The So-Called Great Satrap's Revolt (366-360 B.C.): Concerning Local Instability in the Achaemenid Far West

MICHAEL WEISKOPF THE SO-CALLED "GREAT SATRAPS' REVOLT", 366-360 s.c

ZEITSCHRIFT FOR ALTE GESCHICHTE' REVUE D'HISTOlRE ANCIENNE· JOURNAL OF ANCIENT HISTORY· RIVISTA DI STORIA ANTIC A

EINZELSCHRIFTEN

HERAUSGEGEBEN VON HEINZ HEINEN/TRIER FRAN<;OIS PASCHOUD/GENEVE KURT RAAFLAUB/PROVIDENCE n.r. HILDEGARD TEMPORINI/TDBINGEN GEROLD WALSERjBASEL

HEFT 63

FRANZ STEINER VERLAG WIESBADEN GMBH STUTTGART 1989

MICHAEL WEISKOPF

THE SO-CALLED "GREAT SATRAPS' REVOLT", 366-360 B.C. CONCERNING LOCAL INSTABILITY IN THE ACHAEMENID FAR WEST

., "\' 1P @ <,..'."../

FRANZ STEINER VERLAG WffiSBADEN GMBH STUITGART 1989

CIP-Titelaufnahme der Deutschen Bibliothek Weiskopf, Michael: The so-called "great Satraps' revolt" : 366-360 B.c.; concerning local instability in the achaemenid far West I Michael Weiskopf. - Stuttgart: Steiner-Vorl. Wiesbaden, 1989 (Historia : Einzelschriften : H. 63) ISBN 3-515-05387-5 NE: Historia I Einzelschriften

Jede Verwertung des Werkes auBerhalb der Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulassig und strafbar, Dies gilt insbesondere fur Ubersetzung, Nachdruck, Mikroverfilmung oder vergleichbare Verfahren sowie fur die Speicherung in Datenverarbeitungsanlagen. © 1989 by Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart. Druck: Druckerei Peter Proff, Starnberg. Printed in the Fed. Rep. of Germany

CONTENTS I.

Introductory: Diodorus' Account of the Satraps' Revolt

II.

Some Aspects of Achaemenid Administration in the Far West... Administrative Landscape and Practices Rebellion in Achaemenid Anatolia The Letter of Orontes The Rebellion of Spithridates

.l4 14 .16 19 23

Ill.

The Anger of Autophradates: Ariobarzanes Declared a Rebel The Background ofAriobarzanes Ariobarzanes' Activities as Satrap, 387-367 Ariobarzanes and Less Stable Peoples Ariobarzanes and the Greeks Declaring Ariobarzanes Rebellious Autophrad ates' Career. The Anger of Autophradates

26

IV.

The Satrapy of Dascylium, 366-360 Operations Against Ariobarzanes (366-365) The Collapse of Ariobarzanes' Administration Artabazus' Background and Early Career Artabazus and the Restabilization ofDascylium Dascylium, Its Environs, Lesser Officers Artabazus, Mithridates, and Cappadocia (362, 361) The Hellespont and the Troad (361, 360)

V.

Mausolus, 365-360 Xenophon Agesilaus 2.27 Policing Operations

9

27 31 32 33 37 38 41 .45 45 50 .54 56 57 .58 61 65 65 67

6

VI.

The Opportunism of Orontes, 364-360 Orontes' Position in Mysia Osborne's View Mysia Orontes' Position and Appointment. Orontes' Activities IG n2 207: Orontes and Athens Orontes' Coins Orontes' Military Activities in Sparda Orontes and the Egyptian Theater "The Reply to the Satraps' Envoy" Orontes' War Against Autophradates Timing and Motivation for Rebellion Orontes' Supporters The Order of Events in the Rebellion Appendix: The Droaphernes Inscription

69 70 70 72 74 76 76 79 80 81 84 85 86 88 89 91

VII.

Conclusions

94

Bibliography

100

Index

111

7

Author's Note When I investigated this particular topic first, during the period January through November 1981, the following people benefitted me and I express my gratitude to them: E.S. Gruen, R. Sealey, G. Azarpay, D. Stronach, all of the University of California at Berkeley; S. Hirsch of Tufts University; LM. Balcer of the Ohio State University at Columbus; the Trustees of the M. M. Lewis Memorial Fund. When I took up this investigation again, during the periods January through 8 August 1987 and August through 30 October 1988, the following people in addition benefitted me and I express my gratitude to them: P. Briant of Toulouse; J. Cargill of Rutgers University; the Editors of the Historia Einzelschriften; Joyce Ford of the Doe Library at the University of California, Berkeley.

I. INTRODUCTORY: DIODORUS' ACCOUNT OF THE

SATRAPS' REVOLT In 362/1 a most serious disturbance shook the empire of Artaxerxes n. Diodorus (15.90.1) reports that the inhabitants of the Asiatic coast stood against the Persians and were joined by a number of Achaemenid officers in Anatolia. Farther south, Tachos, king of the rebellious Egyptians, prepared for war against the Persians. An extraordinary threat against the state was posed. The older nobleman Orontes was selected by the Anatolian rebels as their leader, and assistance was sent north by Taches (Diod, 15.90.3, 15.91.1, 15.92.2). Organization soon gave way to treachery: Orontes and his subordinates betrayed their colleagues. The revolt was over. The preceding paragraph summarizes the 'official version' of events in the Achaemenid far west during the mid- to late 360's. That such a revolt, as described by Diodorus, occurred has never been questioned by modem scholars, who from the time of Rawlinson have fleshed out Diodorus' narrative with ancillary anecdotal. notices, inscriptions, and coins. Changes and refinements are made in the reconstructions, but always with the goal of saving the phenomenon of a wen-organized threat to Artaxerxes.! I wish to challenge this perception of Abbreviations and expanded fOnTIS (not used for every work cited) are listed alphabetically by author in the bibliography. Rawlinson 526-527 (plus 670 n. 913-922) in 1870 wrote his narrative based on literary sources alone (Diodorus, Nepos, Plutarch, Xenophon). The revolt was seen as symptomatic of the 'internal decay' of the Achaernenid Empire and a result of the enfeeblement of Artaxerxes II. Judeich 146-149, 193223 remains the standard modem reconstruction, modified, not yet supplanted. Like Rawlinson, Judeich (in 1892) collected the literary sources and arranged them so as to justify Diodorus' list of rebels in 15.90 and his claims of rebel unity. However, he did consider epigraphic and numismatic evidence which seemed to touch on the revolt of the 36O's and the instabilities which lasted into the mid-350's. More recent treatments are derived from and/or modify Judeich's work: Beloch2 3:2 254-257, Olmstead 408-422, Meloni RSl63 (1951) 5-27. Osborne has made the most serious modification by successfully diminishing the duration of Orontes' actions against the crown: ABSA 66 (1971) 297321, Historia 22 (1973) 515-551, Grazer Beitrdge 3 (1975) 291-309. Among the historical works, general and specialized, which have appeared in the 1980's the existence of the "Great Satraps' Revolt" remains unquestioned, thereby assuring Judeich's work a second century of acceptance. General: Cook PE 221-222, Frye Hist, Anc.Lr. 131, Bum CHI 370,378-384. More specialized: Hornblower 170-182, 201-202; Cartledge Agesilaos 200 ff., 325 ff., 386 ff. (not a helpful work on this topic); Sekunda "Datames" 35-53 (on Datames' career before 367).

10

INTRODUCTORY

difficulties in the far west Instead of a single, well-organized threat there existed a number of theatres of local instability, some related, but none serious enough to threaten Artaxerxes himself. For a few, the following will be neither a proper nor complete account of the instabilities for it will cover a canvas wide neither in time nor space. Instead, I will detail the unfortunate effects on the satrapies of Lydia (Sparda) and Dascylium (Hellespontine Phrygia) and their environs of the rivalries and hatreds amongst Achaemenid administrators and of the distrust displayed by these administrators' superior. While all modem reconstructions have accepted the basic premises of Diodorus that the revolt was widespread and well-organized, they have also fallen prey to Diodorus' faults: chronological imprecision; the inability to account for such a massive destabilization; and a rather two-dimensional perception of the Achaemenid administrative structure in which distant provincial officers could pose a direct threat to the crown, shift their loyalties (and the loyalties of their satrapies) at will, and be quickly labeled as 'loyalist' or 'rebel'. Diodorus 15.9093 is chronologically defective. A complex series of events is compressed and placed inaccurately, under a single year, 362/1. The revolt emerges full-blown and then collapses within a short period of time. Within that year, there are only approximate indications of the order of events in Anatolia, Diodorus in 15.91.2 synchronizes Orontes' defection with a battle between Datames and Artabazus; in 15.92.1 he synchronizes the aforementioned battle with Rheomithres' return from Egypt. Diodorus provides no explanation as to why so serious an instability would occur. Motivation for siding with rebellion against Artaxerxes is assigned to only one participant the Spartans were angered at Artaxerxes for recognizing the Messenians as a people equal to the other participants in the King's Peace, i.e., equal to and independent from Sparta (Diod, 15.90.2). For this reason the Spartans fight as allies of the Egyptian Taches, Only when discussing their betrayal of the already organized rebellion does Diodorus attribute motives to some of the Anatolian rebels. Orontes (Diod. 15.91.1) betrays his allies to royal forces in hopes of some great reward, Rheomithres (15.92.1) and Mithrobarzanes (Datames' father-in-law, 15.91.3) out of self-interest. Unreasoned treachery satisfies Diodorus for the most part. Diodorus' account, while stressing how widespread and well-organized the revolt was, tells us very little about what actually happened in Anatolia. Egyptian affairs attracted most of the historian's attention, no doubt because of the leading role played by Greek generals (Chabrias and Agesilaus). A number of officers and peoples are mentioned in 15.90.3; all but Orontes drop alit of the account. We learn only of Orontes' leadership and surrender (15.91. I), the existence of

IN1RODUcrORY

11

warfare between Artabazus and Datames (15.91.2-7, but all attention is paid to Mithrobarzanes' defection to exclusion of any data on the warfare itself), and the surrender of Rheomithres upon his return from Egypt (15.92.1). Treachery alone appears worthy of narration. The perception of the administrative structure of the Achaemenid Empire presented in Diodorus is a shallow one. All major figures who are given by name are assigned the same level of power, all are able to do with their provinces what they wish. There is no room for subordinate officers and the response they might make to their superiors' disloyalty. Purely local instabilities caused by perennially recalcitrant tribes such as the Pisidians are made into threats to Artaxerxes equal to the troubles caused by disloyal Achaemenid officers. Many of Diodorus' particulars, when examined in the light of Achaemenid administrative practices and other evidence for the 360's, prove questionable. Diodorus' account of how Ariobarzanes received his satrapy, i.e., taking it up after the death of Mithridates, is wrong. There is no evidence to prove Mausolus or Autophradates disloyal to Artaxerxes, Orontes' title, "satrap of Mysia", is imprecise. Placing the Lycians, Pisidians, Parnphylians, and Cilicians under the rubric "Ionians" makes no sense.I The Cilicians, Syrians, and Phoenicians are listed simply as ethnics without consideration of Achaemenid personnel in those regions. In particular, Syria and Phoenicia are better seen as regions destabilized as the result of the temporary forward policy carried out by Egyptian rebels. Finally, Artaxerxes would have little chance of losing one half his revenues because of troubles in frontier regions. The shallow administrative structure in Diodorus' account does serve one purpose: it permits the historian to describe the revolt, its impact, and Orontes' role in grandiose terms. Diodorus' account is unique-sand this should be a source of concern. He is the only one to perceive a high level of organization among rebels in the 360's. Trogus Prol. 10 lists the threats to Artaxerxes in chronological order, but does not indicate any interrelation among them: Euagoras (380's), Egypt (370's), the Cadusians (after 374); then follow the names of three leaders (purpuratos) who were rebellious (Datames, Ariobarzanes, Orontes):

... defectores in Asia purpuratos suos persecutus (sc. Artaxerxes), primum Dotamen praefectum. Paphlagonum origo repetita. deinde praefectum

2

As a result of supposed text problems, some scholars have tried to emend Diod. 15.90.3 to make Orontes satrap of Armenia. See Hornblower 177 n. 61.

12

IN1RODUcrORY

Hellesponti Ariobarzanen, deinde in Syria praefectum Armeniae Oronton, omnibusque victis decesserit filio successore Ocho.

The use of primum, deinde, deinde suggests sequential rebellions. None of these events was significant enough in Justin's view to warrant discussion in his summary of book ten. Plutarch's life of Artaxerxes says nothing about far western troubles of the 360's: court intrigue posed the real danger to the Great King. Nepos provides a rather full account of Datames' career and discusses the activities of Greek generals in Asia: not once is there mention of a widespread and well-organized destabilization of the Achaemenid far west. Nor is there any in Xenophon's Hellenica or Agesilaus. Absence of reference to a satraps' revolt in the latter work is surprising: Much could have been made of Agesilaus' role in supporting a major effort to break up the Empire. In the other historical and literary sources not once is an anecdote introduced with a context of a 'great satraps' revolt'. More disturbing is the absence of any reference to the revolt in the works of Demosthenes and Isocrates who sometimes presented portraits of Achaemenid rule somewhat removed from the truth as a means of convincing their audience to undertake certain activities to the future detriment of the Empire. As regards the 360's, Demosthenes refers to troubles caused by Ariobarzanes (15.9) and Orontes (14.31) and to a quarrel between Autophradates and Artabazus (23.154), but nowhere does he seem to believe that these incidents were part of a well organized threat to Artaxerxes Il's rule. Isocrates took pains to disparage the empire and its administrators, but he is strangely silent about an event which should have been played up in his attempts to persuade Greek political entities and then Philip to expend resources on attacks against the Achaemenid far west.' It is better to shift the point of reference, and to note in Diodorus (or rather in Ephorus, whose account Diodorus summarized) echoes of Isocrates' biased and false perceptions. Diodorus' account of instability in Anatolia is very much an Isocratean panorama of barbarian turpitude cast in the form of a historical narrative. Both the oratory and the history are somewhat removed from the truth. An alternate reconstruction should begin with a more sophisticated view of Achaemenid administrative structure than Diodorus' and a consideration of the political entities in the far west, administrative practices, and the interplay of personnel and practices which

3

Achaemenid control was marked by an ignoble ethos (4.150-157); the Empire seethed with discontent (4.160-167 for c. 380,5.99-105 for the 350's).

INIRODUcrORY

13

can suggest how and why instabilities would arise and damage Achaernenid Anatolia." I shall then consider the backgrounds and activities of the satraps (governors) of Dascylium and Lydia, Ariobarzanes and Autophradates. Ill-feelings between these two officers caused Autophradates to represent at Susa the activities of Ariobarzanes as those of a rebel. Artaxerxes' decision, the result of Autophradates' arguments, to have war made on Ariobarzanes set off a series of local troubles. I discuss the warfare and its effects on Ariobarzanes' administration and then the efforts of Artabazus, the new satrap, to restabilize Dascylium. I argue that Mausolus of Carla, who had assisted Autophradates in the conflict with Ariobarzanes, did not undertake any activities directed against Artaxerxes H. Finally I consider the activities of the lesser officer Orontes, a subordinate of Autophradates in Mysia, who attempted to exploit the troubles in Dascylium and Lydia and increase his own power in western Anatolia until he fell to Autophradates' forces. What has been perceived traditionally as a major threat to Artaxerxes' control was in fact a series of local, but interrelated, troubles, limited in duration to the 360's and in impact to western Anatolia, Artaxerxes n himself was not threatened.

4

It is disturbing that those works which do take pains to discuss Achaemcnid administrative practices fail to make much use of their conclusions in analyzing the instabilities of the 360's. Cook CNI 267-277 is not considered in Bum's chapter in the same work (CHI 375-384); Cook PE 167-182 v. 218-222; Hornblower 145-165 v . 170-182.

IT. SOl\1lE ASPECTS OF ACHAEl\1lENID ADMINISTRATION IN THE FAR WEST Administrative Landscape and Practices 5

"Developmental" and "competitive" viewpoints marked the administrative ethos of Achaernenid control. In the first (cf. Briant's "chief economic command") the Empire's goal was the transformation of the landscape into paradeisos, a well-ordered, productive estate, free from external and internal disruption. This vision was to be achieved by a rational use of human and economic resources. The second held that great deeds proved one worthy of post and promotion. For the Great King this meant a 'heroic kingship' (cf. the sentiments in Hdt. 7.8, 11), for his subordinates-regardless of nationality--a service and status orientation of empire. Serving the Great King was matter of honor (Xen. Hell. 4.1.37); visibility and performance added to one's status (e.g. Xen. Hell. 3.1.10-13) and compensated for ignoble ancestry. From these viewpoints were derived the major characteristics of Achaemenid control (which made little distinction between Iranians and non-Iranians), From the first were derived those characteristics which permitted the rational use of resources: decentralized government (let local experts govern on the frontier), replication in activities (each officer was expected to maintain order in the area entrusted to him and so be able to forward tribute to superiors), continuity in personnel and administrative practices (prevent unnecessary, deleterious changes; co-opt rebels, if at all possible; create miniature dynasties-vsuch as the sons of Phamaces in Dascylium-with which the central government could work easily). From the second spawned great deeds and dangers. There existed an undercurrent of competition and rivalry in the relations between officers (Thucyd. 8.5-6, Xen. Hell. 3.1.9, 14-15) which could result in open warfare between them (Xen. Anab. 1.1.6-8, Hell. 4.1). The crown need not have been the object of hatred and at times did not react. Achaemenid Anatolia thus was like a Zoroastrian battlefield upon which the forces of good administration contended with the forces of maladministration. 5

Of value here are Briant RTP, Briant "Pouvoir Central", Root, Tuplin "Administration" (focuses on administrative components, is aware of problems posed by evidence drawn from diverse portions of the Empire), Weiskopf 1-81.

ACHAEMEJ'\fID ADMIJ\ilSTRAnON

15

The warriors on this battlefield, the administrators, were a multi ethnic lot (well-documented families prove to be both Iranian and non-Iranian). Their responsibilities were the same (maintain order, forward tribute), but more important administrators, the satraps, were permitted wide ranging discretionary powers and their deeds had impact over a larger region. The sources do not permit detailing a precise administrative hierarchy within the Anatolian satrapies, In general, a satrap (khshahthrapavan), not necessarily an Iranian, headed a province (satrapy). Subordinate to him were multi-ethnic lesser officers: local nobles (usually estate owners with personal following of their own), city bosses, semi-obedient tribal chieftains, native dynasts. These categories overlap: Greek city bosses Zenis and Mania were styled 'satraps' of Pharnabazus (Xen, Hell. 3.1.10-12); the Carian Hecatomnid family, initially city bosses in Mylasa and local dynasts, provided Caria (and Lycia) with satraps. The service and status orientation of empire left much room for promotion and for demotion (when rivalry and hatred went awry). Monitoring the activities of rival officers was not entrusted to a special class of officers (so Xen. Cyrop. 8.6.16). As will be detailed below, the Great King relied on and reacted to a variety of information sources. 6 Agricultural activities generated most of the Empire's wealth in the far west. The creation of estates was the physical expression of the belief that an aim in administration was maintaining agricultural productivity through the protection of the land and its fertility. The estates (with their owners) were the building blocks of control: the Achaemenid presence was rurally-based and not uniform in depth. The foundation of new estates (and the settlement of Iranians, Sir. 13.629, Xen. Anab. 7.8.15) facilitated the growth of a stronger and more productive landscape. The crops grown and livestock raised were the raw materials of revenue and wealth; the cavalry commanded by the estate owner was the backbone of Achaernenid military power (cf. Xen. Anab. 4.4.3-22, 7.8.8-24). The characteristics of Achaernenid control engendered longstanding problems for administrators. Power was land-based, cavalry at its heart (note Autophradates' forces in Polyaenus 7.14.3). Naval power depended primarily upon the utilization of fleets from Anatolian Greek city-states (cooperative when Achaemenid land-based power nearby was unchallenged) or sources outside Anatolia (expensive and/ or compromising to Achaemenid administration, cf. Thucyd. 8.5-6). As a result, the coast could be raided, often with impunity, the invader pushing further inland if the Empire's officers were otherwise occupied. 6

Hirsch 101-139 is quite valuable on the supposed 'King's Eye'.

16

ACHAEMENID ADM1N1STRAnON

Extreme care and foresight were requisites in setting priorities for the use of naval power in imperial defense. Only Hecatomnid Caria developed a more permanent satrapally control fleet in Anatolia (note its use in Xen. Ages. 2.26). The uneven and porous nature of Achaemenid control meant that some areas were frequently in disorder and deserving of near constant policing action (e.g. the territory of the Mysians, Hell. Oxy. 2 L 1, Xen. Anab. 3.2.23). Such disorder increased when those officers charged with diminishing it were themselves making irrational use of the Empire's resources. The undercurrent of rivalry among officers lead to ill feelings or, worse, protracted clashes. Overall, the only beneficiaries were the less stable, tribally organized peoples of Anatolia, who both exploited and were exploited by the contending forces (e.g. the events in Xen. Hell. 4.1., discussed below). Internal dissentions were a source of delight to external enemies: Egypt, when in rebellion and led by native 'pharaohs' , sought to assist anti-Achaernenid forces in Anatolia as a means of tying up scarce Achaemenid naval forces (e.g. Diod. 15.2, 92; Xen. Cyrop . 8.8.4). The Greeks, politically fragmented and scattered in numerous settlements in both Europe and Asia, possessed the characteristics of both an external enemy and a tribally organized people. Ready access to naval power, theirs or others', enabled them to defy long-term effective control by land-based forces and, in Asia, to tum away from such control when administrators were distracted. The better to understand the motivations behind and the development of the instabilities during the 360's a closer examination is in order, an examination of rivalry between officers, open rebellion, and the circumstances under which the crown decided to intervene.

Rebellion in Achaemenid Anatolia For Achaemenid officers their rank, political and social, was a matter of pride. In the service and status orientation of administration any diminishing of that rank, real or imagined, was cause for ill-feeling and, under the worst of conditions, open warfare. Such a diminishing of one's majesty might be perceived in a number of activities. An officer might react with dismay or hostility at an appointment made by his superior, believing that the recipient was of lower status than himself or otherwise less deserving. One officer might perceive another as acting without cause in a region the first believed to be properly within his own authority. Satrapal control on the frontier could be defined as sphere of influence emanating from the satrapal capital. Outer reaches of adjoining spheres intersected: there satrapal control was less consolidated and

ACHAEMEl\iID ADMINTSTRATION

17

the satraps anxious to extend and improve in quality their control as a means of winning greater fame for themselves and greater favor in the Great King's eyes. Within these regions satraps competed with each other and could work at cross purposes. Overall, this undercurrent of rivaJlry itself diminish the possibility that a number of highest officers for provinces, satraps, would join together and act in concert to damage the Great King. The well-documented and poisoned relations between the fifth and fourth century B.C. satraps Pharnabazus of Dascyliurn and Tissaphernes of Sparda (Lydia), the first (and perhaps the second) a member of the cadet branch of the Achaemenid house, illustrate satrapal rivalry.? Both were anxious to remove Athenian influence from the coastal regions of their satrapies and to secure use of a Spartan fleet. They ended up in competition (Thucyd. 8.5-6, esp. 8.6.2) which did remove some of the Athenians, but permitted the establishment in the region of Spartan forces. Their rivalry was one reason Darius Il sent Cyrus to western Anatolia: hopefully his presence there would end the competition between Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes, for Cyrus would be superior in status to both and have full control over funds to be paid out for use of the Spartan fleet. Following Cyrus' unfortunate tenure, T'issaphemes, to Pharnabazus' dismay, was appointed as a special commander in the far west to deal with the Greek problem (Xen. Hell. 3.1.3) and so became Phamabazus' superior. The Spartan general Dercylidas was able to exploit the satraps' increased ill-feeling to the detriment of Achaemenid control (Xen. Hell. 3.1.9 ff.). Pharnabazus complained to Artaxerxes in person about Tissaphernes, alongside of whom he felt he could fight only after binding himself by oath (Xen, Hell. 3.2.13). Finally, Tissaphemes was executed upon Artaxerxes' command after the Great King himself grew exasperated, in part with the satrap's inability to work with his northern colleague. Such was the bitterness Pharnabazus felt that supposedly he stated to Agesilaus (Xen, Hell. 4.1.37) that if his status was once more diminished by a royal appointment he would work on the Spartan's behalf and so against the Great King. Pharnabazus' statement indicates how an administrative problem could eventually infect an entire satrapy, One result of rivalry could be rebellion. But because administrative guidelines for the frontier were often broad and flexible, rebellion was often a matter of interpretation and could be clearly and readily defined only in its most serious manifestation: preemptive and wanton destruction by an officer of the physical plant and personnel belonging to a sector 7

Westlake His/aria 30 (1981) 257-279 traces the later stages of their mutual hatred.

18

ACHAEMENID ADMINISTRATION

controlled by another officer or the rebel's superior (e.g. the type of activities outlined in Polyaenus 7.29.1, Nepos Datames 10.2).8 In order to determine whether someone was in a state of rebellion his superior made use of first-hand local information, interpreting it on the basis of the nature of the data presented and the status of the one presenting the data (cf. Darius in DNb 21-24).9 The response varied, ranging from rejection of the data, to investigation of their validity, to accepting their validity. A major danger in determining the response to be made was that a highly successful officer could arouse such a high level of resentment among his contemporaries that they would seek to portray his successful activities as the preparation of a power base for use against his superior. The personal nature of politics in the Achaemenid far west created many situations in which an officer thought he was preparing something for himself, but was in fact preparing it for his enemies. The importance of local information in effecting policy at Susa in matters calling for a judgement about loyalty and competence emerges quite clearly upon consideration of the preludes to campaigns or actions directed against suspected rebels: Tissaphernes' ride from Sparda to Susa brought undeniable evidence of Cyrus' rebellion (Xen, Anab. 1.2.4-5); envoys from Cypriote dynasts told of Euagoras' threat to the status quo on the island (Diad. 14.98); Sysinas, Datames' son, argued that his father's consolidation of power in central Anatolia was detrimental to the crown (Nepos Datames 7.1). The royal response to such information was often dependent upon both the nature of the data presented and the persons presenting. Someone of high enough status could attempt to mislead the Great King and his advisors by misrepresenting the facts. H is important to note that the Great King does not appear to have actively sought out information by which he could discomfit or destroy his subordinates in the far west. Two disturbance s from the earlier portion of Artaxerxes' reign are worth considering in anticipation of the supposedly widespread troubles of the 360's. The first to be considered is from the 380's and involves Tiribazus, satrap at Sparda, and Orontes, satrap of Armenia. Both were supposed to cooperate and defeat Euagoras of Salamis, deemed a rebel, but Orontes composed a letter charging Tiribazus with actions against the Empire. This letter and the royal response illustrate how rebellion was a matter of perception, of interpreting new data. The 8

9

These are moves against the symbols of Achaemenid control: pulling down phrouria (focal points of power), burning komai (destruction of part of the physical plant necessary for agricultural production, the basis of tribute), seizing phoroi, the King's wealth, which becomes booty, leia, the robber's tribute. Cited in Kent OF ]38-140.

ACHAEMENID ADMINIS1RATION

19

second example, fram the 390's, involves Pharnabazus, satrap at Dascylium, and a lesser officer from the satrapy, Spithridates. Although Spithridates' activities precede Orontes' letter chronologically, they will be considered second because they offer an example of an actual rebellion, the motivation for such, and the resources available to the rebel in carrying out the rebellion. One should note that Spithridates' activities were directed against Phamabazus: the Great King was involved only tangentially in this rather local disturbance.

The Letter of 0 rontes When Artaxerxes named Tiribazus and Orontes as co-commanders in the operations against Euagoras, he did so in hopes that the two officers would work well together and bring the conflict to a swift conclusion. Both Tiribazus and Orontes had stood beside Artaxerxes during the time of Cyrus. Tiribazus, once Orantes' subordinate in Armenia, was now satrap at Sparda and would be familiar to and with most of the military leaders participating in the Cypriote campaign. Artaxerxes' appointment of Orontes as leader of land forces was a recognition of the satrap of Armenia's military skill and his ability to have Armenia running smoothly enough so that he could be absent from the region.U' Regrettably, difficult operations and supposedly diminished status bred resentment. Tiribazus, in addition to commanding the naval forces, was the chief commander (Diod. 18.2). Orontes--once Tiribazus' superior-vgrew jealous of his colleague's status (Diod. 15.8.3). Diodorus' perception is basically accurate. In theory the two commanders were equals: both were highest officers, satraps, and each commanded a branch of the military (Diod. 15.2.2). A team effort would lead to success. But in reality Tiribazus' position as a man more familiar to and with the general region of operations gave him an advantage: subordinate commanders were likely to feel more comfortable with him than with an outsider and would look to him for guidance and even to countermand unpopular decisions by Orontes. This status of Tiribazus was sure to lead to ill feelings. It is very probable that such ill feelings grew after the naval battle won by Glos, a subordinate commander from Lydia and Tiribazus' son-in-law (Diod. 15.3.6, 15.9.3). Achaemenid forces were now besieging Euagoras on land, a tiresome task of perhaps indefinite duration in the viewpoint of lower military personnel. Tiribazus had gone to Sus a, Orantes was left as sale commander (Diod. 10

Osborne His/aria 22 (1973) 522-537 analyzes events.

20

ACHAEMENID ADMINISTRATION

15.4.1-2). He may have been believed by those accustomed to Tiribazus to have abused his post. Eventually, the continued siege, ill feelings, and recriminations led to a worse situation. When Tiribazus, upon his return, was unable to bring the siege to an end (Diod. 15.8.2-3), Orontes laid charges against Tiribazus in a letter sent secretly to Artaxerxes. The charges were believed (Diod. 15.8.5, cf. Polyaenus 7.14.1) and Artaxerxes ordered the arrest of Tiribazus, Orontes was of high enough and trusted enough status to cause Artaxerxes to accept the new local data the letter presented. The charges are laid out in Diodorus 15.8.4: Tiribazus could have taken Salamis, but did not. Behind the delay and negotiations lay Tiribazus' desire for koinopragia with Euagoras. In addition, the satrap at Sparda had already concluded a private alliance with Sparta, with which he was friendly. An embassy was sent by Tiribazus to Delphi-ito ask the oracle whether he should rebel. The most important charge of all was the last enumerated in the letter: Tiribazus was building up a personal following by his kindness to his subordinate commanders. In short, Orontes' letter was designed to convince the Great King that Tiribazus' activities in 381 and early 380 had been designed not to end the Cypriote campaign, but to exploit his access to a large number of Achaemcnid forces as a means of facilitating a rebellion against the crown. Orontes' status and the charges as a whole succeeded in effecting royal policy. But a close examination of these charges reveals that they are a matter of hostile perception, a misrepresentation of Tiribazus' activities. Behind the first charge lay frequent diplomatic contact with a recalcitrant party under siege. Tiribazus seems to have been the chief Achaemenid officer with whom Euagoras dealt. This is reasonable: Tiribazus had just returned from consultations at Susa over the means by which to bring hostilities to an end. Orontes, who had kept up the siege during Tiribazus' absence, will have felt shunted aside. Theopornpus (FGrH 115 fr. 103) implies that Euagoras exploited this feeling of ingratitude. As far as the second charge, Tiribazus was friendly towards the Spartans. Ten years earlier he had been willing to listen to Antalcidas and had arrested the mercenary admiral Conon, He ran into trouble for his friendship (Xen, Hell. 4.8.16-17). His friendship and supposed alliance with Sparta can be characterized as simply a move designed to utilize the resources of a now compliant city. One should recall that in the 390's Euagoras and Athens, while not acting against Achaemenid interests, had tried to formulate cooperative activities which would weaken Spartan power. 11 Sparta might now be willing to take vengeance on Euagoras, a 11

Cf. Costa Historia 23 (1974) 51-52 on the anti-Spartan tilt of Euagoras before 390.

ACHAEMENID ADMINIS1RATION

21

vengeance which for the Achaemenids would offer the bonus of advancing the Empire's interest Theopompus records that Euagoras did send out envoys to Sparta; these may have acted to counterbalance Tiribazus' activities and to seek out new sources of foreign support (needed in view of Egypt's unwillingness to back Euagoras fully). The final two charges fall under the general heading of public relations. There is no other way to characterize realistically am embassy to Delphi; it may be compared in kind to the type of activities Pharnabazus had carried out earlier in the case of Athenian temples.V The 'most serious' charge, that Tiribazus was building up his own power base by private goodwill displayed towards military leaders in the campaign by honors and gifts, is a misrepresentation of Tiribazus' efforts to assure the success of the campaign by preventing disaffection. At the very start of the campaign the troops had become disaffected over the issue of provisions (Diod, 15.3.1-2, Polyaenus 7.20). The demanding task of keeping large numbers of men stationary in the course siege operations could lead to similar difficulties, difficulties Tiribazus was anxious to avoid. Perhaps this charge contains some allusion, as well, to Tiribazus' marriage connection with Glos (Diod. 15.9.3), the man credited with victory using the naval forces over which Tiribazus had supreme command. Orontes' charges were a misrepresentation of limited local policy designed to achieve local goals in the interest of the crown. Although Orontes' charges were sufficient for causing the arrest and detention at Susa of Tirbazus, they were insufficient for finding Tiribazus guilty of improper activity. Diodorus (15.10-11) provides an account of the trial which illustrates the high value placed on service to the Great King. Following Tiribazus' arrest, the Great King put off the trial (Diod, 15.8.5, 10.1) because it was necessary for him to undertake a punitive campaign against the Cadusians. It was during the same period of time that Orontes reached an accord with Euagoras. Tiribazus' defense, as presented by Diodorus, is surprisingly lame, a characteristic which may be due to Diodorus' summarizing a more detailed account. The defense against the charge of collusion with Euagoras is given as a simple comparison of the arrangements proposed by Tiribazus and those reached by Orontes, the implication being that Orontes gave Euagoras more favorable terms. The consultation at Delphi is explained as well with a summary defense: Apollo, as a custom, gave no answers about death. Apparently Orontes had couched Tiribazus' investigations in terms of inquiries about the health of 12

Lewis and Stroud Hesperia 48 (1979) 191 n. 16.

22

ACHAEMS"rm ADMINISTRATION

Artaxerxes, e.g. would he die in battle? The friendship with Sparta is explained as having been made while in the service of the crown. The remainder of Diodorus' account--and Tiribazus' defense-vrevolves around how and to what degree Tiribazus had laid up a store of good will in the King's House. The royal judges (Died. 15.11) deliberated and presented opinions. The satrap was acquitted and rewarded. But Orontes' false accusations laid up such a store of illwill in the King's House that his status as highest officer for Armenia was terminated (Diad. 15.11.2, Suda sv. Arbazakios, Pluto Mor. 174b). Stripped of Armenia, Orontes was demoted and became a lesser officer, a subordinate to Tiribazus in the sector of Mysia, A brief comment is required on this punishment: Orontes had served Artaxerxes well in the past, receiving one of the King's daughters in marriage following his support of the crown in Cyrus' rebellion (Xen. Anab. 2.4.8. 3.4.13, Pluto Artax. 27). The King may have felt that in this matter dishonor, rather than death, was a more proper punishment to inflict on his previously loyal son-in-law who had not taken up arms against the King himself, but who had accused a fellow officer of treason. It is important to note those aspects of rebellion in the far west which emerge from this incident. First, its interpretative nature. It was possible to view Tiribazus' activities dispassionately and see nothing threatening to Susa. But they could be misrepresented: Steps taken to assure the success of Achaernenid policies will build up the status and influence of one officer and can be presented by another to an outside party as threats to that party's status and influence. Secondly, the Great King did not initiate activity designed to destroy his officers. Rather, he responded to data presented to him. The nature of these data and the presenter determined the response, in this case investigation and ultimately the rejection of the data. However, Artaxerxes' decision to investigate, rather than reject, the accusations appears to have been characteristic of his willingness, upon which I will comment later, to display a measure of distrust towards officers in the far west who were operating under conditions which could call to mind the time of Cyrus the Younger.l-'

13

Osborne His/aria 22 (1973) 534-536 believes that the effect of the letter was to conjure up the ghost of Cyrus. Note, too, that Glos was son of Tamos, who served with Cyrus (Xen. Anab. 1.2.1, 1.4.2) and that Glos himself had entered Cyrus' service (1.4.16,1.5.7,2.1.3). Cf. Weiskopf 174-175.

ACHAEME1'<'ID ADMlJ','1STRATION

23

The Rebellion ojSpithridates'" In late 396 B.C. the lesser officer Spithridates stood against his superior, Phamabazus, satrap at Dascylium, and in the campaigning season of 395 B.C., with the assistance of Agesilaus of Sparta and Otys, a Paphlagonian chieftain, caused damage in the satrapy of Dascylium before moving south to Lydia where he hoped to find shelter. This rebellion, although limited in duration and impact, provides an example of the damage which a lesser officer could do, his motivation for so doing, and his potential sources of support. Spithridates' activities are detailed in the ancient sources not because of their importance, but because they were abetted by the Spartan invader Agesilaus, whose activities were of interest to Greco-Roman historians. Spithridates was a lesser officer of not ignoble social status,15 an estate ownerl", and a member of Phamabazus' retinue at the satrapal court. 17 He had served Phamabazus well: In 400 B.C. he and Rhathines, a lesser officer near Gordium, were sent by the satrap to harass Xenophon and those under his command as they moved through the satrapy (Xen. Anab. 6.5.7). It is possible that in the course of similar policing operations Spithridates had contact with the occasionally recalcitrant Otys.18 But satrapal arrogance and Hellenic meddling sparked Spithridates' armed revolt. The officer was insulted, his status diminished in a manner specified only by Xenophon (Ages. 3.3): Phamabazus

14 15

16

17 18

Bruce 137-145 analyzes events and discusses earlier scholarship. lIeli. Oxy. 21.4, Xen. Hell. 4.1.6. The name Spithridates is borne by an officer who assisted in subduing Pissouthnes of Sparda (Ctesias FGrH 688 fr. 15 sect. 53). Since our Spithridates' family is rather young (a son neon onta, Hell. Oxy. 21.4, cf. Xen. Hell. 3.4.10, 4.16, Xen. Ages. 5.4-5; a daughter of marriageable age, but unmarried, Xen. Hell. 3.4.10, Plut. Ages. 11.2, Xen, Ages. 3.3), it may be reasonable to make the Spithridates of the 390's the son of the Spithridates active thirty years before. Sekunda "Persian Settlement" 178-180 also attempts, through prosopography, to enhance Spithridates' status. Cf. Lewis Spa ria and Persia 81 n. 200 (he identifies the two men named Spithridates as the same man). On Spithridates' 200 horsemen as indicative of a higher status, cf. Sekunda "Persian Settlement" 184-185. That he was an estate owner and that his estate was near Pharnabazus' estate, Dascylium, I deduce from the following: Spithridates has his own following from which he can draw at least two hundred cavalry (Xen. Hell. 3.4.10, cf. Plut. Lys. 24.1; cf. participation in cavalry operations, Xen. Anab. 6.5.7); he brings his property and family to Cyzicus, a protected site not as open to an attack as an estate (Hell. Oxy. 21.4, Xen. Hell. 3.4.10), but probably nearby; his position as member of the satrapal court (Hell. Oxy, 21.4). Hell. Oxy. 21.4. Spithridates is aware of Otys' disposition and is able to bring him over to his side without much difficulty (Hell. Oxy. 21.6, Xen. Hell. 4.1.2-3), all this suggesting familiarity with Paphlagonia and its political leaders.

24

ACHAEMENID ADMINIS1RATION

wanted Spithridates' daughter, but without a proper marriage. Spithridates' anger turned to fear and he, with his family and following, sought refuge in Cyzicus, There Lysander prompted the young noble to stand against his superior.'? Normally an Achaemenid officer could draw upon family and following in carrying out an endeavor, but Spithridates was a younger noble and consequently his support among Achaemenid forces for his illegality was limited: his son, Megabates, who accompanied him on his operations, was a youngster; his personal following yielded only 200 horse,20 no other Achaernenid officer joined rum. 21 Apparently Spithridates was not perceived as being of high enough status, but only as a tool of the foreigners who fought at his side. He was able to gamer support only from the traditional enemies of Achaemenid stability who hoped to exploit the noble's anger at Pharnabazus as a means of facilitating their own disruption cf the satrapy of Dascylium, Agesilaus, who first met Spithridates in 396 (Xen. Hell. 3.4.10, Pluto Lys. 24.1), believed him to be to provide a military force as well as knowledge to compensate for the Spartan's unfamiliarity with the region he sought to 'liberate' (Hell. Oxy, 21.4, Xen, Hell. 3.4.10).22 Later in the campaigning season of 395 Spithridates was able to obtain troops from Otys, a Paphlagonian chieftain who had already laid up a store of ill-will in the King's House. 23 Otys' willingness to commit troops and to consider a marriage alliance with the Achaemenid rebel was no doubt created by the chieftain's perception of Spithridates as a means by which to expand the extent and duration of his own damage to Pharnabazus' territory and to enhance his possibilities of collecting larger amounts of booty.24 In the

19

20

21 22 23 24

Hell Oxy. 21.4, Xen, Hell. 3.4.10, Plut. Ages. 11.2 and Lys. 24.1 (the second and fourth mention Lysander's role). Xen. Ages. 3.3 gives the specific cause for anger, but synchronizes it with Pharnabazus' expectation of a royal marriage, which did not occur until c. 388 (Xen, Hell. 5.1.28)and was a reward for his land and naval victories in the Aegean and Greece. The synchronization does not rule out Xenophon's explanation for Spithridates' ill-feeling; perhaps Xenophon made an erroneous synchronization to simply have Phamabazus look bad and Agesilaus, who served as the marriage broker for the woman in question, look good. Xcn.Hell. 3.4.10, Plut. Lys. 24.1, Xen, Ages. 3.3 Cf. Schwartz CHI 655 on the Iranian belief that girls were of marriageable age at fifteen years. Note Spartan hyperbole in Xen. Hell. 4.1.7 about Spithridates. Hell. Oxy. 21.4, Xen.lIeli. 3.4.10, Bruce 139. Otys'ill-will: Xen. Hell. 4.1.3, Xen. Ages. 3.4; troops: Hell. Oxy. 22.2, Xen. Hell. 4.1.3, Xen. Ages. 3.4, Plut, Ages. 11.3. Xenophon and Plutarch cite Agesilaus' character and Spartan power as reasons for Otys' cooperation: Plut. Ages. 11.1, Xcn, Hell. 4.1.9. On the marriage alliance: Xen.Hell. 4.1.6-15; Bruce 144 claims the marriage would be beneath Otys. On booty and its causing a break in the rebel ranks: Hell.Uxy. 22.4, Xen.Heli. 4.1.26-28, Plut. Ages. 11.4.

ACHAElv'lENID ADMIN1STRKf10N

25

final stages of operations Spithridates' ally, was able to obtain the use of some Mysians (Hell. Oxy. 22.4). The impact of Spithridates' activities was nugatory.I> The rebel, with Agesilaus, Paphlagonians, and Mysians, was enough only to damage and diminish Dascylium's stability temporarily, but not powerful enough to occupy areas and establish an actual powerbase to counterbalance legitimate satrapal administration. He and his allies were baffled by the defenses set up to protect the satrapy's human and economic resources. Attacks on fortified strongpoints failed, Spithridates driven away by the lesser officer in charge of Gordium and its environs.sv Spithridates' Paphlagonian allies proved of little value.I? By the end of the campaigning season Spithridates and his allies encamped on the outskirts of Phamabazus' estate (also called Dascylium), A surprise attack by over four thousand troops managed to gamer some of Pharnabazus' moveable property at Caue village, but a dispute over its division and, no doubt, Spithridates' fear of facing his superior in open battle, led the rebel to take his cavalry and Paphlagonian allies south. 28 He retreated (Xen. Hell. 4.1.27) from Dascylium towards Sardis in hopes, perhaps foolish ones, that Ariaeus, himself once a rebel, would not destroy those who made the mistake of standing against Phamabazus.Y Although Spithridates' activities disturbed the peace in Dascylium, no serious threat was posed to Pharnabazus and his administration or to Artaxerxes, If Spithridates had been of higher status the situation might have been different: the rebel's personal following would have been more extensive, his status might have attracted participation of other nobles who disliked Pharnabazus, and there might have been underway a serious threat to satrapal administration as damage was followed by a rebel conquest and occupation. Then perhaps Artaxerxes himself would have needed to take a hand in restoring order.

25 26 27 28 29

Xen. Hell. 4.1.1, a vague account designed to explain the collection of booty, is to be rejected in favor of Hell. Oxy. 21.4-5. Bruce 140-141. Failure at Leon/on Kephalai: Hell. Oxy, 21.5, Bruce 140-141; failure at Gordium, thanks to Rhathines: Hell. Oxy, 21.5, Bruce 141-142. Hell. Oxy. 22.1-2, Xen. Hell. 4.1.3, Bruce 143-144; failure at Mile/ou Teichos: Hell. Oxy, 22.3, Bruce 145. Hell. Oxy. 22.3-4, Xen. Hell. 4.1.15 ff.; Caue attack: Xen. Hell. 4.1.20-28. Later Agesilaus is warned to get out of the satrapy, Xen, Hell. 4.1.41. Tithraustes, following his disposal of Tissaphcmes, appointed Ariacus and Pasiphcmes as caretakers at Sardis pending the naming of a new satrap. Hell. Oxy. 19.3, Bruce 92 on Ariaeus' career. The name Spithridates appears in the satrapal family of Sparda, thus raising the possibility that the rebel lesser officer was pardoned. Bosworth Arrian I 112 on Arr. Anab. 1.12.8.

Ill. THE ANGER OF AUTOPHRADATES: ARIOBARZANES DECLARED A REBEL An examination of the troubles in the far west should begin with an investigation of Ariobarzanes and his career as satrap. The few chronologically fixed points for the mid-360's allow the operations against Ariobarzanes in 366 and 365 to be placed as the first of the troubles in western Anatolia.J" The fact that Ariobarzanes is labeled a 'rebel' in the ancient sources-'! has been significant for modem reconstructions of the satraps' revolt: those who fight him are 'loyalists', those who stand with him against his opponents are 'rebels'. The operations against him are made the prelude to widespread warfare, a spark igniting a general conflagration which threatened to bum down the western portion of the King's House. The warfare between Ariobarzanes and his opponents, Autophradates and Mausolus, considered in detail below, appears to bear the hallmarks of a punitive campaign decreed at Susa, Command is held by two men, one supervising land forces (Autophradates), one naval (Mausolus); one may be described as local man (Autophradates, whose contact and familiarity with Dascylium was far greater than the more distant Mausolus'), the other an outsider. Continuity in personnel may be noted: Autophradates and Hecatomnus, Mausolus' father, had cooperated, with a similar division of command, in the first campaign against Euagoras. This type of campaign, requiring cooperation between satraps and the deployment of land and naval forces from two satrapies-vwith concommittant risks of partially denuding sectors of loyal men, is an activity whose scope and expense would demand royal approval. In addition, these are operations directed against an Achaemenid highest officer, not a minor political entity. The campaigns of 366-365 were carried out upon the command or with the approval of the Great King. 32 Given its danger and expense, why did this war meet with Artaxerxes' approval? In what way did Ariobarzanes' tenure as satrap win for him Susa's hatred? In order to answer these questions 1 will discuss 30 31

Judeich 202-203, Beloch 2 3:2 255, 257 for the date. Ariobarzanes called rebel; Diod. 15.90.3, Dem. 15.9, Tragus Prot, 10, Harpocration sv.

32

Meloni RSJ63 (1951) 9 argues for a campaign at the King's behest, its objective to install Artabazus as satrap at Dascylium.

Ariobarzanes.

ARIOBARZANES AND AUTOPHRADATES

27

Ariobarzanes' career as satrap and indicate how his activities won for him the anger of Autophradates. The Background ofAriobarzanes

Ariobarzanes should be regarded as Pharnabazus' eldest son, already experienced in satrapal affairs and regarded, if not formally appointed, as satrap at Dascylium before 387 B.C. by Artaxerxes in the context of the King's initiating a new phase in the management of the Empire's troubled far western frontier.F' A close association between Phamabazus and Ariobarzanes is suggested by the family history of the former and by Achaernenid administrative practice. The name Ariobarzanes appears as the name of one of Pharnabazus' grandsons; Phamabazus' birth, not later than 445 B .C,; adds to the likelihood that Ariobarzanes was born in the 420's and hence old enough to have undertaken those tasks attested for him before 388 B.c. 34 It was administrative good sense for Artaxerxes to elevate Phamabazus' son. Dascylium had been for over a century the hereditary satrapy of Phamabazus' family, the sons of Pharnaces, a cadet branch of the ruling Achaemenid house and by now deeply rooted in the far northwest. 35 Phamabazus' own career, save for open dislike for the now 33

34

35

Ariobarzanes' post is described with varying degrees of accuracy. Xen. Hell. 5.1.28, Diad. 15.90.3 (phrygia, cf. 17.17.6-7 where it means Hellespontine Phrygia, i.e., Dascylium); Trogus Prol. 10 (praefectum Hellesponiiy; Harpocration sv. Ariobarzanes (error similar to Diodorus'); Nepos Dat. 2.5 (praefecto Lydiae et Ioniae totiusque Phrygiae, perhaps a reflection of Ariobarzanes' importance in the far west). Noldcke 295-296 seems to have been the first to place Ariobarzanes in Phamabazus' family. Beloch Janus 9, Beloch 2 3:2146-147, following Noldeke's lead, suggested Ariobarzanes was either a son or a brother of Pharnabazus and used Xen. Hell. 4.1.31 to establish an approximate date for Phamabazus' birth. On Ariobarzanes the grandson, correct Berve nr. 115 with Bosworth Arrian 1325. I find it quite unlikely that the young boy of Xen. Hell. 4.1.40 (cf. Plut. Ages. 13.3-4) was Phamabazus' eldest living son, the implication of Bum CHI 366. This son by Parapita is discussed below. One may call the family of Phamabazus the 'sons of Pharnaces' after the expression found in Thucydides 8.58.I,tous Pharnakou paideis. Back in 1884 Noldeke (296) wondered whetherthis term "nicht am Ende das ganze Haus bedeuten soll, statt bloss Phamabazus und seine Bruder." He tried to make Phamabazus a descendent from one of the Seven. Recent work based on the Persepolis tablets permits something of a vindication of this view. Hallock has identified the Pamaka of the tablets with Phamaces, father of Artabazus (hero of the northwest in 479 and later satrap of Dascylium, Thucyd. 1.129.1). This Pamaka is a son of Arsames and cousin to Darius. Consult Hallock CII1589 n. 92 and Lewis Sparta and Persia 8, 8 n.25. I would suggest that the 'sons of Phamaces' is indeed a way of referring to the entire family descended from Phamaces (Parnaka) and that it is a local (in Dascylium) equivalent to the imperial appellation "Achaemenid". Cf. Weiskopf 141 n. 64, Schmitt "Achaimenidisches" 74-76, 84-85 (I do not accept the sternrna on p. 84). One may note that Pharnabazus' brother Bagaeus is active in the province: Xen, Hell. 3.4.13, Nepos Ale. 10.3, Plut. Ale. 39--also reporting an uncle of Phamabazus, Susamithras. Simple extrapolation should indicate how deeply rooted the family was in the province.

28

ARIOBARZANES AND AUTOPHRADATES

discredited Tissaphernes, was unblemished: Pharnabazus' successful use of naval power in the 390's and me invasion of southern Greece built a royal road for me King's Peace, set him above the generals of Darius and Xerxes, and avenged Artabazus, son of Pharnaces and me first of Pharnabazus' family to hold Dasc ylium.v" Phamabazus was elevated in social and political status: He journeyed to court, married a daughter of Artaxerxes, Apame, and was given the task of subduing me rebellious portions of Egypt and its environs.V There is no need to assume Pharnabazus was divorced from Dascylium, Although he figures in sometimes lengthy activities in me Levant and at Susa,38 I would see him as maintaining dose ties with his ancestral province, still owning property mere and drawing upon the satrapy's human and economic resources for efforts outside Dascylium, To exclude the son of Pharnabazus from the post of satrap would have been an insulting and unnecessarily disruptive administrative decision. There is no reason to assign such to Artaxerxes II.39 Rather the King could capitalize on and hasten a transmission of power from the experienced father to an already experienced son, so achieving a continuity in personnel. The choice of Ariobarzanes as successor to Pharnabazus was a wise one, for the former was already experienced in the diplomatic and military activities of satrap, having learnt them probably at his father's side. 40 Ariobarzanes had the task (c. 405 B.c.) of escorting to Cius Athenian ambassadors whom Pharnabazus

36 37

38 39

40

Xen. Hell. 4.8.1-11. Xen. 5.1.28, Xen. Ages. 3.3, Plut. Artax. 27. Cf. Herve nr. 152 (Artabazus), For Pharnabazus and the Egyptian theater: Isoc. 4.140, Diad. 15.29 ff., Nepos Dat. 3.4-5, Plut, Ar/ax. 24.1. By 388 Pharnabazus was indeed the senior officer in the far west, an expert on its affairs, familiar to all and personally familiar with most of those officers subordinate to him in the field. Since resources from Anatolia and the use of sea power would be requisite in the pacification of Egypt, Artaxerxcs' appointment of Pharnabazus was a wise administrative decision. Nepos Dat, 3.4-5 provides an example of his moving between Susa and the theater of his military operations. That members of Achaemenid nobility, such as Arsames, satrap of Egypt, owned property--a portion in grants from the Great King-vthroughout the Empire is discussed most recently by Stolper 52-67. I suggest that in Dascylium we might perceive Pharnabazus and his family in a similar light, owning estates throughout the satrapy (estates managed by their supporters) and granting properly to those favored by the satrapal house. Again, it is reasonable to assume that the sons of Pharnaces were deeply rooted in the administrative landscape of the northwest. Parallels from Dascylium: Ariobarzanes: younger brother (see below) in Xen. Hell. 4.1.39-40, Plut, Ages. 13; Mcgabates, the young son of the lesser officer Spithridates: Xen. Hell. 4.1.28, Xen, Ages. 5.4-5, Plut. Ages. 11, cf. Xen, Hell. 3.4.10.

.un.

ARIOBARZANES AND AUTOPHRADATES

29

had been holding, seemingly for three He had made xenia with the Spartan Antalcidas.f? He was able to provide from his satrapy for a fleet commanded, in part, by Antalcidas, an indication of his firm control over previously unstable coastal regions Hell. 5.1.28). The of Ariobarzanes' by his age (he was at least 35 years old, assuming his birth in c. 425 B.C., years after Pharnabazus'), was due to a discontinuity in Achaemenid policy and a need to move policy ahead by carrying over as few difficulties as possible from the past. In 387 Artaxerxes managed to apply what he hoped would be a definitive solution to the Greek problem, i.e., the presence in Anatolia of and actively hostile forces from mainland Greece who supported local Greek politicians inimical to Achaemenid control and who supported other recalcitrant elements. Pharnabazus had done much to help bring the problem under control the Athenian Conon. In the by his able supervision of a mercenary fleet led later 390's, then, the Athenians were viewed at Dascylium (and Susa) as the more compliant among the Greeks for they served as instruments for weakening Sparta and her bases outside Greece. In the years immediately before 387 that view was shared by the satrap at Sardis, Struthas Hell. 4.8.17). But in 387, Tiribazus, Struthas' predecessor, returned to his old post and imposed the King's Peace. Now that almost all hostile foreign troops had been removed from the Anatolian coast and its environs, the Great King recognized Sparta also as a compliant Greek state (Xen. Hell. 4.8.16-17, 5.1.25-34). It was best not to find out whether Pharnabazus, the most senior man in the Achaemenid far west, would develop an animosity towards the younger Tiribazus and a policy which seemingly forgave Agesilaus and Sparta, enemies of Phamabazus and Struthas.f-' Ariobarzanes would assure a continuity in in but might not have the same personal stake in the older policy as did Pharnabazus. The skilled the skilled father to son would keep order in Dascylium, establish order elsewhere in the Empire. When a reconstruction of events offers as a result an intelligent administrative decision, that reconstruction should be preferred over one offering a seemingly

41

Xen, Hell. 1.4.7. The elate of this mission is problematic and dependent upon accepting eniautoi Ires (questionable when the activities of the envoys are examined in Xen. Hell. 1.3.13, 1.4.19). Cf. Beloch 2 3:2150-151.

42

Xen. Hell. 5.1.28, the date of xenia is uncertain. Cf. Beloch 2 3:2147. Xen. Hell. 4.1.40 indicates that the age of one making xenia need not be of great importance. Ariobarzanes could have made it as quite a young man. Lewis Sparta and Persia 147.

43

30

ARIOBARZANES AND AUTOPHRADATES

unnecessary and foolish administrative decision. Since Beloch's time, and with a regrettable frequency recently, scholars have suggested as the cause for Ariobarzanes' later rebellion Artaxerxes' decision in c. 388 that Ariobarzanes was to hold Dascylium 'in trust' and Artaxerxes' decision in the 360's to replace the satrap with the then grown-up true holder of the satrapy, Artabazus, a younger son of Pharnabazus by Apame.vt There is no evidence that Ariobarzanes was holding the satrapy 'in trust'. The later decision of Artaxerxes to send Artabazus westward is perceived best as the response to continued instability in Dascylium, not its cause (see below). The granting of a satrapy in trust, especially for a period of more than twenty years, would be unprecedented in Achaernenid history and not a mark of administrative competence. Either by assigning a satrapy in trust or by announcing the preemptive replacement of an officer who has acted within his guidelines, Artaxerxes would literally ask that officer to go into revolt. In 387 Artaxerxes had made major progress in resolving the Greek problem. Assigning a satrapy abutting the Greek sphere as a satrapy to be held in trust for a child as yet unborn would have been a foolish act. 45 Two other passages which touch on Ariobarzanes' accession need to be considered. The first is Diodorus' confused description of Ariobarzanes (15.90.3) as the 'satrap of Phrygia' (i.e., Hellespontine Phrygia), who, upon the death of Mithridates, gained control over his realm tbasileiay. an apparent reversal of father and son. A most reasonable suggestion, proposed by Beloch,46 is that Diodorus has somehow confused and/or conflated the satraps of Dascylium with the local lords around Cius, a family bearing many of the same names as the satrapal branch of the sons of Phamaces. Such confusion on Diodorus' part does him little credit because elsewhere, where he does mention the dynasts of Cius (16.90.2, 19.40.2,20.111.4) he does not confuse them with other similiarly named figures and is able to provide information which permits the construction of a stemma without much difficulty. The second passage is an anecdote related in Xenophon H ellenica 4.1.40 (repeated in Plut. Ages. 13), a digression about strife in the satrapal family which follows Xenophon's account of the meeting in 394 between Phamabazus and

44

45 46

Beloch Janus 9 assigns as the cause for Ariobarzanes' rebellion the fear that he would be replaced by a mature Artabazus. Similar views: Olmstead 413, Meloni RS/63 (1951) 9, Osborne Grazer Beitrage 3 (1975) 300; a satrapy held in trust is implied in Cook PE 221, cf. 17J, 178; Bum CHI 377, d. 374; Hornblower 173. Sekunda "Datarnes" 47, 51 doubts the customary modem explanations for Ariobarzanes' rebellion. In addition, such reasoning would ignore other living members of Pharnabazus' family. Be1och2 3:2150; Weiskopf 127-128,143 n. 81.

ARIOBARZANES AND AUTOPHRADATES

31

Agesilaus.f? When Phamabazus was away from Dascylium, an unidentified brother deprived the son of Parapita (a wife of Phamabazus) of his arche and made him an exile. This son, who had concluded xenia with Agesilaus, fled to the Peloponnese where he was well treated. The time of this exile is best placed after 388, a safer time for someone to act against the old satrap's son. Although Xenophon has just used the word arche in 4.1.37 to signify the post of satrap, it is highly unlikely that such a post would be in the hands of someone who was a boy in 394 and still youthful in the 380's. Arche should signify here whatever estates were the exile's patrimony. Indeed, this is Plutarch's understanding (Plut. Ages. 13). But the absence of proper names and the location of adelphos in the sentence, which may refer to brother of either Phamabazus or of the son of Parapita, pose the greater problems. It is curious that Xenophon knows the name of the exile's Athenian lover (Euacles) and his mother, but not the name of the exile or the exiler, The identification of the adelphos, the exiler, with Ariobarzanes, proposed by Beloch, certainly is correct. Ariobarzanes was long active in the affairs of Dascylium and would be powerful enough to deal summarily with rivals by 387, particularly those younger than him. But to whom is he a brother? Beloch was uncertain. Plutarch understood adelphos to refer to Parapita's son, i.e. the exiler (Ariobarzanes) is the brother to the exile, and he used the plural in recounting the episode. By accepting Plutarch's interpretation we have a reasonable reconstruction of events: Ariobarzanes, eldest son of Pharnabazus (by a woman whose name is not attested) and now senior member of the family, quarrels with his younger (half-)brother and drives him into exile. In sum, Xen. Hell. 4.1.40 demonstrates Ariobarzanes' finn hand on satrapal affairs and is complementary to the information in 5.1.38, that Ariobarzancs was solidly in control of Dascylium in 388.

Ariobarzanes' Activities as Satrap, 387-367 I have just argued that Ariobarzanes' appointment to succeed his father Phamabazus as satrap at Dascylium was a logical and intelligent administrative decision, and one in keeping with past administrative practice. Now to be considered is the question whether Ariobarzanes as satrap acted in a manner inimical to Achaemenid control. Was his career before the difficulties of the mid360's one which diminished the majesty of the Empire?

47

Be1och2 3:2 146-147.

32

ARIOBARZANES A..ND AUTOPHRADATES

As satrap, Ariobarzanes was responsible for maintaining order in his sphere and its environs and for forwarding tribute to Susa, More specifically, he should be expected to keep less stable, tribally organized peoples from damaging settled areas of value to the Empire; to assure that Greek city states within and abutting regions of Achaemenid control maintain a posture at least not actively hostile to that control; to cooperate with. other nearby Achaemenid officers in dealing with threats posed to more than a single satrapy; to contribute resources to larger military campaigns which might occur some distance from Dascylium proper (no data on this survive); and to act to develop the next generation of administrators. We know that Ariobarzanes had three sons (Dem. 23.202), the eldest of whom was Mithridates.P' Ariobarzanes and Less Stable Peoples

Ariobarzanes' monitoring of less stable peoples permits us to see him groom his eldest son and cooperate with an officer east of Dascylium. The career of Pharnabazus indicates the types of peoples Ariobarzanes would have to watch. The Bithynians posed a constant threat in the eastern portion of the satrapy (which apparently extended to include Gordiumj.f" Xenophon reports that conflicts occurred pollakis (Hell. 3.2.2), although some Bithynians could be pressed into the satrap's service (Xen. Anab. 6.4.24, 6.5.30).50 Frequent policing action was also required against the Mysians and Pisidians (Xen, Hell. 3.1.13). In these actions Pharnabazus drew upon troops from the western portion of his satrapy. Paphlagonia was another perpetual trouble spot: in the 390's the chieftain Otys was ready to work in concert with the disaffected lesser officer Spithridates and the invader Agesilaus (Xen. Hell. 4.1.1-15, Hell. Oxy. 21). Information on Ariobarzanes' activities is provided in Cornelius Nepos' biography of Datames, a lesser officer from Cilicia who later became satrap of Cappadocia, Unfortunately, Nepos, in order to glorify his subject, has assigned base motives for the activities of all other Achaemenid officers. Biases removed, some data are forthcoming for the period of the early to mid-370's.51

48 49 50 5l

Cf. Nepos Dal. 4.5, 10.1; Val. Max. 9.11 eXI. 2, Xen. Cyrop. 8.8.4. Rhathines, a subordinate of Pharnabazus, is stationed there. Hell. Oxy. 21.4, Xen, Anab. 6.5.7, Xen, Hell. 3.4.13. Cf. Xen. Anab. 7.8.25 where Pharnabazus is inaccurately described as ruler of the Bithynians, a reflection of his ability to use them to benefit Achaemenid control. On Datarnes and Nepos' biases see Weiskopf 197-220 with these corrections: p. 210--Polyaenus 7.29.2 might be best assigned to the period after Ariobarzanes' death (see below); p. 211--Sestus

ARlOBARZANES AND AUTOPHRADATES

33

Ariobarzanes provided support to Datames, then a lesser officer, in his campaign against Thuys, a Paphlagonian and Datames' own cousin (Nepos. Dat. 2.5).52 While mobilization for the Egyptian campaign was underway, Datames was called back to fight Aspis of Cataonia, who, upon defeat, was handed over to Mithridates, son of Ariobarzanes, for transport to Susa (Nepos Dat. 4.5).53 This suggests some military involvement by forces from Dascylium. When Datames took up the satrapy of Cappadocia (Nepos Dat. 5.5-6, cf. Diod. 15.91.2-7) he supposedly clam cum Ariobarzane facit amicitiam. Secrecy is an unnecessary addition by Nepos. In fact, Datames proceeds to benefit Achaemenid control in both Cappadocia and Dascylium by moving against the Pisidians (Nepos Dat. 6.1-8).54 This is the extent of our knowledge of Ariobarzanes' activities in the eastern portion of his satrapy, They display continuity with Pharnabazus' activities and in no way diminish the Empire's strength. Ariobarzanes and the Greeks

In those portions of the satrapy at Dascylium and its environs inhabited by Greeks Ariobarzanes did much to extend his own influence and that of the Empire. The bulk of the evidence for such comes in accounts of events in the 360's, thereby permitting us the examine the results, rather than the development, of Dascylium's power. 55 In sum, Ariobarzanes' influence extended into the southern Tread and westward to encompass European portions of the Hellespontine region. Pharnabazus was outdone. During the operations conducted against Ariobarzanes in 366 the satrap is found to be in secure control of Atramyttium (Polyaenus 7.26) and Assus (Xen Ages. 2.26), two places axiologoi (Strabo 13.614). Assus, in particular, was well-fortified, difficult to attack by land or sea. It was proverbial for its grain supply (Str. 13.610, 15.735).

52 53

54

55

should not be read here, rather Sesamon (Polyaenus 7.21.2). Sestus is too far away and doesn't fit readily the military requirements of the stratagem. Cf. Sekunda "Datarnes'' 46-47 prefers Sestus. Weiskopf 203, 220 n. 6. Weiskopf 204, but it was probably not Mithridates who led the tribute caravan which Aspis attacked. That the Mithridates mentioned here is Ariobarzanes' son seems reasonable since he is the only Mithridates mentioned elsewhere in the biography. Weiskopf 209-210. Judeich (194,197,198-199) used Nepos' evidence to propose that Ariobarzanes and Datarnes made a secret agreement to rebel, and that Sysinas divulged information about it 10 Artaxerxes. Sekunda "Datames'' 47 accepts the secret agreement. After Xen. Hell. 5.1.28 (installing the King's Peace) there is a gap until the mid-370's when information is forthcoming on the growth of Achaernenid power in the straits.

34

ARlOBARZANES AND AUTOPHRADA TES

By 367 Ariobarzanes also controlled both sides of the Hellespont and held the major cities of Abydus and Sestus. 5 6 Much of the information on this development comes from an unfriendly source, a speech of Demosthenes, in which it is in the orator's interest to cast aspersions upon civic honors granted foreign potentates. Demosthenes 23.141-142 offers an unfriendly account of Ariobarzanes' subordinate (hyparchos) Philiscus of Abydus.P? who, along with the satrap, was made an Athenian citizen: Philiscus used the satrap's forces to extend Philiscus' own (read: Ariobarzanes') influence over Greek cities, which he then proceeded to maltreat (read: in which he punished recalcitrant antiAchaemenid elements). Before his death Philiscus had paid for mercenaries at Perinthus, had held the whole Hellespont, and had been the greatest of all hyparchs. Later on in the speech (23.202) Demosthenes accuses unscrupulous Athenian politicians of granting to Ariobarzanes, to his three sons, to Philiscus, and to Agavus,58 another citizen of Abydus, everything they wished. Agavus should be perceived as Philiscus' subordinate. Ariobarzanes' use of both as administrators parallels his father's use of the Asiatic Greek Zenis as 'satrap' (Xen Hell. 3.1.10 ff.). It is difficult to set these events into an absolute chronology, but as a whole they point to renewed Achaemenid power in the aftermath of the King's Peace. Philiscus (with his soldiersjappears on the base of Chabrias' statue in the Athenian agora; thus by 375 B.C. Dascylium's power was such that favor was granted by the Athenian general to an Achaemenid officer holding a city vital to Athens' grain supply.P? Intervention at Perinthus cannot be securely dated. 60 The granting of Athenian citizenship, probably to all those named at Demosthenes 23.202,61 has been often placed after hostilities existed between Ariobarzanes and

56 57 58 59 60

61

Sestus under Ariobarzanes: Xen. Ages. 2.26, Nepos Tim. 1.3 (cf. Isoc. 15.108, 112 where Ariobarzanes is not mentioned). His career: Hofstetter nr. 259. His career: Hofstetter nr. 2. Burnett and Edmonson 84-85. Judeich 201 n. 1 places it during the period of difficulty after 366. An earlier date in the 370's may be preferable: payment for mercenaries, interpreted as an act detrimental to Athenian interests, suggests a period of strength for Dascylium. On Perinthos as an Athenian ally: IG IT2 43 line 84 with commentary in Cargill 34, 78, 170, 180 ff., 184. Dem. 23.141 mentions citizenship in connection only with Ariobarzanes, and, thanks to him, PhiJiscus, but Dem. 23.202 is taken, almost universally, to refer in part to citizenship granted; to this it is added that Timotheus had a hand in the arrangements. See, e.g., Judeich 201-202 n. 1,332; Burnett and Edmonson 84; Hofstetter nr. 259. Buckler Theban Hegemony 166 implies that the grants were made early on, at least before Timotheus was sent out to 'assist' Ariobarzanes (i.e., before 366). Bum CHI 376 views the citizenship grant as occurring during Philiscus' mission. Cf. Weiskopf 450

ARlOBARZANES AA'D AUTOPHRADATES

35

his colleagues to the south and has been interpreted as a reward for the satrap's gift of Sestus and Crithote to the Athenians. An earlier date for the granting of citizenship may be more reasonable--andmore deserving of Dernothenes' derision: citizenship was granted not to a tainted and weakened Ariobarzanes as the result of his service to Athens, but to a strong satrap and his subordinates in recognition of the absence of a disservice, the cutting of the Athenian grain supply. with Ariobarzanes' power in the Hellespont and his long-term Greek politicians enabled him to intervene in the affairs of European Greece and attempt to reset the balance of power in what he believed to be his own and the Empire's best interest. This attempt and its results are recounted in Xenophon Hellenica 7.1.27 ff. (less accurately in Diad. 15.70.2): a initiative carried out by Ariobarzanes' Asiatic Greek subordinate, Philiscus.v- In 368 Philiscus, perhaps accompanied by Agavus and Diomedon of journeyed to Greece to achieve a limited and intelligible goal: restore some measure of Spartan security, if not superiority, i.e. restore what was long perceived under the King's Peace as a normal situation. Sparta now was threatened on two sides because hostile Thebes was pre-eminent in central Greece and Messene was also hostile towards Sparta. Sparta, Thebes, and Theban allies met with Dascyliurn's envoys at Delphi.v' The success of the conference was dependent upon Messene returning to Spartan domination. But when diplomacy failed as a result of Theban refusals, Philiscus gathered mercenaries, left them for

62

63

64

n. 54. I still prefer an early date and suggest that if Timotheus played a role in the granting, it was as the son of Conon, employed by Pharnabazus, father of Ariobarzanes. Diodorus has cast his account in the mold of his previous narratives of nameless Achaemcnid envoys' attempts to effect koine eirene, attempts which founder in Thebes' new ascendency (cf. Diod. 15.38, 15.50.4). Hence it has been common simply to combine Diodorus' with Xenophon's narrative, with the result that Artaxerxes (the dispatcher of Philiscus in Diodorus) ordered Ariobarzanes to undertake the activities described in Xenophon. However, Diodorus' account is truncated and ignores the important activities at Susa the next year. Ryder Koine Eirene 79-80, 134-135; Buckler Th eban Hegemony 102-104 are examples of combining the accounts. Cf. Moysey note 29 on pp. 51-53. Cartledge Agesilaos 200, 310 has Dionysius of Syracuse involved (he cites no source)! R. Sealey suggests that Philiscus may have in fact made use of the term koine eirene--but only as diplomatic nicety. Diomedon: Hofstetter nr. 87. Nepos Epaminondas 4.1.makes him an emissary of Artaxerxes who tries to bribe the Theban. He may have been part of Philiscus' mission, Nepos assigning a local activity to a much higher source. Ariobarzanes would have been too sanguine in his expectation if he hoped to bribe all major politicians into compliance. Other versions are more vague: Plut. Mor. 193c, Aelian v.h. 5.5. Buckler Theban Hegemony 134 sets no date for the attempted bribing of Epaminondas, but believes Diomedon acted on the behest of Artaxerxes. The belief that Philiscus was in Greece to arrange a common peace has created the expectation that the Athenians attended the Delphi conference. Ryder Koine Eirene 79, 134. Since the issue was Messene, there was no reason for Athenian attendance. Cf. Weiskopf 362.

36

ARIOBARZANES AND AUTOPHRADATES

Sparta's use, and returned to Asia. Ariobarzanes' activity is not without parallel, for earlier both Tiribazus (Diad. 15.8) and Phamabazus (Diad. 15.29, 15.43.6) has sent their own envoys into Greece on precise and particular missions. It was unique in that the satrap was not involved in military action at the time. But in consideration of Ariobarzanes' great power in the Hellespont and long contact with the Spartans (Xen, Hell. 5.1.28) it should not be surprising that he would act to benefit a known quantity, Sparta, and weaken an unknown quantity, Thebes, and so provide further opportunities for both these Greek cities to continue to wear each other out-von Greek territory, not Achaernenid. Had Philiscus been successful, even greater influence and honor would have accrued for the satrap. If Thebes' supremacy proved an and unfavorable quantity for Ariobarzanes, it did not, in the following year, at Susa appear so unfavorable to Artaxerxes. The King refined his view of the far west to countenance the Theban hegemony, not the vanished Spartan, in Greece. In 367 Greek envoys appeared at Susa, not summoned by Artaxerxes, but in reaction to Theban diplomacy.vUsing as prophasis the appearance of the Spartan Euthycles (Xen. Hell. 7.1.33) on an unspecified mission in Susa, Thebes dispatched Pelopidas, accompanied by Antiochus of Arcadia and Archidamus of Elis. In reaction, Athens sent off Timagoras and Leon, men unable to work together. Surprisingly we hear nothing of Euthycles' actions on his city's behalf. Surrounded by the emissaries of Thebes' allies, Pelopidas measured out the past store of good will laid up in the King's House by the now powerful Thebes (Xen. Hell. 7.1.33-35). Artaxerxes then decided to approve the new Theban hegemony and asked Pelopidas what he wished under royal seal. The answer was for Messene to be autonomous from Sparta, and for Athens to draw up its ships (7.1.36).66 Artaxerxes placed Athens and Sparta, those with much past ill-will, on the defensive. Sparta and her allies

65 66

An excellent modem treatment of events in Susa is provided by Buckler Theban Hegemony 151-157 (his notes discuss previous studies). "Drawing up ships" was a general command and one open to interpretation (Xen. Hell. 7.1.37). I do not believe that Leon's response was evidence of Ariobarzanes' rebellion (so Judeich 199 n. 1) or that the command had serious implications for Amphipolis (so Judeich 199 and 199 n, 2). The demand that Athens draw up its ships should be paired with the demand that Messene not be under Spartan domination: both would hamper the revitalization of a power which would oppose Thebes. As for the Theban navy, Buckler Theban Hegemony 160-161 and 308 n.l9 provides a good discussion, but one must stress the fact that there exists no direct evidence :or Achaernenid funding of a naval construction program (307 n, 9). Buckler himself states that Persia must have funded the navy because of its high cost: I do not rule out the possibility that Achaernenid funds were given in some form to the Thebans, but when Diod. 16.40.1-2 provides the first direct evidence for such funds, there is no indication that this is a continuation of earlier policy.

ARlOBARZANES AND AUTOPHRADATES

37

were encircled by Thebes and those powers favorably disposed to Thebes. There still remained the threat of direct Achaemenid military intervention in Greece: Artaxerxes continued to be the arbiter of future events. Now Ariobarzanes was placed in a difficult position. The policy he espoused, Spartan power or its restoration, was not the policy approved at Susa. The satrap had expended time and money to work against a political situation which at Susa was deemed to be in the Empire's interest. Ariobarzanes had prepared nothing for himself, but rather something for his enemies. For twenty years Ariobarzanes, having received the satrapy of Dascylium as Pharnabazus' successor, had built upon his father's work. He cooperated with other officers to strengthen his satrapy's interior; he extended his influence westward and attempted to control the course of events within Greece itself. It remains to consider how these activities would be interpreted as ones which diminished the security of the Achaemenid Empire. Declaring Ariobarzanes Rebellious

Between 367 and 366 a substantial change had occurred. Ariobarzanes' earlier activities in 368 were now seen as having damaged the Empire and now his satrapy was under attack by Autophradates and Mausolus. As late as the appearance of the Greek envoys at Susa in 367 Ariobarzanes had been viewed as loyal. Xenophon reports too much about the embassies and their aftermath (Xen. Hell. 7.1.38-40) to have concealed a decision so disastrous for Sparta, i.e. the declaration that Ariobarzanes was a rebel. Explaining Artaxerxes' change in perception of Ariobarzanes is difficult because there is no evidence detailing how it occurred. But past events in Anatolia can help in proposing a reasonable explanation, one keeping with Achaemenid administrative practice and the manner in which one became regarded as rebellious plus the rivalry which existed at times between satraps in adjoining sectors. The line separating 'loyal' from 'rebel' was thin and hazy; rebellion was a matter of perception, of how local information presented by local sources was perceived and interpreted at Susa. The possibility of misrepresentation and misinterpretation always existed. Someone of high enough status could mislead the king and his advisors. The problem is to determine what activities of Ariobarzanes could be misrepresented at Susa as hostile to the crown and who would be of high enough status to misrepresent them successfully. Solving the second part of the problem will help resolve the first.

38

ARlOBARZANES AND AUTOPHRADATES

There are few reasonable candidates in the far west who might have convinced Artaxerxes that Ariobarzanes was rebellious. Datames, whose satrapy bordered Dascylium on the east, had himself been regarded as a rebel in the early 360's (Nepos Dat. 7 and is unlikely to have been able to effect a policy hostile towards one with whom he had cooperated in the past. Mausolus, who was to share in the attack on Ariobarzanes, was too distant: Lycia and the Aegean were his concerns. Mithridates is said to have betrayed his father, Ariobarzanes (Xen. Cyrop. 8.8.4, Arist. Pol. 5.1312a), but this betrayal is better suited to the time when Ariobarzanes was already in trouble and Mithridates sought some protection for himself. It is that Artaxerxes, who had committed resources only a few years before to a fruitless campaign against Datames on the word of Datames' own son, would do something similar again on the word of Ariobarzanes' son. The man most able to effect a hostile policy would be Autophradates of Lydia. Of enough status as holder of the flagship satrapy on the Anatolian coast, Autophradates would have the most to gain by damaging Ariobarzanes and would be most able to present the satrap's activities in a hostile light. Effecting the decision to declare Ariobarzanes rebellious fits securely into the pattern of rivalry between Lydia and Dascylium which existed from the fifth century B.C. onwards. An examination of Autophradates' career will help to illuminate the reason for his resentment. Autophradates' Career Ariobarzanes' career was one of a son of a noble family, part of the Achaemenid clan, taking up an ancestral satrapy; Autophradates' appears to be one of a lesser officer, perhaps an estate owner, serving the crown, and eventually winning promotion to highest officer. There is no information at all on Autophradates' family. His first appearance is in the 390's, as co-commander with Hecatomnus in the campaign against Euagoras of Salamis (Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 103). Although Theopompus labels him satrap of Lydia Autophradates was not at the top of the administrative structure of Lydia. The post of satrap was then held by Struthas.v? There are two possible explanations for Autophradates' presence in the far west. He may have been sent down by Artaxerxes to work with the local man already gathering troops, the satrap of

67

On this problem see Weiskopf 88-93, 133-134 n. 10-15. In sum, the epitome of Theopompus is wrong; Struthas' activities, described in Xenophon and SlG 3 134a, are best explained by his being highest officer for Sparda, and are paralleled by the careers of other satraps at Sparda,

ARIOBARZANES AND AUTOPHRADATES

39

Carla, Hecatornnus. It was common for the high command of Achaemenid expeditions to consist of a mix of local men and 'outsiders', who seem to represent the royal interest more directly (e.g. Isocrates 4.140: Abrocomas, satrap of Syria, a local man, joined by Tithraustes, the chiliarch, and Phamabazus in a campaign against the rebellious Egyptians in the 380's). The second possibility is that Autophradates was already in the far west as a lesser officer, a local noble who owned estates and exercised influence over some of the regions from which Hecatomnus was drawing troops. The presence of such local noble and/or lesser officers in or ncar Caria is suggested by the fact that Tissaphernes owned property in Caria (Xen, Hell. 3.2.12) and by the participation of an Artaphernes in the campaigning at Caunus in 397 B.C. (Diod. 14.79.5). Autophradates would have received orders to take a leading role in operations. Following the campaign he remained in Anatolia, The second appearance of Autophradates is in Nepos Datames 2.1 when he and Datames wage war against eos qui defecerani. Unfortunately, no specifics about the campaign are provided beyond the statement that Autophradates was on campaign iusso regis. There is no compelling reason to believe that Autophradates was now satrap or that the campaign took place any distance from Cilicia, Datames' sector at that time. Datames had only just taken up his post in Cilicia and this campaign is a regional one involving local nobility as the commanders. The recalcitrants would be somewhere in southwest Anatolia. 68 Evidence from Lycia (TAM 1 46,61) also suggests that Autophradatcs was closely tied to the southwest of Anatolia, When satrap he was able to exercise some influence in Lycia and over local nobility there. This influence can be better explained if he had already spent part of his career close to that sector. Thus, before his appointment as satrap of Lydia, Autophradates may be perceived as an officer who owned estates and was associated with the regions of Caria, Lycia, and Cilicia Autophradates' appointment as satrap probably occurred sometime after the conclusion of the unsuccessful Achaernenid attack on rebellious Egypt in 374. It would have been in Artaxerxes' interest to keep Tiribazus, Autophradates' predecessor, at Sardis during the time of Phamabazus' Egyptian campaign. Since

68

The campaign took place in the late 380's. Nepos indicates that Datames succeeded his father Camisares after that man's death in a campaign against the Cadusians (Dat. 2.1). This is the one which took place in the late 380's and is reported in Diod. 15.8.5, 10.1. After succeeding Camisares, Datames works with Autophradates, On attempts to identify the rebels see Weiskopf 136 n. 20 against Judeich 190-191 and Beloch 2 3:2136. For a different chronology: Sekunda "Datames" 3638.

4D

ARIOBARZANES AND AUTOPHRADATES

forces were being drawn from Anatolia for use in the campaign, there would be a need for skilled personnel to counteract any deleterious effects which might result from the removal of military forces from one sector for use some distance away. Thereafter, Tiribazus was at court, probably as a royal advisor, and fell somewhat out of favor.P? Why he had been replaced as satrap at this juncture is not known. Autophradates, the new satrap of Lydia, was familiar to and with the Achaemenid personnel of other Anatolian satrapies, Caria (now under Hecatornnus' son, Mausolus) and Cilicia/Cappadocia (under Datames). Knowledge of his activities as satrap before 367 is limited. Artaxerxes, c. 370 B.C., acting on evidence presented by Sysinas, son of Datames, declared the satrap of Cappadocia a rebel and entrusted the conduct of operations to Autophradates (Nepos Dat. 7.1 2). He was able to draw forces from Lydia and its environs (8.2), and appears to have enjoyed the support of Carian and Phrygian personnel as he moved south towards the Cilician Gates (7.2, cf. 8.6). There were no decisive victories for Autophradates, resources were being wasted, and a cease-fire came about by 368.7° One of the satrap's subordinates appears to have enjoyed sOJ!le success in extending Achaernenid influence westward. By 366 Tigranes, son-in-law of the one-time satrap Struthas, had had Achaernenidfunded troops stationed on Sames under the command of Cyprothemis."! But for Autophradates there was no great deed to match Ariobarzanes' mastery of the Hellespont and his ability to attempt manipulating the balance of power in Hellas, As delineated earlier, rivalry and resentment among Achamenid officers was an ever-present danger, and had marred both Lydia and Dascylium at the beginning of the fourth century. Variance in personal status, particularly if magnified in the mind of one officer, does much to help explain the undercurrent of hostility between neighboring officers. Autophradates held the larger, more urbanized and wealthier Sparda,n yet he was a man junior to Ariobarzanes, who held the smaller Dascylium, but had done so since 388 and as a member of a longestablished family. However, it was the deeds, not merely the prestige, of Ariobarzancs which would be most likely to exacerbate the in-feeling of Au tophradates, 69 70

71 72

Cf. Plut. Arlax. 24 and 26. On the chronology of events see Weiskopf 134-135 n. 17 (Tiribazus on a Cadusian campaign which follows the failed attack on Egypt by Pharnabazus). Nepos Dal. 7.2-8.6, Frontinus SImI. 2.7.9, Polyaenus 7.21.6. See Weiskopf 215-217 (two campaigning seasons: 369 and 368. the latter including peace overtures). Sekunda "Datarncs" 49-50, 52 proposes 367 for the campaign. Dem. 15.9. On Tigranes: Xen. Hell. 4.8.21, Judeich 271 n. l, 271. On Cyprothemis: Hofstetter nr.187. Lewis Sparta and Persia 52-53.

ARIOBARZANES M'D AUTOPHRADATIS

41

The Anger ofAutophradates A major cause for tension between two satraps was likely to be the amount of territory over which they exercised control and exerted influence. Because satrapal spheres of influence intersected, areas of intersection, or liminal areas, may become the object of tension and dispute among highest officers, and, to an extent, their subordinates. Ariobarzanes was in control of Atrarnyttium (polyaenus 7.26) and Assus (Xen, Ages. 2.26), portions of the southern Tread which Autophradates might claim as being within his own sphere. The liminal nature of the Troad, its cities, and even personnel is not difficult to establish. It could be claimed either as a southward extension of Dascylium's sphere or as a northern extension of Sparda's.j-' The ancient sources are in disagreement over the region's boundaries.H The city of Atramyttium was tied to the Lydian kings of Sardis in myth and tradition; the city was supposedly a Lydian foundation. Alyattes had appointed his son, Croesus, to rule the plain of Atramyttium and Thebe-sa precedent for satrapal expectations.F' Assus could be placed in the Troad or in Aeolis,76 a sector once held by Pharnabazus (Xen, Hell. 3.1.10, 3.2.13). Thucydides (5.1, 8.108.4) narrates operations involving Pharnaces, Tissaphernes, and Arsaces, a local noble who is active at Antandrus and Atramyttium, Pharnaces of Dascylium introduced exiled Delians into Atramyttium in 422, but Arsaces felt no need to display a similar friendship. In 411, Arsaces was subordinate to the more influential Tissaphernes and acted in accordance with his wishes at Anatandrus. Within a few years it is Pharnabazus, Pharnaces' son and successor as satrap, who seems preeminent at Antandrus and in the Troad (Xen, Hell. 1.1.24-25). In the 350's this region was again subject to operations carried out by personnel from both Sparda and Dascylium, Assus and the more distant Atameus were held by the boss Eubolus, who passed these holdings on to his subordinate, Hermeias. The two men were objects of campaigns by Autophradates and then Mentor.F

73 74 75 76

77

Cf. Lewis Sparta and Persia 55, 80-81 n. 198; superior to Gomme HeT V:VIII 365 and Meyer Grenzen 2-3. Cook Troad 1. He makes Antandrus the southern limit of the Tread, Str. 13.613, Steph. Byz. sv, Adramyteion. Nicolaus of Damascus FGrH 90 fr. 65. The sectors in which Atramyttium, Assus, and Antandrus are located are assigned a variety of names. In Xen. Anab. 7.8.7 Antandrus seems to be outside Mysia, but Atramyttium seems part of Mysia, coming after the Mysian plain. Str. 13.613 calls the region around Atramyttium Mysia, 13.581 places it and Assus in the Troad, 15.735 places Assus in Aeolis. For Eubolus' holdings see Str, 13.610 (he is not referred to by name) and Aristotle Pol. 2.1267a (also reporting the attack by Autophradates),

42

ARlOBARZAN'ES AND AUTOPHRADATES

Although the southern Troad was not a region of no account, its possession by Ariobarzanes-va source of annoyance to alone be little cause to regard him as acting against Achaemenid interests. Ariobarzanes' deeds outside Asia would serve as the more convincing basis for Dascylium's flexing of diplomatic muscle in 368 in the form of Philiscus' mission must have been particularly galling to Autophradates, who had little to show for his efforts against Datames, Ariobarzanes may have chosen that year in particular as a means of upstaging his southern colleague. Control over both sides of the Hellespont, Athenian citizenship, the supplying of mercenaries to Sparta could all be misrepresented to Artaxerxes as Ariobarzanes' building a power base in Europe for future nefarious purposes. At a time when Artaxerxes was already suspicious of one highest officer, Datames, Autophradates could successfully conjure up before the Great King the ghost of his younger Cyrus. 78 Cyrus, ostensibly in the service of the Empire, had funds at his disposal to build up a series of mercenary units (Xen. Anab. 1.1.6-1 These he used to rob Tissaphernes of cities under his and to to render portions of mainland Greece favorably disposed towards him. Ariobarzanes' exploits in the Hellespont-carried out by his subordinate Philiscus-vwere reminiscent of those of Spartan Clearchus, a mercenary of Cyrus who benefitted the Hellespontine Greeks with an Achaemenid-funded army raised just across from Abydus. It had become apparent to Artaxerxes that the Empire's true friend on the Greek mainland was Thebes. But Ariobarzanes seemed to have overstepped his authority and, in direct opposition to what he should have seen as Susa's interest, had supported Sparta with money and men. Therefore, the satrap at Dascylium was a traitor and best stopped early in his home province. Autophradatcs would restore the proper situation: Sparda preeminent on the coast, its influence-sin the Empire's interest-preeminent beyond the western limit of direct Achaernenid control. In order to have effected a hostile policy against Ariobarzanes after the Greek embassies of 367 and to have troops mobilized against Dascylium in time for the 366 campaigning season, Autophradates must have acted swiftly and have pursued a plan of action he had already decided upon. There are two possibilities: less likely, Autophradates may have acted presenting Artaxerxes with a fait accompli. That as soon as he was aware that the Great King no longer viewed the balance of power in Greece as did Ariobarzanes,

78

Cf. Buckler Theban Hegemony 154, but he accepts Judeich's view of collusion between Datames and Ariobarzanes, and the latter's decision to rebel (102-104, 296-297 n, 45-48).

ARIOBARZANES AND AUTOPHRADATES

43

Autophradates, enlisting the assistance of Mausolus, mobilized forces still under his command, moved them up to the outskirts of Dascylium province, and then notified Artaxerxes, perhaps using the Achaernenid embassy returning from Greece (cf. Xen. Hell. 7.1.39). Emissaries from Autophradates may have also been at Susa in connection with the suspended campaign against Datames. Alternatively, and more likely, Autophradates dispatched envoys to present the case against Ariobarzanes and to urge immediate action. Persuasive voices and swift movement would have permitted Autophradates to begin mobilization by the end of the year 367. A campaign against the 'rebel' Ariobarzanes was decreed on the basis of Autophradates' misinformation. It should not be assumed that the military operation's initial purpose was the absolute destruction of Ariobarzanes, but rather his punishment and humiliation, i.e. the reduction of his excessive strength and the offering to him of a chance to be coopted. The lingering of Autophradates' and Mausolus' forces at the periphery of Dascylium's sphere support this hypothesis. Perhaps Ariobarzanes attempted to answer the charges, but was unsuccessful. His father, who might have set matters right, was probably dead. Why Artaxerxes proved amenable to Autophradates' arguments may be indicated in Plutarch's account of the domestic violence which marred Artaxerxes' final years (Artax. 26 ff.); it is partially couched in terms of the King's fear of a new Cyrus.I? For those dissatisfied with the preceding reconstruction of events I conclude this section with a suggestion even more speculative, that there existed some tie of friendship or kinship between the families of Autophradates and Tissaphernes. Important men do not disappear without effect: In 395 Tissaphernes, long-time satrap of Lydia, had been lured from his satrapy by Tithraustes, the head of Artaxerxes' administration, and executed. Tissaphernes had had a brother (Xen, Anab. 2.5.35), a wife who was the daughter of Artaxerxes (Diod. 14.26.4, cf. Suda sv. kedos), property in Sparda and Caria (Xen, Hell. 3.2.12, Hell. Oxy. 19.3). His family, his network of friendships, the loyalty of lesser officers could

79

The preceding paragraphs replace Weiskopf 368-370. Sekunda "Datames" 51 notes Pharnabazus' preeminence in the west and suggests both Datames and Ariobarzanes would be in precarious positions at Pharnabazusdeath.

44

ARIOBARZANES AND AUTOPHRADATES

have not evaporated, changed immediately. When Artaxerxes heard the words of Autophradates conjuring up the ghost of Cyrus, he heard words sharpened by Autophradates' favorable memory of Tissaphernes, rival of Ariobarzanes' father. 80

80

On Tissaphemes' death see Westlake Historia 30 (1981) 257-279. I call particular attention to 270275 which discusses the use of new local ittformation, some presented by Pharnabazus, in causing Artaxerxes to order Tissaphemes' execution. There is a touch of Tissaphernes' penurious behavior in Autophradates: Nepos Dot. 2.5 and Aristotle Pol. 2.l267a.

IV. THE SATRAPY OF DASCYLillM, 366-360 B.C. When Artaxerxes permitted Autophradates to lead forces against a potential Cyrus, he set in motion a series of events preserved in the sources only in unfortunate anecdotal form: Autophradates and Mausolus make war on Ariobarzanes by land and sea. There is a loss of Achaemenid influence in the Hellespont and foreign troops operate against Achaernenid positions there, in the Black Sea, and the Aegean. The satrapal family in Dascylium shatters: Mithridates betrays his father, who is then killed. Artabazus, the new satrap, clashes with both Datames and Autophradates. The former is murdered by Mithridates, The problem is to account for these activities so as to move logically from the point where Ariobarzanes is under attack to the point where Artabazus is in control of Dascylium, Artaxerxes having dispensed with the elder house descended from Pharnabazus. "Moving logically", however, does not signify that each of the Achaemenid officers involved in the troubles from 366 to 360 was endowed with the ability consistently to avoid making poor decisions. Operations Against Ariobarzanes (366-365)

Polyaenus 7.26 describes how Ariobarzanes, in possession of Atramyttium and Pteleous, a small offshore island, sought to reprovision. Autophradates, apparently acting alone, deployed land and sea forces to place his opponent under siege at the former site. Ariobarzanes split the hostile force by ordering his phrourarch on the island to surrender and was so able to gain additional men and supplies. The result of Autophradates' siege is not known. A second passage, Xenophon Agesilaus 2.26-27, praises Agesilaus as being able to accomplish the deeds of a great general while acting in a diplomatic capacity. Ariobarzanes held both Sestus and Abydus, At the latter site he was under siege by Autophradates and Mausolus (with 100 ships total), at the former by Mausolus and Cotys, a Thracian chieftain. All three withdraw as a result of the Spartan's presence--so Xenophon claims. A number of other passages refer to the activities of the Athenian general Timotheus: Demosthenes 15.9 refers to his operations at Samos, although the general had been dispatched to assist Ariobarzanes (cf. Iso, 14.111, Nepos Tim. 1.2, Polyaenus 3.10.9). Timotheus was then active in the

46

DASCYLIUM

Hellespont (Nepos Tim. 1.3, Iso. 14.112) and gained Sestus and Crithote. This lacunose record can be put together to yield a reconstruction of Autophradates' war against Ariobarzanes, a war which had as its result the diminishing of Achaemenid power in the Hellespont and the Aegean and the ultimate collapse of Ariobarzanes' hold on Dascylium. I make the assumptions here that joint satrapal action, more complex, will succeed individual action, and that forces hostile to Achaemenid control will take advantage of the depletion of Achaemenid forces in particular areas. During the first campaigning season against Ariobarzanes, Autophradates deployed land and naval forces in the southern Troad (366 B.C.). He besieged the city of Atramyttium where Ariobarzanes and his forces were located. The island of Pteleous was surrendered to Autophradates, thereby permitting Ariobarzanes to reprovision using his own naval forces (which could slip through the smaller number of ships then besieging Atramyttium). The armies involved were drawn from Sparda and Dascylium: I propose the land forces were ethnically mixed and composed in part of troops drawn from each satrapy's estate owners. Naval forces were most likely supplied by coastal Greek city states. It would appear that Mausolus was still in the process of mobilizing his navy and bringing them up the coast from Caria. It is not known whether Autophradates' troops operated anywhere else in Dascylium. Any concentration of forces northward would create problems farther south, particularly in the outward extensions of Autophradates' sphere. It is in this context that the activities of Timotheus should be placed.s! Demosthenes 15.9 reports that the Athenians dispatched the general to assist Ariobarzanes, but on the condition that the King's Peace not be violated. 82 Timotheus observed that Ariobarzanes was in open rebellion, that Samos was occupied by Achaemenid forces from Lydia (installed by the lesser officer Tigranes), and decided not to assist the satrap, but rather to 'free' the island. Isocrates 14.111 refers to the 81

82

An excellent summary of the operation at Samos is given in Cargill 148-149, 149 n. 8, 168, and GRBS 24 (1983) 321-332. Cf. Judeich 200-201 n. 1,201 n. 1 for date of operations; on 271, 271 n. 2 he argues for an earlier attack in 369/8 by the Athenian Iphicrates, based on Po1yaenus 3.9.36. In the anecdote Iphicrates seems interested only in booty and acts without reference to Athenian authorities. The specific sailing orders are cited only in Dernosthenes (ef. Isoc, 15.111-112, Nepos Tim. 1.1-3-interested in displaying Timotheus as a decisive military man). Demosthenes may have cited the orders incorrectly so as to prove a point in his speech: He sought to argue that Athens was safe in interfering in territory close to the Achaemcnid Empire, i.e., off-shore islands. In particular, he wished to persuade Athens to assist those Rhodians exiled under the influence exercised by Artemisia of Caria. Timotheus at Samos was supposed to represent a successful precedent, sailing out under a policy that was at once circumspect and decisive.

DASCYLIUM

47

siege of as ten l 8.18.9 to Samians exiled as a result of the 83 Timotheus was as a liberator by only some on the island. The orders as cited by Dernosthenes raise a problem: under what could assistance be offered to Ariobarzanes'<" By the start of 366 it must have been obvious that a campaign was to be directed against the because he was a 'rebel' and that assistance to him would have placed Athens in direct conflict with the Great King. Timotheus would have to refrain from overt to Autophradates and somehow not appear in battle as the aggressor-orders more than those once given Athenians at Corcyra. But Timotheus' deeds indicate that Athenian policy, although attempting to be was Direct control could be extended over Samos while Achaemenid forces fought each other-one among the unfortunate results decision to warfare between satraps. In undertaking the against Ariobarzanes, Autophradates would again have to draw the resources of his satrapy, resources recently squandered in the warfare against Datames. There is one piece of data which 1 believe sheds internal to the latest mobilization. light on the satrap's attempt to a statue of Zeus Baradates (Ahura Mazda in In 367/6, year 39 of Artaxerxes his guise as one who established law) was erected at Sardis and instructions were issued concerning the conduct of his worship through the agency of the lesser officer in charge of Sardis, Droaphernes.P This emphasis on the establishment of law the of to the Achaernenid family could serve to remind the on campaign served the interests of inhabitants of Lydia that

83 84

85

Timotheus' chief difficulty in the siege seems to have been one of supply shortages: Isocrates 15.111-112, Polyaenus 3.10.9-10, Pseudo-Aristotle Gee. 2.1350b. Some have attempted to resolve the issue of Timotheus' orders versus his actions by relying on a more narrow interpretation of the King's Peace, that Achaernenid forces had violated the 'autonomy' clause and Timotheus was justified in seizing Samos. Buckler Theban Hegemony 166, Judeich 200, Hofsteucr p. 13, Cargill 171 (d. 32), Cargill GRRS 24 (1983) 330, Hornblower 198. Buckler (166168) does recognize and stresses the importance of self-interest in the operations carried out by Greek forces during the war against Ariobarzanes, I stress that Achaemenid forces after 387 possessed superior power and would be the ones defining 'autonomy'. Hofstetterpp. 186-187 (under nr, 329) places the decision to send Timothcus before the satrap was declared a rebel, thus making him a sort of mercenary in Achaernenid service. Ryder Kaine Eirene 82 proposed a similar solution. Judeich 199-200 places Athens in something of a foolish position. Timotheus is sent against Achaemenidheld territory because of Athens' anger over the Great King's pro- Theban stance. But Athens, while acting against the Great King, is made to send envoys to Susa to request him to recognize their claim to Amphipclis-vand the aggressor's envoys meet with success. Buckler Theban Hegemony 251-255 makes out a good case that Athens never sent envoys to Susa over Arnphipolis. The inscription was published by Robert eRAl (1975) 306-330. Below, I will offer reasons why the inscription does not present information on Autophradates' removal from office.

48

DASCYLIUM

Ahura-Mazda, whereas Ariobarzanes-va deceiver-vserved the interests of Ahriman. In the following campaigning season, 365, while Timotheus continued the siege of Samos, Autophradates' operations expanded to include forces from both Sparda and Caria, with fighting taking place in the Troad and in the Hellespont (Xen. Ages. 2.26).86 Mausolus had brought up a fleet of 100 ships, a portion of which was detached and sent into the Hellespont. Autophradates on land and Mausolus at sea besieged Ariobarzanes at Assus. The portion of the fleet which sailed northward moved against Sestus, perhaps with the ultimate intention of permitting operations closer to the satrapal capital of Dascylium. While under siege by sea, Sestus was attacked by the Thracian Cotys. It is in this set of circumstances that Agesilaus effected the withdrawal all forces hostile to Ariobarzanes. The Spartan, although described by Xenophon as the satrap's symmachos, was present without troops and probably in his capacity as xenos (cf. Xen, Hell. 5.1.28 on Antalcidas) grateful for Ariobarzanes' recent efforts on Sparta's behalf. 87 A truce of some sort, negotiated at Assus by Agesilaus in Ariobarzanes' service, is not unlikely: Autophradates had made a truce earlier 86

87

Xenophon's purpose in relating information about operations is to prove his statement that Agesilaus could perform the deeds of a great general even while a diplomat. Xenophon then offers three examples: Autophradates, while besieging Assus, runs; Cotys breaks off his siege of Sestos; Mausolus sails home from both places. 'This arrangement of events by personality helps obscure the nature of Achaemenid operations and the response of an outside third party (Cotys) to them. That this type of narration is not uncommon in the Ag esilaus may be demonstrated by a brief look at Agesilaus' operations in the 390's. The Hellenica narrates events in their proper order (setbacks concealed, see Bruce 131-149), the Agesilaus discusses events out of order, at times depriving them of their historical context. In general outline, we find the following activities in Agesilaus' campaigns, in this order: the battle of Sardis, the execution of Tissaphernes, Agesilaus' move into Mysia, his ope-ations with Spithridates, his meeting Pharnabazus. The narrative of the campaign in the Agesilaus is brought to a halt at the death of Tissaphernes (1.35). A discourse follows concerning barbarian sadness at this event and the general praise for Agesilaus, Contact with Tithraustes is not mentioned until 4.6, but there is no word about a truce or contemporary military events. We have only an anecdote without context in which a Persian tries to bribe a Greek and the latter issues a noble reply (cf. Plut. Ages. 10.4-5). The Spartan's activities in Dascylium are narrated out of context as anecdotes illustrating his character (3.3-5: contact with Spithridates and Otys; 5.4-5: the story of Megabates), That Agesilaus is a symmachos is made by Xenophon the reason for Autophradates' fright. Buckler Theban Hegemony 104, 297 n, 28 assumes a formal alliance between Sparta and the rebel, struck between 369 and 366 (cf. Cartledge Agesilaos 200-201,325). This I doubt, unless Sparta wished to place itself in a most dangerous position-- perhaps with Susa's support of Thebes Sparta believed the situation could get no worse. Sources mention only the Spartan need for money: Nepos Tim. 1.3, Ages. 7.2 (ef. Pluto Artax. 22.6-7; note that Xen, Ages. 2.27 ff. goes on to talk about Agesilaus' acquisition of funds). Cf. Judeich 202, 202 n. 1-2 on possible troops. Hirsch (96,98, 109-110) suggests that Xenophon, desiring to defend Agesilaus on charges of philobarbarism, concealed that the Spartan was Ariobarzanes' mercenary commander. Walser 80-81 expresses doubt as to Agesilaus' exact status.

DASCYUUM

49

when his own campaign against Datames faltered (Nepos Dat. 8.5-6).88 Assus would not have proven easy to take (fortifications: Str. 13.610; food supply: Str, 15.735). Diplomacy and intelligence may account for the fleet's withdrawal from Sestus: this site was included in the Assus truce; it might prove a better use of resources to allow Cotys the job of Ariobarzanes' northward position. The Thracian accomplished nothing and departed, the credit going to Agesilausf" More significantly, 365 was marked by a weakening of the outward extensions of Achaemenid control. Samos had fallen to Timotheus and anti-Achaemenid forces were bolstered by the arrival of Athenian settlers and the expulsion of disfavored citizens (Cicero de nat. deo. 1.72, Diod. 18.18.9). No action was taken to regain the island, although in the 330's it was used as an Achaernenid naval base (Arr. Anab. 1.19.8).90 The intervention at Sestus by Cotys, a chieftain not under Achaemenid control, boded ill for the Empire's continued control over both sides of the straits. The two seasons of warfare must have created serious problems within Dascylium as well, where most of the lesser officers had grown up in the service of Phamabazus and his family. Now they were forced to choose between King and satrap, to leave their lands open to attack not only by perennially unstable peoples, but by Achaemenid forces as wen. Forces from Sparda and Caria had gotten no further than the frontiers of Dascylium. How much longer would fighting continue until some definitive result? It was as though Autophradates, Mausolus, and Ariobarzanes had embarked upon the type of useless battling that Autophradates and Datames had at an earlier time broken off. Artaxerxes believed that decisive action against Ariobarzanes would prevent the rise of a new Cyrus. Instead, warfare, indecisive it seems, resulted in instability in Caria and Lydia, and an apparent collapse of order within Dascylium. In the first two provinces difficulties can be attributed to the removal of military personnel for use against Ariobarzanes, Those dissatisfied with Achaemenid control, whether Greek cities or tribal peoples, would now face less serious opposition and their actions grow bolder. Both Autophradates and Mausolus would spend part of the rest of the 360's bringing recalcitrants to order. 88 89 90

So implied by Olmstead 413. He would also assign Polyaenus 2.1.16 and 2.1.36 to the 360's (413 n. 38), but a context in the 390's is more reasonable. See Judeich 58, 70. Cotys here exploits Achaemenid difficulties and is allied to no one. See Kallet 246-247. In the years immediately after 365 Autophradates (and Mausolus) would be tied up with internal problems, results of mobilizations. Autophradates' war with Orontes would preclude moves to extend Sparda's sphere. Thereafter, it is quite possible that Samos posed no threat to Achacmenid control elsewhere and warranted no hostile move by the then-powerful Hecatornnid fleet. Cf. Bosworth Arrian 140-141, Heisserer 192.

50

DASCYUUM

In particular, Autophradates faced a rebellion by one of his lesser officers, Orontes, a rebellion viewed with favor by forces in Egypt hostile to the Empire. Human and economic resources from Caria and Lydia would continue to be consumed. The cost to Dascylium was even more burdensome. After 365 Philiscus was murdered (Dem, 23.141-142), Achaemenid control over the straits disappeared and Greek forces operated dose to Dascylium (Diod, 15.81. 6, Nepos Tim. 1.3). The satrapal house was in an uproar. There was fighting between Ariobarzanes and Mithridates, his eldest son (e.g. Val. Max. 9.11 ext. 2), which resulted in the son betraying his father (Xen, Cyrop. 8.8.4), who was then executed c. 363 or 362 at Susa (Harpocration sv. Ariobarzanesi. Adding to the confusion was the appearance in the west of Artabazus, a younger son of Pharnabazus and younger halfbrother of Ariobarzanes, He would fight Datames (Diod, 15.91.2-6) and control Dascylium by the end of the 360's (cf. Dem. 23.154 ff.), Mithridates fled into the interior away from Artabazus, operated there on his own behalf, murdered Datames (Nepos Dat. 10-11), and then disappeared. Artabazus would never win the complete loyalty of his satrapy. The Collapse ofAriobarzanes' Administration Tracing the collapse of Ariobarzanes and his eventual replacement by Artabazus requires the use of most recalcitrant evidence, anecdotal evidence whose chief purpose is to list or praise the deeds of Greek generals, or comment on barbarian perfidy. There are no data as to whether a force from Lydia and Caria penetrated the interior of the satrapy of Dascylium. Autophradates and Mausolus appear to be out of the picture after 365--Artaxerxes may have been debating a new course of action. Although Harpocration refers to a force sent by Artaxerxes effecting the arrest of Ariobarzanes, a good deal of credit for the satrap's fall should be assigned to internal forces: loss of support within and control over city-states, increased instability of tribal peoples, loss of Mithridates' loyalty, and division in the ranks of Achaemenid personnel (further exacerbated by the arrival of Artabazus). The fighting between Achaemenid officers served to weaken Achaemenid control within Dascylium. The use of satrapal forces deployed from the interior to the Troad coast would deplete resources available to police less stable areas and protect valued ones. A mobilization and then demobilization of seemingly compliant tribesmen and mercenaries (Greeks or otherwise) would leave groups of potential troublemakers at large within the one-time theater of battle.

DASCYLIUM

51

Irrespective of his stance towards Susa, Ariobarzanes, after two campaigning seasons, would need to undertake a restabilization of his province. Lesser officers would need to do the same (cf. Xen. Anab. 7.8 for an example of earlier trouble following the campaign against Cyrus). Surviving sources do not outline policing actions, but given past events in Achaemenid Anatolia such would be needed. Among less stable peoples exploiting difficulty should be counted the Paphlagonians (who had shown themselves prone to link up with the disgruntled, cf. Xen. Hell. 4.1.1-15, Hell. Oxy. 21, Nepos Dat. 2.5), the Bithynians (d. Xen. Hell. 3.2.2), and the Mysians (cf, Xen. Hell. 3.1.13). I do not suggest a completely uniform breakdown in stability within the satrapy, but rather that a reconstruction of events should include efforts by local Achaemenid officers to restore peace on a local level. Survival, not rebelliousness versus loyalty towards Artaxerxes, or even Ariobarzanes would at times be of highest importance. That such policing actions were needed is suggested by the activities of Mithridates at Heraclea, Mithridates had among his forces one Clearchus, who had been exiled from Heraclea (Suda sv. Clearchusi and would eventually become tyrant of his home city. Because of western interest in Clearchus and Heraclea Mithridates' activities at Heraclea are attested.but not those immediately before.P! Mithridates was presented with an opportunity to exercise more direct control over Heraclea: the citizens were in the midst of stasis (being divided, according to Justin, along the lines of oligarch versus democrat), and the council tsenatus: Justin 16.4.3) invited Clearchus to attempt a settlement. Clearchus promised Mithridates that once inside he, Clearchus, would hand over the city and become Mithridates' praefectus (Justin 16.4.7). Instead, Clearchus seized Mithridates cum suis amicis (his general staff") and released them upon payment of a large sum (Justin 16.4.9, cf. Xen, Hell. 4.1.24 for moveable wealth on campaigns). Diodorus 15.81.5 assigns these events to 364/3. Thus in 364 Mithridates attempted to reassert Achaemenid control east of Dascylium, the intervention at Heraclea being a false opportunity offered by a subordinate in the midst of a larger operation. Clearchus' attitude towards Achaernenid power, once he was established in the tyranny, is interesting: he looked for security beyond the immediate vagaries of satrapal control out of Dascylium by sending envoys to Susa pollakis, to

91

Events at Heraclea are discussed by Burstein 47-58, who accepts the reconstruction of the satraps' revolt, with some refinements, proposed by Judeich, Heraclea expected Eparninondas could assist them (Justin 16.4.4). Cf. Weiskopf 447 n32.

52

DASCYLIUM

Artaxerxes nand to Artaxerxes m.92 This desire for survival in the midst of instability should be assigned as a motivation in other events. JIn 364 Timotheus intervened at Cyzicus, a site dose to the satrapal capital Dascylium, to relieve forces under siege within the city. Although the identities of the warring parties are not known, I suggest that the citizens did not split along a simplistic 'rebel' versus 'loyalist' (in their attitude towards Artaxerxes), Rather, when forces from the region were used elsewhere by Ariobarzanes, those len in Cyzicus sought to distance themselves from Achaemenid control and formulate a policy which would insure the city's stability. Fighting around the city indicates an attempt by Ariobarzanes' administration to reassert a stricter control, Timotheus acted in Athens' self-interest, diminishing the overall effectiveness of Achaemenid control. 93 On the western frontier of Dascylium's sphere there was collapse in Achaemenid control. In 364 Philiscus, Ariobarzanes' lesser officer in charge of the Hellespont, was murdered by Thesagoras and Execestus, 'tyrant-haters' from Lampsacus, They fled to Lesbos; no action was taken against them. 94 By the end of the Sestus and Crithote were in Timotheus' hands, more the result of Ariobarzanes' weakness than of his generosity (Timotheus then intervened at Cyzicus).95 '

92

93

94

95

Memnon FGrH 434 fr. 1.1. Burstein 129 n. 53 indicates relations must have begun early on in Clearchus' tyranny for pollakis to have value. An instructive study of Greek cities caught between larger forces in the Achaemenid west is offered by H.D. Westlake "Ionians in the Ionian War," CQ 29 (1979) 9-44. Diod. 15.81.6 (36413), Nepos Tim. 1.3. Budder Theban Hegemony 256-257 places the siege in 365 (see below for objections to his chronology). Cf. Judeich 275 and 275 n. 1, Cargill 77 (on PseudoDernosthencs 50.4). Stasis without chronological context: Pseudo-Aristotle Dec. 2.1374b31-34 (van Groniugen 93-94). Demosthenes 23.142-143; Judeich 332, 206 n. 2 (Philiscus dead after Spring 364), Hofstetter nr. 259 (p. 150: 362/1). Philiscus' fall and Timotheus' gains are complementary events: an early death for Philiscus will also help explain Timotheus' ability to operate in Cyzicus and the expectation at Heraclea that Timotheus and Epaminondas could render assistance (Justin 16.4.3-4). There are two problems: Ariobarzanes' role in Timotheus' gain for Athens, and chronology. Isocrates 14.112 reports that after capturing Sarnos, Timotheus sailed north and took Sestos and Crithote. Nepos Tim. 1.3, using the framework of a comparatio favorable to the Athenian, synchronizes the departures of Agesilaus and Tirnotheus to assist Ariobarzanes, The Spartan takes the money, but the patriot Timotheus augments his city's foreign possessions. Thus only Nepos assigns Ariobarzanes a role in passing the two cities to Athenian control and, for Sestus' inhabitants, a respite from Thracian depredation. The Nepos reference occurs within the context of a nonchronological list (1.2-3) of the general's illustrious deeds. As for the chronology, Buckler 168-169, 255-259 (esp, 256-257) assigns all Timotheus' activities to 365 and says that the cities are a gift. Kallet 246 n. 24, although arguing that Timotheus was not in the area, believes the cities were a gift in 365. I take a more cynical view: Timotheus was active in the area in 364 and his forces occupied both cities in the name of Athens. Ariobarzanes was in no position to object-vhence the gift-giving in Nepos.

DASCYLIUM

53

Ariobarzanes' control over Dascylium continued to deteriorate to the point that he was unable to maintain the loyalty of his subordinates and his son Mithridates, Four sources, all complementary, report internal strife. Val. Max. 9.11 ext. 2 describes the dispute between and son as bellum de dominatione. Xenophon Cyrop. 8.8.4, in a discussion of the decline of contemporary Persian morals, argues that great honor is assigned to men, like Mithridates, who betray their fathers, like Ariobarzanes, Aristotle Pol. 5.131231 states that Mithridates attacked Ariobarzanes because he despised him and desired gain. Finally Harpocration (sv.Ariobarzanes) says that Artaxerxes ("Xerxes" by mistake in the text) dispatched a force to arrest the satrap and then crucified him. Taken together, these citations report the final stage of deterioration within the satrapal administration. Cause and chronology require consideration. We may assume two extremes for the position of subordinate officers (who were later to take the side of father or son) at the time Ariobarzanes was declared rebellious. Loyalty to the sons of Phamaces, to whom many of the officers would be tied by blood, plus a loyalty to the memory of Pharnabazus caused Ariobarzanes' subordinates to take his side in an attack perceived in Dascylium as unwarranted. Or loyalty to the Great King caused lesser officers to stand apart from a satrap who misled them. A realistic position for many lies between. No doubt some officers whole heartedly supported the satrap, others-a smaller group-with grudges, or owing more to Suse--refused to mobilize, still others provided resources without alacrity (they were concerned more with maintaining their position beyond the immediate crisisj.?" After two years of war and loss of revenues (366, 365) attitudes would shift or harden. The ranks of the second and third groups would grow as resources were required for the policing actions I suggest would be necessary. Loyalty to Ariobarzanes continued because he was preferable to Greek or Mysian or Bithynian depredations. The final stage in the deterioration of satrapal administration (the open warfare between father, son, and their partisans) occurred when it was believed at Dascylium that Artaxerxes had decided to replace Ariobarzanes. News had reached the satrapy that Artabazus, younger son of Pharnabazus and grandson of Artaxerxes himself, was on his way west. If we take Westlake's reconstruction of Artaxerxes' decision to replace Tissaphernes to be a reasonable model''? and apply it to the decision about 96 97

For recruiting troubles cf. Hdt. 4.84,7.38-39 (embellished to diminish Darius and Xerxes). Westlake His/aria 30 (1981) 266, 270-274 places decision-making at Susa in winter 396/5. Tissaphernes would be given a final chance. His failure in the campaigning season of 395 led to his death.

54

DASCYLIUM

Ariobarzanes, 364 becomes the year in which Artaxerxes weighs the furore of the satrapy.98 The events of that year would be among the considerations as to whether to dispense with any possible 'rehabilitation' of Ariobarzanes: growing instability within Ariobarzanes' administration, loss of the straits, the increase in foreign Greek operations around the satrapy's frontiers, uneasiness among tribal peoples. Artaxerxes also may have decided that Ariobarzanes would have to be removed to save face. Allowing warfare between his satraps had proven a mistake; leaving Ariobarzanes in place would prove an embarrassment to the crown and try Autophradates' patience. Naming Artabazus as the new satrap would dispense with the elder house descended from Phamabazus, yet leave the satrapy in the hands of the sons of Pharnaces, Whether Ariobarzanes was given an opportunity to defend himself in 364 is not known. If he did so, and poorly, perhaps we have a partial explanation for Aristotle's claim that Mithridates despised his father. The decision to dispatch Artabazus would be made later in 364; he would arrive in Dascylium early in the campaign season of 363. Perhaps Artabazus was sent out with enough freedom of action to spare his relatives, but the deterioration he found upon arrival forbade mercy. Ariobarzanes and Mithridates were at war; the latter betrayed the former, hoping for some great reward (his life? a post"), Artabazus, if we take Harpocration's use of the singular "crucified" as literal, sent his brother east. 99 Mithridates fled into the interior of Dascylium, Artabazus would have to pacify his satrapy, Artabazus' Background and Early Career

In the preceding section I referred to Artabazus as a descendant of both Pharnabazus and Artaxerxes. Since this recently has been denied in a work which will be consulted by non-specialists, and also in order better to understand Artaxerxes' decision to replace Ariobarzanes, an examination of Artabazus follows. lOG

98

99

100

The sources do not offer much assistance in formulating an absolute chronology. Diodorus' highly compressed account (15.91-92) roughly synchronizes in 362/1 Orontes' defection, a battle between Datames and Artabazus, and Rheomithres' return from Egypt. Xenophon Cyrop, 8.8.4 lists tbe betrayal of Ariobarzanes before the return of Rheomithres from Egypt. If this order has some chronological value, tben we may argue that Ariobarzanes was out of tbe picture before tbe events synchronized in Diodorus, For a recent variant chronology see Bum CHI 380-381. A further aspect of Ariobarzanes' death should be noted here: the suicide of Antalcidas in 361 following his failure at Susa. Buckler GRRS 17 (1977) 139-145 is tbe best treatment of tbis incident treated in Plut. Ar!ax. 22.6-7. Cf. Weiskopf 446-447 n. 31. Bum CHI 381-382,381 n. 4.

DASCYUUM

55

In determining Artabazus' background we are on firmer ground than the prosopography by inference which marked the investigation of Ariobarzanes. Credit must be given to Noldeke for being the first to suggest that Artabazus was the son of Pharnabazus by his marriage to Apame.U'! IG nl 356 provided the necessary documentation which rendered Noldeke's suggestions certain: although the inscription is damaged, it is clear that the progonoi of the young Memnon honored in the Athenian document included Pharnabazus, Artabazus, and Mentor, so making them all relatives.U'? Based on the data provided in Xen. Hell. 5.1.28, Artabazus' birth may be placed after 388-387. Of his early career we know nothing, but intelligent suggestions can be offered. Achaemenid officers often trained their sons by taking them along while conducting affairs of state. During Artabazus' childhood Pharnabazus was active at court and in the Egyptian theater. lit is possible that Artabazus accompanied his father on campaign, particularly on the Egyptian campaign of the mid-370's (when Artabazus was in his teens). Earlier I suggested that Phamabazus visited Dascylium after 388 B.C.--perhaps he took Artabazus with him. The lacunose record prevents us from investigating a situation for Artabazus which the career of Arsames, fifth century satrap of Egypt, suggests. Arsames owned estates in Egypt and Babylon, and was, at times, an absentee landlord, conservators running his estates. In the fourth century the young son of Parapita, i.e. Artabazus' half-brother, possessed estates in Dascylium, As a son of Pharnabazus, Artabazus, too, could have owned estates even while absent from Dascylium and even while rather young. Unfortunately we do not know what political role, if any, the conservators of such estates could or would play, or whether these estates and the personnel on them acted as a power-base for Artabazus once he arrived in the west. Artabazus, as the union of the sons of Pharnaces and the Achaemenid ruling house, would be a satrap who at once could provide continuity in personnel and 101

102

Noldeke 294-295 notes the reappearance among Artabazus' children of the names associated with the sons of Pharnaces. This similarity in names and the fact that Artabazus was the son of a royal princess suggests to Noldeke that Artabazus named his son Pharnabazus (Berve nr. 766) and his daughter Aparne (Berve nr. 97) after his own parents, the satrap and the princess. Key evidence: Plut, Artax. 27, Xen. Ages. 3.3, Xen, Hell. 5.1.28 (the marriage of Pharnabazus to Aparne); Plut. Alex.21 (Artabazus, son of a royal princess); Plut. Eum. 1, Str, 12.378, Plut. Demetrius 31 (Aparne, daughter of Artabazus), Noldeke's rejection of Curtius 6.5.3 on the age of Artabazus has been accepted by most recent scholars. IG il2 356, also published as Tad 199, pp. 281-284. Beloch Janus 8-12 (cf. Beloch 2 3:2147-150) was the earliest discussion to incorporate the inscription. Other standard treatments: Berve nr. 152 (pp. 82-84), Bosworth Arrian 112-113, Brunt 24 ff., which responds to Tarn 26 ff. on Artabazus' daughter Barsine,

56

DASCYllUM

represent royal interests. He could take up ancestral estates and, eventually, old networks of friendships and alliances. As grandson of Artaxerxes, he would be of high enough status to win me respect and/or fear of far western personnel. He could be expected not to act in a fashion at variance with what should have been obvious as Susa's interests, as had Ariobarzanes in 368-367. And, hopefully, this younger man would defer to his elder southern neighbor, Autophradates, Anomer facet Artabazus' background which is of significance for the 360's and later is mat he is the brother-in-law of me Rhodian warriors Mentor and Memnon, whose sister he had married by the time Charidemus entered satrapal service (Dem. 23.154, Diod. 16.52.4). Because Diodorus, in a passage W be assigned to 342/1, mentions eleven sons and ten daughters borne to Artabazus by his Rhodian wife, many scholars place the satrap's marriage c. 362 at me latest, thereby allowing me necessary approximate twenty years for the production of so many offspring. While one may question Diodorus' numbers, his report of Mentor's reaction, delight in the large number of children and the subsequent rewards, rings true in light of Persian customs (Hdt, 1.136, Str, 15.733). By 342 some of the sons, including Pharnabazus me younger, would be old enough to take up the military posts assigned by Mentor. A problem would not be created moving Artabazus' marriage back a few years: there is no evidence about Artabazus', Mentor's, or Memnon's activities in the earlier 360's. It seems surprising that Artabazus married below his station-vsurprise which might be diminished if we knew more about Mentor and Memnon.J'[' Artabazus and the Restabilization ofDascylium

Artabazus took over a satrapy damaged-to what extent is uncertain. He would need to win the loyalty of officers who had served under Ariobarzanes and had come to view Mithridates as his logical heir. Restabilization of the satrapy would require subduing forces hostile to his own and Achaemenid control, i.e. troops alien to Dascylium and disgruntled lesser officers. Ultimately he was unsuccessful and was forced into exile in me nearby kingdom of Macedonia

103

On the Rhodians: Mernnon is Berve nr. 497, Hofstetter nr. 215, cf. Bosworth Arrian 112 (marriage in 362), Brunt 25 (marriage by 362). Mentor is Hofstetter nr, 220. The expression aprosdoketai euiuchiai in Dem, 23.157 is an exaggeration and need not mean the marriage was sudden. As for Artabazus' marriage, we can account for 5 sons and 3 daughters by name (Herve nr, 152 plus the sternm a in vol. II 442). Recent discussions: Walser "Achaimenidisches'' 87-90, Briant DHA 11 (1985) 181-185 (on Pharnabazus in particular), cf. Briant RTP 440.

DASCYllUM

57

(Diod, 16.52).104 Only a few incidents are reported for the period of 363-360. In

the eastern portions of Dascylium Mithridates operated with his supporters on his own behalf. In this context should be placed tension between Datames and Artabazus (Diod. 15.91.2-6). We also learn, thanks to Demosthenes' dislike of Charidernus, of Artabazus' operations to secure the Troad, operations which bring him into conflict with Autophradates (Dem, 23.154 ff.). Dascylium, Its Environs, Lesser Officers

There exists no evidence about the reception Artabazus received upon his arrival at the satrapal capital, how he won over the remnants of Ariobarzanes' administration, or how he won over the satrapy's lesser officers. Since he was able to operate in the Troad in 361 and 360, Artabazus must have had some success in pacifying the satrapal capital and its environs and he was able to draw upon forces from lesser officers, either in the region of the Troad or nearby. Among the three groups of officers outlined in the discussion of growing insubordination in Ariobarzanes' administration, Artabazus probably drew support from those interested in survival and from those dismayed with Ariobarzanes.Jv'' It is possible to offer some suggestions about specific enemies and allies. Ariobarzanes had three sons. Of these, Mithridates had fled into the interior with his supporters. The fates of the other two sons are not known. Perhaps they were kept on in the satrapy in some position of authority as a means of winning over Ariobarzanes' partisans. Artabazus also had two (half- 7) brothers, Oxythras and Dibictus, These are referred to once, in connection with operations in the 350's (Polyaenus 7.33.2). Unfortunately we don't know if they were elder sons of Pharnabazus already in Dascylium in 363 or younger sons, born after 388 and thus oflimited value to Artabazus in the 360's. There are references to internal difficulties in the Greek city-states in the environs of the satrapal capital of Dascylium. The citizens of Cius honored

104

105

On Artabazus after 360 consult Weiskopf 470-487, 505-524. Artabazus' troubles with the Tithraustes mentioned inFGrH 105 fr. 4 (papyrus Erzherzog Rainer) and the satrapai in Diad. 16.34.1-2 probably reflect his inability to win the loyalty of his satrapy rather than a revolt directed against Artaxerxes himself. That Artabazus arrived with a military force is suggested by the wording of Harpccration. Artabazus fields an army to invade Cappodocia (Died. 15.91.2), but the time of the invasion is uncertain. If it comes after Artabazus has taken control of Dascylium, as I argue below, then Diodorus' words "a large force" may indicate success in garnering the loyalty of lesser officers who then supplied troops.

58

DASCYUUM

Athenodorus, a mercenary who appears in Artabazus' service at Ilium.1 06 Perhaps he assisted the satrap in restoring order at Cius, Pseudo-Demosthenes 50.4 reports a continuation of troubles near Cyzicus into 362/1. 107 The background of these troubles remains obscure. As for problems with unstable peoples or foreign Greek forces, not a word.

Artabazus.Mtthridates, and Cappadocia (362, 361) Events in Dascylium and Cappadocia after Artabazus' assumption of leadership in the satrapy in 363 are noted in a number of sources. Reasonable explanations can be provided for events described in individual passages; bringing them together to form a reasonable reconstruction is more difficult. In sum, it appears that in late 363 Mithridates and his supporters fled east and began to ravage the regions bordering on Cappadocia and Dascylium. The ex-satrap's son played a role similar to Amorges, the son of the rebellious Pissouthnes, who had made a stand in the southern portions of Sparda's sphere (Thucyd, 8.5). Artabazus responded with a punitive campaign which resulted in conflict with Datames, Mithridates eluded capture, killed Datames (who was disgruntled with Mithridates' raiding), and disappeared from sight. The first passage to be considered is Polyaenus 7.21.3, which narrates a strategem by which Datames, who had crossed the Euphrates and fought (or tried to fight) the King, managed to return to his own territory across the Riverbefore the arrival of the slower moving royal force. This incident is normally assigned to the late 360's and is taken as evidence of the initial success of unified rebel satraps.108 This passage is placed better during the earlier war when Datames had been declared a rebel by Artaxerxes, Since Datames is described as crossing back into his own territory, that portion of the Euphrates near which hostilities occurred is not that in Mesopotamia, but that farther north, in Cappadocian territory (ct. Str, 12.534). Datarnes' opponent cannot be Artaxerxes himself. Diodorus, in his account of operations in the Egyptian theater, implies that he

106

107 108

The inscription mentioned here has been published as Tod 149 (pp. 148-149). The city of Cius honors Athenodorus for services rendered, but does not specify the services. The date of the inscription is uncertain: Tod placed it soon after 360, but Judeich 217 -218 n. 1 and Hofstetter pp. 35-36 have made out cases for a date in the 350's. Athenodorus was frequently in Achaernenid service: Berve or. 27, Hofstetter nr. 61. Cf. Cargill 77. Judeich 204. Hornblower 180, Burn CHI 379-?80.

DASCYLIUM

59

remained at Susa (Diod. 15.92.5) and later chides him for not taking the field. 109 A more reasonable explanation is that Datames is defending the eastern portion of his satrapy against royal forces (under subordinate commanders, not the Great King) during the time he was viewed as an open enemy of the state (370-368). Polyaenus 7.21.3 has no bearing on the events of 363. 110 The second passage to be considered is Diodorus 15.91.2-7, which reports that Artabazus, identified only as a general of the King, invaded Cappadocia with a large force and was to do battle with Datames, Diodorus records nothing about the duration or effect of the invasion, instead focusing on the attempt by Mithrobarzanes, Datames' father-in-law, to defect to Datames, A reasonable reconstruction of events would place the invasion in the context of an attempt to capture Mithridates, who had been engaging in free-booting in eastern Dascylium and in Cappadocia (see below). But Diodorus' evidence presents a problem. The defection of Mithrobarzanes and his cavalry is narrated in a number of sources and in a number of variants.U! Nepos Dat. 6 tells nearly the same story as Diodorus, but places the defection in a campaign against the Pisidians (370's). Frontinus Str. 2.7.9 reports the defection, which is foiled by Datames' eloquence, of horsemen (no leader mentioned) during the war with Autophradates, Among Nepos', Frontinus', and Diodorus' accounts, the first is of least value. If an Achaemenid officer and member of a satrapal family is to defect, he would likely join a side which could offer not only safety but status dose to that already held. Thus joining the side of another satrap is more reasonable than joining the Pisidians. Greater credence may be placed in Diodorus' account. He, at least, preserves the name, military post, and relationship with Datames of Mithrobarzanes. For two satraps to wage war over the activities of a free-booter is most unfortunate. In the absence of any data beyond Diodorus' account I can only suggest that both Artabazus and Datames blundered into conflict: Datames was perhaps viewed by Artabazus as too tolerant of the son of Ariobarzanes, a man

109

II0 111

Tachos, rebel king of Egypt, is in Phoenicia (Died. 15.92.3-4) and journeys inland to Artaxerxes (15.92.5) once his forces tum against him. Plut. Ages. 38 ff. gives a different account of events, but Artaxerxes is nowhere present in the west. Died. 16.40.4, in an account of Artaxerxes ill's Egyptian operations, confuses him with Artaxerxes II and chides him for sending generals since he himself was unwarlike. Cf. Weiskopf 424-425 which suggests that the passage referred to a clash with Artabazus as he moved west Cf. Weiskopf 212-214. I leave aside here Polyaenus 7.21.7 (too general), 7.28.2 (similar event, but different officer). Sekunda "Datarnes" 48 discusses Mithrobarzanes' desertion and favors Diodorus' account.

60

DASCYLIUM

with whom Datames enjoyed good relations in the past, and the grandson of Pharnabazus, with whom Datames worked briefly in the mid-370's (Nepos Dat. 4). Artaxerxes is off in the distance in all this. He is affected only in the sense that it is his House which is being damaged by his subordinates. 112 The third set of passages concern Mithridates' activities, including his murder of Datames, The effect of these activities is dear, i.e. the damaging of Achaemenid territory. Mithridates attacks strongholds and villages, seizes revenues and gathers much booty. Some of the property and booty is made available to Datames, These are the activities of a bandit (Polyaenus 7.29.1, Nepos Dat. 10.2).113 The motivation behind the activities is not clear. Both Nepos and Polyaenus cast their accounts so as to highlight unfavorable characteristics of all those involved and focus on a singular occurrence, the murder of a satrap by trickery. Nepos places his account within the context of Artaxerxes' implacibile odium 1) following Autophradates' indecisive war. Datames is not actively opposed to Artaxerxes at this point (cf. 11.1: bellum cum ipso rege suscipi, deque ea re, si ei [Datami] videretury; it is Artaxerxes who betrays his subordinate and will use stealth to eliminate him. Mithridates, seemingly without prompting, offers to kill Datames (so Mithridates, Datames' former 4.5, ct. 5.6, abandons him). In order to win his victim's trust, Mithridates makes a long distance friendship with him (10.2-3), proceeds to damage imperial property and shares his gains with Datames, When a face-toface meeting is finally arranged (U.1), Mithridates kills Datames (11.2-5). Polyaenus' account, shorter and variant, is no more flattering (7.29.1). Here he quickly delineates ernnity and loyalty and focuses on the murder itself. Artaxerxes is the wronged party. Datames is a rebel; Mithridates is ordered by the King to kill or capture Datames, Mithridates wins Datames' trust by pretending to be a rebel, meets the satrap, and kills him. 114 Both accounts are not acceptable. Artaxerxes is made to countenance unnecessary losses as the result of Mithridates' ravaging. He appears to have been introduced simply to be portrayed poorly, to be an excellent example of barbarian craft. Datames' stance towards Artaxerxes and Mithridates is 112

113 114

Diodorus concludes his account by noting the King's hatred of Datames and his efforts to kill him (15.91.7). These data parallel Nepos Dat, 9.1, which follows immediately upon Autophradates' conclusion of hostilities with Datarnes, and agree with Nepos and Polyaenus 7.29.1 that Artaxerxes was anxious for Datames' execution. Royal hatred for the satrap of Cappodocia is a theme running through all accounts of Datames' career (cf. Diod. 31.19.2 on Datames' heroic, but legendary, death). BriantRTP 18!. Both versions have a common source, no doubt. One might have expected Diodorus to recount it (cf. 15.91.7: angered Artaxerxes the prime mover in Datames' death).

DASCYUUM

61

questionable. In Nepos, he seems distant and uninvolved. His friendship with Mithridates is long distance, Nepos admitting that the two appear bound by

communi odio rather than by any cooperation. Datames is not even openly opposed to Artaxerxes: he has raised no forces and is not yet convinced that war against Artaxerxes is a safe course of action (Nepos Dat. 11.2). Polyaenus directly contradicts Nepos: Datames is a there is no with Mithridates, no sharing of booty. Their purpose for is vague. While this intrigue and treachery delight the Hellenic mind, Mithridates' activities can be better explained as those designed primarily to keep himself and supporters alive. His attacks on property and resources, and his maintaining a hold on portions of his gains appear to be an attempt to build up a base of operations, a stronghold which other Achaemenid officers would hopefully come to recognize as his. It is seasons probably in the context of this raiding, which 1 place in the of362 and 361, that Mithridates encountered hostility in Paphlagonia (Polyaenus 7.29.2). Artaxerxes would be involved in all of this most indirectly. The disturbances is damaged and his are local, the King is damaged only because his subordinate is killed. Datames is more directly involved: Mithridates' freebooting occurs in the region bordering on Dascylium and Cappadocia; in reaction to Mithridates' raids Artabazus undertook a punitive campaign into Cappadocia (362). The property and booty Datames received from Mithridates probably represent a combination of Mithridates' inability to hold his gains and his desire to blunt possible reaction from at least one satrap, a man once friendly with his father. The meeting between Mithridates and Datames was the result of the former's fear of retaliation and the latter's displeasure at Artabazus' earlier attempts to police the frontier. 1 place the death of Datames in 361. 115 Mithridates of disappears from the historical record.U" Instability in the eastern Dascylium is a final chapter in the fall of the elder house descended from Pharnabazus. The Hellespont and the Troad (361,360) As in the days of Pharnabazus, Dascylium's sphere encompassed at the northern and central portions of the Troad, the scene of operations during the

115 116

It is alleged that Sysinas, Datames' son, succeeded him as satrap. Cf. Weiskopf 490-494; Harrison JNES 41 (1982) 181-182, 188-189. Cf. Burstein 55, 129 n. 56 accepting literally Xen, Cyrop. 8.8.4.

62

DASCYLIUM

campaigning seasons of 361 and 360. Demosthenes reports Artabazus' activities here in the context of an unfavorable account of Chari demus' career as a mercenary. Before the beginning of the 360 season Artabazus had secured most of the Troad (Dem. 23.154 mentions Scepsis, Cebren, and mum by name). But at the start of the season, when Charidemus entered Dascylium's service, Artabazus was under arrest by Autophradates; Mentor and Memnon were in charge of military operations for their brother-in-law (they paid the mercenary, Dem, 23.154); and Dascylium's forces were deployed away from the regions around the Scamander river. Charidemus.U? hired by Mentor and Memnon, crossed into Asia but instead of operating on behalf of the satrapy, began to occupy cities along the Scamander, By the end of the season he was under attack by a wen-supplied Artabazus (Dem. 23.155). Mentor and Memnon, anxious to end damage to the satrapy, convinced Artabazus to permit his useless employee to march under truce to Abydus and then cross into Europe (Dem, 23.157-159). This account contains items which require consideration. The most significant is Autophradates' 'arrest' of Artabazus, for it is the sole 'rebellious' act of the satrap of Lydia" i.e. arresting a fellow satrap, one sent down to stabilize a province whose previous governor had been declared a rebel. Demosthenes is probably not mistaken in naming Autophradates as the officer who detained Artabazus, The orator is interested in detailing the changes in Chari demus' fortunes and the detention and release of Artabazus are mentioned as chronological points (they are also turning points in the mercenary's Asian activities). I am unable to suggest a rational political or military reason for Autophradates' treatment of his colleague, but point to the relatively short duration of the detention (only a portion of the 360 season) and the detention's relatively minor impact on Artabazus' forces (Charidernus enjoyed no great advantage, Dem. 23.155). There is an explanation which can exonerate Autophradates from standing against Artaxerxes, but it does not reflect well on the satrap as an administrator. In the years preceding 360 Autophradates had been engaged in quelling an uprising led by the disgruntled lesser officer Orontes, who had exploited mobilization against Ariobarzanes to attempt, eventually, the creation of his own realm. Recent interpretation of numismatic evidence for his activities has assigned to Orontes coinage struck at Cisthene and Atramyttium, the

117

On Charidemus in general one may consult: Hofstetter nr, 74, Herve nr, 823 (later career), Osborne His/aria 22 (1973) 541,541 n, 127 (Artabazus released! in 360), Pritchett IT 85. Charidemus in Aeolis: Pseudo Aristotle Oec.2. B51b 13-14, placed! in the 36O'sby van Groningen 177-179.

DASCYLIUM

63

latter the she of Autophradates' siege of Ariobarzanes.Uf I suggest that these regions passed from Orontes' control to control by forces operating out of Dascylium and Lydia. Autophradates' detention of his northern colleague was a foolish and high-handed means of insisting, as he had in 367, that the regions around the Gulf of Atram yttium belonged to the satrapy of Lydia. A further cause of tension between Artabazus and Autophradates may have been their differing opinions on how to deal with the supporters of Orontes and Ariobarzanes, both now removed from the scene. Demosthenes, perhaps exaggerating to highlight Charidemus' poor planning, states that Artabazus, after his release, could draw upon resources from interior Phrygia, Lydia and Paphlagonia; they were oikeias, i.e. friendly territory. This, I believe, indicates that any tension between Artabazus and Autophradates was relatively short-lived. There was some expectation that supplies needed by one Achaemenid officer could be drawn from the lands of another. Demosthenes also affords us a glimpse at the steps taken by Artabazus to secure the western portions of his satrapy. Achaemenid influence in the straits was still weak. Sestus was in Cotys' hands (23.158), Abydus at least not openly inimical to Artabazus' control. The satrap had supplemented his own forces with those led by Greek mercenary generals. Charidemus was hired to help guard the Troad in the context of a larger campaign to reassert Dascylium's control over the entire Troad and chase out any of Orontes' supporters. Present in the Troad already and stationed near Ilium were troops under Athenodorus, who probably had followed Artabazus south and west from the satrapal capital in 361. 119 Mentor and Memnon are not to be counted among the ranks of mercenary generals: they are members of the satrapal family, lesser officers anticipating peaceful estates. By the end of 360 Artabazus had secured most of his brother's old realm. Administering it in peace would prove an impossible task.

118

119

Troxell 29-30, 32-34. Troxell's excellent work eliminates my arguments that Orontes' influence extended far north into Lampsacus (e.g. Weiskopf 426-427) and strengthens my argument (set out below) that Orontes was nothing more than a rebellious officer in the mold of Dascylium's Spithridates. Aen, Tact. 24.3-14 discusses the fall of the city, during whose siege Athenodorus is on his way to help. If ilium knows Charidemus is not acting in Artabazus' interests (highly reasonable), then Athenodorus and the Ilians are favorably disposed towards the satrap. Cf. Plut, Sertorius 1.6, Polyaenus 3.14. SlG 3 188 (Tod 148), assigned to c. 359 by Tod, reports ilium's honors for Menelaus of Athens (cf, Too 143). Tod reports the suggestion that Menelaus helped negotiated Charidernusrelease. In any case, his removal meant a return to a more orderly Achacmenid control.

64

DASCYUUM

Local treachery inspired by moral turpitude, pleasant to recite and quick to report, often proves unsatisfactory as the explanation for imperial disorder. The events recounted in the preceding reconstruction offer a more tragic and, I believe, more accurate picture of the Achaemenid Empire malfunctioning in its northwestern frontier as a result of policy set in Susa. Artaxerxes believed a quick decision based on seemingly reliable sources could forestall a disorder like that which befell his reign's opening. To an extent he was correct: the interior regions of the Empire did not see a new Cyrus march out, this time from Dascylium. Instead, thanks to trust in-placed, the satrapy that had been strengthened by Pharnabazus and Ariobarzanes was delivered serious blows by forces as much internal as external. The local nature of these disturbances must be stressed. Once Autophradates' punitive campaign weakened Ariobarzanes' control and Artabazus arrived at Dascylium, the issue of whether anyone stood against Artaxerxes himself became relatively unimportant. Rather, the establishment of stable government under Artabazus was of great concern. Artabazus' attempts to define the limits of his control brought him into conflict with neighboring satraps. The conflicts were brief; their most serious result, the death of Datames, is to be credited to the account of a displaced noble interested in his own survival.

V. MAUSOLUS, 365-360 Mausolus had participated with Autophradates in wearing down Ariobarzanes in 365. After that point, and in of Diodorus' unsupported claim (15.90.3), there is no evidence which points to Mausolus standing against Artaxerxes.J-'' But the satrap, like other members of his family, has been tainted by his use of Hellenic forms, which created the expectation among Greek writers and their modem interpreters that the Hecatomnids were prone to act against the Empire's interests. For that reason Xenophon Agesilaus 2.27 will be examined. As for Mausolus' deeds, there are none which can be placed securely in the later 360's. of Dascylium's instability fall Those which may have occurred during the under the heading of policing actions designed to strengthen Achaemenid control in Greek cities and perennially less stable peoples (the Lycians). Xenophon Agesilaus 2.27

This is a passage defective in text and thought. Xenophon wants to illustrate how two groups gave Agesilaus money: those who thought they were well treated by him and those who fled him. Xenophon's next sentence should contain two names. Instead the manuscripts name only Mausolus as those 120

Modem reconstructions of Mausolus' deeds tend to have him jerking back and forth between loyalty and disloyalty towards Artaxerxes II (and III). E.g. Judeich 237-240, Bockisch 149-151. At first Mausolus is loyal: SIC 3 167 lines 1-15 (because of the use of Artaxerxes' name in dating the document, 367/6, and the King's execution of a Carian opponent of Mausolus); Xen. Ages. 2.26 (Mausolus fights rebel Ariobarzanes). Then Diodorus 15.90.3 calls him a rebel. Mausolus is loyal again in 361/0: SIC 3 1671ines 16-30 (Artaxerxes' name is used in dating the document). But then Mausolus is removed by Artaxerxes Ill: The trilingual inscription from Xanthus names Pixodarus, Mausolus' brother, the satrap of Caria and Lycia in Siwan, i.e. June-July, year one of Artaxerxes, i.e. Ill, so 358 B.C. This date for the inscription is accepted by Dupont-Sommer CRA! (1974) 139-142, Xanthos VI 165-169; Mayrhofer 281-282; and Bum CHI 380-381, 381 n. 1 (most regrettable, for this is a standard work likely to be consulted by non-specialists). Then Mausolus is restored to power: SIC 3 167 lines 32-50 (355/4, use of Artaxerxes Ill's name in dating the document). SIG 3 167, now also Blurnel Inschriften von Mylasa nr, 1-3, is evidence of both Artaxerxes' and Caria's support for Mausolus, See Weiskopf 230-232, 252-255, 263. The mission which took Arlissis to Artaxerxes in 367/6 may well have been on a purely local matter. A parallel can be found in Egypt when Jewish inhabitants complained about Widranga, the Achaemenid officer in charge of Syene, and accused him of assisting their enemies. See Briant "Ethno-classe" 144-147. The Xanthus inscription should be dated to year one of Arses (Artaxerxes IV), i.e., 337, as demonstrated by Badian "Artaxerxes IV" 4050, cf. Hornblower 366-367 (text of inscription), 46-49; Weiskopf 293-296.

66

MAUSOLUS

sending him home, while giving him a magnificent send off. The second name, required by the two plurals in the Greek text, is missing. Schneider emended the text to read the name Tachos, the rebel king of Egypt under whom Agesilaus served. Thus a second name. The name Tachos is an intelligent restoration: Diodorus 15.93.3 reports that Tachos gave the Spartan gifts because he alone had set right Tachos' kingship. There are variant accounts: Plutarch Ages. 40 and Nepos Ages. 8 report that Agesilaus received gifts from Nectanebis, who stood against Tachos, Xenophon, in his own account of Agesilaus' service (2.28-31), uses no Egyptian proper names, instead, as a face-saving measure for his hero, referring to the king with whom Agesilaus last served and from whom Agesilaus received money as being more philhellenic than the other Egyptian rebel king. The emendation to the name Tachos has been rejected by those who synchronize Tachos' and Mausolos' actions.F! But synchronization is unnecessary: Tachos and Mausolus are the illustrations of those who Xenophon believed were well-treated by the Spartan or who fled (pheugontes. but cf. 2.26: peistheis, hence the defective thought). As he did elsewhere, Xenophon has remixed events in military campaigns to produce a suitably encomiastic account, not a chronologically correct one. Mausolus can still be tainted by his xenia with Agesilaus, made before the events in 2.26, i.e. before 365, and by his giving money to Sparta. These activities are used to bridge the gap between Mausolus' 'loyalist' stance in 2.26 and his 'rebel' stance in Diodorus 15.90.3. 122 The existence of xenia is not evidence of disloyalty to Artaxerxes, but of contact with Sparta to achieve some gain. To date the xenia to the 390's, when Agesilaus was active in Asia, is difficult, for the surviving evidence does not suggest an opportunity for contact between the two men. The Spartan never operated in Caria and we hear of no Carian troops, which might have been led by the future satrap, operating within the satrapy of Lydia in support of Tissaphernes or, later, Tithraustes.1 23 Hecatomnid diplomacy before the troubles with Ariobarzanes might provide an explanation. The imposition of.the King's Peace did not preclude the hiring of Greeks as mercenaries by Achaemenid officers for operations intended to solidify Achaemenid control. Mausolus' arrangement of xenia with the Spartan king may 121 122 123

Hornblower 174-175; cf. Judeich 203 and 203 n. 2. Judeich 203-204,203-204 n, 1; Hornblower 174-175. Sources for Agesilaus (e.g. Xen. Hell. 3.4.12, 21) intimate that moves or suspected moves towards Calia were only a ruse designed to fool Tissaphernes. The Spartan's xenoi in Asia were perhaps quite numerous. Plut, Mor. 212e refers to them as a group. Also note the boast in Xen. Ages. 1.35. But both anecdotes are too general to be used to shed light on Agesilaus' relations with the l-Iecatomnids.

MAUSOLUS

67

have been a first step towards being able to hire Spartans with relative ease. Perhaps Agesilaus thought he, too, would be benefitted (ct. Isocrates' vague claim in 6.63 that dynasts in Asia were ready to lend support to Spartan interests). Xenia was also, according to Xenophon, the reason why Mausolus gave money to Agesilaus for Sparta. Again, disloyalty to Artaxerxes need not be the motivation: Mausolus hoped to buy Agesilaus or at least neutralize him. Hecatomnid gold could buy Laconia the false strength to work against Thebes and so buy Artaxerxes a Hellenic battlefield filled with those who would never cross into Asia.

PolicingOperations Operations in connection with Greek cities may be placed in the later 360's when the stability of Achaemenid control had been weakened by use of troops against Ariobarzanes and later by the need for troops to use against Orontes in Lydia. These difficulties will have encouraged some Greek politicians to distance themselves from Achaemenid control by stasis or otherwise unacceptable alterations in policy. Polyaenus 6.8 reports that within the city of Miletus there existed. a party in favor of Mausolus and one opposed. The Hecatomnid admiral Aegyptus moved to support the pro-Hecatomnid party and avoided an attempt made on him by the opposing party. The prominence of Mausolus in connection with a city normally under Sparda's supervision suggests that some Milesians took advantage of Autophradates' entanglements with Orontes farther north to seize power from those normally well-disposed towards Achaemenid authorities. Mausolus, however, was able to bring to bear naval (and land) forces necessary to restore order. ill the case of Ephesus there appear to have been operations by both Mausolus and Autopbradates.l-" The position of the city on the coast suggests that the satraps of both Lydia and Caria would have dealings with the civic government.l-'' Polyaenus 7.27.2 reports Autophradates' land operations and his eventual taking of the city, and 7.23.2 describes Mausolus' concern about the disruptive activities of Herophytus of Ephesus in connection with campaigning at

124 125

On cooperation between Sparda and Caria during the time of Autophradates and Mausolus see Weiskopf 273-279. Plut. Lys, 3.3 reports that in the late fifth century Ephesus, surrounded by territories under Sparda's control, was used by local Persian officials as a sort of headquarters.

68

MAUSOLUS

Pygela and Heraclea-at-Latmus, the latter city wavering in its 10yahy.126 It appears that Herophytus, prominent among anti-Achaemenid Ephesians into 336,127 had capitalized on troubles within Sparda to draw his city, through stasis, away from Autophradates' control and had then proceeded to destabilize areas around Ephesus, Pygela, The two satraps moved against him, Mausolus first taking Heraclea, then Pygela, while Autophrates captured Ephesus itself. The precise date of the city's fall is uncertain, but should be placed after Autophradates had put aside his troubles with Orontes and Artabazus, Although Diodorus 15.90.3 reports the Lycians as standing against Artaxerxes, it is more realistic to view troubles in Lycia during the 360's as part of the instability which marked the region for most of the fourth century, an instability which did not have as its primary cause in-feelings towards a particular member of the dynasty at Susa, Numismatic, epigraphic, and literary sources record a multitude of minor political entities in Lycia, their warfare with each other, and the intervention-or the results of intervention-vby Achaemenid officers from Sparda (Lydia) and Caria. 128 The first fixed point in fourth century Lycian history, 337 B.C.--provided by Badian's interpretation of the trilingual Xanthus inscription-permits us to see the end of a long process: Lycia went from being a land of dynasts supervised by the satrap of Lydia (probably to his dismay) to a region under the control of the satrap at Halicarnassus, Mausolus' Lycian adventures in the period between 365-360 fall best under the heading of policing actions carried out among politically unstable peoples and of extending Hecatomnid, and so Achaemenid, influence. 129

126 127

128

129

Cf. Judeich 207 n. I, 261 (placing Polyaenus 7.23.2 in the mid-fourth century). Bum CHi 390 places Polyaenus 7.27.2 in the 330·s. Roth (in Roos' Teubner edition) suggested that Heropythus in Arr. Anab. 1.17.11 be emended to Herophytus, based on Polyaenus 7.23.2. The two men have been identified as one in Badian Ehrenberg Studies 62 n. 18, cf. 40. On the politics of dynasts in fourth century Lycia, see Weiskopf :2'.85-293, Childs 73 ff. (note attempts to assign precise military roles to dynasts mentioned), Bryce INES 42 (1983) 31-42, Morkholm and Neumann, Hornblower 181-182, Bryce Lycians 111-Jl4. Mausolus and Lycia: TAM 1l:3 113 (cf. Polyaenus 5.42). Steph. Byz, sv. Solymoi, Pseudo-Aristotle Oec.2.1348aI8-34. Cf. Weiskopf 291-293.

VI. THE OPPORTUNISM OF ORONTES, 364-360 Earlier in the discussion about the eventual collapse of Ariobarzanes' administration, I outlined some of the forces active in the satrapy after the campaign of 365: less stable peoples would act to exploit political instability; Greek city states would try, in the midst of troubles, to distance themselves from that Achaemenid influence normal in peacetime; and lesser officers would grow restless, angered or disappointed over failure in the leadership displayed by their superior and losses their own men and property had suffered. This scenario is similarly applicable to the satrapy of Sparda and Autophradates' administration. Perhaps in the years after 365 Autophradates had to wage war with the traditionally recalcitrant Pisidians (Polyaenus 7.27.1, Frontinus 1.4.5, d. Diod. 15.90.3).130 Miletus and Ephesus both required Achaemenid intervention (see above). But the most serious threat to Autophradates' administration was posed by Orontes, demoted satrap of Armenia. A lesser officer with property in Mysia, Orontes took advantage of the war against Ariobarzanes and the ensuing disorder to gather about him the disgruntled and opportunistic, and set about to build up a sphere of influence at the expense of the satraps at Sparda and DascyHum. This perception is at variance with the accepted tradition concerning Orontes, one dominated by Diodorus' grandiose account of the rebel and by IG U2 207, an Athenian epigraphic document which seems to place Orontes, alive, in the west in 349/8. According to this tradition, in the 360's Orontes led a massive wellorganized rebellion against Artaxerxes Il, invaded Syria, surrendered to Artaxerxes Il, stood against Artaxerxes HI while operating against Autophradates in the 350's, and survived into the 340's.131 During the past two decades a 130

131

Cf. Judeich 204 n. 1. Alternatively, Autophradates could have acted against the Pisidians any time before his campaign against Datames. Cf. Sekunda "Datames" 39, 50 (placed in 367, as part of Autophradates' withdrawal from Cappadocia). Judeich 221-225, 130, 164, 205ff, and esp. 333 ff. Orontes was an Unterstaathalter in Mysia, emerging as the leader of an organized revolt in 363 and receiving aid from Egypt. In 362 he betrayed the other rebels. As a reward, he was allowed to return to Armenia and rebelled again shortly thereafter. By 360 he reached Syria. He returned again to the west, and rebelled in 358 and 356. In 355 he fought Autophradates. In 353 Ochus himself mobilized against Orontes. The following year saw peace: Orontes achieved control over the western portion of Asia Minor and then died. IG il2 20721, Dem. 14.31, Polyaenus 7.14.2-4, OGIS 264 are all used as evidence for Orontes' rebellion in the 350's. This same general pattern of reconstruction may be found in Olmstead 415-422, 427-429. Olmstead's and Judeich's historical reconstructions are accepted by

70

ORONTES

number of studies have appeared which offer conclusions that diminish the majesty of Orontes' status, the scope and impact of his activities, and his lifespan. 132 A reconsideration of all the evidence relating to Orontes reduces him to a more dangerous version of Spithridates, the lesser officer of Dascylium who, with the assistance of enemies of the Achaemenid order, was able to stand against his superior, Phamabazus, and damage the satrapy.

Orontes' Position in Mysia In the list of 'rebels' who stood against Artaxerxes appears Orontes, satrap of Mysia (15.90.3). The identity of the Orontes mentioned by Diodorus has long been established as that Orontes, a son-in-law of Artaxerxes, who held the satrapy of Armenia at the time of the rebellion of Cyrus the Younger. 133 However the title 'satrap of Mysia' had been the object of much puzzlement and discussion as to its significance and its assignation to Orontes.

Osborne's View 134 The most recent scholarly treatment of the problem is that provided by Osborne, who set for himself the task of elucidating the nature of Orontes' post as satrap of Mysia (291). He begins by investigating when Orontes, last known to have been satrap of Armenia, was transferred to the west (291-293). He argues, and I agree, that Orontes, as punishment for his actions against Tiribazus during the campaign against Euagoras, was removed from Armenia and eventually posted west (Diad. 15.11.2, Pluto Mor. 174b, cf. Suda sv, Arbazakiosy. Osborne then turns to a consideration of 'satrap' of Mysia (293-298), arguing that one

132

133

134

Troxell 27-29. Modern works, regrettably those which will be consulted first by non-specialists, continue to make much of Orontes, Cook PE 221-223 (two rebellions, but Orontes may be a lesser officer in the 360's), Bum CHI 370, 379-383 (two rebellions), Hornblower 176-180 (Orontes satrap of Armenia in 360's), 202-203 (no second rebellion, it seems). Troxell: coinage restricted to Atrarnyttium and Cisthene; Osborne's works argue against the existence of a second rebellion, and suggest Orontes was the highest officer in a newly-created satrapy, Mysia. See below and bibliography. Judeich 221-225; Osborne Historia 22 (1973) 515 n. 1 (cf. 517-522 for discussion of Orontes' earlier career). Trogus Prol. 10 erroneously calls Orontes praefectum Armeniae in referring to the 360's. See Osborne Grazer Beurage 3 (1975) 291-295, 297; Historia 22 (1973) 338; ABSA 66 (1971) 315. MJ. Osborne "The Satrapy of Mysia" Grazer Beitrdge 3 (1975) 291-309. References in parentheses in my text are to this article. Most of the earlier treatments of this problem are discussed by Osborne. One may add Troxell 28 and Hornblower's complaints, 177 n. 58. My presentation here in part refines some of Judeich's views: Judeich 130 n. 2, 325 has Orontes appointed to Mysia after 383 (his date for Tiribazus' trial) as a hyparchos (Judeich 223 n. 2).

ORONTES

71

should not emend away Mysia from Diodorus' text. But he rules out any possibility that Orontes was a hyparchos, i.e. a lesser officer. His reason for doing so (296-297) is his acceptance of Diodorus' list of rebels in 15.90.3 and Diodorus' characterization of Orontes as a seemingly important leader of the rebellion (the accuracy of Diodorus' account is not questioned). Orontes has to be someone important enough to be in charge of so many rebels who are satraps, i.e. highest officers. A lesser officer will not do. Neither will a special command (297-298): Osborne notes that there was not one for the Pisidians, who seem to have made a point of acting up in the 360's. So why should there be a special command and special commander for the Mysians? Thus Osborne leaves himself with one possibility: that a "new satrapy, Mysia, was organized for Orontes, and that Diodorus is precise in his description" (298-299). It remained to determine what that satrapy was (299-308).135 Here Osborne runs into into difficulty. Orontes must be the highest officer of a sector, and because Dascylium is ruled out (it is Ariobarzanes'), Osborne must have recourse to the traditional belief of modem scholars that the satrapy of Lydia was at times divided into an interior sector, i.e. the satrapy of Lydia proper, and a coastal sector, the satrapy of Ionia. 136 Thus Osborne puts himself into the position of arguing that Diodorus calls the satrapy of Ionia the satrapy of Mysia (304-307). Osborne finally considers the time of Orontes' appointment (307-309). He is limited by having to find a point when Sparda can be divided and by his belief that Orontes must be a highest officer. Because Orontes is absent in anecdotal accounts of Autophradates' operations against Ariobarzanes in the mid-360's, Orontes' appointment is pushed closer to 362/1. Then, by making Autophradates beleagured by rebels on all sides, Osborne is able to propose that the supposedly rehabilitated Orontes is sent westward to assist the satrap. But this assistance involves the division of the only 'loyalist' satrapy, Shortly thereafter, and for reasons the sources fail to enumerate, both Autophradates and Orontes stand against Artaxerxes, In all this Osborne has failed to address problems underlying the basic reconstruction of the 'satraps' revolt' or to consider the mechanics of the scenario he creates. A reconsideration of the sector of Mysia should permit a reconstruction in which Orontes was there, as Tiribazus' subordinate, after the Cypriote campaign.

135

136

Osborne, it seems, has been led astray by the belief that Ariobarzanes' rebellion was triggered by Artaxerxes' decision to replace him with Artabazus. The references cited 011 300 n. 19 by Osborne give 110 motivation for the rebellion. On the putative satrapy of Ionia see Weiskopf 88-93, n. 14 on pp. 133-134.

72

ORONTES

Mysia

The sector of Mysia was often a particular source of grief to Achaemnid officials. It lay within the spheres of influence of the satraps at Dascylium and at Sardis, although the regions around the Caicus river were properly part of Lydia.1 37 The native Mysians were impossible to control effectively: tribally organized, lightly armed, and highly mobile, they posed a constant threat to more settled regions (Hell. Oxy, 21.1, Xen. Mem. 3.5.26, Xen. Anab . 2.5.13). Campaigns had been launched from Sparda to keep the recalcitrant elements in check as early as the sixth century (Hdt. 6.28). Achaemenid officers had open to them a number of means of counteracting the destabilizing effects of Mysian tribesmen. Tribes could be off each other, or compliant elements coopted and set against their neighbors. Some Mysians were used in local militias: they appear under the command of the younger Artaphernes of Sparda in 480 B.C. (HdL 7.74) and of Pharnabazus in the fourth century (Xen, Hell. 4.1.24). Unfortunately, they might also up part of the power base of recalcitrant Achaemenid officers such as another Orontes, a lesser officer in Sparda who was at odds with the younger Cyrus (Xen, Anab. 1.6.7). It also appears that the more stable Mysians had organized themselves-cor were encouraged to do so by Achaemenid officials-vintn settlements in fixed localities (Xen, Anab. 3.2.23), so forming a bulwark against less stable tribes. 138 Policing the Mysians must have been a constant, if not tiresome, activity for officers from Lydia and Dascylium: Cyrus the Younger, operating out of Sparda, had mobilized troops against the Mysians and attempted to stabilize the region by stationing loyal men in Mysia (Xen, Anab. 1.9.14). Later Pharnabazus of Dascylium undertook campaigns against the disruptive Mysians, during which he relied on the assistance of subordinates (Xen. Hell. 3.1.13). One aim in these campaigns must have been to secure high points from which the Mysians had staged raids (cf, Xen, Mem. 3.5.26). It is perhaps in these locales that Cyrus placed some of the loyal men. Tribally organized, highly mobile recalcitrants were not the only political force operative in Mysia. To them we may add Greek political bosses in nearby cities, local nobles who owned estates, and troops who may have been stationed as 137

138

Lewis Spa ria and Persia 55-56 points out how the Mysian tribesmen lay between the sector effectively controlled by the satraps at Sparda and Dascylium, His is a more sophisticated perception than Osborne's, which simply makes an effort to establish precise boundaries for the region without considering the boundaries' implications. One should not be as sanguine as Xenophon about the nature of these settlements. Robert EI. Anal. 185-198 indicates that small villages were the rule among the native Mysians until about the second century A.D. A brief summary may be found in F. W. Walbank Polybius I 605.

OROj\j~fES

73

garrisons and/or colonists upon royal command. The career of the local noble Asidates in Xen, Anab. 7.8 illustrates the interaction of these political entities. At the time of Thibron's campaign in 399, Asidates found his fortified estate on the Caicus plain under attack by the Greek political bosses in Pergamum and nearby cities, who were now strengthened with foreign troops lead by Xenophon, Asidates, who possessed his own following which he used as a militia, was on good terms with his neighbors, and could obtain assistance from another noble, Itarnenes, and forces which represent either military colonists or a garrison force (Xen. Anab. 7.8.14-15). However, Asidates, his family, and possessions were captured (7.8.22). What is portrayed here is an extension to include the Greeks of the conflict between settled forces on the plain (Achaemenid estates) and disruptive forces on high points, such as those the Mysians held. It is uncertain how long this type of conflict continued in general, but OGIS 264 (1. 5-10) implies that some action had been taken to lessen the threat posed by the Pergamenes by settling them on the plain where they might be dealt with more summarily by local Achaemenid officials.139 It is now possible to construct a list of the types of Achaernenid personnel active in Mysia. Among the highest officers are the satraps at Sparda and Dascylium, and special officers such as Cyrus the Younger. We should assume they will take an active part in Mysian affairs only in extreme circumstances, that is during instability of a level requiring their intervention with a large number of troops. Normal peace-keeping activities would be a job undertaken by local nobles such as Asidates and Iramenes, by military colonists and garrison forces, or by Greek political bosses (regardless of their stance towards the local Persians, it would be in their own interests to keep the Mysians docile). In sum, Mysia does not possess a single Achaemenid official of high status who might be characterized as a satrap. What of the title satrap of Mysia? There is no need to emend away Mysia. 140 Throughout his discussion of Achaemenid affairs Diodorus uses "satrap" in a descriptive sense, the term signifying for him an officer of the Achaemenid Empire who is of Iranian extraction (and has a name which does not sound very Hellenicj.H! For example, in 15.90 the Iranians Orontes, Autophradates, and Ariobarzanes are satraps; Canan Mausolus is a dynast. More significant is the tendency of Diodorus to use the term satrap for those officers who were not 139 140 141

The relevant text indicates that Orontes resettled the Pergamenes back on the hill in. their own city. 'The word for hill is a restoration (only the first two letters are extant). E.g. Hornblower 177 and 11.61. Cf. Weiskopf 9-12.

74

OROmES

highest officers in their sector. Aridaeus, Ariaeus in Xenophon, a subordinate of Cyrus, is called "Cyrus' satrap" (14.24.1, a sense reminiscent of Xen, Hell. 3.1.10 ff). Mithrines is called satrap (17.21.7), although he was only garrison commander at Sardis (Arr. Anab. L 17.3). Harpalus, Alexander's finance minister, is called satrap 07.108.4) as is Tiribazus, a lesser officer in Armenia 04.27.7). But most interesting is Diodorus 14.1L Diodorus has decided to tell Ephorus' version of the arrest and death of Alcibiades. Unable to obtain safe passage from Pharnabazus to Artaxerxes in order to reveal the plans of Cyrus, Alcibiades set out to the 'satrap of Paphlagonia' to obtain safe conduct Like Mysia, Paphlagonia was a sector whose inhabitants were highly mobile recalcitrants organized into tribes. The highest officers who dealt with this region were Pharnabazus, satrap of Dascylium, and, later, Datames, satrap of Cappadocia. As in the case of Mysia, there was no satrap, no single highest officer, in charge of Paphlagonia, When Diodorus refers to Orontes as satrap of Mysia he is at best describing him as an Achaemenid officer, not as the highest officer of a distinct administrative sector, i.e., as satrap of a satrapy, Orontes' Position and Appointment

Orontes' position in Mysia was one parallel to Asidates' and Itamenes' in the 390's (the incidents in Xenophon are unique only in that they were recorded). Orontes would own an estate (with villages and fortifications), have something of a personal following, and deal with Greek cities and Mysian tribesmen. Evidence for Orontes' activities in the west (e.g. OGIS 264, Polyaenus 7.14.2-4) indicate dealings with Greeks and Greek cities in sectors controlled out of Sardis and the possession of his own forces (Diod, 15.91.1 aside). His titular superior would be the satrap at Sardis. And we should not assume that Orontes is the only such lesser officer in the sector. Orontes' appointment to this lesser post should be taken as a sign of Artaxerxes' disfavor (tempered by mercy): Orontes was no longer highest officer as he was in Armenia. He was far from his old estates, his old network of friendships. Mysia was a sector over which influence could be exercised by Ihe more powerful satraps at Sparda and Dascylium. Orontes had displayed a skill which may have suggested to Artaxerxes an appointment to a sector like Mysia: as satrap of Armenia Orontes had been responsible for arranging a modus vivendi with the recalcitrant Carduchi (Xen. Anab. 3.5.16-17). He might be able to do something similar in Mysia. But it would be unlikely, even if he pacified and

ORONTES

75

coopted large numbers of Mysian tribesmen, regardless of his motivation in so doing, that Orontes would have been able to rival ills more powerful neighbors at Dascylium and Sparda-vunder normal circumstances. We should also count on the possibility of some rivalry between Orontes and other local nobles. According to Osborne, Orontes was appointed to the satrapy of Mysia after the years 366-364. He bases this statement on his observation that Orontes does not appear in our documentation between 380 and the late 360's and on his belief that Orontes must be the highest officer of some distinct administrative unit for him to command rebels in 362/1. Because Osborne insists on defining the satrapy of Mysia as those coastal sectors normally under the control of the satrap of Lydia, 364 or shortly thereafter seems to him the most reasonable dating for Orontes' appointment, and the best possible time for Autophradates' satrapy to have been split in two. If we abandon the belief that Orontes was the highest officer of a specific sector, his absence in the meager source material concerning Autophradates and Sparda before 362 is not surprising. Osborne makes much of Orontes' absence in Xen, Ages. 2.26. Autophradates is in conflict with Ariobarzanes and holds the northern part of Sparda, part of the supposed satrapy of Mysia. Since Orontes is not mentioned, he must not be in the west. But his absence should not be a matter of great concern. Xenophon sought to praise Agesilaus' activities and mentioned only those officers with whom the Spartan had contact and emerged superior. Orontes may well have been in the west, but simply had no contact with Agesilaus worth noting. There is no reference to Orontes in Nepos' Datames, a work. designed to glorify Datames at the expense of other important Achaemenid personnel It is entirely possible that Datames had no contact with Orontes in the 370's. What is surprising is that Nepos fails to refer to either Orontes or to a major disturbance when narrating events of the late 360's (Dat. 9-11). The ancient record is simply silent on Orontes' appointment. Osborne leaves a rather large gap, Orontes said to have been removed from Armenia following the Cypriote campaign (early 370's), then appointed to Mysia before 362/1. His scenario is curious: a rehabilitated rebel is sent to assist the only loyalist; shortly after his arrival, he revolts and fights the man he was sent to assist. But if Orontes' transfer to the west involved essentially only giving him an estate in Mysia, we may place the appointment any time between the conclusion of the Cypriote campaign and 362/1. An appointment to Mysia shortly after the conclusion of the Cypriote campaignl'l-' would have attraction for Artaxerxes. Tiribazus, slandered by Orontes and once Orontes' subordinate in 142

Cf. Beloch 2 3:2140.

76

ORONTES

Armenia, would now be his superior, one sure to watch the slanderer closely. To the north of Orontes would be Ariobarzanes, who was apparently on good tenus with Tiribazus, Add the Mysian tribesmen, the Greeks, and other lesser officers who stood beside Tiribazus, and Orontes, isolated from his old power base, would be in for a less than pleasant time. This type of demotion for Orontes can certainly by described by Diodorus' words eschatais atimiais (15.11.1), and could have prompted Orontes' observation Ion his now diminished status (Plut, Mor. 174b). Although Orontes was in disgrace upon his arrival in Mysia, he should have been able to enhance his status among colleagues over time. Success in operations of the type noted for Asidates and Itamenes would have won Orontes begrudging respect. One should not rule out a role for Orontes' age and status. Since he had held an important post in Armenia in 401 B.C., he was probably born before 430 and was older than either Ariobarzanes or Autophradates, his more powerful neighbors.J't- He had married a daughter of Artaxerxes (Xen. Anab . 2.4.8, 3.4.13, Plut, Artax. 27), a dose tie to the ruling house which may have saved his life and which wO,uld be difficult for most officers in the west to claim. Thus, by the mid-360's Orontes would be an officer high in personal status, though not in political status. A failure-real or imagined-in the competence of highest officers could help alter Orontes' political status. Orontes' Activities

Orontes' status has just been diminished from satrap to lesser officer, one among many of Autophradates' subordinates. A reexamination of the various epigraphic. numismatic, and literary documents which chronicle, always in anecdotal or fragmentary form, the activities of Orontes will establish that those activities were within the competence of a lesser officer exploiting the difficulties experienced by his superior. IG Il2 207: Orontes and Athens

lG n2 207 , an epigraphic text consisting of four possibly related fragments, is normally held to be evidence of Orontes' activities in 349/8, and in particular of

143

Cf. Judeich 223.

ORONTES

77

his dose commercial. and military ties with Athens. 144 Although fragment a of the inscription is missing and the archon's name on line 11 required for dating appears differently in each modern copy of that fragment's text, scholars have believed the archon's name in fragment a and the generals mentioned in rragment b- c-vd (these portions can be joined together physically) represent definitive evidence for a date in 349/8. Osborne challenged this dating and so placed all of Orontes' activities in the 360's.145 With this view in general. 1 concur, but 1 will offer some modifications. In addition, 1 stress that the document presents better evidence about the freedom of action a lesser officer might enjoy and, secondly, about Athens' and Orontes' desire to use each other for temporary gain, than evidence for the activities of the well-organized rebels which figure in Diodorus' and in modern accounts of the 360's. Osborne holds that fragments b-vc-v d were part of a single decree involving Athenian agreements with Orontes, In these fragments there is no internal evidence, such as an eponymous archon's name, which would permit their assignment to a precise year. The now-lost fragment a was probably not part of the same decree. As for the date of fragment a, the archon's name was copied as Nikomachou by Pittakys, the scholar who actually saw the stone. Osborne suggests that may be a blunder on Pittakys' part for Nikophemou, for no Nikomachos appears as archon until 341. Thus 361/0, the year in which Nikophemos was eponymous archon, is a possible date for fragment a. While this fragment seems to be from a decree general. in content, the other fragment (b+c+d) contains quite specific provisions. The activities reported in the former fragment are not in themselves rebellious. Orontes is spoken of as being of service to Athens (1. 5-6), he is seen as one who will cooperate with the Athenians and their allies (lines 12 ff.) in commercial agreements. His sphere of influence is defined by the rather colorless term arche (line 14). Orontes is honored with a 1000drachma gold crown, and perhaps-jf restorations are to be trusted-vwith Athenian

144

145

IG li2 207: See also Parke PRJA 43 (1936) 367-378. Cf. Cargill 92 n. 27, Troxell 28, Hornblower

202, 203 n. 160. Osborne ABSA 66 (1971). The old date depended upon the revisions of Pittakys' Nikomachou to Kammachou in Rangabe's copy, then to Kaillijmachou, the IIi simply inserted as a 'restoration'. 349/8 as the date has been defended recently by Moysey ZPE 69 (1987) 93-100, esp. 96 ff. In the year Kallimachus was archon, 349/8, the generals mentioned in b-vc-d could be placed near Orontes' sphere of operations. Osborne ABSA 66 (1971) 317-318 (against Parke 375-376) removes one difficulty for a date in the 360's by indicating that Charidemus need not have been an Athenian citizen in order to appear in the decree. Cargill (172-176, esp. 174-175) removes another difficulty by suggesting that Chares was not at Corcyra in the late 360's, but in the early 360'3.

78

ORONTES

citizenship. Under normal circumstances Orontes could claim without difficulty that Athens, under the King's Peace, was supposed to be friendly towards the Great King and that as he, Orontes, extended his own influence, he extended Achaemenid influence. Earlier I argued that the grant of Athenian citizenship to the satrapal family at Dascylium was a sign of the latter's strength, and of the grantor's fear. Fragment b+c+d reports agreements of a more specific nature, the sale and transport of grain for Athenian forces under the generals Chares, Charidemus, and Phocion (lines 12,14,21). The grain was ready in Mysia, Orontes' sector, at the beginning of the campaigning season. Nothing precluded local nobles and/or lesser officers from disposing of agricultural products as they saw fit unless those goods were sold to those acting openly against Achaernenid interests, or superior officers were being cheated in the transactions, i.e., requisite tribute was left unpaid because funds and goods were diverted elsewhere. In both sets of fragments Orontes' activities would be rebellious only if placed in a context in which he was known to be acting against the Empire. 146 There is such a context: Both decrees, a and b-vcwd, are best assigned to the period of the 360's, when Orontes is claimed to have stood against Artaxerxes, Beginning in 366 the Hellespont became a war zone, and Athen's cultivation of Ariobarzanes and Philiscus was now of little value. But Mysian grain was a product which could be transported with greater safety (fragment c; line 13, suggests shipment to Lesbos). Orontes was presented by the Athenian desire for grain with a further opportunity to build up his own influence and power base. In the wake of commercial ties might follow the ability to hire, without state opposition, mercenaries from Athens (cf. Polyaenus 7.14.3-4 on the significance of Greek mercenaries for Orontes). I suggest that fragment a succeeds b+c+d : Orontes' grain (sold at an earlier time, line 6) purchased for him respectability as one friendly to Athens. 147 Nor is there a problem in assigning the decree to 361/0, although by then Orontes' military positions were under increased pressure. Athens and Orontes had worked together in hopes of substantial future gains-yet neither seems to have been able to provide the other with substantial and lasting aid. IG n2 207, or, more properly, the fragments assigned that single number, does not serve as evidence for grandiose aims on the part of Orontes, but instead

146 147

Parke 376, 378 touches on this briefly. Cf. Moysey ZPE 69 (1987) 100 and 100 n. 29 (There he backs away from the view that Orontes was a rebel in 349/8, i.e. no second rebellion by Orontes). There is a parallel: IG lI 2 2m, securely dated to the summer of 368 (the end of the archon year). grants a crown to Dionysius. His service had been the dispatch of military assistance in the campaigning season of 369, i.e., before Nov.-Dec. 369.

ORONTES

79

fits nicely into a context of activities carried out in Lydia as Orontes tried to extend his influence outward. Osborne's work produced an important conclusion about Orontes: a case can no longer be made that Orontes was active in the 350's, i.e., his second rebellion dlsappears.H'' The only passage from that decade which refers to him is Demosthenes 14.31 (354 B.C.), a general reference coupling Egypt and Orontes as well-known examples of objects of Achaemenid mobilizations in which Greeks fought on the side of the Great King. Fourth century Egypt had already been the object of campaigns in which Greeks served Achaemenid commanders. Orontes' sale of grain to Athens a few years before, his possible Athenian citizenship, political discussions at Athens about both, and the efforts of Orontes and his opponents to hire mercenaries all gained for Orontes here a prominent place in Demosthenes' mind.

Orontes' Coins By far the most abused body of evidence for Orontes' career has been the numismatic record. Fortunately a lengthy discussion of Orontes' coinage here is rendered unnecessary by the excellent work of Hyla Troxell. 149 Some comments win be made on the date of the coins, but they will in no way affect Troxell's numismatic conclusions. Troxell assigns an of Orontes' known coins to two mints: Atramyttium and Cisthene, cities on the Gulf of Atramyttium. The silver and bronze coinage attributed to the first site are the issues normally attributed to Lampsacus (because of their reverse type, the fore-part, or protome, of a winged horse). Troxell's attribution is based on the comparison of the Orontes coins with those of Lampsacus and Attamyttium: the latter's coins offer more points of similarity in size, fabric, orientation, style, and arrangement of inscription. Moreover, Oronta is the genitive form one would expect to find in a city using Aeolic (Lesbian) dialect. The silver and bronze coinage once given to Cisthene and Clazomenae now go to Cisthene alone. The reverse type of a winged boar's forepart, the cause for the coins' attribution to Clazomenae, now appears on a coin stamped kappa, iota, sigma. Again, the genitive Oronta, found on silver and

148

149

Osborne ABSA 66 (1971) 316, 317 n. 126; Historia 22 (1973) 544-551 where he holds that Orontes' appearance in Demosthenes' speech was due to his leadership of an important revolt. Moysey ZPE 69 (1987) 97 ff., although arguing that Orontes was still alive, but not rebellious, in 349/8, does raise the possibility that the Orontes in IG Il 2 207 was a descendant of the famous Orontes. For previous treatments see Troxell, also Starr Ir. AnI. 12 (1977) 89, 91.

80

OROmES

some bronzes, is more likely to appear where does the Aeolic dialect (Cisthene) than the Ionic (Clazomenae), What is remarkable, then, is that the numismatic record confines Orontes' activities to a relatively small area, the same area I proposed was the bone of contention between Ariobarzanes and Autophradates, and orne mot far distant from Pergamum, known to have been in Orontes' hands (OGIS 264).150 What is completely absent is any evidence for Orontes leading a widespread rebellion and possessing grandiose hopes. The gold of Lampsacus once assigned him is assigned by Troxell to Artabazus.Fi! I disagree with Troxell's dating of the Orontes coins to c. 357-352, a dating prompted by her belief that Orontes was rebelling against Artaxerxes HI, the evidence cited for this being IG n2 207. Thanks 1:0 Osborne, 349/8 as the date for that document is removed, and so ends Orontes' existence as an officer active beyond the 360's. Literary evidence, which Troxell places in the 350's as well, calls attention to Orontes' use of Greek mercenaries and his warfare with Autophradates within the satrapy of Lydia. Orontes' coinage is a campaign coinage, i.e., orne struck to pay soldiers. Orontes was able to exercise control enough over two cities, Cisthene and Atramyttium, to cause their mints to strike coins very dose to normal civic issues but which differed in some way so as to call attention to Orontes as the man responsible for their existence, On Atramyttium's appears the name Oronta and/or the image of an Achaemenid officer, on Cisthene's the same. The most reasonable date for these coinages is the later 360's, when Orontes is said to have acted against Artaxerxes. OrontesMilitary Activities in Sparda

There exists only limited attestation in the historical record for specific military operations undertaken by Oromes. 152 Polyaenus 7.14.2-4 reports three such incidents, which should be placed in the later 360's. In 7.14.2 Orontes, a rebel, is fighting unspecified generals of the Great King. Operations center around Sardis and Mount Tmolus and meet with a modicum of success. A reasonable conclusion is that these operations are directed against Autophradates, satrap at

150 151 152

Troxell 32. Troxell 36. Minting in gold is an index of an Achaemenid officer's influence over a region, not of his loyalty or disloyalty towards the crown. For a date in the 360's see Osborne ABSA 66 (1971) 317 n. 126; His/aria 22 (1973) 547-549. For the older dating: Judeich 19,207 TI. 1,208,212-213; Beloch 2 3:2 140.

OROl'<'TES

81

Sparda, and his lesser officers. In 7.14.3 is named as the object of Orontes' aggressions at Cyme. Orontes' Greek hoplites give him at tactical edge; Autophradates and his cavalry will not make a frontal attack. In 7. at an unspecified locale, Orontes has lost many as the result of a surprise attack launched by Autophradates, His strategem convinces Autophradates that new mercenaries, which the satrap had expected to join up with the rebel, arrived. In all these incidents, Orontes operates in the satrapy of Sparda, and his enemy is Autophradates. OGIS 264 (lines 5-10) reports an operation of and political nature. While a Orontes settled 'proOrontes' Greek personnel on the old site of Pergamum. This move represents the building up of Orontes' own base (securing the Caicus valley) and comes before operations closer to the satrapal capital. In the mobilization This record and Orontes' coinage are against Ariobarzanes, Autophradates would have called upon Orontes, one of his lesser officers closest to the satrapy of to provide military forces from his region and probably to lead them himself. Following operations in the Gulf of Atramyttium in 365 Orontes enjoyed enough power eventually to exercise the control over Atramyttium and Cisthene 153 needed for his coinage to be struck and additional foreign soldiers paid. Activities at Cyme and Pergamum suggest a growth in his strength which to attacks farther south ncar Sardis. Orontes and the Egyptian Theater

Crucial to the reconstruction of the 'satraps' revolt' as a massive destabilization of the Achaemenid far west has been the assumption that there existed at least the plans for widespread cooperation (if not joint invasion sectors east of the led by Orontes, and the king Syrian desert) between the rebel satraps of of rebel Egypt, Tachos.1 54 Unfortunately, neither Autophradates nor Mausolus stood against Artaxerxes, and Orontes' seem to have been confined to an outward extension of his base in Mysia (an early version of the Attalid Kingdom, which fed off the weakness in Seleucid Lydia). To what extent, then, were events in Egypt and its environs tied to destabilizations in Anatolia?

153 154

On Cisihene harbor see Troxell 32. Keinitz 93-99, 166-181 provides the most recent thoroughgoing study of Egypt during the 360's. His basic interpretation is a good one: trouble in Anatolia encourages a forward policy in Egypt. But he believes the troubles in Anatolia to have been well-organized. Close ties between the two theaters: Judeich 146, 164-169,203; Beloch 2 3:2157; Olmstead 417-421. Also Bresciani CHl524-525.

82

ORONTES

There are only two incidents which provide evidence of possible cooperation between the Egyptian sphere and Anatolia, i.e, with Orontes. The first is the diplomatic and military activities of Rheomithres, a lesser officer allied to Orontes. Xenophon Cyrop, 8.8.4, in a discussion of the decline of contemporary Persian morals, indicates that Rheomithres left his wife, children, and his friends' children-vas hostages-behind in Egypt while he then 'defected' to the Great King in hopes of some great reward (d. Diad. 15.91.1 on Orontes), Diodorus 15.92.1 reports Rheomithres was sent by the rebels to Tachos and received 500 talents of silver and fifty ships. He sailed north, established a base at Leucae, and became loyal to Artaxerxes, The material donated by Tachos to the rebels was never used to further the rebellion. Only self-interest and self-survival appear to be of importance here: Tachos achieved nothing by his expenditures; the position of the rebels in neither Egypt nor Anatolia was improved. No use of resources against Artaxerxes by Rheornithres is reported, although on his voyage north the 'rebel' may have acted as a pirate in order to reprovision, i.e., he treated all other forces as hostile towards him. A second incident, suggestive of an expectation that Orontes and t-he Egyptian rebels hoped to cooperate, is found in Trogus Prol. 10: deinde in Syria praefectum Armeniae Oronton. Orontes is present in Syria and the object of Artaxerxes' attacks. There are a number of problems with this phrase: Orontes' title, already discussed, is incorrect; there is no way he could have deployed troops in Syria; the Egyptian rebels, whose leadership was unstable in the late 360's, were strong enough only to prevent Achaemenid re-conquest and were unable to make any substantial gains outside Egypt proper-vtheir forces did not reach Syria.1 55 Deployment of large forces by sea would require constant landings for reprovisioning (at least for fresh water). To have Orontes reach Syria from the coast of Sparda one must assume either a great deal of support for Orontes throughout Anatolia (for which there is no evidence, d. next section) or the ability of Orontes and his forces to fight their way by land through Anatolia. Sparda and Caria were not supporters of Orontes' aggrandizement; the experiences of Autophradates against the Pisidians and Datames suggest that one should not be optimistic at all about moving through southern Anatolia, assuming there had been success in moving through Sparda and Caria. Movement by sea would require a sizeable fleet-Iarge enough to oppose the navies which would be launched from Lydia and Caria, powerful enough to force landings for supplies, 155

There are textual difficulties. In Seel's Teubner edition, Class I of the mss. reads Oronti in omnibusque (Oronta: B of Class I).

ORONTES

83

even in hostile territory, and flexible enough to ward off constant forays privateers taking advantage of political disorder. Orontes might have had access to the core of such a fleet had not Rheomithres surrendered the ships provided by Tachos--however many made it safely to Anatolia. The numismatic evidence and historical record (save for Trogus) place Orontes no further south or east than Sardis. Orontes would have had to move through an immense amount of territory. I do not see how he could do it. Trogus Prol. 10 is wrong--the reference to Syria could be a confusion with some aspect of the Egyptian theater, but the cause for such a confusion remains obscure. The Egyptian rebels were in no position to project their power any distance from Egypt proper. 156 In 363 Tachos, the rebel king, was at some advantage in maintaining his independence because troops could not easily be drawn from Anatolia to use against him. He embarked on a forward policy designed to disrupt the Achaemenid-held environs of his kingdom. With the assistance of Greek soldiers led by Chabrias and Agcsilaus.P? Tachos invaded Phoenicia (362/1), and stationed troops there (Plut, Ages. 37; Diod. 15.92.3).1 58 It was his intention that these bases would serve as staging areas for forces to invade and besiege cities in Syria (Diod, 15.92.4). But before the plan could be effected, Tachos' own forces revolted (Plut, Ages. 37; Diod, 15.92.3-5). Plutarch and Diodorus differ as to the outcome.P? What is important to note is the transitory nature of the Egyptian threat beyond Egypt.

156 157

158

159

Note Tachos' financial problems: Pseudo-Aristotle Gee. 2.1350b33- 1351all. Agesilaus: Hofstetter nr, 3, Plut. Ages. 36, Xen, Ages. 2.28, Nepos Ages. 7.2, 8.1-5, Pluto Mar. 214d, Theopompus FGrH 115 fro 106a-b,l08 (= Athenaeus 9.384a, 15.676c-d, 14.616d-e). Chabrias: Pseudo-Aristotle Gee. 2.1350b33-135laI7, 1353a19-24; Plut. Ages. 37, Diod. 15.92.3 (Nepos Chabrias 2-3 confuses service under Akoris-vcf. Diod. 15.29--for service under Tachos). For the difficult to date IG n2 119, which refers to envoys from Tachos, cf. Hornblower 174-175 who cites other discussions. As for Phoenicia, there is a good deal of information on Strato of Sidon, but the best which can be concluded is that in the midst of trouble emanating from Egypt, Strato sought to take a more independent stance. Cf. Weiskopf n. 106 on pp. 458-459. Also see Bctlyon 11-16, who removes Strate from the scene as early as 362/1. Earlier discussions: Austin JHS 66 (1944) 98-100, Moysey AJAH 1 (1976) 182-189. Plut. Ages. 37-40 has Tachos fall from power by rebellion among his own men, Agesilaus' service concluding under Nectanebis. Diod.15.92.2-93.6, anxious to detail treachery, has Tachos seek out Achaernenid assistance, which he uses along with that of the still loyal Agesilaus to regain his throne. Diodorus' defective narrauon-which places Agesilaus in the position of being an Achaernenid supportcr-vmay be a confusion deriving from an unsuccessful punitive campaign undertaken by Artaxerxes ill c. 360. Cf. Trogus Prol, 10. Syncellus (cited in Judeich 167) indicates that Ochus made a campaign while Artaxerxes n was still alive; also see Alben 4.150b-c, cf. Weiskopf 459-460 n.l07-109.

84

ORONTES

Ties between the Egyptian and Anatolian theaters were minimal; relations between Tachos IDd Orontes were that each man was at once exploiter and exploited. To Tachos, Orontes and his emissary Rheomithres were possible allies, Once supplied, they could tie up Achaemenid forces which might otherwise be sent southward against rebel Egypt To Orontes, Tachos was a source of materiel. The troubles in the Levant were Tachos' doing. There was action. no "The Reply to the Satraps' Envoy" One inscription which has been used W enhance the perception that those who stood against Artaxerxes were well-organized IDd that Orontes stood at their head is the fragmentary SIG3 182, the 'reply to the satraps' envoy', Le., an envoy dispatched to the Greeks to obtain their assistance in damaging the King's House. 160 The reply is a refusal to assist either the satraps who sent the envoy or the Great King; neutrality is desired. But this lacunose document is too fragmentary to permit the assignment of a precise date to the reply or the making of any precise statements about the nature of the 'satraps' who sent the envoy. Instead, it is ID example of Greek diplomatic language.self-interest, IDd a desire to place Hellenes in a morally superior position. The inscription, once seen at Argos, is now lost: two copies from the hands of modem scholars are extant The fragmentary text and uncertainty whether the original was inscribed stoichedon make restorations most difficult More significantly, the surviving text, or copies thereof, contains two distinct and seemingly unrelated documents: the first is the 'reply', the second concerns the settlement of territorial disputes by arbitration. The 'reply' itself is too fragmentary to allow a determination of what legal body was responsible for the text The term 'Hellenes' is used, and the natural interpretation is that these are mainland Greeks. No group is specified, and, in spite of the use of the Attic dialect, it would be quite easy for a limited organization to speak broadly IDd with diplomatic niceties. 161 The envoy appears in line 3. This single envoy is given neither specific identity nor specific mission. It is deduced! from the restoration of the reply that the envoy's mission was a request by the 'rebels' for military assistance. Yet

160 161

See fG IV 556, S!G 3 182, Tod 145, Bengtson Staastvertrdge nr, 292, SEG 9.318, 22.265, Ryder Kaine Eirene 85-86,142-144, MeloniRS! 63 (1951) 18-21. Hornblower 175, 175 n. 46, 203, 203 n.161.

ORONTES

85

reply is directed to the Great King. The 'satraps' are unidentified: in view of the vague tone of the document, 'satraps' could simply mean any officer from within the Achaernenid Empire, regardless of status or political disposition. The document is too vague W permit identification of these 'satraps' or determination of their reason for seeking out the 'Hellenes'. It is as if particulars are suppressed in order to place the 'Hellenes' in a better light The tenor of the Greek reply is diplomatically self-serving. It portrays the status quo as one in which affairs in Greece are self-contained. Troubles among the Greeks are solved peacefully by the Greeks themselves (lines 3-7, use of diplomacy; line 8, no hostility with the Great King). Hence there exists neither the opportunity nor the need for Persian involvement in Greek affairs. This depiction of Greek affairs is to apply to all Persian officers regardless of their political disposition. Any shift in the status quo will be blamed on the Great King: the Greeks proclaim they will actively maintain their neutrality and enter into no hostilities with Achaemenid officers.lv? As far as me Greeks are concerned the status quo will continue (1. 8-12). Blame for me opening of any hostilities in me future will be laid directly upon me Great King, and hostile actions are for me Greeks alone to define. Two types of possible hostility are recognized: overt (1. 12), and covert (1. 12-13). Such acts may be committed by the Great King or his subordinates; me latter group is very loosely defined (line 15, me shadowy nature of these officers subordinate to me Great King is another reason to mink me term satrap in this document has no real juridical value). The type of response me Greeks will make to such aggression is left for the Greeks themselves to decide. 163 All of this is marmoreal bravado: the Greeks have taken the opportunity to issue a 'reverse' King's Peace, The Great King is told to stay out of Europe or face the consequences. SlG3 182 tells us nothing about Orontes, his aims, the scope of his activities, or the organization of those officers whom modems label as standing against the crown.

Orontes' War Against Autophradates If Orontes' status in the west is that of a lesser officer and his activities are confined to the satrapy of Lydia and its environs, it remains to present a

162 163

Excellent discussion of these points in Meloni RSl63 (1951) 18-21. Unfortunately, most of this portion of the text is restored; the use oi axios (not restored) seems to point to the Greeks defining what actions they will take.

86

ORONTES

reconstruction of his activities after his removal from Armenia, including his rebellion against his immediate superior, Autophradates, satrap of Lydia. Following his arrival in Mysia early in the 370's as a lesser officer, Orontes could fulfill two types of military and political responsibilities: first, local policing actions of the type described in Xenophon's works for Asidates, Itamenes, and Zenis (the last from Dascylium): second, the provision of human and economic resources for use some distance away in campaigns on a larger scale (e.g, the Egyptian campaign in the 370's, led by Pharnabazus). Orontes would have to undertake local campaigns at least as a matter of self-preservation, to assure the productivity of his property and his ability to meet his financial obligations to Sparda and Susa, Tiribazus may have desired some participation by Orontes' following in larger campaigns waged further from Mysia since it would be unwise to draw troops from Orontes' neighbors, while leaving the previously untrustworthy Orontes' own military resources undiminished. There may have been a lessening of distrust of Orontes on the part of the satrapal administration once Autophradates took up the satrapy, for no previous treachery of Orontes towards him is attested. Troops from Orontes' sector were likely drawn for' use against Datames. Nepos' numbers aside (Dat. 8.2), the campaign appears not to have been a minor one; Autophradates could expect to face the forces drawn from a rather large satrapy. Orontes' role in the warfare against Ariobarzanes would have been more major. His sector was just outside Dascylium's sphere (Pergamum is not too distant from Atramyttium), So much can be suggested for Orontes through the end of the 365 campaigning season.

Timing and Motivation for Rebellion As for the timing and motivation of Orontes' rebellion against Autophradates, Diodorus 15.91.1, the only account which offers a description of a starting and ending point, is of little value. The rebellion is one of many events assigned to the single year 362/1. Only the great rewards Orontes hoped would be corning his way as a result of the surrender are reported: gifts and an office described as 'the satrapy of the whole seacoast'. This phrase refers in some way to the territory that Orontes controlled as a result of his activities against Autophradates and his exploitation of Ariobarzanes' collapse and onto which he hoped the Great King would allow him to hold.1 64 Diodorus' shortcomings leave us to make 164

Comparison with the other passages in Diodorus indicates that a title which combines satrapeia (or a related word) with parathalassios has no single definition. All the passages raise their own problems.

OROT\Y[ES

87

somewhat arbitrary, but hopefully reasonable, suggestions about the timing and motivation behind Orontes' deeds. Orontes would do best to begin overt hostilities when he reached a period of maximum preparedness and perceived the objects of his attack as experiencing a period of maximum instability. During the 364 campaigning season Orontes could keep his troops under arms and claim needed Mysian policing operations as the reason. He could also sound out other officers, now demobilizing from warfare against Ariobarzanes, and, treacherously, sound out their troops for signs of disaffection and possible support for himself. Commercial contacts with Athens could also be initiated. In the campaigning season of 363 Orontes could have had an excellent opportunity to initiate hostilities designed to expand his sector. At this point Ariobarzanes' administration in Dascylium had collapsed and Artabazus had not yet taken control of the entire satrapy, Only Autophradates could offer a ready opposition of any strength. With Orontes' rebellion beginning in 363, there would be enough instability in 362 for Diodorus' assignation of all events to that year to make some sense, and enough of a power base belonging to Orontes, even under attack, for Athenian honors, granted apparently in 361, not to be an illustration of poor timing. As far as the motivation behind Orontes' behavior, it is safest to say that Orontes saw the mid-360's as his last chance to take vengeance for his diminished status. By now he was at least 65, probably closer to 70 years old. His rebellion would be a display of his furor over being subordinate first to Tiribazus and then to Autophradates, who could be viewed as having mismanaged both the campaign against Datames and that against Ariobarzanes.lv'' He would now create a realm for himself in which he was highest officer, and create it at the expense of those for whom he had contempt.

165

Diod. 14.19.2 calls Cyrus the man in charge of the coastal satrapies i.e., one man controls many districts. However, the vexed issue of the exact nature of Cyrus' post is involved. In 14.35.2 Tissaphernes journeys to take up all the coastal satrapies: here too, we must deal with the issue of how to define a special command. Diod. 14.98.3 refers to satraps in charge of coastal cities, but in an imprecise and descriptive fashion. Diod. 16.52.2 and 16.50.7 may seem helpful, but raise difficulties. In the first Mentor is called 'satrap', but is it uncertain whether 'satrap' is used here precisely, to refer to a highest officer. Mentor's duties suggest he held a command of a special nature. The second passage is overly grandiose and Diodorus seems interested in emphasizing the size of the awards. Three passages connect the term 'general' with the 'coast': 9.35.1 (of Harpagus, holding a special command), 13.36.5 (of Diodorus' 'mega-Phamabazus', a conflation of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus), 14.99.1 (of Struthas, satrap of Sparda). Most scholars have seized upon the similarity in wording between 14.19.2 and 15.91.1 to argue that Orontes desired some sort of special command in Anatolia: Judeich 206, 212 (cf. 218,224); Osborne ABSA 66(1971) 315, Historia 22 (1973) 542, 544 n. 133-134. Cf. the disgust of Pharnabazus in Xen. Hell. 4.1.37.

88

ORONTES

OrontesSupporters Orontes' supporters in Diod. 15.91.1 are normally identified with me highest officers named in Diodorus 15.90.3. Unfortunately, Orontes is attested to have had contact with only one, Autophradates, who was me object of his attacks (Polyaenus 7.14.3-4). Rather, one should count among Orontes' supporters those political entities inimical to Achaemenid control and/or dissatisfied with me present satrapal administrations at Dascylium and Sardis: tribal peoples, Greek cities in Asia, other lesser officers, and extra-Anatolian recalcitrants (Greek cities in Europe, rebel Egyptians). Based on me past activities of me Mysians, Orontes should have been able to enlist their support, this time in activities designed to damage Lydia and the southernmost portions of Dascylium (cf. Xen. Anab. 1.6.7). Those dements within the Greek cities of Asia dissatisfied with Achaemenid control could be won over promises of the future absence of those characteristics of control found grating and of future power for politicians not favored by me satraps. Orontes was able to control Atramyttium, Cisthene, and Cyme. He restored me Pergamenes-probably those who promised to assist him-ito their ancestral site. The increase in Orontes' power during this time may have also compelled smaller cities, out of a simple desire for self-preservation, to back me man with a temporarily superior military force. Support from Asiatic poleis would help explain me prominence of hoplites in his forces as 'volunteers' or mercenaries (Polyaenus 7.14.3: 10,0001 at Cyme; cf. 7.14.4: me portion of his forces most feared by Autophradates). Estate owners and other lesser officers dissatisfied with the present situation in Dascylium or with Autophradates might throw their support to Orontes, his rebellion allowing for their personal aggrandizement and a settling of scores. These officers were those who chose Orontes as their leader (Diod, 15.91.1). The name of one such officer is attested, Rheornithres, who journeyed to Egypt and received assistance from Tachos, He apparently survived the rebellion and Alexander at Granicus and lssus. 166 Foreign forces inimical to stable Achaemenid control would find it in 166

Diad. 15.92.1, Xen, Cyrop. 8.8.4 (the wording implies that other lesser officers were involved). Herve nr, 685 (p.346) details the career of a Rheornithres, identified with the Rheomirhres of the 360's (no need to suggest he was a member of the Achaemenid family). Cf. Bosworth Arrian I III and Schachermeyrf 166-168. The identification suggests this reconstruction of Rheomithres' career: He was a local noble in Dascylium (? or Lydia?) who threw his support to Orontes, After his surrender to 'loyalist' forces he remained in the northwest into the 330's. He may have received additional estates as the reward for his 'defection' from Orontes, Rheomithres had a son who was an adult by the time of Darius ITl: this plus Rheornithres' activities in the 360's would place his birth in the 390's.

ORONTES

89

their interest to provide some resources to Orontes and his allies. Most significant would be whatever mercenaries were hired by the rebels from cities outside Asia (cf. Diod, 15.91. 1), although Demosthenes 14.31 suggests that some also served against Orontes. The ships and money provided by Tachos (Diod, 15.92.1) and surrendered by Rheomithres were never used to benefit Orontes' activities. Although Diodorus 15.90.4 speaks grandiosely of a 50% drop in royal revenues as a result of western instabilities and goes on (15.91. 1) to refer to Orontes' possession of a year's pay for 20,000 mercenaries (this supposedly only a portion of his war-chest), it is likely that the rebel had access to a more restricted pool of wealth: funds normally designed for what would become tribute forwarded to satraps and Susa, booty from military operations, special imposts (extortion), his own personal wealth and that of his supporters, and the proceeds from the sale of agricultural goods (i.e., those possibly sold to Athens). Again, it must be stressed that the only funds known to have been supplied by rebel Egypt were surrendered to Artaxerxes' men. In sum, Orontes' power base existed only in sections of Sparda and Dascylium, only among lesser officers and more minor political entities, and only in a time when instability permitted him to emerge temporarily as one possessing superior force. The Order ofEvents in the Rebellion

Reconstructing the order of events in Orontes' rebellion is difficult because there are no fixed points for the military events recorded. A reasonable suggestion is that Orontes would strengthen his power base, expand into regions in which the satrapal government was damaged, attract the attention of foreign powers, take more direct action against the capital, Sardis, and finally surrender once his position became untenable. 1 suggest that hostilities began in the campaigning season of 363 and concluded with Orontes' surrender in his home sector by the beginning of 360. Among the earliest activities undertaken by Orontes would be solidifying control over Pergamum and the Caicus valley (as reported in OG1S 264). From there he could expand north and west and exercise enough control over Atramyttium and Cisthene to have coins there minted for the payment of soldiers.

Rhcornithres' son was Phrasaortes, named satrap of Persis by Alexander. Berve nr, 813; Bosworth Arrian I 330. We would have to assume that Phrasaortes was not held by Tachos in Egypt (Xen. Cyrop, 8.8.4).

90

ORONTES

The regions north and west of Pergamum represented those which Ariobarzanes had controlled, but which Artabazus had not yet taken over. It was probably now that Orontes was able to draw upon support from lesser officers in Dascylium, including Rheomithres, These events I assign to 363 and to the earlier part of 362. By the campaigning season of 362 Orontes had gathered enough strength to make inroads into regions closer to the satrapal capital at Sardis. During this season occurred his attack on the lesser officers of Autophradates who had gathered near Sardis to fight him (Polyaenus 7.14.2).167 Orontes also controlled Cyme (7.14.3) and possessed a large force of Greek mercenaries which he used against Autophradates' cavalry. 168 By 362 at the latest, commercial contacts with Athens had begun. IG n2 207 (b+c+d) refers to a shipment of grain to Lesbos, and the Anatolian coast opposite the island is bracketed by Atramyttium in the north and Cyme in the south, regions under Orontes' influence (further Athenian honors, of no real value to Orontes militarily, would follow in 361/0). Probably in this year, Rheomithres was sent to Egypt. The rebel Tachos had not yet experienced any difficulty among his own troops, and he probably believed he could spare money and ships which were supposed eventually to tie up Achaemenid forces in Anatolia, His demand for hostages indicates that his trust in Orontes was not limitless (Diod. 15.92.1, Xen. Cyrop, 8.8.4). In 361 Orontes' position began to unravel. Artabazus was solidifying his control over Dascylium and this would cost the rebel support in the southern Troad. Rheomithres' surrender shortly after establishing himself at Leucae was another blow: Orontes lost the chance to use the ships and money from Egypt (whatever was left), and a number of his supporters were arrested after arriving at the port (Diod. 15.92.1). Autophradates' destruction of part of Orontes' forces and Orontes' strategem for turning away from the satrap (Polyaenus 7.14.4) should be placed in 361. Orontes' surrender is described in two sources. According to Diodorus 15.91.1, the rebel surrenders other rebels, funds, cities, and mercenaries to the military leaders sent by Artaxerxes (i.e., Autophradates and the nobles loyal to him). This surrender seems to take place before any hostilities involving Orontes himself were initiated. OGIS 264, written from the Pergamene point of view, indicates that Orontes handed over the city to Artaxerxes (probably actually to

167 168

I interpret the King's generals to be nobles who resided in and around Sardis and its environs. Also note that supplies (the agora) are being brought out from Sardis to those massing against Orontes. The numbers are inflated, but the sides are at least evenly matched.

ORONfES

91

Autophradates' men, Artaxerxes' loyal subordinates), and then died. The best that can be made of this is that Orontes decided to surrender to Autophradates before the satrap was able to deliver a killing blow. Perhaps the rebel did hope to hold onto his sphere, although it would be quite unlikely that a new satrapy would be created out of portions of Sparda and Dascylium, The surrender and death of Orontes 1 place in early 360. Artabazus had moved south and Autophradates north-their tension has been discussed above. Orontes' rebellion was not so much directed against Artaxerxes as against Autophradates, satrap of Lydia. Those events preserved place the rebellion in the western portion of the satrapy and pit Orontes and lesser officers loyal to trim against Autophradates and lesser officers loyal to him. In addition, Orontes enjoyed illusory support from Egypt and Athens and so attracted attention from western historians. But his rebellion made no lasting impact on the Achaemenid far west. Autophradates kept his satrapy, damaged by the expenditures for three major campaigns within a single decade. Appendix: The Droaphernes Inscription In 1975 Louis Robert published a short Greek inscription of the Roman period from Sardis.lv? The text appeared to be a translation of extracts from an Achaemenid date Aramaic original relating to a statue and the cult of Baradates Zeus, Zeus the Legislator. While Robert's analysis of the inscription as a cultural document is faultless, his suggestion for its date plus the identification of Droaphernes as satrap create a problem: Autophradates was satrap in 367/6. Need we assume he was replaced? The inscription, dated to year 39 of Artaxerxes, could fall within the reign of Artaxerxes 1 or Artaxerxes H, i.e. in either 427/6 or 367/6. Robert preferred the latter because of the cult statue of Zeus (Altura Mazda). Berossus, cited by ClementProtrepicus 5.65.3, refers to an Artaxerxes, identified with Artaxerxes H, setting up images of Anahita in a number of cities, Sardis included. 170 However, the evidence does not demand an earlier absence of Persian divine statuary in a distant border region with a long history of divine statuary of its own. There is something to be said in favor of the construction at some time before the fourth century of a statue of Ahura-Mazda in his guise as upholder of law in a region 169 170

1. Robert CRAl (1975) 306-330. Robert CRAl (1975) 314-317, cf. Burstein Berossus 29 n. 119 on Clement's citation.

92

ORONTES

frequently plagued by recalcitrance. When one adds the ambiguity of the term hyp archos , four possibilities exist for Droaphernes' position in Lydia's administration: L 427/6, highest officer 2. 367/6, highest officer 3.427/6, lesser officer 4. 367/6, lesser officer To make a case for the first possibility requires assuming lapses in the two accounts which provide more than perfunctory narrations of the Achaernenid far west in the fifth century, Thucydides and the epitome of Ctesias. Thucydides names Pissouthnes as a satrap in the campaigning season of 427 (3.31, 34). Ctesias (FGrH 688 fr. 15 sect. 53) refers to Pissouthnes as a rebel during the reign of Darius, successor of Artaxerxes I, and replaced by the victorious Tissaphernes. It is not very defensible to insert Droaphernes as satrap beginning in late 427 or early 426 and then argue that he was an ineffectual, 'loyal' satrap of Sparda who fell out of the historical record. The second possibility listed above creates similar difficulties: Droaphernes must be inserted into the list of satraps at Sparda and then be assumed to have dropped out of the historical record. This type of difficulty does not occur if Droaphernes is assumed to be a lesser officer. So few are attested in the historical record that it should not be viewed as impossible for new minor personnel to come to light as the result of epigraphical discoveries. Personnel unattested in literary sources have already emerged as the result of discoveries of inscriptions from the regions around Dascylium estate.F! Droaphernes' title may be the Greek translation of an Aramaic term for a lesser officer in charge of the city of Sardis (also known as Sparda), Lydia being an inaccurate rendering of the name Sparda, Other extant Greek inscriptions which refer to the highest officer of a satrapy use some form of the word "satrap." 172 Droaphernes could be placed in either 427/6 or 367/6. I prefer the latter because Robert's analysis of the statuary recorded in the inscription remains intact. Droaphemes would be a subordinate of Autophradates and join his colleagues Tigranes and Orontes,

171 172

E.g. Metzler's article, listed in bibliography, below. These documents include SIC 3 13481, 167, 170; SIC 2 573; and the trilingual Xanthus decree. See Schmitt "Satrap" 376-380.

ORONTES

93

In the inscription Droaphernes has control over religious matters, but this is not a reason to question his status as lesser officer. There is not enough evidence to permit a definitive judgment about who in the Achaernenid far west had control over all religious affairs.

VII. CONCLUSIONS In Anatolia during the years 367-360 there were many instabilities, none directed against Artaxerxes himself, some partially interconnected when malcontents in one region sought to exploit another area's instability. During this time of warring officials the more general concept of Achaemenid rule was not under attack: Achaemenid rebels such as Orontes and Mithridates sought rather to replace the present provincial administration with one in which they might possess some advantage they had lacked before. The first of these instabilities was warfare between Dascylium and Lydia (with the assistance of Caria). As a result, disorder grew within the satrapies whose military forces were involved, as those forces traditionally hostile towards Achaemenid control--some tribal peoples, some city politicians-vgrew bolder. Policing actions were required. Achaemenid control in the Hellespont began to collapse. The second major instability occurred within the satrapy of Dascylium. The weakening, then fall, of Ariobarzanes' administration resulted in warfare among members of the satrapal family, and the flight and subsequent banditry of Mithridates, Artabazus' attempts to restabilize Dascylium and contain Mithridates led to conflict with Datames and to that satrap's eventual murder. To this second instability was related a third: the collapse of Ariobarzanes had an impact on Sparda, where Orontes saw a chance to carve out a realm for himself from the southern portions of Dascylium and the northern portions of Sparda. Outside Anatolia, Egypt was in rebellion, a continuation of troubles which had begun long before the 360's and would continue into the 340's. The results of Egyptian turmoil were felt elsewhere: directly in Phoenicia because the rebels initially were united enough to effect an invasion of territory abutting Egypt; secondarily in Syria, only threatened before rebel unity fell apart. Anatolia was touched only in the form of Tachos' useless provision of materiel to Rheomithres, who promptly surrendered it to Autophradates' men before it could be used by Orontes,

CONCLUSIONS

95

The overall impact of the instabilities in Anatolia was relatively minor. 173 Of the areas involved, Dascylium suffered the most. Artabazus never seems to have consolidated his hold on the satrapy, The Hellespont lay outside effective Achaemenid domination.U'f In the regions touched by Orontes, the city boss Eubolus set up his own realm, which passed to his subordinate Hermeias, but never out of effective Achaemenid control. I 75 Datames' unexpected death did have some impact. 176 During the reign of Artaxerxes Ill, the satrap's rather large holdings had been broken into three parts. Cilicia was in the hands of Mazaeus by the 340's; he later gained Syria and Phoenicia, thus holding both sides of the Cilician Gates. Cappadocia, some time before the Macedonian invasion, had been divided into two satrapies. The region was stable enough for troops to be drawn from it for use in Egypt during the 340's. As best as can be determined, none of the surviving administrators involved in the troubles of the 360's was replaced or executed because of the events of that decade. Economically, Anatolia did suffer. Revenues would have been reduced as a result of damage done to estates and cities and the expenditure of funds on military action. But Achaemenid control was never in question. Below I present a chronology of events: 368 Cappadocia: Autophradates' second, ultimately indecisive, campaigning season Dascylium: Ariobarzanes dispatches Philiscus to assist Sparta, diplomacy fails Datames and Autophradates make truce, send envoys to Susa to arrange peace 367 Spartan Euthycles to Susa, followed by Pelopidas and others Artaxerxes displays favor to Thebes Achaemenid envoys sent west: royal decision read out Autophradates makes charges against Ariobarzanes

173

One more western satrapy about which there is no certain information is larger Phrygia. An Arsames appears in Polyaenus 7.28.2 as a rebel who gained control of the province. The anecdote has no chronological context. Arsames need not be emended to Datames on the basis of the stratagem described. See Be10ch2 3:2153.

174 175

Cf. Weiskopf 484-486. On Eubo1us: Aristotle Pol. 2. 1267a, Str. 13.610, Theopompus FGrH 115 fro 291, Hofstetter nr. 107 (p.65), Weiskopf 514. Str. 12.534, Diod. 31.19.2, cf. Weiskopf 490-494. Mazaeus: Weiskopf 495-500, Diod. 16.42.2.

176

96

CONCLUSIONS

Autophradates prepares for punitive campaign The Droaphernes inscription

366 By this point Tigranes has extended control over Samos First campaigning season against Ariobarzanes: operations in southern Troad Athens dispatches Timotheus, he goes to Samos, besieges island

365 Second campaigning season against Ariobarzanes: joint action by Autophradates and Mausolus, operations at Assus and Sestos Fall of Samos Conclusion of season: truce negotiated with assistance of Agesilaus; envoys to Artaxerxes?

364 At this point need for policing actions in Sparda and Caria Weakening of Ariobarzanes' administration, policing actions in Dascylium Death of Philiscus Sestos and Crithote in Timotheus' hands Timotheus at Cyzicus Mithridates at Heraclea, Clearchus becomes tyrant Artaxerxes dispatches Artabazus west Orontes prepares for rebellion

363 Collapse of Ariobarzanes' administration Tachos king of rebel Egypt Arrival of Artabazus in Dascylium Sparda.Orontes rebels, begins expansion to region around Gulf of Atramyuium Ariobarzanes captured by Artabazus, Mithridates flees east Beginning of Artabazus' administration in Dascylium

362 Sparda: Orontes controls area around Gulf of Atramyttium, carries on warfare with Autophradates, ships grain to Athenian forces, sends Rheomithres to Tachos

CONCLUSIONS

97

Dascylium: Mithridates' banditry on border between Dascylium and Datames' sphere; Artabazus fights Datames; by this point: Artabazus' marriage to sister of Mentor and Memnon; Cyzicus still in disorder South: Tachos' invasion of Phoenicia 361 Tachos' position falls apart Death of Datames at hands of Mithridates Honors for Orontes at Athens Autophradates gains upper hand against Orontes Surrender of Rheomithres Death of Agesilaus in Egyptian theater Artabazus secures southern Troad 360 Artabazus' forces move south Charidemus enters satrapal service Surrender, then death, of Orontes Autophradates detains Artabazus; Charidemus seizes cities Artabazus released, contains and removes Charidemus Ephesus restabilized It is important to note that the 360's, although a time of disorder, do not represent a simple period of decline in Achaernenid control, but rather display important continuities with earlier decades in administrative practices and problems. Artaxerxes acted to maintain in power for as long as possible skilled administrators, even hoping to rehabilitate a number who fell from favor (Orontes, Datames). The most major change in personnel recorded, the appointment of Artabazus, appears to have been a decision made as a last resort, and even here Artaxerxes took pains to preserve the traditional satrapal house of Dascylium. Long-standing characteristics of Achaemenid control in part were responsible for the instabilities of the decade. The tendency of officers to compete, which had helped poison relations between Tissaphemes and Pharnabazus in the fifth and fourth centuries, caused a similar rivalry and hatred to develop between Autophradates and Ariobarzanes, the officer from the more important satrapy angered at the relative success of the one from the smaller satrapy. Anger over diminished status and/or insulted honor, which had spurred Spithridates to exploit hostile external and internal forces for use against his

98

CONCLUSIONS

superior Pharnabazus in the 390's, also helped incite Orontes to exploit for his own benefit the troubles which befell Dascylium and Lydia in the 360's. That neither king nor satrap possessed unlimited resources with which to carry out policies, a problem discussed in connection with the earlier scarcity of Achaemenid naval forces, is evidenced by the local destabilizations which followed in the wake of larger military activities. Achaemenid control did not depend solely upon the military domination of a cowed enemy, but relied on diplomacy, persuasion, and personal conract.l"? These all worked to keep in check potential sources of instability among tribal peoples and Greek city-states (whose politics were marked by factions). When larger-scale operations, such as the warfare between Autophradates and Ariobarzanes, occurred, forces and/or particularly respected administrators were removed from the scene and the less stable grew bolder. Artaxerxes' own pattern of decision-making in regard to the far west, discernible through most of his relatively well-documented reign, bears some responsibility for the disorders of the 360's. The king, in addition to his preference for a continuity in personnel (e.g. in Dascylium and Caria), appears to have been concerned lest a second Cyrus the Younger emerge out of the far west. This concern can be detected in appointments of personnel to Lydia, where officers were removed from office for displaying too great a degree of independence. Tiribazus, who succeeded the caretaker administration appointed by Tithraustes following the execution of the troublesome Tissaphemes, was an outsider to Lydia. It was his loyalty to Artaxerxes that was unquestioned. But when Tiribazus displayed a willingness to listen to the Spartans and told Artaxerxes so, he was removed and replaced by another stranger to Lydia, Struthas (Xen. Hell. 4.8.12 ff.), who was certain to continue the older policy approved by Artaxerxes. Tiribazus returned only when Artaxerxes was willing to shift policy (5.1.25). For Artaxerxes continuity in policy he set at Susa took precedence over continuity in personnel in Lydia.1 78 This desire to avoid permitting an officer to build up too strong a personal power base to the possible detriment of Susa fed Artaxerxes' tendency to distrust the activities or the results of the activities of a number of administrators in the far west and to take action against them. Tiribazus was put on trial because of his popularity and independence during the operations against Euagoras. Datarnes' successes in

177 178

E.g. on the role of gift-giving and diplomacy in maintaining peaceful relations with the peoples of the Zagrus see Briant EPMOA 87-94 and DHA 2 (1976) 185-194. On Sparda after Tissaphernes' death see Weiskopf 84-143.

CONCLUSIONS

99

central Anatolia were perceived as a danger and war was made on him. And when Ariobarzanes, once his role in Europe became too active, was feared to be a new Cyrus from Dascylium, Artaxerxes caused war to be made on him. Finally, one should refrain from assigning too great an importance to the activities of the European Greeks during the 360's. Troops were drawn from Hellas by a variety of officers. Both Orontes and Autophradates relied on mercenaries (cf. Dem.14.31); Ariobarzanes, then Artabazus, hired them. Hellenic forces did try to seek some advantages for themselves (Charidemus) or for their horne states (Timotheus, Agesilaus). But such advantages proved transitory. Official Athenian contacts with Orontes and Strato of Sidon had no lasting impact. Artaxerxes, in 387/6, had demonstrated the extent of his concern for the Aegean frontier. He threatened the Balkan Greeks with destruction if they damaged his lands (Xen. Hell. 5.1.3-1) and stated forcefully that all territory and personnel in Asia were his; other Hellenic cities, save for a few assigned to Athens, were to be autonomous (although it was clear that Artaxerxes or his representatives intended to be the final arbiter of events). But Artaxerxes apparently established no policy by which Achaemenid authorities were to coordinate their own efforts in regulating events beyond Anatolia and within Greece. 179 Rather, the king left his subordinates to manage the frontier as they saw fit, acting individually. Thus Ariobarzanes extended his influence in the straits, Autophradates in Samos. Mausolus sought some advantage in Sparta. The Athenian sea league was tolerated (only in the 350's did Mausolus try to replace its influence with his own).180 Only hindsight and relative ignorance about Artaxerxes' policies for the other imperial frontiers and the peoples beyond them permit us to label his policy decisions as a mistake, one which exacerbated rivalries among his subordinates and so led to the anger of Autophradates.

179

180

The King's words about Anatolia, the region of greatest concern to him, are quite specific. Sinclair Chiron 8 (1978) 29-54 rightly argues that the Persians were not interested in the detailed application of terms on the Greek mainland. Cawkwell CQ 31 (1981) 69-83 argues that there must have been much more to the terms of the peace and attempts to reconstruct provisions relating to exiles, armaments, and sanctions. I believe Sinclair to be right: vagueness worked in the Great King's favor on the Greek mainland. Note the immediate difficulties reported in Xen, Hell. 5.1.33 ff. Cf. Cargill 8 n.3. If the Greeks are killing each other, they will not have the time to damage the King's House. Forthe inclusion of Clazomenae see Ruzicka Phoenix 37 (1983) 104-108. Cargill holds that the sea league offered a system of free alliances and was not aggressively expansionist. Athenian authorities did not intervene in members' internal affairs in the ways they had during the existence of the earlier protection-arrangement. If Cargill is right, then the league did not represent a perceived threat to Achaemenid control. It did give Achaernenid authorities the advantage of a single organization with which to deal.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Austin JHS

Austin, R. P. "Athens and the Satraps' RevaH," JHS 64 (1944) 98-100

Badian Ehrenberg Studies

Badian, E. "Alexander the Great and the Greeks of Asia," Ancient Society and Institutions. Studies Presented to V. Ehrenberg (Oxford, 1966) 37-69.

Badian "Artaxerxes IV"

Badian, E. "A Document of Artaxerxes IV," Kinzl, K., ed. Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory: Studies Presented to Fritz Schachermeyr (Berlin, 1977) 40-50.

BelochJanus

Beloch, K.J. "Artabazos" Janus 1(1921) 812 = Regling, K. and Reich, H., eds. Festschrift zu C. F. Lehmann-Haupts sechzigstem Geburtstage. Wien: Wilhelm Braumuller, 1921.

Beloch2 3 2

Beloch, K. A. Griechische Geschichte 2nd ed., vol, 3:A. Leipzig: Walter de Guyter & Co., 1923.

Bengtson Staatsvertrage

Bengtson, Hermann. Die Staatsvertriige des Altertums n2. Munich 1975.

Berve nr.

Berve, H. Das Alexanderr eich auf prosopographischer Grundlage. Munich, 1926.

BIBliOGRAPHY

101

Betlyon

Betlyon, John Wilson. The Coinage and Mints of Phoenicia: The Pre-Alexandrine Period. Harvard Semetic Monographs, no. 26. Chico, Scholar's Press, 1982.

Blume!

Blumel, W., ed. Die I nschriften von Mylasa. Teil A: lnschriften der Stadt. = l nschriften griechischer Stadte aus Kleinasien, 34. Bonn, 1987.

Bockisch

Bockisch, G. "Die Karer und Dynasten," Klio 51 (1969) 117-175.

Bosworth Arrian

Bosworth, A.B. A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander. Vol. 1: Commentary on Books I-Ill, Oxford, 1980.

Bresciani CHI

Bresciani, C. "The Persian Occupation of Egypt," Ilya Gershevitch, ed. Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. H: The Median and Achaernenian Periods (Cambridge, 1985) 502-528.

Briant EPMOA

Briant, Pierre. Etat et pasteurs au M oyenOrient ancien. Paris: Editions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 1982.

BriantRTP

Briant, Pierre, Rois, Tributs et Paysans. Centre de Recherches d'Histoire Ancienne, vol. 43 = Annales litteraires de l'Universite de Besancon, 269. Paris, 1982.

Briant DHA 2 (1976)

Briant, Pierre. "Brigandage', dissidence, et conquete en Asie achemenide et hellenistique," Dialogues d'histoire ancienne 2 (1976) 163-279. = Centre de Recherches d'Histoire Ancienne, vol. 21 = Annates Litteraires de l'Universite de Besancon, 188.

ihre

102

BriantDHA 11 (1985)

BillUOGRAPHY

Briant, Pierre. "Les Iraniens d'Asie Mineure

apres Ia chute de l'empire Achemenide," Dialogues d'histoire ancienne 11 (1985) 167195. [I have only an off-print from the author, and thus no further publication details] Briant "Pouvoir Centrale"

"Pouvoir Centrale et Culturel dans l'Empire

Briant, Pierre.

Polycentrisme

Achemenide," 1-31 in Sancisi-Weerdenburg, Heleen, ed. Achaemenid History I: Sources, Structures, and Synthesis. Leiden, 1987. Briant "Ethno-classe"

Briant, Pierre. "Ethno-classe Dominante et Populations Soumises dans I'empire Achemenide: la cas d'Egypt," pp. 137-173 in Kuhrt, Amelie and Sancisi- Weerdenburg, Heleen.eds. Achaemenid History III: Method and Theory. Leiden, 1988.

Bruce

Bruce, LA.F. An Historical Commentary on the "Hellenica Oxyrhynchia", Cambridge, 1967.

Brunt

Brunt, P.A. "Alexander, Barsine, and Heraldes," RFIC 103 (1975) 22-34. Bryce, T.R. "Political Unity in Lycia during the Dynastic Period," JNES 42 (1983) 31-42.

Bryce Lycians

Bryce, T.R. and Zahle, Jan. The Lycians: A Study of Lycian History and Civilization to the Conquest of Alexander the Great. 2 vols., I: Bryce, T.R. The Lycians in Literary and Epigraphic Sources. Copenhagen, 1986.

Buckler GRBS

Buckler, J. "Plutarch and the Fate of Antalcidas," GRBS 18 (1977) 139-145.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

103

Buckler Theban Hegemony

Buckler, J. The Theban Hegemony, 371362 B.C. Harvard Historical Studies, no. 98, Cambridge, MA., 1980.

Burnett and Edmonson

Burnett, Anne Pippin and Edmonson, Colin. "The Chabrias Monument in the Athenian Agora," Hesperia 30 (1961) 74-91.

Burstein

Burstein, Stanley Mayer. Outpost of Hellenism: The Emergence of Heraclea on the Black Sea. University of California Publications. Classical Studies, vol. 14. Berkeley, 1976.

Burstein Berossus

Burstein, Stanley Mayer. The "Babyloniaca" of Berossus. Sources and Monographs; Sources from the Ancient Near East, vol, X, fasc. 5. Malibu, CA., 1978.

Burn CHI

Bum, A.R. "Persia and the Greeks," pp. 292-391 in Gerschevitch, Ilya, ed. Cambridge Historv of Iran, vol. 2: The Median and Achaemenian Periods. Cambridge, 1985.

Cargill

Cargill, Jack. The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free Alliance? Berkeley, 1981.

Cargill GRBS

Cargill, Jack. "IG n 2 1 and the Athenian Kleruchy on Samos," GRBS 24 (1983) 321-332.

Cartledge Agesilaos

Cartledge, Paul. Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta. Baltimore, 1987.

104

BIDUOGRAPHY

Cawkwell CQ 13 (1963)

Cawkwell, G.L. "Demosthenes' Policy After the Peace of Philocrates," CQ 13 (1963) 120138, 200-213.

Cawkwell CQ 31 (1981)

Cawkwell, G.L. "The King's Peace," CQ 31 (1981) 69-83.

Childs

Childs, William A. P. "Lycian Relations with Persians and Greeks in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries Re-Examined," Anatolian Studies 31 (1981) 55-80.

Cook Troad

Cook, J.M. The Troad: An Archaeological and Topographical Study. Oxford, 1973.

CookPE

Cook, J.M. York, 1983.

Cook CHI

Cook, J.M. "The Rise of the Achaemenids and Establishment of their Empire," pp. 200291 in Gerschevitch, Ilya, ed. Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 2: The Median and Achaemenian Periods. Cambridge, 1985.

Costa Historia 23 (1974)

Costa, Jr., Eugene A., "Euagoras I and the Persians, ca. 411-391," Historia 23 (1974) 4056.

The Persian Empire. New

Frei, Peter, and Koch, Klaus. Reichsidee und Reichsorganisation im Persereich. Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis, 55. Gottingen, 1984. Frye Hist. Anc. Ir.

Frye, Richard N. The History of Ancient Iran. Munich, 1984.

GommeHCT

Gomrne, A.W., Andrewes, A., and Dover, K.J. A Historical Commentary on Thucydides. Vol. V: Book VIII. Oxford, 1981.

BIBUOGRAPHY

105

Hallock CHI

Hallock, A.T. "The Evidence of the Persepoli s Tablets," 5 88-609 in Gerschevitch, Ilya, ed. Cambridge History of Iran, vol 2: The Median and Achaemenian Periods. Cambridge, 1985.

Harrison

Harrison, Cynthia. "Persian Names on Coins of Northern Anatolia," JNES 41 (1982) 181-194.

Heisserer

Heisserer, A.J. Alexander the Great and the Greeks: The Epigraphic Evidence. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980.

Hofstetter nr.

Hofstetter, Josef. Die Griechen in Persien. Prosopographie der Griechen im persischen Reich vor Alexander. Ar c h d o l o g i s c h e Mitteilungen aus Iran. Erganzungsband, 5. Berlin, 1978.

Hirsch

Hirsch, Steven W. The Friendship of the Barbarians. Hanover, 1985.

Hornblower

Hornblower, Simon. 1982.

Judeich

Judeich, Walther. Kleinasiatische Studien. Marburg, 1892.

Kallet

Kallet, Lisa A. "Iphicrates, Timotheus, and Athens, 371-360 B.C.," GRBS 24 (1983) 239252.

Kent

Kent, Roland G. Old Persian. 2nd. ed., rev. New Haven, 1953.

Mausolus. Oxford,

106

BIBUOGRAPHY

Keinitz

Keinitz, Friedrich Karl. Die politische Geschichte Agyptens vom 7. his zum 4. Jahrhundert vor der Zeitwende. Berlin, 1953.

Lewis Sparta and Persia

Lewis, David M. Sparta and Persia. Cincinnati Classical Studies, New Series, YoU. Leiden, 1977.

Lewis and Stroud

Lewis, David M. and Stroud, Ronald S. "Athens Honors King Euagoras of Salamis," Hesperia 48 (1979) 180-193.

Mayrhofer

Mayrhofer, M. "Kleinasien zwischen Agonie des Perserreiches und hellenistischen Frtihling," Anzeiger der phil-i-hist. Klasse der O. A. W. 112 (1975) 274-282.

Meloni RSI 63 (1951)

Meloni.P. "La Grande Rivolta dei Satrapi contro Artaserse II, RSI 63 (1951) 5-27. Metzger, Henri, La Roche, E., DupontSommer, A., and Mayrhofer, M. Fouilles de Xanthos VI: Le Stele Trilingue du Letoon. Paris, 1979.

Metzler

Metzler, D., Althe im-Stie hl , R., Schwertheim, E. "Eine neue grako-persische Grabstele aus Sultaniye-Koy und Ihre Bedeutung fur die Geschichte und Topographic von Daskyleion," Epigraphica Anatolica 1 (1983) 1-23.

Meyer

Meyer, Ernst. Die Grenz en der hellenistischen Staaten in Kleinasien. Zurich, 1925.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

107

Merkholm and Neumann

Morkholm, Otto and Neumann, Gunter. Die lykischen Miinzlegenden. Nachrichten det Akademie der Wissenschaften in Gottingen: Philologisch-Historische Klasse, 1977.

Moysey

Moysey, Robert Allen. Greek Relations with the Persian Satraps, 371-343 B.c. Ph.D. diss., Princeton, 1973.

Moysey AJAR 1 (1976)

Moysey, Robert A. "The Date of the Strate of Sidon Decree (IG n2 141)," AJAR 1 (1976) 182-189.

Moysey ZPE 69 (1987)

Moysey, R.A. "IG U2 207 and the Great SatrapsRevolt," ZPE 69 (1987) 93-100.

NOldeke

Noldeke, Th. (review of Krumbholz, Paul. De Asiae Minoris Sa trap is Persicis. Leipzig, 1883) Gottingische gelehrte Anzeigen (1884) 290-300.

Olmstead

Olmstead, A.T. History of the Persian Empire. Chicago, 1948.

OsborneABSA

Osborne, M.J. "Athens and Orontes," ABSA 66 (1971) 297-321.

Osborne Historia

Osborne, MJ. "Orontes,' Historia 22 (1973) 515-551.

Osborne Grazer Beitrdge

Osborne, M. J. "The Satrapy of Mysia,' Grazer Beitriige 3 (1975) 291-309.

ParkePRIA

Parke, H. W. "On IG n 2 207 (= IG n 108)," Proceedings of the Irish Academy 43 (1936) 367-378.

108

BIDUOGRAPHY

Pritchett

Pritchett, W. Kendrick. The Greek State at War. H. Berkeley, 1974.

Rawlinson

Rawlinson, George. The Seven Great Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World. Vol. H. New York, 1870.

Robert Et. Anat.

Robert, Louis. Etudes Anatoliennes. Etudes Orientales, V. Paris, 1937.

Robert CRAI

Robert, Louis. "Une nouvelle inscription grecque de Sardis: Reglement de l'autorite perse relatif aun culte de Zeus," CRAI 1975 306-330.

Root

The King and Kingship in Achaemenid Art. Essays on the Creation of an Iconography of Empire. Acta Iranica, 19. Textes et Memoires, 9. Leiden, Root, Margaret Cool.

1979. Ruzicka

Ruzicka, Stephen. "Clazomenae and Persian Foreign Policy, 387-6 B.C.," Phoenix 37 (1983) 104-108.

Ryder

Ryder, T. T. B. Koine Eirene. Oxford, 1965.

Schachermeyr

Schachermeyr, Fritz. Alexander der Grosse.

Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften Philologisch-i-Historische Klasse Sitzungsberichte, 285. Band. Wien, 1973. Schmitt "Satrap"

Schmitt, R. "Der Tite! "Satrap'," pp. 373390 in Davies, Anna Murpurgo and Meid, Wolfgang, eds, Studies in Greek, Italic, and

(Festschrift Indo-European Linguistics. Leonard Robert Palmer) Innsbruck, 1976.

BIDUOGRAPHY

109

Schmitt "Achaimenidisches"

Schmitt, R. "Achaimenidisches bei Thucydides," pp. 69-86 in Heidemarie Koch and D. N. MacKenzie, eds, Kunst, Kultur und Geschichte der Achoimenidenzeit und ihr Fortleben. AMI Ergiinzungsband, 10. Berlin, 1983.

Schwartz CHI

Schwartz, M. "The Old Eastern Iranian World View According to the Avesta," pp. 640-663 in Gerschevitch, Ilya, ed. Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 2. The Median and Achaemenian Periods. Cambridge, 1985.

Sekunda "Persian Settlement"

Sekunda, Nick. "Persian Settlement in Hellespontine Phrygia," pp. 175196 in Kuhrt, Amelie and Sancisi-Weerdenburg, Heleen.eds. Achaemenid History III: Method and Theory. Leiden, 1988.

Sekunda "Datames"

Sekunda, Nicholas Victor. "Some Notes on the Life of Datames," Iran 26 (1988) 35-53.

Sinclair Chiron 8 (1978)

Sinclair, R. K. "The King's Peace and the Employment of Military and Naval Forces, 387378," Chiron 8 (1978) 29-54.

Starr

Starr, Chester G. "Greeks and Persians in the Fourth Century B.C.," Iranica Antiqua 11 (1975) 39-99, 12 (1977) 49-115.

Stolper

Stolper, Matthew W. Entrepreneurs and Empire. Uitgav en van het Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologiscli Instituut te Istanbul, LIV. Istanbul, 1985.

Tam

Tam, W.W. "Herakles, Son of Barsine," JHS 41 (1921) 18-28.

110

BIBliOGRAPHY

Tod

Tad, Marcus N. A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions. Vol. II: From 403 to 323 B.C. Oxford, 1948.

Troxell

Troxell, Hyla. "Orontes, Satrap of Mysia," SNR 60 (1981) 27-37.

Tuplin "Administration"

Tuplin, Christopher. "The Administration of the Achaemenid Empire," pp. 109-166 in Carradice, Ian, ed. Coinage and Administration in the Athenian and Persian Empires. The Ninth Oxford Symposium on Coinage and Monetary History. BAR International Series, no. 343. Oxford, 1987.

van Groningen

van Groningen, B.A. Aristotle. Le second livre de l'Economique. Leiden, 1933.

Walbank

Walbank, F. W. A Historical Commentary on Polybius. 3 vols. Oxford, 1957-1979.

Walser AMI

Walser, G. "Heiraten zwischen Griechen und Achaimenidenprinzessin," pp. 87-90 in Heidemarie Koch and R. N. Mackenzie, eds, Kunst, Kultur und Geschichte der Achaimenidenzeit und ihr Fortleben. AMI Erganzungsband, 10. Berlin, 1983.

Walser

Walser, G. Hellas und Iran. Enrage der Forschung,209. Darmstadt, 1984.

Weiskopf

Weiskopf, M. "Achaemenid Systems of Governing in Anatolia," Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1982.

Westlake CQ 29 (1979)

Westlake, H. D. "Ionians in the Ionian War," CQ 29 (1979) 9-44.

Westlake Historia 30 (1981)

Westlake, H.D. "Decline and Fall of Tissaphemes," Historia 30 (981) 257-279.

INDEX Abydus 34,42,45,62,63

Cilicilll 11, 32, 39, 40, 95

Agavus 34, 35

Cisthene 62,79-81,88,89

Agesilaus 10, 12, 17, 23-25, 29, 31, 32, 45, 48,

Cius 28, 30, 57-58

65-67,75,83,96,97,99 Antalcidas 20,29, 54 Ariobarzanes 11-13,26-44,45-55,57,59,62-63, 64, 69, 71, 73, 75, 76, 78-81, 86-87, 90, 94-99

Clazomenae 79-80 Clearchus 51-52,96 Clearchus (Spartan) 42 Cotys 45,48-49,63 Crithote 35,46,52,96

Armenia 11-12,18-19,22,70,71,74-76,85

Cyme 80-81, 88,90

Artabazus 10-13, 30, 45, 50, 53-64, 68, 80, 87,

Cyprothemis 40

90,91,94-99 Artaxerxe s II 9-13, 17, 19-22, 25-30, 36-37, 39,

42-44, 45, 47, 50-64, 65, 67,68, 69, 70, 71, 74-76,78,80-84,90-92,94-99 Artaxerxes III 12,52,69,79,95

Assus 33,41,48-49,96 Athenodorus 58, 63

Athens 17,20-21,28-29,31,34-35,45-47,49,52, 55,69,76-79,87,89,90,91,96-99 Atramyttium 33, 41, 45, 46, 62, 79-80, 86, 88, 89, 90, 96 Autophradates 11-13, 15,26-27,37-44,45-50,56,

57,59,60-65,67-76,80-82,85-93,94-99 Bithynians 32,51,53 Cadusians 11, 21 Cappadocia 32-33,40,58-61,74,95 Caria 13,15-16,38-40,43,46,48-50,65-68,73, 82, 94, 96, 98 Chabrias 10, 83

Cyprus 18-20,71,75 Cyrus the Younger 17-19,22, 42-43,45, 49, 51, 64,70,72,73,74,98-99 Cyzicus 23-24, 52, 58, 96-97 Dascyliurn

10, 13, 14, 17, 19, 23-25, 26-39,

41-44, 45-64, 65, 69,70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77,81,85-92,94-99 Datames

10, 11, 18,32, 33, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43,

45,47,50,57-61,64,74,75,82,86,87,94, 95,97,98 Delphi 20-22,35 Diomedon 35 Droaphernes 47,91-93,96 Egypt 9-11, 16, 21, 28, 33, 39, 40, 50, 55, 58, 65-66,79,81-84, 86, 88, 89,90,91,94,96, 97 Epaminondas 35,52 Ephesus 67-78,69,97 Euagoras 11,18-21, 26, 38, 70, 98

Chares 77-78

Eubolus 41, 95

Charidemus 56-57,61-63,77-78,97,99

Glos 19,21,22

112

Gordiurn 23, 25, 32 Greeks 16,27-30,33-37,40-43,45-51,53,54,

70, 72, 74 Pharnaces, sons of 14,27-28,30,53,54-55

57-58, 65, 66-67, 69, 72-74, 76, 78-85,

Philiscus 34-36, 42, 50, 52, 78, 95, 96

88-90, 94-99

Phocion 78

Hecatornnus 26,38-39,40

Hellespont 33-36, 37, 40, 42, 45-46, 49-50, 52,

78,94,95

Phoenicia 11, 83, 94, 95 Phrygia 40, 63, 95 Pisidia 11,32-33,59,69,71, 82

Heraclea 51-52,96

Pissouthnes 23, 58, 92

Heraclca-at-Latmus 67-68

Pteleous 45-56

Hermeias 41,95

Pygela 67-68

Larnpsacus 52, 79-80

Rhathines 23

Lycia 11, 26, 38, 39, 65, 68

Rheomithres 10-11,82-84,88-90,94,96,97

Lydia 10, 13, 17-19,23,25,29,38-44,45-50,58,

Soonos 40,45-49,96,99

62-63,66-68,69-99 Mausolus

11, 13, 26, 37-40, 43, 45, 46, 47, 49,

50,65-68,73,96,99

Sestus 34-35,46,48-49,52,63,96

Sparta 10, 17,20-21,23,24-25,29,35-37,42,45,

48, 66-67, 95, 99

Memnon 56,61-63: 97

Spithridates 19,23-25,32,70,97-98

Mentor 41,55,56,61-63,97

Strato 99

Messenc 10,35-36

Struthas 29,38, 40, 98

Miletus 67,69

Syria 11-12,39,69,81-83,94-95

Mithridates 11, 30, 32, 33, 38, 45, 50-51, 53, 54,

56-57,58-61,94,96,97

Taches 9-10,65-66,81-84,88,90,94,96,97 Thebes 35-37,42,66-67,95

Mithrobarzanes 10-11,59

Thrace 45,48-49

Mysia 11, 13, 16,22, 24-25, 32, 51, 53,69-76,

Thuys 33

78,81,85-91

Tigranes 40, 46, 92, 96

Orontes 9-13,18-22,50,62,63,67-68,69-99

Timotheus 45-49, 52, 96

Otys 23-25, 32

Tiribazus 18-22,29, 36, 39-40,70-71,74, 75-76,

Paphlagonia 11,23-25,32-33,51,61,63,74

Parapita, son of 31, 55 Pelopidas 36, 95

86,87,98 Tissaphernes 17,18,28,39,41,42,43-44,53,66,

92,97-98

Pergarnurn 73,84,85,91,93,94,95

Tithraustes 25, 39, 66, 98

Perin thus 35

Troad

Pharnabazus 15, 17-19,21,23-25,27-32,39,41,

43-45,49-50,53-55,57,60,61,64,

33, 41-42, 48-49, 50-51,57,61-63,96,

97 Zenis 15, 34, 86