is well formed)] To say that (Q, Q.^ is obligatory is to say: (x) [PX/C3 z> (Ñ,+j/Q Î <Ñ×, Px+ 1 > is well formed)] (Lakoff 1971, 233)
The first thing to notice about these remarks is that, as they stand, they are confused. What they seem to assert, taken in conjunction with (5), (or with my reformulation of (5)), is that (17) A sequence of phrase markers is a member of Ê only if every pair of successive phrase markers is well formed)] or (b) There is some obligatory transformation (Q, Q> such that (x) [Ñ,/Q = (PX+1/Q = is well formed)].10 However, this clearly won't do. First, to adopt (17) and (18) would be to fail to formally define the notion of well formedness as it applies to successive pairs of phrase markers; for what looks like a definition — namely (18) — mentions the term to be defined on both sides of the biconditional. Second, to say that a specific pair of phrase markers is well formed iff some universal statement of the form mentioned in (a) or (b) is true of the whole sequence of phrase markers of which is a part is just bizarre. Finally, any pair of phrase markers <Ñß} Pj+i) which is a member of a sequence none of whose members satisfies the structural description of some one transformation will automatically be well formed by falsity of antecedent of the statement corresponding to that transformation. Surely these results are undesirable. Thus, if we are to make sense of LakofFs remarks, some other interpretation is needed. 10
Although Lakoff doesn't tell us what the bound variables in (18) are supposed to range over, it seems fair to take them as ranging over the subscripts of phrase markers in an ordered sequence of phrase markers. First, it is only in such sequences that phrase markers have subscripts (and, of course, they have different subscripts in different sequences). Second, Lakoff uses the same notation in stating rule ordering constraints—where the bound variables must be interpreted in this way.
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Perhaps, then, we ought not to interpret Lakoff as offering a definition of the notion of well formedness as it applies to pairs of phrase markers. Instead, we may be able to construe his remarks as giving axioms regarding the use of this notion. According to this interpretation, we can keep (17) above. However, in place of (18) we will have a list of statements of the forms mentioned in (a) and (b)—one for each transformation. Then, to find out whether a given pair of phrase markers (Pj, Pj+i^ is well formed, one instantiates each of the universally quantified formulas, substituting the constant "i" for the variable "x". If one of the resulting formulas of the form mentioned in (b) has a true antecedent, then we can derive by modus ponens a biconditional that states necessary and sufficient conditions for the well formedness of ^Pj, Pi+iX Similarly, if an instantiation of one of the formulas of the form mentioned in (a) has a true antecedent, then modus ponens gives us a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for the well formedness of (P^ Pj+iX These claims are comprehensible. The question now is "Are they adequate?" As they stand, they are not. The reason for this is that nothing has been said to assure us that our axioms regarding well formedness are consistent. To see this, consider the situation in which a phrase marker P| satisfies the structural description of transformations , only one of which need be obligatory. Suppose, for purposes of illustration, that (Q, Q.) is obligatory. Suppose further that Pi+i/Q & nP^/Q. Then, clearly, is both well formed and not well formed. Since this is a contradiction, any set axioms that allows this possibility is inconsistent and must be rejected. It might be thought that on our present interpretation Lakoff could be saved from inconsistency by adopting constraints on the class of allowable transformations. That is, it might be thought that we could constrain the class of transformations so that the possibility considered above could never arise* However, this is not the case. For consider what constraints would have to be imposed. To avoid contradiction we would have to demand that- every obligatory transformation Ô be such that, for all other transformations T', either the structural descriptions of Ô and T' are incompatible or the conditions imposed on the outputs of T and T' are identical. If a grammar didn't meet this demand, then for some obligatory and a pair of phrase markers Pj and Pj such that Pj/Q & Pj/Q, and Pj/Q & nPj/ Q. However, from this it would follow that (i.e. letting j = 1 + 1) is both well formed and not well formed. Further, on Lakoff's theory no amount of rule ordering can save us from this result. This is the ease since rule orderings are constraints defined on members of K whereas what we are worried about now is specifying the class of well formed pairs of phrase markers as a means of defining K itself. Finally, it is worth noting that the problem that Lakoff encounters here is independent of his misrepresentation of the nature of transformations. That
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is, if it is granted that transformations are binary relations in the restrictive sense defined above, then we could just as well take Lakoff as claiming that for each obligatory transformation T, there is a statement that (i) [Pjedomain of T => ( eT == is well formed)] and that for each optional transformation T' there is a statement that (j) [PjEdomain of T' => ( eT' ^ is well formed)]. (Where 'i' and 'j' range over numerical subscripts of phrase markers in derivations.) Then, to avoid contradiction, we would have to restrict the class of transformations in a grammar by demanding that every obligatory transformation T be such that for every other transformation T" and every phrase marker Pj, if P| 6 domain of both T and T", then for all Pj? € T iff 6 T". In practice what this restriction would amount to is the absurdly strong demand that the structural description of every obligatory transformation be incompatible with (not just distinct from) the structural description of every other transformation in the grammar. It would amount to this because otherwise, we would have to imagine two distinct transformations yielding identical outputs from the same input. Anyone familiar with the actual work of generative grammarians will recognize that none of the transformations that have been empirically motivated have this property.
V.
Having shown that both LakofFs characterization of transformations and his distinction between optional and obligatory rules are inadequate, I now turn to what he says about rule ordering. One of the facts that Postal takes to be central to Lakoff s characterization is that rule ordering constraints are to be represented in grammars by independent theoretical statements. Specifically, such statements are supposed to define well formedness conditions on members of K. About this, Lakoff says Rule orderings, for example, are given by global derivational constraints, since they specify where in a given derivation two local derivational constraints can hold relative to one another. Suppose define local derivational constraints. To say that is to state a global constraint of the form: (i) (i) [(Pi/Q & Pi+i/Q & Pj/Q & Pj-H/Q) ^ i < j] (Lakoff 1971, 234)
Adopting the characterization of transformations that I suggested earlier, we can take Lakoff as asserting that, if Tj and T2 are transformations, then the statement that T! is ordered before T2 imposes the following constraint on members of K: (i) (j) [«Pb Pi+^eT! & eT2) ^ i< j] (where T and *j' range over subscripts of phrase markers in a derivation)
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The intent of such constraints is to define a subset of K by eliminating all members of K that— intuitively—are produced by applying rules in the wrong order. There are two major points to notice regarding this proposal. First, if it is accepted, then there is every reason to believe that grammars will be allowed to vary in the extent to which they impose rule ordering—just as there is every reason to believe that grammars vary in the number of language particular transformations that they allow. Second, this characterization does not require that the ordering relation holding between transformations be transitive. In fact, it leads one to expect that it is not. This second point can be readily grasped by considering a grammar that contains three transformations—T, T*, and Ô Ö. Suppose further that the grammar orders Ô before T* and T* before ÔÖ. Given Lakoff's characterization of rule ordering, to say this is just to say that the grammar contains the following two derivational constraints. (19) (20)
(i) (j) [«Pi, P i+ i>eT & eT*) ï i< j] (i) (j) [«P,, Pi+1>eT* & eT#)^ i<j]
However, from (19) and (20) one cannot deduce (21).
(21)
(i)(j)[«P i ) P i + 1 >6T& P j + 1 >eT#)^i<j]
Suppose, for example, that W is a member of K which is such that for all in W, £T*. In a case like this it is not inconsistent to suppose both that (19) and (20) are true of W (by falsity of antecedent) and that for some Pj and Pj in W, eT and ET# and i>j. What this means is that according to Lakoff's characterization of rule ordering, the fact that T is ordered before T* and T* is ordered before Ôö does not guarantee that T is ordered before Ô ö ,11 Of course, it is open to Lakoff to accept (21) as a separate grammatical rule in the case just described. If he were to do so, then Ô, Ô* and ÔÖ would be linearly ordered in the usual sense. However, if it is the case that whenever grammars impose orderings, the orderings imposed are linear, then we want a theory that is not just compatible with this result, but which predicts it. Therefore, if we want to preserve the idea that all orderings are linear, we must reject Lakoff's characterization of such devices. This point can be brought out more clearly by comparing Lakoff's characterization of rule ordering with an alternative characterization which requires all rules that are ordered to be linearly ordered. According to this characterization, universal grammar contains a single rule ordering statement (22). 11
It doesn't even guarantee that Ô ö is not ordered before T.
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(22)
For every generative grammar G, (i) if T' and T" are transformations of G to which G assigns numerical subscripts m and n respectively (ii) and if m < n, then (iii) for all sequences of phrase markers W, (Pj.... Pn), such that We the class K defined by G, and for all Pj, Pj,eW ifeT'and (Pj, Pj+i^ € T", then W is a well formed derivation in G only if Pi precedes P} in W. I will use the following formula, considered as a part of universal grammar, as an abbreviation for this constraint. 22«. (m) (n) [m [(i) (j) [(eT'm & <Ñ^ P j+1 >eT"„)^i<)]]] (Where the variables 'i' and 'j* range over subscripts of phrase markers in derivations and the variables 'n' and 'm' range over subscripts of transformations in the grammar of a language.) Individual grammars can impose rule ordering constraints by assigning positive integers to transformations that need to be ordered. It is clear that this proposal requires rule orderings to be linear since the indices of transformations are drawn from a linearly ordered system—namely the sequence of natural numbers under successor. However, there are two important features of Lakoff's original proposal that are shared by this one. First, rule ordering constraints are global constraints defined on members of K (even though they are not language particular rules). Second, grammars may vary in the amount of rule ordering that they impose. In evaluating this characterization of rule ordering against Lakoffs, there is one important consideration to bear in mind. That is, whereas Lakoffs proposal is compatible with the possibility that all, some, or no transformational orderings are linear, the alternative just constructed is compatible only with the frirst of these three possibilities. Thus, the characterization that incorporates (22) is more restrictive than Lakoff's in that it makes a stronger prediction about the nature of natural languages. Unless there is empirical evidence that contradicts this prediction, Lakoffs characterization of rule ordering must be rejected in favour of the alternative just constructed. In light of this, it would be natural to expect Lakoff to attempt to provide some empirical justification for his proposal. However, not only does he make no such attempt, he seems not to be aware that any empirical justification is necessary. Rather, he seems to regard his characterization of rule ordering as uncontroversial. For example, he says that the framework that he constructs is one which "Most of the work in generative semantics since 1967 has assumed." (Lakoff 1971, 236). In addition, he says that if we restrict the theory that he presents by limiting "global derivational constraints to those which specify rule order" (and if we make certain other restrictions which are irrelevant to our
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discussion), then "The resulting restricted version of the basic theory is what Chomsky describes as a version of the standard theory." (ibid. 268). All of this suggests that Lakoff believes that his characterization of rule ordering captures assumptions that, in Postal's words, have "been implicitly part of transformational theory since the beginning." (Postal 1972, 140) However, since Lakoffs characterization of rule ordering can be accepted only if some grammars impose nonlinear orderings and since generative grammarians have traditionally assumed that all orderings are linear, it seems fair to conclude that neither Lakoff nor Postal is aware of the consequences of LakofPs proposal. Because of this and because no empirical evidence has been brought to bear against the methodologically superior proposal that employs (22), I will assume in what follows that all transformational orderings are linear.12 VI.
We are now in a position to define the notion of an obligatory transformation. To do this we must determine exactly what we take obligatory transformations to be. The standard intuitive characterization of these rules is that they are transformations that cannot be allowed not to apply. That is, they are rules that cannot be "passed over" in their turn in the ordering if their structural descriptions are met. This remark, though far from precise, tells us one very important thing—namely, that in the standard view the notion of an obligatory transformation is defined partly in terms of rule ordering considerations. Given this much, we can determine precisely which members of K violate the constraints defined by obligatory transformations. The offending derivations are those that contain a phrase marker Pj such that (i) PJ e domain of some obligatory transformation Tn (ii) .*T 0 (iii) -.3m[
6TJ m€Ô à =>|£À] r>n (í) (Ô) [Ô is unordered => £T]13 (Where the variables *n', 'm* and V range over numerical subscripts of transformations in a grammar, the variables Ô and ('f range over numerical subscripts of phrase markers in a derivation, and *T' ranges over transformations in a grammar). 12
Though I intend to leave open for the moment whether or not all grammars completely order their transformations. 13 To say that a transformation is unordered is to say that there are no constraints affecting when it can apply. This is reflected in our formalism by not assigning a numerical subscript to it.
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Intuitively, what these conditions state is that if a derivation D defined by a grammar G is such that (i)
It contains a phrase marker Pj that satisfies the structural description of some obligatory transformation Tn
(ii)
In constructing D, Tn did not apply to Pj
(iii)
Failure to apply Tn to Pj was not the result of the fact that Tn had not yet been reached in the ordering of transformations at the time that Pj was an available input to transformations
(iv)
Failure to apply Tn to Pj was not the result of the fact that Tn had already been passed in the ordering of transformations at the time that Pi was available, and
(v)
was not produced by a rule upon which no ordering constraints are stated,
then D is not a well formed derivation in G. The reason that these conditions are adequate to define the standard notion of an obligatory transformation is that to say that a derivation satisfies them (and hence is not well formed) is just to say that the derivation was produced by allowing an obligatory transformation to be passed over in its turn in the ordering even though its structural description was met. Finally, by collapsing these conditions we can formally define the notion of an obligatory transformation. Thus, a transformation Tn of a grammar G is obligatory in G iff G contains a constraint of the following form. (23)
(i) (m) [[ ö·¾Ë & (Ô) (Ô is unordered => ö Ô) m
& (r) (j) «P„ Pj+1>eTr => j > i)] => P^domain Tn] r>n Only those members of K that satisfy all constraints of the form (23) are well formed derivations in G. (Note, to say that a derivations W fails to satisfy (23) is logically equivalent to saying it satisfies conditions (i)-(v) above.) I claim that this characterization captures what we standardly take obligatory transformations to be. However, there is one caveat that must be added. Since the above characterization makes use of rule ordering considerations, the extent to which some subset of the rules of a grammar corresponds to what we standardly take obligatory transformations to be depends upon the extent to which the grammar orders its rules. There are three cases to consider. First, if a grammar orders all of its rules, then the obligatory transformations of that grammar will correspond perfectly with what we standardly take obligatory transformations to be. Second, if a grammar orders none of its rules, then, according to the characterization just given, it can have no obligatory transformations. Finally, if a grammar stands somewhere between these two extremes then (i) none of its unordered rules can be obligatory and (ii) the application of an unordered rule can keep
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an obligatory transformation from applying (if it destroys the relevant environment).14 Of course, for one who thinks that grammars can vary in the amount of rule ordering that they impose, considerations like these might lead one to try to define the notion of an obligatory transformation independently of rule ordering considerations. Two obvious ways of doing this would be to require (a) that every obligatory transformation apply to every phrase marker in a derivation that meets its structural description or (b) that if some phrase marker Pj in a derivation satisfies the structural description of an obligatory transformation T, then that derivation must also contain some PJ^J such that
VII. In this paper I have attempted to clarify the nature of a number of key grammatical notions, to construct proposals for formalizing these notions, and 14
There are several possibilities regarding unordered rules. The reason for my condition (v) is to permit, as well formed, derivations which are such that, for some obligatory Tn and phrase marker Pj meeting its structural description, there is an unordered transformation that applies to Pj, prior to the time in the ordering at which Tn has a chance to apply. It may also be worth noting that by complicating my conditions one could retain this feature of my characterizations while stipulating that no unordered rule could keep an obligatory rule from operating by applying at the time at which the obligatory transformation is applicable. Assuming that there are unordered rules the decision of whether or not to accept conditions like these is purely empirical. 15 For example, the claim that all grammars impose maximal rule ordering.
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to spell out the empirical consequences of accepting one or another of these proposals. In addition, I have tried to explicate and criticize Lakoff 's abstract characterization of grammars. However, there are two questions regarding this characterization that remain. First, considerations of transitivity aside, is it the case that LakofPs treatment of rule ordering "has been implicitly part of transformational theory since the beginning"? (Postal 1972, 140). Second, is there any reason to accept a theory in which the justification of rule ordering constraints in a grammar is fully on a par with the justification of language particular transformations ? It seems to me that the answer to both of these questions is 'no'. This follows from what is probably the most significant feature of LakofPs treatment of rule ordering — namely, the claim that grammars can vary in the amount of rule ordering that they employ.16 Only if this claim is accepted can one maintain 16
The fact that Lakoff regards rule ordering constraints as global constraints defined on members of K is of no theoretical consequence since we can define an equivalent theory that lacks this feature. For example, consider the following: (Recall that in this discussion we are following Lakoff in ignoring the principle of the cycle.) (I) Let the transformations in a grammar be given by means of an ordered list T lt T2, T3 . . . Tn. Further, let each transformation be marked either "obligatory" or "optional." (II) Let the notion of a derivation be defined as a finite sequence of phrase markers in which each is well formed. (III) Then for all sequences W, is well formed in W iff (a) P| = PI ; PI is generated by the base component; and 3 n [eTn & (m) [Tm is optional í P{£ domain of Tm]] m <=Tn & (r) f3m
(g) [# Trl & 00
3
k<m in any sequence is well formed iff (a) Pj is generated by the base. (b) P2 is produced from Pj by applying some transformation T. (c) In arriving at T in the ordering no obligatory transformation whose structural description is met is allowed not to apply. (iii) A pair of phrase markers that is non-initial in a derivation is well formed iff (a) P|+i is produced from Pj by applying a transformation T. (b) T has not been previously reached in the ordering. (c) All transformations ordered before T have either already been passed in the ordering, are optional — and hence can be allowed not to apply — or are not applicable to Pj because their structural descriptions are not met.
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that rule ordering constraints are no more freely available than language particular transformations. Suppose, for example, that in order to account for some phenomena of a particular language we have to choose between postulating a new language particular transformation and ordering two independently motivated transformations. What sort of theoretical considerations are relevant to making this decision? If one's theory of grammar does not require that all grammatical transformations be ordered, then it might be plausible to suppose that there are no theoretical grounds for selecting one alternative over the other. That is, it might be plausible to suppose that rule orderings don't come any more freely than do language particular transformations. If, on the other hand, one's theory of grammar requires that every transformation be ordered with respect to every other transformation, then, since the two independently motivated transformations would have to be ordered with respect to each other anyway, selection of the rule ordering solution would be preferred because it gives us a chance to save ourselves the postulation of an extra grammatical device. From this result two conclusions immediately follow. First, any reason to accept a theory in which rule ordering constraints are no more freely available than language particular transformations must also be a reason to reject the claim that all grammars impose maximal rule ordering. Second, the extent to which rule orderings have traditionally been considered to be more freely available than language particular transformations gives us some reason to think that LakofFs treatment of rule ordering has not "been implicitly part of transformational theory since the beginning" (Postal (1972) 140)—a conclusion that seems obvious anyway from an examination of much of the work of generative grammarians. Finally, we must decide whether or not to accept a theory that allows grammars to vary in the amount of rule ordering that they employ. Clearly, there is at least one good reason not to do so—namely, to adopt such a theory is to expand the class of possible grammars.17 What this means is that instead of being a proposal for which there is a priori justification, the claim that grammars can vary in the amount of rule ordering that they impose is, from an a priori point of view, inferior to the standard account. Of course, factual considerations might ultimately force us to this less restrictive position. However, in order to determine whether or not they do, it is necessary first, to distinguish methodological consi17
My argument assumes that any adequate linguistic theory will allow grammars to order at least some of their rules. If this assuption is accepted, then any constraint on rule ordering that is common to all languages further restricts the class of possible grammars. The requirement that all grammars impose maximal ordering is an obvious choice for such a constraint. Of course, the assumption that adequate linguistic theory will allow grammars to order at least some of their rules is an empirical hypothesis which itself needs justification. However, if it is rejected, then Postal's claim that there is no asymmetry between the availability of rule ordering constraints and other grammatical apparatus is automatically false. It is false because to reject such an assumption is just to say that rule ordering constraints are not available at all.
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derations (like restricting or expanding the class of possible grammars) from empirical considerations and second, to evaluate alternative formal characterizations in terms of both their restrictiveness and their empirical adequacy. A persistent problem with LakofFs theoretical discussions is that these tasks are not adequately performed. With respect to rule ordering, the result is that the issue of restrictiveness is ignored. Hence, the need to empirically justify the claim that grammars vary in the amount of rule ordering that they impose is not recognized. However, once formal, methodological and empirical concerns are distinguished, this oversight can be corrected, and the nature of different hypotheses can be clearly recognized.
References CHOMSKY, N. (1961), On the notion "rule of grammar.*' pp. 119—136 in: Fodor, J.A. and J.J. Katz (Eds.), The Structure of Language, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall CHOMSKY, N. (1967), The formal nature of language, pp. 397—442 in: Lenneberg, E.H. Biological Foundations of Language, appendix, New York, N.Y.: John Wiley CHOMSKY, N. (1971), Deep structure, surface structure, and semantic interpretation, pp. 183—216 in: Jakobovits, L. A. and D. D. Steinberg (Eds.), Semantics, Cambridge, Engl.: The University Press CHOMSKY, N. (1972), Some empirical issues in the theory of transformational grammar, pp. 63—130 in: Peters, S. (Ed.), Goals of Linguistic Theory, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall EMMONDS, J. (1969), Root and structure preserving transformations. Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT LAKOFF, G. (1971), On generative semantics, pp. 232—296 in: Jakobovits, L. A. and D.D. Steinberg (Eds.), Semantics, Cambridge, Engl.: The University Press POSTAL, P. (1972), The best theory, pp. 131—170 in: Peters, S. (Ed.), Goals of Linguistic Theory, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall
DOV M. GABBAY AND J. M. E. MORAVCSIK
BRANCHING QUANTIFIERS, ENGLISH, AND MONTAGUE-GRAMMAR
In this paper we distinguish branching quantifier constructions from linear ones, and illustrate these in English. We then call attention to the interesting properties of systems that include branching quantifiers, and raise the issue of what their inclusion would show for English. In part I we show certain correlations between grammatic and logical order within different syntactic constructions, and show also the syntactic devices in English that allow us to build branching quantifier-constructions of a wide variety. In part II we illustrate how a Montague-type grammar can accommodate branching quantifiers. In doing this we use a simplified version of Montague-grammar for the sake of facilitating exposition. Our work shows that Montague-semantics is stronger than the semantics for the 1st order predicate calculus.
This paper is an attempt to shed some light on quantificational structures in English. As such, it is a part of a larger enterprise, namely, that of presenting a rigorous semantics and syntax for certain important parts of English. Some parts of this enterprise appeared already (see Gabbay 1973, Gabbay and Moravcsik 1973, and Gabbay forthcoming). Below we shall present a brief sketch of the general project. Our aim is to link an empirically motivated rigorous syntax to a modeltheoretic semantics so as to capture what is involved in the understanding of a natural language like English. We assume that the syntax and semantics of English can be represented in a formal way. This amounts to the assumption that the class of wellformed sentences of English, together with their interpretations, can be generated by a set of rules. We do not feel that well known facts such as that grammatically is a matter of degrees, that some terms in natural languages are vague, and that some limits of what certains terms in natural languages denote can be understood only against certain background assumptions, create unsurmountable obstacles for our project. Arguments like the ones in Ryle (1957) against the possibility of projects like ours do not seem to us convincing.
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Essential to our work is the assumption that the notions of truth and denotation are fundamental to the understanding of the semantics of a natural language. We do not claim that no other notions are needed for a full theory of meaning; nor do we claim that there ar no other dimensions of understanding in addition to the dimension of veracity. But we expect that other aspects of meaning will turn out to be additions, and that their full understanding presupposes an explicit semantics in terms of satisfaction relations, such as the one we are trying to formulate. There are further arguments in support of the claim that the notion of truth and reference are fundamental for the semantics of natural languages in Moravcsik (1972). To be more specific, the grammars that we envisage are context-free phrase structure grammars with transformations, while the semantics that we wish to attach to such a syntax is a set-theoretic semantics, that assigns to each non-syncategorematic term a set-theoretic entity as the semantic object representing the denotation of that term. Ideally, these assignments should be governed by the following conditions, i) Terms that would be normally interpreted as having different extensions should have different semantic objects assigned to them, ii) Terms belonging to the same syntactic category should have the same type of semantic object assigned to them, iii) Different syntactic categories should have different types of semantic objects associated with them, iv) Since we deal with natural languages, the construction of the syntactic categories should depend partly on empirical arguments independent of semantic considerations. Our project has its origins in a similar project that was left unfinished by the late Professor Montague (See Montague 1970 and 1973). Montague's work incorporated some, but not all, of the conditions enumerated above. Our work is both an extension and a modification of Montague's work, in ways that are indicated separately in the various parts of our project. In view of some of the work done on the formal structures of the grammars of natural languages—due mostly to Chomsky—-we are in a position today to formulate and partially answer certain clearly formulated questions regarding the complexity of the mind, or machine, that is required to interpret natural languages. As of now, no analogous question can be formulated with regard to the semantic component. Hopefully, work such as ours will lead to a change in this, undesirable, situation.
I. BRANCHING CONSTRUCTIONS AND ENGLISH SYNTAX We shall assume the usual treatment of existential and universal quantifiers, as presented in modern symbolic logic. In recent years there have been attempts to relate this treatment to quantificational structures in English. These attempts, however, have been restricted to structures in which within the sequence of
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quantifiers each quantifier depends for its interpretation on its predecessor. In other words, in these structures we find a linear dependency among the quantifiers. E.g., in the much used example: (1)
Every man loves some woman
the interpretation of the second quantified noun phrase depends on the first one. There is no non-arbitrary restriction on the number of quantifiers that can occur in a linear sequence of this sort within a sentence of English. E.g., in: (2)
Every man loves some woman some time
we have a sequence with three quantified phrases, and it is easy to imagine the addition of further—dependent—modifiers containing quantifiers. The attempts to account for these structures have focused so far mostly on the kinds and number of ambiguities that the relevant English sentences exhibit, and the investigation of how the syntactic analysis of these sentences can be related to the structure demanded by logical analysis. Montague 1973 contains, in addition, also a set-theoretic semantic for such sentences. Logicians have considered for some time configurations other than the linearly dependent ones in quantificational logic. One can construct configurations within which the linear dependency breaks, and thus branches of dependent quantifiers arise. But it is only in recent work by Hintikka (forthcoming) that attention has been called to the existence of such structures in English. E.g., in contrast with (l)and(2): (3)
All products of some subdivisions of every Japanese company, and all products of some subdivisions of every Korean company are shipped to the U.S.A. on the same boat
contains two sequences of quantified phrases, linked by a conjunction, such that though within each sequence there is linear dependency, the two sequences themselves are not connected by such a dependency. Nevertheless, the two sequences are tied to the phrase 'are shipped to the U.S.A. on the same boat'; this phrase functions as a logical predicate. Thus (3)—-unlike (1) and (2)—exemplifies the structure of branching quantifiers in English. These structures are of interest by themselves. E.g., it is not clear that various proposals within the framework of generative grammars—such as generative semantics and Chomsky's extended standard theory—-are equally adequate in representing the syntax of these structures. Furthermore, the representation of the semantics presents an interesting challenge. There are, however, other issues of theoretical interest that rest partly on the analysis of these structures. It has been shown by logicians that the class of logical
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truths that contains all of the constructions involving branching quantifiers is not recursively enumerable, and is equivalent to some fragment of second order logic. (For references, see Hintikka [forthcoming] and Enderton 1970). In view of these considerations, our work is an attempt to shed light on the following questions: (a) (b)
(c)
Can a Montague-grammar handle branching quantifiers? Does the existence and adequate treatment of branching quantifiers in English show anything about the need to go beyond 1st order predicate calculus to present an adequate semantics for English? Does the investigation of these phenomena give support to the claim that the class of analytic sentences in English is not recursively enumerable? [I.e., if English includes all logical truth expressible by branching quantifiers, and that set is not r.e.].
If the answer to the third question is affirmative, and we assume that there is an effective procedure for generating all and only the grammatically wellformed sentences of a natural language, then we will be able to establish an interesting asymmetry between the semantic and syntactic components, namely the set of valid sentences is not r.e. while the set of well-formed sentences is recursive. Before we proceed to deal with these issues, let us consider the order of occurrences of quantified phrases in various types of English sentences and the ordering of quantifiers required by the corresponding paraphrases in any standard logical analysis. Even a cursory look at (3) shows discrepancies. The logical paraphrase would start: "for every Japanese company there are some subdivisions such that...", in short, the quantifiers would occur in the REVERSE order from the order in which the quantified phrases in (3) occur. Thus we should look for some regularities relating logical and grammatical orderings. An alternative to this would be to start with a structure in which the quantifiers occur as required by any reasonable interpretation in 1st order predicate calculus, and assuming this to be "deep structure", proceed to construct a derivation via transformations that arrives eventually at the English sentences. However, there seems to be no empirical syntactic motivation for this, and it is not clear to what extent the types of transformations needed would obey a suitable set of constraints. Sequences of quantified phrases in English can be constructed via the following syntactic patterns: i) ii) iii) iv)
with prepositional phrases (such as in [3]) within subject-verb-object sequences (with modifiers, such as in [2]) with relative clauses with embedded structures (e.g. sentences containing 'believes that') We shall try to show that there are regularities of interpretation linked to
these four classes.
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In the case of structures like (3) the logical predicate linking the branches— 'are shipped to the USA on the same boat'—is dyadic. The variables linked to it in logical paraphrase will be the ones tied to the quantifiers appearing last in the branches. I.e. "for every χ s.t. χ is Japanese company, there are somej s.t. j is subdivision of x, and every ^ s.t. ... and for all u (Korean company) v (subdivision) and #> (product) % and w are shipped...". We shall see later that more complex branching can also be expressed in English. While the respective products make up the classes to which the predicate in (3) applies and thus occupy the last place in the logical sequences of quantifiers, they occupy the initial positions in the sequences as expressed by the grammatical construction of English. This suggests the hypothesis that when we deal with sequences of quantifiers that are constructed out of prepositional phrases, the grammatical order is the reverse of the logical order. As the examples below indicate, this hypothesis seems to work for the prepositions OP, 'to', 'in' (and other locationals), and 'for'. (4) (5) (6)
Some gift to every girl and some gift to every boy are bought by the same Santa Claus Every deer in some forest and every moose in some meadow drink from the same brook Every sacrifice for some good cause and every prayer for some blessing please the gods equally
The same point is illustrated by sentences in which different prepositions are combined such as: (7) Some entrances to every freeway to some city of every country are badly constructed Though this does not involve branching, the same point is exemplified; the logical order will start with the last quantified phrase ('every country') and work in reverse order, ending with 'some entrances' which is linked to the predicate. The hypothesis stands up, even though in this project we do not distinguish between different senses of the prepositions; such as the Of of possession, origin, and object (the portrait of David), as well as the 'to' of direction in contrast with the true dative ('he gave it to me'), and the 'for' of purpose as distinct from the 'for' in 'doing something for someone'. One class of exceptions to our hypothesis will be the pseudo-prepositionals; prepositional phrases that function, semantically at least, not as relational phrases. (8)
In one such type of case, the phrase functions adjectivally; e.g.: Every man of some intelligence (with some sense?) smokes cigars.
In another type of case, the preposition links events with their aspects, and thus denotes once more not a genuine relation. E.g.: (8 a) Some aspects of recent linguistic studies and some aspects of recent logical studies are equally depressing.
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The other exception is the preposition 'with' and its relatives; and as of now we have no explanation for this phenomenon. But the point becomes clear from such examples as (9) Every man without some woman is like every ship without some sail (10) Every man with a large income and every woman with a large appetite suit each other In sentences like these, the logical order and the grammatical order coincide, and the dyadic predicate does not apply to the variables bound by the last quantifiers in the sequences. The same coincidence of logical and grammatical order can be seen in sentences with subject-verb-object structure, such as: (11) Every farmer has some sons and every banker has some daughters who belong to the same club But in the case of this syntactic configuration the dyadic predicate is applied to the variables bound by the last quantified phrases in the logical and grammatical order, i.e., those denoting the sons and daughters respectively. Sentences of this structure admit ambiguities, and thus we cannot assume that all readings of all such sentences will preserve the coincidence of grammatical and logical order. Let us now consider the third type of construction mentioned initially namely relative clauses. Sentences of the following sort are illustrative: (12) Some truths that were rejected by every ancient sage in some civilization and some falsehoods that are accepted by every modern scientist in some country resemble each other The main predicate 'resemble each other' applies clearly to the truths and falsehoods. These are clearly not the things bound by the logically last quantifiers in the sequences. Within the relative clauses, however, the regularities observed so far apply. This shows that we have to determine the logical sequences within each relative clause first, and then attach the whole clause as a complex predicate to the head NP's; the main predicate of the sentence then applies to these. There are sentences where a predicate applies both to something within the clause and outside, such as: (13) Some men who pursue every woman are rejected by them In these cases the same considerations apply as to constructions built around 'with'. (14)
Similar considerations apply to clauses built with 'where' such as: Every place where some lawyers lived and every house where some doctors lived comes under the same zoning law
The specificity-quantifiers of English, such as 'a certain', always come first in logical order, and this rule is prior to all other regularities mentioned here.
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Finally, we turn to embedded sentences. One type of construction is exemplified by sentences with 'believe' as the main verb; e.g. (15) Some men believe that every woman hates them This sentence shows that there can be co-reference between noun-phrases and pronouns across the embedding construction. Needless to say, we can also have branching constructions in which one branch is also outside the belief-context, e.g. (15 a) Some men of some countries believe that they resemble some animals of every species. But note the impossibility of a branching construction in which the branches would be held together by a predicate denoted by the verb which creates the embedding construction. . (15c) Some χ and allj such that ... and some % and all TV such that ... andj believes that w. Let us now review the whole range of syntactic devices that allow us to express a wide variety of branching configurations. So far we dealt only with cases where distinct branches are held together by a predicate. But there are cases in which the branches are preceded by a common node, as in: (16)
Men who make a deal with a certain chisler and women who keep company with him deserve the same fate.
Here the expression referring to the chisler picks out an element that is necessary for the interpretation of both branches, giving us the structure: There is a chisler s.t.
/*
men who...
Vs
*
deserve the same fate
women who... Little reflection on (16) shows that one should be able to attach such an expression, thus forming the diamond-like structure, in front of any arbitrary number of quantified phrases and with any number of branches; the guarantee comes from the fact that these structures are equivalent to very complex relative clauses, as the schematic representation above indicates. Furthermore, these same syntactic devices make it possible to add one diamond-like structure after another; e.g. to go on with (16) in some such form as: - some angels of all religions . deserve the same fate s.t.
equally abhor some devils of all superstitions '
Further complexities of this sort are also expressible in English. Another relevant question is: how many branches can we have? The answer is: any number of these; one can link them with conjunctions, and predicates like the one in (11) can apply to any number of branches. 10 TLIl/2
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Still another dimension of complexity is revealed when we see that the main predicate can apply to more than one class denoted within any one of the branches. E.g., (17)
Some lie of every politician and some weakness of every voter make the voters hate the politicians
Here all four NP's are tied to the main predicate; and further complexity in this dimension (involving more quantified NP's) is imaginable. Examples used in logic textbooks usually treat only verbs that function as monadic or dyadic predicates in English. But the syntactic device of adding cases via prepositional phrases shows that verbs can function as predicates with a much larger number of elements related. E.g., consider the schema: χ brings j with ^ to w in ν for u. We already saw above that more complex verb phrases can apply to any arbitrary finite number of elements. Furthermore, grammatically as well as semantically, prepositional phrases such as 'to Mars', eto London', 'to California' have common structure that must be brought out by analyzing them into further constituents. Thus the treatment of prepositional phrases as adverbial operators is necessities. We therefore give in §2 a simplified account of Montague grammar. In unsatisfactory, since under such treatment (an extra primitive for each phrase) we would lose internal structure and thus miss important generalizations. Thus we have shown how one can build up in English sentences with any number of branches, and predicates tying the branches together, applying to any finite number of variables, and how the language allows us to form the diamondtype branching, with relative clauses. Can we form branches with arbitrary length? Again, there is a syntactic device that guarantees this. For some prepositions, such as Of* allow of an arbitrary number of iterations. Thus we can always form branches of the form: "Quantified NP of quantified NP of..." of arbitrary length. In this section we illustrated a number of regularities linking the order of quantifiers within standard logical paraphrases and the order of quantified noun phrases in a variety of English syntactic constructions. We also indicated several syntactic devices of English that allow the construction of branching structures with arbitrary number of branches, with arbitrary number of NP's within any of the branches, and with predicates that can apply to an arbitrary number of elements. We also illustrated diamond-like structures of arbitrary complexity, and sentences in which the common main predicate is applied to more than one quantified NP's from each branch. The regularities and the variety of sentences expressible in English indicate the extent to which branching structures are part of a natural language like English. This sets the background for the development of the rigorous semantics.
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II. BRANCHING QUANTIFIERS AND MONTAGUE SEMANTICS
§1.
Introduction
Montague (1973) presented a grammar and a semantical interpretation for a certain fragment of English. The fragment is small, but "accomodates all of the more puzzling cases of quantification and reference" known to him. In part I we have shown that branching quantifiers behave according to certain rules. We now show that branching quantifiers can be expressed in Montague grammar and the respective semantics is correct for them. Thus the system of Montague (1973) allows for the construction of sentences with branching quantification. Our plan is as follows. In §2 we give an introduction to Montague type semantics. As explained in Gabbay (1973), Montague's paper (1973) is extremely elegant and some of its features are only technical options and not conceptual necessities. We therefore give in §2 a simplified account of Montague grammar. In § 3 we show how the simplified grammar of § 2 can accomodate branching quantification'and in §4 we show how Montague grammar (1973) accomodates branching quantification. §2.
Simplified Montague Semantics
Let us begin with a certain fragment of English. For example the fragment containing words like John, Mary, run, fall, and sentences like ''John runs', 'Mary kills John''. Our first step is to divide the words into categories, e.g., in this case into the four categories: NP (containing John), IV (containing run), TV (containing kill), S (containing 'John runs'). We supply rules that allow us to construct the sentences we have in mind. E.g., in our case. (Rl) S-+NP + IV, or in diagram:
(R2) IV-+TV + NP, or in diagram:
10*
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(The choice of rules and categories depends on what tasks we set for ourselves; which sentences do we want to construct? What ambiguities do we want to account for? Can we give a simple semantics for this grammar? etc.) Given a grammar, that is, given a set of categories and rules of construction, we can supply this grammar with a semantics. A semantics consists of the following. (a) With each properly constructed phrase ÷ of the language we associate a semantical object ||x||. Phrases belonging to the same category obtain the same kind of semantical object. (b) With each rule R we associate a semantical rule SR. If the rule R allows you to construct phrase z from phrases ×÷,..., x„ (e.g., S—»NP + IV) then SR tells you how to construct ||z || from ||x! ||,..., ||xn ||. These assignments must be natural. That is the semantics keeps close to the meaning of the English phrases and reflects correctly conditions of truth, makes distinctions in case English makes them, etc. As an example let us construct a semantics for the fragment given above. We start with a set of object õ (cao be thought e.g., as a set of people, etc.). NP's get elements of the set, e.g. \Jobn \ å õ. IV's get subsets of õ, e.g. || run || £ õ (intuitively, the set of those who run). TV's get binary relations on õ, (e.g., || kz//\\ c: õ ÷õ (i.e., a list of who kills whom). Sentences get truth values (true or false). We now have to specify the rules SRI, SR2. SRI tells you to check for, given ÷ å ÍÑ and y å IV, whether the element ||x|| belongs to the set ||y||, and gives a truth value. So: \Jobn run || is true if \John || å || run ||, i.e., the element associated with John is in the set ||nwr||, (those who run). The rule SR2 says: Take the relation ||TV|| and construct all those elements that are related to the ||NP||, e.g., ||kill Mary || is obtained from \\kill\\ and ||^irfry|| by collecting all those elements that the relation ||&//|| relates to the object (|Ë/ÁÃ÷:||·. Thus \\ki// Mary\\ is the set of all those who kill Mary. Thus semantics for the above grammar are obtained by taking sets õ and assignments || ||. There are many possible semantical interpretations. The nature of the interpretation depends on the richness of the fragment, the rules and categories chosen, the various distinctions required etc. We give two examples: 1. A fragment containing the verb seek cannot be handled like we handled kill, because you kill objects of the universe but you may seek non-existent objects. 2. But even without new kinds of words, how about adding the simple rule: (R3) NP-*NP + NP (i. e., we want to construct John loves John (and) Mary). What will be || NP + NP || (i. e., \John (and) Mary\)t. John (and) Mary is a member of NP and therefore must be assigned the same type of element as 'John\ A simple way out is to assign to NP's
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finite subsets of õ. So |[/0/&/?|| = set containing one element (John himself). \John (and) Mary\ is the set containing 2 elements. If x,y are NP's and z = x+y then || æ || = || ÷ || u || y || . SR3 tells you to take union. All the other rules remain the same except that we replace õ by \\ = set of all finite subsets of õ. If you look at the fragment and rules of Montague (1973), you will begin to see why the semantics of Montague (1973) is complicated. We now describe how we can introduce quantifiers in the language. Let us, for simplicity, confine ourselves to the fragment with rules Rl, R2, and categories NP, IV, TV. First we add to the category NP, the variable names he^ he2, he^ We can now form phrases that depend on unspecified names. E.g., kill he (or kill him}. We don't know who him is; for different choices of be we get different sentences. We also introduce common nouns like women , men. This is a new category CN. The semantical objects for them are subsets of õ \\wen\\ £Î õ (i.e., the set of all men) etc. We add the category Q of quantifiers containing every and some and add the rule NP—»Q + CN. Now we can form: Every man runs or every man kills some woman or he kills every man or he kills her·, etc. This is a very simple fragment. However, we need one more rule to allow us to express branching quantification ! Luckily this rule was introduced by Montague to treat relative clauses. Recall that we can construct sentences with variables in them, like he runs. We indicate that a sentence S contains a variable name he by writing S (he) (a sentence with he). We want to allow the construction of CN from CN + S (he) by the use of such that., e.g., man such that he runs. We can therefore form "every woman kills some man such that he (the man) runs" . In the next section, let us present this grammar formally and show how it can accomodate branching quantifiers. §3 1.
A Grammar For Branching Quantifiers 1 We have the following basic categories : NP (noun phrases). Contains two sets of basic phrases. N! = {John, Mary, etc.} and N2 — {x,y,z, ^i, he2, she-ij she2, etc.} This is the set of name variables. Besides these basic NP's we can construct more using the rules below. Morphology is neglected, i.e., run—* runs, love—»loves, he—»him, she—»Her, he—»she. In our examples we use the correct English form only for reasons of style. It doesn't affect the representation of branching quantifiers.
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2.
IV (basic ones are for example run, walk).
3.
TV (basic ones are e. g., love, ki/J).
4.
Q (contains every and some).
5.
CN (basic common nouns are man, woman, sheep, etc.) We now define some derived categories and give some rules of grammar. To do this we shall simultaneously define, for any phrase P of any category the notion: "The name variable ÷ appears free in P". We denote this by writing P(x). The following are the clauses defining the rules and the notion.
6.
If Ñ is a basic element of any category (see (1) — (5) for a list of basic elements, such as run, kill, etc.), then ÷ is free in Ñ if Ρ is ÷ itself (as a name in NP).
7.
Æ is an element of the category S of sentences if it is of the form X+Y where X is an NP and Υ is an IV (i.e., the rule S—»NP + IV). A variable name ÷ is free in Æ if ÷ is free in either X or Y.
8.
Ζ is in IV if Z*=X+ Υ with X in TV and Υ in NP. A variable name is free in Æ if it is free in either Xot Υ (i.e., the rule IV—»TV+NP).
9.
Ζ is in NP if Ζ — X+ Υ and X is in Q and Υ is in CN. A variable name is free in Ζ if it is free in either X or Y.
10.
If X is in CN and F(x) is in IV with ÷ free in Y and not appearing in X then the following phrase Æ is in CN. Z= X such that Y(hen), where ben is the first new name variable of this type not appearing in X or Y. u is a free variable of Z if u? 6 x, u ^ hen and u is free in Xot in Y.
11.
If F(x) is in S with ÷ free and X is in NP then the following Æ is in S : (a) If X is a variable name u then take Z(u) to be Y(u) and a variable v is free in Z iff v = u or í φ ÷ but í is free in Y. (b) If X is not a name variable then Æ is obtained by replacing in K(x) the first occurence of ÷ by ¢" and every other occurence of ÷ by ben (or optionally shen depending on gender), where hen is the first name of this form not occurring
Using the notion of construction tree, Montague (1970, 1973), we can give some examples. Near the node of the tree we indicate the free variables of the phrase of that node and the rule (if in doubt) used to construct it.
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every man loves some woman
(18)
every man
every
loves some woman
some woman
man some
woman
Meaning: For every man there is a woman (depending on the man) whom the man loves. every man loves some woman
every man loves ÷
every
man
love
÷
Meaning: There is some woman such that every man-loves her. (The woman is the same for all men.)
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(20)2 Every man loves some woman that shej kills every sheep that he, runs. every man loves some woman such that she, kills every sheep that hex runs love some woman such that she, kills every sheep that he é runs some woman such that shei kills every sheep that he, runs woman such that shei kills every sheep that he, runs y kills every sheep that hei runs v kills
every sheep that hej runs v every
sheep such that he} runs sheep that he é runs
The meaning is that the woman depends on the man (i.e., for every man ÷ there is a woman w = w(x) such that w(x) kills every sheep that ÷ runs).
2
We are not concerned with the deletions that take us from the sentence of this example to the fine surface form.
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(Branching quantification): Every man loves some woman (and) every sheep befriends some girl that belongs to the same club (i.e., the woman and the girl). Z(every man, every sheep)
every sheep
Z (every man, u) Z(x, u) = some woman such that ÷ loves she é belongs to the same club as some girl such that u befriends she2
belong to the same club as some girl such that u befriends she2
some woman such that ÷ loves shei woman such that ÷ loves shei
some
woman
÷ loves y
ftat u befriends she2
girl such that u befriends she2
u befriends í
Once we know how to express branching like (21), we can also express branching like (16) in part I. Simply form a statement Z(u) where u is a name variable (i.e., u replaces the "chiseler") and now quantify over the Uj. Clearly any kind of lattice can be created in this way. (We regard "belong to the same club (as)" as one unit here. We abbreviate it by "belong-". In the top nodes (with Z(x,u)) we used rule 11.) The semantics will show that the meaning of the quantifiers is branching.
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Now suppose we look at the sentence "every man loves some woman and every sheep befriends some girl that belongs to the same club owned by the man". This sentence has the same tree as in (21) except that the node "belong-" should be replaced by the node "belong to the same club owned by x". This phrase has to be constructed separately (i.e., the node is really replaced by a branch constructing the above). This shows we can express branching quantification where the main verb depends on more than the last of the branching quantifiers. We now turn to the semantics for the grammar of this section. Since our fragment is smaller than Montague's (not including intensional objects), our semantics is less complicated in the sense that the semantical objects associated with elements of the basic categories need not be sets of too high a type. As we remarked in section 2, the natural simple semantics of §2 has to be changed a little to accomodate various technical difficulties. So in order to make the present semantics more transparent, we use the original semantics as our starting point. Let H be a function assigning semantical objects to the elements of the categories, //is defined as follows: Let õ be a set (our universe of object). Let Η (÷) åõ, for any name variable ÷ (by name variable we mean variable for names). Let //(ç) å õ for any basic name such as John or Mary. Let //(ç) £Î õ, for any basic IV such as run or basic CN such as man. Let //(ç) £Î õ2 for any basic TV such as love. Given such an assignment Η we define our semantical interpretation. We define a semantical object || Ρ ||H associated with any phrase Ρ of any category, constructive in the language. The definition is given by induction. || \\H is defined first for the basic elements of the categories and then with each syntactical rule of grammar that allows us to obtain new phrases from old. We associate a semantical rule that allows us to obtain the sematical object associated with the newly constructed phrase. The numbers here follow the numbers of the definition of the grammar. (51)
If ç is a basic NP then ||n||H = the function f such that for any subset A £ õ, f(A) is a truth value and f(A) = true exactly when //(ç) å A.
(52)
If ç is a basic IV then ||n ||H = //(n).
(53)
If ç is a basic TV then || ç ||H is the function f such that for any function F (giving truth values to subset of õ), yields the set f(F) = {a å õ|F({b å õ| (a,b) å //(ç)}) = true}.
(54)
.1140/0* ||j? == the function that associates with every subset AS õ the function fA on subsets of õ with ,the property that fA(B) = true exactly when Á ç  φ Ï \every \\Η = the function that associates with every subset Á £Î l) the function GA such that for any B £ õ, GA(B) = true iff  2 ¢.
(55)
If ç is a basic CN, then || n ||H = //(n).
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To continue we need a definition. For a name variable x, let Η = ΚΗ* if Hl is like //except possibly for giving a different value on x, i.e., Vy(y Φ x—»//(y) = (S7-S9) Each of the rules (7-9) has the form Z= X+ Y, where Ζ is the new phrase obtained from X and Y. The corresponding semantical rules say \\Z\\jj — = É|^||Ç(||*º|Á)> i- e -> aPpty tne semantical function ||.ËÃ||Ç to the argument imiHandthevalueis||Z||H. (S10) If 7= A'such that 7(x) then ||Z[|H = || AT||Hn {a å õ | || r(x)||fli = /r«*, where (Sll) If Æ is obtained by applying the rule 11 to the NP X and sentence F( then || Z\\H = || *||H({a| II ^W II*1 = /^ where //* = x// and #*(x) = a}). Lemma 1 : Let P(XI , . . . , x,,) be a phrase with the only free name variables x t , . . ., x„. Let //, T/1 be two semantic functions that agree on x lr . . ., x,, and all the basic phrases appearing in P (such as run, kill, etc.) then ||Ñ||Ç^ Il-Plta 1 · Proof: clear, by induction. Lemma 2. Let Ρ be a phrase not containing the free name variable u, then no existential quantifier in Ρ can be dependent on u. Proof: Follows from Lemma 1, since by changing the value //, assigns to u || Ρ ||H does not change. Corollary. The quantifier of the tree (21) is branching since "some girl" does not depend on "man" and "some woman" does not depend on "sheep". They are both constructed as different phrases (with variables x, u) in different parts of the tree. (22)
(Branching Quantifier) : Every son of some king and every daughter of some queen are friends. First construct : then construct : now construct : now construct : and you can now and finally :
y is son of x u is daughter of í man such that he is son of x woman such that she is daughter of í every woman such that she is daughter of í every man such that he is son of x. S(x, v) = every woman such »that she is daughter of í and every man such that he is son of x are friends say : S (some king, v) S(some king, some queen)
assuming that every king is a man and every queen is a woman. Also note that we are not concerned with rules yielding the final surface form.
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4 BRANCHING QUANTIFIER IN MONTAGUE (1973) Our grammar of §3 is a subgrammar of Montague (1973) and therefore this system can express branching quantification. The reader should note that we did not give a rigorous proof that every sentence with branching quantifiers can be expressed in our grammar. We simply gave several examples to convince the reader that this can be done. §5 DEGREE OF COMPLEXITY OF THE MONTAGUE LANGUAGE The language with branching quantification is stronger than the 1st order predicate calculus. In fact (due to F. Galvin) there exists a sentence of the form (23)
Vx3y| > A(x,y,u, v) Vu3v J
that cannot be expressed in 1st order predicate calculus as it is true in all models with infinite domains. The set of valid sentences of branching quantification is not recursively enumerable. (See Enderton 1970, p. 393.) The fact that we can express, e.g., the above sentence in Montague grammar, shows that the Montague language is stronger than 1st order predicate calculus. The reader may wonder, since on the face of it, whatever we can express in Montague grammar can be expressed also in the predicate calculus. The difference, however, is in the semantic interpretation. Take (23). Montague grammar rewrites this essentially as A(x, F(x), u, G(u)) which is expressible in predicate logic. However, semantically, Montague semantics gives it the interpretation 3 F 3 G A, which cannot be done in predicate logic.
References ENDERTON, H.B. (1970) Finite partially ordered quantifiers, Zeitschrift für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 16, 535-555. GABBAY, D.M. (1973) Representation of the Montague-semantics as a form of the Suppessemantics, pp. 395—412 in: Hintikka J., Moravcsik, J., and Suppes, P., (Ed.) Approaches to Natural Languages, Reidel: Dordrecht. GABBAY, D.M. (forthcoming) Tense logics and the tenses of English, in: Moravcsik, J. (Ed.) Logic and philosophy for linguists, Mouton: the Hague. GABBAY, D. M. and J. MORAVCSIK (1973) Sameness and individuation, Journal of Philosophy 70, 513-525.
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HINTIKKA, J. (forthcoming) Branching quantifiers, Linguistic Inquiry. MONTAGUE, R. (1970) English as a formal language, pp. 189-223 in: Visentini et al. (Ed.) Linguaggi nella societä e nella tecnica, Edizioni di communitä: Milano MONTAGUE, R. (1973) The proper treatment of quantification in ordinary English, pp. 221 -242 in: Hintikka, J. Moravcsik, J. Suppes, P. (Ed.) Approaches to Natural Language, Reidel: Dordrecht. MORAVCSIK, J. (1972) review of G. Leech's Towards a semantic description of English, Language 48,445^54. RYLE, G. (1957) The theory of meaning, pp. 239-264 in: Mace, C. A. (Ed.) British Philosophy in the Mid-Century, George Allen & Unwin: London.
J. PH. HOEPELMAN
TENSE-LOGIC AND THE SEMANTICS OF THE RUSSIAN ASPECTS1
We consider the applicability of J. A. W.Kamp's system for S(ince) and U(ntil) in the formalization of the supposed deep-structure of Russian sentences in which the aspects occur. We will see that, assuming certain expressions for the representation of the perfective and the imperfective, the consequences that are generally felt to be implied by these aspects in spoken Russian, can be inferred, assuming the axioms for linear and dense time. The semantical relations between the imperfective and the perfective aspecjft become more clear.
Introduction
If a "natural logic" exists (Lakoff 1970), it is to be expected that a tenselogical fragment will occur in it. Even in advanced treatments as (Montague 1973), the tense-operators are those of the propositional tense-logical system Kj and its extensions. These operators, however, cannot give a proper account of the logical form of all tense-phenomena that occur in natural language. In the following we consider the drawbacks of the aforementioned operators in the treatment of the logical form of Russian sentences in which the so-called "aspects" are found. Then we will make some proposals concerning the representation of these forms by means of Kamp's system for the operators S(ince) and U(ntil). We will limit our tense-logical analysis to one standard example, the verb "zakryt'—zykryvat'", "to close". This is not due to a limitation of Kamp's system, but to difficulties in the analysis of "unbalanced" word-pairs, like "to close" and "to open", by means of Potts' operator "Δ" (Cooper 1966). To expose this would take too much room for the purpose of the present article.
1
This article is part of research-pro jekt "The tense-logical fragment of natural logic", supported by The Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research. I am indebted to Prof. S. C.Dik. J. A. W. Kamp, G. Berger and E. Krabbe for their help.
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I.
Until recently the study of tenses in linguistics has been more or less primitive. Most linguists treat the tenses in ways similar to those of Russell (1903, 458—476) or Jespersen (1924) and Reichenbach (1947). Prior (1967, 12) however, shows how Russell's analysis leads to a paradox in the treatment of compound tenses, and we in turn can show how Reichenbach's analysis leads to a similar paradox. In his treatment of the tenses, Reichenbach—following Jespersen—uses diagrams like figure 1.
Jti
Κ
I
ο
I
S
I
E
I
R
I
R,E ι
S ι
E
R, S
> I had seen John * I shall have seen John + I saw John -* I have seen John
S: point of speech R: point of reference E: point of event. Fig.l
Let us now assume that the sentence "Once all speech will have come to an end" is true (cf. Prior 1967, 12). Then a finite number of utterances will have taken place. Assuming further that each utterance has a finite number of reference points, there will be a finite number of reference points. At least one of these is the last one. But Reichenbach's analysis of the sentence "there will have been a last reference point" gives a reference point that is later than the last one. A similar pardox can be constructed when the expression "now" is analysed as "contemporaneous with this utterance" (Krabbe 1972). If the analysis of tenses is related to utterances, one is forced to assume that there always were and always will be utterances, in order to avoid these problems.
160
J.Ph. Hoepelman II.
Of the different forms of tense-logic, the non-metric prepositional ones with proposition-forming operators on propositions seem to bear the greatest formal resemblance to the tensed sentences of natural languages. J. A. W. Kamp (Kamp 1968) studies in detail the advantages of non-metric tense-logics for the treatment of tensed expressions in natural languages. We shall enumerate the axioms of standard propositional tense-logic and briefly mention the properties of the related models. The basis we choose is a system for standard propositional logic. The set of well-formed formulas is extended with those well-formed formulas which are preceded by: F P G H
"it will be the case that" "it was the case that" "it will always be the case that" "it always was the case that",
plus the usual truth-functional combinations of these. "F" and "P" are undefined. "A", "B", ... are metavariables for well-formed formulas Def.G. Def.H.
HA= d -.PiA
The rules of inference of propositional logic are extended with: RG. hA->h-iF-.A RH. hA-^KP-iA RM ("Mirror-image" rule). If in a thesis we replace all occurrences of F by P, and of P by F, the resulting formula is a thesis. Ax. 1. -ι Ft (A z> B) z> (FA ^ FB) Ax.2. PiF-iAz>A
Ax. 1. and 2. together give the system K t , the theses of which are valid in every model for the axioms given below. Extensions of K t : Ax.3.FFA=>FA (transitivity) Ax. 4. PFA ID (A v FA v PA) (linearity) Ax. 5. τ FT A => FA (non-ending, non-beginning time) Ax. 6. FA r> FFA (denseness) Ax.7. Π(τΡ Ί A -5 ρ Ί ρπ A) ..=> (τΡτ Ao τΡτ A) (completeness) Def. D : D A = d A & GA & HA
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III.
Russell offers the following definition of "change": "Change is the difference in respect to truth or falsehood, between a proposition concerning an entity and a time T, and a proposition concerning the same entity and another time T', provided that the two propositions differ only by the fact that T occurs in the one, where T' occurs in the other. Change is continuous when the propositions of the above kind form a continuous series, correlated with a continuous series of moments, ... Mere existence on some, but not all moments constitutes change on this definition" (Russell, 1903,469—470). This definition can, with due modifications, equally well be applied to non-metric systems. Von Wright (1963), (1965) has developed a system with a dyadic proposition-forming operator on propositions, T, by means of which four elementary transformations can be described. Clifford (1966) has pointed out, that von Wright's system-goes together with a discrete series of moments. Tp,q means "p now, and q the next moment". If p represents the proposition "the window is open", then Τρ,τρ describes the transformation of a world in which a window is open into a world in which it is closed. Ττ ρ, ρ describes the reverse, Tp, ρ describes the staying open of the window and Ττρ,τρ its staying closed. Agreeing with Russell's definition we can say, that only Tp, τ ρ and Ττρ, ρ describe changes. Anscombe has given an operator Ta, that Prior (1967, 70) has defined as follows: Def. Ta: Ta(A,B) =dP(PA & Β) ν (PA & B) Ta(p, q) may be called "p and then q". Def. Ta can be given for any of the axiom systems given above, and so does not presuppose discrete time. Ta(p, np) and Ta(np, p) describe changes as well, but do not preclude the possibility of there having been more changes in between.
IV.
In Russian there are in general two verbal forms corresponding to one English verb. So for instance the verb "to close", which in Russian is represented by the two forms "zakryt"' and "zakryvat'". These two forms are referred to as "perfective" and "imperfective" respectively (if necessary we will indicate the perfectivity or imperfectivity of a form by the superscripts p and '). It has for a long time been thought, that the aspects are a feature characterising only the slavic languages, but recent studies show that they can be assumed in the basis of other languages as well, e.g. in Dutch; cf. (Verkuyl 1971). Aspectual differences, however, are expressed very systematically in the morphology of the slavic languages. 11 TLIl/2
162
J.Ph. Hocpelman
There is considerable disagreement among linguists as to the meaning of the two Russian aspects and their different functions. The great "Grammatika Russkogo Jazyka" tries to cover all their basic meanings (Forsyth 1970, 3): "The category of aspect indicates that the action expressed by the verb is presented: (a) in its course, in process of its performance, consequently in its duration or repetition, e.g. zit', pet', rabotat', chodit', citat', ... (imperfective); (b) as something restricted, concentrated at some limit of its performance, be it the moment of origin or beginning of the action, or the moment of its completion or result, e.g. zapet', koncit', pobezat', propet', prijti, uznat', ujti, ... (perfective)". Forsyth tries to define the difference between the perfective and the imperfective by means of Jakobson's concept of "privative opposition": "A perfective verb expresses the action as a total event, summed up with reference to a single specific juncture. The imperfective does not inherently express the action as a total event summed up with reference to a single specific juncture" (Forsyth 1970,7). The Dutch slavist Barentsen too uses the term "limit" to define the meaning of the perfective and says further: "The perfective points out that in the Narrated Period two contrasting parts are distinguished, of which one contains the Contrast Orientation Period. The element NONPERF points out that in the Narrated Period no two contrasting parts are distinguished". Furthermore, analysing the meaning of the perfective and imperfective forms "otkryt/p—otkryvat'1"— "to open"—he states: "The notion of contrast ... asks for explanation. Let us consider the following example: There exists a situation "the window is closed". After some time a change is observed: the window is now open. This means that a transition has taken place from one situation into another" (Barentsen 1971, 10; translation mine, J.H.). The similarity of this definition (and many others could be adduced) to Russell's definition of change is easily seen. Both the imperfective and the perfective forms can describe a change, but whereas the imperfective past form "zakryvalas'"—"closed" in the sentence "dver' zakryvalas'"—"the door closed/the door was closing" does not necessarily mean that the door was ever closed, the perfective past form "zakrylas'"—"closed" in "dver' zakrylas'"—"the door closed"/"the door is (was) closed"—does mean that the "limit" of closing (which in a complete (i. e. continuous) series of moments is the first moment of the door being closed—the first moment at which the sentence "the door is closed" is true) is attained. In other words, the imperfective form may describe a change like "becoming more and more closed", while the door is open, whereas the perfective form describes not only this change, but also what may be called the result of this change: the fact that the door was really closed for the first time. The attainment of this result is an event without duration, which may be called an "instantaneous event", cf. (Anscombe 1964,17).
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V.
Let us now assume that we have attached a system for predicate logic to the systems of propositional tense-logic given above. We express predicate constants by "nV, "m2", ..., predicate variables by "jj", "f2", · - ·, individual constants by "a", "b", ..., individual variables by "x", 'V, 'V» - · - In this article we will only consider one-place predicates. Now we can express that an individual, a, gets a quality (e.g. "closed") for the first time: 1.
Hinija & n^a
Clearly (1) is too strong to represent the meaning of "dver' zakrylas/p"— "the door closed"—. Neither the Russian, nor the English sentence imply that the door has never been closed before. What we want to express is, that for some period the door became less and less open and was closed finally. If we try to express this in the propositional tense-logic given above, the best we can get is: 2.
HF-imja & n^a
In dense time HF-in^a is true if -11%a was true during some interval until now. But it is also possible that HF-in^a is true because in^a is true in the future—as can easily be inferred from ax. 2 and ax. 5. Even if we therefore stipulate that Gm1a, HF-imja can in a dense series be verified by a "fuzz": if between any past moment of -in^a's truth and the present, however close, there is a moment of -i mj a's falsehood and conversely, cf. (Prior 1967,108). A second difficulty is, that the standard predicate logical systems do not enable us to relate the result of an event to the event itself, so that we cannot distinguish between an event that stops because its result is attained and an event that stops without its result being attained: 3.
is true when a in the past gradually became mx and finally was (or is) 1%, as well as when a "jumped" to mj. On the other hand, if we have an expression "Φ(πΐι a)" to represent the imperfective verb "zakryvat'"—"to close (gradually)",
4. would be true if a stopped closing gradually without finally being closed, as well as when this result was indeed attained.
164
J.Ph. Hoepelman VI.
To express the concept of gradual becoming Potts (1969) has devised a system of rules of natural deduction. His main rule we use here as an axiom2. If p stands for "x is mj", than Δρ stands for "x becomes m^'. Ax. PL Δ/ίχ=>τ/[χ If we substitute "a is closed" for^x in PI. we get: "if a becomes closed, a is not closed". Contraposition gives "if a is closed, it doesn't become closed". We attach Potts' operator an axiom to the system of predicate logic we choose.
VII. We still cannot express that a proposition, p, was true during a certain interval of time. To express intervals in non-metric systems Kamp (1968) has developed the dyadic proposition-forming operators on propositions S(ince) and U(ntil). S(p, q) means: "Since a time at which p was true q was true until now", and U(p, q) means: "From now q will be true until a time at which p is true". Kamp has proved the functional completeness of S and U (Kamp 1968). We give some expressions defined in S and U (Prior 1967,106f.): PA FA ΗΆ G'A P'A F'A
2
= d S(A, A o A): "A i3 A has been true since A was the case". =d U(A, A => A): "A => A will be true until A is the case". = d S(A=>A, A): "A has been the case since A ID A, i.e. A has been true for some period until now". = d U(Az> A, A): "A will be true until A=> A will be true, i.e. A will be true during some period from now". =d-iHSA: "There can be found no interval, however short, stretching from the past until now, during which π A is uninterruptedly true". =
Potts' system: A, B for /„x,,,
a.
ΔΑΒΞΑ ΔΒ ΔΑ
, ΔΑ&ΔΒ b. Δ(Α & B) , -,ΔΑ d. -
ΔΔΑ
Ad b.: provided that "B" depends on no premisses other than "A", and that "A" depends on no premisses other than"B". I do not think that Potts' system is suited to express all kinds of becoming, e.g. not the concept of becoming more and more open.
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H'A and G Ά are the expressions we have been looking for. H'A is not verified by a "fuzz". Kamp (personal communication) has divised an axiom-system for S and U: Axioms : I. II . 1. 2. 3.
4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
All axioms of standard propositional logic. All formulas of the following forms : nS(A&-iA,B) S(A, B) & S(C, D) ΞΞ (S(A & C, B & D) v S (A & D & S(C, D), B & D) v S(C&B&S(A,B),B&D) S(A & U(C, D), B) = (S(C & B & S(A, B & D), B) v (C & S(A, B & D)) v (U(C, D) & D & S(A, B & D)) (iS(A v -ιΑ, -ιΑ) & S(C,D)) = (S(A & D & S(C, D), D) & nS(A v πΑ, πΑ)) S(A v B, C) = S(A, C) v S(B, C) HA = -.S(-iA,Av-iA) S(AvnA,AvnA) U(A v πΑ, Α ν -ιΑ) -iS(A v -iA, A & -iA) nS(A, B) = iS(A, A v πΑ) ν -iS(B v -iB, B) v S(-iA & (-iB v nS(B v -,Β, Β), nB)
Rules of inference: MP.
ΗΑ,ΗΑ=>Β hB
Eq.
HA = A' hB^B'
If A is a subformula of Β and B' results from replacing an occurrence of A in Β by A'. RM. Mirror-image rule for S and U (cp. Sect. II). Def. P, H', P7, F, G', F', as given above. The axioms 1 —6 correspond to linear time, the axioms 1 —7, 8 to linear nonbeginning, non-ending time, axiom 9 to dense time, axiom 10 to complete time. Furthermore we assume that we have attached a system for predicate-logic, extended with Ax. PL (cp. Sect. VI), to I and II. VIII. 6.
H'An^a &
is true if a is closed now for the first time, after becoming more and more closed during some period. We can prove3 that 1
Throughout proofs of theorems and lemma's can be found in the Appendix.
166
7.
J.Ph. Hoepelman
H'p=> Pp
and thus 8.
Η'Δ/iX &/ lX z> Ρ-,/ιΧ &/iX
can be inferred from axioms 1 — 6, 9, for dense time (cp. Sect. VII). From P^rrt! χ & mjx "x wasn't closed and is now closed" we can, by means of PL., infer T^-imjX, mjx), i.e. the contrast that, according to Forsyth, Barentsen and other grammarians is implied by a sentence like "dver' zykrylas'p"—"the door closed", and that, according to Russell can be used to define change. But because 9.
Η'Δη^χ & m t x
is stronger than P-imjX & nijx, we are now able to express formally the difference between the proposition that a door, a, was closing during some period until now and is now, indeed, closed for the first time, and the proposition that a was closing during some period until now, still being open at the present moment. The former was expressed by (9), the latter we can express by 10.
H'Amja & -in^a.
Although it is possible that a Russian sentence with a perfective-past verb form refers to present time, as in the following examples, this is not often the case : 11.
Umer — vskriknul Kukuskin, brosajas' na koleni u ego krovati — Umer. He is dead/he died — shouted Kukuskin falling on his knees at his bed — He is dead/he died. (B.N. Polevoj, Ex. Russ. Synt. II, 300.)
12.
My pogibli We are lost (Bondarko, 1967, 99)
13.
I teper', poborov otorop', ja resil . . . And now, having fought my shyness, I decided to ... (A. Terc. Pchenc.)
Most Russian sentences with perfective-past verb forms, however, refer to past time. There are, moreover, examples of sentences in which the perfective-past verb is ambiguous in respect to time : 1 4.
Kogda my prisli, oni usli When we arrived, they had (already) gone/When we arrived, they just went away. (Forsyth 1970, 68.)
To (14) we can ascribe the following structure : 15.
P(O(/ixn)&(PO(/jxm)vO(y5xin)), where Φ^χ«) represents a formula in which /^ occurs.
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So we can assume that 16. 17.
Η'Δ/ιΧ&/ιΧ, Ρ(Η'Δ/ιΧ&/ιΧ) as well as
18.
(Η'Δ/ιΧ &/ lX ) ν Ρ(Η'Δ/ιΧ &/lX)
are represented by forms like "zakrylas' " in surface structure. It is equally possible to assume that only (18) is represented by forms like "zakrylas'" in surfacestructure, because (18) is implied by (16) as well as by (17), which occur on some supposed deeper level, without direct representation in the surface-structure. By means of the λ-operator (cf. Carnap 1959, 82ff, 129ff.) we define a predicateforming operator on predicates, p, such that ffi κ is true if and only if Η'Δ^ίΧ & jJX is true : Def. p.: PA =<1(λχ)(Η'Δ/1χ &/lX). Let us for the time being assume that 19.
in the deep structure of Russian sentences is represented by perfective-past forms like "zakrylas'". From 19. we can easily infer 20.
ΡΗ'Δ/ ιΧ νΗ'Δ/ ιΧ ,
while on the other hand from (20) it is impossible to infer (19). If we assume furthermore that (20) occurs in the deep structure of russian sentences with forms of imperfective-past verbs, like the imperfective-past correlate of "zakrylas"', i.e. "zakryvalas'", this corresponds to the situation that in Russian 21. *Dver' zakrylas/p, no ne zakryvalas'1 The door was closed, but didn't close is unacceptable, while 22.
Dver' zakryvalas'1, no ne zakrylas/p. The door was closing, but wasn't closed finally.
is a normal sentence. We may therefore assume, that (21) is unacceptable for a logical reason, but not unwellformed (in the sense of "not generated by the formation-rules"). 23.
Jesli dver' zakrylas'1, ona zakryvalas/p If the door was closed, it was closing
can therefore be considered as an instance of a tense-logical postulate for Russian.
168
J.Ph. Hoepelman IX.
Russian perfective verb-forms of verbs like "zakryt's'a"—"to close" with present-tense endings refer to the future, either denoting an event that is already taking place in the present and has its result in the (near) future, or an event that starts in the future and has its result in a more distant future. Examples: 24.
Ja risuju1 portret moej staroj n'ani; kupite1 li vy etot portret, kogda ja jego narisujup? I am drawing the portrait of my old nanny, will you buy it when it is finished?
25.
Vse ze oni dumali1, cto Kutuzov dozivetp do rassveta. Nevertheless they thought that Kutuzov would live until dawn.
26.
Kogda vy im napisete1* ? My im napisemp cerez tri nedeli. When will you write them? We will write them in three weekstime,(compare also Rassudova, 1968, 93—94)
This corresponds to a consequence of 27.
FP/lX
in linear time. We first prove: 28.
F(H'p & q) => U(q, ρ) ν FU(q, p), and then:
29.
Ff/lX z> U(/lX, Δ/ιΧ) ν FU(/lX, Δ/χχ).
Proof of (29): Subst. Δ/ίχ/ρ JJx/q ω· (28): Def. |>. If we now define a dyadic proposition-forming operator on propositions, Qa, "and then", "and after that", corresponding to Anscombe's Ta in the following way Def. Q.: Q a (A,B)= d F(A & FB) ν (A & FB) We can infer from axioms 1—6, 9, for linear, dense time (cp. Sect. VII): 30.
(U(p, q) ν FU(p, q)) ID Qa(q, p)
Substitution of Δ^χ/q and^x/p in (30) gives 31.
(U(/lX> Δ/,χ) ν FU(/lX) Δ/ιΧ)) ^
(^(AfrJri.
From Ο,(Δ^χ,^χ) we infer by PI, Lemma 9 and PL. 32.
Ο,ίπ/,χ,^χ),
and so from (29) and (31) by Syll.: 33.
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So, if we assume that Fp/jX occurs in the deep structure of Russian sentences with perfective-present verb-forms, the contrast of Barentsen, Forsyth and Russell, mentioned previously, can be inferred for linear, dense time. Furthermore, as we saw, U0£x, A/[x) v F(U(/jx, Δ£χ)) can be inferred from Ff^x. From U(/1x,A/1x)vFU(/1x,A^x) we can infer 34.
G'A/ix ν
by Lemma 4 and Lemma 9. Conversely, from (34) we cannot infer FJ^x. Assuming that (34) occurs in the deep-structure of Russian sentences with the imperfective correlate of perfective verbs with present-tense endings, e.g. "budet zakryvat's'a" — "will be closing" — then the situation described above again corresponds to that of Russian: 35. *Dver' zakroets'ap, no ne budet zakryvat's'a1 The door will close, but it will not be closing is unacceptable — this, as previously pointed out, for a logical reason —, while 36.
Dver' budet zakryvat's'a1, no ne zakroets'ap The door will be closing, but it will not be closed
is perfectly acceptable.
X.
A negated perfective verb can often be replaced by the negated corresponding imperfective verb (Forsyth 1970,102f.). This possibility is also accounted for by our assumed deep-structure for perfective verbs. 37.
ρ/ιΧ=Η'Δ/ιΧ&/ιΧ (byDef.p.)
If one of the conjuncts of the right member of (37) is negated, than p/[x is not true. Thus, if we assume Η'Δ/χΧ to occur in the deep-structure of imperfective verbs, the negation of Η'Δ^χ suffices for the negation of £/Jx. On the other hand, as we saw, the negation of a perfective verb can mean that the result of the event described by the verb, i.e. jix, is not attained, while nevertheless Η'Δ/Jx was the case: 38.
Ja dolgo ubezdal1 prepodavaternicu, cto v etom net nikakogo anarchizma, naoborot—Ubezdal1, no ne ubediP. I tried for a long time to convince the teacher that this was not a manifestation of anarchism, on the contrary. I tried to convince her, but I didn't succeed. (Erenburg. L'udi, gody, zizn'. From Forsyth 1970,104r)
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J.Ph. Hoepelman XL
We have already assumed that expressions in which Η'Δ^χ occurs play a role in the deep structure of Russian sentences with imperfective-past verb forms. We have seen that these forms are implied by the postulated expressions for the deep-structure of perfective forms, so that it is impossible to state the perfective form, but to deny the imperfective one. It is, however, not possible to replace the perfective form by the imperfective one in all contexts. Perfective forms are required when the verb has the function of a perfect and when a series of successive events is described (Forsyth 1970, 92f.). We will try to find a formal expression for these contexts. The perfect meaning of a Russian perfective verb form expresses that a situation, of which the beginning is described by the perfective-past verb, has been existing up to and including now. 39. 40.
41. 42.
On pol'uhiP ee He fell in love with her (and still is in love with her)/He loves her. Moroz snova krepkij—podulp severnyj veter It's hard frost again (because) the north wind has got up. (Erenburg. OttepeF) Ja zabylp, gde on zivet I forget where he lives On s uma soselp He is mad (examples from Forsyth 1970, loc. c.)
As a formal expression of this perfect (for the group of verbs considered here) we propose: 43.
/,x & S(P/1X,/1X)
e.g.: "the door is closed now, and has been closed since it became closed". When perfective verbs are used to describe a series of successive events, each perfective verb describes an event that takes place in a new situation, the beginning of which is described by the preceding perfective verb. This situation can continue to exist after the new event has started, but it is equally well possible that it ceases therewith. 44.
D'akon vstalp, odels'ap, vz'alp svoju tolstuju sukovatuju palku i tycho vyselp iz domu The deacon got up, dressed, took his thick, rough stick and quietly left the house (Cechov, Duel'. Forsyth 1970, 65).
45.
On otkrylp dver', vyselp, i zaper1* ee op'at' He opened the door, went out, and closed it again (Forsyth 1970, 9).
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As a general formal expression of such a sequence we propose: 46.
P(0(x„+1) & S(|>/A & S(p/k_lXn_, & S(. . . & S(P/lXl ,fa\ . . .),
Λ-Λ-ι)./Α v (Φ(*.+ι) & SQP/,Α, & S(?/k_lXn_i & S(. . . &
Xj may be identical with x^/j For the future we replace in (46) all occurrences of Ρ by F, and of S by U in accordance with RM. The formulation of (46) as a disjunction allows us to consider sequences of events of which the last one took place in the past, as well as sequences of events of which the last one takes place in the present (and which eventually goes on in the future). The presence of the expression Φ(χ,ι+ι) allows for the possibility of an interruption or termination of the sequence of perfectives by an imperfective expression, as is often the case in Russian: 47.
Cto i govorit', eto bylo ne samoe obrazcovoe otdelenie. Proderzalip nas tarn minut sorok — kuda-to zvonili1, vyjasn'ali1, trebovali1 fotoplenku —i tol'ko posle aktivnych nasich ubezdenij . . . i dopol'nitel'nych zvonkov nas otpustilip i daze izvinilis/p. I must say it wasn't a model police-station. They held us there for about forty minutes while they made phone-calls, asked questions, demanded the film from the camera. And it was only after our active persuasions . . . and further phone-calls that they let us go, and even apologised. (V. Nekrasov. Po obe storony okeana. Forsyth 1970, 65.)
We see now, that (43) is a special case of the second member of the disjunction (46).
XII.
Except for the expression of a gradual change (and certain other functions), the imperfective forms of Russian verbs can have two functions that stand in a relationship to one another, and to the perfect meaning of perfective verbs. The first one is the expression of a "two-way-action", the other that of a repeated action. The imperfective verb describing a two-way-action stipulates that the situation which came into being by the action described by the verb does not exist any more. This function of the imperfective thus contrasts to the perfect meaning of perfective-past verbs.
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48.
Vojd'a v komnatu on skazal tovariscu — Kak zdes' dusno! Ty by chot' otkrylp okno. — Da ja ego nedavno otkryval1. When he entered the room he said to his friend: "How stuffy it is in here! You might at least have opened the window". "But I did open it (have it open) not long ago". (Forsyth 1970, 78.)
49.
Prochod'a mimo nee on snimal1 sl'apu. As he passed her he raised (i.e. took off and put on again) his hat.
Compare (49) to (50) in which the corresponding perfective form of snim P, sn'alp, occurs: 50.
Vstretiv ee, on sn'alp sTapu i skazal . . . When he met her he took off his hat and said (still with his hat off) . . . (Forsyth 1970, loc. c.)
In our formalism, and for the group of verbs considered here, we can express this meaning of the imperfective as follows : 51.
(Pp/lX & H S/i*) v P(Pf>/lX & Η'-,/ι*)
Η'τ/[Χ implies iSff^f^ 52.
in dense, linear time:
HS/ lX ^nSp/ lX ,/ lX
From τ5£/ίχ, j|X we infer by PL. 53.
-,(/lX & SJ>/lX,/lX)
So we can infer from (51) by PL., Lemma 9 and RM : 54.
P(Pp/lX & -,(/lX & Sp/lX,/lX)) v (Pp/lX & -,(/lX & Sp/lX,/lX)).
(53) is the negation of (43), which we proposed as the formal expression of the perfect meaning of the perfective-past. A repetition of a proposition, p, being true at different moments can, in Anscombe's formalism, be eXpressed as follows : or
T a (T a (p,-,p),p),...etC.
T a (T a (T a (np,p),-,p),...),...etc.
Pp/JX & Η'τ/[Χ implies Ta(Ta(-ijiX,^X), n^X), i.e. a repetition of n^X. 55.
Pp/lX & H VlX ^ T.CT.Cvix, /ix),
This means that, if we assume that (51) occurs in the deep-structure of Russian sentences with imperfective-past forms, as of "zakryvatVa" — "to close" — which denote a "two-way-action", then we can infer the repetition that, as may appear from the eXamples, is implied by this function of the imperfective, given the axioms for linear, dense time.
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XIII.
The other function of imperfect! ve verb forms we mentioned was the expression of repeated action (the iterative). An imperfect!ve verb that expresses an iterative can be considered as a repetition of perfectives : 56.
Kazdyj den' on vypival1 pered obedom r'umku vodki Every day before lunch he drank a glass of vodka i.e.: v ponedel'nik vypilp, vo vtornik vypilp, ... on Monday he drank one, on Tuesday he drank one . . . (Forsyth 1970, 164).
57.
Kazdyj den' on zakryval1 okno He closed the window every day i.e.: v ponedel'nik zakrylp, vo vtornik zakryP ... he closed it on Monday, on Tuesday . . . etc.
We can infer the repetition Ta(Ta(/[x, n^x),^x) without any new axioms if we express this function of the imperfective by a repetition of a perfective verb: 58.
P(P/lX & PP/lX) v (P/lX & PP/,x) o Ta(T.(/lX)
Forms of the future tense of imperfective verbs can also have an iterative meaning: 59.
Kazdyj den' on budet vypivat'1 pered obedom r'umku vodki Every day before lunch he shall drink a glass of vodka i.e. : ν ponedel'nik vyp'etp, vo vtornik vyp'etp ... on Monday he shall drink one, on Tuesday he shall drink one, ...
60.
Kazdyj den' on budet zakryvat'1 okno Every day he shall close the window i.e.: v. ponedel'nik zakroetp, vo vtornik zakroetp, . . .he shall close it on Monday, on Tuesday, . . .
We can infer that Qa(QaOix> ~l/ix)> Jix)> # we represent this meaning of the imperfective future by a future repetition of perfectives, i.e. if a perfective will twice or more be the case. 61.
F(P/ 1 x&FP/ 1 x)=Q a (Q a (/ 1 x > Vix),/ix)
As to the semantical relationship between the perfective and the imperfective (of the group of verbs considered) these results mean, that we can suppose that in surface structure an imperfective verb form occurs when in the deep-structure an expression occurs that implies τ/Jx, Pn^x or F-ijix, but not 'S^Jx and then^x", or a repetition of ^x, or of τ/Jx, whereas the perfective occurs in the surfacestructure when in the deep structure an expression occurs that implies "i^x and then^x", but not a repetition of jix, or of -i/ix.
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Proofs of theorems. Proof of 8. Η'Δ/ιΧ & / x x => P-i/lX & / lX : Lemma 1. S(p, q) 12 S(p, π q ν q) Proof of Lemma 1.: 1.
2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
n(S(p, q) & S(p, q viq)) s -,(S(p & p, q & (q v -,q)) v S(p & (q v iq) & S(p, q vnq), q & (q vnq))) v S(p & q & S(p, q), q & (q v-iq))) (PL, ax. 2, subst.) -,(S(p, q) & S(p, q v -, q)) = -,(S(p, q) v S(p & S(p, q v -, q), q) v S(p&q&S(p,q),q)) (1. PL. EQ) -,(S(p, q) & S(p, q v-.q))==-,S(p, q) & -,S(p & S(p, q v-,q), q) & -,S(p&q&S(p,q),q)) (2. DeM.) -,(S(p, q) & S(p, q v -, q)) ID S(p, q) (3. PL, Sep.) S(p, q) ID S(p, q) & S(p, q ν τ q) (4. Contrap.) S(p, q) & S(p, q) =D S(p, q ν -, q) (5. PL) S(p,q)=>S(p,qv-,q) (6. PL)
Lemma 2. H(p ^ q) ID (H'p ID H'q) Proof of Lemma 2.: 1.
nS((pvnp),-nq)& S(p ν-φ, p) ID S(nq & ρ & S(p ν ι ρ, ρ), ρ) (ax.4,Sep.)
2.
S(iq & p & S(p V -ip, p), p) ^ S(iq & p, p) &
3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
S(S(pv-.p,p),p) (1., ax. 2, PL) -, S(p v -»p, -nq) & S(p v -ip, p) z> S(iq & p, p) (1, 2, Syll, Sep.) S(n q & p, p) -3 S(T q & ρ, τ ρ ν ρ) (Lemma 1., subs.) π S(p ν np, m q) & S(p ν τ p, p) z> S(n q & p, p v τ p) (3, 4, Syll.) n ST (n p v q, p v n p) ID τ S(p v np, p) v S(p v n p, q) (5., Contr. DeM.) H(p =5 q) ID (Hrp i5 H'q) (6., Def. H, Def. H', Def. =5)
Lemma 3. H'p "=> Pp. Proof of Lemma 3.: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
(·ι$(ρν-,ρ,-,(ρν-,ρ))&5(ρν-.ρ,ρ))Ξ(5((ρν-,ρ)& p & S(p v n p, p), p) & -i S((p v -ι ρ), -ι(ρ ν -ι ρ)) S(p v -,ρ, p) = S((p v -ip) & p & S(p v -,ρ, p), p) S(p v -ι ρ, ρ) Ξ S((p & S(p v -,ρ, p), p) S((p & S(p v i p, p), p) => S(p, p) & S(S(p v -, p, p), p) S(p v -, p, p) :D S(p, p) & S(S(p v -. p, p), p) S(p v n p, p) => S(p, p) S(p, p) ID S(p, ρ ν τ p) S(p v -, p, p) => S(p, p v i p) H'piDPp
(Αχ. 4.) (1. Ax. 9, Eq. PL) (2. PL, Eq.) (ax. 2, PL) (3, 4, Syll.) (6. Sep) (Lemma l.) (6, 7, Syll.) (8. Def. H', P)
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Proof of 8. Η'Δ/[χ &^x=> Ρτ/[χ
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
> -ι/ιχ) Η'Δ/ϊχ => Η'Τ/ΪΧ Η'Δ/ιΧ => Ρ-,/ix H f A/ 1 x&/ 1 x^PVi x &/ix
(PL) 0· Ax· l-> ax· 60 (2. Lemma 2., MP.) (Lemma 3.) (3, 4, Syll.) (5. PL) Q.E.D.
Proof of 28. F(q & H'p) z> FU(q, p) v U(q, p) :
2. 3.
4. 5.
U(q & S(p^p, P ), P =D P )s(U((p^ p ) & (pup) & P=> Ρ) ν ((p=> p) & U(q, (p=> p) & ρ)) ν (S(p=> p, p)& p&U(q,( P ^ P )& P )) (ax. 3) U(q & S(p => p, p), p o p) = (U(Uq, p), p o p) v U(q, p) v (S(P => P, P) & P & U(q, p)) (1. PL. Eq.) U(q&S(p=>p,p),p=>p)=> (U(U(q, ρ), ρ => p) v U(q, p) v U(q, p) (2. PL. Eq.) U(q & S(p ID ρ, ρ), ρ 13 p) o (U(U(q, p), p ^ p) v U(q, p) (3.PL.) F(q & H'p) 3 FU(q, p) v U(q, p) Q. E. D.
Proof of 30. (U(p, q) ν FU(p, q)) =5 Qaq, p: Lemma 4. U(p, q) => U(p ν τ p, q) Proof of Lemma 4. : 1. 2. 3-
-iU(Ov-i P ,q) = iU( P ,q)&-iU(-i P ,q) -.U(pvip,q)=>-.U(p,q) (1. PL., Sep.) U(p, q) 13 U(p ν τP, q) (2. ContraP.)
(Ax. 5. DeM.) (1. PL., Sep.) (2. Contrap».)
Lemma 5. G'P & G'q ^ G'(P & q) Proof of Lemma 5 .
1. 2.
3.
4. 5.
& U(p v-ip, p) & U(p ντ Ρ , q) = (U(p v-ip, P& q) ν U((p v q & U(P ν τ Ρ , q), P & q) ν U((P ν τ Ρ ) & (ax. 2, Eq.) ρ & U(p ν -, ρ, ρ), ρ & q)) & U(P ντ Ρ , Ρ) & U(p ντ Ρ , q)=> (U(P vi p , P & q) ν U((P q & U(P ν -ip, q)), p & q) ν U((p ν -ιΡ) & P & U(p ν τ Ρ , ρ) ν ι((ρ ν τρ) & (1 . Lemma 4. PL.) p & U(p ν π ρ, ρ)), ρ & q)) U(P VTJ>, P) & U(P ντ Ρ , q)=>U( P vn p , P & q) vU( P ν Ρ, Ρ & q) (2.Eq.) vU(Pv-iP,P&q) (3. PL.) U(p ν -,ρ, ρ) & U(p ν -,ρ, q) z> U(p ν -,ρ, ρ & q) (4. Def. G;, Eq.) G'p&G'q=>G'(p&q)
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Lemma 6. Fpn>G'Fp Proof of Lemma 6.: 1.
2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
(-iU(p V-ip,-nU(p,p V-ip)) & U(p,p V-ip)) = (U(-iU(p,pVnp) & (p V n p )
&υ(ρ,ρντρ), ρ ν -,p) & -»U(p ν τρ, -nU(p, p v τ p))) (Ax. 4. Subst.)(RM.) (-,U(p v-,p,-r,U(p, ρ ν-,ρ)) & U(p, p vip))z> (U(-,U(p, p ν-,ρ) & (p vip) & U(p, p v-.p), p v -.p)) (1. PL., Sep.) (-iU(p v i p, -n U(p, p v -· p)) & U(p, ρ v -i p)) ID (U(iU(p, p v -i p) & U(p, p v -, p), p v -, p)) (2. PL., Eq.) -i U(-, U(p, p v -i p) & U(p, p v τ p), p v τ p) (ax. l., Subst.) i(-iU(p v -ip, -iiU(p, ρ ν -ip)) & τΙΙ(ρ, ρ ν -ιp) (3, 4. Contrap. MP.) U(p v -ip, -nU(p, ρ ν τ p)) v iU(p, ρ ν τ p) (5. DeM.) U(p, p vip)=> U(p vnp, U(p, p ν-,ρ)) (6. Def. ID) Fpi^G'p (7. Def. F, G')
Lemma 7. FFp =2 Fp Proof of Lemma 7.:
1. 2. 3. 4.
U((p v -ip) & (p v -ip) & U(p, p v ip), (p v -ip) & (p v -·ρ)) ^ U(p ν-,ρ, ρ ν-,ρ) & U(p, p ν-,ρ) (ax. 2, PL.)(RM) U((np v p) & U(p, -,ρ v p), ip v p) ID U(p, -ip v p) (2. Sep.) U(U(p, ρ v -, p), -, p v p) ZD U(p, p v i p) (3. Eq.) FFp->Fp (4. Def. F.)
Lemma 8. U(p, q) ID F(q & Fp) Proof of Lemma 8.: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
U(p, q) r> Fp G'(q & Fp) ID F(q & Fp) U(p,q)iDG'q Fp=)G'Fp U(p,q)rDG'q>p (G'q & G'Fp) z> G'(q & Fp) U(p,q)^F(q&Fp)
(Lemma l, RM) (Lemma 3, RM) (Lemma 4, RM) (Lemma 6) (3,4, PL) (Lemma 5) (7,2 Syll.)
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Lemma 9. G(p ^ q) => (Fp z> Fq) Proof of Lemma 9.: 1. 2. 3.
i(U(-iOp v q), p v -ιρ) ν U(q, p v τ ρ)) Ξ i(U((-.(-i p v q) v q), p v -. p) (ax. 5., Eq.)(RM) -i(U((-i(-ip v q ) v q ) , p v - , p ) = i(U((p & nq) v q), p v -i p) (DeM. Eq.) i(U((p & -. q) ν q), ρ ν -. ρ) = -,(U((p ν q) & (q ν -ι q)), ρ ν ι ρ) (Distr. Eq.)
4.
-iU((p ν q) & (q ν nq), ρ ν -ιρ) = -iU(p v q, p v -φ)
5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
(PL. Eq.)
-iU(p vq, ρ VTp) = -iU(p, ρ ντρ) & iU(q, ρ ντρ) (ax. 5, DeM.) -iU(p v q, p v ip) => -iU(p, ρ ν τ ρ) (5. Sep.) -.(U(-.(-ip ν q), ρ ν -ιρ) ν U(q, ρ ν -,ρ)) => -.U(p, ρ ν -ip) (l, 6, Syll.) -i(nU(-i(Tpvq),pv-ip)z>U(q,pv-ip))iD-iU(p,pv-ip) (7, Def. =>) i(G(p =>q) =5 Fq) ζ? π Fp (8. Def. G, F, Def. =>) G(p 35 q) Z5 (Fp z> Fq) (9. PL.)
Proof of 30. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
G(U(p, q) => F(q & Fp)) (Lemma 8, ax. 1, RM, Def. G.) FU(p, q) ^ FF(q & Fp) (Lemma 9,1., MP.) FU(p, q) => F(q & Fp) (Lemma 7.) U(p, q) ν FU(p, q) => F(q & Fp) (3., Lemma 8, PL.) U(p, q) ν FU(p, q) ^ F(q & Fp) ν (q & Fp) (4. PL.) U(p,q)vFU(p,q)^Qaq,p Q.E.D.
Proof of 52. HVlX ID -, Lemma 10. H'q =5 τ S((p =5 ρ), τ q) Proof of Lemma 10.: 1.
S(p v-ip,q) & S(p Vip,nq)=(S((p v n p ) & (p Vnp), q & nq) ν S((pVTp)&iq& S(pVTp,nq),q&Tq)v
2.
S(p νnp, q) & S(p ντρ, nq) ID S(p ν np, q & -iq) ν S(p ν np, q & -iq) ν
3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
S(p ν τ ρ, q & π q) (1. Lemma 4, Eq.) S(pv-.p,q)&S(pv-,p,-,q):z>S(pvip,q&-,q) (2. PL.) τ S(p ν τ p, q & τ q) =5 i(S(p ν τ ρ, q) & S(p ν τ ρ, η q)) (3. Contrap.) τ S(p ν τ ρ, ρ & τ ρ) (ax. 9.) -,(S(pv-,p,q)&S(pv-ip,-,q) (4,5, MP.) H'q => ·, S(p => ρ, π q) (DeM. Def. =>, Def. H'.)
S((p v-ip) & q & S(p ν np, q), q & -.q)
12 TLI1/2
(ax. 2)
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Proof of 52. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
S(p, q) ID H'q H'q =3 P'q S(p,q)=>P'q -i P'q ID π S(p, q) HS q ^ -ι S(p, q)
6.
HViX^Sfltfx,/^)
(Lemma 4.) (Lemma 10, Def. P'.) (l,2,Syll.) (3, Contrap.) (4, Def. H'.)
(5. Subst.) Q.E.D.
Proof of 55. HS/iX & PftJxiD Ta(Ta(Vix,/ix), Lemma 11. (H'p & Pq) => P(p & Pq) Proof of Lemma 11.: 1. 2. 3. 4.
H'p & Pq => H'p & H'Pq H'p & H'Pq ID H'(p & Pq) H'(p & Pq) =5 P(p & Pq) H'p & Pq ID P(p & Pq)
(PL. RM. Lemma 6.) (Lemma 5, RM.) (Lemma 3.) (1, 3, Syll.)
(Proof of 55.:) 1. 2. 3. 4.
H'-i/iX & PP/iX =5 P(Vix & ρΡ/ιχ) (Lemma 11, Subst.) P(n/ix & PP/ix) = P(Vix & P^x & Η'Δ/ιΧ) (Def. f.) P(-,/ix & P(/iX & Η'Δ/ιΧ) => P(^x & P(/tx & P-i/ix) (PL, Lemma 3, Lemma 2, Lemma 9, RM.) H S/ix & Pf/lX ο Ta(Ta(Vix, /ix), Vix (1> 3, Syll, Def. Ta) Q.E.D.
Proof of 58. (P/1X & Pf/lX) ν P(f/lX & Pftfx) ^ Ta(Ta(/lX, Vix Lemma 12. P(q & r) :=> (Pq & Pr) Proof of Lemma 12.: 1. 2. 3. 4.
S(p, r) & S(q, r) Ξ (S(p & q, r) v S(p & t & S(q, r), r) v S(q & r & S(p, r), r)) S(p & q, r) = S(p, r) & S(q, r) S(p & q, p v n p) o S(p, ρ ν τ ρ) & S(q, ρ ν π ρ) Ρ(ρ & q) ζ> (Ρρ & Pq)
(Ax. 2.) (1. PL.) (2. Subst.) (3. Def, P.)
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(Proof of 58.)
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
p/lX & Pp/lX = (Η'Δ/1Χ &/lX) & Ρ(Η'Δ/ιΧ &/lX) (Def. P) (Η'Δ/ιΧ &/lX) & Ρ(Η'Δ/ιΧ &/lX) => (HS/lX &/lX) & P(HS/iX &/ιχ) (pl· Lemma 2, Lemma 9, RM.) χ HS^X &/ lX & Ρ(Η'-ι/ιΧ &/ι ) ^ (Lemma 12, Sep) H'-i/lX & P^x &/ lX (Lemma 12, Sep.) H'-i/iX & P/lX &/ lX iD P(-./iX & P/ix) &/ix (Lemma 11.) /lX & P(ViX & P/ix) =>/ix & P(Vix & PViX & P(/lX & P(./ix & P(Vix & P/1X & PP/1X ^ Ta(Ta(/lX, Vi P(|>/lX & Pp/lX) is Ta(Ta(/lX, -i/ix)>/ix) (Lemma 9, RM, Lemma 7, PL.) (P/1X & PJ>/lX) ν P(f/lX & Pp/lX) z, Ta(Ta(/lX, ^X),/1X) Q.E.D.
Proof of 61. F(P/1X & Fp/lX) => Qa(Qa(/lX, Lemma 13. F(q & H'p) => F(p & Fq) Proof of Lemma 13.: 1.
F(H'p&q) = U(q,p)vFU(q ) p)
2. 3. 4.
U(q, ρ) ν FU(q, p) => (F(p & Fq) ν FF(p & Fq)) F(p & Fq) ν FF(p & Fq) => F(p & Fq) F(H'p & q) = F(p & Fq)
(28.)
(Lemma 8., Lemma 9.) (Lemma 7., PL.) (1, 3, Syll.)
Proof of 61.: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
F(P/tx & FP/lX) = F((H'A/lX &/lX) & F(H'A/lX &/,X)) (Def. P.) F((H'A/lX & /lX) & Ρ(Η'Δ/,Χ &/,X)) r> F((H'-,/lX &/lX) & F(H' n/ix&/ix)) (PI. Lemma 9.) F((HS/lX &/lX) & F(HS/lX &/lX)) = F0ix & F(n^x & F^X)) (Lemma 12, RM., Lemma 7, Lemma 13.) F(/lX & F(-,/IX & F/lX)) = F(/,X & F(-,/lX & F/lX)) ν Οίχ & F(ViX & F/lX)) (PL.) F(P/lX & FP/,X) ^ Qa(Qa(/lX, Vix)./ix) (L *> SylL, Def. Qa.) Q.E.D.
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References ANSCOMBE,G.E.M.(1964) 'Before and After*. Philosophical Review, 73:1, 3—24 BARENTSEN A. (1971) 'K opisaniju semantiki kategorii "vid" i "vrem'a" (Na materiale sovremennogo russkogo literaturnogo jazyka).* Amsterdam. Unpubl. BONDARKO, A.V. BULANIN, L.L. (1967) 'Russkij glagol. Posobije dl*a studentov i ucitelej; pod red. JU. S. Maslova. Leningrad. CARNAP, R. (1958) 'Introduction to Symbolic Logic and its Applications.* New York: Dover CLIFFORD, J. (1966) 'Tense logic and the logic of change.* Logique et analyse no. 34,219—230. COOPER, N. (1966) Scale-words. Analysis, vol. 27,1966—1967, pp. 153—159. Cambridge University Press FORSYTH, J.: Ά Grammar of Aspect. Usage and Meaning of the Russian Verb.* Cambridge: JESPERSEN, O. (1924) 'The Philosophy of Grammar.* London: Allen and Unwin KAMP, J.A.W. (1968) 'Tense logic and the theory of linear order.* Diss. Univ. of Calif. KRABBE, E. (1972) 'Propositionele tijdslogica.* Amsterdam. Unpubl. LAKOFF, G. (1970) 'Linguistics and natural logic.* Synthese 22,151—271. POTTS, T. (1969) 'The logical description of changes which take time.* (Abstract) Journal of Symbolic Logic 34, 537. PRIOR, A. (1967) 'Past, Present and Future.* Oxford: Clarendon Press RASSUDOVA, O.P. (1968) 'Upotreblenie vidov glagola v russkom jazyke.* Moskva. REICHENBACH, H. (1947) 'Elements of Symbolic Logic.* London: Collier-Macmillan RUSSELL, B. (1903) 'Principles of Mathematics. Cambridge, Engl.: At the University Press VERKUYL, H. (1971) On the compositional nature of the aspects.* Diss. Utrecht: Routledge and Kegan Paul VON WRIGHT, G. (1963) 'Norm and Action, a Logical Inquiry.* London—(1965). 'And Next', Acta Philosophica Fennica, Fasc. 18.
LAURI KARTTUNEN
PRESUPPOSITION AND LINGUISTIC CONTEXT*
According to a pragmatic view, the presuppositions of a sentence detrmine the class of contexts in which the sentence could be felicitously uttered. Complex sentences present a difficult problem in this framework. No simple "projection method" has been found by which we could compute their presuppositions from those of their constituent clauses. This paper presents a way to eliminate the projection problem. A recursive definition of "satisfaction of presuppositions" is proposed that makes it unnecessary to have any explicit method for assigning presuppositions to compound sentences. A theory of presuppositions becomes a theory of contraints on successive contexts in a fully explicit discourse.
What I present here is a sequel to a couple of my earlier studies on presuppositions. The first one is the paper "Presuppositions of Compound Sentences" (Karttunen 1973a), the other is called "Remarks on Presuppositions" (Karttunen 1973b). I won't review these papers here, but I will start by giving some idea of the backgro nd for the present paper. Earlier I was concerned about two things. First, I wanted to show that there was no adequate notion of presupposition that could be defined in purely semantic terms, that is, in terms of truth conditions. What was needed was a pragmatic notion, something along the lines Stalnaker (1972) had suggested, but not a notion of the speaker's presupposition. I had in mind some definition like the one given under (1). (1) Surface sentence A pragmatically presupposes a logical form L, if and only if it is the case that A can be felicitously uttered only in contexts which entail L. * Presented at the 1973 Winter Meeting of the Linguistic Society of America in San Diego. This work was supported in part by the 1973 Research Workshop on Formal Pragmatics of Natural Language, sponsored by the Mathematical Social Science Board. I acknowledge with special gratitude the contributions of Stanley Peters to my understanding of the problems in this paper. Any remaining confusions are my own.
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Lauri Karttunen
The main point about (1) is that presupposition is viewed as a relation between sentences, or more accurately,