trace how the anemones reveal the alternative sense of the human that Woolf’s writing depicts. The sea anemone is important in the history of thinking about feeling. Sea anemones puzzled natural scientists until the late nineteenth century, as it was unclear how much they felt and how they could have feeling at all. In 1860, Philip Henry Gosse insisted that the creature’s responsiveness meant that a ‘delicate sense of touch certainly exists’, but was unable to understand how this feeling could occur: ‘I have been as unsuccessful as my predecessors in my search for nervous thread and ganglia, still, I have little doubt that such exists’ (Gosse 1860, xiv). Gosse’s faith was eventually confirmed by a series of scientific experiments into whether feeling existed in the anemones. By the time Woolf was writing, scientists had discovered through various experiments that the sea anemones did indeed have a basic nerve function.5 They had thus accrued significance as an image for the primitive ancestry of human emotion and for the delicacy of identifying feeling. For Woolf, the sea anemone thus offered a way to think through the ideas of feeling necessary to her vitalist, bodily sense of feeling, and tracing her use of the image of the sea anemone suggests what remains of a humanist position in her work. Writing of unself-conscious emotion in a letter to Vita Sackville-West, Woolf wrote about sea anemones: I had wanted to go into the matter of profound natural happiness; as revealed to me yesterday at a family party of an English Banker; where the passion and joy of sons and daughters in their own society struck me almost to tears with self-pity and amazement. Nothing of that sort do we any of us know – profound emotions, which are yet natural and taken for granted, so that nothing inhibits or restrains – How deep these are, and unself conscious [sic]. There is a book called Father and Son, by Gosse, which says that all the coast of England was fringed with little sea anemones and lovely tassels of seaweed and sprays of emerald moss and so on, from the beginning of time till Jan 1858, when, for some reason, hordes of clergy and spinsters in mushroom hats and goggles began collecting, and so scraped and rifled the coast that this accumulation was destroyed for ever – A parable this, of what we have done to the deposits of family happiness. (Woolf 1977, 254)
Kirsty Martin 55
Woolf is referring to Edmund Gosse’s account of his father Philip Henry Gosse’s work on sea anemones, work which (according to Edmund Gosse 2009, 80–2) fuelled interest in collecting the creatures, leading to their depletion. Woolf is imagining anemones before they had been used to investigate emotion, when the perception that they were feeling creatures rested at the level of an intuition that there was something vital within them. Woolf, in her respect for the untouched sea anemones, implicitly urges a restraint of curiosity and a return to this type of awareness. The image of the sea anemones remained important to Woolf across her literary career and was bound up with the importance of understanding individuals – she recorded in her diary in 1940 that ‘L. sees people in the mass: I singly. I thought biography is like the rim of sea anemones left round the shore in Gosse’s Father & Son’ (Woolf 1984, 332). Woolf is imagining a tentative, faithful feel for the individual feelings of others. She is not, however, without her own self-consciousness – the mock-parable style speaks to the necessity of indirection in conveying such feeling, whilst clinging to the ‘deposits’ of family happiness does not altogether seem an attractive proposition. What remains of ‘profound emotions’ is a feel for the bodily, primitive nature of emotion, and an admission that such emotions cannot entirely be ‘natural and taken for granted’. Woolf’s sense of the human, then, stands at odds with that of Nussbaum. It emphasises the body, the complexity of the relation between emotion and cognition, and instead of maintaining moral autonomy, it suggests something more dependent and responsive. Moreover, the sea anemone suggests the form of feeling best suited to vitalist understanding. Woolf used the creatures in describing her friends, writing to Gerald Brenan: you should know Roger [Fry], whose mind, far subtler and more richly stocked than Clives [sic] [Bell], never ceases for a second to glow, contract, expand, like some wonderful red-tinted sea anemone, which lives in the deepest water and sucks into itself every scrap of living matter within miles. (Woolf 1977, 80) Woolf conveys Fry and Bell in a way that shifts between the embodied and the translucent, whilst the changing colours of the anemones suggest stirrings of energy as they ‘glow, contract, expand’. Woolf’s sea anemones are almost always portrayed with careful attention to light and colour, and the use of colour suggests a way of feeling shaped to Woolf’s concern with the sensuous and otherworldly. Questions of why
56
Towards a New Literary Humanism
we relate to shape and colour in art remain uncertain.6 When we relate to the type of particularised, human representations in which Nussbaum is interested, it can be argued that what we are doing is relating the art analogically to our own life experiences. When we relate to shape and colour as such, we relate to something both abstract and sensuous that has no specific referent in real life. Woolf’s use of colour is at once sensuous and abstract, and the type of feeling it asks for is crucial to her sense of how we might feel for human beings. It is clear that Woolf’s work indicates an idea of the human that is more bodily, less cognitive and less autonomous than that suggested by Nussbaum. My final section will begin to explore how Woolf’s vitalist understanding gives rise to a form of writing that is at odds with Nussbaum’s ideal of humanist fiction as mimetic and particularised, and that deepens a sense of how literature might ‘animate’ the human.
Abstractions of emotion in The Waves The Waves (1931) has prompted concerns about emotion and humanism. In 1977, Hermione Lee described how in the novel a ‘formal, rhythmic monologue subjugates the representation of personality or action to a series of physical images which are made to stand for a state of mind’ (Lee 1977, 163) and in 1987, Makiko Minow-Pinkney, writing from a psychoanalytic perspective, questioned Lee’s ‘liberal humanist assumptions about character’ (Minow-Pinkney 1987, 153). I hope I have shown that Woolf was committed to humanism in her concern for the representation of personalities, but that her views of emotion meant that such personalities and identities did unsettle certain humanist assumptions. Woolf’s conception of emotion, based on her vitalism, expands Nussbaum’s idea of the human. Moreover, Woolf’s sense of the human and of feeling means that one of her most vigorous challenges to humanist assumptions resides in her sense of how the human should be depicted. The assumption that has most troubled criticism on The Waves is the premise that emotion and abstraction are antithetical. Gillian Beer looks at The Waves in the light of contemporary physics and notes the difficulties of such an association: Yet is that abstracted insubstantial world enough for a novelist? How to find and sustain story? emotion? ordinary living without falling into the realist trap? (Beer 1996a, 118) This series of linked questions implies, perhaps, that the most apt mode for the human is storytelling, and that emotion is bound to ‘ordinary
Kirsty Martin 57
living’. Yet, for Woolf, ordinary living also involves an element of abstraction, and emotion includes the type of feelings we have for shape or colour. In ‘Poetry, Fiction and the Future’ (1927), written shortly before Woolf began work on The Waves, she is interested in our feelings for both pure sensation and things that seem pure abstraction: ‘the power of music, the stimulus of sight, the effect on us of the shape of trees or the play of colour, the emotions bred in us by crowds, the obscure terrors and hatreds which come so irrationally in certain places or from certain people, the delight of movement, the intoxication of wine’ (Woolf 1994, 439). The Waves manifests the expressive implications of Woolf’s sense of the human. The novel supports an individualistic view of the human, with first-person monologues revealing characters with distinct habits of thought and feeling. Simultaneously, people are taken beyond the individual, fusing together at the level of elemental, rhythmic energy, expressed in the syntactic harmony of their voices. The individual characters feel in a way that is intimate to each of them and yet is intimately connected with and shaped by the world around them, as is clear from Susan’s reflections: ‘Colour returns. The day waves yellow with all its crops. The earth hangs heavy beneath me. But who am I, who lean on this gate and watch my setter nose in a circle? I think sometimes (I am not twenty yet) I am not a woman, but the light that falls on this gate, on this ground.’ (Woolf 2008c, 79) Employing colour, Woolf allows for something simultaneously immediate and otherworldly. The questioning ‘who am I’ seems to support Minow-Pinkney in destabilising identity, but Susan is very steadily aware of identity. Susan’s identity is forged through her epiphanic, empathetic relation to the colours and things around her. In this way, the rhythm and images of The Waves provide a perfect expression of the human and the human capacity for feeling that abstracts one beyond oneself. Instead of Nussbaum’s insistence on the concrete, The Waves shows how we feel for something suggested by and beyond the body of another. Characters are highly attuned to the gestures of others and to the energy suggested by gesture. Louis watches Rhoda in the schoolroom: ‘There Rhoda sits staring at the blackboard,’ said Louis, ‘in the schoolroom, while we ramble off, picking here a bit of thyme, pinching here a leaf of southernwood while Bernard tells a story.
58
Towards a New Literary Humanism
Her shoulder-blades meet across her back like the wings of a small butterfly. And as she stares at the chalk figures, her mind lodges in those white circles …’ (Woolf 2008c, 15–16) Louis alights on particular detail, the crossing of Rhoda’s shoulderblades, but then moves to imagine the movements of her mind, which abstract the figures on the blackboard into endless white circles. Woolf’s conception of the spirit, rhythm and movement of the human incarnates itself in a text that darts from particularity towards the otherworldly. Woolf, like Nussbaum, links emotion and knowledge, showing intuitive feeling as the way we know each other. Yet, whilst for Nussbaum emotion is key to our thoughts about the world, for Woolf it is crucial to our being. Woolf’s sense of emotion shapes a new humanism which is hesitant about claims of autonomy, and thus casts doubt on the ethics of reading (or at least Nussbaum’s version of this), but which is determined to be true to all the sensuous and abstract ways in which one might feel. Woolf’s subtle reformulation of humanism suggests that one way forward for humanism, and one way of avoiding ‘fuzzy intuition’, may be to look more closely at intuition, enriching our understanding of the human to accommodate the complicating conditions of emotion.
Notes 1. Woolf singled out Dostoevsky for his presentation of the soul’s ‘depth and volume’ (Woolf 1994, 185) in ‘The Russian Point of View’ (1925). 2. For more on nineteenth-century science, see Shuttleworth and Bourne Taylor 1998. 3. For more on early twentieth-century vitalism, see Lofthouse 2005. 4. An anonymous newspaper article documenting this discovery was ‘Influenza and the Heart. Symptoms Explained. Lessons of Army Work’, The Times (21 April 1919, 7). 5. For a description of one such experiment, see ‘Mental Evolution’, The Times (Anon, 4 December 1883, 10). 6. See Christopher Butler 2004, 105–31.
3 Being Human and Being Animal in Twentieth-Century HorseWhispering Writings: ‘Word-Bound Creatures’ and ‘the Breath of Horses’ Elspeth Graham What does it mean to be human? Although this question has, selfevidently, always been central to thought in the humanities, it has been asked in new ways and with increasing frequency over the past few decades. In particular, what is variously referred to as late-modernity, high-modernity or postmodernity has raised questions about modernity’s predication on human-centred positivism. Postmodern and posthuman thought, with an emphasis on the systemic, has not only queried the absolute centrality of the human to the operations and significance of the world, replacing ideas of humanity as the crucial source of agency and meaning with a notion of the human as a generative intersection in a system, but has de-integrated the human itself. The human becomes the product of an accidental and temporary coalescence of forces, a site which is affected by, as well as affecting, larger systems, and which even in its existence as a temporary stasis is fundamentally riven, only ever occupying a position of provisional integration. A new humanism as explored in this volume (valorised in literature – that most central of humanistic practices, based as it is on language, often seen as definitive of human-ness) needs to affirm the human in this decentring context. This chapter contributes to the book’s aim by focusing on a cluster of late-twentieth-century writings featuring horse whisperers, figures who occupy a mediatory position between human and non-human animals. These whispering texts, along with a series of philosophical and psychoanalytic counterparts, foreground questions about the intersubjective nature of human subjectivity, the ways in which being human is predicated on that ‘inter’ at the heart of relational and systemic thought. Most directly, these writings are concerned with human relationships with animal others and, by extension, with a natural ecology. But they are also concerned with ways in which, throughout the thought of the twentieth 59
60
Towards a New Literary Humanism
century, Western humanity has struggled to recognise and conceptualise the other in the self: how interrelationship structures all aspects of being and how the somatic and the instinctual relate to the intellectual and symbolic in us. So, embedded in the chapter is the question of how – if, as one aspect of rethinking the human, we are to envisage a realignment of the human in relation to the non-human others that constitute the rest of the world, as well as to our own human otherness – we might speak to and hear those non-symbolic othernesses that surround and inform us. And in asking these questions in relation to novels and philosophical writings, the question also emerges as to what the implications are for writing of an attempt to speak the necessarily non-verbal and non-symbolic in definitively verbal forms. These questions circulate around that larger question of how a new literary humanism might speak to and for a de-integrated, de-centralised, but still meaningful human-ness.
Word-bound creatures Tess Gallagher’s short story ‘The Lover of Horses’, in exploring the limits of human verbality and reason, introduces key questions that traverse all the writings I am interested in. This story evokes the abiding idea of the mysterious otherness of horses and their association with a realm beyond the Law.1 The story is structured around an implicit opposition between two worlds: that of the responsible, regular, domestic and economically stable against that of freedom, risk and chance, and an inarticulable connection with forces of nature and life. Describing the origins of her great-grandfather’s intuitive understanding of horses, the narrator tells us: I did not learn, until I travelled to where my family originated at Collenamore in the west of Ireland, that my great-grandfather had most likely been a ‘whisperer’, a breed of men among the gypsies who were said to possess the power of talking sense to horses. These men had no fear of even the most malicious and dangerous horses. In fact, they would often take the wild animal into a closed stall in order to perform their skills. (Gallagher 1992, 2) Irishness and gypsiness are conflated in an evocation of an archaic, originating world where the proximity and necessity of horses to people is an unspoken fact. The whisperer is one of a minority within a minority (‘a breed of men among the gypsies’) who have a special ‘power’ to mediate between horses and humans, to introduce, or restore, hostile
Elspeth Graham 61
horses to human culture. With its connotations of breathy semiaudibility, whispering is the bridge between the wild and the domestic. It blends a suggestion of the breath of horses – that evocative, essential characteristic of equines who depend for survival on their powerful respiratory apparatus (large lungs and extended sinuses), who greet by offering breath, exhaling the scent of the self for the other, whose vocal communications include snorting and blowing, and who sigh to relieve tension – with reference to threshold human articulation, speech at the brink of audibility and thus of communication and meaning. The whisperer draws horses into alliance with the human through his esoteric skill. But the exclusivity of such a bond with horses may also work to entice the human over to the side of horses: ‘my great grandfather, at the age of fifty-two, abandoned his wife and family to join a circus’. This may not have been, the narrator speculates, ‘simply drunken bravado, nor even the understandable wish to escape family obligations’, nor again ‘the obvious transgression – that he had run away to join the circus – but that he was in all likelihood a man who had been stolen by a horse’ (3). This transgressive reversal, horses stealing men, prefaced by the conjectural but normalising phrase ‘in all likelihood’, provides the narrative link with other transgressive compulsions experienced by members of the family and the narrator’s arrival at acceptance of her own othersidedness. She, in spite of her mother’s protective guardianship against signs of ‘inexplicable manias’ (6), has manifested symptoms of othering compulsions in childhood, including: that I refused to speak aloud to anyone until the age of eleven. I whispered everything, as if my mind were a repository of secrets which could only be divulged in this intimate manner. (7) But it is the imminent death of her gambler father that brings her to the eventual acknowledgement of her heritage. Only the narrator, amongst all the members of her family, can be with him and care for him during his long final episode of card-playing compulsion when ‘many unspoken tendernesses passed between’ them (10). While the family searches for reasons, for causality, for meaning to his deathbed behaviour, the narrator herself is guided by chance, or intuition, in her response: I found myself in the yard sitting on a stone bench under a little cedar tree my father loved because he liked to sit there and stare at the ocean. The tree whispered, he said ... My thoughts drifted with
62
Towards a New Literary Humanism
its shiftings and murmurings, and it struck me what a wonderful thing nature is because it knows the value of silence, the innuendos of silence and what they could mean for a word-bound creature such as I was. (13) During the night when her father finally dies, the narrator, having torn the branches from this little tree with its ‘painful permission’ and made a bed outside, finds herself giving way to mysterious utterances and sounds: There was a soft crooning of syllables that was satisfying to my ears, but ultimately useless and absurd. Then it came to me that I was the author of those unwieldy sounds, and that my lips had begun to work of themselves. In a raw pulsing of language I could not account for, I lay awake through the long night and spoke to my father as you might speak to the ocean or the wind, letting him know by that threadbare accompaniment that the vastness he was about to enter had its rhythms in me also. (16) In a story full of reference to words, silence and the in-between realm of whispering, it is no accident that acceptance of other-worldliness, and other-wordedness, should be associated with a death. Although connection to that transgressive realm of horses as thieves of men, and men as whisperers to horses, which is also a world of nuanced silences and wide natural forces beyond the rational, practical and regular, may enable one ‘to plunge [oneself] into the heart of [one’s] life’, it also necessitates recognition that this is to be ‘ruthlessly lost forever’ (6). Through her presentation of this mysterious realm, Gallagher’s narrator presents paradox, or a necessity of taking up a position at the brink of being, as central to the fullness of human life. Love, an embrace of life, and completeness of being are dependent on a continuous attunement to that ‘vastness’ that bounds life and implies the ever-imminent dissolution of the self. This is a sacrificial vision of life, in which stability and everyday human security – positioned throughout in oppositional relation to the world of whispering connectedness – must be forfeited in order to live fully. But it is also close to being a vision in which attainment of freedom from restricting regularity necessarily entails an embrace of non-being. The problem raised is that of a human living in the realm of the non-verbal. To move outside the Symbolic and the realm of Law, for all the possibilities of freedom and intuitive connectedness offered,
Elspeth Graham 63
is also to be aligned with dissolution. If humans embrace absolute alterity and defy the limitations of ‘word-bound’ being, must that also involve an embrace of death? The dilemma at the heart of ‘The Lover of Horses’ is also that of Freud in his working out of ideas around the death drive, a psychoanalytic analogue to Gallagher’s story. Freud was perhaps one of the last great humanists and the first great posthumanists. Writing at a threshold moment between the confidence of high modernity and the beginnings of its unravelling in the aftermath of the Great War (later, of course, referred to as the First World War – a poisonous foretaste of later, more varied manifestations of the movement towards globalisation), he struggled to conceptualise the human capacity for destruction that the War evidenced, the trauma experienced by soldiers and the more general implications of mortality through his recurrent return in his later writings to the idea of the death drive (Freud 1955; 1964). He describes this as being implicated in psychic process in a variety of – often paradoxical – ways. The first aspect of the death drive represents the fundamental biological tendency of all organisms towards dissolution, or return to an inorganic state. This drive towards annihilation is in tension with the role of the ego, which aims to preserve life and to disavow the certainty of death, even while being aware of its inevitability. A fundamental paradox thus exists: the death drive (as primary process) operates in tension with the ego (an agent in secondary processes), which recognises but works against a return to a non-animate state. The death drive is further bound up with ‘repetition compulsion’, the attempt to control past traumatic situations, which thwart the establishment of an equilibrium between pleasure and unpleasure, by a recurring attempt to ‘bind’ dangerous energies. This repetition is not a simple act of gaining mastery (a matter of secondary processes), but is related to the instinctual and thus to unbound primary processes, or those processes inherent in organic life which aim towards restoration of an earlier state (Freud 1955, 35). Freud’s concept of the death drive primarily depends on two assumptions: first, that all psychic process is underpinned by biological necessity; and, second, that processes of separation are fundamental to the psychic make-up of humans. These include the separation of the secondary psychic processes, including the agency of the ego, from a somatic base and its agents, the instincts, as well as, more generally, those separations that occur in the psychic development of all individuals and which, in successive stages, mark a movement away from the undividedness and unity of prenatal life. Death – and the pull of
64
Towards a New Literary Humanism
the death drive – represents a return to undividedness, to unity or wholeness. The death drive is, of course, also the pull towards destruction, bodily disintegration and the inanimate. So, for Freud, the death drive, and the instincts in general which ‘represent the somatic demands upon the mind’, underpin all human experience (Freud 1964, 148). But if we are to enter into social life and function in the characteristic way of humans (through the dynamic, interactive division between the conscious and the unconscious that allows us memory and a sense of history, rationality and the capacity for symbol formation), it is necessary that the force of the somatic be bound: We have found that one of the earliest and most important functions of the mental apparatus is to bind the instinctual impulses which impinge on it, to replace the primary process prevailing in them by the secondary process and convert their freely mobile cathectic energy into a mainly quiescent (tonic) cathexis. (Freud 1955, 62) The whole organisation of the ‘mental apparatus’, then, works to mitigate the instincts, disabling their power, so they are only experienced, untroublingly, at the level of the bodily or tonic. And, of course, central to Freud’s account of the mitigation of desire and instinctual impulsion is the organisation of the Oedipus complex. The assumptions about the precarious poise maintained by humans between an organic nature and a rational, social and language-centred nature that underlie Freud’s account of the death drive parallel those implicit in ‘The Lover of Horses’. In exploring the relationship between the instinctual and the social, the story depicts an intensified version of family dynamics that, through the heightened power of the father– daughter bond (described throughout in romantic and sexual terms), leads to an unravelling of the oedipal. Whether this – along with the sort of animist holism, associated with being beyond language that the daughter-narrator embraces at the end – opens her to the transgressive, unbounded, instinctual world of horses in affirmation of life or of death, or of the inseparability of the two, is the question the story raises.
Oedipal animals While intimate connection with horses serves as a trope for attunement to a wider realm of risk, freedom and connectedness in ‘The Lover of Horses’, it is the notion of horse whisperer as human healer
Elspeth Graham 65
which emerges more emphatically in Nicholas Evans’s novel The Horse Whisperer and in the film version directed by Robert Redford (Evans 1995; Redford 1998). These texts, beginning and ending with violent deaths, ultimately subordinate issues of interspecies intersubjectivity to the function of Tom Booker, the horse whisperer of the title, as an agent in the redemptive quest of Annie Graves who seeks healing for herself, her daughter Grace, and Grace’s horse. The story opens with a riding accident in which Grace’s friend and her horse are killed. Grace herself loses a leg and her horse, Pilgrim, is horribly maimed, subsequently becoming, in his distress, unmanageable by humans and detached from other horses. Grace’s mother, Annie, a ‘celebrated journalist’ and workaholic magazine editor in New York, already troubled by guilt over the lack of time she has for her daughter, her inability to sustain further pregnancies and give birth to another child, and the tensions this produces in her marriage, traces a horse whisperer in Montana who she believes can heal the horse and thereby cure them all. Tom Booker, the horse whisperer, insists on the practicality of his knowledge. He laughs at the notion of whisperers and the mythologising history of such men that Annie has researched through her reading (Evans 1995, 284). Instead, he perceives himself as a rancher with intimate knowledge of animals and the natural derived from lifelong experience. Nevertheless, the narrative persistently spiritualises his attunement to nature and animal others. Just as the redemptive nature of Annie’s quest is clearly signalled by the names Grace and Pilgrim, and by the reinforcing allusion to the old copy of Pilgrim’s Progress given by a Baptist couple to Annie and Grace on their journey from New York to Montana, so Tom Booker is presented as someone intuitively attuned to others and the other. He values a Zen-like acceptance of life and a non-verbal, non-cerebral understanding of natural patterns: ‘“Seems to me if you talk about these things too much, the magic gets lost and pretty soon talk is all there is. Some things in life just … are”’ (141–2). His understanding of and harmonious interactions with others depend on bodily sympathy: ‘“Dancing and riding, it’s the same damn thing … It’s just about trust and consent … You’re in harmony and moving to each other’s rhythm …”’ (136). He perceives himself as having, ‘a kind of innate balance’ or being ‘simply part of a pattern, a cohesion of things animate and inanimate, to which he [is] connected both by spirit and blood’ (149). The healing of Grace, Annie and Pilgrim occurs in the context of a wholesome, unsophisticated ranch life, in contrast to the tense, brittle world of control and competitive self-promotion represented by Annie’s life in New York. Tom’s work with horses is organically related to
66
Towards a New Literary Humanism
notions of community, extended family and the traditional life of the ranch. However, Tom’s empathic understanding of horse and human sufferers leads, inevitably enough, to his affair with Annie. It is not, in the end, his capacity for connective interaction with equine others that is decisive in restoring health, but the extension of, or transgression beyond, the boundaries of his healing relationship that allows for the culminating, fragile assumption of grace by the suffering family. Prefigured in his concluding act of treatment of the horse Pilgrim, which is perceived as uncharacteristically brutal, but which Tom defends as involving a choice for the horse (Evans 1995, 442), Tom’s death brings together key ideas clustering round the figure of the horse whisperer: The settling dust was still too thick for Grace to be sure, but she thought she now saw Tom open his arms a little and, in a gesture so minimal that she may have imagined it, show the horse the palms of his hands. It was as though he were offering something and perhaps it was only what he’d always offered, the gift of kinship and peace. But although she would never from this day forth utter the thought to anyone, Grace had a sudden, vivid impression that it was otherwise and that Tom, quite without fear or despair, was somehow this time offering himself. (468) He is thus, in saving Grace, killed by a wild stallion. In this scene, which re-invokes the accident with which the novel opens, Tom, through a passive opening of himself to violence, extracts his living presence from the family dynamic of Annie, her husband and Grace, leaving only the experience of the curative period in Montana, and its traumatising conclusion, as the catalyst to their further healing. Sacrifice of the self, in a literal form, is revealed to be linked to that generosity and connectedness which are necessary to a full humanity. Likewise, acceptance of loss is demonstrated to be central to the ability to love and to live. It is the capacity for psychic integration of suffering that produces wisdom. Grace, at the end, is perceived by her mother as a sort of fully spiritualised being: ‘[Annie] found it hard to think of Grace nowadays without a feeling of reverence and wonder’ (476). The birth of a new child, with undecided paternity, to Annie, the posthumous gift from Tom to Grace of one of his foals, and Pilgrim’s return to her in New York prompt Grace’s final decision to survive rather than be destroyed by tragedy: ‘Twice gone to hell and twice returned. She had seen what
Elspeth Graham 67
she had seen and had gleaned some sad and stilling wisdom that was as old as time itself’ (477). It is perhaps inevitable that popular fiction and film, responding to a commercial need for extensive appeal, should address culturally familiar preoccupations, subsuming issues of interspecies relationship to issues of interhuman subjectivities. Nevertheless, regardless of whether any particular text is fictional or non-fictional, popular or more traditionally ‘literary’, the horse-whispering texts I have so far considered both work with similar difficulties that emerge from the concept of an intersubjectivity that goes beyond the boundaries of the human. Both invoke a potentially transformative power of connection that might be brought about when a commitment to the demands of culture and verbality is abandoned in order to access the way-of-being of the animal. The necessity for silence, or its shadow quietness, an attentive opening of the self to the other and a willingness to relinquish the desire for traditionally valued forms of power all recur as characteristics of the whisperer. But if these are revealed as attractive characteristics, they are dangerously so. Entering into a silent encounter with the animal other is commensurate with movement beyond or retreat from what is definitive of the human: the capacity for and dependence on the symbolic. Transcendence of or regression from the verbal (the two seem undecidable in these texts) leads to death. The implication that death must be a necessary conclusion to an intimate encounter with the animal other can only be avoided if there is either a narrative splitting between the dangerous and the life-enhancing aspects of the figure of the whisperer (as with the death of Tom Booker) or a re-routing of the whisperer’s understanding of the other back into the domestic, so that such understanding is valorised by its therapeutic effect on the damaged and distorted in the familiarly human. The paradoxes inherent in Freud’s conflation of those aspects of the psychic that exceed or undercut the ego’s drive towards survival and creativity, which he identifies as the death drive, appear to be embedded in these texts. These texts oscillate between presenting the whisperer as an embodiment of the death drive, as the central paradox of human life, and avoidance of such implications through a reinflection of the whisperer’s work as restorative of the oedipal.
Love, skin and the face of the other Taken as a group, then, these texts present something of an impasse in the attempt to identify how a full encounter with the being of the other might be represented, without leading, on the one hand, to the
68
Towards a New Literary Humanism
potential annihilation of the encountering subjects or, on the other, to an assimilation of the knowledge of the other into a pre-existing ontology. Nevertheless, the formal and ethical questions they raise relate to a wider set of concerns, voiced most urgently in the second half of the twentieth century in two of those Western intellectual disciplines which most centrally seek to comprehend the nature of the human: philosophy and psychoanalysis. As Todd May shows, a philosophical concern with ‘the articulation of an adequate concept of difference … as well as a proper sense of how to valorise it’ derives from the twentieth-century experience of genocidal wars, especially as underpinned by totalitarian thought (May 1997, 1–2). But the need to find a way of conceptualising difference and non-destructive forms of interaction equally extends into other pressing concerns, such as those that shaped Western identity politics of the 1980s and 1990s and, most especially, those of environmental sustainability and the maintenance of eco-diversity. The idea of death on a massive scale and the shadow of Freud’s thought underlie a series of attempts to rethink the implications of a body-psyche dualism and the related links between encountering otherness and embracing annihilation – whether that involves annihilation of the self or the other. The philosophical writings of Levinas provide one of the most urgent and influential analytic investigations of what it means to fully valorise the other. Building on Martin Buber’s emphasis on the core importance of dialogical encounter and his distinction of the subject-object relationship of I-It from the fully intersubjective I-Thou relationship, Levinas’s notion of an ethical interrelation focuses on how it might be possible to live in the permanence of a face-to-face encounter with the other. For him, this involves not adherence to a set of rules, but an ‘inexorable and constant exposure to alterity’ (Nealon 1998, xi). Levinas’s concept of the other also emerges as a critical divergence from his teacher Heidegger’s concept of Dasein, or Being, which originates in the experience of being-in-the-world, but is focused through reflexive self-recognition crucially achieved by awareness of death and, most particularly, of ‘[t]he fact of dying for and by ourselves [which] is what gives the self authenticity, making it a “being-toward-death”’ (Levinas 1989, 3). For Levinas, infinity resides within the human rather than in the surrounding nothingness that Heidegger’s thought presents as the ‘complement’ of being. Levinas’s idea of the face-to-face encounter with the other works to produce this concept of infinity, to restore (this time, in critique of Husserl) a focus on the quiddity of being, and to critique the totalising philosophies of the West that are based on a desire for mastery and thus denial of the other. The face-to-face encounter reveals
Elspeth Graham 69
that in spite of – or rather because of – attention to particularity (all others cannot be lumped together as other, nor can the other merely be seen as a reflection of the self), the other cannot be fully known. The other exceeds all idea of the other in the self. And because the other exceeds what is already known and thought of, it represents the infinite (rather than Heidegger’s death or nothingness) within the human. From this, Levinas’s concern is with the responsibility that each individual has to otherness, which for him signifies both the personal otherness (autrui) of other people and an impersonal, abstract Otherness (autre) (Levinas 1988, 139, n.24). Since otherness, whether personal or abstract, is never reducible to the categories of the self or of knowledge of the world, Levinas’s notion of ethical responsibility implies not a sort of liberal caring, based on perception of the equality of the self and the other, but a commitment to a simultaneous recognition of the quiddity of the other in the sense of its particularity and of the fact that it exceeds recognition. In his later work, Levinas insists even more strongly that the responsibility for the other (where ‘[m]y responsibility for the other is the for of the relationship’) appears not as the annihilation of the self, but as constitutive of the self and sensibility (Levinas 1989, 90). For Levinas, the excess of the other over understanding produces the self, not death. Many strands of post-Freudian psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic philosophy have similarly taken those paradoxes central to Freud’s work, and formulated so clearly in his speculation on the death drive, in new directions, replacing movement towards death with the idea of a perpetual becoming. However, whereas in Levinas’s writing the concept of the other is only ambiguously related to non-human others,2 in the writings of Deleuze and Guattari recognition that humanist and humancentred thought denies the experience of what they call the inhuman (the experience of animals, non-organic life and even imagined life) provides a starting point. Like Freud (and Levinas), they assert the organic basis of humanity and, like Levinas, they insist on interaction as crucial to all life. In Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia and the companion volume, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate their commitment to the flow of life. Their idea of the ‘schizo’ invokes a way of thinking that is not dependent on the normative, or on any cohesive idea of the self. It implies instead a self that is always in flux, always becoming, refusing the Law. Anti-Oedipus constitutes a plea for an anti-organisation of experience and is specifically written in antithesis to Freud’s theory of the Oedipus complex, a synecdoche of his entire work. For Deleuze
70
Towards a New Literary Humanism
and Guattari, the Oedipus complex is perceived as an organisation of desire that is, in the end, no more than a (bourgeois) convention. If the death drive for Freud, deriving from the organic base of humanity, is what lies behind the drive to the non-animate, as well as being the force that compels one to repeat unpleasure, for Deleuze and Guattari it is participation in deep laws of interchange and becoming that link all organic and inorganic elements of life on earth. Human life is not marked by a pattern of origin in, separation from and eventual return to a non-conscious organicism, as for Freud, but is perceived as one element in a wider continuum that includes all molecular structures. Repetition is crucial to Deleuze and Guattari’s thought, not as return as in Freud, but as central to becoming, since apprehension of difference must be repeated rather than grasped. (As with Levinas, once otherness is fully grasped, it is no longer other, but is reduced to the selfsame.) The encounter with the external or other is a stuttering act. In keeping with this, their idea of opening and becoming, a being-in-process, is articulated a thousand times over in speculation on every actual or imagined form of metamorphosing interaction, contact, exchange, symbiosis, infection, act of contagion or mutation. But it is perhaps most strongly expressed in their notion of the ‘transversal’, the hybrid becoming-animal. Deleuze and Guattari distinguish three kinds of nonhuman animals as conceived of by Western culture: ‘First, individuated animals, family pets, sentimental, Oedipal animals each with its own petty history, “my” cat, “my” dog’; second, ‘animals with characteristics or attributes; genus, classification, or State animals’; and, third, ‘more demonic animals, packs or affect animals that form a multiplicity, a becoming, a tale’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 240–1). The transversal describes a fourth possible relationship with the animal other. It implies openness to the animal other and its way of being, in all its haecceity, a concept that can be likened to Levinas’s notion of quiddity. The transversal, or becoming-centaur, describes what is created in the open encounter between human and non-human animals, where it is the ‘between’ that is significant.3
Becoming-centaur The final novel about horse-human relationships considered in this chapter seeks to articulate what is between horses and humans in a way that is faithful to all that is implied in these ideas of openness of encounter. In particular, it strives to exploit its novelistic structure and the flexibility of imaginative prose writing to embody ideas
Elspeth Graham 71
of multiplicity and the ‘inter’ of interspecies relationships. Cormac McCarthy’s All the Pretty Horses, the first volume of The Border Trilogy, is all about crossing boundaries. Set at a pivotal moment after the Second World War when the traditional way-of-life of the American West is being replaced, the narrative follows the horseback journey across the border from Texas into Mexico of John Grady, himself on the brink of full adulthood, his friend Rawlins, and the boy, Blevins, whom they encounter on the way. In the world of this novel, horse lives and human lives are enmeshed at every level. The impetus of the plot is produced by the issue of the ownership of Blevins’s horse: its appearance as too fine a horse for Blevins, the capture of the horse by the men of the Mexican pueblo of Encantada and its recapture by Blevins, with Grady and Rawlins as accomplices. The plot, produced from this chain of events (along with those brought about by Grady’s illicit affair with the daughter of the aristocratic hacendado who gives them work as vaqueros on his hacienda) thus serves to replicate the way in which horses – as possessions, as status, as work, as passions, as economic tools – shape human life. Likewise, thematic patterning functions as an exploration of horse-human relationship, extending the sense of the centrality of horses to human concerns. Early on we are told of John Grady: What he loved in horses was what he loved in men, the blood and the heat of the blood that ran them. All his reverence and all his fondness and all the leanings of his life were for the ardenthearted and they would always be so and never be otherwise. (McCarthy 1994, 6) The tone of melancholic rhapsody, produced by lexical and phrasal repetitions, the biblical resonance of ‘would always be so’ with the religiously-connoted ‘reverence’ and the accumulation of nouns, particularly where the noun is used in place of a more common adjectival or verb phrase (‘his fondness was for’ rather than ‘he was fond of’, ‘the ardenthearted’ rather than ‘ardenthearted beings’, etc.) to emphasise states of being and feeling, transmits the suffusing sense of loss in the novel, which elegiacally evokes a world that is passing. However, the valorisation here of the ‘heat of … blood’ and the ‘ardenthearted’, or a passion of temperament that is both corporeal and moral, is complicated rather than sustained by the unfolding of the narrative. Blood is not merely intensity and truth of heart, but also comes to be associated with breeding, bloodlines and violence. Ardour as life-force,
72
Towards a New Literary Humanism
and romantic manifestations of ‘the heat of the blood’, transform into bloodshed and the implication of passion in acts of aggression. John Grady’s subsequent discovery of his own capacity for killing, even as an act of self-preservation, further darkens the idea of the truth of passion. In his transformative cross-border journey, John Grady comes to learn experientially those truths already suggested by his father and by the voice of the narrative early in the novel. His father, traumatised as a soldier in the Second World War and, on his return, unable to integrate his experience of war back into his roles as cowboy and husband, dwindles in a shadowy, sickly existence. He is a grieving and damaged witness to change: The last things his father said was that the country would never be the same. People don’t feel safe no more, he said. We’re like the Comanches was two hundred years ago. We don’t know what’s goin to show up here come daylight. We don’t even know what color they’ll be. (26–7) Change is constant, marking the transience of human endeavours and epochs, yet linking opposed peoples through the shared uncertainty of their lives and histories. History itself is a series of repetitions of movements into the unknown. Yet the passage of time and human event with all its vibrancy, passion and cruelty are part of a larger flow of things in which the human and its environment are meshed. After the opening death of the novel, that of John Grady’s grandfather, Grady rides into the evening: He rode where he would always choose to ride, out where the western fork of the old Comanche road … At the hour he’d always choose when the shadows were long and the ancient road was shaped before him in the rose and canted light like a dream of the past where the painted ponies and the riders of that lost nation came down out of the north with their faces chalked and their long hair plaited and each armed for war which was their life and the women and children and women with children at their breasts all of them pledged in blood and redeemable in blood only. When the wind was in the north you could hear them, the horses and the breath of horses and the horses’ hooves that were shod in rawhide and the rattle of lances and the constant drag of the travois poles in the sand like the passing
Elspeth Graham 73
of some enormous serpent and the young boys naked on wild horses jaunty as circus riders and hazing wild horses before them and the dogs trotting with their tongues aloll and footslaves following half naked and sorely burdened and above all the low chant of the travelling song which the riders sang as they rode, nation and ghost of nation passing in a soft chorale across that mineral waste to darkness bearing lost to all history and all remembrance like a grail the sum of their secular and transitory and violent lives. (5) In this passage, which summarises much of the method of the novel, it is horses that embody the meeting of the human and the wild. Humans with all of their history, their language and their culture become strangely inseparable from the animals they use but are intimately connected with. Beyond intimate relation with horses, people become fused with the environment which human culture shapes, but which also gives rise to and allows the possibility of human experience. Just as, here at the start of Grady’s journey, past and present, humans and animals, history and landscape are fused in this picture of being that extends beyond the individuated, so such a blending of human, animal and environment occurs at the ending of the novel. Blood, symbolising a continuous life-force throughout, here colours the physical world and the face of the man who rides into the shadowy future: he came at evening upon a solitary bull rolling in the dust against the bloodred sunset like an animal in sacrificial torment. The bloodred dust blew down out of the sun. He touched the horse with his heels and rode on. He rode with the sun coppering his face and the red wind blowing out of the west across the evening land and the small desert birds flew chittering among the dry bracken and horse and rider and horse passed on and their long shadows passed in tandem like the shadow of a single being. Passed and paled into the darkening land, the world to come. (301) In this novel, the sacrificial does not stand in opposition to that which must be preserved: life and death, the law and freedom, the wild and the human are not separated terms. Rather, just as humans and animals and natural environment, past and present and future, are part of a continuum, blood as death and blood as life are inseparable. The image of the single shadow of the rider and horse in this passage again summarises the centrality of the symbiotic – in Deleuze’s and Guattari’s terms, becoming-centaur – horse-human relationships of
74
Towards a New Literary Humanism
the novel. John Grady is presented as the focal human character of the novel in contradistinction to his father, Rawlins or the pitiful Blevins through his openness to change, full-blooded experience and moral growth. But his moral stature, gained through suffering, commitment to life, capacity for pity and remorse, and his troubled acceptance of his own and the world’s violent destructiveness has an equivalence in his affinity with horses and his ability as a rider and horseman. It is, first of all, his quality of being with horses that renders Grady a figure of stature in the novel: The boy who rode on slightly before … sat a horse not only as if he’d been born to it which he was but as if were he begot by malice or mischance into some queer land where horses never were he would have found them anyway. Would have known that there was something missing for the world to be right or he right in it and would have set forth to wander wherever it was needed for as long as it took until he came upon one and he would have known that that was what he sought and it would have been. (23) Grady talks to and of his horses with matter-of-fact acceptance of their equal being with humans: ‘“He ain’t goin to like it.” “Who, Wallace?” [human] “No. Redbo” [horse]’ (24) or ‘He thought the horse had handled itself well and as he rode he told it so’ (125). And, although not specifically named as a whisperer, it is his special ability to back wild horses quickly, gently and with understanding of their understanding – in precisely the manner attributed to whisperers in other texts – that gains him privilege at the Hacienda de Nuestra Senora de la Purisma Conception. Throughout the novel, McCarthy describes the actions of humans and horses as having equal agency and particularity: ‘They waited for him to arrive if he would. It wasn’t long before the horses raised their heads and stood staring downstream’ (44); ‘Midriver the horses were swimming, snorting and stretching their necks out of the water, their tails afloat behind. They quartered downstream with the current, the naked riders leaning forward and talking to the horses’ (45); ‘He rode back in the dark. The horse quickened its step’ (6). In the swift shifts between subjects, and between human modes of thought and action and horse perception and action, there is a recognition of the particularly human combination of speculative thought with activity as existing alongside, and in sympathetic relation to, the particularity of the horse’s bodily way of perceiving, recognising and acting. Thus, horses in this text are
Elspeth Graham 75
not depicted as other. This is not, as in the earlier texts I have discussed, because knowledge of them is recuperated into the human, but because horses, like humans, are participants with their own quiddity in a larger whole. Difference between horses, like difference between humans, is marked and recognised, but not assimilated. (Among humans, dialogues in Spanish are not translated for any non-Spanish speaking, Anglophone reader or character.) Difference is. All forms of being are acknowledged in their own particularity and are presented as aspects of a wider life. The human and the horse both participate in a natural world where all elements are, and act according to, their essential way of being. This is not a mystified, animist vision of nature, but one in which humans, animals and environment are all active and acted upon in their interfused being. McCarthy’s characteristic stylistic manipulations, in which sentences pared down to a single subject, verb and object are interspersed with sentences that depend solely on accretion of phrases (often depicting continuous action, states of being and sensory reception of an environment and the movements within it), serve as an enactment of this vision of interparticipative being. Although All the Pretty Horses is full of deaths, the animal and the natural environment are not allied with death as something which the human must ward off in order to protect and preserve its humanity. Rather, death and life participate in one another. Likewise, in the novel’s central thought about horse and human intersubjectivity, it is what is between horses and humans that produces horses as horses and humans as humans. John Grady, as rider, is not an initiate in a mystery, but is a figure who embodies, through the very combination of his physical and psychic attunement to horses, full commitment to the passionate ordinariness of life’s struggle in a past world where humans lived in direct contact with the natural.
Conclusion: ‘A breath that touches in words’ Horses as domesticated working animals occupy a highly particular place in human culture. As large, fast, strong animals, they embody ideas of freedom, strangeness and the unpredictable power of the natural other. According to archeological evidence, however, they have also been a familiar part of human life for 6,000 years – and in the Western world they were central to life from antiquity to the 1930s (Budiansky 1997, 5). The fascination with horses evident in the selection of horse-whisperer texts I have considered here is perhaps an effect of the relatively recent loss of that everyday, central relationship with
76
Towards a New Literary Humanism
horses. It is both the proximity and the distance of the history of the human relationship with horses – and, by extension, with other animals and the natural world – that allows that relationship to become a focus for wider thought about the place of humans in the world and about what it means to be human. The fictional texts explored here are shadowed by nostalgia for a past where humans lived in awareness of natural processes and rhythms even as they recognise the inevitability of historical process, and of benefits that have occurred to humanity (and maybe to some animals too) from a liberal, technologically enhanced modernity. But, just as keenly, these texts are also shaped by those broader anxieties about what it means to be human that inform the series of more abstract questions posed in the philosophical and psychoanalytic writings of late modernity invoked here. All these writings, fictional or philosophical, seek to articulate a way in which the animal, the intuitive, the fully relational can be recognised as an aspect of our embodiment as humans living in the world – a world of human, organic and non-organic others. They all embody, in their thought or the fabric of their textuality, the idea that if we are to realise fully our humanness-in-the-world, we need to recognise the non-human in and around us, in our living of life and, particularly, through our use of the most defining of our attributes, our human capacity for meaning and language. As Luce Irigaray’s essay ‘A Breath that Touches in Words’ reminds us: ‘a language ... that is founded on speech, yet pays no heed to the silence and breath making it possible, might well lead to a lack of respect for life; for one’s own life, for the other’s life, for others’ lives’ (Irigaray 1996, 122) It is perhaps such a reminder, these texts suggest, that is whispered to us in the breath of horses.
Notes 1. My reference to the Law here and throughout my essay, as to the Symbolic, is an allusion to Lacan’s terminology. 2. See Clark (1997) for a full account analysis of Levinas’s thought about animals, beginning with the role played in identifying humanness by the dog Bobby who befriends him and other Jewish prisoners during their internment by the Nazis in Camp 1492. 3. This is exemplified by reference to Melville’s Moby Dick (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 244).
4 Judith Butler and the Catachretic Human Inge Arteel
In recent years, literary theory and cultural studies have witnessed a conspicuous revival of the human subject. In the wake of its poststructuralist deconstruction – and facilitated rather than thwarted by that same deconstruction – a renewed conception of the human subject is emerging that is neither outspokenly anti-humanist nor nostalgically humanist. Indeed, it might be called posthumanist in its infusion of the notion of the human with poststructuralist and postmodernist insights and knowledge (Geddes 2007, 70). A telling example out of many is the 2005 international conference The Humanities in Human Rights: Critique, Language, Politics, which had as one of its main organisers Judith Butler, a name not commonly associated with a return to humanist principles. Co-organiser Domna Stanton, in her foreword to the collection of the conference papers, explicitly distanced the conference from Enlightenment humanism with ‘its blind spots and its dramatic failures’ (Stanton 2006, 1518). However, she does not reject the concept of humanism in the humanities altogether; instead, she regards the many ‘discourses of difference’ that have emerged within the humanities since the 1970s as tools to ‘dissent from and revise traditional or dominant readings and understandings’ (1519). Endorsing Todorov’s phrase ‘critical humanism’ (Todorov 1993), Stanton speaks of ‘critical humanities’ that she considers to have an explicitly political task in rethinking ‘progressive, emancipatory practices’ (Stanton 2006, 1523). Differing from Todorov, however, who states that ‘“it is not possible, without inconsistency, to defend human rights with one hand and deconstruct the idea of humanity with the other”’ (quoted in Stanton 2006, 1523),1 Stanton wants to think together the possibility of defending human rights and the deconstruction of the fixed ideas about the human that 77
78
Towards a New Literary Humanism
may lie at the basis of them. It is exactly here that Judith Butler joins in with her project of rethinking the human.
Poststructuralism, literature and the human Though nearly two decades and more than a handful of important book publications have gone by since the publication of Gender Trouble (1990), Butler’s reputation is still almost exclusively associated with the notion, often couched by Butler herself in explicitly anti-humanist terms, of gender performativity. However, her recent work – though far from returning to an ‘old school’ humanism – does indicate a growing and more systematic concern to build alliances between her poststructuralist view on the human subject and the need to redefine the human and humanity in the context of transnational globalised conflicts and debates. In what follows, I want to argue that this redefinition or rethinking of the human has been a motivating urge in Butler’s writing all along. I will therefore retrace the presence of this urge in her earlier work before examining her more explicit rethinking of the human in her recent publications. The narrative which this chapter charts – about the journey of a thinker from an apparently anti-humanist position to a revisionary humanist one – is a narrative that could be told about a number of other thinkers and critical movements, but in the case of Butler it is one that also has a particular bearing on literary studies. Literary criticism and theory over the last decades have been conspicuously influenced by Butler’s theory of (gender) performativity (Armstrong 2006, 106). Although Butler herself only rarely analyses literary texts, her success in the field is not surprising. Prior to a philosopher of the subject, Butler can be considered a philosopher of language and rhetoric: it is the performative quality of language and the linguistic performativity underlying all discourses and ‘subjectivating’ dynamics to which her interests return again and again. In the context of a ‘new literary humanism’ which has ‘affectively charged sensuousness’ as one of its key terms (see the Introduction to this volume), Butler’s work seems especially relevant, because throughout her work she has been concerned with the affective force of linguistic performativity, with what language ‘does’ to people and what they do to each other in and through words, whether this is to coercively essentialise their gender identity, to wound each other or, conversely, to recognise their vulnerability. However open to (discursive) transformation Butler as a poststructuralist philosopher thinks the ‘human’ is, there is a continuing ethical awareness in her work which
Inge Arteel 79
provides a tentative normative basis for human interaction, based on the recognition of the primary existential categories of vulnerability and mourning. It is in her (albeit few) comments on literary texts that Butler offers us some of the most striking examples of how literature activates the ‘upsetting’ (in two senses – emotional and disruptive) power of language.
Subjectivity as subjection, humanism as oppression Judith Butler started her philosophical explorations of the human subject with a study of Hegel. In Subjects of Desire (1987), she critically analyses the desire for pure self-knowledge of the Hegelian subject. In Butler’s reading, Hegel himself undermines the autonomy of this process: the self only gets to know itself through the usurpation of the other in the self. Consequently, the relation between self and other can be called one of subjection. However, the resulting positions of master and slave are not bound up in a fixed dichotomy: the master depends on the slave to support and strengthen his self-knowledge, and the slave in his turn acquires a certain freedom in being the one upon whom the master depends. In The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (1997a), Butler sets out a more encompassing ‘theory of subjection’, with, apart from Hegel, chapters on Nietzsche, Freud, Foucault and Althusser. Here, the philosophical perspective is combined with discourse theory and a stronger psychoanalytic orientation. Butler asks how power structures are internalised in the psyche of the subject in a way that empowers the subject to exceed the original subjection. This implies that the power of the subjected subject, in being a repetition or imitation of the originating subjecting power, also always brings about a displacement of the originating power (Butler 1997a, 17). One form of subjection with which Butler is especially preoccupied is gender identity. In Gender Trouble, Butler applies the linguistic turn to her Hegelian subject theory and analyses the production through language of ‘discrete’, ‘intelligible’ genders – that is, genders that can be recognised as either feminine or masculine within the heterosexual norm. In the dominant symbolic order, only the ‘intelligible’ genders are considered to be human genders; this gendering is ‘part of what “humanizes” individuals within contemporary culture’ (Butler 1990, 139). The hidden agenda, as it were, behind this gendering is to ‘safeguard certain tenets of humanism’ (9), tenets which Butler identifies as ‘the metaphysics of substance’ and the ‘heterosexual matrix’. These notions imply a stable sex category (male or female) expressed through
80
Towards a New Literary Humanism
a stable gender category (masculine or feminine) and defined and sanctioned through a stable sexual desire (heterosexuality). It is in the failed questioning of this heteronormativity and the presentation of a coherent category of ‘women’ that Butler sees grounds to reject ‘a humanist feminist position’ (10).2 Gendering is, in other words, ‘prior to the emergence of the “human”’ (Butler 1993, 7), something Butler elaborates upon in her next book, Bodies that Matter. Here she demonstrates the normative process of ‘humanization’ with examples from gender discourses that ‘orchestrate, delimit, and sustain that which qualifies as “the human”’ (8). Butler is careful to distance her project from a strictly structuralist reading of construction that would reduce construction to determinism and presuppose an impersonal Subject (Power, Discourse) initiating the act of construction. Instead, she considers construction as ‘a process of reiteration’ (9) which produces and destabilises categories. Construction is, in other words, also always deconstruction, producing along with the normative category of the gendered human something or someone other, ‘a constitutive “outside”’: ‘for the construction of the human is a differential operation that produces the more and the less “human”, the inhuman, the humanly unthinkable’ (8). As the title of her book indicates, Butler explicitly sets out to focus on the relationship between bodily materiality and humanisation. In the regulatory system of normative humanisation, only bodies that we can identify as fixed ‘matter’ do matter, that is, count as human. Consequently, it is in ‘abject’ bodies, bodies that ‘fail to materialize’ (16), that Butler not only situates the fortification of the norm but also the potential for the disruption of normative gendering and for a radical rearticulation of bodies that matter. The human as a prescriptive category is thus opened up to other, hitherto marginalised possibilities. Norms become questionable once they are ‘troubled’ by what they leave out. So far – we might say – so poststructuralist, if by poststructuralist we mean a linguistically rooted embrace of difference and a resistance to normative subjectivity, equated with subjection. Butler does not use explicitly humanist discourse to describe her resistance to subjection because humanism is part of the problem rather than the antidote to it. Nevertheless, appeals to norms have always been shadowed by ideals of emancipation in humanism’s diverse (sometimes contradictory) lexicon, and emancipation, broadly speaking, is the driver of Butler’s version of poststructuralism. But it is not the only driver, as she is also increasingly concerned with the issue of responsibility and especially responsible speech. This concern brings back into play the issue of
Inge Arteel 81
norms, and whether norms are always and everywhere oppressive or can instead contribute to a shared recognition of human vulnerabilities, for which we should as ethical beings take responsibility. This dialectic between anti-normative and normative perspectives can be traced in Butler’s Excitable Speech. Here, as in Bodies that Matter, ‘rearticulation’ and ‘reappropriation’ are key words in a book that also signals her preoccupation with the emotional impact of language. In naming, categorising and ordering reality, language can be considered to be unavoidably violent, harmfully normalising. Especially violent is the phenomenon of hate speech, on which Butler concentrates. Hate speech is the speech act that hurts, violates and eventually – and this is where a normative perspective of a positive kind is implied – dehumanises the other. Butler answers this violence with the dynamics of language itself. Each speech act contains an element of failure in at least two senses: the speaking subject is never fully in control of its speech act and the addressee is never fully addressed by the speech act. In this failure lies the possibility of ‘insurrectionary speech’ (Butler 1997b, 163), rebellious speech that can counter linguistic violence through its reappropriation, recontextualisation or contestation of the violent, injuring speech acts. In poststructuralist fashion, Butler links the failure to control the speech act to the notion of ‘excess’: the meaning of a speech act always ‘exceeds’ the utterance (28). The excess cannot be controlled by the sovereign speaker and causes the speech act to miss its intended effects. Exactly this excess can be used by the addressee to subvert or redirect the effect of the utterance. Although we could read this analysis of speech acts as either excusing the ‘perpetrator’ at least to some extent or as unduly stressing the responsibility of the addressee, it seems in the first place to stem from Butler’s endeavour to provide an answer to the unfruitful dynamics of victimisation which often assume the total success of the reduction of the addressee to a paralysed, silenced victim.3 Excitable Speech is a key work in Butler’s oeuvre, as it shows the relevance of poststructuralist language philosophy for countering the coercive norms of state-produced speech acts. But it is also relevant because of its critical revision of an absolute – and perhaps ‘uncritically humanist’ – defence of the freedom of speech, a defence maintained even when dealing with overtly dehumanising speech acts that originate from speaking subjects situated in a dominant position of power. Butler adds an explicitly ethical and again affective dimension to her speech act analysis: not only does the book contain a call for a responsible use of language, it also invites the speaking subject to
82
Towards a New Literary Humanism
consider its own linguistic vulnerability. Each human being becomes a subject by its being addressed by the other. This implies that each subject, even the ‘perpetrator’ of linguistic violence, is subjected to language. An awareness of this subjection might stimulate a responsible attitude towards language. The fundamental vulnerability of each human being – which, it should be clear, does not equal victimisation – becomes a key concept in the volumes Precarious Life and Undoing Gender. It is in these two collections of essays that Butler turns to a more explicit analysis of what counts as a human life and what is considered less human from a Western perspective. Together with the recognition of vulnerability, the notion of ‘grievable lives’ enters the picture here as a foundational emotive and ethical category. In the introduction to Precarious Life, Butler situates the essays in the post-9/11 era: they were written ‘in response to the conditions of heightened vulnerability and aggression that followed from those events’ (Butler 2004a, xi). Butler learns two lessons out of 9/11: the fundamental dependency of human beings on others and the importance of mourning to make for a human life. The first lesson implies a thorough rethinking of the notion of the human subject as autonomous or of autonomy as an aim worth fighting for, be it on the personal or the political level. Again, Butler distinguishes between the subject in power, which wants to maintain its autonomy, and the powerless subject, which strives for autonomy. In the first case, wanting to maintain one’s autonomy inevitably leads to aggression against those who (supposedly) threaten it. Butler proposes the term of ‘interdependency’ as a way to imagine a more peaceful global political community, rather than ‘radical forms of self-sufficiency and unbridled sovereignty’ (xiii). Only when you let go of your own supposed autonomy and acknowledge your fundamental dependency on others can you prevent your fear, injury or anger from turning into aggression. On the other hand, subjected people’s striving for autonomy should always be embedded in a reflection on ‘myself as invariably in community’ (Butler 2004b, 21), on the dependency that is inherent to one’s longing to be recognised by the other as autonomous, and should be accompanied by a critical view on the exclusionary effects of one’s yearnings. Recognition of the dead and the right to mourn them are additional principles that Butler uses to analyse the humaneness of a society. What counts as human is closely connected to what counts as grievable. Lives that are considered worth grieving for count as human lives. Only the dead we can mourn publicly, the bodies we are allowed to bury, count as human. Butler
Inge Arteel 83
takes her examples not only from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and reminds us of the huge taboos at the beginning of the AIDS crisis in the US, a silencing now imposed upon the African AIDS victims. In the title essay of Precarious Life, Butler deals critically with the writings of Emmanuel Levinas and proposes some first outlines of what she hopes to become an ethics of non-violence. This ethics, based on vulnerability, on the awareness of ‘how easily human life is annulled’ (2004a, xvii), has hardly anything to do with softness or passivity. Rather, it originates in an irresolvable tension at the centre of human life and human encounters: the desire to live and survive and to kill the one who threatens your life, who confronts you with your vulnerability on the one hand, and the anxiety about hurting the other on the other hand, a tension that does not make any rational sense. Butler explicitly calls for the humanities to confront this tension: ‘If the humanities has a future as cultural criticism, it is no doubt to return us to the human where we do not expect to find it, in its frailty and at the limits of its capacity to make sense’ (151). One could define Butler’s reading of Levinas as a Nietzschean reappropriation of Levinas’s quasi-religious conception of otherness: Levinas’s godlike face of the Other – which at the same time provokes and prohibits murder – is stripped of its divinity. The struggle between life and death that the face of the other engenders is put at the heart of human subjectivity itself.4 To conclude this outline of Butler’s rethinking of the human, I will consider her view on the human as a ‘category’. In a Foucaultian way, Butler draws attention to the historical character of the human and the need for a critical archeology of the term (Butler 2006b, 1659). The definition of the human has changed over the course of time, as have the ‘inhuman’ minorities which the category has produced. That means that it is not and need not be an absolute category, a foundation. Butler proposes the human as an unpredictable category, open to future changes and without us knowing or controlling what form it will take: ‘This means that we must learn to live and to embrace the destruction and rearticulation of the human in the name of a more capacious and, finally, less violent world’ (2004b, 35). Consequently, her aim is not to adapt ever more forms of the human to the existing categorisation, but to alter the category itself. One way of doing this is through the notion of ‘ecstasy’. Being ‘ec-static’ means, according to Butler, being beside oneself, being dispossessed or ‘undone’, ‘whether it is in sexual passion, or emotional grief, or political rage’ (20). Regarding the human as ‘ec-static’ implies seeing the subject as being invariably in community – a notion
84
Towards a New Literary Humanism
she distinguishes from ‘relationality’, the latter implying that individuals remain intact in their relation to each other. This view might build the first step to the formation of an alternative political ‘collectivity’ that – referring to her radical democratic stance – avows ‘that one’s own position is not sufficient to elaborate the spectrum of the human, that one must enter into a collective work in which one’s own status as a subject must, for democratic reasons, become disoriented, exposed to what it does not know’ (36). In the field of international human rights – to return to the topic at the beginning of this chapter – Butler argues in favour of cultural translation (38). Translation is a process that is mutually affecting: both the self and the other are changed. It is a process that resignifies and confounds supposedly fundamental categories, and questions the exclusionary effects that these categories inevitably produce. International human rights see themselves confronted with the task of constantly redefining and renegotiating the human. The notion of universality can be rescued or reappropriated if it is understood as the endeavour to ‘include in the human the very “other” against which the human was defined. In this sense, in this more radical usage, “universality” … becomes an antifoundationalism’ (190). And yet, as we have seen in Butler’s persistent emphasis upon vulnerability and mourning, this anti-foundationalism, which she advances to counter the dehumanising effects of a normative concept of humanity, is not so ‘open’ as to empty the term ‘human’ entirely of normative content. Vulnerability and mourning are the affective categories that set the lines along which cultural translation should take place. Butler’s growing concern with the notion of the human, as outlined above, bears testimony to an equally growing interest in an ethical project. Over the years, her writing style has consequently become more practical, increasingly turning its attention to concrete human beings in the local or global reality, to embodied experiences of (de)humanisation.5 Butler does not strive towards an ethics that could be universally applicable, but does search for an ethics that could be universally negotiable. She is careful to reflect critically on the violence of an ethics whose rules of behaviour are supposedly grounded in a firm, transparent and infallible subject position, disconnected from rhetorical and social critique (Butler 2005, 135). Instead, and in line with the above-mentioned critique of sovereignty, she proposes an ethics of ‘humility and generosity’ (42) that takes as its subject the ‘fragile and fallible’ (104) human being struggling with its constraints and confronting the social context in which it is embedded.6 Notwithstanding her resistance to what she sees as the violence of normative categories, Butler does allow her ethical
Inge Arteel 85
project to be normative: ‘But there is a normative aspiration here, and it has to do with the ability to live and breathe and move and would no doubt belong somewhere in what is called a philosophy of freedom’ (2004b, 219).7 It is interesting to compare this quotation – with its existentialist and passionate tone and its stress on corporeality – with Butler’s reserved reference, signalled by the use of quotation marks, to normativity in Bodies that Matter, and voiced in exemplary poststructuralist terms: ‘If there is a “normative” dimension to this work, it consists precisely in assisting a radical resignification of the symbolic domain, deviating the citational chain toward a more possible future to expand the very meaning of what counts as a valued and valuable body in the world’ (1993, 21–2). By contrast, the recent text imagines ‘becoming possible’ as an acknowledgement of, and struggle with, bodily and material constraints (‘breathe and move’) rather than linguistic limitations.
Towards the catachretic human As I indicated at the beginning of this chapter, Butler only rarely presents an extensive reading of a literary text. The few readings that are available in print, however, are informed by the above-examined dialectic between a poststructuralist anti-foundationalism and foundational categories of human existence. For Butler as a philosopher of language, literature provides a realm of recognition of the deeply affecting performative force of language. In literary texts, we witness, and are invited to identify with, wounded selves, selves that are wounded largely because of their exclusion from the realm of normative human identities inscribed in language. Yet, for Butler as a moral philosopher, literature also offers an exploratory site for re-imagining the human which, though implicated in ideological and social constraints – Butler never opts for an escapist utopianism – moves beyond them to produce more equitable notions of the human. In Butler’s texts on literature that I want to discuss here, a specific rhetorical and literary figure comes to the fore that in an almost exemplary way embodies the dialectic between a normative ethics and a questioning of norms, a figure we can term the ‘catachretic human’. It is important to stress, however, that this figuration or trope does not aspire to a tidy synthesis of the dialectical tension. Interestingly enough, Butler extensively develops her thoughts on the catachretic human in her reading of a classical text, Sophocles’s play
86
Towards a New Literary Humanism
Antigone. Butler’s interest in the figure of Antigone is raised by her concern that feminism increasingly seeks recourse to the state and the legal system in order to implement its aims, a concern she already voiced in Excitable Speech.8 She contrasts this current feminist strategy with the defiance and anti-authoritarianism that traditionally have been linked with the figure of Antigone and is even momentarily tempted to present Antigone, ‘as many humanists have’ (Butler 2000b, 2), as ‘an example’ (1). Butler identifies two main questions the play poses: ‘whether there can be kinship – and by kinship I do not mean the “family” in any specific form – without the support and mediation of the state, and whether there can be the state without the family as its support and mediation’ (5). In an exemplary deconstructionist reading, Butler demonstrates the mutual implication of kinship and state, both on the thematic and the linguistic level of the play. To make her rebellious claim, Antigone adopts the language of the state and the law, by doing so investing her oppositional politics with scandalous impurity (5), ‘confounding the distinction between the two [state and opposition] at a rhetorical level’ (11). Impurity is also at stake regarding Antigone’s gender: she is referred to as ‘manly’ on more than one occasion. But it is especially her kinship bonds that represent impurity, being determined by incestuous ties. Butler offers an extended reading (57–82) of the ‘kinship trouble’ (62) at the heart of the play and questions the restrictive kinship rules as promoted by a structuralist psychoanalysis that cannot imagine any symbolic order outside of the oedipal scheme: ‘The symbolic is precisely what sets limits to any and all utopian efforts to reconfigure and relive kinship relations at some distance of the oedipal scene’ (20). Instead of reading ‘the symbolic place of the father’ as contingent and thus variable, psychoanalysis considers it to be contingent but still universal, granting it a nearly theological status (21), which prompts Butler to conclude that it is the symbolic that leads to Antigone’s death: Antigone’s love for her brother implies her condemnation to death under the symbolic law of the father, as her desire ‘abrogates precisely the kinship relations that articulate the Lacanian symbolic, the intelligible conditions for life’ (53). Instead of subscribing to Lacan’s view that Antigone positions herself outside of the law by acting on a ‘death-driven movement internal to desire’ (52), Butler puts the responsibility on the symbolic kinship rules and questions the constraints they put on the liveability of human desire. Though Antigone allegorically points to the crisis of kinship norms, her story is not that of a successful subversion (indeed, her collision with the imposed limits of kinship lead to her death), let alone of a promising view on the future. Her fate therefore should not be romanticised or
Inge Arteel 87
presented as an example (23). However, the play can provide a starting point to reflect on ‘a poststructuralism of kinship’ (66, emphasis added), which does not content itself with a subversion of the law but strives for the law’s radical redrawing. Butler therefore does not subscribe to the liberal Lacanian view that the symbolic place of the father and the mother can have multiple inhabitants, even of any gender. Instead, poststructuralist kinship has to let go of the fixation on heteronormativity, family and blood ties. Kinship can for instance also find its basis in ‘consensual affiliation’ or ‘the social organization of need’ (74).9 For Butler, Antigone’s struggle with state-imposed kinship norms reveals itself in the first place as a struggle with linguistic norms. Butler points to the highly ambivalent connotations of the words Antigone uses, an ambivalence Antigone herself is not aware of and that she cannot control. The most prominent example is her use of the word ‘brother’, which for her can only refer to Polyneices – ‘she continues to insist on the singularity and non-reproducibility of this term of kinship’ (77) – but for the reader allows for links with her other brother Eteocles and even her father/brother Oedipus. Butler defines this ambivalence as ‘a place of being between life and death’ (78). Antigone’s desire and grief for her brother have no place in speech but nevertheless claim one, ‘figuring the nonhuman at the border of the human’ (79), the excluded non-human claiming for itself the category of the ‘human’. For Butler, then, the notion ‘human’ has a double meaning: ‘the normative one based on radical exclusion and the one that emerges in the sphere of the excluded’ (81). In this ‘shadowy realm’ (81), a phrase Butler borrows from Hannah Arendt, ‘the human has entered into catachresis: we no longer know its proper usage’ (82). It is this semantic uncertainty, drawn from literary analysis and summed up in the rhetorical trope of catachresis – the use of a wrong or improper word for the context – that in the publications following Antigone’s Claim Butler will work out into the positive political notion of ‘becoming possible’. Antigone’s Claim is Butler’s only lengthy reading of a literary text.10 However, in the work of Franz Kafka, whose name crops up regularly throughout her books, Butler seems to find equally important material to develop her thoughts on the catachretic human. In Giving an Account of Oneself, Butler deals with two of Kafka’s short stories.11 Drawing on the late Foucault, she considers both narrating the self and reading the other as aesthetic and ethical practices. For self and other to ‘become recognizably human’ (Butler 2005, 30), to be ‘readable’ (29) as human, fitting within these normative frames, is a condition sine qua non. The limits of these frames of recognition are tested to the extreme in Kafka’s
88
Towards a New Literary Humanism
story ‘Cares of a Family Man’, where the reader is confronted with Odradek, a figure that, though son-like in his function in the patriarchal household, bodily or materially speaking bears hardly any resemblance to the human. Following Adorno’s reflections on the story, Butler reads Odradek’s ‘vacating the human form … in the face of parental judgment’ (61) as opening up a possibility of overcoming the violence in the family, that is, in the social institution in which Odradek is subjected to dehumanising violence (in the name of the human) in the first place. With his uncertain ontological status, Odradek’s sheer presence interrupts the circle of violence. Though he might be as equally unsuitable an example as Antigone – as for his survival he pays the price of vacating his human form – Odradek, in his scandalous defiance of the (de)humanising frames of recognition, in his becoming the catachretic, improper and unfitting human, does express a moment of hope. Both Adorno and Butler do not present the in- or non-human as an ideal, but as a necessary step in a critical assessment of the conditions that produce the human. The confrontation with the unfitting human therefore provides ‘an essential means by which we become human in and through the destitution of our humanness’ (106). Butler’s reading of Odradek makes it abundantly clear that the notion of the catachretic human does not strive toward an inclusion of the inhuman in the human, but explores an opening up, an upsetting of the human by the inhuman. We can connect the trope of the catachretic human that Butler identifies in literary works with her thoughts on insurrectionary speech. For Butler, literature as a critical force is not initially concerned with elaborating upon utopian alternatives for a more human future; instead, it rhetorically and semantically can work to undermine the ontological status of dehumanised exclusion, thereby creating moments that interrupt the circle of violence.12 Literature then, in escaping any final meaning and even stimulating ‘failures’ and ‘misreadings’ to unfold themselves,13 can provide the ideal stage for ‘doing’ or ‘performing’ theory on the catachretic human.14 Whereas in her earlier works Butler mainly stressed linguistic and rhetorical rearticulation and reappropriation of language as a means of critique – and was confronted with the question of how one could distinguish between a critical and an uncritical rearticulation – in her more recent works she does embed her poststructuralist linguistics more strongly in social critique, in the examination of ‘diverse social formations of power’ (Hanssen 2000, 175). Nevertheless, it is right to say that reading and interpreting words remain central to her methodology. Interpretation is for Butler not a process to be shunned. She stresses the
Inge Arteel 89
importance of hermeneutics for her discourse analysis (Butler studied with Hans-Georg Gadamer in Heidelberg), a critical hermeneutics, that is, ‘that would know and mark its inability to capture what it seeks to know’ (Butler 2006a, 283). In a recent article written as a tribute to the deceased French writer Monique Wittig (Butler 2007), Butler emphasises the importance of reading as allowing for the subversion of conceptual frameworks and provoking disorientation. Rather than defining the potential of literary writing, Butler seems to be concerned with reflecting the potential of the reading process. Her reading does not set out to look for literary solutions to ethical dilemmas, but rather considers the cognitive and emotional effects on readers of their interaction with literature: the potentially unsettling process of reading might sharpen the awareness for ethical dilemmas rather than solving them.15 Though Butler can be said to partake in the ethical turn in the humanities, she makes sure to safeguard a right to ‘ethical ambivalence’: hers is a way of reading that results in ever more questions rather than answers, but ones that are nevertheless anchored by her concern to place the concept of human vulnerability at their centre.
Notes 1. Stanton here quotes Todorov 1987, 190. See also Halliwell and Mousley 2003, 16. 2. Interestingly enough, and illustrating Butler’s current more nuanced understanding of ‘humanism’, she retrospectively inscribes Gender Trouble with a humanist concern, when she writes in ‘The Question of Social Transformation’ (mark the confessional tone!): ‘But let me be more honest than that. I wanted something of gender trouble [sic] to be understood and accorded dignity, according to some humanist ideal, but I also wanted it to disturb – fundamentally – the way in which feminist and social theory think gender’ (Butler 2004b, 207). 3. Butler’s reading of excess can be considered as an example of what Halliwell and Mousley call ‘humanising excess’ or at least as an example of putting excess in the service of subject agency (Halliwell and Mousley 2003, 15). 4. For a first exploration of the differences and correspondences between Nietzsche and Levinas, see Butler 2000a. An excellent analysis of Butler’s ethics and her critical readings of Hegel, Nietzsche, Foucault and Levinas is provided in Loizidou 2007, especially 45–86. 5. A good example is Butler’s analysis of demonstrations in California in the spring of 2006 by Spanish speaking immigrants, living and working illegally in the US (Butler and Spivak 2007, 66ff). The singing immigrant workers are a good example of insurrectionary speech. 6. Especially interesting in the context of humanism and literature is Butler’s critique of the demand for coherent narratives, in that they force the
90
7.
8. 9. 10.
11.
12.
13. 14. 15.
Towards a New Literary Humanism speaking subject to make up a narrative that is not his/hers. The critique is equally illuminating on the level of human rights, when thinking, for instance, of the situation of political refugees, of whom the state demands that the autobiographical stories with which they seek asylum be flawless. What Butler terms here rather abruptly ‘philosophy of freedom’ – she usually opposes the notion of freedom – is analysed as ‘moral philosophy’ by Annika Thiem (2008). Butler is one amongst many to turn to Antigone in search for answers to contemporary ethical questions. See McCance 2007. An example of the latter is the relationship between people living with HIV/ AIDS and the buddies who care for them (Butler 2000b, 74). Bodies that Matter contains two chapters in which Butler reads literary texts in detail. In ‘Dangerous Crossing: Willa Cather’s Masculine Names’, she considers Cather’s ‘destabilization of gender and sexuality’ (143) through the practice of naming; in ‘Passing, Queering: Nella Larsen’s Psychoanalytic Challenge’, she deals with Larsen’s intertwining of ‘normative heterosexuality’ and ‘racially pure reproduction’ (167). Butler herself does not use the notion ‘catachretic human’ in this book, but her thoughts here are similar to those she explores in her reading of Antigone. Beatrice Hanssen detects in Butler’s linguistic theory a kind of ‘avant-gardist belief in the power of poetry’ (Hanssen 2000, 173). However, it should be added that Butler does not naïvely believe in ‘emancipation through language’ (Butler 2003, 203). See Purvis 2006, 447. For Butler, literary narrative is ‘a place where theory takes place’ (Butler 1993, 182). Dorothy Hale presents an intriguing analysis of the similarities she detects between Martha Nussbaum’s and Judith Butler’s ethical reading of literature – a provocative analysis too, given the antagonistic tension between the two philosophers. However, Hale’s analysis might be less convincing when the divergent political motivations inspiring their respective ethics are taken into account (Hale 2009).
Part II Scepticism, or Humanism at the Limit
This page intentionally left blank
Introduction Andy Mousley
Is humanism, literary or otherwise, too naïvely ‘sociable’, too companionable, too clubby in its insistence on whatever it is ‘we’ as human beings are supposed to have in common? And is humanism also too optimistically affirming of ‘the human’, even if, as proposed in the general Introduction, such affirmation is based on literature’s cultivation of deep, rich and complex selves, as opposed to some simpler avowal of, say, our supposedly innate love of beauty, truth or justice? The chapters in this section express scepticism about the values and optimism to which humanism traditionally asks us to subscribe. In interrogating humanism’s positive account of the human, its ‘religion of humanity’, they can be broadly located within the sceptical traditions of modernity (see Introduction). Any ‘new humanism’, as the general Introduction argues, has to be internally robust (by explicitly developing critical terms and principles), but it also has to be reflexive, sceptical and aware of counter-perspectives (some of them coming from posthumanism) that are external to or at a critical distance from it. These chapters provide that necessary kind of critique, although in the case of one of the chapters, by Callus and Herbrechter, the critique also operates in reverse, by showing what ‘high’ literary-humanist values may have to offer posthumanism. The next and final part of this volume does not ‘answer’ the scepticism expressed in this part, but attenuates it, offering as it does a series of contrasting perspectives, which invest to varying degrees and in different ways in humanism as a hopeful social politics.
Richard Chamberlain, ‘Shakespeare’s Refusers: Humanism at the Limit’ Despite their seeming differences, Richard Chamberlain takes as his starting point the connections which exist between humanism and 93
94
Towards a New Literary Humanism
anti-humanism. Notwithstanding the fact that humanism, especially in its liberal manifestation, has often centred upon the free, autonomous individual, and anti-humanism has countered this through its emphasis on the socially constructed nature of subjectivity, both tend to assume that ‘people are essentially sociable beings’. For Chamberlain, the individualism of (liberal) humanism is a circumscribed individualism, ‘relying upon a sense of self which is recognisable, within certain limits, and based on elements of a common culture’. Meanwhile, he argues that anti-humanists ‘tend to make this in-built sociability more explicit’ by decentring the individual ‘who no longer speaks a common language, but is spoken by it’. What both ‘agree to ignore is an account of the genuinely singular’. Drawing on the work of Slavoj Žižek, the main focus of Chamberlain’s chapter is on the figure of the refuser in Shakespeare’s plays, a figure who says ‘no’ and keeps on saying no ‘despite the powerful sway of cultural imperatives’. The refuser ‘resists the symbolic’, ‘refuses to be a “subject”, cancelling their social being, which is to say, their being’. Moreover, such figures (Timon, Apemantus, Barnadine, Malvolio, Horatio and Hamlet, amongst others) cannot, according to Chamberlain, be assimilated to the ‘“principled refuser”’ of liberal mythology who ‘might be able but not willing to remain part of a bad society’, for ‘the Shakespearian refuser, even if willing, would not be able’. Instead of heroically affirming agency and resistance, refusal ‘appears to emerge from the individual in an impersonal way’, more as a ‘drive’. Refusers are both human and inhuman, ‘agonised people’ and ‘disturbing, inhuman presences – irruptions of the Real which question the reality we have constructed, and suffer’. Nevertheless, argues Chamberlain, ‘the refuser … must stand as the high point of our humanity: damaged, benumbed, but still saying “no” to false constructions of the human in which we are constantly encouraged to invest’.
Steven Earnshaw, ‘Why Eliot Killed Lydgate: “Joyful Cruelty” in Middlemarch’ Steven Earnshaw’s wide-ranging chapter begins by identifying two key ‘homologies’ between religion and humanism. The first is the ‘narrative movement towards something better if certain conditions are followed: ‘the Kingdom of Heaven for the religious narrative, improvements in the standard of living in the here-and-now for humanism’. The second is ‘a belief in an invisible force’: God in the case of religion, ‘the human spirit’ in the case of humanism. The nineteenth century, argues
Introduction to Part II 95
Earnshaw, was a century when belief in invisible forces became especially difficult, due to the converging emphases of realism, naturalism and positivism upon observable realities. Nevertheless, numerous writers (George Eliot included) ‘do not necessarily concede the contradiction between their emphasis on observing the world as it is … and … a belief in something beyond the visible, in something which cannot be measured by science’. Drawing on the French philosopher Clément Rosset’s view that traditionally philosophy has always added something (typically ‘“God”’, ‘“soul”’, or ‘“spirit”’) to the stubborn, inconvenient particulars of reality in order to make overarching sense of them, Earnshaw’s chapter unravels the intricate relationship not only between novelistic realism and humanism in Middlemarch and The Mill on the Floss, but also between realism, the ‘really real’ (via Rosset), symbolism and humanism. Rosset’s ‘really real’ is a cruel reality because things happen there which cannot be accommodated – or only with difficulty – within one or another benevolent overarching scheme. The humanistic Eliot may attempt to plot humanist narratives in which characters are assigned meaningful humanist destinies and in which metaphors (such as the scientific metaphor of ‘tissue’ in Middlemarch) take on humanist significance, but plot, character and metaphor can all be read otherwise, as instances of a realism which does not comfortingly add up.
Jeff Wallace, ‘Atomised: Mary Midgley and Michel Houellebecq’ Jeff Wallace’s at once intricate and expansive chapter questions the (Leavisite) perception that literature always and everywhere cultivates humanistic ‘depth’. His specific topic is the relationship between the reductionism with which science has often been associated and literature, the supposedly richer, deeper, more complex humanist counterpart of science. This distinction, which as Wallace points out paradoxically depends on a reductive view of science, is one that underpins Leavisite literary criticism onwards from the foundation of the journal Scrutiny in the 1930s. The two texts discussed in Wallace’s chapter – Science and Poetry (2001) by the English philosopher Mary Midgey and Michel Houellebecq’s novel Atomised (2000) – both identify, according to Wallace, ‘atomistic theory as the source of a fatal reductionism, and attribute[s] the persistence of atomistic thinking within science, and the wider culture, to a prevailing biologism’ (of which Richard Dawkins’s work is an iconic example). However, for Wallace, both these texts
96
Towards a New Literary Humanism
fail in different ways to make good their claims (or assumptions) that literature saves us from such a ‘fatal reductionism’ by restoring a picture of humanity as deep and complex. Two important conclusions emerge from Wallace’s chapter and both have far-reaching implications for this volume. The first is that: ‘In the new, robustly utilitarian environments critically addressed by this current volume, and by literary studies as a discipline, we can ill afford to perpetuate older forms of nebulousness or platitude where either “literature” or “humanism” is concerned.’ Wallace has Midgey in mind here, for while her book ‘in its attention to conceptual detail is unquestionably philosophical’, its claims about the humanistic richness of literature are ‘hollowed out by paucities of theoretical and practical demonstration’. The second conclusion, illustrated through Wallace’s reading of Houellebecq’s novel, is the ‘steadfast refusal of human life to be humanistic … to be human is precisely to have to come to terms with the anti-humanistic aspects of our personalities, behaviours and environments’. This volume provides one answer to the first point in that it furnishes humanist literary criticism with theory, critical terminology and worked examples. The second is a salutary reminder that the ‘richness and complexity’ of the human cannot be guaranteed.
Ivan Callus and Stefan Herbrechter, ‘Humanity Without Itself: Robert Musil, Giorgio Agamben and Posthumanism’ Ivan Callus and Stefan Herbrechter’s chapter focuses, as the title suggests, on the challenge presented by posthumanism in its various different guises to humanism’s ideas and assumptions about the human. However, what distinguishes Callus and Herbrechter’s chapter from other such posthumanist challenges is their use of a ‘high modernist’ literary text – Robert Musil’s monumental The Man without Qualities – as their posthumanist representative. Posthumanism, they argue, has tended to establish its own ‘canon’, one that is rooted in popular culture and fiction – and primarily science fiction – rather than in the ‘high’ literary canon to which Musil’s book seems so naturally affiliated. The choice of Musil is shaped in part by Callus and Herbrechter’s desire to examine ‘“a posthumanism without technology”: that is, a posthumanism not solely driven by technological considerations’. But it is also shaped by the urge to think through ‘what it is within literary culture and within the theoretical humanities [represented in their essay by Agamben] that might be worth revisiting by mainstream, technology-minded
Introduction to Part II 97
posthumanism’. What, ask Callus and Herbrechter, does the ‘“high” literary imagination’, as represented by Musil, ‘offer the posthuman?’ The answer, over-baldly stated, is depth. But there is a rich irony here, of course, of which Callus and Herbrechter are all too keenly aware, the irony being that such depth is attached to a character – the ‘man without qualities’ – who becomes progressively depthless. What this novel as a high literary novel shows us is the psychological process of depletion. A bildungsroman in reverse, Musil’s novel, argue Callus and Herbrechter, ‘may offer the most complete dramatisation we have of the psychology of human(ist) qualities suspending themselves before the prospect of pervasive technoculture’.
5 Shakespeare’s Refusers: Humanism at the Limit Richard Chamberlain
I Hamlet. Horatio. Barnardo Horatio.
Very like, very like. Stayed it long? While one with moderate haste might tell a hundred. and Marcellus. Longer, longer. Not when I saw’t. (Shakespeare 2005, Hamlet, 1.2.235–8)
What should we make of Horatio’s negativity, in the light of renewed interest in a humanist response to Shakespeare? Such a return might entail a positive mental attitude, healing our presently alienated condition and enabling literature to act, once more, as a guide to the good life – or at least as a way to face the whole variety of our experience. Yet this second of discord between allies points to an alienation which runs against the ingrained critical assumption that Shakespeare’s plays are life-enhancing and all-embracing. Perhaps Horatio merely seeks to add a detail – ‘Not the time I was there, by the way’ – but his words could be an uncompromising denial of his companions’ account (his curtness and the clipped ‘saw’t’ seem to urge this view). By replying in this style, he draws attention to the suspiciously collective, clamorously asserted aspect of their version. A brief moment of blank refusal manages to question both the immediate factual assertion and a wider context of human relationships. In doing so, it emphasises tensions inevitable in any humanist reading of Shakespeare: the collective, socially agreed or commonsensical attitude is glimpsed as a route to untruth. That Horatio is neither a villain nor a threatening ‘outsider’ (whether a social misfit or a cultural alien), but rather a social insider, Hamlet’s friend and confidant, makes the problem more acute. The refusal of the insider
98
Richard Chamberlain 99
suggests that there is something rotten in the link between the human and the shared. Humanism is often identified with the individual, and anti-humanism with the collective, shared or cultural. Yet humanism is equally ‘cultural’, relying upon a sense of self which is recognisable, within certain limits, and based on elements of a common culture. Despite the theme of the individual, humanists tend to assume, just as much as anti-humanists, that people are essentially sociable beings, that each can exist only through their interaction with others. Anti-humanists tend to make this in-built sociability more explicit, whilst Marxism, in both its humanist and anti-humanist incarnations, pushes that dependence on sharing to a logical, political conclusion. Implicitly, humanist criticism assumes a limitless audience that will share, approve and identify with the picture of the free individual it paints. Anti-humanism decentres the individual, who no longer speaks a common language, but is spoken by it. In poststructuralism and postmodernism, the autonomous individual of humanism becomes a cultural construct, a nexus of interacting and competing discourses, or the product of a disciplinary gaze. Each subject is constituted by its entanglement in the field of culturally-produced meanings. Notably, both broad trends of critical thought tend to view Shakespeare, above all others, as a ‘sharer’ – either as the repository of a universal humanity or as evidence of the ‘circulation of social energy’ (Greenblatt 1988). The untutored genius with whom we share our understanding of the ever-renewed emotions turns out to be a theatrical shareholder embroiled in the material production of early modern culture. Shakespeare’s sociability is an article of faith for both sides. What the two camps agree to ignore is an account of the genuinely singular. Humanism, which defends the individual, is likely to be uncomfortable with humans who fall outside of its unspoken norms or who reject what currently passes for ‘the human’. Anti-humanism is happy with eccentricity and psychosis, as long as these can be positioned within a cultural matrix. The logical conclusion that Marx draws from human interdependence is that the singular individual (at once single, unique and extraordinary) is an end in itself, but at present is precisely an end rather than a reality. That ideal of singularity might be realised in a society in which each is the condition for the development of all, in which individuality is not the product of social coercion, but of liberated – that is, essentially human – relationships: This is communism as the complete and conscious return of man conserving all the riches of previous development for himself as a social,
100
Towards a New Literary Humanism
i.e. human being. Communism as completed naturalism is humanism and as completed humanism is naturalism. It is the genuine solution of the antagonism between man and nature and between man and man. It is the true solution of the struggle between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. (Marx 1979, 148) Communist society would therefore be one in which it was genuinely possible to enjoy oneself in company, as an expression of one’s social and ‘species’ being. In this condition ‘communal activity and enjoyment, i.e. activity and enjoyment that is expressed and confirmed in the real society of other men, will occur everywhere where this direct expression of sociability arises from the content of the activity or enjoyment and corresponds to its nature’ (Marx 1979, 150). In the here and now, however, as Theodor Adorno might note, there is something deeply suspect about the concept of sharing as the foundation of so much humanist and anti-humanist cultural commentary (Adorno 1974).1 In today’s globalised world, the ideal of participation informs everything from the illusory freedom of ‘social networking’ websites to the spurious collectivity of employers’ demands for ‘teamwork’. The language of communion in the world of the focus group, the paintballing weekend and the interactive TV reality show is incurably contaminated. A culture that champions the individual’s freedom to choose their own way of life enforces more insistently than ever the imperative to join in. The genuinely solitary experience is regarded as unhealthy – sick – and also subversive of a ‘democratic’ social order. The critical force of appeals to the collective is weakened when capital itself insists on comradeship. Consequently, one wonders whether the invention of a new ‘approach’, ‘method’ or ‘theory’ of literary humanism envisaged – albeit with an awareness of the risks involved – in Andy Mousley’s Introduction, with a technical vocabulary ready to go into the latest editions of primers and readers, is not to embrace the logic of that ‘market-place of theories and approaches’ within which critical thought is forced to dance. Can literary humanism, as one more commodity in such a mart, ever be anything other than self-parody, uneasily playing along with the principle of exchange which (in other more pressing contexts) is so indifferent to the survival, let alone the rich inner life, of living people? Shakespeare’s refusers sit uncomfortably with the idea that a literary humanist approach will help us to embrace the possibility of a common humanity, however complexly defined, because, in their own stories,
Richard Chamberlain 101
they change the world or perish – usually the latter – rather than pull up a chair to the table.
II Given these problems with an ethic of shared humanity based on social participation, how disappointing it would be if Timon became reconciled to the Athenians: First Senator. I like this well; he will return again. Timon. I have a tree which grows here in my close, That mine own use invites me to cut down, And shortly must I fell it. Tell my friends, Tell Athens, in the sequence of degree From high to low throughout, that whoso please To stop affliction, let him take his haste, Come hither ere my tree hath felt the axe, And hang himself. I pray you, do my greeting. (Shakespeare 2005, Timon of Athens, 5.2.89–97) Timon learns his refusal from the ‘cynic philosopher’ Apemantus. Once he has become advised of the false friendship of the other nobles and the folly of his own conspicuous generosity, he refuses not just social enjoyment and fellowship, but every standard of human decency: inviting the doomed citizens to come and hang themselves from his solitary tree, right at the end, where there should be some redemptive resolution. It is of no consequence that he is not an admirable character. What is exhilarating is the way he persists so absolutely in his opposition to society. His is a case of sour grapes, but sour grapes with an element of truth that becomes visible through his exaggerated, dramatic refusal. In a world of continual compromises, it is inspiring to see someone utterly unwilling to be persuaded from his course by anything whatsoever. This is the guilty pleasure of reading Timon of Athens. As teachers and critics (and, more generally, members of liberal society) we are expected to value a common culture of reciprocal involvement and balanced, nuanced, collectively ratified judgement. Shakespeare’s plays present a number of figures who develop the implications of Horatio’s inflexible unilateralism, thereby posing significant problems for humanist and anti-humanist criticism. These individuals, who might be called ‘refusers’, live out a traumatic sense of damaged or disingenuous social life, declining to conform to the sociability prescribed
102
Towards a New Literary Humanism
by both philosophies. They often exhibit an unreasonableness, a driven endurance of pain, which makes them scarcely a fit subject for humanist commentary, except as disturbing aberrations. They are probably best represented outside Shakespeare by Sophocles’s Antigone and Melville’s Bartleby: whatever the circumstances and despite the apparently invincible pressure of social expectation, they simply ‘would prefer not to’. Similarly, they unsettle anti-humanist understanding insofar as they absent themselves from a constraining cultural network. Neither way of thinking can fully come to terms with the contradictory nature of the refuser. They remain living, feeling, remembering beings, but are too mutilated by their rejection of, and exclusion from, society to be recognised as fully ‘human’ subjects. They thus function both as agonised people and as disturbing, inhuman presences – irruptions of the Real which question the reality we have constructed, and suffer. As Slavoj Žižek puts it: It is against such a disengagement that Bartleby repeats his ‘I would prefer not to’ – not ‘not to do it’: his refusal is not so much the refusal of a determinate content as, rather, the formal gesture of refusal as such … There is a clear holophrastic quality to ‘I would prefer not to’: it is a signifier-turned-object, a signifier reduced to an inert stain that stands for the collapse of the symbolic order. (Žižek 2006, 384–5) This suggests that Shakespeare’s refusers should be treated as central to his plays. As individuals at the limit of what it means to be human, they are a source of considerable artistic power. However, they go beyond mere studies in alienation: the absolute character of their disengagement is felt, by their oppressors, to threaten the bases (economic, linguistic, psychological) of the social order from which they withdraw their assent. Moreover, refusers prefer not to disappear, but persist as signs of an impossible yet indelible challenge brought into being by some immanent fault in the social-symbolic system.2 These plays, more than most others of their time, are built around this tear in reality, deriving much of their emotional and dramatic impact from its infuriating permanence. Timon, the pupil, and Apemantus, the master, arguably represent the definitive instance of refusal in its Shakespearian form: 1) discontinuing one’s assent, as an insider, to a collective opinion or form of behaviour which is felt to legitimise and integrate the group; 2) persisting as a problem for that group and consequently suffering self-exile or ostracisation. The refuser’s withdrawal of participation casts doubt (and, in effect, aspersions) upon the group; their violation of bonhomie brings to light its inherent violence, its anxious self-regulation as
Richard Chamberlain 103
a coercive entity rather than a free association of individuals. Suffering this opprobrium, there is nowhere for the refuser to go. They might thus be counted as a kind of suicide, impelled to destroy themselves as meaningful subjects because society offers them no place they are able to accept. They are, however, a distinctive kind of suicide because they stay on as the living dead, preventing the processes of social healing which serve to keep an unjust society in place. As experienced by the group, refusal is something like a suicide attack: unexpected, unreasonable and irreversible. One would have to be crazy to refuse, but people do it anyway. This particular brand of insanity, which exposes, through its own extremism, the hidden irrationality of the reasonable and commonsensical, is one to which Shakespeare insistently returns. Anecdotal evidence reinforces this Shakespearian emphasis on rejected enjoyment in acts of refusal. Think of the cold horror felt when one finds oneself in the midst of a friendly social group who suddenly embark upon a drinking game or some other form of formalised, self-policed enjoyment. To demur in such circumstances is felt to be impossible, which suggests that a lot of coerced pseudo-enjoyment must be endured by those who would really ‘prefer not to’. In fact, it is possible to refuse, but the consequences of sitting mutely among others engaged in trying to keep the game going, once punctured, are terrible in a manner disproportionate to the triviality of the situation. Indeed, it is the overtly signalled lightheartedness of the game that unleashes the unbearable consequences of non-compliance: the refuser feels bad; the group who feel refused feel bad. Although they rarely lead to carnal, bloody and unnatural acts under such outwardly convivial circumstances, some of the darkest human emotions are released by the deceptively simple dynamics of this situation. When someone refuses to an absolute degree, it raises the problem, either for the state or the friendly goodfellows, of what to do with this sign of their failure as an all-embracing entity, the embarrassingly hegemonic nature of which has been rendered newly apparent to all. Faced with such a challenging face-off, the state may be driven to kill the refuser, but this too is an admission of failure. The plays make it clear that refusal is not simply admirable. Whilst it might be tempting to imitate Antigone’s principled stand or to fall in love with Bartleby for his quiet subversiveness, we see that Timon overreacts and should have known better, and that (despite certain charming quirks) Malvolio is a fraud. The latter is the best known Shakespearian social suicide, the refuser of cakes and ale, whose purpose is partly to stand as a satirical portrait of Puritanism. Nevertheless, despite the fact that he is there to be ‘notoriously abused’, this does not
104
Towards a New Literary Humanism
quite neutralise the ‘inert stain’ of his refusal. As the butt of the joke, he provides an occasion for everyone else to combine in good fellowship, but his ‘revenge’ is at work, corroding and tainting the collective. His own hypocrisy has exposed the madness of behaviour that everyone considers sane: smiling, dressing up, seeking the approval of others. His calling into question of all festivity is left ringing in the ears of the whole pack of us, characters and audience alike. Enjoyment becomes very complex in this situation. Several refusers seem to elaborate in grimly playful terms upon the systematic ideological destruction wreaked by the gesture of saying no and meaning it, so that refusal appears to produce a parodic version of the ‘game’ of social reality. Timon takes an excessive pleasure in his refusal, toying with the opposition in the most humourless way. His playful redoubling of refusal (also seen when he serves warm water at his last feast) negates the sinister fun of good fellowship. In Measure for Measure, the theme of game-playing and the rules of social enjoyment arise in the treatment of the condemned murderer Barnadine, one of Shakespeare’s most marginal but spectacular refusers: Provost. A man that apprehends death no more dreadfully but as a drunken sleep; careless, reckless, and fearless of what’s past, present, or to come; insensible of mortality, and desperately mortal. (Shakespeare 2005, Measure for Measure, 4.2.144–7) Barnadine is an abject remainder of the human, a leftover within society that proves extremely disconcerting for those attempting to remain in control. He will not be persuaded – he ‘wants advice’ but ‘will hear none’. The man who has no dread of death has no fear of social authority (whether collective or hierarchical) and the maximum punishment it can inflict upon him, but this does not quite capture the special character of Barnadine’s intransigence, his endurance of an alienated condition; neither does it recognise the quandary in which it places his captors. The Provost is partly making it easier for himself by presenting the situation like this. Despite the argument that Barnadine can resist authority because he has nothing to lose, this is to miss the disconcerting effect on that authority which his insouciant disregard for it has.3 The Provost’s words reinforce the sense that, within the thematic world of Shakespeare’s plays, questionable social authority is associated with festivity and play: He hath evermore had the liberty of the prison. Give him leave to escape hence, he would not. Drunk many times a day, if not many
Richard Chamberlain 105
days entirely drunk. We have very oft awaked him as if to carry him to execution, and showed him a seeming warrant for it; it hath not moved him at all. (4.2.149–54) Barnadine collapses the consensual mechanism of law in response to the deathly enjoyment demonstrated by his warders. Why should they have woken him and pretended to take him away to execution? It is a cruel joke which reveals the arbitrary relation of unjust authority to the individual human being, also suggestive of the boredom felt by those with arbitrary power. This unsettlingly ludic quality to the prison business also comes out in Pompey’s way of summoning the prisoner: Barnadine. (within) A pox o’ your throats! Who makes that noise there? What are you? Pompey. Your friends, sir; the hangman. You must be so good, sir, to rise and be put to death. Barnadine. Away, you rogue, away! I am sleepy. Abhorson. Tell him he must awake, and that quickly too. Pompey. Pray, Master Barnadine, awake till you are executed, and sleep afterwards. (4.3.23–30) Yet there is also a sense of experiment in the Provost’s trick: would Barnadine continue to refuse even if he thought he was about to die? The experiment is provoked by astonishment at his refusal of the game which the prison has been set up to play. He does not even want to leave, and in this is perhaps most thoroughly a refuser. He embraces his unhappiness, pushing his incarceration to a parodic logical breaking-point. As a refuser, he knows that there is no way out and resolves to persist in this state of torture – although this is not to attribute to him heroic qualities.4 The prisoner’s refusal to countenance the logic of these social transactions, to the extent of refusing to be killed, is worrying for those who are supposed to be pulling the strings. The effect is to wrong-foot those in control. Either they must haul him to death in a horrific struggle or they must give in to their religious qualms and hope to kill him when he is better shriven: Barnadine. Friar, not I. I have been drinking hard all night, and I will have more time to prepare me, or they shall beat out my brains with billets. I will not consent to die this day, that’s certain. Duke. O sir, you must; and therefore, I beseech you, Look forward on the journey you shall go.
106
Towards a New Literary Humanism
Barnadine. I swear I will not die today, for any man’s persuasion. Duke. But hear you – Barnadine. Not a word. If you have anything to say to me, come to my ward, for thence will not I today. Exit. (4.3.56–60) Perhaps significantly, it is ‘fellows’ who are sent after him – ‘After him, fellows; bring him to the block!’ (4.3.62) – those who must still operate within the bonds of social enjoyment and duty in wrenching him to a violent and ignominious end. As it turns out, his execution is delayed in favour of Ragozine’s and then waived, as part of the play’s purportedly redemptive conclusion. Nevertheless, the prison scenes, and Barnadine in particular, highlight one example of Shakespeare’s fascination with the fragility of society in its current coercive form and its curious vulnerability to the impotent, self-destructive gesture of refusal. If he starkly illuminates the issue of the law’s dependence upon assent, he also embodies the doubled-sided character of refusal, being cancelled, abject, yet permanent and immutable.
III Criticism has traditionally sought to defuse the crisis provoked by Shakespeare’s refusers. On this reading, the plays confirm a companionable view of existing society – or, at least, a society that can be renewed or reformed through the process of comic crisis and resolution. It assumes that the plays, the critics and the audience are pleased that the refuser’s challenge can be put aside once it has fulfilled its dramatic function of creating conflict, comic relief or a limited degree of critical reflection on the current social order. The refuser is thus seen as an important part of Shakespeare’s art, but not a central one; he or she does not offer a perspective from which to read the plays and their account of human life. As Leslie A. Fiedler remarks in The Stranger in Shakespeare, ‘the figure of the mocker … seems not to belong to the deepest and earliest level of Shakespeare’s fantasy, the private mythology which preceded any poem or play’ (Fiedler 1974, 16). The stranger, the demonised ethnic or sexual ‘other’ in the plays (of whom Fiedler offers one of the first sympathetic accounts), is to be distinguished from ‘the spoilsport’: the kind of bad boy who, irked by the rules of the game, wants to take his ball and go home – or failing that, will sit on the sidelines and sulk. The spoilsport appears frequently in Shakespeare – initially as a courtly mocker like Berowne in Love’s Labour’s Lost and the
Richard Chamberlain 107
‘melancholy Jacques’ [sic] in As You Like It, perhaps also, vestigially, as Hamlet himself; and he reappears in surly and unregenerate form as Malvolio in Twelfth Night and Thersites in Troilus and Cressida … (16) The intransigent insider remains for Fiedler an irredeemably selfindulgent, narrow-minded spoiled brat. For the liberal branch of humanist criticism, it is particularly important that Shakespeare the Sharer should continue to flourish. Whilst the presence of the refuser must be acknowledged, their capacity to corrode the bonds of common humanity should be played down. In a recent series of papers surveying Shakespeare’s ‘comic refusers’, Douglas A. Northrop provides a much more subtle and detailed account of them than Fiedler’s brief sketch, but the broad implications of his argument are along the same lines. For him, ‘Shakespeare uses the role of the comic refuser to sharpen the sense of comedy and to highlight the particular issues of the play by having one character conspicuously absent from the comic resolution and from the festivities that signal the resolution’, adding that: ‘The refuser often functions as a critic of the emerging society’ (Northrop 2005, 1).5 Even if the ‘new society’ towards which the comedies point is still flawed, the feeling is still that criticism should align itself with the mainstream, that the message of the plays is, in the end, that the individual should seek social integration. The power of Shakespearian comedy is to reunite the fractured social totality, not to plunge it into a transformative catastrophe; the tragic cost of this, however, is that someone has to be left out: ‘[t]he comic resolution gathers together those people who are able and willing to become something they should have been or were before but have departed from … It excludes the one who does not grow internally, who is not cured of his illness’ (Northrop 2003, 74–5). As the metaphor of disease suggests, this is (once again) not the exclusion of a threatening other, but of one of us, an insider who must be jettisoned because they have ceased to function in the approved way. However, the phrasing of this formulation leaves open the possibility of a more radical, if unsettling view of refusal. That the saved are ‘able and willing’ to adapt implies that the damned are incapable of assenting to their social element and that the refuser is impelled to refuse by a pressure which cannot be reduced to personality. Whilst the ‘principled refuser’, a familiar figure in liberal mythology, might be able but not willing to remain part of a bad society, the Shakespearian refuser, even if willing, would not be able. Refusal appears to emerge from the individual in an impersonal way, short-circuiting both humanist agency and an anti-humanist vision of the subject continually caught up in
108
Towards a New Literary Humanism
the play of desire. This makes its experience even more agonising for the person who finds themselves in the position of the refuser, and even more dangerous to the symbolic order which refusal seems to bypass with a fatal blankness. Žižek’s counterposing of constant psychic drives to the promiscuity of desire might offer a useful analogy. As he explains, desire is often read as subversive or destructive, but it also keeps us alive as sane and useful citizens, ever seeking to heal that wound which engenders yet threatens the subject. Lacan proposes an ethics premised on ‘not giving way relative to your desire’, for which Antigone is an exemplary figure: refusal is non-negotiable, it is not to be swayed by involvement, persuasion, compulsion or seduction. Yet the notion of drive seems to describe the character of refusal, according to which refusers are propelled by alien forces emerging from the centre of the human, more faithfully. Comparing it to the implacable Terminator of James Cameron’s films, Žižek reminds us that drive simply persists according to its own demand, not caring about reasonable accommodations or changing tack when circumstances alter (Žižek 1991, 172). There is a danger that, in its involuntary aspect, refusal will roll onwards, attacking the ties of sociability and spreading this disease throughout the social body. Northrop perceives the possibility that the critic is vulnerable, that the intolerance and dogmatism of the refuser might pass from text to commentary: ‘Critical or directorial efforts to turn any of them into saints or mark off others (even Barnadine) as irredeemable sinners is to fall into not the fault of Angelo but the fault of Lucio and to become a comic refuser’ (Northrop 2003, 77). That is, the wrong lessons might be learned from Shakespearian drama; something of Malvolio, Apemantus or Barnadine may rub off on the reader and end up damaging the humanistic mission of the academy. Even though refusers highlight the dangers of a premature identification of literature with ‘the human’, the critical desire to deflect the force of negation, to absorb the problem by treating it as a salutary call to limited reform, is strong. For instance, Julia Reinhard Lupton has argued recently that Shakespearian refusal at first questions but ultimately helps to create citizenship, healing fault-lines in civil society: ‘If Antigone dies into citizenship, Isabella [from Measure for Measure] marries into citizenship’ (Lupton 2005, 154). Similarly, Geoffrey Galt Harpham, in a different but related context, has noted that: ‘Despite the great differences between them, each of the four critics discussed in this book [Elaine Scarry, Martha Nussbaum, Slavoj Žižek and Edward Said] has responded to terror by affirming universal values and the human community’ (Harpham 2006, 156). Yet it is unfortunate to minimise or overlook the
Richard Chamberlain 109
serious examination of these questions in Shakespeare, looking to him for ideological mystification rather than penetrating observation. His refusers critique the historically premature ethos of participation which the institution of criticism, in both ‘traditional’ and ‘theorised’ forms, has long privileged, and they do so with a negativity which is hard for that institution to recuperate. Although refusal is premised on an absolute, the contribution of the plays lies in their exploration of its various problematic instances. Apemantus is perhaps closest to being a ‘pure’ or ‘authentic’ refuser, a regulative ideal which no one can quite match. Other refusers – among them Jaques, Katherina, Caliban, Cordelia, Shylock, Alcibiades, Coriolanus, Thersites and Iago – occupy their own distinctive positions and affect their societies in different ways. Hamlet, meanwhile, is one of the most compromised. His story may illustrate the capacity of desire to overrun drive, as the refuser capitulates to the tainted symbolic order which his parodic language has so mercilessly baited. Despite the fact that his refusal is more effective than anyone’s at undermining the system of coercive social consensus, he ultimately fails as a refuser and (unlike Timon or Malvolio) becomes fully a social subject, putting off his ‘antic disposition’ in an apologetic, pre-duel speech and separating himself from the ‘madness’ which has attended him throughout the play. Barnadine, who never consents to play the game of imprisonment and execution, is pardoned in a royal act of mercy which, annoyingly, steals his thunder. However, throughout all these differences, the Shakespearian refuser shows us humanity in the grip of an agonising contradiction. The plays leave us in no doubt that ‘the human condition’ in its present state is a thoroughly miserable one about which we cannot be complacent. This is not just a matter of unfavourable economic conditions (whether imagined as tragically inevitable or just waiting to be resolved by the triumph of the market), but rather of the very bonds that create and nurture the human, and which depend upon and emerge from those economic conditions. Reading them, we do not see heroic resistance or plans for a future society, but only the wreckage of the human. Each of the refusers is defeated or compromised. Refusal, by its nature, is flawed, unheroic, undignified; in addition, as Martin Halliwell and Andy Mousley have emphasised, some versions of humanism see limitations, rather than glowing possibilities, as the defining characteristic of the human: ‘Given a rapacious capitalist system that restlessly refashions human desires in order to keep itself going, do we not need to rescue a notion of what people “really” need?’ (Halliwell and Mousley 2003, 10). Yet an ‘holistic’ model of literary humanism as ‘affectively charged sensuousness’
110
Towards a New Literary Humanism
(see the Introduction to this volume) seems distant from Shakespeare’s writing of refusal, which is at once subjective and inhuman. The kind of refuser the dramatist imagines would reject everything that state and capital define as human through tests of participation – today, perhaps, passing the Citizenship Test, being a ‘developing nation’ not a ‘rogue state’, paying by Direct Debit. He or she would recoil from this glut of specious humanisms in the name of a basic humanity which paradoxically does not recognise ‘the human’ as a cosily collective enterprise. Aesthetically speaking, the negative energies released by the refuser’s protest at such enforced ‘human’ fellowship are as remote from modern expressive realism as any ‘inhuman’ work of medieval Christendom. The blankness of refusal negates the richness of literary art posited in a Leavisite or Eliotic marriage of the concrete and the abstract. Unless there is to be a revolutionary transformation of society, the refuser must stand as the high point of our humanity: damaged, benumbed, but still saying ‘no’ to false constructions of the human in which we are constantly encouraged to invest.
IV It is often supposed that Hamlet rejects suicide. Yet, in a special sense, he cannot escape self-annihilation and remain a refuser. The refuser resists the symbolic: despite the powerful sway of cultural imperatives, systems of signification, the ingrained expectations and conventions of social activity, the individual subject is impelled to refuse the course pre-ordained for them; or rather, the individual, in holding back from the continual reaffirmation of community, refuses to be a ‘subject’, cancelling their social being, which is to say their being. At the limitpoint, the refuser is a suicide: it is impossible to be an authentic refuser and ‘live’. Unlike the rebel, they do not build an identity or exhibit challenging behaviour which takes that identity as its source. Unlike the revolutionary, they do not join in collective action to bring about a transformed society. Instead, they create problems for existing society and its managers through their self-cancellation. The refuser is not ‘able or willing’ to participate in certain forms of socially expected behaviour, and so occupies no place within the licensed corridors of human existence, incomprehensible to their fellows and themselves. Until the final Act, Hamlet breaks the feast at Elsinore and refuses the forfeit in the drinking game which Claudius has made of Danish political life. In doing so, he violates the nervous pretence that constitutes sociability itself, the brittle crust of common cause across which company tiptoes,
Richard Chamberlain 111
both in Shakespeare’s Denmark-world and in our own. Hamlet dies the social death of a refuser, or would have done – his status as a prince insulates him from the consequences somewhat. He returns to life (which to a refuser is death) as an honourable duellist, only to perish once and for all at the point of Laertes’s poisoned blade.
Notes I would like to thank Paul Norcross for many indispensable discussions of the themes and thinkers mentioned here. 1. See his Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, in which fragmentary autobiographical notes indicate the stricken nature of humanism and the individual at the mid-twentieth century: Sociability itself connives at injustice by pretending that in this chill world we can still talk to each other, and the casual, amiable remark contributes to perpetuating silence, in that the concessions made to the interlocutor debase him once more or in the person of the speaker … All collaboration, all the human worth of social mixing and participation, merely masks a tacit acceptance of inhumanity. It is the sufferings of men that should be shared: the smallest step towards their pleasures is one towards the hardening of their pains. (Adorno 1974, 25–6) 2. Julian Murphet argues convincingly for an imperative not to recuperate Bartleby’s challenge to capital by resymbolising the crisis it brings to the symbolic order. However, it is worth holding on to the fact that Bartleby does not quite simply ‘refuse’ – he does, in effect, refuse to do his work; it doesn’t get done and yet he will not go away, and that is a serious problem. Whilst Bartleby’s ‘formula’ (as Deleuze calls it) is important, so is the way in which he cannot be compelled to do what he is expected to do, or to behave with the expected humility. In a sense, this transcends even the symbolic ‘void’ he opens up in discourse (Murphet 2007, vii–xi). 3. Terry Eagleton is right to speak of Barnadine’s ‘living death’ and to say that ‘[t]here is no more effective resistance to power than genuinely not caring about it; since power only lives in exacting a response of obedience from its victims’, but this misses some of the power of Barnadine’s example as a refuser (Eagleton 1986, 54–5). In disruptively refusing to perform his death-as-punishment, he is simultaneously performing his (for the Duke and Provost) irritatingly extended life. 4. It is important to distinguish this persistence in refusal from the kind of existential revolt described by Albert Camus: One of the only coherent philosophical positions is thus revolt. It is a constant confrontation between man and his own obscurity. It is an insistence on an impossible transparency. It challenges the world anew every second … That revolt is the certainty of a crushing fate, without the resignation that ought to accompany it. (Camus 2005, 52)
112
Towards a New Literary Humanism
Human life achieves a tragic dignity when one is fully conscious of its absurdity, resolutely facing the meaninglessness and pain of it all, rather than giving in by ‘assenting’ to suicide: ‘Suicide … is acceptance at its extreme’ (Camus 2005, 52). While the existential hero ends up with human dignity, and a great rock, the Shakespearian refuser will either destroy herself, the rock or both. 5. I am very grateful to Professor Douglas A. Northrop for sending me this and other unpublished papers in this series.
6 Why Eliot Killed Lydgate: ‘Joyful Cruelty’ in Middlemarch1 Steven Earnshaw
One common understanding of humanism, and the one upon which this chapter will rest, is that humanism replaces God with ideas of individual autonomy and the belief in progress through our own endeavours. What carries over from religion are analogous structures, or homologies. The first is the narrative movement towards something better if certain conditions are followed: the Kingdom of Heaven for the religious narrative, improvements in the standard of living in the here-and-now for humanism. A second homology is the carry-over of a belief in an invisible force. For religion this is God. To be sure, for the religious, God is visible in certain ways – both metonymically and metaphorically – but God himself remains always invisible. Similarly, for humanism, the human spirit remains invisible in itself but visible in certain other ways, for example, acts of kindness and indomitableness in the face of overwhelming negative forces.2 Eliot commented in a letter (1874): ‘the fellowship between man and man which has been the principle of development, social and moral, is not dependent on conceptions of what is not man … the idea of God, so far as it has been a high spiritual influence, is the ideal of a goodness entirely human (i.e. an exaltation of the human)’ (quoted in Davies 1997, 27). This is the religion of humanity that Auguste Comte’s positivism wished for and to which George Eliot half-subscribed (Knoepflmacher 1965, 39–41).3 The nineteenth century is the century when this second structural carry-over from religion becomes particularly problematic. The convergence or overlap of Realism4 and Naturalism in art and literature, and Naturalism and positivism in science throws the issue of visibility and invisibility into some difficulty, or at least it should do. Yet writers like George Eliot and a host of others do not necessarily concede the contradiction between their emphasis on observing the world as it is, on 113
114
Towards a New Literary Humanism
observing the real or reality, and at the same time adhering to a belief in something beyond the visible, in something which cannot be measured by science. In this chapter, I want to trace through some of these ideas primarily in relation to Middlemarch, since this is a novel which self-consciously explores the possibility that science can provide a metaphorical model for human behaviour, particularly through Lydgate’s work on tissue. More generally, the novel explores the possibilities of humanism through the attention it gives to acts of kindness and generosity, to the limits of individual autonomy and to Lydgate’s belief in the potential for progression through rationality and science. In treating Middlemarch in this way, we can see how in the novel Eliot is trying to tease out a humanism that is not too far removed from that outlined in the Introduction to this volume, one which offers a qualified approach to the idea of the human and what it is possible for humans to achieve with their own endeavours. Humanism is a belief in the human as a universal, which is partly aspirational (what we hope the best of humankind is) and partly descriptive (but described in a way which is generous, ‘humane’). This volume’s Introduction gives due attention to emotional intelligence and to the value of holistic experience, qualities that the narrative voice in Middlemarch, I would suggest, both implicitly and explicitly endorses. And, again comparable with the working-through of humanism suggested by this volume’s Introduction, here is a novel which is exemplary in its attention to ‘richness and complexity’, terms which we could take ‘neutrally’ if we wished, but which are most likely to be understood as part of the humanist’s lexicon of positive attributes. There is one more thing I would like to incorporate into this chapter, an aspect which is the counterpoint to the humanist tradition and throws both Eliot’s novel and current thinking on humanism into relief. I will incorporate the French philosopher Clément Rosset’s views on philosophy and ‘the real’ in Joyful Cruelty as a way to understanding what is happening when we talk about visibility, invisibility and the real. Rosset stands in a self-proclaimed philosophical tradition running counter to the main one (Rosset 1993, 71ff). His forbears are Lucretius, Pascal, Montaigne and Nietzsche. Rosset’s argument in relation to ‘the real’ in his writings in the 1970s and 1980s is that every philosophy is a theory of the real, if by ‘theory’ we take it in its etymological sense of ‘theoria’ or ‘observation’ (71). Rosset claims that in its attempts to generalise, philosophy moves away from the particular items which constitute the real to a point where the real in its particulars is either
Steven Earnshaw 115
irrelevant or inconvenient. The real ‘real’ is therefore insufficient for philosophy and consequently philosophy always supplies something extra in order that we may understand the real, typically ‘God’, ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’. Furthermore, because reality itself is insufficient for the all-embracing requirements of philosophy, it cannot provide the theoretical means – the code, the methodology, the key – for offering up the generalities that philosophy requires, and this too must be supplied by the philosopher as something external to reality (73). Rosset sees novels and paintings, for instance, as dealing with the particular, whereas philosophy wants to deal with the general. This makes for an interesting way into Middlemarch. For one thing, the Realist novel in the hands of George Eliot is sometimes regarded as taking on the role of philosophy in the nineteenth century,5 precisely, I think, because it makes this move from the particular to the general. Its particulars, to use the term deployed in the Introduction to this volume, ‘resonate’ outwards. But the Realist novel doesn’t have to do this – Zola certainly doesn’t do it within his novels. In moving from the particular to the general, Eliot moves from naturalist observation to humanism, from the visible to the invisible. In moving from the particular to the general, Eliot also appears to follow a basic tenet of humanism, that properly humanist values are by definition universal (as discussed above), not parochial, not provincial. Put another way, Middlemarch in its typical particularity both leads us to and represents the universal. All this is very neat – well, at least I think so. But – what I think Eliot does is then partly return us back from the general to the particular within the novel, and in doing so has no option but to counter the leaning towards humanism that is everywhere and elsewhere present in the novel. Eliot does what a good scientist should do and re-tests the general hypothesis – in this case, humanism and its specific credo of progress – against the stories the novel itself offers. Ultimately, Middlemarch casts significant doubt on humanism, leaving us with, with what? In Rosset’s terms, it potentially leaves us with a ‘joyful cruelty’, a Nietzschean embrace of the world as it is. I remember when I first read Middlemarch as a teenager being frustrated by Lydgate’s failure to make any progress. How could somebody with such ability and drive let himself be deflected from his purpose by the machinations of small-minded provincial folk and Rosamond’s pretty face? Re-reading the novel, it is possible to focus more on the ‘how?’ than the ‘what?’, and I suppose it is fairly clear why he fails. Eliot’s genius here is in bringing out Lydgate’s story in a way which is plausible, in a way which is the action of social
116
Towards a New Literary Humanism
environment on character, as any nineteenth-century Realist novel should reveal or set out to do. We know that this is what she is doing because it is the first thing the novel tells us: Who that cares much to know the history of man, and how the mysterious mixture behaves under the varying experiments of Time, has not dwelt, at least briefly, on the life of Saint Theresa, has not smiled with some gentleness at the thought of the little girl walking forth one morning hand-in-hand with her still smaller brother, to go and seek martyrdom in the country of the Moors? (Eliot 1965, 25) I will return to the Saint Theresa reference, but for now let us stick with the broader point about the particular and the general. When Rosset argues that philosophers always come up with systems which rely on things not visible in the real world, he claims that the reason for this is that the real world is cruel, so philosophers mitigate it with ideas of Spirit, Soul or, shall we say, in the case of humanism, the human spirit. To return to Lydgate, not only does he fail in his ambition to improve the discipline of medicine both theoretically and practically, he ends up pandering to the well-healed sick in London and dies young. A tragic waste, the reader cannot help but feel.6 That the reality of life is tragic or cruel is Rosset’s understanding. Tragic not in any classical sense of people brought down because of innate character flaws, or because it is the will of the gods or God, but simply because when we look at the world as it is, this is how it is. This is how it is, and it is not redeemable if we are to stay true to the real in the very particulars that we observe. According to Rosset, every philosophy makes the sum greater than the parts, and this traduces the inconvenient truth of what the real really is. I have focused on Lydgate’s narrative. It appears to endorse Rosset’s view of what ‘the real’ truly is. Rosset calls it joyful cruelty, following on from Nietzsche’s joyful wisdom – the gay science – because we should willingly accept that this is how it is. But what of the other main narratives?7 Am I not missing the point, since the book has multiple plots, not just Lydgate’s? Many readers no doubt feel that the missed opportunity is a coming together of Lydgate and Dorothea, two people with the good of the human race at heart and able to balance out the other’s faults, that is, Dorothea’s naïve sympathy and Lydgate’s scientific detachment.8 Well, they don’t come together. Cruel again, perhaps, on Eliot’s part. But doesn’t Dorothea’s narrative suggest that the human spirit in its generous, warm-hearted form can prevail over the impersonal
Steven Earnshaw 117
will-to-knowledge of Casaubon? And isn’t the moral centre of the novel the Garths, who quietly and uncomplainingly go about their lives in a practical, sympathetic, Anglo-Saxon manner? Isn’t the centre of the novel, well, humanist? If only the world were full of Garths, where every marriage ended in ‘solid mutual happiness’ (890). So why does Eliot kill Lydgate, without allowing him to contribute to ‘the growing good of the world’ (896) – Middlemarch’s humanist credo? Delving further, what we find is a constant tussle between humanism and the ‘real real’. One reading of Lydgate’s death suggests that he deserves to die because he lacks precisely that practical sympathy and empathy that Dorothea is capable of. This interpretation suggests that Lydgate must die because his egoism outweighs any possible benefits he might produce for humanity through his scientific endeavour. When Raffles is dying, Lydgate is interested only in the medical view – he evinces no sign of common humanity. Whilst George Eliot can save Bulstrode, perhaps because he can bring out the best of human sympathy through his wife’s reaction when his mendacity is revealed to her, Lydgate cannot be saved from his scientific arrogance. Lydgate thinks that he should prevail because of his scientific and medical ambition in the service of humanity. Eliot begs to differ and so she gives him a legacy of four little Rosamonds, meting out justice to someone who sets himself higher than the common human lot: no other character suffers nearly so cruel a fate.9 But here the cruelty appears to be the author’s, in the service of humanism rather than ‘a real real’. As we will now see, the novel as a whole moves ambivalently between two possible interpretations of the world: the ‘real real’ and a philosophically-minded humanistic Realism. For instance, there is further punishment when we see that Lydgate’s inability to make headway with his research is inversely proportionate to the novel’s own success with webs and tissues as metaphors that explicate the workings of provincial life. Caldwell, partly drawing on comments by J. Hillis Miller, notes the importance of this ‘reigning metaphor’ for the novel (Caldwell 2004, 159–60). There may be a further cruelty when we consider Susan Graver’s point that Eliot’s endings often emphasise the continued importance of Gemeinschaft (older, rural, organic community structures) in the present Gesellschaft (urban society) (Graver 1984, 90–1). Lydgate’s refusal to engage in the everyday politicking of provincial society would thus align him with the spiritless societal structures Eliot’s fiction seeks to modify and would be another reason why he must die. Graver suggests that Lydgate’s death ‘is noted but not really commemorated, because his own sense of failure makes
118
Towards a New Literary Humanism
his later life a living death’ (Graver 1984, 92) – in other words, Eliot, through the actions of Rosamond, has already killed him. We might also note, along with Jeremy Tambling, that Lydgate’s birth is the same year (1802) as Xavier Bichat’s death (Tambling 1990, 941), offering further possible ironies for us through the idea that Bichat’s death is redeemed by Lydgate (long live Bichat through Lydgate!), only for this ‘growing good’ to come to a dead end. Tambling sees Eliot in the role of Bichat, an ‘author-doctor’, something else which would therefore serve to usurp Lydgate and lead to his death, since the author must by necessity succeed in her analysis at Lydgate’s expense. There is another possible ‘cruelty’ in the comparison the novel offers between the life of Lydgate and that of one of his medical heroes, Vesalius (Eliot 1965, 497). Lydgate observes that when Vesalius was as old as he is now, he ‘had already begun a new era in anatomy’, and Graver comments: ‘The fact that Lydgate dies at exactly the same age as Vesalius, their lives even spanning the same years of their respective centuries, continues the identification between them, but it becomes increasingly ironical as the novel progresses’ (Graver 1984, 207–8, drawing on Greenberg 1975, 39–40). There is one final way in which Lydgate’s death is cruel. As the novel states at the very start, its interest is in the action of time on character. We know the novel is underpinned by scientific ideas, and in this way Eliot transports the role of the natural histor