The United States at War
MAGILL’S C H O I C E
The United States at War Volume 1 Revolutionary War — World War I
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The United States at War
MAGILL’S C H O I C E
The United States at War Volume 1 Revolutionary War — World War I
Edited by
John C. Super West Virginia University
Salem Press, Inc. Pasadena, California
Hackensack, New Jersey
Frontispiece: Archibald Willard’s 1891 painting Spirit of ‘76. (National Archives)
Copyright © 2005, by Salem Press, Inc. All rights in this book are reserved. No part of this work may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. For information address the publisher, Salem Press, Inc., P.O. Box 50062, Pasadena, California 91115. ∞ The paper used in these volumes conforms to the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, Z39.48-1992 (R1997) Some essays originally appeared in Censorship (1997), Encyclopedia of Flight (2002), Encyclopedia of the U.S. Supreme Court (2000), Great Events, 1990-2001, Revised Edition (2002), Great Events from History: North American Series, Revised Edition (1997), Human Rights Violations (2002), Magill’s Guide to Military History (2001), Weapons and Warfare (2001), and Women’s Issues (1997). New material has been added.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The United States at war / edited by John C. Super. p. cm. Essays selected from various publications together with new material. Includes bibliographical references and indexes. ISBN-10: 1-58765-236-6 (set: alk. paper) ISBN-10: 1-58765-237-4 (vol. 1 : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 1-58765-238-2 (vol. 2 : alk. paper) ISBN-13: 978-1-58765-236-3 (set 13 digit: alk. paper) [etc.] 1. United States—History, Military. 2. United States—History, Military—Chronology. I. Super, John C., 1944E181.U64 2005 355’.00973—dc22 2005006689
First Printing
printed in the united states of america
Table of Contents Publisher’s Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii Revolutionary War: 1775-1783 Revolutionary War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Censorship During the Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Women in the Revolutionary War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events March, 1770: Boston Massacre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 December, 1773: Boston Tea Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 April, 1775: Battles of Lexington and Concord . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 May, 1775: Battle of Fort Ticonderoga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 June, 1775: Battle of Bunker Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 December, 1775: Battle of Quebec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 August, 1776: Battle of Long Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 September, 1776: Experiments in Submarine Warfare . . . . . . . . . 44 October, 1776: Battle of White Plains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 December, 1776: Battle of Trenton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 January, 1777: Battle of Princeton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 August, 1777: Battle of Oriskany Creek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 September, 1777: Battle of Brandywine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 October, 1777: Battle of Germantown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 October, 1777: Battle of Saratoga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 February, 1778: Franco-American Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 June, 1778: Battle of Monmouth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 September-October, 1779: Siege of Savannah. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 April-May, 1780: Siege of Charleston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 August, 1780: Battle of Camden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 October, 1780: Battle of King’s Mountain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 January, 1781: Battle of Cowpens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 October, 1781: Surrender at Yorktown. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 September, 1783: Treaty of Paris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Further Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 War of 1812: 1812-1814 War of 1812 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Censorship During the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events September, 1813: Battle of Lake Erie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 October, 1813: Battle of the Thames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 v
The United States at War September, 1814: Battle of Lake Champlain . September, 1814: Battle of Baltimore . . . . . January, 1815: Battle of New Orleans. . . . . February, 1815: Treaty of Ghent . . . . . . . . Further Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Mexican War: 1846-1848 Mexican War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Censorship During the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events June, 1835-October, 1836: Texas Revolution . . . . . . . . February-March, 1836: Battle of the Alamo . . . . . . . . April, 1836: Battle of San Jacinto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . June, 1846-January, 1847: Occupation of California and the Southwest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . September, 1846: Battle of Monterrey . . . . . . . . . . . February, 1847: Battle of Buena Vista. . . . . . . . . . . . April, 1847: Battle of Cerro Gordo . . . . . . . . . . . . . September, 1847: Siege of Chapultepec . . . . . . . . . . February, 1848: Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo . . . . . . Further Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Civil War: 1861-1865 Civil War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Weapons, Tactics, and Strategies . . . . . . . Conscription . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Censorship During the War . . . . . . . . . Justice During the War . . . . . . . . . . . . U.S. Supreme Court During the War . . . . Native American Combatants in the War . . Women in the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events October, 1859: Harpers Ferry . . . . . . . April, 1861: Battle of Fort Sumter. . . . . July, 1861: First Battle of Bull Run . . . . February, 1862: Battle of Fort Donelson . March, 1862: Monitor vs. Virginia . . . . . April, 1862: Battle of Shiloh . . . . . . . . June-July, 1862: Seven Days’ Battles . . . August, 1862: Second Battle of Bull Run. September, 1862: Battle of Antietam . . . October, 1862: Battle of Corinth. . . . . . December, 1862: Battle of Fredericksburg May, 1863: Battle of Chancellorsville . . . vi
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108 109 110 115 119
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140 144 145 146 148 149 154
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159 175 191 195 201 206 213 216
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220 224 225 230 230 234 235 237 239 240 241 243
Table of Contents July, 1863: Battles of Gettysburg and Vicksburg . . . . . . September, 1863: Battle of Chickamauga . . . . . . . . . . November, 1863: Battle of Chattanooga . . . . . . . . . . . May, 1864: Battle of the Wilderness . . . . . . . . . . . . . May, 1864: Battle of Spotsylvania Court House . . . . . . . June, 1864: Battle of Cold Harbor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . June, 1864-April, 1865: Siege of Petersburg . . . . . . . . . November, 1864-April, 1865: Sherman’s March to the Sea December, 1864: Battle of Savannah . . . . . . . . . . . . . December, 1864: Battle of Nashville . . . . . . . . . . . . . April, 1865: Surrender at Appomattox. . . . . . . . . . . . Further Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Spanish-American War: 1898 Spanish-American War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Censorship During the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Campaigns, Battles and Other Events July, 1898: Battle of San Juan/El Caney . . . . . . February, 1899-July, 1902: Philippine Insurrection Further Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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245 251 252 253 255 256 258 259 262 263 264 269
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World War I: 1914-1918 World War I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Weapons, Tactics, and Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Air War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Censorship During the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Propaganda and Civil Liberties During the War . . . . . . . U.S. Supreme Court During the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . Women in the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events June, 1917: The Espionage Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . July, 1917: Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . September, 1918: Battle of St. Mihiel . . . . . . . . . . . . September-November, 1918: Meuse-Argonne Offensive November, 1918: Postwar Demobilization . . . . . . . . January, 1919-July, 1921: Treaty of Versailles . . . . . . . Further Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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299 312 326 332 337 342 346
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351 354 358 360 364 369 375
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Publisher’s Note The United States was forged as a nation in a war, and through its long history, it has repeatedly had to go back to war to protect its interests and the freedoms on which it was founded. Although war runs counter to the democratic principles of the nation, it is an unavoidable central theme of American history. As such, it demands study and understanding. The United States at War seeks to meet this need by offering compact surveys of the most important military conflicts with foreign nations in which the United States, as an independent nation, has been involved—from the Revolutionary War of the late eighteenth century through the Iraq War of 2003. The 177 essays in this two-volume set examine these conflicts from a variety of perspectives, ranging from detailed examinations of individual battles to discussions of broader issues of each conflict and overviews of the conflicts themselves. The basic arrangement of The United States at War is chronological, with chapters on eleven wars and periods of conflict: • • • • • • • • • • •
The Revolutionary War The War of 1812 The Mexican War The Civil War The Spanish-American War World War I World War II The Korean War The Vietnam War Conflicts in the Caribbean Post-Cold War Conflicts
It should be noted that while the basic arrangement of The United States at War is chronological, establishing the chronological parameters of each conflict is not always a straightforward matter. For example, while the Revolutionary War is generally seen as beginning with the Battles of Lexington and Concord in April, 1775, the roots of the military conflict go back at least five years earlier. For that reason, the chapter on the Revolutionary War in this volume opens with essays on the Boston Massacre of 1770 and the Boston Tea Party of 1773. Neither event was a military event in the strict sense of the term, but each played an imporix
The United States at War tant role in advancing Great Britain’s North American colonies toward war. Similarly, the roots of the Mexican War of 1846-1848 can be traced, in part, to the Texas Revolution of 1835-1836. While the U.S. government itself was not directly involved in that earlier conflict, the Texas revolt contributed significantly to the conflict between the U.S. and Mexican governments, and for that reason the chapter on the Mexican War contains three essays on the Texas Revolution. The Spanish-American War was a brief conflict that began and ended in the year 1898. However, its conclusion left unresolved the political status of the Philippines, whose people expected to be granted independence after Spain’s defeat. That expectation led to a popular revolt against U.S. occupation that may be seen as an extension of the Spanish-American War, so that revolt is also covered here. The twentieth century’s two great world wars present a different kind of complication. World War I and World War II both began before the United States entered them. Since the subject of The United States at War is U.S. conflicts, no attempt is made here to cover the two world wars comprehensively. Instead, the essays in these volumes focus on U.S. involvement in those wars. Nevertheless, readers will find a great deal of information about other aspects of those wars here. Since its withdrawal from the Vietnam War during the early 1970’s, the United States has been involved in a variety of armed conflicts around the world. Few of these conflicts have merited the label “wars,” but most have involved uniformed troops of the U.S. military. The most important, militarily, of those conflicts are grouped here under two chapter headings: “Conflicts in the Caribbean” and “Post-Cold War Conflicts.” The former chapter covers military episodes in the Caribbean Basin—including Central America—from the Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 through the occupation of Panama in 1989. The Bay of Pigs invasion was not, strictly speaking, a U.S. military operation, but it did involve military operations and the support of the U.S. government. More importantly, it helps to explain later U.S. conflicts in the Caribbean. The section on post-Cold War conflicts in The United States at War may be seen as an unfinished chapter in U.S. military history, as it covers major conflicts that are presently still unfolding, including the U.S. occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. Users of this set may find that by the time they read the essays in that section, the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan have changed dramatically. However, every effort has been made to bring those essays up to date as this set goes to press, and the essays themselves have been written so that they will not quickly go out of date. x
Publisher’s Note Organization Each section on an individual war or conflict opens with an overview of the conflict, followed by essays that examine the conflict and its individual battles and campaigns from a variety of perspectives. For example, the section on the Revolutionary War includes essays on censorship and on the role of women during the war, as well as more than 20 individual battles, the British surrender, and the peace treaty that concluded the war. The section on World War II—the largest military conflict in which the United States has been involved—contains 37 separate essays, including an overview of the war; discussions of weaponry, censorship, the Lend-Lease program, development of the atomic bomb, expansion of the Navy, aerial warfare, the role of women, and essays on 29 individual battles and campaigns. As in all Salem Press reference works, essays all have standardized ready-reference top matter that allows readers to see the most salient facts about each topic at a glance. Most of the set’s essays are on individual battles and campaigns. The top matter in each essay summarizes this information, as relevant: Name of battle or campaign Date Location Combatants Principal commanders Result Special Features At the end of each section, readers will find an extensive Further Reading list on the conflict. Additional general sources on military history are listed in the appendix Bibliography at the end of volume 2. Other appendices include a detailed Time Line of all U.S. military conflicts from 1775 through early 2005 and a Biographical Directory, which contains thumbnail sketches of more than 100 American military and political leaders who are discussed in The United States at War. Volume 2 also contains an Index of Personages and a detailed General Subject Index. The United States at War is richly illustrated with more than 220 illustrations—an average of more than 20 photographs in each section. The set also has numerous maps, time lines, and other graphical material. Acknowledgments Most of the essays in The United States at War are taken from earlier Salem Press publications, including Magill’s Guide to Military History (2001), xi
The United States at War Weapons and Warfare (2001), Great Events from History: North American Series (1997), Censorship (1997), Women’s Issues (1997), and Encyclopedia of Flight (2002). All articles and bibliographies have been updated, as necessary, and entirely new material has been added. The editors of Salem Press would like to thank the many contributors whose writing has made its publications possible. The editors would particularly like to thank Professor John C. Super of West Virginia University for serving as Editor of The United States at War.
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Contributors Richard Adler University of Michigan at Dearborn
William S. Brockington University of South Carolina, Aiken
William Allison Weber State University
Thomas W. Buchanan Ancilla Domini College
Lenna H. Allred Texas A&M University
David D. Buck University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
Stephen E. Ambrose Louisiana State University, New Orleans
Douglas Campbell Independent Scholar
Eleanor B. Amico Independent Scholar Charles F. Bahmueller Center for Civic Education Maryanne Barsotti Independent Scholar Peter K. Benbow University of Oxford Meredith William Berg Valparaiso University Margaret Boe Birns New York University Steve D. Boilard Independent Scholar John Braeman University of Nebraska John A. Britton Francis Marion University
Byron D. Cannon University of Utah Michael S. Casey Graceland University Gilbert T. Cave Lakeland Community College Paul John Chara, Jr. Northwestern College Frederick B. Chary Indiana University Northwest Ronald J. Cima Library of Congress Thomas Clarkin University of Texas at San Antonio Ross F. Collins North Dakota State University James J. Cooke University of Mississippi
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The United States at War William J. Cooper, Jr. Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge Charles E. Cottle University of Wisconsin Edward R. Crowther Adams State College Bruce J. DeHart University of North Carolina at Pembroke Jennifer Eastman Clark University Ralph L. Eckert Pennsylvania State University at Erie Peter R. Faber United States Air Force Academy Randall Fegley Pennsylvania State University John W. Fiero University of Louisiana at Lafayette Michael Shaw Findlay California State University, Chico John E. Finn Wesleyan University Michael S. Fitzgerald Pikeville College Dale L. Flesher University of Mississippi George Q. Flynn State University of New York, Plattsburgh
Tom Frazier Cumberland College Paul A. Frisch Washington & Jefferson College Michael P. Gabriel Kutztown University Keith Garebian Independent Scholar K. Fred Gillum Colby College Richard A. Glenn Millersville University Nancy M. Gordon Independent Scholar Robert F. Gorman Southwest Texas State University Lewis L. Gould University of Texas at Austin Daniel G. Graetzer Independent Scholar Michael Haas University of Hawaii at Manoa William I. Hair Florida State University Irwin Halfond McKendree College Pamela Hayes-Bohanan McAllen Memorial Library Peter B. Heller Manhattan College xiv
Contributors R. Don Higginbotham University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Kay Hively Independent Scholar Samuel B. Hoff Delaware State University
Joseph Edward Lee Winthrop University Van M. Leslie Union College Thomas Tandy Lewis Anoka-Ramsey Community College
Donald Holley University of Arkansas, Monticello
Eric v.d. Luft State University of New York, Upstate Medical University
John Quinn Imholte University of Minnesota, Morris
William M. McBride U.S. Naval Academy
W. Turrentine Jackson University of California, Davis
Joseph M. McCarthy Suffolk University
Lance Janda Cameron University
Dana P. McDermott Independent Scholar
Bruce E. Johansen University of Nebraska, Omaha
Paul D. Mageli Independent Scholar
Charles W. Johnson University of Tennessee
Carl Henry Marcoux University of California, Riverside
Richard C. Kagan Hamline University
Thomas D. Matijasic Prestonsburg Community College
Burton Kaufman Louisiana State University, New Orleans
James I. Matray New Mexico State University
Christopher E. Kent Independent Scholar Jeffrey Kimball Miami University Gayla Koerting Independent Scholar
Maurice K. Melton Andrew College Liesel Ashley Miller Mississippi State University Bert M. Mutersbaugh Eastern Kentucky University
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The United States at War Burl L. Noggle Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge Cynthia Clark Northrup University of Texas at Arlington Robert J. Paradowski Rochester Institute of Technology Marilyn Elizabeth Perry Independent Scholar John C. Pinheiro University of Tennessee, Knoxville Julio César Pino Kent State University Mark A. Plummer Illinois State University John Powell Cumberland College Eugene L. Rasor Emory & Henry College William G. Ratliff Georgia Southern University Stacy W. Reaves Oklahoma State University William L. Richter Cameron College Edward J. Rielly Saint Joseph’s College of Maine Henry O. Robertson Louisiana State University, Alexandria
Richard H. Sander Woodstock Institute Sean J. Savage Saint Mary’s College Helmut J. Schmeller Fort Hays State University Larry Schweikart University of Dayton Terry L. Seip Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge R. Baird Shuman University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign Michael J. Siler California State University, Los Angeles David Curtis Skaggs Bowling Green State University Chuck Smith West Virginia State College Roger Smith Independent Scholar W. Calvin Smith University of South Carolina, Aiken John A. Sondey South Dakota State University Ronald L. Spiller Edinboro University of Pennsylvania Leon Stein Roosevelt University xvi
Contributors David L. Sterling University of Cincinnati
Spencer C. Tucker Texas Christian University
Leslie Stricker Park University
William M. Tuttle University of Kansas
Taylor Stults Muskingum College
Robert D. Ubriaco, Jr. University of Illinois
Glenn L. Swygart Tennessee Temple University
William E. Watson Immaculata University
Jachin W. Thacker Western Kentucky University
Henry Weisser Colorado State University
Emory M. Thomas University of Georgia
Richard Whitworth Ball State University
Mark Thompson University of North Carolina at Pembroke
Theodore A. Wilson University of Kansas
Brian G. Tobin Lassen College Kenneth William Townsend Coastal Carolina University Anne Trotter Memphis State University
Thomas Winter University of Cincinnati Michael Witkoski Independent Scholar C. E. Wood University of Nebraska, Lincoln Robert Zaller Drexel University
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The United States at War
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The United States at War
MAGILL’S C H O I C E
The United States at War Volume 2 World War II — Post-Cold War Conflicts Appendices Indexes Edited by
John C. Super West Virginia University
Salem Press, Inc. Pasadena, California
Hackensack, New Jersey
Frontispiece: U.S. Marines patrolling in Afghanistan in April, 2004. (U.S. Department of Defense)
Copyright © 2005, by Salem Press, Inc. All rights in this book are reserved. No part of this work may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. For information address the publisher, Salem Press, Inc., P.O. Box 50062, Pasadena, California 91115. ∞ The paper used in these volumes conforms to the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, Z39.48-1992 (R1997) Some essays originally appeared in Censorship (1997), Encyclopedia of Flight (2002), Encyclopedia of the U.S. Supreme Court (2000), Great Events, 1990-2001, Revised Edition (2002), Great Events from History: North American Series, Revised Edition (1997), Human Rights Violations (2002), Magill’s Guide to Military History (2001), Weapons and Warfare (2001), and Women’s Issues (1997). New material has been added.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The United States at war / edited by John C. Super. p. cm. Essays selected from various publications together with new material. Includes bibliographical references and indexes. ISBN-10: 1-58765-236-6 (set: alk. paper) ISBN-10: 1-58765-237-4 (vol. 1 : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 1-58765-238-2 (vol. 2 : alk. paper) ISBN-13: 978-1-58765-236-3 (set 13 digit: alk. paper) [etc.] 1. United States—History, Military. 2. United States—History, Military—Chronology. I. Super, John C., 1944E181.U64 2005 355’.00973—dc22 2005006689
First Printing
printed in the united states of america
Table of Contents World War II: 1939-1945 World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Weapons, Tactics, and Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Naval War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Air War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U.S. Supreme Court During the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . Women in the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Censorship During the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events August, 1939: Mobilization for Possible War . . . . . . . September, 1939-May, 1945: Battle of the North Atlantic March, 1941: Lend-Lease Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . December, 1941: Battle of Pearl Harbor . . . . . . . . . . December, 1941: Axis Declaration of War on the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . December, 1941-April, 1942: Battle of Bataan . . . . . . . February, 1942: Japanese American Internment . . . . . May, 1942: Battle of the Coral Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . June, 1942: Battle of Midway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . June, 1942: Manhattan Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . August, 1942-February, 1943: Battle of Guadalcanal . . . November, 1942: North Africa Invasion . . . . . . . . . . July-September, 1943: Italy Invasion . . . . . . . . . . . . September-October, 1943: Battle of Salerno . . . . . . . . November, 1943: Battle of Tarawa . . . . . . . . . . . . . June, 1944: Operation Overlord. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . June-July, 1944: Battle for Saipan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . June, 1944: Superfortress Bombing of Japan. . . . . . . . July-August, 1944: Battle of Guam . . . . . . . . . . . . . July-August, 1944: Battle of Tinian . . . . . . . . . . . . . October, 1944: Battle for Leyte Gulf . . . . . . . . . . . . December, 1944: Battle of the Bulge . . . . . . . . . . . . February, 1945: Yalta Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . February-March, 1945: Battle for Iwo Jima . . . . . . . . April-July, 1945: Battle of Okinawa. . . . . . . . . . . . . May, 1945: V-E Day. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . July-August, 1945: Potsdam Conference. . . . . . . . . . August, 1945: Atomic Bombing of Japan . . . . . . . . . Further Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxv
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381 397 407 414 422 427 431
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437 441 442 446
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451 455 457 462 464 468 472 477 482 485 487 488 493 494 498 500 501 507 512 515 517 518 522 525 530
The United States at War Korean War: 1950-1953 Korean War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Air War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Censorship During the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events July-September, 1950: Battle of the Pusan Perimeter . September, 1950: Inchon Landing . . . . . . . . . . . October, 1950-April, 1951: Truman-MacArthur Confrontation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . April, 1951: Battle of Imjin River . . . . . . . . . . . . March-July, 1953: Battle of Pork Chop Hill . . . . . . Further Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vietnam War: 1960’s-1975 Vietnam War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Weapons, Tactics, and Strategies . . . . . . . . . The Peace Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Justice During the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U.S. Supreme Court During the War . . . . . . Women in the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ethics of the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Censorship During the War . . . . . . . . . . . Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events August, 1964: Gulf of Tonkin Resolution . . November, 1965: Battle of Ia Drang Valley . January-April, 1968: Siege of Khe Sanh . . . January-February, 1968: Tet Offensive . . . . January-February, 1968: Battle of Hue . . . . March, 1968: My Lai Massacre . . . . . . . . April-June, 1970: Cambodia Invasion . . . . March, 1973: U.S. Withdrawal from Vietnam Further Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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561 565 566 568
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573 581 590 595 600 605 609 613
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619 620 621 622 624 625 631 635 639
Conflicts in the Caribbean: 1961-1989 Conflicts in the Caribbean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1962: Cuban Missile Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1965: Dominican Republic Occupation . . . . . . . 1983: Grenada Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1983: Censorship During the Grenada Occupation. 1989: Panama Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Further Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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653 658 663 665 669 671 674
Table of Contents Post-Cold War Conflicts: 1991-2005 Post-Cold War Conflicts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events 1991: Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1991: Censorship During the Gulf War . . . . . . 1991: Air War in the Gulf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1991: Women in the Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . . 1992: “No Fly” Zone in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1992: Somalia Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1994: U.S. Troops in Bosnia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1995: NATO Troops in Bosnia. . . . . . . . . . . . 1998: Missile Attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan. 1998: Bombing of Military Sites in Iraq . . . . . . 2000: Terrorist Attack on the USS Cole . . . . . . . 2001: Terrorist Attacks on the United States. . . . 2001: Invasion of Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . 2001: War on Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2003: Iraq War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2003: Postwar Occupation of Iraq . . . . . . . . . Further Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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686 691 693 698 701 704 708 710 713 716 719 722 727 732 743 751 758
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 763 Time Line of U.S. Wars and Battles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 775 Biographical Directory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 782 Index of Personages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 797 Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
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The United States at War
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Revolutionary War 1775-1783 Revolutionary War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Censorship During the Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Women in the Revolutionary War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events . . . . . . . . March, 1770: Boston Massacre . . . . . . . . . . . . . December, 1773: Boston Tea Party . . . . . . . . . . . April, 1775: Battles of Lexington and Concord . . . . May, 1775: Battle of Fort Ticonderoga . . . . . . . . . June, 1775: Battle of Bunker Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . December, 1775: Battle of Quebec . . . . . . . . . . . August, 1776: Battle of Long Island . . . . . . . . . . September, 1776: Experiments in Submarine Warfare October, 1776: Battle of White Plains. . . . . . . . . . December, 1776: Battle of Trenton . . . . . . . . . . . January, 1777: Battle of Princeton . . . . . . . . . . . August, 1777: Battle of Oriskany Creek . . . . . . . . September, 1777: Battle of Brandywine . . . . . . . . October, 1777: Battle of Germantown . . . . . . . . . October, 1777: Battle of Saratoga . . . . . . . . . . . . February, 1778: Franco-American Treaties . . . . . . June, 1778: Battle of Monmouth . . . . . . . . . . . . September-October, 1779: Siege of Savannah . . . . . April-May, 1780: Siege of Charleston . . . . . . . . . August, 1780: Battle of Camden . . . . . . . . . . . . October, 1780: Battle of King’s Mountain . . . . . . . January, 1781: Battle of Cowpens. . . . . . . . . . . . October, 1781: Surrender at Yorktown . . . . . . . . . September, 1783: Treaty of Paris . . . . . . . . . . . .
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26 26 30 34 38 40 41 42 44 47 48 50 52 56 57 58 62 67 68 70 71 72 73 74 78
Further Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
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Revolutionary War At issue: Independence of thirteen British colonies in North America Date: April 19, 1775-September 3, 1783 Location: Atlantic seaboard from Georgia to New England and Quebec Combatants: British vs. Americans and French allies Principal commanders: British, Sir Henry Clinton (1738-1795), Sir William Howe (1729-1814); American, Lieutenant General George Washington (1732-1799); French, comte de Rochambeau (1725-1807) Principal battles: Lexington and Concord, Bunker Hill, Quebec, Long Island, White Plains, Trenton, Princeton, Brandywine, Germantown, Saratoga, Monmouth, Siege of Savannah, Siege of Charleston, Camden, King’s Mountain, Cowpens, Yorktown Result: The American victory led to Britain’s recognizing the United States of America as an independent nation in the 1783 Treaty of Paris. The American Revolution resulted from longstanding friction between Britain and its North American colonies. After its 1763 victory in the French and Indian War (1754-1763), the British government decided to maintain a 6,000-man standing army in North America to protect its newly obtained territory between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River. The colonists, suspicious of the new army, were outraged by the prospect that they were to pay a share of its maintenance cost. American discontent continued throughout the 1760’s as the British parliament enacted laws to regulate or tax the colonies. Among the most offensive laws were the Currency Act of 1764, the Sugar Act of 1764, and the Quartering Act of 1765. Colonial Protests Parliament’s passage of the Stamp Act in the spring of 1765 provoked protests and open resistance everywhere in the colonies. The law affected practically every American; it required tax stamps on newspapers, playing cards, dice, marriage licenses, and many other legal documents. The revenue from these stamp duties contributed to maintaining the British army in America. Mobs, called the Sons of Liberty, harassed the stamp distributors. The colonial assemblies and a Stamp Act Congress, held in New York in October, 1765, called for the repeal of the Stamp Act. Colonists also boycotted British goods, a strategy that proved to be more effective than the protests. British manufacturers and merchants adversely affected by the boycott called for Parliament to abolish the Stamp Act, which it did in March, 1766. (continued on page 7)
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Time Line of the Revolutionary War Mar. 5, 1770
Boston Massacre: British soldiers kill five American civilians and wound several others in a bloody encounter that symbolized colonial unrest.
Dec. 16, 1773
Boston Tea Party: Group of men calling themselves the “Sons of Liberty” dumped forty-five tons of tea into Boston Harbor.
Apr. 19, 1775
Battles of Lexington and Concord: American Minute Men confront British troops on Lexington Common. When someone fires “the shot heard round the world,” both Americans and British open fire and the war begins.
May 10-11, 1775
Battle of Fort Ticonderoga: Colonel Ethan Allen and co-commander Benedict Arnold lead a successful, bloodless victory against a surprised British garrison.
June 17, 1775
Battle of Bunker Hill: Americans engage British at Breed’s Hill near Boston; British win but sustain heavy losses.
Dec. 31, 1775
Battle of Quebec: Americans mount two offensives against British Canada but are defeated.
Mar. 17, 1776
British evacuate Boston, retreating to Halifax, Nova Scotia.
July 4, 1776
Declaration of Independence approved by Congress.
Aug. 27-30, 1776
Battle of Long Island: Leading the British, General William Howe and Admiral Richard Howe enter New York harbor, land twenty thousand troops on Long Island, and establish a base of operations. General George Washington retreats to Manhattan Island. British occupy New York City by September.
Sept. 6-7, 1776
Submarine experiments.
Oct. 11, 1776
Battle of Valcour Bay: British commander Guy Carleton attacks American General Benedict Arnold at Lake Champlain, routing the American flotilla.
Oct. 28, 1776
Battle of White Plains: British defeat Americans, who take heavy losses. Washington’s troops retreat to Peekskill, Ft. Lee, and Trenton, New Jersey.
Dec. 26, 1776
Battle of Trenton: Washington defeats the British after crossing the icy Delaware River in a surprise attack.
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Jan. 3, 1777
Battle of Princeton: Washington routs British near Princeton, New Jersey, and then establishes headquarters in Morristown.
June-July, 1777
British advance from Lake Champlain: General John Burgoyne leads British forces up the Hudson River, taking strategic points at Fort Ticonderoga, Mt. Defiance, and Fort Anne.
Aug. 6, 1777
Battle of Oriskany Creek: Southeast of Lake Ontario and Fort Stanwix, an Indian force fighting for the British under Chief Joseph Brant ambushes Americans under General Nicholas Herkimer. Native American losses and renewed American efforts force the British to retreat.
Aug. 16, 1777
Battle of Bennington: In Vermont, a German contingent fighting for the British under the orders of Burgoyne is routed by the Americans under General John Stark.
Sept. 11, 1777
Battle of Brandywine: In Pennsylvania, the British force Washington and his men to retreat to Philadelphia, occupying that city by September 26.
Oct. 4, 1777
Battle of Germantown: Washington’s attack on British forces fails when fog confuses his troops. Americans retreat to Valley Forge, where they will spend a harsh winter.
Oct. 8-17, 1777
Battle of Saratoga: Burgoyne’s campaign to capture Albany, New York, is foiled when Benedict Arnold assaults British forces at Bemis Heights; Burgoyne retreats. One week later, Burgoyne and his British forces surrender.
Nov., 1777
Articles of Confederation submitted to the states: After a year of debate, the Continental Congress devises a plan of government and submits it to the states for ratification, achieved in March, 1781.
Feb. 6, 1778
Franco-American Treaties: France agrees to assist Americans against British.
June 28, 1778
Battle of Monmouth: After a severe winter at Valley Forge, George Washington and the Americans pursue General Henry Clinton, who had commanded the British campaign in Philadelphia. Under General Charles Lee, the Americans rout the British; Washington later engages Clinton in an ensuing battle, forcing a British retreat.
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Time Line of the Revolutionary War—continued July-Aug., 1778
Attack at Newport: In Rhode Island, combined American and French forces are repelled after attempting to take a British garrison.
July 15, 1779
Battle of Stony Point: American General Anthony Wayne takes Stony Point, on the Hudson River, from Clinton.
Aug. 29, 1779
Battle of Newtown: At modern-day Elmira, New York, Americans under General John Sullivan defeat British loyalists and Indians who had been terrorizing frontier settlements of Pennsylvania and New York.
Sept. 23-Oct. 18, 1779
Siege of Savannah: In Georgia, American and French forces fail to take Savannah from the British, suffering heavy casualties.
Apr. 1,-May 12, 1780
Siege of Charleston: General Clinton assaults Charleston, South Carolina, capturing the American garrison and four ships—the greatest American losses of the war.
Aug. 16, 1780
Battle of Camden: In South Carolina, Americans under General Horatio Gates move against the British under Lord Cornwallis but are routed, opening the way for a British advance into North Carolina.
Sept., 1780
Treason of Benedict Arnold: After supplying the British with information for more than a year, Arnold is exposed in a plot to hand over the American garrison at West Point. He becomes a British officer and conducts British assaults on Virginia and Connecticut in 1781.
Oct. 7, 1780
Battle of King’s Mountain: British troops are repelled by Carolina backwoodsmen, forcing Cornwallis to retreat to Winnsborough.
Jan. 17, 1781
Battle of Cowpens: In South Carolina, American General Daniel Morgan repels the British forces of General Banastre Tarleton.
Mar. 15, 1781
Battle of Guilford Courthouse: American General Nathanael Greene engages Cornwallis in North Carolina; Americans are defeated but seriously weaken the British, forcing their retreat.
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Oct. 19, 1781
Surrender at Yorktown: Having abandoned the Carolinas for Virginia, Cornwallis and the British establish a base at Yorktown but French ground and naval forces join with the Americans to hem him in, forcing surrender. Despite General Clinton’s remaining forces in New York, the British are essentially defeated.
Sept. 3, 1783
Treaty of Paris: British and Americans negotiate a peace settlement.
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American joy over the repeal of the Stamp Act did not last long. In 1767, Chancellor of the Exchequer Charles Townshend managed to obtain the enactment of duties on several items imported by the colonies. The revenue from these taxes paid the salaries of royal governors and other royal officials in America, thereby making them independent of the colonial assemblies. In order to strengthen the enforcement of the Acts of Trade, Parliament also provided for the granting of general search warrants and suspended the New York Assembly until it complied with the Quartering Act of 1765. Again the Americans resisted and although the boycott was not as extensive as that against the Stamp Act, British manufacturers once again called for a repeal of the taxes. In 1768, the royal governor of Massachusetts requested that the British government send troops to enforce the trade regulations. On orders from London, the commander of British forces in America, Major General Thomas Gage, sent a regiment to Boston. In June, enraged Bostonians forced the customs commissioners to seek protection on a British warship. In retaliation, the British cabinet ordered two regiments from Ireland to Boston. By the spring of 1769, four British regiments occupied the city; two were withdrawn in May, but the others remained. The Boston Massacre The citizens of Boston, enraged because they expected the entire British force to withdraw, increased their confrontations with the soldiers. On March 5, 1770, in what is remembered as the Boston Massacre, a mob gathered at the Customs House clashed with troops; the soldiers killed five civilians and wounded several others. Fearing a general uprising, the Massachusetts royal officials ordered the troops to withdraw from Boston. Meanwhile, under pressure from the American boycott and British business interests, Parliament withdrew the duty on all American imports except tea.
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Major Sites in the Revolutionary War CANADA
I .
U
oR
O M
O hi
AN AC
HI
VIRGINIA
Boston
MASSACHUSETTS
Long Island
New York Morristown Trenton
S
Valley Forge
N
TA
N
MAINE (MASS.) NEW HAMPSHIRE
Lexington Newport White RHODE ISLAND Plains CONNECTICUT
Philadelphia
Ft. Pitt
NEW JERSEY DELAWARE MARYLAND Chesapeake Bay
Yorktown
Guilford Courthouse
NORTH CAROLINA
APP
AL
Hudson R.
Albany
PENNSYLVANIA
Halifax
L. Champlain
Ft. Ticonderoga Ft. Stanwix Saratoga
NEW YORK
TIA
NO
Montreal . St
CO
VA
La wr e nc eR .
S
Quebec
Cowpens
King’s Mt. Camden Wilmington
SOUTH CAROLINA GEORGIA
A t l a n t i c O c e a n
Charles Town Savannah
In the fall of 1773, the British East India Company made several shipments of low-priced tea to America. Purchase of the tea would require payment of the tea tax. In most ports, the ships were turned back, but in Boston, customs officials planned to sell some of the tea. On the night of December 16, some Bostonians, dressed as Indians, rowed out to the tea ships in the harbor and dumped their cargo overboard. King George III and Parliament’s response to the Boston Tea Party was the passage of the Coercive (Intolerable) Acts of 1774, which closed Boston’s port and reined in the government of Massachusetts.
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9
After General Gage moved more troops to Boston to enforce the new laws, the various colonial assemblies called for a Continental Congress to draw up a redress of grievances. The First Continental Congress met in Philadelphia in September and October; it demanded the repeal of all objectionable laws passed since 1763 and agreed to meet in May, 1775, if Parliament did not respond favorably. Military Action In early 1775, King George, with the support of Parliament, decided to use military force to maintain British authority in America. General Gage moved against the insubordinate citizens in Massachusetts. He sent troops to seize the colonists’ store of powder and weapons at Concord. At Lexington (April 19, 1775), 70 militiamen confronted an advance party of the 700 British troops. In that skirmish, 8 Americans died. The British then marched quickly to Concord, where they destroyed the American supplies. At the north bridge in Concord, about 350 Americans attacked a British unit; they killed 3 and wounded 8. As the British returned to Boston, thousands of colonists fired on them from both sides of their eighteen-mile route. More than 15,000 indignant New Englanders surrounded Boston. The American Revolution had begun. On June 12, 1775, the British major generals Henry Clinton, William Howe, and John Burgoyne arrived in Boston on the frigate Cerberus. They brought orders for Gage to move vigorously against the army of Ameri-
George Washington taking command of the American army at Cambridge, Massachusetts, after the Battle of Bunker Hill. From a painting by M. A. Wageman. (National Archives)
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cans surrounding the city. In response, Gage decided to occupy Bunker Hill and Breed’s Hill, the high points on the peninsula south of Boston. The Americans learned of the British plan and set out to occupy Bunker Hill (June 17, 1775), but instead occupied Breed’s Hill. Patriots numbering 2,200 withstood two frontal attacks on Breed’s Hill but a third assault drove the patriots to Bunker Hill and then on to the mainland. The British force of 2,500 lost 271 soldiers and 783 were wounded; the hills they captured were of little military value. After Bunker Hill, the Second Continental Congress appointed George Washington commander in chief. Washington went to Boston to organize the army. On March 17, 1776, Washington began an artillery bombardment of Boston. Howe, realizing that he could not dislodge the Americans and unwilling to see Boston leveled, took his army to Halifax, Nova Scotia. Canada In 1775, Americans also took action to draw Canada into rebellion against the British. An American force of 83 under the command of Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold captured Fort Ticonderoga (May 10) and Crown Point (May 11), giving America control of Lake Champlain. In late June, Congress ordered the capture of Montreal. Brigadier General Richard
Members of the Second Continental Congress vote for independence in mid-1776. Painting by Robert Pine and Edward Savage. (National Archives)
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Montgomery led a force to Montreal and after a three-month siege captured Fort St. John’s (November 2) and entered Montreal on November 10. He then moved on to join Arnold to prepare an attack of Quebec. Under the cover of a snowstorm, about 1,000 Americans attacked Quebec (December 30), but the 1,200 British defenders repulsed them. More than half of the American army was killed or captured; Montgomery was mortally wounded. This defeat ended the American attempts to capture Canada. The Americans faced an enemy that had a much greater population, a professional army, and a vastly superior navy. The British troops, however, were three thousand miles from England and had to operate in an area about one thousand by six hundred miles. After his defeat at Long Island in 1776, Washington determined that the colonies could not win by victory in a general action, a huge battle that would decide everything. He chose to fight a defensive war, avoiding a general action. He fought a war of attrition, protracting the struggle and wearing down the British will to win. Washington did strive to keep a regular, organized army in the field. He rejected a partisan war that would rely on the militias; he contended that without a trained army to support them the part-time soldiers would hesitate to fight. In 1776 and 1777, the British strategy was to isolate and defeat New England, then move on the middle and southern colonies. Between 1778 and 1781, the British attempted to conquer the south, then use it as a base from which to move northward. Both plans failed largely because of the difficulties of logistics and communication and because of friction among the British commanders. In spring, 1776, British reinforcements arrived in America. General Clinton sailed from New York with 3,000 men to strike the Carolinas in the hope that the Loyalists there would join his forces. He and Admiral Peter Parker attempted to capture Charleston. For eleven hours, the British ships exchanged cannon fire with the fort at the mouth of the harbor on Sullivan’s Island (June 28, 1776). The British suffered heavy casualties and withdrew; shortly thereafter they sailed back to New York. The next British offensive was an attack on New York City; General Howe led 32,000 troops in a three-pronged attack against Washington’s 19,000 poorly trained soldiers at the western end of Long Island (August 27-28, 1776). The Americans did not expect this flanking maneuver, and they suffered 2,000 dead or wounded and 1,000 captured. During the night, Washington moved his troops to Manhattan. Howe landed his troops in Manhattan on September 15 and quickly moved north and west as far as Harlem Heights (September 16) where, in several encounters, the patriots halted his advance. On October 18, the British landed troops north of Washington near New Rochelle. Washington had no choice but to retreat
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west. The American army took up a defensive position at White Plains (October 28), but a British assault drove them to higher ground behind White Plains. On November 5, Howe marched his army back to Manhattan to establish winter quarters. Washington Crosses the Delaware In December, Washington crossed the Delaware River to Pennsylvania and planned a surprise attack on the British, who had settled into winter quarters in towns in New York and New Jersey. He led 2,400 Continentals back across the river into New Jersey and routed a Hessian garrison in Trenton (December 26, 1776). Washington returned to New Jersey again on December 30 and defeated the British troops in Princeton (January 3, 1777). He then established his winter headquarters in Morristown. In the summer of 1777, Howe moved by sea from New York with a force of 15,000 men with the goal of capturing Philadelphia. They landed at the head of the Chesapeake Bay on August 25 and began the march to Philadelphia. Washington, with a force of 8,000 Continental soldiers and 3,000 militia, blocked Howe’s army twenty-five miles southwest of Philadelphia at Brandywine (September 11). Howe assaulted the center and east flank of Washington’s lines, forcing the patriots to retreat. Howe entered Philadelphia on September 25. Washington, however, was unwilling to give up Philadelphia and moved against the British rearguard of 9,000 in Germantown (October 4, 1777). The Americans had the advantage of surprise in their early-morning attack. In the fog, however, one Continental column fired on another, and in the confusion, the British drove them back. Although Howe met success in Pennsylvania, British troops under Burgoyne suffered major losses in New York. On July 5, Burgoyne recaptured Fort Ticonderoga; however, as his army then made its way down the Hudson Valley, he was menaced by American soldiers and, by August, faced a dilemma. He sent 1,400 Redcoats and Hessians to capture supplies. Four miles northwest of Bennington (August 16), 2,600 American militia routed the British, capturing 700 and killing or wounding 200 others. This left Burgoyne weakened as he continued down the valley toward Albany. An army of 7,000 Americans under the command of General Horatio Gates met Burgoyne head on at Freeman’s Farm near Saratoga (September 19, 1777); 2,400 British troops attempted to turn the American left flank. They forced the Americans back but did not break through their lines. Burgoyne attempted the maneuver again on October 7 and suffered 700 casualties. He retreated to Saratoga, where he surrendered his army of 5,000 to Gates on October 17. This victory encouraged France to enter the war as America’s ally.
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George Washington meeting with a congressional committee at Valley Forge. From a painting by W. H. Powell. (National Archives)
During the winter of 1777-1778, Washington made winter camp in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, where his army suffered from the severe weather and a lack of basic supplies. Nevertheless, a veteran of the Prussian army, Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, strengthened the troops by rigorous drilling. At the end of the winter, Clinton took Howe’s place as British commander in chief. In June, Clinton ended the occupation of Philadelphia and marched his army across New Jersey toward New York. Washington left Valley Forge in pursuit. With almost 10,000 troops, he intercepted the equal-sized British forces in New Jersey at Monmouth (June 28, 1778). After a clash with the enemy, General Charles Lee ordered his 5,000 Continental troops to retreat. Infuriated, Washington rode to the front and took command. He stopped the retreat and maneuvered his complete forces onto the field. The clash between the two armies was indecisive; the discipline of Washington’s army proved the value of Steuben’s training. Clinton protected his army by moving it to New York. After 1778, no major military campaigns took place in the north, the contest there became one of attrition and endurance. At the end of the year, Clinton moved his offensive to the south. On December 29, 1778, British troops captured Savannah, Georgia, and on January 29, they captured Augusta. In the fall of 1779, the French fleet
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Despite the great superiority of British naval power, Americans scored some significant naval victories under the leadership of John Paul Jones, seen here directing the capture of the British ship Serapis off the east coast of England on September 23, 1779. (National Archives)
sailed to Savannah and landed 3,500 French troops to supplement the 1,500 American soldiers of General Benjamin Lincoln in a Siege of Savannah (October 9). The Americans and French suffered more than 800 casualties in their unsuccessful assault of the city. The British victory allowed them to concentrate on a conquest of the Carolinas. In December, Clinton sailed from New York with 8,000 troops and besieged Charleston (April 1-May 12, 1780). Lincoln’s more than 5,000 troops were unable to escape and endured the attack for more than six weeks until they were forced to surrender. Clinton left Lord Charles Cornwallis in command and returned to New York. When American troops under Gates moved against British posts in northern South Carolina, Cornwallis rushed to their aid. These forces, 3,000 Americans and 2,200 British, clashed near Camden (August 16, 1780). The militia on the American left flank fled, and Gates’s army was routed, losing 750 men by death or capture. Cornwallis advanced into North Carolina until he heard of the American victory at King’s Mountain (October 7, 1780), where a body of 900 North Carolina militia fought about 1,000 loyalists, killing 225 and capturing more than 700. Deprived of these supporters, Cornwallis bivouacked for three months south of Camden. At the beginning of 1781, Cornwallis, his troops reinforced, again
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planned to move against North Carolina but was diverted. The new American southern commander, Nathanael Greene, aided by Generals Daniel Morgan and Henry “Light Horse Harry” Lee began a series of guerrilla tactics. Cornwallis sent part of his force after Morgan, who lured the British into a devastating defeat at Cowpens (January 17, 1781). Yet, Cornwallis pursued Greene’s army until it reached Dan River in Virginia; there, too far from his base of supplies, Cornwallis withdrew to Hillsborough, North Carolina. Greene gathered an army of more than 4,500 militia and Continentals and moved against Cornwallis; he clashed with the British force of about 2,400 near Guilford Courthouse (March 15). Cornwallis attacked, forcing the Americans to withdraw, but Cornwallis suffered heavy losses for the victory, and to preserve his army, he moved it toward Virginia. With Cornwallis gone, Greene stepped up his action in South Carolina and Georgia. As the Americans advanced, they captured outpost after outpost until the remnant of the British forces withdrew to Charleston. In September, Greene moved to capture Charleston but was cut off by British troops under Colonel Alexander Stuart, who forced the Americans to retreat but at the loss of two-fifths of his force. Greene’s strategy of maintaining his army while wearing down the enemy severely weakened the British in Georgia and the Carolinas. Cornwallis reached Virginia where he assembled 7,000 men. He moved to Yorktown and at the end of July began to build fortifications. In the spring of 1781, a French fleet of twenty warships, with orders to cooperate with Washington, arrived in the United States. Washington first planned a sea and land attack on New York, but then he accepted the advice of the French commander, the comte de Rochambeau, to trap Cornwallis in Yorktown (September 28-October 19, 1781). They marched south swiftly with 2,500 American and 5,000 French troops. Meanwhile, on September 7, the French navy landed 3,000 troops and covered Cornwallis’s lines on the land side of Yorktown. Washington’s army arrived in late September and was soon bolstered by 9,000 Maryland and Virginia militia. On September 28, Washington laid siege to Yorktown. By October 17, the FrancoAmerican army had forced Cornwallis into his inner fortifications. The British had no hope of escape, and on October 19, Cornwallis surrendered. Aftermath After Yorktown, the fighting in America virtually ended. The war formally concluded on September 3, 1783, with the signing of the Treaty of Paris, in which Britain recognized the United States of America as an independent nation. Chuck Smith
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Censorship During the Revolution The revolt of American colonists against British rule tested the rebels’ commitment to liberty; they suppressed dissent by those who expressed loyalty to Britain or dissatisfaction with armed insurrection. The American war against Great Britain began with the battle at Lexington, Massachusetts, on April 19, 1775, but the struggle by American rebels for the support of their fellow colonists preceded this skirmish. It has been estimated by historians that colonists who remained loyal to the British monarchy may have numbered 20 percent at the most, but the strength of loyalist support varied widely between and within colonies. Disloyalty to the British crown was not a step taken lightly, and as long as the conflict was viewed as between the American colonies and the British parliament, many who were later considered loyalists or Tories often supported measured resistance to perceived threats to their liberties by Britain. The lines between American patriots and loyalists began to harden after Lexington, and they became fixed after the Declaration of Independence. Actions and even words against the American cause brought swift and often harsh censure. Continental Association In 1774 delegates from the thirteen colonies met as the First Continental Congress to seek redress of grievances against Britain that dated back to 1763. After failing in their previous attempts to petition Great Britain’s Parliament to rescind what many American colonists considered unjust encroachments upon colonial prerogatives, the Continental Congress set up the Continental Association to put economic pressure on Britain. Effective December 1, 1774, American colonists would cease to import goods from Britain, the British Indies, and Ireland. Effective September 1, 1775, colonists would discontinue their exportation of colonial goods to these destinations. Congress authorized the establishment of committees in every town, city, and county to enforce the association’s decrees. All voters eligible to participate in local elections could vote for committeemen. This enforcement apparatus was the first legally sanctioned effort to enforce compliance with the colonials’ struggle against the British. By 1775 local committees were summoning violators of nonimportation. They might be fined or have their names published in the local newspaper. The outcome desired by the committees was to have the dissenters sign oaths pledging themselves to the Continental Association.
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One of the most outspoken and influential critics of British rule in North America was the British-born pamphleteer Thomas Paine, whose writings frequently got him in trouble. (National Archives)
Committees of Safety The shedding of American blood at Lexington quickened the pace and resolve of American resistance to British authority. As the rebels brushed aside the governmental structures put in place by imperial Britain, they went about setting up their own governments. On July 18, 1775, the Second Continental Congress recommended the establishment of committees of safety in the various colonies to carry on the functions of government. Among the duties of these committees were the recruitment and arming of troops, gathering pledges of support for the nonimportation of British goods, and the apprehension of Tories opposed to the struggle for American rights. The local committees of safety drew sharp lines between friends and enemies of the American cause. While the phrase “enemies of the people” had been used in the Continental Association to stigmatize those who violated the commercial prohibitions of that document, this negative label was extended to any persons who expressed any disapproval of revolutionary activities or who took any action contrary to the American cause. As the eyes and ears of American resistance, local committees of safety sometimes created situations to expose Tories. Some local committees circulated defense associations, which were agreements to take up arms
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against Britain. Persons who refused to sign these agreements were publicly labeled as enemies. Another tactic used to expose the unsympathetic was the official mustering of the local militia. Once the disaffected were identified, they came under the committees’ control. Suspects were watched, fined, required to post bond for their proper behavior, disarmed, imprisoned, or forcibly removed to other areas in the colony or to another colony. Sending away dissenters or getting them to flee to areas under British military protection served the purpose of separating the critics of the American cause from their neighbors, whom they might influence. Punishing Loyalists When the Second Continental Congress declared for independence on July 4, 1776, the necessity for a united colonial front against the British gained urgency. American rebels faced a war against the British military, domestic resistance from colonists opposed to independence, and lack of commitment from Americans who either maintained neutrality or changed their support depending on the latest military situation. Antiloyalist legislation and its enforcement depended on the relative strengths of the competing sides and the threat of the British military to local security. Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey each had significant portions of its populations either opposed to or neutral to the American cause. In Pennsylvania, the legislature took steps to punish non-Associators. Many of these non-Associators were Quakers, whose pacifism kept them from supporting either the British or the Americans. Representing nearly one-third of Pennsylvania’s population, Quaker refusal to take up arms caused considerable resentment among the state’s militiamen, who pressured the legislature to penalize those not siding with the militia. A fine and an additional tax were levied against persons refusing to serve. In 1777 the legislature demanded that all adult, white male inhabitants take an oath of allegiance. Those who refused lost their citizenship, were disarmed, and could not sue to recover debts or engage in real estate transactions. In 1778 the legislature passed an act allowing the confiscation of property owned by notorious loyalists. During the next three years nearly five hundred were identified, and many lost their property. When the British evacuated Philadelphia in June, 1778, some loyalists failed to leave with the British forces. To make an example, twenty-five loyalists were hanged. It is not clear whether all of these Tories aided the British or if some merely held loyalist sympathies. In New York Tories held a majority in the southern counties of Queens and Staten Island. The loyalists in Queens embarrassed their patriot opponents in November, 1775, during an election to send delegates to a provin-
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cial congress. The loyalists refused to send delegates, defeating the patriots by a vote of 747-221. After their electoral setback, the patriots sent twelve hundred troops to discourage the loyalists. About twenty were arrested. In December, 1775, Staten Island loyalists also voted not to send delegates to the provincial congress. After the suppression of Queens’s loyalists, the Staten Islanders decided to elect delegates. A significant part of New Jersey’s population did not support the patriots. In the eastern counties, Tories held considerable influence, while neutrals, mostly religious pacifists, were numerous in the western counties. The legislature penalized active Tories, but pacifists in New Jersey did not suffer persecution. The Press Censorship of the press during the American Revolution was as swift and certain as was the suppression of individual dissidents. American patriots tolerated no criticism of their cause. The censorship of James Rivington illustrates the various means used to silence opponents of the Revolution. Arriving in America from Britain in 1760, Rivington established a successful bookstore in New York City. In 1773 he also decided to publish books, pamphlets, and a newspaper, the New-York Gazetteer. For a time his newspaper carried articles arguing both sides of the dispute between the colonies and the mother country. As the conflict deepened, Rivington began to publish an increasing number of pro-British pamphlets. Meanwhile, he published articles and editorials that satirized the Sons of Liberty. These radical patriots urged people to cancel their subscriptions to the New-York Gazetteer. Rivington’s pro-British pamphlets were publicly burned. On April 13, 1775, Rivington was hanged in effigy by a crowd at New Brunswick, New Jersey. On May 10, a mob entered his shop, damaged his press and other equipment, and tried to kidnap him. Rivington managed to escape to HMS King Fisher in New York’s harbor. After Rivington agreed to support the Continental Association, the provincial congress of New York agreed to allow him to resume his business. On November 23, an armed mob led by Isaac Sears, a leader of the Sons of Liberty criticized by Rivington, broke into Rivington’s shop and destroyed his printing press. This effectively ended publication of the New-York Gazetteer. Rivington fled to Britain in early 1776 but returned to British-occupied New York City to begin publishing Rivington’s New-York Loyal Gazette. This unabashedly pro-British newspaper continued until the British withdrew from New York City. Impartiality did not fare much better than Toryism. In Boston, the Fleet brothers’ Evening-Post published news articles and letters from patriots
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and loyalists. Although denying public claims that they were a loyalist organ, the Fleet brothers ceased publication after the battles of Lexington and Concord. Even a pro-patriot paper could raise the ire of patriots. In February, 1777, the Maryland Journal, owned by the patriot William Goddard and published by his sister Mary Katherine Goddard, ran into trouble with the local Whig Club, who misinterpreted a tongue-in-cheek piece anonymously submitted by a signer of the Declaration of Independence. The satirical article advised the acceptance of the peace terms offered by the British ministry. The Whig Club demanded that the publisher leave Baltimore within forty-eight hours. The Goddards stood their ground, and the Maryland House of Representatives backed them. Two years later the Maryland Journal came under fire for publishing an article by General Charles Lee, who had been dismissed by General George Washington. The article was critical of Washington and aroused the anger of Washington’s friends. William Goddard was mobbed, forced to publish a recantation, and narrowly escaped hanging. Goddard appealed for state protection and published a disavowal of his recantation. The need to protect military secrets and maintain popular support for the sacrifices of war make censorship common during wars. Censorship during revolutionary or civil wars is usually even more quickly invoked, and the penalties much harsher, than is the case with wars of other kinds. American revolutionaries propagandized to rally their countrymen to arms against Great Britain. They held no tolerance for neutrality nor opposition in their struggle for independence. Local committees of safety held wide powers of censorship that were used against individuals who opposed the war for independence. Despite abuses of power, the penalties were usually invoked to bring dissenters into the patriot camp. Compared to the violent excesses of the French Revolution, and the Russian and Chinese Revolutions, the censorship of the American Revolution was moderate; it was ironic, however, that such measures were taken in defense of freedom. Paul A. Frisch
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Women in the Revolutionary War The American Revolution produced a new republican ideology that emphasized the importance of individual freedom and democratic liberty, but these rights were not extended to women. The American Revolution is often considered to be one of the most important political revolutions in modern history. This internal conflict that pitted patriots against Tory loyalists immediately subjected women to the horrors and sacrifices of war. While the revolution ushered in a new egalitarian republican ideology, it failed to address the issue of sexual equality adequately. This failure, however, did not prevent women from becoming active participants in the war. Inspired by new radical doctrines, a collective feminist identity began to emerge, and after the American victory, the struggle for women’s rights and gender equality began to unfold in American history. Women’s Contributions Patriot women provided various services and made numerous contributions to the war effort. Left to manage the household economy, women undermined England’s ability to wage war by refusing to support the sale and production of British manufactured goods. “Buy American” campaigns were initiated as women sacrificed to protect the domestic market. They refused to purchase British textiles, wore only homespun clothes, and boycotted English tea. Women also attacked local merchants who refused to sell valuable goods. In July, 1778, more than one hundred women stormed into a coffee warehouse, confronted a loyalist merchant, and confiscated his supply of coffee. Similar demonstrations occurred throughout the revolution. In addition, women eased the revolutionary government’s economic burdens through aggressive fund-raising campaigns. Door-todoor canvassing took place in various states, such as New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia. In 1780, several women attempted to coordinate the entire colonial effort by creating a national organization to help obtain money for the troops. Women also played a pivotal role in furnishing key auxiliary support during several military campaigns. They served as spies, worked behind the lines as nurses and boardinghouse managers, and provided priceless logistical support that enabled the colonial army to seek shelter and tend their wounded before the next battle. Some wives became steadfast camp followers and assumed their traditional domestic responsibilities, includ-
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One of the most famous women associated with the American Revolution is Betsy Ross, who according to tradition sewed the first American flag in June, 1776, on the request of George Washington. However, no firm evidence supports this legend. (National Archives)
ing cooking meals and cleaning the camps. More adventurous women disguised themselves as men and even took part in actual combat. Deborah Sampson represented the most noteworthy case: She fought for more than two years before her true gender was discovered. By fulfilling these basic domestic tasks and through their willingness to endure the hardships and sacrifice of war, women elevated the soldiers’ morale and provided comfort and solace to those who were separated from their families. More important, their patriotism revealed that women had developed a sense of rebellious political consciousness and did not remain passive observers during the revolution. Dangers Despite all these displays of patriotic fervor, women were denied access to political and military decision making, were subjected to exploitative wage disparities when employed as nurses and camp servants, and were victimized by the same cult of domesticity that had existed prior to the war. In addition, enemy troops often raped and pillaged as they advanced, creating thousands of female refugees, and women were consistently forced to open their homes and surrender their property to British troops.
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Tory wives experienced a similar fate. They were often brutalized by American troops, and since their husbands were fighting for the British, they were victimized by constant surveillance and suspicion. States passed expulsion laws that required Tory wives to vacate their property, and many were forced to find shelter in refugee camps. One Tory wife in New Jersey openly denounced her husband’s affiliation with the British, but the state legislature refused to grant her clemency and held her accountable for her husband’s political beliefs. Because American troops and local governments assumed that a woman could not possess the knowledge to formulate a political opinion that differed from that of her husband, countless women were unjustly accused of being conspirators. The war also generated outbursts of patriotism from Tory women. On numerous occasions, they infiltrated enemy lines and distributed British propaganda to American troops. Colonial military commander George Washington often complained that women were filtering through his defenses and relaying key information back to the British. Washington’s concerns caused considerable alarm, and in 1780, thirty-two women were im-
According to legend, an American woman named Mary McCauly accompanied her husband to the Battle of Monmouth, where she took her husband’s place at a cannon after he collapsed from exhaustion. She then served heroically through the remainder of the battle. For her work carrying pitchers of water to soldiers, she was dubbed “Molly Pitcher,” by which name she later became famous. (National Archives)
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prisoned in New York State for conducting espionage activities and for providing sanctuary for British troops. By the end of the year, the state granted local justices the power to evict loyalist women from their households and ordered them to leave the state within twenty days. Legal and Social Restrictions Following the end of hostilities in 1781, women’s legal and social status slightly improved, but unlike their male counterparts, women were still denied full participation in political and legal affairs. The constitutional and judicial systems in late eighteenth century America refused to grant women the right to vote and significantly curtailed women’s property rights as well. Women were subjected to laws of coverture, in which a married woman’s identity was supposedly subsumed into her husband’s identity; consequently, she did not require any individual legal protection. As a result of women’s contributions during the revolution and the emergence of such prominent female writers as Abigail Adams, playwright Mercy Otis Warren, and political theorist Mary Wollstonecraft, a new feminist consciousness slowly developed. This shift generated several challenges to the patriarchal system of power. Several states passed treason statutes that allowed Tory wives to retain title to their dowries if they declared their loyalty to the United States and declined to follow their husbands into exile. Dowry rights were also preserved for all women after marriage, which meant that a husband could no longer sell his wife’s property without her written consent. Such gains, however, did not eradicate male dominance. Although prenuptial agreements became more common in the propertied classes, courts often confiscated dowry property to pay off a man’s creditors if he died with considerable debts. Divorce laws were relaxed in certain states, but in others, such as South Carolina, women remained locked in abusive marriages. Education was improving, and the literacy gap between the sexes was closing, but women were still denied access to the professions. For example, women could enter the courts as plaintiffs, defendants, or as witnesses, but since they lacked formal educational training, women were prevented from becoming attorneys, judges, and clerks. This limitation significantly subverted their quest for full equality. Education was still associated with masculinity, and any woman who aggressively pursued studies was perceived as being an undesirable partner. Yet the American Revolution and the advent of republican ideology did elevate women’s social status in American society. During the formative years of the revolution, many theorists began to argue that women could
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fulfill a certain political role that did not necessitate the right to vote. As a wife and mother, a woman could rear virtuous sons who would ultimately govern the republic. Referred to as the concept of Republican Motherhood, this belief spurred the creation of female academies and women’s literature that emphasized the interdependency between domesticity and women’s political rights. Under this concept, which has often been classified as the fourth branch of the American government, women were expected to become self-reliant, pious, free from material temptations, and well educated, but these skills were only to be utilized within a domestic framework. While Republican Motherhood enhanced women’s prestige, it did little to challenge the subordinate political and legal status that women were forced to endure during the American Revolution. Thus, despite playing a prominent role in the struggle for independence, women did not share equally in the fruits of victory. Robert D. Ubriaco, Jr.
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Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events March, 1770 Boston Massacre Date: March 5, 1770 Location: Boston, Massachusetts Combatants: Small number of Americans vs. small number of British Principal commander: Thomas Preston, officer of the main British guard at Boston Result: American fears of British standing armies resulted in a bloody confrontation and epitomized colonial unrest. On the night of March 5, 1770, a small crowd gathered around a soldier at the guard post in front of the Customs House at Boston, accusing him of striking a boy who had made disparaging remarks about a British officer. John Adams depicted the hecklers as “a motley rabble of saucy boys, negroes and mulattoes, Irish teagues and outlandish Jack tars.” The sentinel’s call for aid brought eight men from the Twenty-ninth Regiment and Captain Thomas Preston, officer of the day. The crowd increased, especially after someone rang the bell in the old Brick Meeting House; men and boys hurled snowballs and pieces of ice at the crimson-coated regulars and, with cries of “lobster,” “bloody-back,” and “coward,” taunted them to retaliate. The crowd’s hostility stemmed from more than this particular incident; it rested on a series of occurrences between the Bostonians and the military during the seventeen months that the troops had been garrisoned in the city. If possible, the townspeople had expressed even more antipathy for the Customs Commissioners, who that very evening gazed uneasily from the windows of the Customs House on the scene before them in King Street. They were the real source of the trouble; their cries for protection had brought troops to Boston in the first place. The Americans were right about the role of the commissioners, but their version of what transpired shortly after nine o’clock on the evening of March 5 is highly questionable. Captain Preston probably did not order his
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nervous troops to fire into the angry throng, but fire they did after one of their number was clubbed on the head. Three Americans died instantly, two a short time later, and six more received wounds. Crispus Attucks The “Boston Massacre” may have been a misnomer, the result of extreme harassment of the redcoats, and triggered, according to John Adams, by an unprincipled mulatto, Crispus Attucks, “to whose mad behavior, in all probability, the dreadful carnage of that night is chiefly to be ascribed.” Attucks, son of an African American father and a Massachuset Indian mother, was the first casualty of the Boston Massacre of March 5, 1770, the first death in the cause of the American Revolution. Attucks’s father was a black slave in a Framington, Massachusetts, household until about 1750, when he escaped and became a sailor. Crispus’s mother lived in an Indian mission at Natick. Attucks was known around Boston as one of the Sons of Liberty’s most aggressive agitators. When the British claimed that he had provoked their soldiers, they may have been right. Attucks and Paul Re-
Patriot Paul Revere’s engraving of the Boston Massacre. (National Archives)
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General Thomas Gage. (National Archives)
vere were among the earliest Sons of Liberty, a clandestine society that agitated against the British by engaging in acts of propaganda and creative political mischief. The Sons of Liberty tormented Tories and their supporters, often stripping, tarring, and feathering tax collectors, then walking free at the hands of sympathetic colonial juries. They later would form the nucleus of a revolutionary armed force, but in the early years, their main business was what a later generation would call “guerrilla theater.” Americans elsewhere wondered whether their respective colonies would be the next to have a standing army in their midst, an army seemingly intent on destroying their liberties, not only by its presence but also by the use of fire and sword. At the time, however, Massachusetts had been singled out ostensibly because of the Customs Commissioners’ appeal for protection. Undoubtedly, another consideration made the decision to comply an easy one for London politicians: the Massachusetts Bay Colony, with its spirited opposition to the Stamp Act (1765) and the Townshend Revenue Act (1767), had long been viewed as a hotbed of sedition. The conduct of His Majesty’s revenue collectors had incited colonial opposition. They were considered by many to be “customs racketeers,” a lecherous band who played fast and loose with the complicated provisions of the Sugar Act (1764) in order to win, in Vice-Admiralty Courts, judgments that lined their own pockets. This was substantially the opinion of
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New Hampshire’s Governor Benning Wentworth, and the British commander in chief in North America, General Thomas Gage, admitted almost as much to the secretary of state for the colonies, Wills Hill, earl of Hillsborough and marquis of Downshire. Nevertheless, the secretary of state ordered the general to dispatch regulars to the Massachusetts capital. Gage’s troops met no resistance when they landed on October 1, 1768. Despite the obvious displeasure of the populace, reflected in the town fathers’ reluctance to aid in securing quarters for the soldiers (soon increased by two additional regiments), there followed months of relative calm with no mob activity against either the redcoats or the customs collectors. Lord Hillsborough, however, was determined to deal harshly with Massachusetts, and had he been able to impose his will, Parliament would have wrought changes to equal or surpass in severity the Coercive Acts of 1774. Because of troubles in Ireland, threats from France and Spain, and the colonial boycott of British goods in protest against the Townshend duties, the government rejected Hillsborough’s schemes and eventually repealed all the Townshend taxes except the one on tea. The employment of troops against civilians was ticklish business to George III and Englishmen in general, calling forth memories of Stuart days. The logical step was to remove all the troops, but two regiments remained in Boston. Rising Tensions Serious tension began to build in the late summer and fall of 1769, when Bostonians believed that the redcoats were becoming permanent residents. The soldiers were subjected to every form of legal harassment by local magistrates, to say nothing of mounting acts of violence against the men in uniform. The redcoats in the ranks, like all European soldiers of their day, were hardly of the highest character, often recruited from the slums and the gin mills, and stories of theft, assault, and rape by the regulars were not without considerable foundation. The culmination, foreseen by the army and townspeople alike, was the Boston Massacre. Only then were the last regiments pulled out of the city, leaving behind a legacy of fear and suspicion that was revived every succeeding March 5. “Massacre Day,” as it was called, was commemorated by the tolling of bells and a patriot address that stressed the danger of standing armies. Tension in Boston rose again in 1773, due to another act of political mischief by the Sons of Liberty, who remembered the victims of the Boston Massacre at the Boston Tea Party. In 1888, a monument to Attucks was erected at the Boston Common. R. Don Higginbotham updated by Bruce E. Johansen
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December, 1773 Boston Tea Party Date: December 16, 1773 Location: Boston, Massachusetts Combatants: Uncertain number of Americans vs. uncertain number of British Result: The incident was a symbolic protest against British exploitation of the colonies, one step short of armed rebellion, and it is regarded by some historians as the first battle of the American Revolution. On the evening of December 16, 1773, three merchant vessels lay at anchor in Boston Harbor. They carried 342 chests containing more than ninety thousand pounds of dutiable tea worth about nine thousand pounds sterling. Shortly after 6:00 p.m., between thirty and sixty men, calling themselves “Mohawks” and roughly disguised as Indians, boarded the ships. Hundreds of silent onlookers at the wharf saw the “Mohawks,” organized into three groups, swiftly and systematically break open the tea chests and pour their contents into the sea. Because the water was only two or three feet deep, the tea began to pile up, forcing the men to rake it aside to allow room for the rest. In less than three hours, they had completed their work and disappeared into the darkness; to this day, the identities of most remain unknown. The “Destruction of the Tea,” exclaimed John Adams the next day, “is so bold, so daring . . . it must have so important Consequences and so lasting, that I cannot but consider it as an Epocha [sic] in History.” Eighteen months later, the colonists were locked in military combat with Great Britain. The Boston Tea Party had ushered in a series of events that led directly to war and, eventually, independence. Background The origins of the famous Tea Party are to be found in Parliament’s 1770 repeal of all the external taxes embodied in the controversial Townshend Revenue Act, except the tax on tea, which was to remain principally as a symbol of Great Britain’s right to extract cash from American purses. Although the colonists had won only a partial victory in their battle against the second British program of taxation, compared to a complete repeal of the earlier Stamp Act, the chances for an improvement in AngloAmerican relations seemed fairly bright in the years 1771-l773. The secretary of state for the colonies, Wills Hill, earl of Hillsborough and
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marquis of Downshire, soothed American tempers by announcing that the British government did not intend to propose any new taxes for the colonists. These were years of renewed commercial prosperity, during which countless Americans drank the dutied brew, when all but a few ignored the frantic schemes of Samuel Adams and a radical minority to keep alive the old flames of resentment. There were, to be sure, occasional events that generated fresh ill will, such as the burning by Rhode Islanders of the royal revenue cutter Gaspee and the clandestine publication of Massachusetts governor Thomas Hutchinson’s correspondence expressing stern criticism of the colony’s patriot leaders. However, it was Parliament’s Tea Act of 1773 that brought the period of quiescence to an abrupt end throughout North America. Ironically, British politicians acted not with the purpose of disciplining the Americans but with the intention of boosting the sagging fortunes of the giant East India Company. After unsuccessful attempts to help the ailing corporation with huge investments in India, the prime minister of Great Britain, Lord North, earl of Guilford, secured passage of the Tea Act. This allowed the East India Company to sell tea directly to America for the first time, and to do so through its own agents; previously, it had sold its product to English wholesale merchants, from whom the tea passed into the hands of American wholesalers and retailers. By removing the profits formerly obtained by English and American middlemen, and by the added
An 1846 depiction of the Boston Tea Party. (National Archives)
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provision eliminating English duties on tea exported to the New World possessions, the company hoped to undersell Dutch-smuggled leaves in America, even though the provincials would have to pay the remaining Townshend tax of three pence on each pound. Everywhere in North America, Lord North’s move met stiff resistance. Merchants accused the ministry of giving the East India Company and its agents a monopoly on the local tea market, which would be followed in time by other monopolies in the American trade. More frightening to Americans was the constitutional threat; they were vulnerable already since the taxed herb had been purchased in America after 1770. Now, if they consumed even more of the dutied drink, they would implicitly admit the authority of Parliament to tax them. In fact, they saw in Lord North’s undertaking a cynical endeavor to get them to “barter liberty for luxury.” Consignees in New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston were persuaded to resign their commissions, as the stamp tax collectors previously had been made to do. The outcome was different in Boston, where Governor Hutchinson backed the consignees and refused to let the tea ships return to England without first unloading their cargo. Symbolic Protest The Tea Party was a form of symbolic protest—one step beyond random violence, one step short of organized, armed rebellion. The tea dumpers chose their symbols with utmost care. As the imported tea symbolized British tyranny and taxation, so the image of the Indian, and the Mohawk disguise, represented its antithesis: a trademark of an emerging American identity and a voice for liberty in a new land. The image of the Indian was figured into tea-dumpers’ disguises not only in Boston but also in cities all along the Atlantic Seaboard. The Mohawk symbol was not picked at random. It was used as a revolutionary symbol, counterpoising the tea tax. The image of the Indian (particularly the Mohawk) also appeared at about the same time, in the same context, in revolutionary songs, slogans, and engravings. Paul Revere, whose midnight rides became legendary in the poetry of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, played a crucial role in forging this sense of identity, contributing to the revolutionary cause a set of remarkable engravings that cast as America’s first national symbol an American Indian woman, long before Uncle Sam came along. Boston’s patriots were not known for their civility in the face of British authority, and it was Boston’s “Mohawks” who sparked physical confrontation over the tea tax. As they dumped the tea, the “Mohawks” exchanged words in a secret sign language using Indian hand symbols, and sang:
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Rally Mohawks, and bring your axes And tell King George we’ll pay no taxes on his foreign tea; His threats are vain, and vain to think To force our girls and wives to drink his vile Bohea! Then rally, boys, and hasten on To meet our chiefs at the Green Dragon! Our Warren’s here, and bold Revere With hands to do and words to cheer, for liberty and laws; Our country’s “braves” and firm defenders shall ne’er be left by true North Enders fighting freedom’s cause! Then rally, boys, and hasten on To meet our chiefs at the Green Dragon.
After the “Mohawks” had performed the task of unloading, Parliament’s response was one of unparalleled severity. It passed the Coercive Acts in 1774 in order to bring rebellious Massachusetts to its knees, by closing the port of Boston, altering the structure of government in the colony, and allowing British officials and soldiers accused of capital offenses to be tried in England or, to avoid a hostile local jury, in a colony other than the one where the offense had occurred. The Coercive Acts also provided for the quartering of troops once more in the town of Boston, stoking the smoldering resentment of its citizens. Legacy The Boston Tea Party is regarded by some as the first battle of the American Revolution, an economic one: In 1773, Britain exported 738,083 pounds of tea to the colonies. In 1774, the figure had fallen to 69,830. Imports of tea fell all along the seaboard: from 206,312 pounds to 30,161 in New England; 208,385 to 1,304 pounds in New York; and 208,191 pounds to none in Pennsylvania. R. Don Higginbotham updated by Bruce E. Johansen
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April, 1775 Battles of Lexington and Concord Date: April 19, 1775 Location: Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts Combatants: 3,500 American vs. 1,700 British troops Principal commanders: American, Lexington, Captain John Parker (17291775), Concord, Colonel James Barrett; British, Lexington and Concord, Lieutenant Colonel Francis Smith (1723-1791) Result: These battles opened hostilities in what became America’s Revolutionary War. In the early-morning hours of April 19, 1775, Captain John Parker, fortyfive-year-old veteran of the French and Indian War, stood with his single company of Minutemen on the village green at Lexington, Massachusetts. Several hours had passed since Paul Revere’s word of an approaching column of redcoats had brought them tumbling out of their beds. Revere had been unsure as to how General Thomas Gage would lead his men, quartered in Boston, toward Lexington. The land route across the isthmus to the mainland was long and more obvious; the Charles River was not frozen, and the river route was shorter. A signal from the steeple of Christ’s Church provided the answer; the British were coming by sea. Now a messenger reported that the royal troops were almost within sight. Earlier, the Minutemen and their neighbors had adopted a resolution that the presence of a British army in their province constituted an infringement upon their “natural, constitutional, chartered rights.” They had pledged their “estates and every thing dear in life, yea and life itself” if necessary in opposing the Coercive Acts. The British were correct in their suspicions that the Americans had hidden arms; gunpowder and shot had been stored all winter for such a moment as this. The Combatants The seventy-seven men who answered Parker’s call, including sixteenyear-old drummer William Diamond, were hopelessly outnumbered by the approaching British. Many were old for such work; fifty-five were more than thirty years of age. Most of the town’s men hoped not to provoke the British. Parker kept his men on the green and away from the nearby road the British would follow to the next town of Concord. The captain of the Minutemen intended their presence to serve only a symbolic purpose, an expression of their displeasure at the redcoats’ intrusion. Brit-
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ish major John Pitcairn nevertheless led his advance companies onto the green. As the British approached, Pitcairn ordered his men to hold their fire. He told the Minutemen to leave their arms and disperse. Seeing they had made their point, some of the Americans broke ranks and walked away, but a shot rang out, its origin unknown. The British immediately returned volleys of fire, beyond control of their officers. The Americans were quickly driven from the field, leaving eight dead and ten wounded. Lexington was hardly a battle, and yet a war had begun. The United States was born in an act of violence lasting but fifteen to twenty minutes. British troops had returned to Boston following the Tea Party and the Coercive Acts. With them came a new governor of Massachusetts, General Thomas Gage, a longtime military commander in chief in North America. In retaliation, the Massachusetts Assembly, now calling itself the provincial congress and sitting as an extralegal body, took control of the militia, appointed general officers, and ordered the organizing of one-fourth of all the militia into Minute companies. Massachusetts’s firm resolution to fight if pressed was duplicated throughout New England, as well as in the Middle Colonies and in far-off Virginia, where on March 9, the Virginia convention sat transfixed by the eloquence of Patrick Henry: “The war is inevitable. . . . The war is actually begun. . . . Our brethren are already in the field! Why stand here idle?” The potentially explosive situation was heightened by the struggle over gunpowder in the colonies. In London, the ministry imposed an embargo on the shipment of munitions to America, except for quantities headed for Gage’s army. Armed clashes were narrowly averted in Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Virginia, as patriots
Romantic depiction of Paul Revere’s ride through the streets of Boston on the eve of the Battle of Lexington, warning fellow patriots of the coming of the Redcoats. Revere’s ride was immortalized in a narrative poem written by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow in 1863. (National Archives)
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and British authorities sought to monopolize the critically short amounts of powder. The capture or destruction of the Massachusetts provincial congress’s military stores was the assignment of Lieutenant Colonel Francis Smith as he headed down the silent country road that ran through Lexington and on to Concord on the night of April 18, 1775. Long before reaching Lexington, Smith realized that his assignment was known to the patriots, whose church bells and signal guns were audible to the marchers. Consequently, Smith dispatched Major Pitcairn ahead with six companies to occupy the bridges over the Concord River, at the same time that he wisely sent a courier to ask General Gage for reinforcements. After routing the Lexington Minutemen, Pitcairn continued on the additional five miles to Concord, entering the village at eight o’clock in the morning. The patriots had managed to cart away part of their supplies. When the British had burned several gun carriages and destroyed flour, the patriots set out about noon on their return journey. The sixteen miles back to Boston were a nightmare for Smith and Pitcairn. The scarlet column proved an inviting target for the swarms of militia and Minute companies that had converged on Concord and Lexington. From trees, rocks, and stone walls, they kept up a steady fire. Smith’s force may well have escaped annihilation only because at Lexing-
The Battle of Lexington. From an eyewitness drawing by Amos Doolittle (1754-1832). (National Archives)
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British retreat from Concord. (F. R. Niglutsch)
ton they received a reinforcement of nine hundred men under General Hugh, Earl Percy. Even so, the combined column might have been destroyed had the efforts of the various American detachments been coordinated. As it was, the wild, unorthodox battle continued until the British reached Charleston, across the harbor from Boston, where dusk and the protecting guns of the Royal Navy brought an end to the mauling. Results British losses came to 73 killed, 174 wounded, and 26 missing, while American casualties in all categories totaled 93. The colonists remained to besiege the enemy in Boston. The Newport Mercury described the day’s events as the beginning of “the American Civil War, which will hereafter fill an important page in History.” At least some British papers also reflected the American viewpoint. For example, forty-one days after the fighting, the London Chronicle carried a detailed description of the events that had transpired at Lexington. The account included statements from witnesses who reported that the British had indeed fired first, clearly favoring the American version of events. This was followed some weeks later with General Gage’s account of the affair. Gage also alluded to the Americans having returned fire, the implication being that the British had fired the first shots. The British had badly misjudged the extent of American resistance. While at no point in the war were the Americans united in their stand
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against England, events that transpired at Lexington and Concord had lit a fire in the “belly of the beast.” It would be a short time before the patriots would be unsatisfied with anything but independence. R. Don Higginbotham updated by Richard Adler
May, 1775 Battle of Fort Ticonderoga Date: May 10-11, 1775 Location: Southwest bank of Lake Champlain, New York Combatants: 270-300 American vs. 51 British troops Principal commanders: American, Lieutenant Colonel Ethan Allen (17381789), Lieutenant Colonel Seth Warner (1743-1784), Colonel Benedict Arnold (1741-1801); British, Captain William Delaplace Result: A bloodless American victory. Control of Fort Ticonderoga on the bank of Lake Champlain was key to troop movements between Canada and New York. Lieutenant Colonel
Benedict Arnold. From an 1879 engraving by H. B. Hall. (National Archives)
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Lieutenant Colonel Ethan Allen’s arrest of Captain William Delaplace at Fort Ticonderoga. (National Archives)
Ethan Allen’s militia, the Green Mountain Boys, already had plans to capture it when Colonel Benedict Arnold, commissioned by the Massachusetts Committee of Safety for the same task, tried to assume command. Allen’s men refused to serve under Arnold, so Allen led the raid with Arnold accompanying as a volunteer. Before dawn on May 10, Allen and Arnold crossed Lake Champlain with 83 men, surprised the lone sentry, and entered the open gate. Allen woke Captain William Delaplace and forced him at swordpoint to surrender his sleeping garrison, a 42-man company of the Twenty-sixth Regiment of Foot (Cameronians). When Lieutenant Colonel Seth Warner arrived with the rest of the men, Allen detached them to take Fort Crown Point, eight miles north of Fort Ticonderoga. Warner accomplished this easily on May 11 against a single Cameronian squad: one sergeant and eight privates. After the Battle of Bunker Hill (June, 1775), the Americans were desperate for cannons. Under General George Washington’s orders, Colonel Henry Knox brought 30 of the 100 cannons captured at Ticonderoga, 29 of the 114 captured at Crown Point, and about 120,000 pounds of ordnance by sled to eastern Massachusetts. This artillery, mounted on Dorchester Heights, forced General Sir William Howe to abandon Boston (March 17, 1776). Eric v.d. Luft
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June, 1775 Battle of Bunker Hill Date: June 17, 1775 Location: Breed’s Hill (Charlestown, Massachusetts, British colonies) Combatants: 1,600 American vs. 2,400 British troops Principal commanders: American, Colonel William Prescott (1726-1795); British, Major General Sir William Howe (1729-1814) Result: The British dislodged American troops from a redoubt on Breed’s Hill on Charlestown peninsula. British regulars were ordered to occupy an elevated area on the Charlestown peninsula, across the river from Boston. Before the British could act, however, American forces, who had been instructed to seize Bunker Hill, instead fortified Breed’s Hill, also located on the peninsula. The commander of the American forces, Colonel William Prescott, chose Breed’s Hill because of its proximity to Boston and its especially steep slopes on two sides. The 1,600 Americans constructed a square redoubt on the top of Breed’s Hill. Early in the afternoon of June 17, 1775, British major general William Howe ordered his troops to advance on Breed’s Hill. The Americans
Contemporary depiction of the Battle of Bunker Hill. (National Archives)
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repelled the first and second assaults. On the third assault, the Americans ran out of powder and bullets. By nightfall, the British had seized the hill. The British military suffered 1,054 casualties, 226 dead and 828 wounded. The Americans endured 411 casualties, 140 killed and 271 wounded. The Battle of Bunker Hill (more accurately Breed’s Hill) constituted the first major battle of the Revolutionary War. Although the British accomplished their objective, they did so at a heavy cost. This moral victory united the Americans in their opposition to the British. Richard A. Glenn
December, 1775 Battle of Quebec Date: December 31, 1775 Location: Quebec City, Canada Combatants: 1,175 Americans and Canadians vs. 1,800 British regulars and militia Principal commanders: American, Major General Richard Montgomery (1738-1775); British, Governor Sir Guy Carleton (1724-1808) Result: The British repulsed an assault on Quebec, inflicting heavy casualties on American forces. From December 5 to December 30, 1775, American troops besieged Quebec, the last major British outpost in Canada, attempting to complete their invasion of the province. Faced with expiring enlistments in Benedict Arnold’s command, General Richard Montgomery launched an assault in the early morning hours of December 31, during a howling blizzard. Two small detachments feinted against the upper town, while the main attack struck the lower. Montgomery led 275 troops from the southwest, penetrated the outer fortifications undetected, and then charged a blockhouse. The general and several other officers were killed in the first volley, and his soldiers retreated. Meanwhile, Arnold and 600 men stormed Quebec from the other direction. Arnold was quickly wounded and retired from the field, but his troops fought their way into the lower town. The attack stalled, however, as the British concentrated on this threat, following Montgomery’s repulse. Sir Guy Carleton counterattacked, cutting the American line of retreat and, by mid-morning, forced the Americans to
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The death of Major General Montgomery at Quebec. From a painting by John Trumbull, a patriot who served in the Revolutionary War. (National Archives)
surrender. He then overran a nearby siege battery, capturing six cannons and mortars. Overall, the Americans had 48 killed, 34 wounded, and 372 captured. British losses were 5 dead and 14 wounded. The British victory at Quebec during the revolution crippled the American army in Canada and effectively ended its invasion of the province. Michael P. Gabriel
August, 1776 Battle of Long Island Date: August 27-30, 1776 Location: Brooklyn, New York Combatants: 32,000 British vs. 19,000 American troops Principal commanders: British, General Sir William Howe (1732-1786); American, General George Washington (1732-1799) Result: General Washington’s army retreated across the East River to Manhattan.
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George Washington moved his troops to Manhattan in March, 1776, convinced that the British would attack. Fortifications were constructed around Manhattan. On June 29, British ships moved toward Staten Island. On August 12, British reinforcements arrived, consisting of more than four hundred transport ships protected by thirty warships. These ships, with a total of 10,000 sailors, brought 32,000 soldiers to Staten Island. After learning of this troop movement, General Washington, realizing that he must confront the British in Brooklyn at the western extreme of Long Island, sent 7,000 troops there, increasing the number of American troops there to 19,000. These troops fortified Brooklyn Heights, establishing an outer defensive position behind their fortifications, which had a weak spot at Jamaica Pass. On August 27, one British contingent attacked the American troops while another body of troops swarmed in through the Jamaica Pass, completely overwhelming Washington’s forces. The Americans suffered 1,012 casualties, whereas the British incurred 392. Capitalizing on stormy weather that kept British warships at bay, Washington led a retreat to Manhattan.
General Washington leads the American retreat from Long Island. From a painting by M. A. Wageman. (National Archives)
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Victorious in Brooklyn, the British held Long Island until 1783. The Battle of Long Island, however, prevented General William Howe’s forces from capturing Manhattan. The British victory was bittersweet. R. Baird Shuman
September, 1776 Experiments in Submarine Warfare Date: September 6-7, 1776 Location: New York Principal commanders: American, Major General Israel Putnam (17181790), Sergeant Ezra Lee; British, Admiral Richard Howe (1726-1799) Result: Technology was driven and advanced by the need to succeed in revolutionary combat. David Bushnell was known throughout his native Connecticut for his inventive mind. While on his father’s farm, he had developed a harrow with flexible teeth, which farmers could use in the stony New England fields without the teeth’s breaking constantly. As a student at Yale College, he became interested in the possibilities of exploding kegs of black powder under water. Traditional theories of the time held that such an explosion would not work, because the water would dissipate its force. Through experiments, Bushnell proved that this theory was wrong and developed the forerunner of the naval mine. Birth of the Turtle With the onset of the American Revolution, Bushnell decided that his mine would be useful against the blockading British fleet, but he needed an accurate method of placing his explosives under a ship’s keel without being seen by naval gunners. His solution was a submarine vessel called the Turtle, which he designed early in 1775 while still a student at Yale. During the college’s spring vacation that year, Bushnell went home to Saybrook, Connecticut, where he and his brother Ezra spent more than a month constructing the world’s first submarine. They built no model; the Turtle was built full-sized from the start. According to its inventor, the submarine “bore some resemblance to two upper tortoise shells of equal size joined together.” The boat was seven and a half feet long, four feet wide, and eight feet deep. Made of carefully
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David Bushnell’s submarine Turtle. (U. S. Navy)
fitted oak timbers caulked with cork and tar, Bushnell’s craft was driven by a screw propeller, the first one ever used to power a ship. The contraption included a short, primitive “snorkel,” through which the one-person crew could obtain fresh air. The tube was equipped with valves that automatically closed when the submarine submerged to greater depths. The operator navigated the vessel by looking through a glass conning tower and by checking his compass and depth gauge, which were illuminated by fox fire. Although many accounts of David Bushnell and his Turtle do not indicate that he piloted the vessel, Robert F. Burgess in Ships Beneath the Sea (1975) reveals that he did. Once Bushnell graduated from Yale in June, 1775, he returned to Saybrook to make some adjustments to the boat. The maiden voyage of the Turtle took place in Long Island Sound, where David Bushnell stayed submerged for a rather uneventful forty-five minutes. He nearly fainted, however, and based on this initial experience, realized he was not physically capable of piloting the submarine for extended periods. From then on, his brother, Ezra, practiced maneuvering the Turtle in the sound and prepared for its ultimate mission. In subsequent months, several devices were added to assist in navigation, including a compass and a barometer. At this point, Dr. Benjamin Gale, a family friend of the Bushnells, brought Benjamin Franklin to see the Turtle. Franklin encouraged Bushnell to take his vessel to New York, where the British fleet had set up a blockade. Franklin then told General George Washington about the submarine. Washington was doubtful, however, about the boat’s potential in his endeavors.
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Demonstration of the Turtle Through the influence of Governor Jonathan Trumbull of Connecticut in late 1775, Bushnell demonstrated the Turtle for Major General Israel Putnam of the new Continental army. Putnam was impressed and secured government financing for further development of the submarine. The army wanted to use the submersible to break the British blockade of Boston, but the British squadron departed before Bushnell could fully assemble the ballast pumps. The next opportunity to strike at the British fleet was in 1776 at New York City. The Turtle was hauled overland and launched into the harbor from Manhattan Island. Ezra Bushnell was to have navigated the submarine in its first real combat mission; he was well prepared after a year’s training in the sound. Unfortunately, he became seriously ill with a fever and had to be hospitalized for several weeks. The mission could not wait. General Putnam provided three volunteers, whom Bushnell trained to navigate the vessel. It was twenty-seven-year-old Sergeant Ezra Lee who proved to be the most capable replacement. Just after midnight on the night of September 6, 1776, Lee slipped into the Turtle and, after two hours of tediously maneuvering the boat with hand cranks, guided it under the sixty-four-gun HMS Eagle, the British flagship. Lee was supposed to attach an explosive charge to the flagship by screwing it to the hull. Some historians speculate that Lee might have hit an iron bar connecting a part of the rudder to the stern, because each time he attempted to twist the bit into the metal of the ship, it would not engage. The hull of the Eagle was sheathed in copper, but Bushnell had anticipated this and had made the auger strong enough to penetrate the weaker metal. While Lee tried to maneuver the submarine to another spot on the hull, the Turtle rose to the surface in broad daylight. At the mercy of the tide and without the aid of a compass—which, for some reason, was not working—Lee remained four miles from safety. Although he submerged every few minutes, he finally had to remain on the surface to see his way. Lee’s craft was spotted by English sentries on Governor’s Island, and the sentries quickly launched their own boat in a chase. Lee reported that the sailors came within fifty yards of the Turtle but were frightened of what they saw and turned away. Lee released the keg of powder, which drifted harmlessly into the bay and later exploded. Heading back to New York Harbor, Lee was spotted by his own people and towed to shore by a whaleboat. Lee made several other attempts to destroy British ships in New York Harbor, but all were unsuccessful. When the British advanced up the Hudson River in October, 1776, Bushnell placed his invention aboard
October, 1776: White Plains
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a small sloop. A British warship sank the sloop as it fled up the river in an effort to avoid capture. Although Bushnell reportedly recovered his submarine from the depths, its actual fate remains unknown. After the loss of the Turtle, Governor Trumbull had Bushnell commissioned as an officer in the Sappers and Miners Corps of the Continental army, and Bushnell served during the remainder of the war as a demolition expert. After the American Revolution, the reticent inventor moved to Georgia, where he practiced medicine, taught school, and died in obscurity in 1824. Impact Although David Bushnell’s submarine failed to sink any enemy vessels, he was responsible for several notable achievements. He was the first to prove that gunpowder could explode underwater with sufficient force to disable and sink a surface ship. He also developed floating and submerged mines and invented the first practical submarine. In so doing, Bushnell solved several basic engineering and nautical problems: constructing a watertight and pressure-proof hull with vertical and horizontal propulsion mechanisms; achieving vertical stability and steering control; and developing the means of using variable ballast systems. Bushnell’s inventions were rapidly improved upon by other U.S. inventors who continued to develop the submarine for use in subsequent U.S. naval conflicts. William L. Richter updated by Liesel Ashley Miller
October, 1776 Battle of White Plains Date: October 28, 1776 Location: 21 miles north of New York City along Bronx River Combatants: 13,000 British and Hessians vs. 2,000 Americans Principal commanders: British/Hessian, General Sir William Howe (17291814); American, General George Washington (1732-1799) Result: British victory over American troops. General George Washington and the American colonial army had been forced to abandon New York City during the summer of 1776 and were on
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the run. After resisting a British attack at Harlem Heights, Washington retreated to Chatterton Hill, near White Plains, New York. British general William Howe’s large army, freshly reinforced with Hessian troops, followed. Howe significantly reduced his forces when he dispatched a detachment to contain another branch of the colonial army. In the meantime, Washington’s soldiers fortified Chatterton Hill. After waiting three days, Howe launched frontal and flank assaults on Washington’s troops on October 28. Though the Americans were temporarily able to resist British forces in open-field battle, Howe’s men eventually took the hill. Washington’s army fell back and retreated overnight under the camouflage of a heavy fog. Despite his numerical advantage, Howe chose not to renew the assault the next morning, possibly missing an opportunity to completely defeat the colonial army. Though the British won the Battle of White Plains, British commander in chief Howe was criticized for failing to follow up his tactical advantage, allowing Washington’s army to escape. The colonial army survived and eventually won the war. Leslie Stricker
December, 1776 Battle of Trenton Date: December 26, 1776 Location: Trenton, New Jersey Combatants: 2,400 Americans vs. 1,400 Hessians Principal commanders: American, General George Washington (17321799); British/Hessian, Colonel Johann Gottlieb Rall (c. 1720-1776) Result: American victory. During the New York campaign of 1776, British redcoats inflicted a series of humiliating defeats on rebel forces. With his ragtag army demoralized and dwindling in number, General George Washington sought an opportunity to strike back. Intelligence reports showed that the dispersed British army was retiring to winter quarters. The Hessian soldiers at Trenton could not be easily reinforced, and the garrison’s commander failed to prepare its defenses. Washington therefore planned to lead 2,400 men across the Delaware River at McKonkey’s Ferry and march the nine miles to Trenton. Simultaneously, General James Ewing’s force would cross the river be-
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Emanuel Leutze’s 1851 painting of Washington’s crossing of the Delaware River on his way to Trenton is one of the best-known pictures in American history. (National Archives)
low the town, while Colonel John Cadwalader’s men would create a diversion at Bristol. During the night of December 25-26, Washington, his troops, and eighteen artillery pieces crossed the icy Delaware River. Heavy snow and ice prevented Ewing and Cadwalader from doing likewise. By 8:00 a.m., the continentals reached Trenton, pushed back enemy sentries, and stormed the town. Wet conditions silenced many American muskets, so artillery keyed the attack. Colonel Johann Gottlieb Rall’s troops, recovering from a boisterous Christmas celebration, awoke to the sounds of battle and offered scattered resistance. The Hessian commander tried to rally his confused men, but by that time rebels had infiltrated the town with withering gunfire. Rall was fatally wounded. Leaderless and surrounded, the Hessians surrendered less than an hour after the fighting began. Washington’s troops suffered 4 wounded, while inflicting 114 casualties, capturing 948 prisoners, and seizing six field pieces. The battle’s outcome severely compromised the redcoats’ image of invincibility, revital-
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General Washington accepting the surrender of the Hessian troops after the Battle of Trenton. From an 1850 lithograph by Henry Hoff. (National Archives)
ized American support for the revolutionary cause, demonstrated the effectiveness of field artillery, and bolstered Washington’s reputation, which had suffered from the previous setbacks of 1776. Mark Thompson
January, 1777 Battle of Princeton Date: January 3, 1777 Location: Princeton, New Jersey Combatants: 5,000 American vs. 1,200 British troops Principal commanders: American, General George Washington (17321799); British, General Lord Charles Cornwallis (1738-1805) Result: Washington defeated a detached British brigade in a sharp fight. In late December, 1776, George Washington recrossed the Delaware River from Pennsylvania into New Jersey and concentrated 5,000 soldiers in
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Trenton, having destroyed a Hessian force there several days earlier. Skillfully eluding a British army under General Lord Charles Cornwallis with a night march on January 2-3, Washington struck a lone brigade near Princeton that morning. The disciplined British regulars scattered the first American units on the field with heavy volleys of musketry and a bayonet charge. Washington, however, brought up reinforcements, restored order, and counterattacked. This routed one British regiment. Two others quickly retreated as the Americans advanced on the town. The Americans inflicted approximately 500 casualties, taking 300 prisoners in this sharp, forty-fiveminute fight, at the cost of 44 killed and wounded. Washington had hoped to then seize the British magazine at New Brunswick, but his troops were exhausted. Therefore, he marched to Morristown and went into winter quarters. The victory at Princeton, coupled with the one at Trenton, greatly revitalized the American effort after the disastrous New York campaign of 1776. They also caused the British to evacuate most of New Jersey, undoing much of what the British had accomplished during the previous year. Michael P. Gabriel
George Washington at Princeton. From an 1853 lithography by D. McLellan. (National Archives)
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August, 1777 Battle of Oriskany Creek Date: August 6, 1777 Location: Oriskany Creek, New York Combatants: Uncertain number of Americans vs. uncertain number of British Principal commanders: British, Joseph Brant (also known as Thayendanegea; 1742-1807), General John Burgoyne (1722-1792), Barry St. Leger (1737-1789); American, Horatio Gates (c. 1728-1806), Nicholas Herkimer (1728-1777) Result: British forces retreated west, leaving American forces free to concentrate against Burgoyne. British strategy for suppressing the rebellion in their American colonies during 1776 and 1777 was twofold: a defeat of George Washington’s rebel army and an invasion through New York State to cut the colonies in two. If they succeeded in their strategy, the British would cut off New England, the center of the rebellion, allowing for its occupation and submission by British troops. The remaining colonies, bereft of leadership, would fall under British control. In the summer of 1776, a British army of thirty thousand soldiers, under General William Howe, was to move west from New York City, to be met by a smaller force advancing from Canada under Guy Carleton, British general and governor of Canada. Although an American initiative into Canada, led by Colonel Benedict Arnold and General Richard Montgomery, was stopped at the gates of Quebec, it disrupted this strategy. Carleton, knighted for his success at Quebec, was unable to press on into New York. Burgoyne’s Plan Lieutenant General “Gentleman Johnny” Burgoyne, so named for his appearance and manner, had been in the colonies since the beginning of the revolution. Burgoyne had accompanied Carleton in the attempt to invade New York during the summer of 1776. Returning to England the following winter, Burgoyne presented to King George a paper called “Thoughts for Conducting the War from the Side of Canada,” arguing the soundness of the strategy for an invasion from Canada. Burgoyne felt that more aggressive leadership (provided by himself) would prove more successful than the earlier attempt. The invasion would begin from Montreal, cross Lake Champlain, and follow the Hudson River. A second force
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General John Burgoyne. From an engraving by S. Hollyer. (National Archives)
would proceed from Oswego down the Mohawk Valley, along a tributary of the Hudson River; a third force, under Howe, would move from New York City up the Hudson River. The three armies would converge at Albany, cutting off the northern colonies and isolating Washington’s army. The British ministry accepted Burgoyne’s plan as its war strategy for the following year, and in March, 1777, Burgoyne was given command of the forces from Canada. Lieutenant Colonel Barry St. Leger was given the temporary rank of brigadier and command of the force moving down the Mohawk Valley. On May 6, 1777, Burgoyne arrived in Quebec, where he was met by Carleton. Burgoyne’s army of eighty-three hundred men included thirtyseven hundred regulars and four hundred men from the Six Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy. On June 20, Burgoyne and his forces assembled and set sail from Lake Champlain, heading for Crown Point, eight miles north of Fort Ticonderoga. The second arm of the British strategy, four hundred troops under St. Leger, arrived at Oswego in western New York on July 25. There St. Leger was joined by a thousand Iroquois under the command of Thayendanegea, known as Joseph Brant. St. Leger planned on advancing along the Mohawk River to the Hudson River, brushing past Fort Schuyler on the way. Opposing the British was the Northern Department of the Continental army. Ostensibly under the leadership of General Philip Schuyler, the Americans actually regarded Horatio Gates as their commander. Schuyler
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was a New York patroon, autocratic, and less than successful in earlier campaigns. Many of his troops were New Englanders. They had not excelled as soldiers to date, and Schuyler despised them for it. Gates, although a plantation-owning Virginian, was much like the New Englanders he hoped to lead. He was a man of plain appearance and, although a veteran of the French and Indian War, not a strict disciplinarian. He admired the New Englanders and was admired in return. Fort Ticonderoga Burgoyne’s first target was Fort Ticonderoga. The fort had been seized two years earlier by Americans under the command of Benedict Arnold and Ethan Allen. The fort straddled the northern tip of Lake George and was virtually indefensible if the British occupied a nearby hill. This they did on July 5, and the commander at Fort Ticonderoga, General Arthur St. Clair, evacuated his army south. Burgoyne spent the next three weeks advancing toward the Hudson River, which he reached on July 30. On August 4, Gates replaced Schuyler as commander of the northern Continental army. Meanwhile, St. Leger was about to march toward the Hudson River, 150 miles east. Only Fort Schuyler stood in the way. Built during the French and Indian War, the fort had only recently been reoccupied. Its commander, Colonel Peter Gansevoort, had strengthened its defenses the previous three months. When his allies, local Oneidas, warned him of St. Leger’s approach, Gansevoort evacuated the women and children, leaving about 750 men to oppose St. Leger. The British commander began an encirclement of the fort, preparing to lay siege. Coming to the fort’s relief were General Nicholas Herkimer and eight hundred volunteers of the Tryon County militia. On August 5, Herkimer approached Oriskany Creek, eight miles from the fort. That night, Herkimer sent messengers to the fort requesting that guns be fired as a diversion to cover his men. However, St. Leger was well aware of his arrival. Herkimer’s column included four hundred oxcarts of supplies, strung out for more than a mile. In addition, Molly Brant, Joseph Brant’s sister, had learned of Herkimer’s approach and warned St. Leger. St. Leger laid a trap along a ravine on the road to the fort. At ten o’clock Herkimer reached the ravine, where a waiting Tory detachment, and Native Americans commanded by Brant, opened a cascade of fire. Racing toward the firing, Herkimer was badly wounded in the leg. Herkimer propped himself by a tree, lit his pipe, and directed his men in the battle. Refusing to panic, the officers assembled the men into a defensive perimeter from which they held off the British and their Native American al-
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lies for an hour, until rain interrupted the battle. Wet powder then prevented the guns from firing. When fighting resumed, Herkimer directed his men to fight in pairs, so Indians could not tomahawk a man while he was reloading. Brant was reinforced by troops participating in the siege at Fort Schuyler. Hoping to fool the Americans, they disguised themselves as fellow militia. However, a militiaman recognized one as his neighbor, a Tory who sided with the British, and the ruse failed. The battle continued for six hours, evolving into bitter hand-to-hand combat. Losses among the attacking force approached 25 percent, and finally they withdrew. More than two hundred Americans were killed or wounded. Herkimer was carried to his home and died ten days later. Despite Herkimer’s failure to relieve the fort, casualties among St. Leger’s Native American allies were so heavy that they lost interest in the campaign. Furthermore, General Schuyler was determined that the Americans would retain control of the Mohawk Valley; he directed reinforcements under General Arnold to come to Gansevoort’s aid. When St. Leger learned of the column’s approach, he lifted the siege, ending his role in Burgoyne’s campaign. Burgoyne himself would receive no reinforcements. Trapped by General Gates in Saratoga a month later, he surrendered his army. Aftermath Following the Battle of Oriskany Creek and the defeat of Burgoyne, fighting became increasingly bitter, as each side revenged itself on its opponent’s allies. In July, 1778, Colonel John Butler, leading four hundred Tories and five hundred Senecas, burned and murdered his way through Pennsylvania’s Wyoming Valley. In response, Washington ordered General John Sullivan to destroy the country of the Six Nations, comprising much of western New York and northern Pennsylvania. During the spring and summer of 1779, Sullivan’s four thousand men marched through the Mohawk Valley. Although he met little opposition, Sullivan destroyed more than forty Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, and Mohawk towns. Similarly, Iroquois warriors under Joseph Brant worked devastation on American allies, burning Oneida and Tuscarora villages. This period not only marked an escalation in the bitterness and the extent of fighting but also heralded the disintegration of the once neutral Iroquois Confederacy. The union of the Six Nations did not survive the revolution. Richard Adler
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September, 1777 Battle of Brandywine Date: September 11, 1777 Location: Chadds Ford, Pennsylvania Combatants: 17,000 British and Hessians vs. 15,000 Americans Principal commanders: British/Hessian, General Sir William Howe (17321786); American, General George Washington (1732-1799) Result: Tactical British victory. Hoping to stop the British advance from Elkton, Maryland, to Philadelphia, General George Washington established a strong defensive position on high ground just east of the Brandywine River (September 9, 1777). He failed to gain adequate knowledge of the surrounding terrain and mistakenly believed he had guarded all nearby fords. By preventing British crossings at Wistar’s, Jones’s, Brinton’s, Chad’s, Lower, Gibson’s, Pyle’s, or Corner Fords, he expected to force Sir William Howe to attack frontally from the west bank. The British marched northeast up the Baltimore Pike (later U.S. Route 1) and headquartered at Kennett Square, Pennsylvania. Howe’s reconnaissance was superior to that of Washington. He divided his army, attacked frontally with the smaller part under Baron Wilhelm von Knyphausen, and sent the larger part under Lord Charles Cornwallis to another ford north of Wistar’s. Fog favored the British. When the sky cleared, Washington realized he had been outflanked on his right. He held ground as long as he could but finally had to retreat. Casualty estimates range between 600 and 1,900 for the British and between 700 and 1,300 for the Americans. Washington also lost ten cannons and a howitzer. Howe entered Philadelphia unopposed (September 26). Through casualties and desertions, only 6,000 men remained with Washington after the Philadelphia campaign to winter at Valley Forge. Eric v.d. Luft
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October, 1777 Battle of Germantown Date: October 4, 1777 Location: Germantown, Pennsylvania Combatants: 12,000 American vs. 8,000 British troops Principal commanders: American, General George Washington (17321799); British, Sir William Howe (1732-1786) Result: American retreat. Following his defeat at the Battle of Brandywine and the British occupation of Philadelphia, General George Washington ordered Continental forces to attack British redcoats encamped at Germantown. Washington’s troops set out on October 3 and in four converging columns attacked the following morning. They made rapid and dramatic gains, sweeping across two to three miles of enemy ground before Sir William Howe could organize his beleaguered redcoats. With victory near, Washington prepared to order a general advance of his army to finish off its reeling foe. Then, as quickly as success had come, the momentum rapidly shifted. The rebels’ initial rapid advance and the
Chew House. (National Archives)
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redcoats’ desultory retreat took place in the midst of a dense fog that aided American stealth but prevented them from recognizing the extent of their success. Furthermore, British occupation of the large, stone-walled Chew House slowed the American advance as Henry Knox’s Continental artillery futilely blasted the stronghold. Additionally, two of Washington’s columns collided and exchanged fire. The resulting confusion precipitated a general collapse of the American line that reversed the movement of battle and left the Continental commander bewildered by the sudden need for retreat. Despite the Germantown setback, morale in the Continental ranks remained high. “Our troops are in prodigious Spirits,” Knox reported after the battle. They had carried out a complex plan requiring considerable skill and almost defeated a formidable foe. Rather than demonstrating the soldiers’ incompetence and heightening their despair, the near-success reflected their increased military prowess and buoyed hopes for victory in future confrontations. Mark Thompson
October, 1777 Battle of Saratoga Date: October 8-17, 1777 Location: Upper New York State Combatants: British vs. Americans Principal commanders: British, General John Burgoyne (1722-1792), William Howe (1729-1814), Henry Clinton (1730-1795); American, General Horatio Gates (1728-1806), Benedict Arnold (1741-1801) Result: Britain’s defeat marked the end of any prospect of British victory in America’s Revolutionary War. For the campaign of 1777 of the American Revolution, the British devised a bold strategy designed to bring the war to an immediate end. It involved military action in three different locales: the capture of Philadelphia, the seat of the American congress, by an army led by William Howe and transported to the vicinity by the British Royal Navy; an attack from Canada down the Lake Champlain-Lake George waterway, under the command of General John Burgoyne, to assault and seize Albany; and a movement of British forces from their base in New York City up the Hudson River, to
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meet Burgoyne at Albany. The effect would be to split the colonies in two— in particular to seal off New England, where revolutionary fervor was greatest, from the colonies to the south. Although all participants agreed on the plan, the exact role each was to play, and especially their coordination with one another, was never made clear. George Washington, the American commander in chief, realized early the nature of the British plan but was powerless to do much about it. He felt compelled to try to protect Philadelphia, but his efforts led only to defeat by Howe. Recognizing the significance of the Burgoyne expedition, Washington sent Colonel Daniel Morgan’s detachment of sharpshooters north to join the American army defending Albany. Morgan’s unit at Saratoga helped to neutralize the Native American forces fighting on the British side and played a vital role in overcoming the British officers.
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General Horatio Gates. (National Archives)
Burgoyne’s Advance General Burgoyne’s army, about eight thousand strong, was successfully advancing toward Albany. A large flotilla had been assembled, able to proceed by water down the Richelieu River to Lake Champlain, where it defeated American attempts to halt it. The British disembarked at the foot of Lake George and successfully seized the lightly guarded fort at Ticonderoga, from which the American force was compelled to withdraw. Burgoyne then proceeded overland toward the Hudson River, but the terrain, the weather, and the lack of adequate oxen and horses to draw his supplies slowed his advance substantially. Burgoyne detached a force of Germans serving under him to invade Vermont and capture any supplies and animals they could find. This force was wiped out by the Americans at the Battle of Bennington on August 16. The American victory did much to enhance American morale and to motivate recruits to join the American army defending Albany. The American army, previously under the command of General Philip Schuyler, was now turned over to the command of General Horatio Gates. Gates’s talent was organization, not battlefield tactics, and he has been much criticized for taking a defensive posture against Burgoyne’s advancing army. However, he did realize the importance of a strong defensive position, and this led him to move the American forces northward, to a position above Stillwater on the heights overlooking the Hudson River. The American forces heavily fortified their position.
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On September 19, 1777, the opposing forces came face to face with each other. Burgoyne, recognizing the folly of attempting to advance further on the road to Albany, deployed his forces, now down to about five thousand. His plan was to attack the American left wing, on the heights, with his British troops, leaving the Germans to anchor the position on the road and along the river. The attack on the heights was fought largely in the woods, but partly in a clearing around an isolated farm called Freeman’s Farm. The American sharpshooters shot down the officers; the British suffered heavy casualties. Burgoyne regrouped his forces to consider what to do next. He had received little news of the cooperating army, under Henry Clinton, that was supposed to advance up the Hudson River and meet him at Albany. He did learn that many of the supplies he had left behind at Ticonderoga had been seized by American forces, leaving him with only enough supplies to last until mid-October. Burgoyne therefore staged a second, hotly contested attack on the American positions on October 7. Benedict Arnold again led the Americans in battle, and the British were unable to overcome the American forces. Unable to advance, Burgoyne on October 8 ordered his army to retreat toward Saratoga.
General Burgoyne’s surrender at Saratoga. From a painting by John Trumbull (17561843). (National Archives)
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Americans Surround the British Meanwhile, American forces had seized more of the line of retreat toward Canada. Burgoyne’s army was effectively surrounded. On October 13, Burgoyne began to negotiate terms of surrender with Gates, negotiations that were completed on October 16. Under the terms of the Convention of Saratoga, the British troops laid down their arms on October 17. They were to be marched to a port of embarkation and sent back to Europe, on condition that they would take no further part in the conflict. In the end, Congress reneged on this commitment and the captured troops spent the rest of the war in prisoner-of-war camps in America. The defeat of Burgoyne’s expedition meant the failure of the British strategy to end the war in 1777. France took steps to support the Americans, and this cooperation led eventually to the American victory at Yorktown. Nancy M. Gordon
February, 1778 Franco-American Treaties Date: February 6, 1778 Location: Paris Principal negotiators: American, Commissioners Benjamin Franklin (17061790), Silas Deane (1737-1789), and Arthur Lee (1740-1792); French, Foreign Affairs Minister Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes (1717-1787), Minister Anne César, Chevalier de La Luzerne (1741-1791), King Louis XVI (1754-1793); Spanish, Prime Minister José Moñino y Redondo, conde de Floridablanca (1728-1808) Result: The terms of the treaties reflected the long-standing enmity between France and Britain and offered French assistance to the emerging American nation. The American revolutionaries did not believe that their war of independence would go unnoticed by the outside world. In 1763, the balance of power in Europe had swung decisively toward Great Britain, largely because of its defeat of France and Spain in the Western Hemisphere. Americans and Europeans agreed that the scales would remain tipped in favor of the island kingdom only so long as it retained its New World possessions. At first, colonial writers warned that the Bourbon monarchies might at-
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Benjamin Franklin at the royal court of France in 1778. From a painting by Hobens. (National Archives)
tempt to seize several of George III’s American provinces while his house was divided against itself, and that such storm warnings might offer the most compelling reasons for the colonies and the mother country to patch up their quarrel. As the imperial crisis deepened, American opinion of the Roman Catholic states gradually shifted from fear to the hope that they would assist America in case of war with Great Britain. Changing Sentiments That change of sentiment was one of the radical features of the American Revolution. Bred on a hatred of Catholicism and political absolutism associated especially with France, American publicists for decades had shrilled for the permanent removal of the French peril from North America. The elimination of France from Canada in 1763, however, meant that France was no longer the threat it had been previously. France and its ally, Spain, were now more tolerable from afar than in the day when the fleur-delis loomed over the back door of the mainland settlements. Moreover,
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France’s nearly total elimination from mainland North America did not mean that the striving colonies were destined to lose a potentially valuable international trading partner. A thriving market for import-export trade had grown between Atlantic seaboard ports and the Spanish and French colonial possessions in the Caribbean area. The American colonists’ desire to keep this trade free from British control was as much a factor in their feelings toward France as was their interest in political independence. The need for foreign assistance, so ably expressed in Thomas Paine’s Common Sense (1776), was a powerful catalyst for independence. Anticipating the final break, Congress in March, 1776, dispatched Silas Deane to Paris to purchase military stores and to explore the possibilities of a commercial alliance. Even before Deane’s arrival, French leaders decided to provide the patriots with covert aid. The Anglo-American war gave France the long-awaited opportunity to gain revenge for its humiliation in 1763. However, the comte de Vergennes, French minister of foreign affairs, was cautious and prudent, a tough-minded career diplomat, and no messenger of Enlightenment idealism. Fearful of American defeat or a compromise settlement between the colonies and Great Britain, Vergennes plotted a judicious course until the picture cleared. The attitude of Spain, which feared an independent America as a threat to its overseas dominions, also served to restrain Vergennes and his countrymen. Nevertheless, the year 1777 marked France’s increasing commitment to the American patriots.
The marquis de Lafayette in 1781. From a painting by J. B. LePaon. (National Archives)
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The growing stream of supplies bought with royal funds or taken surreptitiously from military arsenals, the opening of French ports to rebel privateers and warships, the procession of French officers bound for Washington’s army, the unremitting pressures of Silas Deane, and the subtler blandishments of his colleague, Benjamin Franklin, all combined to move France toward the patriots’ orbit. News of the British capitulation of General John Burgoyne at Saratoga in October, 1777, dispelled any lingering doubts as to the patriots’ ability to continue the struggle. Vergennes now feared that the American victory might give rise to a spirit of conciliation in Great Britain, leading to some form of reunion between the Englishspeaking people on opposite sides of the Atlantic. The French minister of foreign affairs notified Franklin and his fellow commissioners that the government of Louis XVI was ready to establish formal ties with the United States. Propagandists Prior to and after final agreement on the treaties that were signed in 1778, Vergennes had French agents in America contact (and contract) willing propagandists to support a Franco-American Alliance. The bestknown of these, until American leaders’ political differences led to his alienation, was Thomas Paine. Another supporter of the French, in Massachusetts, was the Reverend Samuel Cooper, whose brother was active in the politics of independence both before and after 1776. Cooper not only wrote articles calling for closer Franco-American relations but also gathered key information from the American emissary in Paris, Benjamin Franklin. His activities actually earned for him a salary from the French foreign ministry. Shortly after the French and the Americans signed the 1778 treaties, he and a number of other Francophiles opened a literary and social salon in Boston, to which French officers, including the famous marquis de Lafayette, were invited. Although Cooper was among a small number of American patriots who corresponded regularly with French officials (including Foreign Minister Vergennes and France’s chief minister in America, Chevalier de La Luzerne), Lafayette did not know of their semiofficial propagandistic functions. Lafayette even wrote to Vergennes in May, 1780, urging Paris to “especially put Dr. Cooper at the head of the list of our friends.” Cooper’s service to the cause of closer Franco-American relations continued until he died in 1784. Another patriot propagandist who maintained close ties with La Luzerne was Hugh Henry Brackenridge, a Philadelphia Presbyterian minister and attorney who in 1779 edited United States Magazine. Although the magazine did not print specific articles backing the French treaties, it
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was assumed that French pay for other propagandistic pieces helped finance Brackenridge’s publication. For both parties, the Franco-American Alliance was the child of necessity. If the patriots in the beginning hoped for massive French aid and the entrance of the Bourbon nation into the war, they wanted only a temporary relationship; too intimate a formal connection would mean becoming involved in the future strife of the Old World, whose peoples mirrored a society and way of life incompatible with free, republican institutions. While the patriots offered only a commercial treaty to France, Vergennes successfully demanded more: a “conditional and defensive alliance.” The French minister of foreign affairs and his sovereign were not enthusiastic about revolution against kings. Their willingness to recognize the United States of America and to sign treaties with the infant nation on February 6, 1778, was based upon a desire to humiliate France’s ancient foe. The Treaty of Amity and Commerce contained most of the proposals made by Congress for liberalization of trade along principles foreign to mercantilism. The Treaty of Alliance stipulated that, in case of war between Great Britain and France—which the two treaties made inevitable— neither America nor France would make peace without the approval of the other. France renounced forever any claims to British territory on the continent of North America and agreed to recognize the U.S. right to any such territory seized by patriot armies. The two nations also guaranteed each other’s territorial boundaries in the New World as they would be drawn at the end of hostilities. Public Reactions Once news of the Franco-American treaties spread, an inevitable division of opinion over their presumed positive or negative significance appeared among American clerics. Although not all Anglican and Methodist ministers denounced the treaties, their denominational closeness to England caused schisms among parishioners. Many loyalists among the clergy had already left their pulpits as early as 1775 and 1776. The dissenting clergy that took over such ministerial posts tried to combine support for independence with some form of justification for the expediency of a formal alliance between the secularist Continental Congress and monarchical Catholic France. Among non-Anglicans, some pastors, such as the Reverend Cooper (already committed, for pay, to the French cause), defended the treaties openly. Others, including James Dana of Wallingford, Connecticut, recognized the necessity of international political alliances to help the struggling former colonies defeat Great Britain, but insisted that more extensive ties with “popery” would run counter to American princi-
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ples of free government. A striking example of denunciation of the alliance as camouflage to hide presumed French Catholic propagandistic intentions came from John Zulby, a Swiss-born cleric and anti-independence member of the Continental Congress. Zulby was ultimately banished for referring to American patriots as preferring “Independancy and papist Connections” over “the Gospel and . . . former acknowledged happy Connections” with Great Britain. Great Britain’s international difficulties continued to mount after hostilities opened with France in the summer of 1778. The next year, Spain entered the fray after securing a promise from Vergennes to continue hostilities until Gibraltar was regained. Although Spain did not join the Franco-American Alliance, the United States, through its tie with France, found itself committed to fight until Gibraltar fell to Spain. In 1780, AngloDutch commercial friction brought the Netherlands into the war. Great Britain was also confronted by the League of Armed Neutrality, organized by several nonbelligerent nations in protest against British practices of search and seizure on the high seas. Unlike in earlier wars of the eighteenth century, Great Britain was isolated both diplomatically and militarily. R. Don Higginbotham updated by Byron D. Cannon
June, 1778 Battle of Monmouth Date: June 28, 1778 Location: Monmouth Courthouse, New Jersey Combatants: 10,000 American vs. 10,000 British troops Principal commanders: American, General George Washington (17321799); British, General Sir Henry Clinton (1738-1795) Result: The Americans and British fought to a draw in the last major battle of the American Revolution in the north. On June 18, 1778, General Sir Henry Clinton evacuated Philadelphia after an eight-month occupation and marched toward New York City. George Washington pursued with an army that had been extensively trained by Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben during the preceding winter at Valley Forge. On June 28, the Americans caught the British rearguard near Monmouth Courthouse and attacked at 10:00 a.m. General Charles Lee di-
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George Washington at Monmouth. From an 1858 engraving by G. R. Hall. (National Archives)
rected the assault but issued no firm orders, and the Americans were soon in full retreat. Washington rallied his army and organized a new line. The two armies then fought in the sweltering heat until dark, as the Americans repulsed a series of disjointed British attacks. Clinton then withdrew and resumed his march to New York. The British had at least 147 killed, many from sunstroke, 170 wounded, and 64 missing. Washington lost 106 dead, 161 wounded, and 95 missing. Monmouth demonstrated the growing professionalism in the American army. For the remainder of the war, the army would be able to stand up to the British in open combat. The battle was also the last major engagement in the north. Washington would station his army near New York City, awaiting an opportunity to attack, until the Yorktown campaign in 1781. Michael P. Gabriel
September-October, 1779 Siege of Savannah Date: September 23-October 18, 1779 Location: Savannah, Georgia Combatants: 10,000 American vs. 3,000 British troops
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Principal commanders: American, General Benjamin Lincoln (1733-1810), Admiral Comte Jean-Baptiste-Charles-Henri-Hector d’Estaing (17291794); British, Major General Augustine Prevost (1723-1786) Result: Successful defense of Savannah retained Georgia under British control. The Americans believed the recovery of Savannah was the best way of regaining control of Georgia. In September of 1779, Major General Benjamin Lincoln advanced with 4,000 troops toward Savannah. At the same time, Admiral Comte Hector d’Estaing sailed in from the West Indies with thirty-five ships and 4,000 troops. The British, led by Major General Augustine Prevost, were unprepared. The city of Savannah’s defenses were in disrepair. Fortunately for the British, d’Estaing was slow in the debarkation of his troops. Upon reaching the city, d’Estaing demanded surrender. Prevost, buying time for reinforcements to arrive, requested a twenty-four-hour truce. D’Estaing foolishly agreed. When Prevost rejected the surrender demand the next day, the allies prepared for a siege. Actual siege operations began September 23. Concerned about his unprotected ships and the approaching hurricane season in the West Indies, and despite the objections of the Americans,
British attack on Savannah on October 8, 1779. From an illustration by Arthur I. Keller (1866-1924). (National Archives)
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d’Estaing took matters into his own hands and gave the order to attack on October 9. The siege lasted nine days with the superior British troops prevailing. The allies lost 244 men, and 584 were wounded. British casualties included 125 missing or wounded and 40 killed. The defeat at Savannah dealt a severe blow to the revolutionary cause in the south and put further strain on the American-French alliance. Maryanne Barsotti
April-May, 1780 Siege of Charleston Date: April 1, 1780-May 12, 1780 Location: Charleston, North Carolina Combatants: 5,530 American vs. 10,000 British troops Principal commanders: American, General Benjamin Lincoln (1733-1810); British, Lieutenant General Henry Clinton (1738-1795) Result: The Siege of Charleston proved to be the greatest British victory and the worst American disaster of the war. Looking to expand British victories in the south, Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton landed in Charleston on March 12, 1780. Fortunately for the Americans, severe winter storms caused heavy damage to British ships and delayed their advancement on Charleston by two weeks. This gave General Benjamin Lincoln time to reinforce the city’s sadly neglected fortifications. Despite several successful early skirmishes, the Americans were no match for the British. By the end of March, the city was nearly surrounded. The citizens of Charleston refused to listen to Lincoln’s recommendation to evacuate the city. Britain’s Royal Navy bombarded the city from the harbor, cutting off all routes in and out. By May 12, Lincoln had little choice but to finally surrender. British losses totaled 150 killed and 189 wounded. American losses totaled 100 killed and 150 wounded. More than 5,000 American soldiers were taken prisoner. Within a few months of the fall of Charleston, practically all of South Carolina was in British hands, successfully securing the southern part of the continent for England. Maryanne Barsotti
August, 1780: Camden
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August, 1780 Battle of Camden Date: August 16, 1780 Location: Camden, South Carolina Combatants: 3,052 American vs. 2,240 British troops Principal commanders: American, General Horatio Gates (1728-1806); British, General Lord Charles Cornwallis (1738-1805) Result: The British attack routed American forces. In July, 1780, General Horatio Gates decided to advance against the British forces under Lord Charles Cornwallis in South Carolina. Arriving at Camden on August 16, the same day as the troops of Cornwallis, Gates was determined to take the town of Camden from the British, and the battle was joined seven miles north of the town. Although the American forces outnumbered those of the British, several factors severely handicapped the colonials. American troops were exhausted by long marches, weakened by the laxative effect of their ill-chosen supplies, and poorly commanded. In addition, fewer than 900 troops were trained Continental soldiers. The British attacked first, and the Virginia and North Carolina militia quickly threw down their arms and fled. Only the
Death of General Johann Kalb at the Battle of Camden. From a painting by Alonzo Chappel (1828-1887). (National Archives)
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600 Delaware and Maryland Continentals under the German general Johann Kalb (also known as Baron de Kalb) stood their ground, but 2,000 British attackers eventually overwhelmed them. The Americans chaotically fled to North Carolina, with Gates at the forefront of the fleeing survivors. Only about 1,000 Americans survived death or capture, compared with 331 deaths suffered by the British. The cowardice of Gates and the size of American losses combined to make for the worst defeat of the Americans during the war. Paul John Chara, Jr.
October, 1780 Battle of King’s Mountain Date: October 7, 1780 Location: King’s Mountain, South Carolina (forty miles west-southwest of Charlotte, N.C.) Combatants: 1,100 British loyalist militia and regulars vs. about 1,400 American patriot militia Principal commanders: British, Major Patrick Ferguson (1744-1780); American, Colonel William Campbell (1745-1781) Result: American troops destroyed Ferguson’s force. On October 7, 1780, British forces subduing the south suffered a major defeat when American patriot militia under Colonel William Campbell from the Carolinas, Virginia, and the Tennessee region combined forces at King’s Mountain. There, the Americans annihilated Major Patrick Ferguson’s loyalists, protecting General Charles Cornwallis’s left flank as he advanced toward Charlotte, North Carolina. The American militia trapped Ferguson’s force atop King’s Mountain, an open plateau rising sixty feet with steep, heavily wooded sides. The rifle-armed Americans advanced up the mountain, using terrain well, and attacked about three in the afternoon. Ferguson’s troops, using musket and bayonet charges, drove attackers back only to face repeated assaults from regrouped riflemen. With his force steadily cut down by deadly frontier rifle fire and his position hopeless, Ferguson and a few followers attempted a breakthrough. A hail of bullets felled the British commander, ending the battle, although Americans continued firing briefly at the despised, surrender-
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ing loyalists. British casualties included about 200 killed, 160 wounded and about 700 prisoners. Americans lost 28 killed and 62 wounded. American victory at King’s Mountain, which ended a string of British victories, forced Cornwallis to abandon his move into North Carolina and retreat to Winnsborough. It became a turning point of the revolution in the south. W. Calvin Smith
January, 1781 Battle of Cowpens Date: January 17, 1781 Location: Cowpens, Piedmont region in South Carolina Combatants: 1,100 British vs. 1,025 American troops Principal commanders: British, Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton (17361802); American, Brigadier General Daniel Morgan (1754-1833) Result: An American victory that destroyed much of Lord Charles Cornwallis’s light infantry.
George Washington’s nephew, Colonel William Augustine Washington, at the Battle of Cowpens. From an engraving by S. H. Gimber for Graham’s Magazine, which began publication in 1841. (National Archives)
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On January 17, 1781, Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton attacked Brigadier General Daniel Morgan’s troops, whose back and left flank were anchored by the Broad River. Morgan’s first line of 150 sharpshooters fired and then fell back to a second line of 300 militia. These fired two volleys and retired to the rear to regroup. The British then pressed on to meet the main American line, which consisted of Continentals. A mistaken order caused a momentary retreat on the American right, but it was orderly and merely anticipated Morgan’s plan to draw in the British. When commanded, the Americans turned and subjected the British to withering fire. The shock of this volley was promptly followed with a bayonet charge. This American counterattack was supported by dragoons, which struck the left flank and rear of the British Highlanders. The regrouped militia hit the Highlanders’ right flank. Under this intense pressure, the Highlanders broke, causing panic throughout the British line. The British right was turned as well; therefore, Tarleton’s army experienced the disaster of a double envelopment. British casualties and prisoners numbered about 900. American casualties amounted to about 70. Cowpens boosted American morale and destroyed a good deal of Lord Charles Cornwallis’s army. Morgan’s army was able to unite with Nathanael Greene’s troops and to continue to contest the British for control of the south. Peter K. Benbow
October, 1781 Surrender at Yorktown Date: October 19, 1781 Location: Yorktown, Virginia Combatants: British vs. Americans and French Principal commanders: British, Henry Clinton (1730-1795), Charles Cornwallis (1738-1805); American, Nathanael Greene (1742-1786), Benjamin Lincoln (1733-1810), George Washington (1732-1799); French, Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, comte de Rochambeau (1725-1807) Result: The entire British field army surrendered to combined American and French forces, marking the military end to the Revolutionary War. The surrender of Lord Charles Cornwallis in 1781 at Yorktown made immortal the name of that sleepy village at the tip of a Virginia peninsula. The
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roots of the Yorktown debacle are to be found in a train of events that followed the decision of the Ministry in London in 1778 to shift the focus of the war to the region below the Potomac. French intervention and failure to win in the North led to the British campaign in the South. Although such a campaign would see royal military forces dispersed from Manhattan to the West Indies, the policymakers at Whitehall based their decision on two crucial assumptions: first, that the southern loyalists were exceedingly numerous; and second, that on the sea, Great Britain could maintain naval superiority against its combined Bourbon enemies of France and Spain. Although the loyalists were not so numerous as anticipated, and a British garrison at Savannah almost fell to French admiral Jean-BaptisteCharles-Henri-Hector d’Estaing in October, 1779, when he caught the British fleet napping, the basic assumptions in London never were altered. Indeed, the war in the South went extremely well for the home government until 1781. Georgia fell in 1779 and South Carolina in 1780. In major actions in the latter state, at Charleston on May 12, 1780, and at Camden on August 16, 1780, the Continental Congress entrusted to Major General Nathanael Greene, a former Quaker from Rhode Island, the task of rallying the scattered and dispirited American forces. His antagonist was Major General Lord Charles Cornwallis, who headed the British field army when Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton returned to New York. Cornwallis Cornwallis displayed none of the caution or timidity that many of the British senior officers had shown during the American Revolution. Determined to overrun North Carolina and, he hoped, Virginia as well, he refused to allow the annihilation of two of his detached units, at King’s Mountain on October 7, 1780, and at Cowpens on January 17, 1781, to dampen his ambitions. Nor did the failure of the loyalists, whose numbers he exaggerated, alter his thinking. Greene, a master of harassment tactics, severely mauled still more of Cornwallis’s irreplaceable redcoats at Guilford Court House, North Carolina, on March 15, 1781. In April, Greene and Cornwallis went opposite ways—Greene south to pick off British outposts in South Carolina, Cornwallis north to invade Virginia. Greene’s brilliant campaign eventually cleared the enemy from all points except Charleston, South Carolina, and Savannah, Georgia, while Cornwallis, far from his supply depots, took the road to disaster. Although Clinton had favored the establishment of a naval base on the Chesapeake and had sent turncoat Brigadier General Benedict Arnold to Virginia on a raiding expedition, he had been more concerned about the welfare of Brit-
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Romanticized depiction of the surrender of General Cornwallis (left) at Yorktown. One of the most capable of the British generals in the war, the first marquis of Cornwallis had the misfortune of having to surrender to the revolutionaries at Yorktown; however, he is better remembered in British Empire history for his later service as governor-general of India and viceroy of Ireland. (F. R. Niglutsch)
ish interests in the lower South. Consequently, he had instructed his restless subordinate to undertake nothing that might endanger “the tranquility of South Carolina.” After limping to Wilmington, North Carolina, to rest his troops, Cornwallis wrote to Clinton, who previously had been in the dark as to Cornwallis’s whereabouts, that “a serious attempt upon Virginia . . . would tend to the security of South Carolina and ultimately to the submission of North Carolina.” On May 20, Cornwallis joined Arnold at Petersburg, Virginia, and assumed direction of the combined force of seventy-two hundred men. Apprehensive about the possible arrival of a French fleet in the Chesapeake Bay, Clinton disapproved of Cornwallis’s abandoning South Carolina and voiced reluctance at turning Virginia into a prime military theater. Clinton, an able strategist but an insecure commander in chief, failed to deal decisively with Cornwallis, a personal rival who, he feared, might be appointed to succeed him at any moment. Cornwallis, meanwhile, idled away vital weeks skirmishing in the Old Dominion before retiring to Yorktown in the late summer to erect fortifications.
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Enter the French In New York, Clinton fretted and Washington awaited a large French fleet. Approximately five thousand French troops under Brigadier General comte de Rochambeau were already at Newport, Rhode Island, but the comte de Barras’s escorting ships had been quickly blockaded inside the harbor by a superior British squadron. Finally, word came of Admiral Françoise-Joseph-Paul de Grasse’s sailing from France to the West Indies with plans to detach part of his fleet later to assist a mainland campaign. Although Washington preferred to attack New York City, after hearing on August 14 that Grasse was bound for the Chesapeake, he recognized that his better prospect would be to trap Cornwallis. Accordingly, Washington and Rochambeau hurried southward with seven thousand men, while Barras, loaded with the siege guns for the allied armies, slipped out of Newport. It was scarcely the British navy’s finest hour; not only had the navy permitted Barras to elude the Newport blockade, but the West Indian squadron also had been equally lax, because Admiral Sir George Rodney had assumed erroneously that Grasse would not sail to the Virginia coast with his entire fleet of twenty-eight ships. Rodney consequently sent only fourteen vessels northward under Admiral Sir Samuel Hood, who united with the seven ships of Admiral Sir Thomas Graves at New York. Unaware of Grasse’s strength, Graves hastened down the coast and met the French admiral at the mouth of Chesapeake Bay on September 5. The ensuing contest was indecisive, but Graves felt compelled to return to New York, leaving the French in control of the ocean approaches to the Middle Colonies. The fate of Cornwallis at Yorktown was then all but sealed. Franco-American land operations began on September 7, when soldiers carried by Grasse and Lafayette’s Americans took up positions on the land side of Yorktown. By September 28, after the arrival of Washington and Rochambeau, the entire allied force was in siege position. It numbered more than sixteen thousand men, about half of it French and half American. Once the first parallel was opened and allied siege guns were emplaced, the firing was incessant, forcing the British to withdraw to their inner fortifications. At this point, the British were closely invested by land and completely isolated by sea. With their supplies and morale dangerously low, the British recognized the hopelessness of their position. The Surrender On October 17, when Cornwallis asked for terms, the allies demanded complete surrender. Two days later, his seven thousand scarlet-uniformed
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veterans marched out between rows of white-coated Frenchmen and illclad Americans and stacked their arms, while the British bands played “The World Turned Upside Down.” News of Yorktown convinced responsible leaders on both sides of the Atlantic that Great Britain’s American empire had been permanently rent asunder. The defeat of Cornwallis and the surrender of his army by no means ended the American Revolution in a single blow. In fact, had the British Empire chosen to do so, it could have mounted renewed thrusts against the rebellious colonies, either from forces in New York or with reinforcements from the British Isles. However, the effect of a major military setback in the Americas, in conjunction with Great Britain’s precarious position in a worldwide struggle against Spain, France, and Holland, as well as the newly formed United States, combined to force George III and his ministers to accept peace with American independence as the best possible solution left to them under the circumstances. R. Don Higginbotham updated by Michael Witkoski
September, 1783 Treaty of Paris Date: September 3, 1783 Location: Paris Principal figures: American, Ambassador John Jay (1745-1829), Commissioner John Adams (1735-1826), Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790); Spanish, Ambassador Pedro Pablo Abarca de Bolea, conde de Aranda (17181798); French, Minister of Foreign Affairs Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes (1719-1787); British, Prime Minister Frederick North (17321792), Richard Oswald (1705-1784), William Petty, earl of Shelburne (1737-1805), Charles Watson Wentworth, Lord Rockingham (1730-1782) Result: The treaty represented the formal close to the Revolutionary War and ensured the United States recognition as a sovereign nation. The ultimate success of the United States in winning the Revolutionary War did not immediately translate into an easy peace. The new nation’s primary objective was to gain formal recognition of its independence from Great Britain; it also needed agreements related to tangential issues, such as boundaries and fishing rights off Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. It
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John Jay, from a painting by Gilbert Stuart. One of the chief American negotiators at Paris, Jay was later the first chief justice of the United States. (National Archives)
quickly became evident that the United States could not expect altruistic generosity from either its friends or its former adversaries. France, an ally of Spain, hesitated to support U.S. interests against the wishes of its Bourbon neighbor. Madrid also objected to any new rising empire in the Western Hemisphere, fearing possible instability within its own Latin American colonies. If Great Britain appeared conciliatory toward the United States, its motives were dictated by a desire to weaken the Franco-American Alliance and maintain remaining North American interests. At the same time, as events later revealed, Great Britain and France were willing to cooperate surreptitiously to limit the territorial aspirations of the United States when it proved to be in the interest of either power. The American Diplomats The U.S. diplomats at the peace conference were a match for their French and English counterparts, despite problems in undertaking their important task. Of those appointed by the Continental Congress to negotiate a peace, Thomas Jefferson did not serve because of the fatal illness of his wife, and Henry Laurens was a prisoner in England during the most crucial period of the peacemaking discussions. Two other appointees were serving in previous diplomatic assignments—John Jay at Madrid and John Adams at The Hague—and did not reach Paris until months after Benjamin Franklin began discussions with the British in April, 1782. (Jay
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reached Paris in late June, while Adams did not arrive until the end of October.) In London, Lord North had been prime minister throughout the entire war, but King George III largely had dictated government policy. The revolt of the American colonies and their probable loss from the British Empire led to North’s resignation in March, 1782. Lord Rockingham succeeded him but died several months later. William Petty, the earl of Shelburne, the home secretary in Rockingham’s cabinet, had been assigned the responsibility of dealing with the Americans. Shelburne sent to Paris a Scottish merchant named Richard Oswald, an elderly acquaintance of Franklin, to start conversations aimed at luring the venerable commissioner away from France. Oswald argued that the former British colonies in America could gain more by dealing separately with the mother country, but while Franklin revealed a willingness to speak with the British representatives, he remained firmly committed to the Franco-American military alliance created in 1778. He did, however, assure Oswald that a generous peace would go far toward rebuilding ties between the English-speaking nations. When Lord Rockingham died in July, Shelburne became prime minister but was reluctant to concede total independence to the former colonies.
General George Washington and his victorious troops entering New York, which briefly served as the new nation’s first capital. (F. R. Niglutsch)
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Suspicions About France When Jay finally arrived in Paris in June, he expressed his deep suspicion of French intentions, correctly believing that the comte de Vergennes, French minister of foreign affairs, favored Spanish ambitions in the disputed region between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River. The conde de Aranda, Spanish ambassador to France, informed Jay of the unwillingness of Charles III, the Bourbon king of Spain, to recognize U.S. claims to all lands to the east bank of the Mississippi River north of 31° north latitude and to free navigation of the entire river. Subsequently, Aranda and Gérard de Rayneval, Vergennes’s secretary and diplomatic courier, proposed that the region between the Great Lakes and the Ohio River remain in British hands and that much of the Southwest should become a Spanish protectorate. When he learned that Rayneval had slipped away to London, Jay suspected that the Bourbons might negotiate with Great Britain at U.S. expense. Led by Jay, who personally took the initiative in August, the U.S. commissioners assured Shelburne of their willingness to deal directly with the British if London would change Oswald’s instructions to permit him to negotiate openly and with full authority with the representatives of the United States. This would be an implicit recognition of U.S. sovereignty, which Great Britain had hitherto refused to acknowledge. Shelburne now responded positively, believing that the patriots could be separated from France and would be more cooperative with Great Britain in the future. Oswald received his increased authority in September, and the negotiations rapidly clarified the details of an agreement. Terms Franklin was disappointed at not gaining Canada, one of his personal objectives in the negotiations, but the boundaries agreed upon in the preliminary treaty did meet U.S. aspirations in the northwest and southwest. The Mississippi River was designated as the primary western boundary of the United States. In addition, the new nation was given access to the Canadian fishing grounds, and British forces would be evacuated from U.S. soil. In return, the U.S. commissioners agreed to validate prewar debts owed to British subjects and to recommend to the states that they return confiscated loyalist property. On balance, the United States gained more than the British in the concessions each side made to reach a satisfactory conclusion. The preliminary articles, signed on November 30, 1782, although without the advice or consent of Vergennes, did not technically violate the letter of the Franco-American Alliance, for the treaty was not to go into effect un-
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til France and Great Britain also had come to terms. What the commissioners had violated, however, were the instructions given by Congress in June, 1781, that they do nothing without the knowledge and consent of France. At that time, Congress had even withdrawn the requirement that the Mississippi River be the nation’s western boundary, ordering its commissioners to insist only upon independence. The negotiators’ coup enabled Vergennes, never really eager to keep fighting until Spain recovered Gibraltar from the British, to persuade Charles III’s ministers to settle instead for the acquisition of the island of Minorca in the Mediterranean Sea, as well as the two Floridas. The final treaties were signed at Paris on September 3, 1783, confirming the detailed Anglo-American understanding of the previous November. With the acceptance of the formal agreement and Congress’s ratification of the treaty, the United States of America entered the community of nations. R. Don Higginbotham updated by Taylor Stults
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Further Reading Abbot, Henry L. Beginning of Modern Submarine Warfare Under Captain Lieutenant David Bushnell. Edited by Frank Anderson. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1966. Alden, John R. General Gage in America. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1948. Anderson, Troyer Steele. The Command of the Howe Brothers During the American Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936. Andrews, Joseph L., Jr. Revolutionary Boston, Lexington and Concord: The Shots Heard Round the World. Concord, Mass.: Concord Guides Press, 1999. Apple, R. W., Jr. “Benedict Arnold, Hero: A Revolutionary Turning Point.” The New York Times Magazine, April 18, 1999, p. 141. Babits, Lawrence. A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998. Bailey, J. D. Commanders at King’s Mountain. Greenville, S.C.: A Press, 1980. Barefoot, Daniel W. Touring South Carolina’s Revolutionary War Sites. Touring the Backroads Series. Winston-Salem, N.C.: John F. Blair, 1999. Beer, George L. British Colonial Policy, 1754-1765. New York: Macmillan, 1907. Bellesiles, Michael A. Revolutionary Outlaws: Ethan Allen and the Struggle for Independence on the Early American Frontier. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993. Bemis, Samuel Flagg. The Diplomacy of the American Revolution. 1935. Reprint. Washington, D.C.: American Historical Association, 1957. Bennett, Charles E. A Quest for Glory: Major General Robert Howe and the American Revolution. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991. Bobrick, Benson. Angel in the Whirlwind: The Triumph of the American Revolution. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997. Borick, Carl P. A Gallant Defense: The Siege of Charleston, 1780. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003. Boston City Council. A Memorial of Crispus Attucks, [et al.] from the City of Boston. Miami, Fla.: Mnemosyne, 1969. Brant, Irving. James Madison: The Virginia Revolutionist. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1941. Breen, T. H. The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped American Independence. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
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____________. Tobacco Culture: The Mentality of the Great Tidewater Planters on the Eve of Revolution. 2d ed. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001. Brooke, John. The Chatham Administration, 1766-1768. Vol. 1 in England in the Age of the Revolution, edited by Louis Namier. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1956. Buchanan, John. The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas. New York: Wiley, 1997. ____________. The Road to Valley Forge: How Washington Built the Army That Won the Revolution. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2004. Burgess, Robert Forrest. “The Eagle and the Turtle.” In Ships Beneath the Sea: A History of Subs and Submersibles. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975. Burt, Alfred L. The United States, Great Britain, and British North America from the Revolution to the Establishment of Peace After the War of 1812. 1940. Reprint. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968. Butterfield, Herbert. George III and the Historians. New York: Macmillan, 1957. Calhoon, Robert M. The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 1760-1781. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973. Coakley, Robert W., and Stetson Conn. The War of the American Revolution. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, Government Printing Office, 1975. Coggins, Jack. Ships and Seamen of the American Revolution. Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1969. Cohen, Warren, ed. Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations. 4 vols. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Commager, Henry, and Richard Morris. The Spirit of Seventy-Six. 1975. Reprint. New York: Da Capo Press, 1995. Conway, Stephen. The British Isles and the War of American Independence. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Cook, Don. How England Lost the American Colonies, 1760-1785. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995. ____________. The Long Fuse: England and America, 1760-1785. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995. Corwin, Edward S. French Policy and the American Alliance of 1778. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1916. Countryman, Edward. The American Revolution. Rev. ed. New York: Hill and Wang, 2003. Darling, Arthur B. Our Rising Empire, 1763-1803. 1972. Reprint. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1940.
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Davis, Burke. The Campaign That Won America: The Story of Yorktown. Philadelphia: Eastern Acorn Press, 1970. ____________. The Cowpens-Guilford Courthouse Campaign. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003. Draper, Lyman C. King’s Mountain and Its Heroes: A History of the Battle of King’s Mountain, October 7, 1780, and the Events Which Led to It. Baltimore, Md.: Genealogical Publishing, 1997. Dull, Jonathan R. A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985. Dupuy, Trevor N. People and Events of the American Revolution. New York: R. R. Bowker, 1974. Dwyer, William M. The Day Is Ours! November 1776-January 1777: An Inside View of the Battles of Trenton and Princeton. New York: Viking Press, 1983. Edgar, Walter B. Partisans and Redcoats: The Southern Conflict That Turned the Tide of the American Revolution. New York: Morrow, 2001. Ellis, Joseph J. Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000. ____________. His Excellency: George Washington. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004. Evans, Sara M. Born for Liberty: A History of Women in America. New York: Free Press, 1989. Ferling, John E. A Leap in the Dark: The Struggle to Create the American Republic. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Ferrie, Richard. The World Turned Upside Down: George Washington and the Battle of Yorktown. New York: Holiday House, 1999. Fischer, David Hackett. Paul Revere’s Ride. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. ____________. Washington’s Crossing. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Fleming, Thomas. Liberty! The American Revolution. New York: Viking, 1997. Foote, Timothy, and Mark S. Wexler. “Shadows on the Rock.” Smithsonian 28, no. 6 (September, 1997): 30. Forbes, Esther. Paul Revere and the World He Lived In. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942. French, Allen. The Taking of Ticonderoga in 1775: The British Story. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1928. Fuller, J. F. C. The Decisive Battles of the Western World. Vol. 3. London: Eyre & Spottiswode, 1955. Gabriel, Michael P. Major General Richard Montgomery: The Making of an American Hero. Madison, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2002.
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Glover, Michael. General Burgoyne in Canada and America: Scapegoat for a System. London: Gordon & Cremonesi, 1976. Golway, Terry. Washington’s General: Nathanael Greene and the Triumph of the American Revolution. New York: H. Holt, 2005. Gordon, John W. South Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003. Gottschalk, Louis. Lafayette Comes to America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935. Grinde, Donald A., Jr., and Bruce E. Johansen. “Mohawks, Axes, and Taxes.” In Exemplar of Liberty: Native America and the Evolution of Democracy. Los Angeles: American Indian Studies Center, University of California, Los Angeles, 1991. Griswold, Wesley S. The Night the Revolution Began: The Boston Tea Party, 1773. Brattleboro, Vt.: S. Greene Press, 1972. Hallahan, William H. The Day the Revolution Ended, 19 October 1781. New York: Wiley, 2004. Hamilton, Edward P. Fort Ticonderoga: Key to a Continent. Boston: Little, Brown, 1964. Hansen, Harry. The Boston Massacre: An Episode of Dissent and Violence. New York: Hastings House, 1970. Hargrove, Richard J., Jr. General John Burgoyne. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1983. Harvey, Maurice. Gibraltar. Staplehurst, England: Spellmount, 1996. Hatch, Charles E. Yorktown and the Siege of 1781. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 1957. Hatch, Robert McConnell. Thrust for Canada: The American Attempt on Quebec in 1775-1776. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979. Hibbert, Christopher. Redcoats and Rebels: The American Revolution Through British Eyes. New York: W. W. Norton, 1990. Hoffman, Ronald, and Peter J. Albert, eds. Arms and Independence: The Military Character of the American Revolution. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1999. ____________. Peace and the Peacemakers: The Treaty of 1783. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1986. Howson, Gerald. Burgoyne of Saratoga: A Biography. New York: Times Books, 1979. Hoyt, Edwin P. Submarines at War: The History of the American Silent Service. Briarcliff Manor, N.Y.: Stein & Day, 1983. Hunt, Agnes. The Provincial Committees of Safety of the American Revolution. New York: Haskell House, 1968.
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Ingraham, Leonard W. An Album of the American Revolution. New York: Franklin-Watts, 1971. Jackson, John W. With the British Army in Philadelphia, 1777-1778. San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1979. Jacobson, David L. John Dickinson and the Revolution in Pennsylvania, 17641774. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965. Jellison, Charles A. Ethan Allen: Frontier Rebel. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1969. Johnston, Henry P. The Campaign of 1776 Around New York and Brooklyn. New York: Da Capo Press, 1971. ____________. The Yorktown Campaign and the Surrender of Lord Cornwallis, 1781. 1881. Reprint. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1973. Kennedy, Roger G. Orders from France: The Americans and the French in a Revolutionary World, 1780-1820. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989. Kerber, Linda K. Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America. New York: W. W. Norton, 1986. Ketchum, Richard M. Decisive Day: The Battle for Bunker Hill. New York: Owl Books, 1999. ____________. Divided Loyalties: How the American Revolution Came to New York. New York: Henry Holt, 2002. ____________. Saratoga: Turning Point of America’s Revolutionary War. New York: H. Holt, 1997. ____________. Victory at Yorktown: The Campaign That Won the Revolution. New York: H. Holt, 2004. ____________. The Winter Soldiers: The Battles for Trenton and Princeton. New York: Doubleday, 1973. Knollenberg, Bernard. Growth of the American Revolution, 1765-1775. New York: Free Press, 1975. Kwasny, Mark V. Washington’s Partisan War, 1775-1783. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1996. Labaree, Benjamin W. The Boston Tea Party. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Landers, H. L. The Battle of Camden, South Carolina: Historical Statements. 1929. Reprint. Camden, S.C.: Kershaw County Historical Society, 1997. Langguth, A. J. Patriots: The Men Who Started the American Revolution. New York: Touchstone, 1988. Leckie, Robert. George Washington’s War: The Saga of the American Revolution. New York: HarperCollins, 1992. Lefkowitz, Arthur S. The Long Retreat: The Calamitous American Defense of New Jersey, 1776. Metuchen, N.J.: Upland Press, 1998.
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Liss, Peggy K. Atlantic Empires: The Network of Trade and Revolution, 17131826. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. Lumpkin, Henry. From Savannah to Yorktown: The American Revolution in the South. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1981. Lunt, James. John Burgoyne of Saratoga. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975. McGuffie, Tom Henderson. The Siege of Gibraltar, 1779-1793. London: Batsford, 1965. Macintyre, Donald G. F. W. “The Pioneers.” In Fighting Under the Sea. New York: W. W. Norton, 1966. Mackesy, Piers. The War for America, 1775-1783. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964. Maier, Pauline. From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972. Malcolm, Joyce Lee. The Scene of the Battle, 1775. Boston: Division of Cultural Resources, National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, 1985. Massachusetts Historical Society. Battle of Bunker Hill. Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1968. Merinos, Samuel Eliot. Sources and Documents Illustrating the American Revolution, 1776-1788. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. Middelkauff, Robert. The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 17631789. 2d ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Miller, John C. Sam Adams: Pioneer in Propaganda. Boston: Little, Brown, 1936. Millett, Allan Reed. For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America. New York: Free Press, 1994. Mintz, Max M. The Generals of Saratoga. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990. Mitchell, Joseph. Decisive Battles of the American Revolution. New York: Putnam’s Son’s, 1962. Morris, Richard B. The American Revolution Reconsidered. New York: Harper & Row, 1967. ____________. The Peacemakers: The Great Powers and American Independence. 1965. Reprint. New York: Harper & Row, 1983. Mott, Frank L. American Journalism: A History of Newspapers in the United States Through 250 Years, 1690-1940. New York: Macmillan, 1942. Namier, Lewis B., and John Brooke. Charles Townshend. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964. Nelson, Paul David. General Sir Guy Carleton, Lord Dorchester: Soldier-Statesman of Early British Canada. Madison, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2000.
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Nickerson, Hoffman. The Turning Point of the Revolution. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1967. Norton, Mary Beth. Liberty’s Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience of American Women, 1750-1800. Boston: Little, Brown, 1980. Pancake, John S. 1777: Year of the Hangman. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993. ____________. This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1985. Pares, Richard. King George II and the Politicians. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1953. Patterson, Benton Rain. Washington and Cornwallis: The Battle for America, 1775-1783. Lanham, Md.: Taylor Trade Publishing, 2004. Pell, John. Ethan Allen. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1929. Perlmutter, Tom, ed. War Machines: Sea. London: Octopus Books, 1975. Raphael, Ray. A People’s History of the American Revolution: How Common People Shaped the Fight for Independence. New York: New Press, 2001. Roberts, Cokie. Founding Mothers: The Women Who Raised Our Nation. New York: William Morrow, 2004. Roberts, Kenneth. The Battle of Cowpens. New York: Doubleday, 1958. ____________, ed. March to Quebec: Journals of the Members of Arnold’s Expedition. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1945. Russell, David Lee. The American Revolution in the Southern Colonies. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2000. Russell, Jack. Gibraltar Besieged, 1779-1783. London: Heinemann, 1965. Schecter, Barnet. The Battle for New York: The City at the Heart of the American Revolution. New York: Walker Publishing, 2002. Scheer, George, and Hugh Rankin. Rebels and Redcoats. New York: World Publishing, 1957. Schlesinger, Arthur M. The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution, 1763-1776. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. Smith, Justin H. Our Struggle for the Fourteenth Colony: Canada and the American Revolution. 2 vols. New York: Da Capo Press, 1974. Smith, Page. A New Age Now Begins: A People’s History of the American Revolution. 2 vols. New York: Penguin Books, 1976. Smith, Samuel Stelle. The Battle of Brandywine. Monmouth Beach, N.J.: Philip Freneau, 1976. Stinchcombe, William C. The American Revolution and the French Alliance. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1969. Stokesburry, James L. A Short History of the American Revolution. New York: William Morrow, 1991.
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Taaffe, Stephen R. The Philadelphia Campaign, 1777-1778. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003. Tebbel, John. Turning the World Upside Down: Inside the American Revolution. New York: Orion Books, 1993. Thayer, Theodore. The Making of a Scapegoat: Washington and Lee at Monmouth. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1976. Thomas, Peter D. G. Tea Party to Independence: The Third Phase of the American Revolution, 1773-1776. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1991. ____________. The Townshend Duties Crisis: The Second Phase of the Revolution, 1767-1773. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1987. Tourtellot, Arthur Bernon. William Diamond’s Drum: The Beginning of the War of the American Revolution. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959. Townsend, Joseph. Some Account of the British Army Under the Command of General Howe, and of the Battle of Brandywine. Philadelphia: Townsend Ward, 1846. Tuchman, Barbara. The First Salute: A View of the American Revolution. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988. Ubbelohde, Carl. The Vice-Admiralty Courts and the American Revolution. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960. Udoff, Irv. The Bunker Hill Story. Paducah, Ky.: Turner, 1994. Van der Vat, Dan. Stealth at Sea: The History of the Submarine. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1995. Varg, Paul A. Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1963. Ward, Christopher. The War of the Revolution. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1952. Ward, Harry M. The American Revolution: Nationhood Achieved, 1763-1788. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995. White, Katherine Keogh. The King’s Mountain Men: The Story of the Battle, with Sketches of the American Soldiers Who Took Part. Baltimore, Md.: Genealogical Publishing, 1998. Wood, Gordon S. The American Revolution: A History. New York: Modern Library, 2002. Wood, W. J. Battles of the Revolutionary War, 1775-1781. New York: Da Capo Press, 1995. Young, Alfred F. The Shoemaker and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution. Boston: Beacon Press, 1999. Young, Philip. Revolutionary Ladies. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977. Zobel, Hiller B. The Boston Massacre. New York: W. W. Norton, 1970.
War of 1812 1812-1814 War of 1812 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Censorship During the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events . . . September, 1813: Battle of Lake Erie . . . . October, 1813: Battle of the Thames. . . . . September, 1814: Battle of Lake Champlain September, 1814: Battle of Baltimore . . . . January, 1815: Battle of New Orleans . . . . February, 1815: Treaty of Ghent . . . . . . .
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War of 1812 At issue: American sovereignty and neutral rights on the seas Date: June 18, 1812-December 24, 1814 Location: Canada, New York, Maryland, Louisiana, the Great Lakes region, and the Atlantic and Caribbean coasts of the United States Combatants: Americans vs. British Principal commanders: American, Major General William Henry Harrison (1773-1841), Major General Andrew Jackson (1767-1845); British, Lieutenant General Sir George Prevost (1767-1816), Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren (1753-1822) Principal battles: Queenston Heights, Lake Erie, Thames, Chrysler’s Farm, Horseshoe Bend, Lundy’s Lane, Bladensburg, Lake Champlain, Baltimore, New Orleans Result: The war was a military stalemate in which neither side achieved its objectives in the peace treaty that ended the conflict. The War of 1812 is sometimes called the Second War of Independence, because Americans believed that Great Britain’s aggressive policies forced them to fight to defend U.S. sovereignty and honor. They demanded that the British treat them with the respect usually shown to great powers and allow the new nation a freedom of action unjustified by American weakness. When the U.S. government insisted that Britain observe neutral rights on the high seas, privileges then unrecognized in international law, the two nations were placed on a course toward confrontation. Under normal circumstances, the British would have accommodated the United States, their most important trading partner, by modifying their actions. However, Britain was locked in a life-or-death struggle against Napoleon I’s France and believed that a militant stance against its former colonies was imperative to its own survival. British obstinacy and an emerging American national pride thus produced a war that many people at the time thought was unnecessary. Issues of Contention Impressment, the removal of sailors from American ships and their forceable enlistment in the British military, was the most objectionable of British actions. The British government invigorated this long-standing policy during the French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1802) and Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815) as a way to ensure full manning of its huge navy. Recruitment and retention of sailors became a problem, especially during war-
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Time Line of the War of 1812 1803-1812
Great Britain’s Royal Navy impresses approximately six thousand American sailors to serve on British ships.
1807-1812
British and French seize at least nine hundred American ships, increasing American animosity toward the British.
1812
U.S. forces attempt three unsuccessful invasions of Canada.
June 18, 1812
United States declares war on Great Britain to force the British to stop impressing American sailors and to recognize the neutral maritime rights of the United States.
Aug. 16, 1812
U.S. army in Detroit is forced to surrender, leaving the Upper Northwest entirely in British control.
Oct. 13, 1812
Battle of Queenston Heights: British and Canadian forces defeat a charge by the Americans.
Jan. 22, 1813
Battle of Frenchtown: Small U.S. force is massacred.
Apr. 27, 1813
Battle of York: U.S. troops capture and burn York (Toronto).
May 27, 1813
Battle of Fort George: Colonel Winfield Scott’s troops, in cooperation with the U.S. fleet, capture Fort George, causing the British to abandon the entire Niagara front.
May 28-29, 1813
Battle of Sackett’s Harbor: General Jacob J. Brown repels a major British offensive on Sackett’s Harbor, the main U.S. naval base on Lake Ontario.
June 6, 1813
Battle of Stony Creek: British regain initiative and most of the west bank of the Niagara.
Sept. 10, 1813
Battle of Lake Erie: Captain Oliver Hazard Perry leads U.S. forces in victory over a British naval attack.
Oct. 5, 1813
Battle of the Thames: General William Henry Harrison leads U.S. forces to victory in the northwestern theater. The defeat of the British and the multitribal alliance led by Tecumseh, enables the United States to regain control of territory in the Detroit area that was lost in earlier defeats.
Nov. 11, 1813
Battle of Chrysler’s Farm: U.S. force is defeated.
Dec. 29-30, 1813
British troops burn Buffalo.
Mar. 27, 1814
Battle of Horseshoe Bend: Andrew Jackson defeats Creeks and seizes Creek lands.
July, 1814
Battles of Chippewa, Lundy’s Lane, and Ft. Erie.
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Aug. 24, 1814
Battle of Bladensburg: British route U.S. army and capture Washington, D.C., burning important public buildings; President James Madison leads U.S. countercharge through the streets of the capital city.
Sept. 11, 1814
Battle of Lake Champlain: British squadron surrenders to American force and retreats to Canada.
Sept. 12-14, 1814
Battle of Baltimore: Britain is unable to capture this important military target and the failure at Baltimore strongly influences the outcome of the War of 1812.
Dec. 24, 1814
United States and Great Britain sign Treaty of Ghent.
Jan. 8, 1815
Battle of New Orleans: Last battle of the war ends in British defeat.
Feb. 17, 1815
Treaty of Ghent takes effect, representing the formal end to the war.
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time, because of the notoriously bad conditions and low pay aboard British ships. Potential enlistees signed up for duty with the American merchant marine, where the work was easier and the compensation higher. The Royal Navy routinely stopped Yankee merchantmen to search for British citizens and usually removed several sailors. Some were British citizens deserting their nation’s cause, but others were native-born Americans or naturalized citizens, a status not recognized by British law. Probably at least 6,000 men were abducted from U.S. vessels during this period. The United States considered the decks of its ships to be an extension of its territory and viewed impressment as a violation of U.S. sovereignty and honor. During this period, the United States emerged as a prominent advocate for the privilege of noncombatant nations to trade freely with belligerents during war, a diplomatic position later known as neutral maritime rights. Americans had taken advantage of European conflicts to establish a highly profitable carrying trade with the New World possessions of Britain, France, and Spain. Mercantilistic policies had mostly closed these colonies to Americans before the French Revolutionary Wars began. British and French tolerance of the American takeover of this commerce ended with the intensification of their war in 1805-1807. Britain’s naval victory at Trafalgar (October 21, 1805) and France’s land victory at Austerlitz (December 2, 1805) created an exclusive supremacy for the British on the seas and for the French on the European continent. Unable to come to grips militarily, Britain and France struck at each other’s trade, hoping to damage their enemy’s economy.
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Napoleon, the emperor of France, declared Britain under blockade by the Berlin Decree (November 21, 1806). He later ordered the seizure of neutral vessels stopping in the British Isles or British colonial ports by the Milan Decree (December 17, 1807). Britain retaliated with a series of orders in council, beginning on January 7 and November 11, 1807, which closed the European continent to neutral ships and required these vessels to pay duties and unload their cargoes in Britain. With the world’s strongest powers striking at its merchantmen, the United States suffered a serious disruption of trade. Between 1807 and 1812, the British and the French seized at least 900 Yankee ships, the majority falling into the hands of the Royal Navy. The greater effectiveness of Britain’s naval power caused American anger to fall mainly on Britain. The United States declared war on June 18, 1812, to force the British to abandon impressment and to recognize neutral maritime rights. Action The U.S. government hoped to end British aggressions by seizing Canada and holding it hostage until Britain agreed to U.S. demands. Consequently, most of the war’s land operations involved American attempts to conquer the province. The initial year of the war was the most favorable time for U.S. success. The British were surprised by the declaration of war
When the British captured Washington, D.C., they burned many of the capital city’s most important government buildings. (National Archives)
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War of 1812 Battles in the South
MISSISSIPPI TERRITORY Rive r
Horseshoe Bend
ama
Mississip
pi R iv e r
TENNESSEE
Alab
GEORGIA
Mobile Pensacola
LOUISIANA New Orleans
G u l f
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M e x i c o
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and maintained only 7,000 regulars in Canada. The opportunity was lost, however, because of incompetent leadership, administrative and logistical inefficiency, and overreliance on an ill-prepared militia. In the far west, an American army at Detroit was forced to surrender (August 16, 1812), leaving the upper Northwest completely in British hands. Along the Niagara River, a U.S. invasion was turned back at the Battle of Queenston Heights (October 13). In the Lake Champlain region, the main effort failed in November when the militia refused to cross over into Canada. During 1813, serious opposition to the war in New England and northern New York forced the federal government to concentrate military efforts in the Detroit and Niagara regions. As Major General William Henry Harrison assembled and trained an army to recapture Detroit, the British remained on the offensive, besieging Fort Meigs and Fort Stephenson and massacring a small U.S. force at Frenchtown (January 22). Harrison was eventually able to seize the initiative after Captain Oliver Hazard Perry destroyed a British naval squadron at the Battle of Lake Erie (September 10). The triumphant U.S. fleet solved the army’s supply problems and transported Harrison’s troops to southern Ontario. The outflanked British army abandoned Detroit and was decisively defeated at the Battle of the Thames (October 5). The Americans later had to abandon southern Ontario, however, because they lacked the regulars to garrison the area and the militia proved undependable for this service.
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N
A
D
A
St
Montreal Chrysler’s Farm
St. Regis
York (Toronto)
OHIO
D
Cleveland
RHODE ISLAND New York CONNECTICUT PENNSYLVANIA NEW JERSEY Baltimore
A
Erie
E
Lundy’s Lane
rie
Ft. McHenry Washington
VIRGINIA
m Poto
Ohio River
NEW YORK
Boston MASSACHUSETTS
O
Sandusky
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Buffalo
K
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Albany
Ft. Niagara
ac
DELAWARE MARYLAND
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BL
Detroit
am
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NEW HAMPSHIRE
SH
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Sackett's Harbor
BRITI
MICHIGAN TERRITORY
Plattsburg
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War of 1812 Battles in the North
U.S. operations in the Niagara-Lake Ontario theater were initially successful. A combined expedition captured and burned York (later Toronto), the capital of Upper Canada (April 27, 1813). Colonel Winfield Scott’s troops in cooperation with the U.S. fleet seized Fort George (May 27), causing the British to abandon the entire Niagara front. A small garrison under Brigadier General Jacob J. Brown repulsed a major British assault on Sackett’s Harbor (May 28-29), the main U.S. naval base on Lake Ontario. American success was short-lived, however, because a British counterattack at Stony Creek (June 6) allowed them to regain both the initiative and most of the west bank of the Niagara. Late in the year, the British crossed the river, captured Fort Niagara, and burned Buffalo, New York. The year ended with Britain holding the upper hand in this theater of operations. In the fall, the Americans launched a major offensive against Montreal. This two-pronged assault was turned back at the Battles of the Chateaugay (October 25) and Chrysler’s Farm (November 11), ending American attempts to conquer Lower Canada. The most alarming events of 1813, however, occurred in the southern United States. Distressed by continuous encroachments on Indian rights and lands, the Creek started a war against
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the Americans by massacring soldiers and settlers at Fort Mims (August 30). A retaliatory expedition under the command of Major General Andrew Jackson defeated the Creek at Tallasahatchee (November 3) and at Talladega (November 9) but was unable to eliminate Indian resistance because of militia desertions and supply problems. In 1814, Jackson crushed the Creek rebellion at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend (March 27) but discovered that the British and the Spanish in Florida had been supplying and encouraging the Indians. Jackson ended this collusion by seizing Pensacola (November 7), denying its use to the British as a base. In the northern theater, Brown’s forces crossed the Niagara and captured Fort Erie (July 3). At the Battle of Chippewa (July 5), the Americans routed a superior British army but were themselves driven back at Lundy’s Lane (July 25). Retreating to Fort Erie, the Americans successfully endured a seven-week siege. Its lifting (September 18-19) signaled the end of significant operations in the Niagara region. Napolean’s Fall Napoleon’s defeat and first abdication in April, 1814, changed British views of the war. Reinforced by ships and troops formerly employed against France, the British government decided to adopt major offensive operations with the goal of taking eastern Maine from the United States and setting up an Indian buffer state in the Northwest. Consequently, Britain executed three naval-land assaults, targeting upper New York, the Chesapeake Bay, and New Orleans. Britain’s efforts met with limited success, despite wielding an overall force superiority for the first time during the war. The northern expedition under Lieutenant General Sir George Prevost was turned back on land at the Battle of Plattsburgh (September 11), and the accompanying British naval squadron was crushed on Lake Champlain (September 11). The eastern expedition enjoyed early success when it routed an American army at Bladensburg (August 24) and captured Washington, burning the important public buildings. This expedition was decisively defeated, however, when it attempted to take Baltimore (September 12-14). On the southern front, Britain’s Siege of New Orleans produced three battles (December 24, 1814; January 1 and 8, 1815), which resulted in one of the most humiliating reverses ever suffered by British arms. This victory propelled General Jackson, the U.S. commander, to national fame and eventually to the presidency. The failure of the 1814 offensives led Britain to renew negotiations for peace. Two-and-one-half years of inconclusive fighting on land encouraged both sides to compromise. Nevertheless, it was the war on the seas that did the most to produce a military stalemate and to persuade British and Ameri-
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can leaders that their objectives were unachievable at any reasonable cost. The U.S. Navy’s performance surprised the Europeans. Its single-ship victories—such as the USS Constitution versus HMS Guerrière (August 19, 1812)—displayed Yankee superiority in seamanship and gunnery and boosted American morale. Privateering was the most effective American weapon, however, with approximately 1,600 British merchant vessels falling into the hands of American captains. The massive loss in ships and cargo was the single most important factor causing a restless British public to pressure Parliament for peace. Britain also applied its maritime weapons with success. Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, who commanded the British fleets in the Caribbean and western Atlantic through most of the war, imposed a tight blockade on the United States, beginning in February of 1813. By 1814, the American navy was effectively bottled up and useless. Yankee merchantmen were also confined to port. Neutral nations had assumed their carrying trade. New England Federalists’ resistance to the war consequently grew to alarming proportions. The blockade seriously weakened the American economy and disrupted government finances, because federal revenues depended strongly on tariff income. Bankrupt, frustrated by domestic opposition, and constantly annoyed by British coastal raids, Americans were eager for peace by the summer of 1814. Aftermath On January 15, 1815, the Treaty of Ghent (signed in December, 1814) was ratified. The treaty ignored the basic issues over which the war had been fought and instead dealt with agreements and procedures to return territories and boundaries to their prewar status. Michael S. Fitzgerald
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Censorship During the War The War of 1812 divided the United States into pro-French and pro-British factions, each with its own press attacking the actions of the other side. The First Amendment prohibited abridgment of freedom of the press because the Framers of the Bill of Rights wanted to guarantee rights enjoyed in Great Britain. When James Madison wrote the Virginia Resolution attacking the infamous Sedition Act of 1798, he wrote that attempts to curb speech could not be subjected to prior censorship and prosecution for seditious libel was inconsistent with American democracy. Therefore, it would have been intellectually and politically inconsistent for Madison, as president, to curb an active free press in the years preceding and during the War of 1812. The American press of Madison’s era published highly charged political commentary in newspapers, printed inflammatory political pamphlets, and, in a few instances, wrote political graffiti on town walls and offered bribes to British and U.S. political figures. In the years leading up to 1812 U.S. newspapers were divided into pro-Federalist and pro-DemocraticRepublican camps. Washington, D.C.’s National Intelligencer, regarded as Madison’s political mouthpiece, frequently contained articles written by
President James Madison. (Library of Congress)
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Madison himself, or members of his staff, explaining their governmental views on issues affecting the nation. The Georgetown Federal Republican was run by Madison’s archfoe, Alexander C. Hanson, who put aside his political rivalry with Madison long enough during the War of 1812 to warn the president about a plot to kill him. President Madison made no formal effort, and did not encourage congressional action, to squelch press attacks on him during his presidency and the War of 1812. However, partisan politics exercised a form of press censorship when Madison supporters broke into opposition newspapers and destroyed their property. A particularly serious incident that occurred on July 27, 1812, was known as the “Baltimore Massacre.” Former Virginia governor and Federalist Henry Lee was in Baltimore visiting William Hanson. Hanson, the editor of the Federal Republican, was a hard-core opponent of the war whose press regularly denounced the Madison administration. Hanson’s printing office came under attack by an unruly mob who destroyed his press. Hanson replaced the press and continued his criticisms. Lee was joined by additional Federalist Revolutionary War officers who came to defend Hanson. The new office was attacked and in the resulting melée, Lee was taken for dead and left on the street. Found unconscious, he was carried to the security of a jail, but, that, too, was attacked leaving Lee severely wounded. His health never fully recovered from these events and caused him to be disqualified from military service in the War of 1812. Such partisan violence and the inability of Federalist New England freely to trade with Great Britain only emboldened the minority Federalist Party and press to exercise their First Amendment rights in an active press war against the war, Madison, and the DemocraticRepublican Party.
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Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events September, 1813 Battle of Lake Erie Date: September 10, 1813 Location: Lake Erie, west of Put-in-Bay, Ohio Combatants: 562 British vs. about 500 Americans Principal commanders: British, Commander Robert H. Barclay (1785-1837); American, Master Commandant Oliver Hazard Perry (1785-1819) Result: The British squadron surrendered to the American force. Following the surrender of Detroit in 1812, U.S. officials sought to reclaim their control of the Old Northwest by first gaining naval dominance of Lake Erie. The U.S. Navy ordered Master Commandant Oliver Hazard Perry to Erie, Pennsylvania, where he supervised the construction of an
Commodore Perry, transferring his flag to the brig Niagara, at the Battle of Lake Erie— the bloodiest naval battle of the War of 1812. (F. R. Niglutsch)
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American squadron. By August, 1813, his efforts provided the U.S. Navy superiority in vessels and firepower over its foe. Commander Robert H. Barclay, operating out of the small, isolated Detroit River port of Amherstburg, Ontario, could not match the American shipbuilding effort. A shift in the wind gave Perry the advantage and allowed him to close with the British and bring his short-range carronades to bear. His squadron lagged behind the flagship, the Lawrence, and the British concentrated their fire on that vessel, rendering her useless. Perry transferred his flag to the advancing brig Niagara and ordered its commander to bring up the other vessels. Niagara crossed the British line, and the trailing vessels raked the six Royal Navy ships. This bloodiest naval engagement of the war saw 41 British killed and 94 wounded. Perry lost 27 dead and 96 wounded. Perry’s victory opened the way for American ground forces to reclaim Detroit and drive the British and their Indian allies out of Michigan’s lower peninsula and southwestern Ontario. David Curtis Skaggs
October, 1813 Battle of the Thames Date: October 5, 1813 Location: Ontario, Canada Combatants: 880 British and 1,000 Native Americans vs. 3,500 Americans Principal commanders: British, Major General Henry Procter; American Indian, Tecumseh (c. 1758-1813); American, Major General William Henry Harrison (1773-1841) Result: A U.S. victory in the northwestern theater of the war that saw the death of Tecumseh and the decline of his multitribal alliance. The Battle of the Thames was an important United States victory in the Northwestern theater during the War of 1812 with Great Britain. The battle took place on the northern bank of the Thames River near Moraviantown in Upper Canada (southern Ontario Province). In the Battle of Lake Erie (September 10, 1813), U.S. naval forces won control of Lake Erie. This prevented reinforcement and resupply of the British army at the lake’s western end, in the vicinity of Detroit and Fort Malden. When a superior U.S. force under William Henry Harrison crossed the lake on September 27, the British commander in Upper Canada, Major
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General Henry Procter, began withdrawing toward the east along the Thames River. Procter’s Native American allies, who made up the bulk of his forces, angrily protested the abandonment of their homelands in Michigan. The Shawnee chief Tecumseh, leader of an alliance of warriors from many tribes, was reassured by Procter that a stand soon would be made against Harrison’s advancing army. Procter’s retreat up the Thames was mismanaged and slow, and most of his spare ammunition and other supplies were lost. Harrison’s faster-moving army overtook the British on October 5, forcing Procter to turn and fight before he had reached a defensive position being prepared at Moraviantown. The British force included five hundred warriors of Tecumseh’s alliance. Besides Tecumseh’s fellow Shawnees (then dwelling principally in Indiana), there were warriors from the Sac, Fox, Ottawa, Ojibwa, Wyandot, Potawatomi, Winnebago, Lenni Lenape, and Kickapoo nations, all from the Northwest Territory, and a small band of Creeks from the South. Their women and children accompanied the still-loyal warriors. Approximately a thousand of Tecumseh’s followers, angered by Procter’s retreat from Michigan, had abandoned the British. Proctor’s forces totaled more than a thousand, including 450 regulars of the Forty-first Regiment of Foot and a scattering of Canadian militia. The U.S. army under Harrison numbered about three thousand troops. One hundred twenty of these were infantrymen from the regular army; the rest were Kentucky mounted militia volunteers. A thousand-soldier mounted militia regiment commanded by Colonel Richard Mentor Johnson played a decisive part in the battle. There were also 260 American Indians in Harrison’s force, including about 40 Shawnees. Proctor’s British and American Indian force, outnumbered three-to-one by the U.S. troops, took a position across a road that ran along the north bank of the Thames River. With the river protecting his left flank and a wooded swamp his right, Procter placed his British regulars in two parallel lines a hundred yards apart. On his left, commanding the road, Procter positioned his one cannon, a six-pounder. Tecumseh’s warriors were placed in the swamp on the British right flank. The swamp slanted away at an angle that would enable the Indians to fire into the left flank of U.S. troops advancing toward the British infantrymen. Because Procter expected Harrison to send his mounted units, as usual, against the Native Americans, he dispersed the two lines of British soldiers thinly, sheltering behind scattered trees in open order, several feet apart. Only when infantry were positioned almost shoulder-to-shoulder, however, could they effectively repel a cavalry charge. When Harrison noticed this inviting disposition, he sent Colonel Johnson’s mounted reg-
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Death of Chief Tecumseh at the Battle of the Thames. (F. R. Niglutsch)
iment to attack the British infantry, while his other forces, dismounted as infantry, marched against the Indians on the American left. The small force of regular U.S. infantry was assigned to rush the single British cannon. The Fighting Begins Colonel Johnson’s well-drilled mounted regiment, organized in columns, galloped through the two lines of thinly spread British infantry to their rear. The militiamen then dismounted and began to fire. The British, demoralized and hungry after not having eaten in more than fifty hours, surrendered. Each line of British soldiers seems to have fired a single volley and panicked. The crew of Procter’s one cannon fled without even firing it. This part of the battle lasted less than five minutes. The infantry units on the U.S. troops’ left were having much less success against Tecumseh’s warriors in the swamp. The poorly disciplined militia infantry, now on foot, were initially repulsed and driven back by the Indians. The collapse of the main British position enabled Johnson to swing part of his regiment leftward to attack the Indians’ flank. At this point, where his warriors joined the right of the British soldiers, Tecumseh and the Shawnees had taken their position. Led by Johnson and a small, select group that called itself the Forlorn Hope, Johnson’s regiment dismounted and pushed into the woods. Heavy firing erupted, and most of the twenty men in the Forlorn Hope were killed or wounded. Colonel
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Johnson was hit by five bullets, his horse by seven. Early in this intense action, Tecumseh fell, killed by a shot near his heart. With the death of their leader, the warriors in this part of the swamp (the Indians’ left) began to fall back. Demoralization spread, and this, coupled with the continuing advance of the U.S. forces, brought an end to the fighting. Although Procter, the British commander, had fled after a brief effort to rally his troops, Tecumseh had stood his ground and died fighting, as he had sworn to do. The Native American warriors had fought on for more than thirty minutes after the British regulars had given up, but now they slipped away through the woods to find their families. The victory of Harrison’s army was complete. Because of mismanagement of the retreat and his poor handling of the battle, Major General Procter was court-martialed and publicly reprimanded. Harrison became a national hero, as did Colonel Johnson, widely credited with having shot Tecumseh. Of the British troops 12 were killed, 22 wounded, and 601 captured. Harrison reported a count of 33 warriors’ bodies on the field. Contradictory records suggest that on the U.S. side, as many as 25 were killed or mortally injured, and 30 to 50 wounded. The Battle of the Thames enabled the United States to regain control of territory in the Detroit area that had been lost in earlier defeats, ended any British threat at the western end of Lake Erie, and greatly reduced the danger of tribal raids in the Northwest. An important result of the battle was the decline of the multitribal alliance that Tecumseh had fashioned and brilliantly led. Native Americans continued to take the field in support of British operations, but now this support was sporadic and ineffective. Tecumseh’s strategy of protecting tribal lands through military cooperation with Great Britain had failed. On the northern shore of Lake Erie, the Canadian right flank, a stalemate developed. Harrison’s army disintegrated as the enlistment of his militiamen expired, and they returned to Kentucky. The weakened U.S. troops were unable to advance eastward toward Burlington and York, or to threaten British-held Michilimackinac to the north. However, U.S. naval control of Lake Erie prevented fresh initiatives in the area by the British. Bert M. Mutersbaugh
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September, 1814 Battle of Lake Champlain Date: September 11, 1814 Location: Plattsburgh Bay, New York Combatants: 937 British vs. 882 Americans Principal commanders: British, Captain George Downie; American, Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough (1783-1825) Result: The British squadron surrendered to the American force. After the defeat of Napoleon I in early 1814, the British government sent the duke of Wellington’s veterans to Canada and instructed Lieutenant General Sir George Prevost to conquer the Lake Champlain Valley for incorporation into the British empire. British shipbuilding efforts on the lake slightly outmatched those of the Americans. However, the recently arrived Captain George Downie had little time to create unit cohesion among his hastily assembled crews. Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough’s squadron lay anchored with spring lines to each vessel’s anchor cables so each could be turned 180 degrees within its mooring lines. There were four major vessels on each side, and the British had eleven row galleys and gunboats and the Americans ten. The principal combatants were Downie’s
Engraving from a late nineteenth century painting of the Battle of Lake Champlain. (F. R. Niglutsch)
September, 1814: Baltimore
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thirty-seven-gun Confiance and Macdonough’s twenty-six-gun Saratoga. Downie fell early in the battle, leaving his fleet leaderless. With the outcome in doubt, Macdonough wound his ship so the port guns could be employed, and this fresh broadside allowed him to destroy resistance on the British flagship. Only a few gunboats escaped. Macdonough lost 52 killed and 58 seriously wounded. British casualties included 54 dead, 116 wounded, and the remainder prisoners of war. Also captured were a frigate, a brig, two sloops of war, and several gunboats. Because the British lacked naval superiority, Prevost withdrew his ground forces back to Canada. This defeat contributed to the British decision to end the war and restore territory to its prewar status. David Curtis Skaggs
September, 1814 Battle of Baltimore Date: September 12-14, 1814 Location: Baltimore, Maryland Combatants: 10,000 Americans vs. 4,700 British troops and 16 ships Principal commanders: British army, Major General Robert Ross (17661814); British navy, Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane (1758-1832); American, Major General Samuel Smith (1752-1839) Result: Successful U.S. defense of a major Atlantic port. In the summer of 1814, Britain dispatched a naval-military expedition to the Chesapeake Bay. After capturing Washington, D.C. (August 24), the British turned their attention to Baltimore. This port was the main U.S. base for privateers employed against the British merchant marine and therefore was an important military target. Baltimore’s inner harbor was protected by Fort McHenry. The landward approaches to the city had also been fortified. The British Royal Navy, led by Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, arrived in the outer harbor on September 11. The next day, the army under Major General Robert Ross disembarked onto the North Point Peninsula and marched toward Baltimore. Midway up the peninsula, a 3,200-man U.S. force led by Major General Samuel Smith opposed the British advance. After the ensuing Battle of North Point (September 12), the defeated Americans retired into the mile-long fortifications on Hampstead Hill, just to the east of the city. In the
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early morning hours of September 13, the British subjected Fort McHenry to a twenty-hour bombardment. Discouraged by their inability to subdue the fort and by the strength of the U.S. army on Hampstead Hill, the British withdrew on September 15. Britain’s failure at Baltimore strongly influenced the outcome of the War of 1812. This defeat, coupled with U.S. victories at Plattsburgh (September 11, 1814) and Lake Champlain (September 11, 1814), encouraged British leaders to seek a compromise peace. The result was the Treaty of Ghent (December 24, 1814; ratified January 15, 1815), which reestablished the prewar status quo. Michael S. Fitzgerald
January, 1815 Battle of New Orleans Date: January 8, 1815 Location: New Orleans, Louisiana Combatants: 3,000 American vs. 6,000 British troops Principal commanders: American, General Andrew Jackson (1767-1845); British, Major General Sir Edward Pakenham (1778-1815) Result: Although coming after the the negotiated end of the War of 1812, the crushing U.S. defeat of the British restored pride in the new nation and launched Andrew Jackson toward the presidency. For more than two years, Louisiana lay on the fringe of the southern theater of the War of 1812. The campaigns were waged in Spanish Florida, where U.S. troops seized Mobile, and in the Mississippi Territory, where frontiersmen fought Creek Indians. The British blockade brought commerce to a standstill at New Orleans, but before late 1814, the war did not otherwise threaten its polyglot population. Engaged in a vast struggle with Napoleon’s France, Great Britain could barely spare enough troops to defend Canada against U.S. attack, and the British War Ministry dismissed early proposals to capture New Orleans. The British Plan Napoleon’s defeat at Leipzig in October, 1813, allowed the British to begin consideration of large-scale operations against the United States. When Napoleon’s abdication in April, 1814, released substantial British forces
January, 1815: New Orleans
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Contemporary engraving of the Battle of New Orleans. (National Portrait Gallery, Smithsonian Institution)
from European commitments, preparations began in earnest to tighten the blockade of the United States, raid the Atlantic coast, and invade northern New York from Canada. In July, the War Ministry decided to attack New Orleans and subsequently appointed Admiral Sir Alexander Forrester Inglis Cochrane and Major General Robert Ross to command the expedition. The secretary for war, Earl Bathurst (Henry Bathurst), explained the purposes of the invasion to Ross in September: to obtain command of the mouth of the Mississippi River and deprive trans-Appalachian Americans of their link with the sea; and to occupy a valuable land possession whose restoration would improve the terms of peace for Great Britain, or whose cession by the United States could be exacted as the price of peace. Bathurst gave Cochrane and Ross discretion to strike at New Orleans directly from the Gulf of Mexico or overland from Mobile, and he instructed Ross to aid the Creoles if they desired to reattach themselves to Spain. At the time, Cochrane and Ross were raiding the Chesapeake Bay area, but New Orleans was their next target. Cochrane believed that American Indians, slaves, and pirates who sheltered at Barataria, an island in the swamps off New Orleans, would assist a Gulf coast invasion directed against New Orleans. Operating under orders Cochrane issued before the War Ministry’s decision, his subordinates occupied Spanish Pensacola in August and began to organize and arm natives and escaped slaves. In early September, the British made overtures to
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the Baratarians and prepared to attack Mobile, but their efforts came to nothing. Andrew Jackson Andrew Jackson was major general of the Tennessee militia when he defeated the Creeks at Horseshoe Bend in March, 1814, and seriously weakened their ability to continue fighting. Two months later, Jackson was appointed federal commander of Military District Number Seven, which included the Mobile-New Orleans area, as well as the U.S. Army in the Southwest. Fully aware of British activities, he went south in August to strengthen Mobile’s defenses, sever remaining British and Spanish connections with the Indians, and secure the coast against invasion. In midSeptember, his forces defeated the British attempt on Mobile, which had been made without the Baratarians, who showed no signs of cooperating. In early November, Jackson expelled the British and Indians from Pensacola. Ross’s death near Baltimore in September dealt British fortunes another blow. The ship carrying Major General Sir Edward Michael Pakenham, Ross’s successor, was slow in crossing the Atlantic. As a result, he was not with Cochrane’s mighty invasion fleet when it sailed from its Jamaica rendezvous into the Gulf of Mexico in late November, nor when Cochrane’s sailors overcame U.S. gunboats at the mouth of Lake Borgne, in December. Cochrane had decided to attack New Orleans from the Gulf of Mexico by sailing through Lake Borgne.
General Andrew Jackson commanding at the Battle of New Orleans. (F. R. Niglutsch)
January, 1815: New Orleans
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Jackson had arrived in New Orleans on December 1 and proceeded to block all invasion approaches, but through a subordinate’s negligence, one approach was left open. On December 23, the vanguard of British troops landed, advanced along unprotected Bayou Bienvenue, and emerged from the swamps on the east bank of the Mississippi, fewer than ten miles below the city. Jackson responded quickly. That night, he attacked the British camp, inflicting many casualties and throwing the invaders off balance. When Pakenham arrived on Christmas Day, he found his army in cul-desac. On its right were cypress swamps; on its left were two U.S. warships and the Mississippi River; and in front, Jackson’s small but growing army was constructing a mud and log breastwork on the narrow plain of Chalmett, barring the way to New Orleans. Attempting to regain the advantage, the British destroyed one of Commandant Daniel T. Patterson’s ships on December 27. In the following days, they suffered serious reverses: the U.S. troops turned back a reconnaissance-in-force on December 28, 1814, and won an artillery duel on January 1, 1815, thwarting Pakenham’s attempt to breach the breastwork. The only remaining alternative was a direct assault. Pakenham developed his plan: One large column would attack the U.S. center at the edge of the swamp; a smaller column would assault the U.S. right; a third would support one of the other two according to developments; a small force would attack the weak U.S. positions across the river; and the rest of his approximately ten thousand redcoats, some of whom were veterans of the Napoleonic Wars, would form the reserve. At daybreak, on Sunday, January 8, Pakenham gave the signal to advance. Waiting for the attack was a heterogeneous collection of about five thousand defenders—Louisiana Acadians; Anglo-Saxons; Creoles; free men of color: Baratarians, Choctaw Indians, and French émigrés; Mississippi, Kentucky, and Tennessee militia; and United States Marines, regulars, and sailors. Only portions of the line were directly engaged, but the terrific fire from their artillery, muskets, and rifles cut down Pakenham’s troops as they advanced through the mist across the rain-soaked field. Pakenham was killed while desperately urging his men on. Shortly afterward, his crippled army withdrew. The partially successful attack on the west bank came too late to affect the outcome of the great assault. American casualties totaled 71 (of whom only about a dozen were killed), while British losses in the fighting that Sunday were 2,057. In the campaign that was launched on December 23, British dead totaled more than 2,400. Because of the apparent impregnability of Jackson’s lines and a shortage of supplies, the British leaders decided to retreat. The withdrawal went unimpeded, as Jackson decided against allowing his relatively undisci-
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plined and heterogeneous collection of troops to attack what was still a trained army; they remained behind their lines until the British had disappeared. Pakenham’s forces moved through the swamp to Lake Borgne and then to Pea Island. On January 27, the remainder of the now half-starved British troops were gone from the Mississippi delta. In a face-saving move, Cochrane attempted to level Fort St. Philip near the Gulf; failing that, his fleet sailed away to attack Fort Bowyer at Mobile. After its fall, official news of the Treaty of Ghent—signed on December 24, 1814—reached the armies. In mid-March, the fleet returned to England. On January 23, Jackson marched into the city of New Orleans with his troops, welcomed as a hero. However, he continued to maintain martial law until the middle of March and required the volunteers to remain under arms in the militia until he received official word of the signing of a treaty. As a consequence, the Louisiana Senate, when listing the officers to whom they extended official thanks, omitted Jackson’s name. The Battle of New Orleans, the last major battle in the War of 1812, constituted a British tragedy, inasmuch as it was fought two weeks after the Treaty of Ghent had brought the war to a formal close. Nevertheless, although the bloody engagement did not play a role in the outcome of the war, the battle made Andrew Jackson a national hero. The battle’s consequences stretch beyond Jackson’s role. One must address the question of British goals in a war that they certainly provoked, but that was started by the United States. First, the British aimed to limit U.S. settlement beyond the Appalachian Mountains. To do so, they wanted to create an American buffer state in the region beyond Ohio. Their second goal was to assuage the fear of U.S. aggression into Canada, a fear with some merit. Further, by annexing Louisiana, they could prevent communication of the west with the sea. Along with Spanish claims to Florida, this would serve to block U.S. expansion. Pakenham arrived in the United States with instructions to “rescue” Louisiana; he brought with him a complete governmental staff, with himself appointed as governor. Although the Treaty of Ghent was signed, it was not to take effect until ratified by all concerned. In the meantime, Pakenham would have control of Louisiana, an eventuality interrupted by his defeat and death. Jeffrey Kimball updated by Richard Adler
February, 1815: Treaty of Ghent
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February, 1815 Treaty of Ghent Date: February 17, 1815 Location: Ghent, Austrian Netherlands (now Belgium) Principal figures: American, John Quincy Adams (1767-1848), President James Madison (1751-1836), Albert Gallatin (1761-1849), Secretary of State James Monroe (1758-1831); British, Foreign Secretary Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh (1769-1822) Result: The treaty represented the formal end to the War of 1812. Chances of a negotiated, honorable peace ending the War of 1812 appeared remote in the summer of 1814. The United States ostensibly had gone to war to protect its rights on the high seas. President James Madison and Secretary of State James Monroe had repeatedly stated that the recognition of such rights, and particularly an end to the practice of impressing U.S. sailors into the British Royal Navy, was essential to any settlement. The British had refused to abandon impressment, and the war continued. Militarily, the conflict had been inconclusive. In many ways, the British were in the stronger position at the outset of the talks. By the summer of 1814, they and their allies had defeated Napoleon; now Great Britain could turn its attention and energies to the war with its former colonies. With France subdued and veteran troops available for North American duty, Great Britain seemed in a position to end the war by military conquest. Moreover, the United States was divided over “Mr. Madison’s War.” The Federalist Party and New England generally had opposed the war from its beginning. The Republican administration faced the unpleasant prospects of political humiliation, military defeat, or both, should it continue to pursue its war aims. Negotiations Such were the circumstances when U.S. and British commissioners met in Ghent on August 9, 1814. The British had agreed to direct meetings as an alternative to mediation by Alexander I, czar of Russia, and evinced no haste to deal with the U.S. upstarts. Ghent was chosen as a convenient, easily accessible site—a pleasant, neutral city in what was then the Austrian Netherlands, soon to be part of the Kingdom of the United Netherlands and a major city in Belgium after that country’s independence in 1830. The United States government dispatched five commissioners, representing a broad spectrum of backgrounds. John Quincy Adams, a Massa-
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chusetts Republican and nominally the head of the delegation, was a staunch nationalist. Henry Clay and Jonathan Russell were “war hawks” from Kentucky and Rhode Island, respectively. James A. Bayard, a Delaware Federalist, and Albert Gallatin, a Pennsylvania Republican, were moderates; the latter, because of his role as peacemaker among his colleagues, emerged as the functional leader of the U.S. delegation at Ghent. The representatives from the United States often quarreled among themselves, but they stood firmly together in the face of their British counterparts. Adams and Russell arrived in Ghent on June 23 and the others, by July 6. Clearly, the talks were going to be protracted, and so the U.S. delegates moved out of their hotel and into the Lovendeghem House in the heart of the city. Far from being the “five lonely Americans” as they have been often described, they became active in local intellectual and cultural life. Negotiations began in an atmosphere of distrust as a result of a monthlong wait by the U.S. delegates for their British counterparts. The British delegation included Admiralty lawyer Dr. William Adams, Vice-Admiral Lord Gambier, and Henry Goulburn of the Colonial Office. Accompanied by a secretary, Anthony J. Baker, they took up residence in a former Carthusian monastery at Meerhem. Their principal role was not so much to negotiate as to act as the messengers of Viscount Castlereagh (Robert Stewart), the British foreign secretary. British Proposals Although the United States had always posed as the injured party in the conflict, the British dominated the early months of the conference. They proposed the establishment of an American Indian buffer state in the American Northwest and asked for a substantial cession of land along the border between Canada and the United States. The U.S. representatives refused. The British, anticipating the capture of New Orleans, then suggested that each party continue to occupy the territory it held at the conclusion of hostilities (uti possidetis). Again, the United States refused, holding to its principle of the restoration of territory as it was held prior to the outbreak of war (status quo ante bellum). Finally, the constancy and apparent unanimity of the U.S. delegation bore fruit. Throughout the negotiations, the British cabinet had debated whether to conquer or conciliate the United States. Foreseeing greater good in Anglo-American friendship than in lasting enmity between the kindred nations, Castlereagh led the way toward compromise. Several factors, some only vaguely relating to the war, confirmed Castlereagh’s judgment. The British were having difficulties at the Con-
February, 1815: Treaty of Ghent
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gress of Vienna with their recent allies in the Napoleonic Wars. It seemed for a time that war with Russia was imminent. France was restive, portending Napoleon’s return from Elba in 1815. At home, the British people were war-weary and growing resentful of taxation. To make matters worse, the United States won a timely victory at Plattsburg on September 11, 1814. The architect of the victory over Napoleon, the duke of Wellington, estimated that a conquest of the United States would come only at a heavy cost of men, money, and time. At this juncture, the British decided to compromise. American Proposals The commissioners at Ghent still bargained hard, but the stakes were no longer so great. On November 11, 1814, the United States presented a proposal that would maintain prewar boundaries. They agreed that the treaty would say nothing about impressment, which would be unnecessary in a post-Napoleonic Europe. The British abandoned their designs on U.S. territory and their desire for a buffer state. They still demanded the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay, the right of navigation on the Mississippi River, and prohibitions on U.S. rights to dry fish in Newfoundland. In the end, the participants at Ghent delegated these matters to commissions to resolve after peace had been concluded. The Peace of Ghent provided for a return to the status quo ante bellum. The two sides signed the treaty on Christmas Eve, 1814. Given the slow communications of the era, the treaty only took effect on February 17, 1815, after ratification by the governments of both sides. In the meantime, the British had suffered a humiliating defeat in the Battle of New Orleans on January 8, 1815. Called America’s second war for independence, the War of 1812 had several important results. Spawning a legacy of bad feeling between Great Britain and the United States, which persisted for many years, the war gave the U.S. people a greater feeling of national identity, simultaneously paving the way for the decimation of native populations. The war stimulated the growth of manufacturers and turned the U.S. people increasingly toward domestic matters and away from foreign affairs. Impact The treaty had a major impact on U.S. relationships with both Canada and the American Indian nations. Future war was averted by the RushBagot Agreement of 1817, which limited armaments around the Great Lakes. Boundary commissions and subsequent treaties in 1818, 1842, and 1846 determined most of the border between the United States and British North America (Canada). The Red River Valley went to the United States;
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the borders of Alberta, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan were moved south to 49° north latitude. Oregon Territory (Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia) was to be jointly administered by Great Britain and the United States. The United States agreed to exact no retribution and to take no land from the American Indians who had fought for the British. However, the defeat of the British and their American Indian allies helped to open the Old Northwest and Southwest to the waves of settlement that would lead to white domination east of the Mississippi and eventually beyond. At the time, the treaty was, in many ways, a victory for neither side. Yet for the United States, there was cause for rejoicing. The United States had stood firm against a great power. Castlereagh and the British had recognized U.S. military potential and decided to court instead of conquer. Most important, the peace that both sides wanted and needed was secure. The treaty provided a steady foundation for an Anglo-American relationship that, over a century, would transform the two nations’ foreign policies from suspicious opposition to firm friendship. Emory M. Thomas updated by Randall Fegley
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Further Reading Albright, Harry. New Orleans: Battle of the Bayous. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1990. Antal, Sandy. A Wampum Denied: Procter’s War of 1812. Toronto: Carleton University Press, 1997. Borneman, Walter R. 1812: The War That Forged a Nation. New York: HarperCollins, 2004. DeGrummond, Jane Lucas. The Baratarians and the Battle of New Orleans. Baton Rouge, La.: Legacy, 1979. Everest, Allan S. The War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1981. Fitz-Enz, David G. The Final Invasion: Plattsburgh, the War of 1812’s Most Decisive Battle. Edited by John R. Elting. Foreword by Sir Christopher Prevost. New York: Cooper Square Press, 2001. George, Christopher T. Terror on the Chesapeake: The War of 1812 on the Bay. Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Books, 2000. Heidler, David S., and Jeanne T. Heidler. The War of 1812. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2002. Hickey, Donald R. The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989. Hitsman, J. Mackay. The Incredible War of 1812: A Military History. Rev. ed. Foreword by Sir Christopher Prevost. Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 1999. Horsman, Reginald. The War of 1812. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969. Lord, Walter. The Dawn’s Early Light. New York: W. W. Norton, 1972. Muller, Charles G. The Darkest Day: The Washington-Baltimore Campaign During the War of 1812. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003. Patterson, Benton Rain. The Generals: Andrew Jackson, Sir Edward Pakenham, and the Road to the Battle of New Orleans. New York: New York University Press, 2005. Pitch, Anthony S. The Burning of Washington: The British Invasion of 1814. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1998. Quimby, Robert S. The U.S. Army in the War of 1812: An Operational and Command Study. 2 vols. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997. Reilly, Robin. The British at the Gates: The New Orleans Campaign in the War of 1812. New York: Putnam, 1974. Remini, Robert. The Battle of New Orleans. New York: Viking, 1999.
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Sheads, Scott S. The Rockets’ Red Glare: The Maritime Defense of Baltimore in 1814. Centreville, Md.: Tidewater, 1986. Skaggs, David Curtis, and Gerard T. Altoff. A Signal Victory: The Lake Erie Campaign, 1812-1813. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Stagg, J. C. A. Mr. Madison’s War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American Republic, 1783-1830. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983. Stanley, George F. G. The War of 1812: Land Operations. Toronto: Macmillan, 1983. Sweetman, Jack, ed. Great American Naval Battles. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1998. Turner, Wesley B. British Generals in the War of 1812: High Command in the Canadas. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999. Welsh, William Jeffrey, and David Curtis Skaggs, eds. War on the Great Lakes. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1991.
Mexican War 1846-1848 Mexican War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Censorship During the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events . . . . . . . . June, 1835-October, 1836: Texas Revolution . . . . . February-March, 1836: Battle of the Alamo . . . . . April, 1836: Battle of San Jacinto . . . . . . . . . . . June, 1846-January, 1847: Occupation of California and the Southwest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . September, 1846: Battle of Monterrey . . . . . . . . February, 1847: Battle of Buena Vista . . . . . . . . . April, 1847: Battle of Cerro Gordo . . . . . . . . . . September, 1847: Siege of Chapultepec . . . . . . . February, 1848: Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo . . . .
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Mexican War At issue: Establishment of a permanent border between Mexico and the United States Date: May 6, 1846-February 2, 1848 Location: Mexico, Texas, New Mexico, California Combatants: Americans vs. Mexicans Principal commanders: American, Zachary Taylor (1784-1850), Winfield Scott (1786-1866), Stephen W. Kearny (1794-1848); Mexican, Antonio López de Santa Anna (1794-1876), Mariano Arista (1802-1855), Pedro de Ampudia Principal battles: Palo Alto, Monterrey, Buena Vista, Cerro Gordo, Chapultepec Result: In winning the war, the United States acquired new territory from Mexico, and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo established the permanent border between the United States and Mexico. The United States, by the middle of the nineteenth century, had expanded its western frontier to the Mississippi River through purchases of territory from France and Spain. Many Americans, however, felt that the country had a manifest destiny to expand its horizons across the continent to the Pacific Ocean. Standing in the way of such an expansion was the even younger republic, the United Mexican States, which had achieved its independence from Spain in 1823. The Texas Revolution At the invitation of the Mexican government, a substantial number of U.S. citizens had moved into Texas, setting up towns and ranches, often accompanied by their African slaves. In 1836, these Texan immigrants rebelled against their Mexican overlords. After defeats at the Alamo and Goliad, the Americans, under General Sam Houston, defeated the Mexican army of Antonio López de Santa Anna at San Jacinto, captured the Mexican leader following the battle, and forced him to acquiesce to their independence. However, they failed to establish a clear line of demarcation between Mexico and the new Texas Republic. The U.S. government acceded to the wishes of the Texans and annexed their republic in 1845. The U.S. Congress declared Texas the twenty-eighth state in the Union on December 22, 1845. The Mexican government and people reacted negatively. Because General Santa Anna’s actions had been forced by the Texans, the Mexican government never officially recognized
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Time Line of the Texas Revolution and the Mexican War June 30, 1835
Texans seize Anahuac Garrison and the Texas Revolution begins.
Feb. 23-Mar. 6, 1836
Battle of the Alamo: Overpowering Mexican force led by General Antonio López de Santa Anna destroys the American defenders of the Alamo’s garrison.
Apr. 21, 1836
Battle of San Jacinto: General Sam Houston leads Texans in victory.
Oct. 22, 1836
Texans declare independence and elect Houston president.
May 6, 1846
Mexican War begins.
May 8, 1846
Battle of Palo Alto: General Zachary Taylor leads the American army to victory.
May 9, 1846
Battle of Resaca de la Palma.
June 30, 1846Jan. 13, 1847
Occupation of California and the Southwest.
Sept. 21-24, 1846
Battle of Monterrey: Important conquest for the U.S. because Monterrey is a key site on the approach to Saltillo.
Jan. 2, 1847
Battle of Santa Clara, California.
Jan. 8, 1847
Battle of Rio San Gabriel (Los Angeles), California.
Jan. 9, 1847
Battle of La Mesa (Los Angeles), California.
Feb. 22-23, 1847
Battle of Buena Vista: The narrow U.S. victory secures the northern approaches to Mexico City.
Mar., 1847
Battle of Veracruz: Port city surrenders, and General Winfield Scott begins march toward Mexico City.
Apr. 17-18, 1847
Battle of Cerro Gordo: Defeat of Mexican army blocking the U.S. advance into central Mexico.
Aug. 20, 1847
Battle of Contreras: General Winfield Scott leads American troops in a crushing defeat of the Mexican army.
Aug. 20, 1847
Battle of Churubusco: Scott’s forces suffer heavy casualties, but Mexican army suffers overwhelming defeat.
Sept. 8, 1847
Battle of Molino del Rey.
Sept. 12-13, 1847
Siege of Chapultepec: Scott’s troops occupy Mexico City on Sept. 14., concluding the military stage of the war.
Feb. 2, 1848
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ends the war. The Mexican government cedes Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California to the United States.
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Texas as independent. The Mexicans were even more reluctant to accept Texas’s incorporation into the United States. Tensions with Mexico President James K. Polk sought to solve the border problem and the acquisition of Texas by seeking to buy all the lands claimed by Mexico between the United States and the Pacific Ocean. He sent an emissary, John Slidell, to Mexico to negotiate with the government. The Mexican state had been politically chaotic since achieving its independence from Spain. General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, a fervent nationalist, refused to even receive the U.S. envoy. Thus the stage was set for a confrontation between the two countries. President Polk struck first. He ordered General Zachary Taylor to lead an army into the disputed territory and take a stand at the Rio Grande, the southernmost point in the land claimed by the Americans. Mexican General Mariano Arista, commander of the Mexican troops at Matamoros, received his orders from Mexico City to attack the U.S. Army. On paper, the odds favored the Mexicans, who outnumbered the Americans, 3,700 men to 2,290. However, the Mexicans lacked modern artillery and were using ordinance that still shot cannonballs. The Americans, who had cannons of a much greater range, could fire explosive shells into the ranks of the Mexican infantry at little risk to themselves. This difference in weaponry, to-
General Zachary Taylor, commander of American forces in the Mexican War. (Library of Congress)
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Antonio López de Santa Anna, commander of the Mexican armies and several times president of the country. (Library of Congress)
gether with the fact that the Mexican army consisted of ill-equipped, ill-fed and poorly led draftees, led to convincing victories for the Americans under Taylor at Palo Alto (May 8, 1846) and the battles in Texas and northern Mexico that followed. In the Palo Alto battle, Taylor sustained only 9 killed, 44 wounded, and 2 missing. The Mexican forces at Palo Alto, and at the Resaca de la Palma battle (May 9) that followed shortly thereafter, lost more than 1,000 men, hundreds of prisoners, and huge quantities of war equipment and supplies. Mexican General Pedro de Ampudia had a force of approximately 10,000 troops to defend the major Mexican stronghold of Monterrey (September 20-24, 1846). The defenders manned a stone fortress known as the Black Fort, containing 400 defenders and a dozen guns, some of them eighteen pounders. They awaited Taylor’s attack on September 21, 1846. Taylor saw the city’s western defenses as the Mexican weak spot and sent 2,000 men under General William Worth on a detour around those points. When the Mexican cavalry rushed to attack the Americans, the U.S. artillery opened up, sending the Mexican horsemen back in disorder. Worth then cut off any supplies to the beleaguered city from the south. However, Mexican defenses within the city itself proved to be formidable. They poured heavy fire on the Americans from the windows of the city’s buildings. Taylor lost more than 400 men during a direct frontal assault on the city’s eastern positions. The next day, Worth, con-
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tinuing his attack on the western sector, had more success. He took the major strongpoints there, turned captured guns on the retreating Mexicans, and took the pressure off Taylor’s troops in the east. The Americans advanced into the city, taking it street by street. On September 25, the Mexicans surrendered the city and marched out, leaving behind virtually all their artillery and ammunition as agreed to in the terms signed by Mexican general Ampudia. Taylor’s total casualties, dead and wounded, amounted to 453 men. Casualties suffered by Ampudia’s troops were considerably higher. Invasion of Mexico In addition to the armies of Taylor and Winfield Scott, President Polk directed those of General John E. Wool and General Stephen W. Kearny to move against Mexico. General Wool and his army had orders to invade Mexico’s center and join Taylor’s force at Buena Vista (February 22-23, 1847), where the two combined to defeat the self-styled “Napoleon of the West,” Santa Anna. The Mexican general had returned from exile following his loss of Texas some eleven years previously. Although the Mexican army acquitted itself well in this critical confrontation and appeared to be
Texas Revolution and the Mexican War UPPER CALIFORNIA
(NEW MEXICO) (ARIZONA) Santa Fe Los Angeles
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Area under dispute Texas Battle sites
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Cerro Gordo Veracruz
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winning the battle, Santa Anna chose to retreat toward the capital rather than continue his engagement with Taylor. Polk ordered General Kearny to lead a force into New Mexico and ultimately to California to secure these Mexican outposts. Polk also expected Commodore John D. Sloat to support Kearny’s army by seizing California ports with Sloat’s Naval Pacific Squadron. First General Kearny marched nearly nine hundred miles from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and occupied Santa Fe without firing a shot. Once the U.S. flag flew over New Mexico, Kearny prepared to move farther west to the Pacific Coast. At the same time, Brevet Captain John C. Frémont marched into Northern California, at Sacramento. This invasion proved premature, for when Frémont discovered that Mexican general José Castro proposed to block his entry into California’s settled coastal area, he decamped and retreated to Oregon. Meanwhile, Kearney had entered Southern California, and after some difficult negotiations and with the aid of the naval forces, he managed to secure control of the state through a treaty with the resident Californios, who did not identify with the government in Mexico City. Despite some sporadic skirmishing with the locals in the takeover, Kearney managed to secure California for the United States with little loss to the men under him. Frémont agreed to accept Kearny’s authority as well, thus ending his independent effort. While the Mexicans had attempted to defend themselves from Taylor’s army in the north, other U.S. forces under General Scott landed at Veracruz
The Battle of Resaca de la Palma, the second major engagement of the Mexican War. (Institute of Texan Cultures)
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In March, 1847, American ships bombarded the port city of Veracruz, preparing the way for General Zachary Taylor’s march on Mexico City. (Library of Congress)
in March, 1847. The Americans experienced only minor opposition before the port city surrendered. Scott then began the march toward Mexico City itself. The Mexican Defense The Mexican defenders were led by General Santa Anna, fresh from his retreat following the battle at Buena Vista. He had a force of more than 20,000 men, double that of Scott’s. The two armies met at Cerro Gordo on April 18, 1847. Captain Robert E. Lee found a path around Santa Anna’s flank that led to a quick defeat of the Mexican forces. The Mexican general left the battlefield so precipitously that all his personal possessions—his silverware, official papers, money, even his dinner—fell into the hands of the Americans. Puebla, at that time Mexico’s second city, surrendered without a fight on May 15. The U.S. forces were only one hundred miles from the capital. Santa Anna fell back to prepared positions around Mexico City itself. Again he failed to anticipate the moves of his opposition, and one of his commanders allowed himself to be surrounded. At the Battle of Contreras on August 20, American forces, led by Scott, inflicted a crushing defeat on the Mexican army. The Americans suffered only a few casualties, and the Mexicans lost 700 men and their best cannons. Also on August 20, at almost the same time, American forces attacked Churubusco. Scott’s forces
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General Zachary Taylor at the siege of Monterrey, Mexico. (F. R. Niglutsch)
also attacked at Molino del Rey (September 8). Scott’s desire to keep the pressure on a disorganized enemy cost him many casualties. At Churubusco alone, the Americans lost 137 killed, 879 wounded, and 40 missing in action. This list contained the worst casualties sustained by the invaders up to that time. Mexican losses were estimated at more than 2,000. During the Churubusco battle, the Americans captured a group of Irish deserters from the U.S. Army who had switched allegiance to the Mexicans. Called the St. Patrick’s Battalion, the captured Irish received harsh treatment at the hands of the Americans. Most were later executed by the U.S. Army while the U.S. flag was raised over Chapultepec Castle. The culminating battle of the Mexico City campaign centered on the storming of Chapultepec Castle on September 13, 1847. Among the defenders was a group of Mexican cadets, many of them children, who tried to fight off the Americans. Several threw themselves off the battlements wrapped in Mexican flags rather than surrender to the invaders. They are known in Mexico as “los niños héroes”—the child heros. Shortly after the castle fell, Mexican resistance in the capital for all intents and purposes ceased. Scott’s troops occupied Mexico City on September 14, 1847. The United States had won the war. Faced with U.S. occupation of its capital city as well as a number of states along its northern border, the Mexican government was forced to sue for peace. In the treaty, signed at the Villa de Guadalupe in the small village of Guadalupe Hidalgo on February 2, 1848, the Mexican govern-
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ment ceded Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California to the United States in exchange for $15 million. The Rio Grande became the boundary between the two countries. The border line extended to the Pacific Ocean, ending approximately fifteen miles below the city of San Diego. General Santa Anna died impoverished in his native state of Veracruz. General Taylor won election to the presidency of the United States in 1848, only to die little more than one year after taking office. General Scott ran for president in 1852 but was defeated by another Mexican War hero, General Franklin Pierce. Carl Henry Marcoux
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Censorship During the War Issues arising from the lack of censorship during the Mexican War influenced later U.S. government wartime censorship. The Mexican War was the first American war reported daily in newspapers across the country. The American public followed the conflict with great interest and anticipation. Newspaper reports did more to influence American attitudes toward the war than any other medium. They also molded American perceptions of the war, its causes, and its effects on the United States. Remarkably, government and military censorship of newspaper reports did not exist. Newspapers used war correspondents for the first time to report from the front lines in Mexico and the Southwest. These reporters followed the campaigning American armies and occasionally participated in the fighting. Instead of rehashing often late and nondescript military dispatches, reporters wrote firsthand accounts that fed the American public’s desire to know more about the war. War correspondents rapidly and efficiently wrote their stories and sent them off to press. Their stories proved not only more plentiful but also more accurate than their military counterparts. No military or government authority censored their stories. Although some in military and government circles complained about the lack of censorship,
President James K. Polk. (Library of Congress)
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the large audience reached by the newspapers had a positive effect. The journalistic freedom exercised by newspapers provided Americans more information about this war than previous ones. Thus, the American people may have been better able to form informed, intelligent opinions about the conflict. Dissident opinion against the war also enjoyed widespread freedom. The government did not attempt to silence those who spoke out against “Mr. Polk’s war”—namely, radical Whigs. President James K. Polk publicly complained about opposition to the war, but charges of treason for opposing the war rarely occurred. Authorities did not constrain civil liberties. The Polk administration worried that dissident opinion might affect the prosecution of the war, but not to the point of taking drastic measures to curb opposition. While the war was not without controversy over which side started the conflict and what motivated the United States in the war, censorship had yet to become standard practice. War correspondents informed the American public. Sketch artists, so prevalent in the Civil War, provided uncensored visual depictions of battles to American readers. This freedom caused concern, notably among the military, who worried that reporters might unintentionally leak secret information to the enemy, and that negative reporting might turn public opinion against military action. Journalistic freedom and dissident opinion did not enjoy such freedom in later conflicts.
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Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events June, 1835-October, 1836 Texas Revolution Date: June 30, 1835-October 22, 1836 Location: Texas Combatants: Texans vs. Mexicans Principal commanders: Texan, General Sam Houston (1793-1863); Mexican, President Antonio López de Santa Anna (1794-1876) Principal battles: Gonzales, Goliad (1835), Concepción, Lipantitlán, Béxar, Alamo, San Patricio, Agua Dulce Creek, Refugio, Coleto Creek, Goliad (1836), San Jacinto Result: After winning its independence from Mexico, Texas remained an independent republic for a decade before being annexed by the United States. The creation of Texas is usually dated from 1821, when Spanish authorities granted Moses Austin permission to colonize a large tract of largely unpopulated land. Austin’s plea for the grant was based in part upon his claim to Spanish citizenship by reason of his previous residence in Louisiana. Moses Austin’s death in Missouri the same year and the creation of an independent Mexico failed to stop the colonization project. Austin’s son, Stephen, took over and spent a year in Mexico City persuading the new authorities that his claim should be accepted. When additional grants were made by the provincial government, Austin’s colonization scheme prospered, as did those of other empresarios who had received grants. European American settlers from the United States, sometimes accompanied by their slaves, soon represented a large majority of the people of Texas. Austin and officials of the province of Texas-Coahuila worked in harmony for several years. Slavery was opposed by Mexican officials, but the province of Texas-Coahuila recognized labor contracts that made indentured servants of the slaves. All settlers were required to be Roman Catholics, but they were not required to attend church services. The empresario settlers were given such generous terms for acquiring land that they usu-
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ally sided with the government against people from the United States who were settling illegally in the eastern part of the province. It was with Austin’s backing, for example, that the Fredonian Uprising of 1826, led by the brothers Haden and Benjamin Edwards against the government, was put down. Growing Tensions The rapid growth of the Euro-American population in Texas created uneasiness among many Mexican officials. The frequent incidents between Texan and Mexican officials, especially in eastern Texas, were viewed with alarm; the attempts of Presidents John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson to acquire all or part of Texas were greeted with hostility. General Manuel Mier y Teran proposed a plan to save Texas from being overrun by Euro-Americans. Mier y Teran called for placing more Mexican troops in the northern provinces, settling more Mexicans and Europeans in the area, and increasing coastal trade between Texas and the rest of Mexico. The Colonization Law of April 6, 1830, adopted Mier y Teran’s suggestions and forbade further immigration from the United States. The plan to attract more Mexicans and increase commerce with Texas failed to materialize, and the limiting of legal immigration from the United States only served to restrict the immigration to illegal settlers who had no vested interest in supporting the Mexican government. The military occupation of Texas was the only part of the plan that was realized, and it only increased the friction between the government and the
Sam Houston, the leader of the Texas rebellion, had an exceptional career. Before coming to Texas, he had been a Tennessee congressman and governor of Tennessee. After Texas’s rebellion succeeded, he became the first president of the independent Texas Republic. When Texas was admitted to the Union, he became one of the new state’s first senators and later served as governor. (Library of Congress)
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settlers. The Texans looked to the presumably liberal revolutionary forces of Antonio López de Santa Anna for relief, and when he came to power, they held a convention at San Felipe in April, 1833, to make plans to petition the new government for the redress of their grievances. Austin was commissioned to present the new government with their requests, including the separation of Texas from Coahuila and a liberalizing of the laws governing immigration and import controls. Austin journeyed to Mexico City, where the Mexican congress agreed to repeal the North American immigration exclusion. Austin, however, was arrested during his return trip on the strength of a letter he had written that appeared to advise the Texans to establish a separate state. He was jailed for two years and could not return to Texas until September 1, 1835. During Austin’s absence, Texas-Coahuila made a number of concessions to the Texans, but Santa Anna’s central government was moving to centralize its authority. Although most Texans disapproved of the seizure of the Anahuac Garrison on June 30, 1835, by a group led by William Barret Travis, they were concerned about the apparent intention of the Mexican government to send a greater number of troops to Texas. The Texans responded by calling conventions on August 15 at Columbia and on October 15 at San Felipe. A provisional government was created, although the Texans proclaimed their loyalty to a constitutional Mexican government. An army was created and Austin called for war. The Call to Arms Not all Texans were committed to the call to arms, and opposition increased during the seven-month war. The mainly Irish settlers in the San Patricio region joined forces with the Mexican army and fought against the rebels at Fort Lipantitlán on November 5. Tejanos, or Mexican Texans, were divided in their loyalties: Some were centralists; others supported the rebel forces; still others tried, largely without success, to remain neutral. This split in allegiances made the Texas revolution a civil war in the truest sense, pitting family member against family member. José Antonio Navarro, a hero to many latter-day Texans, supported the Texas Rebels, while his brother Angel maintained his support for Mexico. Many Euro-Americans attempted to remain neutral during the spring of 1836. Although they did not support the centralists, many did avoid recruitment into the armed forces. Personal and family protection was their motivating force. Of the few Euro-Americans who did support the centralist cause, most were older and had resided in Texas for more than ten years. There is little evidence that they were very active during the war. The vast majority of Tejanos who supported the rebel cause were native-
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born Texans from San Antonio. Their knowledge of the area proved beneficial to the rebels. The effects of the war on Tejanos, however, were devastating. After their homes and farms were ransacked and their supplies used to feed and equip the Texas armies, their initial support for the rebellion faded. Most received no compensation for their sacrifices during the war. The Alamo On February 23, 1836, Santa Anna and four thousand troops laid siege to the Alamo. The 187 men inside, mainly newcomers from the United States, held out until March 6, when the garrison, commanded by Travis and including Davy Crockett and James Bowie, was assaulted and wiped out. At Goliad, three hundred defenders under James Fannin surrendered and then were massacred by the Mexican army on March 27. The delegates who met on March 1, 1836, in Washington, Texas, knew of the siege of the Alamo. Continuing their pattern of following the revolutionary example of the United States, they issued a declaration of independence on March 2 and subsequently adopted a constitution. The siege at the Alamo gave commander-in-chief Sam Houston time to assemble an army. Houston avoided a fight for weeks before surprising Santa Anna’s divided army on the west bank of the San Jacinto River near Galveston Bay on April 21, 1836. The Texans defeated twelve hundred Mexicans with their force of eight hundred. Santa Anna was among the captives. Before being released, Santa Anna pledged himself to secure the independence of Texas, but the Mexican congress disavowed his actions. The Mexican army, however, quickly left Texas and made no serious attempt to regain control. Sam Houston was elected president of the Republic of Texas on October 22, 1836. Houston and most Texans were interested in joining the United States, but for diplomatic and domestic reasons, annexation was not accomplished for almost a decade. Mark A. Plummer updated by Pamela Hayes-Bohanan
February-March, 1836 Battle of the Alamo Date: February 23-March 6, 1836 Location: Mission San Antonio de Valero, San Antonio de Béxar, Texas Combatants: 189 Texans and Tennesseans vs. 3,000-6,000 Mexicans
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Principal commanders: Texan, Lieutenant Colonel William Barret Travis (1809-1836), Colonel Jim Bowie (1799-1836); Tennessean, Colonel Davy Crockett (1786-1836); Mexican, General Antonio López de Santa Anna (1794-1876) Result: An overwhelming Mexican force annihilated the American defenders of the Alamo’s garrison. In San Antonio de Béxar, Colonel Benjamin Rush Milam and 300 Texan volunteers arose against the Mexican garrison under General Martín Perfecto de Cós (December 5-10, 1835). When Cós surrendered, Milam’s men occupied the Alamo and enhanced its fortifications. Colonel James C. Neill took command of the Alamo’s garrison of about a hundred on December 21. Acting as emissary and military attaché for Governor Henry Smith and General Sam Houston, Colonel Jim Bowie arrived in San Antonio on January 19, 1836. Lieutenant Colonel William Barret Travis came with thirty more men on February 2. Colonel Davy Crockett brought about twenty Tennesseans on February 8. With Neill on temporary furlough, Travis and Bowie decided to share command on February 14. General Antonio López de Santa Anna arrived in Béxar on February 23 and immediately began bombarding the Alamo. The Mexicans had hundreds of field pieces, but no heavy siege guns. The Alamo had fourteen smoothbore cannons, the largest an eighteen pounder. When Santa Anna demanded unconditional surrender on the first day of the siege, Travis answered with a blast from that gun. Santa Anna ordered continuous bombardment. Travis assumed sole command on February 24 when Bowie fell ill with fever, perhaps pneumonia, and was incapacitated for the rest of the siege. That day Travis wrote a famous letter promising that he would never surrender but begging for help. The Mexican encircling of the Alamo was not tight. Messengers could come and go almost at will, and the Texans could make night raids on the Mexicans. Even reinforcements could get in. The last reinforcements to arrive were 32 men from Gonzales on March 1. An unverifiable tradition says that Travis, on March 3, having accepted that he would get no aid from either Colonel James W. Fannin at Goliad or Houston at Washington-on-theBrazos, drew a line in the sand on the parade ground with his sword and asked all who chose to die with him to cross it. All but one, Louis Rose, crossed. Bowie, too weak to move, had to be carried across. That night, the tradition continues, Crockett helped Rose escape. By the twelfth day of shelling (March 5), Santa Anna had become impatient. He announced that his troops would storm the Alamo at dawn. His
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The Alamo mission building from which the Texans tried to hold off a Mexican army is now preserved as a museum. (Library of Congress)
officers advised waiting because the walls were about to crumble, the north wall was already breached, and the Texans would soon run out of food and ammunition. Few men on either side had yet been killed, but a direct assault would result in considerable Mexican casualties. Santa Anna overruled all these objections. At 4:00 the next morning the first wave attacked. Antipersonnel charges from the Alamo’s cannons took their toll as did the sharpshooters on the parapets. The first two waves retreated with heavy losses, but the third wave succeeded in scaling the west wall. Thereafter the fighting was handto-hand. Within ninety minutes, all the defenders were dead. Estimates of Mexican casualties range from 600 to 1,500. The heroic defense of the Alamo provided the famous rallying cry, “Remember the Alamo!” that later boosted the morale of Houston’s men in their easy victory over Santa Anna at San Jacinto (April 21, 1836). Eric v.d. Luft
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April, 1836 Battle of San Jacinto Date: April 21, 1836 Location: LaPorte, Harris County, Texas Combatants: 900 Texans vs. 1,600 Mexicans Principal commanders: Texan, General Sam Houston (1793-1863); Mexican, President Antonio López de Santa Anna (1794-1876) Result: Decisive Texan victory. When news of the Alamo massacre reached Sam Houston in Gonzales (March 11), he retreated east, followed by many terrified settlers in a move known as the Runaway Scrape. He eluded the pursuing Mexicans for more than a month, then established a strong defensive position at the inner confluence of the San Jacinto River and Buffalo Bayou (April 20). Antonio López de Santa Anna camped about fifteen hundred yards downstream. The next morning, Houston ordered Erastus “Deaf” Smith to destroy Vince’s Bridge, thus blocking the only escape route for both armies and preventing further Mexican reinforcements. About noon, Houston determined a course of action. At 3:30 p.m., his men sneaked across no-man’s-land in a wide skirmish line as the Mexicans were enjoying their siesta, then suddenly attacked, yelling “Remember the Alamo! Remember Goliad! Remember La Bahia!” The battle lasted about twenty minutes. Texan losses were 9 killed and 30 wounded, against 630 Mexicans killed, 208 wounded, and 730 taken prisoner. Santa Anna, disguised as a corporal, was captured the next day. Texas won its independence from Mexico, the Alamo became a legend, and Houston became a hero. Eric v.d. Luft
June, 1846-January, 1847 Occupation of California and the Southwest Date: June 30, 1846-January 13, 1847 Location: Greater Southwest Combatants: Americans vs. Mexicans Principal commanders: American, Philip St. George Cooke (1809-1895), Stephen Watts Kearny (1794-1848), Alexander W. Doniphan (18081887); Mexican, Manuel Armijo (1792?-1853), José Castro (1818-1893)
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Result: The Army of the West was charged with winning New Mexico and California for the United States. When the United States declared war on Mexico in May, 1846, the military strategy of President James K. Polk and his advisers was to occupy the capitals of the northern Mexican provinces and march on Mexico City itself. Polk hoped the two campaigns would result in a quick end to the war. He assigned the task of winning New Mexico and California to the Army of the West, commanded by Brigadier General Stephen Kearny. In the spring of 1846, Kearny assembled his forces at Fort Leavenworth. Under his command were three hundred regular dragoons and five hundred Mormon youths, led by Lieutenant Colonel Philip St. George Cooke, who had been recruited from their encampment at Council Bluffs, Iowa, where Brigham Young was making plans to move westward to Deseret. Kearny also was accompanied by a regiment of infantry and a train of wagons. Missouri frontiersmen and recruits brought the total personnel under his command to twenty-seven hundred. The March to Santa Fe On June 30, 1846, this army started for Santa Fe, following the Santa Fe Trail for eight hundred miles, first to Bent’s Fort on the Arkansas River and then southward into New Mexico. On the outskirts of Santa Fe, Kearny learned that three thousand Mexicans under the command of Manuel Armijo, the governor of New Mexico, had occupied a strategic canyon through which Kearny’s men would have to pass. Rather than risk a military clash, Kearny resorted to diplomacy, sending forward intelligence agent James Magoffin, who, acting on secret instructions from Polk, succeeded in convincing Armijo that he should flee southward. Colonel Juan de Archuleta, Armijo’s second-in-command, proved more difficult and would not withdraw the Mexican Army until Kearny promised that he would occupy only part of New Mexico, leaving the rest to Archuleta. Kearny’s army then marched into Santa Fe without contest, but disregarding his promise to Archuleta, Kearny issued a proclamation announcing the U.S. intention to annex the whole of New Mexico. He promised the residents a democratic government and a code of law, and he named Charles Bent as governor. When settlers in southern New Mexico questioned his actions, Kearny took a detachment down the Rio Grande to ensure the loyalty of Mexican villages. With the first phase of his campaign completed, Kearny continued his program by separating his army into three forces. One he left behind in New Mexico to hold the province. Another, composed of three hundred
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volunteers from Missouri under Colonel Alexander Doniphan, went south by way of El Paso to occupy Chihuahua City. Magoffin, sent ahead to ensure a peaceful occupation, was unsuccessful. Doniphan’s troops had to fight the Battle of Brazito before occupying El Paso, and they had to drive back a Mexican army of four thousand at Chihuahua City. Kearny had taken the third force of three hundred dragoons out of Santa Fe on September 25, 1846, and headed for California. Kearny was accompanied by Lieutenant William Emory and other officers of the Topographical Engineers, who were making observations on the feasibility of wagon and railroad routes. The expedition moved rapidly down the Rio Grande and then west along the Rio Gila. There it encountered a detachment led by Kit Carson, bringing the news east that California was in the hands of the United States. Assuming that a military campaign would be unnecessary on the coast, Kearny ordered two-thirds of his troops back to Santa Fe and commanded the reluctant Kit Carson, now a lieutenant in the United States Army, to guide him and one hundred dragoons westward. The division of Kearny’s force was fortunate for the interests of the United States, because the detachment returning to New Mexico arrived in time to suppress the Taos Revolt led by the disgruntled Archuleta, in which Governor Bent and other officials had been slain. The revolutionaries took refuge within the adobe church there, and U.S. forces had to storm the walls and kill many Mexican leaders before the revolt came to an end and U.S. authority was restored. The Struggle for California At the same time, the United States extended its authority to California. Before war had been declared between the United States and Mexico, Thomas O. Larkin, the U.S. consul in California, had hoped that he could effect a peaceful transfer of the Mexican province to the United States. Larkin’s hopes were dashed, however, by events surrounding John C. Frémont’s appearance in California between December, 1845, and June, 1846. Frémont had secured permission from Governor José Castro for his scientific expedition to winter in California on the condition that Frémont avoid coming near any settlements. Frémont’s failure to honor the agreement prompted Castro to demand Frémont’s departure from California. Avoiding hostilities temporarily, Frémont led his detachment slowly up the Sacramento River Valley until he was overtaken at Klamath Lake by Lieutenant Archibald Gillespie of the U.S. Marines, carrying confidential messages and papers from the U.S. government and from relatives. The exact contents of these communications have remained unknown; however, Frémont there-
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upon returned to California, despite Castro’s order to leave, and made his way to the vicinity of Sonoma. There, in June, he immediately became involved in an uprising of settlers from the United States, a insurrection known as the Bear Flag Revolt, so named for a flag bearing the symbols of a red star and a bear, which the insurgents adopted as their standard. Frémont’s national reputation as a hero in the conquest of California waned when the Bear Flag Revolt was assessed against the efforts of Larkin to secure California peacefully for the United States, and when it was learned that the war with Mexico—which prescribed the U.S. conquest of California— had been declared before the Bear Flag Revolt took place. Critics have censured Frémont for having provocatively endangered relations between the United States and Mexico at a time when Frémont could not have known of the state of war. Historians point out that the Bear Flag Revolt had little importance in the U.S. conquest of California, because Commodore John Sloat’s first official act of conquest was to sail into Monterey Bay and raise the United States flag over the customs house on July 7, twelve days before Frémont’s arrival in Monterey. Events of the Bear Flag Revolt merged with the conquest by United States forces. The first stage of operations, from July 7 to August 15, 1846, resulted in the temporary occupation of every important settlement in California, including San Francisco, Sutter’s Fort, Monterey, and Los Angeles. It was news of this success that Kit Carson was carrying to the east when he met Kearny. Scarcely had Carson departed when a local revolt erupted in Los Angeles on September 22, and the United States troops under Gillespie were forced to retreat to the Pacific port of San Pedro, leaving southern California once again in Mexican hands. Commodore Robert F. Stockton, in charge of U.S. naval forces, left Monterey for the south. Conquest Meanwhile, the Mexicans, learning of Kearny’s approach to San Diego, had come out to meet him near present-day Escondido, California. In the ensuing Battle of San Pasqual, United States troops were mauled badly but managed to struggle on to San Diego. Kearny then joined Stockton’s forces in a successful march into Los Angeles. Frémont, in the meantime, marched down the California coast with deliberation. The Mexican leaders who had violated their paroles made at the time of the first capitulation were afraid of retribution at the hands of Kearny or Stockton, and so sought out Frémont in the mountains north of Los Angeles, where they surrendered at Cahuenga on January 13, 1847. The conquest of the Southwest was at last complete. A bitter quarrel then ensued between Stockton and Kearny over who was in command in
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California. Frémont sided with Stockton, but Kearny appealed to Washington, D.C., and received confirmation of his authority. Diplomatic complications delayed the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo until February, 1848, more than a year after the fighting in the northern Mexican provinces had ceased. As a result of the treaty, the United States acquired all or portions of the future states of California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona. Native Americans and Mexicans passed under the suzerainty of the United States. W. Turrentine Jackson updated by Edward R. Crowther
September, 1846 Battle of Monterrey Date: September 21-24, 1846 Location: Monterrey, Mexico (state capital of Nuevo León, Mexico) Combatants: 6,220 American vs. 7,303 Mexican troops Principal commanders: American, Major General Zachary Taylor (17841850); Mexican, Major General Pedro de Ampudia Result: Successful U.S. takeover of Monterrey.
Contemporary engraving of the Mexican defense of Monterrey. (Institute of Texan Cultures)
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In the mid-afternoon on Sunday, September 20, 1846, General Zachary Taylor issued orders for 6,220 U.S. troops to begin their two-pronged attack on the city of Monterrey. Guarded by 7,303 Mexican soldiers, Monterrey lay nestled between forts, earthworks, natural cliffs, and the Santa Catarina River. Taylor planned to cut off the city from its supply line and only escape route while at the same time taking the heights above the city. Then, despite any defensive action by the army of General Pedro de Ampudia, the city would fall quickly. Though the campaign was poorly executed and hampered by driving rain, U.S. forces were successful after two days of fierce fighting. On September 23, U.S. soldiers entered the city after finding the Mexicans’ outer defenses abandoned. Near dawn the next day, following bloody street warfare, Ampudia asked for an armistice. In the melee, 367 Mexicans had been killed or wounded defending the city. Americans dead numbered 120, with nearly 370 wounded. Significance Monterrey was a key locale on the approach to Saltillo, which, when occupied, would isolate Mexico City from northern Mexico. John C. Pinheiro
February, 1847 Battle of Buena Vista Date: February 22-23, 1847 Location: Hacienda San Juan de la Buena Vista (eight miles south of Saltillo) Combatants: 4,594 American vs. 15,142 Mexican troops Principal commanders: American, Major General Zachary Taylor (17841850); Mexican, General Antonio López de Santa Anna (1794-1876) Result: Successful U.S. defense of its position near Saltillo. On February 22, 1847, General Antonio López de Santa Anna sent some 15,000 soldiers against the positions of American general Zachary Taylor’s 4,594, mostly volunteer, troops. Beginning with skirmishes, a full-scale battle ensued the following morning on rough terrain beneath the Sierra Madre near Hacienda San Juan de la Buena Vista. Santa Anna possessed intelligence of U.S. troop locations and hoped for a decisive defeat.
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Engraving of the Battle of Buena Vista made for Harper’s New Monthly Magazine in 1855. (Institute of Texan Cultures)
Mexican cavalry and infantry threw themselves against U.S. lines throughout the day. Taylor’s decision simply to defend U.S. positions proved successful. Though bloodied and weary, his forces still held the battlefield as night fell. As Taylor’s men anxiously awaited dawn, Santa Anna’s army slipped away, demoralized at their inability to break through U.S. positions. Mexican deaths numbered 691, with nearly 1,050 wounded. American casualties included 272 killed and 387 wounded. The narrow U.S. victory at Buena Vista was not only of strategic significance but also of political importance for Taylor. The victory had secured the northern approaches to Mexico City, and the general’s fame would help to elect him president of the United States. John C. Pinheiro
April, 1847 Battle of Cerro Gordo Date: April 17-18, 1847 Location: On the National Road between Plan del Rio and Cerro Gordo, in the Mexican state of Veracruz
April, 1847: Cerro Gordo
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Combatants: 8,500 American vs. 12,000 Mexican troops Principal commanders: American, Major General Winfield Scott (17861866); Mexican, General Antonio López de Santa Anna (1794-1876) Result: Rout of Mexican army blocking the U.S. march into central Mexico. Moving up from Veracruz along the National Road, Major General Winfield Scott’s 8,500-man army encountered Mexican forces at the Rio de Plan on April 11. Over the next six days, U.S. engineers scouted the Mexican positions. General Antonio López de Santa Anna, commanding more than 12,000 men, had established a strong defense on his right, which controlled a defile through which the National Road ran. He relied on rough terrain and two hills, El Atalaya and the larger El Telégrafo, to protect his left. Scott’s chief engineer, Captain Robert E. Lee, found a route around Santa Anna’s left, however, and U.S. troops began to move into position on April 17. Mexican sentries on El Atalaya discovered the movement, forcing a successful American assault on the hill. Now aware of what he thought was Scott’s plan, Santa Anna reinforced his left and the summit of El Telégrafo. The next morning Brigadier General Gideon Pillow launched a badly managed assault on the Mexican right. Scott’s main attack, however, swept around the Mexican left, while another force stormed El Telégrafo. Real-
U.S. forces under General Winfield Scott at the Battle of Cerro Gordo. (Library of Congress)
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izing Americans now commanded the National Road to his rear, Santa Anna abandoned his army, and the Mexican defense collapsed. Scott lost 65 killed and 353 wounded. The Mexicans lost an estimated 1,000 killed and wounded and 3,000 captured. Scott’s men also captured forty-three heavy guns and Santa Anna’s personal baggage. The victory allowed Scott to establish himself in the Mexican highlands, escape the potentially disastrous effects of being caught on the coast during yellowfever season, and reorganize his army for its descent on Mexico City. Ronald L. Spiller
September, 1847 Siege of Chapultepec Date: September 12-13, 1847 Location: Chapultepec Hill, Mexico City Combatants: 7,180 American vs. about 7,100 Mexican troops Principal commanders: American, General Winfeld Scott (1786-1866); Mexican, General Antonio López de Santa Anna (1794-1876) Result: American troops captured the fortifications of Chapultepec Hill, and thus Mexico City, ending the military phase of the Mexican War.
American troops storming the citadel of Chapultepec, which was defended by 5,000 troops. (Institute of Texan Cultures)
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American general Winfield Scott decided to attack Mexico City through its western gate. However, to see his strategy succeed, Scott had to take the high ground of Chapultepec Hill. When the American forces began approaching, Mexican General Antonio López de Santa Anna placed a force of some 7,100 soldiers throughout the hill’s fortifications, including the buildings of a local military school. The battle began when the American forces opened up with artillery fire on September 12. The next day, Scott attacked from two fronts: A storming party came from the south and east and a second force came from the west. The American troops approaching from the west were able to scale the walls of Chapultepec and engage in extensive hand-to-hand combat with the Mexican defenders. By 9:30 on the morning of September 13, the Americans had won, and General Santa Anna surrendered all of his troops. The Mexican forces lost 1,800 soldiers; the Americans lost 450. The battle for Chapultepec brought the surrender of Mexico City, forcing a negotiated peace and bringing an end to the hostilities between the two armies. Tom Frazier
February, 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo Date: February 2, 1848 Location: Guadalupe Hidalgo, near Mexico City Principal figures: American, Secretary of State James Buchanan (17911868), President James K. Polk (1795-1849), General Winfield Scott (1786-1866), General Zachary Taylor (1784-1850); Mexican, President Manuel de la Peña y Peña (1789-1850), General and President Antonio López de Santa Anna (1794-1876) Result: The formal conclusion to the Mexican War resulted in cession of extensive Mexican lands to the United States. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, drafted and signed at the Mexican village of Guadalupe Hidalgo, near Mexico City, ended the Mexican War. The war had been prompted partly by hawkish adherents of manifest destiny, a belief in the inevitable expansion of the United States through the whole of North America, although it had nominally erupted over disputed territories shortly after the United States annexed the Republic of Texas in 1845.
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The specific cause of the war was the dispute over which river— the Rio Bravo del Norte or the Nueces—marked a boundary line between the two countries. War had been declared formally in April of 1846, after Mexican and U.S. troops clashed in the disputed territory between the two rivers. The U.S. Victory In Mexico, political turmoil and poor military strategy and preparedness at first led to fairly easy U.S. victories. Successful campaigns in northeastern Mexico by General Zachary Taylor caused the collapse of the Mexican government and the recall from exile of General Antonio López de Santa Anna, who fought a close but losing battle against Taylor at Buena Vista in February of 1847. The tide turned fully against Mexico when General Winfield Scott invaded Mexico at Veracruz and fought his way inland against tough resistance to capture Mexico City. The crucial battle in Scott’s march from the sea was fought against Santa Anna at Cerro Gordo on April 18, 1847. Even with Santa Anna’s defeat, Scott’s army had difficulty, and it was not until September 14, 1847, that his troops entered and took control of the Mexican capital. Santa Anna, threatened with impeachment for his conduct of the war, went once more into exile. In order to take direct command of the Mexican forces, he earlier had named Manuel de la Peña y Peña interim president and eventually had to ask the Peña government for permission to leave Mexico. It was Peña who was forced to agree to the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, negotiated under the weakest possible conditions for Mexico. For a payment of $15 million and $3.25 million in claims of Mexican citizens, Mexico ceded to the United States the territories of New Mexico and Upper California. The agreement also established the MexicanAmerican boundary, which followed the course of the Rio Grande from the Gulf of Mexico to the southern border of New Mexico, west to the Gila and Colorado Rivers, and eventually to a point just south of San Diego on the Pacific Ocean. Negotiations The negotiations leading up to the treaty were complex. In April of 1847, President Polk had sent Nicholas P. Trist of the Department of State to Scott’s camp with a secret treaty proposal drafted by Secretary of State James Buchanan. Trist was empowered to consider counterproposals and secure an armistice, which was actually arranged in late August of that same year. Scott had been in secret communication with Santa Anna, who, without the knowledge of the Mexican government, was trying to arrange treaty terms on his own. Santa Anna assured Scott that hostilities could be
February, 1848: Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
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General Scott’s troops storming Molino del Rey, while advancing toward Mexico City. (Institute of Texan Cultures)
suspended and a treaty negotiated if and when Scott’s army laid siege to Mexico City. Scott had even written a memorandum in which he avowed that he would fight a battle in view of the capital and then “give those in the City an opportunity to save the capital by making a peace.” Scott, with victories at Contreras and Churubusco in August, 1847, had met Santa Anna’s conditions. The road to Mexico City was open, and the remnants of Santa Anna’s army had been put to disordered flight, taking refuge within the capital. Scott was certain that a peace with a compliant Santa Anna could be quickly negotiated. Santa Anna, however, was as deceitful and crafty as Scott was forthright and naïve. He knew that Scott’s army was wracked by disease, declining morale, and logistics problems, and he believed that time was an invisible ally. As his blame-shifting maneuvers made clear, he also wanted to avoid making any treaty concessions that would tarnish his national image. Thus, although a cease-fire was arranged and agreed to, the efforts to draft a mutually acceptable set of terms at the ensuing peace conference proved futile and were probably doomed from the outset. The armistice broke off on September 6, and on September 14 Scott took Mexico City. Santa Anna soon fled. When it became clear to Buchanan and Polk that Santa Anna was stalling, Polk ordered the recall of Trist, in part to counteract the impression that the United States was anxious to achieve a peace, a view gaining currency among the Mexican people. Trist did not return, however; he stayed
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General Winfield Scott’s entry into Mexico City completed the American victory. (Library of Congress)
on after the futile negotiations broke off and fighting resumed. The war dragged on past the departure of Santa Anna, who met his final defeat at Puebla on October 11. It was abundantly clear that Mexico could not turn the war’s tide, and within two months, it sued for peace. Trist, never having returned home, became the chief U.S. negotiator at Guadalupe Hidalgo, where the treaty was finally signed. Terms The drafted terms, readied by January 24, 1848, more fully realized the territorial ambitions of the United States than the terms that had been discussed during the earlier armistice conference, which had at least left the Texas border question open. However, even from the outset of the earlier negotiations, it had been clear that the United States was determined to annex both Upper California and New Mexico. In the end, Santa Anna’s delaying tactics had proved a bit more costly to Mexico. Because a flawed map was used during the treaty negotiations, the boundaries between Mexico and the United States remained open to interpretation. Surveyors could not agree on the identity of the first branch of the Gila River, one of the important demarcation lines, and the boundary line between Mexico and the United States in the area separating the Gila River and the Rio Grande was not settled. However, both the Rio Grande
February, 1848: Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
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and the Gila River were established as principal boundaries. Mexico thereby ceded territories south of the Nueces River and all of Upper California from one nautical league south of San Diego to the Northwest Territories. The United States gained all of the Territory of New Mexico, the disputed lands in southern Texas, and Upper California. In consideration for ceding this vast acreage, the United States was to pay only the stipulated $15 million plus the $3.25 million in claims. It was a grand bargain for the expansionist believers in manifest destiny. The treaty terms were quickly accepted by Polk and, with some amendments, ratified by the U.S. Senate on March 10, 1848. Aftermath The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo did not immediately end the boundary issue. In 1853, during the administration of Franklin Pierce, the current border between Mexico and the United States was finally set when the United States purchased the Arizona Territory from Mexico in the Gadsden Purchase and described the boundary line between the two countries in the disputed area. An important provision of that treaty, Article VII, granted U.S. citizenship with full constitutional rights to the Mexicans living in the ceded territories and guaranteed them ownership of their land. However, through the invalidation of Spanish and Mexican land grants, federal courts and the U.S. Congress allowed government agencies, ranchers, land speculators, and business and railroad magnates to gobble up acreage that, by the terms of the treaty, rightly belonged to Mexican Americans. Over two generations, almost twenty million acres of their land was lost to private owners and state and federal agencies. John W. Fiero
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Further Reading Bartlett, Robert Merril. Those Valiant Texans: A Breed Apart. Portsmouth, N.H.: P. E. Randall, 1989. Bauer, Karl Jack. The Mexican War, 1846-1848. New York: Macmillan, 1974. ____________. Zachary Taylor: Soldier, Planter, Statesman of the Old Southwest. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985. Binkley, William C. The Texas Revolution. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952. Boethel, Paul C. Colonel Amasa Turner: The Gentleman from Lavaca and Other Captains at San Jacinto. Austin, Tex.: Von Boeckmann-Jones, 1963. Brown, Gary. Volunteers in the Texas Revolution: The New Orleans Greys. Plano: Republic of Texas Press, 1999. Christensen, Carol, and Thomas Christensen. The U.S.-Mexican War. San Francisco: Bay Books, 1998. Crawford, Mark. Encyclopedia of the Mexican-American War. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 1999. Davis, William C. Lone Star Rising: The Revolutionary Birth of the Texas Republic. New York: Free Press, 2004. ____________. Three Roads to the Alamo: The Lives and Fortunes of David Crockett, James Bowie, and William Barret Travis. New York: HarperCollins, 1998. Dawson, Joseph G. III. Doniphan’s Epic March: The First Missouri Volunteers in the Mexican War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999. Dixon, Sam Houston, and L. W. Kemp. The Heroes of San Jacinto. Houston: Anson Jones, 1932. Dufour, Charles L. The Mexican War: A Compact History, 1846-1848. New York: Hawthorne Books, 1968. Edmondson, J. R. The Alamo Story: From Early History to Current Conflicts. Plano: Republic of Texas Press, 2000. Eisenhower, John S. D. So Far from God: The U.S. War with Mexico 1846-1848. New York: Random House, 1989. Foos, Paul. A Short Offhand, Killing Affair: Soldiers and Social Conflict During the Mexican-American War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002. Griswold Del Castillo, Richard. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: A Legacy of Conflict. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990. Groneman, Bill. Battlefields of Texas. Plano: Republic of Texas Press, 1998.
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____________. Death of a Legend: The Myth and Mystery Surrounding the Death of Davy Crockett. Plano: Republic of Texas Press, 1999. Hardin, Stephen L. Texian Iliad: A Military History of the Texas Revolution, 1835-1836. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994. Johannsen, Robert Walter. To the Halls of the Montezumas: The Mexican War in the American Imagination. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. Johnson, Timothy D. Winfield Scott. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998. Kemp, L. W., and Ed Kilman. The Battle of San Jacinto and the San Jacinto Campaign. Houston: Anson Jones, 1947. Kendall, George Wilkins. Dispatches from the Mexican War. Edited and with an introduction by Lawrence Delbert Cress. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999. Lavender, David. Climax at Buena Vista: The Decisive Battle of the MexicanAmerican War. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003. Long, Jeff. Duel of Eagles: The Mexican and U.S. Fight for the Alamo. New York: Morrow, 1990. McCaffrey, James M. Army of Manifest Destiny: The American Soldier in the War with Mexico. New York: New York University Press, 1992. Matovina, Timothy M. The Alamo Remembered: Tejano Accounts and Perspectives. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995. Miller, Robert Ryal. Shamrock and Sword, The Saint Patrick’s Battalion in the U.S.-Mexican War. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989. Moore, Stephen L. Eighteen Minutes: The Battle of San Jacinto and the Texas Independence Campaign. Dallas: Republic of Texas Press, 2004. Nance, Joseph Milton. After San Jacinto: The Texas Mexican Frontier, 18361841. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1963. Nevin, David. “’Fight and Be Damned!’ Said Sam Houston.” Smithsonian 23, no. 4 (July, 1992). Nofi, Albert A. The Alamo and the Texas War of Independence, September 30, 1835 to April 21, 1836: Heroes, Myths, and History. New York: Da Capo Press, 1994. Olivera, Ruth R., and Liliane Crété. Life in Mexico Under Santa Anna, 18221855. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. Peskin, Allan, ed. Volunteers: The Mexican War Journals of Private Richard Coulter and Sergeant Thomas Barclay, Co. E, Second Pennsylvania Infantry. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1991. Pohl, James W. The Battle of San Jacinto. Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 1989. Walker, Dale L. Bear Flag Rising: The Conquest of California, 1846. New York: Forge, 1999.
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Weems, John Edward. To Conquer a Peace: The War Between the United States and Mexico. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974. Wharton, Clarence R. San Jacinto: The Sixteenth Decisive Battle. Houston: Lamar, 1930. Williams, John Hoyt. Sam Houston: The Life and Times of the Liberator of Texas, an Authentic American Hero. New York: Promontory Press, 1993. Winders, Richard Bruce. Mr. Polk’s Army: The American Military Experience in the Mexican War. College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1997. ____________. Sacrificed at the Alamo: Tragedy and Triumph in the Texas Revolution. Abilene, Tex.: State House Press, 2004.
Civil War 1861-1865 Civil War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Weapons, Tactics, and Strategies . . . . . Conscription . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Censorship During the War . . . . . . . . Justice During the War. . . . . . . . . . . U.S. Supreme Court During the War . . . Native American Combatants in the War Women in the War . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events . . . . . . . . . . . October, 1859: Harpers Ferry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . April, 1861: Battle of Fort Sumter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . July, 1861: First Battle of Bull Run . . . . . . . . . . . . . . February, 1862: Battle of Fort Donelson . . . . . . . . . . March, 1862: Monitor vs. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . April, 1862: Battle of Shiloh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . June-July, 1862: Seven Days’ Battles . . . . . . . . . . . . August, 1862: Second Battle of Bull Run . . . . . . . . . . September, 1862: Battle of Antietam . . . . . . . . . . . . October, 1862: Battle of Corinth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . December, 1862: Battle of Fredericksburg . . . . . . . . . May, 1863: Battle of Chancellorsville . . . . . . . . . . . . July, 1863: Battles of Gettysburg and Vicksburg . . . . . . September, 1863: Battle of Chickamauga. . . . . . . . . . November, 1863: Battle of Chattanooga . . . . . . . . . . May, 1864: Battle of the Wilderness . . . . . . . . . . . . . May, 1864: Battle of Spotsylvania Court House . . . . . . June, 1864: Battle of Cold Harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . June, 1864-April, 1865: Siege of Petersburg . . . . . . . . November, 1864-April, 1865: Sherman’s March to the Sea December, 1864: Battle of Savannah . . . . . . . . . . . . December, 1864: Battle of Nashville . . . . . . . . . . . . April, 1865: Surrender at Appomattox . . . . . . . . . . .
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Civil War At issue: Nature of the U.S. Constitution and national government, states rights, and slavery Date: April 12, 1861-May 26, 1865 Location: North America Combatants: United States of America (the North, or Union) vs. Confederate States of America (the South) Principal commanders: Union, Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865); Confederate, Jefferson Davis (1808-1889) Principal battles: Fort Sumter, First Bull Run, Fort Donelson, Shiloh, Seven Pines, Seven Days’ Battles, Second Bull Run, Antietam, Perryville, Corinth, Fredericksburg, Stones River, Siege of Vicksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, Overland Campaign, Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, Cold Harbor, Petersburg, Atlanta, Nashville, Savannah Result: A Northern victory that preserved the Union and led to the freeing of all the nation’s African American slaves Decades of conflict and controversy between the North and the South finally culminated in war in 1861. Longstanding economic, political, social, and constitutional differences had steadily divided the two areas during the antebellum period. By 1860, the North had grown increasingly industrial, and the South remained primarily agricultural. The Republican Party dominated the free states of the North and the West, and the slave states of the South were solidly Democratic. The majority of Northerners opposed the spread of slavery, and Southerners wholeheartedly pushed for its expansion. Northerners believed the national government, the Union of the states, was indivisible and not dissolvable, and Southerners subscribed to the doctrine of states’ rights and the legitimacy of secession. Extremists on both sides exacerbated tensions in an already charged political environment until compromise became impossible. Secession The November, 1860, election of Abraham Lincoln, the Republican antislavery candidate, precipitated the secession of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas by February 1, 1861. Representatives for these states met in Montgomery, Alabama, later that month, formed the Confederate States of America, and demanded that all federal property in the South be turned over to Confederate authorities. (continued on page 165)
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Time Line of the Civil War Oct. 16-18, 1859
John Brown leads raid on Harpers Ferry, Virginia (now part of West Virginia).
Nov. 6, 1860
Abraham Lincoln’s election to the U.S. presidency triggers the secession of South Carolina.
Dec. 20, 1860
South Carolina secedes from the Union, followed by Virginia (Apr. 17), Arkansas (May 6), Tennessee (May 7), and North Carolina (May 20). West Virginia organizes its own government on June 11 and is admitted to the Union on June 20, 1863. Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri eventually join the Union after bitter contention.
Apr. 12-14, 1861
Battle of Fort Sumter: South Carolina’s Palmetto Guard, under command of General P. G. T. Beauregard, opens fire on Fort Sumter following President Lincoln’s announcement that he is sending reinforcements to that garrison. The Civil War begins.
Apr. 15, 1861
Lincoln calls for militiamen: Announcing that an “insurrection” exists, Lincoln calls for a volunteer militia of 75,000 men for three months’ service.
Apr. 19, 1861
Blockade of the South: Lincoln announces that the U.S. will blockade the Confederate shore along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. The declaration tacitly acknowledges existence of a state of war, although the conflict is still officially considered an insurrection. Lincoln asks Robert E. Lee to head the Northern army; Lee, considering his first duty to be to his state, opts to lead the Virginia militia instead.
July 21, 1861
First Battle of Bull Run: Near Manassas Junction, Virginia, Union General Irvin McDowell and his green Union troops are routed by Southern forces under General Beauregard, reinforced by Joseph E. Johnston and Stonewall Jackson.
Feb. 11-16, 1862
Battle of Fort Donelson: In Tennessee, Confederate troops at Fort Donelson under General Nathan Bedford Forrest surrender to General Ulysses S. Grant. Nashville falls on Feb. 25.
Mar. 6-8, 1862
Battle of Pea Ridge: Northern victory results in Union control of the bitterly divided state of Missouri.
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Mar. 9, 1862
Battle of Monitor vs. Virginia: The South’s ship Virginia (a rebuilt version of the Merrimack) meets the North’s Monitor in the first battle of two ironclad vessels, revolutionizing naval warfare. The outcome of the battle is considered a draw.
Mar. 17, 1862
McClellan begins his peninsular campaign: Failing to move quickly enough for Lincoln, head of the Union forces George B. McClellan is relieved of general command and placed in charge of the Army of the Potomac. He ignores Lincoln’s orders to move directly against the Confederate capital at Richmond and launches his own campaign up the peninsula between the James and York rivers. Despite advancing within twenty miles of Richmond with superior forces, McClellan waits for reinforcements rather than attack while he has the advantage.
Apr., 1862
Confederate Conscription Act: Passed by the Confederacy, this draft law arouses controversy, especially because it exempts from the draft anyone who owns twenty or more slaves.
Apr. 6-7, 1862
Battle of Shiloh: In the northern Mississippi River theater, Union forces under Grant and Confederate forces under Albert S. Johnston, after a number of battles for control of the region, clash at Shiloh. The battle is a two-day slaughter that ultimately results in a Southern retreat and Northern exhaustion. Both sides sustain heavy losses totaling approximately 23,000. Johnston is killed.
Apr. 28, 1862
Fall of New Orleans: Commander of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron David G. Farragut destroys most of the Confederate fleet as he moves up the Mississippi River to bombard New Orleans. Union occupation of New Orleans is overseen by General Benjamin F. Butler, whose dictatorial methods arouse controversy.
May 25, 1862
Jackson forces Union retreat: Confederate General Stonewall Jackson pushes Union troops in the Shenandoah Valley back across the Potomac River and forces Northern states to send militia to defend Washington, D.C. continued
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Time Line of the Civil War—continued May 31, 1862
Battle of Fair Oaks and Seven Pines: McClellan’s army, now within five miles of Richmond but forced by flooding of the Chicahominy River to split into two groups, is attacked by General Joseph E. Johnston. Both sides sustain losses totaling approximately 14,000.
June 25-July 1, 1862
Seven Days’ Battles: Confederate general Robert E. Lee resolves to save Richmond, now under Union threat from McClellan. In a string of engagements, Stonewall Jackson and J. E. B. “Jeb” Stuart assist Lee in driving back Union forces despite the North’s superior numbers. Casualties for both sides total approximately 25,000. Marks the end of McClellan’s peninsular campaign.
July 17, 1862
Confiscation Act: Congress passes legislation that frees slaves whose masters serve in the Confederate Army, but not slaves in the North. Has little practical emancipatory effect, but lays a legal foundation for the Emancipation Proclamation.
Aug. 29-30, 1862
Second Battle of Bull Run: Union commander Henry Halleck sends General John Pope to McClellan’s aid near Richmond. Lee, moving to prevent the joining of the two Union forces, sends Stonewall Jackson to attack Pope’s troops. The two forces meet at Bull Run, where the South succeeds in driving the North back to Washington, D.C.
Sept. 13-15, 1862
Battle of Harpers Ferry: Confederate victory; more than 12,000 total casualties.
Sept. 17, 1862
Battle of Antietam: Near Sharpsburg, Maryland, Union troops under McClellan force a Confederate retreat (under Lee) across the Potomac River. With over 26,000 casualties, the day is the war’s bloodiest yet.
Sept. 23, 1862
Emancipation Proclamation: Lincoln releases the Emancipation Proclamation to the newspapers. The proclamation states that slaves whose masters are Confederates as of Jan. 1, 1863, will be free as of that date. The announcement adds a second objective to the Union war: liberation of the slaves. In effect, few Southern slaves see immediate emancipation, although Union troops increase by the addition of African Americans to their ranks.
Oct. 3-4, 1862
Battle of Corinth: Union troops resist the Confederate offensive and hold the Mississippi city of Corinth.
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Dec. 13, 1862
Battle of Fredericksburg: Exasperated by McClellan’s delays and refusals to attack, Lincoln replaces him with Ambrose E. Burnside. Burnside attacks Confederates at Fredericksburg, Virginia, but sustains severe losses and a defeat. Lincoln replaces Burnside with Joseph Hooker.
Dec. 31, 1862
Battle of Murfreesboro: Confederate general Braxton Bragg is forced to withdraw from Tennessee by Union general William S. Rosecrans.
Mar. 3, 1863
Conscription Act: Congress passes the first federal draft law. The creation of a national military incites controversy regarding individual and states’ rights.
May 1-4, 1863
Battle of Chancellorsville: Lee, holding position below the Rappahannock River since Fredericksburg, is attacked by Hooker. Lee divides his contingent in two, sending Stonewall Jackson through the dense area called the Wilderness to strike one flank of the Union. Results in a Union retreat but costs the South nearly 13,000 casualties—including the death of Stonewall Jackson.
May 18-July 4, 1863
Siege of Vicksburg: Union general Ulysses S. Grant takes Vicksburg, on the Mississippi River, from the command of Confederate general J. C. Pemberton after a grueling six-week siege. Secures the Mississippi River for the North.
July 1-3, 1863
Battle of Gettysburg: Union forces under General George G. Meade rout Confederates under Lee; each side sustains heavy casualties. The casualties are the worst yet, but the battle is a turning point: After a string of Southern victories, the North now has the upper hand.
July 13-15, 1863
In New York City draft riots result in 128 killed— mostly blacks at the hands of Irish American immigrants.
Sept. 19-20, 1863
Battle of Chickamauga: Union generals William Rosecrans and George Thomas engage Confederate generals Braxton Bragg and James Longstreet; Both sides suffer heavy casualties. Union troops retreat to Chattanooga, where they are besieged by the Confederate army. continued
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Time Line of the Civil War—continued Nov. 19, 1863
Gettysburg Address: Lincoln delivers one of the briefest and most memorable speeches in history at the dedication of Gettysburg Cemetery in honor of the Gettysburg dead.
Nov. 23-25, 1863
Battle of Chattanooga: Now in command of the western armies, Grant joins forces with Generals William Tecumseh Sherman, Joseph Hooker, and George Thomas to push Confederate general Braxton Bragg south from Tennessee. Bragg is driven off Lookout Mountain but entrenches his troops on Missionary Ridge; Union forces under Thomas then storm the ridge and rout the Southern forces. This victory in the Mississippi region drives a wedge into the South, splitting the Confederacy.
Dec. 8, 1863
Lincoln’s Reconstruction plan: Lincoln announces a plan for Reconstruction based on amnesty for Confederates who take a loyalty oath and recognition of Southern states in which 10 percent of the population has taken the oath and in which the state government has accepted emancipation of the slaves. Radical Reconstruction, instituted in 1867, will prove much more painful for the South.
May 5-7, 1864
Battle of the Wilderness: In the thickly overgrown area near the site of the Chancellorsville battle one year before, the first confrontation in an unrelenting month of warfare pits Lee against Grant. The battle is a tactical draw and each side sustains heavy losses as well; casualties total more than 28,000. Wounded soldiers left in the Wilderness are burned alive in a fire fueled by dead leaves and other debris.
May 8-20, 1864
Battle of Spotsylvania Court House: The battles end in a draw, but both sides suffer heavy casualties.
June 3-12, 1864
Battle of Cold Harbor: Grant, pushing toward Richmond, suffers substantial casualties and is accused of coldly sending his men into one of the most murderous engagements of the war.
June 15, 1864Apr. 3, 1865
Siege of Petersburg: After a protracted siege, Union troops seize Petersburg.
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June 27, 1864
Battle of Kennesaw Mountain: In Georgia, Joseph E. Johnston defeats Union general William Tecumseh Sherman, who has been in charge of the Union’s western war while Grant is at Petersburg. Sherman will rally to move toward Atlanta.
July 20-Sept. 2, 1864
Battle of Atlanta: After engaging Confederate general John Bell Hood in July outside Atlanta, Sherman forces the South to evacuate the city. This Union victory breaks the North’s despondency over the stagnating siege of Petersburg and helps Lincoln win reelection against unfavorable odds. Sherman will completely destroy Atlanta before leaving it on his march towards Savannah.
Nov. 15, 1864Apr. 18, 1865
Sherman’s March to the Sea: On the principle that defeat of the South requires defeat of civilian supplies and infrastructure as well as troops, Sherman ruthlessly and methodically destroys everything in his path—animals, crops, buildings, equipment—as he moves toward Savannah on Georgia’s Atlantic coast.
Dec. 9-21, 1864
Battle of Savannah: Sherman eventually seizes Savannah, Georgia’s largest city and a significant port. Sherman then continues his trail of destruction into the Carolinas.
Dec. 15-16, 1864
Battle of Nashville: Union forces under Generals John M. Schofield and George H. Thomas destroy Confederate general John Bell Hood’s forces and secure Tennessee for the North.
Apr. 9, 1865
Lee’s surrender at Appomattox Courthouse: The Confederacy’s surrender formally ends the Civil War.
The North’s refusal to relinquish several forts within the Confederacy led to the outbreak of hostilities in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina. The war began when Southern artillery units attacked and captured Fort Sumter (April 12-14, 1861). Following the surrender of Fort Sumter, Lincoln declared a naval blockade of Southern ports and called 75,000 militiamen into national service. Quotas were assigned to all the states still in the Union, including the slave states of the Upper South. Compelled to decide whether to use force to bring the seven seceded states back into the Union or to support their sister slave states, Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina seceded in April and May and joined what became the eleven-state Confederacy. Lincoln, fearing further defections, labored effectively to keep the
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four northern-most slave states—Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri—in the Union, thereby adding to the North’s great numerical superiority. Although the Union had more men, more industry, more resources, and more of almost everything needed to wage war, the Confederacy attracted many of the best officers in the prewar regular army. As a result, the South early on enjoyed an advantage in military leadership. The Fighting Begins Both sides expected the war to be a brief, relatively painless, and successful affair; however, despite these expectations, only one major battle was fought in 1861. Near Manassas Junction southwest of Washington, D.C., Union forces under Irvin McDowell attacked Confederates along Bull Run (July 21, 1861). The armies, though small and inexperienced, fought valiantly, but the late-afternoon arrival of reinforcements allowed the Confederates to rout McDowell and send his army fleeing back to the nation’s capital. Lincoln, who always suspected the war would be a long, hard-fought struggle, soon thereafter called for 500,000 volunteers to serve for up to three years. The Confederacy also sought long-term volunteers, but as the wild enthusiasm for war waned, each of the rival governments would eventually be forced to resort to conscription. Lincoln replaced
The raising of the Confederate flag over Fort Sumter signaled the start of the Civil War. (To avoid confusion on battlefields, the design of the Confederate flag was later changed from the Stars and Bars to the more familiar “Southern Cross” battle flags.) (National Archives)
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From the moment he was inaugurated president in March, 1861, until shortly before he was assassinated in April, 1865, Abraham Lincoln struggled to keep the Union together. He died a martyr to his cause but has been ever afterward remembered as the savior of the Union. (Library of Congress)
McDowell with George B. McClellan who would command the rapidly assembling army around Washington, the Army of the Potomac. Despite repeated pleas and orders from his commander in chief, McClellan refused to advance until he, and he alone, was ready. That would not be until March, 1862. No major battles occurred in the western theater during 1861, but Union forces were active in the critical border states, especially in Kentucky. Occupation of northern Kentucky in late 1861 allowed the Union forces the following year to assail the center of the long Confederate defensive line that stretched from the Mississippi River to the Cumberland Gap. Ulysses S. Grant, recognizing the strategic value of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, seized control of these crucial waterways with his February capture of Fort Henry (February 6, 1862) and Fort Donelson (February 11-16, 1862). He pushed southward along the Tennessee until struck unexpectedly by Confederates under Albert Sidney Johnston near Pittsburg Landing. The ensuing two-day Battle of Shiloh (April 6-7, 1862) ended as a tactical draw; however, the battered Confederates were forced to retreat. The unprecedented casualties at Shiloh shocked all Americans. Almost 25,000 American soldiers fell, making it the most severe, costliest battle in U.S. history to that point. Shiloh merely hinted of things to come. The Union concentrated its western forces, took the rail center of Corinth, Mississippi (October 3-4, 1862), and began eying Vicksburg. Then, action in the west shifted to eastern Tennessee where Braxton Bragg and his
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Union general Ulysses S. Grant at his Cold Harbor camp in June, 1864. (National Archives)
Southern army were moving northward into Kentucky. The North hurriedly dispatched Don Carlos Buell to Louisville to meet the Confederate threat. At Perryville (October 8, 1862), Bragg and Buell clashed in a strange conflict that saw only small portions of the two armies actually engaged because of an “acoustic shadow.” A drawn battle, Perryville turned into a strategic defeat after Bragg retreated back into Tennessee. When Buell refused to pursue, Lincoln replaced him with William S. Rosecrans. Near Murfreesboro along Stones River (December 31, 1862-January 2, 1863), Rosecrans and Bragg fought a vicious three-day battle that earned the distinction of having the highest combined casualty rate of the war, with 32 percent of the combatants killed, wounded, or missing. Although Stones River ended inconclusively, Bragg withdrew toward Chattanooga. McClellan’s Offensive Back in the east, 1862 began auspiciously but ended miserably. McClellan’s long-anticipated offensive on Richmond began in March when he landed his army at the base of the peninsula formed by the James and York Rivers. By mid-May, he had advanced to within five miles of the Confederate capital. Recognizing that McClellan’s plans to employ his artillery and engineering skills to capture Richmond would probably succeed, Joseph Eggleston Johnston attacked McClellan at Seven Pines or Fair Oaks (May 31-June 1, 1862). He made no headway and was severely wounded, but Johnston’s aggressiveness disturbed McClellan—especially in conjunction
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with Stonewall Jackson’s brilliant spring campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, which prevented troops originally assigned to McClellan from reaching him at Richmond. Always guilty of overestimating the strength of his opponent and unwilling to commit his forces fully when engaged, McClellan never took the offensive around Richmond. Robert E. Lee, the fortuitous choice to replace Johnston, attacked in late June, initiating the Seven Days’ Battles (June 25July 1, 1862). Despite his numerical superiority, the Union commander steadily retreated across the peninsula until he assumed an impregnable position around Harrison’s Landing on the James. Stalemate developed. Disappointed by McClellan’s lack of aggressiveness and inactivity, Lincoln began assembling another army in Northern Virginia to march overland against Richmond. He appointed John Pope to command the scattered forces in the region as well as units being withdrawn from McClellan. Lee, in mid-August, gambling that McClellan would not attack, marched northward to meet Pope’s growing threat, and at Second Bull Run (August 29-30, 1862) he decisively defeated the inept Pope. Hoping to capitalize on his summer success, Lee invaded Maryland the following week; how-
General Robert E. Lee in a photograph made by Mathew Brady shortly after the conclusion of the Civil War. (National Archives)
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ever, when the two armies fought near Sharpsburg along Antietam Creek (September 17, 1862), Lee faced disaster. Had the recently restored-tocommand McClellan moved more quickly, had he fully utilized his two-toone advantage in a coordinated assault, or had he renewed his attack the next day, he probably would have destroyed Lee’s army. He did not, and thus Antietam ended as a draw, allowing Lee to retreat into Virginia. The Momentum Shifts The impact of Antietam cannot be overemphasized. This day of unprecedented carnage cost the two armies more than 26,000 casualties. The blunting of Lee’s invasion also doused European enthusiasm for entering the war on the South’s side, but even more important, the draw at Antietam gave Lincoln the opportunity he had been seeking to issue his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation in 1863. His broadening of the war from a political struggle to restore the Union into a moral crusade to free the slaves virtually eliminated the possibility of foreign intervention or recognition. Still, 1862 ended tragically for the North when Ambrose E. Burnside, McClellan’s successor, futilely sacrificed his army at Fredericksburg (December 13, 1862). This devastating defeat sent morale in the army and the North plummeting to its lowest level of the war. Union plans in the west in 1863 centered on Vicksburg on the Mississippi River and Chattanooga in eastern Tennessee. Grant, who began operations against Vicksburg in October, 1862, made several unsuccessful at-
Harriet Beecher Stowe, author of the novel Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852), which exposed the horrors of slavery and helped arouse the wrath of the North against the South. When Abraham Lincoln met Stowe in 1862, he reportedly said to her, “So you are the little woman who wrote the book that started this great war!” (National Archives)
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Major Sites in the Civil War, 1861-1865 P E N N S Y LVA N I A
Columbus Indianapolis
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Cincinnati
Lexington St. Louis
Charleston
Louisville
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Appomattox Petersburg Courthouse
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Baton Rouge New Orleans
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Wilmington
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Jackson
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NA Columbia Charleston Augusta Fort Sumter
Vicksburg
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Charlotte
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Chickamauga Atlanta
Corinth Tupelo
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Shreveport
Raleigh
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Chattanooga
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Bowling Green Columbus Island No. 10 Fort Donelson Pea Ridge Fort Henry Nashville Prairie Grove TENNE Murfreesboro S
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Cairo
Jenkin’s Ferry
Washington, D.C. Manassas Chancellorsville Richmond Peninsular VIRG campaign IN
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Kansas City
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Harrisburg Philadelphia WA R E Gettysburg M A RYWheeling Antietam Baltimore LAND
Pittsburgh
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tempts to take the river fortress, but in the spring of 1863, he conducted an unconventional campaign to capture Vicksburg (May 18-July 4, 1863). Severing his lines of supply and communication and fighting south and east of Vicksburg, Grant successfully drove the Confederates back into the city where he laid siege to the garrison. A six-week siege—perhaps the most grueling of the war—ended on Independence Day when the Confederates surrendered Vicksburg. With the fall of Port Hudson, Louisiana, five days later, the Union conquered the Mississippi River line, dividing the Confederacy by cutting off the trans-Mississippi west. In eastern Tennessee, Rosecrans, though often slow to advance, conducted a brilliant campaign of maneuver during the summer of 1863. He first forced Bragg to abandon a strong position near Tullahoma and then, amazingly, compelled the Confederates to retreat from Chattanooga without a fight in early September. The two armies finally came to blows in northwestern Georgia at Chickamauga (September 19-20, 1863). A Confederate breakthrough on the second day threatened to destroy the Union army, but a resolute holding action by the George H. Thomas allowed most
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of Rosecrans’s men to escape to Chattanooga. Bragg pursued and laid siege to the city as effectively as possible given the terrain and the size of his army. In October, following his appointment to overall command in the west, Grant relieved Rosecrans and assumed personal control at Chattanooga. He reopened supply lines and assembled a large army to break the siege. During the battles for Chattanooga (November 23-25, 1863), elements from three Union armies—Tennessee, Mississippi, and Potomac—combined to drive Bragg’s forces away from the gateway city and into winter quarters in Georgia. The Union controlled all Tennessee. The Army of the Potomac In the east in 1863, Joseph Hooker reorganized and revitalized the Army of the Potomac and moved against Lee in late April. His excellent plan to compel Lee to fall back or to give battle under unfavorable conditions disintegrated when Hooker lost his nerve near Chancellorsville (May 1-4, 1863). He surrendered the initiative to the bold Confederate and retreated, humiliated in defeat. Having just bested an army twice as large as his, Lee decided, despite the death of Stonewall Jackson, that he must again invade the North. Recognizing that Confederate military manpower was at its peak in the spring of 1863 and that the fighting had to be taken out of war-ravaged Virginia, Lee marched into Pennsylvania, hoping a decisive victory on Northern soil would attract foreign intervention or break the North’s will to fight. The two major eastern armies met at Gettysburg (July 1-3, 1863) and fought the bloodiest battle of the entire war. More than 51,000 fell during the three days of combat. Following the repulse of a charge led by George E. Pickett, Lee retired to Virginia, painfully aware that his 28,000 casualties had broken the offensive backbone of his army, confining him to the strategic defensive in the future. Indeed, Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga—all decisive Union victories—eliminated the Confederacy’s chance of winning the war on the battlefield. Independence was not impossible because the North might still abandon its effort to restore the Union, but by the end of 1863, the Northern military held the upper hand. Grant Takes Command As the war entered its fourth year in the spring of 1864, Lincoln appointed a new general in chief. In Grant, Lincoln finally found a man who shared his strategic views, who would use all his resources to accomplish his goals, and who would drive the Union to victory. In early May, Grant initiated five separate offensives, the two largest and most important being
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the Army of the Potomac’s advance against the Army of Northern Virginia and William T. Sherman’s move against Johnston in Georgia. The Overland Campaign in Virginia (May 4-June 12, 1864) began in early May. Although Grant attempted a campaign of maneuver, Lee’s skillful countering of all Grant’s flanking moves in the month and a half that followed turned their combat into a brutal slugging match that saw the hardest-fought, longest-sustained fighting of the war. Both armies suffered terrible losses in this war of attrition; however, the North could replace its casualties, the South could not. At each battle—the Wilderness (May 5-7, 1864), Spotsylvania Court House (May 8-20, 1864), the North Anna River (May 23-26, 1864), Totopotomy Creek (May 26-31, 1864), and Cold Harbor (June 1-3, 1864)—Lee stopped Grant momentarily, but the two armies moved steadily closer to Richmond. The Union attempt in mid-June to slip south of the James River and seize Petersburg, twenty miles south of the capital, would have succeeded had not Union commanders’ mistakes and lack of aggressiveness enabled the Confederates to rush troops to the threatened area and stave off disaster. With room to maneuver gone, the armies constructed extensive trench networks around Richmond and Petersburg (June 15, 1864-April 3, 1865) and a ten-month siege followed. Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign While fighting slowed in Virginia, Sherman matched wits with Johnston in the Atlanta campaign (July 20-September 2, 1864). Sherman, advancing from Chattanooga in early May, repeatedly tried to outflank the Confederates, but Johnston thwarted each move. Casualties in this cat-and-mouse game of maneuver were light compared to the Virginia slugfest; however, the two western armies moved ever closer to Atlanta. In mid-July, Confederate president Jefferson Davis, believing that Johnston would not fight, removed him from command. John Bell Hood, Johnston’s successor, assumed the offensive but could not defeat Sherman, and on September 1, he evacuated Atlanta. The Union occupation of the city the next day provided Lincoln with a powerful boost in his bid for reelection. A strange situation developed after the fall of Atlanta. Although badly outnumbered, Hood launched a desperate invasion of Tennessee in an effort to draw Union forces out of Atlanta and divert Sherman from his plan to march to the sea. Hood’s offensive ended disastrously at Nashville (December 15-16, 1864), where his army was effectively destroyed. Sherman, on the other hand, brought a new psychological dimension to the war when he cut a sixty-mile-wide swath of destruction through the defense-
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Confederate president Jefferson Davis in a photograph taken by Mathew Brady before the Civil War began. (National Archives)
less region between Atlanta and Savannah. He believed that his wholesale, unhindered devastation of the area’s resources and the Confederacy’s inability to protect the Southern heartland would seriously damage, if not destroy, Southerners’ will to resist. After capturing Savannah (December 921, 1864) in late December, Sherman’s army rested and refitted and then marched northward into the Carolinas toward Grant in Virginia. The Union Victory The four years of blood-letting ended in the spring of 1865. Grant finally turned Lee’s flank west of Petersburg on April 1, cutting the Confederate army’s last major railroad supply line. Heavy Union attacks the next day all along a more than forty-mile front necessitated Lee’s hurried evacuation of Petersburg and the Confederate capital. What ensued was a weeklong chase that concluded at Appomattox Courthouse on April 9, 1865, when Lee surrendered to Grant. Other Confederate armies would surrender in North Carolina on April 26, in Alabama on May 4, and in the trans-Mississippi west on May 26. The war was over. The Union victory vindicated Northerners’ interpretation of the Constitution, ended Southerners’ dreams of independence, and ensured emancipation of all slaves. The war preserved the Union, but reconstructing the nation would be a difficult, divisive process. Ralph L. Eckert
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Weapons, Tactics, and Strategies Long considered a watershed in American history, the Civil War was also a turning point in the execution of warfare. Although it did not begin as a radically new kind of war, this conflict developed into the first total modern war, in which farmers, artisans, and businessmen played as important a role as soldiers and sailors. It was the first time that a nation, which was passing through the Industrial Revolution, put to large-scale military use new scientific discoveries and modern technological advances. During the Civil War, breech-loading rifles replaced smoothbore muskets, ironclads replaced wooden ships, and the telegraph replaced dispatch bearers. Military leaders made use of such new weapons as land and naval mines, machine guns, armored railroad cars, submarines, and aerial reconnaissance from anchored hot-air balloons. The Civil War was also the first war to be extensively photographed, the first to combine weapons technologies with mass production, and the first to transport large numbers of men and equipment over long distances via railroad. Political Considerations The Civil War was rooted in the political paradoxes of the Revolutionary War of 1775-1783, which had been a civil war as well as a war for independence. The American Revolution created the world’s leading democracy, which was also a slave-based republic. Founders, such as George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, established a union of states in which white liberty and black slavery coexisted. In the decades following the Revolution, Northern states instituted programs of emancipation, whereas Southern states, spurred by the productivity of the cotton gin and the demands of European textile factories for raw cotton, promoted the expansion of slavery. According to many scholars, the increasing political, economic, and cultural tensions between Northern and Southern states made violent conflict between these antagonistic civilizations inevitable. Others see the Civil War as a constitutional or moral struggle, pitting libertarians against abolitionists. Still others see the crisis in terms of technological history. The Northern business class, friendly toward the technology that had made it wealthy and powerful, was hostile toward a Southern plutocracy wedded to an outdated agricultural society that resisted industrialization. Although the war was ultimately decided by both military and technological achievements as well as by industrial and agricultural production,
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the political context influencing these developments was also important. In terms of international politics both the North and South had strong ties of economic interdependence with European countries. For example, both Great Britain and France relied on raw cotton from the South to keep their textile mills productive, but these countries also had extensive investments in Northern land and railroads. In terms of domestic politics, the North and South, though claiming to be equally dedicated to the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution, had significant political differences that would influence military developments. The Confederate leaders may have seen themselves as the true heirs to the Founders of the United States, but the South’s material and military weaknesses forced Confederate president Jefferson Davis to reduce the rights of the seceded states in order to expand the power of his central government. For example, he forced through the Confederate Congress laws that resulted in the continent’s first military draft, the impressment of goods and labor, and the suspension of certain civil and economic liberties—all to help secure the new republic. Northern Actions For Northerners, the relative unanimity that followed the outbreak of hostilities in 1861 quickly dissolved as leaders debated a series of controversial war measures, including conscription and emancipation. The military became enmeshed in politics when soldiers were required to capture and imprison influential “Copperheads”—Northerners who sympathized with Southern secession. Following the instructions of Republican politicians, some state militia arrested draft dodgers and dissenting newspaper editors. Particularly troublesome to many was the brutal suppression of the 1863 Irish-immigrant riots against the draft in New York City. Because the wealthy could buy substitutes, many less advantaged Irish felt that the federal government was failing to live up to its egalitarian ideals. President Abraham Lincoln did try to engage an important group of Americans in the war effort when, in March, 1863, he signed an act of Congress creating the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). The Academy’s charter required its members, whenever called upon by government agencies, to investigate and report on any subject of science or technology. During its first year and a half the NAS had committees studying such important military matters as magnetic deviation on iron ships, the protection of iron vessels from corrosion, the preparation of accurate wind and current charts, and the development of efficient steam engines. Although the NAS did much to encourage the invention and production of weapons that am-
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plified the abilities of Northern armies to inflict damage on Southern soldiers, it failed to improve significantly medical techniques and facilities, with the result that disease killed twice as many Union soldiers as Confederate weapons did. The Balance of Power The Civil War began with the fall of Fort Sumter in April, 1861. At this time, the Union possessed overwhelming superiority in both manpower and material resources needed to conduct war in an industrial age. Although neither the South nor the North had made any special preparations for a prolonged war, Northerners had many advantages over Southerners, which politicians tried to turn into the means of victory. The North, exclusive of the border and far western states, surpassed the South in population, with 18.5 million Northerners to 5.5 million Southern whites (there were also 3.5 million black slaves). The disproportion in industrial strength was even greater: the North had more than 100,000 factories with more than one million workers, whereas the South had approximately 20,600 factories with only 111,000 workers. Northern industrial output was valued at $1.5 billion; Southern output was valued at $155 million. Because the Civil War would be the first modern war, iron and steel would become the basic material for the production of munitions, railroads, bridges, and other equipment and structures. The total output of pig iron in the United States in 1860 was about 860,000 tons, of which the South produced only 26,000 tons, or 3 percent. Pennsylvania alone manufactured 560,000 tons of iron, which helps to explain Southern raids into this state. In 1860 there were 30,500 miles of railroad track in the United States, 72 percent of which lay in the North. In sum, political decisions and developments affecting technology, industry, and the military helped shape the course of the Civil War and its resolution. Although the South was outmanned, outgunned, and outproduced by the North, a case can be made that the Confederacy’s initial success and ultimate failure owed much to such intangibles as moral and religious concerns and civilian and military morale. Some Southern sympathizers claimed that the South had waged this war in defense of an aristocratic republic, and only the overwhelming force of Northern numbers and arms had defeated it. Certain Northern sympathizers saw the war primarily as a moral crusade against slavery. Lincoln himself believed that he was using the men, matériel, and weapons at his disposal to save the Union. Even his Emancipation Proclamation, which became effective January 1, 1863, actually freed no slaves but declared that only slaves in rebellious states would be freed. After the war, emancipation reshaped Ameri-
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can race relations, but during the war Lincoln’s political actions resulted in increased federal power over civilians and the military. The significance of the Civil War on the military has been a central concern to scholars. Some have emphasized the role of traditional weapons and techniques during most of the war, whereas others have located the center of this war’s modernity in its evolution into a total war. Both of these views came under criticism in the 1980’s, when some scholars argued that technology, in the form of new rifles and other weapons, actually made little difference on small-scale Civil War battlefields. Others questioned the notion of the Civil War as the first total war, claiming that military leaders rarely destroyed civilian lives and property in any systematic way. These interpretations and reinterpretations of a war that has been so extensively studied and so charged with moral, religious, and political meaning are likely to continue. Military Goals and Achievements The military goals of both the Confederacy and the Union can be simply stated. The South was fighting for independence, the North for restoration of the Union. The Confederacy was thus forced into a war whose ultimate goal was the defense of its own territory. Although it did occasionally expand the war into the enemy’s territory in the west and north, that was a
The photographic outfit of Mathew Brady, who was the leading photographer of the Civil War. (National Archives)
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matter of operational strategy rather than national policy. The North’s goals were different from those of the South and more difficult to accomplish. In order to restore the Union, Lincoln had to destroy the Confederacy. To force a new country of several million people to cease to exist is a much more daunting task than to protect such a country from external attacks. At the start of the war, slavery’s abolition was not one of the North’s military goals. Both Lincoln and the Congress were explicit in asserting that they wanted to restore the Union without interfering with slavery. Military aims guided military achievements. To preserve its independence, the Confederacy built an army but did not want to use it: It wanted only to be left alone. In contrast the North had to be aggressive. Unless Lincoln could compel the rebellious states to return to the Union, he would lose the war. The Union was initially successful in achieving some of its goals. With the aid of military force it was able to keep the border states of Maryland, Missouri, and Kentucky in the Union, but because of the small number of Union sympathizers in the eleven seceded states, Northern armies eventually had to invade the Confederacy’s territory to destroy its armies and government. Despite the North’s manpower and material advantages, the initial military achievements in the Civil War were primarily Southern. The Confederates won several early battles, helped by their excellent generals and the introduction of new weapons. After the Battle of Antietam in September of 1862, Union leaders shifted to a defensive strategy in the East, accepting a temporary stalemate in Virginia, but became more aggressive in the West. By 1863 the Union had achieved control of the Mississippi River, effectively dividing the Confederacy. Confederate general Robert E. Lee then embarked on an invasion of the North by crossing into Pennsylvania. After its defeat at Gettysburg (July 1-3, 1863), however, the rebel army had to return to Virginia. The Union achieved a second major military goal in 1863 with its occupation of East Tennessee. In early 1864 Ulysses S. Grant was promoted to general-in-chief of the Union forces, and he embarked on a war of attrition to subdue Lee’s army. General William T. Sherman, Grant’s replacement in the West, was able to capture Atlanta in the summer of 1864 and then march through Georgia to the sea, effectively splitting the Confederacy into still smaller pieces. By April 9, 1865, the war was over. Weapons, Uniforms, and Armor Despite its reputation as the first modern war, the Civil War was actually fought with both old and new weapons. During the war’s early years many soldiers were issued old flintlock or smoothbore muskets. In 1860 American arsenals held more than 500,000 small arms, and when the war
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started, 135,000 of these were confiscated by the South. Only 10,000 of these guns, however, were modern rifles. The two great government armories were at Harpers Ferry, Virginia, and Springfield, Massachusetts. The North and South exchanged control of Harpers Ferry numerous times during the conflict, and so its production of weapons was hampered, whereas the Springfield armory was able to produce about two million rifles during the four years of the war. These Springfield rifles, single-shot muzzle-loaders, became the most widely used weapon of the U.S. Army. The Confederacy found weapons to be in short supply, particularly early in the war. In 1861 the weapons collected from citizens and confiscated from federal armories were insufficient to arm the increasing numbers of recruits. The South’s output of small arms measured in the hundreds rather than the thousands, hence the need for European purchases. However, lack of funds, competition from the North, and difficulty of shipping across the Northern blockade handicapped the South’s attempts to acquire arms for its troops. Only 50,000 arms had reached the South from Europe by August of 1862. The situation improved later in the war, and by the war’s end the South’s Ordnance Bureau had imported some 330,000 arms, mostly Enfield rifles, through the blockade. The North was in a much better position than the South to arm its troops. The federal government was able to acquire arms from several private armories, such as the Colt Arms Works at Hartford, Connecticut, in addition to the arsenal at Springfield. The North also possessed supplies of saltpeter for gunpowder, lead for cartridges, and copper for percussion caps. Furthermore, three cannon factories were located in the North: at South Boston, Massachusetts; West Point, New York; and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The war created a demand for improved and efficient weapons, which were supplied by American inventors. The basic infantry weapon of both North and South was the rifled musket, and although it resembled the muskets of earlier wars, it actually incorporated several modifications that transformed its performance. Smoothbore muskets had a killing range of about 50 yards, whereas rifled muskets could kill at 500 yards. Most of these rifles were muzzle-loaders, but a French officer, Claude-Étienne Minié, had devised a bullet with a hollowed base that allowed it to expand when fired, forming a tight fit as it left the barrel. This Minié ball, so named despite its cylindrical shape, vastly increased the range and accuracy of the new rifled muskets. The Minié ball and rifled musket were responsible for over 80 percent of battlefield casualties during the Civil War. The South produced about 600,000 rifles during the war; the North imported about 400,000 and manufactured another 1,700,000. Although a
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single-shot, breech-loading rifle had been developed at the Harpers Ferry armory just before the war, large numbers of these breech-loading weapons became available only late in the war. Repeating rifles, used mainly by the cavalry, were also developed. Percussion caps, which were reliable in all kinds of weather, improved the rate of fire and added to the range and accuracy of the rifles. These improved weapons had the effect of extending the killing zone in front of a line of soldiers. Just as small arms were at a transitional stage at the beginning of the war, so, too, was artillery. Cannon were both smoothbore and rifled, with rifled cannon barrels becoming more widely adopted. During the four years of the conflict, nearly one-half of the Union cannon, but only onethird of Confederate cannon, were rifled. Rifled barrels gave projectiles greater distance, velocity, and accuracy. Cannon were muzzle-loaded with various projectiles, including solid shot and explosive shells such as canisters. These canisters, which killed more men than all other artillery rounds combined, were metallic cylinders packed with musket balls, nails, or metal scraps that, when explosively propelled from cannon, scattered their lethal pellets over a wide area. At the start of the war, the U.S. Army had about 4,200 cannon, most of which were heavy pieces in coastal fortifications; only 167 were field artillery. The Union army used 7,892 cannon in the war, compared with more than four million small firearms. These data imply that the Civil War was basically an infantry war, in which artillery played a supporting role. Numbers can be deceiving, however; artillery, when properly used, was often highly effective. Union artillery was superior to its Confederate counterpart in terms of numbers, quality, maintenance, and skilled use. Casualties If hit in the head or chest by bullets or shrapnel, infantry soldiers often died. The Minié ball shattered bones, shredded tendons, and mangled major organs beyond repair. Arm and leg wounds frequently required amputation. Soldiers wounded but not killed on the battlefield frequently succumbed to infections in camp hospitals. On the Northern side, the total medical casualties recorded from May 1, 1861, to June 30, 1866, were 6,454,834. Of this number, at least 195,627 died. If the 425,274 cases due to battle wounds and injuries (and the subsequent 38,115 deaths) are subtracted from the total medical casualties, the remainder, constituting the diseases, numbered 6,029,560 cases, and 157,512 deaths. Southern casualties exhibited a similar pattern, but Confederate medical data are so incomplete and disordered that it is impossible to be specific.
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Because of its weaknesses in small arms, artillery, and medical care, the South had greater incentives than the North to develop new weapons. For example, early in the war a Confederate general introduced land mines, and a Confederate captain invented a machine gun. The first use of land mines in war took place during a delaying action that the Confederate army fought near Williamsburg, Virginia, on May 5, 1862. To cover his withdrawal to Richmond, General Gabriel J. Rains ordered 10-inch shells to be buried in the road, with strings attached to the fuses. Union cavalry set off these buried shells, causing casualties and panic. A breech-loading machine gun, invented by Confederate captain R. S. Williams, was first used at the Battle of Seven Pines, or Fair Oaks (May 31June 1, 1862). This unwieldy weapon, weighing 275 pounds, with an ammunition box of 600 pounds, was pulled by one horse and operated by three men. Operators turned a crank that fed bullets from a hopper into the breech, and the gun fired these at the rate of twenty to forty per minute, with a range of 2,000 yards. When, in October of 1863, the Confederates brought six of these machine guns into action at the Battle of Blue Springs, Tennessee, the torrent of bullets caused mass confusion in the opposing Union army. However, the Williams machine guns were prone to malfunction and saw little action in the remainder of the war. The same was true of a similar machine gun invented in 1862 by Richard Gatling of Indiana. The multibarreled Gatling gun could fire 250 shots a minute, but its unreliability meant that it was only minimally used by the North. Naval Weapons A new weapon that did have significant use in the Civil War was the ironclad warship. The ironclad’s advent came at a time of rapid naval transition—from sail to steam, side-wheel to screw propeller, and thick wood sides to iron armor. The first Confederate ironclad, the CSS Virginia, quickly proved its effectiveness. This experimental craft was built from the scuttled USS Merrimack, which was raised, armored with two layers of thick iron plates, armed with six 9-inch guns, and fitted with a heavy castiron prow for ramming. The renamed Virginia was designed to break the Union blockade at Hampton Roads, Virginia, and on March 8, 1862, it sent four large Union warships to the bottom of the channel without sustaining any damage. Union spies had alerted Northern officials to the construction of the CSS Virginia, and Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles engaged Captain John Ericsson, a brilliant engineer, to construct an ironclad in response to this Southern threat. The USS Monitor, which was less than one-third the size of the Virginia, had a distinctive revolving turret containing two 11-inch guns.
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The USS St. Louis, the first Eads class ironclad in the Union Navy. In October, 1862, it was renamed the Baron de Kalb in honor of the German officer who fought on the American side in the Revolutionary War. (National Archives)
On March 9, 1862, it confronted the Virginia in one of the most famous naval battles in history. For three hours each ship fired at the other, neither able to inflict any serious damage on the other. The Virginia had shown that wooden ships were helpless when attacked by an ironclad, and now the Monitor had shown that an ironclad could neutralize another ironclad. Ironclads clearly represented the future of naval warfare, consequently dooming wooden navies. Within a week of the battle, Welles ordered six new ironclads, called “monitors” after their prototype. Many others followed, to be used on western rivers and to support the blockade of Southern ports. Less successful than the ironclads was the submarine. Because Southern ports were desperate to break the blockade, private citizens contributed to financing the CSS H. L. Hunley, a nine-man underwater vessel designed to approach blockaders undetected and to sink them with explosives. On February 17, 1864, the Hunley was able to attach an explosive charge to the USS Housatonic by means of a long wooden spar. The explosion sent this 1,800-ton, 23-gun corvette to the bottom of the sea just outside the entrance to Charleston Harbor. However, the Hunley also sank, drowning its crew. Naval mines, which were used by both North and South, proved to be more effective than submarines in sinking enemy ships.
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The Confederate submarine H. L. Hunley was powered by eight men working a handcrank and had a maximum speed of about four knots. (U. S. Naval Historical Society)
Uniforms Uniforms, as well as weapons, evolved over the course of the Civil War. In the early months of the conflict, individual states provided uniforms, which led to a motley of styles and colors. For example, some Union soldiers wore uniforms patterned after those of the Zouaves, French colonial soldiers in Algeria: baggy red breeches and brief blue coats with yellow sashes. Some Union regiments were initially attired in gray, and some Confederate soldiers wore blue, leading to tragic confusion on early battlefields. The Confederate government soon adopted cadet gray as the official color for its uniforms, but it was never able to clothe its soldiers consistently. Confederate officers were expected to provide their own uniforms, and these often did not conform to the standards set by the War Department in 1861. Coats were of many different cuts and materials, but after the first year of the war, they were generally a shade of gray. Not until 1862 were Union soldiers consistently uniformed in blue. As with weapons, the North had an advantage over the South, because their uniforms were made by the newly invented sewing machine, which had helped create a highly developed Northern clothing industry. Northern textile mills were converted to war production, and the factories of Lowell and Lawrence, Massachusetts, were soon turning out thousands of pairs of blue trousers and dark blue fatigue jackets.
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Underneath their uniforms many Union volunteers wore body armor to protect themselves against enemy bullets. At least three New England firms manufactured and aggressively marketed the “soldier’s bullet-proof vest.” This vest, containing large pockets into which steel plates were inserted, weighed 3.5 pounds. In some regiments more than half the soldiers used these steel-plated vests, but, as the war progressed, enthusiasm for this uncomfortable body armor waned, especially when enemy sharpshooters chose to aim at soldiers’ heads instead of their chests. These bulletproof vests were far less common among Confederate soldiers because steel was in short supply in the South. Military Organization Because many officers of both the Union and Confederate armies had been trained at West Point, both armies were similar in military organization. The regiment, which initially had about 1,000 men, was the basic unit. It was led by a colonel, with a lieutenant colonel as second and a major as third in command. A regiment was divided into 10 companies, each officered by a captain and 2 lieutenants. There were three kinds of regiments: infantry, artillery, and cavalry. Infantry regiments were the nucleus of both the Union and Confederate armies. Artillery regiments were of two basic kinds: heavy artillery positioned in fortifications and light or field artillery attached to mobile armies. Cavalry regiments were organized in the same way as infantry, but the South expected its cavalrymen to provide their own horses, whereas the Union supplied its troops with horses. During the Civil War the Union raised 2,047 regiments: 1,696 infantry, 272 cavalry, and 78 artillery. The numbers of regiments in the Confederacy is unknown because of the loss of relevant records, but rough estimates range from 750 to 1,000. Military regiments were organized into increasingly larger units: brigades, divisions, corps, and armies, each commanded by a brigadier or major general. Union armies were normally named after rivers in the area of their command, for example, the Army of the Potomac, whereas Confederate armies often took their names from a state or part of a state, for example, the Army of Northern Virginia. Although regimental organization and numbers varied from army to army, time to time, and place to place, overall structures tended to remain constant. As the war continued, however, both the North and South failed to maintain the strengths of existing regiments in the face of attrition due to casualties, deaths, and desertions. States preferred to set up new regiments rather than re-man old ones. Thus, as the war proceeded, the number of regiments became a very unreliable guide to the actual strength of armies.
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Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics Throughout history soldiers have performed according to their and their leaders’ understanding of the nature of war itself. This understanding, which is an important component of military doctrine, is concerned with the beliefs that drive soldiers to fight and the methods by which they actually fight. These doctrines are also related to the means by which leaders establish military standards and how, in battle, they determine the balance between offense and defense, individual and group action, and traditional and modern technologies. Theoretically, a nation’s founding principles help to shape its military doctrines, which, in turn, influence its military strategies and tactics. Practically, military doctrines determine how wars are fought. At the start of the Civil War, the military doctrines of both North and South were guided by French military ideas about the organization and use of large numbers of soldiers. For Napoleon, a military campaign was an orderly sequence of informed decisions leading to a clear objective. American soldiers of both Northern and Southern armies entered the Civil War prepared to fight a version of war more than fifty years old. However, technological progress modifies military doctrines, even though conservative leaders often fight a new war with the techniques of an old one. Some Civil War officers were aware of the disjunction between old doctrines and new realities. For example, they realized the folly of lines of troops advancing into areas enfiladed by highly accurate small-arms and artillery fire. Some officers believed that the only way to conserve their troops during such an assault was to disperse them, even though this meant surrendering strict control of troop movements. This tactic generated controversy, since tight formations caused heavy casualties, but dispersed formations led to dangerously purposeless actions. Like military doctrine, strategy has evolved in meaning over time. Initially strategy meant the military leader’s art of war, but by the Civil War its sense had become generalized to mean the science of war, or the use of reason to achieve national goals by military means. For example, the overall grand strategy of the Union was to reconquer and reoccupy all original U.S. territory and to restore federal authority throughout. The grand strategy of the Confederacy was to defend its political independence and territorial integrity. Union Strategy The Northern strategy of preserving the Union at first seemed to require a military strategy of limited war: first suppress the insurrection in the eleven seceded states, then arrest Confederate leaders, and finally put
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Unionists in control. On May 3, 1861, General-in-Chief Winfield Scott presented an offensive plan to bring the rebels to accept these terms with as little bloodshed as possible. He proposed economically strangling the Confederacy by blockading its ocean and river ports and gaining military control of the border states. Several newspapers contemptuously called this the Anaconda Plan, because it would take an interminably long time for the strangulation to become effective. Meanwhile, public opinion was clamoring for an immediate invasion to crush the rebellion. By 1862 Union military strategy had evolved, under pressure from public opinion and President Lincoln, to a policy of conquest of Confederate territory. This new plan succeeded in Tennessee and the lower Mississippi Valley but was stalemated by Lee’s victories in the East. Consequently, Northern military strategy changed yet again, in 1863, to a conviction that the Confederate armies would have to be destroyed. However, despite a significant Northern victory at Gettysburg, Lee’s army survived and the Confederacy continued to resist. Thus, by 1864, Union strategists realized that it was inadequate to conquer territory and cripple armies. They had to destroy the capacity of the Southern people to wage war. Sherman’s march of conquest and destruction through Georgia and South Carolina in 1864 contributed significantly to weakening the will of Southerners to continue to fight. To many, the Civil War had become, by 1865, a total war, and this fact finally led to the Confederacy’s capitulation. Confederate Strategy Although the Confederacy’s national strategy of preserving its independence remained constant throughout the four years of the war, the military strategies devised to achieve this goal continually shifted. Initially Confederate leaders sparsely spread their troops around the circumference of their new country to repel potential invaders, but this tactic proved to be an unwise use of the South’s limited manpower. Another unwise military strategy was the political decision to move the Confederacy’s capital from Montgomery, Alabama, to Richmond, Virginia, about 100 miles from Washington, D.C. This move turned northern Virginia into one of the war’s principal battlegrounds. The concentration of Confederate forces in the East weakened the West, allowing Union forces to gain control of the Mississippi River and divide the Confederacy. On the other hand, the Confederacy proved more adept than the Union expected at countering the Anaconda Plan; Southern blockade runners were successful in bringing much-needed military supplies from Europe. Lee was also successful in persuading Confederate leaders to modify the “dispersed defensive” strategy into an “offensive-defensive” strategy. This
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meant that, although the national strategy remained the protection of the Confederacy, this goal could sometimes best be achieved by attacking the enemy in Confederate territory or by attacking the enemy’s territory itself. Lee thus sought to break the Union’s will to reunite the country by defeating its armies. However, in the end Lee’s army could not withstand the unremitting pressure of the large, well-armed, and amply supplied Union armies. Tactics The strategies of North and South were implemented by various tactics. In military terminology, tactics is the management of soldiers on a battlefield. The tactical systems of the Civil War were modifications of deployments in eighteenth century battles. Under the traditional system, soldiers in several long lines advanced toward enemy positions while exchanging controlled volleys. This continued until either the offensive or defensive lines broke down. Although military leaders on both sides continued to use this old tactic, the long range and high accuracy of such new weapons as rifled muskets and cannon, and, later, rapid-fire breechloaders, made its use extremely costly for the attackers. As the war evolved, some commanders developed new tactics that allowed infantry formations to be flexible, even to the point of granting individual soldiers free-handed initiative to achieve their mission. Improved weapons also brought about the end of the classic cavalry charge, because Minié bullets and raking artillery fire easily downed horses and cavalrymen long before they could reach enemy positions. In the latter part of the war military leaders used cavalry strictly for reconnaissance and the capture of critical road junctions. Because of the failures of traditional assault tactics, both Union and Confederate leaders used, during the campaigns of 1864 and 1865, a new technique that came to be called trench warfare, in which defensive lines were protected by forts with artillery, pits with riflemen, and elaborate breastworks of logs and dirt piles. The Civil War was also the first American conflict in which the tactic of the rapid movement of men and matériel by railroad played a major role. However, during the initial phases of the war, railroads were used to transport supplies, not troops. By the summer of 1862, when thousands of Union troops were transported to Washington by rail to prevent Lee’s army from capturing the capital, the advantages of train over foot and horse transport became obvious. The South, too, quickly realized the military significance of railroads, and Southern raiders destroyed Northern tracks, bridges, and locomotives. These tactics led to the creation of a spe-
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One of the many technological advances of the Civil War was the use of railroads to move troops and heavy armaments, such as this thirteen-inch mortar, rapidly over great distances. (National Archives)
cial corps in the Union army to repair torn-up tracks and destroyed bridges. This corps used standardized, interchangeable parts and made a science of track and bridge reconstruction. This construction corps was also a destruction corps, because its men developed new ways of destroying enemy rails and bridges. For example, they both bent and twisted heated rails to render them irreparable and useless. The armored railroad car was yet another contribution to military transport technology that made its first appearance during the Civil War. These bulletproof cars were used to patrol important railroads, protecting key supply and trooptransport lines for Union armies. Naval Battles Finally, naval tactics, like land tactics, experienced radical changes during the Civil War. Before the war, naval tactics had involved the effective detection of enemy ships and the countermeasures to neutralize or destroy them. Guns were a fleet’s decisive weapons, and a tightly spaced line of ships was its most advantageous formation. The tactical aim was to bring the maximum amount of firepower to bear on the enemy. The Battle of Hampton Roads changed all this. In terms of strategy, the mission of the Monitor was to protect the Union warships that had not yet been destroyed
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by the Virginia. Because the Monitor did this, the battle was a strategic victory for the North. From a tactical viewpoint, both the Monitor and the Virginia left the battle in almost the same condition as they entered it, with the Monitor a bit more damaged than the Virginia. As for how the battle affected the strategic situation in Virginia, the battle was also a draw, because the Union still controlled Hampton Roads while the Confederates held the rivers. Like this battle between the Monitor and Virginia, the military doctrines, strategies, and tactics of the Civil War helped to change the nature of warfare throughout the world. The First Battle of Bull Run (1861) would have been familiar in its weapons and tactics to a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815), whereas the trench warfare around Petersburg (18641865) and Richmond (1865) was a harbinger of World War I. Furthermore, Sherman’s march through Georgia was an early intimation of the German Blitzkrieg of World War II. The North’s emphasis on outproducing rather than outfighting the South also had a profound influence on future strategic and tactical military thinking. Thus, in its weapons, strategies, and tactics, the Civil War may have begun with an eye to the past, but it ended as a portent of the future. Robert J. Paradowski
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Conscription Before the Civil War, the traditional method of increasing the size of the army was to expand the state militias and to form a volunteer emergency national army recruited through the states. The war introduced military conscription, which provoked widespread opposition in both the North and the South. The firing on Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861, at the beginning of the Civil War, came at a time when the regular U.S. Army numbered only about 16,000 officers and troops. The immediate response of President Abraham Lincoln to the attack was to call for 75,000 militia volunteers for three months’ service. This call was exceeded, and some volunteers were turned away because the expectation was that a mere show of force would be sufficient to defeat the South. Congress and the president subsequently found it necessary, however, to call for more volunteers. Repeated defeats of the Union army and the resultant loss of men moved Lincoln to call for 300,000 volunteers in the summer of 1862. The difficulty of obtaining volunteers was soon apparent; bounties were increased, and the threat of the draft was invoked. Congress passed the Militia Act of July, 1862, which allowed the states to draft men into the militia and encouraged enlistments. Lincoln called for another 300,000 men to be enrolled into the militia. Although the Militia Act of 1862 gave the federal government power to enroll men in situations where the state machinery was inadequate, the short-term (nine-month maximum) nature of the militia draft and the inequities of the system made it less than satisfactory. Conscription Begins Spurred by the loss of 75,000 men, by news of a conscription law passed by the Confederacy, and by the failure of the states to provide men promptly for the various calls, Congress passed its own Conscription Act on March 3, 1863. Henry Wilson, chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, was responsible for the introduction of a bill that eventually was passed and labeled “An Act for Enrolling and Calling Out the National Forces and for Other Purposes.” This act was the first national draft law in the history of the nation. It called for the creation of the “national forces,” which were to consist of all able-bodied male citizens and alien declarants between twenty and forty-five years of age, including African Americans. White opposition to blacks in federal army uniforms noticeably lessened
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as a result of the draft. In all, more than 168,000 African American recruits were drafted. Certain high officials, medically unfit persons, and hardship cases were exempted. Exemption could also be obtained by paying three hundred dollars or by securing a substitute. The system was operated by the War Department under the direction of Colonel James B. Fry, provost-marshal-general. Provost-marshals were appointed in districts similar to the congressional districts and enrollments began. Quotas were established, and credit was given for enlistments. If the quotas were not met, drawings were held to determine who should be drafted. Small cards were placed in sealed envelopes in a large trunk, and the names were drawn in public by a trustworthy citizen wearing a blindfold. The system of paying three hundred dollars for exemption from service subsequently was abolished, but the privilege of hiring a substitute was continued. The names of more than three million men were gathered, but only about 170,000 were drafted, and 120,000 of those produced substitutes. The primary intent for passage of the law was to speed up voluntary enlistment, and more than one million men enlisted. The chief motivation for these enlistments was probably the threat of the draft. Opposition The draft brought Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin McMasters Stanton into conflict with state governors. Those governors who were unenthusiastic about the conduct of the war openly criticized the president and the draft, while governors who favored a more vigorous prosecution of the war often complained that their states had not been given full credit for previous enlistments. Lincoln and Stanton often temporized with the governors by granting postponements or additional credits as the end of the war drew near. There was considerable resistance to the draft. Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana, and Kentucky had considerable problems with enrollment, and draft offices and officers were attacked in those states. The Irish in New York and New Jersey were particularly incensed by the draft, many viewing the conflicts as a rich man’s war and a poor man’s fight. With fifty-one categories of diseases qualifying men for medical exemption, the system was fraught with medical resistance problems. Surgeons administering medical qualifying exams were confronted by faked hernias (the most widespread cause of exemption), eye problems caused by applying eye irritants, and pretended deafness. Giving incorrect birth dates, claiming false dependents, and even the enrollment of dead people were other methods of noncompliance. Finally, there were the runaways. Given time
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to settle their affairs before departing for camp, a considerable number of draftees either relocated or fled to Canada. With the public generally hostile to the draft, the best way for a community to avoid it was to fill the quota with volunteers. Consequently, bounty taxes were implemented to raise revenues to attract foreigners, new immigrants, and the poverty-stricken to enlist. The paying of bounties corrupted the draft system. It produced bounty jumpers who, attracted by lump-sum payments, were willing to jump off trains or boats to escape conscription. Riots Notorious resistance to the draft instigated the draft riots in New York City. Governor Horatio Seymour’s speech of July 4, 1863, attacking the Lincoln administration for violations of individual liberty, did nothing to decrease the hostility of the New York Irish toward African Americans and the abolitionists. Antidraft rioting, which took place between July 13 and 15, destroyed property and physically harmed many African Americans. Some New York militia units that had been engaged at Gettysburg were hastily ordered back to New York to stop the rioting. Estimates of the casualties in the violence range up to more than one thousand. In spite of the violence, the federal government was determined to enforce the draft with even more fervor. The Confederacy The Confederacy’s calls for volunteers and its national conscription law antedated those of the Union. Jefferson Davis’s call for 100,000 volunteers came before the firing on Fort Sumter, and the Conscription Act was passed on April 16, 1862, almost a year before similar legislation was passed by the United States. The Confederate act conscripted men from eighteen to thirty-five years of age; later the same year, it was extended to include those between seventeen and fifty years of age. The Confederate law included a substitute system and a controversial list of exempted persons held to be essential at home. The category that caused the most discussion was that which exempted one slave owner or overseer for each twenty slaves. The Confederate draft was also controversial because it was a national levy; it made no concession to the doctrine of states’ rights for which most Southerners claimed to be fighting. It appears that the Confederacy’s early use of a conscription law enabled General Robert E. Lee’s armies to continue their general success in the Civil War well into 1863. It was only after the North also began drafting
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men that Lincoln could be confident of victory. The North, with a much larger population, was able to sustain its losses and to continue the war indefinitely; the Confederacy could not. Continuance of the draft underscored Northern determination to continue the war to its conclusion. The result was Lee’s surrender at Appomattox and the restoration of the Union. Mark A. Plummer updated by Irwin Halfond
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Censorship During the War The Civil War proved that public communications could provide vital information to the enemy; policies developed during the war served as precedents for future censorship policies. Technologies developed during the decades preceding the Civil War allowed news and information to be transmitted more rapidly and efficiently. The telegraph enabled reporters to send stories to their home offices almost immediately. The steam printing press increased production and lowered costs, and throughout the nation newspaper circulation rose dramatically. New transportation systems, especially railroads, permitted the speedy distribution of newspapers and mail over wide areas. These remarkable changes posed unprecedented challenges for military and civilian leaders in the North and the South at the outbreak of the Civil War in April, 1861. The easy transmission of information raised fears that military secrets could intentionally or inadvertently be made available to the enemy. Early Censorship Lacking clearly established precedents for censorship, the Union government’s early policies were conducted in a haphazard fashion. Author-
Field reporters for the New York Herald. (National Archives)
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ities were uncertain as to which government department was responsible for creating and implementing censorship policies. The Post Office waited for days after war had been declared before it refused to send mail into enemy territory. Although the State Department began censoring telegraph communications from Washington, D.C., in April, 1861, transmissions between the North and South continued for more than a month until Union officials seized thousands of telegrams that implicated Northerners in Southern plots. In July, 1861, the commander of the Union Army, General Winfield Scott, issued a censorship order that banned telegraph companies from transmitting any military information without his approval. Scott changed the order a few days later, permitting reporters to send reports concerning battles in progress that did not include information about troop movements. Less than two weeks later, during the disastrous Union defeat at Bull Run, the first major battle of the war, Scott again changed his order and imposed full censorship on reporters. Unaware of the battle’s true outcome, newspapers in New York and Washington reported a fantastic Union victory. The confusion that resulted in the Northern press and populace as a result of Scott’s censorship orders indicated the need for a more coherent policy. In August, 1861, several prominent Northern reporters met with Union general George B. McClellan and agreed not to report any information that would assist the enemy. In return for their voluntary self-censorship, the reporters would receive full government cooperation in obtaining and reporting all other news. McClellan could not ensure government cooperation, however, because the official censor, H. E. Thayer, was under the authority of the State Department. When Secretary of State William H. Seward ordered Thayer to ban all telegraph communications from Washington, D.C., concerning military and civil operations, the press argued that the government had violated the agreement and the voluntary censorship plan was abandoned. Press complaints about Seward’s order prompted a congressional investigation in December, 1861. Released four months later in March, 1862, the investigating committee’s final report cited the numerous failures of the censorship policy, including inefficiency, favoritism toward certain reporters, and the censoring of material that violated no military secrets. The report concluded that Seward’s censorship order was far too broad and that censorship should be limited to military information that would be useful to the enemy. By the time the committee released its report important policy changes had already occurred. Congress had already clarified the issue of depart-
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Constructing telegraph lines in early 1864. While the introduction of telegraphy greatly increased the speed and efficiency of military communications, it also made it easier for enemies to communicate information, so the Union government imposed strict regulations on telegraphic communications. (National Archives)
mental authority in January, 1862, when it granted the president the power to regulate the use of telegraph transmissions. Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton requested that President Abraham Lincoln transfer responsibility for controlling the telegraph lines from the State Department to the War Department, a request that Lincoln approved that same day. Stanton immediately acted to articulate and enforce a new censorship policy. Stanton and Censorship On February 25, 1862, Stanton issued a new censorship order that required all telegraph communications regarding military operations to receive official military approval before they were transmitted. Stanton appointed a military supervisor to manage all telegraph messages and a military superintendent to manage the telegraph lines and offices throughout the United States. Stanton also threatened to punish any newspaper that published unauthorized military news by prohibiting that paper from using the telegraph or the railroads. This threat raised such an outcry from the press that Stanton quickly modified that order to ban only the publication of military news that had occurred that same day.
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Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton. (National Archives)
Stanton hoped that his strict censorship order would eliminate sensitive military information from news reports, but the order proved difficult to enforce. Censors did a poor job, newsmen looked for alternative methods for sending stories to their editors, and officers could be convinced to release a questionable story in return for a positive mention in the press. The main achievement of Stanton’s order was the establishment of a precedent of a formal censorship policy and the clarification of lines of authority for that policy. Generals in the field proved the most effective enforcers of censorship. Many generals hated reporters, whom they believed put the military’s plans and its men at risk when they wrote their stories. Weary of press criticism, General Henry W. Halleck banned all noncombatants from his army. While Halleck justified the order as a security measure aimed at Southern spies, press correspondents claimed that the general intended to silence the press. Union general William T. Sherman nursed a special contempt for the press. He had little patience for reporters, accusing them of informing the enemy and of sowing dissension in the Union ranks. In return reporters constantly attacked Sherman—a story published early in the war claimed that he was insane. Angered by a New York Herald story, Sherman had the reporter, Thomas Knox, arrested on charges of spying. Sherman knew that Knox was not a spy, but hoped to set an example. Knox was later acquitted of the spying charge, but he was banned from the army. By banning most
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reporters from the field, Halleck, Sherman, and other generals censored the press and prevented the passage of information to the enemy and to the American public. Although military leaders often scorned newspaper reporting, attempts at total censorship of military information proved disastrous to the war effort. In late 1862 General Halleck ordered a complete news blackout on information concerning the Army of Virginia, which was responsible for protecting Washington, D.C. In the absence of any reliable news, rumors spread through the city that the army had been defeated and the Confederates were preparing to invade. Confusion and a sense of crisis seized the populace, and confidence in the government waned. The blackout ended and government leaders learned that the public required reliable news in order to support the war. Selectivity, not a complete gag on the press, was required for censorship to be effective. Military news was not the only information subject to censorship in the North. Opposition to the war, especially from Northern Democrats known as Copperheads, resulted in harsh criticism of the government and the military. President Lincoln was a frequent target. Northern officials had to determine at what point the expression of opposition became detrimental to the conduct of the war, or perhaps even treasonous. In April, 1863, Union general Ambrose E. Burnside issued General Orders Number Thirty-eight, which declared that anyone expressing sympathy for the enemy would be arrested and face possible execution if found guilty of violating the order. Former Ohio congressman Clement L. Vallandigham, a vocal opponent of the war who detested Lincoln, responded to the order by giving two speeches in which he fiercely attacked the president. Burnside had Vallandigham arrested three days later. Convicted of violating the order, Vallandigham was sentenced to prison. Lincoln ordered Vallandigham transported to Confederate lines and banished from the Union. While Lincoln and his cabinet supported Burnside during the Vallandigham episode, Lincoln later decided that the government had exceeded its authority in the incident. Press stories and criticism also brought official reaction. In May, 1864, two New York newspapers printed a forged presidential document ordering the drafting of 400,000 men. The printing of the false document could have caused bloody draft riots similar to those that racked the city in 1863. Military censors leaped at the chance to suppress the papers, both of which had been critical of the war. The papers were closed, and their editors were imprisoned for two days. In the Midwest, Wilbur F. Storey, owner and publisher of the Chicago Times, published a series of editorials condemning abolition and the conduct of the war. In late May, 1864, the paper printed a
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story that maligned General Burnside, Republican leaders, and the president, whom the article implied had become mentally unbalanced. Two days later Burnside ordered the paper closed for three days. While Lincoln sympathized with Burnside’s reaction, he deemed his response as too extreme and politically imprudent. The order was rescinded. Lincoln’s cautious attitude toward the Vallandigham and Storey cases reveals that the president believed that speech and press censorship were politically sensitive issues in a democracy. Requiring public support to continue the war, the president could not alienate potential allies who might be offended by a strict censorship policy. Lincoln ably balanced the needs of a nation at war with the tradition of a free press in America. Southern Censorship Lacking adequate resources to cover the war, several Southern publishers met in 1862 and formed a pool for sharing correspondents and information. Headed by J. S. Thrasher, the Press Association of the Confederate States of America fought military censorship of news dispatches. Thrasher met with Confederate general P. G. T. Beauregard in 1863 to protest censorship policies. He maintained that Southern newspapers held to the highest standards and would never publish sensitive information. Impressed by Thrasher’s arguments, Beauregard ordered military commanders to assist reporters in transmitting their dispatches. Compliance was spotty, however, and throughout the war obstinate Confederate officers refused to aid reporters. Although Southern military commanders often attempted to prevent the press from using telegraph lines to send messages, the most significant problems that Southern publishers faced stemmed from popular attitudes and material conditions. Always ready to criticize the government and the military for their failures, the Southern press nonetheless supported the Confederate cause. Any editor unwise enough to condemn the ultimate aims of the South faced the public’s wrath and indignation. Southern publishers who might hold unpopular attitudes toward slavery or the Confederacy imposed a degree of voluntary censorship on their editorial policy out of self-interest. As the war progressed, manpower and paper shortages limited the effectiveness of the Southern press far more than any government censorship policy. Thomas Clarkin
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Justice During the War The Civil War established the primacy of the federal government over the states in the administration of justice, and it elevated the ethical system of free-labor capitalism as the national standard. The Civil War redefined both the relationship between the U.S. government and the individual and between the central and state governments. During the course of the conflict, the Union and Confederate governments pursued aggressively nationalistic policies that undermined states’ rights, civil liberties, and property rights. The Slavery Issue By the mid-nineteenth century, the free-labor ideal had taken hold in the states of the North. It was believed that economic opportunity should be open to all. To many in the North, the slave system in the South appeared to be the antithesis of the free-labor ideal. Northerners believed that slavery was inefficient, that it degraded labor as a whole, and that it created economic stagnation. Though most were willing to tolerate slavery where it existed, they wanted the western territories reserved for free white labor. They interpreted the Constitution as a document that made freedom national and slavery local. Southerners shared a belief in the positive benefits of economic opportunity, but they identified it with the acquisition of land and slaves. Slavery was thus seen as a positive good, and Southerners dreamed of extending the slave system into the territories. Southerners argued that the territories were the common property of all Americans; to prohibit slavery within them deprived Southern people of their right to share in the nation’s bounty. The Republican victory in 1860 brought to power an administration pledged to restrict slavery in the territories. Fearing that the new administration would undermine slavery, seven Southern states asserted their right to secede from the federal union and form a new government. Abraham Lincoln’s administration denied the right of secession and refused to relinquish federal property in the South to the new Confederacy. When the state of South Carolina fired on a federal fort in Charleston harbor, President Lincoln called upon the states to supply troops to suppress the rebellion and preserve the federal union. Four additional states believed Lincoln’s action to be an unjust usurpation of federal power and joined the Confederacy.
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For the Lincoln administration, the highest good was the preservation of the Union. All issues of justice were considered in relation to that objective. The Confederacy was dedicated to the proposition that human property was an unalienable right and must be preserved. For the first year of fighting, the Lincoln administration took no action to destroy slavery. It enforced the provisions of the Fugitive Slave Law, and Lincoln rebuked Union general John C. Fremont when he issued a proclamation freeing the slaves of Confederate sympathizers in Missouri. Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation did not take effect until January 1, 1863. When he issued the proclamation, Lincoln justified his action in terms of military necessity. The proclamation freed only the slaves behind Confederate lines, but after the Emancipation Proclamation was issued, the Union Army became a force for liberation. Civil Liberties Both the Union and Confederate governments restricted traditional civil liberties during the conflict. In early 1862, the Confederate Congress authorized President Jefferson Davis to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law in areas in danger of attack. That same year President Davis ordered the first military draft in North America and established a Conscription Bureau to carry it out. Even more striking, the Confederacy never established a Supreme Court and allowed the attorney general to judge the constitutionality of laws. That omission seriously un-
A former slave and a leading abolitionist, Frederick Douglass was an outspoken advocate of allowing African Americans to fight for the Union. (National Archives)
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dermined the notion of judicial independence and gave the executive branch unprecedented powers over the administration of justice. Thousands of civilians were arrested by the Union government during the war, and many were tried by military courts. In response to civil disturbances in Baltimore, Lincoln suspended the privilege of habeas corpus on April 27, 1861, along the rail line from Philadelphia to Washington. The suspension was later extended to other areas of the North and gradually became general in certain types of cases. Most military arrests by the Union government were not political. The vast majority of civilian prisoners were blockade-runners, residents of Confederate states, army deserters, draft dodgers, foreign nationals, people who dealt in contraband goods, or fraudulent war contractors. A loyal opposition continued to function in the North throughout the war and actually won control of several state legislatures. Among those arrests early in the war was John Merryman. Merryman was a member of a pro-Confederate Maryland cavalry unit that had damaged railroad bridges in April, 1861. Merryman’s attorney successfully petitioned a federal circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus to show just cause for his arrest. The commander of Fort McHenry, where Merryman was being held, refused to honor the writ on the grounds that President Lincoln had suspended the privilege in Maryland. Judge Roger B. Taney responded by issuing a circuit court ruling stating that only the Congress had the power to exercise such a suspension (Ex parte Merryman, 1861). In spite of the ruling, Lincoln continued to maintain his right to suspend the writ as an essential power necessary to suppress the rebellion. For purposes of election propaganda, unscrupulous Republican politicians and military officers attempted to exploit fears that traitorous secret organizations existed in the Midwest. Recent scholarship has demonstrated that the major Copperhead societies, such as the Knights of the Golden Circle and the Sons of Liberty, were little more than paper tigers. In the wake of Democratic victories in the state elections of 1862, Republican newspaper editors frequently printed tales of treasonable Democratic activities. When Ohio Democrat Clement L. Vallandigham declared that the war was being fought to free blacks and enslave whites, General Ambrose Burnside ordered his arrest. A military commission convicted Vallandigham of attempting to hamper the government’s efforts to suppress the rebellion and recommended imprisonment. President Lincoln altered the sentence to banishment, and Vallandigham was escorted to Confederate lines. Lincoln justified his action by arguing that it made no sense to shoot a simple-minded deserter and do nothing to the man who induced him to desert.
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Later in the war, Democratic activist H. H. Dodd of Indiana organized the Sons of Liberty to protect the civil liberties of those opposed to the Republican administration. Acting on rumors that the Sons of Liberty had aided Confederates, Union general Henry Carrington arrested Indiana Democrats linked to the Sons of Liberty, including editor Lambdin Milligan. A military commission sentenced three of the defendants to death. Others received prison terms. The death sentences were never carried out, but it is clear that the men were tried on questionable evidence by military commissions in areas where civil courts were functioning. After the war, the Supreme Court ruled in Ex parte Milligan (1866) that such trials were illegal. Treatment of Black Troops When the conflict began, neither the Union nor Confederate governments would sanction the use of African American soldiers. As the Union government moved toward an acceptance of emancipation, however, it also began to organize African American regiments. In spite of the large-scale recruitment of black soldiers during the last two years of the war, the Union army discriminated against African Americans in a wide variety of ways including pay, chance of promotion, and the amount of fatigue duty (manual labor) black units were expected to perform. While a few blacks did receive commissions, the vast majority of officers in the United States Colored Troops (USCT) were white combat veterans. The men of the USCT proved their courage at the battles of Port Hudson, Milliken’s Bend, and Fort Wagner, where they took heavy casualties. Generally, however, the prejudice of many commanding officers led to the use of USCT regiments for fatigue or guard duty while saving white units for combat. The Confederacy reacted harshly to the use of black troops by the Union army. President Davis approved of the execution of black prisoners of war in South Carolina in November, 1862. Later, Davis ordered that all former slaves captured while serving in the Union army be returned to the states for trial. The massacre of black prisoners by Confederate troops on several occasions forced Union authorities to threaten retaliation in order to stem the injustice. The use of large numbers of black troops by the Union war effort helped pave the way for universal emancipation. Throughout his political career, Lincoln consistently asserted that slavery was morally wrong. Though emancipation began as a military tactic, it became a war aim. The courage of black soldiers allowed Lincoln to secure passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, providing for an end to slavery throughout the country.
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Military Justice The system of military justice employed within the army was seriously flawed. At least 267 soldiers were executed by the Union army during the Civil War era. More than half of those executed were either foreigners or African Americans. A number of black soldiers were convicted of mutiny for protesting unequal pay in the Union army. Racial tensions accelerated during the final months of the conflict. A high number of black soldiers were executed for alleged sexual offenses against white women. The Confederacy had an incomplete record of military justice. Since many Southern officers had received their training in the prewar U.S. army, the procedural flaws of courts-martial were similar in both armies. The Civil War moved the United States toward a more perfect application of its ideals of equality and justice. The United States entered the war as a federal union with contrasting standards of justice, one based on freelabor ideals, the other on the slave system of the Southern states. Property rights took precedent over human rights, and equal justice was denied African Americans in virtually every section of the country. The Union government, through its policy of emancipation and the enlistment of African Americans into its armed forces, transformed the war from a crusade to preserve the Union into a war of liberation. In doing so, it expanded the nation’s concept of justice to include equality for African Americans. Thomas D. Matijasic
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U.S. Supreme Court During the War The Civil War was a profound threat to the stability of the U.S. constitutional order. The Supreme Court played a role in the war’s inception, the response by President Abraham Lincoln and Congress, and the war’s conclusion and aftermath. Except for a few important and controversial decisions, however, the Court had limited significance during the Civil War. The Civil War raised questions of fundamental importance to the U.S. constitutional order. Among these were questions about whether a state could secede from the Union, the distribution of the war-making powers between the president and Congress, and the authority of the Supreme Court to review those powers. What was undoubtedly a crisis for the country was no less a crisis for the Court. In the end, these fundamental constitutional issues were decided and resolved, not through appeals to the law or to the Supreme Court, but through political force. The Road to War A number of factors led to the war. Prominent among them was the issue of slavery, left unresolved at the nation’s founding. Congress formally prohibited the slave trade in 1808 and tried to end the debate with the Missouri Compromise of 1820, but the problems slavery raised for the Union did not dissipate. The Court took up the issue in the case of Scott v. Sandford (1857). Dred Scott, a slave, claimed that he had become a free man because he had resided in areas where slavery was illegal under the Missouri Compromise. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney held that persons of African American descent, whether slaves or emancipated, were not citizens of the United States. For “more than a century,” Taney wrote, African Americans had “been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race . . . and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.” The chief justice also ruled that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional because Congress had no constitutional authority to regulate slavery in the territories. Some critics of the Court complain that it should not have tried to resolve a divisive political issue through a legal decision. On the other hand, the Court had not come to the issue uninvited. President James Buchanan, for example, had encouraged the Court to rule on the issue, stating in his inaugural speech that slavery “was a judicial question, which legitimately belongs to the Supreme Court, before whom it is now pending and will . . . be speedily settled.” The Court’s controversial
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ruling, far from settling the matter, galvanized forces on both sides of the slavery question. Just four years later, the country was at war with itself. Secession and the Constitution In late 1860 South Carolina and several other states sought to secede from the Union. Such claims were not novel, at least as a matter of constitutional theory. The nullification controversy of 1832-1833 had involved similar claims. During that controversy, South Carolina had argued that “each state of the Union has the right, whenever it may deem such a course necessary . . . to secede peaceably from the Union, and that there is no constitutional power in the general government . . . to retain by force such stake in the Union.” President Buchanan thought secession illegal, but he agreed that the federal government lacked the authority to prevent states from leaving. In Kentucky v. Dennison (1861), the Court sanctioned this understanding of the limits of federal power. The case involved a fugitive who had helped a slave escape from Kentucky. The fugitive ran to Ohio, and the Ohio governor refused to return him to Kentucky. Ruling for the Court, Chief Justice Taney refused to order the governor to turn over the fugitive, stating that criminal extradition clause of the Constitution depended on the states for its enforcement. There is, he argued, “no power delegated to the General Government . . . to use any coercive means” to force a governor to act. Implicit in this opinion is the clear sense that President Abraham Lincoln lacked any constitutional authority to keep the states in the Union. In his inaugural address, President Lincoln argued instead that “the Union of these States is perpetual. Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law of all national governments.” Lincoln thus concluded that the Union, older than the Constitution, authorized him to prevent states from dissolving the bonds of the Union. One of his first actions was to resupply the Union troops at Fort Sumter. Forces in Charleston fired upon the fort, and the constitutional nature of the Union was left to be decided by military force and not by the Supreme Court. Presidential Authority to Make War When he assumed office, President Lincoln was faced with the prospect of war. In his first inaugural address, he responded directly to the Court’s decision in Scott. “I do not forget the position assumed by some, that constitutional questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court. . . . At the same time the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government, upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court . . . the people will have ceased to be their own rulers.” Lincoln’s insistence upon his own authority to inter-
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pret the Constitution foreshadowed his interaction with the Court throughout the Civil War. The first significant issue concerned the president’s authority to conduct war without prior congressional approval. The issue was raised when Lincoln, responding to the South’s declaration of independence from the Union, ordered a naval blockade of Southern ports in April, 1861. Acting pursuant to Lincoln’s order, Union warships seized a number of Southern and foreign ships and put them and their cargoes up for sale. In the Prize Cases (1863), the owners of four such ships argued that the president had no constitutional authority to order the blockade, for the power “to declare war [and] make rules concerning captures on land and water” was given by the Constitution to Congress, not the president. Congress did not ratify the president’s decision until July, 1861. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled for Lincoln. Writing for the majority, Justice Robert C. Grier admitted that the Constitution gave to Congress alone the power to declare a national or foreign war. He noted also that the Constitution entrusts the position of commander-in-chief to the presidency. “If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation,” Grier continued, “the President is not only authorized but bound to resist by force.” In this case, “the President was bound to meet [the war] in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name.” The Court further underscored the president’s autonomy by declaring that “whether the President, in fulfilling his duties, as Commander-in-Chief, in suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed resistance, and a civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel him to accord to them the character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by him, and this Court must be governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the Government to which this power was entrusted.” In dissent, Justice Samuel Nelson agreed that “in one sense, no doubt this is war, but it is a statement simply of its existence in a material sense, and has no relevancy or weight when the question is what constitutes war in a legal sense . . . and of the Constitution of the United States.” The Court’s deference to the president’s decision about when the war began was mirrored at war’s end by its decision in Freeborn v. the “Protector,” (1872), which held that the war was formally concluded when the president said so. Together, these cases have provided strong support for presidential decisions to initiate military actions without first seeking congressional authorization. The Court and Civil Liberties President Lincoln’s decision to impose a naval blockade on Southern
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Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney. (Library of Congress)
ports was just one part of a larger war effort. In addition to the blockade, Lincoln undertook a series of actions that amounted to the imposition of martial law. Among these were orders directing military authorities to search homes without warrants, imprisonment without charge or trial in civilian or in military courts, and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The most expansive order suspending the writ was issued in September, 1862; Lincoln did not seek congressional authorization for this order, and Congress did not finally authorize the president to suspend habeas corpus until the following March. Thousands of citizens were detained by the military and held without charge and without trial in either a civilian or a military court. The constitutionality of Lincoln’s decision to suspend the writ was first tested in a federal circuit court in Baltimore, Maryland, in 1861. The military had arrested John Merryman for his participation in an attack on Union forces. Merryman petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus. Chief Justice Taney, riding circuit, granted the writ and had it sent to the general in command of the fort where Merryman was detained. Sending an aide in his place, the general replied that he would not obey the writ because Lincoln had suspended its operation. In response, Chief Justice Taney found the general in contempt of court, an action with little practical effect, and issued an opinion that directly addressed the constitutionality
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of Lincoln’s decision. Taney held that Lincoln had no authority to suspend the writ because Article I of the Constitution entrusted that authority to Congress “in language too clear to be misunderstood by anyone.” Taney ordered a copy of the opinion sent to Lincoln. Lincoln failed to respond directly, instead stating in a later special session of Congress: “Now it is insisted that Congress, and not the Executive, is vested with [the power]. However, the Constitution itself, is silent as to which, or who, is to exercise the power.” In the same speech, Lincoln offered a more fundamental objection: “Are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?” The Supreme Court was presented with another claim concerning habeas corpus just two years later, in the case of Ex parte Vallandigham (1864). Vallandigham was arrested and tried by the military. He sought a writ of habeas corpus, but the Court dismissed his case, claiming that it had no authority over a military court. The Court’s reluctance to entertain the case was symbolic of its silent posture on military interferences with civil liberties throughout the Civil War. Moreover, the Court would not again consider the constitutionality of Lincoln’s wartime suspensions until well after the war was over, in the case of Ex parte Milligan (1866). Reconstruction The end of the Civil War left the Union with difficult questions about how to bring the Southern states back into the fold. Congressional representatives from the Northern states had denied that the Southern states could validly leave the Union, but a return to the status quo that had existed before the hostilities was unlikely. Some congressional representatives and President Andrew Johnson, Lincoln’s successor, favored a policy of accelerated reconstruction that included provisional state governments. However, so-called Radical Republicans in Congress insisted that the Southern states could be readmitted only on whatever terms Congress imposed. What followed was the imposition of military rule, which included trials in military courts and the use of federal troops to maintain order. The result was a great contest between the president and Congress, a contest that revolved around the question of how the South should be “reconstructed” and about which branch of government would be responsible for the process. The Supreme Court played a small, but nonetheless significant, part in this contest. Initially the Court cast some doubt on the constitutionality of various Reconstruction measures. In the Test Oath Cases (1867, Cummings v. Missouri and Ex parte Garland), for example, the Court found the loyalty oaths
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required of voters, attorneys, and others in the Southern states a violation of the ex post facto clause. In the well-known Milligan case, the Court seemed to cast further doubt on the constitutionality of congressional reconstruction by holding that military courts could not try civilians in those areas in which the civilian courts were functioning. In this case, the military had arrested Milligan, and he was convicted and sentenced to be hanged by a military commission. He sought a writ of habeas corpus. Notwithstanding its earlier decision in Vallandigham, the Court ruled for Milligan. In his opinion for the Court, Justice David Davis wrote The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and for people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government.
The Court did agree, though, “that there are occasions when martial law can be properly applied.” If civilian courts are “actually closed” and it is “impossible to administer criminal justice according to law,” then the military may supply a substitute for civilian authority. In Milligan’s case, the courts had been open and functioning; consequently, Milligan’s arrest by military authorities had been unconstitutional. Although the Court did not fervently protect civil liberties until the war was over—in stark contrast to its behavior during the war—many congressional leaders saw in the case a more general threat to Reconstruction policy, which included military governments and tribunals. Thaddeaus Stevens, for example, complained that the decision “although in terms not as infamous as the Dred Scott decision, is yet far more dangerous in its operation.” Several bills were introduced in Congress to curb the Court, including one by Representative John Bingham of Ohio, who warned ominously of a constitutional amendment that could result “in the abolition of the tribunal itself.” Opposition to Reconstruction Many congressional leaders believed that a case then working its way through the federal courts would give the Court a chance to declare much of the Reconstruction effort unconstitutional. The case, Ex parte McCardle (1869), concerned a newspaper editor in Mississippi who had been arrested and tried by a military commission. McCardle petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the Reconstruction statute that had authorized his trial was unconstitutional. An appellate court denied the writ,
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whereupon McCardle appealed to the Supreme Court under an 1867 statute that governed such appeals. The Court accepted the appeal and heard arguments on the case. Fearful of the ruling, Congress reacted by passing a new law repealing the 1867 statute. This led the Court to reschedule oral argument, this time focusing on the question of whether Congress could withdraw jurisdiction from the Court in a pending case. A unanimous Court concluded that the statute withdrawing its jurisdiction in McCardle was constitutionally permissible. No longer having jurisdiction, the Court dismissed McCardle’s appeal. Milligan aside, the Court generally refrained from inquiring into the constitutionality of Reconstruction. Thus, in Mississippi v. Johnson (1867), the Court ruled that a president is immune from an injunction by a court to restrain enforcement of Reconstruction legislation. Mississippi had asked the Court to enjoin President Johnson from executing the Reconstruction acts because they were, according to Mississippi, unconstitutional. The Court declined to intervene, finding that such interference would be “an absurd and excessive extravagance.” One year later, in a similar case (Georgia v. Stanton, 1868), the Court again indicated that it was unwilling to inquire into the details of Reconstruction policy by refusing to enjoin enforcement of the Reconstruction acts by the secretary of war. In 1869 the Court put its imprimatur on Reconstruction—and on Lincoln’s insistence that the Union was perpetual—in Texas v. White. The Court ruled, first, that Texas’s decision to leave the Union was invalid because when Texas “became one of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble relation. . . . There was no place for reconsideration, or revocation.” Therefore, Texas had remained a “state” in the Union throughout the war. In some ways, the Court simply reaffirmed the result of the war, but the opinion is also an important statement of constitutional principle, for it held that the Union was not a mere “compact of states.” The case is also important for a second reason: The Court conceded that the initial responsibility for Reconstruction rested with the president in his capacity as commander-in-chief; however, that authority “must be considered as provisional” to the greater authority of Congress to “guarantee to every state in the Union a republican form of government.” John E. Finn
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Native American Combatants in the War Native Americans made significant contributions to both sides during the Civil War. Approximately 3,500 Indians fought for the Union, and a similar number fought for the Confederacy. Most of the Indians who participated in the war were from the so-called Five Civilized Tribes, and a Cherokee leader named Stand Watie (1806-1871) became one of the Confederacy’s most distinguished generals. With the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861, both the Union and the Confederacy looked toward the Indian Territory for support. American Indians there, mostly members of the famed Five Civilized Tribes (the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole), had connections with the federal government through various agencies, but most also had Southern roots in the Carolinas, Alabama, Kentucky, Georgia, and Tennessee. In March, 1861, Confederate president Jefferson Davis commissioned Albert Pike to visit Indian Territory to seek treaties with the Five Civilized Tribes. It was hoped that a strong Confederate force in Indian Territory would prevent Union sympathizers in Kansas from raiding Texas. Pike’s visit with all the tribes in Indian Territory was largely successful. Shortly afterward, General Ben McCulloch raised two American Indian regiments: one led by Colonel John Drew and the other by Colonel Stand Watie. Drew and Stand Watie were bitter enemies, and during much of the war commanders on the western front kept the two Cherokee regiments separated as much as possible. Stand Watie, a mixed-blood Cherokee, had been born in Georgia and was one of the signers of the New Echota Treaty, which sold Cherokee lands in Georgia to the United States government. He was also a prosperous Cherokee landowner and businessman, a brilliant warrior, and a member of an opposition faction within the Cherokee tribe. His signature on the new Echota Treaty put him at odds with the more dominant faction of the Cherokee Nation, led by John Ross. Stand Watie Stand Watie was a great leader, and even in the face of extreme hardships, especially during the winter months, he kept his regiment together and participated in numerous battles. Although the treaties that had been signed with the Confederacy promised that Indian regiments would not be required to fight outside Indian Territory, Stand Watie’s troops also were called to duty in Missouri and Arkansas. Over a four-year span, the old Cherokee warrior and his forces fought at Wilson’s Creek, Newtonia, Bird Creek, Pea Ridge, Spavinaw, Fort Wayne, Fort Gibson, Honey
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Springs, Webber’s Falls, Poison Spring, Massard Prairie, and Cabin Creek. Stand Watie’s abilities on the battlefield were widely recognized and greatly heralded by both his contemporaries and historians. His greatest skills were gaining and keeping the confidence of his troops and his wily guerrilla tactics. Stand Watie’s regiment, without his presence on the field, also fought the Second Battle at Newtonia in Southwest Missouri in 1864. The first Newtonia battle, fought in 1862, is of major historic significance, because it was the only Civil War battle in which American Indians fought on both sides. In most battles, Stand Watie’s Confederate Cherokees fought admirably. In a losing cause at the Battle of Pea Ridge in Arkansas, however, they and Colonel Drew’s troops were accused of bad conduct because they were too easily routed during the battle and because they allegedly scalped some of the federal casualties. This act, when reported to the upper command of the Confederate Army, created a great embarrassment among officers, most of whom had been trained at such prestigious military academies as West Point, where cadets were taught to be gentlemen as well as warriors. The loss at Pea Ridge was made even greater by the death of General McCulloch, who had organized and fought with the Cherokees from the beginning. Shifting Allegiances Despite the overwhelming support given the Confederacy in 1861, when the tide of war turned in favor of the Union and the Confederacy became unable to supply its forces on the frontier, disenchantment took hold of the leaders of the various tribes. In February, 1863, the Cherokee Council met on Cowskin Prairie in Indian Territory and voted to end its alliance with the Confederacy. Colonel Stand Watie refused to accept the vote and vowed to continue his fight. This created an even deeper split in the Cherokee tribe. Stand Watie’s forces and Cherokee civilians with attachments in the South remained loyal to Stand Watie, even establishing a government that they claimed was the legitimate government of the Cherokee Nation. These Southern sympathizers elected Stand Watie as the principal chief. Those now aligned with Union forces recognized John Ross as their chief, although he left Indian Territory and returned to his wife’s family in Pennsylvania. At the time of this deepening split, there were about ten thousand Cherokees with Union sympathies and seven thousand supporters of the Confederacy. This situation actually created a civil war within a civil war. On May 10, 1864, Stand Watie was promoted to the rank of brigadier general, the only American Indian to attain this rank in the Civil War. In the
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remaining months of the conflict, General Stand Watie fought without reservations for the Confederacy. One of his most spectacular successes was the sinking of the steam-driven ferry J. R. Williams on the Arkansas River at Pleasant Bluff and making off with food and clothing for his Cherokee and Creek troopers, breaking a major supply route for Union forces at Fort Gibson. Successful raids on Union supplies kept Stand Watie’s forces busy, supplied, and inspired to stay in the fight. Because the battlefield situation for the Confederacy was growing worse, Stand Watie called all the Cherokee units to his camp on June 24, 1864. At that meeting, the Cherokee Troops, Confederate States of America, resolved to “unanimously re-enlist as soldiers for the war, be it long or short.” In September of 1864, Stand Watie masterminded a plan to attack and steal a Union supply-wagon train worth one million dollars. This battle was fought at Cabin Creek in Indian Territory and is said to have been Stand Watie’s greatest success. His brilliance and bravery were not enough, however, as the Confederacy was losing battle after battle. On April 9, 1865, General Robert E. Lee surrendered for the Confederacy at Appomattox Courthouse in Virginia. General Stand Watie fought on, hoping to win the battle for the West, but it was not to be. On June 23, 1865, when Brigadier General Stand Watie surrendered at Doakesville in Indian Territory, he became the last Confederate general to lay down his sword. The contribution made by American Indians in the Civil War was enormous. An estimated 3,500 fought for the Union and 1,018, or more than 28 percent, died while in service to their country. Census figures in the Cherokee Nation showed a population of 21,000 in 1860. By 1867, that number had dropped to 13,566. Approximately one-third of the nation had been lost, either in battle or to hunger and exposure, which were suffered by soldiers and civilians alike. After the war, General Stand Watie became more involved in the political activities of the Cherokee Nation and in resettling his people in the aftermath of the conflict. On September 7, 1871, the great general became ill and was taken to his old home at Honey Creek, where he died on September 9. Kay Hively
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Women in the War The Civil War is an excellent illustration of how gender roles are transformed during a military conflict when women are allowed to enter into previously maledominated positions of power. The Civil War generated a considerable amount of social, economic, and political change for American women. Because the conflict called for a substantial number of men to leave their families and enter military service, women were required to accept responsibilities and tasks that had previously been limited to men. Yet, although these contributions had a direct impact on the outcome of the war, the majority of American women were forced to return to their traditional domestic roles following the end of the war in 1865. The Abolitionist Movement In 1860 and 1861, many Southern states decided to secede from the United States and fight a civil war rather than dismantle their system of African American slavery. For decades, female activists had flocked to the abolitionist movement and exerted considerable pressure on the Southern “slavocracy.” Individuals such as author Lydia Maria Child published pamphlets and books condemning this institution. Her coverage of John Brown’s 1859 raid at Harpers Ferry in Virginia attracted national attention and helped to increase support for African American freedom. Harriet Tubman, a former slave from Maryland, escaped to Philadelphia in 1849 and, during the 1850’s, organized the Underground Railroad to help runaway slaves obtain freedom in the North. Other activists, bolstered by the first successful women’s rights convention at Seneca Falls, New York, in 1848, also agitated for slavery’s demise and demanded equal rights for all Americans regardless of race or sex. In fact, although many male politicians continued to search for a negotiated settlement, female abolitionists refused to accept any compromise on slavery. During the first two years of the war, many women delivered speeches, conducted letter-writing campaigns, and pressured President Abraham Lincoln to free all slaves still held in bondage in the South. When Lincoln eventually issued his famous Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863, most female abolitionists remained skeptical and lobbied for a constitutional amendment that would eliminate this practice forever. Two leading feminist reformers, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, formed the Woman’s National Loyal League in 1863. During the next two years, they enlisted the assistance of numerous other leading feminists and
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ultimately attained nationwide support in 1865 for the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which banned slavery in the United States. In addition, this organization provided women with an opportunity to champion equal rights for women, and many of the league’s members later served as the leaders of the emerging woman suffrage movement. Industrial Developments The war also granted women greater access to newly developing industrial jobs and economic household power. With more and more men entering the conflict, women were required to oversee farm production, plantations, and rural businesses. This task became increasingly difficult in the South following the introduction of the Union blockade. Unable to secure goods from foreign sources, Southern women assumed responsibility for sustaining the food supply for both the troops and the home front. Other shortages forced them to produce cotton and wool clothing, construct tents, sew flags, and manufacture medical bandages. Wealthy women supervised lumber mills, widows served as government clerks, and other women became schoolteachers. Although critical shortages of goods and services would ultimately contribute to the South’s defeat in 1865, Southern women performed duties well beyond their prewar domestic sphere of influence, and consequently, their efforts enabled the Confederate Army to withstand and survive countless material hardships. While the South struggled with shortages, wartime production created an unprecedented need for industrial goods in the North. Clothing, muni-
One of the most famous women to serve with Union troops during the Civil War was Mary Tippee (also known as Tebe or Tepe), who carried water and provided laundry and sewing services for the men in the 114th Pennsylvania infantry company. In this photo she wears a medal that she won for valor in combat. (National Archives)
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tions, and other manufactured goods were in high demand, and with the loss of income because their husbands and sons were fighting at the front, women flocked to the mills. These opportunities, however, did not result in increased prosperity. Women were forced to accept substandard wages, and many barely escaped starvation. In New York City alone, more than twenty thousand women were employed in the clothing industry as stitchers and sewers. Working fifteenhour days, they were forced to pay for their own thread and any damaged goods, but these women refused to accept their fate. In 1863, they formed the Working Women’s Union, and by the end of the war, they were able to mobilize female clothing workers throughout the Northern industrial belt. These efforts eventually helped to produce greater female participation in the emerging American labor movement; similar to the abolitionist experience, this venture significantly contributed to the rise of modern feminism in post-Civil War America. The Military Front Despite all the adversities and difficulties women suffered on the home front, their contributions on the military front as nurses and spies provided vital support throughout the war. By mid-1861, Elizabeth Blackwell, the first woman to earn an M.D., in 1849, organized the United States Sanitary Commission. This organization raised funds for medical supplies and recruited and trained nurses. It also labored to improve sanitation in Army camps. Through the establishment of several local chapters, the commission ensured that soldiers received their back pay and pensions. It provided help for disabled veterans, obtained jobs for soldiers’ wives, and eventually, by the war’s end, raised more than $50 million. Other women achieved similar successes. Dorothea Dix, a renowned prison reformer and advocate for the mentally ill, also trained nurses and eventually was appointed as superintendent of army nurses. Clara Barton, a former patent office clerk, labored endlessly in hospitals and battlefields as a one-woman aid society. She helped families locate relatives missing in action, and she was able to provide a dignified grave site for more than thirteen thousand men who perished at the notorious Andersonville prison in Georgia. These accomplishments, moreover, generated longterm gains that facilitated the rise of modern American feminism. After the war, Barton and others eventually formed the American Red Cross and helped the nursing profession gain legitimacy in the medical field. Southern women followed a similar path. Several middle- and upperclass women quickly erected army hospitals following the outbreak of hostilities. In Virginia, Sally Louisa Thompkins, who later received a commis-
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Clara Barton. (National Archives)
sion as a captain in the Confederate Army, established a hospital in Richmond. Others served in military stations at the front and helped to create fund-raising agencies similar to the United States Sanitary Commission. In September, 1862, the Confederate Congress passed a law granting women official positions in the army medical service, and, like their Northern counterparts, Southern nurses helped to eliminate barriers for others. Spies Female spies on both sides also provided military leaders with indispensable logistical information. Some helped prisoners of war escape; others befriended generals and politicians in order to destroy the enemy’s element of surprise. More than four hundred women, moreover, concealed their sex and fought in the war. Although military combat was largely limited to men, female spies and soldiers are further indications of how the war affected the rise of modern feminism. Although the majority of women were forced to return to their domestic roles following the Civil War, this period marked a significant turning point in women’s history. Wartime experiences shattered the myth that women could not endure the rigors of economics, politics, and war. No longer content to sit at home and leave the decision making to men, women gained self-confidence from their wartime ordeals, which fortified the growing feminist movement and eventually helped countless women achieve unprecedented personal success in post-Civil War affairs. Robert D. Ubriaco, Jr.
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Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events October, 1859 Harpers Ferry Date: October 16-18, 1859 Location: Harpers Ferry, Virginia (now part of West Virginia) Principal figures: John Brown (1800-1859), John H. Kagi (1835?-1859), Robert Edward Lee (1807-1870), Franklin Benjamin Sanborn (1831-1917), Governor Henry Alexander Wise (1806-1876) Result: The raid was an attempt by a militant abolitionist to liberate and arm Virginia slaves and help force a civil war. John Brown’s abortive raid on the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry, Virginia (now West Virginia), in October, 1859, stands out as a critical episode in the spiraling sequence of events that led Northerners and Southerners into the Civil War in 1861. Brown, long a militant abolitionist, emigrated to Kansas Territory in 1855 with five of his sons to participate in the struggle between proslavery and antislavery forces for control of the territory. Their insurrection was in the same spirit as earlier violence perpetrated by abolitionist, Free State militias such as the Border Ruffians following election of a proslavery, territorial legislature in 1854. With a small band of Free State men, Brown helped initiate civil war in Kansas by murdering five allegedly proslavery settlers along Pottawatomie Creek, in May, 1856. Historians would later dub this era “Bleeding Kansas.” John Brown Brown’s experience in the Kansas civil war convinced him that a conspiracy existed to seize the national territories for slavery. Having long since lost faith in combating slavery by peaceful means, Brown vowed to strike a violent blow at the heart of slavery. An intense Calvinist, Brown had come to believe that he was God’s personal instrument to eradicate the inhuman institution. As early as 1857, he had decided to seize a mountain fortress in Virginia with a small guerrilla force and incite a bloody slave rebellion that would overthrow the slave powers throughout the South.
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To that end, Brown sought funds and arms from abolitionists in the North. Under the guise of seeking money to continue the Free State fight in Kansas, Brown secured the friendship and financial aid of the Massachusetts State Kansas Committee—a group dedicated to helping the Free-Soil forces in Kansas and elsewhere. The resolute and persuasive Brown won the support of six prominent antislavery figures, who agreed to form a secret Committee of Six to advise him and raise money for his still-secret mission. The Secret Six consisted of a well-educated group of dedicated abolitionists and reformers: Franklin B. Sanborn, a young Concord schoolteacher and secretary of the Massachusetts State Kansas Committee; Thomas Wentworth Higginson, a “disunion abolitionist” and outspoken Unitarian minister; Theodore Parker, a controversial theologian-preacher; Samuel Gridley Howe, a prominent physician and educator; George Luther Stearns, a prosperous merchant and chairman of the Massachusetts State Kansas Committee; and Gerrit Smith, a wealthy New York landowner and reformer. Preparations Throughout the remainder of 1857, the indefatigable Brown trained a small group of adventurers and militant abolitionists in preparation for his mission. In May, 1858, Brown moved on to Chatham, Canada, holding a secret “constitutional convention” attended by thirty-four African Ameri-
John Brown, from a daguerreotype made around 1856. (National Archives)
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cans and twelve whites. There, he outlined his plans to invade Virginia, liberate and arm the slaves, defeat any military force brought against them, organize the African Americans into a government, and force the Southern states to concede emancipation. Under Brown’s leadership, the convention approved a constitution for a new state once the slaves were freed, and elected Brown commander in chief with John Kagi, his chief lieutenant, as secretary of war. Brown’s proposed invasion was delayed in 1858, when a disgruntled follower partially betrayed the plans to several prominent politicians. The exposé so frightened the Secret Six that they urged Brown to return to Kansas and create a diversionary operation until rumors of the Virginia plan dissipated. Brown also agreed not to inform the Secret Six of the details of his plans, so that they could not be held responsible in case the invasion failed. In December, 1858, Brown conducted the diversion as planned, by leading a raid into Missouri, liberating eleven slaves, and escorting them to Canada. He then began final preparations for the invasion of Virginia. The Raid Harpers Ferry, situated at the confluence of the Potomac and Shenandoah Rivers in northern Virginia, was the initial target in Brown’s plan, because he needed weapons from the federal arsenal to arm the liberated
Confluence of the Shenandoah and Potomac Rivers at Harpers Ferry, in 1865. (National Archives)
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slaves. Brown and three of his men arrived at Harpers Ferry on July 3, 1859, and set up headquarters at the Kennedy farm, seven miles east of Harpers Ferry in Maryland. The rest of Brown’s twenty-one young recruits (sixteen whites and five African Americans) slowly trickled in. On the night of October 16, 1859, after several months of refining his plans, Brown led eighteen of his followers in an assault on the arsenal and rifle works at Harpers Ferry. They quickly captured the arsenal, the armory, and a nearby rifle works, and then seized hostages from among the townspeople and surrounding countryside. Fearing a slave insurrection, the armed townspeople gathered in the streets, and church bells tolled the alarm. Brown stood his ground, anxiously waiting for the slaves from the countryside to rally to his cause. By 11:00 a.m. the next day, Brown’s men—holed up in the small fireenginehouse of the armory—engaged in a pitched battle with the assembled townspeople, farmers, and militia. By dawn the following morning, a company of horse Marines under the command of Colonel Robert E. Lee took up positions in front of the armory. When Brown refused Lee’s summons to surrender unconditionally, the Marines stormed the armory, wounded Brown, and routed his followers. Seventeen people died in the raid; ten of the dead, including two of Brown’s sons, were raiders. Five raiders were captured, two were taken prisoner several days later, but five escaped without a trace. Aftermath Governor Henry A. Wise of Virginia decided that Brown and his coconspirators should be tried in Virginia rather than by federal authorities, even though their attack had been against federal property. Brown and the captured raiders stood trial at Charles Town, Virginia; on October 31, the jury found them guilty of inciting a slave rebellion, murder, and treason against the state of Virginia. After the trial, in a final attempt to save his life, Brown’s lawyers collected affidavits from many of his friends and relatives alleging that Brown suffered from hereditary insanity and monomania. Brown rejected his defense, claiming that he was sane. He knew that he could better serve the abolitionist cause as a martyr, a sentiment shared by Northern abolitionists. Governor Wise agreed that Brown was sane, and on December 2, 1859, John Brown was hanged at Charles Town. Six of his fellow conspirators met a similar fate. Brown’s raid intensified the sectional bitterness that led to the Civil War. Although the vast majority of Northerners condemned the incident as the work of a fanatic, the outraged South, racked by rumors of a slave insurrection, suspected all Northerners of abetting Brown’s crime. Republi-
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can denials of any link with Brown were of little avail. Northern abolitionists, including the Secret Six, who had been cleared of complicity, gathered by the hundreds throughout the North to honor and acclaim Brown’s martyrdom. The South was in no mood to distinguish between the Northern Republicans who wanted to contain slavery and the small group of abolitionists who sought to destroy the institution. The South withdrew even further into a defense of its peculiar institution, stifled internal criticism, and intensified its hatred and suspicion of the “Black Republican” Party. In 1861, Northerners marched to war to the tune of “John Brown’s Body”— fulfilling Brown’s prophecy that “the crimes of this guilty land will never be purged away; but with Blood.” Terry L. Seip updated by Richard Whitworth
April, 1861 Battle of Fort Sumter Date: April 12-14, 1861 Location: Charleston, South Carolina Combatants: 80 Union vs. 2,000 Confederate troops Principal commanders: Union, Major Robert Anderson (1805-1871); Confederate, General P. G. T. Beauregard (1818-1893) Result: By capturing Fort Sumter, the Confederacy opened the war with a important symbolic victory. On April 12, 1861, at 4:30 in the morning, Confederate forces began the Civil War with a bombardment of the large masonry fort commanding the shipping lanes into Charleston harbor. Thousands of Confederates filled the city and occupied outer islands, surrounding the installation and making escape or reinforcement nearly impossible. Defending the fort was a skeleton garrison, which lacked necessary manpower and supplies for an effective defense. Major Robert Anderson kept his men under cover and gave limited return fire. General P. G. T. Beauregard kept up the shelling from batteries carefully positioned around the harbor. For thirty-four hours, the shells rained down until a fire within the fort near the powder magazine prompted surrender. Surprisingly, neither side suffered casualties nor were any civilians hurt, and the only deaths came when a gun salute exploded at the surrender ceremony. Union President Abraham Lin-
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Confederate gunners bombarding the Union-held Fort Sumter. (Library of Congress)
coln responded to the loss of the fort by calling for 75,000 volunteers to suppress the Southerners’ rebellion. The firing on Fort Sumter meant the beginning of war between the Union and Confederacy. The Confederate victory boosted Southern morale. For the Union, the loss only strengthened resolve to preserve the Union at all costs. Across the nation, war fever swept up many men who joined the armies of both sides. Henry O. Robertson
July, 1861 First Battle of Bull Run Date: July 21, 1861 Location: Bull Run Creek, or Manassas Junction, Virginia Combatants: 35,000 Union vs. 30,000 Confederate troops Principal commanders: Union, Brigadier General Irvin McDowell (18181885); Confederate, Brigadier General P. G. T. Beauregard (1818-1893), Brigadier General Stonewall Jackson (1824-1863) Result: The first major armed confrontation of the war resulted in a victory for the South and a mutual realization of the terrible brutality of battle.
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The Civil War began on April 12, 1861, at Charleston, South Carolina, when Confederate forces fired on Fort Sumter. For three months thereafter, small fights but no major battles occurred from the Atlantic coast west to Missouri. Then, during July, in the vicinity of a watercourse in northern Virginia called Bull Run, Union and Confederate soldiers met in the largest battle ever fought to that time on the North American continent. That great conflict, the First Battle of Manassas, or Bull Run, was the first of many bloody engagements that marked the road between Washington and Richmond, the capitals of the old Union and the new Confederacy. With the decision, in May, 1861, to make Richmond the infant nation’s capital, Confederate leaders began to strengthen their forces in northern Virginia. President Jefferson Davis brought his country’s military hero, General Pierre G. T. Beauregard, the conqueror of Fort Sumter, to help direct those forces. These troops could both threaten Washington, D.C., and protect Richmond, from a suitable distance. The Confederates were divided into two main groups: one, under Beauregard, numbering about twenty-four thousand troops, was centered on Manassas Junction, thirty miles southwest of Washington; the other, under General Joseph E. Johnston, numbering about eleven thousand, was situated sixty miles west of Manassas, near Winchester, Virginia. Union Preparations While the Confederates were establishing themselves in these positions, the North was beginning to build its military machine. After the battle at Fort Sumter, President Abraham Lincoln had issued an initial call for seventy-five thousand volunteers. Across the Union, armies were being formed. Directing this mobilization from Washington, seventy-five-yearold Winfield Scott, veteran of a half-century of military service and general in chief, tried to make order out of chaos. Under Scott, Brigadier General Irvin McDowell was in command of the Union forces stationed across the Potomac River in Virginia. From his headquarters in Arlington House, which had been the home of Robert E. Lee, McDowell strove to weld his raw recruits into an effective fighting force. Scott’s Plan General Scott, who had more experience than any other officer in the United States Army, developed a plan for the war known as the Anaconda Plan. According to Scott’s strategic concepts, the Union fleet would seize the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, thereby dividing the Confederacy in two. The Navy would then blockade all major Southern ports, prohibiting exportation of cotton and importation of war material. The South then would
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Confederate fortifications at the first Battle of Bull Run, which the Confederacy called the Battle of Manassas. (National Archives)
be strangled slowly in a vise-like grip (hence the name Anaconda Plan). There would be few casualties, and best of all, a wholesale bloodbath involving Americans would be avoided, making reconciliation easier. Scott, who had worked so well with the Navy in the Mexican War, knew that it would take time to train the flood of volunteers, and the longer combat could be avoided, the better it would be for all concerned. Scott, a soldier, thought in military terms, and he did not have to face the tremendous political pressures that Lincoln was experiencing. Except for the naval blockade, Lincoln rejected Scott’s plan in favor of more direct, immediate attacks demanded by his Northern constituency. (Through bitter experience, the Union would eventually gain victory by a process that, in most essentials, resembled Scott’s original plan.) The troops pouring into Washington were totally ignorant of war, and they had not the slightest idea of drill, military discipline, or camp sanitation. Many Northern units wore gray uniforms, and many Southern troops wore blue uniforms. For both sides, there was a bewildering variation in weapons. Some Rebels and Yankees arrived in their camps with antiquated flintlock muskets and obsolete smoothbore muskets. Officers on both sides read the drill manual while putting their troops through the re-
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quired formations. With many units bringing cooks from the best restaurants in New York or New Orleans, the opposing camps took on the air of summer outings rather than schools for war. Scott knew that these “green” attitudes would spell disaster when the issue was finally joined on the battlefield. While Scott and McDowell wanted time to organize and train their troops, Northern public opinion demanded action. A clamor arose for a march to Richmond to put down the rebellion in order to teach the Rebels a lesson. President Lincoln also urged offensive movement, for he believed the North had to attack to win. Finally, upon Lincoln’s order, McDowell’s untried army of about thirty-five thousand moved south toward Beauregard’s Confederates. No previous American had ever taken so large an army into battle. The Battle Beauregard, with his army drawn up behind a small stream named Bull Run, knew about McDowell’s advance. To reinforce the defending army, the Confederate government ordered General Joseph E. Johnston to come to Beauregard’s aid. Johnston began transferring his troops eastward, but before Beauregard could launch his attack, McDowell struck. On the morning of July 21, he ordered his army across Bull Run and hit Beauregard’s left flank. His well-planned assault drove the Confederates back in chaos and confusion. The inexperienced troops on both sides fought well, but the
Union troops retreating at the first Battle of Bull Run. (F. R. Niglutsch)
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Union soldiers steadily forced the Confederates to retreat toward Henry House Hill, the commanding topographical feature on the battlefield. As the advancing Union regiments approached the hill, they ran into elements of Johnston’s army. Johnston had used the railroad to transport his soldiers (a first in warfare), which enabled him to move rapidly to make his junction with Beauregard. Just as the Confederate line on Henry House Hill seemed about to break, General Bernard Bee of South Carolina pointed to a Virginia brigade on the crest and shouted to his beleaguered comrades that it was standing like a stone wall against the Union onslaught. General Thomas J. Jackson’s stand saved the day for the Confederate troops and earned the general the sobriquet “Stonewall.” With Johnston’s fresh troops, the Confederates began advancing. Initially, the Northern units withdrew in an orderly fashion. Suddenly Union units were attacked with great violence by Colonel Jeb Stuart’s First Virginia Cavalry. Heat, weariness, and lack of water and food began to take their toll, and the Northern troops began, often with no orders, to withdraw from the field. Officers tried with varying degrees of success to keep the troops on the field, while some took charge of the withdrawing regiments to ensure some semblance of order. When Confederate artillery fire caused the blocking of a key bridge, the retreat became a rout. Caught up in the Union rout were dignitaries from Washington, including congressmen, who had come down to have a Sunday picnic in the countryside and watch the gallant Northern boys “whip the Rebels.” Aftermath Although the Confederates had defeated their enemy and possessed the battlefield, they could not press their advantage. They were too exhausted and too disorganized to mount a major pursuit and threaten Washington. The Confederates had administered the Union a smashing defeat, yet, like most of the battles that were to follow, this one was indecisive, for it produced neither serious military disadvantage for the North nor advantage for the South. The First Battle of Bull Run was widely celebrated in the South, but it was Lincoln and the North that began a serious training and supply program for their troops. In this, the Union gained a slight advantage from the battle. Although it would be dwarfed in size and ferocity in the months ahead, this first great battle clearly demonstrated that the North and the South were faced, not with a romantic adventure, but with a real and brutal war. William J. Cooper, Jr. updated by James J. Cooke
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February, 1862 Battle of Fort Donelson Date: February 11-16, 1862 Location: Tennessee River in western Tennessee Combatants: 24,000 Union vs. 12,000 Confederate troops Principal commanders: Union, Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant (18221885), Flag Officer Andrew Foote (1806-1863); Confederates, Brigadier General John Floyd (1806-1863), Brigadier General Gideon Pillow (1806-1878), Brigadier General Simon Buckner (1823-1914) Result: Union victory and surrender of a Confederate garrison. Early in February, 1862, Union general Ulysses S. Grant began a campaign along the Tennessee River to open the western portion of the state. On February 6, sixteen transports and gunboats carried 15,000 of Grant’s troops in a combined attack on Fort Henry, forcing its surrender. The next day, Grant marched his army toward Fort Donelson, a distance of twelve miles. On February 14, an assault on the fort by Grant’s troops was repulsed. Grant and Flag Officer Andrew Foote spent the next two days surrounding the fort, which was commanded by General John Floyd, who was assisted by General Gideon Pillow and General Simon Buckner. Despite a partial breakout led by Nathan Bedford Forrest, most of the Confederate forces were trapped. On February 16, Grant sent a message to General Buckner, demanding “unconditional and immediate surrender,” earning the nickname “Unconditional Surrender (U.S.) Grant.” Buckner accepted the terms. Union casualties in the campaign totaled approximately 2,300, and Confederate losses totaled more than 1,400. The capture of Forts Henry and Donelson represented the first victories for forces under the command of General Grant. The victory ensured that Kentucky would remain in the union. Richard Adler
March, 1862 Monitor vs. Virginia Date: March 9, 1862 Location: Hampton Roads, Virginia Combatants: USS Monitor‘s 58-man crew vs. CSS Virginia‘s 150-man crew
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Principal commanders: Union, Lieutenant John Worden (1818-1887), Lieutenant Samuel Dana Greene (1840-1884); Confederate, Captain Franklin Buchanan (1800-1874), Lieutenant Catesby ap R. Jones (1821-1877) Result: This historic battle between ironclad ships marked the beginning of a new era in naval warfare. To build a new navy while his new nation was engaged in a war for survival, Confederate secretary of the navy Stephen R. Mallory determined to adapt new technologies. First on his agenda was equipping his navy with ironclad warships. Although both France and England were building such vessels, the Union navy had maintained its faith in wooden frigates, sloops, and gunboats. The new Southern nation, agrarian in outlook and character, had neither the skilled shipbuilding personnel nor the iron-manufacturing industry to lay down a fleet of iron-armored war vessels immediately. Yet Mallory lobbied the Confederate Congress for such new and expensive technology, telling them, “I regard the possession of an iron armored vessel as a matter of the first necessity.” The Confederacy could never compete with the U.S. Navy in numbers of vessels, he said; thus, armored ships that could stand up to squadrons of wooden-walled frigates were essential. Mallory sent agents to England to order ironclads from British and Scottish naval yards, and at home, he put naval lieutenant John M. Brooke and naval constructor John L. Porter to work designing an ironclad to be built for the Confederacy. Independently, both developed the same design—the ship’s gun deck protected by an armored casemate, its sides sloping inward to ricochet enemy shot. The decks fore and aft of the casemate would ride at water level, and boilers and machinery would be carried below the waterline to further protect them from enemy fire. The Union Navy Union secretary of the navy Gideon Welles, blessed with a strong fleet of conventional wooden warships, was less inclined toward new technology than were others, such as Swedish-born inventor John Ericsson. Ericsson took a number of recent ideas and combined them into a new and radical ironclad design. Instead of a long casemate housing many guns, his ironclad would mount two huge cannons in a round, revolving turret, set squarely in the center of a flat-decked iron ship. When the Union navy abandoned its base at Norfolk, Virginia, to the Confederates, it burned and scuttled several war vessels, including the sixyear-old steam frigate Merrimack. The frigate’s hull, the Rebels found, would make a good platform for their casemated ironclad, and the conversion began. When word of it reached President Abraham Lincoln and
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Secretary Welles, it spurred the Union navy into immediate action on ironclads. The peculiar vessel John Ericsson called the Monitor was now a top naval priority. The Confederates named the ship they built from the remains of the Merrimack the CSS Virginia. Yet, perhaps because of the alliterative properties of “the Monitor and the Merrimack,” the name of the earlier, U.S. wooden frigate has been used most often to identify the Confederate vessel. Even during the war, Confederate citizens and newspapers referred to the Confederate ironclad Virginia as the Merrimack. The race to have an ironclad combat-ready and on the eastern fighting front resulted in a draw. The Monitor, built in one hundred days, showed development problems on its trial runs. Its speed was minimal because of a malfunctioning blower, and it would barely answer the helm, weaving like a drunkard between the shores of Brooklyn and Manhattan. Ericsson fixed these problems, and on March 6, 1862, the Monitor left New York bound for Hampton Roads to meet the threat of the Virginia. The Virginia The Confederates’ Virginia made its trial run on March 8, steaming toward the U.S. blockading squadron in Hampton Roads. The vessel’s commander, Franklin Buchanan, made it a trial by fire, steaming with an untried, ten-gun vessel into the teeth of the enemy’s naval might. The Virginia rammed and sank the forty-four-gun Cumberland and chased aground the fifty-gun Congress, the forty-six-gun Minnesota, and the forty-six-gun St. Lawrence. The Virginia‘s shells set the Congress afire. The Yankees’ return fire had no effect on the ironclad. Burning and aground, the Congress surrendered. Confederate gunboats moved in to evacuate wounded sailors from the vessel, drawing small-arms fire from U.S. soldiers ashore. Captain Buchanan returned fire from the Virginia‘s foredeck and was wounded in the thigh. Command of the ironclad passed to his executive officer, Catesby ap R. Jones. With the tide falling, two Union ships destroyed, and two more aground and awaiting execution, Jones avoided grounding the Virginia by taking it back to its moorings near Norfolk. The next morning, with the rising tide, the Virginia steamed back into the Hampton Roads to finish off the wooden fleet. Unexpectedly, they encountered the Monitor, which had arrived during the night. The two ironclads immediately locked in combat, the wooden ships all but forgotten. The Battle Carrying only explosive shell (no solid shot) in anticipation of fighting only wooden ships, the Virginia was unable to penetrate the Monitor‘s ar-
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mor. One of its shells damaged the Monitor‘s pilot house, however, wounding the captain, Commander John L. Worden. Lieutenant S. Dana Greene assumed command. The Monitor‘s shot broke some iron plating on the Virginia but could not penetrate its armor. For four hours, the two heavyweights fought it out, giving spectators around Hampton Roads a show some thought to be the greatest naval battle of all time. A falling tide finally forced the deep-draft Virginia to break off the engagement and steam for home. The Virginia returned to a hero’s welcome, but Jones and others aboard were frustrated at having sunk neither the Monitor nor the Minnesota. In four hours’ combat, Jones had developed a great respect for the Monitor. “Give me that vessel,” he told a friend, “and I will sink this one in twenty minutes.” In subsequent days, the Virginia was unable to force the Monitor to resume the duel. Secretary Welles forbade the Monitor the option of renewing the fight unless it were absolutely necessary to save the wooden blockading fleet. Aftermath Southerners looked to subsequent Confederate ironclads to break the Union blockade of their port cities. Mallory had thought that the Virginia could steam to New York, carrying the war to the north and laying that city under tribute. Buchanan told him that was impossible: The Virginia was not seaworthy. (Neither was the Monitor. It went down at sea within weeks after the Virginia was burned when McClellan’s army forced the evacua-
Near-contemporary illustration of the battle between the USS Monitor and the CSS Virginia. (National Archives)
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tion of Norfolk.) This quick dashing of Mallory’s offensive hopes may have made him more amenable to President Jefferson Davis’s idea of fighting a strictly defensive war. Thus, the score and more of Confederate ironclads the Virginia spawned stayed mostly on the defensive, successfully holding the ports of Mobile, Savannah, Charleston, and Wilmington, as well as the capital city of Richmond, against the Union Navy. All were taken, like Norfolk, by armies from the rear. The Monitor, too, begat copies. This style of Union ironclad proved superior, with its lighter draft, heavily armored turret, and larger guns, when tried in battle against the Confederate ironclads Atlanta and Tennessee; and its revolving turret became the standard of the world’s navies for the next century. Armored ships and floating batteries had seen combat before the Virginia fought the Monitor, but the devastation the Virginia wrought on the U.S. wooden ships, and the publicity surrounding the entire Hampton Roads affair, made the contest of the Virginia and the Monitor the defining moment in the world’s move from wood to armor in naval warfare. Maurice K. Melton
April, 1862 Battle of Shiloh Date: April 6-7, 1862 Location: Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee (Tennessee River; 110 miles east of Memphis) Combatants: 66,812 Union vs. 44,700 Confederate troops Principal commanders: Union, Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885); Confederate, Albert Sidney Johnston (1803-1862) Result: Union defeat of Confederate forces. On April 6, 1862, about 44,700 Confederate troops under command of Albert Sidney Johnston launched a surprise attack on Ulysses S. Grant’s Union troops camped at Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee. During twelve hours of fighting, Confederate forces concentrated sixty-two pieces of artillery in the “hornet’s nest,” which was the largest concentration to this date of artillery on the North American continent. General Johnston was fatally wounded, and General P. G. T. Beauregard replaced him as commander of the Confederate troops. Despite Grant’s attempts to make a
June-July, 1862: Seven Days’ Battles
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General Pierre G. T. Beauregard. (National Archives)
strong defensive stand, the Confederates forced his troops to retreat to the Tennessee River. The first day of fighting ended at sundown. During the night, Union General Don Carlos Buell arrived from Nashville with 17,918 reinforcements. With fresh troops increasing his strength, Grant attacked the Confederates at dawn. Beauregard, unable to position his troops effectively, retreated to Corinth, Mississippi. Union casualties were 13,087 and Confederates 10,697. The Confederate defeat at Shiloh helped the Union army gain control of the Mississippi River Valley. Stacy W. Reaves
June-July, 1862 Seven Days’ Battles Date: June 25-July 1, 1862 Location: Virginia Combatants: 70,000 Union vs. 90,000 Confederate troops Principal commanders: Union, General George B. McClellan (1826-1885); Confederate General Robert E. Lee (1807-1870) Result: The Confederacy forced Union forces to retreat.
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A typical ruse employed during the Civil War was the Confederacy’s mounting of logs in place of cannons at this Centerville, Virginia, fortification, to fool Union troops. The dummy cannons were known as “Quaker guns,” after the pacifist Society of Friends. (National Archives)
Union general George B. McClellan’s Peninsula campaign was underway in the summer of 1862; the general hoped to lead Union troops to the Confederate capital of Richmond. However, in several encounters with rebel forces, McClellan failed to strike the city. General Robert E. Lee had assumed command of the Confederate forces after General Joseph Eggleston Johnston had been wounded at the Battle of Seven Pines a few weeks earlier. Lee began preparations to defend Richmond and attacked a Union corps just south of Chickahominy. During the next week, both sides clashed at Mechanicsville (June 26), Gaines Mill (June 27), Savage Station (June 29), White Oak Swamp (June 30), and Malvern Hill (July 1). In this last battle, Lee ordered waves of infantry up a hill where the Union forces cut them down with well-positioned artillery. However, although the Union lost only the Gaines Mill engagement, McClellan made the decision to retreat. The Peninsula campaign, especially McClellan’s failure to pursue Lee after the Seven Days’ Battles, reinforced McClellan’s reputation as a field commander who lacked aggressiveness. Lee took the offensive in the East; two months later, Lee and McClellan would meet at Antietam. Gayla Koerting
August, 1862: Second Bull Run
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August, 1862 Second Battle of Bull Run Date: August 29-30, 1862 Location: Near Manassas Junction, Virginia Combatants: 75,000 Union vs. 60,000 Confederate troops Principal commanders: Union, Major General John Pope (1822-1892); Confederate, Major General Stonewall Jackson (1824-1863), Major General James Longstreet (1809-1865) Result: This decisive Confederate victory set the stage for General Robert E. Lee’s first invasion of the North. Major General John Pope displayed his unfitness for command throughout the Second Battle of Bull Run (also known as the Second Manassas Battle). Confused by Stonewall Jackson’s destruction of the huge Union supply depot at Manassas Junction on August 27, Pope ordered his scattered army to concentrate at Centerville and try to cut off Jackson. However, instead of thinking about escape, Jackson assumed a strong defensive position along an abandoned railroad on the battlefield at Bull Run and awaited attack.
Pontoon bridge at Bull Run, Virginia. (National Archives)
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Union general John Pope’s mistakes during the Second Battle of Bull Run gave a victory to the Confederacy and caused a drop in Union morale. (Library of Congress)
On August 29, Pope attacked Jackson, repeatedly sending in troops as they arrived on the battlefield. The piecemeal, uncoordinated nature of these assaults gained little headway; still, when Jackson adjusted his line that evening, Pope misinterpreted it as a retreat and ordered the attack to continue the following morning. These assaults were heavier and better organized, but Pope focused so much on Jackson that he completely ignored the arrival of Major General James Longstreet’s 30,000 Confederates. Consequently, when Longstreet attacked Pope’s exposed left on the afternoon of August 30, he sent the entire Union army into a hurried retreat. Only an effective holding action around Henry House Hill prevented disaster. Union losses exceeded 16,000, while Confederate casualties numbered about 9,200. Coupled with George B. McClellan’s withdrawal from the Virginia Peninsula, Pope’s defeat sent Union morale spiraling downward. When Robert E. Lee moved northward the following week, Abraham Lincoln fired Pope and restored McClellan to overall command in the east. Ralph L. Eckert
September, 1862: Antietam
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September, 1862 Battle of Antietam Date: September 17, 1862 Location: Near Sharpsburg, Maryland Combatants: 70,000-75,000 Union vs. 40,000 Confederate troops Principal commanders: Union, Major General George B. McClellan (18261885); Confederate, General Robert E. Lee (1807-1870) Result: A drawn battle that ended General Lee’s first invasion of the North. After a copy of his plans detailing the widely scattered nature of his army fell into Union hands, Confederate general Robert E. Lee hurriedly concentrated his troops at Sharpsburg. His Union rival, George B. McClellan, pursued cautiously, assembling his army along Antietam Creek. There on September 17, the war’s bloodiest single-day battle was fought. Enjoying a nearly two-to-one advantage, McClellan planned to attack both flanks simultaneously; however, failure by the Union left to advance in the morning prevented a coordinated assault and allowed Lee to shift his outnumbered forces frequently throughout the day. No battle during the American Civil War exceeded Antietam’s intensity and ferocity. The
President Abraham Lincoln and General George B. McClellan visiting the Antietam battlefield two weeks after the battle. (National Archives)
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confused fury of charges and countercharges on the Confederate left raged from dawn until almost noon. Action shifted to the center where combatants hammered away at each other along the “Bloody Lane” to the point of exhaustion. When the Union left finally drove toward Lee’s rear late in the afternoon, only the arrival and attack by the last Southern reinforcements saved Lee from disaster. There was no fighting the following day, but that evening, Lee withdrew across the Potomac. Union casualties exceeded 12,400 and Confederate losses topped 13,700. Although a tactical draw, Antietam profoundly affected the war. Five days after the battle, President Abraham Lincoln issued his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, broadening the war to include a moral crusade to free the slaves. In doing so, he effectively ended the prospect of foreign intervention. Ralph L. Eckert
October, 1862 Battle of Corinth Date: October 3-4, 1862 Location: In and around Corinth, Mississippi Combatants: 128,315 Union vs. 112,000 Confederate troops Principal commanders: Union, General William S. Rosecrans (1819-1898); Confederate, General Earl Van Dorn (1820-1863), General Sterling Price (1809-1867) Result: Union troops resisted the Confederate attack and held the Mississippi city of Corinth. Although the major fighting of the Battle of Corinth took place on October 3-4, 1862, there had been skirmishes dating back to the Battle of Shiloh on April 6-7. In fact, Shiloh was an attempt by the Confederates to keep the Union forces away from the city of Corinth, where two major railroads intersected. The Mobile and Ohio Railroad (M&O) and the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which crossed at Corinth, connected the Confederate States from the Mississippi River at Memphis to the Atlantic Ocean at Charleston, Richmond, and Savannah, and to the Gulf of Mexico at Mobile. If the Confederacy was to win the war, it had to keep these rail lines open. After Shiloh, the Confederates retreated to Corinth awaiting the Union
December, 1862: Fredericksburg
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attack. On May 29, more than 128,000 Union troops, under General William S. Rosecrans, invaded Corinth in what the Union generals thought would be the last battle of the war. However, although the Union forces took the city, the Confederates, led by Generals Earl Van Dorn and Sterling Price, had evacuated Corinth in the dark of night and retreated to Tupelo. The Confederates tried to retake the city on October 3, but following two days of heavy fighting, the assault failed and the Confederates retreated to Ripley. The Union controlled the railroads until 1865. Altogether during the war, more than 300,000 troops were stationed in Corinth, including 200 generals. There were more than one hundred skirmishes in the area. Dale L. Flesher
December, 1862 Battle of Fredericksburg Date: December 13, 1862 Location: At and near Fredericksburg, Virginia Combatants: 130,000 Union vs. 75,000 Confederate troops
Fredericksburg, Virginia, from across the Rappahannock River, a few months after the battle there. (National Archives)
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Principal commanders: Union, Major General Ambrose E. Burnside (18241881); Confederate, General Robert E. Lee (1807-1870) Result: A Confederate victory that was a decisive, dispiriting defeat for the Union. Even though the Confederates, led by General Robert E. Lee, established a strong seven-mile defensive line west and south of Fredericksburg, Major General Ambrose E. Burnside decided to attack there on December 13. His plan had no chance of succeeding. A diversionary effort to the south achieved a brief breakthrough in the morning, but failure to press the advantage guaranteed that the main attack would be made at Fredericksburg against an almost impregnable Confederate position along Marye’s Heights. Advancing uphill across open ground swept by artillery toward infantry well posted on a sunken road behind a stonewall, the Union troops attacked throughout the afternoon. Given the terrain and Confederate placements, the offensive degenerated into a series of piecemeal, suicidal, frontal assaults, all of which were repulsed. Nightfall mercifully ended the slaughter, and two days later, the Union army withdrew across the Rappahannock River. Fredericksburg—one of the most lopsided battles of the war—cost the Union 12,700 lives, the Confederacy barely 5,000.
General Joseph Hooker. (National Archives)
May, 1863: Chancellorsville
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The futile, almost criminal, sacrifice of Union soldiers at Fredericksburg drove morale in the North and in the Army of the Potomac to a new low in the winter of 1862-1863. Burnside was replaced in January, 1863, by Joseph Hooker, who restored the army to its fighting trim. Ralph L. Eckert
May, 1863 Battle of Chancellorsville Date: May 1-4, 1863 Location: Northern Virginia (between Fredericksburg and the Wilderness) Combatants: 134,000 Union vs. 60,000 Confederate troops Principal commanders: Union, Major General Joseph Hooker (1814-1879); Confederate, General Robert E. Lee (1807-1870) Result: A Confederate victory that thwarted another Union move toward Richmond. Major General Joseph Hooker formulated an excellent tactical plan. He would hold General Robert E. Lee’s army near Fredericksburg with 40,000 troops under John Sedgwick while he marched around Lee’s left flank with
General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson scored a brilliant victory at Chancellorsville but died a week afterward—the victim of an accidental shot from one of his own men. (National Archives)
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Dead Confederate soldiers lining a trench after the Battle of Chancellorsville. (National Archives)
75,000. If Lee moved against Hooker, Sedgwick would advance against the Confederate rear. Initially, the plan worked perfectly, but on May 1, Confederates struck the advancing Union soldiers near Chancellorsville. Inexplicably, Hooker surrendered the initiative, ordering his army back into the Wilderness’s wooded maze, which neutralized his manpower and artillery advantages. On May 2, Stonewall Jackson and 28,000 Confederates marched across and around the Union front and delivered an early evening surprise attack against Hooker’s exposed right flank, which crumbled before the onslaught. Despite the wounding of Jackson, Lee renewed his attack on May 3, convincing a dazed and whipped Hooker to retreat. Having turned back Hooker, Lee on the afternoon of May 3 marched back toward Fredericksburg where he met and stopped Sedgwick. By May 6, Hooker’s army had retreated north of the Rappahannock River, leaving the Union with another humiliating defeat. Union casualties exceeded 17,200, and Confederate losses numbered nearly 13,000. This Confederate victory against an army twice its size is recognized as Lee’s greatest battle. His audacity and boldness allowed him to exploit Hooker’s loss of nerve and timidity; nevertheless, Chancellorsville cost the South the invaluable services of Stonewall Jackson, who died on May 10. Ralph L. Eckert
July, 1863: Gettysburg and Vicksburg
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July, 1863 Battles of Gettysburg and Vicksburg Battle of Gettysburg Date: July 1-3, 1863 Location: Gettysburg, Pennsylvania Combatants: 75,000 Confederate vs. 90,000 Union troops Principal commanders: Union, Major General George G. Meade (18151872); Confederate, General Robert E. Lee (1807-1870) Battle of Vicksburg Date: July 4, 1863 Location: Vicksburg, Mississippi Combatants: 70,000 Union vs. 30,000 Confederate troops Principal commanders: Union, General Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885); Confederate, General John C. Pemberton (1814-1881), Joseph Eggleston Johnston (1807-1891) Result: Marking the turning point in the Civil War, these Union victories effectively ended the South’s offensive capabilities. Following the First Battle of Bull Run in July, 1861, there was no serious campaigning in the Eastern theater that year. In 1862, George B. McClellan, the commander of the Union Army of the Potomac, tried to take Richmond by attacking westward on the peninsula between the York and James Rivers. His campaign failed, and Robert E. Lee, commander of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, invaded Maryland. McClellan repulsed him at the Battle of Antietam on September 17. During the ensuing winter, Ambrose Burnside replaced McClellan and attempted to get at Richmond from the north. Lee stopped Burnside’s advance at the Battle of Fredericksburg on December 13. President Abraham Lincoln then put Joseph Hooker in Burnside’s place. Early in the spring of 1863, Hooker tried to move around Lee’s left flank, but Lee counterattacked and defeated him at Chancellorsville on May 3. Gettysburg Lee then launched his second invasion of the North, moving in the general direction of Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania. The Army of the Potomac followed, keeping between Lee and the national capital at Washington. On July 1, the two armies came in contact at Gettysburg, a small
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Pennsylvania college town southwest of Harrisburg. George G. Meade, who had just taken command of the Union forces, rushed his men to the town, as did Lee, for what would become the greatest land battle ever fought in the Americas. On the first day, there was fierce fighting on the northern end of the line, where, despite heavy losses (amounting to 80 percent in one brigade), the Union forces held. On July 2, Lee attacked with his right wing, with similar results. On July 3, Lee ordered a massive assault on Meade’s center, which was fixed on Cemetery Hill. After a planned artillery bombardment of one hour, there ensued an infantry attack of approximately twelve thousand troops under the operational command of Lieutenant General James Longstreet. Longstreet, commanding First Corps and Lee’s “Old War Horse,” had argued strongly against any fight at Gettysburg and bitterly opposed the attack on July 3. Longstreet had three divisions, the strongest of which was Major General George Pickett’s Virginia division. Union artillery and massed infantry fire inflicted casualties of more than 50 percent on the assaulting force and broke up attacking divisions. After an hour of bitter fighting, shattered and dispirited Confederates streamed back from Cemetery Hill. At the same time, east of Gettysburg, General Jeb Stuart’s once seemingly invincible Confederate cavalry was soundly defeated.
General Jeb Stuart, the leading Confederate cavalry commander. (National Archives)
July, 1863: Gettysburg and Vicksburg
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Artist’s depiction of the Battle of Gettysburg. (F. R. Niglutsch)
July 3, 1863, was Lee’s worst day as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee suffered twenty-eight thousand casualties; Meade, twentythree thousand. Lee, his army sorely depleted, retired to Virginia. He could now do no more than defend Virginia and hope that the North would abandon its effort to conquer the South, for the Army of Northern Virginia would never again be capable of assuming the offensive. Vicksburg In the Western theater, meanwhile, the Union was on the offensive. Early in 1862, Ulysses S. Grant had captured Confederate positions at Fort Donelson on the lower Cumberland River and Fort Henry on the Tennessee River. The Confederates fell back to Mississippi, but counterattacked at Shiloh on April 6-7 without success. The Union then took control of all points north of Vicksburg on the Mississippi River. In October, 1862, Grant began an advance down the Mississippi Central Railroad headed for Vicksburg, a fortified city on the Mississippi River. Vicksburg was important because it was on a high bluff, and Confederate artillery there denied passage of the river to the Union boats. While Grant moved along the railroad line with forty thousand men, William T. Sherman, with thirty-two thousand, moved along the river. In December, Confederate cavalry moved into Grant’s rear flank and burned his supply dumps at Holly Springs, Mississippi. Grant fell back to bases in Tennessee. Sherman, not
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Artist’s romantic depiction of Union troops storming a Confederate post at Vicksburg. (F. R. Niglutsch)
realizing that he was unsupported, attacked Vicksburg and suffered heavy casualties. Grant was determined to take Vicksburg by any means, and during the winter of 1862-1863 he tried to bypass Vicksburg by digging a canal opposite the city. This scheme failed, but Grant did not give up the idea of taking the heavily fortified city. Preparing for a spring campaign, he built up a vast quantity of supplies, most placed on barges, which were floated downriver. He had decided on a daring campaign to move south of Vicksburg, cross from Louisiana to Mississippi, and then march his army into the heart of Mississippi, taking the capital city of Jackson, which was forty miles east of Vicksburg. Once Jackson was taken and his rear secured, Grant would move on to Vicksburg, attacking from the east. The prepared supply barges that would be offloaded south of Vicksburg would keep Grant’s highly mobile army well supplied with ammunition and food. It was a daring plan with many dangers, but taking advantage of surprise, mobility, and a unified command, Grant was confident that he could keep Confederates confused and incapable of massing forces against Grant’s smaller army. On April 30, Grant was on dry ground on the east bank of the Mississippi River. He then began a campaign in which he achieved six victories in seventeen days. Moving north, he defeated two Confederate brigades at
July, 1863: Gettysburg and Vicksburg
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Port Gibson on May 1. Continuing his move inland, he headed toward Jackson, the capital of Mississippi and a major railroad center directly east of Vicksburg. With Jackson secure, he would not have to worry about his rear flank when he struck out for Vicksburg. Joseph E. Johnston, Confederate commander in the area, was unable to discover Grant’s intentions, and John C. Pemberton, in immediate command at Vicksburg, was equally confused over the Union commander’s intentions. The result was that Grant, although far outnumbered in the area (seventy thousand to forty thousand), fought each successive battle with overwhelming superiority. On May 12, one of his three corps defeated a Confederate brigade at Raymond, and two days later, his entire army scattered the six thousand Confederates defending Jackson. Grant burned the city, destroyed the railroad facilities, and turned west toward Vicksburg. Pemberton finally realized where Grant was and with most of his force, but without help from Johnston, he engaged Grant halfway to Vicksburg at Champion’s Hill on May 16. Again, Grant drove the enemy from the field, as he did the next day when Pemberton tried to mount a defense a few miles outside Vicksburg at the Big Black River, where Union troops routed the Confederates, forcing a headlong retreat to the earthworks. Pemberton then withdrew inside his defenses at Vicksburg.
Gettysburg, 1863 Confederate attacks Union positions
idge ry R Cemete
Little Round Top Big Round Top
Creek
Willoughby Run
Culp’s Hill Rock
GETTYSBURG Cemetery Hill Pickett’s Lee’s Charge HQ
Meade’s HQ
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On May 19, Grant and his troops, filled with confidence, assaulted the fortress. The Confederates, safely inside their trenches, easily repulsed the attack. Three days later, Grant tried again, with heavy losses. Grant then realized that he could not take the city by assault and settled into a siege. Reinforcements arriving from the North increased the size of his force to seventy thousand, while abundant supplies allowed his artillery to maintain a constant barrage on the enemy positions. The Confederates were short of supplies. By early July, the citizens were starving, the troops were eating mule meat, and the gunners could fire their artillery pieces only three times a day. On July 3, Pemberton asked Grant for surrender terms. Grant allowed the twenty thousand Confederate soldiers to leave Vicksburg upon signing paroles, an agreement not to fight again until properly exchanged. Pemberton accepted. On July 4, Grant raised the Union flag over Vicksburg. With the fall of Port Hudson in Louisiana immediately thereafter, the Mississippi River was in Union hands, and the third of the Confederacy to the west was permanently cut off.
Union and Confederate casualties after the Battle of Gettysburg. The invention of photography before the Civil War helped to bring home the full horrors of war for the first time in history. When President Abraham Lincoln visited the battle site during the following November and delivered his famous Gettysburg Address, he made a point of honoring the dead of both sides. (National Archives)
September, 1863: Chickamauga
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Impact The union strategic and operational victories at Vicksburg and Chattanooga marked the emergence of Ulysses S. Grant as the premier general of the war at that time. Chattanooga confirmed that Grant could win campaigns. In Washington, D.C., Abraham Lincoln, who had dismissed a string of generals and was dissatisfied with Meade’s performance after Gettysburg, made Grant the overall commander of Union forces. Leaving Major General William T. Sherman behind in the West, Grant went east to confront and finally defeat Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. Stephen E. Ambrose updated by James J. Cooke
September, 1863 Battle of Chickamauga Date: September 19-20, 1863 Location: Chickamauga Creek, twelve miles south of Chattanooga, Tennessee Combatants: 60,000 Union vs. 70,000 Confederate troops Principal commanders: Union, General William S. Rosecrans (1819-1898), General George H. Thomas (1816-1870); Confederate, General Braxton Bragg (1817-1876), General James Longstreet (1809-1865) Result: A Confederate victory that drove Union forces back into Chattanooga, where they were besieged. By September 19, 1863, General William S. Rosecrans had assembled his widely scattered forces and established a defensive line near Chickamauga Creek. The densely wooded terrain resulted in generally desultory fighting as the opposing armies sought each other’s positions. General Braxton Bragg planned to assault both Union flanks on September 20, followed by an assault on the Union center. A blunder by Union forces resulted in a gap in the Union center only minutes before General James Longstreet attacked. The Union right flank crumpled, but the defense of Snodgrass Hill by George H. Thomas—the “Rock of Chickamauga”—saved the Union army from annihilation. Having suffered 16,000 casualties, the Union army retreated into Chattanooga. There a severely weakened Confederate army that had sustained nearly 18,500 casualties besieged it.
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Chickamauga battlefield. (National Archives)
The Confederate victory restored Southern morale after the twin defeats of Gettysburg and Vicksburg in early July. Union general William T. Sherman replaced Rosecrans and broke the siege with the victory at Chattanooga (November 23-25, 1863). William S. Brockington
November, 1863 Battle of Chattanooga Date: November 23-25, 1863 Location: Chattanooga, Tennessee Combatants: Union vs. Confederacy Principal commanders: Confederate, Braxton Bragg (1817-1870); Union, General Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885), George H. Thomas (1816-1870) Result: Mainly because of good luck, the Union general Ulysses S. Grant won another important victory that solidified the growing Union strength in the South. Following his victory at Vicksburg, Mississippi, in July, 1863, General Ulysses S. Grant, accompanied by General William T. Sherman and his corps,
May, 1864: Battle of the Wilderness
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went east to Chattanooga, Tennessee, where a Union army was under siege. Chattanooga was a railroad center and the largest city in eastern Tennessee, an area noted for its Union sentiments. Braxton Bragg, leading the Confederate forces, had won a victory south of the city at Chickamauga (September 20, 1863), forcing the Union Army to fall back into Chattanooga. Grant arrived in mid-October. After restoring the supply line that Bragg had cut, Grant launched his attack on November 25. He planned to strike Bragg’s flanks, with a feint in the center. The troops of George H. Thomas, commander of the Union Army of the Cumberland, made the feint up Missionary Ridge, drove out the Confederates who had been facing them in their trenches, and to the amazement of the Union commanders, continued, without orders, right up the hill to destroy Bragg’s line. Bragg lost sixty-seven hundred troops, Grant fifty-eight hundred. With Vicksburg and Chattanooga firmly in the hands of the Union, the Confederate position in the West had become tenuous at best. Stephen E. Ambrose updated by James J. Cooke
May, 1864 Battle of the Wilderness Date: May 5-7, 1864 Location: West of Chancellorsville, Virginia Combatants: 115,000 Union vs. 70,000 Confederate troops Principal commanders: Union, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant (18221885); Confederate, General Robert E. Lee (1807-1870) Result: This first battle of the 1864 Overland Campaign was a tactical draw. On May 4, 1864, when Ulysses S. Grant crossed the Rapidan River, Robert E. Lee moved quickly to strike the Union army in the dense, overgrown Wilderness, hoping to minimize the Union’s manpower and artillery advantages. Fighting began the following morning along the Orange Turnpike and later along the Orange Plank Road. Fed into battle as they arrived, soldiers rarely saw their opponents in this wooded maze and were forced to fire blindly in the direction from which bullets and noise came. Combat was furious, incredibly confused, but inconclusive on the May 5.
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Burying the dead at Fredericksburg, Virginia, after the Battle of the Wilderness. (National Archives)
May 6 brought another day of vicious, disoriented fighting, during which the tide of battle shifted frequently. A heavy, early morning Union assault drove the Confederates back and threatened disaster until justarriving reinforcements stopped the advance. Later, though outnumbered, Lee managed to turn both of Grant’s flanks, but lines stabilized after dark. The situation that evening was similar to that in Chancellorsville the previous year. Joseph Hooker had retreated; Grant, however, pressed on toward Richmond on the night of May 7. Union losses numbered 17,000 and Confederate casualties exceeded 11,000. Although the Battle of the Wilderness was a costly tactical draw, Grant’s decision to continue his offensive, to move southward toward Spotsylvania Court House, marked the beginning of the end. Grant maintained pressure on Lee and concluded the war on his terms. Ralph L. Eckert
May, 1864: Spotsylvania Court House
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May, 1864 Battle of Spotsylvania Court House Date: May 8-20, 1864 Location: Around Spotsylvania Court House, Virginia Combatants: 110,000 Union vs. 60,000 Confederate troops Principal commanders: Union, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant (18221885); Confederate, General Robert E. Lee (1807-1870) Result: Indecisive series of battles in the 1864 Overland Campaign. Following the Battle of the Wilderness (May, 1864), Ulysses S. Grant tried to slip around Robert E. Lee’s right and seize Spotsylvania Court House. However, vigilant Confederates beat the Union forces to this crucial crossroads early on May 8. Lee’s men erected field fortifications and fierce fighting developed as the armies converged. On May 10, a compact mass of Union soldiers pierced the Mule Shoe salient in the center of Lee’s line but could not exploit the penetration. Convinced that a tactically similar, though massive assault against the salient could achieve a decisive breakthrough, Grant ordered an entire corps to attack on May 12. At 4:30 a.m., Union troops attacked, captured Confederate trenches, prisoners, and artillery, and drove down the Mule Shoe. Disaster threatened, but desperate Confederate counterattacks pushed the Union forces back to the original lines. Some of the most savage
General Ulysses S. Grant (at left) studying a map over the shoulder of General George G. Meade (seated), shortly after the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House. (National Archives)
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fighting of the war ensued as soldiers fought long into the night—often at arm’s length—while Lee constructed a new defensive line. Grant attacked again on May 18 but was easily repulsed as was a Confederate reconnaissance in force the following day. The battles around Spotsylvania ended in a draw but cost the North 18,000 casualties and the South at least 12,000. Almost two weeks of combat around Spotsylvania Court House provided further evidence of Grant’s relentless determination. Despite appalling casualties, he would not retreat, but rather pressed on toward Richmond. Ralph L. Eckert
June, 1864 Battle of Cold Harbor Date: June 3-12, 1864 Location: Central Virginia Combatants: 100,000 Union vs. 50,000 Confederate troops Principal commanders: Union, Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885), George G. Meade (1815-1872); Confederate, Robert E. Lee (1807-1870) Result: Against well-fortified Confederate defenders, the Union army suffered heavy casualties.
Image not available
Workers bury the remains of men who died at the Battle of Cold Harbor. (Corbis)
June, 1864: Cold Harbor
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General George G. Meade (National Archives)
When Ulysses S. Grant was appointed to lead the various Union armies in March, 1864, he was upset by the lack of a coordinated plan for victory. He believed a policy of unrelenting attrition would eventually ground down the Confederacy. He ordered George G. Meade to advance toward Richmond. To ensure Meade’s continual advance, Grant attached himself to the combined force. Opposing this Union thrust was the Army of Northern Virginia, ably led by Robert E. Lee. The first major battles were at the Wilderness (May 5-7) and Spotsylvania (May 8-20). In both of these conflicts, Union forces suffered substantial casualties, but Grant continued moving to the Confederate right, seeking to outflank his opponent. On June 3, the Northern armies launched a massive assault on the entrenched Confederates at Cold Harbor. The Southerners decimated the Union infantry. Gunners firing from fortifications mowed down waves of foot soldiers. Ultimately, the Union suffered 7,000 casualties, compared with only 1,500 for the defenders. After the Battle at Cold Harbor, Grant again moved south, then advanced on Petersburg. The heavy losses incurred at Cold Harbor caused Grant to later comment that he regretted this assault more than any other he had ever ordered. Thomas W. Buchanan
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June, 1864-April, 1865 Siege of Petersburg Date: June 15, 1864-April 3, 1865 Location: Petersburg, Virginia, twenty miles south of Confederate capital, Richmond Combatants: 64,000 Union vs. 42,000 Confederate troops Principal commanders: Union, General Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885); Confederate, General Robert E. Lee (1807-1870) Result: After a prolonged siege, Union troops captured Petersburg. Union general Ulysses S. Grant repeatedly failed in previous operations to turn General Robert E. Lee’s flank so that Richmond would be exposed to attack. Grant changed his strategy, making his main objective to capture Petersburg, an important railroad and supply junction, after crossing the James River from the south. He would then be in a good position to make a direct assault against the Confederate capital once Petersburg was under Union control. Grant’s Army of the Potomac managed to keep Lee’s
Union soldiers waiting in their trenches for the start of the Battle of Petersburg. (National Archives)
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Army of Northern Virginia unaware of his movements for several days. However, misunderstanding, a lack of coordination, and disorganization among Union commanders put a halt to the original plan. Lee’s forces were able to reinforce and defend Petersburg; a ten-month siege began. The Union forces bungled the situation further by exploding a mine, costing many lives. Grant eventually took Petersburg after Union forces routed the rebels at Five Forks. This Union victory placed a tremendous strain upon Lee’s limited manpower and resources. Gayla Koerting
November, 1864-April, 1865 Sherman’s March to the Sea Date: November 15, 1864-April 18, 1865 Location: Georgia and the Carolinas Principal figures: Confederate, John Bell Hood (1831-1879); Union, William T. Sherman (1820-1891), Oliver Otis Howard (1830-1909), Henry Warner Slocum (1827-1894) Result: Practicing “total war” and demoralization, General Sherman carved a path of destruction through Georgia and the Carolinas. Following his victory at Chattanooga, Ulysses S. Grant went to Washington, D.C., to become the general in chief of the Union army. His successor in the Western theater was William T. Sherman. In the spring of 1864, both generals launched offensives, Grant against Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, and Sherman against Joseph E. Johnston’s Army of Tennessee. Grant spent the spring and summer fighting Lee in northern Virginia, suffering heavy casualties but forcing the Confederates to fall back. By fall, the Union forces were besieging Richmond in overwhelming numbers. The Campaign Begins Sherman began his campaign on May 7, starting from Chattanooga with a hundred thousand troops and heading toward Atlanta. Johnston, his opponent, had a strength of about sixty-two thousand. Johnston used delaying tactics, refusing to fight a major battle and falling back toward Atlanta. Johnston’s tactics exasperated Confederate president Jefferson Davis, who replaced Johnston with John Bell Hood. Despite inferior numbers,
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Artist’s depiction of the destruction wreaked during Sherman’s march through Georgia. (F. R. Niglutsch)
Hood attacked Sherman twice, at Peachtree Creek on July 20 and in the Battle of Atlanta on July 22. Hood lost eighty-five hundred soldiers to Sherman’s loss of thirty-seven hundred and had to abandon Atlanta. Hood then slipped around Sherman’s flank, heading toward the Union supply dumps at Chattanooga and Nashville, Tennessee. Grant, Union chief of staff Henry Halleck, and President Abraham Lincoln all wanted Sherman to follow Hood and to destroy his army, but instead, Sherman left a comparatively small force under George Thomas at Nashville and prepared to march across Georgia to the Atlantic seaport of Savannah. After burning Atlanta, he began the march on November 15. With Hood moving against Thomas in Nashville (where he eventually lost most of his army in the Battle of Nashville), the Confederates could oppose Sherman’s sixty thousand troops with only thirteen thousand soldiers, mostly cavalry. Sherman moved in two wings, brushing all opposition aside. His men lived off the land. “Bummers” went out each morning to the flanks, taking chickens, cows, vegetables, and whatever else they could find. They burned down homes and buildings and destroyed the railroad system. Sherman was determined to see to it that Georgia’s civilians realized the horrors of war, and he succeeded. He also wished to cut off Lee’s food supply and to encourage desertion in the Army of Northern Virginia, hoping
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that Confederate soldiers would return to their homes to protect them from Union “bummers.” As Sherman expressed his philosophy, “Until we can repopulate Georgia, it is useless to occupy it; but the utter destruction of its roads, houses and people will cripple their military resources. . . . I can make the march, and make Georgia howl.” Sherman reached Savannah on December 10. He sent Lincoln a telegram stating that he wished to offer Savannah as “a Christmas present” to the commander in chief. After refitting his army with supplies brought down from Washington by sea, he marched north into the Carolinas. Again his troops, facing no major opposition, devastated the countryside. The Northern troops were even more severe in South Carolina than they had been in Georgia, since they tended to blame South Carolina, the first state to secede, for the war. As Sherman put it: “We can punish South Carolina as she deserves. . . . I do sincerely believe that the whole United States, North and South, would rejoice to have this army turned loose on South Carolina to devastate that State, in the manner we have done in Georgia.” South Carolina’s capital city, Columbia, was engulfed in flames in late February. Union Victory By late March, 1865, Sherman was in the middle of North Carolina, where his old opponent, Joseph Johnston, had scraped together a small force to resist him. In Virginia, meanwhile, Grant had forced Lee to abandon Richmond and retreat toward western Virginia. By early April, Grant was in close pursuit. Lee, his army almost gone as a result of starvation and desertion, surrendered on April 9 at Appomattox Courthouse, Virginia. By then, the proud Army of Northern Virginia was reduced to a force of 26,700, while Grant had nearly 113,000 troops. Johnston, with the major Confederate Army gone, decided to follow Lee’s example, and on April 18 he signed an armistice with Sherman. The Civil War was over. As Sherman, who earlier in his career had directed a Louisiana military school, explained succinctly, “The South bet on the wrong card and lost.” His fifty-seven-mile-wide path of destruction demoralized the South’s population and, with Grant’s military success, helped hasten the war’s end. Stephen E. Ambrose updated by Joseph Edward Lee
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December, 1864 Battle of Savannah Date: December 9-21, 1864 Location: Savannah, Georgia Combatants: 62,000 Union vs. 15,000 Confederate troops Principal commanders: Union, Major General William T. Sherman (18201891); Confederate, Lieutenant General William J. Hardee (1815-1873) Result: Sherman eventually captured Savannah, Georgia’s largest city and a major port. By late 1864, the forces of Confederate general John Bell Hood had been driven back into northern Alabama. General William T. Sherman, no longer fearing opposition from the enemy, planned his March to the Sea campaign after occupying Atlanta. His main goal was to continue operations in Georgia and capture Savannah. To achieve this objective, Sherman marched his troops 285 miles. As they marched, they destroyed anything of military value in their path. Sherman wanted to demoralize the southern population by using total warfare tactics. His forces reached Savannah in early December, but Lieutenant General William J. Hardee maintained strong defensive fortifications. A siege ensued until December 13, when one of Sherman’s divisions took Fort McCallister along the Ogeechee River. This action allowed Sher-
General William T. Sherman. (National Archives)
December, 1864: Nashville
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man to surround the city and seize it eight days later. Sherman later telegraphed President Abraham Lincoln and presented the city to him as a Christmas gift. The occupation of Savannah signaled the ultimate triumph of Sherman’s March to the Sea. Sherman then continued his path of destruction into the Carolinas. Gayla Koerting
December, 1864 Battle of Nashville Date: December 15-16, 1864 Location: Nashville and Franklin, Tennessee Combatants: 65,000 Union vs. 40,000 Confederate troops Principal commanders: Union, General George H. Thomas (1816-1870), Major General John Schofield (1831-1906); Confederate, General John Bell Hood (1831-1879) Result: The Union victory left General Hood’s Army of Tennessee in shambles. Confederate general John Bell Hood planned to move into middle Tennessee to cut off Union general William T. Sherman’s advance into the lower south. However, Hood’s operation was doomed from the start because he did not begin until mid-November and lacked troops to execute such a campaign. He failed to strike a serious blow against retreating Union forces commanded by General John Schofield. This allowed Schofield time to set up a defensive perimeter outside of Franklin, twenty-five miles south of Nashville. Unfortunately, Hood ordered a frontal assault against Union positions and suffered huge casualties including a number of generals. Hood’s offensive was shattered, but Union general George H. Thomas delayed in delivering a counterstrike because of bad weather. On December 15, Thomas finally attacked Hood’s flank. The next day, Union troops launched an all-out offensive and soundly defeated the rebel forces. Hood’s army was in complete ruins after Nashville, and he resigned from command. With Hood no longer a threat, Sherman completed his March to the Sea, and Union troops captured Savannah, Georgia, later that month. Gayla Koerting
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April, 1865 Surrender at Appomattox Date: April 9, 1865 Location: Appomattox Courthouse, Virginia Principal figures: Confederate, General Robert Edward Lee (1807-1870), John Wilkes Booth (1838-1865); Union, General Ulysses S. Grant (18221885), President Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865), Vice President Andrew Johnson (1808-1875), Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton (1814-1869) Result: The Confederacy’s surrender formally brought an end to the Civil War. Five days later, a Confederate sympathizer shot and killed President Abraham Lincoln while he was attending a play in Washington, D.C. The assassination of President Abraham Lincoln occurred only five days after Confederate general Robert E. Lee surrendered to Union general Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Courthouse on April 9, 1865. The other Confederate armies soon surrendered, and the Civil War came to an end. Lincoln’s body was taken back to Springfield, Illinois, on a circuitous seventeen-hundred-mile route that retraced his 1861 journey to Washington, D.C. The Union Victory President Lincoln had been the chief architect of the Union victory that ended the long war. In March, 1864, he called General Grant to the White House and placed him in overall command of the Union Armies. Grant then embarked upon a vigorous campaign aimed at Richmond, engaging Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia in two important battles west of Fredricksburg, Virginia—Wilderness, May 5-7, and Spotsylvania, May 8-9, 1864. Grant suffered heavy casualties but pushed on to Cold Harbor (June 1-3). There, the Confederates repulsed his attack which, had it been successful, would have led to the fall of Richmond. Grant then attempted to outflank Lee by crossing the James River and driving toward Petersburg, where he intended to cut vital rail connections. Lee was able to check Grant’s advance short of Petersburg, however, and a nine-month stalemate ensued. Meanwhile, General William T. Sherman had completed his destructive march from Atlanta to the sea at Savannah, Georgia. He then moved northward in a march that was to take him through South Carolina and North Carolina. All signs pointed to a Confederate defeat in 1865:
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The Union blockade was increasingly effective; Great Britain no longer showed much sympathy for the Confederacy; the economy of the South was breaking down under the impact of the war; and Grant continued to receive troop replacements, whereas Lee’s troops were becoming exhausted. A peace conference, which Confederate president Jefferson Davis had suggested, was held on February 3, 1865. Confederate vice president Alexander H. Stephens led the delegation from the South, while Lincoln spoke for the Union. Lincoln insisted upon the disbanding of the Confederate forces, but the Confederacy was not then willing to surrender. In April, 1865, Grant was able to extend Lee’s lines to the breaking point, and Lee was forced to evacuated the Confederate capital of Richmond as well as Petersburg. Lee’s escape route lay to the west and south; he hoped to join forces with General Joe Johnston in North Carolina, but Grant’s forces blocked his escape. Lee, now convinced of the futility of continuing the war, met Grant at the McLean house in Appomattox Courthouse, where he surrendered. Grant, following the spirit of President Lincoln’s instructions, agreed to release Lee’s officers and men on parole. Lee’s troops were allowed to keep their horses, mules, and sidearms and then return home. In short order, the other scattered
Appomattox Court House. (National Archives)
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After Abraham Lincoln’s assassination, Vice President Andrew Johnson became president and assumed responsibility for implementing the Union’s Reconstruction policies in the defeated South. (National Archives)
Confederate armies followed General Lee’s lead and began the ordeal of surrender. The last significant group of men under arms, those under the command of General Joseph Johnston, began surrender negotiations with Sherman on April 17. The war had wrought a death toll far greater than anyone could have imagined four years earlier: 360,000 Union soldiers, 260,000 men from the South, and unknown numbers of civilians. The economic havoc would leave the South devastated for a century. News of Lee’s surrender reached Washington the same day it took place, and it was received with great rejoicing. Lincoln made several extemporaneous speeches and one prepared address during the course of the next several days in response to the demands of exuberant crowds. It was Lincoln’s view that the South should be welcomed back as brothers to enable healing to begin. In this regard, he was strongly opposed by the Radical Republicans within Congress. It was their view that the South had started the war and should be made to pay. Whether Lincoln might have curbed their hatred remains an unanswered question. Lincoln’s Assassination At approximately 8:30 p.m. on April 14, President and Mrs. Lincoln, in company with Miss Clara Harris and Major Henry R. Rathbone, entered Ford’s Theater to see a performance of Our American Cousin. About
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10:15 p.m., John Wilkes Booth, a twenty-six-year-old actor who sympathized with the South, slipped into the president’s box and fired one shot into the back of Lincoln’s head. The president was mortally wounded and died the next morning at 7:22, without ever having regained consciousness. After shooting Lincoln, Booth jumped onto the stage, breaking a small bone in his leg as he landed. From the stage he shouted the motto of Virginia, Sic semper tyrannis (thus ever to tyrants). In the confusion, he managed to evade capture in Washington, escaping over the bridge into Virginia. There, his broken leg was set by Dr. Samuel Mudd. It remains unclear whether Mudd was aware of the significance of his patient. Booth was eventually trapped in a tobacco shed near Port Royal, Virginia, on April 26. There Booth died, either by his own hand or from a shot fired by one of the soldiers attempting to arrest him. The president’s assassination was only one part of a major plot to murder the most important Union officials. Secretary of State William Seward and his sons, Frederick and Augustus, suffered knife wounds at the hands of Lewis Paine, a former Confederate soldier and devotee of Booth. George A. Atzerodt, an alcoholic, was assigned by Booth to kill Vice President Johnson, but he failed to make the attempt. Secretary of War Edwin Stanton took charge of the investigation and ordered the arrest of Paine, Atzerodt, David Herold, Edward Spangler, Samuel Arnold, Michael O’Laughlin, Dr. Samuel Mudd, and Mrs. Mary E. Surratt, owner of the boardinghouse in which the conspirators met. The likelihood is that Mrs. Surratt knew nothing of Booth’s plot. However, she was caught up in the passion for revenge that followed Lincoln’s murder. Fate of the Conspirators The alleged conspirators were tried before a military commission whose jurisdiction was questionable. The trial lasted from May 10 to June 30, and all the defendants were found guilty. Atzerodt, Paine, Herold, and Surratt were hanged seven days after the trial ended, while Spangler, Arnold, Mudd, and O’Laughlin were sentenced to life imprisonment. Surratt’s execution was almost certainly a miscarriage of justice that could not have been carried out if a few weeks or months had been allowed for passions to cool. By contrast, her son John escaped immediate capture and, when tried in 1867, was released after a jury failed to agree on a verdict. Those sentenced to life imprisonment were pardoned in 1869, with the exception of O’Laughlin, who died of yellow fever at the Dry Tortugas prison off Key West. Dr. Mudd was found guilty as an accessory after the fact, and also sentenced to life imprisonment. However, his heroics
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during the yellow fever epidemic resulted in a commutation of his sentence, and he also was freed in 1869. Mudd’s descendants have continued to argue for his innocence. Former president of the Confederacy Jefferson Davis was taken prisoner soon after Lee’s surrender. Although he was indicted for treason and imprisoned two years at Fort Monroe, he never came to trial. Mark A. Plummer updated by Richard Adler
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Further Reading Allen, Stacy. “Shiloh.” Blue and Gray, Winter-Summer, 1997, 6-65. Alotta, Robert I. Civil War Justice: Union Army Executions Under Lincoln. Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane, 1989. Andrews, J. Cutler. The North Reports the Civil War. Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1955. Bailey, Anne J. The Chessboard of War: Sherman and Hood in the Autumn Campaigns of 1864. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000. ____________. War and Ruin: William T. Sherman and the Savannah Campaign. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 2003. Ballard, Michael B. Vicksburg: The Campaign That Opened the Mississippi. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004. Baxter, James Phinney. The Introduction of the Ironclad Warship. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933. Belz, Herman. Abraham Lincoln, Constitutionalism, and Equal Rights in the Civil War Era. New York: Fordham University Press, 1998. Beringer, Richard E., Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still, Jr. Why the South Lost the Civil War. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986. Bernstein, Iver Charles. The New York City Draft Riots: Their Significance for American Society and Politics in the Age of the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Bigelow, John, Jr. The Campaign of Chancellorsville: A Strategic and Tactical Study. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1910. Blanton, DeAnne, and Lauren M. Cook. They Fought Like Demons: Women Soldiers in the American Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002. Boatner, Mark M. III. The Civil War Dictionary. New York: Harper & Row, 1959. Bonekemper, Edward H. III. A Victor, Not a Butcher: Ulysses S. Grant’s Overlooked Military Genius. Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2004. Bowers, John. Chickamauga and Chattanooga: The Battles That Doomed the Confederacy. New York: HarperCollins, 1994. Bruce, Robert V. Lincoln and the Tools of War. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1956. Burton, Brian K. Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001.
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Burton, E. Milby. The Siege of Charleston, 1861-1865. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987. Cannan, John. The Spotsylvania Campaign: May 7-21, 1864. Conshohocken, Pa.: Combined Publishing, 1997. Catton, Bruce. The Centennial History of the Civil War. 3 vols. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961-1965. The Civil War. 28 vols. Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 1983-1987. Collier, Christopher. The Civil War, 1860-1865. New York: Benchmark Books, 2000. Commager, H. S., ed. The Civil War Archive: The History of the Civil War in Documents. New York: Black Dog & Leventhal, 2000. Connelly, Thomas L., and Archer Jones. The Politics of Command: Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1983. Cooling, Benjamin. Fort Donelson’s Legacy: War and Society in Kentucky and Tennessee. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1997. Cox, Jacob D. The March to the Sea: Franklin and Nashville. New York: J. Brussel, 1959. Cozzens, Peter. The Darkest Days of the War: The Battles of Iuka and Corinth. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. ____________. The Shipwreck of Their Hopes: The Battles for Chattanooga. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994. ____________. This Terrible Sound: The Battle of Chickamauga. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992. Cozzens, Peter, and Robert I. Girardi, eds. The Military Memoirs of General John Pope. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998. Cullen, Joseph P. The Peninsula Campaign, 1862: McClellan and Lee Struggle for Richmond. Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1973. Cunningham, Frank. General Stand Watie’s Confederate Indians. San Antonio, Tex.: Naylor, 1959. Dale, Edward Everett, and Morris L. Wardell. History of Oklahoma. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1948. Daniel, Larry J. Shiloh: The Battle That Changed the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997. ____________. Days of Glory: The Army of the Cumberland, 1861-1865. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004. Davis, William C. Battle at Bull Run: A History of the First Major Campaign of the Civil War. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1977. ____________. Death in the Trenches: Grant at Petersburg. Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 1986. ____________. Duel Between the First Ironclads. New York: Doubleday, 1975.
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Detzer, David. Allegiance: Fort Sumter, Charleston, and the Beginning of the Civil War. New York: Harcourt, 2001. ____________. Donnybrook: The Battle of Bull Run, 1861. Orlando, Fla.: Harcourt, 2004. Dowdy, Clifford. The Seven Days: The Emergence of Robert E. Lee. New York: Fairfax Press, 1978. Dudley, G. W. Lost Account of the Battle of Corinth and Court Martial of General Van Dorn. Jackson, Tenn.: McCowat-Mercer Press, 1955. Emery, Michael, and Edwin Emery. The Press and America: An Interpretive History of the Mass Media. 6th ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1988. Engle, Stephen D. Struggle for the Heartland: The Campaigns from Fort Henry to Corinth. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001. Evans, Sara M. Born for Liberty: A History of Women in America. New York: Free Press, 1991. Fairman, Charles. History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Reconstruction and Reunion 1864-88. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1971. Faust, Patricia L., ed. Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War. New York: Harper & Row, 1986. Fellman, Michael. Citizen Sherman: A Life of William Tecumseh Sherman. New York: Random House, 1995. First Blood: Fort Sumter to Bull Run. Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 1983. Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative. 3 vols. New York: Random House, 1958-1974. Fordney, Ben Fuller. Stoneman at Chancellorsville: The Coming of Age of Union Cavalry. Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Books, 1998. Frank, Allen, and George A. Reaves. “Seeing the Elephant”: Raw Recruits at Shiloh. New York: Greenwood Press, 1989. Freeman, Douglas Southall. Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1942-1944. Friend, Jack. West Wind, Flood Tide: The Battle of Mobile Bay. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2004. Furgurson, Ernest B. Chancellorsville, 1863: The Souls of the Brave. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992. ____________. Not War But Murder: Cold Harbor, 1864. New York: Knopf, 2000. Gaines, W. Craig. The Confederate Cherokees: John Drew’s Regiment of Mounted Rifles. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989. Gallagher, Gary W., ed. The Antietam Campaign. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999.
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____________. Chancellorsville: The Battle and its Aftermath. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996. ____________. The Fredericksburg Campaign: Decision on the Rappahannock. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995. ____________. The Richmond Campaign of 1862: The Peninsula and the Seven Days. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. ____________. The Spotsylvania Campaign. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998. ____________. The Wilderness Campaign. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. Geary, James W. We Need Men: The Union Draft in the Civil War. Dekalb: Illinois University Press, 1991. Glatthaar, Joseph T. Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers. New York: Free Press, 1990. ____________. The March to the Sea and Beyond: Sherman’s Troops in the Savannah and Carolinas Campaigns. New York: New York University Press, 1985. Gott, Kendall D. Where the South Lost the War: An Analysis of the Fort HenryFort Donelson Campaign, February 1862. Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 2003. Greene, A. Wilson. Breaking the Backbone of the Rebellion: The Final Battles of the Petersburg Campaign. Madison City, Iowa: Savas Publishing, 2000. Harsh, Joseph L. Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1999. Haskins, James. The Day Fort Sumter Was Fired On: A Photo History of the Civil War. New York: Scholastic, 1995. Hattaway, Herman, and Archer Jones. How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983. Hearn, Chester G. Six Years of Hell: Harpers Ferry During the Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996. Hendrickson, Robert. Sumter, the First Day of the Civil War. New York: Promontory Press, 1996. Hennessy, John J. Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993. Hess, Earl J. Banners to the Breeze: The Kentucky Campaign, Corinth, and Stones River. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000. ____________. Pickett’s Charge–the Last Attack at Gettysburg. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. Hirshson, Stanley P. The White Tecumseh: A Biography of General William T. Sherman. New York: J. Wiley, 1997.
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Hoeling, A. A. Vicksburg, Forty-seven Days of Siege. Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1996. Huddleston, Edwin. The Civil War in Middle Tennessee. Nashville, Tenn.: Nashville Banner, 1965. Hyman, Harold. A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on the Constitution. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973. ____________. The Reconstruction Justice of Salmon P. Chase: “In Re Turner” and “Texas v. White.” Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997. Johnston, Robert M. Bull Run: Its Strategy and Tactics. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913. Jones, Archer. Civil War Command and Strategy: The Process of Victory and Defeat. New York: Free Press, 1992. Josephy, Alvin M., Jr. Civil War in the American West. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991. Klement, Frank L. Dark Lanterns: Secret Political Societies, Conspiracies, and Treason Trials in the Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984. Kobre, Sidney. Foundations of American Journalism. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970. Kohn, Stephen M. Jailed for Peace: The History of American Draft Law Violation, 1658-1985. New York: Praeger, 1987. Korn, Jerry. The Fight for Chattanooga: Chickamauga to Missionary Ridge. Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 1985. Kutler, Stanley. Judicial Power and Reconstruction Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968. Lee Takes Command: From Seven Days to Second Bull Run. Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 1984. Leonard, Elizabeth D. All the Daring of the Soldier: Women of the Civil War Armies. New York: W. W. Norton, 1999. Long, E. B. The Civil War Day by Day: An Almanac, 1861-1865. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971. Longacre, Edward G. Army of Amateurs: General Benjamin Butler and the Army of the James, 1863-1865. Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1997. McDonald, JoAnna H. We Shall Meet Again: The First Battle of Manassas (Bull Run), July 18-21, 1861. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. McDonough, James L. Nashville: The Western Confederacy’s Final Gamble. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2004. ____________. Shiloh in Hell Before Night. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1977. McPherson, James M. The American Heritage New History of the Civil War. New York: Viking, 1996.
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____________. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. ____________. Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. ____________. Drawn with the Sword: Reflections on the American Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. McWhiney, Grady, and Perry D. Jamieson. Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1982. Maney, R. Wayne. Marching to Cold Harbor: Victory and Failure, 1864. Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane, 1995. Marszalek, John. Sherman: A Soldier’s Passion for Order. New York: Free Press, 1993. Martin, David G. The Second Bull Run Campaign, July-August 1862. New York: Combined Books, 1996. Marvel, William. Burnside. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991. ____________. Lee’s Last Retreat: The Flight to Appomattox. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002. Maslowski, Peter. Treason Must Be Odious: Military Occupation and Wartime Reconstruction in Nashville, Tennessee, 1862-1865. New York: KTO Press, 1978. Matloff, Maurice, ed. The Army Historical Series: American Military History. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969. Matter, William D. If It Takes All Summer: The Battle of Spotsylvania. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988. Miles, Jim. Piercing the Heartland. Nashville, Tenn.: Cumberland House, 1999. Mokin, Arthur. Ironclad: The Monitor and the Merrimack. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1991. Mott, Frank Luther. American Journalism: A History, 1690-1960. 3d ed. New York: Macmillan, 1962. Murfin, James V. The Gleam of Bayonets: The Battle of Antietam and Robert E. Lee’s Maryland Campaign, 1862. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965. Neely, Mark E., Jr. The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. Nelson, James L. Reign of Iron: The Story of the First Battling Ironclads, the Monitor and the Merrimack. New York: William Morrow, 2004. Nevins, Allan. The War for the Union. 4 vols. New York: Scribner, 19591971.
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Nolan, Alan T. Lee Considered: General Robert E. Lee and Civil War History. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991. Nosworthy, Brent. The Bloody Crucible of Courage: Fighting Methods and Combat Experience of the Civil War. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2003. The Official Military Atlas of the Civil War. New York: Fairfax Press, 1983. Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion. 30 vols. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1894-1922. O’Reilly, Francis Augustín. The Fredericksburg Campaign: Winter War on the Rappahannock. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003. Pfanz, Harry Willcox. Gettysburg: Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993. ____________. Gettysburg: The First Day. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. ____________. Gettysburg: The Second Day. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987. Rable, George C. Civil Wars: Women and the Crisis of Southern Nationalism. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989. ____________. Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg! Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002. Rafuse, Ethan S. A Single Grand Victory: The First Campaign and Battle of Manassas. Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 2002. Randall, James G. Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964. Rhea, Gordon C. The Battle of the Wilderness, May 5-6, 1864. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994. ____________. The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow Tavern, May 7-12, 1864. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997. ____________. Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26-June 3, 1864. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002. ____________. To the North Anna River: Grant and Lee, May 13-25, 1864. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000. Ropes, John C. The Army Under Pope. New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1881. Rowland, Thomas J. George B. McClellan and Civil War History: In the Shadow of Grant and Sherman. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1998. Scott, Anne Firor. The Southern Lady: From Pedestal to Politics: 1830-1930. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970. Sears, Stephen W. Chancellorsville. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1996. ____________. Controversies and Commanders: Dispatches from the Army of the Potomac. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999.
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____________. “The First News Blackout.” American Heritage 36, no. 4 (June-July, 1985). ____________. Gettysburg. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003. ____________. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983. Shea, William L., and Terrence J. Winschel. Vicksburg Is the Key: The Struggle for the Mississippi River. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003. Smith, Merritt Roe. Harpers Ferry Armory and the New Technology: The Challenge of Change. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977. Sommers, Richard J. Richmond Redeemed: The Siege at Petersburg. New York: Doubleday, 1981. Spruill, Matt. Storming the Heights: A Guide to the Battle of Chattanooga. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2003. ____________, ed. Guide to the Battle of Chickamauga. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993. Steere, Edward. The Wilderness Campaign: The Meeting of Grant and Lee. 2d ed. Introduction by Robert Krick. Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1994. Sutherland, Daniel E. Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville: The Dare Mark Campaign. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998. ____________. Seasons of War: The Ordeal of a Confederate Community, 18611865. New York: Free Press, 1995. Sword, Wiley. Embrace an Angry Wind: The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah: Spring Hill, Franklin, and Nashville. New York: HarperCollins, 1992. ____________. Mountains Touched with Fire: Chattanooga Besieged, 1863. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995. ____________. Shiloh: Bloody April. Dayton, Ohio: Morningside Press, 1974. Thomas, Emory M. The Confederate Nation: 1861-1865. New York: Harper & Row, 1979. Trudeau, Noah Andre. Bloody Roads South: The Wilderness to Cold Harbor, May-June 1864. 1989. Reprint. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000. ____________. The Last Citadel: Petersburg, Virginia, June 1864-April 1865. Boston: Little, Brown, 1991. Trulack, Alice Rains, and Alan T. Nolan. In the Hands of Providence: Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain and the American Civil War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992. U.S. War Department. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. 128 vols. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1880-1901.
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Venet, Wendy Hamand. Neither Ballots nor Bullets: Women Abolitionists and the Civil War. Richmond: University Press of Virginia, 1991. Welker, David A. Tempest at Ox Hill: The Battle of Chantilly. Conshohocken, Pa.: Combined Publishing, 2001. Wert, Jeffry D. Gettysburg, Day Three. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. Wertheimer, Barbara Mayer. We Were There: The Story of Working Women in America. New York: Pantheon Books, 1977. Whan, Vorin E. Fiasco at Fredericksburg. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1961. Wheeler, Richard. On Fields of Fury: From the Wilderness to the Crater, an Eyewitness History. New York: HarperCollins, 1991. Winik, Jay. April 1865: The Month That Saved America. HarperCollins, 2001. Winschel, Terrence J. Triumph and Defeat: The Vicksburg Campaign. Mason City, Iowa: Savas, 1999. ____________. Vicksburg: Fall of the Confederate Gibraltar. Abilene, Tex.: McWhinney Foundation Press, 1999. Woodworth, Steven E. Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990. ____________. Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga Campaigns. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998.
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Spanish-American War 1898 Spanish-American War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281 Censorship During the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288 Campaigns, Battles and Other Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290 July, 1898: Battle of San Juan/El Caney. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290 February, 1899-July, 1902: Philippine Insurrection . . . . . . . . . . . . 291 Further Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
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Spanish-American War Date: April 24-December 10, 1898 Location: Principally Cuba and adjacent waters, and the Philippines Combatants: Spanish vs. Americans Principal commanders: American, General William R. Shafter (1835-1906), Rear Admiral William T. Sampson (1840-1902), Rear Admiral George Dewey (1837-1917); Spanish, General Arsenio Linares Pomba (18481914), Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete (1839-1909) Principal battles: Manila Bay, Las Guásimas, El Caney, San Juan Hill, Santiago de Cuba Result: The U.S. victory over Spain launched an American colonial empire and made the United States an international power. The United States entered the Spanish-American War to liberate its Cuban neighbors from foreign rule. It emerged from the conflict in possession of a distant Philippine empire whose inhabitants rebelled against U.S. dominance. The war with Spain marked a significant turning point in U.S. history. Acquisition of an overseas empire made the United States a major power on the world stage. Within a few years, however, the people of the United States decided that the expansion achieved during 1898-1899 should not be extended. Disillusionment about the results of imperialism characterized historical memories of the conflict with Spain. Cuba Cuba became an issue for the United States after Cuba’s residents staged a revolution against Spain in 1895. The Spanish regarded Cuba as an integral part of their nation. It was “the ever faithful isle,” and no Spanish government could long remain in power if it accepted the loss of Cuba without a military struggle. A bitter war ensued, in which the Spanish controlled major cities such as Havana, while the rebels dominated the countryside. In 1896, the Spanish captain general in Cuba, Valeriano Weyler, announced a tough policy of reconcentration. Cuban civilians in certain parts of the island were to be herded into the Spanish-held towns, where they could no longer assist and supply the rebel armies. Thousands of women and children died of disease or malnutrition in these overcrowded camps. U.S. opinion, already sympathetic to the Cubans, was outrage. Popular newspapers in the United States published sensational stories about Cu-
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Time Line of the Spanish-American War Feb. 24, 1895Apr. 13, 1898
Cuban war of independence.
Apr. 24, 1898
Spain declares war on the United States.
May 1, 1898
Battle of Manila Bay: Commodore George Dewey and the U.S. Asiatic Squadron rout the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay in the Philippines.
May 21, 1898
U.S. Navy takes control of Guam.
June 29, 1898
Engagement between U.S. and Spanish troops at Las Guásimas, near Santiago, Cuba.
July 1, 1898
Battle of San Juan/El Caney: The United States seizes Santiago. The collapse of Santiago causes Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete’s fleet to flee the harbor and face destruction by the U.S. Navy.
July 25, 1898
U.S. forces land in Guánica, Puerto Rico.
Aug. 12-13, 1898
Armistice between the United States and Spain.
Dec. 10, 1898
Treaty of Paris formally ends the war. The treaty recognizes Cuban independence and cedes Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the United States. By way of partial compensation, the United States pays Spain twenty million dollars.
Feb. 4, 1899
Philippine insurrection begins. Early U.S. attempts at colonial administration mark the tenuous beginnings of U.S.-Philippine relations and set the Philippines on a path toward independence.
ban suffering and Spanish brutalities that fed discontent with the rule of Madrid. President Grover Cleveland, who occupied the White House during the first two years of the Cuban rebellion, took the position that Spain deserved the chance to defeat the rebellion. He resisted pressure from Congress to intervene in the Caribbean. By the time that Cleveland left office in March, 1897, his policy had failed to persuade the Spanish of the need to negotiate with the rebels, and he had lost the trust of the U.S. people over foreign policy. Cleveland’s successor, William McKinley, came into office with two main reactions to the fighting. First, Spain could try to repress the rebellion, but it had only a limited time to do so. Second, any outcome of the war
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must be acceptable to the Cuban rebels. The latter condition ensured eventual fighting between the United States and Spain, because the rebels would accept nothing less than Cuban independence. McKinley played for time, hoping that the Spanish could be persuaded to leave Cuba. The Spanish stalled on their side, expecting U.S. resolve to falter. Spanish efforts to conciliate the United States included a modification of the reconcentration policy in November, 1897, and limited autonomy for Cuba. Spain retained control over Cuba’s international relations. These steps did not resolve the issues between the United States and Spain. Early in 1898, two events pushed the nations toward war. In February, the Cubans published a private letter from the Spanish minister in Washington, Enrique Dupuy de Lôme, in which the diplomat made disparaging remarks about President McKinley; the letter also revealed that the Spanish were using delaying tactics. Dupuy de Lôme resigned in disgrace. A week later, the United States battleship Maine exploded in Havana harbor. Two hundred sixty men of the U.S. Navy were killed. Modern scientific research has concluded that an internal cause probably produced the explosion. In 1898, however, many in the United States decided that Spain had either blown up the ship or failed to prevent its destruction. The episode put the two countries on a collision course toward war. As diplo-
Hull of the battleship Maine after it was raised from the bottom of Havana Harbor in early 1912. After the ship was examined and bodies and various artifacts were removed, it was towed out to sea and resunk with military honors. (Library of Congress)
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matic negotiations proceeded, it became apparent that Spain would not grant Cuban independence. The most it would concede was to suspend hostilities, a proposal that neither Washington nor the Cuban rebels would accept. United States Declares War On April 11, McKinley sent a message to Congress asking for the authority to intervene (April 20), and officials informed Spain that failing to grant independence to Cuba would result in the United States’ putting the resolutions into effect. Spain broke relations with the United States, a U.S. blockade of Cuba ensued, and Spain declared war on April 24. The president had resisted the popular pressure for war until it became clear that Spain would not yield. After Congress passed resolutions to grant the president the right to intervene, Spain declared war and Congress followed suit. The war came about because both nations saw no way out of the diplomatic impasse other than armed conflict. In the United States, the war was very popular. Volunteers jammed U.S. Army and Navy recruiting offices. The first U.S. victory came on May 1, 1898, when Commodore George Dewey and the U.S. Asiatic Squadron defeated the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay in the Philippines. The Navy attacked the Philippines as part of a longstanding war plan to induce the Spanish to negotiate an end to the war by threatening their possession in Asia. The victory presented Washington with a new challenge of what to do with this unexpected territorial
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opportunity. The McKinley administration sent reinforcements to Manila and kept its options open about taking all the islands in a peace settlement. During June and July, the main focus of military and public attention was on Cuba and the sea and land battles that occurred in the Caribbean. Initial plans for Army action in Cuba called for a large-scale landing near Havana during the autumn of 1898. In June, the White House decided to dispatch an expeditionary force of seventeen thousand men to the southeastern Cuban coast. There, in the harbor of the city of Santiago de Cuba, Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete’s decrepit Spanish fleet had taken refuge. The U.S. Atlantic Squadron, commanded by Admiral William T. Sampson, was stationed outside Santiago ready to do battle if Cervera ventured forth. The revised U.S. strategy called for the capture of Santiago by land invasion, which would force the Spanish fleet to steam out to virtually certain destruction. Near Tampa Bay in Florida, the bulk of the regular army, under the command of General William R. Shafter, prepared to leave for Cuba. Along with the regulars was the Rough Rider volunteer regiment, of which Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt was second in command. Shafter’s
The Battle of Manila Bay may have been the most one-sided major naval engagement in history. The United States captured the entire Spanish squadron without the loss of a single ship or sailor. The victory made Admiral George Dewey a national hero and nearly propelled him to candidacy for the presidency. (F. R. Niglutsch)
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landing along the coast near Santiago was accomplished late in June. Despite logistical difficulties, the U.S. forces moved forward to engage the Spanish on July 1 near Santiago at the twin battles of El Caney and San Juan Hill. Both battles were U.S. victories. Shafter’s troops subsequently occupied the strategic heights above the port city. On July 3, Admiral Cervera, on orders from Madrid, headed out of Santiago harbor and vainly tried to evade the U.S. fleet. By the end of the day, all Spanish ships had been sunk or beached. End of the War Following Cervera’s defeat, the end of the war came swiftly. On July 17, after lengthy negotiations, the Spanish soldiers in Santiago surrendered. Puerto Rico was occupied almost without resistance later that month. The Spanish had asked Washington to discuss an end to hostilities during July, which culminated in an armistice on August 12. A peace commission from the United States, led by former Secretary of State William R. Day, met with Spanish envoys in Paris in October to arrange peace terms. The Treaty of Paris, signed on December 10, 1898, recognized Cuban independence and ceded Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the United States. By way of partial compensation, the United States paid Spain twenty million dollars.
Under the command of Admiral William T. Sampson, the U.S. fleet pursues Spanish admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete’s fleet off Santiago, Cuba. (F. R. Niglutsch)
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U.S. scouting party advancing on Santiago in June, 1898. (U.S. Army War College)
The war revealed inadequacies in the U.S. Army’s ability to mobilize to meet a foreign policy crisis. The resulting outcry over shortages and inefficiencies focused the blame on Secretary of War Russell A. Alger. President McKinley appointed a commission to probe these problems, and out of these deliberations came later military reforms. For the most part, the armed forces performed well under McKinley’s leadership. Following the signing of the peace treaty, a bitter struggle over ratification took place in the United States. McKinley effectively mobilized public opinion to secure approval. The outcome of the war left the United States with an overseas empire and new world responsibilities. William I. Hair Updated by Lewis L. Gould
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Censorship During the War The United States government imposed censorship restrictions on military personnel and on newspaper correspondents covering the military operations of the war. On April 25, 1898, the United States declared war on Spain. The declaration came after several years of repeated newspaper accounts of Spanish atrocities against the Cuban people and the sinking of the battleship USS Maine on February 15, 1898, in the Cuban harbor at Havana—an act most Americans believed was perpetrated by the Spanish. In the several decades prior to the war with Spain, correspondents of the major American newspapers had freely covered both domestic and international events unhampered by any form of official censorship. In fact, the government often relied on reports sent by correspondents from around the world, and in some cases even used reporters in semiofficial capacities to deliver government information. When government censorship was finally imposed for reasons of military security, the press was shocked. The first act of censorship during the war took place on April 23, 1898, just two days before the U.S. Senate officially declared war. On that day, the
Joseph Pulitzer, publisher of the New York World. Pulitzer’s sensationalist treatment of the SpanishAmerican War gave rise to the term “yellow journalism” for irresponsible journalistic practices. (Library of Congress)
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U.S. Navy Department took control of the Key West, Florida, cable office in order to monitor all cable correspondence passing through. Key West stood squarely in the path of American naval convoys sailing to the island of Cuba, some ninety miles away. Two days later, on April 25, 1898, on President William McKinley’s orders, the Army Signal Corps placed an official censor in each of the six cable companies located in New York City, the headquarters for most of America’s major papers. Censorship by the government was not restricted exclusively to the press, but included reviewing all forms of cable correspondence and any mail going to or coming from Spain. Another form of censorship placed restrictions on the U.S. military itself. Orders from Navy Secretary John D. Long forbade naval personnel from speaking with representatives of the press on matters pertaining to the Navy. Secretary of War Russell A. Alger followed suit by issuing a directive making all War Department records confidential and unavailable for discussion with newspaper representatives. Enforcement Censorship of the press was enforced in several ways. Typically, stories were edited so that no information thought detrimental to the military was printed. Often the stories that correspondents cabled back to their home newspapers ended up on publishers’ desks with so many details missing that they proved useless. Another method of enforcement employed by the Army was threatening newspaper correspondents with the loss of their military-issued press credentials if they were caught bypassing censorship rules. Loss of military press credentials precluded correspondents from accompanying troops into battle areas. Although censorship restrictions worked well overall, persistent reporters found ways to get around them. Some sent messages to cable offices in Haiti or Jamaica, which were then forwarded to the United States. Other reporters sent their stories with stipulations that they were not to be published until they returned home. Given the fierce competition among the papers for fresh news from the front, especially the New York papers, some unscrupulous publishers, such as William Randolph Hearst of the New York Journal and Joseph Pulitzer of the New York World, printed stories that their correspondents had asked be delayed without regard for the repercussions that their reporters would face.
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Campaigns, Battles and Other Events July, 1898 Battle of San Juan/El Caney Date: July 1, 1898 Location: Hills east of the harbor of Santiago in eastern Cuba Combatants: 10,000 Spanish vs. 17,000 Americans Principal commanders: Spanish, General Arsenio Linares Pomba (18481914); American, General William R. Shafter (1835-1906) Result: The United States captured Santiago. Spanish General Arsenio Linares Pomba confronted the possibility of attacks from the west by the powerful U.S. fleet that blockaded the harbor
Theodore Roosevelt (center) with his Rough Rider regiment at San Juan Hill. (U.S. Army War College)
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and from the east by General William R. Shafter’s army. He chose to concentrate his defenses to the west and stationed only 500 soldiers atop San Juan Heights (including Kettle Hill) and another 520 on his northern flank at El Caney. The offensive came from the east. Shafter sent 5,000 men against El Caney, but instead of a quick victory, the U.S. soldiers struggled for nine hours before the stubborn Spanish fell back. Meanwhile, the main U.S. force advanced on San Juan Heights. While Spanish soldiers poured down deadly fire, a group of volunteers under Colonel Theodore Roosevelt launched their famous charge up Kettle Hill. Roosevelt’s Rough Riders were at the forefront of an 8,000-man offensive that eventually overwhelmed the outnumbered Spanish. Both sides endured heavy casualties. The United States lost 205 killed and 1,180 wounded. The Spanish suffered 215 killed and 376 wounded. The fall of Santiago prompted Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete’s fleet to flee the harbor and face destruction by the U.S. Navy. John A. Britton
February, 1899-July, 1902 Philippine Insurrection Date: February 4, 1899-July 4, 1902 Location: Philippine Islands Principal figures: American, Rear Admiral George Dewey (1837-1917), President William McKinley (1843-1901), Governor William Howard Taft (1857-1930); Filipino, Emilio Aguinaldo (1869-1964), Apolinario Mabini (1864-1903) Result: Early U.S. attempts at colonial administration marked the tenuous beginnings of U.S.-Philippine relations and set the Philippines on a path toward independence. The Philippine Insurrection, known as the War of Independence by Filipinos was an offshoot of the Spanish-American War. It is an early example of a country’s resisting the rise of the United States as an imperial power. It resulted from misunderstanding and indecision on both sides. U.S. and Filipino forces, which had worked together to end Spanish control of the Philippines, found themselves fighting as enemies in a long, brutal struggle for domination of the Philippine Islands.
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United States involvement in the Philippines began during the SpanishAmerican War of 1898. U.S. naval strategists already had a plan for attacking the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay in the event of war with Spain. As relations between the United States and Spain worsened in 1897, Commodore George Dewey, commander of the U.S. Navy’s Asiatic Squadron, was ordered to move his fleet to Hong Kong, with instructions to attack Manila Bay in case of war. War was declared by Spain on April 24, 1898. On the morning of May 1, Dewey’s fleet steamed into Manila Bay. By noon, his ships had sunk or disabled every Spanish ship. The U.S. government was slow to react to the victorious news. The quick defeat of the Spanish fleet was unexpected, and President William McKinley had not planned what to do with the Philippines once the war was ended. McKinley considered either taking the entire archipelago, establishing a naval base, or returning the islands to Spain. Complete independence for the islands was never seriously considered. While McKinley contemplated the fate of the Philippines, relations between the U.S. military occupation force at Manila Bay and the Filipino population deteriorated. At first, the Filipinos welcomed Dewey’s forces as liberators. The Filipinos soon realized that the Americans intended to control the islands at least until the end of the war, perhaps longer. In early May, McKinley dispatched an expeditionary force, under the command of General Arthur MacArthur, to Manila Bay. MacArthur arrived just in time to accept the Spanish garrison’s surrender at the end of the war, an honor Filipino forces had assumed would be theirs. The Insurgents Filipino insurgents had been fighting the Spanish since early 1896. Spanish efforts to destroy the infant revolution had failed, as rebel leaders fled to the hills of the islands to hide out and organize bases for guerrilla warfare against the Spanish. In 1897, both sides, weary of the increasingly bloody war, agreed to a cease-fire to discuss peace. The Spanish authorities refused to consider independence, forcing the Filipino insurgents to continue their rebellion. Under the military leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo and the intellectual direction of Apolinario Mabini, rebel leaders established a base of operations at Hong Kong, where they could purchase supplies and arms. It was at this time that the Spanish-American War began, bringing an unexpected opportunity for the rebels. Filipino leaders first believed that the United States would assist them in expelling the Spanish and establishing an independent Philippine state. Aguinaldo accepted anticolonial statements by U.S. consular officers at face value. The Filipinos soon found, however, that Dewey was more cau-
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A U.S. soldier signals the capture of Philippine rebel leader and provisional president Emilio Aguinaldo. After being released from captivity, Aguinaldo retired from public life and lived until 1964. He is now remembered as a national hero and the first president of the Philippines. (F. R. Niglutsch)
tious, speaking only of military cooperation to defeat Spain and saying nothing of independence. Aguinaldo organized an army of thirty thousand men and won notable victories; nevertheless, the United States held supreme authority, accepting the surrender of Manila Bay and refusing to allow Filipino forces into the city without permission. When the Spanish flag came down, the Stars and Stripes, not the Filipino revolutionary flag, replaced it. Faced with the realization that the United States was going to annex the islands, Aguinaldo moved to organize a new government. On June 12, 1898, he proclaimed independence for the Philippines. In September, a constituent assembly was convened, and on November 29, a constitution was adopted. The United States largely ignored this move toward independence. The McKinley administration, mainly because of racial prejudice, arbitrarily decided that the Filipinos were not ready for selfgovernment. In addition, there was a fear that an independent Philippines might fall easy prey to an ambitious European power, such as Germany or Great Britain. Therefore, the United States proceeded to obtain full control by a provision for annexation of the Philippines in the peace treaty ending the war with Spain.
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Members of the Eagle Troop of the Ninth Cavalry before going to the Philippines in 1900. One of the most distinguished predominantly African American units in U.S. Army history, E Troop was formed shortly after the Civil War. (U.S. Army War College)
Armed Clashes While the United States Senate debated ratification of the peace treaty, a series of clashes between U.S. and Filipino forces beginning on February 4, 1899, soon escalated into large-scale fighting. The Philippine Insurrection against U.S. rule had begun. The United States, because of its decision to assume responsibility for “civilizing” the Filipinos, was forced to wage a bitter war, which would cost much more money and take many more human lives than the war with Spain. The Philippine Insurrection was, in many ways, a prototype of modern guerrilla warfare. Filipino revolutionary leaders quickly lost the support of conservative Filipinos who accepted U.S. rule. As a result, Aguinaldo and his forces retreated to fight the U.S. troops in the jungles, as they had done earlier against Spanish forces. In early 1899, United States forces moved into central Luzon, where they captured and burned Malolos, the rebel capital. Rebel forces, however, escaped into the hills, where they were supplied by sympathetic villagers until spring rains forced U.S. troops to withdraw. U.S. commanders finally admitted that Aguinaldo had extensive popular support and that total war was necessary to pacify the islands. The
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government responded by sending reinforcements, bringing the number of U.S. troops in the Philippines to seventy-four thousand. As the scale of the fighting rose, vicious tactics and brutality on both sides also increased. Both sides committed atrocities involving soldiers and civilians. U.S. forces systematically burned villages and took hostages in an effort to deny popular assistance to rebel forces. Gradually, the overwhelming strength of the United States prevailed, as U.S. forces took rebel strongholds in the hills and rural regions. By 1901, 639 U.S. garrisons dotted the islands, breaking Filipino resistance. Collapse of the Insurrection The insurrection finally collapsed with Aguinaldo’s capture in March, 1901. He was seized by Colonel Frederick Funston and three other U.S. officers pretending to be the prisoners of a group of Filipino defectors, who led the officers directly to Aguinaldo’s headquarters in northeastern Luzon. After his capture, Aguinaldo reluctantly took an oath of allegiance to the United States. By July 4, 1901, civil government, under United States auspices, was instituted everywhere in the Philippines, except in southern Mindanao and the Sulu Islands, where Moro tribesmen continued resistance. On July 4, 1902, the Philippine Insurrection was formally declared over. The United States issued a proclamation of general peace and amnesty. As a result of the struggle, the United States suffered 4,200 dead and 2,800 wounded. While close to 20,000 rebels were killed in the war, another 200,000 Filipinos died from disease, famine, and other war-related causes. William Howard Taft served as the first U.S. governor of the Philippines. Taft continued to be heavily involved in the administration of the islands as secretary of war and president of the United States. It was Taft who coined the phrase “little brown brothers,” which referred to his hope that the United States could somehow “Americanize” these native peoples. This phrase remained a strong racial force in U.S. relations with the states in the Pacific and Latin America. The Philippine Islands remained under U.S. jurisdiction until 1934, when Congress passed the TydingsMcDuffie Act, granting independence to the Philippines. World War II delayed complete independence for the islands until 1946. Theodore A. Wilson updated by William Allison
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Further Reading Bradford, James C., ed. Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War and Its Aftermath. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993. Corry, John. 1898: Prelude to a Century. New York: Fordham University Press, 1998. Feuer, A. B., ed. America at War: The Philippines, 1898-1913. Forewords by Dominic J. Caraccilo and Michael G. Price. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002. O’Toole, G. J. A. The Spanish War: An American Epic, 1898. New York: W. W. Norton, 1984. Roosevelt, Theodore. The Rough Riders: An Autobiography. New York: Library of America, 2004. Rosenfeld, Harvey. Diary of a Dirty Little War: The Spanish-American War of 1898. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2000. Shaw, Angel Velasco, and Luis H. Francia, eds. Vestiges of War: The Philippine-American War and the Aftermath of an Imperial Dream, 1899-1999. New York: New York University Press, 2002. Smith, Joseph. The Spanish-American War: Conflict in the Caribbean and the Pacific, 1895-1902. London: Longman, 1994. Tebbel, John. America’s Great Patriotic War with Spain. Manchester Center, Vt.: Marshall Jones, 1996. Trask, David F. The War with Spain in 1898. New York: Macmillan, 1981. Troxel, David. 1898: The Birth of the American Century. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998. Walker, Dale. The Boys of ’98: Theodore Roosevelt and the Rough Riders. New York: Tom Doherty, 1998.
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Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events . . . . . . . . . . . June, 1917: The Espionage Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . July, 1917: Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . September, 1918: Battle of St. Mihiel . . . . . . . . . . . . September-November, 1918: Meuse-Argonne Offensive. November, 1918: Postwar Demobilization . . . . . . . . January, 1919-July, 1921: Treaty of Versailles. . . . . . . .
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World War I At issue: German domination in Europe, French desire to regain AlsaceLorraine, Slavic nationalism, British security concerns, and U.S. concerns about democracy, freedom of the seas, and the Monroe Doctrine Date: 1914-1918 Location: France and Belgium from the Channel coast to the Swiss Alps (western front), Russia, Poland, and East Prussia (eastern front); the Balkans, Eastern Europe, Turkey, Italy, the Middle East, Africa, and China Combatants: Allies: France, Great Britain, Russia, and United States vs. Central Powers: Germany, Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Turkey Principal commanders: German, Helmuth von Moltke (1848-1916), Erich von Falkenhayn (1861-1922), Paul von Hindenburg (1847-1934), Erich Ludendorff (1865-1937); Russian, Pavel Rennenkampf (1854-1918), Aleksandr Samsonov (1859-1914), Grand Duke Nicholas (1856-1929), Aleksei Brusilov (1853-1926); English, John French (1852-1925), Douglas Haig (1861-1926), Lord Allenby (1861-1936), Winston S. Churchill (18741965); French, Ferdinand Foch (1851-1929), Robert-Georges Nivelle (1856-1924), Henri-Philippe Pétain (1856-1951), Joseph-Jacques Césaire Joffre (1852-1931); American, John J. Pershing (1860-1948) Principal battles: Frontiers, Mons, Tannenberg, Masurian Lakes, Marne, Ypres (1914), Falkland Islands, Gallipoli Campaign, Verdun, Somme, Brusilov Offensive, Jutland, Champagne, Aisne, Flanders, Ypres (1917), Caporetto, Baghdad, Beersheba, Jerusalem, Ludendorff Offensive, Lys, Aisne, Château-Thierry/Belleau Wood, Amiens, St. Mihiel, MeuseArgonne Result: The Allied victory resulted in the breakup of the Ottoman, AustroHungarian, Russian, and German Empires, and the imposition of harsh conditions on Germany that helped foster the conditions leading to World War II. World War I had its roots in several developments in the previous half century. Following the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) and the French loss of Alsace-Lorraine, Otto von Bismarck, the chancellor of the new German nation, sought to keep France isolated by constructing a complex series of alliances with the major powers. After Bismarck’s dismissal in 1890, the German Re-Insurance Treaty with Russia was not renewed. Within four years, Russia signed a military alliance with France. In 1904, France reached a treaty of friendship with England, and in 1907, Russia joined the agreement, forming the Triple Entente. Peacetime Europe be-
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Time Line of World War I June 28, 1914
Gavrilo Princip, a Serbian nationalist, assassinates Austria-Hungary’s Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Sarajevo.
July 28
Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia; Russia mobilizes for war.
August 1
Germany declares war on Russia.
August 3
Germany declares war on France.
Aug. 4, 1914
Great Britain’s declaration of war on Germany.
Aug. 14-25, 1914
Battle of the Frontiers.
Aug. 23, 1914
Battle of Mons.
Aug. 26-31, 1914
Battle of Tannenberg.
Sept. 5-9, 1914
Battle of the Marne.
Sept. 9-14, 1914
Battle of Masurian Lakes.
Oct. 30-Nov. 24, 1914
First Battle of Ypres.
Dec. 8. 1914
Battle of Falkland Islands.
Feb. 19, 1915Jan. 9, 1916
Gallipoli Campaign.
Apr. 22-May 25, 1915
Second Battle of Ypres.
May 2-June 27, 1915
Battle of Gorlice-Tarnow.
June 23, 1915Sept. 12, 1917
Eleven Battles of the Isonzo.
Dec. 8, 1915Apr. 29, 1916
Siege of Kut-al-Amara.
Feb. 19-Dec. 18, 1916
Battle of Verdun.
May 31-June 1, 1916
Battle of Jutland.
June 4-Sept. 30, 1916
Brusilov Offensive.
June 24-Nov. 13, 1916
Battle of the Somme.
Mar. 11, 1917
Battle of Baghdad.
Apr. 6, 1917
United States declares war on Germany.
Apr. 9-15, 1917
Battle of Vimy Ridge.
June 15, 1917
Espionage Act: United States Congress passes the Espionage Act. Implementation of this act leads to the suppression of free speech and the press during the war and to the prosecution and incarceration of political dissenters.
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July-Oct., 1917
United States forces mass in eastern France. General John J. Pershing establishes headquarters in Chaumont.
July 31-Nov. 10, 1917
Third Battle of Ypres.
Oct. 24-Nov. 12, 1917
Battle of Caporetto.
Oct. 31, 1917
Battle of Beersheba.
Nov. 20-Dec. 7, 1917
Battle of Cambrai.
Dec. 7, 1917
United States declares war on Austria-Hungary.
Apr. 6, 1918
Piccardy Offensive: Germans attack Allied lines near Amiens.
May 27-July 1, 1918
Battle of Chateau-Thierry/Belleau Wood.
July 8, 1917
Mobilization: U.S. government organizes the War Industries Board to direct economic resources for the war effort.
Aug. 8-Sept. 4, 1918
Battle of Amiens.
Sept. 12-16, 1918
Battle of St. Mihiel: Offensive mounted almost totally by United States; ends German threat in the region and demonstrates U.S. military force.
Sept. 20, 1918
Battle of Megiddo.
Sept. 26-Nov. 11, 1918
Battle of Meuse-Argonne: U.S. offensive cuts off railroad supplies to Germans. Heavy casualties are suffered by the United States in this last significant battle of the war.
Nov., 1918Jan., 1923
Postwar demobilization: Two million members of the American Expeditionary Force are reintegrated into the U.S. economy.
Nov. 11, 1918
Armistice ends the war.
Jan. 18, 1919
Peace conference opens in Paris.
June 28, 1919
Germany signs Treaty of Versailles.
July 2, 1921
Joint resolution of U.S. Congress recognizes a formal end to the war.
came divided into two rival blocs: the Triple Entente and the Central Powers of Germany and Austro-Hungary. European Militarism and Nationalism Militarism was also rampant in early twentieth century Europe. The French Schneider works and German Krupp works competed to produce more massive artillery and superior fortifications, and England and Germany were locked in a race to produce large numbers of state-of-the-art
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battleships (dreadnoughts). Both France and Germany instituted peacetime conscription laws to maintain large reserves of trained manpower. Nationalism was flourishing in all major nations and the Balkans, where it resulted in two wars in 1912 and 1913. The fate of BosniaHerzegovina, taken over by the Austrian Empire in 1908 was particularly troublesome, setting off Serbian nationalism and angering Russia, which was the leader of Slavic nationalism. Disputes over imperialism, industrial competition between a rising Germany and a declining England, and the lack of an international body authorized to mediate national disputes were additional contributing factors. Consequently, the assassination of Austria’s Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, by Bosnian nationalists allied to Serbia, set off a chain of events leading to the outbreak of war in early August. Encouraged by Germany, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia (July 28), and Russia mobilized, resulting in a German declaration of war on Russia (August 1). Germany then declared war on France (August 3). Under its Schlieffen Plan, Germany intended to invade Belgium in order to rapidly capture Paris and end the war. Initially, most of the involved nations desired this war; however, none of them wanted it to last four years or be as destructive. All previous wars for the past century had been short and relatively bloodless. No nation had plans for fighting more than a three-month war, and all expected to return by Christmas with a short and decisive victory that would achieve their national objectives. In all European capitals, the war was greeted not with somberness but rather popular celebration. Men rapidly enlisted in order not to miss out on a short and glorious event. Fighting Begins Using precisely planned railroad timetables, in early August, 1914, Germany massed a five-front attack through Belgium in an effort to encircle Paris and bring France to its knees in the first months of the war. Belgian forts proved formidable. It took three weeks for Belgium to fall. The violation of Belgian neutrality brought England into the war on August 4. Germans met Anglo-French armies in a group of actions called the Battle of the Frontiers (August 14-25, 1914). France’s Plan Seventeen, which involved sending a highly motivated army to retake Alsace-Lorraine, failed miserably. French tactics did not take into account the dramatic changes that had taken place in the technology of killing since the Napoleonic era. At the Battle of Mons (August 23, 1914), outnumbered British forces battled the Germans but were forced to withdraw after French forces withdrew.
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Allied offensives on the Western Front N o r t h S e a
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Armistice line (Nov. 11) Farthest German advance (July 18)
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The airplane, still in its infancy, was used in the first year of the war largely for observation of enemy movements. Eventually, pistols, rifles, and machine guns were brought along to drive off enemy planes. A major problem persisted in that airmen tended to shoot off their own propellers in the heat of combat. The Germans made the engineering breakthrough on their Fokker planes by developing a synchronized propeller with mounted machine guns. However, this technology was soon copied by the Allies. The Russian offensive through East Prussia (August 17-20, 1914) was formidable. To meet the Russian advance, two corps from the western front, under generals Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff were sent to revitalize the German Eighth Army in East Prussia. The Russian offensive was smashed in the Battle of Tannenberg (August 26-31, 1914) and Masurian Lakes (September 9-14, 1914). Russia’s poorly led and inadequately equipped forces suffered heavy casualties and lost more than one million soldiers as prisoners. As German troops were replaced by Austro-Hungarian forces, the eastern front of the war remained huge and fluid. Russian supply difficulties and the poor leadership of Generals Pavel Rennenkampf and Aleksandr Samsonov and Grand Duke Nicholas would be matched by Austro-Hungarian incompetence in fighting a modern war. On the western front, German forces reached the Marne River, twenty miles outside of Paris. In a less than heroic stand, the French government fled southward to reestablish itself at Bordeaux. However, the French commander, General Joseph-Jacques Césaire Joffre, committed every available reserve and commandeered every wheeled vehicle, including bicycles, to
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rush troops to fight the Battle of the Marne (September 5-9, 1914). Blocked in their efforts to take Paris, the German army, led by Helmuth von Moltke, turned to the west, capturing the Belgian ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend. However, after heavy fighting in the First Battle of Ypres (October 18November 30, 1914), the German advance was stopped. Germany’s failure to produce a clear victory destined it to fight a twofront war of attrition. On the western front, both sides dug in until a system of trenches extended from the English Channel to the Swiss Alps. Any opportunity for flanking movements had disappeared. Trenches could be taken only by costly frontal assault across no-man’s-land. Because neither side had planned to fight more than a three-month war, common sense might have dictated a negotiated settlement of the deadlock. Instead, each side tried to improvise. Naval Warfare The Allies had command of the high seas during 1914, effectively cutting off Germany from trade and contact with its colonies. Germany’s main port in China, Qingdao (Tsingtao), was easily taken over by Japan after it joined the Allied side on August 23. Following the minor Battle of Falkland Islands (December 8, 1914), most of the German fleet remained in German ports. However, the submarine, an unexpectedly effective weapon that the German navy had only passing interest in before the war, began to take a heavy toll on Allied shipping beginning in 1915.
The crew of a German submarine posing on their vessel in 1916. The development of Germany’s submarine fleet revolutionized naval warfare. (Library of Congress)
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By February, neutral nations such as the United States were warned that ships sailing to British ports risked attack. On May 17, 1915, the British passenger ship Lusitania was sunk off the coast of Ireland by a German U-boat, causing 1,201 casualties, including 139 Americans. The United States was so enraged that Germany suspended U-boat attacks on passenger ships and diverted much of its submarine fleet to the Mediterranean. Although an initial Austro-German offensive in the Carpathians (January 23, 1915) was blunted within a month by a large Russian army, new German forces siphoned from the western front under General August von Mackensen drove Russian forces out of Poland by August, 1915. Austro-German forces successfully invaded Serbia in early fall, 1915, and were helped in their efforts by Bulgaria, a new entrant in the war. The Allies focused on the taking of the Gallipoli Peninsula (1915-1916) in an effort to capture the Gallipoli Straits. The Ottoman Empire had joined the Central Powers on October 28, 1914, closing the Allied maritime route to Russia. To break this stranglehold, Winston S. Churchill, British first lord of the admiralty, envisioned a bold plan. An Anglo-French naval force would heavily shell Ottoman forts for almost a month (beginning February 19, 1915); shelling would be followed by the amphibious landing of large expeditionary forces intent on seizing control of the Dardanelles. Not taking into account the high cliffs on the shoreline or the spirited opposition of well-entrenched Turkish forces, Australian, New Zealand, and Canadian forces under General Ian Hamilton soon became pinned down on the Gallipoli Peninsula, while a second landing force suffered a similar fate at Sulva Bay. This disastrous campaign, which almost ended Churchill’s political career, resulted in 252,000 Allied casualties and the withdrawal of forces beginning on December 20, 1915. The withdrawal occurred exactly at the time the Turks were using the last of their munitions. Clearly the war was not going well for the Allies, and a change in command was undertaken. Marshal Joffre was appointed commander of French forces and Field Marshal Douglas Haig was appointed British commander to replace John French. Another Christmas slipped by, and an end to the war was nowhere in sight. New German Offensive Early in 1916, Germany decided to break the stalemate by attacking the French fortress city of Verdun (February 19-December 18, 1916), a strategically central part of the French defensive system on the western front. While fortified positions changed hands many times during the lengthy battle, French forces under the command of Marshal Henri-Philippe Pétain
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Much of the combat in the western front of the war was static, with armies mired in trenches, often suffering numerous casualties with little to show for their sacrifices. (U.S. Army War College)
ultimately prevailed, although France lost 315,000 men as compared with 281,000 German casualties. In order to take the pressure off Verdun, the Allies launched three attacks from June 24-November 13, 1916, collectively known as the Battle of the Somme. Anglo-French forces suffered 60,000 casualties on the first day of the offensive, which would stand as the bloodiest day in the war. Anglo-French forces made massive artillery barrages meant to destroy German barbed wire and machine-gun nests. However, neither objective was attained. By the end of the disastrous offensive, the Allies had lost nearly 800,000 men and the Germans 530,000. At the Somme, the tank was first used as a weapon of warfare in an attack near Courcelette (September 15, 1916) with inconsequential effect. In August, Ludendorff replaced Erich von Falkenhayn as Hindenburg’s chief of staff. Ludendorff was an advocate of total war, which meant military control at home, and striking decisive blows on the battle front. Berated for not doing its share, Russian forces led by Aleksei Brusilov launched a campaign (June 4-September 30, 1916) known as the Brusilov Offensive into Galicia and the Carpathians. The attack wreaked havoc on poorly trained Austrian forces, which suffered 1.5 million dead, wounded, or captured to Russia’s comparatively smaller loss of 500,000. Romania entered the war on the Allied side during the attack, its appetite whetted by promises of territorial gains made in the secret Treaty of Bucharest (August
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17). However, the Romanian push into Transylvania was halted. By December 6, much of Romania, including the capital city of Bucharest, was occupied by a German-Bulgarian army. Christmas, 1916, saw considerable disillusionment in soldiers on both fronts of the war. Naval and Air Battles The major naval battle of the war took place at Jutland (May-June, 1916) as twenty-eight British dreadnoughts and nine cruisers faced sixteen German dreadnoughts and five cruisers. The naval battle itself is viewed by most military historians to be a draw. However, the fact that the German fleet remained at port for the rest of the war makes the end result of the battle a British victory. Jutland also caused Germany to resume heavy reliance on its U-boats. In 1917, as Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare, Great Britain lost two million more tons of ships than were constructed, and the British Isles faced an acute food shortage. Although the English experimented with squadron formations in 1916, air battles were usually duels between groups of planes, contests somewhat similar to the gallant jousting of knights of old. Heroes such as Baron Manfred von Richthofen, or the Red Baron, arose in this otherwise impersonal war. Bombing at first was merely tossing hand-held bombs from planes onto enemy troops below, but by 1917, wing-mounted bombs had been developed. Still, bombing played a very minor role in combat. The zeppelin, huge and slow, nevertheless became a terror weapon developed by the Germans. Zeppelins could deliver a large bomb payload, and attacks on England caused considerable panic among the population. However, zeppelins achieved their lift by using highly explosive hydrogen gas and were easy targets. Allied Counteroffensives Early in 1917, the new French commander, General Robert-Georges Nivelle attempted a breakthrough by launching a series of diversionary attacks at German positions along the Somme River and then launching a major offensive in Champagne (April 16, 1917). The offensive failed at the Second Battle of Aisne (May 9, 1917). Faced with mutinies by French troops during and after the battle, Nivelle was replaced by Marshal Pétain, who used courts-martial, firing squads, and other stringent measures to restore discipline. Nivelle’s disaster was followed by an equally calamitous British effort by Haig to launch an offensive in Flanders (June 7, 1917) aimed at capturing the Flemish port cities of Ostend and Zeebrugge. The resulting Third Battle of Ypres (July 31-November 4, 1917) succeeded only in capturing
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Passchendaele Ridge. Both sides suffered heavy losses in this evident war of attrition and were bleeding each other dry. However, the Allies merely had to hold on, because a new and powerful nation was entering the war on their side. United States Enters the War The German resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1 angered the United States, led by President Woodrow Wilson, an Anglophile. Two days later, the United States terminated diplomatic relations with Germany and proceeded to pressure most of the major Latin American nations to do likewise. A miscalculated countermove to make the United States worry about events close at home resulted in the famous Zimmermann telegram (March 2) promising Mexico help, in the event of conflict, in regaining the American Southwest, lost in the Mexican War (1846-1848). This violation of the Monroe Doctrine, a sacred pillar of policy for the United States, was all that Wilson needed to move an isolationist nation to declare war on April 6. Since czarism had toppled in Russia several weeks earlier, to be replaced by the democratic provisional government, the United States could enter the war on the side of the democratic Allies against the autocratic central powers. Wilson set the objective of the war as making the world safe for democracy, thus supplanting British prime minister David Lloyd George’s rationale that this was a war to end all wars. The initial American Expedition-
General John J. Pershing. (Library of Congress)
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ary Force of 175,000, led by General John J. Pershing, arrived in France on June 25, greatly boosting French morale. By the end of the war, U.S. combat troops numbered two million and five million were in uniform. If the war of attrition were to continue, it was evident that Germany would atrophy first. However, other developments indicated that the war, in the short run, was turning in favor of Germany. In order to knock Italy out of the war in one blow, Ludendorff sent seven well-trained German divisions, equipped with heavy artillery, to attack Italian forces at Caporetto (October 24-November 12, 1917) in Slovenia. One million Italian soldiers entered into a three-week-long retreat in which 350,000 were taken prisoner, and 40,000 were killed. German success against Italy was coupled with an even more spectacular event. In November, Vladimir Ilich Lenin, who had been smuggled by the Germans into Russia in a sealed train in early spring, had succeeded in seizing power in Russia. To maintain power, Lenin withdrew from the war. In the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918), Lenin gave Germany control of nearly onethird of Russia’s most productive territory. Other Theaters of the War If things were going well for the Allies, it was in a secondary theater of the war, namely the Middle East. The British Mesopotamian campaign succeeded in capturing Baghdad on March 11, 1917, while General Lord Allenby took Jerusalem on December 9, after a victory at Beersheba on October 31. In Greece, an Allied invasion had convinced the pro-German King Constantine to abdicate in favor of his son Alexander (June 12). As planned, Alexander’s new premier, Venizelos, brought Greece into the war on the Allied side two weeks later. With the end of the war on the Russian front, the Germans were able to reinforce their strength on the western front and plan a major offensive aimed at bringing the war to a decisive conclusion. The Ludendorff Offensive (1918) was intended to launch German divisions between French and English forces, enabling them to drive the English to the channel coast and then attack Paris. Beginning the offensive on March 21, four major attacks were made on Allied forces. The first attack, aimed at British forces south of Arras, hurled British lines back forty miles, before the front could be stabilized on April 5. In a second offensive at Lys (April 9-29, 1918), the Germans took Messines Ridge and Armentieres from the British. A powerful attack on the Aisne (June, 1918) allowed German forces to drive to the Marne at a point thirty-seven miles from Paris. It was during this drive that U.S. forces played a significant role, halting the German advance at Château-Thierry/Belleau Wood (May 27-July 1, 1918). German
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U.S. troops fighting in France. (Library of Congress)
forces were successfully able to cross the Marne in mid-July, but at this juncture Ferdinand Foch, who had been appointed Allied commander on April 24, ordered a counterattack, which began with a successful British attack on German forces at Amiens (August 8-September 4, 1918). Following German defeats at the Second Battle of the Somme, and the Fifth Battle of Arras, German forces were driven back to the Hindenburg Line (September 5). Allied forces also removed the Germans from the St. Mihiel salient (September 12-16, 1918). In September, the Americans launched the Meuse-Argonne Offensive (September 26-November 11, 1918), advancing through the Argonne Forest and breaking through German lines between Metz and Sedan. In October, the French took St. Quentin, and Britain occupied Cambrai and Ostend. By early November, the Hindenburg Line was broken, with German forces in full retreat. Austria-Hungary rapidly signed an armistice (November 3), joining Turkey, which had withdrawn from the war several days before, and Bulgaria, which had withdrawn from the war in late September. Allied Victory The defeat of the German army set off a naval mutiny, which in turn stimulated popular uprisings. Kaiser William II decided to leave Germany
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and seek refuge in the Netherlands. On November 9, 1918, Germany declared itself to be a democratic republic, hoping for a lenient peace treaty under Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the American president’s program for peace, which Wilson had laid out in a January, 1918, speech. At 5:00 a.m. on November 11, an armistice was signed. Six hours later, the guns were silent on the western front. The armistice called for Germany’s surrender. Germany was to evacuate immediately all occupied territory and Alsace-Lorraine as well as German territory west of the Rhine and three bridgeheads over the Rhine. It was to surrender immediately a great deal of war equipment, including guns and machine guns, as well as its submarines. The war broke up four empires: Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, Russian, and German. It left nine million dead and seven million severely wounded. The Treaty of Versailles (June 28, 1919) imposed harsh conditions on Germany, including financial reparations based on its “war guilt,” or responsibility in starting the war, and considerable loss of territory. These conditions would play a part in the rise of the Nazis and the start of World War II. Irwin Halfond
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Weapons, Tactics, and Strategies World War I was the first truly modern war conducted on a worldwide scale. Building on military advances coming out of the Civil War in the United States, the Crimean and Franco-Prussian Wars in Europe, and the South African (Boer) War, World War I introduced large-scale armored naval combat, aerial warfare, tank warfare, and other destructive innovations. However, despite all these technological advances, the actual conduct of war remained mired in nineteenth century concepts, and the heaviest land combat of the war was largely static. Beginning in 1871, with the unification of Kaiser Wilhelm (William) I’s German Reich through the diplomacy of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck and the efficiency of the Prussian army, the balance of power in Europe began to change. The swift German defeats of Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866, and France in 1870-1871 had created a central European state that alarmed all nine of its neighbors. France, clearly seeking revenge for its defeat and for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, was ready to join other states in a coalition against Germany. Bismarck maintained friendly agreements with Russia and Austria, thus isolating France. By 1882 this agreement had culminated in a Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, as well as a nonaggression understanding with Russia. The Bismarck system was weakened by the 1887 refusal of German banks to extend new loans to Russia, causing the czar to turn to French bankers. After Bismarck’s 1890 dismissal by Kaiser Wilhelm (William) II, the German treaty with Russia lapsed, and a Franco-Russian defensive military alliance followed in 1894. Britain’s search for allies after the South African (Boer) War (1899-1902) led to an alliance with Japan, a 1904 colonial “entente” with France, and a similar understanding with Russia in 1907. Although Britain was not bound under the agreement to support France and Russia, and Italy had expressed reservations on its obligations to the alliance, the average European citizen saw the powers as rival camps— Triple Alliance versus Triple Entente. In 1914 neither the people nor the leaders of the larger European powers were planning for or seeking war, although they all sought military security and considered their windows of opportunity for military success. After the war broke out, the forces aligned with the Triple Alliance became known as the Axis, or Central, Powers. The forces aligned with the Triple Entente became known as the Allied Powers.
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Competing War Aims Whereas Russia had the manpower and Britain the sea power for a long war, Germany’s chances seemed better in a short conflict. General Alfred von Schlieffen, the German chief of staff from 1891 to 1905, devised a plan for a quick march through central Belgium aimed at enveloping Paris within six weeks, so that some German troops could be entrained back to Berlin to save that city from the slower advance of the Russians. This meant, however, that Germany would have to invade Belgium within a few days of any Russian mobilization. In the 1914 crisis following the assassination of the Austrian crown prince Francis Ferdinand and his wife by pro-Serb extremists on June 28, 1914, Germany gambled that Russia would stay neutral while Austria defeated the Serbs. When the czar ordered mobilization on July 30, Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II, Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, and Chief of Staff General Helmuth von Moltke all felt compelled to put the Schlieffen Plan into action, declaring war on Russia and mobilizing on August 1 to attack France through Belgium. In all the belligerent states of 1914, the leaders, press, and public felt sure that they had no choice but to fight, that their enemies had forced them to defend themselves. Nationalism and moral righteousness fanned by newspaper jingoism excited overwhelming support for a war that was expected to be brief, with winners and losers determined by a few battles. Many young men were ready to volunteer for a bit of excitement before settling down. As Winston S. Churchill put it, “they sought adventure but found death.” The invasion of Belgium became a serious moral handicap for Germany. Allied propaganda built on this violation of neutrality and treaties with stories of atrocities in occupied Belgium that depicted the Germans as bestial criminals. Further, the German advance on Paris bogged down in stalemated trench warfare, and the German defeat of the Russians at Tannenberg in August, 1914, and at the Masurian Lakes in September, 1914, was not decisive, partly due to Austria’s poor showing on the eastern front. Although a negotiated peace might have been possible at the end of 1914, public opinion was not prepared for it, and it would not have met the demand for future security against aggression. The German armies were successful enough in 1914 to overrun most of France’s northern industrial zone. As they held off the Russians, the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers, the former Triple Alliance, in October, 1914, hoping to pay off old scores against Russia, Britain, and France. Japan also joined with Germany in August, occupying Germany’s Far Eastern bases, especially that of Qingdao, in China’s Shandong province.
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In 1915 French marshal Joseph-Jacques Césaire Joffre mounted offensives that he termed as “nibbling” against the German troops, now commanded by General Erich von Falkenhayn. On the eastern front, the failure of Russia’s offensive encouraged Bulgaria to join the Central Powers, combining with Austria to drive the Serb army out of Serbia. An August 6, 1915, Anglo-French naval attempt to open the Dardanelles, a narrow strait between Turkey and Europe, as a supply route to Russia failed. These debacles brought about a coalition cabinet in Britain, and Winston S. Churchill was dropped from the Admiralty. The British also committed an expedition to occupy Basra, a southeastern Iraqi port, and to move up the Tigris River toward Baghdad in Turkish Mesopotamia. Italy joined the Axis Powers, with the promise of land in the Trentino, the Tyrol, and the Dalmatian coast as well as extra-European colonies. In a further Eastern diversion, Axis troops occupied Salonika as a check to Bulgaria. Germany fell into a quarrel with the United States over American lives lost in the May 7, 1915, torpedoing of the British liner Lusitania. When U.S. president Woodrow Wilson threatened war, the Germans promised in May of 1916 to restrict their submarine tactics to the nearly prohibitive terms demanded by the United States. Year of Decision It was widely expected that 1916 would be a year of decisive battles. The Allied plan for simultaneous convergence on Germany was anticipated when Falkenhayn launched a major assault on French fortifications at Verdun in February. Russia’s June attack on Austria, the Brusilov Offensive, encouraged Romania to join the Allies, while the British Expeditionary Force under Sir Douglas Haig made a major attack on the Germans in the Battle of the Somme (1916). The Germans did not take Verdun, but they rescued the Austrians and overran nearly all of Romania. This success did not quite make up for a potato blight in Germany and a subsequent “turnip winter” for the civilians. In Mesopotamia the British advance army of 10,000 was defeated and surrendered. The May, 1916, naval Battle of Jutland proved a tactical success for Germany but a strategic success for the continuing British blockade. The British losses on the Somme were heavy, and the Easter Rebellion in Ireland rounded out another grim year. In the United States, 1916 was a year of preparedness rallies and appropriations. After his reelection, President Wilson asked both the Allied and the Axis Powers to state their specific war aims, but each side replied in vague terms. The restriction of territorial annexations gained support among those tired of the war, but there was no agreement on the possession of the Alsace-Lorraine region on the French-German border.
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By March of 1917, street demonstrations in the Russian cities of St. Petersburg and Moscow had become uncontrollable. Czar Nicholas II abdicated, and a government of moderates was formed, headed by Prince Georgy Lvov and dominated by Aleksandr Kerensky. Attempts to continue the war were unsuccessful. Peace, bread, and land were the popular demands, and on that program, Vladimir Ilich Lenin and the Bolsheviks took power in November, signed an armistice on December 15, and accepted a treaty at Brest-Litovsk (now in Belarus) on March 3, 1918. Renewed German Offensive The German General Staff, headed since 1916 by Paul von Hindenburg, with Erich Ludendorff as his strategic guide, viewed the Russian collapse as Germany’s chance for total victory. The Germans calculated that an allout submarine campaign would defeat Britain by 1918, that America would never risk sending troops across a submarine-dominated Atlantic, and that German soldiers from the eastern front would give the Reich the manpower it needed to crush France in 1918. Diplomatic alternatives were not explored. The resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in February, 1917, was an open challenge to Wilson’s policy. The so-called Zimmermann telegram, an intercepted German message made public proposing an alliance of Germany, Mexico, and Japan in war against the United States, was clearly a hostile act that Americans treated as such. The United States declared war on Germany on April 6, 1917. The United States chose to fight as an “Associated Power,” against war and autocracy and for peace, humanity, and justice, without seeking territory as the spoils of victory. After the failure of a French offensive in April, 1917, was followed by a mutinous “sit-down” in several French army divisions, General HenriPhilippe Pétain became French commander in chief, restoring confidence with a strategic choice to “wait for the tanks and the Americans.” The Italians were outgeneraled in the autumn Battle of Caporetto (1917), losing heavily in prisoners as they were driven from the Isonzo River back to the Piave River. These German successes, however great, could not make up for the facts that Britain had been saved by the transatlantic convoy system and that U.S. troops had begun arriving in France in June of 1917. Ideological Changes The Russian (Bolshevik) Revolution, which had also begun in 1917, and the American entrance into the war had, by 1918, given the war an increasingly ideological meaning. After the Bolsheviks published the Axis Powers’ secret treaties, The New York Times editorialized that Russian revo-
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One of the great technological advances of World War I was the introduction of heavily armored and highly mobile tanks. However, it would not be until World War II that the mobility of tanks was used to advantage on a large scale. (U.S. Army War College)
lutionary leader Leon Trotsky was “not a gentleman,” but, in fact, the treaties’ evidence of haggling over territorial loot insulted the sacrifice of millions of lives. The promise of self-determination, democracy, and justice espoused in both Wilson’s program for a just settlement of the war, known as the Fourteen Points, and Lenin’s propaganda encouraged separatism in AustriaHungary and the Ottoman Empire, as well as in Ireland and Asia. Ludendorff ignored the political trends and the possibilities of defensive strategy and gambled that he could find military victory in France with a wellplanned attack and revised infantry tactics. His offensive broke the front and gained ground, but again the troops outran their reinforcements and supplies. When the Allies, finally united under the command of French marshal Ferdinand Foch, struck back in mid-June with the advantage of tanks and air support, the overextended German lines could no longer halt the Allied attacks. In September, Ludendorff declared victory out of reach, and in October the German chancellor asked Wilson for armistice terms based on the Fourteen Points. Negotiations proceeded as Bulgaria made terms on September 29, Turkey on October 31, and Austria on November 4. Part of the German navy mutinied on October 29, and an armistice delegation left Berlin for France on November 7. Demonstrations in Berlin led Kaiser William II to abdicate on November 9 and flee to Holland the following day. The German delegates, now representing a new government, signed an
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Armistice at Compiègne on November 11. President Wilson arrived in Europe on December 13, 1918, hailed as a powerful idealist bringing peace, democracy, justice, and security at the end of the “Great War.” Military Achievement Germany’s goal in the major theater of World War I was to defeat France by taking Paris within six weeks and then shifting troops eastward to stop the invading Russians. The drive for Paris failed. The Germans were stymied by problems with supplies and reinforcements that were multiplied with the distance from the German railheads, whereas the French used their own transport network, centered on Paris, for rapid countermoves. Falkenhayn’s 1916 attrition strategy in the attack of Verdun killed almost as many Germans as Allies and was basically unsound, given the Allied predominance in manpower. Colonel Max Hoffman’s 1917 campaign on the eastern front took advantage of the Russian Revolution to drive the Russians to accept German peace terms and created an opportunity for a negotiated peace that was acceptable to Germany. Ludendorff, in the west, preferred to gamble on submarines and a 1918 capture of Paris before American intervention could be effective. A better German foreign policy might have been the avoidance of a two-front war or the negotiation of an acceptable peace plan in late 1916 or early 1917. Germany’s wartime aims for territory or dominance in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East were militarily impractical. The French offensive aims never achieved their ostensible goals until the Ludendorff Offensive of 1918 depleted German manpower. Only then could the French achieve the obvious goal of gaining Alsace-Lorraine plus security. France’s Plan 17 in 1914 was geographically unsound and misjudged the location of the German attack, but it drew the German battle eastward and away from Paris. Joffre’s 1915 “nibbling” with bombardments was ineffective, and General Robert-Georges Nivelle’s “surprise breakthrough” in 1917 had been too widely advertised to surprise anyone. Pétain’s defensive strategy gave the French army a chance to recover, a sensible goal after the French army mutinies of 1917. The French general staff was generally less effective than its German counterpart but made fewer costly mistakes. The Russian goals of taking Berlin, threatening Vienna, and dominating Constantinople at least had the advantage of a numerous, courageous, and usually uncomplaining infantry. Against Austrian and Turkish forces, the Russians had many successes, limited only by inadequate transportation. Against the Germans, however, the Russian army officers seemed to be too preoccupied by the probability of defeat to act on the possibility of success.
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With a shortage of both experienced noncommissioned ranks and competent officers, the quality of Russian army leadership was so bad that the troops were losing faith in the army leaders, even as the home front was losing faith in the government and the czar. Britain achieved some limited and peripheral goals: It prevailed narrowly in the Battle of Jutland; it maintained a blockade of the Central Powers; it brought world, and especially U.S., resources to the western front despite German submarines; it helped to finance the Allies; it did most of the fighting in Germany’s African colonies, in the Middle East, and at the Dardanelles and Gallipoli; and it committed a sizable army to the western front. These were significant goals and achievements. Without victory over the submarines, there might well have been no Allied victory in the European theater. On the other hand, Germany’s chief threat to Britain was economic, and on that score, the liquidation of Britain’s overseas investments to finance the war benefited the United States more than it hurt Germany and was certainly an important step in Britain’s later decline as a world power. Austria did occupy Serbia in 1915, thereby more or less achieving Austria-Hungary’s goal to eliminate Serbia as a factor in Balkan politics. It also held off the Italians until the collapse of 1918, but its campaigns against Russia lacked direction; the 1918 wave of “self-determination” simply dissolved the polyglot Habsburg Empire. The Treaty of Versailles that ended the war in 1919 drew very restricted boundaries for Hungary and forbade the Austrian remnant from making any political or commercial union with Germany. The Allied Powers had made generous territorial promises to Italy for joining them in 1915, and the Italian army’s military goal from 1915 to 1918 was to take the Austrian capital of Vienna. Adverse geography and an army that was both poorly equipped and poorly trained stalled the Italians on the Isonzo River, until their defeat at Caporetto forced them to develop assault squads that finally won the Battle of Vittorio Veneto (1918) as Austria-Hungary collapsed. Even though Italy did gain the Trentino, Tyrol, and, later, Fiume, in the Treaty of Versailles, it still felt shortchanged. The Ottoman Empire wished to gain territory, such as the Suez Canal, from the British, and land in the Caucasus from Russia, but was more successful in defensive campaigns, such as Gallipoli. In the Balkans, the Serbian army had been forced out of Serbia into Salonika, a French territory, but in the Treaty of Versailles, the Serbian premier gained leadership over the kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Bulgaria had joined the Central Powers to invade Serbia but lost border enclaves in the Treaty of Versailles. Romania’s goal had been to gain Transylvania, and despite a complete mil-
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itary defeat, did so at Paris; it had also regained Bessarabia from Russia under the earlier Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Greece had the distinction of being forced into the war by the British and French for modest territorial gains. Belgium had wanted Luxembourg but had no means of armed occupation. Japan’s goal had been to acquire German bases and islands in the Far East, and its army and navy enforced these claims. Japan’s military presence in Shandong and Siberia and its naval construction program aroused U.S. hostility. The United States entered the war on April 6, 1917, participating in the battles of 1918 as an “Associated Power” on the Allied side. The American political goals were to defeat Germany, “making the world safe for democracy,” and to end war by means of a League of Nations based on selfdetermination and justice. The U.S. military goal was German surrender. Land Weapons In 1914, as oversized armies met in the European theater, increased firepower made battlefields impassable for conventional infantry assaults. The previously ineffective mitrailleuse came into its own: Situated to cover enemy troop concentrations and used in short bursts to avoid overheating and jamming, these machine guns, whether water-cooled Maxims or aircooled Hotchkiss types, fired 400 to 600 rounds per minute. Also, boltaction repeating rifles, such as the German Mauser Gewehr 98, the British Lee-Metford, the Austrian Mannlicher Model 1895, the Italian MannlicherCarcano, the French Lebel M-1e 1886/93, the Russian Nagant, and later,
An air-cooled Hotchkiss machine gun. (U.S. Army War College)
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the American Springfield, achieved a range, accuracy, and rate of fire unprecedented in European warfare. Battles of encounter became a story of heavy losses, entrenchment, barbed wire, and stalemate. Light field artillery was used to attack the trenches, ranging from the 75millimeter gun (known in French as the soixante-quinze) to the 105-millimeter howitzer. The Germans used 30.5-centimeter Skodas and 42-centimeter Krupps Big Berthas for howitzer shelling of the forts at Liège and Namur. Larger artillery, such as the “Paris gun,” used by the Germans to shell Paris in 1918, had to be moved by rail. Antitrench bombardments, however, so cratered the terrain as to slow down the assault troops, a self-defeating result. The mining of enemy trenches, as by the British at Messines Ridge in June, 1917, was effective but caused massive terrain dislocation and took a great deal of time for a limited gain. Flamethrowers were tried with good results at close quarters but without achieving major breakthroughs. Poison gas, under the right conditions, could break down a line of defense, but advancing in gas masks was slow work and some gases persisted for days. Repeatedly, attacking armies were hampered in moving men and supplies across ravaged battlefields while retreating armies drew on rapid support from the rail center it was defending. For most of World War I, defense was a stronger position than offense in terms of reinforcement and supply. Another defensive form, the blockade, dominated the war at sea, but undersea and aerial weapons threatened the traditional line of battle style of naval warfare. Submerged mines kept the British from entering the Dardanelles in 1915 and effectively kept them out of the Baltic Sea. Aerial reconnaissance at sea by dirigibles, blimps, and airplanes became a new factor, and German diesel-electric submarines did much more damage to Allied warships and world commercial shipping than did any of its surface warships. These submarines were also a major factor in the 1917 entry of the United States into the war, which ensured Germany’s defeat. The Air War Aerial warfare captured the imagination of the public, but the comparative airpower of the European states in 1914 is difficult to put into quantitative terms, because too many variables are involved. France apparently had from 200 to 250 serviceable airplanes. Germany had a few more, as well as zeppelins. Britain claimed only 35 planes but could be compared at 135. Austria-Hungary had 36, and Belgium 24. Russia purchased 250 foreign planes in 1913 to add to those of its own production but listed only about 100 total pilots. Wartime production greatly increased these numbers.
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The first aerial reconnaissance and bombing began in 1914, when machine guns were mounted on airplanes. Dutch aircraft designer Anthony H. G. Fokker equipped his 1915 German planes with interrupter gears for forward firing through the propeller. Germany’s zeppelins were useful only in long-range bombing, and its airplane production was limited by an inadequate supply of engines. During the war, airplanes improved greatly in both general reliability and strength of construction. Pilots were not usually issued parachutes, giving them an incentive to land their planes safely if hit. Survivors could not remember any “dogfights” quite as crowded as those depicted in later Hollywood films. Armored Vehicles Armored trains and armored cars were not new, but they could not cross trenches. In 1916, British colonel Ernest Swinton developed a “land warship,” code-named “tank,” with a caterpillar tractor-type continuous tread stretched over a long and rigid track. This tread gave the 30-ton vehicle the ability to cross trenches while carrying 6-pound guns or machine guns in side-mounted gun platforms as it advanced through the German defenses. In 1918 Britain produced a 14-ton Whippet model tank with a machine gun, and France introduced the 6.5-ton Renault Char-Mitrailleuse with a 360-degree turret. The British used a few tanks on the Somme in 1916 and successfully at Cambrai in 1917. Germany produced a few 30-ton tanks and only prototypes for a lighter machine. Germany’s western offensive in 1918 depended chiefly on the use of captured Allied tanks. Despite their persistent tendencies to ditch or break down, tanks were the Allies’ best new weapon in 1918. Although the tank became a tactical breakthrough weapon in World War I, it was not yet capable of leading a sustained offensive. Several elements of civilian life came to have military significance. Trucks became necessary links between railheads and battlefields, although horses still pulled field artillery. Telephones and wireless telegraphy became variably useful. Voice radio would have been very useful for conveying reports and orders over large combat areas, but the transmitting and receiving equipment had a limited range. By 1914 armor at sea had been maximized. Waterline “blisters” were added to battleships for protection against mines and torpedoes, but the addition of any more deck armor to protect against aerial bombs or the plunging fire of long-range shooting would have made ships top-heavy and ready to capsize. German compartmentalization and wider dry docks gave the Germans stronger ships at Jutland.
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Armor on land principally concerned tanks. Although World War I tanks had enough armor to stop ordinary rifle or machine-gun bullets, .50caliber or larger high-velocity bullets would penetrate them. The size of tank needed to cross trenches meant a large vehicle that was only thinly covered. Basically, tanks needed more horsepower, which ideally came from diesel engines. Uniforms European uniforms became discreetly drab after the Russo-Japanese War showed the advantage of camouflage. Khaki or gray-green colors prevailed. Shoulder and collar patches identified units and rank. Headgear, such as a forage cap, tin hat, turban, or fez, was distinctive. In 1914 the exceptions in uniform uniformity were the French, whose press and politicians had insisted on the troops’ traditional blue coat and red trousers, and the Scots, whose kilts were covered by khaki aprons for the field. Military Organization The belligerents, or warring nations, of World War I originally organized their military forces along the same general lines developed during the French Revolution (1789-1799). The head of the government or the war cabinet determined war policies for the army and navy. The service chiefs developed and executed the military war plans. This latter group was described as General Headquarters (GHQ) in Britain and the United States, as Grand Quartier Géneral (GQG) in France, as Stavka in Russia, and as Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL) in Germany. The land forces were divided into army groups of field armies composed of corps. The corps was an all-arms group including two infantry divisions, a cavalry brigade or division, an artillery brigade, and several support groups. The division continued to be a basic all-arms unit capable of independent action if ordered and composed of brigades, regiments, battalions, companies, platoons, and squads in diminishing order of size. A typical infantry division included headquarters personnel, two or three brigades of infantry, one or two regiments of field artillery, a squadron or up to a regiment of cavalry, a battalion or regiment of engineers, one or more signal companies (in the United States, this included airplanes as well as telegraph and radio), ambulance companies, field hospitals, a base hospital, ammunition and supply services, and food services. European divisions might number 10,000 to 15,000, and U.S. divisions in Europe 25,000 to 30,000. Cavalry divisions were much less numerous in personnel. Some divisions were specialized, such as investment divisions for sieges or mountain (Alpine) divisions.
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This multiplicity of functions meant that while battlefield firepower increased, the number of riflemen decreased in favor of the new special services. In military jargon, there was “less teeth and more tail,” especially in U.S. overseas divisions. Indeed, some servicemen might find that apart from boredom, mud, and the danger of being killed or wounded, they were better fed and cared for than they had been in civilian life. The development during World War I of infiltration squads and supporting assault battalions meant special selection, training, and organization for these shock troops, or combat teams, as they would later be called. At the time, this separation of an elite infantry force was controversial for being potentially harmful to general army morale. Is is considered in some accounts as a factor in Germany’s 1918 military defeat. The new weapons of World War I were sometimes seen as a threat to senior army ranks. Young officers ambitious for promotion might be drawn to a new technical field, to which older officers found it difficult to adjust, and claim the need for an independent organization with its own system of funding, control, and promotion. Submarines were safely under navy control, and aircraft carriers could be limited, but a separate Royal Air Force, such as the British established in 1918, was an unwelcome competitor for shrinking postwar military budgets. There was widespread agreement that tanks should be nothing more than ancillary to infantry operations. The general staff system of army administration, planning, and command, used with great success by Germany in the nineteenth century, was widely copied but with very mixed results in World War I. The German staff was efficient in the military field but calamitous in trying to shape general strategy and foreign policy. The French staff managed its generals fairly well but did not do much for the front-line soldiers. Otherwise, general staffs tended to defer to the commanding general without giving him needed information. Britain’s imperial general staff suffered from the fact that the British had little regard for military desk jobs and opted instead for field commands. Although the United States had capable staff chiefs, it still seemed that General John J. Pershing did too much of his own staff work. On the whole, most countries felt that their own general staff needed improvement and that the German staff should be abolished. The abolition turned out to be only a matter of form. Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics Nineteenth century military theory, attempting to borrow its principles of war from the French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1802), concluded that mass citizen armies had outmoded the older professional armies of the eighteenth century and that the offensive campaigns of French emperor
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Napoleon Bonaparte showed how these mass armies should be used to win wars. The doctrine of the offensive became established at military academies. In the Crimean War (1853-1856), the Civil War (1861-1865), the Wars of German Unification (1864, 1866, 1870-1871), and the RussoJapanese War (1904-1905), victory went to invaders pursuing the offensive, although the cost to the attacking infantry increased. Breech-loading rifles with longer effective ranges made frontal assaults increasingly costly, and railways gave defenders a quick deployment against any strategic flank attack. Although it took little training to fire a rifle from a defensive position, the half-trained recruits of mass armies might not be as willing and able to press home a successful bayonet attack. In France the doctrine of the offensive became even more imperative as military leaders appreciated that the predictable speed of a German offensive aimed at Paris would need to be matched by a fast-moving FrancoRussian offensive converging on Berlin. According to the French high command, the French infantry would need to have the spirit, discipline, and courage to attack and win by the bayonet against ever-increasing odds. The Germans held a similar philosophy. The western front battles of 1914 began as open-field encounters of deadly firepower that drove the troops into hasty trenches. The short lesson was “bullets kill men, and earth stops bullets.” The dominant tactic from 1915 to 1917 was bombardment by more and bigger howitzers. This offensive was undeniably more wracking for the target infantry, and fatal for some outposts, but it destroyed the element of surprise and left a scarred no-man’s-land of a battlefield that was too chewed up for an offensive advance. Extensive mining could destroy an entire enemy entrenchment, but again, the zone of destruction was difficult for the attackers to cross. This method was effective, but time-consuming and expensive. Attacks with poisonous gases were frequently surprising and damaging to the defenders but also caused problems for the attackers. Tank attacks were promising but not very effective in 1916 and 1917. French general Nivelle promised a new kind of offensive when he replaced Marshal Joffre in 1917. On paper his plan did seem to incorporate some of the flexible infiltration ideas advocated by earlier theorists, but when the plan was fully explained to the politicians, and through the press to the public, including the Germans, its failure became inevitable. “Vertical infiltration” was more successfully developed by the Germans for their breakthrough against the Russians at Riga (1917). The same methods accounted for some of the Austro-German success against Italy at Caporetto. The surprising strength of the Ludendorff Offensive in 1918 again showed the effectiveness of these methods. The Allies followed
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somewhat similar offensive methods later in 1918, but these tended to be tank-led breakthrough and penetration tactics against German troops who were increasingly willing to surrender. Vertical infiltration, as developed by the Germans during World War I, was basically an infantry attack involving several new tactics. The spear point was to be a squad of fourteen to eighteen storm troopers, or (in German) Sturmtruppen, attacking on several principles. The first was the use of reconnaissance to find weak spots, infiltrating in surprise night penetrations, deceptive preparations, and short bombardments, moving forward bypassing strong points. After this initial infiltration, platoons, companies, and larger units would also move forward and widen the breakthrough. The infiltration squad would use light machine guns or portable submachine guns such as the Madsen, Bergmann, or Parabellum, as well as grenades and grenade launchers, light trench mortars, gas shells, and sometimes flamethrowers. Battalion support followed with machine gun companies, light artillery companies, and heavier, individually placed guns. Ideally aerial bombing and strafing would find targets of opportunity. The principle of momentum held that the assault and support units should always keep moving. The assault team included engineers to ensure that reinforcements, replacements, and supplies could be moved directly from the rear to the front. Clearly, these were ideal principles. In practice, the logistical problems of moving equipment from the railhead to the forward storm troopers could not keep an advance going indefinitely. Also, many generals rejected the idea of elite storm troopers as bad for general army morale. However, the resemblance of these early troops to World War II German Panzer divisions and to later U.S. assault team formations is clear enough to show the eventual significance of these tactics for future offensives. Lessons of the War In Britain and France the lessons that generals learned in 1918 mattered less to the public, press, and political leaders than did the preceding fouryear western front stalemate and slaughter. The doctrine of the offensive and the strategy of attrition were discredited among the postwar disillusioned, or “lost,” generation. Without American or Soviet support, the remaining Allies adopted a defensive doctrine, believing that the Maginot line, a line of fortifications along the French-German border, and a British naval blockade would be enough to defeat Germany economically. This strategy was crushed by the German Blitzkrieg of 1940. K. Fred Gillum
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The Air War World War I, the first truly global conflict, was also the first war in which rapidly developing aviation technology allowed for the widespread use of fighter planes and bombers in support of ground troops. At the start of World War I, often known as the Great War, airplanes were little more than ten years old. The Blériot XI type airplane, only five years old, had first gone to war in 1911 with Italian forces in North Africa. At the outbreak of World War I, the British Royal Flying Corps (RFC) brought twenty-three Blériot XI’s to France with its expeditionary force. These planes served as reconnaissance aircraft with six RFC squadrons. The French Air Service also furnished Blériots to eight of their escadrilles, or air squadrons, and Italy went into action with its own previously acquired Blériot XI’s in six squadrons. The first airplanes were looked upon not as weapons of destruction but rather as scouts. Even at the end of the war, fighters such as the Sopwith Snipe and the Fokker D-VIII were still classified as scouts. At the start of the war, planes were unarmed, and pilots from opposing sides would wave as they flew by each other, in a sort of “camaraderie of the sky.” This arrangement did not last. Armed Aircraft On the night of June 17, 1915, in a Morane Saulnier L, Lieutenant R. A. J. Warneford of the Royal Naval Air Force (RNAF) was flying toward Evere, Belgium, to bomb zeppelin bases. Warneford spotted the LZ-37, a German zeppelin, 521 feet long, kept aloft by 935,000 cubic feet of dangerously flammable hydrogen gas and armed with four machine guns. Warneford’s single-seater carried only a few bombs and a carbine. The zeppelin crew fired at Warneford as it dumped ballast and rapidly rose higher into the sky. On through the night and early into the morning, Warneford pursued the zeppelin, which eventually began to lose altitude. Warneford pushed his Morane to higher altitudes until he was above the zeppelin, at which point Warneford released his bombs. The bombs made contact with the zeppelin, resulting in a tremendous explosion. The dirigible, engulfed in flames, plummeted to the earth. Lieutenant Warneford was the first Allied flier to bring down a zeppelin. Air fighting began as the exchange of shots from small arms between enemy airmen meeting one another in the course of reconnoitering. Fighter aircraft armed with machine guns, however, made their first ap-
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pearance in 1915. Tactical bombing and the bombing of enemy air bases were also gradually introduced at this time. Contact patrolling, with aircraft giving immediate support to infantry, was developed in 1916. Fighter Group Organization On the German side of the western front, aviation units in the field were at first divided into thirty-four flying sections, or flights, known as Feldfliegerabteilungen. Each flight had six aircraft for reconnaissance, photographic duties, and artillery target-spotting. Two additional aircraft were later added for escort work. When, in 1915, the need for more specialized duties was clear, units solely for reconnaissance and fighting were formed, known as Kampf und Feldfliegerabteilungen. The British established the Air Battalion of the Royal Engineers in 1911. In April, 1912, the RFC was established and the Military Wing of the RFC absorbed the Air Battalion. The Military Wing initially had seven squadrons of planes with twelve aircraft to a squadron, an aircraft for each squadron commander, and one airship and manned kite balloon squadron. The RFC was still attached, however, to the army. The Royal Air Force (RAF), the world’s first separate air military service, was brought into active existence by a series of measures taken between October, 1917, and June, 1918. The French Air Service had a structure similar to those of the British and the Germans. The French had a unit of American volunteers that was created in April, 1916, and renamed the Lafayette Escadrille in December, 1916. The Lafayette Escadrille saw much frontline action and suffered heavy casualties. In January, 1918, the Lafayette Escadrille was reorganized in the U.S. Army as the 103d Pursuit Squadron. Development of Fighter Planes After a few months into the war, pilots were unanimous in their desire for fixed machine guns. Pusher aircraft presented no problem in this matter, because their propellers were placed behind the cockpit compartment. Thus, a machine gun could be mounted in front of the pilot with a clear line of fire. In contrast, a tractor aircraft, with the propeller at the front of the plane’s fuselage, had no clear line of fire ahead of the pilot. A machine gun mounted along the line of the fuselage would have shot off the propeller blades. During the month before the outbreak of the war, French engineer Raymond Saulnier had been working on an interrupter gear that would allow a machine gun to be fired through the propeller arc. He had grown impatient with hang-fire failures, so he attached steel deflection plates on
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the propeller where the bullets passed through the arc. The famous sporting pilot and friend of Saulnier, Lieutenant Roland Garros, asked Saulnier to attach steel deflector plates to his propeller blades and to mount a fixed machine gun in front of the cockpit. Garros relied upon the steel plates to ward off the bullets that hit the airscrew. Shortly thereafter, Garros shot down five German planes and was awarded the French Legion of Honor. The problem of perfecting a machine gun that would synchronize its firing with the rotation of the propellers was the assignment given to the Dutch engineer Anthony Fokker. In 1915, Fokker considerably improved upon Garros’s innovation. Fokker Eindecker E-I’s armed with synchronized Spandau machine guns roamed the skies virtually unopposed. German aces such as Lieutenant Max Immelman and Captain Oswald Boelcke led a reign of terror in the skies, known as the “Fokker Scourge.” However, the Allies soon came up with a synchronized gun designed by Georges Constantinesco. Early Losses British losses in the air in 1915 were serious. The British workhorse aircraft was the BE.2 of pre-1914 Geoffrey De Havilland design. The BE.2, under mass production in a way not accorded to any other British machine, was used on all fronts for all types of work. By 1915, improvements to the BE.2’s original design had been made, but the Fokker Eindecker E-I, with its interrupter-geared, forward-firing machine gun, still outmatched the BE.2. Any effective British response to the Fokker scourge was often hampered by the difference in the tactics of the British and the Germans. British tactics were to cover as much of the war theater as possible while the Germans would concentrate their strength at key areas where it was felt that an effort was needed. The latter approach proved the more effective. From the winter of 1914-1915, the practice of British squadrons in France was to have one or two single-seat scouts with some form of armament that enabled them to act as fighters, not merely as faster reconnaissance aircraft. The successful RFC single-seat fighter was the Airco DH.2 pusher biplane. RFC Squadron Twenty-four, equipped with these planes, went to France in February, 1916, and momentarily overcame the Fokker monoplane and the German two-seaters in the struggle for aerial supremacy. The Fighter Planes Of the German fighter planes, the D-types were single-seat, singleengine biplanes, which usually had two fixed Maxim (Spandau) machine
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guns. The Dr-types were single-seat, single-engine, armed triplanes, such as that used by the “Red Baron,” Manfred von Richthofen. The Dr’s had the same armament as the D-types. The E-types were single-seat, occasionally two-seat, single-engine, armed monoplanes. The Fokker E-IV was equipped with three synchronized machine guns. The Airco D.H.2 finally put an end to the Fokker scourge in 1916, but was soon outclassed by faster and more agile German fighters. With the Albatros D.II, the Germans reclaimed the skies in early 1916. The Fokker Dr.I, the triplane made famous by the Red Baron, was not as fast as many other aircraft of the time, but it could outmaneuver them. The Fokker DVII was the best fighter aircraft that Germany had. The D-VII could “hang on its prop,” or, point straight up, and shoot the underside of an enemy aircraft. Next to the Sopwith Camel, the S.E. 5 was one of Britain’s most successful fighters during World War I. The S.E. 5 was designed by Royal Aircraft and used the 150-horsepower Hispano-Suiza engine. It was introduced in 1916 and modified first with a 200-horsepower engine, then later with a Wolselev W.4a Viper engine. The latter engine proved very successful. Large numbers of this aircraft did not reach the front until early 1918. British fighter pilots, such as J. B. McCudden, William A. Bishop, and Edward Mannock, had a lot of success flying this plane. The S.E. 5 was one of the fastest fighters of the war and was also used for sneaking up under the enemy and shooting into its belly. Of the French planes, the Spad S. VIII was a very good climber and was favored by many pilots, such as Captain Eddie Rickenbacker of the United States. The main problem with the plane was that when the engine power or speed was reduced, the plane would drop like a dead weight. Bombing Strategic bombing was initiated very early in the war. British aircraft from Dunkirk bombed Cologne, Dusseldorf, and Friedrichshafen in the autumn of 1914. Their main objective was to destroy the sheds of the German dirigible airships or zeppelins. Raids by German planes or seaplanes on English towns in December, 1914, heralded a great zeppelin offensive sustained with increasing intensity from January, 1915, to September, 1916. London was first bombed in the night of May 31 to June 1, 1915. In October, 1916, the British, in turn, began a more systematic offensive from eastern France against industrial targets in southwestern Germany. While the British directed much of their new bombing strength to attacks on the bases of German U-boats, the Germans used theirs largely to continue the offensive against the towns of southeastern England. On
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One of the most glamorous American heroes of the war was fighter pilot Eddie Rickenbacker (center), who scored twenty-six victories in aerial combat. After the war, he parlayed his fame into a successful business career, and he helped to build the modern airline industry. (U.S. Army War College)
June 13, 1917, in daylight, fourteen German bombers dropped 118 highexplosive bombs on London and returned home safely. Many World War I bombers, such as the Blackburn Kangaroo, were converted passenger planes that returned to passenger service after the war. The Breguet Br-14B2, probably one of the best French-made bombers, was produced until 1926. The Caudron R-11 was the last bomber the French built during the war. Aces and Bloody April The honorific title of “ace” was given to any pilot who had downed five or more aircraft, including balloons, unarmed observation planes, and machine gun-armed fighter planes. The dark side of being a fighter pilot was that the vast majority of pilots flew until the war ended or they were killed. It often was only a matter of time until the odds went against individual pilots. This was true of the Red Baron, who was killed on April 21, 1918, as well as of many others, such as Boelcke and Immelman of the Fokker scourge. The top aces who survived the war were truly lucky. The British often referred to April, 1917, as “Bloody April.” During this month, the British listed 316 RFC pilots and observers as killed or missing
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and 224 RFC aircraft as having been destroyed. Credit for the losses was given to the inadequate training of new British pilots and to the superiority of the German fighter planes, principally the Albatros D.III, the effect of their shrewdly concentrated organization, aerial tactics, and the skill of the German pilots. Other Theaters of the War The RFC was active in northern Italy, Egypt, Palestine, Macedonia (northern Greece), Mesopotamia (Iraq), northern Persia, the Dardanelles and the Aegean Sea, and East Africa. The RFC’s efforts in most of those theaters were in support of ground troops. However, on the Austro-Italian front in northern Italy, the RFC had a strong presence. Great Britain sent seasoned fighter units to northern Italy because the Austro-Hungarian Air Service was very experienced and supported by German fighter and bomber forces. By May, 1918, the British squadrons had shot down eightythree enemy aircraft on the Austro-Italian front. In Egypt and Palestine, the RFC aided the breakout of the British Expeditionary Force from the Suez Canal area of Egypt into Palestine. In Macedonia, the RFC primarily was engaged in patrolling over the Bulgarian positions using kite balloons. In the Dardanelles and the Aegean Sea area, the RFC primarily scouted and bombed Turkish positions. The British rarely encountered significant aerial opposition in those diverse areas, with the notable exception of Macedonia. In the areas of Macedonia, northern Greece, and Bulgaria, a German ace, Rudolf von Eschwege, had twenty victories, three of which were against kite balloons. Von Eschwege’s Bulgarian allies called him “The Eagle of the Aegean.” In October and November, 1917, von Eschwege proved to be a serious threat to the Seventeenth Balloon Section of the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) at Orljak in Macedonia. On November 21, 1917, the Allies prepared a decoy balloon with a dummy observer and 500 pounds of explosives. When von Eschwege made his expected attack, the explosive was electronically detonated from the ground. The destructive radius of the blast was sufficient to cripple von Eschwege’s aircraft, and the plane crashed, killing its pilot. Dana P. McDermott
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Censorship During the War World War I ushered in a new era of modern media censorship, creating a proving ground for techniques of government control and propagandistic manipulation of the press which would be used in subsequent conflicts. During World War I, at the time the largest and most costly war in human history, censorship was pervasive, involving a complex web of ministries and laws in all belligerent, or warring, nations. Thousands of censors were used on battlefields, in government offices, and in newspaper pressrooms to limit the access of press and public to the war’s often terrible truths. As the war progressed, censorship in the principal combatant nations evolved in strikingly similar ways; for the sake of clarity, World War I censorship can be divided into three general phases, or periods. First Phase The beginning of the war witnessed the so-called eyewash period, nicknamed later by those who were appalled at tendentious lies and canards that had filled the press of all belligerent nations. This initial phase lasted through 1914, but the inaccuracies were most blatant in August and September. Editors and reporters filled news columns with misleading material, often because they were unable to obtain news from the war zones. Strict military censorship not only kept correspondents from the front but also maintained a nearly complete silence regarding the major battles of fall, 1914. Faced with anxious readers clamoring for war news, editors responded with exhortations to patriotism and fabricated stories of doughty troops relentlessly advancing; one famous French headline, for example, optimistically reported that Allied soldiers were “only five steps from Berlin.” Editors in the belligerent nations, especially the democracies of Great Britain and France, accepted, with surprisingly little initial protest, the strict military censorship that made it almost impossible to obtain reliable information. In Britain, Lord Kitchener, commanding the British Expeditionary Force, intensely disliked the press. In France, General JosephJacques Césaire Joffre, commanding the French armies, believed, as did most of the French military, that press indiscretions had led to the country’s defeat during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. He was not about to let such a hazard again befall French military operations. In fact, neither Germany, Austria-Hungary, nor Russia generally allowed war correspondents at the front during this period. A partial excep-
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tion was Germany, which, during the first weeks of war, allowed correspondents from neutral countries, such as the United States, to follow German troops as they advanced through northern France. This meant that the press of neutral nations offered a more accurate perception of the fall battles than the press of combatant nations. Reporters who tried to sneak past military police risked being jailed or even executed as spies, although none apparently received the ultimate punishment for trying to evade military censorship. Accompanying this silence from the front was a haphazard but determined effort to set up a censorship arm of government at home. Wartime press offices, designed to offer censorship guidelines and punishment for “betrayal,” sprouted from all ministries. French censorship was typical: A day before France declared war, a “press office” was set up; two days later, before parliament adjourned to let the government fight unimpeded by politics, the Law of August 5, 1914, forbade publication of a wide variety of news. It covered news of a military nature, such as troop and ship movements; mobilization, armament, and provision operations; and changes in high command. However, it also covered lists of killed and wounded, as well as any news “having a troubling influence on the spirit of the army or population.” This last part was the origin of a new concept—that of political censorship during wartime. It would become the most controversial aspect of censorship during World War I. In August, 1914, however, the press in most belligerent nations agreed with little protest to harsh limitations on freedom of expression. The key to understanding this, especially in nations such as France and Britain, which had enjoyed great press freedom, is the concept of a short but “sacred union.” In every fighting nation, nearly everyone assumed that the war would be brief: a few weeks, perhaps; a few months, at most; “home by Christmas,” for sure. For this short crisis period, nearly everyone agreed that the most effective and patriotic response was silence, a brief suspension of political discourse during a short war. If for a few weeks there could be no news other than patriotic hyperbole, it did not really matter, because after the war was over—and no country considered the possibility of a long struggle—normality would return. The tight screws of censorship meant that few people, even in neutral nations, were aware of the scale of slaughter during the fall of 1914. As it became clear that the war would last longer than a few weeks, however, journalists began trying to reclaim their lost rights as reporters, especially in Britain and France. The Allied military relented slightly at the end of 1914, when Britain, and then France, began to give journalists tours of the front. It was becom-
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ing clear to government and military leaders that carefully censored news articles could have a propagandistic effect more powerful than silence. Second Phase The second year of war inaugurated a new phase of censorship based not on the elimination of all war news but on the development of a structured system to carefully manage the news. At the beginning of the war, censorship generally developed haphazardly, with no underlying plan or structure. Of the conflict’s major original belligerents, Britain had fought in other wars most recently, and therefore had more experience of press coverage during modern war. France, however, had a stronger central bureaucracy and had enjoyed only three decades of press freedom, while Germany and Austria-Hungary were not committed to democratic principles of a free press, although prewar publications in those countries had been quite outspoken. Russia had never had a free press at all. As censorship coalesced into bureaucracy, France established the most pervasive of all systems. Censors were employed in every city, large and small, to review every publication in France, from the smallest rural magazines to the largest metropolitan dailies. Offending news columns could literally be scraped off the metal plates already molded, leaving huge blocks of blank space in the printed paper. No other country’s press was physically so scarred by censorship. The capriciousness of political censorship increasingly became an object of press protests. Governments discovered that their censors not only could stop military reports but also could offer a means to control morale on the home front. France’s censorship law against “troubling influence” left censors wide latitude to cut any sort of antigovernment criticism or negative news. Britain’s Defence of the Realm Acts provided the government broad powers to control criticism that might weaken morale, although Britain did not resort to on-site censorship as France did. However, as the terrible human and material costs of a stalemated war often ineptly fought over four hundred miles of front began to become clear, wartime governments also began to realize that, in order to win, public opinion would have to be mobilized for a long siege. The need to mobilize public opinion, as well as industry, the economy, and men in uniform, became a significant new feature of this war, one which would heavily influence the century’s later wars as well. By 1916 military commanders and government leaders were persuaded: The phases of great secrecy and begrudging acceptance gave way to the war’s third phase of censorship, one in which the United States would play a major role.
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Third Phase Part of World War I lore is the story of the 1916 Verdun battle: The tenacious heroes of French forts, the “sacred way” supplying the front, and the ultimate sacrifices under the most difficult conditions became an inspiration for French and Allied morale throughout the rest of the war. This was, however, a legend produced by the French military’s own correspondents, writer-soldiers in the field who dispatched battle stories to the press back home. The French military had replaced secrecy with an energetic publicity campaign designed to strengthen morale and sway world opinion to the Allied side. Britain, Germany, and soon the United States were also to build elaborate propaganda operations, which provided a blizzard of brochures, photos, articles, and reference materials to the world’s press. A system of battlefield accreditation allowed Allied correspondents greater access to the front, and every government now encouraged reporters to publish more, and still more, about the war, as long as the press published the right kinds of story. Generally speaking, after 1915 no major battle was actually misrepresented in the Allied press. The United States, outraged over renewed German submarine attacks on neutral ships as well as over the German atrocity stories spread primarily by British propagandists, declared war on the Central Powers in April, 1917. The United States military had been little different from its European counterparts in its intense distrust of the press, but President Woodrow Wilson’s government had learned from the trials and errors of its allies. The Committee on Public Information, directed by journalist George Creel, was charged with coordinating censorship and publicity but avoiding rigid controls; it encouraged the government to be as open and honest with the press as possible. Still, the appearance of an American censorship more flexible than that of European powers belies the often coercive nature of U.S. censorship law. For accreditation, American war correspondents were required to take an oath not to disclose facts helpful to the enemy, and their sponsoring publications were required to post ten-thousand-dollar bonds to guarantee their proper behavior. Reporters in Europe chafed at the American general John J. Pershing’s rigid control; in one case, New York Tribune correspondent Heywood Broun, fed up with the enforced silence over the U.S. military’s monumental supply blunders, broke the story in December, 1917, after evading on-site censors by returning to the United States. The newspaper forfeited its ten thousand dollars. Pershing was furious. Another reporter determined to evade military censors, George Seldes, joined a group of five American correspondents shortly after the armistice to sneak into Germany from Luxembourg. The “adventure of the runaway
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correspondents” made the men celebrities, especially after Seldes and his group landed a short but sensational interview with the German field marshal Paul von Hindenburg. The reporters were arrested and tried in courtsmartial on their return to the Allied lines, but they escaped punishment. At home, American publications generally were not harassed as long as they reflected mainstream, patriotic concerns. Most did. Those that did not, particularly radical and socialist publications, were harassed not only by federal authorities but also by an extensive patchwork of state and local censorship laws designed, as per a government directive to accredited war correspondents, to withhold information liable to “injure the morale of our forces abroad, at home, or among our allies.” Three new federal laws limited free speech: the Espionage Act (1917), the Trading with the Enemy Act (1917), and the Sedition Act (1918). These formed the first set of U.S. laws controlling press freedom since the early 1800’s, but, influenced by wartime patriotic fervor, few editors complained. Offending publications were denied access to the mails and confiscated from street corners. More than one thousand Americans were sentenced to banishment or long jail terms under the Espionage and Sedition acts, although most of their jail terms were commuted after the fear of German spies and postwar Bolsheviks faded in the early 1920’s. During World War I, the United States and other combatant nations established a sprawling web of censorship and propaganda unprecedented in its comprehensive influence. Germany was perhaps least skillful of the major powers in organizing this network to mobilize public opinion. Such Germans as Adolf Hitler and Joseph Goebbels, however, so obsessed with the control of public opinion, clearly learned from their enemies’ successes in World War I; they would use these and other, similar techniques to great effect during the Nazi era, which would begin a mere fifteen years after World War I ended. Ross F. Collins
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Propaganda and Civil Liberties During the War Government and public action in wartime curtails civil liberties to ensure national security. On the evening of April 6, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson, in delivering his war message to Congress, said that the United States was to embark upon a crusade to “make the world safe for democracy.” Unfortunately for socialists, pacifists, German Americans, and the leadership of the Industrial Workers of the World (popularly known as the Wobblies), who opposed this intervention, the president said nothing about the protection of democracy at home. U.S. participation in World War I gave rise to an alarming attack upon civil liberties, as Congress enacted laws to curtail constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and press. For the first time, the government embarked on a concerted propaganda campaign to “sell” a war to its citizens. As a result, hysteria swept the country. The responsibility for these occurrences rests with Wilson, with George Creel, with Congress, and with thousands of superpatriotic citizens who saw a monumental foreign menace rather than its meager substance. Challenges to the Government Two problems faced the government. First, citizens had to be mobilized behind a war that did not involve a direct attack on the United States and that had been entered into slowly and unwillingly. Second, internal security needed to be guaranteed against enemies, real and imagined. On April 13, 1917, Wilson established the Committee on Public Information (CPI), under the leadership of Creel, whose name soon became synonymous with the office. The committee was established to convince wavering citizens that the war was a righteous one and to educate them about the government’s war aims. Similar offices of war information had been created in Great Britain, Germany, and France. Propaganda came of age during World War I. Its purposes were multifaceted: to mobilize hatred of the enemy; to preserve friendship among allies; to maintain the friendship of neutrals and, if possible, to gain their cooperation; to demoralize the enemy; to promote the economical use of commodities; to stimulate war production; to encourage the purchase of war bonds; and to alert citizens to the danger of spies and saboteurs. The
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British-born film star Charles Chaplin (center) was one of many celebrities who appealed to the patriotism of Americans by publicly calling on them to purchase war bonds during World War I. (National Archives)
mobilization of the civilian mind for total war was seen as more important than the preservation of human rights. George Creel was an excellent choice for chairman of the CPI. A veteran Progressive from Denver and one of Wilson’s earliest supporters, Creel had built a reputation as a crusading journalist. Because of his reform record, Creel’s appointment was cheered by the press, which had feared repressive censorship. Instead, Creel called for voluntary censorship and usually received cooperation. The committee relied on securing publication of a torrent of government-sponsored reports and stories. During the course of the war, Creel hired 150,000 artists, writers, lecturers, actors, and scholars to sell the war to the public. Colorful posters urged citizens to join the Army or Navy, buy Liberty Bonds, knit socks for soldiers, and guard against the ever-present danger of spies and saboteurs. Writers turned out hundreds of “true” stories concerning German atrocities and “accounts” of what the Hun planned to do to the United States. Columbia University professor Charles Hazen wrote The Government of Germany, a booklet “exposing” the medievalism of a military-dominated Germany. Teams of speakers toured the country delivering anti-German talks. AntiGerman motion pictures included Pershing’s Crusaders, The Prussian Cur, and The Kaiser, the Beast of Berlin. The public was encouraged to see the Central Powers as constituting a clear and present danger to civilization.
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Censorship Although the Creel Committee became synonymous in the public mind with censorship, it had no such power. That authority was vested in the Post Office Department and the Department of Justice. Public confusion was understandable. On June 15, 1917, the Espionage Act was passed, after considerable debate and many amendments. This act gave the government authority to limit the rights of speech and the press. Somehow, the public had become convinced that the act conferred enforcement powers upon the CPI, a misconception that Creel never attempted to dispel. This illusion of power was effective in securing public cooperation. Title I, section 3, of the Espionage Act made it a crime to make false reports that would aid the enemy, incite rebellion in the armed forces, or obstruct recruitment or the draft. In practice, this section was used to stifle criticism. Those prosecuted included socialists Victor Berger and Eugene V. Debs, and “Big Bill” Haywood, one of the leaders of the Industrial Workers of the World. Socialist and pacifist newspapers were denied use of the mails under Title XII. The editors of The Messenger, a New York African American newspaper, were imprisoned for questioning the war. Ricardo Flores Magon, a Mexican American labor organizer, was sentenced to twenty years in prison for his dissent. In October, 1917, another law required foreign-language newspapers to submit
The most enduring propaganda image of World War I is James Montgomery Flagg’s “I Want You” Army recruiting poster with a compelling picture of Uncle Sam pointing his finger at prospective recruits. (U.S. Army)
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translations of all war-related material before distribution to local readers. The Espionage Act was bolstered in May, 1918, by the Sedition Act, which provided penalties of up to ten thousand dollars and twenty years’ imprisonment for the willful writing, utterance, or publication of material abusing the government, showing contempt for the Constitution, for inciting others to resist the government, for supporting the enemy, or for hindering production of war matériel. Under this law, it was unnecessary to prove that the language in question had affected anyone or had produced injurious consequences. The postmaster general was empowered to deny use of the mails to anyone who, in his opinion, used them to violate the act. A total of 2,168 people were prosecuted under the Espionage and Sedition Acts. Restrictions on Dissent The limitations placed on dissent by Congress and the Departments of Justice and the Post Office, together with the Creel Committee’s encouragement of pro-Allied sentiment, might have been expected to produce a climate of loyalty in the United States without help from unofficial sources. However, there also appeared a number of superpatriotic volunteer organizations dedicated to spreading propaganda and discovering alleged traitors, saboteurs, and slackers. The most influential of these groups were the National Security League and the National Protective Association. The Boy Spies of America, the Sedition Slammers, and the Terrible Threateners had more picturesque names but were less powerful. These volunteer groups carried patriotism to excess and often were responsible for human rights violations, which the government made no real attempt to discourage. As a result, coercion became the order of the day, and the government never regained control of the explosive situation. The brunt of government and vigilante activity was borne by the country’s largest minority: German Americans. Although German Americans never were interned in camps, their plight during World War I paralleled that of Japanese Americans in World War II: Both were suspected as traitors. Attempts were made to eradicate anything German from American life. Schools and colleges banned the teaching of German, as a “language that disseminates the ideals of autocracy, brutality, and hatred.” South Dakota prohibited the use of German on the telephone. Fewer than one hundred of the twelve hundred U.S. German-language periodicals survived to 1920. Thousands of Pennsylvania German parents, seventh- and eighth-generation Americans, forbade their children to learn German. Several cities, including Boston, banned the music of Ludwig von Beethoven, Richard Wagner, and other German composers. Pretzels were
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removed from saloon lunch counters in Cincinnati. German sausages, sauerkraut, German shepherd dogs, German measles, and pinochle were all renamed, as were many American towns with names such as Berlin, Frankfurt, and Bismarck. Many people hastened to “Americanize” their German surnames, for example, by changing “Schmidt” to “Smith.” The superpatriotic volunteers, encouraged by the Creel Committee’s propaganda, produced a wave of hysteria that targeted innocent citizens. IWW organizer Frank Little was tortured and lynched in Montana. In April, 1918, a mob in East St. Louis humiliated and hanged a young German American, Robert Prager. Ringleaders were eventually acquitted on the grounds that the murder was patriotic. In Los Angeles, three pacifist clergymen were beaten by a mob and then jailed for expressing “thoughts calculated to cause any American citizen then and there present to assault and batter them.” Once unleashed, antiforeign biases could not be controlled when the war ended. These sentiments eventually backfired on Wilson: His dream of a League of Nations would be rejected by the U.S. public, and one of his own books was banned in Nebraska. Somewhere during the fight to make the world safe for democracy, the United States almost lost its most democratic ideals: tolerance and compassion. When new challenges arose, they were often met with newer, more repressive laws and public hysteria, exemplified in the Red Scare, the race riots of 1919-1920, and other postwar disturbances. Anne Trotter updated by Randall Fegley
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U.S. Supreme Court During the War World War I brought legal challenges to the federal government’s power to draft citizens into the military, regulate industrial production for wartime purposes, and control public utterances. The Supreme Court’s rulings, taking place after the war, did not affect wartime activities but rather postwar freedom of speech and the press issues and the expansion of federal government powers. The United States entered World War I in April of 1917, generating the need to create a mass army comparable to the armies of the great European powers; to train, equip, and transport that army to Europe; to supply and maintain it for the duration of hostilities; and to control the economic, political, and social impact on the American population as a whole. The crisis was managed in part by statutes and executive orders, most notably the Selective Service Act (1917), the Lever Food and Fuel Control Bill (1917), the Espionage Act (1917), the Trading with the Enemy Act (1917), the Sedition Act (1918), the Federal Control Act (1918), and the War Prohibition Act (1918). In an emotional situation that encouraged fear of spies, foreign agitation, and sabotage, these measures tended to contain harsh and overdrawn provisions. The Sedition Act banned “any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United States, or the Constitution of the United States, or the flag of the United States, or the uniform of the Army or Navy.” The Trading with the Enemy Act made the publication of foreign-language newspapers almost impossible by requiring that before publication, editors submit to the postmaster general English translations of any pieces discussing the conduct of the war or mentioning any of the governments then at war. Moreover, bureaucrats often enforced these laws in an extreme and unreasonable way, making legal challenges to them inevitable. Many of these challenges eventually required action by the Supreme Court. The most basic power of the federal government to be contested was the power to conscript persons for military service. In Arver et al. v. United States (1918), the Court rejected the contention that the military draft was a form of slavery violating the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment and in Cox v. Wood (1918), it ruled that draftees could be required to perform their military service outside the United States. Freedom of Speech and the Press The Espionage Act of 1917 not only was directed at acts of espionage but also made it a crime during wartime to make false statements to aid
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U.S. enemies or to impede military operations, to foment disobedience in the armed forces, or to interfere with military recruiting. Its extension, the Sedition Act of 1918, contained impossibly broad and vague language that made almost any kind of debate about the war potentially illegal. Of more than two thousand people prosecuted under these statutes, about half were convicted. Only after the war was over did the Supreme Court have occasion to rule on any of these convictions. In March of 1919, decisions were handed down in three cases, Schenck v. United States, Frohwerk v. United States, and Debs v. United States. Applying the time-honored bad tendency test, which limited freedom of speech when it had a tendency to provoke illegal action, the Court unanimously upheld the conviction of Charles Schenck for distributing antidraft pamphlets, Jacob Frohwerk for publishing antidraft articles, and Eugene V. Debs for making a speech praising persons convicted of interfering with military recruitment. Clear and Present Danger Writing for the Court in the Schenck case, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes went beyond the bad tendency test to enunciate a new standard for measuring freedom of speech. “The question in every case,” he wrote, “is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.” He was severely
Eugene V. Debs speaking at a labor convention. (Library of Congress)
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criticized by liberal friends for his vote in these decisions. In November, 1919, when the Court voted seven to two in Abrams v. United States to uphold the conviction of Jacob Abrams and four others for publishing pamphlets encouraging resistance to the war, Holmes clarified his clear and present danger doctrine by dissenting. Downplaying the importance of the appellants, whom he termed “these poor and puny anonymities,” he held that “nobody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man . . . would present any danger.” The following year, he and Brandeis both dissented in Schaefer v. United States (1920), when the Court upheld the conviction of a German-language newspaper editor who published pro-German articles and in Pierce v. United States (1920), which denied the appeal of three socialists convicted of publishing an antiwar pamphlet. The Court’s support of the federal government’s prosecutions in free speech and freedom of the press cases had a chilling effect on civil liberties and added fuel to postwar attacks on the civil rights of socialists, labor leaders, and foreigners. Following the trend, President Woodrow Wilson in 1919 called for the adoption of a peacetime sedition act to replace the wartime legislation that would expire in 1921. By the late 1920’s, however, the persistent efforts of Holmes and Brandeis had clarified and strengthened the clear and present danger test, and it was increasingly being used with great effect in defending the civil rights of dissenters. Government v. Business Supreme Court decisions in cases arising from World War I also had the effect of strengthening the hand of the federal government in regulating business, particularly utilities. Railroads were vital to the war effort and were severely burdened by the increasing volume of passengers and freight. The federal government assumed direction of the railroads, raised the wages of railway workers, undertook repairs and improvements, and increased shipping rates to meet the cost. Owners were distressed at their loss of control, which would continue nearly two years after the end of the war; shippers and the general public were dismayed at rate hikes; and opponents of the extension of federal power were enraged at the government’s highhandedness. However, the Court upheld federal power to use, set rates for, and otherwise control railways in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. North Dakota (1919). Challenges to the federal government’s control of telephone, telegraph, and cable facilities were disposed of in Dakota Central Telephone v. South Dakota (1919) and Commercial Cable v. Burleson (1919). Under the Trading with the Enemy Act, the president was given broad powers to deal with any
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business or financial linkages between the United States and the Central Powers with which it was at war. This resulted in the U.S. government confiscating millions of dollars of German and Austrian investments and holding money from the sale of enemy assets to use in settling claims for U.S. property seized in Europe. It penalized U.S. firms that bought, sold, or exchanged goods or transferred money to or from any firms anywhere in the world that were owned or controlled by persons or groups in enemy countries. A week before the end of hostilities, amendments to this act permitted the alien property custodian to sell patents held by firms in enemy countries. Some U.S. industries and businesses benefited; however, a great many found their commercial and financial relationships disrupted. Various challenges to the operations of this act were turned back by the Court in Rumely v. McCarthy (1919), Central Union Trust Co. v. Carvin (1921), and Stoehr v. Wallace (1921). Utilities and firms linked to belligerent powers were not the only businesses to experience government regulation. By 1917, temperance advocates had already persuaded nineteen states to adopt prohibition of alcoholic beverages. When they persuaded the government to place national restrictions on the sale and use of alcoholic beverages, including banning liquor sales in the vicinity of military camps and barring uniformed service personnel from buying drinks, the liquor industry brought challenges. In the War Prohibition Cases (1919), Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co. (1919), and Rupert v. Caffey (1920), the Court upheld such wartime restrictions, clearing a bit more ground for the adoption in 1919 of the Eighteenth Amendment prohibiting the production, distribution, and sale of alcoholic beverages nationwide. At the end of World War I, the powers of the federal government over the economy were far greater than they had been before the war. Never before had the United States had to organize a national effort so huge in so short a time. It was carried out so effectively not only because of public enthusiasm for the task but also because of the unprecedented extension of the power of the presidency and of the federal bureaucracy by a willing and eager Congress and the rejection of challenges to those powers by the Court. Though the wartime powers and controls lapsed at the end of the war according to provisions in most of the legislation establishing them, the precedents had been set for the federal government’s economic leadership and control in crisis situations. The legal and conceptual foundations for the even greater federal efforts in the New Deal and World War II had been firmly laid. Joseph M. McCarthy
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Women in the War More educated and more independent than ever before, American women found World War I both a challenge to pacifist beliefs and an opportunity to advance their cause as full equals in society The early years of the twentieth century presented a dichotomy in terms of society’s view of the role of women. The traditional or Victorian view held that women’s role centered on motherhood, household, and caregiving—a role well distanced from the economic mainstream. A second, emerging perspective was one of militant but pacifist feminism. This view centered on a violent, flawed world guided by male posturing and blundering, one that could be improved by full incorporation of a feminist perspective. A synthesis between the two viewpoints was eventually forged by female activists, correlating the more gentle, feminine nature with pacifist, antiwar tendencies. Military pacifism grew as an important plank supporting the woman suffrage movement, in Europe as well as America. Implicitly, it held that allowing women the vote would reduce the possibili-
Women factory workers inspecting parts for handguns in 1917. (National Archives)
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ties for war. Pacifist women became strident in their espousal of antiwar views. Emmeline Pankhurst, leader of British suffragists, drew a distinction between destruction of property (for which she was jailed) and destruction of human life, which could never be condoned. The onset of World War I, however, created a dilemma for pacifist feminists. Should women continue in blind opposition to the reality of another war, or should they use the war to forward women’s causes by enlisting underutilized feminine resources in the process of war? They did both. The Pacifist Movement The declaration of war in 1914 inspired greater fervency within the global peace movement, in which women held leadership positions. In part because of the close association between woman suffrage and peace, in part because many women regarded civilization as having progressed beyond war as a means of settling disputes, and in part because women were widely held as morally superior to men, women banded together to find ways of ending the war. In the United States, many women’s organizations, from the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) to the Daughters of the American Revolution, went on record as seeking an early resolution to the conflict. To coordinate national efforts toward peace, Carrie Chapman Catt founded the Women’s Peace Party (WPP). In turn, the WPP made plans for an international peace conference. In 1915, the International Congress of Women, presided over by Jane Addams, social reformer, pacifist, and ultimate cowinner of the 1931 Nobel Peace Prize, met at The Hague to discuss conditions for a permanent state of peace. The neutrality of the meeting was underlined by the full participation of a German women’s contingent. Heckled by the press but unawed by the seemingly impossible task facing them, the congress attendees established a set of principles as cornerstones of a lasting peace. President Woodrow Wilson is said to have borrowed the WPP conference principles in establishing his Fourteen Points as the foundation for a League of Nations. Women in Uniform Drawing on the immense contributions of nurses to the recovery and welfare of military patients during both the Civil War and the SpanishAmerican War, Congress authorized an Army Nurse Corps in 1901 and Navy Nurse Corps in 1908. Both nurse corps, however, existed outside the regular military establishment. Nurses did not receive military rank, pay, or retirement benefits. Yet, the permanency of the congressionally man-
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Women were permitted to serve in the U.S. Marines during World War I, but they were all discharged soon after the war ended. (National Archives)
dated nurse corps illustrated their integrity to the military mission. By the end of World War I, the Army Nurse Corps had expanded to twenty thousand and the Navy Nurse Corps to more than one thousand women. In 1917, while mobilizing U.S. forces for entry into the war, both Secretary of War Newton Baker and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels found the Army and Navy short on skilled administrative clerks. Their solutions to the problem, however, were markedly different. Finding no legal requirement that a Navy clerk (yeoman) be a man, Daniels ordered that sufficient clerically skilled women be enlisted as yeomen in the naval reserve, with the same pay and rank as men. Thus, 12,500 female yeomen were enlisted and ultimately came to function as draftsmen, fingerprint experts, intelligence experts, and clerks. Despite the stated demand for the skills of enlisted women by many Army officers, including General John J. Pershing, Baker was uncomfortable with any formal military status for women and hired female clerical workers on a civilian contractual basis. By war’s end, more than 34,000 uniformed women had served in the Army and Navy nurse corps, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard. With the exception of the two nurse corps, however, all the female military personnel were discharged.
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The Civilian War Effort More than 25,000 American women served overseas during World War I under a host of civilian war relief organizations. All told, fifty-two American organizations and forty-five foreign organizations made up the war relief effort in Europe. The women who volunteered were in their thirties or older, with above-average levels of education and socioeconomic status. The “new” American woman was perceived by foreigners as skilled, independent, and, most of all, determined. The plethora of organizations made for some duplication of effort and complexities in distribution. General John Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, commented about the difficulties of coordinating military and civilian efforts among the multitude of agencies. Nevertheless, the immense civilian (and largely female) war relief effort was vital from both a humanitarian and a military perspective. While many of the U.S. organizations operated under the umbrella (and impressive financial resources) of the American Red Cross, others functioned independently. American civilian women wishing to serve abroad could select among a host of quasi-government agencies, church organizations such as the Quakers, the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), the YWCA, the Red Cross, and the Salvation Army. They might opt to serve in private charities established by the rich and famous, such as Edith Wharton. They might enlist in foreign relief and medical agencies (as ambulance drivers, among other hazardous occupations) or the relief agencies sponsored by women’s universities in the United States, such as Smith, Vassar, Wellesley, and Pembroke colleges. In all, more than three hundred American women in service would perish by the end of World War I. The Canadian Experience The Canadians anticipated putting 500,000 men in uniform (from a national population of eight million). Therefore, women were substituted for men in “men’s jobs” to a greater degree than in the United States. For example, the chief armament supplier, the Imperial Munitions Board, eventually employed 250,000 Canadians, of whom 40,000 were women. As in the United States, a strong feminist movement reinforced the substitution effect in changing the way society regarded women’s roles. Impact In the aftermath of World War I, women’s role in society had irrevocably changed. The war would act as a propellant of women’s interests such
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as suffrage and greater equality in the workplace. The war allowed women a unique opportunity for responsible, fulfilling action independent of men. Moreover, it proved to society that women were completely capable in “men’s occupations” such as factories, shipyards, and aircraft construction. The Victorian perception of women as retiring, frail ancillaries to men was eclipsed. John A. Sondey
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June, 1917 The Espionage Act Date: June 15, 1917 Significance: Enforcement of this act led to the suppression of free speech and the press during World War I and to the prosecution and incarceration of political dissenters In June, 1917, two months after the United States declared war against Imperial Germany and a month after the Selective Service Act went into effect, the U.S. Congress passed the Espionage Act. Concerned about the German American and Irish American opposition to the U.S. support of Great Britain and its allies, as well as about potential interference with conscription, Congress defined three new criminal offenses. The act penalized “false statements or reports with intent to interfere with the operation” of military forces, causing “insubordination” in the military, and obstructing enlistment services. Passage of the Espionage Act did not end Congress’s efforts to suppress dissent. The attorney general of the United States, Thomas Gregory, recommended several relatively minor adjustments in the act’s wording, but Congress enacted a series of amendments in 1918 that collectively became known as the Sedition Act. Among other offenses, it became a crime to “utter . . . print . . . write [or] publish” any disloyal “language intended to cause contempt” for “the form of government of the United States or the Constitution, or the flag or the uniform of the Army or Navy.” Conviction could bring fines of twenty-thousand dollars, prison terms of up to twenty years, or both. Sedition Sections of the Act The act was used during World War I to suppress any speech or act alleged to be disloyal to the United States or disparaging of the national war
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effort. No one, poor or rich, prominent or unknown, was immune from prosecution. For example, a California fortune teller who told a customer that liberty bonds were worthless and that her husband had been wounded in France was sentenced to two years in prison. A German American saloon keeper in Ohio who cursed President Woodrow Wilson and the United States was given a twenty-year sentence. A would-be poet in Pennsylvania who wrote doggerel in a disrespectful letter about the Liberty Bell was sentenced to five years in prison. Rose Pastor Stokes, the wife of an aristocratic and wealthy New Yorker, was convicted under the Espionage Act for saying that she was “for the people and the government is for the profiteers.” (Her conviction was later reversed by an appeals court.) An Alabama man angry at the United States for entering the war was sentenced to prison for fifteen months. In all, approximately two thousand persons—including many German Americans and Socialist Party members—were convicted under the law. Constitutionality of the Espionage Act The constitutionality of convictions under the Espionage Act was not decided by the U.S. Supreme Court until after the end of the war when the Court considered six cases. These concerned a Socialist Party handbill sent to military inductees, a speech by Eugene Victor Debs, two newspapers that printed objectionable material, a protest against U.S. intervention in the Russian Revolution, and a pamphlet opposing the U.S. war effort. The first case, Schenck v. United States, was perhaps the most important in the doctrinal history of the First Amendment. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote the unanimous opinion for the Supreme Court, enunciating the “clear and present danger” test for construing the boundaries of permissible speech. In the third case, Holmes affirmed the conviction of Debs, the three-time Socialist candidate for president who ran again from his prison cell in 1920. Debs was pardoned by President Warren G. Harding the following year. Frohwerk v. United States Jacob Frohwerk and Carl Glesser, the editor and the publisher of a small German-language newspaper in Kansas City, had been indicted for conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act. They had written and published twelve articles between late 1917 that were pro-German and anti-British. One article argued that it was an error in policy to send American soldiers to the trenches in France and praised the “undiminished strength of the German nation.” Another referred to the Oklahoma draft riots and to the suffering of men drafted into the armed forces. Still another exhorted the
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Anti-German films such as The Kaiser exaggerated German atrocities during the war and helped build public support for laws against espionage and sedition. (Universal Film Co., Courtesy National Archives)
American public to wake up to the fact “that we are led and ruled by England and that our sons, our taxes and our sacrifices are only in the interest of England.” Glesser had pleaded guilty and had been sentenced to five years; Frohwerk had gone to trial and been convicted, fined, and given a ten-year sentence. The Frohwerk case was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in March, 1919, with, once again, Justice Holmes writing the Court’s unanimous opinion. As the record in the Frohwerk case came to the high tribunal, no evidence was present about who read the newspaper or what the attitudes and feelings of Kansas City’s German community were. Only the articles themselves were presented as evidence. In affirming their convictions, Holmes wrote that the Court could act only on the basis of the record as it existed, and that on that record it was “impossible to say that it might not have been found that the circulation of the paper was in quarters where a little breath would be enough to kindle a fire and that the fact was known and relied upon by those who sent the paper out.” Frohwerk’s sentence was later commuted to one year, and Justice
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Holmes, after the Debs case, broke with his colleagues on the Court and authored dissenting opinions in Abrams v. United States (the handbill case protesting U.S. intervention in the Russian Revolution) and in Pierce v. United States (the pamphlet case criticizing the American war effort). During the war, however, the Espionage Act was a potent weapon in government suppression of civil liberties and the prosecution and persecution of political dissenters. David L. Sterling
July, 1917 Mobilization Date: Beginning July 8, 1917 Location: Washington, D.C. Principal figures: Bernard Mannes Baruch (1870-1965), F. A. Scott (18731949), Daniel Willard (1861-1942), Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) Result: The U.S. government established the War Industries Board to manage economic resources for the war effort. The War Industries Board (WIB) was organized on July 8, 1917, to coordinate and control the industrial resources of the United States in its World War I effort against Germany. Establishment of the WIB was the climax of several frustrating months of efforts to mobilize agencies of production and distribution following the nation’s entry into the war in April. Committee on Industrial Preapredness Federal coordination of industry had begun in 1915, when Congress authorized the creation of a Committee on Industrial Preparedness to study the supply requirements of the Army and Navy. The committee’s work was narrow in scope—its primary accomplishment was the preparation of an inventory of plants able to manufacture munitions. As the war emergency in the United States became more acute, the government extended its power over the nation’s industrial life. By the National Defense Act of June, 1916, Congress authorized the president to place orders for war matériel with any source of supply and to commandeer plants when it was in the national interest to do so. Two months later, Congress approved a Military Appropriations Act providing for a Council of National Defense consisting of the secretaries of
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war, the Navy, the interior, agriculture, commerce, and labor, and an advisory commission comprising civilian representatives from all the major sectors of the nation’s economy. The purpose of both committees was to plan for the most efficient use of the country’s resources in case of war. The advisory commission, which served as the executive committee of the Council of National Defense, did most of the work and mapped out extensive preparations to meet wartime needs. Each of the seven members of the commission took charge of a special segment of the economy, such as transportation, engineering and education, munitions and manufacturing, medicine and surgery, raw materials, supplies, and labor. The commission soon became the nucleus of numerous committees and boards that were the forerunners of several wartime agencies, including the WIB. Finally, Bernard Baruch, a Wall Street investor and the commissioner in charge of raw materials, formulated an elaborate plan whereby representatives of various businesses were organized into “committees of the industries” to work with the council in coordinating the country’s resources. For their efforts, they received one dollar a year, and thus were known as the “dollara-year men.” Because the Council of National Defense had been formed to plan for, rather than direct, industrial mobilization, its powers were only advisory. Moreover, its organization was extremely loose; many of its ablest men
President Woodrow Wilson formally announcing to Congress that he has cut diplomatic relations with Germany, on February 3, 1917. (National Archives)
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served only in a part-time capacity. It was ill-prepared, therefore, to assume the responsibility of directing mobilization, which was forced upon it after the U.S. entry into war in 1917. That unpreparedness was readily apparent in the council’s attempt to coordinate the purchases required by the U.S. Departments of the Navy and War. For that purpose, the advisory commission first established a Munitions Standard Board and then replaced it with a General Munitions Board, on which members of the commission and representatives from the military purchasing bureaus served. The power and authority of the latter board were poorly defined, and its machinery nearly broke down under the pressure of the war orders. Within a month after its establishment, it was found that the board merely overlapped in jurisdiction and authority with many of the other committees formed by the Advisory Commission. As a result, it was unable to coordinate the purchases of the military bureaus, which, jealous of their own prerogatives, continued to go their own ways. Realizing that a central coordinating agency was needed, the Council of National Defense, on July 18, 1917, replaced the General Munitions Board with the WIB, comprising five civilians and one representative each from the Army and the Navy.
U.S. soldiers leaving for France. (National Archives)
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War Industries Board Before the Civil War, the United States had adopted a policy of procuring many—if not most—wartime goods and weapons from civilian businesses. With the exception of a few shipyards or munitions plants, the government therefore relied primarily on private industry to provide a steady stream of war goods and combat weapons. Coordinating that production and flow was a major problem for a nation that allowed the market to determine the type and number of goods to be supplied. In wartime, the urgency of delivery dictated that coordination of production and delivery systems fall to the government. While the War Industries Board was given broad responsibilities for the direction of war industry needs, its ability to do effective work suffered from the lack of any executive power. As a result, the government’s effort to coordinate the nation’s military and industrial efforts continued to flounder for the next eight months. The board’s first chairman, F. A. Scott, broke down under the strain of the war; its second, Daniel Willard, resigned because he believed that the board lacked authority. In the spring of 1918, President Woodrow Wilson reorganized the board and named Bernard Baruch as its chairman. In effect, the president transferred to Baruch the power to coordinate industry that Congress had granted to the president in the National Defense and Military Appropriations Acts of 1916, as well as giving Baruch certain controls over the military that Wilson had in his capacity as commander in chief. Endowed with this authority, Baruch was able to determine priorities, requisition supplies, conserve resources, commandeer plants, and make purchases for the United States and the Allies. The only important control he did not exercise directly was that of fixing prices, which was left to a separate committee within the board. Despite some sharp criticism later by congressional critics regarding the extent of power that the War Industries Board assumed, the board was highly effective in coordinating the nation’s industrial and military effort. The pattern of organization created by the board became the model for the war regulation of industry by the Allies in World War II. Moreover, the introduction of businessmen into government procurement placed professional business managers in close proximity with bureaucrats. This led to an appreciation by business for the role of control and planning, and convinced many in government that business management practices would be effective in improving the government during peacetime. Business already had undergone a managerial revolution that emphasized planning; therefore, the new, centralized control reinforced the notion that stability could be achieved by proper accounting and forecasting. The quintessen-
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tial proponent of that approach was Herbert Hoover, elected president in 1928, who attempted to apply such nostrums to the Great Depression. On December 31, 1918, President Wilson directed that the board be dissolved, and it was liquidated on July 22, 1919. Other wartime agencies that were involved in economic mobilization—such as the War Trade Board, which licensed exports and imports and rationed supplies to neutrals, and the United States Railroad Administration, which controlled the nation’s railroads—also were dissolved gradually after the war ended. Big Business and Government The friendly relationship between big business and government that emerged from the war cemented an alliance that lasted until the Great Depression. In the short term, business thought that it was the beneficiary of that relationship, receiving government contracts and favorable treatment. Although the boom provided by the 1920s proved nourishing to many small businesses, as witnessed by the extensive growth of all business during that decade, the special treatment afforded to such new enterprises as airplane and some shipping companies, based on future wartime needs, served to align government with some industries at the expense of others. More important, however, were the lessons learned by the government during wartime that were inapplicable during peacetime. The government assumed that wartime planning— based on the coercive powers yielded to bureaucrats by citizens facing a national emergency—would provide the same degree of effectiveness in the absence of the emergency. Since the national tendency of government was to increase during emergencies, but never to recede to its original levels, the war intruded federal authority into the lives of millions of people who had never before experienced it. Thus, although the WIB was disbanded after World War I, the notion that government planning and direct management of businesses could keep the economy stable was revived on a larger scale during the Great Depression. Burton Kaufman updated by Larry Schweikart
September, 1918 Battle of St. Mihiel Date: September 12-16, 1918 Location: St. Mihiel, France, thirty-five miles southwest of Metz, France Combatants: 248,000 American and French troops vs. 85,000 German troops
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Principal commanders: American, General John J. Pershing (1860-1948); German, General Erich Ludendorff (1865-1937) Result: The victory gave the Americans recognition as a fighting force. In September, 1918, American forces attacked the salient at St. Mihiel. General John J. Pershing’s intent was to flatten the salient and seize a strategic railroad. The Germans, led by Erich Ludendorff, had held St. Mihiel since 1914 but could no longer afford to occupy the whole perimeter. On September 10, they began to withdraw, just as the Americans and French attacked nine depleted German divisions with 3,000 artillery pieces and 267 tanks. Although the Germans intended to withdraw, the speed of the American attack and the use of phosgene gas resulted in the capture of 13,000 prisoners and 200 guns. The offensive used nearly 1,500 aircraft under the command of Colonel Billy Mitchell, the largest concentration of military aircraft up to that date. The Americans gained access to a new railroad line but suffered 8,000 casualties in the process. The salient was cleared and the Americans received recognition as a fighting force. C. E. Wood
An American army officer tests a field telephone abandoned by the Germans during their retreat from St. Mihiel in September, 1918. (National Archives)
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September-November, 1918 Meuse-Argonne Offensive Date: September 26-November 11, 1918 Location: Northeastern France Combatants: Americans vs. Germans Principal commanders: American, General John J. Pershing (1860-1948); French, Ferdinand Foch (1851-1929), supreme commander of the Allied Armies; British, Douglas Haig (1861-1928), commander in chief, British Expeditionary Forces Result: Heavy American casualties in this final major battle of World War I underscored the necessity of having well-trained troops in combat. When the United States declared war on Germany on April 6, 1917, the U.S. Army, consisting of only about 125,000 officers and enlisted men, was not an organized, professional army with modern equipment or training doctrines. The United States found itself embarrassingly short of weapons, uniforms, accoutrements, aircraft, and other critical items. The National Guard, called to service by President Woodrow Wilson, numbered only 73,000 to add to the army regulars. The United States did have a huge reservoir of eager recruits, however, and plans were made to raise, via the 1917 Conscription Act, a national army to augment regular and National Guard forces. The commander of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), General John J. Pershing, knew that his force was ill-prepared for combat on the Western Front and, after his arrival in France, announced to the Allies that U.S. troops would need to be trained. The ultimate goal of the AEF, however, was to have a strictly American army, with its own sector of the line. Pershing received support in the form of training assistance and facilities from French general Ferdinand Foch and from Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig, commander of British forces in France and in Flanders. Neither Foch nor Haig, however, was optimistic about an exclusive U.S. zone and the creation of a U.S. army. Pershing firmly believed in a doctrine of maneuver warfare—getting the troops out of the static trenches, forcing an end to the war by destroying the enemy, and seizing terrain. He argued that trench warfare sapped the aggressive spirit of an army, and he distrusted the morale of both British and French armies after four years of trench fighting. Despite these feelings, Pershing placed the incoming 28,000-soldier infantry divisions under foreign tutelage in training areas and then in the trenches in so-called quiet
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areas. Pershing, however, stressed maneuver warfare without really knowing the impact of modern artillery, machine guns, aircraft, and chemicals on the battlefield. By December of 1917, Pershing had four divisions (the First, Second, Twenty-sixth, and Forty-second) in training, but it was not until the German offensives that began on March 21, 1918, that Pershing allowed AEF divisions to see combat. They were then primarily under the operational control of French senior commanders. Command Structure One result of the German offensives was the naming of Ferdinand Foch as the Supreme Allied Commander. While Foch was frustrated with Pershing’s obstinacy, he understood Pershing’s desire to have a U.S. army in the field. In August, Pershing was allowed to form the First U.S. Army, with himself as commander. Pershing divided his army into three corps, selecting solid but inexperienced commanders for the corps. The divisions that would make up those corps were of varying quality. Those divisions that arrived early in France had extensive training and experience, but many of the new divisions did not. Division commanders and staffs had difficulty writing and overseeing the implementation of orders for subordinate brigades and regiments, let alone integrating air assets, tanks, and the like, which were habitually attached to the divisions. During May and June, four hundred thousand troops made the dangerous ocean crossing. Supplies for this growing force were shipped by rail from the huge Service of Supply (SOS) base in Tours to depots near the western front. Yet the SOS remained critically short of heavy-duty trucks; aircraft, artillery, and heavy weapons had to be begged from the Allies. Despite the shortfall in supply and the tentative training of many AEF divisions, Pershing pushed ahead with plans to reduce the St. Mihiel salient, a large bulge that jutted into the Allied lines. The bulge resembled a triangle, with the town of St. Mihiel at its apex and the city of Metz a few miles from the base. The Attack Setting the attack for dawn on September 12, Pershing moved his most experienced units into line for the attack. The French sent combat divisions and augmented U.S. artillery with a large number of guns. Brigadier General William “Billy” Mitchell assembled more than fourteen hundred aircraft for the attack, and Major General James Harbord’s SOS brought up vast quantities of supplies. When the attack began, however, heavy rains made roads impassible for the trucks of the SOS, tanks became bogged
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Members of the U.S. Thirty-fifth Coast Artillery loading a mobile railroad gun on the Argonne front in September, 1918. (National Archives)
down, and aircraft had difficulty flying. Unknown to the AEF, the German High Command had chosen to evacuate the salient, fighting the oncoming U.S. troops with well-placed machine guns and artillery. For four days, U.S. soldiers reduced the St. Mihiel salient, and Pershing firmly believed that maneuver warfare had been proven. He also had promised Foch to have a large U.S. force in place to begin the Meuse-Argonne offensive on September 26. Pershing hurried forces to staging areas for the offensive. His operational planners, including Colonel George C. Marshall, did not have time to reflect upon reports from the St. Mihiel operation, and a false sense of optimism reigned at the headquarters of the First U.S. Army. Pershing himself wrote that everyone at army headquarters felt alert and confident, but they set impossible objectives, disregarding terrain, the enemy, the climate, and the ability to resupply. Pershing’s best and most combatexperienced divisions had yet to leave the St. Mihiel area. The attack would begin with less experienced, less trained combat divisions. The Meuse-Argonne area resembled a box twenty miles long and about forty miles in depth. There were dense forests such as the Argonne and ranges of rugged, thicketed hills that had been turned into formidable defensive positions by the Germans. There were three solid defensive lines, the strongest being the second line, the Krimhilde Stellung (the Hindenburg
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Line). Unlike at St. Mihiel, the Germans had continually improved their defensive positions with machine guns and more artillery; most important, they had sent first-class infantry to the defense. Against these determined, dug-in defenders, the AEF arrayed divisions with little training or experience. The Thirty-fifth Infantry Division, for example, had had no time to work with its artillery prior to starting the assault against the first defensive line, and by the end of the first day, it was showing signs of confusion. While Pershing was overly optimistic about the combat capabilities of his troops, his operational instincts were correct. He arrayed from left to right three corps of four divisions each on the start line—the First, Fifth, and Third—which were to advance together. The Meuse-Argonne was not the battle of maneuver that Pershing had preached. It was a head-on, frontal assault that pitted muscle against muscle, and the casualties were appalling. By the end of the operation, 120,000 U.S. troops had been killed or wounded, and the number of stragglers, those who wandered off from their units, numbered near 100,000. Heavy rains continued, supplies went forward very slowly, and many of the wounded languished in agony for days before they could be removed to combat hospitals. By November, 1918, the AEF was reaching the end of its rope as a result of combat, fatigue, lack of supplies, climatic conditions, and the German defense. The attack had begun on September 26 and in four days had ground to a halt. On October 7, Pershing ceased all operations and ordered the Twentyeighth and Eighty-second Divisions to clear the Argonne Forest of German defenders. This they did, at great cost, for several days, but the Krimhilde Stellung had not yet been reached. In mid-October, the AEF attacked the Krimhilde Stellung. Some of the best divisions of the AEF, such as the First and the Forty-second, were used up in the attack. On October 15, a brigade of infantry of the Forty-second Division, under Brigadier General Douglas A. MacArthur, established a foothold on one key position of the line. After another lull, U.S. forces attacked on November 1 with great success. By this time the Germans were in full retreat. Continuing to take casualties against a stiff German rearguard action, the AEF finally reached the Meuse River on November 11, when the armistice was announced. The date would later be dubbed Armistice Day. Later still, it became Veterans Day in the United States. German Collapse The fighting in the Meuse-Argonne came to an end because Germany was at an end. The AEF fought with grim determination, but the army that
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Pershing commanded was near collapse. Despite the horrendous casualties, Pershing and his many disciples came to believe that the battle had confirmed the correctness of their doctrine: that determined infantry with rifle and bayonet, supported by artillery and machine guns and air, was the decisive factor in war. Due to strict censorship, few civilians realized the horrendous conditions under which U.S. soldiers fought. For decades, the extent of the slaughter in the Meuse-Argonne remained undiscussed. The MeuseArgonne offensive, however, showed the fighting spirit of the AEF and fixed the concept that only trained, well-schooled soldiers should be committed to battle. Memories of the early confusion and subsequent combat in the Meuse-Argonne motivated men like General George C. Marshall to train and prepare troops extensively for the next great global conflict. James J. Cooke
November, 1918 Postwar Demobilization Date: November, 1918-January, 1923 Significance: Two million members of the American Expeditionary Force are reintegrated into the U.S. economy. At 11:00 a.m. Paris time, Thursday, November 11, 1918, World War I, the Great War, ended. News of the German surrender reached the United States at 3:00 a.m. via Associated Press. From the White House that same day, President Woodrow Wilson announced the armistice: Everything for which America fought has been accomplished. It will now be our fortunate duty to assist by example, by sober, friendly counsel, and by material aid in the establishment of just democracy throughout the world.
Events of the next two years indicate that Wilson was thinking primarily of his plans for the peace conference soon to open in Paris. The more immediate problems of demobilizing the U.S. armed forces and managing U.S. society itself seems not to have concerned him. By November, 1918, Wilson had planned virtually nothing in the way of a domestic program of postwar reconstruction. Preoccupied with the coming peace conference, he provided no program of his own and encouraged none from his administration.
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Even the Army seemed surprised when it suddenly faced the problem of disbanding the American Expeditionary Forces. Preparations for military demobilization got under way just before the armistice, when a War Department committee began making tentative plans and was faced with certain immediate problems. Should soldiers be demobilized by military units, and as quickly as possible, without reference to their employment opportunities or the industrial needs of the country? Should the Army take the soldiers home before releasing them from service, or would several major mustering-out centers make for a more effective demobilization? In making its plans, the Army had no comparable precedent and few European procedures to emulate. With the armistice, massive pressure arose to demobilize quickly. The soldiers’ families wanted them home at once, and economic arguments were as strong as family sentiment. On November 11, the war was costing the United States approximately $50 million a day; every day’s delay in demobilization added to the burden of taxation required to finance the army’s upkeep. Unfortunate Timing One great problem faced by General John Pershing was timing. Pershing had planned for a massive U.S. offensive in the spring of 1919. Plans had been made for a huge buildup of AEF forces, including the procurement of supplies and the letting of contracts for facilities. After the armistice, all of those plans had to be reversed immediately. On the afternoon of November 11, Pershing received a cable from Washington, D.C., stating that on November 12, all overtime pay and Sunday work would end in the United States. It was clear to Pershing that economy was now all-important. Working with Major General James Harbord, his chief of supply, Pershing quickly identified a large number of contracts with the British and French that would have to be canceled immediately. There were loud protests from both London and Paris, as well as from local contractors and suppliers, but Pershing was bound by his instructions from Washington. Pershing also ordered that all AEF schools be closed as rapidly as possible. Only those soldiers already in schools and halfway through their course of study would be allowed to complete the training. The massive Air Service training center at Issoudun, which was the largest in the world, would be closed by December, 1918. Several thousand pilot trainees were released from Issoudun by the end of November and ordered to report to processing stations for return to the United States. All over France, the process was repeated, despite the hardships caused to local concerns and protests from the French government.
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Troops and Materials The AEF at the time had some two million troops, equipped with thousands of horses, trucks, motorcycles, railroad cars, weapons, tanks, and planes. Most of the equipment, animals, vehicles, and weapons remained in France, there to rust, to die, or to be sold in a huge salvage operation. To bring the men home, the Army had to find transportation. More than half the AEF had been transported to France in foreign ships, mostly English. At war’s end, the British government, wanting to return its people to their countries and also eager to restore its maritime trade, immediately withdrew its ships from use by the United States, as did France and Italy. The U.S. Army began to convert cargo carriers into troop ships. The U.S. Navy did the same with fourteen battleships and ten cruisers. Several confiscated German ships were added to the demobilization fleet. By June, 1919, that fleet reached its maximum: 174 vessels with one-trip accommodations for 419,000 troops. The fleet could have carried the entire AEF in five trips, with room to spare. Acting with dispatch, U.S. Army chief of staff Peyton March, on November 16, issued orders for mustering out the first two hundred thousand troops. March expected to release thirty thousand soldiers per day when the process was in full operation. In the months to come, the War Department occasionally tried to demobilize according to a soldier’s occupational skill, but such sporadic gestures did not occur until the great machine of military demobilization had begun pouring the AEF back into the United States from stations abroad. For nearly a year thereafter, the homecoming stream continued, reaching a peak in June, 1919, when almost 350,000 troops reached the United States. By September, 1919, only forty thousand U.S. troops remained in Europe, all of them either logistical units or part of the U.S. occupation force in Germany. The Home Front At home, demobilization went even more rapidly. In December, 1918, the Army discharged more than 600,000 of those then stationed in the United States. By April 1, 1920, the U.S. Army contained fewer than oneeighth of 1 percent of those who had enlisted for emergency duty during the war. The U.S. Navy discharged with equal dispatch, releasing 400,000 persons within a year after the armistice. The U.S. Marine Corps demobilized 50,000 in the same period. Efficient though it was, this massive demobilization suffered delays and frustrations. In France, after the armistice, fifty-one new companies of military police were organized and kept busy as soldiers began to grumble and discipline began to break down. Paris and the French embarkation
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ports began to collect soldiers who were absent without leave. Barracks graffiti appeared: “Lafayette, we are still here.” Meanwhile, the machinery of demobilization did its job. The U.S. Quartermaster Service chose Brest, Bordeaux, and Saint-Nazaire as French ports of embarkation. Midway between Paris and the Biscay coast of France, at Le Mans, the U.S. Army built an enormous assembly area for troops bound for the coast. At Le Mans or at the embarkation port itself, the troops received medical examinations, treatment from barbers and dentists, and new or supplementary outfits of clothing. They also went through a delousing center. Coming in from the western front, nine out of ten U.S. service personnel brought with them the infamous louse, or “cootie,” parasite of the trenches. Returning Home Once they had made the routine voyage across the Atlantic—during which not one life was lost—the troops docked at one of four ports: Boston, New York, Newport News, or Charleston. Each person leaving the Army kept a complete outfit of clothing and various items of equipment, such as a safety razor. The enterprising Gillette Razor Company had designed and sold this item to the Army, thereby changing the shaving habits of a generation of Americans while making a fortune for itself. The soldiers’ duffle bags often bulged with souvenirs. Their eagerness for German Iron Crosses had become so great during and after the war that, according to one report, the Germans began to manufacture the item for the overseas trade. Once back in the United States, soldiers were rushed through processing stations. Many were told to take all of their military equipment home; the government would send for it later. It never did. Each soldier was to receive sixty dollars in cash to buy a new suit of clothes. The processing was so rapid that a majority of the soldiers did not receive their Victory Medals. When soldiers arrived back home, they found they had no job protection, and many remained unemployed for some time after the war. Recordkeeping tended to be sloppy, given the emphasis on a speedy demobilization, and a large number of soldiers never had wounds or disabilities recorded properly. Occupation of Germany While Pershing was under orders to send the troops home as rapidly as possible, he still had to send a sizable military force, eventually numbering thirty divisions, to occupy Germany. This newly created Third Army had to be ready to commence combat operations if the Versailles peace talks failed. The forces sent were the oldest, most experienced combat divisions
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Pershing had, which caused a good deal of grumbling among those soldiers who had been in combat the longest. U.S. troops were scattered from the port of Antwerp, Belgium, to the west bank of the Rhine River, with U.S. Army headquarters in Coblenz, Germany. By the spring of 1919, Pershing had begun to send those divisions back to the United States. Many of those troops returning from the occupation suffered the most from the lack of employment. Until the army of occupation had come home and until the U.S. Army had disposed of its huge properties in Europe, demobilization did not officially end. Portions of the occupation army remained on the Rhine until January, 1923. War Surplus Well before that date, the Army disposed of its European properties. Pershing had been authorized to sell all surplus property on the spot, and the supply section of the AEF remained busy with contracts. Except for some 850,000 tons of artillery, road-making machinery, and other heavy equipment that it shipped home, the U.S. Army sold its holdings in Europe or simply allowed them to disintegrate or disappear. The French government agreed to pay four hundred million dollars for some of it. The Czechs bought overcoats; Estonia bought army bacon; the Portuguese bought shoes. At home, the Army disposed of much unneeded property through surplus stores. It gave up other items in sundry ways. For example, fourteen National Guard camps, three embarkation camps, sixteen training camps, four flying fields, four hospitals, and various other buildings brought a total return to the government of $4.2 million. One camp in Louisiana, built at a cost of $4.3 million, sold for $43,000 in “salvage recovery.” As U.S. Army property diminished, so did its regular workforce. As soon as the war ended, debate over the size and function of the peacetime military force began. In June, 1920, through the new National Defense Act, Congress cut the regular army to 280,000 soldiers. It reduced this number still more in the next two years; by 1927, the U.S. Army had been reduced to little more than a token force. The U.S. Navy was reduced in 1921 to fewer than 138,000 men. When Woodrow Wilson left the White House, the great military force raised to fight the war had been demobilized. Readjustment of those forces to civilian life, the dismantling of war industries, the return of people and of property (such as the railroads) to private industry, and countless other adjustments in United States society after war, all created enormous difficulties, many of which would be felt for another generation. Mustering out its service personnel was, by comparison, a matter of relative ease to the
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nation. In its broader meaning, demobilization and the consequent adjustment from war to peace would influence the history of the next two decades, until another war brought on an even greater mobilization. Burl L. Noggle updated by James J. Cooke
January, 1919-July, 1921 Treaty of Versailles Date: January 18, 1919-July 2, 1921 Location: Paris, and Washington, D.C. Principal figures: American, President Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924), Senator William Edgar Borah (1865-1940), Senator Hiram Warren Johnson (1866-1945), Senator Robert Marion La Follette (1855-1925), Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (1850-1924); French, Premier Georges Clemenceau (1841-1929); British, David Lloyd George (1863-1945); Italian, Premier Vittorio Emanuele Orlando (1860-1952) Result: The peace settlement that came out of the war established a fragile basis for European peace by creating the League of Nations, which was the first global collective security organization, presaging the United Nations. While World War I raged in Europe, President Woodrow Wilson began to articulate the hopes of many people in the United States for a liberal peace. He believed that the victors could not indulge themselves in the luxury of vengeance: Only a just and merciful settlement could ensure a lasting peace. In early 1917, three months before the United States entered the conflict, Wilson called for a “peace without victory,” with no indemnities and annexations to sow the seeds of future wars. Wilson sought more than a just settlement; he wanted to create a new, rational, international order. On January 8, 1918, addressing a joint session of Congress, he outlined his famous Fourteen Points. The first five applied to all nations: open diplomacy, freedom of the seas, removal of barriers to free trade, arms reductions, and impartial adjustments of colonial claims. The next eight points revolved around the principle of national selfdetermination, listing the French, Belgian, and Russian territory that Germany must evacuate and promising autonomy to the subject nationalities of Eastern Europe. The capstone was Wilson’s fourteenth point: the cre-
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ation of an international League of Nations. Wilson envisioned, above all, the United States playing a permanent role in world affairs through membership in a collective security organization. Great Britain and France had already made secret treaties that violated several of Wilson’s points, but on November 11, 1918, representatives of Germany, the United States, and the Allies, meeting in a railroad car in the Compiègne Forest, signed an armistice based substantially on Wilson’s program. The Great War was over. The Peace Conference Two months later, on January 18, 1919, the peace conference convened at Paris amid an atmosphere of crisis. The war had left Europe in confusion. A half dozen small wars still raged. As the Bolsheviks tightened their hold on Russia, communist hysteria swept through Eastern Europe. The conference, although sensing the need for haste, had to consider calmly the fate of much of the world. Thirty-two nations sent delegations, but the actual decision making devolved on the Big Four: Great Britain’s David Lloyd George, France’s Georges Clemenceau, Italy’s Vittorio Orlando, and President Woodrow Wilson of the United States. Clemenceau, the cynical French “Tiger,” was suspicious of Wilsonian idealism. “God gave us the Ten Commandments, and we broke them,” he said. “Wilson gives us the Fourteen Points. We shall see.” The Big Four approved the demilitarization of Germany, Allied occupation of the Rhineland, the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, and an Anglo-FrenchU.S. mutual defense pact. These provisions, if maintained, would guarantee French security. Italy received Southern Tyrol, a region populated by some two hundred thousand Austrians. The conference also redrew the map of Eastern Europe. A series of new, independent nations sprang to life: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Austria, Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania, and Finland. The boundary areas of Poland and Czechoslovakia included large populations of German-speaking people. In the Far East, Japan took over German economic rights in the Chinese province of Shantun, while Great Britain and France divided up the other German colonies in the Pacific and Africa. The conference forced Germany not only to take full responsibility for causing the war but also to provide a “blank check” for reparations, including damages to civilian properties and future pensions. The Germans signed the treaty on June 28. They would later learn that they owed thirty-three billion dollars. While the Treaty of Versailles did not live up to Wilson’s ideas of selfdetermination, it left a smaller proportion than ever of European people living under foreign governments. Nor was it a peace without victory. Wil-
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son did win acceptance for the League of Nations, however, with the League Covenant being incorporated into the treaty itself. The League, he hoped, would later correct any imperfections in the work of the conference. American Reactions to the Treaty When Wilson returned to the United States from Paris, public opinion favored ratification of the treaty and membership in the League of Nations, but the Senate had the final decision. In March, 1919, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge had ominously secured a “round robin” resolution with the signatures of thirty-seven senators—more than enough to kill the treaty— announcing their opposition to the League Covenant in its current form. Wilson could count on the support of most of the Senate Democrats, but he could not meet the two-thirds majority necessary for ratification without a large block of Republican votes. A dozen or so Republican senators had mild reservations about the League; another group had strong reservations. These latter opposed Article 10 of the League Covenant, a provision binding nations to preserve the territorial integrity and independence of
British prime minister David Lloyd George (left), Italian premier Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, French premier Georges Clemenceau, and U.S. president Woodrow Wilson in Paris in May, 1919. (Library of Congress)
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all League members against aggression. Senator William E. Borah was the leader of the “irreconcilables,” who unconditionally opposed the treaty. As chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Lodge played a crucial role in the fight over the League of Nations. Unlike the irreconcilables, he was no isolationist. He claimed to favor the League but with strong reservations. Yet Lodge possessed an intense personal dislike for Wilson and a distrust of his leadership. For two weeks, Lodge stalled for time by reading aloud the text of the treaty, all 268 pages of it. Then he held six weeks of hearings, calling witnesses who opposed ratification. At last, he drew up a list of fourteen reservations, as if to ridicule Wilson’s Fourteen Points. Gradually, the mood of the country shifted against the treaty. Wilson, overworked and ill, decided to go to the people in a whirlwind speaking tour. In three weeks, he traveled eight thousand miles and delivered thirty-six major speeches, typing them out himself on his portable typewriter. On the night of September 25, he fell ill in Pueblo, Colorado. The presidential train rushed him back to Washington. On October 20, in the White House, he collapsed: He had suffered a stroke that paralyzed his left side. For the next six weeks, the country was virtually without a president, and Wilson never fully recovered. When the treaty came to a vote, he passed word for Democrats to vote against the treaty with the Lodge reservations. On November 19, 1919, and in a second vote on March 19, 1920, a coalition of Democrats and irreconcilables sent the treaty to defeat. A Crippled League The failure of Wilson’s efforts to win support for unqualified U.S. participation in the League of Nations ultimately reduced the League’s effective operation. As for the peace itself, the U.S. Congress passed a joint resolution formally bringing hostilities to an end on July 2, 1921. Despite the isolationist mood of the country, the United States eventually participated in a number of League activities, although never as a formal member. The absence of the United States from the League Council hampered its peacemaking capacity. More deadly to the League’s future, however, were the growing nationalism throughout Europe, the deep resentment among the Germans with regard to what they viewed as unfair Versailles Treaty provisions, and the lack of consensus about how to deal with violations of League Covenant provisions. Like many of Wilson’s idealized Fourteen Points, the League of Nations was a noble experiment that foundered on political realities. The world was not ready for a global collective security organization, but the League’s work in a number of economic and humanitarian areas did substantially
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advance international cooperation. These efforts, coupled with greater realism about power politics and keeping international peace, led to more realistic structures in the League’s successor, the United Nations. U.S. policymakers played the lead role in fashioning the new organization, as Wilson had with the League, but they were more careful to build bipartisan domestic support for the United Nations as they seized, rather than spurned, global leadership. Donald Holley updated by Robert F. Gorman
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Further Reading Arthur, Max, comp. Forgotten Voices of the Great War: A History of World War I in the Words of the Men and Women Who Were There. Introduction by Sir Martin Gilbert. Guilford, Conn.: Lyons Press, 2004. Asprey, Robert B. The German High Command at War. New York: William Morrow, 1991. Binkin, Martin, and Shirley L. Bach. Women and the Military. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977. Boemeke, Manfred F., Gerald D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser, eds. The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment After Seventy-five Years. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Braim, Paul F. The Test of Battle: The American Expeditionary Forces in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign. 2d ed. Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Books, 1998. Chafee, Zechariah, Jr. Free Speech in the United States. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946. Collins, Ross F. “The Development of Censorship in World War I France.” Journalism Monographs 131 (February, 1992). Cowin, Hugh W. German and Austrian Aviation of World War I. New York: Osprey, 2000. Currie, David P. “The Constitution and the Supreme Court: 1910-1921.” Duke Law Journal, December, 1985. Devilbiss, M. C. Women and Military Service. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1990. Ebbert, Jean, and Marie-Beth Hall. The First, the Few, the Forgotten: Navy and Marine Corps Women in World War I. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2002. Farwell, Byron. Over There: The United States in the Great War. New York: W. W. Norton, 1999. Ferrell, Robert H. Collapse at Meuse-Argonne: The Failure of the MissouriKansas Division. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2004. Fleming, Thomas J. The Illusion of Victory: America in World War I. New York: Basic Books, 2003. Franks, Norman. Who Downed the Aces in WWI? New York: Seven Hills, 1996. Gilbert, Martin. The First World War: A Complete History. New York: Henry Holt, 1994.
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Griffith, Paddy. Battle Tactics of the Western Front. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994. Hallas, James H. Squandered Victory: The American First Army at St. Mihiel. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995. Halpern, Paul G. A Naval History of World War I. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994. Herwig, Holger. The First World War: Germany and Austria, 1914-1918. London: Edward Arnold, 1997. Holm, Jeanne. Women in the Military. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1992. Horne, Allistair. The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916. 1963. Reprint. New York: Penguin Books, 1993. Jensen, Joan M. The Price of Vigilance. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969. Johnson, Donald O. The Challenge to American Freedoms: World War I and the Rise of the American Civil Liberties Union. Lexington: For the Mississippi Valley Historical Association, University of Kentucky Press, 1963. Keegan, John. The First World War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999. Kennedy, David M. Over Here: The First World War and American Society. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. Knightley, Phillip. The First Casualty. London: Pan Books, 1989. Larzelere, Alex R. The Coast Guard in World War I: An Untold Story. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2003. Lasswell, Harold D. Propaganda Technique in the World War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927. Layman, R. D. Naval Aviation in the First World War: Its Impact and Influence. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996. Liddle, Peter H. The Airman’s War, 1914-1918. New York: Sterling, 1987. Luebke, Frederick. Bonds of Loyalty: German-Americans and World War I. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974. Lyons, Michael J. World War I: A Short History. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1994. Macdonald, Sharon, Pat Holden, and Shirley Ardener, eds. Images of Women in Peace and War. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988. Macmillan, Margaret. Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World. New York: Random House, 2002. Maslowski, Peter, and Allan Millett. For the Common Defense. New York: Free Press, 1984. Matloff, Maurice, ed. American Military History. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1985. Messimer, Dwight R. Find and Destroy: Antisubmarine Warfare in World War I. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001.
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Millett, Allan R., and Peter Maslowski. For the Common Defense. New York: Free Press, 1984. Mock, James R. Censorship 1917. New York: Da Capo Press, 1972. Morton, Desmond. A Military History of Canada. Edmonton, Alberta: Hurtig, 1985. Murphy, Paul L. The Constitution in Crisis Times, 1918-1969. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. ____________. World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States. New York: W. W. Norton, 1979. Ousby, Ian. The Road to Verdun: World War I’s Most Momentous Battle and the Folly of Nationalism. New York: Doubleday, 2002. Palazzo, Albert. Seeking Victory on the Western Front: The British Army and Chemical Warfare in World War I. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000. Persico, Joseph E. Eleventh Month, Eleventh Day, Eleventh Hour—Armistice Day, 1918: World War I and Its Violent Climax. New York: Random House, 2004. Pohlman, H. L. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: Free Speech and the Living Constitution. New York: New York University Press, 1991. Polenberg, Richard. Fighting Faiths: The Abrams Case, the Supreme Court, and Free Speech. 1987. Reprint. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999. Ragan, Fred D. “Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., and the Clear and Present Danger Test for Free Speech: The First Year, 1919.” Journal of American History, June, 1971. Revell, Alex, and Bob Pearson. Victoria Cross: WWI Airmen and Their Aircraft. Boulder, Colo.: Paladin Press, 1999. Salvatore, Nick. Eugene V. Debs: Citizen and Socialist. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982. Samuels, Martin. Doctrine and Dogma: German and British Infantry Tactics in the First World War. New York: Greenwood Press, 1992. Schneider, Dorothy, and Carl Schneider. Into the Breach. New York: Viking Press, 1991. Smith, Leonard V. Between Mutiny and Obedience: The Case of the French Fifth Infantry Division During World War I. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994. Stone, Norman. The Eastern Front, 1914-1917. New York: Penguin Books, 1975. Strachan, Hew. The Outbreak of the First World War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Taylor, A. J. P. The First World War: An Illustrated History. New York: Capricorn, 1972.
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Triplet, William S. A Youth in the Meuse-Argonne: A Memoir of World War I, 1917-1918. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000. Tuchman, Barbara. The Guns of August. 1962. Reprint. New York: Ballantine Books, 1994. Tucker, Spencer. The Great War, 1914-1918. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998. Vaughn, Stephen. Holding Fast the Inner Lines. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980. White, G. Edward. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Wright, William M. Meuse-Argonne Diary: A Division Commander in World War I.
World War II 1939-1945 World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . Weapons, Tactics, and Strategies . . The Naval War . . . . . . . . . . . . The Air War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U.S. Supreme Court During the War Women in the War . . . . . . . . . . Censorship During the War . . . . .
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Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . August, 1939: Mobilization for Possible War . . . . . . . . . . September, 1939-May, 1945: Battle of the North Atlantic . . . . March, 1941: Lend-Lease Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . December, 1941: Battle of Pearl Harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . December, 1941: Axis Declaration of War on the United States December, 1941-April, 1942: Battle of Bataan . . . . . . . . . . February, 1942: Japanese American Internment. . . . . . . . . May, 1942: Battle of the Coral Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . June, 1942: Battle of Midway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . June, 1942: Manhattan Project. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . August, 1942-February, 1943: Battle of Guadalcanal . . . . . . November, 1942: North Africa Invasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . July-September, 1943: Italy Invasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . September-October, 1943: Battle of Salerno . . . . . . . . . . . November, 1943: Battle of Tarawa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . June, 1944: Operation Overlord. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . June-July, 1944: Battle for Saipan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . June, 1944: Superfortress Bombing of Japan . . . . . . . . . . . July-August, 1944: Battle of Guam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . July-August, 1944: Battle of Tinian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . October, 1944: Battle for Leyte Gulf. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . December, 1944: Battle of the Bulge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . February, 1945: Yalta Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . February-March, 1945: Battle for Iwo Jima. . . . . . . . . . . . April-July, 1945: Battle of Okinawa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . May, 1945: V-E Day. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . July-August, 1945: Potsdam Conference. . . . . . . . . . . . . August, 1945: Atomic Bombing of Japan. . . . . . . . . . . . .
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World War II At issue: Democracy and communism vs. fascism; German or Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe; Japanese or American dominance in the Pacific Date: September 1, 1939-August 14, 1945 Location: Europe, Asia, Africa, Middle East, and Pacific and Atlantic Oceans Combatants: Allies: Great Britain, France, United States, Soviet Union vs. Axis Powers: Germany, Italy, Japan Principal commanders: British, Bernard Law Montgomery (1887-1976); French, Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970); American, Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890-1969), Chester W. Nimitz (1885-1966), Douglas MacArthur (18801964), George S. Patton (1885-1945); Soviet, Georgy Zhukov (1896-1974); German, Erwin Rommel (1891-1944), Adolf Hitler (1889-1945); Japanese, Isoroku Yamamoto (1884-1943) Principal battles: France, Britain, Operation Barbarossa, Pearl Harbor, Singapore, Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal, El Alamein, Stalingrad, Kursk, Normandy, the Bulge, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Berlin Result: A total Allied victory over the Axis in which Germany lost territory and was occupied and partitioned, the Soviet Union replaced Germany as the dominant power in Eastern Europe, and Japan lost territory and was occupied. World War II was the largest, most destructive, and most widespread war in history. During the conflict, more than 50 million people died and hundreds of millions were wounded, physically and psychologically. The war, fought on land, sea, and air, was the epic struggle of the twentieth century and was central to the whole century. It was caused in large part by the unresolved issues of World War I (1914-1918), and its aftermath became the Cold War (1945-1991). Two coalitions of nations, the Axis and the Allies, fought the war. The Axis states were fascist and militaristic. Fascism was an extreme form of racist nationalism under the leadership of dictators who claimed to express the collective will of their peoples. The major powers of the Axis were Germany, Italy, and Japan. The major Allied Powers were Great Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Some nations switched allegiances during the war. Italy changed sides in 1943. After 1940, France had forces on both sides, the Free French and Vichy French. The Soviet Union cooperated with Germany until attacked in June, 1941, (continued on page 386)
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Time Line of World War II Dec., 1937-Jan., 1938
Japanese troops invade China, beginning World War II in East Asia.
Sept. 15-29, 1938
British and German leaders meet in Munich.
Aug., 1939
The possibility of American involvement in the war developing in Europe and East Asia prompts conversion of domestic production to meet military needs.
Sept. 1, 1939
Germany invades Poland, beginning World War II in Europe.
Sept. 3, 1939May 4, 1945
Battle of North Atlantic: Eventual definitive victory for Allied forces.
Oct., 1939Dec. 7, 1941
Polish Campaign.
Apr. 9, 1940
Germany invades Norway.
May-June, 1940
Germany occupies France.
May 10, 1940
Germany invades Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Belgium.
June 10, 1940
Italy declares war on France and Great Britain. Italian forces enter southern France.
July 10-Oct. 31, 1940
Battle of Britain: Germany bombs Great Britain in preparation for a land invasion. Despite great losses on both sides, the British repulse German air power and avoid German occupation.
Sept. 27, 1940
Japan signs the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, becoming a member of the Axis powers.
Oct. 8, 1940
Germany begins occupation of Romania.
Oct. 28, 1940
Italy invades Greece.
Nov. 11, 1940
Battle of Taranto.
Dec. 9-13, 1940
Battle of Stdt Barr3ni.
1941-1942
Battle of Moscow.
1941-1944
Siege of Leningrad.
Mar. 11, 1941
Before the United States becomes formally involved in the war, it uses the Lend-Lease program to support Great Britain’s war effort while declaring official neutrality.
May 20-31, 1941
Crete campaign.
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Japan occupies French Indochina (modern Vietnam). United States halts trade with Japan, sends General Douglas MacArthur to oversee military forces in the Philippines.
Sept. 16-26, 1941
Battle of Kiev.
Nov. 18, 1941June 21, 1942
Battles of Tobruk.
Dec., 1941-Apr., 1942
Battle of Bataan: A Japanese victory that is a major step in Japan’s attainment of the Philippines.
Dec. 7, 1941
Battle of Pearl Harbor: Japanese bomb Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands, sinking or disabling five of eight U.S. battleships, as well as other ships and airplanes. Nearly 2,500 persons, including 68 civilians are killed. Japan simultaneously attacks Guam, the Philippines, Midway Island, Hong Kong, and the Malay Peninsula.
Dec. 8, 1941
United States declares war on Japan.
Dec. 10, 1941Feb. 15, 1942
Battle of Singapore.
Dec. 11, 1941
Axis nations declare war on the United States.
1942-1943
Battles of Kharkov.
Feb. 19, 1942
U.S. government begins relocating persons of Japanese descent on the Pacific Coast.
Feb. 27-Mar. 1, 1942
Battle of the Java Sea: Severe U.S. losses; Japan occupies Java.
Mar. 9, 1942
Japan occupies Rangoon, Burma, cutting off Allied access to China.
May 3-8, 1942
Battle of the Coral Sea: For the first time in history, all fighting in a naval battle is conducted by planes launched off aircraft carriers. Japanese advance into Australia is halted.
May 6, 1942
Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor fall to the Japanese.
June 3-21, 1942
Japan bombs Alaska, occupies the Aleutian Islands, and shells the Oregon coast.
June 3-5, 1942
Battle of Midway: Japan’s advance across the Pacific is stopped, and Japan suffers severe losses. Turning point in the Pacific war.
June 17, 1942
President Roosevelt approves the Manhattan Project, which is to build an atomic bomb.
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Time Line of World War II—continued Aug. 7, 1942Feb. 9, 1943
Battle of Guadalcanal: United States prevents Japanese from landing reinforcements, ensuring Allied conquest of Guadalcanal. Japanese evacuate Guadalcanal on Feb. 9, 1943.
Aug. 19, 1942
Raid on Dieppe.
Aug. 23, 1942Feb. 2, 1943
Battle of Stalingrad.
Aug. 23-25, 1942
Battle of Eastern Solomons: United States inflicts severe damage on Japanese ships.
Sept. 13-14, 1942
Battle of Bloody Ridge: Six thousand Japanese troops are routed.
Oct. 23-Nov. 4, 1942
Battle of El Alamein.
Nov. 7-8, 1942
North Africa Invasion: An Allied campaign designed to drive the Germans out of North Africa, this operation provides a training ground for U.S. forces in World War II.
Feb., 1943
Casablanca Conference.
July 5-15, 1943
Battle of Kursk.
July 6, 1943
Battle of Kula Gulf: First U.S. victory in South Pacific.
July 9-Sept. 19, 1943
Italy Invasion: This campaign forces Germany to use troops and resources that might otherwise have been used in northern France.
Aug. 15, 1943
United States regains Aleutian Islands.
Sept. 8, 1943
Italy surrenders unconditionally.
Sept. 9-Oct. 1, 1943
Battle of Salerno: The Allies accomplish their objective, taking the port of Naples.
Nov., 1943June, 1944
Battle of Monte Cassino.
Nov. 2, 1943
Battle of Empress Augusta Bay: Japanese defeat in South Pacific secures Solomons for the Allies.
Nov. 20-23, 1943
Battle of Tarawa: Costly U.S. victory in which U.S. forces use the captured airstrip to support invasions of the Marshall Islands.
Jan. 22-May 25, 1944
Battle of Anzio.
Jan. 31-Nov. 25, 1944
United States takes Marshall Islands, Mariana Islands, Guam, and the Palaus.
June 6, 1944
D Day: Operation Overlord’s Normandy invasion begins.
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June 15-July 9, 1944
United States seizes the island of Saipan, headquarters for the Japanese defense of the Central Pacific. Its fall impairs the Japanese defense strategy and gives the Americans an air base from which B-29 Superfortress bombers can reach Tokyo.
June 15, 1944
Superfortress bombing of Japan begins.
June 19-20, 1944
Battle of the Philippine Sea: Inflicts severe losses on Japan, of both sea vessels and airplanes.
June 22-July 11, 1944
Soviets send 166 divisions against German positions in Belorussia in Operation Bagration.
July 20-Aug. 10, 1944
Battle of Guam: United States recaptures a strategic base in the Pacific from the Japanese.
July 24-Aug. 1, 1944
Battle of Tinian: United States swiftly takes Tinian from the Japanese; it becomes the launching site for numerous B-29 bombing raids against the Japanese main islands.
Aug. 25, 1944
Liberation of Paris.
Sept. 11, 1944
Liberation of Luxembourg.
Sept. 17-26, 1944
Battle of Arnhem.
Oct. 23-26, 1944
Battle of Leyte Gulf: In three major naval engagements, United States destroys remaining Japanese naval forces and takes control of Philippines. The largest naval battle of the war.
Dec. 16, 1944Jan. 25, 1945
Battle of the Bulge: German forces are routed in a desperate campaign to halt advancing Allied armies.
Feb. 4-11, 1945
Yalta Conference: This significant meeting of the “Big Three” Allied powers marks the height of Allied cooperation but also reveals conflicting agendas.
Feb. 19-Mar. 26, 1945
Battle of Iwo Jima: U.S. Marines seize a Japanese island air base located southeast of Japan.
Mar., 1945
Battle of Mandalay.
Mar. 7-May 8, 1945
Rhine Crossings.
Apr. 1-July 2, 1945
Battle of Okinawa: United States invades Okinawa, occupying it by June 21. Japanese suicide flights contribute to making this the costliest battle of the war.
Apr. 19-May 2, 1945
Battle of Berlin.
May 7, 1945
Germany signs surrender documents.
May 8, 1945
V-E Day: President Harry S. Truman declares victory in Europe.
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Time Line of World War II—continued July 17-Aug. 2, 1945
Potsdam Conference: The third and final “Big Three” meeting plans a peace settlement at the end of World War II.
Aug. 6 and 9, 1945
United States drops atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan.
Aug. 14, 1945
V-J Day: Japan accepts terms of surrender and occasion is declared “Victory in Japan” day.
and the United States did not officially participate until attacked by Japan on December 7, 1941. Causes of the War World War II grew out of grievances produced by the aftermath of World War I. Germans were outraged by the harsh Treaty of Versailles (1919), which had taken away German territory in the east and west, destroyed the Austro-Hungarian Empire, humiliated Germans by including a “war guilt” clause, imposed disarmament, and demanded payments for war damage. Racked by inflation and depression, a substantial minority of Germans voted the extremist Nazi Party into power in 1933. Adolf Hitler, the charismatic and fanatical nationalist, pursued policies of economic control and rearmament. The Nazis were both anticommunist and antiSemitic, blaming Reds and Jews for Germany’s problems. Hitler saw a need for “living space” for “superior” Germans, which was to be carved from lands occupied by “inferior” Slavic peoples living to the east. Hitler pursued a policy of aggression in foreign policy, with the express aim of bringing all ethnic Germans into the new Reich, or empire. German forces entered the demilitarized German Rhineland in 1936, Austria in 1938, and Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939. Meanwhile, Britain and France sought to appease the Nazis by granting concessions in the hope that this would satisfy German ambitions. The height of the policy of appeasement came at the Munich Conference in 1938, which dismembered Czechoslovakia. However, in the eyes of the Western democracies, concessions to Hitler appeared only to encourage more aggression. Britain and France decided to guarantee the integrity of several small states in Europe, including Poland. Hitler’s demands on Poland centered on the surrender of territory that had been shifted from Germany to Poland after World War I, particularly the Polish corridor and the city of Danzig. The Poles resolved to resist dis-
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memberment of their country, and World War II began on September 1, 1939, when Germany attacked Poland. Britain and France honored their commitment to Poland and went to war. Just before attacking Poland, Hitler made an unexpected agreement, the German-Soviet Pact of 1939, with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. It called for peace and economic cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union and divided Poland between them. It was Stalin’s hope that Germany and the Western powers would destroy themselves while a neutral Soviet Union would continue to gain strength. Italy did not join the war on the German side until 1940. Italy had been appeased when it attacked Ethiopia in 1935. Another important fascist state, Spain, whose leader, Francisco Franco, had been aided by the Germans during its civil war of 1936, managed to remain neutral throughout the war. A major question decided by World War II was whether Germany or the Soviet Union would dominate the lands of Eastern Europe and control the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, and many South Slavs. Germans had enjoyed economic predominance in this area for centuries, and Russians had long regarded the Slavic peoples as ethnic and cultural relatives who needed their protection. The Russo-German phase of the war, beginning with the sudden German invasion of the Soviet Union in June, 1941,
German chancellor Adolf Hitler receiving an ovation from the Reichstag after announcing his annexation of Austria in March, 1938. (National Archives)
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Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov signs the German-Soviet nonaggression pact in Moscow on August 23, 1939, while Soviet premier Joseph Stalin (in white jacket) and German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop (behind Molotov) look on. (National Archives)
brought the war’s most ferocious fighting and worst attrition to the plains of Eastern Europe. Before the invasion of the Soviet Union, some military leaders had favored a war against the Soviet Union. The War in Asia The war in Asia began earlier, in 1931, when Japan moved against the rich Chinese province of Manchuria. Japan had modernized rapidly and wanted the province’s raw materials for its industries. Military figures came to dominate Japanese domestic politics as ruthless aggression led to a full-scale war between Japan and China. The United States favored China and began an anti-Japanese foreign policy that ultimately led to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Both Japan and the United States had large naval forces in the Pacific. One of the great questions to be decided by World War II was which of these nations would dominate the Pacific. Japan signed a defensive pact with Germany and Italy in 1936. Partly as a result of Germany’s success in invading the Soviet Union in 1941, the Japanese decided to strike southward against the European nations’ holdings in Asia. By attacking European holdings in Asia, Japan could claim to be freeing Asians from European rule. Southeast Asia would give Japan an abundance of resources, particularly oil and rubber. Japan and the Soviet Union maintained neutrality toward each other until the Soviets attacked the Japanese in 1945.
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Only the U.S. Navy stood in the way of Japan. The United States had a large, modern navy, divided between the Atlantic and the Pacific. President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to curtail Japanese expansion in Asia at the same time that he opposed German advances in Europe. He had the utmost concern for the plight of Britain in 1940, when Britain stood alone in Europe against Hitler. Like many Americans, Roosevelt thought that German victory in Europe would bring tyranny to millions and eventually threaten democracy in the United States as well. What hampered Roosevelt from joining outright in Britain’s defense was very strong isolationist sentiment in the United States. Isolationists did not want to support or participate in foreign wars, which they claimed had nothing to do with the United States. Roosevelt could not risk deeply offending the isolationists because he needed their support to be reelected. However, he gave as much aid to Britain as possible under legislative constraints, allowing the U.S. Navy to help protect convoys destined for Britain.
Pacific Theater of World War II ALASKA
SOVIET UNION
A L E U T I A N
D
S
LE
IS LA
N
D S
ALIN SAKH
OUTER MONGOLIA
N L A I S
U RI
MANCHURIA
K
Peking
KOREA Hiroshima
CHINA The Hump
Shanghai
Nagasaki
Tokyo
JAPAN
Okinawa Hong Kong
BURMA
FORMOSA
Bataan Luzon PHILIPPINE
Rangoon
SIAM (Thailand)
INDOCHINA
IS.
Pearl Harbor Wake I.
HAWAIIAN IS.
MARSHALL IS.
P a c i f i c
Guam Caroline I.
Leyte
Midway I.
Iwo Jima
MARIANA IS.
Eniwetok
MALAYA Singapore
SUMATRA
BORNEO JAVA
NEW GUINEA
SOLOMON IS.
Port Guadalcanal Moresby
Indian
Coral
Ocean
O c e a n Tarawa Gilbert I.
AUSTRALIA
Sea
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When Japan launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, World War II took on its full global dimensions. Shortly afterward, Germany declared war on the United States. As 1942 began, all the major powers were engaged in the conflict. Land, sea, and air forces contended throughout the globe. The War in Europe Germany’s September 1, 1939 attack on Poland utilized new techniques of air assault and armored breakthrough, called Blitzkrieg, or lightning war. Planes would bomb to disrupt ground operations while tanks, mobile guns, and mechanized infantry would punch through a soft spot and race to surround defending forces. The Germans defeated poorly equipped Polish forces by September 28. The British and French did not attack Germany’s lightly defended western border but stayed on the defensive. Meanwhile, a desultory war at sea began, featuring submarine sinkings and sorties by units of the German surface fleet. The calm in the west in the fall and winter of 1939-1940 was called the “Phony War.” The storm broke in the west in April of 1940 when Hitler launched a swift campaign against Denmark and Norway. Naval units, parachute troops, and transport planes boldly carried out the Norwegian invasion. British forces landed in northern Norway but could not prevail without air cover. The Netherlands fell next as German troops swarmed across the border and planes dropped bombs on the region. Hitler adopted a daring strategy for his western offensive. While the Allies sent their forces north to defend Belgium, just as they had during World War I, German armored units lined up to storm through the rough terrain of the almost undefended Ardennes forest, the least likely access route to France. German tanks broke out and crossed below the Allied armies and raced to the sea. The Allies had more troops and more tanks than the Germans, but the superior tactics and communication and air power of the Germans soon caused the French and British armies to retreat in panic. Hundreds of thousands of Allied troops were surrounded at Dunkirk, a northern French port. Instead of crushing them with armor, Hitler elected to allow the Luftwaffe (German air force) to destroy these forces from the air. They failed, in part because of the resistance of the Royal Air Force (RAF) and also because a great flotilla of varied ships arrived from Britain to evacuate soldiers. Through these actions, Britain’s defeat became a heroic retreat. In May, 1940, the Germans renewed the attack on France, which surrendered in June. Northern France was occupied, and Vichy France, a collaborating fascist state, was established under General Henri-Philippe Pétain in
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World War II saw the introduction of paratroops to combat, making it possible for the first time for combatants to place large numbers of troops behind enemy lines quickly. (National Archives)
southern France. General Charles de Gaulle escaped to Britain, where he came to lead the Free French forces worldwide. As France collapsed, the British government changed hands. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was replaced by Winston S. Churchill, who had always opposed appeasing the Germans. Britain stood all alone, except for its overseas empire, and faced a continent dominated by Hitler. In stirring and famous speeches, Churchill vowed to fight to the death. Hitler was not as eager to fight the British as he was to fight the Soviets, who were still helping him, because he saw the British as racially similar to the Germans. Nevertheless, he tried to subdue Britain in the summer of 1940. Before he could mount an invasion, he had to establish German superiority in the air. The Battle of Britain was fought entirely in the air from July to November, 1940. The Luftwaffe could not destroy the RAF and suffered substantial losses in the effort. Thwarted, Hitler turned his attention to preparing for a land campaign against the Soviet Union. However, German forces continued mass night
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European Theater of World War II
EN
RW
ED
AY
SW
c S ea
N
Tallinn
Moscow
Orel
S O V I E T
al
POLAND
Dunkirk
ni
N U N I O
ep er R
Kharkov
iv e
Se
ve Ri
e iv
r
Rh ine
eR in
n
Do
Odessa
Rhone River
ROMANIA Belgrade
Po River
ri
r
S e a
BULGARIA
S ea
RT
B l a c k
ic
Monte
A GREECE
T U R K E Y
n ea eg
PO
ALBANIA
at
AL
d I TA LY
Rome Cassino Anzio Naples Salerno
ive Danube R
Yalta
Sevastopol
Bucharest
YUGOSLAVIA
A
Florence
S PA I N
Algiers
r
r UKRAINE
Rive r
D
AUSTRIA HUNGARY
SWITZERLAND Vichy
UG
LITHUANIA
Berlin Warsaw Ruhr Potsdam O Torgau der Lodz Cologne Ri ve BrusselsG E R M A N Y r Normandy Compiègne Bastogne Prague Trier CZECH Reims OSLOV Paris AKIA Nuremberg Strasbourg Stuttgart Vienna FRANCE Budapest London
O c e a n
Smolensk
EAST PRUSSIA
BELGIUM
BRITAIN
A t l a n t i c
er
LATVIA
B
DENMARK NETHERLANDS
GREAT
Riv
Rostov
ESTONIA
ti
Sea
IRELAND
lga Vo
Leningrad
O
North
FINLAND
Bizerte
S
IA
SYRIA
M e d i t e r r a n e a n
N TU
MOROCCO
ALGERIA
IS
Casablanca
FRENCH
ea
Tunis
Oran
S e a
PALESTINE TRANS-
Tripoli
JORDAN
Tobruk El Alamein
EGYPT
iver Nile R
Benghazi
L I B YA
bombings of British cities, a tactic known as the Blitz. London was particularly hard hit, but Londoners showed amazing bravery and determination. Britain was also threatened on the seas by a growing submarine campaign against merchant ships, which provided the imports necessary to sustain industry and feed the nation. The Battle of the North Atlantic, which raged all through the war, destroying many British ships, greatly worried Churchill. Italy joined the war as France collapsed, hoping to gain more territory in Africa. Italy launched unsuccessful campaigns against British forces in North Africa in the summer of 1940 and against Greece in October, 1940. German forces had to rescue Italian troops in both campaigns. To save the Italians, Hitler had to conquer the Balkans and send the German Afrika Corps to North Africa, led by General Erwin Rommel. North Africa was only a sideshow for the Axis, however. The great campaign of 1941 was Operation Barbarossa, in which more than three million
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German and Axis forces attacked the Soviet Union. Victory followed victory as German forces advanced on a three-pronged front, aiming at Leningrad, Moscow, and Ukraine. Many people thought that the Soviet collapse was near, but despite fearful losses, the Russians held on until mud and cold stalled the German invasion. The Germans had expected victory before winter and were unprepared for Russia’s bitter cold. The United States Enters the War When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941), the Germans were about to be thrown back on the outskirts of Moscow. The brilliant surprise attack sank U.S. battleships but U.S. carriers were at sea. Japanese strategy called for the rapid conquest of Southeast Asia after crippling the U.S. fleet. U.S. forces held out in the Philippines as long as possible, but Japanese forces stormed to victory all through the area, easily conquering the British bastion of Singapore (1941-1942). Nevertheless, American leaders decided that Japan was less of a threat than Nazi Germany and gave the war in Europe first priority for the rapidly expanding U.S. forces. At the beginning of 1942, the Axis Powers were at the height of their expansion, dominating continental Europe and the western Pacific. The Soviet Union appeared about to collapse, and Britain was being strangled by submarine warfare. The United States was unable to stop the victorious Japanese fleet. Then the course of the war changed through three dramatic turning points: the Battles of Coral Sea (May 3-8, 1942), Midway (June 4, 1942), and Guadalcanal (August 7, 1942-February 9, 1943), when the tide turned against the Japanese in the Pacific; El Alamein (October 23-November 4, 1942) in North Africa, where Rommel was defeated by Bernard Law Montgomery at the outskirts of Egypt; and the most important battle of all, Stalingrad (August 23, 1942-February 2, 1943) along the Volga River, deep in the Soviet Union, which threw the Germans back. The Russian Front The hitherto invincible German army was destroyed on the plains of Russia. Four out of five German casualties in the war occurred on this battle site, at the cost of more than twenty million Soviet lives. In 1942, Hitler planned to drive his troops to the southeast to capture oil fields in the Caucasus. When his forces became bogged down in Stalingrad, the campaign foundered. The Soviets launched a counterattack that surrounded the city and eventually forced a stunning German surrender. An even more destructive defeat occurred at Kursk (July, 1943) in the
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Ukraine. Until 1943, the Germans had advanced in the summer and the Soviets had pushed them back in the winter. Beginning in 1943, however, Soviet forces advanced westward in the summer and winter, arriving in eastern Europe by 1944 and in Berlin in 1945. The fighting on the eastern front was vicious and included the mass murder of civilians and prisoners by both sides. Stalin constantly called for a “second front,” meaning an Allied invasion in Western Europe. Anglo-American forces were cautious, first invading North Africa in November, 1942, and Italy in 1943. The Italians changed sides and eventually executed Italian leader Benito Mussolini. Meanwhile, the great Allied bombing offensive against German cities intensified, which drew German forces from the critical eastern front. Simultaneously, the convoy system, long-range air power, and new equipment diminished the submarine menace. U.S. wartime production became phenomenal. Massive numbers of ships, planes, tanks, and guns poured out of factories to equip U.S. and Allied forces. Powerful trucks, landing craft, and rapidly evolving aircraft were particularly important American contributions to the war. Women took jobs hitherto reserved for men in all countries involved in the war. A more sinister operation gained speed in German-occupied Europe: the deliberate mass killing of Jews and other groups, a well-documented event called the Holocaust. More than eight million Jews and three million others were murdered in concentration camps. Allied Victory The long-expected Allied invasion of Europe took place June 6, 1944, at Normandy, long after the Soviets had begun to push back the German armies on the eastern front. Breakout and the liberation of Paris followed, due in large measure to the actions of General George S. Patton. General Montgomery’s plan to cross the Rhine via Holland, Operation Market Garden, September, 1944, failed. A surprise German attack in Belgium in December, 1944, the Battle of the Bulge, temporarily caused the Allies concern. Yet by the spring of 1945, they were able to push deep into Germany and link up with Soviet forces, which reached Berlin in April, 1945. The war in Europe came to an end after Hitler committed suicide in a Berlin bunker as Soviet troops conquered the city. Meanwhile, U.S. forces under Douglas MacArthur in the Pacific liberated the Philippines (October, 1944-July, 1945), and Chester W. Nimitz used the dramatically expanded U.S. Navy in an island-hopping campaign. The Japanese fleet and air forces were virtually wiped out in a series of one-sided battles. When islands close to Japan—Iwo Jima (February-
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Many of the inmates of Germany’s Buchenwald concentration camp were barely alive when Allied troops liberated the camp in April, 1945. (National Archives)
March, 1945) and Okinawa (April-July, 1945)—were seized, the Japanese turned to suicidal kamikaze attacks against U.S. ships. An invasion of Japan was planned, but became unnecessary after the world’s first atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August, 1945. Japan surrendered but was allowed to keep its emperor. Aftermath The results of World War II largely determined the course of the rest of the century. Devastated Germany was shorn of territory to the east, west, and south, and was partitioned and occupied. The Soviet Union replaced Germany as the dominant power in Eastern Europe as communist puppet states emerged in the shadow of the Red Army. Bombed-out Japan was occupied by the now clearly dominant power in the Pacific, the United States. The postwar world was soon overshadowed by the Cold War, as the Soviet sphere in Europe was delineated by what Churchill came to call the Iron Curtain. Western Europe was uplifted and protected by the United States. The generous Marshall Plan poured millions of dollars into non-
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As Supreme Allied Commander in the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur signs the formal documents recognizing Japan’s surrender in the war. The ceremony took place aboard the battleship USS Missouri, anchored in Tokyo Bay, on September 2, 1945. (National Archives)
communist countries to bolster their resistance to communism and eventually to make them good business partners for the United States. Observers expected Western Europe to take generations to recuperate, but Europe recovered with surprising rapidity. The ideology of fascist racism was thoroughly discredited by the war. Communism in the Soviet bloc continued until the Soviet Union’s dissolution during the early 1990’s. The Cold War’s key confrontation was the border between democratic West Germany and communist East Germany. The United States emerged from the war as a global superpower with its productive capacities hugely expanded by the war. National pride and confidence in democracy and capitalism flourished as wealth and power soared. Overall, Americans and their allies looked back on the war, terrible as it was, as a necessary struggle to preserve freedom. Henry Weisser
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Weapons, Tactics, and Strategies While World War I was the first global war to employ the advanced destructive capabilities of modern weapons systems and armaments, it was World War II that brought modern tactical and strategic thinking to their application. The result was destruction of human life and property on a scale unprecedented in history. At the end of World War I, there was no longer a balance of power in Europe. Great Britain and France had been physically devastated and were close to financial bankruptcy; Germany had been defeated and disarmed; Russia, by then the Soviet Union, had been excluded as a result of the Russian Revolution (1918-1921) and the spread of communism. The United States had withdrawn from European affairs, devoting its attention to the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific and leaving Britain and France as the only real powers in an unstable political and military system. France decided to strengthen its border defenses, known as the Maginot line, using the Treaty of Versailles (1919) to prevent the rearmament of Germany and entering into a series of security alliances. Great Britain, perceiving no serious threat, returned to the advancement of its imperial interests, relying upon its navy for defense. Although both Britain and France belonged to the League of Nations created at the end of World War I, neither saw this organization as a credible deterrent to war. With the exception of the persistent threat of communism, the 1920’s witnessed a lessening of international tensions, with the drafting of the Locarno Pact (1925), establishing Germany’s western borders; the KelloggBriand Pact (1928), renouncing the use of war in settling international disputes; and the entrance of Germany into the League of Nations (1926). Everything changed, however, after the U.S. stock market collapsed in 1929. Financial and economic crisis brought political instability and a renewal of international tensions. On January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany. Italy began to assert its authority under fascist dictator Benito Mussolini, and Fascism spread into Romania and Hungary, as the rest of Eastern Europe began to disintegrate. At the same time, communist activities directed by Communist International (Comintern), the communist organization founded by Vladimir Ilich Lenin, under the control of the Soviet Union increased. Governments were forced to direct all available resources to provide social services for the large numbers of unemployed and destitute.
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Germany Rearms International tensions escalated after Hitler began to rebuild German military power. In 1933, after the League of Nations refused to weaken the restrictions on German rearmament, Hitler’s Germany left the organization. In 1935 the Saar was returned to Germany in response to a wave of Nationalist propaganda, and Hitler then attempted to take over Austria. Britain and France were able to thwart Hitler but only with the support of Mussolini, who allied with Hitler two years later when Britain and France refused to support his conquest of Ethiopia. In 1936 Hitler and Mussolini also sent aid to Nationalist general Francisco Franco in Spain at the beginning of the Spanish Civil War, whereas the West relied on sanctions and weak protests. By 1936 Germany under Hitler and his National Socialist Party (Nazis) had begun to rearm at a frantic pace, whereas Britain, France, and the United States used almost all of their resources to bolster their economies. However, it should be noted that a considerable amount of the Works Progress Administration (WPA) spending in the United States was devoted to military purposes, including the building of two aircraft carriers and several military posts. Britain, in the meantime, had devoted a large portion of its 1936, 1937, and 1938 defense budgets to the building of radar stations and the infrastructure of an early warning system. In 1936 military-age Germans outnumbered their French counterparts two to one. France, the key to Allied defense against Nazi aggression, realized that it would be unable to match either German manpower or German industrial production. For a short time, the French government actively sought an alliance with the Soviet Union, but this alliance never materialized, due to the purges of Joseph Stalin in the late 1930’s. Increasingly forced to rely on a defensive strategy, France became more obvious in its weaknesses, taking no action when Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland in 1937. British Appeasement Meanwhile, Britain had decided that some kind of accommodation or appeasement could be reached with Hitler, offering only perfunctory protests when Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland and carried out his Anschluss, or annexation, of Austria in early 1938. When Hitler demanded that something be done about Czechoslovakia, the British, with French acquiescence, decided to appease Nazi Germany rather than risk a war they were not prepared to fight. In September, 1938, the British and French leaders, Neville Chamberlain and Édouard Daladier, allowed Hitler to seize the Sudetenland, which included most of Czechoslovakia’s defenses and
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armament industries, in return for Hitler’s promise that he would meet with them to negotiate future problems. In March, 1939, Hitler violated the agreement and seized the rest of Czechoslovakia. Neither France nor Britain had begun to rearm seriously until the crisis over the Sudetenland, and they thus negotiated from a position of weakness. For example, all the aircraft used by Britain to fight the Battle of Britain (1940) were manufactured after the Czech crisis. Although both France and Britain had begun to rebuild their military forces in early 1939, their action was too little, too late. When the Polish crisis escalated into war with the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, neither France nor Britain was prepared to fight. In actuality, the military weakness of Britain and France encouraged German aggression and added to the crises that led to World War II. U.S. Preparedness The United States was even further behind its European allies in military development. Preoccupied with the efforts to deal with the Great Depression and perceiving no immediate external threat to national security, the U.S. Army was less prepared to wage war than it had been at any time since the Civil War. Ranked equally with Britain and Japan in naval power, in 1939 the United States was ranked seventeenth in overall military strength, behind both Spain and Romania. The U.S. armed forces had no tanks, few first-line fighter aircraft, and barely enough rifles for its army. It should be remembered that the United States, disillusioned by the outcome of World War I, was determined to stay out of World War II. However, as British and French power in the Pacific diminished as a result of the fighting in Europe, the Japanese seized the opportunity to expand their influence in the region. Although the U.S. armed forces were in a weakened state, U.S. interests in the Pacific, mainly China and the Philippines, had to be protected. A series of crises, misunderstandings, and miscalculations on both sides resulted in the Japanese decision to attack the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941. Unprepared, the United States suddenly found itself involved in World War II. Military Achievement The military role of France during World War II was limited by its early defeat and surrender in 1940. Hampered both by its reliance on the fixed fortifications of the Maginot line and by its refusal to create a modern armored force, the French army was neither doctrinally nor technically capable of defeating the Germans. Later in the war, however, the First French Army, equipped and supplied by the United States and commanded by
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One key to Allied success in the war was American industrial might. Here women at Douglas Aircraft’s Long Beach, California, plant assemble nose cones for A-20 attack bombers. (National Archives)
General Jean-Marie-Gabriel de Lattre de Tassigny, performed well and helped to liberate France. The British army did no better than the French. Defeated on the frontier of France in 1940, it was forced to retreat to Dunkirk and had to be evacuated, leaving behind all of its heavy equipment. Only in the initial battles against the Italians in North Africa did the British army emerge victorious. The Royal Air Force did perform better: With their Spitfire and Hurricane fighters, both guided by sophisticated early-warning radar systems, they were able to defeat the German air force, or Luftwaffe, and prevent the invasion of Britain. At the same time the heavy bomber force under British air marshal Arthur T. Harris, after concluding that daylight bombing would be too costly, began the successful development of night bombing operations. Harris developed the concept of “saturation bombing”; in May, 1942, he attacked Cologne with 1,000 planes and destroyed 600 acres of the city. However, high losses of 970 bombers between May and November, 1942, hampered his efforts. British military performance, even when supported by a large infusion of U.S. aid, improved little in the desert battles against German com-
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mander Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps. Problems with command and control, armor, and leadership led to numerous British defeats. At the same time, the British army in the Far East was outfought and outmaneuvered by the Japanese, resulting in one of the worst defeats in British history, at Singapore (1941-1942). The situation did begin to improve when British generals Harold Alexander and Bernard Law Montgomery reorganized the British Eighth Army and won the Battle of El Alamein (1942). At the same time the British army came increasingly under U.S. control, both logistically and tactically. U.S. Mobilization Although the United States had not been prepared to fight a war when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the nation quickly mobilized its vast resources and was able to launch offenses in both North Africa and the South Pacific within less than a year. Although its initial performance was unimpressive, the U.S. Army was victorious at the Battles of the Kasserine Pass (1943) and New Guinea (1943). Three factors played a major role in early U.S. victories: material superiority, command of the air, and adaptability to changing circumstances. Due in large measure to the training provided by the government and armed forces service schools, senior officers were intellectually prepared for a global war. The logistical accomplishments of the Army and Navy were formidable. Despite initial problems and some brief shortages of critical supplies, the U.S. servicemen and their allies were amply supplied with everything they needed to fight the war. Another area of exceptional performance was the U.S. artillery, which used forward observers and new operational techniques. The U.S. artillery proved to be the most successful arm of the service, a fact repeatedly remarked upon by captured German soldiers. The U.S. Army excelled in two other aspects of warfare: air and amphibious operations. In the air, using heavy bombers such as B-17’s and B-24’s, the U.S. Army Air Corps was able to destroy much of Nazi Germany’s infrastructure, making it very difficult to maintain production. In the Pacific the B-29’s were even more successful in destroying Japanese industrial production. Although strategic bombing did not win the war, as some prewar theorists had predicted, it did play a significant role in the defeat of the Axis Powers. Amphibious operations were very difficult, and much of the necessary equipment had to be developed during the war. Thanks to U.S. engineering and production genius, the United States was able to carry out successful landings on hostile beaches in both the European and Pacific theaters of operation. The most important amphibious operations were the
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landings during Operation Overlord on Normandy beaches launched on June 6, 1944 (D day), which marked the start of the final campaign of World War II. British and American intelligence was able to break the German and Japanese codes during the war, thereby gaining advanced warning of enemy intentions. At Bletchley Park, 50 miles north of London, Britain assembled a large group of cryptologists, who successfully decrypted the German codes throughout the war, providing real-time intelligence to the commanders in the field. The Allied intelligence system was code-named Ultra, and its existence was not revealed until almost twenty years after the war ended. At the same time, U.S. cryptologists broke the Japanese codes. Despite this success, however, the United States was surprised by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and reliance upon the Ultra codes contributed to the failure of U.S. intelligence to realize the seriousness of the German attack in December, 1944, that resulted in the Battle of the Bulge (19441945). Perhaps the greatest military achievement during World War II was the development and use of the atomic bomb by the United States. Rarely has a single weapon so changed the nature of warfare and the global balance of power. The decision to drop the atomic bomb, though controversial, hastened the end of the war. Weapons World War II witnessed the development and deployment of a large number of weapons ranging from the M1 Garand rifle to the atomic bomb. Science and technology played a greater role in the operational aspects of World War II than in those of any other war in history. In fact, a whole new area of military operations, called operational analysis, developed from the application of science to military problems. Operational analysis dealt with everything from the best depth at which to set depth charges to the most efficient force structure for combat divisions. During the 1920’s and 1930’s the British experimented with a wide variety of armored vehicles, as well as other weapons systems. However, due to a lack of funding and a perceived lack of a serious military threat, these experiments were carried no further. The British went to war in 1939 with an army that was essentially equipped with slightly upgraded World War I weapons, except for the Spitfire and Hurricane fighters and some heavy bombers, which were developed late in the war. This failure in military modernization resulted in an increasing reliance throughout the war upon U.S. weapons, especially tanks and armored vehicles. After its defeat in 1940, the reconstituted French army that fought along-
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side the Allies in 1944 and 1945 relied almost entirely upon American weapons. Within a year after the U.S. entry into the war, it had become the “Arsenal of Democracy,” providing weaponry and supplies for all of the Allies, including the Soviet Union. At the same time, it equipped the ninety-division U.S. Army with excellent weapons. The standard infantry weapon was the M1 Garand, which was a gas-operated, clip-fed, semiautomatic rifle that fired eight shots and weighed 9.5 pounds. The artillery, especially the 105-millimeter howitzer and the 155-millimeter gun, used the fire-control system developed early in the war and proved to be the most effective arm of the army. In the air, the U.S. heavy bombers (B-17’s, B-24’s, and B-29’s) and fighters (P-47’s and P-51’s) were dependable and proved capable of defeating their adversaries. One of the less well known technical triumphs of American ingenuity was the proximity (V.T.) fuse. Actually a small radar set built into an explosive shell, it was so effective that no one was allowed to fire it over land, for fear the enemy might get their hands on one that did not explode. The greatest success of American technology was the atomic bomb, which hastened the end of the war against Japan and revolutionized warfare. The greatest failure of American weaponry was the M4 Sherman medium tank. Although the reliable Sherman tank was capable of performing most of the tasks assigned to it, it had not been designed to be an antitank weapon and failed when called upon to engage the German medium or heavy tanks known as Panthers and Tigers. Produced in large numbers, more than 40,000, it provided armor not only for the U.S. Army but also for the British, French, and Polish forces in Europe. The M26 Pershing, which was designed to fight other tanks, was introduced at the end of the war but arrived too late to have any real effect. Only 700 Pershings were shipped to Europe. Military Organization At the beginning of World War II, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was dispatched to France. While retaining its independence, it served under the French commander General Maurice-Gustave Gamelin and later General Maxime Weygand. Organized into two army groups, the French concentrated the bulk of their mobile forces in the north with the BEF. After the defeat of France and the evacuation of the BEF to Dunkirk, most of the French army became a home-defense force. The remainder, along with Commonwealth forces, were sent to North Africa, whereas the British army stationed in India under separate command was used to reinforce the defenses in the Near East and Asia.
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After the United States entered the war, the British army, although more experienced, came under U.S. field command. At the highest levels, the military command structure was the Combined Chiefs of Staff, consisting of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British Imperial General Staff. Although the Combined Chiefs of Staff operated on the principle of unanimity, the United States was decidedly the dominant partner. The staffs of both countries became more elaborate as the war progressed. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff became increasingly involved in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy during the war. When the North African campaign began, the Free French were brought in as a junior partner. However, this relationship remained tenuous throughout the war because of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s personal distrust of the French leader, General Charles de Gaulle. Although the Soviet Union was an ally, it was seldom involved in military decisions at the strategic or tactical level. The war was fought by the Allies—mainly the United States, Britain, and France—in four theaters of operation. The European theater was commanded by U.S. general Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had taken direct control over the cross-Channel invasion, prompting Field Marshal Alexander to take control of the Italian campaign. In the Pacific theater, the Southeast Pacific was commanded by General Douglas MacArthur, the Central Pacific by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, and the China-Burma-India theater by Admiral Louis Mountbatten. For a brief period during the Guadalcanal campaign in the Solomon Islands, there was a further division called the South Pacific theater, commanded by Admiral William F. Halsey. In all of these commands there were joint staffs of U.S., British, and other Allied officers. The Americans were in command and provided most of the forces who fought in all theaters, except the China-Burma-India theater. One major difference in operations should be noted: in the European theater of operation, Commonwealth—mainly Canadian—troops remained as part of the British command, whereas in the Southwest theater of operations, the Australian army served directly under MacArthur. The reconstituted French army served not as a separate force but rather as one of the armies under U.S. command. One of the primary reasons for this arrangement was U.S. responsibility for logistical support. At the end of the war, the First French Army was separated and given its own sector of Germany to occupy. Cooperation between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union was difficult at best. At the beginning of the war, due to British resistance to an early cross-Channel invasion, U.S. staff officers had been more favorable to the Soviet Union. However, as the war progressed and Soviet intentions in
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Eastern Europe became apparent, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff became increasingly hostile to the Soviets. The resulting mutual suspicion contributed to the beginning of the Cold War. Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics A nation’s military doctrine generally determines the nature of its weapons development, strategy, and tactics. During the years immediately following World War I, all the major powers reevaluated their military in the light of lessons learned in that war. The French came to the conclusion that defensive fortifications such as Verdun were their best option along with an infantry force supported by artillery and some armor. They believed that such a force would be able to take the offensive only in a limited way, using armor basically as mobile artillery to support the infantry rather than as an independent force capable of disrupting the enemy’s lines. Britain experimented with a variety of armor operations during the interwar years. For example, General Sir Percy Hobart conducted deep penetration armor maneuvers in 1935. However, the lack of adequate funding and the absence of a clear threat limited any deployment to small units more suitable for use as an empire constabulary rather than a continental army. Some American planners such as Colonel George Patton did conceive of the use of large armored formations but the absence of any real threat, the financial restraints created by the Great Depression, and the conviction that the United States would not be involved in a European war in the future resulted in inadequately trained and equipped forces. The U.S. Army and many planning staff did develop very extensive plans (the Rainbow Plans) and realized many of the possible difficulties that were found later in the war. For example, under the leadership of Marine major Earl H. Ellis, doctrine and planning for amphibious warfare was developed prior to the war. By not entering the war until December of 1941, American planners were able to take advantage of the experiences of both the Allies and the Germans. The decision to create only a ninety-division army hampered some operations, especially the large-scale armor attacks favored by the Germans and the Soviets. Much of American doctrinal development during the war centered on the use of the vast material advantage that the United States possessed, especially in artillery and airpower. In the area of airborne operations, the U.S. Army developed the doctrine, organization, equipment, and tactics during the early part of the war. After basing much of their development on reports of German successes in
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1939 and 1940, the U.S. airborne units and their British counterparts proved to be some of the most effective fighting forces in the European theater of operations, despite their limited use. The 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions were considered two of the best. Strategies From the beginning of U.S. involvement in the war, the Allied strategy was “Europe first.” Although unable to launch a cross-Channel invasion in 1942, the Allies attacked Germany first in North Africa (Operation Torch) and then in Sicily (Operation Huskey). At the same time priority was given to the heavy bomber offensive against Germany. After the successful landings at Normandy, Allied strategy in Europe was a broad-front strategy. Rather than concentrate on one or two major thrusts, as the British commander Field Marshal Montgomery advocated, Eisenhower opted to attack along the entire front, forcing the German army to retreat back into Germany and ultimately destroying its ability to fight. Probably the greatest failure of American strategy was Eisenhower’s decision to stop his advance at the Elbe River, allowing the Soviets to take Berlin and consequently to occupy all of Eastern Europe. In the Pacific, General MacArthur directed an island-hopping strategy that avoided Japanese strong points. At the same time, the Japanese were further stretched by the U.S. decision to shift the axis of their attacks along two fronts: the Southwest Pacific from New Guinea through the Philippines and the Central Pacific. The Japanese surrendered before they were actually invaded. Jachin W. Thacker
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The Naval War On the eve of World War II, the U.S. government began building warships that would dominate both the Atlantic and the Pacific theaters of naval warfare. The goal of establishing a two-ocean fleet was a powerful, if elusive, force in determining the nature of the United States Navy before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor plunged the United States into war in 1941. In the late 1930’s, the two-ocean standard became the latest in a succession of rallying cries designed to gain popular support for naval expansion. Its appeal originated in a growing recognition that vital U.S. interests were being threatened simultaneously by Germany and Japan. This two-ocean focus was an extension of threat perceptions and arguments dating back to the 1890’s and made more pressing with the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 and Japan’s victory over Russia in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War. With the collapse of naval arms limitations in 1936, the rearmament of National Socialist Germany, and the naval buildup and military adventurism of Japan, the necessity of creating fleets capable of fighting independently in widely separated theaters seemed evident. Congress, responding to the change in popular attitude, passed legislation between 1938 and 1941 designed to translate the ideal of a two-ocean fleet into reality. U.S. Naval Policy U.S. naval policy has been a mirror of national ambition. During the 1890’s, and especially after the Spanish-American War, the horizon of that ambition increased measurably. At a single stroke, the United States became both a Caribbean and a Pacific power. U.S. control of the Philippines was perplexing for many people in the United States but exciting for navalists and imperialists. Together with Hawaii, which was annexed in 1898, the Philippines provided U.S. commerce with a toehold in the fabled China trade. Distant possessions seemed to mandate an increased fleet, and an increased fleet required overseas bases, setting the foundation for a self-perpetuating expansion of the military and naval establishment. For better or worse, expanded interests called for expanded responsibilities, and President Theodore Roosevelt, an enthusiastic convert to U.S. imperialism, led the movement to secure those interests. Between 1905 and 1909, Congress authorized the construction of sixteen new battleships of the all-big-gun, dreadnought style by which international naval power was measured. Meanwhile, work on the Panama Canal, which was in-
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tended to provide much-needed flexibility for the fleet, continued toward its completion in 1914. By the time of Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency, Japan and especially Germany were seen as the most important potential threats to U.S. commerce and possessions. Tension caused by the treatment of Japanese nationals living in the United States was the primary reason for congressional approval of the last six new battleships authorized during Roosevelt’s administration. The attention of most U.S. naval experts was fixed on Germany, where an ambitious twenty-year naval construction program had been announced in 1900. While the German fleet law was intended as a challenge to British naval supremacy, it was also perceived as a threat to U.S. interests by a host of U.S. congressmen and naval authorities. That traditional German concerns were continental and that the German navy had a nearer rival in Great Britain seemed to make no difference. Those guiding U.S. naval policy believed that it would be a mistake for the United States to allow itself to be surpassed in naval power by any na-
Japan planned its attack on Pearl Harbor with the idea of knocking the U.S. Pacific Fleet completely out of action. However, while the damage done to the fleet was temporarily crippling, its effects were not long lasting. This photo shows the USS West Virginia, one of the battleships most badly damaged at Pearl Harbor. (National Archives)
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tion that also maintained a great standing army. This growing U.S. fear of Germany was also reflected in the concentration of the fleet. Long a dictum of the most distinguished U.S. naval strategic synthesizer, Captain A. T. Mahan, the concentration of naval forces was adopted by Roosevelt as a cardinal principle of fleet deployment. Throughout his presidency, and Taft’s as well, the main fleet remained posted in the Atlantic Ocean. Interwar Developments After 1914, the prewar desire to improve the United States Navy to second place behind the British fleet was replaced by a determination to build a navy second to none. This challenge to British naval superiority, the first ever by the United States, was engendered by British arrogance toward neutral U.S. shipping and a fear of the naval landscape in the postwar world. President Woodrow Wilson and Congress joined in the $588 million naval construction act of 1916, which mandated ten new superdreadnought battleships and six battle cruisers. Wilson called for a similar program in 1918 to strengthen the U.S. bargaining position at the Versailles Conference. By 1924, the United States Navy would be the most powerful in the world, a dismaying prospect to the British government. U.S. naval ascension was delayed by the decision to shift battleship construction assets to the production of antisubmarine warships, such as destroyers, and to merchant ships to counter losses to German submarines. In the three years that followed the signing of the armistice ending World War I, the United States built more warships than all the rest of the world combined. In taking dead aim at British naval superiority, the United States also revealed apprehension concerning Japan’s being linked to Britain by the ten-year renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1911. Between 1917 and 1921, Japanese naval appropriations tripled, undoubtedly affected by the upsurge in U.S. construction. It is not surprising that with the demise of German naval power in 1919, concern in the United States shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific. In the summer of that year, the battle fleet was divided, with the newer and heavier units being sent to the West Coast. Fear of a costly, all-out naval race in the immediate postwar period served to induce a certain amount of moderation. In Washington, D.C., in 1921-1922, the five leading naval powers adopted a system of restrictions on individual capital ships (battleships and battle cruisers) and aircraft carriers as well as on the aggregate tonnages of capital war fleets. By the terms of the Five-Power Treaty, Great Britain and the United States were to share the first rank of naval power, Japan was assigned the second rank (approximately 60 percent of capital ship parity with the first-rank pow-
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ers), while France and Italy were relegated to the third rank. In 1930, this agreement was augmented by the London Treaty, which established similar kinds of restrictions on the noncapital construction (cruisers, destroyers, and submarines) of Great Britain, the United States, and Japan. Thus, from 1922 through 1936, the size and nature of the United States war fleet was restricted by international agreement. The Japanese Challenge Domination of the Imperial Japanese Navy by the hardliners of the socalled Fleet Faction, who chafed at Japan’s second-rank status under the treaties, resulted in significant pressure on the Japanese government to demand equal status with the United States and Great Britain at the London Naval Conference of 1935. When Great Britain and the United States demurred, the Japanese government provided the requisite notice that it would no longer abide by the naval treaties after December, 1936. Japan’s subsequent penetration of China in 1937 and Hitler’s annexation of Austria and absorption of the Sudetenland in 1938 seemed to provide ample proof for the proposition that unilateral restraint by the United States was a dangerous policy. The issue of naval preparedness became correspondingly less controversial. In 1932, U.S. naval officers applauded the election of navalist Franklin D. Roosevelt to the presidency after the lean years of Republican naval and military expenditures. They were not disappointed. On the same day that he signed the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) into law in June, 1933, Roosevelt signed an executive order using $238 million of NIRA public works funds for construction of new warships. This first step in building the U.S. Navy up to “treaty limits” was followed by congressional moves to improve the status of the war fleet. Spearheaded by the navalist chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, Carl Vinson, and the aging chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, Park Trammel, this movement’s objective was the replacement of all the fleet’s obsolete warships, or “floating coffins,” to use Vinson’s words. The resulting VinsonTrammel bill which became law in March of 1934, also known as the Vinson Naval Parity Act, envisioned the replacement of almost a third of the existing tonnage of the Navy, including practically all the destroyers and submarines. The act did not appropriate funds for construction but served as a blueprint for U.S. naval policy. The clear intention of this action was the establishment of a fighting force that would be the equal of any in the world. Both the NIRA-funded ships and the Vinson-Trammel Act exacerbated strategic concerns in Japan, which was approaching its warship treaty limits and now faced new, qualitatively superior, U.S. warships.
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The Pacific theater of the war was dominated by naval combat, and most land operations were dependent on naval assistance. Of particular importance in coordinating land and sea operations were amphibious landing craft such as these, which were used to carry large numbers of troops ashore as quickly as possible . (National Archives)
Preparations for War By 1938, many isolationists, hemispherists, and internationalists were in agreement that a powerful navy was an indispensable adjunct to a free United States. Thus, another authorization bill swiftly passed through Congress. The second Vinson-Trammel bill, the Naval Expansion Act, or Vinson Naval Parity Act, sought the creation of a navy 20 percent larger than that permitted by the former limitation treaties. As Europe plunged into war, the last restraints on full-scale naval construction disappeared. On June 14, 1940, the day that Paris fell to the German Blitzkrieg, President Roosevelt signed into law a naval expansion bill that authorized an 11 percent increase in appropriations. Three days later, Admiral Harold R. Stark, chief of naval operations, asked Congress for an additional four billion dollars in order to bring the fleet up to the two-ocean standard. This bill, which was passed the following month, was the largest single naval construction program ever undertaken by any country. It provided for a 70 percent increase in combat tonnage to be constructed over a period of six years.
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An F6F fighter plane preparing to take off from the USS Yorktown in late 1943. Because of the immense distances between combat zones in the Pacific, air operations played a crucial role in Pacific theater naval operations, and aircraft carriers assumed an importance not matched in any other war. (National Archives)
Franklin D. Roosevelt acted largely as his own navy secretary and shared most admirals’ perception that the battleship defined naval power. While additional aircraft carriers were authorized in the late 1930’s, the main focus of the Roosevelt naval buildup was the production of the seventeen new battleships authorized prior to U.S. entry into World War II. Despite the flurry of construction authorizations, U.S. naval power was insufficient to protect the Atlantic and Pacific interests of the United States in the wake of Pearl Harbor. A full year prior to that catastrophe, the Navy, pressured by the president, had been forced to shift its strategic focus from an offensive action against Japan to a position that in any future war would include both Germany and Japan; the fleet would take the offensive in the Atlantic while assuming a defensive posture in the Pacific. Even this severe modification of the strategy implicit in the two-ocean standard did not achieve satisfactory results for a disconcertingly long period of time. While the success of Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor might well be considered the result of a failure of specific rather than general preparedness, the inability of U.S. naval resources to provide adequate protection against
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the onslaught of Germany’s U-boat attacks during all of 1942 provides convincing evidence that the Atlantic fleet had not achieved even a one-ocean capability at that time. This was an outgrowth of the myopic battleship strategic paradigm that restricted movement toward true capabilities in air, surface, and subsurface warfare. It was not until early 1943 that U.S. naval forces began to gain the upper hand in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters of the war. Meredith William Berg updated by William M. McBride
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The Air War The outbreak of World War II marked the beginning of a new era in aerial warfare, speeding up development of piston-engine-driven aircraft leading to the inauguration of the first jet to fly a combat mission, the German Messerschmitt Me-262. Following World War II, fighting jets often determined the outcome of contemporary military confrontations as their speed, maneuverability, and destructive capability rapidly escalated. World War II began with the 1939 German bombing of major cities in Poland and the rapid destruction of the Polish air fleet by the German air force, called the Luftwaffe. The 1940 German victories over Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France were greatly assisted by air support. The Battle of Britain in August and September of 1940 dramatically ended with the Royal Air Force (RAF) Fighter Command’s defeat of the Luftwaffe. Later German strategic air bombing efforts, designed to destroy factories and civilian morale, were curtailed from completing their objectives by technically advanced Allied warcraft. As the European front of the war developed, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt repeatedly proclaimed the neutrality of the United States, thus satisfying the public opinion of the majority of Americans. U.S. neutrality laws forbidding arms sales to warring nations were quickly changed by Congress to assist the aerial warfare efforts of Britain and France. The U.S. entry into World War II began with the Japanese carrier-borne aircraft attacks on Pearl Harbor, on the island of Oahu, Hawaii, which quickly destroyed or disabled many U.S. land-based combat aircraft in the Pacific. At the time of the December 7, 1941, Pearl Harbor bombing, the U.S. Army Air Force possessed only 1,100 combat-ready planes. Historians of aviation often note that no motivating force speeds up aircraft development and technology more rapidly than war. By 1944, the U.S. Army Air Force had nearly 80,000 planes in sixteen separate air forces stationed around the world. Aircraft Development On August 27, 1939, four days before the outbreak of war in Europe, the Heinkel He-178 took off from Germany’s Marienhe Airport. The monumental first successful flight of this slender research turbojet aircraft began a new era in aerial warfare and is generally credited to two men: Hans von Ohain of Germany and Sir Frank Whittle of Great Britain. Desperate to curtail Allied bombing offensives, Germany then rapidly developed the
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Messerschmitt Me-262 jet, considered a “Nazi wonder-weapon.” Following its maiden flight in July, 1942, the Me-262 was regularly utilized by German engineers as a flying laboratory for the testing of new weapons. Among the more successful weapons utilized on the Me-262 were 550pound bombs installed on the aircraft’s wing racks and a row of twelve R4M rockets fitted directly upon each wing. These attached rockets were able to fire in rapid succession and could saturate a target the size of a B-17. In their rush to enhance the capabilities of the Me-262, German scientists initially attempted to attach a 50-millimeter nose cannon, which produced a flash that blinded the pilot when fired. Engineers also experimented with attaching a 2,200-pound bomb in tow, which made the plane functionally unstable during flight. Allied bomber crews flying over Germany during the summer of 1944 were stunned by their encounters with the Messerschmitt Me-163 Komet, a jet fighter much faster than the jet-propelled Me-262. The Komet carried a
In order to lift American morale after Japan’s December, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States mounted its first bombing attack on Japan during the following April. Under the command of James Doolittle, sixteen B-25 bombers took off from the aircraft carrier Hornet off the east coast of Japan and struck Tokyo, Yokohama, and other Japanese cities before continuing west to land in China. The bombing raid inflicted only minor damage on Japan but boosted American morale and forced the Japanese to divert resources to air defense. (National Archives)
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revolutionary 3,750-pound thrust rocket motor, which enabled travel at nearly 600 miles per hour. Called the “powdered egg” by Luftwaffe test pilots, the Komet had a limited radius of action of only 25 miles. It would exhaust its 437-gallon fuel supply within seven minutes of takeoff. The Komet’s great effectiveness was due to its ability to climb vertically at 11,810 feet per minute, thus rising quickly above Allied planes. The Komet could then nose over and dive-attack Allied bomber formations and efficiently utilize its twin 30-millimeter cannons. After the war, historians noted that only a handful of the 279 Komets manufactured during the war actually saw combat, but the fact that the Komets claimed nine monumental victories over Allied forces should not be minimized. The most serious flaw of the Komet was its required fuel mixture of methyl alcohol and concentrated hydrogen peroxide, which proved so volatile that several prototypes exploded on the runway during takeoff. Some Komets suffered engine failures that rapidly filled the cockpit with acrid fumes, literally blinding the crew and dousing them with corrosive chemicals from ruptured fuel lines that rapidly dissolved any exposed flesh. Military analysts later reflected that the Komet was probably
American naval pilots celebrate their success in the November, 1943, Battle of Tarawa in the Marshall Islands, in which they shot down seventeen of the twenty Japanese planes that attacked American forces. (National Archives)
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ten years ahead of its time. Despite the flaws consequent to its escalated development, the Komet remained known as the most dangerous warplane in the sky during World War II. In the summer of 1944, Germany first flew the Blitz, a twin-engine Arado 234B bomber capable of a maximum speed of 461 miles per hour and an elevation of 33,000 feet. Other features attempted on the Blitz included a dramatically reduced weight and drag, a trolley that was jettisoned after takeoff, skids that allowed grass landings, rocket boosters enabling takeoffs from short runways, a pressurized cabin, four engines, and one of the first crew ejection seats. Although the Blitz was considerably more advanced than any Allied bomber, its implementation came too late to significantly assist Third Reich bombardment strategy. Major Wolfgang Schenk, a top Luftwaffe pilot, established the Edelweiss Bomber Group of Me-262’s, which were originally designed as fighters but later manufactured as fighter-bombers by a late change in orders directly from Adolf Hitler. Schenk’s unit of fifteen planes, stationed in Orléans, France, however, was too small to deter significantly the advancing Allies and was pulled back to Germany for the final unsuccessful German defense. Experimental Planes Frantically trying to rapidly manufacture a miracle jet that might turn the tide late in the war, German engineers designed three revolutionary planes later considered to be amazingly ahead of their time. The German Gotha 229 Flying Wing, originally designed as a glider, was modified as a high-speed fighter by the attachment of turbojets to its drag-resistant body. One experimental Gotha was clocked at 497 miles per hour while still in its development stage as the war ended. The German Junkers Ju-287 was designed with forward-swept wings mounted over swept-back wings to delay the onset of air compressibility and establish stability at low speeds. The first Junkers was built in 1944 from sections of other planes, including the nose wheels of a downed U.S. Consolidated B-24. The Junkers made seventeen test flights before it was captured in 1945 by Soviet troops, who experimented extensively with the plane themselves for three years before moving to later designs. Soviet engineers attached tufts of wool to the fuselage and forward-swept wings of the Junkers to study its airflow. The planned design of the first jet attempted with variable-sweep wings, the Messerschmitt P-1101, was probably never flown, but the swing-wing design was later developed on the U.S. F-14 and F-111 fighters of the 1970’s, the B-1 bomber of the 1980’s, and an entire generation of Soviet fighters.
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The first fighting jets had only minimal influence on the outcome of World War II, but they clearly set the stage for the rapid, future evolution of jet warplanes. Great Britain, the United States, and Japan rapidly followed Germany by developing and flying jet fighters before the conclusion of the war. Britain’s first jet fighters consisted of seven Gloster Meteors, which joined the RAF in July, 1944, after four years of development. With an airspeed of 490 miles per hour, the Gloster Meteors were effective in intercepting German bombers that were daily attacking London at speeds of 400 miles per hour. However, they proved ineffective at downing enemy planes due to faulty guns. The first combat victory for an Allied jet occurred on August 4, 1944, when pilot T. D. Dean’s gun failed as he maneuvered alongside the attached missile of a German bomber and used his plane’s wing to unbalance and crash the German aircraft. Other Technological Developments British air-defense systems were greatly assisted by the development of radar. The development of German night-fighter systems was not prompted until after British night bombers began large-scale raids on Germany, most notably the one-thousand-plane raid over Cologne in May, 1942. Radar enhanced the ability of U.S. bombers to avoid detection and simultaneously to carry out early morning attacks on prominent German industrial and military targets. These Combined Bomber Offensives notably included the Ploesti, Romania, mission of August 1, 1943. The Ploesti raid utilized B-24’s of the U.S. Fifteenth Air Force, originally based in Italy but launched from Africa, to bomb the Romanian oil refineries that were Germany’s largest supplier of fuel. This costly mission, known as the “graveyard of the Fifteenth,” was quickly followed by the RegensburgSchweinfurt mission of August 17, the first large-scale U.S. attack on Germany launched from English bases. American losses in these offensives were considerable until 1944, when long-range P-47 and P-51 escort fighters enabled the attack of strategic sites deep within German-occupied territories with relative safety. The Allies were then able to establish clear air superiority and hit considerably more German planes and aircraft facilities. A notable example of this timely Allied air supremacy was D day, June 6, 1944, when Allied air forces restricted Germany to only a few Luftwaffe sorties against land invasion forces. Newer designs of wings and other structural improvements greatly increased the speed and maneuverability of combat jets. By the end of the war, one of the most advanced fighters was the British Spitfire, which achieved a top airspeed of 350 miles per hour and an elevation of 40,000 feet. The United States and the Soviet Union both developed jet bombers
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that could fly nonstop from their homelands deep into enemy territory anywhere in the world in only a few hours. Surfaces that deflected radar beams and materials that absorb radar energy and made planes much more difficult to detect, later known as stealth technology, were initially developed during World War II. Modern supersonic wings, which are thinner and flatter for increased speed and range, began to be made with heat-resistant materials. Materials such as titanium later began replacing aluminum, which melts at high speeds, using ideas initiated during World War II. Other notable German aerial warfare developments included the V-1 buzz bomb, a pilotless jet-propelled plane carrying 2,000 pounds of explosives, which flew against England in June, 1944. The V-2, a true guided missile capable of carrying 1,650 pounds of explosives more than 200 miles, was launched in September, 1944. These technologies arrived too late to have an impact on the final outcome of the war, but their designs set the stage for future military warcraft. Notable Battles and Flying Groups Air battles in the Pacific most notably included the June, 1942, Battle of Midway, a crucial victory for the U.S. carrier-based Navy. Battles for the
“Flying Tiger” P-40 fighter planes on an airfield in China in 1942. (National Archives)
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Gilbert Islands, the Marshall Islands, and the Mariana Islands were also monumental, as they later provided bases for air attacks upon Japan. Because Japan failed to develop a strong home air defense, the Boeing B-29 Superfortress caught that nation unprepared in late 1944 to detect bombers and coordinate army and navy maneuvers. On March 9, 1945, a massive raid on Tokyo, Japan, torched approximately 25 percent of the city’s buildings. On August 6, 1945, the U.S. B-29 Enola Gay dropped the first atomic bomb on the city of Hiroshima, three days later a second atomic bomb was dropped on the city of Nagasaki, after which Japan surrendered. The skills of the Flying Tigers, a United States Volunteer Group, were displayed in the China-Burma-India theater, following the Japanese conquest of Burma, later known as Myanmar. Supply flights from India to China over the Himalayas became as critical as combat flights, with bases in China later used to launch critical bombing operations against Japan. Casualties and Costs Advances in air warfare strongly contributed to making World War II the costliest military conflict in history, in terms of both human casualties and resources. An estimated 15 million to 20 million military personnel were killed in action, along with approximately 25 million civilians. Military deaths for the Axis Powers have been estimated at 3.5 million Germans, 1.5 million Japanese, and 200,000 Italians. Of the Allies, the Soviets lost an estimated 7.5 million military personnel, and China lost an estimated 2.2 million combatants from July, 1937, until the war’s end. Britain lost 300,000; the United States lost 292,000; and France lost 210,000. In terms of civilian casualties, the Soviet Union lost 10 million; China 6 million; France 400,000; Britain 65,000; and the United States 6,000. Of the Axis Powers, Germany lost 500,000 civilians; Japan lost 600,000; and Italy lost 145,000. Approximately 6 million Jews, most from Eastern Europe, died in Nazi death camps. Total expenditures for war materials is estimated at $1.154 trillion, with the United States spending $300 billion and Germany $231 billion. Long-Term Effects The Japanese surrender in 1945, which did not require a land invasion, indicated to many that future military encounters would ultimately be determined by the combatant that controlled the battlefield in the air. The tactical use of fighting aircraft continued to escalate immediately following World War II, with essentially all world governments developing military planes by the early 1950’s in response to the Cold War. Military air force strategies have since displayed disturbing trends, from the use of aircraft
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to prevent enemy movements and destroy enemy communications and supply lines to the doctrine of massive retaliation, whereby a country would not necessarily confine air strikes to local hostilities but would consider bombardment of civilian centers within enemy homelands. Notable battles in which the ultimate victor was determined by warcraft technology begun during World War II included those of the Korean War, in which American propeller-equipped planes were initially very effective. Later Korean air combats employing the F-80 and F-86 against the Soviet-built MiG-15 were notably the first aerial combats between opposing modern jet fighters. After spending the Korean War dodging the best in Soviet fighter technology in what became known as “MiG Alley,” the United States developed the world’s first supersonic fighting jet, the F-100 Super Sabre, in 1953. Another example was the 1967 Six-Day War between Israeli and Palestinian forces, which was essentially decided within the first three hours when Arab forces lost 452 aircraft. Ground warfare was also transformed forever by World War II aircraft developments. The widespread use of helicopters mounted with jet engines enabled enhanced speed and lift capacity to transport troops and supplies efficiently. Daniel G. Graetzer
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U.S. Supreme Court During the War Many U.S. actions during this war, especially on the home front, were affected by and interpreted by the Supreme Court. These actions include war-making powers, emergency powers, economic controls, and the internment of Japanese Americans, both resident aliens and U.S. citizens of Japanese descent. Late in the nineteenth century, Justice Stephen J. Field declared, “War seems to create—or leave unresolved—at least as many problems as it settles.” Issues are raised when a nation is at war that would never be raised during times of peace. World peace was shattered by the German invasion of Poland in 1939. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, the headquarters of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, on December 7, 1941, thrust the United States into its second world war within twenty-five years. A major U.S. objective in World War II was to preserve the principle of constitutional government. Ironically, parts of that principle had to be sacrificed in order to preserve the whole. During World War II, the wheels of U.S. government had to be streamlined as part of the war effort. Early in 1942, in a lecture at Cornell University, political scientist Robert Cushman outlined three changes that he believed would result from that streamlining. The first was the relationship between the states and the federal government, in which the states would lose. Second was the relationship between Congress and the president, in which Congress would lose. The last change would be the impact on civil liberties, where individual citizens would lose to strengthen the nation as a whole. Cushman’s predictions proved accurate, although surprisingly few of the changes rose to the need of a Supreme Court decision. War-Making Powers The Constitution carefully divides the war-making powers of Congress and of the president. Congress has the responsibility for raising and supporting military forces and the sole authority to declare war. The president is the commander in chief of all military forces and therefore has the authority to send them anywhere in the world. After President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Congress, on December 8, 1941, for a declaration of war against Japan, each branch carried out its constitutional responsibilities. One major issue involving war-making powers was the raising of military forces by involuntary means. Conscription was used during the Civil War and accepted as constitutional. However, during World War I, conscription was criticized as being involuntary servitude and therefore in vi-
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olation of the Thirteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court, in Butler v. Perry (1916) and in subsequent Selective Draft Law Cases (1918), differentiated between involuntary servitude and involuntary duty. In 1939, with war again raging in Europe, the possibility and constitutionality of a peacetime draft was discussed in the United States. By June, 1940, with France on the verge of collapse, eventual U.S. involvement in the war seemed certain. President Roosevelt did not want the nation caught unprepared as in 1917, but knowing that a peacetime draft would arouse strong opposition, especially with the inborn American fear of a strong government, he appointed a private citizen task force to develop a plan. The group was led by Grenville Clark, a highly respected law partner of Elihu Root (secretary of war, 1901-1904). The plan was implemented with surprisingly little opposition or refusal to register, as in 1917. The Court resolved, in Falbo v. United States (1944), an issue involving a conscientious objector who had failed to report for alternate civilian service as ordered. Falbo’s claim of ministerial exemption had been rejected by his draft board, but the Court refused to accept his appeal. Other draft-related problems, such as congressional expansion of the draft to include eighteen-year-olds, pre-Pearl Harbor fathers, and some farmworkers, the issue of African American soldiers in combat after D day in 1944, and interpretation of fair deferment standards, were all resolved without further Court action. A related issue of national
President Franklin D. Roosevelt signing the declaration of war against Japan on December 8, 1941. (National Archives)
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civilian service was raised by Clark and Roosevelt in 1944 but was rejected by Congress. Military courts also became an issue during the war. In Ex parte Quirin (1942), the Court ruled that a military commission had the right to try eight German saboteurs who were captured with explosives on beaches in New York and Florida six months after Pearl Harbor. The Court in In re Yamashita (1946) upheld the right of the military to condemn a Japanese officer for war crimes. However, in Duncan v. Kahanamoku (1946), the Court refused to extend the power of military courts to include civilian crimes not related to the war. Emergency Powers The Constitution does not make specific provisions for emergency powers to be used by the executive branch of government. However, an issue that arose during World War II was the presidential use of emergency or discretionary funds. In 1943 Congress passed the Urgent Deficiency Appropriations Act. Section 304 of that act, initiated by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, chaired by Representative Martin Dies (Democrat, Texas), suspended salary or compensation for three federal employees after November 15, 1943, unless by that date they were reappointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate. The named employees were Robert Morse Lovett, William E. Dodd, Jr., and Goodwin B. Watson. They were among thirty-nine federal employees attacked in a speech in the House by Representative Dies on February 1, 1943, as being “irresponsible, unrepresentative, crackpot radical bureaucrats” and affiliates of “communist front organizations.” Although the president did not reappoint Lovett, Dodd, and Watson, the agencies for which they worked kept them on the job after November 15, but without their salaries. The men later filed with the Court of Claims to recover their lost salaries on three grounds: that Congress has no power to remove executive employees, that section 304 violated Article I, section 9, clause 3, of the Constitution, which prohibits bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, and that it violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. In United States v. Lovett (1946), the Court ruled that section 304 was in fact a bill of attainder and thus in violation of the Constitution. Lovett, Dodd, and Watson were entitled to receive their salaries and compensation after November 15, 1943. Japanese American Internment After the United States declared war on Japan, President Roosevelt issued several executive orders that seriously affected the rights of any per-
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After losing his test case in the Supreme Court in 1944, Fred Korematsu continued to challenge the ruling until 1983, when the Court finally vacated its earlier decision because the government had suppressed evidence. Meanwhile, Korematsu became a prominent spokesperson for civil liberties and remained a sought-after lecturer into the twenty-first century. (Asia Week)
son of Japanese ancestry living in the United States, especially those living on the West Coast. The orders authorized the secretary of war to designate military areas within the United States and to limit individual rights in those areas. Congress soon ratified the president’s action by authorizing curfew orders to protect vital war resources. On March 24, 1942, in accordance with the orders, the military commander of the Western Defense Command, Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt, proclaimed the entire Pacific coast to be a military area and that all persons of Japanese descent must observe a curfew from 8:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. Gordon Kiyoshi Hirabayashi was an American citizen and a student at the University of Washington in Seattle. After he was convicted of violating the curfew, he appealed on the grounds that the executive orders and the power delegated to military authorities were in violation of the Fifth Amendment. His case, Hirabayashi v. United States reached the Court in 1943. The Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, unanimously upheld both the presidential orders and the curfew, basing the action on the great importance of the military installations on the West Coast and on the close ties that persons of Japanese descent had with their mother country. The decision viewed the curfew as a protective measure but did not answer the constitutional issues involved. Chief Justice Stone went so far as to say that racial discrimination was justified during times of war when applied to those who had ethnic affiliation with an invading enemy. Military authorities eventually decided that people of Japanese descent must be evacuated from the West Coast. When voluntary evacuation failed, a new presidential order created the War Relocation Authority,
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which was given the task of relocating one hundred thousand people. Fred Korematsu, from San Leandro, California, was arrested for refusing evacuation. The American Civil Liberties Union chose him as a test case for the constitutionality of the presidential order. Like Hirabayashi, Korematsu was a U.S. citizen. The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Hugo L. Black in 1944, decided Korematsu v. United States on the same basis as Hirabayashi’s case but this time without a unanimous decision. Justice Black stated that compulsory evacuation was constitutionally suspect but was justified by the national emergency. In a case related to Korematsu, Ex parte Endo (1944), Justice William O. Douglas ordered the release of a Japanese American whose loyalty was never questioned. He argued that congressional approval of the War Relocation Authority was not a blanket approval for every individual case. The Court treated the internment of people of Japanese ancestry as an exercise of the government’s emergency powers and appeared to regard the suspension of civil liberties as necessary in the interest of national security. Economic Controls Less than two months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Congress passed the Emergency Price Control Act in order to prevent inflation that would hinder the war effort. In Yakus v. United States (1944), the Court ruled only on the manner in which Congress should achieve its goal, not on the goal itself. The Court upheld the power given by the act to the administrator of the Office of Price Administration to fix maximum prices and rents for a limited period of time, stating that sufficient standards had been established by Congress to ensure the just application of the law. Similar issues relating to economic controls followed the same pattern. Glenn L. Swygart
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Women in the War World War II provided American women with their first major opportunity to serve their country in a military capacity, paving the way for expanded roles for women in succeeding decades. Although military service traditionally had been limited to men, the personnel demands of World War II spurred the U.S. military leadership to accept women in significant numbers. By 1943, women’s military branches had been established in all the services. A total of 350,000 women served in the U.S. Armed Forces during World War II. Although women were not permitted to serve in combat, many served with distinction, and some were counted among American war casualties. Women’s military service during the war altered perceptions about the capabilities of female soldiers and helped bring some specific women’s issues to the fore. The Women’s Corps The impetus for women’s corps in the United States began with the extension of the vote to women in 1920. Fearing extreme pacifism among the new female voters, the War Department (the forerunner of the Department of Defense) established a director of women’s relations, whose job was to bolster support for the U.S. military among women’s groups. Anita Phipps held the position throughout the 1920’s, during which time she developed a plan to create a women’s corps within the Army. The War Department was not amenable, and it was not until World War II was underway, and with the support of First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, that such a corps was finally authorized. Edith Nourse Rogers, a member of Congress and a longtime advocate of women’s military service, introduced a bill in 1941 to create a women’s Army auxiliary corps. The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, which brought the United States into the war, virtually ensured passage of the bill. In 1942, the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) was established. The following year, its auxiliary status was dropped, and it was placed under the direction of Oveta Culp Hobby. Members of the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) were uniformed servicewomen with full military status. The Navy established a women’s reserve and placed as its head Mildred McAfee, the president of Wellesley College; members of the Navy women’s reserve would be known as Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service (WAVES). The Coast Guard also established a women’s reserve, based on the acronym SPAR, from the Coast Guard motto “Sem-
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per Paratus—Always Ready.” The Marine Corps was less eager to take on women, but in 1943 it finally established a reserve for women, headed by Ruth Cheney Streeter; members of the Marine Corps Women’s Reserve were not given an official acronym, and thus were simply “marines.” Although the women’s corps represented a major advancement in the removal of barriers to women’s service, most jobs within the corps were clerical and secretarial. In effect, women in the military were taking office jobs from men, who thus were released to serve in combat assignments. Many women also were placed in nursing jobs or other traditional occupations for women. The most dramatic exception to the tendency of relegating women to office jobs were Women’s Airforce Service Pilots (WASPs). A severe shortage of pilots during the war spurred the Air Force to use female pilots in noncombat assignments. Between 1942 and 1944, more than a thousand women ferried warplanes, tested aircraft, and towed practice targets. By all accounts, these women performed exceptionally. Although never involved in battle, thirty-eight WASPs died in the line of duty. The leader of the WASPs, Jacqueline Cochran, resisted integration of her unit with the Women’s Army Corps, and thus her pilots retained civilian status. In an ex-
World War II was the first conflict in which women were encouraged to enlist in the military services in large numbers. (National Archives)
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As during World War I, thousands of American women—such as this aircraft riveter—assisted the war cause by working in armament factories. (National Archives)
ample of the changing attitudes that followed the military performance of women during the war, military status was retroactively granted to the WASPs in 1977. Impact The employment of women in the U.S. military during World War II was largely driven by need. This situation was not unique to the United States; other countries, notably Great Britain, Japan, and the Soviet Union, pressed women into more integral military assignments. Although women’s military assignments in the United States during the war generally were limited to support roles, the very entrance of women into military service had far-reaching effects on the military and society in general. The widespread inclusion of women forced a number of unspoken gender issues. In many ways, the U.S. military leadership—including its female officers—continued to impose a traditional cultural value system on women, expecting chastity, temperance, and otherwise “ladylike” language and behavior. Meanwhile, women in the military often were subjected to sexual harassment and intimidation. Double standards were evident throughout the armed forces. Pregnancy was frowned on and, if it occurred outside of wedlock, could lead to various official sanctions. At the same time, abortion was discouraged, and an illegal abortion could lead to a dishonorable discharge.
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Although the military contributions of women during the war were significant and recognized within the military leadership and society, some people disapproved of, and even actively opposed, women serving in military roles. Among the complaints were that women “feminized” the military, that military service “masculinized” women, and that the presence of women caused morale problems. Some people believed that any woman who would volunteer to serve in the military was a lesbian. These and similar charges reached a peak in a slander campaign against the WAC in late 1943 and early 1944. Charges (later to be deemed unfounded) surfaced that women’s official role in the military was primarily to improve troop morale, that the War Department was providing them with contraceptives, and that a high rate of lesbianism existed among female personnel. Many of these stories were traced to servicemen who resented the presence of women in the military. The friction, double standards, and clashing social conventions caused by the introduction of women into the military were addressed in a variety of ways, including compromises on an individual basis and some policy changes in the services. In the long run, these incidents created an awareness that various social customs were biased and outmoded, eventually leading to their demise. Most directly, women’s military service during World War II caused changes in the military itself. Women had proved that they have the strength, courage, and commitment to make tremendous sacrifices in defense of their country, and therefore that the military excluded their contributions to its own detriment. Indeed, by 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was prepared to draft women as nurses, but the war ended before such an action could take place. These developments started a long process of accepting women into all areas of military service. In 1948, the U.S. Congress passed the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act, which permanently opened all branches to women. For the next several decades, advancements in women’s military service would occur until women were even accepted in some combat roles. Steve D. Boilard
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Censorship During the War During this conflict censorship was extended beyond military security material to delete, minimize, or classify any news conceivably useful to an enemy or damaging to home front morale. During World War II, censorship became part of a broader attempt on the part of combatant nations to develop an effective overall news policy that, in addition to protecting military information from the enemy, would also serve to bolster civilian morale. News of military victories, of course, required little censorship, while defeats were normally ignored, then denied, then explained as unimportant. Depressing news was generally taboo in all belligerent, or warring, nations. Beyond such common factors, censorship varied from country to country. United States Censorship in the United States during the war avoided the heavyhanded bungling of World War I and caused relatively few media complaints. The war itself enjoyed broad public support, and antifascism was overwhelmingly endorsed by journalists, who wanted to be “on the team.” The public was less ideologically oriented, but after Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Americans were ready for extensive control of war news, including the Navy’s refusal to reveal its losses at Pearl Harbor. Under the War Powers Act of 1917, President Franklin D. Roosevelt named Byron Price on December 19, 1941, to head an Office of Censorship, which would develop guidelines for voluntary censorship by the producers of newspapers, magazines, radio shows, and films. Military plans, presidential trips overseas, intelligence operations, and new weapons (such as the atomic bomb) were secret, as were statistics concerning war production, shipping losses, and so on. The 1917 Espionage Act and the Trading with the Enemy Act were invoked to restrict use of the mails and to suppress, directly or otherwise, about thirty publications, most notably Father Coughlin’s Social Justice. An attempt to prosecute the Chicago Tribune for revealing intelligence secrets failed to gain a grand jury indictment. The 1940 Smith Act, making it illegal to advocate the overthrow of the American government, was used more to prosecute individuals—mostly communists—than to censor the media. Most of the sixteen thousand employees assigned to censorship-related matters spent their time reading letters to and from servicemen stationed overseas.
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A consistent theme in wartime propaganda on the homefront was the need for maintaining secrecy in any and all matters relating to the military and war industries. This 1942 poster suggests that an indiscrete remark by someone could have consequences as dire as the sinking of an Allied ship. (National Archives)
Broadly speaking, bad news in the media was discouraged, and the government gave the African American press a particularly hard time for its supposed insufficient enthusiasm in support of the war effort. In war reports, censors deleted or minimized news of units refusing to go into combat, officers’ cowardice, soldiers panicking or going AWOL, and casualties incurred from friendly fire, as well as of looting, black marketeering, rape, race riots, and mutiny. The tendency to sanitize the news obscured brutality and blunders and encouraged an ongoing tendency to “classify” inconvenient information. The American Civil Liberties Union reported in 1945 that “wartime censorship raised almost no issues in the United States.” Newsmen hailed what was widely called “the best reported war in history,” although some admitted that they didn’t always write the whole truth. Indeed, a Vietnamera journalist might well have been surprised at the military misconduct that did not get reported. United Kingdom The Emergency Powers (Defence) Bill approved on August 24, 1939, authorized the renewal of the censorship powers contained in the Defence of the Realm Acts of 1914 (DORA), apparently including many of DORA’s well remembered faults. A new Ministry of Information provided volun-
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tary censorship guidelines, but, with the outbreak of war, it was not clear who was in charge of releasing news. Ministry of Information censorship was largely entrusted to former navy officers whose instinct was to tell the public nothing and refer all problems to higher authorities, sometimes with incongruous results. American journalist John Gunther, for example, asking for a copy of a propaganda leaflet scattered by the millions in Royal Air Force flights over Germany, was informed that the government was not allowed to disclose information which might be of value to the enemy. The fall of France in 1940 prompted a new spirit. The British mythologized the “Dunkirk Miracle,” deleting from press reports all negative comments by returning troops. The tally of planes downed in the Battle of Britain was reported with a view to impressing public opinion in both Britain and neutral countries such as the United States. Making a favorable impression in America was considered to be worth security risks; Edward R. Murrow, for example, was allowed to do live and unscripted radio broadcasts critical of Britain during London air raids. On the other hand, any British public comments on the 1940 U.S. elections or the 1941 Lend-Lease Act were strictly forbidden. Among other countries, Canada was considered an especially important military and intelligence link with the United States, and the three countries often coordinated censorship operations. British military censorship was successful in controlling news of advances in radar, details of the Normandy invasion, and the invention of the atomic bomb. It was a remarkable achievement to develop an effective news management system during a period of military defeats. Some confidential material remained classified after 1945, not by wartime censorship but under the Official Secrets Act of 1911. France French censorship from 1939 to 1940 by the information ministry under Jean Giraudoux was a model of ineffective news management. Compared to news from Berlin, Paris wartime bulletins were invariably late, vague, and misleading. French censorship did protect military secrets from the enemy, but it also promoted ignorance and complacency about the state of the country’s defenses. From the debacle of 1940 to liberation in 1944, censorship in both occupied France, which was administered by Germany, and Vichy France, which was administered by a collaborationist French government, was under direct or indirect German control. The Soviet Union Czarist censorship, which ended in 1917, was soon followed by that of the communists, and under the dictatorship of Joseph Stalin there was am-
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ple information for the censors to keep from public view—devastating famines, crippling production shortages, the ruthless purge of military and political opponents, and so on. In any case, the purpose of the Soviet news media was less to provide information than to define correct opinions and attitudes. World War II did not constrict the scope of Soviet news but even slightly expanded it. The major problem facing Soviet news agencies during World War II was explaining why the unpreparedness, defeats, and casualties of 19411942 were not the fault of Stalin and the communist leadership. Censoring news about British and American war efforts made more plausible the emerging Stalinist interpretation that the British and Americans were covert partners in Adolf Hitler’s treachery—an international conspiracy of fascists and imperialists attacking the Soviet Union again, as it had in 1919. Censorship left Stalin’s leadership as the only hope of resistance. For the Soviet people, wanting to believe in victory meant having to believe in Stalin. China The struggle against Japanese aggression in World War II was complicated by the intense internal conflict between Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist party (Guomindang) and a rival offshoot, Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party. Between 1927 and 1937, as communist writers called for radical policies, the Guomindang censored or banned their books and articles and bribed, shot, or beheaded their editors. The Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) produced an official but uneasy truce between the Chinese rivals. In Chiang’s wartime capital of Chongqing, the communist activist Zhou Enlai supervised The New China Daily’s attacks on the Guomindang, while Nationalist officials tried to prevent the paper from being delivered. Even the Guomindang papers depended on left-wing writers who had to be censored. After 1945 the government’s obvious inability to control inflation, corruption, and inefficiency could not be disguised by censorship, and popular support as well as armed force brought the communists to power in 1949. Germany In 1933 Adolf Hitler appointed Joseph Goebbels minister of propaganda in order to gain and keep control of German thought and opinion. While it was deemed important to advertise the positive objectives of Nazism, it was also considered essential to conceal a great deal about Hitler’s character, associates, goals, and methods. A journalism law of October, 1933, systematized Goebbels’s approach.
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Censorship of foreign reporters kept the West from realizing the extent of antiwar sentiment in Germany during the West’s calamitous appeasement of Hitler at the Munich Conference in 1938. However, newsreels showing Nazi Brownshirts attacking Jewish shops and homes in the 1938 riots known as the Night of Broken Glass were allowed to leave Germany, as was a 1939 film of Hitler rudely mocking Roosevelt in a speech to the Reichstag. Censorship also surrounded the staged incident in 1939 which Hitler used as an excuse to invade Poland and start the war. German victories in 1939 and 1940 needed little censorship except to delete images of German dead from combat films. However, after the failure to take Moscow in 1941, soldiers’ letters home began to be censored, and newspapers were limited to a “quota” of obituaries for local soldiers. As the war progressed, reporting on shortages of food, coal, and other necessities had to be censored, as did accounts of Allied air raids. It was forbidden to report in the press on the extermination of the Jews and other victims of Nazi death camps. Nazi propaganda attempted to portray Germany’s defeat as a tragic misfortune for Hitler and to conceal his indifference to German suffering. After the war ended, many Germans still found it impossible to blame Hitler for the Nazis’ unspeakable crimes. Italy Statutes passed in 1923, the year after the Fascists seized power, proclaimed that “the press is free, but a law regulates the abuse thereof.” In practice, editors applied censorship according to government directives. The primary specific goal was to present dictator Benito Mussolini as a great and infallible leader and conceal his many shortcomings and failures. Censorship helped to glamorize the conquest of Ethiopia in 1935-1936, minimize Italian defeats from 1936 to 1939 in the Spanish Civil War, and conceal Mussolini’s mismanagement of the supposed conquest of Albania in 1939. However, after Italy entered World War II, the military’s many failures—France in 1940, Greece in 1941, and the campaign against the British and Americans from 1941 to 1943—were impossible to hide from the Italian people. Censorship served only to further weaken confidence in Mussolini, who was ousted from power in 1943, prior to Italy’s surrender. Japan Imperial Japan’s traditionally nationalistic and authoritarian society favored unity rather than the ideological divisions encouraged by a free press. A government agency dictated which news would be available to the press. Censorship in the form of “token suppression” or jailing “token editors” in the 1920’s became stricter as Japan’s expansion into China be-
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came an undeclared war in 1937. The National Mobilization Law of February, 1941, tightened secrecy and censorship rules, assisting preparations for the December 7 attack on the U.S. Navy base at Pearl Harbor. As war extended the Japanese Empire, propaganda and censorship, usually in English, were aimed at conquered peoples. The main attempts at thought control, however, were directed at the Japanese people themselves. Victory depended on loyalty and obedience to the hierarchy of authority in Japanese life—neighborhood groups, local officials, national leaders, and the emperor. The censors’ task was to exclude ideas that might challenge this pattern of united action. Following the war, Japan eventually lifted censorship on such topics as its wartime biological warfare research program, which was continued as a highly classified project by the U.S. armed forces. As the secret weapon changed hands, it was protected by a new shield of censorship. K. Fred Gillum
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Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events August, 1939 Mobilization for Possible War Date: Beginning August, 1939 Location: United States Principal figures: President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945); Secretary of the Treasury Henry J. Morgenthau, Jr. (1891-1967); James Francis Byrnes (1879-1972), director of the Office of Economic Stabilization; William Martin Jeffers (1876-1953), head of the Government Rubber Board; William Signius Knudsen (1879-1948), head of the Office of Production Management; Emory Scott Land (1879-1971), head of the U.S. Maritime Commission; Donald Marr Nelson (1888-1959), head of the War Production Board; Senator Harry S. Truman (1884-1972) Result: The prospect of American involvement in the war developing in Europe and East Asia prompted conversion of domestic production to meet military needs. In June, 1940, German forces overran France. U.S. industrial mobilization became necessary when large British orders for military supplies were received. European events also aided the Roosevelt administration in passing a number of military appropriations bills. Although more money was becoming available for war production, U.S. industry was reluctant to exploit this market. Conditioned by the static economic situation of the Depression, many capitalists expected such conditions to return after the war. Expanding plants for wartime production was seen as a risky, shortterm investment. The Roosevelt administration tried in various ways to persuade industrialists that this was not true. The federal government offered to finance expansion through low-interest loans from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The Revenue Act of 1940 provided an incentive in the form of a 20 percent per year depreciation of new defense plants, instead of the former 5 percent tax write-off. Most important, however, was the “cost-plus” provision incorporated into government defense
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contracts. Private industry was guaranteed the cost of producing particular military hardware, plus a profit of a certain percentage of the cost. This plan proved lucrative to industry but led to excessive waste in production. Eventually, Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri led a special investigation into the waste and corruption in defense work, the revelations of which resulted in improved efficiency. Centralizing Control Roosevelt wrestled desperately with the problem of centralizing control of industrial mobilization. Drawing upon his experiences during World War I, he first established a War Resources Board (WRB) in August, 1939. The WRB drew up a plan of mobilization providing for rigid government controls. Roosevelt rejected this plan for political and personal reasons and permitted the WRB to be dissolved in October, 1939, after organized labor accused it of being prejudiced in favor of big business. A pattern of establishing an agency with a vague mandate and then reorganizing it when its attempts to operate provoked criticism was repeated during succeeding years. The next attempt at central direction was the establishment of the National Defense Advisory Commission on May 28, 1940. Composed of representatives of labor, industry, the armed services, and the consuming public, the commission was under the direction of a former General Motors executive, William S. Knudsen. Knudsen was expected to balance these various interests. The most vexing problem was the assignment of priorities to the various manufacturers for the acquisition of scarce materials. Ideally, such materials ought to have gone to factories in proportion to the relative importance of their finished products to the health of the economy as a whole. Knudsen never solved this problem but permitted the ArmyNavy Munitions Board to gain great power in acquiring scarce materials. On January 7, 1941, Roosevelt tried another reorganization. The Office of Production Management (OPM) was set up, with Knudsen and Sidney Hillman of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) as joint directors. The OPM did succeed in beginning the shift toward a war economy, but it placed strains on domestic needs and shortages developed in the electric power, aluminum, steel, and railroad equipment industries. By August 28, 1941, Roosevelt was ready for another change. At first, a slight adjustment was made by creating a Supplies Priorities and Allocation Board headed by Sears Roebuck executive Donald M. Nelson. Within a few months, the OPM had gone the way of the WRB, and Nelson was called to the White House to head an entirely new organization, the War Production Board (WPB).
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The War Production Board Established on January 16, 1942, the WPB was to have supreme command over the entire economy. Nelson, however, proved inadequate for the job; he permitted the military to regain control over priorities and seemed to favor big corporations in the allocation of contracts. He also permitted the economy to develop unevenly. Ship factories were built at a pace far exceeding the ability of the steel industry to supply material for ship construction. Nelson remained as head of the WPB until 1944, but long before then control of economic mobilization had been assigned to yet another agency. Recognizing that problems were developing under the WPB, Roosevelt asked Supreme Court associate justice James F. Byrnes to head the new Office of Economic Stabilization (OES). This new office replaced the WPB as supreme arbiter of the economy. Byrnes did solve the problems of priorities and brought order to the entire mobilization scheme. He seemed to have the political astuteness required to make the OES work. In May, 1943, his agency’s official title was changed to Office of War Mobilization, and in October, 1944, it became the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. Despite such frequent reorganization of the government’s regulatory bodies, U.S. industry performed fantastic feats of production during the war years. Statistics tell part of the story. In 1941, the United States produced approximately eight and one-half billion dollars’ worth of military equipment. Using the same dollar value, in 1944 the sum was sixty billion dollars. Included in these gross figures was an increase in the annual production of planes from 5,865 in 1939 to almost 100,000 in 1944. Ship tonnage rose from one million tons in 1941 to nineteen million in 1943. Certain parts of the economy performed miracles. As public director of WPB, William M. Jeffers, president of the Union Pacific Railroad, directed the creation of a great synthetic rubber industry; Admiral Emory S. Land, head of the United States Maritime Commission, prodded the shipping industry into building ships in fewer than ten days; comparable production feats were achieved by other industries. Economic Impact Probably most significant in the long run was the fact that this remarkable production was accomplished with little effect on the basic corporate structure of the economy. Shortages existed in the civilian community during World War II, and rationing was introduced for foodstuffs, including meat and sugar. While restraints were imposed on free enterprise, outright government seizure of private industry was never attempted. For the most
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A young boy presents his family’s ration book while making a grocery purchase. Individual consumer goods were assigned point values, and the books were used to keep track of the points that each family expended. (National Archives)
part, government gave businessmen exceptional latitude in what they could produce and how, as long as it met national goals. The government let contracts for a wide variety of experimental or unusual projects, such as the famous Spruce Goose developed by Howard Hughes’s engineers. Government allowed exceptional industrialists, such as Andrew Jackson Higgins, Preston Tucker, and Henry Kaiser, to mass-produce patrol torpedo (PT) boats and landing craft, gun turrets, and ships with little interference and with almost no concern for cost. Kaiser, for example, cut the production time of a Liberty Ship (a basic freighter crucial to the war effort) from 120 days to 4.5 days. As British historian Paul Johnson observed, the war “put back on his pedestal the American capitalist folk-hero.” The efforts of the War Production Board also involved businesses in planning future economic activities more than ever before, and persuaded many that government could and should play a role in that planning. The size of government has never returned to its pre-Depression levels, and only in the administration of Ronald Reagan did the military share of the gross national product remain at less than 6 percent for more than a year.
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Ironically, many business leaders took from the war the exact opposite message from what it had taught. Rather than reaffirming the phenomenal productive capacity of the United States, business left the war expecting special favors and government considerations. George Q. Flynn updated by Larry Schweikart
September, 1939-May, 1945 Battle of the North Atlantic Date: September 3, 1939-May 4, 1945 Location: North Atlantic ocean Combatants: Primarily German submarines vs. Allied surface vessels and aircraft Principal commanders: German, Admiral Karl Dönitz (1891-1980); American, Ernest King (1878-1956) Result: Eventual decisive victory for Allied forces. The Battle of the North Atlantic began on September 3, 1939, with the sinking of the British liner Athenia by the German submarine U-30. At the time, neither side was prepared for what was to follow. Germany had only fiftysix operational submarines of which only twenty-two were suited for service in the Atlantic Ocean. The British did not attach a high priority to planning and equipment for antisubmarine warfare, thinking that they could improvise at the outbreak of hostilities. At the outset of the war, the Germans sought to impose a submarine blockade of all British ports. This proved not to be the best strategy. The commander of U-boats, Admiral Karl Dönitz, was soon convinced that operating in coastal waters made the U-boats too vulnerable to land-based aircraft and that they should instead concentrate in the mid-Atlantic, which was out of reach for most aircraft at that time. In this first phase, Uboats operated singly rather than as a group. However, the Allies, including the U.S. Navy under Ernest King, soon organized a convoy system, and the Germans adapted by attacking in groups called wolfpacks. Dönitz calculated that sinking a monthly average of 800,000 tons of shipping would cripple the British war effort and bring about its capitulation. Without merchant shipping, the British could neither eat, run their industries, nor continue fighting. In the early years of the war, losses of mer-
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chant ships exceeded the rate of ship production by a 2-1 margin. It was not until August, 1942, that ship production balanced the losses. By April, 1943, more than 400 U-boats were in service, and victory in the Atlantic was almost achieved by the Germans. Abruptly, however, the tide of battle turned. The Allies were able to close the gap and provide air cover the entire width of the Atlantic. Improved radar enabled the Allies to pinpoint the location of German submarines after only a brief radio transmission. The United States was constructing merchant ships at a rate far exceeding losses. More than 2,500 of these wartime merchant vessels known as Liberty ships were built in American shipyards. In May, 1943, the Germans lost thirty-five submarines with only 96,000 tons of shipping to show for it. It was now clear that it was pointless to send submarines into the North Atlantic to attack shipping as the losses would exceed any reasonable return. Dönitz temporarily withdrew Uboats from the North Atlantic and used them in other locations where they would not be so vulnerable. The U-boats were returned to the Atlantic, but their main function became to slow and harass Allied shipping and force the Allies to continue devoting resources to an antisubmarine campaign, thus preventing these resources from being used elsewhere. The end came on May 4, 1945, when Dönitz sent a radio signal to all U-boats to stop all hostile action against Allied shipping. The battle was costly to both sides. During the course of the war, the Allies lost more than 2,600 ships. More than 30,000 merchant seaman and supporting naval personnel lost their lives. The Germans lost more than 750 U-boats, which amounted to more than 85 percent of all operational boats. Of the approximate 40,000 who served as U-boat crewmen, 27,491 died in action. Winning the Battle of the North Atlantic was essential for an Allied victory. Britain could not be sustained nor could offensive operations be undertaken on the European continent without control of the North Atlantic. Gilbert T. Cave
March, 1941 Lend-Lease Act Date: March 11, 1941 Location: Washington, D.C. Principal figures: Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill (1874-1965), President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945)
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Result: Before the United States became formally involved in the war, it used the lend-lease program to support Great Britain’s war effort while maintaining official neutrality. Germany’s invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, plunged Europe into a second major war within twenty-five years—a war that would prove to be the worst in human history. As in the beginning of World War I, the United States hoped to remain neutral, although popular sentiment weighed heavily toward Great Britain and France. With memories of World War I still fresh in the minds of most Americans, isolationist views prevailed. For six years prior to Germany’s move against Poland, the United States watched developments in Europe with concern. Adolf Hitler, whose Nazi Party governed Germany, made no attempt to conceal his intentions to break with the Treaty of Versailles, rearm Germany, and expand Nazi control throughout Europe. At the same time, Italy’s Benito Mussolini advanced aggressively against Ethiopia, and Japan continued military operations in China. Neutrality Laws Keenly aware of these developments, the U.S. Congress in 1935 legislated the first in a series of neutrality laws. A six-month renewable act, the legislation prohibited the United States from selling arms or transporting munitions to belligerent (warring) nations. When it was renewed, a ban against making loans to warring nations was included. Congress and the president believed such a foreign policy would prevent the United States from slipping into another European war, should one arise. The following year, developments in Europe proved peace to be but an illusion. Hitler’s forces moved unopposed into the Rhineland, a French territory; in 1937, Germany involved itself in the Spanish Civil War and sealed the Rome-Berlin alliance. The United States responded with the Neutrality Act of 1937, which retained the principal features of the 1935 act but, at Roosevelt’s urging, allowed presidential discretion to sell military goods to belligerents on a “cash and carry” basis, provided the material was not transported on U.S. ships. The altered policy pleased manufacturers who wanted to profit while the nation remained officially neutral and apart from the European crisis. The new policy also pleased those in the United States who thought it essential to aid the country’s traditional allies. Germany’s expansion continued, and in his state of the union address, on January 4, 1939, President Roosevelt announced his dismay over the course of European affairs and his dissatisfaction with existing neutrality
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laws. He believed that the 1937 act benefited Hitler more than it did France or Great Britain. If Hitler’s enemies were unable to acquire sufficient material for defense, Germany would find the Western nations unable to halt German aggression. Surely, the president hinted, the United States could devise methods short of war to aid British and French military defense preparations. Answering Britain’s Appeal Early that summer, the British government made a direct appeal to Roosevelt for military supplies, and in June, the president suggested revision of the Neutrality Act of 1937 to broaden the cash-and-carry provision. Fearful that such a program of support for Great Britain would cast the United States in an image of cobelligerent, isolationists in Congress blocked Roosevelt’s efforts. Germany’s invasion of Poland on September 1, and the British-French declaration of war that followed, changed the congressional mood. By year’s end, revisions to the 1937 act were sanctioned, making it easier for Britain to obtain needed supplies. France fell to the Germans in June, 1940. Great Britain was the sole surviving power in Europe. Many thought that the United States should provide direct military aid to the British, the U.S. front line against Germany. If Britain collapsed, the United States would become Hitler’s next target. Others contended that the United States needed to strengthen its own defenses in preparation for German actions in the Western Hemisphere. Roosevelt chose to follow both courses. He gained approval from Congress to appropriate funds for U.S. rearmament and for a peacetime compulsory military training law. In June, using executive authority, Roosevelt authorized the supply of outdated aircraft and rifles to Great Britain; in September, he arranged with Britain the exchange of fifty U.S. naval destroyers for leases of British naval bases. Great Britain’s financial reserves dwindled as autumn faded. In December, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill informed Roosevelt that the cashand-carry system needed modification. Roosevelt understood that Great Britain could not withstand further German attacks without direct U.S. aid and that the security of the United States was largely dependent on British resistance to Hitler. In mid-December, Roosevelt conceived the idea of lend-lease: War goods would be provided to Allied nations and either returned or paid for at war’s end. In both a press conference and a radio “fireside chat,” Roosevelt stated that the best defense for the United States was a strong Great Britain. Every step short of war should be taken to help the British Empire defend itself. Great Britain’s inability to pay cash for U.S. supplies should not relegate
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the empire to German conquest. To lend or lease the necessary goods would provide for Great Britain’s immediate war needs and indirectly benefit the United States by making Great Britain the U.S. front line of defense. Roosevelt presented an analogy to clarify the proposal: “Suppose my neighbor’s home catches fire, and I have a length of garden hose four hundred or five hundred feet away. If he can take my garden hose and connect it up with his hydrant, I may help him to put out his fire.” If the hose survived the fire, it would be returned. Should it be damaged, the neighbor would replace it. Military aid would be treated in the same way. The United States must become the “arsenal of democracy” and provide the goods necessary to halt German expansion. The Lend-Lease Bill To secure permission and funding to aid Great Britain, Roosevelt introduced into the House of Representatives the lend-lease bill. The bill generated intense debate. Opponents said the measure would move the United States from neutrality to the status of active nonbelligerent and risk war with Germany. They believed that it would be more logical to plan to build up the U.S. defenses. Supporters argued that Hitler posed a real, direct threat to the United States, and that aiding Great Britain would make U.S. entry into the war less likely. Public opinion favored the president. Although 82 percent of Americans believed war was inevitable, nearly 80 percent opposed entry unless the nation were directly attacked. After two months of congressional debate, the Lend-Lease Act was passed on March 11, 1941. It permitted the president to lend or lease war materiel to any nation whose defense was deemed critical to the United States, and it authorized an immediate appropriation of seven billion dollars for Great Britain. In June, following Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union, Roosevelt extended lend-lease to the Soviet Union. The Lend-Lease Act retained official U.S. neutrality, but the measure also placed the United States more squarely in opposition to Nazi Germany. In March, 1941, the United States teetered on the brink of war. By war’s end, in 1945, the United States appropriated slightly more than fifty billion dollars under the lend-lease program. Great Britain received twenty-seven billion dollars in aid, the Soviet Union was provided ten billion dollars, and the remaining funds supplied goods to other Allied nations. Roosevelt’s contemporaries and postwar scholars have questioned the president’s prewar direction of U.S. policy, particularly with regard to lend-lease. Some have argued that Roosevelt desperately wanted U.S. entry into the war long before Pearl Harbor but was restrained by popular
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opinion and political realities. Therefore, they argue, Roosevelt worked within the system to place the United States on an ever-advancing course toward war by molding public opinion, relaxing neutrality laws, and securing lend-lease. Others contend the president hoped to avoid intervention in Europe’s war. Lend-lease thus was a practical method for the United States to aid the Allies while remaining a nonbelligerent. Regardless of Roosevelt’s motives, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, sealed U.S. fate. War came to the United States. Kenneth William Townsend
December, 1941 Battle of Pearl Harbor Date: December 7, 1941 Location: Pearl Harbor, Oahu, Hawaiian Islands Combatants: Japanese First Air Fleet vs. U.S. Pacific Fleet and U.S. Army, Hawaiian Department Principal commanders: U.S. Navy, Admiral Husband Edward Kimmel (1882-1968); U.S. Army, Lieutenant General Walter C. Short (1880-1949); Japan, Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo (1886-1944), Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (1884-1943) Result: Japan’s surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet forced U.S. entry into World War II. The surprise attack by Japanese naval air forces upon the huge United States naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, has become synonymous with duplicity and cunning. Nevertheless, the circumstances of the attack engendered bitter controversy over the reasons for the failure of U.S. leaders to anticipate and to defend themselves against this devastating blow. Background In retrospect, Pearl Harbor can be explained without recourse to a “devil theory of war”—that Japan, unprovoked by the United States, deliberately and wantonly struck the Navy’s Pacific command center. Given the Japanese military and political situation and the dictates of Japanese strategic thinking, the attack was the logical result of a series of confrontations between Japan and the United States. Although U.S. interest was focused primarily on Europe between 1939 and 1941, events in the Far East aroused
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increasing concern in Washington, D.C., as Japan carried forth its ambitious creation of a Japanese-dominated Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which championed “Asia for Asians.” Much of China had fallen under Japanese control by 1939. Japan officially became an Axis Power in September, 1940, with the signing of the Tripartite Pact—a “defensive” alliance among Germany, Italy, and Japan. By the summer of 1941, Japan had gained concessions in Indochina and was threatening to engulf Thailand, the Soviet Union’s Siberian provinces, the British bastion of Singapore, Burma, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines. The United States opposed this Japanese expansion primarily with economic sanctions. Throughout the 1930’s, as Japan seized Manchuria and moved against China, the United States proved unable or unwilling to oppose Japan by force. Although sympathetic toward China, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was more concerned about Germany than about Japan. Supported by Navy spokesmen who feared that a two-ocean war would lead the United States to disaster, Roosevelt adopted a policy of caution toward Japanese expansion in the hope that liberal Japanese leaders would wrest power from the more militant imperialists and reverse Japan’s course. Despite British and Dutch pressure, the United States was slow to accept the necessity of economic sanctions until August, 1940, when Roosevelt imposed an embargo on aviation gasoline. Restrictions on the export of scrap iron and steel followed in September, 1940, and Japanese assets in the United States were frozen in July, 1941. Japanese leaders, almost all of whom supported the program of expansion and differed only on how it should be accomplished, came to believe that Japan was being encircled by the Western powers. If Japanese demands were not achieved by diplomacy, military force would become necessary. Economic sanctions by the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands—especially the embargo—meant that Japan had to choose between peace and war within a year, before its oil reserves were exhausted. In July, 1941, an advance into Southeast Asia for oil and other resources was approved by the Japanese Imperial Council, even if it meant war with the United States. On September 6, an Imperial Conference set what amounted to a time limit on diplomatic efforts for the settlement of negotiations with the United States. Negotiations continued, with neither side offering concessions. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull were pessimistic but believed that discussions should continue, in order that the United States might gain time for defense preparations. Meanwhile, Army and Navy intelligence at Pearl Harbor and in Washington, D.C., learned that Japan might be planning to mount a surprise attack, but the evidence was fragmentary. U.S. military planners knew from
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intercepted messages that things would happen automatically if the U.S. rejected a final Japanese proposal, but most indications pointed to an attack somewhere in Southeast Asia. Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura of Japan presented to Hull what was to be the final Japanese proposal for peace on November 10. Hull declared it unacceptable and on November 26 made a counteroffer, which he knew from intercepted Japanese messages would be rejected. Diplomacy proved futile. On Sunday, December 7, while Japanese planes were making their bomb runs over Pearl Harbor, a Japanese diplomatic note was handed to the secretary of state; it implied disruption of relations, but it was not a declaration of war. Japanese Preparations Japan’s preparations for the attack on Pearl Harbor had begun with tactical planning in the early months of 1941. Japanese strategists recognized that an advance into Southeast Asia would likely generate a U.S. military response. Destruction of the United States Pacific Fleet based in Hawaii was essential if Japan’s move into the region was to succeed. A daring plan by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto to destroy or cripple the fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbor was at first considered impractical, if not suicidal, but the proposal was later accepted when table-top games proved it workable and Yamamoto exerted his powerful influence in favor of it. Pilots began training in September, and all objections were overcome. To cope with the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor, wooden-finned torpedoes were devised, together with a new method of delivering them on target; elaborate precautions were undertaken to preserve secrecy; and abundant intelligence was gathered concerning the movements of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Under the command of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, a special task force of thirty-one vessels, including six aircraft carriers that carried 432 airplanes—fighters, dive-bombers, high-level attack bombers, and torpedo planes—left Japanese ports in early November. On November 22, this force gathered in the Southern Kuriles. Four days later, it headed out to sea for a run of 3,500 miles to a rendezvous point 275 miles north of Pearl Harbor. The strike force was not to attack until final clearance for action was issued from the Japanese high command. On December 2, the signal “Climb Mount Niitaka” was received by Nagumo and the date of attack confirmed. Early on December 7, the strike force reached position, so that the first Japanese planes were flying over Pearl Harbor by 7:55 a.m., local time. The Attack The weather was ideal for an attack, and Pearl Harbor was caught totally unprepared. The blow was deliberately planned for Sunday morning,
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Japanese sailors give an enthusiastic sendoff to planes taking off from an aircraft carrier before the attack on Pearl Harbor. (National Archives)
when the ships of the Pacific Fleet were moored in perfect alignment and their crews were ashore, having breakfast, or relaxing on board ship. There was no advance warning in Hawaii. An operator at a temporary U.S. radar post observed the oncoming Japanese squadrons at 7:02 a.m.; he reported the blips shown on the radar screen, but the watch officer did not pass on the information, thinking they were a group of U.S. bombers expected to arrive that morning from the West Coast. The Japanese planes swooped to the attack. Fighters and dive-bombers strafed and bombed the neat rows of aircraft at Wheeler Field and the Naval Air Station. Torpedo planes and dive-bombers also attacked Battleship Row in the devastating first phase, which lasted thirty minutes. After a fifteen-minute lull, the Japanese launched high-level bombing attacks on the harbor, airfields, and shore installations, followed by more attacks by dive-bombers, which pressed through mounting antiaircraft fire. The last planes withdrew at 9:45 a.m., less than two hours after the attack had begun. They left behind a scene of destruction and carnage without parallel in U.S. history. Casualties were 2,403 dead and 1,178 wounded. Three battleships—the West Virginia, Arizona, and California—were sunk; the Oklahoma lay capsized; and the Tennessee, Nevada, Maryland, and Pennsylvania suffered varying degrees of damage. Several smaller warships were sunk, and
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The destroyer USS Shaw explodes after its forward magazines are hit by bombs. Although the ship sustained heavy fire damage and lost its entire bow, it remained afloat the next day. (National Archives)
others were seriously crippled. Almost all combat aircraft on the islands were damaged or destroyed. Twenty-nine Japanese airplanes were lost, along with one full-sized submarine and five midget submarines. Recovery The U.S. forces in Hawaii fought courageously and recovered quickly from their initial shock. However, they were tragically unprepared to repel the skillful blows rained down by the Japanese strike force. The Japanese were successful far beyond the expectations of their high command; the United States Pacific Fleet lay grievously wounded and would not, Japan believed, be able to undertake offensive operations for months. The attack failed, however, in two particulars. First, the Japanese missed their prime targets: the aircraft carriers Lexington and Enterprise (both of which were at sea), and Saratoga (which was in dry dock on the West Coast). Second, the Japanese failed to destroy the huge oil storage facilities, without which the Pacific Fleet would have been forced to retire to the West Coast. While historical debate continues regarding the necessity of the attack for Japan and
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the lack of U.S. preparedness, the Pearl Harbor attack unified the U.S. people and eliminated whatever isolationist sentiment still existed in 1941. Within a few days, the United States was at war with Japan, and, because of the Tripartite Pact, with Germany as well. Theodore A. Wilson updated by Kenneth William Townsend
December, 1941 Axis Declaration of War on the United States Date: December 11, 1941 Location: Berlin, Rome, and Washington, D.C. Principal figures: Chancellor Adolf Hitler (1889-1945), Benito Mussolini (1883-1945), President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945) Result: By declaring war on the United States, Germany and Italy transformed the Pacific and European conflicts into a single global war. On December 11, 1941, four days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the governments of Germany and Italy issued declarations of war against the United States of America. Although both the Germans and the Italians had pledged Japan their aid in the event of a conflict between Japan and the United States, their declarations cited President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s anti-Axis attitude and hostile U.S. actions as reasons for their decision to declare war. In response, Congress passed two joint resolutions affirming a state of war against Germany and Italy. With these events, the war in Europe and the war in the Far East merged to become World War II. American Neutrality That the United States would become involved in a war in Europe seemed highly unlikely from 1936 to 1940, because during these years, the U.S. government and people were strongly isolationist. Moreover, Nazi Germany was preoccupied in Europe and not primarily interested in the Western Hemisphere. Although most Americans were opposed to Benito Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia, the United States government did no more than invoke the first Neutrality Act, which included an arms embargo designed to weaken Italy. By 1936, it became clear that Germany and Italy were bent on territorial revisions. The Rome-Berlin Axis was formed in 1936, and Japan joined Germany and Italy in the Anti- Comintern Pact in
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1937. In response, the United States government extended the Neutrality Act in 1937. Despite their desire to stay out of war, President Roosevelt and his advisers grew increasingly concerned about the dangers of foreign aggression and human rights violations in both Europe and the Far East during the last years of the 1930’s. In November, 1938, Roosevelt responded to the German riots against Jews during Kristallnacht (literally, “night of broken glass”) by replacing the U.S. ambassador in Berlin with a chargé d’affaires; in April, 1939, the president sent letters to Adolf Hitler and Mussolini asking for assurances that they would refrain from aggression and suggesting discussions on armaments reductions. Hitler’s invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, increased the Roosevelt administration’s belief that Germany posed a real threat to U.S. security. France’s Fall The year 1940 marked a turning point in U.S. foreign policy. The fall of France seriously alerted people in the United States to the might of Nazi Germany, while England’s dogged resistance to Hitler, exemplified in the Battle of Britain, resulted in increased U.S. aid to the English. During the last six months of 1940, the United States responded to the German Blitz-
Benito Mussolini (left) and Adolf Hitler in Munich in 1940. (National Archives)
December, 1941: Axis Declaration of War on the U.S.
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German troops marching through Warsaw shortly after invading Poland in September, 1939. (National Archives)
krieg in Europe with billions of dollars for defense, destroyers for England, and the first peacetime Selective Service Act in U.S. history. In addition, Roosevelt, after winning an unprecedented third term in office in November, 1940, proclaimed the United States “the great arsenal of democracy” and announced his intention to secure congressional approval of a LendLease Act to aid all countries fighting to preserve freedom. During 1941, the United States inched ever closer to war with Germany. In January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. armed forces met with their British counterparts and discussed how to coordinate military actions in the event of U.S. entry into the war. It was decided that the defeat of Germany should be given top priority. On March 11, the U.S. Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act, authorizing Roosevelt to provide arms, equipment, and supplies to “any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States.” In a speech on May 27, Roosevelt stressed the German danger to the Western Hemisphere and declared a state of
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national emergency. In August, Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston S. Churchill issued the Atlantic Charter against the Axis Powers. Serious naval incidents occurred in September and October, when German submarines torpedoed the U.S. destroyer Greer and sank the Reuben James. In November, the president extended lend-lease to the Soviet Union, which had been attacked by Germany on June 22, while Congress modified the Neutrality Act to permit the arming of U.S. merchant ships. It is clear that by the fall of 1941, Roosevelt believed Germany was bent on world domination, was a great threat to the Western Hemisphere, and that war was a strong possibility. German Intentions In spite of the increased U.S. presence in the European conflict, the ultimate initiative for war lay with Germany and its ally Japan. By 1941, Hitler, who had first mentioned the possibility of a conflict with the United States in his 1928 unpublished sequel to Mein Kampf (1925-1927), clearly intended to wage war against the United States at some undetermined point in the future. Hitler believed the United States was culturally and racially decadent and underestimated its industrial capacity and willingness and ability to fight a war. In this connection, he was impressed by the strength of U.S. isolationism. Thus, unlike many German diplomats, Hitler failed to grasp the implications of U.S. power. Hitler’s contempt for the United States turned to hostility when Roosevelt expressed his opposition to Nazi totalitarianism and aided Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Despite Hitler’s intention to fight, Germany developed no military plans. The Nazi dictator wanted to postpone war with Washington until Germany could construct a navy large enough to win what would certainly be a naval conflict. Consequently, Hitler ordered the German navy to avoid any incidents with U.S. ships in the Atlantic that might bring on war sooner than desired. Nevertheless, incidents did occur, the result being that an undeclared, limited naval war between the United States and Germany existed by the autumn of 1941. Germany’s caution in the Atlantic was offset by a reckless support of Japanese ambitions in the Far East. Hoping that the Japanese would exacerbate Great Britain’s already difficult position and help check the United States commitment to Europe, Hitler began in 1940 to urge Tokyo to expand into southeast Asia. To encourage the Japanese, the Nazi dictator and Mussolini entered into a defense mutual assistance agreement, the Tripartite Pact, with Japan on September 27, 1940. Six months later, on April 4, 1941, the Nazi dictator went further, assuring Japan of his full support in the event of a Japanese-American war, no matter who was the aggressor.
December, 1941-April, 1942: Bataan
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Pearl Harbor The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor came as a surprise to both Hitler and Mussolini. Believing that Japan would weaken the British, Soviet, and U.S. war efforts, the Nazi dictator decided the time had come for war with the United States. Hitler took the initiative for this conflict, ordering all-out submarine attacks on U.S. ships and, along with his Italian ally, declaring war on the United States. In declaring war on the United States at a time when Axis military forces found themselves bogged down in the Soviet Union and under attack by the British in North Africa, Hitler and Mussolini may have made the worst blunder of their careers. When the Nazi dictator said that his declaration of war on the United States would be “decisive not only for the history of Germany, but for the whole of Europe and indeed for the world,” he was right. With their declaration of war, Germany and Italy not only unleashed a global war but also went a long way toward guaranteeing their own ultimate defeat and the postwar superpower ascendancy of the United States. Leon Stein updated by Bruce J. DeHart
December, 1941-April, 1942 Battle of Bataan Date: December, 1941-April, 1942 Location: Bataan Peninsula in Luzon, Philippines Combatants: 80,000 American and Filipino troops vs. 43,000 Japanese troops Principal commanders: American-Filipino, General Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964); Japanese, General Masaharu Homma (1887-1946) Result: A Japanese victory that was a major step in Japan’s conquest of the Philippines. Japanese landings on Luzon in late December, 1941, forced General Douglas MacArthur to withdraw to Bataan and Corregidor Island. By January 6, 1942, more than 80,000 Americans and Filipinos had retreated to the jungles and mountains of the rugged peninsula. Fierce Japanese attacks, amphibious assaults along the west coast, and numerous infiltration operations pushed the defenders back until they es-
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American prisoners carrying their disabled comrades on the “Death March” from Bataan in May, 1942. (National Archives)
tablished a solid defensive line on January 26. With both armies exhausted, a two-month stalemate developed. Severe shortages of all supplies, especially food and medicine, progressively weakened MacArthur’s men. Even though their effectiveness deteriorated daily, “the battling bastards of Bataan” believed they might be rescued. MacArthur’s departure from the Philippines on March 11 dashed those hopes. The heavily reinforced Japanese, led by General Masaharu Homma, resumed their offensive in early April and steadily drove the sick and starving defenders down the peninsula until April 9, when all troops on Bataan were unconditionally surrendered. Corregidor would hold out for almost a month, but Japan won the Philippines with its victory on Bataan. The tragedy of Bataan—beyond the death and suffering of those who fought there—was the fate that befell the 75,000 surviving American and Filipino soldiers immediately after surrender. On the Bataan Death March, a grueling, six-day, sixty-mile march to prison camps, thousands of prisoners died. Ralph L. Eckert
February, 1942: Japanese American Internment
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February, 1942 Japanese American Internment Date: February 19, 1942 Location: Pacific coast states Principal figures: Military, Major General Allen W. Gullion (1880-1946), Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt; Government, Karl R. Bendetsen (c. 1908-1989), Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, California state attorney general Earl Warren (1891-1974) Result: The forced removal and internment of approximately 110,000 Japanese Americans was one of the gravest violations of civil liberties in United States history. At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, approximately 110,000 Japanese Americans lived on the Pacific coast of the United States. Roughly one-third of those were known as issei—foreignborn Japanese who had migrated before the exclusion of Japanese immigrants in 1924 and were barred from United States citizenship. The rest were nisei—their United States-born children who were U.S. citizens and for the most part strongly American-oriented. The government had in place plans for the arrest of enemy aliens whose loyalty was suspect in the event of war. Attack on Pearl Harbor In the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, approximately fifteen hundred suspect Japanese aliens were rounded up. Those not regarded as security risks were, along with German and Italian aliens, restricted from traveling without permission, barred from areas near strategic installations, and forbidden to possess arms, shortwave radios, or maps. The attack on Pearl Harbor, however, gave new impetus to the long-standing anti-Japanese sentiment held by many in the Pacific coast states. The result was loud demands from local patriotic groups, newspapers, and politicians for removal of all Japanese Americans. Leading the clamor was California State attorney general Earl Warren, who warned that their race made all Japanese Americans security risks. Within the military, the lead in pushing for the roundup of Japanese Americans on the Pacific coast was taken by Major General Allen W. Gullion, the Army’s chief law enforcement officer as provost marshal general, in a bid at bureaucratic empire building. His key lieutenant in pushing this program was his ambitious aide, Major (later Colonel) Karl R.
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Bendetsen, chief of the Aliens Division of the provost marshal general’s office. Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, the commander of the Army’s Western Defense Command, was an indecisive and easily pressured man with a history of anti-Japanese prejudice. At first, DeWitt opposed total removal of the Japanese Americans. By early February, 1942, however, he added his voice to the calls for such action. “In the war in which we are now engaged,” DeWitt would rationalize, “racial affinities are not severed by migration. The Japanese race is an enemy race.” He warned in apocalyptic terms about the dangers raised by the “continued presence of a large, unassimilated, tightly knit racial group, bound to an enemy nation by strong ties of race, culture, custom, and religion along a frontier vulnerable to attack.” Those views were shared by his civilian superiors. The decisive figure was Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, who in turn brought Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to support total removal. Attorney General Francis Biddle and most Justice Department officials saw no necessity for mass evacuation, but Biddle yielded to the War Department on the issue. Most important, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, from motives of political expediency as much as from any anxiety over possible sabotage, gave his full backing to the military program. On February 19, 1942, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, authorizing the military to designate “military areas” from which “any or all persons may be excluded.” Congress followed by adopting legislation in March making it a criminal offense for anyone excluded from a military area to remain there. The Internment Camps No one appeared to have given much thought to what would be done with the evacuees. At first, the military simply called upon the Japanese Americans living in the western parts of California, Oregon, and Washington, and in the strip of Arizona along the Mexican border, to leave voluntarily for the interior of the country. Resistance by interior communities to the newcomers led the Army to issue, on March 27, 1942, a freeze order requiring Japanese Americans to remain where they were. The next step was the issuance of orders requiring Japanese Americans to report to makeshift assembly centers pending transfer to more permanent facilities. By June, 1942, more than one hundred thousand Japanese Americans had been evacuated. The evacuees were transferred from the assembly centers to ten permanent relocation camps in the interior, each holding between ten and eleven thousand persons, administered by the newly established War Relocation Authority (WRA).
February, 1942: Japanese American Internment
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Internees lining up at a Southern California assembly center in April, 1942, awaiting transportation to inland camps, where most of them would live through the duration of the war. (National Archives)
The camps were surrounded by barbed wire and patrolled by armed military guards. The typical camp consisted of wooden barracks covered with tar paper, and each barrack was subdivided into one-room apartments—each furnished with army cots, blankets, and a light bulb—to which a family or unrelated group of individuals was assigned. Toilets and bathing, laundry, and dining facilities were communal. Religious worship (except for the practice of Shinto) was allowed. Schools were later opened for the young people. Although the evacuees grew some of their own food and even undertook small-scale manufacturing projects, most found no productive outlets in the camps for their energies and talents. The WRA promoted the formation of camp governments to administer the day-today life of the camps, but those governments lacked meaningful power and rapidly lost the respect of camp populations. Conditions in the Camps Conditions were at their worst, and the resulting tensions at their height, at the Tule Lake, California, relocation center, which became a dumping ground for those from other camps regarded as troublemakers.
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The upshot was terror-enforced domination of the camp by a secret group of pro-Japan militants. A nisei recalled poignantly the scene of the evacuees being taken off to a camp: “The sight of hundreds of people assembled with assorted baggage, lined up to board the buses at the embarkation point, with rifle-bearing soldiers standing around as guards, is still imprinted in memory. And I can still remember the acute sense of embitterment. . . .” Life in the camps, said another, held evils that “lie in something more subtle than physical privations. It lies more in that something essential [is] missing from our lives. . . . The most devastating effect upon a human soul is not hatred but being considered not human.” At first, Dillon S. Myer, the director of the WRA from June, 1942, on, regarded the relocation centers as simply “temporary wayside stations.” In 1943, the WRA instituted a program of releasing evacuees against whom there was no evidence of disloyalty, who had jobs waiting away from the Pacific coast, and who could show local community acceptance. By the end of 1944, approximately thirty-five thousand evacuees had left the camps under this release program. The Roosevelt administration had, by the spring of 1944, recognized that there was no longer any possible military
A dust storm envelopes the Manzanar, California, internment camp in the eastern Sierras, where internees had to endure harsh weather conditions. (National Archives)
February, 1942: Japanese American Internment
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justification for the continued exclusion of Japanese Americans from the Pacific coast. To avoid any possible political backlash, however, the Roosevelt administration waited until after the 1944 presidential election to announce the termination of the exclusion order and allow nearly all of those still in the relocation centers to leave at will. Many of the evacuees, fearful of a hostile reception on the outside, continued to cling to the camps. In June, 1945, the WRA decided to terminate the camps by the end of the year and later imposed weekly quotas for departure, to be filled by compulsion if required. Aftermath The evacuation and internment was a traumatic blow to the Japanese American population. Since evacuees were allowed to bring with them only clothes, bedding, and utensils, most sold their possessions for whatever they could get. Only slightly more than half of the evacuees returned to the Pacific coast, and most found their homes, businesses, and jobs lost. Japanese Americans suffered income and property losses estimated at $350 million. Of even longer-lasting impact were the psychological wounds. Internment dealt a heavy blow to the traditional Japanese family structure by undermining the authority of the father. Many nisei, eager to show their patriotism, volunteered for service in the United States military. The Japanese American One Hundredth Infantry Battalion and 422d Regimental Combat Team were among the Army’s most-decorated units. On the other hand, more than five thousand nisei were so embittered by their experiences that they renounced their U.S. citizenship. Thousands more would carry throughout their lives painful, even shameful, memories from the years spent behind the barbed wire. Defenders of civil liberties were appalled at how weak a reed the U.S. Supreme Court proved to be in the war crisis. The first challenge to the treatment suffered by the Japanese Americans to reach the Court involved Gordon Hirabayashi, a student at the University of Washington who had been imprisoned for refusing to obey a curfew imposed by General DeWitt and then failing to report to an assembly center for evacuation. Dodging the removal issue, the Court on June 21, 1943, unanimously upheld the curfew. Refusing to second-guess the military, the Court found reasonable the conclusion by the military authorities that “residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those of a different ancestry.” On December 18, 1944, a six-to-three majority in Korematsu v. United States upheld the exclusion of the Japanese from the Pacific coast as a similarly reasonable military precaution. The Court, in the companion case of Ex parte Endo handed down the same day, however,
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barred continued detention of citizens whose loyalty had been established. The ruling’s substantive importance was nil, because it was handed down one day after the announcement of the termination of the order barring Japanese Americans from the Pacific coast. The Supreme Court never formally overruled its Hirabayashi and Korematsu rulings. Later decisions, however, transmuted Korematsu into a precedent for applying so-called “strict scrutiny” to classifications based upon race or national origin—that is, that such classifications can be upheld only if required by a compelling governmental interest. Pressure from the Japanese-American community led Congress in 1981 to establish a special Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment to review the internment program. The commission report concluded that the internment was not justified by military necessity, but had resulted from race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political leadership. At the same time, petitions were filed in federal courts to vacate the criminal convictions of resisters to the evacuation. The climax was the unanimous decision by a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1987—which the government declined to appeal to the Supreme Court—vacating Gordon Hirabayashi’s curfew violation conviction on the ground that the order had been “based upon racism rather than military necessity.” In 1988, Congress voted a formal apology along with $1.25 billion in compensation to surviving internment victims. John Braeman
May, 1942 Battle of the Coral Sea Date: May 3-8, 1942 Location: Coral Sea, southwest of New Guinea Combatants: U.S. Navy vs. Japanese navy Principal commanders: Japanese, Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inouye (18891980); American, Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher (1885-1973) Result: The U.S. victory halted the Japanese advance in the Pacific, creating an important precedent for the Battle of Midway. Until this battle, the Japanese advance into the Pacific had continued unabated. Japanese forces sought to take Port Moresby on the southern side
May, 1942: Coral Sea /
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of the large island of New Guinea. It was essential for the Japanese to control the approaches to Australia and thereby protect the large base that they had recently established at Rabaul on New Britain. Japanese strategy called for the establishment of a large defensive perimeter far out from the home islands. Eventually, Japan hoped to lure the remnants of the U.S. fleet into a climactic battle somewhere along its defensive ring of bases, where the Japanese fleet could rely on the additional impact of land-based aircraft. Japanese forces under the command of Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inouye launched an end run around western New Guinea by sending invasion forces to Port Moresby by sea. Some invasion forces were also intended to establish a seaplane base in the nearby Solomon Islands, and they took Tulagi in the Solomons on May 3. However, they ran into a U.S. naval ambush in the Coral Sea. ULTRA, the U.S. code-breaking operation, had deciphered most of the Japanese naval code, and U.S. intelligence had learned of Japan’s invasion plans. For the first time in naval history, surface ships from both fleets never saw each other during the battle. Fighting was carried out entirely by aircraft flying from three Japanese and two U.S. carri-
Image not available
The U.S. aircraft carrier Lexington explodes after being hit by Japanese bombs during the Battle of the Coral Sea. The other large U.S. carrier in the battle, the Yorktown, was so badly damaged that it had to return to port for repairs. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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ers that were approximately 175 miles apart. During the exchange of attacks on May 7 and 8, the Japanese lost one light carrier, the Shoho, and suffered damage on the larger Shokaku. The Americans, under the command of Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher, lost one of their two large carriers, the Lexington. The other carrier, the Yorktown, was damaged and had to limp to Pearl Harbor for repairs. Several other ships were sunk on both sides. Which side gained the victory was not clear at first. The Japanese had exchanged a small carrier for a large one, and when other losses are calculated, they won the tactical victory in terms of tonnage sunk. At the time, Japanese leaders boasted of having won a great victory, convinced that they had sunk both U.S. carriers. However, the battle was really a strategic victory for the United States. The Japanese invasion fleet, which had been steaming toward Port Moresby, turned back. This was the first time that a Japanese advance in the Pacific was prevented. Checked in the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese began a campaign to take Port Moresby over land, which necessitated going up and over the spine of New Guinea, the Owen Stanley Range. The Australians were able to hold them back in a struggle fought in miserable terrain. The U.S. Navy gained vital combat experience and a boost in morale from the battle, which demonstrated that the Japanese advance could be held up and turned back. The battle set the stage for the long series of land, sea, and air battles centering on the island of Guadalcanal in the Solomons. These battles were part of the Japanese plan to threaten Australia, an extension of Japanese power that met considerable resistance from the U.S. Navy. The battle also reduced Japanese strength available for the Battle of Midway: Two Japanese carriers were not available for the battle so American carriers could confront the Japanese fleet outnumbered by only four to three instead of six to three. Henry Weisser
June, 1942 Battle of Midway Date: June 3-5, 1942 Location: Pacific Ocean near Midway Island Combatants: Four Japanese carriers vs. three American carriers and defenders
June, 1942: Midway
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Principal commanders: Japanese, Admiral Chuichi Nagumo (1886-1944), Isoroku Yamamoto (1884-1943); American, Frank Fletcher (1885-1973), Chester W. Nimitz (1885-1966), Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (18861969) Result: The U.S. naval victory ended Japanese dominance in the Pacific theater of the war. From December, 1941, until the spring of 1942, Japanese forces conquered British, Dutch, and U.S. possessions in East Asia and the Pacific Ocean. Fast aircraft carriers enabled them to project their power far into the Pacific, and the December 7 strike by their carrier-based aircraft on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, had crippled the United States Pacific Fleet. Six months later, Japanese planners prepared for another strike toward Hawaii. They intended to neutralize the remaining vessels in the U.S. fleet and occupy Midway, an island located a thousand miles east of Hawaii that could serve as the springboard for future operations in the Hawaiian chain proper. With Midway and Hawaii in their hands, the Japanese believed they could force the United States to retreat to California. The commander in chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, sought to initiate the operation before the overwhelming U.S. industrial capacity began to play a decisive role in the conflict. Yamamoto put together the largest fleet the Japanese ever had assembled; it included eleven battleships, headed by the Yamato, Japan’s newest and the world’s largest battleship; four heavy and four light carriers; twentyone cruisers; sixty-five destroyers; more than fifty support and smaller craft; and nineteen submarines. In a serious strategic error, Yamamoto dispersed these vessels in many groups so widely scattered that they could not be mutually supporting. The Northern Force—comprising two light carriers, eight cruisers, thirteen destroyers, and six submarines—sped toward the Aleutian Islands of Alaska in order to divert the U.S. forces and capture Kiska and Attu, which might be used as the springboards for future operations. The islands were successfully occupied, but the operation was secondary in nature, and the ships could have been used more effectively for the main thrust toward Midway. Japanese forces were badly divided within the main strike force, as well. From the southwest came Japan’s Midway Occupation Group, supported by the Second Fleet with two battleships, eight cruisers, a light carrier, and a dozen destroyers. Approaching Midway from the northwest was Yamamoto with the Main Body and the Carrier Striking Force. His main force was organized around three battleships and a light carrier. Split off to the north in order to move either to the Aleutians or to Midway, but in ac-
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U.S. Navy fighter planes flying over a burning Japanese ship during the Battle of Midway. (National Archives)
tuality too far from either, was the Guard Force of four battleships and a screen of cruisers and destroyers. In the vanguard was the First Carrier Striking Force under Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, with four heavy carriers, Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu, and their screen and support vessels. Japanese Plan of Attack Nagumo’s carriers were to attack Midway on June 4 and destroy the U.S. airfields and planes preparatory to the landings; when the Americans sortied from Pearl Harbor, the Main Body would move in and destroy them. Previous successes had made Japanese planners arrogant. They made no plans for what to do if the U.S. response unfolded in a different manner from the one they anticipated. United States naval intelligence teams had advance warning of Japanese plans from official Japanese navy messages that had been intercepted. The intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor, under Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, Jr., decided, on the basis of incomplete information and brilliant analysis, that Midway was the primary target. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, called in all of his available carriers and could come up with only three: the Enterprise and the Hornet, commanded by Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, and the wounded Yorktown, commanded by Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. The carriers
June, 1942: Midway
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were screened by a total of eight cruisers and fourteen destroyers. Nimitz ordered the extensive reinforcement of Midway to a total of 120 planes, antiaircraft guns, and 3,632 defenders. The three carriers lay in wait for the Japanese, northeast of Midway, as ready as forewarning could make them. Confirmation that the intelligence guesses were correct came early on June 3, when a scout plane sighted the invasion force six hundred miles to the southwest. Army and Marine pilots attacking from Midway scored no significant hits. Unaware that U.S. ships were anywhere nearby, Nagumo launched an attack with half of his planes (108) before dawn on June 4; the other half he held back, in case the United States fleet threatened. Searches by Nagumo’s own planes were inadequate. The Midway defenders put all of their planes in the air and took heavy punishment, but were not knocked out. Defending planes were totally outclassed, but they and the antiaircraft guns still inflicted losses on the Japanese Zeros. By 7:00 a.m., the first raid was over and the Japanese flight leader radioed Nagumo that another attack was required. Before the second attack could be launched, the Japanese carriers were scattered repeatedly by Marine and Army pilots from Midway, none of whom scored hits and nearly all of whom died trying. In the midst of these attacks, a Japanese scout plane reported a U.S. carrier within range. Rather than immediately launching the second wave of planes that were being rearmed for another attack on Midway, Nagumo decided to recover his first
Ships Sunk at Midway, June 4, 1942 Hiryu sinks
U.S. Carriers
Hiryu hit, on fire Soryu sinks
Yorktown hit, abandoned
Japanese carriers
Akagi sinks
Yorktown sinks (June 6)
Kaga sinks
N Kure Atoll Path of U.S. Fighters path of Japanese warplanes
U.S. Fighters
Pacific Ocean
Midway Islands
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wave and rearm the second for fleet action. By 9:18, all was ready, although the haste meant that bombs and torpedoes were piled around the carrier decks. U.S. Bombers At that point, forty-two slow-moving, low-level U.S. torpedo bombers arrived unescorted by fighters and began nearly suicidal attacks, in which thirty-eight planes were lost. None scored hits, but the defending Zeros were drawn down to low levels to attack them. At the end of these attacks, thirty-three high-altitude SBD Dauntless dive bombers, led by Lieutenant Commander C. Wade McCluskey, by chance managed to locate the Kaga, Akagi, and Soryu. McCluskey’s planes soon were joined by another group of dive bombers, led by Lieutenant Commander Maxwell Leslie. The Zeros were flying too low to intercept the U.S. planes before the damage was done. In only five minutes, U.S. pilots made fatal hits on the three Japanese carriers. With poor fire management policies on their ships, the Japanese were unable to prevent the sinking of the carriers. Later the same day, the Hiryu was also fatally hit and sunk by U.S. pilots. While Yamamoto wanted to engage the U.S. surface fleet in a nighttime battle, a U.S. course change prevented him from doing so. The Japanese lost 275 planes, about three thousand military personnel, and their four largest carriers in the Battle of Midway. The United States, by contrast, lost one carrier (the Yorktown), one destroyer, 150 planes, and 307 personnel. Many of Japan’s best pilots were lost in the battle, and the balance of power in the Pacific soon shifted in favor of the United States. Charles W. Johnson updated by William E. Watson
June, 1942 Manhattan Project Date: Project approved on June 17, 1942 Location: Los Alamos, New Mexico; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Hanford, Washington Principal figures: Physicist Albert Einstein (1879-1955), Carnegie Institute president Vannevar Bush (1890-1974), Harvard president James Conant (1893-1978), General Leslie R. Groves (1896-1970), U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945)
June, 1942: Manhattan Project
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Result: Under the looming threat of German scientists’ developing an atomic bomb that would advance the Nazi regime’s plans for conquest, a U.S.-government supported team of scientists developed the world’s first nuclear weapon. The building by the United States of an atomic bomb was not the result of a single decision, but of a series of decisions taken over more than two years. Although President Franklin D. Roosevelt held the ultimate responsibility, his attitudes were shaped by scientific advisers whose reasoned conclusions and best guesses persuaded him that it was possible to construct a nuclear fission device “of superlatively destructive powers,” as a 1941 report termed it. Research had begun during the 1920’s and 1930’s, primarily by European physicists, including James Chadwick in Great Britain, Enrico Fermi and Emilio Segrè in Italy, Lise Meitner and Otto Frisch, who in 1938 fled Austria for Denmark, (where Niels Bohr was working), Hungarians such as Leo Szilard, the Frenchman Frédéric Joliot-Curie, and Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin. Their research indicated the possibility of bombarding the nucleus of the uranium atom, splitting it into lighter fragments, and releasing tremendous amounts of energy. A significant number of these scientists fled fascism for the United States or England. Many of them gathered with U.S. physicists in January, 1939, at the fifth Washington Conference on Theoretical Physics to hear Bohr recount the exciting atomic discoveries. Within the year, nearly one hundred papers had been published in scholarly journals expanding on and confirming this new work. In March, 1939, Fermi, Szilard, and a number of other émigré physicists who feared that the Germans were developing an atomic bomb began a lengthy effort to arouse in both their U.S. colleagues and the United States government some sense of their own urgent concern. After Fermi’s direct approach to the U.S. Navy on March 17 failed to generate any active interest, and after the Germans forbade further export of uranium ore from the Joachimstal mines in recently conquered Czechoslovakia, Szilard became convinced that Albert Einstein was the only scientist in the United States with enough fame and prestige to garner a sympathetic hearing from the U.S. government. During a visit to Einstein on Long Island in mid-July, 1940, Szilard exacted from his old friend a promise to write, or at least sign, any letter or letters that might be needed to attract the attention of the U.S. government. With Einstein’s promise in hand, Szilard and fellow émigré physicist Eugene Wigner wrote a letter addressed to President Roosevelt. Dated August 2, 1939, and signed “A. Einstein,” this letter, detailing the
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dangers and possibilities of atomic energy, was presented to Roosevelt on October 11 by Alexander Sachs, an occasional presidential adviser who had eagerly agreed to serve as the intermediary for Szilard. Roosevelt Becomes Involved Sachs and the Einstein letter convinced the president that the situation should be explored. Accordingly, he established the Advisory Committee on Uranium. Headed by Lyman Briggs, director of the National Bureau of Standards, and including representatives from the Army, the Navy, and the scientific community, this attempt to draw federal support into scientific research for the national defense produced few early results. The committee met infrequently, and its financial support involved only a sixthousand-dollar research grant. Research on the explosive potential of uranium, which was being conducted at university laboratories scattered across the country, pointed in two main directions. One involved the separation of the fissionable isotope U-235 from the much more common U-238 by a variety of methods, including gaseous or thermal diffusion, electromagnetic separation, and the centrifuge. The other sought to transmute uranium into a new fissionable element, plutonium (U-239), through a controlled chain reaction in an atomic pile. It was not until 1942 that either a chain reaction or the separation of more than a few micrograms of U-235 would be accomplished. As the Germans drove into France in May and June, 1940, others in the scientific community, including Hungarian-born émigré physicist Edward Teller, grew increasingly concerned. Responding to that concern, on June 15, President Roosevelt established the National Defense Research Council (NDRC) under the leadership of Vannevar Bush, president of the Carnegie Institute. Creative and highly capable, Bush and his able deputy, Harvard president James Conant, played key roles in the decision to make the bomb. While support for the Advisory Committee on Uranium and other scientific defense research grew during the next year, Bush believed that the work lacked the necessary urgency. On June 28, 1941, acting on Bush’s advice, Roosevelt created the stronger Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), with Bush as the head. Conant moved up to head the NDRC, and the Uranium Committee, strengthened and enlarged, became the S-1 Section of OSRD. The Decision to Make the Bomb Although the establishment of OSRD represented a significant organizational step, it did not signify a decisive commitment to the building of an
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Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee in 1944, a year after it was built. The lab’s contribution to the Manhattan Project was production of the plutonium needed to produce atomic bombs. (Martin Marietta)
atomic bomb. Key figures in the U.S. government—Roosevelt, Vice President Henry Wallace, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall—members of the OSRD, and members of the U.S. scientific community remained skeptical about both the cost and feasibility of developing an atomic weapon. This skepticism, however, began to give way during the second half of 1941. At that time, the British government, based on the recent ideas of Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls, refugee physicists working at Cambridge, reported to the OSRD its belief that an atomic bomb could be developed within two years. Another push to the U.S. atomic effort was provided by Mark Oliphant, the Australian-born head of the physics department at the University of Birmingham. During a visit to the United States in August, 1941, Oliphant pressed upon Bush the British conviction that a bomb really could be made. With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the German and Italian declarations of war on the United States in December, 1941, Roosevelt had to choose between committing to the construction of a weapon that might win the war in the long run or cutting back on an unproven program to concentrate valuable resources to the more immediate goal of not losing the war in the short run. On March 9, 1942, Bush informed the president
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that a major industrial effort might produce an atomic weapon in 1944, but that a decision had to be made soon. After receiving additional encouraging news, Roosevelt decided on June 17, 1942, that the United States would build an atomic bomb. Having committed itself to the construction of an atomic weapon, the U.S. government had to determine how to produce sufficient quantities of fissionable materials. After learning from S-1 Section researchers that four methods—gaseous diffusion, the centrifuge, electromagnetic separation, and controlled chain reactions in uranium piles—were at comparable stages of development, it was decided to make an all-out effort on all four fronts, rather than explore a single method that might prove a dead end. The U.S. atomic bomb program—code-named the Manhattan Project and headed by General Leslie R. Groves (appointed September 17, 1942)— involved highly secret research at Los Alamos, New Mexico, where basic bomb development took place; Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where U-235 was separated from U-238 by gaseous diffusion and electromagnetic techniques; and Hanford, Washington, where plutonium was produced in graphite piles. At a cost of nearly two billion dollars, the Manhattan Project ultimately paid dividends: The first bomb was successfully detonated on July 16 at Alamogordo, New Mexico, and there followed production of the weapons that ended World War II in August, 1945, and that enabled the United States to lead the world into the Atomic Age. Charles W. Johnson updated by Bruce J. DeHart
August, 1942-February, 1943 Battle of Guadalcanal Date: August 7, 1942-February 9, 1943 Location: Solomon Islands Combatants: Americans vs. Japanese Principal commanders: Japanese, Admiral Hiroaki Abe (1879-1953), General Harukichi Hyakutake (1888-1947), General Kiyotake Kawaguchi, Admiral Gunichi Mikawa; American, Admiral Frank Fletcher (18851973), Admiral Ernest Joseph King (1878-1956), Admiral Robert Lee Ghormley (1883-1958), Admiral William Frederick Halsey (1882-1959), General Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964), Chester W. Nimitz (1885-
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1966), Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner (1885-1961), General Alexander Archer Vandegrift (1887-1973) Result: One of the first military campaigns to use air, land, sea, subsurface, and amphibious forces together, this conflict turned the tide in the Asian-Pacific war. During the first half of 1942, the Japanese achieved spectacular expansion and the Allies were in desperate straits in all theaters of World War II. The global strategic priority was Germany first, so resources were scarce. The Guadalcanal and larger Solomon Islands campaigns were fought under these challenging circumstances, and the Allied situation was reversed. The Battle of Midway set the stage for the Battle of Guadalcanal, one of the most important struggles during the war in the Pacific. The engagement at Midway had taken place in early June, 1942. It was a spectacular air engagement, in which the Japanese lost 4 aircraft carriers, 275 planes, and one hundred first-line pilots. Land-based Army Air Force planes also participated, although they achieved little. This stunning defeat forced Japan onto the defensive and gave the Allied powers a badly needed reprieve. As a result of the Battle of Midway, U.S. planners soon decided to launch a limited offensive in the area of the Pacific Ocean where the Central Pacific and Southwest Pacific commands overlapped. U.S. Objectives The logical initial objective was the Solomon Islands. This chain of islands was located within easy bombing range of the great Japanese air base at Rabaul on New Britain Island and the important Allied base of Port Moresby in southern New Guinea. Furthermore, the Japanese had begun construction of a bomber field on Guadalcanal—one of the southernmost islands in the Solomons. Whoever controlled Guadalcanal and finished the airfield would hold an important advantage in the Pacific war. Acting from the initiative of Admiral Ernest King, chief of naval operations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered Admiral Chester Nimitz and General Douglas MacArthur, theater commanders, to gather all available forces and equipment for an amphibious operation in the Solomon Islands against the adjoining islands of Guadalcanal and Tulagi. The invasion, planned in conjunction with a renewed attack in New Guinea and an attempt to seize Rabaul, was to begin on August 1, but delays and a lack of supplies dictated that the Solomons operation be postponed until August 7. The Allied forces included U.S. air, marine, army, naval, and submarine units, and various other forces from Australia and New Zealand, native coastwatcher units coordinated by the Royal Australian Navy, and
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Battle of Guadalcanal OUTER MONGOLIA
SOVIET UNION
LE S RI N D KU LA IS
Peking
KOREA Hiroshima
CHINA Shanghai
JAPAN
Nagasaki
FORMOSA
Bataan Luzon PHILIPPINE
INDOCHINA
O c e a n
Tokyo
Okinawa
Hong Kong
P a c i f i c
MARIANA IS.
Wake I.
Guam Caroline I.
Tarawa Gilbert I.
Singapore
JAVA
HAWAIIAN IS.
Eniwetok
MALAYA BORNEO
Pearl Harbor
MARSHALL IS.
IS. Leyte
Midway I.
Iwo Jima
NEW GUINEA
SOLOMON IS.
Guadalcanal
Port Moresby
Indian Ocean
AUSTRALIA
Coral Sea
intelligence agencies modeled on British methods. The U.S. forces were largely ignorant of the islands that they were to invade and had little time to work out plans for the landings. The combined force, consisting of eighty-two ships carrying the First Marine Division, elements of the Second Marine Division, and other contingents, met near the Fiji Islands in late July. The Campaign Begins Early on August 7, a U.S. carrier task force took position south of Guadalcanal. Under its protection, the first support ships and landing force, commanded by Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, slipped along the west coast of Guadalcanal. After a heavy shore bombardment, Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift’s Marines waded ashore. The landings were practically unopposed on Guadalcanal, although strong resistance was encountered on Tulagi. On August 8, the Marines seized their primary objective, the unfinished airfield soon to be named Henderson Field. Japanese forces on Guadalcanal were fewer than twenty-five hundred, and within a few days there were approximately sixteen thousand Marines on the island. Other factors, however, intervened to prevent a swift Allied victory.
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The Japanese were able to respond quickly to the attack by dispatching reinforcements to Guadalcanal and initiating steps designed to gain naval superiority in the area. They were assisted by U.S. timidity regarding the safety of the carrier task force. Vice Admiral Frank J. Fletcher, commander of the invasion, withdrew his carriers on August 8. Thereafter, the beachhead received almost no air protection, and heavy Japanese bombing attacks began. The withdrawal of the carriers emboldened the Japanese to send a strong surface force, in the hope of destroying U.S. warships and transports and thereby isolating the Marines. The Japanese striking force of five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and a destroyer slipped past Allied patrol vessels and entered Iron Bottom Sound at 1:00 a.m. on August 9. Carefully trained for night action, the Japanese sank four Allied cruisers and won a tremendous victory, although their commander, Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, erred in not attacking the unprotected support ships and the beachhead itself. The defeat caused Rear Admiral Turner to withdraw his amphibious force, leaving behind sixteen thousand Marines who were insufficiently supplied for the task of maintaining their positions on Guadalcanal. However, their enemy had even more serious logistical problems. War of Attrition From mid-August, 1942, until early February, 1943, when Allied forces finally cleared the entire island, Japanese and Allied forces were locked in bitter conflict. Both sides made desperate efforts to reinforce their numbers in this struggle of attrition and to deny supplies and reinforcements to the other. After initial success, the Marines encountered stubborn resistance and made little progress for several months. The Japanese launched several offensives, but inaccurate information about the strength of the Allied forces caused them to fail. The most notable engagements were the Battle of the Tenaru River, in which one thousand Japanese were virtually wiped out, and the Battle of Bloody Ridge on September 13 and 14, at which a Japanese force of six thousand troops under Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi was cut to pieces. By the time the Japanese high command realized that large reinforcements were required, Allied naval and air defenses were much improved. After mid-September, the Marine foothold was secure, and reinforcements and supplies were coming in on a continual basis. Final victory could not be won, however, until one side achieved naval dominance in the area. The struggle between Allied and Japanese naval forces continued through the autumn, with the Imperial Navy controlling the waters around Guadalcanal at night and the Allies—because of Henderson Field’s aircraft, mostly with Marine pilots—commanding the
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area during the day. A number of important but indecisive carrier and shipto-ship engagements occurred, such as the Battle of the Eastern Solomons and the Battle of Cape Esperance. The latter was the result of a desperate Japanese effort to reinforce Guadalcanal. Although it was considered an Allied victory, the Japanese moved ahead, bombing Henderson Field and dispatching a battleship force to bombard Allied positions. On October 15, forty-five hundred Japanese soldiers were landed, raising their total on the island to twenty thousand, and the Imperial Army prepared for a victorious offensive. The Marines suffered from low morale, malaria and other diseases, and exhaustion. With more than half the planes on Henderson Field rendered nonoperational, a defeatist feeling spread throughout the chain of command. On October 16, Vice Admiral William F. Halsey replaced Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley as commander of the Southwest Pacific forces. Halsey was convinced that control of Guadalcanal was essential, and the Joint Chiefs had reached the same conclusion. Escalation of Fighting The main Japanese attacks came on October 24 and 25, but these frontal assaults against fortified U.S. positions resulted in costly defeats. In November, both sides attempted to bring in reinforcements. The Allies were successful, but the Japanese, having lost a crucial naval engagement in the middle of the month, were able to land only about four thousand soldiers, who were badly equipped and poorly supplied. In December, U.S. Army units replaced the exhausted Marines, and these fresh forces soon launched a powerful attack, assisted by air strikes from Henderson Field and from aircraft carriers. The Japanese held on grimly until January 4, 1943, when Tokyo ordered the evacuation of Guadalcanal within thirty days. Operating brilliantly under constant pressure from the Allies, the Imperial Army command evacuated more than eleven thousand troops by destroyers February 9. The bitter six-month struggle for Guadalcanal ended on this note of indecisiveness. Allied casualties were sixteen hundred killed and forty-two hundred wounded. Fourteen thousand Japanese were killed or missing, nine thousand dead from disease, and approximately one thousand captured. Later disclosures concerning intelligence, communications, and reconnaissance have shed additional light on events. The coastwatchers rightly have received major credit. One reason the Japanese cruisers that annihilated the Allied naval forces at Savo Island were a surprise was a communication breakdown between regional commands. An Australian reconnaissance aircraft sighted and reported the Japanese, but the message was
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lost between command centers. The Allies benefited frequently from intercepts and analysis of signals intelligence. The Japanese achieved complete surprise when they withdrew more than ten thousand troops at the end. Indeed, the Allies were expecting a Japanese offensive. Guadalcanal received much interest on the home front, and a new vocabulary arose: Guadalcanal, Henderson Field, the Tokyo Express (Japanese reinforcements), Iron Bottom Sound (a bay north of Guadalcanal, where naval and air forces were destroyed and sunk), the Long Lance torpedo (a superior Japanese weapon), and Starvation Island (the Japanese name for Guadalcanal). The fiftieth anniversary commemorations of events of World War II paid tribute to Guadalcanal through several publications, a reenactment, an entire summer of events involving underwater searches and the discovery of wrecks, and a symposium. Theodore A. Wilson updated by Eugene L. Rasor
November, 1942 North Africa Invasion Date: November 7-8, 1942 Location: French North Africa Combatants: Allies vs. Germans Principal figures: British, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill (1874-1965); Bernard Law Montgomery (1887-1976), commander of the Eighth Army in North Africa; Allied, Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890-1969); French, General Henri-Honoré Giraud (1879-1949), Jean Louis Darlan (1881-1942), Henri-Philippe Pétain (1856-1951); American, George C. Marshall (18801959), George S. Patton (1885-1945), President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945); German, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel (1891-1944) Result: An Allied campaign designed to force the Germans out of North Africa, this operation provided a training ground for U.S. forces in World War II. On December 11, 1941, Germany and Italy declared war on the United States. Thereafter, the United States devoted its chief efforts to defeating its European enemies. Officers of the U.S. Army, however, disagreed with their British counterparts about how this aim should be accomplished. General George C. Marshall, chief of staff of the U.S. Army, wanted to build
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German field marshal Erwin Rommel in Libya. (National Archives)
up air and ground forces in the British Isles and then launch a crosschannel invasion into France, aimed ultimately at Berlin. He hoped to be ready to invade late in 1942 and certainly by early 1943. The British leaders, especially Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, favored a peripheral strategy designed to wear down Germany and Italy through air attacks and by striking at weak points on the frontiers of their empires. Churchill argued that only when the enemy was exhausted should the Allies cross the English Channel and confront the German army directly. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Marshall also believed that by concentrating on a cross-channel operation, they could achieve several objectives. First, the operation would satisfy the Soviet Union’s Joseph Stalin, who was pressuring the Allies for a second front in Europe, which would take pressure off the beleaguered Soviets. Second, such an attack would take the Germans by surprise and stimulate French resistance. In the long run, it was unrealistic to attack the powerful Germans on their home ground without preparation. The dangers of defeat were great, but it was imperative that the United States show its colors somewhere. Roosevelt insisted that U.S. troops be in action against the Germans somewhere before the end of 1942. Invasion of France was not possible in 1942 because of a lack of landing craft and trained troops to staff them, so the Allies had to find an easier target. Churchill won the argument when the Allies decided that French North Africa was ideal for invasion. There were no German troops in that area, and it was probable that the Vichy
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French forces (set up as part of the French puppet state after France had surrendered to the Germans in June, 1940) would put up only token resistance against British and U.S. invaders. At the other end of the North African landmass, the British Eighth Army was fighting General Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps. An Allied landing in French North Africa would relieve the pressure on the British in Egypt and, it was hoped, make it possible to force the Germans out of North Africa altogether. Allied possession of North Africa would free the Mediterranean Sea for British shipping, so that oil from the Near East and supplies from India could come to the British Isles by the most direct route. Marshall argued that a landing in North Africa would delay an invasion of northern France by two years because of the drain on supplies, but Roosevelt overruled him. Preparations The planning for the invasion, called Operation Torch, proved to be difficult. The United States preferred simultaneous landings in Morocco and Algeria, while the British wanted the operation to focus on the Algerian coastline alone. Both sides had good reasons. The United States wanted a foothold in Morocco, near Casablanca, if things went poorly in Algeria. Casablanca also would give the Allies a port that would not be subject to Axis air attacks. On the other hand, the British argued that if the landings did not include eastern Algeria, the Germans and Italians could quickly occupy all of Tunisia, using it as a base for air attacks and for a solid defensive position that would take many Allied lives to reduce. By the end of August, the plans were in place, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower was firmly entrenched as the overall commander of the operation. In October, 1942, Major General Mark Clark and diplomat Robert Murphy were sent on a secret mission into North Africa to gauge the sentiments of the French forces there. Clark and Murphy ran head-on into French politics in North Africa. One problem was deciding which French general would lead the defection from Vichy and from collaboration with the Axis. It was clear that the maverick French general Charles de Gaulle would be unacceptable to French military leadership in North Africa. Admiral Jean Darlan, commander in chief of Vichy forces, was suspect because of his previous support for Vichy. It was agreed that General HenriHonoré Giraud would announce the landings and order Vichy troops not to resist the Allies. In another undercover operation, Giraud was brought to Gibraltar to confer with Eisenhower on the eve of the invasion. In the long run, Giraud’s selection did not settle French political problems in North Africa.
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First Landings In the early morning of November 8, 1942, Eisenhower’s troops landed at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers. General Giraud’s orders not to resist too often were ignored by French officers unaware of Giraud’s new role in French North Africa, and the aged Marshal Henri-Philippe Pétain, head of the Vichy government, ordered his forces to resist. Eisenhower, contacting Admiral Darlan, arranged for Darlan to assume control of French North Africa and then order his troops to cease fire preparatory to a later attack on the Germans. The U.S. press criticized Eisenhower for coming to terms with a pro-Fascist, but Churchill and Roosevelt supported him, especially when Eisenhower explained that the deal was necessary to avoid fighting the French and to begin the real job of fighting the Germans. In November and early December, Eisenhower made a dash for Tunis, hoping to seize that port before the Germans could pour troops into Tunisia. Rain, superior German tank tactics, and German air superiority stalled his offensive before it reached its objective. The British Eighth Army, under General Bernard L. Montgomery, was driving Rommel back. By February, 1943, Rommel had crossed Libya and reached southern Tunisia. He then turned against Eisenhower’s troops and inflicted a sharp blow on them at Kasserine Pass. The Allies, however, were building up their forces, while the Germans received no significant reinforcements. By May 13, the last resistance had ended, and Eisenhower had captured nearly three hundred thousand prisoners in Tunisia.
Despite his lack of combat experience, General Dwight D. Eisenhower was made overall commander of the Allied invasion of North Africa and he was later elevated to supreme commander of all Allied forces in the European theater of the war. (National Archives)
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British field marshal Bernard Montgomery. (National Archives)
As Marshall had feared, the large troop commitment to North Africa made a cross-channel invasion in 1943 impossible. Because the troops and landing craft were already in the Mediterranean, they had to be used there. Despite Marshall’s concerns, Operation Torch did have a number of beneficial results. First, it established Eisenhower as a military planner and as an officer who could be diplomat as well as warrior. Second, it gave Eisenhower’s staff valuable training in planning and executing a complex mission that involved air, land, and sea components. Third, Operation Torch and subsequent fighting in North Africa allowed U.S. Army troops to train in realistic conditions. Fourth, Operation Torch was carried out successfully less than one year after the attack on Pearl Harbor, thereby showing the U.S. resilience, resolve, and combat potential. On July 10, 1943, Anglo-American forces invaded Sicily, and the Allies soon captured the island. The fall of Sicily and the Allied bombing of Rome led to the downfall of the Italian head of government, Benito Mussolini, on July 25, 1943, and ultimately to an Italian surrender. Before the negotiations could be planned, however, the Germans had occupied the country. In September, U.S. troops invaded Italy. The progress of the Allied forces up the peninsula was slow; not until June 4, 1944, did the U.S. Fifth Army
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liberate Rome. The campaign that began with the invasion of North Africa had accomplished much, principally the freeing of the Mediterranean Sea and the elimination of Italy from the war. Stephen E. Ambrose updated by James J. Cooke
July-September, 1943 Italy Invasion Date: July 9-September 19, 1943 Location: Sicily and the Italian mainland Combatants: c. 170,000 Allied troops vs. smaller number of German troops Principal figures: Americans, General Harold R. L. George Alexander (1891-1969), commander of the Fifteenth Army Group; Mark W. Clark (1896-1984), commander of the U.S. Fifth Army; General Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890-1969), supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force; General George S. Patton, Jr. (1885-1945), commander of the U.S. Seventh Army; British, Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery (1887-1976), commander of the British Eighth Army; Italian, Benito Mussolini (1883-1945), prime minister of Italy, 1922-1943; Pietro Badoglio (1871-1956), prime minister of Italy, 1943-1944; German, Albert Kesselring (1885-1960), German commander in chief, South Result: This campaign forced Germany to use troops and resources that might otherwise have been used in northern France. One of the decisions made by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill at the Casablanca Conference in February of 1943 was to occupy the island of Sicily in order to assure the safety of Allied shipping lines in the Mediterranean. At the time, no decision was made as to an invasion of the Italian mainland. General Dwight Eisenhower was given overall military command of the Mediterranean theater, while General Harold R. L. George Alexander was in command of the invasion force, the Fifteenth Army Group. The invasion of Sicily was preceded by the capture of a small garrison on the nearby island of Pantelleria on June 11, 1943. The Germans were not convinced that the capture of this island pointed to an invasion of Sicily, but were tricked by a British ruse that suggested that an Allied invasion of Sardinia was forthcoming.
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Following a monthlong bombardment of Axis air bases, the Fifteenth Army Group, consisting of the British Eighth Army under General Bernard Law Montgomery and the U.S. Seventh Army commanded by General George S. Patton, carried out two separate landings on the southern coast of Sicily on July 9 and July 10, 1943. Supported by naval gunfire and airborne operations, the Allies landed 160,000 men on the island. The Allies benefited greatly from superior air power, having thirty-seven hundred planes as opposed to sixteen hundred Axis aircraft. Although the landing itself went relatively smoothly, tragedy struck when U.S. airborne drops encountered friendly fire. Montgomery’s forces ran into some stubborn German resistance south of Catania, while Patton, whose forces had landed on the left flank, first moved through western Sicily and later assisted the British. On August 17, both forces arrived in Messina, on the northern tip of the island. In spite of complete Allied air superiority, the Germans had managed to evacuate more than a hundred thousand troops and a considerable number of vehicles to the Italian mainland. Fall of Mussolini The fall of Sicily was a major factor in the collapse of Benito Mussolini’s government. The Fascist leadership had become increasingly disenchanted with Mussolini, in particular with his alliance with Adolf Hitler. A meeting between Mussolini and Hitler, in which Mussolini requested the transfer of Italian divisions from the Russian front to be used in the defense of Italy, had brought no results. During a subsequent meeting of the Fascist Grand Council on July 24, Mussolini was handed a vote of no confidence. On the following day, he was dismissed from office by the king of Italy, Victor Emmanuel III, arrested, and spirited away to a hotel on the Gran Sasso in the Abbruzzi Mountains. Mussolini was succeeded as prime minister by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, a former Fascist leader whose emissaries had negotiated secretly with the Allies in Lisbon and Madrid. Badoglio’s problem was to make peace with the Allies and extricate Italy from the war, while preventing the Germans from defending Italy against an expected Allied invasion. The collapse of the Fascist government in Italy brought to the fore the still unresolved issue of the entire purpose of the Italian campaign. U.S. military planners had insisted all along that the Italian campaign was to be no more than a secondary effort, insisting that the primary Allied effort had to be Operation Overlord, the Normandy invasion. In their view, the purpose of the Italian campaign was merely to force the Germans to commit troops and resources in the Italian theater to prevent their use on the eastern front and, more important, against an Allied invasion in Nor-
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mandy. On the other hand, British military planners—perhaps with an eye toward postwar settlements in the Balkans—assigned far greater importance to the Italian theater. The conflict of opinion was reflected in the fact that it took until the end of July to authorize an invasion of the Italian peninsula. On September 3, 1943, an armistice was signed between Italy and the Allies. By mid-October, the Badoglio government had declared war on Germany and was recognized by the Allies as a cobelligerent. Although the announcement of the Italian capitulation took many Germans by surprise, Hitler had prepared for such an eventuality ever since Mussolini’s overthrow by ordering troops to assemble for possible entry into Italy. Thus, by the beginning of September, the Germans had eight divisions in readiness in the north of Italy, in addition to Field Marshall Albert Kesselring’s forces in southern Italy. The Invasion The invasion of the Italian mainland began on September 3. It involved the movement of two British divisions under General Montgomery across the narrow Straits of Messina into Calabria. On September 9, another British division landed at Taranto. The Italians were unprepared for the invasions, but the Germans reacted quickly, occupying Rome and airfields in the vicinity, thereby putting an end to any hopes for a possible Allied airborne operation in the area. Unlike the invasions in Calabria and Taranto, which met with virtually no resistance, Allied landings at Salerno (Operation Avalanche) on September 9 met with stiff resistance. An invasion force of 55,000 troops for the initial landings, with another 115,000 to follow, was confronted by a much smaller contingent of German defenders. Lieutenant General Mark Clark, who had intended to surprise the defenders by forgoing preparatory naval bombardment, was faced with counterattacks from the Germans that almost turned the entire invasion into a disaster. Only with the help of skillful naval gunnery, artillery, and considerable air support could the invasion force maintain its precarious positions on the beach. By September 18, the beachhead was at last secured and the German offensive could be checked. Montgomery, after some prompting to accelerate, at last had managed to make contact with the beachhead on September 16. The Germans realized that their failure to drive the Allies back into the sea left them only one option: a gradual withdrawal northward beyond Naples, where they had established a strong defensive zone, the so-called Winter Line or Gustav Line. The Allied campaign to penetrate this line met with little success. In an effort to break the stalemate, the Allies, on January
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22, 1944, resorted to a landing behind the German lines on the beaches at Anzio. In spite of initial successes, the effort bogged down, and during four months on the beachhead, the Allies had to evacuate more than thirty thousand casualties. Following a combined air-ground offensive, a breakthrough was at last effected, and Allied troops entered Rome on June 4, 1944, two days before the Normandy invasion. The Allied drive toward the new German defensive positions south of Bologna—the so-called Gothic Line—again bogged down, and the offensive could not be resumed until the spring of 1945. Bologna fell on April 21, only a few days before Mussolini was captured and executed by partisans. In fact, since March, 1945, SS General Karl Wolff secretly had been negotiating surrender terms for the German forces in Italy with Allen Dulles, the chief of the American Office of Strategic Services in Switzerland. Fighting in Italy ceased on May 2, 1945, five days before the final capitulation of Germany. Helmut J. Schmeller
September-October, 1943 Battle of Salerno Date: September 9-October 1, 1943 Location: Gulf of Salerno off the southwest coast of Italy Combatants: United States Fifth Army (British Tenth and American Sixth Corps) vs. German Tenth Army Principal commanders: American, General Mark Clark (1896-1984); German, General Heinrich von Vietinghoff (1887-1952) Result: The Allies achieved their objective, taking the port of Naples. With Sicily secured and Benito Mussolini’s Fascist government collapsing, the Allies decided to invade Italy rather than attempt a 1943 cross-channel invasion of northern France. On September 9, 1943, a combined British and American amphibious assault (Operation Avalanche) led by General Mark Clark took place at Salerno, with the intent of drawing German troops to Italy and away from more potentially active and important invasion possibilities elsewhere. Although the Allies anticipated little or no resistance, German troops, led by Heinrich von Vietinghoff, put up a strong defense from positions in the mountains from which they could fire down on the attacking troops.
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After Allied troops drove the German occupation forces out of Salerno, some of the townspeople waded out into the surf to get closer looks at the unusual Allied landing craft. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Nonetheless, Allied progress was slow but steady until September 12, when the Germans unleashed a furious counterattack. However, necessary Allied assistance arrived, including two battalions of the Eightysecond Airborne, additional firepower provided by two British battleships, two thousand air sorties, and fifteen hundred additional troops from North Africa. The Germans retreated, and on October 1, Allied troops entered Naples. British and American losses exceeded 15,000 men, German losses were estimated at 8,000. About 175,000 Allied troops, more than two-thirds of whom were British, and about 60,000 Germans and Italians participated in the battle. Both Salerno in the southwest and General Bernard Law Montgomery’s invasion of Southeast Italy were the beginning of the Allied effort to drive the Germans out of Italy. A less than well-planned strategy engendered a great deal of controversy both at the time and later. John Quinn Imholte
November, 1943: Tarawa
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November, 1943 Battle of Tarawa Date: November 20-23, 1943 Location: Tarawa Atoll, Gilbert Islands Combatants: 35,000 Americans vs. 4,700 Japanese and Koreans Principal commanders: American, Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill, Major General Holland M. “Howlin’ Mad” Smith (1882-1967); Japanese and Korean, Rear Admiral Keiji Shibasaki Result: A costly U.S. victory. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance launched Operation Galvanic in November, 1943, to gain air bases in the Gilbert Islands to support the push toward Japan. The first objective was the airstrip on 300-acre Betio Island in Tarawa Atoll. Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill’s naval and air bombardment (November 17-20) had little effect. Rear Admiral Keiji Shibasaki had boasted that a million Americans could not take Tarawa in a hundred years. Major General
U.S. infantry troops wade ashore during the Battle of Tarawa. (National Archives)
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Holland M. Smith’s Second Marine Division began landing at dawn on November 20. Shallow reefs, unpredictable tides, and Japanese obstacles frustrated landing craft. Marines had to wade hundreds of yards to shore under the fire of more than five hundred Japanese pillboxes. The first wave had 75 percent casualties. Smith ordered reinforcements from Makin Atoll. The Americans advanced inland on the second day and secured the island after seventy-six hours of tenacious, inch-by-inch fighting, including desperate suicide charges by the Japanese on the third day. Tarawa was the bloodiest battle that the U.S. Marine Corps had experienced up until its time. U.S. losses were 1,057 killed, 2,351 wounded, and 88 missing in action. All except 17 of the Japanese and 129 of the Koreans died. The Americans used the captured airstrip to support invasions of the Marshall Islands. Eric v.d. Luft
June, 1944 Operation Overlord Date: June 6, 1944 Location: Normandy, France Combatants: Allies vs. Germans Principal commanders: Allied, Omar Bradley (1893-1981), Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890-1969), Bernard Law Montgomery (1887-1976); German, Chancellor Adolf Hitler (1889-1945), Erwin Rommel (1891-1944), Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt (1875-1953) Result: This amphibious invasion of northern France began the final liberation of Western Europe from German control. The Allied invasion of German-occupied France in June, 1944, remains one of the most famous events in World War II history. Crossing the English Channel from England to the French coast of Normandy, the forces waging the attack constituted the largest amphibious operation undertaken in military history. To command this challenging effort, Western Allied leaders appointed General Dwight D. Eisenhower as commander in chief of Allied Forces in Western Europe. Arriving in England in January, 1944, to oversee the complicated project, he spent many months directing the planning for the cross-channel invasion. Excellent cooperation between the Western Allies
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General Dwight D. Eisenhower gives encouragement to American paratroopers preparing to join the assault on German positions in Europe in June, 1944. (Library of Congress)
was essential for successfully planning and implementing the attack. The second highest military appointment was, therefore, assigned to a prominent British general, Bernard Montgomery. Allied Planning Defining the attack’s size, scope, and location required careful consideration. Normandy was selected because of its proximity to Great Britain. German defenses in Normandy were weaker than elsewhere on France’s northern coast, although Field Marshal Erwin Rommel had strengthened his fortified positions in early 1944. Beach and tide characteristics also made Normandy a likely choice. The original plan for “Overlord,” the operation’s code name, designated three army divisions for the initial invasion. Eisenhower and Montgomery expanded the size of the target area and increased the divisions to five for the coastal attack: two U.S. divisions, two British, and one Canadian. Allied deception played an important role before the attack. Adolf Hitler and most German military leaders predicted an invasion would occur in the Pas de Calais region to the northeast. Significant German forces therefore were positioned there, and did not play a role when the actual invasion began. Allied schemes increased Hitler’s belief that the Pas de Calais was the intended target. Phantom armies were “located” in eastern England and fake radio transmissions misled the Germans. Eisenhower
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Normandy Invasion, 1944 English Channel Cherbourg
COTENTIN PENINSULA
Utah
Omaha
Gold
Juno Sword
St. Lo
Caen
N O R M A N D Y Falaise
also ordered widespread air attacks on railroad centers, bridges, and other transportation targets within France to hinder German reinforcements from reaching the coast when the invasion eventually began. The Normandy attack was therefore nearly a complete surprise. The plan required the landings to begin at dawn, so troops would have a full day to establish a beachhead and begin to move inland. Other requirements included a full moon the night before, so parachute forces could be dropped in predawn hours behind enemy lines to cut communication lines and control key bridges and road junctions; a low tide at dawn, so beach obstacles could be cleared; and a fairly calm sea, as soldiers had to land from small assault craft. Early June would meet these requirements, assuming favorable weather. General Eisenhower selected June 5 as D day for the attack. The right combination of tide and moon would not occur again for several weeks, and planners did not wish to postpone the invasion. The Invasion In early June, soldiers boarded ships in English embarkation ports, but bad weather on June 3 and June 4 made the scheduled June 5 invasion impossible. An updated weather forecast indicated a break in the storm
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might occur the night of June 5-6. Eisenhower decided on June 5 to take the risk. The weather improved, and more than five thousand ships, carrying more than a hundred thousand troops, headed for the continent. Paratroopers dropped inland during the night, the first Allied soldiers to land in occupied France. By daylight on June 6, bombers and fighter planes were flying overhead, as ground forces moved toward the beaches. Warships pounded German fortifications with heavy artillery from the sea. Each of the five army divisions had an assigned coastal sector (identified by a code name) to attack and secure: “Utah” and “Omaha” were assigned to the United States, “Gold” and “Sword” to the British, and “Juno” to the Canadians. The landings succeeded in the face of heavy German resistance, although the United States troops at “Omaha Beach” had the greatest difficulty and highest casualties. By the end of the first day, approximately 150,000 soldiers had landed in Normandy. The invasion forces gradually consolidated and expanded their positions. By the end of June, more than 850,000 Allied troops were in France.
American soldiers pour ashore at Normandy under heavy German machine fire. Most of the landing craft in such amphibious operations were operated by Coast Guard sailors, who suffered among the highest casualties of any branch of the service. (National Archives)
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The Germans, because of the disruption of their transportation systems from air attacks, could not bring sufficient units to launch effective and sustained counterattacks. Rommel’s preferred strategy favored using all available German forces to drive the Allies into the sea. However, Hitler in Berlin and Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt adopted a policy of using their forces on a more selective basis. Thus, the German defense was not well coordinated at the highest levels. German forces occasionally succeeded in blocking Allied advances from the beachhead. British and Canadian troops on Montgomery’s left flank were unable to capture the city of Caen, a D day objective, until midJuly. On the right flank, General Omar Bradley’s U.S. First Army finally succeeded in capturing the port of Cherbourg on June 27 but was unable to break out of the Cotentin Peninsula quickly. Greater Allied firepower, both on the ground and in the air, finally broke the impasse. By August 1, Bradley’s troops were in open country, and General George Patton’s U.S. Third Army headed to the south and east. The German Seventh Army, nearly cut off in the “Falaise pocket,” sustained major losses of troops and equipment by mid-August. U.S. and French forces liberated Paris on August 25. Aftermath Casualty figures for Operation Overlord vary, in part because of incomplete data. Considering the large numbers of troops in the operation, contradictory totals seem inevitable. Tallies of battle losses also differ according to the period included in any tabulation. Descriptions of the Normandy campaign often cover the weeks between June 6 and the Allied breakout into the French interior by the end of July. Some figures include the liberation of Paris in late August. Casualties on D day (June 6) alone are estimated to be between 10,000 and 10,500 for the Allies and 6,500 for the Germans. Eisenhower referred to 60,000 casualties in three weeks. Another source placed casualties from June 6 to the end of August at approximately 84,000 British and Canadian, 126,000 U.S., and 200,000 German. Relations between Eisenhower and Montgomery eroded during the campaign. Eisenhower believed the British commander was overly cautious in advancing toward Caen. Montgomery favored holding German forces there while urging Bradley to break out to the west. Eisenhower was displeased when Montgomery did not push his British forces toward Falaise, where, if they had linked with U.S. forces advancing from the west, they would have cut off an entire German army. In both cases, Montgomery believed he had acted correctly and resented Eisenhower’s assessment.
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Western scholars emphasize the significance of the Normandy invasion in the overall history of World War II. Veterans and the general public correctly interpret Operation Overlord as a major step toward the ultimate defeat of Nazi Germany. In June, 1994, on the fiftieth anniversary of the battle, an elaborate commemoration of the campaign was held in the locale where this dramatic and violent conflict had occurred. Stephen E. Ambrose updated by Taylor Stults
June-July, 1944 Battle for Saipan Date: June 15-July 9, 1944 Location: Saipan, one of the Mariana Islands in the Central Pacific Combatants: 66,779 Americans vs. 31,650 Japanese Principal commanders: American, Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith (1882-1967); Japanese, Lieutenant General Yoshitsugo Saito Result: U.S. capture of the island from Japan.
U.S. troops cross a coral reef to reach Saipan from their landing craft. (National Archives)
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At 8:00 a.m. on June 15, 1944, 40,000 marines of the Second and Fourth Marine Divisions, led by Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, began amphibious landings on beaches around Garapan, Saipan’s principal city, with the Army’s Twenty-seventh Division in reserve. The landing followed four days of bombardment from the invasion fleet, during which U.S. forces won air superiority. Awaiting the marines were 31,650 Japanese, many of them untested and led by overconfident commanders. Despite heavy small-arms and artillery fire, both U.S. marine divisions were ashore by nightfall. They pushed through the thin beach defenses during the next day and crushed sporadic Japanese counterattacks. By the end of June 17, Japanese forces, led by Lieutenant General Yoshitsugo Saito, were in hasty retreat inland. A mass suicide attack on July 7 failed to check U.S. advances, and Saipan was declared secured on July 9, although small groups continued resistance until the end of the war. The Japanese sustained 28,500 killed in action; 3,471 Americans died, and another 13,160 were wounded. Saipan was headquarters for the Japanese defense of the Central Pacific, a vital shield for the Japanese homeland. Its fall crippled the Japanese defense strategy and gave the Americans an airbase from which B-29 Superfortress bombers could reach Tokyo. Roger Smith
June, 1944 Superfortress Bombing of Japan Date: June 15, 1944 Location: Chengtu, China; and Yawata, Japan Principal figures: American, Henry Harley “Hap” Arnold (1886-1950), President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945), LaVerne “Blondie” Saunders (1903), Kenneth B. Wolfe (1886-1971) Result: A raid on Yawata marked the beginning of the American strategic bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands. The Doolittle raid against Tokyo on April 18, 1942, was the first air raid by United States bombers on the Japanese home islands and the only one for the next two years. The rapid Japanese advance in the Pacific and the Japanese hold on the Asian mainland drove U.S. forces from any bases close enough to carry out air raids on Japan. The available heavy bombers,
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B-29’s on a bombing run over Yokohama, Japan. (National Archives)
the B-17 Flying Fortress and the B-24 Liberator, did not have adequate range. The B-29 Superfortress, however, brought to bear new technology that made possible a devastating strategic bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands. The B-29 Bomber The Army had shown interest in the new long-range, high-altitude bomber that the Boeing Company had begun to develop in 1938. Although the prototype, the XB-29, was not test-flown until September 21, 1942, the Air Corps had already ordered 250 planes from Boeing, which built an entire new plant to produce the new bomber exclusively. Far larger than the B-17, the Superfortress measured 99 feet in length, with a wing span of 141 feet. It weighed more than sixty tons fully loaded and had a top speed of up to 375 miles per hour. Powered by four twenty-two-hundred-horsepower Wright Duplex Cyclone engines, it had a combat radius of sixteen hundred miles fully loaded. Three separate pressurized compartments meant that its crew of eleven could cruise at the plane’s service ceiling of 31,800 feet without needing oxygen masks. The aircraft was armed with twelve .50-caliber machine guns, or ten machine guns and a 20-millimeter cannon, all mounted in power-driven turrets. Under ideal conditions, it could carry a bomb load of ten tons. Plans by the Air Force for the plane’s use had taken various forms, including its commitment in Europe. By the time significant numbers of the planes could be ready, however, British and U.S. bombers flying from En-
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gland had made the B-29 less than essential for the war against Germany. By the end of 1943, Air Force chief General H. “Hap” Arnold, was committed to its use against Japan. United States air bases in the Aleutian Islands, however, were too far from Japan. The islands in the Mariana group that could provide bases (Saipan, Tinian, and Guam) were not projected to be in U.S. hands until the winter of 1944. Thus, Air Force planners, wanting to get the new Superfortresses into operation as soon as possible, looked to China. The U.S. Plan On Arnold’s orders, Brigadier General Kenneth B. Wolfe drew up a plan. Submitted to the Air Force chief on October 11, 1943, Wolfe’s plan called for basing the new B-29’s in India and staging them through fields in China. Approved by Arnold, the plan then went to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Desiring to do something for China and fearing that China’s leader, Chiang Kai-shek, might quit the war if he did not receive some tangible help against the Japanese, Roosevelt proved a receptive audience and approved the plan, known as Operation Matterhorn, in November, 1943. The idea of an independent, powerful, strategic bombing force had long been a dream of U.S. flyers. Supplying itself with all the necessities of war, this command could, it was believed, bludgeon any enemy into surrender by strategic bombing without the necessity of invasion. Perhaps the Superfortress was the weapon.
While the Superfortress bombing raids were being conducted, the United States attacked Japanese cities with smaller planes launched from aircraft carriers. Here, gunners on the carrier USS Hornet shell Japanese positions from the sea, while their own aircraft are bombing Tokyo, in February, 1945. (National Archives)
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Having committed itself to a strategic bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands, in April, 1944, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff established a special organization, the Twentieth Air Force, to direct all B-29 operations. General Arnold, acting as executive agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was selected to command this new force and given control over the deployment of the Superfortresses. Neither the British commander in the area, Lord Louis Mountbatten, nor U.S. Army commander Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell exercised any authority over the deployment and use of the B-29’s in the China-Burma-India theater of operations, except in an emergency. However, they would see a significant amount of the very limited tonnage that was flown over the Hump into China diverted to the B-29 bases at Chengtu. Implementation of Operation Matterhorn was entrusted to Wolfe’s Twentieth Bomber Command, which originally was made up of the Fiftyeighth and the Seventy-third Bombardment Wings. The Seventy-third was detached in April, 1944, to go to the Mariana Islands, whose date of capture had been advanced to June, 1944. A wing contained 112 bombers plus replacement ships, and slightly more than three thousand officers and eight thousand enlisted men. Support, service, and engineering personnel brought the total strength of the Twentieth Bomber Command to approximately twenty thousand troops. Because all supplies for Chinese bases had to be flown in, stockpiling was difficult. B-29s from India had to fly seven round trips to bring enough gasoline and other necessities to make possible one mission over Japan. With the loss of the Seventy-third Wing, the Fifty-eighth Wing could not supply itself for raids of one hundred planes or more, the hoped-for number, more than a few times each month. This, combined with the high rate of engine failure, the loss of planes because of inexperienced crews, and the other faults to be expected in a new weapon meant that the first raid on Japan could not be launched until June 15, 1944. The Army Air Force’s (AAF) Committee of Operations analysts had suggested that an appropriate strategic target for B-29s would be the coke ovens that supplied Japan’s steel mills. Consequently, the first strike was directed against the coke ovens of the Imperial Iron and Steel Works at Yawata. Located on the island of Kyushu, at the edge of the bomber’s combat range, the Yawata plant produced 24 percent of Japan’s rolled steel and was considered the most important target in the Japanese steel industry. The Raids Begin Beginning on June 13, ninety-two planes left the Bengal fields in India, seventy-nine of which reached the Chengtu bases. Each came loaded with
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two tons of five-hundred-pound bombs and needed only to refuel in China. Commanders in Washington, D.C., who had picked the target, ordered a night mission with bombs to be dropped from between eight thousand and eighteen thousand feet. On June 15, the same day that Marines went ashore on Saipan, sixty-eight planes, led by Wing Commander Brigadier General LaVerne “Blondie” Saunders, left the fields. Four were forced back by engine trouble, and one crashed immediately after take-off. Fortyseven Superfortresses bombed Yawata that night, thirty-two using radar because of an effective blackout of the city compounded by haze and smoke. The other planes did not make it over Yawata for a variety of reasons, most of them mechanical. Six planes were lost, one to enemy fighters on the return trip. Fighter opposition over the target and antiaircraft fire had been light. Photo reconnaissance showed little damage, the only significant hit being on a power station thirty-seven hundred feet from the coke ovens. This was not a massive fire-bomb raid of the type that would begin in March, 1945, from the Mariana Islands. The AAF was still concentrating on high-altitude, precision bombing. The Fifty-eighth Wing averaged two raids a month until March, 1945, when it was moved to Saipan. Operating under a very difficult logistical situation, Operation Matterhorn had been a stimulant for Chinese morale and had provided a necessary shakedown for the new bombers and crews. Matterhorn was not a success, nor was the first raid on Japan; but both presaged a more destructive future for the Superfortress. Charles W. Johnson updated by Bruce J. DeHart
July-August, 1944 Battle of Guam Date: July 21-August 10, 1944 Location: Guam, the largest island of the Mariana Islands in the Pacific Combatants: Third U.S. Marine, First Marine Brigade, and Seventyseventh Army divisions vs. 19,000 Japanese Principal commanders: American, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz (1885-1966), Admiral Marc Mitscher (1887-1947); Japanese, Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa (1886-1966) Result: The United States recaptured from the Japanese a strategic base in the Pacific.
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The first Marines to land on Guam plant a U.S. flag on the beach. (National Archives)
On June 15, 1944, U.S. Army and U.S. Marine divisions under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz landed on Saipan, beginning a bloody three-week battle. Then, on July 21, Army and Marine units invaded Guam, one hundred miles south of Saipan, and three days later, Marines attacked Tinian Island. Guam fell to the Third Marine, Seventy-seventh Army divisions, and First Marine Brigade on August 10, after a difficult struggle. Admiral Marc Mitscher’s Fast Carrier Task Force (which included six heavy and six light carriers, escorted by fast battleships, cruisers, and destroyers) used bombers to strafe Guam, neutralizing the Japanese airfield. The United States had 1,400 fatalities and 5,600 wounded. The Japanese, led by Jisaburo Ozawa, had 10,000 fatalities, and several hundred more died when they refused to surrender during the mopping-up operations. The Battle of Guam was an important turning point of the Pacific war because the U.S. seizure of the Marianas placed the U.S. Army Air Force’s B-29 bombers in easy reach of Japanese islands, enabling the United States to fly missions against Japan in late November and destroying Japan’s objective of controlling the Pacific. Keith Garebian
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July-August, 1944 Battle of Tinian Date: July 24-August 1, 1944 Location: Mariana Islands, 1,250 miles southeast of Tokyo Combatants: 40,000 Americans vs. 9,000 Japanese Principal commanders: American, Major General Harry Schmidt; Japanese, Colonel Kiyochi Ogata Result: American forces swiftly took Tinian from the Japanese. After the fall of the Marshall Islands in January, 1944, the next phase of the American Central Pacific Campaign focused on the taking of the Marianas from Japanese forces, led by Colonel Kiyochi Ogata. Saipan fell in early July; American designs then turned to Tinian, only three miles south of Saipan. American landings on July 24, led by Major General Harry Schmidt, surprised the Japanese because they arrived on the small beaches to the
An amphibious vehicle known as a “Water Buffalo” carries Marines to the beaches of Tinian Island during the Battle of Tinian. (National Archives)
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north of the island rather than on the large beaches to the south. Taken by surprise, unable to make effective use of gun emplacements directed toward the southern beaches, greatly outnumbered, and hampered by poor communication between military units, Japanese resistance was quickly overcome. The island was declared secure on August 1, though small pockets of Japanese troops held out in caves for nearly three more months. The Americans suffered 389 dead and 1,816 wounded compared with more than 5,000 Japanese dead and 252 prisoners. The unaccounted-for Japanese most likely perished in their cavernous hiding places. The world’s longest runways were built on Tinian and became the launching sites of numerous B-29 bombing raids against the Japanese main islands, including the planes that dropped the atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Paul John Chara, Jr.
October, 1944 Battle for Leyte Gulf Date: October 23-26, 1944 Location: Leyte Gulf, Surigao Strait, San Bernardino Strait, and Cape Engaño in the Philippines Combatants: U.S. Navy vs. Imperial Japanese Navy Principal commanders: American, Admiral William F. Halsey (1882-1959), Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid (1888-1972), General Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964), Admiral Chester W. Nimitz (1885-1966), Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf (1887-1974), Rear Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague (18961955); Japanese, Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa (1886-1966), Admiral Takeo Kurita (1889-1977) Result: This largest naval engagement of the war secured Allied control of the seas surrounding the Philippine Islands and broke Japanese naval power. The Battle for Leyte Gulf, October 23- 26, 1944, was history’s largest naval engagement. Its 282 vessels (216 U.S., 2 Australian, and 64 Japanese) outnumbered the ships of the 1916 Battle of Jutland. The battle in Leyte Gulf involved almost 200,000 men and encompassed an area of more than 100,000 square miles. It saw all aspects of naval warfare—air, surface, submarine, and amphibious—as well as the use of the largest guns ever at sea,
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the last clash of the dreadnoughts, and the introduction of kamikazes. The battle was also distinguished by fine planning and leadership, brilliant deception, failed intelligence, and great controversies. Allied Objectives The invasion of Leyte Island, beginning on October 20, 1944, was the first phase of an Allied campaign to liberate the Philippine Islands from the Japanese. The Philippines occupied a strategically important position between Japan and its important resources base of the East Indies. Leyte is in the middle of the Philippine archipelago. The Japanese anticipated a U.S. offensive and had plans to combat it; Sho Ichi Go (Operation Victory One) covered defense of the Philippines, to which the Japanese decided to commit the entire Combined Fleet. The Combined Fleet commander, Admiral Soemu Toyoda, knew the operation would be a gamble. He said after the war, If things went well, we might obtain unexpectedly good results; but if the worst should happen, there was a chance that we would lose the entire fleet. But I felt that chance had to be taken.
Toyoda knew that should the Americans retake the Philippines, even with the fleet left, the shipping lane to the south would be completely cut off, so that if the fleet came back to Japanese waters, it could not obtain fuel. If the fleet remained in southern waters, it could not receive supplies of ammunition and arms. In Toyoda’s opinion, there would be no reason to save the fleet at the expense of the Philippines. The Allied armada that advanced toward Leyte in mid-October comprised more than seven hundred ships. The U.S. Third Fleet also was available for strategic support of the operation. Under the command of Admiral William F. Halsey, the Third Fleet was given two tasks: to cover the Leyte landings and, if the opportunity arose, to destroy the Japanese fleet. Japanese Forces Opposing the Allied forces were four Japanese naval forces. The Northern Force, commanded by Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, consisted of one heavy carrier, three light carriers, two hybrid battleship-carriers, three cruisers, and eight destroyers. It was to serve as a decoy, drawing Halsey’s Third Fleet toward the north and away from the beaches. The most powerful of the Japanese units was Central Force (First Division Attack Force), commanded by Admiral Takeo Kurita. It included the two super battleships, Musashi and Yamato. With their 18.1-inch guns, these 862-foot long, 70,000-ton behemoths were, at the time, the largest warships ever
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built. Kurita also had three older battleships, twelve cruisers, and fifteen destroyers. Kurita’s ships were to slip through San Bernardino Strait. Meanwhile, Southern Force (C Force)—comprising two battleships, one heavy cruiser, and four destroyers, commanded by Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura—would strike eastward through the Sulu Sea in an effort to force its way through Surigao Strait between the islands of Leyte and Mindanao. It was trailed by the Second Division Attack Force, commanded by Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima, which had one light and two heavy cruisers and four destroyers. These two prongs would then converge simultaneously on the landing area in the Leyte Gulf and destroy Allied shipping there. At the same time, Japanese shore-based aircraft were to inflict maximum damage on U.S. forces assisting the landings. The main strength of the Japanese fleet lay in its naval gunnery, because its carrierand land-based aircraft had largely been destroyed in earlier battles and by U.S. Army and Navy air raids during September and early October. Any chance the Japanese had for success lay in using their huge battleships to shell the Leyte beaches. Shf Ichi Go was, at best, a long shot. U.S. Forces Opposing the Japanese were two U.S. fleets: the Seventh Fleet, commanded by Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid and operating under General Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Command, and Admiral Halsey’s Third Fleet, under Admiral Chester Nimitz at Pearl Harbor. Leyte was the first landing to involve two entire U.S. fleets and the first landing without unified command. Divided command had unfortunate consequences. The Seventh Fleet was divided into three task groups. The first consisted of Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf’s six old battleships, sixteen escort carriers, four heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, thirty destroyers, and ten destroyer escorts. The other two elements were amphibious task groups carrying out the actual invasion. Seventh Fleet had escorted the invasion force to Leyte and now provided broad protection for the entire landing area. As most of Halsey’s amphibious assets had been loaned to Kinkaid, Third Fleet consisted almost entirely of Admiral Marc Mitscher’s Task Force (TF) 38: fourteen fast carriers (with more than one thousand aircraft) organized into four task groups containing six battleships, eight heavy cruisers, thirteen light cruisers, and fifty-seven destroyers. Third Fleet’s orders called for it to secure air superiority over the Philippines, protect the landings, and maintain pressure on the Japanese. If the opportunity to destroy a major part of the Japanese fleet presented itself or could be created, that destruction was to be Third Fleet’s primary task.
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The Battle Begins First contact between the rival forces was made on October 23. In the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, U.S. submarines sighted the Central Force and sank two Japanese heavy cruisers, one of which was Kurita’s flagship, Atago. When reports of Nishimura’s Southern Force reached Admiral Halsey, he issued a preliminary order detailing a battle line of battleships known as Task Force 34, to be commanded by Vice Admiral Willis A. Lee. Admiral Kinkaid was aware of that signal and assumed TF 34 had been established. Kinkaid ordered the fire-support portion of Seventh Fleet, commanded by Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf, to assume a blocking position at the lower end of Leyte Gulf to halt any Japanese attempt to force Surigao Strait; Seventh Fleet escort carriers guarded the eastern entrance to Leyte Gulf. Halsey, meanwhile, ordered his own fleet carriers to launch air strikes against enemy units then steaming through San Bernardino Strait. These planes concentrated on the Musashi. She took nineteen torpedoes and nearly as many bombs before finally succumbing. Half of her nearly 2,200man crew perished with her. Several other Japanese ships were damaged. On the afternoon of October 25, U.S. pilots reported that Kurita had reversed course and was heading west; Halsey incorrectly assumed that this part of the battle was over. Meanwhile, Japanese land-based planes from the Second Air Fleet attacked U.S. ships supporting the land invasion. Most were shot down, but they sank the light carrier Princeton and damaged the cruiser Birmingham. Unknown to Halsey, after nightfall Kurita’s force changed course and resumed heading for San Bernardino Strait. Halsey broke off the engagement in order to pursue what appeared to be a more tempting target. U.S. scout planes had sighted the Northern Force, and Halsey, believing it to be the most powerful Japanese threat, turned his carrier task forces northward. Several of Halsey’s subordinates registered reservations about his decision, but the admiral would not be deterred. Compounding the error, Halsey failed to inform Admiral Kinkaid, who still assumed that TF 34 was protecting the strait. Halsey’s decision left the landing beaches guarded only by Seventh Fleet’s Taffy 3 escort carrier group commanded by Rear Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague. Taffy 3 was one of three such support groups operating off Samar. Sprague had six light escort carriers, three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts. This was precisely what the Japanese had intended; for the U.S. forces, it was a grave tactical error, because it enabled the Japanese Central Force to sail undisturbed through the San Bernardino Strait toward the landing area.
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Leading the U.S. landing at Leyte Island, General Douglas MacArthur makes his triumphal return to the Philippines, to which he had vowed to return two and one-half years earlier. (National Archives)
Late on the evening of October 24, battleships and cruisers of the Seventh Fleet engaged the Southern Force. The October 24-25 Battle of Surigao Strait was a classic example of “crossing the T” in naval warfare. The PT boats discovered the Japanese moving in line-ahead formation, but Nishimura’s force easily forced the PT boats back. While the battleships often get the credit for the Surigao Strait victory, it was U.S. destroyers that inflicted most of the damage. Two converging torpedo attacks sank a battleship and three destroyers. The Japanese then ran into the line of Oldendorf’s battleships. The Allies won a great victory at little cost to themselves; when it was over, the sole survivors of the Southern Force and Second Division Attack Force were five destroyers and a heavy cruiser. The U.S. escort carriers operating north of Leyte were not as fortunate. Early on October 25, the Central Force emerged from San Bernardino Strait, headed for Leyte Gulf, and surprised the U.S. ships. Crew members of the U.S. destroyers and pilots of escort carriers of Taffy 3, brilliantly commanded by Admiral Sprague, fought a courageous but apparently hopeless battle. The Japanese sank the Gambier Bay, the only U.S. carrier ever lost to gunfire, and also sank the destroyers Hoel and Johnston, and the de-
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Giant landing ships (LSTs) open their jaws in the surf, as American soldiers build sandbag piers to facilitate the unloading of the supplies and equipment to be used in the Philippine campaign. (National Archives)
stroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts. Although Japanese guns were registering repeated hits and Kurita was in position to secure a crushing victory, he abruptly broke all contact and retired north toward the San Bernardino Strait. This puzzling action allowed the transports and troops at the beachhead to escape certain destruction. Kurita believed he was under attack by aircraft from Halsey’s fleet carriers. Kurita’s decision was strengthened by the fact that the southern attacking force had been destroyed. After the war, Kurita said, “The conclusion from our gunfire and antiaircraft fire during the day had led me to believe in my uselessness, my ineffectual position, if I proceeded into Leyte Gulf where I would come under even heavier air attack.” Several days of nearly incessant attacks may also have frayed Kurita’s nerves. Kurita hoped to join Ozawa’s force to the north but changed his mind and exited through San Bernardino Strait. Sprague later noted that the failure of Kurita’s force “to completely wipe out all vessels of this Task Unit can be attributed to our successful smoke screen, our torpedo counterattack, con-
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tinuous harassment of the enemy by bomb, torpedo, and strafing air attacks, timely maneuvers, and the definite partiality of Almighty God.” The four ships lost by Taffy 3 were the only U.S. warships sunk by Japanese surface ships in the Battle for Leyte Gulf. Meanwhile, Admiral Sprague’s escort carriers and Oldendorf’s force returning from the Battle of Surigao Strait came under attack from landbased kamikaze aircraft, the first such attacks of the war. These sank the escort carrier St. Lô and damaged several other ships. Aftermath After the major issues of the battle had been decided, Halsey’s Third Fleet caught the Japanese Northern Force off Cape Engaño. By nightfall, U.S. aircraft, a submarine, and surface ships had sunk all four Japanese carriers of Ozawa’s force as well as five other ships. This blow ended Japanese carrier aviation. Ironically, the entire Northern Force would have been destroyed if Halsey had not yielded to urgent appeals to turn back to intercept the Central Force. The Third Fleet failed to catch up with Kurita and the remainder of Northern Force was able to get away. Including retiring vessels sunk on October 26 and 27, Japanese losses in the battle were twenty-nine warships (four carriers, three battleships, six heavy and four light cruisers, eleven destroyers, and a submarine) and more than five hundred aircraft. Japanese personnel losses amounted to some 10,500 seamen and aviators dead. The U.S. Navy lost only six ships (one light carrier, two escort carriers, two destroyers, and a destroyer escort) and more than two hundred aircraft. About twenty-eight hundred Americans were killed and another one thousand wounded. The Battle for Leyte Gulf ended the Japanese fleet as an organized fighting force. Theodore A. Wilson Revised by Spencer C. Tucker
December, 1944 Battle of the Bulge Date: December 16-26, 1944 Location: Belgium and Luxembourg Combatants: 500,000 Germans vs. 600,000 Americans and 55,000 British Principal commanders: American, General Dwight D. Eisenhower (18901969), General George S. Patton, Jr. (1885-1945), General Omar Bradley
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(1893-1981); British, Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery (18871976); German, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt (1875-1953) Result: German forces were defeated in a desperate campaign to halt advancing Allied armies. In December, 1944, six months after the successful landing at Normandy, Allied forces were closing in on Germany’s western frontier. The advance across France was so rapid as to overstretch the Allied supply lines that ran five hundred miles back to Normandy and the English Channel. Faced with growing fuel shortages, the supreme Allied commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, gave fuel supply priority to the advancing British forces under Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery as they drove toward the Low Countries and the port city of Antwerp. The U.S. advance farther south ground to a halt as a result of the lack of fuel. As the Allied assault on Germany stalled, Adolf Hitler saw a chance to alter the course of the war by launching a great counteroffensive against the Western Allies. He announced his intentions on September 16 at a conference held at his East Prussian headquarters, the Wolf’s Lair. Hilter’s Plan Hitler’s plan was bold and desperate. It called for an attack against the rugged Ardennes sector, thinly held by U.S. forces. Hoping for a repeat of the highly successful 1940 campaign that led to the fall of France, Hitler aimed at splitting the Allied forces—U.S. troops to the south and the British and Canadians to the north. The German thrust first would obtain the Meuse River and then advance on the strategically important city of Antwerp. Speed and the ability of the advancing German forces to capture key road junctions in the Ardennes were critical ingredients for success. Once this was achieved, the Allied forces (chiefly British and Canadian), north of a line running from Antwerp to the Ardennes, would be destroyed. Hitler hoped that, if the plan worked, the Allied coalition would fall apart, leading to a negotiated peace. It might at least be possible to transfer troops to the Eastern Front to meet the Soviet threat. Hitler’s generals were less confident of success. They argued that Germany did not have sufficient resources in troops and materiel to carry out such an attack. Nevertheless, by tremendous exertion, two new Panzer armies, the Sixth SS Panzer and Fifth Panzer, were assembled. More than twenty-five German divisions were gathered for the attack along a fiftymile front opposite five U.S. divisions. Two largely infantry armies, the Fifteenth and Seventh, were to provide support on the right and left flanks, respectively, of advancing Panzer armies. Two hundred thousand troops
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Battle of the Bulge, 1944-1945 GERMANY
Sixth Panzer Army
BELGIUM Meuse R.
U.S. First Army St. Vith Celles
AR
N
DE
S NE
Bastogne
Under German control, December 15 Under German control, December 24
U.S. 101st Airborne
Fifth Panzer Army
Seventh Panzer Army
U.S. Third Army LUXEMBOURG
were mustered, along with six hundred tanks and nineteen hundred guns. Opposite, the U.S. front was held by eighty thousand troops, supported by four hundred tanks and four hundred guns. Special commando units composed of English-speaking Germans dressed in U.S. uniforms were assembled to spread chaos behind the U.S. lines. As the Germans marshaled their forces for the attack, strict secrecy was imposed on all involved. Poor weather and the rugged territory of the Eifel region opposite the U.S. sector covered German preparations. Radio traffic directly mentioning the impending counteroffensive was banned. Although the Allies had various clues that something was being planned, underestimation of German potential led Allied intelligence to disregard the accumulating evidence of a possible enemy winter offensive. Allied intelligence considered the broken terrain of the Ardennes region unsuitable and therefore unlikely to be attacked. Intercepted German radio traffic that mentioned fuel shortages was interpreted as a positive indicator that the Germans were incapable of launching an attack. In reality, fuel was being prioritized for the assembled German forces in the Eifel. The Offensive Begins On the morning of December 16, advancing out of the winter gloom, the German forces under General Karl Gerd von Rundstedt obtained complete
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An American soldier guards some of the fifty thousand Germans captured at the Battle of the Bulge. (National Archives)
tactical surprise as the great offensive began. Two U.S. divisions, depleted by earlier fighting, were shattered by the initial blow. Rapid gains were made by the attacking Germans, as they drove on the key road junctions at St. Vith and Bastogne. Yet the German advance immediately ran into difficulty. Even cut-off and surrounded U.S. units continued to fight with a ferocity unanticipated by the Germans. If the Allies underestimated the German ability to launch a great counteroffensive, Hitler also seriously erred by underestimating the fighting abilities of the U.S. troops. For six days, U.S. troops at St. Vith held the critical road junction against German attacks. The 101st Airborne Division encircled at Bastogne held on in the face of tremendous pressure from the Fifth Panzer Army. The commander of the division responded to a surrender demand from the Germans with the famous reply, “Nuts!” To the north, the Eighty-second Airborne Division held on to the shoulder of the bulge. The Germans were unable to widen their initial breech in the Allied line. In the most infamous moment of the battle, on December 17, elements of the First SS Panzer Division participated in the murder of eighty-six U.S. prisoners at Malmedy. A number of the German officers and men involved were later charged with
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war crimes. The German attack was canalized and proved unable to widen the initial breakthrough that had managed to create only a bulge in the Allied line, from which the famous battle receives its name. The Allied Response The Allied response to the German attack was swift. Eisenhower halted all offensive operations along the front and concentrated all available Allied forces to stop the German advance. With communications sliced, Lieutenant General Omar Bradley’s troops north of the salient were put under the command of Field Marshal Montgomery. In a remarkable feat, Lieutenant General George S. Patton’s Third Army halted the Germans’ advance into the Saar and, after a ninety-degree turn north, moved to relieve Bastogne. By Christmas Day, staunch U.S. resistance and critical fuel shortages had stopped the German momentum more than five miles short of the Meuse River, the first objective of Hitler’s battle plan, and one hundred miles from the primary objective of Antwerp. A long but narrow bulge had been created in the Allied lines that was forty miles at the base and nearly sixty miles in depth. The clearing of the skies over the battlefield opened the way for massive Allied air attacks on the German forces. More than five thousand planes moved to cut off the German supply line and support the hard-pressed Allied ground forces. Not until January 21, 1945, did the Allies manage to retake the lost ground.
American casualties of the Battle of the Bulge. (National Archives)
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Aftermath The Battle of the Bulge, perhaps the greatest battle in the history of the U.S. Army, took staggering tolls: The Germans lost 120,000 men either killed, wounded, or missing, along with six hundred tanks and assault guns. Air strikes to cover the retreating German forces had cost the Luftwaffe (the German air force) more than fifteen hundred aircraft. Allied casualties, chiefly from the United States, totaled 8,000 killed, 48,000 wounded, and 21,000 captured or missing. Nearly 740 tanks and tank destroyers were lost. Among the soldiers, 4,500 African Americans saw action. Hitler’s great gamble had failed without achieving any of its objectives. The Germans, using up their strategic reserves, lost irreplaceable men and equipment, hastening the end of the war. At most, the Germans had merely slowed the Allied advance by weeks. With the destruction of Germany’s reserves, little was left to stop the Soviet New Year offensive on the Eastern Front and the Allied advance across the Rhine into the heart of Germany. Van M. Leslie
February, 1945 Yalta Conference Date: February 4-11, 1945 Location: Livadia Palace, Yalta, Crimea, Soviet Union Principal participants: British, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill (18741965); American, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945); Soviet, Premier Joseph Stalin (Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili, 1879-1953) Result: This most important meeting of the “Big Three” Allied Powers marked the height of Allied cooperation but also revealed conflicting agendas. In February, 1945, the armies of the Soviet Union moved rapidly toward Berlin with the Germans in full retreat. In the West, British and U.S. forces, commanded by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, prepared to invade Germany. The unconditional surrender of Germany was expected in a matter of weeks. In the Far East, U.S. forces moved steadily from island to island across the Pacific toward a final invasion of the Japanese home islands. The possibility of using an atomic bomb to end the war remained questionable.
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Military experts did not believe the bomb could be made ready before the end of the year. With the defeats of Germany and Japan a certainty, the Big Three Allied leaders—Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill of Great Britain, Communist Party secretary Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States—met to plan the postwar world. It was the last time the three would see one another, for Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, just two months after the conference ended and less than a month before Germany surrendered. At Stalin’s request, the Allies gathered at Livadia Palace (once a summer home of Czar Nicholas II) at Yalta on the Crimean Peninsula of the Black Sea. The conference lasted from February 4 to February 11, 1945. Allied Issues Yalta represented the height of Allied cooperation. The Big Three spoke happily of the end of the fighting, but conflicting aims and conflicting personalities led to compromises in the spirit of cooperation that failed to satisfy any of them. Four major issues were discussed, and in spite of much talk of cooperation, no comprehensive settlement proved possible. The future of Germany, the future of Poland, the nature of a world organization to replace the discredited League of Nations, and the Soviet Union’s formal entrance into the war against Japan were all highly controversial issues that needed to be settled by the Big Three. Upon the defeat of Germany, Stalin wanted to divide that country into permanent zones of occupation; he also wanted reparations in kind (food and industry) to compensate for the nearly twenty million Soviet dead and the German destruction of one thousand Soviet towns and cities. Stalin demanded a harsh policy to prevent Germany from ever making war again. Churchill agreed to divide Germany, but not permanently. He insisted that a healthy Europe depended upon a prosperous Germany. Roosevelt’s position was somewhere between these two views. Stalin’s reparations demands were incorporated into the conference’s final protocol, and the three powers called for Germany’s “dismemberment” into occupation zones during the period following surrender. A U.S. proposal granting France the status of an occupying power gained Stalin’s reluctant approval. The details of Allied occupation policy, however, as well as the precise amount of reparations, were deferred to a later meeting. In addition to a neutralized Germany, Stalin wanted the security of a friendly Polish government. He sought boundaries giving the Soviet Union territory from eastern Poland, while compensating the Poles with part of eastern Germany. The Soviet Union recognized the provisional Pol-
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British prime minister Winston S. Churchill (left), U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt (center), and Soviet premier Joseph Stalin at Yalta. (National Archives)
ish government in Warsaw (the so-called Lublin Poles), but both Great Britain and the United States insisted that the Polish government-in-exile in London also participate in the political rebuilding of Poland after the war. The Big Three agreed on a formula calling for the reorganization of the Lublin government with open elections, worded in such a way that both sides could see their respective interests maintained. The question of Poland’s postwar boundaries also found a compromise solution. Ignoring the protests of the London Poles, the Big Three set the Curzon Line as the basis for Poland’s eastern border, thereby sanctioning Soviet reacquisition of areas lost in the fighting during the Russian Civil War of 1918-1921. As compensation, the Poles would receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west, but the precise delineation of the new German frontier was left to the peace conference. The United Nations Primarily at U.S. insistence, discussion of a world organization to maintain the postwar peace enjoyed a high priority at Yalta. The Big Three planned an international conference to be held in San Francisco in April, at
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which the United Nations would be formed. Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill reached agreements on several points concerning membership and voting in the new body. Churchill resented U.S. proposals for United Nations trusteeships of colonial territories, which the British prime minister interpreted as an attempt by Roosevelt to dismantle the British Empire. Stalin exploited the disagreement over trusteeships between the Western Allies to gain Churchill’s support for his own plan to have two Soviet republics recognized as independent voting members of the new United Nations. The atomic bomb was still a somewhat vague conception at Yalta, and so it was assumed that the Soviets would be needed to defeat Japan. Stalin promised that in return for Russian territory ceded to Japan under Russia’s czarist imperial government, he would declare war on Japan within three months of Germany’s surrender. The agreement on the Far East was not made public in February, 1945. The agreements at Yalta could have become the basis for an amicable peace, for the spirit of the conference was one of hope and trust. In the spring and summer, however, charges of bad faith and double-dealing began to replace the spirit of compromise. Serious disagreements that heralded the Cold War to come were soon in evidence, and within a short time, the good will that marked the Yalta Conference had vanished. Burton Kaufman updated by William Allison
February-March, 1945 Battle for Iwo Jima Date: February 19-March 26, 1945 Location: Volcano Islands, south of the Bonin Island chain (six hundred miles southeast of Japan) Combatants: 250,000 Americans vs. 22,000 Japanese Principal commanders: American, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (18861969); Japanese, Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi (1891-1945) Result: American forces captured a Japanese island air base located southeast of Japan. The eight square miles of Iwo Jima, defended by Tadamichi Kuribayashi, served as the most important Japanese base in the Bonin-Volcano chain because its defenders could provide Japan with a two-hour advance warning
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One of the most dramatic photographs to come out of any war shows soldiers raising an American flag on Iwo Jima after U.S. troops captured the island. (National Archives)
of impending U.S. air attacks from the Marianas, and fighters from its airfields could intercept oncoming U.S. planes. Following a heavy but ineffective naval bombardment, U.S. Marines landed on Iwo Jima on February 19, 1945. The U.S. advance was hampered by volcanic sand and enemy defenses including miles of underground tunnels and trenches. Combat focal points were at Mount Suribachi (taken February 23), the airfields (taken February 24-28), and a central area of the island called “the Meatgrinder” (pacified in early March). Fighting ended with a futile nighttime Japanese banzai charge on March 26. The assault on the island, led by Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, killed 5,400 Americans and wounded 17,400 others. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz summed up the fight with the statement “Uncommon valor was a common virtue.” Only 216 Japanese surrendered. Control of Iwo Jima provided U.S. bombers with fighter escorts to accompany them on their missions to Japan and gave crippled planes access to Allied airfields. Nimitz stated that more U.S. military personnel were thus saved than were lost in the island’s capture. William E. Watson
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April-July, 1945 Battle of Okinawa Date: April 1-July 2, 1945 Location: Okinawa, 350 miles southwest of Japanese main islands Combatants: 208,750 Americans vs. 77,199 Japanese and 40,000 Okinawans Principal commanders: American, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz (1885-1966); Japanese, Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima (1887-1945) Result: The United States took Okinawa from the Japanese. On April 1, some 60,000 U.S. troops landed, largely unopposed, on Okinawa. Intense fighting began a few days later when the Americans reached the strong, inland Japanese fortifications. Grueling ground combat raged throughout the spring until the last line of significant Japanese defenses, led by General Mitsuru Ushijima, was overcome on June 22. The naval portion of the war was similarly bloody and drawn out. The Japanese launched several thousand aircraft and one naval task force against the Americans, led by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. The task force was intercepted and routed, and the largest battleship in the world, the Yamato, was sunk on April 7. However, nearly 2,000 missiles and kamikaze (suicide planes) helped cause the worst U.S. naval losses in history.
An American Corsair fighter plane unloads a volley of rockets against a Japanese position on Okinawa. At ground level, smoke can be seen rising from a battle in which U.S. Marines are fighting. (National Archives)
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By the time the battle was officially declared over on July 2, the United States had suffered 12,281 dead, more than 50,000 wounded and other casualties, 763 planes lost, and 36 ships sunk and 368 damaged. Japanese losses included 110,071 killed, 7,401 captured, 7,830 planes lost, and 16 ships sunk and 4 damaged. Okinawa was the bloodiest campaign of the Pacific war, and the high casualty rate was influential in the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Paul John Chara, Jr.
May, 1945 V-E Day Date: May 8, 1945 Location: Rheims, France Principal figures: American, General Omar Bradley (1893-1981), General Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890-1969), President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945), President Harry S. Truman (1884-1972); British, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill (1874-1965), Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery, first Viscount Montgomery of Alamein (1887-1976); Soviet, General Secretary Joseph Stalin (1879-1953); German, Chancellor Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) Result: The defeat of Nazi Germany marked the transfer of international power from the center of the European continent to two world powers at Europe’s flanks. After repelling the German counterattack in the Ardennes during the Battle of the Bulge in December, 1944, the commander in chief of Allied forces in Western Europe, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, prepared for the final offensive into the heart of Germany. He planned two major crossings of the Rhine in the spring of 1945—one on the north by Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery’s Twenty-first Army Group, consisting mainly of British and Canadian troops, and the U.S. Ninth Army; another in the center by General Omar N. Bradley’s Twelfth Army Group; and a third in the south by the U.S. Third and Seventh Armies. Adolf Hitler, the führer of Germany, had ordered his commanders to defend every inch of ground, and as a result of this directive, Eisenhower was able to destroy much of the German army in battles west of the Rhine in February, 1945. He also was able to capture the Ludendorff railroad bridge over the Rhine at Remagen
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American troops advancing into war-torn Germany. (National Archives)
on March 7, so that he had a bridgehead in the center; consequently, he abandoned plans to cross the river on his left and right flanks, and instead he rushed troops across the Rhine at Remagen. The Campaign By March 28, Bradley’s forces had passed through Remagen and reached Marburg, where they were ready to swing northward to link up with Montgomery’s Twenty-first Army Group, which also had crossed the Rhine and had cut off German Army Group B, assigned to defend Germany’s main industrial area, the Ruhr Valley. Eisenhower informed Montgomery that once the latter’s encirclement of German units had been completed, the U.S. Ninth Army (which had been fighting with Montgomery’s Twenty-first Army Group) would revert to General Bradley’s Twelfth Army Group for the final thrust into Germany. This administrative shift was a major change in Eisenhower’s overall strategy. Before the capture of the railroad bridge at Remagen, he had intended that Montgomery should spearhead the major military effort east of the Rhine, with Berlin as the primary target; now he was shifting the emphasis to General Bradley’s Twelfth Army Group headed for Dresden. On March 28, Eisenhower informed Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin of his inten-
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tions, implying that he would leave capture of the German capital to the Soviet armies advancing from the East. Allied Disagreements The prime minister of Great Britain, Winston S. Churchill, was furious. He considered Eisenhower’s shift in emphasis uncalled-for from the military point of view and held that Berlin should remain the prime objective for both the British and U.S. forces. Eisenhower insisted that Berlin was no longer important, because no German armies or government agencies of any significance remained in the capital. The Supreme Allied Commander wanted to end the war as soon as possible; to do so he had to destroy the remaining armed forces of Germany, which were concentrated in southern Germany. Churchill insisted that politically it was essential for the British and Americans to capture Berlin, for if the Soviets were allowed to capture the capital, they would gain an exaggerated opinion of their contribution to the common victory. Churchill also implied that if the British-U.S. forces took Berlin, they could hold the city for the purpose of making postwar deals with the Soviets. The division of Germany into zones of occupation already had been decided, and Berlin was located within the territory allotted to the Soviet zone. Berlin itself was to be divided into sectors among the Allies. Eisenhower held that it would be foolish to waste U.S. and British lives in taking a city that would have to be handed over by prior agreement to the Soviets
After Germany’s capitulation, Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower (right), Omar N. Bradley (left) and George S. Patton (behind Eisenhower) inspect art treasures stolen by German forces and hidden in a salt mine in Germany. (National Archives)
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because it was to be allocated to their zone. At no time did Churchill advocate repudiating earlier agreements with the Soviets concerning the division of Germany, although he did want “to shake hands as far east as possible” with the Red Army. Churchill could not give orders to Eisenhower; that prerogative was reserved for the combined chiefs of staff of the United States and Great Britain, or the president of the United States. The chief of staff of the U.S. Army, General George C. Marshall, saw to it that Eisenhower was given a free hand in field operations. Churchill appealed to President Roosevelt, but Roosevelt’s foreign policy was to make every effort to attain good relations with Stalin, and he refused to order Eisenhower to race the Soviet army to Berlin. After Roosevelt’s death on April 12, 1945, the new president, Harry S. Truman, adopted the same policy. Eisenhower was free to do as he thought fit, and he sent his armies into central and southern Germany, avoiding Berlin. The Soviets captured the German capital in late April. Eisenhower’s forces reached the Elbe River in central Germany between April 19 and May 2. Partition of Germany On April 25, U.S. and Soviet patrols met near Torgau and cut Germany in half. Hitler committed suicide on April 30; his successor, Admiral Karl Dönitz, began negotiations for surrender on May 4. Dönitz wanted to hand over German forces to the Western Allies, hoping thereby to avoid punishment from the Soviets for German crimes in the east, but Eisenhower refused to comply. Dönitz, his country in ruin, agreed to the immediate unconditional surrender of all Germany’s armed forces. German and Allied representatives met at Eisenhower’s headquarters in Rheims, France, on May 7, 1945, and signed the necessary documents that made the surrender effective the following day. Truman declared that day, May 8, to be V-E Day (victory in Europe day). It soon became evident that the documents signed at Reims were not the correct versions previously agreed upon by the Allies. Confusion reigned. The documents had not been approved formally by the Soviets, did not make provisions for authoritative Russian translations, and were signed by an obscure Soviet general without Stalin’s knowledge. Although the United States tried to downplay the mistake, the Soviets insisted upon a second surrender ceremony with the proper documents and different representatives in Berlin. That ceremony took place on May 9, a date that Soviets subsequently commemorated as the “true” V-E Day. The Soviets had achieved a symbolic victory over the United States, as the second signing ceremony bolstered Moscow’s dark intimations that the Western Allies
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sought to marginalize the Soviet Union in the postwar order. As much as marking the end of the war against Germany, V-E Day also can be seen as the opening of the Cold War. Stephen E. Ambrose updated by Steve D. Boilard
July-August, 1945 Potsdam Conference Date: July 17-August 2, 1945 Location: Potsdam, near Berlin, Germany Principal participants: British, Clement Richard Attlee (1883-1967), Winston S. Churchill (1874-1965); American, Harry S. Truman (18841972); Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin (Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili, 1879-1953) Result: The third and final “Big Three” meeting planned a peace settlement at the conclusion of World War II. There were only three occasions when all three Allied heads of state met face to face: Teheran, November-December, 1943; Yalta, February, 1945; and the Potsdam Conference, July 17-August 2, 1945. At the Potsdam Conference—the third and last Big Three summit conference during World War II—the Allied leaders attempted, but failed, to resolve outstanding disagreements and to conclude a final peace settlement of the war. In addition to peace, the disposition of Germany, Eastern Europe, and the Japanese surrender were on the agenda. The personalities involved at the first two conferences were U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt, British prime minister Winston S. Churchill, and Soviet premier Joseph Stalin. Roosevelt died in April, 1945, and was succeeded by Vice President Harry S. Truman. The results of the general election of Great Britain were announced on July 26, after the Potsdam Conference began. Churchill, head of the Conservative Party, and Clement Attlee, head of the Labour Party, both attended the conference until the announcement was made that the Labour Party had won. Only Attlee returned. Stalin was the only Big Three leader in power before, during, and after the war. Thus, at Potsdam, Stalin enjoyed some advantage because of his experience and the enormous power he wielded as dictator of the Soviet Union.
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The End of the War The war in Europe had ended with the unconditional surrender of Germany in May, 1945, the Italians having previously surrendered in 1943. The war in the Pacific, to which the Soviet Union was not a party, continued, and at the time of the Potsdam Conference there appeared to be no immediate prospect for ending it. At the Yalta Conference, Stalin had promised to break the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact concluded earlier and enter the Pacific war within two or three months after the Germans surrendered. The strategic bombing campaign against Japan, and its ultimate dimension, the use of the atomic bomb, was being developed by the United States, with important British contributions. This effort involved massive resources and enormous costs, however. By the summer of 1945, sufficient materials for a small number of bombs were ready for use. Testing occurred successfully in New Mexico on July 15. President Truman was informed of this while en route to Potsdam. Materials for at least two additional bombs were assembled and rushed to Tinian in the Mariana Islands, from where superbombers could reach Japan. Much has been made of the fact that Truman, in an almost casual manner, informed Stalin of the fact that a bomb with massive destructive potential had been developed. Stalin urged him to use it against Japan. The British, who already knew of the project and its results, also urged the bomb’s use. The Conference The Big Three leaders assembled at Potsdam, south of war-torn Berlin, where the extensive palace complex of the former Hohenzollern rulers of Prussia was located. The official conference took place at the Cecilienhof Palace on the shores of Lake Griebnitz. At the time, the Soviet Union occupied all of Germany east of the Elbe River, including Berlin and its environs. Stalin and the Soviets therefore acted as host of the conference and made all the arrangements. At the first of thirteen plenary sessions, Stalin nominated Truman as chairman. Truman was pleased to serve and had already prepared an agenda. The Yalta agreements were reaffirmed and elaborated upon. Previously, the European Advisory Committee had overseen Allied international issues in the European war. At Potsdam, the decision was made to replace that committee with the Council of Foreign Ministers, charged with preparation for peace terms in Europe, initially for Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Austria, Hungary, and Finland. Other items included the political and economic principles that would govern Germany, continued discussion of the question of German reparations, German disarmament and
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military occupation, provisions for punishment of war criminals, and the disposition of Poland and other Eastern European states. Plans for Germany The disposition of Germany was perhaps the most important, pressing, and controversial issue on the table of the Big Three. At Yalta, a general agreement had been reached that Germany would be occupied by Allied forces. After much deliberation and debate, the Attlee Plan, named for the then vice prime minister of Great Britain, was accepted. Germany was to be divided temporarily into three zones—the Northwest, the Southwest, and the East—to be militarily occupied by Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union respectively. Berlin, the old capital, located about one hundred miles inside the Soviet zone, was also to be divided into three zones. Originally, there were to be three occupiers, and zones of occupation were drawn up. However, at the Yalta Conference, after much persuasion, Stalin reluctantly had agreed with the Roosevelt-Churchill recommendation that France participate. Subsequently, the French did participate and a French zone was carved out contiguous to the French border. However, the French were bitter and disappointed because they were not a party to the arrangements, and they had not been invited to Potsdam. Reparations War reparations was another sensitive issue harking back to the previous treaties at Vienna and Versailles. Stalin consistently pressured for huge amounts to be extracted from Germany, rightly pointing out that the Soviet Union, more than any other power, deserved to be compensated for massive destruction of its homeland caused by the Germans. Roosevelt and Churchill acknowledged that, but also recalled the imbroglio caused by the reparations question after World War I. They effectively renounced all claims on Germany. A tentative arrangement was initialed stating that the Soviet Union was eligible for the equivalent of ten billion dollars worth of reparations from Germany. Further discussion and much debate ensued on how, and especially from which zones of occupation, in-kind reparations could be obtained. Anglo-American leaders insisted that the future health of the German economy must be considered. Reparations remained a contentious issue between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-Americans, and final amounts and other details were not decided until later. The central authority that was to administer occupied Germany was the Allied Control Council. Its objective was to disarm, demobilize, demilita-
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rize, de-Nazify, and democratize Germany. Trials of Nazi war criminals were prepared and conducted at Nuremberg. Certain limits were placed on reparations if a threat to the future of the German economy was indicated. Complications abounded. The Potsdam Declaration came out of the Potsdam Conference and was published on July 26. This was a joint statement to Japan calling for immediate surrender, signed by Truman, Churchill, and a representative of Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese head of state. Since the Soviet Union was not, at that time, an official belligerent in the Pacific war, it was not a signatory. Eugene L. Rasor
August, 1945 Atomic Bombing of Japan Date: August 6 and 9, 1945 Location: Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan Principal figures: American, James Francis Byrnes (1879-1972), Leslie R. Groves (1896-1970), Henry L. Stimson (1867-1950), Harry S. Truman (1884-1972) Result: The use of powerful new weapons against civilian populations accelerated the end of World War II and unleashed a new age of nuclear weapons. At 2:45 a.m. on August 6, 1945, a U.S. B-29 bomber, the Enola Gay, took off from the island of Tinian in the Mariana Islands, carrying an atomic bomb. Shortly after 8:15 a.m., from an altitude of about 31,600 feet, the bomb was released over Hiroshima, Japan. It exploded with terrible fury over the center of the city, immediately killing more than eighty thousand people and maiming thousands more. The searing heat that resulted from the explosion set the city afire and utterly destroyed it. Two days later, on August 8, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. On August 9, over Nagasaki, Japan, at 11:00 a.m., the United States dropped a second atomic bomb, which killed more than forty thousand of the city’s inhabitants. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a shock to the Japanese, but the Soviet Union’s declaration of war was devastating, for it removed all hope of Soviet mediation with the West to end the war. Moreover, it necessitated that the Kwangtung Army—the force that Japanese
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Colonel Paul W. Tibbets, the pilot of the B-29 bomber Enola Gay, waves a farewell before taking off to drop the atomic bomb destined to destroy Hiroshima. (National Archives)
extremists were hoping to bring home to face the anticipated Allied invasions—remain in Manchuria to protect the region from Soviet invasion. Throughout the day and into the night of August 9, the Japanese Supreme War Council met in grim deliberation. At 2:00 a.m., on August 10, the Japanese prime minister asked Emperor Hirohito to decide Japan’s future. Speaking softly, the emperor told his ministers that he wished the war brought to an end. That day, Japan announced that it would accept the terms of surrender that the Allies had demanded in the Potsdam Declaration, with the addition of a sole condition not contained therein: that the position of the emperor be protected. The Japanese accepted the Allies’ terms on August 14, 1945, now known as V-J (for “victory in Japan”) day. Background The dropping of the atomic bomb by the United States was one of the most portentous events in history. Development of the bomb had begun in 1939, after a small group of scientists persuaded the U.S. government that such a weapon was feasible and that Germany was already conducting experiments in atomic energy. The research program that began in October, 1939, ultimately developed into the two-billion-dollar Manhattan Project, which was headed by Leslie R. Groves. The project’s goal was to produce a bomb before the Germans did. Few U.S. political or military officials ever doubted that such a bomb, if produced, would be used. Yet before the first
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bomb was perfected and tested, Germany surrendered. Only Japan remained at war with the Allies. Early in 1945, as the first bomb neared completion, some scientists began to have doubts about using it. The wave of horror that might follow its use and the moral burden of unleashing such an awesome weapon might, they thought, offset any immediate advantage the bomb could provide. Several options were possible: The United States might demonstrate the new weapon on a barren island before representatives of the United Nations, who could then warn the Japanese of its destructive power; the bomb might be dropped on a military target in Japan after giving a preliminary warning; or the United States could refuse to drop it at all. While the scientists pondered such choices, military officials prepared to use the bomb. By the end of 1944, possible targets in Japan had been selected, and a B-29 squadron had begun training for the bomb’s delivery. Two weeks after President Roosevelt died in 1945, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, on April 25, met with the new president, Harry S. Truman, informed him about the bomb, and predicted that in four months it would be available for use. Upon Stimson’s recommendation, Truman appointed a special Interim Committee on Atomic Policy to consider use of the bomb. On June l, 1945, the committee recommended to the president that the bomb be used against Japan as soon as possible, be used against a military
The mushroom cloud rising from the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki. (National Archives)
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President Harry S. Truman announces Japan’s surrender on August 14, 1945—five days after the second atomic bomb was dropped on Japan. (National Archives)
target, and be dropped without prior warning. By early July, 1945, as Truman left for the Potsdam Conference in Germany to discuss postwar settlements with Great Britain and the Soviet Union, he had decided to use the bomb once it was perfected. On July 16, in the Trinity Flats near Alamogordo, New Mexico, the first atomic bomb was successfully tested. The United States now had its weapon, although the war in the Pacific had already driven Japan to the brink of surrender. As early as September, 1944, the Japanese had sought to sound out the Allies concerning peace terms. On the eve of the Potsdam Conference, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow asked the Soviet government to mediate with the Allies to end the war. Japan could not accept unconditional surrender, but the Japanese appeared ready to surrender under terms that would allow them to preserve the position of the emperor in the Japanese system. This the Allies would not accept. Truman’s Dilemma The Truman administration faced difficult problems. Total defeat and unconditional surrender of Japan might require a costly and prolonged invasion of the Japanese home islands. The Soviets, as they had promised at
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Yalta in February, 1945, were scheduled to enter the Pacific war in early August. Although their support had been eagerly sought until the spring of 1945, it now appeared less vital; indeed, Truman now hoped to defeat Japan before the Soviet Union could effectively enter the war and gain any control over the postwar settlement with Japan. Also, use of the atomic bomb in Japan would indicate to the Soviets just how powerful the United States was. On July 26, from Potsdam, the Allies called upon Japan to surrender unconditionally or suffer “the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland,” a veiled reference the significance of which only the Allies fully understood. The Potsdam Declaration did not mention the atomic bomb and did not offer Japan any terms. The Japanese government chose not to reply to the declaration, while it waited for a reply to the peace overtures it had made through the Soviet government. For home consumption, the Japanese government called the Potsdam Declaration “unworthy of public notice.” In the Mariana Islands, two bombs had been readied for use, and the B-29 crews were standing by. Truman ordered the U.S. Air Corps to drop them. When they were dropped, the age of atomic warfare and the Cold War began. Aftermath During the fiftieth anniversary of the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima, in 1995, there was considerable controversy in the United States concerning why the first bomb over Hiroshima was dropped. The Smithsonian Institution first proposed an exhibit that would have the Enola Gay as its centerpiece with four side displays, two of which would depict the devastation of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. With these displays, it intended to depict the Japanese as victims. Veterans’ groups and Congress complained, pointing out that the bomb was dropped not only to end the war but also to retaliate for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which produced U.S. victims. In spite of the efforts of various scholars, the exhibit ultimately simply contained the Enola Gay. Thus, the significance of dropping the bomb on Hiroshima, the start of the Cold War and the atomic age, is by no means uncontroverted. The question still remains: Was it necessary to drop the bomb on population centers in the first place? Burl L. Noggle updated by Jennifer Eastman
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Further Reading Alexander, Joseph H. Storm Landings: Epic Amphibious Battles in the Central Pacific. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997. ____________. Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Alexander, Joseph H., with Don Horan and Norman C. Stahl. A Fellowship of Valor: The Battle History of the United States Marines. Foreword by Edwin H. Simmons. New York: HarperCollins, 1997. Ambrose, Stephen E. Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the Surrender of Germany, June 7, 1944-May 7, 1945. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997. ____________. D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994. ____________. Eisenhower and His Boys: The Men of World War II. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998. Astor, Gerald. A Blood-Dimmed Tide: The Battle of the Bulge by the Men Who Fought It. New York: Donald I. Fine, 1992. ____________. Operation Iceberg: The Invasion and Conquest of Okinawa in World War II. New York: D. I. Fine, 1995. ____________. Wings of Gold: The U.S. Naval Air Campaign in World War II. New York: Presidio Press/Ballantine Books, 2004. Atkinson, Rick. An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943. New York: Henry Holt, 2002. Badsey, Stephen. Modern Air Power: Fighters. New York: Gallery Books, 1990. Baird, Jay W. The Mythical World of Nazi War Propaganda, 1939-1945. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974. Balfour, Michael. Propaganda in War, 1939-1945. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979. Balkoski, Joseph. Beyond the Beachhead: The Twenty-ninth Infantry Division in Normandy. Foreword by Stephen E. Ambrose. Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1999. ____________. Omaha Beach: D-Day, June 6, 1944. Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 2004. Beach, Edward L. Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Beck, John J. MacArthur and Wainwright: Sacrifice of the Philippines. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974.
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Beschloss, Michael. The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman, and the Destruction of Hitler’s Germany, 1941-1945. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002. Bicheno, Hugh. Midway. London: Cassell, 2001. Bishop, Chris, and Chris McNab, eds. Campaigns of World War II Day by Day. Hauppauge, N.Y.: Barron’s, 2003. Blair, Clay. Hitler’s U-Boat War. 2 vols. New York: Random House, 19961998. ____________. Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001. Blumenson, Martin. The Battle of the Generals: The Untold Story of the Falaise Pocket—the Campaign That Should Have Won World War II. New York: William Morrow, 1993. ____________. Mark Clark. New York: Congdon & Weed, 1984. ____________. Salerno to Cassino. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1969. Breuer, William B. The Great Raid on Cabanatuan: Rescuing the Doomed Ghosts of Bataan and Corregidor. New York: J. Wiley & Sons, 1994. ____________. They Jumped at Midnight: The “Crash” Parachute Missions That Turned the Tide at Salerno. New York: Jove Books, 1990. Buchheim, Lothar-Gunther. U-Boat War. New York: Bonanza Books, 1986. Buckner, Simon Bolivar. Seven Stars: The Okinawa Battle Diaries of Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. and Joseph Stilwell. Edited by Nicholas Evan Sarantakes. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004. Burgett, Donald R. Seven Roads to Hell: A Screaming Eagle at Bastogne. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1999. Chamberlain, Peter, and Charles Ellis. British and American Tanks of World War II: The Complete Illustrated History of British, American, and Commonwealth Tanks, 1939-1945. New York: Arco, 1969. Chandler, David G., and James L. Collins, Jr. The D-Day Encyclopedia. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994. Chrisman, Catherine Bell. My War: WW II, as Experienced by One Woman Soldier. Denver, Colo.: Maverick, 1989. Christy, Joe. American Aviation: An Illustrated History. Blue Ridge Summit, Pa.: Tab Books, 1987. Clausen, Henry C., and Bruce Lee. Pearl Harbor: Final Judgment. New York: Crown, 1992. Cole, Hugh M. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1994. Cole, Jean Hascall. Women Pilots of World War II. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1992. Collins, Donald E. Native American Aliens: Disloyalty and the Renunciation of
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Citizenship by Japanese Americans During World War II. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985. Condon, John Pomeroy. Corsairs and Flattops: Marine Carrier Air Warfare, 1944-1945. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Conn, Stetson, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild. The United States Army in World War II: Guarding the United States and Its Outposts. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1964. Conroy, Robert. The Battle of Bataan: America’s Greatest Defeat. New York: Macmillan, 1969. Cooksley, Peter G., and Bruce Robertson. Air Warfare: The Encyclopedia of Twentieth Century Conflict. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1998. Coulthard-Clark, C. D. Action Stations Coral Sea: The Australian Commander’s Story. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1991. Cressman, Robert J., et al. A Glorious Page in Our History. Missoula, Mont.: Pictorial Histories, 1990. Currie, David B. The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second Century— 1888-1986. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. Cutler, Thomas J. The Battle of Leyte Gulf, 23-26 October 1944. New York: HarperCollins, 1994. Daniels, Roger. Concentration Camps U.S.A.: Japanese Americans and World War II. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972. ____________. The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1975. Degan, Patrick. Flattop Fighting in World War II: The Battles Between American and Japanese Aircraft Carriers. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2003. Dencker, Donald O. Love Company: Infantry Combat Against the Japanese, World War II: Leyte and Okinawa: Company L, 383rd Infantry Regiment, Ninety-sixth Infantry Division. Manhattan, Kans.: Sunflower University Press, 2002. Denfeld, D. Colt. Hold the Marianas: The Japanese Defense of the Mariana Islands. Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane, 1997. Doubler, Michael D. Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994. Dunmore, Spencer. In Great Waters: The Epic Story of the Battle of the Atlantic, 1939-1945. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1999. Duskin, Gerald, and Ralph Segman. If the Gods Are Good: The Epic Sacrifice of HMS Jervis Bay. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2004. Dyess, Wm. E. Bataan Death March: A Survivor’s Account. Edited and with a biographical introduction by Charles Leavelle. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002.
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Edwards, Bernard. The Twilight of the U-Boats. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2004. Ellis, John. Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War. New York: Viking, 1990. Falk, Stanley L. Decision at Leyte. Norwalk, Conn.: Easton Press, 1989. Foster, Barry J. The Last Destroyer: The Story of the USS Callaghan. Haverford, Pa.: Infinity, 2002. Frank, Richard B. Guadalcanal. New York: Random House, 1990. Fremon, David K. Japanese-American Internment in American History. Springfield, N.J.: Enslow, 1996. Friedman, Kenneth I. Afternoon of the Rising Sun: The Battle of Leyte Gulf. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 2001. Fuchida, Mitsuo, and Masatake Okumiya. Midway. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institutes Press, 1955. Gannon, Michael. Black May. New York: HarperCollins, 1998. ____________. Operation Drumbeat: The Dramatic True Story of Germany’s First U-Boat Attacks Along the American Coast in World War II. New York: Harper & Row, 1990. Giangreco, D. M., with Kathryn Moore. Eyewitness D-Day: Firsthand Accounts from the Landing at Normandy to the Liberation of Paris. Edited and with a foreword by Norman Polmar. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2004. Gilbert, Martin. D-Day. Hoboken, N.J.: J. Wiley & Sons, 2004. Gilbert, Oscar E. Marine Tank Battles in the Pacific. Conshohocken, Pa.: Combined Publishing, 2001. Grace, James W. The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal: Night Action, 13 November 1942. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1999. Graham, Michael B. Mantle of Heroism: Tarawa and the Struggle for the Gilberts, November 1943. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1997. Grahlfs, F. Lincoln. Undaunted: The Story of a United States Navy Tug and Her Crew in World War II. St. Louis, Mo.: Author, 2002. Gregg, Charles T. Tarawa. New York: Stein and Day, 1984. Hallas, James H. Killing Ground on Okinawa: The Battle for Sugar Loaf Hill. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996. Hammel, Eric M. Guadalcanal—Decision at Sea: The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, November 13-15, 1942. Pacifica, Calif.: Pacifica Press, 1999. Hammel, Eric M., and John E. Lane. Bloody Tarawa. Pacifica, Calif.: Pacifica Military History, 1998. Hart, Russell A. Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won in Normandy. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2001.
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Hart, Stephen A. Montgomery and Colossal Cracks: The Twenty-first Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944-1945. New York: Praeger, 2000. Harvey, Robert. Amache: The Story of Japanese Internment in Colorado During World War II. Dallas, Tex.: Taylor Trade Publishing, 2003. Harwood, Richard. A Close Encounter: The Marine Landing on Tinian. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994. Hastings, Max. Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984. Hayashi, Brian Masaru. Democratizing the Enemy: The Japanese American Internment. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004. Henry, Chris. The Battle of the Coral Sea. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2003. Herken, Gregg. Brotherhood of the Bomb: The Tangled Lives and Loyalties of Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence, and Edward Teller. New York: Henry Holt, 2002. Hess, Gary. The United States at War: 1941-1945. Arlington Heights, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 1986. Hoffman, Carl W. The Seizure of Tinian. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951. Holt, Thaddeus. The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War. New York: Scribner, 2004. Hornfischer, James D. The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors. New York: Bantam Books, 2004. Hoyt, Edwin Palmer. The Men of the Gambier Bay. Introduction by Thomas H. Moorer. Guilford, Conn.: Lyons Press, 2002. The Impact of the War on America: Six Lectures by Members of the Faculty of Cornell University. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1942. Inada, Lawson Fusao, ed. Only What We Could Carry: The Japanese American Internment Experience. Berkeley, Calif.: Heyday Books, 2000. Jasper, Joy Waldron, James P. Delgado, and Jim Adams. The USS Arizona: The Ship, the Men, and Pearl Harbor Attack, and the Symbol That Aroused America. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001. Josephy, Alvin M. The Long and the Short and the Tall: The Story of a Marine Combat Unit in the Pacific. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946. Kaminski, Theresa. Prisoners in Paradise: American Women in the Wartime South Pacific. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000. Kaplan, Philip, and Jack Currie. Convoy: Merchant Sailors at War, 1939-1945. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1998. ____________. Wolfpack: U-Boats at War, 1939-1945. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997.
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Katz, Robert. The Battle for Rome: The Germans, the Allies, the Partisans and the Pope, September 1943-June 1944. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003. Keegan, John. The Second World War. London: Penguin Books, 1989. Kelly, Orr. Meeting the Fox: The Allied Invasion of Africa, from Operation Torch to Kasserine Pass to Victory in Tunisia. New York: J. Wiley, 2002. Kitano, Harry H. L. Japanese Americans: The Evolution of a Subculture. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976. Knightley, Phillip. The First Casualty. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975. Knox, Donald. Death March: The Survivors of Bataan. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981. Kutler, Stanley, ed. The Supreme Court and the Constitution: Readings in American Constitutional History. 2d ed. New York: W. W. Norton, 1977. Leckie, Robert. Okinawa: The Last Battle of World War II. New York: Viking, 1995. Lee, Robert Edward. Victory at Guadalcanal. Novato, Calif.: Presido Press, 1981. Lord, Walter. Day of Infamy. 60th anniversary ed. New York: H. Holt, 2001. Lorelli, John A. To Foreign Shores: U.S. Amphibious Operations in World War II. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Lowry, Thomas P., and John Wellham. The Attack on Taranto: Blueprint for Pearl Harbor. Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1995. Loza, D. F. Attack of the Airacobras: Soviet Aces, American P-39s, and the Air War Against Germany. Translated and edited by James F. Gebhardt. Introduction by Von Hardesty. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002. Lundstrom, John B. The First South Pacific Campaign. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1976. ____________. The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign: Naval Fighter Combat from August to November 1942. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994. Lyne, Mary C., and Kay Arthur. Three Years Behind the Mast: The Story of the United States Coast Guard, SPARS. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard, 1946. MacDonald, Charles B. A Time for Trumpets: The Untold Story of the Battle of the Bulge. New York: Morrow, 1985. McIntosh, Elizabeth P. Sisterhood of Spies: The Women of the OSS. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1998. Macintyre, Donald. U-Boat Killer: Fighting the U-Boats in the Battle of the Atlantic. London: Cassell, 1999.
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McManus, John C. The Americans at D-Day: The American Experience at the Normandy Invasion. New York: Forge, 2004. ____________. The Americans at Normandy: The Summer of 1944—the American War from the Normandy Beaches to Falaise. New York: Forge, 2004. ____________. Deadly Sky: The American Combat Airman in World War II. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 2000. Mann, B. David. Avenging Bataan: The Battle of Zigzag Pass. Raleigh, N.C.: Pentland Press, 2001. Mansoor, Peter R. The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999. Marion, Ore J., with Thomas Cuddihy and Edward Cuddihy. On the Canal: The Marines of L-3-5 on Guadalcanal, 1942. Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 2004. Mathews, Joseph J. Reporting the Wars. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957. Monahan, Evelyn M., and Rosemary Neidel-Greenlee. All This Hell: U.S. Nurses Imprisoned by the Japanese. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000. ____________. And If I Perish: Frontline U.S. Army Nurses in World War II. New York: Knopf, 2003. Morris, Eric. Salerno: A Military Fiasco. New York: Stein and Day, 1983. Morrison, Samuel Eliot. Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine Actions. Vol. 4 in History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. New York: Little, Brown, 1964. ____________. The Struggle for Guadalcanal. Vol. 5 in History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. New York: Little, Brown, 1964. Morrison, Wilbur H. Birds from Hell: History of the B-29. Central Point, Oreg.: Hellgate Press, 2001. Morton, Louis. The Fall of the Philippines: History of the United States Army in World War II—the War in the Pacific. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1953. Muller, Eric L. Free to Die for Their Country: The Story of the Japanese American Draft Resisters in World War II. Foreword by Daniel K. Inouye. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001. Murray, Williamson, and Allan R. Millett. A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000. Neill, George W. Infantry Soldier: Holding the Line at the Battle of the Bulge. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000. Nesmith, Jeff. No Higher Honor: The U.S.S. Yorktown at the Battle of Midway. Atlanta, Ga.: Longstreet, 1999.
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Newcomb, Richard F. Iwo Jima. 2d rev ed. New York: Bantam Books, 2002. Nieva, Antonio A. The Fight for Freedom: Remembering Bataan and Corregidor. Quezon City, Philippines: New Day, 1997. Norman, Elizabeth M. We Band of Angels: The Untold Story of American Nurses Trapped on Bataan by the Japanese. New York: Random House, 1999. Norris, Robert S. Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves, the Manhattan Project’s Indispensable Man. South Royalton, Vt.: Steerforth Press, 2002. O’Brien, Francis. Battling for Saipan. New York: Ballantine Books, 2003. O’Donnell, Patrick K. Into the Rising Sun: In Their Own Words, World War II’s Pacific Veterans Reveal the Heart of Combat. New York: Free Press, 2002. O’Neill, William L. A Democracy at War. New York: Free Press, 1993. Discusses many economic issues relating to World War II. Overy, Richard. Why the Allies Won. New York: W. W. Norton, 1995. Owens, William J. Green Hell: The Battle for Guadalcanal. Central Point, Oreg.: Hellgate Press, 1999. Parker, Danny S., ed. Hitler’s Ardennes Offensive: The German View of the Battle of the Bulge. London: Greenhill Press, 1997. Petty, Bruce M. Voices from the Pacific War: Bluejackets Remember. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2004. Pitt, Barrie. “Italy’s Pearl Harbor.” Military History Quarterly 3 (Spring, 1991): 50-57. Prange, Gordon W. At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. New York: Viking, 1991. ____________. Miracle at Midway. New York: McGraw Hill, 1982. Prange, Gordon W., with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon. Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History. 1991. Reprint. New York: Penguin Books, 2001. Rhodes, Richard. The Making of the Atomic Bomb. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986. Robinson, Greg. By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. Ross, Bill D. Iwo Jima. New York: Vintage, 1986. Ryan, Cornelius. The Longest Day. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1959. Schom, Alan. The Eagle and the Rising Sun: The Japanese-American War, 19411943, Pearl Harbor Through Guadalcanal. New York: W. W. Norton, 2004. Schrijvers, Peter. The GI War Against Japan: American Soldiers in Asia and the Pacific During World War II. New York: New York University Press, 2002. Shaw, Henry I. Tarawa: A Legend Is Born. New York: Ballantine, 1969. Sherrod, Robert Lee. Tarawa: The Story of a Battle. New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1944.
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Short, K. R. M., ed. Film and Radio Propaganda in World War II. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983. Shteppa, Konstantin F. Russian Historians and the Soviet State. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1962. Sides, Hampton. Ghost Soldiers: The Forgotten Epic Story of World War II’s Most Dramatic Mission. New York: Doubleday, 2001. Sledge, Eugene B. With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996. Sloan, Bill. Given Up for Dead: America’s Heroic Stand at Wake Island. New York: Bantam Books, 2003. Smith, Michael S. Bloody Ridge: The Battle That Saved Guadalcanal. Novato, Calif.: Presido Press, 2000. Smith, Page. Democracy on Trial. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. Smithers, A. J. Taranto, 1940. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Soderbergh, Peter A. Women Marines: The World War II Era. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992. Solberg, Carl. Decision and Dissent: With Halsey at Leyte Gulf. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan. New York: Vintage Books, 1985. Stinnett, Robert B. Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor. New York: Free Press, 2000. Stokesbury, James L. A Short History of World War II. New York: William Morrow, 1980. Sweeney, Michael S. Secrets of Victory: The Office of Censorship and the American Press and Radio in World War II. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. Taylor, Frederick. Dresden, Tuesday, February 13, 1945. New York: HarperCollins, 2004. Thomas, Dorothy S., and Richard S. Nishimoto. The Spoilage: JapaneseAmerican Evacuation and Resettlement During World War II. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946. Toland, John. Battle: The Story of the Bulge. Introduction by Carlo D’Este. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999. Tomblin, Barbara. With Utmost Spirit: Allied Naval Operations in the Mediterranean, 1942-1945. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004. Treadwell, Mattie E. The Women’s Army Corps. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954. Van Creveld, Martin. Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1995. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. Walker, J. Samuel. Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of
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Atomic Bombs Against Japan. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. Walling, Michael G. Bloodstained Sea: The U.S. Coast Guard in the Battle of the Atlantic, 1941-1944. Camden, Maine: International Marine/McGrawHill, 2004. Watt, Donald Cameron. Too Serious a Business: European Armored Forces and the Approach to the Second World War. New York: W. W. Norton, 1975. Weeks, Albert L. Russia’s Life-Saver: Lend-Lease Aid to the U.S.S.R. in World War II. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2004. Weglyn, Michi Nishiura. Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America’s Concentration Camps. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996. Weigley, Russell F. Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944-1945. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981. Weinberg, Gerhard L. A World at Arms. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Welch, Bob. American Nightingale: The Story of Frances Slanger, Forgotten Heroine of Normandy. New York: Atria Books, 2004. Wells, Mark K. Courage and Air Warfare: The Allied Aircrew Experience in the Second World War. London: Frank Cass, 2000. Wheeler, Richard. Iwo. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994. Winchester, Jim, general ed. Aircraft of World War II. San Diego, Calif.: Thunder Bay Press, 2004. Wragg, David W. Swordfish: The Story of the Taranto Raid. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003. Yahara, Hiromichi. The Battle for Okinawa. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997. Yellin, Emily. Our Mothers’ War: American Women at Home and at the Front During World War II. New York: Free Press, 2004. Young, Donald J. The Battle of Bataan. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1992. Young, Roland. Congressional Politics in the Second World War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956.
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Korean War 1950-1953 Korean War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 543 The Air War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 552 Censorship During the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 556 Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . July-September, 1950: Battle of the Pusan Perimeter . . . . . . September, 1950: Inchon Landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . October, 1950-April, 1951: Truman-MacArthur Confrontation April, 1951: Battle of Imjin River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . March-July, 1953: Battle of Pork Chop Hill. . . . . . . . . . . .
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Korean War At issue: Reunification of Korea Date: June 25, 1950-July 27, 1953 Location: Korea Combatants: North Korea and China vs. South Korea, the United States, and fifteen members of the United Nations Principal commanders: North Korean, Choe Yong Gun (1900-1976); American, Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964); U.N., Matthew B. Ridgway (18951993) Principal battles: Kaesong, Seoul (1950), Osan, Taejon, Inchon Landing, Seoul (1951), Bloody Ridge, Heartbreak Ridge, Pork Chop Hill Result: Military stalemate and restoration of prewar status quo. The division of Korea in 1945 after World War II at the thirty-eighth parallel into U.S. and Soviet zones of military occupation resulted in the creation of two separate governments. The determination of both the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north to reunify the country ignited the Korean War. After its creation in September, 1948, North Korea had focused on supporting southern guerrillas, holding its army in reserve, and allowing South Korea to initiate most of the clashes along the thirty-eighth parallel. Starting in May, 1949, North Korea escalated its retaliation, resulting in major fighting. After Soviet arms deliveries tilted the balance in its favor, North Korea committed its regular army in August, 1949, to a campaign that drove ROK forces from salients north of the parallel. Except for a brief clash on the Ongjin Peninsula, there were few serious border incidents for the next ten months, as South Korea avoided fights it could no longer win. However, the clashes persuaded the United States to limit South Korea’s offensive military capability, denying it tanks, planes, and much heavy artillery, while bolstering North Korea’s argument to Moscow that only conquest of South Korea would remove future threats to its survival. The North Korean Invasion Soviet leader Joseph Stalin gave his reluctant consent to North Korea’s invasion plan in April, 1950. At dawn on June 25, 1950, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA), led by Choe Yong Gun, launched assaults at seven points along the parallel, while staging amphibious landings on the east
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Time Line of the Korean War June 25, 1950
Korean War begins when North Korean troops cross the thirty-eighth parallel.
June 28, 1950
North Koreans occupy Seoul.
July 1, 1950
First U.S. ground combat troops arrive in Korea.
July 5, 1950
Battle of Osan: North Korean forces, in their first engagement with poorly equipped and ill-trained U.S. forces, easily sweep them aside.
July 16-20, 1950
Taejon falls.
July 29Sept. 19, 1950
Battle of the Pusan Perimeter: American and South Korean forces effectively defend the Pusan Perimeter, preventing North Korea’s military conquest of the entire peninsula.
Sept. 15, 1950
Inchon Landing: A decisive American and United Nations victory.
Sept. 26, 1950
Recapture of Seoul.
Sept. 29, 1950
United Nations forces drive the remainder of the North Korean forces out of South Korea.
Oct. 8, 1950
United Nations and Chinese forces move into North Korea.
Oct. 14, 1950Apr. 11, 1951
Truman-MacArthur Confrontation: An irreconcilable dispute between General Douglas MacArthur, the head of military forces in Korea, and President Harry S. Truman tests the principle of civil control of the military.
Nov. 24, 1950
MacArthur launches his Home-by-Christmas Offensive to force North Korea to surrender.
Nov. 26, 1950
Chinese forces intervene in the war by crossing the Yalu River and attacking the exposed flanks of MacArthur’s forces.
Jan., 1951
Chinese forces recapture Seoul, which they maintain until March, 1951.
Apr. 22-30, 1951
Battle of Imjin River: Communist offensive fails to take Seoul, and the Chinese army fails to sever the primary supply line to U.S. First Corps.
Aug., 1952
Battle of Bloody Ridge.
Sept., 1952
Battle of Heartbreak Ridge.
Mar. 23July 11, 1953
Battle of Pork Chop Hill: Chinese forces seize Pork Chop Hill near the end of the war.
June 4, 1953
China accepts voluntary repatriation.
July 27, 1953
Armistice ends the fighting.
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coast. Composed of roughly 135,000 well-trained troops, it had about 150 Soviet-built T-34 tanks, 110 combat planes, and abundant heavy artillery. The South Korean army consisted of eight combat divisions totaling 65,000 soldiers plus 33,000 support troops, with only flat-trajectory antitank guns and rocket-launching bazookas. The North Korean army’s main offensive thrust sent four of seven infantry divisions and 120 tanks toward Kaesong (June 25, 1950), seizing the city after just three hours. Early the next day, the North Korean forces crushed South Korea’s counterattacking Seventh Division, and fleeing South Korean soldiers abandoned countless mortars, howitzers, machine guns, and antitank guns. The North Koreans occupied Seoul on June 28, 1950. Meanwhile, in the center of the peninsula, South Korean forces mounted a spirited defense against two Northern Korean divisions and thirty tanks for five days, then withdrew to avoid being flanked from the west. Isolated on the east coast, the South Korean Eighth Division fought well and delayed the North Korean advance. The U.S. Reaction North Korea’s attack surprised the United States, although intelligence reports that spring had indicated that North Korea was evacuating civilians and staging a military buildup just north of the parallel. Following existing plans, President Harry S. Truman secured resolutions at the United Nations (U.N.) authorizing military assistance to South Korea. He ordered U.S. naval and air support for South Korean forces on June 25 but did not commit ground troops until five days later, approving the urgent request of General Douglas MacArthur, the occupation commander in Japan. Reorganized remnants of the South Korean army delayed the North Korean advance south of the Han River until July 3. At the Battle of Osan (July 5, 1950), the North Korean forces, in their first engagement with understrength, poorly equipped, and ill-trained U.S. forces, easily swept aside Task Force Smith. A United Nations resolution created the U.N. Command, and Truman named MacArthur commander. After Taejon fell (July 16-20, 1950), North Korea pushed U.N. forces back to the Pusan Perimeter (July 29-September 19, 1950) in the southeastern corner of Korea. By August, the North Korean army had grown to ten divisions with the addition of South Koreans who either had been impressed into service or had voluntarily enlisted. It faced five reorganized South Korean divisions and the U.S. Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry Divisions and First Cavalry Division. The Tenth Corps’ amphibious assault at the port of Inchon (September
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15, 1950), thirty miles west of Seoul, met only slight resistance. The next morning, the U.S. First Marines moved eastward, with the Seventh Infantry Division protecting its right flank. Recapture of Seoul (September 26, 1950) was more difficult even after linking up with the U.S. Eighth Army that had broken out of the Pusan Perimeter, but once accomplished, United Nations forces on September 29 pushed the remnants of the North Korean forces out of South Korea. China Enters the War After the United States sent its Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait, the People’s Republic of China feared that U.S. destruction of the North Korean army would threaten not only its own security, but its image as the leader in Asia. In July, China reorganized its Thirteenth Army Corps into the Northeastern Border Forces and deployed it along the Yalu River. On October 2, Mao Zedong persuaded his reluctant colleagues to approve sending troops to fight in Korea as “volunteers.” Beijing made a final effort to avoid entry when on October 3, Premier Zhou Enlai told India’s ambas-
General Douglas MacArthur (right) visiting the front lines, accompanied by his military secretary, Major General Courtney Whitney (second from left) and Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway (center), who was later to replace him as commander of the United Nations ground forces. (National Archives)
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Korean War, 1950-1953 U.S.S.R. H
I
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Shenyang
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Hyesan
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NORTH KOREA
. gR on d e Ta P'yongyang
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Chongjin
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Ch’unch’on Wonju Seoul Shantung Ha n R Andong SOUTH . S e a . Kum R g R . KOREA N a k to n Taejon Kunsan Farthest northern advance Kyongju Chonju Taegu Kwangju Farthest southern retreat Pusan Haeju Y e l l o w Inchon
Demilitarized zone
o f
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sador that if U.S. forces crossed the parallel, China would react. Most U.S. officials thought Beijing was bluffing. In fact, the Truman administration had decided in August to invade North Korea, finalizing plans for forcible reunification on September 11 and giving MacArthur almost a free hand in advancing to the Yalu River. On October 8, both United Nations and Chinese forces moved into North Korea. Major engagements early in November confirmed China’s intervention, but MacArthur viewed full Chinese participation as unlikely. He launched his Home-by-Christmas Offensive on November 24 to force North Korea to capitulate. The Eighth Army and the Tenth Corps were to strike northward separately before linking to crush the North Korean forces. The U.N. forces encountered little resistance initially, then China counterattacked in force, sending its enemy into rapid retreat. Only a harrowing withdrawal from the Chongjin Reservoir and a miraculous evacuation at Hungnam rescued the Tenth Corps from annihilation. MacArthur pressed for a naval blockade and military attacks against China, but Truman refused to widen the war, despite publicly hinting in December that he was considering using atomic weapons.
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Allied Counteroffensive General Matthew B. Ridgway, who became commander of U.N. ground forces in December, halted the retreat after Chinese forces recaptured Seoul early in January, 1951. He then implemented a strategy to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy, providing for the use of long-range artillery coupled with air attacks using napalm and rockets before ground troops with support of tanks advanced with heavy machine-gun and mortar fire. Beginning in February, Ridgway employed this “meat-grinder” strategy in Operation Killer and then in Operations Ripper and Courageous. Within three months, the U.N. forces had returned to the parallel. However, on April 22, the Chinese initiated a final effort to destroy the U.N. forces and reunite Korea. The primary target of this offensive was Seoul, with a secondary thrust at Kapyong to the east. The Chinese assault, relying as before on night attacks and superior numbers to overwhelm the enemy, was costly and ineffective against well-prepared U.N. forces, although the South Korean Sixth Division collapsed. Despite suffering huge casualties, the Chinese redeployed eastward in May and sent thirty divisions against U.N. lines. South Korean units again broke under pressure, but reinforcements blocked a breakthrough. A U.N. counteroffensive soon threatened Chinese forces with envelopment, forcing them to retreat in disarray. China’s Fifth Phase Offensive gained nothing, and its forces sustained the worst losses of the war. By confirming the U.N. forces’ ability, through superior organization and firepower, to overcome tactics relying on massed manpower, the offensive hastened a military stalemate, thus opening the way to truce talks on July 10. By then, smaller contingents of military forces from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, South Africa, and Great Britain had joined South Korea and the United States. However, to maintain the multinational character of the U.N. forces, the United States had to comply when its allies opposed military escalation. Cease-fire U.N. forces maintained battlefield pressure to achieve a quick armistice, seizing key positions north of the parallel in the Battles of Bloody Ridge (August, 1952) and Heartbreak Ridge (September, 1952). To force concessions, the United States dropped dummy atomic bombs and intensified B-29 bombing raids on North Korea, but communist MiG fighters, often with Soviet pilots, inflicted heavy damage, climaxing in the Battle of Namsi (1952). When negotiators agreed to a cease-fire line in November, the U.N. forces adopted active defense as the basis for ground strategy. The
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A U.S. gunnery squadron led by an African American sergeant holds a position north of North Korea’s Chongchon River in late November 20, 1950. The Korean War was the first U.S. conflict in which the armed services were racially integrated. (National Archives)
Eighth Army would undertake no major offensives and limit the scope of operations to capturing outposts in terrain suitable for temporary defense. Thereafter, a pattern emerged of patrolling and small-scale fighting with U.N. forces merely reacting to enemy contacts. Peng Dehuai, commander of Chinese forces, followed suit, causing Korea to develop into a war of attrition resembling World War I, with a static battlefield and armies depending on barbed wire, trenches, artillery, and mortars. Because both sides placed a priority on achieving an early armistice, they emphasized gaining and maintaining defense in depth, increasing troops, and stockpiling equipment behind the front line. U.S. military leaders proposed plans for offensive action but were unable to gain approval for implementation from either the Truman or Dwight D. Eisenhower administration. However, the United States did expand the air war in the spring of 1952, attacking North Korean targets of economic importance to China and the Soviet Union. That summer, the U.N. forces bombed power installations along the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, such as the huge Suiho plant. This strategy extended to attacking targets of political significance, especially Pyongyang, using napalm as well as high explosives, with the aim of undermining enemy
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U.S. Marines negotiating Korea’s rugged mountain terrain while closing with the enemy. (U.S. Marine Corps)
morale and raising to an unacceptable level the costs of stalling the truce talks. Despite the raids, the North Koreans remained inflexible, resulting in suspension of the talks in October. Both sides continued to sustain huge losses in protracted ground engagements in the spring of 1953 at Triangle, Whitehorse, and Pork Chop Hill. By then, U.S. planners had gained approval for attacks against the dams supplying water for rice cultivation in North Korea, the first attacks taking place in May. Armistice President Eisenhower later credited the armistice ending the Korean War to success in convincing the North Koreans and Chinese that the alternative was a wider war, employing atomic weapons. Atomic coercion may have played a role in China’s accepting voluntary repatriation on June 4, 1953, thus opening the way to an armistice, but domestic economic pressures in the communist states, the Soviet bloc’s growing desire for peaceful coexistence, and the death of Joseph Stalin were more important. The communists then launched new military thrusts to gain the propaganda value of a symbolic military victory at the end of the war. China also focused attacks on South Korean forces to persuade South Korea’s government to endorse and respect the armistice agreement. Despite more than a year of U.S. effort to train and equip an enlarged South Korean army capable of
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postwar self-defense, only U.S. troops from the Third and Twenty-fourth Divisions, and commitment of the 187th Regimental Combat Team from Japan, halted the offensive. A U.N. counteroffensive on July 17 restored a position six miles south of the original battle line. On July 27, 1953, signing of an armistice ended fighting in the Korean War. More than 2 million Koreans died during the war, and China sustained an estimated 360,000 casualties. U.N. casualties totaled 159,000, which included 33,629 U.S. combat deaths. Aftermath Conflict between South Korea and North Korea continued into the twenty-first century, making the demilitarized zone that separates the two Koreas one of the world’s most heavily fortified and dangerous boundaries. Chinese forces withdrew, but the United States retained troops in South Korea. Periodic incidents kept alive fears of renewed war. James I. Matray
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The Air War As the first jet-age war, the Korean conflict affirmed air power’s decisive importance in modern warfare, but its conditions undermined some air power expectations. After World War II, the Korean Peninsula was divided into two countries, the Republic of Korea (ROK), supported by the United States, in the south, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), with Soviet and Chinese backing, in the north. After communist North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, the United States led a U.N. effort to help South Korea repel the assault, supplying the vast majority of U.N. forces. At first, neither the United Nations nor the South Koreans were prepared for the North Korean onslaught, but desperate fighting enabled them to retain some of the southeastern peninsula near Pusan during the summer of 1950. The Americans’ September 15, 1950, Inchon Landing, combined with a breakout from Pusan, helped the South Koreans to rout the North Koreans that autumn. The United Nations then resolved to destroy the North Korean Army and to reunite Korea under its sponsorship. However, China, threatened by U.S. aggression in Asia, attacked U.N. forces in late autumn, 1950, forcing their lengthy retreat back into South Korea. The United Nations counterattacked in early spring, 1951, and had stabilized the lines near the prewar boundary by summer. The two sides entered protracted negotiations as their forces fought for limited advantage. The July 27, 1953, armistice terminated active hostilities. Air Forces Both sides in the Korean War fought for limited objectives,and the superpowers were concerned with defense needs elsewhere in their worldwide face-off. Thus, neither side fully committed its air forces to this fight. Also, the war occurred during a transition period in air warfare technology. Thus, World War II-vintage, propeller-driven fighters, such as the Soviet Yak-9 and U.S. P-51 Mustang, did much of the early fighting for the respective sides. Other propeller planes, such as the A-1, Corsair, and British Sea Fury,also provided excellent service as attack planes throughout the war. Because the Americans did not commit their frontline strategic bombers to Korea, World War II-era B-29’s accomplished most of the United Nations’ long-range heavy bombing tasks. U.S. transport planes were mostly
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propeller-driven holdovers from the last war. The communists even used P0-2 biplanes to fly nighttime nuisance attacks, nicknamed “Bedcheck Charlies,” against U.N. forces. Simultaneously, the Korean War introduced jets to air combat. U.S. F-80’s and F-9F Panthers were among the straight-wing, subsonic jets that flew attack missions. The most noteworthy jet development occurred with the appearance of the Soviet-built Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15. This sweptwing, transonic fighter seriously threatened the U.N. air effort until the Americans quickly fielded a counterpart, the F-86 Sabre jet. Jets such as the U.S. F-94 Starfire and F-3D Skyknight also served as radar-equipped night fighters. The Korean War also witnessed the first extensive use of helicopters. These early, underpowered, piston-engine models flew light logistics missions. However, they also demonstrated impressive utility for rescue missions and covert operations.
An important contribution of the Korean War to aerial warfare was the first extensive use of helicopters, which made it possible to move materials and personnel in and out of areas inaccessible to other aircraft. Helicopters were particularly useful for evacuating wounded soldiers, as in this Marine photograph, and helped enable the Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals later made famous by the film and television series titled M*A*S*H— in both of which helicopters figured prominently. (U.S. Marine Corps)
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Air War Conduct The war’s limited scope precluded nuclear weapons usage by both sides. Also, the combatant air arms attacked targets only in Korea, not communist targets in the Soviet Union and China, or U.S. targets in Japan. Both sides thus emphasized tactical air combat, though each remained wary of the other’s capacity to escalate the air war, and with it, the war itself. At the war’s start, U.S. fighters quickly vanquished the inexperienced North Korean Air Force, thus allowing attack planes to maul the North Korean Army’s supply lines. These interdiction air raids, along with close air support (CAS) missions against frontline troops, were major factors in repelling the communist invasion. U.N. air forces pulverized North Korean transportation links during the autumn, 1950, U.N. advance. As they entered the war, the Chinese introduced the MiG-15, flown by Chinese and Soviet pilots, to check this effort. They failed partly because of the MiG’s short range and partly because F-86 pilots were better trained. Although U.N. air raids destroyed communist air bases in North Korea, MiG-15’s could still fly from their safe havens in China and harrass U.N. planes in far northeast Korea, nicknamed “MiG Alley.” The Chinese did have bombers, but they kept them only as an inplace air raid threat. Air power was important in stopping the late-1950 Chinese advance. On two occasions, U.N. CAS and air supply saved large units surrounded by communist armies. As the battle lines stabilized and truce talks stalemated, U.N. leaders approved several U.S. Air Force-led attempts to interdict the communist supply lines. These interdictions inflicted serious damage and kept many troops and supplies from the front, but they did not compel capitulation or even perceptibly affect the truce talks. The communists were masters of primitive improvisation, and because both sides attempted no major offensives, interdiction’s true effect could not be assessed. More dramatic were the MiG Alley air battles between F-86’s and MiG-15’s, in which U.S. pilots increasingly dominated their opponents. Air War Results The Korean War ended after the death of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin and a veiled American threat to use nuclear weapons. U.N. aerial successes probably helped convince the communists of the war’s futility, but the later interdiction campaigns remained controversial because they did not meet their proponents’ claims. Indeed, the war demonstrated that not all post-World War II conflicts would be decided exclusively by nuclear
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bombing campaigns by or conventional interdiction, as some air power advocates asserted. Instead, the Korean War revealed an ever-widening air warfare spectrum. Per the air power ideal, jet fighters remained necessary to achieve air superiority, and heavy bombers and attack planes remained decisive with behind-the-lines attacks. However, in Korea, tactical missions such as CAS rose in importance. Aircraft carrier-based planes were especially valuable early in the war, when battle conditions eliminated land bases. The performance of helicopters did not match that of airplanes, but their utility showed great promise for future conflicts. Although U.S. leaders saw Korea as an aberration, they encountered similar conditions in the Vietnam War. Douglas Campbell
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Censorship During the War During this U.S.-led war against North Korea’s invasion of South Korea, U.S. government efforts to constrain negative media coverage contrasted sharply with World War II censorship policies, foreshadowing an even more adversarial government-media relationship during the later Vietnam War. North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in June, 1950, triggered a renewal of American military operations barely five years after the end of World War II. American press coverage of the Korean War represented a sharp departure from the role the media had played in the earlier conflict. Whereas the media generally accepted the need to support the Allied effort against the Axis powers, American involvement in the Korean War was controversial and less generally accepted. General Douglas MacArthur, the supreme commander in Korea, initially instituted a system of voluntary censorship resembling the system used in the world war. However, as it became evident that journalists were less willing to toe Washington’s official line, MacArthur instituted a system of formal, prepublication review for all dispatches from the war zone. As a consequence, many press reports were heavily censored, fostering resentment among members of the press corps. This further weakened the shared sense of mission that had characterized military-press relations in the previous war. Moreover, the increasingly critical perspective of press reports in turn fostered the belief among military leaders that the press was handicapping the war effort. More than practicing simple censorship, MacArthur’s headquarters has been accused of deliberately disseminating misinformation during the Korean War. Press conferences, communiqués, and other official statements from the military headquarters in Tokyo, Japan, were frequently challenged by journalists and columnists in the United States and Britain. The official exaggerations of foreign threats and the downplaying of national casualties might partly be explained as owing to the Cold War climate that permeated virtually all aspects of international relations. However, some critics attributed the high command’s thoroughgoing control and manipulation of war information to be a function of the supreme commander’s personal hubris. Against this interpretation, the fact that press censorship and media manipulation did not significantly ease after President Harry S. Truman’s dismissal of MacArthur in April, 1951, suggests that there was a driving force larger than MacArthur’s ego behind military censorship. Indeed, censorship was signifi-
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cantly strengthened after the United States began committing troops to the Vietnam War during the 1960’s. Meanwhile, as late as 1996 investigations were continuing into charges that the U.S. government had deliberately hidden embarrassing information about the Korean War effort. U.S. Senate hearings and Pentagon investigations uncovered documents revealing that up to a thousand American prisoners of war (POWs) remained in North Korea after the July, 1953, armistice and prisoner exchange. The possibility that POWs had been left behind has often been raised, but it has repeatedly been discounted by U.S. authorities. Recently discovered evidence indicates, however, that President Dwight D. Eisenhower himself may have been aware that some POWs remained behind in North Korea.
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Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events July-September, 1950 Battle of the Pusan Perimeter Date: July 29-September 19, 1950 Location: Southeast corner of Korea Combatants: United States, South Korean, and United Nations forces vs. North Korea and China Principal commanders: American and U.N., Lieutenant General Walton Walker (1889-1950); North Korean, Choe Yong Gun (1900-1976) Result: American and South Korean forces successfully defended the Pusan Perimeter, preventing North Korea’s military conquest of the entire peninsula. North Korean forces invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, advancing southward quickly despite U.S. military intervention. After defeats at Osan, the Kum River, and Taejon, the U.S. Eighth Army established in late July a defensive position in the southeast corner of the peninsula. A rectangular area, the Pusan Perimeter was about eighty miles from north to south along the Naktong River and fifty miles east to west to just north of Yongdok on the Sea of Japan. Defending it was the U.S. Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry and First Cavalry Divisions together with the First, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Capital Divisions of the Republic of Korea (ROK), guided by General Walton Walker. North Korea’s Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighteenth, and Twelfth Guards and elements of its Thirteenth and Fifteenth Infantry and 105th Armored Divisions, though exhausted and understrength, initiated fierce fighting for over a month. No longer able to use previously devastating flanking and rear attacks and subject to constant U.S. air and naval bombardment, the North Korean forces, under Choe Yong Gun, battered but did not destroy the Pusan Perimeter. The South Korean forces successfully defended Taegu, allowing supplies and reinforcements to arrive at Pusan behind shorter logistics lines.
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U.S. Marines marching through Pusan on their way to the front. (U.S. Marine Corps)
The amphibious landing assault at Inchon on September 15, 1950, and then interdiction of North Korea’s extended logistics lines enabled U.S. and South Korean forces to break out of the Pusan Perimeter and move northward swiftly after September 19. James I. Matray
September, 1950 Inchon Landing Date: September 15-25, 1950 Location: West-central Korea Combatants: United States vs. Korean People’s Army Principal commanders: American, Major General Edward M. Almond; North Korean, unknown Result: A decisive American and United Nations victory.
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As the Battle of the Pusan Perimeter raged, United Nations commander General Douglas MacArthur prepared an amphibious assault behind Korean People’s Army (KPA) lines to cut its communications south and open a two-front war. Confident that Lieutenant General Walton Walker’s Eighth Army could hold Pusan, MacArthur built up another force for Operation Chromite. Although there was agreement on a landing, only MacArthur wanted the landing to be at Inchon. Korea’s second largest port, Inchon was fifteen miles from the capital city and the main KPA supply line south; cutting it would starve KPA troops on the Pusan Perimeter. However, Inchon’s tidal range, strong currents, and narrow channel all made a landing there extremely hazardous. MacArthur overrode all opposition, however. On September 15, Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond’s Tenth Corps (First Marine Division and Seventh Army Division) carried out the landing. Destroyers and U.S. Marine and British aircraft provided support. The operation went off in textbook fashion, and Inchon was taken with light United Nations forces casualties. MacArthur’s timing was fortunate; Soviet mines were stacked ashore waiting to be laid.
U.S. Marines (in foreground) commandeer defensive trenches abandoned by North Korean troops as supplies are landed at Inchon. (U.S. Marine Corps)
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The Eighth Army shortly broke out on the Pusan Perimeter and drove north. Seoul fell on September 26, and only some one-third of the KPA escaped across the thirty-eighth parallel. MacArthur was convinced the war was won. Spencer C. Tucker
October, 1950-April, 1951 Truman-MacArthur Confrontation Date: October 14, 1950-April 11, 1951 Location: Korea, Tokyo, and Washington, D.C. Principal figures: Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964), President Harry S. Truman (1884-1972) Result: An irreconciliable disagreement between the head of military forces in Korea and the U.S. commander in chief tested the principle of civil control of the military. General Douglas MacArthur of the U.S. Army was a powerful military leader and a highly controversial politician, having been a Republican Party contender in the presidential campaigns of 1944, 1948, and 1952. As the overseer of the occupation of Japan, he was the obvious choice as commander of all United Nations forces when the Korean War broke out in June, 1950. The Korean War challenged the willingness of the U.S. people to accept the burden of a discouraging and dirty struggle to check communist aggression. It was a war being fought for limited ends, without hope of a decisive victory. This was the first war to be carried forward under the policy of containment initiated by President Harry S. Truman. A cause of serious dispute was whether the brand of military strategy dictated by the containment policy would prove workable or would be tolerable to the public and to Congress. In the first year of the Korean War, the question of how communist expansion should be met found expression in a personal, political, and constitutional struggle between President Truman and General MacArthur. MacArthur’s flouting of a strategy that had presidential approval resulted in his dismissal. A public outcry ensued. The MacArthur-Truman confrontation was one of the most serious threats in the nation’s history to the basic principles of civilian control over the military. The circumstances in which the Korean War began guaranteed that
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President Harry S. Truman greets General Douglas MacArthur at the latter’s arrival on Wake Island on October 14, 1950. (AP/Wide World Photos)
MacArthur would have a commanding role. In June, 1950, MacArthur, after a long and illustrious military career, was serving as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). Since September, 1945, MacArthur had governed Japan, exercising the functions and enjoying much of the prestige of a head of state. For some time, MacArthur had disapproved of the Far Eastern policy of the Truman administration. MacArthur believed that Asia would be the supreme test of communist expansion, not Europe. When North Korea invaded South Korea in June, 1950, President Truman responded and gained United Nations’ sanction. MacArthur was appointed supreme commander of U.N. forces in Korea. Operating out of his headquarters in Tokyo and using staff officers who were personally devoted to him, MacArthur began to plan a bold offensive counterstrike that would place the United Nations on the way to a complete victory. This plan called for amphibious landings at Inchon, the port on Korea’s west coast a few miles from Seoul, and was carried forward against strong opposition from some military and naval leaders. MacArthur dismissed all objections, revealing a pattern of authoritarianism that was to become clearer as the
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weeks and months passed. He believed that Korea provided a priceless opportunity for the United States to recoup lost prestige and to stop Asian communism once and for all. He also saw this war as an outstanding opportunity to conclude a brilliant military career. China Enters the War As the U.N. forces approached China in the north, rumors of Chinese intervention abounded. MacArthur downplayed them. He advocated, if necessary, a preventive war against China, including the dropping of twenty or thirty atomic bombs on Chinese cities. He supported a policy of encouraging the Chiang Kai-shek regime on Formosa and employing part of Chiang’s army in Korea. This was in direct opposition to Truman’s aim of preventing any widening of the war. MacArthur’s outspokenness about Formosa caused the first dispute with Truman, and apparently led the president to give serious thought to firing the general. Instead, Truman ordered MacArthur to withdraw the statement, which MacArthur did. President Truman was forced to move carefully in his relations with MacArthur because of MacArthur’s great popularity and the power of his political supporters. The stunning success of the Inchon landings added to the general’s reputation. Military success also allowed the Truman administration to expand its political goals in Korea. For a time, Truman and MacArthur worked toward the same ends. The administration’s initial aim had been the restoration of the thirty-eighth parallel as the boundary between North and South Korea, but in September, Truman approved MacArthur’s proposal that United Nations and South Korean forces move into North Korea and occupy the entire country. This action followed a National Security Council recommendation that all North Korea be occupied, unless Soviet or Chinese troops were encountered. The thirty-eighth parallel was crossed on October 7, and the campaign proceeded without difficulty. By mid-November, advance units were nearing the Yalu River. MacArthur’s headquarters was supremely confident that complete victory was assured and discounted growing rumors of military intervention by the Chinese communists. At that point, an extraordinary conference took place. Truman flew to remote Wake Island for a meeting with MacArthur on October 14. The fact that the president would travel so far to meet with a subordinate was evidence of the delicacy of the relationship between the two men. The Wake Island conference glossed over the differences between them. MacArthur provided assurances that the Chinese would not intervene, but was in error. On November 26, Chinese forces crossed the Yalu River and attacked
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the exposed flanks of MacArthur’s forces. There followed a numbing retreat, and by Christmas, 1950, United Nations forces were once again fighting below the thirty-eighth parallel. Truman and MacArthur now took opposing positions. The Truman administration, alarmed by China’s action, moved to limit the war. MacArthur pressed for attacks against the Chinese troops and supplies in Manchuria and, implicitly, for expansion of the war into China proper. The president refused and decided to allow only the Korean side of the Yalu River bridges to be bombed. This was a compromise that infuriated MacArthur. MacArthur’s Intransigence MacArthur became increasingly belligerent. In January, 1951, he recommended a naval blockade of China, air attacks to destroy Chinese military and industrial capabilities, and the use of Nationalist Chinese forces in Korea. The president again restrained him, arguing that the worldwide threat of the Soviet Union made a war of containment necessary in Korea. The fact that Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway, MacArthur’s deputy in Korea, was dealing directly with the White House and the Pentagon, and was making a success of limited war, made MacArthur’s position more difficult. The final phase of the MacArthur-Truman confrontation began when the general attempted to bypass the president in order to gain support for his program from Congress and the U.S. people. MacArthur’s practice of making public his differences with the president and Washington policymakers angered and embarrassed Truman on several occasions. The break came in late March, 1951. When MacArthur learned that President Truman planned to issue a peace offer, he released a military appraisal, a document that amounted to an ultimatum to the Chinese. It destroyed any hope of a negotiated settlement and precipitated Truman’s decision to dismiss MacArthur. “By this act,” Truman stated, “MacArthur left me no choice—I could no longer tolerate his insubordination.” After making his decision, Truman was concerned only about the timing of the act, but the timing was to be decided by MacArthur and his allies in Congress. On April 5, Representative Joseph Martin read a letter from MacArthur on the floor of the House of Representatives. MacArthur again rejected the limited war policy and called for total victory in Asia. A series of meetings began in the White House the following day. On April 11, President Truman cabled MacArthur in Tokyo and, at the same time, informed the press that the general was being relieved of his command because he was unable to give wholehearted support to the president’s policies.
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Aftermath General MacArthur returned to the United States a triumphant hero. He addressed a joint session of Congress. Across the nation, there was a tremendous surge of support for him. A joint Senate committee conducted hearings during the rest of the summer. Truman rode out the emotional reaction, secure in the conviction that his decision had been correct. He was supported openly by his military advisers. Powerful foreign leaders praised his courage. After two months of hearings, the committee issued no report. Theodore A. Wilson updated by Eugene L. Rasor
April, 1951 Battle of Imjin River Date: April 22-30, 1951 Location: Along the Imjin River, north of Seoul, Korea Combatants: United Nations (U.N.) forces, mostly U.S. and British vs. Chinese forces Principal commanders: U.N., Lieutenant General James Van Fleet (18921992); Chinese, General Peng Dehuai (1898-1974) Result: Communist offensive failed to take Seoul, and the Chinese army failed to cut the main supply line to U.S. First Corps. Having failed to maintain their hold on Seoul during the first offensive of 1951 (January through March), Chinese communist forces, under by General Peng Dehuai, launched a second offensive in April against the United Nations forces, under Lieutenant General James Van Fleet. The main goal of the Chinese Sixty-third Army, about 27,000 strong, had been to recapture the South Korean capital. The British Twenty-ninth Brigade Group, including a Belgian infantry battalion, held the ground north of the Imjin River. Only 63 men from the Belgian battalion reached safety, the unit having run out of ammunition, food, and water. Although the brigade group was forced to fall back, they inflicted such heavy casualties on the Chinese army that it was no longer capable of recapturing Seoul. Chinese casualties were estimated at 11,000; U.N. casualties at about 1,000. The fighting resulted in a U.S. Presidential Unit Citation and the
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awarding of Victoria Crosses to Lieutenant Colonel J. P. Carne and Lieutenant P. K. E. Curtis. By mid-May, communist forces were forced to withdraw to the north, and by July 1, they had agreed to discuss a possible cease-fire. John Powell
March-July, 1953 Battle of Pork Chop Hill Date: March 23-July 11, 1953 Location: East-central Korea Combatants: United Nations Command vs. Chinese communist forces Principal commanders: U.N., General Maxwell Taylor (1901-1987); China, Commander in Chief Peng Dehuai (1898-1974) Result: Chinese forces took Pork Chop Hill near the conclusion of the war.
Soldiers wounded in the Battle of Pork Chop Hill are evacuated from the combat zone. (U.S. Department of Defense)
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Named because of its shape, Pork Chop Hill became a test of endurance for U.S. and Chinese military forces during the last five months of the Korean War. Located less than sixty miles north of Seoul, Pork Chop possessed little strategic value. However, the Chinese, led by Peng Dehuai, wanted to take possession of the hill before the conclusion of the Panmunjon Peace Talks to demonstrate China’s will to continue fighting if necessary. The Chinese mounted three attacks on Pork Chop Hill between March 23 and July 11, 1953. The first two attempts were unsuccessful, although on March 26, the Chinese did secure Old Baldy, a hill near Pork Chop. In midApril, a second attack took and held Pork Chop for two days but then lost it to U.S. counterattacks on April 18, thanks to help from an allied artillery barrage of more than 77,000 rounds during the two-day battle. The third and final Chinese attack began on July 6, just three weeks before the end of the war. For three days, there were U.S. counterattacks, until General Maxwell Taylor decided that increasing the number of casualties was not commensurate to the strategic value of the hill. Pork Chop was evacuated on July 11, 1953. After the armistice on July 27, Pork Chop became a part of both North Korea and the demilitarized zone. John Quinn Imholte
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Further Reading Appleman, Roy S. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu: The U.S. Army in the Korean War. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961. Bateman, Robert L. No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War Incident. Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 2002. Blair, Clay. The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953. New York: Times Books, 1987. Cagle, Malcolm W., and Frank A. Manson The Sea War in Korea. 1957. Reprint. New York: Arno Press, 1980. Chen, Jian. China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. Clark, Eugene Franklin. The Secrets of Inchon: The Untold Story of the Most Daring Covert Mission of the Korean War. Introduction by Thomas Fleming. New York: Putnam’s, 2002. Crane, Conrad. American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000. Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War. 2 vols. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990. Ent, Uzal W. Fighting on the Brink: Defense of the Pusan Perimeter. Paducah, Ky.: Turner Publishing, 1996. Fehrenbach, T. R. This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History. 50th anniversary ed. Foreword by Gordon Sullivan. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s 2000. Field, James A. History of United States Naval Operations: Korea. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Navy, Naval History Division, 1962. Foot, Rosemary. The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985. Futrell, Robert. The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953. Reprint. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1996. Goncharov, Sergei, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai. Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993. Green, David. Captured at the Imjin River: The Korean War Memories of a Gloster, 1950-1953. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Leo Cooper, 2003. Haas, Michael E. In the Devil’s Shadow: UN Special Operations During the Korean War. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000. Hallion, Richard. The Naval Air War in Korea. Baltimore: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1986.
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Hamburger, Kenneth E. Leadership in the Crucible: The Korean War Battles of Twin Tunnels and Chipyong-ni. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003. Hanley, Charles J., Sang-Hun Choe, and Martha Mendoza. The Bridge at No Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare from the Korean War. New York: Henry Holt, 2001. Hermes, Walter G. Truce Tent and Fighting Front. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966. James, D. Clayton. Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea, 1950-1953. New York: Free Press, 1993. Kaufman, Burton I. The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command, 1950-1953. Philadelphia: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986. Knox, Donald. The Korean War: Uncertain Victory. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988. Langley, Michael. Inchon Landing: MacArthur’s Last Triumph. New York: Times Books, 1979. Lowe, Peter. The Korean War. Basingstoke, England: Macmillan, 2000. MacDonald, Callum A. Korea: The War Before Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 1986. McLaren, David R. Mustangs over Korea: The North American F-51 at War, 1950-1953. Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer Publishers, 1999. McWilliams, Bill. On Hallowed Ground: The Last Battle for Pork Chop Hill. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2004. Marshall, S. L. A. Pork Chop Hill: The American Fighting Man in Action, Korea, Spring, 1953. 1956. Reprint. Norwalk, Conn.: Easton Press, 1993. Matray, James I., ed. Historical Dictionary of the Korean War. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991. Merrill, John. Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989. Montross, Lyn, and Nicholas Canzona. The Inchon-Seoul Operation. Vol. 2 in U.S. Marine Operations in Korea. Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, United States Marine Corps, 1954-1957. Owen, Joseph R. Colder Than Hell: A Marine Rifle Company at Chosin Reservoir. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996. Rees, David. Korea: The Limited War. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964. Rottman, Gordon L. Korean War Order of Battle: United States, United Nations, and Communist Ground, Naval, and Air Forces, 1950-1953. Foreword by Ed Evanhoe. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002. Russ, Martin. Breakout: The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, Korea 1950. New York: Fromm International, 1999.
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Sandler, Stanley. The Korean War: No Victors, No Vanquished. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999. ____________, ed. The Korean War: An Encyclopedia. New York: Garland, 1995. Stueck, William W., Jr. The Korean War: An International History. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995. ____________. Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002. Thompson, Warren E., and David R. McLaren. MIG Alley: Sabres vs. MIGs over Korea: Pilot Accounts and the Complete Combat Record of the F-86 Sabre. North Branch, Minn.: Specialty Press, 2002. Toland, John. In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953. New York: Quill, 1991. Varhola, Michael J. Fire and Ice: The Korean War, 1950-1953. Mason City, Iowa: Savas, 2000. Whiting, Charles. Battleground Korea: The British in the Korean War. London: Sutton, 1999. Zhang, Shu Guang. Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995. Zhang, Xiaoming. Red Wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002.
Vietnam War 1960’s-1975 Vietnam War . . . . . . . . . . . . . Weapons, Tactics, and Strategies . . The Peace Movement . . . . . . . . Justice During the War. . . . . . . . U.S. Supreme Court During the War Women in the War . . . . . . . . . . Ethics of the War . . . . . . . . . . . Censorship During the War . . . . .
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Vietnam War At issue: Control of South Vietnam Date: 1961-1975 Location: North and South Vietnam Combatants: United States, South Vietnam vs. North Vietnam Principal commanders: American, Paul Harkins (1904-1984), William Westmoreland (1914), Creighton Williams Abrams, Jr. (1914-1974); North Vietnam, Vo Nguyen Giap (1911) Principal battles: Ia Drang Valley (1965), Siege of Khe Sanh (1968), Hue (1968) Result: After a decades-long struggle, the communist regime of North Vietnam achieved a complete victory and reunited Vietnam under a single government. The Vietminh victory over the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 led to the withdrawal of the French from Vietnam, which they had colonized and controlled for more than a century except for a brief period during World War II. The 1954 Geneva Conference split Vietnam into North and South and recommended elections be held within two years. However, South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem rejected the Geneva agreement, proclaiming himself president of the Republic of Vietnam. The United States, which refused to sign the Geneva agreement, supported the Diem regime with funds and, by 1960, with 900 American military personnel. U.S. Involvement The incoming presidential administration of John F. Kennedy approved a counterinsurgency plan for Vietnam early in 1961. The Kennedy White House likewise sought a cease-fire in Laos, where communists also sought to gain a foothold. South Vietnamese President Diem requested an increase in the U.S. presence in his country, which rose to 3,205 advisers by the end of the year. In 1962, the United States established the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), under the authority of General Paul Harkins. Changes were also made in the army’s joint chiefs and chief of staff positions. In order to gain the support of the South Vietnamese people against communist invaders, the United States assisted South Vietnam with the strategic hamlet program, whereby rural communities were organized and fortified against attacks. American military personnel increased to 11,300 by the conclusion of 1962.
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Time Line of the Vietnam War Aug. 18, 1945
Indochinese Communist Party leader Ho Chi Minh proclaims a Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and France begins reasserting its colonial rule in Indochina.
Mar. 13-May 7, 1954
Battle of Dien Bien Phu: Viet Minh victory over the French, leads to withdrawal of the French from Vietnam.
July 21, 1954
The Geneva Conference calls for a partition of Indochina into four countries—North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia—and for an election within two years to unify North and South Vietnam.
Aug. 11, 1954
Formal peace treaty partitions the country into North and South Vietnam.
1955
United States assumes political control of South Vietnam from the French.
1956
United States and the U.S.-backed South Vietnamese president, Ngo Dinh Diem, reject the Genevamandated reunification elections, knowing that the popular Ho Chi Minh would win.
1961
North Vietnam seeks to absorb South Vietnam; United States gradually becomes involved.
Aug., 1964
Gulf of Tonkin incident: Facts pertaining to this event, which is used to justify empowering the president of the United States to conduct warfare without Senate approval, are suppressed by the U.S. government in order to rally popular support for the Vietnam War.
Nov. 14-16, 1965
Battle of Ia Drang Valley: U.S. disturbance of a planned North Vietnamese offensive.
Jan. 21-Apr. 6, 1968
Siege of Khe Sanh: Although U.S. firepower clearly overwhelmed the North Vietnamese, General Vo Nguyen Giap refuses to admit defeat, claiming that the battle is a calculated diversionary tactic.
Jan. 30-Feb. 25, 1968
Tet Offensive: North Vietnamese and Viet Cong launch the Tet Offensive, which, although unsuccessful, provides a political and psychological victory.
Jan. 31-Feb. 25, 1968
Battle of Hue: The battle signals the beginning of the end of U.S. involvement in the war.
Mar. 16, 1968
My Lai Massacre.
Apr. 29-June, 1970
U.S. troops invade Cambodia.
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Nov. 17, 1970Mar. 29, 1971
Lieutenant William L. Calley is tried and convicted of killing twenty-two Vietnamese civilians.
Jan. 31, 1973
Peace accord is signed; North Vietnam begins releasing U.S. prisoners.
Mar. 29, 1973
Last U.S. troops leave Vietnam.
Apr. 30, 1975
North Vietnam occupies Saigon, ending the civil war, and last U.S. advisers leave the country.
July 2, 1976
North and South Vietnam are formally united.
The following year witnessed several violent demonstrations against the Diem government, which was accused of progressing too slowly on reforms and stifling dissent. After the U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam was replaced, the Kennedy administration gave tacit support to a coup by some of Diem’s military commanders. The coup succeeded, and Diem and his brother were subsequently executed. Less than three weeks after the change in the South Vietnamese government, President Kennedy was assassinated. Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson became president, promising no major changes in Vietnam policy. By the end of the year, 16,300 U.S. military advisers were stationed in South Vietnam. General William Westmoreland replaced General Harkins as head of the MACV, while General Maxwell Taylor replaced Henry Cabot Lodge as U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam in 1964. In August of that year, allegations of two separate attacks by the North Vietnamese on U.S. destroyers in the region led the Johnson administration to request that Congress approve the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which would permit the United States to suppress communist attacks by any means necessary. The latter legislation was approved unanimously in the U.S. House of Representatives, and it received only two negative votes in the Senate. On November 1, two days before Johnson was elected president in his own right, an attack by communist supporters in South Vietnam (Viet Cong) resulted in the deaths of five U.S. servicemen. Two more Americans were killed by a Viet Cong attack on Christmas Eve. By the end of 1964, 23,300 U.S. soldiers were stationed in Vietnam. Escalation of the Conflict After widespread attacks by Viet Cong on U.S. military installations in South Vietnam during early 1965, President Johnson ordered the first large-scale ground troops to the embattled nation. He likewise authorized the beginning of an air-bombing campaign, known as Operation Rolling
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Although American military involvement in Vietnam began long before Lyndon B. Johnson became president and did not end until more than six years after he left office, the war is associated more closely with his administration than with that of any other president, and it ultimately doomed his presidency. (Library of Congress)
Thunder, which would continue on and off until the end of 1972. Lodge returned as U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam in July of 1965. In November, with American troop strength at 184,300, the first major battle between American and North Vietnamese soldiers occurred in the Ia Drang Valley (1965) region. American deaths totaled 636 by the end of the year. The United States rapidly escalated its military presence in South Vietnam over the next two years. In 1966, Americans bombed oil deposits in Hanoi and Haiphong. Troop strength increased to 385,300 by the end of 1966. During 1967, Nguyen Van Thieu was elected president of South Vietnam, ending a period of instability in which a series of South Vietnamese leaders served for a short duration, and Ellsworth Bunker became the new U.S. ambassador there. By the end of 1967, 485,600 U.S. military personnel were present in South Vietnam, with a total of 16,021 U.S. servicemen killed to date in the conflict. For several reasons, 1968 proved to be a pivotal period in the Vietnam War. First, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong engaged Americans in costly battles at Khe Sanh and Hue. Second, the Viet Cong, led by Vo Nguyen Giap, used the lunar new year known as Tet to simultaneously attack military, diplomatic, and civilian sites throughout South Vietnam.
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Third, General Creighton William Abrams, Jr., replaced General Westmoreland as head of MACV. Fourth, President Johnson announced in March that he would not run for reelection as president. Republican Richard Nixon narrowly defeated Democrat Hubert H. Humphrey for the presidency in the November election, promising to enact a plan to end the war. Finally, after several years of backing U.S. participation in the Vietnam War, a majority of American citizens expressed opposition to it. By the end of 1968, with the war looking like a stalemate at best, 536,000 U.S. soldiers were stationed in South Vietnam. A total of 30,610 U.S. troops had perished in hostilities to date. Nixon’s Strategy The incoming Nixon administration implemented a multifaceted strategy pertaining to the Vietnam War in 1969. First, in June, President Nixon announced the initial withdrawal of American ground troops, which numbered about 25,000. Second, Nixon promulgated the Nixon Doctrine in July, which established the policy of Vietnamization. By that policy, the United States would furnish the funds and equipment necessary to permit the South Vietnamese military to defend the country against the communist North. Third, the Nixon White House initiated secret talks with the North Vietnamese aimed at ending the U.S. role in the conflict, which would continue through 1972. Fourth, the Nixon administration enacted a pacification policy, which involved coordinating military, intelligence, and civilian operations in order to take the offensive in the war. Although U.S. troop strength decreased to 475,200 by the end of 1969, the number of American deaths climbed to a cumulative total of 40,024. Frustrated by the communist tendency to use neighboring Cambodia as a sanctuary from which attacks were mounted against South Vietnam, the Nixon administration sought the assistance of Cambodian leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk. When Sihanouk insisted on remaining neutral, the U.S. supported a coup to topple him from power. The replacement of Sihanouk with General Lon Nol, in March, 1970, led directly to the U.S. occupation of the nation a month later in order to ferret out communist troops. The operation, though approved by General Nol, was viewed by many Americans as an invasion. Subsequent protests at home, many on college campuses, precipitated the killing of four students at Kent State University, in Ohio, and two students at Jackson State University, in Mississippi. The Cambodian mission ended after two months. The reaction by the U.S. Congress was swift: In July, the Senate unanimously repealed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, and in December, Congress banned both American combat forces and advisers from Cambodia and Laos. By the end of
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1970, with U.S. troop strength reduced to 334,600, a total of 44,245 Americans had died in the conflict. In 1971, the Nixon administration faced the release of the Pentagon Papers—the secret history of the Vietnam War as compiled by the Department of Defense—when the U.S. Supreme Court rejected their suppression. Though the mission of U.S. ground troops changed from an offensive to a defensive role, Nixon ordered a resumption of bombing of North Vietnam. By the end of the year, 156,800 American troops were still present in South Vietnam, with 45,626 U.S. soldiers killed in fighting to date. Turning Point Other than 1968, the year 1972 was the most eventful of the war. First, the South Vietnamese military, with American logistical support, successfully repelled an Easter offensive by North Vietnam. Second, Nixon’s dual visits to China and the Soviet Union resulted in slowing support for North Vietnam by both the Chinese and the Soviets. Third, Americans renewed bombing of Hanoi in March and mined several North Vietnamese ports in April. The combination of the latter factors hastened a peace agreement between the United States and North Vietnam. Announced in October, less than a month from the presidential election, it no doubt contributed to Nixon’s overwhelming victory against Democratic candidate George McGovern. The agreement, hammered out by Nixon’s national security adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, later appeared to be in jeopardy. In response, Nixon ordered widespread bombing of North Vietnam, including civilian targets. The massive bombing continued over the Christmas holiday but caused Hanoi to request renewed negotiations on December 26. At the end of 1972, for the first time during the conflict, cumulative American deaths (45,926) outnumbered the remaining troops stationed in South Vietnam (24,200). The peace agreement ending direct U.S. participation in the Vietnam War was signed in Paris on January 27, 1973. It called for withdrawal of all but a few U.S. troops from South Vietnam along with a return of all U.S. prisoners of war. However, because it also provided for a cease-fire, allowing the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong to remain in South Vietnam, the South Vietnamese government opposed the arrangement. Aftermath Though South Vietnamese leaders remained adamantly against the aforementioned peace agreement, they assumed that the United States would fulfill Nixon’s pledge to furnish the material and fiscal resources necessary to protect their nation. However, the Watergate scandal, com-
Vietnam, 1954-1975 NORTH
VI
C
ET
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Dien Bien Phu
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Haiphong
Gulf
A
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Hanoi
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of
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To n k i n
Demilitarized Zone Quang Tri Hue
H
A
I
L
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Da Nang
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SO
T
My Lai
S o u t h C h i n a
UT
S e a
H Qui Nhon
M
ek
on
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Ri
ve
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C A M B O D I A
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G u l f
o f
Nha Trang
Saigon
T h a i l a n d Mekong River Delta
(1) Last French position falls, 1954. (2) Tet Offensive, January, 1968. (3) Cambodian invasion, April-May, 1970. (4) Sihanouk falls, April, 1970. (5) Laotian incursian, February, 1971. (6) Areas of U.S. bombing, 1972. (7) Mining of Haiphong Harbor, May, 1972. (8) Lon Nol falls, April, 1975. (9) North Vietnamese offensive, spring, 1975. (10) South Vietnam surrenders, April 20, 1975.
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bined with a newly assertive Congress, compromised the U.S. promise to guard South Vietnam against further communist aggression. In August, 1973, direct U.S. military operations ended in all of Indochina. In November, the U.S. Congress prohibited funds from being expended for military actions in any part of Southeast Asia and passed the War Powers Act over Nixon’s veto. In April, 1974, as he faced impeachment, Nixon requested an additional $474 million to assist South Vietnam and was denied it. After Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974, Vice President Gerald R. Ford became president. He reaffirmed to South Vietnamese President Thieu the U.S. commitment to furnish funds and equipment, but his subsequent proposals in that regard were rejected by Congress. Although they assumed in December, 1974, that it would take two years to conquer the South, North Vietnamese military leaders planned a winter, 1975, offensive. The strategy proved enormously successful, as South Vietnamese troop morale and supplies diminished rapidly. Just two weeks after Cambodia fell to communist forces, North Vietnamese soldiers marched on Saigon on April 30, 1975, ending the decades-long conflict and unifying the nation under communism. The United States spent over $140 billion in its longest war, which most acknowledge to be the first military defeat suffered by the nation. The United States lost more than money; it lost a generation of its youth, with more than 58,000 killed in fighting or as a result of the war. Some 2,000 U.S. troops missing in action remain unaccounted for and are presumed dead. South Vietnam lost more than one million soldiers and citizens during the conflict, as did North Vietnam. In 1995, twenty years after the end of the conflict, the United States and Vietnam renewed diplomatic relations and began trading with each other. Samuel B. Hoff
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Weapons, Tactics, and Strategies Although the United States had an overwhelming superiority in weapons throughout its military involvement in Vietnam, it ultimately lost the war because of its failure to find a strategy suitable for the political and geographical conditions of the conflict. As the conclusion of World War II liberated Southeast Asia from Japanese domination, Indochinese Communist Party leader Ho Chi Minh swiftly moved ahead with his political goal of a unified and independent Vietnam, proclaiming a Democratic Republic of Vietnam on September 2, 1945. At the same time, however, France began reasserting its colonial rule in Indochina. Ho, previously allied with the United States—especially through its Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), against the Japanese, looked for support in his goal from the United States. Political Considerations With a Cold War developing between the United States and the Soviet Union, U.S. president Harry S. Truman chose not to risk a break with France and adopted a policy of what has been called “guarded neutrality.” The United States accepted France’s return to Indochina but required that aid to France not be used in Vietnam. As war in Korea threatened in 1950, the United States recognized the French-supported government of Emperor Bao Dai, the last emperor of the Nguyen Dynasty, and made available both economic aid and military supplies. The 1954 Geneva Conference, which ended the war between France and Ho’s Viet Minh, called for a partition of Indochina into four countries— North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia—and for an election no later than 1956 to unify the two Vietnams. The United States, however, assumed political control of South Vietnam from the French in 1955, when the American choice for president, Ngo Dinh Diem, replaced Bao Dai. Diem proclaimed the Republic of Vietnam in the south, and both he and the United States refused to be bound by the call for a reunification election, knowing that the North’s popular Ho Chi Minh would win. North Vietnam, determined to conquer the South, had the political, financial, and technological support of the Soviet Union and China. The South Vietnamese government sought, with the support of the United States, to maintain its rule in the South. The United States government
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feared a so-called domino effect; if South Vietnam fell to communism, it reasoned, so would other nations in Asia, including India. Both North and South Vietnam were now markers in the Cold War conflict between the three superpowers—the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. During its long struggle in Vietnam, the United States remained hampered by Cold War concerns and the desire to avoid pushing either of the other superpowers into active engagement in the fighting. Military Achievement The crushing defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu in northern Vietnam in 1954 essentially brought the First Indochina War (1946-1954) to an end. However, Ho Chi Minh controlled only the northern half of Vietnam, and although the French had been forced out, the Americans had replaced them. Now the North Vietnamese turned their attention to undermining the South Vietnamese government and extracting such a high price for American involvement that the United States would withdraw. The date often given for the beginning of the Second Indochina War, or what Americans call the Vietnam War, is 1956, the year in which the United States and Diem rejected the Geneva-mandated reunification elections. In 1959, North Vietnam’s Central Executive Committee formally changed the country’s approach from political to armed struggle. Remnants of the Viet Minh who had stayed in the South (the Viet Cong) were activated by the North Vietnamese Politburo. The Viet Cong specialized in terrorist warfare against U.S. soldiers and South Vietnamese loyal to the Diem government. Their largest campaign was the Tet Offensive of 1968, which ended in the almost complete destruction of the Viet Cong infrastructure and the end of the Viet Cong as a significant military threat. From that point on, the war to unify the country was carried out primarily by traditionally organized North Vietnamese military forces. U.S. president Richard M. Nixon, taking office in 1969, implemented the policy of Vietnamization, whereby the war effort would be turned over gradually to the South Vietnamese. The final American fighting forces withdrew from Vietnam in late March, 1973, following a January 27 peace agreement. The South Vietnamese were given some breathing room by many American victories, including the decimation of the Viet Cong forces and the disruption of communist staging areas and transportation routes in Cambodia by means of a 1969 bombing (Operation Menu) and a 1970 invasion. Nonetheless, the fall of Saigon eventually occurred, on April 30, 1975.
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Weapons, Uniforms, and Armor The French army in the First Indochina War was highly mechanized and had the support of such artillery pieces as 105-millimeter howitzers, 75-millimeter recoilless rifles, and heavy mortars. Quad-50 machine guns, consisting of four .50-caliber machine guns mounted together, were capable of great destruction. France also had fighters, fighter-bombers, and bombers, but only about one hundred planes altogether. The Viet Minh began its military efforts against the French with a ragtag collection of arms given them by the United States during World War II or captured from the French. Land mines proved useful against the French, as they would later against the Americans. As the Korean War (1950-1953) neared its end, arms and other equipment began to flow into North Vietnam from the Soviets and Chinese. Soviet heavy-duty Molotova trucks proved invaluable for transporting arms and supplies. The Soviet Union provided rifles, machine guns, and a variety of heavier weapons, including 120-millimeter mortars, recoilless cannons, and bazookas. Effective additions to Viet Minh uniforms were two large wire-mesh disks, one over the helmet, the other hanging from the back. The wire mesh was filled with foliage to hide the troops from both aerial and ground observation. In the Second Indochina War, or the Vietnam War, the most powerful aerial weapon for the United States was the Strategic Air Force B-52 Stratofortress bomber, modified to carry thirty tons of conventional bombs and with a range of 7,500 miles. Leading fighter-bombers were the Air Force F-105 Thunderchief and the Navy and Marine Corps A-4 Skyhawk. The top fighter plane was the F-4 Phantom, flown by the Air Force, Navy, and Marines. Napalm, a jellied gasoline, was widely employed by the United States and South Vietnam in aerial bombs. The South Vietnamese Air Force, trained and supplied by the U.S., flew F-5 Freedom Fighters and A-37 Dragonfly fighter-bombers. The North Vietnamese essentially had no air force until the mid-1960’s when China and the Soviet Union started supplying the North with MiG15, MiG-17, MiG-19, and MiG-21 jet fighters. The United States relied heavily on helicopters. The Huey utility helicopter (UH-1) was used to transport troops and supplies, evacuate wounded, and even attack the enemy when modified with heavy armaments. The primary attack helicopter was the AH-1 Cobra gunship, armed with a grenade launcher, machine guns, and rockets. The U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet deployed attack carrier strike forces consisting of carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and other vessels. American forces
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Vo Nguyen Giap, the chief Viet Cong commander. (Library of Congress)
also had access to amphibious ships, swift inland boats to patrol rivers, and air-cushioned hovercraft (PACVs) and airboats for marshy areas. U.S. artillery included 105-millimeter towed artillery, 105-millimeter and 155-millimeter self-propelled howitzers, 175-millimeter guns, and 8-inch howitzers. The portable, shoulder-fired M72 Light Antitank Weapon (LAW) was used by Americans and South Vietnamese against tanks and bunkers. North Vietnam began to use medium and heavy artillery in the South during the 1970’s. Their artillery pieces ultimately included 76-millimeter, 85-millimeter, 100-millimeter, 122-millimeter, and 130-millimeter guns and howitzers. Communist forces in the South had only machine guns and rifles to use against planes early in the war but near the end had Soviet SA-7 antiaircraft missiles and Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), the latter able to reach 85,000 feet. Another SAM, the Soviet SA-7, could be shoulder-fired. Americans switched in 1967 from the heavy M-14 rifle to the lighter and shorter M-16, which used a smaller, 5.56-millimeter cartridge and could be fired either one shot at a time or fully automatically. The United States also armed the South Vietnamese with the new rifle. The most effective sniper weapon was a carefully modified version of the M-14, the M-14 National
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Match rifle (M-14NM) with the Limited War Laboratory’s adjustable ranging telescope (ART), possessing a range of more than 1,000 yards. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong used the Soviet AK-47 rifle, which was similar to the M-16. Less conventional weapons included mines and booby traps. The United States and its allies used the antipersonnel Claymore mine, which could be detonated at a distance by closing an electrical circuit, and also did extensive mining from the air. The Viet Cong made widespread use of booby traps, ranging from sharpened bamboo stakes called pungi stakes to a variety of mines including the Bouncing Betty, which would bounce into the air when triggered and explode around waist height. Military uniforms of generally standard types were worn by the regular forces. Although Viet Cong are associated with the black pajamas and sandals they sometimes wore in combat, they often mingled during the day with other South Vietnamese, wearing no uniform or other clothing that would set them apart. Despite the often inhospitable terrain, the United States and South Vietnamese troops used tanks throughout the war, including the dieselpowered M48A3 Patton tank and the M42 Duster tank. The North Vietnamese, beginning in 1968, utilized Soviet-made T-34, T-54, and T-59 medium tanks as well as PT-76 amphibious tanks. The United States made wide use of armored personnel carriers (APCs), especially the M-113 APC. The APCs were often altered to carry weapons and other cargo as well as troops, and with the addition of gun shields, extra armor, and machine guns, served as attack vehicles. Military Organization Both the French and communist forces used traditional patterns of organization such as battalions, regiments, and divisions. However, Viet Minh general Vo Nguyen Giap gave his commanders considerable flexibility regarding strategy and tactics, thus permitting quick decision making. French control remained more centralized along World War II models to coordinate armor, infantry, airpower, and parachute drops. During the Second Indochina War, or Vietnam War, American decision making was fragmented, split along various vectors that included the president of the United States as commander in chief, the secretary of defense, the joint chiefs of staff, and the commander in chief of the Pacific Command (CINCPAC), the latter stationed in Honolulu and responsible for prosecution of the war. The United States/Vietnam-based command and control entity after 1962 was MACV (U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam). As a “sub-
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ordinate unified command,” MACV was required to seek approval from the Honolulu-based CINCPAC headquarters. Virtually all military control for the North Vietnamese was unified under Giap, who was a member of the ruling Politburo, minister of defense, and commander in chief of the armed forces. The United States divided South Vietnam into four tactical zones numbered, from north to south, I, II, III, and IV Corps. Air Force operations, except for Strategic Air Command B-52 actions, were carried out by the Seventh Air Force, with Naval operations conducted by the Seventh Fleet, both ultimately under CINCPAC. The basic units of the U.S. Army were the squad, platoon, company, battalion, brigade, division, and corps, with minor differences in the Artillery and Marine Corps. Below the Seventh Air Force in Vietnam was the 834th Air Division, divided into wings, squadrons, and flights. A flight included about five aircraft. Marine and Naval air units were similarly organized. The South Vietnamese Armed Forces were largely organized in the same manner as those of the United States but under the SVNAF Joint General Staff, which increasingly took direction from MACV. The South Vietnamese Regional Forces and Popular Forces, both civilian militias, also were under the Joint General Staff. The Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDGs), primarily Montagnards, were trained and usually led by U.S. Army Special Forces. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were organized generally along the same lines as the U.S. forces, starting with divisions but including regiments rather than brigades. The Viet Cong had a party secretary and various supply, social welfare, and propaganda units. After Tet, remaining Viet Cong were organized into cadres under North Vietnamese control. Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics The primary doctrines that drove the First and Second Indochina Wars were colonialism, nationalism, communism, and democracy. At the conclusion of World War II, France sought to reestablish its colonial rule over Indochina. Ho Chi Minh, widely seen within his country and by the Americans as more of a nationalist than a communist, a perception the validity of which continues to be debated, sought to assert his vision of a unified and independent Vietnam. Ho’s triumph over the French in 1954 removed one colonial ruler but failed to unite all of Vietnam. The Second Indochina War, or the Vietnam War, achieved Ho’s nationalist goal of unifying all of Vietnam, but as a communist nation. The United States throughout adopted the position of eschewing colonial domination while attempting to help South Vietnam secure permanent freedom as a
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democratic state, thus containing the spread of communism. These basic tenants led, affected by a variety of misconceptions, to the strategies and tactics adopted by the various warring parties. The French tried to fight a war of attrition, believing they could wear down the Viet Minh. The French implemented this strategy by constructing hundreds of forts and pillboxes in northern Vietnam, which the Viet Minh simply went around whenever they chose. The French finally decided to adopt a more active strategy, which included cutting supply lines and luring the enemy into face-to-face battles. In the climactic manifestation of this policy, the French began in November, 1953, to establish a “mooring point” for French troops in a valley in northwestern Vietnam near the village of Dien Bien Phu. There the French established a defense perimeter, built two landing strips, and sent out patrols to cut supply lines to the enemy forces in Laos and engage the enemy in direct combat. Giap used Soviet-supplied trucks and large numbers of construction workers to enlarge a winding mountain road to permit transportation of heavy artillery into the surrounding mountains and began his assault on March 13, 1954. The battle, and effectively the war, ended on May 7. The United States, during its Vietnam War, fused a war of attrition with both a limited war to contain communism and a misjudgment that the Viet Cong were engaged in an insurgency that could be opposed with counterinsurgency tactics. Because the United States never fully recognized that North Vietnam was the true enemy and that the Viet Cong were an arm of the North, its primary goals, which included supporting the South Vietnamese government and rooting out insurgent elements in the South, at best addressed only parts of the problem. President Lyndon B. Johnson, given a free hand by the Gulf of Tonkin resolution (1964), began a steady buildup of American forces in Vietnam that numbered about 550,000 by 1968. The United States had thus abandoned its earlier advisory role and taken over primary direction and prosecution of the war. To weaken the enemy’s resolve, the United States bombed the North in a campaign called Operation Rolling Thunder that lasted from 1965 until 1968. The bombing stopped in 1968 to encourage peace discussions but resumed in 1972 to push the communists toward serious negotiations. The United States also steadily bombed the Ho Chi Minh Trail in fruitless efforts to halt infiltration of men and materials into the South. Airpower never achieved the major goals the United States set for it, but it did help win many battles in the South with bombing and close support for ground operations. Helicopters proved extremely effective in transporting men and supplies and evacuating the wounded. In addition, the
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bombing of Cambodia in 1969 and 1970 bought time for the South Vietnamese armed forces to try to improve their war capabilities. On the ground, American forces attempted to engage the enemy in direct combat operations, which first occurred in the fall of 1965 in the Ia Drang Valley. Like most such encounters, the short-term effect was a victory for the Americans. Counterinsurgency tactics included such pacification efforts as educational, medical, and economic-development programs and search-anddestroy operations such as Cedar Falls (1967) and Junction City (1967) to deny the Viet Cong access to the countryside and its people. The hammerand-anvil tactic caught Viet Cong between forces already in place (the anvil) and forces sweeping in from the sides (the hammer). These operations cleared the land for a time, but the Viet Cong inevitably moved back in. As a guerrilla force, the Viet Cong used such tactics as mines and booby traps with deadly effectiveness. They dug elaborate tunnel complexes that served as supply depots, hiding areas for troops, even field hospitals. The Tet Offensive of 1968 was the result of the change in strategy on the part of the North Vietnamese to a wider armed struggle. In cities, towns, and hamlets, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong launched attacks on January 31, during the Vietnamese Tet holiday. In all locations, the communist forces were ultimately driven back. Although the Viet Cong suffered massive losses and ceased to be a major player in the war, Americans were unaware of the magnitude of their defeat. Instead, seeing attacks all across South Vietnam convinced Americans that the war was going badly. In 1969 President Nixon instituted a new strategy called Vietnamization, which meant getting the United States out of the war and turning the fighting over to the South Vietnamese. With a plan to capture as much territory as possible before a final peace agreement, the North Vietnamese army launched attacks against provincial and district capitals throughout much of South Vietnam in the spring of 1972. Like Tet, the offensive was a military defeat for the North but a psychological victory, demonstrating how dependent the South Vietnamese were on U.S. support. By 1975 the North Vietnamese army had twice as many tanks as the South Vietnamese, and the more than 25,000 North Vietnamese troops in the Central Highlands were easily reinforced from the North. The U.S. failure to recognize North Vietnam as the central enemy had led to peace with the supply lines along the Ho Chi Minh Trail still functioning and the war production effort in the North unimpeded after 1973. The strategic definition of the war as counterinsurgency and the principle of containment, along with fear that movement of U.S. forces into the North might trigger a
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war between superpowers, meant there would be no invasion by U.S. forces. The United States had by neither force nor negotiation been able to drive the communists out of the South. The United States had the military might but not the strategy, and therefore not the tactics, to defeat the enemy. With the expectation that the March, 1975, offensive would be both a prelude to a final triumph the following year and a test to see whether the United States would intervene, the North began its military push on March 11 with a victory at Ban Me Thuot in the Central Highlands. South Vietnamese president Nguyen Van Thieu decided to abandon the Central Highlands, and the North Vietnamese drove to the sea, cutting South Vietnam in half. The northern provinces fell, Thieu resigned on April 21, and on April 30, the new president, General Duong Van Minh surrendered. Edward J. Rielly
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The Peace Movement While the U.S. government sought a military solution in Vietnam and mechanisms to contain dissent at home, the peace movement criticized U.S. domestic and foreign policies in social, political, and cultural terms. The peace movement in the United States was influenced heavily by the Civil Rights movement of the early 1960’s. Especially influential was the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), which worked to oppose racial segregation in the southern states. Students of all races who had been active in the Civil Rights movement through freedom rides, boycotts, and voter-registration projects learned to demonstrate their discontent through nonviolent protest. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) became one of the largest organizations associated with the peace movement during the late 1960’s. In 1962, leaders of SDS drafted the Port Huron statement, which called for nonexclusion of socialist and communist groups and for participatory, grass-roots democracy. The rejection of “red-baiting” and promotion of democratic decision making and nonexclusion by SDS became hallmarks of the peace movement and were used to define a “New Left,” which rejected dogma and the fragmentation of the “Old Left.” The prominence of SDS dramatically increased as a result of its decision to protest the U.S. intervention in Vietnam by sponsoring the first national demonstration against the war in Washington, D.C., and by organizing teach-ins, at which people would hear the SDS perspective on Vietnam and U.S. policy. By June, 1969, however, SDS had become factionalized to the point that it dissolved. Supporters of the Movement Despite popular perceptions, the peace movement had a broader base than student organizations. Groups of African Americans protested U.S. involvement in Vietnam as well. Since the combat soldiers who were sent to Vietnam were disproportionately black, and since many blacks were upset at the federal government for not protecting their rights while it was using rhetoric that the United States was defending the rights of Vietnamese, many blacks (especially the youths involved with the SNCC) were strongly involved in the antiwar movement. Martin Luther King, Jr., became an active leader in the peace movement in 1967, stressing that the importance of his emphasis on promoting nonviolence in the Civil Rights movement paled when compared to the level of violence the United States was using in Vietnam.
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Prominent Hollywood personalities also became involved with activities in support of the peace movement. In 1970 and 1971, actor Jane Fonda and other entertainers toured under the name “Free the Army Antiwar Troupe” in areas around U.S. military bases in order to encourage military personnel to protest U.S. policies. When Fonda visited Hanoi in 1972, she made numerous antiwar radio broadcasts to U.S. troops. Although Fonda had seen POWs, upon returning to the U.S. she did not defend them. In reaction to her trip and reports, leaders in Colorado and Maryland tried to ban Fonda from entering their states. An intellectual wing, embodied in the Community of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS), became a large factor in the peace movement. Consisting of academics and graduate students who had been trained in various aspects of Asian studies, the CCAS broke from the larger academic community (particularly the Association for Asian Studies), which refused to take an official stand on the war. Seeing complicity in silence, CCAS members were determined to take responsibility for the results of their research. Once organized, the CCAS became a source for vital information on Vietnam for a movement (and a society) that had little understanding of the country or its people. Through books, lectures, periodicals, and conferences, the CCAS served as a counter to the governmental disinformation about Vietnam and U.S. policy. Utilizing many different tactics, the peace movement was able to exert considerable influence on public opinion. Large marches became a major way in which the movement was able to show its strength and gain media attention. On April 24, 1971, one million protesters crowded Washington, D.C., in the largest demonstration in U.S. history. Parts of the movement also used direct action, especially targeting the draft. Youths burned their draft cards at the risk of imprisonment, and priests destroyed draft boards’ records in symbolic protest. The use of teach-ins to spread information about Vietnam spread to college campuses across the United States. On October 15, 1969, millions of people participated in a day of moratorium by not working. Government Response The governmental response to the peace movement was multifaceted. Most visibly, the U.S. government, especially under President Richard Nixon, countered demonstrators with strong rhetoric, painting the demonstrators as unpatriotic radicals. This rhetoric sprang from the attitude that protesters were students who were self-indulgent and morally rudderless, allowing officials to discredit their actions. In addition to this criticism, the government instituted harsh policies against the peace movement. More
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than three thousand draft resisters were imprisoned for burning draft cards or tampering with draft records. Further, the Nixon administration established domestic espionage and infiltration programs, using both the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The FBI and CIA systematically spied on and attempted to subvert activist organizations by planting agents. The information gathered or created was then used to blacklist antiwar activists and, in some instances, was used to bring charges against organizations, diverting their resources from opposing the war. A major target was the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars. Evidence suggests that the agencies used provocateurs to participate in illegal activities, thereby entrapping activists. Part of the Nixon administration’s response to defuse public opinion was to open public negotiations and to implement “Vietnamization,” which called for an increased reliance on Vietnamese troops and a reduction in the number of U.S. troops deployed in Vietnam. The chief proponent of Vietnamization, Melvin Laird, also recommended that the administration make the prisoners of war a public issue, breaking the silence on the issue that had prevailed during the Lyndon Johnson administration. The United States intended to use the POW issue “to bring world opinion to bear on the North Vietnamese” by charging that the Vietnamese had maltreated and tortured prisoners. In accordance with this goal, in 1969 and 1970 the United States brought up the issue with the International Red Cross and the United Nations. Finally, some prisoners who were released early were used to broadcast charges of maltreatment by their captors. Making the POWs a public issue in tandem with negotiations also allowed the administration to dismiss immediate withdrawal plans as unrealistic, since they did not resolve the issue of the POWs. Critics of the administration’s policy charged that the rhetoric used against the Vietnamese merely increased the value of the prisoners as hostages. Another charge of the peace movement was that the Nixon administration manipulated the issue of the prisoners to expand the war and to continue to keep U.S. forces in Vietnam. Both sides in the war violated international standards for treatment of prisoners. The recounting of torture by U.S. prisoners, the early parading of prisoners as “war criminals” in Hanoi, and the lack of information given about the prisoners by the government of North Vietnam all were clear violations of international conventions. In South Vietnam, however, treatment was as harsh if not harsher. It was revealed that prisoners were kept in “tiger cages” on Con Son island. Guerrillas who were captured were classified as political dissidents, not prisoners of war (and thus were not protected by international conventions). Aside from the evidence of tor-
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ture of prisoners, there was strong evidence showing that U.S. forces often killed prisoners in the battlefield in order to raise body-count figures. On January 27, 1973, the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and a protocol on prisoners of war were signed by the United States, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (National Liberation Front), and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). When the POWs were returned to the United States, the treatment they received was less than honorable. They were not allowed to speak freely for a period after their return, and when they were allowed to speak it was in controlled press conferences. Some prisoners who had made statements against the war while captives were charged with aiding the enemy. These charges were dismissed after one of the accused shot himself to death. Since there no longer existed any clear issue around which the peace movement could organize, the diverse groups had no reason to continue to work together and returned to separate domestic concerns. Impact The peace movement in the Vietnam era changed the way people in the United States thought about government and politics. Foremost among these changes was that a large segment of the population grew to distrust the federal government, especially the presidency. A direct result of this sentiment was the War Powers Act of 1973, which was intended to curb the power of the president to commit U.S. troops abroad. For the first time since the founding of a bipartisan consensus on foreign policy after World War II, the public grew to challenge the assumptions that underlay U.S. policy. The congressional consensus broke down, resulting in the U.S. decision not to send troops to Angola. The change in perspective about the public’s right to debate foreign policy also led to a larger segment active in challenging presidential and State Department decisions. The methods of the peace movement in the Vietnam era permeated society to such an extent that the ideals of nonviolent resistance and grassroots organizing became mainstays of social movements. Not only did progressive organizations continue to use these protest tactics, but conservative organizations, notably antiabortion groups, also adopted similar strategies in pursuit of their goals. Scholars who were blacklisted for their antiwar activities in the Vietnam era continued to feel the war’s impact, as some still were unable to get jobs within the field of Asian studies. In large part, these scholars’ input on governmental decisions was limited, as was their access to research and grant
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money. Their prolific output of information during the war changed the context of academic debate, however, and helped to encourage a strain of activist scholar. The division in society did not end with the war but continued to manifest itself in various ways in the United States. Conflict continued over the issue of whether there were any living prisoners of war or soldiers missing in action (MIA) remaining in Indochina. In large part, however, the numbers of MIA included a significant number of people known to have been killed in action. Still, some organizations such as the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing In Southeast Asia continued to demand a full accounting of every MIA. Strongly related to the issue of MIAs was the dispute over whether and when the United States should normalize relations with Vietnam. By the early 1990’s, the United States was relaxing its trade embargo on Vietnam, and there were calls to normalize relations with the country. In January, 1994, the Senate approved a nonbinding resolution urging President Bill Clinton to lift the trade embargo completely, in the hope of persuading the Vietnamese government to provide a full accounting of Americans still listed as missing during the war. The president complied with the resolution, and U.S.-Vietnamese relations grew steadily warmer. In May, 1995, Vietnam began giving the United States documents on missing Americans. In July, President Clinton announced that relations with Vietnam would be normalized, and during the following month the first U.S. embassy was opened in Hanoi. High-level dignitaries of the two countries began exchanging visits, and President Clinton himself visited Hanoi with his family in November, 2000. Richard C. Kagan updated by the editors
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Justice During the War The war in Vietnam raised significant political and social justice issues, including the constitutional powers of the presidency, free speech, the composition of the armed forces, and the reintegration of veterans into society. American involvement in the war in Vietnam was the result of Cold War politics. After World War II the United States supported its ally France in French attempts to regain former colonial possessions in Indochina. In 1954, when the French left Indochina after the siege at Dien Bien Phu, the Eisenhower administration gave full backing to a pro-American South Vietnamese dictatorship. Subsequent administrations increased American commitment in Vietnam. The Powers of the Presidency On August 7, 1964, Congress approved the so-called Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the U.S. government’s response to an alleged attack by North Vietnamese patrol boats on U.S. naval vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of North Vietnam. The resolution authorized President Lyndon B. Johnson to take “all necessary measures to repel any armed attacks against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression” and to “promote the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia.” Johnson used the resolution as a blank check to expand American involvement in the conflict. By essentially forfeiting its constitutional right to declare war, Congress had made it possible for Johnson and, later, Richard Nixon to expand the U.S. commitment of equipment and troops. In the spring of 1970, the Nixon administration went so far as to bomb two neutral countries, Cambodia and Laos, because the Viet Cong were transporting arms through both countries into South Vietnam and maintained supply bases within their borders. At that point, the Senate repealed the 1964 resolution. On January 27, 1973, the United States and North Vietnam signed a cease-fire agreement, mandating the withdrawal of all remaining U.S. troops within sixty days. Reacting to the Vietnam experience, Congress passed the War Powers Act on November 7, 1973, which limited deployment of troops without notification of Congress to sixty days. The act was intended to define and circumscribe the powers of the president when acting as the commander in chief of the armed forces.
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Opposition to the War Demonstrations against the war began in earnest in 1965, along with the first burning of a draft card in protest of the war. Many of the early demonstrations against the war were organized by Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), and opponents of the war were generally dismissed as leftists and college radicals. As American involvement in Southeast Asia increased, however, opposition to the war drew wider and wider circles, until it involved people of all ages and walks of life. The war began to polarize American society. Riots occurred in Chicago in 1968 during the Democratic presidential convention; the rioting was later determined to have been provoked by the local police in a “police riot.” Nevertheless, the U.S. Department of Justice leveled conspiracy charges against Rennie Davis, Dave Dellinger, Tom Hayden, Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, John Froines, Lee Weiner, and Bobby Seale, dubbed the “Chicago eight.” (The “Chicago seven” trial did not include Bobby Seale, who was tried separately.)
Drawing on his fame as the author of Dr. Spock’s Baby and Child Care, Dr. Benjamin Spock (center front) led many demonstrations to protest American involvement in Vietnam and was frequently arrested. Here, he leads a march in New York City in April, 1965, at a time when the war was starting to be noticed by the average American. (Library of Congress)
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Particular events in the war, as they were reported in the press, fueled antiwar protests and increased the ranks of protesters. One such event was the March, 1968, massacre of civilians at the village of My Lai, which became public knowledge in the fall of 1969 when Lieutenant William Calley was charged with murdering more than a hundred Vietnamese civilians; photographs of the atrocity were printed in Life magazine. Another was the American bombing of Cambodia and Laos in 1970. In May, 1970, protests against the bombing were disrupting classes at Kent State University in Ohio, and Governor James Rhodes ordered the state’s national guard to patrol the Kent State campus. On May 4, National Guardsmen opened fire, killing four students. In response to the Kent State deaths, five hundred college campuses and four million students across the nation went on strike. The Draft Conscription (the draft) and the Selective Service system were among the main targets of the war’s opponents. The most attention-getting way to show opposition to the war and the draft was the burning of draft cards. Prosecution of draft card burners was inconsistent. While during the height of resistance hundreds of men burned their cards publicly, the Justice Department brought action against fewer than fifty draft card burners, and only forty were actually convicted. Many observers expected the courts to overturn those convictions. In the 1968 case United States v. O’Brien, however, the Supreme Court upheld the law against draft card burning even though the decision seemed to run counter to decisions in other freedom of speech cases. Among opponents of the draft, conscientious objectors (COs) created the most sustained legal problems. The Selective Service system tended to treat conscientious objectors—individuals who are excused from combatant military service, traditionally for religious reasons—inconsistently, often failing to follow due process of law. Many COs were Jehovah’s Witnesses, Quakers, Mennonites, and others whose religious beliefs included strict pacifism. As the war progressed and the death toll rose, interest in becoming a CO rose drastically. In the mid-1960’s, the military approved fewer than 30 percent of the several hundred applications for CO status it received. By the late 1960’s, CO applicants attempted to take advantage of existing case law pertaining to civilian COs. The military, however, continued to reject CO applications, overlooking precedents in the case law. In 1970, the Supreme Court ruled in Welsh v. United States and two other cases that its 1965 decision in United States v. Seeger applied to members of the military as well as civilians. The Supreme Court had ruled in Seeger that sincere pacifists were entitled to CO status even if their motivation had no
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foundation in religious beliefs. The courts further ruled that the military could not reject the CO application of a person who was already a member of the service unless the military could point to factual evidence in his or her military record to support the conclusion that the applicant did not have sincere motives. Soon the number of successful CO applications rose, and the military faced a growing number of lawsuits. In 1971 and 1972, two-thirds of CO applications were successful. Whether draft evaders (as well as soldiers who went AWOL, or “absent without leave”) should be prosecuted or given clemency became a growing debate as American involvement in the war came to an end. After 1973, when the United States signed a cease-fire agreement with North Vietnam, the call for clemency no longer fell on deaf ears. In 1974, President Gerald R. Ford created a President’s Clemency Board. Considering the generally lenient treatment of draft offenders by then, the Ford program actually offered little improvement; only 2,600 people applied. Another 265,650 received pardons from President Jimmy Carter in 1977. Military Service and Social Justice The administration of the draft itself raised issues of social justice. Of 26,800,000 men of draft age, 15,980,000 never served. Of these, 15,410,000 were deferred, exempted, or disqualified. Of 570,000 draft offenders, 209,517 were accused; 197,750 cases were dropped, 3,250 people were imprisoned, and 5,500 received probation or a suspended sentence. Among those who escaped the draft were recipients of deferments (mostly student deferments), draft evaders, nonregistrants, and conscientious objectors. The fact that potential draftees could receive student deferments while attending college struck many observers as unfair, given that the young people likely to be in college were disproportionately white and middle- or upper-class. For those who served, issues of social and racial justice played a significant role. Among the American forces stationed in Vietnam, fewer than 1 percent were ever needed for combat missions, but that 1 percent was most likely to consist of minorities from disadvantaged backgrounds. Front-line combat personnel were, on average, a cross section of American minorities. In addition, soldiers of low-income background were about twice as likely to serve in Vietnam and about twice as likely to end up in combat service than soldiers from high-income backgrounds. Agent Orange Many of the soldiers who went to Vietnam came home with new problems, such as drug dependencies and posttraumatic stress disorder
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(PTSD). Those afflicted with PTSD had extraordinary difficulties reintegrating into civilian life. In addition, severe health problems were experienced by those soldiers who had been exposed to an herbicide called Agent Orange, which contained the highly toxic chemical dioxin. During the war, American planes sprayed nearly thirteen million gallons of Agent Orange. The herbicide created health problems for those with significant exposure to it, and it caused birth defects in their children. The government, Dow Chemical (the principal supplier of Agent Orange), and other companies involved were aware of the possibly fatal consequences of exposure to dioxin but ignored or publicly denied them. The Veterans Administration downplayed the effects of Agent Orange and dismissed veterans’ complaints for many years. Veterans had little legal recourse against the Veterans Administration, since federal law barred them from taking Veterans Administration benefit decisions to court. In 1983, veterans and their families brought a class action suit. Long Island U.S. circuit court judge Jack Weinstein decided against Dow and a number of other makers of Agent Orange, forcing the companies to release crucial documents proving that Dow and others acted in full knowledge of the possible health consequences of the substance. In May, 1984, the involved parties reached a settlement which created a $184 million fund. Dow and the other companies involved appealed the case. In 1989, the U.S. Agent Orange Settlement Fund finally began distributing funds. On average, single lump-sum benefits ranged between $340 and $3,400. By 1993, about sixty-five thousand claims had been filed. By December 29, $22 million was left in the fund, and the claim deadline was extended from December 31, 1994, to January 17, 1995. In February, 1994, events took another turn when the Supreme Court in Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock and Hartman v. Diamond Shamrock denied review of cases requesting reopening litigation by two groups of Vietnam veterans and their families. In both cases, the veterans had received benefits but in amounts considered insufficient. On the other hand, the Court has agreed to hear arguments by Hercules and William T. Thompson, two companies that made the herbicide, who were seeking $30 million in costs in relation to the 1984 class action suit. The companies claim that it was not their fault that the government used the defoliant in Vietnam, thereby exposing humans to the toxic chemical dioxin. Thomas Winter
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U.S. Supreme Court During the War The Supreme Court’s actions on Vietnam War-related cases established major precedents regarding the freedoms of speech, press, and religion and the powers of Congress and the president to conduct foreign and defense policies. The Vietnam War’s length and controversial nature raised various constitutional questions. Appeals to the Supreme Court included cases pertaining to the freedom of speech, the relationship between the free exercise clause and military conscription, freedom of the press, and the constitutionality of the U.S. military effort in Vietnam. In some cases, the Court established new precedents and in others, refused to accept a case, often citing the doctrine of political questions. Freedom of Speech The Court decisions about the Vietnam War that had the broadest, most long-term effects were those that pertained to the freedom of speech. During antiwar demonstrations obscenities and symbolic actions were sometimes used to communicate opposition to the Vietnam War. In United States v. O’Brien (1968), the Court, by a vote of seven to one, ruled against David O’Brien, who had been convicted of violating a federal conscript law by burning his draft card in a symbolic protest. O’Brien claimed that his conviction violated his freedom of speech. The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Earl Warren, stated that Congress has broad constitutional powers to raise and maintain armed forces, including the process of conscription, which encompasses draft cards. More significantly, O’Brien‘s long-term impact was to place certain restrictions on the freedom of speech, especially when litigants claimed that their symbolic actions were protected by the freedom of speech. One year later, however, the Court ruled in favor of high school and junior high school students who used symbolism to protest against the Vietnam War in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969). The Tinker children and other students wore arm bands with peace symbols to silently protest the Vietnam War despite the fact that school officials had previously forbidden them to do so. These students were suspended unless they returned to school without the arm bands. The students asserted that this punishment and policy violated their freedom of speech. By a vote of seven to two, the Court ruled in favor of the protesting students. The Court stated that public school students retained their freedom of speech rights as long as their use of speech did not prove to be dis-
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ruptive. Also, the majority opinion noted that school officials in this district had previously allowed other forms of symbolic political expressions, such as campaign buttons. Therefore, the disciplinary action against students wearing antiwar arm bands seemed to be directed against symbolic protest against the Vietnam War rather than against any student’s use of any symbol of political speech. What was somewhat surprising in the Tinker case was the dissenting opinion of Justice Hugo L. Black. Earlier in his career on the Court, Black was often identified as an absolutist in his support of the freedom of speech; that is, he took the view that government policies should not limit “balanced” speech, at least oral speech, in any way. In Tinker, however, Black asserted that symbolic actions such as this had less protection under the First Amendment and that school officials needed to have broad discretionary authority to prevent, prohibit, and punish expressions that they believed could be disruptive. In Cohen v. California (1971), the Court had to address Paul Cohen’s symbolic protest against the Vietnam War in general and the draft in particular, in which he printed the words “F—k the draft” on his jacket. The state of California convicted him for violating a state law prohibiting “disturbing the peace . . . by offensive conduct.” The long-term significance of this decision was the definition of obscenity concerning First Amendment protection. The Court ruled in favor of Cohen, stating that Cohen’s profanity was “vulgar” but not obscene because its purpose was to convey a political message. Asserting the value of political speech for constitutional protest,
Chief Justice Earl Warren. (Supreme Court Historical Society)
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the Court ruled that states cannot prohibit and punish such provocative speech and that such speech should not be perceived and punished as an incitement to possible future violent actions. The Court further expanded the freedom of speech-related antiwar expressions by ruling in Flower v. United States (1972) that the military could not prohibit antiwar activists from accessing military bases that are open to the public. The Draft Although the Court, with the prominent exception of the O’Brien decision, generally ruled in favor of expressions of antiwar opinions, it also expanded and diversified military draft exemptions based on the free exercise and establishment clauses of the First Amendment. Before the Vietnam War, the Court had generally deferred to and closely adhered to the few, limited, specific religious reasons why a person would be designated as a conscientious objector, and therefore, exempted from being drafted into the armed forces. Although Congress had apparently intended conscientious objector exemptions to be primarily applied to members of pacifistic denominations, such as the Quaker and Amish churches, the Court ruled in United States v. Seeger (1965) and Welsh v. United States (1970) that agnostics who demonstrated a sincere, consistent philosophy of opposition to war should also be granted conscientious objector status. In its most famous Vietnam War-era draft case, the Court ruled in favor of the famous professional boxer Muhammad Ali, formerly known as Cassius Clay. Ali claimed that he should be exempt from the draft as a conscientious objector because of his Nation of Islam (Black Muslim) beliefs. In Clay v. United States (1971), the Court ruled in his favor. After expanding and diversifying legitimate grounds for conscientious objector status, the Court further clarified, and then limited this expansion in Gillette v. United States (1971). In Gillette, the Court rejected the claim of conscientious objector status for a man who cited the Roman Catholic doctrine of the just-war theory, that is, that a Catholic should refuse to participate in unjust wars. Gillette asserted his belief that the Vietnam War was an unjust war. The Court concluded that Congress did not violate the establishment clause or Gillette’s free exercise rights by refusing to allow drafteligible men to choose which wars they would participate in according to their professed religious or philosophical beliefs. Other Issues The most significant Court decision about the relationship between the Vietnam War and freedom of speech was New York Times Co. v. United States
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(1971), commonly known as the Pentagon Papers case. Daniel Ellsberg, an antiwar former employee of the Pentagon (the Department of Defense), provided several newspapers, including The New York Times, with copies of the documentary history of U.S. foreign and defense policy toward Vietnam. The administration of Richard M. Nixon tried to prevent the publication of the Pentagon Papers, but the Court allowed their publication. The Court concluded that the Nixon administration failed to prove that publishing such papers would endanger current or future national security. Although the Court generally strengthened the protection of First Amendment freedoms in the cases related to the Vietnam War, it repeatedly refused to rule on the war’s constitutionality. Although Congress had never declared war against North Vietnam, it did adopt the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964, a joint resolution that gave the president broad, discretionary power to conduct war in Southeast Asia. The Court refused to grant writs of certiorari and review the lower court cases of Holtzman v. Schlesinger (1973), Orlando v. Laird (1971), Mora v. McNamara (1967), and Massachusetts v. Laird (1970), all of which challenged the constitutionality of the Vietnam War. Associate Justice William O. Douglas was the most emphatic, determined justice who wanted the Court to grant certiorari and rule on the constitutionality of the Vietnam War. He took the unusual action of writing an opinion criticizing the Court’s denial of certiorari in Massachusetts v. Laird. However, most justices believed that the existence and conduct of the war were political questions, that is, specific policies and political issues that were not justiciable by the courts because they should be resolved within and between the other two branches of the national government. The constitutional legacy of major Court decisions related to the Vietnam War is that they provided important, influential precedents for future cases, especially for freedom of speech cases that did not pertain to expressions of protest over foreign and defense policy. For example, the Court partially relied on the O’Brien precedent to uphold a public indecency and nudity law in Barnes v. Glen Theatre (1991). In Barnes, the majority opinion concluded that the O’Brien precedent for limiting First Amendment protection of expressive conduct justified state laws prohibiting entirely nude exotic dancing in bars, just as the Court had ruled in Cohen that Cohen’s use of an expletive to criticize the Vietnam War era draft was not an incitement. According to the Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) “fighting words” precedent, the Court ruled in Texas v. Johnson (1989) that burning or desecrating the U.S. flag did not represent an incitement either.
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Regarding the more specific issues of whether public or congressional acts of opposition to certain U.S. foreign policy decisions are unconstitutional, the Court has generally followed the Vietnam War-era practice of holding such disputes to be nonjusticiable political questions. In Goldwater v. Carter (1979), several members of Congress unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of President Jimmy Carter’s decision to terminate a treaty with Taiwan without obtaining the advice or consent of the Senate. Sean J. Savage
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Women in the War American military and civilian women served in a wide variety of primarily sexspecific roles during the Vietnam War and shared the same danger as male support personnel with whom they worked. Between April, 1956, when the first U.S. Army nurses arrived in South Vietnam to train Vietnamese nurses, and April, 1975, when Americans fled South Vietnam as the North Vietnamese army rapidly advanced on the capital city of Saigon, an estimated 33,000 to 55,000 American civilian and military women served in a variety of roles in the war. There is no reliable count of these women because few organizations recorded personnel by sex. The Department of Defense does not even know exactly how many military women served. Most of the estimated 7,500 servicewomen in Vietnam were members of the Army, Air Force, or Navy nurse corps. Only 1,300 women in the line and staff corps of the armed forces (the nonmedical components of the female military) served in Vietnam. Civilians account for the remainder of the 33,000 to 55,000 women. Servicewomen About 6,000 military nurses served in more than thirty hospitals throughout the country. Army nurses worked in field, surgical, and evacuation hospitals. Navy nurses staffed two hospital ships, the USS Repose and the USS Sanctuary, and naval hospitals in Danang and Saigon. Air Force nurses served at casualty staging facilities or evacuation hospitals and as flight nurses on evacuation flights. These women witnessed the worst of the war as they cared for a constant stream of badly injured young servicemen. The thirteen hundred servicewomen of the line and staff included about seven hundred members of the Women’s Army Corps (WAC), five hundred to six hundred Women in the Air Force (WAF), thirty-nine members of the Women’s Reserve in the Marine Corps, and nine Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service (WAVES). Members of the WAC, WAF, WAVES, and the Women’s Reserve volunteered for the Vietnam War in far larger numbers than were accepted; cultural attitudes toward women kept a majority of them from serving. Military leaders expressed concern about the need to provide guards to protect women in Vietnam. Some women feared that deploying women to a war zone would detract from the feminine image that they wished to maintain. Therefore, servicewomen were requested for duty in Vietnam in a narrow range of sex-specific specialties.
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These three U.S. Navy nurses in Saigon became the first American women to win purple heart medals for service in Vietnam in January, 1965. All three were wounded by an explosion in a Saigon hotel. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Civilians Civilian women who served in the Vietnam War can be roughly divided into three groups: those who provided humanitarian aid to the Vietnamese people; those who provided recreation, entertainment, or social services to the troops; and those who provided secretarial and administrative support. A few groups of women—journalists, flight attendants, and wives who came to Vietnam with their husbands—do not fit neatly into any one of these categories. Women provided humanitarian aid to the Vietnamese as part of what became known as “the other war in Vietnam,” the battle to win the hearts and minds of the people. Aware that military force alone could not win the war, some sought to increase the quality of life for the Vietnamese people to help them resist communism. More than forty nonprofit voluntary organizations worked in Vietnam and cooperated with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which was sponsored by the State Department. Many of these organizations recruited women to work as doctors, nurses, teachers, social workers, and home economists in a vast number of projects. USAID and organizations such as Catholic Relief Services, the American Friends Service Committee, and International Voluntary Services helped the Vietnamese establish hospitals, orphanages,
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day care centers, recreation programs, rehabilitation centers, agricultural projects, refugee centers, and training programs of all kinds. The American Red Cross, Army Special Services, and United Services Organization (USO) hired women to work as social workers, librarians, entertainers, and craft and recreation specialists. They recruited primarily young, single, college-educated women, though supervisors were often older and sometimes male. The Red Cross provided both social services and recreation programs through Service to Military Installations (SMI), Service to Military Hospitals (SMH), and Supplemental Recreation Activities Overseas (SRAO). SMI, which employed both men and women, received and delivered emergency messages for military personnel and provided emergency loans. SMH women worked as hospital case workers or recreation specialists. SRAO women (nicknamed “donut dollies” after the Red Cross women who served during World War II) provided recreation for able-bodied enlisted men through the club mobile program or at recreation centers. Recreation centers, found at most military bases and operated by SRAO, Army Special Services, or USO women, provided a place where soldiers could relax, listen to music, write letters, play pool, or talk to an American woman. Army Special Services also provided libraries and craft shops at many of the bases. USO-sponsored shows, often featuring female entertainers, regularly toured the military bases for a month or two at a time to entertain the troops. Women in secretarial or administrative positions worked for the Department of Defense serving under the Army, Navy, or Air Force; for the State Department in the American Embassy or consulates, with United States Information Services, or Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office; or with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). They also worked for private companies under contract to the government. Some were well-seasoned civil service career women, while others were young women with little experience. Risks and Aftermath Although most men treated these women with respect, some men believed that the real reason for the presence of women in Vietnam was to provide sexual favors. This misperception led to sexual harassment, innuendoes, propositions, sexual assault, and rape. One young Red Cross woman was murdered by an American serviceman. Most women who came to Vietnam expected to work “behind the lines” in areas of safety. In Vietnam, however, no area was impervious to rocket and mortar attacks, sniper fire, and terrorist bombings. Sixty-five American women are known to have died in Vietnam: eight military women,
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whose names are inscribed on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, and fiftyseven civilian women. Women came home to a nation bitterly divided by the war and experienced the same feelings of alienation as male veterans. No one could understand what they had seen and done, and no one wanted to hear about their experiences. Some women repressed their emotions, only to have them surface later as posttraumatic stress disorder. By the 1980’s, some female veterans began to talk and search for others like themselves. Reunions and the dedication of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial and the Vietnam Women’s Memorial began to unite many of the women who had for so long been silent and isolated. Talking about their experiences with others who had served in Vietnam began the process of healing. Lenna H. Allred
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Ethics of the War The morality of U.S. participation in the Vietnam War was questioned by many at the time it occurred and has been questioned ever since. The war’s greatest legacy has arguably come in the form of its effects upon U.S. foreign policy, U.S. selfperception, and the world’s perception of the United States. It was as a direct result of the Vietnam War that both the moral purity of U.S. interests and the invincibility of the U.S. military came to be questioned on a significant scale, both at home and abroad. The question of when a powerful nation should intervene militarily in the affairs of a small country is not susceptible to a simple answer. Failure to intervene can mean that a small country will be subjected to tyranny, anarchy, or even genocide. Yet a military intervention that is bloody and inconclusive can also wreak havoc on a small country; furthermore, sending troops into a combat situation abroad means that some people will be killed or wounded. The unsuccessful end of the costly and controversial American intervention in Vietnam by no means ensured that policymakers would be spared similar dilemmas in the future. The United States had been involved in the affairs of Vietnam ever since that country was divided, in 1954, into a communist North and an anticommunist South. As long as the American military mission in South Vietnam was small-scale, it aroused little opposition in the United States. Between 1965 and 1968, however, the number of American combat troops in Vietnam rose from 50,000 to 500,000; the casualties suffered by the troops and the monthly draft calls soared; and the loud debate at home reached an unprecedented level. Religious Opposition to the War and the Just War Tradition Although at least one theologian, R. Paul Ramsey, did support the American military intervention in Vietnam, members of the clergy and theologians were conspicuous in the movement against such intervention. In 1966, the organization Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam was formed. Vocal opponents of the American war effort included the Protestant theologian Robert McAfee Brown; Yale University’s Protestant chaplain, William Sloane Coffin; and two Roman Catholic priests, Daniel Berrigan and Philip Berrigan. The just war tradition was first elaborated by the theologians of Christian Europe during the late Middle Ages. After centuries of indifference by peoples and governments, this tradition was revived by the Nurem-
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berg Trials of 1946, which followed the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II. The just war tradition sets forth six criteria for determining whether a particular war is just. The war must be waged for a just cause; it must be waged as a last resort; the intent behind the war must be right; there must be a reasonable hope of success; the war must be waged by a legitimate, duly constituted authority; and the harm inflicted by the war must not be disproportionate to the good that one hopes to achieve. During the Vietnam War, America’s clergy, theologians, and laypersons questioned whether American military intervention in Vietnam met all or even most of these criteria for a just war. Opposition to the War The U.S. Constitution, while making the president commander in chief of the armed forces, gives Congress the right to declare war. Yet the massive war effort in Vietnam, dissenters pointed out, had come about through presidential orders alone. The first substantial increase in troop levels in Vietnam had been announced on July 28, 1965, at a little-publicized presidential news conference. The dissenters did not have an airtight case, however: The Korean War (1950-1953) had also started without a congressional declaration. The official justification for the war, given by presidents Lyndon Baines Johnson and Richard M. Nixon, was that the American military was in South Vietnam to repel aggression launched from communist North Vietnam. Defenders of the war viewed the conflict through an ideological lens, as an assault by international communism against those who loved freedom. The moral and material support that the world’s major communist states, China and the Soviet Union, gave to North Vietnam was cited as evidence for this interpretation. The opponents of the war, by contrast, stressed the facts that both sides of the conflict were ethnic Vietnamese and that Vietnam had been a single country until 1954. Dissenters viewed the United States as meddling in another country’s civil war and thus committing aggression itself, rather than nobly defending a victim of unprovoked aggression; hence, the war did not meet the “just cause” criterion. The dissenters’ localized view of the Vietnam War led them to scorn the notion that defeating the communists in South Vietnam was necessary to protect the United States itself. The dissenters saw the Vietnamese communists as nationalist defenders of Vietnamese independence, not as the Southeast Asian arm of a worldwide conspiracy against American democracy. Hence, the war, dissenters believed, did not meet the “last resort” criterion.
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Concerned about the Johnson administration’s continued escalation of the war, the Senate held hearings on the war in March, 1968, and subjected Secretary of State Dean Rusk (right foreground) to a two-day cross-examination on live television. (Library of Congress)
War Crimes Until the early 1970’s, the spearhead of the communist assault on the South Vietnamese government was not the North Vietnamese Army, but the so-called National Liberation Front, or Viet Cong. The Viet Cong, drawn from communist sympathizers in the South, were not regular troops in uniform; instead, they were guerrillas who wore peasant clothing and blended in with the villagers after conducting hit-and-run raids against American or South Vietnamese troops. It was nearly impossible for American troops to fight such an enemy without hurting some innocent civilians. The American military attacked villages from which sniper fire had come (one officer declared that he had had to destroy a village in order to save it) and decreed whole areas to be free-fire zones, where anybody who moved was assumed to be the enemy. The chemical Agent Orange was used to defoliate certain areas, in order to deprive the Viet Cong of food. Napalm, a burning jelly, was dropped on centers of enemy fire; inevitably, some children were hurt. In the My Lai massacre of March, 1968 (made public in 1969), all the people in a village were killed by American troops under the command of Lieutenant William Calley.
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Such suffering led all dissenters to question whether the war met the “proportionality” criterion; some dissenters even condemned the war as genocidal. Defenders of the war effort pointed out that the Viet Cong also committed atrocities and that the perpetrators of My Lai were finally subjected to American military justice. The Debate After the War’s End In April, 1975, the North Vietnamese, having signed a peace agreement with the United States in January, 1973, overran and conquered South Vietnam. As a result, the United States admitted, by airlift, a wave of refugees. Contrary to the fears of earlier American administrations, the loss of South Vietnam did not lead to a communist advance to Hawaii or even to the fall of all of eastern Asia; the only other Asian countries to become communist were Vietnam’s neighbors, Laos and Cambodia. By 1979, however, the repressiveness of the communist regime led to another massive flight of refugees, this time by boat; ironically, at least a few of the new refugees were former Viet Cong. The results of defeat started a new debate in America. In 1978, historian Guenter Lewy published a history of the Vietnam War, defending American intervention in that conflict; in 1982, magazine editor Norman Podhoretz did the same thing. Both looked back on the Vietnam War as a noble effort to defend a free people against communism; so also did the president of the United States during the 1980’s, Ronald Reagan. Political philosopher Michael Walzer, in Just and Unjust Wars (1977), condemned the means used in the Vietnam War without thoroughly discussing the issue of the war’s rationale. In 1985, former president Richard M. Nixon published No More Vietnams defending his administration’s Vietnam policy. Podhoretz’s view, that post-1975 communist repression provided a retrospective justification for the American war effort of 1965 to 1973, never won a great following among academics or the general public. By the end of the 1980’s, as the Cold War ended, the question of the morality of the war was still controversial among historians and journalists. Paul D. Mageli
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Censorship During the War The Vietnam War was the first large-scale military conflict closely covered on television; the relative absence of censorship controls was blamed by many for contributing to the failure of the U.S. military effort. After the U.S. defeat in the Vietnam War, a debate arose over the role played by newspaper and television reporters in that war. Censorship of the media by the United States government was undoubtedly less strict than in some earlier wars. Whether this relative absence of censorship was responsible for the American defeat in Vietnam has, however, been hotly disputed. Contrasts with World War II Because World War II began with a formal declaration of war, an Office of Censorship was set up almost immediately after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in December, 1941. Censors had to approve what appeared concerning the war in print (including combat photographs) and in motion picture newsreels. The American public was spared revelations about bungling or atrocities by the American military, although incidents of both occurred. Government censorship was supplemented by journalists’ selfcensorship; war correspondents believed it was their patriotic duty to help build up homefront morale. In contrast, the Vietnam War was an undeclared war, in which large numbers of American combat troops did not see action until 1965. Unlike in World War II, there were no war-bond drives, featuring stars of the entertainment world, to arouse homefront enthusiasm for the war and hatred for the enemy; nor was there an Office of Censorship. During World War II television was not yet a commercial medium; Americans learned about the war through newspapers, radio reports, and motion picture newsreels. Television news broadcasts, which were still in their infancy during the Korean War (1950-1953), had become, by the time of the escalation of the Vietnam War in 1965, the major source of information about the world for most Americans. The existence of communications satellites and regular jet transportation in the early 1960’s made the transmission of news faster than it had been in World War II or the Korean War, thereby making any government efforts to manage the news vastly more complicated than it had been in those earlier wars. Although a ban on journalists’ accompanying airmen limited the coverage of the Vietnam air war, efforts by the United States and South Vietnam-
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ese governments to control news about the ground war were hampered by the guerrilla nature of much of the conflict, without clear front-lines, as were found in World War II. The military could sometimes keep bad news secret by denying reporters transportation to battlefields; but major battles could—as in 1968—erupt in unexpected places. The contradictions of fighting a limited war made press self-censorship harder to maintain than in World War II, in which the aim had been the unconditional surrender of the enemy. During World War II journalistic selfcensorship, and acceptance of official censorship, were encouraged by a national consensus that the war was necessary and just. The gradual breakdown of national consensus about the Vietnam War set media and government on the road to becoming adversaries rather than allies. The Early Phase of the Vietnam War The Geneva Peace Agreements of 1954, under which French colonial forces left Vietnam, divided the country into a communist north and a noncommunist south. By the early 1960’s South Vietnam was troubled by a communist guerrilla rebellion in the countryside. When the U.S. military buildup was first begun by President John F. Kennedy in late 1961, only several hundred American military advisers were in South Vietnam; by the end of Kennedy’s presidency, there were twelve thousand such advisers. In the spring of 1963, it became clear that the South Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem had a dangerously narrow base of popular support. On November 1, 1963, after five months of protests by Buddhists angered at what they saw as Diem’s favoritism to his fellow Roman Catholics, Diem was overthrown and killed in a military coup. On November 22, 1963, President Kennedy was himself assassinated in Texas. At first, the Vietnamese developments were overshadowed by other crises around the world, all seen by Americans as part of the Cold War between American democracy and Sino-Soviet communism. Although some American advisers were being killed and wounded in Vietnam in 1963, the relatively low American casualty figures and the fact that all the advisers were volunteers, rather than draftees, kept the Vietnam story from arousing controversy in the United States. Hence, the American media still had only a handful of representatives in South Vietnam. The wire services were represented, but only one newspaper, The New York Times. In 1963 there was still no full-time correspondent in Vietnam from any of the three major networks that then dominated television. Network evening newscasts were not even increased from fifteen to thirty minutes until September, 1963.
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Meanwhile, three young reporters—Americans David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan and New Zealander Peter Arnett—ran into difficulty with the U.S. military mission in South Vietnam (which wished to minimize publicity for American efforts) because of their frank reporting. Frustrated by the bland optimism of the head of the U.S. military mission, these reporters sought information from lower-level American military advisers working in the field. In October, 1963, President Kennedy himself, unhappy about the pessimism in Halberstam’s reporting, secretly—and unsuccessfully—urged The New York Times to recall him. Historians who have studied press-military relations for the 1961-1963 period can, however, detect no profound doubts among American reporters about the American goal of preserving a noncommunist South Vietnam. However much frustration the American military mission caused them, American journalists faced much greater harassment from the South Vietnamese government during the Buddhist crisis of May-November, 1963. Relations became particularly bad after an American reporter photographed a Buddhist monk setting himself on fire in protest. At one point, Arnett was physically beaten by Vietnamese police. To outwit Diem’s censors, American reporters sometimes persuaded American military or civilian officials traveling back to the United States to serve as couriers for their film stories. The Period of Escalation Following Kennedy’s assassination, his successor, President Lyndon Baines Johnson, at first tried to keep the military mission at the level that he had inherited. In the summer of 1964, Johnson won a resolution of support from Congress (the Gulf of Tonkin resolution) after an incident at sea between the U.S. Navy and North Vietnamese forces. Following his election in 1964 to the presidency for a full term, Johnson widened and deepened American involvement, ordering the bombing of North Vietnam in February, 1965, and in July, 1965, for the first time, sending large numbers of American combat troops into South Vietnam. As American casualties and draft calls increased sharply, more and more television reporters were sent to cover Vietnam full-time for the three major television networks. A controversy that erupted over a single television story in August, 1965, clearly demonstrated both the risks of iconoclastic reporting and the limited ability of the Johnson administration to censor reporters. A correspondent for the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) in South Vietnam, Canadian-born Morley Safer, produced a film piece with his own commentary, showing a detachment of American soldiers deliberately setting fire to the huts of a village from which enemy fire was supposed to have origi-
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nated. After agonizing deliberation by Safer’s CBS superior, news division chief Fred Friendly, the decision was made to broadcast the piece on the evening news. After it was aired, Press Secretary Arthur Sylvester wrote an angry letter to Friendly. President Johnson made an angry telephone call to Friendly’s superior, CBS network president Frank Stanton, and angry telephone calls and letters poured in from viewers throughout the country. In the end, however, both Friendly and Stanton stood by Safer despite official pressure. Further examples of dissenting journalism followed. In February, 1966, the voices of dissent from politicians were first heard when the television networks broadcast Arkansas senator J. William Fulbright’s Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the war. During World War II no American journalist had reported from an enemy capital; hence, print journalist Harrison Salisbury was harshly criticized when, after returning from a trip to North Vietnam in December, 1966, he reported in The New York Times that— contrary to U.S. government statements—American bombing of the north had produced civilian casualties. As late as 1967 CBS refused to broadcast in full a documentary film on North Vietnam that it had commissioned British journalist Felix Greene to make, when it realized that the film criticized American bombing. Throughout 1966 and 1967, many television reports from South Vietnam still expressed support for the American military effort and hostility toward the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. Reporting on the Tet Offensive of January-March, 1968, in which the Viet Cong launched bold (and ultimately unsuccessful) assaults against South Vietnam’s major cities, bred distrust for the press in military circles. Film coverage of the Tet offensive, which was often transmitted by satellite in unedited form, was particularly disturbing to the average American viewer. Especially shocking was a film showing South Vietnam’s chief of police, Brigadier General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, shooting a captured Viet Cong insurgent in the head. In his report from the village of Ben Tre, Peter Arnett provided a catchy slogan for the American antiwar movement by simply relaying the conclusion of the American military commander, that American forces had had to destroy the village in order to save it. On February 27, 1968, Walter Cronkite, anchor of the CBS evening news broadcast, departed from his usual impartiality to urge the government to negotiate in good faith with the communist regime in North Vietnam. Shocked by the Tet offensive, Cronkite’s defection, and setbacks in the primary elections President Johnson declared, on March 31, 1968, his decision not to run for re-election. Peace talks began in Paris, and Richard Nixon was elected president of the United States later that year.
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The Last Years of the War Under President Richard M. Nixon, the U.S. government tried gradually to shift the burden of fighting to the South Vietnamese. American casualties remained high, however, in 1969 and 1970. Nixon was able to hide enough information from the press so that the American entry into Cambodia in May, 1970, came as a surprise. Throughout his presidency, a markedly adversarial relationship prevailed between the administration and the media over Vietnam, one that contrasted strikingly with the government-media cooperation of the earliest phases of the conflict. There were reports in American newsmagazines of breakdowns of discipline in the American expeditionary force in Vietnam (nothing similar to that had ever been revealed in the newspapers during World War II); and in June, 1969, Life magazine put out a special issue listing—with photographs—all the American soldiers who had died in Vietnam in a single week. President Nixon had his vice president, Spiro Agnew, publicly denounce the media, and also used threats to make the television networks more sympathetic to the administration’s viewpoint. After being criticized by the White House for allowing a television news reporter to speak favorably about a North Vietnamese peace proposal, the networks ended the policy of allowing instant analysis by television newsmen in front of the camera. Yet the growing division of opinion over Vietnam in Congress had, by the early 1970’s, emboldened at least some journalists to risk displeasing the executive branch of the government. In June, 1971, the Nixon administration tried to prevent The New York Times from publishing the Pentagon Papers, U.S. government documents on the war’s origins that had been stolen by Daniel Ellsberg, a Defense Department bureaucrat who had been involved in planning the war effort. The documents were embarrassing to American officials, but they endangered no American soldier’s life; a Supreme Court decision guaranteed the people’s right to see them in print. As the number of American troops in Vietnam dwindled between 1971 and 1973, American media interest in the war also dwindled. American correspondents still in South Vietnam found themselves dealing less and less with American military censorship, and more and more with South Vietnamese government censorship. The Vietnam peace accords were signed in January, 1973. Nixon’s resignation in August, 1974, in the wake of the Watergate scandal, ended all presidential attempts to pressure the media into supporting government policy on Vietnam. When Nixon’s successor, Gerald Ford, asked for American aid to South Vietnam, a Congress mindful of popular war-weariness flatly rejected the idea. Coverage of the
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war ended after the North Vietnamese army overran South Vietnam in March-April, 1975. Television Images and Public Opinion Those who blamed the press for the U.S. defeat in Vietnam argued that excessively gory television coverage of the war so weakened popular support as to make defeat inevitable. Yet many scholars contend that the television coverage that critics of the medium remember most vividly—the burning of the village of Cam Ne and the police chief’s killing of a captured Viet Cong—was atypical of the combat scenes presented on the evening news. Television news broadcasts tried to avoid showing the bodies of dead American soldiers. Most combat footage simply showed American soldiers trudging onward, with enemy fire merely a menacing sound in the distance. Television reporters who tried to get combat footage were handicapped by the elusive nature of guerrilla foes, and by the fact that much combat occurred at night, when it could not be filmed. The most bloody American atrocity, the My Lai massacre of March, 1968, was not captured on film by a television journalist; it was uncovered a year after it happened by a United States-based print journalist. Revulsion against the war, many scholars contend, was caused not by images on the television screen but by high American casualty levels sustained over a long period of time. Legacy of the War Although many scholars question whether any conceivable American strategy could have won the Vietnam War, the belief grew in some military and governmental circles that lack of press censorship had doomed the American effort in Vietnam to defeat. To prevent further such debacles, President Ronald Reagan decided that future military expeditions would be accompanied by tight controls over the press. Such strict censorship characterized the American expeditions in Grenada in 1983 (from which all newsmen were excluded) and Panama in 1989, and the Persian Gulf War of January-February, 1991. Yet it is unlikely that strict censorship, by itself, assured victory. The more decisive role of air power in the Persian Gulf War, the complete absence of guerrilla warfare from that conflict, and Iraq’s total diplomatic isolation may all be more important than censorship policy in explaining the difference between failure in Vietnam and success in the Persian Gulf. Paul D. Mageli
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Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events August, 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution Date: August 7, 1964 Location: Washington, D.C. Principal figures: American, President Lyndon B. Johnson (1908-1973); Senator J. William Fulbright (1905-1995) Result: Facts concerning an incident in Vietnam’s Gulf of Tonkin that was used to justify empowering the president of the United States to conduct warfare without Senate approval were suppressed by the U.S. government in order to rally popular support for the Vietnam War. In early August of 1964, when U.S. forces in Vietnam still numbered only 25,000 troops, President Lyndon B. Johnson announced to the American public that two U.S. destroyers had been targets of unprovoked attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo ships. At the president’s urging, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on August 7, giving the president power to send U.S. troops into combat without asking Congress for a formal declaration of war. This resolution, in effect, contributed significantly to the subsequent escalation of the Vietnam War. The American public was generally supportive of swift and decisive action. However, an inquiry conducted by Senator J. William Fulbright later raised serious doubts about the validity of Johnson’s claims. Details of Johnson’s account of what had transpired on August 2 and 4 conflicted with those of his own senior officials. When asked about the attacks, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara often gave conflicting testimony, as did other military officials. Based on all testimony given at this inquiry, Fulbright concluded that the entire incident had been a “misrepresentation” of the facts and that conclusions based on military accounts and by the American press were suspect. Initially, the American news media saw the incident and Johnson’s reaction to the alleged attacks as a sign of American strength and decisiveness. In numerous press conferences reporters avoided asking hard and probing
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questions. The European press was more skeptical. For example, a Danish paper stated: “To create a pretext for an attack on Poland, Hitler ordered the Germans to put on Polish uniforms and attack a German guard. What the Americans did in Vietnam is not the same. But the story sounds doubtful.” Although historians have continued to debate what actually occurred in that August off of Vietnam’s coast, most agree that the Johnson administration misled the public into thinking that American sovereignty had been attacked. The press, although it had not engaged in overt censorship, tacitly suppressed a more factual and detailed accounting of the incident by not following up on the numerous and varied inconsistencies in the accounts of the incident. The Gulf of Tonkin incident and its subsequent impact on international relations set a dangerous precedent; but perhaps the most damaging aspect of this affair was the blow it delivered to the public trust. Michael Shaw Findlay
November, 1965 Battle of Ia Drang Valley Date: November 14-16, 1965 Location: Principally landing zones X-Ray (fourteen miles southwest of Plei Me) and Albany (two miles northeast of X-Ray), Pleiku province, South Vietnam Combatants: 450 Americans vs. 1,600 North Vietnamese at X-Ray; 450 Americans vs. about 1,000 North Vietnamese at Albany Principal commanders: American, Lieutenant Colonel Harold G. Moore at X-Ray, Lieutenant Colonel Robert McDade at Albany; North Vietnamese, Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Huu An Result: American disruption of a planned North Vietnamese offensive. In November, 1965, North Vietnamese forces gathered in the Ia Drang Valley in Pleiku province in the central highlands of South Vietnam with the intention of dividing the country in two. On November 14, 1965, Harold G. Moore’s First Battalion, Seventh Cavalry, landed by helicopter at landing zone X-Ray, where the North Vietnamese were assembled, and was assaulted by portions of three North Vietnamese army regiments. Moore’s troops fought against overwhelming odds for more than forty hours while U.S. air and artillery strikes closed to within fifty yards of U.S. positions.
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U.S. soldiers carrying a dead comrade from the battle in Ia Drang Valley, where members of the Air Cavalry Division suffered the heaviest U.S. losses of the war up to that time. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Gradually reinforced, Moore’s men successfully fought off the final North Vietnamese attacks and were withdrawn on November 16, having lost 79 killed and 121 wounded. On November 17, Robert McDade’s battalion was ambushed while marching to landing zone Albany, suffering 155 killed and 124 wounded. North Vietnamese combat deaths from both battles were estimated at 3,561. The campaign decisively altered the Vietnam War. It convinced U.S. leaders to send more combat troops to Vietnam and to pursue a war of attrition and conclusively proved the combat potential of the helicopter. For the North Vietnamese, the campaign provided confidence they could defeat superior U.S. firepower by fighting at close quarters. Lance Janda
January-April, 1968 Siege of Khe Sanh Date: January 21-April 6, 1968 Location: Marine air base at Khe Sanh in northern province of South Vietnam Combatants: 3,500 Marines and 2,100 South Vietnamese soldiers vs. 22,000 North Vietnamese troops Principal commanders: American, General William Westmoreland (1914); North Vietnamese, General Vo Nguyen Giap (1911)
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Result: Although U.S. firepower clearly overwhelmed the North Vietnamese, General Giap refused to admit defeat, claiming that the battle was a deliberate diversionary tactic. As part of the Tet Offensive, in January, 1968, North Vietnamese troops directed by General Vo Nguyen Giap attacked the marine air base at Khe Sanh, scoring an early direct hit on the base’s main ammunition dump, which detonated more than 1,500 tons of explosives. With little food and a precarious water supply, marines and other soldiers were besieged for seventy-seven days. The United States retaliated with massive round-the-clock air strikes, one of the most concentrated aerial bombardments in the history of warfare. General William Westmoreland, seeking a decisive set-piece battle, placed the defense of Khe Sanh over all other military operations, with an estimated five tons of artillery and aerial munitions deployed for every North Vietnamese soldier. During the siege, 205 U.S. Marines and an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 North Vietnamese were killed in action. After the battle, Khe Sanh reverted to its previous status as a strategically unimportant site. Although the United States claimed victory, the siege at Khe Sanh brought about serious debate on U.S. military strategy in Vietnam. Soon after, General Westmoreland was relieved of his command. Margaret Boe Birns
January-February, 1968 Tet Offensive Date: January 30-February 25, 1968 Location: Throughout South Vietnam Combatants: Communist guerrilla forces and North Vietnamese troops vs. South Vietnamese and U.S. troops Principal commanders: North Vietnamese, Vo Nguyen Giap (1911); American, General William Westmoreland (1914) Result: A North Vietnamese military failure but a political and psychological victory for communist forces. On January 30, 1968, the Viet Cong and North Vietnam army opened a new phase of the war by launching surprise attacks on most major cities and towns of South Vietnam. The campaign began at the start of Tet, the Vietnamese celebration of the new year in the lunar calendar. The United States had nearly 500,000 troops stationed in Vietnam, and the army of South
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Vietnam was not entirely reliable. The Viet Cong guerrilla forces included about 200,000 fighters, and the North Vietnam army had some 100,000 troops in the south. The Americans enjoyed an overwhelming superiority in military technology and air power. The leadership of North Vietnam began to prepare for the Tet Offensive in July, 1967. Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap’s goal was to win the war quickly in one master stroke. Influenced by Chinese communist theory, Giap’s doctrine of a “general offensive” assumed that a coordinated attack would be followed by a “general uprising” of the Vietnamese people. To surprise the enemy, the timing and objectives of the offensive were withheld from field commanders until the last possible moment. The Offensive Begins In the fall of 1967, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces began diverting U.S. forces from urban centers by initiating a series of random but bloody attacks in isolated border garrisons. In November, 1967, the 101st Airborne Division captured a communist document suggesting a general offensive, but U.S. intelligence analysts dismissed it as unrealistic. During the Christmas, 1967, cease-fire, the communists started moving their forces into position. Beginning on January 21, 1968, they attacked the marine outpost in Khe Sanh near the demilitarized zone, successfully deceiving most U.S. leaders into expecting a concentrated attack on Khe Sanh. However, one commander, Lieutenant General Frederick Weyand, expecting a possible attack around Saigon, convinced General William Westmoreland to increase the combat battalions in the region from fourteen to twenty-seven. The massive offensive was actually scheduled to start on January 31. Confused by the new lunar calendar of North Vietnam, however, commanders in the center of South Vietnam began their campaigns twentyfour hours too early, attacking Da Nang, Pleiku, and nine other central cities. As a result, U.S. forces went on alert, minimizing the element of surprise. On January 31, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces attacked 36 of the provincial capitals, 64 of the 245 district capitals, and 5 of the 6 autonomous cities. Initially, the attackers were able to occupy several cities, including much of Saigon. A Viet Cong suicide squad even managed to penetrate the U.S. Embassy compound before they were finally killed by Marine guards. Most cities were retaken within a few days, although the Saigon region was not cleared of Viet Cong guerrillas until March 7. The communists’ greatest success was in the imperial city of Hue. After the North Vietnamese conquered Hue, they executed an estimated 3,000 residents accused of collaboration with the enemy. The U.S. military subjected the city, including its huge citadel, to sustained bombardment. An
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U.S. Marines hold a position overlooking a street in Hue during the Tet Offensive in February, 1968. (AP/Wide World Photos)
estimated 10,000 soldiers and civilians died in the battle for Hue. By February 25, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces had regained control of the city. By the end of the Tet Offensive, more than 58,000 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops were dead, with the Americans suffering 3,895 deaths and the South Vietnamese army losing 4,957. Also, some 14,300 South Vietnamese non-combatants died in the fighting. Significance The Vietnamese communists suffered a military defeat, and the Viet Cong was destroyed as an effective organization. The Tet Offensive, nevertheless, convinced the majority of the American public that the war in Vietnam could not be won easily or quickly—a perception that greatly encouraged the antiwar movement. Shortly thereafter, President Lyndon B. Johnson refused to agree to General Westmoreland’s request for an additional 200,000 soldiers, and on March 31, Johnson announced a halt to the bombing combined with efforts to negotiate a peace settlement. Thomas T. Lewis
January-February, 1968 Battle of Hue Date: January 31-February 25, 1968 Location: Hue, Vietnam
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Combatants: North Vietnamese and Viet Cong vs. Americans and South Vietnamese Principal commanders: South Vietnamese, Brigadier General Ngo Quang Troung (1929) Result: The battle signaled the beginning of the end of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. On January 31, 1968, the battle for Hue begin with a fierce bombardment and military assault by North Vietnamese army regulars (NVA) of the Fourth and Sixth Regiments and Viet Cong. Hue was overrun in the first hours, except for the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) Advisory compound in southern Hue and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) First Division headquarters in the northern sector of the Citadel. Brigadier General Ngo Quang Troung, the respected commander of the First Division, quickly gave orders for major elements of the division, as well as other U.S./ARVN forces, to converge on Hue. In the next few days, major U.S. and ARVN military forces fought their way into Hue to reinforce the tottering defenses of the northern sector of the Citadel and the MACV compound, as well as to prepare for military counterattacks. In the days that followed, the allied bombardment of the Citadel and U.S. marine and ARVN airborne attacks slowly began to dislodge North Vietnamese forces from the Citadel. On February 25, the Citadel and Hue was finally secured, and NVA and Viet Cong forces in areas surrounding Hue were defeated. The Battle of Hue indicated North Vietnam’s psychological willingness to endure huge military losses to win the war. Michael J. Siler
March, 1968 My Lai Massacre Date: March 16, 1968 Location: My Lai Village, South Vietnam Principal figures: William L. Calley (1943), Frank A. Barker (19281968), Steven K. Brooks (1942?-1968), Ernest Medina (1936), William R. Peers (1914-1984), Hugh Thompson (1947?), Samuel W. Koster (1919) Result: Lieutenant William L. Calley was convicted of murdering twentytwo Vietnamese civilians and was the only person convicted of any crime in the aftermath of the My Lai massacre.
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The My Lai massacre occurred during the first hours of a March 16, 1968, operation carried out by a battalion-sized unit, code-named Task Force Barker, of the Americal Division of the U.S. Army. This unit, comprising three infantry companies (A, B, and C) supported by artillery, helicopters, and coastal patrol craft, was intended to sweep between two hundred and four hundred Viet Cong from a group of hamlets in the Son My subdistrict of Quang Ngai Province in South Vietnam. Following the surprise Tet offensive launched by the Viet Cong on January 31, American commanders sought to reestablish control and to destroy known Viet Cong units. The Americal Division, including Task Force Barker, had been searching around Quang Ngai in February and March but encountered few Viet Cong. On March 15, Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Barker announced a threeday sweep against the Viet Cong 48th Local Forces battalion operating in and around a large, coastal fishing village. This was the third such operation against this village since February. Barker planned to move his three infantry companies into place by helicopter about 8:00 a.m., following a short artillery barrage. Helicopters were to engage fleeing or fighting Viet Cong. Offshore, small Navy patrol craft blocked any escape through the eastern seaward end of the noose. Company C landed at 7:30 a.m., just west of another hamlet, My Lai. Lieutenant William L. Calley’s platoon of twenty-five men moved first through the hamlet’s south section; Lieutenant Stephen Brooks’s platoon went through the north. Lieutenant Larry LaCroix’s platoon remained in reserve near the landing zone. The men of Company C expected to encounter two armed Viet Cong companies. Captain Ernest Medina, commander of Company C, had instructed his officers to burn the houses and destroy the livestock, crops, and foodstuffs in My Lai. Several men from Company C later testified that Captain Medina, who stayed at the landing zone, had specifically instructed them to kill civilians found in the hamlets. Medina denied such statements. Calley’s platoon slaughtered two large groups of villagers sometime between 7:50 a.m. and 9:15 a.m. In one instance, more than twenty people were gunned down on a pathway; in another, around 150 were systematically slaughtered with machine gun and small-arms fire in a ditch about one hundred meters east of the hamlet. Soldiers later testified that Calley ordered them to kill their civilian captives. Men from all three platoons of Company C committed murder, rape, and other atrocities that morning. About 8:30 a.m. Brooks’s platoon turned northward on Medina’s command to recover the bodies of two Viet Cong killed by a helicopter gun-
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ship. Brooks’s platoon then entered Binh Tay, a hamlet a few hundred meters away, where they raped and murdered villagers before rejoining Company C around 10:00 a.m. While this killing was going on, Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson, an experienced combat helicopter pilot, was flying close overhead in an armed observation craft. At various times from 8:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m., Thompson attempted to aid wounded South Vietnamese civilians in the fields around My Lai, saw Medina kill a wounded Vietnamese woman in a field, and landed his craft near the ditch where so many defenseless people were shot. He urged members of Company C to stop the killing, but killings resumed after he left. Around 10:00 a.m. he landed again to protect a group of women and children who were being herded toward a bunker by men of Company C. Thompson called in one of his gunships to evacuate some of the wounded civilians and then landed his own small helicopter to save one slightly wounded child from the heaps of bodies. In addition to his combat radio transmissions, Thompson made reports upon his return to base to his commander about the slaughter. Cover-up The truth of these events was covered up within the Americal Division for a year, until a letter from a Vietnam veteran, Ronald Ridenhour, to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in late March, 1969, claimed “something very black indeed” had occurred at My Lai. Laird ordered an investigation. In September, 1969, William Calley was charged with murdering more than one hundred civilians at My Lai. The full dimensions of the massacre became public knowledge in mid-November, 1969, when newspapers carried Seymour Hersh’s interviews with men from Company C, the CBS Evening News broadcast other interviews, and photographs of the massacred victims were printed in Life magazine. Lieutenant General William R. Peers was assigned responsibility for conducting the official investigation of the incident. He learned that Hugh Thompson’s accusations of a civilian massacre, as well as reports by South Vietnamese officials of more than five hundred civilian deaths, were never properly investigated. Peers’s report of March, 1970, contained detailed findings about what happened at My Lai and a recommendation that thirty individuals be held for possible charges. War Crimes Charges The Army preferred charges against a total of twenty-five men: twelve for war crimes and thirteen for other military offenses. Four of the five men eventually tried on war crime charges were members of Company C. The
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fifth was Captain Eugene Kotouc, the staff intelligence officer of Task Force Barker. He was acquitted of torturing a prisoner. There was no evidence of any misdeeds by men from Company A, but Company B had been involved in killings of civilians at the hamlet of My Khe. Captain Earl Michles, in command of Company B, was killed in the same helicopter crash that killed Lieutenant Colonel Barker in June, 1968, so both of those men were beyond the reach of the law. Charges against Lieutenant Willingham of Company B were dismissed in 1970, in spite of evidence of between thirty-eight and ninety civilian deaths caused by his men in My Khe on the morning of March 16. Charges were brought in 1970 against thirteen officers in the Americal Division for various military offenses that were less than war crimes and did not involve murder or attempted murder. Charges were dismissed against several of the officers, and several had their cases resolved in other manners. Only four men were tried for the war crimes of murdering civilians, all were members of Company C: Captain Medina, the company commander; Lieutenant Calley, in command of one of the company’s platoons; Staff Sergeant David Mitchell, a squad leader in Calley’s platoon; and Staff Sergeant Charles E. Hutto, a squad leader from Brooks’s platoon. Lieutenant Brooks was killed in combat after the incident and so was not charged. Initially, seven enlisted men from Company C had been charged by the Army with crimes including murder, rape, and assault. Charges against five were dropped and two men were tried. Courts-Martial The first court-martial resulting from My Lai was that of David Mitchell, a career soldier; it began in October, 1970, at Fort Hood, Texas. Mitchell was acquitted of all charges. While Calley’s trial was still in session, Charles Hutto was tried at Fort McPherson, Georgia, and found innocent. Medina’s trial took place at Fort McPherson in August and September, 1971, after Calley’s March, 1971, conviction. Medina was found not guilty of murder and assault. Calley’s trial was the most prominent of all the courts-martial. He had been identified from the start as ordering the shooting of women and children and was tried under article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice for premeditated murder of more than one hundred Vietnamese. The trial at Fort Benning, Georgia, lasted about four months. On March 29, 1971, Calley was found guilty of three counts of murder by a panel of six officers. He was sentenced “to be confined at hard labor for the rest of [his] natural life; to be dismissed from the service; to forfeit all pay and allowances.” Two days later, President Richard M. Nixon ordered Calley re-
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leased from the stockade and returned to his quarters to serve his sentence. In August, 1971, the Army reduced Calley’s sentence to twenty years, and in April, 1974, further reduced it to ten years. In the Army, prisoners become eligible for parole after one-third of their sentence is served. With Calley’s punishment reduced to ten years, he became eligible in the fall of 1974 and parole was granted in November. Impact The reactions both to the My Lai massacre and to Lieutenant Calley’s conviction cover a tremendous range. Most Americans and many people around the world expressed horror and distress at the massacre itself; yet a great many considered Lieutenant Calley to be a scapegoat. To some, it was not Lieutenant Calley or the others who were tried in courts-martial, but the United States that was on trial for its Vietnam war. The outcome of the courts-martial reveals that no one—not the Army, the president, Congress, or the American public—relished punishing American fighting men for their conduct in Vietnam. The Army backed away from a joint trial of the accused and did not carry through the stern spirit of justice that pervades the official Peers Report. American official and popular statements from the time typically express outrage toward the massacre itself but suggest that it would be best to reserve judgment about Calley’s or others’ guilt. Some veterans and Army members believed that Calley was being punished for one of the inevitable tragedies of war. Still others believed Calley had done only what
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Ruined remains of My Lai in late 1969, one and one-half years after the massacre. (AP/ Wide World Photos)
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the army had trained him to do: kill communists. Many believed, in contrast, that since the United States was fighting to protect Vietnam from communism, the Army should be saving, or at least protecting, Vietnamese civilians. Immediately following Calley’s conviction for murder, the White House and Congress received a strong wave of popular sympathy for him. It was believed that Calley’s conviction condemned, by implication, all Americans who had fought in Vietnam. Others believed that what occurred at My Lai were war crimes and that Calley, and others, should have been punished by death in the same way that German and Japanese war criminals were following World War II. Beneath these opposing emotional calls for Calley’s release or execution, the My Lai massacre and the subsequent courts-martial had a profound impact on the United States and the Army. Knowledge of the massacre came twenty-one months after the Tet Offensive, but it was additional confirmation that hopes for an American victory in Vietnam were unfounded. If U.S. troops were slaughtering the South Vietnamese, how could the people ever be won over to the side of the United States? People also wondered if My Lai was only the first of many such massacres that would come to light. In fact, evidence of thousands of unnecessary and unwarranted deaths of South Vietnamese civilians caused by U.S. and other allied units have been documented, but nothing quite so horrible as that at My Lai. Reconsiderations of the War Simply because of the questions raised about possible American atrocities in Vietnam, the whole discussion of the war itself took on a new color. The massacre gave proof to those antiwar protestors who called the war immoral and unjust. The atrocity marked an end, or at least a profound shock, to trust in American goodness and nobility of purpose. During the 1970’s, evidence of various hidden schemes and deadly plans by the U.S. government came to light, many of them completely unconnected with My Lai. The My Lai massacre remains a key incident that loosed the tide of self-doubt and questioning about the American purpose and moral stature that marked much of national life in the 1970’s and 1980’s. One of the most profound and lasting impacts of the My Lai massacre and the Calley court-martial was the coldness and distaste Vietnam veterans encountered after 1969 upon return to the United States. Many Americans treated all veterans as if they had joined with Company C to abuse and murder Vietnamese women and children. For those remaining in the military service, the vision of a unit running amok killing civilians in
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Vietnam’s guerrilla war was one of several powerful forces that led to major reforms in Army military doctrine and the abandonment of the draft in favor of an all-volunteer armed services. David D. Buck
April-June, 1970 Cambodia Invasion Date: April 29-June, 1970 Location: Cambodia, adjacent to the border with Vietnam Principal figures: American, Creighton Williams Abrams, Jr. (1914-1975), Henry Kissinger (1923), Richard M. Nixon (1913-1994); Cambodian, Lon Nol (1913-1985), Norodom Sihanouk (1922) Result: An abortive effort to hasten the end of U.S. involvement in Vietnam plunged Cambodia into two decades of civil war. In 1968, when Richard M. Nixon was voted into office, partly on the strength of his promise to bring peace to Vietnam, Cambodia was at peace. Its ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, had successfully maneuvered to keep his country separate from the Vietnam War by allowing the North Vietnamese to use border provinces both as sanctuaries and to channel supplies destined for South Vietnam through Cambodian territory. For Sihanouk, the decision to aid the Vietnamese communists in this manner was one of expediency rather than sympathy. In his eyes, the choices were few; he must either help the communists or accept “American imperialism.” According to the Nixon doctrine, in the future the United States would provide material support to troops of countries resisting communist aggression but refrain from sending U.S. personnel to the battlefield. The key to Nixon’s plan for ending the war was “Vietnamization,” a program calling for the gradual extrication of U.S. troops and their replacement by Vietnamese. In essence, it was a solution to the U.S. problem of disengaging from the war rather than a solution to the war. In the same way, the prospect of invading Cambodia was viewed only as a means to ease disengagement. That it would actually widen the war and introduce a previously neutral country to the conflict were possibilities that remained secondary considerations. In April, 1964, U.S. planes, flying from bases in Thailand, strafed two Cambodian villages. Sihanouk soon severed diplomatic relations with
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the United States. Subsequent border forays by the South Vietnamese army into Cambodia, coordinated with U.S. military advisers, also had little effect on stopping the flow of support from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. Background The U.S. military leadership had, for some time, sought permission to invade Cambodia. President Nixon’s immediate predecessor, Lyndon B. Johnson, had rejected several requests on the grounds that the impact of such an invasion on the course of the war would be negligible. In February of 1969, however, less than a month after Nixon assumed office, General Creighton W. Abrams, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, requested that B-52 bombers be used against sanctuaries and supply routes. Nixon, in concurrence with his national security adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, agreed, and in March, 1969, the bombing of Cambodia began. As the U.S. Constitution specifically holds that only Congress can decide to wage war, this act to widen the war almost certainly was illegal. To prevent the issue of legality from arising, however, Nixon ordered that the bombing be kept secret. To prevent a news leak, he even bypassed the ordinary military chain of command, failing to notify the Pentagon. The domestic outcry over the bombing forced him to order a halt. In this manner, without the knowledge of Congress or the American people, Cambodia was introduced to the war one year prior to the U.S. invasion. Although the bombing in itself achieved limited success in interdicting North Vietnamese supply routes and storage areas, it killed more Cambodians than North Vietnamese, had a significant impact on the Cambodian political situation, and was primarily responsible for initiating a series of events that would impact Cambodia’s future for years. First, it pushed the communists out of the border sanctuary areas and deeper into Cambodia. This irritated rightist elements in Sihanouk’s government who, already dissatisfied with his permissiveness in allowing Vietnamese communists access to Cambodian territory, became even more so as they witnessed the communists usurp still more. Sihanouk, aware of the discord, took measures to allay it. He reopened diplomatic relations with the United States. He informed Washington that he would not object to some attacks on Vietnamese sanctuaries inside Cambodia, but he never agreed to indiscriminate bombing. By not protesting the B-52 raids, which he strongly opposed, he felt he was making a significant concession to these same rightist elements who supported them. Fearing eventual annexation by Vietnam, rightist General Lon Nol, Cambodian armed forces commander, ordered all Vietnamese to leave the country, and anti-Vietnamese demonstrations were or-
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ganized in Phnom Penh and the provinces along the Vietnamese border. In March, 1970, as tensions continued to mount within his government, Sihanouk departed from Phnom Penh on a diplomatic mission to Moscow and Peking. Again, motivated by the need to settle the unrest among his ministers, he intended to urge both governments to restrain the North Vietnamese from encroaching further into Cambodian territory. However, he had failed to assess accurately how far the crisis in his capital had actually advanced. While still in Moscow, he learned he had been deposed by his pro-U.S. defense minister, Lon Nol. Although there is no evidence that the United States or any other foreign power promoted the coup, it precipitated crucial policy changes on both sides of the Vietnam War. The struggling Cambodian communist movement Khmer Rouge, which previously had been judged by Hanoi to be too small to be effective, was suddenly thrust by Sihanouk’s downfall into a position from which it could make a serious attempt at gaining power. As a result, Vietnamese assistance increased dramatically, and the Khmer Rouge received the support it needed eventually to achieve power. For those among the U.S. leadership who supported an invasion plan, Sihanouk’s downfall was a fortuitous event, since he alone among Cambodia’s leaders had remained strongly opposed. With his removal, all Cambodian government opposition to an invasion attempt ended. The Invasion On April 29-30, 1970, an invasion was mounted with thirty thousand U.S. and South Vietnamese troops crossing into Cambodia. Secrecy had so pervaded the operation’s planning that no one in Cambodia, including the United States mission and Lon Nol, learned of it until after it occurred. Although Nixon spoke of the invasion as a decisive victory, the military regarded it as having attained a temporary advantage at best. While uncovering enormous stores of supplies, it encountered few enemy troops. In effect, military planners had failed to take into account the communists’ move westward under the impact of the bombing. Thus, while temporarily disrupting the communists’ logistics, the invasion made little impact on their long-term conduct of the war. Pentagon estimates suggested that North Vietnamese plans for an offensive had been set back by no more than a year; in keeping with this assessment, the North Vietnamese, within two months of the withdrawal of United States invasion forces, had reestablished their supply trails and sanctuaries. Within the United States, the effect of the invasion was devastating. The antiwar movement reacted with intensified demonstrations and student strikes. The deaths of four students at Kent State University as the result of
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a confrontation between National Guardsmen and protesters shocked the nation. The extent of the reaction engendered by the invasion surprised President Nixon. Although he defended his action to the American people, his arguments appeared flimsy and misrepresentative. Claiming that the United States had for five years respected Cambodian neutrality, he neglected to mention the bombing. Declaring that the invasion was intended to destroy the headquarters for the entire communist military operation in South Vietnam, he ignored overwhelming evidence offered by the military proving that no such target existed. Depicting the invasion as a necessary step taken against the North Vietnamese to preclude the possibility of attacks on U.S. troops withdrawing from the war, he hid the fact that during the course of negotiations for peace, the North Vietnamese had already offered to refrain from such attacks once a withdrawal date was determined. Finally, asserting that his decision was crucial to the maintenance of U.S. prestige abroad, Nixon contradicted evidence indicating a substantial fall in U.S. prestige following the invasion. Both internationally and domestically, the feeling prevailed that the president had succeeded only in expanding an already wearisome war. Impact For Cambodia, the invasion completed the destruction of a tenuous neutrality already severely damaged for more than a year by the bombing campaign. It precipitated an internal war that had not existed before U.S. forces crossed the border and that subsequently enveloped Cambodia in a prolonged conflict between United States-supported anti-communist forces and Vietnam-supported Khmer Rouge insurgents, thereby subjecting the country to still further devastation and eventual communist rule. In this way, the fate of Cambodia was decided. U.S. policymakers, interested only in exploiting Cambodia’s territory as an adjunct to the Vietnam War, held the welfare of Cambodians and their land in small regard. President Nixon made this clear when in December, 1970, he stated that the Cambodians were “tying down forty thousand North Vietnamese regulars [in Cambodia and] if those North Vietnamese weren’t in Cambodia they’d be over killing Americans.” The Cambodians were thus reduced to acting as surrogate U.S. targets for North Vietnamese guns. The tragedy of the U.S. invasion was that so much was suffered for so little reason. Cambodia was but a sideshow for Nixon, who failed to take either the subtleties of Indochina or the domestic antiwar movement into account. Sihanouk’s assessment of policymakers in Washington was, in characteristic hyperbole, that “They demoralized America, they lost all of Indochina to the communists, and they created the Khmer Rouge.”
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When U.S. and Vietnamese troops withdrew from Cambodia, civil war ensued. The Khmer Rouge, which came to power in 1975, soon attacked Vietnam to regain lost territory. Hanoi counterattacked in 1978, pushing the Khmer Rouge to the border with Thailand by 1979. In 1989, Vietnamese troops withdrew, and in 1993, the United Nations held elections, resulting in an elected parliament, which restored Sihanouk as king of Cambodia. Ronald J. Cima updated by Michael Haas
March, 1973 U.S. Withdrawal from Vietnam Date: March 29, 1973 Location: South Vietnam and Paris Principal figures: American, Henry Kissinger (1923), Richard M. Nixon (1913-1994); Vietnamese, President Nguyen Van Thieu (1923), president of South Vietnam, Le Duc Tho (1911-1990) Result: The American withdrawal from Vietnam marked the first defeat of the United States in a foreign war. Throughout the history of the United States, only the Civil War aroused as many conflicting emotions among citizens, officials, and soldiers as did the Vietnam War. Debate in the United States began in the early 1960’s over what means should be used to protect the Republic of South Vietnam. Division spread with time to questions of ends: What sort of peace was being sought in Asia? Were the Viet Cong really worse than the South Vietnamese government? Could the United States achieve an honorable withdrawal? The war posed such dilemmas that the government was soon caught up in a charade of truth, obscuring issues and purposes even further. Nixon’s Peace Plan From the time Richard M. Nixon became president in 1969, he was chiefly dependent upon the negotiating table for bringing the peace he had promised. His bargaining position was weak. With half a million U.S. troops in South Vietnam, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces could not win a direct offensive, but their guerrilla techniques ensured that they could not lose, either. The war was essentially a waiting game, and the stakes were so much higher for the communists that they could afford to
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wait longer. Nor did the communists need a negotiated peace as much as Nixon did. The massive opposition at home to continued war required Nixon to deescalate, but strong popular support of U.S. intervention made total withdrawal an equally unacceptable policy. Nevertheless, communist initiatives brought the first real breakthroughs in discussions over peace. From May, 1968, formal negotiations had been carried on in Paris, but these talks produced little more than rhetoric and repeatedly broke down in frustration. In June, 1971, Hanoi backed away from two earlier demands and agreed to discuss an in-place ceasefire and the conduct of internationally supervised elections without prior abolition of the Saigon government. Shortly afterward, the Viet Cong (South Vietnamese communists) made similar concessions, showing a conciliatory attitude toward the West. With these concessions, a second round of negotiations began, held between Le Duc Tho, a prominent North Vietnamese official, and Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s national security adviser. Although a subordinate of Nixon, Kissinger viewed his role in a different light. For Kissinger, the peace settlement would have to reflect the actual power situation, in which the North remained strong, the United States was to leave, and the government of the South lacked popular support and would probably collapse. Domestic political considerations did not matter to him. Nixon, on the other hand, wanted to end the war without alienating his domestic political support and by reassuring allies that the United States would come to their aid if needed in the future. The United States made several minor concessions in the ensuing discussions, but little real progress was made. President Nixon was feeling the pressure of an election year, and U.S. troop levels in Vietnam dropped rapidly, weakening his leverage at the talks. Although U.S. forces numbered ninety-five thousand, only six thousand were combat-ready. Despite the historic détentes Nixon achieved with China and the Soviet Union during 1972, neither of these two allies of North Vietnam pressured Hanoi to accept a compromise with the United States. Instead, the North launched a major offensive in the spring, overrunning Quang Tri province. In May, 1972, Nixon retaliated by ordering the bombing of North Vietnam to be stepped up, and the ports of the country mined and blockaded (bringing economic crisis to the communists); but at the same time, Kissinger offered major modifications of the United States bargaining position. For the first time, the United States was willing to permit North Vietnamese troops to remain in South Vietnam after a cease-fire, and to modify the Saigon government before elections. Intensive talks between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho resumed, with special incentives for both sides. The Nixon administration had to prove that its gamble in escalating the war was effec-
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tive, and the North Vietnamese, watching the increasing likelihood of Nixon’s reelection, wanted to reach an agreement before a safer Nixon became tougher. Negotiated Settlement In early October, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho agreed to a peace settlement along the lines of a proposal made by Hanoi in 1969, except that the confident North would allow the precarious government in the South to remain in place. The first step in the settlement was a cease-fire that would go into effect on October 24, 1972. When the text was revealed to Nixon, who was confident of reelection, the president insisted that South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu must also support the peace. Kissinger went to Saigon but was unable to apply pressure on Thieu, who was intransigent. The North expressed its anger by releasing the text of the draft agreement and the history of the hitherto secret negotiations. Kissinger then flew back to Washington, D.C. Hoping to apply pressure on Saigon, he informed the U.S. press upon his arrival that “Peace is at hand,” although not “in hand,” but South Vietnam soon announced sixty-nine objections to the proposed text of the peace agreement. In early November, Nixon won reelection in a landslide. In Paris, the North, believing that it had been duped by Kissinger, refused to make any concessions to the South. The talks became bitter and broke down in midDecember. When the talks collapsed, Nixon tried one more bold stroke and ordered the Christmas bombing of North Vietnam. Dozens of B-52 bombers were set upon the largest cities of the country, widely destroying industry. The communist antiaircraft defense was so vigorous, and U.S. anger at the attack so powerful, as to make the success of the bombing questionable. It was stopped in less than two weeks, and war-weary negotiators returned to Paris. The Peace Accords On January 31, 1973, peace accords were signed by North Vietnam, the Viet Cong, the United States, and a reluctant South Vietnam. The provisions of the treaty were substantially the same as those of the October agreement. By March 27, the United States was to withdraw its troops from Vietnam; exchanges of prisoners would go on during those two months. All Vietnamese forces would remain in place, and a cease-fire would be supervised by an International Commission of Control and Supervision, comprising representatives from Canada, Hungary, Indonesia, and Poland. All parties concurred on Vietnam’s sovereignty and right of selfdetermination, and a council was established with responsibility for devel-
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oping and executing plans for an open election. In 1973, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. There is room for doubt concerning how seriously the treaty was taken by any of the concerned nations. Cease-fire lines never were clearly established, many of the provisions were vague and invited violation, and both sides broke the treaty almost as soon as it was signed. Kissinger’s creative ambiguity in the wording of the peace treaty meant that all sides could interpret the text the way they wished, without being aware of alternative interpretations by others. The United States quickly withdrew, regained its captured prisoners, and could claim “peace with honor.” Both President Thieu of South Vietnam and the scattered communist forces seemed to believe that their best prospects lay in renewed fighting. Congress had no intention of providing humanitarian aid to the North, as provided in the treaty, and Hanoi ignored the pledge to stop sending supplies to the Viet Cong. After U.S. troops withdrew on March 29, 1973, the United States sent the South some $2.6 billion in aid, resumed reconnaissance flights over Vietnam, and continued to bomb Cambodia. Upon learning that Kissinger had given secret assurances to Thieu to reenter the war if the South faltered, Congress required all military operations in and over Indochina to cease by August 15, 1973. By the end of 1973, open war had returned to the nation. U.S. aid continued to flow to South Vietnam, and Thieu controlled a well-trained army of one million men. However, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese seemed to have gained some critical psychological edge on their enemy, and their successes were self-reinforcing. During 1974, with Nixon distracted by investigations of his effort to cover up the burglary of Democratic Party headquarters at the Watergate apartments, Congress reduced military aid to the South to $907 million and then to $700 million in 1975. Accordingly, the communist positions were generally strengthened, and at the outset of 1975 they launched a last major offensive. After a major direct victory at Hue, communist forces drove rapidly over South Vietnam, pursuing an utterly demoralized army. By the end of April, Saigon was captured; the last U.S. advisers abandoned the country; and the Vietnam era of U.S. history was truly at an end. Richard H. Sander updated by Michael Haas
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Further Reading Anderson, David L., ed. Facing My Lai: Moving Beyond the Massacre. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997. Angers, Trent. The Forgotten Hero of My Lai: The Hugh Thompson Story. Lafayette, La.: Acadian House, 1999. Arnold, James. Tet Offensive 1968. Sterling Heights, Mich.: Osprey, 1991. Barnouw, Erik. Tube of Plenty: The Evolution of American Television. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975. Baskir, Lawrence M., and William A. Strauss. Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War, and the Vietnam Generation. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978. Belknap, Michal R. The Vietnam War on Trial: The My Lai Massacre and the Court-martial of Lieutenant Calley. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002. Bickel, Alexander M. The Least Dangerous Branch. Indianapolis, Ind.: BobbsMerrill, 1962. Brown, Robert McAfee, Abraham Heschel, and Michael Novak. Vietnam: Crisis of Conscience. New York: Association Press, 1967. Calley, William. Lieutenant Calley: His Own Story, as Told to John Sack. New York: Viking Press, 1971. Capps, Walter H. The Unfinished War: Vietnam and the American Conscience. Boston: Beacon Press, 1982. Caputo, Philip. A Rumor of War. New York: Henry Holt, 1996. Casey, William Van Etten, and Philip Nobile, eds. The Berrigans. New York: Praeger, 1971. Cash, John A. Seven Firefights in Vietnam. New York: Bantam, 1993. Chomsky, Noam. For Reasons of State. 1972. Reprint. Introduction by Arundhati Roy. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2003. Clark, Johnnie M. Guns Up! Rev. ed. New York: Ballantine Books, 2002. Corbett, John. West Dickens Avenue: A Marine at Khe Sanh. New York: Ballantine Books, 2003. Cummings, Dennis J., ed. The Men Behind the Trident: SEAL Team One in Vietnam. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Daum, Andreas W., Lloyd C. Gardner, and Wilfried Mausbach, eds. America, the Vietnam War, and the World: Comparative and International Perspectives. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Davidson, Phillip B. Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
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Donovan, Robert J., and Ray Scherer. Unsilent Revolution: Television News and American Public Life. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Dunn, Peter M. The First Vietnam War. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985. Ellsberg, Daniel. Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers. New York: Viking, 2002. Frankum, Ronald B., Jr. Like Rolling Thunder: The Air War in Vietnam, 19641975. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. Freedman, Dan, and Jacqueline Rhoads. Nurses in Vietnam: The Forgotten Veterans. Austin: Texas Monthly Press, 1987. Freeman, Gregory A. Sailors to the End: The Deadly Fire on the USS Forrestal and the Heroes Who Fought It. New York: William Morrow, 2002. Friel, Howard. The Record of the Paper: How the New York Times Misreports US Foreign Policy. New York: Verso, 2004. Gates, Gary Paul. Air Time: The Inside Story of CBS News. New York: Harper & Row, 1978. Gilbert, Marc, and William Head, eds. The Tet Offensive. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996. Goldman, Sheldon. Constitutional Law: Cases and Essays. New York: HarperCollins, 1991. Halberstam, David. The Powers That Be. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979. Hall, Mitchell D. Because of Their Faith: CALCAV and Religious Opposition to the Vietnam War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. Hallin, Daniel. The “Uncensored War”: The Media and Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. Hammel, Eric. Fire in the Streets: The Battle for Hue, Tet 1968. New York: Dell, 1991. ____________. Khe Sanh: Siege in the Clouds, an Oral History. Pacifica, Calif.: Pacifica Press, 2000. Hammer, Richard. The Court-Martial of Lt. Calley. New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1971. Hammond, William M. Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968. Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1988. ____________. Reporting Vietnam: Media and Military at War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998. Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975. 2d ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986. Hersh, Seymour. My Lai Four: A Report on the Massacre and Its Aftermath. New York: Random House, 1970. Holm, Jeanne. Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982.
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Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2d rev. ed. New York: Penguin Books, 1997. Kissinger, Henry. Ending the Vietnam War: A Personal History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003. Lanning, Michael Lee. Inside the Crosshairs: Snipers in Vietnam. New York: Ivy Books, 1998. Laurence, John. The Cat from Hue: A Vietnam War Story. New York: PublicAffairs, 2002. Levy, David W. The Debate over Vietnam. 2d ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. Lewy, Guenter. America in Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. Lowe, Peter, ed. The Vietnam War. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998. McMahon, Robert J., ed. Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1995. MacPherson, Myra. Long Time Passing: Vietnam and the Haunted Generation. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1984. Maraniss, David. They Marched into Sunlight: War and Peace, Vietnam and America, October 1967. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003. Marolda, Edward J. The U.S. Navy in the Vietnam War: An Illustrated History. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s 2001. Marshall, Kathryn. In the Combat Zone: An Oral History of American Women in Vietnam, 1966-1975. Boston: Little, Brown, 1987. Michel, Marshall L. III. Clashes: Air Combat over North Vietnam, 1965-1972. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997. ____________. The Eleven Days of Christmas: America’s Last Vietnam Battle. San Francisco, Calif.: Encounter Books, 2002. Moise, Edwin E. Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996. Moore, Harold G., and Joseph L. Galloway. We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young: Ia Drang, the Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1992. Morden, Bettie J. The Women’s Army Corps, 1945-1978. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1990. Murphy, Edward F. The Hill Fights: The First Battle of Khe Sanh. New York: Ballantine Books, 2003. Nalty, Bernard C. Air War over South Vietnam, 1968-1975. Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2000. Nichols, John B., and Barrett Tillman. On Yankee Station: The Naval Air War over Vietnam. 1987. Reprint. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001.
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Nolan, Keith William. Battle for Hue: Tet, 1968. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1996. ____________. The Magnificent Bastards: The Joint Army-Marine Defense of Dong Ha, 1968. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1994. Norman, Elizabeth. Women at War: The Story of Fifty Military Nurses Who Served in Vietnam. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990. Oberdorfer, Don. Tet! New York: Doubleday, 1971. O’Brien, David M. Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics. New York: W. W. Norton, 1990. Olson, James S., and Randy Roberts. My Lai: A Brief History with Documents. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999. ____________. Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam, 1945-1995. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996. Palmer, Dave Richard. Summons of the Trumpet: A History of the Vietnam War from a Military Man’s Viewpoint. San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978. Peers, William R. The My Lai Inquiry. New York: W. W. Norton, 1979. Pisor, Robert. The End of the Line: The Siege of Khe Sanh. New York: Ballantine Books, 1982. Plaster, John L. Secret Commandos: Behind Enemy Lines with the Elite Warriors of SOG. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004. ____________. SOG: The Secret Wars of America’s Commandos in Vietnam. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997. Podhoretz, Norman. Why We Were in Vietnam. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982. Prados, John, and Ray W. Stubbe. Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991. Price, Alfred. War in the Fourth Dimension: US Electronic Warfare, from the Vietnam War to the Present. Foreword by Charles A. Horner. Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 2001. Prochnau, William. Once Upon a Distant War: Young War Correspondents and the Early Vietnam Battles. New York: Random House, 1995. Reporting Vietnam: American Journalism, 1959-1975. Introduction by Ward Just. New York: Library of America, 2000. Rochester, Stuart I., and Frederick T. Kiley. Honor Bound: American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1999. Rosas, Allan. The Legal Status of Prisoners of War: A Study in International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1976. Rossum, Ralph A., and G. Alan Taer. American Constitutional Law. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991.
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Safer, Morley. Flashbacks: On Returning to Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1990. Sales, Kirkpatrick. SDS. New York: Random House, 1973. Schuck, Peter H. Agent Orange on Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986. Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York: Vintage Books, 1989. ____________, et al. The Pentagon Papers. Toronto: Bantam Books, 1971. Sim, Kevin, and Michael Bilton. Four Hours in My Lai. New York: Viking Press, 1992. Smith, George W. The Siege at Hue. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999. Smith, Jean E. The Constitution and American Foreign Policy. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing, 1989. Solis, Gary D. Son Thang: An American War Crime. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Strum, Philippa. The Supreme Court and Political Questions. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1974. Summers, Harry G., Jr. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1995. Turley, William S. The Second Indochina War: A Short Political and Military History, 1954-1975. New York: Mentor/Penguin Books, 1987. United States Department of the Army. The My Lai Massacre and Its Coverup: Beyond the Reach of the Law? The Peers Commission Report: Joseph Goldstein, Burke Marshall and Jack Schwartz. New York: Free Press, 1976. Van Devanter, Lynda. Home Before Morning: The Story of an Army Nurse in Vietnam. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001. Van Staaveren, Jacob. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: Interdiction in Southern Laos, 1960-1968. Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1993. Walker, Keith. A Piece of My Heart: The Stories of Twenty-Six American Women Who Served in Vietnam. New York: Ballantine Books, 1985. Walker, Samuel. In Defense of American Liberties. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Warr, Nicholas. Phase Line Green: The Battle for Hue, 1968. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Wetterhahn, Ralph. The Last Battle: The Mayaguez Incident and the End of the Vietnam War. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2001. Willbanks, James H. Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004. Windrow, Martin. The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam. Cambridge, Mass.: De Capo Press, 2005.
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Wirtz, James. The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War. Cornell, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994. Woods, Randall B., ed. Vietnam and the American Political Tradition: The Politics of Dissent. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Woodward, Bob, and Scott Armstrong. The Brethren. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979. Wyatt, Clarence R. Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War. New York: W. W. Norton, 1992. Young, Marilyn B. The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.
Conflicts in the Caribbean 1961-1989 Conflicts in the Caribbean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 647 Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events . . . . . . . . 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1962: Cuban Missile Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1965: Dominican Republic Occupation . . . . . . . 1983: Grenada Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1983: Censorship During the Grenada Occupation . 1989: Panama Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Conflicts in the Caribbean At issue: U.S.-Soviet competition for influence in the region Date: 1961-1989 Location: Caribbean Basin Combatants: Americans vs. Soviet allies and suspect allies in the Caribbean Principal conflicts: Bay of Pigs (1961), Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), Dominican Republic occupation (1965), Grenada occupation (1983), Panama occupation (1989) Result: The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 ended the Cold War and lessened tensions in the Caribbean, but the United States continued to cast a long shadow over the region. American interests in the Caribbean region go back to the pre-independence era, when Great Britain was developing trade relationships between its Caribbean and North American colonies. After the United States won its Revolutionary War during the early 1780’s, it stood as the only independent nation in the Western Hemisphere. In the early nineteenth century, a wave of independence movements swept throughout Latin America. Ironically, although the Caribbean island nation of Haiti became the second country in the Western Hemisphere to assert its independence in 1804, most of the region’s islands—including all of Great Britain’s colonies— remained colonial dependencies throughout the rest of the century. Some did not become independent until as late as the 1970’s and 1980’s, and ten territories remained colonial dependencies into the twenty-first century. The Monroe Doctrine Meanwhile, virtually all the Spanish and Portuguese colonies on the continental land masses surrounding the Caribbean were becoming independent, and a new era of political disorder began. Most of the new national governments were unstable and appeared vulnerable to foreign intervention. Concerned about the possibility of other European powers moving into the region to fill the power void created by Spain and Brazil’s withdrawal, U.S. president James Monroe enunciated four foreign policy points during his 1823 state-of-the-union address to Congress that much later became known as the Monroe Doctrine. The first point of the Monroe Doctrine was that the United States would not interfere in the affairs of, or conflicts among, European nations. The second point was assurance that the United States would respect the rights
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Time Line of Conflicts in the Caribbean May 20, 1902
Cuba becomes independent after four-year occupation by U.S. troops.
Nov. 3, 1903
With U.S. backing, Panama declares its independence from Colombia.
Nov. 18, 1903
United States signs agreement with Panama to build Panama Canal and assumes permanent sovereignty over a six-mile-wide zone bordering the canal.
1904
U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt articulates the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, asserting that the United States has the right to intervene in the internal affairs of any Western Hemisphere nation guilty of flagrant misconduct.
Aug. 3, 1912Jan., 1933
U.S. troops occupy Nicaragua to quell political unrest.
Aug. 15, 1914
Panama Canal opens to shipping.
July 28, 1915-1934
U.S. Marines occupy Haiti.
May 15, 1916-1924
U.S. Marines occupy Dominican Republic.
1930
President Herbert Hoover’s administration rejects the Roosevelt Corollary and adopts the “Good Neighbor Policy” toward Latin America. Meanwhile, U.S.-trained Dominican army officer Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina seizes power in the Dominican Republic.
Dec., 1956
Fidel Castro launches Cuban Revolution.
Jan.-Feb., 1959
Castro’s Revolution overthrows Cuban government; Castro takes power as premier.
Mar., 1960
U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower authorizes the training of a Cuban exile force to be used against Castro’s government.
1961
United States severs diplomatic relations with Cuba.
Apr. 17, 1961
Bay of Pigs Invasion.
Oct. 22Nov. 3, 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis.
Apr. 24, 1965June 1, 1966
United States occupies Dominican Republic after coup overthrows President Juan Bosch.
Feb. 7, 1974
Grenada becomes independent.
Mar.-Apr., 1978
United States and Panama sign treaties designed eventually to give Panama full control over the canal.
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Oct. 13, 1983
Grenadan army overthrows government of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, who is killed six days later.
Oct. 25Dec. 15, 1983
United States occupies Grenada.
1987
Army general Manuel Noriega takes power in Panama.
May 7, 1989
Noriega voids Panama’s presidential election after his favored candidates suffer a crushing defeat.
Dec. 20, 1989Jan. 3, 1990
U.S. troops occupy Panama and arrest President Noriega after he survives a bungled coup attempt.
Apr. 9July 10, 1992
Noriega is convicted on drug and racketeering charges in a Florida court and is sentenced to forty years in a federal prison.
Dec. 31, 1999
Panama assumes full ownership of the Panama Canal.
of European colonies that remained in the Western Hemisphere—most of which were in the Caribbean. The third point asserted that the Western Hemisphere was closed to further European colonization. The fourth point was an elaboration on the third, stating that the United States would regard any attempt by any European nation to control or threaten any Western Hemisphere nation as a hostile act against the United States itself. Under the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States saw itself as the protector of the Western Hemisphere—a view that has colored U.S. policy in the region ever since. Through the early nineteenth century, the Monroe Doctrine meant little, as the United States was militarily too weak to pose a serious threat to most European powers and because there was little interest in Europe in recolonizing Latin America. The first true assertion of the doctrine came during the 1860’s, when France attempted to install a puppet government in Mexico. Partly in response to U.S. pressure, France withdrew from Mexico in 1867. As the century wore on, and as U.S. military strength increased, succeeding presidential administrations broadened their interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine, and it became a partial justification for the U.S. intervention in Cuba’s revolt against Spain that led to the Spanish-American War in 1898. The Roosevelt Corollary Theodore Roosevelt won fame from his brief combat experience in Cuba during the Spanish-American War and was elected vice president of the United States in 1900. After President William McKinley was assassinated the following year, he became president. In 1904, he added what be-
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came known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Under Roosevelt’s doctrine, the United States asserted that it had the right to intervene in the internal affairs of any fellow Western Hemisphere nations guilty of flagrant misconduct. Roosevelt justified the doctrine as an extension of the Monroe Doctrine because U.S. intervention would prevent the intervention of European powers seeking redress against misbehaving Latin American nations; however, the doctrine became a justification for U.S. imperialism against its own neighbors. During the first half of the twentieth century, the United States repeatedly intervened in the affairs of Latin American nations in the Caribbean and surrounding land masses. In addition to occupying Cuba from late 1898 through mid-1902, the United States sent troops into Mexico on occasion and occupied Nicaragua from 1912 to 1933 and Haiti from 1915 to 1934. From the mid-1930’s until the mid-1950’s, the United States kept its hands off its neighbors. However, the relatively long period of nonintervention ended when Cold War tensions reached the Caribbean. In 1954, the United States backed an invasion that overthrew the left-leaning government of Guatemala. Five years later, socialist revolutionaries under the leadership of Fidel Castro took power in Cuba, and the U.S. government moved to isolate the new government. This policy pushed Castro closer to the Soviet Union and transformed the Caribbean into a major Cold War arena. The Cold War From the mid-1950’s until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, all the U.S. military involvements in the Caribbean region had Cold War ramifications. In 1961, the United States severed diplomatic relations with Cuba and imposed a rigid trade embargo on the Caribbean’s largest island. That same year, the United States backed an attempt to overthrow Castro’s regime in the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion. In October, 1962, the world was poised on the brink of nuclear war when the United States forced the Soviet Union to withdraw missiles that it was installing in Cuba. The Cold War again flared up in the region in 1965, when the United States occupied the Dominican Republic to suppress a popular movement to restore to power the country’s legally elected president, whom the U.S. government regarded as a potentially dangerous ally of Castro. Cold War politics were also behind the U.S. intervention in the tiny island nation of Grenada in 1983, which the U.S. government feared was falling under the influence of Cuba. The motives behind U.S. intervention in Panama in 1989 had less to do with Cold War politics than with disciplining Panama’s President Manuel
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The United States sowed seeds for future conflict in the Caribbean Basin during the early twentieth century, when it built the Panama Canal and afterward administered the zone surrounding the canal as if it were sovereign U.S. territory. Panamanian resentment against the U.S. presence erupted in violence during the 1960’s that prompted a renegotiation of the U.S.-Panama treaty governing the canal and ultimately led to the United States turning the canal over to Panamanian control on the last day of 1999. (Library of Congress)
Noriega, a former U.S. ally who had gone too far in profiteering from illegal narcotics dealing. However, the occupation itself fell into the same pattern as earlier U.S. interventions in the Caribbean region and set the stage for U.S. military interventions in other parts of the post-Cold War world. Christopher E. Kent
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Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion At issue: Legitimacy of Fidel Castro’s government in Cuba Date: April 17-19, 1961 Location: Bay of Pigs, Las Villas province, Cuba Combatants: U.S.-trained Cuban exiles vs. Cuban military Principal commanders: American/Cuban exile, President John F. Kennedy, Jr., (1917-1963); Cuban, Fidel Castro (1926 or 1927) Result: The invasion of Cuba by an American-trained Cuban guerrilla force resulted in a crushing defeat. In 1959, Fidel Castro and his revolutionary forces overthrew Cuba’s government, establishing a revolutionary socialist regime in its place. Lands formerly owned by members of the upper classes and by U.S. companies were seized and redistributed, and many Cubans fled to the United States—primarily Florida—in exile. In March, 1960, President Dwight D. Eisenhower authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), headed by Allen Dulles, to train and equip a Cuban exile guerrilla force for the purpose of infiltrating Cuba and joining the anti-Castro underground. With the cooperation of the Guatemalan government, the CIA soon established training camps in that country, and the training of Cuban exile volunteers began. By November, 1960, the CIA operation, under the supervision of Richard Bissell, had changed from the training of guerrillas to the preparation of an invasion force. After that date, guerrilla training ceased, and a small army was trained in conventional assault landing tactics. Cuban Exiles Meanwhile, in the Cuban exile community in Miami, Florida, the United Revolutionary Front was formed. Headed by Dr. José Miró Cardona, who would become provisional president of Cuba upon the exiles’ return, the group in Miami managed the recruitment of soldiers for the expeditionary
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force, although the operation was completely directed by the CIA. Volunteers were screened for political acceptability, and leftists were discouraged or rejected. Consequently, the force in training took on a conservative character. The CIA-directed operation ran into severe problems from the start. Numerous political conflicts that threatened to undermine the entire operation erupted among the exile volunteers. U.S. involvement in the affair was supposed to remain covert, but in Miami the existence of the invasion force and the Guatemalan camps, as well as the CIA direction of the operation, were common knowledge. Increasingly, the American press reported on the preparations in progress for an invasion of Cuba. Castro, the premier of Cuba, also knew of the exile army being trained in Guatemala. In February, 1961, the invasion plans underwent an important change. Originally, the CIA had specified the city of Trinidad as the landing point for the exile force. The newly elected president, John F. Kennedy, decided that the invasion plans could proceed, however, only if U.S. support troops were better camouflaged. The site at Trinidad was judged too risky. In its place, the Bay of Pigs, one hundred miles to the west of Trinidad on the south-central coast of Cuba, was chosen. Trinidad was the better of the two sites for one simple reason: In the event of failure, the invasion force could retreat into the Escambray Mountains with little difficulty. The beaches at the Bay of Pigs, on the other hand, were surrounded by the Zapata swamps. Escape to the mountains some eighty miles to the east would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. In the event that the exiles could not establish a defensible beachhead at the Bay of Pigs, the only realistic retreat possible for them would be in the direction from which they came: to the sea. Invasion Plans By April, 1961, the invasion plans had taken shape. Castro’s air force was to be destroyed on the ground by two scheduled air strikes against Cuban air bases. The invasion force of fifteen hundred troops would disembark under the cover of night and acquire the advantage of complete surprise. Meanwhile, paratroopers would be dropped to establish advance positions, from which they could scout approaching Cuban forces and cut off transportation routes. With the skies to themselves, the exile forces initially would be resupplied at the Playa Girón airfield, close to the Bay of Pigs. Simultaneously, a diversionary landing would occur on the eastern coast of Cuba in an attempt to deceive Cuban forces about the exiles’ real intentions. The main invasion force then would advance into Matanzas Province with the goal of securing a defensible area of Cuban territory.
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President John F. Kennedy examines the combat flag that the 2506th Cuban Landing Brigade carried during the Bay of Pigs invasion. (National Archives)
This accomplished, the leaders of the United Revolutionary Front would be flown to Cuba to establish a provisional government. It was hoped that the local Cuban population might join the invaders in their fight against the Castro regime. With this possibility in mind, the supply ships accompanying the invasion force were to be stocked with arms and ammunition for a force of four thousand. The Invasion From the beginning, Operation Pluto, as the invasion plan was called, went badly. On April 15, 1961, eight B-26 bombers, supplied by the United States and disguised as Cuban air force planes, departed from Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, and attacked Cuban airfields in an attempt to destroy the Cuban air force. The bombing raid was unsuccessful. Although considerable damage was done to Cuba’s small air force, the attack left unharmed two or three T-33 trainer jets, three Sea Furies, and two B-26’s. At the United Nations, Raúl Roa, Cuba’s foreign minister, charged that the attack was a prelude to invasion from the United States. Adlai Stevenson, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, replied that the attacking planes were of Cuban origin. Because one of the planes had landed in Florida after the raid, Stevenson was able to produce photographs showing a B-26 bomber displaying the insignia of the Cuban air force. Stevenson
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actually believed the Cuban pilots to be defectors from Castro’s own forces; he was unaware of the deception. The trick was soon discovered, however, when reporters pointed out certain differences in the nose cones of the Cuban B-26’s as compared with the one that had landed in Florida. U.S. complicity in the air strike was apparent, and President Kennedy, at the recommendation of Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Special Assistant for National Security McGeorge Bundy, canceled the second air strike, scheduled for dawn on April 17. In the early-morning hours of Monday, April 17, the invasion force (now named Brigade 2506) began to disembark at two beaches on the Bay of Pigs: Playa Girón and Playa Larga. Contrary to advance intelligence reports that the area was virtually uninhabited and that militia in the area had no communications with Havana, the invaders were spotted almost immediately, and the news of invasion was relayed quickly to Castro’s headquarters. Thus, the dangerous night landing was conducted under fire from the very start. The unloading of troops and arms progressed more slowly than planned, and at dawn there were still invasion forces on the ships. The element of surprise had not been achieved, and the force of the undestroyed Cuban planes soon would be felt. Throughout the day on Monday, events continued to go against the invaders. Cuba’s air force, particularly the jets, proved to be the decisive factor in the battle. Two of the exiles’ escort ships, the Rio Escondido and the Houston, were sunk with arms, ammunition, and supplies on board. The exile air force (the Free Cuban Air Squadron), which consisted of sixteen B-26
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bombers, lost half of its planes. Flying from Nicaragua, the B-26’s carried extra fuel and had no tail guns. Unable to maneuver quickly, they made easy targets for the T-33 jet trainers. At sea, the escort vessels that were not sunk by Cuban planes were forced to withdraw from the invasion area. On the ground, the invasion forces fought well but were hampered by wet communication equipment and a scarcity of ammunition. Only one of the paratroop drops succeeded. The other failed because the paratroopers were dropped too close to the invasion area and because their heavy equipment was dropped into the swamps, never to be found again during the remainder of the battle. Failure The Bay of Pigs region was politically one of the worst possible sites for a successful counterrevolution in Cuba. What before 1959 had been an exclusively agricultural zone peopled by woodcutters was being developed by the revolutionary government as a future tourist haven. New roads, markets, and schools had won Castro the support of the populace, and few welcomed the invaders, who represented the middle and upper classes of Havana. Once the invasion foundered, the men of Brigade 2506 could not count on the local inhabitants to give them refuge. The U.S. planners of the invasion, through wishful thinking, had misread the mood of the Cuban people in the spring of 1961. Almost all of those dissatisfied with the revolution had already departed for the United States, and the bombing of Cuban airfields by the exile air force rallied public opinion behind Castro. The national uprising that the CIA was counting on to coincide with the debarkation of the exile force never occurred. The Cuban army and militia remained loyal to the regime, and between April 15 and 17, Castro ordered the arrest of more than one hundred thousand opponents of his government, eliminating dissident elements in the Roman Catholic Church and the Cuban press and destroying the CIA’s underground network of agents. With all of these problems at the Bay of Pigs, it probably made no difference in the final result that the diversionary landing on the eastern coast of Cuba never took place. In Washington, the discouraging news from the Bay of Pigs led President Kennedy to reinstate the second air strike, which earlier had been canceled. The planes of the Free Cuban Air Squadron based in Nicaragua were to strike the San Antonio de los Banos airfield at dawn on Tuesday, April 18. The following morning, six B-26 bombers piloted by Cuban exile pilots were over the designated target, but the bombers were forced to return to Nicaragua without dropping a single bomb because of fog and cloud cover.
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On the ground, Castro was moving twenty thousand troops toward the Zapata swamp region as Brigade 2506 was running out of ammunition. Because the Cuban air force still commanded the skies, there was no chance to unload the remaining arms, supplies, and troops aboard the two remaining escort ships at sea. In the early-morning hours of Wednesday, April 19, President Kennedy authorized an “air-umbrella” at dawn over the invasion area. He gave permission for six unmarked jet fighters from the USS Essex in the Caribbean to protect a B-26 attack from Nicaragua and to cover the unloading of the exile escort ships at sea. This final attempt to help the invading forces also proved to be a failure. Probably because of confusion about the difference in time zones between Cuba and Nicaragua, the B-26 bombers from Nicaragua arrived an hour early over Cuba and were shot down by the Cubans; only one escaped. The jets that were to have provided air cover never left the Essex. Later on April 19, 1961, the invasion was crushed. Facing overwhelming opposition and out of ammunition, the leaders destroyed their heavy equipment and ordered a retreat into the swamps. Only a handful of exiles escaped to the sea; the remainder were rounded up by Castro’s forces and imprisoned. Of 1,297 brigade members who had come ashore, 1,180 were captured. Cuban losses are difficult to estimate. Although Castro admitted to losing fewer than a hundred men in battle, a more accurate estimate would be 1,250. Charles E. Cottle updated by Julio César Pino
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis At issue: Right of the Soviet Union to install missile bases in the Western Hemisphere Date: October 22-28, 1962 Location: Washington, D.C., and Cuba Principal figures: American, President John Fitzgerald Kennedy (19171963), Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara (1916), Secretary of State Dean Rusk (1909-1994), Attorney General Robert Kennedy (1925-1968), McGeorge Bundy (1919-1996); Cuban, Fidel Castro (1926 or 1927); Soviet, Premier Nikita Khrushchev (1894-1971), Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin (1919), Aleksandr S. Fomin
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Result: At the height of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union risked nuclear war but managed to end the confrontation without resorting to combat. When Fidel Castro’s revolutionary July 26 Movement assumed power in Cuba in 1959, it marked the end of U.S. political and economic dominance over the island. Ever since the late nineteenth century, the United States, supported by loyal Cuban politicians, had enjoyed control over all Cuba’s commerce and industry. Castro, however, refused to adhere to U.S. interests, and, as a result, the United States attempted to overthrow Castro’s government through the use of covert military operations and an economic blockade. In 1960, President Dwight Eisenhower and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began organizing and training anti-Castro Cuban exiles for a potential invasion. When President John F. Kennedy entered the White House in 1961, he agreed to continue this program, and in April, more than fourteen hundred commandos landed at the Bay of Pigs. U.S. experts believed that the people would rise up and revolt against Castro during this assault, but Castro easily quashed this rebellion. Afterward, Kennedy developed several assassination plots against Castro, and he sanctioned the CIA to conduct sabotage raids upon Cuban sugarcane fields, railroad bridges, and oil tanks through Operation Mongoose. Cuba and the Soviet Union All of these attacks, however, backfired. Threatened with continuous military invasions and the loss of trade, Castro turned to the Soviet Union for support. He declared himself a Marxist-Leninist in 1961, and, afterward, Soviet influence substantially increased. By 1962, the Soviet Union had stationed several military advisers in Cuba, and Kennedy feared that communist influence ultimately could undermine U.S. hegemony in Latin America if this relationship continued to grow. In October, 1962, Senator Kenneth B. Keating of New York startled the United States by alleging that offensive missile bases were under construction in Cuba. Keating did not reveal the source of his information, but a flight by a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance airplane on October 14 substantiated his charges. Long-range nuclear missiles, which had begun arriving in Cuban ports from the Soviet Union in September, were being installed at San Cristobal on the western part of the island. An international crisis of potentially catastrophic proportions threatened the safety of the world. After President Kennedy viewed the satellite photos on October 16, he called his key military and political advisers to the White House. The ini-
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U.S. aerial reconnaissance photography of the Soviet missile installations that precipitated the crisis. (National Archives)
tial discussion centered on the issue of whether the missiles were fully armed and ready to fire. After concluding that the United States still had time before the Soviets attained nuclear readiness on Cuba, the president and his executive committee (Ex Comm) discussed various options. General Maxwell Taylor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended an immediate air strike. Others, including Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and McGeorge Bundy, the president’s special assistant for national security affairs, suggested that the president resort to diplomacy rather than war. U.S. Blockade By Thursday, October 18, a consensus had emerged from the discussions, and the next day, the president indicated that he favored a naval blockade as the first step. He also decided that he would announce his decision to the U.S. people on the evening of Monday, October 22. At 5:00 p.m., he briefed congressional leaders. An hour later, Soviet ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin was ushered into the office of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, where he was handed a copy of Kennedy’s speech. At 7:00 p.m., the president spoke over nationwide television and radio. “The purpose of these bases,” Kennedy said in a calm but firm voice, “can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.” The Soviet action was “a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country, if our courage and commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe.”
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The president then outlined the initial steps the United States would take to deal with the situation: a quarantine on offensive military equipment being shipped to Cuba; an assertion that any missile launched from Cuba would be regarded as an attack by the Soviet Union, requiring a total retaliatory response by the United States; emergency meetings of both the Organization of American States and the United Nations to consider this threat to peace; and an appeal to Nikita S. Khrushchev, premier of the Soviet Union, “to abandon this course of world domination, and to join in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and to transform the history of man.” The quarantine was to become effective on October 24 at 10 a.m. Confrontation On Wednesday, October 24, the Soviet Union officially rejected the U.S. proclamation of quarantine. Late that day, however, some Soviet ships sailing toward Cuba altered course or stopped in midsea. Yet, a direct confrontation between U.S. and Soviet ships could not long be delayed, as this crisis escalated into an international war of brinkmanship. The American Strategic Air Command went to Defense Condition 2, one step away from actual war; B-52 bombers took off with nuclear arsenals; and soldiers were moved to bases in the southeast and briefed for a potential invasion of Cuba. The first real thaw in the crisis occurred on Friday afternoon, October 26, when John Scali, diplomatic correspondent of the American Broadcasting Company, received a call from Aleksandr S. Fomin, an official of the Soviet embassy who was also a colonel in the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB) and a personal friend of Khrushchev. At lunch, Fomin proposed a settlement of the crisis and asked Scali if he could find out from contacts
Editorial cartoon published during the crisis showing Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev blaming the United States for threatening world peace, as he tows an armada of Soviet weapons intended to threaten the United States. (Library of Congress)
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in the Department of State if it would be acceptable. The missile bases in Cuba, Fomin said, would be dismantled and the Soviet Union would promise not to ship any more offensive missiles in exchange for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba. Scali immediately took this proposal to Rusk, who felt it was legitimate. At the same time, a personal letter from Khrushchev confirmed Fomin’s offer, but it also reminded Kennedy that the Soviet Union’s actions were simply a response to his provocative measures toward Castro’s government. The next day, the situation deteriorated when Khrushchev seemed to change the proposal markedly when he demanded that the United States abandon its missile bases in Turkey. This angered Kennedy. Despite the fact that the missiles in Turkey were of little strategic value, he felt that U.S. credibility was at stake. Several members of Ex Comm, including U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union W. Averell Harriman, suggested that this provided Khrushchev with a face-saving alternative. The president and his advisers decided to proceed on the basis of the meetings with Fomin and to ignore Khrushchev’s demand, but at the same time, Kennedy sent his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, to meet with Soviet ambassador Dobrynin and secretly agree to remove the missiles in Turkey if the Cuban crisis were resolved peacefully. Other news also threatened the peace. The afternoon of October 27, a U.S. U-2 strayed over Soviet air space; it managed to return home safely, but Kennedy feared that the Soviets would view this as the first step in a preemptive strike. On the same day, another U-2 was shot down over Cuba, and as a result, most members of Ex Comm believed that a nuclear exchange was imminent. Soviets Back Down On the morning of Sunday, October 28, Moscow radio carried an announcement that had come from Khrushchev: “In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible the conflict which endangers the cause of peace . . . the Soviet Government . . . has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you have described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union.” The Cuban missile crisis had passed, and a nuclear holocaust had been averted. The United States removed the missiles from Turkey in 1963, both nations installed a nuclear hotline between Washington, D.C., and Moscow to prevent future misunderstandings over nuclear war, and both nations began to explore talks to curtail the nuclear arms race. William M. Tuttle updated by Robert D. Ubriaco, Jr.
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1965 Dominican Republic Occupation At issue: Suppression of a leftist revolt Date: April 24, 1965-June 1, 1966 Location: Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic Combatants: Rebels (pro-Bosch) vs. loyalists (anti-Bosch), with the help of 30,000 U.S. troops Principal commanders: Rebel, Francisco Caamaño; Loyalist, Elías Wessin y Wessin Result: In a compromise to settle the hostilities, a new presidential election was held, allowing Bosch to run once more; but he was defeated by Joaquín Balaguer. The Dominican Republic shares the Caribbean island of Hispaniola with the Republic of Haiti. The history of the Dominican Republic has been a tumultuous one, dating back to the time of its settlement by the Spanish conquistadores at the beginning of the sixteenth century. In 1930, a Dominican army officer trained by the United States, Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina, took over the government. He ruled the country as a dictator for the next thirty-one years. His violent excesses finally led to his assassination, and the country again returned to a period of unstable but supposedly democratic government. Civil War The civil war that racked the country in 1965 reflected the tumultuous history of the Dominican Republic. The president at this time, Donald Reid Cabral, had been installed as the result of the ouster of the country’s legitimately elected president, Juan Bosch, through a military coup. Reid Cabral was not a popular leader. In 1965, a lack of economic progress, coupled with a severe water shortage in the capital itself, had turned the general public against the president. On April 24, 1965, the revolt broke out. A group of civilians and younger army officers seized the principal radio station in the capital, Santo Domingo, as well as two army bases. They announced that they planned to restore Bosch to power. Bosch, at that time living in exile in nearby Puerto Rico, commenced packing his bags for a return to the Dominican Republic. A militarily powerful opposition group announced that they would not saccept Bosch’s resumption of the presidency. The intense fighting that
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erupted between these self-described loyalists and the pro-Bosch rebels precluded the former president’s return. The U.S. government, already nervous concerning the Caribbean political situation because of the rise of Fidel Castro in nearby Cuba, regarded Bosch as a potential ally to the Cuban dictator. The U.S. embassy committed itself to backing General Elías Wessin y Wessin, the commander of the loyalist troops. The navy of the Dominican Republic, its air force, and a number of army units also sided with Wessin in his opposition to the coup. Colonel Francisco Caamaño, who had received training from the U.S. Marines, assumed command of the rebel forces. When he attempted to secure the support of American ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., to arrange peace negotiations with General Wessin, he was told that the rebels had no choice but to surrender unconditionally. The rebel leadership immediately rejected this suggestion. U.S. Occupation U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson had reached the conclusion that the rebel movement was a communist plot. He agreed initially to send U.S. troops into the country to aid in the evacuation of U.S. citizens. As time went on, and the conflict between the rebels and the loyalists continued,
U.S. troops guarding a food distribution center during the American occupation of the Dominican Republic. (National Archives)
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Johnson announced that the rebel movement was in the hands of communist conspirators and authorized the use of American forces to maintain peace. The Americans provided support, if indirectly, to the Wessin loyalists. The U.S. forces set up a cordon around downtown Santo Domingo, the district that contained the bulk of the rebel troops, limiting the ability of that faction to maneuver. Ultimately the number of U.S. Army and Marine troops, both ashore and on support vessels, reached 30,000. The United States sought international support for its intervention by involving the Organization of American States (OAS), comprising the Western Hemisphere governments, in the peacekeeping effort. The U.S. government worked to find a political solution among the Dominican Republic factions as well. At the urging of the U.S. government, the OAS recommended the establishment of a provisional government until popular elections could be held once more. Under the proposed pact, the Dominican military leaders from both factions were required to leave the country. Aftermath The Dominican Republic held presidential elections in 1966. A former Trujillo Molina supporter, Joaquín Balaguer, defeated Bosch convincingly. Balaguer had open U.S. support, for the United States felt that Bosch might ally himself with Fidel Castro. U.S. troops departed Hispaniola after the election. Carl Henry Marcoux
1983 Grenada Occupation At issue: Soviet influence in the Caribbean Date: October 25-December 15, 1983 Location: Republic of Grenada Combatants: 6,000 American troops vs. Grenada forces and some Cubans Principal commanders: American, Joseph Metcalf; Grenadian, Hudson Austin Principal battles: Pearls Airport, Point Salines Airport, Fort Rupert, Government House, Fort Frederick Result: A late Cold War confrontation on a Western Hemisphere island nation, aimed at communist containment.
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Relations between Grenada, an independent republic within the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the United States began to deteriorate in the late 1970’s with the creation of a Grenadian Marxist government, the New Jewel Movement (NJM), led by moderate socialist Maurice Bishop. Beginning in 1979, Bishop established cordial relations with the Soviet Union and Cuba, including an exchange of diplomatic recognition and the beginnings of extensive Cuban-Soviet military and financial aid to Grenada. As a result, the United States government initiated a boycott of the Bishop government, refused to accept the credentials of the Grenadian ambassador in Washington, D.C., and withdrew the United States ambassador to Grenada. The United States also attempted to block loans to Grenada from Western Europe, the World Bank, and the Caribbean Development Bank. Grenada was excluded from U.S. regional assistance programs available to other Caribbean and Latin American states. Soviet and Cuban assistance for Central American rebellions hostile to the United States strengthened the U.S. resolve to prevent further possible Soviet threats to U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean. U.S.-Grenada Tensions The immediate cause of heightened U.S.-Grenadian tensions, however, was the construction of an international airport at Point Salines, southwest of St. George’s, Grenada’s capital. According to U.S. intelligence sources, the airport was being built with assistance from Cuba, as well as several European nations. Cuban engineers were alleged to be in the process of lengthening and strengthening the airport runways for the possible use of Cuban and Soviet military aircraft. The alleged military application of the new Grenadian airport was used from 1981 to 1983 by President Ronald Reagan, a longtime critic of Soviet influence and a staunch supporter of Cold War diplomacy, to focus attention on the alleged Soviet and Cuban direction of Bishop’s NJM. The Reagan administration claimed that the Soviet Union had established a missile base in Grenada’s central mountains, and that sophisticated Soviet monitoring equipment might be installed in Grenada to track U.S. submarine movements in the Caribbean. U.S. Intervention The Reagan administration’s decision to use military force was reinforced by an October, 1983, coup against Bishop, sparked by Bernard Coard, the leader of an extremist revolutionary faction within the New Jewel Movement and an ardent admirer of Cuban communism. Coard also was accused of being responsible for Bishop’s murder during the fighting
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U.S. soldier poses with American students at a Grenadan medical school. Protecting the safety of U.S. nationals was a primary justification of the U.S. occupation of the minuscule eastern Caribbean nation. (U.S. Department of Defense)
between NJM factions and Grenadian government forces. Coard’s extremist revolutionary regime immediately requested increased Cuban and Soviet military assistance and ordered the creation of a people’s militia, the jailing of political opponents, and an end to Bishop’s pledge of free elections by the beginning of 1984. Following several weeks of ineffective diplomatic negotiations between the Reagan administration and the Coard regime, on October 25, 1983, U.S. Marines and U.S. Army Rangers, plus a small military police force from six Caribbean nations, invaded Grenada. The U.S. military force included nineteen hundred Marines, the helicopter carrier Saipan, a sixteen-ship battle group led by the aircraft carrier Independence, and the amphibious assault ship Guam. President Reagan’s official announcement of the invasion included a statement that the United States was responding to an October 23 request from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) to help restore law and order in Grenada and guarantee political freedom and free elections for the Grenadian population. Reagan also maintained that information from the OECS and reports that U.S. citizens, many of them medical students enrolled at the Medical University of St. George’s, were trying to escape the island and could be held hostage by the Coard regime or Cuban military advisers had persuaded him that the United States had no choice but to act decisively. Reagan’s assertions were seconded by Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica, chairwoman of the OECS. Charles asserted
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that the Coard-led coup against Bishop was inspired and directed by Cuban advisers who feared that free elections in Grenada would result in a repudiation of revolutionary Marxism and the end of Cuban influence on the island. Resistance to the U.S. Invasion Armed resistance to the U.S.-led invasion was stronger than anticipated. U.S. military intelligence concluded that between six hundred and eleven hundred Cuban construction workers, military advisers, and militia were in Grenada. U.S. Marines reported that the airport, government buildings, and other strategic areas were heavily defended. By October 26, however, most opposition had been subdued and, once the major U.S. military objectives were attained, three hundred members of a joint eastern Caribbean police force landed on the island to begin security operations. By October 29, all Cuban personnel on the island had been captured, and Coard and other members of his regime had been arrested. Under OECS auspices, a new interim government was announced under British Commonwealth jurisdiction. Sir Paul Scoon, Commonwealth governor general, on November 1 announced plans for elections and revealed his intention to bring to trial those responsible for the murder of Maurice Bishop. Scoon also delivered diplomatic messages to the Soviet Union and Cuba that Grenada was cutting all ties with the two nations, and that approximately 650 captured Cubans would be repatriated. By early November, the U.S. Department of State had revealed the contents of thousands of secret documents discovered by U.S. and Caribbean security forces. The documents included three Soviet supply agreements with the Bishop regime. U.S. officials also cited evidence that the Soviet Union had agreed to provide military training for the Grenadian militia. Other documents indicated that Cuba had long-range plans to take over the island and initiate a terrorist training camp to be used to foment revolutionary movements in the Caribbean and Central America. The Central Intelligence Agency released captured Cuban communications indicating that Cuba had planned to send 341 additional officers and 4,000 reservists to Grenada by the end of 1983. Reagan administration officials also cited documentary evidence to show that Cuba and the Coard regime planned to hold U.S. citizens hostage in the event of hostile U.S. actions. International Reactions International reaction to the U.S. invasion was almost universally negative. British prime minister Margaret Thatcher expressed considerable doubt regarding the invasion and advised Reagan to reconsider using military action as a substitute for economic sanctions against the Coard re-
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gime. Thatcher also announced publicly that the Grenada situation should be considered a British Commonwealth affair and therefore outside the interests of the United States. By November 1, however, the Thatcher government announced limited support for Reagan’s decision to invade, based on the prime minister’s understanding that the United States was entitled to act at the request of the OECS. The French government, on October 25, declared the U.S. invasion a violation of international law. The Canadian government also announced its regret for the invasion in light of the lack of substantial evidence to show that U.S. citizens in Grenada were in danger. The governments of the Soviet Union and Cuba, and the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua issued pro forma condemnations of U.S. actions, which asserted that the Reagan administration was interested solely in subordinating Grenada to U.S. neocolonialist rule. On October 28, the United Nations Security Council approved, by a vote of eleven to one, with three abstentions, a resolution condemning the armed intervention in Grenada. The United States vetoed the resolution. In the United States, political opinions regarding the invasion split along party lines. Democratic congressmen and senators generally condemned the invasion as unprovoked, hasty, an overreaction, and tantamount to an act of war. Other Democratic Party leaders in Washington ridiculed Reagan as having a “cowboy mentality” and criticized the president for relying too heavily on the military solution to diplomatic problems. Republican political leaders, however, praised Reagan’s “decisive actions.” Most proinvasion sentiment centered on arguments for enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, the thwarting of Soviet-inspired terrorism, and the necessity for backing the president and the U.S. Armed Forces during a time of crisis. U.S. public opinion generally favored President Reagan’s decision to invade Grenada and eliminate Soviet and Cuban influence. William G. Ratliff
1983 Censorship During the Grenada Occupation During this surprise invasion, U.S. military leaders kept the press out of Grenada, thus preventing independent news coverage of initial military operations. On October 25, 1983, approximately six thousand U.S. Marines and paratroopers invaded the tiny Caribbean island of Grenada on the orders of
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President Ronald Reagan. Hostilities ended ten days later, and U.S. combat troops were withdrawn by December 15, 1983. Military commanders, supported by the Reagan administration, kept all news reporters out of Grenada during the first two days of military operations. Not surprisingly, representatives of the news media bitterly accused the president and the Pentagon of denying freedom of the press and encouraging censorship in the name of national security. The military’s contention that the exclusion of press representation during the initial fighting was motivated solely by concerns for the reporters’ safety was promptly challenged. Journalists pointed out that they had always accepted the risks of war as part of their profession, citing the 146 war correspondents killed during World War II and the 53 correspondents killed in the Vietnam War. Management of the news by the Department of Defense was described as a military blackout. This implied that unsympathetic coverage of the war against Grenada should not be available to the American public or the U.S. Congress. A long tradition of war reporting and the First Amendment’s protection of the public’s right to know dates back to the U.S. Civil War. In Grenada, however, the Pentagon chose to bar independent media access by not arranging transportation, allowing unrestricted movement among the troops, or providing communications facilities on the island until the invasion’s success was achieved. This type of censorship differed from that during the British-Argentine Falkland Islands War seven years earlier. In that conflict the British government provided journalists with access to warships, and gave a limited number of journalists access to the ground fighting, but it subjected their reports to official scrutiny, deletion, and revision. In Grenada the U.S. officials did not overtly censor the press; it simply did not bring reporters along during the initial fighting, thereby creating a news blackout. The important exceptions to the blackout were the Pentagon’s official statements on the fighting, White House justifications of the invasion, and statements of other officials, who portrayed the rescue mission of American medical students and removal of Grenada’s communist government in the best possible light. The relationship between the U.S. press and the military establishment had deteriorated so greatly since the Vietnam War that, in the eyes of leading military officers, much of the press was viewed as motivated by malevolent intent and lacking any sympathy for a strong military. An attempt to reconcile the media and the press was made by the Sidle Commission report, August 23, 1984. It recommended that the media should be allowed to cover U.S. military operations to the maximum degree possible in the fu-
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ture. If only a few journalists could be accommodated, then “pool” reporters would be selected by the Pentagon who then would share their information with other journalists. Christopher E. Kent
1989 Panama Occupation At issue: Legitimacy of Manuel Noriega’s government Date: December 20, 1989-January, 1990 Location: Republic of Panama Combatants: Americans vs. Panamanians Principal figures: American, President George Bush (1924), General Maxwell Thurman (1931); Panamanian, President Manuel Noriega (1934), President-elect Guillermo Endara (1936) Result: U.S. troops captured Panamanian president Manuel Noriega, permitting a legally elected president to take office; however, the U.S. seizure of a foreign head of state in his own country raised troubling questions about U.S. intervention in the affairs of other nations. The generally amicable relations between the United States and Panama began to falter after Panamanian general Manuel Noriega came to power in Panama in 1987. Despite his history of involvement in drug trafficking, gun running, and money laundering, Noriega had been receiving support from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as a friendly resource in Panama. However, relations between the two countries deteriorated rapidly after Noriega arranged the ouster of Panama’s legally elected president Eric Delvalle and annulled the subsequent election of Guillermo Endara. The U.S. government continued to distance itself from Noriega as both Panamanian domestic unrest and international opprobrium rose against Noriega. Background Growing instability in Panama raised American concern about the security of the Panama Canal, which was vital to international shipping. On December 20, 1989, President George Bush ordered U.S. troops into Panama with the ostensible purpose of seizing Noriega on drug-smuggling charges. Code-named Operation Just Cause, the invasion was undertaken
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with the primary goal of capturing Noriega. General Maxwell Thurman commanded forces that included paratroopers, amphibious assault units, attack helicopters, and jet fighters. Thurman’s invasion overwhelmed the Panamanian Defense Forces within a few days. About twenty-five thousand U.S. military personnel were involved, and their weapons included two advanced Stealth fighter-bombers. In spite of their superior technology, Thurman’s forces did come upon some difficulties. Their attack on Noriega’s military headquarters was effective, but this multistory building was located in a densely populated part of Panama City. After American attack helicopters and artillery set the building ablaze, the fire spread until almost two thousand surrounding homes were destroyed. Fifteen thousand people were left homeless, and a number of civilians were killed or injured. For several days Noriega succeeded in hiding from the U.S. forces. Finally, he took refuge in the Papal Nunciature—the office of the pope’s representative in the country—where he stayed until January 3, 1990. After officials of the Roman Catholic Church informed the Bush administration where Noriega was hiding, General Thurman decided to use psychologi-
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency officers taking deposed Panamanian president Manuel Noriega aboard the Air Force transport plane that took him to the United States, where he was tried and convicted of drug dealing. (U.S. Air Force)
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cal weapons: He surrounded the Nunciature with large numbers of troops and played rock-and-roll music over powerful loudspeakers. Noriega finally surrendered to the U.S. military. After an overnight airplane flight to Miami, he found himself in a Florida jail awaiting trial. On April 9, 1992, he was convicted of eight out of ten drug and racketeering charges, and in July he was sentenced to forty years in prison. U.S. Embarrassments Several aspects of the invasion held the potential for embarrassing the U.S. government—not least of which was Washington’s earlier support for Noriega. Moreover, the military operation itself had a number of embarrassing problems, including civilian deaths, and there were instances of Panamanian civilians protesting the American effort to “liberate” them. Despite these problems, the American news media were unusually supportive of the invasion, portraying it in a positive light—even in comparison with the media’s coverage of the following year’s Persian Gulf War. More significantly, there was little official effort to restrict or manage news coverage of the Panama invasion. The “press pool” system that would be used in reporting on the later Gulf War was not utilized in the Panama operation. American reporters and photographers were present at the invitation of the invasion force and had relatively free access to cover events. American press coverage might therefore have been partly a product of self-censorship. Although the U.S. government did not overtly hinder media access, there is some evidence that the Endara government—which the U.S. military returned to power after removing Noriega—worked to limit negative portrayals of the military intervention by its American benefactors. Also, Noriega’s numerous moral and political faults may have made portraying the invasion as a morality play almost irresistible. Finally, the relative swiftness of Noriega’s defeat provided little time for antiwar sentiment to materialize. Noriega’s capture was a victory over brutal dictatorship and international lawlessness, but it also raised some controversial issues. Using military force to capture a citizen of one country for criminal charges in another country was a dangerous step to take, for in other circumstances it might bring greater bloodshed, even war. A gutted, burned-down area of Panama City remained as a sad illustration of the risks President Bush had taken in ordering the invasion. Also, Latin American countries remembered how the United States had used its military forces to get its way in their countries earlier in the twentieth century. They were unhappy to see the pattern repeated. Christopher E. Kent
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Further Reading Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 2d ed. New York: Longman, 1999. Beck, Robert J. The Grenada Invasion: Politics, Law, and Foreign Policy Decisionmaking. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993. Blight, James G., and Peter Kornbluh, eds. Politics of Illusion: The Bay of Pigs Invasion Reexamined. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998. Boot, Max. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. New York: Basic Books, 2003. Brugioni, Dino A. Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Random House, 1991. Buckley, Kevin. Panama: The Whole Story. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991. Chang, Laurence, and Peter Kornbluh, eds. The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader. New York: New Press, 1992. Dunn, Peter M., and Bruce W. Watson, eds. American Intervention in Grenada: The Implications of Operation Urgent Fury. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985. Entman, Robert M. Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. Frankel, Max. High Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Ballantine Books, 2004. Fursenko, Alexander, and Timothy Naftali. One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964. New York: Norton, 1997. George, Alice L. Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003. Gleijeses, Piero. The Dominican Crisis. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. Hartlyn, Jonathan. The Struggle for Democratic Politics in the Dominican Republic. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998. Huchthausen, Peter A. America’s Splendid Little Wars: A Short History of U.S. Military Engagements, 1975-2000. New York: Viking, 2003. Johns, Christina Jacqueline, and P. Ward Johnson. State Crime, the Media, and the Invasion of Panama. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994. Kornbluh, Peter, ed. Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba. New York: New Press, 1998. Lindsay-Poland, John. Emperors in the Jungle: The Hidden History of the U.S. in Panama. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003.
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Lowenthal, Abraham F. The Dominican Intervention. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. Lynch, Grayston L. Decision for Disaster: Betrayal at the Bay of Pigs. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1998. May, Ernest, and Philip Zelikow, eds. The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Norton, 2002. Mermin, Jonathan. Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of U.S. Intervention in the Post-Vietnam Era. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999. Nathan, James A., ed. The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. O’Shaughnessy, Hugh. Grenada: An Eyewitness Account of the U.S. Invasion and the Caribbean History That Provoked It. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1984. Palmer, Bruce, Jr. Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1989. Peguero, Valentina. The Militarization of Culture in the Dominican Republic, from the Captains General to General Trujillo. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004. Pérez, Orlando J., ed. Post-invasion Panama: The Challenges of Democratization in the New World Order. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2000. Rodríguez, Juan Carlos. The Bay of Pigs and the CIA. Translated by Mary Todd. New York: Ocean Press, 1999. Salinger, Pierre. “Bay of Pigs.” In John F. Kennedy, Commander in Chief: A Profile in Leadership. New York: Penguin Studio, 1997. Stern, Sheldon M. Averting ‘the Final Failure’: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003. Strober, Gerald S., and Deborah H. Strober. “Let Us Begin Anew.” In An Oral History of the Kennedy Presidency. New York: HarperCollins, 1993. Thompson, Robert Smith. The Missiles of October: The Declassified Story of John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992. Tiwathia, Vijay. The Grenada War: Anatomy of a Low Intensity Conflict. New Delhi: Lancer International, 1987. Triay, Victor Andres. Bay of Pigs: An Oral History of Brigade 2506. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001. White, Mark J. Missiles in Cuba: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Castro, and the 1962 Crisis. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1997. ____________, ed. The Kennedys and Cuba: The Declassified Documentary History. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001. Wyden, Peter. Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1980.
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Post-Cold War Conflicts 1991-2005 Post-Cold War Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 679 Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events. . . . . . . 1991: Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1991: Censorship During the Gulf War . . . . . . . 1991: Air War in the Gulf. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1991: Women in the Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . . 1992: “No Fly” Zone in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1992: Somalia Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1994: U.S. Troops in Bosnia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1995: NATO Troops in Bosnia . . . . . . . . . . . . 1998: Missile Attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan . 1998: Bombing of Military Sites in Iraq . . . . . . . 2000: Terrorist Attack on the USS Cole . . . . . . . 2001: Terrorist Attacks on the United States . . . . 2001: Invasion of Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . 2001: War on Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2003: Iraq War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2003: Postwar Occupation of Iraq. . . . . . . . . .
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Post-Cold War Conflicts At issue: Political stability, secular vs. theocratic government, and suppression of world terrorism Date: 1991Location: Middle East, Northeast Africa, and the Balkans Principal conflicts: Gulf War (1991), Somalia occupation (1992-1994), Bosnia (1994-1995), Afghanistan and Sudan (1998), Terrorist attack on the USS Cole (2000), Terrorist attacks on the United States (2001), Invasion of Afghanistan (2001), War on Terrorism (2001), Iraq War (2003) Results: Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the tensions associated with the Cold War have abated; however, new and potentially more dangerous conflicts have arisen to take their place. By the year 2005, most of these conflicts remained unresolved. One of the most unexpected developments of the last years of the twentieth century and first years of the twenty-first century has been the failure of the ending of the Cold War to bring peace and stability to the world order. Although there has been a dramatic lessening of tensions between the United States and its former Cold War rivals, new and unexpected conflicts and tensions have arisen to take their place, and many of these have drawn U.S. forces into combat. Moreover, by the year 2005, a majority of Americans believed that the world was an even more dangerous place than it had been during the days of the Cold War. Between 1991 and 2005, U.S. military forces were directly involved in lethal conflicts in three different regions: the Middle East, Northeast Africa, and the Balkans. Several of these conflicts developed into full-scale wars. Northeast Africa and the Middle East The Middle East was a center of conflicts throughout the second half of the twentieth century, but much of the region’s tension and actual armed conflict arose from the animosity between the Jewish state of Israel, which was founded in 1948, and the predominantly Muslim nations that surround it. The United States generally supported Israel through those years but was never directly involved in any of Israel’s wars with its Arab neighbors. What finally drew the United States into major armed conflict in the region was only tangentially related to the Arab-Israeli struggle. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, unequivocal U.S. diplomatic support for its long-time ally Israel came to an end. U.S. diplomats began to bring (continued on page 682)
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Time Line of Post-Cold War Conflicts June, 1961
Kuwait becomes independent; Iraq begins challenging the new nation’s sovereignty.
May, 1988
Somali civil war begins.
Aug. 2, 1990
Iraq occupies Kuwait; United Nations Security Council orders Iraq to pull out.
Nov. 29, 1990
U.N. Security Council gives Iraq January 15, 1991, deadline to withdraw from Iraq.
Jan. 16, 1991
United States launches air strikes on Iraq, while leading international coalition in what becomes known as the Gulf War (or Persian Gulf War).
February 23, 1991
Coalition land offensive vs. Iraq begins.
Feb. 28, 1991
Iraq capitulates and withdraws from Kuwait, but Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein stays in power.
May 17, 1991
Northern Somalis declare independent Republic of Somaliland.
Oct., 1991
The Yugoslavian republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina declare their independence.
Jan. 15, 1992
Yugoslavian federation dissolves into constituent parts.
Feb., 1992
Cease-fire is declared in Somali civil war but soon breaks down; national famine worsens.
Mar., 1992
Civil war begins in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
August 11, 1992
U.N. human rights inspector reports that Hussein is killing his own people.
August 27, 1992
To counter Hussein’s attacks on Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq, United States, Great Britain, and France establish “no fly” zone for Iraqi aircraft below the 32d parallel.
Dec. 9, 1992Mar. 31, 1994
U.S. troops occupy Somalia.
Feb. 26, 1993
Terrorist bombing damages lower level of one of the towers of New York City’s World Trade Center.
Apr. 10, 1994
U.S. troops intervene in Bosnian civil war.
Dec. 14, 1995
U.S. troops are major part of NATO contingent that enter Bosnia to enforce peace agreement.
Aug. 7, 1998
Terrorist bombs explode at U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing more than 250 people—mostly African nationals.
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Aug. 20, 1998
United States launches missile strikes against targets in Afghanistan and the Sudan in retaliation for terrorist bombings.
October 31, 1998
Iraq suspends all cooperation with the U.N. weapons inspectors.
Dec. 16, 1998
United States and Britain bomb five Iraq radar sites.
Oct. 12, 2000
Suicide terrorist attack on USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen.
Sept. 11, 2001
“9/11" terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon; U.S. Congress responds by passing the Patriot Act to give president greater power to combat terrorism.
Oct. 7, 2001
United States launches invasion of Afghanistan after Taliban regime refuses to comply with U.S. request to turn over Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders. President George W. Bush declares ”war on terrorism."
Jan., 2002
In his state of the union address, President Bush alludes to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as “an axis of evil.”
Oct., 2002
Al-Qaeda bombs resort complex in Indonesia.
Oct. 10-11, 2002
U.S. Congress empowers President Bush to invade Iraq if latter fails to dismantle its alleged weapons programs.
Nov., 2002
United Nations approves a resolution calling upon Iraq to disarm.
Jan., 2003
In his state of the union address, President Bush claims that Iraq is attempting to acquire uranium in order to build nuclear weapons. U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell presents evidence to the U.N. Security Council that Iraq is building “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD).
Mar. 15-16, 2003
President Bush and British prime minister Tony Blair hold emergency meeting and issue ultimatum to Iraq to disarm.
Mar. 19, 2003
United States leads a new coalition in a new invasion of Iraq, in what becomes known as the Iraq War, after Hussein fails to meet U.S.-British ultimatum.
May 1, 2003
President Bush proclaims that the Iraq War is won.
December 13, 2003
Saddam Hussein is captured.
Mar., 2004
Al-Qaeda bombs commuter train in Madrid, Spain.
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Time Line of Post-Cold War Conflicts—continued May, 2004
U.S. soldiers’ torture and abuse of Iraqi prisoners is made public.
June 1, 2004
Iraq’s Interim Governing Council names Iyad Allawi prime minister.
Sept., 2004
U.N. secretary-general Kofi Annan calls the war in Iraq “illegal” under the U.N. Charter.
Sept. 8, 2004
One thousandth American service person is killed in Iraq.
Jan. 30, 2005
8.4 million Iraqis defy insurgent violence by voting in election for transitional national assembly; Shi’ite candidates win 48 percent of votes; Kurdish candidates place second. Afterward, civilian and military death tolls rise as assassinations and bombings continue.
Mar., 2005
U.S. military death total passes 1,500.
Dec., 2005
Scheduled date for national election on new constitution.
pressure to bear on the Israelis to make concessions to the Palestinians and other Middle Eastern states to achieve a lasting peace in the region. In 1991 war again interrupted the peace process. The Gulf War—or Persian Gulf War as it is also known—resulted from Iraq’s invasion of the tiny oil-rich nation of Kuwait, which Iraq claimed as a lost province. Encouraged by mixed signals from U.S. diplomats, Iraqi armed forces under Saddam Hussein occupied Kuwait, a region Hussein considered to be legally part of Iraq. U.S. trading partners in Europe and Asia received much of their oil from Kuwait. Consequently, U.S. president George Bush secured a United Nations (U.N.) condemnation of Iraqi actions and a Security Council resolution calling for the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait by force of arms. A military force made up overwhelmingly of American troops landed in Kuwait, while American aircraft bombed Iraqi military targets and cities. During the brief conflict, the Iraqis launched guided missile attacks on Saudi Arabia and Israel. The American-led U.N. forces quickly overwhelmed the Iraqis and drove them out of Kuwait, forcing Hussein to capitulate. U.S. military forces remained stationed in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait into the next century, to guard against renewed Iraqi attempts to incorporate Kuwait into Iraq. Allied forces continued to monitor Iraq through the 1990’s and renewed bombing attacks on Iraqi bases in 1998,
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but Iraq eventually renounced its claims to Kuwait, and the situation seemed to stabilized. In the early twenty-first century, new—and possibly unrelated—developments would turn U.S. attention back to Iraq. Meanwhile, other disturbing events were commanding American attention and placing new demands on U.S. military forces. In December, 1992, the United States sent troops into the Northeast African nation of Somalia to help bring order to a country whose central government had literally collapsed. The United Nations-authorized humanitarian mission was doomed from the start, and U.S. troops spent more than one year fighting a no-win war against feuding warlords. Eventually, both U.S. and U.N. forces were withdrawn, after accomplishing almost nothing and leaving Americans skeptical about intervening in the internal conflicts of developing nations. Bosnia The end of the Cold War was brought about by the collapse of communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and the Balkans during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. In Eastern Europe, this developB l a c k S e a GEORGIA
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ment led to the democratization and increased prosperity of such nations as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia—all of which later joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). By contrast, the transformation brought mostly chaos to the Balkans. The death in 1980 of Yugoslavia’s communist dictator, Tito, revealed the tenuousness of the fabric holding together the diverse and mutually antagonistic ethnic and religious groups that Tito’s federation had held together for more than three decades. These tensions were aggravated by the general collapse of communist regimes elsewhere in Europe, and Yugoslavia itself began breaking up in October, 1991, when the former Yugoslav republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina declared their independence. In March, 1992, a bitter civil war began in Bosnia between Christian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims. Two years later, U.S. troops entered Bosnia, under U.N. auspices, to help restore peace. As was the case in Somalia, U.S. forces could do little to improve the apparently intractable situation, even after more troops entered Bosnia at the end of 1995, under the auspices of NATO. The whole experience merely exasperated Americans and renewed their suspicions that the end of the Cold War was not bringing the stability to world order that they had expected. World Terrorism Less than three months after U.S. forces entered Somalia, world terrorism made its presence felt on American shores, when agents of al-Qaeda bombed the lower level of one of New York’s World Trade Center towers. The bombing attack did comparatively minor damage to the gigantic structure but made Americans uneasy about the vulnerability of their open society to terrorism. The attacks that came eight years later would replace uneasiness with something akin to widespread panic. In August, 1998, the United States again became the target of al-Qaeda attacks, but this time on foreign shores, when the U.S. embassies in the capital cities of East Africa’s Kenya and Tanzania were both bombed. The United States responded quickly by launching missile strikes against suspected terrorist bases in Afghanistan and the Sudan. Yet another terrorist attack against the United States occurred in October, 2000, when suicide bombers managed to cripple the U.S. destroyer Cole while the ship was in the Yemen port of Aden, across the inlet to the Red Sea from Somalia. Finally, on September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States mounted by radical Islamic fundamentalists based in the Middle East brought the most serious armed conflict to the U.S. mainland since the U.S. Civil War. Indeed, when the terrorists flew hijacked American airliners into the Pentagon Building and the towers of New York City’s World Trade
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Iraqi president Saddam Hussein (left) and his oldest son, Uday, shortly before the beginning of the Gulf War. In official portraits, Hussein often posed in military uniforms. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Center on September 11, more Americans died than had perished during Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in December, 1941. Thereafter, September 11—or “9/11”—became a patriotic rallying cry for Americans feeling threatened by little-understood enemies from abroad. It would be difficult to overstate the feeling of alarm that the attacks created throughout the United States. Under the leadership of President George W. Bush, the nation quickly retaliated by launching an invasion of Afghanistan—the nation in which the terrorists were based, and calls for a general “war on terrorism” arose. Much of the alarm was focused on the Middle East, including Iraq. Although no credible evidence has been brought forth to establish a link between the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration fostered the notion that Iraq shared some of the blame and posed a threat to world peace. This notion was reinforced by unresolved questions about the Iraqi regime’s building of weapons of mass destruction, and the United States led another invasion of Iraq in early 2003. However, despite the use of overwhelming force that quickly defeated Iraqi’s formal military units, the United States and its allies failed to gain complete control of the country even after nearly two years of occupation. Christopher E. Kent
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Campaigns, Battles, and Other Events 1991 Gulf War At issue: Kuwait’s sovereignty Date: January 16-February 28, 1991 Location: Iraq, Kuwait, and the Persian Gulf Combatants: Iraqis vs. the allied coalition forces Principal commanders: Iraqi, Lieutenant General Sultan Hashem Ahmad, Lieutenant General Saleh Abbud Mahmoud; Coalition, U.S. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf (1934) Principal battle: Khafji Result: An allied victory allowed the reestablishment of Kuwaiti sovereignty and began a prolonged and controversial isolation of Iraq that would eventually lead to another war. In August, 1990, a number of factors contributed to Iraqi president Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade and annex neighboring Kuwait. Since Kuwait’s independence, in June, 1961, Iraqi leaders had questioned the legitimacy of Kuwait’s sovereignty and the border demarcating the two countries. An important oil field straddled the ill-defined frontier, and Kuwait had been tapping it. Iraq also charged Kuwait with exceeding its oil quota set by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), thereby increasing supplies and depressing prices. Iraq had pressed Kuwait unsuccessfully for the latter to make available to Baghdad two islands, Warba and Babiyan, strategically located across from Umm Qasr, Iraq’s only outlet on the Persian Gulf proper. Iraq’s Goals Most important, 1990 was a time of acute financial hardship for Iraq because of the great indebtedness it had incurred following its murderous eight-year war with Iran, which had concluded in 1988. Iraq had to rebuild its devastated economy, especially its crucial oil industry. Several factors led Saddam Hussein to decide that this was a good time
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to force Iraq’s creditors, especially Kuwait, to relinquish their claims on their wartime “loans”: Iranian-Iraqi relations were improving; Iraqi economic problems were becoming more pressing; he had misread the degree of U.S.-Soviet cooperation possible in the post-Cold War era; and he apparently misinterpreted U.S. ambassador April Glaspie’s statement to him on July 25, 1990, that the Bush administration was neutral in matters of interArab disputes “like your border disagreement with Kuwait.” Hussein also hoped to punish those who had brought down the price of oil by overproduction or had committed other “offenses.” Various meetings of leaders and conferences involving Iraq, Kuwait, and others were fruitless, partly because Kuwait refused to give ground on substantive issues and partly because Saddam Hussein seemed to be determined to invade Kuwait. The invasion occurred at 2:00 a.m. on August 2, 1990. Token resistance by the tiny Kuwaiti army and the escape of most members of the extended al-Sabah ruling family to Saudi Arabia followed within hours. Kuwait was occupied by Iraq and soon declared to be its nineteenth province. The World Response Saddam Hussein proved to be wrong in his estimate of the response of the international community, which insisted that his invasion of the neighboring country be rolled back. The United States, the Soviet Union, and
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United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 called for Iraq’s immediate withdrawal from Kuwait. Four days later, on August 6, the Security Council imposed mandatory trade sanctions by members of the international organization, including a ban on Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil (Resolution 661). Despite Saddam Hussein’s reassurances to Joseph Wilson, the U.S. chargé d’affaires in Baghdad, President George Bush ordered the Eightysecond Airborne Division to protect neighboring Saudi Arabia in case Iraq was contemplating monopolizing the bulk of Middle Eastern oil production. Spearheading the emerging international response, Operation Desert Shield became the largest deployment of U.S. troops overseas since the Vietnam War. Iraq’s formal annexation of Kuwait brought several Arab and other Muslim countries to side with the U.N.-sponsored, U.S.-led coalition. Westerners in Iraq and Kuwait were moved as human shields to sites that could become potential coalition targets in Iraq. On November 29, the U.N. Security Council, acknowledging that its Resolution 660 of August 2 ordering Iraq to evacuate Kuwait had not been followed, mandated that all necessary means be used to expel Iraq after January 15, 1991 (Resolution 678). One last meeting between U.S. secretary of state James Baker and Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva on January 9, 1991, proved unsuccessful, as Aziz refused to accept Baker’s renewed call for Iraq’s unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. The same was true of U.N. Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar’s visit to Saddam Hussein on January 13. The War The Persian Gulf War is usually broken down into four stages. Operation Desert Shield covered the period from the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, to the unleashing of the U.S.-led U.N. coalition’s air war on January 17, 1991. The next phase, Operation Desert Storm, had two components: the air war through February 23 and the ground war from February 24 through February 28. The aftermath following the cease-fire saw the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; the redrawing of the IraqiKuwaiti border by a U.N. commission; the creation of U.N.-sponsored safe zones and no-fly zones in Iraq to protect Kurds and other minorities; U.N. inspection of Iraqi facilities to monitor and force the destruction of any nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons; and the continued imposition of U.N. trade sanctions on Iraq. The military operations involved more than three-quarters of a million troops on the coalition side (some 541,000 from the United States and about 254,000 from a number of the twenty-nine other countries participating in Desert Storm at its peak) facing some one million Iraqis. The Iraqi numeri-
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Antiaircraft fire illuminates the sky over Baghdad during the early hours of January 18, 1991, as U.S. warplanes bombard Iraq’s capital city. (AP/Wide World Photos)
cal advantage was not translated into battlefield successes; the technological edge of the coalition greatly offset other factors. As news reporters from CNN broadcast the events of the airwar live, a world audience watched and wondered whether the high-tech advantage of the coalition forces had spawned a new type of “bloodless” war. Such expectations proved illusory: The disproportionate Iraqi casualties not only testified to this fact but also raised the question of a just war among some observers. On March 3, senior military representatives from both sides met to finalize the ceasefire, whose terms the Iraqis accepted unconditionally. In the aftermath, a protracted controversy continued over the Bush administration’s decision to halt the ground war after a hundred hours, allowing Saddam Hussein and his Baathist regime to remain in power and the Iraqi army to suppress the Kurdish and Shiite uprisings soon after the cease-fire. President George Bush was aware that any longer-term entanglement might antagonize his constituency back home, as presidential elections were already on the horizon. He was unable to capitalize on his spectacular victory and soaring postwar popularity in the polls, however, because by November, 1992, economic problems had become the electorate’s primary concern. Questions also were raised as to whether enough time had been given for the economic embargo to take effect before Operation Desert Storm was
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As Iraqi troops withdrew from Kuwait, they set fire to most of the oil fields, causing millions of dollars in damages and creating a massive ecological disaster in the Persian Gulf. (U.S. Department of Defense)
initiated. A debate regarding the high cost in Iraqi civilian suffering and lives that the U.N. embargo was exacting also continued. Despite the suspected contraband with its next-door neighbors Jordan and Iran, Iraq, deprived of its major export and foreign currency earner, oil, was becoming impoverished and unable to provide for the needs of the masses. Controversy also continued regarding the degree of encouragement that the earlier tilt toward Iraq of the Reagan and Bush administrations and the ambivalent words of Ambassador April Glaspie had given to Saddam Hussein. United Nations agencies were saddled with additional responsibilities and outlays in their several missions, especially the caring for many internal and external refugees. As for the overall significance of the Persian Gulf War, there was no consensus on whether it was either the defining moment of President Bush’s “New World Order” to uphold international law or the event simply reflecting oil politics as usual, packaged to appear as a stand for what was right with a few Arab members in the coalition providing an appropriate cover. Peter B. Heller
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1991 Censorship During the Gulf War The war included strict controls on the information allowed to the media. The Gulf War, which began as Operation Desert Shield to protect Saudi Arabia from Iraqi invasion and became Operation Desert Storm to liberate Iraqi-held Kuwait, involved world access to Persian Gulf oil. The United States fought to keep the mercurial Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, from military dominance in a sensitive region. Consequently, the United States began a military buildup in the region in August, 1990, after Iraq overran its small neighbor, Kuwait. United States and allied forces waged a massive air and ground assault on Iraq from January 16, 1991, to February 28, 1991. This assault liberated Kuwait but stopped short of total occupation of Iraq or removal of Saddam Hussein. The campaign involved serious censorship issues. Military Censorship Generally, the restriction or manipulation of information in a free society during wartime has been viewed as acceptable when national or military security is at stake. It is viewed as unacceptable when information is restricted or manipulated for political purposes—such as protecting the images of military and civilian leaders. Generally too, the media and the wartime authorities conflict over the manner and degree of censorship. The Vietnam War prompted American leadership to develop a new model for dealing with the media during subsequent conflicts. Vietnam had been the most open war in U.S. history. It was also the first television war. Brutal images flashed back to the United States the reality of war. Although political and military leadership had tried to influence the type and flow of information, the media were free to roam the war zone and talk to the troops. In a war without fronts, the count of enemy dead became the military yardstick by which success was measured. The media exposed the body count system as fantasy and folly. Some in the military blamed the media for damaging American morale to the extent that the war became unwinnable. The new model for war coverage in an age of instant communication, based on the British practice during the Falkland Islands War of 1982, involved sanitizing visual images, controlling media access to military operations, censoring information that could upset civilians, and excluding journalists who filed unfavorable stories. True to the British model, during
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the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983 the media were simply held incommunicado until the operation was complete. During the Gulf War, this proved impractical, owing to the duration of the conflict. Not a single journalist, however, accompanied the first American troops to the Persian Gulf in August of 1990 (actual fighting did not begin until January, 1991), as the Department of Defense began to lay the groundwork for censorship. In September, 1990, the Department of Defense claimed that at least 250,000 Iraqi troops were massing in Kuwait to attack Saudi Arabia. President George Bush used this misinformation to “draw a line in the sand.” No such buildup existed. Journalists at first accepted the military’s word. As journalists arrived in the Persian Gulf, the military implemented the pool system for controlling the flow of information. The pool system restricted journalists to group meetings with selected military units and accompanied by a military official. The military also instituted a security-review procedure, which constituted a prior restraint on the news. Escort guidelines further dictated that the media were allowed no “unilateral coverage” of events. Finally, all stories and photographs had to be cleared by the Pentagon. The commanding U.S. field general, Norman Schwarzkopf, deflected all criticism of the system by claiming that he was merely following orders and referring all critics to the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs in the Pentagon. Schwartzkopf’s own rules for dealing with the media were “Don’t let them intimidate you”; “There’s no law that says you have to answer all their questions”; “Don’t answer any questions that in your judgment would help the enemy”; and “Don’t ever lie to the American people.” As a junior officer in Vietnam, Schwartzkopf had had firsthand experience with the high command’s insistence upon a body count. Consequently, as commander in the Persian Gulf, he angrily rejected any talk about body counts. He claimed that he was as forthcoming as he could be, and that he even had to intercede with the Saudis to ensure some media access to the war. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were without any tradition of a free press. Officially, the Saudis and the Kuwaitis could not understand why censorship could not be complete. Schwartzkopf’s command had to handle this situation delicately. Political Necessities Politics, rather than military necessity, was the motive for much of the censorship in the Persian Gulf War. Washington insisted that it engaged in “precision bombing” using “smart” bombs during its forty-three day pounding of Baghdad, and doctored its photographic evidence accord-
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ingly. In fact, more than 90 percent of the bombs dropped were “dumb” bombs (those without guidance systems). Success was defined as avoiding civilian targets. Peter Arnett, a Cable News Network (CNN) correspondent who was allowed to broadcast from Baghdad, documented damage to civilian targets. He also verified the destruction of a plant that produced powdered milk for infants (the United States had insisted that the plant was used to produce biological weapons). The Iraqi government shadowed Arnett, but likely figured it was getting more propaganda value from his reports than the enemy was getting morale value. This introduced a new technological twist to modern warfare. A correspondent may broadcast live attacks on the enemy from the enemy’s position; Arnett did so. Some viewed this, in the heat of war, as treasonous. Arnett was vilified in Washington. Senator Alan Simpson even went so far as to call him a “sympathizer” with the enemy. War is ugly and any attempt to beautify it—such as showing only attractive videos of perfect hits with smart bombs—must have political implications. Presidential orders barred the media from Dover Air Force Base in Delaware when American caskets returned from the war zone. The military report minimizing the number of Iraqis killed became a sanitized account of how many tanks, planes, and pieces of equipment had been destroyed. Critics have claimed that these attempts to shield a free people from the consequences of their country’s actions can have no justification as military security. They see this as a way of shielding political and military leaders from criticism. Clearly, a controversial and delicate balance exists between military security and freedom of information. Brian G. Tobin
1991 Air War in the Gulf The 1991 Gulf War demonstrated the overwhelming and decisive role of air power in modern warfare. As the first major international crisis following the Cold War, the war demonstrated that a cooperative effort between the United States and the Soviet Union, along with the support of China, could enable the United Nations to quell a world crisis in a volatile area such as the Middle East. During the early hours of August 2, 1990, Iraqi military forces occupied the tiny, oil-rich nation of Kuwait, Iraq’s Arab neighbor on the Northern Per-
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sian Gulf. Ordered by Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, the invasion employed hundreds of tanks and surprised nearly the entire world. Within twenty-four hours, Iraq had taken complete control of Kuwait and moved thousands of Iraqi troops to Kuwait’s Saudi Arabian border. Industrialized nations, such as the United States, that depended heavily on Kuwaiti and Saudi petroleum immediately terminated its foreign policies that had previously benefited Iraq. The United States and the United Nations organized a coalition of thirty-nine countries, including Egypt, France, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, that expelled Iraq within just six weeks and restored Kuwaiti independence without stripping Hussein of power. The United States made the unusual request that other countries contribute financially to the campaign. More than fiftythree billion dollars was received, with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait the largest donors. Several countries donated resources but not personnel. Military Buildup Immediately following the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia invited U.S. troops onto Saudi soil for protection against further aggression. This coalition, termed Operation Desert Shield, deployed 1,800 combat aircraft, 3,500 tanks, and 670,000 troops (425,000 of which were American), into the Gulf region by mid-January. The coalition also had moved 200 warships into the Gulf region, including six U.S. aircraft carriers and two battleships. By contrast, Iraq mobilized between 350,000 and 550,000 troops into Kuwait and southern Iraq, along with 550 aircraft, 4,500 tanks, and a small navy. Had Hussein taken advantage of his initial military leverage and invaded Saudi Arabia in August, 1990, no military force in the immediate area could have deterred him. Any immediate American retaliation would have been limited to air and missile attacks from the USS Independence aircraft carrier in the Gulf and by B-52 bombers stationed on Diego Garcia Island, 2,500 miles away in the Indian Ocean. Hussein’s unexplained delay gave U.S. president George Bush time to organize the largest deployment of air power and troops since World War II. Fifty thousand air and ground troops were sent to bases in Saudi Arabia in addition to three aircraft carrier fleets: the Independence, the USS Eisenhower, and the USS Saratoga. The number of American troops in the region had increased to more than 200,000 by November, after which Bush tried to scare Hussein into retreating by doubling the size of the American force. Operation Desert Storm began with 539,000 American troops in the Gulf, along with 270,000 other coalition troops. There were 545,000 Iraqi troops in and around Kuwait. U.S. general H. Norman Schwarzkopf com-
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manded the non-Arab units and Saudi general Khalid Sultan commanded the Arab units. Air Power Strategies The primary goal of the coalition air command was to destroy Iraq’s ability to launch either offensive or defensive air campaigns. Secondary goals included the elimination of Iraq’s weapons facilities and the disruption of Iraq’s ability to gather information about coalition forces and to communicate internally. Coalition aircraft first bombed the Iraqi capital of Baghdad before attacking strategic military targets throughout Iraq and Kuwait. The allies focused their heaviest bombing on Iraqi troops, artillery centers, tanks, transportation routes, and supplies of ammunition, food, fuel, and water, as Hussein attempted to shield his military behind civilians. Iraq then launched crude Scud missiles at populated areas in Israel and Saudi Arabia, enraging many by killing civilians. Operation Desert Storm Hussein was given a deadline of January 15, 1991, to exit Kuwait. When he made no attempt to honor this deadline, Operation Desert Shield was upgraded to the military offensive Operation Desert Storm. On January 16, 1991, at 6:40 p.m. eastern standard time, the White House announced that “the liberation of Kuwait has begun.” Intensive air attacks continued for five and one-half weeks, concluding with a ground assault
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A Baghdad hotel destroyed by Allied bombing. (Barry W. Barker)
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that began on February 23, 1991, at 8:00 p.m. eastern standard time, and lasted for exactly one hundred hours. The United States flew most of the campaign’s sorties, and the British, French, and Saudis flew most of the rest. The coalition deployed unprecedented technological weapons systems, such as the unmanned Tomahawk cruise missile, the antimissile version of the Patriot antiaircraft system, and advanced infrared targeting that illuminated Iraqi tanks buried in the sand. Iraqi forces were overwhelmed by the use of new aircraft such as the British Tornado and the U.S. F-117A stealth fighter. Other new technology included coalition smart bombs, which utilized previously untested laser guidance systems and accounted for 7 percent of all bombs dropped. Modern media coverage enabled the entire world continually to view coalition bombing raids. As Hussein desired, Iraq’s longstanding neighbor and enemy, Iran, did not make a stand. As the bombing intensified, Iraq evacuated to Iran 137 aircraft, all of which Iran kept after the war. For its initial thirty-seven days, Operation Desert Storm was almost exclusively a war of air bombardment. Iraq’s military installations, communications facilities, air bases, armed forces in the field, missile launchers, weapons-producing factories, and nuclear production facilities were relentlessly bombed by more than 100,000 sea-launched sorties and missiles from the Persian Gulf. The Iraqi air force had surprisingly been grounded by Hussein after only the one day of bombing. Iraq’s only offensive effort after its initial invasion of Kuwait was to launch eighty-five Scud missiles against Israel and Saudi Arabia. They resulted in a relatively minimal loss of life. Some were intercepted by American Patriot antimissile rockets, and others broke up upon reentry or missed their targets. Operation Desert Saber The land offensive Operation Desert Saber was launched on February 23, 1991, and lasted for four days. Deployment of ground troops was restrained until nearly the entire Iraqi infrastructure, including bridges, highways, electric power systems, water filtration plants, and airports, had been destroyed. With thousands of Iraqis already dead, surviving troops surrendered by the tens of thousands. The few Iraqi troops, including many of the elite Republican Guard, who continued to fight while retreating, shot their surrendering comrades in the back. When President Bush ordered a cease-fire on February 27, Kuwait was liberated, and the most extensive air bombardment and land offensive since World War II was over. Bush’s early termination of the ground war was later criticized, as Baghdad was able to rescue a substantial amount of military equipment,
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which was later used to suppress postwar Shiite and Kurdish rebellions as Hussein remained in power. Military Warcraft Initial air attacks led by the United States included Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from warships in the Persian Gulf, F-117A stealth fighter-bombers armed with smart bombs, and F-4G Wild Weasel aircraft loaded with antiradar missiles. These attacks permitted F-14, F-15, and F-16 fighter-bombers, and F/A-18 Hornet fighters to gain air superiority. Bombing missions were timed to reduce the effectiveness of Iraqi ground radar defenses. The A-10 Thunderbolt, with its Gatling gun and heat-seeking or optically-guided Maverick missiles, effectively provided support for ground units. Other essential coalition support was provided by the AH-64 Apache, Black Hawk, AH-1 Cobra, and Super Cobra helicopters, which fired laser-guided Hellfire missiles, the E-3A airborne warning and control system (AWACS), and a modernized fleet of older B-52G’s. The coalition’s 2,250 combat aircraft, including 1,800 U.S. planes, overmatched Iraq’s 500 Soviet-built MiG-29’s and French-made Mirage F-1’s. Coalition combat missions dropped more than 88,000 tons of bombs. Precision-guided missiles, night-vision devices, an infrared navigation and target designation system, and target sensors enabled round-the-clock bombing by the coalition. Coalition ground-based firepower included the multiple-launch rocket system, the M-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the M-60A3 main battle tank, the M-109 self-propelled howitzer tank, the M-1A1 main battle tank, and ninety Patriot missile launchers. Casualties and Aftermath Immediately following the Gulf War, the United States Defense Intelligence Agency estimated that 100,000 Iraqi soldiers had been killed, 300,000 wounded, 150,000 deserted, and 60,000 taken prisoner. U.S. representatives later stated these estimates could be off as much as 50 percent following claims by various human rights organizations of significantly different numbers. U.S. casualties included 148 killed in action, 407 wounded, and 121 killed in nonhostile activities, such as friendly fire. Coalition bombing severely damaged Iraq’s transportation systems, communication systems, and petroleum and other industries. Much of Iraq’s electric power and clean water were destroyed, resulting in many civilian deaths from lack of food or medical treatment. Severe environmental pollution resulted after Hussein ordered approximately six hundred Kuwaiti oil wells set afire. The blazes took more than twelve months to extinguish and caused severe air pollution. Huge amounts of Kuwaiti oil were
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dumped into the Persian Gulf as the war ended. Postwar economic sanctions continued to cause great hardship to the civilians of Iraq and neighboring countries, as efforts to strip Hussein of power repeatedly failed. The operation had another, unintended effect: The presence of U.S. troops angered Osama bin Laden and other Islamic fundamentalists. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, that killed almost three thousand people were tied to the Gulf War. Following Gulf War duty, many veterans complained of physical and psychological ailments, including memory loss, fatigue, and joint pain, collectively known as Gulf War syndrome. In 1996, the Pentagon warned five thousand veterans of the war that these symptoms might have been caused by exposure to nerve gas during an attack on a weapons depot. Daniel G. Graetzer
1991 Women in the Gulf War Women’s assistance in the Gulf War operations of Desert Shield and Desert Storm led to legislation allowing female pilots to fly combat missions. Historically, there has been much debate about women serving in military and combat roles. The level of that debate increased when the United States armed forces were mobilized after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August, 1990. As the country watched, 33,000 women were among the 537,000 U.S. troops sent to Saudi Arabia. Women constituted 11 percent of the total active duty military and 13 percent of the reservists of all military personnel. They operated in key combat support positions in the largest U.S. military action since the Vietnam War. The contributions of these soldiers enabled women to gain greater acceptance and to make inroads in the military service. Duties of Women in the War Women were responsible for many of the same jobs as men in the Gulf War. Their duties brought them close to combat zones, where they directed artillery, fired Patriot missiles to intercept incoming Scud missiles, constructed buildings, flew airplanes, and refueled tanks. For the first time, American women flew helicopters over battle zones, carrying more than two thousand men and supplies into enemy territory. Women repaired tac-
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tical satellite communications systems and battlefield radios and were visible in all phases of the conflict, from operating high-tech equipment to repairing tanks and earth-moving equipment to commanding brigades and platoons. Each branch of the service interpreted the ban on women in combat in its own way. The Army had the greatest number of military women. Many Army commanders ignored normal procedure and assigned tasks without regard to gender. Others took capable women out of their normal positions, interpreting the Direct Combat Probability Coding (DCPC) system by their own standards. Women were often close to combat areas simply because front lines shifted constantly. In the Air Force, women were in danger of being struck by Iraqi Scud missiles as they serviced and armed combat aircraft. Navy women were kept from combat areas, as they were not given any offshore carrier assignments. The controversies regarding gender were largely put aside as men and women treated one another with mutual respect amid the hardships of the desert. Critics claimed that there would be sexual tension among men and women, but such fears proved unwarranted as the sexes shared tents and duties without noticeable friction. In addition to the pressures of combat, both male and female soldiers had to adhere to the strict customs of Muslim culture. For women, these customs were more stringent. When leaving their military compounds, they had to be escorted by men, keeping their heads covered and their eyes lowered, and they could not drive vehicles or wear shorts. Heroines One of the first American Army helicopter pilots to fly into a combat zone, Major Marie T. Rossi, a commander of B Company, 18th Army Aviation Brigade, appeared on national television shortly before she died when her chopper hit a tower. She had carried troops, supplies, ammunition, and fuel and had encountered hostile fire, but ironically her death came a day after a cease-fire had begun. Rossi became a symbol of heroism for American women. African American women played an important role in the Gulf War, risking their lives with fellow military personnel. Captain Cynthia Mosley, a commander of Alpha Company, received a bronze star for combat service. Commanding a one hundred-person unit that was close to the front lines, Mosley and her company were responsible for supplying troops with fuel, water, and ammunition. Lieutenant Phoebe Jeter was another of the thousands of African American women who served with distinction during Desert Storm. In charge of
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the control center that deployed Patriot missiles, Jeter headed an all-male platoon that destroyed at least two Scud missiles. She became the first and only woman to shoot down a Scud. A total of thirteen women died during the Gulf War. The war claimed the lives of the first enlisted women to be killed in action during a Scud missile attack. In addition, Major Rhonda Cornum, a flight surgeon, and Army truck driver Melissa Rathbun-Nealy were captured by the Iraqis, and both received purple hearts on their release. The Continuing Debates The questions concerning women’s role in the military and whether they should be drafted was argued during the ratification drive for the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). In May, 1991, Representatives Patricia Schroeder and Beverly Bryon introduced a measure to rescind the ban on women flying combat missions. Despite a proposal by the Senate Armed Services Committee to study the measure, it passed both the House and the Senate. The Senate also included an addendum that provided an option for the defense secretary to waive other combat exclusions as well. In 1993, Defense Secretary Les Aspin stated that although women were still excluded from actual ground combat, they would now be allowed to serve as combat pilots and aboard combat ships. The favorable public opinion about the women’s role in the Gulf War helped lead to this decision. Other debates affected women in the Gulf War. Headlines and newspaper photographs depicted mothers leaving behind their children as they were sent to war. Emphasizing such role reversal, the press popularized Operation Desert Storm as the “Mommy War.” Impact on Women in the Military When President George Bush announced the start of an air war against Iraq in January, 1991, he referred to the military troops that he was sending into Saudi Arabia as “our sons and daughters.” The Gulf War narrowed the divisions between men and women in the armed forces, placing them all in the category of service personnel, not servicemen or servicewomen. Prior to Desert Storm, women had been unable to gain significant ground in their struggle to be accepted as part of the military. Their contributions in the invasions of Grenada and Panama had been downplayed. The performance of women in the Gulf War enabled all female soldiers to gain new respect because it showed that women were as capable as men in the completion of military duties. While the war opened the door for women as combat pilots, however, women in ground troops continued the
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fight for the right to engage in combat. Without full recognition as members of combat units, women could not hope to break through the military’s glass ceiling to advance in rank and position. Marilyn Elizabeth Perry
1992 “No Fly” Zone in Iraq Date: August 27, 1992 Location: Iraq Principal figures: American, George Bush (1924); Iraqi, Saddam Hussein (1937); British, John Major (1943); French, François Mitterrand (1916-1996) Result: To stem Iraqi attacks against rebellious Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq, the United States, Great Britain, and France established a “no fly” zone for Iraqi aircraft below the 32d parallel. On August 27, 1992, the United States, Great Britain, and France made a joint decision to establish a “no fly” zone in southern Iraq. The decision not to allow Iraqi aircraft south of the 32d parallel was controversial. There were those who doubted the humanitarian motives of the allies. The Iraqis saw the change as a plot designed to break up their country. Iranian leaders wondered about U.S. president George Bush’s motives—did he support the “no fly” zone simply to give himself a boost in public opinion polls and improve his chances for reelection? Such doubts were echoed in newspaper editorials within the United States. Egypt, Syria, and several Persian Gulf states worried that Iraq would eventually splinter and leave Iran in control of the area. The Arabs wanted to keep the eastern flank of their world intact, but not necessarily under the control of Iran’s fundamentalist Shiite government. The allied leaders dismissed such concerns about the “no fly” zone. Their stated motives were simple—they were merely responding to the defiance of Saddam Hussein, the political leader of Iraq. Hussein, the allies argued, had repeatedly defied requests of the international community and violated the cease-fire agreements still in effect from the Gulf War of 1991. Hussein, for example, deployed antiaircraft missiles in northern Iraq, refused to accept his postwar border with Kuwait, blocked humanitarian aid convoys throughout the countryside, and interfered with United Na-
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A female U.S. Navy aviation electronics technician performs maintenance work on a fighter plane on the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson in the Persian Gulf in early 1999. The carrier’s mission was to support coalition enforcement of the no-fly zone over southern Iraq. (U.S. Department of Defense)
tions (U.N.) weapons inspectors trying to investigate suspected nuclear, biological, and chemical facilities. As a result of these violations and many others, the United States, Great Britain, and France decided to issue an ultimatum and then strike if Hussein did not comply. The allies’ military options were limited by the fact that U.N. representatives remained in Iraq. If his three foes attacked him, Hussein could take hostages from among more than one thousand U.N. representatives. The “no fly” zone policy seemed to be a better option. It would help the Shiites in southern Iraq and possibly inspire the overthrow of Hussein from within the country. U.N. Resolution 688, which passed in April, 1991, required Iraq to ensure the human and political rights of all of its citizens. Without any legal blessing from the United Nations, the United States and its two allies, Great Britain and France, responded to Hussein’s aggression and adopted a “688 strategy” to defend the rights of Iraqi citizens. The strategy went into effect on August 27, 1992, and established an Iraqi “no fly” zone south of the 32d parallel. The zone covered 47,500 square miles, or about onefourth of Iraq’s land area. The goals of the strategy were simple: to protect the Shiites, although not from Iraqi ground forces already in the area; to stir
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up a mutiny in the south; and possibly to inspire a palace coup in Baghdad against Hussein. The strategy was not immediately successful in achieving its three goals, although allied fighter planes continued to keep the skies clear of Iraqi aircraft below the 32d parallel. The Politics of the Decision After the Persian Gulf War, American, French, and British aircraft continued to control the skies over the northernmost portion of Iraq. Their goal was to protect the local Kurdish population from the wrath of Hussein. The Kurds were an ethnic minority that rebelled against the Iraqi dictator after the Gulf War. They tried to establish their own state, but the so-called butcher of Baghdad had other ideas. He wanted to reassert his control over northern Iraq and force the Kurds into submission. To prevent this from happening and also to prevent the creation of a Kurdish state, the United States, Great Britain, and France established a “no fly” zone north of the 36th parallel. The allies vowed to attack any Iraqi aircraft or ground troops that entered the zone and tried to attack the Kurds. The policy appeared to work. The Kurds remained protected, and the Iraqi regime did not bully its way back into northern Iraq. In the case of southern Iraq, however, things were different. The allies did not establish a “no fly” zone there after the Gulf War, even though local Shiite Muslims also rebelled against Baghdad. The uprising failed, but rebels continued to operate in the vast marshes where the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers meet. Hussein wanted to crush these rebels once and for all and turn the area into a “dead zone.” He deployed 100,000 troops and began a strafing and bombing campaign against the estimated 50,000 Iraqi Shiites living in the marshes. The Iraqi campaign did not go unnoticed. Max van der Stoel, a U.N. human rights inspector, reported on August 11, 1992, that Hussein was killing his own people. This was a violation of U.N. Resolution 688. The United States and its two allies, Great Britain and France, responded to Hussein’s aggression with their “688 strategy.” Consequences The “no fly” zone policy failed to accomplish its most important goals. Because it did not require Iraqi ground forces to retreat north of the 32d parallel, troops stayed in southern Iraq. They drained wells and defoliated marshlands, and they then used tanks and artillery to wipe out completely the Shiite Muslim rebels. The United States, Great Britain, and France may have controlled the skies of southern Iraq, but there was no real resistance to Hussein on the ground. Further, there were few mutinies and coup at-
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tempts against his government. By protecting his supporters from the effects of the U.N. economic blockade, Hussein bought their loyalty and remained firmly in power into the next century. Peter R. Faber
1992 Somalia Occupation At issue: Restoration of order in a nation whose central government collapsed Date: December 9, 1992-March 31, 1994 Location: Somalia Principal figures: American, President George Bush (1924), President Bill Clinton (1946), Special Envoy Robert B. Oakley (1931); United Nations, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1922); Somali, Mahammad Farah Aideed, Ali Mahdi Mahammad (1939), former president Mahammad Siad Barré (1921) Result: Under the auspices of the United Nations, U.S. forces entered a northeast Africa nation living in anarchy to secure humanitarian operations. On December 4, 1992, U.S. president George Bush announced that U.S. forces would be sent to Somalia in order to provide security for the provision of emergency humanitarian assistance. This announcement followed months of civil war and famine in Somalia and many months of international debate about how best to deal with that country’s deteriorating situation. On December 3, 1992, the U.N. Security Council authorized a member state to intervene in Somalia, where anarchy reigned. The intervening power was authorized to use all necessary means to provide security for humanitarian relief. The Bush administration, which had been preparing for this eventuality, took formal steps to mount a peacekeeping operation, called Operation Restore Hope, under U.S. command. The first troops landed in Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital and largest city, in the early morning hours of December 9. U.S. forces remained in Somalia until March 31, 1994, when President Bill Clinton formally called for the withdrawal of all but a handful of U.S. troops, in the face of ongoing civil strife and discord. Although the operation failed to produce a political resolution to the Somali civil war, it did restore considerable order to the Somali countryside and ended the famine.
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Somali Background Although Somalia is a largely homogeneous country in terms of ethnicity, religion, and language, its people are divided into six major clans and numerous subclans. The majority of Somalis are fiercely independent nomads, with strong loyalty to the family and clan. Traditionally, clans and subclans have engaged in disputes over pasture and water resources, but significant interclan marriage has muted such conflict, as has the mediating authority of clan elders. This traditional capacity for conflict resolution was weakened during the 1980’s, as President Mahammad Siad Barré, who had seized power in a coup in 1969, nine years after Somalia’s independence, sought to manipulate the clan system to maintain his increasingly unpopular regime. Siad Barré’s policies of reform in his early years were welcomed by most Somalis. After the failure of his attempt to capture the predominantly Somali-inhabited Ogaden region in Ethiopia, his regime gradually became more authoritarian and increasingly brutal. As opposition to Siad Barré grew, he responded by rewarding fellow Marehan clan members with positions of power. Other clans responded with determined resistance. The northwestern part of Somalia fell into open rebellion in May, 1988. Siad Barré re-
Image not available
During the period of the United Nations occupation, members of rival clans moved freely through the streets of Mogadishu carrying weapons as advanced as the hand-held rocket launcher seen here. The complicated rivalries among factions and generally undisciplined nature of the fighting made Somalia an exceptionally dangerous place for occupation forces. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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sponded ruthlessly with aerial bombings of Hargeisa, the regional capital, and hundreds of thousands of Isaq Somali took refuge in nearby Ethiopia. The civil war in the north continued for three years, culminating in a declaration of independence on May 17, 1991, and the formation of Somaliland Republic. During the latter months of 1990, civil war had spread throughout southern Somalia. Awash in arms from years of military assistance during the Cold War, opposition groups flourished. Mahammad Farah Aideed’s well-armed Somali National Army (SNA) gradually gained the upper hand against Siad Barré’s forces, which had been reduced by defections to Marehan clan units. Aideed’s forces captured Mogadishu in late January, 1991, as Siad Barré fled from the capital city after plundering it and retreated into the southern countryside, where pitched battles were fought with Aideed’s forces in fertile agricultural areas, interrupting local farming and precipitating the famine. If Siad Barré’s opposition had been united, Somalia might not have devolved into anarchy. However, disputes over who should govern the country developed immediately after Siad Barré’s flight, the principal contest being between Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mahammad, a Mogadishu businessman. Both men were members of the Hawiye clan of the United Somali Congress (USC), but they hailed from different subclans. Ali Mahdi Mahammad had considerable political support, especially among his Agbal subclan, but Aideed had a more effective fighting force. In late 1991, the two sides clashed for several months in the streets of Mogadishu. International relief organizations of the United Nations withdrew from the country because of the complete lack of security, leaving only the International Committee of the Red Cross and some private agencies to cope with the growing famine. Regional diplomatic efforts failed. By February, 1992, a cease-fire was agreed upon and a special coordinator was appointed to reinitiate a U.N. presence. These efforts failed, and U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali called for a more concerted international effort. United Nations Intervention The U.N. Security Council responded by creating the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), under the direction of Mohamed Sahnoun. This ill-fated effort was underfunded and met with strong Somali resistance. The famine deepened during 1992, and relief supplies could not be delivered, owing to the ongoing civil war. Boutros-Ghali and Sahnoun clashed over how the United Nations should respond, and the latter resigned in September, just before a planned national reconciliation conference. Matters deteriorated further as death rates from starvation and disease skyrocketed. Facing this grim humanitarian situation, the Bush adminis-
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tration, in its waning months in office, offered to deploy U.S. troops to provide security for relief supplies. Special envoy Robert Oakley was dispatched by Bush to negotiate a smooth entry for U.S. forces with Somali factional leaders, and U.S. forces, designated the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), were on the ground by December 9, 1992, with assistance from military units of Canada, France, Italy, Belgium, and Morocco. The troops initially received a hero’s welcome from the Somali people and cautious acquiescence from the Somali factions. Within a month, Mogadishu and key regional cities had been secured, relief supplies were reaching faminestricken areas, and the emergency situation had been greatly stabilized— but the political situation remained tenuous. Diplomatic efforts to restore the local elders’ influence, to establish an interim police force, and quietly to impound the large caches of weapons were initiated. Initially, public support in the United States for Operation Restore Hope was strong. Most U.S. citizens perceived the operation as being consistent with U.S. humanitarian policies, even though the United States paid for three quarters of the UNITAF expenses. The problems came after the United States handed over authority to a reconstituted UNOSOM II. President Clinton, a newcomer to foreign policy, was eager to reduce the U.S. presence in the region and for the U.N. to take overall operational control. Robert Oakley finished his assignment in March, 1993. Later in the same month, UNITAF functions were transferred formally to UNOSOM II, and the U.S. marines began to withdraw from Somalia, leaving a much smaller U.S. contingent of four thousand to join UNOSOM II. With the United Nations taking a more direct role, Aideed’s forces became bolder in resistance to UNOSOM II. Aideed greatly resented U.N. secretary general Boutros-Ghali and took an early opportunity to challenge him. SNA forces attacked a Pakistani patrol in early June, 1993, killing many. Boutros-Ghali called the action a war crime and Aideed a criminal. U.N. forces began a cat-and-mouse effort to capture Aideed, and UNOSOM II became increasingly unpopular among Somalis. In early October, 1993, U.S. units of UNOSOM II engaged in a running gun battle with Aideed forces, suffering more than ninety casualties, including eighteen dead. This event stirred outrage in the United States and sparked calls for complete U.S. withdrawal. Bowing to the political pressures, the Clinton administration agreed to withdraw all U.S. forces by March 31, 1994. The vast majority of U.S. forces were withdrawn from Somalia by the summer of 1994, although several thousand U.S. troops were deployed in 1995 to provide security for the complete withdrawal of U.N. forces, leaving Somalis to work out a political solution for themselves. Robert F. Gorman
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1994 U.S. Troops in Bosnia At issue: Control of Bosnia after the breakup of Yugoslavia Date: April 10, 1994 Location: Gorazde, Bosnia Principal figures: Serbian and Bosnian, Slobodan Miloševi2 (1941), Franjo Tudjman (1922-1999), Radovan Karadzi2 (1945), Alija Izetbegovic (1925-2003); American, Bill Clinton (1946) Result: By United Nations request and under NATO auspices, American air forces became involved in the protracted war in Bosnia between the Serbs and Bosnian Muslims. At dusk on the evening of April 10, 1994, two American F-16 jets from the American air base in Aviano, Italy, flew over Gorazde, Bosnia. The planes dropped three five-hundred-pound bombs on Serbian positions used to bombard the city, which had been designated by the United Nations as a safe zone for Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks). The strike, under North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) auspices, brought the United States military further into the civil war being waged in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia. In February, 1994, U.S. airplanes had shot down Serbian aircraft violating the “no fly” zone established by the United Nations. The April 10 bombing was the first time in forty-five years that NATO air forces attacked ground targets in Europe. The attack occurred after repeated warnings from the United Nations, NATO, and American president Bill Clinton to the Serbs that continued bombardment of Gorazde would bring retaliation. Gorazde was one of several regions the United Nations had designated as havens for Muslim refugees and was garrisoned by U.N. peacekeeping troops. When the Serbs refused to stop their bombardment, Yasushi Akashi, the U.N. representative in Bosnia, advised U.N. secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali to call NATO strikes. NATO charged the American command to carry out the task, and Admiral Leighton Smith, Jr., commander of the NATO southern forces, ordered the strikes. The bombing at first appeared to stop the Serbian shelling, but the Serb leader in Bosnia, Radovan Karadzi2, claimed that the strikes brought the United Nations into the war on the Bosniak side, and he threatened retaliation against U.N. forces. President Clinton responded that the air attack was a clear expression of the will of NATO and the will of the United Nations. When Serb shelling resumed, a second attack was carried out on April 11.
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Centuries of Conflict The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 revealed longstanding national and communal hostilities that dictatorship had hidden for forty-five years. Nowhere was this more evident than in the Federation of Yugoslavia, a collection of six republics that was home to eight major nationalities. Created after World War I, Yugoslavia never came to grips with its nationality problem, a major reason the country fell prey to fascist aggression in World War II. After that conflict, the powerful and charismatic communist leader Tito was able to maintain stability in the country. After Tito died in 1980, Yugoslavia began to unravel because of national differences. Hostilities that extended back to the Middle Ages appeared in full bloom once more, and the republics declared their independence. The first serious war between the republics erupted in 1991, pitting Serbia, led by Slobodan Milos evi2, against Croatia, led by Franjo Tudjman. Croats and Serbs are members of the same nationality but differ in religion (the Croats are Roman Catholic, the Serbs Eastern Orthodox) and historical experience. Both republics claimed territory in Bosnia. Bosnia itself was a republic Tito had created in 1945 for the Bosniaks, descendants of Serbo-Croatian Christians who converted to Islam in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Milos evi2 and Tudjman considered dividing Bosnia between them. In response to this possibility, Bosniak leaders headed by Alija Izetbegovic declared Bosnia’s independence from Yugoslavia and appealed to the nations of the world for recognition. This was slow in coming because of the problems the former Yugoslavia presented on the international stage at that time. European nations approached the situation carefully because traditional alliances divided them between the Serbs and the Croats. These peoples, especially the Serbs, reacted to Bosnian independence by launching a war against the Bosniaks. Serbs living in Bosnia soon formed an independent force under Karadzi2. Milos evi2 came to his aid with all the resources of the Yugoslav state and military. As violence increased, especially toward civilian populations, the United Nations placed an arms embargo on the area. This worked to the advantage of the Serbs, and attacks against the Bosniaks increased. The nations of the West finally recognized Bosnia, but the civil war continued. Western nations were forced to act by the pressure of public outrage, fanned by detailed media reports of atrocities, particularly the systematic raping of Bosnian women by Serbian soldiers and the deaths and maiming of hundreds of children. NATO voted to take military action but not to send in ground forces against the Serbs. Pressure was applied on Serbian leaders in Belgrade to stop the support of their conationals in Bosnia. Numerous plans for a negotiated settlement failed. Serbian military
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units surrounded Bosniak cities, including the safe zones the United Nations had established, and bombarded them from the surrounding highlands. NATO then decided to attack these Serbian outposts from the air. President Clinton agreed and, when asked, ordered American planes to begin raids. Consequences The action had little effect in lessening the war. Serbs continued their onslaught with success, with ground forces increasing the territory they controlled. In December, 1994, former U.S. president Jimmy Carter visited Bosnia to mediate a peace and worked out a cease-fire with Karadzi2, only to see it fail within a few weeks. An airplane piloted by American Scott F. O’Grady was shot down in June, 1995, but he was rescued after a six-day ordeal hiding in the mountains. In July, the Serbian forces captured Gorazde and then moved on to the other safe areas. Within the United States, Congress, administration officials, military leaders, and numerous presidential candidates debated the course of action to take—lift the arms embargo, continue existing policies, commit ground troops, or simply ignore the war. NATO forces, with a large U.S. contingent, entered Bosnia in December, 1995, to enforce a peace agreement. Frederick B. Chary
1995 NATO Troops in Bosnia Date: December 14, 1995 Location: Bosnia Principal figures: Serbian, Slobodan Miloševi2 (1941), Croatian president Franjo Tudjman (1922-1999), Alija Izetbegovic (1925-2003); American, General William Lafayette Nash (1943), Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Jr. (1940?) Result: NATO forces, one-third from the U.S. military, entered Bosnia to enforce the peace agreement drawn up by the warring sides. On December 14, 1995, after being delayed by foul weather, the first troops of the United States Army crossed the Sava River and entered the Republic of Bosnia. The troops were part of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) force charged with implementing the peace treaty agreed to by
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Bosnia and its neighbors the previous month. NATO planned a contingent of sixty thousand military personnel, twenty thousand of them from the United States. The first American soldiers were part of the advance group assigned to prepare the way for the remainder of the American troops. At the same time, forces from the other NATO countries entered at different locations. The NATO forces replaced the failed United Nations (U.N.) mission, which was unable to maintain peace among the communities or secure safe areas for the beleaguered Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims). NATO sought to provide buffers separating the three ethnic communities and to ensure that the timetable of the negotiations was carried out. Both Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Jr., the commander of the NATO operation, and General William Nash, the commander of the American contingent, emphasized that any attack on the troops would be met with a suitable response, including force. There was virtually no resistance to the entry by the warring Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks. On the contrary, the various ethnic armies welcomed the NATO forces and promised full cooperation. The greatest danger came from land mines strewn along the roads and fields between the points of entry and the staging areas where the troops were to encamp. Winter weather conditions also caused problems. Snow and ice jammed the river, making the crossing extremely difficult, interfering with the operation of the motorized and electronic equipment, and slowing the progress of the entry of troops as well as their travel to their destinations. Over the next days, more troops and supplies entered the country as the various contingents established their bases. A New Initiative In the fall of 1995, after more than three years of fighting, there appeared to be no end in sight to the war among the Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks of Bosnia. Reports of unspeakable atrocities had aroused the moral outrage of the world. Attempts to bring peace through use of U.N. forces and NATO air raids had little effect. Political divisions kept the European nations from taking decisive action. The final straw was the Serb attack against and conquest of Srebrenica, a Muslim safe area protected by the United Nations. The reported massacre of Muslim men and boys from the area by Serbs and threats to the U.N. forces drove the West to action. It appeared to U.S. president Bill Clinton’s administration that an American initiative was necessary to bring a conclusion to the conflict. Such an initiative would be complicated by divisions in the federal government:
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The Democratic president faced a hostile Republican Congress and a difficult election in November of 1996. President Clinton invited the presidents of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia to come to Dayton, Ohio, to work out a new peace plan that would establish Serbian and Croatian areas in Bosnia and allow the Bosnian government to function in the rest of the country. The negotiations were interrupted several times by disagreements among the principals, but all sides had a commitment to see an end to the war. The talks were further complicated by a military campaign in September by the Croatian army that drove Serbian families out of the Krajina region of their country. Furthermore, the leaders of the Bosnian Serbs were not invited to take part in the negotiations, and they continued their attacks on Muslim areas. The three parties in Dayton agreed to a peace plan including a specific timetable for withdrawal from the front lines, the exchange of prisoners, and the punishment of war criminals. The agreement called for a large NATO force, including a substantial American contingent, to enforce the treaty. The commitment of American troops caused concern in the United States because of fear of becoming embroiled in an endless conflict. The failures associated with the 1993 American operation in Somalia were still fresh in people’s memories. Public opinion opposed the venture, and Congress insisted that the president get its approval before the commitment. The president realized this would not come about and insisted that as commander in chief of the U.S. military, he could commit the troops. He ordered them to Bosnia. Congress reluctantly agreed to support the troops but not the decision to send them. Consequences Twenty thousand American and forty thousand other troops entered Bosnia with few incidents. NATO forces, unlike those of the United Nations, responded to the occasional attacks against them. The one American casualty in the initial weeks was a soldier who was wounded by a land mine. After the first month of the peacekeeping mission, despite some friction, the various ethnic armies cooperated with NATO and in general adhered to the timetable. Most of the difficulties concerned the investigation of Serbian war crimes, but even in that situation the Bosnian Serbian army reluctantly went along. An atmosphere of uncertainty and cautiousness nevertheless prevailed. Many observers thought that it might take generations to sort out what had happened in the Bosnia Herzegovina war, as well as what should be done about the war’s legacy. Historians and journalists have come to dif-
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ferent conclusions. Some speculate that there is something endemic in the Balkan character that has resulted in civil wars, religious persecution, and war crimes; others dismiss the idea of blood feuds and historic animosities, preferring to analyze how Yugoslavia broke apart after its strong communist leader, Tito, died and a power vacuum opened up that former communists and nationalists of all kinds exploited. Frederick B. Chary
1998 Missile Attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan At issue: Retaliation for acts of terrorism Date: August 20, 1998 Location: Reputed terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and Khartoum, Sudan Principal figures: American, President Bill Clinton (1946), William Cohen (1940), Henry Hugh Shelton (1942); Arab, Osama bin Laden (c. 1957) Result: U.S. military forces conducted coordinated cruise missile attacks on what were identified as terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and the Sudan. These facilities belonged to the terrorist group reputed to be behind the earlier bombing of two U.S. embassies in East Africa. On August 7, 1998, two bombs exploded at the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing more than 250 people and injuring more than 5,000. An Islamic terrorist group identified as the International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders indirectly claimed responsibility for the bombings and threatened additional terrorist attacks on American targets worldwide. This terrorist group was reportedly founded and financed by a renegade Saudi Arabian millionaire, Osama bin Laden, previously linked to other attacks by terrorist groups. U.S. intelligence and military officials, reviewing the available circumstantial evidence, concluded that bin Laden’s group was responsible for these two embassy bombings. Intelligence reports also indicated that this group of terrorists was in the process of developing chemical weapons in the Sudan and concurrently training additional Islamic terrorists in Afghanistan. President Bill Clinton, on advice from Defense Secretary William Cohen and General Henry Hugh Shelton, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, determined that an immediate surprise military response would appropriately punish the
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perpetrators. The president also concluded that such a military strike would delay, and possibly prevent, additional terrorist attacks by this group. Detailed military planning for the strikes commenced immediately and took about one week to complete. Missile Strikes in Retaliation To avoid losses, U.S. armed forces used only cruise missiles rather than manned aircraft to attack what had been identified as terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and the Sudan. Cruise missiles, fired from U.S. Navy ships in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, simultaneously struck the reported terrorist facilities. The missiles hit six individual targets in Afghanistan, most of which were located along the border with Pakistan. Specific targets were in Khost, south of Afghanistan’s capital city of Kabul, and Jalalabad, east of the capital. Collectively, these targets constituted a suspected terrorist training complex in which bin Laden’s group reportedly trained hundreds of other terrorists. In the Sudan, the target of the U.S. missiles was the El Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries plant. This factory, located in Khartoum, Sudan’s capital, was alleged to be storing chemical weapons for later use by the terrorists. The precise number of casualties in Afghanistan and the Sudan as a direct result of the missile strikes was never established with certainty. No U.S. casualties occurred in any of the attacks. Consequences Following the missile strikes, U.S. spokespeople conceded that the strikes would not eliminate the problem of state-sponsored terrorism but said that they would clearly convey that there would be no safe haven for terrorists who chose to attack the United States or its embassies worldwide. Bin Laden and his closest associates were all reported to have survived the attacks unscathed. Damage to the facilities themselves was extensive, however, and military planners labeled both attacks as successful. Already under some international pressure for harboring bin Laden, a fugitive, the government of Afghanistan showed no sign of reconsidering its policy because of the U.S. strike. Instead, Afghan spokespeople interpreted the American missile strike not as an attack on bin Laden or terrorists but instead as an attack on the Afghan people. The Sudanese government immediately condemned the attack on its nation and disavowed any knowledge of chemical weapons on Sudanese territory, claiming that the plant manufactured pharmaceuticals for civilian use. The Sudanese government also suggested that it might request an inspection by the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council to firmly dis-
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Aerial photograph of the Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan that was used by the secretary of defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to brief reporters on the U.S. missile strike on the site. (U.S. Department of Defense)
prove the allegations of chemical weapons at the destroyed plant. No U.N. inspection was subsequently conducted. American politicians, regardless of political affiliation, almost universally supported the need for the attacks, as well as the manner in which the missile strikes were conducted. China, Japan, Kenya, and several other countries chose neither to condemn nor to support the United States. U.N. secretary-general Kofi Annan, informed of the strikes by American diplomats only moments before they occurred, also maintained a cautious silence. Traditional U.S. allies were generally supportive of the military retaliation against state-sponsored terrorism. The strongest support was offered by Great Britain, but Israel, Germany, and Australia also spoke out in favor of the U.S. measures. As a general rule, Muslim countries expressed the loudest outrage at the U.S. attacks. Muslim nations that most vehemently condemned the American actions included Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Pakistan. Muted protests came from other Muslim nations such as Turkey, Egypt, and Indonesia. Non-Muslim nations condemning the strikes included the Soviet Union and Cuba. Anti-American public demonstrations took place in many of
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these countries. U.S. flags were burned in protest in dozens of cities around the globe. Many critics of the unilateral American response, at home and abroad, charged that President Clinton had ordered the missile attacks only to draw attention away from the sex scandal in which he was personally becoming embroiled. After the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, suspicion again fell on bin Laden’s organization. With the backing of the world’s most powerful nations, the United States issued an ultimatum to Afghanistan’s Taliban regime to surrender bin Laden and his followers. After the Taliban refused to comply, the United States led a massive missile and bomber assault on Taliban targets. This assault, in conjunction with a ground-based attack from the regime’s Afghan opponents in the north, brought down the government in December of the same year. Many of bin Laden’s subordinates were killed in the attacks, but the whereabouts of bin Laden himself remained unknown as late as early 2005. Michael S. Casey
1998 Bombing of Military Sites in Iraq Date: December 16, 1998 Location: Iraq Principal figures: American, President Bill Clinton (1946); British, Prime Minsiter Tony Blair (1953); Iraqi, President Saddam Hussein (1937) Result: U.S. president Bill Clinton and British prime minister Tony Blair authorized the bombing of five Iraqi radar sites on the eve of the impeachment vote against Clinton. At the conclusion of the Gulf War in early 1991, restrictions imposed on Iraq by the United Nations included an agreement that required United Nations (U.N.) inspectors to visit sites within the country for the purpose of verifying compliance with the treaty terms governing the production of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Over the next several years, Iraq repeatedly violated the agreement and attempted to renegotiate new terms, backing down only when the threat of retaliation appeared imminent.
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On October 31, 1998, Iraqi officials suspended all cooperation with the U.N. inspectors, prompting U.S. president Bill Clinton and British prime minister Tony Blair to order additional troops and ships into the region for a possible military response. While the military coordinated the movement of men and matériel into the Persian Gulf area, U.N. secretary-general Kofi Annan contacted Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in an effort to persuade him to reconsider his position. As negotiations continued, Clinton authorized National Security Adviser Sandy Berger to inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the strike should commence on the following day. At 8:00 a.m. eastern standard time on November 14, the Cable News Network (CNN) reported that an Iraqi government announcement would be made shortly, prompting Clinton temporarily to place the strike on hold. Later that morning, a letter arrived from Baghdad in which Iraq agreed to permit the return of U.N. inspectors, but since the dispatch contained what appeared to be conditions, Clinton rejected the offer. The following day, Clinton received a second letter from Iraq, clarifying its position and informing him that the “conditions” were meant as preferences only. A third letter that officially rescinded Iraq’s decision to end cooperation with U.N. inspectors arrived later that afternoon. Clinton suspended the U.S. military operation and contacted Blair, who then ordered British troops to follow the lead of the American forces. On November 17, U.N. inspectors returned to Iraq, but within one week, Iraqi leaders denied their requests for access to specific documents,
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Antiaircraft fire again illuminates the sky over Baghdad after British and American aircraft resume bombing attacks during the early hours of December 17, 1998. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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claiming that the demands were provocative and designed to justify a military attack against their country. For the next three weeks, Iraq continually denied U.N. inspectors access to the reports, leading Richard Butler, the chief U.N. inspector, to issue a statement on December 15 stating that Hussein had failed to fulfill the earlier promises and instead had placed additional restrictions on U.N. investigators. Military Action Begins On December 16, as the U.N. team left Baghdad, Clinton conferred with his national security advisers regarding the situation. Domestically an attack against Iraq on the eve of the House of Representatives’ vote on impeachment articles might be suspicious, but international concerns over initiating an attack during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, then just days away, required an immediate response. Clinton authorized the deployment of more than two hundred aircraft and twenty warships, including the USS Enterprise along with fifteen B-52 bombers carrying more than four hundred cruise missiles and a variety of other arms. Targets included military installations and possible chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons sites as well as the barracks of the Republican Guard. A second attack on the following day knocked out additional military air defense sites for the protection of U.S. and British pilots. Although the U.N. Security Council held an emergency session throughout the day, no course of action was decided upon. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy commenced Operation Desert Fox, attacking at 3:10 p.m. eastern standard time, deploying two hundred Tomahawk missiles from ships located in the Persian Gulf. One and one-half hours later, the president informed Congress of the attack. Shortly after 5:00 p.m. eastern standard time, the first missiles landed in Iraq as the White House announced that a “substantial” attack was underway. During prime time, Clinton informed the American public about the strike against Iraq and warned Saddam Hussein that any violation of treaty obligations would be dealt with swiftly and severely. An hour later, Republicans voted to delay the impeachment hearings. Consequences Critics of President Clinton questioned the timing of the air strike, raising concerns that Operation Desert Fox was initiated to push the impeachment hearings from the front page of the news. Congressional members, including Representatives Joe L. Barton and Ron Paul of Texas, Senator Paul Coverdell of Georgia, Senator Bill Frist of Tennessee, and Senator Richard Shelby, supported military action against Hussein but argued that
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Clinton had already paused the strike before and should not have initiated hostilities while facing the impeachment vote. Others, including both Republicans and Democrats such as Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle, Senator John Chafee, and Senator Sam Brownback, supported the president’s action, arguing that military action was necessary immediately because the Muslim holy month prevented strikes for the next thirty days, during which time, Hussein could have prepared his forces for a confrontation. During the next year, Iraq rebuilt most of the military sites destroyed in the bombing. The United Nations, concerned with the increasing threat from Iraq, proposed a resolution designed to persuade Iraq into once again accepting U.N. inspectors in exchange for a loosening of restrictions on the country’s economy. On December 19, 1999, the United Nations passed a resolution, by a vote of 11-0, with the Soviet Union, China, France, and Malaysia abstaining, calling for the removal of the $5.26 billion limit imposed on the sale of oil for food and the lifting of sanctions against the country for renewable 120-day periods once inspectors verified disarmament. Iraq rejected the resolution and prepared to accept the consequences. Although official sanctions remained in place for most items, the U.N. agreed to gradually increase the total amount of oil that could be sold to pay for food and other humanitarian items such as medical supplies. Cynthia Clark Northrup
2000 Terrorist Attack on the USS Cole Date: October 12, 2000 Location: Aden, Yemen Principal figures: American, Captain Kirk S. Lippold; Arab, Jamal alBedawi Result: Terrorists on a suicide mission aboard a small boat approached the U.S. Navy destroyer Cole, setting off an explosion that created a large hole in the hull of the ship. On October 12, 2000, while the U.S. Navy destroyer Cole was refueling in the port of Aden in Yemen, it was attacked by two men who pulled alongside the ship in a small boat and caused an explosion that blew a large hole in the hull of the ship, killing seventeen people. Although Yemen was offi-
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cially a friend of the United States and had been trying to promote good relations, it also was home to terrorists and Islamic extremists who considered the United States a major enemy. The Cole entered the harbor on the morning of October 12, planning to stay only a few hours. The destroyer was on threat condition bravo, a moderate level of security alert. The mooring of the Cole was complete about 9:30 a.m. local time, and refueling began soon thereafter. Shortly after 11:00, a small boat with two men in it approached the ship. No one recognized the small boat that pulled alongside as a danger because it blended in with the boats that were servicing the ship. At 11:18 as the two men in the small boat stood at attention, about 400 to 500 pounds (181 to 226 kilograms) of military type explosives went off, blowing a 40-by-40-foot (12by-12-meter) hole in the hull of the Cole. The attack was a suicide mission; the men on the small boat knew they would die in the explosion but believed it was their duty to do so in order to carry out their mission. Sailors were thrown into the air, and thick, black smoke was everywhere. Hatches were blown open, doorways bent, and parts of the upper deck buckled. Entire lower compartments were blown upward, trapping some crew members. The floor of the mess galley was pushed up against the ceiling. The Cole lost electrical power, and all onboard communication equipment was disabled. The hole was near engine rooms and eating and living quarters, and if it had come minutes earlier, it might have caught many more crew members in the ship’s mess area just above where the explosion took place. The ship listed at a four-degree angle, but the keel was not damaged, no fires started, and the ship did not take on water. It was later found that seventeen crew members had been killed in the blast, and thirty-nine were injured, but the captain, Kirk S. Lippold, was not hurt, and he and the remaining crew acted decisively and quickly to help the injured and keep the ship from sinking. The Aftermath The injured were taken to a local hospital, then to a military hospital in Germany, and finally home to the United States. The crew and U.S. investigators had to cut through the wreckage to retrieve all the bodies of the victims, but they tried to disturb as little as possible so as to preserve evidence. It took a week to recover all the bodies. The crew then worked to make the ship seaworthy enough to be towed into deeper water, where it could be loaded onto a special Norwegian ship built to transport offshore oil rigs. This ship, the Blue Marlin, was a floating dock, and once the Cole had been towed out of the harbor into deeper
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water, the Blue Marlin took on ballast, or extra water, which sank its upper deck under the sea. The Cole was towed onto its deck, and the ballast was removed, lifting the deck back above water. The Cole was then secured for the trip home. The ship arrived in the United States on December 13, where it was to be repaired and returned to service. Consequences In the United States, two investigations were carried out soon after the incident, one by the U.S. Navy into what happened aboard the ship, and the other by the Pentagon into what could have been done overall to prevent such an attack. Neither investigation cast blame on any individual, although the Navy investigation found that the captain and crew of the Cole were lax about following a number of security procedures. The Pentagon report recommended better methods all along the chain of command for preventing terrorist attacks. In May, 2001, congressional hearings were held regarding the incident, and lawmakers criticized the apparent relaxation of the accountability standards to which the Cole’s commander was held. Admiral Vern Clark, chief of naval operations, said the Navy declined to punish Lippold because even if Lippold had carried out the security procedures he ignored, he would have been unable to prevent the attack. William S. Cohen, defense secretary at the time of the attack, supported Clark’s decision. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) sent investigators to Yemen, but initially, they were not allowed to directly question suspects or witnesses. Later they were given permission to question suspects, but Yemen refused to allow the suspects to be taken to the United States for trial. Finally it was decided that suspects found outside Yemen could be tried in the United States, although those found and charged by the Yemeni government were to be tried in Yemen. The United States suspected from the beginning that Osama bin Laden was behind the attack. Bin Laden was a fugitive from Saudi Arabia, a millionaire who had fought in the Afghan War against the Soviets in 1980, and who afterward organized a worldwide terrorist network focused on the United States. No direct evidence immediately linked him to the attack, but reports from suspects showed that he could have been behind it. Six men were arrested and prepared for trial in Yemen; other suspects remained at large. The chief suspect was Jamal al-Bedawi, who said he received his orders from Muhammad Omar al-Hazari, a man who may have links to bin Laden. Eleanor B. Amico
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2001 Terrorist Attacks on the United States At issue: Security of the United States against terrorist attacks Date: September 11, 2001 Location: New York City; Washington, D.C.; Somerset County, rural Pennsylvania Principal figures: Arab, Mohammad Atta (1968-2001), Osama bin Laden (c. 1957) Result: The use of hijacked jetliners as flying bombs directed against densely populated civilian targets was the largest-scale act of terrorism on U.S. territory and raised the scale of terrorist violence to an unprecedented level. Around the beginning of the business day in the eastern United States, two American Airlines jetliners and two United Airlines jetliners were hijacked after taking off from Boston and Washington, D.C. Three of the four planes were deliberately smashed into targets in order to kill as many people and to do as much damage as possible; the fourth plane crashed in a rural area of Somerset County in western Pennsylvania, eighty miles southeast of Pittsburgh. It was later established that the fourth plane went down after passengers, having learned via cell phones that the first planes had been deliberately flown into buildings, attacked the hijackers. It also became known later that the fourth plane had been assigned to hit the White House, the presidential mansion in Washington, D.C., symbol for many of American democracy. The planes that hit their intended targets were flown into the two towers of the World Trade Center (WTC) in Lower Manhattan, New York City, and the Pentagon, the headquarters of the American military, near Washington, D.C. Both of the World Trade Center towers collapsed, killing almost 2,800 people; the Pentagon attack resulted in 189 deaths; and the crash in rural Pennsylvania killed 44 more persons. Thus almost 3,000 persons lost their lives in the attacks. Terrorist acts in the public sphere are generally regarded as illegal attempts to kill, physically harm, or intimidate civilians to further a political end. However, international law recognizes no political ends that justify deliberate attacks on civilians. The notion of terrorism concerns the means used in attempts to attain political ends; it does not concern the legitimacy of the ends themselves. Such judgments constitute a separate issue. Just as “just” wars may be fought with unjust means, so may “just” causes be fought with vicious and morally untenable tactics. To believe otherwise is
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to believe that ends can justify means—a doctrine that sets loose the illwinds of nihilism, since it destroys the legitimacy of all complaints against limitless tactics. Because the Pentagon was not, strictly speaking, a civilian target, an attack on it might be characterized as an act of war, rather than a terrorist act. However, the airline passengers and crew who died in the attack were innocent civilians who were deliberately killed, and the plane itself was a civilian plane, making its hijacking itself a terrorist act. Moreover, the Pentagon attack was part of the same plan of attack as the assaults on the Trade Center, which were purely terrorist acts. The Pentagon attack thus also involved terrorism, even if it were to be considered primarily an act of war. Acts of war, however, are generally considered to be those undertaken by politically organized societies, namely national governments, and the participants in the act were not—so far as is known—acting on behalf of a government, but rather for the shadowy network of organizations known as al-Qaeda. Thus characterization of the September 11 attacks as “acts of war” is suggestive, but not precise.
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One of the hijacked jetliners crashes into the second tower (left) of New York City’s World Trade Center, creating a shower of flames and debris, as the first tower burns from the earlier plane crash. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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Impact of the Attacks The September 11 terrorist attacks were notable for the fact that they were not carried out in retaliation for some unmet concession demanded of the American government or some private entity. Their apparent aim was simply to maximize death and destruction as an end in itself and to terrorize American society at large and, presumably, America’s allies. No specific set of demands was ever issued, before or after the attacks. Moreover, no organization openly took responsibility for the attacks, though subsequent videotaped statements by Osama bin Laden left no doubt in the minds of fair-minded observers that he and his organization were behind the carnage. The military, political, and economic consequences of the attacks were of great significance. The United States, assisted by various allies, led by the British, attacked and subdued Afghanistan, home to al-Qaeda. The Taliban, the radical Islamist political movement that governed that country, was brought down, and a moderate regime was chosen by popular representatives to replace it. Numerous antiterrorist covert and overt operations were set in motion in dozens of countries throughout the world, often—but not always—with the cooperation of the nations involved. In the months that followed the attacks, U.S. stock markets fared badly. Falling swiftly, they recovered to some degree but then sagged again. Some of this downturn was attributed to the direct economic effects of the attacks, which included temporary suspension of all airline services in the United States, interruptions in mail services, and the destruction of businesses and financial institutions in the World Trade Center itself. Although other factors were at work, investor fears of further attacks also played a role in the markets’ decline. Airlines took tremendous financial hits, as many people were reluctant to fly after the airlines resumed operations. With the decline of air travel, the travel and hospitality industries, catering to both business and recreational travel, suffered as well. At the same time, the attacks elicited a strong upswell of overt American patriotism, as millions of Americans were jolted into the realization of what they owed to their country. Pride in citizenship—which had been out of fashion in many quarters since the Vietnam War—again came into vogue. In important ways American democracy appeared to be a beneficiary of the attacks. Internationally, for a time, solidarity with the American cause was seen throughout nearly the whole of the industrialized world. A notable exception was neighboring Canada, whose government’s concern for terrorism on American soil was, at best, tepid and fragmentary.
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A few weeks after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, a videotape showing al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden praising the attacks appeared on world television. The belief that bin Laden taped his message inside Afghanistan fueled U.S. calls for a military invasion of that country. (Associated Press/Wide World Photos)
Aftermath As weeks turned to months after the attacks, however, traditional, wellingrained European anti-Americanism began to reemerge. However, the Soviet Union, which had been fence-sitting in its attitude to the West, in light of its having been badly wounded by terrorism itself, now moved decisively into the camp of its one-time historic rival. In Central Asia, America gained several allies, as countries such as Uzbekistan opened their doors to U.S. military installations, but at a price. Elsewhere in Asia, China proclaimed its solidarity with the United States on the terrorism issue, though perhaps with unspoken reservations. The fact that both governmental and nongovernmental objectives— both civilian and military—were attacked showed that there was no intention to discriminate among those who were to be killed and property that was to be destroyed. The terrorists made no attempt to protect the human rights of any segment of society. No humane value structured any portion of the actions, which may be accordingly described as nihilistic in character. To understand the attacks at a deeper level, the background to prohibitions against attacking civilians needs exploration. International laws of
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war, which are recognized by most of the world’s nations, require that any combatants planning attacks do everything possible to ensure that no civilian targets are selected. While the terrorists did not act on behalf of a state that had ratified the War Conventions that articulate these international laws, clearly their actions took no heed of civilized requirements for making war. Although the terrorists’ primary intended victims were Americans, those who planned the WTC attack failed to discriminate between American and non-American victims. Consequently, hundreds of non-Americans from dozens of countries around the world were incinerated in the assaults on Lower Manhattan. The planners of the attacks did not investigate the nationalities of those who were likely to die in their attacks either because they were not interested, or because such matters did not occur to them. Either possibility illustrates the perpetrators’ stark indifference to the first and most fundamental human right—the right to life, especially of innocents. International military convention has long prohibited attacks on civilians. Such formal international “conventions” (treaties signed and ratified by states, which become obligated to their terms upon ratification) attempt to protect innocent human life, under the implicit or explicit grounds that human life is valuable for its own sake. Such conventions assume that human beings have a right to life and therefore ought not to be arbitrarily attacked. Terrorism grew apace in the 1980’s, when states such as Libya and Iran began sponsoring terrorist activity. Outstanding among the acts that form a background to the September 11 attacks is the terrorist bombing of a Pan American World Airways jetliner that crashed near Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 259 persons aboard and 11 on the ground in 1988. Two of the worst terrorist incidents aimed at American targets outside the United States were committed on August 7, 1998, when 224 civilians—mostly Africans— were killed by terrorist bombs exploding at the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. These and other incidents of terrorism spelled out the weakening of international human rights norms among those involved in a variety of political struggles. Another terrorist act on American soil stands as a prelude to September 11 and a warning that terrorists would be as heedless of basic human rights in the United States as they were elsewhere in the world. This was the bombing at the World Trade Center of February 26, 1993, when four Islamic militants detonated a bomb in the Twin Towers’ underground parking garage. The explosion killed six people and injured more than 1,000 but failed to threaten the buildings’ structure, although it did send smoke into
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all 112 stories of the WTC’s two towers. The incident proved that American landmarks had become the targets of foreign terrorists and that acts posing significant risks to basic human rights could be expected in the future. This fact was underlined when in July, 1993, it was found that some terrorists involved in the February WTC incident were close associates of participants in an aborted plot to blow up a number of New York City targets, including the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels and the United Nations Building. In the end, the September 11 attacks represented a qualitative change for the worse in terrorist activity. It was generally believed that future terrorists might be expected to consider these attacks as a benchmark to be emulated with respect to numbers killed, dire economic consequences, and the sheer level of terror unleashed within the country attacked and upon its allies and sympathizers around the world. Charles F. Bahmueller
2001 Invasion of Afghanistan At issue: Stabilizing Afghanistan’s government and removing terrorist bases in the country Date: October 7, 2001Location: Afghanistan and Pakistan Combatants: United States vs. Afghanistan government troops and alQaeda forces Principal commander: American, General Tommy Franks (1945) Result: The U.S. invasion toppled Afghanistan’s Taliban regime and made possible free elections; however, the al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden remained a fugitive through 2004. The United States was not the first country to invade Afghanistan in modern times. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, took Kabul, its capital city, within one week and then spent the next decade trying to defeat Afghanistan’s mujahideen insurgents. The mujahideen received aid from the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and a loosely organized group of radical Muslims drawn from more than thirty countries. These Muslims deplored the Soviet invasion and the presence of 100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan because they feared the Soviet Union would attempt to impose atheism upon the country.
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Osama bin Laden The mujahideen were ill equipped to fight invaders. The Saudis sought someone prominent to funnel money and military assistance into Afghanistan but had trouble finding anyone willing to accept that responsibility. Then Osama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi who knew Afghanistan well, emerged to accept the challenge. He established training camps to prepare men to fight in what they regarded as an Afghan holy war, or jihad. Under bin Laden’s fundamentalist Islamic training, his followers formed alQaeda, an organization that would later be responsible for bombing two United States embassies, attacking the U.S. naval vessel Cole, and bombing the U.S. Air Force barracks in Khobar, Saudi Arabia. On September 11, 2001, members of al-Qaeda launched air attacks on prominent American landmarks with four simultaneous suicide missions on hijacked commercial airliners. Two of the hijacked planes were flown into the twin towers of New York City’s World Trade Center, causing both buildings to collapse, with a loss of thousands of lives. Another airliner was flown into the Pentagon Building outside Washington, D.C. A fourth crashed in Pennsylvania, while evidently headed toward an attack on the White House or the Capitol Building in Washington, D.C.; it was evidently brought down when its civilian passengers—who had learned of the other attacks through cell-phone calls—rose up against the hijackers. All these incidents claimed approximately three thousand lives—mostly Americans. The horrendous attacks of September 11 were recognized as the handiwork of Osama bin Laden, whose fingerprints were on earlier acts of terrorism that involved suicide bombers. Immediately after the attacks, the Bush administration demanded that the Taliban, which controlled Afghanistan, turn over bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders to the United States and close al-Qaeda training camps inside Afghanistan. On October 7, 2001, after the Taliban refused to comply with the U.S. request, the United States declared war on Afghanistan, designating the campaign Operation Enduring Freedom. The ensuing American victory was swift. The Taliban regime capitulated in December. The Hunt for bin Laden and New Weaponry The U.S. Department of Justice made capturing Osama bin Laden its highest priority, offering a $25-million-dollar reward for his capture dead or alive. However, the hunt for bin Laden was made almost unimaginably difficult by Afghanistan’s rugged topography. The land is half again the size of California, and its climate is harsh. The country is honeycombed with networks of intersecting caves familiar to bin Laden and his cohorts but not to the Americans.
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The search for bin Laden centered on Tora Bora, thirty miles southeast of Jalalabad. The Americans employed advanced weaponry designed to penetrate caverns in an effort to kill bin Laden or flush him from the caves in which he was presumed to be hiding. In March, 2002, a thermobaric bomb, the BLU-118/B, was dropped close to a cavern in which bin Laden was thought to be. However, because its laser guidance system was faulty, it fell short of its target. The BLU-118/B bomb releases a fine mist of combustible fuel that erupts into a fireball when ignited and penetrates deep caves and bunkers. Even with the use of thermobaric bombs and laser guidance systems, the search for bin Laden had not succeeded three years later. Laser guidance systems require personnel on the ground to direct the the systems’ laser beams to their targets. These systems are disrupted by smoke or fog. In the Afghan war, Global Positioning Systems (GPSs), computers embedded in bombs, replaced many laser guidance systems. These so-called “smart bombs” proved accurate and reliable. The war with Afghanistan was also the first to employ unmanned aircraft (UVAs) as attack vehicles. Such aircraft had previously been used for target practice and reconnaissance, but early in the Afghan conflict, the Central Intelligence Agency used a reconfigured UVA to fire a Hellcat missile at a group of three men it identified as al-Qaeda operatives. After the three men were killed, they were found to be innocent bystanders, residents of an Afghan village. A similar error was made when a wedding party was misidentified from the air as a group of al-Qaeda and fired upon, killing nearly one hundred innocent civilians. Overall, American bombs had killed some 3,000 Afghan civilians by early 2005. The Global Hawk and Predator were the two UVAs used in Afghanistan. Both of these aircraft are vulnerable to enemy fire as well as to bad weather and icing on their wings. They have the advantage, however, of being able to stay aloft unmanned for long periods to accomplish their missions without imperiling crew members. Through 2004, the United States lost one Global Hawk and five Predators in the Afghan war. The initial Afghan invasion involved more bombing than ground combat. A mere fifteen Americans and five U.S. allies were killed by hostile fire. Another fifty-five Americans and twenty allies died in accidents or from so-called “friendly fire.” Meanwhile, innocent Afghan citizens were left wondering what they had done to deserve the punishment the United States and it allies visited upon them. Logistics of the Afghan War Because Afghanistan is a landlocked country, waging war upon it has historically always been difficult. The monumental problems involved in
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The American commander of a coalition task force talks with Afghan citizens during a routine patrol in the Cehar Cineh area during Operation Outlaw in October, 2004. (U.S. Department of Defense)
supplying troops with necessities in a place that is not accessible by ship have caused many would-be invaders to retreat. By the early twenty-first century, however, the United States possessed the technical wherewithal and financial resources to supply large numbers of troops by air. As the United States was preparing to wage war against Afghanistan, it committed approximately 140 supply aircraft to the war effort. These aircraft included C-5 Galaxy and C-17 Globemaster III transport planes. The C-5 Galaxy can carry more than one hundred tons of cargo but requires airfields almost one mile long on which to land. The C-17 Globemaster, although it cannot carry as much cargo as the C-5 Galaxy, can land on airfields only three thousand feet long, which gives it an advantage in a country such as Afghanistan, whose airfields are small and often in poor condition. During each of the early months of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, American troops consumed 3.6 million gallons of water and the contents of seventy-two eighteen-wheel truckloads of food and other supplies—all delivered by air. However, having the technology to supply the troops is not enough. The cost of supplying troops by air entails colossal expenditures. For this reason, the Pentagon favored waging a massive bombing campaign rather than a ground war in Afghanistan. As a consequence, the United States has conducted much of its offensive in the Afghan conflict from offices in the Pentagon Building, half a world away.
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Specialized Military Personnel In earlier wars, most army personnel were infantrymen and cavalry whose training was not highly specialized. Modern wars, however, have required soldiers trained to use highly complex and expensive equipment whose operation can be entrusted only to those who have had extensive specialized training. In Afghanistan, the logistics of ferreting out the enemy from caves and other hiding places in remote parts of the country have required the development of innovative weapons such as the thermobaric bombs. More than two thousand special forces from the United States, along with troops from other coalition member countries that joined with the United States, have been deployed to help in the Afghan conflict. These special forces usually comprise clusters of military personnel that seldom exceed a dozen members. They specialize in such fields as combat searchand-rescue, counterterrorism, clandestine surveillance, and jungle or desert warfare. It is essential that highly specialized personnel be as mobile as possible. The MH-533 Pave Low III heavy-lift helicopter is designed specifically to transport specialized personnel, generally under cover of darkness. Equipped with special radar and infrared sensors to detect objects from a distance, this helicopter can fly close to the ground, making it difficult for enemy radar to detect it. It is armed with machine guns and heavy armor so that enemy fire cannot easily penetrate it. When the United States attacked Iraq in March, 2003, many troops stationed in Afghanistan were redeployed to that country. The search for bin Laden continued, but the United States relied more than before on the aid of Afghans in the search. Some of those employed in the search were Afghan warlords whose loyalty to the U.S. cause was doubtful. Indeed, many of them were directly involved in Afghanistan’s illegal drug trade, which thrives because Afghanistan is well suited to growing the poppies from which opium is produced. After March, 2003, a much reduced force of American military personnel remained in Afghanistan, where insurgents constantly threatened them. Democratic Changes in Afghanistan On December 22, 2001, Hamid Karzai was inaugurated chairperson of the Afghan Interim Authority. In April, 2002, the former Afghan king, Muhammad Sahir Shah, returned to Kabul from his exile in Paris to attend the loya jirga, a grand council of Afghanistan’s leaders. During the following June, this council elected—by secret ballot—Karzai president of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, a post in which he served until a constitution was drafted and nationwide elections scheduled. On Octo-
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ber 9, 2004, direct elections were held in Afghanistan. Ten and one-half million Afghans registered to vote, and for the first time, women were eligible to vote. Hamid Karzai won the presidency with 55.9 percent of the votes cast. Through many decades of the twentieth century, the Afghan people lived in a country lacking central political authority. When the Taliban emerged in the early 1990’s, many Afghans eagerly embraced it because it offered an internal security that the country needed. During the mid1990’s, an emerging al-Qaeda capitalized on the political and economic distrust of many Afghan citizens. The drug trade has long been a thriving enterprise in Afghanistan. The provincial warlords who enrich themselves through this trade have no wish for a strong central government. Since occupying the country at the end of 2001, the United States has introduced representative government but has made minimal progress in controlling Afghanistan’s drug traffic. At the beginning of 2005, it remained to be seen whether the Karzai regime, with Washington’s continuing support and encouragement, would survive in a political climate rife with insurgents and warlords. The geography of the country provides a daunting impediment to the establishment of a strong central government, and Afghanistan’s situation in southwest Asia, which is among the most troubled areas in the world, seemed tenuous at best. R. Baird Shuman
2001 War on Terrorism At issue: Elimination of the al-Qaeda terrorist network responsible for the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States and military action as judged necessary against supporting groups or states Date: 2001Location: Worldwide Combatants: United States vs. al-Qaeda, Afghanistan, and Iraq Principal commanders: American, General Tommy Franks (1945) (Afghan campaign); Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez (Iraq), General Richard Myers; al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden; Afghanistan, Mullah Omar; Iraq, President Saddam Hussein (1937) Principal battles: Tora Bora (Afghanistan); siege of Baghdad (Iraq)
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Result: The first three years of U.S. military effort toppled Afghanistan’s Taliban regime and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein regime and captured senior al-Qaeda commanders but failed to capture Osama bin Laden himself or suppress violent insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. The so-called war on terrorism is in some respects typical of other wars that the United States waged after 1917. In other respects, however, it is unique. In common with the two world wars in which the United States fought and the amorphous, quasi-military conflict known as the Cold War, the war on terrorism has been justified on ideological grounds rather than those of territorial, commercial, or imperial aggrandizement. Unlike those earlier conflicts, however, it is not a neatly staged “theater” war against a clearly defined territorial opponent. Instead, it has been represented as a global war against an all-pervasive foe whose most salient defining characteristic is the desire to inflict harm on the United States in particular and on the civilized world in general. The war on terrorism may thus be regarded in part as an outgrowth of wars of the past and in part as a novel extension of them. Ideological Antecedents When President Woodrow Wilson asked the Congress for a declaration of war against Imperial Germany and its allies in 1917, he did so on the basis of the right of a neutral America to trade with belligerent (warring) states over the high seas, a right under attack by Germany’s resumption of unrestricted warfare against all nations trafficking with its enemies. Wilson subsequently broadened his war aims to include such far-reaching and vaguely defined purposes as the inherent right of peoples to political self-determination and the desire to create a world “safe for democracy.” Similarly, in 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt depicted World War II not merely as a war against Germany, Italy, and Japan, but as a war against fascism. Although American entry into World War II was triggered by Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in December, 1941, the war’s ideological foundations had been laid down in the Atlantic Charter issued by Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston S. Churchill during the previous summer. The Cold War of the second half of the twentieth century focused on the communist Soviet Union, China, and their allies but was represented primarily as an ideological war against communism. That war, although it never involved direct military conflict between the superpower principals—the United States and the Soviet Union—did involve theater actions against the Soviet Union and China’s perceived proxies in Korea, Vietnam,
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U.S. Marines patrolling in Beirut, Lebanon, during a multinational peacekeeping operation in 1982. (U.S. Navy)
and Afghanistan. Whereas the two world wars had been fought to decisive conclusions capped by unconditional surrenders—which are characteristic of wars of ideology that require total victory—the Cold War did not seem to offer a definitive resolution in the foreseeable future. The U.S. objective in the Cold War was merely containment of the Soviet Union and was coupled with avoidance of a nuclear exchange between the superpowers. The Post-Cold War World The unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union during 1989-1991 provided a satisfying conclusion to the Cold War and appeared to vindicate the principles of political democracy, religious freedom, and market capitalism that the United States espoused. As the regimes of the Soviet client states of Eastern Europe fell, and China, Vietnam, and other erstwhile communist states moved away from managed economic systems toward market capitalism, a Western victory in the Cold War seemed complete. Despite the end of the Cold War, the roots of future war had been sown. Although the United States had come into conflict with the theocratic regime of Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini in Iran shortly after
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the latter’s assumption of power in 1979, the United States continued to train, equip, and finance Muslim insurgents fighting against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Many of these insurgents were not Afghans. The consequence of this American policy was to lay the basis of the fundamentalist Taliban regime in Kabul after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq, a former U.S. ally that had been encouraged and covertly supplied in its long border war with Iran, weakened a buffer against what was now perceived as a general threat to the region. Partly in response to this, American troops were stationed in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War. Until the United States entered the region during the early 1990’s, no Western army had occupied a Middle Eastern Muslim state since the departure of French forces from Algeria in 1962. The brief American incursion in Lebanon in 1983 had been swiftly withdrawn in the wake of a terrorist attack that had killed 241 soldiers. The Saudi garrison provoked a similar response, and on June 25, 1996, nineteen Americans were killed by a truck bomb detonated outside the U.S. Air Force compound near Khobar. This attack had been preceded both by another attack on the Riyadh headquarters of the U.S. military mission in November, 1995, and one on the World Trade Center in New York in 1993. These attacks were gradually traced to a shadowy, multinational network of Islamic militants known as al-Qaeda, Arabic for “the base.” Its leader, Osama bin Laden, was the heir
U.S. Air Force compound near Khobar after the terrorist bombing of June 29, 1996. (U.S. Department of Defense)
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of one of Saudi Arabia’s wealthiest families. A former Afghan resistance fighter sponsored by the United States, bin Laden had covert patronage from members of the Saudi elite, including state elements, as well as from the Taliban in Afghanistan, where he trained his agents. The U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia were not the only source of resentment against the United States in the Middle East. The Arab-Israeli dispute, in which Israel was widely regarded as an American client, festered despite attempts at a diplomatic resolution by President Bill Clinton during the 1990’s. Meanwhile, the Gulf War continued as a low-intensity conflict in which the United States sponsored a commercial embargo and a weapons-inspection regime against Iraq, enforced a no-fly zone over the northern and southern thirds of the country, and bombed suspected military installations at will. As the United States began to disengage its forces from Saudi Arabia in the wake of the Khobar attack, neoconservative commentators in the United States, including former officials of the administration of President George Bush, envisaged Iraq as a possible site for American bases, and urged a war to overthrow Saddam Hussein. At the same time, a Harvard scholar, Samuel P. Huntington, suggested in a widely influential study that the coming century would see a “clash of civilizations” between the Muslim and Western worlds. This, too, helped to lay the ideological foundations for war. The Bush Administration As the administration of George W. Bush came to power in 2001, war with Iraq was given high priority. Its long-term planning, however, was primarily concentrated on identifying potential state antagonists, notably China. Warning signs of another al-Qaeda attack on the United States were ignored or lost in the bureaucratic maze of intelligence agencies. As a result, the events of September 11 caught the nation by surprise. Nineteen militants succeeded in hijacking four commercial American airliners. Two of the planes were crashed into the towers of New York City’s World Trade Center, resulting in the collapse of both buildings. A third was crashed into the Pentagon near Washington, D.C. A fourth was downed by its passengers in rural Pennsylvania. In all, about three thousand American lives were lost, a number exceeding the total American fatalities at Pearl Harbor in December, 1941, although first reports put the death toll at twice that number. Immediate economic damage was placed in the hundreds of billions of dollars. As Americans and others reacted to the terrorist attacks of September 11 with shock, horror, and outrage, President Bush responded the next day by proclaiming a generalized war on terrorism. He characterized it in near-
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biblical terms as “a monumental struggle between good and evil,” adding that the enemy was not simply a group or groups but “a frame of mind” that fostered hatred of Christianity, Judaism, and, in a word, “everything that is not them.” These comments were all the more extraordinary in that the identity of the hijackers had not been fully established at that time, although the Central Intelligence Agency reported that al-Qaeda had been involved. Several days later, the president declared his intention to bring Osama bin Laden to justice, “dead or alive.” Nevertheless, during the interval, members of bin Laden’s family had been permitted to leave the United States without even being interrogated. Both the legal and operational dimensions of the new war were unclear. None of the military actions of the Cold War had been accompanied by a congressional declaration of war, including the major conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. Likewise, certain other long-term military operations of earlier years, such as the U.S. occupations of Nicaragua (1912-1933) and Haiti (1915-1934), had not received congressional sanction. When President Bush consulted congressional leaders on September 12, he asked for a resolution endorsing the use of force under the War Powers Act rather than a declaration of war. His intention, however, was not to limit military action in either scope or duration, but to preserve maximum executive discretion about how, where, and when to use American power. Launching the War One evident difficulty in launching the war was knowing precisely whom to attack. Afghanistan’s Taliban regime was a logical target; its leaders had harbored al-Qaeda and permitted it to train forces on Afghan soil. In the days after September 11, a consensus developed in the Bush administration that the Taliban and al-Qaeda were to be treated as a single belligerent entity. However, members of the Taliban themselves were to a large extent creatures of Pakistan’s intelligence services, and al-Qaeda’s chief funding had come from Saudi Arabia. Neither nuclear-armed Pakistan nor oil-rich Saudi Arabia could be attacked with impunity. By contrast, Afghanistan, although difficult to access, had an established guerrilla insurgency, the Northern Alliance. Using Northern Alliance troops, American Special Forces units, and air power, the Taliban could be put to rout, and a symbolic initial victory achieved. Participation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was also secured. On October 7, 2001, following a last demand that the Taliban surrender Osama bin Laden, the United States commenced bombing attacks. The Afghan campaign went raggedly. Determined to minimize American casualties, the Bush administration did not insert regular forces in
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unit strength into the country until March, 2002. Meanwhile, the Northern Alliance, itself divided by factions, ignored American instructions and captured Kabul. In the strategic confusion that ensued, Taliban leaders regrouped in the south, their base of ethnic support, and al-Qaeda commanders, including Osama bin Laden, escaped to sanctuary in Pakistan. Tribal chieftains and warlords asserted their authority in the northern and western parts of Afghanistan, leaving the American-appointed president, Hamid Karzai, effectively confined to Kabul under heavy American guard. The war had its usual by-products: unknown thousands of civilian deaths and casualties, many caused by high-altitude bombing attacks, and fresh refugees in the millions, many of whom fled to Pakistan. The United States promised, but did not deliver, substantial reconstruction aid. In its absence, opium cultivation, banned by the Taliban, resumed in the north. American and allied forces remained, but with little or no control over large stretches of the country, and subject to guerrilla assault. In October, 2004, Karzai was formally elected president but remained under American protection. The United States spirited captured fighters and others suspected of collaboration with al-Qaeda out of the country. The captives included an American citizen, John Walker Lindh, who was conspicuously displayed in confinement despite serious injuries. More than six hundred of the captives were imprisoned at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, while others were “rendered” to third-party countries for interrogation. The Iraq War In the meantime, the Bush administration prepared for war on a second front, Iraq. Planning for this war went forward at the highest levels from the first days of the Bush administration, but the September 11 attacks gave them new impetus. Some White House personnel were startled in the immediate aftermath of the attacks to find senior advisors preoccupied with Iraq rather than Afghanistan, and the president himself demanding evidence of links between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda. The improvisational response to Afghanistan and the absence of serious logistical commitment at key moments of the war may be explained in part by this preoccupation. Seven hundred million dollars appropriated for the Afghan war were subsequently diverted to prepare for invading Iraq, without notification to Congress. The U.S. commitment to go to war against Iraq had several sources. Some Bush officials regretted the failure to depose Hussein during the earlier Gulf War, and thereby to reshape the Middle East. They coveted Iraq as
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a source of secure oil supply and a base of operations to replace the one evacuated in Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, Hussein had succeeded in interrupting United Nations efforts to monitor his military arsenal. After September 11, it was alleged that Hussein would share his arsenal with terrorist groups. The road to war was carefully plotted. Under American pressure, Hussein readmitted U.N. weapons inspectors, but the United States insisted that he was concealing so-called weapons of mass destruction prohibited under Gulf War protocols. Vice President Dick Cheney claimed that Hussein was on the verge of achieving nuclear capability, and the president’s National Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice, conjured up visions of mushroom clouds rising up over American cities. In February, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell appeared before the United Nations to display what he claimed to be incontrovertible evidence of Hussein’s hidden weapons caches. In the meantime, a legal rationale for attack was prepared. On October 10 and 11, 2002, both houses of Congress gave President Bush authority to invade Iraq should diplomatic efforts to dismantle Hussein’s presumed arsenal fail. The vote was 296 to 133 in the House of Representatives and 77 to 23 in the Senate. These congressional resolutions fell short of a declaration of war, and some members of Congress, notably Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia, warned against ceding constitutional powers to the president. In November, the United Na-
U.S. soldiers cautiously enter a building in Zumrat, Afghanistan, that they believe may be storing illegal weapons, in October, 2004. (U.S. Department of Defense)
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tions approved a Resolution 1441 after intense American lobbying, calling upon Hussein to disarm and warning of potential military consequences should he fail to do so. The War on Terrorism Begins Despite concessions by Hussein, antiwar protests, and last-minute efforts by the international community to broker a compromise, the United States attacked Iraq on March 19, 2003 in company with a hastily improvised “Coalition of the Willing.” The latter numbered some thirty nations, but only Great Britain provided significant support. Some of the other allies supplied token contingents numbering as few as twenty-five troops. Baghdad fell on April 9, and on May 1 President Bush declared “major combat operations” over and Iraq liberated. Hussein and his chief officials went into hiding, but most Iraqi leaders were captured in the succeeding months, and Hussein himself was finally found in December. Securing Iraq, however, proved elusive. Elements of Hussein’s army and Baathist Party organized resistance, and they were joined by native Islamic militants and foreign fighters. The American force, only 140,000 in number, proved grossly inadequate to pacify the country or even to secure military arsenals (which contained no WMDs, much to the embarrassment of the Bush administration). Repeated attempts to take rebel strongholds such as Fallujah resulted in devastation but no lasting success. The insurgency spread, and by the time of President Bush’s election to a second term of office in November, 2004, more than 1,100 American troops had been killed. Unnumbered thousands of Iraqi soldiers and insurgents had also died, and civilian deaths, based on projections of ordinary mortality, were estimated as high as 100,000. Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners A further complication arose when revelations of widespread torture and abuse in the central Baghdad detention center, Abu Ghraib, were made public in May, 2004. As worldwide condemnation mounted, prisoner deaths not only at Abu Ghraib but at other, sometimes secret, facilities were revealed. Abuses at Guantanamo Bay, where prisoners had been held for two and a half years without charge or review, were brought to light as well. President Bush denounced the abuses, although he had himself signed off on memoranda defining captured terrorists as “enemy combatants” falling outside the protections of the Geneva Conventions against torture. Some notorious offenders were prosecuted by military tribunals, but senior officers and civilian officials were shielded, and the president resisted calls for the resignation of his defense secretary, Donald H. Rumsfeld.
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Detainees, many of whom proved to be innocent persons swept up in dragnets or otherwise misidentified, remained in a legal limbo until the U.S. Supreme Court ordered their processing in June, 2004. Among them were two American citizens, Yaser Esam Hamdi and José Padilla, who had been held without charge or access to counsel. Hamdi was subsequently deported to Saudi Arabia. Their cases highlighted concerns about the erosion of basic constitutional safeguards at home. The so-called Patriot Act, hastily passed by Congress in September, 2001, to give the president extraordinary authority in pursuing terrorists, was widely criticized for permitting secret searches and other infringements of civil liberties. The legal, constitutional, and civil rights issues raised by the war on terrorism were underscored by the uncertainty over its nature, duration, and purposes. Terrorism itself, as the action of organized, nonstate agents to promote political or social change through violence or coercion, has been a feature of modern life since the nineteenth century. The terrorist “problem,” like that of crime or narcotics (against which “wars” have also been periodically proclaimed), has proved ineradicable as such, although particular manifestations have been contained or suppressed by police work, such as the Red Brigades faction in Italy or the Baader-Meinhof Gang in Germany. In proclaiming a war on terrorism, however, and in identifying an “axis of evil” of terrorist-associated or terrorist-sponsoring states (Iraq, Iran, and North Korea), President Bush not only raised the rhetorical stakes of the U.S. response to September 11 but also laid the groundwork for a broad doctrine of intervention, collaborative if possible but unilateralist where necessary. Such an open-ended war against an ever-shifting foe— Secretary Rumsfeld had suggested that it might last a generation or more— conjured up fears of an entrenched national security state, and, among traditional allies as well as potential foes, the perception of the United States as a hyperpower in quest of global hegemony under the guise of a war of self-defense. When, in September, 2004, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan characterized the war in Iraq as “illegal” under the United Nations Charter, he gave voice to the opinion of many that American policy was undermining the international order. Al-Qaeda itself, reputedly with cells in some sixty countries, remained active despite the capture of some senior operatives. Prominent attacks included bombings of a resort complex in Bali, Indonesia, in October, 2002, and of commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, in March, 2004. Saudi financing continued with little impediment, and in Iran, Pakistan, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, al-Qaeda operatives and networks appeared to
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move freely, sometimes with covert assistance from state security forces or in concert with local terrorist groups. The United States sent Special Forces units to the Philippines to help combat the Abu Sayyaf insurrection in Mindinao, established a new military base in East Africa at Djibouti, and spurred counterterrorist efforts elsewhere in Asia and Africa. Many governments faced a delicate balancing act between placating American demands for access, military or otherwise, and arousing hostility within their own populations, among whom there was frequently sympathy and support for al-Qaeda. Meanwhile, other groups emerged in the shadowy underworld of terror, whether connected to al-Qaeda or claiming independence of it. In this regard, too, the war on terrorism had created its own paradox, spawning new terrorist entities even as it worked to identify and eliminate existing ones. American Reaction to the War on Terrorism Within the United States, the war on terrorism had created a new culture of security in which ordinary citizens found their freedom of movement and expression burdened and sometimes curtailed; even Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts, the brother of a former president and one of the most conspicuous figures in American public life, was denied air travel when his name mistakenly appeared on a watch list. After initial resistance, the Bush administration embraced the creation of the new cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security, whose first director was Tom Ridge, the former governor of Pennnsylvania. The new department’s mandate was to coordinate security activities, but it met with resistance from entrenched military and intelligence bureaucracies, and its color-coded terror alerts soon became the subject of ridicule. A bipartisan commission to investigate the circumstances of September 11, also initially opposed by President Bush, detailed the grave intelligence failings that lay behind the World Trade Center attacks, but its recommendation that intelligence budgeting and activity be centralized and coordinated was not implemented. The Justice Department launched numerous investigations and prosecutions of suspected terrorist cells in the United States, but achieved few significant convictions. On the other hand. the United States suffered no new terrorist attacks in the three years following September 11, even as the worldwide civilian death toll from further alQaeda attacks approached 1,000. Few doubted, however, that al-Qaeda, and perhaps other groups as well, retained the will and the capacity to strike again at American interests—either at home or abroad. In particular, many pointed to the potential havoc of insufficiently secured Soviet arsenals and to nuclear trafficking by North Korea and Pakistan.
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Terrorism is a complex reaction to the authority of the modern state and the associated phenomena, real or perceived, of imperialism, neocolonialism, globalization, and underdevelopment. The war on terrorism was a response, both real and rhetorical, to the trauma of September 11, the most devastating attack ever launched on American soil. By early 2005, it involved major armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, neither of which was favorably resolved; the threat of action against Syria and Iran; and covert action in other sectors. It has seen as well a major reorientation of American foreign policy in the direction of an aggressive unilateralism. The case of Iraq is instructive in this regard. The Bush administration had planned a war against Iraq prior to September 11, which served it as a pretext. Although President Bush made the Iraq war the centerpiece of his war on terrorism, this rationale clearly subsumed other, prior purposes. Meanwhile, in 2005, the threat of terror to American security remained real. On the other hand, the response to it by the Bush administration was giving credence to those who feared that the war would be exploited to advance hegemonic American interests. The war on terrorism was, therefore, in the broadest sense a war in progress, whose character and objectives were still being defined, and whose end was nowhere in sight. Robert Zaller
2003: Iraq War At issue: Iraq’s potential threat to world order Date: March 19-May 1, 2003 Location: Iraq Combatants: Iraq vs. United States, Great Britain, and other coalition members Principal commanders: American, Tommy Franks (1945) Principal political leaders: American, President George W. Bush (1946), Vice President Dick Cheney (1941), Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (1932), National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice (1954), Secretary of State Colin Powell (1937); Iraqi, President Saddam Hussein (1937), Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz (1936), Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi (1945) Result: The U.S. military victory toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime, but disorder and violence continued through the ensuing occupation, and there were allegations of U.S. imperialism.
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The Iraq War of 2003 was the second time that a U.S.-led coalition confronted the armed forces of Saddam Hussein. After Iraq’s invasion of oilrich Kuwait in 1990, the Security Council of the United Nations (U.N.) authorized member nations to force Iraq out of Kuwait. In the resulting Gulf War of 1991, the coalition of some two dozen countries easily accomplished that mission. At the time Kuwait was liberated, some observers argued that coalition forces should march into Baghdad in order to force a change in the Iraqi regime. President George Bush, however, refused to pursue such a policy, which had never been endorsed by the United Nations. In the ensuing cease-fire agreement, Hussein agreed to destroy all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which included biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Because of his non-compliance, however, the United Nations applied economic sanctions that resulted in painful shortages of food and medical supplies. In December, 1998, after Hussein rejected requests for U.N. investigations of numerous sites for possible WMD, President Bill Clinton ordered that the sites be bombed. In December, 1999, following much diplomatic controversy, Hussein refused to allow U.N. inspectors to enter his country. After George W. Bush became president in January, 2001, he and his advisers believed that Hussein posed a threat to American interests. Although Bush often referred to the tyrannical abuses of the Iraqi regime, he emphasized Hussein’s expansionist goals combined with his development of WMD. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, Bush assumed that Hussein had been affiliated with the Islamic militants responsible for the attacks. In his state of the union address of January, 2002, Bush referred to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as “an axis of evil.” Addressing the United Nations in September, Bush warned that the United Nations would become irrelevant if it failed to enforce its resolutions. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Congress authorized Bush to use force against Hussein’s regime. In November, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1441, demanding that U.N. inspectors be given unrestricted access to visit any sites at their discretion. Diplomatic Disarmament Crisis Faced with the prospect of another war, Hussein finally allowed Hans Blix and his team of weapons inspectors to enter Iraq. Hussein’s government provided the inspectors documentation asserting that the country had destroyed all its weapons of mass destruction. Blix, however, complained about continued limitations on the work of the inspectors. U.S. officials charged that Iraq was in “material breach” and demanded full and
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immediate compliance. In March, Hussein tried to gain support by recognizing the sovereignty of Kuwait. The Arab leaders at a summit meeting expressed firm opposition to military action against Iraq and called for an end to sanctions. In his state of the union address in January, 2003, Bush claimed that the Iraqi government was attempting to purchase uranium in Africa in order to develop nuclear weapons (an allegation later found to be mistaken). Bush asked the Security Council to pass a resolution authorizing war on the grounds that Iraq continued to develop illegal WMD. Secretary of State Colin Powell delivered a long speech at the Security Council, presenting a combination of evidence and allegations collected by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Hans Blix and his team, however, were skeptical about the U.S. allegations and asked for additional time for the investigations to continue. At the Security Council, Bush’s proposed resolution met strong opposition. While the British government firmly supported the resolution, France, Germany, the Soviet Union, and China voiced strong disagreement. Opponents to the U.S. plan argued that there was insufficient evidence of “an imminent threat” to justify going to war. President Bush and British prime minister Tony Blair, in contrast, insisted on the need to take preemptive action to eliminate a developing threat. Although Bush and Blair were unable to get the resolution passed, they put together a so-called “coalition of the willing,” which included the limited participation of Spain, Poland, Australia, Japan, and more than twenty other countries. Officials of the Bush administration spoke optimistically about the prospects for a rapid military victory and for a postwar reconstruction of Iraq. They confidently asserted that Iraq’s Shia Muslims would rebel against Hussein’s regime as soon as an invasion began. Secretary Rumsfeld even suggested that American forces would be greeted by Iraqis dancing in the streets. His deputy secretary Paul Wolfowitz assured a Senate committee that the Iraqis, given their huge oil reserves, would be able to pay for the reconstruction of the country with little or no help from American taxpayers. Moreover, President Bush argued that the establishment of a democratic Iraq would become a model for the Middle East. Meanwhile, despite the prospects of an imminent U.S.-led invasion, Saddam Hussein maintained a defiant posture. In an interview with CBSTV anchorman Dan Rather on February 24, he insisted that his country did not possess any illegal weapons. He declared that he would continue to “maintain the honor of nationalism and pan-Arabism.” He further said that he would not seek asylum in another country and that he was prepared to die in Iraq for his principles.
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Outbreak of Hostilities During the weekend of March 15-16, Bush and Blair met in the Azores Islands for an “emergency summit.” The two leaders agreed that Hussein had no intention of complying with U.N. resolution 1441. The next day, Bush demanded in a nationally televised speech that Hussein and his two sons, Uday and Qusay, must leave Iraq within forty-eight hours or face the consequences. Bush explained that his purpose was “to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and defend the world from grave danger.” When the deadline expired on March 19, 2003, President Bush issued an order to begin firing tomahawk cruise missiles and guided bombs at military targets in Baghdad and other targets within Iraq. He also ordered U.S. forces in Kuwait and the Persian Gulf to launch an attack on Iraq the next day. Under the code name Operation Iraqi Freedom, the invading forces included 250,000 U.S. combat troops, joined by 50,000 British, 2,000 Australian, and 200 Polish troops. Other coalition nations contributed only token numbers of soldiers. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who supervised the military strategy of the war, emphasized the intensive use of missiles and bombs, with as few troops on the ground as possible. The massive attacks from the air, called a “shock and awe” campaign, did great damage to Iraqi cities, with limited damage to populated areas. From both the Persian Gulf and the eastern Mediterranean Sea, the U.S. launched guided missile cruisers that struck specific targets throughout Iraq. The Air Force dropped “bunker busters,” enormous bombs that weighted 4,700 pounds each. Officials said that they were conducting a “decapitation attack” directed at Saddam Hussein. Despite angry protests in most U.S. cities, the majority of Americans initially supported the military operations against Iraq. In addition to fears of WMD, Americans tended to assume that the Iraqi government had been an ally of radical Islamic terrorists and appeared to think that Hussein’s domestic violations of human rights provided added justification for the use of force. In many parts of the world, however, the U.S. attack on Iraq brought forth waves of anti-Americanism, particularly in Arab countries and in Western Europe, Canada, and the Soviet Union. The large number of protests reflected a widespread distrust of American power. Numerous protesters alleged that the Bush administration was attempting to take control of oil in the Middle East. The Push to Baghdad On March 20, the land invasion began from Iraq’s border in Kuwait. Plans for an invasion from the north were canceled when Turkey refused
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Former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein after his capture in Tikrit by coalition troops in December, 2003. The pictures show him with the beard he had when he was captured and his appearance after being shaved. (AP/Wide World Photos)
the use of its territory. American and British forces quickly took control of the airfields in southwestern Iraq, and they also seized the port city of Umm Qasar on the Persian Gulf. The fighting was brutal in many places. Near the city of An Nasariyah, enemy forces ambushed a supply convoy, which caused many U.S. soldiers to go missing in action. Nevertheless, on March 24, the commander of the invasion, General Tommy Franks, announced that coalition soldiers were only sixty miles from Baghdad, although he acknowledged that casualties were increasing. As U.S. marines fought in the streets of An Nasariyah, British forces shelled Al Basrah, the second largest city of the country. On March 25, large numbers of U.S. soldiers crossed the Euphrates River by way of the An Nasariyah bridges. They then began to drive northward to Baghdad, located on the Tigris River. By then, the allied supply line stretched from the Persian Gulf to the city of Karbala, only fifty miles southwest of Baghdad. However, the push northward was slower than U.S. military planners had hoped it would be. Aided by blinding sandstorms, Iraqi troops ambushed and harassed the heavily armed column. The resistance was especially fierce in the region between An Najaf and Karbala, where U.S. troops confronted both regular Iraq soldiers and the
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Fedayeen Saddam, a paramilitary group that answered directly to Uday Hussein, the oldest son of the dictator. As U.S. forces began to battle the Republican Guard near Baghdad, British troops fought more than a thousand loyalists in the streets of Al Basarah. Second Front On March 27, the U.S. military opened a second front in northern Iraq, where the coalition could count on the support of more than 50,000 Kurdish guerrilla fighters. About a thousand parachuters of the 173rd Airborne Brigade landed northeast of Arbil and joined forces with Kurdish fighters. After four days of heavy air strikes in the region, the Iraqi army abandoned the town of Chamchamal, which was northwest of Kirkuk, a city with many loyal supporters of Hussein’s Baath Party. Kurdish guerrillas quickly moved into Chamchamal, providing coalition troops with a forward position for attacking Kirkuk. Resistance to the allied advance northward toward Baghdad was beginning to crumble. On April 2, U.S. Marines defeated Republican Guard forces at Al Kut, a strategic city on the Tigris River one hundred miles southeast of Baghdad. About the same time, the U.S. Army took control of a bridge over the Euphrates at Al Musayyib, thirty miles south of the capital. The next day, the Army’s Third Infantry Division seized the Saddam International Airport, located only twelve miles from the capital. Meanwhile, U.S. aircraft conducted about one thousand bombing missions in the regions, most of them aimed at Republican Guard stations. By April 4, allied forces were advancing rapidly toward Baghdad in three columns—from the south, the southwest, and the southeast. As the conquest of the city appeared inevitable, thousands of its residents attempted to flee in bumper-to-bumper traffic. About 2,500 Republican Guard soldiers surrendered to coalition forces south of Baghdad. Also on April 4, the British Seventh Armored Brigade, called the Desert Rats, entered the center of Al Basrah with thousands of troops and hundreds of tanks. The Shia Muslims of the city enthusiastically greeted the British as liberators. In the Shia holy city of Karbala, U.S. forces defeated Fedayeen Saddam fighters after a five-day battle that ended on April 6. As the Americans occupied the city, a crowd of 10,000 residents, mostly Shia Muslims who hated Hussein, celebrated in the city’s public square. Shouting “Saddam is no more,” they pulled down a statue of the dictator. To the American public, the progress of the war appeared to be following the optimistic predictions of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and other officials.
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Victory in Iraq U.S. forces pushed into the capital city and occupied a major presidential palace along with other important buildings on April 7. As the Third Infantry Division, supported by air strikes, entered central Baghdad with some seventy tanks and sixty Bradley fighting vehicles, it faced only scattered pockets of resistance. That same day, U.S. intelligence agents reported that Hussein and his two sons were probably located in a private house in an affluent neighborhood of the city. B-1 bombers destroyed the house with four bombs of 2,000 pounds each. However, the dictator and his sons were not present. The next day, about five hundred of Hussein’s loyal soldiers crossed the Tigris and moved into Baghdad to launch a counteroffensive. The U.S. infantry responded with artillery fire, while A-10 attack planes strafed the Iraqi soldiers. The counteroffensive was a complete failure. By April 9, coalition forces had control of the eastern sector of the city. U.S. soldiers were generally greeted with cheering crowds. The Shia Muslims of southeastern neighborhoods were particularly enthusiastic about the fall of the regime. In Firdos Square, U.S. troops helped Iraqi civilians topple an enormous statue of Hussein. The Iraqis then dragged the head of the statue through the streets of the city, while onlookers spat at it and yelled insults at Hussein’s memory. By April 11, Kurdish fighters and U.S. special forces had conquered the northern cities of Kirkuk and Mosul. Two days later, U.S. Marines entered Hussein’s hometown of Tikrit, the last remaining city not controlled by the allies. By that date, only 115 U.S. military troops had died in combat. The rapid conclusion of the war and the low rate of casualties delighted the American public. Bush’s approval rating soared to 73 percent, which had risen almost 20 percent higher than it had been in polls taken before the war. While visiting the USS Abraham Lincoln near San Diego on May 1, President Bush announced that the military phase of the war was essentially over. He described the victory as a battle in “a war on terrorism,” necessary to keep WMD out of the hands of such terrorists. Growing Violence Under the Occupation Attempts to pacify and reconstruct Iraq turned out to be much more difficult than overthrowing the Hussein regime. The collapse of Iraq’s government and army left most of the country without any civil authority. In Baghdad and elsewhere, looters stripped almost everything of value from public buildings, including hospitals and electrical power plants. They even ransacked the National Museum of Iraq, stealing some twelve thousand objects. At the same time, sabotage of oil wells, pipelines, and refiner-
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ies almost produced a temporary standstill of the country’s oil industry. Even though Iraq possessed the second largest oil reserves in the world, it was forced to import gasoline in May. Critics charged that Bush’s postwar reconstruction polices contained three major mistakes: an underestimation of the potential for postwar violence, the sending of too few U.S. soldiers to the war, and the premature disbanding of the Iraqi army. Much of the criticism was directed at Secretary Rumsfeld, who had insisted on keeping the number of soldiers as small as possible. By May 1, the number of troops in Iraq had been reduced to about 160,000—a number that proved inadequate for the multifaceted tasks of hunting for members of Hussein’s regime and guerrilla fighters, while also restraining ethnic conflict and trying to maintain public order. Criticism was also directed toward the civilian head of the occupation, Paul Bremer III, who had insisted on disbanding the Iraqi army, with the result of casting loose many thousands of armed men who had no way of legally supporting themselves and their families. As the majority of Iraq’s population failed to see tangible improvements in their daily lives, large numbers of Iraqis blamed the United States for their deplorable conditions. Over the next two years, guerrilla attacks on coalition soldiers grew more frequent and more deadly. Militant insurgents also targeted Iraqis who cooperated with the U.S.-led occupation. Car bombings became increasingly common. By August of 2003, some officials of the Department of Defense were classifying the insurgency as a classic guerrilla war. Between May 1 and October 28, 116 U.S. soldiers died in hostile action. Within a year, the number of American deaths would grow to almost one thousand. Continuing Controversy About the War As a rationale for waging the preemptive war, President Bush and Prime Minister Blair had relied almost entirely on the potential threat from Hussein’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction. After the war, the failure to find any such weapons in Iraq was embarrassing to both leaders—especially to Blair, because of the extreme antipathy for the conflict in Great Britain. Eventually the lack of evidence for WMD forced the Bush administration to admit that it had relied on inadequate information. When Bush continued to try to link Saddam Hussein with international terrorism, critics forced him to concede that the evidence was speculative and uncertain. The Bush administration increasingly defended the war by calling attention to the dictatorial nature of Hussein’s regime. American disillusionment with the war increased as the public learned about its mounting costs. In September, 2003, Bush had to ask Congress for
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an additional $87 billion. Some respected economists predicted that the combination of war and reconstruction programs would eventually cost U.S. taxpayers more than $200 billion. Even with this expense, the establishment of a democratic and stable Iraq appeared elusive. Meanwhile, the Bush administration insisted that there were many positive developments. On October 16, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution endorsing the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq. Later that month, seventy-seven countries meeting in Madrid pledged about $33 billion for the pacification and economic rebuilding of the country. In Iraq, most top leaders of Hussein’s government, including his two hated sons, Uday and Qusay, were either captured or killed. Hussein himself was finally captured on December 13, 2003. A provisional government was organized in early 2004, and multiparty elections were held in January, 2005. Thomas Tandy Lewis
2003 Postwar Occupation of Iraq At issue: Controlling insurgent activity in Iraq; preparing for nationwide elections in 2005 Date: 2003-2005 Location: Iraq Combatants: Coalition occupation forces vs. Iraqi insurgents Principal commanders: American, Tommy Franks (1945), John Abizaid (1951), George Casey (1948) Result: No closure in the Iraq War through early 2005. On May 1, 2003, President George W. Bush boarded the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln that bore a banner, allegedly provided by the White House, proclaiming “Mission Accomplished.” The war against Iraq, begun on March 19, 2003, officially ended forty-three days later. Up to that moment, no comprehensive exit plan had been formulated. President Bush believed that the Iraqis, liberated from Saddam Hussein’s despotism, would welcome American and allied soldiers as liberators, as the French had welcomed American troops toward the end of World War II. This assumption underestimated the military sophistication, weaponry, nationalism, and xenophobia of an estimated twelve thousand militant Iraqi insurgents who attacked military occupiers and relief work-
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ers. In October, 2004, these insurgents abducted Margaret Hassan, a CARE executive, the wife of an Iraqi and holder of dual citizenship, and thirtyyear resident of Iraq who had devoted her life to helping Iraqis. The following month, they executed her. U.S. forces toppled Saddam Hussein’s statue in a Baghdad square on April 9, 2003. Pictures of this symbolic act that were flashed around the world clearly—but falsely—implied that the downfall of the tyrant who had held Iraqis at bay since 1979 was accomplished and that peace was imminent. On December 13, Hussein himself was captured while cowering in a spider-hole near Tikrit, his birthplace. Meanwhile, in December, 2004, more mass graves were uncovered containing the bodies of Iraqis presmuably slaughtered by Hussein’s followers, several of whom were put on trial in mid-December for their involvement in such atrocities. By the beginning of 2005, Hussein was in custody awaiting trial by his fellow Iraqis, and the cost of the conflict with Iraq had exceeded $100 million—twice the figure originally estimated. Moreover, the conflict still appeared to be far from fully resolved. The Occupation In 2002, when a war with Iraq seemed to be coming, the U.S. Army’s Central Command directed by General Tommy Franks prepared an exit plan titled Operation Desert Crossing. The Bush administration disre-
U.S. Army soldiers move cautiously through a dangerous part of Fallujah during a mission in early November, 2004. (U.S. Department of Defense)
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garded this plan. The Pentagon’s Central Command requested 380,000 troops for the Iraq War. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld considered 40,000 troops sufficient. Congress finally approved 250,000 troops, but only 150,000 were actually deployed. Rumsfeld anticipated the withdrawal of 50,000 troops in June, 2003, another 50,000 in July, and another 50,000 in August. He foresaw transferring day-to-day operation to Iraqis by September, 2003. By January, 2005, however, the 138,000 troops still in Iraq after the formal conclusion of the war had seen their numbers increased to 148,000. Meanwhile, U.S. troops continued to fight insurgents and discourage dissidents from torching Iraq’s oil fields, whose revenues were earmarked for the nation’s recovery. By late 2004, Iraq was $122 billion in debt. Thirty billion dollars were to be forgiven by several nations including the United States, France, and the Soviet Union. The American conservators overseeing the distribution of Iraq’s oil revenues were accused of mismanagement. Ahmed Chalabi of the Iraq National Conference provided the administration with intelligence about Iraq. Much of this intelligence proved unreliable. Chalabi’s schemes connected with Iraq’s rehabilitation often were detrimental to American interests. The Bush administration eventually considered Chalabi persona non grata. On June 1, 2004, the Iraq Interim Governing Council, formed following Hussein’s fall, named Iyad Allawi prime minister of Iraq’s interim government and the council was, thereupon, dissolved. Although this Iraqi council chose Allawi, his selection was clearly instigated by the Bush administration, with which he had cooperated. At the same time, Ghazi al-Yawar became interim president. Iraqi Resistance U.S. forces approaching Baghdad when the war ended met sustained resistance and ambushes from Iraq’s second largest city, Basra, to Baghdad, 276 miles to the north. On September 8, 2004, the Iraq War claimed the life of its one thousandth American service person. Of those 1,000 casualties, 818 had died after the “mission-accomplished” ceremony aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln in May, 2003. Another 134 American military fatalities occurred during the month of November, 2004, alone. Insurgents were especially active along the corridor connecting Baghdad’s airport to Baghdad proper, a ten-mile thoroughfare that people flying into the city usually traverse. Mortar and small-arms fire became daily occurrences along this vital artery, which was in constant use by both military personnel and civilians. Although the road seemed too dangerous to
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travel, it was also too important to close. American and British military personnel, however, were ordered to enter the airport via helicopter, also vulnerable to enemy fire. Life in Baghdad itself also became extremely dangerous. Protective barriers were erected to surround the “green zone,” the international section of Baghdad, where most embassies and government offices are located. These barriers, however, could not offer total protection against weapons that lobbed explosives into buildings. Throughout Baghdad and other Iraqi cities, no one was safe from mortar attacks, roadside bombs, smallarms fire, and suicide bombers. Domestic Problems The war and subsequent occupation of Iraq were devastating for many Iraqis. In some cities, unemployment approached 90 percent. This was not because workers were not needed but because those working for, or cooperating with, coalition forces faced possible execution by insurgents, who slaughtered Iraqis in training to become law enforcement officers and soldiers. The insurgents also blew up their training facilities and held family members as hostages. Job-placement centers in Iraq’s cities were bombed, killing job applicants and office personnel. Nevertheless, on November 24, 2004, a group of 2,500 Iraqis managed to complete military training. Before and after the war, Sadr City, a Baghdad slum covering about thirteen square miles, was a Shiite stronghold that became a particularly dangerous area. Once named Saddam City, this enclave was renamed to honor Imam Mohammed Sadr, a Shiite religious leader whom Saddam Hussein had had murdered, along with two of his sons. Sadr’s surviving son, thirty-year-old Muqtada al-Sadr, a cleric, became Sadr City’s charismatic leader; he was adored by followers who stood ready to support him unconditionally. When American troops arrived, they found that the area’s lavish municipal building that had been erected years earlier at Saddam Hussein’s command, had been stripped of almost everything in it, down to the electrical wiring and water pipes. In August, 2004, Muqtada solidified his base and increased his influence when Ayatollah Sistani of Najaf, who had brokered a truce that ended two months of fierce fighting in his city, fell ill and sought treatment in England. Muqtada moved in to undo the truce Sistani had achieved in Najaf. Muqtada Sadr’s adherents followed him unquestioningly. Sometimes he cooperated with the American forces but more often openly defied them, creating an inflammatory situation in Sadr City and throughout the socalled Sunni triangle region. He expressed his willingness to become a martyr to drive American occupiers from Iraq.
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Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal In the spring of 2004, it was revealed that Iraqi prisoners confined in Baghdad’s Abu Ghraib prison had been subjected to torture and humiliation in clear violation of the Geneva Convention and any reasonable standards of human rights. Night guards at Abu Ghraib, including Jeremy Sivits, Charles Graner, and Lynndie England, who were later prosecuted, subjected their prisoners to disgraceful humiliations. Numerous photographs and videotapes showed naked male prisoners chained for long periods to walls and furniture in excruciatingly painful positions. They were smeared with feces and, in some cases, forced to engage in homosexual acts with other naked prisoners. Scores of unclothed prisoners were piled upon each other in human pyramids and forced to remain that way for extended periods. One videotape showed a naked prisoner with a dog collar around his neck held on a leash by a taunting and laughing Lynndie England. Another naked prisoner was chained to the bars of a cell, while a snarling German shepherd guard dog, with its teeth bared, was brought to within an inch or two of him, making him recoil in terror. It has been speculated that such treatment was first suggested to guards by senior officers as means of extracting information from prisoners. U.S.
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U.S. Army policeman watches over detainees in the Abu Ghraib prison compound in May, 2004. The soldier was part of a new group of military policemen trained to replace the soldiers being investigated for prisoner abuse. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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brigadier general Janice Karpinsky, the prison’s warden, was relieved of her duties when the Abu Ghraib situation came to light. Commanding general Ricardo Sanchez also came under scrutiny. General William Boykin was reproached for publicly describing the war on terrorism as a battle with Satan, who targeted America because it was a Christian nation. Boykin demonized Iraqis, calling his Christian God superior to Islam’s Allah. Punishment was meted out to some members of the night guard detail at Abu Ghraib shown in the videotape. However, questions remained about how high in the chain of command responsibility reached. It was charged that high officials ignored the scandal as it unfolded. Battle of Fallujah In the summer of 2004, it became clear that Fallujah, a Sunni Muslim stronghold thirty-five miles west of Baghdad, was a stronghold for fanatical insurgents. Home to 300,000 Iraqis, Fallujah is an ancient city honeycombed with narrow streets. Its buildings are jammed together, creating the most dangerous environment possible for armed conflict, in which its confines force person-to-person combat. In October, 2004, the Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr announced that he would work with the mujahideen in Fallujah. Several prominent insurgents were hiding there. Chief among them was Jamil Sidqi al-Zarqawi, the Iraqi fugitive wanted for his role in beheading hostages, including several Americans, abducted and marked for death if their countries refused to withdraw from Iraq by stipulated deadlines. During the week of November 8, 2004, the attack began on Fallujah, where an estimated 1,500 to 3,000 armed insurgents were thought to be hiding in its more than 50,000 buildings. Although many of the most influential insurgents, including al-Zarqawi, had already fled, most remained in the city, whose mosques were used to store weapons and provide sanctuary for insurgents. Americans enraged Iraqis by invading their mosques. They had little choice, however, because at least half the city’s 130 mosques were being used to store armaments and hide snipers. To deal with the situation, some 10,000 American soldiers and marines, accompanied by about 2,000 Iraqis, trained by the Americans in law enforcement, were deployed to attack the city. However, many Iraqi security officers quickly abandoned the Americans and joined the insurgents, who threatened death for them and their families if they supported American or coalition forces. Twenty-two newly commissioned Iraqi security officers in Haditha were ambushed at a checkpoint by insurgents disguised as police and were murdered in a mass execution. Similar actions occurred elsewhere in Iraq. Many police stations were bombed or torched. Under these
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dangerous conditions, it became difficult to recruit Iraqis into local security forces. Fighting in Fallujah was almost continuous. Some troops fought for forty-eight hours without sleep and ate only the dry rations they carried with them. About 50 Americans were killed in the first days of the offensive, which claimed an estimated 1,000 insurgents. Elections In late 2004, analysts contended that having successful general elections in January, as Iraq’s first tentative step toward establishing democracy, would depend upon containing insurgency. The Sunnis and some Kurds, each constituting about 20 percent of Iraq’s Muslim population, urged postponement for at least six months. However, The Shi’ites, with their 60percent majority, pressed for holding the elections on the scheduled date, which the Bush administration supported. Taking Fallujah did not end insurgent activity, much of which later erupted in Mosul, Ramadi, and Samara. Insurgents threatened to kill political candidates and any Iraqis who registered to vote and carried out their threats with assassinations and devastating bombings in public places. Meanwhile, millions of Iraqis—both at home and abroad—registered to vote. On January 30, 2005, approximately 8.5 million of the 14 million Iraqis eligible to vote turned out at more than five thousand polling centers throughout Iraq to cast ballots in a nationwide election for an interim national assembly. Under the protection of 100,000 police officers and 60,000 U.S. and Iraqi national guard troops, they elected 275 delegates from a field of 7,700 candidates. Official election results were announced on February 13: Shi’ite candidates of the United Iraqi Alliance won 48 percent of the total vote, and the Kurdish alliance won 25.6 percent. Interim prime minister Aya Allawi’s “Iraqi List” candidates won 13.8 percent. Women voted for the first time in Iraqi history, and women candidates won about 30 percent of the contested seats. The immediate mission of the new assembly was to draft a new constitution on which the nation was to vote in December, 2005. Although the January, 2005, election was generally acclaimed as a success, the level of violence in Iraq did not abate, and political assassinations and public bombings continued. On February 28, more than 100 people were killed by a car bomb in the southern Baghdad suburb of Hilla in the worst such incident since the formal conclusion of the war nearly two years earlier. Attacks on coalition troops also continued. In March, the death toll of U.S. troops topped 1,500, and the total for all coalition troops reached 1,700. R. Baird Shuman
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Further Reading Alexander, Yonah, and Dan Musch, eds. Terrorism and Homeland Security. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004. Ali, Tariq. Bush in Babylon: The Recolonization of Iraq. New York: Verso, 2003. Allard, Carl Kenneth. Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995. Anderson, Jon Lee. The Fall of Baghdad. New York: Penguin, 2004. Arnett, Peter. Live from the Battlefield. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994. Atkinson, Rick. Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993. Bamford, James. A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America’s Intelligence Agencies. New York: Random House, 2004. Beck, Sara, and Malcolm Downing, eds. The Battle for Iraq: BBC News Correspondents on the War Against Saddam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. Blix, Hans. Disarming Iraq. New York: Pantheon Books, 2004. Boyne, Walter. Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went Right, What Went Wrong, and Why. New York: Tor Books, 2003. Bresnahan, David M. 9-11 Terror in America. n.p.: Windsor House, 2001. Casper, Lawrence E. Falcon Brigade: Combat and Command in Somalia and Haiti. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2001. Christy, Joe. American Aviation: An Illustrated History. Blue Ridge Summit, Pa.: Tab Books, 1987. Clark, Ramsey. The Fire This Time: U.S. War Crimes in the Gulf. New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1992. Clarke, Richard A. Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror. New York: Free Press, 2004. Clarke, Victoria. “The Pentagon and the Press.” In The Media and the War on Terrorism, edited by Stephen Hess and Marvin Kalb. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003. ____________, et al. “Three Months Later.” In The Media and the War on Terrorism, edited by Stephen Hess and Marvin Kalb. Cohen, Roger, and Claudio Gatti. In the Eye of the Storm: The Life of General H. Norman Schwartzkopf. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1991. Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin Press, 2004.
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Cooksley, Peter G., and Bruce Robertson. Air Warfare: The Encyclopedia of Twentieth Century Conflict. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1998. Cordesman, Anthony. Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons. Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2003. Cornum, Rhonda, as told to Peter Copeland. She Went to War: The Rhonda Cornum Story. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1992. Daalder, Ivo H., and Michael E. O’Hanlon. Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. Danchev, Alex, and Dan Keohane, eds. International Perspectives on the Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994. Davis, John, ed. The Global War on Terrorism: Assessing the American Response. Hauppauge, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2004. DiPrizio, Robert C. Armed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002. Donald, David, ed. The Complete Encyclopedia of World Aircraft. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1997. Elshtein, Jean Bethke. Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World. New York: Basic Books, 2004. Emerson, Gloria, et al. 9/11/01: The Collected “Portraits of Grief” from The New York Times. New York: New York Times Books, 2002. Emerson, Steven. American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us. New York: Free Press, 2002. Engel, Richard. A Fist in the Hornet’s Nest: On the Ground Before, During, and After the War. New York: Hyperion, 2004. Feldman, Noah. What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004. Francke, Linda Bird. Ground Zero: The Gender Wars in the Military. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997. Freedman, Lawrence, and Efraim Karsh. The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993. Friedman, Thomas L. Longitudes and Attitudes: Exploring the World After September 11. New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 2002. Fromkin, David. Kosovo Crossing: American Ideals Meet Reality on the Balkan Battlefields. New York: Free Press, 1999. Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. Haass, Richard. Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the PostCold War World. Rev. ed. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999.
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Hamza, Khidhir, with Jeff Stein. Saddam’s Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda. New York: Scribner, 2000. Heikal, Mohammed Hassanein. Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War. New York: HarperCollins, 1992. Hersh, Seymour. Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib. New York: Harper Collins, 2004. Hilsman, Roger. George Bush vs. Saddam Hussein: Military Success! Political Failure? Novato, Calif.: Lyford Books, 1992. Hiro, Dilip. Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War. New York: Routledge, 1992. Hirsch, John L. Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995. Holden, Henry M., with Lori Griffith. Ladybirds: The Untold Story of Women Pilots in America. Freedom, N.J.: Black Hawk, 1991. Holm, Jeanne. Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982. Honig, Jan Willem, and Norbert Both. Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime. New York: Penguin Books, 1997. Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004. Hutchison, Kevin. Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm: Chronology and Factbook. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995. Ignatieff, Michael. Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond. New York: Henry Holt, 2000. Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2004. Keaney, Thomas A., and Eliot A. Cohen. Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Keegan, John. The Iraq War. New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004. Khadduri, Majid, and Edmund Ghareeb. War in the Gulf, 1990-1991. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Lahneman, William J. Military Intervention: Cases in Context for the Twentyfirst Century. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. Lyons, Terrence, and Ahmed I. Samatar. Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1995. MacArthur, John R. Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the 1991 Gulf War. Updated ed. Foreword by Ben H. Bagdikian. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.
Further Reading
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761
Mackey, Chris. The Interrogators: Inside the Secret War Against al Qaeda. New York: Little Brown, 2004. Mann, Michael. Incoherent Empire. New York: Verso, 2003. Mermin, Jonathan. Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of U.S. Intervention in the Post-Vietnam Era. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999. Mills, Kay. From Pocahontas to Power Suits: Everything You Need to Know About Women’s History in America. New York: Plume, 1995. Moore, James. Bush’s War for Reelection: Iraq, the White House, and the People. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2004. Moore, Molly. A Woman at War: Storming Kuwait with the U.S. Marines. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993. Moore, Robin. Hunting Down Saddam: The Inside Story of the Search and Capture. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004. Morris, David J. Storm on the Horizon: Khafji–the Battle That Changed the Course of the Gulf War. New York: Free Press, 2004. Murray, Williamson. Air War in the Persian Gulf. Baltimore: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1995. Murray, Williamson, and Robert H. Scales, Jr. The Iraq War: A Military History. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks. The 9/11 Commission Report. New York: W. W. Norton, 2004. Newhouse, John. Imperial America: The Bush Assault on the World Order. New York: Knopf, 2003. Picciotto, Richard, with Daniel Paisner. Last Man Down: A Firefighter’s Story of Survival and Escape from the World Trade Center. New York: Berkley Books, 2002. Price, Alfred. Sky Battles: Dramatic Air Warfare Battles. Dulles, Va.: Continuum, 1999. Randolph, Laura B. “The Untold Story of Black Women in the Gulf War.” Ebony 46 (September, 1991): 100-106. Robinson, Linda. Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces. New York: Public Affairs, 2004. Schecter, Danny. Media Wars: News at a Time of Terror. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003. Schwartzkopf, H. Norman. It Doesn’t Take a Hero. New York: Bantam Books, 1993. Sharkey, Jacqueline. Under Fire: U.S. Military Restrictions on the Media from Grenada to the Persian Gulf. Washington, D.C.: Center for Public Integrity, 1991.
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Post-Cold War Conflicts
Stevenson, Jonathan. Losing Mogadishu: Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Sudetic, Chuck. Blood and Vengeance: One Family’s Story of the War in Bosnia. New York: W. W. Norton, 1998. Swofford, Anthony. Jarhead: A Marine’s Chronicle of the Gulf War and Other Battles. New York: Scribner, 2003. U.S. News & World Report. Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War. New York: Times Books, 1992. Voices of War: Stories of Service from the Homefront and the Frontlines. Washington, D.C.: National Geographic Society, 2004. Von Hippel, Karin. Democracy by Force: U.S. Military Intervention in the PostCold War World. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. West, Bing, and Ray L. Smith. The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the First Marine Division. New York: Bantam Books, 2003. Weiss, Thomas G. Military-Civilian Interactions: Humanitarian Crises and the Responsibility to Protect. 2d ed. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. Woodward, Bob. Bush at War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002. ____________. Plan of Attack. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004. Zinsmeister, Karl. Boots on the Ground: A Month with the Eighty-second Airborne in the Battle for Iraq. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2003. Zucchino, David. Thunder Run: The Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad. Foreword by Mark Bowden. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004.
763
Bibliography This bibliography contains annotated listings of standard reference works and atlases and categorized listings of books on specific topics in U.S. military history. The latter include titles on each of the major conflicts covered in this set. For additional titles on specific conflicts, see the Further Reading sections at the end of each chapter. Standard References Arms, Thomas S. Encyclopedia of the Cold War. New York: Facts on File, 1994. Good coverage in a single-volume work. Beckett, Ian F. W. Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare. New York: ABC-CLIO, 1999. An increasingly necessary reference source, as guerrilla warfare becomes more prominent in conflicts throughout the world. Bercovitch, Jacob, and Richard Jackson. International Conflict: A Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and Their Management, 1945-1995. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1997. Focuses on boundary disputes; numerous cross-references; good bibliography. Biger, Gideon. The Encyclopedia of International Boundaries. New York: Facts on File, 1995. Useful in understanding the details of international disputes, which have often led to war. Arranged geographically. Focuses on contemporary boundaries but includes some historical background. Black, Jeremy. War and the World: Military Power and the Fate of Continents, 1450-2000. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998. A prescient study, which covers both Western and non-Western themes. Brief treatments arranged topically but incorporating the latest scholarship. Bowyer, Richard. Dictionary of Military Terms. Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, 1999. Thorough treatment of the basic terminology of warfare. Brownstone, David, and Irene Franck. Timelines of War: A Chronology of Warfare from 100,000 b.c. to the Present. Boston: Little, Brown, 1994. A suggestive chronology, remarkably full and especially useful for the ancient period. Generally reliable, but one wonders where the authors got their information—no bibliography. Bruce, A. P. C., and William B. Cogar. An Encyclopedia of Naval History. New York: Facts on File, 1998. Comprehensive treatment of naval warfare throughout world history. Burns, Richard Dean, ed. Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993. A useful adjunct to the the study of military conflict.
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Bibliography
Collins, John M. Military Geography. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1998. Excellent on the relationships among topography, weather, and culture, and the formation of tactics and strategy. Cowley, Robert, and Geoffrey Parker. The Reader’s Companion to Military History. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1996. Combines coverage of people, battles, weapons, and concepts, expertly edited. Cowley was cofounder and longtime editor of the premier popular military journal, MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History. Provides almost six hundred articles, forty maps and several dozen well-chosen illustrations, and a limited bibliography. Gaps in this work reflect its emphasis on modern Western military history; however, what is included is thorough and written by many of the world’s best military scholars. Davis, Paul K. Encyclopedia of Invasions and Conquests from Ancient Times to the Present. New York: ABC-CLIO, 1996. Approximately two hundred well-illustrated entries. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1994. Definitions of terms, including those used by NATO. Dupuy, R. Ernest, and Trevor N. Dupuy. The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History: From 3500 B.C. to the Present. 4th ed. New York: Harper, 1993. The classic one-volume reference. Organized chronologically by region, or by major wars. A narrative introduction provides context, with relatively brief treatments of the battles themselves; excellent discussion of weapons and tactics; extensive index; maps of variable quality. The best source for basic narrative but should be used in conjunction with recent monographs and articles when dealing with controversial points or relatively obscure topics. Dupuy, Trevor N., Curt Johnson, and David L. Bongard. The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography. Edison, N.J.: Castle Books, 1995. A good one-volume reference, with three thousand entries from earliest times. Fact-driven, with useful headings listing “principal wars” and “principal battles.” The brief bibliographies are sometimes dated but still useful. Not quite comprehensive but close. Dupuy, Trevor N., Curt Johnson, and Grace P. Hayes. Dictionary of Military Terms: A Guide to the Language of Warfare and Military Institutions. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1986. Eggenberger, David. An Encyclopedia of Battles. Rev. ed. New York: Dover, 1985. Covers more than 1,560 battles and wars, including an appendix for battles between 1967 and 1984. Useful maps; lists principal battles under each war.
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765
Featherstone, Donald. Bridges of Battle: Famous Battlefield Actions at Bridges and River Crossings. London: Arms & Armour, 1998. Detailed studies of one hundred actions, from ancient times through World War II. Frankel, Benjamin. The Cold War, 1945-1991. 3 vols. Detroit: Gale Research, 1992. Volume 1 includes U.S. and Western figures; volume 2, Soviet, East European and Third World figures; volume 3, articles and appendixes on history, chronology, concepts, archives, and bibliography. Fregosi, Paul. Jihad in the West: Muslim Conquests from the Seventh to the Twenty-first Centuries. New York: Prometheus, 1998. A controversial argument for the unity of Islamic jihads; nevertheless combines a great deal of information on military actions and commanders not found together elsewhere. Fuller, J. F. C. A Military History of the Western World. 1954-1956. Reprint. New York: Da Capo, 1987. A classic work by one of the early theorists and practitioners of mechanized warfare. Grbasic, Zvonimir, and Velimir Vuksic. Cavalry: The History of a Fighting Elite, 650 B.C.-A.D. 1914. New York: Cassell, 1999. A good introduction, including one hundred full-page, full-color plates. Hart, Kristin, ed. Americans at War: Society, Culture, and the Home Front. 4 vols. New York: Macmillan, 2004. Encyclopedic treatment of all aspects of the domestic side of U.S. wars. Heinl, Robert Debs. Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations. Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1966. International Military and Defense Encyclopedia. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1993. See both of the Margiotta entries that follow. Keegan, John. A History of Warfare. New York: Vintage Books, 1994. The perfect introduction to the subject, full of both fact and analysis in a stylish narrative. Keegan, John, and Andrew Wheatcroft. Who’s Who in Military History, from 1453 to the Present Day. Rev. ed. London: Routledge, 1996. About 725 relatively brief entries. Contains a concise but useful glossary. Kohn, George C. Dictionary of Wars. New York: Facts on File, 1986. Covers about fifteen hundred wars, revolutions, and other conflicts, as well as a few battles. Features an extensive and useful system of cross-referencing. Good index of wars grouped by country or geographical region. Laffin, John. Brassey’s Dictionary of Battles. Rev. ed. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1995. Seven thousand battles and campaigns treated concisely but thoroughly. More than ninety maps. Luttwak, Edward, and Stuart L. Koehl. The Dictionary of Modern War. New York: Gramercy Books, 1991. Focuses on technical descriptions of institutions and weapons of international conflict since World War II.
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Bibliography
Lynn, John A. Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993. Useful work on an often neglected element of military success. Margiotta, Franklin D. Brassey’s Encyclopedia of Military History and Biography. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1994. Articles slightly revised from previous publication in International Military and Defense Encyclopedia. Margiotta, Franklin D., and Gordon R. Sullivan. Brassey’s Encyclopedia of Land Forces and Warfare. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1996. Articles slightly revised from previous publication in International Military and Defense Encyclopedia. Perrett, Bryan. The Battle Book: Crucial Conflicts in History from 1469 B.C. to the Present. London: Brockhampton Press, 1992. Contains fewer entries than most battle books (566) but greater uniformity in assessing casualties and in clearly stating objectives. Also includes a useful appendix arranging the battles by the wars of which they were a part. Powell, John, ed. Magill’s Guide to Military History. 5 vols. Pasadena, Calif.: Salem Press, 2001. Offers encyclopedic coverage of world military history, from earliest recorded times to the present day. Alphabetically arranged articles on major conflicts, individual battles, military leaders, and nations and societies. In addition to individual bibliographies for every article, the set contains extensive appendices and indexes. See also Powell’s companion set, Weapons and Warfare. ____________. Weapons and Warfare. 2 vols. Pasadena, Calif.: Salem Press, 2002. Companion set to Powell’s Magill’s Guide to Military History. Encyclopedic survey of the weaponry, tactics, and modes of warfare throughout the world, from ancient times to the present day. The first volume covers ancient and medieval warfare through 1500, and the second volume continues the subject up to the present day. Articles range from discussions of individual weapons and modes of fighting to surveys of the military histories of societies and state systems. Well illustrated, with extensive bibliographies, appendices, and indexes. Purcell, L. Edward, and Sarah J. Purcell. Encyclopedia of Battles in North America, 1517-1916. New York: Facts on File, 2000. Ramsbotham, Oliver, and Tom Woodhouse. Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operations. New York: ABC-CLIO, 1999. Royle, Trevor. A Dictionary of Military Quotations. New York: Routledge, 1990. Shafritz, Jay M., Todd J. A. Shafritz, and David B. Robertson. The Facts on File Dictionary of Military Science. New York: Facts on File, 1989.
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Spiller, Roger J., Joseph G. Dawson, and T. Harry Williams, eds. Dictionary of American Military Biography. 3 vols. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984. Strait, Newton A. Alphabetical List of Battles, 1754-1900: War of the Rebellion, Spanish-American War, Philippine Insurrection, and all Old Wars with Dates. 1905. Reprint. Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1968. Mainly a listing but with some additional information, including casualties. Especially useful in tracking minor engagements seldom treated in encyclopedias or monographs. United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dictionary of Military Terms. Rev. ed. London: Greenhill Press, 1999. Comprehensive guide to current use, containing six thousand terms and three thousand abbreviations. Unsworth, Michael E., ed. Military Periodicals: United States and Selected International Journals and Newspapers. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990. A thorough guide to key magazines, journals, and other periodicals, including descriptions, content, and publishing histories. Wintle, J. The Dictionary of War Quotations. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1989. Atlases Anderson, Ewan W., and Don Shewan. An Atlas of World Political Flashpoints: A Sourcebook of Geopolitical Crisis. London: Pinter Reference, 1993. The best ready reference to the wars and potential conflicts of the postCold War era. Excellent maps. Banks, Arthur. A World Atlas of Military History, 1861-1945. New York: Da Capo Press, 1988. Barraclough, Geoffrey, and Geoffrey Parker, eds. The Times Atlas of World History. 4th ed. Maplewood, N.J.: Hammond, 1996. Pathbreaking maps and perspectives at its first publication in 1978. Still the best general historical atlas, with much of relevance for military historians. Hartman, Tom, with John Mitchell. A World Atlas of Military History, 19451984. New York: Da Capo Press, 1985. Provides detailed maps and time lines for more than eighty wars and conflicts worldwide. Kidron, Michael, and Dan Smith. The New State of War and Peace, an International Atlas: A Full Color Survey of Arsenals, Armies, and Alliances Throughout the World. London: Grafton, 1991. Previously published as The War Atlas: Armed Conflict, Armed Peace. London: Pan, 1983. Lloyd, Christopher. Atlas of Maritime History. New York: Arco, 1975. Extensive narrative. Most wars and a few key battles are covered. Murray, Stuart. Atlas of American Military History. New York: Facts on File, 2004.
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Natkiel, Richard, and Antony Preston. Atlas of Maritime History. New York: Facts on File, 1986. Extensive narrative accompanying excellent maps. Many key battles covered. O’Brien, Patrick K. Oxford Atlas of World History. London: Oxford, 1999. An excellent general reference that incorporates much military history. Pemsel, Helmut. A History of War at Sea: An Atlas and Chronology of Conflict at Sea from Earliest Times to the Present. Translated by G. D. G. Smith. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1977. A superb one-volume treatment, placing key conflicts in the context of both international diplomacy and technological innovation. Excellent maps, action plans, and scale drawings of representative ships. Pimlott, John, and Richard Holmes, eds. The Hutchinson Atlas of Battle Plans: Before and After. Oxford, England: Helicon, 2000. Smith, Dan. The State of War and Peace Atlas. Rev. 3d ed. London: Penguin, 1997. United States Military Academy: Department of Military Art and Engineering. West Point Atlas of American War. 1959. Reprint. New York: Praeger, 1978. Pre-computer but still superb. Wheatcroft, Andrew. World Atlas of Revolutions. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1983. Woodworth, Steven. An Atlas of the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Categorized Bibliography Armies, Navies, and Air Forces Alexander, Joseph H. A Fellowship of Honor: The Battle History of the United States Marines. New York: HarperCollins, 1997. Beach, Edward L. The United States Navy: Two Hundred Years. New York: Henry Holt, 1986. Boyne, Walter. Beyond the Wild Blue: A History of the U.S. Air Force. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. Frisbee, John L., ed. Makers of the United States Air Force. Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1996. Fukuyama, Francis, and Abram N. Shulsky. The “Virtual Corporation” and Army Organization. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1997. Hagan, Kenneth J. This People’s Navy: The Making of American Sea Power. New York: Free Press, 1991. Hogan, David W., Jr. Two Hundred Twenty-five Years of Service: The U.S. Army, 1775-2000.Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, 2000. Howarth, Stephen. To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 17751991. New York: Random House, 1991.
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Johnson, Robert Erwin. Guardians of the Sea: History of the United States Coast Guard, 1915 to Present. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1988. King, Irving H. The Coast Guard Expands, 1865-1915: New Roles, New Frontiers. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1996. Love, Robert W. History of the United States Navy. Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1992. Lutz, Norma Jean. John Paul Jones: Father of the U.S. Navy. New York: Chelsea House, 1999. Mackay, James. “I Have Not Yet Begun to Fight”: A Life of John Paul Jones. Edinburgh, Scotland: Mainstream, 1998. Mersky, Peter B. U.S. Marine Corps Aviation, 1912 to the Present. 3d ed. Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation, 1997. Miller, Nathan. The U.S. Navy. 3d ed. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Millett, Allan R. Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps. Rev. ed. New York: Free Press, 1991. Mitchell, Vance. Air Force Officers. Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997. Moskin, J. Robert. The U.S. Marine Corps Story. 3d ed. Boston: Little, Brown, 1992. O’Connor, Raymond G. Origins of the American Navy: Sea Power in the Colonies and the New Nation. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1994. Reynolds, Clark G. Navies in History. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1998. Simmons, Edwin Howard. The United States Marine Corps: A History. 3d ed. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Sullivan, Gordon R., ed. Portrait of an Army. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1991. Communications and Military Intelligence Adams, James. The Next World War: Computers Are the Weapons and the Front Line Is Everywhere. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998. Alexander, Martin S., ed. Knowing Your Friends: Intelligence Inside Alliances and Coalitions from 1914 to the Cold War. London: Frank Cass, 1998. Andrew, Christopher, and Oleg Gordievsky. KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1990. Bateman, Robert L. Digital War: A View from the Front Lines. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1999. Bauer, Frederich L. Decrypted Secrets: Methods and Maxims of Cryptology. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1997.
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Ranelagh, John. The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986. Reporting Vietnam: American Journalism, 1959-1975. Introduction by Ward Just. New York: Library of America, 2000. Roeder, George H. The Censored War: American Visual Experience During World War II. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993. Ross, Stewart H. Propaganda for War: How the United States Was Conditioned to Fight the Great War of 1914-1918. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1996. Sharkey, Jacqueline. Under Fire: U.S. Military Restrictions on the Media from Grenada to the Persian Gulf. Washington, D.C.: Center for Public Integrity, 1991. Taylor, Philip M. Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Era. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995. Williamson, John, ed. Jane’s Military Communications. 20th ed. Surrey, England: Jane’s Information Group, 1999-2000. Moral and Legal Issues Cahill, Lisa S. Love Your Enemies: Discipleship, Pacifism, and Just-War Theory. Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 1994. Cole, Leonard A. The Eleventh Plague: The Politics of Biological and Chemical Warfare. New York: W. H. Freeman, 1997. De Lupuis, Ingrid Detter. The Law of War. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Feldman, Noah. What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004. Healey, Kaye, ed. The Nuclear Issue. Balmain, New South Wales, Australia: Spinney Press, 1996. Holmes, Robert L. On War and Morality. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989. Johnson, James Turner. The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. Kuper, Jenny. International Law Concerning Child Civilians in Armed Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. McCormack, Timothy L. H. The Law of War Crimes: National and International Approaches. Boston: Kluwer, 1997. Miller, Richard B. Interpretations of Conflict: Ethics, Pacifism, and the Just-War Tradition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. Morris, Virginia, and Michael P. Scharf. An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 2 vols. Irvington-onHudson, N.Y.: Transnational, 1995.
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O’Malley, T. J., and Ray Hutchins. Artillery: Guns and Rocket Systems. Greenhill Military Manuals. Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1994. Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pringle, Laurence P. Chemical and Biological Warfare: The Cruelest Weapons. Springfield, N.J.: Enslow, 1991. Rhodes, Richard. Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. ____________. The Making of the Atomic Bomb. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986. Rotblat, Joseph. Nuclear Weapons: The Road to Zero. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998. Sharpe, Richard, ed. Jane’s Fighting Ships 1999-2000. 102d ed. Coulsdon, Surrey, England: Jane’s Information Group, 1999. Sherrow, Victoria. The Making of the Atom Bomb. San Diego, Calif.: Lucent Books, 2000. Shukman, David. Tomorrow’s War: The Threat of High-Technology Weapons. San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt Brace, 1996. Swanborough, Gordon, and Peter Bowers. United States Military Aircraft Since 1909. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989. Tunstall, Brian. Naval Warfare in the Age of Sail: The Evolution of Fighting Tactics. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1990. Walter, John. The Modern Machine Gun. New York: Greenhill Books/Lionel Leventhal, 2000. Waltz, Kenneth, and Scott Sagan. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate. New York: W. W. Norton, 1995. Watson, Bruce A. Sieges: A Comparative Study. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993. Yinon, Jehuda. Forensic and Environmental Detection of Explosives. Chichester, England: Wiley, 1999.
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Time Line of U.S. Wars and Battles Dates assigned to each conflict are those that are generally regarded as the formal start and finish of each war. It should be noted that the United States did not enter the two world wars of the twentieth century until several years after those wars began. In order to provide fuller perspectives, this time line includes events that preceded U.S. involvement in several conflicts and thus includes some battles and other developments in which the United States was not directly involved.
Date
Event
Revolutionary War, 1775-1783 Mar. 5, 1770
Boston Massacre.
Dec. 16, 1773
Boston Tea Party.
Apr. 19, 1775
Battles of Lexington and Concord begin Revolutionary War.
May 10-11, 1775
Battle of Fort Ticonderoga.
June 17, 1775
Battle of Bunker Hill.
Dec. 31, 1775
Battle of Quebec.
Aug. 27-30, 1776
Battle of Long Island.
Sept. 6-7, 1776
Submarine experiments.
Oct. 28, 1776
Battle of White Plains.
Dec. 26, 1776
Battle of Trenton.
Jan. 3, 1777
Battle of Princeton.
Aug. 6, 1777
Battle of Oriskany Creek.
Sept. 11, 1777
Battle of Brandywine.
Oct. 4, 1777
Battle of Germantown.
Oct. 8-17, 1777
Battle of Saratoga.
Feb. 6, 1778
Franco-American Treaties are signed.
June 28, 1778
Battle of Monmouth.
June 21, 1779-Feb. 7, 1783
Siege of Gibraltar.
Sept. 23-Oct. 18, 1779
Siege of Savannah.
Apr. 1-May 12, 1780
Siege of Charleston.
Aug. 16, 1780
Battle of Camden.
Oct. 7, 1780
Battle of King’s Mountain.
Jan. 17, 1781
Battle of Cowpens.
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Time Line of U.S. Wars and Battles
Sept.-Oct., 1781
Battle of Yorktown and Virginia Capes.
Oct. 19, 1781
British surrender at Yorktown.
Sept. 3, 1783
Treaty of Paris formally ends the war.
War of 1812, 1812-1814 June 18, 1812
United States declares war on Great Britain.
Sept. 10, 1813
Battle of Lake Erie.
Oct. 5, 1813
Battle of Thames.
Sept. 11, 1814
Battle of Lake Champlain.
Sept. 12-14, 1814
Battle of Baltimore.
Dec. 24, 1814
United States and Britain sign Treaty of Ghent.
Jan. 8, 1815
Battle of New Orleans.
Feb. 17, 1815
Full terms of the Treaty of Ghent go into effect.
Texas Revolution, 1835-1836, and Mexican War, 1846-1848 June 30, 1835
Texans seize Anahuac Garrison and Texas Revolution begins.
Feb. 23-Mar. 6, 1836
Battle of the Alamo.
Apr. 21, 1836
Battle of San Jacinto.
Oct. 22, 1836
Texans declare independence and elect Sam Houston president.
May 6, 1846
Mexican War begins.
Sept. 21-24, 1846
Battle of Monterrey.
Feb. 22-23, 1847
Battle of Buena Vista.
Apr. 17-18, 1847
Battle of Cerro Gordo.
Sept. 12-13, 1847
Siege of Chapultepec.
Feb. 2, 1848
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ends the war.
Civil War, 1861-1865 Oct. 16-18, 1859
John Brown leads raid on Harpers Ferry.
Apr. 12-14, 1861
Confederate assault on Fort Sumter opens the Civil War.
July 21, 1861
First Battle of Bull Run.
Feb. 11-16, 1862
Battle of Fort Donelson.
Mar. 9, 1862
Battle of Monitor vs. Virginia (Merrimack).
Apr. 6-7, 1862
Battle of Shiloh.
June 25-July 1, 1862
Seven Days’ Battles.
Aug. 29-30, 1862
Second Battle of Bull Run.
Sept. 13-15, 1862
Battle of Harpers Ferry.
Time Line of U.S. Wars and Battles Sept. 17, 1862
Battle of Antietam.
Oct. 3-4, 1862
Battle of Corinth.
Dec. 13, 1862
Battle of Fredericksburg.
May 1-4, 1863
Battle of Chancellorsville.
May 18-July 4, 1863
Siege of Vicksburg.
July 1-3, 1863
Battle of Gettysburg.
July 13-15, 1863
Draft riots in New York City.
Sept. 19-20, 1863
Battle of Chickamauga.
Nov. 23-25, 1863
Battle of Chattanooga.
May 5-7, 1864
Battle of the Wilderness.
May 8-20, 1864
Battle of Spotsylvania Court House.
June 3-12, 1864
Battle of Cold Harbor.
June 15, 1864-Apr. 3, 1865
Siege of Petersburg.
July 20-Sept. 2, 1864
Battle of Atlanta.
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Nov. 15, 1864-Apr. 18, 1865
Sherman’s March to the Sea.
Dec. 9-21, 1864
Battle of Savannah.
Dec. 15-16, 1864
Battle of Nashville.
Apr. 9, 1865
Confederate general Robert E. Lee surrenders to General Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox.
Spanish-American War, 1898 Feb. 24, 1895-Apr. 13, 1898
Cuban war of independence.
Apr. 24, 1898
Spain declares war on the United States.
May 1, 1898
Battle of Manila Bay.
July 1, 1898
Battle of San Juan/El Caney.
Dec. 10. 1898
Treaty of Paris formally ends the war.
Feb. 4, 1899
Philippine insurrection begins.
World War I, 1914-1918 June 28, 1914
Serbian nationalist assassinates Austrian archduke Francis Ferdinand at Sarajevo.
Aug. 1, 3 1914
Germany declares war on Russia and France
Aug. 4, 1914
Great Britain’s declaration of war on Germany opens World War I.
Aug. 14-25, 1914
Battle of the Frontiers.
Aug. 26-31, 1914
Battle of Tannenberg.
Sept. 5-9, 1914
Battle of Marne.
Sept. 9-14, 1914
Battle of Masurian Lakes.
Oct. 30-Nov. 24, 1914
First Battle of Ypres.
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Time Line of U.S. Wars and Battles
Dec. 8, 1914
Battle of the Falkland Islands.
Feb. 19, 1915-Jan. 9, 1916
Gallipoli Campaign.
Apr. 22-May 25, 1915
Second Battle of Ypres.
May 2-June 27, 1915
Battle of Gorlice-Tarnow.
June 23, 1915-Sept. 12, 1917
Eleven Battles of the Isonzo.
Dec. 8, 1915-Apr. 29, 1916
Siege of Kut-al-Amara.
Feb. 19-Dec. 18, 1916
Battle of Verdun.
May 31-June 1, 1916
Battle of Jutland.
June 4-Sept. 30, 1916
Brusilov Offensive.
June 24-Nov. 13, 1916
Battle of Somme.
Mar. 11, 1917
Battle of Baghdad.
Apr. 9-15, 1917
Battle of Vimy Ridge.
July 31-Nov. 10, 1917
Third Battle of Ypres.
Oct. 24-Nov. 12, 1917
Battle of Caporetto.
Oct. 31, 1917
Battle of Beersheba.
Nov. 20-Dec. 7, 1917
Battle of Cambrai.
May 27-July 1, 1918
Battle of Chateau-Thierry/Belleau Wood.
Aug. 8-Sept. 4, 1918
Battle of Amiens.
Sept. 12-16, 1918
Battle of St. Mihiel.
Sept. 20, 1918
Battle of Megiddo.
Sept. 26-Nov. 11, 1918
Battle of Meuse-Argonne.
Nov. 11, 1918
Armistice ends the war.
Jan. 18, 1919
Peace conference opens in Paris.
June 28, 1919
Germany signs Treaty of Versailles.
July 2, 1921
Joint resolution of U.S. Congress recognizes formal end to the war.
World War II, 1939-1945 Dec., 1937-Jan., 1938
Japanese troops invade China, beginning World War II in East Asia.
Sept. 15-29, 1938
British and German leaders meet in Munich.
Sept. 1, 1939
Germany invades Poland, beginning World War II in Europe.
Oct., 1939-Dec. 7, 1941
Polish Campaign.
May-June, 1940
Germany occupies France.
July 10-Oct. 31, 1940
Battle of Britain.
Nov. 11, 1940
Battle of Taranto.
Dec. 9-13, 1940
Battle of Stdt Barr3ni.
1941-1942
Battle of Moscow.
Time Line of U.S. Wars and Battles 1941-1944
Siege of Leningrad.
May 20-31, 1941
Crete campaign.
July, 1941-Sept., 1941
Battle of Smolensk.
Sept. 16-26, 1941
Battle of Kiev.
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Nov. 18, 1941-June 21, 1942
Battles of Tobruk.
Dec., 1941-Apr., 1942
Battle of Bataan.
Dec. 7, 1941
Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor brings the United States into the war.
Dec. 10, 1941-Feb. 15, 1942
Battle of Singapore.
Dec. 11, 1941
Axis nations declare war on the United States.
1942-1943
Battles of Kharkov.
Feb. 19, 1942
U.S. government begins relocating persons of Japanese descent on the Pacific Coast.
May 3-8, 1942
Battle of the Coral Sea.
June 3-5, 1942
Battle of Midway.
June 17, 1942
President Franklin D. Roosevelt approves the Manhattan Project.
Aug. 7, 1942-Feb. 9, 1943
Battle of Guadalcanal.
Aug. 19, 1942
Raid on Dieppe.
Aug. 23, 1942-Feb. 2, 1943
Battle of Stalingrad.
Oct. 23-Nov. 4, 1942
Battle of El Alamein.
Feb., 1943
Casablanca Conference.
July 5-15, 1943
Battle of Kursk.
Sept. 9-Oct. 1, 1943
Battle of Salerno.
Nov., 1943-June, 1944
Battle of Monte Cassino.
Nov. 20-23, 1943
Battle of Tarawa.
Jan. 22-May 25, 1944
Battle of Anzio.
June 6, 1944
D Day: Operation Overlord’s Normandy invasion begins.
June 15-July 9, 1944
Battle of Saipan.
June 15, 1944
Superfortress bombing of Japan begins.
June 22-July 11, 1944
Operation Bagration.
July 20-Aug. 10, 1944
Battle of Guam.
July 24-Aug. 1, 1944
Battle of Tinian.
Sept. 17-26, 1944
Battle of Arnhem.
Oct. 23-26, 1944
Battle of Leyte Gulf.
Dec. 16, 1944-Jan. 25, 1945
Battle of the Bulge.
Feb. 4-11, 1945
Yalta Conference.
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Time Line of U.S. Wars and Battles
Feb. 19-Mar. 26, 1945
Battle of Iwo Jima.
Mar., 1945
Battle of Mandalay.
Mar. 7-May 8, 1945
Rhine Crossings.
Apr. 1-July 2, 1945
Battle of Okinawa.
Apr. 19-May 2, 1945
Battle of Berlin.
May 7, 1945
Germany signs surrender documents.
May 8, 1945
V-E Day: President Harry S. Truman declares victory in Europe.
July 17-Aug. 2, 1945
Potsdam Conference.
Aug. 6 & 9, 1945
United States drops atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan.
Aug. 14, 1945
V-J Day: Japan accepts terms of surrender and occasion is declared “Victory in Japan” day.
Korean War, 1950-1953 June 25, 1950
Korean War begins when North Korean troops cross the thirty-eighth parallel.
July 29-Sept. 19, 1950
Battle of the Pusan Perimeter.
Sept. 15-25, 1950
Inchon Landing.
Apr. 22-30, 1951
Battle of Imjin River.
Spring, 1953
Battle of Pork Chop Hill.
July 27, 1953
Armistice ends the fighting.
Vietnam War Aug. 18, 1945
Vietnam nationalists declare Vietnam an independent republic, beginning Indochina War with France.
Mar. 13-May 7, 1954
Battle of Dien Bien Phu.
Aug. 11, 1954
Formal peace treaty partitions the country into North and South Vietnam.
1961
North Vietnam begins struggle to absorb South Vietnam; United States gradually becomes involved.
Aug., 1964
Gulf of Tonkin incident.
Nov. 14-16, 1965
Battle of Ia Drang Valley.
Jan. 21-Apr. 6, 1968
Siege of Khe Sanh.
Jan. 30-Feb. 25, 1968
Tet Offensive.
Jan. 31-Feb. 25, 1968
Battle of Hue.
Mar. 16, 1968
My Lai Massacre.
April 29-June, 1970
U.S. troops invade Cambodia
Time Line of U.S. Wars and Battles
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Jan. 31, 1973
Peace accord is signed; North Vietnam begins releasing U.S. prisoners.
Mar. 29, 1973
Last U.S. troops leave Vietnam.
Apr. 30, 1975
North Vietnam occupies Saigon, ending civil war, and last U.S. advisers leave the country.
July 2, 1976
North and South Vietnam are formally united.
Caribbean Conflicts Dec., 1956
Fidel Castro launches Cuban Revolution.
Feb., 1959
Revolution overthrows Cuban government; Castro takes power.
Apr. 17, 1961
Bay of Pigs Invasion.
Oct. 22-Nov. 3, 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis.
Apr., 1965-June, 1966
United States occupies Dominican Republic.
Oct.-Dec., 1983
United States occupies Grenada.
Dec., 1989-Jan., 1990
United States occupies Panama.
Post-Cold War Conflicts Jan. 16-Feb. 28, 1991
Gulf War.
Dec., 1992-Mar., 1994
U.S. troops occupy Somalia.
Feb. 26, 1993
Terrorist bombing of New York City’s World Trade Center.
Apr., 1994 and Dec., 1995
U.S. troops intervene in Bosnia.
Aug. 20, 1998
United States launches missile strikes against targets in Afghanistan and the Sudan.
Dec. 16, 1998
United States bombs military sites in Iraq.
Oct. 12, 2000
Terrorist attack on USS Cole.
Sept. 11, 2001
“9/11" terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
Oct. 7, 2001
United States launches invasion of Afghanistan.
Mar. 19-May 1, 2003
Iraq War.
782
Biographical Directory The brief sketches in this appendix offer highlights of the careers of American military and political leaders who played significant roles in the history of U.S. warfare. For fuller information on these figures and others, consult the pages referenced in the Index of Personages. Abrams, Creighton Williams, Jr. (1914-1974): A graduate of West Point, Abrams distinguished himself as a tank commander during World War II. He emerged from the war as a leading authority on armored combat and rose steadily in the Army’s adminstrative ranks until 1968, when he was appointed to replace General William Westmoreland as commander of all American forces in Vietnam. In October, 1972, Abrams was promoted to chief of staff of the U.S. Army. In that position, he laid the groundwork for post-Vietnam Army reforms. Allen, Ethan (1738-1789): Allen led Vermont settlers’ fight for land rights and secured the first American military victory of the Revolutionary War at Fort Ticonderoga. Arnold, Benedict (1741-1801): Arnold was one of the most outstanding tactical leaders of the Revolutionary War. However, his mercurial, resentful disposition culminated in the most notorious episode of treason in U.S. history. Despite his skillful leadership of forces in that war, his betrayal of his country has made his name a synonym for treason. During the Revolutionary War, he served in the battles at Fort Ticonderoga, Quebec, Valcour Island, and Saratoga. Arnold, H. H. (1886-1950): Before and during World War II, Arnold was an ardent advocate of air power. He was in charge of all flight training conducted overseas during World War I. During World War II, Arnold was the principal adviser to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the employment of aviation in both theaters of operations. He is also known as the father of the U.S. Air Force. President Harry S. Truman named him general of the Air Force in May, 1949. Attucks, Crispus (1723-1770): Attucks was the first person killed in the Boston Massacre in 1770. A literate former slave, he was among a group of colonists who confronted British troops in Boston. As the first of five colonists to die when the British fired into the crowd, Attucks is often regarded as the first American casualty of the Revolutionary War. Austin, Stephen Fuller (1793-1836): Austin established the first AngloAmerican colony in Texas and played a significant role in the Texas Revolution, which resulted in Texas’s securing its independence from Mexico.
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Beauregard, P. G. T. (1818-1893): Beauregard served in the Mexican War under General Winfield Scott but is best remembered for his later service during the Civil War. One of only eight full generals in the Confederacy, Beauregard was involved in virtually every major theater during the Civil War. His principal battles included Fort Sumter, First Battle of Bull Run, and Shiloh. Bowie, Jim (1796-1836): A colonel in the Texas revolutionary army that fought for independence, Bowie shared command at the Alamo with Colonel William Barret Travis when both officers, along with about other 150 men, were trapped in the abandoned mission grounds in early 1836. When the Mexican army overwhelmed the defenders, Bowie was killed while lying sick in his cot. Bradley, Omar N. (1893-1981): Bradley served during World War I but saw his most notable service during World War II. He led American troops to victories in North Africa and Sicily, commanded the U.S. First Army during the Normandy invasion, and repulsed the German counteroffensive known as the Battle of the Bulge. Bradley provided stability and continuity within the American military establishment during the critical period following the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War. He was also the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was involved in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Brown, John (1800-1859): As the leader of the 1859 raid on Harpers Ferry, Brown has come to symbolize the struggle over the abolition of slavery in the United States. He was the catalyst for change from polite debate and parliamentary maneuvering aimed at modification of the institution to physical violence and a direct onslaught on Southern territory and the supporters of slavery. Burnside, Ambrose E. (1824-1881): Burnside’s military record was marked by high and low points. Shortly after assuming command of the Army of the Potomac during the Civil War, he faced a crushing defeat at Fredericksburg. His principal battles included First Battle of Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Petersburg. Burr, Aaron (1756-1836): During the Revolutionary War, Burr served with distinction at the battles of Quebec, New York, and Monmouth and commanded American forces in Westchester. After his health forced him to resign, he returned to the study of the law. Burr developed the political organization that assured the presidential victory of Thomas Jefferson in 1800 and was the force behind the liberalization of New York’s penal codes and political process. Bush, George (1924): During World War II, Bush flew fifty-eight combat missions in the Pacific and was considered a hero for his conduct at
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Biographical Directory
Chichi Jima. As the forty-first president (1989-1993), he presided over the end of the Cold War, the occupation of Panama in 1989, and the 1991 Gulf War. Bush, George W. (1946): As forty-third president of the United States (2001), Bush presided over the response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States, the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iraq War in 2003. Calley, William L. (1943): An army lieutenant during the Vietnam War, Calley was convicted of murdering twenty-two Vietnamese civilians in the My Lai Massacre and was the only person convicted of any crime in that affair. However, his sentence was reduced and he served only three and one-half years under house arrest before receiving parole in 1974. Carson, Kit (1809-1868): As a trapper, guide, Indian agent, and soldier, Carson helped open the American West to settlement. Although he is better known as a frontiersman than as a soldier, Carson fought in California during the Mexican War and saw action in battles at San Pasqual, Los Angeles, and Valverde. He also served as colonel in the First New Mexico Volunteer Infantry during the Civil War and in that position forced thousands of Navajo to abandon their homes. Clark, George Rogers (1752-1818): Clark’s successful attack against the British forts at Kaskaskia, Cahokia, and Vincennes in 1778-1779 served as the basis for the American claim to the Northwest Territory during negotiation of the Treaty of Paris at the end of the Revolutionary War. His leadership of the Northwest campaign led in turn to the founding of Louisville, Kentucky, and Clarksville, Indiana. Clark, Mark W. (1896-1984): Clark began his military service as an infantry officer during World War I. During World War II, he commanded Allied forces in Italy from 1943 to 1945, and he commanded United Nations troops in Korea from 1952 to 1953. Clark’s principal battles included Salerno, Anzio, and Monte Cassino. Clinton, Bill (1946): As the forty-second president of the United States (1993-2001), Clinton presided over the nation during the Somalia occupation, U.S. involvement in the Bosnian war, the 1998 missile attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan, and the bombing of military sites in Iraq. The terrorist attack on the USS Cole also occurred during his presidency. Crockett, David (1786-1836): A U.S. congressman from western Tennessee and the author of a best-selling autobiography, Crockett became the most celebrated backwoodsman in the United States. His death at the
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battle of the Alamo in 1836 turned him into one of America’s legendary frontier heroes. Custer, George A. (1839-1876): Although obscured by the events surrounding his death at the hands of American Indians at the Battle of the Little Bighorn, Custer’s Civil War exploits made him one of the nation’s most respected military figures and a national idol. After the war, his expeditions into the Yellowstone region and the Black Hills earned him renown as an explorer and compiler of scientific information. His principal Civil War battles included Gettysburg and Appomattox Court House. Davis, Jefferson (1808-1889): Davis saw military service in the Mexican War and was later a U.S. senator and the secretary of war. However, his commitment to the South at the start of the Civil War led him to accept the presidency of the Confederacy and to attempt to preserve Southern independence against bitter opposition and overwhelming odds. Decatur, Stephen (1779-1820): Decatur was the most colorful and successful open-sea naval commander and hero of the Barbary Wars and the War of 1812. Dewey, George (1837-1917): A naval admiral, Dewey defeated the Spanish fleet in the Battle of Manila Bay during the Spanish-American War and afterward served as senior officer of the U.S. Navy until his death. Eisenhower, Dwight D. (1890-1969): A master organizer, Eisenhower received the Distinguished Service Medal for his organization of the Army Tank Corps during World War I. During World War II, he served with distinction as Allied Commander for the invasions of North Africa, Italy, and France. He won the presidential elections of 1952 and 1956 and guided the country through the beginning of the Cold War. Farragut, David G. (1801-1870): The first admiral in the U.S. Navy, Farragut is most noted for his victory over Confederate forces in the Battle of Mobile Bay during the Civil War. He earlier served in minor capacities during the War of 1812 and the Mexican War. Franks, Tommy (1945): Franks served in the Vietnam War and in June, 2000, was appointed commander-in-chief of United States Central Command. He led the attack on the Taliban in Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq until his retirement in July, 2003. Frémont, John C. (1813-1890): Frémont’s exploits as an explorer helped to propel the American people westward toward Oregon and California. When the nation faced civil war, he fought to maintain the Union and
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end slavery. He served as a major general in the Civil War but was relieved of his command in the West after a disagreement with Abraham Lincoln and received another post in the East, from which he resigned after losing several battles. Gadsden, James (1788-1858): Although Gadsden was an accomplished soldier, engineer, and railroad executive, his lasting fame came as the U.S. minister to Mexico during the mid-1850’s. While in Mexico City, he negotiated the Gadsden Purchase, the U.S. acquisition of a strip of territory that became the southern portions of Arizona and New Mexico. Gates, Horatio (c. 1728-1806): As an army general, Gates presided over the first strategic victory over the British at Saratoga in 1777. At Camden, three years later, he was responsible for one of the worst defeats ever suffered by American forces. Grant, Ulysses S. (1822-1885): Grant became the preeminent Union general during the Civil War, demonstrating the persistence and strategic genius that brought about victory. His principal battles included Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Shiloh, Vicksburg, Chattanooga, Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, Cold Harbor, Petersburg, and Appomattox Court House. Grant earlier served during the Mexican War, in which he excelled as a field officer at the battles of Molino del Rey and Chapultepec. Greene, Nathanael (1742-1786): Greene was one of George Washington’s most trusted subordinates throughout the Revolutionary War, playing a significant role both as a field commander and as the Continental army’s quartermaster general. His principal battles included Trenton, Brandywine, Germantown, Guilford Courthouse, Hobkirk’s Hill, and Eutaw Springs. Haig, Alexander M. (1924): Haig fought in the Korean War, in which he won a Bronze Star for valor, and participated in the 1950 Inchon Landing and the march to the Yalu River. He was a successful battalion commander in Vietnam who later influenced military policy as an aide to President Richard Nixon before serving as commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Halleck, Henry W. (1815-1872): During the Civil War, Halleck, who was famous as the author of a work on military theory, was named commanding general of all Union armies in July, 1862. In March, 1864, he became the first chief of staff. Halsey, William F. (1882-1959): “Bull” Halsey was a colorful and offensiveminded fighter who went by the slogan “hit hard, hit fast, hit often.” A
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proponent of naval aviation and an avowed risk taker, he epitomized the aggressive spirit of the U.S. Navy during World War II. Hancock, Winfield S. (1824-1886): Hancock is probably best known for defending Cemetery Ridge at Gettysburg during the Civil War, avoiding a Confederate victory, and possibly saving the Union. Harrison, William Henry (1773-1841): Harrison became one of the nation’s most popular military heroes because of his victory over the Indian forces of Tecumseh and the Prophet at the Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811. As a soldier and later governor of the Old Northwest Territory, he became identified with the ideas and desires of the West. His military reputation got him elected president in 1840, but he died only one month after he was inaugurated. His principal battles during the War of 1812 were Fallen Timbers, Tippecanoe, Fort Meigs, and Thames. Higginson, Thomas Wentworth (1823-1911): Higginson wrote prolifically but is best known in the literary world as the discoverer of Emily Dickinson’s poetry. He is also noted for commanding a regiment of black enlisted men during the Civil War and for laboring in social causes such as the abolition of slavery and women’s rights. Hood, John Bell (1831-1879): A rash commander for the South during the Civil War, Hood lost Atlanta and the Confederacy’s last chance for independence. Hood’s principal battles included Antietam, Gettysburg, Chickamauga, Atlanta, Franklin, and Nashville. Hooker, Joseph (1814-1879): At the Civil War’s Battle of Chancellorsville in May, 1863, Hooker was badly outgeneraled and ultimately relieved of army command. He rehabilitated his reputation somewhat in the western theater in late 1863 and 1864. He earlier served in the Mexican War. Houston, Sam (1793-1863): During the Texas Revolution, Houston served as commanding general of the Texan army and guided the Mexican province to independence in 1836. Afterward, he served as first president of the Republic of Texas, first governor of the state of Texas, and as one of the state’s first U.S. senators. Jackson, Andrew (1767-1845): Possessing the characteristics of the roughly hewn Western frontiersman as opposed to aristocratic propensities of the eastern and Virginia “establishment,” Jackson came to symbolize the common man in America and the rise of democracy. In 1815, Jackson prevented the British from seizing New Orleans in the last major battle of the War of 1812. The reputation he won during that war helped lift him to the presidency in 1829.
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Jackson, Stonewall (1824-1863): The ablest and most renowned of General Robert E. Lee’s lieutenants, Jackson led daring marches and employed do-or-die battle tactics that resulted in key victories that helped sustain the Confederacy during the first two years of the Civil War. His career might have been even more distinguished, had he not died after being accidentally shot by one of his own men. Jackson also served earlier during the Mexican War as an artillery officer. Johnson, Lyndon B. (1908-1973): Johnson served briefly in the U.S. Navy during World War II as a lieutenant commander, winning a Silver Star in the South Pacific. Johnson went on to become majority leader in the U.S. Senate and was elected vice president in 1960. After President John Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, Johnson became president of the United States and approved the escalation of U.S. involvement in the Vietnamese civil war by ordering the first large-scale ground troops to the embattled nation and authorized the beginning of an air-bombing campaign. In 1965, Johnson sent a U.S. occupation force into the Dominican Republic. Johnson’s handling of the Vietnam War ultimately doomed his presidency and he chose not to run for reelection in 1968. Johnston, Albert Sidney (1803-1862): In 1861, Jefferson Davis appointed Johnston to command Confederate Department No. 2, encompassing the entire region west of the Appalachian Mountains. Earlier, Johnston served in the Texan War of Independence and the Mexican War. His principal battles included Monterrey in the Mexican War and Shiloh in the Civil War. Johnston, Joseph Eggleston (1807-1891): Johnston was one of the most able practitioners of defensive tactics on either side of the Civil War but was limited as a Confederate army commander by his lack of strategic planning and his poor communication skills. His principal battles included First Battle of Bull Run, Seven Pines, and Bentonville. Jones, John Paul (1747-1792): A naval captain known during his own time for his daring raids on British territory and spectacular engagements with British vessels during the Revolutionary War, Jones is now widely regarded as the symbolic founder of the U.S. Navy. Kearny, Stephen W. (1794-1848): Kearny joined the U.S. Army as a lieutenant and fought in the War of 1812. Afterward, he held several commands in the West and fought in the Mexican War. He was instrumental in creating the territories of New Mexico and California. Kennedy, John F. (1917-1963): During World War II, Kennedy served as a lieutenant in the U.S. Navy, for which he commanded a PT boat in the
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Pacific, and earned several decorations, including a Purple Heart for his heroism during the war. After serving in the U.S. Senate during the 1950’s, Kennedy was elected president in 1960. During the following year, he put into operation the Bay of Pigs invasion that had been planned by the Eisenhower administration and the Central Intelligence Agency. That attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro’s government in Cuba was a humiliating failure for Kennedy’s administration, but in October, 1962, Kennedy recovered his prestige with his successful management of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kimmel, Husband Edward (1882-1968): Admiral Kimmel was commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941. He was blamed for the disaster and relieved of his command but was never officially found at fault for the U.S. Navy’s lack of preparedness. King, Ernest (1878-1956): Admiral King directed all U.S. Navy strategy during World War II. Under his leadership, the U.S. Navy helped win the Allied Battle of the North Atlantic against the German submarine force. Other major battles against Germany included the invasions of North Africa and of Normandy. In the Pacific, King’s fleet fought the Japanese at Coral Sea, Midway, and Leyte Gulf. Lee, Henry (1756-1818): An accomplished horseman and fearless cavalryman, Lee successfully commanded a legion of cavalry and infantry during the Revolutionary War. His victory at Paulus Hook was one of the most impressive feats of the war. He was also the father of future Confederate general Robert E. Lee. Lee, Robert E. (1807-1870): Perhaps the finest army tactician of his generation, Lee so brilliantly commanded the Confederacy’s Army of Northern Virginia that he prolonged the life of the Confederacy during the Civil War. His principal battles included Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. Earlier, he served in the Mexican War. Lincoln, Abraham (1809-1865): As the sixteenth president of the United States (1861-1865), Lincoln directed the Northern war effort during the Civil War. His abilities and unshakable commitment to preserving the Union mark him as one of the nation’s greatest leaders. Longstreet, James (1821-1904): Longstreet served in the U.S. Army during the Mexican War. As Robert E. Lee’s second in command in the Confederate army during the Civil War, Longstreet obeyed Lee and ordered a charge on Cemetery Ridge at Gettysburg that was driven back at great cost to the Confederates and ended the battle.
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MacArthur, Douglas (1880-1964): MacArthur may have had a greater impact on American military history than any other officer of the twentieth century. Variously gifted, he was a hero to much of the American public but a center of controversy on several occasions. He commanded Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific during World War II and was instrumental in defeating Japan. After commanding the occupation of Japan, he led United Nations forces in the Korean War until relieved of his command for disobeying President Harry S. Truman’s orders. His principal battles in the Korean War included Pusan Perimeter and Inchon Landing. McClellan, George B. (1826-1885): Although Union general McClellan was unsuccessful in destroying Confederate armies or capturing Richmond during the Civil War, his victory at Antietam permitted President Abraham Lincoln’s issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863, and he helped make the Army of the Potomac a potent fighting force. Marshall, George C. (1880-1959): As a general, Marshall helped create the U.S. Army of World War II, picked the commanders who led it to victory, and exemplified the best in the American military tradition: civilian control, integrity, and competence. Marshall was also involved in World War I, in which he served as a staff officer in France working on training and planning. He also served as secretary of defense for one year during the Korean War. In 1953, he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace for his work in postwar economic relief in Europe, where he was the author the Marshall Plan, which was named after him. Meade, George G. (1815-1872): Meade first saw combat as an army engineer during the Mexican War. He began the Civil War as a brigadier general, and his courage and aggressive leadership in several early battles marked him as a valuable commander. In July, 1863, he became commander of the Army of the Potomac only a few days before the decisive Battle of Gettysburg. Afterward, he was criticized for not taking advantage of Robert E. Lee’s retreat from Gettysburg to counterattack and perhaps hasten the end of the Civil War. Mitchell, William (1879-1936): An advocate of air power in the armed forces, Mitchell worked to create an air force separate from the U.S. Army and to develop strategic doctrines that would utilize the full potential of air power in the conduct of modern war. During World War I, at the battle of St. Mihiel, Mitchell organized the largest Allied air effort of the conflict, involving 1,481 planes. Monroe, James (1758-1831): The fifth president of the United States, Monroe served in the Revolutionary War, fighting alongside George Washington in the Continental army, in which he achieved the rank of major.
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He later went on to be appointed the military commissioner of Virginia. During his presidency (1817-1825), he presided over the nation during the Missouri Compromise and is perhaps best known for the Monroe Doctrine, which articulated American foreign policy regarding the Western Hemisphere. Nimitz, Chester W. (1885-1966): Admiral Nimitz commanded American naval forces in the Pacific during World War II and played a crucial role in winning the important and difficult Battle of Midway. After the war, he became Chief of Naval Operations. His other principal battles included Coral Sea, Leyte Gulf, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. Nixon, Richard M. (1913-1994): During World War II, Nixon served in the U.S. Navy as a lieutenant commander and was praised as an excellent officer and leader by his own commanders. After becoming the thirtyseventh president of the United States in 1969, he continued the unpopular war in Vietnam. He also ordered a massive bombing campaign in Cambodia in 1970 that was kept secret from the American public and the Congress. The campaign was ineffective and resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of Cambodian civilians. Patton, George S. (1885-1945): Though never a theoretician, the U.S. Army’s General Patton was a masterful tactician who demonstrated the advantages of mobility and aggressive offensive action as essential elements of modern warfare. During World War II, his principal battles included Sicily, where he captured Palermo in a well-organized armored attack. His other principal battles included Normandy and the Bulge. Patton also organized a French center for training U.S. tank crews during World War I, in which his principal battles included St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne. Perry, Matthew C. (1794-1858): In a naval career spanning almost half a century, Perry, besides commanding ships and fleets with distinction in peace and in war, proposed and accomplished reforms in naval architecture, ordnance, and organization, and through skillful negotiation introduced Japan into the modern community of nations. Perry was also involved in both the War of 1812 and the Mexican War. He was the younger brother of Oliver Hazard Perry. Perry, Oliver Hazard (1785-1819): Perry’s skillful seamanship and tactical tenacity in the War of 1812 provided an example of leadership and courage to the officers and crews of the young republic’s fledgling navy. Perry’s actions during the battle of Lake Erie earned him the status of hero and a promotion to captain.
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Pershing, John J. (1860-1948): A career U.S. Army soldier, Pershing was ready when called upon to lead the American Expeditionary Force to Europe in World War I, helping to preserve democracy in the first global conflict. He also served during the Spanish-American War, in which he fought at San Juan Hill and in the Philippine Insurrection. During World War II, he served as an unofficial military adviser to President Franklin D. Roosevelt Pickett, George E. (1825-1875): Pickett fought for the United States during the Mexican War and for the Confederacy during the Civil War. Under orders from General Robert E. Lee, General Pickett led 15,000 troops in a charge against the Union stronghold on Cemetery Ridge during the Battle of Gettysburg, losing more than half his forces. Although Pickett served admirably through the remainder of the war, his failed charge at Gettysburg defined his reputation. Pierce, Franklin (1804-1869): After service in his state’s legislature and in both houses of Congress and military service in the Mexican War, Pierce became the nation’s fourteenth president in 1853, serving as president during the four politically challenging years leading up to the crisis that brought the Civil War. Pope, John (1822-1892): Pope served during the Mexican War and the Civil War. During the Civil War he commanded the Confederate Army of Virginia, which was defeated at the Second Battle of Bull Run. Powell, Colin L. (1937): Career army officer who was the first African American to become chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He successfully organized and supervised U.S. military operations during the Gulf War of 1991. He was later appointed secretary of state by president George W. Bush and served in that capacity through the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Iraq War, and the start of the administration’s war on terrorism. Reagan, Ronald (1911-2004): As the fortieth president of the United States (1981-1989), Reagan authorized an increase in the defense budget, increased the size of the U.S. Navy, and supported the creation and development of new and more sophisticated military weaponry. In 1983, after Grenada’s government had been overthrown in a leftist coup, Reagan, in conjunction with the Organization of Eastern Caribbean Nations agreed to restore law and order on Grenada through military intervention. Revere, Paul (1735-1818): A Revolutionary War patriot and propagandist, Revere was a prominent silversmith, engraver, and industrialist. Notable for his famous midnight ride to warn Samuel Adams and John Han-
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cock of the impending arrival of British troops, Revere later served as lieutenant colonel in the Massachusetts State Train of Artillery and as commander of Castle Island in Boston Harbor. Revere and his troops did not see much action, however, and his military career ended without distinction. Ridgway, Matthew B. (1895-1993): Ridgway commanded the first airborne division in U.S. history, led troops in World War II and Korea, and replaced both General Douglas MacArthur and General Dwight D. Eisenhower. As the commander of the Eighty-second Airborne Division, he invaded Sicily in July, 1943, landed at Salerno in September, and parachuted into Normandy in June, 1944. Roosevelt, Franklin D. (1882-1945): President of the United States through the Great Depression and most of World War II, Roosevelt served as commander in chief of the armed forces and planned with Great Britain and the Soviet Union strategies for the military defeat of Germany and Japan and for postwar collective security. Roosevelt, Theodore (1858-1919): During the Spanish-American War, Roosevelt led a volunteer regiment against Spanish positions on Kettle Hill outside Santiago de Cuba. His successful charge secured fortifications on the heights overlooking the city, and he returned a military hero. Afterward, he was elected governor of New York and then vice president of the United States. After President William McKinley was assassinated in 1901, Roosevelt became president (1901-1909). In that capacity, he promoted American imperial designs on the Pacific and advocated a strong army and navy. Root, Elihu (1845-1937): As secretary of war under William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, Root administered territories gained at the end of the Spanish-American War and initiated reforms in army administration. He pursued a conservative line as secretary of state under Roosevelt and later as U.S. senator from New York, and argued for the value of international law as a political instrument. Rosecrans, William S. (1819-1898): A gifted strategist while serving as a Union army general during the Civil War, Rosecrans was noted for his brilliance at getting his troops into advantageous positions, but he was considered less capable of executing his plans on the battlefield. His defeat at Chickamauga ended his combat career. Schwarzkopf, H. Norman (1934): As commander of coalition ground forces during the 1991 Gulf War, General Schwarzkopf was credited with liberating Kuwait from its Iraqi occupiers in only one hundred hours of fighting. His lightning moves on the battlefield and diplomatic
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finesse in handling a diverse multicultural force established him as one of the great coalition leaders. Schwarzkopf earlier served in the Vietnam War—in which he earned two Purple Hearts and three Silver Stars— and in the occupation of Grenada. Scott, Winfield (1786-1866): In a military career spanning more than fifty years, Scott emphasized offensive warfare and influenced the military tactics employed by Union and Confederate officers during the Civil War. Scott earlier served in both the War of 1812 and the Mexican War, in which he commanded the army’s first major amphibious landing operation in 1847. During the latter war, he defeated Mexican forces at Cerro Gordo and at Contreras, Churubusco, and Molino del Rey, before storming the fortress at Chapultepec and capturing Mexico City. Sheridan, Philip H. (1831-1888): Recognized as a great fighting general, Sheridan experienced a meteoric rise to become the overall commander of Union cavalry in the eastern theater of the Civil War. Sherman, William Tecumseh (1820-1891): One of the architects of the Union victory in the Civil War and an inventor of modern forms of warfare, Sherman was also a leader in the nation’s late nineteenth century Indian wars in the West. His principal battles during the Civil War included Shiloh, Atlanta, and his March to the Sea. Spruance, Raymond A. (1886-1969): Quiet and unassuming, Admiral Spruance was a highly effective fleet commander during World War II, in which he participated in the raids on the Marshall and Gilbert Islands. He also participated in the Battle of Midway, the turning point in the war in the Pacific. Spruance had overall command of the invasion of the Marianas and the Battle of the Philippine Sea that effectively destroyed Japan’s naval aviation. Stanton, Edwin M. (1814-1869): Combining excellent administrative skills with attention to detail, Stanton served as President Abraham Lincoln’s secretary of war during the Civil War and made major contributions to Union victory. Stimson, Henry L. (1867-1950): Serving as secretary of war during the years 1909 to 1913 and again during World War II, and serving as secretary of state from 1929 to 1933, Stimson helped to define the United States’ transition from isolationism to world responsibility. Taylor, Zachary (1784-1850): Climaxing a military career of nearly forty years with major victories in the Mexican War, Taylor used his popularity as a war hero to win office as twelfth president of the United States in 1848.
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Tecumseh (c. 1768-1813): Leading Indians of the Old Northwest in a united defense against the intrusion of white settlers, the Shawnee Tecumseh contributed significantly to the development of pan-Indianism in North American history. During the War of 1812, he and many of his followers joined the British, believing the former colonial ruler offered Indians the best hope for retaining their homelands. Tecumseh fought in a number of battles until he was killed at the Battle of the Thames. Thayer, Sylvanus (1785-1872): Known as the “Father of West Point,” Thayer is remembered for reorganizing the administration and curriculum of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and for firmly establishing a scientific and theory-based system of engineering education in the United States. Thomas, George H. (1816-1870): Thomas’s victory at the Battle of Nashville during the Civil War effectively ended the war in the western theater. His other principal battles during the Civil War included Mill Springs, Corinth, Perryville, Stones River, Chickamauga, and Chattanooga. Thomas also saw action earlier in the Mexican War at the battles of Monterrey and Buena Vista. Truman, Harry S. (1884-1972): Truman saw combat service in World War I fighting in the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne campaigns. After the war he served in the reserves, rising to the rank of colonel. Meanwhile, he was elected to the U.S. Senate and chaired a defense committee that came to be called the Truman Committee. After President Franklin D. Roosevelt died in office, Truman became the thirty-third president of the United States. He participated in the conference at Potsdam and prepared for the final stage of World War II. He approved the dropping of the two atomic bombs on Japan in 1945. Truman also presided over the Korean War until Dwight D. Eisenhower succeeded him as president in 1953. Wainright, Jonathan (1883-1953): During World War I, Wainright served as a staff officer in France. In March, 1942, after the United States entered World War II, he was promoted to lieutenant general and given command of all U.S. forces in the Philippines. Overwhelmed by more numerous Japanese forces, Wainright and his men surrendered at Corregidor in May, 1942. Washington, George (1732-1799): As commander in chief of the Continental army during the Revolutionary War, as president of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, and as first president of the United States (1789-1797), Washington was the principal architect of the nation’s independence and its federal political system. Washington made notable
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contributions to military strategy—his retreat and counterattack approach and his understanding of the role of naval forces. As president, Washington established the Department of War and he became the only former U.S. president to be renamed commander in chief of American forces in 1798. Watie, Stand (1806-1871): Among the many Native Americans who fought in the Civil War, Stand Watie may have served with the greatest distinction. As a Confederate brigadier general, he commanded Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole cavalry and was the last fighting general to surrender to the Union. Wayne, Anthony (1745-1796): Appointed a colonel in the Continental army in January, 1776, Wayne was one of George Washington’s most reliable commanders during the Revolutionary War. He was nicknamed “Mad Anthony” for his daring and served with distinction and cunning throughout the war. Westmoreland, William (1914): Westmoreland led battalions in North Africa and Europe during World War II and saw combat in the Korean War. As a general, Westmoreland was the commander of all U.S. forces in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968. Wilson, Woodrow (1856-1924): As twenty-eighth president of the United States (1913-1921), Wilson was responsible for America’s entry into World War I, and he played a key role in insisting that the Allies refuse to negotiate with William II of Germany. Wilson was also one of the formulators of the Paris peace settlement and was the principal architect of the League of Nations, although the U.S. Senate refused to ratify U.S. membership in that world body.
Index of Personages Abizaid, John, 751 Abrams, Creighton Williams, Jr., 577, 631, 782 Adams, John, 78 Adams, John Quincy, 115; and Texas, 135 Addams, Jane, 347 Agnew, Spiro T., 617 Aguinaldo, Emilio, 291-295 Aideed, Mahammad Farah, 704 Alexander, Harold, 401, 404, 482 Alger, Russell A., 287, 289 Ali, Muhammad, 602 Allawi, Iyad, 743, 753 Allen, Ethan, 10, 39, 54, 782 Allenby, Lord, 309 Almond, Edward M., 560 Ampudia, Pedro de, 126, 145 Anderson, Robert, 224 Annan, Kofi, 741 Anthony, Susan B., 216 Aranda, conde de (Pedro Pablo Abarca de Bolea), 78 Arista, Mariano, 125 Armijo, Manuel, 140 Arnett, Peter, 615, 693 Arnold, Benedict, 10, 39, 41, 52, 54, 58, 782 Arnold, Henry Harley “Hap,” 494, 782 Arnold, Samuel, 267 Atta, Mohammad, 722 Attlee, Clement, 522-525 Attucks, Crispus, 27, 29, 782 Atzerodt, George A., 267 Austin, Hudson, 665 Austin, Moses, 134 Austin, Stephen Fuller, 782 Aziz, Tariq, 688 Badoglio, Pietro, 482-484 Baker, Newton, 348 Balaguer, Joaquín, 663, 665 Barclay, Robert H., 104
Barker, Frank A., 625 Barras, comte de, 77 Barton, Clara, 218 Barton, Joe L., 718 Baruch, Bernard Mannes, 354 Bayard, James A., 116 Beauregard, P. G. T., 200, 224, 234-235, 783 Bedawi, Jamal al-, 719 Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr., 664 Berrigan, Daniel, 609 Berrigan, Philip, 609 Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald von, 313 Biddle, Francis, 458; Bin Laden, Osama, 698, 713, 722, 732; and al-Qaeda, 735; and Taliban, 736 Bishop, Maurice, 666, 668 Bismarck, Otto von, 299, 312 Bissell, Richard, 653 Blackwell, Elizabeth, 218 Blair, Tony, 716, 745; and Iraq, 717 Blix, Hans, 744 Boelcke, Oswald, 328 Booth, John Wilkes, 264, 267 Borah, William Edgar, 369 Bosch, Juan, 663-665 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 704 Bowie, James “Jim,” 137-138, 783 Boykin, William, 756 Brackenridge, Hugh Henry, 65 Bradley, Omar, 488, 507, 518, 783 Brady, Mathew, 169, 174, 178 Bragg, Braxton, 167, 251-253 Brant, Joseph, 52 Brant, Molly, 54 Bremer, Paul, III, 750 Briggs, Lyman, 470 Brooks, Steven K., 625 Broun, Heywood, 335 Brown, Jacob J., 98 Brown, John, 220, 783 Brownback, Sam, 719
797
The United States at War Brusilov, Aleksei, 306 Buchanan, Franklin, 231-233 Buchanan, James; and Mexican War, 149-151; and Missouri Compromise, 206; and secessionism, 207 Buckner, Simon, 230 Buell, Don Carlos, 168, 235 Bundy, McGeorge, 656, 658, 660 Bunker, Ellsworth, 576 Burgoyne, John, 9, 52, 58 Burnside, Ambrose E., 170, 199, 242, 783 Burr, Aaron, 783 Bush, George, 783; and Gulf War, 682, 688-689, 692, 694, 696, 700; and Iraq, 687, 690, 701, 736, 744; and Panama occupation, 671; and Somalia, 704 Bush, George W., 784; and Afghanistan, 737; and Iraq, 736, 744; and Iraq War, 738, 743-751; and war on terrorism, 728, 737 Bush, Vannevar, 468, 470 Bushnell, David, 44-45, 47 Butler, John, 55 Byrd, Robert, 739 Byrnes, James Francis, 437, 525 Caamaño, Francisco, 664 Calley, William L., 597, 611, 625-631, 784 Campbell, William, 72 Cardona, José Miró, 653 Carleton, Guy, 41, 52 Carson, Kit, 784 Casey, George, 751 Castlereagh, Viscount (Robert Stewart), 115 Castro, Fidel, 658; and Bay of Pigs invasion, 653-658; and Cuban Missile Crisis, 658-662; and Dominican Republic, 664; and Soviet Union, 659 Castro, José, 128, 140 Catt, Carrie Chapman, 347 Cervera y Topete, Pascual, 281, 291 Chafee, John, 719 Chalabi, Ahmed, 753
Chamberlain, Neville, 398 Charles, Eugenia, 667 Cheney, Dick, 739, 743 Chiang Kai-shek, 434, 496, 525, 563 Child, Lydia Maria, 216 Choe Yong Gun, 543, 558 Churchill, Winston S., 305, 313, 391, 442, 518; and Casablanca Conference, 482; and Eisenhower, Dwight D., 520; and North Africa invasion, 477; and Potsdam Conference, 522-525; and Roosevelt, Franklin D., 521; and Yalta Conference, 512-515 Clark, George Rogers, 784 Clark, Mark W., 479, 482, 485, 784 Clark, Vern, 721 Clay, Henry, 116 Clemenceau, Georges, 369-371 Cleveland, Stephen Grover, 282 Clinton, Bill, 708, 713, 716, 784; and Iraq, 744; and Israel, 736; and Somalia, 704 Clinton, Henry, 9, 58, 67, 70, 74 Coard, Bernard, 666, 668 Cochran, Jacqueline, 428 Cochrane, Alexander, 109 Cohen, William, 713, 721 Conant, James, 468, 470 Constantinesco, Georges, 328 Cooke, Philip St. George, 140 Cooper, Samuel, 65 Cornum, Rhonda, 700 Cornwallis, First Marquess, 14-15, 56, 71-72; and Camden, 71-72; and Princeton, 50-51; and Yorktown, 7478 Cós, Martín Perfecto de, 138 Coughlin, Father Charles Edward, 431 Coverdell, Paul, 718 Creel, George, 335 Crockett, Davy, 137-138, 784 Custer, George A., 785 Daladier, Édouard, 398 Dana, James Freeman, 66 Daniels, Josephus, 348 Darlan, Jean Louis, 477
798
Index of Personages Daschle, Tom, 719 Davis, Jefferson, 173-174, 226, 234, 785; call for volunteers, 193; and civil liberties, 202; and conscription, 202; imprisonment of, 268; powers of, 176 Deane, Silas, 62 Debs, Eugene V., 343, 352 Decatur, Stephen, 785 Delaplace, William, 39 Delvalle, Eric, 671 DeNiro, Robert, 617 D’Estaing, Jean-Baptiste-CharlesHenri-Hector, 69 Dewey, George, 281, 285, 291, 785 DeWitt, John L., 457-458 Diem, Ngo Dinh, 614 Dix, Dorothea, 218 Dobrynin, Anatoly Federovich, 658 Doniphan, Alexander W., 140 Dönitz, Karl, 441, 521 Doolittle, Amos, 36 Doolittle, James, 415 Douglass, Frederick, 202 Downie, George, 108 Dulles, Allen, 485, 653 Edwards, Benjamin, 135 Edwards, Haden, 135 Einstein, Albert, 468-469 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 404, 488, 518, 659, 785; and Bay of Pigs invasion, 653; and Churchill, Winston S., 520; and Italy invasion, 482; and Korean War, 549, 557; and North Africa invasion, 477 Ellis, Earl H., 405 Ellsberg, Daniel, 617 Endara, Guillermo, 671 Ericsson, John, 182, 231 Eschwege, Rudolf von, 331 Falkenhayn, Erich von, 306, 314 Fannin, James W., 138 Farragut, David G., 785 Ferguson, Patrick, 72 Fermi, Enrico, 469 Flagg, James Montgomery, 339
Fletcher, Frank, 464-465, 472 Floridablanca, conde de (José Moñino y Redondo), 62 Floyd, John, 230 Foch, Ferdinand, 310, 316, 360-361 Fokker, Anthony, 321, 328 Fomin, Aleksandr S., 658 Foote, Andrew, 230 Ford, Gerald R., 580, 617 Forrest, Nathan Bedford, 230 Francis Ferdinand, 302, 313 Franco, Francisco, 387, 398 Franklin, Benjamin; and FrancoAmerican treaties, 62-63, 65, 67; and submarines, 45; and Treaty of Paris, 78-82 Franks, Tommy, 727, 732, 747, 751-752, 785 Frémont, John C., 128, 785 French, John, 305 Friendly, Fred, 616 Frohwerk, Jacob, 352 Fry, James B., 192 Fulbright, J. William, 616, 619 Gadsden, James, 786 Gage, Thomas, 7, 35 Gallatin, Albert, 115 Gamelin, Maurice-Gustave, 403 Gansevoort, Peter, 54 Garros, Roland, 328 Gates, Horatio, 12, 52, 786; and Camden, 71-72 Gatling, Richard, 182 Gaulle, Charles de, 381, 391; and Free French, 391; and North Africa invasion, 479; and Roosevelt, Franklin D., 404 George I, 9 Ghormley, Robert Lee, 472 Giraud, Henri-Honoré, 477 Giraudoux, Jean, 433 Glesser, Carl, 352 Goddard, Mary Katherine, 20 Goddard, William, 20 Goebbels, Joseph, 434 Grant, Ulysses S., 167, 179, 230, 234, 255, 786; accepts surrender, 264-268;
799
The United States at War and Chattanooga, 251-253; and Cold Harbor, 168, 257; and Petersburg, 258-259; promotion to chief of Army, 251, 259; and Spotsylvania Court House, 255256; and Vicksburg, 245, 247-250; and Wilderness battle, 253 Grasse, Françoise-Joseph-Paul de, 77 Graves, Thomas, 77 Greene, Felix, 616 Greene, Nathanael, 15, 74, 786 Greene, Samuel Dana, 231 Gregory, Thomas, 351 Groves, Leslie R., 468, 472, 525 Gullion, Allen W., 457 Gunther, John, 433 Haig, Alexander M., 786 Haig, Douglas, 305, 314, 360 Halberstam, David, 615 Halleck, Henry W., 198-199, 260, 786 Halsey, William F., 404, 472, 786 Hamdi, Yaser Esam, 741 Hamilton, Ian, 305 Hancock, Winfield S., 787 Hanson, Alexander C., 102 Hanson, William, 102 Harbord, James, 361, 365 Hardee, William J., 262 Harkins, Paul, 573 Harriman, W. Averell, 662 Harris, Arthur T., 400 Harris, Clara, 266 Harrison, William Henry, 97, 787 Hassan, Margaret, 752 Hearst, William Randolph, 289 Herkimer, Nicholas, 52 Herold, David, 267 Higginson, Thomas Wentworth, 221, 787 Hill, Harry W., 487 Hill, Wills, 30 Hindenburg, Paul von, 303, 315 Hirabayashi, Gordon, 461 Hirohito, Emperor, 526 Hitler, Adolf, 386, 434, 451-452, 488, 518; annexation of Austria, 387; and
Mussolini, Benito, 452, 483; and Treaty of Versailles, 443 Ho Chi Minh, 581-582, 586 Hobart, Percy, 405 Hobby, Oveta Culp, 427 Hoffman, Max, 317 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr., 352-353 Homma, Masaharu, 455-456 Hood, John Bell, 173, 259, 262-263, 787 Hood, Samuel, 77 Hooker, Joseph, 172, 243, 254, 787; promotion of, 245 Houston, Sam, 123, 134, 135, 138, 140, 787 Howard, Oliver Otis, 259 Howe, Richard, 44 Howe, Samuel Gridley, 221 Howe, William, 3, 9, 39, 52-53; and Brandywine, 12, 56; and Bunker Hill, 40-41; and Germantown, 57-58; and Long Island, 11, 42-44; and Saratoga, 58-59, 61-62; and White Plains, 47-48 Hughes, Howard, 440 Humphrey, Hubert H., 577 Huntington, Samuel P., 736 Hussein, Qusay, 746, 751 Hussein, Saddam, 685, 701, 716, 732; capture of, 740, 751-752; and Gulf War, 687; and Iraq War, 743-750; and Kuwait, 686, 694 Hussein, Uday, 685, 746, 748, 751 Hutchinson, Thomas, 31 Immelman, Max, 328 Inouye, Shigeyoshi, 463 Izetbegovic, Alija, 708, 710 Jackson, Andrew, 99, 787; and Texas, 135 Jackson, Stonewall, 169, 172, 237, 243244, 788 Jay, John, 78 Jeffers, William Martin, 437 Jefferson, Thomas, 79 Jeter, Phoebe, 699 Joffre, Joseph-Jacques Césaire, 303, 314, 324, 332
800
Index of Personages Johnson, Andrew, 264, 266 Johnson, Hiram Warren, 369 Johnson, Lyndon B., 575, 587, 615, 788; and Dominican Republic, 664; and Tonkin Gulf incident, 619; and Vietnam, 576, 592, 624 Johnston, Albert Sidney, 167, 234, 788 Johnston, Joseph Eggleston, 168, 236, 245, 265, 788 Jones, Catesby ap R., 231-232 Jones, John Paul, 14, 788 Kagi, John H., 220 Kalb, Johann, 71-72, 183 Karadúiã, Radovan, 708, 710 Karpinsky, Janice, 756 Karzai, Hamid, 731, 738 Kawaguchi, Kiyotake, 472 Kearny, Stephen W., 127, 140, 788 Keating, Kenneth B., 659 Kennedy, John F., 614-615, 658, 788; and Bay of Pigs invasion, 654; and Vietnam, 573 Kennedy, Robert Francis, 658 Kerensky, Aleksandr, 315 Kesselring, Albert, 482 Khalid Sultan, 695 Khomeini, Ruhollah Musawi, 734 Khrushchev, Nikita, 658, 661-662; and Cuban Missile Crisis, 661 Kimmel, Husband Edward, 789 King, Ernest, 441, 472, 789 Kinkaid, Thomas C., 501 Kissinger, Henry, 578, 631, 635; Nobel Peace Prize, 638 Kitchener, Lord, 332 Knox, Henry, 39, 58 Knox, Thomas, 198 Knudsen, William Signius, 437 Knyphausen, Wilhelm von, 56 Koster, Samuel W., 625 Kuribayashi, Tadamichi, 515 Kurita, Takeo, 501 Lafayette, marquis de, 65 La Follette, Robert Marion, 369 La Luzerne, Chevalier de, 62 Land, Emory Scott, 437
Larkin, Thomas Oliver, 142 Lattre de Tassigny, Jean-Marie-Gabriel de, 400 Laurens, Henry, 79 Le Duc Tho, 635-636; Nobel Peace Prize, 638 Lee, Arthur, 62 Lee, Charles, 13, 20, 67 Lee, Ezra, 44 Lee, Henry, 15, 102, 789 Lee, Robert E., 169, 179, 187, 226, 238, 789; and Antietam, 170, 239-240; and Chancellorsville, 172, 243-244; and Cold Harbor, 256-257; and Fredericksburg, 241-243; and Gettysburg, 245-247; vs. Grant, U.S., 173, 259; and Harpers Ferry, 223; Mexican War, 129, 147; and Petersburg, 258-259; and Second Bull Run, 169; and Seven Days’ Battles, 169, 235-236; and Spotsylvania Court House, 255-256; surrender of, 264-268; and Wilderness battle, 253-254 Lee, Willis A., 504 Lenin, Vladimir Ilich, 315; seizure of power, 309 Leutze, Emanuel, 49 Linares Pomba, Arsenio, 281, 290 Lincoln, Abraham, 197, 789; at Antietam, 239; assassination of, 264-268; calls for troops, 191, 201, 225-226; and censorship, 200; and civil liberties, 203; and Civil War, 207-210, 212, 227-229, 260; and conscription, 192-194; election of, 159; Emancipation Proclamation, 240; and Grant, U.S., 251; and Hooker, Joseph, 245; and McClellan, George B., 238; and National Academy of Sciences, 176; and Navy, 231; on secession, 201, 207; and slavery, 202, 204; and Stowe, Harriet Beecher, 170; and Vallandigham, Clement L., 199, 203 Lincoln, Benjamin, 14, 69-70, 74 Lindh, John Walker, 738 Lippold, Kirk S., 719
801
The United States at War Little, Frank, 341 Lloyd George, David, 308, 369-371 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 369, 575 Lon Nol, 577, 631 Long, John D., 289 Longfellow, Henry Wadsworth, 35 Longstreet, James, 238, 251, 789 Louis XVI, 62 Ludendorff, Erich, 303, 315; and St. Mihiel, 359 Lvov, Georgy, 315 Mabini, Apolinario, 291-292 McAfee, Mildred, 427 MacArthur, Douglas, 404, 472, 501, 546, 556-557, 790; and Bataan, 455; and Japanese surrender, 396; and Korean War, 543, 545, 560; Philippines, 394; and Truman, Harry S., 561-565; McClellan, George B., 167, 196, 236, 238, 245; and Antietam, 239, 790 McCloy, John J., 457-458 McDade, Robert, 620, 621 Macdonough, Thomas, 108 McDowell, Irvin, 166 McGovern, George, 578 Mackensen, August von, 305 McKinley, William, 289, 291 McNamara, Robert, 619, 658 Madison, James, 115 Mahammad, Ali Mahdi, 704 Mahan, A. T., 409 Major, John, 701 Mao Zedong, 434; and Korean War, 546 Marshall, George C., 364, 790; and Manhattan Project, 471; and North Africa invasion, 477 Meade, George G., 255-257, 790; and Gettysburg, 245 Medina, Ernest, 625 Metcalf, Joseph, 665 Mikawa, Gunichi, 472 Milam, Benjamin Rush, 138 Miloseviã, Slobodan, 708, 710 Minié, Claude-Étienne, 180 Mitchell, William “Billy,” 359, 361, 790 Mitscher, Marc, 499, 503
Mitterrand, François, 701 Molotov, Vyacheslav, 388 Moltke, Helmuth von, 304, 313 Monroe, James, 115, 647, 790 Montgomery, Bernard Law, 393, 401, 477, 481-482, 486, 488, 518 Montgomery, Richard, 11, 41, 52 Moore, Harold G., 620 Morgan, Daniel, 15, 74 Morgenthau, Henry J., Jr., 437 Mosley, Cynthia, 699 Mountbatten, Louis, 404 Mudd, Samuel, 267 Muhammad Sahir Shah, 731 Murphy, Robert Daniel, 479 Murrow, Edward R., 433 Mussolini, Benito, 435, 443, 451, 482; execution of, 394; fall of, 485; and Hitler, Adolf, 452, 483 Myer, Dillon S., 460 Myers, Richard, 732 Napoleon I, 96, 117; and Leipzig, 110; strategy of, 324; tactics of, 186 Nash, William Lafayette, 710 Navarro, José Antonio, 136 Neill, James C., 138 Nelson, Donald Marr, 437 Ngo Dinh Diem, 573, 581 Ngo Quang Troung, 625 Nguyen Huu An, 620 Nguyen Van Thieu, 576, 589 Nicholas, Grand Duke, 303 Nicholas II, Czar, 315 Nimitz, Chester W., 394, 404, 516, 791; and Guadalcanal, 472-473, 475, 477; and Guam, 498-499; and Leyte Gulf, 501, 503-507; and Midway, 464-465, 467-468; and Okinawa, 517-518 Nivelle, Robert-Georges, 307, 317, 324 Nixon, Richard M., 577, 582, 617, 631, 635, 791; and political dissent, 591592 Noriega, Manuel, 671-673 Norodom Sihanouk, 577 North, Frederick, Lord (second earl of Guilford), 31, 78
802
Index of Personages Oakley, Robert B., 704 Ogata, Kiyochi, 500 O’Grady, Scott F., 710 O’Laughlin, Michael, 267 Oldendorf, Jesse, 501 Oliphant, Mark, 471 Omar, Mullah, 732 Orlando, Vittorio, 369-371 Oswald, Richard, 78 Ozawa, Jisaburo, 499 Paine, Lewis, 267 Paine, Thomas, 17, 64 Pankhurst, Emmeline, 347 Paredes y Arrillaga, Mariano, 125 Parker, Peter, 11 Patton, George S., 394, 482, 507, 791; and North Africa invasion, 477 Paul, Ron, 718 Peers, William R., 625, 627 Pemberton, John C.; and Vicksburg, 245 Peña y Peña, Manuel de la, 149 Peng Dehuai, 549, 565, 567 Perry, Matthew C., 791 Perry, Oliver Hazard, 97, 103, 791 Pershing, John J., 308, 361-362, 364, 792; and American Expeditionary Force, 309, 360; and Foch, Ferdinand, 361; and press censorship, 335; and Roosevelt, Franklin D., 792; and St. Mihiel, 359; staff work of, 323; and women in military, 348 Pétain, Henri-Philippe, 299, 305, 307, 315, 390; and North Africa invasion, 477, 480 Petty, William, 78 Phipps, Anita, 427 Pickett, George E., 172 Pierce, Franklin, 153, 792; in Mexican War, 131 Pillow, Gideon, 147, 230 Pitcher, Molly, 23 Polk, James K., 132; and Mexican War, 125, 127-128, 133, 141, 149-151, 153; and Texas, 125 Pope, John, 169, 237-238, 792
Powell, Colin, 743, 745, 792; and Iraq War, 739 Prager, Robert, 341 Prescott, William, 40 Preston, Thomas, 26 Prevost, Augustine, 69 Prevost, George, 99, 108 Price, Byron, 431 Price, Sterling, 241 Pulitzer, Joseph, 288-289 Putnam, Israel, 44 Rains, Gabriel J., 182 Rall, Johann Gottlieb, 48-49 Rathbone, Henry R., 266 Rathbun-Nealy, Melissa, 700 Rather, Dan, 745 Reagan, Ronald, 618, 792; and Grenada invasion, 666, 669, 670 “Red Baron,” 307, 329-330 Reid Cabral, Donald, 663 Rennenkampf, Pavel, 303 Revere, Paul, 27, 792; midnight ride, 32, 34-35 Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 388 Rice, Condoleeza, 739, 743 Richthofen, Manfred von, 307, 329 Rickenbacker, Eddie, 329-330 Ridgway, Matthew B., 546, 793; and Korean War, 543, 548 Rivington, James, 19 Roa, Raúl, 655 Rochambeau, comte de (Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur), 15, 74 Rockingham, Lord (Charles Watson Wentworth), 78 Rodney, George, 77 Rogers, Edith Nourse, 427 Rommel, Erwin, 392, 401, 477, 488 Roosevelt, Eleanor, 427 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 793; and air war, 496; and the Axis, 451-452, 454; and Casablanca Conference, 482; and censorship, 431; and China, 447; and Churchill, Winston S., 521; and conscription, 423, 430; and Japan, 389, 422, 447; and Japanese American internment, 424, 457-458;
803
The United States at War and Lend-Lease Act, 442-443, 445446, 453; and Manhattan Project, 468-471; and mobilization, 437-438; and naval power, 412; and Navy, 410-411; and North Africa invasion, 477; and Pershing, John J., 792; and Stalin, Joseph, 521; war aims, 733; and women, 430; World War II, 414; and Yalta Conference, 512-515 Roosevelt, Theodore, 285, 291, 793; as an imperialist, 407; and Monroe Doctrine, 649; and Navy, 408-409 Root, Elihu, 793 Rose, Louis, 138 Rosecrans, William S., 168, 241, 251, 793 Ross, Betsy, 22 Ross, Robert, 109 Rossi, Marie T., 699 Rumsfeld, Donald H., 740-741, 743, 745-746, 748, 753; critics of, 750 Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von, 488 Rusk, Dean, 611, 656, 658 Russell, Jonathan, 116 Sachs, Alexander, 470 Sadr, Mohammed, 754 Sadr, Muqtada al-, 754, 756 Safer, Morley, 615 St. Clair, Arthur, 54 St. Leger, Barry, 52 Saito, Yoshitsugo, 494 Sampson, Deborah, 22 Sampson, William T., 281 Samsonov, Aleksandr, 303 Sanborn, Franklin Benjamin, 220 Sanchez, Ricardo, 732, 756 Santa Anna, Antonio López de, 123, 127, 129, 136-138, 149; and the Alamo, 137, 138; and Buena Vista, 145-146; and Cerro Gordo, 147; and Chapultepec, 148-149; death of, 131; and San Jacinto, 140; and Texas, 134 Saulnier, Raymond, 327 Saunders, LaVerne “Blondie,” 494 Schlieffen, Alfred von, 313 Schmidt, Harry, 500 Schofield, John, 263
Schuyler, Philip, 53, 60 Schwarzkopf, H. Norman, 692, 793; Gulf War, 694 Scoon, Paul, 668 Scott, F. A., 354 Scott, Winfield, 98, 127, 132, 147, 149, 187, 196, 226, 794; and Mexican War, 149 Sears, Isaac, 19 Sedgwick, John, 243 Seldes, George, 335 Seward, William H., 196 Shafter, William R., 281, 290-291 Sheehan, Neil, 615 Shelby, Richard, 718 Shelton, Henry Hugh, 713 Sheridan, Philip H., 794 Sherman, William T., 198, 252, 263; and Chattanooga, 252; and Johnston, Joseph Eggleston, 173; march to the sea, 173, 179, 190, 259-264; and Savannah, 262; and Vicksburg, 247 Sherman, William Tecumseh, 794 Shibasaki, Keiji, 487 Siad Barré, Mahammad, 704 Sihanouk, Norodom, 631 Simpson, Alan, 693 Sistani, Ayatollah, 754 Slidell, John, 125 Sloat, John D., 128, 143 Slocum, Henry Warner, 259 Smith, Erastus “Deaf,” 140 Smith, Gerrit, 221 Smith, Henry, 138 Smith, Holland M., 488, 494 Smith, Leighton W., Jr., 710 Smith, Samuel, 109 Spangler, Edward, 267 Spock, Benjamin, 596 Sprague, Clifton A. F., 501 Spruance, Raymond A., 487, 516, 794 Stalin, Joseph, 518; and censorship, 433; and German-Soviet Pact, 387-388; and Korean War, 543; and Potsdam Conference, 522-525; purges of, 398; and Roosevelt, Franklin D., 521; and “second front,” 394, 478; and Yalta Conference, 512-515
804
Index of Personages Stanton, Edwin M., 192, 197-198, 264, 794 Stanton, Elizabeth Cady, 216 Stanton, Frank, 616 Stearns, George Luther, 221 Stephens, Alexander Hamilton, 265 Steuben, Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von, 13, 67 Stevenson, Adlai, 655 Stimson, Henry L., 457-458, 525, 527, 794; and Manhattan Project, 471 Stokes, Rose Pastor, 352 Storey, Wilbur, 199 Stowe, Harriet Beecher, 170 Streeter, Ruth Cheney, 428 Stuart, Alexander, 15 Sudetenland crisis, 398 Sullivan, John, 55 Surratt, Mary E., 267 Swinton, Ernest, 321 Szilard, Leo, 469
529; and Japanese surrender, 528; and Korean War, 545; and MacArthur, Douglas, 561-565; and Potsdam Conference, 522-525; and Soviet Union, 521 Trumbull, John, 42, 61 Tubman, Harriet, 216 Tudjman, Franjo, 708, 710 Turner, Richmond Kelly, 473
Taft, William Howard, 291; in the Philippines, 295 Taney, Roger Brooke, 203, 206-207, 209 Tarleton, Banastre, 74 Taylor, Maxwell, 567, 575, 660 Taylor, Zachary, 125, 129-130, 145, 794; and Mexican War, 149 Tecumseh, 105, 795 Teller, Edward, 470 Thatcher, Margaret, 668 Thayer, H. E., 196 Thayer, Sylvanus, 795 Thieu, Nguyen Van, 635 Thomas, George H., 171, 251-253, 260, 263, 795 Thompson, Hugh, 625, 627 Thrasher, J. S., 200 Thurman, Maxwell, 672 Tibbets, Paul W., 526 Tippee, Mary, 217 Townshend, Charles, 7 Toyoda, Soemu, 502 Travis, William Barret, 138, 783 Trujillo Molina, Rafael Leónidas, 663 Truman, Harry S., 437, 518, 556, 581, 795; and atomic bomb, 523, 525, 527,
Wainright, Jonathan, 795 Walker, Walton, 558, 560 Wallace, Henry Agard, 471 Warneford, R. A. J., 326 Warner, Seth, 39 Warren, Earl, 457, 600 Warren, John Borlase, 100 Washington, George, 3, 39, 55, 59, 795; and Brandywine, 12, 56; and Bunker Hill, 10; crossing of Delaware, 12, 48; and Germantown, 57-58; and Lee, Charles, 20; and Long Island, 11, 42-44; and Monmouth, 13, 67-68; and Princeton, 50-51; and Ross, Betsy, 22; and submarines, 45; and Trenton, 12, 48-50; at Valley Forge, 13; and White Plains, 47-48; on women, 23; and Yorktown, 15, 74-78 Washington, William Augustine, 73 Watie, Stand, 213, 796 Wayne, Anthony, 796 Welles, Gideon, 182 Wellington, duke of, 108, 117 Wentworth, Benning, 29
Ushijima, Mitsuru, 517 Vallandigham, Clement L., 199, 203 Van Dorn, Earl, 241 Van Fleet, James, 565 Vandegrift, Alexander Archer, 473 Vergennes, comte de (Charles Gravier), 62, 78 Vietinghoff, Heinrich von, 486 Vinson, Carl, 410 Vo Nguyen Giap, 576, 585, 622-623
805
The United States at War Wessin y Wessin, Elías, 664 Westmoreland, William, 575, 622-623, 782, 796 Weyand, Frederick, 623 Weygand, Maxime, 403 Weyler, Valeriano, 281 Whitney, Courtney, 546 Wigner, Eugene, 469 Willard, Daniel, 354 William I (Prussia), 312 William II (Germany), 310, 312 Williams, R. S., 182 Wilson, Woodrow, 335, 337, 344, 354, 357, 369, 371, 796; and armistice, 364; and Big Four, 370; and Congress, 355; declaration of war,
308, 733; Fourteen Points, 311, 316, 347, 369-370, 372; and Lusitania, 314; and Navy, 409 Wise, Henry Alexander, 220 Wolfe, Kenneth B., 494 Wolff, Karl, 485 Wolfowitz, Paul, 745 Wool, John E., 127 Worden, John, 231 Worth, William, 126 Yamamoto, Isoroku, 446, 465 Zarqawi, Jamil Sidqi al-, 756 Zhou Enlai, 434 Zulby, John, 67
806
Subject Index Abizaid, John, 751 Abolitionism; and Civil War, 175, 179, 199; and ethnic conflict, 193; and Harpers Ferry raid, 220-224; Underground Railroad, 216; and women, 216. See also Slavery Abrams, Creighton Williams, Jr., 577, 631, 782 Abrams v. United States, 344 Abu Ghraib prison scandal, 755 Adams, John, 78 Adams, John Quincy, 115; and Texas, 135 Addams, Jane, 347 AEF. See American Expeditionary Forces Afghanistan; invasion of, 727-732, 737; mujahideen, 727; and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 737; Northern Alliance, 737-738; and Saudi Arabia, 727; and Soviet Union, 727, 735; U.S. missile attack on (1998), 713-716 African Americans; in Civil War, 191, 204; in Gulf War, 699; and Harpers Ferry, 222; in Korean War, 549; in Philippines, 294; in Revolutionary War, 27; in Vietnam War, 590; in War of 1812, 113; in World War II, 512. See also Abolitionism; Slavery Afrika Korps, 401 Agent Orange, 598; legal settlement, 599 Agnew, Spiro T., 617 Aguinaldo, Emilio, 291-295 Aideed, Mahammad Farah, 704 Air Force, U.S.; Vietnam War, 586 Aircraft carriers, 409; Battle of Midway, 473; building of, 398, 412; in Caribbean, 667; Gulf War, 694; Korean War, 555; and Pearl Harbor attack, 448, 450, 465, 468; World War I, 323; World War II, 448, 450, 465, 468, 473, 476
Aisne, Second Battle of, 307 Alamo, Battle of the, 123, 137-140, 783 Alamogordo, New Mexico, 528 Alexander, Harold, 401, 404, 482 Alger, Russell A., 287, 289 Ali, Muhammad, 602 Allawi, Iyad, 743, 753 Allen, Ethan, 10, 39, 54, 782 Allenby, Lord, 309 Alliance, Treaty of (1778), 66 Allied Control Council, 524 Almond, Edward M., 560 American Civil Liberties Union, 426, 432 American Expeditionary Forces, 309, 349, 360; demobilization of, 364-369 American Friends Service Committee, 606 American Revolution. See Revolutionary War Amiens, Battle of, 310 Amity and Commerce, Treaty of (1778), 66 Amphibious operations; Korean War, 543, 545, 560, 562; World War I, 305; World War II, 401, 405, 455, 473, 485, 488, 494, 503 Ampudia, Pedro de, 126, 145 Anaconda Plan, 187, 226 Anderson, Robert, 224 Angola, 593 Annan, Kofi, 741 Anschluss, 398 Anthony, Susan B., 216 Antietam, Battle of, 170, 179, 239-240, 245 Appomattox Courthouse, surrender at, 174, 194, 215, 261, 264-268 Aranda, conde de (Pedro Pablo Abarca de Bolea), 78 Arista, Mariano, 125 Armijo, Manuel, 140 Armistice (World War I), 317, 363-364 Armistice Day, 363
807
The United States at War Armored vehicles, 402, 585; World War I, 321; World War II, 402 Army Air Corps, U.S., 401, 495 Army of Northern Virginia, 259 Army of Tennessee, 259 Army of the Potomac, 245 Army of the West, 141 Arnett, Peter, 615, 693 Arnold, Benedict, 10, 39, 41, 52, 54, 58, 782 Arnold, Henry Harley “Hap,” 494, 782 Arnold, Samuel, 267 Artillery; Civil War, 165, 168, 181, 185, 188, 229, 234, 236, 244, 246-247, 250, 253; Gulf War, 698, 703; Indochina War, 583; Korean War, 543, 545, 567, 584; Mexican War, 125-126, 149; naval, 491; Revolutionary War, 10, 39, 49-50, 58; Vietnam War, 620, 622, 626; War of 1812, 113; World War I, 301, 306, 309, 320-321, 359, 361-362, 364; World War II, 401, 491 Arver et al. v. United States, 342 Atlanta campaign, Sherman’s. See Sherman, William T., march to the sea Atlantic Charter, 454, 733 Atomic bomb, 420; development of, 402-403, 468-472, 512, 523, 528; and Germany, 469; and Japan, 523, 525529; and Korean War, 548, 550, 563; and Yalta Conference, 515 Atta, Mohammad, 722 Attlee, Clement, 522-525 Attucks, Crispus, 27, 29, 782 Atzerodt, George A., 267 Austin, Hudson, 665 Austin, Moses, 134 Austin, Stephen Fuller, 782 Australia, 715; and Gulf War, 694; and Korean War, 548; and Iraq War, 745746; and World War I, 305; and World War II, 404, 463-464, 473, 476, 501 Austria; annexation by Germany, 398, 410; and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 302; and Serbia, 314; World War I, 313314, 316, 318
“Axis of evil,” 741, 744 Axis Powers, World War I, 312, 314, 315; and Italy, 314 Axis Powers, World War II, 381, 393; and Atlantic Charter, 454; and Italy, 451; and Japan, 447 Aziz, Tariq, 688 Badoglio, Pietro, 482-484 Baker, Newton, 348 Balaguer, Joaquín, 663, 665 Balkans, NATO incursion, 710-713 Baltimore, Battle of, 99, 109-110 Baltimore Massacre, 102 Bao Dai, Emperor, 581 Barclay, Robert H., 104 Barker, Frank A., 625 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 603 Barras, comte de, 77 Barton, Clara, 218 Barton, Joe L., 718 Baruch, Bernard Mannes, 354 Bataan, Battle of, 455-456 Bataan Death March, 456 Battles. See under names of individual battles Bay of Pigs invasion, 653-658; and Kennedy, John F., 789 Bayard, James A., 116 Bear Flag Revolt, 143 Beauregard, P. G. T., 200, 224, 234-235, 783 Bedawi, Jamal al-, 719 BEF. See British Expeditionary Forces Belgium; Battle of the Bulge, 507-512; U.S. troops in, 368 Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr., 664 Bennington, Battle of, 60 Berlin, post-World War II partition of, 520, 523-524 Berlin Decree of 1806, 96 Berrigan, Daniel, 609 Berrigan, Philip, 609 Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald von, 313 Biddle, Francis, 458 Bin Laden, Osama, 698, 713, 722, 732; search for, 728; and Taliban, 735-736 Bishop, Maurice, 666, 668
808
Subject Index Bismarck, Otto von, 299, 312 Bissell, Richard, 653 Blackwell, Elizabeth, 218 Bladensburg, Battle of, 99 Blair, Tony, 716, 745; and Iraq, 717 Blitzkrieg, 190, 325, 390 Blix, Hans, 744-745 Blockades, 183; Caribbean, 659-660; Civil War, 165, 180, 182-183, 187, 203, 208, 217, 226, 233, 265; and Iraq, 704; Korean War, 547, 564; Napoleonic Wars, 96; Revolutionary War, 45-46, 77; Spanish-American War, 284, 290; Vietnam War, 636; War of 1812, 100, 110; World War I, 314, 318, 320, 325; World War II, 441 Bloody April (World War I), 330 Bloody Ridge, Battle of, 475, 548 Blue Springs, Battle of, 182 Boelcke, Oswald, 328 Bolsheviks, 315, 370; fear of, 336; and Russian Revolution, 315 Bombing, 307; in Afghan war, 729; Afghanistan, 716; and atomic bomb, 525-529; and Bay of Pigs, 655, 657; Gulf War, 694, 697, 718; Korean War, 552, 554-555; Vietnam War, 583, 632, 637; World War I, 321, 327, 330-331; World War II, 400-403, 406, 415, 417-418, 448, 468, 494-495, 497-498, 525-529 Booth, John Wilkes, 264, 267 Borah, William Edgar, 369 Border Ruffians, 220 Bosch, Juan, 663-665 Bosnia-Herzegovina, World War I, 302 Bosnian War, 708-712 Boston Massacre, 7, 26-27, 29, 782 Boston Tea Party, 8, 29-31, 33, 35 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 704 Bowie, James “Jim,” 137-138, 783 Boy Spies of America, 340 Boycotts; and American Revolution, 3, 7, 29; vs. Grenada, 666; and Revolutionary War, 21 Boykin, William, 756 Brackenridge, Hugh Henry, 65
Bradley, Omar, 488, 507, 518, 783 Brady, Mathew, 169, 174, 178 Bragg, Braxton, 167, 251-253 Brandywine, Battle of, 12, 56 Brant, Joseph, 52 Brant, Molly, 54 Bremer, Paul, III, 750 Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (1918), 309, 315, 319 Briggs, Lyman, 470 Britain. See Great Britain Britain, Battle of, 391, 399, 414 British East India Company, 8 British Expeditionary Forces, 314, 331332, 403 Brooks, Steven K., 625 Broun, Heywood, 335 Brown, Jacob J., 98 Brown, John, 220, 783 Brownback, Sam, 719 Brusilov, Aleksei, 306 Brusilov Offensive, 306, 314 Buchanan, Franklin, 231-233 Buchanan, James; and Mexican War, 149-151; and Missouri Compromise, 206; and secessionism, 207 Bucharest, Treaty of (1916), 306 Buckner, Simon, 230 Buell, Don Carlos, 168, 235 Buena Vista, Battle of, 127, 145-146, 150 Bulgaria; World War I, 305, 314, 318; World War II, 523 Bulge, Battle of the, 394, 402, 507-512; casualties, 512 Bull Run, First Battle of, 166, 190, 225229, 245 Bull Run, Second Battle of, 169, 237238 Bundy, McGeorge, 656, 658, 660 Bunker, Ellsworth, 576 Bunker Hill, Battle of, 10, 40-41 Burgoyne, John, 9, 52, 58 Burnside, Ambrose E., 170, 199, 242, 783 Burr, Aaron, 783 Bush, George, 783; and Gulf War, 682, 688-689, 692, 694, 696, 700; and Iraq,
809
The United States at War 687, 690, 701, 736, 744; and Panama occupation, 671; and Somalia, 704 Bush, George W., 784; and Afghanistan, 737; and Iraq, 736, 744; and Iraq War, 738, 743-751; and war on terrorism, 728, 737 Bush, Vannevar, 468, 470 Bushnell, David, 44-45, 47 Butler, John, 55 Butler v. Perry, 423 Byrd, Robert, 739 Byrnes, James Francis, 437, 525 Caamaño, Francisco, 664 Cabin Creek, Battle of, 215 Cable News Network, 693 California; Bear Flag Revolt, 143; Japanese residents of, 458; Mexican rule in, 128; Mexico’s cession of, 153; occupation of, 140-144; U.S. administration of, 142 Calley, William L., 597, 611, 625-631, 784 Cambodia; communism in, 612; creation of, 581; U.S. bombing of, 582, 588, 595, 597, 638; U.S. invasion of, 617, 631-635; Vietnam War, 577 Camden, Battle of, 14, 71-72 Campbell, William, 72 Canada; American slaves in, 221-222; and Civil War, 193; expulsion of French, 63; and Grenada invasion, 669; and Gulf War, 694, 707; and Revolutionary War, 10-11, 41-42, 5253, 58, 62, 81; and terrorist attacks on the United States, 724; and Vietnam War, 637; and War of 1812, 96, 98, 104-107, 109-111, 114, 116-117; World War I, 305, 349; World War II, 404, 433, 489, 491-492, 508, 518 Cape Esperance, Battle of, 476 Caporetto, Battle of, 309, 315, 318, 324 Cardona, José Miró, 653 Caribbean, 647-675; Soviet influence in, 665; and Spanish-American War, 282, 285; time line of conflicts, 648; and War of 1812, 100. See also Cuba; Dominican Republic; Grenada
Caribbean Basin, map, 650 Caribbean Development Bank, 666 Carleton, Guy, 41, 52 Carson, Kit, 784 Casablanca and Operation Torch, 479480 Casablanca Conference, 482 Casey, George, 751 Castlereagh, Viscount (Robert Stewart), 115 Castro, Fidel, 658; and Bay of Pigs invasion, 653-658; and Cuban Missile Crisis, 658-662; and Dominican Republic, 664; and Soviet Union, 659 Castro, José, 128, 140 Catholic Relief Services, 606 Catholics. See Roman Catholics Catt, Carrie Chapman, 347 Cavalry; Civil War, 181-182, 185, 188, 203, 246-247, 260; vs. infantry, 105; Mexican War, 126, 146; World War I, 322 CCAS. See Community of Concerned Asian Scholars Censorship; Civil War, 195-200; and Grenada occupation, 669-671; Korean War, 556-557, 613; Mexican War, 132-133; Revolutionary War, 16-17, 19-20; Spanish-American War, 288-289; Vietnam War, 613-618, 620; War of 1812, 101-102; World War I, 332-336, 338-339, 364; World War II, 431, 433, 435-436, 613-614 Central Intelligence Agency, 581, 592, 659; and Afghan war, 729; and Cuba, 653, 668; and Iraq, 745; and 9/11 attacks, 737; and Panama, 671; women in, 607 Central Powers (World War I), 301, 335, 338, 345; and Bulgaria, 314, 318; and Ottoman Empire, 305, 313 Central Union Trust Co. v. Carvin, 345 Cerro Gordo, Battle of, 129, 146-148, 150 Cervera y Topete, Pascual, 281, 291 Chafee, John, 719 Chalabi, Ahmed, 753
810
Subject Index Chamberlain, Neville, 398 Champagne, Battle of, 307 Chancellorsville, Battle of, 172, 243245, 254 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 603 Chapultepec, siege of, 130, 148-149 Charles, Eugenia, 667 Charleston, Siege of, 14, 70, 75 Château-Thierry/Belleau Wood (1918), 309 Chateaugay, Battle of, 98 Chattanooga, Battle of, 172, 252-253 Chemical warfare; Agent Orange, 598, 611; Gulf War, 688, 702; and Iraq, 716, 718; and Sudan, 714; and terrorists, 713-714; Vietnam War, 599, 611; World War I, 320, 324, 359; World War II, 416 Cheney, Dick, 739, 743 Cherokee and Civil War, 213, 215 Chiang Kai-shek, 434, 496, 525, 563 Chicago Tribune, 431 Chickamauga, Battle of, 171, 251-253 Child, Lydia Maria, 216 China; and Japan, 434, 443; Japanese invasion of, 410, 435, 447; and Korean War, 546-547, 550, 552, 563, 565, 567; trade of, 407; U.S. interests in, 399; and Vietnam, 610, 623, 636; and world terrorism, 725; in World War II, 420, 434 Chippewa, Battle of, 99 Choe Yong Gun, 543, 558 Chrysler’s Farm, Battle of, 98 Churchill, Winston S., 305, 313, 391, 442, 518; and Casablanca Conference, 482; and Eisenhower, Dwight D., 520; and North Africa invasion, 477; and Potsdam Conference, 522-525; and Roosevelt, Franklin D., 521; and Yalta Conference, 512-515 CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency CIO. See Congress of Industrial Organizations Civil Rights movement, 590 Civil War, 159-277; African American troops, 204; censorship during, 195-
200; conscription, 191-194; and Harpers Ferry, 220-224; and justice system, 201-205; major sites (map), 171; Native American combatants, 213-215; Northern mobilization, 226; Overland Campaign, 173, 253256; and Supreme Court, 206-212; tactics and strategies, 175-190; time line, 160; weapons, 175-190; and women, 216-219 Civil War battles, 220; Antietam, 239; Chancellorsville, 243-244; Chattanooga of, 252-253; Chickamauga, 251-252; Cold Harbor, 256-257; Corinth, 240-241; First Bull Run, 225-229; Fort Sumter, 224-225; Fort Donelson, 230; Fredericksburg, 241-243; Gettysburg, 245-251; Monitor vs. Virginia (Merrimack), 230-234; Nashville, 263; Petersburg, 258-259; Savannah, 262-263; Second Bull Run, 237-238; Seven Days’, 235-236; Sherman’s march to the sea, 259261; Shiloh, 234-235; Spotsylvania Court House, 255-256; surrender at Appomattox, 264-268; Vicksburg, 245-251; Wilderness, 253-254 Clark, George Rogers, 784 Clark, Mark W., 479, 482, 485, 784 Clark, Vern, 721 Clay, Henry, 116 Clay v. United States, 602 Clemenceau, Georges, 369-371 Cleveland, Stephen Grover, 282 Clinton, Bill, 708, 713, 716, 784; and Iraq, 744; and Israel, 736; and Somalia, 704 Clinton, Henry, 9, 58, 67, 70, 74 CNN. See Cable News Network Coard, Bernard, 666, 668 Coast Guard, U.S., 427 Cochran, Jacqueline, 428 Cochrane, Alexander, 109 Coercive (Intolerable) Acts of 1774, 8, 29, 33-34 Cohen v. California, 601 Cohen, William, 713, 721
811
The United States at War Cold Harbor, Battle of, 173, 256-257, 264 Cold War, 381, 395, 556; beginning of, 405; and Congress, U.S., 737; ideological basis, 733; and Middle East, 679; and Vietnam, 581; and Yalta Conference, 515 Cole, USS, attack on, 719-721, 728 Colonization Law of 1830, 135 Commercial Cable v. Burleson, 344 Committee on Public Information, 335, 337 Common Sense (Paine), 64 Communism; China, 434; in Dominican Republic, 665; and Korean War, 561; Soviet bloc, 396; Vietnam, 586, 635 Communist International, 397 Community of Concerned Asian Scholars, 591 Conant, James, 468, 470 Concord and Lexington, Battle of, 3435, 37-38 Confederate States of America, 159174, 277; and censorship, 200; centralization of, 176; formation of, 159; and Native American troops, 215 Congress, Confederate, 176, 202, 219, 231 Congress, U.S.; and Bosnia, 710; and censorship, 337, 340, 351; and Cold War, 737; and Grenada occupation, 669; and Iraq War, 738-739, 744, 750, 753; and Korean War, 561, 564; and Mexican War, 153; and Navy, 407410; and Reconstruction, 210-212, 266; and slavery, 179, 206; and Spanish-American War, 284; and Texas, 123; and Vietnam War, 575, 577, 580, 595, 603, 610, 611, 615, 617, 619, 638; and War of 1812, 102; and war powers, 196, 203, 206, 208, 284, 357, 422, 595, 600, 610, 615, 619, 632; and World War I, 372, 733; and World War II, 424-426, 443-445, 451, 454, 462. See also individual laws; Continental Congress
Congress of Industrial Organizations, 438 Conscientious objection; during Vietnam War, 597-598, 602; during World War II, 423 Conscription; Civil War, 191-194, 199, 202; draft riots, 176, 191-194; and espionage, 339; as form of slavery, 342; and Lincoln, Abraham, 192194; Selective Service Act, 453; Vietnam War, 591, 597-598, 600-602, 609; and women, 430, 700; World War I, 342, 422 Conscription Act of 1863, 191 Conscription Act of 1917, 360 Constantinesco, Georges, 328 Constitution, USS, 100 Containment policy, 561, 588 Continental Association, 16 Continental Congress, First, 9, 16 Continental Congress, Second, 10, 17, 64, 66, 75, 79, 82; Declaration of Independence, 18 Contreras and Churubosco, Battles of, 129, 151 Convention of Saratoga, 62 Cooke, Philip St. George, 140 Cooper, Samuel, 65 Copperheads, 176, 199, 203 Coral Sea, Battle of the, 393, 462-464 Corinth, Battle of, 167, 240-241 Cornum, Rhonda, 700 Cornwallis, First Marquess, 14-15, 56, 71-72; and Camden, 71-72; and Princeton, 50-51; and Yorktown, 7478 Cós, Martín Perfecto de, 138 Coughlin, Father Charles Edward, 431 Coverdell, Paul, 718 Cowpens, Battle of, 15, 73-74 Cox v. Wood, 342 CPI. See Committee on Public Information Creek War, 112 Creel, George, 335 Crimean War, 324 Crockett, Davy, 137-138, 784 Crown Point, Battle of, 10, 39
812
Subject Index Cryptography, 402, 463 CSA. See Confederate States of America Cuba, 289; Bay of Pigs invasion, 653658; exiles, 653; and Grenada Invasion, 665-666; Guantanamo Bay, 738, 740; missile crisis, 658-662; Revolution of 1895, 281; Revolution of 1959, 653; and Spanish-American War, 281-287, 290-291, 296; and terrorism, 668 Cuban Missile Crisis, 658-662; and Kennedy, John F., 789 Cummings v. Missouri, 210 Currency Act of 1764, 3 Custer, George A., 785 D day, 402, 490 Dakota Central Telephone v. South Dakota, 344 Daladier, Édouard, 398 Dana, James Freeman, 66 Daniels, Josephus, 348 DAR. See Daughters of the American Revolution Dardanelles campaign, 305, 314, 318, 320, 331 Darlan, Jean Louis, 477 Daschle, Tom, 719 Daughters of the American Revolution, 347 Davis, Jefferson, 173-174, 226, 234, 785; call for volunteers, 193; and civil liberties, 202; and conscription, 202; imprisonment of, 268; powers of, 176 Dayton Accord, 712 Deane, Silas, 62 Debs, Eugene V., 343, 352 Decatur, Stephen, 785 Deer Hunter, The (film), 617 Defence of the Realm Acts of 1914, 334, 432 Delaplace, William, 39 Delaware River, crossing of, 12, 48 Delvalle, Eric, 671 Demobilization, World War I, 364-369 DeNiro, Robert, 617
D’Estaing, Jean-Baptiste-CharlesHenri-Hector, 69 Dewey, George, 281, 285, 291, 785 DeWitt, John L., 457-458 Diem, Ngo Dinh, 614 Dien Bien Phu, Battle of, 573, 582, 587, 595 Dix, Dorothea, 218 Dobrynin, Anatoly Federovich, 658, 660 Dominican Republic, U.S. occupation of, 663-665 Doniphan, Alexander W., 140 Dönitz, Karl, 441, 521 Doolittle, Amos, 36 Doolittle, James, 415 DORA. See Defence of the Realm Acts of 1914 Douglass, Frederick, 202 Downie, George, 108 DPRK. See Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Draft, military. See Conscription Draft riots, 176, 199, 352 Dresden, bombing of, 519 Drug trafficking; Afghanistan, 731-732, 738; Panama, 671, 673 Dulles, Allen, 485, 653 Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 424 Dunkirk, retreat to, 403 East India Company, 31 Easter Rebellion, 314 Eastern Solomons, Battle of the, 476 Edwards, Benjamin, 135 Edwards, Haden, 135 1812, War of. See War of 1812 Einstein, Albert, 468-469 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 404, 488, 518, 659, 785; and Bay of Pigs invasion, 653; and Churchill, Winston S., 520; and Italy invasion, 482; and Korean War, 549, 557; and North Africa invasion, 477 El Alamein, Battle of, 393, 401 Elections; British, 522; and Civil War, 203; in Dominican Republic, 663, 665; in Grenada, 667-668; in
813
The United States at War Panama, 671; in Vietnam, 573, 581, 635-636, 638 Ellis, Earl H., 405 Ellsberg, Daniel, 617 Emancipation Proclamation, 170, 177, 202, 216, 240 Emergency Powers (Defence) Bill, 432 Endara, Guillermo, 671 Endo, Ex parte, 426 England. See Great Britain Enola Gay, 420, 525-526, 529 Equal Rights Amendment, 700 ERA. See Equal Rights Amendment Ericsson, John, 182, 231 Eschwege, Rudolf von, 331 Espionage, and conscription, 339 Espionage Act of 1917, 336, 339-340, 342, 351-354, 431 Ethics of Vietnam War, 609-612 Ethiopia; Italian invasion, 387, 398, 435, 443, 451; and Somalia, 705 Ex parte . . . See under key word Executive Order 9066, 458 Fair Oaks, Battle of, 182 Falbo v. United States, 423 Falkenhayn, Erich von, 306, 314 Falkland Islands, Battle of (1914), 304 Falkland Islands War (1982), 670, 691 Fannin, James W., 138 Farragut, David G., 785 Fascism, 381, 387, 396-397 FBI. See Federal Bureau of Investigation Federal Bureau of Investigation, 592; and Cole bombing, 721 Federal Republican, 102 Federalist Party, 115 Ferguson, Patrick, 72 Fermi, Enrico, 469 Fighter planes; Gulf War, 703; Vietnam War, 583; World War I, 327; World War II, 403 Five-Power Treaty, 409 Flagg, James Montgomery, 339 Flanders, Battle of, 307 Fletcher, Frank, 464-465, 472
Floridablanca, conde de (José Moñino y Redondo), 62 Flower v. United States, 602 Floyd, John, 230 Foch, Ferdinand, 310, 316, 360-361 Fokker, Anthony, 321, 328 Fomin, Aleksandr S., 658 Foote, Andrew, 230 Ford, Gerald R., 580, 617 Forrest, Nathan Bedford, 230 Fort Donelson, Battle of, 167, 230 Fort Erie, Siege of, 99 Fort George, Battle of, 98 Fort Henry, Battle of, 167, 230 Fort Sumter, Battle of, 165, 177, 191, 224-226 Fort Ticonderoga, Battle of, 10, 38-39, 54 Fourteen Points, Wilson’s, 311, 316, 369-370, 372 France; and American Revolution, 12, 62-63, 65, 67, 79; German invasion of (1940), 390; Gulf War, 694, 701; and Triple Entente, 312; Vichy government, 381, 390, 433, 479; World War I, 327; World War II, 381, 398, 420 Francis Ferdinand, 302, 313 Franco, Francisco, 387, 398 Franco-American Alliance (1778), 77, 79 Franco-American Treaties, 62-63, 65, 67 Franco-Prussian War, 312, 332 Franklin, Benjamin; and FrancoAmerican treaties, 62-63, 65, 67; and submarines, 45; and Treaty of Paris, 78-82 Franks, Tommy, 727, 732, 747, 751-752, 785 Fredericksburg, Battle of, 170, 241-243, 245 Fredonian Uprising of 1826, 135 Free French, 381, 404; and Gaulle, Charles de, 391 Free-Soil Party, 221 Free State Party, 220 Freeborn v. the “Protector,” 208 Frémont, John C., 128, 785 French, John, 305
814
Subject Index French and Indian War, 3 Frenchtown, Battle of, 97 Friendly, Fred, 616 Frohwerk, Jacob, 352 Frohwerk v. United States, 353 Fry, James B., 192 Fulbright, J. William, 616, 619 Gadsden, James, 786 Gadsden Purchase, 153 Gage, Thomas, 7, 35 Gallatin, Albert, 115 Gallipoli Campaign, 305, 318 Gamelin, Maurice-Gustave, 403 Gansevoort, Peter, 54 Garland, Ex parte, 210 Garros, Roland, 328 Gas, poisonous, 320, 324, 599 Gates, Horatio, 12, 52, 786; and Camden, 71-72 Gatling, Richard, 182 Gatling guns, 182 Gaulle, Charles de, 381, 391; and Free French, 391; and North Africa invasion, 479; and Roosevelt, Franklin D., 404 Geneva Conference, 573, 581, 614 Genocide and “ethnic cleansing,” 394, 609 George I, 9 German-Soviet Pact, 387-388 Germantown, Battle of, 12, 57-58 Germany; Nazi rise to power, 398; Wars of Unification, 324; World War II casualties, 420 Gettysburg, Battle of, 172, 245-251 Ghent, Treaty of (1815), 100, 110, 114118; and Battle of New Orleans, 114 Ghormley, Robert Lee, 472 Gillette v. United States, 602 Giraud, Henri-Honoré, 477 Giraudoux, Jean, 433 Glesser, Carl, 352 Goddard, Mary Katherine, 20 Goddard, William, 20 Goebbels, Joseph, 434 Goldwater v. Carter, 604
Goliad, Battle of, 123 Grant, Ulysses S., 167, 179, 230, 234, 255, 786; accepts surrender, 264-268; and Chattanooga, 251-253; and Cold Harbor, 168, 256-257; and Petersburg, 258-259; promotion to chief of Army, 251, 259; and Spotsylvania Court House, 255-256; and Vicksburg, 245, 247-250; and Wilderness battle, 253 Grasse, Françoise-Joseph-Paul de, 77 Graves, Thomas, 77 Great Britain; and Afghanistan, 724; and American Revolution, 3, 15-17, 19-20, 78-82, 90; and atomic bomb, 469; and Civil War, 176, 231, 265; Falkland Islands War, 670, 691; and Grenada, 666; Gulf War, 694, 701; and Iraq, 717; Iraq War, 743-750; Korean War, 548; South African War, 312; and Triple Entente, 312; and War of 1812, 93, 100-102, 115118, 120; World War I, 326-328; World War II, 381, 398, 420, 441-443, 445-446, 477, 479, 481-482, 488-489, 491, 493 Great Depression, 358, 405, 437 Greece; World War I, 309, 319; World War II, 392 Green Mountain Boys, 39 Greene, Felix, 616 Greene, Nathanael, 15, 74, 786 Greene, Samuel Dana, 231 Gregory, Thomas, 351 Grenada, U.S. invasion of, 618, 665-671; and censorship, 669-671 Groves, Leslie R., 468, 472, 525 Guadalcanal, Battle of, 393, 472-473, 475, 477 Guadalupe Hidalgo, Treaty of (1848), 130, 144, 149-153 Guam; Battle of, 498-499; ceded to United States, 286; U.S. bases on, 496 Guatemala and Bay of Pigs invasion, 653-654 Guerrilla warfare; and Bay of Pigs invasion, 653; Civil War, 214, 220;
815
The United States at War Iraq, 748, 750; Korea, 543; Philippines, 292, 294; Revolutionary War, 15; Vietnam, 588, 611, 614, 618, 623, 631, 635 Guilford Courthouse, Battle of, 15 Gulf of Tonkin resolution, 575, 595, 603, 615, 619-620; and Johnson, Lyndon B., 587; repeal of, 577 Gulf War, 618, 682, 686-690, 697; air war, 693-698; censorship during, 691-693; Iraq “no fly” zone, 701-704; media coverage of, 673; Operation Desert Fox, 718; Operation Desert Saber, 696; Operation Desert Shield, 688, 691, 694-695; Operation Desert Storm, 688, 694-695, 700; Operation Restore Hope, 707; and United Nations, 687, 690, 694, 744; women in, 698-701 Gullion, Allen W., 457 Gunther, John, 433 Habsburg Empire, 318 Haig, Alexander M., 786 Haig, Douglas, 305, 314, 360 Haiti, U.S. occupation of, 737 Halberstam, David, 615 Halleck, Henry W., 198-199, 260, 786 Halsey, William F., 404, 472, 786 Hamdi, Yaser Esam, 741 Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co., 345 Hamilton, Ian, 305 Hampton Roads, Battle of, 189 Hancock, Winfield S., 787 Hanson, Alexander C., 102 Hanson, William, 102 Harbord, James, 361, 365 Hardee, William J., 262 Harkins, Paul, 573 Harpers Ferry, 220-224, 783 Harriman, W. Averell, 662 Harris, Arthur T., 400 Harris, Clara, 266 Harrison, William Henry, 97, 787 Hassan, Margaret, 752 Hawaii. See Pearl Harbor attack Hearst, William Randolph, 289
Heartbreak Ridge, Battle of, 548 Helicopters; Korean War, 553; Vietnam War, 583 Herkimer, Nicholas, 52 Herold, David, 267 Hessians, 12; at White Plains, 48; at Brandywine, 56; at Trenton, 48-50 Higginson, Thomas Wentworth, 221, 787 Hill, Harry W., 487 Hill, Wills, 30 Hillman, Sidney, 438 Hindenburg, Paul von, 303, 315 Hindenburg Line, 310 Hirabayashi, Gordon, 461 Hirabayashi v. United States, 425 Hirohito, Emperor, 526 Hiroshima, bombing of, 395, 420, 525529 Hitler, Adolf, 386, 434, 451-452, 488, 518; annexation of Austria, 387; and Mussolini, Benito, 452, 483; and Treaty of Versailles, 443 Ho Chi Minh, 581-582, 586 Ho Chi Minh Trail, 587-588 Hobart, Percy, 405 Hobby, Oveta Culp, 427 Hoffman, Max, 317 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr., 352-353 Holocaust, 394 Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 603 Homeland Security, Department of, 742 Homma, Masaharu, 455-456 Hood, John Bell, 173, 259, 262-263, 787 Hood, Samuel, 77 Hooker, Joseph, 172, 243, 254, 787; promotion of, 245 Horseshoe Bend, Battle of, 99 Housatonic, USS, 183 Houston, Sam, 123, 134, 135, 138, 140, 787 Howard, Oliver Otis, 259 Howe, Richard, 44 Howe, Samuel Gridley, 221 Howe, William, 3, 9, 39, 52-53; and Brandywine, 12, 56; and Bunker Hill, 40-41; and Germantown, 57-58;
816
Subject Index and Long Island, 11, 42-44; and Saratoga, 58-59, 61-62; and White Plains, 47-48 Hue, Battle of, 576, 623-625, 638 Hughes, Howard, 440 Humphrey, Hubert H., 577 Hunley, CSS, 183-184 Huntington, Samuel P., 736 Hussein, Qusay, 746, 751 Hussein, Saddam, 682, 685, 701, 716, 732; capture of, 740, 751-752; and Gulf War, 687; and Iraq War, 743750; and Kuwait, 686, 694 Hussein, Uday, 685, 746, 748, 751 Hutchinson, Thomas, 31 Ia Drang Valley, Battle of, 576, 620-621 Imjin River, Battle of, 565-566 Immelman, Max, 328 Impressment of sailors, 93, 95-96, 115; and Treaty of Ghent, 117 Inchon Landing, 546, 559-561 Independence, USS, 694 Indian Territory, 213-215 Indochina; colonial, 586; partition of, 581 Indochina War, First, 582 Indonesia, 715; terrorist bombing in, 741 Industrial Workers of the World, 337 Infantry; Civil War, 180-181, 185, 188, 246; Korean War, 545; mechanized, 390; Mexican War, 125, 146; Revolutionary War, 73; and tanks, 323; War of 1812, 105; World War I, 317, 319, 322-324, 360, 363, 405; World War II, 390 Inouye, Shigeyoshi, 463 International Congress of Women, 347 Iran; and Arab nations, 701; and “axis of evil,” 741, 744; and Iraq, 686, 690, 696, 735; and terrorism, 726; theocratic regime of, 734 Iraq; Abu Ghraib prison scandal, 755; and “axis of evil,” 741, 744; and Gulf War, 686-693; and Iran, 686, 690, 696, 735; and Kuwait, 745; and 9/11 attack, 744; postwar
occupation of, 749-757; and terrorism, 744, 746, 749-750; U.S. and U.K. bombing of (1998), 716719; weapons of, 688, 693, 695-696, 702, 707, 716, 718, 736, 739, 744-745, 750, 756 Iraq War, 743-750; Operation Desert Crossing, 752; Operation Iraqi Freedom, 746; preparations for, 738; “shock and awe” campaign, 746; and United Nations, 739 Ireland, Easter Rebellion, 314 Iroquois Confederacy, 53, 55 Islam, 688, 715; and Afghanistan, 731; and Bosnia, 708-709, 711; fundamentalists, 698, 724, 728, 735; and Gulf War, 699, 701, 703; and Iraq, 718-719, 740, 746, 756; and alQaeda, 735; and terrorists, 713, 722727, 744 Isolationism, 444, 454 Italy, 435; Allied invasion of, 482-483, 485; World War I, 309; World War II, 398, 420 Iwo Jima, Battle for, 515-516 Izetbegovic, Alija, 708, 710 Jackson, Andrew, 99, 787; and Texas, 135 Jackson, Stonewall, 169, 172, 237, 243244, 788 Jackson State University, student deaths at, 577 Japan; air power, 418, 420; alliance with Great Britain, 409; vs. Britain in World War II, 401; censorship in, 435-436; and China, 434, 443; industrial production, 401; and Iraq War, 745; naval power, 399, 409; U.S. bombing of, 494-495, 497-498, 523; U.S. occupation of, 545, 561562; World War I, 304, 313, 319; World War II, 381, 388, 390, 393-394, 396, 399, 402, 407, 410, 412, 420, 422, 424-426, 435-436, 446-447, 449, 451, 455-456, 462-465, 467-468, 472-473, 475, 477, 493-495, 497-501, 503-507, 515-518, 525-529
817
The United States at War Japanese American internment, 424426, 457, 459, 461-462 Japanese immigrants, 408 Jay, John, 78 Jeffers, William Martin, 437 Jefferson, Thomas, 79 Jeter, Phoebe, 699 Joffre, Joseph-Jacques Césaire, 303, 314, 324, 332 Johnson, Andrew, 264, 266 Johnson, Hiram Warren, 369 Johnson, Lyndon B., 575, 587, 615, 788; and Dominican Republic, 664; and Tonkin Gulf incident, 619; and Vietnam War, 576, 592, 624 Johnston, Albert Sidney, 167, 234, 788 Johnston, Joseph Eggleston, 168, 236, 245, 265, 788 Jones, Catesby ap R., 231-232 Jones, John Paul, 14, 788 Justice, and Vietnam War, 595-599 Jutland, Battle of, 307, 314, 318 Kaesong, Battle of, 545 Kagi, John H., 220 Kalb, Johann, 71-72, 183 Kamikaze pilots, 395, 502, 507, 517 Karadúiã, Radovan, 708, 710 Karpinsky, Janice, 756 Karzai, Hamid, 731, 738 Kasserine Pass, Battle of, 401 Kawaguchi, Kiyotake, 472 Kearny, Stephen W., 127, 140, 788 Keating, Kenneth B., 659 Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), 397 Kennedy, John F., 614-615, 658, 788; and Bay of Pigs invasion, 654; and Vietnam, 573 Kennedy, Robert Francis, 658 Kent State University, student deaths at, 577 Kentucky v. Dennison, 207 Kenya, 726 Kerensky, Aleksandr, 315 Kesselring, Albert, 482 KGB. See Soviet State Security Committee Khalid Sultan, 695
Khe Sanh, Siege of, 576, 621-623 Khmer Rouge, 633-635 Khomeini, Ruhollah Musawi, 734 Khrushchev, Nikita, 658, 661-662; and Cuban Missile Crisis, 661 Kimmel, Husband Edward, 789 King, Ernest, 441, 472, 789 King’s Mountain, Battle of, 14, 72-73, 75 Kinkaid, Thomas C., 501 Kissinger, Henry, 578, 631, 635; Nobel Peace Prize, 638 Kitchener, Lord, 332 Knox, Henry, 39, 58 Knox, Thomas, 198 Knudsen, William Signius, 437 Knyphausen, Wilhelm von, 56 Korean People’s Army, 560 Korean War, 543-570; air war, 552-555; censorship during, 556-557, 613; MacArthur-Truman confrontation, 561-565; Operation Chromite, 560; Operation Killer, 548; time line, 544 Korean War battles; Imjin River, 565566; Inchon, 559-561; Pork Chop Hill, 566-567; Pusan Perimeter, 558559 Korematsu v. United States, 426 Koster, Samuel W., 625 KPA. See Korean People’s Army Kristallnacht, 452 Kurds, 688-689, 697, 703, 748-749 Kuribayashi, Tadamichi, 515 Kurita, Takeo, 501 Kursk, Battle of, 393; Kuwait; and Gulf War, 686-698; and Iraq, 745 Laden, Osama bin. See Bin Laden, Osama Lafayette, marquis de, 65 La Follette, Robert Marion, 369 Lake Champlain, Battle of, 99, 108110 Lake Erie, Battle of, 97, 103-104 La Luzerne, Chevalier de, 62 Land, Emory Scott, 437
818
Subject Index Land mines, 182, 583, 711-712; World War I, 320 Laos, 573, 577; communism in, 612; creation of, 581; U.S. bombing of, 595, 597 Larkin, Thomas Oliver, 142 Lattre de Tassigny, Jean-Marie-Gabriel de, 400 Laurens, Henry, 79 Le Duc Tho, 635-636; Nobel Peace Prize, 638 League of Nations, 319, 372, 397; creation of, 370; and German rearmament, 398; and United States, 371; and Yalta Conference, 513 Lebanon, 735 Lee, Arthur, 62 Lee, Charles, 13, 20, 67 Lee, Ezra, 44 Lee, Henry, 15, 102, 789 Lee, Robert E., 169, 179, 187, 226, 238, 789; and Antietam, 170, 239-240; and Chancellorsville, 172, 243-244; and Cold Harbor, 256-257; and Fredericksburg, 241-243; and Gettysburg, 245-247; vs. Grant, U.S., 173, 259; and Harpers Ferry, 223; Mexican War, 129, 147; and Petersburg, 258-259; and Second Bull Run, 169; and Seven Days’ Battles, 169, 235-236; and Spotsylvania Court House, 255-256; surrender of, 264-268; and Wilderness battle, 253-254 Lee, Willis A., 504 Lend-Lease Act of 1941, 433, 442-443, 445-446, 453 Lenin, Vladimir Ilich, 315; seizure of power, 309 Leutze, Emanuel, 49 Lexington and Concord, Battle of, 9, 34-35, 37-38 Leyte Gulf, Battle for, 501, 503-507 Libya, 726 Life magazine, 597, 617, 627 Linares Pomba, Arsenio, 281, 290 Lincoln, Abraham, 197, 789; at Antietam, 239; assassination of,
264-268; calls for troops, 191, 201, 225-226; and censorship, 200; and civil liberties, 203; and Civil War, 207-210, 212, 227-229, 260; and conscription, 192-194; and Copperheads, 199; election of, 159; Emancipation Proclamation, 240; and Grant, U.S., 251; and Hooker, Joseph, 245; and McClellan, George B., 238; and National Academy of Sciences, 176; and Navy, 231; on secession, 201, 207; and slavery, 202, 204; and Stowe, Harriet Beecher, 170; and Vallandigham, Clement L., 199, 203 Lincoln, Benjamin, 14, 69-70, 74 Lindh, John Walker, 738 Lippold, Kirk S., 719 Little, Frank, 341 Lloyd George, David, 308, 369-371 Locarno Pact, 397 Lockerbie, Scotland, airliner disaster, 726 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 369, 575 Lon Nol, 577, 631 London Treaty of 1930, 410 Long, John D., 289 Long Island, Battle of, 11, 42-44 Longfellow, Henry Wadsworth, 35 Longstreet, James, 238, 251, 789 Los Alamos, New Mexico, research center, 472 Louis XVI, 62 Lovett, United States v., 424 Ludendorff, Erich, 303, 315; and St. Mihiel, 359 Ludendorff Offensive, 309, 317, 324 Luftwaffe, 390, 414, 416, 418, 512; vs. Royal Air Force, 391, 400 Lundy’s Lane, Battle of, 99 Lusitania, sinking of, 305, 314 Luxembourg; Battle of the Bulge, 507512; World War I, 319; World War II, 507-512, 548 Lvov, Georgy, 315 Mabini, Apolinario, 291-292 McAfee, Mildred, 427
819
The United States at War MacArthur, Douglas, 404, 472, 501, 546, 556-557, 790; and Bataan, 455; and Japanese surrender, 396; and Korea War, 560; and Korean War, 545; and Korean War, 543; Philippines, 394; and Truman, Harry S., 561-565 McCardle, Ex parte, 211; McClellan, George B., 167, 196, 236, 238, 245, 790; and Antietam, 239 McCloy, John J., 457-458 McDade, Robert, 620, 621 Macdonough, Thomas, 108 McDowell, Irvin, 166 McGovern, George, 578 Mackensen, August von, 305 McKinley, William, 289, 291 McNamara, Robert, 619, 658 Madison, James, 115 Maginot line, 325, 397, 399 Mahammad, Ali Mahdi, 704 Mahan, A. T., 409 Maine, USS, 283, 288 Major, John, 701 Manassas. See Bull Run Manchuria; Japanese occupation of, 388, 447; and Korean War, 564; and Soviet Union, 526 Manhattan Project, 468-469, 471-472, 526 Manifest destiny, 123, 149, 153 Mao Zedong, 434; and Korean War, 546 Mariana Islands, 420, 497-498, 500, 516, 523; Guam, 498-499; naval bases in, 496; Saipan, 493-494; Tinian, 500501 Marine Corps, U.S.; women in, 428; World War I, 366; World War II, 488 Marne, Battle of the, 304 Marshall, George C., 364, 790; and Manhattan Project, 471; and North Africa invasion, 477 Marshall Plan, 395 Massachusetts Bay Colony, 28 Massachusetts v. Laird, 603 Masurian Lakes, Battle of, 303, 313 Meade, George G., 255-257, 790; and Gettysburg, 245
Medina, Ernest, 625 Merrimack, USS, 182, 231. See also Virginia, CSS vs. USS Monitor Merryman, Ex parte, 203 Messines Ridge, Battle of, 320 Metcalf, Joseph, 665 Meuse-Argonne Offensive, 310, 360364 Mexican War, 123-131, 156; censorship during, 132-133; map, 127; Mexico’s lost territory, 308; Mormons in, 141; occupation of California, 140-144; and Texas Revolution, 134-140; time line, 124; Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 149-153 Mexican War battles; Alamo, 137-139; Buena Vista, 145-146; Cerro Gordo, 146-148; Chapultepec, 148-149; Monterrey, 144-145; San Jacinto, 140 Mexican-American War. See Mexican War Middle East, and Cold War, 679 Midway, Battle of, 393, 419, 464-465, 467-468, 473 Mikawa, Gunichi, 472 Milam, Benjamin Rush, 138 Military; and Supreme Court, 209; women in the, 605 Military Appropriations Act of 1916, 354 Military courts; Civil War, 203, 209-211; World War II, 424 Military justice; Civil War, 205 Militia Act of 1862, 191 Milligan, Ex parte, 210 Miloseviã, Slobodan, 708, 710 Mines, land. See Land mines Minié, Claude-Étienne, 180 Minutemen, 34, 36 Mississippi v. Johnson, 212 Mitchell, William “Billy,” 359, 361, 790 Mitscher, Marc, 499, 503 Mitterrand, François, 701 Mobilization; Civil War, 226; Gulf War, 698; Spanish-American War, 287; World War I, 348, 354-358; World War II, 401, 437, 439, 441 Molotov, Vyacheslav, 388
820
Subject Index Moltke, Helmuth von, 304, 313 Monitor, USS, vs. CSS Virginia (Merrimack), 182, 190, 230-234 Monmouth, Battle of, 13, 67-68; and Pitcher, Molly, 23 Monroe, James, 115, 647, 790 Monroe Doctrine, 647; and Grenada invasion, 669; Roosevelt Corollary, 649; and World War I, 308 Montagnards, 586 Monterrey, Battle of, 144-145 Montgomery, Bernard Law, 393, 401, 477, 481-482, 486, 488, 518 Montgomery, Richard, 11, 41, 52 Moore, Harold G., 620 Mora v. McNamara, 603 Morgan, Daniel, 15, 74 Morgenthau, Henry J., Jr., 437 Mormon Battalion, 141 Mosley, Cynthia, 699 Mountbatten, Louis, 404 Mudd, Samuel, 267 Muhammad Sahir Shah, 731 Mujahideen; and Afghanistan, 727; and Iraq, 756 Munich Conference, 386, 435 Murphy, Robert Daniel, 479 Murrow, Edward R., 433 Muslims. See Islam Mussolini, Benito, 435, 443, 451, 482; execution of, 394; fall of, 485; and Hitler, Adolf, 452, 483 My Lai massacre, 597, 611, 618, 625-631 Myer, Dillon S., 460 Myers, Richard, 732 Nagasaki, bombing of, 395, 525-529 Napalm; Korean War, 548-549; Vietnam War, 583, 611 Napoleon I, 96, 117; and Leipzig, 110; strategy of, 324; tactics of, 186 Nash, William Lafayette, 710 Nashville, Battle of, 173, 260, 263 National Academy of Sciences, 176 National Defense Act of 1916, 354 National Defense Act of 1920, 368 National Defense Advisory Commission, 438
National Defense Research Council, 470 National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, 410 National Mobilization Law of 1941, 436 National Protective Association, 340 National Security League, 340 Native Americans; in Civil War, 213215; in Revolutionary War, 54-55, 59; in War of 1812, 104-107, 113 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization Naval Expansion Act of 1938, 411 Naval Parity Act of 1934, 410 Naval warfare; Civil War, 165, 182-183, 189, 230-234; Korean War, 545; Mexican War, 128; Revolutionary War, 75; Vietnam War, 586, 615; War of 1812, 93, 96, 100, 103-104, 109; World War I, 320-321 Navarro, José Antonio, 136 Nazi Party, 386 Nazi war criminals, 525 NDRC. See National Defense Research Council Neill, James C., 138 Nelson, Donald Marr, 437 Netherlands; German occupation of, 390; and William II, 311 Neutrality Acts, 443, 452 New Echota Treaty, 213 New Guinea, Battle of, 401 New Jewel Movement, 666 New Mexico; and Mexican War, 123, 141, 150; Mexico’s cession of, 153 New Orleans, Battle of, 99, 110-114, 117 New York Times Co. v. United States, 602 Ngo Dinh Diem, 573, 581 Ngo Quang Troung, 625 Nguyen Huu An, 620 Nguyen Van Thieu, 576, 589 Nicaragua, 658, 669; and Bay of Pigs invasion, 655, 657; U.S. occupation of, 737 Nicholas, Grand Duke, 303 Nicholas II, Czar, 315 Nimitz, Chester W., 394, 404, 516, 791; and Guadalcanal, 472-473, 475, 477;
821
The United States at War and Guam, 498-499; and Leyte Gulf, 501, 503-507; and Midway, 464-465, 467-468; and Okinawa, 517-518 9/11 attacks, 722-728; investigation of, 742; and Iraq, 744; public reaction to, 736; and Qaeda, al-, 737; and war on terrorism, 743 NIRA. See National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 Nivelle, Robert-Georges, 307, 317, 324 Nixon, Richard M., 577, 582, 617, 631, 635, 791; and political dissent, 591592 NJM. See New Jewel Movement “No fly” zone, 701-704 Noriega, Manuel, 671-673 Normandy invasion, 394, 402, 406, 433, 483, 488-489, 491, 493 Norodom Sihanouk, 577 North, Frederick, Lord (second earl of Guilford), 31, 78 North Africa; Operation Torch, 406; World War II, 392-394, 401, 404, 477, 479, 481-482 North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and Afghanistan, 737; and Balkans, 710-713; and Haig, Alexander M., 786 North Atlantic, Battle of, 392, 441-442 North Korea, 741, 744. See also Korean War North Point, Battle of, 109 Northern Alliance (Afghanistan), 737738 Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. North Dakota, 344 Nuclear weapons. See Atomic bomb Nuremberg trials, 525, 610 Nurses; Civil War, 218-219; Revolutionary War, 21-22; Vietnam War, 605; women as, 218; World War I, 347-348 Oakley, Robert B., 704 OAS. See Organization of American States O’Brien, United States v., 600
OECS. See Organization of Eastern Caribbean States OES. See Office of Economic Stabilization Office of Censorship, 431, 613 Office of Economic Stabilization, 439 Office of Production Management, 438 Office of Scientific Research and Development, 470 Office of Strategic Services, 581 Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, 439 Official Secrets Act, U.K., 433 Ogata, Kiyochi, 500 O’Grady, Scott F., 710 Okinawa, Battle of, 517-518 O’Laughlin, Michael, 267 Oldendorf, Jesse, 501 Oliphant, Mark, 471 Omaha Beach, 491 Omar, Mullah, 732 OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Operation Avalanche, 484-485 Operation Barbarossa, 392 Operation Chromite, 560 Operation Desert Crossing, 752 Operation Desert Fox, 718 Operation Desert Saber, 696 Operation Desert Shield, 688, 691, 694695 Operation Desert Storm, 688, 694-695, 700 Operation Enduring Freedom, 728 Operation Galvanic, 487 Operation Huskey, 406 Operation Iraqi Freedom, 746 Operation Just Cause, 671 Operation Killer, 548 Operation Market Garden, 394 Operation Matterhorn, 496, 498 Operation Menu, 582 Operation Overlord, 402, 483, 488-489, 491, 493 Operation Pluto, 655 Operation Restore Hope, 704, 707 Operation Rolling Thunder, 576, 587 Operation Torch, 406, 477, 479, 481-482
822
Subject Index Operation Victory One, 502 OPM. See Office of Production Management Organization of American States, 661, 665 Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, 667 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 686 Oriskany Creek, Battle of, 52-53, 55 Orlando, Vittorio, 369-371 Orlando v. Laird, 603 Osan, Battle of, 545 OSRD. See Office of Scientific Research and Development OSS. See Office of Strategic Services Oswald, Richard, 78 Ottoman Empire; World War I, 305, 318 Overland Campaign, 173, 253-256 Ozawa, Jisaburo, 499 Pacific theater (World War II), 401 Padilla, José, 741 Paine, Lewis, 267 Paine, Thomas, 17, 64 Pakistan, 714-715, 738; nuclear weapons of, 742; and Taliban, 737738 Palo Alto, Battle of, 126 Pan American jetliner downing, 726 Panama, U.S. occupation of, 618, 671673 Panama Canal, 407, 652, 671 Pankhurst, Emmeline, 347 Paredes y Arrillaga, Mariano, 125 Paris, Treaty of (1783), 15, 78-82 Paris, Treaty of (1898), 286 Parker, Peter, 11 Parliament, British; and civil liberties, 7; colonial policies, 16, 29, 33; tax laws, 3, 7, 30 Patriot Act of 2001, 741 Patriot missiles, 697-698, 700 Patton, George S., 394, 482, 507, 791; and North Africa invasion, 477 Paul, Ron, 718 Pea Ridge, Battle of, 214
Pearl Harbor attack, 393, 414, 446-447, 449, 451, 465; and Axis powers, 455; Japanese objectives, 388, 399; public reaction to, 431; U.S. unpreparedness, 402, 412 Peers, William R., 625, 627 Pemberton, John C., 245 Peña y Peña, Manuel de la, 149 Peng Dehuai, 549, 565, 567 Pentagon, terrorist attack on, 722-727 Pentagon Papers, 578, 603, 617 Percussion caps, 180 Perry, Matthew C., 791 Perry, Oliver Hazard, 97, 103, 791 Perryville, Battle of, 168 Pershing, John J., 308, 361-362, 364, 792; and American Expeditionary Force, 309, 360; and Foch, Ferdinand, 361; and press censorship, 335; and Roosevelt, Franklin D., 792; and St. Mihiel, 359; staff work of, 323; and women in military, 348 Persian Gulf War. See Gulf War Pétain, Henri-Philippe, 299, 305, 307, 315, 390; and North Africa invasion, 477, 480 Petersburg, Siege of, 258-259 Petty, William, 78 Philippines, 291-295, 394, 407, 502; Abu Sayyaf insurrection, 742; World War II, 455 Phipps, Anita, 427 Photography; and Bay of Pigs invasion, 655; and Civil War, 175; and Gulf War, 692, 700; and Panama occupation, 673; and Vietnam War, 597, 613, 615, 617, 627 Pickett, George E., 172, 792 Pickett’s Charge, 172 Pierce, Franklin, 153, 792; in Mexican War, 131 Pierce v. United States, 344, 354 Pillow, Gideon, 147, 230 Pilots; Chinese, 554; Cuban Missile Crisis, 656-657; Gulf War, 698-699, 718; helicopter, 699; Japanese, 448, 468, 473; Kamikaze, 395, 502, 507,
823
The United States at War 517; Korean War, 548, 554; Soviet, 548, 554; women, 428, 698-700; World War I, 320-321, 326-327, 329330, 365; World War II, 415, 417, 428, 448, 467-468 Pitcher, Molly, 23 Plan 17 (1914), 317 Plattsburgh, Battle of, 99, 110 Poland; and Iraq War, 746; and Soviet Union, 513; World War I, 305; World War II, 386, 390, 414, 443 Polk, James K., 132; and Mexican War, 125, 127-128, 133, 141, 149-151, 153; and Texas, 125 Pope, John, 169, 237-238, 792 Pork Chop Hill, Battle of, 550, 566-567 Port Moresby, Battle of, 462 Post-Cold War Conflicts, 679-762; time line, 680 Posttraumatic stress disorder, 608 Potsdam Conference, 522-525, 528 POW. See Prisoners of war Powell, Colin, 743, 745, 792; and Iraq War, 739 Prager, Robert, 341 Prescott, William, 40 Presidential powers, 208 Preston, Thomas, 26 Prevost, Augustine, 69 Prevost, George, 99, 108 Price, Byron, 431 Price, Sterling, 241 Princeton, Battle of, 12, 50-51 Prisoners of war; African American, 204; Korean War, 557; Vietnam War, 578 Prize Cases, 208 Propaganda; German, 398; Gulf War, 693; Korean War, 550; Nazi, 434-435; Revolutionary War, 23, 28; Vietnam War, 586; World War I, 313, 316, 335-341; World War II, 433-434, 436 Proslavery argument, 220 Puebla, surrender of, 129 Puerto Rico, 286 Pulitzer, Joseph, 288-289 Pusan Perimeter, 545-546, 552; Battle of the, 558-559, 560
Put-In Bay, Battle of, 104 Putnam, Israel, 44 Qaeda, al-, 723-724, 741; and Afghanistan, 727-732; origin of name, 735; and Saudi Arabia, 737; and Taliban, 737; and war on terrorism, 732-743 Quartering Act of 1765, 3, 7 Quebec, Battle of, 11, 41-42 Queenston Heights, Battle of, 97 Quirin, Ex parte, 424 RAF. See Royal Air Force Railroads, Civil War, 188 Rainbow Plans (World War II), 405 Rains, Gabriel J., 182 Rall, Johann Gottlieb, 48-49 Rathbone, Henry R., 266 Rathbun-Nealy, Melissa, 700 Rather, Dan, 745 Rationing; World War I, 358; World War II, 439 Reagan, Ronald, 618, 792; and Grenada invasion, 666, 669-670 Reconstruction, 210 Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 437 “Red Baron,” 307, 329-330 Red Cross, 349, 607; founding of, 218; International Committee of, 706 Red Scare, 341 Reid Cabral, Donald, 663 Rennenkampf, Pavel, 303 Reparations; and Potsdam Conference, 524; World War I, 311, 370, 386; World War II, 513, 523-525 Republican Motherhood, 25 Republican Party, 115 Resaca de la Palma, Battle of, 126 Revenue Act of 1767. See Townshend Revenue Act of 1767 Revenue Act of 1940, 437 Revere, Paul, 27, 792; midnight ride, 32, 34-35 Revolutionary War, 3-90; Boston Massacre, 26-29, 782; Boston Tea Party, 30-33; British surrender, 74-
824
Subject Index 78; and Canada, 41-42; censorship during, 16-20; and Civil War, 175; Franco-American Treaties, 62-63, 65, 67; major sites (map), 8; submarines, 44-47; time line, 4; Treaty of Paris, 78-82; women in, 21-25 Revolutionary War battles; Brandywine, 56; Bunker Hill, 40-41; Camden, 71-72; Charleston, 70; Concord, 34-38; Cowpens, 73-74; Fort Ticonderoga, 38-39; Germantown, 57-58; King’s Mountain, 72-73; Lexington, 34-38; Long Island, 42-44; Monmouth, 6768; Oriskany Creek, 52-55; Princeton, 50-51; Quebec, 41-42; Saratoga, 58-62; Savannah, 68-70; Trenton, 48-50; White Plains, 47-48; Yorktown, 74-78 Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 388 Rice, Condoleeza, 739, 743 Richthofen, Manfred von, 307, 329 Rickenbacker, Eddie, 329-330 Ridgway, Matthew B., 546, 793; and Korean War, 543, 548 Riga, Battle of, 324 Rivington, James, 19 RNAF. See Royal Naval Air Force Roa, Raúl, 655 Rochambeau, comte de (Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur), 15, 74 Rockingham, Lord (Charles Watson Wentworth), 78 Rodney, George, 77 Rogers, Edith Nourse, 427 ROK. See Republic of Korea Roman Catholics; in Croatia, 709; in Cuba, 657; and just-war theory, 602; and Revolutionary War, 63, 66; in Texas, 134; in Vietnam, 614 Romania; fascism in, 397; World War I, 306, 314, 318; World War II, 418 Rommel, Erwin, 392, 401, 477, 488 Roosevelt, Eleanor, 427 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 793; and air war, 496; and the Axis, 451-452, 454; and Casablanca Conference, 482;
and censorship, 431; and China, 447; and Churchill, Winston S., 521; and conscription, 423, 430; and Gaulle, Charles de, 404; and Japan, 389, 422, 447; and Japanese American internment, 424, 457-458; and LendLease Act, 442-443, 445-446, 453; and Manhattan Project, 468-471; and mobilization, 437-438; and naval power, 412; and Navy, 410411; and North Africa invasion, 477; and Pershing, John J., 792; and Stalin, Joseph, 521; war aims, 733; and women, 430; World War II, 414; and Yalta Conference, 512-515 Roosevelt, Theodore, 285, 291, 793; as an imperialist, 407; and Monroe Doctrine, 649; and Navy, 408-409 Root, Elihu, 793 Rose, Louis, 138 Rosecrans, William S., 168, 241, 251, 793 Ross, Betsy, 22 Ross, Robert, 109 Rossi, Marie T., 699 Rough Riders, 285, 291 Royal Air Force, 323, 327, 414; vs. Luftwaffe, 391, 400 Royal Flying Corps, 326 Royal Naval Air Force, 326 Rumely v. McCarthy, 345 Rumsfeld, Donald H., 740-741, 743, 745-746, 748, 753; critics of, 750 Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von, 488 Rupert v. Caffey, 345 Rush-Bagot Agreement, 117 Rusk, Dean, 611, 656, 658 Russell, Jonathan, 116 Russia; and Triple Entente, 312. See also Soviet Union Russian Revolution, 315, 397 Russo-Japanese War, 322, 324, 407 Sachs, Alexander, 470 Sackett’s Harbor, Battle of, 98 Sadr, Mohammed, 754 Sadr, Muqtada al-, 754, 756 Safer, Morley, 615 Saigon, 580; fall of, 582, 638
825
The United States at War St. Clair, Arthur, 54 St. John’s, siege of, 11 St. Leger, Barry, 52 St. Louis, USS, 183 St. Mihiel, Battle of, 310, 358-359 St. Patrick’s Battalion, 130 Saipan, Battle of, 493-494 Saito, Yoshitsugo, 494 Salerno, Battle of, 485-486 Sampson, Deborah, 22 Sampson, William T., 281 Samsonov, Aleksandr, 303 San Jacinto, Battle of, 123, 139-140 San Juan/El Caney, Battle of, 290-291 San Pasqual, Battle of, 143 Sanborn, Franklin Benjamin, 220 Sanchez, Ricardo, 732, 756 Santa Anna, Antonio López de, 123, 127, 129, 136-138, 149; and the Alamo, 137-138; and Buena Vista, 145-146; and Cerro Gordo, 147; and Chapultepec, 148-149; death of, 131; and San Jacinto, 140; and Texas, 134 Santa Fe Trail, 141 Saratoga, Battle of, 12, 58-59, 61-62 Saudi Arabia; and Afghanistan, 727; censorship in, 692; Gulf War, 688, 691-692, 694; and Iraq, 692; and Kuwait, 687; and al-Qaeda, 737; U.S. troops in, 698 Saulnier, Raymond, 327 Saunders, LaVerne “Blondie,” 494 Savannah, Siege of, 14, 68-70, 174, 262263 Schaefer v. United States, 344 Schenck v. United States, 343, 352 Schlieffen, Alfred von, 313 Schmidt, Harry, 500 Schofield, John, 263 Schuyler, Philip, 53, 60 Schwarzkopf, H. Norman, 692, 793; Gulf War, 694 Scoon, Paul, 668 Scott v. Sandford, 206 Scott, F. A., 354 Scott, Winfield, 98, 127, 132, 147, 149, 187, 196, 226, 794; and Mexican War, 149
Scud missiles, 695-696, 698 SDS. See Students for a Democratic Society Sears, Isaac, 19 Secret Six, 221 Sedgwick, John, 243 Sedition Act of 1798, 101 Sedition Act of 1918, 336, 340, 351 Seeger, United States v., 602 Seldes, George, 335 Selective Draft Law Cases, 423 Selective Service Act of 1940, 453 September 11, 2001, attacks. See 9/11 attacks Serapis, HMS, 14 Serbia; and Russia, 302; World War I, 302, 305, 314, 318 Seven Days’ Battles, 169, 235-236 Seven Pines, Battle of, 168, 182 Seward, William H., 196 Shafter, William R., 281, 290-291 Shawnees and War of 1812, 105 Sheehan, Neil, 615 Shelby, Richard, 718 Shelton, Henry Hugh, 713 Sheridan, Philip H., 794 Sherman, William T., 198, 252, 263, 794; and Chattanooga, 252; and Johnston, Joseph Eggleston, 173; march to the sea, 173, 179, 190, 259264; and Savannah, 262; and Vicksburg, 247 Shibasaki, Keiji, 487 Shiloh, Battle of, 167, 234-235, 240 Siad Barré, Mahammad, 704 Sibuyan Sea, Battle of the, 504 Sicily, Allied invasion of, 406, 481-483, 485 Sidle Commission, 670 Sihanouk, Norodom, 631 Simpson, Alan, 693 Singapore, Battle of, 393, 401 Sino-Japanese War, 388, 434 Sistani, Ayatollah, 754 Slavery, 201; and Civil War, 159, 165, 170, 201-202, 206-207; and conscription, 342; and conscription in Confederacy, 193; Emancipation
826
Subject Index Proclamation, 170, 202; fugitive slaves, 202, 207; and Lincoln, Abraham, 202, 204; in Mexico, 134; in Texas, 123. See also Abolitionism Slidell, John, 125 Sloat, John D., 128, 143 Slocum, Henry Warner, 259 Smith, Erastus “Deaf,” 140 Smith, Gerrit, 221 Smith, Henry, 138 Smith, Holland M., 488, 494 Smith, Leighton W., Jr., 710 Smith, Samuel, 109 Smith Act of 1940, 431 Smithsonian Institution, 529 SNCC. See Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Socialist Party, 352 Somalia, U.N. occupation of, 704-707 Somme, Battle of the, 306, 314 Sons of Liberty, 19, 28-29, 203 Soviet State Security Committee (KGB), 661 Soviet Union; and Afghanistan, 727, 735; and Cuban Missile Crisis, 658662; dissolution of, 396; German invasion of, 393; World War II, 381, 397, 404, 420. See also Russia Spad S. VIII fighter, 329 Spain; and American Revolution, 67, 79, 81; and Iraq War, 745; and Spanish-American War, 281-291, 296; terrorist bombing in, 741; World War II, 387 Spangler, Edward, 267 Spanish-American relations, 67, 79 Spanish-American War, 281-296; censorship during, 288-289; and Philippine insurrection, 291-295; San Juan/El Caney, 290-291; time line, 282; U.S. mobilization, 287 Spanish Civil War, 398, 435, 443 Speech, freedom of, 600 Spock, Benjamin, 596 Spotsylvania Court House, Battle of, 173, 255-257, 264 Sprague, Clifton A. F., 501 Spruance, Raymond A., 487, 516, 794
Spruce Goose (airplane), 440 Stalin, Joseph, 518; and censorship, 433; and German-Soviet Pact, 387-388; and Korean War, 543; and Potsdam Conference, 522-525; purges of, 398; and Roosevelt, Franklin D., 521; and “second front,” 394, 478; and Yalta Conference, 512-515 Stalingrad, Battle of, 393 Stamp Act Congress, 3 Stamp Act of 1765, 3, 28, 30 Stanton, Edwin M., 192, 197-198, 264, 794 Stanton, Elizabeth Cady, 216 Stanton, Frank, 616 Stearns, George Luther, 221 Stephens, Alexander Hamilton, 265 Steuben, Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von, 13, 67 Stevenson, Adlai, 655 Stimson, Henry L., 457-458, 525, 527, 794; and Manhattan Project, 471 Stoehr v. Wallace, 345 Stokes, Rose Pastor, 352 Stones River, Battle of, 168 Stony Creek, Battle of, 98 Storey, Wilbur, 199 Stowe, Harriet Beecher, 170 Strategic bombing; Germans in World War II, 414; Gulf War, 695; World War I, 329 Streeter, Ruth Cheney, 428 Stuart, Alexander, 15 Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, 590 Students for a Democratic Society, 590, 596 Submarines; Civil War, 183; Revolutionary War, 44-45, 47; World War I, 304, 315, 320, 323, 335; World War II, 390, 441 Sudan, U.S. missile attack on, 713-716 Sudetenland crisis, 398 Sugar Act of 1764, 3, 28 Sullivan, John, 55 Sullivan’s Island, Battle of, 11 Supreme Court, U.S.; and Civil War, 206-212; and Japanese American
827
The United States at War internment, 461; and slavery, 206207; and suspect terrorists, 741; and Vietnam War, 600-604; and World War I, 342-345; and World War II, 422-423, 425-426 Surigao Strait, Battle of, 505 Surratt, Mary E., 267 Swinton, Ernest, 321 Symbolic speech, 601 Szilard, Leo, 469 Tactical air combat; Korean War, 554 Taejon, Battle of, 545 Taft, William Howard, 291; in the Philippines, 295 Taliban, 724; assumption of power, 735; and bin Laden, Osama, 736; overthrow of, 716, 727-732, 737-738; and Pakistan, 737-738; and Qaeda, al-, 737 Taney, Roger Brooke, 203, 206-207, 209 Tanks; South Vietnamese, 585; World War I, 306, 321; World War II, 403 Tannenberg, Battle of, 303, 313 Tanzania, 726 Taos Rebellion, 142 Tarawa, Battle of, 487-488 Tarleton, Banastre, 74 Taylor, Maxwell, 567, 575, 660 Taylor, Zachary, 125, 129-130, 145, 794; and Mexican War, 149 Tea Act of 1773, 31 Tecumseh, 105, 795 Teheran Conference, 522 Teller, Edward, 470 Terrorism; and Afghanistan, 713-716, 727-732; attack on USS Cole, 719721; and Cuba, 668; and Iraq, 744, 746, 749-750; 9/11 attacks, 722-727; and Sudan, 713-716; U.S. war on, 732-743; and Viet War, 582, 607; and Zeppelins, 307 Test Oath Cases, 210 Tet Offensive, 576, 582, 588, 616, 622624 Texan War of Independence, 123 Texas; annexation of, 149; slavery in, 134
Texas Revolution, 134-137; Battle of Alamo, 137-139; Battle of San Jacinto, 140; map, 127; timeline, 124 Texas v. Johnson, 603 Texas v. White, 212 Thames, Battle of the, 97, 104-107 Thatcher, Margaret, 668 Thayer, H. E., 196 Thayer, Sylvanus, 795 Thieu, Nguyen Van, 635 Thomas, George H., 171, 251-253, 260, 263, 795 Thompson, Hugh, 625, 627 Thrasher, J. S., 200 Thurman, Maxwell, 672 Tibbets, Paul W., 526 Tinian, Battle of, 500-501 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 600 Tippee, Mary, 217 Tonkin Gulf. See Gulf of Tonkin resolution Townshend, Charles, 7 Townshend Revenue Act of 1767, 28, 30 Toyoda, Soemu, 502 Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 336, 431 Trafalgar, Battle of, 95 Travis, William Barret, 138, 783 Treaties. See under names of specific treaties Trench warfare, 188, 320; World War I, 304, 313 Trenton, Battle of, 12, 48-50 Tripartite Pact, 447 Triple Alliance, 312 Triple Entente (Britain, Russia, France), 299, 312 Trujillo Molina, Rafael Leónidas, 663 Truman, Harry S., 437, 518, 556, 581, 795; and atomic bomb, 523, 525, 527, 529; and Japanese surrender, 528; and Korean War, 545; and MacArthur, Douglas, 561-565; and Potsdam Conference, 522-525; and Soviet Union, 521
828
Subject Index Trumbull, John, 42, 61 Tubman, Harriet, 216 Tudjman, Franjo, 708, 710 Turkey; and Iraq War, 746 Turner, Richmond Kelly, 473 Turtle (submarine), 44, 47 Tydings-McDuffie Act (1934), 295 U-2 incident, 662 ULTRA, 463 U.N. See United Nations “Uncle Sam,” 339 Uncle Tom’s Cabin (Stowe), 170 Underground Railroad, 216 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See Soviet Union United Nations; and atomic bomb, 527; and Bay of Pigs invasion, 655; charter convention, 515; and conflict resolution, 545; and Gulf War, 687, 690, 694, 744; and Iraq War, 739; and Somalia, 706; weapons inspectors, 702, 739, 744 United Revolutionary Front, 653 United Services Organization, 607 United States Colored Troops, 204 USCT. See United States Colored Troops Ushijima, Mitsuru, 517 USO. See United Services Organization Vallandigham, Clement L., 199, 203 Vallandigham, Ex parte, 210 Valley Forge, 13 Van Dorn, Earl, 241 Van Fleet, James, 565 Vandegrift, Alexander Archer, 473 V-E Day, 518-522 Veracruz, Battle of, 129 Verdun, Battle of, 305 Vergennes, comte de (Charles Gravier), 62, 78 Versailles, Treaty of (1919), 311, 318, 369-374, 386, 397 Veterans Day, 363 Vichy France, 381, 390, 433, 479 Vicksburg, Battle of, 245-251 Vicksburg, Siege of, 171
Viet Cong, 582, 635 Viet Minh, 581 Vietinghoff, Heinrich von, 486 Vietnam Veterans Memorial, 608 Vietnam War, 557-644, 691; anti-war movement, 590-594; censorship during, 613-618, 620; draft protests, 591, 597-598, 601, 609; ethics of, 609612; Gulf of Tonkin incident, 619620; journalist casualties, 670; justice during, 595-599; map, 579; My Lai massacre, 625-631; Operation Menu, 582; Operation Rolling Thunder, 576, 587; and the Supreme Court, 600-604; tactics and strategies, 581-589; time line, 574; U.S. withdrawal, 635-638; Vietnamization, 582, 588, 592, 631; weapons, 583; women in, 605-608 Vietnam War battles; Cambodia, 631635; Hue, 624-625; Ia Drang Valley, 620-621; Khe Sanh of, 621-622; Tet Offensive, 622-624 Vietnam Women’s Memorial, 608 Vietnamization policy, 577, 582, 588, 592, 631 Vinson Naval Parity Act of 1934, 410 Vinson Naval Parity Act of 1938, 411 Vinson, Carl, 410 Virginia (Merrimack), CSS, vs. USS Monitor, 182, 190, 230-234 Virginia Resolution, 101 Vittorio Veneto, Battle of, 318 V-J day, 526 Vo Nguyen Giap, 576, 585, 622-623 WAAC. See Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps WAC. See Women’s Army Corps WAF. See Women in the Air Force Wainright, Jonathan, 795 Walker, Walton, 558, 560 Wallace, Henry Agard, 471 War Industries Board, 354 War of 1812, 93-120; Baltimore, 109-110; battles in the south (map), 97; battles in the north (map), 98; censorship during, 101-102; Lake
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The United States at War Champlain, 108-109; Lake Erie, 103; New Orleans, 110-114; Thames, 104-107; time line, 94; Treaty of Ghent, 115-118 War on terrorism, 732-743 War Powers Act of 1917, 431 War Powers Act of 1973, 580, 593, 595, 737 War Production Board, 438 War Prohibition Cases, 345 War Relocation Authority, 458 War Resources Board, 438 Warneford, R. A. J., 326 Warner, Seth, 39 Warren, Earl, 457, 600 Warren, John Borlase, 100 Washington, George, 3, 39, 55, 59, 795; and Brandywine, 12, 56; and Bunker Hill, 10; crossing of Delaware, 12, 48; and Germantown, 57-58; and Lee, Charles, 20; and Long Island, 11, 42-44; and Monmouth, 13, 67-68; and Princeton, 50-51; and Ross, Betsy, 22; and submarines, 45; and Trenton, 12, 48-50; at Valley Forge, 13; and White Plains, 47-48; on women, 23; and Yorktown, 15, 7478 Washington, William Augustine, 73 WASP. See Women’s Airforce Service Pilots Watergate affair, 638 Watie, Stand, 213, 796 WAVES. See Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service Wayne, Anthony, 796 Weapons; and Afghan war, 729; Civil War, 179; Vietnam War, 583; World War I, 319; World War II, 402 Weapons of mass destruction, 739, 744, 750 Welles, Gideon, 182 Wellington, duke of, 108, 117 Welsh v. United States, 602 Wentworth, Benning, 29 Wessin y Wessin, Elías, 664 West Point, 185
Western front, 303 Westmoreland, William, 575, 622-623, 782, 796 Weyand, Frederick, 623 Weygand, Maxime, 403 Weyler, Valeriano, 281 White Plains, Battle of, 12, 47-48 Whitney, Courtney, 546 WIB. See War Industries Board Wigner, Eugene, 469 Wilderness, Battle of the, 173, 253-254, 257, 264 Wilhelm II. See William II Willard, Daniel, 354 William I (Prussia), 312 William II (Germany), 310, 312; abdication of, 316 Williams, R. S., 182 Wilson, Woodrow, 335, 337, 344, 354, 357, 369, 371, 796; and armistice, 364; and Big Four, 370; and Congress, 355; declaration of war, 308, 733; Fourteen Points, 311, 316, 347, 369-370, 372; and Lusitania, 314; and Navy, 409 Wise, Henry Alexander, 220 WMD. See Weapons of mass destruction Wolfe, Kenneth B., 494 Wolff, Karl, 485 Wolfowitz, Paul, 745 Women; in Afghanistan, 732; in Central Intelligence Agency, 607; in Civil War, 216-219; and conscription, 430, 700; Gulf War, 698-702; Revolutionary War, 21, 23, 25; Vietnam War, 605-608; World War I, 346-350; World War II, 394, 427, 429-430 Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service, 427, 605 Women in the Air Force, 605 Women’s Airforce Service Pilots, 428 Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, 430 Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps, 427 Women’s Army Corps, 427, 605 Women’s Peace Party, 347
830
Subject Index Women’s Reserve in the Marine Corps, 605 Wool, John E., 127 Worden, John, 231 World Trade Center, terrorist attacks on, 722-728 World War I, 299-378, 381; aftermath, 397; air war, 326-331; Allied offensives on the Western Front (map), 303; armed aircraft, 326; Armistice, 317, 363-364; Axis Powers, 312, 314-315; censorship during, 332-336, 338-339, 364; conscription, 422; de-mobilization, 364-369; early losses, 328; and Espionage Act, 351-354; propaganda, 337-341; Russian mobilization, 302, 313; and Supreme Court, 342-345; tactics and strategies, 312-325; theaters, 331; time line, 300; Treaty of Versailles, 369-374; U.S. mobilization, 348, 354358; weapons, 319; and women, 346-350 World War I battles; Meuse-Argonne, 360-364; St. Mihiel, 358-359 World War II, 381-539; air war, 414-421; Axis Powers, 381, 393, 451; background, 414; bombing of Japan, 494-498, 525-529; casualties, 420; censorship during, 431-436, 613-614; Japanese American internment, 457-462; Japanese American relocation, 424-426; journalist casualties, 670; and LendLease Act, 442-446; and Manhattan Project, 468-472; naval war, 407-413; Operation Avalanche, 484-485; Operation Barbarossa, 392; Operation Galvanic, 487; Operation Market Garden, 394; Operation Matterhorn, 496-498; Operation Overlord, 402, 483, 488-493; Operation Torch, 406; Operation Victory One, 502; rationing in,
439; and Supreme Court, 422-426; tactics and strategies, 397-406; time line, 382; U.S. entry, 414, 451-455; U.S. mobilization, 437-441; weapons, 402; women in, 427-430 World War II battles; Bataan, 455-456; Coral Sea, 462-464; Guadalcanal, 472-477; Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 494-498, 525-529; Italy, 482-485; Midway, 464-468; Normandy, 488493; North Africa, 477-482; North Atlantic, 441-442; Operation Overlord, 488-491, 493; Pearl Harbor, 446-451; Salerno, 485-486; Sicily, 482-485; Tarawa, 487-488; World War II; U.S. entry, 451-455 Worth, William, 126 WRA. See War Relocation Authority WRB. See War Resources Board Yakus v. United States, 426 Yalta Conference, 512-515, 522 Yamamoto, Isoroku, 446, 465 Yamashita, In re, 424 Yamato, sinking of, 517 Yellow fever, 268 Yemen, 719-721 YMCA. See Young Men’s Christian Association YWCA. See Young Women’s Christian Association York, Battle of, 98 Yorktown, Battle of, 15, 74-78 Young Men’s Christian Association, 349 Young Women’s Christian Association, 347 Ypres, First Battle of, 304 Ypres, Second Battle of, 307 Zarqawi, Jamil Sidqi al-, 756 Zeppelins, 307, 321 Zhou Enlai, 434 Zimmermann telegram, 308, 315 Zulby, John, 67
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