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The Shakespearean International Yearbook Volume 10: Special section, The Achievement of Robert Weimann
Edited by Graham Bradshaw, Tom Bishop and David Schalkwyk
The Shakespearean International Yearbook Volume 10: Special section, The Achievement of Robert Weimann
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The Shakespearean International Yearbook Volume 10: Special section, The Achievement of Robert Weimann
General Editors
Graham Bradshaw and Tom Bishop Special Guest Editor
David Schalkwyk
© The editors and contributors, 2010 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. The editors and contributors have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the authors of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company Wey Court East Suite 420 Union Road 101 Cherry Street Farnham Burlington Surrey, GU9 7PT VT 05401-4405 England USA www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data The Shakespearean international yearbook. Volume 10, Special section. The achievement of Robert Weimann. 1. Weimann, Robert – Influence. 2. Shakespeare, William, 1564–1616 – Dramatic production. 3. Theater – England – History – 16th century. 4. Theater – England – History – 17th century. I. Bradshaw, Graham. II. Bishop, T. G. III. Schalkwyk, David. 822.3’3-dc22
ISBN 9781409408581 (hbk) ISBN 9781409408598 (ebk) III ISSN 1465-5098
Contents Part I: Special Section, The Achievement of Robert Weimann
1 Performance in Shakespeare’s Theatre: Ministerial and/or Magisterial? Robert Weimann 2 3
Traction Control K. Ludwig Pfeiffer
31
The Spectator, the Text, and Ezekiel Dennis Kennedy
39
Text and Performance, Reiterated: A Reproof Valiant or Lie Direct? David Schalkwyk
Shakespeare Performance Studies W.B. Worthen
Author’s Voice? Acting with Authority in Early References to Shakespeare William N. West
93
The Author’s Accomplice, or the Unsearchable Complicities of Players in the Making of Elizabethan Drama John Gillies
119
Disciplining ‘Unexpert People’: Children’s Dramatic Practices and Page/Stage Tensions in Early English Theatre Jeanne McCarthy
143
Bifold Adam: Shakespeare, Milton, and the Actor’s Voice Nora Johnson
4
5 6
7
8
9
3
47 77
165
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vi
10
“Grose Indecorum”, “Contrarietie”, Vice-Descendants and the Power of Comic Performance: Weimann and Shakespeare Among the Neoclassicals Robert Hornback
183
Part II 11 Rusting, Bright, and Resting Weapons: A Textual Crux, and Closure in Romeo and Juliet Richard Levin 12
13 14
207
Circes in Ephesus: Civic Affiliations in The Comedy of Errors and Early Modern English Identity Atsuhiko Hirota
“If imagination amend them”: Lucretius, Marlowe, Shakespeare 257 R. Allen Shoaf
Twice-telly-ed Tales Ruth Morse
Notes on Contributors Bibliography Index
231
281 299 303 325
PART I SPECIAL SECTION
The Achievement of Robert Weimann
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1 Performance in Shakespeare’s Theatre: Ministerial and/or Magisterial? Robert Weimann
In our time the unsettled space of performance in Shakespeare’s theatre raises questions that were undreamt of only a generation ago. Surrounded by our own rapidly changing, increasingly mediated culture, we begin to understand that, on Elizabethan stages, the conjuncture of language and show was more complex, more variable and more vulnerable than has traditionally been assumed. The rise of early modern drama involved an unfixed, largely untested encounter of literature and theatre as two different institutions, two different modes of cultural production. Since the difference between these two media is derived from genealogies that were deeply divided in both social background and cultural function, their conjunction on early modern stages was neither tidily smooth nor purely formal. In twentieth-century Shakespeare studies, these different constituents of Elizabethan drama were by and large recognized; in fact, in the late mid-century and after, a sense of complementarity, even cooperation of a sort, prevailed between page-centred and stage-centred approaches. Only recently has this somewhat pragmatic division in Shakespeare criticism been challenged by a new, culturally inclusive, concept of performance. Informed by linguistic, anthropological, and political uses, this new concept of the “performative” resisted being reduced to any “derivative” status. In the wake of its most influential theorists – among them J.L. Austin, Victor Turner, and Judith Butler – performance practice is envisioned as authorized by its own workings, as an independent, self-sustained practice. As a socially formative, behaviourfashioning, encounter-structuring, even “psychobiological” (Erving Goffman) force, performance organizes both everyday and especially celebratory events, contacts, and responses.
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Such performative modes, which include staged performance in the theatre, have, as W.B. Worthen notes, “no intrinsic relation to texts”.1 Hence, in its theatrical uses the performative does not have any “intrinsic relation” to what language can represent. As distinct from such representation, the working of performance should be perceived in terms of a so-called “performativity”, which per definitionem involves a “dislinkage” in relations “between the signifier and the world”,2 which ensures a “radical estrangement between the meaning and the performance”.3 Such estrangement has reinforced the alienation between textual and performance approaches to Shakespeare criticism. It is not surprising, then, that in their most recent polemical confrontation these two approaches have reached a “rhetorical impasse” which “prevents not merely agreement, but debate itself”.4 The present essay cannot hope to do more than focus on a single, potentially crucial argument in the much larger field of the current text/performance debate. The question is, to what extent and to which effect would performance practice in Shakespeare’s theatre exceed, if it does at all, a “ministerial” quality in its relation to dramatic language? This question (which, incidentally, addresses partially open, unformulated horizons of my own work5) is deliberately raised at ground-level. This is a starting point in a fresh attempt to come to terms with some of the rapidly changing parameters in the theory and practice of early modern drama produced both materially as an event with live performance and as a textually sustained imaginary act. This question will be addressed on two levels. First, in terms of the historical moment and situation of Shakespeare’s theatre, where the alliance between writing and playing was inseparable from their divergence. In these circumstances, the difference between texts and bodies served as a tensionridden, dynamic impulse in Shakespeare’s “swelling scene” (Henry V, Prologue, 4).6 In this intricate relationship, the socio-cultural and aesthetic differences between writing and playing marked the ways that each medium informed, and was informed by, the other. This first section seeks to examine some of the potentially fresh perspectives that the new notion of performance offers for our understanding of Shakespeare’s achievement in the early modern theatre. The second section studies some of the changing text/performance relations in today’s Shakespeare productions through the examination of the tension between text and performance in avant-garde, modern theatre. These changing constellations between word and body require some direct experience of Shakespeare’s plays as performed on the living stage. Such immediate response is indispensable for the perception of a past significance through the inescapable lens of a present meaning.
Performance in Shakespeare’s Theatre
The Untamed Performative: Sources and Traditions In a long view, the formation of new performance concepts in Shakespeare studies is likely to be traced back to the twentieth-century phalanx of stagecentred critics as its precursor rather than, as it is from today’s perspective, its antagonist. As Barbara Hodgdon observes, it is not without irony that “a field of study so predicated on restaging, re-presenting, and playing back” could “become amnesiac about its heritage”.7 To re-view twentieth-century performance criticism as an at least partially usable inheritance does not necessarily deny that its “rhetoric”, as W.B. Worthen has shown,8 was ultimately predicated on a concept of drama as a text-oriented genre. Even so, critics like Bernard Beckerman, John Russell Brown, Michael Goldman, J.L. Styan, and others pursued a scenario “informed by a sense that the performances are revealing potentialities latent in the plays rather than producing new meanings”.9 This scenario was partially anticipated by Harley Granville- Barker and, on the Continent, by far-sighted scholars like Rudolf Stamm. These critics groped for what in performance enriched the text, qualified its meaning, and even served as a unique (in Beckerman’s phrase) “self-generative” force.10 Such an inclusive perspective must have been available after the decline of the New Criticism, even among textually oriented critics. Take, for example, Harry Berger, Jr., who assumes a “problematic relation of Shakespeare’s text to the instituted theatre process in terms of which he wrote”.11 As Alvin Kernan notes even earlier in a study of Shakespeare’s representation of the poet in the theatre, that image was not an untroubled one. Rather, it reflected “a need to resolve the very real tensions created by a situation in which the writer’s conception of the nature and value of his art did not square with the actual circumstances” in which his plays were produced and performed: “Shakespeare was, the evidence suggests, suspended between a vision of his art as noble as the highest Renaissance views on the subject, and questions about that art as it had to be practiced in the actual conditions of playing in the public theatre.”12 Thus, Renaissance poetics sought to enclose representation within an architecturally and verbally imposed frame which, bounded by closure and the unities, kept in check subaltern actors and restrained them from any “self-resembled show”.13 As distinct from, say, the Renaissance stage within the precincts of the Ducal Palace, the conditions and effects of playing in public places were marked by an outgoing and sometimes “self-resembled” force, unrestrained by standards derived from an absent, self-contained, verbal composition. Ultimately, such outgoing freedom from closure harked back
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to what Anne Meredith Skura has called “the nonmimetic roots of theater in ritual celebrations, popular pastimes, and folk tradition”.14 Thus, in the Elizabethan theatre the relationship of text and performance was marked by variable liabilities on either side. While today it is, of course, difficult to assess the impact of anonymous, largely non-verbal performance traditions, these do appear to be alien to and different from the scriptural culture advanced by both humanism and Reformation literacy. The performative élan, the verve and vigour of late ritual and ceremonial occasions, seasonal mayings, mummings, and misrule practices can only be reconstructed through rare fragments and the lens of censure and reforming zeal of antitheatrical polemics. But what a few observers like Philip Stubbes and others allude to is an entire panorama of rural performance practices that were not subjected to verbal, let alone authorial, authority. Next to these largely seasonal, post-ritual ceremonies there developed in mid-Elizabethan London large playhouses, bear-gardens for baitings and related sports, all marked by a good deal of non-verbal performance practices. In particular, large commercial venues like the Red Lion (1567), the Theatre (1576) or the Curtain (1577) operated in the absence of dramatic scripts as we tend to think of them. In these places, theatre historians have perceived a startling “disparity between theatrical activity and printed texts”.15 Once we acknowledge a “gross discrepancy” between what was done and what was spoken on these stages, we need to conclude that whatever performance practices prevailed, they disposed of a fairly self-assured extra-textual matrix. Historians of the early Elizabethan theatre, such as John Astington and William Ingram, are agreed that these stages offered shows or entertainments and enjoyed responses which were not subservient to any literary standards and meanings. Nor were the extra-textual modes of playing forgotten after Kyd and Marlowe had introduced blank verse as a dramatic vehicle of Renaissance secular passion. Recall, for example, the “predominantly visual” style of performance associated with the Queen’s Men, in which “spoken language tends to be subordinate”.16 In their itinerant progress they had a “Turkish ropedancer” in their repertory and on occasion were able to split into two groups – one of them “tumblers”. This non-representational background of performance practice must have invigorated a tradition and stimulated a cultural memory well into the seventeenth century, when the discrepancy between the dramatist’s prescribed text and the performer’s wilful action could itself be staged as a comic burlesque in The Knight of the Burning Pestle (1608). A grocer and his wife intervene against a textually laid-out city comedy and cheer their
Performance in Shakespeare’s Theatre
apprentice when he performs as “May Lord” (3.399–400), only to proceed in the name of “Saint George” with “drums, and guns, and flags” to lead the city trained bands to Mile End (5.57–156).17 Decades later, Ben Jonson, the dramatist most jealously anxious about his own scriptural authority, would complain against players who attempted to “possess the Stage against the Play”.18 Clearly such self-sufficient ways of extemporal performance were anything but “ministerial”; in fact, they defied textual authority. It is difficult to account for the extra-textual strength of Elizabethan performance traditions unless we acknowledge a residue of their free-wheeling independence of textually dominated scripts. At the same time, there were traditions of a text-oriented performance whose uncomic uses of language and gesture, especially in the delivery of an “excellent actor” (Edward Alleyn or Richard Burbage, for example), made a powerful impression even on large audiences. We have the well-known early testimony of Thomas Nashe in his Pierce Penniless (1592) about “brave Talbot” newly “embalmed with the tears of ten thousand spectators” who “in the Tragedian that represents his person, imagine they behold him fresh bleeding”.19 In cases like these a dramatic text must have helped performers (as well as spectators) partially at least to identify with what was performed. It is difficult to envision large audiences in tears without assuming that they were moved by Talbot’s language of the “heart” (4.1.80; 4.7.11) and the rhymed verbal bond of filial affection which “warm’d thy father’s heart” (4.6.11) unto the last.20 In view of the different histories and the enormous varieties informing relations of performance and language in early modern culture, there is reason to be sceptical about any univocal definition of the relationship in question. My doubts about any universally valid formula of either a “ministerial” or a “magisterial” role of performance must at this point remain strictly provisional; but if the evidence collected in Author’s Pen and Actor’s Voice suggests anything, it is that the extraordinary spectrum of performance practices embraced both ways of “secretly open” presentation and the “secret close intent” in plot and character. Between these different modes of ‘playing’ and ‘acting’ there was a host of transitions and combinations, to different degrees dominated by either the power of performance or, increasingly, the puissance of imaginary uses of language. If, in the contingency of this context, an absolute distinction between text and performance is questionable, that does not detract from the usefulness, in contemporary Shakespeare studies, of those recent, more broadly comprehending vistas of performative action. Indebted to Victor Turner’s work,
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new anthropological premises, especially in concepts like liminality or van Gennep’s rites of passage, can usefully be applied to the Elizabethan theatre. Comprising social as well as aesthetic forms and events, these concepts offer a helpful matrix in terms of which text, performance, and audience may relate in, say, the opening and the concluding action of a play.21 In conjunction with J.L. Austin’s idea of illocutionary speech action and Jacques Derrida’s ideas of iterability and citationality, the new performative is open to hybridity and conjunctions of different media. Nonetheless, while the new concept of performance has been remarkably comprehensive, even privileged as an almost paradigmatic figure, the outcome was not without a certain irony: the unforeseen danger was that particularly intense, intimate ties between performance and theatre were occluded. As Elin Diamond notes, “the terminological expansion of performance” has resulted in “its drift away from theater.”22 Part of the reason, as hinted above, was that a non-representational concept of performance was at odds with the theatre as an institutionalized site of rendering dramatic images of characters in worldly circumstances. Unfortunately, the new performance theory grounded its disaffection from representation on what many in the profession believed was a culturally and politically avant-garde position. This position is in fact derived from a dated reading of (neo)Aristotelian versions of mimesis. While Aristotele’s poetics is dominated by literary concerns, it seeks to domesticate those unruly forms and functions of mimesis, which Platonic anxiety bore witness to. But we know at least since Hermann Koller that the thrust of early forms of mimesis was not exclusively towards imitation, but was also marked by strong links to dance and song. In its aversion to representation, the new performative favoured a politics and poetics that tended to ignore recent dynamic developments in the concept of mimesis, including those advanced by Walter Benjamin, Louis Marin, Jacques Derrida, and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, not forgetting Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and her reading of “representation” in Marx.23 Since the work of the new performance theorists cannot be considered a homogeneous or coherent body of thought, there are remarkable exceptions, especially among those who sought to accommodate their avant-garde preoccupations to traditional performance practices in the theatre. To illustrate at least one of these positions, let us look briefly at Peggy Phelan’s project which maintains an intriguing relevance to the study of Shakespeare’s plays. Pointing to the “‘excess’ meaning” that goes with performed representations, she is prepared to conceive of this meaning as at least “a supplement that makes multiple and resistant readings possible”. Since “it fails to reproduce the
Performance in Shakespeare’s Theatre
real exactly,” we need to recognize that “representation produces ruptures and gaps”.24 For Phelan, the “chasm” itself “between presence and re-presentation” tends to associate a sense of “loss and grief” which can tinge “the currency of our representational economy”. In this view, “presence” refers to the physical existence on stage of the actor. In Shakespeare’s The Tempest, for example, Prospero confronts, and even explicates in his epilogue, this “chasm” between the actor’s role and his being. In the ending of the play, this “chasm” serves as the threshold between the fictional representation of Prospero’s magic prowess and the actual presentation of the performing actor requesting applause, and who, in his own voice, acknowledges that “what strength I have is mine own”. The firstperson pronoun may appear to dangle freely, but in fact its motion sways from character to actor. Even when the poetic transition offers an exquisite swerve back to the world of the playhouse, it entails a sense of “loss and grief” in the passage through which the genius surrenders his most precious possession. As the imploding fiction betrays its own absence and illusion, the performer consorts with his entanglement in the interaction between character and being, gracefully undoing the knot that up to this moment has tied his imaginary and his professional identities. Released into an open postscriptural future, he escapes the regime of the play’s representational economy. Although the “chasm” between presentation and representation in the ending of The Tempest may well contain the most felicitous rites of passage, there are at least a dozen other plays which in their conclusions foreground uses of performance at the cutting edge of the disparity between representational and presentational functions.25 Even as the concluding words are spoken, performance practice comes into its own: the story is told, all action is done; what remains is a potentially sovereign mediation – the actor who, having done his job, forcefully generates (and serves) liminality, drawing on untold kinetic energy in the process. And yet, even here this non-derivative use of performance cannot be an absolute one. As we shall see, it assumes its greatest potential wherever a “thick” performative maintains its indigenous strength and independence in the midst of a wide spectrum of multiformity between the media of representation and bodily presence. The acknowledgement in liminality of performance’s independent power can remind us that the “anti-theatrical prejudice” (Jonas Barish’s term) was derived from an anti-histrionic bias. Animated by disdain for a socially inferior habitus, this bias was anticipated in Robert Greene’s scorn for those “base grooms” or John Marston’s devastating treatment of the actors in Histriomastix, Or The Player Whip’t.26 There is plenty of continuity between
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this early scourging of the players and the condescension of eighteenth-century editors who believed the actors “foisted in” that “low stuff which disgraces the work of this great Author” (Sir Thomas Hanmer), especially those “mean conceits and ribaldries” (Alexander Pope).27 To underline the socially inflected origins of such devaluation of the actor’s role helps us to see that we are dealing with two different cultures, two different media – one antedating, the other following what Patrick Collinson calls the “second English reformation” which culminated in the 1580s. There was a veritable “cultural revolution,” which effected a “moral and cultural watershed” marked by withdrawal of the middling sort from traditional sports and pastimes, and the incipient triumph of those who “were cleaning up the shows”.28 Under these circumstances, performance on London stages was considered by many as a waste of time, even when it did survive behind the shield of royal patronage. As Peggy Phelan pointedly notes, performance has “no reproductive” efficacy. Since “performance implicates the real through the presence of living bodies”, it “saves nothing; it only spends”, until it “disappears into memory, into the realm of invisibility and the unconscious where, again and finally, it eludes regulation and control”. Thus, from a modern perspective, performance’s “independence from mass production, technologically, economically, and linguistically is its greatest strength.”29 These brief citations from one of the most distinguished critics in performance studies show how theatrical and extra-theatrical practices can profitably be addressed alongside one another. Phelan is specifically concerned with the performance art of Angelika Festa and related artists. In terms of her wider comprehension of performative practice, the discussion of modern unscripted experiments such as these reveals the staggering degree to which, as a medium, performance is open to all sorts of action and behaviour on the most varied occasions. As Rose Lee Goldberg suggests, it is “an openended medium with endless variables”.30 On the strength of these intermedial leanings, performance – as we shall presently see – can serve as a masterful but also as a ministerial force: it can dominate, but it can also serve such intermedial alliances. One of the earliest modern performance displays without language was the three-day cohabitation of Joseph Beuys with an untamed coyote in the New York René Block Gallery, between 23 and 25 May 1974. The presence of an animal – an unpredictable, non-representational being in a perfectly open, tentative relationship with a human being – constitutes an exemplary performative situation of the first order. As Erika Fischer-Lichte notes in her Ästhetik des Performativen, “the staged animal is the Einbruch (the break-in
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11
and entering) of the real into fiction, accident and chance into order, nature into culture”.31 This performative action has distinct parallels in Shakespeare’s plays, not only in the performance of Launce’s dog Crab or the bear in The Winter’s Tale but, as some penetrating recent criticism has shown, also in the spatial contiguity, even identity of playhouse and bear-garden.32 The cohabitation of Joseph Beuys with a coyote or the work of Angelika Festa and other performance artists provides us with spectacular illustrations of how far performative practice can move beyond the ties of its traditional affiliation with the language of drama. Without in the least challenging the validity of this larger field of performance action, critics like W.B. Worthen, Barbara Hodgdon, Philip Auslander and others have set out to do some countervailing bridge-building between theatre, including that of Shakespeare, and performance studies. Together with earlier work like Clive Barker’s pathbreaking Theatre Games (1977) or later studies like Herbert Blau’s To All Appearances (1992) and Marvin Carlson’s Performance (1996), an expansive and self-centred concept of performance has come to invade the traditional agenda of the theatre, providing sufficient grounds on which to challenge, in Barbara Hodgdon’s phrase, “the supplementary character of the concept of performance in traditional dramatic criticism”. In contrast to the main drift of textuality and the declining linguistic turn, she prefers to pursue “crossdisciplinary allegiances with cultural studies and film studies” but also with recent media like “television, video-cassette recorders, DVD technology”. They all have broadened “the sense of what performance is, what it does and what it might be made to do”.33 No doubt this is a timely and persuasive plea, even when the ever-expanding range of performance has its own problems. For instance, the question is of how to meet the staggering dissemination of all sorts of communicative means, messages, and media and yet retain the focus on the dramatic performative as a stimulating, activating element in the traditional theatre. No doubt some caution vis-à-vis these inflationary developments appears advisable. Specifying the social function of theatre, Worthen, with an admirable sense of realism, cautions us against the “considerable disciplinary and institutional pressure of Performance Studies”, especially since any optimism about the state of our knowledge appears premature. Thus, he doubts “that we have a compelling model, if there can be a single compelling model, for the functioning of writing in dramatic performance”. This is an extremely important warning. Even within Shakespeare’s theatre, and the limited spectrum of his own plays, there is no universally valid pattern of “what the work of writing is and does when it is used, or used up, in/as theatre”.34
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In other words, in Shakespeare there is not and cannot be “a single compelling model”. As a study like Shakespeare and the Power of Performance abundantly shows, dramatic writing can inspire the craft and direction of performance. It is possible, as David Schalkwyk has conclusively shown, for “words” to bring out “the power of the self-authorizing performative as a public act”.35 On the other hand, there is also a compelling thrust, a self-delivered might, in certain types of performance practice that puts writing in its place. Such power of performance is not derivative but self-projected: it prospects as well as projects a surplus force, a textually stirring strength in association with specific uses of open, platea-like space. There is an undisguised presentational element in personation and in conventions of liminality where a chorus, a prologue or epilogue or some induction irresistibly appeals to the audience, bypassing the authority of textual representation. Such given, pre-ordained patterns of performative action have been studied in Shakespeare’s adaptation of the medieval Vice; in exuberant versions of clownage and folly; and in the doubleencoded forms of gendered disguise. Even more important, this performative impulse continued to inform important types of role-playing as long as these were delivered by an actor-character; that is, through the “secretly open” presence, in the character, of its performing “personator”. With these recently scrutinized forms and practices before us, it certainly makes sense, as our title asserts, to speak of an early modern “power of performance”, which cannot be reduced to recapturing or restating “the authority of the text”.36 However, such “power” is not dictatorial; it is constitutional rather than absolute. Double-voiced Bodies: Exceeding and Serving the Text As a matter of course, then, the absence in performance of any single binding model calls for rethinking the linkage between the writing and the acting in Shakespeare’s theatre. It is one thing, in Worthen’s phrase, to release “the stage from a ‘derivative’ dependence on literature”; but it is an entirely different matter, as this phrase continues, to release the stage “from the obligation (even the ability) to reproduce the text”.37 As Barbara Hodgdon describes it, this “obligation” to reproduce the text, “as exhibited in directing, acting, and scholarship, constrains the work of performance”.38 Here is the point on which R.A. Foakes has put much emphasis: the radical notion of a performative designed to liberate the production of the plays from “the Procrustean bed of Shakespeare’s text”.39
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From my point of view, a term like “liberate” upsets a differential relationship of text and performance, and in conjunction with “Procrustean bed” the phrase suggests a somewhat rash reversal of hierarchies. In contrast with the traditional, centuries-old privileged status of dramatic language to which performance was taken to be subsidiary, the hierarchy in question is simply reversed: the text is now simply subordinated to the sovereignty of performance. What – as we shall see in the concluding section – appears to be a matter of concern is the practical outcome, as displayed on our stages, of this reversal of priorities in mise-en-scène. It is one thing to resist the reduction of performance to a ministerial practice, to what Worthen justifiably calls a “derivative” and purely “interpretive” function. But it is quite another thing to sanction any absolute resistance of performance to textual modes of signification. Matters are worse still when far from univocal, dialogic uses of language – defined by M.M. Bakhtin “heteroglot” – are felt to place constraints on performing practice. Shakespeare’s dramatic dialogue is a “double-voiced discourse” par excellence that conveys “different intentions” and, as poetic language, “has a double, even a multiple, meaning”.40 On Shakespeare’s stage it is, of course, true that “the authority of the text” does not and cannot exclusively hold sway. In its enunciation the play’s language is exposed to, in fact is bound to consort with, a different authority, which is that of its institutionalized context. On this circumstantial platform, both language and performance serve as “ciphers to this great accompt” (Henry V, Prologue, 17). As editors like G. Blakemore Evans and Andrew Gurr have noted, “accompt” plays on two meanings: the story, the account of historical exploits; and the communicative use of it in the form of the service rendered, the profit garnered. The final arbiter between these two modes is the audience’s response – the story-account’s impact on them, its success. There is not a single but rather a “Bi-fold authority” (Troilus and Cressida, 5.2.144) in Shakespeare’s theatre.41 The two identities (“This is, and is not, Cressid!”) can cleave “a thing inseparate” (148); its “division” (150) informs the drama of perception, but also the perception of dramaturgy. The latter is inspired by the give and take, the pro and con, the dynamic that propels the difference in the two media – one the pre-eminently imaginary, textually sustained account, the other a largely material embodiment of visible bodies and performing voices. Once this reading is accepted, we need to go one step further still. The recent rift in Shakespeare studies is correlative with Shakespeare’s plays themselves. These in their turn submit to those competing forces of authorization which we have alluded to as the perplexing grounds of a constitutive “Bi-fold authority”. As I have suggested elsewhere, “author’s
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pen” and “actor’s voice” (from the prologue to Troilus and Cressida) do not share the same space, poetics, or ontology. Even while they appear happily to complement one another in production, they remain incommensurable in that, as David Scott Kastan poignantly notes, “[n]either is the effect of the other; neither produces, or draws upon (except rhetorically) the other’s claim to authenticity”.42 The difference, in short, is not simply cultural or aesthetic in any general sense; it inhabits two versions of epistemology, two modes of communication, and, in the early modern contexts, two types of socially determined habitus and perception. To trace the roughest outlines of their difference shows up the limitations in what has often enough been described as the “duality of drama”. Nor can my own preferred terminology, the distinction between “pen” and “voice”, be the last word in this matter. If in the “scene individable” (Hamlet, 2.2.399) the difference in question may undergo a certain amount of play,43 then the mere juxtaposition of the two media will not do. Rather, the argument needs to explore their interactive relationship. In this direction, then, Shakespearean performance involves playing with a difference. In other words, the critic would wish to envision, as dramatically potent, the extent to which “actor’s voice” is in “author’s pen” just as, simultaneously, “author’s pen” is in “actor’s voice”. Whether the difference in question is transmuted into play or conflict, bodily action or thoughtful apprehension, the result is a sense of motion, a stirring movement along or across the boundaries between the real and the imaginary. But if this is so, the fixity of an “either/or”, let alone the frontiers of opposition between actor and character, between the speaking voice of the performer and the scripted speech of the performed, dissolves into air, the thin air of theory. Hence, the scenario of performance constrained by a mighty text needs to be qualified insofar as Shakespeare’s language of drama accommodates, and is accommodated by, another compelling medium of artful communication, that of performance. Once such adjustment is understood as mutual, one medium may indeed be seen to impel, and simultaneously to propel, the other. The relationship embraces not so much constraint as a mutual assignment; it is a compelling ensemble marked by goad and impulsion, even when sustained by either common interests or divisive concerns.44 To invoke a differential reading of the text/performance relationship is not to minimize the range and depth of insight that the new concept of nonderivative and non-ministerial performance practice has helped to advance. If, finally, my enthusiasm for this concept is qualified, my hesitation derives from a stubborn resolve to differentiate historically the sources of this relationship and to specify
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the spaces of an independent performance practice. No doubt the strength of the latter was most acute before the dynamic rapprochement of the two media in the course of the late sixteenth century. The incomparable cultural ascendancy that reached its peak in the flourishing consortium of literature and theatre was a process of growth through association rather than dissociation, inclusion rather than exclusion. Shakespeare more than anyone else contributed to this growth through an unprecedented degree of interpenetration between writing and playing. Performance Theory and Practice in the Modern Theatre At this point, let us explore further the changing premises on which a revolution in relations of text and performance is occurring under our own eyes. In order to view in conjunction the practice of playing then and the modes of performance now, we must be prepared to consider what is happening to Shakespeare’s plays in our own theatre. Insofar as there may be an element of reciprocity between the staging of Shakespeare’s plays then and their performances now, we may say that any modern “staging of a Shakespeare play results from a dialogue between the historical moment of its creation and the contemporaneity of the mise-en-scène”.45 Since we have studied the former and found “the historical moment” marked by an extraordinary variety of performance practices, the modern side of the “dialogue” remains to be inspected more closely. The question, then, is what does “the contemporaneity of the mise-en-scène” teach us about the grounds and aims of the reversal in the traditional relationship between performance and text? In pursuit of this question, I begin by offering my own experience of an apparent self-authorization of actors, taking my illustrations from productions/ adaptations of Hamlet in the German theatre. There is reason to believe that on the Continent the preoccupation with performance-oriented productions of Shakespeare is most prominent and most virulent. More often than not this preoccupation serves the task of ousting traditional, especially nineteenthcentury, conventions in contemporary theatre. It may well be that the late twentieth-century anxiety over the expenditure on unity, wholeness, and homogeneity borders on a kind of panic, but unless this anxiety blinds us in all our responses, an intriguing reciprocity may be traced in the conjunction of the sixteenth- and the twentieth-century stages. My use of the word “conjunction” seeks to avoid the projection of mere analogy between then and now in favour of a more problematic sense of
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mutual interrogation and illumination between early modern and late modern approaches to performance. There are at least two cultural constellations between then and now that appear to facilitate the proposed conjunctural operation. First, both early and late modern performance practices refuse to take for granted the supreme figure of closure in the architecture of the picture-frame stage. Secondly, neither the early nor the late modern period can be subsumed under an entirely scriptural mode of communication, with the culture of literacy at the undisputed centre of things. Rather, both early modern and late modern civilizations constitute a hybrid type of communicative culture. It is a culture in which, then as now, the Gutenberg paradigm does not go unchallenged by other modes and channels of information, among them such vastly different forms as oral, pictorial, and digital means of communication. In these circumstances which, again, I understand as conjunctural, not analogical, it was then possible and is now (for entirely different reasons) feasible to aim at a circulation of authority in the theatre that is not necessarily and not entirely dominated by one (scriptural) mode of utterance and expression. While, as a consequence, the space for performance practice tends to be enhanced, the expansion in question then and now is energized by a radically different set of forces and circumstances. In our time it is dominated not by the authority of the performer but rather by the power of the director. The latter’s domination has brought forth a Regietheater in which the Regisseur, not the player, decides every move, every gesture, every rendering. As a result, performance practice cannot claim to be self-sustained. As noted above, far from self-authorizing the direction and execution of his/her craft, the actor’s work again assumes a ministerial status. Again, we have a mode of acting that is derivative, in the unquestionable sense that it derives from the director’s aims, concepts, perceptions, and decisions. What is behind these directorial decisions is ultimately a desire to attract attention, to make an impact by the originality, and the quality of this originality, in the treatment of the play. To say this is not to dispute that directorial initiative can serve as a genuine inspiration for actors, in the sense of the working modes of Adolphe Appia, Edward Gordon Craig, and Konstantin Stanislavsky. Among the most talented and influential directors of Shakespeare’s plays it was Max Reinhardt whose work was based, as Wilhelm Hortmann notes, “on the concord between performers and audience” whereby Reinhardt “would willingly incorporate actors’ suggestions”.46 While this concord was increasingly disrupted in the early twentieth century, elements of a concurrence between performers and sympathizing spectators in the audience persisted. Such was the case in
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Brecht’s Berliner Ensemble and in the work of Peter Stein, not to forget Brecht’s disciples in direction, among them Benno Besson and Manfred Wekwerth. In the present context, Besson’s work is important because his name is associated with a highly pertinent revision of the one Shakespearean scene which may be held to be a veritable seismograph to the issue in question: Hamlet’s advice to the players. Besson directed Hamlet in the East Berlin Volksbühne in 1977. This production deserves to be recalled because in it Brecht’s distinguished disciple forged central concepts and ideas that were further developed in his prolonged series of reinterpretations of the same play in Helsinki, Avignon, Geneva, and Paris. Following Besson’s invitation, I was privileged to serve as consultant to the initial Berlin production. In what follows I wish to acknowledge that this re-reading was exclusively the director’s initiative. Rejecting the traditional affirmation of the Prince of Denmark’s authority in affairs theatrical, Besson preferred to present a somewhat obtrusive, loquacious character with altogether uncourtly costume and gesture. But in his advice to the players, Hamlet (played by Manfred Karge) put on an air of self-absorption that informed the ineffectual delivery of a somewhat facile and all-too-familiar poetics of imitation. No less striking was the stance of the First Player (played by Fritz Marquardt). As he was told to “Speak the speech, I pray you, as I pronounc’d it to you, trippingly on the tongue” (3.2.1–2), the First Player’s response was full of reserve. Here, obviously, was a practitioner and a sceptic, slightly bored, if not exasperated, by mere theory, someone who appeared to know more about delivery than any theoretical disquisition could teach him. Suffering Hamlet’s admonitions gladly, the player just went through the motions until he almost defied social distance with his curt “I warrant your honor” (15), and the casualness of his “I hope we have reform’d that indifferently with us” (36–7) – to which F, though not Q2, adds an understating “Sir”. The remarkable thing was that this reading could be so sustained in its ramifications throughout the players’ scenes that it appeared to underline the force of the “controversy”, reported by Rosencrantz, according to which “the poet and the player went to cuffs in the question” (2.2.355–6). To be sure, the First Player had little opportunity for signs of resentment when the author of “a speech of some dozen lines, or sixteen lines”(2.2.541–2) presumed to advise the performer in his (the performer’s) own craft. Even so, throughout Hamlet’s lengthy speech, Besson’s reading informed the scene with a submerged sense of dramatic irritation and suppressed conflict. Challenging not simply the poetic validity of the neoclassical doctrine of imitatio vitae, this reading defied any strictly literate location of authority. Predicated on a rhetoric of exhortation, the
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speech was given a self-reflexive tenor that, seeking to celebrate the marriage of “word” and “action,” revealed in fact how vulnerable the prescribed union was. The advice, as we know, culminated in a call to safe-guard the “necessary question” (3.2.42–3) in the text of the play against extemporal, that is, selfauthorized performance. Besson, of French-Swiss origin, had in the 1950s joined the Berliner Ensemble, where he became acquainted with Brecht’s practical and theoretical work towards a renouvellement of the twentieth-century theatre. In the late 1920s, Brecht’s attention was first drawn to what he then called an ongoing “battle between theatre and play”. Recognizing the “great struggle for supremacy between words, music, and production”, his solution was “a radical separation of the elements”47 of theatre. In this process of separation, Brecht effectively redefined the uses of performance, especially in relation to the text and the textual authority and ideology of the playwright. Although the actor remained under strict directorial control, Brecht enhanced rather than reduced the space for performative action. Thus, the performer’s position was transformed from an agency naturalizing and affirming the text of representation to an agency reviewing, distancing and potentially criticizing this text. By doing so, Brecht deliberately and unrelentingly broke up what he considered the false assumption of unity, in the theatre of illusion, among text, performance, and audience. Insofar as the Brechtian performer was made to serve as a critical agency in the reception and reproduction of the text of representation, he or she was also a divisive agent in the theatre at large. Instead of operating as a congenial mediating instance between the dramatist’s text and its reception by the audience, performance practice was redesigned to differentiate both the meaning of the text and its impact on the audience. The so-called “V-effect”, that is, the Brechtian strategy of alienation, was introduced and used as a crucial means of precluding empathy and identification with any given, authorially prescribed meaning. The idea was thereby to reveal the strange and the unwonted, to expose contradictions, to unmask false pretensions and illusions, to uncover the source of privilege, and to show up the hidden operations of ideology and exploitation. In doing all this, the performer was empowered to question textual authority and, if necessary, to undermine the representational thrust of whatever meaning seemed false or illusory. As opposed to Brecht’s theatre of gestus and commitment, the Nietzschean tradition of a theatre of release from textualized figurations of truth and meaning went several steps further in seeking to emancipate performance from the confines of a literary type of representation. Here, the most provocative
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point of departure was that of Antonin Artaud when he called for alternatives to “our theater which lives under the exclusive dictatorship of speech”.48 The gist of Artaud’s radical revaluation of the text/performance relationship lies in the demand that the theater, an independent and autonomous art, must, in order to revive or simply to live, realize what differentiates it from text, pure speech, literature, and all other fixed and written means. We can perfectly well continue to conceive of a theater based upon the authority of the text … But this conception of theater … is, if not the absolute negation of theater … certainly its perversion.49
The point, of course, is that today this position is no longer that of an isolated avant-garde intellectual. Nor is it an indifferent position vis-à-vis Shakespeare’s reception in the twentieth-century theatre. We need only remember how Peter Brook refers to the “acting revolution through Brecht” and how, through using Artaud “as a springboard”, he set out in “search for a theatrical language as flexible and penetrating as that of the Elizabethans”.50 As Patrice Pavis suggests, Brook’s position may well be considered as the most eminent approach towards a “hermeneutic refusal” in staging the classical text, when that text is received as: a series of meanings which contradict and answer one another and which decline to annihilate themselves in a final global meaning. … The plurality of signifieds is maintained by multiplication of theatrical enunciators (actors, music, rhythm of presentation, etc.); rejection of hierarchy in stage systems; refusal … to reduce them to a fundamental signified; and finally, refusal to interpret.51
Disjunction between Words and Staging Since for many in today’s theatre “the modern-written-text or the classicalshown-text have both been emptied of meaning”,52 the distrust of textual authority in representations is more widespread than most of us would tend to believe. This distrust has inspired the theatrical project of Robert Wilson in America where, as Christopher Innes noted, “the active factor is the disjunction between words and staging”, including “casting against concept” and the shaping of “a visual action that had no illustrative relation to the speeches”.53 In other words, visual action as well as visual scenery can – like
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the performing body – no longer be reduced to a “derivative” function in the service of the text. Wilson’s theatre is, of course, in close touch with the work of one of the leading late twentieth-century German dramatists, Heiner Müller. Significantly, the disaffection from the text of representation is writ large in Müller’s Hamletmachine, first produced and directed by Wilson himself. This adaptation of Shakespeare’s tragedy is centrally concerned with vanishing locations of meaning in the text of the play, even with a dramatically presumed loss of the “script” itself. Let us look at the main character’s central speech in which, significantly, Müller’s Hamlet shies away from bearing, in “My words”, the burden of meaning traditionally associated with the protagonist’s text: I’m not Hamlet. I don’t take part any more. My words have nothing to tell me. … My drama doesn’t happen anymore. Behind me the set is put up. By people who aren’t interested in my drama, for people to whom it means nothing … My drama didn’t happen. The script has been lost.54
Once the character’s language has ceased to convey anything, the play “means nothing” to its audience. There is a link between this meaninglessness and the alleged refusal, on the part of the performing actor, to do the role in the first place. As Müller has it, the opening speech is no longer Hamlet’s but that of “the actor playing Hamlet”. While the representation of meaning has become questionable, the dramatist is content to render the performer performing the business of performance. To replace the protagonist by the actor playing the protagonist’s role can be read as an image of potentially the most radical liberation of performance from its “ministerial” status. Ironically, it is the author’s pen that dictates the terms by which the player’s voice proclaims the obliteration of Shakespeare’s own authorial meaning and authority. Thus, the agent of performance can displace the discipline of the text by substituting his own fiction of a refusal to speak it and a histrionic wilfulness to throw off the presumed burden of any textually imposed signified. Having got rid of any prescribed course of action and delivery, the player and his audience confront no longer Shakespeare’s tragedy but its vanishing trace, along with a magisterial insistence that the great dramatist’s “drama doesn’t happen anymore”. To replace the protagonist by the actor playing, or even refusing to play, the protagonist’s role can be read as an ironic image, a simulacrum of the player’s refusal to submit to a text, even to one whose “script has been lost”.
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As a cultural prophecy, the most troubling outlook is not primarily the rupture between classical text and contemporary performance per se. Rather, what the Hamletmachine heralded in 1977 must today be regarded not as a solitary avant-garde experiment but as an inexorable anticipation of what, for better or worse, the future of the European theatre, especially its continental variety, will look like. From an international point of view, it is startling to realize that these are not isolated adaptations but that these trends in the late twentieth-century theatre are pervasive enough to comprehend the work of theatre practitioners as remote from one another as Brecht and Artaud, not to mention Beckett or even work like that of Robert Wilson or contemporary ensembles in the tradition of the Wooster Group. Wherever we look there are changes in the relations of language and show which permit us to view in a fresh perspective the element of mutuality in the give and take of word, icon, and voice on Shakespeare’s stage. There is no way, of course, to expect our own productions of Shakespeare to achieve anything like a replica of what went on in the Elizabethan Globe. Imitating the past does not bring forth productions pulsating with a living sense of experience. What instead, I suggest, is truly rewarding is a conjunctural relationship, that is, an interaction between then and now. There is a need to work with both the links and the gaps between Shakespeare’s and our own theatre; in other words, relations between the past significance of a players’ theatre and the present meaning of a director’s stage and mise-en-scène. It is in this conjunctural sense that I have chosen two further twentieth-century plays, partially to expose the gaps in their stark impact and to advance potential links between Shakespeare’s own dramaturgy of text and performance and our contemporary options in the staging of classical plays as well. Late modern emphases in mise-en-scène appear particularly prominent where another leading dramatist of the past is chosen to serve as protagonist in yet another of Müller’s own plays. What is at stake in his Gundling55 is Müller’s own treatment of Lessing’s dramatic writings. Viewed as entirely vulnerable, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, the eighteenth-century German dramatist, is involved, but only to stage the plight that neither the writing nor, indeed, the dramatist ever gets performed. Although the play’s lengthy title forecasts Lessings Schlaf Traum Schrei, the representation of his “dream” never gets properly started. In fact, Lessing as would-be protagonist never actually enters. What we have is an unambiguous use of the figure of performance when an actor, preparing for his role of Lessing, receives his make-up in the form of Lessing’s mask. But the attempt to represent the role
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of Lessing ends up in disaster; the embodiment of the dramatist is abortive. In a crucial scene Lessing is more than half covered under a heap of sand, on which the stage personnel, “disguised as theatre audience”, empty buckets of sand. At this moment, “waiters” enter carrying onto the stage “busts of poets and thinkers”: Lessing searches in the sand, unburying one hand, one arm. Waiters, their heads covered with safety hardhats, topple upon him a Lessing-bust covering head and shoulders. Lessing, on his knees now, attempts to free himself from this bust, without success. A muffled cry is heard from within [the bust]. Waiters, stage personnel (theater audience) applaud.56
The stupor of the poet-performer, first under the mask of his role, then under the weight of his own bust, constitutes a pregnant metaphor of failure. Any mutually sustained relations of language and play appear gravely undermined when the protagonist heaves under the incubus of a throttling performative: Here, of course, we have another simulacrum when ultimately it is a dramatist’s composition which ironically celebrates the muting of a poet-protagonist, the mutilation of the author’s text under the delivery of an exorbitant stage business. As the author of classical texts struggles to rid himself of the meaningless signs of his own potential authorship, both mask and bust are reduced, in a desperate gesture, to a speechless image of the futility of dramatic uses of language. Some of the same scruples about the capacity of dramatic discourse abound in Beckett and other modern dramatists. I have space only to mention Peter Handke’s Offending the Audience (1966). What is truly provocative in this play is the image of a twentieth-century rebellion of an entire group of actors as they refuse to submit to the imaginary text of a dramatic representation. Addressing the audience, they say: You see no picture of something … We are no pictures of something. We are no representatives. We have no pseudonyms. Our heartbeat does not pretend to be another’s heartbeat. Our bloodcurdling screams don’t pretend to be another’s bloodcurdling screams. We don’t step out of our roles. We have no roles. We are ourselves.57
Here, again, is the ironic text of a representation that, paradoxically, seeks to render nothing except the performer’s refusal to represent. As far as this rejection of a basic traditional convention is “offending” spectators, the reason is to be found in the actors’ presumption to abandon or at least to redefine representational action. If anything, the refusal to honour the contract with
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spectators and to assume roles in a world of fiction is made to appear as a magisterial not a ministerial gesture of the actors. Although their presumed independence is, again, a “simulacrum”, the (post)modern formally recalls a fraction of early modern practice which, in Schalkwyk’s phrase, can bring out “the power of the self-authorizing performative” in public. Hence, in Benno Besson’s re-reading of Hamlet’s advice to the players as in both Müller’s and Handke’s plays, the act of “liberating” performance comes full circle; it is thrown back upon itself. What this seemingly self-generative performative finally does convey is a representation of histrionic practice and “the power” of its apparently untamed independence. As such, this performance practice may indeed be taken to demonstrate that, in Bill Worthen’s phrase, performance has “no intrinsic relation to texts”. In a long view, these twentieth-century productions do not just content themselves to reveal the unsettled relations of text and performance; more intriguingly, they indicate some of the contingencies that are bound to affect productions of Shakespeare’s plays in the years to come. While it is unwise to speculate about the future, there is one aspect of future transformation that appears safe enough to be further pursued here. If the present foray into nearcontemporary developments in the theatre assures us of anything, it is that the changeful ensemble of communicative channels and technologies may affect and, perhaps, upset the cultural order and context of each single medium within this ensemble. As the theatre combines language/writing/reading with bodily action/show/iconography, the confederation of all these media now appears especially vulnerable, liable to far-reaching changes in the hierarchy and priority of its radically diverse constituents. Once these contingencies are given consideration, the more obvious and perfectly relevant question will have to focus on the fate of Shakespeare’s text on stages exposed to these unsettled relations of language and performance. More pointedly, and in over-simplified abstraction from conditions alluded to here, the question is, can this type of performance practice be considered as a truly independent, self-sustained, even self-generative, practice that is able to bring about a living Shakespeare on our stages? Paradoxically, we have in modern concepts and theories of acting a strong trend to enhance the specific contribution that the individual actor can make. Here is space only briefly to draw attention to two highly influential late twentieth-century theatre practitioners and theoreticians – Jerzy Grotowski and Eugenio Barba. For them, the text/performance relationship is strangely threatened by dysfunction or, as Grotowski terms it, by “contradiction”. A sense of balance and confederation, let alone a mutual effect of complementarity is
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out of the question after literature has ceased to be considered as “the creative part of the theatre”. The “important thing”, according to Grotowski, “is not the words but what we do with these words”. If, as he continues to suggest, the very core of theatrical experience is an “encounter”, then, in this encounter as a performed event, the uses of language must content themselves with a secondary role – even when and where they engage in the “contradiction” between, say, “gesture and voice, voice and word, word and thought”.58 The point here, first and foremost, is to suit “the word to the action”, rather than “the action to the word” (Hamlet, 3.2.17). Alongside Grotowski’s position, Eugenio Barba’s view of the “encounter” in question is marked by a related, but even more radical, notion of “a clash”, As he argues: In western theater, the actor is – or should be – a creator. His clash with the text, through his own sensibility and his own historical perspective opens up a unique and personal universe to his audience.59
Clearly, after centuries of “servitude”, the performer, toiling with the burden of an alien text, “is – or should be –” authorized to come into his/her own, allowed to follow his/her own craft and, as Barba says, “sensibility”. The question of course is, if there is “a new ethic for the actor” on the horizon, can we trust “his own historical perspective”? Can we indeed assume that this “ethic”, according to Barba, “has always been the moving force of all theater revolutions: to liberate the actor from servitude”? Here is a prospect devoutly to be wished, one resounding with all the pathos it takes to argue for a new paradigm. But, as soon as the historical comes into the picture and the actor’s function “in society” is being defined as that of “a question mark”,60 one would wish to redefine the nature and degree of the actor’s ‘liberation’ and the ways of his/her independence. Finally, of course, the range of histrionic flexibility will have to be assessed in reference to the circumstances, including the evermore innovative ambitions of directors, conditioning this function in the first place. Rephrasing the question leads us back to where the acting – the profession and the individual – can best hope to serve in the performance of Shakespeare’s plays as a “creator” (Barba’s phrase). It is impossible to advocate a contemporary sense for actors to bring alive Shakespeare’s plays today without taking into account the changeful panorama of the media and their cultural, political, and educational functions. To view written language spoken live by diverse voices in both its own implicit difference and in explicit interaction with other media (print, film, DVD, and so on) amounts to a formidable task, one which confronts an unprecedented rate and density of change in communication technologies. If
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the complexity and celerity of these changes defy any meaningful summary in the present context, we must confine our concern to what, arguably, is the most consequential momentum affecting the contemporary spectator’s preferred uses of the senses – that is, the shift from letters to pictures, from reading to viewing, from verbal to pictorial perception. In this momentous move the two media in the theatre are vitally involved. If, on contemporary stages, language and show, text and performance, experience a reversal in the order of which is magisterial and which is ministerial it appears only appropriate for Shakespeare’s plays in mise-en-scène to put up some resistance. This is not to belittle the power of performance in the staging of his plays; but once the power of his pre-representational heritage is fully recognized in the ways and means of its continuity we come to the point where the Shakespearean text cannot and must not be reduced to (I am tempted to say, abused as) a ministerial element in the production. In conclusion, let me affirm the need to defend the players against those directors who have usurped an extraordinary authority that ill consorts with the actor’s “new ethic” of conveying an independent, even “unique vision to his audience”. Let us be wary of taking for granted the proclaimed, all too wishful grounds on which actors can open up a “unique and personal universe” in directorially controlled theatre institutions. Shakespeare’s is an actor’s theatre, a stage run by performers. Barba’s clarion call “to liberate the actor from servitude” has a utopian ring, at least as it ignores that even in our time the actor’s ministerial position has two frontiers of uncongenial subordination. On the one hand, there is an immovable, purely conservative concept of Shakespeare’s text; on the other, we have the obsession with innovation on the part of directors rewriting the plays in their own original ways. While the former tends to turn the great plays into a museum, the latter has reached a point at which avant-garde memories have long since been tainted with commercial success.61 At this juncture, the work of the actor needs more than ever to escape the derivative state of directorial “servitude”. Unless this escape can be implemented in alliance with both the audience and the dramatic text, actors continue to be “reduced to mere tools in the hands of dictator-directors”.62 Notes The author wishes to convey his thanks to David Schalkwyk for the invaluable editorial help he gave to turn the present essay into printable shape. 1. W.B. Worthen, Shakespeare and the Authority of Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 27.
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2. Andrew Parker and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, eds, Performativity and Performance (New York and London: Routledge, 1995), 2–3; italics in the original. 3. Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 298; cited by Parker and Kosofsky Sedgwick, Performativity and Performance, 3. 4. David Schalkwyk, “Text and Performance, Reiterated: A Reproof Valiant or Lie Direct”, Chapter 4 in this volume, p. 48. For the most recent controversial discussion see John Russell Brown, “Learning Shakespeare’s Secret Language: the Limits of ‘Performance Studies’”, New Theatre Quarterly 24 (August 2008): 211–21. 5. What follows is an independent essay, but it may also be read as an epilogue to two closely connected studies which seek to engage the interlocking area of difference and alliance between text and performance. My Author’s Pen and Actor’s Voice: Playing and Writing in Shakespeare’s Theatre (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) confronts this conjuncture in the Elizabethan theatre as socio-cultural institution. Shakespeare and the Power of Performance: Stage and Page in the Elizabethan Theatre (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), co-authored with Douglas Bruster, approaches these variable, highly differential relations between language and show in terms of specific practices and figurations of performance, especially in the formative phase of Shakespeare’s plays. 6. My text throughout is The Riverside Shakespeare, 2nd edn., ed. G. Blakemore Evans (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997). 7. Barbara Hodgdon, Introduction to A Companion to Shakespeare and Performance, ed. Barbara Hodgdon and W.B. Worthen (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 6–7. 8. See W.B. Worthen’s influential study “Deeper Meanings and Theatrical Technique: The Rhetoric of Performance Criticism”, Shakespeare Quarterly 40 (1989): 441–55.This important intervention is adapted in chap. 4 of his Shakespeare and the Authority of Performance, 151–91. 9. Worthen, Shakespeare and the Authority of Performance, 223 n.5. 10. Bernard Beckerman, Theatrical Presentation: Performer, Audience, and Act, ed. Gloria Brim Beckerman and William Coco (New York: Routledge, 1990), 6–7. 11. Harry Berger, Jr., Imaginary Audition. Shakespeare on Stage and Page (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), xli; cf. 157, 159. 12. Alvin B. Kernan, The Playwright as Magician. Shakespeare’s Image of the Poet in the English Public Theater (New Haven: Yale University Press,1979), 53, 152–3. 13. The phrase is from Joseph Hall’s Virgidemiarum (1597)], 1.3.34 (reprinted in The Works, ed. Philip Wynter, vol. 9 [Oxford: AMS Press, 1969]) where the subaltern context is unambiguous: it is that of the “base clown” who enters in “vile Russetings” (l. 29). 14. Meredith Anne Skura, Shakespeare the Actor and the Purposes of Playing (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 57–8. I have collected evidence of widespread residual traces of these anonymous (non)verbal, extremely variable performance practices in my Shakespeare and the Popular Tradition in the Theater (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). For further evidence, especially path-breaking on juggling and tumbling, see Philip Butterworth, Magic on the Early English Stage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 7–73. 15. John Astington, “The London Stage in the 1580s”, The Elizabethan Theatre 11 (1990), 1. Here the work of David Bradley, William Ingram, Janet S. Loengard, Paul
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Whitfield White, and others has shed some valuable light on the terra incognita of mid-Elizabethan playing. 16. Scott McMillin and Sally-Beth MacLean, The Queen’s Men and their Plays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 125. 17. My text is Francis Beaumont, The Knight of the Burning Pestle, ed. John Doebler, Regents Renaissance Drama Series (London: Edward Arnold, 1967). 18. C.H. Herford, Percy Simpson, and Evelyn Simpson, ed., Ben Jonson: The Complete Works, 11 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925–52), vol. 6, 397. 19. Thomas Nashe, Pierce Penniless, in The Works of Thomas Nashe, ed. R.B. Mckerrow, 5 vols (London: 1904–10), vol. 1, 212. 20. Stephen Orgel, “What is a Text?”, in Staging the Renaissance. Reinterpretations of Elizabethan and Jacobean Drama, ed. David Scott Kastan and Peter Stallybrass (London: Routledge, 1991), 87. 21. For liminality in Shakespeare’s endings, see my Author’s Pen and Actor’s Voice, 216–45; for the threshold in his openings, Douglas Bruster and Robert Weimann, Prologues to Shakespeare’s Theatre. Performance and Liminality in Early Modern Drama (London and New York: Routledge, 2004). 22. Elin Diamond, ed., Performance and Cultural Politics (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), Introduction, 12 n. 22. 23. See my introductory piece, “Representation and Mimesis: Towards a New Theory”, together with the essay, “Doubly Encoded Representations in Modern Drama and Fiction: Rupturing Coordinates of (Re)Semblance and Meaning”, both in Symbolim 6: 3–36 and 97–136, respectively. For Hermann Koller’s study, see Die Mimesis in der Antike (Bern: Francke, 1954), 12; 119. For Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s distinction in representation between “portrait” and “proxy,” see her reading of Marx’ Brumaire in “Can the Subaltern Speak?”, in Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory. A Reader, ed. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 66–111. 24. Peggy Phelan, Unmarked. The Politics of Performance (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 2; subsequent citations 163–4, 172. For another singular exception, see Elin Diamond’s redefinition of mimesis in Unmaking Mimesis: Essays on Mimesis and Theater (London and New York: Routledge, 1997). 25. See Robert Weimann, “Thresholds to Commodity and Memory in Shakespeare’s Endings”, Representations 53 (1996): 1–20. 26. For illustrations, see my Author’s Pen and Actor’s Voice,124–25. 27. See, for instance, Eighteenth Century Essays on Shakespeare, ed. David Nichol Smith (New York: Russel & Russel, 1962), 48, 86f., 89. 28. Patrick Collinson, From Iconoclasm to Iconophobia: The Cultural Impact of the Second English Reformation (Reading: The University of Reading Press, 1986), 8, 12; and The Birthpangs of Protestant England (London: Macmillan, 1988), 101, 108. 29. Phelan, Unmarked, 148–9. 30. Rose Lee Goldberg, Performance Art: From Futurism to the Present (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1988), 9. 31. Erika Fischer-Lichte, Ästhetik des Performativen (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2004), 185 (my translation). 32. See Terence Hawkes, Shakespeare in the Present (London: Routledge, 2002), 83–106; Andreas Höfele, “Humanity at Stake: Man and Animal in Shakespeare’s Theatre”,
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Shakespeare Survey 60 (2007), 118–29. My thanks to Andreas Höfele for letting me use and cite from an unpublished essay, “‘More than a creeping thing’: Baiting Coriolanus”, where “the species crossover” is explored “in the opposite direction”, projecting “creatures from the bear-pit onto the stage”. For a reading of Launce and his dog, see Shakespeare and the Power of Performance (104–10) where I view the performing animal as part of a travesty of representation. 33. Hodgdon and Worthen, A Companion to Shakespeare and Performance, 3–4. 34. W.B. Worthen, “Texts, Tools, and Technologies of Performance: A Quip Modest in Response to R.A. Foakes”, Shakespeare 2, no. 2 (2006): 208. 35. David Schalkwyk, Speech and Performance in Shakespeare’s Sonnets and Plays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 32; cf. 50f., 111f., 214. 36. Worthen, Shakespeare and the Authority of Performance, esp. 23–8. Cf. Michael D. Bristol, Big-Time Shakespeare (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), for more comprehensive uses of “ministerial,” 58, 83. 37. W.B. Worthen, Shakespeare and the Force of Modern Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 37. 38. Hodgdon and Worthen, A Companion to Shakespeare and Performance, 5. 39. Worthen, Shakespeare and the Authority of Performance, 178; see R.A. Foakes, “Performance Theory and Textual Theory: A Retort Courteous”, Shakespeare 2 (2006), 50 et passim. But the phrase should not be overemphasized when read in the context of a polemic against “the armchair reading of speech” as theatrically “normative” modern “interlocution”. See in this connection Worthen’s brilliant critique of Andrew Parker and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick who “recapitulate Austin’s mistaken substitution of ontological for historical formations” of theatre (226, n. 18). 40. M.M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, ed. Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 296, 324–7. 41. Cf. my essay on “Bifold Authority in Shakespeare’s Theatre”, Shakespeare Quarterly 39 (Winter 1988), 401–17. 42. David Scott Kastan, Shakespeare and the Book (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 8. 43. See my essay “Playing with a Difference: Revisiting ‘Pen’ and ‘Voice’ in Shakespeare’s Theater”, Shakespeare Quarterly 50 (1999): 415–32. 44. Again, readers will notice that my use of “difference” or “differential” is closer to Saussure than to the theorists of deconstruction. 45. Bristol, Big-Time Shakespeare. I have further grappled with this dialectic in “Shakespeare on the Modern Stage: Past Significance and Present Meaning,” Shakespeare Survey 20 (1967):113–20. 46. Wilhelm Hortmann, Shakespeare on the German Stage: The Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 31. 47. Brecht on Theatre. The Development of an Aesthetic, ed. and trans. John Willett (London: Methuen, 1978 repr.), 22, 37. 48. Antonin Artaud, The Theater and Its Double, trans. Mary Caroline Richards (New York: Grove Press, 1958), 40. 49. Ibid., 106. 50. Peter Brook, The Shifting Point, 1949–1987 (New York: TCG, 1987), 43, 58. This confronts the danger of a “deadly theatre”; see Peter Brook, The Empty Space (New York: Athenaeum, 1969), 10.
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51. Patrice Pavis, Theatre at the Crossroads of Culture, trans. Loren Kruger (London: Routledge, 1992), 60. 52. Ibid., 59. 53. Christopher Innes, Avant Garde Theatre, 1892–1992 (London: Routledge, 1993), 204f. 54. Heiner Müller, Hamletmachine and Other Texts for the Stage (New York: PAJ, 1984), 56. 55. The full original title of the text which I use (and adapt) in translation, is Leben Gundlings Friedrich von Preußen Lessings Schlaf Traum Schrei (1977). 56. This is a stage direction (in my own translation) taken from Heiner Müller, Leben Gundlings Friedrich von Preußen Lessings Schlaf Traum Schrei. Ein Greuelmärchen (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag der Autoren, 1982), 43. 57. Peter Handke, Kaspar and Other Plays, trans. Michael Roloff (New York: Farrar, 1969), 44. 58. Jerzy Grotowski, Towards a Poor Theatre, with Preface by Peter Brook (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968), 33, 58, 56, 18. 59. Eugenio Barba, Beyond the Floating Islands (New York: PAJ, 1986), 57. 60. Ibid., 58. 61. Take only the 75-minute duration of The Tempest, produced in the Viennese Burgtheater, directed by Barbara Frey; or the Hamlet produced in the Hamburg Thalia Theater, directed by Michael Thalheimer, which, without either Horatio or the Gravediggers, ran for under two hours. In either case, these durations cannot of course serve as a gauge for the quality of the performances. 62. Hortmann, Shakespeare on the German Stage, 292. In this connection, see the superb chapter on the rise of the modern director in Dennis Kennedy’s The Spectator and the Spectacle: Audiences in Modernity and Postmodernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 26–48, where the commercial conjunction between profit and innovation forever after is cogently demonstrated.
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2 Traction Control K. Ludwig Pfeiffer
I In Robert Weimann’s Shakespearean scholarship, representation and performance – representational meaning and performative eloquence – have always been in flexible relationships with each other. Recently, the emphasis has shifted. In the (very) early work, representational density and concreteness were more strongly foregrounded. In the later work, starting conspicuously with Shakespeare and the Popular Tradition in the Theater (1978, German original, 1967), layers of intrinsically performative values have more strongly asserted themselves.1 However, none of these dimensions has gained an autonomy of its own. Nor were they, on the other hand, strictly opposed to each other. Weimann’s essay in this volume (Chapter 1, “Performance in Shakespeare’s Theatre: Ministerial and/or Magisterial?”) insists, and very rightly so, on the very complex, variable and vulnerable conjuncture of language and show. The introduction to Shakespeare and the Power of Performance (2008, with Douglas Bruster)2 examines the mobility of embodied signs with even greater zest. The book also argues very powerfully for the need to differentiate each of the terms in question. Performance, as in Wolfgang Iser’s literary anthropology, can be thought of as the – purely textual and mental – dynamics of textual organization and its impact. At the other end of that spectrum, it can be illustrated by the bodily autonomy of acrobatic feats. Likewise, the notion of meaning can be used, substantially as it were, for representational or even referential pressures and priorities. But it can also be cut back to a mere external frame. Such a frame might surround performance, preserving it from a total lack of direction, but it cannot control it. A representational framework can be thinned out into an overall or volatile effect which does not condition our response to art; although, without it as a kind of precondition, it would be difficult to begin our engagement with art. 31
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Shakespearean studies have been drawn, with particular force, in all of these directions, because Shakespeare’s genius, so often invoked, described and mythologized, can also be said to have revealed the strength and the complexities of performative, semantic and representational urges. No one else has tracked down their elusive interplay as Weimann has. Even for him, as my title suggests, the movement between incipient and elaborate degrees in the autonomy or instrumentality of performance, in the importunity, imposition or imposture of historical meanings as “touches of the real” (David Schalkwyk),3 has been difficult to control. We may move, like Schalkwyk, back and forth between (deconstructive) linguistic analysis and questions of (real) power and society. We may shift our analytical and theoretical presuppositions between (new) historicist assumptions, deconstructively floating signifiers and – perhaps – fairly concrete Wittgensteinian life forms.4 But we never know enough about alleged historical realities, about the plurality of life forms and the mentalities they might imply or enforce, about the impact of performance and the entrenchment of representational meanings in either Shakespeare’s or his audience’s minds. An awareness of the limits of historical knowledge emerges very pointedly in Weimann’s essay for this volume.5 II That is why a second move, in Weimann’s present essay, takes on a crucial (methodo)logical importance. In the second half of the essay, in concentrating on “Shakespeare now”, Weimann appears to move away from the historical, some would say the “authentic”, the “original”, Shakespeare. In reality, if that word is still mentionable, the opposite is the case. My own arguments support Weimann’s move and perhaps even enlarge its legitimate range. First, Weimann appeals to two “cultural constellations” that “appear to facilitate the proposed conjunctural operation” (16). Theatrical performance practices then and now do not take the architectural – and that means also the mental, that is, fictional/real – closure of the stage for granted. Second, both Shakespeare’s and our time respectively constitute hybrid communicative structures. They do not bow much to what has appeared, to all intents and purposes, as the hegemony of the scriptural or textual from, say, the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries. Both periods might be seen as (relatively welldefinable and comparable) times of expansion. Certainly, expansions in the two periods take place on very different levels. But they produce analogous results in experiential and terminological interpenetrations, which tend to blur
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the boundaries between the performative and the representational, between the real and the fictional (or, as I think one should say, not only within the philosophical tradition, the fictive – fictionality being a term which has sprung from epistemological dead ends in literary studies and theory). Heiner Müller and his Hamletmaschine provide a powerfully instructive example. On the face (that is, on the text) of it, that work seems to bear hardly any resemblance to Shakespeare’s almost mythic play. Müller appears to have made his work into one of the most ‘autonomous’ of so-called Shakespearean adaptions. He confronts us, both verbally and performatively, with an explosion of coherent meanings through which an identification, however rough and provisional, of persons and history would have – were it still possible – to be envisaged. In such a situation, we would be ill advised to rehearse an Adornian ruse: to argue, as Adorno did with respect to Beckett’s Endgame in particular, that the general absence of any form of coherence in this play is itself the result of specific historical catastrophes.6 Adorno might have justifiably claimed that Müller’s (like Beckett’s) timeless picture emerged from within the German Democratic Republic, one of the most representationally (some would even have said, ideologically) committed cultures of post-World War II Europe. Müller, I think by contrast, provides us with a double, though much diluted, historical perspective. He presents us with the most radical example of a modern representational-performative scope (as well as its breakdown), which we have to imagine, however, in order to get a sense of Shakespeare’s own potential. Epistemologically, such a scope (and its breakdown) is of course not better than the historical constructions of contexts and their impact which we must, from time to time, indulge in. Theoretically and methodologically, Weimann’s procedure (which I strongly support and would reinforce) is not to be confused with the aesthetics of reception (for example, sensu Jauss) or the theory of aesthetic respose in the mode of Wolfgang Iser.7 Weimann’s present essay, embedded as it is in the continuity of his earlier work, rather undertakes a more challenging, but also more clarifying widening of what he has called, first in the subtitle of a Shakespeare Survey article on “Shakespeare on the Modern Stage” (1967), the almost inextricable interplay (or more nobly and traditionally put, the dialectics) of “past significance and present meaning”.8
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III Challenge and clarification derive from the fact that both performance and its extension by other media have infiltrated the scholarly scene. Let me therefore sharpen the point of my argument. The power of page and stage, of author’s pen and actor’s voice (and these various terms, although seemingly running parallel, do indeed, to repeat, indicate a spectrum of possibilities themselves) must be gauged by what I would call a logic of historical media. Because of Shakespeare’s sheer comprehensiveness, his “universality” (whether seen in terms of Harold Bloom as the invention of the human, or any other) should not be squeezed into the Procrustean bed of alleged Elizabethan theatre conditions, however precisely we may – and Robert Weimann indeed does – describe them. Nor should Shakespeare be put on the bone-breaking torture rack of certain contemporary, chainsaw massacre-like exploitations. The modern version of the old rack, the orthopaedic bed, on which rigidities and stereotypes of all kinds can be smoothed out, might serve as a playful image of my desired logic of historical media. This would provoke the question of whether even a shorthand use of the term “traditional theatre” (11) or, by contrast, “living stage” (4), is advisable. If “living” means “contemporary”, then this living stage is often pretty dead. If “living” means “full of vitality”, then its loci are not always easy to find. Stage construction, design, acting techniques and acting power have varied continuously throughout the ages. If sufficient evidence were available, one might ask, for example, whether many eighteenth-century productions, say with David Garrick in the leading role, might not have demonstrated the potential of performative autonomy and the pitfalls of thematic conventionality to a striking degree. Eighteenth-century handbooks on acting techniques insisted on the priority of body movements. These had to suggest the emotive essence of a situation upon which the words are a mere elaboration. Certainly, the coupling of movement and emotive codes was easier for that time than it has become for us. But the satires on physiognomy and related speculations also show that such couplings were far from reliable even then. Garrick, in his slow-motion movements as Hamlet or Richard III, for example, seems both to have suggested such couplings very strongly, but also transcended them completely. The systematic problem – shifts in the framework of a logic of media as opposed to literary history and the status ascribed especially to the great, that is, canonized works therein – had been brewing, in various places and forms, since the very early sixteenth century. In Florence, the Camerata “invented”
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opera, amongst other reasons, also because even Dante’s words, in their ordinary form of spoken recitation, did not appeal as strongly as one would have liked and expected.9 Dryden, in his Essay of Dramatick Poesie, still held a “serious Play” to be “Nature wrought up to a higher pitch”. At the same time, however, he seriously contemplated turning Milton’s Paradise Lost into an opera to be called The State of Innocence. There is evidence that he and Waller visited the elderly Milton to get his permission for a rhymed dramatic version that could serve as an opera libretto.10 Some decades later, G.F. Handel, in an enterprise analogous to the Camerata’s use of Dante, in what we would have to say was the final accomplishment of Dryden’s attempted rape of Milton, composed the music to texts which his “song writer” Charles Jennens had produced under the titles of “L’Allegro”, “Il Penseroso” and, to cap it all, “Il Moderato”. In his report, Handel appears to have been particularly satisfied with the reception of and indeed the admiration for the third piece by an audience made up of the high and educated ranks of society.11 Despite the anecdotal and episodic character of this account, it exemplifies the tension between textual and performative modes that has remained a crucial cultural issue ever since. This tension is not an opposition, because the performative is normally an amalgamation of various levels of mediality, including the textual itself. The manifold and drastic changes in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of what modern textual editorship, and, in its wake, the general (scholarly) public, have come to establish or to accept as textually (more or less) normative Shakespearean plays do not amount to their irresponsible violation. Rather, they are a series of (sometimes) desperate attempts to save the powerful impulses irradiating from them under different sociocultural and ‘theatrical’ conditions and their impact on bodily and emotive codes. In spite of scholarship, we have not escaped from this situation which, within scholarship, Robert Weimann has handled with the utmost circumspection. I suspect that the possibilitites for adaptation and performance are intrinsic to Shakespeare. But they do not exist to the same extent in all plays. In a great deal of contemporary scholarship, the tension has been radicalized into something like an original media shift in Shakespeare himself. G.B. Shaw introduced the idea that the famous soliloquies are akin to opera arias: not meant to convey ideas, but rather to function as visible and audible signs of passion (in whichever sense of that word). It would be a bit, though not entirely, far-fetched to link this Shavian provocation to the – very serious – historical scholarship of, say, L.L. Schücking, especially the latter’s 1947 book on Shakespeare and the style of tragedy in his time.12 Schücking emphasized
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the pathos of speeches of figures who, he thought, pace Harold Bloom, were radically un(der)developed as personalities. The German ShakespeareHandbuch, in its turn, connects the Schücking type of work with the “critical modifications” of Robert Weimann (and also M.C. Bradbrook, A. Harbage and A.C. Sprague).13 Weimann must stand out, of course, because, although he can be called a historical critic, the range and sophistication of his theoretical mastery finds no equal or parallel in historical criticism. Other forms of media-oriented criticism have been inspired by modern film, which includes some truly overwhelming versions of Shakespeare. For many advocates of the filmic mode, Shakespeare is basically a screenplay writer. (We might remember that, for Helmholtz Watson in Huxley’s Brave New World, Shakespeare was a genius in advertizing psychology.) As general theses, such assertions go too far on several counts. It seems especially hard to compare the restricted visual dimensions of the Shakespearean stage with the visual opulence and the wealth of visual techniques in film. On the other hand, one could take up Schücking’s notion of the pathos of speech by assuming that pathos is a relatively loosely encoded form of emotion. It suggests psychological urgency without, pace Lily B. Campbell and her slaveof-passion concept of a Shakespearean tragic hero, defining its emotional category.14 In such a perspective, and in some cases, one might see parts of the visuality of Shakespeare films, especially close-ups of faces, as visualizations, that is to say, visual translations of underdetermined, but lively and strong emotional energies which Shakespeare had to suggest through speech only (using the audience intimacy of stage and stagecraft). Robert Weimann was and remains an optimist of the theatre as a crucial cultural form. We must be very grateful for that, and for the farreaching, subtle analyses to that effect, concentrating on and culminating in Shakespeare, because, as Heiner Müller has said, the basic human potential of transformation in its embodiment by living beings can be witnesssed – or should we say, experienced – “live”only on a stage.15 But as Müller also knew (and said on the same page), there are limits to that noble enterprise. The mere fact of having standing theatres with almost continuous productions all year round is detrimental to the aura and the cultural effectiveness of the theatre. Shakespeare’s reaction to that problem provoked what some critics (J.L. Calderwood, A.B. Kernan and Weimann himself) have called “metadrama”. Shakespearean metadrama asserts itself mainly as theatrical scepticism. For us that means that the contemporary stage, whether living or languishing, cannot claim any privilege in the unfolding of (especially) the potentialities of Shakespearean theatre. We also must look at the modern avatars and simulacra
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of those potentialities which might do more justice to the mythic-original complex called Shakespeare than what we continue to call the theatrical stage. In dealing with those, in enlarging, of necessity, the scope of that “volatile dramaturgy” which Weimann and Bruster speak of,16 we would do well at least to aim for the subtly differentiated comprehensiveness which Robert Weimann has demonstrated with respect to Shakespeare as the mythic, but ineluctable, point of departure and return. Notes 1. Robert Weimann, Shakespeare and the Popular Tradition in the Theater: Studies in the Social Dimension of Dramatic Form and Function, ed. Robert Schwartz (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). 2. Robert Weimann and Douglas Bruster, Shakespeare and the Power of Performance: Stage and Page in the Elizabethan Theatre (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 3. David Schalkwyk, Literature and the Touch of the Real (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2004), especially chapter 2 on Derrida, chapter 3 on Wittgenstein, and their joint impact on Schalkwyk’s discussion of Weimann and Derrida in chapter 4. See also Schalkwyk, Speech and Performance in Shakespeare’s Sonnets and Plays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 2. 4. See, for example, Schalkwyk, Literature, 115–16, 126. 5. See Robert Weimann, “Performance in Shakespeare’s Theatre: Ministerial and/or Magisterial?”, Chapter 1 in this volume, 3–29. Further references to this essay will be made in the text in brackets. 6. See Theodor W. Adorno, “Trying to Understand Endgame”, New German Critique 25 (1982): 119–50. 7. For the distinction, see Wolfgang Iser, How to Do Theory (Malden, MA, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell, 2006), 57–8. 8. Robert Weimann, “Shakespeare on the Modern Stage: Past Significance and Present Meaning”, Shakespeare Survey, Vol. 20: Shakespearean and Other Tragedy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 113–20. 9. See in particular Robert Donington, The Rise of Opera (London and Boston: Faber & Faber, 1981), 82–5. 10. See James Anderson Winn, John Dryden and His World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), 264–5, but also more generally 262–4, 269, 323. See further Robert D. Hume, The Development of English Drama in the Late Seventeenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 207 (Dryden’s definition of opera as the first “posthuman” art), 433, 482–3; also the extended argument in my book The Protoliterary: Steps Toward an Anthropology of Culture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 180–94, 210–20. Given the kinds of works Hume writes about in his book, the term “drama” in his title is misleading and too narrow. 11. See Handel’s letter to Jennens, quoted in Robin Manson Myers, Handel, Dryden, and Milton (London: Bowers & Bowers, 1956), 56.
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12. Levin L. Schücking, Shakespeare und der Tragödienstil seiner Zeit (Bern: A. Francke, 1947). 13. See Gary Schmidgall, Shakespeare and Opera (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) and Ina Schabert, ed., Shakespeare-Handbuch. Die Zeit – Der Mensch – Das Werk – Die Nachwelt, 4th ed. (Stuttgart: Kröner, 2000), 866. 14. Lily B. Campbell, Shakespeare’s Tragic Heroes: Slaves of Passion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930). 15. Hyunseon Lee, Günter de Bruyn – Christoph Hein – Heiner Müller. Drei Interviews (Siegen: Universität Siegen Fachbereich 3, 1995), 56–7. 16. Weimann and Bruster, Shakespeare, 5. Cf. also ibid., 22, on “Shakespeare in the present” and “an awareness of historicity in Elizabethan performance practices”.
3 The Spectator, the Text, and Ezekiel Dennis Kennedy
For Robert Weimann, magister ludi My ideas have always marched with Robert Weimann’s: his in front, mine behind. From him I have taken much, but chiefly I learned that, without a social orientation, assessment of Shakespeare in the theatre is a barren exercise. In this brief reflection I pick up his concern about text and performance by thinking about what the text, and the idea of a text, might mean in the most direct of social circumstances, that of a spectator in performance. Considerations of the spectator are conspicuously thorny and usually impractical. Audiences are notoriously miscellaneous, their experiences of the event diverse and irregular, and their reactions, while occasionally expressed outwardly, are for the most part internal. Almost anything one can say about a spectator is false on some level. Though that has not prevented critics from making the attempt: it can be argued that much writing about performance in general is recessively or unconsciously about the spectator, even if that spectator is the writer imaging herself as watcher. But rather than talking about actual spectators or imagined audiences, I would like to approach the issue as a philosopher might, a philosopher of performance.1 Actor/spectator = doer/watcher = speaker/listener. This common semiotic assumption, based on Roman Jacobson’s “communication model” of sender/ receiver, imagines the theatre event primarily as conveyer of meaning, its procedures and practices engaged in the manufacture of signifiers that contain messages. Not necessarily intellectual messages, of course, but messages nonetheless, non-material processes that ensue from the materiality of the stage and leap between actor and spectator as a small and invisible current of electricity along a telegraph wire, capable of engendering responses in the minds and bodies of willing recipients. I will return to this at the end; now I want to emphasize that for many commentators who follow that model the 39
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written text has been considered central to understanding performance. It is hardly the only factor involved in the formation of meaning: the stage creates such a multiplicity of signifiers, chiefly visual and auditory but potentially appealing to all five senses, that giving pride of place to the spoken word smacks of puritanical bias. In Shakespeare studies, however, that bias – as unconscious as other biases and sometimes unconscious of the telegraphic metaphor that underlies it – has tended to inflect much consideration of performance, presuming the theatre has an inevitable similarity to literary experience, judging the success of a performed play by its propinquity to the action of reading. How close is that approach to a spectator’s experience? Imagine the first performance of an unknown play called The Prince of Denmark in London around the year 1600. For spectators the text was not a document but a set of vocalities and physical enactments inside a visual field, three elements with approximately equal consequence for reception. The print on the page we now value so highly came to initial spectators only through audition. The paradox of a dramatic script, especially a new script, that its dialogue has been written in order to appear not written, means that its performance always retains originary qualities, implying, even when the text is familiar, that it is emerging for the first time. The opposition Weimann discusses between author’s pen and actor’s voice, hugely important today in the consideration of Shakespeare performance, was hardly an issue in 1600: for spectators thoroughly engaged with the enactment the pen that wrote Hamlet did not seem present, unless one reflected on the processes of theatrical production. Further, before the spoken text arrived in the ears of its audience it encountered the mundane difficulties of actors’ voices rising insufficiently above the ambient noise of a playhouse crowded with coming and going, inattentive auditors, the distractions of costumes and actor movement, sounds of a city busy with river and road traffic, the noise of wind and weather. That was then. Today, of course, a production of Hamlet any place in the world arrives with history, heavy baggage strapped to the back of performance but chiefly loaded on reading, textual and biographical criticism, and the general awareness of Shakespeare as an icon of high culture. Sometimes a director attacks the textual baggage directly; German directors were particularly inclined to this as the Cold War drew to its enervating close. I think, for example, of Hansgünter Heyme’s “electronic” Hamlet in Cologne in 1979, in which an aphasic prince could not talk, so that his text was delivered by a disembodied voice through an amplifier. Or Heiner Müller’s seven-anda-half-hour production in Berlin in 1990 that included his own by-product
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play Hamletmachine, which saw Shakespeare’s text as impossibly tainted by history, predicting the end of European culture as the Berlin Wall came down. Occasionally a director has staged the impossibility of performing the text of Hamlet at all, relying instead on absurd text fragments and derangements of action, as Frank Castorf did in Frankfurt in 1989 with Hamlet-Material von Shakespeare. But when a production tries to sidestep the baggage of history by offering a radically new or oppositional interpretation, the result is likely to call further attention to the ghostly traces of the play’s past, ironically foregrounding it as a literary document in the midst of its deconstruction. There is nothing wrong with treating a Shakespeare play as a species of literature; people have been reading plays as books for a long time. Writing can be examined variously, in silence, by mouthing the words, out loud, in dialogue, imagining or not the possibility of performance. There is really no need to set text against performance, except to note the rather obvious point that the phenomenon and effect of performance, the Gestus of performance, is not limited to the enactment of speech or to the realization of a pre-existing text. It is a more complex matter than that. Part of the complication involves what a text means for an actor, its mediator-in-chief. We know little about how actors approached learning their lines in the early modern period, or what degree of literacy they possessed, how they were taught to perform, or how thoroughly they were expected to remember the words.2 But the presence of the prompter throughout Europe, attested in Shakespeare’s time and well recorded in most countries from the early seventeenth century, implies that actors were often imperfect of memory. The double practice of repertory playing and casting by “lines of business” (called emploi in France), whereby actors were hired into a company for specific type roles to facilitate rapid preparation for many different plays under quick changes of bill, underlines the probability that they regularly stumbled over the text, or perhaps tumbled over it. The prompt box, in regular use on the Continent, shielded the prompter, a professional as important as the actor, and allowed him to assist speech and correct blocking errors with little disruption to the audience. In proscenium theatres in England after the Restoration the prompter was in the wings on “prompt side”, stage left, which meant he was more likely to be heard by spectators. While the prompter provided insurance that the play would be kept going when actors lost the words or lost their places, he was also a continuing reminder to the audience that the on-stage speech had been written, that a book of reference existed. Such a reminder, an intervention from the realm of the literary, is a risky intrusion in the realm of performance. Theatre is at
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base a preliterate form that does not actually require the participation of a writer. Theatre’s operating procedure, usually unacknowledged, that the actor is inventing the words as we do in ordinary life, is broken by prompts in the way that a scene in the cinema is broken when the power fails or when sound and image get out of sync. Theatre works best when the actor appears to own the text. What does it mean to own the text? At the start of his prophecy (593 bc), Ezekiel gives a frightening account of how he was chosen as god’s spokesman. A vision of a crystal throne in the heavens appeared to him and a voice charged him to instruct the Israelites (“that rebellious house”) to repent. A hand stretched out from the throne holding a scroll, written on both sides with “words of mourning and woe”. A voice spoke: He said to me, O mortal, eat what is offered to you; eat this scroll, and go speak to the house of Israel. So I opened my mouth, and he gave me the scroll to eat. He said to me, Mortal, eat this scroll that I give you and fill your stomach with it. Then I ate it; and in my mouth it was sweet as honey. He said to me: Mortal, go to the house of Israel and speak my very words to them (Ezekiel 3.1–3).3
The scroll would have been made of papyrus so – hoping for the prophet’s sake it had no winding sticks – it could have been eaten. Eating the writing is an extreme enforcement of the desire for textual accuracy in a speaker. Yahweh does not trust his prophet to remember his words accurately and entirely, human memory being both imperfect and unpredictable, so Ezekiel is commanded to incorporate the words. That is what an actor must do – incorporate the words. Not through alimentation; all peace to Ezekiel, it’s not an aide-memoire. But an actor must nonetheless swallow the text in a metaphoric sense, make it part of bodily existence. In the modern era, under the pervasive influence of Stanislavsky, much of an actor’s preparation, communal and private, is directed towards a thorough embodiment of the text so that it may be reproduced effortlessly, unaffectedly, without prompting and without awareness of its foundation in writing. The disappearance of the prompter as a regular feature is the result of a number of coalescing factors, including the development of long runs rather than repertory scheduling, but it is chiefly due to audience expectation of uninterrupted or unbroken commitment to the moment of action. Affected by realism and the cinema, actors and audiences today are equally distressed by a player who loses his lines. Calling for a prompt now, because it is so rare and so obvious, undermines the play.
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Which presents an intriguing dilemma for a Shakespearian who insists on the primacy of text over performance. From the standpoint of the show, an actor mistaking the words is better than an actor “drying” entirely. If the speaker dries on “O what a rogue and peasant slave am I”, most spectators would like to hear a confident banality in blank verse, such as “The wind, me thinks, doth blow from far away” or “My feet are sore from walking all night long”. Silly examples, and quite un-Hamlet-like, but a stuttering of “O – O – O”, or an intimidating long pause suggesting the rest may be silence, would be far worse after the protagonist has cleared the stage in order to soliloquize. Technological interventions can aid an actor’s memory, usually without the spectator’s awareness. Some large opera houses place teleprompters inside the proscenium or in the orchestra pit for the on-stage singers; in a somewhat different case it is also common to send video images of the conductor to the chorus in the wings. But in the spoken theatre technology is more likely to fail than the old-fashioned prompter. I was once involved in a production of a talky Edwardian play in a well-known theatre in the United States, where an elderly actor playing an elderly role had severe difficulty with his lines. As a last resort he was fitted with a discreet radio earpiece and given continuous prompt from offstage. The actor became so reliant on the device that one night, when a passing police car interfered with transmission, he repeated “Right, Sarge, I’ll clear those fuckers out of there” before he realized he was off script. Too bad it wasn’t Hamlet: that’s a perfect iambic pentameter line. In my experience as a playwright and director, actors learn their lines best through dialogic repetition with other actors, whether in rehearsal or outside it. Verbal reiteration coupled with physical movement sets the text in the mind and the body; in the end the goal is to use the book in order to discard it. Until the book becomes irrelevant an actor does not own the text, and most good actors understand that they will not seriously advance in characterization until they can toss the book aside. Ezekiel’s vision was wrong. Swallowing the text does not ensure fidelity to the author; swallowing the text means denying its authority, undercutting its primacy, disturbing its textuality, its word-forwordness. The author – even an author like Shakespeare – disappears into the body of the actor. On the way to that goal, however, the pitfalls of memory are legion. For the most popular Shakespeare plays they include an added psychological stress, the awareness that the text is already well known, intensifying the actor’s concern about accuracy. The most intriguing problem in learning lines, however, is the tendency for an actor to rewrite them unconsciously. Once this happens, whether it’s just a word or two or skipping entire passages in a long speech, it
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is very difficult to return the proper text. It happens frequently and often goes uncorrected. So for the spectator in the theatre, what does the Shakespeare text mean? Obviously I cannot speak for everyone, but I think that most ordinary spectators – those who are not specialists in some field of theatre or literature or early modern history – are likely to have a contradictory attitude to the idea of text. On the one hand, they are probably well aware of the significance of Shakespeare’s plays in literary studies, in anglophone culture and in wider global culture. Such an awareness highlights the authority or probity of the written word, and implies the importance of accuracy in the text’s representation. On the other hand, faced with the immediacy of enactment, and usually caring little how the enactment was achieved, spectators, assuming they are not bored out of their minds, are even more likely to be dominated by the presence of the actorincorporating-text rather than the text-in-itself. Which returns me to the semiotic model. The trouble with the concept of sender/receiver as the pattern of theatrical communication is that it imagines the spectator passively, as one willing and able to accept what is on display, rather than as an interactive presence capable of rejecting, altering, or idiosyncratically revising whatever signals may come from the stage, whether deliberate or accidental. The semiotic approach, in short, imagines an ideal spectator as reader: which may be why some Shakespeare performance criticism has been caught in the trap of assuming there are correct interpretations, and correct receptions, for plays in performance. We know that in history and the present spectators attend a play for highly various reasons, often unconnected to its text: to see a striking actress, to accompany a lonely friend, or out of social obligation, or because that’s what a tourist in Stratford does in the evening. Spectators, engaged in the moment-to-moment flow of performance, may be interested in many things, but not necessarily interested in what the performance might mean, whether emotionally or intellectually. If we continue to think of the transmission of meaning as the purpose of theatre, we are in a parallel trap of thinking that text messages constitute its primary goal. To understand better how a performance might affect its audience we need to go beyond all forms of producer intentionality – intentions of actors, directors, designers, and playwrights – to admit that the words of the text and the narrative they order are sparks for a spectator’s experience but do not determine the experience.
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Notes 1. What follows gives a quick summary of my approach in The Spectator and the Spectacle: Audiences in Modernity and Postmodernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 2. Tiffany Stern’s Rehearsal from Shakespeare to Sheridan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000) recapitulates these matters. Peter Holland also brilliantly examines actor and audience memory in “On the Gravy Train: Shakespeare, Memory and Forgetting”, in Shakespeare, Memory and Performance, ed. Peter Holland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 207–34. 3. New Revised Standard Version, quoted from The New Oxford Annotated Bible, ed. Bruce M. Metzger and Roland E. Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). The image of the scroll was used contemporaneously to Ezekiel in Jeremiah (15.16) and recalled in the Christian era in Revelation (10.8–11).
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4 Text and Performance, Reiterated: A Reproof Valiant or Lie Direct? David Schalkwyk
The struggle between text and performance that has been waging in recent years has always been implicit in Robert Weimann’s work, albeit complicated by nuance and qualification. He has never treated it as a direct conflict upon a field of winners and losers. As early as his path-breaking Shakespeare and the Popular Tradition in the Theater (1987), Weimann wrote that “the representational forms of mimesis and the nonrepresentational forms of selfexpression existed side by side, and, in the resulting drama, role and actor, the representation of society and the re-enactment of self, became indivisible”.1 Here the terms in productive tension are “representation” and “self-expression”, “role” and “actor” (related to the differentiation of “locus” and “platea”), rather than “text” and “performance”. It took another twenty years for Weimann to recast the bifold practices of representation broached in Popular Tradition as a clash of the respective authority of “author’s pen” and “actor’s voice”.2 In the interim the very notion of “the text” had come under considerable deconstructive pressure, while “performance” as an embodied practice distinct from the (dislocated) structures of “representation” had gained an independent force within a broad array of disciplines. For those concerned with early modern drama, Shakespeare’s text was reconstructed through the practice of the theatre in such path-breaking editions as the Oxford Shakespeare, while critics like W.B. Worthen have played leading roles in the battle to free performance from mere servility to the hitherto-assumed authority of Shakespeare’s text. Those battle lines were redrawn in a recent exchange between Worthen and R.A. Foakes in Shakespeare (The Journal).3 In this essay, I propose to enter the fray from a third position, that of the “performative” inaugurated by J.L. Austin. Whereas Austin is often invoked in discussions of performance, 47
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the philosophical complexities of his analysis are seldom discussed in any detail. While his contribution to the centrality of performance in the uses of language is acknowledged, his subtle distinctions between different kinds of performance, and especially between illocutionary and perlocutionary forms of the performative, are seldom explored for what they have to add to what Weimann has formulated as the contested authority of page and stage in Shakespeare. Using Austin, I propose, first, to clarify what seem to me to be the conceptual obscurities exemplified by the debate between Worthen and Foakes in the pages of Shakespeare. My argument rests on the difference between logical and rhetorical force in Austin’s distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. In the last section of my analysis I complicate that distinction by drawing on Weimann’s historical reconception of the authority of what we might call representation and performance in text and action. This argument introduces a third kind of performative, between Austin’s illocutionary and perlocutionary, in the form of what Stanley Cavell calls “passionate utterances”4 and William Reddy terms “emotives”.5 “Derivative” or “Derived From”? The rhetorical impasse between Foakes and Worthen on the contest between text and performance indicates a conceptual confusion that systematically prevents not merely agreement, but debate itself. Foakes and Worthen may indeed be divided by irreconcilable ideological differences – that is to say, by what they respectively value in the negotiation of Shakespeare’s authority – but it is almost certain that the exact nature of such difference and value is being obscured by the fact that they are talking (or writing) past each other. Worthen concedes as much in his honest admission that an adequate language is yet to be found for the relationship between “text” and “performance”. Foakes writes deprecatingly of the “steamroller of theory” flattening “critical discourse”, whereas Worthen decries Foakes’s “commonsense” position for “increasingly” seeing “nearly all dramatic performance … as oppressively overdetermined by textual meanings, by writing”.6 The proof is in the concepts, and more often than not arguments in this debate proceed by assertion rather than through ground-clearing analysis. What is a “text”, or, more accurately, how is the word “text” being used here? What is each protagonist’s understanding of the key concept, “performance”? And what notions are invoked either to yoke the text and performance together or force them apart? I want to begin by tracing the uncertainty or instability in
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the respective positions – respectively for or against “performance” and “text” – first by examining Worthen’s terminology in his Shakespeare and the Force of Modern Performance, and then by retracing his concepts to his recent “quip modest” and his earlier Shakespeare and the Authority of Performance.7 The gist of Worthen’s argument, conveyed especially forcibly by the repeated attack on the notion of performance as a “derivative” phenomenon, is relatively clear: To see performance evoking a force intrinsic to the text … defines performance as “derivative” … To see performance as an independent (though related) mode of production, refashioning texts into something else (behaviour), releases the stage from “derivative” dependence on literature, from the obligation (even from the ability) to reproduce the text, or the ways we may understand it as mere readers. (Force, 36–7)
“Derivative” is a word with a chiefly pejorative usage. We use it in judging one thing to be secondary to, dependent on, or the by-product of, an ontologically and logically prior thing. Taken in this sense, Worthen’s position is completely unobjectionable, even urgently necessary. It is in fact often argued that in the early modern theatre it is the written text that is “derivative”: it is called into being by the needs and demands of performance, even if it may precede performance. But the ontological priority of the text may be questioned beyond the specific historical conditions of Shakespeare’s theatre and the supposed passing of the “oral cultures” of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. In apartheid South Africa’s thriving oppositional theatre, for example, written and printed texts appeared after performance, based on workshopped productions that had no script from which they could be derived.8 The question, however, is whether ontological primacy is identical to logical primacy, or, better, whether it is correct to speak of primacy or priority here at all. Let us begin by looking at the grammatical difference between the cognate but not identical terms “derivative” and “derived from”. If to say that A is “derivative” in relation to B means making a pejorative judgement against A, to say that A is “derived from” B does not necessarily imply such a judgement. It may, but it does not have to. Let us take another ordinary, grammatical example. We commonly say that we are going to see a performance of Hamlet. What lurks in that seemingly innocent preposition? What are we saying (and implying) when we say we are seeing a performance “of” Hamlet? Well, that there is an entity, Hamlet (the work? the text? the type?) to which the performance is related in some way. If this relationship were not entailed then we would not be seeing what we can call Hamlet. The rub lies in the fact that
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it is not clear, on reflection, what exactly the relationship between Hamlet and the performance is. The “of” signals a relationship without telling us its exact nature. Would it be fair to say that it suggests that in some way the performance is “derived” from whatever it is that is called “Hamlet”? Remember that this need not imply that the performance is “derivative”. If we said that we would mean something else altogether, namely that there was nothing original about it as a performance, that it merely rehashed old techniques, modes of acting or design, or interpretations of other performances of Hamlet (whatever Hamlet is: text, play, work, type, performance). We could therefore say without ideological prejudice that this performance (like all performances of Hamlet) is derived from Hamlet – otherwise it wouldn’t be Hamlet. We therefore have two different notions of derivation: one pejorative, the other descriptive. Does Worthen confuse the one with the other? It seems that he does. But it would be too hasty to rest our case with the revelation of this category mistake, because the nature of the “of” remains too complex and certainly too opaque as it stands. What is the “Text”? Worthen writes most often against the “text”, setting his sights repeatedly on the ideological priority given to writing over action in the position he attacks. Here is a characteristic statement of this stance: The iterative nature of print changed the understanding of the relationship between writing and performance, giving rise to a sense of theatre as a form of printlike iteration, and so to a distinctive sense of theatrical (in)fidelity, the notion that theatrical performance is a replaying of an artistic identity held elsewhere, within the printed text of the play. (Force, 41)
Worthen’s historical narrative suggests that this displacement of authority (which is where the crux lies) is contingent and accidental rather than ontological or logical. Print produces a durable form of language that would otherwise disappear as a singular event. It is the stability of the printed text or playscript that allows the reincarnation of an event that would otherwise be impossible: this performance “of ” Hamlet. The text can be reiterated as or in performance; but it is only because the text continues to subsist that multiple performances of Hamlet are possible.
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Because we have a particular view of iteration, we tend to see the performance as something derivative from the text, something we can either praise for its fidelity or criticize for its infidelity to the printed text. (We should remind ourselves that the pejorative force of this dependency, being historical, is entirely accidental or ideological, but that its logical force does not depend on this accident.) A myriad of philosophical uncertainties besets this way of talking. How are we using “text” here? Is it the black marks on the page, repeated with each operation of the printing press, or is it the iterability of those marks in an act or event of reading, where, as Derrida has shown, repeatability is indelibly crossed by difference. How is the “identity” of the “text” constituted, except through the event(s) or acts(s) of reading, through which identity occurs only through the suppression of difference(s)? And how does performance relate to this multiply complex iteration that we call the text, unless it arises (if it is to be a performance “of” Hamlet) out of the process by which the black marks are transformed by the embodied event of reading? The artistic identity of a text can never simply lie in or on its pages in the form of printed marks. “The text is not the book,” although the term can indeed be used to designate the book.9 But in that case the identity of that material object cannot be projected across its iterations. This book of Hamlet is identical to itself; copy or reprint it and you produce a completely different object. What enables us to call both books Hamlet is not reducible to their material properties. In addition to using “derivative” without making it clear whether the use is pejorative or descriptive, Worthen moves between the two different senses of “the text” that I have been analysing. In one case the text “disappears” in the moment of performance (Force, 74): “we do not see the text onstage” (68), it is “absent” (68). Here “text” appears to mean the marks on the page, which clearly do vanish, rendered invisible in performance, even if the phenomenological understanding of the text as appropriated language event would not be encompassed by this sense. This “disappearing” text is shorthand for the institutional force of a pejorative mode of judgement that seeks to measure performance against the impossible strictures of a prior, commanding structure. It is this priority (called the “text”) that Worthen wishes to leave behind or negate through the alternative force of performance. In other formulations, however, he negotiates a passage between text and performance in a different sense, writing variously that performance “reconstitutes” (59), “refashions” (56), “consumes” and “transforms” (21), “alters”, “reinscribes”, and “rewrites” (23) the “text,” “subject[ing] print to use, to labour, in ways that render it not the container of meaning but raw material for new meanings”
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(56). In this way of speaking, the text is not left behind or rendered invisible by performance; it is rather material to be worked upon, used, and transformed. Especially the idea that the text is to be used – re-produced as a new event through work – signals a move away from a structuralist understanding of “text” to what we may call a Wittgensteinian one. If structuralism ignores use (or la parole) as the consequence of a prior, enabling structure (la langue),10 then Wittgenstein anticipates a problem that post-structuralists, especially Derrida, highlight: there is a gap between structure and signification11 which no conception of the structure as an enabling or constituting, prior system can possibly bridge. Following one half of the structuralist truth that signification can occur only in a language, Wittgenstein anticipates Derrida’s critique by insisting on the equal truth that no structure can determine meaning of its own accord: no rule can determine its own application.12 That is why Wittgenstein subjects use, agency, or performance to painstaking analysis in an attempt to understand the precise sense in which a particular use of language may be said to be derived from a linguistic rule. J.L. Austin’s notion of performative speech acts – that is, that certain uses of language are actions whose force can act upon or transform the world – is closely related to Wittgenstein’s description of meaning as something that arises from the interaction of use or action and language as a system of conventional rules.13 Austin’s argument occupies a strangely displaced but nevertheless central role in Shakespeare and the Force of Modern Performance, which I shall deal with shortly. For the moment, we can summarize this part of my argument by saying that Worthen is in effect rejecting a residual, structuralist conception of the logic of the relationship between text and performance, insofar as these terms could be said to be analogous to the crucial Saussurean hierarchy of la langue (text) and la parole (performance). It is less clear whether he is endorsing either a poststructuralist or a Wittgenstein/Austinian alternative, however. This uncertainly arises chiefly because his reading of Austin is filtered by a post-structuralist critique which sees performative acts as a type of “citation”, a term with which Worthen is understandably as uncomfortable as “text”. Is the Text a Tool? For the moment, let us turn to Worthen’s “Texts, Tools and Technologies” which, as its title suggests, tries to address the inadequacy of “the metaphors we use to think through the work that texts do when they are used in the
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theatre” by offering “better ways for localizing the various kinds of work ‘the text’ performs in performance”.14 By now invoking the relationship between tools and technologies, Worthen introduces a metaphor for the relationship between text and performance that, on the face of it, builds on the Wittgensteinian conception of a flexible practice encompassing work, labour, or use, in changing social contexts. Texts should be seen as tools, appropriable for a variety of (nondetermined) uses by technologies, which are akin to the force of appropriating performances. The strength of the new metaphor lies in its intuitive demolition of the idea that the uses of the text are immanent within it. Tools do not carry their uses on their faces. Instead they are appropriable for a variety of different uses: screwdrivers may be used variously to drive in screws or open cans of paint, to steal a car or to kill someone. It could, however, be argued that they have a “purposiveness” which suggests that everything other than the first use is a misappropriation or perversion of their original design. This is not a knockdown argument, but its existence renders Worthen’s own view of variable appropriability at least challengeable, and it renders the heuristic purpose of the new metaphor less than straightforward. The new metaphor is problematic for a more clearly compelling reason, however. Worthen suggests that the metaphor of the text as tool in fact comes from Foakes. If this is true, it serves Foakes very poorly, for a tool is something one discards (or puts aside or hangs up) after it has been used for the technologically designated purpose. A table might bear the marks or signs of the saws, screwdrivers, planes and emery paper that were used to construct it; but they are not part of the table – they have not been incorporated into it. This returns us to the first (and most questionable) of Worthen’s conceptions of the place of the text in Shakespeare and the Force of Modern Performance, namely as something which disappears, is rendered invisible or is discarded in performance. I argue above that this can only be true if the text is taken as the book, the physical marks on the page, not as the signifiers inscribed in the book which, in the second of Worthen’s models, are “raw material” to be “re-inscribed”, “reconstituted”, “embodied”, “transformed”, or “refashioned” through performance. In this later model the text is not the tool but rather the material from which the table is made: it is changed, reshaped, given form by the use of the tools, but it remains as part of the new product, even if parts of it have been discarded and reformed. The language that makes up the text of Hamlet, however refashioned, shaped, appropriated, changed, pared down or expanded in production remains embodied in and through the performance. This “text” is not at all analogous to a tool, which is put away after it has
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been used and makes up no material part (other than through its – unnoticed – marks) of the fashioned product, the result of labour or work. Worthen’s new metaphor thus reiterates the most problematical aspects of his old impulse to leave the text behind through the force of performance. The problem lies with the incorrigible ambiguity of the term “text” and its tendency to shift its signification. For if we take it to mean the marks on the page or the book then it is obviously discarded in performance. But it makes no sense to say that the text in its iterable movement as language – as a variety of iterable speech acts – is discarded in performance. Rather, it is precisely such speech acts that are performed and mobilized through behaviour, which is itself an iterable, conventional, expressive force, and therefore, Derrida would say, textual in its own way. Performance and Performativity Once it is agreed that the language of the text is mobilized or embodied as physical behaviour on stage, we need to think through two related things. First, what kinds of iterability inform both the text as language and acting as behaviour, and what is the relationship between these two forces? Is such iterability a kind of citationality? Worthen follows Derrida’s reading of Austin’s notion of the performative force of speech acts by reading them as forms of citation. Saying “I do” in a marriage ceremony gains its force from its character as a citation of a formulaic expression and also an instantiation or invocation of a prior set of conventional and ideological practices, values, and beliefs. Precisely because it is beholden to a prior form, which it cites, speech-act theory in Worthen’s view entrenches the debilitating, derivative relationship between text and performance. If performance is to text as speech act is to its cited model and code, then it is entirely dependent on that priority; it is a secondary instantiation of a primary model: it is “derivative”. There is, however, no need to read speech-act theory in this quasistructuralist way. Or to put it differently, if performative speech acts are indeed citational, then the behaviour that characterizes the theatre is citational in the same way, a fact that Worthen recognizes well enough: “As citational practice, theatre – like all signifying performance – is engaged not so much in citing texts as reiterating its own regimes of performance … Theatre goes well beyond the force of mere speech, subjecting writing to the body, to labor, to the work of production.”15 The problem with this claim, which on its face is unexceptional, is that it shifts between two distinct, but related, senses of
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“citation”. The “citational practice” that informs “all signifying practice” is what Derrida calls a “general citationality” – the necessary repeatability that makes every form of signification possible, including meaningful action. It is encapsulated in a different formulation by Wittgenstein’s statement that to follow a rule is to engage in a customary practice.16 But when Worthen denies that performance cites texts he means “citation” in the narrow sense of reproducing or quoting something whose originality lies outside the citing event. The difference between Derrida and John Searle in their debate about Austin lies in Searle’s refusal to see that the latter is a specific instance of the structural possibility of the former.17 One couldn’t quote someone if all language were not made possible by the general structure of its universal iterability or citationality. This confusion between the general, philosophical and the specific, quasi-pejorative notion of citation means that it is best not to talk about citation in this context. What we should, however, note is Derrida’s point that performative speech acts are not secondary or etiolated when they are used in fiction – in a play. They are not fallen or empty copies of something “real,” but continue to do their work in their new (fictional) context. So what does it mean to talk of performative speech acts in a play? What constitutes a “play”? The “text”? Or the performance? Strangely, Worthen’s refusal to countenance the citation of the “text” in performance reproduces by inverting it the structure of Searle’s argument that a speech act is secondary, etiolated, or not really serious when it occurs in fiction. Theatre, Worthen says, goes well beyond “mere speech”: “mere speech” is presumably pale, empty, and etiolated without the “work of production”. It should never usurp or direct the work of performance. But is print not an etiolated form of speech? Illocutionary vs. Perlocutionary Acts The waters are very murky here. Perhaps it helps to imagine a hierarchy of relations, moving from the “least performative” as it were, to the “fully performative,” starting with the printed text, through a silent reading of that text, its “live” reading (as in a “play-reading”), to performance “proper” (which always has to be a specific performance – “last Friday night’s performance”). What is immediately striking (and this may indicate why Worthen is wary of speech-act theory) is that the force of what Austin calls illocutionary performatives (those whose force is enacted in the saying of something, as an immediate and often irreversible consequence of the speech act, given the
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right circumstances) does not seem to depend upon any necessary embodiment or expressiveness. The statement “I do” in the context of a fictional marriage ceremony carries the same force whether it is read silently or performed in the theatre. And that force is independent of the voiced and embodied expressiveness with which the speech act is performed. There are no rules for how loudly or expressively one has to say “I do”, provided one says it at the right time in appropriate circumstances. Nor are there any rules for how one should speak the words of a promise for it to be binding. There are rules of thumb governing the production of rhetorical, or what Austin calls perlocutionary, effects. One might feel that one should express the utterance of a promise with special forcefulness and gravity, in order to ensure that the person to whom the promise is directed will be persuaded of its sincerity. But that makes no difference to the fact that a promise has been made. The force of a written illocutionary act is no different from its embodied, fully “expressive” form. A promise is no less a promise if we read it than if we see or hear it embodied, if it is said with special emphasis or dispassionately.18 In this strict sense both are equally performative actions or events with illocutionary force. The same is not true of perlocutionary acts, however. The way in which “I do” is said or a promise made may well persuade or fail to persuade onlookers and hearers of the sincerity or conviction of the act, though it will not affect the force of the act. Recall that, whereas the force of a felicitous illocutionary act is the immediate, predictable outcome of the act, the effects of a perlocutionary act are contingent and uncertain, even if they may be predicated upon techniques such as Classical and Renaissance rhetoric or modern advertising methods. It is predictably certain that saying “I do” at a properly constituted marriage ceremony will render me married to another person, but not that its perlocutionary effect may be to prompt my jilted ex-fiancée to stand up and shoot me. Expression and embodiment can make a great deal of difference to the uptake or significance of the speech act. In this case performance carries a different weight and meaning, one conveyed by the embodied behaviour that, in Worthen’s argument, appropriates, transforms, and subjects the text to its own ritualized forms. At this point we should recall Worthen’s central point that theatrical performance is not merely a kind of embodiment of something else that exists prior to it and therefore in a sense governs it. It is itself a set of signifying conventions that imposes itself upon the playscript. The modes that convey sincerity at one point in history will differ from those understood in another; and in some cases the notion of conveying sincerity (or “character”) may not exist at all, or in preliminary, attenuated ways. This is one of the major
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reasons why performance does not simply cite something that exists already in a merely more intense or expressive way: because the iterative, historical, and conventional modes of behaviour that we call “acting” have to shape the performatives of the text in their own image. In some cases that image will have no place for signifying activities that marked the “original” performative practices of the theatre for which the play was written or improvised. It is clear that such changing conventions will play a decisive role in conveying perlocutionary force, but it is less clear that they affect illocutionary force to the same degree. If the illocutionary force of an action has been lost, that loss lies in cultural and social change much broader than theatrical convention. I am arguing that illocutionary acts do not depend for their effects on the transformative, appropriating labour of the theatre, but that perlocutionary acts do. The multiple illocutionary acts that lie at the heart of Shakespeare’s plays – from coronations and usurpations through acts of promising, declaring, marrying, swearing, imploring, cursing (and interesting case, this, as we shall see), and sentencing are as effective (in conveying and securing their force or transformation) in reading as they are in embodied performance, although they may be differently affective, depending on how they are performed or imagined to be embodied. The performative acts that are most interesting are illocutionary utterances which also have perlocutionary force, for here the illocutionary force of the act is overlaid and informed by the conventionally determined labour of the theatre at specific cultural moments. We may therefore respond to illocutionary acts differently in accordance with the specific work that goes into producing their perlocutionary effect and affect. I develop this point in due course. Let us first deal with the difference between reading and performance. Reading and Embodiment Worthen claims that performance is not “reading by another means.”19 At one level this makes perfect sense, especially if we take into account that the work performed upon the language of the text by the embodied theatre obeys its own rules and conventions that are specific to its practitioners, and so would not be shared by every reader. Here Terry Eagleton’s observation, quoted approvingly by Worthen, is apposite:
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Eagleton’s formulation does not deny all relations between text and performance, even though he does maintain that they are “incommensurate” because they “inhabit distinct real and theoretical spaces”. Text and performance have come to occupy distinct “spaces” historically through distinct institutional ways of valuing them and talking about them. This “distinctness” is historically specific – the result of the institutional divergence of “literature” and “theatre” that was incipient in Shakespeare’s day but not yet developed. Current arguments against the performative orthodoxy to the effect that Shakespeare wrote plays both for the theatre and explicitly to be read indicate the beginnings of this historical divergence.21 And if one heeds Weimann’s work on the tension between “actor’s voice and author’s pen” or Tiffany Stern’s scholarship on the place of the text in early modern production, one will see a fluid and unsettled relationship between text and performance in the early modern period. In Weimann’s view, this moment of the history of drama and theatre sees an active, and highly productive, negotiation between actor and author, or text and performance.22 Stern shows that, whereas the text was accommodated to the demands of acting in some circumstances, in others the actor’s textual part would have directed him on how to perform his role.23 Given both the variable relationship between the authority of text and performance, author’s pen and actor’s body, that Weimann and Stern disclose, and the historical variability of this relationship, Eagleton’s claim of an essential, theoretical incommensurability looks questionable. Nor does it seem likely that we will discover a metaphor or even a set of theoretical precepts that will capture any essential relation between text and performance. Moreover, in the face of the claim that the text gains its value and releases its meaning from within the institution of literature, we should remember that the debate for which the interchange between Foakes and Worthen is metonymic of what is happening is taking place within the institution of literature. This is not a fight between literature and the theatre; it is a fight between literary practitioners regarding the place of performance in the valuation and evaluation of the literary.
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Force vs. Authority In Shakespeare and the Authority of Performance, Worthen entertains a philosophically complex relationship between text and performance that is flattened by the more polemical tenor of his later book, Shakespeare and the Force of Modern Performance. In the first, for example, the ontological relationship between text and performance is mediated by the concept of the “work”, a notion that cannot be reduced to any instance of either text or performance. More significantly, in contrast to the flat denial in “Texts, Tools and Technologies” that performance might usefully be regarded as “‘reading’ by other means”,24 he reminds us in the earlier text that “reading is as much a performance, a production of the work, as a stage performance is”,25 and again, “a reading of the text is not the text itself, but a new production of the work”.26 In this context reading and performance, though distinct, bear a similarly productive relation to the text, each being an instantiation of the “work”, which is best regarded as a “type”, irreducible to any material instance, either textual or behavioural. I want to offer an exploratory analysis of this relationship in order to render more permeable the barrier constructed between reading and performance in Worthen’s later work. In “Texts, Tools, and Technologies” the radical difference between reading and performance is based on the degree to which “use”, “embodiment”, “transformation”, “action”, and its nature as an “event” belong exclusively to the domain of the theatre: however readily it might enable the reader to set the play’s hypothetical action in the theatre of the mind, a reader does not use the text as part of a regime of embodiment, a means of transforming the text into a different mode of publication, in which the words are situated within and conveyed through an event, inflected as living human action, as behaviour to an audience of spectators itself engaged in its own complex, reciprocal life.27
Everything said here about the difference between reading and acting commands assent in a straightforward, commonsense way. But recall that one of Worthen’s major points of difference from Foakes lies in the former’s claim that the “commonsense view” espoused by Foakes both does not “explain very much” and is “wrong, though … in interesting ways that command our attention”.28 One man’s “commonsense” is another’s flattening “steamroller of theory”,29 and vice versa. Theory – especially, but not only, deconstructive philosophy – prompts one to ask: to what degree are the terms that Worthen invokes on
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behalf of performance radically distinct from the process (event) of reading? Is reading not a “use” of the text? And is it not a use that entails “embodiment”, “performance”, “action”, “behaviour”, or “event”? It is possible to show that none of these concepts, subjected to a rigorous theoretical analysis, can be radically differentiated from reading, and that, moreover, such analysis is implicit in the work of Merleau-Ponty and Derrida. We have seen that Worthen himself reminds us that reading is a kind of performance. Once that is conceded, it is a small matter to show that such a performance must take the character of an event (or series of events), which in turn must entail, at the most fundamental, phenomenological level, action, behaviour, and embodiment.30 The point is not the empirical platitude that readers are free to imagine the embodied action implied by the text if they so wish (which is, in effect, Foakes’s case against performance theory, and from which he derives the claim, made forcefully by Harry Berger, Jr, that reading is better than performance because it leaves different modes of expression and interpretation open).31 The point is that our language is the language of embodied beings. It carries within it, especially in its variously performative dimensions, both its embodied and its psychological nature (an embodied psychology) as part of what Wittgenstein calls its “grammar”. This is why the discussion of character in this debate and others falls so short of the mark: because “character” (for want of a better word) is implied as the informing condition of all utterances that appear to be the property of human beings, no matter how reduced they may be. We have as much choice not to see the vestiges of character in an utterance as we do to refuse to see a face and its expression in a few marks – thus: . That is to say, we have no choice; we are phenomenologically compelled to see these lines as a face.32 Reading a play involves a similar grammar of embodiment when we constitute utterances as events in consciousness. To put the point more strongly, the recognition of a speech act on the page entails its embodiment as a form of human behaviour. This means that the radical distinction that Worthen insists upon between “mere reading” and “performance” rests on a false, neo-Cartesian conception of language as, on the one hand, something that exists in the domain of a disembodied mind, and, on the other, utterance as bodily action. Merleau-Ponty offers a compelling account of the essentially embodied dimensions of language: “the thinking subject must have its basis in the subject incarnate. The phonetic ‘gesture’ brings about … a certain structural co-ordination of experience, a certain modulation of existence, exactly as a pattern of my bodily behaviour endows the objects around me with a certain significance.”33 Because the “gesture” of language is so implicated in the
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body, reading always bears the trace of the body in its processes, and this trace is not something added to the signifier but rather something embedded in it as a condition of its possibility:34 “There is thus, either in the man who listens or reads, who speaks or writes, a thought in speech the existence of which is unsuspected by intellectualism.”35 This “thought” is inseparable from “speech”, even in the act of silent reading, which is in turn (contrary to the “intellectualism” that Merleau-Ponty decries) founded upon an embodied “existential meaning which is not only rendered by [words], but which inhabits them, and is inseparable from them”.36 This critique has both a historical and logical dimension. Historically speaking, the disembodied act of reading that Worthen uses as his model comes after Shakespeare, both in its philosophical bifurcation of body and mind and, by all accounts, in the actual experience of reading, which had not yet secured itself as a solitary, interior, mental activity, but was still much closer to performance, as Worthen understands it. Whatever the contingencies of the history of reading may have been, however, my logical argument is that a Cartesian conception of reading can never reduce the experience to the rehearsal of a totally disembodied state: vestiges of the necessary embodied activity that constitutes human language must be retained in that event. Worthen is right to insist that performance is not reading by another means, if he means by that a process whereby an essentially disembodied string of signifying forms puts on the eventfulness of human behaviour as one puts on (or discards) a coat. The language that the actor speaks does not have body and behaviour added to it, as some ancillary supplement. The actor inhabits the language from within, in a mode which is not a merging of two separate entities but rather an expressive unity. That is how we speak: not as bodily movement plus language; rather language is the product of an embodied mind. That is what Hamlet cannot understand about the player’s “monstrous” performance: representing an incipient Cartesian split between the inner and exterior man, he believes (for political reasons, which he mistakenly takes as metaphysical causes) that he nurtures an inexpressible interior self that “passes show”, and which clothes itself in the mere forms of expressive symbolism. Having trapped himself in the model of real speech as disembodied interiority, he ironically finds that nothing he can do can convey his (hidden) passion any better than the moving expressiveness of the player’s “show”. Whereas Worthen grasps the fact that acting is not language to which behaviour is added as a supplementary kind of show, he remains trapped in Hamlet’s debilitating philosophy of language by refusing to accept that the language of the “text” is itself not removed from the embodied expressiveness that
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he values in the theatre. It retains, as its phenomenological possibility, the informing embodiment that is its condition of being. That is what allows its seamless passage onto the stage – it is what marries text and performance, making them “one flesh”. Complications: “Emotives” and “Passionate Utterances” I have so far been following Austin’s uncompromising disjunction of illocutionary and perlocutionary utterances, but I now wish to complicate that distinction, especially in its relation to the theatre. Stanley Cavell analyses forms of perlocutionary speech acts, which he calls “passionate utterances”, in terms that are related to my conclusions above that, whereas illocutionary acts do not require embodiment to exercise their force, the effects of perlocutionary acts are much more open and uncertain, amenable to variations in performance and negotiations between interlocutors that are in effect unpredictable. “Perlocutionary acts make room for, and reward, imagination and virtuosity,” Cavell writes, whereas: illocutionary acts do not in general make such room – I do not … wonder how I might make a promise or … render a verdict. But to persuade you may well take considerable thought, to insinuate as much as to control may require tact, to seduce or to confuse you may take talent … passionate expression makes demands upon the singular body in a way illocutionary force (if it goes well) foregoes.37
Crucial to Cavell’s analysis is the dialogical nature of passionate utterances: a passionate utterance is an invitation to another to respond in such a mode that “a refusal may become part of the performance”;38 a “you” is singled out that: comes into play in relation to the declaration of the “I” who thereby takes upon itself a definition of itself, in, as it may prove, a causal or a fateful form. A performative utterance is an invitation to participation in the order of law.39 And perhaps we can say: A passionate utterance is an invitation to improvisation in the disorders of desire.40
That is beautifully put, and I shall come back to the “disorders of desire.” But Cavell writes here as if a passionate utterance is not exactly a performative. William M. Reddy argues convincingly that what he calls “emotives” – the expression of emotions in the mode of Cavell’s passionate utterances – are themselves performative in the sense that they do not merely express an
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emotion that is fully formed before it is put into words: that is, the outward sign of an “inward spiritual act”41 or state. In a telling echo of Cavell’s analysis, Reddy states, “To speak about how one feels is, very often, to make an implicit offer or gift, to negotiate, to refuse, to initiate a plan or terminate it, to establish a tie or alter it.”42 In addition to such dialogical negotiation between people, emotives themselves do not merely describe feelings but also shape emotions in their expression. They are therefore performative in a way that is distinct from illocutionary force and perlocutionary effect, but no less performative for that. With this new notion of the performative aspects of emotives or passionate utterances in mind, let us return to the relation between text and performance. In his account of the “construction” of the utterance in everyday life, M.M. Bakhtin/V.N. Voloshinov argues that all utterances have the structure of an enthymeme: a formal argument that is missing one of its steps.43 No utterance means anything without recourse to the situation or context that structures it, even if the latter is not present. To understand the full force or import of an utterance, we need to understand its situation; but the situation is often absent – it has to be constructed from the utterance.44 To adopt a somewhat inappropriate but familiar idiom, the utterance is determined by an absent cause of which it is the effect. Using a term that is related to Cavell’s and Reddy’s respective accounts of the performative force of emotive utterances, Bakhtin/Voloshinov writes of the “intonation” of an utterance, which “lies on the border of the verbal and non-verbal, the said and the unsaid”.45 Weimann’s analysis of historical and sociological conditions of representation on the early modern English stage, ranging from the tension between text and performance, through locus and platea, to mimesis and self-expressive show, is marked by this Bakhtinian paradox. Because we are no longer immersed in these historically specific forces, they need to be constructed from the playtext; but the meaning of that text, in its fully performative dimensions, is not complete without such representational and performative tensions “beyond” the text. This paradox suggests that text and performance cannot be opposed to each other in anything but a provisional way; indeed, they are necessarily imbricated in each other. I now bring the strands of my argument together in an analysis of the relation between text and performance, language and body, representation and self-expressive show, and illocutionary and perlocutionary (including “passionate”) force and effect in the infamous wooing of Anne by Richard in Shakespeare’s Richard III.
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The Forces and Effects of Seduction Is seduction an illocutionary or a perlocutionary act? By the usual Austinian tests, it is the latter. One can say “I promise you” or “I warn you” with immediate force, but not “I seduce you”. One has to engage in other speech acts in order to seduce, and the seductive purpose is usually concealed or at least not declared openly (otherwise the action is known as “flirting”). Seduction requires all the resources of talent, passionate negotiation, openness to and challenge by the other, as well as indirection and the uncertainty of outcome that Cavell aligns with the “disorders of desire” rather than the “order of the law”.46 But Shakespeare reveals, through the intercourse of seduction, the extraordinary complexity of the relationships among illocutionary force, perlocutionary effect and their hybrid – passionate utterance. He uses the historically specific resources of theatrical technique in its negotiations with sociological reality to reveal the subtle imbrication of law and desire through the intertwining of performative and performance. Let us trace the complex layering or embedding of Anne’s speech acts as they are affected by the relationships among perlocutionary, illocutionary, and passionate utterance, and the tension, to which Weimann directs our attention, between the imaginary world of representation and the existential act of bodily delivery, such as Brecht associated with the actor’s gestus. Given such sociological, theatrical, and historical knowledge as Weimann has made available, one can look for elements in the text (which are almost always a particular kind of performative utterance) that point to the kinds of performance-in-tension that he has excelled in delineating; one can even speculate as to how such elements might, or might have, charmed or repelled an idealized spectator. But one cannot tell what effect such elements have, had, or will have in any specific performance. This is a different way of formulating the distinction between the predictability in the read text of, respectively, illocutionary force and perlocutionary effects. Shakespeare distributes illocutionary and perlocutionary acts disproportionately between Anne and Richard. She tends to engage in utterances with illocutionary force, which he deflects and reflects with the sheer talent of his performance. Here text and performance do not part company so much as set up a productive tension that releases the power of “passionate utterance” as Cavell understands it. And the full performative power of passionate utterance, arising out of the “disorders of desire” that must be located in a specific body – here and now – can be demonstrated only in opposition to the warranty of the illocutionary act, behind which stands the abstract “order of the law”.47
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The point about the illocutionary is that it is finite – it comes to an end when its effect is procured. Say “I promise”, and you have promised. Say “I do”, and you are married. Raise your index finger and the batsman must walk. There is no more to be said, by either party, unless it is to engage in a different illocutionary act, or else a series of logically subsequent, perlocutionary negotiations. There is, however, no end to a passionate engagement unless a line is drawn by one of the parties; and a refusal may itself be a further, passionate entanglement. For this reason, the seduction scene requires the redoubled capacities of performance – not only of an actor revelling in his self-expressive gestus, but also of the actor showing the character as revelling in the same virtuoso performance. Worthen is right: the seduction can in this sense never be the iteration or rehearsal of something that is indifferent to the specific rhythms and intensities of embodiment in this performance. It gains its power in contrast to its other, the illocutionary, which appears to need no such locality or specificity. Yet there are certain speech acts that put this distinction between illocutionary force and perlocutionary effect into question: they require a perlocutionary investment of affective energy to muster their illocutionary force. They are perhaps the most exemplary of passionate utterances. In Richard III, such acts are given exclusively to women: they are curses. Let us examine how this works in the relationship between Anne’s performative speech acts and her situation in performance. She enters with a pure illocutionary act, a command (“Set down, set down your honourable load” – Richard III, 1.2).48 She then declares her act of mourning through the jussive plea for the legitimacy of her invocation (another illocutionary act) of Henry’s ghost as witness: “Thou bloodless remnant of that royal blood: / Be it lawful that I invocate thy ghost / To hear the lamentations of poor Anne” (1.2.7–9). Her entry, emblematized by the coffin of the slain king and the attendants, places her firmly in the represented space of the locus. But as she speaks the force of her self-expressive, perlocutionary speech acts (which register impotent rage and grief) shift her towards the platea. The referent of her speech acts is himself, as Weimann shows, the first character in whom Shakespeare would “assimilate the full thrust and surplus of performance to the semi-tragic shape of a Renaissance protagonist”.49 In the scenes leading up to Anne’s entrance, Richard has given an almost continuous, bravura performance of platea self-expression and theatrical manipulation. Those performances and his seduction of Anne are, as Weimann and Bruster remark, “platea occasions”.50 But the seduction scene embodies a struggle within the shifting, self-expressive space of the platea rather than a conventional battle
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between it and the distanced locus. That change occurs through a concomitant shift between perlocutionary, illocutionary, and hybrid, passionate utterances. Anne’s weighty imperative, directed locus-like at the pall-bearers, also provides the moment or space for the absent spirit of Henry to be invoked (via a proleptic, exculpatory excuse) as the sympathetic audience to her further acts of mourning, complaint and cursing. Her invocation and excuse moreover doubles her audience: the absent ghost (as empathetic counterpart on the stage – specifically the locus) is replicated as the invocation of pity is felt by the spectators to be directed at them. Anne’s illocutionary prayer in effect invites the audience to take the part of Henry’s ghost. Perfectly intelligible through the pure act of reading, it clears the space for the mode of platea-like gestus from the place of locus-like representation. Here is an actor calling (by indirection) for the audience’s support for the character, but without using the common trick of breaking through the illusion of character. This move is the product of the stage – of performance – and it is therefore subject to the unpredictable volatility of perlocutionary and/or passionate utterance. But its action and direction (though not its effect) can be adduced through mere reading. The complexity of this single act indicates both the strengths and the limits of a certain kind of performance criticism that I have sketched above: one can read off the text the possible or even likely embodiments of representation and gestus, but one cannot say exactly what the effects will actually be. The subtle move from the personated to the personator through a speech act that leaves the representational surface entirely unruffled, is sustained until the antagonist (actor/character and actor) appears upon the scene, ironically invoked, as we shall see, by the very call to pity that goes out to absent spirit and present spectator alike. The rest of Anne’s speech consists of a sustained imprecation, as grief, rage, and hatred are united in a catalogue of curses against the Duke of Gloucester, whose humanity is questioned by her further invocation of “wolves”, “spiders”, “toads”, “any creeping venomed thing that lives” and his putative child’s “ugly and unnatural aspect” (1.2.19–23). The affective intensity of her utterances may indeed be read off the text, but its performative affect is less easy to predict. Moreover, Anne’s curses call into question an absolute divide between what I have called the performative orders of law and desire. As illocutionary acts, curses cannot be delivered without being deeply invested by perlocutionary affect. The illocutionary law that animates a curse is directly related to the perlocutionary passion that drives it. Margaret makes this clear in her response to Anne’s request to teach her how to curse:
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Queen Elizabeth (rising) O thou, well skilled in curses, stay a while, And teach me how to curse mine enemies. Queen Margaret Forbear to sleep the nights, and fast the days; Compare dead happiness with living woe; Think that thy babes were sweeter than they were, And he that slew them fouler than he is. Bett’ring thy loss makes the bad causer worse. Revolving this will teach thee how to curse. Queen Elizabeth My words are dull. O quicken them with thine! Queen Margaret Thy woes will make them sharp and pierce like mine. (Exit) Duchess Of York Why should calamity be full of words? Queen Elizabeth Windy attorneys to their client woes, Airy recorders of intestate joys, Poor breathing orators of miseries. Let them have scope. Though what they will impart Help nothing else, yet do they ease the heart. (4.4.116–31)
This later exchange with Margaret betrays both a hope that the intensity of personal passion (“living woe”, “client woes”, “miseries”) will “quicken” “dull” “words” with a kind of performative magic and the acknowledgement that the real effect will be merely cathartic – achieving little more than an “easing” of the “heart” of the speaker. Anne’s sustained curse against Richard is driven by hatred, as all curses are, and as such it is perhaps a sign of rage at her own impotence rather than the outcome of her real power. But her curses are displaced, as if she knows that she can do Richard no harm, and therefore her imprecations rebound upon his putative wife and child. Shakespeare leaves undecided the real illocutionary force of the curse, while mustering the power of dramatic irony to entertain the possibility of its more than merely perlocutionary efficacy. Part of the effect of Shakespeare’s irony is to demonstrate the degree to which the power of performative speech acts, which is derived not from anything in or about the speaker, but rather from a set of social and linguistic conventions (“the order of the law”) that each speaker is always negotiating and appropriating on specific occasions, is as it were only borrowed by the utterer. Once released, such authority and power are not the speaker’s to control or change. Furthermore, the mustering of the order of the law in the service of desire’s disorder frequently shows an incomplete grasp of desire itself.
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Cavell points out that the difference between an illocutionary and a perlocutionary act is that the former requires no peculiar talent or ability (although it may require status or office). Promises, for example, require no special genius; anyone can make them to perfectly good effect, whether proclaimed or mumbled, declared solemnly with hand on heart or affirmed matter-of-factly. To move someone with the sheer force of one’s voice, body, and rhetoric, however, requires especial abilities. They are the exemplary province of the actor, exemplified here by Richard. How are the uses of the performative in this scene related to Weimann’s spaces and modes of performance? Although expressed within the confines of a represented character, Anne’s self-expressive reflexivity, which draws attention both to the palpable histrionics of her grief and the ironic effects of her imprecations and invocations, induces a contesting platea-like performance even before Richard arrives to challenge its authority. Much of its affective force will depend on how the actor behaves in relation to the spectators, but whatever such emotional effects may be wrought by specific players, audiences will be struck by the illocutionary irony through which, in invoking Henry’s ghost, she in fact conjures up the figure of deformity that is the target of her curses. In cursing Richard’s future wife, she blights herself: “If ever he have wife, let her be made / More miserable by the death of him / Than I am made by my young lord and thee” (1.2.26–8). The ironic effects of the curse or the prophecy are the property of the theatre, or rather, the projective capacity of the dramatic text for a kind of prolepsis that is impossible in what we call “real life”: it is purely the property of Shakespeare’s play and its performative medium that an illocutionary act that has no “ordinary” felicity conditions is granted them by the unfolding action of the play, the text. By the time Anne departs, she leaves us with the horrific knowledge that she has cursed herself, and moreover that it is she who has conjured up the demon to whom she has now wedded her miserable life rather than the sympathetic spirit of her father-in-law. The play erases performatively and textually the absolute difference that Anne seeks to interpose through performative utterances between herself as “angel” and Richard as “devil” (just as Shakespeare does in Sonnet 144). Having cursed Richard as a poisonous toad, it is Anne who turns herself into a “creeping venomed thing”, spitting at her victim in the wish that it were “mortal poison” (1.2.145), willing her infecting eyes to turn to basilisks. But the interchange of passionate utterance between the two antagonists also shows the discovery or “navigation,” as Reddy puts it, of emotion that is not already formed. The overall shape of Anne’s transformation by her
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own passionate utterance from loathing to attraction unfolds as the dialogue progresses. She moves from the plain invective of “foul devil” (50), through the critical plea, “Vouchsafe, diffused infection of a man, / Of these known evils but to give me leave / By circumstance t’ accuse thy cursèd self” (7880), to the uncertain expression of desire in “I would I knew thy heart” (180) and the progressive capitulation of “To take is not to give” (190), followed at last by the wholehearted gift: “With all my heart – and much it joys me, too …” (207). It may seem as if Anne is the only one navigated, as it were, by a Richard totally sure of his secure insincerity and the dark reserves of his self-expressive energy expressed thyrough “the authority of the act of performing”.51 Richard certainly reoccupies the platea position that introduced him to the audience in the opening lines of the play with a triumphant directness of address: “Was ever woman in this humour wooed? / Was ever woman in this humour won?” (1.2.215–16). Weimann and Bruster see this moment as a celebration of the freedom both of the represented character from moral and social constraint and the self-expressive actor’s “game”: “a player in front of a looking-glass, an actor who counterfeits the socially counterfeiting, who descants on the ‘shadow’ of his ‘deformity’: ‘Shine out, fair sun, till I have bought a glass, / That I may see my shadow as I pass’” (249–50). This is true. But Richard’s move into the platea position also exposes him to the critical scrutiny of the spectators to whom he now deliberately opens his performance. They may take delight in his self-conscious exuberance, expressed via player and character alike, but there is a shift in Richard’s declaration, “I do mistake my person all this while”, that marks a change, indeed a loss of complete control, over his histrionic mastery of performance and performative alike: Upon my life she finds, although I cannot, Myself to be a marv’lous proper man. I’ll be at charges for a looking-glass And entertain a score or two of tailors To study fashions to adorn my body. Since I am crept in favour with myself, I will maintain it with some little cost. But first I’ll turn yon fellow in his grave, And then return lamenting to my love. Shine out, fair sun, till I have bought a glass, That I may see my shadow as I pass. (1.2.240–50)
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Who is speaking here? It seems to me that the move by which Anne moves from locus to platea in the opening of the scene is inverted in Richard’s location in its close. Richard the character usurps the position of the actor playing Richard, or even the liminal personation through which character can draw attention to and share delight in his own histrionic talent. The “glass” in question is not merely the mimetic action by which playing shows “the very age and body of the time his form and pressure” (Hamlet, 3.2.23–4); nor is it only the “shadow” that “reveals the performer in self-reflexive effigy”.52 It is called up, invoked performatively, by the character Richard, who has been increasingly entranced by the image of his own attractive power, and who now wishes, in a fit of uncontrolled hubris, to bask in the image of himself that he thinks is mirrored in Anne’s eyes and speech. Just as Anne transforms herself unconsciously into the venomous creature she sees in Richard through the parallels established in the text, so the text of the play takes Richard’s performance back to its opening lines, ironically and retroactively reshaping his histrionics in the light of its earlier play on “son”/”sun” and his scornful rejection of the “amorous looking-glass” and “sportive tricks” of a “lady’s chamber”. That is to say, the correspondences established through textual continuity transform the audience’s relationship to the actor/character as performance. In this case, Richard’s performative closeness to his audience is distanced by the fact that his delight at seeing his newly fashioned and fashionable shadow in the sun puts him in the position of the very objects of his uncontested scorn in the opening scene, where he disparages, in an irony that echoes through text and performance alike, “this son of York” (1.1.2). Text and performance thus share more than a “bi-fold” authority: performance and text are inextricably part of the play of perlocutionary and illocutionary utterance, both in speech and body. But who is to know what the real, actual, embodied, performed effects of this set of performatives are? I can extrapolate my reading from a combination of Austinian and Cavellian philosophical analyses and Weimanian performative ones, bolstered by the general movement of the playtext, whereby Richard is increasingly and inexorably removed from the intimacy of the platea as he assumes locuslike power, and paradoxically becomes the object rather than the subject of representation. But what happens in any actual performance must be tested purely phenomenologically, in the moment of immediate interaction that we call the theatre.
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Conclusion I began by presenting two arguments regarding the relationship between text and performance which, on the face of it, may seem to be pulling in two directions. On the one hand, I have argued that reading is as much a performance as acting, and that it retains an irreducible bodily dimension in the phenomenological transformation of marks on the page into signifiers and signifieds. Underlying this argument is a more basic analysis, which shows that precisely because of this phenomenological transformation it makes little sense to say that the text “disappears” or is “left behind” in performance. I have argued that embodied behaviour may affect and effect the perlocutionary force of the speech acts contained in the text, but that it cannot change the force of illocutionary acts – the very forms of behaviour and action that carry the political dimensions of drama. On the other, I have argued for a necessary dimension of embodiment in the event of reading, which is not confined to the freedom of the imagination to create a performance in the mind’s eye. Although they may seem to be in tension, these two phenomena complement each other. It is precisely because all reading events are traces of embodiment that illocutionary acts can have the same force “in” the text and “beyond” it, in embodied performance. My other argument is that the force of illocutionary speech acts escapes the distinction that Worthen draws between reading (or text) and performance. The act does not have to be turned into behaviour for it to be properly constituted as an illocutionary act or carry its performative force. Unless Worthen maintains that the multitude of promises, oaths, coronations, declarations, depositions, avowals, and marriages that are encountered in the reading of Shakespeare’s texts are not equally conveyed in reading and acting, he would need to concede that in these cases the illocutionary performative works as forcefully in reading as it does through embodied action.53 This has crucial implications for our sense of the politics of the plays, for it is primarily through such illocutionary acts, which signal the “order of the law”, that political relations are expressed and negotiated. In the second part of my analysis I substantiate my theoretical or philosophical analysis by complicating the difference between perlocutionary and illocutionary acts via Cavell and Reddy’s notions of “passionate utterances” and “emotives,” which are hybrid performatives. I explore the relations between “the order of the law” and the “disorders of desire” by applying the analysis of performative speech acts to Weimann’s notions of the bi-fold authority of text and performance on Shakespeare’s stage. I show
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what difference acting does make in a reading of Richard’s seduction of Anne. I address what I call the “Bakhtinian paradox” whereby the text, incomplete without its embodied situation of performance, is the ground on which that situation must be reconstructed for the utterance to make complete sense.54 In a display of the variable interaction of the represented and presented figures embodied by the player in his shifting relation to the spectator, I argue that performance plays as much of a role in embodying the text as the text does in shaping the possibilities of performance. Finally, there is indeed something about the presence of the body and its capacity to inhabit in unexpected ways the phenomenological residue of incarnation in all language that is quite specific to the theatre (and different from film). For if it is possible to show that the things that Worthen claims exclusively for the theatre (“use”, “performance”, “action”, “event”, “embodiment”, and “behaviour”) are irreducibly aspects of the act, event, or use of the text in reading, it must also be conceded that he is right when he distinguishes acting as “behaviour to an audience of spectators itself engaged in its own complex, reciprocal life”.55 It is this embodied, powerful, but fleeting and unstable, event of community that is exclusive to the theatre (but not to film or solitary reading), and which constitutes the force of performance as communal ritual in Weimann’s earliest work. I’ll leave the last word to Kenneth Gross, who reminds us of the “radiance of individual gestures” that retain a specificity not used up through ritual iteration, and the “dream of community able to absorb and sustain such uncommon forces, to make them the means of survival, a source of increased life”, which “produces a wound capable of communicating itself to the world, like a plague, a wound whose strength binds audience and actor to the shared space of the theatre”.56 This wound of a threefold community, this unexpected radiance, is not an irreducible part of reading. Its force in performance is not illocutionary, although it may use illocutionary acts as its vehicle. More important, it calls into question the reach of performance criticism itself. For, being a communal experience that cannot be predicted or predicated from conventional ritual, it cannot be anticipated in the act of reading. It can barely be imagined. Nor can it be reconstituted retrospectively in an act of critical recollection, after the event. For by the time the performance critics sit down to write of that event, they have already lost the “shared space of the theatre”, the precise moment of which can never be recaptured or restored except as a wholly new event of communal conjunction and disjunction.
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Notes 1. Robert Weimann, Shakespeare and the Popular Tradition in the Theater: Studies in the Social Dimension of Dramatic Form and Function, ed. Robert Schwartz (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 59. 2. Robert Weimann, Author’s Pen and Actor’s Voice: Playing and Writing in Shakespeare’s Theatre, ed. Helen Higbee and William West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 3. R.A. Foakes, “Performance Theory and Textual Theory: A Retort Courteous”, Shakespeare 2, no. 1 (2006): 47–58 and W.B. Worthen, “Texts, Tools, and Technologies: A Quip Modest, in Response to R.A. Foakes”, Shakespeare 2, no 2 (2006): 208–19. 4. Stanley Cavell, Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 155–91. 5. William M. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 100 and passim. 6. Foakes, “Performance Theory”, 47 and 209. 7. W.B. Worthen, Shakespeare and the Force of Modern Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) and Shakespeare and the Authority of Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 8. Two notable examples are Athol Fugard, Winston Ntshona and John Kani’s Sizwe Banzi is Dead (1999) and Percy Mtwa, Mbongeni Ngema and Barney Simon’s Woza Albert (1973). 9. Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 137. 10. F. de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Roy Harris (London: Duckworth, 1983) 11. See, for example, Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences”, in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 1978), 278–94. 12. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ed. and trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), para. 201 and passim. 13. J.L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). 14. Worthen, “Texts”, 216 and 214. 15. Worthen, Force, 9. 16. Wittgenstein, Investigations, para. 198 and passim. 17. See Derrida, Limited Inc. 18. There is a complication. If one made a solemn promise while laughing, or winking, it will in all probability not be taken seriously. But does that mean that it has not in fact been made? Certainly, it opens the door to a claim that it was not made with the utterer’s full intention or, save the word, “seriously”. Each position is arguable. 19. Worthen, “Texts”, 213. 20. Terry Eagleton, Criticism and Ideology: A Study in Marxist Literary Theory (London: Verso, 2006), 64–5. 21. Lucas Erne, Shakespeare as Literary Dramatist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 22. Weimann, Author’s Pen and Actor’s Voice.
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23. See Tiffany Stern, Making Shakespeare: From Stage to Page (London and New York: Routledge, 2004). The first instance is exemplified by the attitudes to the “ownership” of a text, and the free adaptation of texts to the demands of specific performances: “some textual shortening between first and second performance seems regularly to have taken place. A play in performance was by no means textually fixed … even by the time of publication, Shakespeare’s plays were considerably distanced from what he had written” (122 and141). On the other hand, “Actors were not free to act as they wished; they were free only to act as the text wished them to … Actors’ separate texts contained all the information necessary for that actor to perform his ‘part’ well” (84–5). 24. Worthen, “Texts”, 213. 25. Ibid., 17. 26. Ibid., 21. 27. Ibid., 211. 28. Ibid., 209. 29. Foakes, “Performance Theory”, 47. 30. For an account of this in the context of materialism,see David Schalkwyk, “Shakespeare’s Ghosts”, Shakespeare 1, no. 2 (2005): 219–40. See also Anthony Dawson’s argument in favour of the “imaginary text” in “The Imaginary Text, or the Curse of the Folio”, in A Companion to Shakespeare and Performance, ed. Barbara Hodgdon and W.B. Worthen, (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007), 141–61. 31. Foakes, “Performance Theory,” 54 and Harry Berger Jr, Making Trifles of Terrors: Redistributing Complicities in Shakespeare (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 103 and passim. 32. The problem of character is given especially thoughtful treatment by Worthen in “Prefixing the Author: Print, Plays, and Performance”, in Hodgdon and Worthen, Companion, 212–30, at 224: “Prefixes may, now, be so fully laminated to modern notions of character – as names – as to be impossible to leverage away, even despite the Oxford edition’s considerable effort in this direction. And yet there’s an important sense in which early modern prefixes register a reality theatre: onstage, ‘character’ is not something you are, it’s something – as perhaps it was in the early modern theatre – you do. Thinking about speech prefixes as ‘names’ is a decisively literary notion, as though ‘character’ is something prior to its enactment.” 33. M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), 193. 34. See Wittgenstein, Investigations, para. 329 and passim. 35. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 179. 36. Ibid., 182. For a recent account of the essential embodiment of language, see Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987). 37. Cavell, Philosophy, 173. 38. Ibid., 183. 39. It is important to remember that by “performative utterance” Cavell means the technical, Austinian notion of an illocutionary act, which can have no force without a law or convention to inform it. 40. Cavell, Philosophy, 185. 41. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 10.
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42. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling, 100–101. 43. V.N. Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art,” in Freudianism: A Critical Sketch, ed. I.R. Titunik and N.H. Bruss (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1987), 100. Cf. “The situation enters into the utterance as an essential constitutive part of the structure of its import.” 44. This absence is the burden of Derrida’s argument in Limited Inc. 45. Voloshinov, “Discourse”, 102. 46. Cavell, Philosophy, 185. 47. Ibid., 145. 48. The text used throughout is The Oxford Shakespeare: The Complete Works, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 49. Robert Weimann and Douglas Bruster, Shakespeare and the Power of Performance: Stage and Page in the Elizabethan Theatre (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 47. 50. Ibid., 48. 51. Ibid., 49. 52. Ibid., 52. 53. Tom Bishop points out to me that this was certainly the view of the Elizabethan press censorship, in such cases as the “deposition scene” in Richard II or the speeches of the rebels in 2 Henry IV. I am greatly indebted to Tom for his astute comments on earlier drafts of this essay and also to Robert Weimann, whose patient and wise engagement with my analysis and arguments has made it a much better paper. 54. Part of this paradox resides in the fact that Weimann’s trenchant demonstration of the bifold authority of text and performance can proceed so effectively via the text of the plays. 55. Worthen, “Texts”, 211. 56. Kenneth Gross, Shakespeare’s Noise (London and Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001), 197.
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Shakespeare Performance Studies W.B. Worthen
What are we talking about when we’re talking about that slice of theatre called “Shakespeare performance”? Throughout his career, Robert Weimann has asked what writing, texts, scripts do in the various regimes of early modern performance, training an insistently dialectical imagination on the spatializing structure of locus and platea, the authorizing gestures of author’s pen and actor’s voice, and now the magisterial or ministerial relation between writing and performance in the institutions of literature and theatre. Performance is at once always changing and evanescent; the critical challenge is to find ways of conceiving performance – and perhaps especially performance using writing, dramatic performance – in ways that engage and articulate its distinctive fluidity. Weimann’s latest instigation also develops a disciplinary agenda, an open effort to suggest that the mapping of the question of dramatic performance in the text-inflected field of Shakespeare studies should draw on the resources of the adjacent “antidiscipline” of performance studies. This is a salutary – and in my view, unavoidable – move, but resistance to the distinctively “Bifold authority” of dramatic performance remains in play, despite Weimann’s leverage, across the terrain of Shakespeare performance studies, illustrated in a productive – and provocative – way by David Schalkwyk’s essay here.1 Since the 1950s or so, we’ve been saddled with a succession of relatively ineffective approaches to dramatic performance, and while I have from time to time explored the critical frontiers dividing drama studies and performance studies, it was arresting to learn “Worthen writes most often against the ‘text’” (50), to be cast as an opponent to literature, literary critique, the complex signification of writing in performance.2 What I think our three-way conversation reveals is a need to restage the question: What are we talking about when we’re talking about that slice of theatre called “Shakespeare performance”? One thing we’re talking about is an event that uses writing in the fashioning of performance. Schalkwyk rightly asks “What is a ‘text’, or, more accurately, 77
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how is the word ‘text’ being used?” in discussions of text and performance (48), and there is indeed considerable slippage in the ways text, textuality, text-based and other terms referring to written documents operate in the text-oriented field of Shakespeare performance and in performance studies more widely. On the one hand, the critique of dramatic performance – “performance-oriented” Shakespeare criticism, for example – sometimes assumes that the purpose of playing is to hold the mirror up to the text, that Shakespeare performance is primarily the performance of the writing, and that the play constellated in a non-theatrical reading of the text should provide a palpable template or manifest point of reference for the play produced by stage performance. In this perspective, text generally stands in for a critical sense of what specific words, lines, scenes are about; it refers to a set of implied interpretations of the work and how it should be decanted in performance, rather than what writing might help to do, to bring about as an event onstage. As Schalkwyk points out, “the text” here does not refer to specific features of the marks on the page, nor indeed to the specific texts used in a given production. The “text” is a “multiply complex iteration” (51) both of written forms of the work and of the ways it has been represented critically and culturally. The conception of “the text” as a “multiply complex iteration” would effectively make it impossible to measure a performance against a logically prior work, even against the many different, multiply complex iterations of the text used in making a single production. Yet Schalkwyk’s meticulous engagement with performative speech acts, particularly the illocutionary “languge” stabilized by print, seems to predicate performance on the order of writing. That predication, though, should give us pause. One reason to hesitate has to do with the place of Shakespeare theatre on the wider horizon of performance. Is Shakespeare performance a distinctively archival genre, in which the ideological reiteration of meanings derived from critical encounters with the text-as-poetry forms a crucial part of the expected, legitimate (and legitimating) work of performance? Perhaps; some performance genres do foreground their dependence on writing: inaugural addresses, Spalding Gray’s monologues, Noh theatre, staged readings, academic lectures, David Hare’s recent Berlin/Wall (he holds the script in hand throughout). Although much Shakespeare performance behaves in this way, too (pumpkin pants and hose as the signifiers of scriptural fidelity), I am not yet content to concede that Shakespeare performance should be segregated in this way. As Weimann suggests, Shakespeare’s plays helped to fashion an “unfixed, largely untested encounter of literature and theatre as two different institutions”;3 perhaps the modern sense of dramatic performance – and especially, in the English-
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speaking world, of Shakespeare performance – as an institution secondary to literature is a waning accident of history. Moreover, while locating performance as secondary to writing provides a comforting sense of the magisterial critical and artistic precedence of literature and literary studies to the tawdry stage, from the perspective of the more urgently politicized field of performance studies this hierarchy tends to conceive dramatic performance as essentially committed to a restaging of social and cultural hegemony by reiterating its principal means of dominion, writing. I am putting this baldly here, but much as we have learned – from performance studies – not to take dramatic performance as definitive of performance per se, so we should withstand the temptation – as performance studies has often failed to do – to regard dramatic performance as the mere reproduction of textual authority on the stage. As Victor Turner might have said, it is often difficult to maintain one’s footing betwixt and between disciplinary agendas. Perhaps not surprisingly, though, Schalkwyk’s critique of my use of several key terms – derivative, illocution – strikes me as a tactical gambit for reinstating a nuanced, complex, but finally text-centred understanding of dramatic performance. I take my use of derivative from Michael Bristol’s superb book, Big-time Shakespeare, where the term “derivative creativity” is proposed as a way to understand the work of performance in the longue durée of Shakespeare’s plays’ encounter with labour and culture. Bristol rigorously locates all subsequent purveyors of the original written work as “derivative” – printers, editors as well as actors and directors are “secondary creative agents”. While I’ve struggled with this sense of “derivative creativity”, Bristol does not understand derivative – meaning secondary, derived from “an ontologically and logically prior thing” (49) – in the pejorative sense of second-rate; nor do I.4 In rescuing the notion of derivative performance from my alleged misuse, though, Schalkwyk reprises a familiar vision of theatre. Refusing to specify “whatever Hamlet is: text, play, work, type, performance” (50) appears to sidestep “deriving” performance from “the text”; yet inasmuch as he regards a new performance to “derive” principally from the artists’ creative encounter with written material, “We could therefore say without ideological prejudice” that a performance of Hamlet “is derived from Hamlet – otherwise it wouldn’t be Hamlet” (50). Where does this sense of “derivation” take us? Not very far, in part because – whether or not I am pejorative in my sense of “derivative” – the sense of the text’s logical or ontological priority in the production process easily slips in a euphemistic direction, shading from “first in line” or “antecedent” toward “first in importance”, gathering performance back into the work of reiterating writing: “It is the stability of the printed text or
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playscript that allows the reincarnation of an event that would otherwise be impossible: this performance ‘of’ Hamlet” (50). Hamlet? Stable? Print and its alleged stability have nothing to do with it; neither Athenian tragedy nor the medieval mystery cycles depended on print to survive for centuries as living theatre; plays in Shakespeare’s theatre – many of which survived for decades in repertory – were not dependent on print for their lives in performance; and it might be remembered that many plays preserved in print – The Magnetic Lady, Aureng-Zebe, Cato, Strange Interlude – seem to have lost their lifelines, for the time being at least. Some written documents record the drama in ways that we might not recognize as inherently dramatic or theatrical: the papyri of some classical plays mark the change in speakers – when they mark them at all – merely with a dot. In print culture, there is Gertrude Stein. Moreover, we can only create an event by using Hamlet, and in practice a performance is less of the writing than something made with it. I do not think performances derive directly from, or reincarnate, writing, but there is a non-pejorative way to characterize performance as “derivative”: it involves de-prioritizing the text in our understanding of performance. While some text of Hamlet, and some sense of whatever Hamlet is may have been used in imagining, rehearsing, and performing a given production, the performance in the end “derives” only partially – and in some productions perhaps not crucially – from properties attributed to the text, from whatever Hamlet was before it was subjected to theatrical labour. As Weimann’s engagement of recent German productions suggests, a stage production is also assembled from – “derived from” – available strategies of directing, design, and acting; from the specificities of individual bodies and personalities; from the material constraints of a given theatre. (In textual terms, it is also “derived from” various print conventions of spelling, design, layout, the cultural signification of printforms compacted here into the word “type”.) I take the point that our ability to do a Hamlet is dependent on the existence of Shakespeare’s play; it is also dependent on our understanding of Hamlet as an instrument for performance, and on a sense that we have the means – whatever we (whoever we are) take them (whatever they are) to be. Do we think only one actor should play the lines signified by the speech-prefix “Hamlet”? That a boy should play Ophelia? That we should complicate live performance with simultaneous film and live-feed digital video? To say that performance principally “derives” from Hamlet is to locate the text in a privileged priority, as though an understanding of what performance is and does is primarily dependent on the text it uses. The Almereyda Hamlet derives from a (heavily cut, modernized, and rearranged) text of Hamlet, but the performance also clearly derives from Pixelvision,
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from Ethan Hawke’s pout, from an intertextual sense of literary and theatrical history (Gielgud, Mayakovsky, Nietzsche all appear alongside Shakespeare on Hamlet’s desk), from a transitional moment in the history of recording technologies, all of which play a distinctive part in identifying Hamlet as performance. A text of Hamlet is critical in unique ways to any performance, but I am still not convinced that “derivation” frames a compelling characterization of the conceptual or practical functioning of writing in dramatic performance. The collocation of “reincarnation” with print also implies that the performance “event” – and here I think reincarnation silently displaces the complex, nonliterary notions embodied in terms like Joseph Roach’s surrogation or Richard Schechner’s restoration – is conceived as a scripted one.5 This is the burden of Schalkwyk’s reading of Austin’s illocution. For Schalkwyk, “If performance is to text as speech act is to its cited model and code, then it is entirely dependent on that priority; it is a secondary instantiation of a primary model: it is ‘derivative’” (54). Yet while linguistic performatives depend on the proper deployment of words, with the correct agents, in the legitimate circumstances, to do things, to assume the status of acts (the act incorporates the words and much else in its sustaining process of citation), for Schalkwyk the words on the page, as illocution, are apparently already performing; they are always already performing, which is why actors’ performances legitimately derive from them. In Speech and Performance in Shakespeare’s Sonnets and Plays, this notion of textual performativity sustains a superb collocation of the sonnets with the plays’ scenic representation of the working of poetic language. Here, though, rather than using represented performances in the plays to concretize the represented scene of the sonnets, a purely textual illocution is retrained toward a theory of dramatic performance, the complex interaction between represented performance and actual doing (this move is also apparent in Speech and Performance: “Antony and Cleopatra and the sonnets both represent and perform this transformative power of language in the imaginary space of theatrical and poetic production”6). In Shakespeare and the Force of Modern Performance, I argued that Austin’s model of both illocution and perlocution removes the signifying force of performative language from the words alone (the “imaginary space of theatrical and poetic production”, perhaps), and assigns it to the complex interplay between the words and the circumstances of their enactment. When the words are performed in the material space of theatre, they do things, but the significance of what they do is not contained in the words, but in how they are activated – and so are “transformed” – in this situation, the moment of performance. To this extent, if we are looking for a way to characterize the performative force of Shakespeare’s texts in
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the theatre, we cannot assign them absolute semantic priority: they will gain their peculiar force and significance as theatrical action, do the things they do, through the ways their performance engages circumstances beyond the words themselves. Schalkwyk takes a different view of Austin’s application to dramatic performance, arguing that Shakespeare’s plays not only represent illocutionary acts but perform those acts, even without rendering them as utterance, placing them in the world of action, or lending them material agents. Unless Worthen maintains that the multitude of promises, oaths, coronations, declarations, depositions, avowals, and marriages that are encountered in the reading of Shakespeare’s texts are not equally conveyed in reading and acting, he would need to concede that in these cases the illocutionary performative works as forcefully in reading as it does through embodied action. (71 above)
I am hardly ready to concede this point, since performance is not about conveying an encounter with a linguistic performative, but about the use of words in the creation of acts. When I read a play, I “encounter” these events (promises, oaths), but they are not performed in Austin’s sense. Illocutions represented in a text are not “equally conveyed” in performance because the speech act represented on the page cannot be identical to the speech act performed on the stage, an act considerably more complex than a mere utterance of words, making a speech.7 Speech acts may be “conveyed”, but the precise act that will be created when they are “performed” lies – as in the case of “I do” or “I promise” – outside the words themselves: how the words are performed is inseparable from the act performed with them. This is an important point, and underscores the attraction and the challenges of using Austin to explore dramatic performance, difficulties I do not think either of us have quite captured. As an instrument for performance, any classic play will create the opportunity for actors to perform activities that simply have lost the sustaining social structure in which those actions signified, had their potentially performative, transformative force as speech acts. For example, any speech made while kneeling, or any business involving a hat is legible to us today, but also has very different, less complex force as action than it would have had in 1600, when these activities played a crucial role in daily social rituals of identification, legitimation, survival. So far, we are in agreement: “the iterative, historical, and conventional modes of behaviour that we call ‘acting’” at a given point in time and place may “have no place for signifying activities that marked the ‘original’ performative practices of
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the theatre for which the play was written or improvised” (57). There are a number of textually encoded moments of illocution that can still be made to have significant force as theatre, but a force quite distinct from any that might have been encoded in the text four hundred years ago: oaths are a useful case in point. Reading the text may convey an encounter with performative language, but the performative we encounter in performance has been altered by the act of performing it, here and now, in these circumstances. Indeed, Schalkwyk distinguishes between perlocution and illocution on this ground: while the “set of signifying conventions that imposes itself upon the playscript” (!) may “play a decisive role in conveying perlocutionary force”, it has less bearing on the represented illocutions of dramatic writing, which “do not depend for their effects on the transformative, appropriating labour of the theatre” (56, 57). In this view, the illocutionary acts represented in the script retain a kind of signifying priority apart from the transformation, appropriation, imposition of the stage (and who is being pejorative now? in what sense is the theatre’s use of writing theft, appropriation, an imposition?). An oath is an oath is an oath, and always enacts a curse, the same curse, regardless of how it is said, or when, by whom or to whom. To that, all I can say is, Zounds! This understanding of the universal force of illocution depends on the sense that for Austin there are no “rules for how one should speak the words of a promise for it to be binding” Instead, the “force of a written illocutionary act is no different from its embodied, fully ‘expressive’ form. A promise is no less a promise if we read it than if we see or hear it embodied, if it is said with special emphasis or dispassionately” (56). A promise may be a promise whether read or spoken, but it does not become an act, do things, promise until it enters the world of action, where the quality of the performance will constitute the specific act performed, the specificity of this promise as an act. How one speaks the words will govern what promise is actually performed. To take a scripted example, if my brother writes me a letter and says, “I promise, I’ll kill you if you spill our plans to surprise Mom and Dad”, a promise has been accomplished, performed in the world as well as on the page. Even here the promise is not identical with the words conveying it; I would understand him to promise to be very angry, but not actually to kill me. My brother is not Tony Soprano, a distinction illustrating the principle that the words do not determine their performative force: with a different agent, the same words produce a different promise, different speech act. Olivier vowing revenge accomplishes a different act than Branagh does. But reading a letter is to read a script that has already entered the world of action, unlike reading a promise in a literary work – Laertes’ promise to avenge Polonius’ murder, for instance.
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I have many times voiced this promise, reading the speech aloud in class. In that case, though, I have used this text to accomplish the act of “illustrative reading”, a performative designed to point up, underline features of language, phrasing, for our discussion. While we’ve encountered a performative, perhaps, I have clearly promised nothing, and have not come close to performing “promising” even in the theatrical sense. Without the enabling circumstances of theatrical performance, or even of rehearsal, this classroom reading conveys an encounter with Laertes’ promise, but doesn’t enact it, even in the special way theatrical promises are enacted. Theatre uses writing differently than reading aloud, or reading silently, does. The purpose of the theatre is to signify fictive action through the process of acting, “with all the people engaged in the mimesis actually doing things,” as Aristotle put it.8 Laertes may promise “I’ll be revenged / Most throughly for my father” (4.5.134– 5), but the specific character of the promise, the specific promise created in action, is surely a consequence of how the words are spoken, of how they are transformed by embodiment into the codes of action, characterization, performance epitomizing this production.9 In a paradox Austin might appreciate (Hamlet certainly does), Laertes’ ranting vows might seem to be hollowed out, etiolated, by how he performs them, by their conventional, even “theatrical” quality.10 Laertes promises, but the act accomplished by that promise depends on how it’s done. The text might convey a “promise” to the agents of stage performance, but it is their performance that creates and signifies the specific promise. As Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler have pointed out, the performative depends on its theatrical, citational dimension: performative speech depends not simply on the “general citationality” of language, but on the use of language, in precise circumstances, to summon an available paradigm of signification, one that is fundamentally akin to the notion of conventionality in the theatre (no, I don’t mean the pejorative sense of “citation” or “conventional” here). Rather than merely continuing “to do their work in their new (fictional) context” (55), when performed as theatre, the performatives of the page are remade into, qualified as different acts on the stage. To invoke Kenneth Burke, we might even say that the agents of this event (actors), use the agency of the script, with different purposes, and in a different scene than those displayed in the fictive text. The act they perform cannot be identical to the acts represented in the play. The theatre speaks this duplicitous grammar of motives.11 Schalkwyk hesitates at my refusal to see performance as “reading by other means”, but I do not think that illocution in the text allows for the drama’s “seamless passage onto the stage” (62), a seamless passage, in other words,
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from the performatives we read to those enacted. First, of course, if acting were the seamless embodiment of scripted illocution, we would all be good actors; actor training, rehearsal, table-work, getting “off book” – all point to the hard work of refashioning writing as part of building a more comprehensive event, one in which the words are no longer identified solely as words, but become part of something else, speech, action, behaviour. For this reason, I think it is fair to say that the text is left behind as a text, and that while this may be an obvious point, it is not trivial in its consequences. Although there may be many texts onstage in a performance of Hamlet – Hamlet’s book, Ophelia’s poem, Horatio’s letter – the text of Hamlet has been digested into acting, movement, behavior which – while it may retain the words (now not written, and not merely spoken, but transformed into behaviour, enacted) of a text of Hamlet – is no longer a textual thing, even if, in the Geertzian sense, we can metaphorically textualize it for interpretation.12 Alluding to an image I have found useful in conceptualizing the ways writing is used in performances, Schalkwyk shrewdly observes that, if the performance uses the text as material (something to work on), then it is not quite left behind: “the language that makes up the text of Hamlet, however re-fashioned, shaped, appropriated, changed, pared down or expanded in production remains embodied in and through the performance” (53). Replacing “text” with “language” does much less work than it may appear here, for “language” is not embodied by performance: words are taken up, used in a densely corporeal activity to fashion an act of which the words are only a part. Of course, Hamlet has a semantic dimension, and to this degree it provides different challenges and opportunities than a pine plank (though the intersection of these challenges might be said to lie at the heart of Tom Stoppard’s play Dogg’s Hamlet). And yet, creating performative force with Hamlet’s language involves working it into something else: even some words will gain new meanings that exist only onstage as action. (In Hamlet, “enseaméd bed”, which means [or meant in 1600] “greasy”, now is typically performed and heard to mean “ensemened”, the word Mel Gibson actually speaks in Zeffirelli’s film; Olivier substituted “lascivious”, proving the point, I think.) According to the text, Hamlet will kill Claudius at the end of the play, but will the performance of “Hamlet killing Claudius” enact justice, retribution, revenge, or just more of Elsinore’s casual slaughter? Language, some language, is borne into performance, but that language is transformed into something that is not essentially verbal, not inherently “textual” – however “iterable, conventional” it may be as behaviour (54) – and not derivable from the text alone. Acting is not speaking by the card: the deed will be created in its doing.
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Even if we understand the script as a kind of illocutionary encyclopaedia, a “variety of iterable speech acts” (54), the language of a play is transformed into something else; rather than seizing the text (or the “language” that makes it up) as something the performance appropriates or imposes on, the sense that dramatic performance instrumentalizes the text, using it every evening as part of the means of making this performance, is better captured by a different image, the text-as-tool. What do we want to do with this text, what work do we want to accomplish with it, what work can we accomplish with it? What designers call the “affordance” of a given tool is partly given by its material properties, and partly given by the demands we make of it when we use it, deploy it within one of the dense structures of human work we could term “technology”. A screwdriver has specific properties – it is flat-headed or Phillips, long or short, and so on – but the work we can make it perform, its “affordance”, arises in a specific scene of objectives and relations. Yes, a screwdriver has “purposiveness” I suppose (53), but that imagined purpose may be more relevant when driving a screw than when hotwiring a car, where the affordance of the blade, its ability to do the job, is measured by the diameter of the starter cylinder rather than by the dimensions of the screw slot. Thinking about dramatic texts as tools points to a long-recognized aspect of dramatic performance, the fact that new theatrical technologies (the proscenium, rehearsing from print, electricity, moveable scenery, the royal box, plumbing, Method acting, live-feed digital video) enable old plays to do previously unimagined work in ways that redefine them as tools for performance (it took some time for us to understand the cellular phone as a small computer, the alphanumeric keypad as a linguistic instrument, or to find this affordance as essential to its identity as a “tool”). This instrumental character of dramatic writing, its agency in Burke’s terms, is particularly visible in the history of performance; once a particular affordance is discovered, it tends to persist, despite Schalkwyk’s dismissive sense that “a tool is something one discards (or puts aside or hangs up) after it has been used for the technologically designated purpose” (53). Locked out of the car – coathanger; blown electrical fuse – penny; chair too low for the table – telephone book: the object world is full of tools some of whose affordances have been orphaned by changing technologies, new door locks, circuit breakers, the internet. Yet for a while, at least, coathangers and pennies and phone books trail these erstwhile capacities, much as Hamlet still trails an Oedipal affordance pioneered or at least popularized in performance by Olivier. Since I am not “against texts”, I would say that dramatic writing retains the potentialities we discover for its use: once you’ve hotwired a car, you never look at a screwdriver the same
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way again, and after Brook or Luhrmann or Almereyda we see new capacities for A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Romeo and Juliet, or Hamlet, new ways to do the work of performance with these texts. The metaphors – material, tool – are incompatible, but complementary, dramatizing not only the “incorrigible ambiguity of the term ‘text’” (54), but the dynamic, transformational work that happens to and with writing in performance. As material, the text is worked on and worked into the performance, made into something no longer essentially verbal in its construction, an event; as a tool, the text provides a critical agency, one instrument among many for making the performance. In the Western tradition, dramatic writing is part of the “embodied, powerful, but fleeting and unstable, event of community that is exclusive to the theatre” (72). I do not quite think that Shakespeare performance studies is or should be imagined as anticipating the shape of those events or be limited to accounting for the engagement of that distinctive community. Like the range of “literary criticism”, the critique of Shakespeare performance is more broadly concerned with the ways – historical, theoretical, conceptual, practical – Shakespeare has been produced, has been imagined, has been made to work, or might be made to work in the cultures of performance. A concern for the purposes of Shakespeare performance studies is also traced out in Robert Weimann’s bold effort to set the critique of Shakespeare and performance on a new and more productive course. First, he reviews contemporary anxieties about the relationship between writing and performing, both in the sphere of Shakespeare and in the sometimes contestatory field of performance studies, arguing that the dual identity of drama – arising first in the “largely untested encounter of literature and theatre as two different institutions, two different modes of cultural production”13 – in the early modern period has continued to mark contemporary efforts to liberate performance from a merely ministerial role. This historical perspective enables a shrewd observation: that the disciplinary struggles surrounding the function of dramatic writing in performance working around the edges both of Shakespeare studies and of performance studies in the past decade have their own historicity. Sidestepping the disciplinary politics that have beset this debate, Weimann seizes more directly on the emergence – on stage and in scholarship – of a “non-representational concept of performance” generally “at odds with the theatre as an institutionalized site of rendering dramatic images of characters in worldly circumstances” (8). Deftly refusing merely to engage in the “rash reversal of hierarchies” (13) characteristic of some more polemical writing (including my own), Weimann instead proposes to take the “Bi-fold authority” (Troilus and Cressida, 5.2.144; 13 above) of “Shakespeare’s theatre” as paradigmatic – resisting, in other words a vision
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of a strictly “ministerial” or “magisterial” conception of the relationship of performance to writing. Refusing, then, to “sanction any absolute resistance of performance to textual modes of signification” (13), while at the same time refusing to sanction the inherent dominion of textual to theatrical modes of signification in the sphere of dramatic performance, Weimann suggests that the Shakespeare theatre, evincing “an unprecedented degree of interpenetration between writing and playing” (15), provides a paradigm of performance, at least a paradigm for those forms of performance using writing as one instrument of performing. Shakespeare, our performance (studies) contemporary. To stand back from the essay slightly, we might say that Weimann proposes to rethink the text/performance problematic in ways that – emulating the open field of early modern theatricality – refuse to frame the question as a simple binarism. Instead, given that a “revolution in relations of text and performance is occurring under our own eyes” (15), he takes seriously the sense that dramatic performance works with writing in ways that cannot be anticipated from the writing itself. This is to take neither the “ministerial” nor the “magisterial” position, but a more difficult one, asking how performance, neither “liberated” from nor inscribed within the text, deploys writing within the changing social technology of theatrical performance. It is salutary, I think, that Weimann turns to contemporary German theatre here. Not only is there “reason to believe that on the Continent the preoccupation with performance-oriented productions of Shakespeare is most prominent and most virulent” (15), but these performances – unlike performances that implicitly gesture toward the authority of the text by framing Shakespeare in an ersatz realism – directly engage the question, Weimann’s question, our question, of the work writing affords in performance today, when both digital and social technologies are exploring newly liminal relations between writing and performance. Placing Shakespeare on the horizon of contemporary performance, then, Weimann asks not what performance has to say about Shakespeare’s writing (a question only writing can answer), but what kind of work we understand Shakespearean writing to afford in those forms of theatre most attentive to the critical work of performance today. Tracking Benno Besson, Heiner Müller, and Peter Handke through the light of Brecht, Artaud, and Grotowski, Weimann locates the contemporary use of Hamlet as part of a wider critique of representational theatre, a theatre in which the actor’s task is taken to be already prescribed in the writing, a genre perhaps cognate with “Shakespeare performance” for some audiences. More to the point, he raises the question of the extent to which contemporary communication technologies, in their ideological work, retrain and reprivilege the senses, notably affecting a “shift
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from letters to pictures, from reading to viewing, from verbal to pictorial perception. In this momentous move two media in the theatre are vitally involved.” And yet, “If on contemporary stages, language and show, text and performance experience a reversal in the order of which is magisterial and which is ministerial it appears only appropriate for Shakespeare’s plays in mise-enscène to put up some resistance”, at least insofar as the “pre-representational heritage” of Shakespeare’s plays appears to encode a dialectical encounter with performance that should prevent the “Shakespearean text” from being reduced to “a ministerial element in the production” (25). I am sympathetic to the notion that writing resists the mise-en-scène, and also drawn to the sense that, as a tool, writing generates friction in the mode of production, resists being merely dissolved, creates resistance as a means of doing work. Shakespeare’s texts generated this resistance in their original theatre – the boy actor’s ridicule of squeaking Cleopatras is just one sign of this friction; I would only add that the kind of resistance they provide is a function of the work we ask them to do, an affordance arising in our understanding of the mutual interplay between writing and the mise-en-scène. Since the mise-en-scène is always changing, changing in how it understands its instruments, and changing in its imagination of presentation and representation, I’m not certain that this “heritage” – if it is encoded in texts rather than in our means of employing them – is recoverable as performance. Indeed, while digital technologies have massively reordered the practices of visual, verbal, and inscribed communications, it is also possible that they have alerted us to conceptual instabilities that have been there all along. Perhaps writing and performance cannot be adequately mapped along a ministerial/ magisterial axis, like the axis between dramatic representation and theatrical presentation, an accident of print culture. Although Weimann resists the notion of a ministerial Shakespeare, an instrumental Shakespeare perhaps sustains his critique of writing in the changing technology and changing sensorium of performance, captured in the evocative phrase “thick performative”: And yet, even here this non-derivative use of performance cannot be an absolute one. As we shall see, it assumes its greatest potential wherever a “thick” performative maintains its indigenous strength and independence in the midst of a wide spectrum of multiformity between the media of representation and bodily presence. (9 above)
What is “thick” performativity? I think we might have the sense of writing whose ability to become “performative” in a given realm of doing – the early modern stage, now – is “thick”, rich with opportunity evidently related to
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available practices of embodiment, acting, imagined doing. It might be noted that this “thickness” has nothing necessarily to do with literary complexity: there are many elegant, beautiful, complex texts, even dramatic texts, for which the modern theatre has little use, plays which do not seem to afford enactment, to enable an event to assume the (troubled) status of illocution in the theatre, words transformable into signifying events. So, too, there are performative structures that no longer work for us, no longer render writing “thick” with performative force. For us, it seems, adult, female Cleopatras are “thicker” with performative potentiality, more capable of using the text as a means to framing a richly evocative act, than boys. Although Weimann points to the ineluctably non-representational dimension of theatre (most of what we see happening onstage is happening, doing as well as representing something else), a mimetic or representational vision of Shakespeare performance is still very much with us, thickly enough: so many outdoor Dreams among the pines and mosquitoes.14 But theatre is no longer on the cusp of traditional modes of nontheatrical performance, and the question Weimann proposes has to do with the longevity of Shakespeare, the sense that transformations in the technology of theatre will necessarily transform our understanding of its tools, its instruments. Understanding these transformations means not only considering the work engaged by new technologies onstage, but interrogating the shape of acting, the practice of directing, the uses of writing as it develops in our theatre today, when stage performance is constantly in dialogue with media spectacle, film, television, all the tiny performances happening on your iPhone. Taken together, these essays open out toward several observations on the critical terrain of Shakespeare performance studies today. First, textuality and performance are institutional; early modern theatre companies had rope dancers, contemporary companies hire a video editor. Moreover, how texts function in different conceptions of performance identifies what texts are and what work they can do in different conceptions of theatre. Second, the disciplines of performance scholarship need to be porous and interactive, which is not quite the same thing as being interdisciplinary or antidisciplinary. Weimann several times brings recent scholarship on early modern theatricality to bear on a wider critique of performance, work known at best only to specialists in the period, and likely best known to scholars mainly working in “literature”. Yet much as theatre and performance studies have used a range of non-literary genres to expand and clarify our understanding of performance, so too the range of performance falling generally under the heading of “dramatic” or “theatrical” provides a rich and diverse archive of practice, an archive barely
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mined by the theoretical inquiry of performance studies. Third, Weimann’s essay also reviews one of the most contentious sites on the border between literature, theatre, and performance: authority. Authority in the theatre is a relatively modern notion, assigned to the playwright in the era of expanding literacy (print), now assigned to the director in much theatre. I recently saw a production of a new play, Architecting by TEAM (Theatre of the Emerging American Moment) that blended several narratives – hurricane Katrina, Gone with the Wind, architecture – in a performance that shifted seamlessly among them, in effect foregrounding the complexity, even the opacity, of its authorizing gestures. Hans-Thies Lehmann has considered performances that, in his words, “de-dramatize” both the play and the event; here, we might say that the event works to “de-dramatize” some assumptions about scripted dramatic performance.15 Finally, the field itself: what kind of talking are we doing when we’re talking about that slice of theatre called “Shakespeare performance”. If we imagine the “reach of performance criticism”16 to be either the predication of performance on some richly imagined textual critique, or the mere documentation of performances, then the game is surely lost. These are the purposes that have been assigned to the critique of dramatic performance from Granville Barker onward, and there is often more than a hint of antitheatrical animus when they are reasserted, as they frequently are today. But while historical reconstruction or the imagined articulation of performance possibilities are both engaging, neither is really at the centre of what we might imagine Shakespeare performance studies to be about. A much more dynamic vision emerges here in Robert Weimann’s simultaneous contemplation of past and present, text and performance, actor’s voice and author’s pen: a sense that when writing and theatre happen together, a range of significant cultural effects arise, thick performativities thick with the potential to unbind the constraints of text and performance. Notes 1. David Schalkwyk, “Text and Performance Reiterated: A Reproof Valiant or Lie Direct?”, Chapter 4 above, 47–75; hereafter cited by page number in parenthesis. 2. In addition to the texts cited in Schalkwyk’s essay, I have in mind several pieces in which I was concerned to address the problems of conceptualizing the uses of writing in performance: “Disciplines of the Text / Sites of Performance”, TDR: The Drama Review – The Journal of Performance Studies 39, no. 1(T-145, Spring 1995): 13–28; “Drama, Performativity, and Performance,” PMLA 113 (1998): 1093–107; “Antigone’s Bones”, TDR: The Drama Review – The Journal of Performance Studies 52, no. 3
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(T-199, Fall 2008): 10–33. I have also considered the materiality of writing and its consequences for the imagining of performance in Print and the Poetics of Modern Drama (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 3. Robert Weimann, “Performance in Shakespeare’s Theatre: Ministerial and/or Magisterial?” Chapter 1 above, 3–29. 4. Michael D. Bristol, Big-time Shakespeare (London: Routledge, 1996), 61, 52. 5. See Joseph Roach, Cities of the Dead: Circum-Atlantic Performance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) on surrogation; on restored behaviour, see Richard Schechner, “Restoration of Behavior”, in Between Theater and Anthropology (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 35–116. 6. David Schalkwyk, Speech and Performance in Shakespeare’s Sonnets and Plays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 10, 49. 7. By “speech” here and elsewhere, I mean to suggest that acting in the theatre is not merely delivering lines in speech, as though merely uttering the words prescribed by Shakespeare is what constitutes Shakespeare performance. Although scripted language is used, the transmission of words is subordinated to the behavioural systems that are used to transform scripts into acts, acting, theatre. The distinction between acting (using scripted language to perform an act) and speaking (recitation) is an important one, and should – despite Schalkwyk’s reservations (“Text and Performance”, 52) – be kept in mind when we are trying to locate the sphere of dramatic performance as opposed to other performative uses of Shakespearean writing. I return to this issue below. 8. Aristotle, Poetics 1448a, trans. M.E. Hubbard, in Classical Literary Criticism, ed. D.A. Russell and Michael Winterbottom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 53. Gerald Else’s translation perhaps offers a slightly different emphasis: “with all the persons who are performing the imitation acting, that is carrying on for themselves.” Aristotle, Poetics, trans. Gerald F. Else (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970), 18. 9. I cite from Hamlet, ed. Ann Thompson and Neil Taylor (London: Arden, 2006). 10. J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, ed. J.O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 22. 11. Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (1945; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969). 12. For a fuller articulation of this perspective, see Benjamin Bennett, All Theater is Revolutionary Theater (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 13. Weimann, “Performance in Shakespeare’s Theatre”, 3. Subsequent refences in parenthesis are to this essay. 14. On the relationship between representational and non-representational dimensions of performance, see Erika Fischer-Lichte, The Transformative Power of Performance: A New Aesthetics, trans. Saskya Iris Jain (London: Routledge, 2008), chap. 1. 15. Hans-Thies Lehmann, Postdramatic Theatre, trans. Karen Jürs-Munby (London: Routledge, 2006), 74. 16. Schalkwyk, “Text and Performance”, 72.
6 Author’s Voice? Acting with Authority in Early References to Shakespeare William N. West
Yet take Dicke Tarlton once for thyne Authour … – Tarltons Newes Out of Purgatorie 1
In Author’s Pen and Actor’s Voice: Playing and Writing in Shakespeare’s Theatre, Robert Weimann traces the fruitful tensions between two modes of presentation exploited on the Elizabethan stage, the textual authority of the playwright and the self-authorizing performative powers of the actor.2 I specify the “stage” because it was there, as Weimann demonstrates, that these positions were most fully shown in conversation: on its own terrain, after the theatres closed and as texts were established as the principal source for Shakespeare’s theatre, the impulse of print was generally to erase the other authority of performance.3 As Weimann has shown in his examinations of the variously bifold authority of the Elizabethan stage, many of which are revisited in Author’s Pen and Actor’s Voice, it is precisely the competition of forces and the deployment of multiple and conflicting resources in Elizabethan playing that allowed its unprecedented capacity to represent, reproduce, and reshape the lived and imagined worlds of experience.4 As Weimann acknowledges, though, in early modern England the authority of the playwright was no more culturally legitimate than that of the player. While the playwright’s written words shared the authoritative, textual medium of traditional learning used by the church, the legal apparatus, and the universities, they could only mimic impotently an access to the power that supported such institutions. Recent scholarship has reiterated how unlike traditional texts, whether in print or manuscript, playhouse texts were in their 93
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construction, and what efforts were required to make them into the sort of Works that Ben Jonson was ambitious to publish, or that John Hemminges and Henry Condell were eager to publish on Shakespeare’s behalf.5 Thomas Bodley’s famous exclusion of playbooks from the library he founded at Oxford in 1605 is another reminder of how far this kind of writing was from already established sources of authority, and when John Foxe allied playing with preaching and printing as the Reformers’ triple bulwark against Rome, he was more interested in the power of the actors’ share than the playwrights’, whom he does not mention.6 In the early years of public playhouses, playwrights like Robert Greene, who identified himself with the universities as a “Master of Arts”, and the anonymous scripters of plays and pamphlets against Martin Marprelate had to wrest what authority they could from the existing institutions of church, state, and university with which they cooperated and contended.7 While public playing developed a complex set of relations with such institutions over the sixteenth century, the contests between poet and player that Weimann explores in Author’s Pen and Actor’s Voice were primarily local ones, fought out within the playhouses and playing companies rather than at large, with neither side privileged by any authority that they did not first appropriate for themselves. Much of the manifest power of playing was predicated on the notion that players and playwrights spoke with a shared lack of authority relative to the world outside the theatres. They were authorized but unauthoritative – permitted to speak and act, but not officially credited as sources of truth or knowledge.8 How, then, did marginal figures like these gain an authority of their own, one that, if not proper to them, was at least theirs to deploy? The conflict between poet and player that Weimann’s study details came to delineate a new ground of authority beside the recognized ones of church, law, and university, all of which claimed to draw their authority in varying ways from a textual tradition that they upheld and continued. Recognizing this casts some of the intestine broils of the profession of playing (the War of the Theatres, the rivalry of boys’ and men’s companies, even the contributions of Kemp and Shakespeare to the Chamberlain’s Men) in a different light: like modern political pundits, playing companies developed their power to speak by pitting it not against existing powers, but against each other. These skirmishes are not struggles to control authority that already exists, but an unintentionally cooperative effort to produce a new authority to speak and play beyond what was authorized to them. In the case of Elizabethan players’ pens and voices, the struggle itself is in part what produced the authority, since the contest implied that the prize for which it was fought must already be in existence. As Weimann amply shows,
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the authority that could be assumed to lodge in mere textuality, and in the Shakespearean text in particular, would come later – as the result of struggles distinct from those before the closing of the playhouses in 1642. Weimann’s study reminds us that for playing, at least, authority was not given but redirected from a variety of sources and capacities. Here I wish to focus on some particular passages that scholars have frequently returned to in trying to understand the particular authority of Shakespeare, and more generally of Elizabethan playwrights, during the period in which they were first making their plays. I will argue that these comments, from a variety of sources and seemingly independent of each other, are in fact better understood as attempts from a number of different directions to grasp a system of dramatic production that had no immediate institutional or traditional authority on which to rely, and yet seemed able to act with authority as if on behalf of nearly any institution whatsoever – authoritative, countercultural, disenfranchised, nationalist, even those that as yet had no proper names. What we might call criticism of individual playwrights and plays – descriptive appraisals of them rather than mere mentions, praises, or condemnations – is scarce in Elizabethan documents, and Shakespeare is no exception. Clear evaluations, for good or bad, of Shakespeare’s work in the theatre from his lifetime (rather than echoes of it, or expressions of attitudes towards his non-dramatic poems) are almost scant enough to be counted on one hand. They also tend to be frustratingly thin in their descriptions: he is “honey-tongued” (in the sources by Meres and Weever) or “honey-flowing” (Barnfield); his writing is “sweet” (Covell, Barnfield, the second and third Parnassus plays) or “sugared” (Meres and Weever again). If it can “please the wiser sort” (Harvey) as well as “please all” (Scoloker), perhaps that is because Shakespeare is a Johannes fac totum (Greene).9 The consistency of these observations suggests either an unusually single-minded reception of Shakespeare’s works – perhaps the more surprising to modern readers, who most often admire Shakespeare’s myriad-mindedness and polyvocality – or, by the same token, a petrified convention linking “sweet” and “Shakespeare” that substitutes for more varied or nuanced descriptions of what Shakespeare’s plays and poems are like. To consider the very early history of Shakespearean praise and blame raises the question of how to understand the structures of evaluation at work in the few surviving instances. As critics coming on the heels of three centuries in which Shakespeare has been central to the definitions of English literature, dramatic power, and psychological richness, we risk being misled by what can look like a steady history of talking about and, mostly, admiring Shakespeare. The (apparent, anyway) sameness of our pleasures and
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those of Shakespeare’s contemporaries glosses over what may be different in those responses. There have, in fact, been different ways to like or dislike the figure currently known as “Shakespeare”. Many passages traditionally understood as positive appraisals of Shakespeare, like the ones I have cited, do not comment at all on the subject of “Shakespeare” as it has almost automatically been conceived since the late eighteenth century – that is, as a particular author of unique skill.10 They may speak to his popularity or to the wide distribution of his works in print or on stage, but even this is hard to gauge.11 Read with other comments on playing in the period, in fact, I want to argue that many of what we have understood as allusions to Shakespeare – that is, passages that can tell us something about the author we call Shakespeare, or even something about the works of the author we call Shakespeare – in fact are trying to say something different. They suggest concepts of identity, authorship, and authority other than those presupposed by the Shakespere Allusion-Book or by the contemporary critical practice of searching for allusions. It would be strange, of course, if Shakespeare had appeared in the 1590s already somehow equipped for the role he would play in the imaginative history of the next four hundred years. But works of scholarship on Shakespeare have shown a tendency to collect these early references to Shakespeare and his works as if they had anticipated their subject’s afterlife. Like many references to playing in general during the period, these familiar passages address instead the question of authority, that is, the problem of determining to whom the words and actions of the theatres belong. What I take to be the usual modern understanding of what it means to be an author is of course a writer, but more specifically a pre-scriber, one who originates a text to which other texts may respond, and especially correspond. The modern author has a literal priority over others; his or her words come before readers, interpreters, or actors, and their activities presuppose his or hers. This set of assumptions meets, if it does not actually derive from, Hobbes’ definition of the role in Leviathan (1650): Of Persons Artificiall, some have their words and actions Owned by those whom they represent. And then the Person is the Actor, and he that owneth his words and actions, is the Author: in which case the Actor acteth by Authority. For that which in speaking of goods and possessions, is called an Owner, and in latine Dominus, in Greeke kúrioς; speaking of Actions, is called Author.12
Author’s Voice?
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An author, then, is the first mover of actions, and the point to which they ultimately refer. Actors are intermediaries for them who carry out their instructions. When I talk here about the problem of “authorship”, or, better, “authority”, I am shifting the use of either word metaphorically to address questions that are specifically theatrical rather than textual. That is, I want to consider the ways in which, in the playhouses of Elizabethan England, words and gestures were (or were not) attributed to certain people as sources of origin, and were instead attached to other kinds of persons (those we call characters), or even to particular ways of speaking or behaving, which Elizabethans called “veins”. My aim is to demetaphorize the question and ask “What does it matter who is speaking?”, where speaking is taken literally.13 By making, or undoing, this metaphorical slide from writing to speaking, I want to try to revise the almost inevitably textual bases on which we establish or critique authorship, which Weimann has surveyed in Author’s Pen and Actor’s Voice. My observation of the diffused nature of theatrical authority is nothing new. It has served as a kind of concealed double of authorship studies of drama, most of which acknowledge the collaborative nature of theatrical production, thus allowing the problem of authority in playing to be first recognized and then set aside. To take only one representative example, G.E. Bentley observes: Every performance in the commercial theatres from 1590 to 1642 was itself essentially a collaboration: it was the joint accomplishment of dramatists, actors, musicians, costumers, prompters (who made alterations in the original manuscript) and – at least in the later theatres – of managers.14
Most scholars after him have taken this as a starting point, even if they have then turned their attention to other problems.15 But I contend that the centrality of the player in conveying the words of what we now call Elizabethan theatre, and the prominence of the player in the imaginations of Elizabethan playgoers, make the general modern understanding of what an author is, of who speaks and why it matters, rather different, and considerably more complex, than we generally acknowledge. Some of the earliest commentators on Shakespeare were less quick than more recent ones to move on after noticing how playing distributed and allocated authority.16 Greenes Groats-worth of Wit (1592), which purports to be the last mortal reflections of the pamphleteer and playwright Robert Greene, contains the first notice we have of Shakespeare’s career in the playhouses:
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THE SHAKESPEAREAN INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK: 10 for there is an vpstart Crow, beautified with our feathers, that with his Tygers hart wrapt in a Players hyde, supposes he is as well able to bombast out a blanke verse as the best of you: and beeing an absolute Iohannes fac totum, is in his owne conceit the onely Shake-scene in a countrey.17
The pun on Shakespeare’s name in “Shake-scene” and the distorted quotation from his 3 Henry VI – “A tiger’s heart wrapped in a woman’s hide” (1.4.137) – seem to clinch the identification.18 But Greene is not necessarily saying anything at all about writing, not the least reason for which is that the play (so far as we know) was not yet printed.19 His question seems to be the much more practical problem of who is speaking: when I hear words like these, to whom should they be credited, how, and with what consequences? This passage is from Greene’s open letter at the end of the pamphlet warning three other “Gentlemen his Quondam acquaintance, that spend their wits in making plaies” ([E4v]) not to trust the players’ companies and to give up their professions as writers for them. Only two sentences before the one about Shakespeare, Greene describes players in terms very similar to those he uses for the upstart crow: “those Puppets (I meane) that spake from our mouths, those Anticks garnisht in our colours” (Fv). Here, though, his complaint is not against unlettered authors who usurp the position of educated ones, but against actors who, perhaps ungratefully, perhaps merely unworthily, take up language that has been given to them by writers. Greene seems less to be picking out a rival than noting the possibility of a rivalry for authorship and authority between those who compose lines and those who perform them. Greene’s words “Shake-scene” and “bombast” sound more aural or performative than graphic, as does a similar phrase from Thomas Nashe’s preface to Greene’s Menaphon, which objects to those “who (mounted on the stage of arrogance) think to outbrave better pens with the swelling bombast of a bragging blank verse”.20 Again, it is hard to be sure, but it sounds like