The Search for a Common European Foreign and Security Policy: Leaders, Cognitions, and Questions of Institutional Viability (Advances in Foreign Policy Analysis)

Advances in Foreign Policy Analysis Series Editor: Alex Mintz Foreign policy analysis offers rich theoretical perspectives and diverse methodological approaches. Scholars specializing in foreign policy analysis produce a vast output of research. Yet, there are only very few specialized outlets for publishing work in the field. Addressing this need is the purpose of Advances in Foreign Policy Analysis. The series bridges the gap between academic and policy approaches to foreign policy analysis, integrates across levels of analysis, spans theoretical approaches to the field, and advances research utilizing decision theory, utility theory, and game theory. Members of the Board of Advisors: Allison Astorino-Courtois Steve Chan Margaret Hermann Valerie Hudson Patrick James Jack Levy

Zeev Maoz Bruce M. Russett Donal Sylvan Steve Walker Dina A. Zinnes Betty Hanson

Published by Palgrave Macmillan: Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making Edited by Alex Mintz Studies in International Mediation Edited by Jacob Bercovitch Media, Bureaucracies, and Foreign Aid: A Comparative Analysis of United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Japan By Douglas A. Van Belle, Jean-Sébastien Rioux, and David M. Potter Civil-Military Dynamics, Democracy, and International Conflict: A New Quest for International Peace By Seung-Whan Choi and Patrick James Economic Sanctions and Presidential Decisions: Models of Political Rationality By A. Cooper Drury Purpose and Policy in the Global Community By Bruce Russett Modeling Bilateral International Relations: The Case of U.S.-China Interactions By Xinsheng Liu

Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics: Methods and Applications of Operational Code Analysis Edited by Mark Schafer and Stephen G. Walker Approaches, Levels and Methods of Analysis in International Politics Edited by Harvey Starr The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein: Deciding on Conflict By Alex Roberto Hybel and Justin Matthew Kaufman Nationalism in International Relations: Norms, Foreign Policy, and Enmity By Douglas Woodwell The Search for a Common European Foreign and Security Policy: Leaders, Cognitions, and Questions of Institutional Viability By Akan Malici

THE SEARCH FOR A COMMON EUROPEAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY LEADERS, COGNITIONS, AND QUESTIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL VIABILITY

Akan Malici

THE SEARCH FOR A COMMON EUROPEAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

Copyright © Akan Malici, 2008. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2008 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–0–230–60446–9 ISBN-10: 0–230–60446–3 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Malici, Akan, 1974– The search for a common European foreign and security policy : leaders, cognitions, and questions of institutional viability / Akan Malici. p. cm.—(Advances in foreign policy analysis) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–230–60446–3 1. European Union countries—Foreign relations. 2. National security—European Union countries. 3. European Union—Foreign relations. I. Title. JZ1570.A5M36 2008 341.24292—dc22

2007035416

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: April 2008 10

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Printed in the United States of America.

CONTENTS

List of Figures

vii

List of Tables

ix

Preface

xi

List of Abbreviations

xv

Part I 1

2

The Argument

Political Leadership and Security Integration

3

The Argument in Brief The Institutional Evolution of European Security The Institutional Problematique Relevance Plan of the Book

5 7 12 14 15

A Cognitive Theory of Institutional Viability

17

Leaders and International Institutions Institutions as Shared Mental Models Forming Mental Models Discerning Mental Models Manifestations of Mental Models

18 20 23 25 27

Part II

The Cases

3 The Kosovo War The Origins of the Kosovo Crisis Internationalization of the Conf lict Mental Models in the Kosovo Crisis France

37 37 42 45 48

vi

4

5

CON T EN TS

Great Britain Germany Conclusion

54 61 67

The Afghanistan War

71

The Origins of the War Internationalization of the Conf lict Mental Models After 9/11 France Great Britain Germany Conclusion

71 76 79 81 87 94 99

The Iraq War

103

The Origins of the Iraq Crisis Internationalization of the Crisis Mental Models in the Iraq Crisis France Great Britain Germany Conclusion

103 108 112 114 120 129 136

Part III The Implications 6

Conclusions and Implications: A European Common Foreign and Security Policy? The Lessons of Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq The Crisis with Iran The Crisis with North Korea Theorizing Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy Questions of World Order

141 142 147 150 153 155

Notes

161

Bibliography

189

Index

217

LIST OF FIGURES

2.1

Map for Mental Models

28

2.2 Institutional Viability Continuum

29

3.1

Mental Models in the Kosovo Crisis

46

4.1

Mental Models after 9/11

79

5.1

Mental Models in the Iraq Crisis

112

6.1

European Mental Models in Three Security Situations

142

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LIST OF TABLES

2.1 Definition of the Problem Space

24

2.2

Steps in the Verbs in Context System (VICS)

26

2.3

Indices for Mental Model Propensities

27

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PREFACE

I

n a very insightful and excellent contribution to a recent volume titled Progress in International Relations Theory, Stephen Walker asked a rather simple question: “Do individual leaders matter?” He answers: “Intuitively, we sense that they do and, as citizens of a democratic society, we act as if they do.” This rhetorical question has guided my thinking about international relations in general and international relations theory in particular since I first read it. The answer that leaders matter in the conduct of international relations is sensible to most political observers, analysts, and political practitioners. It is, therefore, particularly surprising and puzzling that, traditionally, the grand theories of the discipline, such as neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, have very much favored the study of (amorphous) structures and rejected or ignored the study of (motivated) leaders. This rejection is not justified. It is equivalent to denying the sociopsychological character of politics and it leads to an impoverished understanding of politics. The relevance of asking questions about the cognitions of leaders is reinforced by the end of the cold war and even more so by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 a decade later. These events created nonroutine situations that required more than the application of standard operating procedures and established decision rules, not least because the new nature of international politics we are facing now tends to be highly ambiguous and open to a variety of interpretations. Politics are a human affair and so the problematization of humans should be centerstage in any theoretical effort. A similar insight is made by Douglass North in the context of institutions, the subject matter of this book. In his 1990 book Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, North explains that “Institutions are creations of human beings. They evolve and are altered by human beings; hence our theory must begin with the individual.” It is only plausible that this insight

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would apply not only to economic institutions, but also to security institutions. It is on these premises that I have approached the writing of this book as I aimed at developing a cognitive theory of institutional viability. European institutionalization efforts toward a common and foreign security policy (CFSP) seemed to be an interesting test case for this new theory. European states have succeeded with their unification efforts in the realm of economic policy and these efforts were guided and administered by an enormous institutional apparatus. Also in the area of foreign and security policy European states have created a considerable institutional apparatus. However, here the goals continue to remain an aspiration rather than a reality. My theory aims at explaining why institutions may or may not achieve their defined and established goals. In writing this book I also intended to advance two further goals. One goal is to advance and promote interparadigmatic thinking and theorizing. In the past international relations theorists have traditionally confined themselves to working within the boundaries dictated by their respective theoretical paradigm. That such theorizing is an obstacle to theoretical progress and empirical understanding was argued a long time ago by Alberto Hirschman in his compelling essay The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding. Nevertheless, paradigmatic thinking continued over the decades. This is unfortunate because paradigmatic theorizing has, by definition, limits. It is, therefore, more productive to do away with paradigmatic boundaries and search for areas of synthesis between various theoretical paradigms of the discipline. It is my firm conviction that progress in any paradigm is conditioned by the integration of insights from other paradigms and that it will lead to a more comprehensive and better understanding of the phenomena we are interested in. Finally, with this book I also intend to promote interdisciplinary approaches to the study of international politics. What applies to paradigms within scientific disciplines should also apply to the disciplines more generally. My theory is heavily inf luenced by insights gained in the discipline of social psychology and, to a lesser extent, sociology. An interdisciplinary approach is promising and important. Philosopher of Science Karl Popper has argued that the coexistence of various scientific disciplines represents (merely) a division of labor that is necessary because of the multidimensionality of (political) phenomena. Each discipline is thus only an artificial cutoff from a larger endeavor and it is this larger endeavor that aspires toward a comprehensive understanding of the issues researchers strive to explain. It follows, moreover, that each discipline by

P R E FAC E

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itself can only provide us with partial and, therefore, rather unsatisfactory answers. The prospects for more complete and satisfactory answers are given through interdisciplinary approaches. I have benefited enormously in the writing of this book from others. I am particularly grateful to Stephen Walker for provoking my interest in the cognitive study of leaders and motivating me contribute to a widening scholarly effort with the goal of “bringing leaders back in.” I want to thank Cooper Drury for his helpful comments and Michael Young for providing me with the necessary software for cognitive analysis of leaders. I also want to thank Toby Wahl for his very conscientious work as the editor and Alex Mintz for featuring my book in his Advances in Foreign Policy Analysis series at Palgrave Macmillan. Finally, I want to thank my wife Johnna for her help with everything relating to this book. More importantly, she continues to travel with me on a journey full of unseen places filled with unimaginable reward. This book is dedicated to my brother Agim Malici.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AEW AFP ALARM AMVs AP AWAC BBC CAP CDU CFSP CSCE DL DPA DPRK DW EC ECR EDC EDI EEC EPC ERRF EU EW FRY GDP GMP GNP HEU

Airborne Early Warning Agence France Presse Air launched Antiradiation Missiles Armored Military Vehicles The Associated Press Airborne Warning and Control British Broadcasting Corporation Combat Air Patrol Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union) Common Foreign and Security Policy Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe Liberal Democracy party (Democratie Liberale) Deutsche Presse Agentur Democratic People’s Republic of Korea North Korea Deutsche Welle European Community electronic combat and reconnaissance European Defence Community European Defence Identity European Economic Community European Political Cooperation program European Rapid Reaction Force European Union electronic warfare Federal Republic of Yugoslavia gross domestic product gross material product gross national product high enriched uranium

xvi

IAEA ISAF ISR ITAR-TASS KFOR KLA KSK LDK NAC NATO NBC NPT OAF OSCE PCF PGMs PPEWU RAF RPR SAS SEA TEU TLAM UAVs UFC UN UNMOVIC UNSCOM VICS WEU WMD

L I S T O F A B B R E V I AT I O N S

International Atomic Energy Agency International Security Assistance Force intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance Information Telegraph Agency of Russia-Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union Kosovo Force Kosovo Liberation Army Special Forces Command (Kommando Spezialkraefte) League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves) North Atlantic Council North Atlantic Treaty Organization nuclear, biological, and chemical (weapons) Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Operation Allied Force Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe French Communist Party (Parti Communiste Francais) precision-guided munitions Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit Royal Air Force Rassemblement pour la Republique Special Air Service Single European Act Treaty on European Union tomahawk land attack missiles unmanned aerial vehicles Uranium Conversion Facility United Nations UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission UN Special Commission on Iraq Verbs in Context System Western European Union Weapons of Mass Destructions

PART I

THE ARGUMENT

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CHAPTER 1

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND SECURITY INTEGRATION

T

he idea of European unity is fairly old. It can be traced back to Sully, Podierbrand, and perhaps even Charlemange and the Holy Roman Empire.1 However, with the end of the Second World War the idea of an union on the European continent took on new qualities of practicability and desirability. Writing in the early 1950s, the preeminent international relations scholar Hans Morgenthau regarded the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) as an attempt by the member states to compensate, through united effort, for the loss of power of the individual European nations.2 However, when reviewing the plans for the European Defence Community (EDC) set forth by Frenchman Jean Monnet, British prime minister Winston Churchill commented that it was a “sludgy amalgam.”3 Regarding the practice of European unity this vivid image applied for the years and decades to come and scholars continue trying to comprehend this amalgam. The elusiveness of European unity was further expressed pointedly by Henry Kissinger when he was U.S. secretary of state during the 1970s and posed the following question: “If I want to call Europe, what phone number do I use?”4 Kissinger’s implication was clear: although Europe was moving toward a union, in reality it was lacking the necessary coherence. Certainly, however, this was not true in the aftermath of the tragic and horrific terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. France, Great Britain, and Germany as the main forces within the European Union (EU) were quick to agree on a coherent strategic orientation against the Taliban regime and terrorist cells in Afghanistan. And even before the attacks some spectators noted that national differences in Europe are narrowing, describing the emergence of a European foreign policy as an “ineluctable

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trend,” and stating that the “center of gravity is moving towards greater, not lesser acceptance of the use of military force.”5 However, such conclusions turned out to be premature. Collaboration on the European continent regarding the war in Afghanistan gave way to discord with the onset of the crisis with Iraq and the subsequent war starting in March 2003. The lack of European cohesion motivated U.S. secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld to split the community of European states into “New Europeans” and “Old Europeans.” Having apparently understood the new geopolitical realities and asserting itself in an aggressive foreign policy, Great Britain stood out as the most prominent “new European.” Displaying a hesitancy to follow suit and advocating a continuation of political means as instruments of conf lict resolution, Germany and France were the most prominent “old Europeans.”6 This fundamental disagreement among these three most important EU members over the war in Iraq illustrated that Europe still does not have one phone number and that its members continue to search for a coherent European foreign and security policy. Past research has accompanied this search. Here one often finds descriptive studies that focus on tracing the EU’s foreign policy behavior and assessing its performance in the international system. In particular, these studies tend to assess the Union’s ambitions for a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) on the basis of its policy output and more often than not, the EU seems to come up short in these assessments.7 As one observer wrote, “International crises have a habit of embarrassing the European Union.”8 There are also many analytical studies about Europe’s arrangements toward CFSP and these studies often build on classic institutional theory. Most prominently, scholars have argued that the EU is a complex political and legal phenomenon and they have spent much time discussing and investigating these aspects.9 Many instances of institutional viability or lack thereof are ascribed to the structural factors inherent to the EU. The recommendations that follow subsequently focus on questions of how to improve or amend its institutional design. There are limits to this line of argument. For international institutions to be effective their injunctions, directives and prescriptions have to be obeyed.10 Matters of institutional “obedience” are located on the national level and not within the institution. This insight requires a departure form conventional institutional theorizing with an emphasis on institutional features towards an emphasis on agential theorizing. This effort must be embedded in a framework carrying implications about questions of institutional viability.

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The Argument in Brief In this book I contend that while the institutional setup is certainly of importance, issues of institutional viability might be more accurately attributed to irreconcilable or harmonious national preferences that exist independently from apparent institutional merits or shortcomings. This would make giving primary attention to the nature of an institution superf luous.11 Diverging from past research on the EU, I argue that the manifestation of unity on the European continent is also, and perhaps even first and foremost, a cognitive phenomenon and it is here where much more attention is warranted. Having said this, this book is about European leaders. Hence the subtitle of the book Leaders, Cognitions, and Questions of Institutional Viability. This book considers the viability of international institutions—whether they achieve their established and defined goals or not—to be dependent not on considerations of institutional design, but on leaders and their cognitions. I am focusing on the French, British, and German leadership because it is they who can be held accountable for much of the apparent successes and failures regarding a coherent European foreign and security policy.12 I argue that these cannot be understood accurately without examining the cognitions of these leaders and that otherwise they will remain elusive. My approach begins with two simple but crucial insights: First, although CFSP ambitions of EU member states are often articulated by common institutions of the EU, in the final analysis they are intergovernmental in character and not supranational. In this issue area the EU possesses no sovereignty by which it could implement or enforce any institutional goals. CFSP ambitions, therefore, rely on more or less voluntary national decisions and contributions. From this assessment it follows that an analysis of nationally held preferences is analytically prior to institutional features and characteristics. However, the problematization of institution-constituting agents must be undertaken within a unified framework with clear implications for the relative viability of an institution. Toward this end, my approach is inspired by the tradition of comparative foreign policy analysis and a conceptualization of international institutions as shared mental models.13 This is meritorious because of a further simple recognition, namely that international institutions are built to manage decision problems external to the institution and these decision problems often do not speak for themselves. Long-ago sociologist Max Weber argued that agents “take a deliberate attitude towards the world and lend it significance.”14 Weber’s insight was echoed later by scholars working in the area of foreign policy analysis where, for example, Arnold Wolfers has

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argued that “factors external to the actor can become determinants only as they affect the mind, the heart, and the will of the decision maker.”15 Similarly, Harold and Margaret Sprout have argued that policy choices are made by decisionmakers and external factors are related to these decisions only by being perceived and taken into account in the policymaking process.16 However, to what degree institution-constituting agents lend significance to externalities and to what degree and in what way they perceive them are empirical questions. They must be answered before any questions about institutional viability can be addressed. The answers to these questions stand at the core of an understanding of international institutions as shared mental models. Mental models are cognitive representations of reality, which actors build in their minds as they are faced with decision problems such as uncertain policy options, latent or imminent security threats. More specifically, a mental model is an actor’s “definition of the situation” with diagnostic propensities about a particular decision problem and prescriptive propensities towards the decision problem. My central argument in this book is that institutional viability increases as its constituting actors share a cognitive agreement about an external decision problem and vice versa. These cognitive agreements and disagreements of leaders are independent of an institution’s claimed and aspired goals such as unity in the area of foreign and security policy. This is not to say that institutions are epiphenomenal, but that their viability depends to a considerable degree upon the relative compatibility of their constituting actors’ mental models.17 At the base of this interdisciplinary approach stands a conviction that all politics, be it domestic politics or international politics, are a sociopsychological affair. Decisionmakers are not to be considered as passive agents who merely respond to environmental stimuli and institutional “demands” and “requirements.” Instead, they are to be viewed as selective agents responding to and actively shaping their environments— “problem solvers” who aim to make sense of a complex environment, and derive alternatives for decisions.18 Politics is then not merely governed by amorphous structures in which human beings find themselves, but shaped by human beings themselves. It follows that relevant actors must be problematized. Their perceptions of the political universe, events within it and prescriptions towards them, are an undeniable fact of politics. While this recognition has long been made by scholars working in the tradition of comparative foreign policy, their progress was ultimately arrested because they lacked the methodological toolkit to account systematically for variables that were considered to be important.19

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In this book I remedy this shortcoming. I use newly developed methods of cognitive analysis and systematically trace the diagnoses and prescriptions of the French, British, and German leadership over three security episodes that have occurred since the conclusion of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. This treaty concluded forty years of European efforts toward CFSP with the establishment of a European defence identity (EDI). Now, more than ever, the political spectator could legitimately expect a common stand of France, Great Britain, and Germany on external security issues in the following security episodes: the Kosovo War (1998–1999), the Afghanistan War (2001–2002), and the Iraq War (2003). My ultimate goal in examining these cases is to advance the study of international institutions by contributing a cognitive theory of institutional viability for assessing cooperation on security issues. The necessity of a new framework becomes even more evident against the backdrop of the historical institutionalization effort on the European continent toward CFSP. Admittedly, these institutions were weak and not well-developed in the beginning but over the decades the institutional infrastructure evolved to a substantial degree so that Europe ought to be able to move away from a “silent global player” in matters of security and defense and towards an openly assertive actor.20 In the remainder of this chapter I will provide a brief overview of this effort and conclude with a short discussion of Europe’s institutional problematique followed by an emphasis on the importance of studying the EU’s CFSP ambitions.21 The Institutional Evolution of European Security From the beginning it was French and German leaders who took the role of leading promoters in propelling the European project. French postwar president Charles de Gaulle clearly resented the de facto hegemony of the United States in Western Europe.22 Since his days, French policymakers intended European security to be a mainly European affair and, therefore, promoted a “European Europe” free from the directives of the United States and independent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).23 Their goal was, moreover, to represent, through their unswerving opposition to the prevailing bipolar order, a “third way” to other powers. It was thus not sufficient for Europe simply to exist, but it had to become an actor in its own right.24 The German postwar government under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer was less opposed to NATO when compared to French leadership, but equally enthusiastic about an emerging independent Europe. This enthusiasm in Germany did not change over the decades. Contrary

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to the fears of many in Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there would be no German Sonderweg, or a reorientation of German foreign policy toward power politics.25 Instead, political spectators observed a strong international, predominantly European, embeddedness of Germany.26 This commitment was made explicit by unification chancellor Helmut Kohl when he argued: “Germany is our fatherland, Europe our future.”27 Great Britain, as the third of the “big three,” initially presented itself as rather critical toward the European project, favoring an “Atlantic Europe” as opposed to a “European Europe,” which was the French preference.28 Exemplary here is Winston Churchill’s statement from May 1953 that the British are with but not of Europe. However, the British attitude of “cordial caution”29 toward the European project has gradually given way to increasing support over the decades. Both the John Major and Tony Blair governments located Great Britain “at the heart of Europe,”30 and at the turn of the century Tony Blair went even so far as to call for a “European superpower,” explaining that “Europe today is no longer just about peace. It is about projecting collective power.”31 The institutional evolution in Europe started with the Brussels Treaty in 1948, which ultimately led to the creation of the Western European Union (WEU) in the 1950s. France, Great Britain, and Germany along with Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Italy committed themselves to integration at the army group level.32 The WEU process established a ministerial council, a small secretariat, a consultative assembly, and an armaments agency. Its main function was to serve as a forum for foreign policy coordination of its member states. Subsequent implementation thereof, however, remained under the auspices of NATO, orchestrated predominantly by the United States. The WEU was, therefore, destined to be NATO’s junior sibling from its conception. 33 This subordinate relationship to NATO ultimately caused French president de Gaulle to go so far as to withdraw all French forces from NATO’s military integration and to terminate French participation in most bodies of NATO’s military organization.34 Despite this disappointment with the WEU, de Gaulle continued his efforts toward a European Europe. When in 1957 the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community (EEC), he aimed to move the community beyond an economic pact and initiated the Fouchet Plan.35 The plan envisioned the establishment of a common foreign and defense policy among the EEC members independent of the NATO agenda. To this end, the plan proposed the development of an autonomous European institutional infrastructure. The plan also suggested the creation

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of a council encompassing government leaders who would meet every quarter, as would the foreign ministers. Furthermore, it was proposed that a political committee, composed of senior foreign ministry representatives of the member states, would meet regularly to implement the council’s decisions. However, the cold war anxieties and fears of various European Governments led their respective leaders to prefer NATO over an alternative and yet to be established European construct. Nevertheless, although the Fouchet Plan ultimately failed, it remained important for two reasons. First, it specified the idea of an independent European foreign policy. Second, it suggested a concrete institutional infrastructure toward this end. After the passing of de Gaulle, his successors Georges Pompidou and Valery Giscard d’Estaing continued to work toward an independent European foreign and security policy.36 The project was given new momentum in 1969 at the Hague Summit in the Netherlands with the initiation of the European political cooperation (EPC) program.37 Beyond the launching of the enlargement process of the EEC and plans for monetary unification, foreign ministers considered strategies for political unification toward a “united Europe” that would make an international contribution “commensurate with its role and mission.” The EPC process installed an institutional mechanism which called for a series of biannual meetings between foreign ministers and senior Foreign Affairs Ministry officials so that the world might know that “Europe has a political vocation.”38 The meetings resulted in a host of declarations and suggestive procedures for policy coordination but they did not have the authority of binding directives. Another limitation was that coordination and subsequent cooperation were confined to the field of foreign policy, leaving out the realm of common defense.39 However, despite these confinements, EPC processes succeeded in paving the way to further integration and cooperation in the area of foreign policy.40 One important development here was the contribution it made to the Helsinki process in the 1970s. This was a multilateral set of negotiations concerned, among other things, with enhancing the political and economic aspects of security. These negotiations eventually produced the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).41 The next landmark was set through the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987. The Act formally established the EPC process as part of the European Community (EC). The fact that EPC and EC procedures were handled within a single legal framework was considered to be an important step.42 The act made the European Commission fully associated with EPC, and the European Parliament’s views were also to be taken into consideration. To increase the coherence of EPC, a permanent secretariat

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was installed and it would service both the foreign ministers and the commission.43 The act committed member states “to contribute together to [make] concrete progress towards European unity,”44 a “European foreign policy” and closer collaboration on defense and security issues.45 The addition of defense and security issues was a significant advance on its current areas of operation.46 The members also agreed to inform and consult each other on any foreign policy matters of general interest so as to ensure that their combined inf luence is exercised as effectively as possible through co-ordination, the convergence of their positions and the implementation of joint action.47

The Act noted the “responsibility incumbent upon Europe to aim at speaking with one voice and to act with consistency and solidarity in order more effectively to protect its common interests and independence.”48 The SEA thus represented the most elaborate manifestation of the European institutional momentum to date. Because of international events in the next years, it would be propelled even further. At the end of the 1980s, French president Francois Mitterrand and German chancellor Helmut Kohl worked together to conceptualize and publish several plans to develop the WEU into an alternative security framework largely independent from NATO. Their efforts were complemented by the waning of the cold war rivalry at the end of the 1980s and the onset of regional conf licts in the Middle East and in the Balkans. For many European Governments the concern arose that henceforth the United States, more than ever, could afford giving less importance to what was happening in Europe.49 For good or bad, this concern was confirmed by the leaders of the United States. In 1990, President George H.W. Bush commented: “We are not in Europe for the sake of the Europeans—we are in Europe for our own sake.”50 Subsequently, Secretary of State James Baker explained that the American position in 1991 was that the EC could handle the ensuing Yugoslav crisis and “most important, unlike in the Persian Gulf, [U.S.] vital national interests were not at stake.”51 Indeed, it appeared that the U.S. engagement could not be taken for granted any longer.52 At the same time the evolving crisis in the Bosnia region of Yugoslavia demonstrated Europe’s impotence. The changing security environment in Europe, and in particular the ensuing crisis in the Balkans, thus gave the European project a powerful new impulse. It provided the Mitterrand-Kohl tandem with the opportunity to include their plans of a transformation of EPC toward a more stringent CFSP project

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within the context of the EU.53 CFSP was established through the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, and it came into being on November 1, 1993.54 The CFSP project went far beyond the confines of its predecessors. It specified the institutional mechanisms further and in contrast to the regulations of EPC and SEA, European Governments agreed that CFSP declarations would be made not “on behalf of the EU and its member states” but on behalf of the “EU only.”55 The overall objective of the CFSP process is that the union asserts “its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy.”56 CFSP formally included all aspects of security policy with the addition of the EDI. This was seen as a “risk assurance” against potential military contingencies threatening European security in the future.57 To this end, the WEU is identified in the Maastricht Treaty as an “integral part of the development of the Union” and the “defence component of the Union.” 58 Thus, not only did the Maastricht Treaty represent a further development of the institutional infrastructure, but it also identified a concrete defense mechanism. CFSP was subsequently consolidated further through the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. European leaders re-emphasized the relationship to the WEU and stated that CFSP should include “all questions relating to the security of the Union.” The treaty also explicitly restated that these security competencies included “the progressive framing of a common defence policy.”59 To this end the treaty officially incorporated the so-called Petersberg Tasks, which had been negotiated by WEU members in 1992. Aside from humanitarian rescue tasks and peacekeeping tasks, these also included tasks of combat forces in crisis management and peacemaking. Former NATO secretary-general Javier Solana was named “High Representative”60 and given explicit responsibility for the CFSP, including “the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate, acting on behalf of the [European] Council at the request of the Presidency.”61 The treaty also further consolidated the instruments of CFSP and added new ones such as The Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) consisting of personnel drawn from the general secretariat, the member states, the commission and the WEU. Its task was to “monitor, analyze, and provide assessments, including policy option papers, and early warning on all areas of interest to CFSP.”62 A series of informal and formal multilateral European Summits followed the Amsterdam Treaty in the coming years. Of particular importance, among other things because of the reversal of traditional

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British hesitation toward the European project, is the prelude to the St. Malo Summit and the summit itself at the beginning of December 1998. Throughout the year, British prime minister Tony Blair signaled favorable sympathies toward an EDI.63 At an informal EU Summit hosted by the Austrian presidency in October, Tony Blair made a statement declaring, “There is a strong willingness, which the UK obviously shares, for Europe to take a stronger foreign policy and security role.”64 Great Britain’s formal commitment toward an European security construct was sealed two months later at St. Malo when the prime minister together with French president Chirac appeared to formally end the historic Franco-British antagonism and issued the following joint statement: The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. This means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam . . . [by a] full and rapid implementation [of ] the Amsterdam provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the framing of a common defense policy of CFSP . . . .65

Subsequently, at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, the European Council took further steps as it underlined its intention in “developing the Union’s military and non-military crisis management capability as part of a strengthened common European policy on security and defence.” Toward this end the council planed the development of an autonomous capacity where one of the main goals would be to “launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.”66 Further European Summits and Conferences were all carried by similar goals, namely, to verify and amend CFSP toward an ever stronger manifestation of EDI. Looking back at the evolutionary trajectory, it is safe to say that the European project has come a long way. Over the decades the institutional momentum in Europe shifted from an emphasis on consultation, to coordination, culminating in the post–cold war era with an emphasis on common foreign and security policy and an EDI. The Institutional Problematique Notwithstanding the record of institutional evolution toward a desired common foreign and security policy, the actual foreign and security policies of the three major states within the EU—Germany, France, and Great Britain—often continue to diverge, and the recent spat over Iraq is only the latest manifestation. Given the institutional development on the European continent, this is surprising and puzzling to the political

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spectator, and it poses the following question: why do we at times face a convergence of French, British, and German foreign policies and why, at other times, a divergence? The viability of a common foreign and security policy on the European continent has been subject to a considerable amount of scrutiny in the scholarly literature. One strand of criticism concerns Europe’s lack of military capabilities to carry out its foreign policy actions. One analyst here argues, “The EU is poorly designed to deal with large-scale, intense military conf licts. Such armed forces as it can call upon are controlled by national governments rather than EU institutions.”67 Another observer concludes that, “without a credible military element . . . in support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU lacks the full range of capabilities for an operational security and defense policy.”68 Critics go as far as to argue that “the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security policy . . . is a misnomer . . . CFSP is an acronym without empirical context.”69 Similarly, scholars have identified this problem as the expectation-capabilities gap: the EU is often seen to be incapable of letting words be followed by action. This strand of criticism leads to the conclusion that the EU may have created a policy without true substance.70 At the core of another, yet related, strand of criticism is the argument that “an inefficient decision-making system in CFSP” is “a great handicap to the conduct of European foreign affairs.” 71 Specifically, scholars have criticized CFSP for having a slow decision-making system. The principle of absolute retention of sovereignty manifests itself by requiring decisions to be unanimous. This, of course, takes time and may lead to timid results.72 One observer concludes accordingly that, “the nature of the EU’s decision-making machinery means that it will never be able to deploy force as quickly as a nation-state.” 73 An equally pessimistic conclusion here is that any foreign policy formulated “represents the lowest common denominator, or what the most reluctant member state could accept.” 74 Also related to the foregoing is the fundamental recognition that whereas the economic integration of the EU occurs largely within a supranational framework, the ambitions for common foreign and security policies do not. The institutional mechanisms and units of the EU in this realm are intergovernmental and not federal in character. They lack the capacities and authorities that a supranational institution would have. Regardless of the criticism’s particular nature, what they all share in common is a skepticism towards a process that has been referred to as the “Brusselsisation” of European foreign and security policy.75 More specifically, scholars point to the fact that the EU is not a sovereign actor in the

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same manner as its member states and question, therefore, the extent to which the EU is able to exercise a credible and authoritative foreign policy.76 These recognitions call for one crucial step, namely, to move away from exclusive institutional theorizing. On the European continent foreign and security policy continues to be a policy area where national decision making remains important. EU action could, therefore, be construed more broadly, but also more accurately, as compatible strategic orientations of the institution-constituting members toward a decision problem in the form of a security externality. EU foreign and security policy would thus be understood as a composite constituted at the national level. The recent war in Iraq clearly illustrated that while European states and their respective governments do share many values, they continue to disagree on the fundamental issues of threat perceptions and utility assessments of force as a means of conf lict resolution.77 Threat perceptions and utility assessments are agent-level phenomena and, as such, they call for a bottom-up rather than a top-down approach to the study of the EU’s CFSP. The specification of this approach is the subject of the next chapter. Relevance Europe’s difficulties in realm of foreign security policy are interesting, puzzling, and important. European states proved themselves to be relatively successful in matters of economic integration, jointly surpassing the capacities of the United States. However, at the same time they also proved themselves relatively unsuccessful in matters of foreign policy and security integration.78 One observer has labeled this discrepancy the “Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy” 79 and another has concluded that “the EU may well have become an economic colossus, but it must remain a political pigmy because of its deficiencies in handling foreign affairs.”80 Acknowledging that European states have put together the “framework of a defence cooperation machine,” one scholar writes, “It is also apparent that the machine is weak and driven by little power.”81 Similar is the argument that Europe has established a “presence” but is lacking the crucial quality of “actorness.”82 The viability of international institutions constituted through sovereign states belongs to the most fundamental phenomena of international politics and international relations. The emphasis on sovereignty is important because it indicates that the viability of these institutions is conditioned by the choices of individual member states. These choices have far-reaching consequences not only for the viability of international

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institutions but also for the conduct of world politics more generally. The choices “that bring . . . states together and drive them apart, will affect the security of individual states by determining both how large a threat they face and how much help they can expect.”83 In today’s interdependent world, the foreign policies of France, Great Britain, or Germany cannot f lourish in a vacuum. This is an indisputable fact for all those state officials and diplomats working toward CFSP and was illustrated vividly through the unilateral moves of both France and Germany in the Bosnia crisis at the beginning of the 1990s.84 The lesson learned from the conf lict in the former Yugoslavia is that the allies can be effective only if they speak with one voice.85 An EU that remains weak and fragmented in foreign and security policy, however, will continue to be unable to deal with security crises even on its own periphery. It would continue to be the subordinate partner that it is today—dependent on U. S. leadership within the Atlantic Alliance and a relatively minor diplomatic actor in the wider world. Similar implications apply to the United States. In the post–cold war era, the cooperation of its allies within the EU is of crucial importance for political, economic, or military sanctions to be effective, or alternatively, for the acquisition of important intelligence. Issues that require coordinated actions, whether in regards to North Korea, Iran, or some other hot spot in the world, will arise again soon. And these, as one scholar recently remarked, “[c]annot be handled just by the United States, despite all of its power.”86 There are, moreover, implications for the international system and its evolution. Whether the member states of the EU are able to develop a common and coherent security structure is thus important not only for those Europeans seeking to enhance their own inf luence on the world stage, but for the structure of international politics itself. An EU with a population of about 460 million people and a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of more than 10 trillion euros able to unite its diplomatic and military potential could easily be in a position to challenge the United States’ current status as the lone hegemon and bring forth a new era of bipolarity. Plan of the Book The chapters in this book are organized into three major parts. Part I consists of the present one and the next chapter. This chapter has laid out the overview and introduced the argument brief ly, while chapter 2 presents the theoretical and methodological core. Here I devise a cognitive

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theory of institutional viability as I contextualize leaders within a unified framework with implications for the EU’s institutional arrangements towards a common foreign and security policy. Part II presents the empirical cases to which I apply this framework. Chapter 3 addresses the Kosovo conf lict, and chapters 4 and 5 examine the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Part III of the book presents the implications of the study. Here I brief ly summarize the main results, give an outlook for the emerging nuclear crises with Iran and North Korea, and engage in a brief discussion about the importance of alternative theoretical constructs for the study of international institutions. I conclude with a short consideration of questions about a new world order.

CHAPTER 2

A COGNITIVE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL VIABILITY

Institutions are creations of human beings. They evolve and are altered by human beings; hence our theory must begin with the individual. —Douglass North1

A

basic and crucial premise of the model of institutional viability that I will present in this chapter is that intergovernmental international institutions, of which the EU’s CFSP is but one example, are composed of sovereign states.2 The viability of such international institutions is contingent first and foremost upon their doings and not upon the apparent merits or defects of the institutional design. The primary focus of my theory is, therefore, not on the EU as an institution itself, its formal arrangements, structures or any intrainstitutional dynamics. My focus is rather on states and their leaders as sovereign agents and the implications of their beliefs and subsequent behavior for the institution they belong to. In doing so, I take seriously the insight of the preeminent institutional theorist Douglass North, namely that institutions are human constructions. They evolve, are altered, and confirmed or disconfirmed by human beings. It follows that proper theorizing must begin with the individual. As this move is intuitively sensible, it is rather surprising that little or no attention has been devoted to a systematic study of those leaders that can be held responsible for the relative viability—the failures and successes—of an institutionalized common foreign and security policy in Europe. In this chapter I fill this gap as I develop a cognitive theory of institutional viability. Because all politics are human affairs, cognitive

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considerations in thinking about international institutions are a theoretical mandate. Leaders and International Institutions Regarding the study of international institutions, the theoretical literature offers a multitude of definitions.3 However, the dominant strand of conceptualizations shares an emphasis on the regulative quality of institutions, that is on the institution’s decision-making structures and rules, formal arrangements such as treaties and declarations, and so on. Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, for example, define international institutions as “explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behavior.”4 Somewhat more broadly, Keohane conceptualizes international institutions as “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.”5 Institutional theorists Beth Simmons and Lisa Martin summarize various conceptualizations stating that “most scholars have come to regard international institutions as sets of rules meant to govern international behavior,” such that rules “are often conceived of as statements that forbid, require, or permit particular kinds of actions.”6 Institutions thereby define “how the game is being played,” and they are thus, at least implicitly, considered to be sovereign actors in and of themselves.7 In many works following such definitions, international institutions are viewed as a “given” and their underlying structures and features serve as analytical starting points. Such an approach is warranted for institutions that are sovereign over their constituting members, that is, for institutions capable of issuing authoritative and binding statements to its members. It applies, for example, to supranational institutions in which states have rendered their prerogatives in any given issue area to the institution. Cases in point regarding the EU are issue areas such as various aspects of the EU’s economic and monetary affairs, the EU’s internal market affairs, trade and agricultural affairs, legal affairs between member states, and so on. However, taking institutions themselves as the analytical starting point for intergovernmental institutions is wrongheaded. It is crucial to understand that a collection of actors that share “only” intergovernmental instead of supranational ties cannot be considered a sovereign institution with authoritative top-down decision-making structures.8 Analysis is impeded and misguided if we refer to this same collectivity as a coherent and sovereign institution. Doing so would be equal to assigning qualities to the

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institution that it simply does not possess and any analysis of institutional efficiency and viability is, therefore, almost doomed to lead to often times disappointing conclusions.9 The EU’s institutional arrangements in the area of common foreign and security policy are constituted of sovereign states in the first place and these states are headed by their respective leaders. To what degree these leaders internalize or decide to abide by institutional norms, rules, and prescriptions is an open question that cannot be taken for granted. It is for this reason that ideationally oriented scholars have emphasized not the regulative quality but the normative quality of international institutions. Here institutions are viewed as “shared beliefs about the way things should be, or how things should be done” and the normative character implies that institutional aspirations and goals ought to be followed.10 Matters of institutional viability are located not within the institution, but with the agents constituting the institution. This recognition rectifies common misconceptualizations of intergovernmental institutions leading to false and unwarranted expectations posed to any given intergovernmental institution. In theorizing international institutions, it also allows the analyst to avoid the so-called endogeneity problem resulting in “sins of omission.”11 The analytical fallacy here is that many instances of institutional viability or the lack thereof are ascribed to structural characteristics of the particular institution under examination when, in fact, they might more accurately be attributed to irreconcilable or to harmonious preferences at the national level. This possibility would make a primary attention to institutional features superf luous.12 One cannot assert that a shared institutional membership led to compatible strategic orientations among states confirming institutional viability without first establishing that there might otherwise have been some reason for disagreement, and vice versa.13 Doing so obscures where the real explanatory action for apparent institutional “success” or “failure” may be situated. It follows that one has to move beyond a structural analysis of any given institution and its features. Prominent institutional theorists have recognized that in traditional institutional theory actors’ preferences and causal beliefs are exogenous and undertheorized. It is exactly this omission that subjects traditional institutional theory to the endogeneity trap. Therefore, institutional theorists have come to advocate “more emphasis on agency” and “less on structure.”14 More specifically, the recommendation is “to develop theories with microfoundations: that is, theories that begin with individuals . . . and show how, on the basis of a coherent set of theoretical assumptions, varying preferences emerge.”15 Taking this

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suggestion seriously my approach ventures back to the tradition of comparative foreign policy analysis.16 The chief advantage of resorting to this tradition is that it represents an agential approach to preferences. Yet, it is distinct in two important respects. First, this tradition rejected exogenously given preferences and proved to be strong in identifying decision-making contingencies such as subjective representations of decision problems. The prevalent argument was that these contingencies would bias national decision-making processes away from an expected outcome. Although the argument was plausibly grounded, scholars proved unable to account in systematic ways for these effects. James Rosenau thus aptly criticized the tradition stating, “[t]o identify factors in not to trace their inf luence.”17 My approach remedies this shortcoming by engaging in the scientific study of subjective representations conditioned by individual perceptions. Second, analyses in this tradition were often monadic in design. The monadic view assumes that any given state is “predisposed to act in some characteristic way, and that [the resultant] behavior pattern is regarded as invariant with respect to any foreign actor.”18 My approach is distinctly dyadic not only in that it is target-oriented. More importantly, it contextualizes the comparisons of various national predispositions within a unified framework carrying propositions about the viability of an international institution.19 To this end, I consider intergovernmental international institutions to be “shared mental models” as I seek to build a model that seeks to establish links between antecedent environmental conditions, actors belonging to an institution, and questions about institutional viability.20 Institutions as Shared Mental Models Douglass North and Arthur Denzau were among the first to use the shared mental models concept in institutional analyses within the field of political science. Their efforts were concentrated toward accounting for institutional performance and goal attainment primarily in economic matters. Classic economic theory, embedded in much of conventional institutional theory, assumes that actors belonging to an institution operate under the principles of substantive rationality, that is, their decisionmaking process is constrained by the institutional structures and the surrounding environment while “the characteristics of the choosing organism are ignored.”21 If only externalities are relevant, one would expect that the relative performance of various economies should be comparable whenever they are governed by sufficiently similar

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institutions. Yet, empirical research concerned predominantly with Europe and the Western Hemisphere shows that economies operating within the same parameters, in fact, show a wide range of performance levels.22 In order to account for these empirical puzzles, North and Denzau argue it is important to recognize that institutions are shared mental models—and as such, despite being objective physical facts—they are cognitive entities that do not exist independently from actor’s beliefs about how the world works and how institutions ought to work within this world.23 North and Denzau explain that choice about policy options is marked by uncertainty, which reinforces a subjective quality in the ensuing decision-making process.24 This feature leads them to argue that individuals do not operate under the principles of substantive rationality but under the principles of bounded rationality. In an earlier study Douglass North refers to Herbert Simon to argue the point: If we accept values as given and consistent, if we postulate an objective description of the world as it really is, and if we assume that the decision maker’s computational powers are unlimited, then two important consequences follow: we do not need to distinguish between the real world and the decision maker’s perception of it: He or she perceives the world as it is. Second, we can predict our knowledge of the real world and without a knowledge of the decisionmaker’s perceptions or modes of calculation. If, on the other hand, we accept the proposition that both the knowledge and the computational power of the decisionmaker are severely limited, then we must distinguish between the real world and the actor’s perception of it and reasoning about it. That is to say, we must construct a theory (and test it empirically) of the processes of decision. Our theory must include . . . the actor’s subjective representation of the decision problem, his or her frame.25

The juxtaposition of actors and decision problems is of crucial significance. Decision problems are external to the institution and if two or more actors share sufficiently similar subjective representations of the decision problem, the effect is a positive feedback mechanism for the institution to which these actors belong. In other words, institutional viability and the prospect for goal attainment increase as the institution’s constituting actors share a cognitive agreement about an external decision problem. If, however, the constituting actors of an institution do not share a cognitive agreement about a decision problem, the feedback mechanism is negative and institutional viability decreases. In the first case actors do share a mental model and in the second case they do not.

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The shared mental models concept in questions of institutional viability is meritorious because it is intuitively sensible. However, in order to advance the study of international institutions from a cognitive perspective, it is important to formalize the concept further. The foregoing establishes mental models as subjective cognitive representations of an objective reality. Actors build them in their minds as they are faced with a decision problem representing a cognitive challenge. Examples of decision problems are generally uncertain policy options, or more specifically in the context of this book a latent or an imminent security threat. In such cases, actors’ “cognitive systems construct models of the problem space that are then mentally ‘run’ or manipulated to produce expectations about the environment,” others in the environment and, moreover, understandings about oneself within that environment.26 Thus, beyond a cognitive diagnosis of the environment, a mental model also provides actors with a prescription on how to achieve one’s goals within this environment. Both diagnosis and prescription are mediated by an actor’s control propensities that may either strengthen or weaken the actor’s diagnostic and prescriptive inferences. Mental models, expressed formally, thus constitute an actor’s operational code as they not only govern how actors think about a problem but also how they (ought to) act.27 A mental model is, in short, an actor’s “definition of the situation” containing diagnostic, prescriptive, and control propensities.28 In the end, North and Denzau argue that institutions, be it in the economic realm or in the security realm, perform best when its constituting actors share sufficiently similar mental models with respect to any given decision problem. To summarize so far, intergovernmental institutions are confirmed or disconfirmed at the national leader level. This recognition requires the resort to an agential approach that ought to be connected in logical ways to questions of institutional viability and goal attainment. Such a bridge is provided by the shared mental model framework. It problematizes the preferences of institution-constituting actors within a context that carries implications for the viability of the institution’s defined aspirations. To be sure, the argument here is not that international institutions are epiphenomenal. Institutions can, for example, serve as fora to consult and exchange information and thereby contribute to the establishment of compatibility across various national mental models.29 However, the focus of the theory developed here is not on any intra-institutional dynamics but on the specific manifestations of national mental models. The reason for this focus is that the ultimate question is whether various

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national leaderships share a mental model or not, and if they do not, whether they act in accordance with their cognitive propensities or with the established and defined goals of the institution. Forming Mental Models Scholars have argued that mental models are the result of distinct cultures and the sociopsychological milieus in which individuals find themselves.30 They are, in other words, the result of an individual’s socialization—a graduated and continuous process by which a person acquires a unique and distinct belief system about the surrounding world and himself in that world. Because leaders from different countries and generally different backgrounds never share the exact same socialization, it follows that they are likely to act differently on the same data.31 Such an understanding of mental models is unnecessarily constrained and, moreover, of limited explanatory value. Although it could provide us with explanations of variations in the strategic orientations of leaders from diverse countries, it would face difficulties in an explanation of similar or even identical strategic orientations towards any given decision problem whenever leaders do not share a similar background. It is much more fruitful and realistic to assume that while mental models are contingent upon an actor’s past socialization, they are also context dependent, that is, they are also contingent upon the particular situation and decision problem an actor faces at the present time. Regarding the formation of mental models in the face of a decision problem, the insights of the cognitive revolution in the field of psychology are paramount. Replacing the behavioral revolution some two decades earlier, henceforth the individual was not any longer considered to be a “passive agent who merely responds to environmental stimuli.”32 He was seen instead as a selective agent responding to and actively shaping his environment—a “problem solver” who aims to make sense of a complex environment, and derive alternatives for decisions.33 The most fundamental fact about international politics becomes thereby the nature of the sociopsychological consciousness of actors as they engage in “an active process of interpretation and construction of reality.”34 Problem solving thus becomes a subjective challenge and task and the alternatives for decisions are derived from the problem space containing the three fundamental questions in table 2.1.35 A decisionmaker’s subjective answers to the first question in the sidebar above contain his diagnostic propensities for a decision problem defined as a political opponent. Is this opponent inclined toward

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Table 2.1

Definition of the Problem Space

• What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents? • What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action? • How much “control” or “mastery” do Self and Other have over historical development? What is Self and Other’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction?

cooperative or conf lictual means of conf lict resolution? The second question contains the decisionmaker’s prescriptive propensities toward this situation. Will political and diplomatic means or military means prove more effective? A decisionmaker’s control propensities are contained in the third question. Is the opponent commanding the situation and ensuing events or is this capacity with oneself ? Taken together, these beliefs help constitute a decisionmaker’s mental model, defining his propensities toward the opponent and his perceptions of the opponent’s propensities for action. When actors give the same or similar answers to these questions they share a mental model and this agreement, in effect, as I will argue in more detail below, generates a positive feedback mechanism onto the institution to which the actors belong, enhancing the institution’s viability and the prospects for its goal attainment. Those readers familiar with the sociological and psychological literature on group cohesion in crises and conf lict situations will recognize the fundamental postulates of this scholarship in the argument presented here.36 The general and most prominent propositions this scholarship set forth is the idea that actors’ common perception of threat from external conf lict is highly conducive toward the viability of the group they belong to. This shared threat perception is a precondition for subsequent group solidarity and compatible action toward a commonly defined target. Conversely, as common perceptions of threat decrease, shared mental models cease, and along with it, the viability of the group they belong to. This argument was subsequently also applied to questions of interstate dynamics in world politics.37 The fundamental shortcoming in much of this literature is an exclusive emphasis on actors’ diagnoses of a security situation. However, it is important to remember that a mental model is composed not only of an actor’s diagnostic propensities of a security externality, but also of prescriptive propensities toward the security externality within the same cognitive process and that both can be conditioned and altered by an actor’s control propensities. It is, for

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example, theoretically possible that two actors share the same perceptions of a security situation, but nevertheless believe that distinct means of conf lict resolution are to be employed. Diagnostic, prescriptive, and control propensities together define an actor’s mental model and all three elements must be part of the theoretical construct.38 The constitutive elements of mental models as they are developed in the present context are framed and formulated so that they apply directly to international security situations, the subject matter of this book. Depending on what the decisionmaker perceives the character of the political opponent to be, what he believes the best strategy for selecting goals would be and how much control he sees himself as opposed to the opponent to have, he will seek either settlement, deadlock, or domination as the political outcome to the conf lict. At the same time, the mental model provides a leader with inferences about the opponent’s goals regarding the outcomes of settlement, deadlock or domination.39 Discerning Mental Models Determining mental models of decisionmakers, their diagnostic, prescriptive, and control propensities, accurately requires innovative and reliable assessment methods. Drawing on assumptions and methods found in three different academic fields—psychology, political science, and speech communication—scholars have developed new techniques and assessment strategies to analyze the psychological characteristics of leaders “at a distance.”40 The most important assumption made with at-a-distance techniques is that it is possible to assess decisionmakers’ mental models by systematically investigating what they say and how they say it. In order to determine the diagnostic, prescriptive, and control propensities in the French, British, and German mental models, this study employs the Verbs in Context System (VICS).41 As a method of content analysis, VICS is a set of techniques for retrieving a decisionmaker’s answers to the mental model’s questions above from public statements, such as speeches, interviews, or press conferences. The recording unit in these public statements is the “utterance,” which is each transitive verb in the statement and the corresponding parts of speech associated with each verb—the subject and object. The steps of the VICS system are summarized in table 2.2. “Self” or “Other” in the VICS sidebar designate whether the speaker or some other actor is the subject of the verb. The verb is categorized in its tense as either a positive (+) or negative (2) transitive verb. If it is a transitive verb, it is categorized further as representing either a cooperative (+) or

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Table 2.2 Steps in the Verbs in Context System (VICS) 1. Identify The Subject As Self Or Other 2. Identify The Tense Of The Transitive Verb As Past Present Future 3. Identify The Category Of The Verb As Positive (+) Or Negative (2) Words

Deeds

Appeal, Support (+1) Or Promise Benefits (+2) Rewards (+3)

Oppose, Resist (21) Or Threaten Costs (22) Punishments (23)

conflictual (2) behavior that takes the form of a word or a deed. Positive transitive deeds are coded as Rewards (+3) while negative transitive deeds are coded as Punishments (23). Positive transitive words are coded as either Promises (+2) or Appeal/Support (+1), while negative transitive words are coded as either Threats (22) or Oppose/Resist (21). Verbs that do not fit into one of these categories or that do not have a political context (i.e., do not deal with a policy domain or are not addressed directly toward a political target) are coded as Neutral (0) and discarded from further analysis. The categories in the VICS sidebar subsequently become the basis for a statistical calculation of the composite indices that constitute a leader’s mental model. The underlying logic of these indices rests on the assumption that the balance and relative frequency of verbs in the cooperation (+) and conf lict (2) categories of the VICS scoring system are numerical ref lections of a mental model’s constitutive elements. The first index in table 2.3 is designated with a (D) for diagnostic propensities and the second one is designated with a (P) for prescriptive propensities of a Self ’s mental model. A decisionmaker’s prescriptive propensities for Self (P) and his diagnostic propensities for Other (D) are conditioned by his control propensities (C-1 for Self and C-2 for Other) before they are translated into a strategic orientation for Self and Self ’s perceived strategic orientation of Other. The calculations of these propensities are fairly straightforward. It may nevertheless be valuable to illustrate these procedures by reference to a decisionmaker’s perceived level of control (C) in a security situation. On the basis of locus-of-control literature, this perceptual belief is operationalized as the ratio of Self attributions to Self-plus-Other attributions.42 It follows that “as the ratio increases, the speaker’s rhetoric demonstrates that self is doing more than others in the political universe,

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Table 2.3

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Indices for Mental Model Propensities

Propensities

Elements

Index

Interpretation

D

PERCEIVED PROPENSITIES OF ONE’S OPPONENT

%Positive minus %Negative Transitive Other Attributions

+1.0 friendly to 21.0 hostile

P

SELF’S APPROACH %Positive minus TO GOALS (Direction %Negative of Strategy) Transitive Self Attributions

C

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT (Locus of Control for Self and Other)

Self (C-1) or Other (C-2) Attributions 4 [Self plus Other Attributions]

+1.0 high cooperation to 21.0 high conf lict 1.0 high to 0.0 low Self control

indicating that self is more in control.”43 The calculations for the remaining indices of a mental model are equally simple and along with the interpretation for each composite index they are described in table 2.3. The discussed cognitive propensities are fundamental because a leader’s strategic orientation is ultimately the result of what he is inclined to do in terms of conf lict and cooperation (P) combined with how much power he perceives himself to have for doing so (C-1). Conversely, the leader’s perception of other actors’ strategic orientation is the result of what he perceives them wanting to do in terms of conf lict and cooperation (D) and how much power he perceives them to have in pursuing their objectives (C-2). Changes in these propensities interact to define changes in the strategic orientation of Self and the perceived strategic orientation of Other regarding the political outcomes of domination, settlement, or deadlock in world politics.44 Manifestations of Mental Models The paramount benefit of these procedures is that they allow a systematic and replicable investigation of mental models. Because they lead to quantified results, it is possible to statistically compare mental models (1) between decisionmakers within one state, that is between the chief executive and the foreign minister and (2) decisionmakers in different states regarding any given security externality. These comparisons subsequently allow for the systematic determination of an existing or nonexisting shared mental model within or across states in the face of an

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Type A

Type C

+.75 Cooperative Leader with Low Control

+.50

Cooperative Leader with High Control

Strategic Goals: Settle, Deadlock

+.25

Strategic Goals: Settle, Dominate

Control

–.75

–.50

–.25

Conflictual Leader with Low Control Strategic Goals: Dominate, Settle

+.25 –.25 –.50

+.50

+.75

Control

Conflictual Leader with High Control Strategic Goals: Dominate, Deadlock

–.75 Type D

Figure 2.1

P/D Conflict

Type B

Map for Mental Models.

emerging or already present security externality by mapping them as dimensions on the vertical (P/D) and horizontal (C) axes in figure 2.1.45 The two types in the upper quadrants (A, C) represent cooperative mental models. A leader with prescriptive (Self ) propensities in these quadrants believes his first goal should be to settle the situation with the opponent. Similarly, a leader with diagnostic (Other) propensities in these quadrants perceives the opponent to want to settle the situation. In these cases the numerical values of the prescriptive Self propensities (P) and the diagnostic Other propensities (D) are positive. The difference between Type A and Type C leaders is in their alternative second goal that varies because of a perceived power discrepancy. A Type A leader has smaller control propensities (C) than a Type B leader. Therefore, a leader with self propensities in the Type A quadrant will seek to deadlock the situation as his second best goal and will perceive the opponent to do the same if his other propensities are in this quadrant. Finally, a leader with self propensities in the Type C quadrant believes that he should dominate the situation as his second best goal and he perceives the opponent to seek the same goal if his other propensities are in this quadrant. The two types in the lower quadrants (D, B) represent conf lictual mental models. A leader with Self propensities in these quadrants believes

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his primary goal should be to dominate the situation. Similarly, a leader with other propensities in these quadrants perceives the opponent to want to dominate the situation. In these cases the numerical values of the prescriptive Self propensities (P) and the diagnostic Other propensities (D) are negative. The difference between Type D and Type B leaders is again in their alternative second goal as they perceive themselves to have varying amounts of relative power to control the situation. A Type D leader has smaller control propensities (C) than a Type B leader. Therefore, a leader with Self propensities in the Type D quadrant will seek to settle the situation as his second best goal and will perceive the opponent to do so if his Other propensities are in this quadrant. A leader with Self propensities in the Type B quadrant believes that he should deadlock the situation as his second best goal and he perceives the opponent to seek the same goal if his Other propensities are in this quadrant. From the shared mental model framework two general hypotheses can be deduced. The first hypothesis states that the likelihood of a common or compatible strategic orientation between member states of an international institution toward a decision problem is more likely when the mental models of the respective national decisionmakers are similar, or at least compatible. Compatibility across national mental models, in other words, results in high institutional goal attainability, defined here as the conduct of a common foreign and security policy toward any given security externality. In contrast, the second hypothesis states that incompatibility among the various national mental models results in low institutional goal attainability, i.e. the lack of a common and foreign security policy toward a security externality. Figure 2.2 illustrates these hypotheses. On the institutional viability continuum “Self ” stands for a leader’s self propensities and “Other” stands for his other propensities. Self and Other are featured three times in each of the four typology matrices Difference in Degree Type A

Type C Self(1) Self(2) Self(3)

Other(1) Other(2) Other(3) Type D

Type B

Type A

Difference in Type Type C

Self(1)

Self(2) Self(3)

Other(1) Other(2)

Other(1)

Type D

Type B

Type A Other(1) Other(2) Other(3)

Type D

Type C

Type C

Other(1) Other(2)

Self(1) Self(2)

Self(2) Self(3)

Other(3)

Self(3)

Type B

High Institutional Viability

Figure 2.2

Type A

Self(1)

Institutional Viability Continuum.

Type D

Type B

Low Institutional Viability

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on the continuum in order to represent three states (1), (2), (3) in the quadrants of the typology. The continuum must be understood as an ideal-type categorization of different mental models. It does not illustrate all possible configurations of Self and Other but is limited to the paradigmatic distinction between difference in degree and difference in type. It will be valuable to explicate the general hypotheses above further in the context of the distinction between difference in degree and difference in type. A difference in degree occurs when either the Self or Other or both for the three states are spread along the horizontal axis of the matrices. A difference in type occurs when either Self or Other or both are spread along the vertical axis of the matrices. A difference in type has more severe implications for the prospects of a common foreign and security policy than a difference in degree. In the case of a difference in type, the national leaders have a fundamental disagreement over their primary goal in the security situation or their perceived primary goal of the opponent. In the case of a difference in degree, national leaders disagree “only” over their secondary goal or their perceived secondary goal of the opponent. Such a disagreement has less disturbing effects on the prospects for the conduct of a common foreign and security policy. Below I explain the institutional viability continuum in some more detail. The typology matrix on the very left of the continuum illustrates the maximum compatibility level of mental models across three states. The Other propensities of all three leaderships are located in quadrant D and their Self propensities are located in quadrant C. In other words, the leaders of all three countries are in an absolute agreement about the diagnosis of an opponent’s intentions. Moreover, they also agree on the strategy with which they should approach the opponent. According to the shared mental model framework, this absolute agreement should lead to a very high level of institutional viability and maximum prospects for institutional goal-attainment, that is, the emergence of a common foreign and security policy. The second matrix from the left also shows a high compatibility among mental models. However, compared to the first matrix it is lessened somewhat by a difference in degree. The Other propensities of all three leaderships are located across quadrants D and B and their Self propensities are located across quadrants A and C. This means that leaders of all three countries are in agreement about an opponent’s intentions and they also agree on a strategy by which they should approach the opponent. However, this agreement is not absolute but conditioned by the leaders’ perceived alternative strategy of the opponent as well as their preferred alternative strategy toward the opponent. In this second case the level of

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31

institutional viability it is still considerable, leading to an expectation of good prospects for institutional goal-attainment. The third ideal-type matrix on the institutional viability continuum illustrates a much lower level of mental model compatibility as it shows a difference in type. The Other propensities of all three leaderships are all located in quadrant A. However, their Self propensities are located across quadrants C and B and these vertically related quadrants are fundamentally incompatible. In this ideal-type example, the leaders of all three states agree on their diagnoses of the opponent’s intentions. However, they fundamentally disagree with what strategy the opponent should be approached. According to the shared mental model framework, this disagreement should lead to a lower level of institutional viability and corresponding prospects for institutional goal-attainment. The fourth matrix on the institutional viability continuum illustrates the lowest level of mental model compatibility. Like the third matrix, it also shows a difference in type. However, in this case the difference is wider. The Other propensities of the three leaderships are located across quadrants A and D and the Self propensities are located across quadrants C and B. In contrast to the third matrix, in this matrix both Self and Other propensities, therefore, are located across fundamentally incompatible quadrants. This means that the leaders of the three states, considered together, share no agreement about the diagnoses of the opponent and also no agreement on how to approach the opponent. In this fourth case any significant level of institutional viability is lacking and so are the prospects for institutional goal-attainment. The selected quadrants used in this discussion about levels of mental model compatibility are hypothetical. The chosen examples illustrate possible fundamental differences in a cross-national comparison of mental models. Other constellations of Self vis-a-vis Other are possible as well. Generally, maximum mental model compatibility occurs when there is convergence among the Self and Other images, that is, when all Self images are contained in one quadrant and when all Other images are contained in another quadrant. The second highest level of mental model compatibility occurs when either Self or Other images or both are spread horizontally. The next lower level of mental model compatibility occurs when either Self or Other images are spread vertically. Finally, the lowest level of mental model compatibility occurs when both Self and Other images are spread vertically. The levels of institutional viability and the prospects for institutional goal attainment decrease accordingly. The cognitive propensities in the mental models of French, British, and German leaders are the independent variables in this study. The

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dependent variables are the strategic activities of the leaders under investigation and these can have two dimensions, namely material contribution and diplomatic activities in any security crisis. Material contributions may include, for example, the provision of aircraft, artillery, troops or more general, capabilities to the military campaign. Support or opposition to a military campaign can alternatively also be expressed in the political and diplomatic activities of a state. I analyze the official statements of each leadership, press reports, and secondary accounts for evidence of variance in material contributions and diplomatic activities.46 In the next three chapters of this book, therefore, I examine the mental models of the French, British, and German chief executives and their respective foreign ministers in the Kosovo War, the Afghanistan War, and the Iraq War. These three cases are appropriate for at least three reasons. The first reason is very simple. These wars are very recent and they are still very much debated by political scientists and international observers. Moreover, they resemble current situations of policy concern, namely the evolving security situations with Iran and North Korea and it is likely that more situations like these will emerge in the future. These past, present, and future security situations share in common that a coherent and common European approach is required for managing the situation more effectively. Examining the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq may allow for applying conclusions found here to the ensuing and emerging cases and this, in turn, may prove to be of policy value.47 Second, as mentioned above, all three of these cases occurred after the institutional momentum toward a common foreign and security policy reached a highpoint with the ratifications the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the Amsterdam Treaty (1997). Because Europe’s ambitions toward a common foreign and security policy are highly institutionalized, conventional institutional theory and its predictions should have “homeadvantage.” However, empirically these predictions do not bear out. On the other hand, a cognitive theory as I present it in this book makes quite different predictions and it is disadvantaged because the impact of cognitive variables is generally said to diminish in highly structured environments. These considerations make the case studies in this book “severe tests” for a cognitive theory. New theories gain strength as they succeed in severe tests.48 Third, good theories should explain the entire range of the phenomenon they address.49 The explanandum in this study are the strategic activities of France, Great Britain, and Germany and the implications these have on the institutional viability of Europe’s common foreign and

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security policy ambitions. The strategic activities of the countries under investigation indeed display a strong degree of variance across and within the examined cases. This quality makes further appropriate the selection of the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. My analysis follows the method of a structured focused comparison. In each security episode I ask the same question, namely whether the mental models of these key decisionmakers converged or diverged across countries. I also examine in an analytical narrative the implications of the various national mental models regarding their impact on the strategic activities of each state and the implications they have for the viability of the EU’s CFSP. I expect to find convergence on common strategic activities by the three states will depend on compatible mental models among the three leaderships.

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PART II

THE CASES

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CHAPTER 3

THE KOSOVO WAR

T

he conf lict in the Kosovo region of the former Yugoslavia ensued most dramatically in the years 1998 and 1999. It presented the EU and its main actors, France, Great Britain, and Germany, with a serious security challenge that was magnified even further by Yugoslavia’s geographic proximity. The region had proved to be a powder keg not only in the distant past but also in the recent past, as the world had to witness during the Bosnia War at the beginning of the 1990s. Now again it carried the potential for major ruptures not only in the Balkans but also in large parts of the European continent.1 The Kosovo crisis represented the first security challenge to the EU since the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. The Treaty consolidated the EU’s CFSP project and thereby provided an opportunity to test these ambitions in an actual crisis situation on the European continent. Before examining the beliefs and mental models of the French, British, and German leaders, their subsequent strategic orientations toward the crisis, and the resulting implications for the viability of the CFSP project, it is desirable to put the crisis in a historical context.2 The Origins of the Kosovo Crisis Historical accounts date the origins of the recent war in Kosovo back to the thirteenth century, and there is no agreement as to what belongs to the realm of myth as opposed to the realm of reality. Serbs argue that they have been in Kosovo since the seventh century, that their medieval kings were crowned there and, but for a defeat by the Ottoman Turks at the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389, they would have retained control over Kosovo. The contending ethnic Albanians also lay a far-reaching historical claim over Kosovo, suggesting that they arrived in Kosovo prior to the

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Serbian people and that they are the direct descendants of the region’s earliest inhabitants.3 A historical fact is that at the turn to the fourteenth century, Kosovo and large parts of the Balkans were conquered by the Ottoman Turks and incorporated into their expanding empire. This occupation added a new quality to the latent conf lict between Serbs and Albanians. Serbs henceforth considered their culture and Orthodox Christian religion to be endangered as the majority of ethnic Albanians assumed Islam as their religion in the centuries to follow.4 Although coexistence rather than Ottoman oppression was the modus vivendi in Kosovo, the stigma of foreign occupation nevertheless weighed heavy on the Serbian people.5 The opportunity for the Serbs to reassert themselves would rise again with the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the late eighteenth century. With the demise of the empire came a resurgence of nationalism in the Balkans. Serbian nationalism was particularly strong. As early as 1843, Serbian national leaders advocated a Greater Serbia, which would encompass Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and northern Albania, including Kosovo. Although Kosovo remained part of the Ottoman Empire for several more decades, Albanian fears of future Serb expansion remained. These fears were magnified by the Serb southward advance during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878. Many mosques were destroyed during the invasion, thousands of Albanians f led, and the Serbian army advanced to the area around the Kosovar capital Pristina.6 This occupation represented the first manifestation of the idea of a Greater Serbia. Tensions in the Balkans rose further after Austria-Hungary’s annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. The expansion of the Danube Monarchy’s sphere of inf luence in combination with the growing urge of the Albanians to establish their own independent state led to emerging balancing politics as it drew Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia closer together. In 1912, they formed the Balkan League. After the Ottoman Empire collapsed in the Balkans, these countries settled the allocation of its remaining parts between them. The Serbian and Bulgarian leadership concluded an agreement in which Kosovo was assigned to Serbia and not to Albania, which had gained independence in the meantime.7 This phase of the Serbo-Albanian history marked the birth of the Kosovo tragedy that the world would face in the 1990s. After the First World War the Yugoslav federation formed. It was composed of many different peoples with distinct cultural and religious backgrounds with Serbs, Croats, Macedonians, Albanians, Slovenes, Bosnians, and Montenegrins as the most prominent ones plus a dozen other smaller minorities. The federation was headed by a predominantly

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Serbian Government which, in effect, was a dictatorship. The suppression of Albanians thus continued as the leadership in Belgrade promoted a “Serbian colonization” of Kosovo. While Serbs received favored treatment and were provided with incentives to migrate to Kosovo, Albanians that were already there were oppressed in that, for example, their land was seized and their schools were closed. The Serbian Government went even so far as to initiate negotiations with Turkey regarding the emigration of Albanians to that country.8 In the end Belgrade’s “Serbianization” policies remained without much effect as the ethnic composition of Kosovo remained about the same. The mainly passive resistance of Albanians in Kosovo continued throughout the interwar period until 1943 when Albanian nationalists reconstituted the Prizren League, that had first been established in 1878 and now aimed for a Greater Albania. However, the movement was soon halted by the Yugoslav Army, and the consequence was that “Kosovo . . . emerged from the war into the new Federal Yugoslavia under siege, and with its alienated Albanian population regarded, as in 1918, as a threat to the new state.”9 After the Second World War, longtime leader Josip Broz Tito emerged as the head of the Yugoslav Communist Party. Tito’s goal was to curb Albanian separatism and prevent the possible disintegration of Yugoslavia. To this end, he assigned Kosovo the status of an “autonomous region” in the Yugoslav Constitution of 1946.10 Tito also granted several concessions to the Albanian population in Kosovo, and in 1967 the Serbian Parliament adopted a new constitution specifically for Kosovo. In it, Kosovo was given its own supreme court and other institutions while the Albanian language was accorded an equal status to Serbo-Croatian language. These concessions, in turn, led to a growth of distrust among Kosovo’s Serbian population.11 Yet, Tito never declared Kosovo to be a republic, and it was perhaps because of this omission that his balancing act toward the stabilization of Yugoslavia was not a satisfactory solution.12 The new state structure was bound to lead to dissatisfaction: “[f ]or Albanians the provision of autonomy did not go far enough to satisfy their demand to have a republic. . . . Serbs complained further that they were divided not only in Serbia, but in Yugoslavia as well . . .”13 Dissatisfaction indeed continued to grow on both sides. The resentments created by this initial imbalance of power was reinforced by the fact that Serbs dominated the party and state security apparatus. This fact set up an oscillating dynamic of reaction and counterreaction in the 1980s, which made Kosovo’s internal politics all the more bitter and intractable.

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Economic and demographic factors added to the contentions in the 1980s. Kosovo had always been the poorest region of Yugoslavia. In the year 1952, Kosovo’s gross material product (GMP) per capita was 44 percent that of the Yugoslav average.14 It had declined to 29 percent in the 1980s and to 22 percent in the 1990s.15 Kosovo’s economic malperformance directly contributed to the crisis because the way in which resources were distributed became part of the nationalist debate. Traditionally, bureaucratically regulated economies are characterized by competition for resources rather than competition for markets. This was also the case in Yugoslavia. Thus, Serbia, Slovenia, and Croatia increasingly resented the monies being taxed to support the development of Kosovo. Long before the rise of Milosevic, Serbian political debate included demands for recentralizing control of economic policy and budgetary resources in Belgrade away from Kosovo and also from Vojvodina.16 In the meantime demographics in Kosovo shifted in favor of ethnic Albanians. More and more Serbs felt not only disadvantaged and marginalized but also started to complain about harassment and discrimination.17 In April 1987, the president of the Serbian League of Communists Ivan Stambolic responded and initiated measures against any Albanian oppression of Serbs. He sent Slobodan Milosevic, then deputy president of the Serbian Party, to Kosovo to negotiate with a group of dissatisfied Serbian activists. At a public rally Milosevic stated “[n]o one should dare to beat you,” and proceeded to give a speech about the sacred rights of Serbs.18 He subsequently became a national hero overnight. With the support of the Serbian media and with mass rallies throughout the country known as “Meetings of Truth,” he was not only able to mobilize popular feelings, but also to take control of the party leadership.19 Milosevic knew all too well about how to utilize Serbian national sentiments for a course that was essentially a politics of devastation. At a rally in Belgrade in November 1988, attended by 350,000 people, he declared “[e]very nation has a love, which eternally warms its heart. For Serbia, it is Kosovo.”20 And in June 1989, on the six-hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, Milosevic declared to approximately 1 million people: “[s]ix centuries later, again, we are in battles and quarrels. They are not armed battles although such things cannot be excluded . . . . We shall win the battle for Kosovo regardless of the obstacles facing us inside and outside the country.”21 Concerns and fears among Albanians grew once again and along with it their desire for counteractions. In response to growing fears of oppression, Albanians in Kosovo established parallel and competing state structures. These were championed by

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Ibrahim Rugova and his Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratikee kosovës, LDK). Rugova and the LDK were from the outset “committed to opposing Serb sovereignty over the Kosovar Albanian people.” In the years to come Rugova would be confirmed several times as Kosovo’s “president” in unofficial elections among the region’s ethnic Albanian population.22 Yet, these countermoves were not strong and viable enough to stop Milosevic’s increasingly aggressive advance. In July 1989, the Kosovo Assembly in Pristina was dissolved and the Serbian Assembly took more direct control over Kosovo’s security, judiciary, finance, and social planning. Subsequently Milosevic also revoked the autonomy status of Kosovo.23 With the gradual Serbian take-over in Kosovo, Montenegro, and Vojvodina, Milosevic was able to dominate the Yugoslav federal institutions and exercise unconstrained rule. This precipitated a crisis which hastened the collapse of Yugoslavia as it led to a series of events leading to demands for independence from other republics, namely in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and eventually, by the mid-1990s, Kosovo.24 Milosevic gradually drove Yugoslavia into the abyss. By this time the treatment of Kosovar Albanians as second-class citizens grew into state-sponsored violence. The Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms in Kosovo listed thousands of physical assaults by the police, raids on private dwellings, and arbitrary arrests in the year 1994 alone.25 At the very moment when many ordinary Kosovar Albanians were losing patience with passive resistance and were becoming exhausted from the struggle to sustain the parallel system under such difficult conditions, the international Dayton Agreement over Bosnia was signed in which no mention was made of Kosovo. Albanians were disillusioned and frustrated and Rugova was criticized more and more as he did not succeed in putting the Kosovo problem high enough on the international political agenda.26 It was during this period and in this atmosphere that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) made its first appearance. The KLA did not represent a unified military organization subordinated to a political party or civil authority. It rather functioned as a guerilla movement consisting of lightly armed fighters that, however, executed the assignments of their command in a disciplined way. In June 1996 the KLA for the first time claimed a raid on Serbian targets, and in the period leading up to 1998 its members claimed to have killed ten Serbs.27 The situation was deteriorating, and the Serbian response was to follow suit as the already pervasive Serbian police harassment increased.28 The Serbian Government proclaimed the KLA a terrorist organization, thereby justifying intrusive searches, detentions, and political trials. The Humanitarian Law Center

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documented numerous cases involving police mistreatment of ethnic Albanians, including arbitrary arrest, detention, physical abuse, illegal searches, and extra-judicial killing.29 In the second half of the 1990s, the situation in Kosovo went from bad to worse. In late March 1998, Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians again voted for their own president and parliament with the latter to be inaugurated in the same year. Serb authorities refused to recognize the former political figures and used the police to disperse MPs and others. By this time members of the KLA reached the conclusion that because Albanians had not achieved their goals in a peaceful manner and because a Serbian crackdown was likely to be maintained unless something was done, it was necessary to take further radical steps. The KLA thus embarked on a series of insurgent operations against Serb officials and the government structures in Kosovo. Milosevic responded by sending tanks and in March 1998, Serb forces stoked the fires by massacring eighty-five people in Kosovo.30 At this point, the violence in Kosovo reached a critical threshold and demanded sustained international attention and involvement.31 Internationalization of the Conf lict Both the United States and the EU had long been concerned about Kosovo and the consequences of a violent eruption in the Balkans.32 However, for much of the 1990s they failed to translate their concerns into effective action to prevent the escalation of the conf lict into a humanitarian disaster. It was only in the years 1998 and 1999 that the international community started to deliberate about more decisive and punitive measures. These deliberations took place in various international fora including the UN, NATO, and the EU. Ultimately, the military action dubbed Operation Allied Force (OAF) took place under the auspices of NATO and U.S. leadership. However, the questions regarding the convergence or divergence of French, British, and German strategic orientations and the corresponding implications for common European defense ambitions remained. After the failure of this tripartite effort in particular and the EU in general to respond coherently and effectively to the Bosnia War at the beginning of the 1990s, the ensuing crisis in Kosovo provided a new opportunity to test the ambitions for a common foreign and security policy. Common European measures toward the troubled region occurred initially in August 1991. However, in subsequent years they often took a rather Janus-faced character. On the one hand, EU member states clearly aimed at halting the worsening humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. On the other hand, because of a

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traditional European “more carrot, less stick” approach, they provided Milosevic with the necessary means, mainly time, to continue his atrocities toward the realization of a Greater Serbia.33 One of the measures the EU had taken early on was the establishment of the so-called Badinter Commission. The commission was formed in the fall of 1991, only a few months after Slovenia and Croatia had declared their independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Its task was to assess the policy implications of the gradual disintegration of Yugoslavia into its constituent republics and to arbiter differences arising in the context of peace negotiations among the contending parties that were soon to begin in The Hague.34 The commission concluded that the international community should recognize the former Yugoslav Republics’ claim to sovereignty. Yet, it also stated that “the right to self-determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers” of the six republics.35 Kosovo had never been a republic and, therefore, it would remain under Serbian territorial jurisdiction. In the following years the European trio of France, Great Britain, and Germany worked mainly through the so-called international Contact Group. This group was initially constituted to deal with the Bosnia crisis earlier in the decade and now started to assume a dominant role as diplomatic agent in the deepening Kosovo crisis. Other members of the group were the United States, Russia, and Italy. Given the range of views within the group on how to respond to the ensuing crisis, it was difficult to forge an agreement on decisive and effective action. As one observer remarked critically, the “decision to rely on consensus within the Contact Group inevitably resulted in least-common-denominator policies, hardly the kind of approach necessary to convince Belgrade to change course.”36 The result was that the Contact Group often “merely” urged the Serbian leadership to “respect minority rights” and refrain from “further repression in Kosovo.”37 Thus, until the eruption of the conf lict in 1998, EU members as well the EU itself acted mainly in a civilian role. It imposed sanctions, nominated special envoys mandated to negotiate on its behalf, and issued various resolutions, statements, declarations, and conclusions in which it frequently made political statements calling for a settlement of the crisis. Indeed, between 1992 and 1999, the EU had issued over 100 statements, resolutions, declarations, conclusions, grants of humanitarian aid, which either referred to Kosovo, or from mid-1997 onward were often devoted exclusively to the crisis there. However, this immense diplomatic activity and involvement by the EU did not show much success as the regime in Belgrade remained recalcitrant and aggressive.38

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In fact, some EU actions were even counterproductive. Despite the continuing tumultuous situation in Kosovo, the EU had decided to extend recognition to the now reconstituted FRY in April 1996. De facto, the EU thereby dispensed with the weaker requirement of a special status for the Kosovar Albanians. From a legal perspective this implied that any occurrences within Yugoslavia’s borders would continue to constitute its internal problem.39 The only cautionary note of the EU was that it “considers” that improved relations between the Yugoslavia and the international community will depend, among other things, on a constructive approach by Belgrade to the granting of autonomy for Kosovo.40 Any more resolute actions of the EU remained absent. Although there had been discussion on the possibility of mandating the WEU to send a policing force to Albania at the request of the Albanian Government, this issue was never seriously mooted. The EU resisted any punitive measures against Yugoslavia, as the predominating argument was that the situation should be resolved diplomatically.41 It preferred to continue the more carrot and less stick approach in economic terms, threatening Milosevic with further sanctions and simultaneously dangling the carrot of financial aid in the form of vast reconstruction programs.42 The strategy clearly seemed to fail. In November 1997 Milosevic rejected an EU offer to “improve diplomatic and trade relations with Belgrade and support its reentry into international institutions for accepting a negotiating process between the Kosovar, Serb, and Yugoslav authorities that would be supported by third-party mediation.”43 Just like the EU, NATO and the UN also engaged in rather haphazard strategies toward Belgrade until 1998. However, in March of that year the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1160, which addressed “the serious political and human rights issues in Kosovo.” Subsequently, in September the council passed Resolution 1199, requesting that Belgrade must cease all actions by its security forces against the civilian population and also order the withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression.44 These UN demands were backed by NATO military threats as the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved the issuing of an “activation warning” for both limited air strikes and a phased air campaign.45 A few weeks later, on October 13, the alliance went further and issued an “activation order” for these actions.46 The order caused Milosevic to delay but not to stop the continuation of his atrocities. In response to the increasing international pressure Milosevic held a referendum to show that Serbian people rejected foreign meddling in their domestic matters. Empowered by a 95 percent vote of confidence,

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he subsequently stepped up military operations throughout Kosovo.47 Newspapers started documenting unprecedented levels of violence as “heavily armed police and paramilitary units, backed by helicopters, armored personnel carriers and heavy anti-aircraft guns, surrounded” and “opened fire on the villages” in southern and western Kosovo.48 Most dramatic was the infamous massacre in Racak on January 15, 1999 when at least forty-five people, including three women, a twelve-year-old boy, and several elderly men were murdered by Serbian Forces.49 The violence escalated further between February and March, when at least eighty ethnic Albanians in the Drenica region were killed which, in turn, led to a wave of 50,000 refugees. In a final initiative, the international Contact Group summoned representatives of the Kosovo Albanians and the Serb Government to the Rambouillet peace negotiations in France. The negotiations were held under the joint chairmanship of France and Britain. Germany also had a significant presence, as it had just inherited the presidency of the EU in January of 1999.50 Milosevic was not present at the conference. Instead, the Serbian delegation was led by Vice Prime Minister Ratko Markovic. The Albanian delegation was led by Ibrahim Rugowa. The Contact Group reaffirmed UN Resolution 1199, demanded that the KLA should disarm, that the Serb Forces withdraw from the Kosovo region, and that Yugoslavia restore Kosovo’s autonomy and independent institutions.51 The Serbian delegation, however, did not show much intention to negotiate. Milosevic had already declared in previous years that “[n]o pressure will make us surrender a single inch of Kosovo,” and he did not change his position over the years.52 Observers have argued that he was, in fact, using his absence in Rambouillet to plan an offensive believed to be called “Horseshoe” (Potkova), which ultimately would become a massive campaign to kill and expel all Kosovar Albanians.53 While the West placed faith in negotiations, Belgrade was preparing for a campaign that would create an ethnically cleansed Kosovo. When the Kosovar Albanian delegation signed the agreement at Rambouillet, the Serbian delegation refused to do the same.54 The atrocities continued and would soon escalate into a major conf lagration. Mental Models in the Kosovo Crisis Ultimately, the situation in Kosovo required a military intervention. The EU were left without means to address the escalation in Kosovo effectively and it was thus up to its individual members states to confront the challenge. Figure 3.1 illustrates the mental models of the French, British,

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Type A Settle > Deadlock

Type C Settle > Dominate

P/D +.75

+.50 Vedrine–O (–.08/.38)* *Fischer–S (–.67/.28) Chirac–O (–.17/.19)* C –.75

–.50

*Schroeder–S (.50/.34) +.25

Schroeder–O (–.50/.22)*

–.25

Cook–O (–.33/–.31)* Blair–O (–.33/–.44)*

Fischer–O (.67/.03) Chirac–S (.17/.00) * C * +.75 +.25 +.50 *Cook–S (.33/–.13) *Blair–S (.33/–.23) –.25 *Vedrine-S (.08/–.36) –.50

–.75 Dominate > Settle Type D

P/D

Dominate > Deadlock Type B

Figure 3.1 Mental Models in the Kosovo Crisis.

and German leadership during the Kosovo crisis. It answers two questions: First, how did the French, British, and German leadership respectively perceive and diagnose Milosevic’s intentions? These diagnoses are mapped into the figure with the letter “O” for “Other.” Second, what means did they consider effective toward a resolution of the conf lict? These prescriptive inclinations are mapped into the figure by the letter “S” for “Self.” Taken together, the figure answers whether the mental models of the French, British, and German leadership converged or diverged in the Kosovo crisis. Regarding the French leadership, both President Chirac (2.17/+.19) and his foreign minister Vedrine (2.08/+.38) diagnosed Milosevic as a Type A leader. Therefore, they believed that a political solution could potentially be possible as they perceived Milosevic to have inclinations toward a settlement. Yet, their confidence in this diagnosis is rather weak and this is ref lected in their prescriptive beliefs. Whereas President Chirac (+.17/.00) is somewhat ambiguous about what means of conf lict resolution would be appropriate, Foreign Minister Vedrine (+.08/2.36) clearly believes in the utility of a hard-line conf lict strategy. Ultimately both Chirac and Vedrine are Type B leaders in regards to the Kosovo crisis— their beliefs display inclinations for the use of military force towards dominating the situation.55

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The British leadership diagnosed the situation in Kosovo somewhat differently. The negative diagnostic propensities of its mental model indicate that Prime Minister Blair (2.33/2.44) and his foreign secretary Cook (2.33/2.31) diagnosed Milosevic to be a Type D leader. Therefore, they believed that a political solution to the ongoing crisis would not be possible. Instead, they were convinced that Milosevic was and would remain hostile.56 Blair (+.33/2.23) and Cook (+.33/2.13) do resemble their French counterparts, however, in that they exert Type B prescriptive propensities. They believed in the utility of a conf lictual approach toward the regime in Belgrade. Both leaders also shared a faith that this would indeed be the final outcome, as their positive control propensities scores (+.33) indicate a belief that the alliance would be in ultimate control over the future developments in Kosovo. The mental models of the German leadership are indicative of a yet different assessment when compared to the French and British mental models.57 Both Chancellor Schroeder (2.50/+.22) and his foreign minister Fischer (+.67/+.03) believed that a political solution and cooperation was still possible as they diagnosed Milosevic to ultimately favor a settlement. Hence in terms of diagnosis the German leadership was in agreement with French leaders but not with British leaders. Regarding prescriptive propensities, the German leadership was in disagreement with both, French and British leaders. Chancellor Schroeder (+.50/+.34) exerted Type C prescriptive propensities. Foreign Minister Fischer (2.67/+.28) diverts from the chancellor in that he perceives himself to have less control over the development of the conf lict. He, therefore, resembles a Type A leader.58 In stark contrast to the French and British leadership, both German leaders favor a cooperative strategy as they aimed to avoid further escalation and, for the most part, considered resources other than military intervention as useful.59 In sum, in the Kosovo crisis the French British, and German leaderships did not share a uniform mental model. Whereas the French perceived that a political solution might be possible, they ultimately, and seemingly paradoxically, aimed to impose the solution through military means. The British leadership, on the other hand, did not place any faith in a peaceful resolution of the conf lict and was, therefore, very determined in its conf lictual approach to the crisis. In stark contrast is the German leadership, which believed that a political solution would be possible and was willing to work toward it by diplomatic means. According to the theoretical expectations from the shared mental model framework, the divergence of the respective national mental models should lead to a negative feedback on the EU’s common foreign and security policy

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aspirations and translate into dissimilar strategic activities of France, Great Britain, and Germany toward the regime in Belgrade. The task for the remainder of this chapter is to investigate empirically this theoretical expectation. France More than any other European leaders, the French decision-making elite considered the Kosovo crisis to be a European affair and, therefore, sought to assume a leadership role.60 Already in March 1998, French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine emphasized that “the status quo” in Kosovo has become intolerable.”61 He subsequently renounced the previously issued European recognition of Yugoslav sovereignty, explaining that violence in the Serbian province “is not exclusively a domestic Serbian issue, because a deterioration of the situation could lead to unpredictable repercussions of neighboring states.”62 At the same time President Jacques Chirac called for an “urgent, resolute reaction” from the international community on the Kosovo crisis, arguing, “[w]e cannot allow ethnic hatred to unfurl again on our continent.”63 However, as indicated by the diagnostic propensities of French mental models, the French leadership was still hopeful for a political settlement to the crisis and, often motivated in addition by Germany, it was also willing to work toward it. At the end of March, Vedrine and his German counterpart Klaus Kinkel convened in France to discuss the demands issued by the international Contact Group, which had just declared its expectation that Milosevic must “implement the process of unconditional dialogue and take political responsibility for ensuring that Belgrade engages in serious negotiation on Kosovo’s status.”64 Vedrine reasoned that an autonomous Kosovo would be the only solution to the escalating crisis. To this end, both parties had to be brought to the negotiating table. Vedrine, therefore, also called on Albanian leaders to contribute to this goal and to “engage themselves immediately in talks.”65 Although Albanians were disposed to negotiations, Milosevic rejected them and the crisis continued to escalate. From this point onward, French initiatives toward the Belgrade regime oscillated more intensely between diplomacy and military threats and the prescriptive elements of the French mental models would gradually manifest themselves in their strategic activities. At the end of May, French Military authorities participated in intensified contingency planning meetings at the NATO headquarters in Brussels and on June 9, French European affairs Minister Pierre Moscovici declared that the use of force

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in Kosovo would indeed be a possibility.66 In mid-June, French prime minister Lionel Jospin echoed in a television interview earlier U.S. statements to the effect that Kosovo will not become another Bosnia. Also, President Chirac supported this stance two weeks later, declaring that only “very firm action by the international community,” including the threat of military force, could break the cycle of violence in Kosovo as it did in Bosnia three years ago after years of ineffective UN peacekeeping action there.67 Milosevic, however, still did not show any signs of compromise. Subsequently, on July 2, 1998, Vedrine judged the situation in Kosovo to be explosive and declared that further punitive action would be necessary.68 Together with the British leadership, the French leaders thus engaged in drafting a UN Security Council resolution aimed at securing a ceasefire in Kosovo. The draft would later become UN Resolution 1160.69 It complemented previous declarations by the international Contact Group and threatened that additional measures aimed at ending the fighting would be taken if Serb Forces and the KLA did not take steps to halt the hostilities. Like many others that followed, the resolution had no real impact on the situation because Russia, a traditional ally of Yugoslavia, disapproved of any specification regarding what those additional measures might entail.70 Cognizant of this constraining limitation, in mid-September, France, in close collaboration with Britain, pushed for a UN worldwide ban for “tougher actions” over Kosovo.71 As the violence in Kosovo persisted through September, the French leadership increased the warning signs for an armed intervention. Defence Minister Alain Richard explained that France would be ready to commit its air force in order to stop the “mass repression carried out by the Serbian Army in Kosovo.” 72 One week later, a French Defence Ministry spokesman confirmed this announcement stating that “France will participate in all operations, including ground operations, if the international community should take such a decision.” 73 Regarding the aspect of ground operations, the confirmation turned out to be premature, however, causing some upheavals within the Defence Ministry. In a subsequent communiqué, the ministry thus aimed at clarifying this statement and declared that no decision had yet been made on sending ground troops. Because the diagnostic and prescriptive propensities of the French mental model were at odds with each other, French military threats continued to be coupled with political appeals and initiatives. On October 5, President Chirac urged Milosevic to “fully and immediately” implement UN Security Council Resolution 1199 that had been ratified in the meantime.74 The resolution called for the cessation of hostilities toward

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ethnic Albanians, a cease-fire, as well as immediate steps by both parties to improve the humanitarian situation and enter into negotiations with international involvement. The document concluded that if the concrete measures demanded in this would not be taken the Security Council would be compelled to consider “further action and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region.” 75 However, any specification about these additional measures was lacking again. In the following weeks the French leadership would continue its dual strategy of political efforts combined with military threats. Soon after Resolution 1199 had been ratified, President Chirac explained that, “military action can still be averted,” but he also cautioned that, “If the humanitarian situation required it, France would not hesitate to intervene militarily.” 76 Recognizing that the UN resolution was not sufficient to provide a legal basis for the use of armed forces, France sought to legitimize these and further threats by introducing new proposals for future Security Council resolutions. During subsequent weeks, however, it became clear again that Russia and China would veto any Security Council resolution containing a concrete mandate or an authorization to employ threats or the use of force against Yugoslavia.77 Despite Russian and Chinese resistance, Chirac remained convinced of the necessity of such means and reasoned on October 6: Any military action must be requested . . . by the Security Council. In this particular case, we have a resolution which does open the way to the possibility of military action. I would add, and repeat, that the humanitarian situation constitutes a ground that can justify an exception to a rule, however strong and firm it is. And if it appeared that the situation required it, then France would not hesitate to join those to intervene in order to assist those that are in danger.78

While Chirac appealed to the Russian and Chinese presidents Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin, arguing for the appropriateness of strikes against Belgrade, the French military continued to engage in military preparations anticipating a potential further escalation of the situation. In fact, Defence Minister Alain Richard announced that the country would be ready to lead and supply the largest contingent of the “extraction force,” an all-European squad of about 1,500 troops intended to protect unarmed observers deployed to monitor the truce in the Yugoslav province.79 Smaller contingencies were also to be provided by Great Britain and Germany. Despite these warnings and military preparations, at this stage the French leadership had not yet entirely lost the hope in their initial

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diagnosis of Milosevic as favoring a settlement. It was again especially the German leadership which continuously sought to regain the French commitment to the diplomatic track. On January 20, 1999, Vedrine convened in Paris with his German counterpart Joschka Fischer who, in the meantime, had come to replace Klaus Kinkel. Both foreign ministers declared in a joint statement after their deliberations that “Every effort must be made to intensify diplomatic efforts.”80 At the end of January, Vedrine also met with his Italian counterpart Lamberto Dini in Rome to discuss the situation in Kosovo. Both considered it imperative that the negotiations of the Contact Group should produce a “fully-f ledged diplomatic and political action plan” backed by a “credible” NATO threat to use force if necessary. Vedrine explained further that the international community must try to “force the hand” of the parties to the conf lict and that they must know that, “If they don’t negotiate, there is the risk of more direct action, and we want to avoid a catastrophe.”81 At the same time, Chirac and Vedrine continued demonstrating their readiness to back up rhetoric by concrete actions. The foreign minister’s announcement concerning the obligations of the international community and the necessity of dialogue between the conf licting parties came just shortly after the French leadership declared that it would redeploy aircraft in Italy and send an aircraft carrier to the Adriatic Sea bordering the south of Yugoslavia in response to the escalating crisis.82 In fact, at this time the crisis had reached a low point after the Serb assault and murder of dozens of Albanians in Racak on January 15, 1999. The French leadership’s last diplomatic effort occurred then finally through the Rambouillet Conference that opened on February 6, 1999 near Paris. Chirac and Vedrine considered it important that the conference would take place in France in an attempt to demonstrate its leadership in the crisis and to compensate for the EU’s failure in the Bosnia crisis where without heavy U.S. involvement no peace could have been reached at Dayton in 1995. One observer writes accordingly: The choice of a French chateau for the talks, rather than a U.S. base in Ohio, was intended to symbolize the ability of the Europeans to sort out their own backyard, without the need to rely on the kind of decisive U.S. action which had eventually led to the termination of active hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.83

While the French leadership aimed at substantiating the EU’s CFSP project at Rambouillet, it was also well aware that divergent national approaches to the escalating Kosovo crisis were emerging. Britain had

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advocated the deployment of ground troops all along. France, along with Germany, largely opposed this option. German leaders went even further and were hesitant towards any military intervention. This disharmony rendered French leaders cautious. In fact, given the lack of cohesion in the foreplay to Rambouillet, French leaders even appeared to be prepared for a prospective failure of the forthcoming talks. One observer quoted one French diplomat as saying that “[a]bove all we do not want this to be seen as a test of Europe’s CFSP.”84 The goal at the Rambouillet Conference was to secure a cease-fire and subsequently to negotiate the conditions concerning international civilian and military presence in Kosovo. However, after the first round of negotiations it was clear that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to reach any agreement between the conf licting parties. Indeed, in the end the conference turned out to be a mere process in which terms were laid out but no agreements were reached. A follow-up meeting was scheduled for March 15. Yet, also this meeting proved unsuccessful. When on March 18 the Kosovo delegation signed an agreement and the Serbs did not, the French and British conference cochairs adjourned the conference, stating that “the talks will not resume unless the Serbs express their acceptance of the accords.”85 Milosevic, however, showed no inclination to do so. Instead, he decided to escalate the crisis. As the second round of talks in France began, Milosevic reportedly ordered a major buildup of Yugoslav Armed Forces. The buildup took place within and immediately adjacent to Kosovo’s borders and it was interpreted as a clear sign that a major move against the KLA and against ethnic Albanians was imminent.86 The crisis escalated yet further on March 22 when Milosevic dismissed a joint message from the French foreign minister and British foreign secretary asking him to accept the Rambouillet peace plan for Kosovo or face severe consequences. Milosevic’s response to this warning was announced on Radio Belgrade and he stated that, in fact, no agreement had been reached at Rambouillet and that there was nothing to sign.87 The French leadership became increasingly cognizant that their perception of a possible settlement with Milosevic was in fact a misperception and it was now willing to respond accordingly. The prescriptive propensities of the French mental model came into full play on March 24, 1999 when President Chirac announced his decision to take part in OAF military actions in Kosovo. A governmental communiqué justified this move explaining that all political means had been exhausted to convince the Yugoslav authorities to chose a negotiated solution. The communiqué stated further that the “Belgrade authorities refused to reply to the

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international community’s demands, end any offensive in Kosovo and sign the Rambouillet accords. By persisting in this attitude . . . Milosevic bears the entire responsibility for the consequences resulting from this refusal.” On the same day, Chirac also stated that the international community would “have to take note of the failure of a diplomatic solution in Kosovo and draw the consequences.”88 French leaders remained determined through the duration of the war. On April 14, the Defence Ministry explained that despite three weeks of air strikes, Serbia still has “important and threatening” ground forces. A spokesman estimated Serbian Forces still operating in the province at 20,000 troops, 15,000 paramilitary, and 300 to 400 vehicles and tanks.89 In consequence, on May 3, Defence Secretary Richard announced that France was to boost its participation in the NATO air-strikes campaign against Yugoslavia by 25 percent. At this time, France had already nearly 6,000 troops, 7 warships, and approximately 60 aircraft deployed in Albania, Macedonia, Italy, and the Adriatic.90 Indeed, France’s ambition to take a leading role in the crisis question was visible in its overall contribution to OAF. It deployed a total of more than 100 aircrafts to the alliance and f lew a total of 2,414 sorties, thereby topping any other European state. The aircrafts consisted primarily of fighter aircraft to f ly strikes against strategic Serbian targets. Among these were approximately eight Mirage 2000Ds, twelve Jaguar strike aircraft, six Mirage F1CTs, three Mirage IV Ps, and several Super Entendards. Along with Great Britain, France also participated at high levels in the strike phase of air operations through the use of precision-guided munitions (PGMs). The majority of PGMs employed by the French were Paveway I and III laser-guided bombs and AS30L air-to-surface missiles.91 Moreover, France also deployed a substantial number of support aircraft to the area of operations and they f lew approximately, 1,600 sorties. This deployment included eight Mirage 200Cs for Combat Air Patrol (CAP), four Mirage F1 CRs and one C-160G for electronic warfare (EW), three Mirage IV Ps, and two E-3F Airborne Warning and Control (AWAC) aircraft. Included were also several CL-289 drones and Crecerelle unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions; and three KC-135F aerial refueling aircraft. French pilots f lew approximately 21 percent of all reconnaissance missions, 12 percent of strike missions, and 12 percent of transport and support missions.92 The military operations were orchestrated mainly by the United States and to a lesser extent Great Britain. However, France’s ambition to demonstrate its leadership role led at various times to contentions

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with the United States. Contrary to the inclinations of the latter, the French leadership had advocated that decision authority in various military questions ought to rest with the Contact Group and the UN rather than with NATO. Exemplary here were questions of when and how to launch air strikes. French authorities often painstakingly reviewed all NATO targets throughout the air war and, in fact, at times wielded their veto power over hitting certain targets.93 France also argued that that the deployment of the multinational force had to be authorized by the UN and not NATO. The United States opposed this demand and both settled for the British proposal that the deployment would receive UN endorsement rather than authorization.94 Despite these contentions France was committed to the campaign in Kosovo throughout the crisis. The diagnostic propensities of the French leadership’s mental models had indicated a belief that a political settlement over the Kosovo question would be possible. As it became evident that this was in fact a false hope, the prescriptive elements of the French mental models increasingly manifested themselves, and the French leadership acted in accordance with them as the historical narrative illustrates. Both President Chirac and Foreign Minister Vedrine showed themselves determined to dominate the ensuing situation by resorting to military force and contributing in significant ways to the military campaign. However, there were also limits to the French commitment. On May 12, French defense chief Jean-Pierre Kelche had notified the NATO command that France would participate in a ground invasion with up to 20,000 troops. Two weeks later the French leadership renewed this pledge at a secret NATO meeting. However, it soon became evident that the French leadership was in no hurry to begin such a campaign.95 As concrete planning went forward within the British decision-making elite, the French argued for a delay until the spring of 2000 and distanced themselves from any immediate ground engagement in Kosovo.96 Great Britain As the situation in Kosovo escalated, Great Britain showed itself as the most assertive and hawkish European state. Both Prime Minister Tony Blair and Foreign Secretary Robin Cook sought to support their aggressive stance by continuous references to the lessons of history such as the Nazi threat in the 1930s and the tragic failure of British appeasement policy toward Germany. Also, the more recent history figured prominently in the British decision-making process during the Kosovo crisis. Wanting to avoid the same mistake made in Bosnia where the West

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dithered as thousands died, the British leadership appealed to the international community that determined and decisive action, including military intervention, needed to be taken early on. At the beginning of March 1998, Foreign Office State Minister Tony Lloyd traveled to Belgrade to assess the evolving situation. After a subsequent meeting in Tirana with Albania’s foreign minister Paskal Milo and state minister Kastriot Islami, Lloyd declared that the “Kosovo issue is not a domestic affair of Serbia, but an international problem.”97 Lloyd was subsequently backed by Foreign Secretary Robin Cook who confirmed that the British government would not accept events in Kosovo as “a purely domestic affair.”98 Thus, just like the French leadership, the British leadership renounced the EU’s previously granted sovereignty status for Yugoslavia. Early on, the British leadership saw the diagnostic propensities of its mental models confirmed and their prescriptive propensities would also manifest themselves very soon in its actions. According to one British official, already in the spring of 1998 London firmly believed that the “only thing that would change Milosevic’s actions would be [military] actions in and over Kosovo itself.”99 In June, Prime Minister Blair went further and argued that, in dealing with Milosevic, “the only question that matters is whether you are prepared to use force. And we have to be. I’ll send troops to end the slaughter.”100 Indeed, just a few days earlier, the Defence Ministry had announced that over the next weeks Britain would dispatch troops to Macedonia to build a “firewall” in order to preempt a wider Balkan conf lict that could potentially spill over to wider regions of Europe.101 In New York in the meantime, the British leadership was engaged in seeking agreement on a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of “all necessary means” to stabilize the region. Moreover, in Brussels Britain suggested that NATO had to consider deploying ground forces.102 However, the Blair-Cook tandem found few supporters among its European allies as no one here, at this time, advocated the deployment of ground troops. Especially, the German decision-making elite showed itself to be very critical toward the British strategy. Moreover, much to the disappointment of Tony Blair and Robin Cook, U.S. President Bill Clinton also renounced the consideration of ground troops at this time. The British leadership, however, in accordance with the prescriptive propensities of its mental model, remained committed to its assertive course. On June 12, British defence secretary George Robertson ordered six Royal Air Force (RAF) Jaguar ground attack aircraft and one Tristar

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tanker to be prepared to take part in a “possible NATO air exercise over Albania and Macedonia.” He elaborated further on this decision, stating: Mr. Milosevic must understand that diplomacy to end the escalating Kosovo violence is being backed up by the threat of force. This is not just defence ministers rattling sabers—it is time for Belgrade to get the message that NATO mean business. A multinational NATO exercise will show Belgrade how high the stakes have become.103

The response of Milosevic to these stern British warnings led to a further escalation of the crisis. He declared that Yugoslavia “will defend itself as much as it will be able to.”104 Similar voices came from his Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic in Brussels where he told his Belgian counterpart, Eric Derycke, that his country will not cede to the international community’s demand that Yugoslav security forces be withdrawn from Kosovo where they would have to fight the KLA. In September at the UN, Tony Blair was emphatic that no action by the KLA could “justify scorched earth tactics and forcible creation of hundreds of thousands of refugees.”105 In the same month the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1199, demanding the withdrawal of Serbian Military units. Yet at the beginning of October, UN secretary-general Kofi Annan reported only a limited withdrawal from Kosovo. At the same time NATO secretarygeneral Javier Solana said that it was evident that the Serbian Government has neither complied with this nor previous UN resolutions. Indeed, by the middle of November, the number of Serb Forces increased again and they would continue to do so in coming weeks. The increasingly brazen Serbian defiance would pose a major challenge to the cohesiveness of the international alliance. It was again especially German leaders who continued to argue against the hawkish stance of the British leadership. The British leadership, however, remained determined as was to be expected from the diagnostic and prescriptive propensities of its mental model. In a statement to the Security Council it referred to Article 7 of the UN Charter and declared that Serbian actions constituted “a threat to peace and security in the region.” Therefore, the international community would be justified in employing “any means necessary” towards ending the escalation of the crisis.106 The British leadership was convinced that diplomatic pressure alone would not persuade Milosevic to withdraw from Kosovo and that it had to react with military means to avoid mistakes of the past.

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At the very beginning of October Tony Blair was briefed by chief of defence staff General Charles Guthire.107 In response to Milosevic’s continuous defiance Britain was reinforcing its RAF Harrier ground attack aircraft unit stationed at Gioia del Colle in southern Italy. Announcing the new deployment, Defence Secretary George Robertson explained, “This deployment shows that we mean business and if the violence does not stop, then Britain will play its full part in what needs to be done.” Tony Blair elaborated further on British television and explained that the “humanitarian disaster will only be stopped if Milosevic gets the clearest possible message . . . , namely if you carry on doing this you will face a military penalty.”108 On October 4, a Whitehall spokesperson confirmed that military preparations were “well advanced.”109 Military threats were repeated in the following days with increased intensity. However, these were met again by Milosevic’s defiance when in December he threatened military resistance should any foreign troops attempt to enter Kosovo. In the aftermath of the horrific Racak massacre in January 1999, the British leadership emphasized that the Rabouillet Conference would be the last opportunity for a political settlement. Because the leadership did not have much, if any confidence as indicated by the diagnostic propensities of its mental model, it continued to emphasize its commitment to ground troops. When after the first round of negotiations it became obvious that the conference might fail in reaching its goals, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook declared at a subsequent press gathering: “Those who put obstacles in the way of the successful realization of the Rambouillet Accords will be held responsible.”110 Indeed, at the beginning of February the British Army began moving about 400 tanks and other armored military vehicles (AMVS) from Germany to Greece for use in a possible NATO military intervention in Kosovo.111 As Milosevic continued his uncompromising stance, the crisis escalated into a war. On March 24, OAF started and together with the United States, the British leadership came to take the main role in orchestrating it. In an interview regarding the first wave of air strikes, British defence minister Robertson underlined the leadership’s confidence in its diagnosis of Milosevic. He likened striking at Milosevic to standing up to Hitler, stating: We could not simply stand idly by. We must learn the lessons of the early days of Hitler. Had we stood up to his tyranny earlier, the course of history might have been very different. More than most, the British people understand that appeasement did not work in the 1930s. Nor will it in the 1990s.

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And so we had to bring Milosevic to heel, before the spark of violence erupted throughout the Balkans.112

The British RAF was the second largest contributing allied air force, deploying forty-five fixed-wing aircrafts and f lying a total of 1,950 sorties. For strike and CAP missions, the RAF deployed sixteen Harrier GR7s, seven Sea Harrier FA2s, and three Tornado GR1s. Like the French air force, the British air force participated in a high percentage of strike missions f lying a total of approximately 1,000 sorties.113 The PGMs the British used were predominantly Paveway II and III laser-guided bombs as well as Air Launched Antiradition Missiles (ALARM) antiradiation missiles. RAF support aircraft deployed to OAF consisted of three E-3Ds and one Nimrod for Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and ISR missions; four Tristars and five VC10s were deployed for aerial refueling and various fighter aircraft were used to f ly CAP sorties.114 Throughout the duration of the conf lict, the British leadership was clearly more determined than its European partners and especially Germany. Both the French and the German leaders had consistently rejected the deployment of ground troops. Britain, however, remained committed to this option. At the beginning of April, NATO general Wesley Clark briefed the prime minister on the continuing expulsion of Albanians, the disposition of Serb forces in Kosovo, and the effects of the ongoing air campaign. The briefing had the consequence of furthering Blair’s already strong support for a ground invasion of Kosovo. According to General Clark, the “British were leaning hard to push ahead for planning the ground option. The Prime Minister was determined to do all required to win.”115 Indeed, Blair’s prescriptive propensities translated into direct action. In a television interview on April 18, Blair advocated what he referred to as a “multicomponent war,” and many international observers interpreted this statement as publicly raising the question of NATO ground troops. The British stance came much to the dismay of German leaders and Chancellor Schroeder soon threatened to break with NATO if ground forces became a serious agenda item. Despite various urgings from the German leadership, the Blair-Cook tandem was not willing to move from its stance. After Milosevic had offered a unilateral cease-fire, the British leadership rejected it instantly as a diversionary tactic, commenting that it falls “pitifully short of what we expect,” reasoning moreover, “the Balkans are littered with broken Serbian cease-fires” and that “Bosnia is a testimony to that.”116 The timing of the offer also raised suspicion that Milosevic was engaging in a diplomatic ploy to divide NATO on the eve of the alliance’s fiftieth anniversary summit, which would open on April 23.

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Members of the Alliance had indeed diverging strategic preferences. At the NATO Summit, therefore, NATO officials considered important the establishment of “an irreversible commitment” for all members to continue military action until Milosevic accepted five conditions.117 These included A verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression; the withdrawal of Serb military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo; the stationing of an international military presence in Kosovo; the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations; an assurance to work on the basis of the Rambouillet accords in the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international law and the charter of the United Nations.118

Given that Milosevic remained defiant, Britain reacted by increasing the number of Harrier GR7 warplanes to the conf lict in a further “ratcheting up” of the NATO air campaign and at the beginning of May Britain send the helicopter carrier Ocean to the Mediterranean adding to the presence of the aircraft carrier Invincible and the Splendid, a submarine equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles. In addition to about eighteen helicopters, the Ocean carried approximately 1,000 troops. In accordance with his prescriptive propensities, on April 21, Tony Blair again proposed a ground invasion of Kosovo. He had not succeeded in convincing European allies, and now he tried to convince President Clinton of this necessity as he met with him two days before the NATO Summit. At this meeting as well as in preceding and following ones, Blair emphasized that failure was not an option for NATO, and, that in his mind, airpower was hardly guaranteed to work.119 Clinton gradually came to share Blair’s frustration with the course of the air campaign and that NATO could not allow itself to lose. A possible ground deployment was not discussed at the NATO meeting in order to maintain alliance cohesion. However, soon afterwards the U.S. indeed initiated accelerated the planning for a possible ground campaign. Comments were made subsequently by a spokesman in Downing Street, suggesting that it was not a question of whether ground troops would be deployed, but a question of when.120 British defense chief Charles Guthire notified NATO supreme commander Wesley Clark on May 12 that the country was willing to devote as many as 35,000–50,000 thousand troops for an invasion force.121 On May 17 in Brussels, Robin Cook furthered advanced the prime minister’s appeal for what he had referred to as a “multicomponent war.” The British argument was that the air strikes would soon create a “semi-permissive” environment. Cook

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explained that in such a situation a land attack could occur without major organized Serbian resistance.122 Opposition to such a move came swiftly from the French leadership and also from the German chancellor and the Italian prime minister. Seemingly oblivious of the continental resistance, Britain kept pushing without support by its European allies. At the end of May, the British leadership sent yet further signals for a ground invasion when Defence Minister Robertson announced the deployment of an extra 12,000 troops and support personnel for the KFOR (Kosovo Force) peace implementation force. This brought total British military strength committed to the Kosovo crisis in Albania, Macedonia, Italy, and the Adriatic to more than 19,000.123 Regarding this particular deployment, Robertson publicly insisted that what was being formed was not an invasion force. However, Tony Blair soon indicated in the House of Commons that the troops could be used for a combat role. In the meantime the British leadership had engaged in unilateral assessments for a ground offensive in Kosovo and developed an operational plan for a ground invasion.124 The plan was subsequently submitted to the NATO headquarters where General Wesley Clark appointed a secret team to review it. It was code named Plan Bravo and intended the invasion of Belgrade with a troop strength of 300,000. However, after consideration the review team opted for the evaluation of a less-intensive invasion plan that called for 175,000 troops to invade Kosovo from the south. This plan became subsequently known as the Bravo-minus option, indicating that it would be less intensive than a full invasion of Belgrade.125 The Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff John Day later acknowledged the British KFOR increase in the context of B minus: The decision to increase KFOR was militarily right in itself, but it was also a form of heavy breathing on Milosevic and a subtle way of moving to B Minus whilst keeping the coalition together. The move also had the effect of shortening our timelines for B Minus. It is true that the forces that were being prepared for KFOR-Plus were the core elements of what would then become B Minus, the full ground invasion.126

Toward the end of May, defense ministers from the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and France convened in Cologne to discuss the ensuing situation in Kosovo. George Robertson used this occasion to further the case for a ground invasion, pledging 54,000 troops to the effort. The British Government backed up this pledge by acknowledging that 30,000 letters had been prepared calling up reservists.127 It remains unclear whether the NAC would indeed have approved a ground invasion. At the

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end of the month Robin Cook departed for Bonn and Paris in an effort to swing the reluctant German and French allies behind the more hawkish British approach. And a few days later on May 29, Britain reportedly offered to provide up to a third of a 15,000 invasion force for Kosovo.128 However, just a few days later Milosevic conceded to an international peace plan that was initiated mainly by German leaders. Germany In Germany deliberations about possible military operations in Kosovo came relatively late in Germany. By the spring of 1998, Belgrade had concentrated approximately 20,000 troops and special police forces in Kosovo and the region in fact constituted a combat zone.129 Nevertheless, a situation report of the German Foreign Ministry from March 11, 1998 dismissed the notion that Kosovo Albanian refugees returning to Kosovo would face any repression on the part of state authorities.130 Shortly thereafter, in contrast to the French and British approaches, Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel told the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel that the government recognized Belgrade’s sovereignty in Kosovo and that it could, therefore, not condone either Albanian separatism or efforts to alter existing borders.131 By the end of October, longtime chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Kinkel were replaced by a Left-leaning coalition. SocialDemocratic Party leader Gerhard Schroeder was elected chancellor and Joschka Fischer from the Green Party became vice-chancellor and foreign minister. This new government coalition shared antimilitarist ideology that was particularly strong within the ranks of the Green Party as it emerged from the pacifist movement of the 1960s and 1970s.132 As the evidence of Serbian-initiated mass genocide against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo would become evident over the next weeks and months, the German leadership confronted the traumatic dilemma of how to balance two contending lessons of German history—“never again war” and “never again Auschwitz.”133 For the most part, the lesson “never again war” prevailed in the German decision-making process. The German capitol became the hub for diplomatic consultations toward a political end to the war. The diagnostic propensities of the German mental models showed overlap with the French assessment insofar as German leaders believed that Milosevic would ultimately be inclined toward a political solution. Regarding prescriptive propensities, however, the German leaders stood far apart from both their French and British counterparts as they rejected

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the consideration of military means to reach a resolution of the conf lict. Indeed, German hesitancy regarding the use of military force as a means of conf lict resolution was visible throughout the crisis in Kosovo. In mid-October, for example, Milosevic had agreed to a cease-fire and a partial withdrawal of Serb Forces from Kosovo in response to an immediate NATO bombing threat. When on October 26 the NATO command in Brussels called off the threat of attacks against Serbian targets, the decision was greeted “with great relief ” in Germany.134 As was to be expected from the distinct German mental models, the German course was different from that taken by the French and British leadership. Chancellor Schroeder and Foreign Minister Fischer put a much heavier emphasis on diplomacy toward settlement. They argued that the region’s problems cannot be solved militarily, but required instead a long-term political engagement by the international community. Toward this end, German leaders used their EU Presidency to initiate the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. The pact was based on the premise that only politics of integration can create a peaceful and stable order in Europe. It, therefore, aimed at the transformation of the entire region by offering the perspective of eventually joining the EU.135 Germany also used its presidency of the G-8 forum to push a nonmilitary solution. Here, the German approach was distinct from France and Britain not only in the stronger rejection of military force, but also in that it sought the close collaboration of Russia.136 Moscow shared traditional ties with Belgrade and, in the mind of German leaders, it had the capacity to help bring forth a settlement. Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping explained these German efforts, stating, “It is quite clear that, perhaps more than other states, Russia has the opportunity to inf luence the behavior of certain governments. As far as I can see, Russia is doing this in an absolutely constructive way”—a statement subsequently confirmed on several occasions by Chancellor Schroeder.137 Despite its hesitancy towards using military means, the German leadership was aware that ultimately it had to meet its international obligations and prove its alliance loyalty.138 However, whatever German leaders undertook outside the political track came with much hesitation and was of a rather modest nature. On November 4, Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping informed the Bundestag of the cabinet’s plans to employ 16 unmanned drones for surveillance purposes and 350 troops intended to protect observers from the OSCE who were to monitor the Serb army’s withdrawal from Kosovo. Ultimately, however, on November 18, the German leadership reduced its commitment to 200 soldiers.

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Characteristic of the German approach was henceforth strong rhetoric, but weak actions. While Joschka Fischer, for instance, argued publicly for the consideration of force, concrete German efforts remained confined to political undertakings.139 Even after the massacre in Racak the German leadership continued to believe in a political solution to the Kosovo conf lict focusing its efforts to bring Serbs and KLA representatives to the negotiating table.140 The French and British leaders, of course, also participated in such political efforts, but much more than the German politicians, they engaged simultaneously in military preparations for a possible attack on Serbian targets. Differences existed not only between Germany and its European partners, but also vis-a-vis Washington. Similar to the British leadership, U.S. officials argued that a military strike against Serbia should have been carried out in response to the Serb massacre at Racak. Within the Contact Group and the EU, German officials strongly opposed this option and it succeeded in averting immediate air strikes against Belgrade.141 Foreign Minister Fischer met subsequently with his Russian counterpart Igor Ivanov on February 17 to discuss anew a possible settlement in Kosovo. At the meeting he emphasized anew the importance of a broad international consensus towards a peaceful solution and the importance of Russia towards this end. He explained that, “Russia has been, is and will remain Germany’s major partner, and this is ref lected in our joint decision to achieve the Kosovo settlement.”142 While Germany was engaging Russia, it registered a concern with the British hawkishness and with a certain half heartedness on the part of the United States in the international negotiations.143 U.S. officials insisted that the negotiations in Rambouillet should be conducted at the ambassador level. The German Government, however, preferred that these should be conducted by the Foreign Ministers of the Contact Group. The Germans argued it would project higher levels of authority and, therefore, be more efficient. Despite its EU presidency, Germany failed to achieve its goal. Nevertheless, just before the onset of the conference the German leadership expressed its “restrained optimism” for a political settlement to the conf lict. A Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed that there were signs that the hostile parties were willing to participate in the conference.144 Germany was very committed to the Rambouillet talks and hopeful that they would lead to a political solution of the conf lict. In the aftermath of the conference it was striking that the German interpretation of the outcomes stood quite apart from the French and British interpretation. Despite the fact that the conference resulted in a failure as the Serbian

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delegation blocked any viable agreement, State Secretary Wolfgang Ischinger nevertheless assessed the results of the negotiations in Rambouillet as positive stating that although less was achieved than what had been hoped for, “it was clearly more than many had been feared.”145 One day later, Defense Minister Scharping spoke in the Bundestag and reinforced this assessment as he stressed that the path toward peace has been opened by the negotiations.146 Subsequently, on March 8, Fischer traveled to Belgrade to meet Milosevic and his Foreign Minister Jovanovic in an effort to further the peace initiative. Fischer called for the reinstitution of autonomy for Kosovo and for the acceptance of the international peace plan in its entirety calling it the “last chance for a peaceful solution” in Kosovo. Milosevic countered that the international community was already represented in Kosovo through observers from the OSCE and that, therefore, there would be no justification for military threats or pressure of any kind on Belgrade. Instead, Milosevic argued, that Europe should “support the fight against Albanian terrorism.” Jovanovic further backed Milosevic as he called for an end of all international support and financing for Kosovar Albanian “separatism and terrorism.”147 Despite Fischer’s failure to persuade the Yugoslav leadership to accept the international peace plan, the German leadership, in accordance with the prescriptive propensities of its mental model, remained committed to a political solution. On March 17, the chancellor stressed that the cabinet would be in complete agreement that “up to the last conceivable moment,” everything must be tried to reach a peaceful settlement.148 Dislike for military operations was expressed especially by the Green Party and their defense expert Angelika Beer. In a radio interview on March 22, she reasoned that, “[m]ilitary action does not help at all.” The result would not only be war in Kosovo but would also endanger the situation in Bosnia and the Dayton peace agreement. She emphasized further that a NATO Military strike does not provide “a peace guarantee for the Balkans,” and expressed her hope and expectation that “Milosevic, as a calculating tactician of power,” will sign the peace agreement at the last moment.149 As the crisis continued to escalate, however, German leaders recognized that they could not ignore their alliance obligations and the “lessons of Auschwitz” appeared to start weighing heavier in their decision-making processes. The German Bundestag finally gave its approval for German participation in the alliance action. Chancellor Schroeder justified the forthcoming engagement, arguing that the “fundamental values of freedom, democracy, and human rights” were being

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f louted in Kosovo.150 At the same time it was stressed by all leading politicians that the German agreement for military action was not to be regarded as a “green light” for similar NATO interventions in general. Despite Germany’s approval for military action its subsequent contribution in this area was rather modest. In fact, one observer pointed out that “the German role in military operations was so limited that it could almost be called token.”151 During the military campaign in Kosovo German forces were restricted almost exclusively to roles that involved no major risk of combat.152 As opposed to the French and British Air forces, the German Air force did not participate in any major strike missions. Germany deployed 14 Tornados to support OAF. Ten of these were Tornado electronic combat and reconnaissance (ECR), four of which were interdiction Tornados fitted with reconnaissance pods. The Tornado ECR’s were used for suppressing enemy air defenses, while the four Tornado pods were used to gather reconnaissance on ground units and refugee f lows. The other air asset that Germany deployed was the CL-289 reconnaissance drone f lying 237 sorties. Immediately after the first air strikes a German hesitation toward continuing the military operations set in. On 29 March, German Government officials including many members of the Green Party argued that since the beginning of the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, the “situation has not changed for the better, but for the worse.”153 Indeed, toward midApril air strikes against Serbian targets were without much success. NATO officials estimated that it had destroyed only about a dozen Serb tanks.154 Even worse, on April 27, NATO general Wesley Clark suggested that Belgrade might even have strengthened its forces inside Kosovo since the war began.155 The alliance was thus achieving neither its humanitarian goals of saving lives nor its strategic goals of stopping the Serb aggression and stabilizing the region.156 The British leadership reacted to this assessment by calling for an intensification of the military campaign and the deployment of ground troops. The German leadership, however, returned to its prewar stance, and in accordance with the prescriptive propensities of its mental model, it pushed strongly for the use of political means. These political initiatives occurred again in close collaboration with Russia.157 In fact, Moscow rather than Paris or London was the main partner of the German leadership during the Kosovo crisis putting serious doubts on Europe’s ambitions for a common foreign and security policy. Both Chancellor Schroeder and Foreign Minister Fischer continued to consider Russia’s help toward a diplomatic solution to be indispensable.

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Foreign Minister Fischer especially was keen to emphasize on numerous public occasions that a political solution will be “possible only with Russia on board.”158 On March 29, Russian prime minister Yevgeny Primakov traveled to Belgrade to assess the situation and one day later he met with Chancellor Schroeder to brief him on the situation and possibilities to resolve the crisis.159 In mid-April, NATO strikes entered their third week and the German leadership set forth a new peace initiative. On April 14, Joschka Fischer together with Chancellor Schroeder’s national security adviser Michael Steiner traveled to Moscow for bilateral discussions. With their Russian counterparts they agreed that the conf lict could not be resolved while NATO continued bombing. Subsequently, Germany presented its partners in the EU and the G-8 with a six-point plan for ending the war.160 The proposal reiterated earlier NATO demands, yet at the same time it included a much more prominent role for the G-8 and the UN than in the NATO plans. According to the plan, a final settlement should be negotiated by the G-8 countries and not by NATO. Moreover, once a settlement was reached, it proposed that an interim administration of Kosovo be authorized and run by the UN. Toward these ends, the plan urged NATO to agree to a twenty-four-hour bombing pause as soon as Serb military and other security forces commenced their withdrawal from Kosovo.161 On May 5, the German leadership convened a meeting of the G-8 countries in Bonn to discuss and negotiate the proposal. One day later the G-8 leaders issued the Agreement on General Principles that in broad terms ref lected various ideas of the German initiative. At this time, all leading German politicians shared an optimism regarding a prospective diplomatic solution. Parallel to such hopes the German leadership continued to express its reservation about NATO.162 These concerns culminated with the renewed British call for a consideration of ground troops. This, however, was not an option, not even a consideration for German leaders. In a joint appearance with President Clinton on 6 May, Chancellor Schroeder stated that, “There is no reason whatsoever to change our jointly adopted strategy.”163 For the next two weeks the Chancellor continued to publicly oppose the ground invasion and on May 19 he declared that he would use his veto power to block NATO from fighting a ground war in Kosovo.164 Chancellor Schroeder’s comments came at a time when Britain’s Foreign Secretary Robin Cook urged anew for NATO to “seriously examine” the option of sending troops. The chancellor was subsequently quick to dismiss any discussion on “British war theories.” Fischer also responded in stark opposition to London, stressing that “[w]e are trying

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to reach a political breakthrough right now.”165 The opposition to the deployment of ground troops was shared across the political spectrum in Germany. Already on May 16, Fischer had declared that Germany will not support moves by the members of the alliance to send ground troops into Kosovo, explaining further that “there will be no majority in the Bundestag for sending ground troops . . . [as] this is opposed by all parties.”166 The French leadership, along with other European governments, followed suit. While British officials were trying to rally support for ground deployment, German leaders intensified their peace initiative and rallied support for a political solution. On May 15, Chancellor Schroeder traveled to Helsinki to consult with Finish President Marti Ahtisaari, who had been tapped by Kofi Annan to serve as an intermediary in the Kosovo conf lict. Subsequently, Schroeder departed for Italy for discussions with Prime Minister d’Alema, and after their meeting in Bari on May 17, Schroeder reiterated the call for a suspension of the NATO bombing campaign by explaining that there were “encouraging signs for a political solution.”167 On May 29, Chancellor Schroeder and President Chirac said they were hopeful of a turnaround in NATO’s conf lict with Yugoslavia over Kosovo. On June 2 the G-8 foreign ministers met in Cologne to ratify a comprehensive peace plan that had been negotiated since the beginning of May.168 On May 30, U.S. deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott followed a German invitation and traveled to Bonn to hold talks with Schroeder, Fischer, Ahtisaari, and Chernomyrdin. At the same time the German chancellor called again on NATO commanders to withhold the bombing campaign as an inducement to the Serb leadership to finalize its acceptance of the coalition demands. He continued to be optimistic about the prospects for peace as he told reporters that the world was “on the way to a political solution of the problem and that substantial progress has been made.”169 The chancellor’s optimism would soon be vindicated. After Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari traveled to Belgrade, Milosevic conceded on June 2. To what extent the military campaign or German political initiatives contributed to this outcome remains an open question. For its part, the German leadership considered its political approach, characterized by a strong emphasis on diplomacy, to be confirmed. Conclusion After two months of bombing the Yugoslav Government’s resolve began to crack and Serb soldiers began to desert Kosovo. Milosevic finally agreed

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to the principles of settlement adopted at the meeting of the G-8 countries in Cologne, and the Serbian Parliament formally approved the peace plan on June 3, 1999. Among other things the peace plan included the withdrawal of Serb Security forces from Kosovo, a NATO led peacekeeping force, and a UN international administration in Kosovo. Subsequently, about 750,000 refugees were able to return to their homes, and one observer called this “a remarkable testament to the success of U.S. and NATO policy.”170 The EU considered NATO’s intervention in Kosovo to be “necessary and justified.”171 The EU itself, however, acted mainly as a civilian power, threatening economic sanctions and issuing resolutions, statements, and declarations in which it often called for a political settlement to the Kosovo crisis. Given Milosevic’s continuous defiance, such a solution proved elusive and, in the end, seemingly impossible. As the crisis escalated, the EU ran out of means to address it effectively, and it was ultimately up to its member states to confront the challenge and either prove strategic compatibility or lack thereof and thereby deliver implications about the EU’s CFSP ambitions. Clearly, after the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, which institutionalized these ambitions yet further, the international spectator could have expected a common approach. This expectation was not met at a satisfactory level. A cognitive analysis of the French, British, and German leaders reveals the reason to be the lack of a shared mental model in the Kosovo crisis. The French leadership believed that Milosevic might concede to a political solution. Yet, ultimately the prescriptive propensities of both President Chirac and Foreign Minister Vedrine’s mental models showed inclinations towards the use of military force. The British leadership consistently perceived Milosevic to be hostile and the mental models of Prime Minister Blair and Foreign Secretary Straw showed much stronger inclinations toward the use of force. In stark contrast are the mental models of the German leadership. Both Chancellor Schroeder and Foreign Minister Fischer believed that Milosevic would ultimately concede to a political settlement, and they shared a belief in the utility of diplomatic means. All three leaderships acted in accordance with their mental models and not with the implications that would follow from their institutional membership. France and Britain engaged in military preparations and contributed significantly to OAF. France did so in spite of its leadership’s belief that Milosevic might concede to a political settlement. It was vital in the view of the French decision making elite that the crisis could not be left to the United States, which had favored military strikes early on. Throughout the crisis the French leadership was explicit about the linkage

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between the Kosovo crisis and the opportunities it provided to advance France’s European security and defense ideal. To this end, the leadership felt that it had to demonstrate that it was willing to back up diplomatic initiatives with military means. In contrast to the strategic approaches of both France and Britain, Germany was very hesitant to engage itself militarily and this reticence was in accordance with the mental models of the German leadership. At times the German stance was even considered to endanger the alliance. Military behavior in OAF had to conform to the preferences of the most cautious alliance members or at least had to be taken into consideration before any concrete action could be taken. Critics have thus argued that Germany not only strained the relations among the alliance members but also contributed to the escalation of the crisis while it could have been halted much earlier.172 In the Kosovo conf lict the divergence of the various national mental models had a negative feedback on Europe’s institutional ambitions toward a common foreign and security ambitions and they were therefore disappointed. During the conf lict, U.S envoy to the Balkans Richard Holbrooke stated somewhat undiplomatically, “[t]he fact is that the Europeans are not going to have a common security policy for the foreseeable future.”173 Despite Europe’s institutionalization efforts toward a common foreign and security policy over the preceding years and decades, a common European approach was indeed absent in the Kosovo crisis. Whether Holbrooke’s pessimism is warranted or not is the subject of the next two chapters, which examine the Afghanistan War in the aftermath of the tragic terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 and the Iraq War in 2003.

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CHAPTER 4

THE AFGHANISTAN WAR

W

ithout any doubt the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, or 9/11 as the day soon became universally known, represent the most defining moment in international politics since the end of the cold war. Policymakers and analysts around the world agreed quickly that the horrific events of that day delineate a new era in world politics. UN secretary-general Kofi Annan stated, “We entered the twenty-first century through a gate of fire” and U.S. president George W. Bush observed that “night had fallen on a different world,” as he urged governments around the world to participate in a “global war on terrorism.”1 In retrospect, it was revealed that in the weeks prior to the attacks the White House had been warned that Al Qaeda was “determined to strike in the United States.” However, nobody thought the attacks to be imminent and the assaults on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon thus came as a surprise.2 European leaders agreed that the attacks represented not only an aggression toward the United States, but toward all democratic states. The danger for France, Great Britain, and Germany was magnified because of their close ties to the United States and because several terrorists directly engaged in the attacks had resided and trained in Europe. The Origins of the War Given the nature of a surprise attack, it appears difficult to talk about the origins of September 11, 2001. Yet most events of this nature do have a history and, in fact, the present one is rather complex. Again, like in the Kosovo Crisis, it will be useful to provide such a historical context. The precipitating events can be located in the years 1978 and 1979 with two of them standing out, namely the Communist “Saur Revolution” in

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Afghanistan and the subsequent Soviet invasion of the country. Eventually, the Soviet Union was compelled to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989. However, its departure left a power vacuum that would tragically be filled by the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the 1990s.3 Afghanistan’s past is to a large extent the history of contentious ethnic tribes and the meddling of the superpowers in the region. Since the end of the Second World War Afghanistan had been in a constant state of civil war and political disintegration. The most relevant groupings politically were the Pasthuns under the leadership of Mohammad Daoud, the Khalqi under the leadership of Hafizullah Amin, and the Parchami under the leadership of Karmal Babrak. Toward the end of the 1970s, socioeconomic and political dissatisfaction in the Afghan polity and society culminated. The frustrations were paired with ongoing tribal contentions and resulted ultimately in the communist Saur Revolution, the overthrow of the reigning Daoud regime in April 1978, and the subsequent emergence of the Khalqi as the reigning power.4 The overarching goal of President Amin was to strengthen the deteriorating state-society relationship, halting the further disintegration of the country and thereby leading it to sustained political, economic, and social development. However, the regime lacked popular base, economic program, administrative experience, and even internal unity. Despite this recognition, Amin made no effort to build a gradual process of reform from below.5 Instead, he rejected any coalition with existing political parties and denied their right to political activities. Indeed, any persons or groups able to invoke any form of political power became the target of regime oppression. Among them were the intelligentsia, political figures from previous regimes, local notables, and religious leaders.6 The arbitrary manner in which the Amin regime carried out its reign was a prime cause of a spate of uprisings that took place before the Soviet invasion.7 Opposition forces organized from the ranks of military cadres, religious groups as well as marginalized political organizations. Together they formed effective resistance movements that culminated in revolts in Heart in March 1979 followed by further uprisings in Jalalabad, Asmar, Ghazni, and Nahrin and eventually also in Kabul. The regime reacted with waves of arrests as Amin sought to remove counterrevolutionaries from the armed forces and place his own men in key positions.8 Ultimately the resistance proved too strong and Amin failed in his efforts. After twenty months of Khalqi rule, far from strengthening state-society relations, Amin had provoked a violent and extensive reaction that had further imperiled and divided the state and perpetuated civil war that was to last for decades.

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As Amin was failing, the Soviet Union felt compelled to invade Afghanistan in late-1979 and orchestrated the installation of a pro-Communist and pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. The Soviet goal was to prevent a further advance of the United States in the region.9 The United States had already, in the 1950s, signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Pakistan and supported a Turkish-Pakistani military alliance. In response to the U.S. presence in the region, the Soviets thus set out to control Afghanistan. Starting in 1954, the Kremilin first provided substantial economic aid and arranged trade agreements, and then, in order to assist Afghanistan in its rivalry with Pakistan, it also provided military supplies, military training, and technical assistance to the country. Until their withdrawal in 1989, the Soviet Union would station up to 115,000 troops in Afghanistan.10 With Soviet backing, the Parchami under Babrak Karmal assumed the new leadership in Kabul in December 1979. The new regime was, in essence, a puppet regime of the Soviets and after a few years it was apparent that its political success would be rather limited.11 Since the Soviet invasion, political, social, economic, and perhaps most importantly, religious oppression had been growing. However, along with the oppression the resistance grew as well and it would soon manifest itself most strongly in a guerilla force that came to be known as the mujahideen, a coalition of loosely aligned opposition groups determined to fight the occupation.12 The mujahideen soon found support in the United States as the latter aimed at compensating for its decreasing inf luence in the region after it had lost Iran as one of its supporters through the Islamic Revolution. In 1980, the Carter administration allocated $30 million for the Afghan resistance followed by another $50 million in 1981. After President Reagan took office he referred to the mujahideen as “freedom fighters . . . defending principles of independence and freedom that form the basis of global security and stability.” His administration subsequently increased the amount to $80 million in 1984. In 1985, President Reagan signed National Security Directive 166, which authorized a harsh new policy of driving out the Soviets from Afghanistan “by all means available.” Thus, in 1985 Congress approved an amount of $250 million. A further $470 million was pledged for 1986, including the delivery of laser guided antiaircraft Stinger missiles. The U.S. contribution was increased once again to $630 million in 1987 and to $600 million in 1989.13 The mujahideen were henceforth able to move from a position of weakness to a position in which they were increasingly able to challenge the Soviet presence.14 This challenge would be complemented by the resurgence of the old Pacham-Khalqi struggle. The Khalqis had remained

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dominant in the officer corps of the Afghan armed forces and expected that Karmal’s position would weaken to a state of defenselessness once the Soviet forces withdrew.15 Politically, the Karmal regime failed as well. In 1986, Soviet marshal Akhromeev elaborated to the Politburo, “We control Kabul and the provincial centers, but we cannot establish authority in the conquered areas. We have lost the struggle for the Afghan people. A minority of people support the government.”16 Ultimately, the Soviet Union also decided to withdraw support from Karmal and supported instead Communist leader Muhammad Najibullah. Then, in March 1985, a new direction was given to the situation in Afghanistan when Konstantin Chernenko was succeeded by Mikhail Gorbachev as the new leader in the Kremlin. Gorbachev’s “new thinking” led him soon to initiate departures from confrontational bloc politics, and thereby also to question the utility of a Soviet presence in Afghanistan. In February 1986, he would describe Afghanistan as a “bleeding wound.”17 Three years later the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, leaving Communist leader Muhammad Najibullah orphaned. Without Soviet backing, he was not be able to survive. Afghanistan became even more conf licted, contested by warring factions and thereby ultimately more dangerous to the outside world.18 Left to his own devices, Najibullah was ultimately toppled by the socalled Northern Alliance, a loose confederation of Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras with the Tajiks controlling the presidency and the official security establishment. Its reign came to the detriment of the Pasthuns who suffered not only politically but also economically as they, for example, lost access to pasture lands in much of Afghanistan.19 The Alliance ruled Afghanistan for the next four years, a period that would be marred by civil war between the Northern Alliance and Pasthun warlords and by general infighting among various other ethnic and tribal factions. Gradually, the Alliance would disintegrate as well and in the years from 1992 to 1996 virtually every group was at one time both the ally and the opponent of every other group, regardless of ethnicity.20 By 1994, the country reached the climax of anarchy and violence. The UN thus reacted with the establishment of a new mission to Afghanistan. In October, the mission submitted peace proposals to the main factions and by 1995 it had developed plans for a transfer of power to an interim council of all the contending parties involved. However, these plans were soon preempted by the appearance of a new actor. This was the ethnically Pasthun Taliban under the leadership of Mullah Muhammad Omar. In the weeks, months, and years to follow, the Taliban would be able to draw much of its strength from the general disillusion with the conf licting

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parties. Like the previous power holders in Afghanistan, Mullah Omar rejected all suggestions that he might work with them.21 The core of the Taliban was the remnants of the mujahideen. Although the civil war had dispersed many of them into various factions, camps, and regions, there were still veterans who had remained neutral and were consumed by a sense of loss.22 The Taliban’s gradual conquest had begun in October 1994 when its fighters seized the Afghan border post of Spin Baldak. Less than a month later, the Taliban attacked and captured Kandahar as the second largest city in Afghanistan. By February of the following year, the Taliban controlled nine out of Afghanistan’s thirty provinces. In September 1995, the Taliban seized Heart and just over a year later the Taliban took control of Mazar-i-Sharif and forced the Northern Alliance into a small corner of northwest Afghanistan. Subsequently, Jalalabad fell and on September 26, 1996 the Taliban captured Kabul.23 Until the international intervention after the September 11 attacks in 2001, the Taliban would remain in a state of continuous civil war with the Northern Alliance. It was around this time that Osama bin Laden was expelled from Sudan, which he had used as a base to engage in acts of international terrorism. His departure to Afghanistan led to the unholy alliance between his Al Qaeda organization and the Taliban. Having been a mujahideen organizer and financier in the 1980s, he was quick to consolidate his links with the Taliban leadership. He financed and materially assisted the regime, and soon he would develop a guerilla unit especially to assist the Taliban in the fight against the Northern Alliance.24 The regime reciprocated Osama’s assistance by giving him and Al Qaeda sanctuary, and by providing training facilities. Furthermore, Al Qaeda was permitted to use Afghanistan’s national aircraft to transport members, recruits and supplies from overseas.25 Although the struggle against the Northern Alliance figured prominently on Al Qaeda’s agenda, for Osama bin Laden the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia since the Gulf War in 1991 was and remained the issue of primary concern. This was clearly ref lected when Al Qaeda executed its first major successful operation against the United States. The eighth anniversary of the arrival of American troops in Saudi Arabia was on August 7, 1998, and Al Qaeda used this as an occasion to attack U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania killing 224 people. Then on October 12, 2000, Al Qaeda targeted the USS Cole, which was at anchor in the Yemeni harbor of Aden. The suicide attack killed seventeen U.S. sailors and wounded dozens. Both assaults underscored the global reach and determination of the Al Qaeda network, which at this time was estimated to have 3,000–5,000 well-trained fighters scattered around the world.26

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In February 2001, shortly after George W. Bush was sworn in as the U.S. president, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet testified before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee on “worldwide threats to national security.” In his presentation Tenet cited the threat from terrorism as “real, immediate, and evolving.” He concluded that Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network would represent “the most immediate and serious threat to U.S. national security.”27 Just seven months later the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001 demonstrated not only to the United States but also to the entire world how real the threat posed by Al Qaeda was. Internationalization of the Conf lict A number of EU member states have had ongoing problems with terrorism for decades. France, Great Britain, and Germany were among them. However, the Al Qaeda threats looming before 9/11 were treated mostly as latent dangers or ugly abstractions. On 9/11, the threats became starkly immediate. The French, British, and German leaderships along with all other European leaders agreed quickly that while the United States may have been the prime target because of its central symbolism and its global presence, Europe may also be the subject of similar attacks in the time to come.28 Indeed, these fears were confirmed rather quickly. It was soon found that some of the terrorists participating in the attack had lived and trained in Germany. Moreover, just how real the threat was in Europe, was illustrated tragically in further attacks in Istanbul, Madrid, and London in the years following 9/11. The European reaction to the terrorist assaults was resolute. Within thirty-six hours of the attacks, formal statements were made by EU Commission president Roman Prodi, the high representative for Europe’s Common and Foreign Security Policy Javier Solana, the president of the European Parliament Nicole Fontaine, External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten, and the General Affairs Council after its extraordinary meeting. Perhaps most important was Javier Solana’s straightforward declaration that “The European Union stands firmly and fully behind the United States.”29 Beyond these high-ranking officials, many more EU officials underlined that transatlantic relations were a genuine two-way street, and that there would be “no safe haven for terrorists and their sponsors” in Europe.30 Already a day after the attacks France appealed to the UN Security Council by proposing a resolution condemning the attacks and declaring them a “threat to international peace and security” under the charter’s

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Chapter VII concerning the use of force.31 Indeed, on the same day the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1368 legitimizing forthcoming military actions against Afghanistan.32 Two weeks later, the council adopted the U.S.-drafted Resolution 1373, obligating all UN member states to take far-reaching domestic legislative and executive actions designed to prevent and suppress terrorist activities.33 The permanent U.S. representative to the Security Council John Negroponte called the UN “a unique partner in troubled times” and described Resolution 1373 as the UN’s “single most powerful response” in the war on terrorism.34 A similar scenario unfolded within NATO. All member states considered the attack on the United States as an attack against all and, therefore, the undertaking of retaliatory actions as legitimate. In the past, France had often been critical of NATO as it perceived the alliance to be a tool for U.S. domination in world affairs. Such hesitations were absent after 9/11 and the French leadership strongly supported the activation of the alliance’s mutual defense guarantee.35 Great Britain proved itself in its traditional role of “first friend and ally,” and Germany would soon promise “unconditional solidarity.”36 A few days later the alliance’s British secretary-general Lord Robertson urged a united front, as he declared that “clear and compelling” evidence has been shown by the United States. that Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization had been behind the attacks.37 On September 18, President Bush declared the United States to be at war and two days later he told other governments, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists,” a statement for which he would face much international criticism in subsequent years.38 Back then, however, European Governments followed the call as they saw themselves as major players within the “coalition against terrorism.” On September 20, a EU-U.S. ministerial meeting was held in Washington and a day later the European Council convened for an extraordinary meeting to analyze the international situation in the aftermath of the attacks. The council members emphasized anew that they would be in “total solidarity with the United States,” reasoning that the “attacks are an assault on our open, democratic, tolerant and multicultural societies.”39 The council recognized the legitimacy of any forthcoming military retaliation and indicated that the members of the union would assist within the realm of their possibilities.40 The European Heads of State also issued an action plan that contained a broad blueprint of EU counterterrorism activities. It called for the EU to concentrate on various issues, including the enhancement of police

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cooperation, the development of international legal instruments, the strengthening of air security, and the coordination of the EU’s global action with an emphasis for enhanced cooperation between the EU and other countries. Toward this end, the EU used traditional means of soft power such as trade and aid to promote its goals. In November, for example, in an effort to bring the Iranian Government closer to the international coalition, the European Commission proposed the negotiation of a new trade and cooperation agreement. Later on the EU combined 100 million of extra aid for Pakistan with a new package of trade measures to reward the Musharraf government for its help in the fight against the Taliban.41 Indeed, global coalition building became one of the main tasks for the EU in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. Further efforts followed at the EU-Russia Summit on October 3, the EU-Canada Summit on October 18, a meeting with East European countries in Brussels on October 20 and still another meeting with the twelve members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership on November 5. European Commission president Romano Prodi subsequently initiated a EU-India Summit with Prime Minister Vajpayee on November 23 in New Delhi. At this occasion the EU and India issued a declaration against international terrorism and strengthened their support for a joint working group on international terrorism at the experts’ level. President Jacques Chirac, Prime Minister Tony Blair, and Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder as Europe’s “big three” met twice as a group after the September 11 attacks. Their first summit came just one day before the official EU Summit in Ghent on October 20. After the meeting, the leaders faced much criticism from other European Governments who felt unjustifiably excluded from the crisis deliberations. It thus came as a surprise that on November 4, just about two weeks after the first meeting, Blair again invited Chirac and Schroeder for another mini-summit to London. After international criticism mounted anew, the British leadership conceded to the criticism and also invited EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, the Belgian prime minister currently holding the EU presidency as well as the Italian, Spanish, and Dutch leaders.42 The first retaliatory attacks against Afghanistan were launched on October 7 carried out mainly by U.S. and British forces. The following day the EU gave strong backing for the military action. The Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt declared that “The European Union wished to . . . reaffirm its entire solidarity with the United States, the United Kingdom and the other countries engaged in these operations.”43

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Similarly, European Commission president Romano Prodi declared that the whole of Europe stood alongside the United States. He emphasized, “We are united and will remain united in this struggle against those who attack the very foundations of civilization.”44 Mental Models After 9/11 In the aftermath of 9/11 the EU affirmed its solidarity with the United States and confirmed its political support. However, while it would continue to do so in the time to come, it would ultimately be up to its individual member states to underscore the viability of the EU’s common foreign policy ambitions. Figure 4.1 illustrates the French, British, and German leaderships’ diagnoses of the opponent’s strategic disposition as well as their prescriptive beliefs about the most viable means in dealing with the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Diagnoses are mapped into the figure with the letter “O” for Other and prescriptive beliefs are mapped with the letter “S” for Self. When comparing the mental models of the “big three” in the Kosovo conf lict to those after the September 11, 2001 attacks, it is evident that the latter led to the emergence of a very homogenous “European mental Type A Settle > Deadlock

P/D

Type C Settle > Dominate

+.75

+.50 Fischer–O (–.17/.38)* +.25 Fischer–S (.17/–.06) C

*

–.75 –.50 –.25 Straw–S (–.08/0) * Schroeder–O (–.08/–.13) * Vedrine-S (–.33/–.17) Chirac-O (–.42/–.31)* * Blair–O (–.25/–.34)

C * +.50 +.75 Chirac–S (.42/–.04) *Blair–S (.25/–.17) * Vedrine–O (.33/–.28)

* +.25 * –.25 *

Schroeder–S (.08/–.15) –.50 Straw–O (.08/–.34) –.75

Dominate > Settle Type D

Figure 4.1

P/D

Mental Models after 9/11.

Dominate > Deadlock Type B

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model.” In the case of the French leadership both President Chirac (2.42/2.31) and Foreign Minister Vedrine (+.33/2.28) diagnosed that a political solution would be unlikely. Regarding the prescriptive elements of the mental models, President Chirac (+.42/2.04) was very confident in the utility of military means and exerted Type B propensities while Foreign Minister Vedrine (2.33/2.17) exerted Type D propensities. Despite this difference both leaders believed in the utility of an aggressive strategy towards Afghanistan with the goal of dominating the situation. In the Kosovo Crisis, the British leadership had diverged from the French leadership in its diagnosis of the situation and Milosevic’s intentions. However, after September 11, 2001 both leaderships came to the same conclusion. Just like Chirac and Vedrine, Prime Minister Blair (2.25/2.34) and his Foreign Secretary Straw (+.08/2.34) also perceived the Taliban and Al Qaeda to be very conf lictual in the time to come. Tony Blair (+.25/2.17) was a Type B leader and like his French counterpart he had a strong belief in the utility of military force. Foreign Secretary Straw (2.08/.00) was slightly more ambiguous about the utility of military force. However, as a Type D leader, he ultimately also believed in the utility of a conf lict strategy toward dominating the situation.45 Finally, German chancellor Schroeder along with the French and British leadership, agreed on a conf lictual definition of the situation in Afghanistan. However, interestingly Foreign Minister Fischer (2.17/+.38) was not as pessimistic about the situation as Chancellor Schroeder (2.08/2.13).46 Despite this diagnostic difference, in regards to their prescriptive beliefs, both Schroeder (+.08/2.15) and Fischer (+.17/2.06) were Type B leaders as they saw high prescriptive utility in a conf lictual approach towards the Taliban and the Al Qaeda organization. Given the nature of the attacks, this might come as no surprise. However, given Germany’s pacifist foreign and security policy culture since the end of the Second World War, these cognitive propensities, if translated into action, would represent a fundamental break with Germany’s culture of reticence in military affairs. In sum, although some cognitive differences within or across national leaderships do exist, the mental models of all leaders ultimately carry common prescriptive propensities towards the ensuing conf lict. Unlike in the Kosovo conf lict, the French, British and German leadership overall did share a common mental model. In accordance with the theoretical expectations from the shared mental model framework, this convergence of these mental models should translate into similar and compatible strategies towards the ensuing war in Afghanistan and, thereby, confirm Europe’s common foreign and security policy ambitions.

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France The French reaction to the events of 9/11 was one of “immense shock.” President Chirac was informed about the attacks while he was on a visit to Rennes. He immediately returned to Paris where he held urgent talks with the prime minister, as well as the foreign, defense, interior, and transport ministers. The fear that France might become a victim of a similar attack was weighing heavily on French authorities. Thus, on the same day, Foreign Minister Vedrine announced to the public that a national crisis unit had been installed at the Quai d’Orsay and that the Vigipirate plan had been activated. This plan had been developed in the 1980s in response to Algerian extremists and it was designed to aid in the mobilization of police and armed forces. The plan also takes protective measures such as the reinforcement of surveillance and security measures in train stations, airports, and other public places.47 The prescriptive elements of the French mental models also manifested themselves quickly in regards to international politics where the French leadership was resolute in its reaction. Within hours of the attacks France took the initiative as its UN ambassador Jean-David Levitte circulated a draft resolution in the UN Security Council. The draft subsequently resulted in UN Resolution 1368 on the next day. It strongly condemned the attacks and paved the way for subsequent military action. President Chirac emphasized that France would be at United States’ side “when it comes to the punishment for this murderous folly.” Similarly, Foreign Minister Vedrine stated that the entire world recognized that President Bush was justified in “legitimate defense.”48 French leaders were also quick to stress the European dimension of the response to the terrorist threats. Here they were careful to emphasize the importance of European solidarity in the form of NATO and the role of the EU’s Directorate-General covering external affairs. Traditionally, France had been “reluctant to see NATO’s role enhanced, or the scope of its missions expanded.” In fact, under President de Gaulle France had even placed itself outside NATO’s command and control structures. However, this time the French leadership “did not hesitate to support the invocation of NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense guarantee.”49 Foreign Minister Vedrine emphasized the importance of the EU Ministers’ coordination of an integrated EU response and also pointed out that ongoing French and EU diplomatic efforts in missions to Saudi Arabia, Syria, Pakistan, and Egypt would be instrumental in securing support for the forthcoming military campaign.50 French empathy for the United States was evident.51 Two days after the attacks, Chirac, together with Prime Minister Lionel Jospin and many

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other leading political figures, attended an ecumenical service in the American church in Paris. Spontaneous gestures of friendship, including symbolic acts such as the playing of the American national anthem at the Elysee Palace, underlined the degree to which much of the French public felt themselves victims of the attack along with Americans. One of the major French newspapers Le Monde editorialized on September 13 “Nous sommes tous Americans”—We are all Americans. The paper even began publishing daily full-page English language coverage of the story drawn from the New York Times.52 It was also noticeable that the traditional semiautomatic reservations to anything American, particularly on the intellectual Left in France, were initially absent to a large degree. Although the French media had predicted that tensions would emerge between Gaullist president Chirac and Socialist prime minister Jospin as well as within the French cabinet, these remained absent. In general, the determination of French leaders to collaborate in the aftermath of 9/11 was striking. The president of the Liberal Democracy Party (Democratie Liberale, DL) Alain Madelin urged that there be none of the subtle equivocations so “traditional” in French debates about the United States. Instead, he emphasized that total support for the United States was needed. On the political right Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR) president Michele Alliot-Marie said she would fully expect that France would support U.S. reprisals against Afghanistan. Even the French Communist Party (Parti Communiste Francais, PCF) leader Robert Hue dropped his traditional anti-Americanism, although he warned against “clash of civilizations” simplicities.53 One week after the attacks, President Chirac departed for Washington for consultations with President Bush. Notably, the French president was the first leader to be received in the White House after 9/11.54 In accordance with the prescriptive elements of his mental model, Chirac promised the president that France was “completely determined to fight by your side this new type of evil.”55 However, at the same time he also underlined that the French Government had to be “consulted in advance about the objectives and modalities of an action, whose goal must be the elimination of terrorism.”56 Chirac cautioned further that French solidarity would not mean a “blank check” for the United States, stating in a press conference with an international audience, “You can’t strike blindly.”57 Foreign Minister Vedrine emphasized early on that any response must not only be punitive but also preventive, reasoning that in order for terrorism to be addressed effectively, one must fight against its sources, namely finances, fanatical and destructive ideologies, situations and crises that provide militants to the terrorists.”58 Prime Minister Jospin advanced

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a similarly cautionary note at his September 24 appearance at the Institute des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale in Paris. He stressed that while France would not “shirk its responsibilities,” this would not prevent it from “making a free judgment about French participation in a military engagement.”59 He went on to emphasize that military strikes must be “proportional, strategically and militarily justified, and politically coherent.”60 In the meantime, the United States had been fully engaged in preparations for a military reprisal against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. On September 19, the Pentagon had ordered about 150 military aircraft to the Middle East. These aircraft complemented more that 200 warplanes already in position on two aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean and at military bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Included were B52 bombers, F-15s and F-16s, Stealth Bombers, U2 spy planes, f lying tankers, and AWACS (airborne warning and control system) reconnaissance jets.61 Just a few days after these initial military preparations, the U.S. leadership in coordination with its British counterparts announced that it would soon release further evidence linking Osama bin Laden to the attacks on New York and Washington.62 At the beginning of October, French Government officials expressed satisfaction with Washington’s provision of evidence. After a U.S. request for military aid, President Chirac convened on October 2 with top members of his government including Prime Minister Jospin, Foreign Minister Vedrine, and Defense Minister Richard to evaluate the request. A government spokesperson subsequently declared that France had agreed to allow the United States to use its airspace and, moreover, to assist U.S. warships stationed in the Indian Ocean through the provision of a French frigate and a supply ship.63 The initial French contribution was thus rather modest. However, on October 6, Chirac’s prescriptive propensities would manifest themselves further as he extended the French commitment and pledged on national television that French troops will participate in the U.S. led-military offensive in a “spirit of solidarity and responsibility.”64 By this time the United States together with Britain had assembled more than 50,000 troops and approximately 500 aircraft within striking distance of Afghanistan. Moreover, the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk had unloaded a number of its fighter-bombers for the accommodation of special forces and helicopters giving the allies the option of an airborne landing of combat troops from the sea.65 The first strikes against Afghanistan came on October 7 and it was notable that these were carried out exclusively by U.S. and British forces. The impression thus emerged that continental Europe, while strong in rhetoric was, in fact,

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weak in deeds. Yet, such a perception would prove wrong. On the day of the attacks, French defence minister Alain Richard acknowledged that French intelligence forces were already on the ground, that “in a matter of days” France would be an active partner in the offensive, and that the French “level of capacity for intervention” would be “comparable to that of Britain.”66 One dilemma for France was its traditional unwillingness to be entangled in military operations led and devised by other states.67 The French leadership was thus walking a difficult line as it aimed at emphasizing its independence in any military action while maintaining its reputation of a reliable and committed alliance partner. Initially, the leadership had rejected the idea that French forces would be integrated into U.S. units.68 However, on October 17 Defense Minister Richard confirmed that French soldiers would take part in U.S.-led operations. On national television he explained that French military officials together with their U.S. counterparts were in the “planning phase” toward dismantling the military and logistics infrastructure of the Taliban regime.69 In the Assemblée Nationale, Prime Minister Jospin was quick to attach modalities such as that the French Government would expect to be fully consulted on targets and political aims before committing its forces to the front line of any U.S.-led action.70 Some days later, European Affairs Minister Moscovici emphasized that France “naturally maintains its autonomy of assessment.” 71 On October 20, just prior to a EU Council Summit in Ghent, President Chirac participated in a mini-summit along with his British and German counterparts. After their consultations, the trio faced criticism that it would sideline other European partners and the impression emerged that Europe would not speak with a single voice. EU Commission President Romano Prodi called the meeting a “shame” and demanded that Europe should meet together and decide together.72 Officials of all three countries defended the meeting and it was in particular the French leadership who rejected any impression that the EU was not united. Pierre Moscovici argued that Europe “has gone forward” after the September 11 attack, with a “united and consistent” response. France, Germany, and the Great Britain, he reasoned further, would be the three European countries that have direct military commitment and that it was thus normal to hold technical consultations regarding the military aspects of their commitments.73 At the beginning of November, President Chirac traveled to Washington to convene with President Bush for a second time after 9/11.74 The French president used the occasion to urge Bush to further deliberations about the post-Taliban situation, emphasizing that “the

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authority of the United Nations will be decisive in this respect.” After their meeting Chirac renewed his pledge that France stood by the United States “in actions of defence against people who have neither faith nor law.” He also renewed the French readiness “to send special forces.” However, in order to demonstrate France’s leadership role in the war campaign he also emphasized again the condition that “we know what missions they will be sent on and what kind of missions they are, and secondly that we are involved in the operational planning.” 75 On November 6, France deployed an infantry company around Mazar-i-Sharif in Afghanistan to assist U.S. and British forces.76 At the same time Prime Minister Jospin announced that France was readying “to increase the density of our support for the coalition effort by contributing troops for aerial, naval, and ground forces.” 77 Some days later, France sent eight Mirage aircraft to the region surrounding Afghanistan. Announcing the deployment of these aircraft, Alain Richard explained that “the objective is to protect an advance party of French ground troops and, moreover, to “establish security and to prevent the risk of Taliban counter-attacks.” 78 The French Air Force then also deployed C-160, C-130 and KC-135 aircraft to Dushanbe and Manas in Tajikistan. These aircraft were to provide humanitarian assistance as well as coalition airlift support and aerial refueling. France also provided its only Carrier Battle Group to support combat operations in the North Arabian Sea. Aircraft from this Battle Group supported the coalition with reconnaissance, strike and AEW missions.79 The French contributions and the efforts of the international coalition would soon bear success. On November 9, the strategically important city Mazar-i-Sharif had fallen and Kabul had been captured by November 13. At the end of November, the French leadership thus gave a positive account of the coalition campaign in Afghanistan stating that the “Taliban regime has been overthrown and the purpose of striking at terrorism and its Afghan sanctuary, along with seeing it uprooted everywhere in the world, is almost complete.”80 According to the French leadership, the actions of the alliance should be limited to terrorist targets rather than countries or regimes more broadly. The coming weeks and months would show that the French understanding of the war on terrorism was not universally shared. As the Taliban was falling, speculations about U.S. intentions to attack Iraq became louder and would lead to the first cracks in the international alliance against terrorism. Inf luential officials within the U.S. administration such as defense secretaries Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz and Vice President Richard Cheney accused Saddam Hussein of supporting

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international terrorists and also engaging in the secret production and proliferation of material for WMD. President Bush warned the Iraqi dictator to allow for a continuation of UN arms inspections in Iraq. Upon being asked what consequences a refusal would bring, Bush replied: “He’ll find out.” This cryptic reply would fuel further speculations that the regime in Baghdad might be the next on Washington’s list of targets in the war on terrorism.81 The French leadership was quick to strongly oppose such an option. On November 27, Defence Minister Richard expressed doubt whether Saddam Hussein was indeed actively involved in the sponsoring of terrorism and declared that military attacks on Iraq would not only be unnecessary but would in fact be detrimental to the geopolitical stability of the entire region.82 Similar voices came from Pierre Moscovici at a BritishFrench Summit held in London on November 29 where he warned that extending the war would probably weaken the international coalition against terrorism. Concluding the summit, however, President Chirac and Prime Minister Blair insisted that at this time the coalition against terrorism was not weakening.83 Both leaders also emphasized the strong relations between their countries and Chirac described them as f lawless. Military operations in Afghanistan continued in the meantime. On December 1, the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle departed from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean to take part in the ongoing campaign. It was carrying almost 2,000 troops and nearly 30 aircraft, including 16 Super-Etendard fighters, 2 interceptors, and 9 helicopters. The carrier was preceded by its escort vessels, two submarine-hunting frigates, an anti-aerial frigate, a nuclear attack submarine, and a supply ship 84 The carrier and its escort was to join about fifty warships of the international coalition, mostly from the United States, Britain, Canada, and Australia. At the same time French Mirage 4-P and Mirage 2000-D aircraft based in Abu Dhabi were engaged in reconnaissance missions over Afghanistan.85 As the fight against enemy resistance and rebels continued, the UN held a conference in Germany on Afghanistan’s postwar order at the end of November. The conference was attended by representatives of Afghanistan’s various ethnic factions and it concluded with the establishment of an interim regime and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) of approximately 5,000 troops. On December 11, the French defence minister Alain Richard announced that in the next few weeks the country would deploy about 800 troops for the protection of the new interim Afghan Government.86 Further contingents would be provided by Germany and the Netherlands.

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Pockets of enemy and insurgent resistance in Afghanistan remain until today and, in fact, have increased most recently. However, the major battles had been concluded by the spring of 2002. Before the onset of the war, the mental models of both President Chirac and Foreign Minister Vedrine were ref lective of a pessimistic definition of the situation. The diagnostic propensities of their mental models indicated no faith that a settlement with the Taliban would be possible and their prescriptive elements indicated an inclination toward a conf lict strategy including military means toward Afghanistan. These propensities were indeed translated into the actual French decision-making process in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. A similar analysis applies to the British leadership. Great Britain Just like the White House and other governments around the world, Downing Street in London had indications about 9/11 prior to the event. In fact, the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee would later report that the Joint Intelligence Committee had warned Prime Minister Tony Blair in its weekly intelligence assessment given to him on July 16, 2001. The report stated that the Al Qaeda network was in the “final stages” of preparing a terrorist attacks on the West. Yet, in Great Britain, just as elsewhere, such warnings did not receive as much attention as they should have and the reaction to the attacks was one of immense shock. Exemplary was British foreign secretary Jack Straw statement, “That’s it. The world will never be the same again” and Prime Minister Tony Blair declared that “mass terrorism is the new evil in our world today.”87 The prime minister was informed about the news while on a visit to Brighton. Upon his immediate return to London, he held consultations with Foreign Secretary Straw, Defence Secretary Hoon, and other cabinet members. Blair emphasized that the first priority was domestic security. The next morning he started to engage in international consultations by phone. First was French president Chirac followed by conversations with Russian president Vladimir Putin, German chancellor Schroeder and Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt of Belgium, who also held the current presidency of the EU. Subsequently, Blair also consulted with President Bush and advised him to contact the Russian president in an effort to build as broad a coalition as possible. Foreign Secretary Straw, in the meantime, announced an emergency session of parliament.88 As was the case in France, also in Britain public opinion showed much solidarity with the United States. However, in anticipation that Britain

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would be engaged more heavily in the military campaign, the Blair government provided further reassurance for the necessity of retaliatory strikes with a document containing declassified intelligence, titled “Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States.” Citing the document in an emergency session on October 4, Blair told the House of Commons he had “absolutely no doubt” that Osama bin Laden was responsible for 9/11. Reading further, he explained, “No other organization has both the motivation and the capability to carry out attacks like those of September 11—only the Al Qaeda network under Osama bin Laden.”89 The prime minister also emphasized that “this is not a battle between the United States and terrorism, but between the free and democratic world and terrorism” and he underscored British solidarity stating, “We stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of tragedy, and we, like them, will not rest until this evil is driven from our world.”90 Already two days after the attacks, Blair had sent a letter to President Bush outlining his thoughts on the ensuing situation. The letter suggested giving the Taliban an ultimatum, namely, to hand over Osama bin Laden and his chief associates, shut down his terrorist camps, and allow investigations of international inspectors or face severe consequences. In slightly altered form, President Bush would deliver these demands seven days later in his speech to Congress where he would also declare that the United States “had no truer friend than Great Britain.”91 Blair, in the meantime, as was to be expected from the prescriptive propensities of his mental model, had stated in his cabinet that Britain would be prepared to take part in any military reprisals led by the United States. The British commitment would very soon become evident in concrete British military preparations. These preparations came earlier than in any other European country. Military preparations were made under the codename Operation Veritas and they coincided with an already ongoing major warfare exercise in Oman—Exercise Saif Sareea II (Swift Sword). This happenstance assisted considerably in the logistical aspects of Britain’s preparations. Saif Sareea involved 20,000 service personnel and was centered around a powerful force including the aircraft carrier Illustrious carrying eight Royal Navy Sea Harriers and seven RAF Harrier GR7s. The exercise included the destroyers HMS Southampton and Nottingham, the frigates HMS Cornwall, Monmouth, Kent, and Marlborough, and the submarines HMS Superb, Trafalgar, and Triumph.92 Prior to the exercise, Britain had already stationed two squadrons of Tornado F4 fighter jets and two squadrons of Tornado GR 4 bombers in the area surrounding Afghanistan.93 In effect,

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Operation Veritas came to be Britain’s biggest military mobilization since the Falkland War in 1982. While Britain’s military preparations were progressing, Tony Blair delivered a stark ultimatum similar to the one he had proposed to President Bush. He demanded that the Taliban hand over Osama bin Laden or face “very considerable damage.”94 However, as bin Laden remained under cover, on October 2, the prime minister confirmed his initial diagnosis of the situation and stated that the deadline for a political solution had passed. In the meantime, the United States had issued a request asking the British leadership to engage its missile-firing submarines in the forthcoming strikes. This request coincided with new Al Qaeda threats warning that Great Britain would be a legitimate target.95 However, London remained undeterred and on October 7 British submarines launched tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAM) into Afghanistan as they took part in the first wave of attacks against the Taliban regime.96 The British leadership was well aware that militarily Afghanistan posed enormous challenges and risks and agreed with the United States to closely coordinate their military actions. Both governments also realized the opportunities and risks they had in the Northern Alliance. The methods of this guerrilla group were often brutal, and their advance could lead to upheavals within the Afghan society as it did a decade earlier. However, at the same time the Northern Alliance could provide necessary troops on the ground to fight enemy forces and thereby diminish the risks for coalition troops. Ultimately, U.S. and British military planners decided on a strategy of heavy and sustained aerial bombardment supplemented by an engaged support of the Northern Alliance before U.S. and British special forces would enter the country. Shortly after the first coalition attacks in Afghanistan, President Bush remarked that the ensuing campaign was part of a “broader battle” against various states sheltering terrorists. This statement led to immediate speculations about a geographical extension of the war, and Iraqi deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz would soon confirm that “it is just a matter of time” before Britain and the United States attack Iraq under the pretext of a war on terrorism. Upon further questions by journalists, Foreign Secretary Straw responded that military objectives have not expanded.97 He acknowledged that no evidence to link Iraq with the 11 September attacks has been found and explained further that the UN Charter is very specific about circumstances in which military action can take place. We have effective endorsement of the Security Council for

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this military action. Were any action to be taken anywhere else in the world, it has to follow similar principles.

However, the Foreign Secretary also suggested, “If circumstances change, then we change.”98 In the meantime, U.S. and British attacks had been increasingly effective in either destroying or damaging facilities and the logistical infrastructure of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. However, while Defence Secretary Hoon confirmed that “some of Mullah Omar’s followers are starting to defect,” he also cautioned that the signs of cracks in the Taliban “do not yet amount to a clear indication of the collapse of the regime.” 99 Indeed, after twelve days of aerial bombardment analysts and commentators suggested that ground troops would have to be deployed in Afghanistan if the campaign was to be successful.100 Accordingly, in the second half of October, Blair declared that the conf lict is entering its “most testing time” as he prepared the British public for the possibility of casualties in forthcoming military operations.101 U.S. and British military planners met subsequently in order to engage in intensive deliberations about a ground deployment. By October 19, the first of approximately 300 U.S. special forces had already entered Afghanistan. British Military chiefs agreed to send up to 1,000 soldiers, including troops from the elite Special Air Service (SAS) contingent for sensitive operations.102 The helicopter carrier HMS Ocean along with a mountain-warfare-experienced Royal Marines Commando unit was expected to form an important element of the British deployment. As these and other military preparations continued, Defense Secretary Hoon was soon to confirm that the troops were on stand-by and ready to go into action “at very short notice.”103 In the following weeks the prescriptive propensities of the British leadership would continue to manifest themselves in concrete actions. On October 22, Tony Blair held a crucial meeting with his cabinet in order to finalize the British deployment plans. Indeed, toward the end of the month British helicopters deployed the special units inside Afghanistan for pinpoint raids as had been planned.104 The goal was to focus on all possible targets that would sustain the regime’s ability to govern and fight, such as Taliban supplies and military positions, key officials and leaders.105 At the same time, Armed Forces Minister Adam Ingram indicated that Britain would step up its involvement in the air campaign over Afghanistan that, so he argued, would represent “a major enhancement of the coalition’s capability.”106 By the end of October, a total of 4,200 British troops had been assigned to the operations in Afghanistan.107

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As the U.S.-British bombing campaign gained momentum, so would international criticism regarding the dropping of cluster bombs. In some cases these bombs had been fired near civilian areas, leaving submunitions scattered among residences. Accidentally, U.S. and British Forces also targeted a Red Cross food distribution center, a food convoy, a nursing home, and a school. One errant bomb missed its intended target north of Kandahar and led to the wounding of the designated Afghan interim president Hamid Karzai and the death of three coalition troops.108 Criticism came also from the home front. Former British defence secretary Lord Healey commented on the bombing, stating that “it is killing a lot of innocent women and children.” He added, “It hasn’t got any chances whatsoever of destroying Al Qaeda. It is in fact creating more terrorists, turning more people throughout the Muslim world against the West.”109 Along with this criticism, on October 30 British polls showed a significant drop in public support for the war and for the first time a majority favored a pause in the bombing campaign.110 The prime minister defended the use of cluster bombs as “legal and necessary in specific circumstances.”111 The prescriptive propensities of his mental model weighed most heavily in his decision-making process and he emphasized, “It is important that we never forget why we are doing this; never forget how we felt watching the planes f ly into the trade towers . . . . Never forget the gloating menace of Osama Bin Laden in his propaganda videos.”112 U.S. President Bush would also join in a defense of the bombing campaign by warning that Al Qaeda could unleash a nuclear Armageddon. Later, as Kabul fell to the coalition forces, British Military commanders further countered the public criticism as they attributed it to the effectiveness of the bombing campaign.113 At the beginning of November, the military campaign had entered into its fifth week and the British leadership sought to highlight its contribution. Defence officials emphasized that RAF planes were engaged in one third of all the surveillance and early-warning missions in the region. At the same time, on November 10 the British leadership confirmed speculations that it already had conventional ground forces deployed in Afghanistan.114 Prime Minister Blair elaborated that the main purpose of these troops would be to make safe the humanitarian supply routes now opening up as a result of military progress. He stated that others may be focusing on securing airfields, clearing unexploded ordnance, and ensuring the safe return of the UN and various nongovernmental organizations to Afghanistan, permitting the construction of the broad-based government that is so badly needed.115 In a subsequent emergency statement to members of parliament Blair added: “We cannot,

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of course, rule out some of our troops being used in offensive frontline operations.”116 Shortly before the prime minister’s latest trip to Washington, he convened an international meeting in Downing Street. His original plan was to confine it to the European “big three,” Chirac, Schroeder, and himself as the host. However, the prime minister quickly faced considerable criticism for bypassing the EU and the meeting was thus subsequently expanded to include prime ministers Jose Maria Aznar of Spain, Silvio Berlusconi of Italy, Guy Verhofstadt of Belgium, Wim Kok of the Netherlands, as well as the EU’s foreign policy chief Javier Solana. Blair used the occasion to elaborate on the military progress so far and the plans for a ground offensive. German chancellor Schroeder made clear his concern about the bombing tactics and the effect they were having on the Arab Street. He was backed by French president Chirac who stated “We know what is likely to happen. A mosque will be bombed by accident during Ramadan. What do we do then?”117 French concerns remained without much effect. On November 7, U.S. secretary of defense Donald Rumslfeld declared in an address to defence contractors, congressional staff, and ranking military, “We will not stop for Ramadan. We will not stop for winter. After the Taliban and Al Qaeda, we’ll get after the rest.”118 Toward the end of the month, the U.S. leadership showed again inclinations toward extending the campaign to Iraq. The British leadership was aware of the high concerns such speculations yielded especially in France and Germany and that they would endanger the viability of Europe’s common foreign and security policy ambitions. At a British-French Summit on November 29 in London, Chirac was seemingly concerned about the possible U.S. intentions. However, despite apparent differences between Europe and the United States over plans to widen the war to include Iraq, both leaders insisted that the coalition remained coherent. In the meantime the Northern Alliance, supported by coalition forces, had captured the city of Mazar-i-Sharif and other areas of northern Afghanistan. British forces had already been liaising with Northern Alliance forces on the ground and developing the plans for several offensives. At the same time, the aerial bombing campaign assisted the advance of the Northern Alliance toward the city. At the British Armed Forces headquarters in Northwood, Defence Secretary Hood elaborated that British Troops played a “very significant” role in the advance of the Northern Alliance and the disintegration of the Taliban. After having been briefed by chief of joint operations General John Reith, Hoon suggested that Kabul may be captured with a similar strategy as the Taliban was already retreating south

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and the prime minister’s spokesman subsequently commented that “The momentum is very much with us, the Taliban is hurting.”119 The Afghan capital was indeed captured by November 13, and the United States reported that the bombings of both Kabul and Kandahar had killed various enemy leaders, including Muhammed Atef, a leading Al Qaeda military commander, featured on the American “most wanted” list.120 However, Tony Blair was quick to stress that despite recent successes “the military job is not yet done.”121 On November 14, the prime minister called on the people of southern Afghanistan to rise up against the crumbling Taliban as they were f leeing to their strongholds from the advancing Northern Alliance and on Afghan radio he urged tribesmen to cash in on a US $ 25 million reward for the capture of Osama bin Laden.122 On December 20, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a Resolution 1386 to authorize the establishment of a multinational force to ensure peace and stability in Afghanistan.123 Blair had early on been very cognizant of the inherent difficulties related to the governance of Afghanistan and the chronic instability of previous regimes. On the eve of the coalition’s campaign against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, he had assured the Afghan people that “the conf lict will not be the end. We will not walk away as the outside world has done so many times before.”124 The British leadership remained committed to this pledge. Already prior to the UN Conference it announced that Britain would take the first lead of the emerging multinational military force for three months designed to stabilize the Afghan postwar order.125 Although Britain was engaged in peacekeeping missions it also remained committed to peacemaking operations. Enemy resistance continued to be greater than expected particularly around Spin Boldak along the Pakistani border. In the new year the Pentagon acknowledged “non-trivial” pockets of resistance.126 The British leadership subsequently announced the dispatch of 1,700 further combat troops including forty-five Royal Marine commandos.127 Together with U.S. and Afghan Forces the British Troops engaged in Operation Ptarmigan and Operation Snipe in April 2002, destroying various weapons arsenals and the general infrastructure of Al Qaeda. Although the force of the resistance would decrease over time, coalition forces proved unable to capture Osama bin Laden. Already in January, President Bush had signaled that the alliance might not achieve the original goal of capturing Osama bin Laden. Subsequently, Bush widened the goal of the campaign as he stated, “Our objective is more than bin Laden. I just don’t spend that much time on him, to be honest.

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Focusing on one person indicates to me that people don’t understand the scope of this mission. Terror is bigger than one man.” Subsequently, a Pentagon spokesman added the United States has decided to stop “chasing shadows” in the war on terror that would continue.128 From this point onward, the speculations about Iraq as the next target in this war would become stronger. Germany In Germany, as elsewhere, the 9/11 attacks raised concerns about the country’s vulnerability to similar attacks.129 However, in Germany these concerns were fueled even further by a wave of anthrax letters, as surfaced later also in the United States and, more worryingly, by evidence that the Al Qaeda network had established roots within the country. Not only had a number of the terrorists lived in Hamburg, it also became increasingly evident that Al Qaeda had a substantial financial and logistical base in Germany.130 Thus, immediately after the attacks the Federal Office for Criminal Investigation declared that Germany was facing an “increased risk” and the Federal Border Control boosted police forces while security for airports, public buildings, and transport infrastructure were stepped up.131 Like France and Great Britain, Germany also joined the solidarity with the United States. One day after the attacks, Chancellor Schroeder addressed the German Bundestag and declared, “11 September, will go down in history for all of us as a black day.” Similar to French and British leaders, he added that the atrocities in New York and Washington were directed not only against the United States but against the “civilized international community” as a whole. Schroeder argued that UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, along with NATO’s activation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, provided a legal base for military action against the perpetrators of terrorism and countries harboring them.132 Therefore, said Schroeder, the country would extend “unconditional solidarity” to the United States including the deployment of military forces.133 The chancellor’s call for “unconditional solidarity” was endorsed by all major parties in the bundestag and a vast majority of parliamentarians voted for Germany to provide “suitable military capabilities to fight international terrorism.”134 At the same time, the German leadership showed itself concerned about the “root causes” of terrorism. Foreign Minister Fischer emphasized that “providing support for modernization, resolving bitter regional conf licts, rebuilding shattered structures is just as important as the work done by the

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military.”135 Although Fischer ultimately agreed with Schroeder on the need for military action, together they demanded that it ought to be limited, precise, and proportionate. Similarly, parliamentarians across the political spectrum stressed that while Germany was obliged to stand by the United States, it was also obliged to speak up for multilateralism, cooperation, and consultation, and press for comprehensive political and social measures to be embedded in Operation Enduring Freedom.136 Thus one of the key roles for the German leadership after the 9/11 attacks was to contribute to the creation and the consolidation of the international alliance in the fight against terrorism. Foreign Minister Fischer worked assiduously to build a common EU diplomatic response to the terrorist attacks and encouraged a prominent role for the UN in the antiterror campaign. He also embarked on an intense round of shuttle diplomacy to the Middle East and various states in Central Asia to foster the international coalition.137 Similarly, Chancellor Schroeder garnered diplomatic support for the antiterror coalition by traveling to the capitols of China, India, Pakistan, and Russia.138 Pakistan figured especially prominently not only on the German, but also on the European agenda. To the west, the country shared mountainous borders with Afghanistan that were suspected to serve as hideouts for Taliban and Al Qaeda. Equally important was that Al Qaeda had in the past established bases in Islamabad and in other parts of the country. Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf thus became an important figure in the coalition against terrorism. In consultations with the German chancellor, Musharraf declared that Pakistan would remain committed to the international coalition, its efforts to capture Al Qaeda, and patrol the Afghan-Pakistani border.139 Recognizing the economic burden of the Pakistani efforts, Schroeder, in return, pledged increases in economic aid to the country. Throughout September and for much of October, German actions had been on the nonmilitary track emphasizing the importance of coalition building and curtailing finances that were fueling the network of terrorists.140 On the eve before the first wave of attacks against Afghanistan, U.S. president Bush informed Schroeder by phone about the imminence of the forthcoming military assault. The chancellor responded that Germany would “without reservation” support the attacks on “terrorist targets in Afghanistan.”141 However, on October 7 German Forces did not participate in the first strike missions against Afghanistan. Nevertheless, one day after the attack Schroeder declared in a news conference that Germany’s solidarity would “not exclude a military contribution if it is requested.”142

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Two days later, the chancellor convened with President Bush at the White House in Washington. During their meeting the president issued a military request asking the chancellor for the redeployment of some NATO aircraft to the United States that would, in turn, free U.S. planes for the mission in Afghanistan.143 The president also requested that the German chancellor send German Naval units to the Mediterranean in order to replace and free U.S. units from there. Thus, the U.S. request was of a rather modest nature and German Forces would not be committed to any combat missions. In a joint press conference after their deliberations, it was striking that Schroeder averted questions about German Military contribution and instead continued to focus on terrorist finances and humanitarian issues in Afghanistan. Indeed, as the coalition campaign in Afghanistan intensified, the German leadership, more than any other European government, showed increasing concern about humanitarian aspects and the political aftermath in Afghanistan. Foreign Minister Fischer met with several international aid groups and declared that Afghanistan would be hit by a “humanitarian disaster” in the absence of proper countermeasures. Indeed, since the onset of the war, masses of Afghan refugees were f leeing into neighboring countries. Another concern was that international aid efforts could not be effective as long as the Taliban remained in Kabul. Regarding the postwar order in Afghanistan, Fischer identified the lack of power sharing in the past as one of the main reasons for the recent tragedies. Thus, he initiated deliberations about a “post-Taliban solution that would involve all the country’s ethnic groups.”144 Although the mental models of German leadership’s prescriptive propensities show inclinations towards the use of military force, at this point, it remained hesitant. Germany continued to be very committed to the political path. However, it was also evident that the country would not be able to avoid responding positively to a more demanding U.S. Military request without threatening the very basis of the transatlantic alliance and the prospects for viable foreign and security policy cooperation on the European continent.Cognizant of this risk, Chancellor Schroeder set out to overcome the “taboo” on German involvement in military operations that had loomed over Germany since the second world war.145 In the bundestag he declared that the era when Germany could provide only financial or other secondary support to a foreign military mission was “irrevocably gone.” The country had a “new responsibility in international operations aimed at securing a safe and just world order.”146 The chancellor requested from the parliamentarians that German “solidarity must be more than mere lip-service.”147 “Let there be no mistake,” he continued, “this

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expressly includes participation in military operations to defend freedom and human rights, and to establish stability and security.”148 The prescriptive propensities of the German leadership’s mental model would gradually manifest themselves. It was only a week after the first coalition attacks in Afghanistan that Chancellor Schroeder announced to the German public that the country would shortly be called upon to provide more substantive military help in the ongoing operations. Earlier, Defense Minister Peter Struck had already acknowledged ongoing talks between Berlin and Washington. In a letter to party deputies, he explained that “concrete and operational demands” were expected to emerge from the talks. At the same time, however, the defense minister also cautioned international expectations that Germany would join the international coalition immediately, explaining that it would be not until November that the bundestag would vote on a military involvement in Afghanistan.149 Reports about possible German deployments were indeed confirmed by the beginning of November. After Schroeder convened with his security council, he announced publicly that Germany would be prepared to send anti–nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warfare units along with German “Fuchs” Sniffer tanks with 800 specialized troops, as requested by Washington. In addition to these NBC troops, he explained that 250 airborne rescue and evacuation personnel could be called into combat when required. Moreover, some 1,800 naval personnel were planned to be mobilized to safeguard international shipping routes, cut off terrorist supply channels, and gather intelligence about possible terrorist activities in these regions.150 Germany indeed appeared to have abandoned its postwar ambivalence toward the use of military force in international conf licts as its leadership’s prescriptive propensities started to translate into direct action. In what the chancellor described as an “important and historic” decision, Germany was subsequently preparing to complement its political support with military support by sending up to 3,900 troops, the largest German combat contingent to serve overseas since 1945.151 Schroeder commented that his country’s willingness to provide military backing was an important message for Germany’s allies. It signaled a “new conception of German foreign policy. Avoiding every direct risk cannot and must not be the guiding principle of Germany’s foreign and security policy.”Germany had entered a new phase in its postwar history, willing and able to use military force abroad “in defence of freedom and human rights.”152 The chancellor’s decision received support across the political spectrum. The leadership of the Social-Democratic Party emphasized that the party

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would support the participation of the Bundeswehr (German Forces) unconditionally and the Christian Democratic (CDU) opposition followed suit. It was from the ranks of Foreign Minister Fischer’s Green Party, the ruling coalition’s junior partner, that the chancellor would face criticism. Only a minority here approved of a German military involvement, as they judged that such means would not be helpful towards achieving the “goal of the war against terrorism.” Fischer reacted to this opposition by threatening his resignation unless the party would back the government decision.153 Ultimately, the party gave in and in mid-November the Bundestag formally approved the chancellor’s plan to send troops for an engagement in the war against terrorism.154 On November 20, the Defence Ministry announced that the Bundeswehr’s contribution to the international coalition would start with Transall f lights on 26 November.155 On the same day three Transall C-160 cargo haulers were loaded with pallets of blankets, medical supplies, and other humanitarian supplies for departure to the Incirlik NATO base in Turkey. About 500 aircrew personnel were deployed for these transports. A few days later reconnaissance commandos f lew to Bahrain to prepare for naval deployment. Two frigates, the Brandenburg and the Bremen, together with the tanker Rhoen and the tender Mosel were sent to the region surrounding the Horn of Africa. Toward the end of November 2001, an Airbus A 310 MEDVAC was made available on twelve-hour standby to provide transport for wounded, injured, and seriously ill troops. Thus, Germany had indeed contributed militarily. Many international observers concluded that the events of 9/11 had provided a catalyst for German leaders towards more assertiveness in questions of international security. However, the involvement of the Bundeswehr was limited once again. With the exception of the KSK (Kommando Spezialkräefte) special forces contingency, German Troops were not designated to participate in either aerial or ground combat missions.156 Instead, German Forces have been involved mainly in surveillance missions around the Cape of Africa, and they have played a central role in the political and economic reconstruction of Afghanistan. Further German contributions to the antiterror campaign were on the political front. Central here was the organization and funding of a UN-sponsored Conference on the creation of a post-Taliban interim regime. The conference began on November 27 in the former German capital Bonn, and it involved representatives from the main Afghan ethnic groups. Despite significant differences between these groups, they eventually agreed to the creation of a temporary transitional government that would give way to a more representative two-year administration

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after six months. The resulting “Bonn Accords” were signed on December 5, and they established a twenty-nine member interim government led by Hamid Karzai.157 Hosting the conference was important for Germany. It contributed to the maintenance of consensus in the government coalition as parliamentary support for military action had been conditional upon a concurrent search for political solutions.158 Beyond creating an interim government, the Bonn Accords also established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Germany sent 1,200 troops to Kabul and additional troops for logistic purposes to neighboring Uzbekistan, and was thereby the main contributor to the multinational peacekeeping force. From February to August of the next year, Germany together with the Netherlands became the lead nation in the ISAF operation. The major coalition powers were united in welcoming the Bonn Accords and it was, as one observer noted, “one of those telling moments of Europe and America coming together.”159 However, this harmony would soon vanish. Already in November the U.S. leadership had signaled that Iraq might also become a target in the war on terrorism. German leaders were quick to voice their concern and warned that such a move could ignite a broader conf lict in the Middle East.160 In a parliamentary debate, Chancellor Schroeder urged an end to the growing debate on whether Iraq should be targeted after Afghanistan. He cautioned that the alliance must be “very careful about discussing new targets in the Middle East. More could blow up around our ears than any of us are able to deal with.” Similarly, Foreign Minister Fischer said “all European nations would view a widening of the conf lict with great skepticism. We should try to solve regional conf licts politically.”161 In the end, the German appeals would remain without effect. Conclusion The efforts of the international coalition in Afghanistan were widely considered to be a success. The Taliban were overthrown, and the Bonn Conference established a process for the political, social, and economic reconstruction of a wartorn country. This process included the adoption of a new constitution in 2003, a presidential election in 2004, and National Assembly elections in 2005. On October 9, 2004, Hamid Karzai became the first democratically elected president of Afghanistan. The new Afghan National Assembly was inaugurated on December 19, 2005. During the conf lict in Afghanistan, the EU had been very active in crafting and moving toward the implementation of antiterrorism policies.162

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The first of its practical efforts came on September 13, just two days after the terrorist attacks. Within two weeks it had had developed a comprehensive action plan, which was revised on a monthly basis. However, the military campaign in Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al Qaeda was orchestrated mainly by the United States. The EU acted mostly as a civilian power, and here particularly through its external assistance programs budgeting for over € one billion as part of the Bonn Agreement. The attacks of September 11, nevertheless strengthened the confidence in an emerging viable common foreign and security policy on the European continent. The broad consensus among all members of the EU in general and among the big three in particular allowed EU Commission President Romano Prodi and the EU’s high representative for foreign policy Javier Solana to speak for the EU as a coherent institution. As in the Kosovo conf lict, it was ultimately to the individual member states of the EU to engage militarily and thereby to prove the EU’s ambitions toward a common foreign and security policy. In contrast to the Kosovo Crisis, a cognitive analysis of French, British, and German leaders reveals that, overall, they did share a unified mental model. The French diagnosis of the situation after 9/11 was pessimistic and its threat perception was ref lected in its immediate activation of the antiterror Vigipirate plan. Also on the international level its diagnostic and prescriptive propensities manifested themselves quickly as ref lected in the French appeal to the UN Security Council one day after the attack and the support for NATO’s invocation of its mutual defense guarantee. Moreover, in accordance with the prescriptions that follow from the mental models of President Chirac and Foreign Minister Vedrine, France engaged all three branches of its armed forces, army, navy, and air force, in the conf lict with the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Like the French diagnosis of the situation, the British diagnosis was also very pessimistic. In accordance with the prescriptive propensities from its mental model, it showed itself as the most determined actor on the European continent. Aside from the United States, Britain was the only power to deploy forces on the first day of the military strikes against Afghanistan. Tony Blair reiterated on several occasions his commitment that Britain was in “for the long haul.”163 Like France, Britain engaged all three branches of its armed forces in the conf lict. After major combat operations ended, Britain became the first lead power in ISAF operations in and around Kabul in January 2002, and it was subsequently again Britain that supplied reinforcements in Operation Anaconda. The German leadership, in accordance with its mental model, was also disposed toward the use of force in Afghanistan. However, with the

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exception of a special forces contingency, German Troops were not designated to participate in either aerial or ground combat missions. Instead, the German Forces have been involved mainly in surveillance around the Cape of Africa, and they have played a considerable role in the reconstruction of the wartorn country. The German contribution to the Afghan campaign, while of relatively small importance militarily, were nevertheless of considerable political significance as they underlined a unity in strategic orientations on the European continent.164 As in the Kosovo conf lict, the leadership of all three states acted in accordance with the propensities of their respective models. The difference in these successive security challenges is that in the Kosovo question the French, British, and German leaders did not share a uniform mental model, and the consequence was negative feedback on the institutionalized common foreign and security policy ambitions in Europe. In the aftermath of 9/11, however, the big three on the European continent did share a uniform mental model, which resulted in positive feedback on the viability of European ambitions. At the culmination of the campaign it was believed that Osama bin Laden had been cornered and killed. Later evidence, supplied by video and broadcast tape, dashed such hopes. The top leadership of Al Qaeda remained at large, and the organization as a whole remained active. The fight against terrorism would continue and the European Council meeting in June 2002 declared that CFSP was to play a more important part in this campaign.165 However, the direction this fight would take would lead to much discord on the European continent.

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CHAPTER 5

THE IRAQ WAR

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ith all the tragedy the events of September 11, 2001 brought, they appeared to confirm the viability of Europe’s common foreign and security policy ambitions. Europe’s big three displayed similar strategic orientations toward the Taliban and the Al Qaeda terrorists it had harbored. However, given the nature and magnitude of the terrorist attacks, the converging strategies on the European continent might have come as no surprise. The next challenge came soon as it became apparent that the defeat of the Taliban was only the first phase in the U.S.-declared war on terrorism. The Iraqi regime had been a recurring threat and menace in international politics long before 2003. Beginning in 2002, the leadership in the United States set forth a rationale for building a coalition to engage in a preemptive strike against Iraq. The justification provided by Washington was apparent evidence of the Iraqi regime intending to acquire stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and an apparent link between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. If the allegations were true, Iraq constituted an imminent danger and France, Great Britain, and Germany would have to respond. The Origins of the Iraq Crisis

The ultimate countdown for the Iraq War begins in 2002 with U.S. President George Bush’s branding of Iraq as part of the infamous “axis of evil.” However, its roots date back to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent initiation of Desert Storm under the leadership of the United States more than a decade earlier in January 1991. The war itself was short-lived as Iraqi Forces were not prepared to resist the overwhelming

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air power displayed by coalition forces. Indeed, by February 27, 1991, Iraq’s military was defeated. Its regime, however, remained in power and over the years both the United States and Great Britain would cite it as the provocateur for a new military confrontation in 2003. With the collapse of Iraqi forces after Desert Storm, the UN Security Council moved to impose a postwar regime to enforce the elimination of Iraqi production and use of WMD. UN Resolution 686 on March 2, 1991 set forth the basis for a cease-fire, and a month later, UN Resolution 687 laid out the Security Council’s requirements in detail.1 It first reaffirmed UN Resolution 678 from the previous year as it called for the continuation of the oil embargo imposed then, and it demanded Baghdad to unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of all its WMD. Although the verification of these declarations in the area of chemical and biological weapons would be the responsibility of the newly created UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would be responsible for the nuclear sphere. For the IAEA, the years between 1991 and 1998 were rather uneventful. Its director Hans Blix reported later, “Early in the period, the IAEA secured the removal of all fissionable material . . . The agency further supervised the destruction of many of many large installations that had been used in the Iraqi weapons program.” In its final report to the Security Council in October 1997, the agency declared that a “technically coherent” picture of Iraq’s past nuclear program had evolved, and that there were no significant discrepancies between that picture and Iraq’s latest declaration.2 UNSCOM, on the other hand, would be entangled in complex and at times very contentious relations with the Baghdad regime. Iraq was willing to disclose in small increments some of its prohibited weapons program and UNSCOM was often able to destroy large quantities of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons and production facilities. However, at the same time, Baghdad would often obstruct the workings of the UN weapons inspectors, deny them access to various cites, and leave much of its remaining weaponry unaccounted for.3 Because of the inadequate accounting on the Iraqi side, UNSCOM concluded, “it could not be excluded at the end of 1998 that there still existed undeclared missiles, chemical weapons and biological weapons.”4 The regime in Baghdad would often cite violations of its sovereignty for its contentions and, moreover, it also demanded the lifting of sanctions. It was especially the leaders of the United States and Great Britain who displayed the most uncompromising stance in the international

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community. Both governments declared that sanctions would be lifted only if Iraq was to adhere unconditionally to any UN requests of which more than a dozen were issued over the 1990s.5 Much to Iraqi dismay, in the spring of 1997, U.S. secretary of state Madeleine Albright had introduced the possibility that sanctions in Iraq might not end until Saddam Hussein is replaced. Later that year President Clinton confirmed that “sanctions will be there until the end of time, or as long as he [Saddam Hussein] lasts.”6 Iraq reacted in kind and a dramatic episode evolved in the fall of 1997. Baghdad accused U.S. personnel working for the UNSCOM inspections team of espionage and threatened to expel them from the country.7 UNSCOM, in effect, did withdraw all of its weapons inspectors, and subsequently the U.S. threatened military action. It was only after an intervention by Russian president Boris Yeltsin that war was averted as Saddam Hussein subsequently agreed to allow UN inspectors to return to Iraq on November 20. Upon its return, UNSCOM intended to inspect presidential palaces. However, the Iraqi regime refused to grant access to these cites, and the United States and Britain responded by threatening imminent air strikes. This time UN secretary-general Kofi Annan intervened and averted further escalation of the crisis. He convened negotiations with Tariq Aziz in February 1998 and signed a new agreement with the Iraqi regime to allow the resumption of inspections under the condition that the inspectors “respect the legitimate concerns of Iraq relating to national security, sovereignty and dignity.”8 This agreement became anchored in UN Resolution 1154 and UNSCOM returned to Iraq with an open-ended mandate. However, the rest of the year saw the confrontation intensifying rather than diminishing. The United States complained about continuous Iraqi obstruction to inspections, while the Iraqi regime continued to complain about U.S. and British espionage under the guise of surveillance. The U.S. approach thus grew increasingly bellicose. On October 29, 1998, U.S. Congress passed the Iraqi Liberation Act aimed at removing Saddam Hussein as the Iraqi leader. To this end, the United States would provide increased funds for Iraqi dissident groups.9 President Clinton signed the act on October 31. The crisis then climaxed on the same day when Iraq cut off all work by UN monitors. The United States, with British support, reacted with the launching of Operation Desert Fox, a four-day bombing campaign in mid-December that destroyed a number of suspect sites and degraded some of the regime’s command and control facilities. As the operation was not endorsed by the UN, it led to considerable concern within international community.10

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The international divide was furthered by the United States’ and Great Britain’s continued insistence to prohibit the sale of approximately 80 percent of potential Iraqi oil exports with an annual value of 20 billion dollars. By the end of the decade, the international community showed increasing concern over the perilous humanitarian situation in the country, and there was an increasing unwillingness to punish the Iraqi populace for the wrongdoings of its regime. Many states, including France, Germany, and Russia, articulated considerable unease about the human costs of the embargo and argued for the easing of economic sanctions to urge Iraqi cooperation with UNSCOM.11 The opponents of the campaign also argued that Iraq posed no imminent threat to international security. They contended that as a result of the destruction caused by the Gulf War and the extensive weapons monitoring and dismantlement of UNSCOM, much of Iraq’s capacity for developing and using WMD was eliminated during the 1990s.12 Indeed, an independent panel of experts established by the Security Council in 1999 concluded that, “In spite of well-known difficult circumstances, UNSCOM and [the] IAEA have been effective in uncovering and destroying many elements of Iraq’s proscribed weapons programmes . . . the bulk of Iraq’s proscribed weapons programmes has been eliminated.”13 Despite such assessments, difficulties remained as the Iraqi regime would either continue to deny UN inspectors access to certain sites and also demand the lifting of UN sanctions. Diplomats and technical experts within the UN thus advanced a plan combining more intrusive inspections under a new UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) with suspension of the oil embargo for the purchase of food and medical goods. UNMOVIC officially replaced UNSCOM with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1284 of December 17, 1999.14 Moreover, in contrast to its predecessor, UNMOVIC was to have a clear “United Nations identity,” and should thus, not be “remote-controlled by any state.” Hans Blix would be appointed as the commission’s executive chairman after he had been replaced by Mohammed El Baradei at the IAEA. Their work on the ground would not begin until the fall of 2002. In 2000, President Bush and his administration took the reins in the White House. The bellicosity toward Iraq increased as officials now argued that the UN inspections regime was itself a charade. The reasoning was that even if Iraq were adjudged finally to have destroyed its WMD and ceased development programs, such a verdict might either be ill-founded or itself have ignored the possibility of future Iraqi capability. In such cases, so the argument ran further, the United States and Great

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Britain might not be able to convince the Security Council of the imminent dangers and muster a new armed coalition to intensify military action against Iraq.15 Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz in the meantime had formulated a new foreign policy. With regards to Iraq and “other potential aggressor states,” it dismissed “containment” in favor of “preemption,” with the goal of striking first to eliminate threats. The September 11, 2001 attacks would bring Wolfowitz’s advocacy for preemption to the forefront of the White House’s foreign policy options.16 The terrorist attacks altered how Washington saw his behavior in terms of U.S. national interests and a policy of containment was indeed deemed as no longer acceptable.17 Shortly after 9/11, the U.S. leadership had hinted in a letter to the UN Security Council that the ensuing war in Afghanistan might be geographically extended. It reasoned that the inquiry about state-supported terrorism is “in the early stages,” and that “We may find that our self-defense requires further actions with respect to other organizations and other states.”18 Regarding Iraq, the president subsequently argued that the question would not be about sanctions so much; rather Saddam was the “problem” and the United States was going to “deal with him.”19 In an atmosphere of fear paired with solidarity toward the United States, such remarks went largely unnoticed within the EU. The forthcoming split on the European continent and across the Atlantic was initially hidden. Yet this would change with the onset of the ultimate countdown to the Iraq War that can be dated to January 29, 2002 when President Bush delivered his State of the Union address to the U.S. Congress. In that speech Bush branded Iraq along with Iran and North Korea as constituting a tiny but lethal “axis of evil.” “States like these and their terrorist allies” he argued, are “arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.” Regarding the case of Iraq, the president added later that “nothing to date has restrained him [Saddam Hussein] from his pursuit of these weapons—not economic sanctions, not isolation from the civilized world, not even cruise missiles strikes on his military facilities.”20 Of particular concern to many Europeans was Bush’s inclination towards preemption as he stated that “America would not wait on events while dangers gather.”21 The justification for a military invasion citied by the U.S. administration was apparent evidence of Baghdad engaging in the acquisition of WMD and an assumed link between Al Qaeda and Iraq.22 However, conclusive evidence apart from inferential extrapolations from the Iraqi dictator’s previous attempts to acquire nuclear weapons and unsubstantiated

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speculations about the connection between Al Qaeda and the regime in Iraq remained absent.23 The ambiguity of the situation triggered what turned out to be one of the most damaging crises in the history of the EU’s common foreign and security policy ambitions. Internationalization of the Crisis Barely two weeks after the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration made it clear that the war on terrorism would have phases, the first of which would be against Afghanistan. The U.S. leadership also suggested that its foreign policy would be underlined by the continuing assembly of American power in the country’s vicinity.24 On November 6, President Bush gave a preview of his forthcoming speech at the UN. He advanced his “vision of our common responsibilities in the war on terror,” and he warned, “I will put every nation on notice that these duties involve more than sympathy or words. No nation can be neutral in this conf lict, because no civilized nation can be secure in a world threatened by terror.”25 The president was aware of the controversial claims regarding Iraqi WMD and the possible lack of support, stating in private conversations with his advisors that “At some point, we may be the only ones left. That’s okay with me. We are America.”26 Given such indications since 9/11, Europeans probably should have not been as surprised as they were by the ultimate direction the United States took in the war on terror. On several occasions during his trip to Europe in May 2002, the U.S. president attempted to rally support for a coalition against Iraq declaring that “Europe was facing the same threats as America” and that Iraq would be at the center of this threat.27 However, while many Europeans acknowledged that Saddam Hussein was a tyrant to his own people, they did not see him as an imminent threat to themselves, to the United States, or even to his own neighborhood. The EU, in the words of its High Representative Javier Solana, was “in a postAfghanistan mood. Where Americans still feel threatened, we in Europe feel a lack of vision in American policy on how to tackle global problems in the post 9/11 period.”28 Many Europeans also believed that an invasion of an Arab country with its consequent civilian casualties and likely need for long term-occupation will more likely be a recruitment tool for Al Qaeda rather than an effective strike against terrorism.29 Europeans generally read Saddam Hussein’s behavior as that of a rational dictator whose desire to remain in power restrained him from launching WMD or providing them to terrorists. Many European capitals thus wanted the emphasis to be on disarming Iraq and rejected the idea of a

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preemptive war. They were of the view that a combination of containment through a rigorous inspection regime and the gradual provision of a possible relaxation of sanctions, was keeping Saddam Hussein in line.30 The European stance was confirmed by a report of the Brooking Institution in January 2002 in which it was concluded that “At present, . . . [Saddam Hussein] appears to be contained every bit as well as the North Korean leadership—and much more tightly than was the Soviet Union during the cold war.”31 Thus, while in the United States there was much debate about Iraq, it was not figuring very prominently on the European agenda in 2002. The European Council in Barcelona in March 2002 was preoccupied with the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conf lict, and the conclusions of the summit did not mention Iraq. The subsequent June summit in Seville focused on the Treaty of Nice, handling all external relations cursorily. The Brussels European Council meeting in October then moved on to EU-NATO relations but again did not mention Iraq. The primary item on the agenda at the Copenhagen European Council meeting of December 12213 were enlargement issues of the EU. However, it was finally at this meeting that Iraq was formally discussed as well. In a concluding declaration, the EU expressed its full support for any UN measures and called upon Iraq to comply fully and immediately.32 The United States had in the meantime continued its campaign against Iraq. In a speech delivered at the West Point Military Academy on June 1, 2002, President Bush declared that, to ensure the defense of the United States and its allies, old notions such as containment were no longer valid, and that attention must focus on pre-emptive action.33 Bush reasoned that the enemy would now consist of “shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend” and “dictators with weapons of mass destruction[who] can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.” Faced with such enemies, the president concluded, “if we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited for too long.”34 The EU, for its part, continued to insist on the UN path and inspection processes. On September 12, 2002, President Bush spoke to the UN General Assembly in New York. He declared that, “If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose and remove or destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles and all related material.”35 Europeans were heartened when the president announced the U.S. position to seek necessary UN resolutions for further action toward Iraq. The UN subsequently recognized the need to act and upon concluding its session, it initiated discussions for the drafting of a

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new resolution designed to compel Iraq to comply with all UN requests for weapons inspections. Signs of relief within the international community followed as “multilateralism was pronounced alive and well.”36 However, the relief would not last long. Shortly after the president’s UN speech, on September 18, 2002, the White House published The National Security Strategy of the USA or the “Bush Doctrine” as it came to be known.37 Most importantly and controversially, the new security strategy elevated preemptive strikes to a legitimate action in the conduct of international politics. The international and European reaction was an increased concern that the United States might detach itself further from the international rules and restraints that had developed since the end of the Second World War. Indeed, Donald Rumsfeld had declared already earlier that in the post-9/11 world, the mission would determine the coalition and not vice versa. In other words, according to one observer, “America decides and if others want to join, so be it.”38 Shortly after the release of the Bush Doctrine Saddam Hussein responded and offered to allow UN weapons inspectors back into the country “without conditions.” The IAEA under the leadership of Mohamed El Baradei subsequently announced that it was ready to resume inspections in Iraq within only a few days.39 However, the United States, backed by Britain, dismissed it as a “tactical step by Iraq in hopes of avoiding strong UN Security Council action.”40 As the European Commission had been in strong advocacy for a resumption of the inspections, the U.S. and British reactions led commission President Romano Prodi to denounce U.S. unilateralism. He demanded that Washington and London respect the will of the international community.41 Instead, however, the U.S. increased the pressure on the UN. In an aggressive campaign in the weeks to follow President Bush challenged the Security Council that it must act if it did not want to be seen as a mere “debating society” or else make itself “irrelevant.”42 At times, the president’s rhetoric became even frantic. He challenged the Security Council, “[s]how the world whether you’ve got the backbone necessary to enforce your edicts.” Whether the United States considered the UN to be a multilateral forum based on a principle of international consensus was indeed questionable, as Bush warned that “The UN must know that the will of this country is strong.”43 On November 8, the UN passed Resolution 1441. The resolution was ratified by a unanimous vote of all members in the Security Council and it gave Iraq a “final opportunity” to disarm.44 Two weeks later the resolution was strongly endorsed by a unanimous NATO alliance at the

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Prague Summit in Poland. Here European states not only declared to “stand united” in their commitment to implement Resolution 1441, they also announced the development of a European rapid reaction force that would enable member states to conduct joint military operations abroad.45 However, the concord on the European continent did not last long. Shortly after the Prague meeting much discussion would focus on the explicit language of the resolution. The crux of the disagreement was whether the resolution itself gave the individual members of the council the right to take military action against Iraq.46 The resolution threatened “serious consequences” if Iraq would be found to be in “material breach” of any UN imposed demands. Any material breach was to be reported back to the Security Council for “assessment” and in the following weeks much debate centered around the ambiguity of these words. It ultimately became clear that the resolution was a “spongy document that each of the contesting parties was going to interpret freely.”47 Whereas Washington considered the resolution to carry a mandate for war, others disagreed. In January, Greece came to hold the presidency over the EU, and mid-month it called for a special meeting in Brussels. At the summit European leaders agreed on a resolution that expressly approved of war as a “last resort.” Yet, just what exactly what this would mean would also become the subject of contentious debates. Britain led the effort to forge a coalition of European countries in support of Washington’s policy. While France and Germany tried to develop a common EU position that would set a separate course. The elusiveness of reaching unanimity was illustrated further when France, Germany, and Belgium vetoed a U.S.-British backed plan for NATO to protect Turkey from any retaliatory strike by Iraq in the event of war. This trio argued that to provide Turkey with equipment now would indicate a presumption that a conf lict in Iraq is inevitable and would send the wrong signal while diplomatic efforts were underway to try to make disarmament work.48 The diplomatic negotiations continued for about two more months, but by the morning of March 17 it had become evident that an agreement remained out of reach. On this day President Bush issued an ultimatum to the regime of Saddam Hussein, demanding that he and his sons must leave Iraq within forty-eight hours. The president threatened further that their refusal to do so will result in military action commenced at an unspecified time.49 On March 19, the European Commission president Romano Prodi wrote to the fifteen EU member state’s leaders. He described the situation as “grim” and he called on the EU to “reforge its

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unity quickly.”50 It was too late. Military operations began on March 20, shortly after the expiration of President Bush’s forty-eight-hour ultimatum. Mental Models in the Iraq Crisis At a session of the European Parliament at the very beginning of September 2002, members described the rift between Europe’s biggest players as a “deep crisis in EU foreign policy.” One observer commented that “The EU has made tremendous progress in the past ten years, but Iraq is the Achilles’ heel of EU foreign policy. . . . . [T]he EU’s joint security and foreign policy program won’t work if the major countries disagree.”51 Such a conclusion is disturbing for the common foreign and security policy ambitions of the EU and even more so because since 9/11, the EU had underscored these aims further, for example, in the December 2001 summit in Laeken. Figure 5.1 illustrates that the disagreement can be traced back to diverging mental models in the face of the Iraq crisis. Diagnostic propensities of the mental models are mapped with the letter “O” for Other and prescriptive beliefs are mapped with the letter “S” for Self. Regarding the mental models of the French leadership, both President Chirac (2.67/+.47) and his foreign minister de Villepin (2.08/+.60)

Type A Settle > Deadlock

P/D

Type C Settle > Dominate Chirac–S (.67/.85)* * Schroeder–S (.25/.74)

+.75

* Fischer–S (.08/.69)

de Villepin–O (–.08/.60)* *Chirac–O (–.67/.47)

+.50 *de Villepin–S (.08/.49) +.25

Schroeder–O (–.25/.13)* C

C –.75

–.50

–.25

Fischer–O (–.08/–.19)* Blair–O (–.58/–.31)* Straw–S (–.42/–.37)*

+ .25

+ .50

+.75

*Blair–S (.58/–.15)

–.25

–.50 *Straw–O (.42/–.60) –.75

Dominate > Settle Type D

P/D

Dominate > Deadlock Type B

Figure 5.1 Mental Models in the Iraq Crisis.

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believed that a political solution to the Iraq crisis could be possible as they perceived Saddam Hussein to have inclinations toward a settlement. In fact, both leaders believed that Saddam Hussein was more disposed to a political solution than Milosovic in the Kosovo crisis. Regarding their mental model’s prescriptive propensities, both Chirac (+.67/+.85) and de Villepin (+.08/+.49) are Type A leaders in the time period before the outbreak of the war in March 2003. These propensities are indicative of inclinations toward political means such as negotiation and diplomacy for resolving the crisis and reaching a settlement. The British leadership diagnosed the situation as fundamentally different. Unlike their French counterparts, neither Prime Minister Blair (2.58/2.31) nor his foreign secretary Straw (+.42/2.60) had much confidence in a political solution as they perceived Saddam Hussein to be driven by hostile intentions.52 Tony Blair’s prescriptive beliefs (+.58/2.15) display a most uncompromising stance as he appears to be very confident that the forthcoming events in the crisis would be under the control of the alliance against Iraq. He is a Type B leader whereas Jack Straw (2.42/2.37) is a Type D leader with a somewhat lesser degree of confidence. Ultimately, however, both British leaders aimed at a conf lict strategy in accordance with the prescriptive elements of their mental models. Unlike those of their French counterparts, they show dispositions toward the use of military force as they aim to dominate the situation.53 The mental models of the German leadership are somewhat ref lective of the French assessment regarding the situation in Iraq.54 Although Chancellor Schroeder (2.25/+.13) shared the French perception that Saddam Hussein would ultimately be inclined toward a settlement, Foreign Minister Fischer (2.08/2.19) did not share this confidence. However, despite Fischer’s pessimism regarding Saddam Hussein’s strategic dispositions, both Schroeder (+.25/+.74) and Fischer (+.08/+.69) Type C characteristics. The prescriptive propensities of their mental models display favoring a political strategy toward the resolution of the conf lict, as they aimed to avoid a further escalation. Like the French leadership, Chancellor Schroeder and Foreign Minister Fischer stand apart from their British counterparts.55 In sum, the shared European mental model that had emerged after the September 11, 2001 attacks gave way to distinct national mental models in the face of the Iraq crisis. Both the French and the German leadership aimed at a political solution, even though the German Foreign Minister was pessimistic. In stark contrast, the British leadership did not have any faith in a settlement of the conf lict and it was, therefore, very conf lictual in its approach to the crisis. The theoretical expectation from the shared

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mental model framework is negative feedback on the viability of Europe’s common foreign and security policy ambitions. The remainder of this chapter will illustrate how the absence of a shared European mental model, led indeed to diverging foreign policy strategies in the Iraq crisis. France Although French leaders were concerned about Iraq, they did not consider it to be an imminent security threat. Throughout the crisis, the French leadership insisted that the international community needed solid proof that Baghdad was developing WMD and that such proof was missing.56 President Chirac also continuously insisted that diplomatic means be exhausted first and that the long-term deployment of UN arms inspectors was indispensable. However, contrary to the conventional portrayal of the French leadership, in the prelude to the Iraq War it was not categorically opposed to military action under any circumstances. In fact, for much of the first half of 2002 the French president did not rule out the possibility of using force against Iraq, yet he emphasized that such a decision should be made by the UN. In a speech to French ambassadors he explained: “If Baghdad insists on refusing to allow the unconditional return of inspectors, it would be up to the Security Council alone to decide what measures to take.”57 As in previous crises situations, the French leadership aimed to posture as a leader and a counterweight to the United States. Toward this end, it attempted to use international institutions, and here mainly the UN but also the EU, to multilateralize the conf lict and thereby to diminish the U.S. proclivity toward unilateral action.58 Foreign Minister de Villepin convened with his Dutch counterpart Jaap de Hoop toward the end of August. Both foreign ministers emphasized the importance of a common European position, not only in order to foster the viability of Europe’s common foreign and security policy ambitions but also in order to effectively counter the inclinations of the United States de Villepin explained that “an over-reliance on force” as advocated by the United States “did not in itself provide any solution.”59 At the beginning of September, President Chirac met with German chancellor Schroeder in Germany and was keen to declare that “[o]verall, we have a relatively coherent European position.” In fact, however, this was not the case. President Chirac’s statement came at a time when British prime minister Tony Blair clearly had already broken ranks with various of his European colleagues, most importantly with his French and German counterparts. Indeed, while the French leadership

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had been engaged in a campaign to forge European unity, the British prime minister was convening with President Bush at Camp David where both leaders together emphasized that the failure to act over the “serious threat” posed by Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein would be “irresponsible.”60 The international spat was in the making and it would reach its first climax in the maneuvering over UN Resolution 1441. In September, U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “We are a long way from getting an agreement.” He advised that the UN resolution should find Iraq in violation of previous resolutions, specify what the country must do to comply, and “determine what consequences will f low from Iraq’s failure to take action.”61 U.S. and British officials subsequently collaborated toward the development of a draft resolution, which was to be unveiled at the beginning of October. However, at the end of September France together with Germany reacted skeptically and confirmed Secretary Powell’s pessimism. As the date for the presentation of the draft approached, President Chirac again convened with Chancellor Schroeder in Paris. Both leaders suspected a built-in automaticity toward war and, in accordance with the prescriptive propensities of their mental models, declared that they would oppose such a resolution.62 After the publication of the draft resolution, the French leadership saw its suspicion confirmed and moved in further opposition to Washington and London. Much of the contentions centered around the language of the draft. The United States insisted on wording that said Iraq “will” face serious consequences, whereas the French instead argued for the word “might.” Another point of debate centered around the nature of “material breach.” Paris insisted that only the Security Council could determine exactly what would constitute such. De Villepin thus anew criticized the draft for de facto giving the United States a “blank check” to unilateral military actions.63 Rejecting such “hidden triggers,” he subsequently announced that France may seek to propose its own resolution on Iraq to the Security Council if an agreement with the British and American leaders could not be reached. Henceforth, the French leadership adopted a two-stage position demonstrating its ambition for a settlement. The first step would be embodied in UN Resolution 1441, which demanded the resumption of UN inspections in Iraq. The second step was a requirement that military action in the event of Iraqi non-compliance would require a second UN resolution. From the French perspective such an approach had several merits. Among them were that it emphasized the ultimate authority of the UN Security

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Council. Moreover, it denied the United States the prerogative to unilaterally declare Iraq in noncompliance and thus acquire the legitimacy to go to war over the slightest misstep.64 After embarking upon diplomatic consultations with their Russian and Chinese counterparts the French leadership gained considerable support for its proposal. President Chirac also intensified his campaign toward lobbying nonpermanent members of the UN Security Council to build an opposition to the hawkish U.S.-British position. Toward this end, he met with Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and Mexican president Vincente Fox who agreed with Chirac on a “common approach to Iraq” and opposition to “any unilateral attack” against Iraq. Germany would become a member of the Security Council in the new year and deliberations with Chancellor Schroeder had already been the norm. Beyond his efforts in the UN, Chirac also implored NATO members to abstain from a commitment to any coalition outside the UN.65 Given the discord on the European continent and the transatlantic disagreement it came as no surprise that when UN Resolution 1441 was ratified on November 8, it constituted a “compromise passage.” It did not carry the automatic link between noncompliance and military action as lobbied for by the United States. However, it also did not carry the explicit requirement of a second UN resolution to authorize war as the French had argued for. The resolution specified that in the event of a material breach, the Security Council would “convene immediately in order to consider the situation.” Because of the resolution’s “creative ambiguity,” it allowed everyone to claim victory. For their part, Chirac and de Villepin emphasized the symbolic value of the resolution as a commitment to work within the UN. The United States, on the other hand, had an implicit threat of force, but “serious consequences” fell short of the standard “all necessary means” formula. In the end, as one observer commented, Resolution 1441 “contained an inherent contradiction. Either military action was automatic, or it required a second resolution. It had to be one or the other.”66 As the differences between the United States and France on how to approach the Iraq crisis continued to become more manifest, it was surprising that in mid-November France found itself among those countries that the United States had contacted with an inquiry about possible contributions to a possible war effort in Iraq. The French leadership, however, declined to engage in any deliberations about the use of force and responded that the focus ought to be on the application of Resolution 1441 with the goal of peaceful disarmament in Iraq.67 In accordance with the cognitive propensities of their mental models, a settlement remained the primary

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goal of French leaders. In the meantime the UN inspectors began their work and at the beginning of December, the French leadership argued that the UN weapons inspections were developing well.68 Throughout December, these inspection activities took centerstage. As requested by the Security Council, Iraq had produced and submitted a 12,000 page report about its WMD programs on December 8. Although France advocated a slow-paced and careful scrutiny of the document, Britain pressed the Security Council by announcing that it would send a “contingency deployment” toward the Persian Gulf in anticipation of possible action against Iraq.69 Chirac and de Villepin continued to insist that it would be for the Security Council as a collective and not for individual members to assess the consequences and decide on the measures being taken.70 They further countered that, so far, it could not be concluded that Baghdad had engaged in a “material breach” of Resolution 1441. Given these contentions within a few weeks of the Security Council’s approval of Resolution 1441, the issue of whether a second resolution would be required was in play. While France continued to engage on the political path toward settlement, Great Britain together with the United States were going forth with substantive deployments in the Gulf region throughout January. Foreign Minister de Villepin argued that these buildups would disturb the political process. He commented that there would be no justification for an intervention because of a well-developing inspection process. Indeed, at this point eleven members in the Security Council were supportive of the French strategy toward Iraq.71 In a rather vivid illustration of the deepening discord on the European continent the French foreign minister said further that France would continue to collaborate with other countries to solidify a united front against U.S. and British efforts to push for military action before there was a clear signal from the inspectors and agreement by the UN Security Council.72 The French leadership remained confident in its diagnosis that a political solution with the Baghdad regime would be possible. During the period before a Security Council session scheduled for January 27, the Security Council requested from UN chief inspector Hans Blix an informal “pre-update” briefing. The briefing took place on January 9 and Blix used the occasion to voice his disappointment about the Iraqi weapons report from December, which in his impression was “rich in volume but poor in new information about weapons issues.” However, he also noted that there was no denial of access to sites inspectors sought to investigate and also that there was no “smoking gun.”73 It is this information that the French and also the Germans would focus on

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while the U.S. and Britain would emphasize the insufficiency of the Iraqi report. As a consequence the gaps across the Atlantic as well as within Europe continued to widen. A few days later international attention came to focus on the UN inspectors again. Eleven empty chemical warheads were found in Iraq, and this prompted Hans Blix and IAEA director Mohammed El Baradei to appear at a news conference in Paris. Both requested more time for inspections. President Chirac appeared personally at the event to support their plans.74 However, the U.S. leadership argued for the exact opposite as it touted the warheads as evidence of a material breach of sanctions that sufficiently justified immediate military action. The pressure on France for viable diplomatic action increased when U.S. defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld declared on January 20 that the decision on whether or not Iraq was in fact in violation of 1441 would be made in “a matter of weeks, not of months or years.” 75 Thus, a “growing assumption” emerged in France that the decision for war had been already made. This perception would be reinforced in midJanuary in a meeting that French ambassador Jean-David Levitte together with Chirac’s diplomatic advisor Maurice Gourdault-Montagne had with U.S. security advisor Condoleezza Rice. Upon their return to Paris, both diplomats informed the president, “[t]hey’re going to do it.” 76 The French leadership, backed by German support, was quick to react and called for a Security Council meeting on January 20 where de Villepin stated to Colin Powell that there is “nothing that could justify a war at this time.” 77 Asked whether France would use its veto power in the Security Council, he responded, “[b]elieve me that in a matter of principles France will go all the way to the end.” 78 On January 21, the French and German Parliaments held a joint session in Versailles to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the Elysee Treaty. The treaty marked the reconciliation between the two countries after the Second World War, and both leaderships used this occasion to emphasize their commitment to a peaceful solution of the Iraq crisis. Speaking to the applause of more than 900 parliamentarians, Chirac emphasized that “the only framework for a legitimate solution is the United Nations” and that “War is not inevitable.” 79 He also used the occasion to assert France’s leadership role and emphasized that role of Europe should be to assert itself as a coherent global player and that towards this end it had to speak with a uniform voice. In February the U.S. approach toward the ensuing crisis took a temporary turn. Prime Minister Tony Blair’s aggressive stance toward Iraq had been contested in the British Parliament and in the British public. In

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order to garner increased support at home he attempted to convince President Bush of the necessity for a second resolution beyond Resolution 1441. This would not only strengthen domestic support but also foster international legitimacy. Bush agreed to introduce into the debate the possibility of a second resolution giving Saddam Hussein a new ultimatum for compliance. Chirac was quick to cease the opportunity and on February 7 he held a phone conversation with Bush. He pressed his case that the world could “disarm Saddam Hussein without war.”80 The two presidents concluded by agreeing to work toward a second resolution. However, the second resolution would soon become an orphan as it became evident that it led merely to a further manifestation of already existing disagreements rather than to the launching of a common denominator. In the new resolution the United States was expected to declare Iraq in breach of commitments made to the UN and to open the way to “serious consequences” for Saddam Hussein. At the beginning of February Tony Blair traveled to Le Touquet in France with the hope of persuading Chirac to support a second UN resolution authorizing military force against Iraq. Chirac did not agree that Iraq was to be found in “material breach” and argued instead that “[w]e must let the inspectors do their jobs.” Asked in a postsummit press conference whether France might eventually join a military operation in Iraq, Chirac expressed the continued French commitment toward a settlement of the crisis. He responded “[w]e are still far from that . . . There is still much to be done in the way of disarmament by peaceful means.”81 The gap between supporters of the military option and those opposing it widened further. On February 10, the leaders of France, Germany, and Russia issued a joint statement in which they rejected U.S. arguments for a military intervention in Iraq and instead appealed to Washington to give peace “every chance.” Chirac elaborated further that “nothing justified” a war and that it would have disastrous consequences for the wider region.82 In accordance with the diagnostic propensities of his mental model, Chirac remained convinced that Iraq did not pose an imminent security threat as he discarded any intelligence suggesting otherwise arguing that intelligence, services “intoxicate each other.”83 In a subsequent speech to the Security Council on February 14, Foreign Minister de Villepin pointed out that considerable progress was being made in the disarmament of Iraq through UN inspection processes.84 It became increasingly evident that the impasse between the contending parties on the European continent and across the Atlantic would not be bridged. As the United States and Britain continued in their military deployments, U.S. officials commented that UN Resolution 1441 by itself would

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provide legitimacy for military action against Iraq. UN secretary-general Kofi Annan reacted on March 9 and warned that if the United States and Britain were to act unilaterally against Iraq, “the legitimacy of such military action will be seriously impaired.”85 Amid the quickening U.S.-British war preparations, the French foreign minister also convened for a minisummit with his German and Russian counterparts. In a press conference after their meeting, de Villepin hinted at the possibility of a joint use of the veto, saying that Russia and France “will assume all their responsibilities at the United Nations Security Council.”86 Finally, on March 10, the effort to find a common stance was brought to a full stop by President Chirac. In a television broadcast from his presidential offices in the Elysee Palace, he announced that France would vote against a new resolution, “whatever the circumstances.”87 In the UN, British officials were furious and assailed their French counterparts for blocking efforts to set a deadline for Iraq to disarm. British reactions would further rupture cross-Channel relations with Blair’s spokesperson accusing the French of “poisoning diplomacy.”88 Similarly, Foreign Secretary Straw commented that he would find it “extraordinary” that “without even proper consideration the French government has decided that it will reject these proposals.”89 Paris responded to the British criticism with “shock and sadness” as a deputy ministry spokesman declared that the British remarks would not be “worthy of a friendly nation and a European partner.”90 On March 14, France together with Germany and Russia issued a joint appeal to fellow UN Security Council members to support continued weapons inspections in Iraq and to hold a meeting in the following week to create a task list for Iraqi disarmament. The tripartite group also emphasized that the successive reports of chief UN arms inspectors have shown that inspections are producing results. They reaffirmed that in the present circumstances nothing justifies abandoning the inspection process and resorting to the use of force.91 De Villepin argued that there was a clear choice between the “logic of war” and the “logic of peace,” as embodied on either side of the council divide.92 However, any further effort proved fruitless. As the war commenced on March 20, Jacques Chirac responded that “France regrets this action taken without the approval of the United Nations.”93 Great Britain Although the British leadership was willing to marginally tolerate the Iraqi menace before 9/11, this was not the case in the aftermath of the

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terrorist attacks. In contrast to the French leadership, the British leadership perceived Iraq to be an imminent security threat. Shortly after the first coalition strikes on Afghanistan, speculations arose about whether the war on terrorism would be extended to Iraq. At that time Prime Minister Tony Blair had responded, “We are in this for the long haul. Even when Al Qaeda is dealt with, the job is not over.”94 Blair acknowledged that no link between the Iraqi regime and Al Qaeda could be substantiated, and thus his focus was on Iraq’s inclination towards the development and use of weapons of mass destruction:95 What changed for me with September 11th was that I thought then you have to change your mindset . . . you have to go out and get after the different aspects of this threat . . . you have to deal with this because otherwise the threat will grow . . . you have to take a stand, you have to say “Right we are not going to allow the development of WMD in breach of the will of the international community to continue.96

Reminiscent of Bush’s “axis of evil” speech in January 2002, Defence Secretary Hoon in a parliamentary debate in March referred to an “axis of concern” containing Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea.97 As previously in the first Gulf War, in Bosnia, and in Kosovo, Great Britain and the United States found themselves “shoulder to shoulder.”98 In accordance with the prescriptive propensities of his mental model, Blair subsequently declared that Great Britain would line up with the United States in a possible military engagement in Iraq.99 This would lead to a British distancing from its main continental allies, France and Britain, and Blair was aware of this. Early on, he told his aides, “[w]e’re not going to be with the Europeans. Our policy on Iraq has always been different to them. We’ve always been with the Americans on this one.”100 The British leadership aimed at dominating the situation. In order to further the case against Iraq, a policy document titled the Butler Report was circulated among cabinet ministers in early 2002. One objective in this document was particularly telling, namely “the reintegration of a law-abiding Iraq, which does not possess WMD or threaten its neighbors, into the international community. Implicitly, this cannot occur with Saddam in power.”101 The pessimistic diagnostic propensities of Blair’s mental model were evident when he confirmed the assumptions of the Butler Report at his April 6 meeting with President Bush in Crawford, Texas, where he emphasized that “we must be prepared to act where terrorism or weapons of mass destruction threaten us.” More importantly, however, the prime minister also justified the need for

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regime change in certain cases, stating “If necessary the action should be military and again, if necessary and justified, it should involve regime change.”102 By the spring of 2002, European criticism of Blair was growing. Some left-leaning and less Atlanticist European politicians and observers regarded him as warmonger, and argued that his strongly pro-American line was by definition anti-European.103 The prime minister’s intentions were also not shared by the British populace where the majority was opposed to a war option. Also within the larger part of Blair’s parliamentary Labour Party, his inclination to go to war against Iraq alongside the United States would become one of the most controversial decisions in decades. The prime minister, moreover, continued to face criticism from various European colleagues. The Belgian foreign minister Louis Michel accused Blair of “grandstanding” and of using “bellicose” language. Indeed, the thrust of Blair’s remarks appeared to follow President Bush’s aggressive line, rather than the general European view at this time that an invasion would be unwise. The gap across the channel widened further in May. European Commission president Romano Prodi attacked Blair in a speech in Oxford, arguing that if the British believed being proAmerican increased their clout in Europe, they were wrong.104 Domestic and international opposition thus became an increasing concern for Prime Minister Blair. Another meeting with President Bush was planned for the beginning of September. In order to calm the criticism, Blair decided to make his military commitment contingent upon one condition, namely that the United States would attempt to gain increased levels of legitimacy at the UN.105 Yet, as commentators have argued, this was more an issue of presentation, namely “to make the war more palatable for British and European voters.” In principle, the prime minister remained committed to military action and dominating the situation.106 Upon concluding their consultations at Camp David, Blair emphasized that the Iraqi threat “is very real and it is a threat not just to America or the international community but to Britain.” He described Hussein as an “international outlaw,” and concluded that “action would follow” if the Iraqi leader refused to allow the return of weapons inspectors.107 Upon his return to London, Blair would continue to face considerable criticism in the British Parliament and his efforts were thus concentrated toward further legitimizing his pro-war stance. His foreword to an Intelligence dossier titled “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government,” claimed that WMD represented a “current and serious threat to the UK’s national interests.” The dossier

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also asserted that Saddam Hussein’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, program “is active, detailed and growing . . . the policy of containment is not working” and alleged Saddam Hussein does “not regard them only as weapons of last resort.”108 In his subsequent statement to the House of Commons, the prime minister warned of the dire consequences if the Iraqi challenge is ignored stating, “And if people say: why should Britain care? I answer: because there is no way that [Saddam Hussein], in this region above all regions, could begin a conf lict using such weapons and the consequences not engulf the whole world.”109 Many parliamentarians in London remained unswayed and also on the international front the British report was subject to much criticism. In Moscow, President Vladimir Putin was dismissive of the dossier, commenting that “[f ]ears are one thing, hard facts are another.” French president Chirac told Blair in a phone conversation that the document had offered “no proof, only indications.”110 Whitehall sources subsequently acknowledged that the United States and Britain faced an uphill struggle to win the support of permanent UN Security Council members Russia, China, and France for a resolution that would legitimize military action. The British leadership, however, remained committed to such a task. Despite Saddam Hussein’s offer for an unconditional return of weapons inspectors, the prime minister urged the international community to maintain the pressure on Baghdad. Similarly, President Bush insisted that the Iraqi offer “wouldn’t fool anybody.”111 After much back and forth and diplomatic wrangling, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002. The British leadership, along with their U.S. counterparts, lauded the resolution for ref lecting a new firmness with Baghdad and hoped that the council’s unanimity would facilitate recruiting allies for military action should Iraq fail to fully cooperate with inspections.112 Thus, contrary to the French leadership, Blair and Straw had interpreted 1441 to mean that the UN had authorized military action against Iraq if Saddam failed to comply with the resolution. Shortly after the ratification of the resolution the prime minister warned Saddam Hussein, “[d]efy the UN’s will and we will disarm you by force.”113 In mid-November Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon acknowledged that the United States had formally asked Britain to mobilize its troops for a possible deployment in Iraq but added that it did not mean a strike was imminent.114 Similarly, during a question and answer session in the House of Commons, Tony Blair labeled the U.S. request a general inquiry, not a request and said that Washington has sounded out many other nations in the same way. A Ministry of Defence spokesman, however, acknowledged

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that the government was engaged in “contingency planning” and later Hoon added that it is important that “we are prepared.”115 Indeed, already prior to the U.S. request, British military strategists from the army, the air force, and the navy had been sent to the Gulf. Together with Hoon’s indications, observers interpreted the move as the clearest signal yet that British and U.S. forces were determined to attack Saddam Hussein, with or without the UN.116 The Iraqi declaration regarding its weapons program was due on December 8. When it was submitted to the UN, the British reaction was very different from the French reaction and it was quickly discarded as an exercise in “obfuscation.” In seemingly coordinated reactions, Britain and the United States strongly faulted the Iraqi report for containing “obvious omissions and falsehoods.”117 The assessment was self-serving. It would soon become another important milestone in the British conclusion that Iraq is in “material breach” of the UN Resolution 1441. Shortly after the publication of the Iraqi declaration, Blair gave indications that for him the war had moved from being probable to being certain as he commented to his advisors “That was his [Saddam Hussein’s] big opportunity. He’s blown it.”118 The prime minister saw his diagnosis of Saddam Hussein confirmed. However, neither London nor Washington offered any evidence to back their claims about Saddam Hussein’s possession of WMD.119 UN chief inspector Hans Blix repeatedly complained to senior U.S. officials that the intelligence was meager or simply bad.120 Indeed, the sites they directed the inspection teams to rarely yielded anything. He also expressed his frustration publicly in a BBC radio interview stating, “If the UK and the U.S. . . . have evidence, then one would expect that they would be able to tell us where the stuff is.”121 Most concerning to Blix, the White House and Downing Street seemed to be dismissing the whole inspection efforts too soon. As was to be expected, the ambiguity of the situation continued to trigger further sparring on the European continent and across the Atlantic. As the new year began, U.S and British Forces seemed determined for an attack on Iraq. One of the decisive moments came on January 11, 2003 when Defense Secretary Rumsfeld ordered the deployment of 60,000 troops together with military aircraft and warships to the Persian Gulf. Soon afterward, on January 20, British defence minister Geoffrey Hoon commanded the dispatch of 26,000 British troops and 100 aircraft. With those already in the area, a quarter of the British Army and a third of the RAF were now present in a zone of possible operations.122 Despite this massive deployment, however, Hoon continued to argue that it would

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serve primarily the purpose of increasing pressure on Saddam Hussein and that it did not mean that war with Iraq was imminent.123 However, in mid-January, the British inclination toward war grew stronger as the leaderships prescriptive propensities increasingly manifested themselves. At a UN Security Council meeting in New York, Foreign Secretary Straw declared that “there has to come a moment when our patience runs out, and we are now near the point with Iraq.”124 At the same time the British leadership was cognizant that in order to garner international and domestic legitimacy for military action, the support of European allies and in particular the support France would be especially important. However, when Tony Blair convened with Jacques Chirac for a summit in the French town Le Touquet, he failed to budge him from his opposition to a war. In fact, the gap between the two countries widened yet further. Their postsummit press conference was marked by “awkward silences and eager attempts to patch over . . . a growing diplomatic divide.”125 The United States was also engaged in garnering further international support. The expectations for Colin Powell’s presentation at the UN on February 5 were high as U.S. officials had put in prospect that it would unambiguously prove Iraqi defiance. In his speech the secretary of state asserted that for the past twelve years Saddam Hussein had developed very sophisticated techniques to conceal his efforts to produce more WMD. Powell’s presentation also included tape recordings, satellite photographs, and other intelligence data aimed to underscore the evasion of weapons inspections and WMD productions. However, while Washington was insisting that the momentum for war was building, UN chief inspector Hans Blix appeared two days later declaring that Iraq was indeed making efforts to cooperate with inspection teams. Already earlier, IAEA director El Baradei had declared the inspections had to date not led to any “evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons program since the elimination of the program in the 1990s.”126 Although Powell’s presentation would succeed in hardening the overall tone of the UN toward Iraq, it would fail to change the fundamental position of the UN Security Council, most notably the positions of France, Russia, China, and Germany which in the meantime had become a nonpermanent Security Council member. While the British Prime Minister claimed that it is “perfectly obvious” that Iraq still has WMD, these governments remained highly doubtful.127 Rejecting British proposals for the consideration of force, the leaderships of these countries jointly proposed instead to triple the numbers of UN inspectors in Iraq. The British reaction was to dismiss the proposal. On February 10, Prime Minister Blair explained that “the alternative proposals submitted

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by France, Germany, and Russia for more time and more resolutions carry no ultimatum and no threat of force.” Targeting especially the Franco-German tandem, he complained that the proposal would “not implement Resolution 1441 but seek to rewrite it.” The consequences, said the prime minister, would be to allow “Saddam to continue stringing out inspections indefinitely,” and draw the lesson that the “Security Council was simply not prepared to enforce the ultimatum that lies at the heart of Resolution 1441.”128 As the EU Summit in Brussels that was scheduled for the end of February approached, Tony Blair urged his fellow European leaders anew in a letter not to rule out the use of force against Iraq.129 Foreign Secretary Jack Straw justified the British stance further, reasoning that even a “thousandfold” increase in the number of inspectors could not guarantee disarmament of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.130 He called on European governments “to do the right thing” and to drop their rival initiative which he described as a “recipe for procrastination.”131 At the beginning of March, the United States increasingly demurred especially against the French opposition. President Bush stated, “We don’t need a second resolution. It’s clear this guy [Saddam Hussein] couldn’t even care less about the first resolution.”132 As the diagnostic propensities of the British mental modes show, the leadership did not lend credibility to any cooperative inclinations of Saddam Hussein. The British foreign secretary supported the U.S. president, as he stated that Britain and the United States would have “sufficient legal authority” to go to war against Iraq without a new UN Resolution justifying it by reference to UN Resolution 1441.133 However, this assertion was far from being universally shared within the British policymaking community. Indeed, the Left wing of the Blair’s Labour Party continued to criticize the prime minister and countered that without a second resolution an attack would violate international law and be illegal. In further discussions in the UN Security Council, the U.S. and British Governments continued to insist that Iraq was failing to comply with the demands of Resolution 1441 and on March 10, now joined by the Spanish leadership, they presented a new draft resolution to the Security council. The proposal called on the council to declare Iraq to be in material breach of its disarmament obligations and it gave a deadline of March 17 for Iraqi compliance with all previous resolutions. It also indicated that military action would be authorized should this deadline not be met.134 In the following days, the foreign secretary remarked that although war would not be inevitable it would be “much more probable.”135

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War indeed became more probable when in mid-March, Blair, Bush, and the Spanish prime minister Jose Maria Aznar convened on the Portuguese Azores Islands in the Atlantic for what, in effect, came to be a prewar summit. Tony Blair accused Saddam Hussein of playing the same “game” over the past twelve years and that disarmament had never happened. Targeting France and Germany again, he declared: If their position does not change, if they are still saying that they will veto any resolution that authorizes the use of force in the event of non compliance, so that we just have another discussion, if that remains their position overnight, it is very difficult to see how you can move the diplomatic process forward.136

After their consultations, the three leaders released a joint statement in which they allowed for a final period of twenty-four hours for the pursuit of a diplomatic consensus toward Iraq.137 Yet, such a pursuit was unrealistic. U.S. president Bush subsequently declared that “diplomacy had failed.”138 On March 17, Foreign Secretary Straw made a statement to the House of Commons on the situation following the Azores Summit. He reiterated the leadership’s view that Iraq had failed to comply with the demands of the Security Council under Resolution 1441, and he criticized the French Government for its opposition to the draft resolution, stating: Given that, it was my belief, up to a week ago, that we are close to achieving the consensus that we sought on the further resolution. Sadly, one country then ensured that the Security Council could not act. President Chirac’s unequivocal announcement that France would veto a second resolution containing any ultimatum, ‘whatever the circumstances,’ inevitably created a sense of paralysis in our negotiations.139

Many members of the British parliament reacted with criticism and complained that the Azores declaration fell short of any diplomatic inclinations. They demanded that any authority over the use of force against Iraq reside exclusively with the UN.140 Some parliamentarians went even further and in a demonstrative protest they resigned. Among the most prominent here was former foreign secretary Robin Cook who had currently served as the leader of the House of Commons. Cook criticized the assertion that France had been responsible for the lack of consensus in the Security Council, declaring that It is not France alone that wants more time for inspections. Germany wants more time for inspections; Russia wants more time for inspections . . . . The

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reality is that Britain is being asked to embark on a war without agreement in any of the international bodies of which we are a leading partner—not NATO, not the European Union and, now, not the Security Council.141

On March 18, the House of Commons was to vote on an approval for military action against Iraq. The prime minister acknowledged that Iraq had complied in certain regards. His emphasis was, however, that there had been “no fundamental change of heart or mind” in Baghdad as he remained convinced in his initial diagnosis of Saddam Hussein.142 With regard to the deadlock in the UN Security Council on a further resolution, he reminded the parliamentarians of his efforts to secure an agreement. He again cited as unreasonable France’s opposition to any resolution containing an ultimatum to Iraq to comply, adding that it would be the only sure way to disarm Saddam Hussein.143 On the same day the prime minister argued that “Our fault has not been impatience. The truth is our patience should have been exhausted weeks and months and even years ago.”144 Then in a television address on March 20, the prime minister announced that, “[t]onight, British servicemen are engaged from air, land and sea [in a mission] to remove Saddam Hussein from power, and disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction.”145 Great Britain provided a significant contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom. At a maximum strength of more than 40,000 troops, the force was larger than the government had planned to make available in its initial Strategic Defence Review. The maritime contribution was built on an already standing Royal Navy presence in the Gulf. The HMS ARK Royal led the Naval Task Group, which also included submarines armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles and a significant amphibious capability with the helicopter carrier HMS Ocean carrying some 9,000 personnel and. Also, the RAF had already maintained a presence of some twentyfive aircraft in the region—a contingency that was ultimately increased to 100, manned and supported by 7,000 troops. The force included E3-D Sentry aircraft for airborne warning and control, Nimrod and Canberra reconnaissance aircraft, VC 10 and Tristar air refueling aircraft, Hercules transport aircraft, Tornado F3 air defense aircraft, and Tornado GR4 and Harrier GR7 aircraft. Finally, the British Ground force carried a contingency of 28,000 troops and was equipped with Challenger 2 tanks, Warrior armored infantry fighting vehicles, AS90 self-propelled guns, and a range of helicopters.146 Symbolic victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom was achieved when the statue of Saddam Hussein was toppled by U.S. Forces in the centre of Baghdad on April 9. Most of the major military action was over by

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mid-April. On that day U.S. Marines entered Tikrit, Saddam Hussein’s hometown, and secured the presidential palace. Subsequent operations throughout the country became more localized and directed at remaining pockets of resistance.147 On May 1, 2003, Bush declared that the major combat operations were complete after his high-profile arrival on the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln off the coast of California. However, he also made it clear that the military operations in Iraq were not yet finished.148 Just how unfinished military operations were indeed, he could not foresee. Until today the fighting in Iraq continues. Germany In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, German ambassador to Washington Wolfgang Ischinger characterized the German-U.S. relationship as a high-point of a long-lasting friendship, stating, “I cannot remember a time when that relation was better.”149 This was to change in the course of the next year as the German leadership shared the French concern about U.S. foreign policy inclinations in the Middle East. Many German politicians agreed that the U.S. strategy relied too excessively on preemptive, punitive, and military measures, and they expressed much concern about their efficacy in the Iraqi context.150 Exemplary was Chancellor Schroeder’s declaration that the “Middle East needed a new peace and not a new war.” Early on, the chancellor warned that an attack on Iraq could “destroy the international coalition against terrorism.”151 Although the diagnostic propensities of Chancellor Schroeder and Foreign Minister Fischer’s mental models indicate some disagreement about whether Saddam Hussein would ultimately opt for a cooperation, their prescriptive propensities indicate a belief that political means would prove most effective in dealing with Iraq.152 Schroeder and Fischer emphasized that the government would pursue a nonviolent “German way” to bring about a resolution of the crisis.153 German leaders were also explicit in rejecting the war option even in the case of a UN mandate.154 Germany thus became the only major European country to exclude a priori any military involvement in a possible war against Iraq. With its uncompromising stance, the German leadership left no f lexibility for a mutual diplomatic accommodation with the United States, and the relations between the two states would sour severely over the next months. The German leadership’s emphasis on the “German way” coincided with an effort to turn the tide in the ongoing German election campaign, which created the appearance of opportunism.155 U.S. Government advisor Richard Perle, for example, told a major German newspaper that

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“it looks as if the Chancellor is distancing himself from an old friend [the U.S.] in order to gain a few seats.” Similarly, on September 17 the Washington Post accused Germany of sacrificing its “international prestige and inf luence” in a bid to gain Left-wing voters in the run-up to the elections. The article warned further that “[t]he enhanced role in international security Schroeder has sought for his country will crumble as Germany sits timidly on the sidelines, watching while its allies face up to a challenge that the Chancellor cynically has ducked.” 156 Electoral considerations indeed played a prominent role in popularizing the chancellor’s concerns about U.S. policy in the Middle East. However, they did not bring them about.157 The chancellor’s opposition to U.S. planning for a military intervention in Iraq in fact dates back to the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and it had remained consistent since then. It was just one week after the 2001 terrorist attacks when Schroeder declared that under his leadership the country would not participate in “adventures” and, in his mind, an attack against Iraq would constitute exactly that.158 Although Schroeder’s view did indeed correspond with the prevailing national sentiment and while this would likely have positive effects on the upcoming elections, his opposition to a possible war also corresponded to his own views. A low point in Germany’s relations with the United States was then brought forth by a speech U.S. vice president Cheney gave to war veterans at the end of August. Cheney labeled Saddam Hussein a “mortal threat” and said that what was necessary to stop this threat would be an elimination of the Iraqi dictator. 159 In Cheney’s mind a “return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of his [Saddam Hussein’s] compliance with UN resolutions.”160 He asserted that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and that there was no doubt that he would amass them further and not hesitate to use them. According to Cheney, Saddam Hussein “could be expected to seek domination of the entire Middle East, take control of a great portion of the world’s energy supplies, directly threaten America’s friends throughout the region, and subject the United States or any other nation to nuclear blackmail.” He concluded that “wars are never won on the defensive,” as he issued a call for preemptive action against Iraq.161 Across the political spectrum in Germany, the vice president’s words hit a raw nerve. The chancellor labeled Cheney’s bellicose line “ill-considered” and a political and diplomatic “mistake.” According to Schroeder, a war against Iraq would not only distract from the war against terrorism but also result in an uncontrollable escalation and mass casualties. His concern was furthermore that Saddam Hussein might attempt to turn the

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conf lict into a war between the Muslim world and West.162 He even went so far as to denounce U.S. inclinations as “military adventurism,” and promised that Germany would be a voice of reason and restraint.163 Similarly, Foreign Minister Fischer argued that, “There is a big question as to whether this consequence has been thought through and discussed in the U.S.”164 Defense Minister Peter Struck subsequently announced that Germany would withdraw tanks and troops that had been stationed in Kuwait to serve in Operation Enduring Freedom.165 The German leadership further criticized the Bush administration’s insistence on toppling the regime in Baghdad was effectively undercutting UN efforts to monitor Iraq’s weapons programme.166 Of much concern to German leaders was also that preemptive military action would constitute a breach of international law, which would set a dangerous international precedent. This view was confirmed later by UN secretary-general Kofi Annan when he declared that “Any state, if attacked, retains the inherent right of self defense . . . But beyond that, when states decide to use force to deal with broader threats to international peace, there is no substitute for the unique legitimacy provided by the UN.”167 The German criticism was thus not only directed toward the U.S. policy inclinations in the Middle East. It also targeted what German leaders perceived as a lack of U.S. commitment toward multilateralism. In an interview Chancellor Schroeder argued that “consultation . . . has to mean consultation not just about the how and when, but also about the whether.” The chancellor also criticized the U.S. Government’s general tendency to inform rather than to consult its allies in the fight against terrorism. He emphasized that “consultation cannot mean that I get a phone call two hours in advance only to be told, “We are going in.” Schroeder’s concern was that the United States was already determined to do so. In regards to Vice President Cheney’s speech he added, “[t]he problem is that he has or seems to have committed himself so strongly that it is hard to imagine how he can climb down. And that is the real problem, that not only I have, but that all of us in Europe have.”168 As the date for the much anticipated UN General Assembly meeting in September 2002 approached, the Schroeder-Fischer tandem displayed an increasingly dismissive stance not only toward the United States but also toward Britain. London’s disposition toward a war option became increasingly stronger and Schroeder publicly commented that the British prime minister would “not speak for Europe on this issue.”169 Henceforth the chancellor and his foreign minister moved in close lockstep with their French counterparts. In a press conference after a

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Franco-German Summit on September 6, Schroeder declared that both countries were in full agreement on four points. He specified these as an opposition of unilateralism, an emphasis on multilateralism in the UN and the unconditional return of UN arms inspectors to Iraq, the rejection of regime change as a strategic goal, and an insistence that any Security Council resolution on Iraq may not contain any mechanism that would justify immediate military action in the case of Iraqi noncompliance.170 The UN General Assembly meeting took place on September 12. President Bush announced in his speech that the United States would seek a Security Council resolution for further actions toward Iraq. However, at the same time he warned that “if the UN doesn’t have the will or the courage to disarm Saddam Hussein . . . the U.S. will lead a coalition to disarm it.” Although German leaders welcomed Bush’s announcement that he would seek UN resolutions, the pressure the United States was exercising on the UN, left them critical about U.S. ultimate intentions.171 Their concerns would be reinforced in October by the vote of the U.S. Congress authorizing the use of force against Iraq. However, when on November 5 Saddam Hussein declared that he would “respect any decision that is issued in accordance with the UN charter and international law,”172 the German leadership saw the diagnostic propensities of its mental model confirmed. It received Saddam Hussein’s declaration as a hopeful sign that a political path toward the resolution of the conf lict might prove successful. The Iraq regime then indeed accepted the conditions of Resolution 1441 shortly after it had been ratified by the Security Council. The German leadership welcomed this move as yet another a step into the right direction. Viewing the diplomatic track as confirmed, Schroeder and Fischer were surprised when toward the end of November, they, like their French counterparts, were contacted by the U.S. administration with an inquiry about possible contributions in case of military action against Iraq. In accordance with the prescriptive propensities of his mental model, Fischer rejected any considerations about force and responded that a war would be a “catastrophe” and that the German position would remain what it had been, namely that it would not participate in a military strike. When later questioned on whether Germany would vote against a resolution legitimizing military action, Fischer, in an effort not to strain U.S.-German relations further, did not repeat the initial German stance, but stated instead that “[n]o one can predict this, because no one knows the conditions under which the Security Council will take up this issue.”173

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When the Iraqi weapons report was reviewed throughout December, German officials acknowledged that Baghdad did indeed not fully account for its past programs. However, contrary to the British leadership, the German argument was that these gaps did not constitute a sufficient reason for war. The German leadership thus continued in its diplomatic efforts to forge an antiwar coalition. Germany’s UN ambassador Gunter Pleuger called for a concerted campaign against U.S. efforts toward war in Iraq. Similar to the French strategy, this included trying to dissuade the nonpermanent members of the Security Council, such as Mexico, Chile, Cameroon, and Angola, from approving a second resolution authorizing the use of force.174 Toward the end of December, Schroeder traveled to China to hold talks with Chinese president Jiang Zemin and his expected successor Hu Jianto. Both Hu and Schroeder insisted on the indispensability of UN procedures and that the Iraq crisis could and should be solved without resort to military means.175 UN chief inspector Hans Blix had in the meantime noted that Resolution 1441 did not establish a deadline and that the inspection team would need more time. Given Blix’s request, German leaders considered U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell’s January 21 statement that “inspections will not work” as yet another affront against multilateralism.176 For Germany the UN inspections process was central for a political settlement of the crisis and needed to be carried out to the full extent. With the support of the French president, Schroeder proposed a joint EU declaration calling for an extension of the inspections at the planned January 27 EU meeting in Brussels. As debates about a second resolution emerged along with the possibility of war, the Chancellor declared, “[d] o not count on Germany to approve a second resolution that legitimizes war.”177 President Bush in the meantime declared in his 2003 State of the Union speech that “the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others.” As the Franco-German opposition toward the U.S.-British stance grew stronger, U.S. defense Secretary Rumsfeld responded that France and Germany were not representative of modern Europe but constituted “old Europe.” Representative of what Rumsfeld labeled “new Europe” were eight governments that had published a joint letter in the Wall Street Journal on January 30. Among the signatories were Britain, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, and the Central European candidates for EU accession Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. In the letter these governments expressed their support for the U.S. course of action and thereby preempted the Franco-German initiative. This letter was followed shortly thereafter by another letter of the “Vilnius ten,” composed

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of further Central and southeast European accession candidates for the EU. The tone in these letters were widely viewed as a rebuff to France and Germany as they stated that Iraq had demonstrated its unwillingness to cooperate with the UN inspectors and that Saddam Hussein was a “clear threat to world security.” They urged Europe to unite with the United States to ensure that the Iraqi regime would be disarmed.178 Although the United States and Great Britain found increasing support on the European continent, it would not be forthcoming from the UN inspectors. In his January 27 testimony to the Security Council, Hans Blix stated that “the most important point to make is that access has been provided to all sites we have wanted to inspect.” This “open doors policy,” as Blix described it, was an “indispensable element of transparency and a process that aimed at securing disarmament by peaceful means.” Blix’s conclusions were subsequently supported by IAEA director Mohammed El Baradei who confirmed that “Iraqi authorities have consistently provided access without conditions and without delay.”179 He noted that the agency’s work was “steadily progressing and should be allowed to run its natural course,” as this would be a valuable “investment in peace.”180 In February, Germany was hosting its annual international security conference in Munich. U.S. deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz used the occasion to repeat what Donald Rumsleld had declared earlier, namely that the mission would determine the coalition and not vice versa. The EU’s external affairs commissioner Chris Patten responded critically, “[t]hose of us who are concerned at certain trends in U.S. policymaking have a duty to speak up. The unilateralist urge is not new [and] it is ultimately ineffective and self-defeating.” During the conference a report of the weekly news magazine Der Spiegel was leaked to the public. According to the article a group of experts in the Chancellery was working on a “secret plan” for a more “robust inspection scheme,” which contained among other things an increased number of inspectors.181 Indeed, this would become part of a proposal advanced later with the support of France, China, and Russia. On February 13, Chancellor Schroeder addressed the German Bundestag and reiterated the dangers of escalation. He argued that “those who want to resolve the crisis with military means must have an answer to the question of whether this will help the global alliance against terrorism or whether it will jeopardize this alliance.”182 In his speech the chancellor also argued that the UNSCOM inspections in the 1990s had led to more disarmament than the preceding Gulf War and that this

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demonstrated that inspections could provide a potent instrument against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. A day later Foreign Minister Fischer followed and declared that the UN inspectors had “effectively” reduced the threat posed by Iraqi weapons programs.183 The foreign minister had based his assessment on an update that was given to the Security Council by Hans Blix and Mohammed El Baradei on the same day. Blix reported that after eleven weeks of investigations in Iraq, the inspectors had discovered no evidence of WMD. He noted that to date there had been 400 inspections of more than 300 sites and that all of them were conducted without prior notice or substantial obstruction by Iraq. He also used the occasion to cast doubt on the evidence provided by Colin Powell a week earlier. Although many items remained unaccounted for, Blix argued that the Iraqis were now more proactive in their cooperation and that inspections were progressing. El Baradei argued, “[w]e have to date found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear related activities in Iraq.” Both inspectors concluded with an appeal for sustaining the inspection activities.184 Toward the end of February, the U.S. together with Britain had set forth a second draft resolution containing an ultimatum for Iraqi compliance and threatening military action in its absence. The publication of the draft coincided with a meeting Schroeder was holding with Chirac and in a joint press conference after their deliberations Schroeder confirmed his confidence in his initial diagnosis of the situation. He stated: “We do not see any reason to modify our position after learning of the draft resolution. We believe that a peaceful disarmament of Iraq is possible on the basis of the existing Resolution 1441.” The French President added that he had “exactly the same” opinion as Schroeder.185 The Security Council was to consider the draft proposal and vote on it within the next few weeks. Given these fundamental differences, a deadlock was to be expected. In the following days the Franco-German tandem would continue to resist specifying a date by which the inspections would have to be concluded, and they would also find support from Moscow for their stance. As the vote in the Security Council approached, Foreign Minister Fischer traveled to Paris on March 4 to meet with his French and Russian counterparts. In a subsequent press conference, Fischer reiterated, “[w]e see clearly that there is progress” in the process of UN weapons inspections as he was referring particularly to the destruction of the banned al-Samoud missiles.186 In a subsequent joint declaration, the three foreign ministers stated that they would not approve a second resolution

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legitimizing war. Instead, they called for an extension of the inspection process and set forth a memorandum proposing to increase the number of UN weapons inspectors in Iraq.187 A day later Hans Blix gave a preview of his general report yet to come on March 7. He confirmed Fischer’s optimism, calling the destruction of al-Samoud missiles over the past few days “real disarmament” and saying that interviews with Iraqi weapons scientists had been successful.188 Blix’s subsequent actual report also addressed the hopes of the German leadership. He testified that Baghdad was cooperating more fully with UNMOVIC than they had done in the past, although not to the point of full disclosure.189 In response to the report Joschka Fischer stated at the Security Council Chamber in New York that there would be no need for a further resolution reasoning that “[w]hy should we leave the paths we have embarked on now that the inspections on the basis of Resolution 1441 are showing viable results?”190 Neither the United States nor Great Britain shared this conclusion. In the following days they would continue to make the case for a war against Iraq. It would culminate with President Bush’s deadline for Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave the country or face severe consequences. Foreign Minister Fischer, backed by his French and Russian counterparts, made one last appeal to the U.S. government in the Security Council, arguing that there is “no basis in the U.N. Charter for a regime change with military means.”191 Any further efforts of the German leadership on the political path to bring about an extension of the inspection processes came to a halt on March 20 with the first strikes on Iraq. Conclusion After only a few weeks into the war, it was evident the Iraqi Military was not only unable but also unwilling to engage in any effective and lasting resistance against coalition forces that were composed mainly of U.S. and British Troops. It appeared that Saddam Hussein had lost authority over his troops and that he was about to lose control over the country. Baghdad fell to the coalition on April 9, and Saddam Hussein was captured on December 16, 2003. Although the campaign seemed successful initially, the fighting between coalition troops and insurgents as well as terrorists would continue well into the future. In the Iraq crisis, the EU became involved relatively late. For much of 2002, the crisis did not figure prominently on its agenda. When the EU did get more involved toward the end of the year, it failed in its ambitions

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to speak with a coherent voice. Although the EU managed to issue a common resolution in January 2003, it was essentially void of any practical meaning. The differences in Europe in general and among the big three in particular proved to be irreconcilable. Observers have advanced alternative explanations for the disagreement among France, Great Britain, and Germany in the Iraq crisis. A commonly suggested explanation for the French opposition is commercial interests in Iraq. In fact, however, these interests were marginal. French exports and imports from Iraq account for substantially under 1 percent of their overall exports and imports.192 A cognitive analysis of the French leadership’s mental model shows that it was opposed to the war option because it did not perceive Iraq an imminent security threat. Moreover, both President Chirac and Foreign Minister De Villepin also believed that Saddam Hussein would ultimately opt for a political settlement and, in their mind, he moved in that direction. In the British case the argument is often made that the leadership was forced into the war as it aimed to underline traditional British loyalty to the United States. However an analysis of British mental models shows that neither Tony Blair nor Jack Straw were dragged into a war by their tight links to the United States. For both Blair and Straw realities had changed since 9/11.193 Their mental models reveal that they perceived the situation in Iraq to be very threatening. In further contrast to the French leadership, neither Blair nor Straw believed that Saddam Hussein would be sincere about a political settlement. Regarding Germany, the argument has been advanced that especially Schroeder’s antiwar stance was a strategy to garner support for upcoming domestic elections. Yet, Schroeder uttered his opposition to a military strategy in the Iraq crisis early on and much before the elections. A cognitive analysis of German mental models shows that Chancellor Schroeder and Foreign Minister Fischer did not tailor their policies in order to cater to the electorate. Their actions were the results of their beliefs. In sum, these alternative explanations for the discord on the European continent in the Iraq crisis do not hold up to empirical scrutiny. The leaders of all three states acted in accordance with the diagnostic and prescriptive propensities of their respective mental models. These were incompatible and this led to a negative feedback on Europe’s common foreign and security policy ambitions. The case for military action against Iraq had been built on the proposition that it possessed WMD or intended to produce them. The work of the Iraq Survey Group, which was set up to locate these weapons

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in the aftermath of the war, as well as various intelligence revelations after the war have demonstrated that this proposition was false.194 The prewar ambiguity of the situation produced not only the gravest crisis in the Atlantic Alliance but also on the European continent itself. It cast serious doubts on whether a common foreign and security policy could ever emerge on the European continent.

PART III

THE IMPLICATIONS

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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS: A EUROPEAN COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY?

S

ince the 1950s, European states have been engaged in a process of economic and political integration. At the same time they have also engaged in an institutionalization process toward unity in questions of foreign and security policy. This process started with the creation of the WEU and culminated with the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties toward the end of the century. Yet, despite the significant increase in institutional momentum over the decades, the viability of a common foreign and security policy on the European continent is questionable. This was the central empirical puzzle addressed in this book and it served as a catalyst for the development of a new theoretical framework with the goal to explain questions of institutional viability. At the core of this framework stands an understanding of international institutions as “shared mental models.” Diverging from past research, I have argued that the EU’s ambition for a common foreign and security policy is not merely a complex political-legal legal, that is structural phenomenon, but perhaps more importantly a cognitive phenomenon. In this final chapter, I intend to brief ly summarize the results of this approach to the security episodes examined in this book followed by a brief discussion about the outlook for an EU response to emerging security challenges in Iran and North Korea. I conclude by emphasizing the merits of an alternative understanding of international institutions and a brief discussion about the future world order.

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The Lessons of Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq Each of the crises analyzed in this book had the potential to severely affect European security. A conf lict originating on the Balkans had led to the First World War and the Kosovo Crisis at the end of the century also carried the danger of spilling over into larger parts of Europe. The events of 9/11, European leaders quickly agreed, was not only an aggression toward the United States, but toward all democratic states and subsequent attacks in various European cities underlined this fear. Finally, if Iraq was indeed possessing or producing WMD and sponsoring international terrorism, the danger of further attacks would be imminent and Europe would have to react. The main argument in this book is that the viability of a European common foreign and security policy is not primarily a function of institutional features and aspects of the EU. Instead, I have argued that the common foreign and security policy ambitions are dependent upon the compatibility of the mental models of key decisionmakers on the European continent. Figure 6.1 summarizes the mental models in the three security situations investigated in this book. It does not distinguish between leader and foreign minister. It simply maps the Self and Other propensities for each country represented by country abbreviations in order to illustrate the presence or absence of a shared mental model. It is important to recall that mental models can differ in degree or in type. A difference in degree occurs along the horizontal axis of the matrices and a difference in type occurs along the vertical axis. It is important to recall the detailed distinction between difference in degree and difference in type detailed in chapter 2. A difference in type has more severe implications for the prospects of a common foreign and security policy than a difference in degree. In the case of a difference in type, national leaders have a fundamental disagreement over their primary goal or their perceived primary goal of Kosovo War Type A

Type C

Afghanistan War Type A

Type C

GY(S), GY(O)

GY(S)

FR(O), FR(O)

GY(O)

GY(O)

GB(O)

FR(S), GB(S)

GY(O),

GB(O)

FR(S), GB(S)

GB(O), GB(S) FR(O), FR(S)

GY(S), GY(S)

Iraq War Type A

Type C

GY(O)

GY(S), GY(S)

FR(O), FR(O)

FR(S), FR(S)

GY(O)

GB(O), GB(S)

GB(O),GB(S)

FR(O), FR(S) GB(O), GB(S) Type D

Type B

Type D

Type B

Type D

Type B

Figure 6.1 European Mental Models in Three Security Situations.

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the opponent in the security situation. In the case of a difference in degree, on the other hand, national leaders disagree “only” over their secondary goal or their perceived secondary goal of the opponent. Such a disagreement has less disturbing effects on the prospects for the conduct of a common foreign and security policy. In the Kosovo War the leaders of France (FR), Great Britain (GB), and Germany (GY) did not share a mental model. One of the most defining divergences is between Great Britain and France and Germany with regards to their diagnostic Other propensities (O) that manifests itself as a difference in type. Another interesting difference is between Germany on the one hand and France and Great Britain on the other hand in regards to their prescriptive Self propensities (S). This divergence also manifests itself as a difference in type. Such a difference, according to the shared mental model framework, has a negative feedback on the common institutional goals of France, Great Britain, and Germany and should lead to the absence of a common foreign and security policy in the Kosovo conf lict. In the Afghanistan War, the big three in Europe did share a mental model with only one small deviation in the case of Germany. This overall uniformity, according to the shared mental model framework, leads to a positive feedback on the common institutional goals of the big three and the expectation of a coherent common foreign and security policy regarding Afghanistan. This shared mental model on the European continent after 9/11 disintegrated in the Iraq War. The most defining divergences here are between Great Britain on the one hand and France and Germany on the other hand with regards to both their prescriptive Self and diagnostic Other propensities. These divergences again manifest themselves as a difference in type. According to the shared mental model framework this divergence again exerts a negative feedback on shared institutional goals and should result in the absence of a common strategy in the Iraq crisis. Let me brief ly recapitulate each of the three cases. After the failure of the EU to intervene effectively in the Bosnia conf lict at the beginning of the 1990s, the Kosovo crisis culminating toward the end of the decade offered a new opportunity for Europe to underscore its ambitions towards a common foreign and security policy. However, for the most part the EU displayed a slow initial reaction and an insistence on protracted diplomacy. It was ultimately to the member states of the EU, and here in particular France, Great Britain, and Germany, to demonstrate the viability of the EU’s ambitions towards a common strategy or the lack thereof. The conclusion of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 with its emphasis on

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crisis management and peacemaking led the international observer to expect a coherent approach toward the unfolding crisis. Yet, such was not the case. The shared institutional affiliations of the big three did not lead to the emergence of strategic convergence in the Kosovo conf lict, and the proclaimed goals of the EU regarding foreign and security policy unity were disappointed. This paradox is explained by a cognitive analysis of the French, British, and German leaders. It reveals that they did not share a uniform mental model and the divergences in their diagnostic and prescriptive propensities indeed translated into different strategic approaches toward the Belgrade regime. Great Britain was eager to engage in military action early on, and France ultimately followed suit. Germany remained very hesitant to engage in any military action, and when it did nevertheless, its contribution was rather marginal. The Kosovo conf lict thus left questions about the viability of a common European foreign and security policy largely unanswered, and they would remain so for the time to come. Both the British and the French ministries of defense drew up “lessons learned” documents in the aftermath of the war. The differences in these documents are telling: Whereas the British document concentrates on building up troop levels, the French document stresses, systematically, that in every area where Europe lags behind the U.S., a special effort needs to be made to close that gap . . . . London’s preferred scenario would be one in which the EU acts as an “intelligent consumer of NATO’s military services.” . . . Between the French maximalist quest for “autonomy” and the UK reliance on NATO for strategic assets, there is currently a gulf which words alone are unlikely to be able to continue to bridge.1

Although France would push for a strengthening of the ambitions toward an autonomous European foreign and security policy, Britain remained hesitant. To the disappointment of French leaders, external commissioner of the EU Chris Patten articulated what was widely perceived to be an undeniable truth, namely that “the division of labour is clear. NATO is a military organization. The EU is a political and economic body with no mutual defence component.”2 Germany did not figure as prominently as either France or Great Britain in this debate. However, it is notable that despite a very limited German military involvement, the leadership ultimately acknowledged the necessity of military action in the Kosovo conf lict. Because Germany is a main player in Europe, it thereby opened prospects for the EU to move beyond a mere presence toward actorness.

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The EU itself also drew a lesson from the Kosovo conf lict and it was articulated at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999. The European Council underlined its determination to develop further the EU’s military capability as part of a strengthened common European policy on security and defense. The next security challenge came with the horrific terrorist attacks of 9/11. Unlike the Kosovo conf lict, the EU acted in a more resolute and decisive manner towards Afghanistan, the Taliban as its ruling regime, and Al Qaeda which it was harboring. Although the EU was very engaged in efforts of international coalition building, it was limited with respect to military action. It was again up to France, Great Britain, and Germany as individual member states to face the challenge and to demonstrate the relative viability of Europe’s common foreign and security policy ambitions. In further contrast to the Kosovo conf lict, a cognitive analysis of the French, British, and German leaders shows that this time they did share a common mental model. Moreover, the convergence of their diagnostic and prescriptive propensities indeed translated into similar strategic orientations towards Afghanistan. Both France and Great Britain engaged all three branches of their armed forces, the army, the navy, and the air force. Germany, for its part, has used 9/11 to “normalize” its foreign and security policy. The leadership removed the taboo on the use of military force constraining German external behavior since the second world war and now declared it a legitimate instrument of foreign policy. With all the tragedy the events of September 11, 2001 brought, they seemed to confirm the viability of Europe’s common foreign and security policy ambitions. The apparent success in the Afghanistan war thus led to no significant lessons that had to be learned on the European continent. Although majority voting in the European Commission was contemplated in the process of the European Convention in early 2002 and the European Intergovernmental Conference that followed it, any such endeavor ultimately failed. The decision-making rule of unanimity prevailed, and foreign and security policy would thereby remain the exclusive prerogatives of the EU’s constituting member states. These prerogatives made the EU’s CFSP an orphan in the next security challenge. When the U.S. leadership articulated its aims to expand the ongoing war on terror to Iraq, it posed severe strains on European unity. The EU itself became involved only very late in the Iraq question. When it tried to assert itself more near the onset of the war, it failed dramatically. A cognitive analysis identifies the lack of unity regarding the

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Iraq crisis in the absence of a shared mental model on the European continent. As in the Kosovo Crisis, the divergence in diagnostic and prescriptive propensities indeed translated into different strategic approaches towards the regime in Baghdad. Alongside the United States, Britain advocated a military strategy while France and Germany remained strongly opposed to such an option. The contentious debate about whether to invade Iraq has provoked one of the worst intra-European crises since the beginning of the European project in the 1950s. 3 The jury is still out and it remains to be seen whether the EU will pick itself up from this debacle. However, some lessons were drawn in the same year. European foreign policy chief Javier Solana took the initiative toward the ratification of a new European security doctrine by all member states. The document emphasized that Europe “faces security threats and challenges” and that “no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own.” Its main premise is: As a union with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP), . . . the European Union is inevitably a global player. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.4

Toward this end, the strategy recognizes that rapid, coherent, and robust intervention is needed to fend off the most dangerous threats to global security. EU member states have thus committed themselves to the development of a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) that would enable them to deploy 60,000 troops within sixty days and sustain itself for up to a year. However, a crucial limitation here is that the ERRF is not a standing army, as its constitutive units remain with their national armies when not deployed or on a multinational exercise. Crucially, national governments retain the power to decide if and when their forces will take part in any particular operation and it, therefore, remains to be seen whether the EU’s CFSP will be orphaned anew in the future. The new European security doctrine also emphasizes that the deployment of traditional “soft power” tools such as economic aid, trade or diplomatic pressure, and enticements may prove insufficient in addressing future security challenges. Similar to the U.S. National Security Doctrine, it recognizes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as particularly threatening to global stability and security among these challenges. Iran and North Korea are two cases in point and they will likely be among those security challenges that will emerge as the next test episodes for Europe’s ambitions toward a uniform strategy.

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The Crisis with Iran Iran’s nuclear ambitions have led to international concern for some years.5 However, these concerns reached a new level in August 2002. An investigation by the IAEA revealed pressing questions about Iran’s nuclear program, including the discovery of an undeclared uranium enrichment program. Since then, the regime in Tehran has been intransigent, arguing that it has a right to peaceful nuclear technology. Yet, its lack of transparency raised suspicion about alternate and hostile intentions of the regime. The EU represented by France, Great Britain, and Germany, the EU-3 as they came to be referred in the nuclear crisis with Iran, has been at the forefront of dealings with Iran. In a diplomatic effort to gain assurance about the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program, the EU-3 first visited Iran in October 2003 to discuss the issues raised by the IAEA. Faced with the prospect of a formal finding of noncompliance by the IAEA Board of Governors and a referral to the UN Security Council, the Iranian leadership agreed to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and provide full information about its nuclear programs. For their part, the Europeans promised that the issue would not be referred to the Security Council and, moreover, they also pledged to provide technology to Iran, including in the civil nuclear areas, if Tehran was to meet its commitments. However, the arrangement ultimately broke down in June 2004 when Iran grew increasingly impatient with the ongoing international scrutiny. In the run-up to the IAEA Board meeting, Iranian leaders threatened that the country would reduce its cooperation with the agency and perhaps even resume suspended enrichment activities unless the board gave adequate recognition to the cooperation Iran had already provided and removed the Iranian nuclear issue from its agenda. The crisis escalated when on June 18 the IAEA Board, supported by the EU-3, adopted a tough resolution deploring Iran’s failure to cooperate in a full, timely, and proactive manner with international demands. A deeper escalation of the crisis was then averted through further diplomatic maneuvering of the EU-3. Short of advancing legal obligations for the contending sides, the result was a voluntary confidence-building measure, the Paris Agreement in November 2004. The agreement set out several objectives according to which the EU-3 were to deliver a proposal for a long-term agreement on how to handle concerns over the peaceful nature of Iran’s program. In this context the European troika also demanded “objective guarantees” that Iran will not misuse its nuclear program for military purposes. While Iran continued to deny any intention of producing nuclear weapons and cited right to peaceful nuclear energy under

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Article 4 of the NPT, it agreed to voluntarily continue its suspension of nuclear activities, including all enrichment and reprocessing activities. The Paris Agreement was widely perceived to be a success, and EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana lauded it as a “landmark.”6 It was considered to be of far-reaching importance because both the EU-3 and Iran confirmed their continued support for the political process in Iraq and their commitment in the fight against international terrorism “irrespective of progress on the nuclear issue.” 7 Given the volatile situation in Iraq, the ongoing threat of international terrorism, and Iran’s geopolitically important location in the Middle East, the EU-3 viewed its collaborative partnership in these questions as crucial whereas further antagonism between the contending sides might prove detrimental not only for regional but also for global stability. However, the crisis would soon escalate again with the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the Iranian presidency in August 2005. EU diplomats were quick to react pessimistically, as they predicted that “negotiations will fail” and that it would be “very difficult to see this ending anywhere but in the Security Council.”8 Indeed, already on August 1, Tehran had notified the IAEA of its decision to resume uranium conversion activities at its Uranium Conversion Facility (UFC) in Esfahan. The Iranian leadership considered this move to be legitimate as the UFC had not originally belonged to the IAEA category of enrichment-related activities and, therefore, would not fall under the Paris Agreement. The EU-3, however, viewed Iran’s continued suspension of all uranium-related activities as a prerequisite for a continuing dialogue, and contrary to Tehran it considered a resumption of uranium enrichment to constitute a fundamental breach of the Paris Agreement. On August 2, France, Britain, and Germany formally informed the Iranian Government that if it indeed resumed currently suspended activities negotiations would be brought to an end and other courses of action would be pursued. Negotiations ultimately reached an impasse, and it led the EU to press for Iran’s referral to the UN Security Council. A few days later, on August 11 a resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors expressed “serious concern” that Iran has resumed uranium conversion and subsequently urged Tehran to restore the Paris Agreement by reestablishing “full suspension of all enrichment-related activities.”9 On September 2, IAEA director general Mohammed El Baradei released a report outlining the status of inspections in Iran. He emphasized: Iran’s full transparency is indispensable and overdue . . . Without such transparency, the Agency’s ability to reconstruct, in particular, the

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chronology of enrichment research and development, which is essential for the Agency to verify the correctness and completeness of the statements by Iran, will be restricted.10

In a subsequent resolution from September 24, the IAEA found Iran to be in noncompliance with its NPT obligations and urged the Tehran regime to “implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General in his report.” The declaration of noncompliance was crucial insofar as it now indeed opened the venue for Iran to be referred to the UN Security Council. In fact, the resolution stated that “the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities [. . . has] given rise to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council.”11 A day later, on September 25 Tehran rejected the resolution by calling it “illegal, illogical and politically motivated.”12 Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki emphasized that Iranian actions would be in accordance with the NPT regulations about the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Subsequently, the Iranian foreign ministry also announced Iran would be withdrawing from the NPT if its case was indeed referred to the Security Council. In October, however, more cautionary words replaced these threatening statements. Secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani announced support for resuming negotiations with the EU-3 under the condition that they were “aimed at materializing the Iranian nation’s nuclear rights.”13 The crisis stalemated for the rest of the year and was then brought to a head on January 3, 2006. In a letter to the IAEA, Iran declared that it has decided to resume research and development on the peaceful nuclear energy program. Then on January 10, 2006, Iran removed IAEA seals on its enrichment-related equipment at its research facility in Nantaz. This move threw into disarray the negotiations between the EU-3 and the Iranian Government. The EU-3 reacted one day later, declaring that negotiations with Tehran had reached a “dead end” and thereby setting the stage for possible sanctions. Indeed, the French, British, and German troika made a concrete recommendation that Iran be referred to the UN Security Council. A joint statement declared: Iran’s decision to restart enrichment activity is a clear rejection of the processes the EU-3 and Iran have been engaged in . . . . In addition it constitutes a further challenge to the authority of the IAEA and the international community. We have, therefore, decided to inform the IAEA Board of Governors that our discussions with Iran have reached an impasse . . . We continue to be committed to resolving the issue diplomatically.14

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Finally, on January 30 the permanent members of the UN Security Council called on the IAEA to transfer the Iranian dossier to the Security Council. One can assume that the Iranian nuclear issue will be on the European foreign and security policy agenda for some time. Iran will likely continue to insist on developing indigenous nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. To date, the IAEA has found no evidence that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. However, if the perception that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons grows stronger, the question becomes whether it will be possible to dissuade Iran through means short of military force—an option already deliberated about in the United States. If the crisis escalates to this point it will be the next test case for the EU’s ambitions toward unity in foreign and security policy. It remains to be seen whether the EU will continue to speak with one voice. The Crisis with North Korea International concerns about North Korea’s nuclear intentions have a history that date back further than those with Iran.15 In 1980, North Korea began the construction of a five megawatt reactor in Yongbyon fueled with natural uranium and moderated with graphite. This reactor would stand at the heart of an international crisis starting in 1992. Throughout the year the regime in Pyongyang had become delinquent in meeting its IAEA obligations. At the same time evidence began to surface that North Korea was reprocessing plutonium and that yet larger reactors and a reprocessing plant were under construction at Yongbyon.16 As international concern over nuclear activities in North Korea increased, the IAEA requested “visits” to identify the nature of the suspected sites. The response from Pyongyang was that a “visit by [IAEA] officials could not be turned into an inspection” and added that any inspections “might jeopardize the supreme interests” of North Korea. Pyongyang’s reference to the escape clause in the NPT was clear. It permits withdrawal in order to avoid compromising “supreme national interest.”17 On March 12, 1993, the crisis escalated further as Pyongyang announced it would indeed be withdrawing from the NPT—a move that led the United States to consider military options.18 In the end, a military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula was avoided. It was only after a phase of multilateral argumentation and series of bilateral diplomatic efforts, including the engagement of former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, that a settlement between the United States and North Korea was reached in 1994. This led to the signing of the North Korea-U.S. Agreed Framework. Within this framework Pyongyang

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agreed to freeze its nuclear weapons programs and to remain part of the NPT.19 The United States, for its part, agreed to a provision of fuel oil and the construction of two light-water nuclear reactors as a substitute for nuclear reactors. Although the crisis calmed in the following years, the underlying conf lict remained and it would culminate again by December 2002. On December 23, the international audience witnessed the North Korean “nuclear revelation” when the regime in Pyongyang expelled international nuclear inspectors and acknowledged that it had disabled cameras of the UN at the Yongbyon nuclear facility which were supposed to monitor the country’s nuclear activities. Arousing further international concern, Pyongyang also announced that it had restarted its nuclear fuel reprocessing laboratory.20 The North Korean regime defended its move by reference to an apparent U.S. lack of commitment to the Agreed Framework from 1994. Indeed, the construction of the two light-water reactors was five years behind schedule, and their completion is still outstanding. More importantly, however, was the North Korean perception of an increasingly belligerent U.S. policy over the preceding years. One example here was the annual military joint exercises between the United States and South Korea. Other, perhaps more significant examples, were President Bush’s inclusion of North Korea in the “axis of evil” in January 2002 and the new U.S. National Security Strategy from September of that year as it outlined in detail the legitimacy of preemptive strikes.21 It was, therefore, to be expected that in the new year, on January 10, 2003, the crisis escalated further when Pyongyang announced that it would be withdrawing from the NPT and subsequently also restarted the Yongbyon nuclear reactor. Shortly afterwards evidence began to surface that North Korea was developing centrifuge-based high enriched uranium (HEU), conventionally used for the production of nuclear weapons. Indeed, by mid-year North Korea announced that it had reprocessed 800 nuclear fuel rods. Subsequently, the regime declared that it would seek to develop nuclear arms. Finally, in January 2005, the North Korean leadership issued a statement, announcing that it had nuclear weapons. In contrast to the EU’s heavy engagement in the Iranian nuclear crisis, in the case of North Korea its involvement had remained rather circumspect for a long time. Aside from several statements about the nuclear situation over the years, concrete EU actions towards Pyongyang tended to be limited to the humanitarian field, particularly in the form of food aid, support for agricultural rehabilitation, and general humanitarian assistance. However, North Korea’s decision to go nuclear in late-2002

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moved what Europeans had so far perceived to be a latent crisis toward an acute crisis. At the same time the EU began recognizing that traditional forms of engagement might prove insufficient. The EU thus gradually started to become more engaged in the North Korean nuclear crisis. In November 2002, the European Commission declared that the future of North Korea’s relations with the international community would be conditioned on Pyongyang’s immediate and verifiable actions towards dismantling its nuclear program under the auspices of the UN. In December 2003, the European Council reiterated that enhancing the EU’s cooperation with the North Korea will be possible only when Pyongyang “fully complies with its international non-proliferation obligations.”22 As the crisis continued to escalate, the European Council declared in 2004 that it remained “gravely concerned” about North Korea’s “nuclear programme, which poses a serious threat to regional and global security.” After Pyongyang’s February 10, 2005 announcement that it possesses nuclear weapons, the presidency of the European Union issued a statement in which it expressed its “strong concern” and urged Pyongyang to allow the resumption of negotiations in order to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in the Korean peninsula.” In its declaration, the presidency also renewed its “appeal to the DPRK to comply with the Treaty on NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”23 Like the Iranian crisis, the nuclear intentions of North Korea are also likely to remain on the international agenda for some time to come. The EU is approaching both the Iranian and North Korean nuclear crises on the basis of a severe trauma incurred during the Iraq crisis, which split Europe down the middle. The bitter dispute revolved to a large extent around how best to ensure the disarmament of WMD, whether by eliminating Saddam Hussein’s regime through force or by relying on continued diplomacy. Both the Iranian and North Korean crises thus challenge the Europeans with a deja-vu experience and the question arises whether they will lead to a new split. Just before the onset of the Iraq war European Commission president Romano Prodi warned, “If we don’t speak with a single voice, our voice won’t exist and nobody will hear us.”24 In both the Iranian and North Korean crises, the EU has so far managed to speak with one voice. Given that the emphasis has been on diplomacy so far and that the crises have not yet escalated to a point where military means might be perceived by some members as appropriate, this might not be too surprising. Whether the EU will be able to maintain its claimed and aspired goals towards strategic coherence in the future will depend to a significant extent on

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whether European states share a common understanding of their nuclear intentions and possible dangers. This book has shown that despite there being an institutional framework, there is no institutional guarantee. Theorizing Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy The empirical case studies in this book illustrate the development and introduction of a new theoretical approach to the study of international institutions. Traditionally, participation in an institution as an entity assumes the acceptance of the institution’s claimed goals. However, this is apparently not the case for the EU in the domain of foreign and security policy. In order to account for this paradox, it is imperative first to advance an accurate understanding of the nature of the institution under investigation. The EU’s external commissioner Chris Patten explained correctly in a speech in 2000: The member states have not given the Commission a sole right of initiative; nor, in general, have they agreed to abide by majority votes; nor do they accept that Europe has occupied the space reducing national freedom of action. It is important to understand this . . . Foreign policy remains primarily a matter for democratically elected member state governments.25

The EU’s common foreign and security policy ambitions are intergovernmental arrangements. In order to undertake a valid investigation of the subject matter it is important to understand that in this issue area the EU possesses no authority by which it could implement or enforce any decisions. The ambitions toward commonality, therefore, depend on voluntary participation by member states towards any given security challenge. The claimed goals of the EU are external constraints to the degree that they are internalized on the national level. States obey their norms and prescriptions only to the extent they are in accordance with nationally formulated preferences.26 Some theoretical mandates follow from this recognition. Rather than assigning analytical priority to the structural context of any given institution, this priority must be reassigned. An analysis of nationally held preferences toward a security challenge is analytically prior to institutional features and characteristics. Indeed, as I argued at the outset of this book, prominent institutional theorists have equally come to recognize that for institutional theory to make progress it is advisable to focus more on agency and less on structure.27 However, the investigation of various relevant

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agents must be undertaken within a unified framework with clear implications for the relative viability of an institution. Toward this end my approach was inspired by the tradition of comparative foreign policy analysis and Douglass North’s conceptualization of international institutions as shared mental models. This synthesis is meritorious because of a simple but important and far-reaching insight. International institutions are built to manage decision problems external to the institution and these decision problems do not speak for themselves. Their perception is contingent upon subjective cognitive processes by the institution’s constituting units, that is, the key decisionmakers of the institution’s member states. In its eagerness for parsimony, traditional institutional theorizing leaves these considerations unproblematized. Actors’ preferences are consequentially undertheorized and treated as “givens.”28 In doing so, traditional institutional theory begs “what may be the most important question on how they were formed.” Analysis may be facilitated, “but at a cost of drawing attention away from areas that may contain much of the explanatory action we are interested in.” 29 These areas encompass what scholars in the tradition of comparative foreign policy have called the “psychological milieu” or “psychological climate” of the decisionmaker.30 This becomes even more important because structural (institutional) constraints on decisionmakers are not deterministic.31 Conceptualizing international institutions as shared mental models offers a viable venue for contextualizing these considerations within a unified framework with clear propositions about the viability of an international institution. This step is crucial because an analysis of institutional viability remains incomplete otherwise. Answering questions about the preferences of actors belonging to an institution before addressing questions of institutional viability is also important to avoid the endogeneity trap resulting from “sins of omission.”32 Are structural features and characteristics of any given institution to be considered as facilitating or hindering the viability of the institution? Without examining the preferences of constituting actors, whether these are essentially compatible with each other or not, one cannot establish true causation between apparent institutional deficiencies and divergent state strategies or, alternatively, apparent institutional merits and compatible state strategies towards an external decision problem. This applies especially to intergovernmental international institutions where national governments retain sovereignty over the institution, and not vice versa. The foregoing argument leads to a perhaps somewhat disappointing but realistic conclusion. There may be limits to the art of institutional

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engineering.33 In the context of the EU, External Commissioner Chris Patten remarked aptly in 2002 that, “We can always discuss institutional improvements—but we will not be able to replace political will which is needed most.”34 One should indeed not succumb to the fallacy of believing that for every institutional “failure” there is an institutional solution. This is important to remember, because many scholars engaged with the study of European foreign policy indeed appear to think that its major problems can be solved by inventing a new procedure or rule for the institutional framework of the EU.35 This conclusion leads back to the introduction of this book and Henry Kissinger’s question about Europe’s telephone number. There is no doubt that European states, through measures of institution building, have established a formal telephone number. The best figurative representation of this number is perhaps the position of the EU’s high representative for a common foreign and security policy. However, the problem remains that neither this office nor any other institutional instance of the EU possesses the capability to speak authoritatively for the EU’s member states. For European action to take place and for a truly robust common and foreign security policy to emerge, member states need to have the political will to pursue common action. States must agree on the nature of the security threat and have convergence regarding the policy to be selected. The practice of a common foreign and security policy is still weak, because it is an area in which member states are rightly jealous of their national prerogatives.36 States are unlikely to give up their sovereignty rights over questions of foreign policy, because foreign policy goes to the heart of what it means to be a nation. Whether a common European foreign and security policy will be more than just declaratory is a question that for the foreseeable future will be answered on a case by case basis. The status and effectiveness of the EU as a crisis actor is not a given but remains highly contingent. This conclusion is likely to hold as long as the EU’s foreign and security policy arrangements are intergovernmental. Questions of World Order Connected to questions about the viability of Europe as a foreign policy actor are questions about the prospects of a future world order. I want to conclude this book with a brief discussion of this issue. The demise of the cold war system at the end of the 1980s led to the end of bipolarity and the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon. With a population of approximately 450 million people and a combined GDP of more than 8 trillion a European Union able to unite its diplomatic potential

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could easily be in a position to challenge the United States’ current status. What are the prospects for such a transformation? The scholarship concerned with configurations of world order distinguishes among three understandings of an international balance of power—balance of power as a situation, balance of power as a system, and balance of power as a policy. The balance of power as a situation is a term “designed to indicate the character of a situation in which the power relationship between states or groups of states is one of rough or precise equality.”37 It performs a purely descriptive function and is, therefore, of no concern for my purposes. The two remaining aspects of the balance of power are concerned with dynamics within the international system and are of interest here.38 The most inf luential elaboration of the balance of power as a system is given in Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics. Central to the Theory is an automatic and self-regulating understanding of the operations of the international system. The international system is defined through its interacting units (states) and the ordering principle (structure) among these units. In the absence of an overarching authority above states, the structure is anarchic and literally “generates” self-help directives to what are considered to be functionally alike system-constituting units.39 By deductive logic the dominant outcome on the systemic level is a balance of power. As Waltz writes, “Balance-of-power politics prevails whenever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive.”40 From such a perspective enduring unipolarity after the end of the cold war represents an anomaly and ought to constitute nothing beyond a transitory moment.41 “As nature abhors a vacuum,” Waltz writes, “so international politics abhors unbalanced power . . . . In international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads others to try and balance against it.”42 The unchanged anarchic quality of the international system in conjunction with a self-regulating understanding of it thus compelled Waltz’s post–cold war argument. Uncontested U.S. hegemony would eventually come to an end and that, in fact, the EU might emerge as a rising pole vis a vis the United States.43 Yet, almost two decades after the end of bipolarity, the United States continues to be the lone hegemon. The problem lies in conceptualizing the system-constituting units as undifferentiated and functionally equal. Exclusive systemic theorizing carries the consequence that it excludes the only possible dimensions of change from the model. As John Ruggie aptly points out, “in any social system structural change itself ultimately has no source other than unitlevel processes.”44 It is simply impossible for structures of unipolarity,

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bipolarity, or multipolarity to come into being or change independent from the attributes of the agents, By banishing these from the domain of systemic theory, as Ruggie argues further, “Waltz . . . exogenizies the ultimate source of systemic change.”45 In order to account for the unipolar anomaly, one must engage in reductionsism, that is engage in subsystemic theorizing and consider the balance of power as a policy. It is not the apparently automatic operations of the system that are central here but rather the behaviors of its constituting units. The balance of power should not be considered as an automatically emergent property of the system but as a conscious and calculated behavior by system-constituting units. It ref lects an active concern with the power situation and it is considered to be an “equilibrating action” by states. Hans Morgenthau, for example, describes it as “dependent upon manipulations carried out by . . . statesmen” and, moreover, considers it to be “a universal instrument of foreign policy.”46 Since the inception of the WEU, it has been indeed the intention, especially of French foreign policy, to instrumentalize European unification as a counterbalance to the United States Concerned with a “European Europe” that is not dominated by the United States, France has consistently refused to make of the WEU a “link” between the EU and NATO, or even a subordinate of NATO.47 EU member states needed to bolster their military capabilities, not as a way of buttressing the Atlantic pillar of the Alliance, but to guarantee the independence of the EU from the United States and NATO. This quest for autonomous (counter)power did not change over the years. Former French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine explained in 1998 that, “We cannot accept a politically unipolar world,” and President Chirac stated, “any community with only one dominant power is always a dangerous one and provokes reactions.”48 In contrast to France, Britain Sees itself as Atlanticist rather than Europeanist. British leaders traditionally instrumentalized foreign policy not toward balancing the United States, but rather towards strengthening the Atlantic Alliance. The partnership between Washington and London has been described as “a relationship rooted in common history, common values, and common interests around the globe.”49 The two countries have also been referred to as “traditional and instinctive military allies.”50 Although at the turn of the century Prime Minister Blair engaged in rhetoric calling for a European superpower, it is clear that he does not envision it to be an autonomous and independent power. After the Iraq debacle, Winston Churchill’s post–world war remark that “between Europe and the Atlantic, Great Britain will always choose the Atlantic,” strikes perhaps truer than ever.51

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German leaders traditionally favored the via media between the French and British positions as they understood themselves as both Europeanist and Atlanticist. However, Germany has recently started to emancipate itself from its ties to the United States. To the dismay of German leaders, the successful campaign in Afghanistan did not bring a return to lasting “participatory hegemony.” Multilateralism as the very cornerstone of traditional German foreign policy had, in effect, been paralyzed. Former foreign minister Joschka Fischer thus declared that a “world order in which the national interest of the strongest power is the criterion for military action simply cannot work.”52 Given the preponderant power position of the United States in the contemporary international system the only viable strategy for Europe toward emerging as a prospective counterpole is to engage in conscious “external balancing,” that is, efforts to strengthen the European alliance away from an ad hoc actor that at times succeeds and other times fails. Yet this concerted equilibrating action has so far remained absent. Scholars have called this “Europe’s strategic deficit”—the United States is a world power, while Europe does not live up to its potential to be one and the unipolar moment is likely to become the unipolar era.53 From a reductionist perspective the linkage between structural transformation and the contingencies caused by the system-constituting agents is rather evident. The mandate is, therefore, to expand the property space of theoretical engagements addressing questions of world order. Waltz is correct in arguing that systemic theory deals with the “pressures of structure on states and not with how states will respond to the pressures.” “The latter,” as he further recognizes correctly, “is a task for theories about how national governments respond to pressures on them.”54 The viability of separating these two bodies of theories is questionable. Without engaging in reductionism, the explanatory power of systemic theorizing remains severely limited and ultimately amounts to a normative theory of what ought to happen rather than what is happening. I conclude, therefore, this book with a firm advocacy for individuallevel theorizing in world politics. Conventional international relations theory has tended to neglect the role of the individual leader, whether in analyses regarding the viability of international institutions or in regards to questions about world order—two subject areas that often share considerable linkage as I have argued here. Presumably in an effort towards parsimony, structure-oriented approaches and not agent-centered ones stand at the core of traditional international relations theory. World politics is complex, however, and it is for this reason that theoretical parsimony may find itself at odds with empirical accuracy.

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Even before the end of the cold war—an era that was dominated by structural international relations theory—one observer noted that, precisely because very few real-world problems are adequately dealt with at the abstract level, “it is not surprising that many [structuralists] have abandoned the high ground of the macro-level and have come down to the trenches of real political analysis.”55 Structural approaches do not require elaborate inferences about the mindset of a particular leader at a particular time. Individual leaders are more or less considered to be instrumentally rational “marionettes” that simply react to the incentives and constraints in their surrounding structure. They ignore how “international relations are conducted by conscious entities capable of reacting to and often modifying the variables they encounter.” “International relations is ultimately about human beings,” and the way in which they engage in such relations is difficult to understand through structural lenses.56 Denying leaders’ subjective interpretations of the incentives and constraints they face as important components of the decision-making process leads to an impoverished understanding of political action and to faulty theoretical predictions and expectations. It is, therefore, imperative to refocus analytical priority from the high ground of macrolevel theorizing and to the levels of real political analysis. The world does not exist independent from human beings. A problematization of leaders in general international relations theory is, therefore, indispensable.

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Political Leadership and Security Integration

1. See Smith (1992, 55) and Salmon and Shepherd (2003, 19). 2. Morgenthau (1973, 5). Like Morgenthau, Wettig (1999, 15) argues that the development of the EEC was seen “by the architects of European integration as being more significant in security than in economic terms.” Hoffmann (2000, 189) complements the argument stating “The project of West European unification, launched by Jean Monnet and the French Government in 1950 would have been, so to speak, a natural framework for a common diplomatic and defense policy.” See also Cogan (1994). For an argument that the European unification was primarily motivated by economic considerations see Moravcsik (1998). 3. Quoted in James (1986, 347). For an excellent account of the EDC see Fursdon (1980) and the memoirs of Jean Monnet (1978). 4. Quoted in Cheysson (1997, 35). 5. Cogan (2001, 480) and Heisbourg (2000, 6). For a similar argument see Penksa and Mason (2003, 256). 6. Rumsfeld (2003). 7. Sjursen (2003); see also Knodt and Princen (2003, 3). 8. Grant (2002, 135). 9. See, for example, Forster and Wallace (1996); Regelsberger et al. (1997); Smith (1998). 10. Keohane (1988, 387). 11. Frieden (1999); Martin (1992); Oye (1985). 12. For a similar argument see Howorth (2003b, 38). Accordingly, France, Great Britain, and Germany are sometimes also referred to as “the big three.” See Grant (2002, 138); Hill (1996); Tonra (1997). 13. Denzau and North (1994); North (1990). 14. Weber (1949, 81). 15. Wolfers (1962, 42). 16. Sprout and Sprout (1965, 1969). 17. For a very similar argument see Goldgeier and Tetlock (2001, 79).

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18. For an exemplification of this argument see George (1980, 56) and Lau and Sears (1986). Although this argument has been popularized through the cognitive revolution, it has been made earlier by Brunner who recognized that the individual perceiver “is not simply a dutiful clerk who passively registers information. Rather, the perceiver is an active interpreter, one who resolves ambiguities, makes educated guesses about events that cannot be observed directly, and forms inferences about associations and causal relations” (quoted in Nisbett and Ross 1980, 17). 19. For an elaboration of this argument see Rosenau (1966). 20. Knodt and Princen (2003, 1). For comprehensive overviews of the institutional evolution see Duke (2000); Hill and Smith (2000); Peterson and Sjursen (1998); Salmon and Shepard (2003); Soetendorp (1999); Whitman (1998). 21. For another overview see Smith (2002). 22. Sauder (1999, 119). Brenner (2003, 199) explains France’s discomfort with the dominant world position of the United States by reference to France’s “exalted self-image that precludes it from accepting the role of subordinate partner, deferential and hesitant about stating its own views or forcefully pursuing its own line of policy.” 23. Bozo (1991); Hoffmann (2000, 190); Menon (2000); Sauder (1999, 117). A detailed account of the formative years of De Gaulle’s security policy can be found in Harrison (1981). For a good overview of French policy toward Europe over the decades see Howorth (1995). 24. France’s conception of a multipolar international system has more recently also been elaborated and argued for by former Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine (Vedrine and Moisi 2001 and Brenner and Parmentier 2001). 25. Kenneth Waltz (1993, 71), for example, argued “Germany may ultimately find that reunification and the renewed life of a greater power are more invigorating than the struggles, complications, and compromises of European integration.” Indeed, the argument was advanced that Germany would seek to acquire nuclear capabilities and allow its existing alliance ties to lapse. See Duffield (1998, 3); Layne (1993); Mearsheimer (1990, 1994/1995); Waltz (1993). 26. Howorth (2003b, 44). 27. Quoted in Feldman (1991, 326). In contrast to France, however, German leaders always attempted to remain faithful to all allies and international commitments (Haftendorn 1999). Exemplary here is a statement by Kohl when he argued in June 1992 that one could not look at Atlanticism and Europeanism as “either/or” propositions. Instead, the two had to be seen as complementary (Rempel 1994, 174, 180, 186). 28. Rynning (2003, 24); Hoffmann (2000, 192). 29. Salmon and Nicoll (1997, 14–15). 30. White (2001, 121). 31. Hill (2004b, 144).

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32. Krupnick (1994, 7). 33. Duke (2000, 39); see also Forster (1994, 51). Regarding the relationship between NATO and the WEU, the Brussels Treaty (Article IV) states, In the execution of the Treaty the High Contracting Parties and any organs established by them under the Treaty shall work in close cooperation with the [NATO]. Recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the Military Staffs of NATO, the Council [of the WEU] and its agency will rely on the appropriate Military Authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters. The text of the treaty is available online at: http://www.weu.int/Treaty. htm. Last accessed May 7, 2007. 34. Sauder (1999, 119). 35. Caporaso (2000, 119); see also Krupnick (1994, 4). 36. Hoffmann (1999, 82). 37. Caporaso (2000, 119). For a good overview of European political cooperation see Nuttall (1992) and Weiler and Wessels (1988). 38. Quoted in Urwin (1995, 148). 39. Duke (2000, 57). 40. Caporaso (2000, 120). 41. White (2001, 145). The CSCE was renamed to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1975. 42. Nuttall (2000, 2); see also Cameron (1997, 99). 43. Urwin (1995, 234). 44. Single European Act (1987), Title I, “Common Provisions,” Article 1. The full text of the act is available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_ finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/singleuropeanact.pdf. Last accessed May 7, 2007. 45. Single European Act (1987), Title III, “Provisions on European Cooperation in the Sphere of Foreign Policy,” Article 30. 46. Urwin (1995, 234). 47. Single European Act (1987), Title III, “Provisions on European Cooperation in the Sphere of Foreign Policy,” Article 30. 48. Single European Act (1987), Preamble. 49. Ehrhart (2001); see also Hoffmann (2000, 191); Krupnick (1994, 20); Laursen and Vanhoonacker (1992). 50. Quoted in Penksa and Mason (2003, 267). 51. Baker (1995, 636). 52. Hoffmann (2000, 191); Sauder (1999, 122). 53. Mueller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002, 257); see also Hill (1993); Menon, Forster, and Wallace (1992); Smith (2003, 41); White (2001, 95). For a good overview of CFSP see Holland (2004). 54. At the end of 1990, Mitterrand and Kohl demanded that “foreign policy and common security would have the vocation of extending to all areas” and “that political union should include a true security policy that would

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55. 56.

57. 58.

59. 60. 61.

62. 63. 64.

65. 66.

67. 68. 69. 70. 71.

72. 73. 74. 75.

in turn lead to a common defence” (Duke 2000, 86); see also de Schoutheete de Tervarent (1997, 44); Nuttall (2000, 4). The plans toward this end were, for example, the so-called Genscher–Dumas Paper published on February 6, 1991 and the announcement of a Franco-German contingent called Eurocorps as the nucleus of an independent European defense organization. Spence (1999, 226). Treaty on European Union (TEU) Title I, Article B. The full text of the treaty is available online at: http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top. html. Last accessed May 7, 2007. Meimeth (1999, 145). Declaration on Western European Union Articles J.3, J.4.1, and J.4.2. The full text of the declaration is available online at: http:// www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/key/ declaration_maastricht_fromeu_site.php. Last accessed May 7, 2007. See also Rempel (1994, 177). Smith (2002, 101). Schneckener (2001, 43); see also Smith (2002, 101). Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Art. 26. The full text of the consolidated treaty is available online at: http://europa. eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/C_2002325EN.000501.html. Last accessed May 7, 2007. Salmon and Shepherd (2003, 63); Smith (2003, 46). Buerkle (1998). Tony Blair speaking in Portschach just after the Austrian Presidency Informal Summit, October 25, 1998, http://www.number-10.gov.uk. Last accessed May 7, 2007. For an elaboration of the British reversal see also Boniface (2003, 59); Deighton (2000); Hill (2004b, 157); Howorth (2000a; 2000b; 2003a); Penksa and Mason (2003, 271–272). Quoted in Cogan (2001, 99). Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council, 1999. Available online at: http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99_en. htm. Last accessed May 7, 2007. Grant (2002, 136). Shepherd (2003, 40). Richard Rosecrance quoted in Zielonka (1998a, 2). See Hill (1993); Hoffmann (2000, 189); Smith (2003, 3); M. Smith (1998). Mueller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002, 260); see also Blair (2003, 186); Cameron (1997); Forster and Wallace (1996, 412); Grunert (1997); Kintis (1997); Lister (1997); Peterson (1998). Mueller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002, 160). Grant (2002, 136). K. Smith (2003, 1). Allen (1998); Howorth (2000a, 2000b); McBreen (2001, 81).

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76. Lister (1997); Smith (2003, 1, 3). 77. For a similar argument see Heiselberg (2003). 78. For a similar argument see Salmon and Shepherd (2003, 1); Zielonka (1998b). 79. Zielonka (1998b); see also Hoffmann (2000, 190); Peterson (1998). 80. Mueller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002, 257). 81. Taylor (1994, 5). 82. Hill and Wallace (1996, 13). 83. Walt (1987, 1). 84. Wettig (1999, 8). 85. Moens et al. (2003, xxi). 86. Hoffmann (2003). For a similar argument see Gordon (1998); Nye (2002).

2 A Cognitive Theory of Institutional Viability 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

11.

12.

13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18. 19.

North (1990, 5). On the concept of sovereignty see Krasner (1999). For good overviews see Duffield (2007) and Risse (2002). Koremenos et al. (2001, 762). North (1990, 405). For more on institutional theory and its evolution see Keohane (1989); Keohane and Martin (2003). Simmons and Martin (2002, 194). Keohane and Martin (2003, 78). North (1990). For a similar argument see Clark (1998, 248). Duffield (2007, 9); Chayes and Chayes (1995, 113); Finnemore and Sikkink (1998); Goertz and Diehl (1992, 638–639); Raymond (1997, 217–218). On the endogeneity problem as it relates to institutional theory see also Keohane and Martin (2003); Mearsheimer (1994/1995). For an elaboration on the “sins of omission” see Frieden (1999). For a similar argument see Frieden (1999). For a similar argument from a structural realist perspective see Mearsheimer (1994/1995); see also Duke (1994, 93). Frieden (1999, 53); see also Martin (1992); Oye (1985, 6–9). Goldstein and Keohane (1993, 4); see also Jervis (2003). Keohane and Martin (2003, 96, 103). For more on the tradition of comparative foreign policy see Andriole et al. (1975); Bauer and Gergen (1968); Frankel (1963); Hanrieder (1971); Lentner (1974); London (1965); McGowan and Shapiro (1973); Rosenau (1966, 1967, 1968). Rosenau (1966, 31). Kegley and Skinner (1976, 308). Richardson (1987).

166

NOTES

20. Denzau and North (1994); see also Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986, 764–765). 21. Simon (1985, 294). 22. See Jones (1981); North (1990); North and Thomas (1973); Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986); Wendt (1999, 96). 23. See also Wendt (1999, Chapter 4). 24. Hogarth and Reder (1986); Holland et al. (1986); Goldgeier and Tetlock (2001). 25. Simon (1986, 210–211; emphasis added); North (1990, 22–23); see also Jervis (1976). 26. Holland et al. (1986, 12, 22). 27. On operational codes see George (1969, 1979); Holsti (1970, 1977); Schafer and Walker (2006); Walker (1977, 1990, 2003). 28. George (1979); Snyder et al. (1954). 29. On information sharing functions of institutions see Martin and Simmons (1999); see also Keohane (1989, 174); Krasner (1983, 5). For a similar argument applied to rational choice theory under which traditional institutional theory can be subsumed, see Jervis (2003). 30. For an elaboration of this argument see Heiner (1983). 31. Arthur (1988); Denzau and North (1994); Sprout and Sprout (1957, 1965, 1969). 32. Herrmann (1988); Kelman (1965); Kelman and Bloom (1973). 33. George (1980, 56); Lau and Sears (1986). 34. Ninkovich (1994, 237). 35. The three questions of the sidebar represent a subset of Alexander George’s (1969) questions about a leader’s operational code. 36. See for example Burgess and Moore (1973); Coser (1956); Dahrendorf (1959, 1968); Hamblin (1958); Lanzetta et al. (1954); Levine and Campbell (1972); Lott and Lott (1965); Mulder and Stemerding (1963); Schachter (1959); Sherif and Sherif (1953); Sheriff et al. (1961); Simmel (1955). 37. See for example Holsti (1965, 1966, 1969); Holsti et al. (1973); Hopmann (1967); Liska (1962); Modelski (1963); Niou and Ordeshook (1994); Stein (1976); Thompson and Rapkin (1981); Walt (1987). 38. Malici (2005, 94). 39. Leng and Walker (1982); Snyder and Diesing (1977). 40. Winter et al. (1991); Winter and Stewart (1977). 41. For a more detailed elaboration of the VICS system than presented here see Schafer and Walker (2006) and Walker et al. (2003). 42. Kaplowitz (1978); Langer (1983); Lefcourt (1976); Phares (1976). 43. Schafer (2000); see also Schafer and Walker (2006) and Walker et al. (1998, 2003). 44. Walker (1977, 2004); Schafer and Walker (2006); Maoz (1990); Snyder and Diesing (1977). 45. The (P) and (D) indices are plotted on the same axis because they both capture the strategic orientation of actors. While (P) is about Self ’s

NOTES

46. 47. 48. 49.

167

strategic orientation, (D) is about Self ’s perceived strategic orientation of other. For a more systematic comparison of decisionmakers within as well as across countries the raw VICS scores are transformed into z-scores. The scores for the VICS indices in figure 2.1 are expressed as standard deviations above and below the index scores for a norming group of world leaders. See Schafer and Walker (2006). See Auerswald (2004) for a similar conceptualization of the dependent variable. For more on the value of selecting cases along the criterion of “policy resemblance” see Van Evera (1997). See Eckstein (1975); Van Evera (1997). Ibid.

3 The Kosovo War 1. See also Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000, 9). 2. Much more detailed historical accounts of the Serb-Albanian contentions in Kosovo than presented here can be found in Malcolm (1998); Mertus (1999); Vickers (1998). 3. Williams (2001, 17); Latawski and Smith (2003, 4). 4. Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000, 7); Fromkin (1999, 89–95). 5. Bayerl (2001, 31). On the role of religion in the Kosovo conf lict see Johnston (2003). On the role of nationalism in the Balkans see Glenny (2000); Hagen (1999); Judah (2000); Ramet (1997). 6. Judah (2000) and Leurdijk and Zandee (2001, 10). 7. Leurdijk and Zandee (2001, 10). 8. Leurdijk and Zandee (2001, 13–14); Williams (2001, 18). 9. Vickers (1998, 122–140). 10. Leurdijk and Zandee (2001, 15). 11. Malcolm (1998, 324–325); Leurdijk and Zandee (2001, 15–16). 12. Lee (1983, 88). 13. Vickers (1998, 179); see also Leurdijk and Zandee (2001, 16). 14. The GMP index is sometimes used in reference to economies which have not yet developed a service sector. It is based on manufacturing and agricultural output while the GNP also includes services. 15. Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000, 37). 16. Ibid.; Leurdijk and Zandee (2001, 17). 17. Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000, 38). 18. Quoted in Leurdijk and Zandee (2001, 18). 19. Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000, 40). 20. Quoted in Malcolm (1998, 343). 21. Quoted in Mertus (1999, 179); Williams (2001, 22). 22. Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000, 8); Malcolm (1998, 342–348). 23. Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000, 8); Mertus (1999, 179); Skrpec (2003, 94–95).

168

NOTES

24. Caplan (1998, 748); Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000, 34). 25. Malcolm (1998, 350). 26. Caplan (1998, 750–751); Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000, 50); Ramet and Lyon (2001, 84); Rezun (2001, 42). 27. Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000, 10); Leurdijk and Zandee (2001, 22). For more on the KLA see O’Neil (2002, 22–35). 28. Malcolm (1998, Preface). 29. Humanitarian Law Center (1998, 30). Severe violations of human rights were also corroborated by organizations such as the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights. 30. Williams (2001, 26). 31. Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000, 11). 32. Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000, 22). 33. For a similar argument see Caplan (1998); Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000, 23); Ramirez and Szapiro (2001). 34. Caplan (1998, 747). 35. Pellet (1992). 36. Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000, 26). 37. Skrpec (2003, 95). 38. McBreen (2001, 80, 88). 39. Skrpec (2003, 95). 40. Bulletin of the European Union (1996, 58); see also Caplan (1998, 750). 41. Skrpec (2003, 99). 42. McBreen (2001, 89). 43. Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000, 25) and Dempsey (1998, 17). 44. Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000, 42). 45. “Statement by the Secretary-General,” NATO Press Statement, Vilamoura, Portugal, September 24, 1998. 46. “Statement to the press by the Secretary-General,” NATO Press Statement from October 13, 1998. The statement is available online at: http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981013b.htm. Last accessed May 7, 2007. 47. Skrpec (2003, 98); Weller (1999, 219). 48. Hedges (1998, A3). 49. Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000, 63). 50. McBreen (2001, 99). 51. Skrpec (2003, 104). For a good assessment of the Rambouillet Conference see Dauphine (2003). 52. Quoted in Krstic (2004, 230); see also Lambeth (2001, 9). 53. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000) has documented the Serbs’ “sealed area” tactics of surrounding a town, killing all military-age males and sending the rest of the population

NOTES

54. 55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71.

169

packing, evidence of a planned genocide directed from the highest levels of the government. See also Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000, 112); Peters et al. (2001, 15); Ramet and Lyon (2001, 87). Skrpec (2003, 104). The coordinates in figure 3.1 are calculated by using two decimals. Increasing the decimals to three digits ultimately places Chirac in the Type B quadrant. Blair’s diagnosis (D) of Milosevic’s intentions, compared to the diagnoses of Chirac and Vedrine show significant statistical differences at the p ≤ .10 and p ≤ .05 levels respectively. Also the comparison of the British Foreign Secretary’s diagnosis shows a significant difference with respect to his French counterpart at the p ≤ .05 level. Compared to the British diagnoses (D) of Milosevic’s intentions, the diagnoses of Chancellor Schroeder and Foreign Minister Fischer show statistically significant difference at the p ≤ .05 and p ≤ .10 levels respectively. The statistical analysis shows a significant difference for the locus of control index (C) between Foreign Minister Fischer and the British decisionmakers at the p ≤ .05 level. When compared with the British leadership, the P indices (prescriptive strategic orientation) of Chancellor Schroeder and Foreign Minister Fischer show significant differences at the p ≤ .05 and p ≤ .10 level respectively. Compared to the French leadership, Schroeder’s P index is significantly different at the p ≤ .05 level. In addition, the statistical analysis shows that Foreign Minister Fischer differs significantly in his prescriptive strategic orientation (P) when compared to his French counterpart at the p ≤ .10 level. Weller (1999, 212). BBC (Europe), “French Foreign Minister explains Franco-German initiative on Kosovo,” March 19, 1998. Agence France Presse (AFP), “France calls for firm stand on Kosovo,” March 11, 1998. AFP, “Chirac urges ‘resolute’ action on Kosovo,” March 8, 1998. The Press Association, “Contact group calls for dialogue to end Kosovo crisis,” March 25, 1998. AFP, “France, Germany call for Kosovo talks,” March 29, 1998. BBC (Europe), “French European Affairs Minister says use of force possible in Kosovo,” June 9, 1998. Whitney (1998b). Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA), “France and U.S. speak of ‘explosive’ situation in Kosovo,” July 2, 1998. The full text of the resolution is available online at: http://www.un.org/ peace/kosovo/98sc1160.htm. Last accessed May 7, 2007. Skrpec (2003, 98). Financial Times, “UK and France to press on tougher action over Kosovo,” September 17, 1998.

170

NOTES

72. BBC (Europe), “French Air Force to contribute to possible operation in Kosovo,” October 1, 1998. 73. AFP, “France ready to put in ground troops in Kosovo,” October 8, 1998. 74. AFP, “Kosovo strike ‘can still be averted,’ French president says,” October 6, 1998. 75. The full text of the resolution is available online at: http://www. un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1199.htm. Last accessed May 7, 2007. 76. AFP, “Kosovo strike ‘can still be averted,’ French president says,” October 6, 1998. 77. Latawski and Smith (2003, 14). 78. Quoted in Guicherd (1999, 28). 79. MacIntyre (1998) and Whitney (1998b). 80. DPA, “Germany, France urge diplomatic solution to Kosovo,” January 20, 1999. 81. BBC (Europe), “France, Italy favour diplomacy backed by threat of force in Kosovo,” January 29, 1999. 82. AFP, “France sends military reinforcements in response to Kosovo crisis,” January 21, 1999. 83. Weller (1999, 212). 84. Quoted in McBreen (2001, 99). 85. Quoted in Weller (1999, 493). 86. Lambeth (2001, 9). 87. BBC (Europe), “Italian, UK, French ministers issue statement on Kosovo,” March 24, 1999. 88. AFP, “France to take part in Kosovo military operations,” March 24, 1999. 89. AFP, “France says Serb forces remain a ‘threat’ in Kosovo,” April 14, 1999. 90. AFP, “France to boost contribution to NATO’s Kosovo force,” May 4, 1999. 91. Nardulli et al. (2002); Peters et al. (2001); Youngs et al. (1999). 92. Ibid. 93. Clark (2000, 224–274); Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000, 124). 94. Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000, 80). 95. Ibid., 158. 96. Auerswald (2004, 651); Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000, 162–163). 97. BBC (Europe), “Albania: British envoy rejects Kosovo as Serbia’s ‘domestic affair’,” March 12, 1998. 98. Quoted in Leurdijk and Zandee (2001, 29). 99. Smith (1998, A17); see also Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000, 36). 100. AFP, “Blair spells out tough line on Kosovo,” June 6, 1998. 101. United Press International, “British troops to go to Kosovo borders,” May 4, 1998.

NOTES

171

102. Smith (1998, A17); see also Clark (2001, 224); Richardson (2000); Ricks and Robbins (1998, B8). 103. Quoted in Mason (2004, 29). 104. AFP, “Yugoslavia stands defiant as Britain warns of action in Kosovo,” June 18, 1998. 105. Quoted in Henig (2001, 50). 106. Ibid. 107. Cordon (1998). 108. Deans and Dillon (1998); Dillon (1998). 109. AFP, “Britain will not hesitate to use force in Kosovo,” October 5, 1998. 110. AFP, “Military force must be part of Kosovo deal, say France and Britain,” March 5, 1999. 111. The Associated Press (AP), “Britain sends military vehicles for possible use in Kosovo,” February 15, 1999. 112. Milmo (1999). 113. Report of the UK Ministry of Defence available online at: http:// www.kosovo.mod.uk/account/stats.htm. Last accessed May 7, 2007. 114. Ibid. 115. Clark (2001, 264, 261). 116. United Press International, “Britain rejects Kosovo cease-fire offer,” April 6, 1999. 117. Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000, 165). 118. Ibid. 119. Ibid., 138. 120. Mason (2004, 50). 121. Clark (2001, 229–302). 122. Peters et al. (2001, 46); Jones and Fenton (1999, 1). 123. Lambeth (2001, 48). 124. Nardulli et al. (2002, 40). 125. Peters et al. (2001, 48); Priest (1999, A1). 126. Beaumont and Wintour (1999). 127. Daalder and O’Hanolan (2000, 157–158). 128. Marshall (1999, 1). 129. Ramet and Lyon (2001, 85). 130. Stenger (1999, 143). 131. Ramet and Lyon (2001, 85). 132. Baumann and Hellmann (2001); Duff lield (1998, 1999). 133. On the evolution of German Foreign Policy in the post–cold war era see Lantis (2002b, 2002a). 134. AFP, “First decision of new Schroeder government—German observers to Kosovo,” October 27, 1998. 135. Brauner (2000). 136. Joetze (2001).

172

NOTES

137. BBC (Europe), “German defence minister views OSCE role in Kosovo,” December 21, 1999. For more on the Russian involvement in the diplomatic process see Boysen (2001). 138. Baumann and Hellmann (2001); Maull (2004). 139. Quoted in Cohen (1999a, A3). 140. BBC (Europe), “German government hopes for political solution in Kosovo,” January 26, 1999; BBC (Europe), “Germany urges Milosevic to back down over Kosovo,” January 21, 1999. 141. BBC (Europe), “Germany, USA allegedly differ over Kosovo strikes,” February 5, 1999. 142. ITAR-TASS, “Russia, Germany committed to seek political Kosovo settlement,” February 18, 1999. 143. BBC (Europe), “Germany, USA allegedly differ over Kosovo strikes,” February 5, 1999. 144. BBC (Europe), “Germany expresses ‘restrained optimism’ over Kosovo talks,” February 3, 1999. 145. BBC (Europe), “Germany gives cautious welcome to outcome of Kosovo peace talks,” February 24, 1999. 146. BBC (Europe), “German Defence Minister stresses need to conclude Kosovo agreement,” February 26, 1999. 147. DPA, “Last chance for peace in Kosovo, Fischer says,” March 8, 1999. 148. BBC (Europe), “German government concerned about Kosovo talks,” March 18, 1999. 149. BBC (Europe), “Germany’s Greens warn against NATO military strike in Kosovo,” March 22, 1999. 150. Lantis (2002c, 147). 151. Bluth (2000, 69); see also Maull (2004). 152. Duffield (1998, 174). 153. BBC (Europe), “German Greens call for new diplomatic initiatives over Kosovo,” March 30, 1999. 154. Whitney (1999, A10). 155. Scarborough (1999, A1). 156. Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000, 3). 157. Harden (1999b). 158. BBC (Europe), “German Foreign, Defence Ministers rule out sending ground troops to Kosovo,” April 13, 1999. 159. AFP, “France wants peaceful solution for Kosovo,” March 29, 1999. 160. Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000, 166). 161. Ibid.; see also Auerswald (2004, 651). 162. BBC (Europe), “German Defence Minister defends German peace plan for Kosovo,” April 16, 1999. 163. Auerswald and Auerswald (2000, 945). 164. Peters et al. (2001, 47); see also Cohen (1999c); Daalder and O’Hanolan (2000, 163); Ramet and Lyon (2001, 93); Schmitt (1999).

NOTES

173

165. Auerswald and Auerswald (2000, 987); AFP, “France, Germany snub Britain on Kosovo troops,” May 17, 1999. 166. AFP, “France, Germany snub Britain on Kosovo troops,” May 17, 1999. 167. The Week in Germany, “Schroeder sees progress in efforts to end Kosovo conf lict,” May 21, 1999. 168. Harden (1999a, A1); Skrpec (2003, 105). 169. Cohen (1999b, A1). 170. Daalder (1999). 171. Brauner (2000). 172. Accordingly, Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000, 164) write, “Decisions were made only carefully and gradually, in the interest of maintaining solidarity.” See also Auerswald (2004, 634); Nye (1999); Rodman (1999). 173. Cohen (1998c, A14).

4 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

10. 11. 12.

The Afghanistan War

Quoted in Shawcross (2004, 11); Lewis (2002, 21). Woodward and Eggen (2002). Khalilzad and Byman (2000). Halliday and Tanin (1998, 1358); Mardsen (2002). Ewans (2002, 143); Mardsen (2002, 24); Misra (2004, 47); Rasanayagam (2003, 73–74). Gibbs (1987, 371); Goldman (1984); Halliday (1980, 22). Rasanayagam (2003, 76–78). Halliday and Tanin (1998, 1362). After the ill-fated Prague Spring of 1968 and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev had promulgated his doctrine that any state that had once ‘turned’ socialist would never be permitted to revert to its original form of government or indeed to any other. Moreover, after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan Brezhnev told Pravda that there had been a “real threat that Afghanistan would lose its independence and be turned into an imperialist military bridgehead on our southern border.’ See Arney (1990, 110); Byron (1981, 25); Misra (2004, 25); Rasanayagam (2003, 83). For more on the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan see Bradsher (1999); Hauner and Canfield (1989). Gibbs (1987, 368); see also Bradscher (1985, 25–28); Mardsen (2002, 25); Rubin (2002, 3). Quoted in Allan (1995, 446); see also Halliday and Tanin (1998, 1367). Ewans (2002, 153). For more on the mujahideen see Jalali and Grau (1999).

174

NOTES

13. Mardsen (2002, 34); Misra (2004, 28); Rasanayagam (2003, 136–137); Rubin (1995, 180–181). 14. For a good summary of the U.S. and Pakistan’s support to the mujahideen see Ewans (2002); Rasanayagam (2003, Chapter 9). 15. Rasanayagam (2003, 95). 16. Quoted in Allan (1995, 446); see also Halliday and Tanin (1998, 1367). 17. Gorbachev (1986); Ewans (2002, 162); Mardsen (2002, 25). For more on the Soviet reorientation see Mendelsohn (1998). 18. Horf (1996); Rais (1994); Rotberg (2002a, 2002b, 85). 19. Rasanayagam (2003, 143); Rubin (1998, 2002, 10). 20. Rubin (1998). 21. Ewans (2002, 182). 22. Misra (2004, 62, 65–69). 23. Rubin (2002, 11). On the strategic implications of the Taliban’s advance for regional security see United States Institute of Peace (1998). 24. Orbach (2001, 55); Rasanayagam (2002, 234). For a good overview of Al Qaeda finances see Comras (2005). 25. Gunaratna (2002, 40; 2003, 36); Misra (2004, 87); Radu (2002, 281). 26. Gunaratna (2002, 46; 2003); see also Byman (2003). 27. Quoted in Hosenball and Thomas (2001, 32); see also Newhouse (2003, 7). 28. Bensahel (2003, 1); Delpech (2002, 15). 29. Hill (2004b, 146). 30. “Declaration by the European Union.” General Affairs Council, 12 September 2001, quoted in Hill (2004b, 146). 31. Bensahel (2003, 1); Gordon (2002a). 32. The full text of the resolution is available at: http://www.un.org/Docs/ scres/2001/sc2001.htm. Last accessed May 7, 2007. 33. Fawn (2003, 15). The full text of the resolution is available at: http:// www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm. Last accessed May 7, 2007. For a good overview of European counterterrorist measures in select countries see van Leeuwen (2003). 34. De Jonge Oudraat (2003, 167); Katselli and Shah (2003). 35. Gordon (2002a); Parmentier (2004). 36. Penska and Mason (2003, 271); Wallace (2002, 113). 37. Western Mail, “Blair prepares Britain for war,” October 3, 2001. 38. The transcript of the speech is available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2001/09/20010920–8.html. Last accessed May 7, 2007. 39. Delpech (2002, 13); Golino (2002). 40. Delpech (2002, 22). For the full text of the declaration see: http://www. un.int/france/documents_anglais/010921_eu_presidence_amerique. htm. Last accessed May 7, 2007. 41. Grant (2002, 137). 42. Golino (2002); Grant (2002, 138); Hyde-Price (2003, 103).

NOTES

175

43. The Independent, “Air strikes on Afghanistan: European reaction— pledges of support from French and German Leaders,” October 8, 2001. 44. Birmingham Post, “War on terror: World reaction backs Afghan raids,” October 8, 2001. 45. The coordinates in figure 4.1 are calculated by using two decimals. Increasing the decimals to three digits ultimately places Straw in the Type D quadrant. 46. A statistical analysis also shows a significant difference between Fischer’s diagnosis of the situation (D) and his British counterpart at the p ≤ .05 level as well as to the British Prime Minister at the p ≤ .10 level. 47. McAlister (2003, 7). 48. McAllister (2003, 90); Parmentier (2004, 117). 49. Gordon (2001/2002, 92; 2002a); Hoffmann (2003b, 1030); Daley (2001). The statement by NATO to the terrorist attacks can be found at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01.124e.htm. Last accessed May 7, 2007. 50. Davison (2004, 74). 51. Gregory (2003, 139). 52. Gordon (2002a). For opinions that blame U.S. foreign policy for the climate in which the attacks occurred see McAllister (2003, 90); Mondzain (2001); Sole (2001). 53. McAllister (2003, 92). 54. Davison (2004, 73); McAlister (2003, 7). 55. Remarks by President Chirac and President Bush at the White House, September 18, 2001. Available online at: http://www.whitehouse.gov. Last accessed May 7, 2007. 56. Le Monde, “Jacques Chirac reaffirme a Washington l’offre de cooperation de la France,” September 19, 2001; see also Davison (2004, 73). 57. Jarreau and Bacque (2001). 58. Hubert Vedrine, interview by Le Monde, September 18, 2001, “Le Monde entire reconnaitra que les Etas-Unis sont en situation de legitime defense.” 59. Vernet (2001); Gordon (2002a). 60. Jarreau and Bacque (2001). 61. Smith and Yates (2001, 4–5). 62. Branson and Starrs (2001, 1). 63. AFP, “France allows US to use airspace and agrees to naval cooperation,” October 3, 2001. 64. AP, “Chirac says French troops will participate in offensive,” October 7, 2001. 65. The Independent, “War on terrorism: Strategy; France offers its special forces to western allies,” October 4, 2001. 66. Gregory (2003, 139); Birmingham Post, “War on terror: World reaction; Leaders back Afghan raids,” October 8, 2001.

176

NOTES

67. Parmentier (2004, 120). 68. BBC (Europe), “French defence minister reacts to air strikes on Afghanistan,” October 8, 2001. 69. AP, “French defense minister: France could play a part in U.S. ground operation in Afghanistan,” October 18, 2001. 70. The Independent, “War on terrorism: Strategy; France offers its special forces to western allies,” October 4, 2001. 71. BBC (Europe), “French minister: Country and leadership united behind military operation,” October 24, 2001. 72. Walker (2001/2002, 2). 73. BBC (Europe), “French minister: Country and leadership united behind military operation,” October 24, 2001. 74. Federal News Service, “President Bush media availability with French President Chirac,” November 6, 2001. 75. Holloway (2001). 76. McAllister (2003, 97). 77. Erlanger (2001a, A4). 78. AFP, “France to send combat aircraft to Afghanistan,” November 16, 2001. 79. Report of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM). Available online at: http://www.centcom.mil/Operations/Coalition/ Coalition_pages/france.htm. Last accessed May 7, 2007. 80. Beattie (2001). 81. AFP, “France against military action against Iraq,” November 28, 2001. 82. Ibid. 83. Beattie (2001). 84. AFP, “French nuclear carrier leaves to help with Afghanistan campaign,” December 1, 2001; Xinhua General News Service, “French aircraft carrier to join anti-terror coalition in Indian Ocean,” December 11, 2001. 85. AFP, “French aircraft carrier on its way to join ‘anti-terror coalition’,” December 11, 2001. 86. AFP, “France offers 800 troops for Afghan security force,” December 18, 2001. 87. Quoted in Kampfner (2003, 110–115). 88. Kampfner (2003, 112–116). 89. Quoted in Kampfner (2003, 125). 90. Ibid., 110–115. 91. New York Times, “A nation challenged: President Bush’s address on terrorism before a joint meeting of Congress,” September 21, 2001; Fawn (2003, 14). 92. Dorman (2003, 74). 93. Press Association, “20,000 British troops poised on Afghanistan’s doorstep,” September 25, 2001.

NOTES

94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125.

177

Hughes (2001, 1, 4). Ibid. Dorman (2003, 74). AP, “War won’t be quick or easy, British officials say, but prime minister confident of victory,” October 28, 2001. AFP, “Straw: Britain not planning military action against Iraq,” October 11, 2001. AP, “Britain says military campaign could last for months,” October 11, 2001. AFP, “British analysts: Ground troops needed in Afghanistan,” October 18, 2001. Swift and Stewart (2001, 6–7); Western Morning News, “Straw: Britain must be prepared for ‘war’ casualties,” September 25, 2001. Kampfner (2003, 131). Sengupta (2001a, 1). Birmingham Post, “British troops join the war on terror,” October 26, 2001. AP, “Britain commits 600 special forces troops,” October 26, 2001. AFP, “Britain mobilizes 600 elite Marine commandos for Afghan ground mission,” October 26, 2001. Financial Times, “Britain sending marines to join Afghan campaign,” October 27, 2001. Conetta (2004). Roberts and Hardy (2001, 2). Kampfner (2003, 133–134). Roberts and Hardy (2001, 2). Quoted in Kampfner (2003, 134). Ibid., 139–143. AFP, “Britain confirms it has ground troops in Afghanistan,” November 11, 2001. McSmith and Smith (2001, 1); Daily Post, “Thousands of British troops go on standby,” November 15, 2001. Hardy (2001, 6–7). Quoted in Kampfner (2003, 139). Ibid., 141. The Press Association, “Blair keeps up pace of war mission,” November 12, 2001); Sengupta (2001b, 11); Smith (2001b, 9). Fawn (2003, 18). McSmith and Smith (2001, 1). Hardy (2001, 6–7). The full text of the resolution is available at: http://www.un.org/ Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm. Last accessed May 7, 2007. Quoted in Kampfner (2003, 122). AP, “Britain announces it will lead peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan,” November 19, 2001.

178

NOTES

126. 127. 128. 129. 130.

131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143.

144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154.

Fawn (2003, 21). Dorman (2003, 66); Evans and Whitworth (2002, 1). Quoted in Kampfner (2003, 148–149). Maull (2003, 1278). Hyde-Price (2003, 104); The Independent, “Air strikes on Afghanistan: European reaction; Pledges of support from French and German leaders,” October 8, 2001. Handelsblatt, “Germany seeks greater European involvement in military action,” October 9, 2001. Schroeder (2001a); Hyde-Price (2003, 101). Hyde-Price (2003, 101–102). Quoted in Miko and Froehlich (2004, 3). Ibid. Dalgaard-Nielsen (2003, 108); Oswald (2004, 90). Proissi (2001). Hyde-Price (2003, 102–103). Kampfner (2003, 127). Federal News Service, “Media stakeout with German Chancellor Schroeder after meeting with President Bush,” October 9, 2001. AFP, “US, Britain launch strikes against Afghanistan,” October 7, 2001. The Irish Times, “France and Germany offer military support,” October 8, 2001. AFP, “Military strikes: fraught moment of truth looms closer for Germany,” October 9, 2001; BBC (Europe), “NATO, defence experts believe German military involvement likely,” October 9, 2001. AFP, “German foreign minister: Taliban must be brought down,” October 19, 2001. AFP, “Schroeder hints Germany could give U.S. more military support,” October 10, 2001. Inter Press Service, “Politics: Germany accepts U.S. requests for greater military role,” November 6, 2001. Haftendorn (2002). Hyde-Price (2003, 107). AFP, “Report: Germany could send up to 6,000 troops to Afghanistan,” October 20, 2001. Inter Press Service, “Politics: Germany accepts U.S. requests for greater military role,” November 6, 2001. Berger (2002, 22); Erlanger (2001a); Finn (2001). Inter Press Service, “Politics: Germany accepts U.S. requests for greater military role,” November 6, 2001. AFP, “German chancellor facing defections but sure to get war deployment approved,” November 11, 2001; Karacs (2001b). Erlanger (2001b); Karacs (2001a).

NOTES

179

155. BBC (Europe), “German anti-terror mission in support of USA to start 26 November,” November 21, 2001. 156. Maull (2003, 26). 157. Hyde-Price (2003, 103). 158. Oswald (2004, 102). 159. Kampfner (2003, 144). 160. Dalgaard-Nielsen (2003, 107); Haftendorn (2002); AP, “German leaders warn on seeking new targets for war on terrorism,” November 28, 2001. 161. AP, “German leaders warn on seeking new targets for war on terrorism,” November 28, 2001; Haftendorn (2002). 162. For more on the EU’s response see Peers (2003). 163. AFP, “Ministers ready Britain for long Afghan war,” October 28, 2001; AP, “War won’t be quick or easy, British officials say, but prime minister confident of victory,” October 28, 2001. 164. Berger (2002, 27). For more on German foreign policy in the post 9/11 era see Erb (2003). 165. Delpech (2002, 21).

5

The Iraq War

1. The full text of the UN Resolutions are available at: http://www. un.org/Docs/scres/1991/scres91.htm. Last accessed May 7, 2007. 2. Blix (2004, 28). 3. Dunne (2003, 269); Murray and Scales (2003, 33). 4. Blix (2004, 29). 5. Bluth (2004, 873). 6. Crosette (1997, 4). 7. Both The Washington Post and the Boston Globe later published material that supported Iraq’s suspicions about espionage. See Lynch (1999, A1) and Gellman (1999, A1). In a PBS interview chief UN inspector Scott Ritter emphasized that the inspectors were not kicked out by Saddam Hussein, but were withdrawn by Bill Clinton. He explained that “Public perception is that the Iraqis were confrontational and blocking the work of inspectors. In 98% of the inspections, the Iraqis did everything we asked them to because it dealt with disarmament. However when we got into issues of sensitivity, such as coming close to presidential security installations, Iraqis raised a f lag and said, ‘Time out.’ We got a CIA out there that’s trying to kill our president and we’re not happy about giving you access to the most sensitive installations and the most sensitive personalities in Iraq.” The transcript of the interview is available at: http:// www.democracynow.org. Last accessed May 7, 2007. 8. See Shawcross (2004, 31). 9. Dunne (2003, 268); Potter (2001, 52).

180

NOTES

10. Dunne (2003, 268). 11. The human costs were ref lected, for example, in UN reports about increases in child mortality and malnutrition. See for example the report by Amnesty International available online at http://web.amnesty.org/ pages/iraq_summary (last accessed May 7, 2007.), or the contributions to Arnove (2000). 12. This was later also confirmed by UN chief inspector Hans Blix (2004, 3). United Nations, “The Security Council: An update on inspections,” January 27, 2003; Cortright et al. (2003, 2). 13. Quoted in Cortright et al. (2003, 2). 14. The full text of the resolution is available at: http://www.un.org/Docs/ scres/1999/sc99.htm. Last accessed May 7, 2007. 15. Dunne (2003, 266). 16. Cogan (2004, 131); Newhouse (2003, 36); Woodward (2002, 49, 83). 17. Boukharas and Yetiv (2003, 67); Shawcross (2004, 51, 63). 18. de Jonge Oudraat (2003, 168). 19. Boukharas and Yetiv (2003, 67); Shawcross (2004, 51, 63). 20. Dunne (2003, 270); Keegan (2004, 100). 21. The President’s State of the Union Speech is available online at: http:// www.whitehouse.gov. Last accessed May 7, 2007. 22. Jehl (2004). 23. Anderson (2003); Goh (2003, 87); Cannistraro (2002, 2); Cortright et al. (2003); Gordon and O’Hanlon (2002, 93); Haftendorn and Kolkmann (2004, 472). 24. Fawn (2003, 14). 25. Fiddler and Simonian (2001). 26. Quoted in Lafeber (2002); see also Dunn (2003, 283). 27. Delpech (2002, 16). On the increasing momentum for war against Iraq see also Gordon et al. (2002). 28. Layne (2004, 48); Pond (2004, 36); Boukharas and Yetiv (2003, 66). 29. Gordon (2002b). 30. Hill (2004b, 151). 31. Gordon and O’Hanlon (2002, 7). 32. Hill (2004a, 95). 33. Keegan (2004, 100). 34. Ortega (2002, 6). 35. Quoted in Bell (2003, 225); see also Kirshner et al. (2003). 36. Newhouse (2003, 51). 37. Ortega (2002, 6). 38. Kampfner (2003, 141); Pond (2004, 1). 39. Weisman (2002). 40. Deutsche Welle News, “Mixed reactions to Iraqi move on weapons inspections,” September 17, 2002. 41. AFP, “US, Britain, France agree on Iraq threat, but Europeans wary on US strike,” September 12, 2002.

NOTES

181

42. Knowlton (2002a); AFP, “Britain to release evidence on Iraq as US push for military action continues,” September 24, 2004. 43. Gordenker (2003, 284). 44. The full text of the resolution is available at: http://www.un.org/Docs/ scres/2002/sc2002.htm. Last accessed May 7, 2007. 45. Gordon (2003). 46. Dunne (2003, 274). 47. Newhouse (2003, 57). 48. Sennott (2003b, A1). 49. Taylor and Youngs (2003, 8). 50. Global News Wire, “Britain and France continue sniping at start of summit with each other,” March 20, 2003. 51. Deutsche Welle News, “Iraq debate shakes up EU’s common foreign policy,” September 10, 2001. 52. A statistical analysis shows that the French President’s diagnosis of Saddam Hussein’s intentions (D) is significantly different from that of the British Foreign Secretary at the p ≤ .10 level. Moreover, the French Foreign Minister’s perception of Saddam Hussein’s intentions (D) is significantly different from Blair’s and Straw’s diagnoses at the p ≤ .05 level and p ≤ .01 level respectively. 53. Here the statistical analysis shows significant differences between the two British leaders and the two French leaders at the p ≤ .01 level. 54. The only statistical difference is in the German Foreign Minister’s diagnoses of Saddam Hussein’s intentions (D) when compared to his French counterpart. Here the analysis shows statistical significance at the p ≤ .10 level. 55. In a statistical comparison between the two German leaders and the two British leaders, the analysis reveals significant differences for the prescriptive index (P) at the p ≤ .01 level. Regarding the diagnoses of Saddam Hussein’s intentions (D) the analysis reveals a statistically significant difference between Chancellor Schroeder and the British Foreign Secretary at the p ≤ .02 level. Finally regarding the locus of control index (C) the analysis shows also here a difference between Schroeder and Straw at the p ≤ .001 level. 56. Deutsche Welle News, “Iraq debate shakes up EU’s common foreign policy,” September 10, 2001. 57. AFP, “France’s Chirac warns against US unilateralist approach on Iraq,” August 29, 2002; Harding et al. (2002, 8). 58. Davison (2004, 69). 59. Xinhua General News Service, “France, Netherlands call for European common position on Iraq,” August 28, 2002. 60. AFP, “France and Germany reaffirm opposition to unilateral action on Iraq,” September 8, 2002. 61. The Washington Post, “U.S. increases efforts to gain support for U.N. resolution,” September 27, 2002.

182

NOTES

62. AFP, “France, Germany find common ground on Iraq,” October 3, 2002. 63. Xinhua General News Service, “France opposed giving ‘blank check’ to U.S. draft resolution on Iraq,” October 28, 2002. 64. Gordon (2002b). 65. Marf leet and Miller (2005, 336). 66. Kampfner (2003, 220). 67. AFP, “France ‘takes note’ of U.S. request to join Iraq coalition,” November 20, 2002. 68. Global News Wire, “France pleased with resumption of weapons inspections in Iraq,” November 28, 2002; Global News Wire, “France reports no particular problem regarding weapons inspections in Iraq,” December 3, 2002. 69. Marf leet and Miller (2005, 336). 70. World News Connection, “France does not think Iraq in ‘material breach’ of UN resolution at this stage,” December 21, 2002. 71. Marf leet and Miller (2005, 339). 72. Hoge (2003, 7). 73. Blix (2004, 111). 74. Bumiller and Sciolino (2003). 75. Weisman (2003); Marf leet and Miller (2005, 337). 76. Cogan (2004, 126). 77. Efron and Farley (2003). 78. Quoted in Shawcross (2004, 13). 79. AP, “France, Germany counter U.S. war talk,” January 22, 2003. 80. AFP, “Iraq can be disarmed without war, Chirac tells Bush,” February 7, 2003. 81. AP, “Chirac to Blair: France is not changing its position on Iraq,” February 4, 2003. 82. Lichfield and Penketh (2003, 5). 83. Quoted in Blix (2004, 128). 84. Paxton (2003). 85. AFP, “France will veto new UN resolution on Iraq,” March 10, 2003. 86. Xinhua General News Service, “France, Germany, Russia to oppose new resolution on Iraq,” March 5, 2003; AP, “Foreign ministers from France, Russia and Germany meet in Paris for mini-summit on Iraq,” March 5, 2003. 87. Keegan (2004, 120). 88. Davison (2004, 82). 89. AP, “Furious Britain denounces France for blocking Iraq deal,” March 13, 2003. 90. AFP, “France hits out at Britain over Iraq,” March 19, 2003. 91. AFP, “Text of France-Russia-Germany declaration on Iraq,” March 15, 2003.

NOTES

183

92. AFP, “France, Germany, Russia call for UN meeting on Iraq disarmament ‘timetable’,” March 16, 2003. 93. Taylor and Youngs (2003, 20). 94. Quoted in Kampfner (2003, 130). 95. For an excellent overview of the details of Blair’s decision-making leading up to the Iraq war see Kampfner (2003). 96. House of Commons (London), “Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors: Review of intelligence on weapons of mass destruction,” HC 898, 2004, see page 257 (henceforth cited as the Butler Report). 97. Jones and La Guardia (2002). 98. Tony Blair quoted in Hill (2004a, 91). 99. Ortega (2002, 8); Sennott (2002, A6). 100. Kampfner (2003, 167). 101. Butler Report, paragraph 260 (emphases added); see also Bluth (2004, 867). 102. Tony Blair, Speech delivered at the George Bush Senior Presidential Library, College Station, Texas, April 2, 2002, http://www.number-10. gov.uk/output/PAge1712.asp. Last accessed May 7, 2007. 103. Grant (2002, 139). 104. Ibid., 140. 105. Bluth (2004, 879); Cook (2003, 205); Kampfner (2003, 197); Riddell (2003, 210); Wither (2003/2004, 74). 106. Kampfner (2003, 169). 107. Deutsche Welle News, “Iraq debate shakes up EU’s common foreign policy,” September 10, 2001. 108. Blair (2002a); see also Kampfner (2003, 202). 109. Blair (2002b); see also Waugh and Dillon (2002). 110. Kampfner (2003, 207). 111. Woodcock (2002, 4). 112. Commenting on the diverging interpretations of the French and British leadership, the British Ambassador to the UN remarked later, “We entrenched ourselves in different interpretations of what the wording of Resolution 1441 meant” (quoted in Cogan 2004, 125). See also Kusovac and Beeston (2002); Marf leet and Miller (2005, 336). 113. Quoted in Davison (2004, 82). 114. AFP, “France ‘takes note’ of U.S. request to join Iraq coalition,” November 20, 2002. 115. AP, “Britain says U.S. has requested troops for possible Iraq invasion,” November 20, 2002; AFP, “Minister: U.S. calls on Britain to mobilize troops for Iraq,” November 20, 2002. 116. Hamilton (2002, 2). 117. Knowlton (2002b); AFP, “US and Britain find fault with Iraq arms list,” December 18, 2002. 118. Kampfner (2003, 230).

184

NOTES

119. MacAskill and Wintour (2002, 2). 120. Zakaria (2004). 121. Kampfner (2003, 224); The Guradian, “Blix urges US and UK to hand over Iraq evidence,” December 20, 2002. 122. Keegan (2004, 100). 123. AP, “Britain mobilizes 1,500 reservists for possible war with Iraq,” January 7, 2003. 124. AP, “U.S., Britain step up pressure on Iraq and amid split in the Security Council,” January 20, 2003. 125. Sennott (2003a); Marf leet and Miller (2005, 338). 126. Gordon and Risen (2003). 127. Xinhua General News Service, “Blair: Britain still ready to go to war with Iraq in case of UN veto,” February 5, 2003. 128. Quoted in Taylor and Youngs (2003, 10–11). 129. AFP, “Britain slaps down Franco-German plan on eve of Iraq meeting,” February 13, 2003. 130. Martin (2003, 4). 131. AFP, “US, Britain defend Iraq war plans,” February 11, 2003. 132. Quoted in Shawcross (2004, 141). 133. AFP, “Britain sees ‘sufficient authority’ to wage Iraq war,” March 4, 2003. 134. Marf leet and Miller (2005, 339). 135. AFP, “Britain: War on Iraq ‘more probable’ but not inevitable,” March 15, 2003. 136. AFP, “France must decide ‘overnight’ on possible Iraq veto,” March 17, 2003. 137. Taylor and Youngs (2003, 8). 138. AFP, “France must decide ‘overnight’ on possible Iraq veto,” March 17, 2003. 139. Quoted in Taylor and Youngs (2003, 10). 140. Keegan (2004, 115). 141. Quoted in Taylor and Youngs (2003, 11); Keegan (2004, 122). 142. Taylor and Youngs (2003, 14). 143. Ibid. 144. AFP, “France hits out at Britain,” March 19, 2003. 145. Quoted in Taylor and Youngs (2003, 19–20). 146. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (2003). 147. Garden (2003, 708). 148. Ibid., 701. 149. Ischinger (2001). 150. Duke (2003, 8). 151. Erlanger (2002c); Joffe (2002); Delpech (2002, 36). 152. Larres (2003, 25). 153. Hoooper (2002); Larres (2003, 25). 154. Dalgaard-Nielsen (2003, 99).

NOTES

185

155. See for example Abenheim (2003); Deutsche Welle News, “Transatlantic divide widens over Iraq issue,” October 18, 2002; Erlanger (2002d); Hacke (2003); Heldstueck and Hellmann (2003); Stuermer (2004, 142); Walker (2001/2002). 156. Deutsche Welle News, “Transatlantic divide widens over Iraq issue,” October 18, 2002; see also Abenheim (2003); Hacke (2003); Heldstueck and Hellmann (2003); Stuermer (2004, 142); Walker (2002). 157. Harnish (2004, 3); Harnish and Brauner (2001); Newhouse (2003, 44). 158. Schroeder (2001a); see also Oswald (2004, 91). 159. Xinhua General News Service, “Germany to withdraw anti-terror troops if U.S. attacks Iraq,” August 30, 2002. 160. Quoted in Blix (2004, 70). 161. Xinhua General News Service, “Germany to withdraw anti-terror troops if U.S. attacks Iraq,” August 30, 2002. 162. AFP, “Germany’s Schroeder says Cheney call on Iraq a ‘mistake’,” August 27, 2002; Dalgaard-Nielsen (2003, 100); Erlanger (2002b). 163. Dalgaard-Nielsen (2003, 100). 164. Quoted in Walker (2003, 38). 165. Xinhua General News Service, “Germany to withdraw anti-terror troops if U.S. attacks Iraq,” August 30, 2002. 166. Sennott (2002, A6). 167. Quoted in Blix (2004, 73). 168. Erlanger (2002a). 169. Quoted in Kampfner (2003, 242). 170. AFP, “France and Germany united against unilateral attack on Iraq,” September 7, 2002; Fischer (2002a); IraqWatch (2002). 171. Deutsche Welle News, “Transatlantic divide widens over Iraq issue,” October 18, 2002. 172. Pollack (2002). 173. Quoted in Harnisch (2004, 14). 174. Shawcross (2004, 126). 175. AFP, “Germany’s Schroeder discusses Iraq, North Korea with Chinese leaders,” December 30, 2002. 176. Colin Powell is quoted in Glennon (2003, 17). 177. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Schroeder schliesst Ja zur Kriegsresolution aus,” January 22, 2003. 178. Harnisch (2004, 17). 179. Blix and El Baradei are quoted in Cortright et al. (2003, 4). 180. Quoted in Blix (2004, 141). 181. Der Spiegel, “Das projekt mirage,” February 10, 2003; Spiegel Online, “Blauhelmplan bringt Rot-Gruen in Not,” February 12, 2003; see also Fitchett (2003); Harnisch (2004, 17). 182. Schroeder (2003). 183. Quoted in Harnisch (2004, 18). 184. El Baradei (2003).

186

NOTES

185. AFP, “France, Germany reaffirm opposition to new UN Iraq resolution,” February 24, 2003. 186. Xinhua General News Service, “France, Germany vow to oppose new resolution on Iraq,” March 5, 2003. 187. Harnish (2004, 118); Knowlton (2003); Tyler (2003). 188. Dinmore et al. (2003, 1). 189. Keegan (2004, 118). 190. Federal News Service, “Responses by the foreign ministers of Germany, Syria and Mexico following Iraq weapons inspectors report to the United Nations Security Council,” March 7, 2003. 191. Younge (2003). 192. Gordon (2003). 193. Kampfner (2003, 137, 164). 194. Bluth (2004, 886).

6 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9.

10.

11.

12. 13. 14. 15.

Conclusions and Implications: A European Common Foreign and Security Policy?

Howorth (2000a, 38–39); see also Clarke (2000). Quoted in McBreen (2001, 105). Gordon (2003). Solana (2003). For more detailed accounts of the crisis with Iran see Kemp (2005); Taremi (2005). Afrasiabi and Kibaroglu (2005, 259). The full text of the Paris Agreement is available at: http://www.iaea. org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf. Last accessed May 7, 2007. Quoted in International Crisis Group (2005, 13). The full text of the resolution is available at: http://www.iaea.org/ Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005–64.pdf. Last accessed May 7, 2007. The text of the full report is available at: http://www.iaea.org/ Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005–67.pdf. Last accessed May 7, 2007. The full text of the resolution is available at http://www.iaea.org/ Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005–77.pdf. Last accessed May 7, 2007. Fathi and Landler (2005). Quoted in Langenbach et al. (2005). Statement available online at: http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/ pressdata/EN/declarations/87970.pdf. Last accessed May 7, 2007. For more detailed accounts of the North Korean crisis see Kang (2003); Malici (2008).

NOTES

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

187

Manning (1998, 145). Kim (1994, 269); Koh (1998, 88); Oberdorfer (1997, 276). Mazarr (1995, 95); Oberdorfer (1997, 279). Lee (2001, 61); Scalapino (2002, 14). Kang (2003, 320); Lee and Moon (2003). For an elaboration of this argument see Malici and Malici (2005). EU Council (2004, 20–21). Ibid., 20. Daalder (2003, 156). Patten (2000). Wendt (1999, 358). Keohane and Martin (2003, 96). Goldstein and Keohane (1993, 4). Jervis (1988, 319, 324–325). Sprout and Sprout (1965, 1969). This point is also acknowledged by Goldstein and Keohane (1993, 4–5). Frieden (1999). Zielonka (1998a, 1998b, 1998c). The full speech is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ news/patten/sp02_430.htm. Last accessed May 7, 2007. Caporaso (2000, 114); see also Peterson (1998, 10). For a similar argument see Hoffmann (2000). Claude (1962, 13). Ruggie (1986, 153) draws a distinction between generative and descriptive structures. “Descriptive structures are simply abstract summaries of patterned interactions within a system.” In contrast, “In the realm of generative structures, the concern is ‘with principles, not things’ . . . The objective is to discover the underlying principles of interactions, to infer their syntax.” Ruggie (1986, 153). Waltz (1979, 121). Layne (1993). Waltz (2000, 28). Waltz (1993, 2000). Ruggie (1986, 152). Ibid. Morgenthau (1960, 167). Hoffmann (1993); see also Forster (1994, 63). BBC (Europe), “French minister: Country and leadership united behind military operation,” October 24, 2001; Glennon (2003). Joint statement by George Bush and Tony Blair on February 23, 2001 (quoted in Wither 2003/2004, 68). Wither (2003/2004, 74).

188

NOTES

51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56.

Financial Times, “France and the fighting spirit,” October 9, 2001. Quoted in Thomson (2003/2004, 217). Thomson (2003/2004). Waltz (2000, 27). Herrmann (1988, 177); see also Jervis (1988, 324–325). Gaddis (1992/1993, 55).

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INDEX

Adenauer, Konrad, 7 agential/cognitive/reductionist theorizing: merits of, 6, 19, 20, 154–159 passim Amsterdam Treaty, 7, 11–12, 32, 37, 68, 141, 143 balance of power, 156–158 Bin Laden, Osama, 75–77, 83, 88–93 passim, 101 Blix, Hans, 104, 106, 117–118, 124–125, 133–136 CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy), 4, 7, 10–15 passim, 37, 51–52, 68, 101, 145–146, 163n53; as intergovernmental institution 5, 13, 17–18, 153, 154 (see also institutions); defined, 11; and expectation-capabilities gap, 13 Churchill, Winston, 3, 8, 157 Cognitions: and control propensities, 22–28; and diagnostic propensities, 6, 22–29; and prescriptive propensities, 6, 22–29. See also mental models comparative foreign policy: tradition of, 5–6, 20, 154, 165n16 Contact Group, 43–54 passim, 63 CSCE (Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe), 9

d’Estaing, Valery Giscard, 9 de Gaulle, Charles, 9, 81, 162n23 EC (European Community), 9 EDC (European Defense Community), 3, 161n3 EDI (European Defence Identity), 7, 11–12 EEC (European Economic Community), 3, 161n2 El Baradei, Mohammed, 106, 110, 118, 125, 134–135, 148 endogeneity problem, 19, 154, 165n11. See also institutions EPC (European Political Cooperation), 9–11 European Commission, 9–11, 76–79 passim, 84, 110–111, 122, 145, 152, 153 European Council, 11–12, 71, 101, 109, 145, 152 European Parliament, 9 Fouchet Plan, 8, 9 IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), 104–110 passim, 118, 125, 134, 147–150 institutions: and classic economic theory, 20; and decision problem(s), 5–6, 14, 20–23, 29, 154; defined, 18; intergovernmental, 5, 13,

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IN DE X

institutions—continued 17–20, 22, 153–155; and normative understanding of, 19l; and preferences, 5, 19–22 passim, 153; and regulative understanding of, 18–19; as shared mental models, 20–23; and sins of omission, 19; supranational, 5, 13, 18; viability of, 4–7, 13–33 passim ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), 86, 99, 100

Patten, Chris, 76, 134, 144, 153, 155 Petersberg Tasks, 11 Pompidou, Georges, 9 PPEWU (Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit), 11 preferences: importance of problematizing, 5, 19, 20, 22, 153–154. See also agential/ cognitive/reductionist theorizing Prodi, Ronamo, 76–79 passim, 84, 100, 110–111, 122, 152

Keohane, Robert, 18 KFOR (Kosovo Force), 60 Kissinger, Henry, 3, 155 KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army), 41–42, 45, 49, 52, 56, 63 Kohl, Helmut, 8, 10, 61

Rambouillet conference, 45, 51–53, 57, 59, 63–64. See also contact group rationality: bounded, 21; substantive, 20–21

Maastricht treaty, 11, 32, 141 Martin, Lisa, 18 mental model(s): compatibility of, 6, 29–31; conf lictual, 28–29; constitutive elements of, 20–29; cooperative, 28; defined, 6, 20–23; as definition of the situation, 6, 22; and difference in degree, 29–31, 142, 143; and difference in type, 29, 142–143; formation of, 23–25 Mitterrand, Francois, 10, 163n54 Monnet, Jean, 3 Morgenthau, Hans, 3, 157 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 77, 81, 94–100 passim, 109–111, 126, 128, 144 North, Douglass, 17, 20–22, 32, 154 OAF (Operation Allied Force), 42, 52–53, 57–58, 65, 68–69 Operation Enduring Freedom, 95, 131 Operation Iraqi Freedom, 128 operational code, 22

SEA (Single European Act), 9–11 Simon, Herbert, 21. See also rationality Solana, Javier, 11, 56, 76, 78, 92, 100, 108, 146, 148 Sprout, Harold and Margaret, 6 St. Malo summit, 12 structural/systemic theorizing: shortcomings of, 6, 19, 153–159 passim UNMOVIC (UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission), 106, 136 UNSCOM (UN Special Commission on Iraq), 105–106, 134 UN Security Council: and Resolution 686, 104; and Resolution 678, 104; and Resolution 687, 104; and Resolution 1154, 105; and Resolution 1160, 44, 49; and Resolution 1199, 44–45, 49–50, 56; and Resolution 1284, 106; and Resolution 1368, 77, 81, 93–94; and Resolution 1373, 77,

IN DE X

94; and Resolution 1441, 110–111, 115–117, 119, 123–124, 126, 132–136 VICS (Verbs in Context System), 25–26

219

Waltz, Kenneth, 156–158 Weber, Max, 5 WEU (Western European Union), 8, 10–11, 44, 141, 157 Wolfers, Arnold, 5