The United States and Cambodia, 1969–2000
Beginning with the restoration of diplomatic relations between the United St...
21 downloads
548 Views
1MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
The United States and Cambodia, 1969–2000
Beginning with the restoration of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cambodia in 1969, this book is the first to systematically explore the controversial issues and events surrounding the relationship between the two countries in the latter half of the twentieth century. The United States and Cambodia, 1969–2000 traces how the secret bombing of Cambodia, the coup which overthrew Prince Sihanouk, and the American invasion of Cambodia in 1970 led to a brutal civil war followed by the savagery of the Khmer Rouge “killing fields.” Clymer carefully examines the American role in these tragic events before analyzing the American response to the Vietnamese invasion in 1978 that finally drove the Khmer Rouge from power. The book highlights how hostility to the government installed by the Vietnamese led the United States to attempt to undermine it by assisting the Cambodian resistance forces. It closes with an examination of the key role the United States played in the United Nationsassisted settlement of the Cambodian problem in the early 1990s. The companion volume to this book, The United States and Cambodia, 1870–1969, explores from the first American relations with Cambodia, through the Cold War era, up until the late 1960s. Based on extensive archival research in the United States, Australia, and Cambodia, this is the most comprehensive account of the United States’ troubled relationship with Cambodia and will be of enormous interest to scholars of Southeast Asia, U.S. diplomatic history and U.S. foreign policy. Kenton Clymer is Chair of the History Department at Northern Illinois University, USA and was formerly Professor of History at the University of Texas at El Paso, USA. He is the author of Quest for Freedom: The United States and India’s Independence (1995) and other books that focus on American relations with Asia.
RoutledgeCurzon Studies in the Modern History of Asia
1 The Police in Occupation Japan Control, corruption and resistance to reform Christopher Aldous
12 Japan’s Postwar Economic Recovery and Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1948–1962 Noriko Yokoi
2 Chinese Workers A new history Jackie Sheehan
13 Japanese Army Stragglers and Memories of the War in Japan, 1950–1975 Beatrice Trefalt
3 The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya 4 The Australia-Japan Political Alignment 1952 to the present Alan Rix 5 Japan and Singapore in the World Economy Japan’s economic advance into Singapore, 1870–1965 Shimizu Hiroshi and Hirakawa Hitoshi 6 The Triads as Business Yiu Kong Chu 7 Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism A-chin Hsiau 8 Religion and Nationalism in India The case of the Punjab Harnik Deol 9 Japanese Industrialisation Historical and cultural perspectives Ian Inkster 10 War and Nationalism in China, 1925–1945 Hans J. van de Ven 11 Hong Kong in Transition One country, two systems Edited by Robert Ash, Peter Ferdinand, Brian Hook and Robin Porter
14 Ending the Vietnam War The Vietnamese communists’ perspective Ang Cheng Guan 15 The Development of the Japanese Nursing Profession Adopting and adapting western influences Aya Takahashi 16 Women’s Suffrage in Asia Louise Edwards 17 The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902–1922 Phillips Payson O’Brien 18 The United States and Cambodia, 1870–1969 From curiosity to confrontation Kenton Clymer 19 Capitalist Restructuring and the Pacific Rim Ravi Arvind Palat 20 The United States and Cambodia, 1969–2000 A troubled relationship Kenton Clymer 21 British Business in Post-Colonial Malaysia, 1957–70 ‘Neo-colonialism’ or ‘disengagement’? Nicholas J. White 22 The Rise and Decline of Thai Absolutism Kullada Kesboonchoo Mead
The United States and Cambodia, 1969–2000 A troubled relationship
Kenton Clymer
First published 2004 by RoutledgeCurzon 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2004 Kenton Clymer All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Clymer, Kenton J. The United States and Cambodia, 1969–2000 : a troubled relationship / Kenton J. Clymer. p. cm. – (RoutledgeCurzon studies in the modern history of Asia; 18) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. United States–Foreign relations–Cambodia. 2. Cambodia–Foreign relations–United States. 3. United States–Foreign relations–1945–1989. 4. United States–Foreign relations–1989– I. Title. II. Series. E183.8.C15C573 2004 327.730596’09’045–dc22 2003018367 ISBN 0-203-35848-1 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-41541-8 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0–415–32602–8 (Print edition)
To John McAuliff and Bill Herod
Contents
Acknowledgments Abbreviations used in notes Map of Cambodia
1
ix xi xiii
Prologue
1
Richard Nixon and Cambodia: diplomatic relations and bombs
4
2
Sticking with Lon Nol
43
3
Dénouement: Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger, and the fall of Cambodia
86
4
Jimmy Carter, human rights, and Cambodia
113
5
Toward a new beginning
138
Conclusion
171
Notes Bibliography Index
174 214 218
Acknowledgments
All authors accumulate numerous intellectual debts as they prepare their books. I am no exception. The book’s inspiration goes back to 1988 when John McAuliff, director of the U.S.–Indochina Reconciliation Project, invited me to join a group visiting Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Taking place at a time when few Americans were in any of these Indochinese countries (an American trade embargo on Vietnam and Cambodia was still in place), the trip stimulated my interest in seriously exploring American involvement with Cambodia. Though intensely interested in what were then important current developments in the relationship, I was determined to put the relationship in its larger historical perspective. I am most grateful to John for the invitation and for his subsequent insights about Cambodia and American involvement there. I am also deeply grateful to Bill Herod, who in 1989 as director of Indochina Project, then a program of the Fund for Peace in Washington, D.C., invited me to work with him during the summer of 1989. I learned much about contemporary issues affecting U.S.–Cambodian relations and the legislative process and wrote my first article on U.S.–Cambodian relations using the project’s collections. Bill subsequently has served with a number of organizations in Cambodia itself, including the American Friends Service Committee, and kindly hosted me there on several occasions. The materials in the AFSC library in Phnom Penh were helpful. Bill was instrumental in obtaining permission for me to do research in the Cambodian National Archives. To John and Bill this book is gratefully dedicated. Several scholars of Cambodia – especially Ben Kiernan, David Chandler, Craig Etcheson, and Steve Heder – have generously responded to inquiries and read draft chapters, papers, and articles. Several non-Cambodian specialists have also commented on various parts of the manuscript, including Pamela Sodhy, Bradford Perkins, Carl T. Jackson, David H. Anderson, Zhai Qiang, Anne L. Foster, Shelton Woods, David Schalk, Cary Fraser, Gary Hess, Ross Marley, Nick Cullather, and Charles Ambler. The anonymous readers for Routledge provided valuable insights that improved the manuscript. To all of them I express my gratitude, while relieving them of any responsibilities for errors of fact or interpretation or other flaws in the book. Australian Ambassador Noël St. Clair Deschamps flew from Melbourne to Canberra so that I could interview him for parts of two days. His memory of
x Acknowledgments persons and events in the 1960s was extraordinary, and he also gave me some relevant documents and articles. I am most grateful to him. Ambassador Charles Twining took time from his busy schedule for an interview in Phnom Penh, while Ambassador Kenneth Quinn critiqued portions of my manuscript and responded to numerous inquiries. Sorya Sim of the Cambodian Documentation Project in Phnom Penh graciously shared with me many relevant documents from the project’s collection. Sally Benson discussed recent Cambodian developments and shared documents with me. Carlos Cartlidge, who served in Vietnam with the Special Forces, discussed his experiences with me and shared photographs of Khmer Serei soldiers. While teaching in Germany in 1992–3 my able assistant, Volker Depkat, photocopied numerous clippings for me. Cindy Flores, a student at the University of Texas at El Paso, brought my attention to articles about the Khmer Rouge. The late Ruth Arrowsmith sent me many newspaper clippings of value. David Hackett answered my computer questions. To all these people I express my most profound gratitude. No history books can be written without the use of archives and libraries. In the United States I am most grateful to the staffs at National Archives II (and particularly to archivist Milt Gustafson), and at the Lyndon B. Johnson, Gerald R. Ford, and Jimmy Carter Presidential Libraries. Similarly the staff at the Christian and Missionary Alliance Archives in Colorado Springs was most helpful. I was ably assisted in Cambodia by Lim Ky at the Cambodian National Archives. I want to especially single out Gay Hogan of the National Archives of Australia for her dedicated assistance during my three visits to Canberra. I am grateful for her help and for her continued interest in calling my attention to relevant materials. I am also grateful to the several funding agencies that helped defray the costs of research. These include the National Endowment for the Humanities, which graciously provided both a Summer Stipend and the year-long Grant for College Teachers; the Rockefeller Foundation which invited my wife and me, as well as Sorya Sim, to spend a month at the foundation’s beautiful Bellagio Study Center in Italy where I wrote the first draft of the chapter on the Carter administration; and Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library which provided a travel grant. The University of Texas at El Paso, my academic home when most of this book was written, assisted me in numerous ways, most notably with a year-long Faculty Development Grant. The university’s excellent history department was always supportive of my research. A Fulbright grant to teach at the University of Indonesia in 1990–1 allowed me to gain Southeast Asian perspectives on the intense efforts to arrive at a settlement in Cambodia, including reading the considerable coverage of the events by the Jakarta Post. An earlier version of Chapter 4 appeared previously as “Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and Cambodia,” Diplomatic History 27 (April 2003), 145–78, and is incorporated here in revised form with permission. Finally, I am as always grateful to my wife Marlee, who has not only lived with this project for years but read draft after draft, assisted with research, and gave me encouragement along the way.
Abbreviations used in notes
Carter Papers CIA CINCPAC CMAA CNO CO DCC EXAF FO Ford Papers FRUS Hutchinson Papers JCS Johnson Papers NAII NAA NAC Nessen Papers NPM NSC OCB OF PSF
Jimmy Carter Papers, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, GA Central Intelligence Agency Comander in Chief, Pacific Christian and Missionary Alliance Archives, Colorado Springs, CO Chief of Naval Operations Country Documentation Center of Cambodia records, Phnom Penh, Cambodia External Affairs Office (Canberra, Australia, unless otherwise indicated) Foreign Office Gerald R. Ford Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office) Edward Hutchinson Papers, Gerald Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI Joint Chiefs of Staff Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, TX National Archives II, College Park, MD National Archives of Australia, Canberra National Archives of Cambodia, Phnom Penh Ron Nessen Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives II, College Park, MD National Security Council Operations Control Board Official File President’s Secretary’s File
xii Abbreviations RG SNF SS USDS WHCF WHO
Record Group Subject Numeric File Secretary of State U.S. Department of State White House Central File White House Office
50 miles
Figure 1 Map of Cambodia
0
100 km
Mo unt ains
Bay of Kompong Som
SIHANOUKVILLE (KOMPONG SOM)
4
Sre Ambel
KOH KONG
5
6
Kompomg Kirirom Speu
KOMPONG SPEU
Kep
Kampot
KAMPOT
3
13
Kratie
TAKEO
Dak Dam
VIETNAM
Sen Monaram
MONDOL KIRI
Lamphat
Andaung Pich Boung Long
RATANAKIRI
Vouensai
LAOS
Snoul Kompong Cham Moream Tiek Mimot Koh Oudang Rokor 7 Scatum Phnom PREY VENG Penh Anlong Kres Prey Veng Kompong Trach KANDAL Neak Luong SVAY Thlork 1 RIENG TaeyBavet Takeo Prey Tuol Svay Rieng Chantrea Svay A Ngong
Kompong Trach
Pich Nil Pass
Stung Treng
STUNG TRENG
Siempang
KRATIE
KOMPONG CHAM
Kompong Thom
KOMPONG THOM
KOMPONG CHHNANG
4
12
PREAH VIHEAR
Thbeng Mean Chey
Cheom Ksan
Kompong Trabek
Kompong Chhnang
Pursat
PURSAT
Kompong Som (Sihanoukville)
Koh Tang
rda mo m
Krong Koh Kong
Ca
Samlaut
Moung Roessei
Tonle Sap (The Great Lake)
Siem Reap
Angkor
SIEM REAP
Phnom Koulen
Preah Vihear
Sap
50
Gulf of Siam
Pailin
10
BATTAMBANG
Battambang
Sisophon
Poipet
BANTEAY MEANCHEY
Ampil
Anlong Veng
le
0
4
Samrong
THAILAND
ng ko Me
National capital Province capital Town, village Highway numbers
n To
Bassac
Prologue
This book examines Cambodian–American relations during the last third of the twentieth century, a period that saw Cambodia nearly destroyed. It was a period where American policy mattered – and often with very negative consequences. The United States has taken a significant official interest in Cambodia only since World War II, but informal contacts reached back into the nineteenth century. Cambodia itself has a much longer history than has the United States. Though now a small Southeast Asian country, a thousand years ago it was the most powerful kingdom on mainland Southeast Asia. Its capital at Angkor included the most magnificent buildings anywhere in Southeast Asia – or for that matter in the world. Up to one million people lived in the immediate vicinity, and the Angkorean monarchs exercised power far and wide. But by the fifteenth century the empire, under pressure from the Siamese to the west, the Vietnamese to the northeast and the Chams to the south, declined. Angkor was largely abandoned, and the Cambodian court moved south, establishing a new capital in the vicinity of Phnom Penh. In the nineteenth century the kingdom was so weak that it was in many respects a vassal of the more powerful Vietnamese and Thais. The French entered Cambodia in the midnineteenth century and made it a part of French Indochina, the other parts consisting of Laos and the three Vietnamese divisions of Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina.1 Since the Americans were great seafarers in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century it is not impossible that Americans called at Phnom Penh at an early date. But the first American known to have visited the kingdom was Frank Vincent, Jr., an adventurer who in 1871–2 explored the recently “discovered” Angkor, traveling there by boat, horse, bullock cart, and elephant. His immensely popular account of his adventures, published as The Land of the White Elephant in 1872, is still available.2 Only a handful of American adventurers followed Vincent into Cambodia for the rest of the century, but in the twentieth century tourism increased, and many Americans joined the pilgrimage to Angkor, now made easier with the development of automobiles and good roads. Others came as big game hunters, and a few engaged in trade. They were joined in 1923 by missionaries from the Christian and Missionary Alliance, the only Americans actually to live in
2
Prologue
Cambodia for any length of time. Their presence was small, however, and in the years before World War II relatively insignificant. There was no American diplomatic presence in the kingdom, although representatives from the consulate in Saigon sometimes traveled to Cambodia and filed reports. What these early contacts did, however, was to create an image of Cambodians as none too capable beings living under a comic opera court. This was, of course, a commonplace western image in those days of most nonwestern lands, all of which were apparently populated by ignorant, lazy natives. There were, of course, some countervailing images, but this was the generally accepted stereotype. Most thought it was good that the French were there to maintain order and, more importantly, to bring modern civilization to a backward land. And it must be presumed that when the United States began to take an official interest in Cambodian developments in the late 1940s these images affected American perceptions and policies. Official interest developed in the wake of World War II. There were essentially two issues. The first involved the anticolonial pressures and revolutions that engulfed much of the colonial world in the wake of the war. In the case of Indochina, Franklin Roosevelt, taking issue with the often expressed view that colonialism was needed, rebuked the French by saying that the people of Indochina were worse off after 100 years of French rule. There were thus some pressures to get the French to retire from the area, if not immediately then after a period of transition. Americans so inclined often cited the American decision to free the Philippines after nearly a half century of tutelage as a good example for European colonial powers. But this tendency soon had to compete with another development: the beginning of the Cold War that pitted the United States and its allies against the perceived dangers of international communism. Though anticolonial sentiment continued to inform American policy, anticommunism generally overwhelmed it in the battle of ideas and in the formation of policy. When the United States established diplomatic recognition of Cambodia in 1950, it did so not so much to contest French colonialism as to protect Southeast Asia (and its own interests) from communist expansion. The Americans did recognize that continued French rule might alienate the populace, however, and so they urged the French to make concessions. But they feared armed resistance against them and were very uncomfortable when in 1953 the King, Norodom Sihanouk, whom the French first installed in 1941, led a “royal crusade” to oust his former patrons. Despite American fears Sihanouk succeeded, and by 1954 Cambodia was genuinely independent. The United States upgraded its diplomatic presence to an embassy. Thereafter relations with Sihanouk (who abdicated his throne so that he could take a more active part in politics and who effectively controlled the country for the next 16 years) were often marked by controversy. Part of it could be traced to Sihanouk’s anger at condescending treatment from American ambassadors and the American press. But fundamentally the United States
Prologue 3 could never quite find an acceptable way to accommodate to Sihanouk’s insistence that his country would follow a neutral, non-aligned path. As the war in neighboring Vietnam heated up in the 1960s, it became even more difficult for the two countries to maintain close ties. Sihanouk had always thought that American intervention in Vietnam had been a mistake, and in 1963 he ended all American aid. In 1964 there was a violent demonstration at the American embassy, and the following year, after another such demonstration, the Prince broke relations. The immediate cause was a cross-border air attack on a Cambodian village – one of hundreds of such raids over the past several years. For the next four years there were no diplomatic relations. The Australian embassy and its distinguished ambassador, Noël St. Clair Deschamps, handled American affairs in Phnom Penh. Despite the lack of ties, Deschamps had plenty to do as the quickly escalating war in Vietnam often spilled over into Cambodia. In January 1968 there were serious discussions between an American representative, Chester Bowles, and Sihanouk, about improving relations. Sihanouk credited Lyndon Johnson with keeping the real hawks at bay, including those in the military who had long wanted to invade his country to destroy Viet Cong and North Vietnamese sanctuaries there, and he hoped to reestablish relations while Johnson was President, rather than with the “wicked” Richard Nixon, as he once described the incoming President. But it was not to be. Instead, in one of those interesting international ironies, it was Richard Nixon, who had long been sympathetic to military desires to go into Cambodia, who made the concessions necessary to restore relations – although that did not prevent intensive American bombing of Cambodia and an invasion. The stage was set for tragedy.3
1
Richard Nixon and Cambodia Diplomatic relations and bombs
We have reported over recent months the instances of military leaks, particularly from MACV in Saigon, which have apparently been designed to impede the process of resumption of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cambodia. Report from the Australian Embassy in Washington, D.C., July 1969 American and South Vietnamese forces are entering Cambodia to destroy “the headquarters for the entire communist military operation in South Vietnam.” President Richard Nixon, speech to the nation, 30 April 1970 It was never our plan to capture COSVN. We didn’t expect it and it would be a stroke of luck if we did. General John Vogt, 12 May 19701
On 21 January 1969 Richard Nixon became President and continued the effort to improve relations with Cambodia. He was excited when on 31 January the new ambassador from Singapore, who was close to Sihanouk, told him that the Cambodian leader had “warm feelings” for him, and Nixon in turn expressed his warm regard for the Cambodian leader.2 About the same time William Rogers, the new secretary of state, advised the President that Southeast Asians would view a resumption of relations as indicating that Sihanouk now thought the United States would prevail in Vietnam. An embassy in Phnom Penh would also allow for better intelligence collection. Significantly, Rogers rejected Department of Defense objections (the department feared that a resumption of relations would limit its options in Cambodia) on the grounds that renewed relations would inhibit “only major new military actions of a kind which I do not think we should take in any case.”3 The new National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, concurred. The President immediately wrote to Sihanouk that he hoped for progress in resolving differences. Sihanouk quickly let the Americans know that if they restored diplomatic relations, he would not use a border incident as an excuse to break them off again – one of the fears that the Americans had. He even made comments that some interpreted as an invitation to the United States to attack areas of Cambodia where concentrations of Viet Cong were (though Australian Ambassador Noël St. Clair Deschamps, who had repre-
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
5
sented American interests in Cambodia during the previous four years, thought this misconstrued Sihanouk’s intent).4 The lack of an acceptable American declaration recognizing Cambodia’s current borders, Sihanouk indicated, was the sole impediment to renewing relations. Nixon determined to move ahead. Acting on instructions, Deschamps informed Sihanouk that the United States would issue a border declaration if this would contribute to a lasting improvement in relations. Cambodia would have to understand that border incidents might occur even after the resumption of relations, although the United States would try to avoid them and would consult with the Cambodian government on ways to resolve them.5 Although the state department did not anticipate an immediate resumption of diplomatic relations, it is significant that Nixon had set a course toward normalization without first getting concurrence from the Thais and South Vietnamese, whose hostility to any border declaration had not diminished. When Sihanouk explained that he did not expect all border incidents to cease, nor did he expect the Americans actually to help demarcate the border, important obstacles were removed. As a goodwill gesture Sihanouk quickly released four Americans whose aircraft had recently been shot down.6 Also, Cambodian armed forces moved against the Viet Cong, especially in Prey Veng and Svay Rieng Provinces. Along the border, South Vietnamese and Cambodian officials consulted in a friendly manner on how they might deal with the Viet Cong. Therefore, on 2 April Nixon approved the issuance of a border declaration that read: “In conformity with the United Nations Charter, the United States of America recognizes and respects the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia within its present frontiers.” Sihanouk was delighted. Because the Americans saw the border declaration in part as a test of Sihanouk’s attitudes and actions, they did not want to rush toward diplomatic relations. Some problems did in fact emerge. Within two weeks of the American declaration, reports surfaced that Sihanouk was no longer happy with it because certain American officials had let it be known that the border declaration meant very little. Citing published reports to this effect, Sihanouk said that he was rejecting the declaration.7 A few days later he raised the level of National Liberation Front (NLF – the Viet Cong) and East Germany representation in Phnom Penh to that of an embassy. Administration officials were inclined to blame the reversal entirely on Sihanouk. He had suddenly come to realize the extent of Vietnamese communist control of northeastern Cambodia and of his powerlessness to do anything about it, they surmised. Therefore he had no choice but to distance himself from the United States again and find a new modus vivendi with Hanoi. Others, like Deschamps (back in Canberra after having been replaced as ambassador) thought it more likely that Sihanouk was playing domestic politics and that the United States should not respond but watch and wait.8 Observers in Phnom Penh could not easily explain Sihanouk’s reversal. “There is no one reason or set of reasons generally accepted as explaining
6
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
rejection of United States declaration,” reported the Australian embassy after surveying both diplomatic and Cambodian opinion.9 Deschamps may have been correct that Sihanouk’s complaints about the border declaration were intended mostly for a domestic audience, but as the Americans surmised the Prince may also have been dismayed at how deeply entrenched the Vietnamese were in northeastern Cambodia. He may also have misjudged the prospects for a quick end to the war in Vietnam at the Paris peace talks, and he certainly encountered Chinese and North Vietnamese diplomatic pressure. Important as these factors may have been, Sihanouk was clearly irritated at the glosses certain Americans put on the declaration, as well as with general American press reporting about Cambodia.10 Leaks from American officials about the meaninglessness of the declaration were possibly deliberate, intended to derail the reconciliation. “It is a pattern which has occurred frequently in the past, whenever an improvement in U.S.–Cambodian relations has appeared a possibility,” Senator Mike Mansfield (D–MT) wrote to the President.11 Mansfield (and Sihanouk) had genuine cause for concern. As the senator stated, it was a pattern that had occurred frequently in the past. Just when relations were improving, a major border incident or other disruption occurred that threatened to (and sometimes did) thwart efforts at reconciliation. Deschamps also saw this pattern. There was, he recalled, a “hydra-headedness” to American policy. “You’ve got so many institutions involved in foreign affairs, and more or less in rivalry and not always in cooperation.” Asked to respond to the observation that every time there was an important potential breakthrough in efforts to improve relations there was a major bombing incident, he responded, “Exactly … That’s exactly what I mean by hydra-headed. The different institutions were working against each other instead of as a team.”12 Elements in the American military establishment – most likely military intelligence officers – disliked this incipient rapprochement, just as they had disliked similar efforts in the past, and it is probable that they tried to derail the improvement. Hard evidence of this is not easy to find. But in addition to assertions by Mansfield and Deschamps, officials in the Australian embassy in Washington, who had close contact with American officials, believed this to be the case. “We have reported over recent months the instances of military leaks, particularly from MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] in Saigon, which have apparently been designed to impede the process of resumption of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cambodia,” reported an embassy official in July 1969.13 The military’s disagreement with efforts to improve relations may explain, at least in part, the several cross-border incursions and bombing raids that took place in March and April. These, as well as published reports that defoliants had been used in Cambodia and that small teams of Americans were covertly going into Cambodia and occasionally kidnapping villagers, would undoubtedly have angered Sihanouk.14 Potentially the most damaging military leak came on 9 May when William Beecher’s very accurate story about secret B-52 raids on Cambodian territory
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
7
appeared in the New York Times. Beecher, who had a reputation as a Pentagon ally, was later appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. By some accounts his disclosure of the bombing was intended to help the Nixon administration by showing that it was getting tough.15 But at the time the Nixon administration was almost apoplectic about the leak, and it is at least equally plausible that military officials in Saigon leaked the story to derail improving relations with Phnom Penh. Beecher himself stated that his information came from military sources, and state department officials believed that, despite the story’s Washington dateline, it was “almost certainly leaked by MACV in Saigon.” As a consequence of the leak, the state department deliberately avoided informing American authorities in Saigon about its most recent effort to assuage Sihanouk. Even before that American message reached Sihanouk, however, two leaks about defoliant usage in Cambodia threatened to vitiate “the chances of this message having any useful effects in Phnom Penh.”16 A little later Newsweek repeated the charge that the United States was bombing Cambodian territory, and United Press International (UPI) reported that teams of unmarked American helicopters were penetrating up to ten miles inside Cambodia seeking out Vietnamese communist targets. The leaks, whether intended to disrupt the pending rapprochement or not, slowed the movement but did not derail it. Mansfield played an important role (according to the state department) in convincing Sihanouk not formally to reject the border declaration. Having been assured by Rogers that no responsible American officials had attempted to undermine the border declaration, Mansfield made a speech on the Senate floor praising the administration’s Cambodia policy, condemning “diversionary” interpretations of the border declaration that came from unofficial sources outside of the executive branch, and assuring the Cambodians that the administration stood behind the border declaration.17 On 22 May, in a further effort to reassure the Cambodians, the United States informed Cambodian officials that there had been no official American statements “contradicting, expanding, or expressing reservations to” the declaration.18 This satisfied Sihanouk, who was perhaps influenced as well by an increasing number of armed clashes between Cambodian and Vietnamese communist forces, and on 11 June the Cambodian government informed the United States that it was now prepared to resume diplomatic relations. For reasons that are not entirely clear the United States did not immediately respond to Cambodia’s offer. The Americans may have been mulling over as an alternative interim step sending an American representative to be attached to the Australian embassy. But on 27 June the United States accepted the Cambodian proposal and proposed 2 July as the date for formally resuming relations.19 There were some nervous moments that the arrangement might unravel when American military officials in Vietnam announced that American artillery and aircraft would attack Vietnamese targets in Cambodia. But Sihanouk overlooked this provocation, and Thay Sok, who was already in the United States where he was attached to the French embassy, immediately took over as
8
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
Cambodian chargé d’affaires. On 21 July Lloyd M. Rives, who had served previously in Hanoi and Vientiane as well as in Africa, was named American chargé in Phnom Penh. On 15 August Rives reopened the American embassy. After a hiatus of over four years, diplomatic relations had been restored, causing one relieved Australian official to comment, “Amen.”20 The Australians, and some in the state department, still feared that provocative leaks from American military sources in Vietnam could derail the improving relations. In fact in July when a story appeared indicating that the United States was preparing claims against Cambodia for damages, the Australian embassy in Washington reported that it was “another MACV leak.” “What else?” wrote an External Affairs official on the telegram. There were in fact many provocations that Sihanouk could have used to reverse course, but he chose to ignore or minimize them and indeed seemed more concerned at Vietnamese communist activity in his country. The Prince did not have high expectations, however. As the Australian embassy put it, Sihanouk’s views were “soberly expressed, without illusions and indicate[d] a rather cool but not unfriendly attitude towards the impending establishment of U.S. diplomatic mission.”21 Less than a week after Rives arrived in Phnom Penh, Mansfield came to Cambodia. Sent by Nixon to symbolize the new relationship, Mansfield was received almost as a chief of state. The atmosphere, reported Rives, was “extremely cordial.” In a toast Mansfield said that American military force would be used on the Asian mainland only in the most extreme situations.22 The bilateral relationship, it appeared, had gotten off to a good start. The United States’ major hope in restoring diplomatic relations was that it could gain an advantage over its enemies in South Vietnam who used Cambodia as a sanctuary and as a transit point for supplies.23 In this sense, for the Nixon administration Cambodia truly was a “sideshow,” a term journalist William Shawcross made famous. Even so, to a certain extent there was a confluence of interests. Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese use of Cambodian territory angered Sihanouk. The Cambodian government even published a map of Vietnamese inroads into the country, and armed clashes took place between the Cambodian military and the Vietnamese. At the same time the Americans believed that Sihanouk had made a deal with the Viet Cong allowing them to import arms through the port of Sihanoukville, provided none of the weapons got to the Cambodian communists, the Khmer Rouge. According to one well-placed American, Sihanouk subsequently ordered General Lon Nol not to release Chinese arms to the Viet Cong, but “the Vietnamese … then bribed Nhiek Tioulong to release the arms.”24 All of this illustrates how Sihanouk had to maneuver carefully in a web of conflicting pressures. His larger goal was to ensure his country’s survival, to try to keep it from becoming further enmeshed in the violence in neighboring Vietnam, and to gain international acceptance of his country’s boundaries. To the United States, these were not the primary concerns.
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
9
B-52 attacks Even as Sihanouk and Nixon were seeking to improve their bilateral relationship, Nixon ordered B-52 strategic bombers to hit Cambodia in highly secret raids that continued for over a year. They were not officially acknowledged until 1973. Because the motives of the two countries in seeking to improve their relationship were only partially coincident, the secret bombing of Cambodia was not as anomalous as it appears at first glance. Just how extensively the Vietnamese communists used Cambodian territory had long been a matter of considerable dispute. Officials in Saigon almost invariably concluded that the enemy’s use of Cambodia was extensive and growing, that Sihanoukville had become the enemy’s major source of armaments, that Cambodian officials were involved in the arms trade, and that the United States ought to respond with military action.25 Generally speaking the state department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were more skeptical of the military’s claims, as were the Australians. And even within the Pentagon there had been disagreement. Late in the Johnson administration, for example, Major General William Depuy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) told Australian diplomats in confidence that he concurred in MACV’s assessment but acknowledged that the evidence “would not stand up in a court of law,” while Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford and Paul Warnke “preferred not to accept these reports and … played them down.”26 The Johnson administration tried to arrive at some degree of consensus on the issue at an important conference of intelligence experts and American and Australian military attachés in Bangkok in December 1968. The most important person at the Bangkok meeting was James Graham, a CIA expert on evaluating intelligence data. According to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State G. McMurtrie Godley, Graham “was the soundest and most knowledgeable expert on this subject and … his view would be accepted, even if he disagreed with [MACV Commander General Creighton] Abrams.”27 Prior to the Bangkok meeting, the military had engaged in a campaign to publicize its views of the Cambodian situation. With increasing frequency, stories appeared in the American press about Vietnamese communist use of Cambodian territory. The most significant of these was a column by the widely read, well-informed, hardline columnist Joseph Alsop. The day before the Bangkok conference opened (certainly not a coincidence), Alsop, writing from Saigon, reported that Abrams had told the President that “the enemy gets all of his supplies from Cambodia.” Johnson, he stated, reacted “as though stung by a wasp.” Reflecting the military’s scorn for those who disagreed with them, Alsop wrote that “one of the leading Washington analysts [Graham?] has therefore been sent” to Southeast Asia, “no doubt to conduct the study against the facts, which is usual in such cases.”28 Graham brought with him a skeptical mind. At the Bangkok meeting he indicated his objectivity when he told the group that his mission was one of establishing the facts with respect to the “movement of arms through Cambodia, if there is such a thing!” He certainly heard opinions that differed from those of
10
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
MACV. The Australian services attaché stationed in Phnom Penh told the Bangkok meeting that he believed that the amount of supplies getting to the enemy through Cambodia was “very considerably less than is alleged.”29 Just what Graham ultimately concluded remains classified. But it is probable that his final report differed from MACV’s conclusions in some important respects. In one conversation Graham indicated that the evidence of clandestine arms shipments through the port of Sihanoukville was inconclusive, and he was skeptical of claims that large amounts of arms had reached the enemy in South Vietnam from Sihanoukville. He nevertheless agreed that there were significant enemy base areas in Cambodia and that arms were getting to the Vietnamese through Cambodia; but he felt that infiltration through Laos remained a possible source for these arms, despite MACV claims that that route had been stopped.30 A further indication that Graham did not confirm the military assessment was Johnson’s unwillingness to authorize additional military actions against Vietnamese bases in Cambodia in the two weeks he remained in office. Further suggesting that the report was not to the military’s liking, the following February Godley commented to an Australian diplomat that MACV remained “unrepentant despite the Graham Mission.”31 In sum, by the time the Johnson administration left Washington, no consensus had been reached within the government on the extent to which the Vietnamese communists used Cambodian territory. Not surprisingly, therefore, when the new administration took office Earle Wheeler, chairman of the JCS, renewed his request to attack enemy bases in Cambodia. On 9 February Abrams recommended a single, intensive attack lasting about one hour on what he asserted was the headquarters of the enemy’s Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). Unlike Johnson, Nixon was predisposed to believe MACV’s assessments. He came into office wanting to wipe out the sanctuaries. When Kissinger told him that little had been done to destroy enemy concentrations in Cambodia, Nixon was angry and approved Abrams’ request. Postponed twice, the initial secret B52 raid took place on 18 March.32 Abrams promised that the raid – OPERATION BREAKFAST – would completely destroy the target. A joint American–South Vietnamese reconnaissance team that went in immediately afterwards soon found out that this was not the case. Enemy automatic weapons fire nearly wiped it out, and a second team refused orders to go in.33 Post-strike analysis concluded that the bombing had resulted in numerous secondary explosions, suggesting that many munitions had been destroyed. But military officials subsequently admitted that they had seen “no evidence of enemy attempts to evacuate the area since Operation BREAKFAST and there has been no significant change in the enemy order of battle.” The area remained “a lucrative target” and warranted “restrike.”34 Obviously the attacks had not destroyed COSVN. The failure of the raid to accomplish its objectives did not stop the military from recommending additional strikes in new areas. On 9 April the JCS recommended that standing authority be granted to use B-52s to attack enemy forces
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
11
retreating into Cambodia. Two days later they recommended intensive strikes on two more base areas: 609 and 353. No mention was made of possible COSVN headquarters in these areas. And while the Chiefs did envisage only “minimum risk to Cambodian civilians,” they did expect some casualties. They estimated that 196 Cambodians lived in Base Area 609, while 1,640 lived in Base Area 353. The areas were not heavily populated, but they were not, as Henry Kissinger stated in 1973, “unpopulated.” Similarly, Nixon lied to the American people when he told journalists in August 1973 that “no Cambodians had been in it [the area bombed] for years. It was totally occupied by the North Vietnamese Communists.”35 In fact, the Cambodians living in these “unpopulated areas” were terrified. The governor of Ratanakiri, interviewed in 1999, recalled that in his village during the bombing “a great number of villagers were seriously affected by the bomb fragments,” that they “could not endure the tragedy,” and that most of them therefore fled their homes. A Viet Cong defector put it more dramatically: “To the Cambodian villagers, these bombings brought an incomprehensible terror,” he wrote.36 For more than a year, the B-52s secretly bombed targets in Cambodia. Only a few sympathetic members of Congress were informed.37 As late as April 1973 administration officials testifying before congressional committees denied that there had been any bombing of Cambodia prior to May 1970. But in fact from 18 March 1969 through 26 May 1970, B-52s flew 3,875 sorties and dropped 108,823 tons of bombs on Cambodia.38 The bombing had little lasting impact on the ability of the other side to wage war. COSVN was not destroyed, and the Vietnamese communists moved deeper into Cambodia. By July French officials in Phnom Penh were reporting that the area of Cambodia under control of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong had actually increased; roads which had been traveled without difficulty only a few weeks earlier were now closed.39 The Australians concurred. An American government report that appears to have been written early in 1970 noted that in 1969 between 55,000 and 70,000 North Vietnamese troops infiltrated into South Vietnam through Cambodia, which was nearly 60 percent of the total infiltration during that year. The sanctuaries, the report noted, “pose a continuing threat to South Vietnam’s internal security that progress in pacification or Vietnamization cannot eradicate.”40 In December 1969, ten months after the bombing began, the head of Cambodia’s military intelligence approached the American military attaché to say that on a recent trip to Stung Treng and Ratanakiri “he had been shocked at extent of Vietnamese Communist/Pathet Lao infiltration in the area.”41 Clearly the bombing had not diminished the presence of the enemy in Cambodia; on the contrary the Vietnamese communists now controlled even more of Cambodia. The bombing had little impact on the war in Vietnam, but it had ominous consequences for Cambodia. Many who fled the bombing joined the Khmer Rouge. As the governor of Ratanakiri recalled, they wanted “to establish a struggle movement to coincide with the propagation of top Khmer Rouge
12
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
leaders,” while Truong Nhu Tang, the Viet Cong defector, wrote that the bombing drove “the more militant into the ranks of the Khmer Rouge” and left “the rest increasingly sympathetic toward the Americans’ enemies.” All told, as journalist Arnold Isaacs put it, the bombing, “was upsetting the delicate balance on which peace in Cambodia rested.”42 But there were few protests from Phnom Penh, and the question arises whether Sihanouk acquiesced in, or even approved of, the bombing. Those few representatives who were informed about the secret bombing were apparently told at the time that Sihanouk “had approved of the bombing,” and once it became public in 1973 administration officials claimed on several occasions that this was the case.43 General Wheeler, Admiral Thomas Moorer, Henry Kissinger, and Richard Nixon all made the same claim.44 Documents preserved in the Nixon papers prepared by (or for) Kissinger stated unequivocally that Sihanouk “privately … consented to US bombing in Cambodia.” And in 1975 a paper produced by officials in the Gerald Ford administration stated the bombing was kept secret “at Sihanouk’s insistence.” These papers falsely implied that there had been consultation with the Cambodian leader.45 In contemporary papers, as well as in his memoirs, Kissinger cites three specific pieces of evidence to support his assertions of Sihanouk’s complicity: (1) over a year before the strikes, Sihanouk privately told Chester Bowles that he would not object to “hot pursuit in uninhabited areas”; (2) on 13 May 1969, two months after the first strikes, Sihanouk said that he had not protested the bombing because he had not heard about it and that he would make no protest unless Cambodians were killed or their property destroyed; (3) in August 1969 Sihanouk commented to Mansfield (who was unaware of the B-52 raids) that he would not protest bombings that affected only the Viet Cong.46 What have scholars and other informed observers concluded? The journalist Stanley Karnow, who had interviewed Sihanouk at the end of 1967, finds Kissinger’s case compelling. Sihanouk “shut his eyes to the bombing,” Karnow wrote, and even provided information to the Americans about Vietnamese communist bases. Others are not so certain. Shawcross argues that the Prince’s alleged acquiescence was “at least questionable.” Historian David Chandler doubts that Sihanouk granted “permission to conduct a full-scale program of bombing.” Australian scholar Justin J. Corfield contends that Sihanouk “welcomed the restoration of full relations, in spite of the bombing, not because of them [sic].” Jeffrey Kimball, in his recent study of Nixon and Vietnam, writes, no one has yet deciphered what Sihanouk really thought, but it is not likely that he welcomed large-scale invasions or sustained B-52 raids, which would plunge his country into chaos. The fact remains that he was not officially asked for permission to bomb; nor did he give it.47 What in fact do we know about Sihanouk’s attitudes toward American military actions in Cambodia? We know that American and South Vietnamese
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
13
attacks on Cambodian territory in earlier years had infuriated the Prince and in May 1965 led to a complete break in diplomatic relations. Six months later, when the United States gave its military commanders limited rights of hot pursuit into Cambodia, Sihanouk objected.48 We know that for the next several years Cambodia protested hundreds of cross-border raids, overflights, and other incursions into Cambodian territory by American and South Vietnamese forces. At the same time, we know that Sihanouk was increasingly unhappy with Viet Cong and North Vietnamese use of his territory. In 1967 he blamed the Samlaut rebellion in Battambang Province, which he brutally repressed, on the “Khmer Viet Minh.” Sihanouk then cautiously began to court the United States, during which he made some ambiguous statements about possible American actions against communist forces in Cambodian territory. The first such expression came in December 1967 when Sihanouk told Karnow that if American forces entered “uninhabited regions of our country” and if “limited combat breaks out between American and Vietnamese forces, both illegally in Cambodia, it goes without saying that we would not intervene militarily.”49 Presidential aide Walt Rostow read Sihanouk’s words to mean that “he herewith gives U.S. (repeat) U.S. [but not South Vietnamese] troops a green light to drive Communist forces out of uninhabited Cambodian areas.” Karnow retrospectively agreed – as long as the hot pursuit took place in uninhabited territory.50 But it was not quite that clear. In the same statement in which he said he would not intervene militarily if American troops engaged their Vietnamese enemy in uninhabited areas of Cambodia, Sihanouk said he would nevertheless protest the American presence on his territory, and “if serious incursions or bombings are committed against our border regions inhabited by Cambodians – or by Vietnamese residing in Cambodia who depend upon us for protection,” then, he said, he would protest and strike back as strongly as possible.51 And in a press conference at the end of December 1967, Sihanouk specifically denied that his comments to Karnow meant that he would tacitly allow Americans the right of hot pursuit into Cambodian territory.52 Nor, he told Ambassador Deschamps on December 31, would he even discuss the matter of hot pursuit with an American envoy, who was soon to arrive in Phnom Penh.53 Sihanouk repeated these positions in interviews with the New York Times, the Toronto Star, and the Chicago Daily News. He would not authorize American reconnaissance flights over Cambodia. He would not agree to American patrols entering Cambodia. He would retaliate if American forces entered Cambodia and encountered Cambodian forces. He would never authorize any invasion of his territory by any forces whatsoever or for any reasons whatsoever. Clarifying his comments to Karnow, he stated, I simply said that our army would not intervene if a battle was taking place in remote areas, uninhabited and difficult to control, between American forces and North or South Vietnamese forces infiltrated without our knowledge and in violation of the promises made by the National Liberation Front and the RDVN [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] to respect our
14
Richard Nixon and Cambodia borders. In this case, we would confine ourselves to a protest to the two parties. … If serious incursions and bombing were directed against regions inhabited by Cambodians or foreigners who have always been subjects of the Kingdom, we would fight back with all our means and would eventually ask for increased material help from our foreign friends.
At a press conference on 7 January 1968 Sihanouk stated again that he would not discuss hot pursuit with an American envoy. “On the right of hot pursuit, which he rejected,” reported the Australian embassy, “Sihanouk said United States was the wolf and Cambodia the lamb, and latter would avoid discussing what sauce he would be eaten with.”54 Three days later when Chester Bowles met Sihanouk, however, the Prince expressed a conditional willingness to have American forces attack Vietnamese Communist forces inside Cambodia. Contrary to what he had told Ambassador Deschamps, he did discuss the question of hot pursuit: In a general discussion of the likelihood of increasing use of Cambodia by VC/NVA forces, Prince said that he would not mind if US engaged in hot pursuit in unpopulated areas. He could not say this publicly or officially but he would be glad to have this kind of US help in solving his problem. If US engaged VC/NVA on Cambodian territory, both would be guilty of violating Cambodian soil, but VC/NVA would be “more guilty.” He said “You would be liberating us from the VC.” He said he wanted US to force the VC to leave Cambodia and in cases of hot pursuit in remote areas where no Cambodian population would be unaffected, he would “shut my eyes.”55 Bowles subsequently termed Sihanouk’s comments “an amazing reversal.”56 Although he had said much the same thing to Karnow, Sihanouk’s virtual invitation to Bowles for the Americans to engage in hot pursuit in uninhabited areas was more explicit. Thus in his memoirs Henry Kissinger correctly quotes Sihanouk as telling Bowles that he was “not opposed to hot pursuit in uninhabited areas” and that, in such cases, he would “shut my eyes.”57 But a willingness to look the other way if the Americans ventured temporarily into uninhabited areas of Cambodia while pursuing fleeing Vietnamese forces cannot reasonably be construed to mean that Sihanouk approved of the intensive, ongoing B-52 bombing raids – raids that had nothing to do with “hot pursuit” and which (despite retrospective administration claims) were not confined to uninhabited areas. In any event, no one asked him. Nor does Kissinger point out that in the same conversation with Bowles in which Sihanouk invited hot pursuit in certain situations, the Prince stated that the root of the problem was American disregard of the Geneva Accords (in particular the failure to hold elections in 1956), which had led to the war in Vietnam. He blamed the United States for driving the Vietnamese communists into Cambodia and urged the Americans to stop the war in Vietnam immediately.
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
15
In sum, at the end of 1967 and early in January 1968 Sihanouk had made it clear that he would not respond militarily if the United States clashed with Vietnamese forces in uninhabited areas of Cambodia, and his comments to Bowles seemed to encourage American military incursions in such areas. This did indeed represent something new. But Sihanouk remained as committed as ever to demanding that all powers respect his territory, and the question of B-52 attacks (which were not closely related to the concept of hot pursuit in any event) was never discussed with him. Although relations between the United States and Cambodia were not very warm for the rest of 1968, Sihanouk did become increasingly agitated at the presence of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops on Cambodian territory. In the first weeks of 1969, Sihanouk’s verbal assaults on the Vietnamese communists and the Chinese increased. Although North Vietnam had recognized Cambodia’s boundaries, he said in February 1969, it “continues to send its partisans to penetrate our country in increasingly greater numbers.” He feared that they intended “to stay for good.” Later he complained that he could not even visit parts of his own country because the Vietnamese occupied it.58 The Americans were encouraged. For those Americans (and South Vietnamese) who wanted to take aggressive actions against enemy forces in Cambodia, Sihanouk’s remarks at a press conference on 6 March – 12 days before the first B-52 attacks – provided, they thought, an invitation to bomb areas of Cambodia where the Viet Cong were present. As South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Tran Chanh Thanh asked an American official later, when were the Americans going to “take Prince Sihanouk up on his invitation?”59 Actually Sihanouk’s statement was really a condemnation of American bombing of populated areas, not an invitation to bomb areas where there were Vietnamese communists.60 Then on 28 March Sihanouk explicitly rejected reports that he would allow the bombing of Cambodia. Responding to a UPI report that the American military had recommended B-52 attacks on Cambodian territory and to reports that he “would not be opposed to bombing by the Americans directed against communist objectives inside Cambodia’s frontiers,” Sihanouk responded angrily, “How could a head of state, placed in the situation we are in, agree to allow his country to be bombed?” He would, he stated, “always oppose, up to the limit of his capacity, any bombing of Cambodian territory, whatever the pretext may be.”61 Kissinger does not mention Sihanouk’s remarks on 28 March. He does, however, maintain that on 13 May Sihanouk for “all practical purposes invited us to continue” the bombing. At the press conference, Sihanouk (who interestingly refers to a “report about several B-52 bombings,” presumably a reference to William Beecher’s accurate report about the secret bombings which had appeared in the New York Times on 9 May) said he had not protested the attacks “because I have not heard of the bombings.” No Cambodian had informed him about them, he said, and the Vietnamese would not do so because that would prove that they were on Cambodian territory. He would protest only if Cambodians were injured.62
16
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
Sihanouk did indeed make the statements Kissinger cites, although the news conference, which took place in a provincial area and was broadcast in Cambodian, was intended for a domestic audience. His remarks reflected his anger at Vietnamese use of his territory (he had, after all, lost control to them over a section of northeastern Cambodia the size of a province), and the Americans could reasonably conclude that Sihanouk would not protest attacks on Vietnamese forces in remote areas of Cambodia, as long as no Cambodians were injured or their property damaged. But in the same statement Sihanouk “categorically” denied that “he has ever allowed U.S. bombing of his territory” and insisted (as Kissinger acknowledges) that he would not permit violations of his territory “by either side. Please note that.”63 Sihanouk also discussed the bombings with his friend Mike Mansfield, who arrived in Phnom Penh in August 1969, shortly after diplomatic relations had been restored. Sihanouk pointed out to Mansfield that Cambodia had not protested bombings that affected only the Viet Cong and did not injure Cambodians, and he strongly urged the United States to avoid injuries to Cambodians. At the same time, he urged the United States, once again, to leave Vietnam, which of course would have meant the bombing would end. Although Kissinger sees the comments to Mansfield as confirming his view that Sihanouk knew of and approved the bombings, when the bombing became public knowledge in 1973 Mansfield commented publicly, and then wrote to Sihanouk directly, that “any suggestion that you were in accord, tacit or otherwise, with the several thousand secret bombing raids on your country and had so informed me was completely incomprehensible to me.”64 In sum, Sihanouk was never asked to approve the B-52 bombings, and he never gave his approval. He steadfastly insisted on respect for Cambodia’s integrity and sovereignty. He strongly protested American and South Vietnamese border incidents that resulted in injury to Cambodians and Cambodian property. He sought the American border declaration in part to limit border raids and attacks. Though he said that he did not expect that all border raids would end and that he would not use them as an excuse in the future to break relations, he hoped they would diminish. Nixon’s initial letter to him on 14 February encouraged him, for the President wrote that he shared the Prince’s desire to make “every effort … to localize the conflict in Vietnam” and promised to “exercise the utmost restraint.”65 And in instructions to Ambassador Deschamps to be conveyed orally to Sihanouk, the United States pledged that its forces would “do their best … to avoid incidents which might cause casualties or damage in Cambodia.”66 Sihanouk responded that he was encouraged to learn of Nixon’s desire for the belligerents to “display the utmost restraint … with a view to circumscribing the theatre of war to the national territory of Vietnam.”67 Deschamps, who probably knew Sihanouk’s mind as well as any Westerner and who continues to be in close touch with him, stated emphatically that the Cambodian leader did not know about the bombings in advance. “No, no, no, no, very definitely not,” he said.68
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
17
Sihanouk did acknowledge that his army of 35,000 was unable to control the frontier, and those Americans who wanted to bomb Vietnamese forces in Cambodia could take comfort in some of his remarks that suggested he would look the other way. Given his anger at the Vietnamese abuse of his territory and his belief that they were also supporting his domestic opponents, the Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk shed few tears over their casualties. He did, after all, renew relations with the United States, even as the bombing was well underway and, as Nixon pointed out, invited the American President to visit Phnom Penh.69 But the retrospective defenses of the American bombing seize on Sihanouk’s occasional remarks about looking the other way and generally ignore the larger context of his ultimate goals, which was to keep the violence away from Cambodia and retain his country’s independence and neutrality. And while he did not want the United States to withdraw entirely from Southeast Asia, he saw nothing positive to be gained from continued American military involvement in Vietnam. An immediate departure would be best, he thought.
Border incidents, clandestine incursions, and defoliation Although (with one exception), Sihanouk did not protest the B-52 bombings, he protested numerous other instances of American and South Vietnamese incursions. In the first four months of 1969, Cambodia formally protested 109 incidents – 21 more than during the same period in 1968.70 Also complicating the relationship were the numerous clandestine operations. Reconnaissance patrols had existed for some years but were systematized in May 1967 and given the code named OPERATION SALEM HOUSE. Initially teams of six to eight Americans and South Vietnamese operating under strict limitations sought tactical intelligence in the northeastern tip of Cambodia. Subsequently, the operations (renamed DANIEL BOONE) expanded to encompass the entire Cambodian–Vietnamese border region, and the teams operated up to 20 miles inside Cambodia. The previous requirement that each mission have approval from Washington was dropped, and helicopters were authorized to infiltrate the teams. Beginning in October 1968, the number of missions increased sharply. For the first time, the teams were authorized to use anti-personnel mines, and the limitations on the number of Americans who could be included were eliminated. Increasingly there were casualties and contact with civilians and Cambodian military personnel. Covert incursions increased significantly after Nixon took charge. In the first four months of 1969 alone there were at least 188 missions, several of which the Cambodian government protested.71 During all of 1969 there were 454 missions; 558 took place the following year. This compared with 99 in 1967 and 387 in 1968.72 Several Americans and South Vietnamese died, and at least 15 helicopters were lost. These operations, thought Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green, were of only “marginal” value. But the JCS – who refused to provide “an adequate evaluation of the SALEM HOUSE
18
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
program” to the state department – declined to end the missions. They considered the DANIEL BOONE missions useful in gathering information about enemy troop movements. By the time they were ended in 1972, at least 1,885 missions had been undertaken; 27 Americans died, and the families of those killed were not told that they had been in Cambodia.73 Tensions between the United States and the Cambodians also resulted from defoliation of trees and crops. From time to time there had been complaints about the dropping of “yellow powder” over areas of Cambodia, and at times defoliation (RANCH HAND) operations in Vietnam had resulted in unintentional drift of herbicide into Cambodia. But the most dramatic incident occurred in April 1969 when herbicidal damage occurred over an area of approximately 270 square miles. According to the Cambodians there were additional defoliation operations on 9, 12, and 14 May which “nearly doubled over the area affected up to 8th May.”74 The Cambodian government was especially concerned with damage to about one-sixth of this area, where fruit and rubber trees were most affected. In response to Cambodian protests, the United States offered to send a scientific team to investigate and, indicative of the generally improving relations, Cambodia for the first time accepted American investigators. In July four American scientists entered the field. Their findings confirmed Cambodian allegations. Damage near the border was the result of the drift of herbicidal Agents Orange and White, which had been sprayed on South Vietnam when the meteorological conditions were not good. But plantations much deeper inside Cambodia had been sprayed and had suffered severe, though not irreparable, damage.75 The defoliation was deliberate, perhaps in part related to military attempts to undercut efforts to improve Cambodian–American relations. An official American report acknowledged that the areas that were defoliated “ran in regular straight lines and the surrounding jungle was not affected.”76 When Rives arrived in Phnom Penh shortly thereafter, the herbicide issue was “the most important one” he had to confront, and he suggested an immediate partial payment pending a final settlement.77 The state department thought Rives alarmist and did not immediately agree to a payment, but there was no question that the United States would pay damages, which the state department tentatively estimated to be $8.6 million, $5 million of which would go to France since the affected plantations were French owned. By the end of the year the Cambodian claim had jumped to $12.2 million. The military denied that it was responsible for the defoliation, and the irrepressible and imaginative Martin Herz (a foreign service officer whose book about Cambodia had angered Sihanouk) surmised that the Vietnamese communists might have done it. “Both we and the Cambodians [may] have been the victims of a deliberate, well-planned and exceedingly well-executed communist provocation,” he wrote.78 No one else shared Herz’s views, however. Almost surely the defoliation resulted from some secret American operation. In July 1971 Senator Frank Church (D–ID) charged that Air America, the CIA contract airline, had done it. His source, Church wrote, was “an individual who is in a position to know.” Queried about this, Ambassador to South Vietnam
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
19
Ellsworth Bunker denied Air America’s involvement, but he acknowledged that some American airplane, as yet unidentified, might have been involved.79 If it was not a CIA operation, some other American intelligence agency was probably responsible. In 1973 the legal affairs branch of the state department determined unequivocally that the United States was legally responsible to pay “reparations and compensation” to Cambodia for all the defoliation damage.80
New beginnings? The restoration of relations in July 1969 and Senator Mansfield’s visit seemed to mark a chance for a new beginning. “The United States and Cambodia are at a threshold that offers an opportunity to make a clean beginning,” wrote Mansfield.81 Unfortunately, such optimism was premature. After his visit, in fact, the number of Cambodian protests about American violation of Cambodian territory and airspace increased. In October alone Cambodia protested a “rather staggering” 83 separate incidents. In view of this impressive total, wrote Rives, “it appears some credit should be given Cambodia for restraint.” He hoped such incidents could be reduced.82 The most serious incident occurred on 16–19 November when American planes and artillery repeatedly attacked Dak Dam (located 4 miles inside Cambodia), the Cambodian military post located there (which was destroyed), and neighboring villages, including Bu Chric which was hit by B-52s. (This appears to be the only time the Cambodian government specifically protested the use of B-52s.) The American action was triggered when enemy artillery fire, located near the town, hit the Special Forces camp at Bu Prang, located inside Vietnam some 5 to 6 miles from Dak Dam. When American planes tried to suppress the artillery fire, Cambodian forces responded with anti-aircraft rounds. The American pilots then attacked the anti-aircraft guns and, in so doing, inflicted substantial casualties on Cambodian military personnel. At least 25 Cambodians died, and a number of animals, civilian and military buildings (including a school house), and vehicles (including an ambulance) were damaged or destroyed.83 It was, as Marshall Green informed Rogers, “the most serious border incident yet in number of Cambodian casualties, [and] it is among the few involving significant losses among Cambodian Army personnel.”84 This was not the first time Dak Dam had been attacked. In fact on six separate days in October, American and South Vietnamese helicopters had attacked the town with rockets and machine guns, and Rives had asked for an investigation. This new incident resulted in protests within the American bureaucracy. At the United Nations, Ambassador Charles Yost objected to the repeated incursions into Cambodia. If there were a Security Council debate, he wrote, it would be highly embarrassing, for Cambodia would be able to demonstrate “that over period of several years we have repeatedly inflicted significant casualties on Cambodian civilians as well as military.” This would have a “damaging effect” on American public opinion which was “already in a brittle and sensitive state over Mylai affair and other aspects of our operations.”85
20
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
The Dak Dam attack upset Rives. Several months earlier he had privately expressed the fear that such incidents would occur – and that they might be part of a deliberate effort by American military forces to undercut improved relations. “Rives is obviously perturbed – as we here have been before him,” reported the Australian ambassador at that time, “by the possibility that the United States military authorities in Viet Nam will follow a policy towards Cambodia which was different to that of the White House and the State Department.”86 Now he told the state department that he did “not quite see what I am expected to say to the RKG in justification Nov. 16 and Nov. 17 attacks” since the Americans’ own photographic evidence showed that a Cambodian military post, along with a school and an ambulance, had been destroyed and numerous Cambodian soldiers killed.87 Fearing that another break in relations was possible, he strongly suggested that the President send a personal message to Sihanouk expressing his distress over the incident.88 There was no presidential message, but the United States did express its official regrets and sent solatium payments. Much to Rives’ irritation, the border incidents continued. Between 26 November and 17 December Cambodia protested over 40 incidents. On 10 December Rives learned that three days earlier 300 artillery rounds had been fired into Cambodia – the largest ever in a single day. Rives was especially upset by a new, if smaller, attack on Dak Dam, which was “particularly dangerous in view past history.”89 Yet another significant diplomatic irritant concerned the Cambodian decision in October 1969 to end the activities of the International Control Commission (ICC). The decision mystified the Americans, who were initially uncertain what it meant. Often the United States had complained that the ICC had spent most of its energy investigating allegations of American and South Vietnamese violations of Cambodian sovereignty while being dilatory about Viet Cong and North Vietnamese activities in the country. Bunker, who had to investigate the border incidents, considered the ICC “totally useless” and was not overly disturbed at its possible demise. But on the whole the United States regretted the Cambodian decision.90 In 1968 the United States had made attempts to invigorate it, anticipating that it would be useful in verifying Vietnamese communist operations in Cambodia. Also, the withdrawal of the Canadian ICC team would be an intelligence loss for the United States. The Americans tended to believe that Sihanouk’s decision represented a tilt toward the Chinese communists and the North Vietnamese. The Prince, Rives wrote, continued to believe in the inevitable victory of the Viet Cong and North Vietnam in South Vietnam and in the inevitable dominance of Communist China throughout Southeast Asia. Therefore, he has played up to these powers in the hope of winning their friendship now, in preparation for the future. It also seems likely that Sihanouk was responding to Chinese pressure, and since he needed the Chinese to restrain the Vietnamese he asked the ICC to leave.91
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
21
In sum, by the end of 1969 the United States and Cambodia still maintained diplomatic relations. But the border incidents persisted; Cambodians continued to die in bombing raids and clandestine operations; the B-52s continued to take their toll, helping to destabilize Cambodia, driving the enemy deeper into Cambodia, and giving aid and comfort to Sihanouk’s most bitter enemies, the Khmer Rouge. And Sihanouk appeared to be reverting to his earlier view that the Vietnamese communists would prevail in Vietnam and that China would be the dominant outside power. Relations between the United States and Cambodia had cooled. The new year did not bring any immediate improvement in relations. The Cambodian government effusively welcomed two American scientists, E. W. Pfeiffer of the University of Montana’s Biology Department and Professor Arthur Westing of Wyndham College in Vermont, who, with two French colleagues, observed defoliation damage and criticized the American bombing of Dak Dam. (Westing chaired the Herbicide Assessment Commission of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.) Also, in the first week of January alone the Cambodian government filed seven protests about border incidents. Shortly thereafter the Cambodians protested additional incidents of herbicide damage. In February the government accused American or South Vietnamese helicopter crews of killing three Cambodian motorists on Highway 7, and Cambodian forces captured another U.S. naval vessel that had strayed into Cambodian waters on the Mekong River. In sum, border incidents, some involving fatalities, continued to plague Cambodian–American relations. There was no significant warming of relations until Lon Nol and Sirik Matak ousted Sihanouk in March 1970 when the Prince was out of the country.
The coup In March 1970, while Sihanouk was out of the country, Sisowath Sirik Matak and Lon Nol ousted him. Sihanouk’s dismissal (which followed constitutional forms, rather than a blatant military coup d’état) immediately produced much speculation as to its causes. From the beginning, Sihanouk claimed that the United States – and in particular the CIA – was responsible. Antiwar critics, the North Vietnamese, the Soviet Union, and the Chinese made similar claims. Nixon and Kissinger maintained that the Americans had nothing to do with it and were, in fact, caught completely by surprise. “We had no role in the change of Government,” Nixon told Indonesian President Suharto in May 1970. At the end of June he told the American people that the “government had no advance warning of the ouster of Sihanouk.” Kissinger even theorized that the revolt was partly instigated by Sihanouk himself so that he could demonstrate to the Soviet Union and China that he had a right-wing opposition and that he needed to be placated so that he could remain in control of Cambodia.92 What have scholars concluded? Closest to the Kissinger/Nixon view is Evelyn Colbert, a Southeast Asian scholar who, from 1962 to 1968 was Chief of the Southeast Asia Branch of the Far Eastern Division of the state department’s
22
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). She emphasizes that Sihanouk had restored diplomatic relations and was taking an increasingly hard line toward the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. There was, therefore, no American motive to replace him.93 But most others see at least some American involvement. Historian Ben Kiernan clears the CIA but implicates “sections of the U.S. military establishment and the Army Special Forces.” Although allegations that the coup plans received approval at “the highest level of the U.S. government” have not been corroborated, Kiernan concludes, “it is clear that Lon Nol carried out the coup with at least a legitimate expectation of significant U.S. support.”94 Wilfred Deac attributes Sihanouk’s ouster to internal factors and states that the Americans and others “were taken by surprise” and that “it was not in the American interest to upset the Cambodian status quo.” But some Americans had foreknowledge of the coup, and “U.S. military mid-operating levels, including an air force general, did encourage Khmer counterparts to depose the prince.” Other Americans promised their Cambodian contacts American support if Sihanouk were replaced.95 Shawcross credits internal factors for Sihanouk’s ouster and states that “no direct link between the United States government and Sihanouk’s usurpers before the coup has been established.” But he presents considerable circumstantial evidence – including the testimony of two CIA agents – that the United States was aware of the coup ahead of time and may have played a supporting role. He is particularly persuasive in arguing that the United States “had always found the Sihanouk regime inadequate” and that Cambodians who wanted to remove Sihanouk had no reason to doubt that the United States would welcome such a move.96 Chandler also emphasizes internal factors but suspects that there was at least one CIA agent (and possibly more) in the small American embassy in Phnom Penh who had reestablished contacts with old friends, including Sirik Matak, the coup leader.97 Milton Osborne believes that the CIA was not responsible for the coup but adds that “the involvement of some American intelligence services is now beyond dispute” and that Sihanouk, though wrong about the CIA, “could, with justification, point to the incontrovertible evidence that other American agencies knew of the plotters’ plans.”98 Historian Jeffrey Kimball finds no direct evidence of White House or CIA involvement but thinks that military intelligence officials were involved.99 The most recent and most thorough analysis of Sihanouk’s ouster comes from Australian scholar Justin J. Corfield. Corfield identifies three groups of conspirators which, to a certain extent, overlapped. Two of the groups consisted of Cambodians who were dissatisfied with Sihanouk’s rule (and Corfield’s greatest contribution is his detailed account of the Cambodian plotting). But the United States was also “a driving force” behind Sihanouk’s ouster. “The evidence that the US and her allies were involved in the plot is now overwhelming,” he concludes.100 In sum, although the precise degree of American involvement remains murky, most scholars have concluded that, at the very least, some military intelligence agents are culpable.
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
23
Whatever the specific American involvement in the coup, it can be said that there were a number of factors that probably led certain Americans to push for a change of leadership in Cambodia. The American military had chaffed at Sihanouk’s constant protests over border incidents, his acquiescence at the presence of Vietnamese soldiers who sought sanctuary, and his complicity (so they believed) in conveying supplies to the enemy. Military leaders had even drawn up plans for an invasion of Cambodia in 1967 and 1968 and were upset that Lyndon Johnson would not approve them. With Nixon’s election, they pushed even harder and soon received approval for the B-52 strikes and stepped up intelligence operations inside Cambodia. For a time in 1969 as Sihanouk himself worried about the presence of Vietnamese communist troops in Cambodia, he cut off their supplies. But there were reports, apparently accurate, that shipments resumed later in the year.101 On the political side, Sihanouk appeared to have moved back closer to the North Vietnamese; in September 1969 he had attended Ho Chi Minh’s funeral in Hanoi, and North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong was scheduled to visit Phnom Penh early in 1970.102 For those looking for evidence of Sihanouk’s move toward the communist bloc, the publication in Sangkum in September 1969 of an East German document listing the names of 3,000 alleged CIA agents would have been convincing evidence.103 Sangkum helpfully pointed readers to the names of those agents who had served in Cambodia. Critics would also have noted Sihanouk’s warm reception of the antiwar American scientists early in January. They might also have pointed out that shortly thereafter, after Sihanouk left Phnom Penh in January 1970 for medical treatment in Paris, there were reports that he would return via Prague, Moscow, and Peking. Furthermore, Sihanouk was making it very difficult for the Americans to persuade Cambodians to support the American viewpoint. The embassy was unable to place news stories in local publications, to show movies or encourage Cambodians to visit the U.S. Information Center, largely because of Cambodian government directives.104 In sum, as Nixon’s chief of staff H. R. Haldeman put it retrospectively, Lon Nol’s ouster of Sihanouk “was all right with us”105 – a comment that contradicts those who contended that there was no motive for replacing Sihanouk. Those who were predisposed to think that the American military situation in Vietnam would improve if there were a change of leadership in Phnom Penh could find reasons to support their perspective. With Sihanouk’s position in Cambodian politics unraveling at this time, and with his major opponents, especially Sirik Matak, being amenable to American influence and support, an opening was there for those who wished to push Sihanouk out.106 The presence of Americanfinanced, anti-Sihanouk Khmer Serei forces available in South Vietnam to assist a new government provided an additional incentive to support a coup. None of this proves American involvement. But there were reasons why some Americans – most likely military intelligence personnel – might have assisted in Sihanouk’s ouster. And there are hints in the diplomatic correspondence of a possible American role or at least of a foreknowledge of the events.
24
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
The arrival in Cambodian waters of the American transport ship Columbia Eagle carrying bombs and other munitions shortly before the coup led to suspicions at the time that it was on a secret mission to bolster the anticipated coup. The Secretary of Defense’s office did send a telegram to the Commander in Chief of American Forces in the Pacific (CINCPAC), military authorities in Thailand, and the U.S. embassy in Bangkok stating mysteriously that it was “of utmost importance that there be no discussion of what may or may not have occurred on the Columbia Eagle in order to safeguard national interests and to protect the rights and safety of individuals.”107 But this is hardly firm evidence that the ship was involved in supporting the coup plotters. In fact, the ship was carrying the munitions to Thailand for use in American planes when two antiwar crewmen hijacked the vessel, forced most of the crew to abandon ship, and directed it to Cambodia where they promptly requested political asylum. As one of the hijackers lightheartedly put it later, “President Nixon tells the world he wants to de-escalate the war, so we thought we’d help him a bit.” Although the hijackers appear to have been given political asylum, they were still in custody when the government changed. One of them served five years in a California prison; the other escaped in Phnom Penh and may have fled to Ratanakiri Province where he married a local woman, took up farming, and joined the Khmer Rouge.108 For his part, the exiled Prince never ceased to believe that he had been the victim of an American-sponsored coup. In 1979, Kissinger met Sihanouk in Beijing and assured him that the United States had had nothing to do with the coup. “You must believe that we were favorable to your returning to power and that we did not like Lon Nol. We liked you.” “Thank you very much,” Sihanouk responded. “I want you to believe it,” Kissinger pressed on. “Excellency,” Sihanouk replied, “let bygones be bygones.” “No. No. No. I want you to say that you believe me,” Kissinger insisted. To which Sihanouk replied, “I apologize. I cannot say that I believe you.”109
Assisting Lon Nol The person in whom the United States now professed considerable faith – Lon Nol – was a problematic leader for modern times. A proud Khmer, Lon Nol identified with and accepted traditional folk beliefs, including astrology and the occult, associated with what he called the “Khmer-Mon” people. In September 1970 his government officially encouraged the use of a number of occult practices to achieve military victory. Lon Nol himself was thought to believe that he personally had the power of divination. According to an official American embassy assessment, as time passed Lon Nol’s reliance on “mystical sources” embarrassed many educated Cambodians.110 Nevertheless, from the outset the United States sought to bolster the Lon Nol–Sirik Matak regime. “I believe it is important that we take positive actions and not let things develop haphazardly,” Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
25
wrote. To this end he wanted a CIA communications post established in Cambodia at once.111 Whether or not the United States had played a role in Sihanouk’s ouster, it clearly approved of the new government and was going to throw its full weight behind it. A major concern for both the United States and the new Khmer Republic was to get the Vietnamese communist troops out of Cambodia. To this end the United States for a time sought to build support for various international solutions. The first to emerge was a proposal to reactivate the ICC. The United States pushed the issue with the Soviet Union, arguing that it was in the mutual interests of the United States and the USSR to have a truly neutral Cambodia. But Hanoi stated that reestablishing the ICC would be a hostile act. Consequently, although the matter continued to be raised from time to time, nothing came of it. More attention went into efforts to arrange international conferences which, the United States thought, might bolster the new Cambodian government. A French proposal for a conference elicited limited support, a New Zealand one even less. Much more significant was an Indonesian proposal for a conference of Asian nations that would try and “prevent Cambodia from being turned into a second Vietnam,” as one Indonesian newspaper put it.112 Some thought (perhaps correctly) that the Indonesian initiative was a way of expressing Asian displeasure at not having been consulted by the French. The French were in turn contemptuous of the Indonesian effort, and several other countries, among them Malaysia and Japan, were also skeptical. But Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik forged ahead with considerable energy, engaging in what the Australian ambassador to Indonesia termed admiringly “excellent broken field running.”113 The Indonesian proposal elicited strong behind-the-scenes support from the United States. Now was the time, the state department cabled its embassies in Asia, “to encourage Asian resolve toward such initiative.”114 On 28 April invitations went out to 19 Asian countries to attend a conference on 11–12 May. But an Asian conference could not promise success, partly because the North Vietnamese wanted no part of it, and some American officials felt that more was required, and at once, if the new government were going to survive. In particular, they looked for ways to send it arms and supplies. Rives and the state department were initially opposed, arguing that France was a better choice as an arms supplier and that American assistance would lend credence to the view that Lon Nol was an American client. Congressional opposition to American aid quickly developed as well, with Mansfield, J. William Fulbright (D–AR), and Jacob Javits (R–NY) among others speaking out on the issue. But despite opposition, Nixon was determined to provide assistance. The administration quickly offered the Cambodian government 1,500 AK-47s, presumably weapons captured in South Vietnam.115 Angry when news about the arms had leaked to the press, the administration established a new channel for correspondence about “U.S. involvement in military assistance to Cambodia.” Only top-level officials would see communications sent via this NODIS/KHMER channel.116 Soon, unmarked airplanes landed at Pochentong airport delivering several thousand weapons, primarily captured
26
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
AK-47s but also M-1 and M-2 carbines. These deliveries were explained as a South Vietnamese operation but it was an American action. In fact, when James Lowenstein and Richard Moose, staff members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, visited the region later (after the American invasion of Cambodia had begun), General Nguyen Van Manh, the Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff “and one of the half dozen or so most important officers in the Vietnamese armed forces,” told them that South Vietnam had nothing at all to do with shipments. Lowenstein and Moose went to unusual lengths to be sure that Manh had understood the question. He had.117 Later at MACV headquarters they were told reluctantly that some of the AK-47s might have come from American supplies, but they were rebuffed when they tried to learn about the source of the M1s and M-2s which, in fact, came from both American and South Vietnamese stocks; those from South Vietnam were to be replenished. The United States also assisted the new Cambodian government by allowing Khmer Krom soldiers (ethnic Cambodians who lived in Vietnam) serving in U.S. Special Forces camps to go to Cambodia to fight on the side of the Cambodian government.118 Once in Cambodia they were to be integrated into Lon Nol’s army as the 43rd, 45th, 47th, and 48th brigades. Ostensibly volunteers, some of the Khmer soldiers were surprised when they stepped off the plane and discovered that they were in Phnom Penh.119 As in the case of the weapons, the United States tried to make this appear to be a South Vietnamese operation. But General Manh insisted that his government had not ferried the Khmers to Phnom Penh. In fact, the Vietnamese may have helped the 47th brigade get to Phnom Penh. But the U.S. Special Forces shipped at least the 43rd and 45th.120 The use of the Khmer Krom troops embarrassed the United States. These soldiers had conducted clandestine operations into Cambodia and some, perhaps most, were Khmer Serei, a group that the United States had regularly denied supporting. Charges soon began to circulate these were American mercenaries. In important respects, the critics were right. Government officials in Washington were embarrassed to discover that the Khmer soldiers were not part of the South Vietnamese military but were instead “advised, equipped, supported and paid by US Special Forces.”121 To distance the United States from the Khmer troops, the state department then suggested that they be transferred to ARVN (the Army of the Republic of Vietnam), or, if that could not be done, that their salaries be placed in an escrow account while they were fighting in Cambodia, with allotments being paid to their dependents. The Cambodian government, it was hoped, would pay them subsistence allowances. But the embassy officials and General Abrams in Saigon quickly nixed that idea. The Khmers could not just be transferred to the South Vietnamese army which, in any case, would not accept them. Those who did not volunteer to be transferred to Cambodia remained under American command, and those who volunteered were paid in full and given bonuses by the United States. Once in Cambodia the United States paid them for three days, and then they were entirely separated from the United States military, although the United States continued to send supplies for them.122
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
27
The United States also wanted other countries to assist Lon Nol. Nixon appealed personally to Australian Prime Minister John Grey Gorton, for example. But the most interesting (and most secret) effort involved Indonesia. Within two weeks of Sihanouk’s overthrow, the United States encouraged Indonesian officials to give strong support to the Cambodian government. In fact, the Indonesian government, particularly the military and President Suharto, were following events in Cambodia with deep concern. After all, in 1965 Suharto’s accession to power resembled Lon Nol’s. When American Ambassador Francis Joseph Galbraith visited Suharto on 1 April, he found the President “as animated and intensely interested” in Cambodia as he had ever seen him. Two nights later the highest-level Indonesian intelligence officials spent the entire evening discussing Cambodia. It was evident, thought Galbraith, that they wanted to assist Cambodia, even with arms.123 Foreign Minister Malik, who was trying to organize the international conference, opposed providing aid, as did Indonesia’s ambassador to the United States Sudjatmoko. But on 15 April Suharto stated that Indonesia would not only provide small arms but also would bring Cambodian troops to Indonesia for training – provided the United States would secretly replenish the arms. On 24 April representatives of the Indonesian intelligence service OPSUS informed American officials that they were moving ahead with plans to train Cambodians “in special forces techniques both in Indonesia and Cambodia” and to assist Lon Nol’s efforts to establish effective liaison with the Thais and South Vietnamese. They were also examining Cambodian requests for arms. The Indonesians had substantial stocks of AK-47s and M-1 carbines, but they were also well informed about American shipments of AK-47s to Cambodia and questioned whether additional AK-47s were really necessary.124 Nixon assured the Indonesians that the United States would replenish armaments supplied to the Cambodians. But, although Suharto had in principle approved aid and planning continued (indeed Suharto told Ambassador Galbraith that “military assistance for Cambodia was an absolute requirement” and put intelligence officer Benny Murdani in charge of the Cambodia project), for the moment he held back, not wanting to take action that might undercut Malik’s conference on Cambodia.125 Thus by the time of the American/South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the United States had not yet secured Indonesian assistance to Lon Nol’s government.
The invasion Yet another option for assisting the new Cambodian government was to employ American and South Vietnamese troops directly. The military had of course long urged the use of such troops to “clean out” the Cambodian sanctuaries, and, after the coup, cross-border attacks by South Vietnamese forces escalated. The administration initially opted for caution, however, and the state department urged President Nguyen Van Thieu to stop such operations “until the matter can be considered and coordinated at the highest levels.”126
28
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
In mid-April a state department intelligence analysis of possible communist reactions to cross-border military operations provided a mixed picture. On the one hand, the communists had attempted to pressure the new Cambodian government into allowing them to operate unmolested. They had done this in part by expanding and consolidating their “zones of influence.” Expansion of the zones was likely to continue if South Vietnamese border operations were restricted. On the other hand, “extensive, intense and regular South Vietnamese operations into Cambodia” might provoke them to move directly against the Lon Nol–Sirik Matak regime. They would certainly expand their operational zones significantly, give full support to indigenous “liberation movements,” and generate international pressure from the Soviet bloc against the Cambodian government. The report was, thus, prescient. Read retrospectively, in fact, the report vaguely predicted that large-scale cross-border operations would increase the chances of a Khmer Rouge victory in Cambodia.127 But Abrams and the JCS wanted military action. And on 20 April the President told Haldeman that he would personally “take over responsibility for the war in Cambodia.” Two days later, concerned at reports that the North Vietnamese were about to take Phnom Penh, frustrated at the Senate’s failure to confirm his two nominees for the Supreme Court, anxious to assert his personal authority, angry at various perceived enemies, and perhaps spurred on by repeated viewings of the movie Patton, Nixon approved final planning for a South Vietnamese attack into the Parrot’s Beak area of Cambodia.128 Nixon’s original plan called for an invasion on 25 April. But Kissinger thought Nixon was moving too precipitously (although in principle he supported an invasion), and there was a slight delay. On 27 April the state department ordered Rives, who had not been consulted, to inform Lon Nol that on 28 or 29 April the South Vietnamese army, with the full “understanding and backing” of the United States, would move into the Parrot’s Beak to destroy Vietnamese communist bases. Lon Nol, who had also been kept in the dark, was given three ways of responding publicly. He could say that he had requested the action, or that he had been informed in advance and had no objections, or that he regretted the operation but understood why it was being initiated.129 The President was also now thinking about committing American troops to the operation, primarily to destroy the ever elusive COSVN. Laird and Rogers had been frozen out of the planning and were livid when they found out. In a meeting with the President, Rogers objected to not being consulted and faulted Kissinger for not giving Nixon an accurate picture of the probable consequences.130 It would cost “great US casualties w/ little gained,” he stated. COSVN, he stated correctly, was “not [a] permanent location, not a supply base,” and an operation against it would “not be a crippling blow.” Laird was also angry, though apparently more on procedural grounds than for fear of the consequences. He strongly objected to the operation being directed by Kissinger’s Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) rather than his office. It was an unconstitutional arrangement, he told the President.
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
29
In the face of concerted opposition (“R. & L. reiterated their various arguments several times”), Nixon seemed to backtrack. The problem, he said, was that the South Vietnamese invasion of the Parrot’s Beak would be inadequate by itself. It had to be combined with another operation. If an attack on COSVN was undesirable – and if Abrams so agreed – another target could be selected. But any alternative, Nixon insisted, would require the use of American troops. And if an alternative target was selected, there would probably be a lesser payoff with casualties just as high if not higher. Laird and Rogers continued to protest. In the end Rogers said he would support the President’s decision, but he felt (as Haldeman recorded it) that “all these decisions are made w/o adequate consultation & he doesn’t like it.” After the meeting Nixon ordered Kissinger to postpone the invasion for 24 hours. The President wanted to confirm Abrams’ views about going after COSVN with American troops and was willing to change the target. But he was committed to two operations, one involving American troops. According to Haldeman, Kissinger saw the matter largely as one of presidential authority. “I think [he] would go ahead even if plan is wrong,” wrote Haldeman, “just to prove P. can’t be challenged.” Abrams soon reaffirmed his support of an invasion to destroy COSVN, and shortly thereafter B-52s pounded the sanctuaries.131 On 30 April at 9.00 p.m. (Washington time), Nixon told the nation that American and South Vietnamese troops were entering Cambodia and going after “the headquarters for the entire communist military operation in South Vietnam.” Destruction of COSVN was the campaign’s major immediate objective.132 Soon 44,189 ARVN and American troops (a slight majority American) were fighting in the Parrot’s Beak (primarily a South Vietnamese operation) and Fish Hook (primarily an American operation) areas along the Cambodian border. Later, after COSVN was neither found nor destroyed, the administration would make a concerted effort to insist that it had not been a primary target.133 As the last American troops were pulling out of Cambodia at the end of June, Kissinger claimed that the United States invaded because the communists had determined to topple the new Cambodian government and use the entire country as a base for their operations in Vietnam.134 To be sure, Nixon had been concerned about reports that the North Vietnamese were moving on Phnom Penh and in his speech had claimed that they were encircling the Cambodian capital. But contemporary American assessments of enemy intentions, based in part on captured documents, found little evidence of a North Vietnamese aim to overthrow the Cambodian government and take over the country militarily. White House officials went to extraordinary lengths to measure the public response to Nixon’s speech. They compiled reports of newspaper editorials, carefully watched and evaluated television news broadcasts and commentaries, made note of all congressional reactions, sought out the opinion of business and labor leaders, and kept track of the telephone calls, letters, and telegrams that poured into Washington. Much of the opinion was bitterly critical of the invasion. White House officials, including the President himself, went to unusual lengths to try and reverse the trend and generate support. For example, on 2 May Haldeman
30
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
recorded a large number of presidentially approved initiatives. The President wanted to frame the debate entirely in terms of getting “behind our troops.” He wanted the Gallup Poll to change its question on Cambodia so that the results would be more positive. He wanted to distribute the results of friendly polls. He was concerned with an upcoming CBS “Man on the Street” poll and hoped to influence the question the network would ask. He wanted to follow through on previously vetted actions to organize a recall campaign for Governor Edmund Brown of California if the governor called for Nixon’s impeachment. It was time for Barry Goldwater, Ronald Reagan, and other “inflammatory types” to attack the Senate doves, he said, charging them with “knife in the back, disloyalty, lack of patriotism.” There were times, he stated in one of his periodic displays of masculinity, when you had “to step up hard sometimes – not flinch.” Finally, he saw advantages in student rage: “never underest[imate] value of turning the student thing to our advantage esp[ecially] if they get rough.”135 The administration attempted to mobilize right-wing groups such as the Young Americans for Freedom, to have supportive senators keep tabs on doves, to generate letters and telegrams of support from (among others) the Reverend Billy Graham’s mailing list, and to get astronaut Frank Borman on the Ed Sullivan Show. Ross Perot’s help was sought. Haldeman plotted to withdraw Department of Defense research monies from universities where dissent was strong. Nixon was particularly insistent that all cabinet secretaries, under secretaries and assistant secretaries speak out in support. (Getting cabinet support proved difficult. Nixon was angry that none of the cabinet secretaries had called him after the speech to offer him their support, and in a fit of pique he ordered that they not be allowed to use the White House tennis courts.)136 The administration was also intensely interested in the foreign reaction. Every diplomatic post in the world was asked to report official and media reaction to Nixon’s speech and the military action. As a result, voluminous reports were compiled, many of them not comforting to the administration. In all major European countries there was strong criticism of the American action. The British Labour government managed to prevent a condemnation of the United States in Parliament, but many in the party were unhappy at the government’s course. Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart was humiliated at Oxford University and not permitted to speak. Prime Minister Harold Wilson faced a similar situation in Manchester, though he managed with difficulty to finish his speech. In Germany Willie Brandt refused to establish diplomatic relations with the Lon Nol government, and no high-level German official of either major political party would publicly support the United States. The French government was almost palpably hostile. The Scandinavian countries all distanced themselves from the United States. In Yugoslavia, a country favored by the United States because of its split with the Soviet Union, the reaction was especially bitter. Marshall Josip Broz Tito hurriedly recognized Sihanouk’s government in exile, and demonstrators smashed the windows of the USIS building in Belgrade. Venezuelans were uncomfortable, as were Mexicans. In Iran, where Vietnam had scarcely been discussed, Cambodia was the subject of much debate, all of it unfavorable to the United States.
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
31
Non-communist countries of East and Southeast Asia were more supportive. The Thais exhibited “near euphoria.” Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines thought the action was “great, great, great,” though his Foreign Secretary, the eminent Carlos Romulo, was much more reserved. Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew feared that the United States might be tempted to pull out too quickly. The Malaysian government concluded that the Lon Nol administration served its interests better than Sihanouk and passively favored the American action. The Australian government was supportive, but there was much opposition in the country. The Indians were critical. Over 50 members of the Indian Parliament went to the American embassy to express their “horror and outrage at [the] invasion of Cambodia.”137 Particularly important to the administration was the reaction of the Indonesian government because of the planned international conference. The United States tried to reassure Indonesia that the military action in Cambodia did not violate Cambodian sovereignty and in any event made the conference even more important than before. Publicly Indonesian officials “deplored” or “regretted” the action, and a number were strongly opposed in private as well. Foreign Minister Malik, however, privately expressed understanding for the decision. He explained that he had to be critical in public to maintain Indonesia’s credibility for the forthcoming conference. To Ambassador Galbraith this was understandable and even commendable. He urged the administration not to respond strongly to Indonesian verbal attacks. Most important, President Suharto privately supported the American effort. As he told Nixon personally in May, the U.S. action was “essential and important.” If Cambodia went communist, he said, it would become “the base for subversion and infiltration” in the region and would threaten Indonesia.138 In the meantime opposition among Americans to the administration’s Cambodian action intensified. On the day of the invasion, Senator Fulbright and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee demanded to know on what legal basis American forces were being sent into Cambodia and whether the administration planned to consult Congress. By 7 May at least 50 senators had come out in opposition to the President and only 21 had voiced support. Even Henry “Scoop” Jackson (D–WA), a respected hawk who had supported all other acts of escalation, opposed the Cambodian invasion. New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller likened the move to “dropping a match into a powder keg.”139 In the House, John B. Anderson (R–IN) introduced a resolution reaffirming the constitutional requirement for the President to consult with the Congress on questions of war and peace. By 15 May, 78 representatives had become co-sponsors of a bill to cut off all funds used “to finance the operation of any American combat or support troops in Cambodia or Laos.”140 A little later the Senate rejected an amendment reaffirming the President’s responsibility to protect Americans anywhere in the world, “including enemy-occupied Cambodia,” an action that led House Minority leader Gerald Ford (R–MI) to comment that the Senate’s action was a “defeat for American fighting men.”141
32
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
The most visible dissent was seen on the nation’s campuses, many of which exploded in anger. Nixon called student demonstrators “bums” (he claimed, without being entirely convincing, that he was quoted out of context). On 4 May National Guardsmen killed four student demonstrators at Kent State University, setting off an enormous negative reaction around the country and the world. American students in Israel, for example, demanded that the embassy fly the flag at half staff. A number of respected university administrators agreed with their protesting students. Among them was University of Hawaii President Harlan Cleveland, a foreign policy specialist himself, who charged that this was “the only American military enterprise in modern history to be undertaken without the explicit request or permission of the Government whose territory and neutrality are violated.” There was “revulsion” on campus against this decision, he wrote to Nixon.142 The country seemed to be about to be torn apart. Demonstrators took over a portion of the Peace Corps offices in Washington and issued a manifesto calling for withdrawal from Southeast Asia. Some members of the Peace Corps itself joined in opposition to the President’s actions. Two hundred and fifty Foreign Service officers and state department officials signed a letter of protest to Secretary Rogers.143 There was fear of a military coup in Washington. Because Nixon had incited hatred, argued columnist Pete Hamill in the New York Post, the President was as “responsible for the Kent State slaughter as he and the rest of his bloodless gang of corporation men were … for the pillage and murder that is taking place in the name of democracy in Cambodia.” Hamill wondered if Nixon felt his manhood was at stake, wondered if he was lashing out at all of his enemies, people who had given him no respect over the years. “Is he proving his masculinity at the expense of Asian peasants?” Hamill mused. “Is he showing what a macho he can be by unleashing the ugliest barroom instincts in [Vice President Spiro] Agnew, [Attorney General John] Mitchell, National Guardsmen and the American populace?” Hamill was correct about the administration’s extreme rhetoric and its behind-the-scenes attack tactics. On 3 May, to take just one example among many, Nixon met with the “attack group” and told them not to be apologetic. “No defensiveness from WH. … Don’t worry about divisiveness,” he said. “We’ve created division, drawn the sword. Don’t take it out, grind it hard.”144 After Kent State some administration figures, including Charles McWhorter and Rogers, urged Nixon to tone down the rhetoric.145 In response, Nixon was conciliatory during an important press conference in early May. But if the rhetoric was momentarily lowered, behind the scenes the administration retained its “enemies” mentality. It soon undertook a major campaign to discredit student leaders. Among other things, Haldeman ordered Lyn Nofziger to get a column written claiming that the student disturbances were the result of Cuban-trained outside agitators. “This project is to be given top priority,” Haldeman stated.146 Publicly, however, the Nixon administration liked to give the impression that the President relished opposing views. As Haldeman wrote to Herb Klein asking him to rebut the opposite impression in a Tom Wicker column, “you can …
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
33
point out examples of how strongly the President’s advisers have taken positions without any fear of being overruled and that many of them have been overruled and have come right back with another position – not being ruffled a bit.”147 But in fact there was an enormous effort to discourage dissent within the administration. Each cabinet officer, for example, was asked to detail how specifically he and his subordinates were defending the Cambodia operation. The most celebrated example of internal dissent was that of the Secretary of the Interior, Walter Hickel, who criticized the administration’s response to the students. Asked about this in his press conference, Nixon spoke highly of Hickel. “He is courageous. That is one of the reasons I selected him for the cabinet,” he stated, “and one of the reasons I defended him very vigorously before this press corps when he was under attack.” However, Hickel’s dissent was not viewed as “courageous” but rather as traitorous. And the administration’s private response was much the same as toward others it considered its enemy: he was to be discredited and driven out. It was “clear that Hickel was too big for his britches,” Nixon said to Haldeman the day before the news conference. “Be extremely cold – don’t invite to anything.” Some of his cabinet colleagues were to “give him hell.” Returning to the topic a little later, Nixon went on: “start a quiet job chopping Hickel[:] screwed everything up – behind the scenes encourage his enemies – build as incompetent – build pressure on him.” A week later Nixon ordered Haldeman to “get someone to mobilize anti-Hickel ltrs.”148 A few weeks later Hickel was gone. Meanwhile, administration spokespersons made every effort to publicize the invasion’s achievements. They recited endlessly the numbers of arms and ammunition captured (Haldeman ordered that the number of rounds of captured ammunition, rather than tonnage, be reported), tons of rice seized (which was ostentatiously given to refugees), number of structures destroyed, and so forth. The numbers were impressive and doubtless caused the enemy some hardship for a period of weeks or months. But the incursions had not destroyed COSVN nor the ability of the other side to continue the war. The invasion also brought Cambodia itself directly into the war for the first time – and with devastating consequences. Prior to the invasion, the Vietnamese occupied limited, if perhaps growing, parts of Cambodia, especially along the frontier with Vietnam. Now they had driven deeply into Cambodia, had isolated Phnom Penh, and were within a few miles of the capital. Some observers thought they could take the city at any time. They threatened other major interior cities, such as Kompong Cham, and in June temporarily took over the airport at Siem Reap, the gateway to the ancient capital, Angkor. If they succeeded in keeping Siem Reap, the Cambodian government feared, they might make it the capital of Sihanouk’s government in exile, a move that (given the symbolic significance of Angkor to Cambodia) might have debilitating psychological consequences. Administration officials always denied that the invasion was responsible for spreading the war into Cambodia’s interior because, they said, the enemy had moved deeper into Cambodia prior to the invasion. But no less an authority than
34 Richard Nixon and Cambodia Lon Nol disagreed. Among the consequences of the invasion, he told visiting Americans, was that “the enemy was unfortunately forced deeper into Cambodia.” Nor did documents captured during the invasion provide much evidence to support the administration’s assertions. Some documents indicated that the Vietnamese did plan to expand the sanctuaries and exercise control over the population in the sanctuaries. But nothing showed a plan to move deeply into Cambodia; there was no plan “to seize Phnom Penh or any other specific objective not adjacent to sanctuaries after formation of Lon Nol government or at any other time.”149 In any event the situation was so desperate that Lon Nol himself requested, and received, asylum in Singapore for his family, despite state department efforts to talk him out of it. On 9 June, with the announced withdrawal of all American forces from Cambodia less than three weeks away, the American embassy prepared an estimate of what the situation in Cambodia would be like after the Americans withdrew. The overall tone was pessimistic. Except for a few small pockets, the government would not be in control of the country east of the Mekong River or north of Prey Veng Province. The area west of the Mekong River – north of a line running from Kompong Cham to the great lake (the Tonle Sap) – was also controlled by the Vietnamese communists. Southern border provinces would probably remain in friendly hands but would require the presence of ARVN troops. Western and southwestern areas of Cambodia would be subject to “increased disturbances.” In sum, as a result of the invasion a very substantial part of the country was now subject to enemy control – a dramatic change from the pre-invasion situation. Nor was the embassy certain that the government could survive at all. Certainly, without substantial foreign assistance, all was lost. “If other immediate assistance is not forth-coming,” the embassy concluded, “there will remain nothing for diplomacy to deal with.”150 But reports of Cambodia’s weakness infuriated President Nixon. “The line that ‘Cambodia is doomed’ must be stopped,” he said on 15 June. Nixon insisted that all that could be done to save Cambodia be done, regardless of the consequences. “We have been thinking too defensively,” he stated. In essence, Nixon had changed the American mission from one in which Cambodia was a “sideshow” to protect the American withdrawal from Vietnam and assist Vietnamization, to one in which the preservation of a non-communist Cambodia was a goal in itself.151 Nixon ordered direct assistance to Cambodia even before the invasion and without clear legal authority to do so. By the end of June, the United States and the South Vietnamese had provided nearly 30,000 rifles and sub-machine guns (including captured weapons), nearly 9,000,000 rounds of ammunition, and 9,907 radios to Cambodia, with more supplies in the pipeline.152 Soon trucks and aircraft including helicopters arrived. Nixon also urged South Vietnam to keep its troops in Cambodia after the Americans withdrew and, in certain situations, to provide support to Cambodian military operations – in the event, for example, that Phnom Penh was threatened. The United States was also willing to support South Vietnamese operations with American aircraft, if required.
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
35
South Vietnam was cooperative, but the United States had less success in getting other countries to support the new government in Cambodia. Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Taiwan all provided only small amounts of aid or training. But the United States had high hopes that Indonesia and Thailand would provide more meaningful assistance. With respect to Indonesia, the United States continued to support Malik’s efforts to arrange an international conference. The invasion momentarily stopped the momentum in that direction, and there remained considerable skepticism in any event. No communist government accepted an invitation, nor did the major neutralist governments in the region, such as India and Burma. From Singapore came disparaging, condescending comments about Malik and his allegedly poor preparation. Even the Indonesians began to have second thoughts. With no major neutral countries in attendance, many Indonesians were uncomfortable at being closely identified with the West. Such feelings were doubtless intensified when Hanoi accused Indonesia of being an American puppet and Malik of being a CIA agent. The United States did not expect the projected conference to bring peace to Cambodia immediately. But it saw two important benefits that might emerge from it: the creation of a neutral observer group to replace the defunct ICC in Cambodia, and a follow-up mechanism for continuing consultation among the conference participants. Not wanting to be seen as influencing this conference of Asian nations, the United States nevertheless made its views known behind the scenes. In the end, the conference did not send a neutral observer group to Cambodia. But the conference did demand the withdrawal of all foreign forces in Cambodia, urged respect for Cambodia’s territorial integrity and neutrality, and called for the reactivation of the ICC and the convening of a new international conference. The foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Japan were charged with working with the Geneva co-chairs, other countries, and the United Nations to implement the conference’s recommendations and work for the end of the war in Cambodia.153 Although the conference did not accomplish as much as the United States had hoped, most observers nevertheless thought it was an important success. Singaporeans, despite their initial contempt, came away “deeply satisfied with the results.” Among the most enthusiastic observers was the American ambassador in Jakarta. “In sharp contrast to the grave misgivings which they had on arrival,” he reported, “high-powered delegations which attended conference on Cambodia departed Jakarta with general feeling that they had – somewhat to their surprise – participated in something which may have historic significance.” For the first time Asian countries were coming together to deal with Asian problems and propose Asian solutions. “Malik’s willingness to risk his own position domestically, as well as Indonesia’s non-alignment, appears more than vindicated by the successful outcome,” Galbraith concluded.154 Despite some doubts, the state department and President Nixon both agreed that the Jakarta conference was important – “one of the best things which has occurred recently,” Nixon stated.155
36
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
Whatever the judgment about the Jakarta conference, international diplomacy did not offer a short-term solution, and with the very survival of the Lon Nol government in doubt the United States once again sought Indonesian military assistance. The Indonesian government remained split over this question, but the Americans were optimistic. If Indonesia was not yet persuaded that arms were immediately required, they were going ahead with plans to train Cambodians in special warfare techniques (both in Indonesia and Cambodia) and to send advisors to Cambodia.156 The Indonesians continued to hedge on weapons, though they seemed willing to supply them if the United States would commit itself to major military assistance to Indonesia. Suharto said as much to Nixon when he visited Washington in May.157 The United States did agree to increase substantially the aid it provided to Jakarta, and Suharto in turn dispatched Indonesian State Secretary H. Alamsjah to tell Kissinger that “the Indonesians were prepared to send sufficient weapons to Cambodia to equip 10 battalions.” Only three persons in Indonesia knew of this offer: Suharto, Alamsjah, and Galbraith. Kissinger and Alamsjah agreed that the details would be worked out when an Indonesian military mission arrived in a few weeks.158 Indonesian arms thus looked hopeful. But meanwhile attention turned to reconfiguring a factory in Bandung, Indonesia, to produce AK-47 ammunition for use in Cambodia. The Indonesians had apparently raised this possibility during Suharto’s visit to Washington,159 and in June the Indonesians invited American technicians to visit the plant to determine the feasibility of the project. But before they arrived, Indonesian officials stalled. Would it not be better to wait until after the Lusaka Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in September, they asked.160 The effort to delay the visit of the technicians was part of a larger problem of second thoughts that Indonesian officials were having about Indonesian assistance of any kind to Cambodia. Malik feared that such aid would jeopardize Indonesia’s status as a non-aligned power, would have a negative impact on his diplomatic efforts to address the Cambodian problem, and would kill a possible rapprochement with the Soviet Union (a rapprochement that he hoped would result in a resumption of delivery of much needed spare parts for Russian arms and machinery). He convinced Suharto to delay sending the Indonesian military mission to the United States and put off the arrival of the American technicians. There was still support in high Indonesian circles, particularly among the military, for assisting Cambodia. But it was increasingly clear that the Indonesians expected considerable, probably unrealistic, assistance from the United States in return. Their expectations were “running high” and they were “impervious to our cautionary remarks,” reported Galbraith. Suharto seemed to be leaning toward providing assistance, but “his decision will probably depend upon his assessment of the quid pro quos involved.” Unfortunately, Galbraith concluded, “I doubt if our quo would be adequate to his quid.”161 The American technicians did eventually inspect the Bandung facility and another munitions plant then under construction in Turen and concluded
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
37
pessimistically that it would take two to three years for the Bandung factory to be converted to produce AK-47 ammunition, while the Turen plant, which was not yet operational, would take even longer to convert and could produce even less than the Bandung facility.162 The Americans had hoped that the conversion would take considerably less time. In addition, while the Americans were willing to cover the costs of conversion of that portion of the Bandung plant that would be reconfigured to make AK-47 ammunition, the Indonesians wanted the United States to revamp the entire plant. Further dampening American hopes for Indonesian assistance, meetings between Kissinger and General Sumitro (who arrived unannounced on 26 June) were inconclusive. Both sides agreed there was no point in having a larger, official Indonesian military mission come to Washington for the moment. But despite the hemming and hawing, in the end Indonesia did provide some military aid to the Lon Nol government. It hosted a Cambodian military mission in July, and followed up with its own military mission to Cambodia later in the month to assess the situation. The Indonesians also secretly trained some Cambodian troops, something which became public in August 1971. They also very secretly sent a team of five military advisers, headed by a major general, to Cambodia, an operation so secret that as late as October 1971 there had never been any contact between the Indonesian advisers and American officials in Phnom Penh.163 By the end of 1971 they had trained only about 60 Cambodians, according to American sources,164 though in 1972 they offered to train an additional 200.165 More significantly, in exchange for M-16 rifles, the Indonesians sent, very secretly, a number of AK-47 rifles, ammunition, and related equipment to the Americans for transshipment to the Cambodians. There were at least five such shipments. The fifth took place in November 1970 when the Indonesians provided the Americans with 1,770 AK-47s, over 2.5 million rounds of ammunition, and some related equipment in exchange for 5,880 M-16 rifles and 54,214 magazines. The AK-47s went to the American base at Cam Ranh Bay where they were subsequently transferred to the Cambodians. It was later reported that the United States was secretly manufacturing AK-47 ammunition for the use of Cambodian forces. But in fact the United States was getting the ammunition from Indonesia. Perhaps this is what an intelligence report meant when it stated that “in 1971, at American urging, Djakarta provided weapons assistance to FANK [Forces Armées Nationales Khmères, the Cambodian government’s army].”166 Still, Indonesian aid was limited and secret, and the Americans may well not have informed Lon Nol that Indonesia was the source of some of the AK-47s. In sum, despite Suharto’s rhetoric about how crucial it was to stop communist expansion in Cambodia, Indonesia’s limited aid was motivated as much by a desire to modernize the Indonesian armed forces as it was to assist Lon Nol. American hopes to use Indonesia as a significant source of military supplies and the training of Cambodian troops were not to be realized. Other avenues would have to suffice.
38
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
More predictable assistance came from Thailand, although in the end Thai support, like Indonesia’s, was less than was anticipated. Thai assistance took various forms. Early in June 1970 the Thais, with the required American approval, loaned five T-28 aircraft to the Cambodian air force. The Thais hoped that the United States would promise to replace any planes that were lost in the war, but they loaned the planes and agreed to train eight pilots even before receiving assurances. The Thais also cooperated in removing several nonflyable Cambodia T-28s to the American air base at Udorn for repair at the CIA’s Air America facility. While the early battles raged in Cambodia, the Thais also spoke of sending in their own troops. One possibility was to reassign Thai troops serving in South Vietnam (the Black Panthers) to Cambodia. The Cambodian government requested the troops, and the Thais proposed using them, initially to help protect the capital. Lon Nol and Sirik Matak even told a Newsweek correspondent that they were on the way. But neither the South Vietnamese nor the Americans supported removing the Black Panthers from Vietnam. “This will be very disturbing because of their [Thai] desire to provide some quick support for the Cambodians,” the American ambassador wrote.167 Although the Black Panther option came to naught, the United States still hoped that other Thai troops could be sent. Although it was official Thai policy to prevent a communist victory in Cambodia, a major consideration for the Thais (as for the Indonesians) was financial, and much attention was given to creative ways of having the United States fund Thai operations. Ambassador Leonard Unger was especially imaginative in suggesting how the United States could indirectly provide funds. The Americans could, for example, fund student housing for hill tribes, provide building materials for schools, water pumps for housing, food for dependents of Thai counterintelligence troops, and so forth. American funds would thus not be spent directly for operations in Cambodia but would be “trade-offs,” allowing the Thais to free up funds for such operations.168 Soon attention focused on inserting 4,000 to 5,000 Thais into western Cambodia, with additional forces to be sent to Siem Reap and perhaps Phnom Penh. In fact, the prospect of sending troops into Cambodia deeply divided the Thai government and the larger society. A rare public discussion of the matter at Chulalongkorn University resulted in 3,000 students “filling all seats, packing aisles and sitting on available floor space.” Military leaders made the case for armed assistance, while others spoke in opposition. Student reaction was “overwhelmingly opposed to the use of Thai troops.” Not surprisingly, when Lon Nol visited Bangkok shortly thereafter, he did not get any specific promises of assistance. It was another dead end. In spite of initial euphoria and promises of assistance, regular Thai troops did not enter Cambodia–though apparently some irregular volunteer units did, since the United States incurred a financial obligation for each death or severe injury of Thai volunteers.169 A more promising source of troops were Thai-Khmers (many, perhaps most, of them Khmer Serei). The United States agreed to pay for the training of several thousand. On 23 July Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn announced
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
39
that 3,000 Thai-Khmer would go to Cambodia. But in fact they apparently went to Laos instead.170 Despite these disappointments, Thailand provided more assistance to the Lon Nol government than any other Asian country (except for South Vietnam). The Thais trained thousands of raw Cambodian recruits; provided at least 361 technical advisers (including a radio liaison team stationed in Phnom Penh), nine patrol boats, and clothing and equipment kits for 50,000 soldiers; with American approval, they transferred American-supplied military equipment to the Cambodian armed forces. They also conducted reconnaissance flights over Cambodia and, after the Americans withdrew their troops, flew combat missions in direct support of Cambodia troops. The Americans (who observed many of these strikes from their own observation aircraft) were highly impressed with the accuracy of the Thai attacks.171 Directly or indirectly, the United States paid for much of the Thai assistance through its Military Assistance Programs to Thailand and Cambodia, including “trade-off ” arrangements that Ambassador Unger had urged.172 In the end, the assistance provided by third countries was of some political significance but, except for that from South Vietnam and to a lesser extent Thailand, militarily unimportant. As an American embassy report put it in May 1972, it “has had only a very marginal impact on FANK capabilities and operations.”173 With the withdrawal of American forces on 30 June 1970, Lon Nol was concerned whether direct American assistance would continue. He need not have worried. At the end of August Nixon sent Vice President Agnew to Phnom Penh to symbolize the continuing American commitment. The administration wanted to support a Cambodian army of 65,000 by increasing military assistance to Cambodia from $8.9 million in fiscal year (FY) 1970 to an initial $40 million in FY 1971. Despite objections from the Office of Management and Budget, Nixon signed the order. Because Congress had not appropriated these funds, the administration had to reallocate funds approved for assistance to other countries. Admitting that this “seriously jeopardizes MAP [Military Assistance Program] objectives and can complicate bilateral relations in many countries,” the administration determined that funds for Cambodia were more important. So large cuts were made around the globe with Greece, Turkey, and Taiwan absorbing the largest cuts, though Latin American programs suffered the greatest percentage cutbacks. The reductions brought forth anguished cries from American ambassadors around the world who expressed “shock,” “deep regret,” and “utmost concern.”174 But the administration was determined to provide the assistance to Cambodia. In the weeks immediately after the withdrawal, the Americans also continued to pay for the training of Khmer Krom troops in South Vietnam and assisted with their insertion into Cambodia. Indeed, American Special Forces officers were in charge of the training at at least one camp, Lon Hai.175 The Americans also sent a “psyops” radio team to Phnom Penh to help Radio Phnom Penh, funded military training centers in Cambodia, sent a team of technicians to
40
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
service the T-28 aircraft, and provided tens of thousands of M-1 rifles and AK47 magazines. CIA director William Colby visited Phnom Penh to advise the Cambodian government on pacification strategies. Soon the United States would provide a number of C-47 airplanes. Although American support in the summer and early fall of 1970 must have reassured Lon Nol, there were those within the Nixon administration who questioned whether the United States should continue its assistance, particularly after the initial $40 million was nearly all spent by mid-September. Neither Rogers and Laird shared the view that Cambodia’s future was of much consequence to the United States, particularly if the administration was unable to convince Congress to approve a supplemental appropriation bill. There were even suspicions, probably well founded, that Laird in particular “wanted to wash his hands of Cambodia” even though he was publicly supporting a supplemental appropriation. An aide reported all of this to Kissinger.176 Despite some internal doubts, there was no real debate within the administration about whether the survival of Lon Nol’s government was important to the United States. Options that suggested otherwise, Kissinger reported to the Senior Review Group, had one major problem: “the President believes the opposite.” Therefore the debate was over means and not ends.177 The most extreme option, proposed by General William Westmoreland, called for American forces to move into Cambodia and Laos. This was not given serious consideration, but the administration adopted the next most aggressive (and expensive) strategy, which was to continue to build up the Cambodian armed forces while having South Vietnamese forces defend the Cambodian government and one-half of its territory, if necessary. This was to be funded by a supplemental appropriation along with what the assistant secretary of defense called “some devious procedures.”178 In November Nixon asked Congress for a supplemental appropriation of $255 million for Cambodia, of which $100 million would be used to replace the “borrowed” funds from other MAP programs, $85 million would be for additional military assistance, and $70 million for economic aid. If the appropriation was not forthcoming, Nixon’s operatives were determined to do whatever was needed to get the funds somehow – “Operation Scrounge” they termed it – and they were willing to violate regulations if needed.179 Meanwhile the American embassy staff in Phnom Penh had increased, with the assignment of several military personnel. Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan “Fred” Ladd who, despite embassy objections, reported directly to the White House and MACV, headed the MAP staff. By mid-August he had five full-time personnel (including two other lieutenant colonels) and five additional part-time staff, including the embassy’s air and naval attachés. They coordinated the delivery of military supplies and informally advised the Cambodian military. Later, as the American commitment grew, a Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT) replaced the MAP. Ambassador Emory Swank and the state department had strongly resisted the establishment of a MEDT, arguing that a small augmentation of the current embassy staff was sufficient to administer and
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
41
monitor Cambodian military aid. On the other hand, the JCS wanted up to 110 personnel, with most of them assigned to Phnom Penh. Eventually Laird, who had the final say, established a MEDT team of 60 persons but determined that only 10 (soon raised to 16) could be assigned inside Cambodia. In March 1971 he raised the total to 113. As with Ladd, the precise authority of the MEDT chief vis-à-vis the ambassador became a source of controversy between the defense and state departments. Even more indicative of the growing American involvement in Cambodia was the direct air support provided to Cambodian forces. This represented a departure from the initial American mission. “U.S. air in Cambodia has the mission of interdicting the movement of supplies and men relevant to the war in Vietnam,” Henry Kissinger stated on 30 June as the last American troops were pulling out of Cambodia. “It is not assigned the task of close air support.” Increasingly, however, Americans flew combat missions supporting Cambodian troops. For example, on 24 July American fighter bombers struck enemy positions around Siem Reap, causing considerable damage to North Vietnamese structures and supplies. The strikes encouraged Nixon. While the results of strategic strikes were questionable, the President noted, tactical strikes seemed to bring results. There should be more of them, he wrote.180 There were. Two weeks later several American correspondents traveled with Khmer Krom units into battle near Skuon, where they observed American spotter planes directing American fighter bombers strafing and dropping bombs and napalm on enemy positions. The forward air controller on the ground was a Cambodian trained by the American Special Forces “whose radio technique and slang were flawless.” The American actions “directly conflicted with President Nixon’s statement that USAF was only flying interdiction missions against VC supply routes in Cambodia and not giving direct aid.” The Cambodian commander on the ground acknowledged that the actions were flown in “direct air support for my battalions.”181 During the month of August alone, the Americans flew 611 fighter and 189 gunship sorties, some reaching as far as Phum Thkov, which was well east of Siem Reap and not far from the Thai border. American helicopters also transported Cambodian troops from Phnom Penh to Kompong Thom. The same month there were at least 234 B-52 attacks, bringing the total of B-52 sorties since April to 1,484.182 In September another milestone was passed when some American planes were authorized to conduct operations anywhere in Cambodia, though with restrictions. American forward air controller (FAC) aircraft were still limited to certain parts of Cambodia, with Vietnamese or Thai FACs allowed to operate elsewhere. When Senate staffers visited Cambodia in late November and early December, an American officer told them that the description of American air operations in Cambodia as interdiction mission was simply “camouflage.”183 In sum, the war had been spread to Cambodia. The United States had now acquired another weak government to defend, a government that controlled perhaps one-quarter of the country. At the end of October enemy shells fell on Phnom Penh. “The local hospitals are filling up,” a missionary recorded in his
42
Richard Nixon and Cambodia
diary. All highways from Phnom Penh had been cut, except for Route 1 to Saigon. By the fall of 1970 the original rationale for intervention in Cambodia (that American actions were entirely related to the war in Vietnam and that there was no intention of becoming involved directly on behalf of the new Cambodian government) no longer held. As Lloyd Rives advised the incoming ambassador, Emory Swank, the first American objective in Cambodia was to see that the country remained “independent and neutral.”184
2
Sticking with Lon Nol
Anyone who depends on handouts becomes a creeper rather than a tree. Singapore President Lee Kuan Yew, referring to Lon Nol1
During the night of 8–9 November 1972, lightning struck the Phnom Penh stupa, causing the top section to collapse. This was widely regarded as an ill omen for the Cambodian Republic. But Lon Nol had an alternative reading of the event. It signified the end of the Cambodian monarchy, the reelection of Richard Nixon, and the survival of the republic, he thought. “We hope he is right,” reported Ambassador Emory Swank.2 But it was the skeptics who were right. Lon Nol was always optimistic about his prospects, an optimism that U.S. embassy officials had come to share by the end of the 1970s. The government had survived, despite deep pessimism and military setbacks in the weeks immediately following the coup. As a result comedian Bob Hope, then in Bangkok, sent a telegram to the White House saying that President Nixon deserved a medal for bravery. On 31 December 1970 Lon Nol informed Nixon that “popular feeling” was increasingly opposed to the enemy and that “the Khmers are now succeeding in tipping the scales as completely as possible in their favor.” With American planes decimating reinforcements coming in over the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the Prime Minister predicted that his own forces would take back regions of the country currently in the hands of the Vietnamese communists.3 The Prime Minister’s optimism was premature. A few days after his prediction, enemy forces attacked a convoy on the Mekong River that was transporting petroleum supplies to Phnom Penh, sinking two or three barges and other craft. This brought the stocks of various petroleum products in the city to a “critical point,” according to the American embassy. There were no supplies of kerosene and fuel oil left at all.4 Fighting was also picking up in various parts of the country. Thanks to heavy American military cover, a new convoy made it up the Mekong to Phnom Penh without incident. But on 22 January 1971 Viet Cong saboteurs infiltrated Pochentong airport and blew up virtually the entire Cambodian combat air force, including MIGs, helicopters, T-28s and C-47s. All told, 39 Cambodian aircraft were destroyed, and another nine suffered major damage. Ten South Vietnamese planes were also destroyed, while an American
44
Sticking with Lon Nol
C-47, belonging to the embassy’s defense attaché, suffered major damage. The Viet Cong may have lost three soldiers, but 50 Cambodian military personnel died and some 300 civilians, mostly military dependents, were wounded. It was a devastating attack – “the most psychologically sobering experience for the population since my arrival last September,” Swank reported.5 Though these events temporarily sobered Lon Nol, within a few days he had recovered his usual aplomb.6 But it was hard to see why “deterioration” did not appropriately describe the trend in Cambodia. Foreign Minister Kuon Wick told Malaysian officials that Lon Nol was “overly optimistic and militarily inept” and that he should be kicked upstairs to some kind of figurehead position. The day before, unknown to Kuon Wick, Lon Nol had suffered a stroke and was soon taken to Tripler General Hospital in Hawaii for treatment.7 Despite these setbacks, the Nixon administration was determined to portray American involvement in Cambodia as a great success. Nixon himself told Agnew, Kissinger, and Pat Buchanan that there was no reason to be defensive on Cambodia, that press attacks were “unfair, irrelevant & inaccurate & conflicting.” Administration opponents, he raged on, had a vested interest “in seeing us fail cause they predicted we’d fail.” A few days later he told Kissinger that they should not have “a soft-handed defense[;] have to whack the opponents on patriotism – American lives – etc.” The next day the President acknowledged that he had “not gotten over success to people[;] have to make it very simple … have to estab[lish] success of Cambodia[;] public doesn’t see it as success[.] They’ve only heard TV – and it’s all unfavorable.”8 Part of the problem, Nixon surmised, was Kissinger, whose briefings had been less than spellbinding. “You’re a slsman [salesman], not a prof.,” Nixon lectured his National Security Adviser. “Maybe K. can’t do the briefings,” Nixon mused the next day. He had “not been a success in getting across our p[oin]ts re foreign policy success.” What they needed, he thought, was “a cold man who understands & sees all in terms of news leads.” Or perhaps, as Nixon told Alexander Haig, the problem was that Kissinger’s staff had “all turned left. Must examine staff closely. Watch for traitors.”9 To counter the negative public image of Cambodia, the Nixon administration (among other strategies) engaged the conservative Scaife–Mellon Foundation to write an article detailing the successful Nixon policy in Cambodia. The article, tentatively entitled “Cambodia – One Year Later” and ostensibly written by a professor (rather than someone inside the administration), was to appear in a Sunday newspaper supplement. The NSC approved the draft article, and White House operative John Marsh was charged with planting it. They also considered getting a government official to write a similar piece for the influential journal Foreign Affairs.10 When pessimistic press reports continued to appear, some citing government officials, Nixon was incensed. Thus when Terence Smith of the New York Times wrote a story headlined “U.S. Aides See Situation in Cambodia Deteriorating,” Nixon demanded to know who the aides were. The administration’s desire to demonstrate success in Cambodia could not alter the facts on the ground,
Sticking with Lon Nol
45
however. B-52s had to be used to relieve beleaguered Cambodian forces trapped in the Pich Nil Pass on Route 4, the important road linking Phnom Penh with the port of Kompong Som (Sihanoukville), and the Cambodian army continued to be ineffective.11 In effect admitting that the situation was critical without saying so, the administration did all that it could do to prevent Cambodia’s collapse. For fiscal year (FY) 1971, it managed to pry $185 million in aid for Cambodia out of a reluctant Congress, raided MAP funds intended for other countries in order to get matériel to Cambodia, and waived legal requirements so that it could purchase 600 trucks for use in Cambodia from American subsidiaries in Australia. It put considerable pressure on Australia and South Korea to train Cambodian troops. Over strong state department objections, the administration assigned more military personnel to the American embassy, while the chief of the MEDT, Brigadier General Theodore Mataxis, deliberately sidestepped the chief of mission and imported materials that he wanted – even when the ambassador specifically vetoed them. (High-level state department officials attempted, unsuccessfully, to have Mataxis replaced.)12 Skirting the law, Americans provided informal advice and training to Cambodian forces, took in military supplies in the attaché’s helicopter, and evacuated wounded government troops back to Phnom Penh. Most important, the United States extended its already extensive air support of Cambodian forces to cover all Cambodian territory. Not surprisingly, the percentage of sorties over Cambodia soared. In 1970, 8 percent of American sorties in Southeast Asia were over Cambodia. In 1971 the figure was 14 percent.13 Politically, the United States did what it could to support Lon Nol’s government, playing down potentially damaging reports and refusing to encourage coup attempts while Lon Nol was recovering in Hawaii. When the Cambodian leader returned to Phnom Penh on 12 April, a crowd greeted him warmly and Swank hoped his return would produce political stability.14 Despite these efforts, both the Department of Defense and the American embassy in Phnom Penh were privately becoming pessimistic about Cambodia’s future. For one thing, there was no strong political leadership. Lon Nol, while he had made a considerable recovery from his stroke, was still seriously incapacitated. His doctors ordered him to work no more than one hour per day, and in May he had to accept temporarily a figurehead position in the government. For another, the military situation continued to be problematic. A defense department study of the military situation, completed in early June 1971, was “moderately pessimistic.” Though it did not foresee an imminent crisis or even heavy enemy attacks before 1973, it suggested that the communists’ strategy of protracted war might be successful because they had been busy organizing the countryside. Other studies found “widespread dissatisfaction with the government” and “considerable support” for Sihanouk and the communists in rural areas. The Senior Review Group meeting in Washington reviewed these studies and predicted deterioration in the military situation, complaining especially about the lack of aggressive leadership in the Cambodian army – precisely the same complaint that Americans sometimes lodged against South Vietnamese forces.15
46
Sticking with Lon Nol
Reports of endemic corruption and some scathing evaluations of the current government only deepened the gloom. Sim Var, Cambodia’s ambassador to Japan, commented that the present cabinet looked like it had been “picked from the street,” that the National Assembly “lacked maturity,” and that Lon Nol’s entourage was “corrupt.”16 Embassy officials did not accept such reports at face value, but their own considered analyses were scarcely less damning. One, completed in July 1971, concluded that the government was “characterized by corruption and inefficiency” and had failed to “institute meaningful changes” since its inauguration in March 1970. There was no leadership, even as the military and economic situations continued to deteriorate. There was little interest in pacification, and anti-Americanism was growing.17 Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge army (the Front Uni National de Kampuchea, or FUNK) grew at an alarming rate. It was thought to be only a nuisance in 1970, but Sirik Matak estimated that by August 1971 it numbered 15,000, a figure which the American embassy also used. But the actual figures may have been much higher. By the end of the year the Cambodian government’s intelligence service estimated the number at 20,000 which, it thought, would probably grow at some undetermined date to 50,000. Swank described the report as “sobering.”18 American military intelligence analysts thought Khmer Rouge strength was already considerably higher. In August 1971 they estimated it at somewhere between 35,000 and 50,000. One CIA analyst, Sam Adams, thought the number much higher, estimating it at between 100,000 and 150,000 by June 1971.19 Whatever the precise figure, the Khmer Rouge was no longer just a nuisance, and while the military situation might not be critical in 1971, the future looked ominous. By late November 1971 the American embassy was saying that there was no hope that the government could completely expel the Vietnamese communists and regain control over all of Cambodia. “In reality,” stated the embassy’s lengthy annual review of Cambodian developments, “the most the Khmer leadership can expect is to obtain a reasonable bargaining position.”20 The American military’s response to this deterioration was to try to build up the Cambodian military at a frantic pace. Little attention was given to pacification. In July, for example, CINCPAC submitted a military assistance proposal for FY 1972 to the Department of Defense that planners estimated would cost between $480 and $600 million – this at a time when the current funding was $185 million and Congress was increasingly skeptical of the value of aid to Cambodia. At the same time the Department of Defense wanted to increase the number of in-country MEDT personnel to 91 – up from the currently authorized figure of 23.21 Swank and the state department, on the other hand, thought that the United States should keep as low a profile as possible in Phnom Penh. Thus the great increase in military personnel was not something that they wanted. As Fred Ladd, Swank’s Counselor for Military–Political Relations once put it, increasing the in-country MEDT team would be “like helping a thirsty baby by shoving a fire hose down its throat.”22 Swank and Ladd wanted to provide aid, but they
Sticking with Lon Nol
47
thought the defense department’s approach was wrongheaded. For example, there was little reason to provide lots of helicopters when there were few Khmer pilots available. In addition to genuine philosophical differences over how the United States should best relate to Cambodia, there were serious turf wars, with the state department insisting that the ambassador, as chief of mission, had control over all aspects of American relations with Cambodia, including military assistance, while the military officials, feeling that they were running a war, believed they should be the primary actors. General Mataxis was the symbol of this problem. His primary allegiance, as he construed it, was to the military, and so on occasion he ignored or evaded Swank’s express wishes. Perhaps his most notorious act of insubordination (in state department eyes) was his decision to import assault rifles (AK-47s and UZIs) as well as sidearms for MEDT personnel – despite the ambassador’s specific prohibition against them.23 The bureaucratic and philosophical differences led to strong exchanges, even between Secretaries Rogers and Laird, which eventually found their way into newspaper and magazine reports. An article in Newsweek, for example, discussed the “bitter dispute” between civilians and military personnel over involvement in Cambodia. One civilian official asserted that “within a year the Pentagon will have taken over our operations in Cambodia and Swank and all the other civilians will be sitting on the sidelines just like the civilians in Saigon.”24 A few days later the President himself expressed his concern about a divided team, and thereafter accommodation seems to have improved. The news that Mataxis would retire in January and be replaced by an officer whom the state department liked contributed to the new calm. When Brigadier General John Cleland took over as chief of MEDT, relations seemed to be smoother. Swank agreed to substantial increases in the number of MEDT stationed in Cambodia, for example. (Early in 1972 the number increased to 77.) But it was clear that there still remained serious differences. In May 1972, for example, a military official told Frank Tatu of the state department that Cleland was responsible only to CINCPAC.25 If the state and defense departments often found themselves at odds, they both believed, along with the White House, that Congress provided inadequate appropriations for Cambodian assistance. They also disliked the congressional prohibition on the use of American advisers and restrictions on the number of Americans in Cambodia at any one time. Consequently, considerable efforts went into trying to convince Congress to increase funding and reduce restrictions. At first there was apparent success, for it looked as if for FY 1972 Congress would approve $340 million for Cambodia, including $200 million for military assistance – up from $185 million the previous year. But in the end the Cambodian MAP program for FY 1972 was tentatively set at $179.7 million. According to the Pentagon, this would fund a Cambodian force of only 180,000, rather than the 220,000 planned. However, because Cambodia was the top priority, the administration was determined to provide $200 million one way or another. When the time came for
48
Sticking with Lon Nol
Swank to inform Cambodian officials of the actual amount to be provided ($200 million rather than the $179.7 million tentatively approved), he was told that “for Congressional reasons such assurance will have to [be] given only at high-levels GKR [Government of the Khmer Republic] and on closely-held basis.”26 Swank resisted these apparently devious tactics that were, he wrote, “tantamount to a resort to subterfuge, if I may put it bluntly, in our relations with Congress.” His own reputation for candor with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations had, he felt, been helpful, and he did not want to compromise it. The department should “apprize the appropriate committee chairmen on a confidential basis” of how they intended to fund operations in Cambodia. An even better course, he thought, was simply to live with the lower level of funding or, if necessary, cut MAP programs for other countries even more deeply.27 But the state department reassured Swank by pointing out that in previous years shipping charges of goods intended for Cambodia had been paid for out of MAP funds, whereas it was perfectly legal not to include the cost of packing and shipping of the goods to Vietnam. Only the Vietnam–Cambodian portion of these charges needed to be included. In any event, the appropriations process lingered on for many more weeks. Toward the end of the year two developments in Cambodia increased antiwar sentiment in Congress and contributed to the pressures to cut aid. The first was Lon Nol’s effort to reassert his personal control. Democracy was no longer appropriate for Cambodia, he pronounced, and he began to rule by decree. Though not technically accurate, the popular understanding in the United States was that Lon Nol had abolished the National Assembly and assumed dictatorial powers. His actions resulted in biting commentaries from such media luminaries as Eric Severeid and Marvin Kalb. More devastating for Lon Nol and his supporters in the Nixon administration was the disastrous Chenla II military campaign, which began in August 1971. Designed to reopen Route 6 to Kompong Thom, and personally organized and directed by Lon Nol himself, who “brushed aside the concerns of the naysayers” including Americans and some Cambodians who warned him of serious deficiencies in his blitzkrieg plan, the campaign turned into an utter disaster in November as communist forces cut the government forces to pieces. Over 3,000 of Cambodia’s best troops were killed and thousands more wounded, while 15,000 others fled in disarray, leaving their weapons behind. General Sak Sutsakhan called it “the greatest catastrophe of the war.” It would in fact be the last major offensive that Lon Nol’s army took. Also for the first time large numbers of refugees, many escaping allied bombs and artillery during the Chenla II campaign, streamed in panic along the roads or made do in makeshift camps, getting little if any assistance from the authorities, and just trying to stay out of the fighting. “The situation has deteriorated considerably in several areas,” noted missionary Merle Graven, with fighting even on the outskirts of Phnom Penh itself.28 Swank properly put the blame for the Chenla II defeat squarely on Lon Nol. “Not only were the important decisions his,” he wrote in a scathing assessment,
Sticking with Lon Nol
49
“… he also reverted to his habit of giving specific instructions to individual brigade commanders, bypassing normal chains of command and presuming to make tactical decisions without adequate knowledge of the military situation.” All of Swank’s frustrations about Lon Nol came out in his report. “Lon Nol is in fact unrealistic about his country’s capabilities,” he concluded.29 In the end, and after much delay, in March 1972 Congress appropriated only $170 million in MAP assistance for Cambodia. But due to a decision not to include most packing and shipping charges, the actual amount available for arms and munitions increased over the previous year. Whether this procedure was well understood in Congress is doubtful, however. Perhaps Swank was correct in his initial judgment, that this was a “subterfuge.” In any event, Nixon contributed to this sense by invoking executive privilege and denying to appropriate Senate and House committees planning documents related to MAP funding for Cambodia for FYs 1972 and 1973, something which no previous administration had done.30
Diplomacy Even as Congress debated the foreign aid bill, the Cambodians were tempted to see what kind of a deal the other side might offer them. Aware that the United States was withdrawing its combat troops from Vietnam even while negotiating with the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong to end the fighting, and privately concerned that Nixon’s new opening to China might be detrimental to Cambodian interests, Lon Nol endeavored to contact his opponents. Efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution to the Cambodian crisis were by no means new. Within weeks after American troops withdrew from Cambodia following the brief invasion in 1970, attempts to reach a political settlement were made. In September 1970 the Nixon administration itself considered making a public proposal for an Indochina-wide ceasefire in place to be followed by an international conference that would arrange for the withdrawal of all external forces. Swank was ordered to get Lon Nol’s approval of the draft proposal. It turned out that the Cambodians had a number of reservations. In particular, they were suspicious of the proposed international conference. For one thing, they, like Sihanouk before them, liked the clauses of the Geneva Conference of 1954 that guaranteed Cambodian sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. But Nixon’s proposal did not specifically reaffirm the Geneva Accords. Furthermore, they preferred direct negotiations with the North Vietnamese for the withdrawal of their forces, rather than placing their country’s fate in the hands of a new international conference whose orientation was not clear. Finally, they would not attend any meeting where Sihanouk’s government was represented.31 Swank thought the Cambodian reservations had merit, and some modifications resulted. Nixon would refer to the Geneva Accords, and references would be omitted that might seem to allow for the participation of Sihanouk. On 7 October 1970 Nixon made a televised address to the nation along these lines.
50
Sticking with Lon Nol
Though in the end Nixon’s proposal did not achieve results, it is clear that the Khmers were also very nervous about the central point as well: the ceasefire in place. As Lon Nol put it in a personal letter to Nixon the following May, because his government had no effective control over the northeastern portion of the country, a ceasefire in place “would cause an effective division of the country,” and he pleaded with the President to find “a solution which will not be to our disadvantage.”32 Perhaps because of their doubts about Nixon’s proposal, some important Cambodians wanted to sound out Sihanouk about possible terms. Son Sann, in particular, who had served in previous Sihanouk administrations, received encouragement from “senior officials and notables” (apparently including Sirik Matak and Cheng Heng) to contact Sihanouk. In Paris Son Sann met with several of Sihanouk’s supporters. A number of younger officials were “very able men” but they “put on the mask of ideology” whenever he spoke to them. Older men like Sarin Chhak listened attentively. But nothing resulted from these contacts. Son Sann hoped to return to Phnom Penh and then go on to Moscow, Berne, and Prague, where he wanted to meet with former Prime Minister Penn Nouth, the only person worth speaking to, he thought. But when Son Sann returned to Phnom Penn in July, Lon Nol gave him “no encouragement at all.” No negotiations could take place until the Vietnamese withdrew entirely from Cambodia, he was informed. Arguing in religious terms, Lon Nol told Son Sann that victory was certain since “the conflict has become a religious war and the reign of Buddha is to last another 2,500 years.” Although Son Sann had become a devout Buddhist since the death of his son in 1969, Lon Nol’s attitude left him discouraged. He cashed in his unused airline tickets. Nevertheless, Son Sann intended to pursue his contacts when he returned to Paris in August. Asked about the American attitude toward such contacts, Swank responded that the United States had “a sympathetic and positive interest in any serious attempt to contribute to peace.”33 Nothing seems to have eventuated from these talks, doubtless in part because the Khmer Rouge also had little interest in negotiating a settlement. Nixon’s impending and historic visit to Beijing offered a new possibility for negotiations or at least soundings. A number of rumors surfaced that Sihanouk wanted to meet with Nixon when the President was in China. In September 1971, for example, Sihanouk apparently told several people that he would be willing to speak with Nixon. He promised a policy of neutrality and non-alignment once he was back in power.34 Later in the month Sihanouk met for an hour with Malcolm MacDonald, the former U.K. Commissioner General for Southeast Asia. Although there was no specific mention of a possible meeting with Nixon, Sihanouk reiterated his desire for a non-aligned, coalition government. At the same time the Pakistani ambassador in China intimated that the Chinese also wanted such a government, rather than a communist one, in Cambodia, “partly because they would prefer the country to be run by him [Sihanouk] than to see an unbridled spread of North Vietnamese influence.”35
Sticking with Lon Nol
51
Sihanouk, meanwhile, continued to send out signals of his desire for a meeting. In an interview in December with the Italian weekly L’Europeo, Sihanouk displayed an “obvious eagerness” to meet with President Nixon during his Peking visit.36 Sihanouk’s most direct approach to the United States came in January 1972 when he let it be known that “should the President wish to speak to him, he would be pleased to come to Peking.” He would not, he added, see Kissinger in Nixon’s place.37 The chances of a Nixon–Sihanouk meeting were probably diminished when in February Sihanouk’s government rejected Nixon’s new peace proposals for an Indochina settlement. Put forth on 25 January 1972, the “new” proposals were virtually the same as Nixon had outlined the previous October. In the end no Nixon–Sihanouk meeting took place, although there are indications – including a statement by Sihanouk himself – that the Chinese attempted to arrange such a meeting, only to have Nixon veto it.38 It is unfortunate that the United States declined to engage the Prince. To be sure, any agreement with Sihanouk would almost certainly have resulted in the end of the Lon Nol government. But perhaps an arrangement could have been made that would have kept the Khmer Rouge at arm’s length; the results for Cambodia would have been better. Even though there was a sense by then, as Ambassador Swank put it in 1987, that “the Cambodians were doomed,”39 no one in the administration was willing to say so out loud. Despite the public advice of those like Senator Mansfield, who urged that Sihanouk be restored, there was no political will in the administration to forge a solution short of retaining the Lon Nol government. When rumors surfaced in the summer of 1972 that preparations were underway to return Sihanouk to Cambodia, Nixon personally informed Lon Nol that the United States had nothing of the sort in mind. Shortly thereafter, when the Soviet chargé in Phnom Penh asked Swank whether the United States was trying to forge a compromise with Sihanouk, Swank replied that American policy was actually moving in the opposite direction. Restoration of the monarchy and of Sihanouk, said Swank, was something most Khmers did not want, and there was nothing more than “a remote possibility” of it ever happening.40 As the United States continued to negotiate with the Vietnamese communists, as Nixon prepared for his historic trip to China, and presumably as the full force of the Chenla II disaster began to hit home, Lon Nol himself began to look for a way out. The first hint of this came to the Americans’ attention at the end of 1971 when rumors circulated that the communists had attempted to contact the government about possible peace terms. Evidence for this was in the very low level of military activity and in “veiled comments of local Soviet officials.”41 Although the state department tended to doubt the veracity of such reports, they continued to surface. A flurry of rumors appeared late in January 1972 that North Vietnam, using various communist embassies in Phnom Penh as intermediaries, was proposing a ceasefire in exchange for the government agreeing that the North Vietnamese could have uncontested access to their former sanctuaries and could resume shipment of supplies through Kompong Som (Sihanoukville). An alternative rumor was that the Cambodians had initiated the soundings.
52
Sticking with Lon Nol
American embassy officials tended to dismiss a possible Cambodian initiative, since both Lon Nol and Sirik Matak privately denied making one. They put more credence on the former possibility, adducing a number of reasons as to why the Soviets and other communist countries might have an interest in promoting a settlement. The embassy was frankly uncertain about what was going on and concluded that, while “soundings” of some sort probably had been made, no formal negotiating proposal has been presented. In any event, Swank considered discussions between Cambodian government and communist representatives “natural” under the circumstances, though he did not attribute much significance to them.42 A few days later Sirik Matak issued a public denial that any government official supported the idea of partitioning Cambodia to achieve a compromise settlement. At almost exactly the same time that Sirik Matak was making his denial, an intelligence report surfaced that a Lon Nol emissary had approached the Indonesians to see if they would serve as intermediaries with the North Vietnamese. The terms being discussed, the report stated, included a nonaggression pact in return for “North Vietnamese use of the logistics corridors in northeastern Cambodia.” Swank took this report to be “probably accurate.” An even more creditable report about the same time stated that Major General Kang Keng, a trusted associate of Lon Nol, had approached Soviet embassy officials to see if they could serve as intermediaries. Swank now had to admit that this was “an arresting development.” Upon reflection, however, Swank stated it was logical for the Cambodians to develop a negotiating position, given the uncertainties of external assistance in the months ahead. “They see the example of our private talks with Hanoi and Peking,” he wrote, and thus had “an understandable motivation to do some exploring themselves.”43 Although the state department thought Swank’s analysis “cogent,”44 the White House took a very different view of these contacts. With the President’s personal approval, it became the position of the United States that it could not “visualize any mutually agreed modus vivendi between Hanoi and Cambodia” that would not threaten Vietnamization, weaken the Khmer Republic, and “shake general confidence amongst our friends on the Indochinese peninsula.” Reestablishment of the sanctuaries would be “an enormous setback” to American aims. Swank was therefore ordered to express the “deep concern” of the United States about these purported soundings and, in essence, to stamp them out.45 Swank’s account of his hour-long conversation with Lon Nol required 12 pages of single-spaced text. In the conversation Lon Nol insisted that the overtures had come from the Soviet Union, not from him. But Swank was not fully convinced. “I think it plausible to conclude that Lon Nol was not being fully candid with us,” Swank reported. Using his diplomatic skills, the ambassador kept the conversation pleasant throughout, and the two men parted on friendly terms. “We want his cooperation, not his enmity,” Swank explained. But the point had been made, and made clearly. If Lon Nol wanted continued American
Sticking with Lon Nol
53
support, he must stop all contact of this sort. “We will continue to watch this very closely,” Swank concluded.46 It may be only a coincidence, but two weeks after the American démarche the lull in military activity came to a sudden end when a rocket attack on Phnom Penh killed over 100 persons.47 The Cambodian government’s efforts, however fitful they were, to discuss a political settlement that would allow the Vietnamese to retain sanctuaries and transportation corridors for supplies, indicated that the military situation had worsened in 1972. A report in March, for example, concluded that the enemy could create “absolute havoc” without much difficulty and could take Phnom Penh “any time they wish to do so.”48 Though Swank thought the report unnecessarily pessimistic, his own dispatches included disheartening news. Only a few days after reading the report, for example, he reported that the Cambodian army had given up three more outposts on Route 1, and the important city of Svay Rieng remained cut off by land. For the rest of the year, American C-130 aircraft had to drop food and ammunition into the beleaguered town. It was quite clear by this point that the FANK (Forces Armées Nationales Khmères, the Cambodian government’s army) was not winning the war. This was evident in a lengthy interagency review, chaired by an official in the Department of Defense, which in April 1972 produced NSSM-152, a lengthy analysis of the Cambodian situation. FANK would be able to hold Phnom Penh for the next 18 months, the analysis concluded, but the enemy would “continue to make gains” in the countryside. FANK lacked good leadership, and Lon Nol interfered “at all levels.” Even more troublesome, Cambodia’s military strategy was unrealistic, the army’s tactics flawed, and its administration “chaotic.” Furthermore, the Cambodians knew little about unconventional warfare, their psychological warfare program was “very limited,” their intelligence capabilities “only marginally effective,” and the highly touted “general mobilization” almost invisible.49 Nor did the political future look bright. Given his serious medical condition, Lon Nol could leave the scene at any moment, and there was no successor in sight. Political instability would inevitably affect the war effort negatively. In a particularly telling admission, the group conceded that “while they had justifiable complaints under Sihanouk, the Khmer were by and large protected from the ravages of war. Now the war has been brought to the countryside and to the capital city.” Keeping up enthusiasm for the war, which had already diminished, would be more and more difficult as the resistance became increasingly “Khmerized.” While the administration tried to find points of optimism, the future looked bleak indeed.50 Six weeks later CINCPAC Commander Admiral John McCain, a strong supporter of Lon Nol who had been solicitous of the Cambodian leader during his hospital stay in Hawaii and who had done his best to encourage him, acknowledged that even with massive American assistance “there are no military means whereby the GKR, with its limited technical skills, leadership potential, management capabilities, and manpower base,” could defeat a North Vietnamese force intent on destroying it. In just the past two months, he stated,
54
Sticking with Lon Nol
FANK had failed “to maneuver their force properly or apply the power of their combat support.” Continuing his devastating critique, McCain contended that FANK’s efforts even prior to the Chenla II disaster had been mostly ineffective. Then in April and May 1972 (after NSSM-152 had been completed) FANK units surrendered at Kompong Trach and Kampot. Morale declined, and “entire companies surrendered and battalions retreated without discipline.” FANK units refused to hold their positions during rocket attacks. In addition, they abandoned a series of towns along Route 1 and found themselves (ten battalions) encircled in Svay Rieng. Near Kompong Thom, McCain went on, “light enemy pressure” resulted in the abandonment of four FANK outposts.51 Some FANK units reportedly even collaborated with the enemy. Then, in August, for the first time the enemy began to use tanks near Kompong Trabek. They cut Route 1 in three places and isolated several FANK units. The use of tanks unnerved the normally upbeat Lon Nol. He began to write directly to President Nixon pleading for more support. Between 3 and 10 August he wrote five lengthy letters – at least one of them handwritten – to Nixon. Swank thought that this was a poor way for Lon Nol to expend his limited energy, but Nixon encouraged this practice, feeling that this helped the Cambodian President deal with his anxieties. Adding to the sense of gloom, from time to time enemy rockets rained down on Phnom Penh, sometimes aimed accurately at defense targets but often killing civilians and further eroding the already fragile morale. On 6 May 28 persons died and 96 more were wounded when 112 rockets and other ordinance landed near the Ministry of National Defense. Sappers also infiltrated the airport and the city, launching attacks against bridges, airplanes, and other convenient targets. Eventually the embassy had to forbid American families with children from coming to Phnom Penh. The situation became so precarious that later in the year Lon Nol himself asked the Australians if he could send his three young sons to Australia to study. A moment of optimism occurred in May 1972 when FANK troops retook the Siem Reap airport and attempted to surround the enemy in Angkor, but ultimately they did not have the strength to do so. By August FANK was back on the defensive in the Angkor area, and the renowned French archaeologist B. P. Groslier, who had attempted to continue his work at the ruins, feared that in desperation the army would employ heavy weapons and destroy the priceless monuments. Furthermore, FANK’s failure to reopen Route 1 and the enemy’s successful blockading of Route 5 to Battambang resulted in severe rice shortages in the capital, leading in September to riots and looting of Chinese shops. Soldiers perpetrated much of the violence until Lon Nol confined them to their barracks. By the middle of September American officials were not certain that Lon Nol could retain the loyalty of the army, as the military leaders increasingly questioned his judgment. “The underlying thread of this discontent,” concluded American chargé Thomas Enders, was “concern that Lon Nol may be losing the war.”52
Sticking with Lon Nol
55
The American government responded to this situation by reassuring Lon Nol that he retained solid American support; and they took various measures to try and turn the situation around. American planes, including on occasion B-52s, continued to assist Cambodian troops, but the Americans hoped that FANK would become much more aggressive. Perhaps, they told Lon Nol, he could offer special incentive pay to FANK forces that performed well and improve housing conditions for soldiers’ families. In the fall a high-level American delegation arrived in Cambodia to develop recommendations on reorganizing FANK to make it more effective – a delegation whose very presence was, according to the state department’s legal office, a clear violation of the law forbidding Americans to advise the Cambodian government.53 The Americans also attempted to find ways around congressional restrictions on the number of official Americans who could be in the country at any one time and on the number of third-country nationals who could be paid with American funds. But none of these efforts seemed to make much difference. Meanwhile the internal political situation was deteriorating. Students, who had once strongly supported Lon Nol, became discouraged when the democratic reforms they expected did not materialize. On 27 April 1972 military police fired on demonstrating students, hitting at least 20 of them, and the American embassy reported that the populace sympathized with the students. More demonstrations and strikes ensued. Lon Nol, who in March had successfully maneuvered to eliminate Sirik Matak from power, then announced that he would hold presidential elections in which he would run. To his surprise a number of other candidates announced, and two, In Tam of the Democratic Party and Keo An, reputed to be a Sihanoukist, refused to withdraw. In the end, the official figures showed that Lon Nol received about 54 percent of the vote; In Tam, who actually won the election in Phnom Penh, received 24 percent; and Keo An, who was popular in the countryside (despite an apparent reputation of being “wildly impractical and unbalanced,” according to a later American embassy assessment54), received a remarkable 21 percent. Thousands of people simply declined to vote, and in any event the vote was rigged. Had the election been fair, In Tam or possibly even Keo An would have won. One scholar insists that Lon Nol actually received less than 20 percent, and perhaps only 15 percent, of the vote. William Harben, the American embassy’s political officer, documented a number of electoral irregularities, though Swank refused to forward his report to Washington.55 Clearly Lon Nol’s government was in trouble. Even the highly inflated official election figures demonstrated, as an embassy telegram put it, “widespread dissatisfaction with the government.”56 After the presidential elections, the political situation continued to unravel as the two major opposition political parties announced that they would not contest the elections for the National Assembly scheduled for September because the new electoral law ensured a substantial majority for the pro-government party. Shortly thereafter assassins attempted to set off two claymore mines as a fourvehicle convoy made its way along a street near the royal palace in Phnom Penh.
56
Sticking with Lon Nol
The target was Son Ngoc Thanh who was, at this point, a Lon Nol ally. Only one of the mines detonated, missing Thanh but injuring four persons in another car. There was in sum a great malaise among the population, if not quite yet a sense of defeatism. In the fall of 1972 more than ever the United States urged national unity. All Cambodian leaders agreed in principle; but in practice unity was difficult to achieve. Lon Nol, for example, blamed Sirik Matak for the military failures, the student riots, and alienation of the Buddhist monks. For a time it looked as if a rapprochement of sorts was in the works. But on 5 October the government closed down Sirik Matak’s newspaper because it published an article that the government found offensive. Lon Nol’s “ability to govern” was not enhanced, thought the Americans.57 Little came of their pleas for unity. Meanwhile Lon Nol was losing international support. Embassies in Phnom Penh began evacuating dependents and lowering their level of representation. In August the conference of foreign ministers from non-aligned countries in Georgetown, Guyana, seated Sihanouk’s government instead of Lon Nol’s. Stung by this development and “fearing an international trend against it, and for Sihanouk,” the Cambodian government determined to send low-level “goodwill” missions to nearly 70 countries, mostly in Africa and Latin America, where they hoped to build up international support. The United States discreetly assisted this effort by trying to determine in advance whether the teams would be welcome and by providing advice to the teams once they arrived.58 The goodwill missions were part of an effort to create a more favorable impression of the GKR prior to a vote on who would represent Cambodia at the United Nations. Lon Nol himself, in yet another letter to Nixon, appealed for American support. The President assured him that the United States was doing all it could to prevail on the credentials’ question.59 Whether or not the goodwill missions were responsible, in the end the Phnom Penh government retained the Cambodian seat without much difficulty. Meanwhile, in Cambodia things only got worse even as the Vietnam War peace negotiations in Paris began to bear fruit. Indicative of the dangerous situation even in the capital, the American ambassador (or chargé in his absence) rode to work in a heavily armored car. Inside the car was a military policeman armed with an UZI and a pistol. Behind was a second car carrying three Cambodian military policemen armed with M-16s and pistols. Two military policemen on motorcycles rode alongside. The protection was needed. On 24 September the American chargé, Thomas Enders, was riding in this fashion to the embassy when a large bomb made of plastic explosives was detonated near his car on a major Phnom Penh thoroughfare. Had Enders been in a regular car, he would have been killed. As it was he escaped unharmed, although one of the motorcycle policemen died at the scene, as did a civilian cyclist. The Viet Cong and Cambodian communists were blamed, but in retrospect William Harben, chief of the American embassy’s political section, suspected that the brother of Lon Nol, Lon Non, who had a reputation for viciousness and, as head of Cambodia’s covert intelligence operations was familiar with terrorist techniques,
Sticking with Lon Nol
57
was behind it.60 It is possible that Harben was right, for the United States generally considered Lon Non’s influence detrimental. As Marshall Green put it a few weeks later, “Lon Non appears to stand athwart practically everything we are trying to accomplish in Cambodia in terms of unity of purpose and national solidarity.”61 If Lon Non was responsible, he may particularly have disliked American pressure to attain an honest count of the number of Cambodian soldiers and in other ways reduce corruption. Or he may simply have objected to American support for his political enemies in Cambodia. In any event, there was much violence in Phnom Penh. All told, by the time of the assault on Enders, 27 terrorist attacks had taken place during the year in the capital. That number was soon to increase. Early in the morning of 7 October – the second anniversary of the creation of the Khmer Republic – Viet Cong sappers penetrated the northern defenses of Phnom Penh and infiltrated the capital. Achieving total surprise, they destroyed or captured the bulk of a FANK company’s much prized M-113 armored personnel carriers (APCs). (FANK had only two such companies.) Equally important, they destroyed the key bridge across the Tonle Sap River. (The bridge was not restored until 1994, largely with Japanese funding.) The government could take some comfort in the fact that the Cambodian army swiftly rallied, American planes were in action within 15 minutes, and most of the raiders were killed or captured. But the raid was nevertheless devastating. The incoming chief of staff, Sosthene Fernandez, called it “a disaster.” Enders fully agreed. “Given the strategic importance of the Tonle Sap bridge, the key role the APC’s play in sustaining morale in FANK field operations, and the gross negligence displayed, the term is altogether apt,” he reported.62 The future looked bleak. A week after the demoralizing attack on Phnom Penh the American embassy reported that it was now clear that the government could not “hold the countryside in the center of their country, and maybe cannot hold all of the LOC’s [lines of communication], without a larger and more effectively structured force than they now have.”63 Although there was no dramatic change for the rest of the year, the situation in Cambodia had clearly deteriorated dramatically since the coup that placed Lon Nol in power. In January 1973 the state department spelled out the situation in stark terms in a document intended as background reading for Vice President Spiro Agnew, who was about to visit Phnom Penh. He would find a different country than the one he had first visited in 1970, the department wrote. The government now controlled no more than one-third of the country, perhaps only one-fourth. Furthermore, “the high morale and national dedication present at the time of your first visit has largely disappeared into one of war-weariness, ineffectiveness and considerable corruption.” Lon Nol’s base of support was “very narrow,” most other Khmer leaders having withdrawn from the government. The military leadership has “not been effective.” Economically, the country was “not in good shape.” There were no exports to speak of, and Cambodia was almost entirely dependent on the United States for trade. The United States was even supplying rice – this to a country which had almost always been self-sufficient in that commodity.
58
Sticking with Lon Nol
The state department paper also challenged the long-standing American position that the Khmer Rouge were mere puppets of the Vietnamese. With “little assistance from the NVA/VC” the Khmer Rouge had launched large-scale attacks simultaneously in as many as seven different parts of the country. Although the government army was much larger and better equipped and was able, with considerable air support from the United States, to withstand these attacks, it seemed powerless to defeat the insurgency. This, the Vice President was to be informed, was due to “poor leadership, particularly at the highest level; current factionalism within the top military leadership which is intensified by the divisive role of Lon Nol’s brother, Lon Non; [and] corruption and a dramatic decline in morale at all levels.”64 Before the state department’s briefing paper reached the Vice President, it went to Henry Kissinger, who changed it in significant ways. In contrast to the state department’s view that the Khmer Rouge were by now largely independent of the North Vietnamese, the Vice President was informed that Hanoi controlled most of the “indigenous Communist military and political apparatus in Cambodia.” Kissinger’s unwillingness to acknowledge that the Khmer Rouge were not dependent on Hanoi – something even in 1975 he would not fully accept – was a major misreading of the Cambodian situation. As William Shawcross put it in 1978, “from Kissinger’s refusal to accept that the Khmer Rouge could seriously distrust the Vietnamese communists stems much of the subsequent, continuing disaster.”65 Kissinger’s rewrite did acknowledge that the enemy controlled “most of eastern and northeastern Cambodia and substantial areas in other parts of the country,” but government forces also controlled “a substantial part of the country, including the richest rice producing areas, and a majority of the population.” Gone were statistics estimating government control at only one-third to one-fourth of the territory. Furthermore, the Cambodian army, though it had numerous problems, “has been generally successful in keeping open vital lifelines to Phnom Penh and in protecting most of the important population centers.” Gone also were references to the dramatic deterioration that the Vice President would see when compared to his earlier visit in 1970. There were no references at all to declining morale or the pervasive war-weariness that the state department had identified. Nor was there any mention of Cambodia’s dependence on the United States for rice and trade. In sum, Kissinger’s revision of the state department paper suggested that the country had some important problems and still required American assistance to survive, but it was not in desperate straits. “Despite all of its difficulties and shortcomings, the Cambodian Government does manage to function,” the Vice President learned. “Most of the country has been spared the ravages of war, since most of the fighting has been along lines of communication, and U.S. air strikes have been conducted in largely unpopulated areas.”66 The state department’s view was the more accurate one. The situation was so precarious that the embassy recommended that the plane that brought Agnew to
Sticking with Lon Nol
59
Phnom Penh return to Saigon, or perhaps circle in the air during the Vice President’s visit. If it were to stay on the ground at Pochentong airport, it might be attacked.
The Paris Peace Accords – but no talks with Sihanouk Meanwhile in the fall of 1972 there were expectations that the fighting in Vietnam would soon end, as Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho negotiated seriously in Paris. The basic American negotiating position with respect to Vietnam, put forward in the previous May even as Nixon was ordering renewed intensive bombing of North Vietnam (OPERATION LINEBACKER), was a ceasefire in place and the return of prisoners of war, after which the United States would withdraw its troops. In September 1972 Secretary Rogers told Cambodian diplomats that these peace terms applied to all of Indochina, not just Vietnam. But unfortunately, he stated, the communists did not appear interested in serious peace negotiations, and he did not expect any progress for the next two months. Actually there had already been significant progress in the Paris negotiations, where the North Vietnamese had dropped their long-time demand that the United States overthrow the Thieu government. After intensive negotiations, most issues were resolved by 12 October. Cambodians were at no point involved in the negotiations directly. Only after the draft agreement was concluded did American officials inform the Cambodians about the specific provisions affecting them. In late October, having initialed an agreement with Le Duc Tho in Paris, Henry Kissinger was dispatched to Indochina to get South Vietnamese concurrence. On 22 October he flew to Phnom Penh where, for three hours, he discussed the agreement with Lon Nol and other Khmer leaders. The main provision affecting Cambodia was an article that called for an end to military actions and the withdrawal of all foreign troops. It contained no specific deadline. It is not clear how much detail Kissinger shared with the Cambodians, though he certainly informed Lon Nol that the agreement contained a provision for the withdrawal of foreign troops because he asked Lon Nol to call for a cession of hostilities just as soon as the fighting ended in Vietnam to give the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong a chance to withdraw. A few days after Kissinger’s visit, Lon Nol wrote another of his periodic letters to the President. It made no reference to Kissinger’s visit and spoke only in vague generalities.67 Two weeks later he told a New York Times reporter that Kissinger had not informed him in any detail about the Paris agreement. It was probably no coincidence that three days after the Times story, Alexander Haig, Nixon’s Deputy National Security Adviser, and John D. Negroponte of the NSC showed up in Phnom Penh to discuss the tentative peace accords with Lon Nol and Prime Minister Hang Tun Hak. The agreement did not yet specify when hostilities in Cambodia would cease but the Americans told the Khmer leaders that they would press the North Vietnamese on this issue at the next meeting. Nixon planned to guarantee the enforcement of the agreement, in part by
60
Sticking with Lon Nol
keeping “a massive air and naval presence in the area” which, after an agreement was reached with Vietnam, would be “even more at your disposition.” The American MAP program would also continue.68 The Cambodian government wanted the agreement to provide for the withdrawal of all North Vietnamese troops, the evacuation of all sanctuaries, the removal of all arms caches, a prohibition on the North Vietnamese taking Khmers with them for training in North Vietnam (which had happened after the Geneva Conference of 1954), and a requirement that North Vietnam use its influence with the Khmer Rouge to end hostilities in Cambodia. The Americans responded that they doubted they could get the North Vietnamese to agree to the last three of these items. But they did encourage the Cambodians to improve their own bargaining position by taking the offensive militarily to open as many lines of communication as possible prior to a ceasefire. Beyond that, the United States counseled caution. Not only would immediate military efforts to establish control over enemy-occupied areas be counterproductive in a political sense, but they risked humiliating defeat. Better to wait until the North Vietnamese had withdrawn according to the peace agreement, the Americans thought, before expanding government control. But for the moment all of this was academic. South Vietnamese President Thieu had refused to sign the peace agreement, despite great pressure from Kissinger, and Nixon had ordered his National Security Adviser back to the conference table. Difficult negotiations continued into December, but a settlement was not reached, and Nixon resorted to another round of intensive bombing in North Vietnam – the infamous Christmas bombings, or LINEBACKER II. Actually, the prospect of a peace settlement in Vietnam was unnerving for the Cambodian government (as indeed it was for Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge). The government feared that the American departure from Vietnam would inevitably lead to decreasing American support, if not abandonment. Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge feared North Vietnamese and Chinese pressure to accept a ceasefire and negotiated agreement. In any case the Lon Nol government never put all of its negotiating eggs into the Paris talks. In addition to urging the Americans to get acceptable terms for Cambodia in Paris, the Cambodians again attempted to contact the North Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge to see whether a negotiated settlement of the war was possible. Shortly before Kissinger arrived in Phnom Penh, Cambodian premier Hang Thun Hak privately told at least two reporters that the government was talking to Khmer Rouge leaders. A few days later the Washington Post and the New York Times quoted him as saying that the cabinet had agreed “in principle” to negotiate with the Khmer Rouge.69 Although the Cambodian government quickly challenged these reports, saying that its only contacts were with Khmer Rouge military commanders whom it hoped to entice to rally to the government, it was in fact seeking a political settlement. As they had some months earlier, government officials asked the Soviet embassy for assistance in contacting the Khmer Rouge. When these did
Sticking with Lon Nol
61
not initially succeed, Lon Nol asked the Americans to intervene with the Soviets to help. Swank considered the Cambodians’ efforts reasonable and hoped that the United States would not discourage such attempts. Given the advanced state of American negotiations with the North Vietnamese, the United States could hardly object to Cambodian efforts to explore a negotiated settlement as well. Soon the Cambodian government authorized Son Sann to resume his efforts to find a peaceful settlement. He was given implicit authority to contact officials in the Sihanouk government in exile (the Gouvernement Royal d’Union Nationale de Kampuchea, or GRUNK) in Paris.70 In December rumors surfaced that Chinese representatives were in Phnom Penh to talk with the Lon Nol. Swank did not dismiss the rumors out of hand. The Chinese did want a political settlement in Cambodia as a way of reining in the North Vietnamese. Giving some credence to the story, only a few days later government officials apparently made contact in Kratie with Khmer Rouge representatives to probe their attitudes toward reconciliation. But in the end nothing came of these efforts. Meanwhile Sihanouk himself, despite his fiery public rhetoric, was dropping numerous hints again that he would like to meet with American officials. As early as September 1972 he said (in contrast to earlier statements) that he would be glad to meet with Kissinger. About the same time a spate of newspapers reported that the United States was interested in working out a solution that would bring Sihanouk back to Phnom Penh. Agence France Presse (AFP) reported that Sihanouk was “euphoric.”71 It is not impossible that there was some American consideration given to a negotiated settlement at this time involving the Prince. There surely was some informed speculation about this. For example, late in October Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak asked Lon Non how his brother would react if China asked the United States to support a Cambodian settlement involving a role for Sihanouk.72 But, although Senator Mansfield was pushing for just such a settlement, the bulk of the evidence suggests that the Nixon administration had committed itself to the Lon Nol regime. Despite the government’s poor prospects, the United States was not about to turn back toward Sihanouk. Sihanouk, the American officials thought, was finished. He ought to retire to a nice villa in France, they said. That the Americans never seriously contemplated discussions with Sihanouk at this time is evident in their complete disregard of the Prince’s efforts later in the fall of 1972 to open communications. On 23 October Sihanouk told the AFP that he would speak to the Americans “without conditions.” A little later the Algerians reported that Sihanouk wanted to negotiate with the United States.73 Perhaps the most serious effort to get negotiations going came from the French, who offered to help the Americans establish a private channel of communications with Sihanouk. In December similar offers from Sihanouk to talk with the Americans surfaced in Guyana and Mauritania. Not only did the United States decline to pursue these soundings, but it did so vigorously and contemptuously. There would be no response to any of them. To be sure, it would have been
62
Sticking with Lon Nol
politically difficult for the Americans to turn to Sihanouk. But the United States had no treaty obligations to the current Cambodian government and was not in theory tied to any particular personality; it might have been possible to separate Sihanouk from his murderous allies the Khmer Rouge who, the Prince well knew, had no long-term use for him or the monarchy. During the latter stages of the Vietnam peace negotiations, the Chinese indicated to Kissinger that they would be willing to arrange a meeting with Sihanouk. Kissinger acknowledged it was possible to arrive at a solution that would take Sihanouk’s concerns into consideration. “Whoever can best preserve it [Cambodia] as an independent neutral country” would be acceptable, Kissinger told the Chinese. However, he did not envisage negotiations directly between Sihanouk and the United States but rather among the Khmer parties themselves. Only after a ceasefire in Cambodia might the Americans talk with Sihanouk.74 The lack of American diplomatic imagination was unfortunate. As William Shawcross put it eloquently in 1978, “but for the contempt with which Henry Kissinger always dismissed him, Sihanouk – who understood the nature of the Khmer Rouge – might have been able to avert the dark savagery which has been visited upon his people since April 1975.”75 Finally on 27 January 1973 the final peace accords to end the war in Vietnam were signed. With them came some optimism that the fighting in Cambodia might also stop. Cambodia badly needed peace. However, the Paris Accords were vaguer about Cambodia than about Vietnam and Laos. Article 20 called upon the parties to respect Cambodia’s independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and neutrality, as had been delineated in the Geneva agreements of 1954. It required all foreign countries to end their military activities in Cambodia and withdraw their troops; foreign countries were also not to use Cambodia to encroach on the sovereignty or security of other countries, and Cambodia was to settle its own internal affairs without foreign intervention. There was, however, no timetable nor a specific agreement for a ceasefire. In this circumstance, the Americans wanted Lon Nol to declare a unilateral ceasefire and insist on a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, but he was not to take provocative actions against their positions for the time being. He would continue his efforts to seek a negotiated settlement with the insurgents. The United States would temporarily halt the delivery of military supplies and air support. But it would quickly resume both if the fighting began again, in which case American air support would be used initially only against Khmer Rouge positions, thus not impeding any Vietnamese withdrawal. The United States also wanted to see the ICC, which had ceased operations in Cambodia in 1969, restored. In compliance with Article 5 of the accords, the United States quickly shut down training facilities in Vietnam, returning some Khmers to Cambodia and transferring others to Thailand for further training. The peace settlement in Vietnam, along with Lon Nol’s unilateral ceasefire declaration, temporarily put the insurgency on the defensive, politically. On 26 January Sihanouk, Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan and Sihanouk’s Prime Minister Penn Nouth signed a statement (broadcast on 30 January) welcoming
Sticking with Lon Nol
63
the ceasefire in Vietnam and asserting that they too cherished peace. The next day Sihanouk reiterated his willingness to meet with Kissinger. This relative moderation may have been due in part to pressure from the North Vietnamese. Although in Paris they had told Kissinger frankly that they had little control over the Khmer insurgents and were unable to deliver a ceasefire in Cambodia (there had even been fighting at times between the Khmer Rouge and the North Vietnamese), they, and the Chinese as well, attempted to moderate Khmer Rouge intransigence and encourage a negotiated settlement. As Sihanouk put it on 29 January (the day Lon Nol’s ceasefire went into effect), “our friends told us our adversaries are accusing us of bellicosity at a time when peace is being built and we would find ourselves isolated while Lon Nol launched his peace campaign.” Sihanouk also said his side would decrease its military activities and offer a general amnesty, though Lon Nol and his “clique” would have to go into exile. Ominously, however, Sihanouk admitted that he had not yet gotten approval for his proposals from the insurgent leaders in Cambodia (except for the proposal to speak with the United States), adding that Khieu Samphan had the last word. There was, nevertheless, some momentary optimism among the Americans. “With the GKR preempting the peace issue,” Swank cabled, “Sihanouk has obviously felt increasingly isolated by Indochinese developments he vainly opposed, and is clearly angling for some appearance, if not the reality of bilateral talks with the U.S.” As Swank presciently observed, “He may be out in front of the in-country group as he seeks to keep his hand in, but the joint January 26 statement to which Khieu Samphan subscribed also represents a substantial softening of the CNPLAF line.” On the other hand, a later statement (28 January) by Khmer Rouge Minister of the Interior Hou Youn, Minister of Defense Khieu Samphan, and Minister of Information Hu Nim (available to the Americans only on 2 February) took a much harder line and confirmed Swank’s suspicion that Sihanouk was “well out in front of the in-country insurgents.” Although the Khmer Rouge leaders asserted that they too desired peace, they insisted that the United States must completely withdraw all support from the Lon Nol regime, which must then be dissolved. Although the rhetoric was less harsh than previous Khmer Rouge statements, its substance was the same. They would fight on to victory.76 There was, then, clearly a difference of opinion in the insurgent ranks. Sihanouk called for negotiations with the United States and a decrease in military activity. The hardliners had little desire for a ceasefire and wanted to press their military advantage. That the North Vietnamese basically agreed with Sihanouk and made some attempts to get the Khmer Rouge to negotiate eventually widened the growing gulf between the Khmer Rouge and the North Vietnamese. The Chinese, too, continued to urge moderation.77 But the United States never made any attempt to exploit this rift by trying to arrange the talks for which Sihanouk had asked. On the contrary, as Swank told journalist Stanley Karnow, “the reimposition of Sihanouk’s rule is not an acceptable political solution for the majority of the Khmer nation.” Foolishly lumping
64
Sticking with Lon Nol
the Chinese, the North Vietnamese, and the insurgents together, Swank told Karnow that until they all moved away from “their current intransigent stance, the possibility of even beginning meaningful negotiations on Cambodia is remote.” As it was, Sihanouk withdrew (for the moment) his offer to meet with Kissinger because, as he informed Baltimore Sun reporter Eddie Wu, “the US government has refused any meeting with him and had refused to have any dialogue with his government. Under these circumstances, he said, the war in Cambodia would continue.” Swank summed it up this way: “Sihanouk tried in late January to lead in-country insurgents off their hard line on continuing the war, and got reeled in.”78 The Chinese, however, who were at this point not wedded to the Khmer Rouge, believed that direct negotiations between Sihanouk and the United States should take place and might result in a genuinely independent and neutral Cambodian state led once again by the Prince. “Why can’t you accept to have negotiations with Norodom Sihanouk as head of state?” Zhou Enlai asked Kissinger, who was in Beijing. “How can we, when we recognize one government, engage in a direct negotiation with Sihanouk?” he said. “This is out of the question.” Zhou, however, kept pushing. Both France and the Soviet Union had managed to maintain ties with both sides, he pointed out. Furthermore, Lon Nol – an opportunist who over the years had personally benefited from both the communists and the Americans – was not worthy of support, he said. Finally, he pointed out, a major flaw in Kissinger’s position was that Sihanouk would never negotiate with those who overthrew him. But the Chinese leader did not convince Kissinger.79 Nothing might have come of an American effort to begin talks, but, as Kissinger put it later in another context, by urging the talks and offering to act as the intermediary, Zhou was putting his personal prestige on the line. He probably would not have done so if he had thought that direct talks between Kissinger and Sihanouk could not succeed, and it is unfortunate that such talks were not attempted before the Khmer Rouge hardliners became even stronger. As the perceptive American consul in Hong Kong put it a little later, “the longer hostilities continue, the less Sihanouk – and by extension Peking – will have to say about a solution.” Instead, the hardliners would be in charge.80 Interestingly, although there were no American talks with Sihanouk or the Khmer Rouge, there were a few contacts between Lon Nol’s government and the insurgents that did not involve the United States. On at least two occasions (one in January 1973, the other on 13 February) Dr. Mok-Lean, acting at the behest of Cambodian Prime Minister Hang Thun Hak, arranged meetings near Kirirom, an insurgent-controlled region, with GRUNK officials Hou Youn, Khieu Samphan, and Hu Nim. Hou Youn apparently took the lead in the discussions. He was reportedly very anti-Vietnamese (as well as anti-Sihanouk), sought a “third way” between capitalism and communism, and was not interested in fighting a prolonged war with other Khmers. He hoped to get negotiations going but distrusted the Lon brothers and Sirik Matak. Eventually, he felt that negotiations would have to take place in a neutral country such as
Sticking with Lon Nol
65
Burma and involve the United States, China, and the Soviet Union. Hou Youn was in fact a relatively moderate Khmer Rouge leader, who was eventually shot when he criticized the Khmer Rouge’s forcible evacuation of Cambodia’s cities after their takeover in 1975.81 When Lon Nol declared his unilateral ceasefire, Washington Evening Star writer Henry Bradsher stated that the gesture would be “funny if it were not pathetic.”82 This was not quite accurate. It, together with the Paris Peace Accords, had momentarily discombobulated the Khmer Rouge. As Sihanouk realized, it put the onus for continued war on GRUNK’s side. But Bradsher was right fundamentally. As a Western diplomat said, the ceasefire declaration was a “brilliant propaganda” move because it made the other side look bad even when the government itself was not strong enough to launch offensive actions of its own. The Khmer Rouge were actually correct when they denounced the ceasefire as a “coverup” to mask the regime’s “lack of offensive capacity.”83 Those who wanted negotiations soon lost out; the talks with Hou Youn led nowhere. The fighting resumed in a major way on the night of 7–8 February 1973 when Khmer Rouge forces attacked all sides of the FANK perimeter around the besieged city of Kompong Thom. For the first time since the Paris Accords, the Cambodians requested, and received, tactical American air support. Ten days later the American embassy reported that Kompong Thom had become very largely a city of refugees (about 40 percent of the population), along with military personnel and their families. Supplies were very low, with only a two-day supply of gasoline to power the communications center and the hospital. The military garrison had perhaps one week’s worth of ammunition left. The lone doctor was so busy he could not attend to refugees. The airport had been closed since 8 December 1972. Morale was understandably low, and some refugee families had been allowed to leave to go back to their homes in enemy-controlled territory. (The airport was reopened in March 1973, but the city was still surrounded and besieged.) Enemy attacks spread to other regions of the country. Even with little or no assistance from the North Vietnamese (the Lon Nol government could not discover any evidence that the Vietnamese were involved in any of these new actions), the Khmer Rouge once again attacked a variety of targets, interdicting highways and the Mekong River corridor. The FANK response was “lackluster.”84 At the end of February 1973 the American embassy reported that even commanders refused orders to fight. After tactical air strikes, they seldom followed up on the ground. Furthermore, little seemed to have been done about payroll padding and other forms of corruption within the military. All in all, the embassy rated FANK’s battlefield performance “poor.” But when a trusted Cambodian associate tried to alert Lon Nol to the seriousness of the situation, he found the marshal “resolutely optimistic.”85 Nor was the Cambodian government cause helped, in American eyes, by Lon Nol’s lack of interest in broadening his government. Although the marshal always agreed in principle to do this, little happened. In Tam, appointed a special adviser to the government, soon resigned when Lon Non became his
66
Sticking with Lon Nol
superior. All in all, Lon Nol made little progress in gaining back a high level of support. The fraudulent elections had demonstrated his government’s weakness, and little had been done to change the situation. In sum, the situation did not look bright. As Swank understated it in a 12-page cable assessing the situation, “we must recognize the possibility that time is not necessarily on the side of the GKR.”86 Furthermore, the embassy had little to suggest by way of improving the situation. Although Lon Nol was an invalid who was “isolated from contact with the people” and had not provided forceful leadership, the Americans in Phnom Penh saw no alternatives. “The dearth of leadership and organizing ability among the Khmer continues to be a major drawback in the prosecution of the war effort and in rendering our assistance effective,” they concluded. Negotiations were a possibility; the option the embassy officials analyzed with particular care was one that would put the Lon Nol government and GRUNK on an equal footing. To do so might avoid a “prolonged and debilitating war.” Another possibility was to follow up on French suggestions that both Lon Nol and Sihanouk bow out. Both ideas had merit, embassy officials thought. But in the final analysis, the risks were too great for the Americans to support either possibility. This left embassy officials with only two recommendations for the moment. They supported withholding the economic aid promised to North Vietnam in the Paris Accords as long as Hanoi did not respect the agreement, including the provisions relating to Cambodia. And they urged additional pressure against the Vietnamese by increasing the bombing of the logistical network in Cambodia. Together with additional tactical air and B-52 strikes against the insurgency, this pressure might improve the bargaining position vis-à-vis Hanoi and the Khmer Rouge, resulting eventually in a tacit or explicit reduction of hostilities.87 It was not a cheery conclusion or one that promised results. That same day (6 March) the enemy sank another munitions barge – the second one in a month – resulting in the loss of $2 million in MAP-supplied ammunition. In Washington, state department officials read Swank’s reports with increasing concern and began to consider the dramatic possibility of removing Lon Nol. They thought that they had “to do something about Lon Non,” but they were not sure what. What, they asked the ambassador, would he think if Lon Nol traveled abroad on the recommendations of doctors (“which we could arrange”) for medical attention and rest?88 Swank was not yet ready to recommend such a drastic measure – in effect a soft coup. A better alternative, Swank thought, was to insist that Lon Nol appoint Sirik Matak Vice President. This would bring into the government a competent and respected administrator and counter Lon Non’s influence. It would not be a panacea, Swank quickly acknowledged. Sirik Matak did not have widespread popular appeal, and Lon Non, who would resist Matak’s appointment, “could prove to be a ruthless and malevolent opponent of our interests and position here.” Still, Swank offered to speak to Lon Nol along these lines. He hoped he would be able to invoke President Nixon’s name to add extra weight to the American insistence that Sirik Matak be appointed.89
Sticking with Lon Nol
67
But if the ambassador was not yet ready to recommend that Lon Nol be forced to leave, he came to believe that Lon Non had to be removed from the political scene. The ambassador was willing to threaten to withdraw American aid to accomplish this. The state department agreed that Lon Non had to be removed, and it was prepared to have Swank confront Lon Nol about this. But it would not agree to threaten the withdrawal of American assistance. What state department officials hoped would happen was that Lon Nol would insist on seeking additional medical treatment in the United States. In return for arranging this, the United States would insist that Lon Nol leave the government in the hands of a “group of executors, to include Sirik Matak” and that Lon Non leave the country at the same time. The United States was even willing to have Lon Non appointed ambassador to Washington.90 Swank pointed out that the American unwillingness to threaten a withdrawal of aid left only his powers of persuasion to convince Lon Nol, whom he described as a “willful and obstinate man” who would not do anything he considered to be against his own interests. Nevertheless he thought it important to put in writing American concerns directly to Lon Nol.91 The day after Swank’s proposed approach to Lon Nol, two dramatic events occurred that threatened to upset American calculations. Late in the morning of 17 March three of Lon Non’s agents entered a meeting of striking university teachers at the Faculty of Pedagogy, where they assailed a teacher who was denouncing the government. The crowd locked the agents in a room, but then 50 plainclothesmen (also from Lon Non’s forces) who had been waiting outside forced their way in and threw hand grenades into the crowd, killing two persons and wounding eight. Then at 1.20 p.m. that same day a Cambodian Air Force pilot, So Photra, stole one of the American-supplied T-28 airplanes from Pochentong airport and dropped two bombs on the Chamcar Mon palace compound, Lon Nol’s official residence. One of the bombs landed in a military compound of wooden barracks. A third bomb hit the nearby Chrui Changwar peninsula, causing casualties, while a fourth landed in a flooded area on the northwestern outskirts of the city causing no damage. At least 43 people, most dependents of military personnel, died in the attack. Lon Nol and members of the government’s inner circle escaped harm. The plane then flew away from Phnom Penh toward insurgent-controlled areas. Swank reported that “Lon Nol’s prestige and authority are now at stake as never before” as Cambodians and foreigners alike looked to see whether he would be able to meet the challenges posed by these events.92 Initially both the embassy and the government assumed that So Photra was acting on behalf of the insurgents. “It seems probable that the enemy got to him,” Swank reported, and Lon Nol went on the air to assert that the enemy had bribed him.93 Because So Photra was either the husband or (more likely) the boyfriend of Princess Botum Bopha, one of Sihanouk’s daughters, Lon Nol concluded that this was a royalist–communist plot to take over his government, and he responded by suspending civil rights, prohibiting meetings on the street of more than five people, requiring anyone (including foreigners) who planned to
68
Sticking with Lon Nol
leave the country to have their papers revalidated, incarcerating or placing under house arrest at least 16 members of the royal family and grounding a number of pilots of royal birth, arresting former presidential candidate Keo An who had once suggested that Sihanouk ought to be allowed to return as a private citizen, firing Air Force Commander So Satto and placing him under house arrest, arresting leaders of the teachers’ strike, closing newspapers and hauling editors before military courts, and, potentially the most serious of all, placing Sirik Matak under house arrest and cutting off his telephone. Lon Nol told the Indonesian ambassador that “he had tolerated dissent long enough and would tolerate it no longer.”94 A few days later an unsuccessful attempt was made, probably by Lon Non’s forces, to assassinate Tep Kunnah, a close associate of Sirik Matak. Swank and other embassy officials tried to moderate Lon Nol’s actions. They pointed out that the bombing was probably not a plot after all but the actions of a single disaffected and unbalanced air force captain who had washed out of pilot training for lack of discipline. Swank continued to harp on the need for Lon Nol to implement reforms, broaden his political base, and increase his popular appeal by, for example, arranging personal contacts and meetings with students, teachers, soldiers, and police. But Swank had to admit that there was now no more point in urging the President to appoint Sirik Matak as Vice President – not that Sirik Matak helped matters by telling New York Times reporter Henry Kamm that Lon Nol wanted to bring about a military dictatorship and that Sihanouk had more support in the country than the President. The events of 17 March had overtaken the planned American démarche. When opportunities arose, however, Swank continued to suggest that Lon Non might want to leave the country.95 But by now the ambassador’s representations of this sort were beginning to irritate some in the White House. Brent Scowcroft of the NSC staff, for example, called the state department to say that, “if he has not already been so instructed, Ambassador Swank should be asked to refrain from giving further advice to Lon Nol about the internal political situation in Cambodia and to take a more relaxed attitude.”96 A telegram was to be prepared to this effect, but if it was, it has not yet come to light. Swank’s behavior in the coming weeks suggests that White House concerns did not affect his approach, for if anything Swank’s intercessions with the Cambodian government became even more urgent. Thus, for example, two days after Scowcroft’s intervention, Swank met with a prominent member of Lon Nol’s political party and told him that Lon Non’s absence “from the republic would be the optimum solution,” and he again suggested his appointment as ambassador to Washington. It was hard to see how the ambassador could have been any more intrusive, and, perhaps a bit concerned, he asked if the state department approved of his conversation and asked for permission to be equally frank with Lon Nol if necessary.97 One official was immediately supportive. G. McMurtrie Godley, ambassador to Laos, congratulated Swank on “your efforts to bring Lon Nol to his senses and broaden his government.” Godley, who was planning to visit Swank and
Sticking with Lon Nol
69
Cambodian leaders in Phnom Penh soon, encouraged the ambassador to use his name and the forthcoming visit as a means of moving the Cambodian government in the desired direction.98 For the next week a series of devastating reports poured into the state department beginning with an embassy assessment of Lon Non that, when telegraphed to Washington on 31 March, consisted of seven sections totaling 22 pages. Lon Non, the report stated, was a man of “unusual energy and initiative” who unfortunately applied those qualities toward furthering his own personal ambitions “restrained neither by good political judgement nor moral scruples.” He was “an inadequate administrator” and “a poor and probably dishonest manager of men and materiel.” In a particularly biting criticism of Lon Non’s military abilities, the report stated that he was “by Cambodian standards, a poor commander” who “sought maximum exposure to publicity and minimum exposure to the enemy.” He could not be trusted with American-supplied equipment and had, in fact, been cut off from those supplies. He was a political agitator who was behind the student strikes of 1972 that led to Sirik Matak’s resignation as Prime Minister-designate, and he had been involved in the recent disturbances at the Faculty of Pedagogy that left two persons dead. The Australians reported that he used an assassination unit called the “Republican Security Battalion” which drove around in a fleet of yellow Hondas. The purpose of all of this was to keep his brother in power and further his own interests. The report concluded, Those who dislike and fear Lon Non, among who must be counted many if not most of the best military and civilian leaders, are aware of this. Increased reliance upon Lon Non has thus decreased to a dangerous level Lon Nol’s ability to rely on others.99 Meanwhile, things seemed to be falling apart in Cambodia. The embassy’s weekly report dated 3 April described “a somber week” in Cambodia, in which troops refused to fight and soldiers looted market stalls in Phnom Penh. The Mekong River corridor remained closed to convoys, since the government controlled no more than 30 percent of the river between Phnom Penh and the Vietnamese border, and elsewhere enemy forces made advances. The one bright spot was the advance by Brigadier General Norodom Chantarangsey, who had developed about the only successful pacification program in the entire country and whose forces had recently occupied the Kirirom Plateau, an area under enemy control since 1970. But typical of the country’s internal politics, Lon Nol ordered Chantarangsey to withdraw from Kirirom because he did not want a potential rival to be successful when other FANK units were doing so poorly.100 In Washington reports of troops, and even commanders, refusing orders to fight were particularly troubling, and the state department asked to what extent this could be attributed to the political situation. Swank responded that the lack of military aggressiveness was not entirely a new phenomenon, but the growing realization that the enemy was no longer the Vietnamese (whom the Cambodians were more willing to fight) but fellow Khmers contributed to it.
70
Sticking with Lon Nol
There was also a considerable let down after the initial euphoria of the unilateral ceasefire and the end of the fighting in Vietnam. Furthermore, some units were becoming dependent on American air strikes and would not fight when the aircraft were not available. But the political factor was an important consideration as well. Respect for Lon Nol had decayed, and, as the Minister for Defense told Swank, “many FANK soldiers do not now really know for what or for whom they are fighting.” Defeat was perhaps in sight. “We are asking ourselves whether we are not observing a deterioration of FANK effectiveness which could gather danger momentum,” Swank reported.101 Significantly, Swank’s report was read at the White House. The state department’s Cambodia experts were, if anything, more pessimistic than embassy officials in Phnom Penh. In their “Country Program Memorandum” they began by pointing out that most North Vietnamese and Viet Cong combat troops had withdrawn from Cambodia (which, if true, put American operations there on a shaky legal and political foundation). All main force units had pulled out, and only about 7,000 combat troops remained (although there were as many as 20,000 administrative and logistical personnel still there). Thus the war in Cambodia was very much a civil conflict. As for the Cambodian government, it had “a narrow base of support, is unpopular and is generally ineffectual.” Lon Nol was “incapable of developing a competent team to cope with increasing military, political and economic difficulties.” Corruption was rampant. FANK was poorly led, lacked discipline, and increasingly refrained from combat. The democratic experiment in Cambodia had failed, and (a particularly galling point) “most informed Khmer” believed that Lon Nol’s government was worse than Sihanouk’s had been. The group that had banded together to overthrow Sihanouk had disintegrated. Lon Non employed “assassination, bribery and slander” to eliminate almost all capable leaders from the government. And in a chilling conclusion, the report stated that even if there were a change in political leadership, “it may now be too late to reverse the negative trends which have gained considerable momentum.” The officials were equally pessimistic about the future of the Cambodian military. Although FANK had received huge amounts of arms and supplies, was estimated to have an actual strength of about 150,000 men on any given day, and had made some progress in consolidating understrength units and reducing phantom soldiers, weaknesses in such intangible areas as leadership, morale, and discipline offset what progress had been attained. “We see no reason to believe that the downward trend in the intangible factors will be reversed in the foreseeable future,” the report concluded.102 Scowcroft’s directive for Swank to “take a more relaxed attitude” seemed foolish indeed. The flurry of negative reports demanded action at the highest levels, and Nixon dispatched Alexander Haig to Phnom Penh for a first-hand assessment of the situation. Stopping first in Vientiane, where Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma told him emphatically that Lon Nol had to broaden the base of his government and bring back In Tam and Sirik Matak, Haig arrived in Phnom Penh on 10 April. Though details of the Haig visit are unaccountably sketchy,
Sticking with Lon Nol
71
Haig apparently told Lon Nol that the United States would cut off all economic and military assistance unless he brought opposition leaders into the government and ended Lon Non’s activities.103 The threat – which the state department had previously told Swank it would not use – worked. A few days after Haig’s departure it was announced that Lon Non would depart on a three-month trip to France and the United States. In addition the current Hang Thun Hak government resigned. The real test, however, was whether Lon Nol would follow through by forming a new government in which opposition figures would have real authority. If he failed to do so or if the opposition leaders refused to participate, Swank reported, “the survival of the republic could be in real jeopardy.”104 But after intensive negotiations, agreement was reached, and on 24 April 1973 Lon Nol announced that Cheng Heng, Sirik Matak, In Tam, and he had agreed to form a High Political Council that would rule by decree for six months. The National Assembly would be suspended during that time. This was very largely a victory for the opposition, whose demands Lon Nol – under strong American pressure – had accepted. It might even be characterized as an American-driven soft coup, since Lon Nol’s power had been dramatically reduced. On the other hand, as Senate staffers Moose and Lowenstein observed, now that Lon Nol had done what the United States demanded, he had every right to expect continued American military support, support which, all observers agreed, was the only reason his government had so far been able to survive.105 Nevertheless, as the military situation worsened some officials recommended taking a step that had been heretofore resolutely rejected: negotiating with Sihanouk. As the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William J. Porter wrote, “sometimes we must think the unthinkable.” In fact, it might be better to negotiate now (through Hanoi and Beijing) rather than later when the situation might well be worse, he thought. “I am not advocating that we pick up Sihanouk,” Porter wrote in a covering letter, “but I do think we must not build a wall around the possibility that we might have to.” He suggested a Laotian-type settlement be looked at.106 German and Algerian officials also urged the Americans to treat with Sihanouk. The Algerians were particularly compelling, in retrospect, saying that the United States “could prevent his [Sihanouk] becoming a prisoner of the Khmer Rouge or dependent upon the Chinese.”107 But the administration remained unwilling to alter course, and neither Germany nor Algeria received a positive response. In contrast to Porter, state department official William H. Sullivan thought there was little point in trying to work out a solution involving Sihanouk. He had already said as much to Kissinger on 30 March, pointing out a number of drawbacks, including Sihanouk’s inbred anti-Americanism, his antagonism toward all of his neighbors, the hostility of the Khmer Rouge (which he mistakenly stated were under North Vietnamese control), and the fact that the Prince could never again regain the respect of the Cambodian military. But the main reason not to negotiate Sihanouk’s return, he said, was that it would appear to the international community that Lon Nol had lost his struggle against the communists and the United
72
Sticking with Lon Nol
States would have suffered a loss of prestige by appearing to capitulate. Adding to these considerations, Sullivan asserted that the North Vietnamese would never accept Sihanouk.108 Kissinger agreed with Sullivan. Aside from hesitating to abandon the Lon Nol regime on whom the United States had staked its reputation, Kissinger concluded that Sihanouk was already a Khmer Rouge prisoner. “Sihanouk understood that the Khmer Rouge and Hanoi were determined to block” attempts to return him as head of state, Kissinger wrote in his memoirs. And even though the Prince of course hoped that this would not be the case, “he was too weak to abandon the only base he had – whatever his convictions. … So much for the argument that it was American opposition that prevented the return of Sihanouk to power in Cambodia,” Kissinger concludes.109 The flaw in Kissinger’s assertion is that he had repeatedly refused Sihanouk’s offers to negotiate directly with him and so could not be certain how much freedom of action the Prince enjoyed. Kissinger did continue to tell the Chinese privately that the United States was not committed to any particular Cambodian leader and encouraged negotiations between Sihanouk’s representatives and “other forces”; and on 24 April, again using “one of its most highly sensitive channels,” the United States reiterated to China its willingness to work toward a solution for Cambodia that would include “all political forces, including those of Prince Sihanouk.” But the Americans were not yet willing to meet with Sihanouk or his representatives.110 Shortly thereafter Sihanouk, who had recently returned from a visit to the “liberated areas” of Cambodia and was feeling that he had strengthened his influence with the insurgents, stated unequivocally that he would “negotiate directly with President Nixon or his representative.” He said he had “received carte blanche from the GRUNK/FUNK forces to negotiate with the United States.”111 The United States again did not respond. If it had, it might have found out just how much leeway Sihanouk had, whether he really was a prisoner of the Khmer Rouge at this point, and whether it was possible to lure him away from the most radical insurgents. In sum, Kissinger’s assertion that it was not American opposition that prevented Sihanouk’s return to power in April 1973 is unproven. Later (nearly two years later), when Kissinger changed his mind and agreed to meet with Sihanouk, it was too late. Meanwhile the military situation became increasingly difficult. Communist forces again cut Route 1 and recaptured territory along the Mekong River that they had lost only a few weeks before. Mekong River convoys again stopped, and the United States had to airlift fuel to the capital. By late April enemy troops surrounded Phnom Penh, which was well within artillery range. Bombs and shells became a part of daily life in the capital. As Wilfred Deac writes, “The enemy seemed to be everywhere.”112 American embassy officials told the Korean defense attaché that it would be prudent to send dependents out of the country quietly. With the Khmer Rouge pushing in on Phnom Penh from all directions, the Americans unleashed the air force.113 The bombing was so close to Phnom Penh
Sticking with Lon Nol
73
that the force of the explosions damaged buildings in the city itself. It caused “major damage” to a gate at the Christian and Missionary Alliance mission’s compound, for example. By late July the state department felt compelled to urge all civilians to leave. The Americans feared the consequences when the bombing ended on 15 August as Congress had required. “This is the most pessimistic report I have ever gotten in many contacts with the State Department regarding this situation,” wrote an Alliance official. “There were no tempering, optimistic statements.” Early in August a political officer at the American embassy in Phnom Penh told missionaries to “get out immediately.” Representatives of the Seventh-day Adventists did leave, as did the Pentecostals, while the Alliance mission evacuated most women personnel and debated daily whether the men should leave as well.114 In the end the Alliance men did not leave, and in fact the calls to leave Phnom Penh turned out not to be immediately necessary, for the most intense bombing in military history finally stopped the FUNK advance and prevented an insurgent victory in the summer of 1973 (something which Sihanouk frankly admitted publicly on several occasions). In September the Alliance women returned. Still, if the bombing prevented an immediate takeover of Phnom Penh, the GKR appeared at the time to be on the brink of defeat anyway. To the surprise of many, the Khmer Republic survived for nearly two more years. But it was nevertheless a losing cause. Even if the bombing had continued, it is unlikely that the GKR would have survived in the long run. Furthermore, the intense bombing may also have undercut relatively moderate forces within the revolutionary movement and strengthened the hand of the radical Pol Potists, thus ensuring extreme outcomes (such as the evacuation of the cities) when the revolutionaries triumphed in 1975.115 The increased bombing also caused difficulties for the administration at home. Despite safeguards, there were horrendous civilian casualties. In one incident, for example, some 250 civilians were killed or wounded in a B-52 attack near the Vietnamese border town of Chau Doc. “It is simply impossible to use heavy ordnance in the countryside without some civilian casualties,” reported the American embassy. Ironically an official in the American embassy in Saigon later reported that the same area could now be hit again; there was no danger of civilian casualties since all civilians had either been killed or driven out.116 The casualties, and the many refugees who fled to avoid the bombing (news reports stated that 8,000 to 12,000 new refugees had arrived in Phnom Penh as a direct result of the bombing) resulted in strong criticism. Senator Edward Kennedy (D–MA) scheduled hearings on the problems of war victims in Cambodia. Estimates of the number of civilians killed by the American bombing run as high as 150,000.117 The bombing produced two other areas of concern. Its very justification was now problematic. The original justification – that the bombing protected the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam – no longer held since the last American troops had departed on 28 March 1973. Now the administration claimed that the bombing must continue to force the North Vietnamese to
74
Sticking with Lon Nol
respect the Paris Accords. The conflicts in Cambodia and Laos were so interrelated to the war in Vietnam “as to be considered parts of a single conflict,” the administration argued. Because the fighting in Cambodia threatened the settlement in Vietnam, the air operations in Cambodia should be viewed not as a commitment to Cambodia per se but rather as “a meaningful interim action to bring about compliance” with Article 20 of the accords.118 Central to the administration’s legal argument was the contention that the Khmer Rouge were creatures of the North Vietnamese – created, led, and sustained by them. For example, in testimony before the generally friendly House Armed Services Committee, White House legal counsel Fred Buzhardt argued that bombing the Vietnamese communists was legal because they were violating Article 20. What then, asked one representative, was “the justification for bombing the non-North Vietnamese” with whom the United States had no agreement which could be broken? Buzhardt responded that “the combat forces of the local Khmer and NVA are so intermixed, coordinated in their attacks, that it is impossible to distinguish on a day-to-day basis.” Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Dennis J. Doolin put it even more starkly. He agreed that the Khmer insurgents were “directed and controlled and organized by the North Vietnamese” and testified that “if it were not for the North Vietnamese leadership, North Vietnamese advisers and cadres, North Vietnamese heavy weapons support and logistic support there would be no Communist insurgency in Cambodia outside of the capability of the Government to handle it. … If the North Vietnamese were to go home you would have no conflict in Cambodia,” he stated. Congressman Gerald Ford (R–MI) made the same point in a letter to his fellow Republican legislators. “Cambodia is not experiencing a genuine civil war but a classic Communist insurgency controlled and supported by Hanoi,” he wrote.119 But such a view was long outdated. At the Paris peace talks Le Duc Tho contended that he could not control the Khmer Rouge, a statement that Kissinger in his memoirs acknowledged was accurate. In fact, according to a later JCS report, most Vietnamese communist forces withdrew from Cambodia in May 1972, well before the Paris peace agreement.120 By the spring of 1973, the United States was estimating that the Khmer Rouge had about 50,000 combat troops (although the actual number was probably closer to 200,000)121 – far more than North Vietnamese and Viet Cong combat forces in Cambodia. State department reports also indicated that much of the insurgency was strongly anti-Vietnamese and that most of FANK’s encounters were with the insurgents. This in fact was given as one reason why Lon Nol’s forces, not wanting to fight fellow Khmers, were not being aggressive. In sum, by this time Hanoi did not control the Khmer Rouge. As the JCS put it later, by early 1973 the Khmer Rouge “by and large, were responsible for their own war effort,” an assessment with which the state department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research agreed.122 By June 1973 the Khmer Rouge were in the process of driving out the remaining North Vietnamese troops, as well as ethnic Vietnamese civilians. But this did not change Kissinger’s mind. “Even after I
Sticking with Lon Nol
75
returned to Washington in May 1974,” recalled Kenneth Quinn, who had been reporting about these developments from the field, “I could not convince top policy officials that there had been a fundamental change in the situation.”123 Whatever the relationship of the North Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge, some North Vietnamese troops remained in Cambodia. Was this a violation of Article 20 of the Paris Accords? The accords required all foreign countries “to put an end to all military activities in Cambodia,” to withdraw all military personnel, and to “refrain from reintroducing into” Cambodia “troops, military advisers and military personnel, armaments, munitions and war material.” In other words, the agreement required both a North Vietnamese withdrawal and an end to American military actions in Cambodia. It set no timetable, however, and so the North Vietnamese were technically no more in violation of the Paris Accords than was the United States. In May Secretary Rogers, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, agreed that this was the case which, as White House aide William E. Timmons put it in a memorandum to President Nixon, undercut the “Administration’s rationale for continued air operations.”124 A related matter of concern to legislators was the increasingly deep involvement of the American embassy in Phnom Penh in directing the air strikes. To many in Congress this was a violation of American law that prohibited the presence of American advisers in Cambodia. Opponents of the administration believed that the embassy’s intimate involvement also violated various other laws that made it clear that the United States had no commitment to defend the Cambodian government.125 Pressure was growing for a legislative end to American involvement in what was increasingly a Cambodian civil war. Early in May the administration lost a number of key votes in the House. The Addabbo amendment, which prohibited the administration from transferring any funds between categories in the supplemental appropriations bill, carried. (The administration had wanted to transfer a small portion, $25 million, to fund air operations over Cambodia.) Another amendment prohibiting using any funds in the same bill for combat in Cambodia also carried easily, 224–172. It was increasingly clear that it was only a matter of time before Congress cut off all funds for military actions in Cambodia. Adding to the administration’s frustration, the new political arrangement to which Lon Nol had agreed under American pressure was not functioning well. For one thing, the High Political Council had difficulty agreeing on a Prime Minister, and Swank intervened directly to insist that the council act. After further American interventions, the members eventually settled on In Tam. Next the council considered transforming itself into a full-fledged ministerial government, which threatened to overturn the whole concept of the council. “I am still hopeful a sense of the absolute necessity of making progress will prevail,” Swank wrote in some despair. Then for about two weeks the council seemed to function well. But late in May the new Prime Minister, In Tam, complained bitterly to Swank that Lon Nol was attempting to regain his power. He regularly bypassed In Tam and, most importantly, was attempting to keep all military affairs under
76
Sticking with Lon Nol
his personal control. Swank tried to encourage In Tam, but ten days later the ambassador found him in “a despondent and helpless frame of mind.” Lon Nol was increasingly ruling by himself.126 Members of the government, and other prominent Khmers, began to feel that it would be good if Lon Nol would leave for medical treatment. Having received other reports confirming Swank’s gloomy telegrams, the state department found the situation “disturbing and disappointing.” The high hopes of the Americans that the new Cambodian council would bring a sense of unity had been dashed. The department had little to offer as to how the situation might be improved. Swank was instructed only to keep emphasizing the dire necessity of unity.127 By mid-July In Tam indicated that he wanted to resign, and the Americans were clearly hoping that Lon Nol might decide to seek medical treatment abroad for his paralysis. With a difficult military and political situation and the likelihood that Congress would soon legislate an end to the American air war, the possibility of a negotiated settlement warranted renewed exploration – although at the same time the weak position of the GKR led to calls to delay negotiations until the situation improved. The latter point was brought home when in May Son Sann found little support from Lon Nol for his efforts to begin discussions with Sihanouk’s government. Even Swank, who liked Son Sann and thought that he would eventually play an important role in any negotiations that did develop, urged him to delay any peace initiative until the GKR was in a stronger position. The United States, for its part, was giving more serious consideration to a settlement that might involve Sihanouk’s return in some capacity (although it was still unwilling to speak with the Prince or his representatives directly). On several occasions in May 1973 Sihanouk again made it clear that he was willing to negotiate with the United States. On 6 May in a lengthy and revealing interview with Stanley Karnow in Beijing, Sihanouk stated that he had offered to reconcile with the United States if the United States would deal with his government and end its intervention in Cambodian affairs. But the previous February, he said, Nixon had not let Kissinger see him when he came to Peking. Sihanouk said he had proposed meetings as early as 1972 and had repeated the proposal in 1973 but to no effect. He would still be willing to meet with Nixon or Kissinger or with his friends Averell Harriman and Mike Mansfield, he stated.128 Shortly thereafter Sihanouk left for a trip to Africa and Europe, where he hoped to gain the political support of a number of countries. At virtually every stop in Africa he repeated his willingness to negotiate with American officials. In Senegal he offered to negotiate directly with the United States. In Guinea he told Sékou Touré that he had no current complaints against the United States, and Touré, who was also friendly with the United States, offered to help bring about negotiations. In Rabat, Morocco, Sihanouk proposed “direct and bilateral negotiation to end the unjust war.” The result, he said, playing on Nixon’s own rhetorical approach to peace in Vietnam, would be “a peace with honor.”129 In Mauritania, where the American ambassador condescendingly reported that Sihanouk “giggled his way” through the airport ceremony, the Prince repeated
Sticking with Lon Nol
77
that he would not negotiate with Lon Nol but only directly with the United States. More significantly, Sihanouk asked Mauritania’s President Ould Daddah to pass a note to President Nixon stating that if Nixon would negotiate with him, he would reestablish diplomatic relations with Washington and make “generous arrangements” for the present Cambodian leadership in Phnom Penh (the “major criminals” – fewer than ten – would have to leave Cambodia but no Cambodian blood would be shed). Daddah, for his part, was “particularly struck … by the Prince’s lack of rancor about the past and [the] realism with which he faced [the] future.”130 The United States responded negatively to all of Sihanouk’s offers. The American position continued to be that Sihanouk would have to negotiate with the GKR. Furthermore, the administration took an almost contemptuous attitude toward the offers of African leaders to assist in reaching a settlement, probably because the Nixon–Kissinger administration had little interest in Africa or respect for its leaders. Later Kissinger told a group of high-level advisers, “the idea that we had to communicate with Sihanouk through Mauritania was absurd.”131 Instead of negotiating directly with Sihanouk, the United States tried once again to negotiate a settlement indirectly – in this case with Hanoi. On 23 May 1973 in Paris Kissinger proposed to the North Vietnamese an end to the U.S. bombing of Cambodia, a withdrawal within 60 days of all American and North Vietnamese personnel, and a ceasefire to last 60 days during which negotiations would take place among the Cambodians. The North Vietnamese agreed only that both sides would do their best to bring about a peaceful settlement. To Kissinger, this meant that nothing would happen. Nothing did. In August Kissinger told Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew the reason that nothing had happened was that the Watergate scandal had so weakened the administration that it was unable to bomb North Vietnam for a week, as planned. Had the bombing taken place, Kissinger said, North Vietnam would unquestionably have agreed to a temporary settlement in Cambodia.132 Such a statement was speculative in the extreme. It assumed North Vietnamese control over the insurgency and that North Vietnam would have succumbed to such pressure. More likely, nothing would have happened in any case since the proposal did not include negotiations between Sihanouk and the United States. Vietnam would not have acted after a week of bombing, there would have been strongly negative domestic and international reactions, and Sihanouk would never have agreed to negotiate with the GKR.
Negotiations with Sihanouk? Four days after Kissinger’s approach to Hanoi, however, the United States significantly modified its position. To Huang Hua, the Chinese ambassador to the United Nations, Kissinger proposed a 60- to 90-day ceasefire, during which the United States would withdraw its personnel and arrange for Lon Nol to leave Phnom Penh for medical treatment in the United States. Discussions would then
78
Sticking with Lon Nol
take place between Sihanouk and the GKR. And for the first time the United States would engage in “some discussions” with Sihanouk’s representatives. The proposed discussions would take place in Beijing with lower-level American officials in the newly opened United States liaison office. At the end of the process the United States “would not oppose the return of Prince Sihanouk.” Two days later Kissinger reiterated his proposal to Ambassador Huang Zhen, the newly appointed head of the Chinese liaison office in Washington. Both Chinese officials pointedly reminded Kissinger that Premier Zhou Enlai had previously told the Americans that Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge were willing to negotiate directly with the United States.133 This was the first time the United States had proposed any discussions with Sihanouk or his representatives. On 4 June, according to Kissinger’s memoirs, China “was now prepared to: ‘communicate the U.S. tentative thinking to the Cambodian side’ ” once Sihanouk returned from his African and European tour.134 Kissinger chose to interpret the Chinese action in very positive terms. Zhou, he wrote in his memoirs, “had clearly committed himself to a compromise that preserved key elements of the Lon Nol structure,” and he would not have agreed to act as an intermediary unless he thought a settlement probable. Furthermore, Kissinger stated, Zhou privately wanted the American bombing to continue since this was his major bargaining chip with the Khmer Rouge. Zhou could tell them that he could bring about an end to the bombing in exchange for negotiations. “In mid-June,” Kissinger recalled, we believed for better or worse that we were on the homestretch. We could envisage a cease-fire, Sihanouk’s return, and then Sihanouk’s dealing with existing political forces so as to give himself room to maneuver between them and the Communists. We nearly made it, with all that it would have meant for Cambodia’s future.135 On 19 June Kissinger went a step further. If a ceasefire was in effect later in the summer, he would personally meet with Sihanouk “for political discussions.”136 But the optimism soon faded. Sihanouk returned to Beijing on 6 July. On the same day the Chinese handed Kissinger a note strongly complaining about rumors, allegedly from the Lon Nol “clique,” that there would soon be negotiations between the GKR and GRUNK, with the United States and China acting as intermediaries. “In spreading such utterly groundless assertions, the Lon Nol clique harbours ulterior motives, widely attempting to confuse public opinion and forestall the settlement of the Cambodian question,” the note read. China considered this development “extremely disadvantageous to seeking a settlement of the Cambodian question.”137 Then on 16 July Sihanouk ann